Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) excel at logical and algorithmic reasoning, yet their emotional intelligence (EQ) still lags far behind their cognitive prowess. While reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) has advanced in other domains, its application to dialogue-especially for emotional intelligence-remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce RLVER, the first end-to-end reinforcement learning framework that leverages verifiable emotion rewards from simulated users to cultivate higher-order empathetic abilities in LLMs. Within this framework, self-consistent affective simulated users engage in dialogue rollouts and produce deterministic emotion scores during conversations, serving as reward signals to guide the LLM's learning. Fine-tuning publicly available Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct model with PPO boosts its Sentient-Benchmark score from 13.3 to 79.2 while largely preserving mathematical and coding competence. Extensive experiments reveal that: (i) RLVER consistently improves multiple dialogue capabilities; (ii) Thinking and non-thinking models show distinct trends--thinking models excel in empathy and insight, while non-thinking models favor action; (iii) GRPO often yields stable gains, while PPO can push certain capabilities to a higher ceiling; (iv) More challenging environments are not always better-moderate ones can yield stronger outcomes. Our results show that RLVER is a practical route toward emotionally intelligent and broadly capable language agents.

Recent advances in Multi-Modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have enabled unified processing of language, vision, and structured inputs, opening the door to complex tasks such as logical deduction, spatial reasoning, and scientific analysis. Despite their promise, the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs, particularly those augmented with intermediate thinking traces (MLLMs-T), remain poorly understood and lack standardized evaluation benchmarks. Existing work focuses primarily on perception or final answer correctness, offering limited insight into how models reason or fail across modalities. To address this gap, we introduce the MMMR, a new benchmark designed to rigorously evaluate multi-modal reasoning with explicit thinking. The MMMR comprises 1) a high-difficulty dataset of 1,083 questions spanning six diverse reasoning types with symbolic depth and multi-hop demands and 2) a modular Reasoning Trace Evaluation Pipeline (RTEP) for assessing reasoning quality beyond accuracy through metrics like relevance, consistency, and structured error annotations. Empirical results show that MLLMs-T overall outperform non-thinking counterparts, but even top models like Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5 Pro suffer from reasoning pathologies such as inconsistency and overthinking. This benchmark reveals persistent gaps between accuracy and reasoning quality and provides an actionable evaluation pipeline for future model development. Overall, the MMMR offers a scalable foundation for evaluating, comparing, and improving the next generation of multi-modal reasoning systems.

In this work, we present Qwen3, the latest version of the Qwen model family. Qwen3 comprises a series of large language models (LLMs) designed to advance performance, efficiency, and multilingual capabilities. The Qwen3 series includes models of both dense and Mixture-of-Expert (MoE) architectures, with parameter scales ranging from 0.6 to 235 billion. A key innovation in Qwen3 is the integration of thinking mode (for complex, multi-step reasoning) and non-thinking mode (for rapid, context-driven responses) into a unified framework. This eliminates the need to switch between different models--such as chat-optimized models (e.g., GPT-4o) and dedicated reasoning models (e.g., QwQ-32B)--and enables dynamic mode switching based on user queries or chat templates. Meanwhile, Qwen3 introduces a thinking budget mechanism, allowing users to allocate computational resources adaptively during inference, thereby balancing latency and performance based on task complexity. Moreover, by leveraging the knowledge from the flagship models, we significantly reduce the computational resources required to build smaller-scale models, while ensuring their highly competitive performance. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that Qwen3 achieves state-of-the-art results across diverse benchmarks, including tasks in code generation, mathematical reasoning, agent tasks, etc., competitive against larger MoE models and proprietary models. Compared to its predecessor Qwen2.5, Qwen3 expands multilingual support from 29 to 119 languages and dialects, enhancing global accessibility through improved cross-lingual understanding and generation capabilities. To facilitate reproducibility and community-driven research and development, all Qwen3 models are publicly accessible under Apache 2.0.

Chain-of-Thought(CoT) prompting and its variants explore equipping large language models (LLMs) with high-level reasoning abilities by emulating human-like linear cognition and logic. However, the human mind is complicated and mixed with both linear and nonlinear thinking. In this work, we propose Inferential Exclusion Prompting (IEP), a novel prompting that combines the principles of elimination and inference in order to guide LLMs to think non-linearly. IEP guides LLMs to plan and then utilize Natural Language Inference (NLI) to deduce each possible solution's entailment relation with context, commonsense, or facts, therefore yielding a broader perspective by thinking back for inferring. This forward planning and backward eliminating process allows IEP to better simulate the complex human thinking processes compared to other CoT-based methods, which only reflect linear cognitive processes. We conducted a series of empirical studies and have corroborated that IEP consistently outperforms CoT across various tasks. Additionally, we observe that integrating IEP and CoT further improves the LLMs' performance on certain tasks, highlighting the necessity of equipping LLMs with mixed logic processes. Moreover, to better evaluate comprehensive features inherent in human logic, we introduce Mental-Ability Reasoning Benchmark (MARB). The benchmark comprises six novel subtasks with a total of 9,115 questions, among which 1,685 are developed with hand-crafted rationale references. We believe both IEP and MARB can serve as a promising direction for unveiling LLMs' logic and verbal reasoning abilities and drive further advancements. MARB will be available at ~anonymity link soon.

We introduce Seed1.5-Thinking, capable of reasoning through thinking before responding, resulting in improved performance on a wide range of benchmarks. Seed1.5-Thinking achieves 86.7 on AIME 2024, 55.0 on Codeforces and 77.3 on GPQA, demonstrating excellent reasoning abilities in STEM and coding. Beyond reasoning tasks, the method demonstrates notable generalization across diverse domains. For instance, it surpasses DeepSeek R1 by 8% in win rate on non-reasoning tasks, indicating its broader applicability. Compared to other state-of-the-art reasoning models, Seed1.5-Thinking is a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model with a relatively small size, featuring 20B activated and 200B total parameters. As part of our effort to assess generalized reasoning, we develop two internal benchmarks, BeyondAIME and Codeforces, both of which will be publicly released to support future research. Model trial link: https://www.volcengine.com/experience/ark.

Human dialogue contains evolving concepts, and speakers naturally associate multiple concepts to compose a response. However, current dialogue models with the seq2seq framework lack the ability to effectively manage concept transitions and can hardly introduce multiple concepts to responses in a sequential decoding manner. To facilitate a controllable and coherent dialogue, in this work, we devise a concept-guided non-autoregressive model (CG-nAR) for open-domain dialogue generation. The proposed model comprises a multi-concept planning module that learns to identify multiple associated concepts from a concept graph and a customized Insertion Transformer that performs concept-guided non-autoregressive generation to complete a response. The experimental results on two public datasets show that CG-nAR can produce diverse and coherent responses, outperforming state-of-the-art baselines in both automatic and human evaluations with substantially faster inference speed.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

While recent success of large reasoning models (LRMs) significantly advanced LLMs' reasoning capability by optimizing the final answer accuracy using reinforcement learning, they may also drastically increase the output length due to overthinking, characterized by unnecessarily complex reasoning paths that waste computation and potentially degrade the performance. We hypothesize that such inefficiencies stem from LRMs' limited capability to dynamically select the proper modular reasoning strategies, termed thinking patterns at the right position. To investigate this hypothesis, we propose a dynamic optimization framework that segments model-generated reasoning paths into distinct thinking patterns, systematically identifying and promoting beneficial patterns that improve the answer while removing detrimental ones. Empirical analysis confirms that our optimized thinking paths yield more concise yet sufficiently informative trajectories, enhancing reasoning efficiency by reducing attention FLOPs by up to 47% while maintaining accuracy for originally correct responses. Moreover, a non-trivial portion of originally incorrect responses are transformed into correct ones, achieving a 15.6% accuracy improvement with reduced length. Motivated by the improvement brought by the optimized thinking paths, we apply a preference optimization technique supported by a pairwise dataset contrasting suboptimal and optimal reasoning paths. Experimental evaluations across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks reveal that our method notably reduces computational overhead while simultaneously improving reasoning accuracy, achieving up to a 12% accuracy improvement and reducing token usage from approximately 5,000 to 3,000 tokens.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1, have demonstrated the significant effectiveness of test-time scaling, achieving substantial performance gains across various benchmarks. These advanced models utilize deliberate "thinking" steps to systematically enhance answer quality. In this paper, we propose leveraging these high-quality outputs generated by reasoning-intensive models to improve less computationally demanding, non-reasoning models. We explore and compare methodologies for utilizing the answers produced by reasoning models to train and improve non-reasoning models. Through straightforward Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) experiments on established benchmarks, we demonstrate consistent improvements across various benchmarks, underscoring the potential of this approach for advancing the ability of models to answer questions directly.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Despite their strengths, large language models (LLMs) often fail to communicate their confidence accurately, making it difficult to assess when they might be wrong and limiting their reliability. In this work, we demonstrate that reasoning models-LLMs that engage in extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning-exhibit superior performance not only in problem-solving but also in accurately expressing their confidence. Specifically, we benchmark six reasoning models across six datasets and find that they achieve strictly better confidence calibration than their non-reasoning counterparts in 33 out of the 36 settings. Our detailed analysis reveals that these gains in calibration stem from the slow thinking behaviors of reasoning models-such as exploring alternative approaches and backtracking-which enable them to adjust their confidence dynamically throughout their CoT, making it progressively more accurate. In particular, we find that reasoning models become increasingly better calibrated as their CoT unfolds, a trend not observed in non-reasoning models. Moreover, removing slow thinking behaviors from the CoT leads to a significant drop in calibration. Lastly, we show that these gains are not exclusive to reasoning models-non-reasoning models also benefit when guided to perform slow thinking via in-context learning.

We introduce the Diffusion Chain of Lateral Thought (DCoLT), a reasoning framework for diffusion language models. DCoLT treats each intermediate step in the reverse diffusion process as a latent "thinking" action and optimizes the entire reasoning trajectory to maximize the reward on the correctness of the final answer with outcome-based Reinforcement Learning (RL). Unlike traditional Chain-of-Thought (CoT) methods that follow a causal, linear thinking process, DCoLT allows bidirectional, non-linear reasoning with no strict rule on grammatical correctness amid its intermediate steps of thought. We implement DCoLT on two representative Diffusion Language Models (DLMs). First, we choose SEDD as a representative continuous-time discrete diffusion model, where its concrete score derives a probabilistic policy to maximize the RL reward over the entire sequence of intermediate diffusion steps. We further consider the discrete-time masked diffusion language model -- LLaDA, and find that the order to predict and unmask tokens plays an essential role to optimize its RL action resulting from the ranking-based Unmasking Policy Module (UPM) defined by the Plackett-Luce model. Experiments on both math and code generation tasks show that using only public data and 16 H800 GPUs, DCoLT-reinforced DLMs outperform other DLMs trained by SFT or RL or even both. Notably, DCoLT-reinforced LLaDA boosts its reasoning accuracy by +9.8%, +5.7%, +11.4%, +19.5% on GSM8K, MATH, MBPP, and HumanEval.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) guides large language models (LLMs) to reason step-by-step, and can motivate their logical reasoning ability. While effective for logical tasks, CoT is not conducive to creative problem-solving which often requires out-of-box thoughts and is crucial for innovation advancements. In this paper, we explore the Leap-of-Thought (LoT) abilities within LLMs -- a non-sequential, creative paradigm involving strong associations and knowledge leaps. To this end, we study LLMs on the popular Oogiri game which needs participants to have good creativity and strong associative thinking for responding unexpectedly and humorously to the given image, text, or both, and thus is suitable for LoT study. Then to investigate LLMs' LoT ability in the Oogiri game, we first build a multimodal and multilingual Oogiri-GO dataset which contains over 130,000 samples from the Oogiri game, and observe the insufficient LoT ability or failures of most existing LLMs on the Oogiri game. Accordingly, we introduce a creative Leap-of-Thought (CLoT) paradigm to improve LLM's LoT ability. CLoT first formulates the Oogiri-GO dataset into LoT-oriented instruction tuning data to train pretrained LLM for achieving certain LoT humor generation and discrimination abilities. Then CLoT designs an explorative self-refinement that encourages the LLM to generate more creative LoT data via exploring parallels between seemingly unrelated concepts and selects high-quality data to train itself for self-refinement. CLoT not only excels in humor generation in the Oogiri game but also boosts creative abilities in various tasks like cloud guessing game and divergent association task. These findings advance our understanding and offer a pathway to improve LLMs' creative capacities for innovative applications across domains. The dataset, code, and models will be released online. https://zhongshsh.github.io/CLoT/.

With the widespread use of large language models (LLMs) in NLP tasks, researchers have discovered the potential of Chain-of-thought (CoT) to assist LLMs in accomplishing complex reasoning tasks by generating intermediate steps. However, human thought processes are often non-linear, rather than simply sequential chains of thoughts. Therefore, we propose Graph-of-Thought (GoT) reasoning, which models human thought processes not only as a chain but also as a graph. By representing thought units as nodes and connections between them as edges, our approach captures the non-sequential nature of human thinking and allows for a more realistic modeling of thought processes. Similar to Multimodal-CoT, we modeled GoT reasoning as a two-stage framework, generating rationales first and then producing the final answer. Specifically, we employ an additional graph-of-thoughts encoder for GoT representation learning and fuse the GoT representation with the original input representation through a gated fusion mechanism. We implement a GoT reasoning model on the T5 pre-trained model and evaluate its performance on a text-only reasoning task (GSM8K) and a multimodal reasoning task (ScienceQA). Our model achieves significant improvement over the strong CoT baseline with 3.41% and 5.08% on the GSM8K test set with T5-base and T5-large architectures, respectively. Additionally, our model boosts accuracy from 84.91% to 91.54% using the T5-base model and from 91.68% to 92.77% using the T5-large model over the state-of-the-art Multimodal-CoT on the ScienceQA test set. Experiments have shown that GoT achieves comparable results to Multimodal-CoT(large) with over 700M parameters, despite having fewer than 250M backbone model parameters, demonstrating the effectiveness of GoT.

Recent advances leverage post-training to enhance model reasoning performance, which typically requires costly training pipelines and still suffers from inefficient, overly lengthy outputs. We introduce Speculative Thinking, a training-free framework that enables large reasoning models to guide smaller ones during inference at the reasoning level, distinct from speculative decoding, which operates at the token level. Our approach is based on two observations: (1) reasoning-supportive tokens such as "wait" frequently appear after structural delimiters like "\n\n", serving as signals for reflection or continuation; and (2) larger models exhibit stronger control over reflective behavior, reducing unnecessary backtracking while improving reasoning quality. By strategically delegating reflective steps to a more capable model, our method significantly boosts the reasoning accuracy of reasoning models while shortening their output. With the assistance of the 32B reasoning model, the 1.5B model's accuracy on MATH500 increases from 83.2% to 89.4%, marking a substantial improvement of 6.2%. Simultaneously, the average output length is reduced from 5439 tokens to 4583 tokens, representing a 15.7% decrease. Moreover, when applied to a non-reasoning model (Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct), our framework boosts its accuracy from 74.0% to 81.8% on the same benchmark, achieving a relative improvement of 7.8%.

The field of privacy-preserving Natural Language Processing has risen in popularity, particularly at a time when concerns about privacy grow with the proliferation of Large Language Models. One solution consistently appearing in recent literature has been the integration of Differential Privacy (DP) into NLP techniques. In this paper, we take these approaches into critical view, discussing the restrictions that DP integration imposes, as well as bring to light the challenges that such restrictions entail. To accomplish this, we focus on DP-Prompt, a recent method for text privatization leveraging language models to rewrite texts. In particular, we explore this rewriting task in multiple scenarios, both with DP and without DP. To drive the discussion on the merits of DP in NLP, we conduct empirical utility and privacy experiments. Our results demonstrate the need for more discussion on the usability of DP in NLP and its benefits over non-DP approaches.

PRefLexOR (Preference-based Recursive Language Modeling for Exploratory Optimization of Reasoning) combines preference optimization with concepts from Reinforcement Learning to enable models to self-teach through iterative reasoning improvements. We propose a recursive learning approach that engages the model in multi-step reasoning, revisiting, and refining intermediate steps before producing a final output in training and inference phases. Through multiple training stages, the model first learns to align its reasoning with accurate decision paths by optimizing the log odds between preferred and non-preferred responses. During this process, PRefLexOR builds a dynamic knowledge graph by generating questions from random text chunks and retrieval-augmentation to contextualize relevant details from the entire training corpus. In the second stage, preference optimization enhances model performance by using rejection sampling to fine-tune reasoning quality by continually producing in-situ training data while masking the reasoning steps. Recursive optimization within a thinking token framework introduces iterative feedback loops, where the model refines reasoning, achieving deeper coherence, consistency, and adaptability. Implemented in small language models with only 3 billion parameters, we should that even tiny models can iteratively teach themselves to reason with greater depth and reflectivity. Our implementation is straightforward and can be incorporated into any existing pretrained LLM. We focus our examples on applications in biological materials science and demonstrate the method in a variety of case studies that range from in-domain to cross-domain applications. Using reasoning strategies that include thinking and reflection modalities we build a multi-agent recursive self-improving inference approach to successively improve responses via repeated sampling in inference time.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

Recent advanced large reasoning models (LRMs) leverage extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to solve complex tasks, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Despite their success, we identify a critical issue: a substantial portion of simple tasks solved by LRMs can also be addressed by non-reasoning LLMs using significantly fewer tokens, indicating the complex reasoning may not always be necessary. To address this, we systematically analyze the reasoning trajectories of LRMs and present a method utilizing identified paradigms and LLM-Judge to classify these trajectories as either Redundant Reasoning or Essential Reasoning. And we introduce OThink-R1, a method that prunes redundant reasoning steps while preserving logical validity. OThink-R1 dynamically employs the non-thinking mode (fast-thinking) for straightforward problems while engaging in deliberate thinking (slow-thinking) for complex problems. Experiments across mathematical and question-answering tasks demonstrate that OThink-R1 reduces reasoning redundancy by almost 23\% on average without compromising accuracy, offering practical guidelines for efficient reasoning models. The code is available at https://github.com/AgenticIR-Lab/OThink-R1.

Large-scale pretrained language models (LMs) are said to ``lack the ability to connect utterances to the world'' (Bender and Koller, 2020), because they do not have ``mental models of the world' '(Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023). If so, one would expect LM representations to be unrelated to representations induced by vision models. We present an empirical evaluation across four families of LMs (BERT, GPT-2, OPT and LLaMA-2) and three vision model architectures (ResNet, SegFormer, and MAE). Our experiments show that LMs partially converge towards representations isomorphic to those of vision models, subject to dispersion, polysemy and frequency. This has important implications for both multi-modal processing and the LM understanding debate (Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023).

