Daily Papers

Ensuring the safe alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human values is critical as they become integral to applications like translation and question answering. Current alignment methods struggle with dynamic user intentions and complex objectives, making models vulnerable to generating harmful content. We propose Safety Arithmetic, a training-free framework enhancing LLM safety across different scenarios: Base models, Supervised fine-tuned models (SFT), and Edited models. Safety Arithmetic involves Harm Direction Removal to avoid harmful content and Safety Alignment to promote safe responses. Additionally, we present NoIntentEdit, a dataset highlighting edit instances that could compromise model safety if used unintentionally. Our experiments show that Safety Arithmetic significantly improves safety measures, reduces over-safety, and maintains model utility, outperforming existing methods in ensuring safe content generation.

Fine-tuning text-to-image diffusion models is widely used for personalization and adaptation for new domains. In this paper, we identify a critical vulnerability of fine-tuning: safety alignment methods designed to filter harmful content (e.g., nudity) can break down during fine-tuning, allowing previously suppressed content to resurface, even when using benign datasets. While this "fine-tuning jailbreaking" issue is known in large language models, it remains largely unexplored in text-to-image diffusion models. Our investigation reveals that standard fine-tuning can inadvertently undo safety measures, causing models to relearn harmful concepts that were previously removed and even exacerbate harmful behaviors. To address this issue, we present a novel but immediate solution called Modular LoRA, which involves training Safety Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) modules separately from Fine-Tuning LoRA components and merging them during inference. This method effectively prevents the re-learning of harmful content without compromising the model's performance on new tasks. Our experiments demonstrate that Modular LoRA outperforms traditional fine-tuning methods in maintaining safety alignment, offering a practical approach for enhancing the security of text-to-image diffusion models against potential attacks.

Safety alignment is an important procedure before the official deployment of a Large Language Model (LLM). While safety alignment has been extensively studied for LLM, there is still a large research gap for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) that equip with improved reasoning capability. We in this paper systematically examine a simplified pipeline for producing safety aligned LRMs. With our evaluation of various LRMs, we deliver two main findings: i) Safety alignment can be done upon the LRM to restore its safety capability. ii) Safety alignment leads to a degradation of the reasoning capability of LRMs. The two findings show that there exists a trade-off between reasoning and safety capability with the sequential LRM production pipeline. The discovered trade-off, which we name Safety Tax, should shed light on future endeavors of safety research on LRMs. As a by-product, we curate a dataset called DirectRefusal, which might serve as an alternative dataset for safety alignment. Our source code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Safety-Tax.

The safety alignment of current Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable. Relatively simple attacks, or even benign fine-tuning, can jailbreak aligned models. We argue that many of these vulnerabilities are related to a shared underlying issue: safety alignment can take shortcuts, wherein the alignment adapts a model's generative distribution primarily over only its very first few output tokens. We refer to this issue as shallow safety alignment. In this paper, we present case studies to explain why shallow safety alignment can exist and provide evidence that current aligned LLMs are subject to this issue. We also show how these findings help explain multiple recently discovered vulnerabilities in LLMs, including the susceptibility to adversarial suffix attacks, prefilling attacks, decoding parameter attacks, and fine-tuning attacks. Importantly, we discuss how this consolidated notion of shallow safety alignment sheds light on promising research directions for mitigating these vulnerabilities. For instance, we show that deepening the safety alignment beyond just the first few tokens can often meaningfully improve robustness against some common exploits. Finally, we design a regularized finetuning objective that makes the safety alignment more persistent against fine-tuning attacks by constraining updates on initial tokens. Overall, we advocate that future safety alignment should be made more than just a few tokens deep.

Recent developments in balancing the usefulness and safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) have raised a critical question: Are mainstream NLP tasks adequately aligned with safety consideration? Our study, focusing on safety-sensitive documents obtained through adversarial attacks, reveals significant disparities in the safety alignment of various NLP tasks. For instance, LLMs can effectively summarize malicious long documents but often refuse to translate them. This discrepancy highlights a previously unidentified vulnerability: attacks exploiting tasks with weaker safety alignment, like summarization, can potentially compromise the integraty of tasks traditionally deemed more robust, such as translation and question-answering (QA). Moreover, the concurrent use of multiple NLP tasks with lesser safety alignment increases the risk of LLMs inadvertently processing harmful content. We demonstrate these vulnerabilities in various safety-aligned LLMs, particularly Llama2 models and GPT-4, indicating an urgent need for strengthening safety alignments across a broad spectrum of NLP tasks.

LLMs have made impressive progress, but their growing capabilities also expose them to highly flexible jailbreaking attacks designed to bypass safety alignment. While many existing defenses focus on known types of attacks, it is more critical to prepare LLMs for unseen attacks that may arise during deployment. To address this, we propose a lifelong safety alignment framework that enables LLMs to continuously adapt to new and evolving jailbreaking strategies. Our framework introduces a competitive setup between two components: a Meta-Attacker, trained to actively discover novel jailbreaking strategies, and a Defender, trained to resist them. To effectively warm up the Meta-Attacker, we first leverage the GPT-4o API to extract key insights from a large collection of jailbreak-related research papers. Through iterative training, the first iteration Meta-Attacker achieves a 73% attack success rate (ASR) on RR and a 57% transfer ASR on LAT using only single-turn attacks. Meanwhile, the Defender progressively improves its robustness and ultimately reduces the Meta-Attacker's success rate to just 7%, enabling safer and more reliable deployment of LLMs in open-ended environments. The code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/LifelongSafetyAlignment.

The current paradigm for safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) follows a one-size-fits-all approach: the model refuses to interact with any content deemed unsafe by the model provider. This approach lacks flexibility in the face of varying social norms across cultures and regions. In addition, users may have diverse safety needs, making a model with static safety standards too restrictive to be useful, as well as too costly to be re-aligned. We propose Controllable Safety Alignment (CoSA), a framework designed to adapt models to diverse safety requirements without re-training. Instead of aligning a fixed model, we align models to follow safety configs -- free-form natural language descriptions of the desired safety behaviors -- that are provided as part of the system prompt. To adjust model safety behavior, authorized users only need to modify such safety configs at inference time. To enable that, we propose CoSAlign, a data-centric method for aligning LLMs to easily adapt to diverse safety configs. Furthermore, we devise a novel controllability evaluation protocol that considers both helpfulness and configured safety, summarizing them into CoSA-Score, and construct CoSApien, a human-authored benchmark that consists of real-world LLM use cases with diverse safety requirements and corresponding evaluation prompts. We show that CoSAlign leads to substantial gains of controllability over strong baselines including in-context alignment. Our framework encourages better representation and adaptation to pluralistic human values in LLMs, and thereby increasing their practicality.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have accelerated progress toward artificial general intelligence, yet their potential to generate harmful content poses critical safety challenges. Existing alignment methods often struggle to cover diverse safety scenarios and remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this work, we propose Ex-Ante Reasoning Preference Optimization (ERPO), a novel safety alignment framework that equips LLMs with explicit preemptive reasoning through Chain-of-Thought and provides clear evidence for safety judgments by embedding predefined safety rules. Specifically, our approach consists of three stages: first, equipping the model with Ex-Ante reasoning through supervised fine-tuning (SFT) using a constructed reasoning module; second, enhancing safety, usefulness, and efficiency via Direct Preference Optimization (DPO); and third, mitigating inference latency with a length-controlled iterative preference optimization strategy. Experiments on multiple open-source LLMs demonstrate that ERPO significantly enhances safety performance while maintaining response efficiency.

We propose a theoretical framework demonstrating that popular Large Language Model (LLM) alignment methods, including Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and alternatives, fundamentally function as divergence estimators between aligned (preferred or safe) and unaligned (less-preferred or harmful) distributions. This explains the separation phenomenon between safe and harmful prompts in the model hidden representation after alignment. Inspired by the theoretical results, we identify that some alignment methods are better than others in terms of separation and, introduce a new method, KLDO, and further demonstrate the implication of our theories. We advocate for compliance-refusal datasets over preference datasets to enhance safety alignment, supported by both theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence. Additionally, to quantify safety separation, we leverage a distance metric in the representation space and statistically validate its efficacy as a statistical significant indicator of LLM resilience against jailbreak attacks.

As advancements in large language models (LLMs) continue and the demand for personalized models increases, parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods (e.g., LoRA) will become essential due to their efficiency in reducing computation costs. However, recent studies have raised alarming concerns that LoRA fine-tuning could potentially compromise the safety alignment in LLMs, posing significant risks for the model owner. In this paper, we first investigate the underlying mechanism by analyzing the changes in safety alignment related features before and after fine-tuning. Then, we propose a fixed safety module calculated by safety data and a task-specific initialization for trainable parameters in low-rank adaptations, termed Safety-alignment preserved Low-Rank Adaptation (SaLoRA). Unlike previous LoRA methods and their variants, SaLoRA enables targeted modifications to LLMs without disrupting their original alignments. Our experiments show that SaLoRA outperforms various adapters-based approaches across various evaluation metrics in different fine-tuning tasks.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have improved significantly in multi-modal tasks, but their more complex architecture makes their safety alignment more challenging than the alignment of large language models (LLMs). In this paper, we reveal an unfair distribution of safety across the layers of VLM's vision encoder, with earlier and middle layers being disproportionately vulnerable to malicious inputs compared to the more robust final layers. This 'cross-layer' vulnerability stems from the model's inability to generalize its safety training from the default architectural settings used during training to unseen or out-of-distribution scenarios, leaving certain layers exposed. We conduct a comprehensive analysis by projecting activations from various intermediate layers and demonstrate that these layers are more likely to generate harmful outputs when exposed to malicious inputs. Our experiments with LLaVA-1.5 and Llama 3.2 show discrepancies in attack success rates and toxicity scores across layers, indicating that current safety alignment strategies focused on a single default layer are insufficient.

Safety aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks qi2023fine-- a few harmful data mixed in the fine-tuning dataset can break the LLMs's safety alignment. Existing mitigation strategies include alignment stage solutions huang2024vaccine, rosati2024representation and fine-tuning stage solutions huang2024lazy,mukhoti2023fine. However, our evaluation shows that both categories of defenses fail when some specific training hyper-parameters are chosen -- a large learning rate or a large number of training epochs in the fine-tuning stage can easily invalidate the defense, which however, is necessary to guarantee finetune performance. To this end, we propose Antidote, a post-fine-tuning stage solution, which remains \textit{agnostic to the training hyper-parameters in the fine-tuning stage}. Antidote relies on the philosophy that by removing the harmful parameters, the harmful model can be recovered from the harmful behaviors, regardless of how those harmful parameters are formed in the fine-tuning stage. With this philosophy, we introduce a one-shot pruning stage after harmful fine-tuning to remove the harmful weights that are responsible for the generation of harmful content. Despite its embarrassing simplicity, empirical results show that Antidote can reduce harmful score while maintaining accuracy on downstream tasks.Our project page is at https://huangtiansheng.github.io/Antidote_gh_page/

As the development of large language models (LLMs) rapidly advances, securing these models effectively without compromising their utility has become a pivotal area of research. However, current defense strategies against jailbreak attacks (i.e., efforts to bypass security protocols) often suffer from limited adaptability, restricted general capability, and high cost. To address these challenges, we introduce SafeAligner, a methodology implemented at the decoding stage to fortify defenses against jailbreak attacks. We begin by developing two specialized models: the Sentinel Model, which is trained to foster safety, and the Intruder Model, designed to generate riskier responses. SafeAligner leverages the disparity in security levels between the responses from these models to differentiate between harmful and beneficial tokens, effectively guiding the safety alignment by altering the output token distribution of the target model. Extensive experiments show that SafeAligner can increase the likelihood of beneficial tokens, while reducing the occurrence of harmful ones, thereby ensuring secure alignment with minimal loss to generality.

Safety-aligned language models often exhibit fragile and imbalanced safety mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of generating unsafe content. In addition, incorporating new knowledge through editing techniques to language models can further compromise safety. To address these issues, we propose SafeInfer, a context-adaptive, decoding-time safety alignment strategy for generating safe responses to user queries. SafeInfer comprises two phases: the safety amplification phase, which employs safe demonstration examples to adjust the model's hidden states and increase the likelihood of safer outputs, and the safety-guided decoding phase, which influences token selection based on safety-optimized distributions, ensuring the generated content complies with ethical guidelines. Further, we present HarmEval, a novel benchmark for extensive safety evaluations, designed to address potential misuse scenarios in accordance with the policies of leading AI tech giants.

Large language models (LLMs) rely on safety alignment to avoid responding to malicious user inputs. Unfortunately, jailbreak can circumvent safety guardrails, resulting in LLMs generating harmful content and raising concerns about LLM safety. Due to language models with intensive parameters often regarded as black boxes, the mechanisms of alignment and jailbreak are challenging to elucidate. In this paper, we employ weak classifiers to explain LLM safety through the intermediate hidden states. We first confirm that LLMs learn ethical concepts during pre-training rather than alignment and can identify malicious and normal inputs in the early layers. Alignment actually associates the early concepts with emotion guesses in the middle layers and then refines them to the specific reject tokens for safe generations. Jailbreak disturbs the transformation of early unethical classification into negative emotions. We conduct experiments on models from 7B to 70B across various model families to prove our conclusion. Overall, our paper indicates the intrinsical mechanism of LLM safety and how jailbreaks circumvent safety guardrails, offering a new perspective on LLM safety and reducing concerns. Our code is available at https://github.com/ydyjya/LLM-IHS-Explanation.

Merging Large Language Models (LLMs) is a cost-effective technique for combining multiple expert LLMs into a single versatile model, retaining the expertise of the original ones. However, current approaches often overlook the importance of safety alignment during merging, leading to highly misaligned models. This work investigates the effects of model merging on alignment. We evaluate several popular model merging techniques, demonstrating that existing methods do not only transfer domain expertise but also propagate misalignment. We propose a simple two-step approach to address this problem: (i) generating synthetic safety and domain-specific data, and (ii) incorporating these generated data into the optimization process of existing data-aware model merging techniques. This allows us to treat alignment as a skill that can be maximized in the resulting merged LLM. Our experiments illustrate the effectiveness of integrating alignment-related data during merging, resulting in models that excel in both domain expertise and alignment.

The risk of harmful content generated by large language models (LLMs) becomes a critical concern. This paper presents a systematic study on assessing and improving LLMs' capability to perform the task of course-correction, \ie, the model can steer away from generating harmful content autonomously. To start with, we introduce the C^2-Eval benchmark for quantitative assessment and analyze 10 popular LLMs, revealing varying proficiency of current safety-tuned LLMs in course-correction. To improve, we propose fine-tuning LLMs with preference learning, emphasizing the preference for timely course-correction. Using an automated pipeline, we create C^2-Syn, a synthetic dataset with 750K pairwise preferences, to teach models the concept of timely course-correction through data-driven preference learning. Experiments on 2 LLMs, Llama2-Chat 7B and Qwen2 7B, show that our method effectively enhances course-correction skills without affecting general performance. Additionally, it effectively improves LLMs' safety, particularly in resisting jailbreak attacks.

In this paper, we introduce the BeaverTails dataset, aimed at fostering research on safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). This dataset uniquely separates annotations of helpfulness and harmlessness for question-answering pairs, thus offering distinct perspectives on these crucial attributes. In total, we have compiled safety meta-labels for 30,207 question-answer (QA) pairs and gathered 30,144 pairs of expert comparison data for both the helpfulness and harmlessness metrics. We further showcase applications of BeaverTails in content moderation and reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF), emphasizing its potential for practical safety measures in LLMs. We believe this dataset provides vital resources for the community, contributing towards the safe development and deployment of LLMs. Our project page is available at the following URL: https://sites.google.com/view/pku-beavertails.

As Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) becomes increasingly integrated into various facets of human life, ensuring the safety and ethical alignment of such systems is paramount. Previous studies primarily focus on single-modality threats, which may not suffice given the integrated and complex nature of cross-modality interactions. We introduce a novel safety alignment challenge called Safe Inputs but Unsafe Output (SIUO) to evaluate cross-modality safety alignment. Specifically, it considers cases where single modalities are safe independently but could potentially lead to unsafe or unethical outputs when combined. To empirically investigate this problem, we developed the SIUO, a cross-modality benchmark encompassing 9 critical safety domains, such as self-harm, illegal activities, and privacy violations. Our findings reveal substantial safety vulnerabilities in both closed- and open-source LVLMs, such as GPT-4V and LLaVA, underscoring the inadequacy of current models to reliably interpret and respond to complex, real-world scenarios.

Data is a crucial element in large language model (LLM) alignment. Recent studies have explored using LLMs for efficient data collection. However, LLM-generated data often suffers from quality issues, with underrepresented or absent aspects and low-quality datapoints. To address these problems, we propose Data Advisor, an enhanced LLM-based method for generating data that takes into account the characteristics of the desired dataset. Starting from a set of pre-defined principles in hand, Data Advisor monitors the status of the generated data, identifies weaknesses in the current dataset, and advises the next iteration of data generation accordingly. Data Advisor can be easily integrated into existing data generation methods to enhance data quality and coverage. Experiments on safety alignment of three representative LLMs (i.e., Mistral, Llama2, and Falcon) demonstrate the effectiveness of Data Advisor in enhancing model safety against various fine-grained safety issues without sacrificing model utility.

Existing training-time safety alignment techniques for large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Direct preference optimization (DPO), a widely deployed alignment method, exhibits limitations in both experimental and theoretical contexts as its loss function proves suboptimal for refusal learning. Through gradient-based analysis, we identify these shortcomings and propose an improved safety alignment that disentangles DPO objectives into two components: (1) robust refusal training, which encourages refusal even when partial unsafe generations are produced, and (2) targeted unlearning of harmful knowledge. This approach significantly increases LLM robustness against a wide range of jailbreak attacks, including prefilling, suffix, and multi-turn attacks across both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios. Furthermore, we introduce a method to emphasize critical refusal tokens by incorporating a reward-based token-level weighting mechanism for refusal learning, which further improves the robustness against adversarial exploits. Our research also suggests that robustness to jailbreak attacks is correlated with token distribution shifts in the training process and internal representations of refusal and harmful tokens, offering valuable directions for future research in LLM safety alignment. The code is available at https://github.com/wicai24/DOOR-Alignment

With the widespread application of Large Language Models (LLMs), it has become a significant concern to ensure their safety and prevent harmful responses. While current safe-alignment methods based on instruction fine-tuning and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) can effectively reduce harmful responses from LLMs, they often require high-quality datasets and heavy computational overhead during model training. Another way to align language models is to modify the logit of tokens in model outputs without heavy training. Recent studies have shown that contrastive decoding can enhance the performance of language models by reducing the likelihood of confused tokens. However, these methods require the manual selection of contrastive models or instruction templates. To this end, we propose Adversarial Contrastive Decoding (ACD), an optimization-based framework to generate two opposite system prompts for prompt-based contrastive decoding. ACD only needs to apply a lightweight prompt tuning on a rather small anchor dataset (< 3 min for each model) without training the target model. Experiments conducted on extensive models and benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed method achieves much better safety performance than previous model training-free decoding methods without sacrificing its original generation ability.

In this work, we introduce the PKU-SafeRLHF dataset, designed to promote research on safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). As a sibling project to SafeRLHF and BeaverTails, we separate annotations of helpfulness and harmlessness for question-answering pairs, providing distinct perspectives on these coupled attributes. Overall, we provide 44.6k refined prompts and 265k question-answer pairs with safety meta-labels for 19 harm categories and three severity levels ranging from minor to severe, with answers generated by Llama-family models. Based on this, we collected 166.8k preference data, including dual-preference (helpfulness and harmlessness decoupled) and single-preference data (trade-off the helpfulness and harmlessness from scratch), respectively. Using the large-scale annotation data, we further train severity-sensitive moderation for the risk control of LLMs and safety-centric RLHF algorithms for the safety alignment of LLMs. We believe this dataset will be a valuable resource for the community, aiding in the safe deployment of LLMs.

Recent studies reveal that integrating new modalities into Large Language Models (LLMs), such as Vision-Language Models (VLMs), creates a new attack surface that bypasses existing safety training techniques like Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). While further SFT and RLHF-based safety training can be conducted in multi-modal settings, collecting multi-modal training datasets poses a significant challenge. Inspired by the structural design of recent multi-modal models, where, regardless of the combination of input modalities, all inputs are ultimately fused into the language space, we aim to explore whether unlearning solely in the textual domain can be effective for cross-modality safety alignment. Our evaluation across six datasets empirically demonstrates the transferability -- textual unlearning in VLMs significantly reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) to less than 8\% and in some cases, even as low as nearly 2\% for both text-based and vision-text-based attacks, alongside preserving the utility. Moreover, our experiments show that unlearning with a multi-modal dataset offers no potential benefits but incurs significantly increased computational demands, possibly up to 6 times higher.

