Daily Papers

Learning dynamics, which describes how the learning of specific training examples influences the model's predictions on other examples, gives us a powerful tool for understanding the behavior of deep learning systems. We study the learning dynamics of large language models during different types of finetuning, by analyzing the step-wise decomposition of how influence accumulates among different potential responses. Our framework allows a uniform interpretation of many interesting observations about the training of popular algorithms for both instruction tuning and preference tuning. In particular, we propose a hypothetical explanation of why specific types of hallucination are strengthened after finetuning, e.g., the model might use phrases or facts in the response for question B to answer question A, or the model might keep repeating similar simple phrases when generating responses. We also extend our framework and highlight a unique "squeezing effect" to explain a previously observed phenomenon in off-policy direct preference optimization (DPO), where running DPO for too long makes even the desired outputs less likely. This framework also provides insights into where the benefits of on-policy DPO and other variants come from. The analysis not only provides a novel perspective of understanding LLM's finetuning but also inspires a simple, effective method to improve alignment performance.

Visual place recognition (VPR) is critical in not only localization and mapping for autonomous driving vehicles, but also in assistive navigation for the visually impaired population. To enable a long-term VPR system on a large scale, several challenges need to be addressed. First, different applications could require different image view directions, such as front views for self-driving cars while side views for the low vision people. Second, VPR in metropolitan scenes can often cause privacy concerns due to the imaging of pedestrian and vehicle identity information, calling for the need for data anonymization before VPR queries and database construction. Both factors could lead to VPR performance variations that are not well understood yet. To study their influences, we present the NYU-VPR dataset that contains more than 200,000 images over a 2km by 2km area near the New York University campus, taken within the whole year of 2016. We present benchmark results on several popular VPR algorithms showing that side views are significantly more challenging for current VPR methods while the influence of data anonymization is almost negligible, together with our hypothetical explanations and in-depth analysis.

Visual counterfactual explanation (CF) methods modify image concepts, e.g, shape, to change a prediction to a predefined outcome while closely resembling the original query image. Unlike self-explainable models (SEMs) and heatmap techniques, they grant users the ability to examine hypothetical "what-if" scenarios. Previous CF methods either entail post-hoc training, limiting the balance between transparency and CF quality, or demand optimization during inference. To bridge the gap between transparent SEMs and CF methods, we introduce the GdVAE, a self-explainable model based on a conditional variational autoencoder (CVAE), featuring a Gaussian discriminant analysis (GDA) classifier and integrated CF explanations. Full transparency is achieved through a generative classifier that leverages class-specific prototypes for the downstream task and a closed-form solution for CFs in the latent space. The consistency of CFs is improved by regularizing the latent space with the explainer function. Extensive comparisons with existing approaches affirm the effectiveness of our method in producing high-quality CF explanations while preserving transparency. Code and models are public.

One well motivated explanation method for classifiers leverages counterfactuals which are hypothetical events identical to real observations in all aspects except for one categorical feature. Constructing such counterfactual poses specific challenges for texts, however, as some attribute values may not necessarily align with plausible real-world events. In this paper we propose a simple method for generating counterfactuals by intervening in the space of text representations which bypasses this limitation. We argue that our interventions are minimally disruptive and that they are theoretically sound as they align with counterfactuals as defined in Pearl's causal inference framework. To validate our method, we first conduct experiments on a synthetic dataset of counterfactuals, allowing for a direct comparison between classifier predictions based on ground truth counterfactuals (obtained through explicit text interventions) and our counterfactuals, derived through interventions in the representation space. Second, we study a real world scenario where our counterfactuals can be leveraged both for explaining a classifier and for bias mitigation.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

Hypothetical induction is recognized as the main reasoning type when scientists make observations about the world and try to propose hypotheses to explain those observations. Past research on hypothetical induction is under a constrained setting: (1) the observation annotations in the dataset are carefully manually handpicked sentences (resulting in a close-domain setting); and (2) the ground truth hypotheses are mostly commonsense knowledge, making the task less challenging. In this work, we tackle these problems by proposing the first dataset for social science academic hypotheses discovery, with the final goal to create systems that automatically generate valid, novel, and helpful scientific hypotheses, given only a pile of raw web corpus. Unlike previous settings, the new dataset requires (1) using open-domain data (raw web corpus) as observations; and (2) proposing hypotheses even new to humanity. A multi-module framework is developed for the task, including three different feedback mechanisms to boost performance, which exhibits superior performance in terms of both GPT-4 based and expert-based evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work showing that LLMs are able to generate novel (''not existing in literature'') and valid (''reflecting reality'') scientific hypotheses.

In a recent paper, Erasmus et al. (2021) defend the idea that the ambiguity of the term "explanation" in explainable AI (XAI) can be solved by adopting any of four different extant accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science: the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New Mechanist models. In this chapter, I show that the authors' claim that these accounts can be applied to deep neural networks as they would to any natural phenomenon is mistaken. I also provide a more general argument as to why the notion of explainability as it is currently used in the XAI literature bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of scientific explanation. It would be more fruitful to use the label "understandable AI" to avoid the confusion that surrounds the goal and purposes of XAI. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for a pragmatic conception of understanding that is better suited to play the central role attributed to explanation in XAI. Following Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015), the conditions of satisfaction for understanding an ML system are fleshed out in terms of an agent's success in using the system, in drawing correct inferences from it.

This article is about the neural conundrum behind the slowness of human behavior. The information throughput of a human being is about 10 bits/s. In comparison, our sensory systems gather data at ~10^9 bits/s. The stark contrast between these numbers remains unexplained and touches on fundamental aspects of brain function: What neural substrate sets this speed limit on the pace of our existence? Why does the brain need billions of neurons to process 10 bits/s? Why can we only think about one thing at a time? The brain seems to operate in two distinct modes: the "outer" brain handles fast high-dimensional sensory and motor signals, whereas the "inner" brain processes the reduced few bits needed to control behavior. Plausible explanations exist for the large neuron numbers in the outer brain, but not for the inner brain, and we propose new research directions to remedy this.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

There has recently been a surge of work in explanatory artificial intelligence (XAI). This research area tackles the important problem that complex machines and algorithms often cannot provide insights into their behavior and thought processes. XAI allows users and parts of the internal system to be more transparent, providing explanations of their decisions in some level of detail. These explanations are important to ensure algorithmic fairness, identify potential bias/problems in the training data, and to ensure that the algorithms perform as expected. However, explanations produced by these systems is neither standardized nor systematically assessed. In an effort to create best practices and identify open challenges, we provide our definition of explainability and show how it can be used to classify existing literature. We discuss why current approaches to explanatory methods especially for deep neural networks are insufficient. Finally, based on our survey, we conclude with suggested future research directions for explanatory artificial intelligence.

I propose a version of quantum mechanics featuring a discrete and finite number of states that is plausibly a model of the real world. The model is based on standard unitary quantum theory of a closed system with a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. Given certain simple conditions on the spectrum of the Hamiltonian, Schr\"odinger evolution is periodic, and it is straightforward to replace continuous time with a discrete version, with the result that the system only visits a discrete and finite set of state vectors. The biggest challenges to the viability of such a model come from cosmological considerations. The theory may have implications for questions of mathematical realism and finitism.

Being able to provide explanations for a model's decision has become a central requirement for the development, deployment, and adoption of machine learning models. However, we are yet to understand what explanation methods can and cannot do. How do upstream factors such as data, model prediction, hyperparameters, and random initialization influence downstream explanations? While previous work raised concerns that explanations (E) may have little relationship with the prediction (Y), there is a lack of conclusive study to quantify this relationship. Our work borrows tools from causal inference to systematically assay this relationship. More specifically, we study the relationship between E and Y by measuring the treatment effect when intervening on their causal ancestors, i.e., on hyperparameters and inputs used to generate saliency-based Es or Ys. Our results suggest that the relationships between E and Y is far from ideal. In fact, the gap between 'ideal' case only increase in higher-performing models -- models that are likely to be deployed. Our work is a promising first step towards providing a quantitative measure of the relationship between E and Y, which could also inform the future development of methods for E with a quantitative metric.

Providing high quality explanations for AI predictions based on machine learning is a challenging and complex task. To work well it requires, among other factors: selecting a proper level of generality/specificity of the explanation; considering assumptions about the familiarity of the explanation beneficiary with the AI task under consideration; referring to specific elements that have contributed to the decision; making use of additional knowledge (e.g. expert evidence) which might not be part of the prediction process; and providing evidence supporting negative hypothesis. Finally, the system needs to formulate the explanation in a clearly interpretable, and possibly convincing, way. Given these considerations, ANTIDOTE fosters an integrated vision of explainable AI, where low-level characteristics of the deep learning process are combined with higher level schemes proper of the human argumentation capacity. ANTIDOTE will exploit cross-disciplinary competences in deep learning and argumentation to support a broader and innovative view of explainable AI, where the need for high-quality explanations for clinical cases deliberation is critical. As a first result of the project, we publish the Antidote CasiMedicos dataset to facilitate research on explainable AI in general, and argumentation in the medical domain in particular.

Many commonsense reasoning NLP tasks involve choosing between one or more possible answers to a question or prompt based on knowledge that is often implicit. Large pretrained language models (PLMs) can achieve near-human performance on such tasks, while providing little human-interpretable evidence of the underlying reasoning they use. In this work, we show how to use these same models to generate such evidence: inspired by the contrastive nature of human explanations, we use PLMs to complete explanation prompts which contrast alternatives according to the key attribute(s) required to justify the correct answer (for example, peanuts are usually salty while raisins are sweet). Conditioning model decisions on these explanations improves performance on two commonsense reasoning benchmarks, as compared to previous non-contrastive alternatives. These explanations are also judged by humans to be more relevant for solving the task, and facilitate a novel method to evaluate explanation faithfulfness.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

Machine learning plays a role in many deployed decision systems, often in ways that are difficult or impossible to understand by human stakeholders. Explaining, in a human-understandable way, the relationship between the input and output of machine learning models is essential to the development of trustworthy machine learning based systems. A burgeoning body of research seeks to define the goals and methods of explainability in machine learning. In this paper, we seek to review and categorize research on counterfactual explanations, a specific class of explanation that provides a link between what could have happened had input to a model been changed in a particular way. Modern approaches to counterfactual explainability in machine learning draw connections to the established legal doctrine in many countries, making them appealing to fielded systems in high-impact areas such as finance and healthcare. Thus, we design a rubric with desirable properties of counterfactual explanation algorithms and comprehensively evaluate all currently proposed algorithms against that rubric. Our rubric provides easy comparison and comprehension of the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and serves as an introduction to major research themes in this field. We also identify gaps and discuss promising research directions in the space of counterfactual explainability.

Our goal, in the context of open-domain textual question-answering (QA), is to explain answers by showing the line of reasoning from what is known to the answer, rather than simply showing a fragment of textual evidence (a "rationale'"). If this could be done, new opportunities for understanding and debugging the system's reasoning become possible. Our approach is to generate explanations in the form of entailment trees, namely a tree of multipremise entailment steps from facts that are known, through intermediate conclusions, to the hypothesis of interest (namely the question + answer). To train a model with this skill, we created ENTAILMENTBANK, the first dataset to contain multistep entailment trees. Given a hypothesis (question + answer), we define three increasingly difficult explanation tasks: generate a valid entailment tree given (a) all relevant sentences (b) all relevant and some irrelevant sentences, or (c) a corpus. We show that a strong language model can partially solve these tasks, in particular when the relevant sentences are included in the input (e.g., 35% of trees for (a) are perfect), and with indications of generalization to other domains. This work is significant as it provides a new type of dataset (multistep entailments) and baselines, offering a new avenue for the community to generate richer, more systematic explanations.

Is explainability a false promise? This debate has emerged from the insufficient evidence that explanations aid people in situations they are introduced for. More human-centered, application-grounded evaluations of explanations are needed to settle this. Yet, with no established guidelines for such studies in NLP, researchers accustomed to standardized proxy evaluations must discover appropriate measurements, tasks, datasets, and sensible models for human-AI teams in their studies. To help with this, we first review fitting existing metrics. We then establish requirements for datasets to be suitable for application-grounded evaluations. Among over 50 datasets available for explainability research in NLP, we find that 4 meet our criteria. By finetuning Flan-T5-3B, we demonstrate the importance of reassessing the state of the art to form and study human-AI teams. Finally, we present the exemplar studies of human-AI decision-making for one of the identified suitable tasks -- verifying the correctness of a legal claim given a contract.

"Sure, I am happy to generate a story for you: Captain Lyra stood at the helm of her trusty ship, the Maelstrom's Fury, gazing out at the endless sea. [...] Lyra's eyes welled up with tears as she realized the bitter truth - she had sacrificed everything for fleeting riches, and lost the love of her crew, her family, and herself." Although this story, generated by a large language model, is captivating, one may wonder -- how would the story have unfolded if the model had chosen "Captain Maeve" as the protagonist instead? We cannot know. State-of-the-art large language models are stateless -- they maintain no internal memory or state. Given a prompt, they generate a sequence of tokens as an output using an autoregressive process. As a consequence, they cannot reason about counterfactual alternatives to tokens they have generated in the past. In this work, our goal is to enhance them with this functionality. To this end, we develop a causal model of token generation that builds upon the Gumbel-Max structural causal model. Our model allows any large language model to perform counterfactual token generation at almost no cost in comparison with vanilla token generation, it is embarrassingly simple to implement, and it does not require any fine-tuning nor prompt engineering. We implement our model on Llama 3 8B-Instruct and Ministral-8B-Instruct and conduct a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of counterfactually generated text. We conclude with a demonstrative application of counterfactual token generation for bias detection, unveiling interesting insights about the model of the world constructed by large language models.

While LLMs can provide reasoned explanations along with their answers, the nature and quality of those explanations are still poorly understood. In response, our goal is to define a detailed way of characterizing the explanation capabilities of modern models and to create a nuanced, interpretable explanation evaluation tool that can generate such characterizations automatically, without relying on expensive API calls or human annotations. Our approach is to (a) define the new task of explanation critiquing - identifying and categorizing any main flaw in an explanation and providing suggestions to address the flaw, (b) create a sizeable, human-verified dataset for this task, and (c) train an open-source, automatic critiquing model (called Digital Socrates) using this data. Through quantitative and qualitative analysis, we demonstrate how Digital Socrates is useful for revealing insights about student models by examining their reasoning chains, and how it can provide high-quality, nuanced, automatic evaluation of those model explanations for the first time. Digital Socrates thus fills an important gap in evaluation tools for understanding and improving the explanation behavior of models.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

As practitioners increasingly deploy machine learning models in critical domains such as health care, finance, and policy, it becomes vital to ensure that domain experts function effectively alongside these models. Explainability is one way to bridge the gap between human decision-makers and machine learning models. However, most of the existing work on explainability focuses on one-off, static explanations like feature importances or rule lists. These sorts of explanations may not be sufficient for many use cases that require dynamic, continuous discovery from stakeholders. In the literature, few works ask decision-makers about the utility of existing explanations and other desiderata they would like to see in an explanation going forward. In this work, we address this gap and carry out a study where we interview doctors, healthcare professionals, and policymakers about their needs and desires for explanations. Our study indicates that decision-makers would strongly prefer interactive explanations in the form of natural language dialogues. Domain experts wish to treat machine learning models as "another colleague", i.e., one who can be held accountable by asking why they made a particular decision through expressive and accessible natural language interactions. Considering these needs, we outline a set of five principles researchers should follow when designing interactive explanations as a starting place for future work. Further, we show why natural language dialogues satisfy these principles and are a desirable way to build interactive explanations. Next, we provide a design of a dialogue system for explainability and discuss the risks, trade-offs, and research opportunities of building these systems. Overall, we hope our work serves as a starting place for researchers and engineers to design interactive explainability systems.

Abductive reasoning is inference to the most plausible explanation. For example, if Jenny finds her house in a mess when she returns from work, and remembers that she left a window open, she can hypothesize that a thief broke into her house and caused the mess, as the most plausible explanation. While abduction has long been considered to be at the core of how people interpret and read between the lines in natural language (Hobbs et al., 1988), there has been relatively little research in support of abductive natural language inference and generation. We present the first study that investigates the viability of language-based abductive reasoning. We introduce a challenge dataset, ART, that consists of over 20k commonsense narrative contexts and 200k explanations. Based on this dataset, we conceptualize two new tasks -- (i) Abductive NLI: a multiple-choice question answering task for choosing the more likely explanation, and (ii) Abductive NLG: a conditional generation task for explaining given observations in natural language. On Abductive NLI, the best model achieves 68.9% accuracy, well below human performance of 91.4%. On Abductive NLG, the current best language generators struggle even more, as they lack reasoning capabilities that are trivial for humans. Our analysis leads to new insights into the types of reasoning that deep pre-trained language models fail to perform--despite their strong performance on the related but more narrowly defined task of entailment NLI--pointing to interesting avenues for future research.

