Daily Papers

Cooperative perception can effectively enhance individual perception performance by providing additional viewpoint and expanding the sensing field. Existing cooperation paradigms are either interpretable (result cooperation) or flexible (feature cooperation). In this paper, we propose the concept of query cooperation to enable interpretable instance-level flexible feature interaction. To specifically explain the concept, we propose a cooperative perception framework, termed QUEST, which let query stream flow among agents. The cross-agent queries are interacted via fusion for co-aware instances and complementation for individual unaware instances. Taking camera-based vehicle-infrastructure perception as a typical practical application scene, the experimental results on the real-world dataset, DAIR-V2X-Seq, demonstrate the effectiveness of QUEST and further reveal the advantage of the query cooperation paradigm on transmission flexibility and robustness to packet dropout. We hope our work can further facilitate the cross-agent representation interaction for better cooperative perception in practice.

As intelligent agents become autonomous over longer periods of time, they may eventually become lifelong counterparts to specific people. If so, it may be common for a user to want the agent to master a task temporarily but later on to forget the task due to privacy concerns. However enabling an agent to forget privately what the user specified without degrading the rest of the learned knowledge is a challenging problem. With the aim of addressing this challenge, this paper formalizes this continual learning and private unlearning (CLPU) problem. The paper further introduces a straightforward but exactly private solution, CLPU-DER++, as the first step towards solving the CLPU problem, along with a set of carefully designed benchmark problems to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed solution. The code is available at https://github.com/Cranial-XIX/Continual-Learning-Private-Unlearning.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

Inspired by the phenomenon of catastrophic forgetting, we investigate the learning dynamics of neural networks as they train on single classification tasks. Our goal is to understand whether a related phenomenon occurs when data does not undergo a clear distributional shift. We define a `forgetting event' to have occurred when an individual training example transitions from being classified correctly to incorrectly over the course of learning. Across several benchmark data sets, we find that: (i) certain examples are forgotten with high frequency, and some not at all; (ii) a data set's (un)forgettable examples generalize across neural architectures; and (iii) based on forgetting dynamics, a significant fraction of examples can be omitted from the training data set while still maintaining state-of-the-art generalization performance.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

In the experts problem, on each of T days, an agent needs to follow the advice of one of n ``experts''. After each day, the loss associated with each expert's advice is revealed. A fundamental result in learning theory says that the agent can achieve vanishing regret, i.e. their cumulative loss is within o(T) of the cumulative loss of the best-in-hindsight expert. Can the agent perform well without sufficient space to remember all the experts? We extend a nascent line of research on this question in two directions: bullet We give a new algorithm against the oblivious adversary, improving over the memory-regret tradeoff obtained by [PZ23], and nearly matching the lower bound of [SWXZ22]. bullet We also consider an adaptive adversary who can observe past experts chosen by the agent. In this setting we give both a new algorithm and a novel lower bound, proving that roughly n memory is both necessary and sufficient for obtaining o(T) regret.

No free lunch theorems for supervised learning state that no learner can solve all problems or that all learners achieve exactly the same accuracy on average over a uniform distribution on learning problems. Accordingly, these theorems are often referenced in support of the notion that individual problems require specially tailored inductive biases. While virtually all uniformly sampled datasets have high complexity, real-world problems disproportionately generate low-complexity data, and we argue that neural network models share this same preference, formalized using Kolmogorov complexity. Notably, we show that architectures designed for a particular domain, such as computer vision, can compress datasets on a variety of seemingly unrelated domains. Our experiments show that pre-trained and even randomly initialized language models prefer to generate low-complexity sequences. Whereas no free lunch theorems seemingly indicate that individual problems require specialized learners, we explain how tasks that often require human intervention such as picking an appropriately sized model when labeled data is scarce or plentiful can be automated into a single learning algorithm. These observations justify the trend in deep learning of unifying seemingly disparate problems with an increasingly small set of machine learning models.

