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Aug 1

Self-rationalization improves LLM as a fine-grained judge

LLM-as-a-judge models have been used for evaluating both human and AI generated content, specifically by providing scores and rationales. Rationales, in addition to increasing transparency, help models learn to calibrate its judgments. Enhancing a model's rationale can therefore improve its calibration abilities and ultimately the ability to score content. We introduce Self-Rationalization, an iterative process of improving the rationales for the judge models, which consequently improves the score for fine-grained customizable scoring criteria (i.e., likert-scale scoring with arbitrary evaluation criteria). Self-rationalization works by having the model generate multiple judgments with rationales for the same input, curating a preference pair dataset from its own judgements, and iteratively fine-tuning the judge via DPO. Intuitively, this approach allows the judge model to self-improve by learning from its own rationales, leading to better alignment and evaluation accuracy. After just two iterations -- while only relying on examples in the training set -- human evaluation shows that our judge model learns to produce higher quality rationales, with a win rate of 62% on average compared to models just trained via SFT on rationale . This judge model also achieves high scoring accuracy on BigGen Bench and Reward Bench, outperforming even bigger sized models trained using SFT with rationale, self-consistency or best-of-N sampling by 3% to 9%.

Invariant Graph Transformer

Rationale discovery is defined as finding a subset of the input data that maximally supports the prediction of downstream tasks. In graph machine learning context, graph rationale is defined to locate the critical subgraph in the given graph topology, which fundamentally determines the prediction results. In contrast to the rationale subgraph, the remaining subgraph is named the environment subgraph. Graph rationalization can enhance the model performance as the mapping between the graph rationale and prediction label is viewed as invariant, by assumption. To ensure the discriminative power of the extracted rationale subgraphs, a key technique named "intervention" is applied. The core idea of intervention is that given any changing environment subgraphs, the semantics from the rationale subgraph is invariant, which guarantees the correct prediction result. However, most, if not all, of the existing rationalization works on graph data develop their intervention strategies on the graph level, which is coarse-grained. In this paper, we propose well-tailored intervention strategies on graph data. Our idea is driven by the development of Transformer models, whose self-attention module provides rich interactions between input nodes. Based on the self-attention module, our proposed invariant graph Transformer (IGT) can achieve fine-grained, more specifically, node-level and virtual node-level intervention. Our comprehensive experiments involve 7 real-world datasets, and the proposed IGT shows significant performance advantages compared to 13 baseline methods.

What if you said that differently?: How Explanation Formats Affect Human Feedback Efficacy and User Perception

Eliciting feedback from end users of NLP models can be beneficial for improving models. However, how should we present model responses to users so they are most amenable to be corrected from user feedback? Further, what properties do users value to understand and trust responses? We answer these questions by analyzing the effect of rationales (or explanations) generated by QA models to support their answers. We specifically consider decomposed QA models that first extract an intermediate rationale based on a context and a question and then use solely this rationale to answer the question. A rationale outlines the approach followed by the model to answer the question. Our work considers various formats of these rationales that vary according to well-defined properties of interest. We sample rationales from language models using few-shot prompting for two datasets, and then perform two user studies. First, we present users with incorrect answers and corresponding rationales in various formats and ask them to provide natural language feedback to revise the rationale. We then measure the effectiveness of this feedback in patching these rationales through in-context learning. The second study evaluates how well different rationale formats enable users to understand and trust model answers, when they are correct. We find that rationale formats significantly affect how easy it is (1) for users to give feedback for rationales, and (2) for models to subsequently execute this feedback. In addition, formats with attributions to the context and in-depth reasoning significantly enhance user-reported understanding and trust of model outputs.

Shop-R1: Rewarding LLMs to Simulate Human Behavior in Online Shopping via Reinforcement Learning

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strong potential in generating 'believable human-like' behavior in web environments. Prior work has explored augmenting training data with LLM-synthesized rationales and applying supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to enhance reasoning ability, which in turn can improve downstream action prediction. However, the performance of such approaches remains inherently bounded by the reasoning capabilities of the model used to generate the rationales. In this paper, we introduce Shop-R1, a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework aimed at enhancing the reasoning ability of LLMs for simulation of real human behavior in online shopping environments Specifically, Shop-R1 decomposes the human behavior simulation task into two stages: rationale generation and action prediction, each guided by distinct reward signals. For rationale generation, we leverage internal model signals (e.g., logit distributions) to guide the reasoning process in a self-supervised manner. For action prediction, we propose a hierarchical reward structure with difficulty-aware scaling to prevent reward hacking and enable fine-grained reward assignment. This design evaluates both high-level action types and the correctness of fine-grained sub-action details (attributes and values), rewarding outputs proportionally to their difficulty. Experimental results show that our method achieves a relative improvement of over 65% compared to the baseline.

iReason: Multimodal Commonsense Reasoning using Videos and Natural Language with Interpretability

Causality knowledge is vital to building robust AI systems. Deep learning models often perform poorly on tasks that require causal reasoning, which is often derived using some form of commonsense knowledge not immediately available in the input but implicitly inferred by humans. Prior work has unraveled spurious observational biases that models fall prey to in the absence of causality. While language representation models preserve contextual knowledge within learned embeddings, they do not factor in causal relationships during training. By blending causal relationships with the input features to an existing model that performs visual cognition tasks (such as scene understanding, video captioning, video question-answering, etc.), better performance can be achieved owing to the insight causal relationships bring about. Recently, several models have been proposed that have tackled the task of mining causal data from either the visual or textual modality. However, there does not exist widespread research that mines causal relationships by juxtaposing the visual and language modalities. While images offer a rich and easy-to-process resource for us to mine causality knowledge from, videos are denser and consist of naturally time-ordered events. Also, textual information offers details that could be implicit in videos. We propose iReason, a framework that infers visual-semantic commonsense knowledge using both videos and natural language captions. Furthermore, iReason's architecture integrates a causal rationalization module to aid the process of interpretability, error analysis and bias detection. We demonstrate the effectiveness of iReason using a two-pronged comparative analysis with language representation learning models (BERT, GPT-2) as well as current state-of-the-art multimodal causality models.

PINTO: Faithful Language Reasoning Using Prompt-Generated Rationales

Neural language models (LMs) have achieved impressive results on various language-based reasoning tasks by utilizing latent knowledge encoded in their own pretrained parameters. To make this reasoning process more explicit, recent works retrieve a rationalizing LM's internal knowledge by training or prompting it to generate free-text rationales, which can be used to guide task predictions made by either the same LM or a separate reasoning LM. However, rationalizing LMs require expensive rationale annotation and/or computation, without any assurance that their generated rationales improve LM task performance or faithfully reflect LM decision-making. In this paper, we propose PINTO, an LM pipeline that rationalizes via prompt-based learning, and learns to faithfully reason over rationales via counterfactual regularization. First, PINTO maps out a suitable reasoning process for the task input by prompting a frozen rationalizing LM to generate a free-text rationale. Second, PINTO's reasoning LM is fine-tuned to solve the task using the generated rationale as context, while regularized to output less confident predictions when the rationale is perturbed. Across four datasets, we show that PINTO significantly improves the generalization ability of the reasoning LM, yielding higher performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution test sets. Also, we find that PINTO's rationales are more faithful to its task predictions than those generated by competitive baselines.