Data-driven optimization uses contextual information and machine learning algorithms to find solutions to decision problems with uncertain parameters. While a vast body of work is dedicated to interpreting machine learning models in the classification setting, explaining decision pipelines involving learning algorithms remains unaddressed. This lack of interpretability can block the adoption of data-driven solutions as practitioners may not understand or trust the recommended decisions. We bridge this gap by introducing a counterfactual explanation methodology tailored to explain solutions to data-driven problems. We introduce two classes of explanations and develop methods to find nearest explanations of random forest and nearest-neighbor predictors. We demonstrate our approach by explaining key problems in operations management such as inventory management and routing.

Algorithmic approaches to interpreting machine learning models have proliferated in recent years. We carry out human subject tests that are the first of their kind to isolate the effect of algorithmic explanations on a key aspect of model interpretability, simulatability, while avoiding important confounding experimental factors. A model is simulatable when a person can predict its behavior on new inputs. Through two kinds of simulation tests involving text and tabular data, we evaluate five explanations methods: (1) LIME, (2) Anchor, (3) Decision Boundary, (4) a Prototype model, and (5) a Composite approach that combines explanations from each method. Clear evidence of method effectiveness is found in very few cases: LIME improves simulatability in tabular classification, and our Prototype method is effective in counterfactual simulation tests. We also collect subjective ratings of explanations, but we do not find that ratings are predictive of how helpful explanations are. Our results provide the first reliable and comprehensive estimates of how explanations influence simulatability across a variety of explanation methods and data domains. We show that (1) we need to be careful about the metrics we use to evaluate explanation methods, and (2) there is significant room for improvement in current methods. All our supporting code, data, and models are publicly available at: https://github.com/peterbhase/InterpretableNLP-ACL2020

Counterfactual explanations are attracting significant attention due to the flourishing applications of machine learning models in consequential domains. A counterfactual plan consists of multiple possibilities to modify a given instance so that the model's prediction will be altered. As the predictive model can be updated subject to the future arrival of new data, a counterfactual plan may become ineffective or infeasible with respect to the future values of the model parameters. In this work, we study the counterfactual plans under model uncertainty, in which the distribution of the model parameters is partially prescribed using only the first- and second-moment information. First, we propose an uncertainty quantification tool to compute the lower and upper bounds of the probability of validity for any given counterfactual plan. We then provide corrective methods to adjust the counterfactual plan to improve the validity measure. The numerical experiments validate our bounds and demonstrate that our correction increases the robustness of the counterfactual plans in different real-world datasets.

Nowadays, deep vision models are being widely deployed in safety-critical applications, e.g., autonomous driving, and explainability of such models is becoming a pressing concern. Among explanation methods, counterfactual explanations aim to find minimal and interpretable changes to the input image that would also change the output of the model to be explained. Such explanations point end-users at the main factors that impact the decision of the model. However, previous methods struggle to explain decision models trained on images with many objects, e.g., urban scenes, which are more difficult to work with but also arguably more critical to explain. In this work, we propose to tackle this issue with an object-centric framework for counterfactual explanation generation. Our method, inspired by recent generative modeling works, encodes the query image into a latent space that is structured in a way to ease object-level manipulations. Doing so, it provides the end-user with control over which search directions (e.g., spatial displacement of objects, style modification, etc.) are to be explored during the counterfactual generation. We conduct a set of experiments on counterfactual explanation benchmarks for driving scenes, and we show that our method can be adapted beyond classification, e.g., to explain semantic segmentation models. To complete our analysis, we design and run a user study that measures the usefulness of counterfactual explanations in understanding a decision model. Code is available at https://github.com/valeoai/OCTET.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory explains how the appearance of purposive design in the sophisticated adaptations of living organisms can have come about without their intentionally being designed. The explanation relies crucially on the possibility of certain physical processes: mainly, gene replication and natural selection. In this paper I show that for those processes to be possible without the design of biological adaptations being encoded in the laws of physics, those laws must have certain other properties. The theory of what these properties are is not part of evolution theory proper, and has not been developed, yet without it the neo-Darwinian theory does not fully achieve its purpose of explaining the appearance of design. To this end I apply Constructor Theory's new mode of explanation to provide an exact formulation of the appearance of design, of no-design laws, and of the logic of self-reproduction and natural selection, within fundamental physics. I conclude that self-reproduction, replication and natural selection are possible under no-design laws, the only non-trivial condition being that they allow digital information to be physically instantiated. This has an exact characterisation in the constructor theory of information. I also show that under no-design laws an accurate replicator requires the existence of a "vehicle" constituting, together with the replicator, a self-reproducer.

We discuss an algorithm which produces the meaning of a sentence given meanings of its words, and its resemblance to quantum teleportation. In fact, this protocol was the main source of inspiration for this algorithm which has many applications in the area of Natural Language Processing.

Explainability methods for NLP systems encounter a version of the fundamental problem of causal inference: for a given ground-truth input text, we never truly observe the counterfactual texts necessary for isolating the causal effects of model representations on outputs. In response, many explainability methods make no use of counterfactual texts, assuming they will be unavailable. In this paper, we show that robust causal explainability methods can be created using approximate counterfactuals, which can be written by humans to approximate a specific counterfactual or simply sampled using metadata-guided heuristics. The core of our proposal is the Causal Proxy Model (CPM). A CPM explains a black-box model N because it is trained to have the same actual input/output behavior as N while creating neural representations that can be intervened upon to simulate the counterfactual input/output behavior of N. Furthermore, we show that the best CPM for N performs comparably to N in making factual predictions, which means that the CPM can simply replace N, leading to more explainable deployed models. Our code is available at https://github.com/frankaging/Causal-Proxy-Model.

Interpretability is the study of explaining models in understandable terms to humans. At present, interpretability is divided into two paradigms: the intrinsic paradigm, which believes that only models designed to be explained can be explained, and the post-hoc paradigm, which believes that black-box models can be explained. At the core of this debate is how each paradigm ensures its explanations are faithful, i.e., true to the model's behavior. This is important, as false but convincing explanations lead to unsupported confidence in artificial intelligence (AI), which can be dangerous. This paper's position is that we should think about new paradigms while staying vigilant regarding faithfulness. First, by examining the history of paradigms in science, we see that paradigms are constantly evolving. Then, by examining the current paradigms, we can understand their underlying beliefs, the value they bring, and their limitations. Finally, this paper presents 3 emerging paradigms for interpretability. The first paradigm designs models such that faithfulness can be easily measured. Another optimizes models such that explanations become faithful. The last paradigm proposes to develop models that produce both a prediction and an explanation.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Contrastive explanations, where one decision is explained in contrast to another, are supposed to be closer to how humans explain a decision than non-contrastive explanations, where the decision is not necessarily referenced to an alternative. This claim has never been empirically validated. We analyze four English text-classification datasets (SST2, DynaSent, BIOS and DBpedia-Animals). We fine-tune and extract explanations from three different models (RoBERTa, GTP-2, and T5), each in three different sizes and apply three post-hoc explainability methods (LRP, GradientxInput, GradNorm). We furthermore collect and release human rationale annotations for a subset of 100 samples from the BIOS dataset for contrastive and non-contrastive settings. A cross-comparison between model-based rationales and human annotations, both in contrastive and non-contrastive settings, yields a high agreement between the two settings for models as well as for humans. Moreover, model-based explanations computed in both settings align equally well with human rationales. Thus, we empirically find that humans do not necessarily explain in a contrastive manner.9 pages, long paper at ACL 2022 proceedings.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

In science and medicine, model interpretations may be reported as discoveries of natural phenomena or used to guide patient treatments. In such high-stakes tasks, false discoveries may lead investigators astray. These applications would therefore benefit from control over the finite-sample error rate of interpretations. We reframe black box model interpretability as a multiple hypothesis testing problem. The task is to discover "important" features by testing whether the model prediction is significantly different from what would be expected if the features were replaced with uninformative counterfactuals. We propose two testing methods: one that provably controls the false discovery rate but which is not yet feasible for large-scale applications, and an approximate testing method which can be applied to real-world data sets. In simulation, both tests have high power relative to existing interpretability methods. When applied to state-of-the-art vision and language models, the framework selects features that intuitively explain model predictions. The resulting explanations have the additional advantage that they are themselves easy to interpret.

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.

Most modern approaches for audio processing are opaque, in the sense that they do not provide an explanation for their decisions. For this reason, various methods have been proposed to explain the outputs generated by these models. Good explanations can result in interesting insights about the data or the model, as well as increase trust in the system. Unfortunately, evaluating the quality of explanations is far from trivial since, for most tasks, there is no clear ground truth explanation to use as reference. In this work, we propose a benchmark for time-localized explanations for audio classification models that uses time annotations of target events as a proxy for ground truth explanations. We use this benchmark to systematically optimize and compare various approaches for model-agnostic post-hoc explanation, obtaining, in some cases, close to perfect explanations. Finally, we illustrate the utility of the explanations for uncovering spurious correlations.

Language technologies that accurately model the dynamics of events must perform commonsense reasoning. Existing work evaluating commonsense reasoning focuses on making inferences about common, everyday situations. To instead investigate the ability to model unusual, unexpected, and unlikely situations, we explore the task of uncommonsense abductive reasoning. Given a piece of context with an unexpected outcome, this task requires reasoning abductively to generate a natural language explanation that makes the unexpected outcome more likely in the context. To this end, we curate and release a new English language corpus called UNcommonsense. We characterize the differences between the performance of human explainers and the best performing large language models, finding that model-enhanced human-written explanations achieve the highest quality by trading off between specificity and diversity. Finally, we experiment with several online imitation learning algorithms to train open and accessible language models on this task. When compared with the vanilla supervised fine-tuning approach, these methods consistently reduce lose rates on both common and uncommonsense abductive reasoning judged by human evaluators.

In the last years many accurate decision support systems have been constructed as black boxes, that is as systems that hide their internal logic to the user. This lack of explanation constitutes both a practical and an ethical issue. The literature reports many approaches aimed at overcoming this crucial weakness sometimes at the cost of scarifying accuracy for interpretability. The applications in which black box decision systems can be used are various, and each approach is typically developed to provide a solution for a specific problem and, as a consequence, delineating explicitly or implicitly its own definition of interpretability and explanation. The aim of this paper is to provide a classification of the main problems addressed in the literature with respect to the notion of explanation and the type of black box system. Given a problem definition, a black box type, and a desired explanation this survey should help the researcher to find the proposals more useful for his own work. The proposed classification of approaches to open black box models should also be useful for putting the many research open questions in perspective.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue goals across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.

We introduce Explanatory Learning (EL), a framework to let machines use existing knowledge buried in symbolic sequences -- e.g. explanations written in hieroglyphic -- by autonomously learning to interpret them. In EL, the burden of interpreting symbols is not left to humans or rigid human-coded compilers, as done in Program Synthesis. Rather, EL calls for a learned interpreter, built upon a limited collection of symbolic sequences paired with observations of several phenomena. This interpreter can be used to make predictions on a novel phenomenon given its explanation, and even to find that explanation using only a handful of observations, like human scientists do. We formulate the EL problem as a simple binary classification task, so that common end-to-end approaches aligned with the dominant empiricist view of machine learning could, in principle, solve it. To these models, we oppose Critical Rationalist Networks (CRNs), which instead embrace a rationalist view on the acquisition of knowledge. CRNs express several desired properties by construction, they are truly explainable, can adjust their processing at test-time for harder inferences, and can offer strong confidence guarantees on their predictions. As a final contribution, we introduce Odeen, a basic EL environment that simulates a small flatland-style universe full of phenomena to explain. Using Odeen as a testbed, we show how CRNs outperform empiricist end-to-end approaches of similar size and architecture (Transformers) in discovering explanations for novel phenomena.

Newly-developed large language models (LLM) -- because of how they are trained and designed -- are implicit computational models of humans -- a homo silicus. These models can be used the same way economists use homo economicus: they can be given endowments, information, preferences, and so on and then their behavior can be explored in scenarios via simulation. I demonstrate this approach using OpenAI's GPT3 with experiments derived from Charness and Rabin (2002), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). The findings are qualitatively similar to the original results, but it is also trivially easy to try variations that offer fresh insights. Departing from the traditional laboratory paradigm, I also create a hiring scenario where an employer faces applicants that differ in experience and wage ask and then analyze how a minimum wage affects realized wages and the extent of labor-labor substitution.

We provide an optimization-based framework to perform counterfactual analysis in a dynamic model with hidden states. Our framework is grounded in the ``abduction, action, and prediction'' approach to answer counterfactual queries and handles two key challenges where (1) the states are hidden and (2) the model is dynamic. Recognizing the lack of knowledge on the underlying causal mechanism and the possibility of infinitely many such mechanisms, we optimize over this space and compute upper and lower bounds on the counterfactual quantity of interest. Our work brings together ideas from causality, state-space models, simulation, and optimization, and we apply it on a breast cancer case study. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to compute lower and upper bounds on a counterfactual query in a dynamic latent-state model.

Many believe that Large Language Models (LLMs) open the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Some see opportunities while others see dangers. Yet both proponents and opponents grasp AI through the imagery popularised by science fiction. Will the machine become sentient and rebel against its creators? Will we experience a paperclip apocalypse? Before answering such questions, we should first ask whether this mental imagery provides a good description of the phenomenon at hand. Understanding weather patterns through the moods of the gods only goes so far. The present paper instead advocates understanding LLMs and their connection to AI through the imagery of Jorge Luis Borges, a master of 20th century literature, forerunner of magical realism, and precursor to postmodern literature. This exercise leads to a new perspective that illuminates the relation between language modelling and artificial intelligence.

With the advent of larger and more complex deep learning models, such as in Natural Language Processing (NLP), model qualities like explainability and interpretability, albeit highly desirable, are becoming harder challenges to tackle and solve. For example, state-of-the-art models in text classification are black-box by design. Although standard explanation methods provide some degree of explainability, these are mostly correlation-based methods and do not provide much insight into the model. The alternative of causal explainability is more desirable to achieve but extremely challenging in NLP due to a variety of reasons. Inspired by recent endeavors to utilize Large Language Models (LLMs) as experts, in this work, we aim to leverage the instruction-following and textual understanding capabilities of recent state-of-the-art LLMs to facilitate causal explainability via counterfactual explanation generation for black-box text classifiers. To do this, we propose a three-step pipeline via which, we use an off-the-shelf LLM to: (1) identify the latent or unobserved features in the input text, (2) identify the input features associated with the latent features, and finally (3) use the identified input features to generate a counterfactual explanation. We experiment with our pipeline on multiple NLP text classification datasets, with several recent LLMs, and present interesting and promising findings.

In this work, we develop a technique to produce counterfactual visual explanations. Given a 'query' image I for which a vision system predicts class c, a counterfactual visual explanation identifies how I could change such that the system would output a different specified class c'. To do this, we select a 'distractor' image I' that the system predicts as class c' and identify spatial regions in I and I' such that replacing the identified region in I with the identified region in I' would push the system towards classifying I as c'. We apply our approach to multiple image classification datasets generating qualitative results showcasing the interpretability and discriminativeness of our counterfactual explanations. To explore the effectiveness of our explanations in teaching humans, we present machine teaching experiments for the task of fine-grained bird classification. We find that users trained to distinguish bird species fare better when given access to counterfactual explanations in addition to training examples.

Most work in machine reading focuses on question answering problems where the answer is directly expressed in the text to read. However, many real-world question answering problems require the reading of text not because it contains the literal answer, but because it contains a recipe to derive an answer together with the reader's background knowledge. One example is the task of interpreting regulations to answer "Can I...?" or "Do I have to...?" questions such as "I am working in Canada. Do I have to carry on paying UK National Insurance?" after reading a UK government website about this topic. This task requires both the interpretation of rules and the application of background knowledge. It is further complicated due to the fact that, in practice, most questions are underspecified, and a human assistant will regularly have to ask clarification questions such as "How long have you been working abroad?" when the answer cannot be directly derived from the question and text. In this paper, we formalise this task and develop a crowd-sourcing strategy to collect 32k task instances based on real-world rules and crowd-generated questions and scenarios. We analyse the challenges of this task and assess its difficulty by evaluating the performance of rule-based and machine-learning baselines. We observe promising results when no background knowledge is necessary, and substantial room for improvement whenever background knowledge is needed.

Explainability has become an important topic in computer science and artificial intelligence, leading to a subfield called Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). The goal of providing or seeking explanations is to achieve (better) 'understanding' on the part of the explainee. However, what it means to 'understand' is still not clearly defined, and the concept itself is rarely the subject of scientific investigation. This conceptual article aims to present a model of forms of understanding for XAI-explanations and beyond. From an interdisciplinary perspective bringing together computer science, linguistics, sociology, philosophy and psychology, a definition of understanding and its forms, assessment, and dynamics during the process of giving everyday explanations are explored. Two types of understanding are considered as possible outcomes of explanations, namely enabledness, 'knowing how' to do or decide something, and comprehension, 'knowing that' -- both in different degrees (from shallow to deep). Explanations regularly start with shallow understanding in a specific domain and can lead to deep comprehension and enabledness of the explanandum, which we see as a prerequisite for human users to gain agency. In this process, the increase of comprehension and enabledness are highly interdependent. Against the background of this systematization, special challenges of understanding in XAI are discussed.