We introduce \`A-la-carte Prompt Tuning (APT), a transformer-based scheme to tune prompts on distinct data so that they can be arbitrarily composed at inference time. The individual prompts can be trained in isolation, possibly on different devices, at different times, and on different distributions or domains. Furthermore each prompt only contains information about the subset of data it was exposed to during training. During inference, models can be assembled based on arbitrary selections of data sources, which we call "\`a-la-carte learning". \`A-la-carte learning enables constructing bespoke models specific to each user's individual access rights and preferences. We can add or remove information from the model by simply adding or removing the corresponding prompts without retraining from scratch. We demonstrate that \`a-la-carte built models achieve accuracy within 5% of models trained on the union of the respective sources, with comparable cost in terms of training and inference time. For the continual learning benchmarks Split CIFAR-100 and CORe50, we achieve state-of-the-art performance.

We investigate the extent to which offline demonstration data can improve online learning. It is natural to expect some improvement, but the question is how, and by how much? We show that the degree of improvement must depend on the quality of the demonstration data. To generate portable insights, we focus on Thompson sampling (TS) applied to a multi-armed bandit as a prototypical online learning algorithm and model. The demonstration data is generated by an expert with a given competence level, a notion we introduce. We propose an informed TS algorithm that utilizes the demonstration data in a coherent way through Bayes' rule and derive a prior-dependent Bayesian regret bound. This offers insight into how pretraining can greatly improve online performance and how the degree of improvement increases with the expert's competence level. We also develop a practical, approximate informed TS algorithm through Bayesian bootstrapping and show substantial empirical regret reduction through experiments.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Multiple Instance Learning (MIL) is a sub-domain of classification problems with positive and negative labels and a "bag" of inputs, where the label is positive if and only if a positive element is contained within the bag, and otherwise is negative. Training in this context requires associating the bag-wide label to instance-level information, and implicitly contains a causal assumption and asymmetry to the task (i.e., you can't swap the labels without changing the semantics). MIL problems occur in healthcare (one malignant cell indicates cancer), cyber security (one malicious executable makes an infected computer), and many other tasks. In this work, we examine five of the most prominent deep-MIL models and find that none of them respects the standard MIL assumption. They are able to learn anti-correlated instances, i.e., defaulting to "positive" labels until seeing a negative counter-example, which should not be possible for a correct MIL model. We suspect that enhancements and other works derived from these models will share the same issue. In any context in which these models are being used, this creates the potential for learning incorrect models, which creates risk of operational failure. We identify and demonstrate this problem via a proposed "algorithmic unit test", where we create synthetic datasets that can be solved by a MIL respecting model, and which clearly reveal learning that violates MIL assumptions. The five evaluated methods each fail one or more of these tests. This provides a model-agnostic way to identify violations of modeling assumptions, which we hope will be useful for future development and evaluation of MIL models.

Machine unlearning aims to erase data from a model as if the latter never saw them during training. While existing approaches unlearn information from complete or partial access to the training data, this access can be limited over time due to privacy regulations. Currently, no setting or benchmark exists to probe the effectiveness of unlearning methods in such scenarios. To fill this gap, we propose a novel task we call One-Shot Unlearning of Personal Identities (1-SHUI) that evaluates unlearning models when the training data is not available. We focus on unlearning identity data, which is specifically relevant due to current regulations requiring personal data deletion after training. To cope with data absence, we expect users to provide a portraiting picture to aid unlearning. We design requests on CelebA, CelebA-HQ, and MUFAC with different unlearning set sizes to evaluate applicable methods in 1-SHUI. Moreover, we propose MetaUnlearn, an effective method that meta-learns to forget identities from a single image. Our findings indicate that existing approaches struggle when data availability is limited, especially when there is a dissimilarity between the provided samples and the training data. Source code available at https://github.com/tdemin16/one-shui.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

