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f03f5e37-e34b-406f-b17e-349359fadf7d | ., that its FOIA request is meant to be coterminous with FACA’s parameters. Pl.’s Mem. at 24; Pl.’s Reply at 9. 25 Second, on this subject of records, the Government invokes the so-called “staff work” exception to FACA. Defs.’ Mem. at 15 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
141087bf-0126-4819-a86f-27d0676309ea | . Under this exception, the Government says, “‘staff work’ or other documents not directly considered by the committee members are not subject to FACA’s open records requirement.” Id. FOIA, by contrast, “contains no equivalent exception.” Id. Assuming without deciding that this “staff work” exception exists,9 the Court sees no conflict | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
686c939a-aa14-48fe-a99f-a59954b275cb | . Under the Government’s framing of the exception, if FACA and FOIA apply to the same entity, FACA requires it to disclose certain records, and FOIA requires it to disclose certain additional records. But this would just mean an entity that is both an advisory committee and an agency has greater transparency obligations—for “staff work”—than an entity that is only an advisory committee | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
c0a16668-fefd-4e21-8dd1-9145ccba34d0 | . There is nothing problematic about this. See Pl.’s Mem. at 25 (“Congress may add to the transparency requirements of a federal entity as it desires; there is no provision or rule that limits disclosure obligations to just the FOIA or just the FACA for a particular entity.”) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
fc8de3d7-b739-4610-a65c-19d088777615 | . The Government’s next argument revolves around FOIA’s Exemption 5, which exempts from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5); see Defs.’ Mem. at 15–16 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
9421bd0c-da76-4a72-85e3-d29dd97e675a | . It posits that Exemption 5 reveals the “clearest inconsistency in deeming the same entity an advisory committee and an agency.” Defs.’ Reply at 8. The problem, according to the Government, is that FACA generally requires disclosure of records, yet Exemption 5 would shield a portion of these records from public view, which would undermine FACA’s “purpose.” Id. at 8–9 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
3b3640d6-1922-4dc7-afde-7f56ea2bc496 | . Gates, Wolfe, and the 1988 OLC opinion echo this concern. See Gates, 366 F. Supp. at 799–800; Wolfe, 403 F. Supp. at 242–43; Disclosure of 9 EPIC suggests that it does not. See Pl.’s Mem. at 24 & n.1. 26 Advisory Committee Deliberative Materials, 12 Op. O.L.C. at 77. The Court is unconvinced that a single FOIA exemption prevents Congress from imposing FOIA and FACA on the same body | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
8e55d06b-a088-4921-929b-586b62dd2e35 | . To begin with, even accepting that FACA’s “purpose” is relevant, Gates and Wolfe are once again distinguishable. Those cases dealt with advisory committees already subject to FACA, and the question was whether they were also agencies. If the answer were yes, both decisions reasoned, that would allow the advisory committee to exploit Exemption 5, which would undermine FACA’s purpose | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
a7efd40d-7a6f-43ea-b15a-29b1bc13a515 | . See Gates, 366 F. Supp. at 799–800; Wolfe, 403 F. Supp. at 242–43. Here, we have the reverse situation. The starting point is that the Commission is an agency subject to FOIA, see NSCAI, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 86, so on the Government’s view, Exemption 5 is already in play, see Defs.’ Reply at 8 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
e886b2be-a5d6-44aa-9ec8-8136c1c83b13 | . The Government now tries to argue that because Exemption 5 may shield some records that FACA would otherwise bring to the light of day—which would work to the Government’s advantage—the Court should excuse the Commission from FACA entirely. But permitting the Government this double advantage would hardly serve FACA’s goal of transparency. More, Exemption 5 fails to present a conflict | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
f82436f6-57ec-4633-a071-bb9e690bf941 | . Under the Government’s framing, Exemption 5 would permit the Commission to withhold certain records that are otherwise subject to disclosure under FACA. Id. Assuming for sake of argument that this framing is correct, it represents a way to reconcile FOIA and FACA: working together, they favor withholding certain documents. Cf. Pl | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
17e47b7a-e303-4aa9-9356-aa934c1642a6 | .’s Reply at 8 (“The fact that the FOIA and the FACA generally treat deliberative records differently does not make the statutes irreconcilable; it simply means that a court must reconcile [their] disclosure provisions if and when that court confronts an assertion of Exemption 5 by a dual FOIA-FACA entity.” (citation omitted)) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