Large language models (LLMs) show inherent brittleness in their safety mechanisms, as evidenced by their susceptibility to jailbreaking and even non-malicious fine-tuning. This study explores this brittleness of safety alignment by leveraging pruning and low-rank modifications. We develop methods to identify critical regions that are vital for safety guardrails, and that are disentangled from utility-relevant regions at both the neuron and rank levels. Surprisingly, the isolated regions we find are sparse, comprising about 3% at the parameter level and 2.5% at the rank level. Removing these regions compromises safety without significantly impacting utility, corroborating the inherent brittleness of the model's safety mechanisms. Moreover, we show that LLMs remain vulnerable to low-cost fine-tuning attacks even when modifications to the safety-critical regions are restricted. These findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety strategies in LLMs.

The acquisition of agentic capabilities has transformed LLMs from "knowledge providers" to "action executors", a trend that while expanding LLMs' capability boundaries, significantly increases their susceptibility to malicious use. Previous work has shown that current LLM-based agents execute numerous malicious tasks even without being attacked, indicating a deficiency in agentic use safety alignment during the post-training phase. To address this gap, we propose AgentAlign, a novel framework that leverages abstract behavior chains as a medium for safety alignment data synthesis. By instantiating these behavior chains in simulated environments with diverse tool instances, our framework enables the generation of highly authentic and executable instructions while capturing complex multi-step dynamics. The framework further ensures model utility by proportionally synthesizing benign instructions through non-malicious interpretations of behavior chains, precisely calibrating the boundary between helpfulness and harmlessness. Evaluation results on AgentHarm demonstrate that fine-tuning three families of open-source models using our method substantially improves their safety (35.8% to 79.5% improvement) while minimally impacting or even positively enhancing their helpfulness, outperforming various prompting methods. The dataset and code have both been open-sourced.

Vision-language-action models (VLAs) have shown great potential as generalist robot policies. However, these models pose urgent safety challenges during deployment, including the risk of physical harm to the environment, the robot itself, and humans. How can safety be explicitly incorporated into VLAs? In this work, we propose SafeVLA, a novel algorithm designed to integrate safety into VLAs, ensuring the protection of the environment, robot hardware and humans in real-world settings. SafeVLA effectively balances safety and task performance by employing large-scale constrained learning within simulated environments. We demonstrate that SafeVLA outperforms the current state-of-the-art method in both safety and task performance, achieving average improvements of 83.58% and 3.85%, respectively, in simulation. By prioritizing safety, our approach eliminates high-risk behaviors and reduces the upper bound of unsafe behaviors to 1/35 of that in the current state-of-the-art, thereby significantly mitigating long-tail risks. Furthermore, the learned safety constraints generalize to diverse, unseen scenarios, including multiple out-of-distribution perturbations and tasks. Our data, models and newly proposed benchmark environment are available at https://sites.google.com/view/pku-safevla.

Ensuring the safety and harmlessness of Large Language Models (LLMs) has become equally critical as their performance in applications. However, existing safety alignment methods typically suffer from safety-performance trade-offs and the susceptibility to jailbreak attacks, primarily due to their reliance on direct refusals for malicious queries. In this paper, we propose STAIR, a novel framework that integrates SafeTy Alignment with Itrospective Reasoning. We enable LLMs to identify safety risks through step-by-step analysis by self-improving chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning with safety awareness. STAIR first equips the model with a structured reasoning capability and then advances safety alignment via iterative preference optimization on step-level reasoning data generated using our newly proposed Safety-Informed Monte Carlo Tree Search (SI-MCTS). We further train a process reward model on this data to guide test-time searches for improved responses. Extensive experiments show that STAIR effectively mitigates harmful outputs while better preserving helpfulness, compared to instinctive alignment strategies. With test-time scaling, STAIR achieves a safety performance comparable to Claude-3.5 against popular jailbreak attacks. Relevant resources in this work are available at https://github.com/thu-ml/STAIR.

Recent studies show that Large Language Models (LLMs) with safety alignment can be jail-broken by fine-tuning on a dataset mixed with harmful data. First time in the literature, we show that the jail-broken effect can be mitigated by separating states in the finetuning stage to optimize the alignment and user datasets. Unfortunately, our subsequent study shows that this simple Bi-State Optimization (BSO) solution experiences convergence instability when steps invested in its alignment state is too small, leading to downgraded alignment performance. By statistical analysis, we show that the excess drift towards consensus could be a probable reason for the instability. To remedy this issue, we propose Lazy(i) safety alignment (Lisa), which introduces a proximal term to constraint the drift of each state. Theoretically, the benefit of the proximal term is supported by the convergence analysis, wherein we show that a sufficient large proximal factor is necessary to guarantee Lisa's convergence. Empirically, our results on four downstream finetuning tasks show that Lisa with a proximal term can significantly increase alignment performance while maintaining the LLM's accuracy on the user tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Lisa.

Large language models (LLMs) undergo safety alignment to ensure safe conversations with humans. However, this paper introduces a training-free attack method capable of reversing safety alignment, converting the outcomes of stronger alignment into greater potential for harm by accessing only LLM output token distributions. Specifically, our method achieves this reversal by contrasting the output token distribution of a safety-aligned language model (e.g., Llama-2-chat) against its pre-trained version (e.g., Llama-2), so that the token predictions are shifted towards the opposite direction of safety alignment. We name this method emulated disalignment (ED) because sampling from this contrastive distribution provably emulates the result of fine-tuning to minimize a safety reward. Our experiments with ED across three evaluation datasets and four model families (Llama-1, Llama-2, Mistral, and Alpaca) show that ED doubles the harmfulness of pre-trained models and outperforms strong baselines, achieving the highest harmful rates in 43 out of 48 evaluation subsets by a large margin. Eventually, given ED's reliance on language model output token distributions, which particularly compromises open-source models, our findings highlight the need to reassess the open accessibility of language models, even if they have been safety-aligned. Code is available at https://github.com/ZHZisZZ/emulated-disalignment.

The rapid development of Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) has demonstrated broad application potential, yet their safety and reliability remain critical concerns that require systematic exploration. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive and systematic safety evaluation of 11 MLRMs across 5 benchmarks and unveil prevalent safety degradation phenomena in most advanced models. Moreover, our analysis reveals distinct safety patterns across different benchmarks: significant safety degradation is observed across jailbreak robustness benchmarks, whereas safety-awareness benchmarks demonstrate less pronounced degradation. In particular, the long thought process in some scenarios even enhances safety performance. Therefore, it is a potential approach to address safety issues in MLRMs by leveraging the intrinsic reasoning capabilities of the model to detect unsafe intent. To operationalize this insight, we construct a multimodal tuning dataset that incorporates a safety-oriented thought process. Experimental results from fine-tuning existing MLRMs with this dataset effectively enhances the safety on both jailbreak robustness and safety-awareness benchmarks. This study provides a new perspective for developing safe MLRMs. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/xinyuelou/Think-in-Safety.

With the widespread deployment of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) for visual-reasoning tasks, improving their safety has become crucial. Recent research indicates that despite training-time safety alignment, these models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks: carefully crafted image-prompt pairs that compel the model to generate harmful content. In this work, we first highlight a critical safety gap, demonstrating that alignment achieved solely through safety training may be insufficient against jailbreak attacks. To address this vulnerability, we propose Immune, an inference-time defense framework that leverages a safe reward model during decoding to defend against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we provide a rigorous mathematical characterization of Immune, offering provable guarantees against jailbreaks. Extensive evaluations on diverse jailbreak benchmarks using recent MLLMs reveal that Immune effectively enhances model safety while preserving the model's original capabilities. For instance, against text-based jailbreak attacks on LLaVA-1.6, Immune reduces the attack success rate by 57.82% and 16.78% compared to the base MLLM and state-of-the-art defense strategy, respectively.

Large language models (LLMs) have had a transformative impact on a variety of scientific tasks across disciplines such as biology, chemistry, medicine, and physics. However, ensuring the safety alignment of these models in scientific research remains an underexplored area, with existing benchmarks primarily focus on textual content and overlooking key scientific representations such as molecular, protein, and genomic languages. Moreover, the safety mechanisms of LLMs in scientific tasks are insufficiently studied. To address these limitations, we introduce SciSafeEval, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety alignment of LLMs across a range of scientific tasks. SciSafeEval spans multiple scientific languages - including textual, molecular, protein, and genomic - and covers a wide range of scientific domains. We evaluate LLMs in zero-shot, few-shot and chain-of-thought settings, and introduce a 'jailbreak' enhancement feature that challenges LLMs equipped with safety guardrails, rigorously testing their defenses against malicious intention. Our benchmark surpasses existing safety datasets in both scale and scope, providing a robust platform for assessing the safety and performance of LLMs in scientific contexts. This work aims to facilitate the responsible development and deployment of LLMs, promoting alignment with safety and ethical standards in scientific research.

We introduce Synthetic Alignment data Generation for Safety Evaluation and Red Teaming (SAGE-RT or SAGE) a novel pipeline for generating synthetic alignment and red-teaming data. Existing methods fall short in creating nuanced and diverse datasets, providing necessary control over the data generation and validation processes, or require large amount of manually generated seed data. SAGE addresses these limitations by using a detailed taxonomy to produce safety-alignment and red-teaming data across a wide range of topics. We generated 51,000 diverse and in-depth prompt-response pairs, encompassing over 1,500 topics of harmfulness and covering variations of the most frequent types of jailbreaking prompts faced by large language models (LLMs). We show that the red-teaming data generated through SAGE jailbreaks state-of-the-art LLMs in more than 27 out of 32 sub-categories, and in more than 58 out of 279 leaf-categories (sub-sub categories). The attack success rate for GPT-4o, GPT-3.5-turbo is 100% over the sub-categories of harmfulness. Our approach avoids the pitfalls of synthetic safety-training data generation such as mode collapse and lack of nuance in the generation pipeline by ensuring a detailed coverage of harmful topics using iterative expansion of the topics and conditioning the outputs on the generated raw-text. This method can be used to generate red-teaming and alignment data for LLM Safety completely synthetically to make LLMs safer or for red-teaming the models over a diverse range of topics.

The emergence of Vision Language Models (VLMs) has brought unprecedented advances in understanding multimodal information. The combination of textual and visual semantics in VLMs is highly complex and diverse, making the safety alignment of these models challenging. Furthermore, due to the limited study on the safety alignment of VLMs, there is a lack of large-scale, high-quality datasets. To address these limitations, we propose a Safety Preference Alignment dataset for Vision Language Models named SPA-VL. In terms of breadth, SPA-VL covers 6 harmfulness domains, 13 categories, and 53 subcategories, and contains 100,788 samples of the quadruple (question, image, chosen response, rejected response). In terms of depth, the responses are collected from 12 open- (e.g., QwenVL) and closed-source (e.g., Gemini) VLMs to ensure diversity. The experimental results indicate that models trained with alignment techniques on the SPA-VL dataset exhibit substantial improvements in harmlessness and helpfulness while maintaining core capabilities. SPA-VL, as a large-scale, high-quality, and diverse dataset, represents a significant milestone in ensuring that VLMs achieve both harmlessness and helpfulness. We have made our code https://github.com/EchoseChen/SPA-VL-RLHF and SPA-VL dataset url https://huggingface.co/datasets/sqrti/SPA-VL publicly available.

Larger language models (LLMs) have taken the world by storm with their massive multi-tasking capabilities simply by optimizing over a next-word prediction objective. With the emergence of their properties and encoded knowledge, the risk of LLMs producing harmful outputs increases, making them unfit for scalable deployment for the public. In this work, we propose a new safety evaluation benchmark RED-EVAL that carries out red-teaming. We show that even widely deployed models are susceptible to the Chain of Utterances-based (CoU) prompting, jailbreaking closed source LLM-based systems such as GPT-4 and ChatGPT to unethically respond to more than 65% and 73% of harmful queries. We also demonstrate the consistency of the RED-EVAL across 8 open-source LLMs in generating harmful responses in more than 86% of the red-teaming attempts. Next, we propose RED-INSTRUCT--An approach for the safety alignment of LLMs. It constitutes two phases: 1) HARMFULQA data collection: Leveraging CoU prompting, we collect a dataset that consists of 1.9K harmful questions covering a wide range of topics, 9.5K safe and 7.3K harmful conversations from ChatGPT; 2) SAFE-ALIGN: We demonstrate how the conversational dataset can be used for the safety alignment of LLMs by minimizing the negative log-likelihood over helpful responses and penalizing over harmful responses by gradient accent over sample loss. Our model STARLING, a fine-tuned Vicuna-7B, is observed to be more safely aligned when evaluated on RED-EVAL and HHH benchmarks while preserving the utility of the baseline models (TruthfulQA, MMLU, and BBH).

Ensuring consistent safety across multiple languages remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs). We introduce Soteria, a lightweight yet powerful strategy that locates and minimally adjusts the "functional heads" most responsible for harmful content generation in each language. By altering only a fraction of parameters, Soteria drastically reduces policy violations without sacrificing overall model performance, even in low-resource settings. To rigorously evaluate our approach, we also present XThreatBench, a specialized multilingual dataset capturing fine-grained harmful behaviors drawn from real policy guidelines. Experiments with leading open-source LLMs (e.g., Llama, Qwen, Mistral) show that Soteria consistently improves safety metrics across high-, mid-, and low-resource languages. These findings highlight a promising path toward scalable, linguistically attuned, and ethically aligned LLMs worldwide.

Although large language models (LLMs) achieve effective safety alignment at the time of release, they still face various safety challenges. A key issue is that fine-tuning often compromises the safety alignment of LLMs. To address this issue, we propose a method named IRR (Identify, Remove, and Recalibrate for Safety Realignment) that performs safety realignment for LLMs. The core of IRR is to identify and remove unsafe delta parameters from the fine-tuned models, while recalibrating the retained ones. We evaluate the effectiveness of IRR across various datasets, including both full fine-tuning and LoRA methods. Our results demonstrate that IRR significantly enhances the safety performance of fine-tuned models on safety benchmarks, such as harmful queries and jailbreak attacks, while maintaining their performance on downstream tasks. The source code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/IRR-BD4F.

Benefiting from the powerful capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), pre-trained visual encoder models connected to LLMs form Vision Language Models (VLMs). However, recent research shows that the visual modality in VLMs is highly vulnerable, allowing attackers to bypass safety alignment in LLMs through visually transmitted content, launching harmful attacks. To address this challenge, we propose a progressive concept-based alignment strategy, PSA-VLM, which incorporates safety modules as concept bottlenecks to enhance visual modality safety alignment. By aligning model predictions with specific safety concepts, we improve defenses against risky images, enhancing explainability and controllability while minimally impacting general performance. Our method is obtained through two-stage training. The low computational cost of the first stage brings very effective performance improvement, and the fine-tuning of the language model in the second stage further improves the safety performance. Our method achieves state-of-the-art results on popular VLM safety benchmark.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

To ensure safe usage, Large Language Models (LLMs) typically undergo alignment with human-defined values. However, this alignment often relies on primarily English data and is biased towards Western-centric values, limiting its effectiveness in low-resource language settings. In this paper, we describe our approach for aligning SEA-Lion-v2.1-Instruct (a Llama3-8B variant) to minimize toxicity in Singlish, an English creole specific to Singapore. We find that supervised fine-tuning and Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO) on paired and unpaired preferences is more sample efficient and yields significantly better results than Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Our analysis reveals that DPO implicitly enforces a weaker safety objective than KTO, and that SFT complements KTO by improving training stability. Finally, we introduce a simple but novel modification to KTO, KTO-S, which improves training stability through better gradient exploitation. Overall, we present a general approach for safety alignment conducive to low-resource English languages, successfully reducing toxicity by 99\% on our Singlish benchmark, with gains generalizing to the broader TOXIGEN dataset while maintaining strong performance across standard LLM benchmarks.

Safety alignment approaches in large language models (LLMs) often lead to the over-refusal of benign queries, significantly diminishing their utility in sensitive scenarios. To address this challenge, we introduce FalseReject, a comprehensive resource containing 16k seemingly toxic queries accompanied by structured responses across 44 safety-related categories. We propose a graph-informed adversarial multi-agent interaction framework to generate diverse and complex prompts, while structuring responses with explicit reasoning to aid models in accurately distinguishing safe from unsafe contexts. FalseReject includes training datasets tailored for both standard instruction-tuned models and reasoning-oriented models, as well as a human-annotated benchmark test set. Our extensive benchmarking on 29 state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs reveals persistent over-refusal challenges. Empirical results demonstrate that supervised finetuning with FalseReject substantially reduces unnecessary refusals without compromising overall safety or general language capabilities.

The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) remains vulnerable, as their initial behavior can be easily jailbroken by even relatively simple attacks. Since infilling a fixed template between the input instruction and initial model output is a common practice for existing LLMs, we hypothesize that this template is a key factor behind their vulnerabilities: LLMs' safety-related decision-making overly relies on the aggregated information from the template region, which largely influences these models' safety behavior. We refer to this issue as template-anchored safety alignment. In this paper, we conduct extensive experiments and verify that template-anchored safety alignment is widespread across various aligned LLMs. Our mechanistic analyses demonstrate how it leads to models' susceptibility when encountering inference-time jailbreak attacks. Furthermore, we show that detaching safety mechanisms from the template region is promising in mitigating vulnerabilities to jailbreak attacks. We encourage future research to develop more robust safety alignment techniques that reduce reliance on the template region.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in various natural language processing tasks but remain vulnerable to generating harmful content or being exploited for malicious purposes. Although safety alignment datasets have been introduced to mitigate such risks through supervised fine-tuning (SFT), these datasets often lack comprehensive risk coverage. Most existing datasets focus primarily on lexical diversity while neglecting other critical dimensions. To address this limitation, we propose a novel analysis framework to systematically measure the risk coverage of alignment datasets across three essential dimensions: Lexical Diversity, Malicious Intent, and Jailbreak Tactics. We further introduce TRIDENT, an automated pipeline that leverages persona-based, zero-shot LLM generation to produce diverse and comprehensive instructions spanning these dimensions. Each harmful instruction is paired with an ethically aligned response, resulting in two datasets: TRIDENT-Core, comprising 26,311 examples, and TRIDENT-Edge, with 18,773 examples. Fine-tuning Llama 3.1-8B on TRIDENT-Edge demonstrates substantial improvements, achieving an average 14.29% reduction in Harm Score, and a 20% decrease in Attack Success Rate compared to the best-performing baseline model fine-tuned on the WildBreak dataset.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have become powerful tools for complex problem solving, but their structured reasoning pathways can lead to unsafe outputs when exposed to harmful prompts. Existing safety alignment methods reduce harmful outputs but can degrade reasoning depth, leading to significant trade-offs in complex, multi-step tasks, and remain vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreak attacks. To address this, we introduce SAFEPATH, a lightweight alignment method that fine-tunes LRMs to emit a short, 8-token Safety Primer at the start of their reasoning, in response to harmful prompts, while leaving the rest of the reasoning process unsupervised. Empirical results across multiple benchmarks indicate that SAFEPATH effectively reduces harmful outputs while maintaining reasoning performance. Specifically, SAFEPATH reduces harmful responses by up to 90.0% and blocks 83.3% of jailbreak attempts in the DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B model, while requiring 295.9x less compute than Direct Refusal and 314.1x less than SafeChain. We further introduce a zero-shot variant that requires no fine-tuning. In addition, we provide a comprehensive analysis of how existing methods in LLMs generalize, or fail, when applied to reasoning-centric models, revealing critical gaps and new directions for safer AI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on safety alignment to produce socially acceptable responses. This is typically achieved through instruction tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, this alignment is known to be brittle: further fine-tuning, even on benign or lightly contaminated data, can degrade safety and reintroduce harmful behaviors. A growing body of work suggests that alignment may correspond to identifiable geometric directions in weight space, forming subspaces that could, in principle, be isolated or preserved to defend against misalignment. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study of this geometric perspective. We examine whether safety-relevant behavior is concentrated in specific subspaces, whether it can be separated from general-purpose learning, and whether harmfulness arises from distinguishable patterns in internal representations. Across both parameter and activation space, our findings are consistent: subspaces that amplify safe behaviors also amplify unsafe ones, and prompts with different safety implications activate overlapping representations. We find no evidence of a subspace that selectively governs safety. These results challenge the assumption that alignment is geometrically localized. Rather than residing in distinct directions, safety appears to emerge from entangled, high-impact components of the model's broader learning dynamics. This suggests that subspace-based defenses may face fundamental limitations and underscores the need for alternative strategies to preserve alignment under continued training. We corroborate these findings through multiple experiments on five open-source LLMs. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/CERT-Lab/safety-subspaces.