When language models (LMs) are trained to forget (or "unlearn'') a skill, how precisely does their behavior change? We study the behavior of transformer LMs in which tasks have been forgotten via fine-tuning on randomized labels. Such LMs learn to generate near-random predictions for individual examples in the "training'' set used for forgetting. Across tasks, however, LMs exhibit extreme variability in whether LM predictions change on examples outside the training set. In some tasks (like entailment classification), forgetting generalizes robustly, and causes models to produce uninformative predictions on new task instances; in other tasks (like physical commonsense reasoning and scientific question answering) forgetting affects only the training examples, and models continue to perform the "forgotten'' task accurately even for examples very similar to those that appeared in the training set. Dataset difficulty is not predictive of whether a behavior can be forgotten; instead, generalization in forgetting is (weakly) predicted by the confidence of LMs' initial task predictions and the variability of LM representations of training data, with low confidence and low variability both associated with greater generalization. Perhaps most surprisingly, random-label forgetting appears to be somewhat insensitive to the contents of the training set: for example, models trained on science questions with random labels continue to answer other science questions accurately, but begin to produce random labels on entailment classification tasks. Finally, we show that even generalizable forgetting is shallow: linear probes trained on LMs' representations can still perform tasks reliably after forgetting. Our results highlight the difficulty and unpredictability of performing targeted skill removal from models via fine-tuning.

The training of modern large language models (LLMs) takes place in a regime where most training examples are seen only a few times by the model during the course of training. What does a model remember about such examples seen only a few times during training and how long does that memory persist in the face of continuous training with new examples? Here, we investigate these questions through simple recognition, recall, and retention experiments with LLMs. In recognition experiments, we ask if the model can distinguish the seen example from a novel example; in recall experiments, we ask if the model can correctly recall the seen example when cued by a part of it; and in retention experiments, we periodically probe the model's memory for the original examples as the model is trained continuously with new examples. We find that a single exposure is generally sufficient for a model to achieve near perfect accuracy even in very challenging recognition experiments. We estimate that the recognition performance of even small language models easily exceeds human recognition performance reported in similar experiments with humans (Shepard, 1967). Achieving near perfect recall takes more exposures, but most models can do it in just 3 exposures. The flip side of this remarkable capacity for fast learning is that precise memories are quickly overwritten: recall performance for the original examples drops steeply over the first 10 training updates with new examples, followed by a more gradual decline. Even after 100K updates, however, some of the original examples are still recalled near perfectly. A qualitatively similar retention pattern has been observed in human long-term memory retention studies before (Bahrick, 1984). Finally, recognition is much more robust to interference than recall and memory for natural language sentences is generally superior to memory for stimuli without structure.

Machine learning models are routinely used to support decisions that affect individuals -- be it to screen a patient for a serious illness or to gauge their response to treatment. In these tasks, we are limited to learning models from datasets with noisy labels. In this paper, we study the instance-level impact of learning under label noise. We introduce a notion of regret for this regime, which measures the number of unforeseen mistakes due to noisy labels. We show that standard approaches to learning under label noise can return models that perform well at a population-level while subjecting individuals to a lottery of mistakes. We present a versatile approach to estimate the likelihood of mistakes at the individual-level from a noisy dataset by training models over plausible realizations of datasets without label noise. This is supported by a comprehensive empirical study of label noise in clinical prediction tasks. Our results reveal how failure to anticipate mistakes can compromise model reliability and adoption -- we demonstrate how we can address these challenges by anticipating and avoiding regretful decisions.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Authorship identification has proven unsettlingly effective in inferring the identity of the author of an unsigned document, even when sensitive personal information has been carefully omitted. In the digital era, individuals leave a lasting digital footprint through their written content, whether it is posted on social media, stored on their employer's computers, or located elsewhere. When individuals need to communicate publicly yet wish to remain anonymous, there is little available to protect them from unwanted authorship identification. This unprecedented threat to privacy is evident in scenarios such as whistle-blowing. Proposed defenses against authorship identification attacks primarily aim to obfuscate one's writing style, thereby making it unlinkable to their pre-existing writing, while concurrently preserving the original meaning and grammatical integrity. The presented work offers a comprehensive review of the advancements in this research area spanning over the past two decades and beyond. It emphasizes the methodological frameworks of modification and generation-based strategies devised to evade authorship identification attacks, highlighting joint efforts from the differential privacy community. Limitations of current research are discussed, with a spotlight on open challenges and potential research avenues.