e4b1101d-5d54-4a19-ab21-9d168ad8b72b | . 27 The lack of a conflict is particularly apparent here because FACA’s disclosure provision incorporates FOIA’s exemptions. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 10(b) (“Subject to [5 U.S.C. § 552], the . . . documents which were made available to or prepared for or by each advisory committee shall be available for public inspection and copying[.]” (emphasis added)); NRDC v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 1002, 1003 (D.C | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
3c616528-44b0-44ee-9b12-f6a0c62ee95f | . Cir. 2007) (“FACA incorporates the FOIA exemptions.”). So, as EPIC puts it, “Congress has already done much of the work to reconcile FACA § 10(b) and the FOIA exemptions.” Pl.’s Reply at 7. Finally, the Government’s arguments about Exemption 5 reduce to arguments about purpose, see Defs.’ Reply at 8–9, but that is the wrong way to go about statutory interpretation | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
aad697e5-73aa-4de4-9608-fb066630458f | . Gone are the days when arguments about a statute’s purposes trump clear statutory text. See, e.g., Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 55 n.4 (2012) (“[E]ven the most formidable argument concerning the statute’s purposes could not overcome the clarity we find in the statute’s text.”) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
ef18a61e-0c84-4e12-b950-b601530265a7 | . Here, the “clarity” in the text is that the 2019 NDAA made the Commission both an agency subject to FOIA, see NSCAI, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 86, and an advisory committee subject to FACA, see supra Section III.B. The Court declines to work backward from an argument about FACA’s purpose to conclude that Congress could not have meant what it said in the 2019 NDAA | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
4428f04e-f48a-4c26-9928-d2da3e210949 | . The Government makes two final attempts to show a conflict between FOIA and FACA, but they are unavailing. It asserts that FOIA’s disclosure obligations—unlike FACA’s disclosure obligations—are “limited in time.” Defs.’ Mem. at 16. FOIA requires an agency to produce only records the agency controls at the time of the request, while FACA lacks this limitation. Id | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
c528c6ec-e433-4e14-b989-6cd956631fbb | . The Government next states that FOIA and FACA “create different obligations with regard to the creation of documents.” Id. FOIA does not require agencies to chronicle its activities, while FACA does. Id. 28 These different obligations are complementary, not conflicting | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
98c48f77-a470-434d-8b73-17d9f43b053a | . If the Government is correct, an entity subject to FOIA and FACA would need to look backward, producing records in response to requests, and forward, chronicling its activities and continually supplementing its records. This Janus-like status may be unusual, but it is not impossible | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
3c984d5a-d052-4d0d-8758-01bef342c495 | . And even if there is some tension or conflict between FOIA and FACA, the Government has not offered a persuasive reason why that should matter. It claims that complying with both “would impose greater burdens . . . than is contemplated by either statute alone [and would] wast[e] government resources on complying with redundant requirements.” Defs.’ Reply at 13 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
03dbd100-d739-4a1c-a9ee-d54020d59c48 | . This, the Government stresses, “would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended.” Id. (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998)). An appeal to absurdity faces “a high bar,” and the Government has not come close to clearing it here. Stovic v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 826 F.3d 500, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2016) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
a529928c-8d38-4a3a-90be-c1adff735bbf | . The Government must deal with burdensome—and indeed conflicting—requirements in other areas of law, perhaps most notably in the context of criminal pretrial disclosures. There, the Government faces at least three different and divergent discovery schemes. See, e.g., Cara Spencer, Prosecutorial Disclosure Timing: Does Brady Trump the Jencks Act?, 26 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 997, 997 (2013) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
1556befc-c492-4fc3-87d7-c4aba971e114 | . Yet the Government has proven up to the task.10 The Court expects the same here. For all these reasons, no rule prevented Congress from making the Commission what it is: an “agency” under § 552(f)(1) but not § 551(1), and an “advisory committee” under FACA. 10 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 9-5.000—Issues Related to Discovery Trials, and Other Proceedings, https://www.justice | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
b559846e-5a63-44dd-b1c3-ed8cd91581e9 | .gov/jm/jm-9-5000-issues-related-trials-and-other-court- proceedings (last visited May 29, 2020) (clarifying how to navigate discovery). 29 2. The Government’s secondary argument is that the Commission falls within FACA’s exclusion for “any committee that is composed wholly of full-time, or permanent part-time, officers or employees of the Federal Government.” 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3(2) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