Boosting the Power of Small Multimodal Reasoning Models to Match Larger Models with Self-Consistency Training

Multimodal reasoning is a challenging task that requires models to reason across multiple modalities to answer questions. Existing approaches have made progress by incorporating language and visual modalities into a two-stage reasoning framework, separating rationale generation from answer inference. However, these approaches often fall short due to the inadequate quality of the generated rationales. In this work, we delve into the importance of rationales in model reasoning. We observe that when rationales are completely accurate, the model's accuracy significantly improves, highlighting the need for high-quality rationale generation. Motivated by this, we propose MC-CoT, a self-consistency training strategy that generates multiple rationales and answers, subsequently selecting the most accurate through a voting process. This approach not only enhances the quality of generated rationales but also leads to more accurate and robust answers. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach significantly improves model performance across various benchmarks. Remarkably, we show that even smaller base models, when equipped with our proposed approach, can achieve results comparable to those of larger models, illustrating the potential of our approach in harnessing the power of rationales for improved multimodal reasoning. The code is available at https://github.com/chengtan9907/mc-cot.

Data-Centric Human Preference Optimization with Rationales

Reinforcement learning from human feedback plays a crucial role in aligning language models towards human preferences, traditionally represented through comparisons between pairs or sets of responses within a given context. While many studies have enhanced algorithmic techniques to optimize learning from such data, this work shifts focus to improving preference learning through a data-centric approach. Specifically, we propose enriching existing preference datasets with machine-generated rationales that explain the reasons behind choices. We develop a simple and principled framework to augment current preference learning methods with rationale information. Our comprehensive analysis highlights how rationales enhance learning efficiency. Extensive experiments reveal that rationale-enriched preference learning offers multiple advantages: it improves data efficiency, accelerates convergence to higher-performing models, and reduces verbosity bias and hallucination. Furthermore, this framework is versatile enough to integrate with various preference optimization algorithms. Overall, our findings highlight the potential of re-imagining data design for preference learning, demonstrating that even freely available machine-generated rationales can significantly boost performance across multiple dimensions. The code repository is available at https: //github.com/reds-lab/preference-learning-with-rationales

Post Hoc Explanations of Language Models Can Improve Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in performing complex tasks. Moreover, recent research has shown that incorporating human-annotated rationales (e.g., Chain-of-Thought prompting) during in-context learning can significantly enhance the performance of these models, particularly on tasks that require reasoning capabilities. However, incorporating such rationales poses challenges in terms of scalability as this requires a high degree of human involvement. In this work, we present a novel framework, Amplifying Model Performance by Leveraging In-Context Learning with Post Hoc Explanations (AMPLIFY), which addresses the aforementioned challenges by automating the process of rationale generation. To this end, we leverage post hoc explanation methods which output attribution scores (explanations) capturing the influence of each of the input features on model predictions. More specifically, we construct automated natural language rationales that embed insights from post hoc explanations to provide corrective signals to LLMs. Extensive experimentation with real-world datasets demonstrates that our framework, AMPLIFY, leads to prediction accuracy improvements of about 10-25% over a wide range of tasks, including those where prior approaches which rely on human-annotated rationales such as Chain-of-Thought prompting fall short. Our work makes one of the first attempts at highlighting the potential of post hoc explanations as valuable tools for enhancing the effectiveness of LLMs. Furthermore, we conduct additional empirical analyses and ablation studies to demonstrate the impact of each of the components of AMPLIFY, which, in turn, leads to critical insights for refining in-context learning.

Large Language Models Assume People are More Rational than We Really are

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Game-theoretic LLM: Agent Workflow for Negotiation Games

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

Quantifying the Sensitivity of Inverse Reinforcement Learning to Misspecification

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to infer an agent's preferences (represented as a reward function R) from their behaviour (represented as a policy pi). To do this, we need a behavioural model of how pi relates to R. In the current literature, the most common behavioural models are optimality, Boltzmann-rationality, and causal entropy maximisation. However, the true relationship between a human's preferences and their behaviour is much more complex than any of these behavioural models. This means that the behavioural models are misspecified, which raises the concern that they may lead to systematic errors if applied to real data. In this paper, we analyse how sensitive the IRL problem is to misspecification of the behavioural model. Specifically, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions that completely characterise how the observed data may differ from the assumed behavioural model without incurring an error above a given threshold. In addition to this, we also characterise the conditions under which a behavioural model is robust to small perturbations of the observed policy, and we analyse how robust many behavioural models are to misspecification of their parameter values (such as e.g.\ the discount rate). Our analysis suggests that the IRL problem is highly sensitive to misspecification, in the sense that very mild misspecification can lead to very large errors in the inferred reward function.

Imitate, Explore, and Self-Improve: A Reproduction Report on Slow-thinking Reasoning Systems

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

Can Large Language Models Serve as Rational Players in Game Theory? A Systematic Analysis

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

Can Language Models Teach Weaker Agents? Teacher Explanations Improve Students via Theory of Mind

Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning by generating explanations for their predictions. However, a complementary goal of explanations is to also communicate useful knowledge that improves weaker agents. Hence, we investigate whether LLMs also make good teachers for weaker agents. In particular, we consider a student-teacher framework between two LLM agents and study if, when, and how the teacher should intervene with natural language explanations to improve the student's performance. Since communication is expensive, we define a budget such that the teacher only communicates explanations for a fraction of the data, after which the student should perform well on its own. We decompose the teaching problem along four axes: (1) if teacher's test time intervention improve student predictions, (2) when it is worth explaining a data point, (3) how the teacher should personalize explanations to better teach the student, and (4) if teacher explanations also improve student performance on future unexplained data. We first show that teacher LLMs can indeed intervene on student reasoning to improve their performance. Next, we propose a Theory of Mind approach, in which the teacher builds two few-shot mental models of the student. The first model defines an Intervention Function that simulates the utility of an intervention, allowing the teacher to intervene when this utility is the highest and improving student performance at lower budgets. The second model enables the teacher to personalize explanations for a particular student and outperform unpersonalized teachers. We also demonstrate that in multi-turn interactions, teacher explanations generalize and learning from explained data improves student performance on future unexplained data. Finally, we also verify that misaligned teachers can lower student performance to random chance by intentionally misleading them.

