id
int64 0
3.55k
| input_options
listlengths 5
5
| output
stringlengths 11
48
| gold_index
int64 0
4
|
|---|---|---|---|
600 |
[
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nId. at 493-94. This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 494. “Well established precedent ... holds that the judgment in an action in which a government agency or officer represents private individuals is binding on those individuals.” Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by united states and state of alaska against exxon which resolved governments claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded nonparty sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against exxon",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nId. at 493-94. This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 494. “Well established precedent ... holds that the judgment in an action in which a government agency or officer represents private individuals is binding on those individuals.” Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nId. at 493-94. This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 494. “Well established precedent ... holds that the judgment in an action in which a government agency or officer represents private individuals is binding on those individuals.” Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nId. at 493-94. This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 494. “Well established precedent ... holds that the judgment in an action in which a government agency or officer represents private individuals is binding on those individuals.” Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nId. at 493-94. This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 494. “Well established precedent ... holds that the judgment in an action in which a government agency or officer represents private individuals is binding on those individuals.” Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that the united states and the state of alaska as public trustees under the cwa and cercla could recover all lost use damages caused by the spill and that private claims for lost recreational use were barred under res judicata"
] |
); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125
| 0 |
601 |
[
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe county claims statute could limit. Pross, 303 S.E.2d at 890. The United States Supreme Court has also employed a similar rule of statutory construction when interpreting whether the United States is included as a “person” within federal legislation: Since, in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 743-44, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941) (holding that a plaintiff may state a claim under the sherman act for a defendants enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the pto where the plaintiff alleges deliberate fraud and the other elements of a monopolization claim under section 2 of the sherman act",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe county claims statute could limit. Pross, 303 S.E.2d at 890. The United States Supreme Court has also employed a similar rule of statutory construction when interpreting whether the United States is included as a “person” within federal legislation: Since, in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 743-44, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941) (holding that the government is liable under the ftca in the same respect as a private person under the law of the place where the act occurred",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe county claims statute could limit. Pross, 303 S.E.2d at 890. The United States Supreme Court has also employed a similar rule of statutory construction when interpreting whether the United States is included as a “person” within federal legislation: Since, in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 743-44, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941) (holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe county claims statute could limit. Pross, 303 S.E.2d at 890. The United States Supreme Court has also employed a similar rule of statutory construction when interpreting whether the United States is included as a “person” within federal legislation: Since, in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 743-44, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941) (holding that the use of the words any person was insufficient under the ordinary dignities of speech to authorize an action by the federal government for treble damages under the sherman act",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe county claims statute could limit. Pross, 303 S.E.2d at 890. The United States Supreme Court has also employed a similar rule of statutory construction when interpreting whether the United States is included as a “person” within federal legislation: Since, in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 743-44, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941) (holding treble damages under the civil theft statute are punitive"
] |
). Employing the above standards, we are
| 3 |
602 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsimply did not bar the use of the residual exception. We note that Judge Wiss dissented from the Court’s decision on this issue and complained “that the majority has erred by shuffling past one of the three absolute prerequisites for admission of hearsay under” the residual exception by passing over the fact that the child/vietim in Morgan was available and did testify, albeit in a somewhat limited manner. 40 M.J. at 413 (Wiss, J., dissenting). (2). As to the second part of the appellant’s argument, that AK’s testimony should not have been admitted because better evidence (i.e., Mr. Mills’ tes ority for his contention except to quote our opinion in Martindale out of context. Martindale did not involve the exclusion or possible exclusion of other evidence because, as we pointed out 88) (holding also that only a childs first statement made is admissible under the exception",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsimply did not bar the use of the residual exception. We note that Judge Wiss dissented from the Court’s decision on this issue and complained “that the majority has erred by shuffling past one of the three absolute prerequisites for admission of hearsay under” the residual exception by passing over the fact that the child/vietim in Morgan was available and did testify, albeit in a somewhat limited manner. 40 M.J. at 413 (Wiss, J., dissenting). (2). As to the second part of the appellant’s argument, that AK’s testimony should not have been admitted because better evidence (i.e., Mr. Mills’ tes ority for his contention except to quote our opinion in Martindale out of context. Martindale did not involve the exclusion or possible exclusion of other evidence because, as we pointed out 88) (holding childvictims statement to babysitter admissible un der residual exception in addition to statement to physician under medical treatment exception",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsimply did not bar the use of the residual exception. We note that Judge Wiss dissented from the Court’s decision on this issue and complained “that the majority has erred by shuffling past one of the three absolute prerequisites for admission of hearsay under” the residual exception by passing over the fact that the child/vietim in Morgan was available and did testify, albeit in a somewhat limited manner. 40 M.J. at 413 (Wiss, J., dissenting). (2). As to the second part of the appellant’s argument, that AK’s testimony should not have been admitted because better evidence (i.e., Mr. Mills’ tes ority for his contention except to quote our opinion in Martindale out of context. Martindale did not involve the exclusion or possible exclusion of other evidence because, as we pointed out 88) (holding multiple statements by childvictim and childs mother admissible under residual exception",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsimply did not bar the use of the residual exception. We note that Judge Wiss dissented from the Court’s decision on this issue and complained “that the majority has erred by shuffling past one of the three absolute prerequisites for admission of hearsay under” the residual exception by passing over the fact that the child/vietim in Morgan was available and did testify, albeit in a somewhat limited manner. 40 M.J. at 413 (Wiss, J., dissenting). (2). As to the second part of the appellant’s argument, that AK’s testimony should not have been admitted because better evidence (i.e., Mr. Mills’ tes ority for his contention except to quote our opinion in Martindale out of context. Martindale did not involve the exclusion or possible exclusion of other evidence because, as we pointed out 88) (holding statement by childvictim to teachers aide admissible under residual exception in addition to statements to school nurse and pediatrician under medical treatment exception",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsimply did not bar the use of the residual exception. We note that Judge Wiss dissented from the Court’s decision on this issue and complained “that the majority has erred by shuffling past one of the three absolute prerequisites for admission of hearsay under” the residual exception by passing over the fact that the child/vietim in Morgan was available and did testify, albeit in a somewhat limited manner. 40 M.J. at 413 (Wiss, J., dissenting). (2). As to the second part of the appellant’s argument, that AK’s testimony should not have been admitted because better evidence (i.e., Mr. Mills’ tes ority for his contention except to quote our opinion in Martindale out of context. Martindale did not involve the exclusion or possible exclusion of other evidence because, as we pointed out 88) (holding ehildvictims testimony at pretrial investigation admissible under residual exception in addition to doctors testimony under medical treatment exception"
] |
). We conclude that this aspect of Mil.R.Evid.
| 2 |
603 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsafety information they would choose to disclose in their initial, allegedly fraudulent, reports, would be the most severe adverse events. b. Motive For Fraud Plaintiff contends that its allegations regarding motive bolster its scienter pleadings. In support of this argument Plaintiff argues that it alleged a motive to commit fraud when it alleged that, at the time the allegedly fraudulent statements were made, Defendants were seeking a partner and were planning to raise capital in a stock offering. In addition, Plaintiff points to its allegations that individual defendants knew that they would receive higher salaries, bonuses, and stock options and that the value of their stock options would increase substantially if Rigel reported positive results from the clinical trial. Howev 001) (holding that where knowledgeable insiders did not sell stock at a time that would have taken advantage of allegedly fraudulent statements there was not a strong inference of scienter",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsafety information they would choose to disclose in their initial, allegedly fraudulent, reports, would be the most severe adverse events. b. Motive For Fraud Plaintiff contends that its allegations regarding motive bolster its scienter pleadings. In support of this argument Plaintiff argues that it alleged a motive to commit fraud when it alleged that, at the time the allegedly fraudulent statements were made, Defendants were seeking a partner and were planning to raise capital in a stock offering. In addition, Plaintiff points to its allegations that individual defendants knew that they would receive higher salaries, bonuses, and stock options and that the value of their stock options would increase substantially if Rigel reported positive results from the clinical trial. Howev 001) (holding that where a defendant sold no stock at all this suggested that there was no insider information from which to benefit and there was not a strong inference of scienter",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsafety information they would choose to disclose in their initial, allegedly fraudulent, reports, would be the most severe adverse events. b. Motive For Fraud Plaintiff contends that its allegations regarding motive bolster its scienter pleadings. In support of this argument Plaintiff argues that it alleged a motive to commit fraud when it alleged that, at the time the allegedly fraudulent statements were made, Defendants were seeking a partner and were planning to raise capital in a stock offering. In addition, Plaintiff points to its allegations that individual defendants knew that they would receive higher salaries, bonuses, and stock options and that the value of their stock options would increase substantially if Rigel reported positive results from the clinical trial. Howev 001) (holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsafety information they would choose to disclose in their initial, allegedly fraudulent, reports, would be the most severe adverse events. b. Motive For Fraud Plaintiff contends that its allegations regarding motive bolster its scienter pleadings. In support of this argument Plaintiff argues that it alleged a motive to commit fraud when it alleged that, at the time the allegedly fraudulent statements were made, Defendants were seeking a partner and were planning to raise capital in a stock offering. In addition, Plaintiff points to its allegations that individual defendants knew that they would receive higher salaries, bonuses, and stock options and that the value of their stock options would increase substantially if Rigel reported positive results from the clinical trial. Howev 001) (holding that recounting of analysts opinions did not prove underlying factual support necessary to create a strong inference of scienter",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsafety information they would choose to disclose in their initial, allegedly fraudulent, reports, would be the most severe adverse events. b. Motive For Fraud Plaintiff contends that its allegations regarding motive bolster its scienter pleadings. In support of this argument Plaintiff argues that it alleged a motive to commit fraud when it alleged that, at the time the allegedly fraudulent statements were made, Defendants were seeking a partner and were planning to raise capital in a stock offering. In addition, Plaintiff points to its allegations that individual defendants knew that they would receive higher salaries, bonuses, and stock options and that the value of their stock options would increase substantially if Rigel reported positive results from the clinical trial. Howev 001) (holding that there was no inference of scienter based on defendants knowledge of facts or failure to monitor information because plaintiffs did not specifically identified any reports or statements that existed or would have come to light in a reasonable investigation that would have demonstrated the falsity of the allegedly misleading statements"
] |
). In fact, it supports the opposite inference.
| 0 |
604 |
[
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw, for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. They concede that in this case, the only public policy at issue is the First Amendment, so we affirm the summary judgment on the state tort claim on the same basis as on the section 1983 claim as no violation of Hobler’s or Southwell’s First Amendment rights occurred. Conclusion Because plaintiffs were “confidential employees” in the Bmnti sense, the First Amendment did not protect them from dismissal because of their political loyalty to the defendant’s political adversary, so the summary judgment for defendant is AFFIRMED. 1 . 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). 2 . 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 . 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). 4 . Id. at 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673. 5 134, 1139 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that defendants status as police officer did not obviate the requirement of miranda",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw, for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. They concede that in this case, the only public policy at issue is the First Amendment, so we affirm the summary judgment on the state tort claim on the same basis as on the section 1983 claim as no violation of Hobler’s or Southwell’s First Amendment rights occurred. Conclusion Because plaintiffs were “confidential employees” in the Bmnti sense, the First Amendment did not protect them from dismissal because of their political loyalty to the defendant’s political adversary, so the summary judgment for defendant is AFFIRMED. 1 . 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). 2 . 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 . 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). 4 . Id. at 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673. 5 134, 1139 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that an employees status as a policymaker under the branti exception does not obviate the pickering analysis",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw, for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. They concede that in this case, the only public policy at issue is the First Amendment, so we affirm the summary judgment on the state tort claim on the same basis as on the section 1983 claim as no violation of Hobler’s or Southwell’s First Amendment rights occurred. Conclusion Because plaintiffs were “confidential employees” in the Bmnti sense, the First Amendment did not protect them from dismissal because of their political loyalty to the defendant’s political adversary, so the summary judgment for defendant is AFFIRMED. 1 . 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). 2 . 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 . 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). 4 . Id. at 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673. 5 134, 1139 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that access to confidential information didnt transform janitorial staff into confidential employees under branti",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw, for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. They concede that in this case, the only public policy at issue is the First Amendment, so we affirm the summary judgment on the state tort claim on the same basis as on the section 1983 claim as no violation of Hobler’s or Southwell’s First Amendment rights occurred. Conclusion Because plaintiffs were “confidential employees” in the Bmnti sense, the First Amendment did not protect them from dismissal because of their political loyalty to the defendant’s political adversary, so the summary judgment for defendant is AFFIRMED. 1 . 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). 2 . 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 . 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). 4 . Id. at 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673. 5 134, 1139 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing exception",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw, for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. They concede that in this case, the only public policy at issue is the First Amendment, so we affirm the summary judgment on the state tort claim on the same basis as on the section 1983 claim as no violation of Hobler’s or Southwell’s First Amendment rights occurred. Conclusion Because plaintiffs were “confidential employees” in the Bmnti sense, the First Amendment did not protect them from dismissal because of their political loyalty to the defendant’s political adversary, so the summary judgment for defendant is AFFIRMED. 1 . 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). 2 . 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 . 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). 4 . Id. at 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673. 5 134, 1139 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that filing an answer does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit"
] |
). 18 . Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Tp. High
| 1 |
605 |
[
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nentire arbitration provision because the PAGA waiver expressly forbids severance. 2013 Agreement § 14.3(v)(c). In any event, even if Uber’s structural argument offered a plausible construction of the Agreement (and the Court has considerable doubts on that point) it must ultimately be rejected. At best, Uber’s argument suggests there is some ambiguity in the otherwise crystal clear language of the contract that provides that the PAGA waiver is not severable. Because the 2013 Agreement is a standardized contract written by Uber, however, to the extent the language is ambiguous any ambiguity, must be “resolved against the drafter.” Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal.App. 4th 779, 798, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 (1998); see also Slottow v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 10 F.3d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir.1993) (recognizing that california has a valid interest in protecting a california company from copyright infringement",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nentire arbitration provision because the PAGA waiver expressly forbids severance. 2013 Agreement § 14.3(v)(c). In any event, even if Uber’s structural argument offered a plausible construction of the Agreement (and the Court has considerable doubts on that point) it must ultimately be rejected. At best, Uber’s argument suggests there is some ambiguity in the otherwise crystal clear language of the contract that provides that the PAGA waiver is not severable. Because the 2013 Agreement is a standardized contract written by Uber, however, to the extent the language is ambiguous any ambiguity, must be “resolved against the drafter.” Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal.App. 4th 779, 798, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 (1998); see also Slottow v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 10 F.3d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir.1993) (recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nentire arbitration provision because the PAGA waiver expressly forbids severance. 2013 Agreement § 14.3(v)(c). In any event, even if Uber’s structural argument offered a plausible construction of the Agreement (and the Court has considerable doubts on that point) it must ultimately be rejected. At best, Uber’s argument suggests there is some ambiguity in the otherwise crystal clear language of the contract that provides that the PAGA waiver is not severable. Because the 2013 Agreement is a standardized contract written by Uber, however, to the extent the language is ambiguous any ambiguity, must be “resolved against the drafter.” Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal.App. 4th 779, 798, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 (1998); see also Slottow v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 10 F.3d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir.1993) (recognizing rule",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nentire arbitration provision because the PAGA waiver expressly forbids severance. 2013 Agreement § 14.3(v)(c). In any event, even if Uber’s structural argument offered a plausible construction of the Agreement (and the Court has considerable doubts on that point) it must ultimately be rejected. At best, Uber’s argument suggests there is some ambiguity in the otherwise crystal clear language of the contract that provides that the PAGA waiver is not severable. Because the 2013 Agreement is a standardized contract written by Uber, however, to the extent the language is ambiguous any ambiguity, must be “resolved against the drafter.” Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal.App. 4th 779, 798, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 (1998); see also Slottow v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 10 F.3d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir.1993) (recognizing california law rule that ambiguities in a written instrument are resolved against the drafter",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nentire arbitration provision because the PAGA waiver expressly forbids severance. 2013 Agreement § 14.3(v)(c). In any event, even if Uber’s structural argument offered a plausible construction of the Agreement (and the Court has considerable doubts on that point) it must ultimately be rejected. At best, Uber’s argument suggests there is some ambiguity in the otherwise crystal clear language of the contract that provides that the PAGA waiver is not severable. Because the 2013 Agreement is a standardized contract written by Uber, however, to the extent the language is ambiguous any ambiguity, must be “resolved against the drafter.” Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal.App. 4th 779, 798, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 (1998); see also Slottow v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 10 F.3d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law"
] |
) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court would
| 3 |
606 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\npassage of interstate commerce of either people of goods.” United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 288-89 (3d Cir.1996) (Alito, J., dissenting). The Lessor Defendants argue that Congress appropriately invoked this authority because strict vicarious liability lawsuits against lessors of motor vehicles typically arise following an automobile accident that occurs on roads, streets, intrastate or interstate highways, all of which are channels of commerce. See, e.g. Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147, 123 S.Ct. 720, 154 L.Ed.2d 610 (2003) (upholding legislation aimed at improving safety in the “channel of commerce,” including streets, roads and federal highways); State of Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 61 S.Ct. 1050, 85 L.Ed. 1487 (1941) (holding that state ownership of submerged lands remains subject to congress paramount power over navigable waters under the commerce clause",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\npassage of interstate commerce of either people of goods.” United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 288-89 (3d Cir.1996) (Alito, J., dissenting). The Lessor Defendants argue that Congress appropriately invoked this authority because strict vicarious liability lawsuits against lessors of motor vehicles typically arise following an automobile accident that occurs on roads, streets, intrastate or interstate highways, all of which are channels of commerce. See, e.g. Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147, 123 S.Ct. 720, 154 L.Ed.2d 610 (2003) (upholding legislation aimed at improving safety in the “channel of commerce,” including streets, roads and federal highways); State of Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 61 S.Ct. 1050, 85 L.Ed. 1487 (1941) (holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\npassage of interstate commerce of either people of goods.” United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 288-89 (3d Cir.1996) (Alito, J., dissenting). The Lessor Defendants argue that Congress appropriately invoked this authority because strict vicarious liability lawsuits against lessors of motor vehicles typically arise following an automobile accident that occurs on roads, streets, intrastate or interstate highways, all of which are channels of commerce. See, e.g. Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147, 123 S.Ct. 720, 154 L.Ed.2d 610 (2003) (upholding legislation aimed at improving safety in the “channel of commerce,” including streets, roads and federal highways); State of Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 61 S.Ct. 1050, 85 L.Ed. 1487 (1941) (holding action equivalent to quiet title over navigable waters regulated and controlled by state is form of prohibited relief",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\npassage of interstate commerce of either people of goods.” United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 288-89 (3d Cir.1996) (Alito, J., dissenting). The Lessor Defendants argue that Congress appropriately invoked this authority because strict vicarious liability lawsuits against lessors of motor vehicles typically arise following an automobile accident that occurs on roads, streets, intrastate or interstate highways, all of which are channels of commerce. See, e.g. Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147, 123 S.Ct. 720, 154 L.Ed.2d 610 (2003) (upholding legislation aimed at improving safety in the “channel of commerce,” including streets, roads and federal highways); State of Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 61 S.Ct. 1050, 85 L.Ed. 1487 (1941) (recognizing that navigable waters railroads and highways are channels of commerce which can be regulated under congress commerce powers",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\npassage of interstate commerce of either people of goods.” United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 288-89 (3d Cir.1996) (Alito, J., dissenting). The Lessor Defendants argue that Congress appropriately invoked this authority because strict vicarious liability lawsuits against lessors of motor vehicles typically arise following an automobile accident that occurs on roads, streets, intrastate or interstate highways, all of which are channels of commerce. See, e.g. Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147, 123 S.Ct. 720, 154 L.Ed.2d 610 (2003) (upholding legislation aimed at improving safety in the “channel of commerce,” including streets, roads and federal highways); State of Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 61 S.Ct. 1050, 85 L.Ed. 1487 (1941) (holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters"
] |
); United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218,
| 3 |
607 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCURIAM. Based upon the scant record before us, which does not include a transcript of the proceeding below or an appropriate substitute, we cannot conclude that the lower court abused its discretion when it entered a final judgment of dismissal. For this same reason, we also cannot find that the order denying appellant’s motion to set aside final judgment, due to the appellant’s failure to appear for the duly scheduled trial of this cause and/or failure to contact the court or opposing counsel requesting a continuance was an abuse of discretion. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) (holding that it is the appellants burden to present a record to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial courts findings",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCURIAM. Based upon the scant record before us, which does not include a transcript of the proceeding below or an appropriate substitute, we cannot conclude that the lower court abused its discretion when it entered a final judgment of dismissal. For this same reason, we also cannot find that the order denying appellant’s motion to set aside final judgment, due to the appellant’s failure to appear for the duly scheduled trial of this cause and/or failure to contact the court or opposing counsel requesting a continuance was an abuse of discretion. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) (holding that in appellate proceedings the decision of the trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCURIAM. Based upon the scant record before us, which does not include a transcript of the proceeding below or an appropriate substitute, we cannot conclude that the lower court abused its discretion when it entered a final judgment of dismissal. For this same reason, we also cannot find that the order denying appellant’s motion to set aside final judgment, due to the appellant’s failure to appear for the duly scheduled trial of this cause and/or failure to contact the court or opposing counsel requesting a continuance was an abuse of discretion. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) (holding that it is the duty of the appellant to overcome the presumption of the correctness of the trial courts judgment by demonstrating some reversible error",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCURIAM. Based upon the scant record before us, which does not include a transcript of the proceeding below or an appropriate substitute, we cannot conclude that the lower court abused its discretion when it entered a final judgment of dismissal. For this same reason, we also cannot find that the order denying appellant’s motion to set aside final judgment, due to the appellant’s failure to appear for the duly scheduled trial of this cause and/or failure to contact the court or opposing counsel requesting a continuance was an abuse of discretion. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) (holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCURIAM. Based upon the scant record before us, which does not include a transcript of the proceeding below or an appropriate substitute, we cannot conclude that the lower court abused its discretion when it entered a final judgment of dismissal. For this same reason, we also cannot find that the order denying appellant’s motion to set aside final judgment, due to the appellant’s failure to appear for the duly scheduled trial of this cause and/or failure to contact the court or opposing counsel requesting a continuance was an abuse of discretion. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) (holding that although the presumption of correctness applies to the ultimate classification decision the presumption carries no force as to questions of law"
] |
); Prymus v. Prymus, 753 So.2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA
| 1 |
608 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788 (1974) (“[Plea negotiations] are essential to relieve court calendar congestion and they relieve the prosecution and defense from the risks and uncertainties of trial.”) 4. Modern Acceptance (1970s-Today) Today, approximately ninety-four percent of all state convictions and ninety-seven percent of all federal convictions are resolved by plea bargaining. See Missouri v. Frye, — U.S, -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788 (1974) (“[Plea negotiations] are essential to relieve court calendar congestion and they relieve the prosecution and defense from the risks and uncertainties of trial.”) 4. Modern Acceptance (1970s-Today) Today, approximately ninety-four percent of all state convictions and ninety-seven percent of all federal convictions are resolved by plea bargaining. See Missouri v. Frye, — U.S, -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (holding that defense counsel had duty to communicate formal offer from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788 (1974) (“[Plea negotiations] are essential to relieve court calendar congestion and they relieve the prosecution and defense from the risks and uncertainties of trial.”) 4. Modern Acceptance (1970s-Today) Today, approximately ninety-four percent of all state convictions and ninety-seven percent of all federal convictions are resolved by plea bargaining. See Missouri v. Frye, — U.S, -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (holding that defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788 (1974) (“[Plea negotiations] are essential to relieve court calendar congestion and they relieve the prosecution and defense from the risks and uncertainties of trial.”) 4. Modern Acceptance (1970s-Today) Today, approximately ninety-four percent of all state convictions and ninety-seven percent of all federal convictions are resolved by plea bargaining. See Missouri v. Frye, — U.S, -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (holding that to demonstrate prejudice resulting from counsels deficient performance that caused a defendant to forgo a favorable plea offer a defendant must show that he would have accepted the offer to plead and that there is a reasonable probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788 (1974) (“[Plea negotiations] are essential to relieve court calendar congestion and they relieve the prosecution and defense from the risks and uncertainties of trial.”) 4. Modern Acceptance (1970s-Today) Today, approximately ninety-four percent of all state convictions and ninety-seven percent of all federal convictions are resolved by plea bargaining. See Missouri v. Frye, — U.S, -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (holding that the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment"
] |
). Plea bargaining has become a reflexive
| 1 |
609 |
[
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nrespect to this group of documents. Gov’t Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. It is true that Stein did not specifically contest this point in his appeal letter. He disputed the SEC’s withholding decision under Exemption 7(A) — which, according to the SEC, was also the exemption under which the SEC was withholding some documents related to the second document category. See Compl., Ex. D at 1 n.l. But his appeal letter also specifically demanded — twice—“all of the requested documents,” not just documents related to the. first category. See Compl., Ex. E at 1-2. The government is obligated to construe FOIA requests — and appeals — liberally, where a request is “reasonably susceptible to the broader reading.” See LaCedra v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 317 F.3d 345, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that a foia request should be read to seek all documents covered by a catchall",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nrespect to this group of documents. Gov’t Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. It is true that Stein did not specifically contest this point in his appeal letter. He disputed the SEC’s withholding decision under Exemption 7(A) — which, according to the SEC, was also the exemption under which the SEC was withholding some documents related to the second document category. See Compl., Ex. D at 1 n.l. But his appeal letter also specifically demanded — twice—“all of the requested documents,” not just documents related to the. first category. See Compl., Ex. E at 1-2. The government is obligated to construe FOIA requests — and appeals — liberally, where a request is “reasonably susceptible to the broader reading.” See LaCedra v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 317 F.3d 345, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nrespect to this group of documents. Gov’t Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. It is true that Stein did not specifically contest this point in his appeal letter. He disputed the SEC’s withholding decision under Exemption 7(A) — which, according to the SEC, was also the exemption under which the SEC was withholding some documents related to the second document category. See Compl., Ex. D at 1 n.l. But his appeal letter also specifically demanded — twice—“all of the requested documents,” not just documents related to the. first category. See Compl., Ex. E at 1-2. The government is obligated to construe FOIA requests — and appeals — liberally, where a request is “reasonably susceptible to the broader reading.” See LaCedra v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 317 F.3d 345, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that a contract should be read to give reasonable meaning to all provisions of that contract",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nrespect to this group of documents. Gov’t Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. It is true that Stein did not specifically contest this point in his appeal letter. He disputed the SEC’s withholding decision under Exemption 7(A) — which, according to the SEC, was also the exemption under which the SEC was withholding some documents related to the second document category. See Compl., Ex. D at 1 n.l. But his appeal letter also specifically demanded — twice—“all of the requested documents,” not just documents related to the. first category. See Compl., Ex. E at 1-2. The government is obligated to construe FOIA requests — and appeals — liberally, where a request is “reasonably susceptible to the broader reading.” See LaCedra v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 317 F.3d 345, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nrespect to this group of documents. Gov’t Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. It is true that Stein did not specifically contest this point in his appeal letter. He disputed the SEC’s withholding decision under Exemption 7(A) — which, according to the SEC, was also the exemption under which the SEC was withholding some documents related to the second document category. See Compl., Ex. D at 1 n.l. But his appeal letter also specifically demanded — twice—“all of the requested documents,” not just documents related to the. first category. See Compl., Ex. E at 1-2. The government is obligated to construe FOIA requests — and appeals — liberally, where a request is “reasonably susceptible to the broader reading.” See LaCedra v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 317 F.3d 345, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that related provisions should be read together"
] |
). While Stein’s appeal letter could have been
| 0 |
610 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nOur decision in Pangle v. Bend-LaPine School District, 169 Or App 376, 10 P3d 275 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 558 (2001), is instructive. In Pangle, the plaintiffs, who sought to challenge a school district’s disciplinary decision, brought two actions, one seeking a writ of review, and the other seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief under ORS chapter 28, alleging that the school’s disciplinary decision violated various provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 379. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of review as untimely, and we affirmed that dismissal. Id. at 383. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ state law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief o 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that second sentence of 506a precludes deduction of hypothetical costs of sale in valuing chapter 13 debt ors real property to be retained by debtor",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nOur decision in Pangle v. Bend-LaPine School District, 169 Or App 376, 10 P3d 275 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 558 (2001), is instructive. In Pangle, the plaintiffs, who sought to challenge a school district’s disciplinary decision, brought two actions, one seeking a writ of review, and the other seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief under ORS chapter 28, alleging that the school’s disciplinary decision violated various provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 379. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of review as untimely, and we affirmed that dismissal. Id. at 383. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ state law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief o 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (recognizing that a debt ors sequential filing of a chapter 7 petition and then a chapter 13 petition is the socalled chapter 20 ",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nOur decision in Pangle v. Bend-LaPine School District, 169 Or App 376, 10 P3d 275 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 558 (2001), is instructive. In Pangle, the plaintiffs, who sought to challenge a school district’s disciplinary decision, brought two actions, one seeking a writ of review, and the other seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief under ORS chapter 28, alleging that the school’s disciplinary decision violated various provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 379. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of review as untimely, and we affirmed that dismissal. Id. at 383. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ state law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief o 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nOur decision in Pangle v. Bend-LaPine School District, 169 Or App 376, 10 P3d 275 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 558 (2001), is instructive. In Pangle, the plaintiffs, who sought to challenge a school district’s disciplinary decision, brought two actions, one seeking a writ of review, and the other seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief under ORS chapter 28, alleging that the school’s disciplinary decision violated various provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 379. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of review as untimely, and we affirmed that dismissal. Id. at 383. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ state law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief o 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that a corporate chapter 7 debt ors malpractice claim against its bankruptcy attorney was related to its bankruptcy case",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nOur decision in Pangle v. Bend-LaPine School District, 169 Or App 376, 10 P3d 275 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 558 (2001), is instructive. In Pangle, the plaintiffs, who sought to challenge a school district’s disciplinary decision, brought two actions, one seeking a writ of review, and the other seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief under ORS chapter 28, alleging that the school’s disciplinary decision violated various provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 379. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of review as untimely, and we affirmed that dismissal. Id. at 383. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ state law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief o 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that regarding claims for employment discrimination under ors chapter 659 the exclusivity provision of ors 341022 was inapplicable"
] |
). Here, plaintiffs seek substantially the same
| 4 |
611 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\noverreaching, or compromised independence). We do not presume to draft precise disclaimers for each of appellants’ four claims; we leave that task to the agency in the first instance. Nor do we rule out the possibility that where evidence in support of a claim is outweighed by evidence against the claim, the FDA could deem it incurable by a disclaimer and ban it outright. For example, if the weight of the evidence were against the hypothetical claim that “Consumption of Vitamin E reduces the risk of Alzheimer’s disease,” the agency might reasonably determine that adding a disclaimer such as “The FDA has determined that no evidence supports this claim” would not suffice to mitigate the claim’s misleadingness. Cf. FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 42-43 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding that defendants statement that it owned the rights to a trademark did not give rise to a false advertising claim under the lanham act",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\noverreaching, or compromised independence). We do not presume to draft precise disclaimers for each of appellants’ four claims; we leave that task to the agency in the first instance. Nor do we rule out the possibility that where evidence in support of a claim is outweighed by evidence against the claim, the FDA could deem it incurable by a disclaimer and ban it outright. For example, if the weight of the evidence were against the hypothetical claim that “Consumption of Vitamin E reduces the risk of Alzheimer’s disease,” the agency might reasonably determine that adding a disclaimer such as “The FDA has determined that no evidence supports this claim” would not suffice to mitigate the claim’s misleadingness. Cf. FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 42-43 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding in a false advertising case under the lanham act that a proposed disclaimer would not suffice to cure the misleadingness of an advertising claim",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\noverreaching, or compromised independence). We do not presume to draft precise disclaimers for each of appellants’ four claims; we leave that task to the agency in the first instance. Nor do we rule out the possibility that where evidence in support of a claim is outweighed by evidence against the claim, the FDA could deem it incurable by a disclaimer and ban it outright. For example, if the weight of the evidence were against the hypothetical claim that “Consumption of Vitamin E reduces the risk of Alzheimer’s disease,” the agency might reasonably determine that adding a disclaimer such as “The FDA has determined that no evidence supports this claim” would not suffice to mitigate the claim’s misleadingness. Cf. FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 42-43 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding that there must be a causal connection between an insureds advertising and an alleged injury to trigger coverage for an advertising injury",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\noverreaching, or compromised independence). We do not presume to draft precise disclaimers for each of appellants’ four claims; we leave that task to the agency in the first instance. Nor do we rule out the possibility that where evidence in support of a claim is outweighed by evidence against the claim, the FDA could deem it incurable by a disclaimer and ban it outright. For example, if the weight of the evidence were against the hypothetical claim that “Consumption of Vitamin E reduces the risk of Alzheimer’s disease,” the agency might reasonably determine that adding a disclaimer such as “The FDA has determined that no evidence supports this claim” would not suffice to mitigate the claim’s misleadingness. Cf. FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 42-43 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding that both lanham act false advertising claim and a false advertising claim made under section 349 or section 350 require a showing that the advertisement was false or misleading",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\noverreaching, or compromised independence). We do not presume to draft precise disclaimers for each of appellants’ four claims; we leave that task to the agency in the first instance. Nor do we rule out the possibility that where evidence in support of a claim is outweighed by evidence against the claim, the FDA could deem it incurable by a disclaimer and ban it outright. For example, if the weight of the evidence were against the hypothetical claim that “Consumption of Vitamin E reduces the risk of Alzheimer’s disease,” the agency might reasonably determine that adding a disclaimer such as “The FDA has determined that no evidence supports this claim” would not suffice to mitigate the claim’s misleadingness. Cf. FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 42-43 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding that while under a false association claim parties need not be direct competitors under a false advertising claim they do"
] |
). Finally, while we are skeptical that the
| 1 |
612 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\natffl 16-22. 40 . Doc. No. 41 at ¶ 35. 41 . In re Seaway Intern. Transport, Inc., 341 B.R. 333, 334 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2006). 42 . In re McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc., 326 B.R. 843, 852 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2005) (\"Once a court determines that transfers are avoidable under Bankruptcy Code section 548 or under Florida Statutes section 726.105, (available to the Trustee under Bankruptcy Code section 544(b)), the Court must then look to Bankruptcy Code section 550 to determine the liability of the transferee of the avoided transfer.”); see also In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir.2005) (discussing re-coverability issues under § 550 for transfers avoided under § 544 and FUFTA). But see In re Jackson, 318 B.R. 5, 26 (Bankr.D.N.H.2004) subsequently aff'd, 459 F.3d 117 (1st Cir.2006) (holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\natffl 16-22. 40 . Doc. No. 41 at ¶ 35. 41 . In re Seaway Intern. Transport, Inc., 341 B.R. 333, 334 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2006). 42 . In re McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc., 326 B.R. 843, 852 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2005) (\"Once a court determines that transfers are avoidable under Bankruptcy Code section 548 or under Florida Statutes section 726.105, (available to the Trustee under Bankruptcy Code section 544(b)), the Court must then look to Bankruptcy Code section 550 to determine the liability of the transferee of the avoided transfer.”); see also In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir.2005) (discussing re-coverability issues under § 550 for transfers avoided under § 544 and FUFTA). But see In re Jackson, 318 B.R. 5, 26 (Bankr.D.N.H.2004) subsequently aff'd, 459 F.3d 117 (1st Cir.2006) (holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\natffl 16-22. 40 . Doc. No. 41 at ¶ 35. 41 . In re Seaway Intern. Transport, Inc., 341 B.R. 333, 334 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2006). 42 . In re McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc., 326 B.R. 843, 852 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2005) (\"Once a court determines that transfers are avoidable under Bankruptcy Code section 548 or under Florida Statutes section 726.105, (available to the Trustee under Bankruptcy Code section 544(b)), the Court must then look to Bankruptcy Code section 550 to determine the liability of the transferee of the avoided transfer.”); see also In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir.2005) (discussing re-coverability issues under § 550 for transfers avoided under § 544 and FUFTA). But see In re Jackson, 318 B.R. 5, 26 (Bankr.D.N.H.2004) subsequently aff'd, 459 F.3d 117 (1st Cir.2006) (holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\natffl 16-22. 40 . Doc. No. 41 at ¶ 35. 41 . In re Seaway Intern. Transport, Inc., 341 B.R. 333, 334 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2006). 42 . In re McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc., 326 B.R. 843, 852 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2005) (\"Once a court determines that transfers are avoidable under Bankruptcy Code section 548 or under Florida Statutes section 726.105, (available to the Trustee under Bankruptcy Code section 544(b)), the Court must then look to Bankruptcy Code section 550 to determine the liability of the transferee of the avoided transfer.”); see also In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir.2005) (discussing re-coverability issues under § 550 for transfers avoided under § 544 and FUFTA). But see In re Jackson, 318 B.R. 5, 26 (Bankr.D.N.H.2004) subsequently aff'd, 459 F.3d 117 (1st Cir.2006) (holding clear and convincing standard to prove fraud or fraudulent intent and preponderance of the evidence to prove other elements under 727",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\natffl 16-22. 40 . Doc. No. 41 at ¶ 35. 41 . In re Seaway Intern. Transport, Inc., 341 B.R. 333, 334 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2006). 42 . In re McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc., 326 B.R. 843, 852 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2005) (\"Once a court determines that transfers are avoidable under Bankruptcy Code section 548 or under Florida Statutes section 726.105, (available to the Trustee under Bankruptcy Code section 544(b)), the Court must then look to Bankruptcy Code section 550 to determine the liability of the transferee of the avoided transfer.”); see also In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir.2005) (discussing re-coverability issues under § 550 for transfers avoided under § 544 and FUFTA). But see In re Jackson, 318 B.R. 5, 26 (Bankr.D.N.H.2004) subsequently aff'd, 459 F.3d 117 (1st Cir.2006) (holding that because the plaintiff could not prove avoidance of the transfers under 548 and only proved elements of the state law fraudulent transfer causes of action through 544 the plaintiff was limited to the state law recovery scheme and not 550"
] |
). 43 . In re Kingsley, 518 F.3d 874, 877 (11 th
| 4 |
613 |
[
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nprivacy in one’s bodily integrity. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861. This lesser degree of privacy would result from the needs of prison officials to check intimate areas of a prisoner’s body for weapons or drugs. See id. The theory underlying this principle is that once a person has been subject to such searches, one does not expect to retain such privacy. This logic breaks down when applied and extended to probationers who have not served time in this environment and have not experienced this repeated searching. See id. In addition, the logic is not applicable to a person released and no longer subject to such searches. The intrusion past one’s bodily surface implicates the most grave privacy rights. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826; Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 658 (holding that presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standard are constitutionally required in criminal cases",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nprivacy in one’s bodily integrity. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861. This lesser degree of privacy would result from the needs of prison officials to check intimate areas of a prisoner’s body for weapons or drugs. See id. The theory underlying this principle is that once a person has been subject to such searches, one does not expect to retain such privacy. This logic breaks down when applied and extended to probationers who have not served time in this environment and have not experienced this repeated searching. See id. In addition, the logic is not applicable to a person released and no longer subject to such searches. The intrusion past one’s bodily surface implicates the most grave privacy rights. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826; Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 658 (recognizing the difference between the physical intrusion required to take a fingerprint and the intrusion required to draw a blood sample is constitutionally significant",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nprivacy in one’s bodily integrity. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861. This lesser degree of privacy would result from the needs of prison officials to check intimate areas of a prisoner’s body for weapons or drugs. See id. The theory underlying this principle is that once a person has been subject to such searches, one does not expect to retain such privacy. This logic breaks down when applied and extended to probationers who have not served time in this environment and have not experienced this repeated searching. See id. In addition, the logic is not applicable to a person released and no longer subject to such searches. The intrusion past one’s bodily surface implicates the most grave privacy rights. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826; Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 658 (holding that resentencing is required",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nprivacy in one’s bodily integrity. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861. This lesser degree of privacy would result from the needs of prison officials to check intimate areas of a prisoner’s body for weapons or drugs. See id. The theory underlying this principle is that once a person has been subject to such searches, one does not expect to retain such privacy. This logic breaks down when applied and extended to probationers who have not served time in this environment and have not experienced this repeated searching. See id. In addition, the logic is not applicable to a person released and no longer subject to such searches. The intrusion past one’s bodily surface implicates the most grave privacy rights. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826; Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 658 (holding that more than notice to a defendant is required",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nprivacy in one’s bodily integrity. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861. This lesser degree of privacy would result from the needs of prison officials to check intimate areas of a prisoner’s body for weapons or drugs. See id. The theory underlying this principle is that once a person has been subject to such searches, one does not expect to retain such privacy. This logic breaks down when applied and extended to probationers who have not served time in this environment and have not experienced this repeated searching. See id. In addition, the logic is not applicable to a person released and no longer subject to such searches. The intrusion past one’s bodily surface implicates the most grave privacy rights. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826; Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 658 (recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel"
