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Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence 621

2016-50/4330/en_head.json.gz/16034

Wikia is a free-to-use site that makes money from advertising. We have a modified experience for viewers using ad blockers Wikia is not accessible if you’ve made further modifications. Remove the custom ad blocker rule(s) and the page will load as expected. Copyright is a term encompassing a wide range of laws designed to protect inventors and creators of original work from having such work resold without permission, falsely attributed, or used in some other way that is harmful to the creator or their ability to market the product. It's scope often intersects those of intellectual property and patent law. Plagiarists risk trouble for violating copyright laws. Contents[show] The first appearance of a copyright law dates back to the UK in 1709, when the Statute of Anne was created. It protected the authors of books, maps and drafts from their works being copied for up to 28 years (14 years + an optional extension for another 14 years). In 1790, a similar law was also accepted by the United States Congress. After that, length of the copyright term, as well as its scope, were extended multiple times; as a result, nowadays a work is protected by copyright from being published until 70 years after the author's death (or 95 years in case of works made by companies). Copyright nowadaysEdit While the increasing availability and scope of mass media has called the entire Philosophy of copyright into debate, there is general agreement that at its best, copyright protects everyone from the small-time blogger to the heavily-funded research collaboration from having their creative works blatantly abused, and at its worst, it has been used to prevent legitimate art and research from being pursued, even if such work is not intended to be marketed. Despite many on-line still debating to the degree of how exactly copyright should be reformed (or not), many agree that today's long term and wide scope of copyright rewards publishers significantly more than both people or the authors of their works. Copyright laws sometimes unpopular because big money making corporations will sue you for copying a movie they made to share with friends. But at least we have it, because if we have Eric Bauman, we need copyright. Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity Retrieved from "http://liberapedia.wikia.com/wiki/Copyright?oldid=92602"

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Morrison County Record Opinion & Columns Disappointing that taxpayers of Little Falls have been sued Published May 18, 2012 at 1:23 pm It is disappointing to learn that Robin Hensel has sued the taxpayers of Little Falls because of what she perceives as alleged discrimination. Last fall, Hensel was ordered to take down numerous political signs in her yard that were in violation of the city sign ordinance. She then pointed out that the sign ordinance was not being enforced uniformly. In response, the city took her objections to heart and has been working diligently to create a sign ordinance that is uniformly enforceable. The end product will probably upset a number of other residents, but Hensel’s objection goes to the heart of the U.S. Constitution, which says in effect that when it comes to political speech, the government can’t discriminate against people with whom it disagrees. She also accuses Little Falls Police Chief Greg Schirmers of not protecting her when she received on-line death threats for pointing out that a “We Support Our Troops” sign was in violation of the sign ordinance. Since she has thankfully not been physically attacked, she will have a difficult time proving that the city discriminated against her or that its response was inadequate. We also believe that Hensel will have a hard time proving that the city discriminated against her when it decided not to replace a bench on which she wanted to buy ad space near city hall. There is no constitutional right to a bench by city hall, nor to placing advertising on it, even if it did exist. Hensel’s other point is that she was denied access to an overnight camping permit for an “Occupy” demonstration in a city park. City code is quite clear that no overnight camping will be allowed in city parks. Indeed, as far as we know the city has never issued an overnight camping permit for a city park. However, Hensel raises the issue of the Antiques and Collectibles Fair at Le Bourget Park, in which some booth operators may have slept overnight in their tents to protect their wares. A large group of cross-state bicycle riders also spent a night in Le Bourget Park a couple of years ago. This may require the city to rework the ordinance to accommodate all law-abiding groups in the same way. We would have preferred that Hensel and the city work together to make those changes, but once someone files suit that changes everything. Tax dollars needed for other activities must be spent defending the city in court, and, if she prevails, will hurt taxpayers even more.

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2016-50/4330/en_head.json.gz/16093

Q&A: Newfoundland lawyer files moose collision lawsuit Sarah Boesveld | January 11, 2011 4:34 PM ETMore from Sarah Boesveld | @sarahboesveld They’re one of the calm gentle giants of the Canadian wilderness. But should a moose stroll in front of your vehicle, the damage could be significant, and, in some cases, fatal. This week, 40 Newfoundland residents who had been hospitalized due to moose-vehicle crashes filed a class action lawsuit against the province for allowing the moose population to surge beyond control (there are about 150,000, with about 40,000 added to the Newfoundland population each year) and thus pose a danger to drivers. They’re right to blame the government for the population explosion, says Newfoundland personal injury lawyer Ches Crosbie, who is representing the victims. He spoke to the Post’s Sarah Boesveld from his St. John’s office: Q: Clearly, a person can’t sue a moose for damage and personal injury. But why is the government to blame? A: It looks a lot less strange when you realize that Parks Canada has been studying Gros Morne Park (in Newfoundland) and have decided to eliminate 4,000 moose out of 5,000 within the boundaries this year. The moose are eating us out of house and home, changing the composition of the landscape in the province and destroying the young trees so that we’re losing forest cover. But the park has 25 moose vehicle collisions a year too. One of the benefits of reducing the density of the animal is if you have fewer animals in the woods, you’ll have fewer animals on the road. Q: Canadians tend to think of moose as an indigenous and iconic Canadian animal. But you say in your statement of claim that it really isn’t the case, at least not in Newfoundland. A: It’s a Canadian animal all right, but back in the last Ice Age, the glaciers covered Newfoundland and it had to be colonized by flora and fauna all over again around 18,000 years ago. And the truth of the matter is that moose did not colonize the island, they were brought here 100 years ago by an act of the government. Q: But how can you hold today’s government to account for something their predecessors did 100 years ago? How would they know that in a century, the moose would become a threat to drivers? A: The government runs a chain of accountability and responsibility, but that’s only one factor. It does make us unique in that the animal is exotic and, introduced to Newfoundland, it can be called an invasive species. And whenever introduction is done, the outcome is never predictable. The other very important factor is that moose have been breeding like rabbits, far in excess of the ecological capacity of the land to carry them. Q: What can happen to you if your vehicle’s hit by a moose? A: Moose are 1,000 lb. rabbits on stilts. When a vehicle hits them, the front grill strikes the legs, usually breaking them, and the centre mass of the moose is in the upper body behind the shoulder. And at highway speeds, the bulk of the moose hits the windscreen and the support pillars of a passenger vehicle crashes through the windscreen and lands on top of the front seat passenger and driver. Q: That sounds like a tonne of impact. A: That’s literally correct. Q: So how have moose-vehicle crashes impacted your clients? A: We’re not doing this lawsuit to collect for property damage and we’re not trying to get compensation for people who might have had to go to emergency but not admitted to hospital. We’re suing for people who were admitted as inpatients, and particularly for the most catastrophically injured of those. Q: What about the recommendation to “remove” populations of moose. Have you heard from anyone opposed to a cull? A: No. In Newfoundland, we like our moose. We’re not bloodthirsty, out to kill moose for no good reason. And when we do kill them, we use the animal. We like them as a tasty meal. The fact remains that there are 40,000 new moose deposited onto the landscape of this island every year. Q: What are some other ways to reduce the number of moose-vehicle collisions in Newfoundland? A: There are proven methods of reducing, dramatically, the rate of collision and injury. One example would be moose fencing, and we’ve seen that implemented in a nearby province, New Brunswick. Q: Any word from the province just yet? A: No. It’ll be interesting to see. We’ve asked them not to regard the people in the class as the enemy or for that matter, the people who are using the roadway as the enemy, but to sit down and start talking with us about how solutions can be come up with and imposed. Topics: Canada, News, Accidents, lawsuits, Moose

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You are here: Home / Front Page / Latest News / Voting Rights Act Section 5 Preclearance Provision threatened by Challenge at the U.S. Supreme CourtVoting Rights Act Section 5 Preclearance Provision threatened by Challenge at the U.S. Supreme Court February 24, 2013 2 Comments Image: thedailybeast.com Despite the fact that African Americans and other racial and ethnic minority Americans are guaranteed the right to vote by the 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which was passed just after the Civil War in 1870, states and local jurisdictions continued to use disenfranchising tactics such as poll taxes, literacy tests, gerrymandering and outright intimidation to stop people from casting free and unfettered ballots. Thus the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) was enacted to insure that no federal, state or local government may in any way impede people from registering to vote or voting because of their race or ethnicity. Most provisions in the VRA, and specifically the portions that guarantee that no one may be denied the right to vote because of his or her race or color, are permanent. Section 5 of the VRA, which was originally set to expire after 5 years, requires certain jurisdictions which have an established history of state- or jurisdiction-administered disenfranchisement based on race to obtain advance approval or “preclearance” from the US Department of Justice or the US District Court in D.C. before they can make any changes to voting practices or procedures. This includes “redistricting”, or the re-drawing of congressional district boundaries which happens every 10 years as the result of the census. Federal approval is to be given as soon as the jurisdiction proves that the proposed change would not abridge the right to vote on account of race or color. Under Section 5 a proposed redistricting map must demonstrate that the changes have neither a discriminatory purpose nor effect. Since 1982, the VRA has also included a “bail-out” mechanism, which allows a jurisdiction to be removed from Section 5 coverage if it can show that (1) it has been in full compliance with the preclearance requirements for the past 10 years; (2) no test or device has been used to discriminate on the basis of race, color, or language minority status; and (3) no lawsuits against the jurisdiction, alleging voting discrimination, are pending. Bipartisan congressional majorities have reauthorized Section 5 of the VRA four times, most recently in 2006, when it passed the House overwhelmingly and the Senate unanimously after over 20 hearings and testimony from more than 50 expert witnesses and more than 17,000 pages of testimony (including testimony submitted by the NAACP) and was signed into law by then-President George W. Bush. On Feb. 27, 2013, the United State Supreme Court will hear arguments in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, a case which challenges the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA. On May 18, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court ruling in this case upholding the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA. Writing for the majority, Judge David Tatel stated that Congress still had the right to insist that the Justice Department continue to monitor voting rights in certain areas. Without Section 5, Tatel concluded, the rights of minority voters would be in jeopardy. Further proof of the continued need for Section 5 can be found in the fact that since 2010, 8 out of the 11 states in the former Confederacy have passed laws designed to make it harder for racial and ethnic minorities to register and vote. Related PostsQuicken Loans’ lawsuit accuses DOJ of abuse of powerA Disgraceful Court Decision What part of American Southern history needs to be preserved?Hillary is ready for a run for the White House – Is America ready for her?Statement from Robert L. Johnson on the recent decisions on civil rights & affirmative actionFreedom Sunday: The Role of the African American Faith CommunityAssociation of American Physicians and Surgeons goes to court to fight ObamaCareNew DNC Website: Voting rights matter Filed Under: Latest News, Politics, National Comments Roger Clegg, Ctr for Equal Opportunity says February 25, 2013 at 12:26 pm Here’s why Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is bad policy, outdated, unconstitutional, and ought to be struck down by the Supreme Court: http://www.pacificlegal.org/opeds/Overturn-unconstitutional-Voting-Rights-Act and http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/341443/two-points-ishelby-county-v-holderi-roger-clegg What’s especially ironic is that the principal use to which Section 5 is put today is forcing jurisdictions to create and maintain racially segregated and gerrymandered voting districts – which is completely at odds with the original ideals of the Civil Rights Movement. There are other federal laws available to protect the rights of voters, and they don’t raise the problems that Section 5 does. Leave a Reply Cancel reply Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *Comment Name * Email * Website NDG Current Edition – December 8, 2016 (Click here)

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http://www.ohr.edu/85 For the week ending 19 September 2009 / 29 Elul 5769 Bava Basra 30 - 36 by Rabbi Mendel Weinbach zt'l Mystery of The Stolen Silver The Case: Reuven enters the court of Rabbi Ami, presents a claim against Shimon that he stole a block of silver from him and produces a single witness who testifies that he saw the theft. Shimon responds by admitting that he took the silver but claims that it actually belonged to him although it was in Reuven's possession. Torah law does not give sufficient credence to the testimony of a single witness to conclusively decide a lawsuit but it does require the defendant to take an oath that he is telling the truth in denying the witness' testimony. Rabbi Ami therefore presented his dilemma by detailing all the possible judgments and why they are inapplicable. The Possibilities: 1)Make Shimon Pay? No! Only the testimony of two witnesses can conclusively establish that he took something which was not his. Here he should be believed to say that the silver belonged to him because if he were lying he would simply have denied that he ever took the silver. 2)Acquit Shimon? No! He cannot conclusively be believed because of the aforementioned alternative since there is a witness who testifies that he did take the silver and he would have been required to take an oath that he did not. 3)Let Shimon take an oath? No! The oath which the Torah recognizes as valid for negating the testimony of a single witness is one which directly confronts that testimony. Shimon is incapable of taking such an oath because he has already admitted taking the silver. He cannot take an oath to substantiate his claim that the silver was his because the testimony of the witness did not relate to that claim. The Solution: Rabbi Abba, who was present when the case was being tried, offered a ruling which was accepted by the court. Shimon, he explained, is in the position of an accused who can only exonerate himself by taking an oath. Since he technically cannot take the required oath he is in the same position as someone who is ineligible to take an oath because his record of dishonesty disqualifies his credibility and must therefore pay. Shimon too has, with his admission, forfeited the privilege of taking an oath and must return the silver. Bava Basra 33b A Mother's Memory If someone lays claim to an object which he once owned but is now in someone else's home the defendant is believed with his counter-claim that he purchased the object since there is no other reasonable explanation as to how it reached his home. This is not true, however, in regard to ambulatory objects such as slaves or animals since the disputed property could have walked into the home of the defendant and there been detained. The Sage Rava rules that if the slave was a baby in a crib the defendant will be able to claim that he purchased it since the child was unable to reach his home on its own. To the challenge that perhaps the baby was left there by its mother who subsequently forgot to retrieve him, Rava cited a rule of human nature: "A mother never forgets her child!" Bava Basra 36a

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214 F. 2d 575 - Farm Bureau Mut Auto Ins Co v. Bobo HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 214 F.2d. 214 F2d 575 Farm Bureau Mut Auto Ins Co v. Bobo 214 F.2d 575 FARM BUREAU MUT. AUTO. INS. CO. BOBO. United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit. Argued June 17, 1954. P. H. Nelson and E. W. Mullins, Columbia, S.C. (Nelson, Mullins & Grier, Columbia, S.C., on brief), for appellant. Augustus T. Graydon and C. T. Graydon, Columbia, S.C. for appellee. Before PARKER, Chief Judge, DOBIE, Circuit Judge, and WEBB, District judge. DOBIE, Circuit Judge. Claudia L. Bobo instituted this civil action against the Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to recover damages in the amount of $4,000.00 for the alleged breach of a standard automobile combination policy covering a Dodge Pick-up Truck. The policy had been issued to her by the Insurance Company on August 20, 1949. The case was heard by the District Judge, sitting without a jury, who decided that Bobo was entitled to judgment on the ground that the insurance policy was in full force and effect at the time of the accident. 119 F.Supp. 239. This decision has been duly appealed to us and the sole question to be determined is whether the District Judge was correct in holding that the insurance policy was in effect at the time of the accident. The policy in question was issued for a period of six months and, by its terms, would have expired on February 20, 1950. The premium for this initial coverage was paid by Bobo to the soliciting agent of the Insurance Company, D. C. Felkel. Prior to the expiration of the policy, appellant Company sent Bobo a notice of the premium required to renew the policy, which notice was received by the insured. Subsequently, Bobo asked Felkel if she could 'let it ride' for a few days and, according to Bobo, Felkel replied that she could 'let it ride for thirty days.' Appellant denies this statement alleged to have been made by Felkel but the District Court has found as a fact that such statement was made by Felkel to Bobo and there is nothing in the record to justify our disturbing this finding. Thus, we must proceed on the basis that Bobo did receive from Felkel an assurance that the Insurance Company granted a 30-day period of grace for renewing a policy. Bobo did send in her renewal premium, with the premium notice, in the envelope provided by the insurer. This payment was made on March 20, 1950, twenty-eight days after the initial period of insurance had expired but within the 30-day period of grace. Thereafter, later on the same day, the truck was involved in an accident and completely demolished. There is no question but that the premium payment was received by the appellant and it is also admitted that this payment was retained by the Company and no tender or offer of return has ever been made. On April 7, 1950, however, after the Insurance Company had knowledge of the accident involving the truck, a letter was sent to Bobo by the Company in which it was stated that the payment had arrived too late to prevent cancellation of the previous policy but that the payment had been applied to a new policy effective as of the date the payment was received. It was the contention of appellant that the applicable period of grace was only seventeen days and that the old policy had expired before payment was received. It should be noted, however, that there was nothing contained in the actual policy itself which made any mention whatsoever of either of the contested periods of grace. By adopting the method of issuing the new policy, effective beginning March 22, 1950, the Insurance Company attempted to avoid all liability incident to the accident in question. When Bobo received this letter from appellant, she replied by stating that she refused to accept the new policy, that the old policy was still in effect inasmuch as the premium thereon had been timely remitted and no cancellation had been received, and she also stated that no new policy was required since the truck had been damaged beyond repair before the new policy became effective. While the only question in this appeal concerns the validity of the original policy at the time of the accident, the District Judge's holding of validity may be affirmed on either of two grounds: (1) that the Company's agent, Felkel, had the authority to bind the Company to the 30-day period of grace; or (2) that by the acceptance and retention of the premium, the Company is estopped from claiming a forfeiture, has waived its rights to cancellation and, consequently, the original policy was in effect. Since we believe that, under the South Carolina law, the retention of premiums does serve as a waiver or estoppel, the judgment of the District Court must be affirmed. While it is not necessary to our decision of this case, we might comment upon the question of the agent's authority. Appellant contends, on this point, that its agent had no authority to enlarge or vary the terms of the principal, citing Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 4 Cir., 64 F.2d 583; Cauthen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 189 S.C. 356, 1 S.E.2d 147; Maybank & Co. v. Rogers, 98 S.C. 279, 82 S.E. 422. The Cauthen case concerned the authority of an agent to vary the written terms of an insurance contract, where the limitation of the agent's authority in such respect appeared on the policies. Neither the Simpson nor the Maybank case had to do with insurance agents and the facts of these two cases are quite different from the facts in the instant case. In the case before us there was nothing in the policy concerning any period of grace although the insurer admitted that at least a 17-day period was permitted. The agent's name was stamped on the insurance policy and the Company advised Bobo that if there were any questions as to the policy they should be called to the attention of the local representative. The Company admitted that Felkel had the power to execute a binding insurance contract without the prior knowledge of the Company. Under such circumstances, if an insured were to ask the agent about a period of grace and if, as here, the agent advised that a payment within thirty days would maintain the original policy in force, we believe that the apparent authority of this agent would be sufficient to bind his principal. See, Thomasen v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 168 S.C. 435, 167 S.E. 684; 44 C.J.S.,Insurance, § 149, pages 817-818. See, also, Henderson v. Capital Life & Health Insurance Co., 199 S.C. 100, 18 S.E.2d 605; Galphin v. Pioneer Life Insurance Co., 157 S.C. 469, 154 S.E. 855; 3 Couch on Insurance, § 701, 231. An even stronger reason in support of the judgment below, however, lies in the retention of the premium by the insurer. The inclusion of the pr mium notice with the check of Bobo should have indicated to the Company an intention to renew the existing policy. Even beyond this, however, the Company was explicitly advised that no new policy was desired or accepted and that the insured considered the original policy still in force. Under such circumstances, the insurer was obligated either to return the premium or to be held to have waived its ground for avoidance or forfeiture of the original policy. The South Carolina law on this point is clearly set out in Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Miller, 219 S.C. 17, 64 S.E.2d 8. At 64 S.E.2d at pages 12-13, it is stated: 'The words 'waiver,' 'estoppel', and 'implied ratification' appear rather frequently in insurance cases and are sometimes used interchangeably, although distinguishable in some respects. The principle expressed by the use of these terms is recognized in the law as tending to the furtherance of justice. The rule is succinctly and correctly stated in the following quotation from 45 C.J.S., Insurance, Sec. 672, page 610: 'An insurance company may waive, or be estopped to assert, a ground for avoidance or forfeiture of any insurance policy, and the courts are prompt to seize on any circumstances which indicate a waiver on the part of the company or which will raise an estoppel against it.' 'Indeed, the quoted statement extends further than appears to be necessary in the case at bar, for we think the acceptance and retention of the premium manifestly indicate waiver without the necessity of seizing upon merely incidental circumstances. 'Our Supreme Court held in the case of Spence v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 104 S.C. 403, 89 S.E. 319, that 'the defendant's failure after the fire to return the premium of insurance, or the unearned portion thereof, in accordance with the provisions of the policy, was evidence of waiver'. And in the case of Doyle v. Hill, 75 S.C. 261, 55 S.E. 446, 447, it was held (quoting from the opinion, which was delivered by Mr. Justice Jones): 'An insurance company, affected with knowledge of its agent and thus knowing the existence of a cause of forfeiture at the inception of the contract, is estopped to assert such forfeiture by accepting the premium, delivering the policy as a valid contract of insurance. Gandy v. Orient Insurance Co., 52 S.C. 224, 29 S.E. 655." In Dubuque Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 213 F.2d 115, 118, Judge Soper, speaking for our Court, thus commented upon the Miller case: 'The Supreme Court of South Carolina said in its opinion in Dubuque Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Miller, supra, that the oral binder arising from the transaction between the Wilson Agency and the owner of the restaurant was invalid under the settled law of the state because the agency failed to designate the Dubuque or any other company to assume the risk; and it also held that the agency had no authority to execute and deliver the policy because prior to assumption of the risk it had been notified that restaurants were on the prohibited list of the company. Nevertheless the court held the company liable on the ground that it waived its right to cancel the policy and thereby ratified the unauthorized act of the Wilson Agency because the Timmons Agency, the general agent of the company, accepted and retained the premium.' The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

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Difference between revisions of "Court Procedures" Revision as of 13:36, 17 June 2010 (view source)Erinfaythebrave (Talk | contribs)← Older edit Latest revision as of 07:39, 12 March 2014 (view source) Jamestew36 (Talk | contribs) (→‎External Links) Line 93: *[http://search.ancestry.com/search/category.aspx?cat=36 Search court records on Ancestry.com] *[http://search.ancestry.com/search/category.aspx?cat=36 Search court records on Ancestry.com] +* Coffres forts et armoires fortes sur le site http://www.infosafe.fr Researching Court Records Overview of Court Records Equity Cases Divorce Actions Types of Court Records List of Court Record Types Selected Proceedings and Courts Justice of the Peace Courts List of Useful Court References This article originally appeared in "Court Records" by Sandra Hargreaves Luebking, FUGA, Loretto Dennis Szucs, FUGA, and Arlene H. Eakle, Ph.D. in The Source: A Guidebook to American Genealogy Court procedures differ slightly from state to state, and more than three centuries have seen the evolution of American court procedures, yet many procedures date from the Middle Ages. On 1 June 1872, federal courts changed their procedural rules to conform to those of the states within which they were located. An overview of civil, criminal, and equity actions will define basic words and illuminate what is happening in court minutes and on the dockets.[1] 1 Starting the Action (Pleadings) in Civil Cases 2 Starting the Action (Pleadings) in Criminal Cases 3 Collecting Testimony 4 The Trial 5 Enforcing the Judgment (Execution) 6 New Trials and Appeals Starting the Action (Pleadings) in Civil Cases Every civil action begins with the issuing of a writ, in modern times usually a writ of summons, a command that notifies the defendant to appear before the court to answer a charge. The clerk, upon request of the plaintiff or an attorney, issues the writ under the court's authority. The court directs the sheriff or constable to serve the initiating writ on the defendant. In most jurisdictions, the defendant must receive it personally, but in a few, the sheriff can leave it with an adult member of the family or with someone in charge at the place of business. The usual procedure is for the sheriff to produce the original writ, tell the defendant its contents, and provide him or her with a copy. The sheriff will then make out a return, usually on the back of the original writ, stating where, when, and upon whom he has served it, sign it, and return it to the clerk of the court on or before the return day specified in the writ. The writ and the return are filed in the case file or packet as part of the permanent record of the case. In most cases, an action cannot proceed until the writ has actually been served. The notable exception is in divorce actions. The writ may be published in newspapers when the defendant is outside of the court's jurisdiction or when his or her whereabouts are unknown. In some cases, property may be seized by the sheriff to compel an absent defendant to appear. The next step is the filing of the plaintiff's claim. This pleading may be called a statement of claim, a complaint, or a petition. The purpose of the declaration or petition is to explain clearly the plaintiff's reason for taking action so that the defendant knows the nature of the claim and so that there is "a cause of action sufficient in law" to justify a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The declaration and notice are filed with the court clerk, and a copy is served on the defendant or his attorney. In some jurisdictions, only the attorneys exchange pleadings, not filing them with the clerk of the court until they have been completed or until a judgment may be entered. The defendant then counters with an answer or affidavit of defense admitting or denying the various claims contained in the plaintiff's declaration. It may also present new information bearing on the defense. It is filed with the court clerk, and a copy is served upon the plaintiff or his attorney. If the defendant fails to file an answer within the time allowed by law, the plaintiff is entitled upon motion of the court to enter judgment by default for "failure to file and answer." The clerk enters the judgment in the court records, and the court provides for the enforcement of the judgment. When the declaration and answer have been filed, and if the case has not been judged before, then it is "at issue"-ready for trial before a judge and jury. (In many courts, the parties can waive a jury trial and elect to have their case tried before the judge alone.) The case is then scheduled on the court's docket. In earlier times, there could be repeated exchanges of pleas between the plaintiff and the defendant, each exchange with its own name, like reply or replication, rejoinder, sur rejoinder, and rebutter. Most jurisdictions encourage litigating parties to settle their case out of court to save time and money. When it happens, the clerk usually notes it in the court records. Some jurisdictions require that civil cases under a certain amount be brought before a court of arbitration or conciliation before a trial. At this point, there are certain motions that can be entered to delay (stay) judgment. These motions pertain to points of law (legal technicalities). A record of them and their disposition is also part of the case file. Starting the Action (Pleadings) in Criminal Cases When a crime has been committed, the offender must be brought, by some legal process, before a tribunal to hear the complaint and take appropriate action. Before the days of organized law enforcement, in any locality, the citizens of a community were responsible to see that offenses were reported and the alleged offenders physically brought to court (presentment). Presentment could be made by private persons, constables, town watchmen, selectmen of the town, elected town presenters, grand jurors, government officials, paid informers, church wardens, tithing men, or by the court itself. For example, during the seventeenth century, the English tithing system was established in some colonies for short periods of time. Every male over age twelve was enrolled in a tithing (usually ten households), and one was appointed tithing man, responsible to inspect the households under his supervision regularly so that "sin and disorder may be prevented and suppressed," to see that everyone attended church on Sunday and kept the day holy, retired at curfew, and did not play cards or engage in other illegal gaming. The tithing man had to report offenders to the court or be fined. Today, the injured person, or the state acting for society as a whole, enters a complaint. The court orders the offender to be summoned, usually by means of a warrant or writ of capias issued to an authorized officer (the sheriff, marshal, or other police officer). The officer takes the person named in the writ into custody and usually holds him or her in jail. This officer must produce the accused before the court at a specified time for a hearing. If the apprehension was legal, the person will be recommitted to jail or released on bail to await trial. If not, he or she will be released unconditionally. Bail is the posting of a bond, a written promise to pay a set amount of money if the accused does not appear in court, and a cash deposit, surety bond from an insurance company, or pledge of property may be required to guarantee payment. In default of bail, the accused is committed to jail and kept in custody until the case is disposed of by trial or appeal. Capital crimes may have no provisions for bail. If the crime is minor, the matter may be disposed of by a summary trial before the magistrate without a jury. For example, if the police arrest a vagrant upon the street without a formal complaint having been made, the magistrate decides both facts and law. The amount of the fine or the type of punishment a magistrate may impose is limited by statute. In most cases, however, the next step is a preliminary hearing held before a magistrate to determine if the evidence against the accused is sufficient to justify holding him or her for trial. Guilt or innocence is not the issue. Witnesses are often called to testify, and the court, in some jurisdictions, requires the testimony to be written, attested, and signed by the witnesses. The magistrate must prepare a copy of the hearing and the case, usually within a limited number of days, to send to the court where the trial is to take place. It contains the name of the defendant, the nature of the charge, the names of the prosecutors and witnesses (sometimes their evidence), the information upon which the arrest was made, and the bail bond. In earlier times in the case of murder, the coroner held an inquest before a jury, which heard evidence and rendered a verdict about the cause of death. The coroner then provided a return to the court based upon this semi-judicial investigation. This report was usually presented at the preliminary hearing and became a part of the court record. In recent years, coroners' records have come under the jurisdiction of the state or county medical examiners and no longer include a determination of guilt set by an inquest jury. In the next step, the defendant is brought before the court (arraigned), either to plead guilty and be sentenced at once without further trial or to plead not guilty and be bound over for the trial. Collecting Testimony At the point when the trial is scheduled, civil and criminal procedures are similar. Witnesses are summoned by subpoena to appear at the trial on behalf of the plaintiff or the defendant. If witnesses must bring documents, the writ describes them. The sheriff, marshal, or constable must serve the subpoena directly on the witness and submit a return to the court. If the witness fails to appear at the time and place specified, a bench warrant is issued on the spot for his or her arrest, and an officer of the court goes out to find the witness. A representative of the court interviews and takes depositions from witnesses who live outside the jurisdiction of the court or who are ill, maimed, or unable to appear in person. Sometimes the testimony consists of answers to written questions (interrogatories) prepared by the court and forwarded to a local court where the witness resides. These written statements must be attested, and the witness must sign them. Depositions, and any interrogatories, become part of the permanent record of the court. In early cases, these depositions may be the only written accounts of what the witnesses actually said. They are especially valuable if an out-of-state family member is providing testimony needed to probate an estate or divide a piece of property. Trial procedures may be prescribed by law or by local custom. The jury is selected by drawing names from a list prepared at the beginning of the court term (these lists are recorded in the minutes) or by summoning "twelve good and lawful men, housekeepers" as their names appeared in rotation on the tax rolls. Each party has the right to challenge jurors and dismiss those it feels are "prejudicial to the case." The jury is then to perform its duties impartially, based on the evidence presented. Where jury trial is waived, the judge considers the case. A non-jury trial will usually be shorter, with fewer documents. Presenting the case includes statements by the plaintiff and the defendant (or their attorneys), testimony from the witnesses and cross-examination, introduction of written depositions, review of documents or other exhibits before the court, summation of the case with a parting speech to the judge and/or jury by each side, and instructions to the jury on the points of law at issue. At this point, the jury or the judge retires to consider the case and arrive at a verdict. The verdict must be unanimous. Rendering judgment is the judge's responsibility. The judge relies on the verdict of the jury or personal deliberations to arrive at a decision. In early days, verdict and judgment were given the same day. More recently, there may be up to ninety days between the two. The clerk of the court is required by law to record the names of the parties, the judgment, amounts of money recovered (if any), and the time allowed for meeting the judgment. For example, a money award for damages to crops and fences by a stampeding herd of cattle, to be paid within sixty days, will be entered in the court record. A receipt for payment is often filed with the court, and the clerk may paste it at the top or bottom of the page where the judgment is recorded in the case file or packet. Before 1865, a jail sentence was unusual. Local jails served only to hold the accused for trial. Criminal courts were often called "gaol delivery" because they emptied the jails of prisoners. Instead of "doing time," the convicted person might be whipped, pilloried, submerged in cold water, forced to labor on a public project, or sentenced to pay fines and damages. Capital crimes brought death or banishment. A bankruptcy filing from the U. S. District of Michigan found at the National Archives—Great Lakes Region. From a glance at the list of assets, one might assume that this individual was well-read and had led a fairly comfortable existence to this point. Imprisonment for debt was common in most jurisdictions during the colonial period and even later. Eventually, the courts determined that incarceration rendered a debtor incapable of working to repay the debts. With this realization, more debtors faced fines than prison. Some records of sentencing for debt (or later bankruptcy, see the image at right) include lists of creditors and assets. An excellent history of how the courts dealt with debtors will be found in Debtor's Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America.[2] Consult the reference section under Bankruptcy and Debt for other studies. Enforcing the Judgment (Execution) Once a judgment is rendered, the court commands the sheriff, marshal, or constable to carry it out. Some courts ordered imprisonment or labor until the judgment had been met. In the case of debt, imprisonment was often useless because the person in custody had no way to earn the money. "Judgment-proof" debtors-those certified by the court as unable to pay-could laugh at creditors. If the judgment debtor owned property, the court issued an order for the sheriff to seize and sell it (known as "attachment") to satisfy the creditor's claims. In some jurisdictions, the property must be taken into custody before judgment is given as security that the creditor can recover if the debtor fails to make payment. A companion action is distraint-property is taken into custody to impel the debtor to come to court. When the person appears in court, the property is returned. Personal property is actually brought to the courthouse, and the officer in charge makes an inventory. In some jurisdictions the creditor must post a bond for the value of the property attached to indemnify the officer against unlawful seizure. Seizure of real property consists of recording a writ against the title, called a judgment lien, and giving notice to the person in possession that the land has become court property and cannot be disposed of or sold by the owner. Homesteads (dwelling house and a small piece of garden property), pensions, bankrupt property, property in hands of guardians or trustees, cemeteries, tools of trade, and insurance are usually exempt from attachment. If the debtor fails to make payment, the sheriff takes control of the property and posts it for sale by publicly advertising on placards, in newspapers, by town crier, or by Sunday notice in church. Then the property is auctioned to the highest bidder, and the proceeds go to the creditor for redress, costs, and damages. Each step generates court records. Brief summaries appear in minutes, orders, and judgments; documents, testimony, and exhibits (plus copies of orders), writs, judgments, and notices will be found in the case packets. New Trials and Appeals A litigant, usually the loser but sometimes the winner if he or she received less than petitioned for, can appeal the case within a specified period of time. Each state determines by law which court may hear which appeals. Federal judiciary acts provide similarly on the federal level. Some states have only one appeals court; some allow only specific cases to be appealed; and some place a limit on the amount of damages an appeals court can handle. When the appellate court issues a writ allowing the case to be heard, the litigants prepare briefs containing the facts of the case, errors committed, and reasons why appeal is sought. After printing became common, briefs were printed in multiple copies for the judges, attorneys, litigants, case files, and news media. New trials or appeals are granted if the judge erred on the admissibility of evidence, the verdict was contrary to the evidence, the verdict was contrary to the law, the judge erred in the charge to the jury, and/or new evidence becomes available. When errors occur, the case is tried only on the legal technicalities involved, not on the evidence offered in the trial. The judges consider the matter individually, then collectively, and render their opinions-usually in writing-at a later date. If the court grants a new trial, the case is sent back to the trial court and the whole case is retried in accordance with rules laid down by the appeals court. ↑ Based on Clarence N. Callender, American Courts: Their Organization and Procedures (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1927). ↑ David Skeel, Debtor’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). Search court records on Ancestry.com Coffres forts et armoires fortes sur le site http://www.infosafe.fr Retrieved from "http://www.ancestry.com/wiki/index.php?title=Court_Procedures&oldid=41258" Categories: The Source: A Guidebook to American GenealogyU.S. Federal, State, and County Court Records Navigation menu

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Mean girls or killers? The growing problem of cyber-stalking Bullying has taken to the Internet Published On: Oct 21 2013 10:43:46 AM CDT Tricia Norman/John Couwels By attorney Melba Pearson, Special to THELAW.TV AT&T, Time Warner CEOs go to Capitol Hill to stump for merger Netflix viewers binge shows, then chill This app can spot any celebrity in the world Olympics, election top Twitter's 2016 trending topics Two girls were charged this week with aggravated stalking, in connection with the suicide of a classmate. It is alleged that the non-stop bullying of 12-year-old Rebecca Ann Sedwick by the 14-year-old and 12-year-old defendants caused her to commit suicide. Rebecca was allegedly bullied over a dispute about a boy, and was so overwhelmed that she jumped from the top of a silo, causing her death.This seems to be a stretch for those of us who grew up before the Internet was so big. We all remember the mean kids in school, who stuffed classmates into lockers, or started nasty rumors about a girl who wasn't part of the "in" crowd.Now, these actions have gone to a new level … the Internet. Keep in mind that today, one's entire identity and reputation is linked to the Internet. As an adult, negative reviews on the Internet can impact your business or your ability to get a job. To a teen, who is not as emotionally developed, negative posts on the Internet, in addition to day-to-day bullying in school, can seem like the end of the world. No one sends their child to school to be tortured … and that's what it feels like to the victim of bullying.What led to the charges were Facebook posts, which included the statement: "Yes I know I bullied Rebecca and she killed herself, but I don't give a ____." This post by the older of the two girls charged clearly shows no remorse that her actions hurt someone so deeply that it caused death.The charge of aggravated stalking is a felony. By law, if you choose, with cruel intent, to repeatedly follow, harass or cyber-stalk another person, and make a credible (real) threat to that person, then you can be found guilty of aggravated stalking. There may be evidence in this case that there was a physical confrontation between the girls and Rebecca, which could be where there was a credible threat. Depending on what the girls were doing or saying, the taunting of Rebecca at school, and posting nasty messages on the Internet, can all be deemed under the law to be stalking.The charge carries a maximum of five years in prison under Florida law. That is not to say they will be sentenced to the maximum. There are many other resolutions to this case, including probation with community service hours, counseling or a diversionary program that, if successfully completed, could result in the charges being dropped.Many people may disagree with the charging of these students, but this is a good way to teach them (and others) that each person has to be responsible for his or her actions. If, in fact, the posts made after Rebecca's death are true, then there is a clear disconnect and a lack of humanity in these girls. Punishment may be the wakeup call they need and therapy may address whatever is pushing them to behave in that manner. Hopefully, this will put the two girls on the path to being productive and sensitive citizens.The author, Melba Pearson, is a prosecutor in South Florida. Advertisement Latest Technology Headlines Why Apple is investing in wind turbines in China Tech giants set up database for terrorist content Big tech firms are too slow to remove hate speech Latin American grads say Google is the dream