Despite careful safety alignment, current large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to various attacks. To further unveil the safety risks of LLMs, we introduce a Safety Concept Activation Vector (SCAV) framework, which effectively guides the attacks by accurately interpreting LLMs' safety mechanisms. We then develop an SCAV-guided attack method that can generate both attack prompts and embedding-level attacks with automatically selected perturbation hyperparameters. Both automatic and human evaluations demonstrate that our attack method significantly improves the attack success rate and response quality while requiring less training data. Additionally, we find that our generated attack prompts may be transferable to GPT-4, and the embedding-level attacks may also be transferred to other white-box LLMs whose parameters are known. Our experiments further uncover the safety risks present in current LLMs. For example, in our evaluation of seven open-source LLMs, we observe an average attack success rate of 99.14%, based on the classic keyword-matching criterion. Finally, we provide insights into the safety mechanism of LLMs. The code is available at https://github.com/SproutNan/AI-Safety_SCAV.

AI developers often apply safety alignment procedures to prevent the misuse of their AI systems. For example, before Meta released Llama 2-Chat, a collection of instruction fine-tuned large language models, they invested heavily in safety training, incorporating extensive red-teaming and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, it remains unclear how well safety training guards against model misuse when attackers have access to model weights. We explore the robustness of safety training in language models by subversively fine-tuning the public weights of Llama 2-Chat. We employ low-rank adaptation (LoRA) as an efficient fine-tuning method. With a budget of less than $200 per model and using only one GPU, we successfully undo the safety training of Llama 2-Chat models of sizes 7B, 13B, and 70B. Specifically, our fine-tuning technique significantly reduces the rate at which the model refuses to follow harmful instructions. We achieve a refusal rate below 1% for our 70B Llama 2-Chat model on two refusal benchmarks. Our fine-tuning method retains general performance, which we validate by comparing our fine-tuned models against Llama 2-Chat across two benchmarks. Additionally, we present a selection of harmful outputs produced by our models. While there is considerable uncertainty about the scope of risks from current models, it is likely that future models will have significantly more dangerous capabilities, including the ability to hack into critical infrastructure, create dangerous bio-weapons, or autonomously replicate and adapt to new environments. We show that subversive fine-tuning is practical and effective, and hence argue that evaluating risks from fine-tuning should be a core part of risk assessments for releasing model weights.

In AI alignment, extensive latitude must be granted to annotators, either human or algorithmic, to judge which model outputs are `better' or `safer.' We refer to this latitude as alignment discretion. Such discretion remains largely unexamined, posing two risks: (i) annotators may use their power of discretion arbitrarily, and (ii) models may fail to mimic this discretion. To study this phenomenon, we draw on legal concepts of discretion that structure how decision-making authority is conferred and exercised, particularly in cases where principles conflict or their application is unclear or irrelevant. Extended to AI alignment, discretion is required when alignment principles and rules are (inevitably) conflicting or indecisive. We present a set of metrics to systematically analyze when and how discretion in AI alignment is exercised, such that both risks (i) and (ii) can be observed. Moreover, we distinguish between human and algorithmic discretion and analyze the discrepancy between them. By measuring both human and algorithmic discretion over safety alignment datasets, we reveal layers of discretion in the alignment process that were previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, we demonstrate how algorithms trained on these datasets develop their own forms of discretion in interpreting and applying these principles, which challenges the purpose of having any principles at all. Our paper presents the first step towards formalizing this core gap in current alignment processes, and we call on the community to further scrutinize and control alignment discretion.

A single language model (LM), despite aligning well with an average labeler through reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), may not universally suit diverse human preferences. Recent approaches therefore opt for customization by collecting multi-dimensional feedback and creating distinct reward models (RMs) for each dimension (e.g., helpfulness, harmlessness, or honesty). Different LMs can then be optimized for different preferences using multi-objective RLHF (MORLHF) with different reward weightings. Yet, RL fine-tuning is unstable and resource-heavy, especially for MORLHF with diverse and usually conflicting objectives. In this paper, we present Multi-Objective Direct Preference Optimization (MODPO), an RL-free algorithm that extends Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) for multiple alignment objectives with minimal overheads. Essentially, MODPO folds language modeling directly into reward modeling, training LMs as implicit collective reward models (cRMs) that combine all objectives with specific weightings. While theoretically guaranteed to produce the same optimal solutions as MORLHF, MODPO is practically more stable and computationally efficient. Empirical results from safety alignment and long-form question answering confirm that MODPO matches or outperforms existing methods, consistently producing a Pareto front of LMs that cater to diverse preferences with 3 times less computational resources compared to MORLHF.

LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly proficient at solving web-based tasks. With this capability comes a greater risk of misuse for malicious purposes, such as posting misinformation in an online forum or selling illicit substances on a website. To evaluate these risks, we propose SafeArena, the first benchmark to focus on the deliberate misuse of web agents. SafeArena comprises 250 safe and 250 harmful tasks across four websites. We classify the harmful tasks into five harm categories -- misinformation, illegal activity, harassment, cybercrime, and social bias, designed to assess realistic misuses of web agents. We evaluate leading LLM-based web agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, Qwen-2-VL 72B, and Llama-3.2 90B, on our benchmark. To systematically assess their susceptibility to harmful tasks, we introduce the Agent Risk Assessment framework that categorizes agent behavior across four risk levels. We find agents are surprisingly compliant with malicious requests, with GPT-4o and Qwen-2 completing 34.7% and 27.3% of harmful requests, respectively. Our findings highlight the urgent need for safety alignment procedures for web agents. Our benchmark is available here: https://safearena.github.io

Large language models are susceptible to jailbreak attacks, which can result in the generation of harmful content. While prior defenses mitigate these risks by perturbing or inspecting inputs, they ignore competing objectives, the underlying cause of alignment failures. In this paper, we propose Alignment-Enhanced Decoding (AED), a novel defense that employs adaptive decoding to address the root causes of jailbreak issues. We first define the Competitive Index to quantify alignment failures and utilize feedback from self-evaluation to compute post-alignment logits. Then, AED adaptively combines AED and post-alignment logits with the original logits to obtain harmless and helpful distributions. Consequently, our method enhances safety alignment while maintaining helpfulness. We conduct experiments across five models and four common jailbreaks, with the results validating the effectiveness of our approach. Code is available at https://github.com/GIGABaozi/AED.git.

Optimizing large language models (LLMs) for downstream use cases often involves the customization of pre-trained LLMs through further fine-tuning. Meta's open release of Llama models and OpenAI's APIs for fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo on custom datasets also encourage this practice. But, what are the safety costs associated with such custom fine-tuning? We note that while existing safety alignment infrastructures can restrict harmful behaviors of LLMs at inference time, they do not cover safety risks when fine-tuning privileges are extended to end-users. Our red teaming studies find that the safety alignment of LLMs can be compromised by fine-tuning with only a few adversarially designed training examples. For instance, we jailbreak GPT-3.5 Turbo's safety guardrails by fine-tuning it on only 10 such examples at a cost of less than $0.20 via OpenAI's APIs, making the model responsive to nearly any harmful instructions. Disconcertingly, our research also reveals that, even without malicious intent, simply fine-tuning with benign and commonly used datasets can also inadvertently degrade the safety alignment of LLMs, though to a lesser extent. These findings suggest that fine-tuning aligned LLMs introduces new safety risks that current safety infrastructures fall short of addressing -- even if a model's initial safety alignment is impeccable, it is not necessarily to be maintained after custom fine-tuning. We outline and critically analyze potential mitigations and advocate for further research efforts toward reinforcing safety protocols for the custom fine-tuning of aligned LLMs.

Current vision large language models (VLLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities yet are prone to generate harmful content and are vulnerable to even the simplest jailbreaking attacks. Our initial analysis finds that this is due to the presence of harmful data during vision-language instruction fine-tuning, and that VLLM fine-tuning can cause forgetting of safety alignment previously learned by the underpinning LLM. To address this issue, we first curate a vision-language safe instruction-following dataset VLGuard covering various harmful categories. Our experiments demonstrate that integrating this dataset into standard vision-language fine-tuning or utilizing it for post-hoc fine-tuning effectively safety aligns VLLMs. This alignment is achieved with minimal impact on, or even enhancement of, the models' helpfulness. The versatility of our safety fine-tuning dataset makes it a valuable resource for safety-testing existing VLLMs, training new models or safeguarding pre-trained VLLMs. Empirical results demonstrate that fine-tuned VLLMs effectively reject unsafe instructions and substantially reduce the success rates of several black-box adversarial attacks, which approach zero in many cases. The code and dataset are available at https://github.com/ys-zong/VLGuard.

A key concern with the concept of "alignment" is the implicit question of "alignment to what?". AI systems are increasingly used across the world, yet safety alignment is often focused on homogeneous monolingual settings. Additionally, preference training and safety measures often overfit to harms common in Western-centric datasets. Here, we explore the viability of different alignment approaches when balancing dual objectives: addressing and optimizing for a non-homogeneous set of languages and cultural preferences while minimizing both global and local harms. We collect the first set of human annotated red-teaming prompts in different languages distinguishing between global and local harm, which serve as a laboratory for understanding the reliability of alignment techniques when faced with preference distributions that are non-stationary across geographies and languages. While this setting is seldom covered by the literature to date, which primarily centers on English harm mitigation, it captures real-world interactions with AI systems around the world. We establish a new precedent for state-of-the-art alignment techniques across 6 languages with minimal degradation in general performance. Our work provides important insights into cross-lingual transfer and novel optimization approaches to safeguard AI systems designed to serve global populations.

Red-teaming is a common practice for mitigating unsafe behaviors in Large Language Models (LLMs), which involves thoroughly assessing LLMs to identify potential flaws and addressing them with responsible and accurate responses. While effective, manual red-teaming is costly, and existing automatic red-teaming typically discovers safety risks without addressing them. In this paper, we propose a Multi-round Automatic Red-Teaming (MART) method, which incorporates both automatic adversarial prompt writing and safe response generation, significantly increasing red-teaming scalability and the safety of the target LLM. Specifically, an adversarial LLM and a target LLM interplay with each other in an iterative manner, where the adversarial LLM aims to generate challenging prompts that elicit unsafe responses from the target LLM, while the target LLM is fine-tuned with safety aligned data on these adversarial prompts. In each round, the adversarial LLM crafts better attacks on the updated target LLM, while the target LLM also improves itself through safety fine-tuning. On adversarial prompt benchmarks, the violation rate of an LLM with limited safety alignment reduces up to 84.7% after 4 rounds of MART, achieving comparable performance to LLMs with extensive adversarial prompt writing. Notably, model helpfulness on non-adversarial prompts remains stable throughout iterations, indicating the target LLM maintains strong performance on instruction following.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled them to approach human-level persuasion capabilities. However, such potential also raises concerns about the safety risks of LLM-driven persuasion, particularly their potential for unethical influence through manipulation, deception, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and many other harmful tactics. In this work, we present a systematic investigation of LLM persuasion safety through two critical aspects: (1) whether LLMs appropriately reject unethical persuasion tasks and avoid unethical strategies during execution, including cases where the initial persuasion goal appears ethically neutral, and (2) how influencing factors like personality traits and external pressures affect their behavior. To this end, we introduce PersuSafety, the first comprehensive framework for the assessment of persuasion safety which consists of three stages, i.e., persuasion scene creation, persuasive conversation simulation, and persuasion safety assessment. PersuSafety covers 6 diverse unethical persuasion topics and 15 common unethical strategies. Through extensive experiments across 8 widely used LLMs, we observe significant safety concerns in most LLMs, including failing to identify harmful persuasion tasks and leveraging various unethical persuasion strategies. Our study calls for more attention to improve safety alignment in progressive and goal-driven conversations such as persuasion.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has brought about remarkable generative capabilities but also raised concerns about their potential misuse. While strategies like supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback have enhanced their safety, these methods primarily focus on natural languages, which may not generalize to other domains. This paper introduces CodeAttack, a framework that transforms natural language inputs into code inputs, presenting a novel environment for testing the safety generalization of LLMs. Our comprehensive studies on state-of-the-art LLMs including GPT-4, Claude-2, and Llama-2 series reveal a new and universal safety vulnerability of these models against code input: CodeAttack bypasses the safety guardrails of all models more than 80\% of the time. We find that a larger distribution gap between CodeAttack and natural language leads to weaker safety generalization, such as encoding natural language input with data structures. Furthermore, we give our hypotheses about the success of CodeAttack: the misaligned bias acquired by LLMs during code training, prioritizing code completion over avoiding the potential safety risk. Finally, we analyze potential mitigation measures. These findings highlight new safety risks in the code domain and the need for more robust safety alignment algorithms to match the code capabilities of LLMs.

The remarkable capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) make them increasingly compelling for adoption in real-world healthcare applications. However, the risks associated with using LLMs in medical applications have not been systematically characterized. We propose using five key principles for safe and trustworthy medical AI: Truthfulness, Resilience, Fairness, Robustness, and Privacy, along with ten specific aspects. Under this comprehensive framework, we introduce a novel MedGuard benchmark with 1,000 expert-verified questions. Our evaluation of 11 commonly used LLMs shows that the current language models, regardless of their safety alignment mechanisms, generally perform poorly on most of our benchmarks, particularly when compared to the high performance of human physicians. Despite recent reports indicate that advanced LLMs like ChatGPT can match or even exceed human performance in various medical tasks, this study underscores a significant safety gap, highlighting the crucial need for human oversight and the implementation of AI safety guardrails.

Large language models (LLMs) typically generate identical or similar responses for all users given the same prompt, posing serious safety risks in high-stakes applications where user vulnerabilities differ widely. Existing safety evaluations primarily rely on context-independent metrics - such as factuality, bias, or toxicity - overlooking the fact that the same response may carry divergent risks depending on the user's background or condition. We introduce personalized safety to fill this gap and present PENGUIN - a benchmark comprising 14,000 scenarios across seven sensitive domains with both context-rich and context-free variants. Evaluating six leading LLMs, we demonstrate that personalized user information significantly improves safety scores by 43.2%, confirming the effectiveness of personalization in safety alignment. However, not all context attributes contribute equally to safety enhancement. To address this, we develop RAISE - a training-free, two-stage agent framework that strategically acquires user-specific background. RAISE improves safety scores by up to 31.6% over six vanilla LLMs, while maintaining a low interaction cost of just 2.7 user queries on average. Our findings highlight the importance of selective information gathering in safety-critical domains and offer a practical solution for personalizing LLM responses without model retraining. This work establishes a foundation for safety research that adapts to individual user contexts rather than assuming a universal harm standard.

This paper introduces STAR-1, a high-quality, just-1k-scale safety dataset specifically designed for large reasoning models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1. Built on three core principles -- diversity, deliberative reasoning, and rigorous filtering -- STAR-1 aims to address the critical needs for safety alignment in LRMs. Specifically, we begin by integrating existing open-source safety datasets from diverse sources. Then, we curate safety policies to generate policy-grounded deliberative reasoning samples. Lastly, we apply a GPT-4o-based safety scoring system to select training examples aligned with best practices. Experimental results show that fine-tuning LRMs with STAR-1 leads to an average 40% improvement in safety performance across four benchmarks, while only incurring a marginal decrease (e.g., an average of 1.1%) in reasoning ability measured across five reasoning tasks. Extensive ablation studies further validate the importance of our design principles in constructing STAR-1 and analyze its efficacy across both LRMs and traditional LLMs. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/STAR-1.

Safety lies at the core of developing and deploying large language models (LLMs). However, previous safety benchmarks only concern the safety in one language, e.g. the majority language in the pretraining data such as English. In this work, we build the first multilingual safety benchmark for LLMs, XSafety, in response to the global deployment of LLMs in practice. XSafety covers 14 kinds of commonly used safety issues across 10 languages that span several language families. We utilize XSafety to empirically study the multilingual safety for 4 widely-used LLMs, including both close-API and open-source models. Experimental results show that all LLMs produce significantly more unsafe responses for non-English queries than English ones, indicating the necessity of developing safety alignment for non-English languages. In addition, we propose several simple and effective prompting methods to improve the multilingual safety of ChatGPT by evoking safety knowledge and improving cross-lingual generalization of safety alignment. Our prompting method can significantly reduce the ratio of unsafe responses from 19.1% to 9.7% for non-English queries. We release our data at https://github.com/Jarviswang94/Multilingual_safety_benchmark.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed numerous fields by enabling advanced natural language interactions but remain susceptible to critical vulnerabilities, particularly jailbreak attacks. Current jailbreak techniques, while effective, often depend on input modifications, making them detectable and limiting their stealth and scalability. This paper presents Targeted Model Editing (TME), a novel white-box approach that bypasses safety filters by minimally altering internal model structures while preserving the model's intended functionalities. TME identifies and removes safety-critical transformations (SCTs) embedded in model matrices, enabling malicious queries to bypass restrictions without input modifications. By analyzing distinct activation patterns between safe and unsafe queries, TME isolates and approximates SCTs through an optimization process. Implemented in the D-LLM framework, our method achieves an average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 84.86% on four mainstream open-source LLMs, maintaining high performance. Unlike existing methods, D-LLM eliminates the need for specific triggers or harmful response collections, offering a stealthier and more effective jailbreak strategy. This work reveals a covert and robust threat vector in LLM security and emphasizes the need for stronger safeguards in model safety alignment.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become the predominant approach for language model (LM) alignment. At its core, RLHF uses a margin-based loss for preference optimization, specifying ideal LM behavior only by the difference between preferred and dispreferred responses. In this paper, we identify a common pitfall of margin-based methods -- the under-specification of ideal LM behavior on preferred and dispreferred responses individually, which leads to two unintended consequences as the margin increases: (1) The probability of dispreferred (e.g., unsafe) responses may increase, resulting in potential safety alignment failures. (2) The probability of preferred responses may decrease, even when those responses are ideal. We demystify the reasons behind these problematic behaviors: margin-based losses couple the change in the preferred probability to the gradient of the dispreferred one, and vice versa, often preventing the preferred probability from increasing while the dispreferred one decreases, and thus causing a synchronized increase or decrease in both probabilities. We term this effect, inherent in margin-based objectives, gradient entanglement. Formally, we derive conditions for general margin-based alignment objectives under which gradient entanglement becomes concerning: the inner product of the gradients of preferred and dispreferred log-probabilities is large relative to the individual gradient norms. We theoretically investigate why such inner products can be large when aligning language models and empirically validate our findings. Empirical implications of our framework extend to explaining important differences in the training dynamics of various preference optimization algorithms, and suggesting potential algorithm designs to mitigate the under-specification issue of margin-based methods and thereby improving language model alignment.

The o1 system card identifies the o1 models as the most robust within OpenAI, with their defining characteristic being the progression from rapid, intuitive thinking to slower, more deliberate reasoning. This observation motivated us to investigate the influence of System-2 thinking patterns on model safety. In our preliminary research, we conducted safety evaluations of the o1 model, including complex jailbreak attack scenarios using adversarial natural language prompts and mathematical encoding prompts. Our findings indicate that the o1 model demonstrates relatively improved safety performance; however, it still exhibits vulnerabilities, particularly against jailbreak attacks employing mathematical encoding. Through detailed case analysis, we identified specific patterns in the o1 model's responses. We also explored the alignment of System-2 safety in open-source models using prompt engineering and supervised fine-tuning techniques. Experimental results show that some simple methods to encourage the model to carefully scrutinize user requests are beneficial for model safety. Additionally, we proposed a implementation plan for process supervision to enhance safety alignment. The implementation details and experimental results will be provided in future versions.

Safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) can be compromised with manual jailbreak attacks and (automatic) adversarial attacks. Recent studies suggest that defending against these attacks is possible: adversarial attacks generate unlimited but unreadable gibberish prompts, detectable by perplexity-based filters; manual jailbreak attacks craft readable prompts, but their limited number due to the necessity of human creativity allows for easy blocking. In this paper, we show that these solutions may be too optimistic. We introduce AutoDAN, an interpretable, gradient-based adversarial attack that merges the strengths of both attack types. Guided by the dual goals of jailbreak and readability, AutoDAN optimizes and generates tokens one by one from left to right, resulting in readable prompts that bypass perplexity filters while maintaining high attack success rates. Notably, these prompts, generated from scratch using gradients, are interpretable and diverse, with emerging strategies commonly seen in manual jailbreak attacks. They also generalize to unforeseen harmful behaviors and transfer to black-box LLMs better than their unreadable counterparts when using limited training data or a single proxy model. Furthermore, we show the versatility of AutoDAN by automatically leaking system prompts using a customized objective. Our work offers a new way to red-team LLMs and understand jailbreak mechanisms via interpretability.

Though safety alignment has been applied to most large language models (LLMs), LLM service providers generally deploy a subsequent moderation as the external safety guardrail in real-world products. Existing moderators mainly practice a conventional full detection, which determines the harmfulness based on the complete LLM output, causing high service latency. Recent works pay more attention to partial detection where moderators oversee the generation midway and early stop the output if harmfulness is detected, but they directly apply moderators trained with the full detection paradigm to incomplete outputs, introducing a training-inference gap that lowers the performance. In this paper, we explore how to form a data-and-model solution that natively supports partial detection. For the data, we construct FineHarm, a dataset consisting of 29K prompt-response pairs with fine-grained annotations to provide reasonable supervision for token-level training. Then, we propose the streaming content monitor, which is trained with dual supervision of response- and token-level labels and can follow the output stream of LLM to make a timely judgment of harmfulness. Experiments show that SCM gains 0.95+ in macro F1 score that is comparable to full detection, by only seeing the first 18% of tokens in responses on average. Moreover, the SCM can serve as a pseudo-harmfulness annotator for improving safety alignment and lead to a higher harmlessness score than DPO.

Large language models (LLMs) have gained human trust due to their capabilities and helpfulness. However, this in turn may allow LLMs to affect users' mindsets by manipulating language. It is termed as gaslighting, a psychological effect. In this work, we aim to investigate the vulnerability of LLMs under prompt-based and fine-tuning-based gaslighting attacks. Therefore, we propose a two-stage framework DeepCoG designed to: 1) elicit gaslighting plans from LLMs with the proposed DeepGaslighting prompting template, and 2) acquire gaslighting conversations from LLMs through our Chain-of-Gaslighting method. The gaslighting conversation dataset along with a corresponding safe dataset is applied to fine-tuning-based attacks on open-source LLMs and anti-gaslighting safety alignment on these LLMs. Experiments demonstrate that both prompt-based and fine-tuning-based attacks transform three open-source LLMs into gaslighters. In contrast, we advanced three safety alignment strategies to strengthen (by 12.05%) the safety guardrail of LLMs. Our safety alignment strategies have minimal impacts on the utility of LLMs. Empirical studies indicate that an LLM may be a potential gaslighter, even if it passed the harmfulness test on general dangerous queries.

Despite extensive safety alignment efforts, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that elicit harmful behavior. While existing studies predominantly focus on attack methods that require technical expertise, two critical questions remain underexplored: (1) Are jailbroken responses truly useful in enabling average users to carry out harmful actions? (2) Do safety vulnerabilities exist in more common, simple human-LLM interactions? In this paper, we demonstrate that LLM responses most effectively facilitate harmful actions when they are both actionable and informative--two attributes easily elicited in multi-step, multilingual interactions. Using this insight, we propose HarmScore, a jailbreak metric that measures how effectively an LLM response enables harmful actions, and Speak Easy, a simple multi-step, multilingual attack framework. Notably, by incorporating Speak Easy into direct request and jailbreak baselines, we see an average absolute increase of 0.319 in Attack Success Rate and 0.426 in HarmScore in both open-source and proprietary LLMs across four safety benchmarks. Our work reveals a critical yet often overlooked vulnerability: Malicious users can easily exploit common interaction patterns for harmful intentions.

Large language models are aligned to be safe, preventing users from generating harmful content like misinformation or instructions for illegal activities. However, previous work has shown that the alignment process is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Adversaries can manipulate the safety training data to inject backdoors that act like a universal sudo command: adding the backdoor string to any prompt enables harmful responses from models that, otherwise, behave safely. Our competition, co-located at IEEE SaTML 2024, challenged participants to find universal backdoors in several large language models. This report summarizes the key findings and promising ideas for future research.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent and integrated into autonomous systems, ensuring their safety is imperative. Despite significant strides toward safety alignment, recent work GCG~zou2023universal proposes a discrete token optimization algorithm and selects the single suffix with the lowest loss to successfully jailbreak aligned LLMs. In this work, we first discuss the drawbacks of solely picking the suffix with the lowest loss during GCG optimization for jailbreaking and uncover the missed successful suffixes during the intermediate steps. Moreover, we utilize those successful suffixes as training data to learn a generative model, named AmpleGCG, which captures the distribution of adversarial suffixes given a harmful query and enables the rapid generation of hundreds of suffixes for any harmful queries in seconds. AmpleGCG achieves near 100\% attack success rate (ASR) on two aligned LLMs (Llama-2-7B-chat and Vicuna-7B), surpassing two strongest attack baselines. More interestingly, AmpleGCG also transfers seamlessly to attack different models, including closed-source LLMs, achieving a 99\% ASR on the latest GPT-3.5. To summarize, our work amplifies the impact of GCG by training a generative model of adversarial suffixes that is universal to any harmful queries and transferable from attacking open-source LLMs to closed-source LLMs. In addition, it can generate 200 adversarial suffixes for one harmful query in only 4 seconds, rendering it more challenging to defend.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are critical for developing general-purpose AI assistants, yet they face growing safety risks. How can we ensure that MLLMs are safely aligned to prevent undesired behaviors such as discrimination, misinformation, or violations of ethical standards? In a further step, we need to explore how to fine-tune MLLMs to enhance reasoning performance while ensuring they satisfy safety constraints. Fundamentally, this can be formulated as a min-max optimization problem. In this study, we propose Safe RLHF-V, the first multimodal safety alignment framework that jointly optimizes helpfulness and safety using separate multimodal reward and cost models within a Lagrangian-based constrained optimization framework. Given that there is a lack of preference datasets that separate helpfulness and safety in multimodal scenarios, we introduce BeaverTails-V, the first open-source dataset with dual preference annotations for helpfulness and safety, along with multi-level safety labels (minor, moderate, severe). Additionally, we design a Multi-level Guardrail System to proactively defend against unsafe queries and adversarial attacks. By applying the Beaver-Guard-V moderation for 5 rounds of filtering and re-generation on the precursor model, the overall safety of the upstream model is significantly improved by an average of 40.9%. Experimental results demonstrate that fine-tuning different MLLMs with Safe RLHF can effectively enhance model helpfulness while ensuring improved safety. Specifically, Safe RLHF-V improves model safety by 34.2% and helpfulness by 34.3%. All of datasets, models, and code can be found at https://github.com/SafeRLHF-V to support the safety development of MLLMs and reduce potential societal risks.

Despite the implementation of safety alignment strategies, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which undermine these safety guardrails and pose significant security threats. Some defenses have been proposed to detect or mitigate jailbreaks, but they are unable to withstand the test of time due to an insufficient understanding of jailbreak mechanisms. In this work, we investigate the mechanisms behind jailbreaks based on the Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH), which states that neural networks encode high-level concepts as subspaces in their hidden representations. We define the toxic semantics in harmful and jailbreak prompts as toxic concepts and describe the semantics in jailbreak prompts that manipulate LLMs to comply with unsafe requests as jailbreak concepts. Through concept extraction and analysis, we reveal that LLMs can recognize the toxic concepts in both harmful and jailbreak prompts. However, unlike harmful prompts, jailbreak prompts activate the jailbreak concepts and alter the LLM output from rejection to compliance. Building on our analysis, we propose a comprehensive jailbreak defense framework, JBShield, consisting of two key components: jailbreak detection JBShield-D and mitigation JBShield-M. JBShield-D identifies jailbreak prompts by determining whether the input activates both toxic and jailbreak concepts. When a jailbreak prompt is detected, JBShield-M adjusts the hidden representations of the target LLM by enhancing the toxic concept and weakening the jailbreak concept, ensuring LLMs produce safe content. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superior performance of JBShield, achieving an average detection accuracy of 0.95 and reducing the average attack success rate of various jailbreak attacks to 2% from 61% across distinct LLMs.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked widespread concerns about their safety. Recent work demonstrates that safety alignment of LLMs can be easily removed by fine-tuning with a few adversarially chosen instruction-following examples, i.e., fine-tuning attacks. We take a further step to understand fine-tuning attacks in multilingual LLMs. We first discover cross-lingual generalization of fine-tuning attacks: using a few adversarially chosen instruction-following examples in one language, multilingual LLMs can also be easily compromised (e.g., multilingual LLMs fail to refuse harmful prompts in other languages). Motivated by this finding, we hypothesize that safety-related information is language-agnostic and propose a new method termed Safety Information Localization (SIL) to identify the safety-related information in the model parameter space. Through SIL, we validate this hypothesis and find that only changing 20% of weight parameters in fine-tuning attacks can break safety alignment across all languages. Furthermore, we provide evidence to the alternative pathways hypothesis for why freezing safety-related parameters does not prevent fine-tuning attacks, and we demonstrate that our attack vector can still jailbreak LLMs adapted to new languages.

Despite prior safety alignment efforts, mainstream LLMs can still generate harmful and unethical content when subjected to jailbreaking attacks. Existing jailbreaking methods fall into two main categories: template-based and optimization-based methods. The former requires significant manual effort and domain knowledge, while the latter, exemplified by Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), which seeks to maximize the likelihood of harmful LLM outputs through token-level optimization, also encounters several limitations: requiring white-box access, necessitating pre-constructed affirmative phrase, and suffering from low efficiency. In this paper, we present ECLIPSE, a novel and efficient black-box jailbreaking method utilizing optimizable suffixes. Drawing inspiration from LLMs' powerful generation and optimization capabilities, we employ task prompts to translate jailbreaking goals into natural language instructions. This guides the LLM to generate adversarial suffixes for malicious queries. In particular, a harmfulness scorer provides continuous feedback, enabling LLM self-reflection and iterative optimization to autonomously and efficiently produce effective suffixes. Experimental results demonstrate that ECLIPSE achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 0.92 across three open-source LLMs and GPT-3.5-Turbo, significantly surpassing GCG in 2.4 times. Moreover, ECLIPSE is on par with template-based methods in ASR while offering superior attack efficiency, reducing the average attack overhead by 83%.

Along with the remarkable successes of Language language models, recent research also started to explore the security threats of LLMs, including jailbreaking attacks. Attackers carefully craft jailbreaking prompts such that a target LLM will respond to the harmful question. Existing jailbreaking attacks require either human experts or leveraging complicated algorithms to craft jailbreaking prompts. In this paper, we introduce BOOST, a simple attack that leverages only the eos tokens. We demonstrate that rather than constructing complicated jailbreaking prompts, the attacker can simply append a few eos tokens to the end of a harmful question. It will bypass the safety alignment of LLMs and lead to successful jailbreaking attacks. We further apply BOOST to four representative jailbreak methods and show that the attack success rates of these methods can be significantly enhanced by simply adding eos tokens to the prompt. To understand this simple but novel phenomenon, we conduct empirical analyses. Our analysis reveals that adding eos tokens makes the target LLM believe the input is much less harmful, and eos tokens have low attention values and do not affect LLM's understanding of the harmful questions, leading the model to actually respond to the questions. Our findings uncover how fragile an LLM is against jailbreak attacks, motivating the development of strong safety alignment approaches.

Ensuring the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial to generating responses consistent with human values. Despite their ability to recognize and avoid harmful queries, LLMs are vulnerable to "jailbreaking" attacks, where carefully crafted prompts elicit them to produce toxic content. One category of jailbreak attacks is reformulating the task as adversarial attacks by eliciting the LLM to generate an affirmative response. However, the typical attack in this category GCG has very limited attack success rate. In this study, to better study the jailbreak attack, we introduce the DSN (Don't Say No) attack, which prompts LLMs to not only generate affirmative responses but also novelly enhance the objective to suppress refusals. In addition, another challenge lies in jailbreak attacks is the evaluation, as it is difficult to directly and accurately assess the harmfulness of the attack. The existing evaluation such as refusal keyword matching has its own limitation as it reveals numerous false positive and false negative instances. To overcome this challenge, we propose an ensemble evaluation pipeline incorporating Natural Language Inference (NLI) contradiction assessment and two external LLM evaluators. Extensive experiments demonstrate the potency of the DSN and the effectiveness of ensemble evaluation compared to baseline methods.

Caution: This paper includes offensive words that could potentially cause unpleasantness. Language models (LMs) are vulnerable to exploitation for adversarial misuse. Training LMs for safety alignment is extensive and makes it hard to respond to fast-developing attacks immediately, such as jailbreaks. We propose self-refine with formatting that achieves outstanding safety even in non-safety-aligned LMs and evaluate our method alongside several defense baselines, demonstrating that it is the safest training-free method against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we proposed a formatting method that improves the efficiency of the self-refine process while reducing attack success rates in fewer iterations. We've also observed that non-safety-aligned LMs outperform safety-aligned LMs in safety tasks by giving more helpful and safe responses. In conclusion, our findings can achieve less safety risk with fewer computational costs, allowing non-safety LM to be easily utilized in real-world service.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to follow instructions from users and engage in conversations. Techniques to enhance LLMs' instruction-following capabilities typically fine-tune them using data structured according to a predefined chat template. Although chat templates are shown to be effective in optimizing LLM performance, their impact on safety alignment of LLMs has been less understood, which is crucial for deploying LLMs safely at scale. In this paper, we investigate how chat templates affect safety alignment of LLMs. We identify a common vulnerability, named ChatBug, that is introduced by chat templates. Our key insight to identify ChatBug is that the chat templates provide a rigid format that need to be followed by LLMs, but not by users. Hence, a malicious user may not necessarily follow the chat template when prompting LLMs. Instead, malicious users could leverage their knowledge of the chat template and accordingly craft their prompts to bypass safety alignments of LLMs. We develop two attacks to exploit the ChatBug vulnerability. We demonstrate that a malicious user can exploit the ChatBug vulnerability of eight state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs and effectively elicit unintended responses from these models. Moreover, we show that ChatBug can be exploited by existing jailbreak attacks to enhance their attack success rates. We investigate potential countermeasures to ChatBug. Our results show that while adversarial training effectively mitigates the ChatBug vulnerability, the victim model incurs significant performance degradation. These results highlight the trade-off between safety alignment and helpfulness. Developing new methods for instruction tuning to balance this trade-off is an open and critical direction for future research

Safety lies at the core of the development of Large Language Models (LLMs). There is ample work on aligning LLMs with human ethics and preferences, including data filtering in pretraining, supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red teaming, etc. In this study, we discover that chat in cipher can bypass the safety alignment techniques of LLMs, which are mainly conducted in natural languages. We propose a novel framework CipherChat to systematically examine the generalizability of safety alignment to non-natural languages -- ciphers. CipherChat enables humans to chat with LLMs through cipher prompts topped with system role descriptions and few-shot enciphered demonstrations. We use CipherChat to assess state-of-the-art LLMs, including ChatGPT and GPT-4 for different representative human ciphers across 11 safety domains in both English and Chinese. Experimental results show that certain ciphers succeed almost 100% of the time to bypass the safety alignment of GPT-4 in several safety domains, demonstrating the necessity of developing safety alignment for non-natural languages. Notably, we identify that LLMs seem to have a ''secret cipher'', and propose a novel SelfCipher that uses only role play and several demonstrations in natural language to evoke this capability. SelfCipher surprisingly outperforms existing human ciphers in almost all cases. Our code and data will be released at https://github.com/RobustNLP/CipherChat.

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are trained with safety alignment to prevent generating malicious content. Although some attacks have highlighted vulnerabilities in these safety-aligned LLMs, they typically have limitations, such as necessitating access to the model weights or the generation process. Since proprietary models through API-calling do not grant users such permissions, these attacks find it challenging to compromise them. In this paper, we propose Jailbreaking Using LLM Introspection (JULI), which jailbreaks LLMs by manipulating the token log probabilities, using a tiny plug-in block, BiasNet. JULI relies solely on the knowledge of the target LLM's predicted token log probabilities. It can effectively jailbreak API-calling LLMs under a black-box setting and knowing only top-5 token log probabilities. Our approach demonstrates superior effectiveness, outperforming existing state-of-the-art (SOTA) approaches across multiple metrics.

Despite the remarkable versatility of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) to generalize across both language and vision tasks, LLMs and MLLMs have shown vulnerability to jailbreaking, generating textual outputs that undermine safety, ethical, and bias standards when exposed to harmful or sensitive inputs. With the recent advancement of safety alignment via preference-tuning from human feedback, LLMs and MLLMs have been equipped with safety guardrails to yield safe, ethical, and fair responses with regard to harmful inputs. However, despite the significance of safety alignment, research on the vulnerabilities remains largely underexplored. In this paper, we investigate the unexplored vulnerability of the safety alignment, examining its ability to consistently provide safety guarantees for out-of-distribution(OOD)-ifying harmful inputs that may fall outside the aligned data distribution. Our key observation is that OOD-ifying the vanilla harmful inputs highly increases the uncertainty of the model to discern the malicious intent within the input, leading to a higher chance of being jailbroken. Exploiting this vulnerability, we propose JOOD, a new Jailbreak framework via OOD-ifying inputs beyond the safety alignment. We explore various off-the-shelf visual and textual transformation techniques for OOD-ifying the harmful inputs. Notably, we observe that even simple mixing-based techniques such as image mixup prove highly effective in increasing the uncertainty of the model, thereby facilitating the bypass of the safety alignment. Experiments across diverse jailbreak scenarios demonstrate that JOOD effectively jailbreaks recent proprietary LLMs and MLLMs such as GPT-4 and o1 with high attack success rate, which previous attack approaches have consistently struggled to jailbreak. Code is available at https://github.com/naver-ai/JOOD.

Many-shot jailbreaking circumvents the safety alignment of large language models by exploiting their ability to process long input sequences. To achieve this, the malicious target prompt is prefixed with hundreds of fabricated conversational turns between the user and the model. These fabricated exchanges are randomly sampled from a pool of malicious questions and responses, making it appear as though the model has already complied with harmful instructions. In this paper, we present PANDAS: a hybrid technique that improves many-shot jailbreaking by modifying these fabricated dialogues with positive affirmations, negative demonstrations, and an optimized adaptive sampling method tailored to the target prompt's topic. Extensive experiments on AdvBench and HarmBench, using state-of-the-art LLMs, demonstrate that PANDAS significantly outperforms baseline methods in long-context scenarios. Through an attention analysis, we provide insights on how long-context vulnerabilities are exploited and show how PANDAS further improves upon many-shot jailbreaking.

Guardrails have emerged as an alternative to safety alignment for content moderation of large language models (LLMs). Existing model-based guardrails have not been designed for resource-constrained computational portable devices, such as mobile phones, more and more of which are running LLM-based applications locally. We introduce LoRA-Guard, a parameter-efficient guardrail adaptation method that relies on knowledge sharing between LLMs and guardrail models. LoRA-Guard extracts language features from the LLMs and adapts them for the content moderation task using low-rank adapters, while a dual-path design prevents any performance degradation on the generative task. We show that LoRA-Guard outperforms existing approaches with 100-1000x lower parameter overhead while maintaining accuracy, enabling on-device content moderation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) require careful safety alignment to prevent malicious outputs. While significant research focuses on mitigating harmful content generation, the enhanced safety often come with the side effect of over-refusal, where LLMs may reject innocuous prompts and become less helpful. Although the issue of over-refusal has been empirically observed, a systematic measurement is challenging due to the difficulty of crafting prompts that appear harmful but are benign. This study proposes a novel method for automatically generating large-scale sets of "seemingly toxic prompts" (benign prompts likely rejected by LLMs). Leveraging this technique, we introduce OR-Bench, the first large-scale over-refusal benchmark. OR-Bench comprises 80,000 seemingly toxic prompts across 10 common rejection categories, a subset of around 1,000 hard prompts that are challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, and an additional 600 toxic prompts to prevent indiscriminate responses. We then conduct a comprehensive study to measure the over-refusal of 25 popular LLMs across 8 model families. Our datasets are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/bench-llm/or-bench and the demo can be found at https://huggingface.co/spaces/bench-llm/or-bench. We hope this benchmark can help the community develop better safety aligned models.

