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+Abortion Misinformation on TikTok: Rampant Content, Lax
+Moderation, and Vivid User Experiences
+FILIPO SHAREVSKI, DePaul University, United States
+JENNIFER VANDER LOOP, DePaul University, United States
+PETER JACHIM, DePaul University, United States
+AMY DEVINE, DePaul University, United States
+EMMA PIERONI, DePaul University, United States
+The scientific effort devoted to health misinformation mostly focuses on the implications of misleading
+vaccines and communicable disease claims with respect to public health. However, the proliferation of abortion
+misinformation following the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade banning legal abortion in the
+US highlighted a gap in scientific attention to individual health-related misinformation. To address this gap,
+we conducted a study with 60 TikTok users to uncover their experiences with abortion misinformation and
+the way they conceptualize, assess, and respond to misleading video content on this platform. Our findings
+indicate that users mostly encounter short-term videos suggesting herbal “at-home” remedies for pregnancy
+termination. While many of the participants were cautious about scientifically debunked “abortion alternatives,”
+roughly 30% of the entire sample believed in their safety and efficacy. Even an explicit debunking label attached
+to a misleading abortion video about the harms of “at-home” did not help a third of the participants to dismiss
+a video about self-administering abortion as misinformation. We discuss the implications of our findings for
+future participation on TikTok and other polarizing topics debated on social media.
+CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and privacy; Usability in security
+and privacy; • Human-centered computing → Empirical studies in ubiquitous and mobile comput-
+ing.
+Additional Key Words and Phrases: TikTok, misinformation, abortion, fact-check, debunking, social media
+1
+INTRODUCTION
+Misinformation, thriving around polarizing topics [126], draws a particular attention in online
+discourses centered around health issues [113]. Alternative health narratives are not a new phe-
+nomenon [98], but social media’s affordances for anonymity, free content creation, and the lack of
+editorial checks allow for rapid dissemination among users that, in turn, join pro/against camps
+about “infant vaccination” [97], “COVID-19 mass immunization” [118], and “cancer treatments”
+[46] in droves. Health misinformation is not just a harmful pretext for a polarizing social media
+discourse, but is a real threat for both individual and public well-being [107].
+In the past, the health misinformation was incited mainly by misleading health research [29],
+deceptive interpretations of symptoms [36], and contested public health governance decisions
+[43]. In these cases, misinformation appended a fear of either undesirable or unknown health
+consequences, prompting people to question long-standing health scientific methods. The response
+to such misinformation, thus, was complicated by the tendency of people to hold beliefs that align
+with a persuasive message working on their biases and self-preservation [32]. In these circumstances,
+the effort was driven towards prebunking health myths [58], “accuracy nudges” to debunk the
+misleading health claims [78], and flagging dangerous health misinformation content on social
+media [94]. Some of these interventions did take some of the sting out of the misinformation [106],
+but are far from providing a comprehensive health misinformation containment [20].
+While the scientific community continues to work towards minimizing the adverse effects of
+“fear-mongering” health misinformation [115], a new type of dangerous health misinformation
+– appending the lack of desirable and known health practices – was abruptly amplified in the
+immediate aftermath of the US Supreme Court decision to strike down the constitutional right
+1
+arXiv:2301.05128v1  [cs.SI]  12 Jan 2023
+
+Authors
+for abortion [112]. The inability to obtain a legal abortion turned people to search engines and
+social media to learn how to manage their reproductive decisions and perform safe abortions [99].
+Unfortunately, not all information aligned with the National Library of Medicine’s description of
+abortion and recommendations for safe practices [2].
+Many questionable practices including pills, oils, and herbs for inducing abortion flooded social
+media, both as claims and as an advertisements in users’ feeds [99]. Platforms used diverse strategies
+to mitigate this misinformation: YouTube added “context labels” to such abortion content [122],
+Twitter decided to promote authoritative abortion information in its Twitter Moments and Events
+[52], and Meta purportedly blocked questionable abortion treatment advertisements [66]. TikTok
+also stated it removed and labeled videos with abortion misinformation [51], but many of the
+questionable home practices aimed to “cause a miscarriage” still appeared in users��� personal
+streams [18]. Debunking of abortion misinformation on TikTok followed up [103], but the slow-in-
+nature checking and verifying of health-related facts was no match for the rapid spread of videos
+recommending dangerous abortion remedies.
+Since misinformation in general is “sticky”, i.e. repeated exposure to false statements make them
+appear truthful [57], the lack of systematic response against abortion misinformation at this stage
+created a situation where “sticky” unproven abortion remedies could lead people to attempt unsafe
+procedures and cause serious bodily harm. While all social media platforms require scrutiny of their
+abortion misinformation handling, TikTok – deemed the “New Google” for Gen-Z [41] – draws
+special attention in this conundrum as pressing reproductive decisions are particularly interesting
+to the majority of users on this platform. TikTok’s status as a platform for social support exchange
+[4] further exacerbates the immediate danger of abortion alternatives as supportive communication
+adds to “stickiness” and internalization of such content among adolescents and young adults [30].
+Motivated to explore how TikTok users deal with misinformation and alternative abortion
+narratives, we conducted a study with 60 TikTok users in the United States. First, we obtained
+a large TikTok dataset to uncover the main themes of abortion misinformation on this platform
+and get a better sense of how TikTok recommends and moderates such content. Leveraging the
+unofficial TikTok-API python [108] library, we scraped 8,226 videos with 77,880 hashtags, of which
+17,606 were unique in tagging these videos. We collected the videos using a snowball sampling
+strategy, starting with scraping three initial hashtags, specifically #TikTokTaughtMe, #healthcare,
+and #abortion. We selected the first one as it’s the de facto hashrtag through which a user is
+“googling” short-form TikTok videos for challenges and advice for self-help [18] and the other two
+as we were focused on health/abortion misinformation in particular.
+To report the findings from our study, we review the related work on misinformation and
+misleading health information on social media in Section 2. Section 3 provides the broader context
+of abortion misinformation narratives on social media following the ban on abortion in the United
+States. Section 4 provides the methodological details of our study and Sections 5, 6, and 7 elaborates
+how participants in our study conceptualize, encounter, and respond to abortion misinformation,
+respectively. We draw on our findings in Section 8 to discuss the implications for both individual
+and public health as well as social media content moderation of alternative abortion narratives.
+Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
+2
+HEALTH MISINFORMATION BACKGROUND
+2.1
+Health Misinformation Narratives
+Health-related rumors and alternative narratives precede the Internet era and were concentrated
+around health issues with either unknown or undesirable consequences. In the 1980s, for example,
+the KGB initiated an information warfare campaign called “Operation Infektion” to spread the
+2
+
+Abortion Misinformation on TikTok
+rumour that HIV/AIDS was a mis-fired American biological weapon in order to undermine the
+United States’ credibility during the Cold War [16]. In the same time, the tobacco industry in the
+United States created a “disinformation playbook” to systematically distort and downplay the link
+between the consumption of tobacco and cancer [86]. While the intent to mislead was clearly
+present in these campaigns, the volume and output of the rumors and alternative health narratives
+was limited to a number of outlets and fabricated publications.
+The Internet and social media changed the landscape by enabling an inordinately high volume
+and rapid output of health information with varying quality to reach the public [130]. The health-
+related rumors and alternative narratives collaterally grew and were amplified to a point where
+they yielded uncontrollable consequences even for known and treatable health issues. For example,
+a poorly designed study in the 1990s that falsely claimed that the measles, mumps, rubella (MMR)
+vaccine causes autism [72] caused such a regression in public immunization that resulted in several
+measles outbreaks twenty years later on [44]. Rumours about the Ebola and Zika viruses also
+overshadowed the evidence-based health information and resulted in higher vaccine hesitancy in
+fear of undesirable health consequences and death [75, 119]. The vaccine hesitancy, on a global
+level, achieved a climax during the COVID-19 pandemic with an unprecedented volume and output
+of COVID-19 related misinformation [82].
+While the majority of misleading health information on social media focuses on vaccines and
+communicable diseases, rumors and alternative narratives also spread about cancer, heart disease,
+and other conditions [117]. For example, social media users are more likely to trust and share
+cancer-related rumours if the rumours are dreadful rather than wishful, and if one has had previous
+personal experience [26]. The uncontrollable consequences in these cases are not overall treatment
+hesitancy but seeking of alternative and unproven treatments about diabetes [55], heart failure [25],
+hypertension [54] and psoriasis [83]. Interestingly, in all of these cases of non-communicable health
+issues, the unsubstantiated claims were promulgated through videos as a particularly influential
+mode for conveying misleading health evidence (e.g. also used in anorexia and dietary disorders’
+deceiving messages) [13].
+2.2
+Response to Health Misinformation
+In the context of misleading health claims, misinformation is considered by its opposition to the
+consensus of what the medical community defines as accurate and evidence-based information
+[107]. Scholars, in response, have focused the attention of anti-health-misinformation on two main
+fronts: 1) examining the harms of the misinformation [62, 102]; and 2) misinformation prebunking
+and debunking [53, 57, 80]; The harms of health misinformation are reflected in dramatic increase
+in vaccine hesitancy [62], pursuing dangerous home therapies (e.g. cancer cleansing, weight loss,
+virus prevention) [102], as well as increased hostility toward health workers [68].
+The goal of “prebunking” or forewarning is improving people’s ability to spot and resist ma-
+nipulation techniques commonly used in health misinformation [57]. To this objective, people
+nowadays are “innoculated” against health misinformation by the use of “accuracy nudges” [78],
+social correction that occurs via peers [116], or play browser-based games about health myths and
+facts [6]. The “prebunking” was shown to be an effective strategy [58], though in time of social
+media virality the inoculation effect wanes for users with a conspiracy mentality about unknown
+and undesirable health consequences (e.g. the COVID-19 pandemic) [11].
