Daily Papers

In critical applications, it is vital for classifiers to defer decision-making to humans. We propose a post-hoc method that makes existing classifiers selectively abstain from predicting certain samples. Our abstaining classifier is incentivized to maintain the original accuracy for each sub-population (i.e. no harm) while achieving a set of group fairness definitions to a user specified degree. To this end, we design an Integer Programming (IP) procedure that assigns abstention decisions for each training sample to satisfy a set of constraints. To generalize the abstaining decisions to test samples, we then train a surrogate model to learn the abstaining decisions based on the IP solutions in an end-to-end manner. We analyze the feasibility of the IP procedure to determine the possible abstention rate for different levels of unfairness tolerance and accuracy constraint for achieving no harm. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to identify the theoretical relationships between the constraint parameters and the required abstention rate. Our theoretical results are important since a high abstention rate is often infeasible in practice due to a lack of human resources. Our framework outperforms existing methods in terms of fairness disparity without sacrificing accuracy at similar abstention rates.

Progress in machine learning is measured by careful evaluation on problems of outstanding common interest. However, the proliferation of benchmark suites and environments, adversarial attacks, and other complications has diluted the basic evaluation model by overwhelming researchers with choices. Deliberate or accidental cherry picking is increasingly likely, and designing well-balanced evaluation suites requires increasing effort. In this paper we take a step back and propose Nash averaging. The approach builds on a detailed analysis of the algebraic structure of evaluation in two basic scenarios: agent-vs-agent and agent-vs-task. The key strength of Nash averaging is that it automatically adapts to redundancies in evaluation data, so that results are not biased by the incorporation of easy tasks or weak agents. Nash averaging thus encourages maximally inclusive evaluation -- since there is no harm (computational cost aside) from including all available tasks and agents.

We present ControlNet, a neural network architecture to add spatial conditioning controls to large, pretrained text-to-image diffusion models. ControlNet locks the production-ready large diffusion models, and reuses their deep and robust encoding layers pretrained with billions of images as a strong backbone to learn a diverse set of conditional controls. The neural architecture is connected with "zero convolutions" (zero-initialized convolution layers) that progressively grow the parameters from zero and ensure that no harmful noise could affect the finetuning. We test various conditioning controls, eg, edges, depth, segmentation, human pose, etc, with Stable Diffusion, using single or multiple conditions, with or without prompts. We show that the training of ControlNets is robust with small (<50k) and large (>1m) datasets. Extensive results show that ControlNet may facilitate wider applications to control image diffusion models.

We introduce WildTeaming, an automatic LLM safety red-teaming framework that mines in-the-wild user-chatbot interactions to discover 5.7K unique clusters of novel jailbreak tactics, and then composes multiple tactics for systematic exploration of novel jailbreaks. Compared to prior work that performed red-teaming via recruited human workers, gradient-based optimization, or iterative revision with LLMs, our work investigates jailbreaks from chatbot users who were not specifically instructed to break the system. WildTeaming reveals previously unidentified vulnerabilities of frontier LLMs, resulting in up to 4.6x more diverse and successful adversarial attacks compared to state-of-the-art jailbreak methods. While many datasets exist for jailbreak evaluation, very few open-source datasets exist for jailbreak training, as safety training data has been closed even when model weights are open. With WildTeaming we create WildJailbreak, a large-scale open-source synthetic safety dataset with 262K vanilla (direct request) and adversarial (complex jailbreak) prompt-response pairs. To mitigate exaggerated safety behaviors, WildJailbreak provides two contrastive types of queries: 1) harmful queries (vanilla & adversarial) and 2) benign queries that resemble harmful queries in form but contain no harm. As WildJailbreak considerably upgrades the quality and scale of existing safety resources, it uniquely enables us to examine the scaling effects of data and the interplay of data properties and model capabilities during safety training. Through extensive experiments, we identify the training properties that enable an ideal balance of safety behaviors: appropriate safeguarding without over-refusal, effective handling of vanilla and adversarial queries, and minimal, if any, decrease in general capabilities. All components of WildJailbeak contribute to achieving balanced safety behaviors of models.