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D.C. Circuit Vacates Plug and Play Order and Encoding Rules Applicable to Multichannel Video Programming Distributors Paul Glist | Davis Wright Tremaine LLP On Jan. 15, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided that the FCC lacked the statutory authority to adopt its 2003 encoding rules, which limit the output and copy restrictions that can be applied to multichannel video programming. As a result, the court vacated the entire FCC Plug and Play Order as applied to all multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs), including all of the encoding rules and the rule against selectable outputs; the rules governing the labeling and testing of retail unidirectional set-top boxes (also known as UDCPs); technical standards requiring digital cable systems to pass along data such as channel names; and rules requiring high-definition set-top boxes to offer certain connectors. The court did not eliminate older rules requiring cable operators to provide separable security (like CableCARDs) to compatible retail set-top boxes or the ban on including integrated security in most leased set-tops. But the court’s jurisdictional rulings raise a number of questions about the scope of the Commission’s authority to adopt new rules. Section 629 of the Communications Act seeks to promote a commercial market in retail set-top boxes. The encoding rules were developed as part of a complex 2002 Memorandum of Understanding negotiated by the consumer electronics and cable industries to facilitate such a market. Part of the MOU, and the regulations eventually adopted by the Commission in the 2003 Plug and Play Order, required “digital cable ready” retail set-top boxes to respect certain content-protection codes. These codes are included in some cable programming pursuant to the contract requirements imposed by the content owners who license distribution of the programming. CE manufacturers were only willing to include such copy protection tools if there were rules limiting their exercise, and the cable industry was only willing to agree to limits that were applied throughout the MVPD industry. The FCC encoding rules broke the impasse by providing regulatory ceilings on the use of copy protection tools. Those ceilings provide, for example, that free over-the-air broadcasting must not be coded to prohibit home copying; but that, at the other extreme, earlier release video-on-demand programming may be so encoded. DISH appealed, arguing that the FCC lacked statutory authority under Section 629 of the Communications Act to impose the encoding rules on satellite MVPDs. The majority opinion agreed, in part because the Commission has long been treating satellite as already supporting a commercial market in retail set-top boxes. (Satellite’s support for a retail set-top market has long since changed, but the change has not yet been reflected in FCC rules.) Judge Edwards’ concurrence argues that the FCC might have the authority to impose the encoding rules on all MVPDs, but had not sufficiently explained its argument. The majority decision suggests that the Commission might have authority under older statutes like Section 624A to apply some rules just to cable, but does not resolve the issue. Because the court agreed that the encoding rules were an essential, non-severable part of the entire Plug and Play Order, it vacated the Order and the Reconsideration Order adopted in 2003. (Likewise, the underlying MOU provides that the encoding rules are non-severable, and that “should any part of this MOU not be implemented as proposed … each of the Parties reserves its right to withdraw support for any implementation.”) The court’s mandate is withheld until seven days after disposition of any petition for rehearing. By vacating the Plug and Play Order, the court also vacated a large number of rules governing labeling, testing, support, and output rules. It may also call into question more recent rules adopted in the FCC’s 2010 “CableCARD Fix” Order because that decision (as amended by a later reconsideration order) applied additional rules to MVPDs that are subject to the (now vacated) Plug and Play rule 76.640. These include rules for a home networking output, self-installation, Multistream-CableCARDs, switched digital video solutions, uniform CableCARD fees, and bring-your-own-box discounts. Jurisdictional Issues The decision raises significant questions about the scope of the Commission’s authority to promote a commercial market in retail set-top boxes. It rejected the Commission’s request for wide-ranging direct and ancillary authority under Section 629, a request it characterized throughout the majority opinion as “capacious,” “unbridled,” “omnibus” and “effectively plenary.” It specifically noted the limiting language in Section 629(f) that “Nothing in this section shall be construed as expanding or limiting any authority that the Commission may have under law in effect before February 8, 1996.” The court wrote: “we refuse to interpret ancillary authority as a proxy for omnibus powers limited only by the FCC’s creativity in linking its regulatory actions to the goal of commercial availability of navigation devices.” The court’s reading of Section 629 may impose some disciplining constraints on the Commission’s efforts to stretch its authority, although greater clarity is likely to emerge from other tests of the Commission’s authority, such as the net neutrality appeal pending in the D.C. Circuit that has been briefed and is awaiting an argument date. Latest PostsFinal FAR Rule Proposed for Small Business Set-Asides on Multiple Award Contracts EPA Proposes Ban on Common Degreasing Chemical TCE FCC Grants States Extra Time to Implement Lifeline Rules What Does China’s New Cyberspace Sovereignty Mean, and is Your Company Ready? New Lifeline Rules Take Effect December 2 and Draft Plan Released for National Verifier © Davis Wright Tremaine LLP | Attorney Advertising Refine your interests. Paul Glist Multichannel Video Programming Science, Computers & Technology less- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP on:

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Transparency key to better informed and better protected consumers Lawscot News signup Get the latest news from the Scottish legal profession News release (489) Rss Feed Lawscot News (41) Rss Feed Professional practice updates (1) In-House Lawyers (15) Rss Feed Videos (28) New lawyers news (41) Rss Feed Professional support newsletter (9) Rss Feed Law Matters (10) Rss Feed Brussels Agenda (30) Brussels office updates (13) Current issues (91) Rss Feed Scam alerts (2) Rss Feed Legal aid (6) Opinion (12) For the public (3) Student blog (19) Equality and diversity (12) In-house lawyers blog (4) Archive 24 August 2016 | tagged News release Improving information for clients will be vital in a more competitive legal market according to the Law Society of Scotland. In its response to the Competition & Markets Authority's Interim Report on the Legal Services Market, the Law Society of Scotland (the Society) has said that the legal services sector should be fully transparent from a competition and consumer protection perspective and that providing clear information for consumers is essential to ensure they are making informed choices. Carole Ford, non-solicitor convener of the Law Society of Scotland’s Regulatory Committee, said: “While this particular study focuses on legal services in England and Wales many of the themes relate to legal services in Scotland, although it has a different regulatory system. We think consumers across the UK should have easy access to all the information necessary for them to make a fully informed and reasoned choice in selecting a legal services provider. “We also think that there needs to be change to regulatory processes so that those providing any legal advice or services are regulated to some degree. "The ‘unregulated legal sector’ is not defined within either UK or Scottish legislation. It refers to those who provide legal advice and representation in areas which are not reserved to solicitors or other regulated legal professionals such as copyright attorneys or licensed conveyancers. Consumers purchasing legal services from the unregulated sector, without necessarily being aware of that, are exposed if the advice is incorrect or something goes wrong. “We believe there is a strong case to have proportionate regulation of the legal services market in each of the UK’s jurisdictions to ensure that consumers enjoy and have the benefit of consistent and assured protection, as is currently afforded to all those seeking advice and representation from a regulated firm.” In its response, the Society has criticised current legislation which prevents anyone from acting as a notary in England and Wales unless they were admitted there. Ford said: “This legislation is anti-competitive and not in the public interest as it can lead to delays and increased costs for clients. There are almost 300 notaries public admitted in Scotland who practice as solicitors in England and Wales, but who cannot carry out any duties as a notary. This incurs additional costs as well as delays for clients of Scottish solicitors who have to take an extra step in instructing an English-qualified notary, not to mention finding additional time when both appointed notary and client are available to sign a document.” The Law Society of Scotland is currently in discussions with the Scottish Government in relation to regulating legal services in Scotland. Ford said: “In March 2016, we published our paper ‘The Solicitor (Scotland) Act 1980 – the Case for Change’ which sets out our ambition to replace the current patchwork of legislation to secure a modern, flexible and enabling legislative framework for the regulation of the solicitor profession and the provision of legal services in Scotland, placing consumer interest and protection at the centre.” “We think consumer protection needs to be paramount, particularly in the legal services market where there is a risk of serious detriment effect on the consumer if something, however unlikely, goes wrong. “We know from our own research that people often do not differentiate between those using the title ‘lawyer’ and ‘solicitor’ and don’t realise that a person who can legitimately call themselves a lawyer need not be regulated, unlike a solicitor who is a qualified and regulated legal professional. We have concerns that the unregulated legal sector may not always give consumers the assurance of protection they expect. This could be resolved through better signposting to help build awareness and ensure that consumers are advised of the level of protection available for every legal services provider, as well as the complaints process. “A better informed consumer is a better protected consumer.” The full response is available of the Law Society of Scotland website: CMA Legal Services Market Study – Interim Report The CMA Interim Report on the Legal Services Market is focused on legal services in England and Wales. The CMA’s did not extend its consideration of competition matters in relation to the Scottish legal services market as Scotland has a different legal system and regulatory reform is at a different stage.

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Army sergeant pleads guilty to illegally accessing online system An Army sergeant from Columbus pleaded guilty Thursday to unlawfully obtaining personal information from the Army Knowledge Online computer system. Ammie Brothers, 29, pleaded guilty before District Court Judge Clay Land in Columbus to one count of unauthorized access to information from a U.S. Army computer system, according to a release. She was indicted on five counts by a federal grand jury in Alexandria, Va., stemming from a charge on Feb. 14. She faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison at sentencing on Oct. 24. Between April 24, 2009, and Oct. 5, 2011, Brothers repeatedly and intentionally accessed two victim’ Army Knowledge Online accounts, which contain personnel files for members of the armed services, a statement of facts in the plea agreement shows. She initially gained access to information by calling the Army Knowledge Online help desk in the Eastern District of Virginia and providing the victim’ Social Security numbers and dates of birth to get temporary passwords. Numerous documents printed from the Army Knowledge Online system were discovered when law enforcement searched Brothers’ home in Columbus. Documents contained Social Security numbers, bank account numbers and employment history including the Social Security number of a minor child. In addition to illegally accessing the victims’ Army Knowledge Online accounts, Brothers admitted to law enforcement that she regularly harassed the victims by telephone and accessed several credit card accounts belonging to one victim, and in one case authorized charges without the victim’s knowledge or consent. Trial Attorney Peter V. Roman of the Justice Department’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Assistant U.S. Attorney Lindsay Kelly of the Eastern District of Virginia and Assistant U.S. Attorney Crawford L. Seals of the Middle District of Georgia prosecuted the case. Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia Neil H. MacBride; U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Georgia Michael J. Moore; and Director Daniel T. Andrews of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command’s Computer Crime Investigative Unit announced the guilty plea.

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Home GCSE Law Page Describe the process by which a Bill becomes an Act of Parliament. Legislation and Law Reform (a) Describe the process by which a Bill becomes an Act of Parliament. [24] The government- lawyers in the civil service, who are known as parliamentary counsel to the treasury, first draft the majority of Acts of Parliament. The government gives instructions for the Bill. When this first draft of the Bill has been set out, it is published. Even at this stage difficulties may crop up, as the draft must be precise and accurate to the governments wishes without any possible mistakes. Also there is little time to produce these first drafts, so there is a lot of pressure on time to introduce the Bill to Parliament. To become an Act of Parliament, both Houses of Parliament, in which each there is a lengthy and complex process, must pass the Bill. A Bill may start in either the House of Commons or Lords, although Finance Bills must start in the House of Commons. To become an Act of Parliament, each Bill must go through certain proceedings. The first stage is the 'First Reading' where the name and main aims of the Bill are introduced and there is a vote on whether the Bill should continue. This is verbally done unless it becomes hard for the judge to distinguish the majority vote. ...read more. (ii) Explain the terms 'Green Paper' and 'White Paper'. [30] On major issues in pre-legislative procedure, the minister responsible for the matter may issue a Green Paper. The Labour Government introduced this idea in 1967. A Green Paper is a consultative document on the topic that is being put forward for reform by the government. Interested parties are then invited to send comments to the relevant Government Department so all sides may be considered and necessary amendments made. After this, a White Paper is published with firm new proposals for the Law. (c) Explain how effective the law reform bodies or any other groups have been in persuading Parliament to reform the law. [24] It is important for law to be reformed when necessary, and there are many influences on the way the law is formed and reformed and can come from a number of different sources. Some have more effect than others while in some there may be competing interests in the way the law should be reformed. Pressure groups may provide the impetus for law reform where the subject is high profile and Parliament may give way to public opinion. Judges also play a role in law reform by means of judicial precedent, in which they may either create new law or, in cases where they are bound by previous precedent, draw attention to the need for reform. ...read more. This injury would definitely have a severe impact on her life and her ability to carry out any normal day-to-day activities. (ii) Monica, who is a cook and has developed a painful skin irritation which causes her hand to crack and blister. In this case, the injury is much less serious but still something that may affect the way Monica lives and affect her day-to-day job as a cook. The irritation is obviously one that gives her a lot of pain when going about her normal activities, and so it would be possible for Monica to come under the Disabled Act. It may stop the way she works and hinder her normal routine, and so therefore a disability. However, if there was the chance that the irritation was easily cured, or helped with medication, then this could lessen the chances of falling into the disabled category. Also, it may not have serious long-term effects. (iii) Phoebe, who is a guitarist and is developing profound deafness in one ear. Although this is not a life-threatening case, it is still a disability in which the affected person could not go about their daily activities as per usual, because as a musician, this problem would affect Phoebe's livelihood. This would be a long-term effect, although falling into the category of disability could depend on the seriousness of the deafness, and also whether it worsens in seriousness. ...read more. This student written piece of work is one of many that can be found in our GCSE Law section. Related GCSE Law essays Stages of a Bill to become an Act of Parliament 4 star(s) Report Stage It occurs in the House of Commons and usually takes a short time; here the MPs can suggest and debate amendments to the Bill. However, if there were amendments at the Committee Stages, there will not be a Report Stage. There are many influences operating on parliament before and during the legislative process. Explain ... 3 star(s) The law commission decides what to put into its programme by considering the importance of the issues, availability of resources and the suitability of the issue. Teams of lawyers and research assistants each headed by a law commissioner consider the reforms needed. Judicial precedent. 3 star(s) (Flexibility - i.e. a general Ratio Decidendii can be extended to various fact situations e.g. the test for negligence in Donohue V Stevenson relating to the reliability of the manufacturer of ginger beer has now been extended to every claim in negligence. Offences against the person act 1861; criticisms and reforms. police approach which was to leave domestic violence alone and hope that the partners would sort their problems alone. Although there have already been changes made in recent years, there is still very few domestic violence cases reported. Criminal Law (Offences against the person) - revision notes - smith was a soldier at camp, got into a fight and victim is stabbed. Victim seen to by medical auditory (not qualified) and dropped several times, also diagnosed as drunk only. Later on seen by doctor, but too late and he dies. Explain the need for discipline in at least two public services. Analyse the role ... Interviews should extend to colleagues, close friends and military supervisors. C) Background Medical Factors. It will be necessary to recover a deceased's medical documents from the medical officer civilian doctor concerned, and record any material evidence such as any previous self-harm or psychiatric assessments. The Law Relating to Negotiable Instruments According to the custom of Hindu merchants the money of the Hundi is payable only when and if the goods arrive. The Hundi is in the nature of a policy of insurance, but with this difference that the money is paid beforehand, and is to be recovered if the ship arrives safely. Is there a tort of invasion of privacy? the right to a private life, seemed to have failed due to the competing right to freedom of expression, protected by article 10. As a result of this news the newspapers started celebrating 'press freedom' victory. These celebrations were very premature because after Naomi Campbell's victory over the Mirror newspaper See more essays Looking for expert help with your Law work? Explain how the narrow rule stated in Donoghue v Stevenson has been developed. Citizenship - What is citizenship?, Groups in Society, Good Citizens Don't have an account yet? Create one now!

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Submit TipsSend FeedbackTerms of ServicePrivacy PolicyYour first stop for politics in D.C., Maryland and VirginiaDC Gun Law Gets Hearing Before Washington Appeals Court By Jessica Gresko NEWSLETTERS Receive the latest first-read-dmv updates in your inboxPrivacy policy | More NewslettersNBC 7An appeals court will hear challenges to a District of Columbia law that places tough requirements for gun owners to get concealed carry permits. A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is hearing arguments Tuesday in two cases involving the law, which requires people who want to carry a gun in public to show a "good reason to fear injury'' or another "proper reason'' to carry the weapon. Reasons might include a personal threat, or a job that requires a person to carry or protect cash or valuables. Lower court judges have disagreed on whether the law is constitutional. The hearing is the latest in a long-running tussle over the city's gun laws. Eight years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the city's ban on handguns, leading the city to rewrite its gun laws. City law now requires residents to register guns kept at their homes or businesses; more than 16,500 guns have been registered, according to police.Anyone who wants to carry a weapon outside the home needs a separate concealed carry license. The police department said last week that 89 people have been granted concealed carry permits and 374 have been denied. In March, U.S. District Court Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly sided with the city and declined to issue a preliminary injunction halting the enforcement of the law requiring a "good reason'' or "proper reason'' for anyone who wants to carry a gun in public. Kollar-Kotelly said opponents had not shown that their lawsuit was likely to be successful. She noted that appeals courts in other parts of the country had approved of laws in New York, New Jersey and Maryland that are similar to the District of Columbia's. But in May, ruling in a different dispute, U.S. District Court Judge Richard J. Leon said the law "likely places an unconstitutional burden'' on citizens' right to bear arms. He suspended enforcement of the "good reason'' or "proper reason'' part of the law, but his ruling was put on hold by the appeals court now hearing the case. As a result, the city has continued to enforce the law. Kollar-Kotelly was nominated by a Democrat, President Bill Clinton, and Leon by a Republican, President George W. Bush. On Tuesday, three judges will hear 20 minutes of arguments in each of the two cases. All three judges hearing the case - Karen LeCraft Henderson, Thomas B. Griffith and Stephen F. Williams - were appointed by Republican presidents.One of the cases involves a District of Columbia resident, Matthew Grace, and a shooting group he belongs to, Pink Pistols. The other case involves three people who would like to carry concealed handguns in the city and the Bellevue, Washington-based Second Amendment Foundation. Nine states - Maryland, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Oregon and Washington - filed a brief supporting the District of Columbia. The National Rifle Association and sixteen other states - Arizona, Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming - filed briefs opposing the law. This is the second time the Second Amendment Foundation case has been before a panel of D.C. Circuit judges. Those judges ruled in 2015 that the first judge hearing the case, Judge Frederick J. Scullin Jr., didn't have authority to decide it, sending the case back to the lower court, where Kollar-Kotelly was assigned.Published at 5:19 AM EDT on Sep 20, 2016 | Updated at 5:30 AM EDT on Sep 20, 2016

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Court refuses to overturn bulletproof vest law WASHINGTON (AP) - The Supreme Court on Monday refused to hear a challenge against a federal law making it illegal for criminals to own bulletproof vests. The appeal had questioned Congress' lawmaking ability under the Commerce Clause. The high court refused to hear arguments from Cedrick B. Alderman, who was convicted under a federal law making it illegal for convicted criminals to own body armor that has been sold across state lines. Congress passed that law in 2002, citing its authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce. Alderman was convicted of armed robbery in 1999. Police caught him with a bulletproof vest in 2005, and he was sentenced to prison for 18 months. Alderman challenged the law, saying it exceeded Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco upheld the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court refused to hear Alderman's appeal. Justice Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia said they would have heard the case. Not hearing the case "threatens the proper limits on Congress' commerce power and may allow Congress to exercise police powers that our Constitution reserves to the states," Thomas said.

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Nurse guilty of attempted throttling of brain-damaged amputee, tribunal finds St Andrew's Hospital A nurse’s 35-year-long career is hanging in the balance after she was found guilty by a tribunal of trying to throttle a brain-damaged amputee. Yvonne Brathwaite-John angered the woman when she told her she could not go out because of her behaviour the previous day at the National Brain Injury Centre, which is part of St Andrew’s Hospital in Northampton.The slightly built patient, who was 5ft 5ins tall, started to yank the nurse by her hair down to the floor, the Nursing and Midwifery Council heard. The woman, identified as Resident A, was prone to outbursts of violence after suffering a brain injury and used a prosthetic leg after losing her limb when she jumped from a window. fter four colleagues helped control the situation, Brathwaite-John allegedly put her hand around the woman’s neck and refused to let go, the hearing was told.Renata Jurenko, for the NMC, said: “In this case you [the panel] have found that the registrant did place her hand on Resident A’s throat, that she held it there and under the circumstances, it might be considered that does actually constitute serious misconduct, “It is accepted that this registrant has had a career spanning in excess of 30 years and this appears to have been an isolated incident in an otherwise unblemished career but you need to consider that in this particular case there has not been an acceptance of what has happened.”Brathwaite-John had denied putting her hands around the patient’s throat, applying pressure and refusing to remove them. But the tribunal found all the allegations against the nurse proved.David Juckes, Braithwaite-Johns’s representative said: “The registrant’s hair had been pulled forcefully by the patient and the registrant’s hair had been bitten by the patient, “There is some evidence before the panel that, in fact, part of the registrant’s had been torn out as part of the assault.”He told the panel that the nurse had been ‘attacked to her face and her neck’. During the two weeks prior to the incident the resident A had 286 violent episodes, 229 of which were verbal, 33 involved aggression towards objects and 24 involved aggression towards others.Ms Jurenko said: “The registrant and the patient were having a discussion regarding whether the patient could go out that day and the registrant told her she couldn’t go because of her behaviour the previous day.“So the resident grabbed the registrant’s hair and a struggle ensued.”A violent tussle began between the pair and Brathwaite-John sounded her emergency alarm, the panel heard.Four colleagues attended and the struggle was taken to the floor and pinned the woman down by her arms, head and legs. Ms Jurenko continued: “Resident A still had hold of the registrant’s hair and appeared to be trying to bite it, she (Brathwaite-John) had her right arm across her body.“During that struggle on the floor the registrant was seen to place her hand on the patient’s throat and she appeared to squeeze it and it is this action which is the subject of the complaint.”Despite a nurse shouting at her to let go, Brathwaite-John clung on and had to be removed from the patient, the tribunal heard.She was taken into the office and the resident was moved into seclusion where she later tried to strangle herself with her underwear.Red marks were later found on the woman’s neck, but it could not be established if they were as a result of the nurse’s hand or the ligature.An internal investigation after the incident resulted in Brathwaite-John’s dismissal from St Andrew’s Hospital.The panel have now retired to consider if Brathwaite-John is guilty of misconduct.The hearing continues.

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Parade and service to recognise the Northamptonshire justice system A special service to recognise the role of the courts and those administering justice in Northamptonshire will take place on Tuesday. The service being held at All Saints’ Church in Northampton, is at the invitation of the High Sheriff of Northamptonshire, James Shepherd-Cross, and brings together judges, magistrates and representatives of many of the agencies that work in the justice system.It has been arranged to coincide with the arrival of Justice Flaux, the presiding High Court judge in the Midlands, who will be sitting at Northampton this month. He will be joined at the church by crown and county court judges, magistrates, the coroner, members of the bar and the chief constable among others. The lord lieutenant, mayor and councillors of the borough will be present and contributors will include bishops and other faith representatives from the county.The service will be preceded by robed processions from Sessions House to All Saints’ Church.Mr Shepherd-Cross said: “It is very important we recognise the vital role that is carried out by our judges and all those involved in administering law and order in the county. “We have a world respected justice system and should be proud of it. “This service is a good way of doing that and we are particularly honoured that this year we shall be joined by high sheriffs visiting from 10 other counties, making it a particularly prestigious and colourful occasion”.The processions will take place from 5.45pm on Tuesday, November 12.

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Home Civil Liberties Anti-Second Amendment Democrat Arrested With Gun at Chicago’s O’Hare December 6, 2012 Infowars | Dec 6, 2012 By Kurt Nimmo The arrest yesterday of Illinois Democrat Donne Trotter by TSA agents for attempting to bring a .25-caliber Beretta pistol on an airplane at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport demonstrates the hypocrisy of the anti-Second Amendment crowd. Trotter is charged with one count of attempting to board an airplane with a weapon, a Class 4 felony. Donne Trotter is a long-time gun-grabber. He opposed concealed carry legislation in the state and worked to outlaw so-called assault weapons. During an unsuccessful Democratic primary bid in 2000 against U.S. Rep. Bobby Rush, he criticized his opponent for missing a special legislative session attacking the right of Illinois citizens to own firearms. In 1995, Trotter went up against fellow state senator Kirk Dillard after the Republican proposed a concealed carry law. Trotter argued that passing the law would turn citizens into vigilantes. “Trotter is a South Side Democrat and he was a leader in the move to ban so-called ‘assault weapons’ during his first term as a state representative,” said Alan Gottlieb, chairman of Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, in a press release. “A man who favored banning firearms for thousands of his fellow Illinois residents shouldn’t even have a gun, much less be packing one illegally into an airport.” “Senator Trotter, by his own action, has demonstrated the monumental hypocrisy of gun control advocates who try to disarm average citizens while reserving the right to bear arms for themselves alone,” Gottlieb continued. “He should not even be serving in the state legislature, much less be running for a seat in Congress, which already has its share of gun prohibition hypocrites.” Trotter’s arrest follows remarks by sportscaster Bob Costas and sports writer Jason Whitlock after linebacker Jovan Belcher killed his girlfriend and then committed suicide with a handgun. “If Jovan Belcher didn’t possess a gun, he and Kassandra Perkins would both be alive today,” Costas said Sunday, citing an article condemning the Second Amendment. 1 Comment on "Anti-Second Amendment Democrat Arrested With Gun at Chicago’s O’Hare" BlueSprings | Reply Remember, it was the congress that exempted themselves from ObamaCare so I guess they have done the same in regards to the 2nd Amendment.

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New York’s Seven Round Law Bans Most Firearms Imposing a seven round limit will effectively outlaw a large number of firearms and create a new class of criminals.New York’s Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act that passed in January will effectively outlaw most firearms in the state. The law mandates a seven round maximum capacity for ammunition magazines and there are currently no manufacturers producing seven round magazines. According to the Democrat and Chronicle, no manufacturer plans to start making them. “There was never a need for a (seven-round magazine),” Paul Martin, owner of Pro-Gun Services in Victor, New York, told the Democrat and Chronicle. “Not many manufacturers are going to bother to make something just for the state of New York.” The Democrat and Chronicle contacted a number of manufacturers to see if they plan to make seven round clips. Remington, Smith and Wesson, Pro Mag Industries and Brownells did not respond. Glock had no comment. Of the small number who responded, none gave a definitive answer. “We will not be marketing anything specific to New York,” Karl Hoffman, an account executive for the magazine manufacturer Metalform told the Democrat and Chronicle. “Can you realistically expect a company that’s huge to gear up and say, ‘Let’s make something for those poor suckers in New York because they’ve got a bad law?” said Fred Calcagno, owner of American Sportsman gun shop. “That number, 7, was not arbitrary,” an NRA member posted on the Smith & Wesson forum. “They chose it because it was more than most revolvers hold, but fewer rounds than most semi-autos. They can now claim they aren’t restricting sportsmen or target shooters because they were magnanimous enough to allow guns that carry more than wheel guns… which aren’t evil military style weapons.” “Add to that there are nearly zero seven round mags available for most handguns and rifles and you have a de facto to ban on hundreds of weapons not specifically addressed by the legislation.” The NRA member is right — Cuomo and the gun-grabbers in New York did not simply pull the number seven out of a hat. They knew imposing this limit on clips would effectively outlaw a large number of firearms and create a new class of criminals. “Perhaps that is the reason they passed this law – as a back-door method of instituting a sweeping ban on semiautomatic handguns,” Anna Rittgers wrote in January. “The practical result will be the state prohibiting law abiding gun owners from using their handguns in self defense, as it will become illegal to use even the most common firearms. There is no ‘grandfather clause,’ so legal gun owners who comply with New York State’s existing ten round magazine limit will have to sell or dispose of thousands of those magazines within a year to comply with the new law. Those that fail to comply – who possess magazines that can hold eight or more bullets – will be guilty of a misdemeanor.” This article was posted: Wednesday, February 27, 2013 at 11:44 am Tags: constitution, domestic news, gun rights Share this article

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Ex-atheist professor to push for Christian rights watchdog at university after winning lawsuitA federal jury sided with a conservative college professor who claimed in a lawsuit that the University of North Carolina at Wilmington discriminated against him due to his writings and religious views. Michael Adams, an associate professor of... Christian lawmakers fall for ‘Ponzi schemer’ who said he’d found Noah’s ArkIt might have been a warning sign when he said he’d found Noah’s Ark. Ponzi schemes are notoriously attractive at the onset, then look awfully stupid in the rear-view mirror. The latest, in Texas, involves conservative Christian... SEE ALL RAW STORIES

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Colorado Supreme Court to decide two cases stemming from fracking ban lawsuits By David O. Williams September 27, 2015, 8:27 am Natural gas drilling near Battlement Mesa in Garfield County (David O. Williams photo). Editor’s note: A version of this story first ran in The Colorado Statesman. Another story on the topic ran on www.routefifty.com. The Colorado Supreme Court last week agreed to decide two citizen-driven anti-fracking cases that will go a long way toward determining the future of oil and gas drilling across Colorado. In both cases – a five-year moratorium on fracking imposed by Fort Collins and an outright fracking ban in Longmont – industry and state officials contend that Colorado law preempts local regulations limiting drilling operations. Gov. John Hickenlooper, speaking Tuesday on KRCC (91.5 FM) in Colorado Springs, said he thinks the state’s high court will side with mineral-rights owners. “I expect they will recognize that people’s private property can’t be taken by government without some kind of compensation,” Hickenlooper said. “If Longmont or Fort Collins want to ban fracking permanently or for a period of time, the people that have reserves should be compensated, just like if government takes someone’s land and they want to put a road on it.” That kind of finding by the Supreme Court will not be popular with citizen “fracktivists” who for years have been trying to ban the process, which injects millions of gallons of water, sand and chemicals under high pressure deep into oil and gas wells to force up more hydrocarbons. “I don’t get to appoint the Supreme Court, but it’s also a ‘taking’ to force fracking down the throats of home-owning citizens, thereby taking their property values, health, safety, and quality of life,” said Fort Collins environmental activist Gary Wockner, who adds that Hickenlooper should not be telling his own Supreme Court appointees how they should rule. Fort Collins passed its five-year moratorium in 2013, and Longmont in 2012 imposed an outright ban on fracking, which is utilized in approximately 90 percent of oil and gas wells. The Colorado Oil and Gas Association (COGA), an industry trade group, sued in both cases, and got favorable lower-court rulings. The cities then appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals. COGA director of policy and external affairs Doug Flanders says the Supreme Court in the past has sided with the industry and the state on this topic. “We look forward to once again having the Supreme Court put further clarification that the ban implemented in Longmont and that the Fort Collin’s moratorium are preempted by current law and are thus illegal,” Flanders said in a prepared statement. “However, just like before, we will continue to do the difficult and unsexy work of finding reasonable and workable solutions with our friends and neighbors throughout the state.” The state and its chief oil and gas regulatory agency, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC), has been a party to legal action over Longmont’s more stringent drilling regulations, although it dropped that suit at Hickenlooper’s urging and convinced COGA to do the same. However, the fracking ban remained in place. “Any city or town that tries to keep oil and gas at bay gets sued,” said Coloradans Against Fracking spokeswoman Karen Dike.” I live in Longmont and we didn’t want the oil and gas here, and so the governor and the industry are suing us.” Dike’s coalition of 40 citizen-activist groups is once again weighing a ballot question seeking to ban fracking statewide in November of 2016. “Anything that is done to try and decrease the amount of oil and gas or to have any say in where it is is met with resistance,” Dike added, “and [COGCC Director Matt] Lepore basically said that where wells are sited is ultimately up to COGCC, and so far COGCC reads their mission as being to promote the oil and gas industry.” Lepore’s agency is on the cusp of releasing draft local-control rules that will require oil and gas companies to register with towns and begin discussions on where to local drilling operations well in advance of seeking state permits. The new rules will also define what constitutes a major drilling facility, which will be a key trigger in requiring local input. The draft rules, now expected to be released this week, stemmed from the governor’s Oil and Gas Task Force, which was set up in the wake of a deal that pulled two controversial local-control questions off the 2014 ballot. “There’s a spectrum of thoughts and opinions within even the various stakeholder groups,” Lepore told The Statesman. “Not all of the local jurisdictions see things exactly the same way, and that was certainly one of the lessons of the governor’s task force. There’s a range of feeling about how oil and gas integrates into these communities, or doesn’t in some cases.” Colorado has some of the toughest oil and gas regulations in the nation, including recognizing methane as a pollutant and requiring disclosure of chemicals used in fracking. + = twelve

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News Eleanor Holmes Norton Carries Passion for Civil Liberties into Congress Last Updated: November 01, 2009 12:14 PM Eleanor Holmes Norton is a third generation Washingtonian who says she was shaped by her hometown. "My great-grandfather, Richard Holmes, was a run-away slave." Born in 1937, Norton grew up in a racially segregated Washington where black and white children did not attend the same schools. She says she was raised by her parents and community to regard people who would segregate as flawed. "We were taught to love all people, but to pity those whose ignorance led them to believe in segregation." She says what whites didn't understand about what was wrong with segregation is that all people have the obligation to treat one another in the same way, no matter the color of their skin. Norton went on to Antioch College and Yale Law School. As a young lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union in the 1960s, Norton argued for equal rights under the United States Constitution. Among her early cases was one that reached the U.S. Supreme Court. In it she defended a white supremacist group, which had been denied the right to speak at a public gathering. "It came very easily to me that the First Amendment [to the U.S. Constitution] and the Bill of Rights applied to everybody." Norton made that point by arguing the case and winning. Her work with the ACLU attracted the attention of the mayor of New York, who hired her to chair the city's Commission on Human Rights. In 1977 the Carter administration brought Norton back to Washington to head the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. "I was able to have the rare experience of taking what I was marching in the streets for - namely a law to protect people based on race and gender - and literally enforce such a law." When President Carter left office in 1981, Norton became a law professor at Georgetown University, where she still remains on the faculty. Her switch to politics came in 1990 when she was elected to represent Washington, the District of Columbia, in the United States Congress, a job she had never considered when she was growing up. She says during her youth Washington had no mayor or city council. "This place was ruled like an actual colony by three commissioners appointed by the president of the United States. It is one of the most shameful chapters in American history." Washington, D.C., is a federal district. It is not a state and does not have the same constitutional rights of congressional representation that the 50 U.S. states enjoy. In her role as Washington, D.C.'s elected delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, Norton can introduce laws, serve on house committees, even chair one, but - unless the DC Voting Rights bill now under consideration in Congress is approved and enacted - she cannot cast a vote for passage of any law. She has been unwavering in her support for statehood for the District of Columbia and full representation for her 550,000 constituents. She's even had the American Revolutionary War slogan "Taxation without Representation" printed on every Washington, DC., license plate. This is Norton's battle cry: "The people that I represent and their ancestors fought in that war, the war that established the republic. They have paid federal income tax ever since we've had that obligation, and we still don't have equal rights with other Americans." Eleanor Holmes Norton is a woman of many passions. With the Democrats holding a majority of seats in Congress since last November's elections, she's assumed the chairmanship of a congressional subcommittee, which, among other things, oversees the upkeep of federal buildings. Up for discussion this day is a law that would place photovoltaic panels to generate solar electricity on the roof of the U.S. Department of Energy. "The model will stimulate others to do the same thing," she says. After the session, Norton raced to two committee hearings and then drove herself to a community center for an HIV/AIDS conference, where she delivered a speech. She says her job requires that she often shift among local, national and global issues, a task she clearly enjoys. "The fact that you have the great and wonderful opportunity to work on the smallest and the largest [issues] at the same time, is like having your dinner and desert at the same time." Norton says making laws in a democracy depends a lot on compromise, which means finding common ground with the loyal opposition. "Sometimes (it) doesn't move as quickly as we would want, but I tell you, it makes you understand that you are in a great democracy when it doesn't collapse every time there is a disagreement." Eleanor Holmes Norton is in her 9th two-year term as the Congresswoman from Washington, the District of Columbia. Previous American Profiles White House Opposes Bill to Give Nation's Capital a Congressional Vote DC Vote.org

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States, EPA Try to Tackle Interstate Air Pollution Section 126 of the Clean Air Act authorizes individual states to file petitions with EPA to stop interstate air pollution, and it may be the most effective legal tool available. The question is how aggressively EPA will pursue it. By Christopher Ahlers, Will BittingerJan 21, 2013 Interstate air pollution has posed significant challenges for environmental regulators for decades. Although some air pollutants only affect air quality locally in the states where they are emitted, some emissions cross state lines and affect downwind states. EPA's latest effort to address interstate air pollution, the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR, often pronounced "Casper"), was invalidated Aug. 21, 2012, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The decision in EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A. raises important legal and practical questions regarding EPA's approach to this important public policy issue. Under the Clean Air Act, Congress has tasked EPA with addressing air pollution. Through cooperative federalism, the agency identifies criteria pollutants and sets national ambient air quality standards to protect public health and welfare. The states determine how to meet these standards by preparing State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which must be reviewed and approved by EPA. If a SIP fails to provide for adequate implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of these standards, EPA may impose and enforce a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) against the state or it may impose a sanction on the state. Interstate air pollution is addressed in the Good Neighbor provision of the Clean Air Act. It prohibits states from contributing significantly to nonattainment with these standards in other states or interfering with maintenance of attainment in other states. For nearly 15 years, EPA has attempted to use emissions trading to address interstate pollution under the Good Neighbor provision, and 1998 the agency persuaded 22 states to adopt a trading program to address interstate nitrogen oxides. But in 2005, EPA made mandatory the use of emissions trading to address interstate pollution through the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), which expanded the trading program to include 28 states and address sulfur dioxide as well. After several states challenged this rule in court, the D.C. Circuit Court invalidated it in North Carolina v. E.P.A in 2008, but it allowed the agency to continue administering the rule in the meantime because of the benefit of environmental protection it provided. EPA's response was CSAPR, which it finalized in August 2011. To comply with the court decision, the agency employed modeling to determine each covered state’s specific contribution to downwind nonattainment and established for each state an individual budget that would eliminate its "significant contribution" to nonattainment. But, ultimately, emissions reductions were based on cost-effectiveness rather than these contributions. The D.C. Circuit Court held that CSAPR exceeded EPA's statutory authority in several respects. First, the emissions reduction requirements imposed on upwind states were not based on their contributions to downwind pollution. Second, the rule made no attempt to calculate reduction requirements based on the proportionate contributions of all upwind states. Third, the reduction requirements created unnecessary "over-control" in downwind states by imposing requirements more than necessary to meet standards. This decision has important implications. It is questionable whether EPA can implement the Good Neighbor provision through an emissions trading program as it has been struck down twice in this effort. The agency and environmental groups have petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing, and some members of Congress have discussed amending the Clean Air Act to address the problem. The states have another remedy: Section 126 of the Clean Air Act allows individual states to file petitions with EPA to stop interstate air pollution. The agency may prevent industrial facilities from operating if it finds they are violating the Good Neighbor provision. In fact, it was a series of Section 126 petitions by northeastern states that led EPA to develop CAIR and CSAPR in the first place. While EPA has preferred the emissions trading approach to this injunctive approach, Section 126 may be the most effective legal tool available after the D.C. Circuit Court's decision. The question is how aggressively EPA would pursue it.