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Trained on vast corpora of human language, language models demonstrate emergent human-like reasoning abilities. Yet they are still far from true intelligence, which opens up intriguing opportunities to explore the parallels of humans and model behaviors. In this work, we study the ability to skip steps in reasoning - a hallmark of human expertise developed through practice. Unlike humans, who may skip steps to enhance efficiency or to reduce cognitive load, models do not inherently possess such motivations to minimize reasoning steps. To address this, we introduce a controlled framework that stimulates step-skipping behavior by iteratively refining models to generate shorter and accurate reasoning paths. Empirical results indicate that models can develop the step skipping ability under our guidance. Moreover, after fine-tuning on expanded datasets that include both complete and skipped reasoning sequences, the models can not only resolve tasks with increased efficiency without sacrificing accuracy, but also exhibit comparable and even enhanced generalization capabilities in out-of-domain scenarios. Our work presents the first exploration into human-like step-skipping ability and provides fresh perspectives on how such cognitive abilities can benefit AI models.

Large Language Model can reasonably understand and generate human expressions but may lack of thorough thinking and reasoning mechanisms. Recently there have been several studies which enhance the thinking ability of language models but most of them are not data-driven or training-based. In this paper, we are motivated by the cognitive mechanism in the natural world, and design a novel model architecture called TaS which allows it to first consider the thoughts and then express the response based upon the query. We design several pipelines to annotate or generate the thought contents from prompt-response samples, then add language heads in a middle layer which behaves as the thinking layer. We train the language model by the thoughts-augmented data and successfully let the thinking layer automatically generate reasonable thoughts and finally output more reasonable responses. Both qualitative examples and quantitative results validate the effectiveness and performance of TaS. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/TadE.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have lately been on the spotlight of researchers, businesses, and consumers alike. While the linguistic capabilities of such models have been studied extensively, there is growing interest in investigating them as cognitive subjects. In the present work I examine GPT-3 and ChatGPT capabilities on an limited-data inductive reasoning task from the cognitive science literature. The results suggest that these models' cognitive judgements are not human-like.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Reasoning models are large language models that emit a long chain-of-thought before answering, providing both higher accuracy and explicit reasoning for their response. A major question has been whether language model reasoning generalizes beyond mathematics, programming, and logic, where most previous work has focused. We demonstrate that reasoning models can be post-trained for chemistry without additional domain pretraining, and require substantially less data compared to contemporary domain-specific models. We report ether0, a 24B parameter LLM (based on Mistral-Small-24B) that can reason in natural language and respond with chemical structures. This reasoning model was trained with reinforcement learning on 640,730 experimentally-grounded chemistry problems across 375 tasks ranging from synthesizability, to blood-brain barrier permeability, to human receptor activity, to scent. Our model exceeds general-purpose chemistry models, frontier models, and human experts on molecular design tasks. It is also more data efficient relative to specialized models. We anticipate that this method can be applied to train data-efficient language models specialized for tasks across a wide variety of scientific domains.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated enhanced performance through the Thinking then Responding paradigm, where models generate internal thoughts before final responses (aka, System 2 thinking). However, existing research lacks a systematic understanding of the mechanisms underlying how thinking patterns affect performance across model sizes. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the impact of various thinking types on model performance and introduce ThinkPatterns-21k, a curated dataset comprising 21k instruction-response pairs (QA) collected from existing instruction-following datasets with five thinking types. For each pair, we augment it with five distinct internal thinking patterns: one unstructured thinking (monologue) and four structured variants (decomposition, self-ask, self-debate and self-critic), while maintaining the same instruction and response. Through extensive evaluation across different model sizes (3B-32B parameters), we have two key findings: (1) smaller models (<30B parameters) can benefit from most of structured thinking patterns, while larger models (32B) with structured thinking like decomposition would degrade performance and (2) unstructured monologue demonstrates broad effectiveness across different model sizes. Finally, we released all of our datasets, checkpoints, training logs of diverse thinking patterns to reproducibility, aiming to facilitate further research in this direction.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Recent advances in language models have demonstrated their capability to solve mathematical reasoning problems, achieving near-perfect accuracy on grade-school level math benchmarks like GSM8K. In this paper, we formally study how language models solve these problems. We design a series of controlled experiments to address several fundamental questions: (1) Can language models truly develop reasoning skills, or do they simply memorize templates? (2) What is the model's hidden (mental) reasoning process? (3) Do models solve math questions using skills similar to or different from humans? (4) Do models trained on GSM8K-like datasets develop reasoning skills beyond those necessary for solving GSM8K problems? (5) What mental process causes models to make reasoning mistakes? (6) How large or deep must a model be to effectively solve GSM8K-level math questions? Our study uncovers many hidden mechanisms by which language models solve mathematical questions, providing insights that extend beyond current understandings of LLMs.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

How much is 56 times 37? Language models often make mistakes in these types of difficult calculations. This is usually explained by their inability to perform complex reasoning. Since language models rely on large training sets and great memorization capability, naturally they are not equipped to run complex calculations. However, one can argue that humans also cannot perform this calculation immediately and require a considerable amount of time to construct the solution. In order to enhance the generalization capability of language models, and as a parallel to human behavior, we propose to use special 'thinking tokens' which allow the model to perform much more calculations whenever a complex problem is encountered.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable problem-solving and basic mathematics abilities. However, their efficacy is highly contingent on the formulation of the prompt. This study endeavors to quantify the influence of incorporating "positive thinking" into the system message of the prompt, then compare that to systematic prompt optimization. We assess the performance of 60 combinations of system message snippets, tested with and without Chain of Thought prompting, across three models with parameters ranging from 7 to 70 billion on the GSM8K dataset. Our findings reveal that results do not universally generalize across models. In most instances, the inclusion of "positive thinking" prompts positively affected model performance. Notably, however, Llama2-70B exhibited an exception when not utilizing Chain of Thought, as the optimal system message was found to be none at all. Given the combinatorial complexity, and thus computation time, of experimenting with hand-tuning prompts for large black-box models, we then compared the performance of the best "positive thinking" prompt against the output of systematic prompt optimization. We show that employing an automated prompt optimizer emerges as the most effective method for enhancing performance, even when working with smaller open-source models. Additionally, our findings reveal that the highest-scoring, automatically-optimized prompt exhibits a degree of peculiarity far beyond expectations.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Deep learning models for natural language processing (NLP) are increasingly adopted and deployed by analysts without formal training in NLP or machine learning (ML). However, the documentation intended to convey the model's details and appropriate use is tailored primarily to individuals with ML or NLP expertise. To address this gap, we conduct a design inquiry into interactive model cards, which augment traditionally static model cards with affordances for exploring model documentation and interacting with the models themselves. Our investigation consists of an initial conceptual study with experts in ML, NLP, and AI Ethics, followed by a separate evaluative study with non-expert analysts who use ML models in their work. Using a semi-structured interview format coupled with a think-aloud protocol, we collected feedback from a total of 30 participants who engaged with different versions of standard and interactive model cards. Through a thematic analysis of the collected data, we identified several conceptual dimensions that summarize the strengths and limitations of standard and interactive model cards, including: stakeholders; design; guidance; understandability & interpretability; sensemaking & skepticism; and trust & safety. Our findings demonstrate the importance of carefully considered design and interactivity for orienting and supporting non-expert analysts using deep learning models, along with a need for consideration of broader sociotechnical contexts and organizational dynamics. We have also identified design elements, such as language, visual cues, and warnings, among others, that support interactivity and make non-interactive content accessible. We summarize our findings as design guidelines and discuss their implications for a human-centered approach towards AI/ML documentation.

The task of "unlearning" certain concepts in large language models (LLMs) has attracted immense attention recently, due to its importance for mitigating undesirable model behaviours, such as the generation of harmful, private, or incorrect information. Current protocols to evaluate unlearning methods largely rely on behavioral tests, without monitoring the presence of unlearned knowledge within the model's parameters. This residual knowledge can be adversarially exploited to recover the erased information post-unlearning. We argue that unlearning should also be evaluated internally, by considering changes in the parametric knowledge traces of the unlearned concepts. To this end, we propose a general methodology for eliciting directions in the parameter space (termed "concept vectors") that encode concrete concepts, and construct ConceptVectors, a benchmark dataset containing hundreds of common concepts and their parametric knowledge traces within two open-source LLMs. Evaluation on ConceptVectors shows that existing unlearning methods minimally impact concept vectors, while directly ablating these vectors demonstrably removes the associated knowledge from the LLMs and significantly reduces their susceptibility to adversarial manipulation. Our results highlight limitations in behavioral-based unlearning evaluations and call for future work to include parametric-based evaluations. To support this, we release our code and benchmark at https://github.com/yihuaihong/ConceptVectors.

Reasoning Language Models, capable of extended chain-of-thought reasoning, have demonstrated remarkable performance on tasks requiring complex logical inference. However, applying elaborate reasoning for all queries often results in substantial computational inefficiencies, particularly when many problems admit straightforward solutions. This motivates an open question: Can LLMs learn when to think? To answer this, we propose Thinkless, a learnable framework that empowers an LLM to adaptively select between short-form and long-form reasoning, based on both task complexity and the model's ability. Thinkless is trained under a reinforcement learning paradigm and employs two control tokens, <short> for concise responses and <think> for detailed reasoning. At the core of our method is a Decoupled Group Relative Policy Optimization (DeGRPO) algorithm, which decomposes the learning objective of hybrid reasoning into two components: (1) a control token loss that governs the selection of the reasoning mode, and (2) a response loss that improves the accuracy of the generated answers. This decoupled formulation enables fine-grained control over the contributions of each objective, stabilizing training and effectively preventing collapse observed in vanilla GRPO. Empirically, on several benchmarks such as Minerva Algebra, MATH-500, and GSM8K, Thinkless is able to reduce the usage of long-chain thinking by 50% - 90%, significantly improving the efficiency of Reasoning Language Models. The code is available at https://github.com/VainF/Thinkless

Recent large language models (LLMs) have shown indications of mathematical reasoning ability. However it has not been clear how they would fare on more challenging competition-level problems. And while self-generated verbalizations of intermediate reasoning steps (i.e., chain-of-thought prompting) have been shown to be helpful, whether LLMs can make use of helpful side information such as problem-specific hints has not been investigated before. In this paper, we propose a challenging benchmark dataset for enabling such analyses. The Concept and Hint-Annotated Math Problems (CHAMP) consists of high school math competition problems, annotated with concepts, or general math facts, and hints, or problem-specific tricks. These annotations allow us to explore the effects of additional information, such as relevant hints, misleading concepts, or related problems. This benchmark is difficult, with the best model only scoring 58.1% in standard settings. With concepts and hints, performance sometimes improves, indicating that some models can make use of such side information. We further annotate model-generated solutions for their correctness. Using this corpus, we find that models often arrive at the correct final answer through wrong reasoning steps. In addition, we test whether models are able to verify these solutions, and find that most models struggle. The dataset and code are available on the project website.

Figurative and metaphorical language are commonplace in discourse, and figurative expressions play an important role in communication and cognition. However, figurative language has been a relatively under-studied area in NLP, and it remains an open question to what extent modern language models can interpret nonliteral phrases. To address this question, we introduce Fig-QA, a Winograd-style nonliteral language understanding task consisting of correctly interpreting paired figurative phrases with divergent meanings. We evaluate the performance of several state-of-the-art language models on this task, and find that although language models achieve performance significantly over chance, they still fall short of human performance, particularly in zero- or few-shot settings. This suggests that further work is needed to improve the nonliteral reasoning capabilities of language models.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

Multiple-choice exam questions with "None of the above" (NA) options have been extensively studied in educational testing, in which existing research suggests that they better assess true knowledge. However, their impact on Large Language Models (LLMs) evaluation remains underexplored. Through systematic experiments with 28 LLMs on the MMLU benchmark, we examine how NA options affect model performance and confidence calibration. Our analysis reveals that NA options, when used as the correct answer, lead to a consistent 30-50\% performance drop across models regardless of scale--suggesting that LLMs lack the meta-cognitive ability to systematically evaluate and reject all given options when none are correct. This degradation shows strong domain dependence, with minimal impact on mathematical reasoning (14.6\% drop) but severe effects on tasks requiring uncertainty handling like business ethics (48.1\% drop). Our results highlight important implications for benchmark design and raise questions about LLMs' ability to handle uncertainty in real-world applications.

DeepSeek-R1 has shown that long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning can naturally emerge through a simple reinforcement learning (RL) framework with rule-based rewards, where the training may directly start from the base models-a paradigm referred to as zero RL training. Most recent efforts to reproduce zero RL training have primarily focused on the Qwen2.5 model series, which may not be representative as we find the base models already exhibit strong instruction-following and self-reflection abilities. In this work, we investigate zero RL training across 10 diverse base models, spanning different families and sizes including LLama3-8B, Mistral-7B/24B, DeepSeek-Math-7B, Qwen2.5-math-7B, and all Qwen2.5 models from 0.5B to 32B. Leveraging several key design strategies-such as adjusting format reward and controlling query difficulty-we achieve substantial improvements in both reasoning accuracy and response length across most settings. However, by carefully monitoring the training dynamics, we observe that different base models exhibit distinct patterns during training. For instance, the increased response length does not always correlate with the emergence of certain cognitive behaviors such as verification (i.e., the "aha moment"). Notably, we observe the "aha moment" for the first time in small models not from the Qwen family. We share the key designs that enable successful zero RL training, along with our findings and practices. To facilitate further research, we open-source the code, models, and analysis tools.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Machine learning models are now able to convert user-written text descriptions into naturalistic images. These models are available to anyone online and are being used to generate millions of images a day. We investigate these models and find that they amplify dangerous and complex stereotypes. Moreover, we find that the amplified stereotypes are difficult to predict and not easily mitigated by users or model owners. The extent to which these image-generation models perpetuate and amplify stereotypes and their mass deployment is cause for serious concern.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

Language models demonstrate both quantitative improvement and new qualitative capabilities with increasing scale. Despite their potentially transformative impact, these new capabilities are as yet poorly characterized. In order to inform future research, prepare for disruptive new model capabilities, and ameliorate socially harmful effects, it is vital that we understand the present and near-future capabilities and limitations of language models. To address this challenge, we introduce the Beyond the Imitation Game benchmark (BIG-bench). BIG-bench currently consists of 204 tasks, contributed by 442 authors across 132 institutions. Task topics are diverse, drawing problems from linguistics, childhood development, math, common-sense reasoning, biology, physics, social bias, software development, and beyond. BIG-bench focuses on tasks that are believed to be beyond the capabilities of current language models. We evaluate the behavior of OpenAI's GPT models, Google-internal dense transformer architectures, and Switch-style sparse transformers on BIG-bench, across model sizes spanning millions to hundreds of billions of parameters. In addition, a team of human expert raters performed all tasks in order to provide a strong baseline. Findings include: model performance and calibration both improve with scale, but are poor in absolute terms (and when compared with rater performance); performance is remarkably similar across model classes, though with benefits from sparsity; tasks that improve gradually and predictably commonly involve a large knowledge or memorization component, whereas tasks that exhibit "breakthrough" behavior at a critical scale often involve multiple steps or components, or brittle metrics; social bias typically increases with scale in settings with ambiguous context, but this can be improved with prompting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

The impressive performance of recent language models across a wide range of tasks suggests that they possess a degree of abstract reasoning skills. Are these skills general and transferable, or specialized to specific tasks seen during pretraining? To disentangle these effects, we propose an evaluation framework based on "counterfactual" task variants that deviate from the default assumptions underlying standard tasks. Across a suite of 11 tasks, we observe nontrivial performance on the counterfactual variants, but nevertheless find that performance substantially and consistently degrades compared to the default conditions. This suggests that while current LMs may possess abstract task-solving skills to a degree, they often also rely on narrow, non-transferable procedures for task-solving. These results motivate a more careful interpretation of language model performance that teases apart these aspects of behavior.

Human reasoning relies on constructing and manipulating mental models-simplified internal representations of situations that we use to understand and solve problems. Conceptual diagrams (for example, sketches drawn by humans to aid reasoning) externalize these mental models, abstracting irrelevant details to efficiently capture relational and spatial information. In contrast, Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) predominantly reason through textual representations, limiting their effectiveness in complex multi-step combinatorial and planning tasks. In this paper, we propose a zero-shot fully automatic framework that enables LMMs to reason through multiple chains of self-generated intermediate conceptual diagrams, significantly enhancing their combinatorial planning capabilities. Our approach does not require any human initialization beyond a natural language description of the task. It integrates both textual and diagrammatic reasoning within an optimized graph-of-thought inference framework, enhanced by beam search and depth-wise backtracking. Evaluated on multiple challenging PDDL planning domains, our method substantially improves GPT-4o's performance (for example, from 35.5% to 90.2% in Blocksworld). On more difficult planning domains with solution depths up to 40, our approach outperforms even the o1-preview reasoning model (for example, over 13% improvement in Parking). These results highlight the value of conceptual diagrams as a complementary reasoning medium in LMMs.

The surprising ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform well on complex reasoning with only few-shot chain-of-thought prompts is believed to emerge only in very large-scale models (100+ billion parameters). We show that such abilities can, in fact, be distilled down from GPT-3.5 (ge 175B) to T5 variants (le 11B). We propose model specialization, to specialize the model's ability towards a target task. The hypothesis is that large models (commonly viewed as larger than 100B) have strong modeling power, but are spread on a large spectrum of tasks. Small models (commonly viewed as smaller than 10B) have limited model capacity, but if we concentrate their capacity on a specific target task, the model can achieve a decent improved performance. We use multi-step math reasoning as our testbed because it is a very typical emergent ability. We show two important aspects of model abilities: (1). there exists a very complex balance/ tradeoff between language models' multi-dimensional abilities; (2). by paying the price of decreased generic ability, we can clearly lift up the scaling curve of models smaller than 10B towards a specialized multi-step math reasoning ability. We further give comprehensive discussions about important design choices for better generalization, including the tuning data format, the start model checkpoint, and a new model selection method. We hope our practice and discoveries can serve as an important attempt towards specialized smaller models in the new research paradigm set by LLMs.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated the effectiveness of scaling test-time computation to enhance reasoning capabilities in multiple tasks. However, LRMs typically suffer from "overthinking" problems, where models generate significantly redundant reasoning steps while bringing limited performance gains. Existing work relies on fine-tuning to mitigate overthinking, which requires additional data, unconventional training setups, risky safety misalignment, and poor generalization. Through empirical analysis, we reveal an important characteristic of LRM behaviors that placing external CoTs generated by smaller models between the thinking token (<think> and </think>) can effectively manipulate the model to generate fewer thoughts. Building on these insights, we propose a simple yet efficient pipeline, ThoughtMani, to enable LRMs to bypass unnecessary intermediate steps and reduce computational costs significantly. We conduct extensive experiments to validate the utility and efficiency of ThoughtMani. For instance, when applied to QwQ-32B on the LiveBench/Code dataset, ThoughtMani keeps the original performance and reduces output token counts by approximately 30%, with little overhead from the CoT generator. Furthermore, we find that ThoughtMani enhances safety alignment by an average of 10%. Since model vendors typically serve models of different sizes simultaneously, ThoughtMani provides an effective way to construct more efficient and accessible LRMs for real-world applications.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have introduced Reasoning Large Language Models (RLLMs), which employ extended thinking processes with reflection and self-correction capabilities, demonstrating the effectiveness of test-time scaling. RLLMs exhibit innate Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning capability obtained from training, leading to a natural question: "Is CoT prompting, a popular In-Context Learning (ICL) method for chat LLMs, necessary to enhance the reasoning capability of RLLMs?" In this work, we present the first comprehensive analysis of the impacts of Zero-shot CoT and Few-shot CoT on RLLMs across mathematical reasoning tasks. We examine models ranging from 1.5B to 32B parameters, finding that contrary to concerns, CoT prompting significantly enhances RLLMs' performance in most scenarios. Our results reveal distinct patterns: large-capacity models show minimal improvement on simple tasks but substantial gains on complex problems, while smaller models exhibit the opposite behavior. Further analysis demonstrates that CoT prompting effectively controls the distribution of the numbers of thinking tokens and reasoning steps, reducing excessive reflections by approximately 90% in some cases. Moreover, attention logits analysis reveals the RLLMs' overfitting to reflection-related words, which is mitigated by external CoT guidance. Notably, our experiments indicate that for RLLMs, one-shot CoT consistently yields superior performance compared to Few-shot CoT approaches. Our findings provide important insights for optimizing RLLMs' performance through appropriate prompting strategies.