dd15fbfc-6fc1-4005-8034-b9e845a1b580 | . It asserts that the Commission is “composed wholly of . . . permanent part-time . . . employees.” Defs.’ Mem. at 21–22. EPIC responds that the Commission’s members are neither “permanent” nor “part-time,” but are “temporary” and “intermittent.” Pl.’s Mem. at 16–19. The Court agrees with EPIC | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
23ec2aed-b8e2-4c46-ae4b-059381a64752 | . A straightforward reading of the 2019 NDAA reveals that the Commission’s members are “temporary” federal employees. The Commission “shall be considered . . . a temporary organization under [5 U.S.C. § 3161].” Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1051(a)(2). The Commission’s 15 members are “appointed for the life of the Commission” and are “Federal employees.” Id. § 1051(a)(4)(A), (6)–(7) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
6e09cebc-f156-4bcb-8935-c4bf9d92f451 | . The natural reading of this language is that the Commission’s members, as employees “appointed for the life” of a “temporary” federal organization, are “temporary” federal employees. The Government has no direct response to this interpretation | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
c9208006-9d17-4110-87d9-b455666b7c84 | . Instead, it states in conclusory fashion that the Commission’s status as a temporary organization “does not prevent the commissioners from being permanent part-time employees.” Defs.’ Mem. at 21. It focuses on the word “permanent” and tries to explain why the Commission’s members fit into that term even though they are employees of a temporary organization. Id. at 21–22 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
f44a75a6-a36d-4c26-ab23-1d9de04f59fb | . Its efforts are unavailing. FACA does not define the term “permanent,” so the Government urges the Court to interpret it “consistent with the relevant federal regulation[].” Defs.’ Reply at 15. Already, there are problems. For one, the immediate move to regulations is misplaced, because normally, 30 “[w]hen a term goes undefined in a statute, we give the term its ordinary meaning.” Taniguchi v | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
83d5f150-894b-42bf-b445-70059899b0c9 | . Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012). The Government offers an “ordinary understanding” of “permanent employee,” but it is circular: “a person filling a permanent employment position.” Defs.’ Reply at 15. EPIC provides a more compelling ordinary meaning: “[w]ork that, under a contract, is to continue indefinitely until either party wishes to terminate it for some legitimate reason | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
308072a8-6b4f-4380-b937-e1cb8603f750 | .” Pl.’s Mem. at 17 (quoting Employment, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2009)). That does not describe the Commission’s members, who are employed not indefinitely, but for the temporary “life of the Commission.” More, the case the Government cites for interpreting undefined terms “consistent with the relevant federal regulation[]” involved a far different situation from what we have here | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
b1e8b1da-8997-4ba4-8b98-b19f1dc4c719 | . See FDIC v. Phila Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 431–32 (1986). In that case, definitions in the regulations carried special weight because the FDIC had “developed and interpreted” them “for many years within the framework of the complex statutory scheme that [it] administers.” Id. at 431. Here, by contrast, the Government presents no reason why the provision it cites, 5 C.F.R. § 531 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
39c83b23-d2d5-4370-9d9d-3c8e6811201f | .403, is even a “relevant federal regulation” for the term “permanent” in FACA. Defs.’ Reply at 15. FACA charges the General Services Administration with issuing “administrative guidelines and management controls applicable to advisory committees,” 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 7(c), but it was a different agency—the Office of Personnel Management—that issued 5 C.F.R. § 531 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
bb63e61f-ffb7-47b7-b492-f9a90892b2f9 | .403, see Pay Under the General Schedule, 46 Fed. Reg. 2317, 2320 (Jan. 9, 1981). More, the definitions in this regulation apply only “[i]n this subpart,” i.e., the subpart of the civil service regulations implementing a set of “pay-grade” statutes far afield of FACA. 5 C.F.R. § 531.403; see id. § 531.401. 31 In any event, the regulation’s definition of “permanent” does not help the Government | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
bd58b946-0a7b-4691-9be4-510d3ee04516 | . The specific term that § 531.403 uses is not “permanent employee” but “permanent position.” Its definition is “a position filled by an employee whose appointment is not designated as temporary by law and does not have a definite time limitation of one year or less.” Id. § 531.403 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
67e6b519-3a5f-47f2-8bec-f394ed5971a0 | . Under this definition, the Commission’s members do not occupy “permanent positions” because their appointment is “designated as temporary by law” in the 2019 NDAA. Again, the Government offers no persuasive reason—or indeed, any reason at all—why employees of a “temporary” federal organization would be anything but “temporary” federal employees. See Defs.’ Reply at 15 n.5 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