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Metro Two Black Judges – pioneers who paved the way for women By Yussuf Simmonds (Managing Editor) Published March 22, 2012 Sr. Judge Constance Baker Motley Judge Motley Judge Jane Bolin Atty. Jane Bolin Legends By Yussuf J. Simmonds Managing Editor Two Black Judges – pioneers who paved the way for women Judge Constance Baker MotleyConstance Baker was born on September 14, 1921, in New Haven, Connecticut to Rachel and Willoughby Baker, who were from the Caribbean island of Nevis. She was the ninth of 12 children. Young Constance was one of the few Black students in her elementary and high school in segregated New Haven, and her knowledge of Black history was learned through lectures by a Black minister in a local Episcopal church. Her early interest was in interior decorating, but after high school, she changed to a career in law. After high school, she worked as a domestic to help pay for her college tuition, then accepted a job with the National Youth Administration in New Haven. She started at Fisk University where her interaction with other Blacks taught her invaluable lessons about the effects of segregation. She believed that many of her Black classmates were not interested in being successful in the “white world.” In 1942, she transferred to Washington Square College in New York, where she received her bachelor’s degree in economics. She then went to Columbia Law School where she met Thurgood Marshall who, at the time, was legal counsel for the NAACP. She graduated in 1946 and began her legal career at the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF). She entered private practice in New York City as a member of the law firm of Perlman, Motley and Bronheim. In 1949, she married Joel Wilson Motley. As associate counsel of LDF – its principal trial attorney – she won many difficult civil rights cases and participated in most of the important civil rights cases during that era, including Brown v Board of Education. As a young lawyer, Motley represented Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and played a pivotal role in the nation’s civil rights struggle. She won several cases before the United States Supreme Court; her most important victory was the case of James Meredith against the University of Mississippi in Meredith v Fair in 1962. She was lead counsel in forcing integration of that university. (Meredith went on to complete his degree and later on led demonstrations for voter registration). In 1964, Motley became the first Black woman elected to the New York State Senate; and in 1965, she was the first woman to serve as president of New York City Borough. While working in that capacity, Motley developed a plan to revitalize the inner city and to improve housing and inner-city schools. President Johnson appointed her as United States District Court Judge for the southern district of New York in 1966. This was the largest federal trial court district in the U.S. and it was a lifetime appointment. It made Motley the first Black woman to be appointed a federal judge. Although the appointment was opposed by southern conservatives in the Senate, she was eventually confirmed. She became chief judge in 1982 and senior judge four years later. In addition to numerous awards and honorary degrees recognizing her contributions to civil rights and the legal profession, Motley was inducted into the National Women’s Hall of Fame in 1993. Her autobiography, Equal Justice Under Law, was published in 1998. She remained as a senior judge until her death in 2005. Judge Jane M. Bolin When Jane Bolin was born, there was a hereditary belief that she would become an attorney; that she eventually became was an added bonus. Her father, Gaius Charles Bolin, was an attorney, the first Black to graduate from Williams College. Born in Poughkeepsie, New York, on April 11, 1908, she was the youngest of four siblings. Her mother Matilda Emery Bolin (a White Englishwoman) died when she was eight years old, so she grew up with her father and followed his footsteps into the legal field. Bolin received her early education including high school in Poughkeepsie before going to Wellesley College in Massachusetts where she was one of two Black students in her class. Most of the White students ignored her, and she lived off campus with the other Black student. At that time race played an overt part in all aspects of life for a Black person – even a light-skinned one. Her careers adviser at Wellesley tried to discourage her from applying to attend Yale Law School due to her race and gender. That did not dissuade her and she graduated in 1928 in the top 20 in her class, and proceeded to Yale Law School, where she was the only Black student, and one of only three women. In 1931, she was the first Black woman to receive a law degree from Yale. The following year, she passed the New York state bar examination and joined her father in his law office in Poughkeepsie. After a brief period, she got married to Ralph E. Mizelle, an attorney and began practicing with him. However, she retained her maiden name, “Bolin,” in public. In 1936, she ran unsuccessfully for the New York State Assembly as the Republican candidate in the seventeenth district. Then she joined the New York City Bar Association and became the first to join the city’s legal department, serving as Assistant Corporation Counsel. Bolin became the first Black woman to serve as a judge in the United States when, at age 31, she was appointed to the bench of the New York City Domestic Relations Court in 1939 by the Mayor of New York City, Fiorello La Guardia, at the New York World’s Fair. The Domestic Relations Court was renamed the Family Court and Judge Bolin remained a judge of the court for 40 years. She was reappointed by succeeding mayors three times, until she reached the require retirement age of 70. While on the bench, she worked to encourage racially integrated child services, ensuring that probation officers were assigned without regard to race or religion, and that publicly-funded childcare agencies accepted children without regard to ethnic background. In January 1979, when Judge Bolin reluctantly retired, Judge Constance Baker Motley, her colleague on the federal bench, called her a role model. In her farewell speech, Judge Motley said, “When I thereafter met you, I then knew how a lady judge should comport herself.” The “lady judge” was frequently in the news at the time of her appointment with accounts of her regal bearing, fashionable hats and pearls. But her achievements transcended being a shining example. As a family court judge, she led by example. Bolin had one son, Yorke Bolin Mizelle, from her first marriage in 1941. Two years later, her husband died; she re-married her second husband, the Rev. Walter P. Offutt Jr., in 1950. He died in 1974. As an activist for children’s rights and education, Bolin served on the boards of the NAACP, the Child Welfare League, and the National Urban League. She received honorary degrees from Tuskegee Institute, Williams College, Hampton University, Western College for Women and Morgan State University, and after retiring in 1979, Bolin served on the New York State Board of Regents. She died in 2007 in Queens, New York, and was survived by her son, Yorke. Categories: Legends African American Women Appeal Court Justices Legendary Black Business Men TWO BLACK WOMEN WHO PAVED THE WAY “The Sentinel turns 79” Two Men who understood money 3 Women who have changed society

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Metro VOTING RIGHTS VIOLATIONS STILL WIDESPREAD By Larry Aubry 11/22/12 Published January 11, 2013 Anti-Black attitudes are increasing. Fifty-one percent of all Americans, an increase of 3% over four years, now express such attitudes, according to a recent Associated Press poll. So why has the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to challenge the Voting Rights Act of 1965? The case from Shelby County, Alabama questions whether Congress exceeded its authority when it voted in 2006 to renew Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Voting rights are not guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution-that right is granted to the states. However, the Shelby case does not contest the constitutionality of the voting law itself, which makes it illegal to enforce any voting procedure or election law that discriminates against voters because of their race. Section 5 requires jurisdictions found to have prior voting right violations to be pre-approved by the U.S. Attorney General or the U.S. District Court in Washington, DC before making changes in election laws or rules. The Shelby case, along with a case challenging college affirmative action at the University of Texas, makes this year’s Supreme Court term momentous for civil rights. The common theme in both cases is whether a 1960s era remedy for racial discrimination is still needed-and justified today. The court’s conservative justices have made it clear they are troubled by Section 5, which puts the South under special scrutiny. Section 5’s pre-review requirement currently applies not only to Alabama, but the states of Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Virginia, South Dakota and Texas. Reportedly, it also covers certain counties in California, Florida, New York, North Carolina, Michigan and New Hampshire. (In the 2008 presidential election, the African American Voter Registration, Education and Participation Project (AAVREPP) found discrimination and voting irregularities even in polling places in South Central Los Angeles. This year, AAVREPP again launched a successful get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaign that contributed to the large voter turnout in that area.) In its petition, Shelby County argues that Section 5’s pre-clearance requirement violates the 10th Amendment and Article IV of the U.S. Constitution. Both provisions grant states the power to regulate elections. In passing the law (Section 5), Congress relied on the 15th Amendment which prohibits states from denying a citizen the right to vote based on race, color or previous condition of servitude, such as slavery. The Shelby County petition also claims, -and three years ago Chief Justice John C. Roberts agreed-“Things have changed in the south.” The petition argues, “Voter turnout and registration now approach parity….blatant discrimination, evasions of federal decrees are rare, and minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.” It further charges that the federal government is still relying on data more than 35-years old that fail to account for current political conditions. George E. Curry, National Newspaper Publishers Association (NNPA), Editor-in-Chief, comments, “Surprisingly, the National Black Chamber of Commerce, which describes itself as, “a non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to the economic empowerment of African American communities through entrepreneurship,” filed a friend-of-the-court brief supporting Shelby County’s position opposing continued oversight under the Voting Rights Act. In doing so, the Black Chamber aligned itself with right-wing anti-affirmative groups, who also filed friend-of-the-court briefs with the Supreme Court opposing affirmative action in the University of Texas case. The Black Chamber’s campaign brief declared, “….Section 5 is no longer necessary to combat widespread and persistent discrimination in voting and now, perversely serves as an impediment to racial neutrality in voting and the empowerment of state and local officials who represent minority constituents.” Like its right-wing cohorts, the Chamber too, “rejects the assumption underlying Congress’s reauthorization of Section 5 that the exceptional circumstances which justify close federal oversight of electoral practices of many states and locations in 1965 and 1975 persist today. They do not.” This kind of post-racial rationalization bolsters the Tea Party and its wrongheaded allies throughout the country who, do not publicly proclaim, but apparently ardently believe that Blacks and other people of color, no longer have a right to complain because they now enjoy access, continuing largesse and the same benefits accorded white Americans. (If you believe this, please contact me about purchasing a few snow-capped mountains in Florida.) Before reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act in 2006, Congress considered arguments of opponents who, like Shelby County, argued that there is no longer a need for continued federal oversight of select jurisdictions. The Justice Department quoted findings by Congress that while blatant voter discrimination had been reduced, vestiges of discrimination in voting continue to exist as demonstrated by second (and now third) generation barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fairly participating in the electoral process. (The prolonged and unprecedented attacks on President Obama and undisguised voter suppression efforts leading up to this year’s presidential election leave no doubt as to the broad-based appeal of these obscene tactics.) Since 1982, there were approximately 800 court rulings favorable to voters of color, according to friend-of-the-court briefs by civil rights organizations, including the NAACP, Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the American Civil Liberties Union. Approximately 81% of these rulings were brought against Section 5-covered jurisdictions! Most Blacks strongly support the need for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because they experience continuing race-based discrimination in their everyday lives. [email protected] Categories: Uncategorized Local Pastor Affected by Gun Violence Joins Congresswoman Hahn at the State... EQUALITY FOR ALL? Paula Deen dropped by Wal-Mart after ‘Today’ tears Call 2 Worship – July 18 Keep on Walking, Keep on Talking,’ MLK III Urges Marchers Curry Temple CME Welcomes Rev. McDaniel

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Marijuana Prosecution Not a High Priority, Says Obama from the law-is-an-ass dept. Hugh Pickens writes "VOA reports that President Obama says it does not make sense for federal authorities to seek prosecution of recreational marijuana users in states where such use is legal. 'As it is, you know, the federal government has a lot to do when it comes to criminal prosecutions,' said Obama during a television interview with ABC's Barbara Walters. 'It does not make sense from a prioritization point of view for us to focus on recreational drug users in a state that has already said that, under state law, that's legal.' When asked if he supported legalizing marijuana, the president said he was not endorsing that. 'I wouldn't go that far, but what I think is that, at this point, Washington and Colorado, you've seen the voters speak on this issue.'" South Carolina Shows How Not To Do Security from the at-least-the-failure-was-spectacular dept. CowboyRobot writes "Earlier this year, the state's Department of Revenue was storing 3.3 million bank account numbers, as well as 3.8 million tax returns containing Social Security numbers for 1.9 million children and other dependents, in an unencrypted format. After a state employee clicked on a malicious email link, an attacker was able to obtain copies of those records. It's easy to blame the breach on 'Russian hackers' but who is really to blame? 'The state's leadership, from the governor on down, failed to take information security seriously or to correctly gauge the financial risk involved. As a result, taxpayers will pay extra to clean up the mess. Beyond the $800,000 that the state will spend — and should have already spent — to improve its information security systems, $500,000 will go to the data breach investigation, $740,000 to notify consumers and businesses, $250,000 for legal and PR help, and $12 million for identity theft monitoring services.'" Solar Panels For Every Home? from the particularly-the-ones-with-ugly-roofs dept. Hugh Pickens writes "David Crane and Robert F.Kennedy Jr. write in the NY Times that with residents of New Jersey and New York living through three major storms in the past 16 months and suffering sustained blackouts, we need to ask whether it is really sensible to power the 21st century by using an antiquated and vulnerable system of copper wires and wooden poles. Some have taken matters into their own hands, purchasing portable gas-powered generators to give themselves varying degrees of grid independence. But these dirty, noisy and expensive devices have no value outside of a power failure and there is a better way to secure grid independence for our homes and businesses: electricity-producing photovoltaic panels installed on houses, warehouses and over parking lots, wired so that they deliver power when the grid fails. 'Solar panels have dropped in price by 80 percent in the past five years and can provide electricity at a cost that is at or below the current retail cost of grid power in 20 states, including many of the Northeast states,' write Crane and Kennedy. 'So why isn't there more of a push for this clean, affordable, safe and inexhaustible source of electricity?' First, the investor-owned utilities that depend on the existing system for their profits have little economic interest in promoting a technology that empowers customers to generate their own power. Second, state regulatory agencies and local governments impose burdensome permitting and siting requirements that unnecessarily raise installation costs. While it can take as little as eight days to license and install a solar system on a house in Germany, in the United States, depending on your state, the average ranges from 120 to 180 days." China Quietly Unblocks Names of Its Leaders from the how-now-found-mao dept. hackingbear writes "One of the Chinese Web censorship's central features has long been blocking searches for the names of top leaders to maintain their public images. Sina Weibo, China's largest microblog service, unblocked searches for the names of many top political leaders in a possible sign of looser controls a month after new senior officials were named to head the ruling party, though a number of other senior leaders are still blocked on Weibo, including Premier Web Jiabao. That (President) Xi might be leading by example on softening Web censorship could be a promising sign for future reforms. It isn't on a major shift, but it could portend one." Julian Assange Runs For Office In Australia from the will-of-the-people dept. mpawlo writes "Mr Julian Assange of Wikileaks fame, has, according to The Age, confirmed his intention to run for the Australian Senate in 2013. He will also form a Wikileaks political party. From the article: 'Mr Assange said plans to register an Australian WikiLeaks party were ''significantly advanced''. He indicated he would be a Senate candidate, and added that "a number of very worthy people admired by the Australian public" have indicated their availability to stand for election on a party ticket. Mr Assange said he is able to fulfill the requirements to register as an overseas elector in either New South Wales or Victoria and that he will shortly take a "strategic decision" about which state he would be a Senate candidate for.'" North Korea Launches Long-Range Rocket from the good-thing-they-don't-have-oil dept. virtualXTC writes with news that North Korea, in defiance of international pressure to halt development and testing of long-range weaponry, launched a multi-stage rocket which successfully followed its intended trajectory. The North Korean government claims a weather satellite was placed into orbit. "South Korea has confirmed the launch time, and Japan has confirmed that the rocket went over Okinawa. Two stages of the rocket have successfully avoided other countries and fallen into the sea. While it is still unconfirmed as to whether or not North Korea actually put a satellite into orbit, it seems clear that sanctions have failed to curb North Korea's quest for more powerful weaponry." Chinese Firm Wins Bid For US-Backed Battery Maker from the best-laid-plans dept. theodp writes "On September 13, 2010, President Obama called A123 Systems from the Oval Office to congratulate them on opening the nation's first manufacturing facility to mass-produce electric vehicle batteries, which the White House noted was made possible by a $249 million Recovery Act grant the company received the prior August. 'When folks lift up their hoods on the cars of the future,' the President said, 'I want them to see engines and batteries that are stamped: Made in America. And that's what you guys are helping to make happen.' But on Saturday, the assets of A123 Systems were auctioned off to the Wanxiang Group, a large Chinese auto parts maker. Wanxiang agreed to pay $256 million for A123's automotive and commercial operations, including its three factories in the United States. Forbes reports that A123's stock, which closed at 7 cents a share on Friday, is now worthless." How Corruption Is Strangling US Innovation from the there-oughta-be-a-law dept. hype7 writes "The Harvard Business Review is running a very interesting piece on how money in politics is having a deleterious effect on U.S. innovation. From the article: 'Somehow, it seems that every time that [Mickey Mouse] is about to enter the public domain, Congress has passed a bill to extend the length of copyright. Congress has paid no heed to research or calls for reform; the only thing that matters to determining the appropriate length of copyright is how old Mickey is. Rather than create an incentive to innovate and develop new characters, the present system has created the perverse situation where it makes more sense for Big Content to make campaign contributions to extend protection for their old work.if you were in any doubt how deep inside the political system the system of contributions have allowed incumbents to insert their hands, take a look at what happened when the Republican Study Committee released a paper pointing out some of the problems with current copyright regime. The debate was stifled within 24 hours. And just for good measure, Rep Marsha Blackburn, whose district abuts Nashville and who received more money from the music industry than any other Republican congressional candidate, apparently had the author of the study, Derek Khanna, fired. Sure, debate around policy is important, but it's clearly not as important as raising campaign funds.'" How Yucca Mountain Was Killed from the actually-the-mountain's-doing-just-fine dept. ATKeiper writes "The Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository, which was selected by the U.S. government in the 1980s to be the nation's permanent facility for storing nuclear waste, is essentially dead. A new article in The New Atlantis explains how the project was killed: 'In the end, the Obama administration succeeded, by a combination of legal authority and bureaucratic will, in blocking Congress's plan for the Yucca Mountain repository — certainly for the foreseeable future, and perhaps permanently.... The saga of Yucca Mountain's creation and apparent demise, and of the seeming inability of the courts to prevent the Obama administration from unilaterally nullifying the decades-old statutory framework for Yucca, illustrates how energy infrastructure is uniquely subject to the control of the executive branch, and so to the influence of presidential politics.' A report from the Government Accountability Office notes that the termination 'essentially restarts a time-consuming and costly process [that] has already cost nearly $15 billion through 2009.'" Republican Staffer Khanna Axed Over Copyright Memo from the don't-mistake-the-gop-for-free-marketeers dept. Bob9113 writes "Ars Technica reports that Derek Khanna is getting axed over his memo detailing the conflict between laissez-faire-oriented free market ideals and the regulatory monopoly that is copyright. 'The Republican Study Committee, a caucus of Republicans in the House of Representatives, has told staffer Derek Khanna that he will be out of a job when Congress re-convenes in January. The incoming chairman of the RSC, Steve Scalise (R-LA) was approached by several Republican members of Congress who were upset about a memo Khanna wrote advocating reform of copyright law. They asked that Khanna not be retained, and Scalise agreed to their request.'" US House Votes 397-0 To Oppose UN Control of the Internet from the free-sandwich-with-every-vote dept. An anonymous reader writes "The U.S. House of Representatives voted 397-0 today on a resolution to oppose U.N. control of the internet. 'The 397-0 vote is meant to send a signal to countries meeting at a U.N. conference on telecommunications this week. Participants are meeting to update an international telecom treaty, but critics warn that many countries' proposals could allow U.N. regulation of the Internet.' The European Parliament passed a similar resolution a couple weeks ago, and the U.N. telecom chief has gone on record saying that freedom on the internet won't be curbed. However, that wasn't enough for U.S. lawmakers, who were quite proud of themselves for actually getting bipartisan support for the resolution (PDF). Rep Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) said, 'We need to send a strong message to the world that the Internet has thrived under a decentralized, bottom-up, multi-stakeholder governance model.'" NZ Pirate Party Takes Issue With Pro-Trans-Pacific Partnership Website from the they-were-asking-for-it dept. An anonymous reader writes "The Pirate Party of New Zealand has issued a strongly-worded (yet satirical) press release, decrying a recently-launched pro Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) website, stating, among other things: 'The use of a masted sailing ship is the most glaring example of the satirical nature of this website and one of our main grounds for offence. The Pirate Ship and all its related depictions are clearly intellectual property of the Pirate Party or at least if not the Party then The Pirate Bay which the Party shares a mutual affinity with for a free and open Internet. In these heady days of lawsuits over patents for rounded corners we can not stand by on the decks of the Internet and allow these cannon shots to go unanswered!'" Congressional Committee Casts a Harsh Eye On Vaccination Science from the are-you-or-have-you-ever-been dept. The Bad Astronomer writes "A recent hearing of the Congressional Committee on Oversight and Government Reform became a bully pulpit for antivaccination rhetoric when Representatives Dan Burton (R-Ind.) and Dennis Kucinich (D-Oh.) made speeches connecting vaccines to autism — a connection that medical experts have shown does not exist. Although there were actual medical researchers there as witnesses, they were mostly berated by the Congressmen on the panel. Vaccines are one of the most successful medical advancements in human history, having saved hundreds of millions of lives, and after copious studies have been shown to have no connection with autism. Despite this, a vocal antivax lobby exists, including, clearly, members of Congress. In part this is why preventable and potentially fatal diseases like pertussis and measles are once again on the rise." Interviews: Ask What You Will of Eugene Kaspersky 115 from the make-his-day dept. Eugene Kaspersky probably hates malware just as much as you do on his own machines, but as the head of Kaspersky Labs, the world's largest privately held security software company, he might have a different perspective — the existence of malware and other forms of online malice drives the need for security software of all kinds, and not just on personal desktops or typical internet servers. The SCADA software vulnerabilities of the last few years have led him to announce work on an operating system for industrial control systems of the kind affected by Flame and Stuxnet. But Kaspersky is not just toiling away in the computer equivalent of the CDC: He's been outspoken in his opinions — some of which have drawn ire on Slashdot, like calling for mandatory "Internet ID" and an "Internet Interpol". He's also come out in favor of Internet voting, and against SOPA, even pulling his company out of the BSA over it. More recently, he's been criticized for ties to the current Russian government. (With regard to that Wired article, though, read Kaspersky's detailed response to its claims.) Now, he's agreed to answer Slashdot readers' questions. As usual, you're encouraged to ask all the question you'd like, but please confine your questions to one per post. We'll pass on the best of these for Kaspersky's answers. Update: 12/04 14:20 GMT by T : For more on Kaspersky's thoughts on the importance of online IDs, see this detailed blog posting. North Korea Claims Archaeologists Have Found 'Unicorn Lair' In Pyongyang from the not-so-horny-after-all dept. eldavojohn writes "NPR pointed out a press release claiming that North Korean archaeologists have found a 'unicorn lair' in Pyongyang. The members of the History Institute of the DPRK Academy of Social Sciences have "reconfirmed" that this site was used for King Tongmyong's unicorn where the unicorn would concoct his unicorn schemes and do his unicorn things if anyone ventured too closely. The last line is, perhaps, the most important line of the article, 'The discovery of the unicorn lair, associated with legend about King Tongmyong, proves that Pyongyang was a capital city of Ancient Korea as well as Koguryo Kingdom.' Fear not that North Korea is surpassing the world in cryptozoology, Dr. Melba S. Ketchum of Nacogdoches, TX has claimed to have recently sequenced Bigfoot's DNA and he's part human." US Presidential Election Vote Not Old Enough Not American CowboyNeal Read the 20 comments | Arista Infringed on More Cisco Network Patents, Rules U.S. Trade Judge Can't Hear in Noisy Places is a real medical condition Twitter Cuts API Access for Surveillance Tool That Let Police Spy on Activists

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› Fink v. O'Neil Fink v. O'Neil 106 U.S. 272 (1882) U.S. Supreme CourtFink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272 (1882)Fink v. O'NeilDecided December 11, 1882106 U.S. 272Syllabus The homestead of a defendant is not subject to seizure and sale by virtue of an execution sued out on a judgment recovered by the United States in a civil action if, had a private party been the plaintiff, it would be exempt therefrom, by the law of the state where it is situate. This is a bill in equity filed by O'Neil praying for a perpetual injunction to restrain Fink, the then Marshal of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, from further proceeding under a fi. fa. issued upon a judgment rendered in favor of the United States in the district court for that district against the complainant and others, and which had been levied on real estate alleged to be his homestead, and exempt under the laws of that state from sale on execution. The premises levied on are forty acres, with a dwelling house and appurtenances thereon which he occupied as a residence for himself and family consisting of his wife and seven children, the same being used for agricultural purposes, not included in any town, city, or village plot, and alleged to be of the value of $6,000 and upwards, and it is averred that the cause of action upon which the judgment was rendered was not for any debt or liability contracted prior to Jan. 1, 1849. To this bill there was filed a general demurrer for want of equity which, being overruled and Fink declining to answer or plead, a decree was rendered granting the relief prayed for, from which he prosecutes this appeal. The provision of the statute of Wisconsin on the subject of homestead exemptions, the benefit of which was secured to the appellee by the decree, is as follows: "A homestead to be selected by the owner thereof, consisting, when not included in any village or city, of any quantity of land, not exceeding forty acres, used for agricultural purposes, and when included in any city or village, of a quantity of land not exceeding one-fourth of an acre, and the dwelling house thereon and its appurtenances, owned and occupied by any resident of this state, shall be exempt from seizure or sale on execution from the lien of every Page 106 U. S. 273 judgment and from liability in any form for the debts of such owner, except laborers', mechanics', and purchase money liens, and mortgages lawfully executed, and taxes lawfully assessed, and except as otherwise specially provided in these statutes," &c. Rev.Stat. Wisconsin 1878 783, c. 130 sec. 2983. Page 106 U. S. 275

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The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) amended the Copyright Act, Title 17 of the U.S. Code containing federal copyright law, added section 512-Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation. Section 512 provides "safe harbor" provisions for Internet service providers from liability of copyright infringement based on four categories, two of which are "transitory digital network communications" and "storage of information on systems or networks at direction of users." In general, the College must implement reasonable policy for terminating accounts of repeat offenders; not interfere with standard technical measures to protect copyrighted material; and have procedures for dealing with DMCA Notices of Copyright Infringement, and take down or block access to infringing material. Fort Lewis College supports compliance with copyright law. Unauthorized copying, distribution and certain other uses of copyrighted material are illegal and can expose you to severe civil and criminal liability under copyright law. This applies to all types of copyrighted works, including music, movies, software, games, and other literary and artistic works. Protecting intellectual property and controlling costs, including the cost of Internet bandwidth, benefits everyone. Downloading unauthorized copies of music and movies is not only illegal, but it is an abuse of campus network resources that can interfere with the academic pursuits of other students and faculty. The Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 required the College to create a "Policy and Plan to Combat Unauthorized Distribution of Copyrighted Material and Peer-to-peer (P2P) File Sharing," and notify prospective and enrolled students of institutional polices and sanctions related to copyright infringement. Fort Lewis College Policy 6-10 Accepatble Use of Information Technology Copyright Infringement: Any violation of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner.

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Hogan Lovells partner Gabriela Kennedy Wins Asia Women in Business Law Award LONDON, 14 December 2011 - Hong Kong-based Hogan Lovells partner, Gabriela Kennedy, has won the Best in TMT Award at the Euromoney Asia Women in Business Law Awards. The awards celebrate the accomplishments of women in the legal sector in Asia and are given to firms or individuals that have shown outstanding achievement in their respective fields. Hogan Lovells' global TMT practice comprises more than 200 lawyers who advise clients in the media and entertainment, telecommunications, technology, and electronics spheres; on regulatory, antitrust and competition, commercial, and intellectual property issues; litigation; and large scale corporate transactions. Hogan Lovells received four awards at the European Women in Business Law Awards earlier in 2011, including Best International Firm for Women and Russia Law Firm of the Year; and two individuals, Alicante trademark partner Verena Von Bomhard and Brussels international trade partner Lourdes Catrain, were also recognised as best in their field. The firm also recently held a Women's Executive Summit in New York. ENDS About Hogan Lovells www.hoganlovells.com Hogan Lovells combines the breadth of business-oriented legal advice and high-quality service that clients have come to expect through working with its two founding firms – Hogan & Hartson and Lovells."Hogan Lovells" or the "firm" refers to the international legal practice comprising Hogan Lovells International LLP, Hogan Lovells US LLP, and their affiliated businesses. Hogan Lovells International LLP is a limited liability partnership registered in England and Wales with registered number OC323639. Registered office and principal place of business: Atlantic House, Holborn Viaduct, London EC1A 2FG. Hogan Lovells US LLP is a limited liability partnership registered in the District of Columbia.The word "partner" is used to refer to a member of Hogan Lovells International LLP or a partner of Hogan Lovells US LLP, or an employee or consultant with equivalent standing and qualifications, and to a partner, member, employee or consultant in any of their affiliated businesses who has equivalent standing. Rankings and quotes from legal directories and other sources may refer to the former firms of Hogan & Hartson LLP and Lovells LLP. Where case studies are included, results achieved do not guarantee similar outcomes for other clients. Explore related

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The association that campaigns for privacy protections How Members Can Contribute POLICYSTATEMENTS | What Can I Do? Contact APF Big BrotherAward Submissionsin Date Order Submissionsby Topic | Join APF | OR Click here for Advanced Search This page provides information about how Members can contribute to the operation of the APF. It comprises three sections: membership information actions that every Member can take research and advocacy actions, which require particular expertise Invitation Please read the APF's Obectives. If you want to, please also read its Rules of Incorporation. To join, go to the Membership Form, and follow the instructions. If you have any questions, here are the association's contact points. The annual subscription fees are set low, in order to make sure that they are not a barrier to people joining. If you want to make a more substantial financial contribution, please consider life membership, or a donation, or a contribution to a specific campaign. Room is provided for each of these on the application and renewal forms. The funds are used to support research, and to pay the travel costs involved in getting people with appropriate expertise in front of parliamentary and government committees. Actions By Members There are many things that APF Members can do, in order to contribute to the protection of privacy in Australia. These include: subscribe to the privacy discussion list, read other people's postings, and make your own contributions to it. (The list is run by Electronic Frontiers Australia, in conjunction with APF) monitor the media, and draw people's attention to issues, to important news about issues, and to sources of information keep your eyes open to privacy-related issues in your community, workplace, and school, and draw people's attention to issues, to important news about issues, and to sources of information propose enhancements to the APF's web-site, especially the Resources, Contacts and Issues sections participate in activities organised by the Foundation become familiar with current Australian privacy laws and relevant laws of your State or Territory, and get involved with government reviews of those laws that happen from time to time join and contribute to organisations that support the values of the Foundation, and that operate at State or local level, or that focus on particular segments (like health or the workplace), or particular issues (like video-surveillance or tele-marketing) volunteer your time and expertise by serving on Foundation committees, task forces, and working groups recruit new members, both individuals and organisations Research and Advocacy The APF has been conducting research, and advocating the public interest, since 1987. This has resulted in scores of submissions in relation to a wide variety of issues, and appearances before many official committees. The APF is a volunteer organisation, and depends on its members for expertise, and for energy. People are needed with the following qualities: concern about privacy expertise in privacy generally expertise in areas in which privacy issues arise, such as information technology, health care, telecommunications, road transport, industrial law, privacy law, etc. expertise in, and/or the preparedness to research, privacy issues in one or more specific areas expertise in the written and/or verbal presentation of carefully researched arguments to parliaments, official committees, government agencies, industry associations, and corporations the energy to study documents, prepare working papers, draft and review position papers, negotiate with organisations, and participate in media campaigns responsibility and steadiness in dealing with corporations, government agencies and the media the patience to coax and cajole organisations towards understanding of privacy concerns If this sounds like you, and you would like to be involved in APF's research and advocacy activities, we'd be delighted to hear from you via the association's contact points. If you want to contribute by assisting with a submission, please read the Submission Guidelines. APF thanks its site-sponsor: This web-site is periodically mirrored by the Australian National Library's Pandora Archive and by the Wayback Machine since March 2000 Created: 7 October 1998 - Last Amended: 24 December 2004 - Site Last Verified: 11 January 2009 © Australian Privacy Foundation Inc., 1998-2016 - Mail to Webmaster Site Map - This document is at http://www.privacy.org.au/Members/Contrib.html - Privacy Policy

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The Goldstone Affair If you are not a Subscriber, Subscribe Now!Back to site International Law May 2, 2011 Issue Despite a “reconsideration” on the part of its author, the Goldstone Report remains as vital as ever for understanding the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict. By Adam Horowitz, Lizzy Ratner and Philip Weiss April 14, 2011 Editor’s Note: An earlier version of the article below appeared in our May 2 print issue. Subscribers can download the PDF. From the moment the Goldstone Report was published in September 2009, its opponents have worked tirelessly to undermine it. The 452-page investigation of the 2008–09 Gaza conflict by a United Nations Human Rights Council fact-finding mission accused Israel and Hamas of war crimes for attacks on civilians, but its overall thrust was harshly critical of the Israeli onslaught, which took as many as 1,400 Palestinian lives, including those of more than 300 children. The US Congress denounced the report for allegedly denying Israel’s right of self-defense (it didn’t); Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shortlisted the report, along with Hamas rockets and a nuclear-armed Iran, as one of the three main threats to the Jewish state; and Alan Dershowitz accused the report’s chief author, Richard Goldstone, of being a traitor to the Jewish people. As recently as March, Eli Yishai, Israel’s bellicose interior minister, wrote to Goldstone charging his report with giving “legitimacy” to terrorist organizations and “calm[ing] murderers without a conscience” when they murder children. Adam Horowitz, Lizzy Ratner and Philip Weiss are editors of The Goldstone Report: The Legacy of the Landmark Investigation of the Gaza Conflict. Then came the “reconsideration.” On April 1 Goldstone, a 72-year-old South African judge, published an op-ed in the Washington Post saying that Israeli army investigations of some 400 incidents during Operation Cast Lead had caused him to disavow a key assertion in the report: that Israel had a policy of deliberate attacks on civilians during the twenty-two-day conflict. “If I had known then what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different document,” he wrote. Within hours of Goldstone’s op-ed, those who had been gunning for the report all along gleefully pronounced its demise. They characterized the judge’s essay as a recantation, and they declared the report mortally flawed. Netanyahu demanded that the UN cancel the document. The State Department followed suit, with UN ambassador Susan Rice stating that she wanted the report simply to “disappear.” The Israel Action Network, a multi-million-dollar effort led by the Jewish Federations of North America to massage Israel’s image and rebut “delegitimization” efforts, promptly launched a campaign to circulate the op-ed to as many “opinion molders” as possible. And yet, the Goldstone Report lives on. Not only have all efforts to derail it failed thus far but the report is arguably more relevant than ever. Just a few days before the judge’s “reconsideration,” the UN Human Rights Council gave the report new life by passing a resolution recommending that it be sent to the General Assembly and from there to the Security Council for possible referral to the International Criminal Court. And Goldstone’s op-ed itself has thrust the report, and its recommendations, back into the spotlight. “In my view, the Goldstone retreat, unfortunate for his overall reputation and legacy, has actually given the report, and its recommendation, a second public life, with renewed interest, and civil society engagement with a call for its implementation,” Richard Falk, the UN special rapporteur on Palestinian human rights, wrote in an e-mail. He later added, “It has made people more aware about the need for accountability.” Eminent figures have stepped up to affirm the validity of the original document, including, most notably, the three commissioners who co-authored the report with Goldstone: retired Irish colonel Desmond Travers, Pakistani lawyer Hina Jilani, and legal scholar Christine Chinkin. In a devastating rebuke published in the Guardian on April 14, the three commissioners defended the validity of the report and dismissed critics who have sought to capitalize on Goldstone’s essay as cynically misrepresenting the facts. Most Popular1Democrats Should Fight All of Trump’s Nominees. Yes, All of Them.2Trump Just Told the Fight for $15 to Go Screw Itself3Chuck Jones Is a Better President Than Donald Trump Will Ever Be4The Second Coming of MTV News5The Magnitude of Trump’s Cronyism Is Off the Charts—Even for Washington “We concur in our view that there is no justification for any demand or expectation for reconsideration of the report as nothing of substance has appeared that would in any way change the context, findings or conclusions of that report with respect to any of the parties to the Gaza conflict,” they wrote in their statement. Further down they added, “Had we given in to pressures from any quarter to sanitize our conclusions, we would be doing a serious injustice to the hundreds of innocent civilians killed during the Gaza conflict, the thousands injured, and the hundreds of thousands whose lives continue to be deeply affected by the conflict and the blockade.” Indeed, the largest lesson of the controversy has been that the world is not prepared to forget these hundreds of thousands of killed, injured and “deeply affected” civilians – or the report that documented their suffering. If Gaza was a contemporary Guernica, the report fit the battle by describing riveting horrors: the children forced to sleep next to their parents’ bodies for days on end as ambulances were denied access to neighborhoods; the 15-year-old boy whose mother sought to save him by sewing up the bullet hole in his chest with a needle sterilized in cologne; the mother and daughter, 65 and 37, shot and killed amid a crowd of civilians carrying white flags as they walked from a village in search of safe harbor; the student who calmly told Human Rights Council interviewers, “My legs were exploded away” by a shell that killed several members of his family. These images will haunt anyone who has read the report. No less powerful is the moral vocabulary the report provided to describe the outrage of these events. This language was drawn from the realm of international law and carried the promise of legal repercussions for the wrongs committed—by Israel and Hamas—during Cast Lead. Thanks to the report there were names, and consequences, for the suffering inflicted on the people of Gaza, as well as the people of southern Israel. The attack on Gaza’s only functioning flour mill became an example of Israel’s intentional destruction of the area’s civilian infrastructure, while the siege of Gaza, which deprived civilians of the means of sustenance, was correctly classified as a form of collective punishment. Both are war crimes, and both require criminal prosecution of those who planned and orchestrated them. GET A DIGITAL SUBSCRIPTION FOR JUST $9.50! Subscribe This moral vocabulary has now permeated the global discourse about Israel-Palestine. Israel’s apparent impunity has galvanized the international Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement and inspired grassroots efforts to use universal jurisdiction to hold Israeli leaders accountable where the international community has failed to do so. This too is the achievement of the report: it has retold the story of the Israel-Palestine conflict and reshaped the contours of the debate. There has been wide speculation on why Goldstone issued his “reconsideration.” Many have pointed to the unrelenting pressure on him—the ad hominem attacks, the accusations that he abetted terrorists, the meeting with members of the South African Jewish community that was designed to “puncture” his heart, according to the Forward. But the judge has offered no window on his motivation. Indeed, his reconsideration becomes all the more perplexing in light of his assertion that he still stands by the original report. “As presently advised I have no reason to believe any part of the report needs to be reconsidered at this time,” he told an AP reporter several days after his essay exploded across the Internet. Equally confounding is the matter of the new “evidence” Goldstone adduces in his op-ed to suggest that Israel did not intentionally target civilians, evidence which his co-commissioners as well as legal experts say does not hold up under even the mildest examination. Goldstone’s reconsideration hinges on his claim that Israel’s investigations into some of the most serious alleged crimes of Cast Lead have yielded new information that exonerates it of the charge that it targeted civilians as a matter of policy. To bolster this argument, he cites a March report by a UN Committee of Independent Experts, chaired by former New York Supreme Court justice Mary McGowan Davis which he says “recognized” the validity of Israel’s investigations. And yet, the committee makes no such claim. While commending Israel for initiating investigations, it offers a damning assessment of the quality of those inquiries. It points to Israel’s unwillingness, and structural inability, to investigate those who “designed, planned, ordered and oversaw Operation Cast Lead” as the greatest fault of the Israeli investigations to date. As John Dugard, a former UN special rapporteur for the occupied territories and chair of a 2009 Arab League Independ-ent Fact Finding Committee on Gaza, wrote, “There are no new facts that exonerate Israel and that could possibly have led Goldstone to change his mind.” Dugard added that Goldstone’s op-ed misrepresented a key finding of the report when he said he no longer believed there was an intentional policy to target civilians. Such a policy was never the issue, Dugard points out; rather, it was Israel’s indiscriminate use of force that broke international law. “The principal accusation leveled at Israel,” he explains, “was that during its assault on Gaza, it used force indiscriminately in densely populated areas and was reckless about the foreseeable consequences of its actions, which resulted in at least 900 civilian deaths and 5,000 wounded.” There can be no question that Goldstone’s op-ed has thrown up a considerable roadblock to those who hoped to see the report go to the International Criminal Court. “I was shocked and shattered,” said Norman Finkelstein, a longtime student of the conflict. “I immediately understood it was going to do terrible damage, and damage on many fronts. It’s the damage to truth and justice, it’s the damage to Jewish-Palestinian relations, it’s the damage to Israeli dissidents.” Unfortunately, the willful misrepresentation continues. A bipartisan group of US senators has called for legislation urging the UN to rescind the report as a “libel” against Israel, while the State Department’s chief legal adviser has described the blocking of the Goldstone Report as an achievement right up there with setting up a UN commission to investigate Muammar el-Qaddafi’s human rights violations. The report has survived more than eighteen months of assassination attempts, and it may weather the latest ones too. But if the attacks succeed, it will be a disaster for the principle of accountability in Israel and Palestine. As we write these words, tension is mounting once again between Israel and Hamas, and Israeli leaders like Tzipi Livni are threatening Gaza with a second Operation Cast Lead. Between April 7 and 11, nineteen Palestinians were killed and more than sixty injured. This fragile moment not only underscores the importance of the report and its central call—the need for accountability—but also the danger of ignoring its chief recommendations. As long as the crimes of Cast Lead go unpunished, we run the risk of seeing them repeated. Or as the Goldstone Report’s authors warn, “To deny modes of accountability reinforces impunity.” Facebook Adam Horowitz is an editor of the website Mondoweiss, which covers the Israel-Palestine conflict. Lizzy Ratner Lizzy Ratner is a Senior Editor at The Nation. Philip Weiss Philip Weiss is the author of American Taboo: A Murder in the Peace Corps (Harper Perennial) and an editor of the website Mondoweiss, which covers the Israel-Palestine conflict. President Obama Can Help Prevent Torture From Making a Comeback By Elizabeth Holtzman Dec 05, 2016 Iran, Angered Over Obama’s Renewal of Sanctions, Braces for Trump By Juan Cole Dec 08, 2016 Margaret Sullivan on How Trump Trounced the Media By John Nichols Dec 01, 2016 We Need to Kill the Electoral College By John Nichols Apr 14, 2011 Yet Another Chapter in Trickle-Down Economics By Calvin Trillin Apr 14, 2011 Obama’s ‘Shared Sacrifice’ Hits the Poor and Middle-Class Hardest By the Editors “AN INDISPENSABLE VOICE IN OUR POLITICAL DIALOGUE.”