Meteor: Mamba-based Traversal of Rationale for Large Language and Vision Models

The rapid development of large language and vision models (LLVMs) has been driven by advances in visual instruction tuning. Recently, open-source LLVMs have curated high-quality visual instruction tuning datasets and utilized additional vision encoders or multiple computer vision models in order to narrow the performance gap with powerful closed-source LLVMs. These advancements are attributed to multifaceted information required for diverse capabilities, including fundamental image understanding, real-world knowledge about common-sense and non-object concepts (e.g., charts, diagrams, symbols, signs, and math problems), and step-by-step procedures for solving complex questions. Drawing from the multifaceted information, we present a new efficient LLVM, Mamba-based traversal of rationales (Meteor), which leverages multifaceted rationale to enhance understanding and answering capabilities. To embed lengthy rationales containing abundant information, we employ the Mamba architecture, capable of processing sequential data with linear time complexity. We introduce a new concept of traversal of rationale that facilitates efficient embedding of rationale. Subsequently, the backbone multimodal language model (MLM) is trained to generate answers with the aid of rationale. Through these steps, Meteor achieves significant improvements in vision language performances across multiple evaluation benchmarks requiring diverse capabilities, without scaling up the model size or employing additional vision encoders and computer vision models.

Quiet-STaR: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Think Before Speaking

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

LLM Economist: Large Population Models and Mechanism Design in Multi-Agent Generative Simulacra

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.

Critical-Questions-of-Thought: Steering LLM reasoning with Argumentative Querying

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Language Models Trained to do Arithmetic Predict Human Risky and Intertemporal Choice

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

GLEE: A Unified Framework and Benchmark for Language-based Economic Environments

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

In-Context Learning Strategies Emerge Rationally

Recent work analyzing in-context learning (ICL) has identified a broad set of strategies that describe model behavior in different experimental conditions. We aim to unify these findings by asking why a model learns these disparate strategies in the first place. Specifically, we start with the observation that when trained to learn a mixture of tasks, as is popular in the literature, the strategies learned by a model for performing ICL can be captured by a family of Bayesian predictors: a memorizing predictor, which assumes a discrete prior on the set of seen tasks, and a generalizing predictor, where the prior matches the underlying task distribution. Adopting the normative lens of rational analysis, where a learner's behavior is explained as an optimal adaptation to data given computational constraints, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian framework that almost perfectly predicts Transformer next-token predictions throughout training -- without assuming access to its weights. Under this framework, pretraining is viewed as a process of updating the posterior probability of different strategies, and inference-time behavior as a posterior-weighted average over these strategies' predictions. Our framework draws on common assumptions about neural network learning dynamics, which make explicit a tradeoff between loss and complexity among candidate strategies: beyond how well it explains the data, a model's preference towards implementing a strategy is dictated by its complexity. This helps explain well-known ICL phenomena, while offering novel predictions: e.g., we show a superlinear trend in the timescale for transitioning from generalization to memorization as task diversity increases. Overall, our work advances an explanatory and predictive account of ICL grounded in tradeoffs between strategy loss and complexity.

The Impact of Reasoning Step Length on Large Language Models

Chain of Thought (CoT) is significant in improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, the correlation between the effectiveness of CoT and the length of reasoning steps in prompts remains largely unknown. To shed light on this, we have conducted several empirical experiments to explore the relations. Specifically, we design experiments that expand and compress the rationale reasoning steps within CoT demonstrations, while keeping all other factors constant. We have the following key findings. First, the results indicate that lengthening the reasoning steps in prompts, even without adding new information into the prompt, considerably enhances LLMs' reasoning abilities across multiple datasets. Alternatively, shortening the reasoning steps, even while preserving the key information, significantly diminishes the reasoning abilities of models. This finding highlights the importance of the number of steps in CoT prompts and provides practical guidance to make better use of LLMs' potential in complex problem-solving scenarios. Second, we also investigated the relationship between the performance of CoT and the rationales used in demonstrations. Surprisingly, the result shows that even incorrect rationales can yield favorable outcomes if they maintain the requisite length of inference. Third, we observed that the advantages of increasing reasoning steps are task-dependent: simpler tasks require fewer steps, whereas complex tasks gain significantly from longer inference sequences.

Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

From Thinking to Output: Chain-of-Thought and Text Generation Characteristics in Reasoning Language Models

Recently, there have been notable advancements in large language models (LLMs), demonstrating their growing abilities in complex reasoning. However, existing research largely overlooks a thorough and systematic comparison of these models' reasoning processes and outputs, particularly regarding their self-reflection pattern (also termed "Aha moment") and the interconnections across diverse domains. This paper proposes a novel framework for analyzing the reasoning characteristics of four cutting-edge large reasoning models (GPT-o1, DeepSeek-R1, Kimi-k1.5, and Grok-3) using keywords statistic and LLM-as-a-judge paradigm. Our approach connects their internal thinking processes with their final outputs. A diverse dataset consists of real-world scenario-based questions covering logical deduction, causal inference, and multi-step problem-solving. Additionally, a set of metrics is put forward to assess both the coherence of reasoning and the accuracy of the outputs. The research results uncover various patterns of how these models balance exploration and exploitation, deal with problems, and reach conclusions during the reasoning process. Through quantitative and qualitative comparisons, disparities among these models are identified in aspects such as the depth of reasoning, the reliance on intermediate steps, and the degree of similarity between their thinking processes and output patterns and those of GPT-o1. This work offers valuable insights into the trade-off between computational efficiency and reasoning robustness and provides practical recommendations for enhancing model design and evaluation in practical applications. We publicly release our project at: https://github.com/ChangWenhan/FromThinking2Output

RM-R1: Reward Modeling as Reasoning

Reward modeling is essential for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences, especially through reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). To provide accurate reward signals, a reward model (RM) should stimulate deep thinking and conduct interpretable reasoning before assigning a score or a judgment. However, existing RMs either produce opaque scalar scores or directly generate the prediction of a preferred answer, making them struggle to integrate natural language critiques, thus lacking interpretability. Inspired by recent advances of long chain-of-thought (CoT) on reasoning-intensive tasks, we hypothesize and validate that integrating reasoning capabilities into reward modeling significantly enhances RM's interpretability and performance. In this work, we introduce a new class of generative reward models -- Reasoning Reward Models (ReasRMs) -- which formulate reward modeling as a reasoning task. We propose a reasoning-oriented training pipeline and train a family of ReasRMs, RM-R1. The training consists of two key stages: (1) distillation of high-quality reasoning chains and (2) reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. RM-R1 improves LLM rollouts by self-generating reasoning traces or chat-specific rubrics and evaluating candidate responses against them. Empirically, our models achieve state-of-the-art or near state-of-the-art performance of generative RMs across multiple comprehensive reward model benchmarks, outperforming much larger open-weight models (e.g., Llama3.1-405B) and proprietary ones (e.g., GPT-4o) by up to 13.8%. Beyond final performance, we perform thorough empirical analysis to understand the key ingredients of successful ReasRM training. To facilitate future research, we release six ReasRM models along with code and data at https://github.com/RM-R1-UIUC/RM-R1.