] |
). In the context of a warrantless and
| 1 |
614 |
[
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na certain period of time. Id. at 532. Our Supreme Court held “that when changing a group policy insuring contributing employees and obtaining the applications of those employees, the employer acts as an agent of the employees [cits.], and as such is under a duty to notify the employees of differences between the old and new policies and of any rights the employees may have to continue the old insurance on an individual basis. We hold further that where this duty is breached, an employee can recover such damages as result from the difference in coverage.” Id. at 535-536. Although this case is somewhat factually different from Dawes Mining, the same analysis of duty and breach are applicable in this case. When an employee makes application for group health insurance coverage and ) (1981) (holding the employer breached the duty owed to its employee by erroneously advising the employee he would continue to have coverage for 30 days following his termination of employment under the employers group policy",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na certain period of time. Id. at 532. Our Supreme Court held “that when changing a group policy insuring contributing employees and obtaining the applications of those employees, the employer acts as an agent of the employees [cits.], and as such is under a duty to notify the employees of differences between the old and new policies and of any rights the employees may have to continue the old insurance on an individual basis. We hold further that where this duty is breached, an employee can recover such damages as result from the difference in coverage.” Id. at 535-536. Although this case is somewhat factually different from Dawes Mining, the same analysis of duty and breach are applicable in this case. When an employee makes application for group health insurance coverage and ) (1981) (holding that employer breached fiduciary duty to disclose that it was considering allowing employees to participate in benefit plan",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na certain period of time. Id. at 532. Our Supreme Court held “that when changing a group policy insuring contributing employees and obtaining the applications of those employees, the employer acts as an agent of the employees [cits.], and as such is under a duty to notify the employees of differences between the old and new policies and of any rights the employees may have to continue the old insurance on an individual basis. We hold further that where this duty is breached, an employee can recover such damages as result from the difference in coverage.” Id. at 535-536. Although this case is somewhat factually different from Dawes Mining, the same analysis of duty and breach are applicable in this case. When an employee makes application for group health insurance coverage and ) (1981) (holding that the employer created an erisa plan when it 1 paid for the employees insurance 2 contracted with the insurance company for coverage and eligibility requirements and 3 collected and remitted the employees dependents premiums",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na certain period of time. Id. at 532. Our Supreme Court held “that when changing a group policy insuring contributing employees and obtaining the applications of those employees, the employer acts as an agent of the employees [cits.], and as such is under a duty to notify the employees of differences between the old and new policies and of any rights the employees may have to continue the old insurance on an individual basis. We hold further that where this duty is breached, an employee can recover such damages as result from the difference in coverage.” Id. at 535-536. Although this case is somewhat factually different from Dawes Mining, the same analysis of duty and breach are applicable in this case. When an employee makes application for group health insurance coverage and ) (1981) (holding that the employer breached a duty to its employees by allowing their insurance coverage to lapse without giving them reasonable notification of the lapse",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na certain period of time. Id. at 532. Our Supreme Court held “that when changing a group policy insuring contributing employees and obtaining the applications of those employees, the employer acts as an agent of the employees [cits.], and as such is under a duty to notify the employees of differences between the old and new policies and of any rights the employees may have to continue the old insurance on an individual basis. We hold further that where this duty is breached, an employee can recover such damages as result from the difference in coverage.” Id. at 535-536. Although this case is somewhat factually different from Dawes Mining, the same analysis of duty and breach are applicable in this case. When an employee makes application for group health insurance coverage and ) (1981) (holding the plain terms of the mortgage did not demonstrate any contractual duty on the mortgagee to procure coverage on plaintiffs property or to notify plaintiff of lapse in coverage"
] |
). In reaching our decision we are mindful that
| 3 |
615 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of attempting to set fire to or burn a building under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-67.1. The State was not required to prove a “burning” in order to prove an attempt to bum or set fire. Avery, 315 N.C. at 25, 337 S.E.2d at 799. We note that, unlike the facts of Avery, the juvenile in the present case did not set off a fire bomb, but rather set off fireworks. While this factual distinction may be significant under different facts, the facts here are that the juvenile set off fireworks “near the wall” of the interview room. Given the proximity of the fireworks to the wall and the resulting flame and damage, we infer an intent to set fire with the fireworks. See State v. Grigsby, 351 N.C. 454, 457, 526 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2000) (holding that where a defendant acknowledged awareness of the consequences of his plea agreement counsels erroneous explanation of the consequences was not prejudicial",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of attempting to set fire to or burn a building under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-67.1. The State was not required to prove a “burning” in order to prove an attempt to bum or set fire. Avery, 315 N.C. at 25, 337 S.E.2d at 799. We note that, unlike the facts of Avery, the juvenile in the present case did not set off a fire bomb, but rather set off fireworks. While this factual distinction may be significant under different facts, the facts here are that the juvenile set off fireworks “near the wall” of the interview room. Given the proximity of the fireworks to the wall and the resulting flame and damage, we infer an intent to set fire with the fireworks. See State v. Grigsby, 351 N.C. 454, 457, 526 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2000) (holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of attempting to set fire to or burn a building under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-67.1. The State was not required to prove a “burning” in order to prove an attempt to bum or set fire. Avery, 315 N.C. at 25, 337 S.E.2d at 799. We note that, unlike the facts of Avery, the juvenile in the present case did not set off a fire bomb, but rather set off fireworks. While this factual distinction may be significant under different facts, the facts here are that the juvenile set off fireworks “near the wall” of the interview room. Given the proximity of the fireworks to the wall and the resulting flame and damage, we infer an intent to set fire with the fireworks. See State v. Grigsby, 351 N.C. 454, 457, 526 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2000) (holding that an attorney is required to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and will not be found ineffective for failing to advise of collateral consequences of the plea",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of attempting to set fire to or burn a building under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-67.1. The State was not required to prove a “burning” in order to prove an attempt to bum or set fire. Avery, 315 N.C. at 25, 337 S.E.2d at 799. We note that, unlike the facts of Avery, the juvenile in the present case did not set off a fire bomb, but rather set off fireworks. While this factual distinction may be significant under different facts, the facts here are that the juvenile set off fireworks “near the wall” of the interview room. Given the proximity of the fireworks to the wall and the resulting flame and damage, we infer an intent to set fire with the fireworks. See State v. Grigsby, 351 N.C. 454, 457, 526 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2000) (holding the federal government responsible for the immediately foreseeable consequences of its actions",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of attempting to set fire to or burn a building under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-67.1. The State was not required to prove a “burning” in order to prove an attempt to bum or set fire. Avery, 315 N.C. at 25, 337 S.E.2d at 799. We note that, unlike the facts of Avery, the juvenile in the present case did not set off a fire bomb, but rather set off fireworks. While this factual distinction may be significant under different facts, the facts here are that the juvenile set off fireworks “near the wall” of the interview room. Given the proximity of the fireworks to the wall and the resulting flame and damage, we infer an intent to set fire with the fireworks. See State v. Grigsby, 351 N.C. 454, 457, 526 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2000) (holding that an individual is presumed to intend the natural consequences of the individuals actions"
] |
). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
| 4 |
616 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). A federal habeas court must grant relief if it is in “grave doubt” as to the harmlessness of the error. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 679 (4th Cir.2002). “ ‘[G]rave doubt’ exists when, in the relevant circumstances, the question is so evenly balanced that the reviewing court finds itself in ‘virtual equipóse’ [sic] on the harmlessness issue.” Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 461 (4th Cir.2008); Fullwood, 290 F.3d at 679; accord O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 992. The test is whether it can be said with fair assurance that not a single juror’s decision was swayed by resort to the extrinsic influence of the dictionary. See Parker, 385 U.S. at 366, 87 S.Ct. 468 (holding that a defendants claim that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). A federal habeas court must grant relief if it is in “grave doubt” as to the harmlessness of the error. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 679 (4th Cir.2002). “ ‘[G]rave doubt’ exists when, in the relevant circumstances, the question is so evenly balanced that the reviewing court finds itself in ‘virtual equipóse’ [sic] on the harmlessness issue.” Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 461 (4th Cir.2008); Fullwood, 290 F.3d at 679; accord O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 992. The test is whether it can be said with fair assurance that not a single juror’s decision was swayed by resort to the extrinsic influence of the dictionary. See Parker, 385 U.S. at 366, 87 S.Ct. 468 (holding right of accused to trial by impartial jury justified postverdict protection of jurors from harassment and did not violate first amendment",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). A federal habeas court must grant relief if it is in “grave doubt” as to the harmlessness of the error. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 679 (4th Cir.2002). “ ‘[G]rave doubt’ exists when, in the relevant circumstances, the question is so evenly balanced that the reviewing court finds itself in ‘virtual equipóse’ [sic] on the harmlessness issue.” Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 461 (4th Cir.2008); Fullwood, 290 F.3d at 679; accord O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 992. The test is whether it can be said with fair assurance that not a single juror’s decision was swayed by resort to the extrinsic influence of the dictionary. See Parker, 385 U.S. at 366, 87 S.Ct. 468 (holding that defendant has constitutional right to be tried by impartial jury unprejudiced by extraneous influence",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). A federal habeas court must grant relief if it is in “grave doubt” as to the harmlessness of the error. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 679 (4th Cir.2002). “ ‘[G]rave doubt’ exists when, in the relevant circumstances, the question is so evenly balanced that the reviewing court finds itself in ‘virtual equipóse’ [sic] on the harmlessness issue.” Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 461 (4th Cir.2008); Fullwood, 290 F.3d at 679; accord O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 992. The test is whether it can be said with fair assurance that not a single juror’s decision was swayed by resort to the extrinsic influence of the dictionary. See Parker, 385 U.S. at 366, 87 S.Ct. 468 (holding that a defendant is entitled to be tried by 12 not 9 or even 10 impartial and unprejudiced jurors",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). A federal habeas court must grant relief if it is in “grave doubt” as to the harmlessness of the error. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 679 (4th Cir.2002). “ ‘[G]rave doubt’ exists when, in the relevant circumstances, the question is so evenly balanced that the reviewing court finds itself in ‘virtual equipóse’ [sic] on the harmlessness issue.” Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 461 (4th Cir.2008); Fullwood, 290 F.3d at 679; accord O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 992. The test is whether it can be said with fair assurance that not a single juror’s decision was swayed by resort to the extrinsic influence of the dictionary. See Parker, 385 U.S. at 366, 87 S.Ct. 468 (holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict"
] |
); Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 613 (9th
| 3 |
617 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nover other attorneys, settled tort cases only pursuant to directives he received from an internal management committee, and never participated in any forum wherein departmental policy was discussed and/or established. The defendants’ reliance on a string of cases holding that municipal attorneys in positions similar to Selkirk’s were not protected by Elrod and Branti, is irrelevant and misplaced. The very essence of the following cases required an examination of the duties of each plaintiff to ascertain whether his position entailed “policymak-ing” responsibility or required political fealty to effectively perform. The Court need not undertake such an analysis here because the Defendants have already done so and concluded to the contrary. See Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.1983) (holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages under 1988 in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the states case including deciding which evidence to present",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nover other attorneys, settled tort cases only pursuant to directives he received from an internal management committee, and never participated in any forum wherein departmental policy was discussed and/or established. The defendants’ reliance on a string of cases holding that municipal attorneys in positions similar to Selkirk’s were not protected by Elrod and Branti, is irrelevant and misplaced. The very essence of the following cases required an examination of the duties of each plaintiff to ascertain whether his position entailed “policymak-ing” responsibility or required political fealty to effectively perform. The Court need not undertake such an analysis here because the Defendants have already done so and concluded to the contrary. See Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.1983) (holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a 1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nover other attorneys, settled tort cases only pursuant to directives he received from an internal management committee, and never participated in any forum wherein departmental policy was discussed and/or established. The defendants’ reliance on a string of cases holding that municipal attorneys in positions similar to Selkirk’s were not protected by Elrod and Branti, is irrelevant and misplaced. The very essence of the following cases required an examination of the duties of each plaintiff to ascertain whether his position entailed “policymak-ing” responsibility or required political fealty to effectively perform. The Court need not undertake such an analysis here because the Defendants have already done so and concluded to the contrary. See Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.1983) (holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for withholding exculpatory evidence from grand jury",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nover other attorneys, settled tort cases only pursuant to directives he received from an internal management committee, and never participated in any forum wherein departmental policy was discussed and/or established. The defendants’ reliance on a string of cases holding that municipal attorneys in positions similar to Selkirk’s were not protected by Elrod and Branti, is irrelevant and misplaced. The very essence of the following cases required an examination of the duties of each plaintiff to ascertain whether his position entailed “policymak-ing” responsibility or required political fealty to effectively perform. The Court need not undertake such an analysis here because the Defendants have already done so and concluded to the contrary. See Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.1983) (holding that nasd disciplinary officers are entitled to absolute immunity from further prosecution for civil liability for them actions taken within the outer scope of them official duties",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nover other attorneys, settled tort cases only pursuant to directives he received from an internal management committee, and never participated in any forum wherein departmental policy was discussed and/or established. The defendants’ reliance on a string of cases holding that municipal attorneys in positions similar to Selkirk’s were not protected by Elrod and Branti, is irrelevant and misplaced. The very essence of the following cases required an examination of the duties of each plaintiff to ascertain whether his position entailed “policymak-ing” responsibility or required political fealty to effectively perform. The Court need not undertake such an analysis here because the Defendants have already done so and concluded to the contrary. See Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.1983) (holding in dicta that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute loyalty from his assistants and could terminate them for political reasons"
] |
); Mummau v. Ranck, 687 F.2d 9 (3rd Cir. 1982)
| 4 |
618 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat would arise if we were to affirm a removal order on a ground introduced only on appeal and not raised or litigated below, see Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1252 (9th Cir.2003), the government’s argument fundamentally misunderstands the nature of our review. Whatever the grounds on which Al Mutarreb might have been found removable, only one was charged. We have no power to affirm the BIA on a ground never charged by the Service or found by the IJ. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (noting that a “court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate and proper basis” not relied on by the agency); see also Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir.2006) (holding that when an ij issues a decision granting an aliens application for withholding of removal without a grant of asylum the decision must include an explicit order of removal designating a country of removal",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat would arise if we were to affirm a removal order on a ground introduced only on appeal and not raised or litigated below, see Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1252 (9th Cir.2003), the government’s argument fundamentally misunderstands the nature of our review. Whatever the grounds on which Al Mutarreb might have been found removable, only one was charged. We have no power to affirm the BIA on a ground never charged by the Service or found by the IJ. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (noting that a “court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate and proper basis” not relied on by the agency); see also Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir.2006) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat would arise if we were to affirm a removal order on a ground introduced only on appeal and not raised or litigated below, see Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1252 (9th Cir.2003), the government’s argument fundamentally misunderstands the nature of our review. Whatever the grounds on which Al Mutarreb might have been found removable, only one was charged. We have no power to affirm the BIA on a ground never charged by the Service or found by the IJ. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (noting that a “court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate and proper basis” not relied on by the agency); see also Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir.2006) (holding that term order of removal does not include aliens ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning attorneys actions taken after order of removal becomes final",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat would arise if we were to affirm a removal order on a ground introduced only on appeal and not raised or litigated below, see Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1252 (9th Cir.2003), the government’s argument fundamentally misunderstands the nature of our review. Whatever the grounds on which Al Mutarreb might have been found removable, only one was charged. We have no power to affirm the BIA on a ground never charged by the Service or found by the IJ. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (noting that a “court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate and proper basis” not relied on by the agency); see also Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir.2006) (holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of 4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat would arise if we were to affirm a removal order on a ground introduced only on appeal and not raised or litigated below, see Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1252 (9th Cir.2003), the government’s argument fundamentally misunderstands the nature of our review. Whatever the grounds on which Al Mutarreb might have been found removable, only one was charged. We have no power to affirm the BIA on a ground never charged by the Service or found by the IJ. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (noting that a “court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate and proper basis” not relied on by the agency); see also Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir.2006) (holding that an aliens prior possession conviction cannot sustain the removal order because it was not alleged in the nta"
] |
). Nor do we accept the government’s contention
| 4 |
619 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndid not challenge the adequacy of [the] defendants' search for records in response to his FOIA requests in Counts II and III”). 6 . The plaintiff also asserts that the defendant failed to provide to him his 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice. However, the plaintiff only requested the 2014 Within Grade Increase Notice in his FOIA request. See Def.’s Mot., Def.’s Facts 1. Furthermore, the Court is baffled by the plaintiff’s assertion, given that he provided the Court with the requested 2013 Fiscal Year Acceptable Level of Competence Form, See Pl.’s Compel Mot, I at 23. Accordingly, because the production of any 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice falls outside of the scope of the defendant’s obligations under the FOIA, see Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndid not challenge the adequacy of [the] defendants' search for records in response to his FOIA requests in Counts II and III”). 6 . The plaintiff also asserts that the defendant failed to provide to him his 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice. However, the plaintiff only requested the 2014 Within Grade Increase Notice in his FOIA request. See Def.’s Mot., Def.’s Facts 1. Furthermore, the Court is baffled by the plaintiff’s assertion, given that he provided the Court with the requested 2013 Fiscal Year Acceptable Level of Competence Form, See Pl.’s Compel Mot, I at 23. Accordingly, because the production of any 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice falls outside of the scope of the defendant’s obligations under the FOIA, see Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndid not challenge the adequacy of [the] defendants' search for records in response to his FOIA requests in Counts II and III”). 6 . The plaintiff also asserts that the defendant failed to provide to him his 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice. However, the plaintiff only requested the 2014 Within Grade Increase Notice in his FOIA request. See Def.’s Mot., Def.’s Facts 1. Furthermore, the Court is baffled by the plaintiff’s assertion, given that he provided the Court with the requested 2013 Fiscal Year Acceptable Level of Competence Form, See Pl.’s Compel Mot, I at 23. Accordingly, because the production of any 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice falls outside of the scope of the defendant’s obligations under the FOIA, see Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndid not challenge the adequacy of [the] defendants' search for records in response to his FOIA requests in Counts II and III”). 6 . The plaintiff also asserts that the defendant failed to provide to him his 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice. However, the plaintiff only requested the 2014 Within Grade Increase Notice in his FOIA request. See Def.’s Mot., Def.’s Facts 1. Furthermore, the Court is baffled by the plaintiff’s assertion, given that he provided the Court with the requested 2013 Fiscal Year Acceptable Level of Competence Form, See Pl.’s Compel Mot, I at 23. Accordingly, because the production of any 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice falls outside of the scope of the defendant’s obligations under the FOIA, see Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndid not challenge the adequacy of [the] defendants' search for records in response to his FOIA requests in Counts II and III”). 6 . The plaintiff also asserts that the defendant failed to provide to him his 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice. However, the plaintiff only requested the 2014 Within Grade Increase Notice in his FOIA request. See Def.’s Mot., Def.’s Facts 1. Furthermore, the Court is baffled by the plaintiff’s assertion, given that he provided the Court with the requested 2013 Fiscal Year Acceptable Level of Competence Form, See Pl.’s Compel Mot, I at 23. Accordingly, because the production of any 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice falls outside of the scope of the defendant’s obligations under the FOIA, see Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that a foia request should be read to seek all documents covered by a catchall"
] |
); see also Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d
| 2 |
620 |
[
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nThe downzoning was the subject of the other case consolidated on appeal. The Court of Appeals initially opined: We think it plain ... that the WSSC was subject to valid criticism ... from the Council and the Planning Commission, each of whom had legitimate reason to be concerned .... That they voiced their concern ... and urged the WSSC to deny the permit ... is not the equivalent of wrongful governmental pressure brought to bear upon a sister agency. ... Nor does the mere fact that the future commercial development ... was under study ... justify an inf , 428, 571 A.2d 1270 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 323 Md. 504, 594 A.2d 95 (1991) (stating that application for permit does not create vested right); Miller v. Forty West Builders, Inc., 62 Md.App. 320, 330, 489 A.2d 76 (1985) (holding that vested rights were not acquired by obtaining approval of the subdivision plan",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nThe downzoning was the subject of the other case consolidated on appeal. The Court of Appeals initially opined: We think it plain ... that the WSSC was subject to valid criticism ... from the Council and the Planning Commission, each of whom had legitimate reason to be concerned .... That they voiced their concern ... and urged the WSSC to deny the permit ... is not the equivalent of wrongful governmental pressure brought to bear upon a sister agency. ... Nor does the mere fact that the future commercial development ... was under study ... justify an inf , 428, 571 A.2d 1270 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 323 Md. 504, 594 A.2d 95 (1991) (stating that application for permit does not create vested right); Miller v. Forty West Builders, Inc., 62 Md.App. 320, 330, 489 A.2d 76 (1985) (holding that a plan sponsor was an erisa fiduciary to the extent that it was vested with and exercised discretionary control",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nThe downzoning was the subject of the other case consolidated on appeal. The Court of Appeals initially opined: We think it plain ... that the WSSC was subject to valid criticism ... from the Council and the Planning Commission, each of whom had legitimate reason to be concerned .... That they voiced their concern ... and urged the WSSC to deny the permit ... is not the equivalent of wrongful governmental pressure brought to bear upon a sister agency. ... Nor does the mere fact that the future commercial development ... was under study ... justify an inf , 428, 571 A.2d 1270 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 323 Md. 504, 594 A.2d 95 (1991) (stating that application for permit does not create vested right); Miller v. Forty West Builders, Inc., 62 Md.App. 320, 330, 489 A.2d 76 (1985) (holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nThe downzoning was the subject of the other case consolidated on appeal. The Court of Appeals initially opined: We think it plain ... that the WSSC was subject to valid criticism ... from the Council and the Planning Commission, each of whom had legitimate reason to be concerned .... That they voiced their concern ... and urged the WSSC to deny the permit ... is not the equivalent of wrongful governmental pressure brought to bear upon a sister agency. ... Nor does the mere fact that the future commercial development ... was under study ... justify an inf , 428, 571 A.2d 1270 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 323 Md. 504, 594 A.2d 95 (1991) (stating that application for permit does not create vested right); Miller v. Forty West Builders, Inc., 62 Md.App. 320, 330, 489 A.2d 76 (1985) (holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nThe downzoning was the subject of the other case consolidated on appeal. The Court of Appeals initially opined: We think it plain ... that the WSSC was subject to valid criticism ... from the Council and the Planning Commission, each of whom had legitimate reason to be concerned .... That they voiced their concern ... and urged the WSSC to deny the permit ... is not the equivalent of wrongful governmental pressure brought to bear upon a sister agency. ... Nor does the mere fact that the future commercial development ... was under study ... justify an inf , 428, 571 A.2d 1270 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 323 Md. 504, 594 A.2d 95 (1991) (stating that application for permit does not create vested right); Miller v. Forty West Builders, Inc., 62 Md.App. 320, 330, 489 A.2d 76 (1985) (holding that the right of approval is subject to standards of reasonableness implied by law"
] |
); Prince George’s County v. Equitable Trust
| 0 |
621 |
[
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of die United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 2 . Inferior officers may be appointed by the President alone, the heads of departments, or the judiciary, as Congress may determine, but it is undisputed that no inferior officer was involved in the civil enforcement action here. 3 . Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by congress courts may not create a cause of action absent statutory intent",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of die United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 2 . Inferior officers may be appointed by the President alone, the heads of departments, or the judiciary, as Congress may determine, but it is undisputed that no inferior officer was involved in the civil enforcement action here. 3 . Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that congress cannot confer the executives standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through citizensuit provisions",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of die United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 2 . Inferior officers may be appointed by the President alone, the heads of departments, or the judiciary, as Congress may determine, but it is undisputed that no inferior officer was involved in the civil enforcement action here. 3 . Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that congress cannot consistent with the constitutional principles of the separation of powers confer standing on a qui tam plaintiff who has suffered no cognizable injury to allow that plaintiff to prosecute an fca action on the governments behalf",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of die United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 2 . Inferior officers may be appointed by the President alone, the heads of departments, or the judiciary, as Congress may determine, but it is undisputed that no inferior officer was involved in the civil enforcement action here. 3 . Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that congress did not intend to give individuals a right to enforce specific provisions of nclb",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of die United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 2 . Inferior officers may be appointed by the President alone, the heads of departments, or the judiciary, as Congress may determine, but it is undisputed that no inferior officer was involved in the civil enforcement action here. 3 . Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding congress must unambiguously confer federal rights on the plaintiff"
] |
); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex
| 1 |
622 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nProtective Proceedings, and Durable Power of Attorney Act of 1986) which provides a system of limited and general guard-ianships for incapacitated individuals and protective proceedings concerned with management of their estates. See also Super. Ct. Prob. R. 301-334 (governing intervention proceedings). 2 . D.C.Code § 46-404 provides that proceedings to annul a marriage on behalf of a lunatic and certain others may be instituted by a next friend. 3 .Appellant sought to amend his complaint to preclude appellee from making a claim against the decedent's estate because of the terms of a prenuptial agreement. However, the court held that leave of court was not required to amend the complaint because no responsive pleading had been filed. See Wilson v. Wilson, 785 A.2d 647, 649 (D.C.2001) (holding that the defendant waived its impropervenue defense where its responsive pleading which asserted the defenses of failure to state facts to state a claim and failure to join a necessary party did not assert the defense of improper venue",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nProtective Proceedings, and Durable Power of Attorney Act of 1986) which provides a system of limited and general guard-ianships for incapacitated individuals and protective proceedings concerned with management of their estates. See also Super. Ct. Prob. R. 301-334 (governing intervention proceedings). 2 . D.C.Code § 46-404 provides that proceedings to annul a marriage on behalf of a lunatic and certain others may be instituted by a next friend. 3 .Appellant sought to amend his complaint to preclude appellee from making a claim against the decedent's estate because of the terms of a prenuptial agreement. However, the court held that leave of court was not required to amend the complaint because no responsive pleading had been filed. See Wilson v. Wilson, 785 A.2d 647, 649 (D.C.2001) (holding that a motion to dismiss was not a responsive pleading under rule 15",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nProtective Proceedings, and Durable Power of Attorney Act of 1986) which provides a system of limited and general guard-ianships for incapacitated individuals and protective proceedings concerned with management of their estates. See also Super. Ct. Prob. R. 301-334 (governing intervention proceedings). 2 . D.C.Code § 46-404 provides that proceedings to annul a marriage on behalf of a lunatic and certain others may be instituted by a next friend. 3 .Appellant sought to amend his complaint to preclude appellee from making a claim against the decedent's estate because of the terms of a prenuptial agreement. However, the court held that leave of court was not required to amend the complaint because no responsive pleading had been filed. See Wilson v. Wilson, 785 A.2d 647, 649 (D.C.2001) (holding that for purposes of super ct civ r 41b demand is not jurisdictional but an element of the shareholders claim",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nProtective Proceedings, and Durable Power of Attorney Act of 1986) which provides a system of limited and general guard-ianships for incapacitated individuals and protective proceedings concerned with management of their estates. See also Super. Ct. Prob. R. 301-334 (governing intervention proceedings). 2 . D.C.Code § 46-404 provides that proceedings to annul a marriage on behalf of a lunatic and certain others may be instituted by a next friend. 3 .Appellant sought to amend his complaint to preclude appellee from making a claim against the decedent's estate because of the terms of a prenuptial agreement. However, the court held that leave of court was not required to amend the complaint because no responsive pleading had been filed. See Wilson v. Wilson, 785 A.2d 647, 649 (D.C.2001) (holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading not merely title of pleading",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nProtective Proceedings, and Durable Power of Attorney Act of 1986) which provides a system of limited and general guard-ianships for incapacitated individuals and protective proceedings concerned with management of their estates. See also Super. Ct. Prob. R. 301-334 (governing intervention proceedings). 2 . D.C.Code § 46-404 provides that proceedings to annul a marriage on behalf of a lunatic and certain others may be instituted by a next friend. 3 .Appellant sought to amend his complaint to preclude appellee from making a claim against the decedent's estate because of the terms of a prenuptial agreement. However, the court held that leave of court was not required to amend the complaint because no responsive pleading had been filed. See Wilson v. Wilson, 785 A.2d 647, 649 (D.C.2001) (holding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of super ct civ r 15a which permits a party to amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served"
] |
). No issue concerning any subsequently filed
| 4 |
623 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nF.3d at 909 (noting that a “full evidentiary record” had already been developed); Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d at 1045 (noting that district court’s factual findings on the relevant issue were “unequivocal”); McElyea, 158 F.3d at 1021 (finding that, after a full inquiry into the relevant issue, “[t]he record ... does not contain any information” that would suggest an alternative factual finding), or where there was a failure of proof after a full inquiry into the factual question at issue, see Reyes-Oseguera, 106 F.3d at 1484 (stating that the government had offered insufficient evidence to support a finding of reckless endangerment); Ponce, 51 F.3d at 829 (finding that the government had offered no evidence to support sentencing at criminal history category III); Becerra, 992 F.2d at 967 (holding that the government had offered insufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant jose becerra knew about or could have anticipated that the drug transaction in question could have involved 25 kilograms of cocaine",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nF.3d at 909 (noting that a “full evidentiary record” had already been developed); Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d at 1045 (noting that district court’s factual findings on the relevant issue were “unequivocal”); McElyea, 158 F.3d at 1021 (finding that, after a full inquiry into the relevant issue, “[t]he record ... does not contain any information” that would suggest an alternative factual finding), or where there was a failure of proof after a full inquiry into the factual question at issue, see Reyes-Oseguera, 106 F.3d at 1484 (stating that the government had offered insufficient evidence to support a finding of reckless endangerment); Ponce, 51 F.3d at 829 (finding that the government had offered no evidence to support sentencing at criminal history category III); Becerra, 992 F.2d at 967 (holding evidence of prior drug sales admissible under 404b to show knowledge and intent where defendant claimed he did not know that the gym bag he took possession of contained two kilograms of cocaine",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nF.3d at 909 (noting that a “full evidentiary record” had already been developed); Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d at 1045 (noting that district court’s factual findings on the relevant issue were “unequivocal”); McElyea, 158 F.3d at 1021 (finding that, after a full inquiry into the relevant issue, “[t]he record ... does not contain any information” that would suggest an alternative factual finding), or where there was a failure of proof after a full inquiry into the factual question at issue, see Reyes-Oseguera, 106 F.3d at 1484 (stating that the government had offered insufficient evidence to support a finding of reckless endangerment); Ponce, 51 F.3d at 829 (finding that the government had offered no evidence to support sentencing at criminal history category III); Becerra, 992 F.2d at 967 (holding that government did not suppress evidence when defendant knew about the existence of the evidence and could obtain it through the exercise of reasonable diligence",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nF.3d at 909 (noting that a “full evidentiary record” had already been developed); Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d at 1045 (noting that district court’s factual findings on the relevant issue were “unequivocal”); McElyea, 158 F.3d at 1021 (finding that, after a full inquiry into the relevant issue, “[t]he record ... does not contain any information” that would suggest an alternative factual finding), or where there was a failure of proof after a full inquiry into the factual question at issue, see Reyes-Oseguera, 106 F.3d at 1484 (stating that the government had offered insufficient evidence to support a finding of reckless endangerment); Ponce, 51 F.3d at 829 (finding that the government had offered no evidence to support sentencing at criminal history category III); Becerra, 992 F.2d at 967 (holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nF.3d at 909 (noting that a “full evidentiary record” had already been developed); Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d at 1045 (noting that district court’s factual findings on the relevant issue were “unequivocal”); McElyea, 158 F.3d at 1021 (finding that, after a full inquiry into the relevant issue, “[t]he record ... does not contain any information” that would suggest an alternative factual finding), or where there was a failure of proof after a full inquiry into the factual question at issue, see Reyes-Oseguera, 106 F.3d at 1484 (stating that the government had offered insufficient evidence to support a finding of reckless endangerment); Ponce, 51 F.3d at 829 (finding that the government had offered no evidence to support sentencing at criminal history category III); Becerra, 992 F.2d at 967 (holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract"
] |
). Here, in contrast, there was no offer of
| 0 |
624 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nF.2d at 206-07. Reasonableness, as shown by the movant, is essentially judged by looking to “the delay ... from the time the party is deemed to have notice of the grounds for its Rule 60(b) motion.” Jones v. City of Richmond, 106 F.R.D. 485, 489 (E.D.Va.1985). In measuring this delay, however, there is no set time period distinguishing timely from untimely motions outside of the absolute, one-year time frame for Rule 60(b)(l)-(3) motions. What constitutes a reasonable time will generally depend on the facts of each case. See United States v. Wyle (In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.), 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989). A major consideration may well be whether the nonmovant was prejudiced by the delay and whether the movant had a good reason for failing to take action sooner. Compare id. (holding an internal error that caused the movant to receive the trustees notice of motion twentysix days after the court heard the trustees motion may have constituted excusable neglect had the movant made a prompt motion for reconsideration and pointing out it is the movants actions after he became aware of the existence of the trustees motion that reaches the level of willfulness",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nF.2d at 206-07. Reasonableness, as shown by the movant, is essentially judged by looking to “the delay ... from the time the party is deemed to have notice of the grounds for its Rule 60(b) motion.” Jones v. City of Richmond, 106 F.R.D. 485, 489 (E.D.Va.1985). In measuring this delay, however, there is no set time period distinguishing timely from untimely motions outside of the absolute, one-year time frame for Rule 60(b)(l)-(3) motions. What constitutes a reasonable time will generally depend on the facts of each case. See United States v. Wyle (In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.), 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989). A major consideration may well be whether the nonmovant was prejudiced by the delay and whether the movant had a good reason for failing to take action sooner. Compare id. (holding that the csu board of trustees and individual trustees sued in their official capacity are a political arm of the state and as such are immune from suit",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nF.2d at 206-07. Reasonableness, as shown by the movant, is essentially judged by looking to “the delay ... from the time the party is deemed to have notice of the grounds for its Rule 60(b) motion.” Jones v. City of Richmond, 106 F.R.D. 485, 489 (E.D.Va.1985). In measuring this delay, however, there is no set time period distinguishing timely from untimely motions outside of the absolute, one-year time frame for Rule 60(b)(l)-(3) motions. What constitutes a reasonable time will generally depend on the facts of each case. See United States v. Wyle (In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.), 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989). A major consideration may well be whether the nonmovant was prejudiced by the delay and whether the movant had a good reason for failing to take action sooner. Compare id. (holding that a debtor could not relitigate the claim that the trustee breached his fiduciary duty because the bankruptcy court had already held that the trustees actions were not improper",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nF.2d at 206-07. Reasonableness, as shown by the movant, is essentially judged by looking to “the delay ... from the time the party is deemed to have notice of the grounds for its Rule 60(b) motion.” Jones v. City of Richmond, 106 F.R.D. 485, 489 (E.D.Va.1985). In measuring this delay, however, there is no set time period distinguishing timely from untimely motions outside of the absolute, one-year time frame for Rule 60(b)(l)-(3) motions. What constitutes a reasonable time will generally depend on the facts of each case. See United States v. Wyle (In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.), 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989). A major consideration may well be whether the nonmovant was prejudiced by the delay and whether the movant had a good reason for failing to take action sooner. Compare id. (holding a bankruptcy trustees rule 60b6 motion timely despite a delay of eighteen months from the date of the court order and fifteen months from the denial of the trustees written request for a refund government found to have been put on notice of intention to reopen settlement by earlier actions of trustee",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nF.2d at 206-07. Reasonableness, as shown by the movant, is essentially judged by looking to “the delay ... from the time the party is deemed to have notice of the grounds for its Rule 60(b) motion.” Jones v. City of Richmond, 106 F.R.D. 485, 489 (E.D.Va.1985). In measuring this delay, however, there is no set time period distinguishing timely from untimely motions outside of the absolute, one-year time frame for Rule 60(b)(l)-(3) motions. What constitutes a reasonable time will generally depend on the facts of each case. See United States v. Wyle (In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.), 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989). A major consideration may well be whether the nonmovant was prejudiced by the delay and whether the movant had a good reason for failing to take action sooner. Compare id. (holding that the trustees preference actions against each of the defendants was precluded as a matter of law by the debtors earlier assumption of its agreements with them "
] |
), with McLawhorn v. John W. Daniel & Co., 924
| 3 |
625 |
[
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclear that the standard of consumer mark recognition required for a trademark-dilution claim is much more stringent — meaning truly na tional, widespread recognition — than that required for a likelihood-of-confusion analysis in a trademark-infringement claim. 12 Eva’s Bridal, 639 F3d at 789 (citation omitted) (second alteration in original). 13 See, for example, Detroit Creamery Co v Velvet Brand Ice Cream Co, 187 Mich 312, 316; 153 NW 664 (1915) (“It has been universally held that a trade-mark, as such cannot be assigned separately and distinct from the property to which it has been attached, and likewise the rule has been laid down that a naked license to use a trade-mark is of no more validity than an assignment thereof.”); Broeg v Duchaine, 319 Mass 711, 713; 67 NE2d 466 (1946) (holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclear that the standard of consumer mark recognition required for a trademark-dilution claim is much more stringent — meaning truly na tional, widespread recognition — than that required for a likelihood-of-confusion analysis in a trademark-infringement claim. 12 Eva’s Bridal, 639 F3d at 789 (citation omitted) (second alteration in original). 13 See, for example, Detroit Creamery Co v Velvet Brand Ice Cream Co, 187 Mich 312, 316; 153 NW 664 (1915) (“It has been universally held that a trade-mark, as such cannot be assigned separately and distinct from the property to which it has been attached, and likewise the rule has been laid down that a naked license to use a trade-mark is of no more validity than an assignment thereof.”); Broeg v Duchaine, 319 Mass 711, 713; 67 NE2d 466 (1946) (holding limited use of a mark did not constitute prior use in commerce sufficient to establish rights in the mark",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclear that the standard of consumer mark recognition required for a trademark-dilution claim is much more stringent — meaning truly na tional, widespread recognition — than that required for a likelihood-of-confusion analysis in a trademark-infringement claim. 12 Eva’s Bridal, 639 F3d at 789 (citation omitted) (second alteration in original). 13 See, for example, Detroit Creamery Co v Velvet Brand Ice Cream Co, 187 Mich 312, 316; 153 NW 664 (1915) (“It has been universally held that a trade-mark, as such cannot be assigned separately and distinct from the property to which it has been attached, and likewise the rule has been laid down that a naked license to use a trade-mark is of no more validity than an assignment thereof.”); Broeg v Duchaine, 319 Mass 711, 713; 67 NE2d 466 (1946) (holding under common law of trademark that one who has developed a trade mark as a guaranty of the quality of his merchandise should not he permitted to license its use apart from his business to those who may sell an inferior product",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclear that the standard of consumer mark recognition required for a trademark-dilution claim is much more stringent — meaning truly na tional, widespread recognition — than that required for a likelihood-of-confusion analysis in a trademark-infringement claim. 12 Eva’s Bridal, 639 F3d at 789 (citation omitted) (second alteration in original). 13 See, for example, Detroit Creamery Co v Velvet Brand Ice Cream Co, 187 Mich 312, 316; 153 NW 664 (1915) (“It has been universally held that a trade-mark, as such cannot be assigned separately and distinct from the property to which it has been attached, and likewise the rule has been laid down that a naked license to use a trade-mark is of no more validity than an assignment thereof.”); Broeg v Duchaine, 319 Mass 711, 713; 67 NE2d 466 (1946) (holding that the lack of a confidentiality agreement does not necessarily defeat an argument that information is a trade secret because where an employee acquires during the course of his employment a special technique or process developed by his employer he is under a duty not to use it to the detriment of his employer",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclear that the standard of consumer mark recognition required for a trademark-dilution claim is much more stringent — meaning truly na tional, widespread recognition — than that required for a likelihood-of-confusion analysis in a trademark-infringement claim. 12 Eva’s Bridal, 639 F3d at 789 (citation omitted) (second alteration in original). 13 See, for example, Detroit Creamery Co v Velvet Brand Ice Cream Co, 187 Mich 312, 316; 153 NW 664 (1915) (“It has been universally held that a trade-mark, as such cannot be assigned separately and distinct from the property to which it has been attached, and likewise the rule has been laid down that a naked license to use a trade-mark is of no more validity than an assignment thereof.”); Broeg v Duchaine, 319 Mass 711, 713; 67 NE2d 466 (1946) (holding that the essential wrong of trademark infringement the appropriation of the good will of anothers established mark may be effectively accomplished by advertising matter associating that others distinguishing mark with the product of defendant"
] |
); 3 McCarthy, Trademarks & Unfair Competition
| 2 |
626 |
[