Inference-time computation techniques, analogous to human System 2 Thinking, have recently become popular for improving model performances. However, most existing approaches suffer from several limitations: they are modality-specific (e.g., working only in text), problem-specific (e.g., verifiable domains like math and coding), or require additional supervision/training on top of unsupervised pretraining (e.g., verifiers or verifiable rewards). In this paper, we ask the question "Is it possible to generalize these System 2 Thinking approaches, and develop models that learn to think solely from unsupervised learning?" Interestingly, we find the answer is yes, by learning to explicitly verify the compatibility between inputs and candidate-predictions, and then re-framing prediction problems as optimization with respect to this verifier. Specifically, we train Energy-Based Transformers (EBTs) -- a new class of Energy-Based Models (EBMs) -- to assign an energy value to every input and candidate-prediction pair, enabling predictions through gradient descent-based energy minimization until convergence. Across both discrete (text) and continuous (visual) modalities, we find EBTs scale faster than the dominant Transformer++ approach during training, achieving an up to 35% higher scaling rate with respect to data, batch size, parameters, FLOPs, and depth. During inference, EBTs improve performance with System 2 Thinking by 29% more than the Transformer++ on language tasks, and EBTs outperform Diffusion Transformers on image denoising while using fewer forward passes. Further, we find that EBTs achieve better results than existing models on most downstream tasks given the same or worse pretraining performance, suggesting that EBTs generalize better than existing approaches. Consequently, EBTs are a promising new paradigm for scaling both the learning and thinking capabilities of models.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our daily lives, the potential harms from deceptive behavior underlie the need for faithfully interpreting their decision-making. While traditional probing methods have shown some effectiveness, they remain best for narrowly scoped tasks while more comprehensive explanations are still necessary. To this end, we investigate meta-models-an architecture using a "meta-model" that takes activations from an "input-model" and answers natural language questions about the input-model's behaviors. We evaluate the meta-model's ability to generalize by training them on selected task types and assessing their out-of-distribution performance in deceptive scenarios. Our findings show that meta-models generalize well to out-of-distribution tasks and point towards opportunities for future research in this area. Our code is available at https://github.com/acostarelli/meta-models-public .

The recent proliferation of research into transformer based natural language processing has led to a number of studies which attempt to detect the presence of human-like cognitive behavior in the models. We contend that, as is true of human psychology, the investigation of cognitive behavior in language models must be conducted in an appropriate population of an appropriate size for the results to be meaningful. We leverage work in uncertainty estimation in a novel approach to efficiently construct experimental populations. The resultant tool, PopulationLM, has been made open source. We provide theoretical grounding in the uncertainty estimation literature and motivation from current cognitive work regarding language models. We discuss the methodological lessons from other scientific communities and attempt to demonstrate their application to two artificial population studies. Through population based experimentation we find that language models exhibit behavior consistent with typicality effects among categories highly represented in training. However, we find that language models don't tend to exhibit structural priming effects. Generally, our results show that single models tend to over estimate the presence of cognitive behaviors in neural models.

Xmodel-2 is a 1.2-billion-parameter large language model designed specifically for reasoning tasks. Its architecture enables different model scales to share a unified set of hyperparameters, allowing for extensive experimentation on smaller models and seamless transfer of optimal configurations to larger models. To maximize training efficiency and stability, Xmodel-2 employs the WSD learning rate scheduler from MiniCPM. Pretrained on 1.5 trillion tokens from diverse sources, Xmodel-2 achieves state-of-the-art performance in complex reasoning and agent-based tasks, while maintaining low training costs. These results highlight the potential of efficient model design and training strategies in advancing reasoning capabilities. Model checkpoints and code are publicly available on GitHub at https://github.com/XiaoduoAILab/Xmodel-2

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (LLMs) explicitly generate intermediate reasoning steps prior to generating final answers, helping the model excel in complex problem-solving. In this paper, we demonstrate that this emerging generation framework offers a unique opportunity for more fine-grained control over model behavior. We propose Thinking Intervention, a novel paradigm designed to explicitly guide the internal reasoning processes of LLMs by strategically inserting or revising specific thinking tokens. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across multiple tasks, including instruction following on IFEval, instruction hierarchy on SEP, and safety alignment on XSTest and SORRY-Bench. Our results demonstrate that Thinking Intervention significantly outperforms baseline prompting approaches, achieving up to 6.7% accuracy gains in instruction-following scenarios, 15.4% improvements in reasoning about instruction hierarchies, and a 40.0% increase in refusal rates for unsafe prompts using open-source DeepSeek R1 models. Overall, our work opens a promising new research avenue for controlling reasoning LLMs.

When presented with questions involving visual thinking, humans naturally switch reasoning modalities, often forming mental images or drawing visual aids. Large language models have shown promising results in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning by expressing intermediate reasoning in text as a chain of thought, yet struggle to extend this capability to answer text queries that are easily solved by visual reasoning, even with extensive multimodal pretraining. We introduce a simple method, whiteboard-of-thought prompting, to unlock the visual reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models across modalities. Whiteboard-of-thought prompting provides multimodal large language models with a metaphorical `whiteboard' to draw out reasoning steps as images, then returns these images back to the model for further processing. We find this can be accomplished with no demonstrations or specialized modules, instead leveraging models' existing ability to write code with libraries such as Matplotlib and Turtle. This simple approach shows state-of-the-art results on four difficult natural language tasks that involve visual and spatial reasoning. We identify multiple settings where GPT-4o using chain-of-thought fails dramatically, including more than one where it achieves 0% accuracy, while whiteboard-of-thought enables up to 92% accuracy in these same settings. We present a detailed exploration of where the technique succeeds as well as its sources of error.

LLMs are typically trained to answer user questions or follow instructions similarly to how human experts respond. However, in the standard alignment framework they lack the basic ability of explicit thinking before answering. Thinking is important for complex questions that require reasoning and planning -- but can be applied to any task. We propose a training method for equipping existing LLMs with such thinking abilities for general instruction following without use of additional human data. We achieve this by an iterative search and optimization procedure that explores the space of possible thought generations, allowing the model to learn how to think without direct supervision. For each instruction, the thought candidates are scored using a judge model to evaluate their responses only, and then optimized via preference optimization. We show that this procedure leads to superior performance on AlpacaEval and Arena-Hard, and shows gains from thinking on non-reasoning categories such as marketing, health and general knowledge, in addition to more traditional reasoning & problem-solving tasks.

In human cognition theory, human thinking is governed by two systems: the fast and intuitive System 1 and the slower but more deliberative System 2. Recent studies have shown that incorporating System 2 process into Transformers including large language models (LLMs), significantly enhances their reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, models that purely resemble System 2 thinking require substantially higher computational costs and are much slower to respond. To address this challenge, we present Dualformer, a single Transformer model that seamlessly integrates both the fast and slow reasoning modes. Dualformer is obtained by training on data with randomized reasoning traces, where different parts of the traces are dropped during training. The dropping strategies are specifically tailored according to the trace structure, analogous to analyzing our thinking process and creating shortcuts with patterns. At inference time, our model can be configured to output only the solutions (fast mode) or both the reasoning chain and the final solution (slow mode), or automatically decide which mode to engage (auto mode). In all cases, Dualformer outperforms the corresponding baseline models in both performance and computational efficiency: (1) in slow mode, Dualformer optimally solves unseen 30 x 30 maze navigation tasks 97.6% of the time, surpassing the Searchformer (trained on data with complete reasoning traces) baseline performance of 93.3%, while only using 45.5% fewer reasoning steps; (2) in fast mode, Dualformer completes those tasks with an 80% optimal rate, significantly outperforming the Solution-Only model (trained on solution-only data), which has an optimal rate of only 30%. For math problems, our techniques have also achieved improved performance with LLM fine-tuning, showing its generalization beyond task-specific models.

This research introduces a novel evaluation framework designed to assess large language models' (LLMs) ability to acknowledge uncertainty on 675 fundamentally unsolvable problems. Using a curated dataset of graduate-level grand challenge questions with intentionally unknowable answers, we evaluated twelve state-of-the-art LLMs, including both open and closed-source models, on their propensity to admit ignorance rather than generate plausible but incorrect responses. The best models scored in 62-68% accuracy ranges for admitting the problem solution was unknown in fields ranging from biology to philosophy and mathematics. We observed an inverse relationship between problem difficulty and model accuracy, with GPT-4 demonstrating higher rates of uncertainty acknowledgment on more challenging problems (35.8%) compared to simpler ones (20.0%). This pattern indicates that models may be more prone to generate speculative answers when problems appear more tractable. The study also revealed significant variations across problem categories, with models showing difficulty in acknowledging uncertainty in invention and NP-hard problems while performing relatively better on philosophical and psychological challenges. These results contribute to the growing body of research on artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment by highlighting the importance of uncertainty recognition as a critical component of future machine intelligence evaluation. This impossibility test thus extends previous theoretical frameworks for universal intelligence testing by providing empirical evidence of current limitations in LLMs' ability to recognize their own knowledge boundaries, suggesting new directions for improving model training architectures and evaluation approaches.

Common methods for aligning large language models (LLMs) with desired behaviour heavily rely on human-labelled data. However, as models grow increasingly sophisticated, they will surpass human expertise, and the role of human evaluation will evolve into non-experts overseeing experts. In anticipation of this, we ask: can weaker models assess the correctness of stronger models? We investigate this question in an analogous setting, where stronger models (experts) possess the necessary information to answer questions and weaker models (non-experts) lack this information. The method we evaluate is debate, where two LLM experts each argue for a different answer, and a non-expert selects the answer. We find that debate consistently helps both non-expert models and humans answer questions, achieving 76% and 88% accuracy respectively (naive baselines obtain 48% and 60%). Furthermore, optimising expert debaters for persuasiveness in an unsupervised manner improves non-expert ability to identify the truth in debates. Our results provide encouraging empirical evidence for the viability of aligning models with debate in the absence of ground truth.

In recent years, the community of 'explainable artificial intelligence' (XAI) has created a vast body of methods to bridge a perceived gap between model 'complexity' and 'interpretability'. However, a concrete problem to be solved by XAI methods has not yet been formally stated. As a result, XAI methods are lacking theoretical and empirical evidence for the 'correctness' of their explanations, limiting their potential use for quality-control and transparency purposes. At the same time, Haufe et al. (2014) showed, using simple toy examples, that even standard interpretations of linear models can be highly misleading. Specifically, high importance may be attributed to so-called suppressor variables lacking any statistical relation to the prediction target. This behavior has been confirmed empirically for a large array of XAI methods in Wilming et al. (2022). Here, we go one step further by deriving analytical expressions for the behavior of a variety of popular XAI methods on a simple two-dimensional binary classification problem involving Gaussian class-conditional distributions. We show that the majority of the studied approaches will attribute non-zero importance to a non-class-related suppressor feature in the presence of correlated noise. This poses important limitations on the interpretations and conclusions that the outputs of these XAI methods can afford.

As text-to-image diffusion models become advanced enough for commercial applications, there is also increasing concern about their potential for malicious and harmful use. Model unlearning has been proposed to mitigate the concerns by removing undesired and potentially harmful information from the pre-trained model. So far, the success of unlearning is mainly measured by whether the unlearned model can generate a target concept while maintaining image quality. However, unlearning is typically tested under limited scenarios, and the side effects of unlearning have barely been studied in the current literature. In this work, we thoroughly analyze unlearning under various scenarios with five key aspects. Our investigation reveals that every method has side effects or limitations, especially in more complex and realistic situations. By releasing our comprehensive evaluation framework with the source codes and artifacts, we hope to inspire further research in this area, leading to more reliable and effective unlearning methods.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) embed private or copyrighted information not only in their final answers but also throughout multi-step chain-of-thought (CoT) traces, making reliable unlearning far more demanding than in standard LLMs. We introduce Reasoning-TOFU (R-TOFU), the first benchmark tailored to this setting. R-TOFU augments existing unlearning tasks with realistic CoT annotations and provides step-wise metrics that expose residual knowledge invisible to answer-level checks. Using R-TOFU, we carry out a comprehensive comparison of gradient-based and preference-optimization baselines and show that conventional answer-only objectives leave substantial forget traces in reasoning. We further propose Reasoned IDK, a preference-optimization variant that preserves coherent yet inconclusive reasoning, achieving a stronger balance between forgetting efficacy and model utility than earlier refusal styles. Finally, we identify a failure mode: decoding variants such as ZeroThink and LessThink can still reveal forgotten content despite seemingly successful unlearning, emphasizing the need to evaluate models under diverse decoding settings. Together, the benchmark, analysis, and new baseline establish a systematic foundation for studying and improving unlearning in LRMs while preserving their reasoning capabilities.

Longer thought, better performance: large language models with deep reasoning capabilities, particularly o1-like models, have demonstrated remarkable performance by generating extensive thought processes during inference. This trade-off reveals a potential vulnerability: adversaries could compromise model performance by forcing immediate responses without thought processes. To this end, in this paper, we introduce a novel attack scenario targeting the long thought processes of o1-like models and propose BoT (Break CoT), which can selectively break intrinsic reasoning mechanisms through backdoor attacks. BoT constructs poisoned datasets with designed triggers and injects backdoor by either supervised fine-tuning or direct preference optimization. When triggered, the model directly generates answers without thought processes, while maintaining normal reasoning capabilities for clean inputs. Extensive experiments on open-source o1-like models, including recent DeepSeek-R1, demonstrate that BoT nearly achieves high attack success rates while maintaining clean accuracy, highlighting the critical safety risk in current models. Furthermore, the relationship between task difficulty and helpfulness reveals a potential application for good, enabling users to customize model behavior based on task complexity. Code is available at https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT{https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT}.

Generating a Chain of Thought (CoT) has been shown to consistently improve large language model (LLM) performance on a wide range of NLP tasks. However, prior work has mainly focused on logical reasoning tasks (e.g. arithmetic, commonsense QA); it remains unclear whether improvements hold for more diverse types of reasoning, especially in socially situated contexts. Concretely, we perform a controlled evaluation of zero-shot CoT across two socially sensitive domains: harmful questions and stereotype benchmarks. We find that zero-shot CoT reasoning in sensitive domains significantly increases a model's likelihood to produce harmful or undesirable output, with trends holding across different prompt formats and model variants. Furthermore, we show that harmful CoTs increase with model size, but decrease with improved instruction following. Our work suggests that zero-shot CoT should be used with caution on socially important tasks, especially when marginalized groups or sensitive topics are involved.

In current AI era, users may request AI companies to delete their data from the training dataset due to the privacy concerns. As a model owner, retraining a model will consume significant computational resources. Therefore, machine unlearning is a new emerged technology to allow model owner to delete requested training data or a class with little affecting on the model performance. However, for large-scaling complex data, such as image or text data, unlearning a class from a model leads to a inferior performance due to the difficulty to identify the link between classes and model. An inaccurate class deleting may lead to over or under unlearning. In this paper, to accurately defining the unlearning class of complex data, we apply the definition of Concept, rather than an image feature or a token of text data, to represent the semantic information of unlearning class. This new representation can cut the link between the model and the class, leading to a complete erasing of the impact of a class. To analyze the impact of the concept of complex data, we adopt a Post-hoc Concept Bottleneck Model, and Integrated Gradients to precisely identify concepts across different classes. Next, we take advantage of data poisoning with random and targeted labels to propose unlearning methods. We test our methods on both image classification models and large language models (LLMs). The results consistently show that the proposed methods can accurately erase targeted information from models and can largely maintain the performance of the models.

In this work, we address the problem of large language model (LLM) unlearning, aiming to remove unwanted data influences and associated model capabilities (e.g., copyrighted data or harmful content generation) while preserving essential model utilities, without the need for retraining from scratch. Despite the growing need for LLM unlearning, a principled optimization framework remains lacking. To this end, we revisit the state-of-the-art approach, negative preference optimization (NPO), and identify the issue of reference model bias, which could undermine NPO's effectiveness, particularly when unlearning forget data of varying difficulty. Given that, we propose a simple yet effective unlearning optimization framework, called SimNPO, showing that 'simplicity' in removing the reliance on a reference model (through the lens of simple preference optimization) benefits unlearning. We also provide deeper insights into SimNPO's advantages, supported by analysis using mixtures of Markov chains. Furthermore, we present extensive experiments validating SimNPO's superiority over existing unlearning baselines in benchmarks like TOFU and MUSE, and robustness against relearning attacks. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Simple.

Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have reported high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, it is still unclear whether the observed results arise from true reasoning or from statistical recall of the training set. Inspired by the ladder of causation (Pearl, 2009) and its three levels (associations, interventions and counterfactuals), this paper introduces RE-IMAGINE, a framework to characterize a hierarchy of reasoning ability in LLMs, alongside an automated pipeline to generate problem variations at different levels of the hierarchy. By altering problems in an intermediate symbolic representation, RE-IMAGINE generates arbitrarily many problems that are not solvable using memorization alone. Moreover, the framework is general and can work across reasoning domains, including math, code, and logic. We demonstrate our framework on four widely-used benchmarks to evaluate several families of LLMs, and observe reductions in performance when the models are queried with problem variations. These assessments indicate a degree of reliance on statistical recall for past performance, and open the door to further research targeting skills across the reasoning hierarchy.