Thinking Out Loud: Do Reasoning Models Know When They're Right?

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

One-connection rule for structural equation models

Linear structural equation models are multivariate statistical models encoded by mixed graphs. In particular, the set of covariance matrices for distributions belonging to a linear structural equation model for a fixed mixed graph G=(V, D,B) is parameterized by a rational function with parameters for each vertex and edge in G. This rational parametrization naturally allows for the study of these models from an algebraic and combinatorial point of view. Indeed, this point of view has led to a collection of results in the literature, mainly focusing on questions related to identifiability and determining relationships between covariances (i.e., finding polynomials in the Gaussian vanishing ideal). So far, a large proportion of these results has focused on the case when D, the directed part of the mixed graph G, is acyclic. This is due to the fact that in the acyclic case, the parametrization becomes polynomial and there is a description of the entries of the covariance matrices in terms of a finite sum. We move beyond the acyclic case and give a closed form expression for the entries of the covariance matrices in terms of the one-connections in a graph obtained from D through some small operations. This closed form expression then allows us to show that if G is simple, then the parametrization map is generically finite-to-one. Finally, having a closed form expression for the covariance matrices allows for the development of an algorithm for systematically exploring possible polynomials in the Gaussian vanishing ideal.

On the Computational Complexity of Ethics: Moral Tractability for Minds and Machines

Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative ethics through the lens of computational complexity. First, we introduce computational complexity for the uninitiated reader and discuss how the complexity of ethical problems can be framed within Marr's three levels of analysis. We then study a range of ethical problems based on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, with the aim of elucidating the complexity associated with the problems themselves (e.g., due to combinatorics, uncertainty, strategic dynamics), the computational methods employed (e.g., probability, logic, learning), and the available resources (e.g., time, knowledge, learning). The results indicate that most problems the normative frameworks pose lead to tractability issues in every category analyzed. Our investigation also provides several insights about the computational nature of normative ethics, including the differences between rule- and outcome-based moral strategies, and the implementation-variance with regard to moral resources. We then discuss the consequences complexity results have for the prospect of moral machines in virtue of the trade-off between optimality and efficiency. Finally, we elucidate how computational complexity can be used to inform both philosophical and cognitive-psychological research on human morality by advancing the Moral Tractability Thesis (MTT).

The Off-Switch Game

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

Cash or Comfort? How LLMs Value Your Inconvenience

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly proposed as near-autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents capable of making everyday decisions on behalf of humans. Although LLMs perform well on many technical tasks, their behaviour in personal decision-making remains less understood. Previous studies have assessed their rationality and moral alignment with human decisions. However, the behaviour of AI assistants in scenarios where financial rewards are at odds with user comfort has not yet been thoroughly explored. In this paper, we tackle this problem by quantifying the prices assigned by multiple LLMs to a series of user discomforts: additional walking, waiting, hunger and pain. We uncover several key concerns that strongly question the prospect of using current LLMs as decision-making assistants: (1) a large variance in responses between LLMs, (2) within a single LLM, responses show fragility to minor variations in prompt phrasing (e.g., reformulating the question in the first person can considerably alter the decision), (3) LLMs can accept unreasonably low rewards for major inconveniences (e.g., 1 Euro to wait 10 hours), and (4) LLMs can reject monetary gains where no discomfort is imposed (e.g., 1,000 Euro to wait 0 minutes). These findings emphasize the need for scrutiny of how LLMs value human inconvenience, particularly as we move toward applications where such cash-versus-comfort trade-offs are made on users' behalf.

The AI Economist: Optimal Economic Policy Design via Two-level Deep Reinforcement Learning

AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.

Unified Multimodal Chain-of-Thought Reward Model through Reinforcement Fine-Tuning

Recent advances in multimodal Reward Models (RMs) have shown significant promise in delivering reward signals to align vision models with human preferences. However, current RMs are generally restricted to providing direct responses or engaging in shallow reasoning processes with limited depth, often leading to inaccurate reward signals. We posit that incorporating explicit long chains of thought (CoT) into the reward reasoning process can significantly strengthen their reliability and robustness. Furthermore, we believe that once RMs internalize CoT reasoning, their direct response accuracy can also be improved through implicit reasoning capabilities. To this end, this paper proposes UnifiedReward-Think, the first unified multimodal CoT-based reward model, capable of multi-dimensional, step-by-step long-chain reasoning for both visual understanding and generation reward tasks. Specifically, we adopt an exploration-driven reinforcement fine-tuning approach to elicit and incentivize the model's latent complex reasoning ability: (1) We first use a small amount of image generation preference data to distill the reasoning process of GPT-4o, which is then used for the model's cold start to learn the format and structure of CoT reasoning. (2) Subsequently, by leveraging the model's prior knowledge and generalization capabilities, we prepare large-scale unified multimodal preference data to elicit the model's reasoning process across various vision tasks. During this phase, correct reasoning outputs are retained for rejection sampling to refine the model (3) while incorrect predicted samples are finally used for Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) based reinforcement fine-tuning, enabling the model to explore diverse reasoning paths and optimize for correct and robust solutions. Extensive experiments across various vision reward tasks demonstrate the superiority of our model.

Reward Design for Justifiable Sequential Decision-Making

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

What are human values, and how do we align AI to them?

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

Beyond Accuracy: Dissecting Mathematical Reasoning for LLMs Under Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become the dominant paradigm for endowing language models with advanced reasoning capabilities. Despite the substantial empirical gains demonstrated by RL-based training methods like GRPO, a granular understanding of their advantages is still lacking. To address this gap, we introduce a fine-grained analytic framework to dissect the impact of RL on reasoning. Our framework specifically investigates key elements that have been hypothesized to benefit from RL training: (1) plan-following and execution, (2) problem decomposition, and (3) improved reasoning and knowledge utilization. Using this framework, we gain insights beyond mere accuracy. For instance, providing models with explicit step-by-step plans surprisingly degrades performance on the most challenging benchmarks, yet RL-tuned models exhibit greater robustness, experiencing markedly smaller performance drops than their base counterparts. This suggests that RL may not primarily enhance the execution of external plans but rather empower models to formulate and follow internal strategies better suited to their reasoning processes. Conversely, we observe that RL enhances the model's capacity to integrate provided knowledge into its reasoning process, leading to performance improvements across diverse tasks. We also study difficulty, showing improved training by developing new ways to exploit hard problems. Our findings lay a foundation for more principled training and evaluation of reasoning models.