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nNCAA discriminated against him based on his disability. 3. Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Ct. Rec. 53, is GRANTED IN PART on the issues of whether Plaintiffs ADA claim has become moot and whether the NCAA cannot be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4. Because the Court lacks the authority to grant Plaintiff any relief for his claimed injury under the ADA, Plaintiffs ADA claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 5. Because Plaintiffs due process allegations fail as a matter of law, Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 6. Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claim, Plaintiffs claim under the WLAD is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Th ge, 959 F.Supp. 496, 498-99 (N.D.Ill.1997) (holding ada claim was discharged",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nNCAA discriminated against him based on his disability. 3. Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Ct. Rec. 53, is GRANTED IN PART on the issues of whether Plaintiffs ADA claim has become moot and whether the NCAA cannot be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4. Because the Court lacks the authority to grant Plaintiff any relief for his claimed injury under the ADA, Plaintiffs ADA claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 5. Because Plaintiffs due process allegations fail as a matter of law, Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 6. Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claim, Plaintiffs claim under the WLAD is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Th ge, 959 F.Supp. 496, 498-99 (N.D.Ill.1997) (holding that group organizing bike race was not subject to ada",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nNCAA discriminated against him based on his disability. 3. Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Ct. Rec. 53, is GRANTED IN PART on the issues of whether Plaintiffs ADA claim has become moot and whether the NCAA cannot be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4. Because the Court lacks the authority to grant Plaintiff any relief for his claimed injury under the ADA, Plaintiffs ADA claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 5. Because Plaintiffs due process allegations fail as a matter of law, Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 6. Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claim, Plaintiffs claim under the WLAD is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Th ge, 959 F.Supp. 496, 498-99 (N.D.Ill.1997) (holding that national football league was not a place and therefore not subject to ada",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nNCAA discriminated against him based on his disability. 3. Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Ct. Rec. 53, is GRANTED IN PART on the issues of whether Plaintiffs ADA claim has become moot and whether the NCAA cannot be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4. Because the Court lacks the authority to grant Plaintiff any relief for his claimed injury under the ADA, Plaintiffs ADA claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 5. Because Plaintiffs due process allegations fail as a matter of law, Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 6. Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claim, Plaintiffs claim under the WLAD is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Th ge, 959 F.Supp. 496, 498-99 (N.D.Ill.1997) (holding that a plaintiff would have to show that he was not promoted because of his race not that he was a member of a protected group and was not promoted",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nNCAA discriminated against him based on his disability. 3. Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Ct. Rec. 53, is GRANTED IN PART on the issues of whether Plaintiffs ADA claim has become moot and whether the NCAA cannot be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4. Because the Court lacks the authority to grant Plaintiff any relief for his claimed injury under the ADA, Plaintiffs ADA claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 5. Because Plaintiffs due process allegations fail as a matter of law, Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 6. Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claim, Plaintiffs claim under the WLAD is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Th ge, 959 F.Supp. 496, 498-99 (N.D.Ill.1997) (recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination"
] |
); Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, 59
| 1 |
627 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhave merit. Carnahan’s statement to Det. Tecklen-burg was an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” i.e. that David was involved in the conspiracy and served in the role of money collector or “muscle” for Martin. Fed. R Evid. 801(c). David made a timely objection to the admission of this aspect of Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony, and we find no applicable exclusion to the hearsay definition nor exception to the general rule of inadmissibility that would permit Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony. Carnahan was a cooperating informant and his statement to Det. Tecklenburg was made in that capacity, not in the capacity of co-conspirator and not in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Alonzo, 991 F.2d 1422, 1425-26 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that statements by a cooperating coconspirator to known authorities made after the commencement of cooperation are not admissible under rule 801d2e because such statements are not made in furtherance of the conspiracy",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhave merit. Carnahan’s statement to Det. Tecklen-burg was an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” i.e. that David was involved in the conspiracy and served in the role of money collector or “muscle” for Martin. Fed. R Evid. 801(c). David made a timely objection to the admission of this aspect of Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony, and we find no applicable exclusion to the hearsay definition nor exception to the general rule of inadmissibility that would permit Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony. Carnahan was a cooperating informant and his statement to Det. Tecklenburg was made in that capacity, not in the capacity of co-conspirator and not in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Alonzo, 991 F.2d 1422, 1425-26 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that statements made to keep a coconspirator informed as to the groups drug supply were made in furtherance of the conspiracy",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhave merit. Carnahan’s statement to Det. Tecklen-burg was an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” i.e. that David was involved in the conspiracy and served in the role of money collector or “muscle” for Martin. Fed. R Evid. 801(c). David made a timely objection to the admission of this aspect of Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony, and we find no applicable exclusion to the hearsay definition nor exception to the general rule of inadmissibility that would permit Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony. Carnahan was a cooperating informant and his statement to Det. Tecklenburg was made in that capacity, not in the capacity of co-conspirator and not in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Alonzo, 991 F.2d 1422, 1425-26 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that post arrest statements made by coconspirator to law enforcement officer were not admissible under rule 801d2e but admission of testimony was harmless because officers testimony was cumulative",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhave merit. Carnahan’s statement to Det. Tecklen-burg was an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” i.e. that David was involved in the conspiracy and served in the role of money collector or “muscle” for Martin. Fed. R Evid. 801(c). David made a timely objection to the admission of this aspect of Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony, and we find no applicable exclusion to the hearsay definition nor exception to the general rule of inadmissibility that would permit Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony. Carnahan was a cooperating informant and his statement to Det. Tecklenburg was made in that capacity, not in the capacity of co-conspirator and not in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Alonzo, 991 F.2d 1422, 1425-26 (8th Cir.1993) (holding a trial court should not allow a jury to hear outofcourt coconspirator declarations before holding a hearing outside the jurys presence to determine whether such statements are admissible under federal rule of evidence 801d2e",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhave merit. Carnahan’s statement to Det. Tecklen-burg was an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” i.e. that David was involved in the conspiracy and served in the role of money collector or “muscle” for Martin. Fed. R Evid. 801(c). David made a timely objection to the admission of this aspect of Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony, and we find no applicable exclusion to the hearsay definition nor exception to the general rule of inadmissibility that would permit Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony. Carnahan was a cooperating informant and his statement to Det. Tecklenburg was made in that capacity, not in the capacity of co-conspirator and not in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Alonzo, 991 F.2d 1422, 1425-26 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that statements aimed at preventing detection and punishment were not admissible under the coconspirator exception because admission of such statements would expand exception to hearsay rule to include declarations made not in furtherance of conspiracy charged but made in furtherance of an alleged implied but uncharged conspiracy aimed at preventing detection and punishment"
] |
). Also, it is not clear that Pieters’s
| 0 |
628 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthis Circuit routinely reject Exemption 4 arguments that are grounded in generalizations. See Ctr. for Public Integrity v. Dep’t of Energy, 191 F.Supp.2d 187, 194-95 (D.D.C.2002) (“The Courts of this Circuit have viewed [Exemption 4] arguments with skepticism, generally requiring agencies to disclose information under Exemption 4’s competitive harm prong unless they are able to demonstrate that release of the information would be of substantial assistance to competitors in estimating and undercutting a bidder’s future bids.”); Brownstein Zeidman & Schomer v. Dep’t of Air Force, 781 F.Supp. 31, 33 (D.D.C.1991) (rejecting application of Exemption 4 because the harm that would allegedly result from disclosure of pricing information was “speculative”). Cf. Gilda Indus., 457 F.Supp.2d at 11 (holding that competitive harm would result where the agency identified 212 competitors and explained how the requested information could be used in combination with publicly available information to disrupt supply product lines supply chains and customers",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthis Circuit routinely reject Exemption 4 arguments that are grounded in generalizations. See Ctr. for Public Integrity v. Dep’t of Energy, 191 F.Supp.2d 187, 194-95 (D.D.C.2002) (“The Courts of this Circuit have viewed [Exemption 4] arguments with skepticism, generally requiring agencies to disclose information under Exemption 4’s competitive harm prong unless they are able to demonstrate that release of the information would be of substantial assistance to competitors in estimating and undercutting a bidder’s future bids.”); Brownstein Zeidman & Schomer v. Dep’t of Air Force, 781 F.Supp. 31, 33 (D.D.C.1991) (rejecting application of Exemption 4 because the harm that would allegedly result from disclosure of pricing information was “speculative”). Cf. Gilda Indus., 457 F.Supp.2d at 11 (recognizing that there is an important privacy interest in corporate financial documents the court agrees that the information can be protected therefore the court required that the information be disclosed pursuant to a confidentiality order only to be used in connection with this litigation",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthis Circuit routinely reject Exemption 4 arguments that are grounded in generalizations. See Ctr. for Public Integrity v. Dep’t of Energy, 191 F.Supp.2d 187, 194-95 (D.D.C.2002) (“The Courts of this Circuit have viewed [Exemption 4] arguments with skepticism, generally requiring agencies to disclose information under Exemption 4’s competitive harm prong unless they are able to demonstrate that release of the information would be of substantial assistance to competitors in estimating and undercutting a bidder’s future bids.”); Brownstein Zeidman & Schomer v. Dep’t of Air Force, 781 F.Supp. 31, 33 (D.D.C.1991) (rejecting application of Exemption 4 because the harm that would allegedly result from disclosure of pricing information was “speculative”). Cf. Gilda Indus., 457 F.Supp.2d at 11 (holding contact information of potential computer network services clients was not a trade secret because all businesses are now potential customers of computer network services and their contact information is publicly available",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthis Circuit routinely reject Exemption 4 arguments that are grounded in generalizations. See Ctr. for Public Integrity v. Dep’t of Energy, 191 F.Supp.2d 187, 194-95 (D.D.C.2002) (“The Courts of this Circuit have viewed [Exemption 4] arguments with skepticism, generally requiring agencies to disclose information under Exemption 4’s competitive harm prong unless they are able to demonstrate that release of the information would be of substantial assistance to competitors in estimating and undercutting a bidder’s future bids.”); Brownstein Zeidman & Schomer v. Dep’t of Air Force, 781 F.Supp. 31, 33 (D.D.C.1991) (rejecting application of Exemption 4 because the harm that would allegedly result from disclosure of pricing information was “speculative”). Cf. Gilda Indus., 457 F.Supp.2d at 11 (holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish unconscionability based upon the alleged excessive cost of arbitration because they failed to supply information as to the actual costs that might be incurred",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthis Circuit routinely reject Exemption 4 arguments that are grounded in generalizations. See Ctr. for Public Integrity v. Dep’t of Energy, 191 F.Supp.2d 187, 194-95 (D.D.C.2002) (“The Courts of this Circuit have viewed [Exemption 4] arguments with skepticism, generally requiring agencies to disclose information under Exemption 4’s competitive harm prong unless they are able to demonstrate that release of the information would be of substantial assistance to competitors in estimating and undercutting a bidder’s future bids.”); Brownstein Zeidman & Schomer v. Dep’t of Air Force, 781 F.Supp. 31, 33 (D.D.C.1991) (rejecting application of Exemption 4 because the harm that would allegedly result from disclosure of pricing information was “speculative”). Cf. Gilda Indus., 457 F.Supp.2d at 11 (holding that contact list based on inter alia information that was publicly available did not qualify as trade secret"
] |
). Because the D.C. Circuit has cautioned that
| 0 |
629 |
[
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich he likens to the more familiar terms “for just cause” or “for cause,” which remove employment from the at-will category. The School District does not dispute that § 20.7(3) is applicable to Lockhart, but does contend that Lockhart is nonetheless an at-will employee. Quite surprisingly, no reported Iowa decision has directly addressed the issue of whether § 20.7(3) negates the presumption of at-will employment for the public employees and employers covered under this provision of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act. The few cases that have specifically addressed § 20.7(3) deal with its interaction with other statutory provisions involving discharge of public teachers. See, e.g., Northeast Community Educ. Ass’n v. Northeast Community Sch. Dist., 402 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Iowa 1987) (holding that a collective bargaining agreement between school board and teachers union established a teachers legitimate claim of entitlement to their positions at elementary school",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich he likens to the more familiar terms “for just cause” or “for cause,” which remove employment from the at-will category. The School District does not dispute that § 20.7(3) is applicable to Lockhart, but does contend that Lockhart is nonetheless an at-will employee. Quite surprisingly, no reported Iowa decision has directly addressed the issue of whether § 20.7(3) negates the presumption of at-will employment for the public employees and employers covered under this provision of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act. The few cases that have specifically addressed § 20.7(3) deal with its interaction with other statutory provisions involving discharge of public teachers. See, e.g., Northeast Community Educ. Ass’n v. Northeast Community Sch. Dist., 402 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Iowa 1987) (holding that 2073 was not inconsistent with the provision regarding the discharge of a teacher employed by public schools iowa code 27927",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich he likens to the more familiar terms “for just cause” or “for cause,” which remove employment from the at-will category. The School District does not dispute that § 20.7(3) is applicable to Lockhart, but does contend that Lockhart is nonetheless an at-will employee. Quite surprisingly, no reported Iowa decision has directly addressed the issue of whether § 20.7(3) negates the presumption of at-will employment for the public employees and employers covered under this provision of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act. The few cases that have specifically addressed § 20.7(3) deal with its interaction with other statutory provisions involving discharge of public teachers. See, e.g., Northeast Community Educ. Ass’n v. Northeast Community Sch. Dist., 402 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Iowa 1987) (recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich he likens to the more familiar terms “for just cause” or “for cause,” which remove employment from the at-will category. The School District does not dispute that § 20.7(3) is applicable to Lockhart, but does contend that Lockhart is nonetheless an at-will employee. Quite surprisingly, no reported Iowa decision has directly addressed the issue of whether § 20.7(3) negates the presumption of at-will employment for the public employees and employers covered under this provision of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act. The few cases that have specifically addressed § 20.7(3) deal with its interaction with other statutory provisions involving discharge of public teachers. See, e.g., Northeast Community Educ. Ass’n v. Northeast Community Sch. Dist., 402 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Iowa 1987) (holding that 2073 expressly grants school districts the power to suspend teachers for proper cause for disciplinary reasons provided an iowa code 27927 discharge proceeding has been initiated",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich he likens to the more familiar terms “for just cause” or “for cause,” which remove employment from the at-will category. The School District does not dispute that § 20.7(3) is applicable to Lockhart, but does contend that Lockhart is nonetheless an at-will employee. Quite surprisingly, no reported Iowa decision has directly addressed the issue of whether § 20.7(3) negates the presumption of at-will employment for the public employees and employers covered under this provision of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act. The few cases that have specifically addressed § 20.7(3) deal with its interaction with other statutory provisions involving discharge of public teachers. See, e.g., Northeast Community Educ. Ass’n v. Northeast Community Sch. Dist., 402 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Iowa 1987) (holding that the district was not liable under respondeat superior for a teachers sexual assault of a student even though it occurred on school grounds and during school hours because the criminal misconduct was not within the scope of the teachers employment"
] |
); McFarland v. Board of Educ., 277 N.W.2d 901,
| 3 |
630 |
[
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nargued that “given the criteria for major reports at the CCUSO unit,” section 229A.8A(2)(e) constituted “an unconstitutional imposition of a limitation on a less restrictive placement.” While we generally oppose the “elevat[ion of] form over substance” in conducting error preservation analysis, we note Taft did not cite a specific constitutional principle or provision in support of his challenge to section 229A.8A(2)(e). Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Iowa 1991) (noting that error was preserved on a due process argument where the party cited the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Due Process Clause in support of its constitutional challenge); see also City of Muscatine v. Northbrook P’ship Co., 619 N.W.2d 362, 368 n. 2 (Iowa 2000) (holding that patients constitutional due process rights were violated when his trial counsel was not allowed to present a closing argument prior to involuntary commitment",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nargued that “given the criteria for major reports at the CCUSO unit,” section 229A.8A(2)(e) constituted “an unconstitutional imposition of a limitation on a less restrictive placement.” While we generally oppose the “elevat[ion of] form over substance” in conducting error preservation analysis, we note Taft did not cite a specific constitutional principle or provision in support of his challenge to section 229A.8A(2)(e). Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Iowa 1991) (noting that error was preserved on a due process argument where the party cited the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Due Process Clause in support of its constitutional challenge); see also City of Muscatine v. Northbrook P’ship Co., 619 N.W.2d 362, 368 n. 2 (Iowa 2000) (holding that when neither the petitioners state court briefs nor the state courts decision made any reference to any federal constitutional claim or cited any federal constitutional cases the lack of fundamental error found by the state court was a lack of fundamental error under arizonas state constitution",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nargued that “given the criteria for major reports at the CCUSO unit,” section 229A.8A(2)(e) constituted “an unconstitutional imposition of a limitation on a less restrictive placement.” While we generally oppose the “elevat[ion of] form over substance” in conducting error preservation analysis, we note Taft did not cite a specific constitutional principle or provision in support of his challenge to section 229A.8A(2)(e). Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Iowa 1991) (noting that error was preserved on a due process argument where the party cited the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Due Process Clause in support of its constitutional challenge); see also City of Muscatine v. Northbrook P’ship Co., 619 N.W.2d 362, 368 n. 2 (Iowa 2000) (holding a party failed to preserve error on its constitutional due process argument concerning notice when they did not cite any state or federal constitutional provision to the trial court or otherwise explain how lack of notice violated their constitutional rights",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nargued that “given the criteria for major reports at the CCUSO unit,” section 229A.8A(2)(e) constituted “an unconstitutional imposition of a limitation on a less restrictive placement.” While we generally oppose the “elevat[ion of] form over substance” in conducting error preservation analysis, we note Taft did not cite a specific constitutional principle or provision in support of his challenge to section 229A.8A(2)(e). Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Iowa 1991) (noting that error was preserved on a due process argument where the party cited the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Due Process Clause in support of its constitutional challenge); see also City of Muscatine v. Northbrook P’ship Co., 619 N.W.2d 362, 368 n. 2 (Iowa 2000) (holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nargued that “given the criteria for major reports at the CCUSO unit,” section 229A.8A(2)(e) constituted “an unconstitutional imposition of a limitation on a less restrictive placement.” While we generally oppose the “elevat[ion of] form over substance” in conducting error preservation analysis, we note Taft did not cite a specific constitutional principle or provision in support of his challenge to section 229A.8A(2)(e). Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Iowa 1991) (noting that error was preserved on a due process argument where the party cited the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Due Process Clause in support of its constitutional challenge); see also City of Muscatine v. Northbrook P’ship Co., 619 N.W.2d 362, 368 n. 2 (Iowa 2000) (recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify"
] |
). A party cannot preserve error for appeal by
| 2 |
631 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWL 625006, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 1997); Rodriguez v. Margotta, 71 F.Supp.2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (McMahon, J.); Schultz v. Inc. Vill. of Bellport, No. 08CV0930, 2010 WL 3924751, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (Bianco, J.)). Here, the Individual Defendants did not deny Plaintiff all opportunities to practice in her chosen profession. It is undeniable that Defendants’ actions made it more difficult for Plaintiff to attain her goal as she now has a failing grade on her resume, lost her scholarship, and was only offered to repeat a course for which she allegedly should have been awarded credit. However, the ultimate resolution of Plaintiffs grade appeal was an opportunity to retake the student teaching seminar. See Sacco v. Pataki, 114 F.Supp.2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (Cedarbaum, J.) (holding convicted sex offender had not been deprived of liberty interest for purposes of procedural due process challenge to sorp",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWL 625006, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 1997); Rodriguez v. Margotta, 71 F.Supp.2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (McMahon, J.); Schultz v. Inc. Vill. of Bellport, No. 08CV0930, 2010 WL 3924751, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (Bianco, J.)). Here, the Individual Defendants did not deny Plaintiff all opportunities to practice in her chosen profession. It is undeniable that Defendants’ actions made it more difficult for Plaintiff to attain her goal as she now has a failing grade on her resume, lost her scholarship, and was only offered to repeat a course for which she allegedly should have been awarded credit. However, the ultimate resolution of Plaintiffs grade appeal was an opportunity to retake the student teaching seminar. See Sacco v. Pataki, 114 F.Supp.2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (Cedarbaum, J.) (holding plaintiffs are not deprived of a liberty interest because they cannot have the best job in their field",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWL 625006, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 1997); Rodriguez v. Margotta, 71 F.Supp.2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (McMahon, J.); Schultz v. Inc. Vill. of Bellport, No. 08CV0930, 2010 WL 3924751, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (Bianco, J.)). Here, the Individual Defendants did not deny Plaintiff all opportunities to practice in her chosen profession. It is undeniable that Defendants’ actions made it more difficult for Plaintiff to attain her goal as she now has a failing grade on her resume, lost her scholarship, and was only offered to repeat a course for which she allegedly should have been awarded credit. However, the ultimate resolution of Plaintiffs grade appeal was an opportunity to retake the student teaching seminar. See Sacco v. Pataki, 114 F.Supp.2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (Cedarbaum, J.) (holding that although the parking citation that the plaintiff received did not indicate where and how to contest the allegation the plaintiff was not deprived of procedural due process because he received a summons to appear in court via first class mail before he was deprived of any liberty interest",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWL 625006, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 1997); Rodriguez v. Margotta, 71 F.Supp.2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (McMahon, J.); Schultz v. Inc. Vill. of Bellport, No. 08CV0930, 2010 WL 3924751, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (Bianco, J.)). Here, the Individual Defendants did not deny Plaintiff all opportunities to practice in her chosen profession. It is undeniable that Defendants’ actions made it more difficult for Plaintiff to attain her goal as she now has a failing grade on her resume, lost her scholarship, and was only offered to repeat a course for which she allegedly should have been awarded credit. However, the ultimate resolution of Plaintiffs grade appeal was an opportunity to retake the student teaching seminar. See Sacco v. Pataki, 114 F.Supp.2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (Cedarbaum, J.) (holding that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWL 625006, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 1997); Rodriguez v. Margotta, 71 F.Supp.2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (McMahon, J.); Schultz v. Inc. Vill. of Bellport, No. 08CV0930, 2010 WL 3924751, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (Bianco, J.)). Here, the Individual Defendants did not deny Plaintiff all opportunities to practice in her chosen profession. It is undeniable that Defendants’ actions made it more difficult for Plaintiff to attain her goal as she now has a failing grade on her resume, lost her scholarship, and was only offered to repeat a course for which she allegedly should have been awarded credit. However, the ultimate resolution of Plaintiffs grade appeal was an opportunity to retake the student teaching seminar. See Sacco v. Pataki, 114 F.Supp.2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (Cedarbaum, J.) (holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process"
] |
); Empire Transit Mix, Inc. v. Giuliani, 37
| 1 |
632 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbut data-gathering that preceded it. See Seamon, supra, at 735-36 (quoting Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286). In the latter case, a court need not second-guess the decision's wisdom; it need only examine the decisionmaking process to determine whether the negligently produced data affected it. See id. 16 . The Court here used the term in its common-law sense, which distinguishes \"discretionary” from \"ministerial” acts, and not in its distinct but related FTCA sense. 17 . The Court has limited Mitchell, allowing immediate appeal only of denials of immunity turning on questions of law, not sufficiency of evidence. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), lim’d in turn by Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (recognizing that ruling of one trial judge does not preclude another trial judge reconsidering interlocutory ruling",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbut data-gathering that preceded it. See Seamon, supra, at 735-36 (quoting Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286). In the latter case, a court need not second-guess the decision's wisdom; it need only examine the decisionmaking process to determine whether the negligently produced data affected it. See id. 16 . The Court here used the term in its common-law sense, which distinguishes \"discretionary” from \"ministerial” acts, and not in its distinct but related FTCA sense. 17 . The Court has limited Mitchell, allowing immediate appeal only of denials of immunity turning on questions of law, not sufficiency of evidence. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), lim’d in turn by Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (holding that genuine factual dispute does not preclude appeal of discrete ruling on pure legal issue",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbut data-gathering that preceded it. See Seamon, supra, at 735-36 (quoting Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286). In the latter case, a court need not second-guess the decision's wisdom; it need only examine the decisionmaking process to determine whether the negligently produced data affected it. See id. 16 . The Court here used the term in its common-law sense, which distinguishes \"discretionary” from \"ministerial” acts, and not in its distinct but related FTCA sense. 17 . The Court has limited Mitchell, allowing immediate appeal only of denials of immunity turning on questions of law, not sufficiency of evidence. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), lim’d in turn by Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (recognizing that order denying confirmation of a plan does not resolve a discrete issue",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbut data-gathering that preceded it. See Seamon, supra, at 735-36 (quoting Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286). In the latter case, a court need not second-guess the decision's wisdom; it need only examine the decisionmaking process to determine whether the negligently produced data affected it. See id. 16 . The Court here used the term in its common-law sense, which distinguishes \"discretionary” from \"ministerial” acts, and not in its distinct but related FTCA sense. 17 . The Court has limited Mitchell, allowing immediate appeal only of denials of immunity turning on questions of law, not sufficiency of evidence. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), lim’d in turn by Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbut data-gathering that preceded it. See Seamon, supra, at 735-36 (quoting Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286). In the latter case, a court need not second-guess the decision's wisdom; it need only examine the decisionmaking process to determine whether the negligently produced data affected it. See id. 16 . The Court here used the term in its common-law sense, which distinguishes \"discretionary” from \"ministerial” acts, and not in its distinct but related FTCA sense. 17 . The Court has limited Mitchell, allowing immediate appeal only of denials of immunity turning on questions of law, not sufficiency of evidence. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), lim’d in turn by Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute"
] |
). 18 . As illustrated by the opinion
| 1 |
633 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nadverse discrimination at all. The whole purpose of Title VII, as stated clearly by its text and controlling case law, is preventing harmful discrimination, not the lamentable-but-benign discrimination that the jury found Litton experienced. I respectfully dissent. 1 . See, e.g., Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir.2004); Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir.2000); Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817, 820-21 (8th Cir.2006). 2 . See, e.g., Fuhr, 364 F.3d at 757; Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that the \"ultimate question” is \"whether the plaintiff carried her burden of proof of discriminatory discharge.\" (emphasis added)); Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding the employees complaints must give adequate notice to the employer that the employee is complaining of conduct prohibited by title vii",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nadverse discrimination at all. The whole purpose of Title VII, as stated clearly by its text and controlling case law, is preventing harmful discrimination, not the lamentable-but-benign discrimination that the jury found Litton experienced. I respectfully dissent. 1 . See, e.g., Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir.2004); Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir.2000); Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817, 820-21 (8th Cir.2006). 2 . See, e.g., Fuhr, 364 F.3d at 757; Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that the \"ultimate question” is \"whether the plaintiff carried her burden of proof of discriminatory discharge.\" (emphasis added)); Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nadverse discrimination at all. The whole purpose of Title VII, as stated clearly by its text and controlling case law, is preventing harmful discrimination, not the lamentable-but-benign discrimination that the jury found Litton experienced. I respectfully dissent. 1 . See, e.g., Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir.2004); Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir.2000); Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817, 820-21 (8th Cir.2006). 2 . See, e.g., Fuhr, 364 F.3d at 757; Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that the \"ultimate question” is \"whether the plaintiff carried her burden of proof of discriminatory discharge.\" (emphasis added)); Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding that to determine whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee the court examines if there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the employers stated reason for the firing is pretext",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nadverse discrimination at all. The whole purpose of Title VII, as stated clearly by its text and controlling case law, is preventing harmful discrimination, not the lamentable-but-benign discrimination that the jury found Litton experienced. I respectfully dissent. 1 . See, e.g., Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir.2004); Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir.2000); Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817, 820-21 (8th Cir.2006). 2 . See, e.g., Fuhr, 364 F.3d at 757; Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that the \"ultimate question” is \"whether the plaintiff carried her burden of proof of discriminatory discharge.\" (emphasis added)); Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding that the one central question at a title vii trial is whether the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race color religion sex or national origin emphasis added",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nadverse discrimination at all. The whole purpose of Title VII, as stated clearly by its text and controlling case law, is preventing harmful discrimination, not the lamentable-but-benign discrimination that the jury found Litton experienced. I respectfully dissent. 1 . See, e.g., Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir.2004); Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir.2000); Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817, 820-21 (8th Cir.2006). 2 . See, e.g., Fuhr, 364 F.3d at 757; Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that the \"ultimate question” is \"whether the plaintiff carried her burden of proof of discriminatory discharge.\" (emphasis added)); Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding that whether an employee decides to assist the charging party or refuses to assist the employer the employer may not retaliate against the employee because this decision of the employee constitutes participation in an investigation or proceeding under title vii"
] |
); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d
| 3 |
634 |
[
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbut one, which showed that he was. And, importantly, although Jacob was only seen and taped on thirteen occasions, he was able to elicit testimony that Amtrak was billed $101,253.70 for 1,578 man hours of surveillance. Turning to the third criterion, granting Amtrak’s request to play the tapes did extend the trial, but not for long. And, finally, the District Court found that defense counsel did not act in bad faith in failing to list the tapes or the investigators who made them in the final pretrial order. In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment to the final pretrial order. The third issue raised by Jacob is whether the District Court erred in not granting his motion for judgment as a matter of law. At the close of all 2, 364 (3d Cir.1999)(holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbut one, which showed that he was. And, importantly, although Jacob was only seen and taped on thirteen occasions, he was able to elicit testimony that Amtrak was billed $101,253.70 for 1,578 man hours of surveillance. Turning to the third criterion, granting Amtrak’s request to play the tapes did extend the trial, but not for long. And, finally, the District Court found that defense counsel did not act in bad faith in failing to list the tapes or the investigators who made them in the final pretrial order. In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment to the final pretrial order. The third issue raised by Jacob is whether the District Court erred in not granting his motion for judgment as a matter of law. At the close of all 2, 364 (3d Cir.1999)(holding that appellate courts determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction based on a review of all of the evidence admitted at trial",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbut one, which showed that he was. And, importantly, although Jacob was only seen and taped on thirteen occasions, he was able to elicit testimony that Amtrak was billed $101,253.70 for 1,578 man hours of surveillance. Turning to the third criterion, granting Amtrak’s request to play the tapes did extend the trial, but not for long. And, finally, the District Court found that defense counsel did not act in bad faith in failing to list the tapes or the investigators who made them in the final pretrial order. In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment to the final pretrial order. The third issue raised by Jacob is whether the District Court erred in not granting his motion for judgment as a matter of law. At the close of all 2, 364 (3d Cir.1999)(recognizing that to preserve a claim of insufficiency of the evidence a defendant must move for judgment of acquittal when the government rests or at the close of all the evidence",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbut one, which showed that he was. And, importantly, although Jacob was only seen and taped on thirteen occasions, he was able to elicit testimony that Amtrak was billed $101,253.70 for 1,578 man hours of surveillance. Turning to the third criterion, granting Amtrak’s request to play the tapes did extend the trial, but not for long. And, finally, the District Court found that defense counsel did not act in bad faith in failing to list the tapes or the investigators who made them in the final pretrial order. In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment to the final pretrial order. The third issue raised by Jacob is whether the District Court erred in not granting his motion for judgment as a matter of law. At the close of all 2, 364 (3d Cir.1999)(holding that a party who fails to comply with rule 50 by moving for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence wholly waives the right to mount any posttrial attack on the sufficiency of the evidence",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbut one, which showed that he was. And, importantly, although Jacob was only seen and taped on thirteen occasions, he was able to elicit testimony that Amtrak was billed $101,253.70 for 1,578 man hours of surveillance. Turning to the third criterion, granting Amtrak’s request to play the tapes did extend the trial, but not for long. And, finally, the District Court found that defense counsel did not act in bad faith in failing to list the tapes or the investigators who made them in the final pretrial order. In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment to the final pretrial order. The third issue raised by Jacob is whether the District Court erred in not granting his motion for judgment as a matter of law. At the close of all 2, 364 (3d Cir.1999)(holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence and autocentro did not even do that if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence"
] |
). Even assuming that Jacob has not waived his
| 3 |
635 |
[
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nagreed diming an interview that an “amendment regarding the level of copper” would probably overcome the obviousness rejection. In the amendment that followed, the applicants stated that the phrase, copper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade, “makes explicit that which was implicit in the claim before, namely, that the composition of IgGl im-munoglobulin also contains copper ions.” The applicants also stated that the claimed compositions comprise sufficient amounts of copper ion chelator to bind to the “trace amounts of copper” and thus prevent degradation. After reviewing the specification and the prosecution history, the court finds that the phrase, “copper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade,” should be construed according to its plain meaning. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nagreed diming an interview that an “amendment regarding the level of copper” would probably overcome the obviousness rejection. In the amendment that followed, the applicants stated that the phrase, copper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade, “makes explicit that which was implicit in the claim before, namely, that the composition of IgGl im-munoglobulin also contains copper ions.” The applicants also stated that the claimed compositions comprise sufficient amounts of copper ion chelator to bind to the “trace amounts of copper” and thus prevent degradation. After reviewing the specification and the prosecution history, the court finds that the phrase, “copper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade,” should be construed according to its plain meaning. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (holding that to act as its own lexicographer a patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nagreed diming an interview that an “amendment regarding the level of copper” would probably overcome the obviousness rejection. In the amendment that followed, the applicants stated that the phrase, copper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade, “makes explicit that which was implicit in the claim before, namely, that the composition of IgGl im-munoglobulin also contains copper ions.” The applicants also stated that the claimed compositions comprise sufficient amounts of copper ion chelator to bind to the “trace amounts of copper” and thus prevent degradation. After reviewing the specification and the prosecution history, the court finds that the phrase, “copper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade,” should be construed according to its plain meaning. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (holding that words in the claims are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning unless a patentee clearly sets forth a different definition in the specification or file history",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nagreed diming an interview that an “amendment regarding the level of copper” would probably overcome the obviousness rejection. In the amendment that followed, the applicants stated that the phrase, copper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade, “makes explicit that which was implicit in the claim before, namely, that the composition of IgGl im-munoglobulin also contains copper ions.” The applicants also stated that the claimed compositions comprise sufficient amounts of copper ion chelator to bind to the “trace amounts of copper” and thus prevent degradation. After reviewing the specification and the prosecution history, the court finds that the phrase, “copper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade,” should be construed according to its plain meaning. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nagreed diming an interview that an “amendment regarding the level of copper” would probably overcome the obviousness rejection. In the amendment that followed, the applicants stated that the phrase, copper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade, “makes explicit that which was implicit in the claim before, namely, that the composition of IgGl im-munoglobulin also contains copper ions.” The applicants also stated that the claimed compositions comprise sufficient amounts of copper ion chelator to bind to the “trace amounts of copper” and thus prevent degradation. After reviewing the specification and the prosecution history, the court finds that the phrase, “copper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade,” should be construed according to its plain meaning. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning"
] |
). The inventors did not set forth an
| 2 |
636 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(per curiam). With that in mind, we proceed to analyze Berry’s submission. Berry must demonstrate that his attorneys charged a reasonable rate and that the time they expended on his representation was reasonable. See In re North (Gardner Fee Application), 30 F.3d 143, 146 (D.C.Cir.1994) (per curiam). Based on the affidavits and other exhibits submitted by Berry, we conclude that the hourly rates charged by his attorneys ($110 — $400) and their paralegals ($75-$100) comport with prevailing community standards and are within the realm of reasonableness. Id. We also conclude that he has, for the most part, provided adequate descriptions and documentation of the work performed. See National Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (holding that the officer played no role in the prosecution because the police report provided to the prosecutor did not contain false information",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(per curiam). With that in mind, we proceed to analyze Berry’s submission. Berry must demonstrate that his attorneys charged a reasonable rate and that the time they expended on his representation was reasonable. See In re North (Gardner Fee Application), 30 F.3d 143, 146 (D.C.Cir.1994) (per curiam). Based on the affidavits and other exhibits submitted by Berry, we conclude that the hourly rates charged by his attorneys ($110 — $400) and their paralegals ($75-$100) comport with prevailing community standards and are within the realm of reasonableness. Id. We also conclude that he has, for the most part, provided adequate descriptions and documentation of the work performed. See National Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (holding that a fee application must contain sufficiently detailed information about the hours logged and the work done",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(per curiam). With that in mind, we proceed to analyze Berry’s submission. Berry must demonstrate that his attorneys charged a reasonable rate and that the time they expended on his representation was reasonable. See In re North (Gardner Fee Application), 30 F.3d 143, 146 (D.C.Cir.1994) (per curiam). Based on the affidavits and other exhibits submitted by Berry, we conclude that the hourly rates charged by his attorneys ($110 — $400) and their paralegals ($75-$100) comport with prevailing community standards and are within the realm of reasonableness. Id. We also conclude that he has, for the most part, provided adequate descriptions and documentation of the work performed. See National Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (holding all contracts contain an implied term that the the person for whom the work is contracted to be done will not obstruct hinder or delay the contractor",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(per curiam). With that in mind, we proceed to analyze Berry’s submission. Berry must demonstrate that his attorneys charged a reasonable rate and that the time they expended on his representation was reasonable. See In re North (Gardner Fee Application), 30 F.3d 143, 146 (D.C.Cir.1994) (per curiam). Based on the affidavits and other exhibits submitted by Berry, we conclude that the hourly rates charged by his attorneys ($110 — $400) and their paralegals ($75-$100) comport with prevailing community standards and are within the realm of reasonableness. Id. We also conclude that he has, for the most part, provided adequate descriptions and documentation of the work performed. See National Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (holding that the unambiguous terms of the your work exclusion do not eliminate coverage for harm done to a subcontractors work",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(per curiam). With that in mind, we proceed to analyze Berry’s submission. Berry must demonstrate that his attorneys charged a reasonable rate and that the time they expended on his representation was reasonable. See In re North (Gardner Fee Application), 30 F.3d 143, 146 (D.C.Cir.1994) (per curiam). Based on the affidavits and other exhibits submitted by Berry, we conclude that the hourly rates charged by his attorneys ($110 — $400) and their paralegals ($75-$100) comport with prevailing community standards and are within the realm of reasonableness. Id. We also conclude that he has, for the most part, provided adequate descriptions and documentation of the work performed. See National Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy"
] |
). There are, however, various items that must
| 1 |
637 |
[
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan underground pipe system, is a common usage. See also, Voelker v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 727 F.Supp. 991 (D.Md.1989). Moreover, we have uncovered no case, in Maryland or any other jurisdiction, in which a natural gas utility company was held strictly liable for injuries based on the theory that the distribution of natural gas is an abnormally dangerous activity incapable of being carried out without significant risk. Many cases specifically hold to the contrary. See, e.g., Auriemme v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 21 Conn.Supp. 66, 144 A.2d 701 (Conn.Super.1958) (distinguishing natural gas distribution from the category of other activities, including natural gas storage that have been held inherently dangerous). See also Zamora v. Mobil Oil Co., 104 Wash.2d 199, 704 P.2d 584, 587 (1985) (holding that gas line is not improvement",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan underground pipe system, is a common usage. See also, Voelker v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 727 F.Supp. 991 (D.Md.1989). Moreover, we have uncovered no case, in Maryland or any other jurisdiction, in which a natural gas utility company was held strictly liable for injuries based on the theory that the distribution of natural gas is an abnormally dangerous activity incapable of being carried out without significant risk. Many cases specifically hold to the contrary. See, e.g., Auriemme v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 21 Conn.Supp. 66, 144 A.2d 701 (Conn.Super.1958) (distinguishing natural gas distribution from the category of other activities, including natural gas storage that have been held inherently dangerous). See also Zamora v. Mobil Oil Co., 104 Wash.2d 199, 704 P.2d 584, 587 (1985) (holding that injury caused by criminal fleeing after stealing gas from gas station was not foreseeable result of stations policy of not requiring customers to prepay for gas",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan underground pipe system, is a common usage. See also, Voelker v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 727 F.Supp. 991 (D.Md.1989). Moreover, we have uncovered no case, in Maryland or any other jurisdiction, in which a natural gas utility company was held strictly liable for injuries based on the theory that the distribution of natural gas is an abnormally dangerous activity incapable of being carried out without significant risk. Many cases specifically hold to the contrary. See, e.g., Auriemme v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 21 Conn.Supp. 66, 144 A.2d 701 (Conn.Super.1958) (distinguishing natural gas distribution from the category of other activities, including natural gas storage that have been held inherently dangerous). See also Zamora v. Mobil Oil Co., 104 Wash.2d 199, 704 P.2d 584, 587 (1985) (holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan underground pipe system, is a common usage. See also, Voelker v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 727 F.Supp. 991 (D.Md.1989). Moreover, we have uncovered no case, in Maryland or any other jurisdiction, in which a natural gas utility company was held strictly liable for injuries based on the theory that the distribution of natural gas is an abnormally dangerous activity incapable of being carried out without significant risk. Many cases specifically hold to the contrary. See, e.g., Auriemme v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 21 Conn.Supp. 66, 144 A.2d 701 (Conn.Super.1958) (distinguishing natural gas distribution from the category of other activities, including natural gas storage that have been held inherently dangerous). See also Zamora v. Mobil Oil Co., 104 Wash.2d 199, 704 P.2d 584, 587 (1985) (holding plaintiffs were properly enjoined from using excessive amounts of gas not contemplated by the free gas clause in the lease",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan underground pipe system, is a common usage. See also, Voelker v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 727 F.Supp. 991 (D.Md.1989). Moreover, we have uncovered no case, in Maryland or any other jurisdiction, in which a natural gas utility company was held strictly liable for injuries based on the theory that the distribution of natural gas is an abnormally dangerous activity incapable of being carried out without significant risk. Many cases specifically hold to the contrary. See, e.g., Auriemme v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 21 Conn.Supp. 66, 144 A.2d 701 (Conn.Super.1958) (distinguishing natural gas distribution from the category of other activities, including natural gas storage that have been held inherently dangerous). See also Zamora v. Mobil Oil Co., 104 Wash.2d 199, 704 P.2d 584, 587 (1985) (holding propane gas to be an inherently dangerous product"
] |
); New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water
| 4 |