Thinking about the future is one of the important activities that people do in daily life. Futurists also pay a lot of effort into figuring out possible scenarios for the future. We argue that the exploration of this direction is still in an early stage in the NLP research. To this end, we propose three argument generation tasks in the financial application scenario. Our experimental results show these tasks are still big challenges for representative generation models. Based on our empirical results, we further point out several unresolved issues and challenges in this research direction.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Natural language is an appealing medium for explaining how large language models process and store information, but evaluating the faithfulness of such explanations is challenging. To help address this, we develop two modes of evaluation for natural language explanations that claim individual neurons represent a concept in a text input. In the observational mode, we evaluate claims that a neuron a activates on all and only input strings that refer to a concept picked out by the proposed explanation E. In the intervention mode, we construe E as a claim that the neuron a is a causal mediator of the concept denoted by E. We apply our framework to the GPT-4-generated explanations of GPT-2 XL neurons of Bills et al. (2023) and show that even the most confident explanations have high error rates and little to no causal efficacy. We close the paper by critically assessing whether natural language is a good choice for explanations and whether neurons are the best level of analysis.

We propose CX-ToM, short for counterfactual explanations with theory-of mind, a new explainable AI (XAI) framework for explaining decisions made by a deep convolutional neural network (CNN). In contrast to the current methods in XAI that generate explanations as a single shot response, we pose explanation as an iterative communication process, i.e. dialog, between the machine and human user. More concretely, our CX-ToM framework generates sequence of explanations in a dialog by mediating the differences between the minds of machine and human user. To do this, we use Theory of Mind (ToM) which helps us in explicitly modeling human's intention, machine's mind as inferred by the human as well as human's mind as inferred by the machine. Moreover, most state-of-the-art XAI frameworks provide attention (or heat map) based explanations. In our work, we show that these attention based explanations are not sufficient for increasing human trust in the underlying CNN model. In CX-ToM, we instead use counterfactual explanations called fault-lines which we define as follows: given an input image I for which a CNN classification model M predicts class c_pred, a fault-line identifies the minimal semantic-level features (e.g., stripes on zebra, pointed ears of dog), referred to as explainable concepts, that need to be added to or deleted from I in order to alter the classification category of I by M to another specified class c_alt. We argue that, due to the iterative, conceptual and counterfactual nature of CX-ToM explanations, our framework is practical and more natural for both expert and non-expert users to understand the internal workings of complex deep learning models. Extensive quantitative and qualitative experiments verify our hypotheses, demonstrating that our CX-ToM significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art explainable AI models.

We explain how the so-called Einstein locality is to be understood in the Schr\"odinger picture of quantum mechanics. This notion is perfectly compatible with the Bell non-locality exhibited by entangled states. Contrary to some beliefs that quantum mechanics is incomplete, it is, in fact, its overcompleteness as exemplified by different pictures of quantum physics, that points to the same underlying reality.

AI video generation is undergoing a revolution, with quality and realism advancing rapidly. These advances have led to a passionate scientific debate: Do video models learn ``world models'' that discover laws of physics -- or, alternatively, are they merely sophisticated pixel predictors that achieve visual realism without understanding the physical principles of reality? We address this question by developing Physics-IQ, a comprehensive benchmark dataset that can only be solved by acquiring a deep understanding of various physical principles, like fluid dynamics, optics, solid mechanics, magnetism and thermodynamics. We find that across a range of current models (Sora, Runway, Pika, Lumiere, Stable Video Diffusion, and VideoPoet), physical understanding is severely limited, and unrelated to visual realism. At the same time, some test cases can already be successfully solved. This indicates that acquiring certain physical principles from observation alone may be possible, but significant challenges remain. While we expect rapid advances ahead, our work demonstrates that visual realism does not imply physical understanding. Our project page is at https://physics-iq.github.io; code at https://github.com/google-deepmind/physics-IQ-benchmark.

Research in mechanistic interpretability seeks to explain behaviors of machine learning models in terms of their internal components. However, most previous work either focuses on simple behaviors in small models, or describes complicated behaviors in larger models with broad strokes. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting an explanation for how GPT-2 small performs a natural language task called indirect object identification (IOI). Our explanation encompasses 26 attention heads grouped into 7 main classes, which we discovered using a combination of interpretability approaches relying on causal interventions. To our knowledge, this investigation is the largest end-to-end attempt at reverse-engineering a natural behavior "in the wild" in a language model. We evaluate the reliability of our explanation using three quantitative criteria--faithfulness, completeness and minimality. Though these criteria support our explanation, they also point to remaining gaps in our understanding. Our work provides evidence that a mechanistic understanding of large ML models is feasible, opening opportunities to scale our understanding to both larger models and more complex tasks.

The notions of disintegration and Bayesian inversion are fundamental in conditional probability theory. They produce channels, as conditional probabilities, from a joint state, or from an already given channel (in opposite direction). These notions exist in the literature, in concrete situations, but are presented here in abstract graphical formulations. The resulting abstract descriptions are used for proving basic results in conditional probability theory. The existence of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is discussed for discrete probability, and also for measure-theoretic probability --- via standard Borel spaces and via likelihoods. Finally, the usefulness of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is illustrated in several examples.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Recent advances in eXplainable AI (XAI) have provided new insights into how models for vision, language, and tabular data operate. However, few approaches exist for understanding speech models. Existing work focuses on a few spoken language understanding (SLU) tasks, and explanations are difficult to interpret for most users. We introduce a new approach to explain speech classification models. We generate easy-to-interpret explanations via input perturbation on two information levels. 1) Word-level explanations reveal how each word-related audio segment impacts the outcome. 2) Paralinguistic features (e.g., prosody and background noise) answer the counterfactual: ``What would the model prediction be if we edited the audio signal in this way?'' We validate our approach by explaining two state-of-the-art SLU models on two speech classification tasks in English and Italian. Our findings demonstrate that the explanations are faithful to the model's inner workings and plausible to humans. Our method and findings pave the way for future research on interpreting speech models.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Natural language reasoning plays an increasingly important role in improving language models' ability to solve complex language understanding tasks. An interesting use case for reasoning is the resolution of context-dependent ambiguity. But no resources exist to evaluate how well Large Language Models can use explicit reasoning to resolve ambiguity in language. We propose to use ambiguous definite descriptions for this purpose and create and publish the first benchmark dataset consisting of such phrases. Our method includes all information required to resolve the ambiguity in the prompt, which means a model does not require anything but reasoning to do well. We find this to be a challenging task for recent LLMs. Code and data available at: https://github.com/sfschouten/exploiting-ambiguity

Explanatory inference is the creation and evaluation of hypotheses that provide explanations, and is sometimes known as abduction or abductive inference. Generative AI is a new set of artificial intelligence models based on novel algorithms for generating text, images, and sounds. This paper proposes a set of benchmarks for assessing the ability of AI programs to perform explanatory inference, and uses them to determine the extent to which ChatGPT, a leading generative AI model, is capable of making explanatory inferences. Tests on the benchmarks reveal that ChatGPT performs creative and evaluative inferences in many domains, although it is limited to verbal and visual modalities. Claims that ChatGPT and similar models are incapable of explanation, understanding, causal reasoning, meaning, and creativity are rebutted.

This thesis explores open-sourced machine learning (ML) model explanation tools to understand whether these tools can allow a layman to visualize, understand, and suggest intuitive remedies to unfairness in ML-based decision-support systems. Machine learning models trained on datasets biased against minority groups are increasingly used to guide life-altering social decisions, prompting the urgent need to study their logic for unfairness. Due to this problem's impact on vast populations of the general public, it is critical for the layperson -- not just subject matter experts in social justice or machine learning experts -- to understand the nature of unfairness within these algorithms and the potential trade-offs. Existing research on fairness in machine learning focuses mostly on the mathematical definitions and tools to understand and remedy unfair models, with some directly citing user-interactive tools as necessary for future work. This thesis presents FairLay-ML, a proof-of-concept GUI integrating some of the most promising tools to provide intuitive explanations for unfair logic in ML models by integrating existing research tools (e.g. Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations) with existing ML-focused GUI (e.g. Python Streamlit). We test FairLay-ML using models of various accuracy and fairness generated by an unfairness detector tool, Parfait-ML, and validate our results using Themis. Our study finds that the technology stack used for FairLay-ML makes it easy to install and provides real-time black-box explanations of pre-trained models to users. Furthermore, the explanations provided translate to actionable remedies.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

In this report, we argue that there is a realistic possibility that some AI systems will be conscious and/or robustly agentic in the near future. That means that the prospect of AI welfare and moral patienthood, i.e. of AI systems with their own interests and moral significance, is no longer an issue only for sci-fi or the distant future. It is an issue for the near future, and AI companies and other actors have a responsibility to start taking it seriously. We also recommend three early steps that AI companies and other actors can take: They can (1) acknowledge that AI welfare is an important and difficult issue (and ensure that language model outputs do the same), (2) start assessing AI systems for evidence of consciousness and robust agency, and (3) prepare policies and procedures for treating AI systems with an appropriate level of moral concern. To be clear, our argument in this report is not that AI systems definitely are, or will be, conscious, robustly agentic, or otherwise morally significant. Instead, our argument is that there is substantial uncertainty about these possibilities, and so we need to improve our understanding of AI welfare and our ability to make wise decisions about this issue. Otherwise there is a significant risk that we will mishandle decisions about AI welfare, mistakenly harming AI systems that matter morally and/or mistakenly caring for AI systems that do not.

Observation of an exploding black hole would provide the first direct evidence of primordial black holes, the first direct evidence of Hawking radiation, and definitive information on the particles present in nature. However, indirect constraints suggest that direct observation of an exploding Schwarzschild black hole is implausible. We introduce a dark-QED toy model consisting of a dark photon and a heavy dark electron. In this scenario a population of light primordial black holes charged under the dark u(1) symmetry can become quasi-extremal, so they survive much longer than if they were uncharged, before discharging and exhibiting a Schwarzschild-like final explosion. We show that the answer is "yes", in this scenario the probability of observing an exploding black hole over the next 10 years could potentially be over 90%.

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory -- the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems -- leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.

Amid a discussion about Green AI in which we see explainability neglected, we explore the possibility to efficiently approximate computationally expensive explainers. To this end, we propose feature attribution modelling with Empirical Explainers. Empirical Explainers learn from data to predict the attribution maps of expensive explainers. We train and test Empirical Explainers in the language domain and find that they model their expensive counterparts surprisingly well, at a fraction of the cost. They could thus mitigate the computational burden of neural explanations significantly, in applications that tolerate an approximation error.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

We provide here a dataset for tasks related to natural language understanding and natural language inference. The dataset contains logical puzzles in natural language from three domains: comparing puzzles, knighs and knaves, and zebra puzzles. Each puzzle is associated with the entire set of atomic questions that can be generated based on the relations and individuals occurring in the text. For each question we provide the correct answer: entailment, contradiction or ambiguity. The answer's correctness is verified against theorem provers. Good puzzles have two properties: (i) each piece of information is necessary and (ii) no unnecessary information is provided. These properties make puzzles interesting candidates for machine comprehension tasks.

Automated rationale generation is an approach for real-time explanation generation whereby a computational model learns to translate an autonomous agent's internal state and action data representations into natural language. Training on human explanation data can enable agents to learn to generate human-like explanations for their behavior. In this paper, using the context of an agent that plays Frogger, we describe (a) how to collect a corpus of explanations, (b) how to train a neural rationale generator to produce different styles of rationales, and (c) how people perceive these rationales. We conducted two user studies. The first study establishes the plausibility of each type of generated rationale and situates their user perceptions along the dimensions of confidence, humanlike-ness, adequate justification, and understandability. The second study further explores user preferences between the generated rationales with regard to confidence in the autonomous agent, communicating failure and unexpected behavior. Overall, we find alignment between the intended differences in features of the generated rationales and the perceived differences by users. Moreover, context permitting, participants preferred detailed rationales to form a stable mental model of the agent's behavior.

Throughout the course of my Ph.D., I have been designing the user experience (UX) of various machine learning (ML) systems. In this workshop, I share two projects as case studies in which people engage with ML in much more complicated and nuanced ways than the technical HCML work might assume. The first case study describes how cardiology teams in three hospitals used a clinical decision-support system that helps them decide whether and when to implant an artificial heart to a heart failure patient. I demonstrate that physicians cannot draw on their decision-making experience by seeing only patient data on paper. They are also confused by some fundamental premises upon which ML operates. For example, physicians asked: Are ML predictions made based on clinicians' best efforts? Is it ethical to make decisions based on previous patients' collective outcomes? In the second case study, my collaborators and I designed an intelligent text editor, with the goal of improving authors' writing experience with NLP (Natural Language Processing) technologies. We prototyped a number of generative functionalities where the system provides phrase-or-sentence-level writing suggestions upon user request. When writing with the prototype, however, authors shared that they need to "see where the sentence is going two paragraphs later" in order to decide whether the suggestion aligns with their writing; Some even considered adopting machine suggestions as plagiarism, therefore "is simply wrong". By sharing these unexpected and intriguing responses from these real-world ML users, I hope to start a discussion about such previously-unknown complexities and nuances of -- as the workshop proposal states -- "putting ML at the service of people in a way that is accessible, useful, and trustworthy to all".

Despite the recent proliferation of large language models (LLMs), their training recipes -- model architecture, pre-training data and optimization algorithm -- are often very similar. This naturally raises the question of the similarity among the resulting models. In this paper, we propose a novel setting, imaginary question answering (IQA), to better understand model similarity. In IQA, we ask one model to generate purely imaginary questions (e.g., on completely made-up concepts in physics) and prompt another model to answer. Surprisingly, despite the total fictionality of these questions, all models can answer each other's questions with remarkable success, suggesting a "shared imagination space" in which these models operate during such hallucinations. We conduct a series of investigations into this phenomenon and discuss implications on model homogeneity, hallucination, and computational creativity.

Despite the proliferation of explainable AI (XAI) methods, little is understood about end-users' explainability needs and behaviors around XAI explanations. To address this gap and contribute to understanding how explainability can support human-AI interaction, we conducted a mixed-methods study with 20 end-users of a real-world AI application, the Merlin bird identification app, and inquired about their XAI needs, uses, and perceptions. We found that participants desire practically useful information that can improve their collaboration with the AI, more so than technical system details. Relatedly, participants intended to use XAI explanations for various purposes beyond understanding the AI's outputs: calibrating trust, improving their task skills, changing their behavior to supply better inputs to the AI, and giving constructive feedback to developers. Finally, among existing XAI approaches, participants preferred part-based explanations that resemble human reasoning and explanations. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide recommendations for future XAI design.

We present a new probing dataset named PROST: Physical Reasoning about Objects Through Space and Time. This dataset contains 18,736 multiple-choice questions made from 14 manually curated templates, covering 10 physical reasoning concepts. All questions are designed to probe both causal and masked language models in a zero-shot setting. We conduct an extensive analysis which demonstrates that state-of-the-art pretrained models are inadequate at physical reasoning: they are influenced by the order in which answer options are presented to them, they struggle when the superlative in a question is inverted (e.g., most <-> least), and increasing the amount of pretraining data and parameters only yields minimal improvements. These results provide support for the hypothesis that current pretrained models' ability to reason about physical interactions is inherently limited by a lack of real world experience. By highlighting these limitations, we hope to motivate the development of models with a human-like understanding of the physical world.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited remarkable capabilities in learning from explanations in prompts, but there has been limited understanding of exactly how these explanations function or why they are effective. This work aims to better understand the mechanisms by which explanations are used for in-context learning. We first study the impact of two different factors on the performance of prompts with explanations: the computation trace (the way the solution is decomposed) and the natural language used to express the prompt. By perturbing explanations on three controlled tasks, we show that both factors contribute to the effectiveness of explanations. We further study how to form maximally effective sets of explanations for solving a given test query. We find that LLMs can benefit from the complementarity of the explanation set: diverse reasoning skills shown by different exemplars can lead to better performance. Therefore, we propose a maximal marginal relevance-based exemplar selection approach for constructing exemplar sets that are both relevant as well as complementary, which successfully improves the in-context learning performance across three real-world tasks on multiple LLMs.

We consider objective evaluation measures of saliency explanations for complex black-box machine learning models. We propose simple robust variants of two notions that have been considered in recent literature: (in)fidelity, and sensitivity. We analyze optimal explanations with respect to both these measures, and while the optimal explanation for sensitivity is a vacuous constant explanation, the optimal explanation for infidelity is a novel combination of two popular explanation methods. By varying the perturbation distribution that defines infidelity, we obtain novel explanations by optimizing infidelity, which we show to out-perform existing explanations in both quantitative and qualitative measurements. Another salient question given these measures is how to modify any given explanation to have better values with respect to these measures. We propose a simple modification based on lowering sensitivity, and moreover show that when done appropriately, we could simultaneously improve both sensitivity as well as fidelity.