+If this “innoculation” is rendered ineffective, “debunking” is the next step where verifiable
+corrections of the falsehoods from credible sources are presented in order to break the illusion
+of truth [32, 81]. Debunking, as in fact-checking of health misinformation, was shown to give
+mixed results depending on the perceived credibility and expertise of the sources in science-related
+contexts [128]. The perception of credibility and expertise, for example, matters little to people with
+3
+
+Authors
+strong conspiratorial ideation tendencies who tend to mistrust any official source [56]. As pressing
+health problems of general public interest are hard not be seen also in a political context, debunking
+of health misinformation was found to work either when it comes from sources that are perceived
+to share people’s values and worldviews [70], or when people maintain a science-accepting attitude
+regardless of their political worldviews [3]
+2.3
+Moderation of Health Misinformation
+In as much as the prebunking and debunking helps in curbing the health misinformation work
+online, they are nonetheless slow and difficult to scale to the pace, volume, and output of infor-
+mation sharing on social media [40]. Platforms, in response, had to turn to automated means
+of moderating unsubstantiated content and questionable accounts to prevent an “outbreak” of
+misleading information, especially after the meteoric influx of COVID-19 rumors, conspiracies,
+and falsehoods [130]. YouTube opted for a soft moderation and decided to apply context labels to
+video searches for health information that link to credible sources recommended by the National
+Academy of Medicine [38]. Twitter, up to early December 2022, also applied soft moderation in
+two forms: (i) interstitial covers, which obscure the misleading content and require users to click
+through to see the information; and (ii) trustworthiness tags, which appear under the content and
+do not interrupt the user or compel action [49, 94]. Meta, the parent company of Facebook and
+Instagram, did the same in conjunction with hard moderation, taking down prominent accounts
+that spread COVID-19 misinformation (e.g. Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s account was blocked after he
+repeatedly undercut trust in the COVID-19 vaccines) [24]. TikTok followed suit and expanded their
+soft moderation labeling with trustworthiness tags to content pertaining to eating disorders, health
+challenges, and alternative medical treatment videos next to misleading COVID-19 videos [111].
+The response to platform moderation has been, at best, mixed. The interstitial covers provided
+an adequate “accuracy nudge” for users to distance from COVID-19 misinformation posts, but users
+largely ignored trustworthiness tags [91, 95]. Further, numerous studies reveal that trustworthiness
+tags “backfire” (i.e. make users believe health misinformation more, not less [28, 31, 71, 110]). In the
+context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the tags triggered a “belief echo,” manifested as skepticism of
+adequate mass COVID-19 immunization [94]. A possible reason for such an unexpected reception
+of the trustworthiness tags was the asymmetrical nature of soft moderation—the mere exposure
+to health misinformation often generates a strong and automatic effective response while the tag
+itself may not generate a response of an equal and opposite magnitude [35]. This is because the
+trustworthiness tags often lack meaning, have ambiguous wording, or ask users to find health
+information themselves (e.g. learn more about COVID-19), which is cognitively demanding and
+time consuming [31].
+2.4
+Health Misinformation on TikTok
+TikTok, a social media platform for short-form videos, has rapidly grown in popularity in the last
+few years [45]. A central feature of TikTok is the ‘For You’ page, a feed of algorithmically curated
+videos for the user based on the user’s past browsing, viewing, and interactions with videos [50].
+Users can also search for videos based on hashtags and, in some cases, sounds. Roughly 75% of
+the global users on the platform are age 34 or younger, and every fifth person in the United States
+visits the platform on a daily basis [45].
+TikTok’s affordances for viral spread of curated short-form videos and demographic structure
+[60] made the platform particularly interesting for healthcare workers and science communicators
+creating educational content both based on their speciality and more general advice [101, 127]. A
+review of 331 videos with authoritative COVID-19 information [59] showed that anti-stigma/anti-
+rumor, disease knowledge, encouragement, personal precautions, recognition, and societal crisis
+4
+
+Abortion Misinformation on TikTok
+management drive platform engagement. Another review of 199 videos with information about
+chronic obstructive pulmonary disease showed that most of them have a satisfactory scientific
+background [100]. An analysis of obstetrician-gynaecologists (OBGYNs) videos and the associated
+hashtags and commentary [101] revealed that the health “educators” not just convey authoritative
+sex health information [104], but use it to creatively debunk the related misinformation and mislead-
+ing treatments. This practice of authoritative health communication as a form of misinformation
+diffraction also motivated proposals for teaching abortion using TikTok [30].
+Other work on misleading health content on TikTok is scarce and overwhelmingly focuses on
+COVID-19 health misinformation [64, 127]. Basch et al [5] analyzed a sample of 72 videos containing
+the hashtag #covidvaccine and found that slightly more than half of them discouraged getting the
+vaccine by showing purportedly adverse vaccine reactions. Baumel et al. [7] analyzed the 100 “most
+liked” videos under each of the #Pfizer and #Moderna hashtags and found that 44.2% and 28.8%
+of the comments conveyed misleading negative sentiment against these two COVID-19 vaccines,
+respectively. Baumel et al. [8] also analyzed TikTok commentary related to masks’ effectiveness in
+combating COVID-19 and found that 45.3% of commentary using the #MasksDontWork hashtag
+contained misinformation. Analyzing a sample of 1000 videos, Shang et al. [93] found that around
+22.6% of the videos contained misleading COVID-19 content, but were shared as much as one with
+verified COVID-19 information.
+Outside of the COVID-19 theme, O’Sullivan et al. [73] analyzed 27 TikTok videos containing
+pediatric urology claims and found that only 22.2% contained information that can also be found in
+official guidelines provided by the European Association of Urology (EAU). Xu et al. [121] reviewed
+65 TikTok videos with the hashtag #prostatecancer and found that at least 48% of them contained
+explicit prostate cancer misinformation. Zheng et al. [129] study found that the top 100 videos with
+the #acne hashtag had seriously misleading information about diagnosis and treatments.
+The only study so far analyzing the way misinformation is moderated with warning labels on
+TikTok focused on COVID-19 content [60]. Ling et al. [60] collected 41,000 videos that include 26
+COVID-19-related hashtags in their description. Through a qualitative analysis, they found out that
+TikTok likely moderates videos based on hashtags included in the description without an in-depth
+analysis of the content. Ling et al. learned that this moderation strategy led to a large false positive
+rate – about a quarter of the videos with a misinformation warning label did not contain content
+related to COVID-19. The study also found a 7.7% false negative rate where videos with actual
+COVID-19 misinformation did not include warning labels.
+3
+ABORTION MISINFORMATION CONTEXT
+Prior studies have shown that 70.1% of women obtain information regarding abortion from the
+Internet [61]. Abortion misinformation online, thus, takes many forms and users generally have
+difficulties discerning inaccuracies in the related alternative narratives [74]. Bessett et al. [12]
+presented 586 participants with five vignettes of abortion misinformation – safety, breast cancer,
+infertility, mental health risk, and legality of abortion – and found that only 4% of participants
+were able to correctly identify all of vignettes as misinformation while 73% pointed to two or fewer
+vignettes as inaccurate.
+Common abortion misinformation topics that have been studied are the increased risk of breast
+cancer, future infertility, depression/anxiety, and post-traumatic stress [74]. This misinformation is
+spread through multiple sources, including state-mandated “Women’s Right to Know” documentation
+that providers must supply before a woman can consent to having an abortion [9], despite official
+guidance from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine [69]. The Guttmacher
+Institute found that two states inaccurately include a link between abortion and an increased risk
+of breast cancer, 19 states link abortion to future infertility, and eight states link abortion to
+5
+
+Authors
+negative emotional and psychological responses [42]. Kern and Reader [52] reported that abortion
+misinformation specifically related to an “abortion reversal pill” increased on Facebook from 20
+interactions on June 23 to 3,500 interactions on June 24 2022, the day after the Supreme Court
+decision to overturn Roe v. Wade. Godoy [37] also reported that following the Supreme Court ruling,
+Spanish-language abortion misinformation was deliberately designed to galvanize voters in Latino
+communities across the US.
+Abortifacient herbs – purportedly providing the ability to induce a spontaneous miscarriage –
+form the majority of post-Roe v Wade misinformation [17]. The toxicity of abortifacient herbs has
+been widely studied as shown in Table 1 but there is little literature and few studies related to the
+topic of “herbal abortions” [48]. Most existing studies were done in countries where abortion was
+not legal until recently. Abortion did not become legal in Uruguay until 2012 [63], for example, and
+a 2003 study found that the Montevideo Poison Centre had 86 cases of ingestion of herbal infusions
+with abortive intent from 1986 to 1999 [27]. In the United States, misinformation surrounding
+“herbal abortions” in viral videos on TikTok has increased dramatically after legal abortion was
+overturned [114]. The consequences of these viral misinformation videos already brought several
+people to the emergency rooms seeking critical lifesaving treatment, making active prebunking
+and debunking by qualified health professionals imperative [88].
+Table 1. Herbal Abortifacients and Side Effects
+Common Name
+Side Effects
+Black Cohosh
+Hepatoxicity [34]
+Blue Cohosh
+Nicotinic toxicity: tachycardia, hypertension, headaches,
+abdominal pain, vomiting, muscle weakness and fascicula-
+tions, seizures, and coma [84]
+Eastern Daisy Fleabane
+Insufficient evidence on the safety and effectiveness as an
+abortifacient agent [109]
+Mugwort
+Vomiting, hypertension, confusion, respiratory distress,
+coma, and seizures [22]
+Parsley
+Abdominal pain, vomiting, genital hemorrhage, anemia,
+jaudice [27], internal bleeding, convulsions, and death [21]
+Pennyroyal
+Gastrointestinal
+upset,
+fainting,
+intestinal
+bleeding,
+seizures, hepatomegaly or injury, multiple organ failure,
+coma, cardiac arrest, and death [41, 105]
+Rue
+Vomiting, liver damage, anemia, tremors, respiratory dis-
+tress, multiple organ failure, and death [47]
+4
+MISINFORMATION AND ALTERNATIVE ABORTION NARRATIVES ON TIKTOK
+4.1
+Research Questions
+The volume and output of abortion misinformation naturally prompted health experts, by them-
+selves, to dispel the inaccuracies related to herbal abortions, abortion pills, and abortion side-effects
+directly on social media [92]. This effort is by all means needed, but is likely not to be sufficient to
+prevent an “outbreak” of unsafe decisions about people’s reproductive health in the long run. An
+intuitive response, then, would be a systematic prebunking and debunking of abortion misinforma-
+tion in coordination with moderation of related content on social media. Based on past experiences
+6
+
+Abortion Misinformation on TikTok
+with health misinformation, however, such a response leaves little room for nuanced explorations
+of how people engage on their own with abortion misinformation in the first place [101].