10040e0e-df83-4575-b44a-3cb4d711167a | . The Government also tries to rely on a “common law” meaning of “permanent employee,” but this too fails. It says that under the common law, “a permanent employee is one who is guaranteed a position with an employer so long as the employee’s work is satisfactory and the employer continues to engage in work that requires the employee’s job functions.” Id. at 16 (citing Hodge v. Evans Fin. Corp | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
f232f1ce-0e22-481b-99be-9716f6b15c29 | ., 707 F.2d 1566, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Hodge specifically contrasted this concept of “permanent employment” with employment “scheduled to terminate on a specific date.” See 707 F.2d at 1568. The Commission is scheduled to terminate on a specific date, see 2020 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1735(a), so its members do not meet the Government’s “common law” definition of “permanent employee | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
be574213-bac7-4bf6-abd7-63da08cf00c6 | .” In sum, the Government offers no convincing reason to reject the natural reading of the 2019 NDAA—that the Commission’s members, as employees of a “temporary” federal organization, are “temporary” federal employees. So the Commission does not fall into FACA’s exclusion for committees “composed wholly of . . . permanent part-time . . . employees.” 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3(2) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
44b99f8f-fd39-4dff-87e1-c7aadb767cf6 | . 32 A second, independent reason why the Commission does not fall within this exclusion is that its members are not “part-time” federal employees. Instead, they are “intermittent” employees | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
edd66fb0-6a36-4155-a8e6-ba25249e10cc | . EPIC points to a regulation stating that “[a]n intermittent work schedule is appropriate only when the nature of the work is sporadic and unpredictable so that a tour of duty cannot be regularly scheduled in advance.” Pl.’s Mem. at 18 (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 340.403(a)) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
2635588b-fba4-4347-9030-40bb6494ec73 | . This regulation explicitly distinguishes “intermittent” status from “part-time” status, as it says that “[w]hen an agency is able to schedule work in advance on a regular basis, it has an obligation to document the change in work schedule from intermittent to part-time or full-time to ensure proper service credit.” 5 C.F.R. § 340.403(a) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
4662810c-424f-46b5-b0d0-4dd9982af291 | . The Court agrees with EPIC that “intermittent” accurately describes the employment status of the Commission’s members. All the members have day jobs, the Commission “meets in plenary every other month,” and “each working group meets monthly.” See Compl. ¶, 48 (cleaned up); Answer ¶, 48, ECF No. 29. For example, the Commission met on March 11, May 20, and July 11 of 2019. See Compl | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
c1d1c9ef-ee80-46f8-8f28-1bc923f303b0 | . ¶, 67, 69; Answer ¶, 67, 69. This limited and irregular work schedule fits the bill as “sporadic and unpredictable.” 5 C.F.R. § 340.403(a). The Government does not dispute that § 340.403 is relevant to the meaning of “part- time” versus “intermittent.” Indeed, it provides no affirmative argument for why the Commission’s members are “part-time.” See Defs.’ Mem. at 21–22; Defs.’ Reply at 16–17 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
15202733-36f0-4805-ade8-1bec819998bf | .11 11 EPIC claims the Government’s Answer conceded that “the members of the AI Commission are employed on an ‘intermittent’ basis.” Compl. (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 340.403); see Pl.’s Mem. at 18. The Government disagrees. Defs.’ Reply at 16–17. The Court need not resolve this, as it does not rely on this aspect of EPIC’s argument in concluding that the Commission’s members are “intermittent” employees | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
6218bf94-7797-45a1-9d98-dddc1b5fde3e | . The Court also does not rely on EPIC’s assertion— supported by a declaration attached to its reply brief—that the Commission’s chief of staff stated that “the members of the Commission were employed in ‘excepted service appointments on an intermittent basis.’” Pl.’s Reply at 15; see Davisson Decl. , ECF No. 35-1 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
0d51662d-4834-45ff-b0cf-1fa20e2d8000 | . 33 One final point: EPIC’s position finds support in Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton (“AAPS”), 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993). AAPS considered the status the President’s Task Force on National Health Care Reform and its working group. Id. at 900. The court remanded for further proceedings on the status of the working group. Id | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