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n. One of a variety of writs that may be issued to bring a party before a court or judge, having as its function the release of the party from unlawful restraint. n. The right of a citizen to obtain such a writ. n. A writ to bring a person before a court or a judge, most frequently used to ensure that a person's imprisonment, detention, or commitment is legal. A writ having for its object to bring a party before a court or judge; especially, one to inquire into the cause of a person's imprisonment or detention by another, with the view to protect the right to personal liberty; also, one to bring a prisoner into court to testify in a pending trial. n. In law, a writ issued by a judge or court, requiring the body of a person to be brought before the judge or into the court; specifically, such a writ (entitled in full habeas corpus subjiciendum) requiring the body of a person restrained of liberty to be brought before the judge or into court, that the lawfulness of the restraint may be investigated and determined. n. a writ ordering a prisoner to be brought before a judge n. the civil right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus as protection against illegal imprisonment Middle English, from Medieval Latin habeās corpus, produce the body (from the opening words of the writ) : Latin habeās, second person sing. present subjunctive of habēre, to have + Latin corpus, body. (American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition) Latin habeas corpus ad subjiciendum ("You (shall) have the body to be subjected to (examination)"), referring to the body of the person being detained (not the body of a victim, as in corpus delicti). (Wiktionary) Words that are more generic or abstract civil right judicial writ sionnach commented on the word habeas corpus Monk's pet pig in the Doc Savage adventures.

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If you can't say anything nice, kvetch about it. Miscellaneous rants, shames and (very rarely) praises of developments in the area of privacy, data protection and cyberlaw. "A total map of everyday life" - Today’s data retention decision: The good, the bad and the ugly Nothing like a long held cherished cause to bring Matron out of blogging retirement. Although many have already commented on today’s CJEU decision, there is sure to be room for another one. Budge up fellows! Where to begin? On a purely substantive level of fundamental rights soundbites, it really doesn’t get better than this. In contrast to the Advocate General’s opinion, delivered at the end of last year, the CJEU does not pussyfoot around the issues: 1. The court has strongly resisted falling into the retention/access trap that the Commission and the member states so carefully laid for it all those years ago. For nigh on a decade privacy campaigners have had to contend with the arguments that the Directive is fundamental rights compliant because it only regulates the retention of personal data. Retention itself, so the story went, is not the bad thing. Access is where the potential infringement of privacy and data protection rights kicks in and that’s all down to the member states. Move on folks, nothing to see here. Not so, says the court. Communications data “as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out and the social environments frequented by them” (para. 27). As a result, both Article 7 and Article 8 of the Charter are fully engaged with regard to retention as well as access, and nearly everything the court says subsequently about infringements of rights and the justification for such infringements (or lack thereof) applies to both. Caspar Bowden’s argument, made in his Duke* article all the way back in 2002 that communications data provides a “near complete map of the private life of an individual” has been fully embraced by the court. Well done Caspar and everyone who made that point over the years. 2. The court has not dodged the Article 8 bullet. Unlike Article 7 (right to private life) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, with which EU constitutional scholars feel reasonable comfortable because we have lots of ECHR case law to draw from, Article 8 (right to data protection) has so far been – shall we say – "underexplored”. Following the Advocate General’s opinion, this was set to continue as the AG simply refused to accept that the right to data protection was engaged here. He DID fall into the retention/access trap and argued that the Article 7 right covered the collection and retention of data while the Article 8 right covered its subsequent use. Since the Directive was not concerned with the latter, Article 8 did not have to be examined. Not so, says the court as it clearly states that “retention also falls within the meaning of Article 8 of the Charter because it constitutes the processing of personal data” (para. 29). Cue response from data protection lawyers all over Europe, “Well, duh!” 3. Both the retention of, and access to, communications data constitute an interference with both Articles 7 and 8 and, yes, that interference is particularly serious because of “the important role played by the protection of personal data in the light of the fundamental right to respect for private life” (para. 48) and the likely impact on individuals’ perception of surveillance. In a paragraph that will surely turn out to be the most quoted in the press, the Court confirms that “the fact that data are retained and subsequently used without the subscriber or registered user being informed is likely to generate in the minds of the persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant surveillance” (para. 37). And apparently that’s not ok. 4. The interference is not proportionate and here’s why: 4.1 Because of the importance of the rights interfered with and because of the particular seriousness of the interference, the EU legislature’s discretion is reduced to start with. Meaning that the EU legislator should have been extra extra careful when adopting the Directive to make sure that it dots all the I’s and crosses all the T’s. Not something that can easily be achieved in what remains the briefest legislative procedure in EU history, you will surely agree, dear reader. 4.2 The fight against terrorism is not the universal trump card it once was. The court makes it clear that while the fight against serious crime, in particular against organized crime and terrorism, is of the utmost importance, it “does not, in itself, justify a retention measure such as that established” in the Directive. No, the court doesn’t use the word “overkill” exactly, but yes, it goes on and on about the way in which the Directive “covers, in a generalized manner, all persons and all means of electronic communication” (para. 57), without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of its crime-fighting objective; how it “affects, in a comprehensive manner, all persons using electronic communications services, but without the persons whose data are retained being, even indirectly being in a situation which is liable to give rise to criminal prosecutions" (para. 58); that it applies even to persons “whose communications are subject […] to the obligation of professional secrecy” (para. 58); and that it does not provide for any restrictions that would in some way minimize its impact on law abiding members of society, like, for example, a temporal or geographic restriction or a restriction to persons actually suspected of having committed a crime (para. 59). So while the court does not mention the taboo term “data preservation”, this is where to look for its substance. 4.3 The Directive does nothing to clarify the conditions for access to the retained data. This is one the AG was already very unhappy about and we have of course seen where the decision to let the member states roam freely has already led us. Successful constitutional court challenges in several countries and the ludicrous situation in the UK where local councils and other bodies in no way concerned with security and law enforcement were handed broad access rights to retained data that were subsequently abused. 4.4 The retention period provided for in the Directive bears no relation to any kind of considered calculation regarding what was actually necessary. A spectrum ranging from six to 24 months was handed to the member states to play with as their own national political situations allowed. 4.5 There is nothing in the Directive that imposes obligations on the member states or the communications service providers to ensure the ongoing security of the retained data. No prescribed safeguards, no minimum security standards. Zilch! Not good enough, says the courts. Look at all those hackers out there, to say nothing of the NSA. That last one is Matron’s favourite, because the court doesn’t leave it at the security point. Instead it makes it absolutely clear in para. 68 that in its view security may require that the retained data should be held within the EU. Not in the US, not in some piddly cloud server in the middle of the Indian Ocean, no, in the EU! How else, asks the court, can “the control, explicitly required by Article 8(3) of the Charter, by an independent authority of compliance with the requirements of protection and security […] [be] fully ensured”? Matron couldn’t have said it better. So what does that mean for the ongoing discussions around the future of the safe harbor, the EU-US data protection umbrella agreement and the TTIP? And is there any way to give the various PNR Agreements and the SWIFT Agreement the CJEU treatment? Ignoring the essence of Articles 7 and 8 Unnoticed by many, the court has also made a less welcome announcement that neither the retention of, nor the access to, communications data “adversely affect the essence” of Articles 7 and 8. Art. 52(1) of the Charter provides that a law that affects the essence of a Charter right is immediately invalid and can thus not be proportionate. This interpretation is similar to the case law of the German Constitutional Court which applies the so-called “Kernbereichstheorie” (core of the right theory) under which interference with the core of a right can never be justified. In the area of information privacy, it did, for example, hold that the security service’s installation of spyware on an individual’s computer can constitute an interference with the core of the right because the data thus collected could include data concerning the individual’s intimate sphere. The CFEU’s decision that there is no interference with the essence of the two rights in question seems to be based on the notion that the Directive does not affect the content of the communication but merely the metadata. So here we have one trap the court DID fall into: surveillance of content – bad, surveillance of metadata – not quite so bad. This invalidates a little bit, what it said itself about the importance of communications data in assembling a complete picture of a person’s life. Surely, who an individual communicates with can in some cases be part of that individual’s intimate sphere? Matron is therefore not convinced that the “essence” argument can be so easily resolved. An invitation to long-term legislative pingpong? Although the decision includes extensive criticism of the various ways in which the Directive fails to comply with fundamental right obligations, it is actually a bit thin on the ground on the limits within which a fundamental rights compliant law would have to operate. So, for example, the court says that retention periods of six to 24 months are not good enough because there are no criteria for when which period would be proportionate. But it does not say what ballpark period it would like to see as an upper limit for what type of data. In this is differs from the approach of, for example, the German Constitutional Court, which told the German government in no uncertain terms what kind of safeguards would have to be included in a national data retention law before it could pass muster. Some commenters have remarked that this is a good thing. Former German Federal Data Protection Commissioner, Peter Schaar, for example, tweeted that it was good that the ECJ did not provide a “cookbook” for a revised Directive. The thinking behind that is, of course, that such a cookbook would make it easier for the EU institutions to re-adopt a revised Directive at Warp speed. This way, so the thinking seems to go, the institutions will have to give this some thought. And that will take time. And that’s a good thing for all of us, right? Matron is not so sure. She can't help thinking that the EU institutions will seek to adopt a revised Directive anyway and without specific guidance from the court, the institutions are once again left alone to be “creative”. There is a real danger that they will come up with a new version that formally ticks many of the boxes mentioned by the court but that substantively would still be found to be an infringement of the Charter rights. So, there is a chance that this kind of uncertainty will open us all up to decades of a game of legislative pingpong between the EU institutions and the CJEU. It's been done before and maybe this is one of the reasons why the German Constitutional Court tends to be so prescriptive. But this kind of passing the ball to and fro between the legislative and the judiciary is just about doable at national level in a country like Germany where citizens can bring a constitutional challenge as soon as a law is adopted. The Germans got their Constitutional Court decision on the implementing law within 2 years, some other member states were even quicker. But at EU level where it has taken the combined civil society power of 27 (at the time) member states eight years to get the damn thing to a competent court? Is it going to take us another eight years again next time? And the time after that, as they fiddle about with the detail? For Matron this is a bit concerning and it raises all kinds of issues with regard to the enforcement of fundamental rights in multi-level governance systems. On the plus side, her PhD thesis (a labour of Hercules, if ever there was one) just became a hell of a lot more interesting. The question of trust With the Charter only in force for a few short years, the CJEU’s case law on fundamental rights enforcement is still in its infancy. This is one of the first, if not THE first, CJEU decision that has roundly declared an EU secondary instrument invalid in its entirety because it violates Charter rights. The way in which CJEU jurisprudence shapes up in this regard is closely watched by the citizens, businesses, governments and national courts of the EU member states. Particularly in countries like Germany, where the Constitutional Court enjoys an immense level of trust by the population, people are worried that the CJEU will not guarantee the same level of protection of fundamental rights as their own court. This is becoming a particularly hot topic with regard to the ongoing discussions about the proposed EU Data Protection Regulation, where the German government (supported – surprisingly – by many civil society campaigners) would like to exempt the data processing activities of public bodies from the scope of the Regulation. The German government may very well have its own sinister reason for proposing this, but the privacy campaigners Matron has spoken to are broadly on board with the idea because including those activities in a directly binding EU instrument would potentially remove them from the Constitutional Court’s competence for judicial review. Questions of fundamental rights compliance of that Regulation (and the measures taken under it) would then have to be decided by the CJEU. The concern arises partly from the problem of standing. German citizens have a right to challenge an Act of the German Parliament in the form of a constitutional complaint. There is, as yet, no comparable right of EU citizens to challenge an Act adopted by the EU institutions before the CJEU. But this is also a question of whether or not national judges will trust the CJEU to do its job. The German Constitutional Court, for example, is currently operating on the basis of some sort of self-denying ordinance when it comes to reviewing EU law. Under its “Solange II” principle, it will refuse to do so “as long as” (“solange”) it is satisfied, that the CJEU will apply an equivalent fundamental rights standard. This principle has wobbled a fair few times already (data retention being one of those occasions), but remains intact. However, any indication that the CJEU will indeed apply a significantly lower standard than the German Court itself would adopt could act as a trigger to topple “Solange II”. For all their generally pro-European attitude, the Germans have a few sensitivities of their own. The right to informational self-determination is one of them. ... and the downright Ugly Finally, the one thing the CJEU left entirely open is what will happen now. According to the decision, the Directive is invalid ab initio, i.e. from the date it came into force. This means that in those countries – like Germany – that have not yet implemented the Directive, there is now seemingly no longer a legal obligation to do so. However, it must be remembered that the Directive itself was adopted as a derogation from a general principle (confidentiality of communications) included in another Directive (Art. 15 of the E-Privacy Directive (2002/58/EC)). This derogation was originally granted to the member states but was then exercised by the EU itself through the adoption of the Data Retention Directive. This means that while the Directive was in force, member states did not have the power to derogate under Art. 15, if only to the extent that the DRD had exercised that power. So this raises two questions: 1. If the CJEU declares a Directive invalid, what happens to national legislation that has already implemented that Directive? Does it automatically become invalid too or does it have to be repealed? For example, the UK has implemented the Directive through the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009. If the invalidity of the Directive does not cause those Regulations to become invalid by extension, is there an obligation on the UK government to repeal them? And if there isn’t, is there at least a way in which UK citizens, CSPs or civil society organisations can ask a UK court to declare the Regulations invalid? Does any of us have standing to do this? Do the courts have the power to make such a declaration? 2. If the EU exercise of a derogation falls by the wayside because the derogating instrument was declared invalid, does this mean that the power to derogate in the area previously covered by the EU instrument reverts back to the member states? In other words, could the UK, being bloody-minded on this point, issue the same legislation again as a national instrument under the derogation contained in Article 15 of the E-Privacy Directive? If it did, would it have to do so within the limits set by the CJEU with regard to compliance with Charter rights? And how does the UK’s opt-out from the Charter play into this? The CJEU has ruled previously that the opt-out negotiated by the UK and Poland does not intend to exempt the UK from the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Charter or to prevent a UK court from ensuring compliance with Charter provisions (see Judgment in Joined Cases C-411/10 N.S. v Secretary of State forthe Home Department and C-493/10 M.E. and Others v Refugee ApplicationsCommissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform). But even though this may be correct with regard to laws implementing EU legislation, does it also apply with regard to national legislation that is not mandated by the EU? Matron’s Twitter feed is abuzz about this and the last time she looked no consensus had yet been reached. In the meantime, Commissioner Malmstroem, who currently still oversees that part of the Commission responsible for the Data Retention Directive, has already issued her own version of history. In an FAQ document released today, she specifically claims that: “National legislation needs to be amended only with regard to aspects that become contrary to EU law after a judgment by the European Court of Justice. Furthermore, a finding of invalidity of the Directive does not cancel the ability for Member States under the e-Privacy Directive (2002/58/EC) to oblige retention of data.”** Put that in your pipe and smoke it, pesky privacy nerds! So, onwards and upwards it is! No rest for the wicked and all that. At least the upcoming European Parliament elections and Commission rotation will hopefully give all of us a bit of a much-needed breather. But people, this makes it absolutely clear, how important it is that we get the right kind of European Parliament next time round. So, in May, please get out and exercise your democratic right to vote. Whatever the weather! * C Bowden (2002) “"Closed circuit television for inside your head: blanket traffic data retention and the emergency anti-terrorism legislation", Duke Law & Technology Review, p. 5. ** Many thanks to Lexferenda for bringing this to my attention. Matron on Twitter "A total map of everyday life" - Today’s data rete...

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Economic Tipping: An Approach to a Balanced Neighborhood Frank J. Allocca In the recent decision of Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, a court, for the first time, was confronted with a proposal to apply a "tipping" standard solely on the basis of income, rather than racial grounds. The case involved a group of middle-income residents seeking to enjoin the State and City of New York, as well as the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from increasing an area's low-income population through the building of various housing projects. "Tipping" has been defined as "that point at which a set of conditions has been created that will lead to the rapid flight of an existing majority class under circumstances of instability which result in the deterioration of the neighborhood environment." The court in Trinity refused plaintiffs' request to expand the tipping doctrine to include economic classifications because of the absence of legal precedent for such an argument and the inherent difficulty in expressing the tipping concept in economic terms. Although one court has recognized and accepted the concept of racial tipping, no court has extended this concept into the area of economics. Because all forms of tipping are relatively new concepts, parties using this argument must generally be wary of other problems; i.e., questions of standing and the evidentiary validity of sociological data and research statistics. These parties, recognizing the legal weaknesses of a tipping theory, have also added equal protection arguments where possible to encourage the courts to accept their position. Therefore, to be persuasive, an economic tipping argument should be fashioned after an argument for racial tipping. Frank J. Allocca, Economic Tipping: An Approach to a Balanced Neighborhood, 4 Fordham Urb. L.J. 167 (1975). Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol4/iss1/6 Property Law and Real Estate Commons

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UK law amendments intended to shield Israeli war criminals From the London-based Arab-language newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi, as translated by BBC, July 11:Al-Quds al-Arabi editorial: "British Law Amendments Aim To Shield Israeli War Criminals"British Justice Minister Jack Straw, who was one of the closest aides of former Prime Minister Tony Blair, the main ally of the United States in their wars against Iraq and Afghanistan, is preparing to introduce serious amendments to British law that would repeal the rules that allow trials of war criminals passing through Britain and confine British jurisdiction to trials of British nationals or foreign residents living in the UK and suspected of committing war crimes.The aim of these amendments is to prevent human rights organizations from suing Israeli officials and military officers suspected of committing war crimes against the Palestinians and the Lebanese in the war on Gaza early this year and the war on Lebanon in the summer of 2006.These amendments, scheduled to be passed by the British parliament next autumn, conflict with international law which requires all states to try war criminals wherever they may be. Moreover, these amendments also constitute an insult to Western values of justice as well as human rights organizations.Trying British nationals and foreign residents in the UK suspected of committing war crimes is certainly a good thing. Britain was one of the main participants in formulating rules of international law for the trial of Nazi war criminals who committed crimes against Jews, and therefore it is required today to stick to those laws and to tighten them so as to include people suspected of committing war crimes against Arabs and Muslims or against any other nationality or ethnic minority, and to let them know that there is no safe haven for them in the free world.It was because of the British strict laws that many Israeli generals accused of committing war crimes used to avoid the UK, lest they be apprehended and tried for war crimes they committed in Qana in south Lebanon, and in Gaza in south Palestine, where thousands of civilians were killed or wounded.It does seem that the Israeli lobby has succeeded in pressurizing the British Labour government to change these laws, so as to allow Israeli war criminals to visit the UK and pass through British territory without fear or anxiety, just as they succeeded in bringing about similar amendments in the laws of other countries such as Spain. Such amendments make it clear that the UK and Europe would only amend their criminal laws for two main reasons: the first is to tighten the noose on Muslims and target them on the pretext of combating terrorism; the second is to shield Israeli war criminals and to prevent trials for the massacres they have committed.The British emergency laws which allow the detention without trial, of any person who in the opinion of the security forces constitutes a threat to British national security, and for as long as possible, only came into being after 11 September 2001, with a view to applying them to Muslim personalities, or using them to threaten and terrorize the British Muslim community, scores of whom are now in detention without trial.We are calling on human rights organizations in the UK to launch a campaign objecting to these amendments and to prevent their adoption by the British parliament, as their adoption will tarnish Britain's reputation, British law, British democracy, and respect for the rules of international law.War criminals and those of the children and grandchildren of the holocaust survivors who commit war crimes and crimes against humanity should not escape justice, whether in Britain, or any other European state. And the same should apply to British war criminals who caused the death of a million Iraqis in the second war against Iraq. Labels:IDF,international law,war crimes BDS, American style Solidarity groups tell Amnesty: don't take Cohen's... The Idiot Guide to the Siege of Gaza Maybe you will see it in L.A. but I am not holding... Israel appeals to white solidarity The future of a rotten definition of antisemitism Cif's Matt Seaton censors himself? Another depressing post about everyday Israeli rac... Scotsman: Palestinian Fringe writer stuck in Gaza Banning nazi analogies? Israel not racist but.... Some corrections on Europe Euro court acts to defend the racist war criminals... Las Vegas & Paris: Boycott Ahava settlement cosmet... In case you thought Netanyahu was telling the trut... The Protocols of the Elders of Islamo-Catholicism?... Outlawing anti-racism? UK law amendments intended to shield Israeli war c... Send letters to WaPo re: Olmert twaddle on settlem... Gaza invasion: Israeli troops claim ‘shoot first, ... Here LIES Jonathan Hoffman of the Zionist Federati... Liberal Tel Avivians? Irish tent solidarity with victims of Israeli home... Afghan rebels? Tel Aviv University and Israeli war crimes The meaning of Obama, sort of That Judenrein thing Why I love Netanyahu The struggle in Honduras escalates The starvers of Gaza meet Zionism and books The long march in Gaza Israel needs more segregation? Saying "YES!" to BDS Israel whines about Amnesty report Action NOW: Israel attacks Free Gaza boat

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Attorney Randy Mastro answers questions at a news conference, in New York, Thursday, March 27, 2014. A law firm hired by New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie said Thursday that the governor was not involved in a plot to create gridlock near a major bridge as part of a political retribution scheme. By Angela Delli Santi and Geoff Mulvihill, Associated Press Published Thursday, March 27, 2014 | 9:50 a.m. Updated Thursday, March 27, 2014 | 5:07 p.m. New York — Lawyers hired by New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie's administration said Thursday the governor was not involved in the plot to create traffic jams last fall, a conclusion that left the lead lawyer defending the integrity of his report, which came ahead of the results of separate and ongoing federal and legislative investigations. The taxpayer-funded report released by former federal prosecutor Randy Mastro relied on interviews with Christie and other officials in his administration — who were not under oath — and 250,000 documents, many of them emails and text messages. But the key figures in the political payback plot did not cooperate, leading Democrats to question the credibility of the report and its thoroughness. The investigation concluded Christie had no knowledge beforehand of lane closings Sept. 9-12 near the George Washington Bridge between New Jersey and New York that caused four days of massive gridlock in the community of Fort Lee. The closings became a major scandal for the governor in January when he had to backtrack and acknowledge the involvement of a top aide and an associate in orchestrating the closings. He has repeatedly denied knowing about the plot or being involved in the closings. "Governor Christie's account of these events rings true. It's corroborated by many witnesses, and he has conducted himself at every turn as someone who has nothing to hide," the report found. "We uncovered nothing contradicting the governor's account," it concluded. Democrats blasted the findings, with the party's national committee calling the report "nothing more than an expensive sham." New Jersey state Sen. Loretta Weinberg, co-chair of the legislative committee investigating the same issues, said it "raises more questions than answers." Her co-chair, Assemblyman John Wisniewski, also a Democrat, was critical of the report for not including information from those who refused to cooperate. "It's very hard to tell who's telling the truth when you don't hear from all sides," he said. Christie also went on the offensive after not holding a press conference since early January. The Republican told ABC News on Thursday the episode has been the most trying of his political career, but he never considered resigning over it and it will not affect any possible plans to run for president in 2016. "I don't intend to make a decision on 2016 until a year from now, but it won't have anything to do with what's happened," he said. "What's happened in the past 10 weeks I think ultimately will make me a better leader, whether it's as governor of New Jersey or in any other job I might take in the public or private sector." The report did not find even minor missteps by Christie and his inner circle. It cast Christie as a leader who was deeply troubled about the possibility that staff members were not being truthful to him — asking "with tears in his eyes" whether any of his top aides were involved in the lane closures. During a news conference, Mastro emphasized that the review found no evidence that the scheme was reflective of the wider operations of the governor's office. "We found that this was the action of the few," he said. "This is not reflective of the whole." Defending the report, Mastro said his team was able to review a trove of documents, including emails and text messages among Christie, Lt. Gov. Kim Guadagno, top governor's office staff and former staffers. "We believe we have gotten to the truth or we wouldn't be reporting it," he said. He also said his team was sharing information with federal prosecutors. The report, issued at Mastro's New York law office, concluded that former Port Authority of New York and New Jersey official David Wildstein and ex-Christie aide Bridget Kelly were behind the closures and that they were targeting Fort Lee Mayor Mark Sokolich. It did not determine why they wanted to hurt the Democrat yet said there was no evidence that it was because he refused to endorse Christie for re-election. The report said Sokolich brought up the possibility of endorsing Christie but ultimately decided against it and that even after that decision, the mayor remained on a list of Democrats whom Christie considered appointing to various boards. Both Wildstein and Kelly have refused to talk to investigators, citing their right against self-incrimination. In the absence of their voices, the report delved into their personalities. "Whatever motivated Wildstein and Kelly to act as they did, it was not at the behest of Governor Christie, who knew nothing about it," the report said. Mastro said Wildstein seemed to have "bizarre political and personal animus" against a variety of people. He also quotes another Christie confidante as saying Wildstein had "50 crazy ideas a week." The report said Kelly tried to cover her tracks when Christie began asking what happened. She asked a colleague to delete an email about the plot, but the other staffer retained the email anyway, the report said. The report also suggested Kelly may have been motivated to participate in part because she'd recently been dumped in a romantic relationship by a former Christie campaign manager. Christie also cut ties with that strategist, Bill Stepien, over the scandal. The report found that he knew about the lane closures but not about an ulterior motive. His lawyer, Kevin Marino, said Thursday that raises the question of why Stepien was ousted from Christie's realm. "I just wish someone would acknowledge it was a mistake," said Marino, who also said the mention of Stepien's relationship with Kelly, when both were single and not working together, was gratuitous. Lawyers for Kelly and Wildstein did not return messages. Wildstein's lawyer has said "evidence exists" that Christie knew about the closures as they happened. Mastro surmised in his report that Wildstein was referring to a conversation he had with Christie at a Sept. 11 memorial service. A Christie spokesman told Mastro's team that Wildstein later said he had told the governor about it during that event. But Mastro says Christie did not recall it being brought up and if it was, it would not have registered as significant to Christie — something Christie has said before. Back in December, Christie said he was not aware of the bridge issue until "well after the whole thing was over." By last month, he said he may have heard something about it as it happened but it didn't strike him as important until an Oct. 1 news article about it. Mastro's review accepts that version of when Christie learned about it. There has been no evidence produced that suggests he was aware of the plan before the lanes were shut down. The report also found that a claim by Hoboken Mayor Dawn Zimmer, that Christie's administration told her that Superstorm Sandy funding would be tied to a private redevelopment plan, is "demonstrably false." In response, Zimmer called the report "sadly predictable" and a "one-sided whitewash." Mastro called for Christie's staffers to cease using personal email accounts for official business, eliminating the office where Kelly had worked and appointing an ethics officer in the governor's office. He also recommended studying major changes to the Port Authority, an agency jointly run by New York and New Jersey. Mulvihill reported from Trenton, N.J. AP writer David Porter in Newark, N.J., also contributed. 0 Comments Join the Discussion: Check this out for a full explanation of our conversion to the LiveFyre commenting system and instructions on how to sign up for an account. 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PublicationsGuide to the Massachusetts Judicial Selection ProcessMassachusetts Law Review archivesMassBar Beat Podcastse-JournalEthics OpinionsLawyers JournalMassachusetts Law ReviewSection ReviewJudicial Preference GuideSubmission GuidelinesSection Review2010200920082007200620052004200320021999Search2006v8 n3v8 n2v8 n1v8 n1 v8 n1Previous Story Next StorySection ReviewKelley v. Kelley: Reaffirming principles of traditional alimony By Donald G. Tye and Peter A. Kuperstein Recently, in Kelley v. Kelley, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 733 (2005), the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that a reduction in alimony based on an earning capacity theory was erroneous where a wife continued to be the primary caregiver of the parties' three minor children and to work as a part-time artist. In reversing the alimony reduction, the court reaffirmed the traditional concepts of alimony and expressed the court's long-established reluctance to attribute income to a primary caregiver, declaring that "individuals are often capable of earning more money than they presently do, but career choices are influenced by a number of factors, including family, education, training and personal interests …." The fundamental purpose of alimony has historically been to provide economic support to the dependant spouse at a level commensurate with the dependent spouse's actual need for support and maintenance and the standard of living enjoyed by the dependent spouse during the marriage. Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 397 Mass. 617, 623 (1986); Partridge v. Partridge, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 918, 919 (1982).Toward that end, in determining whether to enter an alimony order or to limit the duration or amount of an order, the Probate and Family Courts have traditionally been adverse to relying upon the income-producing potential of a spouse and parent who has been out of the job market for an extended period. See, e.g., Grubert v. Grubert, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 820 (1985) (In a lengthy marriage, where the wife had no significant work experience or training, and who rarely worked, the court stated it is improper for her to be expected to "make up in the marketplace what her husband plainly has the ability to provide."); Goldman v. Goldman, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 603, 610-11 (1990) (Stating that the lower court improperly emphasized full-time earning capacity of the wife, who had not worked during their long-term marriage, had to be retrained, and wished to work only part time to care for her child); and Deluca v. Deluca, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 191, 192 (1987) (Stating that a housewife who had raised her children for years "should not now be required to serve hamburgers or accept comparable employment at minimum wages unless the situation absolutely requires it."). In Kelley, the plaintiff, Leroy Kelley ("Leroy") and the defendant, Susan Kelley ("Susan") were married on March 17, 1984. Three children were born from this marriage: Brian (born Feb. 18, 1987) and, twins David and Erin (born Feb. 1, 1994). At the time of the divorce trial, Leroy was a self-employed podiatrist. Susan was a homemaker and artist, and was primarily responsible for child-care duties. Susan had worked out of the marital home two half-days a week as a receptionist in one of Leroy's offices from 1987 to 2000, during which time she also worked as an artist. Since then, she had worked only as an artist. On Dec. 22, 2000, the Norfolk Probate and Family Court issued a judgment of divorce nisi, which ordered Leroy, inter alia, to pay Susan $425 a week as child support and $600 a week as alimony. The court recognized Susan's inability to work and stated in its rationale for the divorce judgment that "in the years to come," tending to the needs of the children, particularly the twins [age 6], would "affect and impact" Susan's "ability to obtain regular, gainful employment." The court opined that: If [Susan] is unable to earn even a modest amount of money from her artistic endeavors within the next few years, if not sooner, she will have to rethink the efficacy of such a career as a means of improving her standard of living. However, given the ages of the parties [late 40s], their employment histories and prospects, and their family responsibilities, it is likely that alimony of some type will be paid by [Leroy] through his normal retirement. On March 5, 2003, less than three years after their divorce, Leroy filed a complaint for modification seeking a reduction or elimination of his alimony obligations based on an alleged decrease in his income and increase in his costs for health insurance coverage for Susan and the children. At the commencement of the trial on Leroy's complaint for modification on Sept. 22, 2003, Susan filed a motion in Limine, seeking the court to prohibit Leroy from permitting any testimonial evidence on Susan's financial circumstances because Leroy's claim for a reduction in alimony was limited to changes in his financial circumstances. The trial was held on Sept. 22, 23, and 24, and Oct. 8 and 14, 2003. At the conclusion of the trial on Oct. 14, the court allowed Leroy to amend his modification complaint to include the issue of Susan's earning capacity in order to avoid having the parties return on another complaint for modification on that issue. The court continued the trial to Nov. 24, 2003 to allow the parties to retain vocational experts concerning Susan's earning capacity. Susan and the parties' respective vocational experts testified at the last day of trial. At the time of the modification trial, the trial judge found that Leroy continued to work as a self-employed podiatrist. Although he claimed his income had decreased since the divorce judgment, the trial judge determined that his income had actually increased since their divorce. The court also found that Susan was historically and continued to be a homemaker, the primary custodian of the parties' three children, who were ages 16 and 9, and a part-time artist. Prior to the parties' marriage, Susan attended but did not graduate from Framingham State College. Her real estate broker's license that she obtained before the marriage was not currently active because her child-related duties precluded her from working nights and weekends unless she paid for childcare. Susan also continued to paint every day around the children's schedules and received income from selling her paintings as well as teaching painting classes. She acknowledged that in the previous six years, her income as an artist never exceeded her expenses; however, she taught painting at workshops and she sold her paintings at prices that had increased over the years. After the parties' and their vocational experts testified, the trial court ultimately found, inter alia, that Susan should be capable of earning approximately $500 a week in a clerical position. Based on an attribution of income theory, the court reduced Leroy's alimony obligation by $200 per week. The court also found, with respect to Leroy's financial circumstances, that Leroy's reported income had actually increased since the divorce; that Leroy had engaged in disingenuous and calculated conduct to disengage from the management and operation of his podiatry business; and, that Leroy had an earning capacity significantly beyond the salary reported on his trial financial statement. The Kelley court subsequently reversed the lower court's reduction of alimony after it examined the appropriate circumstances warranting the court's discretion to impute income to a support recipient and in light of all of the relevant circumstances, including Leroy's increase in income since their divorce. In so doing, the Appeals Court reaffirmed the traditional concepts of alimony by declaring that it was improper to impute income for purposes of reducing support to a spouse who continued post-divorce to both attend to the minor children's day-to-day needs and focus on a career that was consistent with that spouse's education and skills and the needs of the minor children. The Appeals Court decision also ensures that the fundamental principles of alimony are not circumvented by an earning capacity theory to a dependent spouse who remained out of the workforce throughout the marriage to care for the minor children of the marriage.