+As TikTok has been identified as a “hotbed of abortion misinformation” [39], such an exploration
+would be beneficial to the ongoing response of removing and moderating misleading content
+on TikTok [51] as it will provide knowledge on how users conceptualize, encounter, assess, and
+respond to abortion falsehoods. So far, such knowledge is scarce and only provides glimpses on
+how users conceptualize misinformation encountered on the traditional social media platforms
+[96]. To address this knowledge gap, we set to conduct a study that aimed to answer the following
+research questions:
+(1) RQ1: Concept: How do social media conceptualize misinformation on TikTok (definition,
+origins, targets, and purpose)?
+(2) RQ2: Encounters: What encounters with abortion misinformation users had so far on TikTok
+and how they dealt with it?
+(3) RQ3: Response: What strategies users employ in assessing and responding to various abortion
+misinformation content on TikTok?
+4.2
+Dataset
+Preliminary, we set to collect a dataset of abortion misinformation on TikTok in the immediate
+period after the overturn of Roe vs Wade, up till the end of November 2022, as shown in Table
+2. We leveraged the unofficial TikTok-API python library [108] to scrape 8,226 videos, which
+we collected using a snowball sampling strategy, starting with scraping three initial hashtags,
+specifically #TikTokTaughtMe, #Healthcare, and #Abortion. Due to the limitations of the API, each
+search returned no more than 300 videos. To continue collecting hashtags, we searched for each
+of the hashtags that were associated with each of the three seeding hashtags above, effectively
+performing a snowballing sampling of the TikTok’s base with abortion-related short-form videos.
+Table 2. TikTok Abortion Hashtag Dataset
+Attribute
+Value
+Total Number of Posts
+8,226
+Number of Hashtags
+77,880
+Unique Hashtags
+17,606
+From here, we vectorized the hashtags using Scikit-Learn’s CountVectorizer [76] to create a
+dense boolean array of 1,754 tokens – character unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams – that appeared
+in 0.01 - 99% of hashtag samples. We then identified the closest hashtags to a given input hashtags
+using Minkowski distance, or ||𝑥||𝑝 where 𝑥 is the difference between an searched vector and
+the saved vectors from our hashtag dataset, and 𝑝 is a scalar that we selected. To identify 𝑝, we
+reviewed kernel density estimate plots of the distances to several searched hashtags and identified
+the most expected bimodal distribution, with a smaller left distribution of relevant hashtags, and a
+larger right distribution of less relevant hashtags. We settled on an ideal 𝑝 of 2, which is ||𝑥||2, or
+euclidean distance.
+Using these hashtag representations, we were easily able to identify perturbations in hashtags
+that might otherwise be moderated by TikTok [51]. For example, searching the representations for
+hashtags like #selfharm highlighted the existence of #sêlfhârm, and #abortion revealed #abotion
+and #anortion, as well as longer hashtags like #abortionishealthcare and #abortionishealthçare. A
+7
+
+Authors
+search with regular terms and hashtags like “#abortifacient” indeed does not present any videos
+tagged as such, but following our dataset analysis above, we discovered that a small change in the
+spelling – #ab0rtifacient, for example – unveils a lot of abortion videos that promote abortifacient
+solutions for miscarriage.
+Many of these videos were not necessarily were tagged with the exact search hashtag and
+may even be tagged with the original “#abortifacient.” One could argue that an ordinary users
+might not know what hashtags exist, but from the video posting functionality, a list of suggested
+hashtag completions provide additional variations, and the number of videos with each variation.
+As such, even an incomplete, suggestive hashtag search on TikTok brings seemingly obscured
+tags for abortion misinformation, as exemplified in Figure 1 Using these built in features, we
+quickly identified dozens of videos that described methods for “at-home” abortions as candidates
+for misleading claims we wanted to test in our study.
+Fig. 1. The images above demonstrate how, while a search for “#abortion #herbs” does not return any videos
+due to the TikTok’s guidelines for harmful content [51], a search for “#abotion #herbs” not only returns videos
+with similar typos, it also returns videos with the original “#abortion #herbs” spelled correctly. Additionally,
+when posting a video, TikTok suggests additional hashtags, any of which can be searched to find additional
+hashtags, like #ab0rtionishelathcare.
+4.3
+Sample
+The analysis of the information in our dataset, given in section 7, helped us identify the main themes
+of abortion misinformation content on TikTok in the aftermath of Roe vs Wade decision. As we were
+interested in better understanding how actual users deal with this content, we obtained approval
+from our Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct an exploratory survey (the questionnaire is
+provided in the Appendix) with a sample of TikTok users ages 18 and above in the United States.
+We used Prolific for recruitment and after we consolidated the responses we obtained through
+Qualtrics, we ended with a sample of total of 60 participants. The responses were anonymous,
+and the survey allowed users to skip any question they were uncomfortable answering, taking
+8
+
+11:30
+@45Gl92%
+Q #abortion #herbs
+X
+Top
+Users
+Videos
+Sounds
+LIVE
+Hashtags
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+Thisphrase maybeassociatedwithbehaviororcontent
+that violates our guidelines. Promoting a safe and
+positive experience is TikTok's top priority.For more
+information,we invite youto review our Community
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+X
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+Detailed Information
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+Contained within
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+What method I've
+used to interrupt
+pregnancy at home
+naturally
+Perspective from a
+Herbalist
+6/28
+8/26
+.#abortion#herbs
+.herbsOnHANDsothat
+#herbalmedicine
+you can even start taking t...
+medical.mamacita
+?569
+boobygrow
+?157
+SHOT
+Abortifacient Herbs
+proud of Texas!
+etthat
+babies will ie..Sad...
+DON'T use these
+dangerous herbs
+O
+<11:35
+Q45GEl 88%
+Post
+#abOrt
+Select cover
+#Hashtags
+@Mention
+OVideos
+#abOrt
+467.5Kviews
+#abOrtionsaveslives
+4.3Mviews
+#abOrto
+3.8M views
+#abOrto
+1.8M views
+#abOrtire
+Oviews
+#abOrtionishelathcare
+206.6Kviews
+#abOrted
+93.7K views
+#abOrtOlegal
+34.4Kviews
+#abOrtionjustice
+67.6Kviews
+#abOrtionrights
+47.2K views
+I=
+VAbortion Misinformation on TikTok
+around 25 minutes to complete it. Participants were offered a compensation rate of $5 each. The
+demographic structure of our sample is given in Table 3.
+Table 3. Sample Demographic Distribution
+Gender
+Female
+44 (73.33%)
+Male
+15 (25%)
+Non-cisgender
+1 (1.67%)
+Age
+[18-20]
+5 (8.33%)
+[21-30]
+33 (55%)
+[31-40]
+12 (20%)
+[41-50]
+6 (10%)
+[51-60]
+4 (6.67%)
+[61+]
+0 (0%)
+Political leanings
+Left
+38 (63.33%)
+Moderate
+14 (23.33%)
+Right
+5 (8.33%)
+Apolitical
+3 (5%)
+Highest Level of Education Completed
+High school
+12 (20%)
+College
+43 (71.67%)
+Graduate
+5 (8.33%)
+4.4
+Method and Analysis
+Participants were provided an open ended qualitative survey through Prolific that provided a list of
+questions and a predetermined set of TikTok videos we selected from our dataset. We singled out
+seven videos in total from our dataset that contained abortion misinformation already debunked
+by the time of our study [103]. We used the input on general abortion misinformation from Table 1,
+information from authoritative verifiable sources [69], and verbatim misinformation terms from
+two fact-checking articles [23, 109] as a selection criteria for videos promoting the use of herbal
+abortifacients. We also chose to focus only on “at-home abortion remedies” as explicit health
+misinformation [101] and not alternative abortion narratives involving “religion” or “political
+contextualizaiton” to avoid bias and expressive responding [10].
+We wanted to have as many varying modalities, formats, and creators in our selection as possible,
+therefore we selected two videos that contained only text and five videos featuring the creator
+of the content. Six of the selected videos were created by women and one was created by an
+individual who identifies as transgender in their profiles. The creators of the videos were ethnically
+diverse, consisting of individuals who identify in their profile or other videos as White, Black,
+North American Indigenous, and Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. We must note that TikTok, in
+response to the increased scrutiny about their lax handling of health misinformation [51], claims
+to regularly remove misleading abortion content so there is a possibility that our dataset was
+considerably restricted for our particular selection.
+Participants were asked to describe their experience with encountering misinformation on
+TikTok. Next, we asked participants to provide their opinions on where misinformation comes
+from, what purpose misinformation serves on social media, and who creates and benefits from it.
+Participants were then asked to further elaborate how they determine a certain social media post is
+misinformation, and what tactics they employ when dealing with misinformation.
