Daily Papers

We consider the linear contextual multi-class multi-period packing problem (LMMP) where the goal is to pack items such that the total vector of consumption is below a given budget vector and the total value is as large as possible. We consider the setting where the reward and the consumption vector associated with each action is a class-dependent linear function of the context, and the decision-maker receives bandit feedback. LMMP includes linear contextual bandits with knapsacks and online revenue management as special cases. We establish a new estimator which guarantees a faster convergence rate, and consequently, a lower regret in such problems. We propose a bandit policy that is a closed-form function of said estimated parameters. When the contexts are non-degenerate, the regret of the proposed policy is sublinear in the context dimension, the number of classes, and the time horizon T when the budget grows at least as T. We also resolve an open problem posed by Agrawal & Devanur (2016) and extend the result to a multi-class setting. Our numerical experiments clearly demonstrate that the performance of our policy is superior to other benchmarks in the literature.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.

In the digital age, the dynamics of customer service are evolving, driven by technological advancements and the integration of Large Language Models (LLMs). This research paper introduces a groundbreaking approach to automating customer service using LangChain, a custom LLM tailored for organizations. The paper explores the obsolescence of traditional customer support techniques, particularly Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), and proposes a paradigm shift towards responsive, context-aware, and personalized customer interactions. The heart of this innovation lies in the fusion of open-source methodologies, web scraping, fine-tuning, and the seamless integration of LangChain into customer service platforms. This open-source state-of-the-art framework, presented as "Sahaay," demonstrates the ability to scale across industries and organizations, offering real-time support and query resolution. Key elements of this research encompass data collection via web scraping, the role of embeddings, the utilization of Google's Flan T5 XXL, Base and Small language models for knowledge retrieval, and the integration of the chatbot into customer service platforms. The results section provides insights into their performance and use cases, here particularly within an educational institution. This research heralds a new era in customer service, where technology is harnessed to create efficient, personalized, and responsive interactions. Sahaay, powered by LangChain, redefines the customer-company relationship, elevating customer retention, value extraction, and brand image. As organizations embrace LLMs, customer service becomes a dynamic and customer-centric ecosystem.

In this paper, we introduce a novel predict-and-optimize method for profit-driven churn prevention. We frame the task of targeting customers for a retention campaign as a regret minimization problem. The main objective is to leverage individual customer lifetime values (CLVs) to ensure that only the most valuable customers are targeted. In contrast, many profit-driven strategies focus on churn probabilities while considering average CLVs. This often results in significant information loss due to data aggregation. Our proposed model aligns with the guidelines of Predict-and-Optimize (PnO) frameworks and can be efficiently solved using stochastic gradient descent methods. Results from 12 churn prediction datasets underscore the effectiveness of our approach, which achieves the best average performance compared to other well-established strategies in terms of average profit.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.