We employ an audit design to investigate biases in state-of-the-art large language models, including GPT-4. In our study, we prompt the models for advice involving a named individual across a variety of scenarios, such as during car purchase negotiations or election outcome predictions. We find that the advice systematically disadvantages names that are commonly associated with racial minorities and women. Names associated with Black women receive the least advantageous outcomes. The biases are consistent across 42 prompt templates and several models, indicating a systemic issue rather than isolated incidents. While providing numerical, decision-relevant anchors in the prompt can successfully counteract the biases, qualitative details have inconsistent effects and may even increase disparities. Our findings underscore the importance of conducting audits at the point of LLM deployment and implementation to mitigate their potential for harm against marginalized communities.

The volume of "free" data on the internet has been key to the current success of deep learning. However, it also raises privacy concerns about the unauthorized exploitation of personal data for training commercial models. It is thus crucial to develop methods to prevent unauthorized data exploitation. This paper raises the question: can data be made unlearnable for deep learning models? We present a type of error-minimizing noise that can indeed make training examples unlearnable. Error-minimizing noise is intentionally generated to reduce the error of one or more of the training example(s) close to zero, which can trick the model into believing there is "nothing" to learn from these example(s). The noise is restricted to be imperceptible to human eyes, and thus does not affect normal data utility. We empirically verify the effectiveness of error-minimizing noise in both sample-wise and class-wise forms. We also demonstrate its flexibility under extensive experimental settings and practicability in a case study of face recognition. Our work establishes an important first step towards making personal data unexploitable to deep learning models.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Understanding commonsense causality is a unique mark of intelligence for humans. It helps people understand the principles of the real world better and benefits the decision-making process related to causation. For instance, commonsense causality is crucial in judging whether a defendant's action causes the plaintiff's loss in determining legal liability. Despite its significance, a systematic exploration of this topic is notably lacking. Our comprehensive survey bridges this gap by focusing on taxonomies, benchmarks, acquisition methods, qualitative reasoning, and quantitative measurements in commonsense causality, synthesizing insights from over 200 representative articles. Our work aims to provide a systematic overview, update scholars on recent advancements, provide a pragmatic guide for beginners, and highlight promising future research directions in this vital field.

Spurious correlations allow flexible models to predict well during training but poorly on related test distributions. Recent work has shown that models that satisfy particular independencies involving correlation-inducing nuisance variables have guarantees on their test performance. Enforcing such independencies requires nuisances to be observed during training. However, nuisances, such as demographics or image background labels, are often missing. Enforcing independence on just the observed data does not imply independence on the entire population. Here we derive mmd estimators used for invariance objectives under missing nuisances. On simulations and clinical data, optimizing through these estimates achieves test performance similar to using estimators that make use of the full data.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to hallucinations-outputs that are ungrounded, factually incorrect, or inconsistent with prior generations. We focus on close-book Question Answering (CBQA), where previous work has not fully addressed the distinction between two possible kinds of hallucinations, namely, whether the model (1) does not hold the correct answer in its parameters or (2) answers incorrectly despite having the required knowledge. We argue that distinguishing these cases is crucial for detecting and mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, case (2) may be mitigated by intervening in the model's internal computation, as the knowledge resides within the model's parameters. In contrast, in case (1) there is no parametric knowledge to leverage for mitigation, so it should be addressed by resorting to an external knowledge source or abstaining. To help distinguish between the two cases, we introduce Wrong Answer despite having Correct Knowledge (WACK), an approach for constructing model-specific datasets for the second hallucination type. Our probing experiments indicate that the two kinds of hallucinations are represented differently in the model's inner states. Next, we show that datasets constructed using WACK exhibit variations across models, demonstrating that even when models share knowledge of certain facts, they still vary in the specific examples that lead to hallucinations. Finally, we show that training a probe on our WACK datasets leads to better hallucination detection of case (2) hallucinations than using the common generic one-size-fits-all datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/hallucination-mitigation .