23f5bb23-c59d-462d-872e-971baf84cad6 | . It was composed in part of “40 ‘special government employees’ hired by . . . agencies and the Executive Office of the President for a limited duration.” Id. at 901. The court expressed skepticism that the working group—so composed—fell within FACA’s exclusion | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
85a4fafd-b35f-4885-9d5e-92a1b0785407 | . “FACA would be rather easy to avoid if an agency could simply appoint 10 private citizens as special government employees for two days, and then have the committee receive the section 3(2) exemption as a body composed of full-time government employees.” Id. at 915. Similar logic applies here | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
eae3409d-84c5-4751-93e5-713b3bab3b30 | . FACA “would be rather easy to avoid” if the Government is right that private-citizen members of short-term advisory groups are always “permanent part- time” employees of the Federal Government. Indeed, AAPS generalized that “a formal group of a limited number of private citizens who are brought together to give publicized advice as a group . . . would seem covered by [FACA].” Id | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
f5e5d218-14fc-4d43-9f89-9eeb40e3db91 | . The Commission fits this model. C. Because the Commission is an “advisory committee” that must comply with FACA’s requirements, EPIC’s entitlement to mandamus relief is straightforward | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
c0f3e0a7-2fbb-4502-b503-3cd38986c563 | . The party seeking mandamus has the burden of showing “(1) a clear and indisputable right to relief, (2) that the government agency or official is violating a clear duty to act, and (3) that no adequate alternative remedy exists.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2016) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
a471d43b-9970-4f9a-918b-79043f34a630 | .12 12 “Even when [these three] legal requirements for mandamus jurisdiction have been satisfied, however, a court may grant relief only when it finds compelling equitable grounds.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189. Given the Commission’s clear duty to comply with FACA, the Court 34 EPIC has shown all three. Since relief under the APA is unavailable, see supra Section III | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
b8f2f843-3514-4d9f-b124-6a56ec174999 | .A, “no adequate alternative remedy exists.” And the Government’s sole argument for why EPIC has not established “a clear and indisputable right to relief” or “a clear duty to act” is that the Commission is not an “advisory committee” under FACA. Defs.’ Mem. at 20–24.13 This, of course, is the argument that the Court has rejected. See supra Section III.B | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
fb5eaa74-261d-4d0d-a69f-0c0f623b576d | . The Government’s only remaining argument against mandamus is that EPIC did not “adequately plead[]” claims under the mandamus statute. Defs.’ Mem. at 18–19. “[I]t is impossible to know,” the Government complains, “what counts [EPIC] intended to pursue under” this statute “or the specific allegations that would support claims under [it].” Id. The Court disagrees | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
1b3ab503-0424-495d-b8ed-bf571fdffe33 | . EPIC styles its Complaint as one “for Injunctive, Mandamus, and Declaratory Relief.” Compl. at 1. It cites the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, in the Complaint’s first paragraph and in its jurisdictional statement. Id. ¶, 7. Then, in Count I, it claims that the Commission’s “failure to timely notice and open [its] meetings violates 5 U.S.C. app | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
c3de5309-1339-43cc-b57b-ad49d730fabf | . 2 §§ 10(a)(1) and (a)(2) finds “compelling equitable grounds” for mandamus relief. Indeed, the Government makes no argument for why, if the Commission is subject to FACA, there would not be “compelling equitable grounds” for relief | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
d727e90a-d556-4035-977a-012a0b1e23e3 | . Other than an argument that EPIC has an adequate alternative remedy in the APA and an argument that EPIC did not adequately plead mandamus claims, which the Court addresses infra, the Government’s arguments against mandamus focus exclusively on its belief that the Commission is just not subject to FACA in the first place. See Defs.’ Mem. at 18–24; Defs.’ Reply at 18–20, 18 n.6 | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
19f67a97-e709-4da1-9653-71ab5f29a847 | . 13 For the first element of mandamus, the Government invokes the doctrine of “judicial estoppel.” Defs.’ Mem. at 22–24. This doctrine “generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8 (2000) | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
fe98968e-0e84-477c-ad79-afb0e7f78110 | . The Government contends that this doctrine bars mandamus relief because EPIC “prevailed on its earlier position that the Commission is an agency subject to FOIA” and “an entity cannot be both an agency and an advisory committee.” Defs.’ Mem. at 23. So the Government’s invocation of “judicial estoppel” just boils down to its argument that the Commission is not an advisory committee | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