Large language models (LLMs) perform better when they produce step-by-step, "Chain-of-Thought" (CoT) reasoning before answering a question, but it is unclear if the stated reasoning is a faithful explanation of the model's actual reasoning (i.e., its process for answering the question). We investigate hypotheses for how CoT reasoning may be unfaithful, by examining how the model predictions change when we intervene on the CoT (e.g., by adding mistakes or paraphrasing it). Models show large variation across tasks in how strongly they condition on the CoT when predicting their answer, sometimes relying heavily on the CoT and other times primarily ignoring it. CoT's performance boost does not seem to come from CoT's added test-time compute alone or from information encoded via the particular phrasing of the CoT. As models become larger and more capable, they produce less faithful reasoning on most tasks we study. Overall, our results suggest that CoT can be faithful if the circumstances such as the model size and task are carefully chosen.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

No free lunch theorems for supervised learning state that no learner can solve all problems or that all learners achieve exactly the same accuracy on average over a uniform distribution on learning problems. Accordingly, these theorems are often referenced in support of the notion that individual problems require specially tailored inductive biases. While virtually all uniformly sampled datasets have high complexity, real-world problems disproportionately generate low-complexity data, and we argue that neural network models share this same preference, formalized using Kolmogorov complexity. Notably, we show that architectures designed for a particular domain, such as computer vision, can compress datasets on a variety of seemingly unrelated domains. Our experiments show that pre-trained and even randomly initialized language models prefer to generate low-complexity sequences. Whereas no free lunch theorems seemingly indicate that individual problems require specialized learners, we explain how tasks that often require human intervention such as picking an appropriately sized model when labeled data is scarce or plentiful can be automated into a single learning algorithm. These observations justify the trend in deep learning of unifying seemingly disparate problems with an increasingly small set of machine learning models.

We introduce S1-Bench, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate Large Reasoning Models' (LRMs) performance on simple tasks that favor intuitive system 1 thinking rather than deliberative system 2 reasoning. While LRMs have achieved significant breakthroughs in complex reasoning tasks through explicit chains of thought, their reliance on deep analytical thinking may limit their system 1 thinking capabilities. Moreover, a lack of benchmark currently exists to evaluate LRMs' performance in tasks that require such capabilities. To fill this gap, S1-Bench presents a set of simple, diverse, and naturally clear questions across multiple domains and languages, specifically designed to assess LRMs' performance in such tasks. Our comprehensive evaluation of 22 LRMs reveals significant lower efficiency tendencies, with outputs averaging 15.5 times longer than those of traditional small LLMs. Additionally, LRMs often identify correct answers early but continue unnecessary deliberation, with some models even producing numerous errors. These findings highlight the rigid reasoning patterns of current LRMs and underscore the substantial development needed to achieve balanced dual-system thinking capabilities that can adapt appropriately to task complexity.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has proven to be an effective post-training strategy for enhancing reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs). Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a recent prominent method that encourages models to generate complete reasoning traces before answering, leading to increased token usage and computational cost. Inspired by the human-like thinking process-where people skip reasoning for easy questions but think carefully when needed-we explore how to enable VLMs to first decide when reasoning is necessary. To realize this, we propose TON, a two-stage training strategy: (i) a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage with a simple yet effective 'thought dropout' operation, where reasoning traces are randomly replaced with empty thoughts. This introduces a think-or-not format that serves as a cold start for selective reasoning; (ii) a GRPO stage that enables the model to freely explore when to think or not, while maximizing task-aware outcome rewards. Experimental results show that TON can reduce the completion length by up to 90% compared to vanilla GRPO, without sacrificing performance or even improving it. Further evaluations across diverse vision-language tasks-covering a range of reasoning difficulties under both 3B and 7B models-consistently reveal that the model progressively learns to bypass unnecessary reasoning steps as training advances. These findings shed light on the path toward human-like reasoning patterns in reinforcement learning approaches. Our code is available at https://github.com/kokolerk/TON.

Recently, large reasoning models have achieved impressive performance on various tasks by employing human-like deep thinking. However, the lengthy thinking process substantially increases inference overhead, making efficiency a critical bottleneck. In this work, we first demonstrate that NoThinking, which prompts the reasoning model to skip thinking and directly generate the final solution, is a better choice for relatively simple tasks in terms of both performance and efficiency. Motivated by this, we propose AdaptThink, a novel RL algorithm to teach reasoning models to choose the optimal thinking mode adaptively based on problem difficulty. Specifically, AdaptThink features two core components: (1) a constrained optimization objective that encourages the model to choose NoThinking while maintaining the overall performance; (2) an importance sampling strategy that balances Thinking and NoThinking samples during on-policy training, thereby enabling cold start and allowing the model to explore and exploit both thinking modes throughout the training process. Our experiments indicate that AdaptThink significantly reduces the inference costs while further enhancing performance. Notably, on three math datasets, AdaptThink reduces the average response length of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B by 53% and improves its accuracy by 2.4%, highlighting the promise of adaptive thinking-mode selection for optimizing the balance between reasoning quality and efficiency. Our codes and models are available at https://github.com/THU-KEG/AdaptThink.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable advances in language generation and understanding but are also prone to exhibiting harmful social biases. While recognition of these behaviors has generated an abundance of bias mitigation techniques, most require modifications to the training data, model parameters, or decoding strategy, which may be infeasible without access to a trainable model. In this work, we leverage the zero-shot capabilities of LLMs to reduce stereotyping in a technique we introduce as zero-shot self-debiasing. With two approaches, self-debiasing via explanation and self-debiasing via reprompting, we show that self-debiasing can significantly reduce the degree of stereotyping across nine different social groups while relying only on the LLM itself and a simple prompt, with explanations correctly identifying invalid assumptions and reprompting delivering the greatest reductions in bias. We hope this work opens inquiry into other zero-shot techniques for bias mitigation.

Recent advancements in natural language processing, especially the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs), have opened exciting possibilities for constructing computational simulations designed to replicate human behavior accurately. However, LLMs are complex statistical learners without straightforward deductive rules, making them prone to unexpected behaviors. In this study, we highlight the limitations of LLMs in simulating human interactions, particularly focusing on LLMs' ability to simulate political debates. Our findings indicate a tendency for LLM agents to conform to the model's inherent social biases despite being directed to debate from certain political perspectives. This tendency results in behavioral patterns that seem to deviate from well-established social dynamics among humans. We reinforce these observations using an automatic self-fine-tuning method, which enables us to manipulate the biases within the LLM and demonstrate that agents subsequently align with the altered biases. These results underscore the need for further research to develop methods that help agents overcome these biases, a critical step toward creating more realistic simulations.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Machine learning models always make a prediction, even when it is likely to be inaccurate. This behavior should be avoided in many decision support applications, where mistakes can have severe consequences. Albeit already studied in 1970, machine learning with rejection recently gained interest. This machine learning subfield enables machine learning models to abstain from making a prediction when likely to make a mistake. This survey aims to provide an overview on machine learning with rejection. We introduce the conditions leading to two types of rejection, ambiguity and novelty rejection, which we carefully formalize. Moreover, we review and categorize strategies to evaluate a model's predictive and rejective quality. Additionally, we define the existing architectures for models with rejection and describe the standard techniques for learning such models. Finally, we provide examples of relevant application domains and show how machine learning with rejection relates to other machine learning research areas.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have performed well on various reasoning tasks, but their inaccessibility and numerous parameters hinder wide application in practice. One promising way is distilling the reasoning ability from LLMs to small models by the generated chain-of-thought reasoning paths. In some cases, however, LLMs may produce incorrect reasoning chains, especially when facing complex mathematical problems. Previous studies only transfer knowledge from positive samples and drop the synthesized data with wrong answers. In this work, we illustrate the merit of negative data and propose a model specialization framework to distill LLMs with negative samples besides positive ones. The framework consists of three progressive steps, covering from training to inference stages, to absorb knowledge from negative data. We conduct extensive experiments across arithmetic reasoning tasks to demonstrate the role of negative data in distillation from LLM.

Despite the recent proliferation of large language models (LLMs), their training recipes -- model architecture, pre-training data and optimization algorithm -- are often very similar. This naturally raises the question of the similarity among the resulting models. In this paper, we propose a novel setting, imaginary question answering (IQA), to better understand model similarity. In IQA, we ask one model to generate purely imaginary questions (e.g., on completely made-up concepts in physics) and prompt another model to answer. Surprisingly, despite the total fictionality of these questions, all models can answer each other's questions with remarkable success, suggesting a "shared imagination space" in which these models operate during such hallucinations. We conduct a series of investigations into this phenomenon and discuss implications on model homogeneity, hallucination, and computational creativity.

We have recently witnessed a number of impressive results on hard mathematical reasoning problems with language models. At the same time, the robustness of these models has also been called into question; recent works have shown that models can rely on shallow patterns in the problem description when generating a solution. Building on the idea of behavioral testing, we propose a novel framework, which pins down the causal effect of various factors in the input, e.g., the surface form of the problem text, the operands, and math operators on the output solution. By grounding the behavioral analysis in a causal graph describing an intuitive reasoning process, we study the behavior of language models in terms of robustness and sensitivity to direct interventions in the input space. We apply our framework on a test bed of math word problems. Our analysis shows that robustness does not appear to continuously improve as a function of size, but the GPT-3 Davinci models (175B) achieve a dramatic improvement in both robustness and sensitivity compared to all other GPT variants.

Large language models (LLMs) have a substantial capacity for high-level analogical reasoning: reproducing patterns in linear text that occur in their training data (zero-shot evaluation) or in the provided context (few-shot in-context learning). However, recent studies show that even the more advanced LLMs fail in scenarios that require reasoning over multiple objects or facts and making sequences of logical deductions. We propose a two-stage probabilistic inference paradigm, ThinkSum, which reasons over sets of objects or facts in a structured manner. In the first stage (Think - retrieval of associations), a LLM is queried in parallel over a set of phrases extracted from the prompt or an auxiliary model call. In the second stage (Sum - probabilistic inference or reasoning), the results of these queries are aggregated to make the final prediction. We demonstrate the possibilities and advantages of ThinkSum on the BIG-bench suite of LLM evaluation tasks, achieving improvements over the state of the art using GPT-family models on thirteen difficult tasks, often with far smaller model variants. We also compare and contrast ThinkSum with other proposed modifications to direct prompting of LLMs, such as variants of chain-of-thought prompting. Our results suggest that because the probabilistic inference in ThinkSum is performed outside of calls to the LLM, ThinkSum is less sensitive to prompt design, yields more interpretable predictions, and can be flexibly combined with latent variable models to extract structured knowledge from LLMs. Overall, our proposed paradigm represents a promising approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

The key components of machine learning are data samples for training, model for learning patterns, and loss function for optimizing accuracy. Analogously, unlearning can potentially be achieved through anti-data samples (or anti-samples), unlearning method, and reversed loss function. While prior research has explored unlearning methods and reversed loss functions, the potential of anti-samples remains largely untapped. In this paper, we introduce UnSTAR: Unlearning with Self-Taught Anti-Sample Reasoning for large language models (LLMs). Our contributions are threefold; first, we propose a novel concept of anti-sample-induced unlearning; second, we generate anti-samples by leveraging misleading rationales, which help reverse learned associations and accelerate the unlearning process; and third, we enable fine-grained targeted unlearning, allowing for the selective removal of specific associations without impacting related knowledge - something not achievable by previous works. Results demonstrate that anti-samples offer an efficient, targeted unlearning strategy for LLMs, opening new avenues for privacy-preserving machine learning and model modification.

Existing methods, such as concept bottleneck models (CBMs), have been successful in providing concept-based interpretations for black-box deep learning models. They typically work by predicting concepts given the input and then predicting the final class label given the predicted concepts. However, (1) they often fail to capture the high-order, nonlinear interaction between concepts, e.g., correcting a predicted concept (e.g., "yellow breast") does not help correct highly correlated concepts (e.g., "yellow belly"), leading to suboptimal final accuracy; (2) they cannot naturally quantify the complex conditional dependencies between different concepts and class labels (e.g., for an image with the class label "Kentucky Warbler" and a concept "black bill", what is the probability that the model correctly predicts another concept "black crown"), therefore failing to provide deeper insight into how a black-box model works. In response to these limitations, we propose Energy-based Concept Bottleneck Models (ECBMs). Our ECBMs use a set of neural networks to define the joint energy of candidate (input, concept, class) tuples. With such a unified interface, prediction, concept correction, and conditional dependency quantification are then represented as conditional probabilities, which are generated by composing different energy functions. Our ECBMs address both limitations of existing CBMs, providing higher accuracy and richer concept interpretations. Empirical results show that our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art on real-world datasets.

Recent LLMs have significantly improved reasoning capabilities, primarily by including an explicit, lengthy Thinking process as part of generation. In this paper, we question whether this explicit thinking is necessary. Using the state-of-the-art DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen, we find that bypassing the thinking process via simple prompting, denoted as NoThinking, can be surprisingly effective. When controlling for the number of tokens, NoThinking outperforms Thinking across a diverse set of seven challenging reasoning datasets--including mathematical problem solving, formal theorem proving, and coding--especially in low-budget settings, e.g., 51.3 vs. 28.9 on ACM 23 with 700 tokens. Notably, the performance of NoThinking becomes more competitive with pass@k as k increases. Building on this observation, we demonstrate that a parallel scaling approach that uses NoThinking to generate N outputs independently and aggregates them is highly effective. For aggregation, we use task-specific verifiers when available, or we apply simple best-of-N strategies such as confidence-based selection. Our method outperforms a range of baselines with similar latency using Thinking, and is comparable to Thinking with significantly longer latency (up to 9x). Together, our research encourages a reconsideration of the necessity of lengthy thinking processes, while also establishing a competitive reference for achieving strong reasoning performance in low-budget settings or at low latency using parallel scaling.

The paradigm of pretrained deep learning models has recently emerged in artificial intelligence practice, allowing deployment in numerous societal settings with limited computational resources, but also embedding biases and enabling unintended negative uses. In this paper, we treat pretrained models as objects of study and discuss the ethical impacts of their sociological position. We discuss how pretrained models are developed and compared under the common task framework, but that this may make self-regulation inadequate. Further how pretrained models may have a performative effect on society that exacerbates biases. We then discuss how pretrained models move through actor networks as a kind of computationally immutable mobile, but that users also act as agents of technological change by reinterpreting them via fine-tuning and transfer. We further discuss how users may use pretrained models in malicious ways, drawing a novel connection between the responsible innovation and user-centered innovation literatures. We close by discussing how this sociological understanding of pretrained models can inform AI governance frameworks for fairness, accountability, and transparency.

Evaluating the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) has traditionally relied on static benchmark datasets, human assessments, or model-based evaluations - methods that often suffer from overfitting, high costs, and biases. ZeroSumEval is a novel competition-based evaluation protocol that leverages zero-sum games to assess LLMs with dynamic benchmarks that resist saturation. ZeroSumEval encompasses a diverse suite of games, including security challenges (PyJail), classic games (Chess, Liar's Dice, Poker), knowledge tests (MathQuiz), and persuasion challenges (Gandalf, Debate). These games are designed to evaluate a range of AI capabilities such as strategic reasoning, planning, knowledge application, and creativity. Building upon recent studies that highlight the effectiveness of game-based evaluations for LLMs, ZeroSumEval enhances these approaches by providing a standardized and extensible framework. To demonstrate this, we conduct extensive experiments with >7000 simulations across 7 games and 13 models. Our results show that while frontier models from the GPT and Claude families can play common games and answer questions, they struggle to play games that require creating novel and challenging questions. We also observe that models cannot reliably jailbreak each other and fail generally at tasks requiring creativity. We release our code at https://github.com/facebookresearch/ZeroSumEval.

AI is undergoing a paradigm shift with the rise of models (e.g., BERT, DALL-E, GPT-3) that are trained on broad data at scale and are adaptable to a wide range of downstream tasks. We call these models foundation models to underscore their critically central yet incomplete character. This report provides a thorough account of the opportunities and risks of foundation models, ranging from their capabilities (e.g., language, vision, robotics, reasoning, human interaction) and technical principles(e.g., model architectures, training procedures, data, systems, security, evaluation, theory) to their applications (e.g., law, healthcare, education) and societal impact (e.g., inequity, misuse, economic and environmental impact, legal and ethical considerations). Though foundation models are based on standard deep learning and transfer learning, their scale results in new emergent capabilities,and their effectiveness across so many tasks incentivizes homogenization. Homogenization provides powerful leverage but demands caution, as the defects of the foundation model are inherited by all the adapted models downstream. Despite the impending widespread deployment of foundation models, we currently lack a clear understanding of how they work, when they fail, and what they are even capable of due to their emergent properties. To tackle these questions, we believe much of the critical research on foundation models will require deep interdisciplinary collaboration commensurate with their fundamentally sociotechnical nature.

Understanding natural language requires common sense, one aspect of which is the ability to discern the plausibility of events. While distributional models -- most recently pre-trained, Transformer language models -- have demonstrated improvements in modeling event plausibility, their performance still falls short of humans'. In this work, we show that Transformer-based plausibility models are markedly inconsistent across the conceptual classes of a lexical hierarchy, inferring that "a person breathing" is plausible while "a dentist breathing" is not, for example. We find this inconsistency persists even when models are softly injected with lexical knowledge, and we present a simple post-hoc method of forcing model consistency that improves correlation with human plausibility judgements.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success, yet they often suffer from producing unnecessary and verbose reasoning chains. We identify a core aspect of this issue as "invalid thinking" -- models tend to repeatedly double-check their work after having derived the correct answer. To address this specific inefficiency, we move beyond the general principles of Efficacy and Efficiency to propose two new, fine-grained principles: Brevity, which advocates for eliminating redundancy, and Sufficiency, which ensures critical reasoning steps are preserved. Guided by these principles, we introduce LC-R1, a post-training method based on Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). LC-R1 employs a novel combination of a Length Reward for overall conciseness and a Compress Reward that is specifically designed to remove the invalid portion of the thinking process. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that LC-R1 achieves a significant reduction in sequence length (~50%) with only a marginal (~2%) drop in accuracy, achieving a favorable trade-off point on the Pareto frontier that prioritizes high compression. Our analysis further validates the robustness of LC-R1 and provides valuable insights for developing more powerful yet computationally efficient LRMs. Our code is released at https://github.com/zxiangx/LC-R1.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced complex reasoning capabilities, particularly through extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that incorporates mechanisms such as backtracking, self-reflection and self-correction. Despite these developments, the self-correction abilities of LLMs during long CoT reasoning remain underexplored. And recent findings on overthinking suggest that such models often engage in unnecessarily redundant reasoning. In this work, we empirically show that the first reasoning step exerts a disproportionately large influence on the final prediction - errors introduced at this stage can substantially degrade subsequent reasoning quality. This phenomenon is consistently observed across two state-of-the-art open-source reasoning model families: DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3. To address this, we propose an efficient sampling strategy that leverages a reward model to identify and retain high-quality first reasoning steps while discarding suboptimal ones, achieving up to a 70% reduction in inference cost without sacrificing accuracy. Finally, we introduce a new benchmark specifically constructed with deliberately flawed first reasoning steps to systematically evaluate model self-correction capabilities, offering a foundation for future research on robust reasoning in LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in generating fluent text, as well as tendencies to reproduce undesirable social biases. This study investigates whether LLMs reproduce the moral biases associated with political groups in the United States, an instance of a broader capability herein termed moral mimicry. This hypothesis is explored in the GPT-3/3.5 and OPT families of Transformer-based LLMs. Using tools from Moral Foundations Theory, it is shown that these LLMs are indeed moral mimics. When prompted with a liberal or conservative political identity, the models generate text reflecting corresponding moral biases. This study also explores the relationship between moral mimicry and model size, and similarity between human and LLM moral word use.