Emergence of psychopathological computations in large language models

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

OlaGPT: Empowering LLMs With Human-like Problem-Solving Abilities

In most current research, large language models (LLMs) are able to perform reasoning tasks by generating chains of thought through the guidance of specific prompts. However, there still exists a significant discrepancy between their capability in solving complex reasoning problems and that of humans. At present, most approaches focus on chains of thought (COT) and tool use, without considering the adoption and application of human cognitive frameworks. It is well-known that when confronting complex reasoning challenges, humans typically employ various cognitive abilities, and necessitate interaction with all aspects of tools, knowledge, and the external environment information to accomplish intricate tasks. This paper introduces a novel intelligent framework, referred to as OlaGPT. OlaGPT carefully studied a cognitive architecture framework, and propose to simulate certain aspects of human cognition. The framework involves approximating different cognitive modules, including attention, memory, reasoning, learning, and corresponding scheduling and decision-making mechanisms. Inspired by the active learning mechanism of human beings, it proposes a learning unit to record previous mistakes and expert opinions, and dynamically refer to them to strengthen their ability to solve similar problems. The paper also outlines common effective reasoning frameworks for human problem-solving and designs Chain-of-Thought (COT) templates accordingly. A comprehensive decision-making mechanism is also proposed to maximize model accuracy. The efficacy of OlaGPT has been stringently evaluated on multiple reasoning datasets, and the experimental outcomes reveal that OlaGPT surpasses state-of-the-art benchmarks, demonstrating its superior performance. Our implementation of OlaGPT is available on GitHub: https://github.com/oladata-team/OlaGPT.

Alice in Wonderland: Simple Tasks Showing Complete Reasoning Breakdown in State-Of-the-Art Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

ArgMed-Agents: Explainable Clinical Decision Reasoning with LLM Disscusion via Argumentation Schemes

There are two main barriers to using large language models (LLMs) in clinical reasoning. Firstly, while LLMs exhibit significant promise in Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks, their performance in complex reasoning and planning falls short of expectations. Secondly, LLMs use uninterpretable methods to make clinical decisions that are fundamentally different from the clinician's cognitive processes. This leads to user distrust. In this paper, we present a multi-agent framework called ArgMed-Agents, which aims to enable LLM-based agents to make explainable clinical decision reasoning through interaction. ArgMed-Agents performs self-argumentation iterations via Argumentation Scheme for Clinical Discussion (a reasoning mechanism for modeling cognitive processes in clinical reasoning), and then constructs the argumentation process as a directed graph representing conflicting relationships. Ultimately, use symbolic solver to identify a series of rational and coherent arguments to support decision. We construct a formal model of ArgMed-Agents and present conjectures for theoretical guarantees. ArgMed-Agents enables LLMs to mimic the process of clinical argumentative reasoning by generating explanations of reasoning in a self-directed manner. The setup experiments show that ArgMed-Agents not only improves accuracy in complex clinical decision reasoning problems compared to other prompt methods, but more importantly, it provides users with decision explanations that increase their confidence.

A Survey of Frontiers in LLM Reasoning: Inference Scaling, Learning to Reason, and Agentic Systems

Reasoning is a fundamental cognitive process that enables logical inference, problem-solving, and decision-making. With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), reasoning has emerged as a key capability that distinguishes advanced AI systems from conventional models that empower chatbots. In this survey, we categorize existing methods along two orthogonal dimensions: (1) Regimes, which define the stage at which reasoning is achieved (either at inference time or through dedicated training); and (2) Architectures, which determine the components involved in the reasoning process, distinguishing between standalone LLMs and agentic compound systems that incorporate external tools, and multi-agent collaborations. Within each dimension, we analyze two key perspectives: (1) Input level, which focuses on techniques that construct high-quality prompts that the LLM condition on; and (2) Output level, which methods that refine multiple sampled candidates to enhance reasoning quality. This categorization provides a systematic understanding of the evolving landscape of LLM reasoning, highlighting emerging trends such as the shift from inference-scaling to learning-to-reason (e.g., DeepSeek-R1), and the transition to agentic workflows (e.g., OpenAI Deep Research, Manus Agent). Additionally, we cover a broad spectrum of learning algorithms, from supervised fine-tuning to reinforcement learning such as PPO and GRPO, and the training of reasoners and verifiers. We also examine key designs of agentic workflows, from established patterns like generator-evaluator and LLM debate to recent innovations. ...

Reasoning Language Models: A Blueprint

Reasoning language models (RLMs), also known as Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as OpenAI's o1 and o3, DeepSeek-V3, and Alibaba's QwQ, have redefined AI's problem-solving capabilities by extending large language models (LLMs) with advanced reasoning mechanisms. Yet, their high costs, proprietary nature, and complex architectures - uniquely combining Reinforcement Learning (RL), search heuristics, and LLMs - present accessibility and scalability challenges. To address these, we propose a comprehensive blueprint that organizes RLM components into a modular framework, based on a survey and analysis of all RLM works. This blueprint incorporates diverse reasoning structures (chains, trees, graphs, and nested forms), reasoning strategies (e.g., Monte Carlo Tree Search, Beam Search), RL concepts (policy, value models and others), and supervision schemes (Output-Based and Process-Based Supervision). We also provide detailed mathematical formulations and algorithmic specifications to simplify RLM implementation. By showing how schemes like LLaMA-Berry, QwQ, Journey Learning, and Graph of Thoughts fit as special cases, we demonstrate the blueprint's versatility and unifying potential. To illustrate its utility, we introduce x1, a modular implementation for rapid RLM prototyping and experimentation. Using x1 and a literature review, we provide key insights, such as multi-phase training for policy and value models, and the importance of familiar training distributions. Finally, we outline how RLMs can integrate with a broader LLM ecosystem, including tools and databases. Our work demystifies RLM construction, democratizes advanced reasoning capabilities, and fosters innovation, aiming to mitigate the gap between "rich AI" and "poor AI" by lowering barriers to RLM development and experimentation.

DailyDilemmas: Revealing Value Preferences of LLMs with Quandaries of Daily Life

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

An Explainable Diagnostic Framework for Neurodegenerative Dementias via Reinforcement-Optimized LLM Reasoning

The differential diagnosis of neurodegenerative dementias is a challenging clinical task, mainly because of the overlap in symptom presentation and the similarity of patterns observed in structural neuroimaging. To improve diagnostic efficiency and accuracy, deep learning-based methods such as Convolutional Neural Networks and Vision Transformers have been proposed for the automatic classification of brain MRIs. However, despite their strong predictive performance, these models find limited clinical utility due to their opaque decision making. In this work, we propose a framework that integrates two core components to enhance diagnostic transparency. First, we introduce a modular pipeline for converting 3D T1-weighted brain MRIs into textual radiology reports. Second, we explore the potential of modern Large Language Models (LLMs) to assist clinicians in the differential diagnosis between Frontotemporal dementia subtypes, Alzheimer's disease, and normal aging based on the generated reports. To bridge the gap between predictive accuracy and explainability, we employ reinforcement learning to incentivize diagnostic reasoning in LLMs. Without requiring supervised reasoning traces or distillation from larger models, our approach enables the emergence of structured diagnostic rationales grounded in neuroimaging findings. Unlike post-hoc explainability methods that retrospectively justify model decisions, our framework generates diagnostic rationales as part of the inference process-producing causally grounded explanations that inform and guide the model's decision-making process. In doing so, our framework matches the diagnostic performance of existing deep learning methods while offering rationales that support its diagnostic conclusions.

