Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) often produce hallucinated or unverifiable content, undermining their reliability in factual domains. This work investigates Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) as a training paradigm that explicitly rewards abstention ("I don't know") alongside correctness to promote intellectual humility. We fine-tune and evaluate Granite-3.3-2B-Instruct and Qwen-3-4B-Instruct on the MedMCQA and Hendrycks Math benchmarks using a ternary reward structure (-1, r_abs, 1) under varying abstention reward structures. We further study the effect of combining RLVR with supervised fine-tuning strategies that teach abstention prior to reinforcement learning. Our results show that moderate abstention rewards (r_abs approx -0.25 to 0.3) consistently reduce incorrect responses without severe accuracy degradation on multiple-choice tasks, with larger models exhibiting greater robustness to abstention incentives. On open-ended question answering, we observe limitations due to insufficient exploration, which can be partially mitigated through supervised abstention training. Overall, these findings demonstrate the feasibility and flexibility of verifiable reward design as a practical approach for hallucination mitigation in language models. Reproducible code for our abstention training framework is available here https://github.com/Mystic-Slice/rl-abstention.

Whether pairing people with AI helps or hurts is usually reported as a single average effect. Using a real-money prediction market (Polymarket) as an objective, externally resolved benchmark, this pilot shows that the value of human-AI collaboration depends on a specific, measurable form of human capital. Analyzed at the level of the individual forecaster, hybrid performance is trimodal: most people either deferred to the model (matching it) or used it to rubber-stamp a prior guess (performing worse than the model alone), while a minority engaged in genuine complementary reasoning and reached accuracy matching or even exceeding (i.e., lower error than) the market itself. Collaborative traits (perspective-taking, intellectual humility, and curiosity) rather than raw cognitive ability or model benchmarks, distinguished who reached that mode. The results are preliminary but statistically robust, and motivate a pre-registered replication now in preparation.

When retrieved evidence contradicts an agent's prior beliefs, does it revise its answer, acknowledge uncertainty, or persist with an incorrect conclusion? Existing evaluations of agentic systems focus primarily on task success, offering limited insight into how agents handle such conflicts. We propose to evaluate agents on epistemic humility (EH): the agent's willingness to recognize, act on, and communicate uncertainty during task execution. We operationalize EH through three trajectory-level behavioral dimensions: Identify, Solve, and Escalate (ISE). Through knowledge conflict, situations where the backbone language model's parametric knowledge contradicts the evidence it encounters, or where two contextual sources disagree, we evaluate two conflict settings: (1) controlled conflict and (2) naturally occurring conflict during multi-step agentic execution, each paired with matched no-conflict controls. Evaluating four agents, we find that higher task accuracy does not necessarily correspond to greater epistemic humility: some high-accuracy configurations recognize conflicts during execution but do not communicate unresolved uncertainty in their incorrect final answers. Trajectory-level analysis further reveals that agents frequently detect conflicts in early steps of execution but fail to maintain or resolve them in later steps. Finally, we show that model-level interventions can improve EH, but often at the cost of task accuracy, suggesting that epistemic humility emerges from the interaction among the backbone model, agent harness, and evaluation environment.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.