eff3a0d4-d174-4554-8732-2ebf8842c126 | . 35 and constitutes a failure to perform duties owed to EPIC within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1361.” Id. . Count IV likewise asserts that the Commission’s “failure to make [its] records available for inspection and copying is a violation of 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 10(b) and constitutes a failure to perform a duty owed to EPIC within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1361.” Id. | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
0164ca36-8bde-416f-9a79-6c0289e7315d | . Both counts seek “a writ of mandamus” compelling the Commission and its officers to comply with FACA. Id. ¶, 139. These counts make clear that EPIC seeks mandamus relief based on the Commission’s refusal to comply with FACA. And for the reasons explained, EPIC is correct that the Commission is subject to FACA | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
399a22ec-ff63-417b-9b6e-67ff2ec92ab3 | . EPIC is thus entitled to writs of mandamus compelling the Commission and its officers to provide timely notice of its meetings, to open them to the public, and to make its records available for public inspection and copying. Id. ¶, 118, 136, 139; Compl. Requested Relief ¶¶ A, D; see 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 10(a)(1)–(2), (b). EPIC also seeks relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), 28 U.S.C | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
52969bcd-d17f-4a4e-9f5b-e32ca1199d7a | . § 2201. Compl. ; Compl. Requested Relief ¶ H. Under the DJA, the Court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). This statute “is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction”; rather, “the availability of such relief presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable right.” Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
0eed2339-1dce-480d-bf1c-64f2de641715 | . 666, 677 (1960). The Court independently has jurisdiction here under the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and EPIC has a judicially remediable right to have the Commission comply with its duties under FACA. See Wash. Legal Found., 89 F.3d at 901–02; supra Section III.B | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
78b7fc72-f2ae-4e65-9b17-3940def6c163 | . EPIC is thus entitled to a declaration that the Commission has a duty under FACA to provide timely notice of its meetings, to open them to the public, and to make its records 36 available for public inspection and copying. See Compl. ¶, 136; 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 10(a)(1)–(2), (b).14 IV. The mythology of Janus recognizes that backward- and forward-facing personae can coexist | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
efc07af4-c466-4cc8-ba71-3190defff01a | . Today, the Court holds that Congress can and did impose Janus-like transparency obligations upon the AI Commission. No rule of law forced Congress to choose just one. The Court will dismiss Counts II, III, and V, and it will grant summary judgment for EPIC on Counts I and IV. A separate Order will issue. Dated: June 1, 2020 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
f5b71f28-67bf-4958-95c6-899534d0f269 | . 14 The Government contends that EPIC did not adequately plead a claim under the DJA because it never references this statute as an “independent cause[] of action.” Defs.’ Mem. at 18–19. But the Government’s own authorities show that EPIC was right not to plead it as an independent cause of action. Id. at 19. It cites cases stating that the DJA does not itself provide “a cause of action,” Ali v | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
32fbb889-eb36-4f71-b681-8b9c67b12119 | . Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and that “a count for declaratory judgment . . . is more properly included in the prayer for relief,” Drone Advisory Comm., 369 F. Supp. 3d at 38 (cleaned up). So EPIC properly requested a declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 in its request for relief. See Compl. Requested Relief ¶ H. 2020.06.01 16:10:09 -04'00' | Electronic_Privacy_Information_2020-06-01.txt |
27db2af5-1ac8-4f6b-9e4d-ee7f5744f960 | Número Identificador SEN2024 ________________ Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES PANEL X OSVALDO FRIGER SALGUEIRO Apelado V. MECH-TECH COLLEGE, LLC; MECH-TECH MANAGEMENT LLC; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Apelantes KLAN202300916 Apelación procedente del Tribunal de Primera Instancia, Sala Superior de Caguas Caso Núm | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
f9574f26-548b-4d18-a7e7-48a2ddc05046 | .: CG2018CV03195 Sobre: Daños y Perjuicios, Utilización No Autorizada del Derecho a la Propia Imagen Panel integrado por su presidenta; la Juez Lebrón Nieves, la Juez Barresi Ramos y la Jueza Santiago Calderón Lebrón Nieves, Juez Ponente SENTENCIA En San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 31 de mayo de 2024 | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
f14e12c9-f281-48c1-829c-8b8844cea58b | . El 16 de octubre de 2023, compareció ante este Tribunal de Apelaciones, Mech-Tech College; Mech-Tech Management; LLC, Artificial Intelligence, Corp. d/b/a Artificial Intelligence, Corp; Compañía Aseguradora ABC; Compañía Aseguradora DEF y Compañía Aseguradora XYZ (en adelante, parte apelante) mediante Apelación Civil | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
