Daily Papers

Providing effective treatment and making informed clinical decisions are essential goals of modern medicine and clinical care. We are interested in simulating disease dynamics for clinical decision-making, leveraging recent advances in large generative models. To this end, we introduce the Medical World Model (MeWM), the first world model in medicine that visually predicts future disease states based on clinical decisions. MeWM comprises (i) vision-language models to serve as policy models, and (ii) tumor generative models as dynamics models. The policy model generates action plans, such as clinical treatments, while the dynamics model simulates tumor progression or regression under given treatment conditions. Building on this, we propose the inverse dynamics model that applies survival analysis to the simulated post-treatment tumor, enabling the evaluation of treatment efficacy and the selection of the optimal clinical action plan. As a result, the proposed MeWM simulates disease dynamics by synthesizing post-treatment tumors, with state-of-the-art specificity in Turing tests evaluated by radiologists. Simultaneously, its inverse dynamics model outperforms medical-specialized GPTs in optimizing individualized treatment protocols across all metrics. Notably, MeWM improves clinical decision-making for interventional physicians, boosting F1-score in selecting the optimal TACE protocol by 13%, paving the way for future integration of medical world models as the second readers.

Recent text-to-video (T2V) technology advancements, as demonstrated by models such as Gen2, Pika, and Sora, have significantly broadened its applicability and popularity. Despite these strides, evaluating these models poses substantial challenges. Primarily, due to the limitations inherent in automatic metrics, manual evaluation is often considered a superior method for assessing T2V generation. However, existing manual evaluation protocols face reproducibility, reliability, and practicality issues. To address these challenges, this paper introduces the Text-to-Video Human Evaluation (T2VHE) protocol, a comprehensive and standardized protocol for T2V models. The T2VHE protocol includes well-defined metrics, thorough annotator training, and an effective dynamic evaluation module. Experimental results demonstrate that this protocol not only ensures high-quality annotations but can also reduce evaluation costs by nearly 50%. We will open-source the entire setup of the T2VHE protocol, including the complete protocol workflow, the dynamic evaluation component details, and the annotation interface code. This will help communities establish more sophisticated human assessment protocols.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.