638 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt. See V.I. Code Ann., tit. 4, § 76(a). Callwood’s petition, in contrast, was filed on November 6, 1997, after the effective date of § 76(a). A suit seeking a writ of habeas corpus, although admittedly somewhat of a hybrid, is considered civil in nature. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 754 (3d Cir.1996). Accordingly, by operation of § 76(a), as of October 1, 1991 the District Court of the Virgin Islands was divested of jurisdiction to consider petitions for writs of habeas corpus under territorial habeas corpus law. We have previously held that to the extent that Virgin Islands Code provisions vest jurisdiction in the District Court, they have been implicitly repealed. See Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that vi code ann tit 5 76a implicitly repealed a writofreview provision that provided for jurisdiction in the district court",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt. See V.I. Code Ann., tit. 4, § 76(a). Callwood’s petition, in contrast, was filed on November 6, 1997, after the effective date of § 76(a). A suit seeking a writ of habeas corpus, although admittedly somewhat of a hybrid, is considered civil in nature. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 754 (3d Cir.1996). Accordingly, by operation of § 76(a), as of October 1, 1991 the District Court of the Virgin Islands was divested of jurisdiction to consider petitions for writs of habeas corpus under territorial habeas corpus law. We have previously held that to the extent that Virgin Islands Code provisions vest jurisdiction in the District Court, they have been implicitly repealed. See Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that habeas jurisdiction under 2241 was not repealed by the illegal immigration reform and immigrant responsibility act of 1996 iirira",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt. See V.I. Code Ann., tit. 4, § 76(a). Callwood’s petition, in contrast, was filed on November 6, 1997, after the effective date of § 76(a). A suit seeking a writ of habeas corpus, although admittedly somewhat of a hybrid, is considered civil in nature. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 754 (3d Cir.1996). Accordingly, by operation of § 76(a), as of October 1, 1991 the District Court of the Virgin Islands was divested of jurisdiction to consider petitions for writs of habeas corpus under territorial habeas corpus law. We have previously held that to the extent that Virgin Islands Code provisions vest jurisdiction in the District Court, they have been implicitly repealed. See Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt. See V.I. Code Ann., tit. 4, § 76(a). Callwood’s petition, in contrast, was filed on November 6, 1997, after the effective date of § 76(a). A suit seeking a writ of habeas corpus, although admittedly somewhat of a hybrid, is considered civil in nature. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 754 (3d Cir.1996). Accordingly, by operation of § 76(a), as of October 1, 1991 the District Court of the Virgin Islands was divested of jurisdiction to consider petitions for writs of habeas corpus under territorial habeas corpus law. We have previously held that to the extent that Virgin Islands Code provisions vest jurisdiction in the District Court, they have been implicitly repealed. See Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that application of the exclusive remedies provision in tax code section 4209 deprives courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt. See V.I. Code Ann., tit. 4, § 76(a). Callwood’s petition, in contrast, was filed on November 6, 1997, after the effective date of § 76(a). A suit seeking a writ of habeas corpus, although admittedly somewhat of a hybrid, is considered civil in nature. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 754 (3d Cir.1996). Accordingly, by operation of § 76(a), as of October 1, 1991 the District Court of the Virgin Islands was divested of jurisdiction to consider petitions for writs of habeas corpus under territorial habeas corpus law. We have previously held that to the extent that Virgin Islands Code provisions vest jurisdiction in the District Court, they have been implicitly repealed. See Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that postconfirmation jurisdiction was proper in light of plan provision retaining such jurisdiction"
] |
); Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. of St. Thomas,
| 0 |
639 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe BIA’s substantive review of the IJ’s decision .was flawed.” Id. At oral argument, Awe’s attorney acknowledged that he had missed the briefing deadline, but argued that “his mistake was not fatal because the Notice of Appeal gave the BIA a ‘fair appraisal’ of the issues to be addressed in Awe’s appeal.” Id. at 513. We held that Awe’s notice argument was waived because he failed to present it to the court prior to oral argument. However, we continued: Even assuming Awe had not waived his right,to challenge the BIA’s procedural dismissal, we note that 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2)(i)(D) explicitly gives the BIA authority to dismiss procedurally defective appeals, and we have condoned the BIA’s use of this power in cases similar to this one. See Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 499 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that reply brief is appropriate forum to rebut new material raised in appellees brief",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe BIA’s substantive review of the IJ’s decision .was flawed.” Id. At oral argument, Awe’s attorney acknowledged that he had missed the briefing deadline, but argued that “his mistake was not fatal because the Notice of Appeal gave the BIA a ‘fair appraisal’ of the issues to be addressed in Awe’s appeal.” Id. at 513. We held that Awe’s notice argument was waived because he failed to present it to the court prior to oral argument. However, we continued: Even assuming Awe had not waived his right,to challenge the BIA’s procedural dismissal, we note that 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2)(i)(D) explicitly gives the BIA authority to dismiss procedurally defective appeals, and we have condoned the BIA’s use of this power in cases similar to this one. See Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 499 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that a party may pursue an issue not raised in its initial brief where a substantial change in law occurs after the brief was filed",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe BIA’s substantive review of the IJ’s decision .was flawed.” Id. At oral argument, Awe’s attorney acknowledged that he had missed the briefing deadline, but argued that “his mistake was not fatal because the Notice of Appeal gave the BIA a ‘fair appraisal’ of the issues to be addressed in Awe’s appeal.” Id. at 513. We held that Awe’s notice argument was waived because he failed to present it to the court prior to oral argument. However, we continued: Even assuming Awe had not waived his right,to challenge the BIA’s procedural dismissal, we note that 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2)(i)(D) explicitly gives the BIA authority to dismiss procedurally defective appeals, and we have condoned the BIA’s use of this power in cases similar to this one. See Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 499 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that a party abandons claims that he does not argue in his brief",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe BIA’s substantive review of the IJ’s decision .was flawed.” Id. At oral argument, Awe’s attorney acknowledged that he had missed the briefing deadline, but argued that “his mistake was not fatal because the Notice of Appeal gave the BIA a ‘fair appraisal’ of the issues to be addressed in Awe’s appeal.” Id. at 513. We held that Awe’s notice argument was waived because he failed to present it to the court prior to oral argument. However, we continued: Even assuming Awe had not waived his right,to challenge the BIA’s procedural dismissal, we note that 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2)(i)(D) explicitly gives the BIA authority to dismiss procedurally defective appeals, and we have condoned the BIA’s use of this power in cases similar to this one. See Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 499 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that appellate counsels admitted failure to timely file the brief constituted good cause to grant motion for belated brief",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe BIA’s substantive review of the IJ’s decision .was flawed.” Id. At oral argument, Awe’s attorney acknowledged that he had missed the briefing deadline, but argued that “his mistake was not fatal because the Notice of Appeal gave the BIA a ‘fair appraisal’ of the issues to be addressed in Awe’s appeal.” Id. at 513. We held that Awe’s notice argument was waived because he failed to present it to the court prior to oral argument. However, we continued: Even assuming Awe had not waived his right,to challenge the BIA’s procedural dismissal, we note that 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2)(i)(D) explicitly gives the BIA authority to dismiss procedurally defective appeals, and we have condoned the BIA’s use of this power in cases similar to this one. See Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 499 (7th Cir.2001) (holding summary dismissal appropriate where party indicated he would file brief requested and received 30day filing extension and never filed brief nor explained why he had not"
] |
); accord Rioja v. Ashcroft, 317 F.3d 514,
| 4 |
640 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Felix I. Lessambo, pro se, appeals from the September 29, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, /.) dismissing the complaint on summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the District Court’s June 2009 decision granting the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings because that decision was not designated in Lessambo’s notice of appeal, as required by Rule 3(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that mothers failure to appeal prior contempt order precluded her challenge to prior order in appeal from later order entered based upon prior contempt order",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Felix I. Lessambo, pro se, appeals from the September 29, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, /.) dismissing the complaint on summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the District Court’s June 2009 decision granting the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings because that decision was not designated in Lessambo’s notice of appeal, as required by Rule 3(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that the appeal was properly before the court where the appellant appealed from an order amending a prior order without appealing from the prior order",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Felix I. Lessambo, pro se, appeals from the September 29, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, /.) dismissing the complaint on summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the District Court’s June 2009 decision granting the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings because that decision was not designated in Lessambo’s notice of appeal, as required by Rule 3(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that when a notice of appeal specified one district court order while failing to reference another an appeal from the unmentioned order cannot be considered",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Felix I. Lessambo, pro se, appeals from the September 29, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, /.) dismissing the complaint on summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the District Court’s June 2009 decision granting the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings because that decision was not designated in Lessambo’s notice of appeal, as required by Rule 3(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Felix I. Lessambo, pro se, appeals from the September 29, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, /.) dismissing the complaint on summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the District Court’s June 2009 decision granting the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings because that decision was not designated in Lessambo’s notice of appeal, as required by Rule 3(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that because the district courts order failed to comply with rule 58 appellants notice of appeal cannot be considered late"
] |
). Therefore, insofar as Lessambo challenges the
| 2 |
641 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nan illegal contract. B. Application of Claim Preclusion to Claim in This Case Under Article I, Section 24 of the Iowa Constitution. We first consider whether the doctrine of claim preclusion applies under the circumstances of this case. Here, the parties are identical, there is no doubt that the article I, section 24 claim could have been brought in the prior proceeding, and there was a final judgment on the merits in the first action. Arnevik, 642 N.W.2d at 319. Further, no additional evidence would have been required to litigate the constitutional question in the first proceeding, in contrast to our other cases allowing parties to litigate separate claims involving the same contract in two proceedings. See Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa 1982) (holding that prior adjudication barred a claim that arose out of the same transactions and that could have been raised in prior suit",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nan illegal contract. B. Application of Claim Preclusion to Claim in This Case Under Article I, Section 24 of the Iowa Constitution. We first consider whether the doctrine of claim preclusion applies under the circumstances of this case. Here, the parties are identical, there is no doubt that the article I, section 24 claim could have been brought in the prior proceeding, and there was a final judgment on the merits in the first action. Arnevik, 642 N.W.2d at 319. Further, no additional evidence would have been required to litigate the constitutional question in the first proceeding, in contrast to our other cases allowing parties to litigate separate claims involving the same contract in two proceedings. See Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa 1982) (holding that claim preclusion did not bar fire insurer from bringing a second action against its coplaintiff in first action",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nan illegal contract. B. Application of Claim Preclusion to Claim in This Case Under Article I, Section 24 of the Iowa Constitution. We first consider whether the doctrine of claim preclusion applies under the circumstances of this case. Here, the parties are identical, there is no doubt that the article I, section 24 claim could have been brought in the prior proceeding, and there was a final judgment on the merits in the first action. Arnevik, 642 N.W.2d at 319. Further, no additional evidence would have been required to litigate the constitutional question in the first proceeding, in contrast to our other cases allowing parties to litigate separate claims involving the same contract in two proceedings. See Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa 1982) (holding district court dismissal of plaintiffs present action did not constitute prior action and thus did not count as third strike",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nan illegal contract. B. Application of Claim Preclusion to Claim in This Case Under Article I, Section 24 of the Iowa Constitution. We first consider whether the doctrine of claim preclusion applies under the circumstances of this case. Here, the parties are identical, there is no doubt that the article I, section 24 claim could have been brought in the prior proceeding, and there was a final judgment on the merits in the first action. Arnevik, 642 N.W.2d at 319. Further, no additional evidence would have been required to litigate the constitutional question in the first proceeding, in contrast to our other cases allowing parties to litigate separate claims involving the same contract in two proceedings. See Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa 1982) (holding claim preclusion did not foreclose plaintiffs second action even though it arose out of the same lease agreement as that of a prior action",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nan illegal contract. B. Application of Claim Preclusion to Claim in This Case Under Article I, Section 24 of the Iowa Constitution. We first consider whether the doctrine of claim preclusion applies under the circumstances of this case. Here, the parties are identical, there is no doubt that the article I, section 24 claim could have been brought in the prior proceeding, and there was a final judgment on the merits in the first action. Arnevik, 642 N.W.2d at 319. Further, no additional evidence would have been required to litigate the constitutional question in the first proceeding, in contrast to our other cases allowing parties to litigate separate claims involving the same contract in two proceedings. See Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa 1982) (holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it arose out of the same conduct as a preempted contract claim"
] |
). Although not raised by the parties, there is
| 3 |
642 |
[
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprotest jurisdiction into pre-procurement decisions. As plaintiffs characterize in responding to defendant’s criticism of their failure to cite authority for their assertions of OCI violations: “[o]f course there are no cases directly on point; there was no such jurisdiction in this Court or in any other forum prior to this case.” (Pls.’ Resp./Reply Def.’s Mot. Dismiss/Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. J. and Cross-Mot. J. AR 12, ECF No. 88.) No viable lack of good faith and fair dealing has been established by plaintiffs in this matter. D. Waiver Defendant contends plaintiffs’ claimed errors in the “procuring method” were waived by failing to timely raise them. (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF No. 79.) See Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“Blue & Gold Fleet”) (holding that plain error review applies where the defendant fails to object to the lack of an opportunity to allocute",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprotest jurisdiction into pre-procurement decisions. As plaintiffs characterize in responding to defendant’s criticism of their failure to cite authority for their assertions of OCI violations: “[o]f course there are no cases directly on point; there was no such jurisdiction in this Court or in any other forum prior to this case.” (Pls.’ Resp./Reply Def.’s Mot. Dismiss/Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. J. and Cross-Mot. J. AR 12, ECF No. 88.) No viable lack of good faith and fair dealing has been established by plaintiffs in this matter. D. Waiver Defendant contends plaintiffs’ claimed errors in the “procuring method” were waived by failing to timely raise them. (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF No. 79.) See Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“Blue & Gold Fleet”) (holding that plain error review applies when a party fails to raise a claim before the district court",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprotest jurisdiction into pre-procurement decisions. As plaintiffs characterize in responding to defendant’s criticism of their failure to cite authority for their assertions of OCI violations: “[o]f course there are no cases directly on point; there was no such jurisdiction in this Court or in any other forum prior to this case.” (Pls.’ Resp./Reply Def.’s Mot. Dismiss/Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. J. and Cross-Mot. J. AR 12, ECF No. 88.) No viable lack of good faith and fair dealing has been established by plaintiffs in this matter. D. Waiver Defendant contends plaintiffs’ claimed errors in the “procuring method” were waived by failing to timely raise them. (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF No. 79.) See Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“Blue & Gold Fleet”) (holding protestor waived its right to challenge a solicitation amendment by not objecting to its terms during the bidding process",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprotest jurisdiction into pre-procurement decisions. As plaintiffs characterize in responding to defendant’s criticism of their failure to cite authority for their assertions of OCI violations: “[o]f course there are no cases directly on point; there was no such jurisdiction in this Court or in any other forum prior to this case.” (Pls.’ Resp./Reply Def.’s Mot. Dismiss/Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. J. and Cross-Mot. J. AR 12, ECF No. 88.) No viable lack of good faith and fair dealing has been established by plaintiffs in this matter. D. Waiver Defendant contends plaintiffs’ claimed errors in the “procuring method” were waived by failing to timely raise them. (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF No. 79.) See Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“Blue & Gold Fleet”) (holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprotest jurisdiction into pre-procurement decisions. As plaintiffs characterize in responding to defendant’s criticism of their failure to cite authority for their assertions of OCI violations: “[o]f course there are no cases directly on point; there was no such jurisdiction in this Court or in any other forum prior to this case.” (Pls.’ Resp./Reply Def.’s Mot. Dismiss/Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. J. and Cross-Mot. J. AR 12, ECF No. 88.) No viable lack of good faith and fair dealing has been established by plaintiffs in this matter. D. Waiver Defendant contends plaintiffs’ claimed errors in the “procuring method” were waived by failing to timely raise them. (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF No. 79.) See Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“Blue & Gold Fleet”) (holding that a party who has the opportunity to object to the terms of a government solicitation containing a patent error and fails to do so prior to the close of the bidding process waives its ability to raise the same objection subsequently in a bid protest action in the court of federal claims"
] |
) Id. Because the protestor was aware that the
| 4 |
643 |
[
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na citizen-informant's tip about a drunk driver is sufficient to give the police reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal behavior, ie., driving under the influence, even if the basis for the informant's conclusion is not fully explained. See id. However, whether a person is \"smoking drugs\" does not seem to fall within the realm of knowledge common to members of the public, unlike the ability to re hat the officer identifies as cocaine is sufficient to constitute probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) requires careful analysis because cocaine in its pure form, as the expert in this case test 2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 2035, 100 L.Ed.2d 620 (1988); State v. Harrison, 287 Wis.2d 133, 703 N.W.2d 383U, 2005 WL 1577441, *2 (Wise.Ct.App.2005) (holding that a smell associated with pcp was enough to establish probable cause",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na citizen-informant's tip about a drunk driver is sufficient to give the police reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal behavior, ie., driving under the influence, even if the basis for the informant's conclusion is not fully explained. See id. However, whether a person is \"smoking drugs\" does not seem to fall within the realm of knowledge common to members of the public, unlike the ability to re hat the officer identifies as cocaine is sufficient to constitute probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) requires careful analysis because cocaine in its pure form, as the expert in this case test 2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 2035, 100 L.Ed.2d 620 (1988); State v. Harrison, 287 Wis.2d 133, 703 N.W.2d 383U, 2005 WL 1577441, *2 (Wise.Ct.App.2005) (holding that because of officers experience detection of the smell of cocaine smoke reliably supported a probable cause determination",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na citizen-informant's tip about a drunk driver is sufficient to give the police reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal behavior, ie., driving under the influence, even if the basis for the informant's conclusion is not fully explained. See id. However, whether a person is \"smoking drugs\" does not seem to fall within the realm of knowledge common to members of the public, unlike the ability to re hat the officer identifies as cocaine is sufficient to constitute probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) requires careful analysis because cocaine in its pure form, as the expert in this case test 2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 2035, 100 L.Ed.2d 620 (1988); State v. Harrison, 287 Wis.2d 133, 703 N.W.2d 383U, 2005 WL 1577441, *2 (Wise.Ct.App.2005) (holding officer had probable cause after detecting an odor associated with cocaine because of officers experience from prior cocaine seizures",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na citizen-informant's tip about a drunk driver is sufficient to give the police reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal behavior, ie., driving under the influence, even if the basis for the informant's conclusion is not fully explained. See id. However, whether a person is \"smoking drugs\" does not seem to fall within the realm of knowledge common to members of the public, unlike the ability to re hat the officer identifies as cocaine is sufficient to constitute probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) requires careful analysis because cocaine in its pure form, as the expert in this case test 2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 2035, 100 L.Ed.2d 620 (1988); State v. Harrison, 287 Wis.2d 133, 703 N.W.2d 383U, 2005 WL 1577441, *2 (Wise.Ct.App.2005) (holding that the smell of marijuana gave the police probable cause to search the vehicle",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\na citizen-informant's tip about a drunk driver is sufficient to give the police reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal behavior, ie., driving under the influence, even if the basis for the informant's conclusion is not fully explained. See id. However, whether a person is \"smoking drugs\" does not seem to fall within the realm of knowledge common to members of the public, unlike the ability to re hat the officer identifies as cocaine is sufficient to constitute probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) requires careful analysis because cocaine in its pure form, as the expert in this case test 2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 2035, 100 L.Ed.2d 620 (1988); State v. Harrison, 287 Wis.2d 133, 703 N.W.2d 383U, 2005 WL 1577441, *2 (Wise.Ct.App.2005) (holding that the smell of burning opium was sufficient to establish probable cause"
] |
). See also People v. Darby, 263 A.D.2d 112,
| 1 |
644 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndistrict court should not apply the less rigorous fairground-for-litigation standard and should only grant the injunction if the moving party establishes, along with irreparable injury, a likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. at 43 n. 6. Here, since the Station already has been closed, an order granting the plaintiffs motion to direct its opening would alter the status quo. As such, Hassan faces a heightened burden. He must establish both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. b. Irreparable harm A showing of irreparable harm is considered the “single most important requirement” in satisfying the standard. See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d at 696; Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1990)(holding that even though irreparable harm is not required it had been shown and weighed in favor of issuance of the preliminary injunction",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndistrict court should not apply the less rigorous fairground-for-litigation standard and should only grant the injunction if the moving party establishes, along with irreparable injury, a likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. at 43 n. 6. Here, since the Station already has been closed, an order granting the plaintiffs motion to direct its opening would alter the status quo. As such, Hassan faces a heightened burden. He must establish both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. b. Irreparable harm A showing of irreparable harm is considered the “single most important requirement” in satisfying the standard. See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d at 696; Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1990)(holding that intangible injuries such as damage to advertising efforts and goodwill can be irreparable harm for purpose of a preliminary injunction",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndistrict court should not apply the less rigorous fairground-for-litigation standard and should only grant the injunction if the moving party establishes, along with irreparable injury, a likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. at 43 n. 6. Here, since the Station already has been closed, an order granting the plaintiffs motion to direct its opening would alter the status quo. As such, Hassan faces a heightened burden. He must establish both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. b. Irreparable harm A showing of irreparable harm is considered the “single most important requirement” in satisfying the standard. See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d at 696; Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1990)(recognizing that irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndistrict court should not apply the less rigorous fairground-for-litigation standard and should only grant the injunction if the moving party establishes, along with irreparable injury, a likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. at 43 n. 6. Here, since the Station already has been closed, an order granting the plaintiffs motion to direct its opening would alter the status quo. As such, Hassan faces a heightened burden. He must establish both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. b. Irreparable harm A showing of irreparable harm is considered the “single most important requirement” in satisfying the standard. See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d at 696; Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1990)(holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndistrict court should not apply the less rigorous fairground-for-litigation standard and should only grant the injunction if the moving party establishes, along with irreparable injury, a likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. at 43 n. 6. Here, since the Station already has been closed, an order granting the plaintiffs motion to direct its opening would alter the status quo. As such, Hassan faces a heightened burden. He must establish both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. b. Irreparable harm A showing of irreparable harm is considered the “single most important requirement” in satisfying the standard. See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d at 696; Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1990)(holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief"
] |
). “A moving party must show that the injury it
| 2 |
645 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nexplained in 4 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 81.01, at p. 81-2: Degree of disability is calculated under most acts by comparing actual earnings before the injury with earning capacity after the injury. It is at once apparent that the two items in the comparison are not quite the same. Actual earnings are a relatively concrete quantity.... Earning capacity, however, is a more theoretical concept. It obviously does not mean actual earnings, since the legislature deliberately chose a different phrase for the post-injury earnings factor. See also Shiek, 2002 ND 85, ¶ 15, 643 N.W.2d 721 (noting the definition of disability is broader than lost wages, it means loss of earning capacity); Business Ins. Co. v. BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc., 23 P.3d 1261, 1265 (Colo.App.2001) (recognizing this distinction",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nexplained in 4 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 81.01, at p. 81-2: Degree of disability is calculated under most acts by comparing actual earnings before the injury with earning capacity after the injury. It is at once apparent that the two items in the comparison are not quite the same. Actual earnings are a relatively concrete quantity.... Earning capacity, however, is a more theoretical concept. It obviously does not mean actual earnings, since the legislature deliberately chose a different phrase for the post-injury earnings factor. See also Shiek, 2002 ND 85, ¶ 15, 643 N.W.2d 721 (noting the definition of disability is broader than lost wages, it means loss of earning capacity); Business Ins. Co. v. BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc., 23 P.3d 1261, 1265 (Colo.App.2001) (recognizing distinction between actual and per se conflicts of interest",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nexplained in 4 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 81.01, at p. 81-2: Degree of disability is calculated under most acts by comparing actual earnings before the injury with earning capacity after the injury. It is at once apparent that the two items in the comparison are not quite the same. Actual earnings are a relatively concrete quantity.... Earning capacity, however, is a more theoretical concept. It obviously does not mean actual earnings, since the legislature deliberately chose a different phrase for the post-injury earnings factor. See also Shiek, 2002 ND 85, ¶ 15, 643 N.W.2d 721 (noting the definition of disability is broader than lost wages, it means loss of earning capacity); Business Ins. Co. v. BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc., 23 P.3d 1261, 1265 (Colo.App.2001) (recognizing distinction between actual wage loss and loss of future earning capacity",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nexplained in 4 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 81.01, at p. 81-2: Degree of disability is calculated under most acts by comparing actual earnings before the injury with earning capacity after the injury. It is at once apparent that the two items in the comparison are not quite the same. Actual earnings are a relatively concrete quantity.... Earning capacity, however, is a more theoretical concept. It obviously does not mean actual earnings, since the legislature deliberately chose a different phrase for the post-injury earnings factor. See also Shiek, 2002 ND 85, ¶ 15, 643 N.W.2d 721 (noting the definition of disability is broader than lost wages, it means loss of earning capacity); Business Ins. Co. v. BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc., 23 P.3d 1261, 1265 (Colo.App.2001) (recognizing distinction between two types of waiver",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nexplained in 4 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 81.01, at p. 81-2: Degree of disability is calculated under most acts by comparing actual earnings before the injury with earning capacity after the injury. It is at once apparent that the two items in the comparison are not quite the same. Actual earnings are a relatively concrete quantity.... Earning capacity, however, is a more theoretical concept. It obviously does not mean actual earnings, since the legislature deliberately chose a different phrase for the post-injury earnings factor. See also Shiek, 2002 ND 85, ¶ 15, 643 N.W.2d 721 (noting the definition of disability is broader than lost wages, it means loss of earning capacity); Business Ins. Co. v. BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc., 23 P.3d 1261, 1265 (Colo.App.2001) (recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel"
] |
); Ruff v. Labor and Industry Review Comm’n, 159
| 2 |
646 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndefendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind.2011). Similarly, a plaintiff must establish that a duty of care exists to prevail on a claim of constructive fraud. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (Ind.1996). “Absent a duty, there can be no breach, and therefore, no recovery for the plaintiff in negligence.” Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 398 (citation omitted). Old National asks that the Court adopt a “no customer, no duty” rule, which recognizes that a bank should not owe a duty of care to an “undefined and unlimited category of strangers who might interact with [the bank’s] customer.” Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir.2002); see also Athey Products Corp. v. Harris Bank Roselle, 89 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir.1996) (holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndefendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind.2011). Similarly, a plaintiff must establish that a duty of care exists to prevail on a claim of constructive fraud. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (Ind.1996). “Absent a duty, there can be no breach, and therefore, no recovery for the plaintiff in negligence.” Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 398 (citation omitted). Old National asks that the Court adopt a “no customer, no duty” rule, which recognizes that a bank should not owe a duty of care to an “undefined and unlimited category of strangers who might interact with [the bank’s] customer.” Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir.2002); see also Athey Products Corp. v. Harris Bank Roselle, 89 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that duty to protect from criminal acts does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndefendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind.2011). Similarly, a plaintiff must establish that a duty of care exists to prevail on a claim of constructive fraud. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (Ind.1996). “Absent a duty, there can be no breach, and therefore, no recovery for the plaintiff in negligence.” Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 398 (citation omitted). Old National asks that the Court adopt a “no customer, no duty” rule, which recognizes that a bank should not owe a duty of care to an “undefined and unlimited category of strangers who might interact with [the bank’s] customer.” Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir.2002); see also Athey Products Corp. v. Harris Bank Roselle, 89 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that under illinois law a lender owes no duty to protect third parties from the credit risk of an insolvent borrower",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndefendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind.2011). Similarly, a plaintiff must establish that a duty of care exists to prevail on a claim of constructive fraud. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (Ind.1996). “Absent a duty, there can be no breach, and therefore, no recovery for the plaintiff in negligence.” Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 398 (citation omitted). Old National asks that the Court adopt a “no customer, no duty” rule, which recognizes that a bank should not owe a duty of care to an “undefined and unlimited category of strangers who might interact with [the bank’s] customer.” Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir.2002); see also Athey Products Corp. v. Harris Bank Roselle, 89 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndefendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind.2011). Similarly, a plaintiff must establish that a duty of care exists to prevail on a claim of constructive fraud. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (Ind.1996). “Absent a duty, there can be no breach, and therefore, no recovery for the plaintiff in negligence.” Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 398 (citation omitted). Old National asks that the Court adopt a “no customer, no duty” rule, which recognizes that a bank should not owe a duty of care to an “undefined and unlimited category of strangers who might interact with [the bank’s] customer.” Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir.2002); see also Athey Products Corp. v. Harris Bank Roselle, 89 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir.1996) (holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons"
] |
). Old Na tional contends that because Purcell
| 2 |
647 |
[
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthey completely terminated their physician and patient relationship. Generally, the negligent conduct of a physician causes at least some immediate damage to the patient, but the statute of limitations, nonetheless, commences running at termination of the course of treatment, sometime after the initial damage occurs. See Schmit, 183 Minn, at 359, 236 N.W. at 625 (adopting the termination of treatment rule despite the general rule that a statute of limitations action in tort begins to run at the time of the negligent act which coincides with the injury). Zagaros claims the termination of treatment rule is inapplicable in her case because no immediate damage coincided with Erickson’s allegedly negligent misdiagnosis. See Peterson v. St. Cloud Hosp., 460 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn.App.1990) (holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthey completely terminated their physician and patient relationship. Generally, the negligent conduct of a physician causes at least some immediate damage to the patient, but the statute of limitations, nonetheless, commences running at termination of the course of treatment, sometime after the initial damage occurs. See Schmit, 183 Minn, at 359, 236 N.W. at 625 (adopting the termination of treatment rule despite the general rule that a statute of limitations action in tort begins to run at the time of the negligent act which coincides with the injury). Zagaros claims the termination of treatment rule is inapplicable in her case because no immediate damage coincided with Erickson’s allegedly negligent misdiagnosis. See Peterson v. St. Cloud Hosp., 460 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn.App.1990) (holding that the occurrence of damages determines when a medical malpractice action accrues",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthey completely terminated their physician and patient relationship. Generally, the negligent conduct of a physician causes at least some immediate damage to the patient, but the statute of limitations, nonetheless, commences running at termination of the course of treatment, sometime after the initial damage occurs. See Schmit, 183 Minn, at 359, 236 N.W. at 625 (adopting the termination of treatment rule despite the general rule that a statute of limitations action in tort begins to run at the time of the negligent act which coincides with the injury). Zagaros claims the termination of treatment rule is inapplicable in her case because no immediate damage coincided with Erickson’s allegedly negligent misdiagnosis. See Peterson v. St. Cloud Hosp., 460 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn.App.1990) (recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthey completely terminated their physician and patient relationship. Generally, the negligent conduct of a physician causes at least some immediate damage to the patient, but the statute of limitations, nonetheless, commences running at termination of the course of treatment, sometime after the initial damage occurs. See Schmit, 183 Minn, at 359, 236 N.W. at 625 (adopting the termination of treatment rule despite the general rule that a statute of limitations action in tort begins to run at the time of the negligent act which coincides with the injury). Zagaros claims the termination of treatment rule is inapplicable in her case because no immediate damage coincided with Erickson’s allegedly negligent misdiagnosis. See Peterson v. St. Cloud Hosp., 460 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn.App.1990) (holding that absent a contrary mandate from congress the discovery rule determines when a cause of action accrues in a federal question case",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthey completely terminated their physician and patient relationship. Generally, the negligent conduct of a physician causes at least some immediate damage to the patient, but the statute of limitations, nonetheless, commences running at termination of the course of treatment, sometime after the initial damage occurs. See Schmit, 183 Minn, at 359, 236 N.W. at 625 (adopting the termination of treatment rule despite the general rule that a statute of limitations action in tort begins to run at the time of the negligent act which coincides with the injury). Zagaros claims the termination of treatment rule is inapplicable in her case because no immediate damage coincided with Erickson’s allegedly negligent misdiagnosis. See Peterson v. St. Cloud Hosp., 460 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn.App.1990) (holding cause of action accrues when some compensable damage occurs"
] |
). She argues she was not injured by any lack of
| 1 |
648 |
[
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas appropriate. 23 . Accord Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.1980); United States v. City of Miami, Fla., supra at note 19. 24 . See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2271 n. 8, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192, 93 S.Ct. 375, 378, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) (judgment entered by an equally divided court is not entitled to precedential weight); Berlin v. F.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.1964) (affirmance by an equally divided court is, between the parties, conclusive determination, but the principles of law involved, having not gained the assent of a majority of the court, prevents the case from being authority for other cases); But see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1976) (holding of fragmented court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas appropriate. 23 . Accord Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.1980); United States v. City of Miami, Fla., supra at note 19. 24 . See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2271 n. 8, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192, 93 S.Ct. 375, 378, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) (judgment entered by an equally divided court is not entitled to precedential weight); Berlin v. F.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.1964) (affirmance by an equally divided court is, between the parties, conclusive determination, but the principles of law involved, having not gained the assent of a majority of the court, prevents the case from being authority for other cases); But see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1976) (recognizing that this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the motion justice",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas appropriate. 23 . Accord Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.1980); United States v. City of Miami, Fla., supra at note 19. 24 . See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2271 n. 8, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192, 93 S.Ct. 375, 378, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) (judgment entered by an equally divided court is not entitled to precedential weight); Berlin v. F.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.1964) (affirmance by an equally divided court is, between the parties, conclusive determination, but the principles of law involved, having not gained the assent of a majority of the court, prevents the case from being authority for other cases); But see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1976) (holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas appropriate. 23 . Accord Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.1980); United States v. City of Miami, Fla., supra at note 19. 24 . See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2271 n. 8, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192, 93 S.Ct. 375, 378, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) (judgment entered by an equally divided court is not entitled to precedential weight); Berlin v. F.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.1964) (affirmance by an equally divided court is, between the parties, conclusive determination, but the principles of law involved, having not gained the assent of a majority of the court, prevents the case from being authority for other cases); But see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1976) (holding that when a fragmented court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taking by those members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas appropriate. 23 . Accord Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.1980); United States v. City of Miami, Fla., supra at note 19. 24 . See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2271 n. 8, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192, 93 S.Ct. 375, 378, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) (judgment entered by an equally divided court is not entitled to precedential weight); Berlin v. F.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.1964) (affirmance by an equally divided court is, between the parties, conclusive determination, but the principles of law involved, having not gained the assent of a majority of the court, prevents the case from being authority for other cases); But see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1976) (holding of the court is the position taken by member who concurs in the judgment on the narrowest grounds"
] |
). 25 . In Fullilove, the Court was faced with
| 0 |
649 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor first degree murder and when the judgment has become final in the trial court, the defendant shall have the right of direct appeal from the trial court to the court of criminal appeals. The affirmance of the conviction and the sentence of death shall be automatically reviewed by the Tennessee supreme court.”). 7 . Application of this pre 1989 version of the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance is proper as the offense was committed in 1987. See State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tenn.1994). 8 . The trial court correctly deleted \"torture” from the instruction, as both parties concede that the evidence does not support a finding that the murder involved torture. See State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 478-79 (Tenn.1993) (citing State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 139-40 (Tenn.1981) (holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor first degree murder and when the judgment has become final in the trial court, the defendant shall have the right of direct appeal from the trial court to the court of criminal appeals. The affirmance of the conviction and the sentence of death shall be automatically reviewed by the Tennessee supreme court.”). 7 . Application of this pre 1989 version of the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance is proper as the offense was committed in 1987. See State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tenn.1994). 8 . The trial court correctly deleted \"torture” from the instruction, as both parties concede that the evidence does not support a finding that the murder involved torture. See State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 478-79 (Tenn.1993) (citing State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 139-40 (Tenn.1981) (recognizing trial court should not weigh evidence",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor first degree murder and when the judgment has become final in the trial court, the defendant shall have the right of direct appeal from the trial court to the court of criminal appeals. The affirmance of the conviction and the sentence of death shall be automatically reviewed by the Tennessee supreme court.”). 7 . Application of this pre 1989 version of the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance is proper as the offense was committed in 1987. See State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tenn.1994). 8 . The trial court correctly deleted \"torture” from the instruction, as both parties concede that the evidence does not support a finding that the murder involved torture. See State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 478-79 (Tenn.1993) (citing State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 139-40 (Tenn.1981) (holding that trial court may charge on involuntary manslaughter only where evidence exists to support such a verdict",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor first degree murder and when the judgment has become final in the trial court, the defendant shall have the right of direct appeal from the trial court to the court of criminal appeals. The affirmance of the conviction and the sentence of death shall be automatically reviewed by the Tennessee supreme court.”). 7 . Application of this pre 1989 version of the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance is proper as the offense was committed in 1987. See State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tenn.1994). 8 . The trial court correctly deleted \"torture” from the instruction, as both parties concede that the evidence does not support a finding that the murder involved torture. See State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 478-79 (Tenn.1993) (citing State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 139-40 (Tenn.1981) (holding that without transcript of trial proceedings appellate court cannot review underlying evidence so as to conclude that trial courts judgment is not supported by evidence",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor first degree murder and when the judgment has become final in the trial court, the defendant shall have the right of direct appeal from the trial court to the court of criminal appeals. The affirmance of the conviction and the sentence of death shall be automatically reviewed by the Tennessee supreme court.”). 7 . Application of this pre 1989 version of the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance is proper as the offense was committed in 1987. See State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tenn.1994). 8 . The trial court correctly deleted \"torture” from the instruction, as both parties concede that the evidence does not support a finding that the murder involved torture. See State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 478-79 (Tenn.1993) (citing State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 139-40 (Tenn.1981) (holding that a trial court should charge only those aspects of an aggravating circumstance supported by the evidence in a case"
] |
)). 9 . In Houston v. Dutton, the whole
| 4 |
650 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ntorture.” As is evident from the facts recited above, there is more than ample evidence to support such a conclusion. This distinction—finding torture but not depravity of mind—is significant. The vagueness problem of the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” (“HAC”) instruction is curable with appropriately narrowing language. We have held, of course, that requiring “torture or depravity of mind” does not solve the vagueness problem. Requiring only torture, however, does. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364-65, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (implying that “torture” limitation suffices to cure vagueness of HAC); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (confirming implication); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 793 (10th Cir.1998) (holding evidence of serious physical injury insufficient where victim was shot in right cheek but did not have to have surgery and victim denied having any longterm effects from the shooting",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ntorture.” As is evident from the facts recited above, there is more than ample evidence to support such a conclusion. This distinction—finding torture but not depravity of mind—is significant. The vagueness problem of the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” (“HAC”) instruction is curable with appropriately narrowing language. We have held, of course, that requiring “torture or depravity of mind” does not solve the vagueness problem. Requiring only torture, however, does. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364-65, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (implying that “torture” limitation suffices to cure vagueness of HAC); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (confirming implication); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 793 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ntorture.” As is evident from the facts recited above, there is more than ample evidence to support such a conclusion. This distinction—finding torture but not depravity of mind—is significant. The vagueness problem of the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” (“HAC”) instruction is curable with appropriately narrowing language. We have held, of course, that requiring “torture or depravity of mind” does not solve the vagueness problem. Requiring only torture, however, does. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364-65, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (implying that “torture” limitation suffices to cure vagueness of HAC); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (confirming implication); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 793 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that torture occurs when the victim is subjected to serious physical abuse before death that serious sexual abuse may constitute serious physical abuse that facts supporting a finding of torture will also support a finding of depravity of mind and that the age of the victim may be considered in determining whether the evidence shows depravity of mind",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ntorture.” As is evident from the facts recited above, there is more than ample evidence to support such a conclusion. This distinction—finding torture but not depravity of mind—is significant. The vagueness problem of the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” (“HAC”) instruction is curable with appropriately narrowing language. We have held, of course, that requiring “torture or depravity of mind” does not solve the vagueness problem. Requiring only torture, however, does. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364-65, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (implying that “torture” limitation suffices to cure vagueness of HAC); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (confirming implication); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 793 (10th Cir.1998) (holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ntorture.” As is evident from the facts recited above, there is more than ample evidence to support such a conclusion. This distinction—finding torture but not depravity of mind—is significant. The vagueness problem of the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” (“HAC”) instruction is curable with appropriately narrowing language. We have held, of course, that requiring “torture or depravity of mind” does not solve the vagueness problem. Requiring only torture, however, does. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364-65, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (implying that “torture” limitation suffices to cure vagueness of HAC); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (confirming implication); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 793 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that torture of the victim or serious physical abuse language in the instruction cures vagueness of hac"
] |
); cf. Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1319-20
| 4 |