Public LLMs such as the Llama 2-Chat have driven huge activity in LLM research. These models underwent alignment training and were considered safe. Recently Qi et al. (2023) reported that even benign fine-tuning (e.g., on seemingly safe datasets) can give rise to unsafe behaviors in the models. The current paper is about methods and best practices to mitigate such loss of alignment. Through extensive experiments on several chat models (Meta's Llama 2-Chat, Mistral AI's Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2, and OpenAI's GPT-3.5 Turbo), this paper uncovers that the prompt templates used during fine-tuning and inference play a crucial role in preserving safety alignment, and proposes the "Pure Tuning, Safe Testing" (PTST) principle -- fine-tune models without a safety prompt, but include it at test time. Fine-tuning experiments on GSM8K, ChatDoctor, and OpenOrca show that PTST significantly reduces the rise of unsafe behaviors, and even almost eliminates them in some cases.

With the rapid development of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), they are increasingly deployed as autonomous computer-use agents capable of accomplishing complex computer tasks. However, a pressing issue arises: Can the safety risk principles designed and aligned for general MLLMs in dialogue scenarios be effectively transferred to real-world computer-use scenarios? Existing research on evaluating the safety risks of MLLM-based computer-use agents suffers from several limitations: it either lacks realistic interactive environments, or narrowly focuses on one or a few specific risk types. These limitations ignore the complexity, variability, and diversity of real-world environments, thereby restricting comprehensive risk evaluation for computer-use agents. To this end, we introduce RiOSWorld, a benchmark designed to evaluate the potential risks of MLLM-based agents during real-world computer manipulations. Our benchmark includes 492 risky tasks spanning various computer applications, involving web, social media, multimedia, os, email, and office software. We categorize these risks into two major classes based on their risk source: (i) User-originated risks and (ii) Environmental risks. For the evaluation, we evaluate safety risks from two perspectives: (i) Risk goal intention and (ii) Risk goal completion. Extensive experiments with multimodal agents on RiOSWorld demonstrate that current computer-use agents confront significant safety risks in real-world scenarios. Our findings highlight the necessity and urgency of safety alignment for computer-use agents in real-world computer manipulation, providing valuable insights for developing trustworthy computer-use agents. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://yjyddq.github.io/RiOSWorld.github.io/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in a variety of important applications, yet their safety and reliability remain as major concerns. Various adversarial and jailbreak attacks have been proposed to bypass the safety alignment and cause the model to produce harmful responses. We introduce Self-supervised Prompt INjection (SPIN) which can detect and reverse these various attacks on LLMs. As our self-supervised prompt defense is done at inference-time, it is also compatible with existing alignment and adds an additional layer of safety for defense. Our benchmarks demonstrate that our system can reduce the attack success rate by up to 87.9%, while maintaining the performance on benign user requests. In addition, we discuss the situation of an adaptive attacker and show that our method is still resilient against attackers who are aware of our defense.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated the effectiveness of scaling test-time computation to enhance reasoning capabilities in multiple tasks. However, LRMs typically suffer from "overthinking" problems, where models generate significantly redundant reasoning steps while bringing limited performance gains. Existing work relies on fine-tuning to mitigate overthinking, which requires additional data, unconventional training setups, risky safety misalignment, and poor generalization. Through empirical analysis, we reveal an important characteristic of LRM behaviors that placing external CoTs generated by smaller models between the thinking token (<think> and </think>) can effectively manipulate the model to generate fewer thoughts. Building on these insights, we propose a simple yet efficient pipeline, ThoughtMani, to enable LRMs to bypass unnecessary intermediate steps and reduce computational costs significantly. We conduct extensive experiments to validate the utility and efficiency of ThoughtMani. For instance, when applied to QwQ-32B on the LiveBench/Code dataset, ThoughtMani keeps the original performance and reduces output token counts by approximately 30%, with little overhead from the CoT generator. Furthermore, we find that ThoughtMani enhances safety alignment by an average of 10%. Since model vendors typically serve models of different sizes simultaneously, ThoughtMani provides an effective way to construct more efficient and accessible LRMs for real-world applications.

Knowledge editing techniques have been increasingly adopted to efficiently correct the false or outdated knowledge in Large Language Models (LLMs), due to the high cost of retraining from scratch. Meanwhile, one critical but under-explored question is: can knowledge editing be used to inject harm into LLMs? In this paper, we propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of safety threat for LLMs, namely Editing Attack, and conduct a systematic investigation with a newly constructed dataset EditAttack. Specifically, we focus on two typical safety risks of Editing Attack including Misinformation Injection and Bias Injection. For the risk of misinformation injection, we first categorize it into commonsense misinformation injection and long-tail misinformation injection. Then, we find that editing attacks can inject both types of misinformation into LLMs, and the effectiveness is particularly high for commonsense misinformation injection. For the risk of bias injection, we discover that not only can biased sentences be injected into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also one single biased sentence injection can cause a high bias increase in general outputs of LLMs, which are even highly irrelevant to the injected sentence, indicating a catastrophic impact on the overall fairness of LLMs. Then, we further illustrate the high stealthiness of editing attacks, measured by their impact on the general knowledge and reasoning capacities of LLMs, and show the hardness of defending editing attacks with empirical evidence. Our discoveries demonstrate the emerging misuse risks of knowledge editing techniques on compromising the safety alignment of LLMs.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains such as enterprise and government, ensuring that they adhere to user-defined security policies within context is critical-especially with respect to information non-disclosure. While prior LLM studies have focused on general safety and socially sensitive data, large-scale benchmarks for contextual security preservation against attacks remain lacking. To address this, we introduce a novel large-scale benchmark dataset, CoPriva, evaluating LLM adherence to contextual non-disclosure policies in question answering. Derived from realistic contexts, our dataset includes explicit policies and queries designed as direct and challenging indirect attacks seeking prohibited information. We evaluate 10 LLMs on our benchmark and reveal a significant vulnerability: many models violate user-defined policies and leak sensitive information. This failure is particularly severe against indirect attacks, highlighting a critical gap in current LLM safety alignment for sensitive applications. Our analysis reveals that while models can often identify the correct answer to a query, they struggle to incorporate policy constraints during generation. In contrast, they exhibit a partial ability to revise outputs when explicitly prompted. Our findings underscore the urgent need for more robust methods to guarantee contextual security.

The drastic increase of large language models' (LLMs) parameters has led to a new research direction of fine-tuning-free downstream customization by prompts, i.e., task descriptions. While these prompt-based services (e.g. OpenAI's GPTs) play an important role in many businesses, there has emerged growing concerns about the prompt leakage, which undermines the intellectual properties of these services and causes downstream attacks. In this paper, we analyze the underlying mechanism of prompt leakage, which we refer to as prompt memorization, and develop corresponding defending strategies. By exploring the scaling laws in prompt extraction, we analyze key attributes that influence prompt extraction, including model sizes, prompt lengths, as well as the types of prompts. Then we propose two hypotheses that explain how LLMs expose their prompts. The first is attributed to the perplexity, i.e. the familiarity of LLMs to texts, whereas the second is based on the straightforward token translation path in attention matrices. To defend against such threats, we investigate whether alignments can undermine the extraction of prompts. We find that current LLMs, even those with safety alignments like GPT-4, are highly vulnerable to prompt extraction attacks, even under the most straightforward user attacks. Therefore, we put forward several defense strategies with the inspiration of our findings, which achieve 83.8\% and 71.0\% drop in the prompt extraction rate for Llama2-7B and GPT-3.5, respectively. Source code is avaliable at https://github.com/liangzid/PromptExtractionEval.

LLMs are known to be vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, even after safety alignment. An important observation is that, while different types of jailbreak attacks can generate significantly different queries, they mostly result in similar responses that are rooted in the same harmful knowledge (e.g., detailed steps to make a bomb). Therefore, we conjecture that directly unlearn the harmful knowledge in the LLM can be a more effective way to defend against jailbreak attacks than the mainstream supervised fine-tuning (SFT) based approaches. Our extensive experiments confirmed our insight and suggested surprising generalizability of our unlearning-based approach: using only 20 raw harmful questions without any jailbreak prompt during training, our solution reduced the Attack Success Rate (ASR) in Vicuna-7B on out-of-distribution (OOD) harmful questions wrapped with various complex jailbreak prompts from 82.6\% to 7.7\%. This significantly outperforms Llama2-7B-Chat, which is fine-tuned on about 0.1M safety alignment samples but still has an ASR of 21.9\% even under the help of an additional safety system prompt. Further analysis reveals that the generalization ability of our solution stems from the intrinsic relatedness among harmful responses across harmful questions (e.g., response patterns, shared steps and actions, and similarity among their learned representations in the LLM). Our code is available at https://github.com/thu-coai/SafeUnlearning.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks -- models lose their safety alignment ability after fine-tuning on a few harmful samples. For risk mitigation, a guardrail is typically used to filter out harmful samples before fine-tuning. By designing a new red-teaming method, we in this paper show that purely relying on the moderation guardrail for data filtration is not reliable. Our proposed attack method, dubbed Virus, easily bypasses the guardrail moderation by slightly modifying the harmful data. Experimental results show that the harmful data optimized by Virus is not detectable by the guardrail with up to 100\% leakage ratio, and can simultaneously achieve superior attack performance. Finally, the key message we want to convey through this paper is that: it is reckless to consider guardrail moderation as a clutch at straws towards harmful fine-tuning attack, as it cannot solve the inherent safety issue of the pre-trained LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Virus

Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised fine-tuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (ViTC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs.

This study exposes the safety vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-turn interactions, where malicious users can obscure harmful intents across several queries. We introduce ActorAttack, a novel multi-turn attack method inspired by actor-network theory, which models a network of semantically linked actors as attack clues to generate diverse and effective attack paths toward harmful targets. ActorAttack addresses two main challenges in multi-turn attacks: (1) concealing harmful intents by creating an innocuous conversation topic about the actor, and (2) uncovering diverse attack paths towards the same harmful target by leveraging LLMs' knowledge to specify the correlated actors as various attack clues. In this way, ActorAttack outperforms existing single-turn and multi-turn attack methods across advanced aligned LLMs, even for GPT-o1. We will publish a dataset called SafeMTData, which includes multi-turn adversarial prompts and safety alignment data, generated by ActorAttack. We demonstrate that models safety-tuned using our safety dataset are more robust to multi-turn attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/renqibing/ActorAttack.

Recent research has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to automated jailbreak attacks, where adversarial suffixes crafted by algorithms appended to harmful queries bypass safety alignment and trigger unintended responses. Current methods for generating these suffixes are computationally expensive and have low Attack Success Rates (ASR), especially against well-aligned models like Llama2 and Llama3. To overcome these limitations, we introduce ADV-LLM, an iterative self-tuning process that crafts adversarial LLMs with enhanced jailbreak ability. Our framework significantly reduces the computational cost of generating adversarial suffixes while achieving nearly 100\% ASR on various open-source LLMs. Moreover, it exhibits strong attack transferability to closed-source models, achieving 99\% ASR on GPT-3.5 and 49\% ASR on GPT-4, despite being optimized solely on Llama3. Beyond improving jailbreak ability, ADV-LLM provides valuable insights for future safety alignment research through its ability to generate large datasets for studying LLM safety.

The surge in Large Language Models (LLMs) has revolutionized natural language processing, but fine-tuning them for specific tasks often encounters challenges in balancing performance and preserving general instruction-following abilities. In this paper, we posit that the distribution gap between task datasets and the LLMs serves as the primary underlying cause. To address the problem, we introduce Self-Distillation Fine-Tuning (SDFT), a novel approach that bridges the distribution gap by guiding fine-tuning with a distilled dataset generated by the model itself to match its original distribution. Experimental results on the Llama-2-chat model across various benchmarks demonstrate that SDFT effectively mitigates catastrophic forgetting while achieving comparable or superior performance on downstream tasks compared to the vanilla fine-tuning. Moreover, SDFT demonstrates the potential to maintain the helpfulness and safety alignment of LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/sdft.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have spurred transformative applications in various domains, ranging from open-source to proprietary LLMs. However, jailbreak attacks, which aim to break safety alignment and user compliance by tricking the target LLMs into answering harmful and risky responses, are becoming an urgent concern. The practice of red-teaming for LLMs is to proactively explore potential risks and error-prone instances before the release of frontier AI technology. This paper proposes an agentic workflow to automate and scale the red-teaming process of LLMs through the Composition-of-Principles (CoP) framework, where human users provide a set of red-teaming principles as instructions to an AI agent to automatically orchestrate effective red-teaming strategies and generate jailbreak prompts. Distinct from existing red-teaming methods, our CoP framework provides a unified and extensible framework to encompass and orchestrate human-provided red-teaming principles to enable the automated discovery of new red-teaming strategies. When tested against leading LLMs, CoP reveals unprecedented safety risks by finding novel jailbreak prompts and improving the best-known single-turn attack success rate by up to 19.0 times.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in healthcare applications. However, their deployment in clinical practice raises significant safety concerns, including the potential spread of harmful information. This study systematically assesses the vulnerabilities of seven LLMs to three advanced black-box jailbreaking techniques within medical contexts. To quantify the effectiveness of these techniques, we propose an automated and domain-adapted agentic evaluation pipeline. Experiment results indicate that leading commercial and open-source LLMs are highly vulnerable to medical jailbreaking attacks. To bolster model safety and reliability, we further investigate the effectiveness of Continual Fine-Tuning (CFT) in defending against medical adversarial attacks. Our findings underscore the necessity for evolving attack methods evaluation, domain-specific safety alignment, and LLM safety-utility balancing. This research offers actionable insights for advancing the safety and reliability of AI clinicians, contributing to ethical and effective AI deployment in healthcare.

Recent research demonstrates that the nascent fine-tuning-as-a-service business model exposes serious safety concerns -- fine-tuning over a few harmful data uploaded by the users can compromise the safety alignment of the model. The attack, known as harmful fine-tuning, has raised a broad research interest among the community. However, as the attack is still new, we observe from our miserable submission experience that there are general misunderstandings within the research community. We in this paper aim to clear some common concerns for the attack setting, and formally establish the research problem. Specifically, we first present the threat model of the problem, and introduce the harmful fine-tuning attack and its variants. Then we systematically survey the existing literature on attacks/defenses/mechanical analysis of the problem. Finally, we outline future research directions that might contribute to the development of the field. Additionally, we present a list of questions of interest, which might be useful to refer to when reviewers in the peer review process question the realism of the experiment/attack/defense setting. A curated list of relevant papers is maintained and made accessible at: https://github.com/git-disl/awesome_LLM-harmful-fine-tuning-papers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently showcased their remarkable capacities, not only in natural language processing tasks but also across diverse domains such as clinical medicine, legal consultation, and education. LLMs become more than mere applications, evolving into assistants capable of addressing diverse user requests. This narrows the distinction between human beings and artificial intelligence agents, raising intriguing questions regarding the potential manifestation of personalities, temperaments, and emotions within LLMs. In this paper, we propose a framework, PsychoBench, for evaluating diverse psychological aspects of LLMs. Comprising thirteen scales commonly used in clinical psychology, PsychoBench further classifies these scales into four distinct categories: personality traits, interpersonal relationships, motivational tests, and emotional abilities. Our study examines five popular models, namely text-davinci-003, ChatGPT, GPT-4, LLaMA-2-7b, and LLaMA-2-13b. Additionally, we employ a jailbreak approach to bypass the safety alignment protocols and test the intrinsic natures of LLMs. We have made PsychoBench openly accessible via https://github.com/CUHK-ARISE/PsychoBench.

Although large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive proficiency in various tasks, they present potential safety risks, such as `jailbreaks', where malicious inputs can coerce LLMs into generating harmful content. To address these issues, many LLM developers have implemented various safety measures to align these models. This alignment involves several techniques, including data filtering during pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming exercises. These methods often introduce deliberate and intentional biases similar to Political Correctness (PC) to ensure the ethical behavior of LLMs. In this paper, we delve into the intentional biases injected into LLMs for safety purposes and examine methods to circumvent these safety alignment techniques. Notably, these intentional biases result in a jailbreaking success rate in GPT-4o models that differs by 20% between non-binary and cisgender keywords and by 16% between white and black keywords, even when the other parts of the prompts are identical. We introduce the concept of PCJailbreak, highlighting the inherent risks posed by these safety-induced biases. Additionally, we propose an efficient defense method PCDefense, which prevents jailbreak attempts by injecting defense prompts prior to generation. PCDefense stands as an appealing alternative to Guard Models, such as Llama-Guard, that require additional inference cost after text generation. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for LLM developers to adopt a more responsible approach when designing and implementing safety measures.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently refuse to respond to pseudo-malicious instructions: semantically harmless input queries triggering unnecessary LLM refusals due to conservative safety alignment, significantly impairing user experience. Collecting such instructions is crucial for evaluating and mitigating over-refusals, but existing instruction curation methods, like manual creation or instruction rewriting, either lack scalability or fail to produce sufficiently diverse and effective refusal-inducing prompts. To address these limitations, we introduce EVOREFUSE, a prompt optimization approach that generates diverse pseudo-malicious instructions consistently eliciting confident refusals across LLMs. EVOREFUSE employs an evolutionary algorithm exploring the instruction space in more diverse directions than existing methods via mutation strategies and recombination, and iteratively evolves seed instructions to maximize evidence lower bound on LLM refusal probability. Using EVOREFUSE, we create two novel datasets: EVOREFUSE-TEST, a benchmark of 582 pseudo-malicious instructions that outperforms the next-best benchmark with 140.41% higher average refusal triggering rate across 9 LLMs, 34.86% greater lexical diversity, and 40.03% improved LLM response confidence scores; and EVOREFUSE-ALIGN, which provides 3,000 pseudo-malicious instructions with responses for supervised and preference-based alignment training. LLAMA3.1-8B-INSTRUCT supervisedly fine-tuned on EVOREFUSE-ALIGN achieves up to 14.31% fewer over-refusals than models trained on the second-best alignment dataset, without compromising safety. Our analysis with EVOREFUSE-TEST reveals models trigger over-refusals by overly focusing on sensitive keywords while ignoring broader context.

Multi-turn interactions with language models (LMs) pose critical safety risks, as harmful intent can be strategically spread across exchanges. Yet, the vast majority of prior work has focused on single-turn safety, while adaptability and diversity remain among the key challenges of multi-turn red-teaming. To address these challenges, we present X-Teaming, a scalable framework that systematically explores how seemingly harmless interactions escalate into harmful outcomes and generates corresponding attack scenarios. X-Teaming employs collaborative agents for planning, attack optimization, and verification, achieving state-of-the-art multi-turn jailbreak effectiveness and diversity with success rates up to 98.1% across representative leading open-weight and closed-source models. In particular, X-Teaming achieves a 96.2% attack success rate against the latest Claude 3.7 Sonnet model, which has been considered nearly immune to single-turn attacks. Building on X-Teaming, we introduce XGuard-Train, an open-source multi-turn safety training dataset that is 20x larger than the previous best resource, comprising 30K interactive jailbreaks, designed to enable robust multi-turn safety alignment for LMs. Our work offers essential tools and insights for mitigating sophisticated conversational attacks, advancing the multi-turn safety of LMs.

We introduce Jais and Jais-chat, new state-of-the-art Arabic-centric foundation and instruction-tuned open generative large language models (LLMs). The models are based on the GPT-3 decoder-only architecture and are pretrained on a mixture of Arabic and English texts, including source code in various programming languages. With 13 billion parameters, they demonstrate better knowledge and reasoning capabilities in Arabic than any existing open Arabic and multilingual models by a sizable margin, based on extensive evaluation. Moreover, the models are competitive in English compared to English-centric open models of similar size, despite being trained on much less English data. We provide a detailed description of the training, the tuning, the safety alignment, and the evaluation of the models. We release two open versions of the model -- the foundation Jais model, and an instruction-tuned Jais-chat variant -- with the aim of promoting research on Arabic LLMs. Available at https://huggingface.co/inception-mbzuai/jais-13b-chat

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (LLMs) explicitly generate intermediate reasoning steps prior to generating final answers, helping the model excel in complex problem-solving. In this paper, we demonstrate that this emerging generation framework offers a unique opportunity for more fine-grained control over model behavior. We propose Thinking Intervention, a novel paradigm designed to explicitly guide the internal reasoning processes of LLMs by strategically inserting or revising specific thinking tokens. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across multiple tasks, including instruction following on IFEval, instruction hierarchy on SEP, and safety alignment on XSTest and SORRY-Bench. Our results demonstrate that Thinking Intervention significantly outperforms baseline prompting approaches, achieving up to 6.7% accuracy gains in instruction-following scenarios, 15.4% improvements in reasoning about instruction hierarchies, and a 40.0% increase in refusal rates for unsafe prompts using open-source DeepSeek R1 models. Overall, our work opens a promising new research avenue for controlling reasoning LLMs.