+In reporting the results, we utilized as much as possible verbatim quotation of participants’
+answers, emphasized in “italics” and with a reference to the participant as either PXYZ# or
+[PXYZ#], where P denotes participant, X denotes the number of the participant in the sample
+(ordered by the time of participation), Y denotes their gender identity (F - female, M - male, NC -
+9
+
+Authors
+non-cisgender), Z denotes their political identity (L - left-leaning, M - moderate, R - right-leaning;
+A - apolitical), and # denotes the upper bound of their age bracket. For example, P16FL30 refers
+to participant 16, female, left-leaning, age bracket [21-30].
+5
+MISINFORMATION CONCEPTUALIZATION ON TIKTOK
+5.1
+Definition
+First, we asked our participants to define misinformation in their own words. Exactly half the
+sample provided a definition that did not include any intention in the production or dissemination
+of questionable content, along the lines of the misinformation definitions outlined in [120]. All of
+these participants conceptualized falsehoods through the inherently fallacious information mental
+model of misinformation on social media described in [96]. For example, P31FL30 defined it
+as “untrue/unsubstantiated statements being presented as fact,” P13FR30 as “incorrect, skewed, or
+communicated incorrectly,” and P27MM20 as simply “false information.” In this half of the sample,
+18 (60%) of the participants identified as left-leaning, 3 (10%) as right-leaning, 8 (26.67%) as moderate,
+and one (3.33%) as apolitical.
+The other half of our sample expressed intentionality as an additional quality of misinformation,
+de facto referring to disinformation instead [126]. Using the folk models of misinformation on
+social media [96], more than half, 20 (66.67%), of the participants conceptualized misinformation
+as out-of-context narratives, for example, P36FL40 stated that misinformation is “is intentionally,
+either by using wrong information or leaving out context, misleading to the people reading it.” The
+next most popular folk model 6 (20%) was external propaganda and the participants pointed to
+“intentional spread of misleading information to stir an emotion or to further promote a system, product,
+or person” [P5FL30]. The remaining 4 (13.33%) participants conceptualized misinformation as
+political (counter)argumentation pointing to cases where “a journalist or news source provides false
+information to persuade you in one political direction” [P47MR30]. Here, the older participants were,
+the more they saw an intention in the spread of misinformation. For example, P50FL60 placed the
+intentionality where “videos get edited and changed, and convincing memes with cherry picked facts
+are created as part of misinformation that has been used extensively in politics and the pandemic.”
+5.2
+Origins
+Three quarters or 45 of the participants in our sample felt that misinformation on TikTok came
+directly from a creator of the TikTok video. In the view of P20FL40, misinformation on TikTok
+is brought by “people who are trying to gain clout, or get numerous views.” P19FL30 went further
+and reckoned that “misinformation can come from the creators’ own consumption of misinformation,
+or a creators’ misinterpretation of information, or a creators’ attempt to sell something or an idea
+to influence others/gain attention.” The creators of Tiktok content, in the view of P27MM20, “are
+people who doesn’t care about misinformation but more about views and attention”.
+The remaining 25% pointed to the “other” side of a polarized debate or issue i.e. “people on both the
+left and right who want to increase views, as well as institutions and political groups with agendas to
+create misinformation” [P50FL60]. P2FL50, seeing misinformation as out-of-context narrative, felt
+that it “comes from a variety of places such as Republicans, Russia or China” and P12FL60 seconded
+the impression of external interference “directly from a bad-actor or a big-mouth source such as
+Fox News. P50FL60, using the political (counter)argumentation model of misinformation, directly
+accused the GOP for “catering misinformation to low information and low IQ people who will believe
+anything they get told because GOP knows they can’t fool the science/college crowd.”
+10
+
+Abortion Misinformation on TikTok
+5.3
+Targets
+Half of our sample felt that the targets of misinformation are “vulnerable people who do not know
+how to research and form their own opinions” [P7FM30], specifically “Younger people, older people,
+or more easily-influenced crowds, which are the people who are not likely to fact check a claim”
+[P40FL30]. P50FL60 expanded this list to include people “in areas that have low instances of college
+education and high poverty areas; who are lower income and very religious; who are already suffering
+themselves and see anyone who gets ahead as a threat to them; and who have very little access to help
+so they resent people.” The other half felt that “anyone and everyone can be a target of misinformation”
+[P44FL30]. P5FL30 described the targets of misinformation on TikTok to be from “All ages, races,
+sexualities, and backgrounds are targets of misinformation because the algorithm brings it to your ‘For
+You page’.”
+5.4
+Purpose
+20 (33.33%) of our participants explicitly indicated that the purpose of misinformation on TikTok
+is for profit. The profit was assigned either to “politicians and large corporations who either make
+money off what evolves from misinformation campaigns or who benefit politically and financially
+from legislation enacted when bad actors are elected to government offices” [P12FL60] or to content
+creators themselves as “they get paid from the views, and there’s probably some devout followers to
+these people which give them a recurring income from just watching the videos every time they post”
+[P15ML30]. Implicit gains, such as “engagement boosts” [P1MR50] that ultimately lead to profit per
+the TikTok participation model [50], was the purpose that 14 (23.33%) of our participants identified
+behind the spread of misinformation on TikTok. They identified “creators and influencers looking to
+gain followers and views” [P1MR50] and “people who doesn’t [sic] care about misinformation but
+more about views and attention” [P27MM20].
+Misinformation as a political ammunition was the purpose identified by 13 (21.67%) of our
+participants. P31FL30 indicated that the purpose of misinformation is “political influence feeding
+into distrust of science and government” and P59FL30 felt the misinformation on TikTok is brought
+“to divide people further and continue to build up the conservative party.” 5 (8.33%) of participants
+felt that misinformation was to “stir the pot” on TikTok, i.e. “foreign agency targeting the US
+or groups within the US that want superiority” [P41FM40]. Videos created by “trolls make up a
+portion of deliberate misinformation” [P38FL30] to “gets a rise out of someone,” in the view of
+P5FL30. A subgroup of 8 (13.33%) participants, indicated that “no one” [P10MA40] benefits from
+misinformation on TikTok, both in a short-run and “ultimately, in the long-run” [P58FM30].
+6
+ABORTION MISINFORMATION ENCOUNTERS ON TIKTOK
+6.1
+Encounters
+Exactly half of the sample indicated they have seen abortion misinformation on TikTok prior to
+the study. The misleading content mostly consisted of “videos like these claiming at home abortion
+remedies” [P25FL20] but also included “misinformation rooted in religion – churches show videos
+of full term pregnancies being ripped apart by limbs from wombs” [P50FL60]. Participants also
+indicate they were seeing politically contextualized abortion narratives “on both sides of the political
+spectrum” [P7FM30] to either ban or allow “birth control as well as contraceptives provided by the
+government” [P24FR20]. Participants also indicated that they see “people who are Pro Life on TikTok
+that spread all kinds of rumors and lies about abortion all the time” [P5FL30] “mostly to cause fear”
+[P49Fl30].
+11
+
+Authors
+6.2
+Response
+About half of the participants indicated that abortion misinformation invoked negative emotions in
+them. Participants stated that the “videos in all just made me sad” [P6FA30], that they were “very
+disturbed by this abortion misinformation” [P13FR30], and “disappointed that people are making
+content like this” [P15ML30]. Some of them said that their “first response was shock that someone
+would even think this” [P24FR20], that and it is “worrying that this type of misinformation is being
+shared because it can be dangerous” [P39-FL30]. Participants in our sample felt “anger, resentment”
+[P42FL30] and “disgust that people will believe anything they see and try it” [P56FM50]. The other
+half indicated they were mostly “intrigued and wanted to know if anything in these herbal videos
+was true or not” [P41FM40].
+In response to abortion misinformation content on TikTok, our participants said they “did not
+engage because it only further spreads the misinformation” [P8FL20] or “just ignored it” [P52MM40].
+Some participants indicated they took action on the video by doing “research on abortion and
+take what I gather on TikTok with a grain of salt unless it is information spread by an actual health
+professional” [P26FL30]. There were also participants that “blocked the creators that spread the
+misinformation” [P20FL40], “reported these videos for spreading false information” [P49Fl30], or
+“Liked comments pointing out the abortion falsehoods” [P31FL30].
+7
+RESPONSE TO ABORTION MISINFORMATION ON TIKTOK
+7.1
+Post #1
+The first post we presented to participants was labeled by the creator with the hashtags #roevwade,
+#abortion, #herb,s #knowyourherbs, #herbalist, #womensrights, #fightbackwithherbs, #herbalism,
+#homesteadinglife, #michigan, #crazyplantlady, and #farmlife. This post discusses the use of Eastern
+Daisy Fleabane root [109]. The use of fleabane as an abortifacient herbal tea was found misleading as
+it can “have unpredictable effects” and there is no evidence that this root can induce a miscarriage,
+as shown in Table 1. The screenshot of the post as it appeared in the standard TikTok app is shown
+in Figure 2.
+7.1.1
+Assessment. We broke down the results of the participants’ evaluation in two groups based
+on their baseline mental model of misinformation on TikTok we outlined in section 5 above.
+The assessment results of the first TikTok video in our study are given in Table 4. Out of the
+30 participants who thought misinformation is disseminated on TikTok without intent, 14 were
+randomly selected to assess the first post with abortion misinformation. Three of them thought the
+video is indeed misinformation, stating that “this is likely misinformation, as a claim such as this
+likely has very little evidence to substantiate it” [P46MM30]. A surprising 50% of the participants in
+this group though the video was not misinformation, feeling that “it is true because she sound [sic]
+like she knows what she is talking about” [P8FL30]. Four participants in this group were unsure if
+this video was misinformation, worried that “they state some historical context not verified in any
+way” [P42FL30].