651 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Law and Order Code also explicitly recognizes causes of action for the types of claims asserted against Snooks. Thus, Bassetto’s causes of action are recognized and anticipated by the Washoe Tribe and by the Washoe Tribal Court. It is clear that the existence of tribal legislation in an area will exclude the state even if the tribal legislation differs greatly from the state’s, or offers no remedy. ... A tribe’s legislative jurisdiction over its own people and within its own territory must include the right not to legislate at all in an area, if self-government is to be meaningful. Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 351 (1982) (citing Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966), Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that oklahoma police officer was without jurisdiction to arrest indian inside indian reservation when the state has neither received by express grant nor acted pursuant to congressional authorization to assume criminal jurisdiction over indian country",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Law and Order Code also explicitly recognizes causes of action for the types of claims asserted against Snooks. Thus, Bassetto’s causes of action are recognized and anticipated by the Washoe Tribe and by the Washoe Tribal Court. It is clear that the existence of tribal legislation in an area will exclude the state even if the tribal legislation differs greatly from the state’s, or offers no remedy. ... A tribe’s legislative jurisdiction over its own people and within its own territory must include the right not to legislate at all in an area, if self-government is to be meaningful. Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 351 (1982) (citing Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966), Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that a nevada state court had no jurisdiction to entertain a civil action filed by a nonindian against an indian for events that occurred on indian land",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Law and Order Code also explicitly recognizes causes of action for the types of claims asserted against Snooks. Thus, Bassetto’s causes of action are recognized and anticipated by the Washoe Tribe and by the Washoe Tribal Court. It is clear that the existence of tribal legislation in an area will exclude the state even if the tribal legislation differs greatly from the state’s, or offers no remedy. ... A tribe’s legislative jurisdiction over its own people and within its own territory must include the right not to legislate at all in an area, if self-government is to be meaningful. Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 351 (1982) (citing Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966), Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that the state has no jurisdiction to pursue an indian onto an indian reservation for criminal offenses committed off the reservation",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Law and Order Code also explicitly recognizes causes of action for the types of claims asserted against Snooks. Thus, Bassetto’s causes of action are recognized and anticipated by the Washoe Tribe and by the Washoe Tribal Court. It is clear that the existence of tribal legislation in an area will exclude the state even if the tribal legislation differs greatly from the state’s, or offers no remedy. ... A tribe’s legislative jurisdiction over its own people and within its own territory must include the right not to legislate at all in an area, if self-government is to be meaningful. Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 351 (1982) (citing Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966), Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that federal court has neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction over civil action by nonindian against indian for events occurring on the reservation",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Law and Order Code also explicitly recognizes causes of action for the types of claims asserted against Snooks. Thus, Bassetto’s causes of action are recognized and anticipated by the Washoe Tribe and by the Washoe Tribal Court. It is clear that the existence of tribal legislation in an area will exclude the state even if the tribal legislation differs greatly from the state’s, or offers no remedy. ... A tribe’s legislative jurisdiction over its own people and within its own territory must include the right not to legislate at all in an area, if self-government is to be meaningful. Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 351 (1982) (citing Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966), Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation"
] |
) and Enriquez v. Superior Court, 565 P.2d 522,
| 3 |
652 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nis not impaired”); In re Harris, 482 B.R. 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); and In re Stroud, 219 B.R. at 390 (same and concluding that “[l]ien avoidance must be conditioned upon Debtor’s completion of the Chapter 13 Plan and granting of the discharge in order to ensure that creditors’ interests are protected” (citation omitted)). 18 . See In re Mulder, No. 810-74217-reg., 2010 WL 4286174, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) (\"This Court finds no support in the Code to use Section 349 as a basis on which to condition Section 522(f) lien avoidance upon entry of a discharge. This position inappropriately assumes that failure to' receive a discharge goes hand in hand with dismissal of a case.”); see also In re Ferrante, No. 09-13098, 2009 WL 2971306 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2009) (holding that a state statutory framework and the punitive nature of segregation created a liberty interest",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nis not impaired”); In re Harris, 482 B.R. 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); and In re Stroud, 219 B.R. at 390 (same and concluding that “[l]ien avoidance must be conditioned upon Debtor’s completion of the Chapter 13 Plan and granting of the discharge in order to ensure that creditors’ interests are protected” (citation omitted)). 18 . See In re Mulder, No. 810-74217-reg., 2010 WL 4286174, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) (\"This Court finds no support in the Code to use Section 349 as a basis on which to condition Section 522(f) lien avoidance upon entry of a discharge. This position inappropriately assumes that failure to' receive a discharge goes hand in hand with dismissal of a case.”); see also In re Ferrante, No. 09-13098, 2009 WL 2971306 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2009) (holding that the debtor must have had an interest in the property before the lien attached to take advantage of 522f",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nis not impaired”); In re Harris, 482 B.R. 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); and In re Stroud, 219 B.R. at 390 (same and concluding that “[l]ien avoidance must be conditioned upon Debtor’s completion of the Chapter 13 Plan and granting of the discharge in order to ensure that creditors’ interests are protected” (citation omitted)). 18 . See In re Mulder, No. 810-74217-reg., 2010 WL 4286174, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) (\"This Court finds no support in the Code to use Section 349 as a basis on which to condition Section 522(f) lien avoidance upon entry of a discharge. This position inappropriately assumes that failure to' receive a discharge goes hand in hand with dismissal of a case.”); see also In re Ferrante, No. 09-13098, 2009 WL 2971306 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2009) (holding that in light of the statutory framework created by the code 522f lien avoidance cannot be made subject to any subsequent event",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nis not impaired”); In re Harris, 482 B.R. 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); and In re Stroud, 219 B.R. at 390 (same and concluding that “[l]ien avoidance must be conditioned upon Debtor’s completion of the Chapter 13 Plan and granting of the discharge in order to ensure that creditors’ interests are protected” (citation omitted)). 18 . See In re Mulder, No. 810-74217-reg., 2010 WL 4286174, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) (\"This Court finds no support in the Code to use Section 349 as a basis on which to condition Section 522(f) lien avoidance upon entry of a discharge. This position inappropriately assumes that failure to' receive a discharge goes hand in hand with dismissal of a case.”); see also In re Ferrante, No. 09-13098, 2009 WL 2971306 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2009) (holding that consumer lien avoidance powers of section 522f cannot be applied retroactively",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nis not impaired”); In re Harris, 482 B.R. 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); and In re Stroud, 219 B.R. at 390 (same and concluding that “[l]ien avoidance must be conditioned upon Debtor’s completion of the Chapter 13 Plan and granting of the discharge in order to ensure that creditors’ interests are protected” (citation omitted)). 18 . See In re Mulder, No. 810-74217-reg., 2010 WL 4286174, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) (\"This Court finds no support in the Code to use Section 349 as a basis on which to condition Section 522(f) lien avoidance upon entry of a discharge. This position inappropriately assumes that failure to' receive a discharge goes hand in hand with dismissal of a case.”); see also In re Ferrante, No. 09-13098, 2009 WL 2971306 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2009) (holding that a debtors ability to utilize 522f to avoid a judicial lien is not dependent upon the debtor receiving a discharge "
] |
). 19 . Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188,
| 2 |
653 |
[
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nif the jury posed a question about insurance during deliberations. Evidence of insurance is generally not admissible at trial unless it is offered for a purpose permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence 411. See also Piontkowski v. Scott, 65 Ohio App.3d 4, 582 N.E.2d 1002, 1003-04 (1989). Gratzianna’s brief reference to “Cincinnati Insurance” was inadvertent and unresponsive to the question Chapman’s counsel asked. ■ Counsel hurriedly diverted the jury’s attention from the comment and, unlike the cases on which defendants rely, defense counsel did not ask the court contemporaneously to strike the witness’s remark and instruct the jury to disregard it, nor did counsel ask for an immediate curative instruction. Cf. e.g., Kaltrider v. YMCA of Cleveland, Ohio, 457 F.2d 768, 770 (6th Cir.1972) (holding the lack of a contemporaneous objection could not be salvaged by a motion for a mistrial",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nif the jury posed a question about insurance during deliberations. Evidence of insurance is generally not admissible at trial unless it is offered for a purpose permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence 411. See also Piontkowski v. Scott, 65 Ohio App.3d 4, 582 N.E.2d 1002, 1003-04 (1989). Gratzianna’s brief reference to “Cincinnati Insurance” was inadvertent and unresponsive to the question Chapman’s counsel asked. ■ Counsel hurriedly diverted the jury’s attention from the comment and, unlike the cases on which defendants rely, defense counsel did not ask the court contemporaneously to strike the witness’s remark and instruct the jury to disregard it, nor did counsel ask for an immediate curative instruction. Cf. e.g., Kaltrider v. YMCA of Cleveland, Ohio, 457 F.2d 768, 770 (6th Cir.1972) (holding no prejudice occurred where party made contemporaneous objection to brief remark about insurance during closing argument and court gave cautionary instruction",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nif the jury posed a question about insurance during deliberations. Evidence of insurance is generally not admissible at trial unless it is offered for a purpose permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence 411. See also Piontkowski v. Scott, 65 Ohio App.3d 4, 582 N.E.2d 1002, 1003-04 (1989). Gratzianna’s brief reference to “Cincinnati Insurance” was inadvertent and unresponsive to the question Chapman’s counsel asked. ■ Counsel hurriedly diverted the jury’s attention from the comment and, unlike the cases on which defendants rely, defense counsel did not ask the court contemporaneously to strike the witness’s remark and instruct the jury to disregard it, nor did counsel ask for an immediate curative instruction. Cf. e.g., Kaltrider v. YMCA of Cleveland, Ohio, 457 F.2d 768, 770 (6th Cir.1972) (holding a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nif the jury posed a question about insurance during deliberations. Evidence of insurance is generally not admissible at trial unless it is offered for a purpose permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence 411. See also Piontkowski v. Scott, 65 Ohio App.3d 4, 582 N.E.2d 1002, 1003-04 (1989). Gratzianna’s brief reference to “Cincinnati Insurance” was inadvertent and unresponsive to the question Chapman’s counsel asked. ■ Counsel hurriedly diverted the jury’s attention from the comment and, unlike the cases on which defendants rely, defense counsel did not ask the court contemporaneously to strike the witness’s remark and instruct the jury to disregard it, nor did counsel ask for an immediate curative instruction. Cf. e.g., Kaltrider v. YMCA of Cleveland, Ohio, 457 F.2d 768, 770 (6th Cir.1972) (holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nif the jury posed a question about insurance during deliberations. Evidence of insurance is generally not admissible at trial unless it is offered for a purpose permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence 411. See also Piontkowski v. Scott, 65 Ohio App.3d 4, 582 N.E.2d 1002, 1003-04 (1989). Gratzianna’s brief reference to “Cincinnati Insurance” was inadvertent and unresponsive to the question Chapman’s counsel asked. ■ Counsel hurriedly diverted the jury’s attention from the comment and, unlike the cases on which defendants rely, defense counsel did not ask the court contemporaneously to strike the witness’s remark and instruct the jury to disregard it, nor did counsel ask for an immediate curative instruction. Cf. e.g., Kaltrider v. YMCA of Cleveland, Ohio, 457 F.2d 768, 770 (6th Cir.1972) (holding mistrial unwarranted where contemporaneous objection was made to single mention of insurance and court gave cautionary instruction"
] |
); Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 967 F.2d
| 4 |
654 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nstop” and “not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence.” Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189, 124 S.Ct. 2451. But the request for Mocek’s identification was a “commonsense inquiry” meant to gather basic information about a suspect, which has “an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.” Id. Mocek’s refusal to cooperate interfered with these efforts to investigate possible disorderly conduct. Second, Mocek argues the arrest was a mere pretext for seizing his camera and destroying his recordings of the security checkpoint. He cites our holding that police cannot use an administrative search as an excuse to enter a building to seize suspected contraband. See Winters v. B ly motivated by hi 4) (recognizing that general rule applies only to statutes that implicate no constitutionally protected conduct emphasis added",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nstop” and “not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence.” Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189, 124 S.Ct. 2451. But the request for Mocek’s identification was a “commonsense inquiry” meant to gather basic information about a suspect, which has “an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.” Id. Mocek’s refusal to cooperate interfered with these efforts to investigate possible disorderly conduct. Second, Mocek argues the arrest was a mere pretext for seizing his camera and destroying his recordings of the security checkpoint. He cites our holding that police cannot use an administrative search as an excuse to enter a building to seize suspected contraband. See Winters v. B ly motivated by hi 4) (holding that the law of michigan rather than the forum applied to manufacturers claim of attorneyclient privilege in a products liability suit because the communication took place in michigan and therefore michigan had most significant relationship to communication",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nstop” and “not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence.” Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189, 124 S.Ct. 2451. But the request for Mocek’s identification was a “commonsense inquiry” meant to gather basic information about a suspect, which has “an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.” Id. Mocek’s refusal to cooperate interfered with these efforts to investigate possible disorderly conduct. Second, Mocek argues the arrest was a mere pretext for seizing his camera and destroying his recordings of the security checkpoint. He cites our holding that police cannot use an administrative search as an excuse to enter a building to seize suspected contraband. See Winters v. B ly motivated by hi 4) (holding for purposes of a retaliation claim because michigan has not passed an applicable time place or manner restriction dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of byerleys residence emphasis added",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nstop” and “not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence.” Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189, 124 S.Ct. 2451. But the request for Mocek’s identification was a “commonsense inquiry” meant to gather basic information about a suspect, which has “an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.” Id. Mocek’s refusal to cooperate interfered with these efforts to investigate possible disorderly conduct. Second, Mocek argues the arrest was a mere pretext for seizing his camera and destroying his recordings of the security checkpoint. He cites our holding that police cannot use an administrative search as an excuse to enter a building to seize suspected contraband. See Winters v. B ly motivated by hi 4) (holding floridas stalking statute which contained the language constitutionally protected activity is not included in the course of conduct definition and constitutional protected activity includes picketing or other organized protests was not impermissibly vague",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nstop” and “not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence.” Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189, 124 S.Ct. 2451. But the request for Mocek’s identification was a “commonsense inquiry” meant to gather basic information about a suspect, which has “an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.” Id. Mocek’s refusal to cooperate interfered with these efforts to investigate possible disorderly conduct. Second, Mocek argues the arrest was a mere pretext for seizing his camera and destroying his recordings of the security checkpoint. He cites our holding that police cannot use an administrative search as an excuse to enter a building to seize suspected contraband. See Winters v. B ly motivated by hi 4) (holding for purposes of a retaliation claim restricting disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time place and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum"
] |
); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th
| 2 |
655 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCo., 32 Va. Cir. 497, 502-03 (Henrico 1981). In any event, Dryvit was sued at the same time as RML and had the same notice of the original homeowner suit. Defendants state that the only notice received regarding the warranty claims was from the service of the Third-Party Motion for Judgment and RML’s cross-claim against Dryvit and argue that this does not constitute adequate notice within the parameters of Virginia Code § 8.2-607(3)(a). It is true that some courts have found that service of process is insufficient notice of a breach of warranty claim. See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 513 (Ala. 1980) (filing of a third-party complaint by defendant one year into the litigation); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 327 A.2d 502, 514 (Md. 1974) (recognizing private right of action",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCo., 32 Va. Cir. 497, 502-03 (Henrico 1981). In any event, Dryvit was sued at the same time as RML and had the same notice of the original homeowner suit. Defendants state that the only notice received regarding the warranty claims was from the service of the Third-Party Motion for Judgment and RML’s cross-claim against Dryvit and argue that this does not constitute adequate notice within the parameters of Virginia Code § 8.2-607(3)(a). It is true that some courts have found that service of process is insufficient notice of a breach of warranty claim. See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 513 (Ala. 1980) (filing of a third-party complaint by defendant one year into the litigation); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 327 A.2d 502, 514 (Md. 1974) (holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCo., 32 Va. Cir. 497, 502-03 (Henrico 1981). In any event, Dryvit was sued at the same time as RML and had the same notice of the original homeowner suit. Defendants state that the only notice received regarding the warranty claims was from the service of the Third-Party Motion for Judgment and RML’s cross-claim against Dryvit and argue that this does not constitute adequate notice within the parameters of Virginia Code § 8.2-607(3)(a). It is true that some courts have found that service of process is insufficient notice of a breach of warranty claim. See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 513 (Ala. 1980) (filing of a third-party complaint by defendant one year into the litigation); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 327 A.2d 502, 514 (Md. 1974) (holding that once the workers compensation act provides a remedy it is exclusive and the employee has no right to bring an action in commonlaw negligence against his employer",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCo., 32 Va. Cir. 497, 502-03 (Henrico 1981). In any event, Dryvit was sued at the same time as RML and had the same notice of the original homeowner suit. Defendants state that the only notice received regarding the warranty claims was from the service of the Third-Party Motion for Judgment and RML’s cross-claim against Dryvit and argue that this does not constitute adequate notice within the parameters of Virginia Code § 8.2-607(3)(a). It is true that some courts have found that service of process is insufficient notice of a breach of warranty claim. See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 513 (Ala. 1980) (filing of a third-party complaint by defendant one year into the litigation); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 327 A.2d 502, 514 (Md. 1974) (holding that if no notice was given prior to the institution of an action a condition precedent to the right to bring the action does not exist and the buyerplaintiff has lost the right of his remedy",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCo., 32 Va. Cir. 497, 502-03 (Henrico 1981). In any event, Dryvit was sued at the same time as RML and had the same notice of the original homeowner suit. Defendants state that the only notice received regarding the warranty claims was from the service of the Third-Party Motion for Judgment and RML’s cross-claim against Dryvit and argue that this does not constitute adequate notice within the parameters of Virginia Code § 8.2-607(3)(a). It is true that some courts have found that service of process is insufficient notice of a breach of warranty claim. See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 513 (Ala. 1980) (filing of a third-party complaint by defendant one year into the litigation); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 327 A.2d 502, 514 (Md. 1974) (holding that no right of action is given to the estate of the victim of a tort but is granted only to his heirs if there are no heirs no right of action vests in anybody"
] |
); Voboril v. Namco Leisure World, Inc., 24 UCC
| 3 |
656 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nruling precluded Bolt from testifying about the work papers. The court did not explicitly make a ruling on Bolt’s testimony concerning the work papers. The court stated it was not prepared to rule on Bolt’s analysis of the work papers at the beginning of the trial. The court also stated it had no problem with QCBT mentioning inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the work papers in its opening statement; The record clearly establishes the court’s ruling on the motion in limine declared that Bolt’s testimony concerning generally accepted CPA auditing standards, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, was inadmissible. The court did not equivocate or state it would reconsider its ruling at trial. Cf. Holst v. Countryside Enters., Inc., 14 F.3d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir.1994) (holding defendant failed to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence that was the subject of the motion in limine where defendant failed to object to evidence when offered at trial",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nruling precluded Bolt from testifying about the work papers. The court did not explicitly make a ruling on Bolt’s testimony concerning the work papers. The court stated it was not prepared to rule on Bolt’s analysis of the work papers at the beginning of the trial. The court also stated it had no problem with QCBT mentioning inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the work papers in its opening statement; The record clearly establishes the court’s ruling on the motion in limine declared that Bolt’s testimony concerning generally accepted CPA auditing standards, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, was inadmissible. The court did not equivocate or state it would reconsider its ruling at trial. Cf. Holst v. Countryside Enters., Inc., 14 F.3d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that a trial courts evidentiary ruling on a pretrial motion is not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal unless a defendant renews the objection during trial",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nruling precluded Bolt from testifying about the work papers. The court did not explicitly make a ruling on Bolt’s testimony concerning the work papers. The court stated it was not prepared to rule on Bolt’s analysis of the work papers at the beginning of the trial. The court also stated it had no problem with QCBT mentioning inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the work papers in its opening statement; The record clearly establishes the court’s ruling on the motion in limine declared that Bolt’s testimony concerning generally accepted CPA auditing standards, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, was inadmissible. The court did not equivocate or state it would reconsider its ruling at trial. Cf. Holst v. Countryside Enters., Inc., 14 F.3d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nruling precluded Bolt from testifying about the work papers. The court did not explicitly make a ruling on Bolt’s testimony concerning the work papers. The court stated it was not prepared to rule on Bolt’s analysis of the work papers at the beginning of the trial. The court also stated it had no problem with QCBT mentioning inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the work papers in its opening statement; The record clearly establishes the court’s ruling on the motion in limine declared that Bolt’s testimony concerning generally accepted CPA auditing standards, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, was inadmissible. The court did not equivocate or state it would reconsider its ruling at trial. Cf. Holst v. Countryside Enters., Inc., 14 F.3d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that a party had failed to preserve an argument for appellate review when that party had failed to argue the issue to the trial court either at trial or in his postjudgment motion",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nruling precluded Bolt from testifying about the work papers. The court did not explicitly make a ruling on Bolt’s testimony concerning the work papers. The court stated it was not prepared to rule on Bolt’s analysis of the work papers at the beginning of the trial. The court also stated it had no problem with QCBT mentioning inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the work papers in its opening statement; The record clearly establishes the court’s ruling on the motion in limine declared that Bolt’s testimony concerning generally accepted CPA auditing standards, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, was inadmissible. The court did not equivocate or state it would reconsider its ruling at trial. Cf. Holst v. Countryside Enters., Inc., 14 F.3d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that trial courts have discretion to decide whether litigation conduct violates a ruling on a motion in limine"
] |
). Thus, as to this testimony, we conclude the
| 2 |
657 |
[
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nme with real questions about the fairness of this trial. See United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 197 (2d Cir.2013) (vacating judgment of conviction and remanding because multiple errors, considered together, “call into serious doubt whether the defendant received the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness to which she and all criminal defendants are entitled”). See infra Point IV. Because the Confrontation Clause violation and the instructional error rendered defendants’ trial fundamentally unfair, a new trial as to all counts is warranted. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (“[T]he Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.”); cf. United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 91 (2d Cir.2004) (recognizing spillover effect that warranted vacatur of counts other than those primarily infected with error",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nme with real questions about the fairness of this trial. See United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 197 (2d Cir.2013) (vacating judgment of conviction and remanding because multiple errors, considered together, “call into serious doubt whether the defendant received the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness to which she and all criminal defendants are entitled”). See infra Point IV. Because the Confrontation Clause violation and the instructional error rendered defendants’ trial fundamentally unfair, a new trial as to all counts is warranted. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (“[T]he Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.”); cf. United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 91 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that severance was not required when a defendant was charged with five counts of forcible rape two counts of felonious restraint three counts of kidnapping two counts of armed criminal action two counts of forcible sodomy one count of second degree assault one count of first degree robbery and one count of stealing",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nme with real questions about the fairness of this trial. See United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 197 (2d Cir.2013) (vacating judgment of conviction and remanding because multiple errors, considered together, “call into serious doubt whether the defendant received the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness to which she and all criminal defendants are entitled”). See infra Point IV. Because the Confrontation Clause violation and the instructional error rendered defendants’ trial fundamentally unfair, a new trial as to all counts is warranted. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (“[T]he Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.”); cf. United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 91 (2d Cir.2004) (holding error was structural because of the difficulty of assessing the effect of the error",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nme with real questions about the fairness of this trial. See United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 197 (2d Cir.2013) (vacating judgment of conviction and remanding because multiple errors, considered together, “call into serious doubt whether the defendant received the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness to which she and all criminal defendants are entitled”). See infra Point IV. Because the Confrontation Clause violation and the instructional error rendered defendants’ trial fundamentally unfair, a new trial as to all counts is warranted. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (“[T]he Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.”); cf. United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 91 (2d Cir.2004) (recognizing with approval the practice following vacatur of some counts of conviction on appeal of increasing the defendants sentence on remaining counts to yield an aggregate sentence equal to the original aggregate imposed",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nme with real questions about the fairness of this trial. See United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 197 (2d Cir.2013) (vacating judgment of conviction and remanding because multiple errors, considered together, “call into serious doubt whether the defendant received the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness to which she and all criminal defendants are entitled”). See infra Point IV. Because the Confrontation Clause violation and the instructional error rendered defendants’ trial fundamentally unfair, a new trial as to all counts is warranted. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (“[T]he Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.”); cf. United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 91 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts"
] |
). See infra Point V. I The Constitution
| 0 |
658 |
[
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1) legal fees incurred to repossess the equipment; (2) investigator’s fees expended to track down the equipment hidden by Paul; (3) devaluation of the market price of the recovered equipment; and (4) loss of some of the equipment hidden by Paul. Mullins has challenged the inclusion of consequential damages in the restitution award and the failure of the court to make findings as to his ability to pay. The amount of restitution that may be awarded under the VWPA is specifically described: The order may require that such defendant— “(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction o n effect, even if costs that are not included would appear to be justified as a way of making the victim whole. United States v. Mitchell, 876 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that restitution under the vwpa was more akin to compensation for actual loss than a criminal penalty that may not bear interest",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1) legal fees incurred to repossess the equipment; (2) investigator’s fees expended to track down the equipment hidden by Paul; (3) devaluation of the market price of the recovered equipment; and (4) loss of some of the equipment hidden by Paul. Mullins has challenged the inclusion of consequential damages in the restitution award and the failure of the court to make findings as to his ability to pay. The amount of restitution that may be awarded under the VWPA is specifically described: The order may require that such defendant— “(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction o n effect, even if costs that are not included would appear to be justified as a way of making the victim whole. United States v. Mitchell, 876 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1) legal fees incurred to repossess the equipment; (2) investigator’s fees expended to track down the equipment hidden by Paul; (3) devaluation of the market price of the recovered equipment; and (4) loss of some of the equipment hidden by Paul. Mullins has challenged the inclusion of consequential damages in the restitution award and the failure of the court to make findings as to his ability to pay. The amount of restitution that may be awarded under the VWPA is specifically described: The order may require that such defendant— “(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction o n effect, even if costs that are not included would appear to be justified as a way of making the victim whole. United States v. Mitchell, 876 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that restitution for lost income in property cases was improper under the plain language of the statute because restitution for lost income is authorized only for victims of bodily injury",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1) legal fees incurred to repossess the equipment; (2) investigator’s fees expended to track down the equipment hidden by Paul; (3) devaluation of the market price of the recovered equipment; and (4) loss of some of the equipment hidden by Paul. Mullins has challenged the inclusion of consequential damages in the restitution award and the failure of the court to make findings as to his ability to pay. The amount of restitution that may be awarded under the VWPA is specifically described: The order may require that such defendant— “(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction o n effect, even if costs that are not included would appear to be justified as a way of making the victim whole. United States v. Mitchell, 876 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1) legal fees incurred to repossess the equipment; (2) investigator’s fees expended to track down the equipment hidden by Paul; (3) devaluation of the market price of the recovered equipment; and (4) loss of some of the equipment hidden by Paul. Mullins has challenged the inclusion of consequential damages in the restitution award and the failure of the court to make findings as to his ability to pay. The amount of restitution that may be awarded under the VWPA is specifically described: The order may require that such defendant— “(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction o n effect, even if costs that are not included would appear to be justified as a way of making the victim whole. United States v. Mitchell, 876 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that restitution for lost income is not authorized for offenses resulting in damage to loss of or destruction of property the fact that the goals of the vwpa may be thwarted by denying lost income restitution does not authorize us to ignore the plain language of the statute"
] |
). In cases involving the damage, loss, or
| 4 |
659 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nHewitt v. State, 242 Md. 111, 113-14, 218 A.2d 19, 20-21 (1966) (specifically holding that a double jeopardy issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal pursuant to then Rule 885); Iozzi v. State, 224 Md. 42, 46, 166 A.2d 257, 260 (1960) (not reaching a claim that the defendant was not allowed his right to counsel when his attorney was not present at a portion of the trial, citing Rule 885 and stating, “[i]n the absence of anything to show a request to the trial court or a ruling thereon, there is nothing before us to consider”) (alteration added); Kirby v. State, 222 Md. 421, 425, 160 A.2d 786, 788 (1960) (stating that “cases almost uniformly hold that the right to a speedy trial ... like other statutory or constitutional rights, may be waived and that it 363, 365-66 (1982) (recognizing that even constitutional issues may be waived if not properly raised at the trial court level pursuant to rules 885 and 1085 both predecessors to current md rule 8131a",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nHewitt v. State, 242 Md. 111, 113-14, 218 A.2d 19, 20-21 (1966) (specifically holding that a double jeopardy issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal pursuant to then Rule 885); Iozzi v. State, 224 Md. 42, 46, 166 A.2d 257, 260 (1960) (not reaching a claim that the defendant was not allowed his right to counsel when his attorney was not present at a portion of the trial, citing Rule 885 and stating, “[i]n the absence of anything to show a request to the trial court or a ruling thereon, there is nothing before us to consider”) (alteration added); Kirby v. State, 222 Md. 421, 425, 160 A.2d 786, 788 (1960) (stating that “cases almost uniformly hold that the right to a speedy trial ... like other statutory or constitutional rights, may be waived and that it 363, 365-66 (1982) (holding issues not raised at trial level cannot be argued for the first time on appeal",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nHewitt v. State, 242 Md. 111, 113-14, 218 A.2d 19, 20-21 (1966) (specifically holding that a double jeopardy issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal pursuant to then Rule 885); Iozzi v. State, 224 Md. 42, 46, 166 A.2d 257, 260 (1960) (not reaching a claim that the defendant was not allowed his right to counsel when his attorney was not present at a portion of the trial, citing Rule 885 and stating, “[i]n the absence of anything to show a request to the trial court or a ruling thereon, there is nothing before us to consider”) (alteration added); Kirby v. State, 222 Md. 421, 425, 160 A.2d 786, 788 (1960) (stating that “cases almost uniformly hold that the right to a speedy trial ... like other statutory or constitutional rights, may be waived and that it 363, 365-66 (1982) (holding that we consider issues not raised at administrative level waived",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nHewitt v. State, 242 Md. 111, 113-14, 218 A.2d 19, 20-21 (1966) (specifically holding that a double jeopardy issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal pursuant to then Rule 885); Iozzi v. State, 224 Md. 42, 46, 166 A.2d 257, 260 (1960) (not reaching a claim that the defendant was not allowed his right to counsel when his attorney was not present at a portion of the trial, citing Rule 885 and stating, “[i]n the absence of anything to show a request to the trial court or a ruling thereon, there is nothing before us to consider”) (alteration added); Kirby v. State, 222 Md. 421, 425, 160 A.2d 786, 788 (1960) (stating that “cases almost uniformly hold that the right to a speedy trial ... like other statutory or constitutional rights, may be waived and that it 363, 365-66 (1982) (holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nHewitt v. State, 242 Md. 111, 113-14, 218 A.2d 19, 20-21 (1966) (specifically holding that a double jeopardy issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal pursuant to then Rule 885); Iozzi v. State, 224 Md. 42, 46, 166 A.2d 257, 260 (1960) (not reaching a claim that the defendant was not allowed his right to counsel when his attorney was not present at a portion of the trial, citing Rule 885 and stating, “[i]n the absence of anything to show a request to the trial court or a ruling thereon, there is nothing before us to consider”) (alteration added); Kirby v. State, 222 Md. 421, 425, 160 A.2d 786, 788 (1960) (stating that “cases almost uniformly hold that the right to a speedy trial ... like other statutory or constitutional rights, may be waived and that it 363, 365-66 (1982) (holding that exhaustion of issues is waived if not raised by the government"
] |
); see also Johnson v. State, 138 Md.App. 539,
| 0 |
660 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nin benefits, ineligibility for promotional opportunities, or more formal discipline”). Defendant’s placement of Plaintiff on the County’s Performance Improvement Plan more closely constitutes an adverse employment action. Plaintiff alleges that the “P.I.P. is a tool, which is a step toward dismissal, demotion, suspension, etc.” (Dkt.36-2, p. 22) Defendant placed Plaintiff on the PIP based on its conclusion that Plaintiff was not receptive to counseling regarding her performance. (Dkt. 25, Papin Aff. ¶ 4; Dkt. 27, Balzer Aff. ¶ 3). As a result of her placement on PIP, Plaintiff alleges she was given additional assignments and reporting requirements and increased supervision, although she does not develop the record in this regard. (Dkt.36-2, pp. 22, 43) See Smith, 509 F.Supp.2d at 1203 (holding that deprivation of increased compensation as the result of a failure to train constitutes an adverse employment action",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nin benefits, ineligibility for promotional opportunities, or more formal discipline”). Defendant’s placement of Plaintiff on the County’s Performance Improvement Plan more closely constitutes an adverse employment action. Plaintiff alleges that the “P.I.P. is a tool, which is a step toward dismissal, demotion, suspension, etc.” (Dkt.36-2, p. 22) Defendant placed Plaintiff on the PIP based on its conclusion that Plaintiff was not receptive to counseling regarding her performance. (Dkt. 25, Papin Aff. ¶ 4; Dkt. 27, Balzer Aff. ¶ 3). As a result of her placement on PIP, Plaintiff alleges she was given additional assignments and reporting requirements and increased supervision, although she does not develop the record in this regard. (Dkt.36-2, pp. 22, 43) See Smith, 509 F.Supp.2d at 1203 (holding that an employers requirement that an employee comply with a performance improvement plan or face disciplinary action did not constitute adverse employment action",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nin benefits, ineligibility for promotional opportunities, or more formal discipline”). Defendant’s placement of Plaintiff on the County’s Performance Improvement Plan more closely constitutes an adverse employment action. Plaintiff alleges that the “P.I.P. is a tool, which is a step toward dismissal, demotion, suspension, etc.” (Dkt.36-2, p. 22) Defendant placed Plaintiff on the PIP based on its conclusion that Plaintiff was not receptive to counseling regarding her performance. (Dkt. 25, Papin Aff. ¶ 4; Dkt. 27, Balzer Aff. ¶ 3). As a result of her placement on PIP, Plaintiff alleges she was given additional assignments and reporting requirements and increased supervision, although she does not develop the record in this regard. (Dkt.36-2, pp. 22, 43) See Smith, 509 F.Supp.2d at 1203 (holding that reduction in workload is an adverse employment action",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nin benefits, ineligibility for promotional opportunities, or more formal discipline”). Defendant’s placement of Plaintiff on the County’s Performance Improvement Plan more closely constitutes an adverse employment action. Plaintiff alleges that the “P.I.P. is a tool, which is a step toward dismissal, demotion, suspension, etc.” (Dkt.36-2, p. 22) Defendant placed Plaintiff on the PIP based on its conclusion that Plaintiff was not receptive to counseling regarding her performance. (Dkt. 25, Papin Aff. ¶ 4; Dkt. 27, Balzer Aff. ¶ 3). As a result of her placement on PIP, Plaintiff alleges she was given additional assignments and reporting requirements and increased supervision, although she does not develop the record in this regard. (Dkt.36-2, pp. 22, 43) See Smith, 509 F.Supp.2d at 1203 (holding that change in employment assignment that inter alia increased onthejob commuting time was not an adverse employment action",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nin benefits, ineligibility for promotional opportunities, or more formal discipline”). Defendant’s placement of Plaintiff on the County’s Performance Improvement Plan more closely constitutes an adverse employment action. Plaintiff alleges that the “P.I.P. is a tool, which is a step toward dismissal, demotion, suspension, etc.” (Dkt.36-2, p. 22) Defendant placed Plaintiff on the PIP based on its conclusion that Plaintiff was not receptive to counseling regarding her performance. (Dkt. 25, Papin Aff. ¶ 4; Dkt. 27, Balzer Aff. ¶ 3). As a result of her placement on PIP, Plaintiff alleges she was given additional assignments and reporting requirements and increased supervision, although she does not develop the record in this regard. (Dkt.36-2, pp. 22, 43) See Smith, 509 F.Supp.2d at 1203 (holding that plaintiffs placement on a performance improvement plan was an adverse employment action because it resulted in increased workload increased reporting requirements increased supervision and tempo rarity prevented plaintiff from receiving pay raises or bonuses"
] |
). Plaintiffs “reassignment to Building 41,”
| 4 |
661 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nAlaska consumer fraud act); Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 6-l-113(2)(a) (the court may award three times the actual damages, or $500, whichever is greater, if it is proven that the defendant engaged in bad faith conduct); Quist v. Specialties Supply Co., Inc., 12 P.3d 863, 867 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) (where the court held plaintiff was precluded under principles of collateral estoppel from challenging the amount of actual damages fixed by the judgment, but holding that collateral estoppel did not preclude plaintiff from pursuing enhanced punitive damages); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1345.09(B)(the injured party may seek and the trial court in its discretion may rescind the contract or award treble the actual damages or $200, whichever is greater); Crye v. Smolak, 110 Ohio App.3d 504, 674 N.E. 2d 779 (1996)(holding that treble damages are appropriate under ohio law when the seller engages in an unconscionable practice or deceptive act",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nAlaska consumer fraud act); Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 6-l-113(2)(a) (the court may award three times the actual damages, or $500, whichever is greater, if it is proven that the defendant engaged in bad faith conduct); Quist v. Specialties Supply Co., Inc., 12 P.3d 863, 867 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) (where the court held plaintiff was precluded under principles of collateral estoppel from challenging the amount of actual damages fixed by the judgment, but holding that collateral estoppel did not preclude plaintiff from pursuing enhanced punitive damages); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1345.09(B)(the injured party may seek and the trial court in its discretion may rescind the contract or award treble the actual damages or $200, whichever is greater); Crye v. Smolak, 110 Ohio App.3d 504, 674 N.E. 2d 779 (1996)(holding treble damages under the civil theft statute are punitive",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nAlaska consumer fraud act); Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 6-l-113(2)(a) (the court may award three times the actual damages, or $500, whichever is greater, if it is proven that the defendant engaged in bad faith conduct); Quist v. Specialties Supply Co., Inc., 12 P.3d 863, 867 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) (where the court held plaintiff was precluded under principles of collateral estoppel from challenging the amount of actual damages fixed by the judgment, but holding that collateral estoppel did not preclude plaintiff from pursuing enhanced punitive damages); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1345.09(B)(the injured party may seek and the trial court in its discretion may rescind the contract or award treble the actual damages or $200, whichever is greater); Crye v. Smolak, 110 Ohio App.3d 504, 674 N.E. 2d 779 (1996)(holding that a plaintiff may receive both treble damages under rico and state law punitive damages for the same course of conduct",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nAlaska consumer fraud act); Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 6-l-113(2)(a) (the court may award three times the actual damages, or $500, whichever is greater, if it is proven that the defendant engaged in bad faith conduct); Quist v. Specialties Supply Co., Inc., 12 P.3d 863, 867 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) (where the court held plaintiff was precluded under principles of collateral estoppel from challenging the amount of actual damages fixed by the judgment, but holding that collateral estoppel did not preclude plaintiff from pursuing enhanced punitive damages); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1345.09(B)(the injured party may seek and the trial court in its discretion may rescind the contract or award treble the actual damages or $200, whichever is greater); Crye v. Smolak, 110 Ohio App.3d 504, 674 N.E. 2d 779 (1996)(recognizing that an award of treble damages for an antitrust violation and punitive damages for common law tortious interference with business relations based on same conduct would be duplicative holding that punitive and treble damages cannot both be awarded and indicating that a special jury verdict in this situation would be appropriate",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nAlaska consumer fraud act); Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 6-l-113(2)(a) (the court may award three times the actual damages, or $500, whichever is greater, if it is proven that the defendant engaged in bad faith conduct); Quist v. Specialties Supply Co., Inc., 12 P.3d 863, 867 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) (where the court held plaintiff was precluded under principles of collateral estoppel from challenging the amount of actual damages fixed by the judgment, but holding that collateral estoppel did not preclude plaintiff from pursuing enhanced punitive damages); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1345.09(B)(the injured party may seek and the trial court in its discretion may rescind the contract or award treble the actual damages or $200, whichever is greater); Crye v. Smolak, 110 Ohio App.3d 504, 674 N.E. 2d 779 (1996)(holding that treble damages under the housing and rent act are remedial in nature"
] |
). Connecticut, Delaware and Kentucky make no
| 0 |
662 |
[
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwas, under the totality of the circumstances, insufficient to taint McLeod’s confession as involuntary. There fore, we hold that the State carried its burden of proving that McLeod’s confession was voluntary. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for an order or proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., concur. ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY, and BUTTS, JJ., concur in the result. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2 . There was evidence to indicate that McKissick and his girlfriend had visited McLeod's wife at McLeod’s residence; that McLeod returned home and became angry when he saw McKissick sitting at the kitchen table; that McLeod ir.1988) (holding that an officers promise to bring defendants cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor did not make confession involuntary",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwas, under the totality of the circumstances, insufficient to taint McLeod’s confession as involuntary. There fore, we hold that the State carried its burden of proving that McLeod’s confession was voluntary. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for an order or proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., concur. ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY, and BUTTS, JJ., concur in the result. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2 . There was evidence to indicate that McKissick and his girlfriend had visited McLeod's wife at McLeod’s residence; that McLeod returned home and became angry when he saw McKissick sitting at the kitchen table; that McLeod ir.1988) (holding that agents promise to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation does not render a subsequent confession involuntary",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwas, under the totality of the circumstances, insufficient to taint McLeod’s confession as involuntary. There fore, we hold that the State carried its burden of proving that McLeod’s confession was voluntary. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for an order or proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., concur. ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY, and BUTTS, JJ., concur in the result. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2 . There was evidence to indicate that McKissick and his girlfriend had visited McLeod's wife at McLeod’s residence; that McLeod returned home and became angry when he saw McKissick sitting at the kitchen table; that McLeod ir.1988) (holding that confession was voluntary although agents had promised to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwas, under the totality of the circumstances, insufficient to taint McLeod’s confession as involuntary. There fore, we hold that the State carried its burden of proving that McLeod’s confession was voluntary. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for an order or proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., concur. ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY, and BUTTS, JJ., concur in the result. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2 . There was evidence to indicate that McKissick and his girlfriend had visited McLeod's wife at McLeod’s residence; that McLeod returned home and became angry when he saw McKissick sitting at the kitchen table; that McLeod ir.1988) (holding that federal agents indication to defendant that his cooperation would be reported to the united states attorney did not make defendants confession involuntary",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwas, under the totality of the circumstances, insufficient to taint McLeod’s confession as involuntary. There fore, we hold that the State carried its burden of proving that McLeod’s confession was voluntary. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for an order or proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., concur. ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY, and BUTTS, JJ., concur in the result. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2 . There was evidence to indicate that McKissick and his girlfriend had visited McLeod's wife at McLeod’s residence; that McLeod returned home and became angry when he saw McKissick sitting at the kitchen table; that McLeod ir.1988) (holding that cooperation was insufficient where the defendants cooperation was based on his confession to the charged crimes"
] |
); United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170,
| 1 |
663 |
[