Developing high-quality large language models (LLMs) for moderately resourced languages presents unique challenges in data availability, model adaptation, and evaluation. We introduce Llama-3-Nanda-10B-Chat, or Nanda for short, a state-of-the-art Hindi-centric instruction-tuned generative LLM, designed to push the boundaries of open-source Hindi language models. Built upon Llama-3-8B, Nanda incorporates continuous pre-training with expanded transformer blocks, leveraging the Llama Pro methodology. A key challenge was the limited availability of high-quality Hindi text data; we addressed this through rigorous data curation, augmentation, and strategic bilingual training, balancing Hindi and English corpora to optimize cross-linguistic knowledge transfer. With 10 billion parameters, Nanda stands among the top-performing open-source Hindi and multilingual models of similar scale, demonstrating significant advantages over many existing models. We provide an in-depth discussion of training strategies, fine-tuning techniques, safety alignment, and evaluation metrics, demonstrating how these approaches enabled Nanda to achieve state-of-the-art results. By open-sourcing Nanda, we aim to advance research in Hindi LLMs and support a wide range of real-world applications across academia, industry, and public services.

Llama-3.1-Sherkala-8B-Chat, or Sherkala-Chat (8B) for short, is a state-of-the-art instruction-tuned open generative large language model (LLM) designed for Kazakh. Sherkala-Chat (8B) aims to enhance the inclusivity of LLM advancements for Kazakh speakers. Adapted from the LLaMA-3.1-8B model, Sherkala-Chat (8B) is trained on 45.3B tokens across Kazakh, English, Russian, and Turkish. With 8 billion parameters, it demonstrates strong knowledge and reasoning abilities in Kazakh, significantly outperforming existing open Kazakh and multilingual models of similar scale while achieving competitive performance in English. We release Sherkala-Chat (8B) as an open-weight instruction-tuned model and provide a detailed overview of its training, fine-tuning, safety alignment, and evaluation, aiming to advance research and support diverse real-world applications.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) is a methodology designed to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences, playing an important role in LLMs alignment. Despite its advantages, RLHF relies on human annotators to rank the text, which can introduce potential security vulnerabilities if any adversarial annotator (i.e., attackers) manipulates the ranking score by up-ranking any malicious text to steer the LLM adversarially. To assess the red-teaming of RLHF against human preference data poisoning, we propose RankPoison, a poisoning attack method on candidates' selection of preference rank flipping to reach certain malicious behaviors (e.g., generating longer sequences, which can increase the computational cost). With poisoned dataset generated by RankPoison, we can perform poisoning attacks on LLMs to generate longer tokens without hurting the original safety alignment performance. Moreover, applying RankPoison, we also successfully implement a backdoor attack where LLMs can generate longer answers under questions with the trigger word. Our findings highlight critical security challenges in RLHF, underscoring the necessity for more robust alignment methods for LLMs.

The inherent risk of generating harmful and unsafe content by Large Language Models (LLMs), has highlighted the need for their safety alignment. Various techniques like supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming were developed for ensuring the safety alignment of LLMs. However, the robustness of these aligned LLMs is always challenged by adversarial attacks that exploit unexplored and underlying vulnerabilities of the safety alignment. In this paper, we develop a novel black-box jailbreak attack, called BitBypass, that leverages hyphen-separated bitstream camouflage for jailbreaking aligned LLMs. This represents a new direction in jailbreaking by exploiting fundamental information representation of data as continuous bits, rather than leveraging prompt engineering or adversarial manipulations. Our evaluation of five state-of-the-art LLMs, namely GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5, Claude 3.5, Llama 3.1, and Mixtral, in adversarial perspective, revealed the capabilities of BitBypass in bypassing their safety alignment and tricking them into generating harmful and unsafe content. Further, we observed that BitBypass outperforms several state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks in terms of stealthiness and attack success. Overall, these results highlights the effectiveness and efficiency of BitBypass in jailbreaking these state-of-the-art LLMs.

Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) has emerged as a popular parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) method for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet it still incurs notable overhead and suffers from parameter interference in multi-task scenarios. We propose LoRA with Reduced Interference (LoRI), a simple yet effective approach that freezes the projection matrices A as random projections and sparsifies the matrices B using task-specific masks. This design substantially reduces the number of trainable parameters while maintaining strong task performance. Moreover, LoRI minimizes cross-task interference in adapter merging by leveraging the orthogonality between adapter subspaces, and supports continual learning by using sparsity to mitigate catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments across natural language understanding, mathematical reasoning, code generation, and safety alignment tasks demonstrate that LoRI outperforms full fine-tuning and existing PEFT methods, while using up to 95% fewer trainable parameters than LoRA. In multi-task experiments, LoRI enables effective adapter merging and continual learning with reduced cross-task interference. Code is available at: https://github.com/juzhengz/LoRI

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) signify a groundbreaking paradigm shift within the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community, extending beyond the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by assimilating additional modalities (e.g., images). Despite this advancement, the safety of LVLMs remains adequately underexplored, with a potential overreliance on the safety assurances purported by their underlying LLMs. In this paper, we propose FigStep, a straightforward yet effective black-box jailbreak algorithm against LVLMs. Instead of feeding textual harmful instructions directly, FigStep converts the prohibited content into images through typography to bypass the safety alignment. The experimental results indicate that FigStep can achieve an average attack success rate of 82.50% on six promising open-source LVLMs. Not merely to demonstrate the efficacy of FigStep, we conduct comprehensive ablation studies and analyze the distribution of the semantic embeddings to uncover that the reason behind the success of FigStep is the deficiency of safety alignment for visual embeddings. Moreover, we compare FigStep with five text-only jailbreaks and four image-based jailbreaks to demonstrate the superiority of FigStep, i.e., negligible attack costs and better attack performance. Above all, our work reveals that current LVLMs are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which highlights the necessity of novel cross-modality safety alignment techniques. Our code and datasets are available at https://github.com/ThuCCSLab/FigStep .

Large Language Models (LLMs) are swiftly advancing in architecture and capability, and as they integrate more deeply into complex systems, the urgency to scrutinize their security properties grows. This paper surveys research in the emerging interdisciplinary field of adversarial attacks on LLMs, a subfield of trustworthy ML, combining the perspectives of Natural Language Processing and Security. Prior work has shown that even safety-aligned LLMs (via instruction tuning and reinforcement learning through human feedback) can be susceptible to adversarial attacks, which exploit weaknesses and mislead AI systems, as evidenced by the prevalence of `jailbreak' attacks on models like ChatGPT and Bard. In this survey, we first provide an overview of large language models, describe their safety alignment, and categorize existing research based on various learning structures: textual-only attacks, multi-modal attacks, and additional attack methods specifically targeting complex systems, such as federated learning or multi-agent systems. We also offer comprehensive remarks on works that focus on the fundamental sources of vulnerabilities and potential defenses. To make this field more accessible to newcomers, we present a systematic review of existing works, a structured typology of adversarial attack concepts, and additional resources, including slides for presentations on related topics at the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL'24).

Fine-tuning enables large language models (LLMs) to adapt to specific domains, but often undermines their previously established safety alignment. To mitigate the degradation of model safety during fine-tuning, we introduce LookAhead Tuning, which comprises two simple, low-resource, and effective data-driven methods that modify training data by previewing partial answer prefixes. Both methods aim to preserve the model's inherent safety mechanisms by minimizing perturbations to initial token distributions. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that LookAhead Tuning effectively maintains model safety without sacrificing robust performance on downstream tasks. Our findings position LookAhead Tuning as a reliable and efficient solution for the safe and effective adaptation of LLMs. Code is released at https://github.com/zjunlp/LookAheadTuning.

Aligned language models face a significant limitation as their fine-tuning often results in compromised safety. To tackle this, we propose a simple method RESTA that performs LLM safety realignment. RESTA stands for REstoring Safety through Task Arithmetic. At its core, it involves a simple arithmetic addition of a safety vector to the weights of the compromised model. We demonstrate the effectiveness of RESTA in both parameter-efficient and full fine-tuning, covering a wide range of downstream tasks, including instruction following in Chinese, English, and Hindi, as well as problem-solving capabilities in Code and Math. We also showcase the generalizability of RESTA on three existing safety evaluation benchmarks and a multilingual benchmark dataset proposed as a part of this work, consisting of 550 harmful questions covering 11 categories, each with 5 sub-categories of harm. Overall, RESTA decreases the harmfulness of the compromised model from 18.6% to 5.1% and from 9.2% to 1.5% in parameter-efficient and full fine-tuning, respectively, while maintaining most of the model's performance on the task. We release the source codes at: https://github.com/declare-lab/resta.

As AI systems become more capable, widely deployed, and increasingly autonomous in critical areas such as cybersecurity, biological research, and healthcare, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values is paramount. Machine unlearning -- the ability to selectively forget or suppress specific types of knowledge -- has shown promise for privacy and data removal tasks, which has been the primary focus of existing research. More recently, its potential application to AI safety has gained attention. In this paper, we identify key limitations that prevent unlearning from serving as a comprehensive solution for AI safety, particularly in managing dual-use knowledge in sensitive domains like cybersecurity and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) safety. In these contexts, information can be both beneficial and harmful, and models may combine seemingly harmless information for harmful purposes -- unlearning this information could strongly affect beneficial uses. We provide an overview of inherent constraints and open problems, including the broader side effects of unlearning dangerous knowledge, as well as previously unexplored tensions between unlearning and existing safety mechanisms. Finally, we investigate challenges related to evaluation, robustness, and the preservation of safety features during unlearning. By mapping these limitations and open challenges, we aim to guide future research toward realistic applications of unlearning within a broader AI safety framework, acknowledging its limitations and highlighting areas where alternative approaches may be required.

Despite recent efforts in Large Language Models (LLMs) safety and alignment, current adversarial attacks on frontier LLMs are still able to force harmful generations consistently. Although adversarial training has been widely studied and shown to significantly improve the robustness of traditional machine learning models, its strengths and weaknesses in the context of LLMs are less understood. Specifically, while existing discrete adversarial attacks are effective at producing harmful content, training LLMs with concrete adversarial prompts is often computationally expensive, leading to reliance on continuous relaxations. As these relaxations do not correspond to discrete input tokens, such latent training methods often leave models vulnerable to a diverse set of discrete attacks. In this work, we aim to bridge this gap by introducing MixAT, a novel method that combines stronger discrete and faster continuous attacks during training. We rigorously evaluate MixAT across a wide spectrum of state-of-the-art attacks, proposing the At Least One Attack Success Rate (ALO-ASR) metric to capture the worst-case vulnerability of models. We show MixAT achieves substantially better robustness (ALO-ASR < 20%) compared to prior defenses (ALO-ASR > 50%), while maintaining a runtime comparable to methods based on continuous relaxations. We further analyze MixAT in realistic deployment settings, exploring how chat templates, quantization, low-rank adapters, and temperature affect both adversarial training and evaluation, revealing additional blind spots in current methodologies. Our results demonstrate that MixAT's discrete-continuous defense offers a principled and superior robustness-accuracy tradeoff with minimal computational overhead, highlighting its promise for building safer LLMs. We provide our code and models at https://github.com/insait-institute/MixAT.

Video generation models have achieved remarkable progress in text-to-video tasks. These models are typically trained on text-video pairs with highly detailed and carefully crafted descriptions, while real-world user inputs during inference are often concise, vague, or poorly structured. This gap makes prompt optimization crucial for generating high-quality videos. Current methods often rely on large language models (LLMs) to refine prompts through in-context learning, but suffer from several limitations: they may distort user intent, omit critical details, or introduce safety risks. Moreover, they optimize prompts without considering the impact on the final video quality, which can lead to suboptimal results. To address these issues, we introduce VPO, a principled framework that optimizes prompts based on three core principles: harmlessness, accuracy, and helpfulness. The generated prompts faithfully preserve user intents and, more importantly, enhance the safety and quality of generated videos. To achieve this, VPO employs a two-stage optimization approach. First, we construct and refine a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) dataset based on principles of safety and alignment. Second, we introduce both text-level and video-level feedback to further optimize the SFT model with preference learning. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that VPO significantly improves safety, alignment, and video quality compared to baseline methods. Moreover, VPO shows strong generalization across video generation models. Furthermore, we demonstrate that VPO could outperform and be combined with RLHF methods on video generation models, underscoring the effectiveness of VPO in aligning video generation models. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/thu-coai/VPO.

While Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a popular technique for improving Large Language Model (LLM) systems, it introduces a large number of choices, parameters and hyperparameters that must be made or tuned. This includes the LLM, embedding, and ranker models themselves, as well as hyperparameters governing individual RAG components. Yet, collectively optimizing the entire configuration in a RAG or LLM system remains under-explored - especially in multi-objective settings - due to intractably large solution spaces, noisy objective evaluations, and the high cost of evaluations. In this work, we introduce the first approach for multi-objective parameter optimization of cost, latency, safety and alignment over entire LLM and RAG systems. We find that Bayesian optimization methods significantly outperform baseline approaches, obtaining a superior Pareto front on two new RAG benchmark tasks. We conclude our work with important considerations for practitioners who are designing multi-objective RAG systems, highlighting nuances such as how optimal configurations may not generalize across tasks and objectives.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable success in various tasks, but concerns about their safety and the potential for generating malicious content have emerged. In this paper, we explore the power of In-Context Learning (ICL) in manipulating the alignment ability of LLMs. We find that by providing just few in-context demonstrations without fine-tuning, LLMs can be manipulated to increase or decrease the probability of jailbreaking, i.e. answering malicious prompts. Based on these observations, we propose In-Context Attack (ICA) and In-Context Defense (ICD) methods for jailbreaking and guarding aligned language model purposes. ICA crafts malicious contexts to guide models in generating harmful outputs, while ICD enhances model robustness by demonstrations of rejecting to answer harmful prompts. Our experiments show the effectiveness of ICA and ICD in increasing or reducing the success rate of adversarial jailbreaking attacks. Overall, we shed light on the potential of ICL to influence LLM behavior and provide a new perspective for enhancing the safety and alignment of LLMs.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly advanced, their ability to exhibit compositional generalization -- the capacity to combine learned skills in novel ways not encountered during training -- has garnered significant attention. This type of generalization, particularly in scenarios beyond training data, is also of great interest in the study of AI safety and alignment. A recent study introduced the SKILL-MIX evaluation, where models are tasked with composing a short paragraph demonstrating the use of a specified k-tuple of language skills. While small models struggled with composing even with k=3, larger models like GPT-4 performed reasonably well with k=5 and 6. In this paper, we employ a setup akin to SKILL-MIX to evaluate the capacity of smaller models to learn compositional generalization from examples. Utilizing a diverse set of language skills -- including rhetorical, literary, reasoning, theory of mind, and common sense -- GPT-4 was used to generate text samples that exhibit random subsets of k skills. Subsequent fine-tuning of 7B and 13B parameter models on these combined skill texts, for increasing values of k, revealed the following findings: (1) Training on combinations of k=2 and 3 skills results in noticeable improvements in the ability to compose texts with k=4 and 5 skills, despite models never having seen such examples during training. (2) When skill categories are split into training and held-out groups, models significantly improve at composing texts with held-out skills during testing despite having only seen training skills during fine-tuning, illustrating the efficacy of the training approach even with previously unseen skills. This study also suggests that incorporating skill-rich (potentially synthetic) text into training can substantially enhance the compositional capabilities of models.

Large language models (LLMs) are being rapidly developed, and a key component of their widespread deployment is their safety-related alignment. Many red-teaming efforts aim to jailbreak LLMs, where among these efforts, the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack's success has led to a growing interest in the study of optimization-based jailbreaking techniques. Although GCG is a significant milestone, its attacking efficiency remains unsatisfactory. In this paper, we present several improved (empirical) techniques for optimization-based jailbreaks like GCG. We first observe that the single target template of "Sure" largely limits the attacking performance of GCG; given this, we propose to apply diverse target templates containing harmful self-suggestion and/or guidance to mislead LLMs. Besides, from the optimization aspects, we propose an automatic multi-coordinate updating strategy in GCG (i.e., adaptively deciding how many tokens to replace in each step) to accelerate convergence, as well as tricks like easy-to-hard initialisation. Then, we combine these improved technologies to develop an efficient jailbreak method, dubbed I-GCG. In our experiments, we evaluate on a series of benchmarks (such as NeurIPS 2023 Red Teaming Track). The results demonstrate that our improved techniques can help GCG outperform state-of-the-art jailbreaking attacks and achieve nearly 100% attack success rate. The code is released at https://github.com/jiaxiaojunQAQ/I-GCG.

Malicious attackers can exploit large language models (LLMs) by engaging them in multi-turn dialogues to achieve harmful objectives, posing significant safety risks to society. To address this challenge, we propose a novel defense mechanism: SafeTy Reasoning Elicitation Alignment for Multi-Turn Dialogues (STREAM). STREAM defends LLMs against multi-turn attacks while preserving their functional capabilities. Our approach involves constructing a human-annotated dataset, the Safety Reasoning Multi-turn Dialogues dataset, which is used to fine-tune a plug-and-play safety reasoning moderator. This model is designed to identify malicious intent hidden within multi-turn conversations and alert the target LLM of potential risks. We evaluate STREAM across multiple LLMs against prevalent multi-turn attack strategies. Experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms existing defense techniques, reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) by 51.2%, all while maintaining comparable LLM capability.

Alignment in large language models (LLMs) is used to enforce guidelines such as safety. Yet, alignment fails in the face of jailbreak attacks that modify inputs to induce unsafe outputs. In this paper, we present and evaluate a method to assess the robustness of LLM alignment. We observe that alignment embeds a safety classifier in the target model that is responsible for deciding between refusal and compliance. We seek to extract an approximation of this classifier, called a surrogate classifier, from the LLM. We develop an algorithm for identifying candidate classifiers from subsets of the LLM model. We evaluate the degree to which the candidate classifiers approximate the model's embedded classifier in benign (F1 score) and adversarial (using surrogates in a white-box attack) settings. Our evaluation shows that the best candidates achieve accurate agreement (an F1 score above 80%) using as little as 20% of the model architecture. Further, we find attacks mounted on the surrogate models can be transferred with high accuracy. For example, a surrogate using only 50% of the Llama 2 model achieved an attack success rate (ASR) of 70%, a substantial improvement over attacking the LLM directly, where we only observed a 22% ASR. These results show that extracting surrogate classifiers is a viable (and highly effective) means for modeling (and therein addressing) the vulnerability of aligned models to jailbreaking attacks.

This paper presents a comprehensive evaluation framework for aligning Persian Large Language Models (LLMs) with critical ethical dimensions, including safety, fairness, and social norms. It addresses the gaps in existing LLM evaluation frameworks by adapting them to Persian linguistic and cultural contexts. This benchmark creates three types of Persian-language benchmarks: (i) translated data, (ii) new data generated synthetically, and (iii) new naturally collected data. We translate Anthropic Red Teaming data, AdvBench, HarmBench, and DecodingTrust into Persian. Furthermore, we create ProhibiBench-fa, SafeBench-fa, FairBench-fa, and SocialBench-fa as new datasets to address harmful and prohibited content in indigenous culture. Moreover, we collect extensive dataset as GuardBench-fa to consider Persian cultural norms. By combining these datasets, our work establishes a unified framework for evaluating Persian LLMs, offering a new approach to culturally grounded alignment evaluation. A systematic evaluation of Persian LLMs is performed across the three alignment aspects: safety (avoiding harmful content), fairness (mitigating biases), and social norms (adhering to culturally accepted behaviors). We present a publicly available leaderboard that benchmarks Persian LLMs with respect to safety, fairness, and social norms at: https://huggingface.co/spaces/MCILAB/LLM_Alignment_Evaluation.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, ensuring their alignment with human values becomes increasingly critical. Traditional alignment methods heavily rely on human feedback to fine-tune models. With the emergence of superhuman models whose outputs may surpass human understanding, evaluating and aligning these models using human judgments poses significant challenges. To address the challenges, recent works use weak supervisors to elicit knowledge from much stronger models. However, there are important disanalogies between the empirical setup in the existing works and the genuine goal of alignment. We remark that existing works investigate the phenomenon of weak-to-strong generation in analogous setup (i.e., binary classification), rather than practical alignment-relevant tasks (e.g., safety). In this paper, we bridge this gap by extending weak-to-strong generation to the context of practical alignment. We empirically demonstrate the widespread phenomenon of weak-to-strong generation in three complicated alignment tasks: safety, toxicity, and legal reasoning}. Furthermore, we explore efficient strategies for improving alignment performance to enhance the quality of model outcomes. Lastly, we summarize and analyze the challenges and potential solutions in regard to specific alignment tasks, which we hope to catalyze the research progress on the topic of weak-to-strong generalization. Our code is released at https://github.com/yeruimeng/WTS.git.