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Learn More About Toxic Tort Law in Boyes Hot Springs, California Hometoxic tort lawcaliforniaboyes hot springs Boyes Hot Springs is a census-designated place (CDP) in Sonoma Valley, Sonoma County, California, United States. The population was 6,665 people at the 2000 census. Resorts in Boyes Hot Springs, El Verano, Fetters Hot Springs, and Agua Caliente were popular health retreats for tourists from San Francisco and points beyond until the middle of the 20th century because of the geothermic hot springs that still well up from deep within the earth. Today the Sonoma Mission Inn in Boyes Hot Springs remains as a main destination resort, and the surrounding valley's wineries, historic sites, and natural beauty are popular tourist attractions. Toxic Tort Law Lawyers In Boyes Hot Springs California What is toxic tort law? Toxic Tort cases involve people who have been injured through exposure to dangerous pharmaceuticals or chemical substances in the environment, on the job, or in consumer products -- including carcinogenic agents, lead, benzene, silica, harmful solvents, hazardous waste, and pesticides to name a few. Most toxic tort cases have arisen either from exposure to pharmaceutical drugs or occupational exposures. Most pharmaceutical toxic injury cases are mass tort cases, because drugs are consumed by thousands of people, many of whom become ill from a toxic drug. There have also been many occupational toxic tort cases, because industrial and other workers are often chronically exposed to toxic chemicals - more so than consumers and residents. Most of the law in this area arises from asbestos exposure, but thousands of toxic chemicals are used in industry and workers in these areas can experience a variety of toxic injuries. Unlike the general population, which is exposed to trace amounts of thousands of different chemicals in the environment, industrial workers are regularly exposed to much higher levels of chemicals and therefore have a greater risk of developing disease from particular chemical exposures than the general population. The home has recently become the subject of toxic tort litigation, mostly due to mold contamination, but also due to construction materials such as formaldehyde-treated wood and carpet. Toxic tort cases also arise when people are exposed to consumer products such as pesticides and suffer injury. Lastly, people can also be injured from environmental toxins in the air or in drinking water. Answers to toxic tort law issues in California Federal court opinions concerning toxic tort law in California 295 F2d 292 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company 317 F2d 19 Lartigue v. R J Reynolds Tobacco Company 328 F2d 3 Ross v. Philip Morris & Company 439 F2d 584 Environmental Defense Fund Incorporated v. D Ruckelshaus 499 F2d 467 Industrial Union Department v. D Hodgson 510 F2d 1292 Environmental Defense Fund Inc v. Environmental Protection Agency 541 F2d 1 Ethyl Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency Hometoxic tort lawcaliforniaboyes hot springs

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Alvis and Alvis, LLC "A Unique Approach to Criminal Defense" Youthful Offender Status Youthful offender is a special status that not only limits the length of punishment and length of probation but greatly restricts the release of information to the general public. The law that determines Youthful Offender (YO) status is found in Section15-19-7, Code of Alabama (1975). It reads in pertinent part, “No determination made under the provisions of this chapter shall disqualify any youth for public office or public employment, operate as a forfeiture of any right or privilege or make him ineligible to receive any license granted by public authority, and such determination shall be deemed a conviction of a crime; provided, however, that he or she is not subsequently convicted of a crime, the prior adjudication shall be considered.” The Supreme Court of the State of Alabama set out the law for Youthful Offender status in the case, Ex parte T.B., 698 So.2d 127 (Ala. 1997). This case is the controlling authority over Youthful Offender Adjudication. It is very important to remember that when a person between the ages of 18 and 21 pleads guilty to Youthful Offender the maximum sentence they can receive is 3 years and they are not pleading to a crime but to Youthful Offender Status with an underlying crime substantiating the YO plea. The above stated case reads as follows, “The Youthful Offender Act (was) intended to extricate persons below the age of twenty-one years of age from the harshness of criminal prosecution and conviction. It (was) designed to provide them with the benefits of an informal, confidential, rehabilitative system. Youthful Offender Proceedings are not criminal in nature. Youthful Offender adjudications are special proceedings designed to protect persons in a certain age group, heretofore tried as adults from the stigma and often harmful consequences of the criminal adjudicatory process. It is a manifestation of the legislature’s judgment that while persons are still young may more readily and appropriately respond to methods of treatment which are more rehabilitative and more correctional and less severe than penalties to which adults are exposed. It is an extension so to speak, of the protective juvenile process. The institution of special procedures is a right vested by the State and their application lies within the discretion of the State.” “From the clear language of Section 15-19-7(a), although an underlying act constitutes a felony, an adjudication of youthful offender status is “NOT A CONVICTION OF FELONY” within the meaning of Section 12-22-222, Code of Alabama (1975), the corroboration statute; it is not a conviction at all.” Ex parte T.B., 698 So.2d 127, 129 (Ala. 1997). Youthful Offender is a useful tool to get some criminal cases disposed of in ways that will not affect your future. However, it is still fair to say that even with the law above, when you apply for certain professional licenses you must disclose even a youthful offender conviction. Our firm strongly recommends not disclosing a Youthful Offender conviction without consulting an attorney on the legalities of whether you are bound to disclose it legally or not. It is also important to always apply for youthful offender even if you think there is no shot that you are going to get it. We have tried many youthful offender hearings where we prepared our clients for the worst but with our preparation and collection of the correct witnesses, we were able to get the Judge to rule with us and grant our client YO status. Content copyright . Alvis and Alvis, LLC. All rights reserved. Website Designed and Maintained by RedWave Technology Group, LLC

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The First Amendment: Why The Muhammad Film Is Protected Speech By editor Sep 13, 2012 TweetShareGoogle+Email Protesters carry an American flag pulled down from the U.S. embassy in Cairo, Egypt on Tuesday. Nasser Nasser The First Amendment guarantee of free speech is in the spotlight this week. If you haven't kept up, a U.S.-produced film depicting the Prophet Muhammad in a less than flattering way has inflamed the Arab world. In a lot of ways, the story is showing how the sweeping nature of the First Amendment puts the United States at odds with most of the world. That rift was perhaps most evident when you compare the statements of Egypt's Islamist President Mohamed Morsi and that of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Morsi asked the United States to take legal action against the makers of the film, and Clinton said this country doesn't punish its citizens over their speech. "I know it is hard for some people to understand why the United States cannot or does not just prevent these kinds of reprehensible videos from ever seeing the light of day," she said. "In today's world with today's technologies, that is impossible. But even if it was possible, our country does have a long tradition of free expression which is enshrined in our constitution and our law. "And we do not stop individual citizens from expressing their views no matter how distasteful they may be." Of course free expression is not absolute. There's a tome of Supreme Court cases dating back to 1942 that examine the limits of protected speech. We called David Hudson, a professor at Vanderbilt University and a First Amendment scholar at the First Amendment Center. We wanted to understand why this film would be considered free speech. Hudson said that under our current interpretation, there is very little doubt in his mind that the film is protected by the First Amendment. One of the cases courts use to test whether speech is protected comes from 1969. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court looked at the case of Clarence Brandenburg, a member of the Ku Klux Clan, who gave a speech after a march in Cincinnati. Hudson wrote at length about the case for its 40th anniversary. He explains that during the speech, Brandenburg made "disparaging remarks about blacks and Jews" and threatened "revengeance" if the government continued to suppress white people. Police arrested Brandeburg and he was convicted for violating a law that prohibited the advocacy of violence and crime as means to achieve political reform. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court decided in favor of Brandenburg ruling that speech cannot be illegal unless it "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Hudson tells us the word "imminent" is key. As we detailed yesterday, the Muhammad film was uploaded to YouTube in early July. The violence it incited didn't happen until this past Tuesday and it happened overseas, which Hudson says adds another wrinkle. Hudson says that it would also be hard to argue that at the moment the film was made, it was intended to incite this particular violence. Taking all of this into account, The Christian Science Monitor asks a provocative question: In a global world, where the American ideals of free speech are being broadcast through YouTube and Facebook, can they coexist with Islam's reverence for Muhammad? "A recent Public Religion Research Institute survey found that 47 percent of Americans say the values of Islam are at odds with American values," The Monitor reports. "Yet among US Muslims, 6 in 10 say they see no conflicts between being a devout Muslim and living in modern society – precisely the same ratio as devout American Christians answering the question in the same way, according to a 2011 Gallup poll." Also, the Monitor reports, most Muslims don't support the kind of violent outburst that has emerged because of this video. "The vast majority of Muslims would definitely be offended by the movie, but I don't think the vast majority of people support to any degree the notion that the US ambassador should be targeted," Mohamed Younis, a senior analyst at the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, told the Monitor. "In Egypt, there's an overwhelming majority of people who say you cannot target civilians, and similarly in Libya, we don't see any overwhelming support for the idea that [blaspheming the Prophet should lead to] targeting and killing civilians."Copyright 2013 NPR. To see more, visit http://www.npr.org/. TweetShareGoogle+EmailView the discussion thread. © 2016 WLRN

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State College couple among plaintiffs challenging state’s gay-marriage ban Civil rights lawyers filed the first known legal challenge Tuesday on behalf of 23 men, women and children seeking to overturn a 17-year-old state law effectively banning same-sex marriage in Pennsylvania, the only northeastern state that doesn’t allow it or civil unions. By Marc Levy - The Associated Press LinkedIn The lawsuit, filed in federal court in Harrisburg, also asks a federal judge to prevent state officials from stopping gay couples from getting married. It names Gov. Tom Corbett, Attorney General Kathleen Kane and three other officials. The plaintiffs are a widow, 10 couples and one of the couples’ two teenage daughters. They include a State College couple, Ron Gebhardtsbauer and Greg Wright. According to the ACLU, the pair met in 1994. Gebhardtsbauer, 60, and Wright, 56, registered as domestic partners in the borough and are engaged, and they would like to be married in their own church. Their minister, the ACLU said, has agreed to officiate at the ceremony if marriage is a legal option. Same-sex marriage is legal, or soon will be, in 13 states. The lawsuit seeks to legalize it in Pennsylvania and to force the state to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples who wed in other jurisdictions. Lawyers in the case believe it is ultimately bound for the U.S. Supreme Court, probably along with similar cases that are cropping up in other states, and could force the high court to rule on the core question of whether it is unconstitutional to deny same-sex couples the right to marry. The plaintiffs, some of whom spoke during a news conference in the state Capitol after the lawsuit was filed, said their willingness to join was driven partly by a desire to have the legal and financial protections afforded to opposite-sex couples, but mostly by the emotional satisfaction of seeking social justice. “Everyone in our world recognizes us as a true family,” said Deb Whitewood, 45, who lives in the Pittsburgh suburb, of Bridgeville, with her partner of 22 years, Susan Whitewood, and their three children. “We feel that it’s time that the commonwealth of Pennsylvania did, too.” Another couple, Dara Raspberry and Helena Miller, who were cradling their 6-week-old daughter, said they married in Connecticut before moving to Philadelphia to be closer to family. But, Raspberry said, they were forced “to become unmarried and less of a family” under Pennsylvania law. Isabel Rieser, the 21-year-old adopted daughter of plaintiffs Len Rieser and Fernando Chang-Muy, of Philadelphia, said her two fathers should be able to marry after 32 years of commitment. “Besides, I am so over being a child out of wedlock,” Rieser joked. “I look forward to my parents finally getting married. I have so many ideas for their wedding: food, location, decorations.” The plaintiffs are represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Philadelphia law firm of Hangley, Aronchick, Segal, Pudlin and Schiller. Spokesman for Corbett and Kane would only say that their offices are reviewing the lawsuit. Corbett has said he opposes gay marriage; Kane has said she supports it. In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs said banning gay marriage satisfies no legitimate government or child welfare concerns, since Pennsylvania judges routinely grant adoptions to same-sex couples that are viewed as in the best interest of the child. “It serves only to disparage and injure lesbian and gay couples and their families,” the lawsuit said. For instance, the suit says, same-sex couples do not have access to a long list of legal and financial protections. Those include an inheritance tax exemption for widows; an automatic power of attorney for spouses in health care decisions; damages and legal recourse under workers’ compensation laws for a spouse; assistance programs for same-sex widows and widowers of military personnel and veterans; pension and survivor benefits for widows and widowers of public employees; Family Medical Leave Act provisions; and a spouse’s Social Security retirement benefits. The lawsuit, in the works since January, was not spurred by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 3-week-old decision that the federal government must grant federal benefits to same-sex couples who were married and live in states that allow same-sex marriage. But the ACLU’s legal director in Pennsylvania, Witold J. Walczak, said the nation’s changing laws and evolving public opinion made it the right time to challenge the law after 17 years on Pennsylvania’s books. Federal courts in California are so far the only ones that have said a state same-sex marriage ban violates the U.S. Constitution. Meanwhile, federal court challenges are emerging in other states, including Nevada, Hawaii and Michigan. In the coming days and weeks, the ACLU plans to lodge same-sex marriage challenges in North Carolina and Virginia. It is also pursuing same-sex marriage legislation in several other states and referenda in Oregon and Nevada in the coming years, ACLU lawyers said. Every state except Pennsylvania in the northeastern United States allows same-sex marriage except New Jersey, which allows civil unions. A 1996 Pennsylvania law defines marriage as a civil contract in which a man and a woman take each other as husband and wife, and it says same-sex marriages, even if entered legally elsewhere, are void in Pennsylvania. State law does not allow civil unions. Recent polls show a majority are in favor of gay marriage in Pennsylvania, even though bills to legalize gay marriage have gone nowhere in recent years in the Legislature. In 2012, the state voted for President Barack Obama, a Democrat who supports same-sex marriage, and in 2010 for Corbett, a Republican who supports a constitutional amendment to permanently ban it. The 1996 law passed with overwhelming majorities in the state legislature. During the debate, the lawmaker who wrote the amendment, Republican House Rep. Allan Egolf, said: “This amendment does not take anything away from anyone that they now have. It is simply an expression of Pennsylvania’s traditional and longstanding policy of moral opposition to same-sex marriages.” facebook twitter email Share More Videos 0:51 Wife shocks husband with Rose Bowl tickets Pause 2:03 Penn State players relished the big game pressure 1:33 Students hold #NotMyPresident protest at Penn State 3:52 Penn State's Cael Sanderson reflects on winning the NCAA Championship 1:03 Malcolm Morrison gives a tour of his Aero Commander U9 0:51 Here's an easier way to peel tomatoes 2:15 How cool is this house? 0:42 Penn State fans and the Big Ten Championship 4:11 No evidence of terror connection in New York City explosion, says mayor 2:34 Gifted - official trailer Share Video Video link: Select facebook twitter email 3 days ago Remembering Pearl Harbor 1:06 3 days ago Remembering Pearl Harbor 0:44 7 days ago Fans riot in downtown State College 1:19 7 days ago Church holds live nativity View more video Loss of health care subsidies would impact South more than anywhere else

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HomeIraqPhase Two in the Saddam Trial Connect With Us: Backgrounder Phase Two in the Saddam Trial Author: Lionel Beehner August 29, 2006 This publication is now archived. Introduction What was the Anfal campaign? What charges does Saddam face? What has been Saddam’s defense? Why was Dujail the first case against Saddam? Why was a national court established versus an international tribunal? What are the advantages of an Iraqi-run court? What are some disadvantages of such a court? What might be the results of the tribunal? How has Iraq’s security situation affected the trial process? Introduction The Iraqi High Criminal Court (IHHC) (PDF), formerly the Iraqi Special Tribunal, is hearing its second case against Saddam Hussein and his top lieutenants. The former Iraqi dictator faces charges of genocide and crimes against humanity and is being tried by Iraqis under Iraqi criminal law, not by international judges under international law. Proponents of this approach, including DePaul University's M. Cherif Bassiouni, argue that trying Saddam domestically will "advance the goals of the rule of law in Iraq and help sustain a new era for the Iraqi legal system." Opponents, including a number of global human rights groups, challenge the court's legitimacy, accuse the tribunal of doling out "victors' justice" that could further inflame Saddam's sympathizers, and decry its use of the death penalty. The most recent charge against Saddam involves his order to exterminate tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurds, many of them by chemical gas, in the so-called Anfal campaign in 1988. Share What was the Anfal campaign? In 1988, Saddam Hussein and six of his deputies launched a six-month campaign to push Kurds out of the mountainous areas of northern Iraq. The directive came toward the end of Iraq's war with Iran at a time when Saddam suspected the Kurds of abetting the Iranians. The alleged ethnic-cleansing operation was dubbed Anfal, named after an Arabic term in the Koran that means "the spoils." It resulted in the deaths of at least 50,000 Kurds and scores of mass graves. There are around fifty documented cases of chemical weapons used against the Kurds. "Four thousand villages were buried and wiped off the earth," says Michael A. Newton, a Vanderbilt University law professor. "Dujail [the first case against Saddam involving the killing in 1982 of 148 Iraqi Shiites] revealed one snippet of life under the Baathists, while Anfal will show the world in living color what life was like under Saddam." What charges does Saddam face? Court documents say Saddam faces charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and other war crimes. Genocide involves the deliberate or systematic elimination of a group of people because of their race, creed, or ethnicity. Some legal scholars say the crime can be difficult to prove because it is not regularly prosecuted. Further, they say, it is necessary to establish the perpetrators—in this case, Saddam and his main aide, Ali Hassan al-Majid, also known as "Chemical Ali"—had command responsibility over the Anfal campaign. Yet Newton says although an element of specific intent must be shown, genocide can be proven through circumstantial evidence as well—i.e. "mass graves filled with 100 percent Kurdish victims." The crimes against humanity Saddam and his deputies are charged with include willful killing, enslavement, and unlawful imprisonment. Separate war crimes charges involve allegations that Saddam intentionally attacked non-military buildings and civilians as well as unlawfully seized and destroyed property. What has been Saddam’s defense? Lawyers for Saddam do not deny the former Iraqi leader ordered the chemical attacks against Kurds but say the strikes were justified and accuse Kurdish militias of treason and conspiring with Iran. This marks a shift from the defense's arguments in the Dujail case, during which Saddam denied ordering 148 Shiites killed and claims he merely ordered farmland to be razed after a failed assassination attempt against him in 1982. Saddam's lawyers have repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the tribunal and claimed they were denied access to witnesses during the Dujail trial. Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's (ICTY) case against Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam has not been given much opportunity to present any real defense, says David M. Crane, a law professor at Syracuse University College of Law and former chief prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Iraq is applying a civil criminal system, traditionally less adversarial, whereas ad hoc tribunals, like Sierra Lione's, more closely follow common law systems. In the civil criminal system, Crane says the judge acts more as an adversary or third party and can limit the defense more than in a common law court, where a higher burden exists to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (he admits, though, that civil systems tend to go more swiftly). Why was Dujail the first case against Saddam? Experts say it was manageable and prosecutors had ample evidence enabling them to launch the tribunal hearings. "The decision to go with Dujail was most likely prompted to get the court off on a good footing," says Laura Dickinson, associate professor at the University of Connecticut School of Law and former adviser to the Justice Department's liaison office to the IHHC. "Anfal is more complex and broader" and therefore expected to take months to reach a verdict. The Iraqis were wary of repeating the experience of the ICTY, which sought to prosecute Milosevic on multiple charges at once, allowing the proceedings to get bogged down. However, "the problem with choosing Dujail as the first case is it doesn't really capture the magnitude of the atrocities committed by Hussein," Dickinson says. Why was a national court established versus an international tribunal? "The Iraqis wanted to do it themselves," Crane says. "Also, the United States did not want to give it up to the international community." Legal experts say the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority operated with some secrecy in establishing the court in 2003 and 2004. It ruled out bringing in outside bodies like the United Nations due, among other reasons, to its objection to capital punishment. Although international tribunals lend some accountability, legitimacy, and impartiality to the court proceedings, experts point to many negatives. For one, Dickinson says, "a purely international tribunal sitting in The Hague runs the risk that the local population would feel disconnected to the process." Others, including Vanderbilt University's Newton, say international courts of justice should act only as a fallback option that "supplement but never supplant domestic processes" (The International Criminal Court statute includes a provision which encourages the domestic resolution of disputes. It only takes cases domestic courts are unwilling or unable to handle on their own; further, the ICC could not exercise jurisdiction in this case because most of the crimes under investigation preceded its creation.) Many legal experts favor the so-called hybrid model, which incorporates elements of domestic and international law and includes both local and international judges. "We have a workable template that easily could have been overlaid in Iraq," Crane says, referring to the UN-established hybrid model currently in place to try war crimes in Sierra Leone. What are the advantages of an Iraqi-run court? Proponents of this model argue that a domestic tribunal will help instill a legal foundation and bolster the rule of law in Iraq's fledgling legal system. An international tribunal, Dickinson says, "would not have funneled any resources into rebuilding Iraq's court system, its physical structures, and legal human resources." Since the fall of Saddam, the Iraqis have imported a number of international legal norms into a body of law based in part on the Iraqi Criminal Code of 1971. In addition to dispensing justice, the trial also establishes a public record and provides documentation of the atrocities committed by Saddam, while allowing victims to come forward with important historical testimony. Some legal scholars say the tribunal may even prompt the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission modeled on the one used by post-apartheid South Africa. What are some disadvantages of such a court? Many Iraqis, as well as Muslims in the Middle East, view the court as a U.S.-led and therefore tainted operation. "There's a lingering shadow in the corners, so to speak," Crane says. "It's perceived as American-made. Whether it's completely true, it doesn't matter. If [Iraqis] feel that it's true, it's a snake-bitten court." Adds Dickinson: "Everyone would have been better served if it had been less dominated by the United States." She favors adding some non-Iraqi judges from the Arab world to the tribunal's bench. Although the United States has bankrolled the court and provides the bulk of its security (the IHHC is based in Baghdad's heavily guarded Green Zone), Newton, who recently returned from Iraq, disputes notions the Americans are calling the shots behind the scenes. "They advise and assist and that's it," he says. "It's an Iraqi court." Others charge that the Iraqis in charge of the court lack the legal wherewithal to effectively prosecute the case. "None of the Iraqi judges and lawyers [have] shown an understanding of international criminal law," claims Human Rights Watch. What might be the results of the tribunal? Given the near-certain chance Saddam will be found guilty of Dujail, there is a possibility he may be executed before the current cases before him conclude (under the tribunal's statute, he is allowed to appeal the verdict). Some legal experts suggest postponing sentencing until after the entire trial (the charges against Saddam, in addition to Anfal and Dujail, include killing or deporting more than 10,000 members of the Kurdish Barzani tribe, putting down the Shiite uprising after 1991, and invading Kuwait in 1990). Another fear is that killing Saddam may only burnish his posthumous reputation among Iraqis, particularly given the current unpopularity of the U.S.-led occupation. "People will be more focused on the death of a martyr who stood up to the Americans," Crane says. There is also some concern the documentation revealed about the genocidal Anfal campaign may spur efforts by Kurds in northern Iraq to push for greater, if not outright, independence from Baghdad. How has Iraq’s security situation affected the trial process? "It's a huge issue," Dickinson says. The Saddam trial has become almost a sideshow given the country's recent slide into sectarian violence. Others say the security situation has imperiled the judges' ability to deliberate and deliver impartial sentences. "We don't have a careful consideration of the facts and figures because everyone is hoping to live till the end of the day," Crane says. "Their families are incredibly frightened." At least three defense lawyers have been killed by insurgents since preparations for the trial began last year. Dickinson and other experts favor temporarily moving the tribunal out of Baghdad's Green Zone to a more secure location in the Middle East like Dubai. Newton, however, says moving the trial would be "subordinating civilized society to the forces of anarchy and lawlessness." More on... Nation Building, Iraq CFR Blog: Politics, Power, and Preventive Action Micah Zenko covers the U.S. national security debate. Ending War in South Sudan: A New ApproachDrone Memos: A Conversation With Jameel JafferRed States and Green Cities: Predictions for Trump-Era Climate ActionReceive Blog Posts by EmailSubscribe to the Blog Feed CFR Blog: Pressure Points Elliott Abrams gives his take on the Middle East and on democracy and human rights issues across the globe. On the Death of Fidel CastroThinking About FidelThe United Nations General Assembly, the Golan, and Theater of the AbsurdReceive Blog Posts by EmailSubscribe to the Blog Feed CFR Blog: Middle East Matters Robert M. Danin analyzes critical developments and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Diplomacy Disonnected from Real Israeli-Palestinian DevelopmentsForeign Affairs: The Struggle For IsraelTrump May Inadvertently Force Netanyahu’s HandReceive Blog Posts by EmailSubscribe to the Blog Feed New Books Complete list of Council Special Reports2015 Annual Report The Fall 2016 issue of CFR's member newsletter, the Chronicle, is a guide to CFR's most important news since August 2016, and includes announcements about new programs, partnerships, fellows, meetings, publications, and members. Read it now. Now Available: Foreign Policy Begins at Home The biggest threat to America's security and prosperity comes not from abroad but from within, writes CFR President Richard N. Haass in his provocative new book. More New Foreign Affairs eBook: Tiananmen and After Tiananmen and After In this special collection, experts weigh in on how China has—and hasn’t—changed since those pivotal events at Tiananmen Square twenty-five years ago. More To request permission to reprint or reuse CFR material, please fill out this permissions request form (PDF), referring to the instructions on page 1. More on This Topic Analysis Brief U.S. Summer Offensive in Iraq As major offensives get underway to root out insurgents outside the capital, Iraq’s economy continues to sputter and political progress... News Briefing Zebari: Iraq's Neighbors "Have Not Been Helpful" Hoshyar Zebari, Iraq's minister of foreign affairs, told a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York that most of Iraq’s... Backgrounder What are Iraq's Benchmarks? Authors: Lionel Beehner and Greg Bruno The U.S. government has set a number of benchmarks on security, economic performance, and governance for the Iraqi government to determine... Podcast Parsi: U.S.-Iran Talks May Not Make Headway Trita Parsi of the National Iranian-American Council warns that U.S.-Iranian talks on Iraq may not produce a major breakthrough but that it... Facebook

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Murder trial of Philly abortion doctor looms This undated photo provided by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office shows Karnamaya Mongar and her husband. Karnamaya Mongar died after being given too much anesthesia and pain medication during a 2009 abortion. The only licensed doctor on staff at the clinic where Mongar died, goes on trial today on eight counts of murder, but prosecutors say he’s not the only person to blame for the deaths. By MARYCLAIRE DALE, Associated Press, PHILADELPHIA — If pioneering physician Kermit Gosnell set out to offer women safe, legal abortions in th By then, Gosnell had gone years without health department inspections, perhaps because state officials preferred a hands-off approach to a political misstep in the abortion quagmire. The result, according to a grand jury report, is that Gosnell’s patients received the equivalent of the back-alley abortions that advocates of legalized abortion had hoped to eradicate. Gosnell, now 72, goes on trial today for murder in the deaths of a woman patient and seven babies allegedly born alive. Eight clinic workers charged with him have pleaded guilty, including his wife, a beautician accused of helping him perform stealth third-term abortions on Sundays. The devastating 2011 grand jury report describes nearly unfathomable conditions: fetal body parts stored in glass jars and staff refrigerators; filthy, blood-stained operating areas; women and teens maimed after Gosnell perforated a uterus or colon. “Anybody walking into that clinic should have known immediately that it should have been shut down,” said Bernard Smalley, a lawyer for the family of Karnamaya Mongar, the 41-year-old refugee who died after being given too much anesthesia and pain medication during a 2009 abortion. Philadelphia prosecutors accuse state and local authorities of turning a blind eye to laws requiring regular inspections. And they say the occasional complaints that trickled in, one after an earlier patient death, went nowhere. “Bureaucratic inertia is not exactly news. ... But we think this was something more. We think the reason no one acted is because the women in question were poor and of color, because the victims were infants without identities, and because the subject was the political football of abortion,” said the 2011 grand jury report, released by the district attorney. The case drew national attention and prompted state lawmakers to tighten clinic regulations. Pennsylvania abortion clinics now have to meet the same standards of care required by ambulatory surgical facilities, and other states are also adopting that rule. Planned Parenthood and other providers complain that the cost of updating facilities to meet ambulatory clinic rules can be prohibitive and further restricts women’s access to abortions. Pennsylvania already required parental or judicial consent for minors, a 24-hour waiting period and a ban on abortions after 24 weeks gestation. The Guttmacher Institute, which supports abortion rights and tracks women’s health laws, believes abortion foes are capitalizing on the Gosnell case. Pennsylvania’s 2012 changes to the law came under Republican Gov. Tom Corbett, who opposes abortion. “They’re using the Gosnell example in the argument to promote clinic regulations,” policy analyst Elizabeth Nash said. “But in the past couple of years, the heat has been turned up under abortion restrictions in general.” Despite the new rules, which took effect in June, nearly all of the state’s abortion centers have remained open, state health officials said. The most recent state data shows that 36,280 abortions were performed in 2011, down somewhat from 37,284 in 2009. The highest annual total on record is 65,777 in 1980; the lowest is 34,494 in 1999. Mongar had fled Bhutan and spent 19 years in refugee camps, some in Nepal, before arriving in the U.S. in 2008 with her husband and three children. When she discovered she was pregnant, she went to a clinic in Virginia, where she lived, but was referred to Gosnell because she was in her second trimester. She was 19 weeks pregnant when her adult daughter brought her to Gosnell’s Women’s Medical Center. The thin, 4-foot-11 Mongar, who spoke no English, was allegedly given a lethal dose of Demerol and other drugs before Gosnell, the only licensed doctor on staff, ever arrived. “She was older, with grown children and grandchildren, and that clearly was the basis for her decision to ... terminate the pregnancy,” said Smalley, who filed the family’s civil suits against Gosnell, city health officials and others. “If it’s legal, people have an opportunity to pursue it if they believe it’s in their best interest and in the best interest of their family, especially for my client, given all they had been through before they ever got to this country.” Smalley grew up in the West Philadelphia neighborhood as Gosnell and recalls the Gosnell family’s good reputation. Gosnell earned kudos by returning to the area after medical school, when he could have set up shop in the suburbs. He worked out of a storefront he bought in the run-down Mantua section. But Gosnell came to operate under the radar, relying on unlicensed medical school graduates, untrained clerical staff and even a teen working after school to administer anesthesia and help perform abortions, usually on poor and immigrant women paying a few hundred dollars in cash, the grand jury found. “At some point, he made a left-hand turn,” Smalley said. “But somebody should have known about it long before my client died.” Gosnell also ran what federal drug investigators call a pill mill, allegedly making millions of dollars over the years by selling prescription painkillers to addicts, drug dealers and others. Federal drug charges await him after the murder trial, which is expected to last six to eight weeks. “Even though everything points back to Gosnell himself, to me it’s a mystery why so many people that he hired on as staff would be complicit in what he was doing,” said Thomas Shaheen, vice president of the Pennsylvania Family Institute, which opposes abortion. “He was the one profiting, but it puzzles me that during that whole time and that whole tragedy, no one blew the whistle.”

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Gold Reflections Fine Jewellery & Specialty Gifts Inc How to buy bedroom furniture: tips from MasterBedroom Whitby HomeNewsHarper facing fresh Supreme Court vacancy Harper facing fresh Supreme Court vacancy OTTAWA - Political gadflies and jurisprudence junkies, grab the popcorn and pull up a chair: Prime Minister Stephen Harper will soon have yet another Quebec vacancy to fill on the Supreme Court of Canada. Word of Justice Louis LeBel's imminent retirement came Friday just as the Globe and Mail published a surprising report detailing what it said were the facts behind Harper's disastrous bid last year to name Marc Nadon to the high court. LeBel, who spent 15 years on the Quebec Court of Appeal before joining the ranks of the Supreme Court in January 2000, served notice he plans to retire on Nov. 30, when he turns 75. "It has been a privilege to contribute to the administration of justice in Canada and to the development of our laws," LeBel said in a statement. When he retires, he will have served as a judge for 30 years, he noted. "I have been fortunate to share my duties with colleagues whom I deeply appreciate and respect." In her own statement, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin said LeBel served the court with great distinction. "He is a jurist of immense gifts and wisdom, and is a pillar of the court," she said. "He is deeply loved and respected by his colleagues and he will be dearly missed." Harper's office issued a familiar-sounding, if heartfelt, statement thanking LeBel for his service, promising that his "exemplary dedication to the law and his distinguished service to Canada will be long remembered." The last sentence, however, seemed to carry more weight than usual: "Plans to fill the resulting vacancy on the Supreme Court of Canada will be announced in due course." Those plans will comprise what is likely to be one of the most closely watched Supreme Court appointments in recent memory. The court, which normally consists of nine members, has been short a justice for some nine months, most notably among the three seats that are reserved by the Constitution for jurists from Quebec. Nadon, a semi-retired Federal Court judge, was deemed ineligible by the very court Harper sought to have him join, ruling in March that he didn't meet the specific criteria for Quebec judges as spelled out in the Supreme Court Act. Since then, the behind-the-scenes machinations of the appointment process have slowly risen to the surface, exposing an unprecedented — and now very public — spat between McLachlin and the Prime Minister's Office. Earlier this month, the Conservatives publicly questioned McLachlin's actions, suggesting she inappropriately tried to make contact with Harper to discuss potential legal problems with Nadon's appointment. But it wasn't just Nadon that prompted McLachlin to contact the government, but a shortlist of candidates that included no fewer than four Federal Court judges, even though it was far from clear whether such candidates would be eligible, the Globe and Mail reported Friday. As part of the selection process, the government stacked the deck with Federal Court candidates in hopes of nominating a more conservative judge than it believed was otherwise available in Quebec, the report suggests. On the day Nadon was rejected, Harper himself offered a hint of that preference, saying, "The reality is the Supreme Court has decided that a Quebec judge at the Federal Court is a second-class judge." How to tell if you need a new furnace There are really only three ways people arrive at the conclusion they need a new furnace: the... When your pet rabbit stops eating, it’s an emergency If your pet rabbit or guinea pig hasn’t eaten in a day, it’s to be considered a medical emergency,... Top 10 places to celebrate World Pasta Day You no longer have to think about where to go for dinner, as Toronto's Menu Palace has done all of... How a bay window can enhance your home Adding a dramatic focal point to your home can be as easy as installing a bay window to a... Why your pet bird is angry, biting and plucking its feathers Owning a pet bird can turn into a frustrating experience for those who don’t realize a bird needs... Help for broken windows and ripped screens If you have a broken pane of glass in a window or a torn screen, turn to the window experts in... Keeping the roof of your home in good shape The roof on your home protects your investment and Adorn Home Improvements in Whitby is a leading... Quality windows manufactured in Durham Region Window shopping takes on a new meaning at Canada Windows and Doors. The Whitby-based company is... Caesarea home destroyed in fire Ajax making election voting more accessible

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New law hinders car insurance oversight By Debbie [email protected] November 8, 2008 5:00 a.m. SCOTT ROGERS/The Times Brian Rogers works on the damaged front end of a 2006 Kia on Tuesday afternoon at Lester's Paint and Body on Browns Bridge Road. Auto insurance rates are increasing across the country. On Oct. 1, a new law went into effect, restricting the insurance commissioner's ability to regulate car insurance rates. Listen to Allison Wall of Georgia Watch talk about the deregulation of car insurance. Save on car insuranceRaise your deductible: If your policy has a low deductible, raising it to at least $500 could reduce your premiums substantially. But don’t raise it to $1,000 unless you’ve got enough cash to cover the out-of-pocket cost if you’re in an accident.Ask about discounts: Many insurers will reduce your premium if you’ve taken a defensive driving course. Teens can sometimes get a discount for maintaining a high grade-point average. Using the same insurance company for auto, home, and other coverage can give you a combination discount. And if you’ve cut back on driving (by carpooling or taking public transit, for example), you may qualify for a low-mileage discount.Check with your agent before buying a vehicle: Find out in advance how much it would cost to insure that new car or truck. If the premiums will be steep, consider a different vehicle.Comparison shop: In Georgia, if your insurance company announces a rate increase, you have 45 days to switch policies before the rate goes into effect. Get quotes from at least three companies before buying a new policy.Don’t let your coverage lapse: If a company discovers you went without insurance for a period of time, they’ll consider you a high risk and will charge more.Check your credit report: Insurance companies may raise premiums on people with bad credit because those customers tend to have higher claims. Make sure your credit information is accurate. Thanks to the gas crisis, during the first nine months of 2008, Americans drove about 62 billion fewer miles than they did during the same period last year.Fewer miles driven means fewer accidents. So insurance rates should be going down, right?Instead, rates are up an average of 7 percent nationwide. In Georgia, the average lowest premium rate has increased during each of the first three quarters this year.And now, a change in Georgia law could push rates up further. On Oct. 1, Senate Bill 276 went into effect, eliminating the state insurance commissioner’s power to give "prior approval" to rate increases.Now, automobile insurance companies can simply announce a rate change to the Georgia Department of Insurance, and the new rate automatically is approved."You’re basically left up to the mercy of the insurance companies," said Georgia Insurance Commissioner John Oxendine. He said SB 276 was supported by insurance industry lobbyists and "went through the legislature with no discussion."Oxendine doesn’t believe consumers will see any benefit from the new law."Some people say this will increase competition, but competition won’t change because all the major insurance companies are already in Georgia," he said. "The best you could hope for is that rates will stay the same. There’s no evidence that they would ever go down."Shane Robinson, spokesman for Allstate Insurance in Georgia, said sometimes insurers do request lower rates."I think (the new law) has been unfairly portrayed as an excuse for insurance companies to raise rates," he said, noting that Allstate has not recently asked for a rate increase."But (the law) gives us the ability to respond to the marketplace quicker."Oxendine said it’s not as if the insurance companies were having to fight through layers of red tape."I routinely approved rate increases, but I made sure they were justified," he said. "I looked at the company’s losses and claims. I looked at whether they had any lavish expenses. We tried to keep them honest. Now, they won’t have anyone looking over their shoulder."Allison Wall, executive director of Georgia Watch, a consumer advocacy group, said some insurance companies invested heavily in the stock market and may have lost revenue from the economic downturn."They pass those losses on to consumers," she said.But insurance customers are hurting financially, too, and Wall believes the last thing they need is another rate increase. "The timing for consumers is just horrible," she said.They can’t simply choose not to buy insurance. In Georgia, it’s illegal to drive a vehicle if you’re uninsured.SB 276 did preserve one requirement: All insurance companies must offer an affordable rate on the minimum amount of coverage required by law."But if you buy even one dollar’s worth of coverage beyond the minimum, that rate doesn’t apply," said Oxendine. "About 95 percent of Georgians buy more than the minimum."Wayne Whitaker, information specialist with the Georgia Department of Insurance, said the minimum coverage requirement is known as the "25-50-25" rule."You have to have liability coverage for the people you hurt (in a car accident), not for yourself," he said. "That’s $25,000 for the first person injured, or a total of $50,000 for everyone in the other vehicle. And then $25,000 for damage to the other guy’s car."But with the high cost of medical care, a victim’s expenses easily can exceed that minimum amount of coverage. And the driver who was at fault is responsible for paying the balance."That’s why most people buy more than the minimum, to protect their assets," said Oxendine.The trick, for consumers, is to buy enough insurance to cover costs, but not more than they can afford. Insurance companies, on the other hand, need to spend enough to cover policyholders’ claims, but not so much that their business becomes unprofitable.To achieve that balance, Robinson said, insurers must have the freedom to adjust their rates."Sometimes we raise rates in one area of the state, but lower rates in another area, based on our loss experience," he said. "We’ve become much more sophisticated in risk assessment. Our ability to make money depends on our ability to assess risk adequately. That’s how we make our profit, not by investing in stocks."Dick Luedke, spokesman for State Farm, said his company’s overall average rate has decreased about 10 percent in the past five years, partly because of better safety features on cars.He said many factors are considered when setting rates. "We look at rising costs of labor, parts, medical care and the cost of the car itself if it gets stolen," he said. "And we also look at our expenses, what it costs to operate an insurance company."Gambling on the stock market, Luedke said, is not a direct cost of doing business. But he acknowledged that for some companies, the market slump has been a factor in setting premium rates."It would not be accurate for me to say investment results have no impact," he said. "Investment revenue is not totally divorced from this. But for State Farm, it’s a pretty small factor."Wall said it’s too early to gauge the long-term effect of SB 276, but she’s worried that insurance rates will continue to rise."I have a lot of concern, with the national trend that Georgia seems to be a part of, and with the way the economy is going and what has happened with the stock market, that we will in fact see rates increase next year as a result of all these things," Wall said. "And the commissioner’s hands are tied, in large part, from doing anything about it."But she said consumers should try to take matters into their own hands by shopping around for the best rates. Georgia law says once an insurance company announces a rate increase, customers have 45 days to look for a new policy before that rate goes into effect."Take advantage of that 45-day shopping-around period," said Wall. "The Internet is a fantastic tool to help you find the adequate coverage you need at a price you can afford. I think that’s the No. 1 message that needs to be out there for consumers."