For privacy and security concerns, the need to erase unwanted information from pre-trained vision models is becoming evident nowadays. In real-world scenarios, erasure requests originate at any time from both users and model owners, and these requests usually form a sequence. Therefore, under such a setting, selective information is expected to be continuously removed from a pre-trained model while maintaining the rest. We define this problem as continual forgetting and identify three key challenges. (i) For unwanted knowledge, efficient and effective deleting is crucial. (ii) For remaining knowledge, the impact brought by the forgetting procedure should be minimal. (iii) In real-world scenarios, the training samples may be scarce or partially missing during the process of forgetting. To address them, we first propose Group Sparse LoRA (GS-LoRA). Specifically, towards (i), we introduce LoRA modules to fine-tune the FFN layers in Transformer blocks for each forgetting task independently, and towards (ii), a simple group sparse regularization is adopted, enabling automatic selection of specific LoRA groups and zeroing out the others. To further extend GS-LoRA to more practical scenarios, we incorporate prototype information as additional supervision and introduce a more practical approach, GS-LoRA++. For each forgotten class, we move the logits away from its original prototype. For the remaining classes, we pull the logits closer to their respective prototypes. We conduct extensive experiments on face recognition, object detection and image classification and demonstrate that our method manages to forget specific classes with minimal impact on other classes. Codes have been released on https://github.com/bjzhb666/GS-LoRA.

Existing question answering (QA) datasets are no longer challenging to most powerful Large Language Models (LLMs). Traditional QA benchmarks like TriviaQA, NaturalQuestions, ELI5 and HotpotQA mainly study ``known unknowns'' with clear indications of both what information is missing, and how to find it to answer the question. Hence, good performance on these benchmarks provides a false sense of security. A yet unmet need of the NLP community is a bank of non-factoid, multi-perspective questions involving a great deal of unclear information needs, i.e. ``unknown uknowns''. We claim we can find such questions in search engine logs, which is surprising because most question-intent queries are indeed factoid. We present Researchy Questions, a dataset of search engine queries tediously filtered to be non-factoid, ``decompositional'' and multi-perspective. We show that users spend a lot of ``effort'' on these questions in terms of signals like clicks and session length, and that they are also challenging for GPT-4. We also show that ``slow thinking'' answering techniques, like decomposition into sub-questions shows benefit over answering directly. We release sim 100k Researchy Questions, along with the Clueweb22 URLs that were clicked.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have shown remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks (e.g., image captioning, visual question answering). While broad, their knowledge remains generic (e.g., recognizing a dog), and they are unable to handle personalized subjects (e.g., recognizing a user's pet dog). Human reasoning, in contrast, typically operates within the context of specific subjects in our surroundings. For example, one might ask, "What should I buy for my dog's birthday?"; as opposed to a generic inquiry about "What should I buy for a dog's birthday?". Similarly, when looking at a friend's image, the interest lies in seeing their activities (e.g., "my friend is holding a cat"), rather than merely observing generic human actions (e.g., "a man is holding a cat"). In this paper, we introduce the novel task of personalizing LMMs, so that they can have conversations about a specific subject. We propose Yo'LLaVA, which learns to embed a personalized subject into a set of latent tokens given a handful of example images of the subject. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that Yo'LLaVA can learn the concept more efficiently using fewer tokens and more effectively encode the visual attributes compared to strong prompting baselines (e.g., LLaVA).

Experts advising decision-makers are likely to display expertise which varies as a function of the problem instance. In practice, this may lead to sub-optimal or discriminatory decisions against minority cases. In this work we model such changes in depth and breadth of knowledge as a partitioning of the problem space into regions of differing expertise. We provide here new algorithms that explicitly consider and adapt to the relationship between problem instances and experts' knowledge. We first propose and highlight the drawbacks of a naive approach based on nearest neighbor queries. To address these drawbacks we then introduce a novel algorithm - expertise trees - that constructs decision trees enabling the learner to select appropriate models. We provide theoretical insights and empirically validate the improved performance of our novel approach on a range of problems for which existing methods proved to be inadequate.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.