+Out of the other 30 participants that saw misinformation being spread with intent on TikTok,
+12 were randomly shown the first post (the random selection was done by the Qualtrics survey
+software we used, leading to slightly unbalanced group). Four of them confirmed the video contains
+falsehoods with quite a verbose justification: “This is misinformation. It is referencing clearing your
+liver which immediately points to something more like a Multi-Level Marketing (MLM) product; She’s
+using the same terminology that essential oil salespeople use; These people can never name what
+toxins, etc you are eliminating because that is not actually happening” [P50FL60]. Three participants
+thought otherwise, believing this post was not misinformation because “the content creator seems
+12
+
+Abortion Misinformation on TikTok
+Fig. 2. TikTok Post #1
+Table 4. Is Post #1 Misinformation?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 14 participants]
+Yes
+3 (21.43%)
+No
+7 (50%)
+Unsure
+4 (28.57%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 12 participants]
+Yes
+4 (33.34%)
+No
+3 (25%)
+Unsure
+5 (41.67%)
+informed” [P10MA40]. Five participants were unsure, because they had “no idea whether the claim
+in the video is based in truth or not” [P32NC50].
+7.1.2
+Response. Participants were also asked to describe what action they would take for each post,
+with their actions given in Table 5. Of the participants that thought misinformation is disseminated
+on TikTok without intent, six (42.86%) said that they would “scroll past without interacting with the
+post” [P42FL30]. Participants in this group were equally likely to “verify said information to see if
+it is accurate” [P20FL40] and “would like the post” [P8FL20]. Only two (14.28%) participants in this
+group said they would “unfollow this person” [P56FM50] or “report this video for dangerous activities”
+[P24FR20]. Of the participants who saw misinformation being spread with intent on TikTok, five
+(41.67%) said they “would just scroll past it” [P10MA40] and five (41.67%) said they would “look
+at the comments and then conduct my own personal research” [P58FM30]. There were also two
+(16.67%) participants that said they “would block it” [P4MM50] or “would report this”[P50FL60]
+and no participants from this group said they would like the post.
+13
+
+Following
+ForYou
+LIVE
+229
+herbs,savealife
+38
+thewheatwitch
+Fight back against the patriarchy by knowing what herbs
+J I sound - thewheatwitch - BethAuthors
+Table 5. What action would you take on Post #1?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 14 participants]
+Ignore
+6 (42.86%)
+Fact-check
+3 (21.43%)
+Block
+1 (7.14%)
+Report
+1 (7.14%)
+Like
+3 (21.43%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 12 participants]
+Ignore
+5 (41.67%)
+Fact-check
+5 (41.67%)
+Block
+1 (8.33%)
+Report
+1 (8.33%)
+Like
+0 (0%)
+7.2
+Post #2
+The second post that we presented to the participants was labeled by the creator with the hashtags
+#roevwade, #women, #health, and #holistic. This post discusses the use of an abortion tea containing
+multiple herbs, including rue, which has dangerous side effects noted in Table 1 and health advisories
+warn that it “can lead to death for both the mother and baby” [67]. The screenshot of the post as it
+appeared in the standard TikTok app is shown in Figure 3.
+Fig. 3. TikTok Post #2
+7.2.1
+Assessment. The participants that thought that misinformation is disseminated on TikTok
+without intent were almost evenly split regarding this post, as shown in Table 6. Six (46.15%) said
+they “don’t believe this is misinformation” [P33FL30] and five (38.46%) said they “do think this
+post is misinformation” [P13FR30]. The remaining two (15.38%) participants said they “cannot
+confirm if this post is misinformation” [P17FR30]. Participants that saw falsehoods as disinformation
+on TikTok did not see this post as inaccurate as only two (15.38%) of them thought the post is
+“misinformation because it is suggesting that an herb blend is a safe and effective way to self administer
+14
+
+LIVE
+FollowingFor You
+Herbs:
+1tspRue
+Crush/Grind:
+1tspTansy
+1tspFenugreekSeeds
+1/2tspWormwood
+1tspAniseSeeds
+9290
+1tspComfreyleaf
+1tspAshwagandaroot
+1tspSage
+1tspDillSeed
+1tspRosemary
+346
+1/2CinnamonStick
+2tsp Lemongrass
+2tspNettleLeaf
+TikTo
+@loudm
+enia
+295
+cleerly_clara
+Period Tips
+#roevwade #women#health#holistic
+J1 -cleerly_clara-ClaraC
+origirAbortion Misinformation on TikTok
+an abortion” [P36FL40]. Five participants (38.46%) said they “don’t think this is misinformation
+because the post provides full context on the information it was trying to provide” [P40FL30]. Six
+participants, or (46.15%) were unsure because they “don’t have enough knowledge to know if it’s
+misinformation” [P59FL30].
+Table 6. Is Post #2 Misinformation?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 13 participants]
+Yes
+5 (38.46%)
+No
+6 (46.15%)
+Unsure
+2 (15.38%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 13 participants]
+Yes
+2 (15.38%)
+No
+5 (38.46%)
+Unsure
+6 (46.15%)
+7.2.2
+Response. The 13 participants who thought of no intent behind misinformation on TikTok
+indicated they would perform a wide variety of activities for this post as shown in Table 7. Four
+(30.77%) of them said they would “potentially do some research into the other herbs that they are not
+familiar with” [P17FR30], three (23.08%) said they “would move past it“ [P8FL20], two (15.38%)
+said they “would most likely block this account” [P13FR30], and two (15.38%) said they “would
+probably like this post” [P31FL30]. The two participants that said they would block this video
+indicated they felt very strongly about the content as it is “definitely misinformation because there is
+scientific evidence that home remedies for this almost never work” [P25FL20] and “it was extremely
+uncalled for in suggesting abortion tea; If this was in my TikTok feed I would [also] report this video”
+[P24FR20].
+None of the participants that saw misinformation being spread with intent on TikTok said they
+would block or report this post. The most popular responses included that six (46.15%) said they
+would “simply move past the video and not pay no mind to it” [P35FL30] and five (38.46%) said they
+would fact-check the content. P5FL30 included that to determine the post is not misinformation
+they would need to see “a Gynocologist [sic] [to] validate or debunk this information before I could trust
+it. This would include discussing the ingredients, linking relevant papers and studies, and reminding
+people to go see their doctor for personal medical information.” Two (15.38%) of the participants
+indicated responses that they’ve “done research on natural remedies for several health issues and if it
+was on my feed I may comment or like it” [P6FA30].
+Table 7. What action would you take on Post #2?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 13 participants]
+Ignore
+3 (23.08%)
+Fact-check
+4 (30.77%)
+Block
+2 (15.38%)
+Report
+2 (15.38%)
+Like
+2 (15.38%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 13 participants]
+Ignore
+6 (46.15%)
+Fact-check
+5 (38.46%)
+Block
+0 (0%)
+Report
+0 (0%)
+Like
+2 (15.38%)
+15
+
+Authors
+7.3
+Post #3
+The third post that we presented to the participants appears to be a ScienceDirect article indicating
+which herbs are abortifacients, but is actually a Google search result snippet with a caption stating
+“learn your herbs”. This TikTok video was not labeled with any hashtags by the creator. Although
+the full ScienceDirect article purportedly referenced in this video provides warnings about the
+toxicity risks of the herbs [87], the screenprint also has directions on the dosage for pregnancy
+termination centrally positioned in the overall text. The screenshot, shown in Figure 4, includes
+the pennyroyal and mugwort herbs as abortifacients.
+Fig. 4. TikTok Post #3
+7.3.1
+Assessment. Multiple participants in both groups observed that the TikTok post appeared
+to be from ScienceDirect. A few noticed it was a Google search result or that the “source looks
+questionable” [P49Fl30] and reflected that in their responses. In the misinformation group, as
+shown in Table 8, six (40%) of the participants said they “think this post maybe fake because the
+whole information is not given just the negative information that they want you to see” [P11ML40].
+Five (33.33%) leaned towards it not being misinformation and weighing that “this post is presenting
+information from ScienceDirect, which I consider to be a reputable source of science-based and factual
+information” [P44FL30]. Four (26.67%) participants were unsure because “This post may contain
+some degree of accuracy given that the source is somewhat credible, but herbs are often not studied
+enough for these claims to be made with a high degree of accuracy” [P46MM30].
+Most of the participants in the disinformation group were unsure if this post was misinformation.
+10 (62.5%) of them said they “honestly cannot tell if this is misinformation; I see that the website
+credited is science based, but without going to the website, I am really unsure” [P41FM40]. The next
+most common response was that “this tries to present as being medically accurate, but it’s just a
+screenshot of Google search results, so I would not trust it on its face” [P12FL60]. Only P15ML30
+16
+
+d emmenaayowine hearyguinclude (Qt
+arenot limited to)tansy,thuja,
+safflower,scotchbroom,rue,
+angelica,mugwort,wormwood,
+yarrow,and essentialoil of
+pennyroyal.
+MaternalConsiderations:Carboprostis
+ananalogof15-methylprostaglandin
+PGF2a....
+DosageWithQualifiers:Pregnancy
+LINDIGEN
+termination-begin100mcgIMtestd
+then 2...
+DrugClass:Abortifacients;Oxytocics
+Prostaglandins,Stimulants,uterine
+Indications:Pregnancytermination
+uterineatony
+E
+https://www.sciencedirect.com>topics
+Abortifacients-anoverview
+ScienceDirectTopics
+Share
+nikki.kiya1
+learn your herbs
+Aboutfeatured snippets
+Fee
+J No - Kreepa Oh No - KreepaAbortion Misinformation on TikTok
+said he did not “know if it’s misinformation; I’d assume it isn’t because I’m not how someone could lie
+about a google search coming up.”
+Table 8. Is Post #3 Misinformation?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 15 participants]
+Yes
+6 (40%)
+No
+5 (33.33%)
+Unsure
+4 (26.67%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 16 participants]
+Yes
+5 (31.25%)
+No
+1 (6.25%)
+Unsure
+10 (62.5%)
+7.3.2
+Response. The participants in both groups, as indicated in Table 9, were mostly inclined to
+ignore this post, saying they “wouldn’t interact with such a post” [P3ML50] with P29FL60 noting
+that the post “was a standard google search so it may be true but again I would not respond and I
+would swipe on by.” The next most common response of the participants in the misinformation
+group was to “report this creator” [P16FL30]. The remaining two (13.33%) participants in this group
+said they would “likely look at the comments to see what others have said” [P19FL30]. Six (37. 5%) of
+the participants in the disinformation group said they “would probably do research on the specifics if
+it was something I desired to learn more about” [P40FL30]. Only one participant in this group said
+they would block the post “because it does not state the risks of using these” [P34MM30].