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbehavior by failing to investigate or to take any remedial measures following Mr. Loy’s arrest. Although the failure to investigate may give rise to § 1983 supervisory liability, Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1457 (6th Cir.1990) Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 188 (6th Cir.1985), no sua sponte investigation by Sexton was warranted here. The reports describing the arrest, including statements by Deputy Elliott and the two Children’s Services workers, do not indicate that Elliott used excessive force or unlawfully entered the Loy residence. In the absence of a “strong” indication of unconstitutional conduct, Sexton’s failure to conduct an investigation was reasonable and he cannot be hable as a supervisor under § 1983. See Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir.2002) (holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbehavior by failing to investigate or to take any remedial measures following Mr. Loy’s arrest. Although the failure to investigate may give rise to § 1983 supervisory liability, Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1457 (6th Cir.1990) Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 188 (6th Cir.1985), no sua sponte investigation by Sexton was warranted here. The reports describing the arrest, including statements by Deputy Elliott and the two Children’s Services workers, do not indicate that Elliott used excessive force or unlawfully entered the Loy residence. In the absence of a “strong” indication of unconstitutional conduct, Sexton’s failure to conduct an investigation was reasonable and he cannot be hable as a supervisor under § 1983. See Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that supervisors were not hable because they possessed no information indicating a strong likelihood of unconstitutional conduct by their subordinate",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbehavior by failing to investigate or to take any remedial measures following Mr. Loy’s arrest. Although the failure to investigate may give rise to § 1983 supervisory liability, Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1457 (6th Cir.1990) Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 188 (6th Cir.1985), no sua sponte investigation by Sexton was warranted here. The reports describing the arrest, including statements by Deputy Elliott and the two Children’s Services workers, do not indicate that Elliott used excessive force or unlawfully entered the Loy residence. In the absence of a “strong” indication of unconstitutional conduct, Sexton’s failure to conduct an investigation was reasonable and he cannot be hable as a supervisor under § 1983. See Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that supervisors are not personally hable as employers under the adea either",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbehavior by failing to investigate or to take any remedial measures following Mr. Loy’s arrest. Although the failure to investigate may give rise to § 1983 supervisory liability, Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1457 (6th Cir.1990) Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 188 (6th Cir.1985), no sua sponte investigation by Sexton was warranted here. The reports describing the arrest, including statements by Deputy Elliott and the two Children’s Services workers, do not indicate that Elliott used excessive force or unlawfully entered the Loy residence. In the absence of a “strong” indication of unconstitutional conduct, Sexton’s failure to conduct an investigation was reasonable and he cannot be hable as a supervisor under § 1983. See Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that deliberate indifference is not the mere possibility a harm will occur rather a strong likelihood",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbehavior by failing to investigate or to take any remedial measures following Mr. Loy’s arrest. Although the failure to investigate may give rise to § 1983 supervisory liability, Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1457 (6th Cir.1990) Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 188 (6th Cir.1985), no sua sponte investigation by Sexton was warranted here. The reports describing the arrest, including statements by Deputy Elliott and the two Children’s Services workers, do not indicate that Elliott used excessive force or unlawfully entered the Loy residence. In the absence of a “strong” indication of unconstitutional conduct, Sexton’s failure to conduct an investigation was reasonable and he cannot be hable as a supervisor under § 1983. See Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that plaintiffs necessarily demonstrated irreparable harm because they showed a substantial likelihood that their first amendment rights had been infringed"
] |
). Moreover, unlike Márchese, 758 F.2d at 188,
| 1 |
664 |
[
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nF.2d at 400. Quarles also claims that the law firm seeks recovery on a sworn account under section 38.001(7) and that such recovery is not available because the law firm did not present the proper affidavit necessary for recovery under a sworn account. We need not inquire as to whether the affidavit in the record is somehow deficient so as not to satisfy Tex.R.Civ.P. 185, since we hold that the law firm need not seek recovery of attorneys' fees only under section 38.-001(7), as section 38.001(1) allows recovery of attorneys' fees on a claim for \"rendered services,\" section 38.001(2) on a claim for \"performed labor,\" and section 38.001(8) on a claim for \"oral or written contract.\" See Youngblood v. Wilson & Cureton, 321 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nF.2d at 400. Quarles also claims that the law firm seeks recovery on a sworn account under section 38.001(7) and that such recovery is not available because the law firm did not present the proper affidavit necessary for recovery under a sworn account. We need not inquire as to whether the affidavit in the record is somehow deficient so as not to satisfy Tex.R.Civ.P. 185, since we hold that the law firm need not seek recovery of attorneys' fees only under section 38.-001(7), as section 38.001(1) allows recovery of attorneys' fees on a claim for \"rendered services,\" section 38.001(2) on a claim for \"performed labor,\" and section 38.001(8) on a claim for \"oral or written contract.\" See Youngblood v. Wilson & Cureton, 321 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nF.2d at 400. Quarles also claims that the law firm seeks recovery on a sworn account under section 38.001(7) and that such recovery is not available because the law firm did not present the proper affidavit necessary for recovery under a sworn account. We need not inquire as to whether the affidavit in the record is somehow deficient so as not to satisfy Tex.R.Civ.P. 185, since we hold that the law firm need not seek recovery of attorneys' fees only under section 38.-001(7), as section 38.001(1) allows recovery of attorneys' fees on a claim for \"rendered services,\" section 38.001(2) on a claim for \"performed labor,\" and section 38.001(8) on a claim for \"oral or written contract.\" See Youngblood v. Wilson & Cureton, 321 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding fees mandatory under predecessor statute of 38001",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nF.2d at 400. Quarles also claims that the law firm seeks recovery on a sworn account under section 38.001(7) and that such recovery is not available because the law firm did not present the proper affidavit necessary for recovery under a sworn account. We need not inquire as to whether the affidavit in the record is somehow deficient so as not to satisfy Tex.R.Civ.P. 185, since we hold that the law firm need not seek recovery of attorneys' fees only under section 38.-001(7), as section 38.001(1) allows recovery of attorneys' fees on a claim for \"rendered services,\" section 38.001(2) on a claim for \"performed labor,\" and section 38.001(8) on a claim for \"oral or written contract.\" See Youngblood v. Wilson & Cureton, 321 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding defendant could not recover attorneys fees under predecessor to statute 38001 when defendant did not present contract claim",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nF.2d at 400. Quarles also claims that the law firm seeks recovery on a sworn account under section 38.001(7) and that such recovery is not available because the law firm did not present the proper affidavit necessary for recovery under a sworn account. We need not inquire as to whether the affidavit in the record is somehow deficient so as not to satisfy Tex.R.Civ.P. 185, since we hold that the law firm need not seek recovery of attorneys' fees only under section 38.-001(7), as section 38.001(1) allows recovery of attorneys' fees on a claim for \"rendered services,\" section 38.001(2) on a claim for \"performed labor,\" and section 38.001(8) on a claim for \"oral or written contract.\" See Youngblood v. Wilson & Cureton, 321 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that predecessor to section 38001 codified with no changes as section 38001 et seq contained no requirement that the contract sued upon have a provision providing for attorneys fees"
] |
). B. As stated earlier, the law firm's
| 0 |
665 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nobjection was based on his claim that the changes were substantive and that he was prejudiced thereby. 9 . We recognize that a member of this panel concurred in Fields v. State. After reading and considering the analysis in Ramon, which was handed down the same day as Fields, that member finds Ramon more persuasive. 10 . We also note that this amendment added thirty-nine additional charges. Brown, however, was not tried on these additional charges and does not challenge the amendment in this regard on appeal. 11 . The State also amended the references to the file names relating specific images to each charge, pp.2004) (\"the sale of four videotapes to a detective ... surely constituted but one act of distribution of obscene matter.\"); Am. Film Distribs., Inc. v. State, 471 N.E.2d 3 (holding that the defendants acquiescence to a mistrial constituted implicit consent precluding a later claim of double jeopardy",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nobjection was based on his claim that the changes were substantive and that he was prejudiced thereby. 9 . We recognize that a member of this panel concurred in Fields v. State. After reading and considering the analysis in Ramon, which was handed down the same day as Fields, that member finds Ramon more persuasive. 10 . We also note that this amendment added thirty-nine additional charges. Brown, however, was not tried on these additional charges and does not challenge the amendment in this regard on appeal. 11 . The State also amended the references to the file names relating specific images to each charge, pp.2004) (\"the sale of four videotapes to a detective ... surely constituted but one act of distribution of obscene matter.\"); Am. Film Distribs., Inc. v. State, 471 N.E.2d 3 (holding that the showing of four pornographic films on one occasion constituted but one exhibition and thus defendants multiple convictions violated double jeopardy",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nobjection was based on his claim that the changes were substantive and that he was prejudiced thereby. 9 . We recognize that a member of this panel concurred in Fields v. State. After reading and considering the analysis in Ramon, which was handed down the same day as Fields, that member finds Ramon more persuasive. 10 . We also note that this amendment added thirty-nine additional charges. Brown, however, was not tried on these additional charges and does not challenge the amendment in this regard on appeal. 11 . The State also amended the references to the file names relating specific images to each charge, pp.2004) (\"the sale of four videotapes to a detective ... surely constituted but one act of distribution of obscene matter.\"); Am. Film Distribs., Inc. v. State, 471 N.E.2d 3 (holding that a bargainedfor plea waives the right to attack multiple convictions on double jeopardy grounds",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nobjection was based on his claim that the changes were substantive and that he was prejudiced thereby. 9 . We recognize that a member of this panel concurred in Fields v. State. After reading and considering the analysis in Ramon, which was handed down the same day as Fields, that member finds Ramon more persuasive. 10 . We also note that this amendment added thirty-nine additional charges. Brown, however, was not tried on these additional charges and does not challenge the amendment in this regard on appeal. 11 . The State also amended the references to the file names relating specific images to each charge, pp.2004) (\"the sale of four videotapes to a detective ... surely constituted but one act of distribution of obscene matter.\"); Am. Film Distribs., Inc. v. State, 471 N.E.2d 3 (holding that convictions for the crimes of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise violate double jeopardy",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nobjection was based on his claim that the changes were substantive and that he was prejudiced thereby. 9 . We recognize that a member of this panel concurred in Fields v. State. After reading and considering the analysis in Ramon, which was handed down the same day as Fields, that member finds Ramon more persuasive. 10 . We also note that this amendment added thirty-nine additional charges. Brown, however, was not tried on these additional charges and does not challenge the amendment in this regard on appeal. 11 . The State also amended the references to the file names relating specific images to each charge, pp.2004) (\"the sale of four videotapes to a detective ... surely constituted but one act of distribution of obscene matter.\"); Am. Film Distribs., Inc. v. State, 471 N.E.2d 3 (holding that convictions for two counts of possession of one quantity of cocaine constituted double jeopardy and fundamental error reversing one possession conviction and remanding for resentencing"
] |
); Porter v. State, 440 N.E.2d 690
| 1 |
666 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nId. (internal quotations and citations omitted). As Lopez acknowledges, we have previously determined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) rejected the argument that a term of life imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Fragoso, 978 F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir.1992); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense.”). Lopez’s Fifth Amendment argument is similarly without merit. See generally Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); accord United States v. Robinson, 344 Fed.Appx. 936, 940-41 (5th Cir.2009) (per mriam) (holding that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate fifth or fourteenth amendments",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nId. (internal quotations and citations omitted). As Lopez acknowledges, we have previously determined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) rejected the argument that a term of life imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Fragoso, 978 F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir.1992); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense.”). Lopez’s Fifth Amendment argument is similarly without merit. See generally Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); accord United States v. Robinson, 344 Fed.Appx. 936, 940-41 (5th Cir.2009) (per mriam) (holding that exclusion of testimony as collateral and of speculative relevance did not violate defendants sixth and fourteenth amendment rights",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nId. (internal quotations and citations omitted). As Lopez acknowledges, we have previously determined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) rejected the argument that a term of life imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Fragoso, 978 F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir.1992); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense.”). Lopez’s Fifth Amendment argument is similarly without merit. See generally Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); accord United States v. Robinson, 344 Fed.Appx. 936, 940-41 (5th Cir.2009) (per mriam) (holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nId. (internal quotations and citations omitted). As Lopez acknowledges, we have previously determined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) rejected the argument that a term of life imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Fragoso, 978 F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir.1992); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense.”). Lopez’s Fifth Amendment argument is similarly without merit. See generally Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); accord United States v. Robinson, 344 Fed.Appx. 936, 940-41 (5th Cir.2009) (per mriam) (holding references to a defendants lack of remorse violate the fifth eighth and fourteenth amendments",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nId. (internal quotations and citations omitted). As Lopez acknowledges, we have previously determined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) rejected the argument that a term of life imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Fragoso, 978 F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir.1992); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense.”). Lopez’s Fifth Amendment argument is similarly without merit. See generally Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); accord United States v. Robinson, 344 Fed.Appx. 936, 940-41 (5th Cir.2009) (per mriam) (holding that application of statutory mandatory minimum in 841b1a does not violate defendants fifth and fourteenth amendment rights"
] |
). Finally, we have rejected the argument that a
| 4 |
667 |
[
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the admission of Permanian’s statements violated the holding in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was deprived of his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment when his codefendant’s post-arrest confession, which incriminated the defendant, was admitted at their joint trial. In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that there was no recognized exception to the hearsay rule before it. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 n.3, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 480 n.3, 88 S. Ct. at statements admissible because there was sufficient indicia of reliability). Moreover, defendant was able to confront and cross-examine Rinaldi, who testified about the statements. See Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d at 528 (holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the admission of Permanian’s statements violated the holding in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was deprived of his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment when his codefendant’s post-arrest confession, which incriminated the defendant, was admitted at their joint trial. In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that there was no recognized exception to the hearsay rule before it. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 n.3, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 480 n.3, 88 S. Ct. at statements admissible because there was sufficient indicia of reliability). Moreover, defendant was able to confront and cross-examine Rinaldi, who testified about the statements. See Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d at 528 (holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the admission of Permanian’s statements violated the holding in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was deprived of his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment when his codefendant’s post-arrest confession, which incriminated the defendant, was admitted at their joint trial. In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that there was no recognized exception to the hearsay rule before it. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 n.3, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 480 n.3, 88 S. Ct. at statements admissible because there was sufficient indicia of reliability). Moreover, defendant was able to confront and cross-examine Rinaldi, who testified about the statements. See Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d at 528 (holding coconspirator hearsay exception does not violate confrontation clause",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the admission of Permanian’s statements violated the holding in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was deprived of his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment when his codefendant’s post-arrest confession, which incriminated the defendant, was admitted at their joint trial. In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that there was no recognized exception to the hearsay rule before it. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 n.3, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 480 n.3, 88 S. Ct. at statements admissible because there was sufficient indicia of reliability). Moreover, defendant was able to confront and cross-examine Rinaldi, who testified about the statements. See Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d at 528 (holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial and that the admission of hearsay statements of codefendants in the penalty phase violated the confrontation clause",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the admission of Permanian’s statements violated the holding in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was deprived of his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment when his codefendant’s post-arrest confession, which incriminated the defendant, was admitted at their joint trial. In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that there was no recognized exception to the hearsay rule before it. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 n.3, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 480 n.3, 88 S. Ct. at statements admissible because there was sufficient indicia of reliability). Moreover, defendant was able to confront and cross-examine Rinaldi, who testified about the statements. See Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d at 528 (holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made"
] |
); Goodman, 81 Ill. 2d at 284 (same). We
| 4 |
668 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n$30,027 instead of the $54,977 it originally found necessary. In the court's explanation of its calculations, it is not clear if this change was intentional. The court stated: \"The court evaluated the evidence, including the photographs of the residence and found Mr. Sparks's evidence 5 (placing property into joint title raises presumption of donative intent, although presumption may be overcome if evidence of different intent at time of placement into joint title is produced). 18 . Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1996). 19 . Sampson v. Sampson, 14 P.3d 272, 275 (Alaska 2000). 20 . Id. 21 . Id. at 277. 22 . 1 Brett R. TurnEr, Division or Prover Ty § 5:69, at 664 (3d ed.2005). 23 . Id. at 665. 24 . Id. at 667. 25 . Id. 26 . See Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478, 481 (Alaska 1994) (holding that it is function of trial court to judge witnesses credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n$30,027 instead of the $54,977 it originally found necessary. In the court's explanation of its calculations, it is not clear if this change was intentional. The court stated: \"The court evaluated the evidence, including the photographs of the residence and found Mr. Sparks's evidence 5 (placing property into joint title raises presumption of donative intent, although presumption may be overcome if evidence of different intent at time of placement into joint title is produced). 18 . Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1996). 19 . Sampson v. Sampson, 14 P.3d 272, 275 (Alaska 2000). 20 . Id. 21 . Id. at 277. 22 . 1 Brett R. TurnEr, Division or Prover Ty § 5:69, at 664 (3d ed.2005). 23 . Id. at 665. 24 . Id. at 667. 25 . Id. 26 . See Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478, 481 (Alaska 1994) (holding that on a motion for summary judgment it is settled that a trial court is not permitted to weigh material conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n$30,027 instead of the $54,977 it originally found necessary. In the court's explanation of its calculations, it is not clear if this change was intentional. The court stated: \"The court evaluated the evidence, including the photographs of the residence and found Mr. Sparks's evidence 5 (placing property into joint title raises presumption of donative intent, although presumption may be overcome if evidence of different intent at time of placement into joint title is produced). 18 . Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1996). 19 . Sampson v. Sampson, 14 P.3d 272, 275 (Alaska 2000). 20 . Id. 21 . Id. at 277. 22 . 1 Brett R. TurnEr, Division or Prover Ty § 5:69, at 664 (3d ed.2005). 23 . Id. at 665. 24 . Id. at 667. 25 . Id. 26 . See Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478, 481 (Alaska 1994) (holding that it is trial courts function to evaluate witness credibility and weigh conflicting evidence",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n$30,027 instead of the $54,977 it originally found necessary. In the court's explanation of its calculations, it is not clear if this change was intentional. The court stated: \"The court evaluated the evidence, including the photographs of the residence and found Mr. Sparks's evidence 5 (placing property into joint title raises presumption of donative intent, although presumption may be overcome if evidence of different intent at time of placement into joint title is produced). 18 . Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1996). 19 . Sampson v. Sampson, 14 P.3d 272, 275 (Alaska 2000). 20 . Id. 21 . Id. at 277. 22 . 1 Brett R. TurnEr, Division or Prover Ty § 5:69, at 664 (3d ed.2005). 23 . Id. at 665. 24 . Id. at 667. 25 . Id. 26 . See Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478, 481 (Alaska 1994) (holding trial court free to evaluate credibility of witnesses",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n$30,027 instead of the $54,977 it originally found necessary. In the court's explanation of its calculations, it is not clear if this change was intentional. The court stated: \"The court evaluated the evidence, including the photographs of the residence and found Mr. Sparks's evidence 5 (placing property into joint title raises presumption of donative intent, although presumption may be overcome if evidence of different intent at time of placement into joint title is produced). 18 . Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1996). 19 . Sampson v. Sampson, 14 P.3d 272, 275 (Alaska 2000). 20 . Id. 21 . Id. at 277. 22 . 1 Brett R. TurnEr, Division or Prover Ty § 5:69, at 664 (3d ed.2005). 23 . Id. at 665. 24 . Id. at 667. 25 . Id. 26 . See Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478, 481 (Alaska 1994) (holding court does notweigh conflicting evidence or consider witness credibility and witnesses conflicting or differing accounts do not necessarily render the evidence insufficient"
] |
). 27 . 119 P.3d 1005 (Alaska 2005). 28 . Id. at
| 2 |
669 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nlegal right to possess that property for a set period of time_”); Def.’s Reply Ex. B at 4 (Master Lease art. II ¶ 1 (providing that Dallas “hereby leases and rents to Lessee for Lessee’s exclusive use, and Lessee hereby agrees to hire and take, ... the Premises”)). As the Court of Appeals of Texas further noted, the ownership of a leasehold interest has a measurable fair market value because there are people who are willing to purchase and do purchase that right to possess the property under the terms of the lease. Furthermore, the assignee of the leasehold may in turn convey his or her ownership right to another person and obtain the fair market value existing at that time. Panola County Appraisal Dist., 69 S.W.3d at 284. See generally Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 373, 65 S.Ct. 357(holding that abandonment requires that tenant vacate the leased premises",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nlegal right to possess that property for a set period of time_”); Def.’s Reply Ex. B at 4 (Master Lease art. II ¶ 1 (providing that Dallas “hereby leases and rents to Lessee for Lessee’s exclusive use, and Lessee hereby agrees to hire and take, ... the Premises”)). As the Court of Appeals of Texas further noted, the ownership of a leasehold interest has a measurable fair market value because there are people who are willing to purchase and do purchase that right to possess the property under the terms of the lease. Furthermore, the assignee of the leasehold may in turn convey his or her ownership right to another person and obtain the fair market value existing at that time. Panola County Appraisal Dist., 69 S.W.3d at 284. See generally Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 373, 65 S.Ct. 357(recognizing when a lease terminates upon condemnation tenant is entitled to no compensation for loss of leasehold interest",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nlegal right to possess that property for a set period of time_”); Def.’s Reply Ex. B at 4 (Master Lease art. II ¶ 1 (providing that Dallas “hereby leases and rents to Lessee for Lessee’s exclusive use, and Lessee hereby agrees to hire and take, ... the Premises”)). As the Court of Appeals of Texas further noted, the ownership of a leasehold interest has a measurable fair market value because there are people who are willing to purchase and do purchase that right to possess the property under the terms of the lease. Furthermore, the assignee of the leasehold may in turn convey his or her ownership right to another person and obtain the fair market value existing at that time. Panola County Appraisal Dist., 69 S.W.3d at 284. See generally Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 373, 65 S.Ct. 357(holding that after township acquired property entered into lease with tenant that was renewable absent notice of termination and terminated lease tenant was not displaced person because tenant will be moving not as a result of the acquisition of such real property but rather because township having already acquired the property has merely declined to renew the lease quotation omitted",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nlegal right to possess that property for a set period of time_”); Def.’s Reply Ex. B at 4 (Master Lease art. II ¶ 1 (providing that Dallas “hereby leases and rents to Lessee for Lessee’s exclusive use, and Lessee hereby agrees to hire and take, ... the Premises”)). As the Court of Appeals of Texas further noted, the ownership of a leasehold interest has a measurable fair market value because there are people who are willing to purchase and do purchase that right to possess the property under the terms of the lease. Furthermore, the assignee of the leasehold may in turn convey his or her ownership right to another person and obtain the fair market value existing at that time. Panola County Appraisal Dist., 69 S.W.3d at 284. See generally Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 373, 65 S.Ct. 357(recognizing that just compensation was required by the fifth amendment in a ease where the federal government deprived a tenant which held a longterm lease of occupancy of portions of a leased building",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nlegal right to possess that property for a set period of time_”); Def.’s Reply Ex. B at 4 (Master Lease art. II ¶ 1 (providing that Dallas “hereby leases and rents to Lessee for Lessee’s exclusive use, and Lessee hereby agrees to hire and take, ... the Premises”)). As the Court of Appeals of Texas further noted, the ownership of a leasehold interest has a measurable fair market value because there are people who are willing to purchase and do purchase that right to possess the property under the terms of the lease. Furthermore, the assignee of the leasehold may in turn convey his or her ownership right to another person and obtain the fair market value existing at that time. Panola County Appraisal Dist., 69 S.W.3d at 284. See generally Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 373, 65 S.Ct. 357(holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease"
] |
); see also U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at
| 3 |
670 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentences, each of which would not have exceeded 20 years. The Apprendi rule, therefore, would not be implicated. It follows as night the day that any failure of the indictment in this case to allege quantity in the possession counts was immaterial. See Price, 265 F.3d at 1108. C. FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY, AND PUBLIC REPUTATION Finally, even were we to assume that the error here did affect substantial rights, we would affirm nonetheless because, given the evidence and the record we have referred to, the error did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544. But see United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 403-04 (4th Cir.2001), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 803, 151 L.Ed.2d 689 (2002) (holding that failure to charge drug quantity in the indictment and submit it to the jury seriously affects the fairness integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings so that the court should exerciseits discretion to recognize the error",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentences, each of which would not have exceeded 20 years. The Apprendi rule, therefore, would not be implicated. It follows as night the day that any failure of the indictment in this case to allege quantity in the possession counts was immaterial. See Price, 265 F.3d at 1108. C. FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY, AND PUBLIC REPUTATION Finally, even were we to assume that the error here did affect substantial rights, we would affirm nonetheless because, given the evidence and the record we have referred to, the error did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544. But see United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 403-04 (4th Cir.2001), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 803, 151 L.Ed.2d 689 (2002) (holding that the closure of a courtroom during jury selection a structural error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentences, each of which would not have exceeded 20 years. The Apprendi rule, therefore, would not be implicated. It follows as night the day that any failure of the indictment in this case to allege quantity in the possession counts was immaterial. See Price, 265 F.3d at 1108. C. FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY, AND PUBLIC REPUTATION Finally, even were we to assume that the error here did affect substantial rights, we would affirm nonetheless because, given the evidence and the record we have referred to, the error did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544. But see United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 403-04 (4th Cir.2001), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 803, 151 L.Ed.2d 689 (2002) (holding that a plain error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings even though the error was assumed to have affected substantial rights",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentences, each of which would not have exceeded 20 years. The Apprendi rule, therefore, would not be implicated. It follows as night the day that any failure of the indictment in this case to allege quantity in the possession counts was immaterial. See Price, 265 F.3d at 1108. C. FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY, AND PUBLIC REPUTATION Finally, even were we to assume that the error here did affect substantial rights, we would affirm nonetheless because, given the evidence and the record we have referred to, the error did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544. But see United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 403-04 (4th Cir.2001), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 803, 151 L.Ed.2d 689 (2002) (recognizing that plain error analysis requires 1 error 2 that is plain 3 that affects defendants substantial rights and 4 that seriously affects fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentences, each of which would not have exceeded 20 years. The Apprendi rule, therefore, would not be implicated. It follows as night the day that any failure of the indictment in this case to allege quantity in the possession counts was immaterial. See Price, 265 F.3d at 1108. C. FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY, AND PUBLIC REPUTATION Finally, even were we to assume that the error here did affect substantial rights, we would affirm nonetheless because, given the evidence and the record we have referred to, the error did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544. But see United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 403-04 (4th Cir.2001), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 803, 151 L.Ed.2d 689 (2002) (holding that plain error exists when 1 an error was committed 2 that was plain 3 that affected the defendants substantial rights and 4 the error seriously affects the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings"
] |
). Our holding in this regard follows our
| 0 |
671 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat, as of the condemnation date, the parcel contained fifteen acres of wetlands that could legally be drained. Specifically, the Department argues that even if the parcel is not subject to regulation under the CWA, it is subject to state regulation by the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) as an isolated wetland. We find no reversible error here. In his order, the master held that the issue of “DHEC’s alleged jurisdiction” over the wetlands was no longer before the court because it had previously been decided by Judge Harwell in his October 2004 order. The Department has not challenged the master’s ruling. Therefore, it is the law of the case, regardless of its correctness. See Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 159, 160-61, 177 S.E.2d 544, 544 (1970) (holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat, as of the condemnation date, the parcel contained fifteen acres of wetlands that could legally be drained. Specifically, the Department argues that even if the parcel is not subject to regulation under the CWA, it is subject to state regulation by the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) as an isolated wetland. We find no reversible error here. In his order, the master held that the issue of “DHEC’s alleged jurisdiction” over the wetlands was no longer before the court because it had previously been decided by Judge Harwell in his October 2004 order. The Department has not challenged the master’s ruling. Therefore, it is the law of the case, regardless of its correctness. See Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 159, 160-61, 177 S.E.2d 544, 544 (1970) (holding that an exhaustion of appellate remedies is required to make a trial courts ruling the law of the case",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat, as of the condemnation date, the parcel contained fifteen acres of wetlands that could legally be drained. Specifically, the Department argues that even if the parcel is not subject to regulation under the CWA, it is subject to state regulation by the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) as an isolated wetland. We find no reversible error here. In his order, the master held that the issue of “DHEC’s alleged jurisdiction” over the wetlands was no longer before the court because it had previously been decided by Judge Harwell in his October 2004 order. The Department has not challenged the master’s ruling. Therefore, it is the law of the case, regardless of its correctness. See Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 159, 160-61, 177 S.E.2d 544, 544 (1970) (holding an unappealed ruling is the law of the case and cannot be later challenged",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat, as of the condemnation date, the parcel contained fifteen acres of wetlands that could legally be drained. Specifically, the Department argues that even if the parcel is not subject to regulation under the CWA, it is subject to state regulation by the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) as an isolated wetland. We find no reversible error here. In his order, the master held that the issue of “DHEC’s alleged jurisdiction” over the wetlands was no longer before the court because it had previously been decided by Judge Harwell in his October 2004 order. The Department has not challenged the master’s ruling. Therefore, it is the law of the case, regardless of its correctness. See Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 159, 160-61, 177 S.E.2d 544, 544 (1970) (holding a trial judges unappealed procedural rulings become the law of the case",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat, as of the condemnation date, the parcel contained fifteen acres of wetlands that could legally be drained. Specifically, the Department argues that even if the parcel is not subject to regulation under the CWA, it is subject to state regulation by the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) as an isolated wetland. We find no reversible error here. In his order, the master held that the issue of “DHEC’s alleged jurisdiction” over the wetlands was no longer before the court because it had previously been decided by Judge Harwell in his October 2004 order. The Department has not challenged the master’s ruling. Therefore, it is the law of the case, regardless of its correctness. See Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 159, 160-61, 177 S.E.2d 544, 544 (1970) (holding that an unappealed ruling right or wrong is the law of the case"
] |
). Accordingly, because OCRM is a part of DHEC,
| 4 |
672 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nresulted from a good-faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103. Therefore, the United States can have no liability to Plaintiffs. 26 U.S.C. § 7431(b). As to the second issue, I find and conclude that the United States has returned to Plaintiffs all the property seized. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), I now issue the findings of fact and conclusions of law that have informed my decision. I. A. Procedural History This case has a complex procedural history. A brief description of that history will provide a meaningful context for the discussion to come. When this case was assigned to United States District Judge Warren K. Urbom, he granted a motion to dismiss by private individuals named as defendants and dismissed Counts IV and VI. See Filing 22 (holding that wrongfuldisclosure allegations of count iv did not state a claim against private individuals and further holding that conspiracy allegations of count vi did not state a claim",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nresulted from a good-faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103. Therefore, the United States can have no liability to Plaintiffs. 26 U.S.C. § 7431(b). As to the second issue, I find and conclude that the United States has returned to Plaintiffs all the property seized. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), I now issue the findings of fact and conclusions of law that have informed my decision. I. A. Procedural History This case has a complex procedural history. A brief description of that history will provide a meaningful context for the discussion to come. When this case was assigned to United States District Judge Warren K. Urbom, he granted a motion to dismiss by private individuals named as defendants and dismissed Counts IV and VI. See Filing 22 (holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nresulted from a good-faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103. Therefore, the United States can have no liability to Plaintiffs. 26 U.S.C. § 7431(b). As to the second issue, I find and conclude that the United States has returned to Plaintiffs all the property seized. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), I now issue the findings of fact and conclusions of law that have informed my decision. I. A. Procedural History This case has a complex procedural history. A brief description of that history will provide a meaningful context for the discussion to come. When this case was assigned to United States District Judge Warren K. Urbom, he granted a motion to dismiss by private individuals named as defendants and dismissed Counts IV and VI. See Filing 22 (holding that because the allegations purportedly suppressed by the government were not material an evidentiary hearing further exploring the allegations themselves and the governments knowledge of the allegations is unnecessary",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nresulted from a good-faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103. Therefore, the United States can have no liability to Plaintiffs. 26 U.S.C. § 7431(b). As to the second issue, I find and conclude that the United States has returned to Plaintiffs all the property seized. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), I now issue the findings of fact and conclusions of law that have informed my decision. I. A. Procedural History This case has a complex procedural history. A brief description of that history will provide a meaningful context for the discussion to come. When this case was assigned to United States District Judge Warren K. Urbom, he granted a motion to dismiss by private individuals named as defendants and dismissed Counts IV and VI. See Filing 22 (holding district court dismissal of plaintiffs present action did not constitute prior action and thus did not count as third strike",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nresulted from a good-faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103. Therefore, the United States can have no liability to Plaintiffs. 26 U.S.C. § 7431(b). As to the second issue, I find and conclude that the United States has returned to Plaintiffs all the property seized. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), I now issue the findings of fact and conclusions of law that have informed my decision. I. A. Procedural History This case has a complex procedural history. A brief description of that history will provide a meaningful context for the discussion to come. When this case was assigned to United States District Judge Warren K. Urbom, he granted a motion to dismiss by private individuals named as defendants and dismissed Counts IV and VI. See Filing 22 (holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim"
] |
). Among other things, the result of Judge
| 0 |
673 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat? (Tr. at 152.) Carter argues the quote is a misstatement of the law, and improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case. The State indicates the prosecutor was \"verifying that the jurors could go outside what might be called the typical paradigm of a robbery ease.\" (Appellee's Br. at 11.) As we find the statement extremely difficult to understand, we cannot say it could have improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case or otherwise prejudiced the jury against Carter. Even if the statement could be understood to misstate the law, it did not make a fair trial impossible, as the jury was instructed multiple times thereafter regarding the elements of the charges against Carter. See Benefield v. State, 904 N.E.2d 239, 247 n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat? (Tr. at 152.) Carter argues the quote is a misstatement of the law, and improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case. The State indicates the prosecutor was \"verifying that the jurors could go outside what might be called the typical paradigm of a robbery ease.\" (Appellee's Br. at 11.) As we find the statement extremely difficult to understand, we cannot say it could have improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case or otherwise prejudiced the jury against Carter. Even if the statement could be understood to misstate the law, it did not make a fair trial impossible, as the jury was instructed multiple times thereafter regarding the elements of the charges against Carter. See Benefield v. State, 904 N.E.2d 239, 247 n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (holding improper admission of extrinsic evidence may be cured by adequate limiting instruction",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat? (Tr. at 152.) Carter argues the quote is a misstatement of the law, and improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case. The State indicates the prosecutor was \"verifying that the jurors could go outside what might be called the typical paradigm of a robbery ease.\" (Appellee's Br. at 11.) As we find the statement extremely difficult to understand, we cannot say it could have improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case or otherwise prejudiced the jury against Carter. Even if the statement could be understood to misstate the law, it did not make a fair trial impossible, as the jury was instructed multiple times thereafter regarding the elements of the charges against Carter. See Benefield v. State, 904 N.E.2d 239, 247 n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (holding an error re garding the element of a crime may be cured through further instruction to the jury",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat? (Tr. at 152.) Carter argues the quote is a misstatement of the law, and improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case. The State indicates the prosecutor was \"verifying that the jurors could go outside what might be called the typical paradigm of a robbery ease.\" (Appellee's Br. at 11.) As we find the statement extremely difficult to understand, we cannot say it could have improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case or otherwise prejudiced the jury against Carter. Even if the statement could be understood to misstate the law, it did not make a fair trial impossible, as the jury was instructed multiple times thereafter regarding the elements of the charges against Carter. See Benefield v. State, 904 N.E.2d 239, 247 n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (holding that a jury instruction directing the verdict on one element deprived defendant of the right to a jury determination on every element of the charged offense and thus constituted structural error",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat? (Tr. at 152.) Carter argues the quote is a misstatement of the law, and improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case. The State indicates the prosecutor was \"verifying that the jurors could go outside what might be called the typical paradigm of a robbery ease.\" (Appellee's Br. at 11.) As we find the statement extremely difficult to understand, we cannot say it could have improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case or otherwise prejudiced the jury against Carter. Even if the statement could be understood to misstate the law, it did not make a fair trial impossible, as the jury was instructed multiple times thereafter regarding the elements of the charges against Carter. See Benefield v. State, 904 N.E.2d 239, 247 n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (holding omission in the jury instruction of element of offense requires a new trial"
] |
), trans. denied. There was no prose-cutorial
| 2 |
674 |
[
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nemployment. Consequently, Miller was required to comply with K.S.A. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirements, which she failed to do, and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Flores was dismissed. 916 F. Supp.1101. Garcia raises state law claims against the police department and the officers acting within the scope of their employment. We agree with the district court that Garcia’s claims could give rise to a number of actions whereby the appellees could be hable in Kansas, namely assault, battery, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and damages for racial profiling. All of these types of claims are covered by K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirement. See Knorp v. Albert, 29 Kan. App. 2d 509, 513, 28 P.3d 1024, rev. denied 272 Kan. 1418 (2001) (holding in age discrimination case under adea that same considerations are pertinent when deciding single employer issue for public entities as for private entities and applying nlrb test to resolve the question noting that where government entities are concerned court also must keep constitutional separation of powers issues in mind",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nemployment. Consequently, Miller was required to comply with K.S.A. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirements, which she failed to do, and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Flores was dismissed. 916 F. Supp.1101. Garcia raises state law claims against the police department and the officers acting within the scope of their employment. We agree with the district court that Garcia’s claims could give rise to a number of actions whereby the appellees could be hable in Kansas, namely assault, battery, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and damages for racial profiling. All of these types of claims are covered by K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirement. See Knorp v. Albert, 29 Kan. App. 2d 509, 513, 28 P.3d 1024, rev. denied 272 Kan. 1418 (2001) (holding that public entities may be held vicariously hable for the negligent acts of their individual employees",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nemployment. Consequently, Miller was required to comply with K.S.A. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirements, which she failed to do, and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Flores was dismissed. 916 F. Supp.1101. Garcia raises state law claims against the police department and the officers acting within the scope of their employment. We agree with the district court that Garcia’s claims could give rise to a number of actions whereby the appellees could be hable in Kansas, namely assault, battery, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and damages for racial profiling. All of these types of claims are covered by K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirement. See Knorp v. Albert, 29 Kan. App. 2d 509, 513, 28 P.3d 1024, rev. denied 272 Kan. 1418 (2001) (holding that notice statute applies to both municipal entities and employees of municipal entities acting within the scope of their employment",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nemployment. Consequently, Miller was required to comply with K.S.A. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirements, which she failed to do, and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Flores was dismissed. 916 F. Supp.1101. Garcia raises state law claims against the police department and the officers acting within the scope of their employment. We agree with the district court that Garcia’s claims could give rise to a number of actions whereby the appellees could be hable in Kansas, namely assault, battery, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and damages for racial profiling. All of these types of claims are covered by K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirement. See Knorp v. Albert, 29 Kan. App. 2d 509, 513, 28 P.3d 1024, rev. denied 272 Kan. 1418 (2001) (holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under 1983 through official policy or custom",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nemployment. Consequently, Miller was required to comply with K.S.A. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirements, which she failed to do, and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Flores was dismissed. 916 F. Supp.1101. Garcia raises state law claims against the police department and the officers acting within the scope of their employment. We agree with the district court that Garcia’s claims could give rise to a number of actions whereby the appellees could be hable in Kansas, namely assault, battery, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and damages for racial profiling. All of these types of claims are covered by K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 12-105b(d)’s notice requirement. See Knorp v. Albert, 29 Kan. App. 2d 509, 513, 28 P.3d 1024, rev. denied 272 Kan. 1418 (2001) (holding that although municipalities are persons within the meaning of 42 usc 1983 no municipal liability lies under that statute unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort"
] |
); King v. Pimentel, 20 Kan. App. 2d 579,
| 2 |
675 |
[
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n§ 1983 claim to the extent that she alleges a procedural due process violation. Because the Court cannot resolve evidentiary issues in the context of a motion to dismiss, however, Ms. Rhyce will be allowed to amend her complaint, but the Court cautions that she should do so only if there is good cause. c. Substantive Due Process Defendants next attack Ms. Rhyce’s § 1983 claim that her substantive due process rights were violated. Relying on McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994), Defendants argue that property interests created by state law, such as a property interest in employment, are not subject to substantive due process protection. It appears that most circuits are now of that view. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142-43 (3d Cir.2000) (holding parents custodial rights are a fundamental interest guaranteed due process protection",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n§ 1983 claim to the extent that she alleges a procedural due process violation. Because the Court cannot resolve evidentiary issues in the context of a motion to dismiss, however, Ms. Rhyce will be allowed to amend her complaint, but the Court cautions that she should do so only if there is good cause. c. Substantive Due Process Defendants next attack Ms. Rhyce’s § 1983 claim that her substantive due process rights were violated. Relying on McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994), Defendants argue that property interests created by state law, such as a property interest in employment, are not subject to substantive due process protection. It appears that most circuits are now of that view. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142-43 (3d Cir.2000) (holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n§ 1983 claim to the extent that she alleges a procedural due process violation. Because the Court cannot resolve evidentiary issues in the context of a motion to dismiss, however, Ms. Rhyce will be allowed to amend her complaint, but the Court cautions that she should do so only if there is good cause. c. Substantive Due Process Defendants next attack Ms. Rhyce’s § 1983 claim that her substantive due process rights were violated. Relying on McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994), Defendants argue that property interests created by state law, such as a property interest in employment, are not subject to substantive due process protection. It appears that most circuits are now of that view. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142-43 (3d Cir.2000) (recognizing 1983 substantive due process claim",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n§ 1983 claim to the extent that she alleges a procedural due process violation. Because the Court cannot resolve evidentiary issues in the context of a motion to dismiss, however, Ms. Rhyce will be allowed to amend her complaint, but the Court cautions that she should do so only if there is good cause. c. Substantive Due Process Defendants next attack Ms. Rhyce’s § 1983 claim that her substantive due process rights were violated. Relying on McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994), Defendants argue that property interests created by state law, such as a property interest in employment, are not subject to substantive due process protection. It appears that most circuits are now of that view. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142-43 (3d Cir.2000) (holding a tenured state employee has a property right to continued employment and must be accorded due process before serious disciplinary sanctions",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n§ 1983 claim to the extent that she alleges a procedural due process violation. Because the Court cannot resolve evidentiary issues in the context of a motion to dismiss, however, Ms. Rhyce will be allowed to amend her complaint, but the Court cautions that she should do so only if there is good cause. c. Substantive Due Process Defendants next attack Ms. Rhyce’s § 1983 claim that her substantive due process rights were violated. Relying on McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994), Defendants argue that property interests created by state law, such as a property interest in employment, are not subject to substantive due process protection. It appears that most circuits are now of that view. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142-43 (3d Cir.2000) (holding that plaintiffs tenured public employment is not a fundamental property interest entitled to substantive due process protection thereby joining the great majority of courts of appeals that have addressed this issue and citing cases"