b604bfb9-897a-4b6f-a3af-28ed93283525 | . En la misma, nos solicita que revisemos la Sentencia emitida y notificada el 15 de septiembre de 2023, por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia, Sala Superior de Caguas | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
5cb3ac52-251b-459c-90ee-c0a4d4e2600a | . En virtud del aludido dictamen, el foro a quo, declaró con lugar la Demanda presentada por la parte apelada, ordenó a Mech-Tech College, LLC (en adelante, Mech-Tech College) a cesar la utilización de cualquiera y todo material en el que se utilizara la imagen de la parte apelada, y a pagarle a esta última la suma de $20,000.00 por la utilización no autorizada de su imagen y $4,000 | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
f691e755-f9e4-443e-8d16-1b96c59a29cd | .00 por concepto de honorarios de abogado. KLAN202300916 2 Por los fundamentos que se exponen a continuación, se revoca la Sentencia apelada | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
9915f0f3-5421-4c1a-ac6d-5503ddb88f0d | . I Los hechos que suscitaron la controversia de epígrafe se remontan a una Demanda sobre daños y perjuicios y utilización no autorizada de la propia imagen, presentada el 13 de diciembre de 2018, por el señor Osvaldo Friger Salgueiro (en adelante, señor Friger Salgueiro o parte apelada) en contra de Mech-Tech College; Mech-Tech Management; LLC, Artificial Intelligence, Corp | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
029adce6-92bc-4433-949e-9e9d2e01b521 | . d/b/a Artificial Intelligence, Corp; Compañía Aseguradora ABC; Compañía Aseguradora DEF y Compañía Aseguradora XYZ (en conjunto, parte apelante) | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
13d9dc2e-f663-4763-b592-847f3e7fbdfe | . Según se desprende de las alegaciones de la Demanda, el señor Friger Salgueiro fue empleado de la parte apelante desde el 1ro de enero de 2010 hasta octubre de 2017 y entre sus funciones se encontraba el dirigir y producir videos y/o contenido promocional | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
60d2cae6-e473-49c3-bb0a-d6f7c32f635a | . Alegó, además, que, la parte apelante había utilizado en más de 380 ocasiones la propia imagen de la parte apelada con fines comerciales, mercantiles y publicitarios sin su consentimiento y sin haber mediado una “transferencia escrita”, según dispuesto por la Ley Núm. 139 del 13 de julio de 2011 (en adelante, Ley 139- 2011) | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
5ec1c1fb-4a85-4a35-9ae9-349c2381a669 | . La parte apelada sostuvo que, luego de haberse culminado la relación obrero patronal entre las partes, la parte apelante no solicitó autorización para la utilización y diseminación de videos o el material en los cuales se incluye su propia imagen | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
be819ec8-5ee3-4d8a-9890-7aac91eb6bf6 | . Expresó que, hasta el momento de la presentación de la Demanda, la parte apelante continuaba utilizando su imagen de forma ilegal, no autorizada y sin que el señor Friger Salgueiro le hubiese transferido los derechos sobre su imagen, incluyendo en plataformas como Facebook, Instagram, Youtube y por medio de la televisión | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
6a6b9a3a-d1d5-4c1a-97ad-3023898465a8 | . Aseguró haber remitido varias misivas a la parte apelante, mediante las cuales solicitó el cese y desista de la alegada conducta, pero que, a KLAN202300916 3 pesar de ello, la parte apelante continuaba utilizando su imagen | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
8c01a726-1a8e-44ab-a722-bf7109f85c87 | . A tales efectos, solicitó al foro a quo que le ordenara el cese y desista de la utilización de su imagen a la parte apelante, más una indemnización ascendiente a una cantidad no menor de $500,000.00. En respuesta, la parte apelante presentó la Contestación a Demanda. Por medio de esta, negó lo alegado en la Demanda | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
26ebfaff-4809-4115-bc28-226662f7f497 | . Además, sostuvo que, en la controversia de epígrafe aplicaba la doctrina de “trabajo por contrato”, donde una persona no puede reclamar violación al uso de su propia imagen o propiedad intelectual, si recibe paga por contrato para el uso de tal imagen | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
4b68ee0d-ec0b-4f30-acda-0db2d6754c2c | . Acotó que, ostentaba los derechos de propiedad intelectual sobre los videos filmados por la parte apelada, ya que le había remunerado por los aludidos videos. Aseguró que, el señor Friger Salgueiro no era empleado, sino que, era un contratista independiente de Artificial Intelligence, Corp. y que prestaba servicios mediante contrato para el Departamento de Producción de tal corporación | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
01ed86ad-efa8-4d49-8c8f-0a5fc89597bf | . Adujo que, no se encontraba en la obligación de solicitar autorización a la parte apelada para utilizar su imagen, ya que se le había pagado por la producción de múltiples videos publicitarios para el uso de las empresas | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