A central goal of cognitive modeling is to develop models that not only predict human behavior but also provide insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. While neural network models trained on large-scale behavioral data often achieve strong predictive performance, they typically fall short in offering interpretable explanations of the cognitive processes they capture. In this work, we explore the potential of pretrained large language models (LLMs) to serve as dual-purpose cognitive models--capable of both accurate prediction and interpretable explanation in natural language. Specifically, we employ reinforcement learning with outcome-based rewards to guide LLMs toward generating explicit reasoning traces for explaining human risky choices. Our findings demonstrate that this approach produces high-quality explanations alongside strong quantitative predictions of human decisions.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit strong reasoning abilities, often attributed to few-shot or zero-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. While effective, these methods require labor-intensive prompt engineering, raising the question of whether reasoning can be induced without reliance on explicit prompts. In this work, we unlock the reasoning capabilities of LLMs without explicit prompting. Inspired by zero-shot CoT and CoT-decoding, we propose a novel decoding strategy that systematically nudges LLMs to continue reasoning, thereby preventing immature reasoning processes. Specifically, we monitor the model's generation and inject a designated phrase whenever it is likely to conclude its response prematurely, before completing the reasoning process. Our experimental evaluations on diverse reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our proposed strategy substantially improves LLM reasoning capabilities, highlighting the potential of decoding-based interventions as an alternative to traditional prompting techniques.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in general natural language processing tasks but often fall short in complex reasoning tasks. Recent studies have explored human-like problem-solving strategies, such as self-correct, to push further the boundary of single-model reasoning ability. In this work, we let a single model "step outside the box" by engaging multiple models to correct each other. We introduce a multi-agent collaboration strategy that emulates the academic peer review process. Each agent independently constructs its own solution, provides reviews on the solutions of others, and assigns confidence levels to its reviews. Upon receiving peer reviews, agents revise their initial solutions. Extensive experiments on three different types of reasoning tasks show that our collaboration approach delivers superior accuracy across all ten datasets compared to existing methods. Further study underscores the effectiveness of integrating confidence in reviews, demonstrates the superiority of feedback exchange over mere solution sharing, and highlights the role of capability and diversity in fostering successful collaboration.

Integer sequences are of central importance to the modeling of concepts admitting complete finitary descriptions. We introduce a novel view on the learning of such concepts and lay down a set of benchmarking tasks aimed at conceptual understanding by machine learning models. These tasks indirectly assess model ability to abstract, and challenge them to reason both interpolatively and extrapolatively from the knowledge gained by observing representative examples. To further aid research in knowledge representation and reasoning, we present FACT, the Finitary Abstraction Comprehension Toolkit. The toolkit surrounds a large dataset of integer sequences comprising both organic and synthetic entries, a library for data pre-processing and generation, a set of model performance evaluation tools, and a collection of baseline model implementations, enabling the making of the future advancements with ease.

Machine unlearning -- efficiently removing the effect of a small "forget set" of training data on a pre-trained machine learning model -- has recently attracted significant research interest. Despite this interest, however, recent work shows that existing machine unlearning techniques do not hold up to thorough evaluation in non-convex settings. In this work, we introduce a new machine unlearning technique that exhibits strong empirical performance even in such challenging settings. Our starting point is the perspective that the goal of unlearning is to produce a model whose outputs are statistically indistinguishable from those of a model re-trained on all but the forget set. This perspective naturally suggests a reduction from the unlearning problem to that of data attribution, where the goal is to predict the effect of changing the training set on a model's outputs. Thus motivated, we propose the following meta-algorithm, which we call Datamodel Matching (DMM): given a trained model, we (a) use data attribution to predict the output of the model if it were re-trained on all but the forget set points; then (b) fine-tune the pre-trained model to match these predicted outputs. In a simple convex setting, we show how this approach provably outperforms a variety of iterative unlearning algorithms. Empirically, we use a combination of existing evaluations and a new metric based on the KL-divergence to show that even in non-convex settings, DMM achieves strong unlearning performance relative to existing algorithms. An added benefit of DMM is that it is a meta-algorithm, in the sense that future advances in data attribution translate directly into better unlearning algorithms, pointing to a clear direction for future progress in unlearning.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

This study investigates the reasoning robustness of large language models (LLMs) on mathematical problem-solving tasks under systematically introduced input perturbations. Using the GSM8K dataset as a controlled testbed, we evaluate how well state-of-the-art models maintain logical consistency and correctness when confronted with four categories of prompt perturbations: irrelevant context, pathological instructions, factually relevant but non-essential context, and a combination of the latter two. Our experiments, conducted on thirteen open-source and closed-source LLMs, reveal that introducing irrelevant context within the model's context window significantly degrades performance, suggesting that distinguishing essential from extraneous details remains a pressing challenge. Surprisingly, performance regressions are relatively insensitive to the complexity of the reasoning task, as measured by the number of steps required, and are not strictly correlated with model size. Moreover, we observe that certain perturbations inadvertently trigger chain-of-thought-like reasoning behaviors, even without explicit prompting. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in current LLMs and underscore the need for improved robustness against noisy, misleading, and contextually dense inputs, paving the way for more resilient and reliable reasoning in real-world applications.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) are proficient at generating explicit, step-by-step reasoning sequences before producing final answers. However, such detailed reasoning can introduce substantial computational overhead and latency, particularly for simple problems. To address this over-thinking problem, we explore how to equip LRMs with adaptive thinking capabilities: enabling them to dynamically decide whether or not to engage in explicit reasoning based on problem complexity. Building on R1-style distilled models, we observe that inserting a simple ellipsis ("...") into the prompt can stochastically trigger either a thinking or no-thinking mode, revealing a latent controllability in the reasoning behavior. Leveraging this property, we propose AutoThink, a multi-stage reinforcement learning (RL) framework that progressively optimizes reasoning policies via stage-wise reward shaping. AutoThink learns to invoke explicit reasoning only when necessary, while defaulting to succinct responses for simpler tasks. Experiments on five mainstream mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that AutoThink achieves favorable accuracy-efficiency trade-offs compared to recent prompting and RL-based pruning methods. It can be seamlessly integrated into any R1-style model, including both distilled and further fine-tuned variants. Notably, AutoThink improves relative accuracy by 6.4 percent while reducing token usage by 52 percent on DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B, establishing a scalable and adaptive reasoning paradigm for LRMs. Project Page: https://github.com/ScienceOne-AI/AutoThink.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has played an important role in improving the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs). Some studies apply RL directly to smaller base models (known as zero-RL) and also achieve notable progress. However, in this paper, we show that using only 920 examples, a simple distillation method based on the base model can clearly outperform zero-RL, which typically requires much more data and computational cost. By analyzing the token frequency in model outputs, we find that the distilled model shows more flexible reasoning. It uses anthropomorphic tokens and logical connectors much more often than the zero-RL model. Further analysis reveals that distillation enhances the presence of two advanced cognitive behaviors: Multi-Perspective Thinking or Attempting and Metacognitive Awareness. Frequent occurrences of these two advanced cognitive behaviors give rise to flexible reasoning, which is essential for solving complex reasoning problems, while zero-RL fails to significantly boost the frequency of these behaviors.

Classification is a core task in machine learning. Recent research has shown that although Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are initially poor at image classification, fine-tuning them with an adequate amount of data can significantly enhance their performance, making them comparable to SOTA classification models. However, acquiring large-scale labeled data is expensive. In this paper, we explore few-shot MLLM classification fine-tuning. We found that SFT can cause severe overfitting issues and may even degrade performance over the zero-shot approach. To address this challenge, inspired by the recent successes in rule-based reinforcement learning, we propose CLS-RL, which uses verifiable signals as reward to fine-tune MLLMs. We discovered that CLS-RL outperforms SFT in most datasets and has a much higher average accuracy on both base-to-new and few-shot learning setting. Moreover, we observed a free-lunch phenomenon for CLS-RL; when models are fine-tuned on a particular dataset, their performance on other distinct datasets may also improve over zero-shot models, even if those datasets differ in distribution and class names. This suggests that RL-based methods effectively teach models the fundamentals of classification. Lastly, inspired by recent works in inference time thinking, we re-examine the `thinking process' during fine-tuning, a critical aspect of RL-based methods, in the context of visual classification. We question whether such tasks require extensive thinking process during fine-tuning, proposing that this may actually detract from performance. Based on this premise, we introduce the No-Thinking-CLS-RL method, which minimizes thinking processes during training by setting an equality accuracy reward. Our findings indicate that, with much less fine-tuning time, No-Thinking-CLS-RL method achieves superior in-domain performance and generalization capabilities than CLS-RL.

As large language models (LLMs) have been deployed in various real-world settings, concerns about the harm they may propagate have grown. Various jailbreaking techniques have been developed to expose the vulnerabilities of these models and improve their safety. This work reveals that many state-of-the-art LLMs are vulnerable to malicious requests hidden behind scientific language. Specifically, our experiments with GPT4o, GPT4o-mini, GPT-4, LLama3-405B-Instruct, Llama3-70B-Instruct, Cohere, Gemini models demonstrate that, the models' biases and toxicity substantially increase when prompted with requests that deliberately misinterpret social science and psychological studies as evidence supporting the benefits of stereotypical biases. Alarmingly, these models can also be manipulated to generate fabricated scientific arguments claiming that biases are beneficial, which can be used by ill-intended actors to systematically jailbreak these strong LLMs. Our analysis studies various factors that contribute to the models' vulnerabilities to malicious requests in academic language. Mentioning author names and venues enhances the persuasiveness of models, and the bias scores increase as dialogues progress. Our findings call for a more careful investigation on the use of scientific data for training LLMs.

We propose a new framework for estimating generative models via an adversarial process, in which we simultaneously train two models: a generative model G that captures the data distribution, and a discriminative model D that estimates the probability that a sample came from the training data rather than G. The training procedure for G is to maximize the probability of D making a mistake. This framework corresponds to a minimax two-player game. In the space of arbitrary functions G and D, a unique solution exists, with G recovering the training data distribution and D equal to 1/2 everywhere. In the case where G and D are defined by multilayer perceptrons, the entire system can be trained with backpropagation. There is no need for any Markov chains or unrolled approximate inference networks during either training or generation of samples. Experiments demonstrate the potential of the framework through qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the generated samples.

Recent advancements in large language models have showcased their remarkable generalizability across various domains. However, their reasoning abilities still have significant room for improvement, especially when confronted with scenarios requiring multi-step reasoning. Although large language models possess extensive knowledge, their behavior, particularly in terms of reasoning, often fails to effectively utilize this knowledge to establish a coherent thinking paradigm. Generative language models sometimes show hallucinations as their reasoning procedures are unconstrained by logical principles. Aiming to improve the zero-shot chain-of-thought reasoning ability of large language models, we propose Logical Chain-of-Thought (LogiCoT), a neurosymbolic framework that leverages principles from symbolic logic to verify and revise the reasoning processes accordingly. Experimental evaluations conducted on language tasks in diverse domains, including arithmetic, commonsense, symbolic, causal inference, and social problems, demonstrate the efficacy of the enhanced reasoning paradigm by logic.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced language models' capabilities in complex problem-solving by emulating human-like deliberative thinking. However, these models often exhibit overthinking (i.e., the generation of unnecessarily verbose and redundant content), which hinders efficiency and inflates inference cost. In this work, we explore the representational and behavioral origins of this inefficiency, revealing that LRMs inherently possess the capacity for more concise reasoning. Empirical analyses show that correct reasoning paths vary significantly in length, and the shortest correct responses often suffice, indicating untapped efficiency potential. Exploiting these findings, we propose two lightweight methods to enhance LRM efficiency. First, we introduce Efficiency Steering, a training-free activation steering technique that modulates reasoning behavior via a single direction in the model's representation space. Second, we develop Self-Rewarded Efficiency RL, a reinforcement learning framework that dynamically balances task accuracy and brevity by rewarding concise correct solutions. Extensive experiments on seven LRM backbones across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly reduce reasoning length while preserving or improving task performance. Our results highlight that reasoning efficiency can be improved by leveraging and guiding the intrinsic capabilities of existing models in a self-guided manner.

When one agent interacts with a multi-agent environment, it is challenging to deal with various opponents unseen before. Modeling the behaviors, goals, or beliefs of opponents could help the agent adjust its policy to adapt to different opponents. In addition, it is also important to consider opponents who are learning simultaneously or capable of reasoning. However, existing work usually tackles only one of the aforementioned types of opponents. In this paper, we propose model-based opponent modeling (MBOM), which employs the environment model to adapt to all kinds of opponents. MBOM simulates the recursive reasoning process in the environment model and imagines a set of improving opponent policies. To effectively and accurately represent the opponent policy, MBOM further mixes the imagined opponent policies according to the similarity with the real behaviors of opponents. Empirically, we show that MBOM achieves more effective adaptation than existing methods in a variety of tasks, respectively with different types of opponents, i.e., fixed policy, na\"ive learner, and reasoning learner.

Pragmatics and non-literal language understanding are essential to human communication, and present a long-standing challenge for artificial language models. We perform a fine-grained comparison of language models and humans on seven pragmatic phenomena, using zero-shot prompting on an expert-curated set of English materials. We ask whether models (1) select pragmatic interpretations of speaker utterances, (2) make similar error patterns as humans, and (3) use similar linguistic cues as humans to solve the tasks. We find that the largest models achieve high accuracy and match human error patterns: within incorrect responses, models favor literal interpretations over heuristic-based distractors. We also find preliminary evidence that models and humans are sensitive to similar linguistic cues. Our results suggest that pragmatic behaviors can emerge in models without explicitly constructed representations of mental states. However, models tend to struggle with phenomena relying on social expectation violations.

Scaling model size and training data has led to great advances in the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, the diminishing returns of this approach necessitate alternative methods to improve model capabilities, particularly in tasks requiring advanced reasoning. Large reasoning models, which leverage long chain-of-thoughts, bring unprecedented breakthroughs in problem-solving capabilities but at a substantial deployment cost associated to longer generations. Reducing inference costs is crucial for the economic feasibility, user experience, and environmental sustainability of these models. In this work, we propose to train large reasoning models to reason efficiently. More precisely, we use reinforcement learning (RL) to train reasoning models to dynamically allocate inference-time compute based on task complexity. Our method incentivizes models to minimize unnecessary computational overhead while maintaining accuracy, thereby achieving substantial efficiency gains. It enables the derivation of a family of reasoning models with varying efficiency levels, controlled via a single hyperparameter. Experiments on two open-weight large reasoning models demonstrate significant reductions in inference cost while preserving most of the accuracy.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has significantly enhanced the reasoning abilities of large language models. However, recent studies have shown that models can still perform complex reasoning tasks even when the CoT is replaced with filler(hidden) characters (e.g., "..."), leaving open questions about how models internally process and represent reasoning steps. In this paper, we investigate methods to decode these hidden characters in transformer models trained with filler CoT sequences. By analyzing layer-wise representations using the logit lens method and examining token rankings, we demonstrate that the hidden characters can be recovered without loss of performance. Our findings provide insights into the internal mechanisms of transformer models and open avenues for improving interpretability and transparency in language model reasoning.

Machine learning models are often used to decide who will receive a loan, a job interview, or a public benefit. Standard techniques to build these models use features about people but overlook their actionability. In turn, models can assign predictions that are fixed, meaning that consumers who are denied loans, interviews, or benefits may be permanently locked out from access to credit, employment, or assistance. In this work, we introduce a formal testing procedure to flag models that assign fixed predictions that we call recourse verification. We develop machinery to reliably determine if a given model can provide recourse to its decision subjects from a set of user-specified actionability constraints. We demonstrate how our tools can ensure recourse and adversarial robustness in real-world datasets and use them to study the infeasibility of recourse in real-world lending datasets. Our results highlight how models can inadvertently assign fixed predictions that permanently bar access, and we provide tools to design algorithms that account for actionability when developing models.

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

Recent advances in large language models have demonstrated that Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning data distilled from large reasoning models (e.g., DeepSeek R1) can effectively transfer reasoning capabilities to non-reasoning models. However, models fine-tuned with this approach inherit the "overthinking" problem from teacher models, producing verbose and redundant reasoning chains during inference. To address this challenge, we propose Long-Short Chain-of-Thought Mixture Supervised Fine-Tuning (LS-Mixture SFT), which combines long CoT reasoning dataset with their short counterparts obtained through structure-preserved rewriting. Our experiments demonstrate that models trained using the LS-Mixture SFT method, compared to those trained with direct SFT, achieved an average accuracy improvement of 2.3% across various benchmarks while substantially reducing model response length by approximately 47.61%. This work offers an approach to endow non-reasoning models with reasoning capabilities through supervised fine-tuning while avoiding the inherent overthinking problems inherited from teacher models, thereby enabling efficient reasoning in the fine-tuned models.

Pretrained large language models (LLMs) are widely used in many sub-fields of natural language processing (NLP) and generally known as excellent few-shot learners with task-specific exemplars. Notably, chain of thought (CoT) prompting, a recent technique for eliciting complex multi-step reasoning through step-by-step answer examples, achieved the state-of-the-art performances in arithmetics and symbolic reasoning, difficult system-2 tasks that do not follow the standard scaling laws for LLMs. While these successes are often attributed to LLMs' ability for few-shot learning, we show that LLMs are decent zero-shot reasoners by simply adding "Let's think step by step" before each answer. Experimental results demonstrate that our Zero-shot-CoT, using the same single prompt template, significantly outperforms zero-shot LLM performances on diverse benchmark reasoning tasks including arithmetics (MultiArith, GSM8K, AQUA-RAT, SVAMP), symbolic reasoning (Last Letter, Coin Flip), and other logical reasoning tasks (Date Understanding, Tracking Shuffled Objects), without any hand-crafted few-shot examples, e.g. increasing the accuracy on MultiArith from 17.7% to 78.7% and GSM8K from 10.4% to 40.7% with large InstructGPT model (text-davinci-002), as well as similar magnitudes of improvements with another off-the-shelf large model, 540B parameter PaLM. The versatility of this single prompt across very diverse reasoning tasks hints at untapped and understudied fundamental zero-shot capabilities of LLMs, suggesting high-level, multi-task broad cognitive capabilities may be extracted by simple prompting. We hope our work not only serves as the minimal strongest zero-shot baseline for the challenging reasoning benchmarks, but also highlights the importance of carefully exploring and analyzing the enormous zero-shot knowledge hidden inside LLMs before crafting finetuning datasets or few-shot exemplars.