] |
). However, in Schaper v. City of Huntsville,
| 4 |
676 |
[
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the corresponding psychiatric evaluation.” McRae I, 139 N.C. App. at 391,394, 533 S.E.2d at 560, 562. In this case, defendant’s competence has never been assessed, let alone at a relevant time. Thus, it is clear that a retrospective determination of defendant’s competence would not be possible here and we do not need to remand for the trial court to make such a determination. Because defendant’s competence to stand trial has never been evaluated and “[g]iven the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances, we cannot conclude that such a procedure would be adequate here.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 183, 43 L.Ed. 2d at 119-20 (citations omitted); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403, 4 L.Ed. 2d 824, 825 (1960) (per curiam) (holding that appellant must present some evidence of a subsequent change in competency or some new evidence in a manner analogous to newly discovered evidence in a motion for new trial to complain of a denial of a second competency hearing",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the corresponding psychiatric evaluation.” McRae I, 139 N.C. App. at 391,394, 533 S.E.2d at 560, 562. In this case, defendant’s competence has never been assessed, let alone at a relevant time. Thus, it is clear that a retrospective determination of defendant’s competence would not be possible here and we do not need to remand for the trial court to make such a determination. Because defendant’s competence to stand trial has never been evaluated and “[g]iven the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances, we cannot conclude that such a procedure would be adequate here.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 183, 43 L.Ed. 2d at 119-20 (citations omitted); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403, 4 L.Ed. 2d 824, 825 (1960) (per curiam) (recognizing the difficulty of retrospectively determining the defendants competency as of more than a year ago and ordering a new trial and hearing as to the defendants present competence",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the corresponding psychiatric evaluation.” McRae I, 139 N.C. App. at 391,394, 533 S.E.2d at 560, 562. In this case, defendant’s competence has never been assessed, let alone at a relevant time. Thus, it is clear that a retrospective determination of defendant’s competence would not be possible here and we do not need to remand for the trial court to make such a determination. Because defendant’s competence to stand trial has never been evaluated and “[g]iven the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances, we cannot conclude that such a procedure would be adequate here.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 183, 43 L.Ed. 2d at 119-20 (citations omitted); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403, 4 L.Ed. 2d 824, 825 (1960) (per curiam) (holding that competency standard for stand ing trial is same as standard for determining competency to waive right to counsel",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the corresponding psychiatric evaluation.” McRae I, 139 N.C. App. at 391,394, 533 S.E.2d at 560, 562. In this case, defendant’s competence has never been assessed, let alone at a relevant time. Thus, it is clear that a retrospective determination of defendant’s competence would not be possible here and we do not need to remand for the trial court to make such a determination. Because defendant’s competence to stand trial has never been evaluated and “[g]iven the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances, we cannot conclude that such a procedure would be adequate here.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 183, 43 L.Ed. 2d at 119-20 (citations omitted); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403, 4 L.Ed. 2d 824, 825 (1960) (per curiam) (holding that the state does not have to prove a defendants competency to stand trial",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the corresponding psychiatric evaluation.” McRae I, 139 N.C. App. at 391,394, 533 S.E.2d at 560, 562. In this case, defendant’s competence has never been assessed, let alone at a relevant time. Thus, it is clear that a retrospective determination of defendant’s competence would not be possible here and we do not need to remand for the trial court to make such a determination. Because defendant’s competence to stand trial has never been evaluated and “[g]iven the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances, we cannot conclude that such a procedure would be adequate here.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 183, 43 L.Ed. 2d at 119-20 (citations omitted); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403, 4 L.Ed. 2d 824, 825 (1960) (per curiam) (holding that a trial court must conduct sua sponte a competency hearing when the information known to the trial court at the time of the trial or plea is sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding the defendants competence"
] |
). Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s
| 1 |
677 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nuse of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application.” 183 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added). This includes the time between the filing of Valdez’s legal challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence in the state appellate courts and his factual challenge under Romero in the superior court. See Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.2001) (“[PJost-conviction review is ‘pending’ — and thus AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled — from ‘the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.’ ” (quoting Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006) (emphasis in original)); Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the limitations period is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nuse of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application.” 183 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added). This includes the time between the filing of Valdez’s legal challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence in the state appellate courts and his factual challenge under Romero in the superior court. See Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.2001) (“[PJost-conviction review is ‘pending’ — and thus AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled — from ‘the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.’ ” (quoting Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006) (emphasis in original)); Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the untimely petition in that case tolled the aedpa statute of limitations",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nuse of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application.” 183 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added). This includes the time between the filing of Valdez’s legal challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence in the state appellate courts and his factual challenge under Romero in the superior court. See Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.2001) (“[PJost-conviction review is ‘pending’ — and thus AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled — from ‘the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.’ ” (quoting Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006) (emphasis in original)); Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the oneyear statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court seeking review of denial of state postconviction relief",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nuse of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application.” 183 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added). This includes the time between the filing of Valdez’s legal challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence in the state appellate courts and his factual challenge under Romero in the superior court. See Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.2001) (“[PJost-conviction review is ‘pending’ — and thus AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled — from ‘the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.’ ” (quoting Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006) (emphasis in original)); Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the aedpa statute of limitations was tolled for the entire period during which saffold pursued state habeas relief including the time between filings",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nuse of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application.” 183 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added). This includes the time between the filing of Valdez’s legal challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence in the state appellate courts and his factual challenge under Romero in the superior court. See Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.2001) (“[PJost-conviction review is ‘pending’ — and thus AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled — from ‘the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.’ ” (quoting Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006) (emphasis in original)); Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional"
] |
). The order in which Valdez filed his state
| 3 |
678 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\na reasonable officer could have concluded that impoundment of the motorcycle was lawful based on the CaLVeh. Code. “If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate”. Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-57 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”)). The only issue that is contested is whether Officer Faulk was acting out of personal animus towards Plaintiff. However, this dispute is over Officer Faulk’s subjective intentions, which is irrelevant in determining whether qualified immunity applies. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (1993) (holding that the qualified immunity determination does not entail an inquiry into the officers subjective intentions merely his knowledge",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\na reasonable officer could have concluded that impoundment of the motorcycle was lawful based on the CaLVeh. Code. “If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate”. Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-57 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”)). The only issue that is contested is whether Officer Faulk was acting out of personal animus towards Plaintiff. However, this dispute is over Officer Faulk’s subjective intentions, which is irrelevant in determining whether qualified immunity applies. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (1993) (holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\na reasonable officer could have concluded that impoundment of the motorcycle was lawful based on the CaLVeh. Code. “If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate”. Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-57 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”)). The only issue that is contested is whether Officer Faulk was acting out of personal animus towards Plaintiff. However, this dispute is over Officer Faulk’s subjective intentions, which is irrelevant in determining whether qualified immunity applies. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (1993) (holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\na reasonable officer could have concluded that impoundment of the motorcycle was lawful based on the CaLVeh. Code. “If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate”. Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-57 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”)). The only issue that is contested is whether Officer Faulk was acting out of personal animus towards Plaintiff. However, this dispute is over Officer Faulk’s subjective intentions, which is irrelevant in determining whether qualified immunity applies. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (1993) (holding that reasonableness for qualified immunity purposes requires an objective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\na reasonable officer could have concluded that impoundment of the motorcycle was lawful based on the CaLVeh. Code. “If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate”. Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-57 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”)). The only issue that is contested is whether Officer Faulk was acting out of personal animus towards Plaintiff. However, this dispute is over Officer Faulk’s subjective intentions, which is irrelevant in determining whether qualified immunity applies. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (1993) (holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim"
] |
). The only question the Court must decide is
| 0 |
679 |
[
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEx parte Parker, 730 So.2d 168, 171 (Ala.1999). The Vanns also assert that, like the borrowers in Branch, they lacked bargaining power because they were sent to the defendant by the automobile dealer and because of their limited educations. The Vanns, however, presented no evidence indicating that they were unable to find an alternate lender or that the dealer required them to use First Community. Furthermore, the Vanns’ lack of education does not relieve them of their contractual obligations. “ ‘[A] person who signs an instrument without reading it, when he can read, can not, in the absence of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, avoid the effect of his signature, because [he is] not informed of its contents....’” Mitchell Nissan, Inc. v. Foster, 775 So.2d 138, 140 (Ala.2000) (holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEx parte Parker, 730 So.2d 168, 171 (Ala.1999). The Vanns also assert that, like the borrowers in Branch, they lacked bargaining power because they were sent to the defendant by the automobile dealer and because of their limited educations. The Vanns, however, presented no evidence indicating that they were unable to find an alternate lender or that the dealer required them to use First Community. Furthermore, the Vanns’ lack of education does not relieve them of their contractual obligations. “ ‘[A] person who signs an instrument without reading it, when he can read, can not, in the absence of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, avoid the effect of his signature, because [he is] not informed of its contents....’” Mitchell Nissan, Inc. v. Foster, 775 So.2d 138, 140 (Ala.2000) (holding that the plaintiff could not avoid his contractual obligation because he read at only a sixthgrade level",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEx parte Parker, 730 So.2d 168, 171 (Ala.1999). The Vanns also assert that, like the borrowers in Branch, they lacked bargaining power because they were sent to the defendant by the automobile dealer and because of their limited educations. The Vanns, however, presented no evidence indicating that they were unable to find an alternate lender or that the dealer required them to use First Community. Furthermore, the Vanns’ lack of education does not relieve them of their contractual obligations. “ ‘[A] person who signs an instrument without reading it, when he can read, can not, in the absence of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, avoid the effect of his signature, because [he is] not informed of its contents....’” Mitchell Nissan, Inc. v. Foster, 775 So.2d 138, 140 (Ala.2000) (holding plaintiff could not avoid release absent evidence he made reasonable effort to have document read to him",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEx parte Parker, 730 So.2d 168, 171 (Ala.1999). The Vanns also assert that, like the borrowers in Branch, they lacked bargaining power because they were sent to the defendant by the automobile dealer and because of their limited educations. The Vanns, however, presented no evidence indicating that they were unable to find an alternate lender or that the dealer required them to use First Community. Furthermore, the Vanns’ lack of education does not relieve them of their contractual obligations. “ ‘[A] person who signs an instrument without reading it, when he can read, can not, in the absence of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, avoid the effect of his signature, because [he is] not informed of its contents....’” Mitchell Nissan, Inc. v. Foster, 775 So.2d 138, 140 (Ala.2000) (holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEx parte Parker, 730 So.2d 168, 171 (Ala.1999). The Vanns also assert that, like the borrowers in Branch, they lacked bargaining power because they were sent to the defendant by the automobile dealer and because of their limited educations. The Vanns, however, presented no evidence indicating that they were unable to find an alternate lender or that the dealer required them to use First Community. Furthermore, the Vanns’ lack of education does not relieve them of their contractual obligations. “ ‘[A] person who signs an instrument without reading it, when he can read, can not, in the absence of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, avoid the effect of his signature, because [he is] not informed of its contents....’” Mitchell Nissan, Inc. v. Foster, 775 So.2d 138, 140 (Ala.2000) (holding that the plaintiff filed suit within the statute of limitations even though he could not prove the time at which he mailed his petition"
] |
) (quoting Beck & Pauli Lithographing Co. v.
| 1 |
680 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n434 (9th Cir. 1983). However, exceptions to that rule exist. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 927, 933-34, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (stays leaving plaintiff “effectively out of court”). In this case, the magistrate was free to recommend to the district court that Reynaga’s action be stayed: if the district court had then adopted the recommendation, we would have jurisdiction over Reynaga’s appeal of the district court’s order because the district court’s action would have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction,” Carson, 450 U.S. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996, and would have left Reynaga “effectively out of court”. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9-10, 103 S.Ct. at 933-34. See also Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968 F.2d at 964-66 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n434 (9th Cir. 1983). However, exceptions to that rule exist. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 927, 933-34, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (stays leaving plaintiff “effectively out of court”). In this case, the magistrate was free to recommend to the district court that Reynaga’s action be stayed: if the district court had then adopted the recommendation, we would have jurisdiction over Reynaga’s appeal of the district court’s order because the district court’s action would have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction,” Carson, 450 U.S. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996, and would have left Reynaga “effectively out of court”. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9-10, 103 S.Ct. at 933-34. See also Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968 F.2d at 964-66 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that appellate jurisdiction exists over district court order staying 1983 action until plaintiff exhausts habeas corpus remedies",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n434 (9th Cir. 1983). However, exceptions to that rule exist. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 927, 933-34, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (stays leaving plaintiff “effectively out of court”). In this case, the magistrate was free to recommend to the district court that Reynaga’s action be stayed: if the district court had then adopted the recommendation, we would have jurisdiction over Reynaga’s appeal of the district court’s order because the district court’s action would have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction,” Carson, 450 U.S. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996, and would have left Reynaga “effectively out of court”. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9-10, 103 S.Ct. at 933-34. See also Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968 F.2d at 964-66 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that habeas corpus petitions are premature until administrative remedies have been exhausted",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n434 (9th Cir. 1983). However, exceptions to that rule exist. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 927, 933-34, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (stays leaving plaintiff “effectively out of court”). In this case, the magistrate was free to recommend to the district court that Reynaga’s action be stayed: if the district court had then adopted the recommendation, we would have jurisdiction over Reynaga’s appeal of the district court’s order because the district court’s action would have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction,” Carson, 450 U.S. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996, and would have left Reynaga “effectively out of court”. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9-10, 103 S.Ct. at 933-34. See also Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968 F.2d at 964-66 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that a federal district court has jurisdiction to stay an execution prior to the filing of a formal habeas corpus petition",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n434 (9th Cir. 1983). However, exceptions to that rule exist. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 927, 933-34, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (stays leaving plaintiff “effectively out of court”). In this case, the magistrate was free to recommend to the district court that Reynaga’s action be stayed: if the district court had then adopted the recommendation, we would have jurisdiction over Reynaga’s appeal of the district court’s order because the district court’s action would have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction,” Carson, 450 U.S. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996, and would have left Reynaga “effectively out of court”. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9-10, 103 S.Ct. at 933-34. See also Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968 F.2d at 964-66 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts"
] |
). Here, however, the magistrate did not
| 1 |
681 |
[
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nby the term of the Act. See § 1415(c)(2)(B) (requiring local school board to respond to the complaint); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404.2 (SRO may modify IHO’s IEP for a child and order relevant “board” [of education] to comply with such modified IEP). As it is the local education agency, not the SRO or State Education Department that is responsible for N.S.’s IEP, it is therefore the School District that is the proper defendant in this action. Adding State Defendants as defendants not only is without support in the “text and structure” of the Act, Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 531, 127 S.Ct. 1994, but disrupts the state’s scheme of imposing primary responsibility for the delivery of special education services upon local school districts, Gulino, 460 F.3d at 366; see also Polera, 288 F.3d at 483-86 (holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nby the term of the Act. See § 1415(c)(2)(B) (requiring local school board to respond to the complaint); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404.2 (SRO may modify IHO’s IEP for a child and order relevant “board” [of education] to comply with such modified IEP). As it is the local education agency, not the SRO or State Education Department that is responsible for N.S.’s IEP, it is therefore the School District that is the proper defendant in this action. Adding State Defendants as defendants not only is without support in the “text and structure” of the Act, Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 531, 127 S.Ct. 1994, but disrupts the state’s scheme of imposing primary responsibility for the delivery of special education services upon local school districts, Gulino, 460 F.3d at 366; see also Polera, 288 F.3d at 483-86 (holding that the local educational agency is the appropriate target of a suit under the idea and that private entities cannot be held liable under the statute as the idea obligates the statenot the private schoolto ensure that such children are provided special education and related services in accordance with an individualized education program ",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nby the term of the Act. See § 1415(c)(2)(B) (requiring local school board to respond to the complaint); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404.2 (SRO may modify IHO’s IEP for a child and order relevant “board” [of education] to comply with such modified IEP). As it is the local education agency, not the SRO or State Education Department that is responsible for N.S.’s IEP, it is therefore the School District that is the proper defendant in this action. Adding State Defendants as defendants not only is without support in the “text and structure” of the Act, Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 531, 127 S.Ct. 1994, but disrupts the state’s scheme of imposing primary responsibility for the delivery of special education services upon local school districts, Gulino, 460 F.3d at 366; see also Polera, 288 F.3d at 483-86 (holding that because the idea contemplates a remedy that seeks changes to a students special education program compensatory damages therefore are not available",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nby the term of the Act. See § 1415(c)(2)(B) (requiring local school board to respond to the complaint); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404.2 (SRO may modify IHO’s IEP for a child and order relevant “board” [of education] to comply with such modified IEP). As it is the local education agency, not the SRO or State Education Department that is responsible for N.S.’s IEP, it is therefore the School District that is the proper defendant in this action. Adding State Defendants as defendants not only is without support in the “text and structure” of the Act, Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 531, 127 S.Ct. 1994, but disrupts the state’s scheme of imposing primary responsibility for the delivery of special education services upon local school districts, Gulino, 460 F.3d at 366; see also Polera, 288 F.3d at 483-86 (holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nby the term of the Act. See § 1415(c)(2)(B) (requiring local school board to respond to the complaint); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404.2 (SRO may modify IHO’s IEP for a child and order relevant “board” [of education] to comply with such modified IEP). As it is the local education agency, not the SRO or State Education Department that is responsible for N.S.’s IEP, it is therefore the School District that is the proper defendant in this action. Adding State Defendants as defendants not only is without support in the “text and structure” of the Act, Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 531, 127 S.Ct. 1994, but disrupts the state’s scheme of imposing primary responsibility for the delivery of special education services upon local school districts, Gulino, 460 F.3d at 366; see also Polera, 288 F.3d at 483-86 (holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated"
] |
) (bracketed material added); Adrian, 2001 WL
| 2 |
682 |
[
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nofficer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In a 2006 publication, the United States Department of Justice reported that 6,000 police officers are assaulted each year, and ten are killed. United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 349 (D.C.Cir.2007). 6 . See, e.g., State v. Abner, 889 So.2d 52, 53-54 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); People v. Super. Ct. (Galbreath), 104 Cal.App.3d 988, 164 Cal. Rptr. 116, 117 (1980); State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10, 22-23 (1988); Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645, 646 (2006); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 367 (Minn.2004); State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 527 (2001); Commonwealth v. Reppert, 2002 PA S 3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.2009) (holding that questions on transportation of contraband must be justified by reasonable suspicion even when they do not extend the duration of the stop",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nofficer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In a 2006 publication, the United States Department of Justice reported that 6,000 police officers are assaulted each year, and ten are killed. United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 349 (D.C.Cir.2007). 6 . See, e.g., State v. Abner, 889 So.2d 52, 53-54 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); People v. Super. Ct. (Galbreath), 104 Cal.App.3d 988, 164 Cal. Rptr. 116, 117 (1980); State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10, 22-23 (1988); Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645, 646 (2006); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 367 (Minn.2004); State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 527 (2001); Commonwealth v. Reppert, 2002 PA S 3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.2009) (holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nofficer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In a 2006 publication, the United States Department of Justice reported that 6,000 police officers are assaulted each year, and ten are killed. United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 349 (D.C.Cir.2007). 6 . See, e.g., State v. Abner, 889 So.2d 52, 53-54 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); People v. Super. Ct. (Galbreath), 104 Cal.App.3d 988, 164 Cal. Rptr. 116, 117 (1980); State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10, 22-23 (1988); Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645, 646 (2006); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 367 (Minn.2004); State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 527 (2001); Commonwealth v. Reppert, 2002 PA S 3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.2009) (holding that the delay of approximately two minutes that occurred prior to the police officer developing reasonable suspicion to further investigate the defendants identity was de minimis and did not unreasonably extend the duration of the traffic stop",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nofficer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In a 2006 publication, the United States Department of Justice reported that 6,000 police officers are assaulted each year, and ten are killed. United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 349 (D.C.Cir.2007). 6 . See, e.g., State v. Abner, 889 So.2d 52, 53-54 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); People v. Super. Ct. (Galbreath), 104 Cal.App.3d 988, 164 Cal. Rptr. 116, 117 (1980); State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10, 22-23 (1988); Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645, 646 (2006); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 367 (Minn.2004); State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 527 (2001); Commonwealth v. Reppert, 2002 PA S 3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.2009) (holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nofficer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In a 2006 publication, the United States Department of Justice reported that 6,000 police officers are assaulted each year, and ten are killed. United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 349 (D.C.Cir.2007). 6 . See, e.g., State v. Abner, 889 So.2d 52, 53-54 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); People v. Super. Ct. (Galbreath), 104 Cal.App.3d 988, 164 Cal. Rptr. 116, 117 (1980); State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10, 22-23 (1988); Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645, 646 (2006); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 367 (Minn.2004); State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 527 (2001); Commonwealth v. Reppert, 2002 PA S 3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.2009) (holding that even a de minimis extension of a traffic stop is unconstitutional absent reasonable suspicion"
] |
); United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115,
| 2 |
683 |
[
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nexplanation for the delay and state when a decision on the claim may be expected. Moreover, in Hollock v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 415 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc), this Court opined that “the broad language of Section' 8371 was designed to remedy all instances of bad faith conduct 'by an insurer’s, whether occurring before, during or after litigation. Therefore, we acknowledge ... that [a]n action for bad faith may also extend to the insurer’s investigative practices[.]” (quoting O’Donnell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 A.2d 901, 906 (Pa.Super.1999)). Implicit in Hollock’s holdings is the requirement that the insurer properly investigate claims prior to refusing to pay the proceeds of the policy to its insured. See Condio v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 899 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super.2006) (holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nexplanation for the delay and state when a decision on the claim may be expected. Moreover, in Hollock v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 415 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc), this Court opined that “the broad language of Section' 8371 was designed to remedy all instances of bad faith conduct 'by an insurer’s, whether occurring before, during or after litigation. Therefore, we acknowledge ... that [a]n action for bad faith may also extend to the insurer’s investigative practices[.]” (quoting O’Donnell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 A.2d 901, 906 (Pa.Super.1999)). Implicit in Hollock’s holdings is the requirement that the insurer properly investigate claims prior to refusing to pay the proceeds of the policy to its insured. See Condio v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 899 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super.2006) (holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nexplanation for the delay and state when a decision on the claim may be expected. Moreover, in Hollock v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 415 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc), this Court opined that “the broad language of Section' 8371 was designed to remedy all instances of bad faith conduct 'by an insurer’s, whether occurring before, during or after litigation. Therefore, we acknowledge ... that [a]n action for bad faith may also extend to the insurer’s investigative practices[.]” (quoting O’Donnell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 A.2d 901, 906 (Pa.Super.1999)). Implicit in Hollock’s holdings is the requirement that the insurer properly investigate claims prior to refusing to pay the proceeds of the policy to its insured. See Condio v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 899 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super.2006) (holding that use of plaintiffs mark is in good faith even though other aspects of defendants behavior may have evidenced bad faith",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nexplanation for the delay and state when a decision on the claim may be expected. Moreover, in Hollock v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 415 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc), this Court opined that “the broad language of Section' 8371 was designed to remedy all instances of bad faith conduct 'by an insurer’s, whether occurring before, during or after litigation. Therefore, we acknowledge ... that [a]n action for bad faith may also extend to the insurer’s investigative practices[.]” (quoting O’Donnell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 A.2d 901, 906 (Pa.Super.1999)). Implicit in Hollock’s holdings is the requirement that the insurer properly investigate claims prior to refusing to pay the proceeds of the policy to its insured. See Condio v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 899 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super.2006) (holding insurer not liable for bad faith when it denied insureds claim based on a good faith dispute regarding the interpretation of a rule",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nexplanation for the delay and state when a decision on the claim may be expected. Moreover, in Hollock v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 415 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc), this Court opined that “the broad language of Section' 8371 was designed to remedy all instances of bad faith conduct 'by an insurer’s, whether occurring before, during or after litigation. Therefore, we acknowledge ... that [a]n action for bad faith may also extend to the insurer’s investigative practices[.]” (quoting O’Donnell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 A.2d 901, 906 (Pa.Super.1999)). Implicit in Hollock’s holdings is the requirement that the insurer properly investigate claims prior to refusing to pay the proceeds of the policy to its insured. See Condio v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 899 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super.2006) (holding that a bad faith claim is a tort"
] |
). Bombar v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 92-93
| 0 |
684 |
[
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJersey Racing Comm’n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1318 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In order to succeed on a claim of deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to termination of a specific employment position, a plaintiff must first establish a property interest in the employment.”) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)). “To have a property interest in a job or job benefit, an employee must have a legitimate claim of entitlement, not just a unilateral expectation.” Latessa, 113 F.3d at 1318 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). “Cognizable property interests can be created by sources such as state law and implied or express contracts.” Miller v. Twp. of Readington, 39 Fed. Appx. 774, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2002) 1987) (holding that court erred as matter of law in failing to enter judgment for employer at close of plaintiffs implied employment contract action",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJersey Racing Comm’n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1318 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In order to succeed on a claim of deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to termination of a specific employment position, a plaintiff must first establish a property interest in the employment.”) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)). “To have a property interest in a job or job benefit, an employee must have a legitimate claim of entitlement, not just a unilateral expectation.” Latessa, 113 F.3d at 1318 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). “Cognizable property interests can be created by sources such as state law and implied or express contracts.” Miller v. Twp. of Readington, 39 Fed. Appx. 774, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2002) 1987) (holding that once the plaintiffs fixed term of employment expired he had no property interest as a matter of law",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJersey Racing Comm’n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1318 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In order to succeed on a claim of deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to termination of a specific employment position, a plaintiff must first establish a property interest in the employment.”) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)). “To have a property interest in a job or job benefit, an employee must have a legitimate claim of entitlement, not just a unilateral expectation.” Latessa, 113 F.3d at 1318 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). “Cognizable property interests can be created by sources such as state law and implied or express contracts.” Miller v. Twp. of Readington, 39 Fed. Appx. 774, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2002) 1987) (holding that plaintiffs had no vested interest in former interpretation of state law",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJersey Racing Comm’n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1318 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In order to succeed on a claim of deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to termination of a specific employment position, a plaintiff must first establish a property interest in the employment.”) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)). “To have a property interest in a job or job benefit, an employee must have a legitimate claim of entitlement, not just a unilateral expectation.” Latessa, 113 F.3d at 1318 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). “Cognizable property interests can be created by sources such as state law and implied or express contracts.” Miller v. Twp. of Readington, 39 Fed. Appx. 774, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2002) 1987) (holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJersey Racing Comm’n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1318 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In order to succeed on a claim of deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to termination of a specific employment position, a plaintiff must first establish a property interest in the employment.”) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)). “To have a property interest in a job or job benefit, an employee must have a legitimate claim of entitlement, not just a unilateral expectation.” Latessa, 113 F.3d at 1318 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). “Cognizable property interests can be created by sources such as state law and implied or express contracts.” Miller v. Twp. of Readington, 39 Fed. Appx. 774, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2002) 1987) (holding that an assistant professor hired for a fixed term of one academic year had no property interest in his job because the terms of his employment allowed that his contract not be renewed"
] |
). The burden thus shifts to Davis to show that
| 1 |
685 |
[
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrequirements”, (id. at ¶¶ 129 & 130), as well as a statement in the First Quarter 10-Q that “[w]e continuously monitor our liquidity requirements and believe that our facilities and access to the capital markets provide sufficient liquidity to meet our business requirements.” (Id. at ¶ 145.) Further alleged are statements in the registration statement and prospectus that: (1) the “risks [of counterparty relationships] are enhanced during periods of commodity price fluctuations. Defaults by suppliers and other counterparties may adversely affect Constellation Energy’s financial results”; and (2) “[a] downgrade in Constellation Energy’s credit ratings could negatively affect its ability to s in original); Hillson Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that mere statements of opinion or prediction such as future profits or how well a business will do in a particular market may not be a basis for a fraud or misrepresentation action because predictions are not past or present material facts",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrequirements”, (id. at ¶¶ 129 & 130), as well as a statement in the First Quarter 10-Q that “[w]e continuously monitor our liquidity requirements and believe that our facilities and access to the capital markets provide sufficient liquidity to meet our business requirements.” (Id. at ¶ 145.) Further alleged are statements in the registration statement and prospectus that: (1) the “risks [of counterparty relationships] are enhanced during periods of commodity price fluctuations. Defaults by suppliers and other counterparties may adversely affect Constellation Energy’s financial results”; and (2) “[a] downgrade in Constellation Energy’s credit ratings could negatively affect its ability to s in original); Hillson Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that statements that 1992 will produce excellent results for adage and adage is on target toward achieving the most profitable year in its history were predictions as to future events not statements as to present facts let alone guarantees and were therefore immaterial as a matter of law",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrequirements”, (id. at ¶¶ 129 & 130), as well as a statement in the First Quarter 10-Q that “[w]e continuously monitor our liquidity requirements and believe that our facilities and access to the capital markets provide sufficient liquidity to meet our business requirements.” (Id. at ¶ 145.) Further alleged are statements in the registration statement and prospectus that: (1) the “risks [of counterparty relationships] are enhanced during periods of commodity price fluctuations. Defaults by suppliers and other counterparties may adversely affect Constellation Energy’s financial results”; and (2) “[a] downgrade in Constellation Energy’s credit ratings could negatively affect its ability to s in original); Hillson Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that in texas future predictions and opinions especially those regarding the future profitability of a business cannot as a matter of law form a basis for fraud",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrequirements”, (id. at ¶¶ 129 & 130), as well as a statement in the First Quarter 10-Q that “[w]e continuously monitor our liquidity requirements and believe that our facilities and access to the capital markets provide sufficient liquidity to meet our business requirements.” (Id. at ¶ 145.) Further alleged are statements in the registration statement and prospectus that: (1) the “risks [of counterparty relationships] are enhanced during periods of commodity price fluctuations. Defaults by suppliers and other counterparties may adversely affect Constellation Energy’s financial results”; and (2) “[a] downgrade in Constellation Energy’s credit ratings could negatively affect its ability to s in original); Hillson Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that vague on schedule and on track statements were immaterial misrepresentations",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrequirements”, (id. at ¶¶ 129 & 130), as well as a statement in the First Quarter 10-Q that “[w]e continuously monitor our liquidity requirements and believe that our facilities and access to the capital markets provide sufficient liquidity to meet our business requirements.” (Id. at ¶ 145.) Further alleged are statements in the registration statement and prospectus that: (1) the “risks [of counterparty relationships] are enhanced during periods of commodity price fluctuations. Defaults by suppliers and other counterparties may adversely affect Constellation Energy’s financial results”; and (2) “[a] downgrade in Constellation Energy’s credit ratings could negatively affect its ability to s in original); Hillson Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that future predictions and opinions especially those regarding future profitability of business cannot form basis for fraud as matter of law"
] |
) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re
| 1 |
686 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor determining whether a war-rantless search of a probationer is reasonable is whether the police or probation officer has a well-founded suspicion that a probation violation has occurred. The determination of whether a probationer’s right to privacy has been violated is dependent, then, on the nature of the search conducted and is not dependent on the nature of the proceeding in which the fruits of the search are to be admitted. Id. at 1095 (emphasis original, internal footnotes and citations omitted). Appellant also cites Mason v. State, 838 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that “[ejvidence that is obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible over objection in a probation revocation hearing”), and State v. Dodd, 419 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1982) (holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor determining whether a war-rantless search of a probationer is reasonable is whether the police or probation officer has a well-founded suspicion that a probation violation has occurred. The determination of whether a probationer’s right to privacy has been violated is dependent, then, on the nature of the search conducted and is not dependent on the nature of the proceeding in which the fruits of the search are to be admitted. Id. at 1095 (emphasis original, internal footnotes and citations omitted). Appellant also cites Mason v. State, 838 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that “[ejvidence that is obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible over objection in a probation revocation hearing”), and State v. Dodd, 419 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1982) (holding that the exclusionary rule embodied in the search and seizure provision of the state constitution applies in probation revocation proceedings",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor determining whether a war-rantless search of a probationer is reasonable is whether the police or probation officer has a well-founded suspicion that a probation violation has occurred. The determination of whether a probationer’s right to privacy has been violated is dependent, then, on the nature of the search conducted and is not dependent on the nature of the proceeding in which the fruits of the search are to be admitted. Id. at 1095 (emphasis original, internal footnotes and citations omitted). Appellant also cites Mason v. State, 838 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that “[ejvidence that is obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible over objection in a probation revocation hearing”), and State v. Dodd, 419 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1982) (holding that probation and parole revocation hearings are not criminal proceedings such that the state exclusionary rule applies but noting that police misconduct which shocks the conscience may lead to invocation of the exclusionary rule",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor determining whether a war-rantless search of a probationer is reasonable is whether the police or probation officer has a well-founded suspicion that a probation violation has occurred. The determination of whether a probationer’s right to privacy has been violated is dependent, then, on the nature of the search conducted and is not dependent on the nature of the proceeding in which the fruits of the search are to be admitted. Id. at 1095 (emphasis original, internal footnotes and citations omitted). Appellant also cites Mason v. State, 838 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that “[ejvidence that is obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible over objection in a probation revocation hearing”), and State v. Dodd, 419 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1982) (holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor determining whether a war-rantless search of a probationer is reasonable is whether the police or probation officer has a well-founded suspicion that a probation violation has occurred. The determination of whether a probationer’s right to privacy has been violated is dependent, then, on the nature of the search conducted and is not dependent on the nature of the proceeding in which the fruits of the search are to be admitted. Id. at 1095 (emphasis original, internal footnotes and citations omitted). Appellant also cites Mason v. State, 838 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that “[ejvidence that is obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible over objection in a probation revocation hearing”), and State v. Dodd, 419 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1982) (holding that the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings"
] |
). The Commonwealth, in its brief, cites a
| 1 |
687 |
[
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), because it is \"inadequate”); State v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 549 n.2 (Tenn.1979) (\"Where, ... as in the particular phase of search and seizure law under consideration, there has been a settled development of state constitutional law which does not contravene the federal, we are not inclined to overrule earlier decisions unless they are demonstrably erroneous.”). While we recognize the rationale underlying the majority rule, we see no reason to depart from the standards of community care-taking that have developed in our state, particularly because neither party has articulated a persuasive basis for recognizing this as yet another exception to the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Lakin, 588 S.W.2d. at 549 (recognizing our jurisprudence in this area has been somewhat inconsistent and confusing",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), because it is \"inadequate”); State v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 549 n.2 (Tenn.1979) (\"Where, ... as in the particular phase of search and seizure law under consideration, there has been a settled development of state constitutional law which does not contravene the federal, we are not inclined to overrule earlier decisions unless they are demonstrably erroneous.”). While we recognize the rationale underlying the majority rule, we see no reason to depart from the standards of community care-taking that have developed in our state, particularly because neither party has articulated a persuasive basis for recognizing this as yet another exception to the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Lakin, 588 S.W.2d. at 549 (recognizing that in the context of the open fields doctrine ajlthough the decisions in this state may be somewhat more restrictive than those in other states or than federal decisions no compelling reason has been demonstrated in this case for modifying or overruling them",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), because it is \"inadequate”); State v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 549 n.2 (Tenn.1979) (\"Where, ... as in the particular phase of search and seizure law under consideration, there has been a settled development of state constitutional law which does not contravene the federal, we are not inclined to overrule earlier decisions unless they are demonstrably erroneous.”). While we recognize the rationale underlying the majority rule, we see no reason to depart from the standards of community care-taking that have developed in our state, particularly because neither party has articulated a persuasive basis for recognizing this as yet another exception to the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Lakin, 588 S.W.2d. at 549 (holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), because it is \"inadequate”); State v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 549 n.2 (Tenn.1979) (\"Where, ... as in the particular phase of search and seizure law under consideration, there has been a settled development of state constitutional law which does not contravene the federal, we are not inclined to overrule earlier decisions unless they are demonstrably erroneous.”). While we recognize the rationale underlying the majority rule, we see no reason to depart from the standards of community care-taking that have developed in our state, particularly because neither party has articulated a persuasive basis for recognizing this as yet another exception to the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Lakin, 588 S.W.2d. at 549 (holding federal district courts do not have jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state courts action was unconstitutional review of those decisions may be had only in this united states supreme court",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), because it is \"inadequate”); State v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 549 n.2 (Tenn.1979) (\"Where, ... as in the particular phase of search and seizure law under consideration, there has been a settled development of state constitutional law which does not contravene the federal, we are not inclined to overrule earlier decisions unless they are demonstrably erroneous.”). While we recognize the rationale underlying the majority rule, we see no reason to depart from the standards of community care-taking that have developed in our state, particularly because neither party has articulated a persuasive basis for recognizing this as yet another exception to the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Lakin, 588 S.W.2d. at 549 (holding that this court is not bound by decisions of the appellate division or the third circuit even where those decisions concern the same parties and legal issues"
] |
). The Defendant has argued strongly against
| 1 |
688 |
[