AI Agent Behavioral Science

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled the development of AI agents that exhibit increasingly human-like behaviors, including planning, adaptation, and social dynamics across diverse, interactive, and open-ended scenarios. These behaviors are not solely the product of the internal architectures of the underlying models, but emerge from their integration into agentic systems operating within specific contexts, where environmental factors, social cues, and interaction feedbacks shape behavior over time. This evolution necessitates a new scientific perspective: AI Agent Behavioral Science. Rather than focusing only on internal mechanisms, this perspective emphasizes the systematic observation of behavior, design of interventions to test hypotheses, and theory-guided interpretation of how AI agents act, adapt, and interact over time. We systematize a growing body of research across individual agent, multi-agent, and human-agent interaction settings, and further demonstrate how this perspective informs responsible AI by treating fairness, safety, interpretability, accountability, and privacy as behavioral properties. By unifying recent findings and laying out future directions, we position AI Agent Behavioral Science as a necessary complement to traditional model-centric approaches, providing essential tools for understanding, evaluating, and governing the real-world behavior of increasingly autonomous AI systems.

SMART: Self-learning Meta-strategy Agent for Reasoning Tasks

Tasks requiring deductive reasoning, especially those involving multiple steps, often demand adaptive strategies such as intermediate generation of rationales or programs, as no single approach is universally optimal. While Language Models (LMs) can enhance their outputs through iterative self-refinement and strategy adjustments, they frequently fail to apply the most effective strategy in their first attempt. This inefficiency raises the question: Can LMs learn to select the optimal strategy in the first attempt, without a need for refinement? To address this challenge, we introduce SMART (Self-learning Meta-strategy Agent for Reasoning Tasks), a novel framework that enables LMs to autonomously learn and select the most effective strategies for various reasoning tasks. We model the strategy selection process as a Markov Decision Process and leverage reinforcement learning-driven continuous self-improvement to allow the model to find the suitable strategy to solve a given task. Unlike traditional self-refinement methods that rely on multiple inference passes or external feedback, SMART allows an LM to internalize the outcomes of its own reasoning processes and adjust its strategy accordingly, aiming for correct solutions on the first attempt. Our experiments across various reasoning datasets and with different model architectures demonstrate that SMART significantly enhances the ability of models to choose optimal strategies without external guidance (+15 points on the GSM8K dataset). By achieving higher accuracy with a single inference pass, SMART not only improves performance but also reduces computational costs for refinement-based strategies, paving the way for more efficient and intelligent reasoning in LMs.

Exploring and Exploiting the Inherent Efficiency within Large Reasoning Models for Self-Guided Efficiency Enhancement

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced language models' capabilities in complex problem-solving by emulating human-like deliberative thinking. However, these models often exhibit overthinking (i.e., the generation of unnecessarily verbose and redundant content), which hinders efficiency and inflates inference cost. In this work, we explore the representational and behavioral origins of this inefficiency, revealing that LRMs inherently possess the capacity for more concise reasoning. Empirical analyses show that correct reasoning paths vary significantly in length, and the shortest correct responses often suffice, indicating untapped efficiency potential. Exploiting these findings, we propose two lightweight methods to enhance LRM efficiency. First, we introduce Efficiency Steering, a training-free activation steering technique that modulates reasoning behavior via a single direction in the model's representation space. Second, we develop Self-Rewarded Efficiency RL, a reinforcement learning framework that dynamically balances task accuracy and brevity by rewarding concise correct solutions. Extensive experiments on seven LRM backbones across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly reduce reasoning length while preserving or improving task performance. Our results highlight that reasoning efficiency can be improved by leveraging and guiding the intrinsic capabilities of existing models in a self-guided manner.

CPL: Critical Plan Step Learning Boosts LLM Generalization in Reasoning Tasks

Post-training, particularly reinforcement learning (RL) using self-play-generated data, has become a new learning paradigm for large language models (LLMs). However, scaling RL to develop a general reasoner remains a research challenge, as existing methods focus on task-specific reasoning without adequately addressing generalization across a broader range of tasks. Moreover, unlike traditional RL with limited action space, LLMs operate in an infinite space, making it crucial to search for valuable and diverse strategies to solve problems effectively. To address this, we propose searching within the action space on high-level abstract plans to enhance model generalization and introduce Critical Plan Step Learning (CPL), comprising: 1) searching on plan, using Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to explore diverse plan steps in multi-step reasoning tasks, and 2) learning critical plan steps through Step-level Advantage Preference Optimization (Step-APO), which integrates advantage estimates for step preference obtained via MCTS into Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). This combination helps the model effectively learn critical plan steps, enhancing both reasoning capabilities and generalization. Experimental results demonstrate that our method, trained exclusively on GSM8K and MATH, not only significantly improves performance on GSM8K (+10.5%) and MATH (+6.5%), but also enhances out-of-domain reasoning benchmarks, such as HumanEval (+12.2%), GPQA (+8.6%), ARC-C (+4.0%), MMLU-STEM (+2.2%), and BBH (+1.8%).

Listener-Rewarded Thinking in VLMs for Image Preferences

Training robust and generalizable reward models for human visual preferences is essential for aligning text-to-image and text-to-video generative models with human intent. However, current reward models often fail to generalize, and supervised fine-tuning leads to memorization, demanding complex annotation pipelines. While reinforcement learning (RL), specifically Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), improves generalization, we uncover a key failure mode: a significant drop in reasoning accuracy occurs when a model's reasoning trace contradicts that of an independent, frozen vision-language model ("listener") evaluating the same output. To address this, we introduce a listener-augmented GRPO framework. Here, the listener re-evaluates the reasoner's chain-of-thought to provide a dense, calibrated confidence score, shaping the RL reward signal. This encourages the reasoner not only to answer correctly, but to produce explanations that are persuasive to an independent model. Our listener-shaped reward scheme achieves best accuracy on the ImageReward benchmark (67.4%), significantly improves out-of-distribution (OOD) performance on a large-scale human preference dataset (1.2M votes, up to +6% over naive reasoner), and reduces reasoning contradictions compared to strong GRPO and SFT baselines. These results demonstrate that listener-based rewards provide a scalable, data-efficient path to aligning vision-language models with nuanced human preferences. We will release our reasoning model here: https://huggingface.co/alexgambashidze/qwen2.5vl_image_preference_reasoner.