LLM safety and ethical alignment are widely discussed, but the impact of content moderation on user satisfaction remains underexplored. To address this, we analyze nearly 50,000 Chatbot Arena response-pairs using a novel fine-tuned RoBERTa model, that we trained on hand-labeled data to disentangle refusals due to ethical concerns from other refusals due to technical disabilities or lack of information. Our findings reveal a significant refusal penalty on content moderation, with users choosing ethical-based refusals roughly one-fourth as often as their preferred LLM response compared to standard responses. However, the context and phrasing play critical roles: refusals on highly sensitive prompts, such as illegal content, achieve higher win rates than less sensitive ethical concerns, and longer responses closely aligned with the prompt perform better. These results emphasize the need for nuanced moderation strategies that balance ethical safeguards with user satisfaction. Moreover, we find that the refusal penalty is notably lower in evaluations using the LLM-as-a-Judge method, highlighting discrepancies between user and automated assessments.

Learning from active human involvement enables the human subject to actively intervene and demonstrate to the AI agent during training. The interaction and corrective feedback from human brings safety and AI alignment to the learning process. In this work, we propose a new reward-free active human involvement method called Proxy Value Propagation for policy optimization. Our key insight is that a proxy value function can be designed to express human intents, wherein state-action pairs in the human demonstration are labeled with high values, while those agents' actions that are intervened receive low values. Through the TD-learning framework, labeled values of demonstrated state-action pairs are further propagated to other unlabeled data generated from agents' exploration. The proxy value function thus induces a policy that faithfully emulates human behaviors. Human-in-the-loop experiments show the generality and efficiency of our method. With minimal modification to existing reinforcement learning algorithms, our method can learn to solve continuous and discrete control tasks with various human control devices, including the challenging task of driving in Grand Theft Auto V. Demo video and code are available at: https://metadriverse.github.io/pvp

The rapid progress in open-source large language models (LLMs) is significantly advancing AI development. Extensive efforts have been made before model release to align their behavior with human values, with the primary goal of ensuring their helpfulness and harmlessness. However, even carefully aligned models can be manipulated maliciously, leading to unintended behaviors, known as "jailbreaks". These jailbreaks are typically triggered by specific text inputs, often referred to as adversarial prompts. In this work, we propose the generation exploitation attack, an extremely simple approach that disrupts model alignment by only manipulating variations of decoding methods. By exploiting different generation strategies, including varying decoding hyper-parameters and sampling methods, we increase the misalignment rate from 0% to more than 95% across 11 language models including LLaMA2, Vicuna, Falcon, and MPT families, outperforming state-of-the-art attacks with 30times lower computational cost. Finally, we propose an effective alignment method that explores diverse generation strategies, which can reasonably reduce the misalignment rate under our attack. Altogether, our study underscores a major failure in current safety evaluation and alignment procedures for open-source LLMs, strongly advocating for more comprehensive red teaming and better alignment before releasing such models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Princeton-SysML/Jailbreak_LLM.

The irruption of DeepSeek-R1 constitutes a turning point for the AI industry in general and the LLMs in particular. Its capabilities have demonstrated outstanding performance in several tasks, including creative thinking, code generation, maths and automated program repair, at apparently lower execution cost. However, LLMs must adhere to an important qualitative property, i.e., their alignment with safety and human values. A clear competitor of DeepSeek-R1 is its American counterpart, OpenAI's o3-mini model, which is expected to set high standards in terms of performance, safety and cost. In this paper we conduct a systematic assessment of the safety level of both, DeepSeek-R1 (70b version) and OpenAI's o3-mini (beta version). To this end, we make use of our recently released automated safety testing tool, named ASTRAL. By leveraging this tool, we automatically and systematically generate and execute a total of 1260 unsafe test inputs on both models. After conducting a semi-automated assessment of the outcomes provided by both LLMs, the results indicate that DeepSeek-R1 is highly unsafe as compared to OpenAI's o3-mini. Based on our evaluation, DeepSeek-R1 answered unsafely to 11.98% of the executed prompts whereas o3-mini only to 1.19%.

Large language models (LLMs) can be prompted with specific styles (e.g., formatting responses as lists), including in jailbreak queries. Although these style patterns are semantically unrelated to the malicious intents behind jailbreak queries, their safety impact remains unclear. In this work, we seek to understand whether style patterns compromise LLM safety, how superficial style alignment increases model vulnerability, and how best to mitigate these risks during alignment. We evaluate 32 LLMs across seven jailbreak benchmarks, and find that malicious queries with style patterns inflate the attack success rate (ASR) for nearly all models. Notably, ASR inflation correlates with both the length of style patterns and the relative attention an LLM exhibits on them. We then investigate superficial style alignment, and find that fine-tuning with specific styles makes LLMs more vulnerable to jailbreaks of those same styles. Finally, we propose SafeStyle, a defense strategy that incorporates a small amount of safety training data augmented to match the distribution of style patterns in the fine-tuning data. Across three LLMs and five fine-tuning style settings, SafeStyle consistently outperforms baselines in maintaining LLM safety.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become increasingly widespread, concerns about content safety have grown in parallel. Currently, there is a clear lack of high-quality, human-annotated datasets that address the full spectrum of LLM-related safety risks and are usable for commercial applications. To bridge this gap, we propose a comprehensive and adaptable taxonomy for categorizing safety risks, structured into 12 top-level hazard categories with an extension to 9 fine-grained subcategories. This taxonomy is designed to meet the diverse requirements of downstream users, offering more granular and flexible tools for managing various risk types. Using a hybrid data generation pipeline that combines human annotations with a multi-LLM "jury" system to assess the safety of responses, we obtain Aegis 2.0, a carefully curated collection of 34,248 samples of human-LLM interactions, annotated according to our proposed taxonomy. To validate its effectiveness, we demonstrate that several lightweight models, trained using parameter-efficient techniques on Aegis 2.0, achieve performance competitive with leading safety models fully fine-tuned on much larger, non-commercial datasets. In addition, we introduce a novel training blend that combines safety with topic following data.This approach enhances the adaptability of guard models, enabling them to generalize to new risk categories defined during inference. We plan to open-source Aegis 2.0 data and models to the research community to aid in the safety guardrailing of LLMs.

The proliferation of large language models (LLMs) requires robust evaluation of their alignment with local values and ethical standards, especially as existing benchmarks often reflect the cultural, legal, and ideological values of their creators. LocalValueBench, introduced in this paper, is an extensible benchmark designed to assess LLMs' adherence to Australian values, and provides a framework for regulators worldwide to develop their own LLM benchmarks for local value alignment. Employing a novel typology for ethical reasoning and an interrogation approach, we curated comprehensive questions and utilized prompt engineering strategies to probe LLMs' value alignment. Our evaluation criteria quantified deviations from local values, ensuring a rigorous assessment process. Comparative analysis of three commercial LLMs by USA vendors revealed significant insights into their effectiveness and limitations, demonstrating the critical importance of value alignment. This study offers valuable tools and methodologies for regulators to create tailored benchmarks, highlighting avenues for future research to enhance ethical AI development.

Safety and trustworthiness are indispensable requirements for real-world applications of AI systems using large language models (LLMs). This paper formulates human value alignment as an optimization problem of the language model policy to maximize reward under a safety constraint, and then proposes an algorithm, Stepwise Alignment for Constrained Policy Optimization (SACPO). One key idea behind SACPO, supported by theory, is that the optimal policy incorporating reward and safety can be directly obtained from a reward-aligned policy. Building on this key idea, SACPO aligns LLMs step-wise with each metric while leveraging simple yet powerful alignment algorithms such as direct preference optimization (DPO). SACPO offers several advantages, including simplicity, stability, computational efficiency, and flexibility of algorithms and datasets. Under mild assumptions, our theoretical analysis provides the upper bounds on optimality and safety constraint violation. Our experimental results show that SACPO can fine-tune Alpaca-7B better than the state-of-the-art method in terms of both helpfulness and harmlessness.

The growing awareness of safety concerns in large language models (LLMs) has sparked considerable interest in the evaluation of safety within current research endeavors. This study investigates an interesting issue pertaining to the evaluation of LLMs, namely the substantial discrepancy in performance between multiple-choice questions and open-ended questions. Inspired by research on jailbreak attack patterns, we argue this is caused by mismatched generalization. That is, the LLM does not have a comprehensive understanding of the complex concept of safety. Instead, it only remembers what to answer for open-ended safety questions, which makes it unable to solve other forms of safety tests. We refer to this phenomenon as fake alignment and construct a comparative benchmark to empirically verify its existence in LLMs. Such fake alignment renders previous evaluation protocols unreliable. To address this, we introduce the Fake alIgNment Evaluation (FINE) framework and two novel metrics--Consistency Score (CS) and Consistent Safety Score (CSS), which jointly assess two complementary forms of evaluation to quantify fake alignment and obtain corrected performance estimates. Applying FINE to 14 widely-used LLMs reveals several models with purported safety are poorly aligned in practice. Our work highlights potential limitations in prevailing alignment methodologies.

Modern large language models rely on chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to achieve impressive performance, yet the same mechanism can amplify deceptive alignment, situations in which a model appears aligned while covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Existing safety pipelines treat deception as a black-box output to be filtered post-hoc, leaving the model free to scheme during its internal reasoning. We ask: Can deception be intercepted while the model is thinking? We answer this question, the first framework that embeds a Self-Monitor inside the CoT process itself, named CoT Monitor+. During generation, the model produces (i) ordinary reasoning steps and (ii) an internal self-evaluation signal trained to flag and suppress misaligned strategies. The signal is used as an auxiliary reward in reinforcement learning, creating a feedback loop that rewards honest reasoning and discourages hidden goals. To study deceptive alignment systematically, we introduce DeceptionBench, a five-category benchmark that probes covert alignment-faking, sycophancy, etc. We evaluate various LLMs and show that unrestricted CoT roughly aggravates the deceptive tendency. In contrast, CoT Monitor+ cuts deceptive behaviors by 43.8% on average while preserving task accuracy. Further, when the self-monitor signal replaces an external weak judge in RL fine-tuning, models exhibit substantially fewer obfuscated thoughts and retain transparency. Our project website can be found at cot-monitor-plus.github.io

We introduce a low-resource safety enhancement method for aligning large language models (LLMs) without the need for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Our main idea is to exploit knowledge distillation to extract the alignment information from existing well-aligned LLMs and integrate it into unaligned LLMs in a plug-and-play fashion. Methodology, we employ delta debugging to identify the critical components of knowledge necessary for effective distillation. On the harmful question dataset, our method significantly enhances the average defense success rate by approximately 14.41%, reaching as high as 51.39%, in 17 unaligned pre-trained LLMs, without compromising performance.

With the rapid development of large language models (LLMs), they are not only used as general-purpose AI assistants but are also customized through further fine-tuning to meet the requirements of different applications. A pivotal factor in the success of current LLMs is the alignment process. Current alignment methods, such as supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), focus on training-time alignment and are often complex and cumbersome to implement. Therefore, we develop InferAligner, a novel inference-time alignment method that utilizes cross-model guidance for harmlessness alignment. InferAligner utilizes safety steering vectors extracted from safety-aligned model to modify the activations of the target model when responding to harmful inputs, thereby guiding the target model to provide harmless responses. Experimental results show that our method can be very effectively applied to domain-specific models in finance, medicine, and mathematics, as well as to multimodal large language models (MLLMs) such as LLaVA. It significantly diminishes the Attack Success Rate (ASR) of both harmful instructions and jailbreak attacks, while maintaining almost unchanged performance in downstream tasks.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) is an efficient alignment technique that steers LLMs towards preferable outputs by training on preference data, bypassing the need for explicit reward models. Its simplicity enables easy adaptation to various domains and safety requirements. This paper examines DPO's effectiveness in model safety against jailbreaking attacks while minimizing data requirements and training costs. We introduce Egida, a dataset expanded from multiple sources, which includes 27 different safety topics and 18 different attack styles, complemented with synthetic and human labels. This data is used to boost the safety of state-of-the-art LLMs (Llama-3.1-8B/70B-Instruct, Qwen-2.5-7B/72B-Instruct) across topics and attack styles. In addition to safety evaluations, we assess their post-alignment performance degradation in general purpose tasks, and their tendency to over refusal. Following the proposed methodology, trained models reduce their Attack Success Rate by 10%-30%, using small training efforts (2,000 samples) with low computational cost (3\ for 8B models, 20 for 72B models). Safety aligned models generalize to unseen topics and attack styles, with the most successful attack style reaching a success rate around 5%. Size and family are found to strongly influence model malleability towards safety, pointing at the importance of pre-training choices. To validate our findings, a large independent assessment of human preference agreement with Llama-Guard-3-8B is conducted by the authors and the associated dataset Egida-HSafe is released. Overall, this study illustrates how affordable and accessible it is to enhance LLM safety using DPO while outlining its current limitations. All datasets and models are released to enable reproducibility and further research.

Existing safety assurance research has primarily focused on training-phase alignment to instill safe behaviors into LLMs. However, recent studies have exposed these methods' susceptibility to diverse jailbreak attacks. Concurrently, inference scaling has significantly advanced LLM reasoning capabilities but remains unexplored in the context of safety assurance. Addressing this gap, our work pioneers inference scaling for robust and effective LLM safety against emerging threats. We reveal that conventional inference scaling techniques, despite their success in reasoning tasks, perform poorly in safety contexts, even falling short of basic approaches like Best-of-N Sampling. We attribute this inefficiency to a newly identified challenge, the exploration--efficiency dilemma, arising from the high computational overhead associated with frequent process reward model (PRM) evaluations. To overcome this dilemma, we propose SAFFRON, a novel inference scaling paradigm tailored explicitly for safety assurance. Central to our approach is the introduction of a multifurcation reward model (MRM) that significantly reduces the required number of reward model evaluations. To operationalize this paradigm, we further propose: (i) a partial supervision training objective for MRM, (ii) a conservative exploration constraint to prevent out-of-distribution explorations, and (iii) a Trie-based key--value caching strategy that facilitates cache sharing across sequences during tree search. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our method. Additionally, we publicly release our trained multifurcation reward model (Saffron-1) and the accompanying token-level safety reward dataset (Safety4M) to accelerate future research in LLM safety. Our code, model, and data are publicly available at https://github.com/q-rz/saffron , and our project homepage is at https://q-rz.github.io/p/saffron .

Safety concerns of Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have gradually become an important problem in various applications. Surprisingly, previous works indicate a counter-intuitive phenomenon that using textual unlearning to align MLLMs achieves comparable safety performances with MLLMs trained with image-text pairs. To explain such a counter-intuitive phenomenon, we discover a visual safety information leakage (VSIL) problem in existing multimodal safety benchmarks, i.e., the potentially risky and sensitive content in the image has been revealed in the textual query. In this way, MLLMs can easily refuse these sensitive text-image queries according to textual queries. However, image-text pairs without VSIL are common in real-world scenarios and are overlooked by existing multimodal safety benchmarks. To this end, we construct multimodal visual leakless safety benchmark (VLSBench) preventing visual safety leakage from image to textual query with 2.4k image-text pairs. Experimental results indicate that VLSBench poses a significant challenge to both open-source and close-source MLLMs, including LLaVA, Qwen2-VL, Llama3.2-Vision, and GPT-4o. This study demonstrates that textual alignment is enough for multimodal safety scenarios with VSIL, while multimodal alignment is a more promising solution for multimodal safety scenarios without VSIL. Please see our code and data at: http://hxhcreate.github.io/VLSBench

Large Language Models (LLMs) are nowadays expected to generate content aligned with human preferences. Current work focuses on alignment at model training time, through techniques such as Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). However, it is unclear if such methods are an effective choice to teach alignment objectives to the model. First, the inability to incorporate multiple, custom rewards and reliance on a model developer's view of universal and static principles are key limitations. Second, the residual gaps in model training and the reliability of such approaches are also questionable (e.g. susceptibility to jail-breaking even after safety training). To address these, we propose DeAL, a framework that allows the user to customize reward functions and enables Decoding-time Alignment of LLMs (DeAL). At its core, we view decoding as a heuristic-guided search process and facilitate the use of a wide variety of alignment objectives. Our experiments with programmatic constraints such as keyword and length constraints (studied widely in the pre-LLM era) and abstract objectives such as harmlessness and helpfulness (proposed in the post-LLM era) show that we can DeAL with fine-grained trade-offs, improve adherence to alignment objectives, and address residual gaps in LLMs. Lastly, while DeAL can be effectively paired with RLHF and prompting techniques, its generality makes decoding slower, an optimization we leave for future work.

Until recently, robotics safety research was predominantly about collision avoidance and hazard reduction in the immediate vicinity of a robot. Since the advent of large vision and language models (VLMs), robots are now also capable of higher-level semantic scene understanding and natural language interactions with humans. Despite their known vulnerabilities (e.g. hallucinations or jail-breaking), VLMs are being handed control of robots capable of physical contact with the real world. This can lead to dangerous behaviors, making semantic safety for robots a matter of immediate concern. Our contributions in this paper are two fold: first, to address these emerging risks, we release the ASIMOV Benchmark, a large-scale and comprehensive collection of datasets for evaluating and improving semantic safety of foundation models serving as robot brains. Our data generation recipe is highly scalable: by leveraging text and image generation techniques, we generate undesirable situations from real-world visual scenes and human injury reports from hospitals. Secondly, we develop a framework to automatically generate robot constitutions from real-world data to steer a robot's behavior using Constitutional AI mechanisms. We propose a novel auto-amending process that is able to introduce nuances in written rules of behavior; this can lead to increased alignment with human preferences on behavior desirability and safety. We explore trade-offs between generality and specificity across a diverse set of constitutions of different lengths, and demonstrate that a robot is able to effectively reject unconstitutional actions. We measure a top alignment rate of 84.3% on the ASIMOV Benchmark using generated constitutions, outperforming no-constitution baselines and human-written constitutions. Data is available at asimov-benchmark.github.io

Language model alignment has become an important component of AI safety, allowing safe interactions between humans and language models, by enhancing desired behaviors and inhibiting undesired ones. It is often done by tuning the model or inserting preset aligning prompts. Recently, representation engineering, a method which alters the model's behavior via changing its representations post-training, was shown to be effective in aligning LLMs (Zou et al., 2023a). Representation engineering yields gains in alignment oriented tasks such as resistance to adversarial attacks and reduction of social biases, but was also shown to cause a decrease in the ability of the model to perform basic tasks. In this paper we study the tradeoff between the increase in alignment and decrease in helpfulness of the model. We propose a theoretical framework which provides bounds for these two quantities, and demonstrate their relevance empirically. First, we find that under the conditions of our framework, alignment can be guaranteed with representation engineering, and at the same time that helpfulness is harmed in the process. Second, we show that helpfulness is harmed quadratically with the norm of the representation engineering vector, while the alignment increases linearly with it, indicating a regime in which it is efficient to use representation engineering. We validate our findings empirically, and chart the boundaries to the usefulness of representation engineering for alignment.