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddressed the applicability of the Boren Amendment in that opinion: With the repeal of the Boren Amendment nothing remains that remotely resembles a federal right to reasonable and adequate rates. There is no federal statutory rate language to parse. There is only a state standard. It follows that there can be no prospective relief under § 1396(a)(13) and that the court must dismiss Heritage’s reimbursement claim for lack of federal jurisdiction. 26 F.Supp.2d at 880. If the Ninth Circuit has held to the contrary, HCMF should take that up in an appeal, not in a motion to amend. HCMF’s motion to amend does not assert any new legal theory and, therefore, is futile. Thus, HCMF’s motion to amend is denied. See Shafer v. Preston Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that amendment is futile if the proposed amended complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddressed the applicability of the Boren Amendment in that opinion: With the repeal of the Boren Amendment nothing remains that remotely resembles a federal right to reasonable and adequate rates. There is no federal statutory rate language to parse. There is only a state standard. It follows that there can be no prospective relief under § 1396(a)(13) and that the court must dismiss Heritage’s reimbursement claim for lack of federal jurisdiction. 26 F.Supp.2d at 880. If the Ninth Circuit has held to the contrary, HCMF should take that up in an appeal, not in a motion to amend. HCMF’s motion to amend does not assert any new legal theory and, therefore, is futile. Thus, HCMF’s motion to amend is denied. See Shafer v. Preston Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding district court properly denied leave to amend where application was four months late and appeared to be futile",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddressed the applicability of the Boren Amendment in that opinion: With the repeal of the Boren Amendment nothing remains that remotely resembles a federal right to reasonable and adequate rates. There is no federal statutory rate language to parse. There is only a state standard. It follows that there can be no prospective relief under § 1396(a)(13) and that the court must dismiss Heritage’s reimbursement claim for lack of federal jurisdiction. 26 F.Supp.2d at 880. If the Ninth Circuit has held to the contrary, HCMF should take that up in an appeal, not in a motion to amend. HCMF’s motion to amend does not assert any new legal theory and, therefore, is futile. Thus, HCMF’s motion to amend is denied. See Shafer v. Preston Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint because the proposed amendment would have been futile",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddressed the applicability of the Boren Amendment in that opinion: With the repeal of the Boren Amendment nothing remains that remotely resembles a federal right to reasonable and adequate rates. There is no federal statutory rate language to parse. There is only a state standard. It follows that there can be no prospective relief under § 1396(a)(13) and that the court must dismiss Heritage’s reimbursement claim for lack of federal jurisdiction. 26 F.Supp.2d at 880. If the Ninth Circuit has held to the contrary, HCMF should take that up in an appeal, not in a motion to amend. HCMF’s motion to amend does not assert any new legal theory and, therefore, is futile. Thus, HCMF’s motion to amend is denied. See Shafer v. Preston Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that upon conclusion that plaintiffs proposed amendment was futile district court correctly denied plaintiffs motion to amend",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddressed the applicability of the Boren Amendment in that opinion: With the repeal of the Boren Amendment nothing remains that remotely resembles a federal right to reasonable and adequate rates. There is no federal statutory rate language to parse. There is only a state standard. It follows that there can be no prospective relief under § 1396(a)(13) and that the court must dismiss Heritage’s reimbursement claim for lack of federal jurisdiction. 26 F.Supp.2d at 880. If the Ninth Circuit has held to the contrary, HCMF should take that up in an appeal, not in a motion to amend. HCMF’s motion to amend does not assert any new legal theory and, therefore, is futile. Thus, HCMF’s motion to amend is denied. See Shafer v. Preston Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint"
] |
); New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int’l Union,
| 3 |
689 |
[
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nArk. 644, 863 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1993); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.30(ll)(b) (West 1997 & 1998 Supp.); Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 750, para. 5/505(a)(2)(a) (1993 & 1998 Supp.); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 403.211(3)(d) (Michie 1984 & 1996 Supp.); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:315.7 (West 1991 & 1997 Supp.); Me.Rev.Stat, Ann. tit. 19, § 2007.3.D (West 1998); Michigan Child Support Formula Manual 4 (1998); Minn.Stat. Ann. § 518.551(c)(2) (West 1990 & 1998 Supp.); Miss.Code Ann. § 43-19-103(b) (1993); Mont. Admin. R. 46.30.1543(l)(m); N.J. Ct. R., Appx. IX.21G); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 413.1(f)(1) (McKinney 1998); Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.123(b)(3) (West 1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 659(a)(1) (1989 & 1997 Supp.); Va.Code Ann. § 20-108.1.B.9 (Michie 1995 & 1998 Supp.); Wa. Rev.Code § 26.19.075(vii) (1994). Cf Idaho R 2) (holding noncustodial parent not entitled to an automatic credit and court could order child support in addition to social security disability dependency benefits",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nArk. 644, 863 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1993); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.30(ll)(b) (West 1997 & 1998 Supp.); Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 750, para. 5/505(a)(2)(a) (1993 & 1998 Supp.); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 403.211(3)(d) (Michie 1984 & 1996 Supp.); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:315.7 (West 1991 & 1997 Supp.); Me.Rev.Stat, Ann. tit. 19, § 2007.3.D (West 1998); Michigan Child Support Formula Manual 4 (1998); Minn.Stat. Ann. § 518.551(c)(2) (West 1990 & 1998 Supp.); Miss.Code Ann. § 43-19-103(b) (1993); Mont. Admin. R. 46.30.1543(l)(m); N.J. Ct. R., Appx. IX.21G); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 413.1(f)(1) (McKinney 1998); Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.123(b)(3) (West 1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 659(a)(1) (1989 & 1997 Supp.); Va.Code Ann. § 20-108.1.B.9 (Michie 1995 & 1998 Supp.); Wa. Rev.Code § 26.19.075(vii) (1994). Cf Idaho R 2) (holding parent entitled to credit for any social security disability benefits paid to child as a result of parents disability",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nArk. 644, 863 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1993); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.30(ll)(b) (West 1997 & 1998 Supp.); Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 750, para. 5/505(a)(2)(a) (1993 & 1998 Supp.); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 403.211(3)(d) (Michie 1984 & 1996 Supp.); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:315.7 (West 1991 & 1997 Supp.); Me.Rev.Stat, Ann. tit. 19, § 2007.3.D (West 1998); Michigan Child Support Formula Manual 4 (1998); Minn.Stat. Ann. § 518.551(c)(2) (West 1990 & 1998 Supp.); Miss.Code Ann. § 43-19-103(b) (1993); Mont. Admin. R. 46.30.1543(l)(m); N.J. Ct. R., Appx. IX.21G); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 413.1(f)(1) (McKinney 1998); Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.123(b)(3) (West 1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 659(a)(1) (1989 & 1997 Supp.); Va.Code Ann. § 20-108.1.B.9 (Michie 1995 & 1998 Supp.); Wa. Rev.Code § 26.19.075(vii) (1994). Cf Idaho R 2) (holding that use of social security benefits satisfied child support obligation",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nArk. 644, 863 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1993); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.30(ll)(b) (West 1997 & 1998 Supp.); Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 750, para. 5/505(a)(2)(a) (1993 & 1998 Supp.); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 403.211(3)(d) (Michie 1984 & 1996 Supp.); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:315.7 (West 1991 & 1997 Supp.); Me.Rev.Stat, Ann. tit. 19, § 2007.3.D (West 1998); Michigan Child Support Formula Manual 4 (1998); Minn.Stat. Ann. § 518.551(c)(2) (West 1990 & 1998 Supp.); Miss.Code Ann. § 43-19-103(b) (1993); Mont. Admin. R. 46.30.1543(l)(m); N.J. Ct. R., Appx. IX.21G); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 413.1(f)(1) (McKinney 1998); Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.123(b)(3) (West 1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 659(a)(1) (1989 & 1997 Supp.); Va.Code Ann. § 20-108.1.B.9 (Michie 1995 & 1998 Supp.); Wa. Rev.Code § 26.19.075(vii) (1994). Cf Idaho R 2) (holding that credit for social security old age and survivor benefits does not also include credit for federal disability benefits",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nArk. 644, 863 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1993); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.30(ll)(b) (West 1997 & 1998 Supp.); Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 750, para. 5/505(a)(2)(a) (1993 & 1998 Supp.); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 403.211(3)(d) (Michie 1984 & 1996 Supp.); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:315.7 (West 1991 & 1997 Supp.); Me.Rev.Stat, Ann. tit. 19, § 2007.3.D (West 1998); Michigan Child Support Formula Manual 4 (1998); Minn.Stat. Ann. § 518.551(c)(2) (West 1990 & 1998 Supp.); Miss.Code Ann. § 43-19-103(b) (1993); Mont. Admin. R. 46.30.1543(l)(m); N.J. Ct. R., Appx. IX.21G); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 413.1(f)(1) (McKinney 1998); Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.123(b)(3) (West 1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 659(a)(1) (1989 & 1997 Supp.); Va.Code Ann. § 20-108.1.B.9 (Michie 1995 & 1998 Supp.); Wa. Rev.Code § 26.19.075(vii) (1994). Cf Idaho R 2) (holding parent has right to credit for social security retirement payments made for child"
] |
); Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907
| 0 |
690 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nomitted). Illustrative cases upholding convictions under this part of subsection (1) are State v. Tornee, 20 Conn.App. 75, 564 A.2d 330 (defendant’s physically abusing a child), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 794 (1989); State v. Tucker, 50 Conn.App. 506, 718 A.2d 979 (defendant’s grabbing an 11-year old, lying on top of her, while holding his hand over her mouth, during his repeated attempts to force his tongue into her mouth violated the risk of injury statute), cert. granted in part, 247 Conn. 928, 719 A.2d 1172 (1998), review dismissed as improvidently granted, 248 Conn. 668, 728 A.2d 1097 (1999); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 234-39, 541 A.2d 96 (1988)(defendant’s severely beating a two-year-old girl with a belt); and State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 428 A.2d 322 (1980)(holding that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the physical endangerment portion of the statute when the defendant was charged only with the risk of injury to a child by doing an act likely to impair the morals of a child under the age of sixteen",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nomitted). Illustrative cases upholding convictions under this part of subsection (1) are State v. Tornee, 20 Conn.App. 75, 564 A.2d 330 (defendant’s physically abusing a child), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 794 (1989); State v. Tucker, 50 Conn.App. 506, 718 A.2d 979 (defendant’s grabbing an 11-year old, lying on top of her, while holding his hand over her mouth, during his repeated attempts to force his tongue into her mouth violated the risk of injury statute), cert. granted in part, 247 Conn. 928, 719 A.2d 1172 (1998), review dismissed as improvidently granted, 248 Conn. 668, 728 A.2d 1097 (1999); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 234-39, 541 A.2d 96 (1988)(defendant’s severely beating a two-year-old girl with a belt); and State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 428 A.2d 322 (1980)(holding that attempted sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen is a crime of viqlenee",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nomitted). Illustrative cases upholding convictions under this part of subsection (1) are State v. Tornee, 20 Conn.App. 75, 564 A.2d 330 (defendant’s physically abusing a child), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 794 (1989); State v. Tucker, 50 Conn.App. 506, 718 A.2d 979 (defendant’s grabbing an 11-year old, lying on top of her, while holding his hand over her mouth, during his repeated attempts to force his tongue into her mouth violated the risk of injury statute), cert. granted in part, 247 Conn. 928, 719 A.2d 1172 (1998), review dismissed as improvidently granted, 248 Conn. 668, 728 A.2d 1097 (1999); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 234-39, 541 A.2d 96 (1988)(defendant’s severely beating a two-year-old girl with a belt); and State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 428 A.2d 322 (1980)(holding that the deliberate touching of the private parts of a child under the age of sixteen in a sexual and indecent manner was conduct proscribed by the second prong of subsection 1",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nomitted). Illustrative cases upholding convictions under this part of subsection (1) are State v. Tornee, 20 Conn.App. 75, 564 A.2d 330 (defendant’s physically abusing a child), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 794 (1989); State v. Tucker, 50 Conn.App. 506, 718 A.2d 979 (defendant’s grabbing an 11-year old, lying on top of her, while holding his hand over her mouth, during his repeated attempts to force his tongue into her mouth violated the risk of injury statute), cert. granted in part, 247 Conn. 928, 719 A.2d 1172 (1998), review dismissed as improvidently granted, 248 Conn. 668, 728 A.2d 1097 (1999); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 234-39, 541 A.2d 96 (1988)(defendant’s severely beating a two-year-old girl with a belt); and State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 428 A.2d 322 (1980)(holding that the florida offense of attempted lewd assault on a child under the age of sixteen is a crime of violence even though the offense might be accomplished without use of physical force",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nomitted). Illustrative cases upholding convictions under this part of subsection (1) are State v. Tornee, 20 Conn.App. 75, 564 A.2d 330 (defendant’s physically abusing a child), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 794 (1989); State v. Tucker, 50 Conn.App. 506, 718 A.2d 979 (defendant’s grabbing an 11-year old, lying on top of her, while holding his hand over her mouth, during his repeated attempts to force his tongue into her mouth violated the risk of injury statute), cert. granted in part, 247 Conn. 928, 719 A.2d 1172 (1998), review dismissed as improvidently granted, 248 Conn. 668, 728 A.2d 1097 (1999); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 234-39, 541 A.2d 96 (1988)(defendant’s severely beating a two-year-old girl with a belt); and State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 428 A.2d 322 (1980)(holding that a petitioners conviction for indecent assault and battery under massachusetts law constituted a crime of violence because any offense under the state statute was by definition nonconsensual and thus any violation of the statute by its nature presents a substantial risk that force may be used to overcome the victims lack of consent and accomplish the indecent touching"
] |
). c. “Contact with the Intimate Parts of a
| 2 |
691 |
[
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\napproved by Congress, via the IRC, to adjust the bare minimum exemption amount of $2,000 for inflation. A reasonable person of ordinary intelligence, if he did not want to avail himself of the IRS documents and notices publishing the applicable exemption amounts, would consult the CPI and make the necessary calculations to determine his gross income for tax purposes. See Pond v. Comm’r, 211 Fed.Appx. 749, 752 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (explaining that the IRC’s provision of a specific number, $2000, and a statutory formula for adjusting that number, adequately defines the exemption amount and permits a taxpayer to be penalized for noncompliance); see also United States v. Priest, Nos. 06-10438, 06-10447, 06-10448, 2007 WL 1961885, at *2 (9th Cir. July 5, 2007) (unpublished mem.) (holding that tax exemption for church property does not violate establishment clause",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\napproved by Congress, via the IRC, to adjust the bare minimum exemption amount of $2,000 for inflation. A reasonable person of ordinary intelligence, if he did not want to avail himself of the IRS documents and notices publishing the applicable exemption amounts, would consult the CPI and make the necessary calculations to determine his gross income for tax purposes. See Pond v. Comm’r, 211 Fed.Appx. 749, 752 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (explaining that the IRC’s provision of a specific number, $2000, and a statutory formula for adjusting that number, adequately defines the exemption amount and permits a taxpayer to be penalized for noncompliance); see also United States v. Priest, Nos. 06-10438, 06-10447, 06-10448, 2007 WL 1961885, at *2 (9th Cir. July 5, 2007) (unpublished mem.) (holding that the alleged imprecision caused by incorporating the cpi in determining a statutorily provided exemption does not void as a matter of law the obligation to file a tax return",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\napproved by Congress, via the IRC, to adjust the bare minimum exemption amount of $2,000 for inflation. A reasonable person of ordinary intelligence, if he did not want to avail himself of the IRS documents and notices publishing the applicable exemption amounts, would consult the CPI and make the necessary calculations to determine his gross income for tax purposes. See Pond v. Comm’r, 211 Fed.Appx. 749, 752 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (explaining that the IRC’s provision of a specific number, $2000, and a statutory formula for adjusting that number, adequately defines the exemption amount and permits a taxpayer to be penalized for noncompliance); see also United States v. Priest, Nos. 06-10438, 06-10447, 06-10448, 2007 WL 1961885, at *2 (9th Cir. July 5, 2007) (unpublished mem.) (holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\napproved by Congress, via the IRC, to adjust the bare minimum exemption amount of $2,000 for inflation. A reasonable person of ordinary intelligence, if he did not want to avail himself of the IRS documents and notices publishing the applicable exemption amounts, would consult the CPI and make the necessary calculations to determine his gross income for tax purposes. See Pond v. Comm’r, 211 Fed.Appx. 749, 752 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (explaining that the IRC’s provision of a specific number, $2000, and a statutory formula for adjusting that number, adequately defines the exemption amount and permits a taxpayer to be penalized for noncompliance); see also United States v. Priest, Nos. 06-10438, 06-10447, 06-10448, 2007 WL 1961885, at *2 (9th Cir. July 5, 2007) (unpublished mem.) (holding that the offense requires that the return be false as to a material matter",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\napproved by Congress, via the IRC, to adjust the bare minimum exemption amount of $2,000 for inflation. A reasonable person of ordinary intelligence, if he did not want to avail himself of the IRS documents and notices publishing the applicable exemption amounts, would consult the CPI and make the necessary calculations to determine his gross income for tax purposes. See Pond v. Comm’r, 211 Fed.Appx. 749, 752 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (explaining that the IRC’s provision of a specific number, $2000, and a statutory formula for adjusting that number, adequately defines the exemption amount and permits a taxpayer to be penalized for noncompliance); see also United States v. Priest, Nos. 06-10438, 06-10447, 06-10448, 2007 WL 1961885, at *2 (9th Cir. July 5, 2007) (unpublished mem.) (holding one who claims tax exemption has burden of showing entitlement to exemption"
] |
). B. ' Whether the Denial of the Defense’s Jury
| 1 |
692 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nerror due to Apprendi would have been considered harmless because Concepcion was subject to a sentence of life imprisonment for more than one of his convictions. Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 234-236. Accordingly, Concepcion was properly sentenced to life in prison. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Blakely and Crawford are not applicable to Concepcion’s case. This case is distinguishable from Crawford in that the statements to which Concepcion refers were sufficiently redacted and thus, properly admitted at trial. See Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 222-223 and “Appendix A.” With regard to Concepcion’s argument that Blakely applies retroactively to his motion, the Court disagrees. See Garcia v. United States, No. 04-CV-0465, 2004 WL 1752588 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.4, 2004) (holding that booker does not apply retroactively to collateral proceedings under 2255",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nerror due to Apprendi would have been considered harmless because Concepcion was subject to a sentence of life imprisonment for more than one of his convictions. Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 234-236. Accordingly, Concepcion was properly sentenced to life in prison. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Blakely and Crawford are not applicable to Concepcion’s case. This case is distinguishable from Crawford in that the statements to which Concepcion refers were sufficiently redacted and thus, properly admitted at trial. See Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 222-223 and “Appendix A.” With regard to Concepcion’s argument that Blakely applies retroactively to his motion, the Court disagrees. See Garcia v. United States, No. 04-CV-0465, 2004 WL 1752588 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.4, 2004) (holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively to claims raised in a 2255 motion",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nerror due to Apprendi would have been considered harmless because Concepcion was subject to a sentence of life imprisonment for more than one of his convictions. Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 234-236. Accordingly, Concepcion was properly sentenced to life in prison. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Blakely and Crawford are not applicable to Concepcion’s case. This case is distinguishable from Crawford in that the statements to which Concepcion refers were sufficiently redacted and thus, properly admitted at trial. See Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 222-223 and “Appendix A.” With regard to Concepcion’s argument that Blakely applies retroactively to his motion, the Court disagrees. See Garcia v. United States, No. 04-CV-0465, 2004 WL 1752588 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.4, 2004) (holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively to initial section 2255 motions for habeas relief",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nerror due to Apprendi would have been considered harmless because Concepcion was subject to a sentence of life imprisonment for more than one of his convictions. Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 234-236. Accordingly, Concepcion was properly sentenced to life in prison. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Blakely and Crawford are not applicable to Concepcion’s case. This case is distinguishable from Crawford in that the statements to which Concepcion refers were sufficiently redacted and thus, properly admitted at trial. See Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 222-223 and “Appendix A.” With regard to Concepcion’s argument that Blakely applies retroactively to his motion, the Court disagrees. See Garcia v. United States, No. 04-CV-0465, 2004 WL 1752588 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.4, 2004) (holding that because apprendi does not apply retroactively neither does blakely",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nerror due to Apprendi would have been considered harmless because Concepcion was subject to a sentence of life imprisonment for more than one of his convictions. Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 234-236. Accordingly, Concepcion was properly sentenced to life in prison. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Blakely and Crawford are not applicable to Concepcion’s case. This case is distinguishable from Crawford in that the statements to which Concepcion refers were sufficiently redacted and thus, properly admitted at trial. See Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 222-223 and “Appendix A.” With regard to Concepcion’s argument that Blakely applies retroactively to his motion, the Court disagrees. See Garcia v. United States, No. 04-CV-0465, 2004 WL 1752588 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.4, 2004) (holding that blakely does not apply retroactively to 2255 motions"
] |
). The Supreme Court has not, as yet, ruled that
| 4 |
693 |
[
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Court deems the § 523(a)(9) claim to have been tried by the consent of parties, and the Court will therefore consider whether this debt should be excepted from discharge under either §§ 523(a)(6) or (a)(9). Wood also cited § 523(a)(2) in her complaint, however, Wood has never argued this theory applied under these facts. The Court considers any claim by Wood under this Code section to have been abandoned by Wood. 8 . Assuming a picture can indeed be worth a thousand words, and to give additional context and flavor to this discussion, a photo of the subject truck, admitted in evidence in this action, is appended to this decision. 9 . In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has endorsed the use of an objective test. Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that there must be proof of both a willful act and malicious injury to establish nondischargeability under section 523a6",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Court deems the § 523(a)(9) claim to have been tried by the consent of parties, and the Court will therefore consider whether this debt should be excepted from discharge under either §§ 523(a)(6) or (a)(9). Wood also cited § 523(a)(2) in her complaint, however, Wood has never argued this theory applied under these facts. The Court considers any claim by Wood under this Code section to have been abandoned by Wood. 8 . Assuming a picture can indeed be worth a thousand words, and to give additional context and flavor to this discussion, a photo of the subject truck, admitted in evidence in this action, is appended to this decision. 9 . In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has endorsed the use of an objective test. Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under 523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Court deems the § 523(a)(9) claim to have been tried by the consent of parties, and the Court will therefore consider whether this debt should be excepted from discharge under either §§ 523(a)(6) or (a)(9). Wood also cited § 523(a)(2) in her complaint, however, Wood has never argued this theory applied under these facts. The Court considers any claim by Wood under this Code section to have been abandoned by Wood. 8 . Assuming a picture can indeed be worth a thousand words, and to give additional context and flavor to this discussion, a photo of the subject truck, admitted in evidence in this action, is appended to this decision. 9 . In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has endorsed the use of an objective test. Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that either objective substantial certainty or subjective motive meets the supreme courts definition of willful injury in 523a6",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Court deems the § 523(a)(9) claim to have been tried by the consent of parties, and the Court will therefore consider whether this debt should be excepted from discharge under either §§ 523(a)(6) or (a)(9). Wood also cited § 523(a)(2) in her complaint, however, Wood has never argued this theory applied under these facts. The Court considers any claim by Wood under this Code section to have been abandoned by Wood. 8 . Assuming a picture can indeed be worth a thousand words, and to give additional context and flavor to this discussion, a photo of the subject truck, admitted in evidence in this action, is appended to this decision. 9 . In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has endorsed the use of an objective test. Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that 523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Court deems the § 523(a)(9) claim to have been tried by the consent of parties, and the Court will therefore consider whether this debt should be excepted from discharge under either §§ 523(a)(6) or (a)(9). Wood also cited § 523(a)(2) in her complaint, however, Wood has never argued this theory applied under these facts. The Court considers any claim by Wood under this Code section to have been abandoned by Wood. 8 . Assuming a picture can indeed be worth a thousand words, and to give additional context and flavor to this discussion, a photo of the subject truck, admitted in evidence in this action, is appended to this decision. 9 . In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has endorsed the use of an objective test. Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that a mere deliberate or intentional act that causes injury is not sufficient to establish willfulness in the context of 11 usc 523a6"
] |
) 10 . Recall, Jury Instruction No. 16 provides:
| 2 |
694 |
[
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nadministration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation”). That goal would not be achieved by requiring a plaintiff who no longer is part of the prison population to return to the institution to partake of an internal administrative dispute mechanism. Other courts have reached the opposite view. See, e.g., Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d 985, 991-92 (D.Ariz.2003); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F.Supp. 1318, 1327 (S.D.Ind.1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.1997); Kerr v. Puckett, 967 F.Supp. 354, 361-62 (E.D.Wis.1997). However, those decisions appear to constitute a minority position, as several other courts have held that the PLRA applies only to inmates confined at the time the lawsuit is commenced. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the ideas exhaustion requirement applies to claims asserted under 1983",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nadministration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation”). That goal would not be achieved by requiring a plaintiff who no longer is part of the prison population to return to the institution to partake of an internal administrative dispute mechanism. Other courts have reached the opposite view. See, e.g., Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d 985, 991-92 (D.Ariz.2003); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F.Supp. 1318, 1327 (S.D.Ind.1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.1997); Kerr v. Puckett, 967 F.Supp. 354, 361-62 (E.D.Wis.1997). However, those decisions appear to constitute a minority position, as several other courts have held that the PLRA applies only to inmates confined at the time the lawsuit is commenced. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nadministration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation”). That goal would not be achieved by requiring a plaintiff who no longer is part of the prison population to return to the institution to partake of an internal administrative dispute mechanism. Other courts have reached the opposite view. See, e.g., Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d 985, 991-92 (D.Ariz.2003); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F.Supp. 1318, 1327 (S.D.Ind.1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.1997); Kerr v. Puckett, 967 F.Supp. 354, 361-62 (E.D.Wis.1997). However, those decisions appear to constitute a minority position, as several other courts have held that the PLRA applies only to inmates confined at the time the lawsuit is commenced. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2000) (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nadministration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation”). That goal would not be achieved by requiring a plaintiff who no longer is part of the prison population to return to the institution to partake of an internal administrative dispute mechanism. Other courts have reached the opposite view. See, e.g., Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d 985, 991-92 (D.Ariz.2003); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F.Supp. 1318, 1327 (S.D.Ind.1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.1997); Kerr v. Puckett, 967 F.Supp. 354, 361-62 (E.D.Wis.1997). However, those decisions appear to constitute a minority position, as several other courts have held that the PLRA applies only to inmates confined at the time the lawsuit is commenced. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nadministration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation”). That goal would not be achieved by requiring a plaintiff who no longer is part of the prison population to return to the institution to partake of an internal administrative dispute mechanism. Other courts have reached the opposite view. See, e.g., Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d 985, 991-92 (D.Ariz.2003); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F.Supp. 1318, 1327 (S.D.Ind.1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.1997); Kerr v. Puckett, 967 F.Supp. 354, 361-62 (E.D.Wis.1997). However, those decisions appear to constitute a minority position, as several other courts have held that the PLRA applies only to inmates confined at the time the lawsuit is commenced. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the exhaustion requirement applies only to individuals who at the time they seek to file their civil actions are detained as a result of being accused of convicted of or sentenced for criminal offenses"
] |
); Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d
| 4 |
695 |
[
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nas an injunction is set forth in Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 85, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), and it requires a litigant requesting appeal to show: (1) that the order has the practical effect of an injunction; and (2) that the order might have “serious, perhaps irreparable eonsequence[s].” As demonstrated in our discussion of the third Cohen factor, supra, this is not a situation where Landise will suffer irreparable consequences. However, we need not reach the Carson test because this court has held that prejudgment security devices “generally have been expressly excluded from the definition of an injunction for appeal purposes and thus are subject to appeal only to the extent they fall within the Cohen collateral order doctrine.” McQueen, 547 A.2d at 177 (holding no due process violation with respect to hearings for protective orders against domestic abuse",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nas an injunction is set forth in Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 85, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), and it requires a litigant requesting appeal to show: (1) that the order has the practical effect of an injunction; and (2) that the order might have “serious, perhaps irreparable eonsequence[s].” As demonstrated in our discussion of the third Cohen factor, supra, this is not a situation where Landise will suffer irreparable consequences. However, we need not reach the Carson test because this court has held that prejudgment security devices “generally have been expressly excluded from the definition of an injunction for appeal purposes and thus are subject to appeal only to the extent they fall within the Cohen collateral order doctrine.” McQueen, 547 A.2d at 177 (holding that protective orders in the landlord and tenant branch are distinguishable from ordinary prejudgment security devices because protective orders are not statutory creations and because a tenant who fails to pay a protective order may suffer the irreparable consequence of losing possession of the property",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nas an injunction is set forth in Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 85, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), and it requires a litigant requesting appeal to show: (1) that the order has the practical effect of an injunction; and (2) that the order might have “serious, perhaps irreparable eonsequence[s].” As demonstrated in our discussion of the third Cohen factor, supra, this is not a situation where Landise will suffer irreparable consequences. However, we need not reach the Carson test because this court has held that prejudgment security devices “generally have been expressly excluded from the definition of an injunction for appeal purposes and thus are subject to appeal only to the extent they fall within the Cohen collateral order doctrine.” McQueen, 547 A.2d at 177 (holding expired child abuse protective order not moot because of possible effect on future custody determinations",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nas an injunction is set forth in Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 85, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), and it requires a litigant requesting appeal to show: (1) that the order has the practical effect of an injunction; and (2) that the order might have “serious, perhaps irreparable eonsequence[s].” As demonstrated in our discussion of the third Cohen factor, supra, this is not a situation where Landise will suffer irreparable consequences. However, we need not reach the Carson test because this court has held that prejudgment security devices “generally have been expressly excluded from the definition of an injunction for appeal purposes and thus are subject to appeal only to the extent they fall within the Cohen collateral order doctrine.” McQueen, 547 A.2d at 177 (holding that trial courts denial of defendants motion seeking a qualified protective order allowing defendants to question the patientplaintiffs health care providers about any and all medical care she received during a threemonth period was not an abuse of discretion because the qualified protective order was not sufficiently tailored to limit the defendants to discussing only the medical conditions at issue in the litigation when the plaintiffs complaint involved only the cause extent treatment and consequences of the patients wound",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nas an injunction is set forth in Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 85, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), and it requires a litigant requesting appeal to show: (1) that the order has the practical effect of an injunction; and (2) that the order might have “serious, perhaps irreparable eonsequence[s].” As demonstrated in our discussion of the third Cohen factor, supra, this is not a situation where Landise will suffer irreparable consequences. However, we need not reach the Carson test because this court has held that prejudgment security devices “generally have been expressly excluded from the definition of an injunction for appeal purposes and thus are subject to appeal only to the extent they fall within the Cohen collateral order doctrine.” McQueen, 547 A.2d at 177 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it modified a protective order after settlement to permit public access to pretrial materials in spite of a protective order to the contrary which it viewed as having had been initially justified"
] |
). Cf. Cohen v. Board of Trs. of the Univ. of
| 1 |
696 |
[
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nattempt to avoid the effect of a judgment offered as a link in the chain of title in a suit to try the title to property. See In re A.L.H.C., 49 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Tex.App.Dallas 2001, pet. denied). SOS Alliance argues that its attempt to set aside the 2004 judgment can be considered a collateral attack on the judgment. We disagree. This proceeding was instituted for the sole purpose of declaring the 2004 judgment void, and in the same district court in which exas Supreme Court’s holding with respect to what constitutes a collateral attack. See Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 345-46 (defining collateral attack as made in “a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment”); see also Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Tex.1985) (per curiam) (holding that bill of review is exclusive remedy on direct attack where court had jurisdictional power even if judgment void",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nattempt to avoid the effect of a judgment offered as a link in the chain of title in a suit to try the title to property. See In re A.L.H.C., 49 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Tex.App.Dallas 2001, pet. denied). SOS Alliance argues that its attempt to set aside the 2004 judgment can be considered a collateral attack on the judgment. We disagree. This proceeding was instituted for the sole purpose of declaring the 2004 judgment void, and in the same district court in which exas Supreme Court’s holding with respect to what constitutes a collateral attack. See Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 345-46 (defining collateral attack as made in “a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment”); see also Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Tex.1985) (per curiam) (holding that the meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review proceeding violates due process where the bill of review plaintiff has no notice of the proceeding in which the default judgment was rendered",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nattempt to avoid the effect of a judgment offered as a link in the chain of title in a suit to try the title to property. See In re A.L.H.C., 49 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Tex.App.Dallas 2001, pet. denied). SOS Alliance argues that its attempt to set aside the 2004 judgment can be considered a collateral attack on the judgment. We disagree. This proceeding was instituted for the sole purpose of declaring the 2004 judgment void, and in the same district court in which exas Supreme Court’s holding with respect to what constitutes a collateral attack. See Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 345-46 (defining collateral attack as made in “a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment”); see also Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Tex.1985) (per curiam) (holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nattempt to avoid the effect of a judgment offered as a link in the chain of title in a suit to try the title to property. See In re A.L.H.C., 49 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Tex.App.Dallas 2001, pet. denied). SOS Alliance argues that its attempt to set aside the 2004 judgment can be considered a collateral attack on the judgment. We disagree. This proceeding was instituted for the sole purpose of declaring the 2004 judgment void, and in the same district court in which exas Supreme Court’s holding with respect to what constitutes a collateral attack. See Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 345-46 (defining collateral attack as made in “a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment”); see also Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Tex.1985) (per curiam) (recognizing collateral attack on void order",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nattempt to avoid the effect of a judgment offered as a link in the chain of title in a suit to try the title to property. See In re A.L.H.C., 49 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Tex.App.Dallas 2001, pet. denied). SOS Alliance argues that its attempt to set aside the 2004 judgment can be considered a collateral attack on the judgment. We disagree. This proceeding was instituted for the sole purpose of declaring the 2004 judgment void, and in the same district court in which exas Supreme Court’s holding with respect to what constitutes a collateral attack. See Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 345-46 (defining collateral attack as made in “a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment”); see also Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Tex.1985) (per curiam) (holding that bill of review brought in wrong court constitutes collateral attack"
] |
). In accordance with supreme court precedent,
| 0 |
697 |
[
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n229 S.W.3d 415, 434 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). To prevail in a forc ible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. However, where the right to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of a title dispute, a justice court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment. Id. Accordingly, a justice court is not deprived of jurisdiction merely by the existence of a title dispute; it is deprived of jurisdiction only if resolution of a title dispute is a prerequisite to determination of the right to immediate possession. See id.', cf. Dass, Inc. v. Smith, 206 S.W.3d 197, 200-01 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that some special relationship between the parties is required to recover under the theory of negligent misrepresentation",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n229 S.W.3d 415, 434 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). To prevail in a forc ible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. However, where the right to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of a title dispute, a justice court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment. Id. Accordingly, a justice court is not deprived of jurisdiction merely by the existence of a title dispute; it is deprived of jurisdiction only if resolution of a title dispute is a prerequisite to determination of the right to immediate possession. See id.', cf. Dass, Inc. v. Smith, 206 S.W.3d 197, 200-01 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that a duty of care may arise out of a contractual relationship between two parties",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n229 S.W.3d 415, 434 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). To prevail in a forc ible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. However, where the right to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of a title dispute, a justice court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment. Id. Accordingly, a justice court is not deprived of jurisdiction merely by the existence of a title dispute; it is deprived of jurisdiction only if resolution of a title dispute is a prerequisite to determination of the right to immediate possession. See id.', cf. Dass, Inc. v. Smith, 206 S.W.3d 197, 200-01 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that where relationship between parties was one of buyerseller rather than lessorlessee determination of right to immediate possession of property necessarily required resolution of title dispute and jurisdiction lay in district court",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n229 S.W.3d 415, 434 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). To prevail in a forc ible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. However, where the right to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of a title dispute, a justice court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment. Id. Accordingly, a justice court is not deprived of jurisdiction merely by the existence of a title dispute; it is deprived of jurisdiction only if resolution of a title dispute is a prerequisite to determination of the right to immediate possession. See id.', cf. Dass, Inc. v. Smith, 206 S.W.3d 197, 200-01 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding where the commonwealth is not in possession of property in question petition for return of property is moot",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n229 S.W.3d 415, 434 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). To prevail in a forc ible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. However, where the right to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of a title dispute, a justice court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment. Id. Accordingly, a justice court is not deprived of jurisdiction merely by the existence of a title dispute; it is deprived of jurisdiction only if resolution of a title dispute is a prerequisite to determination of the right to immediate possession. See id.', cf. Dass, Inc. v. Smith, 206 S.W.3d 197, 200-01 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that immediate right to appeal lies from denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction"
] |
). It has been long settled in Texas
| 2 |
698 |
[
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nprovisions are mandatory, exclusive, and require compliance in all respects, otherwise the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dubai Petroleum Company v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75-77 (Tex.2000). Though the Kazi court indicated a general preference by the high court to follow the modern trend of minimizing the number of defects that deprive courts of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Kazi court did not state or even suggest that no failure to follow a statutory prerequisite would henceforth be a jurisdictional defect. See Kazi, 12 S.W.3d at 74—77. Indeed, on various occasions since it decided Kazi, the high court has held that a failure to follow a statutory prerequisite is a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442-43 (Tex.2013) (holding that the signature requirement was an indispensable condition precedent and the failure to comply with it deprived the town of jurisdiction to annex",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nprovisions are mandatory, exclusive, and require compliance in all respects, otherwise the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dubai Petroleum Company v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75-77 (Tex.2000). Though the Kazi court indicated a general preference by the high court to follow the modern trend of minimizing the number of defects that deprive courts of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Kazi court did not state or even suggest that no failure to follow a statutory prerequisite would henceforth be a jurisdictional defect. See Kazi, 12 S.W.3d at 74—77. Indeed, on various occasions since it decided Kazi, the high court has held that a failure to follow a statutory prerequisite is a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442-43 (Tex.2013) (holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nprovisions are mandatory, exclusive, and require compliance in all respects, otherwise the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dubai Petroleum Company v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75-77 (Tex.2000). Though the Kazi court indicated a general preference by the high court to follow the modern trend of minimizing the number of defects that deprive courts of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Kazi court did not state or even suggest that no failure to follow a statutory prerequisite would henceforth be a jurisdictional defect. See Kazi, 12 S.W.3d at 74—77. Indeed, on various occasions since it decided Kazi, the high court has held that a failure to follow a statutory prerequisite is a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442-43 (Tex.2013) (holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nprovisions are mandatory, exclusive, and require compliance in all respects, otherwise the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dubai Petroleum Company v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75-77 (Tex.2000). Though the Kazi court indicated a general preference by the high court to follow the modern trend of minimizing the number of defects that deprive courts of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Kazi court did not state or even suggest that no failure to follow a statutory prerequisite would henceforth be a jurisdictional defect. See Kazi, 12 S.W.3d at 74—77. Indeed, on various occasions since it decided Kazi, the high court has held that a failure to follow a statutory prerequisite is a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442-43 (Tex.2013) (holding that failure to comply with statutory prerequisite deprived the courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nprovisions are mandatory, exclusive, and require compliance in all respects, otherwise the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dubai Petroleum Company v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75-77 (Tex.2000). Though the Kazi court indicated a general preference by the high court to follow the modern trend of minimizing the number of defects that deprive courts of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Kazi court did not state or even suggest that no failure to follow a statutory prerequisite would henceforth be a jurisdictional defect. See Kazi, 12 S.W.3d at 74—77. Indeed, on various occasions since it decided Kazi, the high court has held that a failure to follow a statutory prerequisite is a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442-43 (Tex.2013) (holding appealable district courts order dismissing for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction due to determination of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction"
] |
); In re John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy
| 3 |
699 |
[
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d). The implementing regulations to the above Section note that a reviewing court may only address matters on appeal of a Notice of Determination that were raised by the taxpayer at the collection due process hearing. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6380-1(f)(2) Q-F5/A-F5 (stating that “the taxpayer can only ask the court to consider an issue that was raised in the taxpayer’s CDP hearing”). Courts interpreting these provisions have determined that actions brought pursuant to § 6330(d) are actions for administrative review and, thus, the reviewing district court is limited to the administrative record and the parties are not entitled to discovery or jury trial. See e.g. Community Residential Services, Inc. v. U.S., 2003 WL 21033239 at * 1 (M.D.N.C. May 7, 2003) (holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d). The implementing regulations to the above Section note that a reviewing court may only address matters on appeal of a Notice of Determination that were raised by the taxpayer at the collection due process hearing. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6380-1(f)(2) Q-F5/A-F5 (stating that “the taxpayer can only ask the court to consider an issue that was raised in the taxpayer’s CDP hearing”). Courts interpreting these provisions have determined that actions brought pursuant to § 6330(d) are actions for administrative review and, thus, the reviewing district court is limited to the administrative record and the parties are not entitled to discovery or jury trial. See e.g. Community Residential Services, Inc. v. U.S., 2003 WL 21033239 at * 1 (M.D.N.C. May 7, 2003) (holding appeal of termination is limited to information that is part of the record",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d). The implementing regulations to the above Section note that a reviewing court may only address matters on appeal of a Notice of Determination that were raised by the taxpayer at the collection due process hearing. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6380-1(f)(2) Q-F5/A-F5 (stating that “the taxpayer can only ask the court to consider an issue that was raised in the taxpayer’s CDP hearing”). Courts interpreting these provisions have determined that actions brought pursuant to § 6330(d) are actions for administrative review and, thus, the reviewing district court is limited to the administrative record and the parties are not entitled to discovery or jury trial. See e.g. Community Residential Services, Inc. v. U.S., 2003 WL 21033239 at * 1 (M.D.N.C. May 7, 2003) (holding that there is no right to habeas review of administrative evidentiary determinations before a district court where direct review of the administrative proceedings is available in the appellate courts",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d). The implementing regulations to the above Section note that a reviewing court may only address matters on appeal of a Notice of Determination that were raised by the taxpayer at the collection due process hearing. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6380-1(f)(2) Q-F5/A-F5 (stating that “the taxpayer can only ask the court to consider an issue that was raised in the taxpayer’s CDP hearing”). Courts interpreting these provisions have determined that actions brought pursuant to § 6330(d) are actions for administrative review and, thus, the reviewing district court is limited to the administrative record and the parties are not entitled to discovery or jury trial. See e.g. Community Residential Services, Inc. v. U.S., 2003 WL 21033239 at * 1 (M.D.N.C. May 7, 2003) (holding that the district courts review of a partial and truncated record was error and remanding the case for review on the entire administrative record",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d). The implementing regulations to the above Section note that a reviewing court may only address matters on appeal of a Notice of Determination that were raised by the taxpayer at the collection due process hearing. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6380-1(f)(2) Q-F5/A-F5 (stating that “the taxpayer can only ask the court to consider an issue that was raised in the taxpayer’s CDP hearing”). Courts interpreting these provisions have determined that actions brought pursuant to § 6330(d) are actions for administrative review and, thus, the reviewing district court is limited to the administrative record and the parties are not entitled to discovery or jury trial. See e.g. Community Residential Services, Inc. v. U.S., 2003 WL 21033239 at * 1 (M.D.N.C. May 7, 2003) (holding that a district courts review of a 6330d appeal is limited to the administrative record and the parties are not entitled to discovery"
] |
); Carroll v. United States, 217 F.Supp.2d 852,
| 4 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.