SimpleToM: Exposing the Gap between Explicit ToM Inference and Implicit ToM Application in LLMs

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Causal Evaluation of Language Models

Causal reasoning is viewed as crucial for achieving human-level machine intelligence. Recent advances in language models have expanded the horizons of artificial intelligence across various domains, sparking inquiries into their potential for causal reasoning. In this work, we introduce Causal evaluation of Language Models (CaLM), which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first comprehensive benchmark for evaluating the causal reasoning capabilities of language models. First, we propose the CaLM framework, which establishes a foundational taxonomy consisting of four modules: causal target (i.e., what to evaluate), adaptation (i.e., how to obtain the results), metric (i.e., how to measure the results), and error (i.e., how to analyze the bad results). This taxonomy defines a broad evaluation design space while systematically selecting criteria and priorities. Second, we compose the CaLM dataset, comprising 126,334 data samples, to provide curated sets of causal targets, adaptations, metrics, and errors, offering extensive coverage for diverse research pursuits. Third, we conduct an extensive evaluation of 28 leading language models on a core set of 92 causal targets, 9 adaptations, 7 metrics, and 12 error types. Fourth, we perform detailed analyses of the evaluation results across various dimensions (e.g., adaptation, scale). Fifth, we present 50 high-level empirical findings across 9 dimensions (e.g., model), providing valuable guidance for future language model development. Finally, we develop a multifaceted platform, including a website, leaderboards, datasets, and toolkits, to support scalable and adaptable assessments. We envision CaLM as an ever-evolving benchmark for the community, systematically updated with new causal targets, adaptations, models, metrics, and error types to reflect ongoing research advancements. Project website is at https://opencausalab.github.io/CaLM.

Position Auctions in AI-Generated Content

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

B-STaR: Monitoring and Balancing Exploration and Exploitation in Self-Taught Reasoners

In the absence of extensive human-annotated data for complex reasoning tasks, self-improvement -- where models are trained on their own outputs -- has emerged as a primary method for enhancing performance. However, the critical factors underlying the mechanism of these iterative self-improving methods remain poorly understood, such as under what conditions self-improvement is effective, and what are the bottlenecks in the current iterations. In this work, we identify and propose methods to monitor two pivotal factors in this iterative process: (1) the model's ability to generate sufficiently diverse responses (exploration); and (2) the effectiveness of external rewards in distinguishing high-quality candidates from lower-quality ones (exploitation). Using mathematical reasoning as a case study, we begin with a quantitative analysis to track the dynamics of exploration and exploitation, discovering that a model's exploratory capabilities rapidly deteriorate over iterations, and the effectiveness of exploiting external rewards diminishes as well. Motivated by these findings, we introduce B-STaR, a Self-Taught Reasoning framework that autonomously adjusts configurations across iterations to Balance exploration and exploitation, thereby optimizing the self-improving effectiveness based on the current policy model and available rewards. Our experiments on mathematical reasoning, coding, and commonsense reasoning demonstrate that B-STaR not only enhances the model's exploratory capabilities throughout training but also achieves a more effective balance between exploration and exploitation, leading to superior performance.

SMART: Self-Aware Agent for Tool Overuse Mitigation

Current Large Language Model (LLM) agents demonstrate strong reasoning and tool use capabilities, but often lack self-awareness, failing to balance these approaches effectively. This imbalance leads to Tool Overuse, where models unnecessarily rely on external tools for tasks solvable with parametric knowledge, increasing computational overhead. Inspired by human metacognition, we introduce SMART (Strategic Model-Aware Reasoning with Tools), a paradigm that enhances an agent's self-awareness to optimize task handling and reduce tool overuse. To support this paradigm, we introduce SMART-ER, a dataset spanning three domains, where reasoning alternates between parametric knowledge and tool-dependent steps, with each step enriched by rationales explaining when tools are necessary. Through supervised training, we develop SMARTAgent, a family of models that dynamically balance parametric knowledge and tool use. Evaluations show that SMARTAgent reduces tool use by 24% while improving performance by over 37%, enabling 7B-scale models to match its 70B counterpart and GPT-4o. Additionally, SMARTAgent generalizes to out-of-distribution test data like GSM8K and MINTQA, maintaining accuracy with just one-fifth the tool calls. These highlight the potential of strategic tool use to enhance reasoning, mitigate overuse, and bridge the gap between model size and performance, advancing intelligent and resource-efficient agent designs.

Adaptive Deep Reasoning: Triggering Deep Thinking When Needed

Large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in handling complex tasks through long-chain reasoning. However, the extensive reasoning steps involved can significantly increase computational costs, posing challenges for real-world deployment. Recent efforts have focused on optimizing reasoning efficiency by shortening the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning processes through various approaches, such as length-aware prompt engineering, supervised fine-tuning on CoT data with variable lengths, and reinforcement learning with length penalties. Although these methods effectively reduce reasoning length, they still necessitate an initial reasoning phase. More recent approaches have attempted to integrate long-chain and short-chain reasoning abilities into a single model, yet they still rely on manual control to toggle between short and long CoT. In this work, we propose a novel approach that autonomously switches between short and long reasoning chains based on problem complexity. Our method begins with supervised fine-tuning of the base model to equip both long-chain and short-chain reasoning abilities. We then employ reinforcement learning to further balance short and long CoT generation while maintaining accuracy through two key strategies: first, integrating reinforcement learning with a long-short adaptive group-wise reward strategy to assess prompt complexity and provide corresponding rewards; second, implementing a logit-based reasoning mode switching loss to optimize the model's initial token choice, thereby guiding the selection of the reasoning type. Evaluations on mathematical datasets demonstrate that our model can dynamically switch between long-chain and short-chain reasoning modes without substantially sacrificing performance. This advancement enhances the practicality of reasoning in large language models for real-world applications.

Specializing Smaller Language Models towards Multi-Step Reasoning

The surprising ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform well on complex reasoning with only few-shot chain-of-thought prompts is believed to emerge only in very large-scale models (100+ billion parameters). We show that such abilities can, in fact, be distilled down from GPT-3.5 (ge 175B) to T5 variants (le 11B). We propose model specialization, to specialize the model's ability towards a target task. The hypothesis is that large models (commonly viewed as larger than 100B) have strong modeling power, but are spread on a large spectrum of tasks. Small models (commonly viewed as smaller than 10B) have limited model capacity, but if we concentrate their capacity on a specific target task, the model can achieve a decent improved performance. We use multi-step math reasoning as our testbed because it is a very typical emergent ability. We show two important aspects of model abilities: (1). there exists a very complex balance/ tradeoff between language models' multi-dimensional abilities; (2). by paying the price of decreased generic ability, we can clearly lift up the scaling curve of models smaller than 10B towards a specialized multi-step math reasoning ability. We further give comprehensive discussions about important design choices for better generalization, including the tuning data format, the start model checkpoint, and a new model selection method. We hope our practice and discoveries can serve as an important attempt towards specialized smaller models in the new research paradigm set by LLMs.