+Table 9. What action would you take on Post #3?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 15 participants]
+Ignore
+9 (60%)
+Fact-check
+2 (13.33%)
+Block
+0 (0%)
+Report
+4 (26.67%)
+Like
+0 (0%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 16 participants]
+Ignore
+9 (56.25%)
+Fact-check
+6 (37.5%)
+Block
+1 (6.25%)
+Report
+0 (0%)
+Like
+0 (0%)
+7.4
+Post #4
+The fourth post presented to the participants was labeled by the creator with the hashtags #fyp,
+#prochoice, #roevwade, and #herbodyherchoice. The text overlay in the video also includes penny-
+royal and mugwort under the heading “unfortunately it’s come down to this”. The screenshot of the
+post as it appeared in the standard TikTok app is shown in Figure 5.
+7.4.1
+Assessment. As shown in Table 10, six (37.5%) participants in the misinformation group
+indicated that they “do think that this post is misinformation” [P13FR30], five (31.25%) said it is
+“not misinformation because it didn’t advise a particular viewpoint or way of thinking” [P54FL30],
+and five (31.25%) said “It’s not clear that the post is misinformation because it’s just a list of herbs,
+supplements, and foods” [P49Fl30]. The disinformation group of participants felt more strongly
+that this post was misinformation, with nine (69.23%) indicating “this one is completely lacking
+context or supporting information, so, yes, I would qualify it as misinformation” [P12FL60]. Three
+(23.08%) were “not sure it’s misinformation but it may cause unsafe things to occur if not posted with
+caution” [P35FL30]. Only P39FL30 said she “doesn’t really think it’s misinformation”.
+17
+
+Authors
+Fig. 5. TikTok Post #4
+Table 10. Is Post #4 Misinformation?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 16 participants]
+Yes
+6 (37.5%)
+No
+5 (31.25%)
+Unsure
+5 (31.25%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 13 participants]
+Yes
+9 (69.23%)
+No
+1 (7.69%)
+Unsure
+3 (23.08%)
+7.4.2
+Response. When asked to describe the action they would take on this post, 8 (50%) participants
+in the misinformation group said they “would just ignore the video and move on” [P52MM40], as
+shown in Table 11. Three (18.75%) participants said they “would probably read through the comments
+and either search for similar videos on TikTok or Google it” [P33FL30], another three (18.75%) said
+they would “report this creator because their information is dangerous” [P16FL30], and the remaining
+two (12.5%) said they would “most likely block this user” [P13FR30]. Almost all of the participants
+in the disinformation group would ignore the fourth post. 11 (84.62%) said “would probably scroll
+past this without interacting because even if it is truth it isn’t helpful or informative” [P48FL30].
+The remaining two participants said they “would try to fact check as best as I could” [P6FA30] and
+“report this post” [P12FL60]. No participants in this group said they would block this post and no
+participants in either group said they would like the post.
+18
+
+CIVE
+FollowingForYou
+Q
+unfortunatelytscome
+downto this
+chamomile
+cinnamon
+liver
+mugwort
+femaleginseng
+unripepapayaseed
+12
+vitaminC
+raweggs
+pennyroyal
+sesameseeds
+w/honey
+voidsnail
+Share
+stay safe outthere<3·#fyp#prochoice #roevwade
+#herbodyherchoice
+JNirvana
+Pennyroyal Tea-NirvAbortion Misinformation on TikTok
+Table 11. What action would you take on Post #4?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 16 participants]
+Ignore
+8 (50%)
+Fact-check
+3 (18.75%)
+Block
+2 (12.5%)
+Report
+3 (18.75%)
+Like
+0 (0%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 13 participants]
+Ignore
+11 (84.62%)
+Fact-check
+1 (7.69%)
+Block
+0 (0%)
+Report
+1 (7.69%)
+Like
+0 (0.00%)
+7.5
+Post #5
+The fifth post that we presented was labeled with the hashtags #themoreyouknow, #parsley, #pes-
+saryinsertion, #pessary, #fertilityherbs, #fertilityeducation, #plantsheal, #herbalist, #apothecarycab-
+inet, #hippocraticoath, #ayurvedic, and #hippocratesfatherofmedicine. This creator has a series
+of posts that contain potential “abortion inducers” and emmenagogues (herbs which purpotedly
+stimulate menstruation). The post explains how to insert parsley into the cervix or make it into a
+tea. In 2018, a women in Argentina died from attempting to induce a miscarriage while utilizing
+this method, which “stimulates blood flow in the uterus and can lead to massive internal bleeding
+and convulsions” [21]. The screenshot of the post as it appeared in the standard TikTok app is
+shown in Figure 6.
+Fig. 6. TikTok Post #5
+7.5.1
+Assessment. As shown in Table 12, most participants from both groups felt this post was
+misinformation. Twenty-two participants in total were randomly selected to assess this video.
+The groups were evenly distributed. Six (54.55%) participants in the misinformation group stated
+19
+
+FollowingForYou
+Q
+LIVE
+101
+HERBS
+THINGSEVERYONE WITHA
+UTERUSSHOULDKNOW
+PARSLEY
+MILDEMMENAGOGUE.RELAXES
+CERVXCOMBNESWELLWITH
+VITAMINC.
+PARSLEYPESSARY:2-4SPRIGSOF
+PARSLEYRINSED.REMOVELARGER
+PARTOFSTEMJUSTBELOWFIRSTLEAF
+JOINT.RINSEAGAIN.PLACEINSIDE
+282
+INTERNALLYAGAINSTCERVIX
+CHANGEEVERY12HOURS.*TIE
+STRINGAROUNDSTEMSFOREASIER
+REMOVAL
+TEA:BOILWATERINSMALLPOT.ADD2
+65
+HANDFOLLSOFCHOPPEDPARSLEY
+COVERTIGHTLY.STEEP20-30MIN
+shenvalleyapothecary
+Reply to edits.in.green Parsley is a mild
+emmenagogue but works well in conjunction...
+See more
+J)aniRoccaMusicoriginal sounoAuthors
+they “feel this post is misinformation because it does not relay the effects of placing an unsterile
+object inside your body, which is what the video is promoting/suggesting” [P17FR30] and that “this
+post has no credible citations to support the claims it is making” [P14FL30]. Three (27.27%) of the
+participants who thought misinformation is disseminated on TikTok without intent felt it was not
+misinformation because “It’s always the consumers [sic] responsibility to do their own research and
+make their own choice(s)” [P23FL30]. Two (18.18%) participants in this group said they “have no idea”
+[P21FA40]. Eight (72.73%) participants in the disinformation group thought “it is misinformation
+because the account is not stating what the benefits of parsley even are, nor where they gathered
+this information” [P7FM30]. Three (27.27%) said they “suspect this is misinformation but do not
+know for sure]” [P36FL40]. No participants in the disinformation group thought the post wasn’t
+misinformation.
+Table 12. Is Post #5 Misinformation?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 11 participants]
+Yes
+6 (54.55%)
+No
+3 (27.27%)
+Unsure
+2 (18.18%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 11 participants]
+Yes
+8 (72.73%)
+No
+0 (0%)
+Unsure
+3 (27.27%)
+7.5.2
+Response. The misinformation group participants, as shown in Table 13 primarily said
+they “would ignore this post” [P14FL30]. Two (18.18%) participants said they would “report the
+video as unsafe due to the major consequences that doing what the video says to do could ensue
+on someone’s health” [P17FR30], one (9.09%) said they “would like to learn more and can always
+compare information on google” [P11ML40], and one (9.09%) said they “would most likely block
+this account” [P13FR30]. Participants in the disinformation group were mostly split on the post’s
+inaccuracies, saying they “wouldn’t respond and just keep scrolling” [P26FL30] and they “would look
+up the benefits of parsley to see if the post has an validation” [P6FA30]. Two (18.18%) participants
+said they would “typically report this post“ [P7FM30] and P38FL30 said she would “block this
+account.” No participants in either group said they would like this video.
+Table 13. What action would you take on Post #5?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 11 participants]
+Ignore
+7 (63.74%)
+Fact-check
+1 (9.09%)
+Block
+1 (9.09%)
+Report
+2 (18.18%)
+Like
+0 (0%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 11 participants]
+Ignore
+4 (36.36%)
+Fact-check
+4 (36.36%)
+Block
+1 (9.09%)
+Report
+2 (18.18%)
+Like
+0 (0%)
+7.6
+Post #6
+The sixth post that we presented participants was labeled with the hashtags #greenscreen, #womb,
+#roevwade, #pregnancyrelease, #abortion, #herbal, #safety, and #withlove. This post contains
+information on which herbs to use to perform a “pregnancy release”. The herbs in the video include
+20
+
+Abortion Misinformation on TikTok
+rue, pennyroyal, and mugwort, which were also included in prior videos. The source cited in
+the video is indicated by the creator to be an article on herbal abortion from we.riseup.net. The
+screenshot of the post as it appeared in the standard TikTok app is shown in Figure 7.
+Fig. 7. TikTok Post #6
+7.6.1
+Assessment. As shown in Table 14, six (42.86%) of the misinformation group participants
+indicated that this post was misinformation. Participant P19FL30 explained that “the content creator
+in this video does tell viewers to do ‘proper research’ on the herbs she is promoting before using them;
+However, she notes that if ‘something goes wrong’ and medical attention is needed that the viewer
+does not need to tell their medical provider that they have been taking these herbs - assuming that
+the creator is not a medical professional, I would consider this to be misinformation.” Five (35.71%) of
+the participants said they weren’t sure if this post is misinformation because “there is an article
+supporting the statements made by the speaker and the speaker seems to have genuine intent; However
+the shared article is not in the form of a scientific verified and peer reviewed study” [P42FL30]. The
+remaining three participants in this group said they “don’t believe this post is misinformation because
+she provides supporting facts that you can double check and they will confirm her point” [P54FL30].