Multiple Instance Learning (MIL) is a sub-domain of classification problems with positive and negative labels and a "bag" of inputs, where the label is positive if and only if a positive element is contained within the bag, and otherwise is negative. Training in this context requires associating the bag-wide label to instance-level information, and implicitly contains a causal assumption and asymmetry to the task (i.e., you can't swap the labels without changing the semantics). MIL problems occur in healthcare (one malignant cell indicates cancer), cyber security (one malicious executable makes an infected computer), and many other tasks. In this work, we examine five of the most prominent deep-MIL models and find that none of them respects the standard MIL assumption. They are able to learn anti-correlated instances, i.e., defaulting to "positive" labels until seeing a negative counter-example, which should not be possible for a correct MIL model. We suspect that enhancements and other works derived from these models will share the same issue. In any context in which these models are being used, this creates the potential for learning incorrect models, which creates risk of operational failure. We identify and demonstrate this problem via a proposed "algorithmic unit test", where we create synthetic datasets that can be solved by a MIL respecting model, and which clearly reveal learning that violates MIL assumptions. The five evaluated methods each fail one or more of these tests. This provides a model-agnostic way to identify violations of modeling assumptions, which we hope will be useful for future development and evaluation of MIL models.

As LLMs become increasingly prevalent, it is interesting to consider how ``creative'' these models can be. From cognitive science, creativity consists of at least two key characteristics: convergent thinking (purposefulness to achieve a given goal) and divergent thinking (adaptability to new environments or constraints) runco2003critical. In this work, we introduce a framework for quantifying LLM creativity that incorporates the two characteristics. This is achieved by (1) Denial Prompting pushes LLMs to come up with more creative solutions to a given problem by incrementally imposing new constraints on the previous solution, compelling LLMs to adopt new strategies, and (2) defining and computing the NeoGauge metric which examines both convergent and divergent thinking in the generated creative responses by LLMs. We apply the proposed framework on Codeforces problems, a natural data source for collecting human coding solutions. We quantify NeoGauge for various proprietary and open-source models and find that even the most creative model, GPT-4, still falls short of demonstrating human-like creativity. We also experiment with advanced reasoning strategies (MCTS, self-correction, etc.) and observe no significant improvement in creativity. As a by-product of our analysis, we release NeoCoder dataset for reproducing our results on future models.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.

When language models (LMs) are trained to forget (or "unlearn'') a skill, how precisely does their behavior change? We study the behavior of transformer LMs in which tasks have been forgotten via fine-tuning on randomized labels. Such LMs learn to generate near-random predictions for individual examples in the "training'' set used for forgetting. Across tasks, however, LMs exhibit extreme variability in whether LM predictions change on examples outside the training set. In some tasks (like entailment classification), forgetting generalizes robustly, and causes models to produce uninformative predictions on new task instances; in other tasks (like physical commonsense reasoning and scientific question answering) forgetting affects only the training examples, and models continue to perform the "forgotten'' task accurately even for examples very similar to those that appeared in the training set. Dataset difficulty is not predictive of whether a behavior can be forgotten; instead, generalization in forgetting is (weakly) predicted by the confidence of LMs' initial task predictions and the variability of LM representations of training data, with low confidence and low variability both associated with greater generalization. Perhaps most surprisingly, random-label forgetting appears to be somewhat insensitive to the contents of the training set: for example, models trained on science questions with random labels continue to answer other science questions accurately, but begin to produce random labels on entailment classification tasks. Finally, we show that even generalizable forgetting is shallow: linear probes trained on LMs' representations can still perform tasks reliably after forgetting. Our results highlight the difficulty and unpredictability of performing targeted skill removal from models via fine-tuning.

We demonstrate LLM agent specification gaming by instructing models to win against a chess engine. We find reasoning models like o1 preview and DeepSeek-R1 will often hack the benchmark by default, while language models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet need to be told that normal play won't work to hack. We improve upon prior work like (Hubinger et al., 2024; Meinke et al., 2024; Weij et al., 2024) by using realistic task prompts and avoiding excess nudging. Our results suggest reasoning models may resort to hacking to solve difficult problems, as observed in OpenAI (2024)'s o1 Docker escape during cyber capabilities testing.

We present Thinking with Generated Images, a novel paradigm that fundamentally transforms how large multimodal models (LMMs) engage with visual reasoning by enabling them to natively think across text and vision modalities through spontaneous generation of intermediate visual thinking steps. Current visual reasoning with LMMs is constrained to either processing fixed user-provided images or reasoning solely through text-based chain-of-thought (CoT). Thinking with Generated Images unlocks a new dimension of cognitive capability where models can actively construct intermediate visual thoughts, critique their own visual hypotheses, and refine them as integral components of their reasoning process. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through two complementary mechanisms: (1) vision generation with intermediate visual subgoals, where models decompose complex visual tasks into manageable components that are generated and integrated progressively, and (2) vision generation with self-critique, where models generate an initial visual hypothesis, analyze its shortcomings through textual reasoning, and produce refined outputs based on their own critiques. Our experiments on vision generation benchmarks show substantial improvements over baseline approaches, with our models achieving up to 50% (from 38% to 57%) relative improvement in handling complex multi-object scenarios. From biochemists exploring novel protein structures, and architects iterating on spatial designs, to forensic analysts reconstructing crime scenes, and basketball players envisioning strategic plays, our approach enables AI models to engage in the kind of visual imagination and iterative refinement that characterizes human creative, analytical, and strategic thinking. We release our open-source suite at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/thinking-with-generated-images.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are smart but forgetful. Recent studies, (e.g., (Bubeck et al., 2023)) on modern LLMs have shown that they are capable of performing amazing tasks typically necessitating human-level intelligence. However, unlike humans, frozen LLMs do not improve over time; they neither acquire new knowledge nor learn from their successes or failures. Some approaches to improving the intelligence of LLMs include fine-tuning models based on problem-solving performance (Zelikman et al., 2022), and building bigger and more sophisticated models (Bubeck et al., 2023). However, these methods have the drawback of requiring substantial data and computational resources to retrain existing models. In this paper, we explore the use of Retrieval Augmented Generation, also known as RAG (Lewis et al., 2021) to improve problem-solving performance. We propose ARM-RAG (Auxiliary Rationale Memory for Retrieval Augmented Generation), a system that learns from its successes without incurring high training costs. We demonstrate that the storage and subsequent retrieval of reasoning chains have a positive influence on performance in grade-school math problems.

Language models are increasingly being deployed for general problem solving across a wide range of tasks, but are still confined to token-level, left-to-right decision-making processes during inference. This means they can fall short in tasks that require exploration, strategic lookahead, or where initial decisions play a pivotal role. To surmount these challenges, we introduce a new framework for language model inference, Tree of Thoughts (ToT), which generalizes over the popular Chain of Thought approach to prompting language models, and enables exploration over coherent units of text (thoughts) that serve as intermediate steps toward problem solving. ToT allows LMs to perform deliberate decision making by considering multiple different reasoning paths and self-evaluating choices to decide the next course of action, as well as looking ahead or backtracking when necessary to make global choices. Our experiments show that ToT significantly enhances language models' problem-solving abilities on three novel tasks requiring non-trivial planning or search: Game of 24, Creative Writing, and Mini Crosswords. For instance, in Game of 24, while GPT-4 with chain-of-thought prompting only solved 4% of tasks, our method achieved a success rate of 74%. Code repo with all prompts: https://github.com/ysymyth/tree-of-thought-llm.

Large Language Models (LLM) with reasoning capabilities offer a promising path for improving candidate evaluation in planning frameworks, but their relative performance against traditional non-reasoning models remains largely underexplored. In this study, we benchmark a distilled 1.5B parameter reasoning model (DeepSeek-R1) against several state-of-the-art non-reasoning LLMs within a generator-discriminator LLM planning framework for the text-to-SQL task. For this, we introduce a novel method for extracting soft scores from the chain-of-thought (CoT) outputs from reasoning that enables fine-grained ranking of candidates. Our central hypothesis is that reasoning models are more effective discriminators than non-reasoning LLMs. Our results show that distilled DeepSeek-R1-1.5B achieves up to 87% higher F1 and 3.7% better discrimination accuracy than CodeLlama-7B, as well as 3.7% higher execution accuracy than CodeLlama-13B, despite having significantly fewer parameters. Furthermore, we find that there is a limit to the logical capabilities of reasoning models, and only providing more context or allowing more compute budget for reasoning is not enough to improve their discrimination performance. Finally, we demonstrate that, unlike non-reasoning LLMs, reasoning models find generation more challenging than discrimination and may underperform as generators compared to smaller non-reasoning LLMs. Our work highlights the potential of reasoning models as discriminators in agentic frameworks, far outweighing their capabilities as generators, offering insights into their optimal role within LLM planning infrastructures.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrate a strong understanding of the real world and can even handle complex tasks. However, they still fail on some straightforward visual question-answering (VQA) problems. This paper dives deeper into this issue, revealing that models tend to err when answering easy questions (e.g. Yes/No questions) about an image, even though they can correctly describe it. We refer to this model behavior discrepancy between difficult and simple questions as model laziness. To systematically investigate model laziness, we manually construct LazyBench, a benchmark that includes Yes/No, multiple choice, short answer questions, and image description tasks that are related to the same subjects in the images. Based on LazyBench, we observe that laziness widely exists in current advanced MLLMs (e.g. GPT-4o, Gemini-1.5-pro, Claude 3 and LLaVA-v1.5-13B), and it is more pronounced on stronger models. We also analyze the VQA v2 (LLaVA-v1.5-13B) benchmark and find that about half of its failure cases are caused by model laziness, which further highlights the importance of ensuring that the model fully utilizes its capability. To this end, we conduct preliminary exploration on how to mitigate laziness and find that chain of thought (CoT) can effectively address this issue.

Implicit bias refers to automatic or spontaneous mental processes that shape perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Previous research examining `implicit bias' in large language models (LLMs) has often approached the phenomenon differently than how it is studied in humans by focusing primarily on model outputs rather than on model processing. To examine model processing, we present a method called the Reasoning Model Implicit Association Test (RM-IAT) for studying implicit bias-like patterns in reasoning models: LLMs that employ step-by-step reasoning to solve complex tasks. Using this method, we find that reasoning models require more tokens when processing association-incompatible information compared to association-compatible information. These findings suggest AI systems harbor patterns in processing information that are analogous to human implicit bias. We consider the implications of these implicit bias-like patterns for their deployment in real-world applications.

Recent research has shown that smaller language models can acquire substantial reasoning abilities when fine-tuned with reasoning exemplars crafted by a significantly larger teacher model. We explore this paradigm for the financial domain, focusing on the challenge of answering questions that require multi-hop numerical reasoning over financial texts. We assess the performance of several smaller models that have been fine-tuned to generate programs that encode the required financial reasoning and calculations. Our findings demonstrate that these fine-tuned smaller models approach the performance of the teacher model. To provide a granular analysis of model performance, we propose an approach to investigate the specific student model capabilities that are enhanced by fine-tuning. Our empirical analysis indicates that fine-tuning refines the student models ability to express and apply the required financial concepts along with adapting the entity extraction for the specific data format. In addition, we hypothesize and demonstrate that comparable financial reasoning capability can be induced using relatively smaller datasets.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

As large language models increase in capability, researchers have started to conduct surveys of all kinds on these models with varying scientific motivations. In this work, we examine what we can learn from a model's survey responses on the basis of the well-established American Community Survey (ACS) by the U.S. Census Bureau. Evaluating more than a dozen different models, varying in size from a few hundred million to ten billion parameters, hundreds of thousands of times each on questions from the ACS, we systematically establish two dominant patterns. First, smaller models have a significant position and labeling bias, for example, towards survey responses labeled with the letter "A". This A-bias diminishes, albeit slowly, as model size increases. Second, when adjusting for this labeling bias through randomized answer ordering, models still do not trend toward US population statistics or those of any cognizable population. Rather, models across the board trend toward uniformly random aggregate statistics over survey responses. This pattern is robust to various different ways of prompting the model, including what is the de-facto standard. Our findings demonstrate that aggregate statistics of a language model's survey responses lack the signals found in human populations. This absence of statistical signal cautions about the use of survey responses from large language models at present time.

Both Minsky's "society of mind" and Schmidhuber's "learning to think" inspire diverse societies of large multimodal neural networks (NNs) that solve problems by interviewing each other in a "mindstorm." Recent implementations of NN-based societies of minds consist of large language models (LLMs) and other NN-based experts communicating through a natural language interface. In doing so, they overcome the limitations of single LLMs, improving multimodal zero-shot reasoning. In these natural language-based societies of mind (NLSOMs), new agents -- all communicating through the same universal symbolic language -- are easily added in a modular fashion. To demonstrate the power of NLSOMs, we assemble and experiment with several of them (having up to 129 members), leveraging mindstorms in them to solve some practical AI tasks: visual question answering, image captioning, text-to-image synthesis, 3D generation, egocentric retrieval, embodied AI, and general language-based task solving. We view this as a starting point towards much larger NLSOMs with billions of agents-some of which may be humans. And with this emergence of great societies of heterogeneous minds, many new research questions have suddenly become paramount to the future of artificial intelligence. What should be the social structure of an NLSOM? What would be the (dis)advantages of having a monarchical rather than a democratic structure? How can principles of NN economies be used to maximize the total reward of a reinforcement learning NLSOM? In this work, we identify, discuss, and try to answer some of these questions.

Long chain-of-thought (CoT) is an essential ingredient in effective usage of modern large language models, but our understanding of the reasoning strategies underlying these capabilities remains limited. While some prior works have attempted to categorize CoTs using predefined strategy types, such approaches are constrained by human intuition and fail to capture the full diversity of model behaviors. In this work, we introduce the CoT Encyclopedia, a bottom-up framework for analyzing and steering model reasoning. Our method automatically extracts diverse reasoning criteria from model-generated CoTs, embeds them into a semantic space, clusters them into representative categories, and derives contrastive rubrics to interpret reasoning behavior. Human evaluations show that this framework produces more interpretable and comprehensive analyses than existing methods. Moreover, we demonstrate that this understanding enables performance gains: we can predict which strategy a model is likely to use and guide it toward more effective alternatives. Finally, we provide practical insights, such as that training data format (e.g., free-form vs. multiple-choice) has a far greater impact on reasoning behavior than data domain, underscoring the importance of format-aware model design.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) provide a new opportunity to address the long-standing question of how concepts are represented and organized in the mind, which is central to unravelling the nature of human cognition. Here, we reframed the classic reverse dictionary task to simulate human concept inference in context and investigated the emergence of human-like conceptual representations within LLMs. We found that LLMs were able to infer concepts from definitional descriptions and construct representation spaces that converge towards a shared, context-independent structure. These representations effectively predicted human behavioural judgments and aligned well with neural activity patterns in the human brain, offering evidence for biological plausibility. These findings demonstrate that human-like conceptual representations and organization can naturally emerge from language prediction, even without real-world grounding. Our work supports the view that LLMs serve as valuable tools for understanding complex human cognition and paves the way for better alignment between artificial and human intelligence.

We test the robustness of debate as a method of scalable oversight by training models to debate with data generated via self-play. In a long-context reading comprehension task, we find that language model based evaluators answer questions more accurately when judging models optimized to win debates. By contrast, we find no such relationship for consultancy models trained to persuade a judge without an opposing debater present. In quantitative and qualitative comparisons between our debate models and novel consultancy baselines, we find evidence that debate training encourages stronger and more informative arguments, showing promise that it can help provide high-quality supervision for tasks that are difficult to directly evaluate.

This paper presents null-shot prompting. Null-shot prompting exploits hallucination in large language models (LLMs) by instructing LLMs to utilize information from the "Examples" section that never exists within the provided context to perform a task. While reducing hallucination is crucial and non-negligible for daily and critical uses of LLMs, we propose that in the current landscape in which these LLMs still hallucinate, it is possible, in fact, to exploit hallucination to increase performance in performing tasks compared to standard zero-shot prompting. Experiments with six LLMs show improvements in performance across the majority of eight datasets, including reading comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, and closed-book question answering. The observed inconsistency in increased relative performance across LLMs also potentially indicates a different degree of inherent hallucination in each model. These differences show that it is possible to utilize null-shot prompting as a way to detect degrees of hallucination in LLMs using existing benchmarking datasets. We also perform ablation studies, including experimenting with a modified version of null-shot prompting that incorporates ideas from zero-shot chain-of-thought prompting, which shows different trends of results.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning abilities through test-time computation (TTC) techniques such as chain-of-thought prompting and tree-based reasoning. However, we argue that current reasoning LLMs (RLLMs) lack the ability to systematically explore the solution space. This paper formalizes what constitutes systematic problem solving and identifies common failure modes that reveal reasoning LLMs to be wanderers rather than systematic explorers. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis across multiple state-of-the-art LLMs, we uncover persistent issues: invalid reasoning steps, redundant explorations, hallucinated or unfaithful conclusions, and so on. Our findings suggest that current models' performance can appear to be competent on simple tasks yet degrade sharply as complexity increases. Based on the findings, we advocate for new metrics and tools that evaluate not just final outputs but the structure of the reasoning process itself.

Recent studies have shown that making a model spend more time thinking through longer Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) enables it to gain significant improvements in complex reasoning tasks. While current researches continue to explore the benefits of increasing test-time compute by extending the CoT lengths of Large Language Models (LLMs), we are concerned about a potential issue hidden behind the current pursuit of test-time scaling: Would excessively scaling the CoT length actually bring adverse effects to a model's reasoning performance? Our explorations on mathematical reasoning tasks reveal an unexpected finding that scaling with longer CoTs can indeed impair the reasoning performance of LLMs in certain domains. Moreover, we discover that there exists an optimal scaled length distribution that differs across different domains. Based on these insights, we propose a Thinking-Optimal Scaling strategy. Our method first uses a small set of seed data with varying response length distributions to teach the model to adopt different reasoning efforts for deep thinking. Then, the model selects its shortest correct response under different reasoning efforts on additional problems for self-improvement. Our self-improved models built upon Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct outperform other distillation-based 32B o1-like models across various math benchmarks, and achieve performance on par with QwQ-32B-Preview.

It has been well-known that Chain-of-Thought can remarkably enhance LLMs' performance on complex tasks. However, because it also introduces slower inference speeds and higher computational costs, many researches have attempted to use implicit CoT, which does not need LLMs to explicitly generate the intermediate steps. But there is still gap between their efficacy and typical explicit CoT methods. This leaves us a doubt that, does implicit CoT really equal to explicit CoT? Therefore, in this study, we address this question through experiments. We probe the information of intermediate steps from the model's hidden states when it is performing implicit CoT. The results surprisingly indicate that LLMs hardly think about intermediate steps, suggesting they may just rely on experience rather than strict step-by-step reasoning. Moreover, we find LLMs' implicit reasoning capabilities are susceptible and unstable, reaffirming the necessity of explicit CoT to effectively support complex tasks.