4702a555-b313-418c-891f-ad58a3cc529b | . Luego de varias incidencias procesales innecesarias pormenorizar, el 28 de julio de 2021, la parte apelante presentó la Moción de Sentencia Sumaria donde reiteró su posición en cuanto a que estaba facultada para utilizar la imagen de la parte apelada y el material videográfico que produjo durante su relación laboral. Asimismo, solicitó la desestimación de la Demanda en su contra | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
b8223b96-8d4a-4748-98fa-ebd630f1d6c1 | . Por su parte, el señor Friger Salgueiro presentó el 7 de septiembre de 2021, la Oposición a Moción de Sentencia Sumaria y Solicitud para que se Dicte Sentencia Sumaria Parcial Interlocutoria a Favor de Osvaldo Friger Salgueiro | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
85bdb5ee-2cc1-4a67-8106-3ee6239fe557 | . Por medio de esta, arguyó que, KLAN202300916 4 había brindado su consentimiento tácito para el uso de su imagen mientras trabajó con la parte apelante y mientras recibía una compensación mensual por los servicios prestados | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
4c4c491e-49c4-4295-b2d5-21d5ef061f12 | . Añadió que, posterior a que la parte apelante diera por terminada unilateralmente la relación laboral entre las partes, tal consentimiento cesó, y que así se lo dejó saber mediante el envío de una misiva de cese y desista. Acotó que, a través de la aludida misiva, le solicitó a la parte apelante que cesara el uso de su imagen | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
08be3512-b81e-42da-8e85-68dcf629907a | . Adujo, además que, luego de que cesara el consentimiento, conforme a la Ley Núm. 139-2011, la parte apelante no estaba autorizada a continuar utilizando la imagen del señor Friger Salgueiro. Posteriormente, la parte apelante presentó la Réplica a Oposición a Moción de Sentencia Sumaria. Sostuvo que, la Ley Núm | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
b4504ba3-741b-4d1e-8191-0ee4309f435e | . 139-2011 no aplicaba en la relación de trabajo entre las partes, puesto que, al momento en que se creó el material videográfico y promocional, esta no estaba en vigor. Acotó que, la parte apelada había consentido sin límites y condiciones al uso del referido material. Igualmente, arguyó que, en caso de que aplicara la aludida ley, esta no requería que el consentimiento fuera por escrito | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
bb98376e-8873-4a9e-8a99-696f479aeb8d | . Añadió que, en el caso de que sí lo requiriese, no existían requisitos de forma del documento donde constase tal consentimiento. Sostuvo, además que, el consentimiento otorgado por la parte apelada no perdió su validez al culminar la relación laboral entre las partes. Así las cosas, el 1 de diciembre de 2021, fue celebrada una Vista Argumentativa | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
7513ed9e-07af-4aae-82fb-56fcef49a5a7 | . Luego de las partes exponer sus respectivas posiciones, el foro a quo determinó que procedería a resolver las mociones dispositivas posteriormente. Subsiguientemente, el foro a quo emitió una Resolución en la cual declaró No Ha Lugar las solicitudes de sentencia sumaria presentadas por las partes | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
3e05257a-5671-4ff0-9c5b-538d469273b0 | . Lo anterior, luego de concluir que, existía controversia sustancial sobre el consentimiento de la parte KLAN202300916 5 apelada y su extensión, términos y condiciones, si alguno | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
eea5b760-3a64-4178-9fab-0796757c0c73 | . De igual manera, determinó que, no contaba con los elementos necesarios para determinar si la parte apelante era dueña de la propiedad intelectual de todos los anuncios, videos y programas creados con la imagen del señor Friger Salgueiro, ya que ello no surgía del expediente. En desacuerdo, la parte apelante presentó la Moción Solicitando Reconsideración | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
9599cd21-b114-40eb-8b7d-e65eded781ff | . Mientras que, la parte apelada presentó la Moción en Oposición a Reconsideración. En respuesta, la parte apelante presentó la Réplica a Oposición a Moción Solicitando Reconsideración. Por su parte, el señor Friger Salgueiro presentó la Enérgica Oposición a “Réplica a Oposición a Moción Solicitando Reconsideración” y Solicitud de Desglose | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
1a4936b8-1301-47f3-b850-3343c44e2a8c | . El 25 de mayo de 2022, el foro primario declaró No Ha Lugar la moción de reconsideración presentada por la parte apelante. Transcurridos varios trámites procesales innecesarios pormenorizar, los días 13 y 14 de marzo de 2023 se celebró el Juicio en su Fondo y el 15 de septiembre de 2023, el foro de primera instancia emitió la Sentencia cuya revisión nos atiene | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
801c8083-9f27-4140-bdc0-4a874ed96cdf | . En virtud de esta determinó que, todo material utilizado con posterioridad a la presentación de la carta de cese y desista fue sin autorización | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
b1d90b79-be75-437c-b1f3-a2f6eb7449c6 | . De igual manera, a pesar de que dio credibilidad a la continuación del uso de la imagen posterior a la culminación de la relación contractual, no pudo especificarse la cantidad de la ocurrencia ni la cuantía de la monetización supuestamente obtenida o beneficio económico recibido por la parte apelante | Friger_Salgueiro,_Osvaldo_2024-05-31.txt |
Subsets and Splits