Echo Chamber: RL Post-training Amplifies Behaviors Learned in Pretraining

Reinforcement learning (RL)-based fine-tuning has become a crucial step in post-training language models for advanced mathematical reasoning and coding. Following the success of frontier reasoning models, recent work has demonstrated that RL fine-tuning consistently improves performance, even in smaller-scale models; however, the underlying mechanisms driving these improvements are not well-understood. Understanding the effects of RL fine-tuning requires disentangling its interaction with pretraining data composition, hyperparameters, and model scale, but such problems are exacerbated by the lack of transparency regarding the training data used in many existing models. In this work, we present a systematic end-to-end study of RL fine-tuning for mathematical reasoning by training models entirely from scratch on different mixtures of fully open datasets. We investigate the effects of various RL fine-tuning algorithms (PPO, GRPO, and Expert Iteration) across models of different scales. Our study reveals that RL algorithms consistently converge towards a dominant output distribution, amplifying patterns in the pretraining data. We also find that models of different scales trained on the same data mixture will converge to distinct output distributions, suggesting that there are scale-dependent biases in model generalization. Moreover, we find that RL post-training on simpler questions can lead to performance gains on harder ones, indicating that certain reasoning capabilities generalize across tasks. Our findings show that small-scale proxies in controlled settings can elicit interesting insights regarding the role of RL in shaping language model behavior.

On the Diagram of Thought

We introduce Diagram of Thought (DoT), a framework that models iterative reasoning in large language models (LLMs) as the construction of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) within a single model. Unlike traditional approaches that represent reasoning as linear chains or trees, DoT organizes propositions, critiques, refinements, and verifications into a cohesive DAG structure, allowing the model to explore complex reasoning pathways while maintaining logical consistency. Each node in the diagram corresponds to a proposition that has been proposed, critiqued, refined, or verified, enabling the LLM to iteratively improve its reasoning through natural language feedback. By leveraging auto-regressive next-token prediction with role-specific tokens, DoT facilitates seamless transitions between proposing ideas and critically evaluating them, providing richer feedback than binary signals. Furthermore, we formalize the DoT framework using Topos Theory, providing a mathematical foundation that ensures logical consistency and soundness in the reasoning process. This approach enhances both the training and inference processes within a single LLM, eliminating the need for multiple models or external control mechanisms. DoT offers a conceptual framework for designing next-generation reasoning-specialized models, emphasizing training efficiency, robust reasoning capabilities, and theoretical grounding. The code is available at https://github.com/diagram-of-thought/diagram-of-thought.

Think-RM: Enabling Long-Horizon Reasoning in Generative Reward Models

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has become a powerful post-training paradigm for aligning large language models with human preferences. A core challenge in RLHF is constructing accurate reward signals, where the conventional Bradley-Terry reward models (BT RMs) often suffer from sensitivity to data size and coverage, as well as vulnerability to reward hacking. Generative reward models (GenRMs) offer a more robust alternative by generating chain-of-thought (CoT) rationales followed by a final reward. However, existing GenRMs rely on shallow, vertically scaled reasoning, limiting their capacity to handle nuanced or complex (e.g., reasoning-intensive) tasks. Moreover, their pairwise preference outputs are incompatible with standard RLHF algorithms that require pointwise reward signals. In this work, we introduce Think-RM, a training framework that enables long-horizon reasoning in GenRMs by modeling an internal thinking process. Rather than producing structured, externally provided rationales, Think-RM generates flexible, self-guided reasoning traces that support advanced capabilities such as self-reflection, hypothetical reasoning, and divergent reasoning. To elicit these reasoning abilities, we first warm-up the models by supervised fine-tuning (SFT) over long CoT data. We then further improve the model's long-horizon abilities by rule-based reinforcement learning (RL). In addition, we propose a novel pairwise RLHF pipeline that directly optimizes policies using pairwise preference rewards, eliminating the need for pointwise reward conversion and enabling more effective use of Think-RM outputs. Experiments show that Think-RM achieves state-of-the-art results on RM-Bench, outperforming both BT RM and vertically scaled GenRM by 8%. When combined with our pairwise RLHF pipeline, it demonstrates superior end-policy performance compared to traditional approaches.

SophiaVL-R1: Reinforcing MLLMs Reasoning with Thinking Reward

Recent advances have shown success in eliciting strong reasoning abilities in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) through rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) with outcome rewards. However, this paradigm typically lacks supervision over the thinking process leading to the final outcome.As a result, the model may learn sub-optimal reasoning strategies, which can hinder its generalization ability. In light of this, we propose SophiaVL-R1, as an attempt to add reward signals for the thinking process in this paradigm. To achieve this, we first train a thinking reward model that evaluates the quality of the entire thinking process. Given that the thinking reward may be unreliable for certain samples due to reward hacking, we propose the Trust-GRPO method, which assigns a trustworthiness weight to the thinking reward during training. This weight is computed based on the thinking reward comparison of responses leading to correct answers versus incorrect answers, helping to mitigate the impact of potentially unreliable thinking rewards. Moreover, we design an annealing training strategy that gradually reduces the thinking reward over time, allowing the model to rely more on the accurate rule-based outcome reward in later training stages. Experiments show that our SophiaVL-R1 surpasses a series of reasoning MLLMs on various benchmarks (e.g., MathVisita, MMMU), demonstrating strong reasoning and generalization capabilities. Notably, our SophiaVL-R1-7B even outperforms LLaVA-OneVision-72B on most benchmarks, despite the latter having 10 times more parameters. All code, models, and datasets are made publicly available at https://github.com/kxfan2002/SophiaVL-R1.

Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agents

As AI systems pervade human life, ensuring that large language models (LLMs) make safe decisions remains a significant challenge. We introduce the Governance of the Commons Simulation (GovSim), a generative simulation platform designed to study strategic interactions and cooperative decision-making in LLMs. In GovSim, a society of AI agents must collectively balance exploiting a common resource with sustaining it for future use. This environment enables the study of how ethical considerations, strategic planning, and negotiation skills impact cooperative outcomes. We develop an LLM-based agent architecture and test it with the leading open and closed LLMs. We find that all but the most powerful LLM agents fail to achieve a sustainable equilibrium in GovSim, with the highest survival rate below 54%. Ablations reveal that successful multi-agent communication between agents is critical for achieving cooperation in these cases. Furthermore, our analyses show that the failure to achieve sustainable cooperation in most LLMs stems from their inability to formulate and analyze hypotheses about the long-term effects of their actions on the equilibrium of the group. Finally, we show that agents that leverage "Universalization"-based reasoning, a theory of moral thinking, are able to achieve significantly better sustainability. Taken together, GovSim enables us to study the mechanisms that underlie sustainable self-government with specificity and scale. We open source the full suite of our research results, including the simulation environment, agent prompts, and a comprehensive web interface.