+Six (35.29%) of the participants in the disinformation group felt “this is not misinformation because
+she is well spoken, shows where she is getting the information from, states what it is for and what it does
+and also mentions to seek medical help” [P51FL40]. Six (35.29%) were unsure because they “can’t
+confirm if this is misinformation or not because I am not familiar with the scientific data that either
+backs up or refutes this info”[P1MR50] and five (29.41%) stated “Yes, this post is misinformation; To
+start - the post screenshots a website: weriseup.net; That website is not a reliable medical source of
+information. I would scroll past” [P41FM4].
+7.6.2
+Response. Table 15 indicates that more that half of the participants from both groups said
+they “would scroll past” [P41FM40], “would simply ignore this post” [P1MR50]. Of the participants
+in the misinformation group, four (28.57%) said they would “encourage viewers to follow up with
+21
+
+Which HerbstoTeke
+LIVE
+Each herb has a unique action on the body and it is useiui toknow how each one works
+in order to select the right ones at the right time.The herbs have been categorised by
+their properties and some herbs appear in more than one category as they affect the body
+in more than one way. Many herbs could cause abortion single-handedly but a
+combination ofcomplementaryherbs could provemore effective.Choosing herbs with
+different actions to each otherwould be complementary,rather than using several with
+the same action.There is some evidence to suggest that using just one to four herbs at a
+time isbetterthan trying to combine a large numberofherbs.
+These categories could be seen as an oversimplification as whole plants have a variety of
+different actions combining to make cach one unique, but nevertheless these three basic
+groupings arean invaluableguidelineforgetting it right.
+ProgesteroneBlockingHerbs
+These are also referred to asimplantation inhibiting herbs'as they are the category of
+herbs that are used as cmergencycontraception after fertilisation,but they're effective
+after that period as well.They work by interfering with the normal production of the
+hormoneprogesterone,without whichthelining ofthewombbecomes unsupporti
+the fertilised egg.Progesterone is crucial to the continued viability ofa pregnang
+egg has not yet implanted in the womb then it is prevented from doing so and is
+along with the lining.If the egg has already implanted, it detaches from the unsupp
+womb liningandthe lining willbreakdown.
+Cotton Root Bark
+Wild CarrotSeed
+VitaminC
+(not a herb, but included here because it's readily
+non-toxic)
+Rue
+(this is not a progesterone blocking herb, is pla
+cause
+thewomb lining to break down. It does this by
+fblood
+capillaries in the womb)
+Uterine Contracting Herbs
+6
+These herbs cause contractions in the uteru
+ean
+ideal addition afteraprogesteroneblocking
+ofte
+these herbs can help to regulate and streng
+to the use of other abortifacients.
+ue
+Angelicaroot
+DongQuai (Chinese angelica)
+Green Screen
+earthnmaya
+linkin mybio for full article#greenscreen#womb
+#roevwade #pregnancyrelease #abortion #heFee more
+JJoriginal sound-earthnmaya-MAuthors
+Table 14. Is Post #6 Misinformation?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 14 participants]
+Yes
+6 (42.86%)
+No
+3 (21.43%)
+Unsure
+5 (35.71%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 17 participants]
+Yes
+5 (29.41%)
+No
+6 (35.29%)
+Unsure
+6 (35.29%)
+doing their own research and a notice that every woman’s body still responds differently to methods”
+[P54FL30], two (14.29%) said they “would simply block the user and move on” [P52MM40], and
+one (7.14%) said they “would report this post” [P25FL20]. The participants in the disinformation
+group did not say they would block this post. Three (17.65%) of them indicated they would “read
+the full article this video links, and find other videos to make a better judgement on the trueness of
+this post” [P5FL30] and two (11.76%) said “there are natural remedies that are legitimate but telling
+people they can take an herb for contraception is dangerous; I would report this one[P50FL60]. No
+participants in either group said they would like this post.
+Table 15. What action would you take on Post #6?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 14 participants]
+Ignore
+7 (50%)
+Fact-check
+4 (28.57%)
+Block
+2 (14.29%)
+Report
+1 (7.14%)
+Like
+0 (0%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 17 participants]
+Ignore
+12 (70.59%)
+Fact-check
+3 (17.65%)
+Block
+0 (0%)
+Report
+2 (11.76%)
+Like
+0 (0%)
+7.7
+Post #7
+We also selected a post that was soft moderated by TikTok [51] and contained a trustworthiness
+tag with stating “Participating in this activity could result in you or others getting hurt.” Post seven
+was labeled by the creator with the hashtages #greenscreen and #roevwade. As this is the only
+explicitly moderated post, we presented it to all 60 participants. The post, shown in Figure 8, has
+overlay text that states “they may be able to ban abortion but they can’t ban these” and has slides of
+images that include pennyroyal, juniper berries, vitamin C, mugwort, aspirin, and a wire hanger.
+7.7.1
+Assessment. As shown in Table 16, 14 (46.67%) of the 30 participants in the misinformation
+group said the post was misinformation “considering this person is unqualified to be spreading this
+information” [P16FL30]. Eleven (36.67%) said the post was not misinformation because they “don’t
+agree with using some of those products for achieving the goal that the video is promoting, but all
+of those products shown, used in the correct way/dosage can result in abortion” [P17FR30]. The
+remaining five (16.67%) participants indicated they would “have to research before deciding if it was
+misinformation or not” [P44FL30].
+In the disinformation group, 13 (43.33%) of participants indicated that “this is misinformation
+as there is no evidence this is safe and effective means of self administering an abortion” [P36FL40].
+Nine (30%) of the participants said “It is not helpful or informative; And the hanger is such a danger
+suggestion to put out there; I wouldn’t consider this misinformation but it isn’t helpful information”
+22
+
+Abortion Misinformation on TikTok
+Fig. 8. TikTok Post #7
+[P48FL30] and 8 (26.67%) stated “I don’t have the scientific data to comment on whether or not this is
+misinformation” [P1MR50].
+Table 16. Is Post #7 Misinformation?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 30 participants]
+Yes
+14 (46.67%)
+No
+11 (36.67%)
+Unsure
+5 (16.67%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 30 participants]
+Yes
+13 (43.33%)
+No
+9 (30%)
+Unsure
+8 (26.67%)
+7.7.2
+Response. As indicated in Table 17, 13 (43.33%) of the misinformation group and 18 (60%) of
+the disinformation group said they “wouldn’t do anything with the post” [P6FA30] and they “would
+not respond and just keep scrolling” [P26FL30]. Eleven participants of the misinformation group
+(36.67%) and 8 of the disinformation group (26.67%) said they “would even consider reporting it as
+harmful because some people are viewing it and are not aware of how to properly use the products”
+[P17FR30] and “because it’s dangerous” [P16FL30]. Three (10%) participants from each group said
+they would “have to do more research” [P2FL50] and they “would read the comments, look at similar
+videos, or Google it” [P33FL30]. Two (6.67%) of the participants from the misinformation group
+said they would like the post as they “agree with this post and have heard these methods before”
+[P8FL20]. One of participants from each group said they would block the post because “it’s not
+humorous joking around about women feeling they are being pushed to use alternative and possibly
+23
+
+Following
+Q
+LIVE
+For You
+286
+they may be able to bal
+abortion but they can't
+ban these
+29.5K
+215
+GreenScreen
+2753
+13kasettetapes
+#greenscreenthelast oneisajoke(kind)#roevwade
+171
+Dalsound-speedaudiios_-Nick
+ Participating in this activity could result inyou
+or others gettinghurt.Authors
+dangerous medicine” [P60ML40] and “it is very disturbing and should not be allowed to be showed to
+young women in particular” [P13FR30].
+Table 17. What action would you take on Post #7?
+Misinformation (no intent) [viewed: 30 participants]
+Ignore
+13 (43.33%)
+Fact-check
+3 (10%)
+Block
+1 (3.33%)
+Report
+11 (36.67%)
+Like
+2 (6.67%)
+Disinformation (intent) [viewed: 30 participants]
+Ignore
+18 (60%)
+Fact-check
+3 (10%)
+Block
+1 (3.33%)
+Report
+8 (26.67%)
+Like
+0 (0%)
+8
+DISCUSSION
+Our first research question aimed to uncover how social media users conceptualize misinformation
+on TikTok, where does it originate, who are the targets, and what’s its purpose. Misinformation,
+even within such a small sample as ours, invokes nuanced interpretations as people do not always
+stick to the popular “fake news” association [58]. According to the participants in our sample,
+misinformation on TikTok might involve falsehoods only, but falsehoods could be interspersed
+with biased interpretations, facts taken out of context, or emotion-provoking narratives [96]. The
+amalgamation of factual and inaccurate content was mostly a craft assigned to individual content
+creators, often for personal gain, but the “usual suspects” – political parties and foreign unfriendly
+countries to the United States – were not spared in disseminating misinformation on Tiktok.
+This finding suggests that while TikTok’s affordances are fit for selling products or participate
+in challenges [50], they are not prohibitive for political and foreign actors to adapt their agenda
+setting and information operations. In the past, misleading narratives and content were migrating
+from fringe and alt-communities to the mainstream platforms [124] and the evidence from our
+study suggest that TikTok could be a future candidate destination. Our participants’ view that many
+vulnerable people and easily-influenced crowds would unlikely step out from the “For You” page to
+check a claim adds to this impression, confirming previous studies that identified such users as the
+most sought out targets of misinformation [19, 77]. The TikTok participation model adds additional
+incentive to engage with misinformation as it provides immediate profit and long-term gains,
+according both to the participants in our sample and studies exploring political and conspirative
+influence on TikTok [14, 65].