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Man's jaw was broken in two places after alleged one-punch street assault – 01 April 2016 02:30 AM Bernard McDonagh allegedly hit a man after intervening in a row A man had his jaw broken in two places when he fell unconscious to the ground after a one-punch assault while he was out socialising in Dublin's city centre, a court heard. Bernard McDonagh (30) is alleged to have delivered the punch after intervening in a verbal confrontation between two men in a laneway. The prosecution maintains the man fell face-down onto a concrete path, causing serious injuries.Mr McDonagh is facing a circuit court trial after a judge ruled the case was too serious to be heard at district court level.Judge Michael Walsh adjourned the case for the preparation of a book of evidence. The accused is charged with assault causing harm to a man at Dame Lane on June 17, 2015.Dublin District Court heard the man had been out socialising at 12.25am with a group of men and women.There was a conversation in which "a few words were exchanged" between the alleged victim and a man known to the accused, a garda sergeant said. Mr McDonagh is alleged to have intervened and struck him one blow to the side of the face.According to the prosecution, this punch knocked the alleged victim unconscious and, unable to save himself, he fell to the concrete path.His face connected with the ground and he remained unconscious for "quite some time," the court heard. The accused left the scene and a witness called an ambulance for the man, who was taken to St James' Hospital for treatment.WiredThe court heard he suffered two fractures to his jaw - one below the ear and another further down towards his chin. His jaw needed to be wired and he was out of work for two to three weeks, the court was told.Due to his time off work because of the injuries, he also missed out on a promotion.According to a dentist's report, there was "quite a substantial amount of work" that remained to be done. The dental work cost €2,070.The alleged victim then gave evidence of his injuries to the judge. As well as the damage to his jaw, he said one of his teeth had been broken in half.The court heard the accused had met gardai by arrangement later.Judge Walsh said that having listened carefully to the evidence, he was satisfied that the case was "not capable of being dealt with" in the jurisdiction of the district court.This means he will be sent forward to Dublin Circuit Criminal Court when a book of evidence is ready.He was remanded on continuing bail to appear in court again on May 11. The charge against Mr McDonagh - with an address at Barn Lodge, Cappogue, Finglas - is under Section 3 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act.

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LAPD officer sues department for demotions Former LAPD captain was allegedly demoted after he refused to fire a police officer Los Angeles police officer Steven Ruiz, who had some bumps in his lengthy law enforcement career, is suing his former employer due to a demotion. The former LAPD captain was allegedly demoted after he refused to fire a police officer, and then demoted again. He had been the top commander in LAPD’s Rampart station. “The LAPD doesn’t always seem to play fair in its internal discipline system, which can jeopardize the constitutional and employment rights of their officers,” Matthew McNicholas, the officer’s attorney, said in a statement. “We believe this suit demonstrates that Chief Charlie Beck can play favorites and ignore the Department’s established procedures.” Ruiz was demoted from Captain III to Captain I, and then demoted to Lieutenant. His attorney claims the demotion “was in retaliation for refusing to violate the rights of fellow officers at an administrative tribunal proceeding over which he presided, contrary to the wishes of Beck.” Top 10 most expensive wage and hour settlements of 2013 Indirect link between worker's FMLA leave, firing doesn't support interference claim LinkedIn repays nearly $6 million in unpaid overtime In 2011, Ruiz presided over a Board of Rights proceeding. Ruiz was verbally reprimanded by an assistant chief, believed to be Earl Paysinger, for recommending a lesser penalty and not terminating an officer. He was later demoted to Lieutenant by Paysinger. “It's a widely or at least somewhat-held belief that officers referred to the Board of Rights by Chief Charlie Beck are being sent to be terminated, a contention echoed in the suit,” the LA Weekly reported. Ruiz was cited on May 30, 2013, for driving under the influence while off-duty, an incident that could have resulted in his demotion. However Ruiz’s attorney says that, Captain Edward Prokop of Newton Division was also stopped in Riverside for driving under the influence and that “various sources of information indicate that … Prokop was not demoted for the situation.” In fact, police officers who receive a DUI usually get only a "conditional official reprimand," a hearing, and treatment, according to a report from LA Weekly. Ruiz claims he suffered, "... physical, mental, and emotional injuries, pain, distress, suffering, anguish, fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shame, mortification, injured feelings, shock, humiliation and indignity, as well as other unpleasant physical, mental, and emotional reactions, damages to reputation, and other non-economic damages." The LAPD has declined to comment on the pending litigation. « Prev Litigation 3662 Regulatory 3023 Labor and Employment 1642 Risk & Compliance 348 Police 5 Matthew McNicholas 3 Los Angeles 2 Los Angeles police 2 Join the Conversation

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Supreme Court Rules on Feeding Tube Case By Associated Press | Posted: Mon 2:59 PM, Jan 24, 2005 | Updated: Mon 2:59 PM, Jan 24, 2005 WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court refused Monday to reinstate a Florida law passed to keep a severely brain-damaged woman hooked to a feeding tube, clearing the way for it to be removed. How soon that would happen, however, was unclear. The Florida Supreme Court had struck down the law last fall, and the justices were the last hope for state leaders who defended the law in a bitter long running dispute over the fate of Terri Schiavo. Her husband, Michael Schiavo, contends she never wanted to be kept alive artificially. But her parents told justices in a filing that their son-in-law is trying to rush her death so he can inherit her estate and be free to marry another woman. The Supreme Court did not comment in rejecting an appeal from Gov. Jeb Bush, who argued that the state had the authority to step in and pass the 2003 law that ordered Terri Schiavo's feeding tube reinserted six days after her husband had it removed. Florida judges will now decide, after the Supreme Court's action, what happens next in the case. "It's judicial homicide. They want to murder her," her father, Robert Schindler, said Monday. "I have no idea what the next step will be. We're going to fight for her as much as we can fight for her. She deserves a chance." The case was one of two right-to-die appeals pending at the high court. Justices are expected to decide in the next month whether to consider a Bush administration request to block the nation's only law allowing doctors to help terminally ill patients die more quickly. Oregon voters passed that law in 1998. At issue Monday was "Terri's Law," which the Florida Supreme Court ruled unanimously was an unconstitutional effort to override court rulings. The 41-year-old Schiavo suffered brain damage in 1990 when her heart temporarily stopped beating because of an eating disorder. In 2001, her parents lost an emergency Supreme Court appeal seeking to keep her feeding tube in place, but more appeals followed. Terri Schiavo has lived in nursing homes. She can breathe on her own but depends on a feeding tube to stay alive because she cannot swallow on her own. She left no written directive. Issues in dispute are whether she is in a persistent vegetative state with no chance of recovery, and if she had said before her illness that she did not want to be kept alive by machines. Washington attorney Robert Destro, representing Florida, told justices to consider "the most vulnerable of our citizens who cannot speak for themselves." Michael Schiavo did not file any arguments with the court, but his attorney had accused Florida leaders of engaging in delaying tactics to prevent Terri Schiavo from carrying out her right to die. The case is Jeb Bush v. Michael Schiavo, 04-757. Texans sign tackle Still to future contract Livestream 2

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Parents of Drowned UNR Student File Lawsuit By Associated Press | Posted: Thu 2:47 PM, Feb 12, 2004 | Updated: Fri 6:48 AM, Feb 13, 2004 The parents of a University of Nevada, Reno freshman pledge who drowned in 2002 have sued the university and the fraternity. The lawsuit says Albert Santos, 18, of Las Vegas drowned after he and seven other Pi Kappa Alpha pledges were told to strip to their underwear and swim around the fountain in Manzanita Lake on the university campus. Santos could not swim. The lawsuit seeks unspecified damages, claiming the school, the fraternity and 11 members of the Iota Eta chapter were negligent. University attorney Brooke Neilsen said the school denies responsibility in the death. After the incident, the university banned the fraternity from campus and suspended an undisclosed number of its members. The case isn't scheduled to go to trial until January because of the large number of defendants involved. Dale Hayes, one of three Las Vegas lawyers representing Santos' mother Editha Day, the plaintiff in the case, disagrees with Neilsen. "It's our belief that this was an annual tradition of what's called the Plunge, and we think the evidence will support that Manzanita Lake has been used in the past by this fraternity for this type of event," Hayes said. After an investigation into Santos' death, the Washoe County district attorney decided not to file criminal charges against fraternity members involved in the incident. A state law passed in 1999 makes hazing on high school and college campuses a criminal offense. But prosecutors determined Santos and the other pledges were not forced to take part in a fraternity hazing and voluntarily decided to make the swim in the chilly waters of the lake on Oct. 10, 2002. "Nothing has changed" - response to Supreme Court Ruling News Copyright © 2002-2016 - Designed by Gray Digital Media - Powered by Clickability kolotv.com/a?a=631347

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Prosecutors seek jury for defendant's Hard 50 sentence Leavenworth County prosecutors want a jury to decide whether a "Hard 50" sentence should be reimposed for a man who was convicted in 2009 of first-degree murder. John [email protected] Matthew Astorga, 37, was sentenced five years ago to a life sentence with no possibility of parole for 50 years under the state's old Hard 50 law. He was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of Ruben Rodriguez. Rodriguez was shot Dec. 26, 2008, in Leavenworth. Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a case from Virginia that jurors, not judges, should weigh whether the facts of a case warrant mandatory minimum sentences such as Kansas' Hard 50. Following this decision, the U.S. Supreme remanded an appeal from Astorga to the Kanas Supreme Court for review. In an opinion released in May, the Kansas Supreme Court vacated Astorga's Hard 50 sentence. His conviction still stands, and he remains in custody as he awaits his re-sentencing. Kansas lawmakers have updated the state's Hard 50 law to allow jurors to determine if such sentences are warranted. Astorga appeared Friday in Leavenworth County District Court. Assistant County Attorney Cheryl Marquardt said prosecutors are requesting a jury proceeding to present evidence and argue for another Hard 50 sentence. Much of Friday's hearing was conducted without Astorga present. The hearing marked the first time Astorga appeared with his new court-appointed attorney, James Colgan. "I haven't had time to speak to the lawyer," Astorga said at the start of the hearing. Astorga said he filed his own motion since last appearing in court June 25. He said he had not received a response. "I did rule on that," District Judge Gunnar Sundby said. Astorga said he shouldn't have been brought into court. Sundby said Astorga was brought into court because he was scheduled to appear for the hearing. Astorga said he wanted to return to his cell. He left the defense table and walked through a door to a holding cell area. Officers from the Leavenworth County Jail accompanied Astorga as he left the courtroom. Sundby continued the proceeding after Astorga left the courtroom. The judge said Astorga filed a motion objecting to having an attorney appointed from a public defender's office. Leavenworth County District Court does not have a public defender's office. Colgan was appointed from a list of attorneys approved by a state board for indigent defense services. "You are exactly what he asked for," Sundby said to Colgan. Sundby said he considered the issue raised by Astorga's motion to be moot. The judge said he filed a response, but Astorga may have not received it. If a jury doesn't feel a Hard 50 sentence is warranted, Astorga could receive a life sentence with a minimum of 25 years before he's eligible for parole. But, Sundby said he believes the law also would allow him to impose a sentence ranging from 46-51.5 years. No date has been set for the requested jury proceeding. Sundby suggested the prosecution file a motion requesting the proceeding. Astorga is scheduled to return to court Aug. 13. Colgan said he would try to visit with Astorga immediately following Friday's hearing. "But, I doubt it will be terribly friendly," Colgan said. The attorney said he also will send a letter to his new client. Sundby said he would accommodate Astorga and provide him due process. "I can't prevent him from ignoring us," Sundby said.

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“Why cooperate with the SEC?” Recent settlements shed light Haynes and Boone LLP Until recently, individuals considering cooperating with an SEC investigation had a difficult time determining whether a tangible benefit would result from cooperation. Two releases issued by the SEC in the past month demonstrate how the SEC has begun to apply its Cooperation Initiative and give new insight into how the SEC evaluates and credits cooperation in determining sanctions against individuals. A comparison of the two executives involved shows that the SEC will reward cooperation at any stage of an investigation; however, those who provide early assistance, give detailed credible information, and, of course, have cleaner hands regarding the underlying conduct, can negotiate a better resolution. In the first two years following the SEC’s announcement of the Cooperation Initiative, the SEC’s settlements reflecting cooperation credit involved companies, not individuals, and included deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. The recent releases highlight the importance that the SEC places on its cooperation initiative for individuals as well as corporate entities. In a March 19, 2012 release, Robert Khuzami, the Director of the Enforcement Division at the SEC, explained the SEC’s view that first-hand evidence possessed by cooperators can enhance and expedite investigations. The SEC’s recent actions, according to Khuzami, demonstrate that the SEC “fully recognizes the value of cooperation in SEC investigations and will seek to reward such cooperation appropriately.” Announcement of No Enforcement Action Against AXA Rosenberg Executive On March 19, 2012, the SEC announced its first decision to credit an individual for cooperating in an investigation. In the release, the SEC announced that it would not be filing an enforcement action against an unnamed former senior executive at AXA Rosenberg based on his timely and fulsome cooperation. Importantly, the cooperating witness came forward soon after the investigation began. The SEC’s announcement makes clear that it appreciates cooperation even after they begin looking into potential violations and is not limiting the credit for cooperation to just whistleblowers. AXA Rosenberg is a California-based institutional money manager that specializes in quantitative investment strategies. According to SEC statements, there was a material error in the computer program that the company used to manage client assets. This error affected more than 600 clients and cost those clients roughly $217 million in losses. With the help of a former senior executive, the SEC was able to bring two different enforcement actions against AXA Rosenberg and its chairman to recoup the full $217 million for investors and $27.5 million in additional penalties. Factors the SEC Considered in Crediting the Cooperating Executive The SEC’s March 19 release focuses on the factors that led it to credit the cooperating executive. The factors it cites are identified in the Commission’s Policy Statement Concerning Cooperation by Individuals in its Investigations and Related Enforcement Actions. Every situation is different, and the factors in this case are not exhaustive, but they are illustrative of the SEC’s considerations when deciding whether and how to credit cooperation. Assistance Provided – The SEC found that the cooperating executive was forthcoming and truthful. He provided credible and detailed information that made the investigative process quicker and more efficient. Moreover, he had knowledge of difficult facts in the investigation, the use of quantitative investment models, which was of significant value to the SEC staff. The SEC recognized that his cooperation enabled them to conserve staff resources. Further, it noted the executive provided the assistance without conditions. The SEC said this enhanced his credibility. Importance of Underlying Matter – The SEC noted that proper compliance policies and procedures in quantitative investment funds are a priority area in the SEC’s enforcement program. Since the concealed error cost investors $217 million, the SEC placed a great deal of importance on this investigation. Accountability – The Commission does not want the Cooperation Initiative to be a path for culpable executives to avoid accountability for their actions. However, in the AXA Rosenberg matter, the cooperating executive had a “limited role in the events surrounding concealment” and he advocated that the error be referred to the CEO. The Executive’s Profile – The SEC noted that the cooperating executive currently is not an associated person of any regulated entity, a fiduciary for others involving financial matters, or an officer or director of a public company. Further, the executive has no regulatory or disciplinary history, resigned from AXA Rosenberg, and retired from the investment advisory industry. Accordingly, he “is no longer in a position to commit future violations” of securities laws. Settlement with former EVP at United Commercial Bank Shortly after the AXA Rosenberg release, the SEC announced another agreement with a cooperating executive, John M. Cinderey. The SEC filed an action and obtained an injunction against Cinderey but did not allege any violations of the anti-fraud provisions and did not order a civil penalty. The SEC noted that the lack of a penalty was based, in part, on the fact that Cinderey had already paid a $40,000 fine in an action brought by the FDIC and, in part, on Cinderey’s cooperation in the SEC investigation. Cinderey was an executive vice president at United Commercial Bank in San Diego who the SEC alleges took part in a scheme to mislead auditors about the bank’s financial position and to delay reporting the deteriorating conditions of the bank’s loan portfolio during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. As part of this effort, the SEC alleges that Cinderey altered memos prepared for the independent auditors to provide incomplete or misleading information and he circumvented the bank’s internal accounting controls. The SEC charged four other senior executives at the bank with securities fraud in October 2011 and litigation is ongoing against three of them. Cinderey’s cooperation in the investigation earned him the settlement without fraud charges and without any monetary penalty. The SEC’s release regarding Cinderey did not contain an evaluation of the cooperation factors comparable to those in the AXA Rosenberg release and stated only that the settlement reflects “credit given to Cinderey . . . for his substantial assistance in the investigation and the fact that he has entered into a cooperation agreement to assist in an ongoing related enforcement action.” However, a review of the SEC’s complaint against Cinderey provides useful indicators of the distinctions in the two matters. On the one hand, Cinderey had been a key player in a scheme to circumvent accounting controls and falsify books and records at the bank including taking action, after discussions with his supervisors, to omit information and add misleading statements to memoranda provided to the bank’s auditors. On the other hand, as in the AXA Rosenberg matter, the underlying conduct alleged at United Commercial Bank involved an area of SEC priority, fraudulent conduct during the early part of the financial crisis. His “substantial” cooperation and agreement to assist in the litigation against others on this priority matter earned Cinderey leniency. But, Cinderey’s alleged conduct involved a greater participation in misconduct as compared to the AXA Rosenberg executive who objected to his firm’s plan to conceal a problem and who had a very minor role in the events in question. Consistent with the Commission’s desire to prevent the Cooperation Initiative from rewarding bad behavior and the need to hold individuals accountable, the terms of Cinderey’s settlement are not as generous. The SEC is trying to publicize its Cooperation Initiative and is publicly crediting cooperating executives in hopes of incentivizing others to cooperate in future investigations. The AXA Rosenberg release is the first time that the Commission has provided some transparency into the factors and process for crediting individual cooperation. As evidenced by both the AXA Rosenberg release and the Cinderey action, the SEC will give leniency not just to whistleblowers who come forward before an investigation has begun but also to those whose assistance begins in the early stages of an investigation. The level of leniency will depend on various factors and likely will require the individual executive to be “the first one in the door” at the SEC. Executives considering cooperating with the SEC and seeking substantial credit for their assistance also should evaluate their role in any company misconduct, the priority of the investigation’s subject matter to the SEC’s enforcement program, the individual’s history of prior violations and current positions, as well as their willingness to be fully credible and freely give information over an extended period of an investigation and litigation. Haynes and Boone LLP - Kit Addleman and Ben Johnson Filed under Understanding English Arbitration: Appeal of a Point of Law * State Taxation - Are We Moving Away from Physical Presence and Towards Economic Nexus? * Federal Court Refuses to Enjoin Implementation of the Part of OSHA’s New Recordkeeping Rule Relating to Post-Accident Drug Testing and Safety Incentive Programs * Litigating exclusive use clauses in shopping centers * Brexit Update

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Supreme Court considers compensation under the Riot Act Cooley Insure Cooley LLP In The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime v Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd & Ord [2016] UKSC 18, the Supreme Court ruled on the quantification of compensation available to insurers under the Riot Act 1886, following insured losses caused by the London riots in 2011. The principal issue in dispute on appeal related to whether persons (in this case the respondent insurers) could claim compensation for consequential losses (such as loss of profits) under s2 of the Riot Act 1886, where damage has been caused to property by rioters. The issue therefore related only to the quantification of the claims against The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC), the liability to pay such claims no longer being in issue before the court. At first instance, it had been held that the Riot Act provided compensation only for physical damage and not consequential loss. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision. The MOPC appealed to the Supreme Court. Lord Hodge, delivering the judgment of the court, allowed the appeal, agreeing with Flaux J at first instance that the Riot Act, on its proper construction, and interpreted against the backdrop of the prior legislative history, did not extend to provide compensation for consequential losses. Cooley LLP - Sam Tacey Filed under Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Group Environmental shareholder proposals increase in frequency and sophistication, but will they continue to be viable? * Amendments To The Federal Rules Of Bankruptcy Procedure Take Effect December 1, 2016 * New Antitrust Risks from Introducing New Drugs * A Beam Of Sun For Trademark Licensees: Another Appellate Court Holds Rejection Does Not Terminate A Trademark Licensee’s Rights * Presidential Transitions: The Congressional Review Act More from Cooley Insure Commercial Court dismisses appeal by reinsurers disputing that certain losses arising from the World Trade Centre attack in 2001 arose from one event Supreme Court determines that an insurer can set aside a settlement of a personal injury claim even if, at the time of settlement, the insurer suspected fraud by the claimant. Supreme Court rules that “collateral lies” are no bar to a claim on an insurance policy Supreme Court determines that a director cannot be liable to an employee under the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 for a failure to insure Commercial court considers extension of time to challenge arbitral award

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An independent Open Source community More Subnet Communities The Wazi Blog By Wazi Wazi Looking Back To Move Forward: My Legal Top 3 of 2012 Top Android stories of 2012 5 key forces driving open source today Top 10 tech stories of 2012: a busted IPO, spotlight on workers, titans in... Before (or, more likely, while) diving headfirst into the deep end of a new year, it's good to take a moment to consider what significant events occurred in the closing year. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, one can gain new perspectives on the recent past and, perhaps, gather valuable insight and foresight to plan for this coming year. That being said, here are my top three significant open source events from 2012:1) Copyright protection of software not as broad as some might likeTwo cases, one in the United States and one in the European Union, provide valuable clarification regarding the limits of copyright protection applicable to software. Oracle v. Google5, it bred early and often conjecture that Oracle was going to take Google to the cleaners, that this could be the death (or at least a major setback) of Android, or other such doomsday scenarios. The world of open source software kept a vigilant watch as this case combined dubious software patents and critical, precedential copyright questions concerning the world's most popular open source mobile operating systems. The copyright portion of the case involved Java API packages. Oracle's central claim was that Google had replicated the structure, sequence, and organization of the overall code for 37 Java API packages. The parties agreed that Google had not literally copied the software, but had instead developed its own implementations of the 37 APIs. Interestingly, Oracle's trial brief also asserted that the Java language itself was protected by copyright, but the court opinion states that "[a]ll agree everyone was and remains free to program in the Java language itself." 6 When Oracle sued Google on August 12, 2010 for copyright and patent infringement (on seven patents) relating to its Java platform The court held that "so long as the specific code used to implement a method is different, anyone is free under the Copyright Act to write his or her own code to carry out exactly the same function or specification of any methods used in the Java API." 7 The court reasoned that although the Android method and class names were the same, copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases, or expressions. Additionally, these names represent a symbol in a command structure; a command structure that is used as a utilitarian and functional set of symbols to carry out pre-assigned functions is a "system or method of operation," as per Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act and cannot be protected. Furthermore, when there is only one (or only a few) ways to express something–as is the case here, where the method specification as set forth in the declaration must be identical under the Java rules to carry out a specific function–then no one can claim ownership of such expression by copyright. 8 SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Limited 1 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that "neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program for the purposes of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250." 2 Such ideas and principles are not protected by copyright; only the expression of those ideas and principles is protected. To hold otherwise would result in a monopoly on ideas, which is not the goal of copyright protection. SAS Institute developed the SAS programming language, a set of programs, and associated documentation. SAS brought suit against World Programming, Ltd (WPL) for copyright infringement involving, among other issues, the extent to which copyright protection applies to a programming language. This concept is not unique to European Union law; under United States law, copyright protection also covers only the expression of an idea, not the idea itself. For example, copyright protects the book that explains a system of bookkeeping, but does not protect the system the book describes. 3 Likewise, recipes are not protectable because they describe a procedure or process. 4 It is reassuring to have the highest court in the EU return a verdict that is consistent with US law, as well as the general assumption in the software industry regardless of location. From a pragmatic view, can you imagine any other result? What if the authors of any of the most popular computer languages could assert copyright, and thereby require a license fee for any implementation or derivation of the language? The sum? For many software programmers, the net result of these court decisions is probably not earth-shattering, as the holdings reflect assumptions long held by many. However, to have such established jurisprudence reduces potential fear, uncertainty, and doubt for business and legal risk managers. 2) Last of BusyBox suits settle Back in December 2009, open source license enforcement made major headlines when the Software Freedom Law Center sued fourteen defendants, including Best Buy, Samsung, Bosch, and Westinghouse, over non-compliance with the GNU General Public License v2 (GPL v2). Most of the defendants settled with minimal public mention. One defendant entered state bankruptcy proceedings and stopped participating in the lawsuit, which led to a default judgment against them including injunctive relief, statutory damages, forfeiture of the remaining infringing items, and attorney’s fees and costs. The remaining defendant finally settled in 2012, almost three years after the filing. There is no doubt that this suit, with household-name defendants, caught the attention of many open source software users. No longer could license compliance be ignored. Legal departments and compliance officers scrambled to get a handle on this "free" software issue. Since then, enforcement actions have not made headlines. This does not mean, however, that license compliance enforcement has ceased 9; rather, it has returned to private discussions that lead to compliance via agreement instead of litigation, which is a far more efficient and preferable resolution for all involved. Unfortunately, many organizations operate primarily out of urgency, and the lack of public visibility can lull back to laziness those companies only concerned about the risk of litigation vis-à-vis license compliance. To do so is severely short-sighted, as it represents a failure to see the many other reasons to properly govern the use of open source software. By way of analogy, do you only drive the speed limit to avoid getting a ticket? Of course not. You also drive the speed limit because it is safer, smarter, more fuel efficient, makes your passengers more comfortable and likely to ride with you, and so forth. 3) Open source software knowledge: a little does not go a long waya similar post, I called 2011 the year when open source adoption left the age of denial, and wondered if 2012 might be the year of responsibility and action. I may have been prematurely optimistic. By "responsibility and action," I imagined that the gap between the vast number of companies using OSS and the relatively small percentage that have an open source policy and governance framework implemented would shrink. But I forgot that in order for this to occur, there is a crucial and easily underestimated step. Last year when I wrote Without consistent and relevant knowledge of open source software by all users within an organization, an open source policy or governance framework cannot be effective. Although awareness of open source software and the surrounding issues has certainly increased (as I noted last year), a little knowledge does not necessarily go a long way. In the various interactions we have with a wide range of customers, one recurring theme is the need for education. Often there may be one or a few open source "champions" in an organization who realize the need to get their ducks in a row in regards to tracking use, achieving license compliance, etc. The champion may have a high level of understanding, but that does not mean the rest of the affected personnel (developers, legal, business) will be able to comprehend the rationale for various open source policy rules, or which risks associated with the open source software apply to their organization. All the best intentions, policies, and procedures are practically useless if some or most of your organization does not possess the knowledge to grasp, value, and implement them.Where does your organization fall on the open source software understanding continuum? Knowing you need to do something is not enough. Perhaps 2013 is the year to transition from simple awareness to cognitive understanding and decisive action.1 C-406/10. See opinion at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=122362&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4617152 Id. at ¶ 39.3 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)4 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).5 http://www.marketwatch.com/story/oracle-sues-google-for-patent-infringement-2010-08-12?reflink=MW_news_stmp6 Oracle America, Inc., v. Google Inc., No. C 10-0361 WHA at ¶ 25 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2012)7 Id. at ¶ 158 In October, Oracle appealed all rulings adverse to it, so we have not heard the last about this yet.9 See http://sfconservancy.org/news/2012/may/29/compliance/ Related: Open Source Subnet

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Articulo en XMLReferencias del artículoComo citar este artículoTraducción automáticaEnviar articulo por emailIndicadoresAccesosLinks relacionadosCitado por Google Similares en Google CompartirOtrosOtrosPermalinkPER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsbladversión On-line ISSN 1727-3781ResumenKRUGER, J y TSHOOSE, CI. The impact of the Labour Relations Act on minority trade unions: A South African perspective. PER [online]. 2013, vol.16, n.4, pp.01-45. ISSN 1727-3781.The advent of the new political dispensation in 1994 heralded the coming of a new labour dispensation. Labour relations and labour policies changed significantly from that which prevailed under the previous government. The review of the labour legislation framework was at that stage a priority for the new government, with specific focus on the review of the collective bargaining dispensation. The abuse of trade unions under the previous government gave rise to a unique entrenchment of labour rights in the Constitution. The drafters thereof were determined to avoid a repetition of this abuse after 1994. Section 23 of the Constitution goes to great lengths to protect, amongst others, the right to form and join a trade union, the right of every trade union to organise and the right of every trade union to engage in collective bargaining. In furtherance of section 23(5) of the Constitution, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 was promulgated. One of the most significant changes of the LRA was that it now provided for legislated organisational rights. Commentators have often viewed the LRA as favouring larger unions and as conferring clear advantages on unions with majority support at the establishment or industry level. It is within this context that this article examines the impact of section 18 of the LRA on the constitutionally entrenched right of every person to freedom of association, the right of every trade union to engage in collective bargaining, and the right of every trade union to organise. Furthermore, this article explores the justifiability of the impact of section 18 on minority trade unions in terms of international labour standards and the Constitution. In part one the article examines the concept of majoritarianism, pluralism and industrial unionism in the context of South African Labour market. Part two deals with the impact of section 18 of the LRA on minority Trade Unions. Whilst part three explores the concept of workplace democracy. Part five investigates the applicability of international labour standards in the context of the right to freedom of association. Part four ends up with conclusion and recommendations on the impact of section 18 of the LRA.Palabras clave Minority unions; collective bargaining; freedom of association; organisational rights; international labour standards. Todo el contenido de esta revista, excepto dónde está identificado, está bajo una Licencia Creative CommonsPotchefstroom Electronic Law JournalFaculty of Law, Private Bag X6001, North-West University, Potchefstroom, North-West Province, ZA, 2520, Tel: +27 18 299 [email protected]

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88 West Utica Street· Buffalo, New York 14209 Call us today: (716) 883-4800 DWI & Other Traffic Law Offenses Crimes of Dishonesty Property Crimes Public Crimes Blood Alcohol Calculator Construction accident Harvey Siegel Melinda Gullo About Harvey F. Siegel Raised in the New York City area, Harvey F Siegel studied Fine Arts in New York from 1981 to 1983. He relocated to Buffalo, New York in 1984, and was immediately taken with the friendly people and the rich cultural and architectural heritage of Western New York. Mr. Siegel now considers himself a Buffalonian. Mr. Siegel later changed his educational and career focus, devoting himself to being of service to others through the practice of law. In 1994, Mr. Siegel graduated with Honors from the State University of New York at Buffalo, earning a B.S. in the Social Sciences Interdisciplinary Legal Studies Program. Two years later, in 1996, he graduated from the State University of New York at Buffalo Law School with a Juris Doctorate. Determined to utilize his legal education without the constraints of working for a law firm, Mr. Siegel opened his law practice immediately upon being sworn in as an attorney in February of 1997. In 2001, the practice relocated to its present location, in what was originally built as the residence for the Catholic Diocese of Buffalo, New York’s Bishop. Mr. Siegel’s practice has grown as has his reputation for hard work, integrity and success in the courtroom. Over time, The Law Office of Harvey Siegel has defined itself as a boutique law practice, primarily concentrating in three practice areas: Personal Injury Law, Criminal Defense and Domestic Relations Representation (Matrimonial and Family Law.) Although the office has become well known, the practice remains dedicated to its original purpose—helping people in need. Mr. Siegel’s makes sure that all of his clients get personal attention and he always ensures that they are kept aware of the status of their cases. Mr. Siegel insists upon his clients’ participation in important decisions about the matters that his office handles for them. Mr. Siegel is involved in many professional committees, including those of the New York State Bar Association, the Bar Association of Erie County, and the Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity. He is a frequent guest on WNED’s Lawline program, a public education project involving the collaborative efforts of WNED, the Erie County Bar Foundation and the Bar Association’s Lawyer Referral and Information Service. Mr. Siegel was appointed to serve as an Inspector for the New York State Athletic Commission in 2005. As an Inspector, he helps regulate professional boxing in New York State. Although Mr. Siegel’s educational and career focus changed many years ago to serving others through the practice of law, his interest in and appreciation for the Arts has not waned. His personal collection includes the works of many Western New York artists. Mr. Siegel is active in the local Arts community and continues to create his own original works of art. Mr. Siegel has contributed many of his own paintings to local fundraising efforts, including those of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society, the Burchfield-Penny Art Center, AIDS Community Services of Western New York and the Volunteer Lawyers Project, in conjunction with Legal Services for the Elderly, Disabled and Disadvantaged. Since law school, Mr. Siegel has been involved in Hillel of Buffalo, an organization that provides cultural continuity and religious services to college students. In 2008, he created an Ark for Hillel, which holds the sacred Torah scrolls. Currently, Mr. Siegel lives in Amherst, New York with Samantha, a chocolate Labrador retriever, and his Great Dane Zeus who frequently comes to work with him. Call us today: 1(716) 883-4800 Online Payment Mobile Apps: SIEGEL GULLO, Attorneys · 88 West Utica Street Buffalo, NY 14209 © 2012 : Privacy Policy ***ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENT *** The Information obtained from this website is not intended as a substitution for legal counsel or advise. You should consult with an attorney regarding your case. Some of the images presented in this website are stock photographs. Website Design and Marketing By: Scout Buffalo Web Design

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January 13 th 2014 Comments Off on Interesting Things Happening in a Small Country – Self-Regulation and Principled Pragmatism Share Legal Ethics Column Interesting Things Happening in a Small Country – Self-Regulation and Principled Pragmatism by Malcolm Mercer More posts by Malcolm » It is easy to be sceptical, perhaps even cynical, about professional self-regulation whether for lawyers, doctors, accountants or other professions. A clear-eyed reading of history shows that protectionism, usually cloaked as high principle, has played a significant part of the history of professional self-regulation. One example was the early resistance to inter-provincial law firms. As an articling student in 1982/83, I had the pleasure of helping to develop arguments under the then new Charter of Rights and Freedoms to attack the Alberta professional conduct rule that prohibited inter-provincial law firms[1]. I particularly recall that the report to the benchers proposing the rule helpfully referred to the “interlopers” from other provinces who should not be partners with Alberta lawyers. Other examples of “ethical” rules that protected lawyers’ practices come easily to mind. Professor Stephen Gillers highlights several in his article How to make Rules for Lawyers, the Professional Responsibility of the Legal Profession[2]. By the 1960s, a number of American unions had established legal plans for their members either by negotiating preferred rates with selected lawyers or by directly offering legal services through union-employed lawyers. Over the opposition of the American Bar Association and 48 state and local bar associations, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately rejected claims of unauthorized practice of law and unethical conduct. Similarly, minimum fee schedules and prohibition of advertising were once justified on the basis of legal ethics. As Professor Bradley Wendel has observed[3] that “[I]t is not hard to convince oneself that one’s primary motivation is not to make money and so to imagine that one is acting professionally …”. Professor Gillers’ article is focused on ABA Ethics 20/20[4]. Professor Gillers (like other commentators[5]) is critical of the earlier rejection in 2000 by the ABA House of Delegates of proposals from the Multi-Disciplinary Practice Commission and the failure of Ethics 20/20 to seriously consider alternative business structures in 2012. In his soft-spoken but powerful critique, Professor Gillers argues that mere assertions of imperilled “professionalism” unsupported by actual evidence and sound reasoning are no proper basis for continued regulation protective of existing practices. The experience in the United States with respect to Multi-Disciplinary Practices (“MDPs”) and Alternative Business Structures (“ABSs”) is in sharp contrast to the experience in Australia and England. In both of those jurisdictions, there has been very substantial liberalization. But this liberalization was not the choice of the profession. In both jurisdictions, liberalization was imposed by government together with an end to self-regulation. In England, the Law Society was stripped of its regulatory authority which was assigned to the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, supervised by the Legal Services Board. Similarly, the Legal Services Commissioner in New South Wales was assigned substantial (but not all) authority previously exercised by the Law Society. The essential point of this column is to observe that the Canadian experience is different than the US experience on hand and the Australian/English experience on the other and to muse why that might be. Since the late 1990s, MDPs have been permitted in Ontario and, more recently, in British Columbia. By the late 2000s, the Law Society of Upper Canada became the regulator of licensed paralegals. To address the reality of hundreds of applicants who could not find articling positions, a new pathway to licensing has been adopted in Ontario. Change has not always been easy nor to the extent sought by some but change has occurred.[6] In Nova Scotia and British Columbia, the law societies now have the jurisdiction to directly regulate law firms as well as lawyers. In Nova Scotia, fundamental regulatory issues are being addressed such as outcomes-focused regulation, a risk management framework for regulation and whether regulated legal services can properly be delivered by non-lawyers and alternative business structures[7]. In British Columbia, the benchers have just unanimously adopted the recommendations[8] of the Legal Service Providers Task Force. The Task Force recommended that (i) the Law Society merge with the Society of Notaries Public[9] and become the regulator of both lawyers and notaries, (ii) standards for and certification of paralegals practising though regulated legal service providers and (iii) the development of a regulatory framework whereby individuals or groups other than lawyers and notaries may provide regulated legal services. Why is so much happening in Canada and so little in the United States? Why was government intervention in Australia and England required for change but not in Canada? Of course, answers to these questions are necessarily speculative. I can only offer an educated guess. Part of the answer, I think, is simply timing. The Canadian law societies saw the loss of self-regulation in Australia and England and, believing that self-regulation is in the public interest, sought to protect self-regulation by learning lessons from those jurisdictions. As a small country, we are better positioned to learn from other experiences than are the Americans who are, by nature, exceptionalists. Another part of the answer is constitutional structure. In England, competition law and policy as well as legal services regulation are both dealt at the same level of government. The same is true in Australia where the government of New South Wales legislated change to legal services regulation as a matter of competition policy. In contrast, Canadian and American competition law/policy is dealt with at the national level while regulation of lawyers is at the provincial and state level. And significantly, I think, regulation of lawyers in the United States is constitutionally under the authority of the judicial branch of government rather than the legislative branch. In the United States, attacks on regulation of advertising, permitting minimum fee schedules and the like have been through litigation not legislation[10]. The last part of the answer (as I see it) is serendipity. In Canada[11], the self-regulatory role of the law societies and the representative role of the Canadian Bar Association have been separated[12]. The fact that the MDP and ABS issues have been addressed within the American Bar Association means that very different dynamics are in play. The fact that the Law Society in England combined the separate roles undertaken by our law societies and the CBA clearly was a factor in government intervention. My ultimate point is that, while there is cause to be sceptical about self-regulation in theory, there is cause for us to be optimistic in practice. Look at what Law Societies are considering and doing in Canada. This is a time of thoughtful consideration and innovation. Perhaps things don’t happen as quickly or to the extent that some would want. No doubt some risk of protectionism still exists. But independence of the profession in support of a democratic society is also valuable. It is not obvious that government appointed regulators will do a better job. And I think that professional pride is enhanced by self-regulation and helps protect clients, the administration of justice and the rule of law. The purists, the sceptics and the cynics can easily be critical. But there is much in the Canadian reality that is attractive for the principled pragmatist. [1] Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [1989] 1 SCR 591 [2] (2013), 40 Pepperdine Law Review 365. Professor Gillers is a respected legal ethicist who served as a member of the ABA Multijurisdictional Practice Commission in 2000-2002 and ABA Ethics 20/20 in 2009-2013. [3] As quoted by Professor Gillers ibid. [4] A periodic review of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct. [5] Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Pathology: The ABA’S latest policy debate on nonlawyer ownership of law practice entitles, (2012) 40 Fordham Urban Law Journal 75 Russell G. Pearce and Pam Jenoff, Nothing New Under The Sun: How the Legal Profession’s Twenty-First Century Challenges Resemble Those Of The Turn Of The Twentieth Century, (2012), 40 Fordham Urban L. J. 481 Gillian K. Hadfield The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice through the (Un)Corporate Practice of Law, (2013), Forthcoming, International Review of Law and Economics See also Zachary C. Zurek, The Limited Power of the Bar to Protect Its Monopoly, 3 St. Mary’s Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics 242 [6] Amy Salyzyn’s recent SLAW article on the newly established Law Society Tribunal in Ontario provides another example. [7] Transforming Regulation and Governance in the Public Interest, October 28, 2013 [8] Final Report of the Legal Service Providers Task Force, December 6, 2013 [9] The scope of practice of a notary public in BC is quite different than in other common law provinces in Canada. [10] For a current example see Jacoby & Meyers LLP v. Presiding Justices of the First Second Third & Fourth Departments, Appellate Div. of Supreme Court of State of New York, 488 F. App’s 526 (2d. Cir. 2012) last amended (Jan.9 ,2013) [11] Québec can be seen as different with the Barreau having a representative role yet being under the supervision of the Office des Professions. [12] While there were debates about this in Ontario in the 1990s the role of the Law Society is now clearly understood to be to act in the public interest rather than in the interest of the profession. The 2006 amendments to the Law Society Act (Ontario) make this clear. « Previous: Monday’s Mix Next: Jean-Marc Leclerc Joins Slaw as Regular Blogger » Comments are closed.