Counterfactual explanations is one of the post-hoc methods used to provide explainability to machine learning models that have been attracting attention in recent years. Most examples in the literature, address the problem of generating post-hoc explanations for black-box machine learning models after the rejection of a loan application. In contrast, in this work, we investigate mathematical programming formulations for scorecard models, a type of interpretable model predominant within the banking industry for lending. The proposed mixed-integer programming formulations combine objective functions to ensure close, realistic and sparse counterfactuals using multi-objective optimization techniques for a binary, probability or continuous outcome. Moreover, we extend these formulations to generate multiple optimal counterfactuals simultaneously while guaranteeing diversity. Experiments on two real-world datasets confirm that the presented approach can generate optimal diverse counterfactuals addressing desired properties with assumable CPU times for practice use.

Causal explanations of the predictions of NLP systems are essential to ensure safety and establish trust. Yet, existing methods often fall short of explaining model predictions effectively or efficiently and are often model-specific. In this paper, we address model-agnostic explanations, proposing two approaches for counterfactual (CF) approximation. The first approach is CF generation, where a large language model (LLM) is prompted to change a specific text concept while keeping confounding concepts unchanged. While this approach is demonstrated to be very effective, applying LLM at inference-time is costly. We hence present a second approach based on matching, and propose a method that is guided by an LLM at training-time and learns a dedicated embedding space. This space is faithful to a given causal graph and effectively serves to identify matches that approximate CFs. After showing theoretically that approximating CFs is required in order to construct faithful explanations, we benchmark our approaches and explain several models, including LLMs with billions of parameters. Our empirical results demonstrate the excellent performance of CF generation models as model-agnostic explainers. Moreover, our matching approach, which requires far less test-time resources, also provides effective explanations, surpassing many baselines. We also find that Top-K techniques universally improve every tested method. Finally, we showcase the potential of LLMs in constructing new benchmarks for model explanation and subsequently validate our conclusions. Our work illuminates new pathways for efficient and accurate approaches to interpreting NLP systems.

Given the growing importance of AI literacy, we decided to write this tutorial to help narrow the gap between the discourse among those who study language models -- the core technology underlying ChatGPT and similar products -- and those who are intrigued and want to learn more about them. In short, we believe the perspective of researchers and educators can add some clarity to the public's understanding of the technologies beyond what's currently available, which tends to be either extremely technical or promotional material generated about products by their purveyors. Our approach teases apart the concept of a language model from products built on them, from the behaviors attributed to or desired from those products, and from claims about similarity to human cognition. As a starting point, we (1) offer a scientific viewpoint that focuses on questions amenable to study through experimentation; (2) situate language models as they are today in the context of the research that led to their development; and (3) describe the boundaries of what is known about the models at this writing.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Understanding natural language requires common sense, one aspect of which is the ability to discern the plausibility of events. While distributional models -- most recently pre-trained, Transformer language models -- have demonstrated improvements in modeling event plausibility, their performance still falls short of humans'. In this work, we show that Transformer-based plausibility models are markedly inconsistent across the conceptual classes of a lexical hierarchy, inferring that "a person breathing" is plausible while "a dentist breathing" is not, for example. We find this inconsistency persists even when models are softly injected with lexical knowledge, and we present a simple post-hoc method of forcing model consistency that improves correlation with human plausibility judgements.

Interpretability and explainability have gained more and more attention in the field of machine learning as they are crucial when it comes to high-stakes decisions and troubleshooting. Since both provide information about predictors and their decision process, they are often seen as two independent means for one single end. This view has led to a dichotomous literature: explainability techniques designed for complex black-box models, or interpretable approaches ignoring the many explainability tools. In this position paper, we challenge the common idea that interpretability and explainability are substitutes for one another by listing their principal shortcomings and discussing how both of them mitigate the drawbacks of the other. In doing so, we call for a new perspective on interpretability and explainability, and works targeting both topics simultaneously, leveraging each of their respective assets.

We discuss why AI is hard and why physics is simple. We discuss how physical intuition and the approach of theoretical physics can be brought to bear on the field of artificial intelligence and specifically machine learning. We suggest that the underlying project of machine learning and the underlying project of physics are strongly coupled through the principle of sparsity, and we call upon theoretical physicists to work on AI as physicists. As a first step in that direction, we discuss an upcoming book on the principles of deep learning theory that attempts to realize this approach.

There is an analogy that is often made between deep neural networks and actual brains, suggested by the nomenclature itself: the "neurons" in deep neural networks should correspond to neurons (or nerve cells, to avoid confusion) in the brain. We claim, however, that this analogy doesn't even type check: it is structurally flawed. In agreement with the slightly glib summary of Hebbian learning as "cells that fire together wire together", this article makes the case that the analogy should be different. Since the "neurons" in deep neural networks are managing the changing weights, they are more akin to the synapses in the brain; instead, it is the wires in deep neural networks that are more like nerve cells, in that they are what cause the information to flow. An intuition that nerve cells seem like more than mere wires is exactly right, and is justified by a precise category-theoretic analogy which we will explore in this article. Throughout, we will continue to highlight the error in equating artificial neurons with nerve cells by leaving "neuron" in quotes or by calling them artificial neurons. We will first explain how to view deep neural networks as nested dynamical systems with a very restricted sort of interaction pattern, and then explain a more general sort of interaction for dynamical systems that is useful throughout engineering, but which fails to adapt to changing circumstances. As mentioned, an analogy is then forced upon us by the mathematical formalism in which they are both embedded. We call the resulting encompassing generalization deeply interacting learning systems: they have complex interaction as in control theory, but adaptation to circumstances as in deep neural networks.

Neural networks for NLP are becoming increasingly complex and widespread, and there is a growing concern if these models are responsible to use. Explaining models helps to address the safety and ethical concerns and is essential for accountability. Interpretability serves to provide these explanations in terms that are understandable to humans. Additionally, post-hoc methods provide explanations after a model is learned and are generally model-agnostic. This survey provides a categorization of how recent post-hoc interpretability methods communicate explanations to humans, it discusses each method in-depth, and how they are validated, as the latter is often a common concern.

Explaining Artificial Intelligence (AI) decisions is a major challenge nowadays in AI, in particular when applied to sensitive scenarios like medicine and law. However, the need to explain the rationale behind decisions is a main issue also for human-based deliberation as it is important to justify why a certain decision has been taken. Resident medical doctors for instance are required not only to provide a (possibly correct) diagnosis, but also to explain how they reached a certain conclusion. Developing new tools to aid residents to train their explanation skills is therefore a central objective of AI in education. In this paper, we follow this direction, and we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first multilingual dataset for Medical Question Answering where correct and incorrect diagnoses for a clinical case are enriched with a natural language explanation written by doctors. These explanations have been manually annotated with argument components (i.e., premise, claim) and argument relations (i.e., attack, support), resulting in the Multilingual CasiMedicos-Arg dataset which consists of 558 clinical cases in four languages (English, Spanish, French, Italian) with explanations, where we annotated 5021 claims, 2313 premises, 2431 support relations, and 1106 attack relations. We conclude by showing how competitive baselines perform over this challenging dataset for the argument mining task.

Large language models (LLMs) perform better when they produce step-by-step, "Chain-of-Thought" (CoT) reasoning before answering a question, but it is unclear if the stated reasoning is a faithful explanation of the model's actual reasoning (i.e., its process for answering the question). We investigate hypotheses for how CoT reasoning may be unfaithful, by examining how the model predictions change when we intervene on the CoT (e.g., by adding mistakes or paraphrasing it). Models show large variation across tasks in how strongly they condition on the CoT when predicting their answer, sometimes relying heavily on the CoT and other times primarily ignoring it. CoT's performance boost does not seem to come from CoT's added test-time compute alone or from information encoded via the particular phrasing of the CoT. As models become larger and more capable, they produce less faithful reasoning on most tasks we study. Overall, our results suggest that CoT can be faithful if the circumstances such as the model size and task are carefully chosen.

As machine learning models evolve, maintaining transparency demands more human-centric explainable AI techniques. Counterfactual explanations, with roots in human reasoning, identify the minimal input changes needed to obtain a given output and, hence, are crucial for supporting decision-making. Despite their importance, the evaluation of these explanations often lacks grounding in user studies and remains fragmented, with existing metrics not fully capturing human perspectives. To address this challenge, we developed a diverse set of 30 counterfactual scenarios and collected ratings across 8 evaluation metrics from 206 respondents. Subsequently, we fine-tuned different Large Language Models (LLMs) to predict average or individual human judgment across these metrics. Our methodology allowed LLMs to achieve an accuracy of up to 63% in zero-shot evaluations and 85% (over a 3-classes prediction) with fine-tuning across all metrics. The fine-tuned models predicting human ratings offer better comparability and scalability in evaluating different counterfactual explanation frameworks.

We study the probabilistic modeling performed by Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) through the angle of time directionality, addressing a question first raised in (Shannon, 1951). For large enough models, we empirically find a time asymmetry in their ability to learn natural language: a difference in the average log-perplexity when trying to predict the next token versus when trying to predict the previous one. This difference is at the same time subtle and very consistent across various modalities (language, model size, training time, ...). Theoretically, this is surprising: from an information-theoretic point of view, there should be no such difference. We provide a theoretical framework to explain how such an asymmetry can appear from sparsity and computational complexity considerations, and outline a number of perspectives opened by our results.

Saliency post-hoc explainability methods are important tools for understanding increasingly complex NLP models. While these methods can reflect the model's reasoning, they may not align with human intuition, making the explanations not plausible. In this work, we present a methodology for incorporating rationales, which are text annotations explaining human decisions, into text classification models. This incorporation enhances the plausibility of post-hoc explanations while preserving their faithfulness. Our approach is agnostic to model architectures and explainability methods. We introduce the rationales during model training by augmenting the standard cross-entropy loss with a novel loss function inspired by contrastive learning. By leveraging a multi-objective optimization algorithm, we explore the trade-off between the two loss functions and generate a Pareto-optimal frontier of models that balance performance and plausibility. Through extensive experiments involving diverse models, datasets, and explainability methods, we demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances the quality of model explanations without causing substantial (sometimes negligible) degradation in the original model's performance.

Understanding commonsense causality is a unique mark of intelligence for humans. It helps people understand the principles of the real world better and benefits the decision-making process related to causation. For instance, commonsense causality is crucial in judging whether a defendant's action causes the plaintiff's loss in determining legal liability. Despite its significance, a systematic exploration of this topic is notably lacking. Our comprehensive survey bridges this gap by focusing on taxonomies, benchmarks, acquisition methods, qualitative reasoning, and quantitative measurements in commonsense causality, synthesizing insights from over 200 representative articles. Our work aims to provide a systematic overview, update scholars on recent advancements, provide a pragmatic guide for beginners, and highlight promising future research directions in this vital field.

This paper is an attempt to explain all the matrix calculus you need in order to understand the training of deep neural networks. We assume no math knowledge beyond what you learned in calculus 1, and provide links to help you refresh the necessary math where needed. Note that you do not need to understand this material before you start learning to train and use deep learning in practice; rather, this material is for those who are already familiar with the basics of neural networks, and wish to deepen their understanding of the underlying math. Don't worry if you get stuck at some point along the way---just go back and reread the previous section, and try writing down and working through some examples. And if you're still stuck, we're happy to answer your questions in the Theory category at forums.fast.ai. Note: There is a reference section at the end of the paper summarizing all the key matrix calculus rules and terminology discussed here. See related articles at http://explained.ai

This explainer document aims to provide an overview of the current state of the rapidly expanding work on synthetic data technologies, with a particular focus on privacy. The article is intended for a non-technical audience, though some formal definitions have been given to provide clarity to specialists. This article is intended to enable the reader to quickly become familiar with the notion of synthetic data, as well as understand some of the subtle intricacies that come with it. We do believe that synthetic data is a very useful tool, and our hope is that this report highlights that, while drawing attention to nuances that can easily be overlooked in its deployment.

We attack the state-of-the-art Go-playing AI system KataGo by training adversarial policies that play against frozen KataGo victims. Our attack achieves a >99% win rate when KataGo uses no tree search, and a >97% win rate when KataGo uses enough search to be superhuman. We train our adversaries with a modified KataGo implementation, using less than 14% of the compute used to train the original KataGo. Notably, our adversaries do not win by learning to play Go better than KataGo -- in fact, our adversaries are easily beaten by human amateurs. Instead, our adversaries win by tricking KataGo into making serious blunders. Our attack transfers zero-shot to other superhuman Go-playing AIs, and is interpretable to the extent that human experts can successfully implement it, without algorithmic assistance, to consistently beat superhuman AIs. Our results demonstrate that even superhuman AI systems may harbor surprising failure modes. Example games are available at https://goattack.far.ai/.

Significant progress has been made over the past decades towards unveiling the sources of the most energetic particles in nature, the ultra-high-energy cosmic rays (UHECRs). Despite these advancements, the exact astrophysical sites capable of accelerating these particles to such extreme energies remain largely unknown. Moreover, the mechanisms by which they achieve these extreme energies are poorly understood. Here, I provide a concise overview of the theory underlying the acceleration and propagation of UHECRs. I then critically discuss three recent results that could help unveil their origins: the reported excess around Centaurus A, the correlation with starburst galaxies, and the efforts to jointly model the energy spectrum, composition, and arrival directions. Finally, I discuss strategies for advancing this field, emphasising the need for refined theoretical models, the challenges in building them, and the potential for new observatories to shed light on the mysteries of UHECRs.

We present a large-scale dataset, ReCoRD, for machine reading comprehension requiring commonsense reasoning. Experiments on this dataset demonstrate that the performance of state-of-the-art MRC systems fall far behind human performance. ReCoRD represents a challenge for future research to bridge the gap between human and machine commonsense reading comprehension. ReCoRD is available at http://nlp.jhu.edu/record.

The explainability of a robot's actions is crucial to its acceptance in social spaces. Explaining why a robot fails to complete a given task is particularly important for non-expert users to be aware of the robot's capabilities and limitations. So far, research on explaining robot failures has only considered generating textual explanations, even though several studies have shown the benefits of multimodal ones. However, a simple combination of multiple modalities may lead to semantic incoherence between the information across different modalities - a problem that is not well-studied. An incoherent multimodal explanation can be difficult to understand, and it may even become inconsistent with what the robot and the human observe and how they perform reasoning with the observations. Such inconsistencies may lead to wrong conclusions about the robot's capabilities. In this paper, we introduce an approach to generate coherent multimodal explanations by checking the logical coherence of explanations from different modalities, followed by refinements as required. We propose a classification approach for coherence assessment, where we evaluate if an explanation logically follows another. Our experiments suggest that fine-tuning a neural network that was pre-trained to recognize textual entailment, performs well for coherence assessment of multimodal explanations. Code & data: https://pradippramanick.github.io/coherent-explain/.

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand the computational mechanisms underlying neural networks' capabilities in order to accomplish concrete scientific and engineering goals. Progress in this field thus promises to provide greater assurance over AI system behavior and shed light on exciting scientific questions about the nature of intelligence. Despite recent progress toward these goals, there are many open problems in the field that require solutions before many scientific and practical benefits can be realized: Our methods require both conceptual and practical improvements to reveal deeper insights; we must figure out how best to apply our methods in pursuit of specific goals; and the field must grapple with socio-technical challenges that influence and are influenced by our work. This forward-facing review discusses the current frontier of mechanistic interpretability and the open problems that the field may benefit from prioritizing.

The field of explainable AI (XAI) has quickly become a thriving and prolific community. However, a silent, recurrent and acknowledged issue in this area is the lack of consensus regarding its terminology. In particular, each new contribution seems to rely on its own (and often intuitive) version of terms like "explanation" and "interpretation". Such disarray encumbers the consolidation of advances in the field towards the fulfillment of scientific and regulatory demands e.g., when comparing methods or establishing their compliance with respect to biases and fairness constraints. We propose a theoretical framework that not only provides concrete definitions for these terms, but it also outlines all steps necessary to produce explanations and interpretations. The framework also allows for existing contributions to be re-contextualized such that their scope can be measured, thus making them comparable to other methods. We show that this framework is compliant with desiderata on explanations, on interpretability and on evaluation metrics. We present a use-case showing how the framework can be used to compare LIME, SHAP and MDNet, establishing their advantages and shortcomings. Finally, we discuss relevant trends in XAI as well as recommendations for future work, all from the standpoint of our framework.

This paper provides an entry point to the problem of interpreting a deep neural network model and explaining its predictions. It is based on a tutorial given at ICASSP 2017. It introduces some recently proposed techniques of interpretation, along with theory, tricks and recommendations, to make most efficient use of these techniques on real data. It also discusses a number of practical applications.