Terms and conditions for online shopping websites often contain terms that can have significant financial consequences for customers. Despite their impact, there is currently no comprehensive understanding of the types and potential risks associated with unfavorable financial terms. Furthermore, there are no publicly available detection systems or datasets to systematically identify or mitigate these terms. In this paper, we take the first steps toward solving this problem with three key contributions. First, we introduce TermMiner, an automated data collection and topic modeling pipeline to understand the landscape of unfavorable financial terms. Second, we create ShopTC-100K, a dataset of terms and conditions from shopping websites in the Tranco top 100K list, comprising 1.8 million terms from 8,251 websites. Consequently, we develop a taxonomy of 22 types from 4 categories of unfavorable financial terms -- spanning purchase, post-purchase, account termination, and legal aspects. Third, we build TermLens, an automated detector that uses Large Language Models (LLMs) to identify unfavorable financial terms. Fine-tuned on an annotated dataset, TermLens achieves an F1 score of 94.6\% and a false positive rate of 2.3\% using GPT-4o. When applied to shopping websites from the Tranco top 100K, we find that 42.06\% of these sites contain at least one unfavorable financial term, with such terms being more prevalent on less popular websites. Case studies further highlight the financial risks and customer dissatisfaction associated with unfavorable financial terms, as well as the limitations of existing ecosystem defenses.

Ensuring the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial to generating responses consistent with human values. Despite their ability to recognize and avoid harmful queries, LLMs are vulnerable to "jailbreaking" attacks, where carefully crafted prompts elicit them to produce toxic content. One category of jailbreak attacks is reformulating the task as adversarial attacks by eliciting the LLM to generate an affirmative response. However, the typical attack in this category GCG has very limited attack success rate. In this study, to better study the jailbreak attack, we introduce the DSN (Don't Say No) attack, which prompts LLMs to not only generate affirmative responses but also novelly enhance the objective to suppress refusals. In addition, another challenge lies in jailbreak attacks is the evaluation, as it is difficult to directly and accurately assess the harmfulness of the attack. The existing evaluation such as refusal keyword matching has its own limitation as it reveals numerous false positive and false negative instances. To overcome this challenge, we propose an ensemble evaluation pipeline incorporating Natural Language Inference (NLI) contradiction assessment and two external LLM evaluators. Extensive experiments demonstrate the potency of the DSN and the effectiveness of ensemble evaluation compared to baseline methods.

Current vision large language models (VLLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities yet are prone to generate harmful content and are vulnerable to even the simplest jailbreaking attacks. Our initial analysis finds that this is due to the presence of harmful data during vision-language instruction fine-tuning, and that VLLM fine-tuning can cause forgetting of safety alignment previously learned by the underpinning LLM. To address this issue, we first curate a vision-language safe instruction-following dataset VLGuard covering various harmful categories. Our experiments demonstrate that integrating this dataset into standard vision-language fine-tuning or utilizing it for post-hoc fine-tuning effectively safety aligns VLLMs. This alignment is achieved with minimal impact on, or even enhancement of, the models' helpfulness. The versatility of our safety fine-tuning dataset makes it a valuable resource for safety-testing existing VLLMs, training new models or safeguarding pre-trained VLLMs. Empirical results demonstrate that fine-tuned VLLMs effectively reject unsafe instructions and substantially reduce the success rates of several black-box adversarial attacks, which approach zero in many cases. The code and dataset are available at https://github.com/ys-zong/VLGuard.

Releasing open-source large language models (LLMs) presents a dual-use risk since bad actors can easily fine-tune these models for harmful purposes. Even without the open release of weights, weight stealing and fine-tuning APIs make closed models vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks (HFAs). While safety measures like preventing jailbreaks and improving safety guardrails are important, such measures can easily be reversed through fine-tuning. In this work, we propose Representation Noising (RepNoise), a defence mechanism that is effective even when attackers have access to the weights and the defender no longer has any control. RepNoise works by removing information about harmful representations such that it is difficult to recover them during fine-tuning. Importantly, our defence is also able to generalize across different subsets of harm that have not been seen during the defence process. Our method does not degrade the general capability of LLMs and retains the ability to train the model on harmless tasks. We provide empirical evidence that the effectiveness of our defence lies in its "depth": the degree to which information about harmful representations is removed across all layers of the LLM.

Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful text from models that were fine-tuned to be harmless. Recent work on red-teaming, model editing, and interpretability suggests that this challenge stems from how (adversarial) fine-tuning largely serves to suppress rather than remove undesirable capabilities from LLMs. Prior work has introduced latent adversarial training (LAT) as a way to improve robustness to broad classes of failures. These prior works have considered untargeted latent space attacks where the adversary perturbs latent activations to maximize loss on examples of desirable behavior. Untargeted LAT can provide a generic type of robustness but does not leverage information about specific failure modes. Here, we experiment with targeted LAT where the adversary seeks to minimize loss on a specific competing task. We find that it can augment a wide variety of state-of-the-art methods. First, we use targeted LAT to improve robustness to jailbreaks, outperforming a strong R2D2 baseline with orders of magnitude less compute. Second, we use it to more effectively remove backdoors with no knowledge of the trigger. Finally, we use it to more effectively unlearn knowledge for specific undesirable tasks in a way that is also more robust to re-learning. Overall, our results suggest that targeted LAT can be an effective tool for defending against harmful behaviors from LLMs.

When an image generation process is guided by both a text prompt and spatial cues, such as a set of bounding boxes, do these elements work in harmony, or does one dominate the other? Our analysis of a pretrained image diffusion model that integrates gated self-attention into the U-Net reveals that spatial grounding often outweighs textual grounding due to the sequential flow from gated self-attention to cross-attention. We demonstrate that such bias can be significantly mitigated without sacrificing accuracy in either grounding by simply rewiring the network architecture, changing from sequential to parallel for gated self-attention and cross-attention. This surprisingly simple yet effective solution does not require any fine-tuning of the network but significantly reduces the trade-off between the two groundings. Our experiments demonstrate significant improvements from the original GLIGEN to the rewired version in the trade-off between textual grounding and spatial grounding.

With little to no parallel data available for programming languages, unsupervised methods are well-suited to source code translation. However, the majority of unsupervised machine translation approaches rely on back-translation, a method developed in the context of natural language translation and one that inherently involves training on noisy inputs. Unfortunately, source code is highly sensitive to small changes; a single token can result in compilation failures or erroneous programs, unlike natural languages where small inaccuracies may not change the meaning of a sentence. To address this issue, we propose to leverage an automated unit-testing system to filter out invalid translations, thereby creating a fully tested parallel corpus. We found that fine-tuning an unsupervised model with this filtered data set significantly reduces the noise in the translations so-generated, comfortably outperforming the state-of-the-art for all language pairs studied. In particular, for Java to Python and Python to C++ we outperform the best previous methods by more than 16% and 24% respectively, reducing the error rate by more than 35%.

Scene graph generation (SGG) aims to predict graph-structured descriptions of input images, in the form of objects and relationships between them. This task is becoming increasingly useful for progress at the interface of vision and language. Here, it is important - yet challenging - to perform well on novel (zero-shot) or rare (few-shot) compositions of objects and relationships. In this paper, we identify two key issues that limit such generalization. Firstly, we show that the standard loss used in this task is unintentionally a function of scene graph density. This leads to the neglect of individual edges in large sparse graphs during training, even though these contain diverse few-shot examples that are important for generalization. Secondly, the frequency of relationships can create a strong bias in this task, such that a blind model predicting the most frequent relationship achieves good performance. Consequently, some state-of-the-art models exploit this bias to improve results. We show that such models can suffer the most in their ability to generalize to rare compositions, evaluating two different models on the Visual Genome dataset and its more recent, improved version, GQA. To address these issues, we introduce a density-normalized edge loss, which provides more than a two-fold improvement in certain generalization metrics. Compared to other works in this direction, our enhancements require only a few lines of code and no added computational cost. We also highlight the difficulty of accurately evaluating models using existing metrics, especially on zero/few shots, and introduce a novel weighted metric.