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ADVERTISEMENT St. Paul dad receives probation for loaded gun used to shoot son December 13, 2012 - 11:07 PM Lue Xiong has a gun safety message for all to hear: Don't leave loaded guns where kids can get them. He had done exactly that, and his 2-year-old son nearly died of a gunshot to the head on Aug. 2. The toddler's 9-year-old brother found a gun in a file cabinet drawer in his parents' bedroom, pointed it at the boy's head and pulled the trigger in the family's home in the 1300 block of Beech Street in St. Paul. The boy's 16-year-old sister had been baby-sitting that day but was sleeping when the shooting happened. The 9-year-old didn't know the gun was loaded, according to a criminal complaint. Thursday, the remorseful father went to court and received probation for a negligent storage of a loaded firearm where a child can access it, which is a gross misdemeanor. Terms of his two years on probation include speaking to the public about gun safety. He'll do so under the monitoring of the Neighborhood Justice Center, a nonprofit, community-based legal service. The Ramsey County attorney's office will be keeping tabs, too. The toddler is now in physical therapy and doing well in his recovery, officials said. Xiong, 43, has completed a gun safety course and intends to have his family members take a gun safety course as well, said Dennis Gerhardstein, a spokesman for the Ramsey County attorney's office, He said Xiong is the sole breadwinner for his family, which is one reason he was placed on probation, along with his willingness to do community service through outreach to promote gun safety, Ramsey County District Judge Robyn Millenacker stayed a one-year workhouse sentence and also imposed a fine of $200, plus $81 court costs. JOY POWELL

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Ethics panel hears first testimony in Glodis case By Thomas Caywood TELEGRAM & GAZETTE STAFF The state ethics case against former Worcester County Sheriff Guy W. Glodis opened yesterday with testimony from five witnesses, including three current and former employees of the Worcester County Jail and House of Correction.Commerce Bank and Trust Chairman David G. “Duddie” Massad also testified, as did his longtime friend Joseph T. Duggan III of Shrewsbury, a former inmate at the jail whose placement in a work release program is at the heart of the case against Mr. Glodis.The Ethics Commission’s Enforcement Division filed an order in June alleging that Mr. Glodis violated two sections of the state conflict of interest law when he was sheriff by allegedly arranging for Mr. Duggan to be placed on work release as a favor to his wealthy friend and campaign donor, Mr. Massad.Candies Pruitt-Doncaster, a lawyer for the Enforcement Division, sought to establish that Mr. Duggan’s placement in the program within a day of arriving at the jail to serve a four-month sentence for larceny was unusual and violated a written policy.“Worcester County Sheriff Guy Glodis broke the rules for prominent, well-known businessman David Massad,” Ms. Pruitt-Doncaster said in her opening statement. “He was out of jail the next day. This was fast. This was unusual.”During his cross examination of the witnesses, Mr. Glodis’ lawyer, Thomas R. Kiley, focused on the role of jail overcrowding in work release decisions. He also asked the current and former jail employees who testified if they were ever told how to classify any inmate by the former sheriff.All three men said Mr. Glodis never spoke to them about such matters.The two-day adjudicatory hearing is scheduled to resume this morning. It is being presided over by Ethics Commission Chairman Charles B. Swartwood, a former state judge, and will be decided by the full commission. Mr. Glodis could be fined up to $10,000, officials said.Mr. Massad testified that he had been friends with Mr. Duggan for decades and lately had been using him as a project manager for construction jobs for his car dealerships in Auburn and a condominium development in Ashland.When he was a state senator, Mr. Glodis worked as a business development officer for Mr. Massad’s Commerce Bank for about 18 months in 2005, before taking over as sheriff. Mr. Massad and members of his family also have been campaign donors to Mr. Glodis.Mr. Massad said he called Mr. Glodis in October 2009 to see if Mr. Duggan could be let out of jail on work release.“He said, ‘I’ll have somebody call you back.’ And that’s what happened,” Mr. Massad said.Cell phone call logs showed Mr. Massad spoke to Mr. Glodis and Mr. Duggan several times throughout the day on Oct. 28, 2009, the day before the latter man was scheduled to begin his sentence.Mr. Kiley asked if the bank chairman had asked the sheriff to do anything improper.“Of course not,” Mr. Massad said. “I told him the situation. I said the guy didn’t hurt anybody or do anything really wrong,” Mr. Massad said. “He said it wasn’t his thing to do, but he’d see if he could have somebody help me. He said somebody would call me.”Mr. Duggan was placed in the work release program the next day despite a written sheriff’s department policy barring inmates with “warrants or cases pending” from participating in the program. At the time, Mr. Duggan had two criminal cases pending in Westboro District Court.The decision to release Mr. Duggan to work for Mr. Massad was made by a three-member classification board at the jail. All sentenced inmates get a classification hearing to determine if they should be placed in maximum security, medium security or the work release program within two weeks of beginning their sentences, according to testimony.The chairman of the classification board was Marc Keddy, who has since retired from the department.Ms. Pruitt-Doncaster asked him if it was atypical for a classification hearing to be arranged within hours of an inmate’s arrival at the jail.“It was quick,” Mr. Keddy said.“Was it unusually quick?” she asked.“Yes,” Mr. Keddy responded.Another jail employee, social worker Jeffrey Heenan, who was a member of the classification board, testified that he couldn’t recall who instructed him to set up a classification hearing for Mr. Duggan.Mr. Keddy, Mr. Heenan and the director of classification, Michael Landgren, all testified that they recommended Mr. Duggan be released to Mr. Massad for work because he was a nonviolent offender and doing so would free up a bed in the crowded medium security building.Ms. Pruitt-Doncaster asked Mr. Landgren what specific exception to the classification policy allowed Mr. Duggan to be released despite his pending cases.“There is none,” Mr. Landgren said.Mr. Keddy said the board made the call to put Mr. Duggan on work release because he didn’t present a threat to the community.Ms. Pruitt-Doncaster asked him where in the policy it said nonviolent offenders are exempted from the requirement that work release inmates not have any pending criminal cases.“It doesn’t,” Mr. Keddy said.Mr. Kiley asked Mr. Keddy about other factors that play into classification decisions, such as objections to work release from victims.“Are there other things taken into consideration that aren’t in the policy?” he asked.“Yes,” Mr. Keddy said.During Mr. Duggan’s testimony he described himself as Mr. Massad’s project manager on all construction work.“I build all his buildings. If something breaks, I fix it,” Mr. Duggan said.A former home improvement contractor who has been stripped of his state construction supervisor licenses by state regulators for repeated misconduct, Mr. Duggan was the subject of a series of stories in the Telegram & Gazette three years ago detailing complaints from customers that he pocketed money intended for building supplies and then walked away from projects leaving them unfinished.He was sentenced to four months in jail for a larceny conviction in one of those cases.Mr. Duggan previously has served more than four years in federal prison for bank fraud and money laundering.In the days before he was to report to the Worcester Country jail to serve his sentence, Mr. Duggan said he called every influential friend he had — including Mr. Massad.Ms. Pruitt-Doncaster later returned to the point again, asking, “When you needed something done with the sheriff, you called Duddie?”“Yes,” Mr. Duggan said.Ms. Pruitt-Doncaster concluded her case yesterday afternoon.The hearing is scheduled to continue this morning with Mr. Kiley calling his witnesses.

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Bird & BirdNews CentreThe Conseil de la Concurrence dismisses AFORST complaint against France Télévisions and France Télécom The Conseil de la Concurrence dismisses AFORST complaint against France Télévisions and France Télécom Romain Ferla On 8 October 2007, the French Association for network operators and telecommunication services (AFORST) complained before the Competition Council about a partnership agreement between France Télévisions and France Télécom and exclusivity rights granted to France Télécom by France Télévisions to distribute some programs in “catch up TV” mode (which allows the viewing of pre-recorded TV programs during a short period of time after their broadcasting). AFORST argued that the exclusive agreement amounts to both an anticompetitive agreement and to an abuse of a dominant position on the market for “catch up TV” services. For AFORST, these practices restrain the effective and loyal competition between internet access providers. AFORST thus asked for a suspension of the agreement as an interim measure. The Competition Council dismissed the complaint of AFORST and the request for interim measures. It considered that the exclusive agreement cannot be seen as a violation of Article 81 EC, as there is no anticompetitive will of the undertakings concerned. It also considered that there was no convincing element likely to demonstrate any abuse of a dominant position on any relevant market.The Competition Council found in particular that the exclusivity was limited to some programmes (only the evening programmes excluding movies, news and sports) the duration of the exclusivity was not excessive and it responded to an economic logic. Indeed, for the consumers, the exclusive agreement allows the appearance of a new service (catch up TV) that France Télécom and France Télévisions are the only actors to offer, and all consumers have a possibility to get access to the programmes proposed by the catch up TV via an internet site.Nevertheless, the Council stressed that its decision rejecting the complaint concerns a very recent market and does not bar the opportunity, in the future, for AFORST or any undertaking of that sector to refer a new case to the Council in the occurrence of new elements or facts.Source: Decision of the Competition Council N° 08-D-10 of May 7, 08http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/08d10.pdf

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Calif. artist sues AP over image of Obama | Updated: Mon 4:19 PM, Feb 09, 2009 NEW YORK (AP) -- An artist who created a famous image of Barack Obama before he became president sued The Associated Press on Monday, asking a judge to find that his use of an AP photo in creating the poster did not violate copyright law. The lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court in Manhattan said street artist Shepard Fairey did not violate the copyright of the April 2006 photograph because he dramatically changed the nature of the image. The AP has said it is owed credit and compensation for the artist's rendition of the picture, taken by Mannie Garcia on assignment for the AP at the National Press Club in Washington. Lawyers for Fairey acknowledged that the artist used the photograph. But they said he transformed the literal depiction into a "stunning, abstracted and idealized visual image that creates powerful new meaning and conveys a radically different message." AP spokesman Paul Colford said the AP was "disappointed by the surprise filing." He said in a statement that the AP had agreed last week not to take legal action while it was in settlement talks, but that Fairey's attorney broke off contact Friday. Colford said the AP had indicated that any settlement would benefit a charitable fund that supports AP journalists worldwide who suffer personal loss from natural disasters and conflicts. "AP believes it is crucial to protect photographers, who are creators and artists. Their work should not be misappropriated by others," Colford said. The AP has not taken legal action against Fairey. But his lawsuit noted that the AP had threatened twice to sue Fairey, possibly as early as Tuesday, and that it considered all works that incorporate the imagery of the "Obama Hope" poster to be infringements of its copyrights. The lawsuit said the purpose of the photograph documented the day's events while Fairey's art, titled "Obama Progress" and "Obama Hope," was meant "to inspire, convince and convey the power of Obama's ideals, as well as his potential as a leader, through graphic metaphor." Fairey's image became popular on buttons, posters and Web sites. It showed a pensive Barack Obama looking upward. It was splashed in a Warholesque red, white and blue and underlined with the caption HOPE. The lawsuit noted that Fairey first began distributing his Obama images in early 2008 and that Obama thanked him in a Feb. 22 letter for his contribution to the presidential campaign. When asked Monday about AP's position, Fairey said: "It's a suppression of an artist's freedom of expression." His attorney advised him not to say anything else. The lawsuit was brought on Fairey's behalf by the Stanford Law School's Fair Use Project and a San Francisco-based law firm. "There should be no doubt about the legality of Fairey's work," said Anthony Falzone, executive director of the Fair Use Project. "He used the photograph for a purpose entirely different than the original, and transformed it dramatically." The lawsuit was filed on the same day that Fairey appeared in two different Boston courtrooms, where he pleaded not guilty to charges he tagged property with graffiti. He allegedly vandalized a Massachusetts Turnpike Authority building last month as part of one of his street art campaigns. Fairey also pleaded not guilty Monday to a charge of placing a poster on a Boston electrical box in September 2000. Boston police said he had failed to appear in court in the 9-year-old case days after his arrest. The 38-year-old Los Angeles resident was arrested Friday when he was in Boston for an event kicking off his exhibit at the Institute of Contemporary Art. At the time of the arrest, detectives were aware that Fairey had failed to appear in court in 2000, said Jake Wark, a spokesman for the Suffolk County district attorney's office. Fairey was ordered to return to court on the Boston charges for pre-trial hearings on March 10 and 11. "I'd love to be able to feel like the culture of Boston continues to encourage freedom of expression," Fairey said after Monday's hearings. "If that's not going to be the case, I'll deal with that." Associated Press writer Russell Contreras contributed to this report from Boston.

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Legislative Committee Considers Fairness Of N.C. Death Penalty Leave this field blankYour e-mail address:*Your friends e-mail addresses (comma separated):*Subject:*Message:*A friend wanted you to see this item from WRAL.com: http://wr.al/4Zu2Get a new codeAre you human?*You must enter the characters with black color that stand out from the other characters RALEIGH, N.C. — North Carolina's death penalty system is racially unfair, too broad, and too costly, witnesses told state lawmakers on Monday. Others, testifying before a House study committee, said the system is as fair as is humanly possible. In the coming months, the 20-member House Select Study Committee on Capital Punishment will sort through these and other issues related to the "accuracy and fairness" of North Carolina's death penalty. This includes prosecutorial misconduct and whether any innocent people may be on death row. "If the goal is to have a perfect system when humans are involved, I don't think you're going to meet that goal," C. Branson Vickory III, president of the N.C. Conference of District Attorneys, told the committee on Monday during its first meeting. He said changes to the death penalty system over the past decade have helped cut in half the annual number of capital cases. These changes include giving district attorneys more discretion on whether to seek the death penalty, prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded defendants, and more disclosure of evidence between attorneys. "Our role is not to convict, but to see that justice is done," said Vickory, who represents Wayne, Greene, and Lenoir counties. Others said the system appears to place a disproportionate number of minorities on death row. While whites make up about 70 percent of the state's general population, blacks represent nearly 13 percent, according to the 2000 U.S. Census. But about 55 percent of death row inmates are black while whites account for 35 percent of some 170 people on North Carolina's death row. Vickory said the racial makeup of death row inmates is close to the overall makeup of the prison population. He said a lack of education and poverty are to blame for the imbalance. Rep. Mickey Michaux, D-Durham, said he was "bothered" that district attorneys have the authority to decide whether to seek the death penalty. He suggested that power could be contributing to the racial disparity on death row. Experts said juries can differ greatly in their sentencing, even when the facts of a murder trial are similar. Superior Court Judge Narley Cashwell told the panel that he's presided over nearly identical murder trials that ended with different sentences. In a Johnston County trial, white defendants were sentenced to death. In Cumberland County, black defendants got life in prison. "I don't have an explanation," Cashwell said. Several speakers said North Carolina should consider narrowing the scope of its death penalty statute, which would further reduce the number of capital trials that often are later changed to lesser penalties. Committee members said they want more information on several issues, including the reversal rate of the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals -- which includes North Carolina -- in death penalty cases; how many people have been convicted of murder over the past 10-15 years; and the jury makeup in the state's capital cases. House Speaker Jim Black, D-Mecklenburg, created the committee when a bill seeking a two-year moratorium on carrying out executions during a death penalty study failed to reach a vote. Experts said they welcome the scrutiny the committee will provide. "Most debate has been on whether to have a death penalty or not instead of how to improve it," said Malcom Ray "Tye" Hunter Jr., executive director of the state's Indigent Defense Services, which provides legal representation to poor defendants. The General Assembly will take up the panel's recommendations next year. North Carolina has executed 39 people since the death penalty was reinstated in 1977. The 39th person to be executed -- a Rockingham County man, Kenneth Boyd, who was convicted for killing his wife and father-in-law -- also became the 1,000th inmate in the nation to be executed since the death penalty resumed 28 years ago. He died Dec. 2.

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Guns prohibition upheld; plan sponsor did not have to notify plan participants of feesharing arrangement; more. May 1, 2009 Page Content Enforceability of Guns Prohibition Depends on State Law Ramsey Winch Inc. v. C. Brad Henry, 10th Cir., No. 07-5166 (Feb. 18, 2009), and Plona v. UPS Inc., 6th Cir., No. 08-3512 (March 6, 2009).In February, the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals determined that Oklahoma laws supporting the right of individuals to possess firearms in locked vehicles on company property are not pre-empted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) and therefore are enforceable. That decision rested on the facts that the Oklahoma state statutes were instituted to regulate employees as members of the general public and not as workers and, therefore, that the statutes did not conflict with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards. Professional Pointer: While workplace safety should remain employers’ primary focus, remain alert to state and local laws and developing case law related to firearms to avoid liability for inadvertent violations.Courts that have addressed the issue of violence in the workplace have found gun-related incidents not to be "work-related" and have specifically recognized that an employer’s duty to maintain a safe workplace "does not extend to the abatement of dangers created by unforeseeable or unpreventable employee misconduct," according to the 10th Circuit.If gun-related violence is not within the ambit of the OSH Act, such workplace issues can be regulated by state or local laws. In fact, OSHA itself has stressed its deference to "other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to regulate workplace homicides." Further, OSHA has issued voluntary guidelines for employers seeking specifically to reduce the risk of workplace violence but has not promulgated any mandatory standards regarding those incidents.In an interesting follow-up in a separate case, the 6th Circuit addressed a similar issue from a different perspective and upheld an employer’s anti-firearm policy.In that case, an individual’s employment termination after the discovery of a firearm in his vehicle on company-controlled property was held not to have violated public policy, even though the state’s constitution guarantees citizens the right to bear arms.Gary Plona was fired from his job with United Parcel Service Inc. (UPS) in Cleveland after a firearm was found in his vehicle parked in a UPS-leased parking lot adjoining his workplace. UPS has a written policy prohibiting employees from possessing firearms while on company property or while conducting company business; the prohibition specifically includes UPS’ parking lots and customer sites. Plona had signed an acknowledgment form indicating that he was aware of that policy.In April 2006, sheriff’s deputies were in the process of conducting a search of cars in the parking lot after receiving a report of contraband in that area. A search dog identified Plona’s car as suspicious. While giving consent for a search of his car, Plona admitted that there was a firearm in that vehicle. There was, in fact, a .22 caliber Luger pistol under the front seat and an empty ammunition magazine in the glove box. Plona did not have a permit to carry a concealed weapon, nor had he registered the pistol.Ohio is an "at-will" employment state, meaning that an employer may fire an employee "for any cause, at any time whatsoever," even if termination violates certain employee rights. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has carved out an exception to that at-will employment doctrine when a firing contravenes public policy. In other words, an individual cannot be fired for reasons that would jeopardize a clear policy for the public good.Plona filed a lawsuit against UPS, alleging that he had been fired in violation of public policy—the right to bear arms embodied in Article I, Section 4, of the Ohio Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS, holding that Plona had not demonstrated that a clear public policy had been jeopardized by his termination.On appeal, the 6th Circuit upheld that decision, finding that Ohio does not, in fact, have a clear public policy with respect to the allowance of firearms at workplaces. In support of that holding, the court pointed out that at least one Ohio law specifically provides that employers may prohibit the presence of firearms on a private employer’s premises or property.While Plona attempted to prove that UPS’ reason for firing him was pretextual, the court pointed out that such a rationale simply goes to the fairness of the termination. Ohio’s at-will doctrine allows termination for any reason, fair or unfair. The real issue in this case is whether Plona’s termination was against a clear public policy, thereby making it illegal.The court found that UPS plainly was within its rights—as spelled out by Ohio law—to prohibit firearms in the workplace. Plona’s firing was not a violation of public policy, and dismissal of the case was appropriate. By Maria Greco Danaher, an attorney with the firm of Ogletree Deakins in Pittsburgh. Plan Sponsor Has No Duty to Disclose Sharing of FeesHecker v. Deere & Co., 7th Cir., No. 07-3605 & 08-1224 (Feb. 12, 2009). The sponsor of a 401(k) plan had no fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to notify plan participants of a fee-sharing arrangement between the plan trustee and its affiliated company, according to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Deere & Co. sponsors two 401(k)s for its employees. Fidelity Management Trust Co. serves as the trustee and record keeper for the plans, while Fidelity Management & Research Co. serves as the investment advisor for many of the mutual funds offered as investment options. Professional Pointer: ​Plan sponsors should take steps to minimize legal exposure such as ensuring that their summary plan descriptions and plan documents do not contain ambiguous or misleading language. The plans offer a variety of investment options. Plan participants decide how to allocate their contributions. Each mutual fund offered charges a fee, calculated as a percentage of assets the investor places with it. A class of plan participants sued Deere and the Fidelity defendants under ERISA, claiming that Fidelity Research unlawfully shared revenue from its mutual fund fees with Fidelity Trust to pay for administration of the 401(k)s. The plaintiffs alleged that Deere breached its fiduciary duty to participants by failing to inform them of the fee-sharing arrangement and by imprudently limiting investment options to Fidelity Research funds. The plaintiffs argued that the Fidelity defendants were "functional fiduciaries" who breached their duty to plan participants. The district court dismissed the claims, and the 7th Circuit affirmed. The Fidelity defendants were not "functional fiduciaries" and did not owe a duty to participants, according to the appeals court, because they did not exercise any discretionary authority over managing the plans. Although the 7th Circuit issued a favorable ruling on this matter, other circuits have yet to weigh in. By R. Alex Boals, an attorney with Kiesewetter Wise Kaplan Prather PLC in Memphis, Tenn. Fired Employee Alleges Libelous E-mailNoonan v. Staples Inc., 1st Cir., No. 07-2159 (Feb. 13, 2009). A company was entitled to deny the exercise of stock options and severance payments to an employee fired for cause, according to the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. It also held that truthful statements arguably published with "actual malice" can give rise to a libel lawsuit. Alan Noonan was a Staples sales director who traveled extensively for business and had to compile expense reports for business expenses. Auditors discovered an expense report in which Noonan had requested $1,622 in excess of what he spent. The auditors also found that Noonan had booked the travel through a noncompany travel agent and failed to submit all the required receipts. Professional Pointer: Pay attention to agreements that deny severance payments or other benefits to employees if they are fired for cause. The for-cause provision should be clearly defined so a fact-finder will have no question about its meaning. Staples fired Noonan. It sent him a letter stating that he had been terminated "for cause" for violating the travel and expense policy and code of ethics. Staples denied Noonan severance benefits and refused to allow him to exercise stock options, claiming that Noonan was ineligible because he had been fired for cause. The next day, a Staples executive vice president sent a mass e-mail to roughly 1,500 employees informing them that Noonan had been fired for violating the travel and expense policy. Noonan sued Staples; his complaint alleged: Breach of stock-option agreements.Breach of his severance agreement.Libel based on the mass e-mail. A district court granted summary judgment in favor of Staples. On appeal, the appeals court upheld summary judgment on the first two claims. In ruling on the severance-agreement claim, the appeals court concluded that the evidence showed Noonan failed to adhere to the code of ethics. The district court therefore had properly determined that Noonan forfeited his entitlement to severance. But the 1st Circuit reversed summary judgment for Staples on the libel claim and returned it to the district court for trial. By Amy Onder, general counsel of iXP Corp. in Cranbury, N.J.Web ExtrasSHRM web page: Legal Issues Area Become a SHRM Member Join/Renew Today

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2016-50/4330/en_head.json.gz/20148

UK criminal justice Justice on trial DNA search for miscarriages of justice Monday 4 May 2009 21.06 EDT First published on Monday 4 May 2009 21.06 EDT The head of the organisation that investigates alleged miscarriages of justice has ordered an urgent review of cases where DNA evidence is involved to find whether there are long-term prisoners whose innocence could now be scientifically proved. The decision comes as one of the country's leading civil rights lawyers claims that there are now as many miscarriage of justice victims behind bars as there were in the 70s and 80s. Richard Foster, the chair of the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), told the Guardian that developments in the gathering of scientific evidence have implications for cases dating back many years. He has asked the Crown Prosecution Service to review all such cases. "Progress in science means you are able to go back and revisit cases – Sean Hodgson [released earlier this year having served 27 years for murder after his innocence was proved through DNA testing] is a very good example of that," said Foster, "But scientific understanding and certainty can actually shift – in cot deaths, for example – and you can also get the issue of the correct understanding of scientific evidence. You need to be sure it's been explained properly to the jury." Considering whether there are other Sean Hodgsons in the prison system, he said: "We have started a review of our cases to check that out and I have written to Keir Starmer [the director of public prosecutions] asking him to check." Foster was speaking on the eve of the launch of a new series on the Guardian's website, Justice on Trial, which will look at alleged miscarriages of justice. He also said he wanted to reach the many prisoners who may be illiterate, inarticulate or with learning difficulties and who may be unaware of how to claim their innocence. "What we know about most people in prison is that they have quite limited education. Many of them can't read or write," he said. Currently, the CCRC requires prisoners to write to them, something many of them may be unable to do. "We also know that the prisons are under considerable pressure," Foster added, "so I want to investigate whether there are ways to make it easier for people who want to approach us to do so." Foster believes there may be ­others who, like Sean Hodgson, confessed to crimes they did not commit. "We are understanding better that you do get people who, for psychological reasons, confess to things they didn't do. That has just reinforced us in the view that, if you've got a case that turns largely on confession evidence, you've got to look very carefully at it." The number of applications to the CCRC, which has the power to refer cases back to the court of appeal, remains fairly constant at about 1,000 a year. Of these, only 2.7% were successful last year, the lowest proportion ever. Foster said that was "a blip" and the figure this year is 4.1%. Campbell Malone, the lawyer whose work largely led to the release of Stefan Kiszko, said he believed there were a large number of innocent people in prison. "I believe we have a government that is positively hostile to the notion of miscarriages of justice," he said. "It would seem to be of the view that it would be better for the odd person to spend their life in prison for a crime they did not commit than to have the inconvenience of it being exposed." He added that there were "just as many" such cases now as in the 70s and 80s. The cases that first prompted serious concern involved the Birmingham six and the Guildford four, both during a period when the IRA was active in Britain. Foster said there were similar concerns today. "Where there is intense pressure – public, political pressure – in a particular case and around terror, there is always the risk that safeguards that should be in place won't be applied as they should be," he said. "You have always got to pause if someone continues to say they're innocent, either when they're in prison or, more pointedly, if they're in prison and ruling themselves out of early release because they're not acknowledging their guilt. I think any sensible person is going to pause on that and say – well, why?" Foster said he did have "3am moments" as to whether one of the 95% of applications that are screened out and not reinvestigated by the CCRC might be a miscarriage of justice. "I worry about that – and anybody who works in criminal justice who doesn't ought to think about whether they made the right choice of career." DNA database UK civil liberties Prisons and probation Dear Jacqui, please keep my DNA for as long as you like Jonathan Myerson Jonathan Myerson: I just don't see how a DNA database could limit my liberties. It holds harmless information that could bring great benefit 'It's like being buried alive' Since the 1980s and 90s a flow of miscarriage of justice cases has undermined public confidence in the criminal justice system. John Kamara, Paddy Hill and Sean Hodgson describe their experiences of wrongful conviction Justice on trial: an opening statement Justice on trial aims to highlight cases where there are major concerns of a miscarriage of justice. Duncan Campbell, Eric Allison and Simon Jeffery explain why Miscarriages of justice: Project innocence Editorial: There could be as many wrongly convicted people in prison today as a quarter of a century ago The miscarriage of justice cases that came to light years later A lesson paid for in innocent lives – and it's not over yet Miscarriages of justice

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2016-50/4330/en_head.json.gz/20212

YOU ARE HERE: LAT Home→Collections→HandicappedWarrior for the Disabled : Brenda Premo Fought on the Front Line to Help Win Landmark Rights BillJuly 25, 1990|HERMAN WONG | TIMES STAFF WRITER Brenda Premo--former teen-age "troublemaker," longtime activist and now troop commander in the disabled-rights movement--has an appointment on the South Lawn of the White House on Thursday morning.She will be joining congressional leaders, administration officials and scores of other activists as President Bush signs the landmark Americans With Disabilities Act, a sweeping piece of legislation that protects the physically and mentally disabled from discrimination in jobs, transportation and public access.As it was being passed overwhelmingly by both houses of Congress two weeks ago, the bill drew the highest praise from Bush and Capitol Hill leaders, who called it the "declaration of independence" for the disabled.And Premo, like others who have relentlessly sought such legislation for years, admits to being just a little stunned as well as elated by it all."Believe me, we have come a long, long way to get here," said Premo, 38, sitting in her executive director's office at the Dayle McIntosh Center for the Disabled, an Anaheim-based service and advocacy organization run largely by the disabled.Premo's credentials for attending the historic signing are more than appropriate.An impassioned, outspoken advocate, she is a member of the National Council on Disability, the advisory panel appointed by the President that has been a driving force behind the rights legislation since it was first officially proposed to Congress in 1986.As executive director of the McIntosh center, a privately operated organization funded with both public and private money, Premo will be playing a key local role in assuring that the new federal law's provisions--many of which are certain to be controversial--are carried out.And like so many others with disabilities, Premo--who is legally blind, has albinism and who as a child was considered retarded--can tell stories of a life spent facing enormous odds and combating stigma, ignorance and isolation.It is not surprising, then, that beneath all the euphoria and ceremonial flourishes of Thursday's White House signing, activists such as Premo still see a disturbing, even ominous, dichotomy in American society."On one hand, we have just passed a monumental bill that says people with disabilities have equal rights, equal protection," she said. "On the other hand, you still have situations where funds for the most crucial kinds of programs are being cut out from under the very people who are going to get those rights."It's like telling people, 'That's OK, we will provide just enough basic services to keep you alive, but we will give you nothing for your dignity, for your independence, for a true quality of life.' "The latest example of such "disastrous cutbacks," Premo noted, is right here in California.As a cost-cutting measure, Gov. George Deukmejian had proposed cutting from next year's budget $5.2 million in previously allocated funds for supporting 25 "independent living centers" for the disabled, the first such cut since the state first helped form the centers in 1979. (Negotiations between the governor and the Legislature are now at an impasse.)Premo and other directors of the program believed such a cut would be devastating for the still relatively small network. Half of the centers would be closed, they said, and services would be drastically reduced at the others, including the Dayle McIntosh, which would face a 30% cut in its budget for next year.Although the governor later announced that he was no longer proposing such a cut, the whole incident, Premo said, emphasized the precarious state of many existing programs for the disabled--and also the probable clashes ahead when new programs are established under the new federal law."The (rights) act is a landmark victory for us, no doubt about that. But," Premo added, sounding like someone already gearing up for the next battle, "obviously, we have yet to win the war."Long before she formally enlisted in the disabled-rights movement, which she did in her 20s, Brenda Premo was fighting her own private war.When she was a young girl, Premo said, "they kept me separated in special-education classes. They treated me like I was retarded, like they had nothing but the lowest of expectations for me. The thinking was that only they knew what was good for me." Premo was born with 10% vision because of her albinism and a damaged optic nerve. She is a Long Beach native who lived in various parts of Los Angeles and Orange Counties as she was growing up."My brains aren't in my eyes. Yet somehow, if you have a disability, they think of you only as someone who is so incapable, so helpless. But I wasn't going to lie down and give up, and say: 'OK, system, take care of me. You owe it to me,' " Premo said.1 | 2 | 3 | Next MORE:Seizure Led to FloJo's DeathHis 104 scores make his caseRestaurant review: South Beverly GrillBrutal Murder by Teen-Age Girls Adds to Britons' ShockComaneci Confirms Suicide Attempt, Magazine SaysAdvertisement FROM THE ARCHIVESInsurers are scouring social media for evidence of fraudJanuary 25, 2011Answers about VA's new stress-disorder policyJuly 13, 2010Financial advice for a widowMarch 28, 2010MORE STORIES ABOUTHandicappedUnited States -- LawsBlindnessBrenda PremoCopyright 2016 Los Angeles TimesTerms of Service|Privacy Policy|Index by Date|Index by Keyword

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J.D. Salinger copyright case to be reconsidered Fri Apr 30, 2010 3:04pm EDT Email This Article | Share This Article NEW YORK (Reuters) - A lawsuit blocking publication of a purported "sequel" to J.D. Salinger's classic novel "The Catcher in the Rye" will be reconsidered in federal court, but Salinger's trustees are likely to prevail, an appeals court ruled Friday. The unauthorized spin-off, "60 Years Later: Coming through the Rye," was barred from publication in the United States after Salinger -- who died in January at age 91 -- last year sued its Swedish author Fredrik Colting, who writes under the name J.D. California. Colting's book is already available in other countries including Britain, where it is labeled on its cover as a sequel to "The Catcher in the Rye." In July, a judge in Manhattan federal court blocked the publication of Colting's book. Friday, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals sent the case back to the federal court to determine whether Salinger's trust will suffer irreparable harm from the publication of Colting's book. But in its ruling, the appeals court made clear it expected Salinger's trust to prevail. "Most of the matters relevant to Salinger's likelihood of success on the merits are either undisputed or readily established in his favor," the court ruled. Salinger, a famous recluse whose 1951 novel is considered one of the great works of American literature, never submitted any deposition in the case. The book is a first-person narrative that relates teen-ager Holden Caulfield's experiences in New York City after being expelled from an elite school. Colting's book begins with a character called Mr. C leaving a retirement home 60 years later. Both books end near a carousel in Central Park. Colting's lawyers argued the book was literary commentary or parody.

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Latest Influencers Fashion Business Runway FN Spy Focus Women’s Men’s Children Athletic & Outdoor Opinion & Analysis FN HomeBusinessNews Insiders Sound Off on Louboutin/YSL Lawsuit By Jordan / April 8, 2011 Share This Article Yves Saint Laurent's Palais pump It’s a high-fashion legal battle. After failing to persuade Yves Saint Laurent to remove its red-soled shoes from store shelves, Christian Louboutin SA is suing the French fashion label for trademark infringement. And fashion lawyers are watching the lawsuit, filed Thursday in a federal court in Manhattan, with great interest. Touting it as a “clash of the titans,” law experts said the litigation could drag on for months, although it would be surprising not to see it settled out of court at the end of the day. Christian Louboutin is alleging that Yves Saint Laurent America Inc. is selling shoes with red soles that are “virtually identical” to its signature styles, thereby violating its trademark for the footwear. Charles Colman, an intellectual property rights attorney at New York-based Charles Colman Law, said litigation between the firms could potentially go on for a long time, because “when you’re dealing with two large parties, both of which have large and skilled law firms working for them, you don’t have that leverage differential that you may have in other situations.” He added: “It’s also less likely that one party is going to be able to run the other one into the ground with the cost of litigation.” The shoes in question, with style names such as Tribute, Palais and Woodstock, have a colored suede upper and colored soles of an identical shade. Online research by FN showed that the named YSL styles in the suit come not just in red, with red soles, but also in green, with green soles, and purple, with purple soles. They also are offered in tan and black. Both companies sell their shoes side by side in high-end fashion stores, including Saks Fifth Avenue, Barneys New York and Bergdorf Goodman, and Louboutin’s complaint stated that the “defendants’ use of a red sole on their infringing footwear threatens to mislead the public, and has impaired plaintiffs’ ability to control their reputation.” According to court documents, Louboutin was awarded a registered trademark for its red sole by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in 2008, and now seeks a court injunction against YSL’s sale of its shoes, as well as damages of at least $1 million. Louboutin’s lawyer, Harley Lewin of McCarter & English, told FN that Louboutin first notified YSL of its alleged infringement in January, but its executives replied by letter that they planned to “continue to sell the infringing footwear.” “We’ve fought long and hard over this one. [The suit comes after] efforts to resolve [the issue] amicably between the parties in Paris. Those discussions broke down, and Louboutin moved forward with its litigation,” said Lewin. “It’s an issue from the point of view of Louboutin because [the red sole] is a core mark of the company and it simply can’t, regardless of who’s on the other side, let its mark get in the hands of others,” Lewin added. Professor Susan Scafidi, academic director of the Fashion Law Institute at Fordham Law School, said because the complaint has just been filed, YSL likely has not had a chance to file its reply. “My educated guess for what their best possible argument would be is ‘aesthetic functionality,’ which involves saying, ‘It’s not that we were copying the trademark, we just had a red shoe and wanted it to be all red,’” said Scafidi. “It’s not clear to me if that’s a winning argument in this case, but it’s about the only route that they have to make a plausible defense,” she added. Scafidi also said that the suit likely was brought in the U.S. — despite both companies having French roots — because “there is a possibility for higher damages here.” But she added it is unlikely the case will go to trial. “Sometimes it’s through a clash of the titans, like this one, that some of the most interesting law is made,” she added. Louboutin has successfully obtained injunctions in Manhattan courts against companies attempting to replicate its red-sole success, most recently in February against Kimera International, which was found to have “engaged in acts of trademark counterfeiting, trademark infringement, unfair competition/false designation of origin and trademark dilution.” — Sign up for the FN Newsletter — Business, News, Barneys New York Inc., Christian Louboutin, Saks Inc., Yves Saint Laurent, North America, Companies, People & Companies, regions Share This Article ← Clarks to Build U.S. Logistics CenterFN Picks: Lego My Stiletto… FitFlops for South Africa… → Leave a Reply Cancel reply Enter your comment here...