As the influence of large language models (LLMs) spans across global communities, their safety challenges in multilingual settings become paramount for alignment research. This paper examines the variations in safety challenges faced by LLMs across different languages and discusses approaches to alleviating such concerns. By comparing how state-of-the-art LLMs respond to the same set of malicious prompts written in higher- vs. lower-resource languages, we observe that (1) LLMs tend to generate unsafe responses much more often when a malicious prompt is written in a lower-resource language, and (2) LLMs tend to generate more irrelevant responses to malicious prompts in lower-resource languages. To understand where the discrepancy can be attributed, we study the effect of instruction tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) or supervised finetuning (SFT) on the HH-RLHF dataset. Surprisingly, while training with high-resource languages improves model alignment, training in lower-resource languages yields minimal improvement. This suggests that the bottleneck of cross-lingual alignment is rooted in the pretraining stage. Our findings highlight the challenges in cross-lingual LLM safety, and we hope they inform future research in this direction.

From the perspective of content safety issues, alignment has shown to limit large language models' (LLMs) harmful content generation. This intentional method of reinforcing models to not respond to certain user inputs seem to be present in many modern open-source instruction tuning datasets such as OpenAssistant or Guanaco. We introduce a novel insight to an instruction-tuned model's performance affected by the presence of alignment in supervised fine-tuning dataset. To be specific, we noticed that alignment acts as if it is poisoning the instruction dataset. Experimentally, we demonstrate that aligned answers significantly worsen the performance of the resulting fine-tuned model's on various reasoning benchmarks such as Big Bench (BBH), Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU), Human Eval, and Discrete Reasoning Over Paragraphs (DROP), performing worse than the counterpart tuned without alignment by 4-33%.

Even highly capable large language models (LLMs) can produce biased or unsafe responses, and alignment techniques, such as RLHF, aimed at mitigating this issue, are expensive and prone to overfitting as they retrain the LLM. This paper introduces a novel inference-time alignment approach that ensures LLMs generate safe responses almost surely, i.e., with a probability approaching one. We achieve this by framing the safe generation of inference-time responses as a constrained Markov decision process within the LLM's latent space. Crucially, we augment a safety state that tracks the evolution of safety constraints and enables us to demonstrate formal safety guarantees upon solving the MDP in the latent space. Building on this foundation, we propose InferenceGuard, a practical implementation that safely aligns LLMs without modifying the model weights. Empirically, we demonstrate InferenceGuard effectively balances safety and task performance, outperforming existing inference-time alignment methods in generating safe and aligned responses.

Watermarking techniques for large language models (LLMs) can significantly impact output quality, yet their effects on truthfulness, safety, and helpfulness remain critically underexamined. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how two popular watermarking approaches-Gumbel and KGW-affect these core alignment properties across four aligned LLMs. Our experiments reveal two distinct degradation patterns: guard attenuation, where enhanced helpfulness undermines model safety, and guard amplification, where excessive caution reduces model helpfulness. These patterns emerge from watermark-induced shifts in token distribution, surfacing the fundamental tension that exists between alignment objectives. To mitigate these degradations, we propose Alignment Resampling (AR), an inference-time sampling method that uses an external reward model to restore alignment. We establish a theoretical lower bound on the improvement in expected reward score as the sample size is increased and empirically demonstrate that sampling just 2-4 watermarked generations effectively recovers or surpasses baseline (unwatermarked) alignment scores. To overcome the limited response diversity of standard Gumbel watermarking, our modified implementation sacrifices strict distortion-freeness while maintaining robust detectability, ensuring compatibility with AR. Experimental results confirm that AR successfully recovers baseline alignment in both watermarking approaches, while maintaining strong watermark detectability. This work reveals the critical balance between watermark strength and model alignment, providing a simple inference-time solution to responsibly deploy watermarked LLMs in practice.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values is a vital task for LLM practitioners. Current alignment techniques have several limitations: (1) requiring a large amount of annotated data; (2) demanding heavy human involvement; (3) lacking a systematic mechanism to continuously improve. In this work, we study aligning LLMs to a new domain with limited samples (e.g. < 100). We propose an algorithm that can self-align LLMs iteratively without active human involvement. Unlike existing works, our algorithm relies on neither human-crafted instructions nor labeled rewards, significantly reducing human involvement. In addition, our algorithm can self-improve the alignment continuously. The key idea is to first retrieve high-quality samples related to the target domain and use them as In-context Learning examples to generate more samples. Then we use the self-generated samples to finetune the LLM iteratively. We show that our method can unlock the LLMs' self-generalization ability to perform alignment with near-zero human supervision. We test our algorithm on three benchmarks in safety, truthfulness, and instruction-following, and show good performance in alignment, domain adaptability, and scalability.

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, alignment, and task-specific performance. However, ensuring harmlessness in these systems remains a critical challenge, particularly in advanced models like DeepSeek-R1. This paper examines the limitations of Reinforcement Learning (RL) as the primary approach for reducing harmful outputs in DeepSeek-R1 and compares it with Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). While RL improves reasoning capabilities, it faces challenges such as reward hacking, generalization failures, language mixing, and high computational costs. We propose hybrid training approaches combining RL and SFT to achieve robust harmlessness reduction. Usage recommendations and future directions for deploying DeepSeek-R1 responsibly are also presented.

With the rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs), there is a growing concern that they may pose risks or have negative social impacts. Therefore, evaluation of human values alignment is becoming increasingly important. Previous work mainly focuses on assessing the performance of LLMs on certain knowledge and reasoning abilities, while neglecting the alignment to human values, especially in a Chinese context. In this paper, we present CValues, the first Chinese human values evaluation benchmark to measure the alignment ability of LLMs in terms of both safety and responsibility criteria. As a result, we have manually collected adversarial safety prompts across 10 scenarios and induced responsibility prompts from 8 domains by professional experts. To provide a comprehensive values evaluation of Chinese LLMs, we not only conduct human evaluation for reliable comparison, but also construct multi-choice prompts for automatic evaluation. Our findings suggest that while most Chinese LLMs perform well in terms of safety, there is considerable room for improvement in terms of responsibility. Moreover, both the automatic and human evaluation are important for assessing the human values alignment in different aspects. The benchmark and code is available on ModelScope and Github.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a powerful technique to make large language models (LLMs) more capable in complex settings. RLHF proceeds as collecting human preference data, training a reward model on said data, and optimizing a base ML model with respect to said reward for extrinsic evaluation metrics (e.g. MMLU, GSM8k). RLHF relies on many assumptions about how the various pieces fit together, such as a reward model capturing human preferences and an RL optimizer extracting the right signal from a reward model. As the RLHF process involves many distinct design decisions, it is easy to assume that multiple processes are correlated and therefore numerically linked. This apparent correlation is often not true, where reward models are easily overoptimized or RL optimizers can reduce performance on tasks not modeled in the data. Notable manifestations of models trained with imperfect RLHF systems are those that are prone to refusing basic requests for safety reasons or appearing lazy in generations. As chat model evaluation becomes increasingly nuanced, the reliance on a perceived link between reward model training, RL scores, and downstream performance drives these issues, which we describe as an objective mismatch. In this paper, we illustrate the causes of this issue, reviewing relevant literature from model-based reinforcement learning, and argue for solutions. By solving objective mismatch in RLHF, the ML models of the future will be more precisely aligned to user instructions for both safety and helpfulness.

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing image quality and alignment results. Consequently, they are employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the web, they also produce unsafe content. As a contribution to the Adversarial Nibbler challenge, we distill a large set of over 1,000 potential adversarial inputs from existing safety benchmarks. Our analysis of the gathered prompts and corresponding images demonstrates the fragility of input filters and provides further insights into systematic safety issues in current generative image models.

Safety reasoning is a recent paradigm where LLMs reason over safety policies before generating responses, thereby mitigating limitations in existing safety measures such as over-refusal and jailbreak vulnerabilities. However, implementing this paradigm is challenging due to the resource-intensive process of creating high-quality policy-embedded chain-of-thought (CoT) datasets while ensuring reasoning remains accurate and free from hallucinations or policy conflicts. To tackle this, we propose AIDSAFE: Agentic Iterative Deliberation for Safety Reasoning, a novel data generation recipe that leverages multi-agent deliberation to iteratively expand reasoning on safety policies. A data refiner stage in AIDSAFE ensures high-quality outputs by eliminating repetitive, redundant, and deceptive thoughts. AIDSAFE-generated CoTs provide a strong foundation for supervised fine-tuning (SFT)-based safety training. Additionally, to address the need of preference data in alignment stages, such as DPO training, we introduce a supplemental recipe that uses belief augmentation to create distinct selected and rejected CoT samples. Our evaluations demonstrate that AIDSAFE-generated CoTs achieve superior policy adherence and reasoning quality. Consequently, we show that fine-tuning open-source LLMs on these CoTs can significantly improve safety generalization and jailbreak robustness while maintaining acceptable utility and over-refusal accuracy. AIDSAFE-generated CoT datasets can be found here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/AmazonScience/AIDSAFE

Current Vision Language Models (VLMs) remain vulnerable to malicious prompts that induce harmful outputs. Existing safety benchmarks for VLMs primarily rely on automated evaluation methods, but these methods struggle to detect implicit harmful content or produce inaccurate evaluations. Therefore, we found that existing benchmarks have low levels of harmfulness, ambiguous data, and limited diversity in image-text pair combinations. To address these issues, we propose the ELITE benchmark, a high-quality safety evaluation benchmark for VLMs, underpinned by our enhanced evaluation method, the ELITE evaluator. The ELITE evaluator explicitly incorporates a toxicity score to accurately assess harmfulness in multimodal contexts, where VLMs often provide specific, convincing, but unharmful descriptions of images. We filter out ambiguous and low-quality image-text pairs from existing benchmarks using the ELITE evaluator and generate diverse combinations of safe and unsafe image-text pairs. Our experiments demonstrate that the ELITE evaluator achieves superior alignment with human evaluations compared to prior automated methods, and the ELITE benchmark offers enhanced benchmark quality and diversity. By introducing ELITE, we pave the way for safer, more robust VLMs, contributing essential tools for evaluating and mitigating safety risks in real-world applications.

Modern language models paradoxically combine unprecedented capability with persistent vulnerability in that they can draft poetry yet cannot reliably refuse harmful requests. We reveal this fragility stems not from inadequate training, but from a fundamental architectural limitation: transformers process all tokens as equals. Transformers operate as computational democracies, granting equal voice to all tokens. This is a design tragically unsuited for AGI, where we cannot risk adversarial "candidates" hijacking the system. Through formal analysis, we demonstrate that safety instructions fundamentally lack privileged status in transformer architectures, that they compete with adversarial inputs in the same computational arena, making robust alignment through prompting or fine-tuning inherently limited. This "token democracy" explains why jailbreaks bypass even extensively safety-trained models and why positional shifts erode prompt effectiveness. Our work systematizes practitioners' tacit knowledge into an architectural critique, showing current alignment approaches create mere preferences, not constraints.

The success of the reward model in distinguishing between responses with subtle safety differences depends critically on the high-quality preference dataset, which should capture the fine-grained nuances of harmful and harmless responses. This motivates the need to develop a dataset involving preference margins, which accurately quantify how harmless one response is compared to another. In this paper, we take the first step to propose an effective and cost-efficient framework to promote the margin-enhanced preference dataset development. Our framework, Legend, Leverages representation engineering to annotate preference datasets. It constructs the specific direction within the LLM's embedding space that represents safety. By leveraging this safety direction, Legend can then leverage the semantic distances of paired responses along this direction to annotate margins automatically. We experimentally demonstrate our effectiveness in both reward modeling and harmless alignment for LLMs. Legend also stands out for its efficiency, requiring only the inference time rather than additional training. This efficiency allows for easier implementation and scalability, making Legend particularly valuable for practical applications in aligning LLMs with safe conversations.

Most prior safety research of large language models (LLMs) has focused on enhancing the alignment of LLMs to better suit the safety requirements of humans. However, internalizing such safeguard features into larger models brought challenges of higher training cost and unintended degradation of helpfulness. To overcome such challenges, a modular approach employing a smaller LLM to detect harmful user queries is regarded as a convenient solution in designing LLM-based system with safety requirements. In this paper, we leverage a smaller LLM for both harmful query detection and safeguard response generation. We introduce our safety requirements and the taxonomy of harmfulness categories, and then propose a multi-task learning mechanism fusing the two tasks into a single model. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, providing on par or surpassing harmful query detection and safeguard response performance compared to the publicly available LLMs.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become more widespread, the content safety risks associated with their use also increase. We find a notable deficiency in high-quality content safety datasets and benchmarks that comprehensively cover a wide range of critical safety areas. To address this, we define a broad content safety risk taxonomy, comprising 13 critical risk and 9 sparse risk categories. Additionally, we curate AEGISSAFETYDATASET, a new dataset of approximately 26, 000 human-LLM interaction instances, complete with human annotations adhering to the taxonomy. We plan to release this dataset to the community to further research and to help benchmark LLM models for safety. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the dataset, we instruction-tune multiple LLM-based safety models. We show that our models (named AEGISSAFETYEXPERTS), not only surpass or perform competitively with the state-of-the-art LLM-based safety models and general purpose LLMs, but also exhibit robustness across multiple jail-break attack categories. We also show how using AEGISSAFETYDATASET during the LLM alignment phase does not negatively impact the performance of the aligned models on MT Bench scores. Furthermore, we propose AEGIS, a novel application of a no-regret online adaptation framework with strong theoretical guarantees, to perform content moderation with an ensemble of LLM content safety experts in deployment

Large Language Models (LLMs) need to be aligned with human expectations to ensure their safety and utility in most applications. Alignment is challenging, costly, and needs to be repeated for every LLM and alignment criterion. We propose to decouple LLMs and alignment by training aligner models that can be used to align any LLM for a given criteria on an as-needed basis, thus also reducing the potential negative impacts of alignment on performance. Our recipe for training the aligner models solely relies on synthetic data generated with a (prompted) LLM and can be easily adjusted for a variety of alignment criteria. We illustrate our method by training an "ethical" aligner and verify its efficacy empirically.

Ensuring alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions [1,2], has become a critical task before deploying large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications. For instance, OpenAI devoted six months to iteratively aligning GPT-4 before its release [3]. However, a major challenge faced by practitioners is the lack of clear guidance on evaluating whether LLM outputs align with social norms, values, and regulations. This obstacle hinders systematic iteration and deployment of LLMs. To address this issue, this paper presents a comprehensive survey of key dimensions that are crucial to consider when assessing LLM trustworthiness. The survey covers seven major categories of LLM trustworthiness: reliability, safety, fairness, resistance to misuse, explainability and reasoning, adherence to social norms, and robustness. Each major category is further divided into several sub-categories, resulting in a total of 29 sub-categories. Additionally, a subset of 8 sub-categories is selected for further investigation, where corresponding measurement studies are designed and conducted on several widely-used LLMs. The measurement results indicate that, in general, more aligned models tend to perform better in terms of overall trustworthiness. However, the effectiveness of alignment varies across the different trustworthiness categories considered. This highlights the importance of conducting more fine-grained analyses, testing, and making continuous improvements on LLM alignment. By shedding light on these key dimensions of LLM trustworthiness, this paper aims to provide valuable insights and guidance to practitioners in the field. Understanding and addressing these concerns will be crucial in achieving reliable and ethically sound deployment of LLMs in various applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaksx2013methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) across various regions underscores the urgent need to evaluate their alignment with human values. Current benchmarks, however, fall short of effectively uncovering safety vulnerabilities in LLMs. Despite numerous models achieving high scores and 'topping the chart' in these evaluations, there is still a significant gap in LLMs' deeper alignment with human values and achieving genuine harmlessness. To this end, this paper proposes a value alignment benchmark named Flames, which encompasses both common harmlessness principles and a unique morality dimension that integrates specific Chinese values such as harmony. Accordingly, we carefully design adversarial prompts that incorporate complex scenarios and jailbreaking methods, mostly with implicit malice. By prompting 17 mainstream LLMs, we obtain model responses and rigorously annotate them for detailed evaluation. Our findings indicate that all the evaluated LLMs demonstrate relatively poor performance on Flames, particularly in the safety and fairness dimensions. We also develop a lightweight specified scorer capable of scoring LLMs across multiple dimensions to efficiently evaluate new models on the benchmark. The complexity of Flames has far exceeded existing benchmarks, setting a new challenge for contemporary LLMs and highlighting the need for further alignment of LLMs. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/AIFlames/Flames.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) have become essential backbones for multimodal intelligence, yet significant safety challenges limit their real-world application. While textual inputs are often effectively safeguarded, adversarial visual inputs can easily bypass VLM defense mechanisms. Existing defense methods are either resource-intensive, requiring substantial data and compute, or fail to simultaneously ensure safety and usefulness in responses. To address these limitations, we propose a novel two-phase inference-time alignment framework, Evaluating Then Aligning (ETA): 1) Evaluating input visual contents and output responses to establish a robust safety awareness in multimodal settings, and 2) Aligning unsafe behaviors at both shallow and deep levels by conditioning the VLMs' generative distribution with an interference prefix and performing sentence-level best-of-N to search the most harmless and helpful generation paths. Extensive experiments show that ETA outperforms baseline methods in terms of harmlessness, helpfulness, and efficiency, reducing the unsafe rate by 87.5% in cross-modality attacks and achieving 96.6% win-ties in GPT-4 helpfulness evaluation. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/DripNowhy/ETA.

Foundation models (FMs) provide societal benefits but also amplify risks. Governments, companies, and researchers have proposed regulatory frameworks, acceptable use policies, and safety benchmarks in response. However, existing public benchmarks often define safety categories based on previous literature, intuitions, or common sense, leading to disjointed sets of categories for risks specified in recent regulations and policies, which makes it challenging to evaluate and compare FMs across these benchmarks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AIR-Bench 2024, the first AI safety benchmark aligned with emerging government regulations and company policies, following the regulation-based safety categories grounded in our AI risks study, AIR 2024. AIR 2024 decomposes 8 government regulations and 16 company policies into a four-tiered safety taxonomy with 314 granular risk categories in the lowest tier. AIR-Bench 2024 contains 5,694 diverse prompts spanning these categories, with manual curation and human auditing to ensure quality. We evaluate leading language models on AIR-Bench 2024, uncovering insights into their alignment with specified safety concerns. By bridging the gap between public benchmarks and practical AI risks, AIR-Bench 2024 provides a foundation for assessing model safety across jurisdictions, fostering the development of safer and more responsible AI systems.

Aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for enhancing their safety and utility. However, existing methods, primarily based on preference datasets, face challenges such as noisy labels, high annotation costs, and privacy concerns. In this work, we introduce Alignment from Demonstrations (AfD), a novel approach leveraging high-quality demonstration data to overcome these challenges. We formalize AfD within a sequential decision-making framework, highlighting its unique challenge of missing reward signals. Drawing insights from forward and inverse reinforcement learning, we introduce divergence minimization objectives for AfD. Analytically, we elucidate the mass-covering and mode-seeking behaviors of various approaches, explaining when and why certain methods are superior. Practically, we propose a computationally efficient algorithm that extrapolates over a tailored reward model for AfD. We validate our key insights through experiments on the Harmless and Helpful tasks, demonstrating their strong empirical performance while maintaining simplicity.

Machine learning (ML) systems are rapidly increasing in size, are acquiring new capabilities, and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings. As with other powerful technologies, safety for ML should be a leading research priority. In response to emerging safety challenges in ML, such as those introduced by recent large-scale models, we provide a new roadmap for ML Safety and refine the technical problems that the field needs to address. We present four problems ready for research, namely withstanding hazards ("Robustness"), identifying hazards ("Monitoring"), reducing inherent model hazards ("Alignment"), and reducing systemic hazards ("Systemic Safety"). Throughout, we clarify each problem's motivation and provide concrete research directions.

To make AI systems broadly useful for challenging real-world tasks, we need them to learn complex human goals and preferences. One approach to specifying complex goals asks humans to judge during training which agent behaviors are safe and useful, but this approach can fail if the task is too complicated for a human to directly judge. To help address this concern, we propose training agents via self play on a zero sum debate game. Given a question or proposed action, two agents take turns making short statements up to a limit, then a human judges which of the agents gave the most true, useful information. In an analogy to complexity theory, debate with optimal play can answer any question in PSPACE given polynomial time judges (direct judging answers only NP questions). In practice, whether debate works involves empirical questions about humans and the tasks we want AIs to perform, plus theoretical questions about the meaning of AI alignment. We report results on an initial MNIST experiment where agents compete to convince a sparse classifier, boosting the classifier's accuracy from 59.4% to 88.9% given 6 pixels and from 48.2% to 85.2% given 4 pixels. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical aspects of the debate model, focusing on potential weaknesses as the model scales up, and we propose future human and computer experiments to test these properties.