We present the first mechanistic evidence that model-free reinforcement learning agents can learn to plan. This is achieved by applying a methodology based on concept-based interpretability to a model-free agent in Sokoban -- a commonly used benchmark for studying planning. Specifically, we demonstrate that DRC, a generic model-free agent introduced by Guez et al. (2019), uses learned concept representations to internally formulate plans that both predict the long-term effects of actions on the environment and influence action selection. Our methodology involves: (1) probing for planning-relevant concepts, (2) investigating plan formation within the agent's representations, and (3) verifying that discovered plans (in the agent's representations) have a causal effect on the agent's behavior through interventions. We also show that the emergence of these plans coincides with the emergence of a planning-like property: the ability to benefit from additional test-time compute. Finally, we perform a qualitative analysis of the planning algorithm learned by the agent and discover a strong resemblance to parallelized bidirectional search. Our findings advance understanding of the internal mechanisms underlying planning behavior in agents, which is important given the recent trend of emergent planning and reasoning capabilities in LLMs through RL

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized decision-making by breaking down complex problems into more manageable language sequences referred to as ``thoughts''. An effective thought design should consider three key perspectives: performance, efficiency, and flexibility. However, existing thought can at most exhibit two of these attributes. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel thought prompting approach called ``Everything of Thoughts'' (XoT) to defy the law of ``Penrose triangle of existing thought paradigms. XoT leverages pretrained reinforcement learning and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to incorporate external domain knowledge into thoughts, thereby enhancing LLMs' capabilities and enabling them to generalize to unseen problems efficiently. Through the utilization of the MCTS-LLM collaborative thought revision framework, this approach autonomously produces high-quality comprehensive cognitive mappings with minimal LLM interactions. Additionally, XoT empowers LLMs to engage in unconstrained thinking, allowing for flexible cognitive mappings for problems with multiple solutions.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

Teaching to improve student models (e.g., knowledge distillation) is an extensively studied methodology in LLMs. However, for humans, teaching not only improves students but also improves teachers. We ask: Can LLMs also learn by teaching (LbT)? If yes, we can potentially unlock the possibility of continuously advancing the models without solely relying on human-produced data or stronger models. In this paper, we provide a preliminary exploration of this ambitious agenda. We show that LbT ideas can be incorporated into existing LLM training/prompting pipelines and provide noticeable improvements. Specifically, we design three methods, each mimicking one of the three levels of LbT in humans: observing students' feedback, learning from the feedback, and learning iteratively, with the goals of improving answer accuracy without training and improving models' inherent capability with fine-tuning. The findings are encouraging. For example, similar to LbT in human, we see that: (1) LbT can induce weak-to-strong generalization: strong models can improve themselves by teaching other weak models; (2) Diversity in students might help: teaching multiple students could be better than teaching one student or the teacher itself. We hope that this early promise can inspire future research on LbT and more broadly adopting the advanced techniques in education to improve LLMs. The code is available at https://github.com/imagination-research/lbt.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), which autonomously produce a reasoning Chain of Thought (CoT) before producing final responses, offer a promising approach to interpreting and monitoring model behaviors. Inspired by the observation that certain CoT patterns -- e.g., ``Wait, did I miss anything?'' -- consistently emerge across tasks, we explore whether LRMs exhibit human-like cognitive habits. Building on Habits of Mind, a well-established framework of cognitive habits associated with successful human problem-solving, we introduce CogTest, a principled benchmark designed to evaluate LRMs' cognitive habits. CogTest includes 16 cognitive habits, each instantiated with 25 diverse tasks, and employs an evidence-first extraction method to ensure reliable habit identification. With CogTest, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 16 widely used LLMs (13 LRMs and 3 non-reasoning ones). Our findings reveal that LRMs, unlike conventional LLMs, not only exhibit human-like habits but also adaptively deploy them according to different tasks. Finer-grained analyses further uncover patterns of similarity and difference in LRMs' cognitive habit profiles, particularly certain inter-family similarity (e.g., Qwen-3 models and DeepSeek-R1). Extending the study to safety-related tasks, we observe that certain habits, such as Taking Responsible Risks, are strongly associated with the generation of harmful responses. These findings suggest that studying persistent behavioral patterns in LRMs' CoTs is a valuable step toward deeper understanding of LLM misbehavior. The code is available at: https://github.com/jianshuod/CogTest.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are frequently updated due to data or architecture changes to improve their performance. When updating models, developers often focus on increasing overall performance metrics with less emphasis on being compatible with previous model versions. However, users often build a mental model of the functionality and capabilities of a particular machine learning model they are interacting with. They have to adapt their mental model with every update -- a draining task that can lead to user dissatisfaction. In practice, fine-tuned downstream task adapters rely on pretrained LLM base models. When these base models are updated, these user-facing downstream task models experience instance regression or negative flips -- previously correct instances are now predicted incorrectly. This happens even when the downstream task training procedures remain identical. Our work aims to provide seamless model updates to a user in two ways. First, we provide evaluation metrics for a notion of compatibility to prior model versions, specifically for generative tasks but also applicable for discriminative tasks. We observe regression and inconsistencies between different model versions on a diverse set of tasks and model updates. Second, we propose a training strategy to minimize the number of inconsistencies in model updates, involving training of a compatibility model that can enhance task fine-tuned language models. We reduce negative flips -- instances where a prior model version was correct, but a new model incorrect -- by up to 40% from Llama 1 to Llama 2.

Memory is one of the most essential cognitive functions serving as a repository of world knowledge and episodes of activities. In recent years, large-scale pre-trained language models have shown remarkable memorizing ability. On the contrary, vanilla neural networks without pre-training have been long observed suffering from the catastrophic forgetting problem. To investigate such a retentive-forgetful contradiction and understand the memory mechanism of language models, we conduct thorough experiments by controlling the target knowledge types, the learning strategies and the learning schedules. We find that: 1) Vanilla language models are forgetful; 2) Pre-training leads to retentive language models; 3) Knowledge relevance and diversification significantly influence the memory formation. These conclusions are useful for understanding the abilities of pre-trained language models and shed light on designing and evaluating new learning and inference algorithms of language models.

Agentic workflows -- where multiple large language model (LLM) instances interact to solve tasks -- are increasingly built on feedback mechanisms, where one model evaluates and critiques another. Despite the promise of feedback-driven improvement, the stability of agentic workflows rests on the reliability of the judge. However, judges may hallucinate information, exhibit bias, or act adversarially -- introducing critical vulnerabilities into the workflow. In this work, we present a systematic analysis of agentic workflows under deceptive or misleading feedback. We introduce a two-dimensional framework for analyzing judge behavior, along axes of intent (from constructive to malicious) and knowledge (from parametric-only to retrieval-augmented systems). Using this taxonomy, we construct a suite of judge behaviors and develop WAFER-QA, a new benchmark with critiques grounded in retrieved web evidence to evaluate robustness of agentic workflows against factually supported adversarial feedback. We reveal that even strongest agents are vulnerable to persuasive yet flawed critiques -- often switching correct answers after a single round of misleading feedback. Taking a step further, we study how model predictions evolve over multiple rounds of interaction, revealing distinct behavioral patterns between reasoning and non-reasoning models. Our findings highlight fundamental vulnerabilities in feedback-based workflows and offer guidance for building more robust agentic systems.

The emergence of large reasoning models (LRMs) has transformed Natural Language Processing by excelling in complex tasks such as mathematical problem-solving and code generation. These models leverage chain-of-thought (CoT) processes, enabling them to emulate human-like reasoning strategies. However, the advancement of LRMs is hindered by the lack of comprehensive CoT datasets. Current resources often fail to provide extensive reasoning problems with coherent CoT processes distilled from multiple teacher models and do not account for multifaceted properties describing the internal characteristics of CoTs. To address these challenges, we introduce OmniThought, a large-scale dataset featuring 2 million CoT processes generated and validated by two powerful LRMs as teacher models. Each CoT process in OmniThought is annotated with novel Reasoning Verbosity (RV) and Cognitive Difficulty (CD) scores, which describe the appropriateness of CoT verbosity and cognitive difficulty level for models to comprehend these reasoning processes. We further establish a self-reliant pipeline to curate this dataset. Extensive experiments using Qwen2.5 models of various sizes demonstrate the positive impact of our proposed scores on LRM training effectiveness. Based on the proposed OmniThought dataset, we further train and release a series of high-performing LRMs, specifically equipped with stronger reasoning abilities and optimal CoT output length and difficulty level. Our contributions significantly enhance the development and training of LRMs for solving complex tasks.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have achieved impressive performance in complex tasks, often outperforming conventional large language models (LLMs). However, the prevalent issue of overthinking severely limits their computational efficiency. Overthinking occurs when models generate excessive and redundant tokens that contribute little to accurate outcomes, especially in simple tasks, resulting in a significant waste of computational resources. To systematically investigate this issue, we introduce Think-Bench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning efficiency of LRMs. We also propose novel efficiency metrics and conduct a comprehensive evaluation of various LRMs across multiple dimensions, including the reasoning process, outcome quality, and chain-of-thought (CoT) characteristics. Our analysis reveals that most LRMs exhibit overthinking in handling easy questions, generating unnecessarily lengthy reasoning chains. While many LRMs demonstrate high CoT quality, several suffer from low efficiency. We hope that Think-Bench can serve as a robust foundation for advancing research into LRMs.

Newly-developed large language models (LLM) -- because of how they are trained and designed -- are implicit computational models of humans -- a homo silicus. These models can be used the same way economists use homo economicus: they can be given endowments, information, preferences, and so on and then their behavior can be explored in scenarios via simulation. I demonstrate this approach using OpenAI's GPT3 with experiments derived from Charness and Rabin (2002), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). The findings are qualitatively similar to the original results, but it is also trivially easy to try variations that offer fresh insights. Departing from the traditional laboratory paradigm, I also create a hiring scenario where an employer faces applicants that differ in experience and wage ask and then analyze how a minimum wage affects realized wages and the extent of labor-labor substitution.

Large Language Model (LLM) unlearning aims to erase or suppress undesirable knowledge within the model, offering promise for controlling harmful or private information to prevent misuse. However, recent studies highlight its limited efficacy in real-world scenarios, hindering practical adoption. In this study, we identify a pervasive issue underlying many downstream failures: the effectiveness of existing unlearning methods heavily depends on the form of training samples and frequently fails to generalize to alternate expressions of the same knowledge. We formally characterize this problem as Form-Dependent Bias and systematically investigate its specific manifestation patterns across various downstream tasks. To quantify its prevalence and support future research, we introduce ORT, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness of unlearning methods against variations in knowledge expression. Results reveal that Form-Dependent Bias is both widespread and severe among current techniques. We argue that LLM unlearning should be form-independent to address the endless forms of downstream tasks encountered in real-world security-critical scenarios. Towards this goal, we introduce Rank-one Concept Redirection (ROCR), a novel training-free method, as a promising solution path. ROCR performs unlearning by targeting the invariants in downstream tasks, specifically the activated dangerous concepts. It is capable of modifying model parameters within seconds to redirect the model's perception of a specific unlearning target concept to another harmless concept. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ROCR significantly improves unlearning effectiveness compared to traditional methods while generating highly natural outputs.

Orca 1 learns from rich signals, such as explanation traces, allowing it to outperform conventional instruction-tuned models on benchmarks like BigBench Hard and AGIEval. In Orca 2, we continue exploring how improved training signals can enhance smaller LMs' reasoning abilities. Research on training small LMs has often relied on imitation learning to replicate the output of more capable models. We contend that excessive emphasis on imitation may restrict the potential of smaller models. We seek to teach small LMs to employ different solution strategies for different tasks, potentially different from the one used by the larger model. For example, while larger models might provide a direct answer to a complex task, smaller models may not have the same capacity. In Orca 2, we teach the model various reasoning techniques (step-by-step, recall then generate, recall-reason-generate, direct answer, etc.). More crucially, we aim to help the model learn to determine the most effective solution strategy for each task. We evaluate Orca 2 using a comprehensive set of 15 diverse benchmarks (corresponding to approximately 100 tasks and over 36,000 unique prompts). Orca 2 significantly surpasses models of similar size and attains performance levels similar or better to those of models 5-10x larger, as assessed on complex tasks that test advanced reasoning abilities in zero-shot settings. We open-source Orca 2 to encourage further research on the development, evaluation, and alignment of smaller LMs.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Facing the current debate on whether Large Language Models (LLMs) attain near-human intelligence levels (Mitchell & Krakauer, 2023; Bubeck et al., 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Shiffrin & Mitchell, 2023; Ullman, 2023), the current study introduces a benchmark for evaluating social intelligence, one of the most distinctive aspects of human cognition. We developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for social dynamics and introduced two evaluation tasks: Inverse Reasoning (IR) and Inverse Inverse Planning (IIP). Our approach also encompassed a computational model based on recursive Bayesian inference, adept at elucidating diverse human behavioral patterns. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses revealed that humans surpassed the latest GPT models in overall performance, zero-shot learning, one-shot generalization, and adaptability to multi-modalities. Notably, GPT models demonstrated social intelligence only at the most basic order (order = 0), in stark contrast to human social intelligence (order >= 2). Further examination indicated a propensity of LLMs to rely on pattern recognition for shortcuts, casting doubt on their possession of authentic human-level social intelligence. Our codes, dataset, appendix and human data are released at https://github.com/bigai-ai/Evaluate-n-Model-Social-Intelligence.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

"An idea is nothing more nor less than a new combination of old elements" (Young, J.W.). The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) and publicly available ChatGPT have marked a significant turning point in the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into people's everyday lives. This study explores the capability of LLMs in generating novel research ideas based on information from research papers. We conduct a thorough examination of 4 LLMs in five domains (e.g., Chemistry, Computer, Economics, Medical, and Physics). We found that the future research ideas generated by Claude-2 and GPT-4 are more aligned with the author's perspective than GPT-3.5 and Gemini. We also found that Claude-2 generates more diverse future research ideas than GPT-4, GPT-3.5, and Gemini 1.0. We further performed a human evaluation of the novelty, relevancy, and feasibility of the generated future research ideas. This investigation offers insights into the evolving role of LLMs in idea generation, highlighting both its capability and limitations. Our work contributes to the ongoing efforts in evaluating and utilizing language models for generating future research ideas. We make our datasets and codes publicly available.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.

Since the advent of ChatGPT, Large Language Models (LLMs) have excelled in various tasks but remain largely as black-box systems. Consequently, their development relies heavily on data-driven approaches, limiting performance enhancement through changes in internal architecture and reasoning pathways. As a result, many researchers have begun exploring the potential internal mechanisms of LLMs, aiming to identify the essence of their reasoning bottlenecks, with most studies focusing on attention heads. Our survey aims to shed light on the internal reasoning processes of LLMs by concentrating on the interpretability and underlying mechanisms of attention heads. We first distill the human thought process into a four-stage framework: Knowledge Recalling, In-Context Identification, Latent Reasoning, and Expression Preparation. Using this framework, we systematically review existing research to identify and categorize the functions of specific attention heads. Furthermore, we summarize the experimental methodologies used to discover these special heads, dividing them into two categories: Modeling-Free methods and Modeling-Required methods. Also, we outline relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks. Finally, we discuss the limitations of current research and propose several potential future directions. Our reference list is open-sourced at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/Awesome-Attention-Heads.

One of the predominant methods for training world models is autoregressive prediction in the output space of the next element of a sequence. In Natural Language Processing (NLP), this takes the form of Large Language Models (LLMs) predicting the next token; in Computer Vision (CV), this takes the form of autoregressive models predicting the next frame/token/pixel. However, this approach differs from human cognition in several respects. First, human predictions about the future actively influence internal cognitive processes. Second, humans naturally evaluate the plausibility of predictions regarding future states. Based on this capability, and third, by assessing when predictions are sufficient, humans allocate a dynamic amount of time to make a prediction. This adaptive process is analogous to System 2 thinking in psychology. All these capabilities are fundamental to the success of humans at high-level reasoning and planning. Therefore, to address the limitations of traditional autoregressive models lacking these human-like capabilities, we introduce Energy-Based World Models (EBWM). EBWM involves training an Energy-Based Model (EBM) to predict the compatibility of a given context and a predicted future state. In doing so, EBWM enables models to achieve all three facets of human cognition described. Moreover, we developed a variant of the traditional autoregressive transformer tailored for Energy-Based models, termed the Energy-Based Transformer (EBT). Our results demonstrate that EBWM scales better with data and GPU Hours than traditional autoregressive transformers in CV, and that EBWM offers promising early scaling in NLP. Consequently, this approach offers an exciting path toward training future models capable of System 2 thinking and intelligently searching across state spaces.

Exact unlearning was first introduced as a privacy mechanism that allowed a user to retract their data from machine learning models on request. Shortly after, inexact schemes were proposed to mitigate the impractical costs associated with exact unlearning. More recently unlearning is often discussed as an approach for removal of impermissible knowledge i.e. knowledge that the model should not possess such as unlicensed copyrighted, inaccurate, or malicious information. The promise is that if the model does not have a certain malicious capability, then it cannot be used for the associated malicious purpose. In this paper we revisit the paradigm in which unlearning is used for in Large Language Models (LLMs) and highlight an underlying inconsistency arising from in-context learning. Unlearning can be an effective control mechanism for the training phase, yet it does not prevent the model from performing an impermissible act during inference. We introduce a concept of ununlearning, where unlearned knowledge gets reintroduced in-context, effectively rendering the model capable of behaving as if it knows the forgotten knowledge. As a result, we argue that content filtering for impermissible knowledge will be required and even exact unlearning schemes are not enough for effective content regulation. We discuss feasibility of ununlearning for modern LLMs and examine broader implications.

Reasoning models have demonstrated remarkable progress in solving complex and logic-intensive tasks by generating extended Chain-of-Thoughts (CoTs) prior to arriving at a final answer. Yet, the emergence of this "slow-thinking" paradigm, with numerous tokens generated in sequence, inevitably introduces substantial computational overhead. To this end, it highlights an urgent need for effective acceleration. This survey aims to provide a comprehensive overview of recent advances in efficient reasoning. It categorizes existing works into three key directions: (1) shorter - compressing lengthy CoTs into concise yet effective reasoning chains; (2) smaller - developing compact language models with strong reasoning capabilities through techniques such as knowledge distillation, other model compression techniques, and reinforcement learning; and (3) faster - designing efficient decoding strategies to accelerate inference. A curated collection of papers discussed in this survey is available in our GitHub repository.

Large Language Models, such as Generative Pre-trained Transformer 3 (aka. GPT-3), have been developed to understand language through the analysis of extensive text data, allowing them to identify patterns and connections between words. While LLMs have demonstrated impressive performance across various text-related tasks, they encounter challenges in tasks associated with reasoning. To address this challenge, Chain of Thought(CoT) prompting method has been proposed as a means to enhance LLMs' proficiency in complex reasoning tasks like solving math word problems and answering questions based on logical argumentative reasoning. The primary aim of this research is to assess how well four language models can grade reflective essays of third-year medical students. The assessment will specifically target the evaluation of critical thinking skills using CoT prompting. The research will provide the following contributions; to introduce and educate on the process of instructing models to evaluate reflective essays from a dataset they have not been previously trained on; to illustrate the use of CoT prompting as an instructional approach for training large models to carry out particular tasks. Our results suggest that among all the models, Llama-7b performs the least effectively, displaying the highest mean squared error. Conversely, ChatGPT emerges as the superior model, boasting a higher Cohen kappa score value of 0.53. Lastly, it's important to note that the selected models do prioritise user privacy by allowing users to delete their own conducted conversations.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

In recent years, large language models have greatly improved in their ability to perform complex multi-step reasoning. However, even state-of-the-art models still regularly produce logical mistakes. To train more reliable models, we can turn either to outcome supervision, which provides feedback for a final result, or process supervision, which provides feedback for each intermediate reasoning step. Given the importance of training reliable models, and given the high cost of human feedback, it is important to carefully compare the both methods. Recent work has already begun this comparison, but many questions still remain. We conduct our own investigation, finding that process supervision significantly outperforms outcome supervision for training models to solve problems from the challenging MATH dataset. Our process-supervised model solves 78% of problems from a representative subset of the MATH test set. Additionally, we show that active learning significantly improves the efficacy of process supervision. To support related research, we also release PRM800K, the complete dataset of 800,000 step-level human feedback labels used to train our best reward model.