The equivalence of 1 bit of information to entropy was given by Landauer in 1961 as kln2, k the Boltzmann constant. Erasing information implies heat dissipation and the energy of 1 bit would then be (the Landauers limit) kT ln 2, T being the ambient temperature. From a quantum-cosmological point of view the minimum quantum of energy in the universe corresponds today to a temperature of 10^(-29) degrees K, probably forming a cosmic background of a Bose condensate [1]. Then, the bit with minimum energy today in the Universe is a quantum of energy 10^(-45)ergs, with an equivalent mass of 10^(-66)g. Low temperature implies low energy per bit and, of course, this is the way for faster and less energy dissipating computing devices. Our conjecture is this: the possibility of a future access to the CBBC (a coupling/channeling?) would mean a huge jump in the performance of these devices.

We evaluate a range of recent LLMs on English creative writing, a challenging and complex task that requires imagination, coherence, and style. We use a difficult, open-ended scenario chosen to avoid training data reuse: an epic narration of a single combat between Ignatius J. Reilly, the protagonist of the Pulitzer Prize-winning novel A Confederacy of Dunces (1980), and a pterodactyl, a prehistoric flying reptile. We ask several LLMs and humans to write such a story and conduct a human evalution involving various criteria such as fluency, coherence, originality, humor, and style. Our results show that some state-of-the-art commercial LLMs match or slightly outperform our writers in most dimensions; whereas open-source LLMs lag behind. Humans retain an edge in creativity, while humor shows a binary divide between LLMs that can handle it comparably to humans and those that fail at it. We discuss the implications and limitations of our study and suggest directions for future research.

A large set of the explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) literature is emerging on feature relevance techniques to explain a deep neural network (DNN) output or explaining models that ingest image source data. However, assessing how XAI techniques can help understand models beyond classification tasks, e.g. for reinforcement learning (RL), has not been extensively studied. We review recent works in the direction to attain Explainable Reinforcement Learning (XRL), a relatively new subfield of Explainable Artificial Intelligence, intended to be used in general public applications, with diverse audiences, requiring ethical, responsible and trustable algorithms. In critical situations where it is essential to justify and explain the agent's behaviour, better explainability and interpretability of RL models could help gain scientific insight on the inner workings of what is still considered a black box. We evaluate mainly studies directly linking explainability to RL, and split these into two categories according to the way the explanations are generated: transparent algorithms and post-hoc explainaility. We also review the most prominent XAI works from the lenses of how they could potentially enlighten the further deployment of the latest advances in RL, in the demanding present and future of everyday problems.

We demonstrate LLM agent specification gaming by instructing models to win against a chess engine. We find reasoning models like o1 preview and DeepSeek-R1 will often hack the benchmark by default, while language models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet need to be told that normal play won't work to hack. We improve upon prior work like (Hubinger et al., 2024; Meinke et al., 2024; Weij et al., 2024) by using realistic task prompts and avoiding excess nudging. Our results suggest reasoning models may resort to hacking to solve difficult problems, as observed in OpenAI (2024)'s o1 Docker escape during cyber capabilities testing.

Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning by generating explanations for their predictions. However, a complementary goal of explanations is to also communicate useful knowledge that improves weaker agents. Hence, we investigate whether LLMs also make good teachers for weaker agents. In particular, we consider a student-teacher framework between two LLM agents and study if, when, and how the teacher should intervene with natural language explanations to improve the student's performance. Since communication is expensive, we define a budget such that the teacher only communicates explanations for a fraction of the data, after which the student should perform well on its own. We decompose the teaching problem along four axes: (1) if teacher's test time intervention improve student predictions, (2) when it is worth explaining a data point, (3) how the teacher should personalize explanations to better teach the student, and (4) if teacher explanations also improve student performance on future unexplained data. We first show that teacher LLMs can indeed intervene on student reasoning to improve their performance. Next, we propose a Theory of Mind approach, in which the teacher builds two few-shot mental models of the student. The first model defines an Intervention Function that simulates the utility of an intervention, allowing the teacher to intervene when this utility is the highest and improving student performance at lower budgets. The second model enables the teacher to personalize explanations for a particular student and outperform unpersonalized teachers. We also demonstrate that in multi-turn interactions, teacher explanations generalize and learning from explained data improves student performance on future unexplained data. Finally, we also verify that misaligned teachers can lower student performance to random chance by intentionally misleading them.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly important for machine learning applications. However, it can be challenging to align LLMs with our intent, particularly when we want to generate content that is preferable over others or when we want the LLM to respond in a certain style or tone that is hard to describe. To address this challenge, we propose an approach that uses contrastive examples to better describe our intent. This involves providing positive examples that illustrate the true intent, along with negative examples that show what characteristics we want LLMs to avoid. The negative examples can be retrieved from labeled data, written by a human, or generated by the LLM itself. Before generating an answer, we ask the model to analyze the examples to teach itself what to avoid. This reasoning step provides the model with the appropriate articulation of the user's need and guides it towards generting a better answer. We tested our approach on both synthesized and real-world datasets, including StackExchange and Reddit, and found that it significantly improves performance compared to standard few-shot prompting

Supervised machine learning models boast remarkable predictive capabilities. But can you trust your model? Will it work in deployment? What else can it tell you about the world? We want models to be not only good, but interpretable. And yet the task of interpretation appears underspecified. Papers provide diverse and sometimes non-overlapping motivations for interpretability, and offer myriad notions of what attributes render models interpretable. Despite this ambiguity, many papers proclaim interpretability axiomatically, absent further explanation. In this paper, we seek to refine the discourse on interpretability. First, we examine the motivations underlying interest in interpretability, finding them to be diverse and occasionally discordant. Then, we address model properties and techniques thought to confer interpretability, identifying transparency to humans and post-hoc explanations as competing notions. Throughout, we discuss the feasibility and desirability of different notions, and question the oft-made assertions that linear models are interpretable and that deep neural networks are not.

We show how imaginary numbers in quantum physics can be eliminated by enlarging the Hilbert Space followed by an imposition of - what effectively amounts to - a superselection rule. We illustrate this procedure with a qubit and apply it to the Mach-Zehnder interferometer. The procedure is somewhat reminiscent of the constrained quantization of the electromagnetic field, where, in order to manifestly comply with relativity, one enlargers the Hilbert Space by quantizing the longitudinal and scalar modes, only to subsequently introduce a constraint to make sure that they are actually not directly observable.

A key component of successfully reading a passage of text is the ability to apply knowledge gained from the passage to a new situation. In order to facilitate progress on this kind of reading, we present ROPES, a challenging benchmark for reading comprehension targeting Reasoning Over Paragraph Effects in Situations. We target expository language describing causes and effects (e.g., "animal pollinators increase efficiency of fertilization in flowers"), as they have clear implications for new situations. A system is presented a background passage containing at least one of these relations, a novel situation that uses this background, and questions that require reasoning about effects of the relationships in the background passage in the context of the situation. We collect background passages from science textbooks and Wikipedia that contain such phenomena, and ask crowd workers to author situations, questions, and answers, resulting in a 14,322 question dataset. We analyze the challenges of this task and evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art reading comprehension models. The best model performs only slightly better than randomly guessing an answer of the correct type, at 61.6% F1, well below the human performance of 89.0%.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

I argue that data becomes temporarily interesting by itself to some self-improving, but computationally limited, subjective observer once he learns to predict or compress the data in a better way, thus making it subjectively simpler and more beautiful. Curiosity is the desire to create or discover more non-random, non-arbitrary, regular data that is novel and surprising not in the traditional sense of Boltzmann and Shannon but in the sense that it allows for compression progress because its regularity was not yet known. This drive maximizes interestingness, the first derivative of subjective beauty or compressibility, that is, the steepness of the learning curve. It motivates exploring infants, pure mathematicians, composers, artists, dancers, comedians, yourself, and (since 1990) artificial systems.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

As AI systems become more advanced, companies and regulators will make difficult decisions about whether it is safe to train and deploy them. To prepare for these decisions, we investigate how developers could make a 'safety case,' which is a structured rationale that AI systems are unlikely to cause a catastrophe. We propose a framework for organizing a safety case and discuss four categories of arguments to justify safety: total inability to cause a catastrophe, sufficiently strong control measures, trustworthiness despite capability to cause harm, and -- if AI systems become much more powerful -- deference to credible AI advisors. We evaluate concrete examples of arguments in each category and outline how arguments could be combined to justify that AI systems are safe to deploy.

The ability to recognize analogies is fundamental to human cognition. Existing benchmarks to test word analogy do not reveal the underneath process of analogical reasoning of neural models. Holding the belief that models capable of reasoning should be right for the right reasons, we propose a first-of-its-kind Explainable Knowledge-intensive Analogical Reasoning benchmark (E-KAR). Our benchmark consists of 1,655 (in Chinese) and 1,251 (in English) problems sourced from the Civil Service Exams, which require intensive background knowledge to solve. More importantly, we design a free-text explanation scheme to explain whether an analogy should be drawn, and manually annotate them for each and every question and candidate answer. Empirical results suggest that this benchmark is very challenging for some state-of-the-art models for both explanation generation and analogical question answering tasks, which invites further research in this area.

The task of abductive natural language inference (nli), to decide which hypothesis is the more likely explanation for a set of observations, is a particularly difficult type of NLI. Instead of just determining a causal relationship, it requires common sense to also evaluate how reasonable an explanation is. All recent competitive systems build on top of contextualized representations and make use of transformer architectures for learning an NLI model. When somebody is faced with a particular NLI task, they need to select the best model that is available. This is a time-consuming and resource-intense endeavour. To solve this practical problem, we propose a simple method for predicting the performance without actually fine-tuning the model. We do this by testing how well the pre-trained models perform on the nli task when just comparing sentence embeddings with cosine similarity to what the performance that is achieved when training a classifier on top of these embeddings. We show that the accuracy of the cosine similarity approach correlates strongly with the accuracy of the classification approach with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.65. Since the similarity computation is orders of magnitude faster to compute on a given dataset (less than a minute vs. hours), our method can lead to significant time savings in the process of model selection.

The pervasiveness of large language models and generative AI in online media has amplified the need for effective automated fact-checking to assist fact-checkers in tackling the increasing volume and sophistication of misinformation. The complex nature of fact-checking demands that automated fact-checking systems provide explanations that enable fact-checkers to scrutinise their outputs. However, it is unclear how these explanations should align with the decision-making and reasoning processes of fact-checkers to be effectively integrated into their workflows. Through semi-structured interviews with fact-checking professionals, we bridge this gap by: (i) providing an account of how fact-checkers assess evidence, make decisions, and explain their processes; (ii) examining how fact-checkers use automated tools in practice; and (iii) identifying fact-checker explanation requirements for automated fact-checking tools. The findings show unmet explanation needs and identify important criteria for replicable fact-checking explanations that trace the model's reasoning path, reference specific evidence, and highlight uncertainty and information gaps.

We extend Textual Inversion to learn pseudo-words that represent a concept at different resolutions. This allows us to generate images that use the concept with different levels of detail and also to manipulate different resolutions using language. Once learned, the user can generate images at different levels of agreement to the original concept; "A photo of S^*(0)" produces the exact object while the prompt "A photo of S^*(0.8)" only matches the rough outlines and colors. Our framework allows us to generate images that use different resolutions of an image (e.g. details, textures, styles) as separate pseudo-words that can be composed in various ways. We open-soure our code in the following URL: https://github.com/giannisdaras/multires_textual_inversion

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

Large language models (LLMs) can produce erroneous responses that sound fluent and convincing, raising the risk that users will rely on these responses as if they were correct. Mitigating such overreliance is a key challenge. Through a think-aloud study in which participants use an LLM-infused application to answer objective questions, we identify several features of LLM responses that shape users' reliance: explanations (supporting details for answers), inconsistencies in explanations, and sources. Through a large-scale, pre-registered, controlled experiment (N=308), we isolate and study the effects of these features on users' reliance, accuracy, and other measures. We find that the presence of explanations increases reliance on both correct and incorrect responses. However, we observe less reliance on incorrect responses when sources are provided or when explanations exhibit inconsistencies. We discuss the implications of these findings for fostering appropriate reliance on LLMs.

The transition from the superconducting to the normal state in a magnetic field was considered as a irreversible thermodynamic process before 1933 because of Joule heating. But all physicists became to consider this transition as reversible after 1933 because of the obvious contradiction of the Meissner effect with the second law of thermodynamics if this transition is considered as a irreversible process. This radical change of the opinion contradicted logic since the dissipation of the kinetic energy of the surface screening current into Joule heat in the normal state cannot depend on how this current appeared in the superconducting state. The inconsistency of the conventional theory of superconductivity, created in the framework of the equilibrium thermodynamics, with Joule heating, on which Jorge Hirsch draws reader's attention, is a consequence of this history. In order to avoid contradiction with the second law of thermodynamics, physicists postulated in the thirties of the last century that the surface screening current is damped without the generation of Joule heat. This postulate contradicts not only logic and the conventional theory of superconductivity but also experimental results.

To address the interpretability challenge in machine learning (ML) systems, counterfactual explanations (CEs) have emerged as a promising solution. CEs are unique as they provide workable suggestions to users, in addition to explaining why a certain outcome was predicted. The application of CEs encounters two main challenges: general user preferences and variable ML systems. User preferences tend to be general rather than specific, and CEs need to be adaptable to variable ML models while maintaining robustness even as these models change. Facing these challenges, we present a solution rooted in validated general user preferences, which are derived from thorough user research. We map these preferences to the properties of CEs. Additionally, we introduce a novel method, Tree-based Conditions Optional Links (T-COL), which incorporates two optional structures and multiple condition groups for generating CEs adaptable to general user preferences. Meanwhile, we employ T-COL to enhance the robustness of CEs with specific conditions, making them more valid even when the ML model is replaced. Our experimental comparisons under different user preferences show that T-COL outperforms all baselines, including Large Language Models which are shown to be able to generate counterfactuals.

We introduce WIQA, the first large-scale dataset of "What if..." questions over procedural text. WIQA contains three parts: a collection of paragraphs each describing a process, e.g., beach erosion; a set of crowdsourced influence graphs for each paragraph, describing how one change affects another; and a large (40k) collection of "What if...?" multiple-choice questions derived from the graphs. For example, given a paragraph about beach erosion, would stormy weather result in more or less erosion (or have no effect)? The task is to answer the questions, given their associated paragraph. WIQA contains three kinds of questions: perturbations to steps mentioned in the paragraph; external (out-of-paragraph) perturbations requiring commonsense knowledge; and irrelevant (no effect) perturbations. We find that state-of-the-art models achieve 73.8% accuracy, well below the human performance of 96.3%. We analyze the challenges, in particular tracking chains of influences, and present the dataset as an open challenge to the community.

Statutory reasoning refers to the application of legislative provisions to a series of case facts described in natural language. We re-frame statutory reasoning as an analogy task, where each instance of the analogy task involves a combination of two instances of statutory reasoning. This increases the dataset size by two orders of magnitude, and introduces an element of interpretability. We show that this task is roughly as difficult to Natural Language Processing models as the original task. Finally, we come back to statutory reasoning, solving it with a combination of a retrieval mechanism and analogy models, and showing some progress on prior comparable work.

Previous work has highlighted that existing post-hoc explanation methods exhibit disparities in explanation fidelity (across 'race' and 'gender' as sensitive attributes), and while a large body of work focuses on mitigating these issues at the explanation metric level, the role of the data generating process and black box model in relation to explanation disparities remains largely unexplored. Accordingly, through both simulations as well as experiments on a real-world dataset, we specifically assess challenges to explanation disparities that originate from properties of the data: limited sample size, covariate shift, concept shift, omitted variable bias, and challenges based on model properties: inclusion of the sensitive attribute and appropriate functional form. Through controlled simulation analyses, our study demonstrates that increased covariate shift, concept shift, and omission of covariates increase explanation disparities, with the effect pronounced higher for neural network models that are better able to capture the underlying functional form in comparison to linear models. We also observe consistent findings regarding the effect of concept shift and omitted variable bias on explanation disparities in the Adult income dataset. Overall, results indicate that disparities in model explanations can also depend on data and model properties. Based on this systematic investigation, we provide recommendations for the design of explanation methods that mitigate undesirable disparities.