Despite growing interest in using large language models (LLMs) in healthcare, current explorations do not assess the real-world utility and safety of LLMs in clinical settings. Our objective was to determine whether two LLMs can serve information needs submitted by physicians as questions to an informatics consultation service in a safe and concordant manner. Sixty six questions from an informatics consult service were submitted to GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 via simple prompts. 12 physicians assessed the LLM responses' possibility of patient harm and concordance with existing reports from an informatics consultation service. Physician assessments were summarized based on majority vote. For no questions did a majority of physicians deem either LLM response as harmful. For GPT-3.5, responses to 8 questions were concordant with the informatics consult report, 20 discordant, and 9 were unable to be assessed. There were 29 responses with no majority on "Agree", "Disagree", and "Unable to assess". For GPT-4, responses to 13 questions were concordant, 15 discordant, and 3 were unable to be assessed. There were 35 responses with no majority. Responses from both LLMs were largely devoid of overt harm, but less than 20% of the responses agreed with an answer from an informatics consultation service, responses contained hallucinated references, and physicians were divided on what constitutes harm. These results suggest that while general purpose LLMs are able to provide safe and credible responses, they often do not meet the specific information need of a given question. A definitive evaluation of the usefulness of LLMs in healthcare settings will likely require additional research on prompt engineering, calibration, and custom-tailoring of general purpose models.

This paper introduces RiskCards, a framework for structured assessment and documentation of risks associated with an application of language models. As with all language, text generated by language models can be harmful, or used to bring about harm. Automating language generation adds both an element of scale and also more subtle or emergent undesirable tendencies to the generated text. Prior work establishes a wide variety of language model harms to many different actors: existing taxonomies identify categories of harms posed by language models; benchmarks establish automated tests of these harms; and documentation standards for models, tasks and datasets encourage transparent reporting. However, there is no risk-centric framework for documenting the complexity of a landscape in which some risks are shared across models and contexts, while others are specific, and where certain conditions may be required for risks to manifest as harms. RiskCards address this methodological gap by providing a generic framework for assessing the use of a given language model in a given scenario. Each RiskCard makes clear the routes for the risk to manifest harm, their placement in harm taxonomies, and example prompt-output pairs. While RiskCards are designed to be open-source, dynamic and participatory, we present a "starter set" of RiskCards taken from a broad literature survey, each of which details a concrete risk presentation. Language model RiskCards initiate a community knowledge base which permits the mapping of risks and harms to a specific model or its application scenario, ultimately contributing to a better, safer and shared understanding of the risk landscape.

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

Foundation models have rapidly permeated society, catalyzing a wave of generative AI applications spanning enterprise and consumer-facing contexts. While the societal impact of foundation models is growing, transparency is on the decline, mirroring the opacity that has plagued past digital technologies (e.g. social media). Reversing this trend is essential: transparency is a vital precondition for public accountability, scientific innovation, and effective governance. To assess the transparency of the foundation model ecosystem and help improve transparency over time, we introduce the Foundation Model Transparency Index. The Foundation Model Transparency Index specifies 100 fine-grained indicators that comprehensively codify transparency for foundation models, spanning the upstream resources used to build a foundation model (e.g data, labor, compute), details about the model itself (e.g. size, capabilities, risks), and the downstream use (e.g. distribution channels, usage policies, affected geographies). We score 10 major foundation model developers (e.g. OpenAI, Google, Meta) against the 100 indicators to assess their transparency. To facilitate and standardize assessment, we score developers in relation to their practices for their flagship foundation model (e.g. GPT-4 for OpenAI, PaLM 2 for Google, Llama 2 for Meta). We present 10 top-level findings about the foundation model ecosystem: for example, no developer currently discloses significant information about the downstream impact of its flagship model, such as the number of users, affected market sectors, or how users can seek redress for harm. Overall, the Foundation Model Transparency Index establishes the level of transparency today to drive progress on foundation model governance via industry standards and regulatory intervention.