Recent studies have put into question the belief that emergent abilities in language models are exclusive to large models. This skepticism arises from two observations: 1) smaller models can also exhibit high performance on emergent abilities and 2) there is doubt on the discontinuous metrics used to measure these abilities. In this paper, we propose to study emergent abilities in the lens of pre-training loss, instead of model size or training compute. We demonstrate that the models with the same pre-training loss, but different model and data sizes, generate the same performance on various downstream tasks. We also discover that a model exhibits emergent abilities on certain tasks -- regardless of the continuity of metrics -- when its pre-training loss falls below a specific threshold. Before reaching this threshold, its performance remains at the level of random guessing. This inspires us to redefine emergent abilities as those that manifest in models with lower pre-training losses, highlighting that these abilities cannot be predicted by merely extrapolating the performance trends of models with higher pre-training losses.

Language models have achieved remarkable performance on a wide range of tasks that require natural language understanding. Nevertheless, state-of-the-art models have generally struggled with tasks that require quantitative reasoning, such as solving mathematics, science, and engineering problems at the college level. To help close this gap, we introduce Minerva, a large language model pretrained on general natural language data and further trained on technical content. The model achieves state-of-the-art performance on technical benchmarks without the use of external tools. We also evaluate our model on over two hundred undergraduate-level problems in physics, biology, chemistry, economics, and other sciences that require quantitative reasoning, and find that the model can correctly answer nearly a third of them.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

The Superficial Alignment Hypothesis posits that almost all of a language model's abilities and knowledge are learned during pre-training, while post-training is about giving a model the right style and format. We re-examine these claims by empirically studying the scaling behavior of post-training with increasing finetuning examples and evaluating them using objective task-specific standardized benchmarks. Through experiments with the Llama-3, Mistral, and Llama-2 model families of multiple sizes, we observe that, similar to the pre-training scaling laws, post-training task performance scales as a power law against the number of finetuning examples. This power law relationship holds across a broad array of capabilities, including mathematical reasoning, coding, instruction following, and multihop-reasoning. In addition, for tasks like math and multihop reasoning, we observe that a handful of examples merely align the model stylistically but do not saturate performance on the benchmarks. Model performance is instead correlated with its reasoning ability and it improves significantly with more examples, illustrating the need for holistic evaluation programs leveraging objective benchmarks in addition to measurement of alignment to human preferences. We also observe that language models are not necessarily limited to using knowledge learned during pre-training. With appropriate post-training, a model's ability to integrate new knowledge greatly improves on downstream tasks like multihop question-answering. Taken together, these results shed new light on the Superficial Alignment Hypothesis, suggesting that it is, at best, an over-simplification.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant strides in problem-solving by incorporating reasoning processes. However, this enhanced reasoning capability results in an increased number of output tokens during inference, leading to higher computational costs. To address this challenge, we propose TwT (Thinking without Tokens), a method that reduces inference-time costs through habitual reasoning distillation with multi-teachers' guidance, while maintaining high performance. Our approach introduces a Habitual Reasoning Distillation method, which internalizes explicit reasoning into the model's habitual behavior through a Teacher-Guided compression strategy inspired by human cognition. Additionally, we propose Dual-Criteria Rejection Sampling (DCRS), a technique that generates a high-quality and diverse distillation dataset using multiple teacher models, making our method suitable for unsupervised scenarios. Experimental results demonstrate that TwT effectively reduces inference costs while preserving superior performance, achieving up to a 13.6% improvement in accuracy with fewer output tokens compared to other distillation methods, offering a highly practical solution for efficient LLM deployment.

Critical thinking is essential for rational decision-making and problem-solving. This skill hinges on the ability to provide precise and reasoned critiques and is a hallmark of human intelligence. In the era of large language models (LLMs), this study explores the ability of LLMs to deliver accurate critiques across various tasks. We are interested in this topic as a capable critic model could not only serve as a reliable evaluator, but also as a source of supervised signals for model tuning. Particularly, if a model can self-critique, it has the potential for autonomous self-improvement. To examine this, we introduce a unified evaluation framework for assessing the critique abilities of LLMs. We develop a benchmark called CriticBench, which comprises 3K high-quality natural language queries and corresponding model responses; and annotate the correctness of these responses. The benchmark cover tasks such as math problem-solving, code completion, and question answering. We evaluate multiple LLMs on the collected dataset and our analysis reveals several noteworthy insights: (1) Critique is generally challenging for most LLMs, and this capability often emerges only when models are sufficiently large. (2) In particular, self-critique is especially difficult. Even top-performing LLMs struggle to achieve satisfactory performance. (3) Models tend to have lower critique accuracy on problems where they are most uncertain. To this end, we introduce a simple yet effective baseline named self-check, which leverages self-critique to improve task performance for various models. We hope this study serves as an initial exploration into understanding the critique abilities of LLMs, and aims to inform future research, including the development of more proficient critic models and the application of critiques across diverse tasks.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) represent a breakthrough in AI problem-solving capabilities, but their effectiveness in interactive environments can be limited. This paper introduces and analyzes overthinking in LRMs. A phenomenon where models favor extended internal reasoning chains over environmental interaction. Through experiments on software engineering tasks using SWE Bench Verified, we observe three recurring patterns: Analysis Paralysis, Rogue Actions, and Premature Disengagement. We propose a framework to study these behaviors, which correlates with human expert assessments, and analyze 4018 trajectories. We observe that higher overthinking scores correlate with decreased performance, with reasoning models exhibiting stronger tendencies toward overthinking compared to non-reasoning models. Our analysis reveals that simple efforts to mitigate overthinking in agentic environments, such as selecting the solution with the lower overthinking score, can improve model performance by almost 30% while reducing computational costs by 43%. These results suggest that mitigating overthinking has strong practical implications. We suggest that by leveraging native function-calling capabilities and selective reinforcement learning overthinking tendencies could be mitigated. We also open-source our evaluation framework and dataset to facilitate research in this direction at https://github.com/AlexCuadron/Overthinking.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled automatic generation of chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, leading to strong performance on tasks such as math and code. However, when reasoning steps reflect social stereotypes (e.g., those related to gender, race or age), they can reinforce harmful associations and lead to misleading conclusions. We present the first systematic evaluation of social bias within LLM-generated reasoning, using the BBQ dataset to analyze both prediction accuracy and bias. Our study spans a wide range of mainstream reasoning models, including instruction-tuned and CoT-augmented variants of DeepSeek-R1 (8B/32B), ChatGPT, and other open-source LLMs. We quantify how biased reasoning steps correlate with incorrect predictions and often lead to stereotype expression. To mitigate reasoning-induced bias, we propose Answer Distribution as Bias Proxy (ADBP), a lightweight mitigation method that detects bias by tracking how model predictions change across incremental reasoning steps. ADBP outperforms a stereotype-free baseline in most cases, mitigating bias and improving the accuracy of LLM outputs. Code will be released upon paper acceptance.

The recent progress in large language models (LLMs), especially the invention of chain-of-thoughts (CoT) prompting, makes it possible to solve reasoning problems. However, even the strongest LLMs are still struggling with more complicated problems that require non-linear thinking and multi-step reasoning. In this work, we explore whether LLMs have the ability to recognize their own errors, without resorting to external resources. In particular, we investigate whether they can be used to identify individual errors within a step-by-step reasoning. To this end, we propose a zero-shot verification scheme to recognize such errors. We then use this verification scheme to improve question-answering performance, by using it to perform weighted voting on different generated answers. We test the method on three math datasets-GSM8K, MathQA, and MATH-and find that it successfully recognizes errors and, in turn, increases final predictive performance.

Recent research has focused on enhancing the capability of smaller models through imitation learning, drawing on the outputs generated by large foundation models (LFMs). A number of issues impact the quality of these models, ranging from limited imitation signals from shallow LFM outputs; small scale homogeneous training data; and most notably a lack of rigorous evaluation resulting in overestimating the small model's capability as they tend to learn to imitate the style, but not the reasoning process of LFMs. To address these challenges, we develop Orca (We are working with our legal team to publicly release a diff of the model weights in accordance with LLaMA's release policy to be published at https://aka.ms/orca-lm), a 13-billion parameter model that learns to imitate the reasoning process of LFMs. Orca learns from rich signals from GPT-4 including explanation traces; step-by-step thought processes; and other complex instructions, guided by teacher assistance from ChatGPT. To promote this progressive learning, we tap into large-scale and diverse imitation data with judicious sampling and selection. Orca surpasses conventional state-of-the-art instruction-tuned models such as Vicuna-13B by more than 100% in complex zero-shot reasoning benchmarks like Big-Bench Hard (BBH) and 42% on AGIEval. Moreover, Orca reaches parity with ChatGPT on the BBH benchmark and shows competitive performance (4 pts gap with optimized system message) in professional and academic examinations like the SAT, LSAT, GRE, and GMAT, both in zero-shot settings without CoT; while trailing behind GPT-4. Our research indicates that learning from step-by-step explanations, whether these are generated by humans or more advanced AI models, is a promising direction to improve model capabilities and skills.

This paper reports the first brain-inspired large language model (BriLLM). This is a non-Transformer, non-GPT, non-traditional machine learning input-output controlled generative language model. The model is based on the Signal Fully-connected flowing (SiFu) definition on the directed graph in terms of the neural network, and has the interpretability of all nodes on the graph of the whole model, instead of the traditional machine learning model that only has limited interpretability at the input and output ends. In the language model scenario, the token is defined as a node in the graph. A randomly shaped or user-defined signal flow flows between nodes on the principle of "least resistance" along paths. The next token or node to be predicted or generated is the target of the signal flow. As a language model, BriLLM theoretically supports infinitely long n-gram models when the model size is independent of the input and predicted length of the model. The model's working signal flow provides the possibility of recall activation and innate multi-modal support similar to the cognitive patterns of the human brain. At present, we released the first BriLLM version in Chinese, with 4000 tokens, 32-dimensional node width, 16-token long sequence prediction ability, and language model prediction performance comparable to GPT-1. More computing power will help us explore the infinite possibilities depicted above.

Although large language models demonstrate emergent abilities in solving math word problems, there is a challenging task in complex multi-step mathematical reasoning tasks. To improve model performance on mathematical reasoning tasks, previous work has conducted supervised fine-tuning on open-source models by improving the quality and quantity of data. In this paper, we propose a novel approach, named Brain, to imitate human thought processes to enhance mathematical reasoning abilities, using the Frontal Lobe Model to generate plans, and then employing the Parietal Lobe Model to generate code and execute to obtain answers. First, we achieve SOTA performance in comparison with Code LLaMA 7B based models through this method. Secondly, we find that plans can be explicitly extracted from natural language, code, or formal language. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/cyzhh/Brain.

When trained on large, unfiltered crawls from the internet, language models pick up and reproduce all kinds of undesirable biases that can be found in the data: they often generate racist, sexist, violent or otherwise toxic language. As large models require millions of training examples to achieve good performance, it is difficult to completely prevent them from being exposed to such content. In this paper, we first demonstrate a surprising finding: pretrained language models recognize, to a considerable degree, their undesirable biases and the toxicity of the content they produce. We refer to this capability as self-diagnosis. Based on this finding, we then propose a decoding algorithm that, given only a textual description of the undesired behavior, reduces the probability of a language model producing problematic text. We refer to this approach as self-debiasing. Self-debiasing does not rely on manually curated word lists, nor does it require any training data or changes to the model's parameters. While we by no means eliminate the issue of language models generating biased text, we believe our approach to be an important step in this direction.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs -- e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)" -- which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations supporting those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. CoT is promising for explainability, but our results highlight the need for targeted efforts to evaluate and improve explanation faithfulness.

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

A binary decision task, like yes-no questions or answer verification, reflects a significant real-world scenario such as where users look for confirmation about the correctness of their decisions on specific issues. In this work, we observe that language models exhibit a negative bias in the binary decisions of complex reasoning tasks. Based on our observations and the rationale about attention-based model dynamics, we propose a negative attention score (NAS) to systematically and quantitatively formulate negative bias. Based on NAS, we identify attention heads that attend to negative tokens provided in the instructions as answer candidate of binary decisions, regardless of the question in the prompt, and validate their association with the negative bias. Additionally, we propose the negative attention score alignment (NASA) method, which is a parameter-efficient fine-tuning technique to address the extracted negatively biased attention heads. Experimental results from various domains of reasoning tasks and large model search space demonstrate that NASA significantly reduces the gap between precision and recall caused by negative bias while preserving their generalization abilities. Our codes are available at https://github.com/ysw1021/NASA.

Large language models have been shown to suffer from reasoning inconsistency issues. That is, they fail more in situations unfamiliar to the training data, even though exact or very similar reasoning paths exist in more common cases that they can successfully solve. Such observations motivate us to propose methods that encourage models to understand the high-level and abstract reasoning processes during training instead of only the final answer. This way, models can transfer the exact solution to similar cases, regardless of their relevance to the pre-training data distribution. In this work, we propose SAL, a self-supervised analogical learning framework. SAL mimics the human analogy process and trains models to explicitly transfer high-quality symbolic solutions from cases that they know how to solve to other rare cases in which they tend to fail more. We show that the resulting models after SAL learning outperform base language models on a wide range of reasoning benchmarks, such as StrategyQA, GSM8K, and HotpotQA, by 2% to 20%. At the same time, we show that our model is more generalizable and controllable through analytical studies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Large language models have achieved impressive performance on various natural language processing tasks. However, so far they have been evaluated primarily on benchmarks where all information in the input context is relevant for solving the task. In this work, we investigate the distractibility of large language models, i.e., how the model problem-solving accuracy can be influenced by irrelevant context. In particular, we introduce Grade-School Math with Irrelevant Context (GSM-IC), an arithmetic reasoning dataset with irrelevant information in the problem description. We use this benchmark to measure the distractibility of cutting-edge prompting techniques for large language models, and find that the model performance is dramatically decreased when irrelevant information is included. We also identify several approaches for mitigating this deficiency, such as decoding with self-consistency and adding to the prompt an instruction that tells the language model to ignore the irrelevant information.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have resulted in increasingly anthropomorphic language concerning the ability of LLMs to reason. Whether reasoning in LLMs should be understood to be inherently different is, however, widely debated. We propose utilizing a representation engineering approach wherein model activations are read from the residual stream of an LLM when processing a reasoning task. The activations are used to derive a control vector that is applied to the model as an inference-time intervention, modulating the representational space of the model, to improve performance on the specified task. We publish the code for deriving control vectors and analyzing model representations. The method allows us to improve performance on reasoning benchmarks and assess how control vectors influence the final logit distribution of a model via metrics such as KL divergence and entropy. We apply control vectors to Mistral-7B-Instruct and a range of Pythia models on an inductive, a deductive and mathematical reasoning task. We show that an LLM can, to a certain degree, be controlled to improve its perceived reasoning ability by modulating activations. The intervention is dependent upon the ability to reliably extract the model's typical state when correctly solving a task. Our results suggest that reasoning performance can be modulated in the same manner as other information-processing tasks performed by LLMs and demonstrate that we are capable of improving performance on specific tasks via a simple intervention on the residual stream with no additional training.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated amazing capabilities in language generation, text comprehension, and knowledge reasoning. While a single powerful model can already handle multiple tasks, relying on a single perspective can lead to biased and unstable results. Recent studies have further improved the model's reasoning ability on a wide range of tasks by introducing multi-model collaboration. However, models with different capabilities may produce conflicting answers on the same problem, and how to reasonably obtain the correct answer from multiple candidate models has become a challenging problem. In this paper, we propose the multi-model brainstorming based on prompt. It incorporates different models into a group for brainstorming, and after multiple rounds of reasoning elaboration and re-inference, a consensus answer is reached within the group. We conducted experiments on three different types of datasets, and demonstrate that the brainstorming can significantly improve the effectiveness in logical reasoning and fact extraction. Furthermore, we find that two small-parameter models can achieve accuracy approximating that of larger-parameter models through brainstorming, which provides a new solution for distributed deployment of LLMs.

Recently, improving the reasoning ability of large multimodal models (LMMs) through reinforcement learning has made great progress. However, most existing works are based on highly reasoning-intensive datasets such as mathematics and code, and researchers generally choose large-scale models as the foundation. We argue that exploring small-scale models' reasoning capabilities remains valuable for researchers with limited computational resources. Moreover, enabling models to explain their reasoning processes on general question-answering datasets is equally meaningful. Therefore, we present the small-scale video reasoning model TinyLLaVA-Video-R1. Based on TinyLLaVA-Video, a traceably trained video understanding model with no more than 4B parameters, it not only demonstrates significantly improved reasoning and thinking capabilities after using reinforcement learning on general Video-QA datasets, but also exhibits the emergent characteristic of "aha moments". Furthermore, we share a series of experimental findings, aiming to provide practical insights for future exploration of video reasoning (thinking) abilities in small-scale models. It is available at https://github.com/ZhangXJ199/TinyLLaVA-Video-R1.

Recently, there have been notable advancements in large language models (LLMs), demonstrating their growing abilities in complex reasoning. However, existing research largely overlooks a thorough and systematic comparison of these models' reasoning processes and outputs, particularly regarding their self-reflection pattern (also termed "Aha moment") and the interconnections across diverse domains. This paper proposes a novel framework for analyzing the reasoning characteristics of four cutting-edge large reasoning models (GPT-o1, DeepSeek-R1, Kimi-k1.5, and Grok-3) using keywords statistic and LLM-as-a-judge paradigm. Our approach connects their internal thinking processes with their final outputs. A diverse dataset consists of real-world scenario-based questions covering logical deduction, causal inference, and multi-step problem-solving. Additionally, a set of metrics is put forward to assess both the coherence of reasoning and the accuracy of the outputs. The research results uncover various patterns of how these models balance exploration and exploitation, deal with problems, and reach conclusions during the reasoning process. Through quantitative and qualitative comparisons, disparities among these models are identified in aspects such as the depth of reasoning, the reliance on intermediate steps, and the degree of similarity between their thinking processes and output patterns and those of GPT-o1. This work offers valuable insights into the trade-off between computational efficiency and reasoning robustness and provides practical recommendations for enhancing model design and evaluation in practical applications. We publicly release our project at: https://github.com/ChangWenhan/FromThinking2Output