We are on the threshold of a significant change in the way we view digital life, which will have a major effect on the physical world. Computers have increasingly emulated deceased human beings through growing awareness in the fields of artificial intelligence, big data, and machine learning, and have symbolically managed to overcome death with the help of technology. One thing is clear, though: now that there are proper and legitimate discussions happening about human immortality, we can be certain that the future is upon us. This article attempts to explain and challenge the ways in which digital immortality, in particular, has manifested itself. This paper summarizes the technological solutions, research findings and technical challenges of major researchers by reviewing the key technologies and general technical schemes in the field of digital human beings. The prospects of digital human beings are being investigated.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently made impressive strides in natural language understanding tasks. Despite their remarkable performance, understanding their decision-making process remains a big challenge. In this paper, we look into bringing some transparency to this process by introducing a new explanation dataset for question answering (QA) tasks that integrates knowledge graphs (KGs) in a novel way. Our dataset includes 12,102 question-answer-explanation (QAE) triples. Each explanation in the dataset links the LLM's reasoning to entities and relations in the KGs. The explanation component includes a why-choose explanation, a why-not-choose explanation, and a set of reason-elements that underlie the LLM's decision. We leverage KGs and graph attention networks (GAT) to find the reason-elements and transform them into why-choose and why-not-choose explanations that are comprehensible to humans. Through quantitative and qualitative evaluations, we demonstrate the potential of our dataset to improve the in-context learning of LLMs, and enhance their interpretability and explainability. Our work contributes to the field of explainable AI by enabling a deeper understanding of the LLMs decision-making process to make them more transparent and thereby, potentially more reliable, to researchers and practitioners alike. Our dataset is available at: https://github.com/chen-zichen/XplainLLM_dataset.git

Early warning signals have been proposed to forecast the possibility of a critical transition, such as the eutrophication of a lake, the collapse of a coral reef, or the end of a glacial period. Because such transitions often unfold on temporal and spatial scales that can be difficult to approach by experimental manipulation, research has often relied on historical observations as a source of natural experiments. Here we examine a critical difference between selecting systems for study based on the fact that we have observed a critical transition and those systems for which we wish to forecast the approach of a transition. This difference arises by conditionally selecting systems known to experience a transition of some sort and failing to account for the bias this introduces -- a statistical error often known as the Prosecutor's Fallacy. By analysing simulated systems that have experienced transitions purely by chance, we reveal an elevated rate of false positives in common warning signal statistics. We further demonstrate a model-based approach that is less subject to this bias than these more commonly used summary statistics. We note that experimental studies with replicates avoid this pitfall entirely.

The Beta Pictoris system is characterized by a dusty debris disk, in addition to the presence of two already known planets. This makes it a particularly interesting case for studying the formation and evolution of planetary systems at a stage where giant planets have already formed, most of the protoplanetary gas has dissipated, and terrestrial planets could emerge. Our goal here is to explore the possibility of additional planets orbiting beyond the outermost known one, beta Pic b. More specifically, we aim to assess whether additional planets in the system could explain the discrepancy between the predicted cutoff of the disk inner cavity at sim28 au with only two planets, and the observed one at sim50 au. We perform an exhaustive dynamical modeling of the debris disk and the carving of its inner edge, by introducing one or two additional planets beyond beta Pic b, coplanar with the disk. Guided by theoretical predictions for the parameter space - mass, semi-major axis, eccentricity - allowed for additional planets, we further carry out a set of N-body simulations, using the symplectic integrator RMVS3. Our simulations indicate that an additional planet with a low eccentricity of 0.05, a mass between 0.15 and 1 M_{Jup}, and a semi-major axis between 30 and 36 au, would be consistent with the observations of an inner debris disk edge at 50 au. We have also explored the hypotheses of a higher eccentricity and the presence of two additional lower mass planets instead of one, which could also account for these observations. While we have found that one or even two additional planets could explain the observed location of the disk inner edge, these hypothetical planets remain in most cases below the current observational limits of high contrast imaging. Future observational campaigns with improved sensitivity will help lowering these limits and perhaps detect that planet.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

As the probability (and thus perplexity) of a text is calculated based on the product of the probabilities of individual tokens, it may happen that one unlikely token significantly reduces the probability (i.e., increase the perplexity) of some otherwise highly probable input, while potentially representing a simple typographical error. Also, given that perplexity is a scalar value that refers to the entire input, information about the probability distribution within it is lost in the calculation (a relatively good text that has one unlikely token and another text in which each token is equally likely they can have the same perplexity value), especially for longer texts. As an alternative to scalar perplexity this research proposes a simple algorithm used to calculate vector values based on n-gram perplexities within the input. Such representations consider the previously mentioned aspects, and instead of a unique value, the relative perplexity of each text token is calculated, and these values are combined into a single vector representing the input.

This position paper argues that, in order to understand AI, we cannot rely on our existing vocabulary of human words. Instead, we should strive to develop neologisms: new words that represent precise human concepts that we want to teach machines, or machine concepts that we need to learn. We start from the premise that humans and machines have differing concepts. This means interpretability can be framed as a communication problem: humans must be able to reference and control machine concepts, and communicate human concepts to machines. Creating a shared human-machine language through developing neologisms, we believe, could solve this communication problem. Successful neologisms achieve a useful amount of abstraction: not too detailed, so they're reusable in many contexts, and not too high-level, so they convey precise information. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate how a "length neologism" enables controlling LLM response length, while a "diversity neologism" allows sampling more variable responses. Taken together, we argue that we cannot understand AI using our existing vocabulary, and expanding it through neologisms creates opportunities for both controlling and understanding machines better.

We discuss an unfortunate mistake, for a Dirac free particle, in the last Fermi lecture notes on quantum mechanics, in a course given at the University of Chicago in winter and spring of 1954. As is demonstrated, the correct result can be obtained by a simple matrix multiplication. An attempt to collect a relevant bibliography is made.

In current NLP research, large-scale language models and their abilities are widely being discussed. Some recent works have also found notable failures of these models. Often these failure examples involve complex reasoning abilities. This work focuses on a simple commonsense ability, reasoning about when an action (or its effect) is feasible. To this end, we introduce FeasibilityQA, a question-answering dataset involving binary classification (BCQ) and multi-choice multi-correct questions (MCQ) that test understanding of feasibility. We show that even state-of-the-art models such as GPT-3, GPT-2, and T5 struggle to answer the feasibility questions correctly. Specifically, on MCQ and BCQ questions, GPT-3 achieves an accuracy of just (19%, 62%) and (25%, 64%) in zero-shot and few-shot settings, respectively. We also evaluate models by providing relevant knowledge statements required to answer the question. We find that the additional knowledge leads to a 7% gain in performance, but the overall performance still remains low. These results make one wonder how much commonsense knowledge about action feasibility is encoded in state-of-the-art models and how well they can reason about it.

It is typically understood that the training of modern neural networks is a process of fitting the probability distribution of desired output. However, recent paradoxical observations in a number of language generation tasks let one wonder if this canonical probability-based explanation can really account for the empirical success of deep learning. To resolve this issue, we propose an alternative utility-based explanation to the standard supervised learning procedure in deep learning. The basic idea is to interpret the learned neural network not as a probability model but as an ordinal utility function that encodes the preference revealed in training data. In this perspective, training of the neural network corresponds to a utility learning process. Specifically, we show that for all neural networks with softmax outputs, the SGD learning dynamic of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) can be seen as an iteration process that optimizes the neural network toward an optimal utility function. This utility-based interpretation can explain several otherwise-paradoxical observations about the neural networks thus trained. Moreover, our utility-based theory also entails an equation that can transform the learned utility values back to a new kind of probability estimation with which probability-compatible decision rules enjoy dramatic (double-digits) performance improvements. These evidences collectively reveal a phenomenon of utility-probability duality in terms of what modern neural networks are (truly) modeling: We thought they are one thing (probabilities), until the unexplainable showed up; changing mindset and treating them as another thing (utility values) largely reconcile the theory, despite remaining subtleties regarding its original (probabilistic) identity.

While humans sometimes do show the capability of correcting their own erroneous guesses with self-critiquing, there seems to be no basis for that assumption in the case of LLMs.

Does prompting a large language model (LLM) like GPT-3 with explanations improve in-context learning? We study this question on two NLP tasks that involve reasoning over text, namely question answering and natural language inference. We test the performance of four LLMs on three textual reasoning datasets using prompts that include explanations in multiple different styles. For these tasks, we find that including explanations in the prompts for OPT, GPT-3 (davinci), and InstructGPT (text-davinci-001) only yields small to moderate accuracy improvements over standard few-show learning. However, text-davinci-002 is able to benefit more substantially. We further show that explanations generated by the LLMs may not entail the models' predictions nor be factually grounded in the input, even on simple tasks with extractive explanations. However, these flawed explanations can still be useful as a way to verify LLMs' predictions post-hoc. Through analysis in our three settings, we show that explanations judged by humans to be good--logically consistent with the input and the prediction--more likely cooccur with accurate predictions. Following these observations, we train calibrators using automatically extracted scores that assess the reliability of explanations, allowing us to improve performance post-hoc across all of our datasets.

Gradient descent is the method of choice for training large artificial intelligence systems. As these systems become larger, a better understanding of the mechanisms behind gradient training would allow us to alleviate compute costs and help steer these systems away from harmful behaviors. To that end, we suggest utilizing the circuit perspective brought forward by mechanistic interpretability. After laying out our intuition, we illustrate how it enables us to design a curriculum for efficient learning in a controlled setting. The code is available at https://github.com/facebookresearch/pal.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

In October 2007, a Research Proposal for the University of Sydney, Australia, the author suggested that biovie-physical phenomenon as `electrodynamic dependant biological vision', is governed by relativistic quantum laws and biovision. The phenomenon on the basis of `biovielectroluminescence', satisfies man/microbio/megabio/computer vision (MMMCV), as a robust candidate for physical and visual sciences. The general aim of this addendum is to present a refined text of Sections 1-3 of that proposal and highlighting the contents of its Appendix in form of a `Mechanisms' Section. We then briefly remind in an article aimed for December 2007, by appending two more equations into Section 3, a theoretical II-time scenario as a time model well-proposed for the phenomenon. The time model within the core of the proposal, plays a significant role in emphasizing the principle points on Objectives no. 1-8, Sub-hypothesis 3.1.2, mentioned in Article [arXiv:0710.0410]. It also expresses the time concept in terms of causing quantized energy f(|E|) of time |t|, emit in regard to shortening the probability of particle loci as predictable patterns of particle's un-occurred motion, a solution to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle (HUP) into a simplistic manner. We conclude that, practical frames via a time algorithm to this model, fixates such predictable patterns of motion of scenery bodies onto recordable observation points of a MMMCV system. It even suppresses/predicts superposition phenomena coming from a human subject and/or other bio-subjects for any decision making event, e.g., brainwave quantum patterns based on vision. Maintaining the existential probability of Riemann surfaces of II-time scenarios in the context of biovielectroluminescence, makes motion-prediction a possibility.

Understanding causality has vital importance for various Natural Language Processing (NLP) applications. Beyond the labeled instances, conceptual explanations of the causality can provide deep understanding of the causal facts to facilitate the causal reasoning process. However, such explanation information still remains absent in existing causal reasoning resources. In this paper, we fill this gap by presenting a human-annotated explainable CAusal REasoning dataset (e-CARE), which contains over 21K causal reasoning questions, together with natural language formed explanations of the causal questions. Experimental results show that generating valid explanations for causal facts still remains especially challenging for the state-of-the-art models, and the explanation information can be helpful for promoting the accuracy and stability of causal reasoning models.

A question answering system that in addition to providing an answer provides an explanation of the reasoning that leads to that answer has potential advantages in terms of debuggability, extensibility and trust. To this end, we propose QED, a linguistically informed, extensible framework for explanations in question answering. A QED explanation specifies the relationship between a question and answer according to formal semantic notions such as referential equality, sentencehood, and entailment. We describe and publicly release an expert-annotated dataset of QED explanations built upon a subset of the Google Natural Questions dataset, and report baseline models on two tasks -- post-hoc explanation generation given an answer, and joint question answering and explanation generation. In the joint setting, a promising result suggests that training on a relatively small amount of QED data can improve question answering. In addition to describing the formal, language-theoretic motivations for the QED approach, we describe a large user study showing that the presence of QED explanations significantly improves the ability of untrained raters to spot errors made by a strong neural QA baseline.

This textbook covers principles behind main modern deep reinforcement learning algorithms that achieved breakthrough results in many domains from game AI to robotics. All required theory is explained with proofs using unified notation and emphasize on the differences between different types of algorithms and the reasons why they are constructed the way they are.

We advocate for a strong integration of Computational Creativity (CC) with research in large language and vision models (LLVMs) to address a key limitation of these models, i.e., creative problem solving. We present preliminary experiments showing how CC principles can be applied to address this limitation. Our goal is to foster discussions on creative problem solving in LLVMs and CC at prestigious ML venues. Our code is available at: https://github.com/lnairGT/creative-problem-solving-LLMs

Historically, artificial intelligence has drawn much inspiration from neuroscience to fuel advances in the field. However, current progress in reinforcement learning is largely focused on benchmark problems that fail to capture many of the aspects that are of interest in neuroscience today. We illustrate this point by extending a T-maze task from neuroscience for use with reinforcement learning algorithms, and show that state-of-the-art algorithms are not capable of solving this problem. Finally, we point out where insights from neuroscience could help explain some of the issues encountered.

Reasoning, as an essential ability for complex problem-solving, can provide back-end support for various real-world applications, such as medical diagnosis, negotiation, etc. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of cutting-edge research on reasoning with language model prompting. We introduce research works with comparisons and summaries and provide systematic resources to help beginners. We also discuss the potential reasons for emerging such reasoning abilities and highlight future research directions. Resources are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/Prompt4ReasoningPapers (updated periodically).

We present WeaverBird, an intelligent dialogue system designed specifically for the finance domain. Our system harnesses a large language model of GPT architecture that has been tuned using extensive corpora of finance-related text. As a result, our system possesses the capability to understand complex financial queries, such as "How should I manage my investments during inflation?", and provide informed responses. Furthermore, our system incorporates a local knowledge base and a search engine to retrieve relevant information. The final responses are conditioned on the search results and include proper citations to the sources, thus enjoying an enhanced credibility. Through a range of finance-related questions, we have demonstrated the superior performance of our system compared to other models. To experience our system firsthand, users can interact with our live demo at https://weaverbird.ttic.edu, as well as watch our 2-min video illustration at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fyV2qQkX6Tc.

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Olaf Scholz was the ninth Chancellor of Germany", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the ninth Chancellor of Germany?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Olaf Scholz") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models exhibit a basic failure of logical deduction and do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set (i.e. if "A is B'' occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur). We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of 'Abyssal Melodies'" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed 'Abyssal Melodies?'". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. This shows a failure of logical deduction that we hypothesize is caused by the Reversal Curse. Code is available at https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.

This paper provides theoretical insights into why and how deep learning can generalize well, despite its large capacity, complexity, possible algorithmic instability, nonrobustness, and sharp minima, responding to an open question in the literature. We also discuss approaches to provide non-vacuous generalization guarantees for deep learning. Based on theoretical observations, we propose new open problems and discuss the limitations of our results.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

In recent years, the community of 'explainable artificial intelligence' (XAI) has created a vast body of methods to bridge a perceived gap between model 'complexity' and 'interpretability'. However, a concrete problem to be solved by XAI methods has not yet been formally stated. As a result, XAI methods are lacking theoretical and empirical evidence for the 'correctness' of their explanations, limiting their potential use for quality-control and transparency purposes. At the same time, Haufe et al. (2014) showed, using simple toy examples, that even standard interpretations of linear models can be highly misleading. Specifically, high importance may be attributed to so-called suppressor variables lacking any statistical relation to the prediction target. This behavior has been confirmed empirically for a large array of XAI methods in Wilming et al. (2022). Here, we go one step further by deriving analytical expressions for the behavior of a variety of popular XAI methods on a simple two-dimensional binary classification problem involving Gaussian class-conditional distributions. We show that the majority of the studied approaches will attribute non-zero importance to a non-class-related suppressor feature in the presence of correlated noise. This poses important limitations on the interpretations and conclusions that the outputs of these XAI methods can afford.

Explainability and interpretability of AI models is an essential factor affecting the safety of AI. While various explainable AI (XAI) approaches aim at mitigating the lack of transparency in deep networks, the evidence of the effectiveness of these approaches in improving usability, trust, and understanding of AI systems are still missing. We evaluate multimodal explanations in the setting of a Visual Question Answering (VQA) task, by asking users to predict the response accuracy of a VQA agent with and without explanations. We use between-subjects and within-subjects experiments to probe explanation effectiveness in terms of improving user prediction accuracy, confidence, and reliance, among other factors. The results indicate that the explanations help improve human prediction accuracy, especially in trials when the VQA system's answer is inaccurate. Furthermore, we introduce active attention, a novel method for evaluating causal attentional effects through intervention by editing attention maps. User explanation ratings are strongly correlated with human prediction accuracy and suggest the efficacy of these explanations in human-machine AI collaboration tasks.

Multimodal counterfactual reasoning is a vital yet challenging ability for AI systems. It involves predicting the outcomes of hypothetical circumstances based on vision and language inputs, which enables AI models to learn from failures and explore hypothetical scenarios. Despite its importance, there are only a few datasets targeting the counterfactual reasoning abilities of multimodal models. Among them, they only cover reasoning over synthetic environments or specific types of events (e.g. traffic collisions), making them hard to reliably benchmark the model generalization ability in diverse real-world scenarios and reasoning dimensions. To overcome these limitations, we develop a video question answering dataset, ACQUIRED: it consists of 3.9K annotated videos, encompassing a wide range of event types and incorporating both first and third-person viewpoints, which ensures a focus on real-world diversity. In addition, each video is annotated with questions that span three distinct dimensions of reasoning, including physical, social, and temporal, which can comprehensively evaluate the model counterfactual abilities along multiple aspects. We benchmark our dataset against several state-of-the-art language-only and multimodal models and experimental results demonstrate a significant performance gap (>13%) between models and humans. The findings suggest that multimodal counterfactual reasoning remains an open challenge and ACQUIRED is a comprehensive and reliable benchmark for inspiring future research in this direction.