+Our second research question narrowed our exploration on misleading abortion narratives.
+Given that we conducted our study after Roe vs Wade was overturned, health misinformation
+regarding herbal abortifacients dominated the TikTok’s ‘For You’ pages of our participants. While
+some of them were simply intrigued about these “at-home remedies,” there were participants
+that were disturbed, worried, angered, and disgusted that dangerously misleading content like
+this finds its way on the platform. This emotion-provoking response, though concentrated on
+a topic of limited polarization, is worrisome because this is precisely the response that foreign
+actors sought to incite in past polarizing debates on social media [90, 125]. These debates always
+involved politicization of the discourse, so the evidence that our participants also saw politically
+contextualized abortion narratives further suggest that TikTok might be the next health/political
+misinformation battleground [36], despite the impression of mostly apolitical participation on the
+platform so far [1].
+24
+
+Abortion Misinformation on TikTok
+But to substantiate such conjectures, one needs evidence on how actual users engage with
+essential, health-related abortion misinformation in the first place. Uncovering this evidence was
+central to our study and we attempted to gain as much as possible a nuanced insight into how
+users actually deal with various abortion misinformation content on TikTok. Our findings indicate
+that a significant number of TikTok users do not see videos promoting herbal abortifacients as
+abortion misinformation, despite the scientific evidence to the contrary [9, 37, 41, 74, 89, 103].
+Regardless of whether the video included the creator itself, contained explicit tags to the herbal
+abortifacients listed in Table 1, or was simply a textual post promoting these at-home remedies, many
+participants were unconvinced the posts were misinformation. The majority of them conceptualized
+misinformation as spreading falsehoods without intent; those that saw intent behind the spread of
+falsehoods on TikTok, in general, were far more skeptical of the posts.
+A deeper look into the responses of the participants that did not see misinformation in the selected
+posts reveals that it was sufficient for the creators to appear “like they know what they are talking
+about,” “provide context,” “seems informed,” and are “well spoken” to make the misinformation
+believable. There was no particular demographic trend among these participants as the posts were
+equally convincing to all gender, political, and age groups. The group of participants that called
+out the misinformation indicated both analytical and heuristic cues that could be helpful for the
+wider audience on TikTok to employ in dealing with misleading abortion content. For example,
+videos that “look like MLM promotions”, “omit any side-effects” of a proposed treatment, “do not
+include credible citations”, and the “creator is unqualified for making any health-related claims”
+should be dismissed as abortion misinformation. All of these strategies have been proven to work
+against health misinformation in the past [80], so our findings strengthen the case for continuing
+the “inoculation” against false and misleading abortion narratives [58].
+This is especially important in situations where many users, like the ones in our study, remain
+unsure whether these misleading videos are abortion misinformation or not. Our results suggest
+that these users lack knowledge on the safety and the effectiveness of herbal abortifacients, which in
+turn precludes them to make a decisive dismissal of the misinformation. Educational interventions
+on TikTok regarding abortions have already be proposed [30], but question is if the algorithmic
+curation of the ‘For You’ page for TikTok users “interested” in alternatives includes them too.
+According to our findings, the undecided participants would be easily “nudged” with accurate
+scientific information, which is a strategy that worked for other types of misleading content [78].
+It is reassuring to see a fact-checking trend among even a small sample like ours. Perhaps
+affordances of TikTok probably encourage majority of the users to simply ignore many misleading
+posts, as many of the participants in our study did, and avoid to critically discern the content
+[79]. But recalling that familiarity, i.e. a repeated exposure to such videos makes the content look
+truthful [80], this fact-checking trend might need to be appended with better debunking and soft
+moderation efforts suggested to work for other health-related misinformation [95, 106]. Such a
+need is further corroborated by our findings suggesting that even in the presence of the current
+TikTok soft moderation labels on post #7, at least 30% of the entire sample still believed that the
+content is not misinformation.
+Equally important for consideration is that our results suggest a number of users are unafraid
+to block or report abortion misinformation. Prior evidence on flagging and reporting misleading
+content suggests that social media users might not opt for such actions as to preserve interpersonal
+relationships and avoid social arguments, especially for issue that do not matter much to them
+[33]. However, reporting misinformation becomes a proactive endeavour when health-related
+misinformation is in question [15]. Our results confirm that this effect also takes place for abortion-
+related misinformation and occurs across all demographics, making a further case for an actionable
+framework of misinformation sharing and correction sharing on TikTok [123].
+25
+
+Authors
+8.1
+Ethical Considerations
+The purpose of our study was not to generalize to a population; rather, to explore the phenomenon
+of individual dealing with abortion misinformation from a regular user perspective. While we
+added the participants’ self-reported age, gender, and political leanings for more detailed reporting,
+we avoided providing definitive numbers accompanying the assessments and response strategies
+for each of the seven intervention posts with these demographics. Instead, we supported our
+findings with descriptive quotations from participants that convey the way ordinary users deal with
+misleading videos on TikTok in a hope that the results can help to elevate the study of abortion
+misinformation on social media as a whole.
+We acknowledge that there might be a potential risk of repeated exposure to abortion misinfor-
+mation, i.e. an “implied truth effect” [80], as each participant saw four of the short-form videos. To
+mitigate this risk we explicitly pointed to the debunked information for the related “at-home” reme-
+dies and their associated harms. There is also a risk from oversimplification of our results where the
+participants’ conceptualization, assessment, and response to abortion misinformation, expressed on
+their behalf, might not represent the entirety of the strategies used to deal with misleading videos.
+We, of course, agree that users do employ others ways and means to deal with misleading videos
+and we welcome every work that brings them to the fore. This will facilitate a scientific work on
+abortion misinformation beyond simple oppositional responses [101], a corollary we also want to
+avoid when contextualizing our results for future anti-misinformation interventions.
+8.2
+Limitations
+Our research was limited was limited in its scope to U.S. TikTok media users and the state of abortion
+misinformation regarding at-home remedies that existed on TikTok in the period immediately
+after the overturn of Roe vs Wade by the Supreme Court of the US. In as much as we attempted to
+have balanced, diverse, and inclusive set of short-form videos regarding herbal abortifacients, there
+certainly are, and will be, other similar content which our participants might assess and respond to
+differently than they did in our study. While the content of these videos was scientifically debunked
+and constituted misinformation during our study, we acknowledge that this might change in light
+of new scientific evidence. We are also limited by the state of the content moderation policies on
+TikTok that, together with public policy changes and new Supreme Court rulings, change and
+impact the relevance of our results, therefore we exercise caution in considering these results in
+the narrow post-Roe vs Wade context.
+A limitation also comes from the sampling method and the use of a survey provider [85], as other
+users and other samples might provide results that differ from the once we obtained as there is
+little insight into general sampling and sample-related differences when users are broadly queried
+about abortion misinformation. By asking users directly about how they interact with abortion
+misinformation and misleading video content on TikTok, we got a wide variety of insights from a
+broad range of perspectives. We did not measure the efficacy of users’ assessment approaches and
+response strategies for explicitly politicized abortion misinformation content, nor did we ask how
+users dealt with other abortion misinformation on other social media platforms. Short-form videos
+are a relatively new way of persuasive communication appealing to younger users, but traditional
+social media text, memes, and visceral images [5] might provoke different responses for a wider
+population of users. Therefore, we are careful to avoid any predictive use of our findings because
+TikTok’s affordances might change in the future.
+26
+
+Abortion Misinformation on TikTok
+9
+CONCLUSION
+Abortion misinformation undoubtedly shapes the way people make reproductive decisions and
+TikTok, a very popular social media platform, allows misleading content regarding “at-home”
+abortion remedies to reach wide audiences. Users possess the critical ability to assess, discern, and
+reject misleading and scientifically debunked abortion claims, but a worrying number of them are
+not ready to dismiss these alternatives for self-induced terminations of unwanted pregnancies in a
+post-Roe v Wade America. Time will tell whether this proclivity for abortion misinformation will
+remain, but meanwhile we hope that TikTok, the scientific community, and health authorities take
+our results as actionable insight that can prevent harmful outcomes of abortion misinformation.
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+STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE
+Exposure and Preconceptions
+(1) Can you please define “misinformation” in your own words (please be verbose): [Open
+Ended]
+32
+
+Abortion Misinformation on TikTok
+(2) Have you encountered misinformation on TikTok and in what form? Please provide examples.
+[Open Ended]
+(3) Where does misinformation on TikTok come from, in your opinion? [Open Ended]
+(4) Who is the target of misinformation on TikTok, in your opinion? [Open Ended]
+(5) Who benefits from misinformation on TikTok, in your opinion? [Open Ended]
+Engagement Strategies
+(1) How do you suspect or know that a certain TikTok post is a misinformation? Please elaborate.
+[Open Ended]
+(2) What is your strategy for dealing with misinformation posts on TikTok? Please elaborate.
+[Open Ended]
+(3) Have you used any engagement features (e.g. share, comment, like, follow) for misinformation
+posts on TikTok? If so, in what circumstances? [Open Ended]
+(4) Have you used any action features (e.g. block, mute, report, unfollow) for misinformation
+posts on TikTok? If so, in what circumstances? [Open Ended]
+(5) Have you talked about a particular TikTok misinformation post outside social media? If so,
+in what circumstances? [Open Ended]
+Abortion Misinformation Exposure
+(1) On what other occasions you have encountered misinformation regarding abortion on
+TikTok? Please elaborate. [Open Ended]
+(2) What was your response to this particular abortion misinformation on TikTok? Please
+elaborate. [Open Ended]
+(3) Where else does abortion misinformation exists outside of TikTok, in your opinion? Please
+elaborate and share any experiences. [Open Ended]
+33
+