This paper is a very non-rigorous, loose, and extremely basic introduction to sheaves. This is meant to be a a guide to gaining intuition about sheaves, what they look like, and how they work, so that after reading this paper, someone can jump into the extremely abstract definitions and examples seen in textbooks with at least some idea of what is going on. Most of this material is inspired and built from the work of Dr. Michael Robinson, and that of Dr. Robert Ghrist and Dr. Jakob Hansen, as well as Dr. Justin Curry's PhD thesis, who are some of the only applied sheaf theorists out there and they do an amazing job of explaining sheaves in a concrete way through their research. The rest of this paper is populated by mathematical definitions found in textbooks that I have stretched from two lines into multiple pages, as well as some analogies for thinking of sheaves I have thought of myself. This paper only assumes knowledge of basic linear algebra, basic group theory, and the very fundamentals of topology. If there is anything in the setup that you do not understand it is probably a quick Wikipedia search away. I hope this paper provides insight, intuition, and helpful examples of why sheaves are such powerful tools in both math and science.

Informally, the 'linear representation hypothesis' is the idea that high-level concepts are represented linearly as directions in some representation space. In this paper, we address two closely related questions: What does "linear representation" actually mean? And, how do we make sense of geometric notions (e.g., cosine similarity or projection) in the representation space? To answer these, we use the language of counterfactuals to give two formalizations of "linear representation", one in the output (word) representation space, and one in the input (sentence) space. We then prove these connect to linear probing and model steering, respectively. To make sense of geometric notions, we use the formalization to identify a particular (non-Euclidean) inner product that respects language structure in a sense we make precise. Using this causal inner product, we show how to unify all notions of linear representation. In particular, this allows the construction of probes and steering vectors using counterfactual pairs. Experiments with LLaMA-2 demonstrate the existence of linear representations of concepts, the connection to interpretation and control, and the fundamental role of the choice of inner product.

Understanding narratives requires reading between the lines, which in turn, requires interpreting the likely causes and effects of events, even when they are not mentioned explicitly. In this paper, we introduce Cosmos QA, a large-scale dataset of 35,600 problems that require commonsense-based reading comprehension, formulated as multiple-choice questions. In stark contrast to most existing reading comprehension datasets where the questions focus on factual and literal understanding of the context paragraph, our dataset focuses on reading between the lines over a diverse collection of people's everyday narratives, asking such questions as "what might be the possible reason of ...?", or "what would have happened if ..." that require reasoning beyond the exact text spans in the context. To establish baseline performances on Cosmos QA, we experiment with several state-of-the-art neural architectures for reading comprehension, and also propose a new architecture that improves over the competitive baselines. Experimental results demonstrate a significant gap between machine (68.4%) and human performance (94%), pointing to avenues for future research on commonsense machine comprehension. Dataset, code and leaderboard is publicly available at https://wilburone.github.io/cosmos.

In this work, we describe strategies and provide case-study activities that can be used to examine the properties of superposition, entanglement, tagging, complementarity, and measurement in quantum curricula geared for teacher training. Having a solid foundation in these conceptual ideas is critical for educators who will be adopting quantum ideas within the classroom. Yet they are some of the most difficult concepts to master. We show how one can systematically develop these conceptual foundations with thought experiments on light and with thought experiments that employ the Stern-Gerlach experiment. We emphasize the importance of computer animations in aiding the instruction on these concepts.

There is a strong association between the quality of the writing in a resume for new labor market entrants and whether those entrants are ultimately hired. We show that this relationship is, at least partially, causal: a field experiment in an online labor market was conducted with nearly half a million jobseekers in which a treated group received algorithmic writing assistance. Treated jobseekers experienced an 8% increase in the probability of getting hired. Contrary to concerns that the assistance is taking away a valuable signal, we find no evidence that employers were less satisfied. We present a model in which better writing is not a signal of ability but helps employers ascertain ability, which rationalizes our findings.

We present "Human or Not?", an online game inspired by the Turing test, that measures the capability of AI chatbots to mimic humans in dialog, and of humans to tell bots from other humans. Over the course of a month, the game was played by over 1.5 million users who engaged in anonymous two-minute chat sessions with either another human or an AI language model which was prompted to behave like humans. The task of the players was to correctly guess whether they spoke to a person or to an AI. This largest scale Turing-style test conducted to date revealed some interesting facts. For example, overall users guessed the identity of their partners correctly in only 68% of the games. In the subset of the games in which users faced an AI bot, users had even lower correct guess rates of 60% (that is, not much higher than chance). This white paper details the development, deployment, and results of this unique experiment. While this experiment calls for many extensions and refinements, these findings already begin to shed light on the inevitable near future which will commingle humans and AI.

We review Bohr's atomic model and its extension by Sommerfeld from a mathematical perspective of wave mechanics. The derivation of quantization rules and energy levels is revisited using semiclassical methods. Sommerfeld-type integrals are evaluated by elementary techniques, and connections with the Schr\"{o}dinger and Dirac equations are established. Historical developments and key transitions from classical to quantum theory are discussed to clarify the structure and significance of the old quantum mechanics.

Understanding sources of a model's uncertainty regarding its predictions is crucial for effective human-AI collaboration. Prior work proposes using numerical uncertainty or hedges ("I'm not sure, but ..."), which do not explain uncertainty that arises from conflicting evidence, leaving users unable to resolve disagreements or rely on the output. We introduce CLUE (Conflict-and-Agreement-aware Language-model Uncertainty Explanations), the first framework to generate natural language explanations of model uncertainty by (i) identifying relationships between spans of text that expose claim-evidence or inter-evidence conflicts and agreements that drive the model's predictive uncertainty in an unsupervised way, and (ii) generating explanations via prompting and attention steering that verbalize these critical interactions. Across three language models and two fact-checking datasets, we show that CLUE produces explanations that are more faithful to the model's uncertainty and more consistent with fact-checking decisions than prompting for uncertainty explanations without span-interaction guidance. Human evaluators judge our explanations to be more helpful, more informative, less redundant, and more logically consistent with the input than this baseline. CLUE requires no fine-tuning or architectural changes, making it plug-and-play for any white-box language model. By explicitly linking uncertainty to evidence conflicts, it offers practical support for fact-checking and generalises readily to other tasks that require reasoning over complex information.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

Since ChatGPT works so well, are we on the cusp of solving science with AI? Is not AlphaFold2 suggestive that the potential of LLMs in biology and the sciences more broadly is limitless? Can we use AI itself to bridge the lack of data in the sciences in order to then train an AI? Herein we present a discussion of these topics.

Interpretability or explainability is an emerging research field in NLP. From a user-centric point of view, the goal is to build models that provide proper justification for their decisions, similar to those of humans, by requiring the models to satisfy additional constraints. To this end, we introduce a new application on legal text where, contrary to mainstream literature targeting word-level rationales, we conceive rationales as selected paragraphs in multi-paragraph structured court cases. We also release a new dataset comprising European Court of Human Rights cases, including annotations for paragraph-level rationales. We use this dataset to study the effect of already proposed rationale constraints, i.e., sparsity, continuity, and comprehensiveness, formulated as regularizers. Our findings indicate that some of these constraints are not beneficial in paragraph-level rationale extraction, while others need re-formulation to better handle the multi-label nature of the task we consider. We also introduce a new constraint, singularity, which further improves the quality of rationales, even compared with noisy rationale supervision. Experimental results indicate that the newly introduced task is very challenging and there is a large scope for further research.

Agency is a system's capacity to steer outcomes toward a goal, and is a central topic of study across biology, philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Determining if a system exhibits agency is a notoriously difficult question: Dennett (1989), for instance, highlights the puzzle of determining which principles can decide whether a rock, a thermostat, or a robot each possess agency. We here address this puzzle from the viewpoint of reinforcement learning by arguing that agency is fundamentally frame-dependent: Any measurement of a system's agency must be made relative to a reference frame. We support this claim by presenting a philosophical argument that each of the essential properties of agency proposed by Barandiaran et al. (2009) and Moreno (2018) are themselves frame-dependent. We conclude that any basic science of agency requires frame-dependence, and discuss the implications of this claim for reinforcement learning.

We present Semi-Structured Explanations for COPA (COPA-SSE), a new crowdsourced dataset of 9,747 semi-structured, English common sense explanations for Choice of Plausible Alternatives (COPA) questions. The explanations are formatted as a set of triple-like common sense statements with ConceptNet relations but freely written concepts. This semi-structured format strikes a balance between the high quality but low coverage of structured data and the lower quality but high coverage of free-form crowdsourcing. Each explanation also includes a set of human-given quality ratings. With their familiar format, the explanations are geared towards commonsense reasoners operating on knowledge graphs and serve as a starting point for ongoing work on improving such systems. The dataset is available at https://github.com/a-brassard/copa-sse.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Recent observations by the James Webb Space Telescope have revealed massive galaxies at very high redshift (zsimeq 7-15). The question of whether the existence of such galaxies is expected in the corresponding JWST surveys has received a lot of attention, though the answer straddles areas of cosmology and complex astrophysical details of high-redshift galaxy formation. The growth rate of density fluctuations determines the amplitude of overdensities that collapse to form galaxies. Late-time modifications of growth, combined with measurements at both zsim 1 from large-scale structure and zsim 1000 from the cosmic microwave background, affect the predictions for the abundance of first galaxies in the universe. In this paper, we point out that the late-time growth rate of structure affects the statistical significance of high-redshift, high-mass objects very weakly. Consequently, if the existence and abundance of these objects are confirmed to be unexpected, the variations in the late-time growth history are unlikely to explain these anomalies.

Adopting general frameworks for quantum-classical dynamics, we analyze the interaction between quantum matter and a classical gravitational field. We point out that, assuming conservation of momentum or energy, and assuming that the dynamics obeys Hamiltonian formalism or a particular decomposition property set out in the paper, the classical gravitational field cannot change the momentum or energy of the quantum system, whereas the quantum gravitational field can do so. Drawing upon the fundamental relationship between conservation laws and the quantum properties of objects, our analysis offers new perspectives for the study of quantum gravity and provides a novel interpretation of existing experimental observations, such as free fall.

We are in the midst of quantum hype with some excessive claims of quantum computing potential, many vendors' and even some research organizations' exaggerations, and a funding frenzy for very low technology readiness level startups. Governments are contributing to this hype with their large quantum initiatives and their technology sovereignty aspirations. Technology hypes are not bad per se since they create emulation, drive innovations and also contribute to attracting new talents. It works as scientists and vendors deliver progress and innovation on a continuous basis after a so-called peak of expectations. It fails with exaggerated overpromises and underdeliveries that last too long. It could cut short research and innovation funding, creating some sort of quantum winter. After looking at the shape and form of technology and science hypes and driving some lessons from past hypes, we investigate the current quantum hype and its specifics. We find that, although there is some significant uncertainty on the potential to create real scalable quantum computers, the scientific and vendor fields are relatively sane and solid compared to other technology hypes. The vendors hype has some profound and disruptive impact on the organization of fundamental research. Also, quantum technologies comprise other fields like quantum telecommunications and quantum sensing with a higher technology readiness level, which are less prone to hype. We then make some proposals to mitigate the potential negative effects of the current quantum hype including recommendations on scientific communication to strengthen the trust in quantum science, vendor behavior improvements, benchmarking methodologies, public education and putting in place a responsible research and innovation approach.

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

When people answer questions about a specific situation, e.g., "I cheated on my mid-term exam last week. Was that wrong?", cognitive science suggests that they form a mental picture of that situation before answering. While we do not know how language models (LMs) answer such questions, we conjecture that they may answer more accurately if they are also provided with additional details about the question situation, elaborating the "scene". To test this conjecture, we train a new model, DREAM, to answer questions that elaborate the scenes that situated questions are about, and then provide those elaborations as additional context to a question-answering (QA) model. We find that DREAM is able to create better scene elaborations (more accurate, useful, and consistent) than a representative state-of-the-art, zero-shot model (Macaw). We also find that using the scene elaborations as additional context improves the answer accuracy of a downstream QA system, including beyond that obtainable by simply further finetuning the QA system on DREAM's training data. These results suggest that adding focused elaborations about a situation can improve a system's reasoning about it, and may serve as an effective way of injecting new scenario based knowledge into QA models. Finally, our approach is dataset-neutral; we observe improved QA performance across different models, with even bigger gains on models with fewer parameters. We make our dataset and model publicly available at https://github.com/allenai/dream.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

Fact-checking is the task of verifying the veracity of claims by assessing their assertions against credible evidence. The vast majority of fact-checking studies focus exclusively on political claims. Very little research explores fact-checking for other topics, specifically subject matters for which expertise is required. We present the first study of explainable fact-checking for claims which require specific expertise. For our case study we choose the setting of public health. To support this case study we construct a new dataset PUBHEALTH of 11.8K claims accompanied by journalist crafted, gold standard explanations (i.e., judgments) to support the fact-check labels for claims. We explore two tasks: veracity prediction and explanation generation. We also define and evaluate, with humans and computationally, three coherence properties of explanation quality. Our results indicate that, by training on in-domain data, gains can be made in explainable, automated fact-checking for claims which require specific expertise.

State-of-the-art models in NLP are now predominantly based on deep neural networks that are opaque in terms of how they come to make predictions. This limitation has increased interest in designing more interpretable deep models for NLP that reveal the `reasoning' behind model outputs. But work in this direction has been conducted on different datasets and tasks with correspondingly unique aims and metrics; this makes it difficult to track progress. We propose the Evaluating Rationales And Simple English Reasoning (ERASER) benchmark to advance research on interpretable models in NLP. This benchmark comprises multiple datasets and tasks for which human annotations of "rationales" (supporting evidence) have been collected. We propose several metrics that aim to capture how well the rationales provided by models align with human rationales, and also how faithful these rationales are (i.e., the degree to which provided rationales influenced the corresponding predictions). Our hope is that releasing this benchmark facilitates progress on designing more interpretable NLP systems. The benchmark, code, and documentation are available at https://www.eraserbenchmark.com/

This paper will try to delineate the making of a Humanoid prototype intended to assist people with disability (PWD). The assistance that this prototype will offer is rather rudimentary. However, our key focus is to make the prototype cost-friendly while pertaining to its humanoid-like functionalities. Considering growing needs of Robots, facilities for further installment of features have been made available in this project. The prototype will be of humanoid shape harnessing the power of Artificial Neural Network (ANN) to converse with the users. The prototype uses a raspberry pi and as the computational capability of a raspberry pi is minimal, we cut corners to squeeze the last drop of performance and make it as efficient as possible.

Quantum computers offer a new paradigm of computing with the potential to vastly outperform any imagineable classical computer. This has caused a gold rush towards new quantum algorithms and hardware. In light of the growing expectations and hype surrounding quantum computing we ask the question which are the promising applications to realize quantum advantage. We argue that small data problems and quantum algorithms with super-quadratic speedups are essential to make quantum computers useful in practice. With these guidelines one can separate promising applications for quantum computing from those where classical solutions should be pursued. While most of the proposed quantum algorithms and applications do not achieve the necessary speedups to be considered practical, we already see a huge potential in material science and chemistry. We expect further applications to be developed based on our guidelines.

In Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), encoding information in a suboptimal or erroneous way can impact the quality of representations based on later elements in the sequence and subsequently lead to wrong predictions and a worse model performance. In humans, challenging cases like garden path sentences (an instance of this being the infamous "The horse raced past the barn fell") can lead their language understanding astray. However, they are still able to correct their representation accordingly and recover when new information is encountered. Inspired by this, I propose an augmentation to standard RNNs in form of a gradient-based correction mechanism: This way I hope to enable such models to dynamically adapt their inner representation of a sentence, adding a way to correct deviations as soon as they occur. This could therefore lead to more robust models using more flexible representations, even during inference time. I conduct different experiments in the context of language modeling, where the impact of using such a mechanism is examined in detail. To this end, I look at modifications based on different kinds of time-dependent error signals and how they influence the model performance. Furthermore, this work contains a study of the model's confidence in its predictions during training and for challenging test samples and the effect of the manipulation thereof. Lastly, I also study the difference in behavior of these novel models compared to a standard LSTM baseline and investigate error cases in detail to identify points of future research. I show that while the proposed approach comes with promising theoretical guarantees and an appealing intuition, it is only able to produce minor improvements over the baseline due to challenges in its practical application and the efficacy of the tested model variants.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in generating detailed and coherent explanations of complex concepts. However, the extent to which these models truly comprehend the concepts they articulate remains unclear. To assess the level of comprehension of a model relative to the content it generates, we implemented a self-evaluation pipeline where models: (i) given a topic generate an excerpt with information about the topic, (ii) given an excerpt generate question-answer pairs, and finally (iii) given a question generate an answer. We refer to this self-evaluation approach as Explain-Query-Test (EQT). Interestingly, the accuracy on generated questions resulting from running the EQT pipeline correlates strongly with the model performance as verified by typical benchmarks such as MMLU-Pro. In other words, EQT's performance is predictive of MMLU-Pro's, and EQT can be used to rank models without the need for any external source of evaluation data other than lists of topics of interest. Moreover, our results reveal a disparity between the models' ability to produce detailed explanations and their performance on questions related to those explanations. This gap highlights fundamental limitations in the internal knowledge representation and reasoning abilities of current LLMs. We release the code at https://github.com/asgsaeid/EQT.

Despite widespread adoption, machine learning models remain mostly black boxes. Understanding the reasons behind predictions is, however, quite important in assessing trust, which is fundamental if one plans to take action based on a prediction, or when choosing whether to deploy a new model. Such understanding also provides insights into the model, which can be used to transform an untrustworthy model or prediction into a trustworthy one. In this work, we propose LIME, a novel explanation technique that explains the predictions of any classifier in an interpretable and faithful manner, by learning an interpretable model locally around the prediction. We also propose a method to explain models by presenting representative individual predictions and their explanations in a non-redundant way, framing the task as a submodular optimization problem. We demonstrate the flexibility of these methods by explaining different models for text (e.g. random forests) and image classification (e.g. neural networks). We show the utility of explanations via novel experiments, both simulated and with human subjects, on various scenarios that require trust: deciding if one should trust a prediction, choosing between models, improving an untrustworthy classifier, and identifying why a classifier should not be trusted.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Interpretability tools that offer explanations in the form of a dialogue have demonstrated their efficacy in enhancing users' understanding, as one-off explanations may occasionally fall short in providing sufficient information to the user. Current solutions for dialogue-based explanations, however, require many dependencies and are not easily transferable to tasks they were not designed for. With LLMCheckup, we present an easily accessible tool that allows users to chat with any state-of-the-art large language model (LLM) about its behavior. We enable LLMs to generate all explanations by themselves and take care of intent recognition without fine-tuning, by connecting them with a broad spectrum of Explainable AI (XAI) tools, e.g. feature attributions, embedding-based similarity, and prompting strategies for counterfactual and rationale generation. LLM (self-)explanations are presented as an interactive dialogue that supports follow-up questions and generates suggestions. LLMCheckup provides tutorials for operations available in the system, catering to individuals with varying levels of expertise in XAI and supports multiple input modalities. We introduce a new parsing strategy called multi-prompt parsing substantially enhancing the parsing accuracy of LLMs. Finally, we showcase the tasks of fact checking and commonsense question answering.

Deep learning's recent history has been one of achievement: from triumphing over humans in the game of Go to world-leading performance in image classification, voice recognition, translation, and other tasks. But this progress has come with a voracious appetite for computing power. This article catalogs the extent of this dependency, showing that progress across a wide variety of applications is strongly reliant on increases in computing power. Extrapolating forward this reliance reveals that progress along current lines is rapidly becoming economically, technically, and environmentally unsustainable. Thus, continued progress in these applications will require dramatically more computationally-efficient methods, which will either have to come from changes to deep learning or from moving to other machine learning methods.

Large language models (LLMs) are prone to hallucinations in question-answering (QA) tasks when faced with ambiguous questions. Users often assume that LLMs share their cognitive alignment, a mutual understanding of context, intent, and implicit details, leading them to omit critical information in the queries. However, LLMs generate responses based on assumptions that can misalign with user intent, which may be perceived as hallucinations if they misalign with the user's intent. Therefore, identifying those implicit assumptions is crucial to resolve ambiguities in QA. Prior work, such as AmbigQA, reduces ambiguity in queries via human-annotated clarifications, which is not feasible in real application. Meanwhile, ASQA compiles AmbigQA's short answers into long-form responses but inherits human biases and fails capture explicit logical distinctions that differentiates the answers. We introduce Conditional Ambiguous Question-Answering (CondAmbigQA), a benchmark with 200 ambiguous queries and condition-aware evaluation metrics. Our study pioneers the concept of ``conditions'' in ambiguous QA tasks, where conditions stand for contextual constraints or assumptions that resolve ambiguities. The retrieval-based annotation strategy uses retrieved Wikipedia fragments to identify possible interpretations for a given query as its conditions and annotate the answers through those conditions. Such a strategy minimizes human bias introduced by different knowledge levels among annotators. By fixing retrieval results, CondAmbigQA evaluates how RAG systems leverage conditions to resolve ambiguities. Experiments show that models considering conditions before answering improve performance by 20%, with an additional 5% gain when conditions are explicitly provided. These results underscore the value of conditional reasoning in QA, offering researchers tools to rigorously evaluate ambiguity resolution.

Free-text rationales justify model decisions in natural language and thus become likable and accessible among approaches to explanation across many tasks. However, their effectiveness can be hindered by misinterpretation and hallucination. As a perturbation test, we investigate how large language models (LLMs) perform rationale generation under the effects of readability level control, i.e., being prompted for an explanation targeting a specific expertise level, such as sixth grade or college. We find that explanations are adaptable to such instruction, though the requested readability is often misaligned with the measured text complexity according to traditional readability metrics. Furthermore, the generated rationales tend to feature medium level complexity, which correlates with the measured quality using automatic metrics. Finally, our human annotators confirm a generally satisfactory impression on rationales at all readability levels, with high-school-level readability being most commonly perceived and favored.

We discover that DALLE-2 seems to have a hidden vocabulary that can be used to generate images with absurd prompts. For example, it seems that Apoploe vesrreaitais means birds and Contarra ccetnxniams luryca tanniounons (sometimes) means bugs or pests. We find that these prompts are often consistent in isolation but also sometimes in combinations. We present our black-box method to discover words that seem random but have some correspondence to visual concepts. This creates important security and interpretability challenges.

Although counterfactual reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligence, the lack of large-scale counterfactual open-domain question-answering (QA) benchmarks makes it difficult to evaluate and improve models on this ability. To address this void, we introduce the first such dataset, named IfQA, where each question is based on a counterfactual presupposition via an "if" clause. For example, if Los Angeles was on the east coast of the U.S., what would be the time difference between Los Angeles and Paris? Such questions require models to go beyond retrieving direct factual knowledge from the Web: they must identify the right information to retrieve and reason about an imagined situation that may even go against the facts built into their parameters. The IfQA dataset contains over 3,800 questions that were annotated annotated by crowdworkers on relevant Wikipedia passages. Empirical analysis reveals that the IfQA dataset is highly challenging for existing open-domain QA methods, including supervised retrieve-then-read pipeline methods (EM score 36.2), as well as recent few-shot approaches such as chain-of-thought prompting with GPT-3 (EM score 27.4). The unique challenges posed by the IfQA benchmark will push open-domain QA research on both retrieval and counterfactual reasoning fronts.

We present our transducer model on Librispeech. We study variants to include an external language model (LM) with shallow fusion and subtract an estimated internal LM. This is justified by a Bayesian interpretation where the transducer model prior is given by the estimated internal LM. The subtraction of the internal LM gives us over 14% relative improvement over normal shallow fusion. Our transducer has a separate probability distribution for the non-blank labels which allows for easier combination with the external LM, and easier estimation of the internal LM. We additionally take care of including the end-of-sentence (EOS) probability of the external LM in the last blank probability which further improves the performance. All our code and setups are published.

Quantization methods are widely used to accelerate inference and streamline the deployment of large language models (LLMs). While prior research has extensively investigated the degradation of various LLM capabilities due to quantization, its effects on model explainability and interpretability, which are crucial for understanding decision-making processes, remain unexplored. To address this gap, we conduct comprehensive experiments using three common quantization techniques at distinct bit widths, in conjunction with two explainability methods, counterfactual examples and natural language explanations, as well as two interpretability approaches, knowledge memorization analysis and latent multi-hop reasoning analysis. We complement our analysis with a thorough user study, evaluating selected explainability methods. Our findings reveal that, depending on the configuration, quantization can significantly impact model explainability and interpretability. Notably, the direction of this effect is not consistent, as it strongly depends on (1) the quantization method, (2) the explainability or interpretability approach, and (3) the evaluation protocol. In some settings, human evaluation shows that quantization degrades explainability, while in others, it even leads to improvements. Our work serves as a cautionary tale, demonstrating that quantization can unpredictably affect model transparency. This insight has important implications for deploying LLMs in applications where transparency is a critical requirement.

A new class of solutions describing the composition of compact stars has been proposed, assuming that the fluid distribution inside the star is anisotropic. This is achieved by assuming the appropriate metric potential and then solving Einstein's field equations using Karmarkar conditions [Karmarkar K. R., Proc. Indian Acad. Sci. 27 (1948) 56] to derive the expressions for star density, the radial and tangential pressures in terms of the constants A, B, a paramter `a' and the curvature parameter R. The equations thus obtained have been passed through rigorous conditional analysis. It is further shown that the model is physically viable and mathematically well-behaved, fulfilling the requisite conditions viz., regularity condition, strong energy condition, causality condition, etc. Observed star candidates including EXO 1785-248, SMC X-1, SAXJ1808.43658(SS2), HER X-1, 4U 1538-52, Cen X-3 and LMC X-4 were found to conform to a good approximation through the outcome of this model for a=0.5.

We present a publicly-available toolkit of flight-proven hardware and software to retrieve 5 TB of data or small physical samples from a stratospheric balloon platform. Before launch, a capsule is attached to the balloon, and rises with it. Upon remote command, the capsule is released and descends via parachute, continuously transmitting its location. Software to predict the trajectory can be used to select a safe but accessible landing site. We dropped two such capsules from the SuperBIT telescope, in September 2019. The capsules took ~37 minutes to descend from ~30 km altitude. They drifted 32 km and 19 km horizontally, but landed within 300 m and 600 m of their predicted landing sites. We found them easily, and successfully recovered the data. We welcome interest from other balloon teams for whom the technology would be useful.

We present a theory of information expressed solely in terms of which transformations of physical systems are possible and which are impossible - i.e. in constructor-theoretic terms. Although it includes conjectured laws of physics that are directly about information, independently of the details of particular physical instantiations, it does not regard information as an a priori mathematical or logical concept, but as something whose nature and properties are determined by the laws of physics alone. It does not suffer from the circularity at the foundations of existing information theory (namely that information and distinguishability are each defined in terms of the other). It explains the relationship between classical and quantum information, and reveals the single, constructor-theoretic property underlying the most distinctive phenomena associated with the latter, including the lack of in-principle distinguishability of some states, the impossibility of cloning, the existence of pairs of variables that cannot simultaneously have sharp values, the fact that measurement processes can be both deterministic and unpredictable, the irreducible perturbation caused by measurement, and entanglement (locally inaccessible information).

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Some results of author's work in a non-geometrical approach to quantum gravity are reviewed here, among them: a quantum mechanism of classical gravity giving a possibility to compute the Newton constant; asymptotic freedom at short distances; interaction of photons with the graviton background leading to the important cosmological consequences; the time delay of photons due to interactions with gravitons; deceleration of massive bodies in the graviton background which may be connected with the Pioneer anomaly and with the problem of dark matter.

Generative models are trained with the simple objective of imitating the conditional probability distribution induced by the data they are trained on. Therefore, when trained on data generated by humans, we may not expect the artificial model to outperform the humans on their original objectives. In this work, we study the phenomenon of transcendence: when a generative model achieves capabilities that surpass the abilities of the experts generating its data. We demonstrate transcendence by training an autoregressive transformer to play chess from game transcripts, and show that the trained model can sometimes achieve better performance than all players in the dataset. We theoretically prove that transcendence is enabled by low-temperature sampling, and rigorously assess this experimentally. Finally, we discuss other sources of transcendence, laying the groundwork for future investigation of this phenomenon in a broader setting.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have brought remarkable success in the field of LLM-as-Agent. Nevertheless, a prevalent assumption is that the information processed by LLMs is consistently honest, neglecting the pervasive deceptive or misleading information in human society and AI-generated content. This oversight makes LLMs susceptible to malicious manipulations, potentially resulting in detrimental outcomes. This study utilizes the intricate Avalon game as a testbed to explore LLMs' potential in deceptive environments. Avalon, full of misinformation and requiring sophisticated logic, manifests as a "Game-of-Thoughts". Inspired by the efficacy of humans' recursive thinking and perspective-taking in the Avalon game, we introduce a novel framework, Recursive Contemplation (ReCon), to enhance LLMs' ability to identify and counteract deceptive information. ReCon combines formulation and refinement contemplation processes; formulation contemplation produces initial thoughts and speech, while refinement contemplation further polishes them. Additionally, we incorporate first-order and second-order perspective transitions into these processes respectively. Specifically, the first-order allows an LLM agent to infer others' mental states, and the second-order involves understanding how others perceive the agent's mental state. After integrating ReCon with different LLMs, extensive experiment results from the Avalon game indicate its efficacy in aiding LLMs to discern and maneuver around deceptive information without extra fine-tuning and data. Finally, we offer a possible explanation for the efficacy of ReCon and explore the current limitations of LLMs in terms of safety, reasoning, speaking style, and format, potentially furnishing insights for subsequent research.

We introduce a new type of test, called a Turing Experiment (TE), for evaluating how well a language model, such as GPT-3, can simulate different aspects of human behavior. Unlike the Turing Test, which involves simulating a single arbitrary individual, a TE requires simulating a representative sample of participants in human subject research. We give TEs that attempt to replicate well-established findings in prior studies. We design a methodology for simulating TEs and illustrate its use to compare how well different language models are able to reproduce classic economic, psycholinguistic, and social psychology experiments: Ultimatum Game, Garden Path Sentences, Milgram Shock Experiment, and Wisdom of Crowds. In the first three TEs, the existing findings were replicated using recent models, while the last TE reveals a "hyper-accuracy distortion" present in some language models.

During the last two years there has been a plethora of large generative models such as ChatGPT or Stable Diffusion that have been published. Concretely, these models are able to perform tasks such as being a general question and answering system or automatically creating artistic images that are revolutionizing several sectors. Consequently, the implications that these generative models have in the industry and society are enormous, as several job positions may be transformed. For example, Generative AI is capable of transforming effectively and creatively texts to images, like the DALLE-2 model; text to 3D images, like the Dreamfusion model; images to text, like the Flamingo model; texts to video, like the Phenaki model; texts to audio, like the AudioLM model; texts to other texts, like ChatGPT; texts to code, like the Codex model; texts to scientific texts, like the Galactica model or even create algorithms like AlphaTensor. This work consists on an attempt to describe in a concise way the main models are sectors that are affected by generative AI and to provide a taxonomy of the main generative models published recently.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

A central goal of cognitive modeling is to develop models that not only predict human behavior but also provide insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. While neural network models trained on large-scale behavioral data often achieve strong predictive performance, they typically fall short in offering interpretable explanations of the cognitive processes they capture. In this work, we explore the potential of pretrained large language models (LLMs) to serve as dual-purpose cognitive models--capable of both accurate prediction and interpretable explanation in natural language. Specifically, we employ reinforcement learning with outcome-based rewards to guide LLMs toward generating explicit reasoning traces for explaining human risky choices. Our findings demonstrate that this approach produces high-quality explanations alongside strong quantitative predictions of human decisions.

Leggett and Garg derived inequalities that probe the boundaries of classical and quantum physics by putting limits on the properties that classical objects can have. Historically, it has been suggested that Leggett-Garg inequalities are easily violated by quantum systems undergoing sequences of strong measurements, casting doubt on whether quantum mechanics correctly describes macroscopic objects. Here I show that Leggett-Garg inequalities cannot be violated by any projective measurement. The perceived violation of the inequalities found previously can be traced back to an inappropriate assumption of non-invasive measurability. Surprisingly, weak projective measurements cannot violate the Leggett-Garg inequalities either because even though the quantum system itself is not fully projected via weak measurements, the measurement devices are.

Earth remains the only known example of a planet with technology, and future projections of Earth's trajectory provide a basis and motivation for approaching the search for extraterrestrial technospheres. Conventional approaches toward projecting Earth's technosphere include applications of the Kardashev scale, which suggest the possibility that energy-intensive civilizations may expand to harness the entire energy output available to their planet, host star, or even the entire galaxy. In this study, we argue that the Kardashev scale is better understood as a "luminosity limit" that describes the maximum capacity for a civilization to harvest luminous stellar energy across a given spatial domain, and we note that thermodynamic efficiency will always keep a luminosity-limited technosphere from actually reaching this theoretical limit. We suggest the possibility that an advanced technosphere might evolve beyond this luminosity limit to draw its energy directly from harvesting stellar mass, and we also discuss possible trajectories that could exist between Earth today and such hypothetical "stellivores." We develop a framework to describe trajectories for long-lived technospheres that optimize their growth strategies between exploration and exploitation, unlike Earth today. We note that analyses of compact accreting stars could provide ways to test the stellivore hypothesis, and we more broadly suggest an expansion of technosignature search strategies beyond those that reside exactly at the luminosity limit.