法律

2016-50/4330/en_head.json.gz/20436

| People v. Scott People v. Scott PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,v.WALTER SCOTT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Criminal Division; the Hon. NATHAN M. COHEN, Judge, presiding. Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. In a jury trial, defendant, Walter Scott, was found guilty of burglary and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 5 to 10 years. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) he was deprived of his constitutional rights in that incriminating statements obtained by the arresting officers without advising him of his constitutional right to counsel were introduced as evidence, and in that his trial counsel was unprepared and inadequate to defend him; (2) he was erroneously denied a change of venue; (3) prejudicial trial errors were committed; and (4) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. On June 24, 1963, when James A. Stolp returned to his apartment at 7243 South Jeffery Avenue, Chicago, he found the back door was open, and it had several broken glass panes. There were glass splinters in the door and pieces of glass held together with white surgical tape lay on the floor. The apartment had been ransacked, and two cameras, two camera lenses, a suitcase, and $100 in currency were taken. An investigating police officer, Edward Willett, on June 25, 1963, took pictures of fingerprints found on the glass on the floor. Later, on July 3, 1963, Joseph Mortimer of the police crime laboratory determined that the fingerprints found in the apartment were identical with the fingerprints of Walter Scott. With this information, Officers Wielosinski, Dooley and Ormond, without obtaining an arrest warrant, went to 1415 East 73rd Street, where Walter Scott was staying with the Walter Young family. They arrived at the Young apartment at about 1:00 p.m. on July 3, where they were informed by Mrs. Young that Scott was at work. The three police officers remained in the vicinity of the apartment until 3:00 a.m. on July 4, when Scott appeared and was arrested. After being placed in custody, a satchel he was carrying was examined, and it contained barber equipment and white surgical tape. Two of the arresting officers testified that he admitted the burglary and told them he had pawned one of the cameras. He produced a pawn ticket and gave it to them. When they arrived at the police station, he told them that the other camera was at a friend's house. The policemen went with him to the home of his friend and obtained a camera. On July 5, the policemen went to the pawn shop and in return for the pawn ticket given to them by the defendant, they received a second camera. At the trial, both cameras were identified by Stolp and received in evidence. Defendant testified on direct examination that he was a licensed barber and a licensed beautician, and that he had been previously convicted of a felony. He denied that he committed the burglary and theft with which he was charged and stated that the police officers were lying when they said they had received a pawn shop ticket from him or that he had admitted "that I burglarized this particular home." He further testified: "On the night that I was picked up I had white adhesive tape in my bag. I recall getting into the car with three officers and having a conversation with them. I gave them a ticket pertaining to a watch repair and a receipt for $4. . . . It is not a fact that I gave them a pawn ticket. . . . I gave them the watch ticket because that is all I had in my possession. They wanted to check it out to see if it was stolen. They questioned me about items they claimed were stolen from Mr. Stolp's apartment. They told me that some cameras had been taken. They asked me if I owned any cameras. I owned one camera which I bought. I am saying that I bought this camera. I bought it from James Thomas. I don't know where he is today. . . . I paid $35 for the camera. This camera was obtained at the apartment of Mr. O'Neill. I took the Police Officers over to this apartment to get the camera. Mr. Lucius O'Neill appeared at the window and handed the camera down that I had left there." Defendant stated further that he bought the camera to use in his business to advertise, and he had left it at Mr. O'Neill's apartment because "we had just `came' from the beach." We consider first defendant's contention of deprivation of his constitutional rights. Initially, he contends that "under the circumstances here presented, the use at trial of a confession obtained by systematic interrogation after arrest without any warning to the defendant of his right to remain silent deprived him of his Fifth Amendment rights. We [defendant's counsel] also contend that the effect of that confession obtained without warning of his rights to counsel and to remain silent, combined with the trial court's refusal to afford defendant effective trial counsel after he had informed the Court of his counsel's unpreparedness deprived him of his Sixth Amendment rights." It is not disputed that defendant was never informed by the police officers, during his initial police interrogation or at any other time, of his right to remain silent or of his right to the advice or assistance of counsel, nor is it disputed that defendant made no request for the assistance of counsel during his initial police interrogation. The testimony of the two arresting officers as to the admission of the burglary was received without objection on behalf of the defendant, and he testified the officers were lying. Although the confession issue was not raised at the trial level, and defendant denies making any confession, we have considered this contention on appeal. The cases cited by defendant in support of this contention include Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, and People v. Dorado, 40 Cal Rptr 264, 394 P.2d 952. We have considered defendant's authorities, but we believe the pronouncements made in People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill.2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964), are controlling here. A failure to warn the accused does not compel a rejection of his confession of guilt. As said at page 379: "[It] is an attendant circumstance `which the accused is entitled to have appropriately considered in determining voluntariness and admissibility of his confession.' 373 US at 517. . . . Page 380: "We do not, however, read the Escobedo case as requiring the rejection of a voluntary confession because the State did not affirmatively caution the accused of his right to have an attorney and his right to remain silent before his admissions of guilt. ". . . It must be noted that neither the petition to suppress nor defendant's testimony at the hearing on the petition raised any suggestion that his confessions were induced by a promise of leniency. This question arose only after an extensive cross-examination of one of the police officers, in which he admitted that he told the defendant, `It would go easier for him in court if he made a statement.' This is in no way the direct promise of leniency made in People v. Heide, 302 Ill. 624. Such a mere suggestion of the advisability of making a statement does not in itself render a confession involuntary. People v. Pugh, 409 Ill. 584, 593; People v. Weber, 401 Ill. 584, 598." The foregoing pronouncements of our Supreme Court were buttressed in People v. Kees, 32 Ill.2d 299, 302, 205 N.E.2d 729 (1965): "This court, however, in People v. Hartgraves, . . . has aligned itself with those courts which have construed Escobedo to be limited to the peculiar facts of the case, and have rejected it as promulgating the sweeping rule that a confession may not be received if made by an accused without counsel, or unless the right to counsel has been intelligently waived." Examining the circumstances of the making of defendant's alleged confession, we find no evidence of coercion or any promise of leniency, and none is charged. A reading of the entire record indicates by overwhelming weight of the evidence that defendant voluntarily confessed to the burglary when, as testified to by one of the police officers, they "told him that we had fingerprints that put him on the scene of the burglary." We find no error here. Defendant's next constitutional contention is the "denial of effective and prepared trial counsel." The record indicates defendant selected his own attorney, and that she had appeared numerous times in his behalf prior to the commencement of the instant trial. During the second day of the trial, at 2:00 P.M. on January 21, 1964, defendant's attorney informed the court that she had not received compensation, and at her request the court appointed her "nunc pro tunc as of January 2, 1964," to represent defendant so that she might receive compensation for her services. The record further shows that on the morning of January 21, 1964, at the opening of the second day of the trial and before the presentation of any evidence, defendant stated to the court, "I would like to relieve my lawyer in this case, because we can't seem to come to any agreement as far as my defense is concerned. . . . I would like to be appointed a Bar Association attorney." After some discussion between the court and the defendant, the request was denied. The remarks of the court include, "You have counsel here who is dedicated to her defense, who is specially able and experienced. This Court has heard her conduct the defense of a client in a very serious trial the Court just concluded. . . . You didn't indicate yesterday before we began to select the jury, that you weren't ready. . . . Not at this stage of the proceedings. Your motion is denied." The State argues that this request was made too late because it was made "after the preliminary hearing on the Motion to Suppress the Physical Evidence, after numerous appearances by his private counsel, after a Motion to Dismiss was argued and denied, after the defendant himself said he answered ready for trial every time he was in court except September 20th, 1963, after the defendant elected to be tried by a jury, after the defendant, through his attorney, answered ready for trial on January 20, 1964, and after the selection and impanelling of a jury by his trial counsel." To show the incompetency of his counsel, defendant asserts that she failed to call six witnesses in his behalf, and "she was so dismally prepared as to be unable to effectively defend him." Defendant also complains that his "court-imposed attorney repeatedly flagged his prior conviction of a `similar' burglary," and "it was not altogether clear which side defendant's `trial counsel' was on." We have carefully scrutinized this record, and we believe it amply demonstrates that defendant's counsel was professionally competent and prepared for his defense. The calling of witnesses and the bringing out of a prior conviction are questions of trial tactics and strategy, and not all attorneys agree on trial strategy. As said in People v. Stephens, 6 Ill.2d 257, 259, 128 N.E.2d 731 (1955): "Where a defendant in a criminal case employs counsel of his own choice, his judgment of conviction will not be reversed merely because his counsel failed to exercise the greatest skill or for the reason that it might appear, in looking back over the trial, that he had made some tactical blunder." Also, as said in People v. Jones, 51 Ill. App.2d 391, 394, 201 N.E.2d 194 (1964): "Such motions must be presented at the earliest practical moment. . . . To hold otherwise would be to advance no theory of public policy while causing chaos to reign in the courtroom." We find no cause for reversal here. Defendant further contends that he was denied a change of venue to which he was entitled as a matter of right. Defendant argues that "an application for a change of venue because of prejudice can be made on the day the case is called for trial, even though the defendant has previously announced his readiness to proceed, provided the knowledge of prejudice first came to the defendant on that day. People v. McGlothen, 26 Ill.2d 392, 186 N.E.2d 319." The record shows that on January 20, the day the case was called for trial, the court heard extended arguments and denied defendant's motion for dismissal under the Fourth Term Statute. Defendant's attorney then answered ready for trial, and twelve jurors were "accepted by counsel for the State and the Defense, whereupon said cause was adjourned until 10:00 o'clock a.m. the following day, Tuesday, January 21, 1964." On the following morning, January 21, 1964, and after defendant's motion for a "Bar Association attorney" was denied, defendant stated, "Your Honor, I just don't want to be tried in this court. I want a change of venue," and the court replied, "That comes too late. That will be denied. . . . Your motion for a change of venue is untimely. We will proceed. Call the jury." When the jury was brought into the courtroom, the clerk informed the judge that the jurors had been sworn. One of the attorneys said, "All twelve were not sworn, Judge," and the court thereupon directed the twelve jurors be sworn to try the issues in the cause. As said in People v. Kostos, 21 Ill.2d 451, 173 N.E.2d 469 (1961), our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the venue provisions should receive a liberal rather than a strict construction, "and should be construed to promote rather than to defeat an application for a change of venue, particularly where prejudice on the part of the judge is charged." Also, as said in People v. McGlothen, 26 Ill.2d 392, 186 N.E.2d 319 (1962): "The right to a change of venue is absolute, provided that the requirements of the statute are met." However, we are of the opinion that neither of these cases is controlling here because the factual situations are not the same. In the Kostos case, the petition for change of venue was filed on December 28, 1959, and alleged that the petitioner had learned of the prejudice of the trial judge against him on December 21, 1959. The petition was denied on the basis of the court's ruling "that since the alleged prejudice was known to counsel on December 9, the application for change of venue was not filed in apt time" (p 453). The Supreme Court held that the acquired knowledge of the alleged prejudice came to the "knowledge of the applicant," the defendant, on December 21 and therefore the petition of December 28 was filed in apt time. In the McGlothen case, defendant informed the court that he wanted a bench trial, and the court announced that the case would be held on call. After a short recess, defendant's counsel informed the court that defendant had just learned facts indicating that the judge was prejudiced against him and requested that the defendant be granted a change of venue. The Supreme Court held (p 394): ". . . where the defendant stated that knowledge of the prejudice came to him during the recess, the actual filing of the motion in open court was the only notice possible, and was reasonable under the circumstances." In the case at bar, the motion for change of venue was not presented until after twelve jurors had been accepted by both sides. Although the jurors were passed upon and accepted in panels of four on January 20, 1964, there appears to be a question as to whether the entire jury was sworn at that time to try the issues. However, the point at which the jury was sworn to try the issues is not determinative of defendant's contention. His trial commenced when the jury was called into the jury box for examination as to its qualifications, and defendant's motion for change of venue came too late because the trial had begun. (Wilhite v. Agbayani, 2 Ill. App.2d 29, 33, 118 N.E.2d 440 (1954); People v. Poole, 284 Ill. 39, 40, 119 NE 916 (1918); 88 CJS, Trial, § 2, p 21). We hold that the denial of the change of venue by the trial court was correct. [9-13] Defendant next contends that "all evidence obtained incident to defendant's unconstitutional arrest should have been excluded." Defendant asserts that at 1:00 p.m. on July 3, 1963, the three police officers went to Walter Scott's residence and learned that he was at work a short distance away, and the "three detectives spent the next 14 hours drinking coffee in Scott's apartment and resting in front of the building in which Scott lived. At no time during this protracted period did any one of the three go to Scott's place of employment. Nor did any one of them make an attempt to obtain a warrant for Walter Scott's arrest." The State points out, "There was no trial objection to the admission of this evidence and of testimony of the officers at the time of trial. It is elementary that a review on this ground should be denied." We agree, but we have considered this point and believe that the pronouncements in People v. Jones, 31 Ill.2d 240, 243, 201 N.E.2d 402 (1964), apply here: "The test, therefore, is not whether it was reasonable or practicable for the officers to obtain a search warrant, but whether the search was unreasonable. It is well established that a search without a warrant is reasonable and valid if it is incident to a lawful arrest and there is no requirement that the arrest be under the authority of an arrest warrant. (Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41, 83 S Ct 1623, 10 L Ed2d 726.) In turn, the validity of an arrest without a warrant depends upon whether the officers had reasonable cause to believe that an offense had been committed and that the defendant had committed it. (People v. Jones, 16 Ill.2d 569, 573.)" We find no error here — an offense had been committed and the officers had reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had committed it. Defendant next contends that "it was prejudicial error for the State's Attorney to ask defendant about his previous convictions and to characterize him as `a burglar.'" Defendant's counsel, in her opening statement and in her final argument, and defendant, on his direct examination, stated that defendant had been convicted of a prior felony. We conclude that the alleged errors were not prejudicial because the defendant deliberately opened the door in this area. See People v. Nastasio, 30 Ill.2d 51, 58, 195 N.E.2d 144 (1963); People v. Woodley, 57 Ill. App.2d 380, 206 N.E.2d 743 (1965). We consider finally defendant's contention that there was insufficient evidence to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. There is substantial evidence in this record to sustain defendant's conviction of burglary. The fingerprints found at the scene of the burglary and the fruits of the burglary recovered by the police from information given them by the defendant are substantial evidence and are corroborated by the testimony of credible witnesses. Although defendant denies the confession of the burglary, we believe it was within the jury's province to determine the credibility of the police officers and to accept what testimony they believed and reject what testimony they did not believe. People v. Garcia, 52 Ill. App.2d 481, 487, 488, 202 N.E.2d 269 (1964). Our review of this record satisfies us that defendant's guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error. For the reasons given, the judgment of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County is affirmed. BURMAN, P.J. and KLUCZYNSKI, J., concur.

法律

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| Scuderi v. Industrial Com. Scuderi v. Industrial Com. OPINION FILED NOVEMBER 22, 1978. PHILLIP J. SCUDERI, APPELLANT,v.THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL. — (BOROS RELIABLE ERECTORS, INC., APPELLEE.) MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARD DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT: The claimant, Phillip Scuderi, sustained accidental injuries on March 4, 1974, while employed as a millwright by the respondent, Boros Reliable Erectors, Inc. An arbitrator for the Industrial Commission found he was entitled to compensation for 10 weeks of temporary total incapacity, 25% permanent loss of use of both legs, and 15% permanent loss of use of his right arm. The Commission increased the award for temporary total incapacity to 16 weeks, but set aside that portion of the award for partial permanent loss of use of the claimant's legs and right arm. The circuit court of Cook County confirmed the award as amended, and the claimant appealed directly to this court under our Rule 302(a) (58 Ill.2d R. 302(a)). The claimant was injured when a steel conveyor weighing approximately one ton slid across his back as he was working on a mail chute installation. One of the conveyor's angle irons deeply lacerated the flesh and muscle of the lower left portion of his back, causing the claimant to fall to the cement floor and strike his right arm and elbow on the ground. After a company nurse had bandaged the claimant's back wound, he was rushed to the hospital where he underwent immediate surgery. He had two subsequent surgical procedures to aid the healing of the wound, the final one as an outpatient. The only question presented is whether the Commission's finding, which reversed the arbitrator's award for partial permanent loss of use of the claimant's legs and right arm, is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (There is no dispute over the claimant's increased award for temporary total incapacity.) The claimant argues that his own testimony before the arbitrator, coupled with that of his medical expert, compels the conclusion that he suffered residual disability of his legs and right arm, and that the medical testimony of the respondent's three witnesses was insufficient to overcome that conclusion. The claimant testified before the arbitrator that he is troubled by cramps after driving for more than 15 minutes, and that it is difficult for him to step out of an automobile. He tires after work and when walking up the stairs of his home. His back frequently cramps up and he suffers from numbness in the back of his legs and knees. He said he has constant pain in his right elbow and arm. On cross-examination, he testified that his right arm was not put in a cast or sling, and that he had not been given a back brace, traction, whirlpool treatments, shoelifts, tests or other physiotherapy for his arm or legs during his 20-day hospitalization or following his release. With the exception of several periods when he did not work, for which he received the award for temporary total incapacity, the claimant continued working full-time as a supervisor, millwright, or welder for the respondent and other employers on various jobs obtained through his union. At the time of the arbitrator's hearing, the claimant was working eight hours a day, five days a week, at a construction site as a welder. He was able to drive his own automobile between his home and the job site, a 35-minute trip each way. Dr. Robert Busch, a specialist in industrial medicine and surgery, testified on behalf of the claimant, whom he had examined twice. His conclusion was that there was "impaired motility of both arms" and "weakness and stiffness of the right leg," conditions which he judged to be permanent and causally related to the accident. The witness did not note any impairment of the claimant's left leg. On cross-examination, however, he testified that the claimant's pain was a subjective response, that his sensations and reflexes had tested normally in both arms and legs, and that there was no evidence of atrophy, or wasting of the extremities. He said he had not reviewed the claimant's hospital records or consulted with the claimant's treating physician or other doctors who had also examined the claimant. The respondent offered evidence from three physicians, two of whom had initially been the claimant's physicians. Dr. Robert Emanuele, who alone had treated the claimant, testified for the respondent that all treatment given the claimant was directed to the area of his laceration, with the exception of unspecified treatment to the right leg because he had complained of pain as the result of the injury. He testified that there was no evidence of neurological involvement in either leg or arm, no evidence of injury to the spinal column, and that the claimant had not complained of pain in his arms. His testimony incorporated the findings of Dr. George Hallenbeck, the roentgenologist who had interpreted the claimant's hospital X rays. Dr. Daniel Grizadas, an orthopedic surgeon, had conducted an examination at the request of the claimant's attorney. He testified for the respondent that the usual tests produced negative findings, and that there was no evidence of neurological involvement of the lower extremities. There were no symptoms of loss of use of the claimant's arms, the witness testified. He stated that certain degenerative changes of the spine were, in his opinion, compatible with the claimant's age and body structure, although they could have been aggravated by trauma. The respondent also introduced the report of its physician, Dr. Clarence Zurfli, which tended to substantiate the testimony offered by Drs. Emanuele and Grizadas. The testimony of the claimant and the expert witnesses relating to the existence, extent and permanency of any injuries to the claimant's legs and right arm was in part conflicting. Questions of fact, including the resolution of conflicts in medical testimony, are within the province of the Industrial Commission (Long v. Industrial Com. (1976), 62 Ill.2d 289, 292; Seay v. Industrial Com. (1976), 62 Ill.2d 241, 244), even where the Commission's findings differ from those of the arbitrator and no further evidence has been taken by the Commission (Crane v. Industrial Com. (1974), 57 Ill.2d 158, 164). The Commission's decision will not be disturbed by a court unless it can be said to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, although the court might have drawn other inferences from it. (C.S.T. Erection Co. v. Industrial Com. (1975), 61 Ill.2d 251, 257; Chicago Transit Authority v. Industrial Com. (1975), 61 Ill.2d 78, 85; Martinez v. Industrial Com. (1974), 59 Ill.2d 258, 260.) We cannot say the Commission's finding here was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and accordingly we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County confirming that finding.

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SCOTUSblog Volokh Conspiracy The Wall Street Journal's Law Blog « Associated Press Clashes With Bloggers | | Another Ethics Ruling on Metadata » ABA Recognizes Lawyer's Pro Bono Work Victor J. Garo, the Massachusetts lawyer who devoted nearly three decades of pro bono work to help clear his client's name, will be honored by the American Bar Association with its Edmund S. Muskie Pro Bono Service Award. Garo represented Joseph Salvati, one of four men who were framed for a 1965 gangland murder and spent decades in prison. In 2001, Garo helped bring about a dismissal of all charges against Salvati. Last year, he was lead counsel for a team of lawyers who won the largest award ever against the U.S. government in a wrongful imprisonment case -- $101.7 million. The ABA's Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section will present Garo with the award during the ABA annual meeting in New York City Aug. 10. TIPS Chair Peter Bennett of Portland, Maine, called Garo's dedication to pro bono work unparalleled. "In the Joseph Salvati case, he invested more than 30,000 hours of pro bono time to right a wrong and to uncover the government’s cover up of a public injustice of epic proportion. His commitment to the rule of law and service above self are examples for all lawyers to follow." Garo's work has already won him a number of honors, including Boston University School of Law's first Victor J. Garo Public Service Award and selection by Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly as one of the 35 most influential Massachusetts lawyers and judges of the last 35 years. Posted by Robert J. Ambrogi on June 18, 2008 at 11:54 AM | Permalink

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Delaying Judgment House Majority Leader Tom DeLay says the federal judiciary needs to be reined in. Montana District Judge Don Molloy isn’t taking the bait. Certain positions in public life demand respect, whether that respect takes the form of reverence or fear. Religious leaders stationed behind the pulpit call up those feelings for some. Police officers, in their distinctive cars and unmistakable uniforms, are sure to invoke strong feelings in nearly every American. But above all, a black-robed judge commands awe. Judges are mysterious figures to most lay people, and many Americans probably don’t know the names of their local jurists. Yet they dread the day they find their fate in the hands of some stone-faced man or woman addressed by the title “Your Honor.” They are feared by the criminal and hated by the zealot. We depend on them to maintain the fabric of justice. They are the irreplaceable pillars of democracy. And they are under attack. Right-wing Christian groups all over the country are mobilizing in an effort to reform the federal bench in the wake of the Terri Schiavo case. While America watched the Schiavo drama unfold, representative Tom DeLay, the Republican House Majority Leader and a former exterminator from Sugarland, Texas, plotted his attack. The federal courts’ refusal to get involved in the Shiavo case—after lower courts ordered doctors to remove her feeding tube—prompted DeLay and Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist to strong-arm Congress into passing two bills giving the federal courts the authority to intervene, on the premise that Schiavo’s constitutional rights were being violated. Federal judges refused to take the bait, knowing that giving in to that kind of emotional political pressure would mean becoming the type of “activist” judges that Republicans claim to despise. Upon Schiavo’s death, DeLay issued his call to have activist judges reined in, firing up his band of conservative Christian “foot soldiers” to take to the airwaves, march in the streets and write letter after letter promoting war against a “judiciary run amok.” Rep. DeLay even went so far as to make vague threats against the judges in the Schiavo case, saying they will “have to answer for their behavior.” With the Shiavo affair still warm, conservative leaders gathered at a conference called “Confronting the Judicial War on Faith.” DeLay was among the dignitaries at the event, where, according to The Nation’s Max Blumenthal, GOP Sen. Tom Coburn’s chief of staff exclaimed, “I’m a radical! I’m a real extremist. I don’t want to impeach judges. I want to impale them.” The assault on the federal bench, led by DeLay, is seen by many as a power grab by conservative Republicans not satisfied with control of Congress and the White House. DeLay Republicans want the judiciary, too, even if it means undermining that which they claim to hold sacred: the Constitution of the United States. And the fight isn’t limited to the House of Representatives. Senate Republicans are threatening to employ the so-called “nuclear option,” a rule change that would preclude the possibility of minority filibuster of judicial appointments and force yea or nay votes on President George W. Bush’s controversial judicial nominees without extended debate. The federal judiciary consists of 877 seats, of which 831 are currently filled, leaving 46 vacancies that could be appointed by the president. It is not unrealistic to imagine that by the end of Bush’s second term, close to 60 percent of the federal bench will be occupied by Republican appointees. Yet ideologues like DeLay, Rep. Steve Chabot, R-Ohio, and columnist and conservative matriarch Phyllis Schlafly suggest that judges who make rulings not in step with their own conservative agenda should be impeached and replaced with Bush’s nominees. Who are these “activist” judges who pose such a threat to DeLay and his Christian-conservative ilk? These mysterious robed figures who play such an important role in American democracy? Here in Western Montana, the federal judiciary’s highest-profile representative is U.S. District Court Judge Donald W. Molloy. By the nature of the federal court, and with 10 national forests in his district, Molloy is in a position to deal with some of the most controversial issues facing the American West. In an average year, Molloy’s court hears upwards of 400 civil and criminal cases, ranging from lawsuits over timber and mining permits to drugs and firearms cases to the ongoing W.R. Grace and Co. debacle. Not surprisingly, Molloy’s rulings are not always popular. In a February 2004 article in High Country News, Molloy was described as “one of the greenest judges in the West.” Supporters of logging, mining and off-road recreation would cite that as evidence of Molloy’s activist tendencies. Just last fall Molloy was blasted by right-wing bloggers on the website www.freerepub-lic.com for statements he made during the sentencing of Tracy Brockway, a woman tied to the Project 7 paramilitary group that allegedly trained and conspired to kill federal judges. According to the Flathead valley’s Daily InterLake, during Brockway’s sentencing Molloy said he had given a lot of thought to the circumstances around Project 7 and other anti-government groups and citizens who follow “Rush Limbaugh or the radio stations in Kalispell, screaming people” who are anti-government or intolerant, and “how that leads to folks taking a view of government that somehow is so at odds with reality it surprises me. “The government is us. It is we, the people,” Molloy told Brockway. Those statements evidently qualified Molloy as an activist in the eyes of Free Republic bloggers. Posts on the website’s forum ranged from mild criticism of Molloy’s Limbaugh reference to veiled threats of violence. However, Molloy has made a number of rulings over the years that upset environmentalists, including a ruling last month that strengthened one of the keystones of the Bush administration’s so-called Healthy Forest Initiative. The decision disappointed environmentalists and was praised by the logging industry. But controversy is nothing new to federal courts. Since their creation, the courts have been at the center of some of the most tumultuous schisms in American history. From the Civil War to civil rights to civil unions, controversy is second nature to judges. And the U.S. District Court of Montana is part of one of the most controversial courts in the land, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Only the 9th Circuit, encompassing nine states, two territories, and 14 million square miles, and the Supreme Court have the power to overrule Molloy’s decisions. It seems natural, then, that when Tom DeLay, without naming names, levies warnings and threats against the federal judiciary, Molloy could be a target. But when we decided to take a close look at Chief Judge Molloy, we didn’t find what DeLay expected. Rather than anecdotes about how Molloy legislates from the bench, or lets his personal politics drive his interpretation of the law, we found the opposite. By most accounts, Molloy appears to be exactly the kind of judge the framers of the Constitution had in mind when they created an independent judiciary.Trial lawyers in these parts know that if you plan to appear before Judge Molloy, you’d better be prepared, because he doesn’t tolerate shenanigans. As former Montana Supreme Court Judge Terry Trieweiler put it: “He’s a judge who holds lawyers accountable for more details than they are probably used to.” Molloy is a big, mustachioed man with a strong resemblance to the stereotypical lawmen of the Old West. He’s imposing at first, nearly to the point of unnerving, but warm and friendly in conversation. He has a steely, almost suspicious gaze, which is often fixed somewhere in the room or on his desk when he talks about the law. Mention his family or Grizzly athletics and he becomes animated, reflective and friendly. So friendly, in fact, it’s easy to forget you’re talking to one of the most powerful men in Montana. To understand Molloy’s approach to the law, and the way he operates his courtroom, it’s important to understand his personal history and his belief in the legal process. “You must understand his background before you go into his courtroom,” says Missoula attorney William Evan Jones. Don Molloy grew up in the tiny eastern Montana town of Malta. He is the son of Dr. Daniel T. Molloy, a long-time country doctor and highly decorated WWII bomber pilot. His mother, Mary Rita, has been described by family and friends as a strong, intellectual woman, a voracious reader who took great pride in raising her four sons and four daughters. After Daniel Molloy finished medical school, the family put down roots in Malta, where sons Dan, Jack, Don and Jim were known as “the Molloy boys.” They were standout athletes in the small town, and all four eventually played college athletics. Don played in the 1964 East-West Shrine game and was a co-captain of the football and basketball teams. In college he was a standout running back for the University of Montana Grizzly football team. Molloy’s four sisters were also exceptional athletes and bright students. All eight Molloy children hold college degrees, and several went on to medical and law schools. Among them, they have a total of 52 years of post-high-school education. “The Molloys were clearly a family of a lot of smarts and athletic ability,” says long-time acquaintance and trial lawyer Cliff Edwards. “They are quite a family.” Edwards met Molloy around 1966 at Carroll College in Helena, where Edwards played football with Don’s brothers Dan and Jack. Edwards and Molloy later practiced law together at Anderson, Edwards and Molloy before Molloy took the federal bench. After finishing his undergraduate studies in political science at UM in 1968, Molloy joined the Navy. He did so despite his reservations about the war in Vietnam. “[Don], at the time, had serious concerns and objections to the war in Vietnam,” says younger brother Jim. “Yet he served with a strong sense of honor, and is very proud of his service.” Molloy flew F-4 Phantom fighter planes off the deck of the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy. He crossed the Atlantic Ocean four times and spent most of his Navy years in the Mediterranean Sea. From 1968 to 1973, Molloy served honorably and proudly in the Navy, despite his opposition to the war. Evidence of his pride in his service is clear to anyone who steps foot in the judge’s chambers. On the east wall, to the left of his desk, are two beautifully detailed paintings of the F-4 Phantoms he once flew. The desk itself he had specially made with a strip of mahogany inlaid diagonally across its surface to represent the deck of the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy. While serving in the Navy, Molloy wrote a letter to legendary Montana Sen. Mike Mansfield in which he expressed the conflict he felt as a sailor and opponent of the war. Mansfield, one of the most powerful and vocal opponents of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, responded to the young sailor’s concerns. “Basically it was a letter about citizenship,” recalls Molloy. “He said you do your duty, and you do it well, but you still have the right to question.” Mansfield told the young sailor that there are aspects of the government that he might not always agree with, but that he is obligated to serve and do his duty to his country. “That letter has been a constant reminder to me over the years,” Molloy says. “It’s helped me realize how great our country really is. Mostly because if you believe in it, in the obligations of citizenship and serving your country, that doesn’t prohibit you from speaking out.” Mansfield’s letter, now framed, hangs prominently in Molloy’s home. Those who know him say Molloy’s military experience is a big part of who he is today. “Anyone who can land a fighter plane on the runway of the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy in high seas, at night, has a precise mind,” says Missoula liability defense attorney Jones, who has worked as a trial lawyer in Missoula for 46 years. “Number one, [Molloy] is aggressive. He played football for the University of Montana. Anyone who can do that is going to be aggressive. Secondly, he has a precise mind. He brings to the courtroom an appreciation for detail many judges don’t.” Molloy didn’t always demonstrate that studiousness and attention to detail. In high school his grades were only average. He didn’t excel in his undergraduate studies early on, either. According to brother Jim, Don’s Navy experience sparked an intellectual interest that wasn’t apparent in his earlier studies.It wasn’t until he left the service in 1974 to return to the University of Montana School of Law that he began to exhibit his now-famous appetite for knowledge. One of his law school classmates, Rick Anderson, said fellow law students had Molloy pegged as a future judge even then. “He was always in the top of the class,” said Anderson. “He truly loves the law and takes a scholarly approach to it.” He is also a voracious reader—a trait his entire family seems to share. It’s not uncommon for Molloy to invoke Aristotle, Ludwig Wittgenstein or William Shakespeare in conversation. That level of literacy, says former law partner Edwards, often frustrated his partners at Anderson, Edwards and Molloy. “He would drive me nuts!” Edwards jokes. “He would deliver closing statements to the jury, look the jurors straight in the eye and start talking about St. Thomas Aquinas.” According to friends and family, Molloy always viewed the federal bench as the epitome of honorable service to the law. Although he’s never been accused of grooming his career toward a federal judgeship, those close to him say it’s something to which he always aspired. He started his legal career in 1976 as a law clerk for U.S. District Court Judge James F. Battin. Some say Battin and Molloy were an odd couple at first: Molloy, a fiery young Irish Democrat working for a former five-term conservative Republican congressman, commonly regarded as a judge of the highest integrity. Molloy says his time clerking for Battin was the best educational experience he could ever have had. Molloy says Battin was a true conservative. “He believed strongly in states’ rights, in federalism, in fiscal conservatism and individual rights,” says Molloy. “It was a wonderful working relationship.” It wasn’t an easy job, however. Battin had high expectations of his staff. “I remember the first day I went in to work,” recalls Molloy. “He called me into his office, we talked for a few minutes, and the he said, ‘Well, we have a lot of work to do.’ And that was it. We got to work.” Molloy calls Battin, who swore Molloy in as a District Court judge just three months before succumbing to cancer, his mentor and his hero. By all accounts, Molloy’s experience clerking for Judge Battin played a key role in forming the younger man’s approach to the law. “He told me something that I’ll never forget,” Molloy recalls. “He said, ‘I won’t tell you how to be a judge, but if you ever get used to sentencing people, if taking liberty becomes easy, get a different job.” Judging has not turned out to be easy. Not least because, “In high-profile cases with political significance, there are always people, especially Republicans, ready to exploit the decision for their own purpose,” according to Trieweiler. “That has fostered distrust of the judiciary among the public.” Asked for his thoughts on some of the criticism he’s received for his decisions, Molloy shrugs and says he doesn’t think about it much. On the other hand, he does believe federal judges are often unfairly characterized in the press. “I think there are correlations that occur that get confused with cause,” says Molloy. “Just because so-and-so appointed so-and-so, there’s an inference that when [judges] make decisions, it is politically motivated by some mythological platform that all Republicans have…or all Democrats have. “There is a correlation: they were appointed by someone who has a political platform, but that doesn’t mean a judge shares that platform.” According to Molloy, all things change once a judge is sworn in. Politics are trumped by law, and judges and their families are asked to make personal sacrifices in the law’s name. That’s another lesson Molloy says he learned from the famously even-handed Battin. “It’s very difficult when you visit with judges to discern—through conversation of the pressing issues of the country—to tell if that was a Democrat-appointed judge or a Republican-appointed judge,” says Molloy. Battin was one of President Richard Nixon’s first judicial nominations. Molloy was a Clinton nominee. Polar opposites of the political spectrum (as far as presidents go), and yet Molloy revered Battin. “The purpose of the federal judiciary is to have a court that’s able to make decisions based on the law, without the effect of local bias, political influence or local economic considerations,” says Trieweiler. The current discourse coming out of Washington has lawyers and judges furious and a bit scared. DeLay’s apparent disregard for the Constitution and his angry rhetoric targeting judges has many legal professionals questioning the future of the system. “It really disgusts me,” says Trieweiler. “It’s purely politically motivated, as in the Schiavo case. It seemed to distract the country from other, more important issues. Rather than talk about the deficit, inflation, or our involvement in a misguided war, it’s easier to stoke up people’s emotions over an issue where people don’t really understand what’s going on.” “I think almost all judges try to do their job to the best of his or her ability based on how they perceive legal arguments,” Molloy says. And he won’t be lured into a political discussion or speculate on the motivations of judicial naysayers. “I believe in the Constitution. I believe in the separation of powers, in federalism, in individual rights. I think all judges hold those beliefs.” Despite the fact that Molloy was once a plaintiff’s lawyer, the favorite whipping boys of Republican politicians, defense attorneys today describe him as consistent, principled and fair. “[Molloy] goes out of his way to walk down the middle of the road,” says Jones, who, as a defense attorney, represents large corporations—the same kinds of corporations Molloy’s former clients sued. “At the same time, he understands plaintiffs’ cases and plaintiff theory better than an ordinary judge.” Molloy had a successful practice before becoming a judge. He certainly could have made more money in private practice than he does serving on the bench (U.S. District Court judges made $158,100 in 2004, and make $162,100 in 2005). Being a federal judge is hardly glamorous, and it requires personal sacrifice beyond the financial. For instance, Molloy says he misses the friendships he had before becoming a judge. “It’s not like I’m a hermit. I have friends. It’s just that now those friendship are different,” he says.Molloy says he can no longer engage in conversations about the issues of the day like he once did. Committing to the bench is in many ways committing to a monastic lifestyle. His wife, once active in politics, is now careful about choosing her volunteer activities. His children have had classmates whose parents Molloy has had to sentence. And Molloy himself, unlike DeLay, must go out of his way to avoid any appearance of impropriety. Because judges are under constant scrutiny from varying factions, including certain members of Congress, Molloy says he has chosen to sacrifice some relationships and activities that could be construed by critics as improper. That can be tough, but to Molloy the sacrifice is worth it. “I can only speak for myself, but I think the principle motivation [for being a judge] is public service,” Molloy says. Molloy is also a firm believer in and advocate of the concept of jury trial. He believes jurors do the real business of the people, and he believes they do it well. “[Jurors] are judges of fact; I’m glad we have them,” he says. “They deal with difficult issues of innocence and guilt and all kinds of things. They are the judges of those facts, and they have a good sense of what’s right. “One of the greatest things about America is that no matter what kind of view any one of us holds, there’s a balance…it kind of comes out the way it’s supposed to be in the end,” says Molloy. Let’s hope he’s right. Some legal professionals aren’t as optimistic when it comes to the current threat against the judiciary. “It has me very worried,” says Trieweiler. “I’m worried about the fact that the party that has control of the executive branch and both houses of Congress—and has now appointed the majority of the federal judiciary—is going to appoint as many extremist right-wing judges as it can. I’m worried about the demagoguery I see every day affecting public attitudes in a way that makes it easier to do what they want.” Trial lawyer Edwards says if former Republican Congressman and Molloy mentor Battin were alive today, he would be furious at the way his party is treating the judiciary. “This is very shortsighted of DeLay and the Republicans,” Edwards says. “There will be a time when Republicans and their ilk won’t be in power.” All Molloy will say publicly on the subject is that judges were given lifetime tenure so that they would not be swayed by such rhetoric. “The founding fathers were brilliant. That is why, in their wisdom, they created lifetime appointments for judges. It is critical to the survival of democracy. The principle problem with the king is that if he didn’t like a decision, he’d get rid of the judge,” says Molloy. “Our judicial system, whether state or federal, is universally recognized as the crown jewel of our democracy. It is the envy of aspiring nations. It is recognized throughout the world as an incredible institution,” he says. That may be, but the fact remains that there’s a vocal and powerful faction inside the U.S. government that would like to see the institution brought to its knees. Former Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson once suggested that conflict among the branches of the federal government is “ready to break out again whenever the provocation becomes sufficient.” Such conflict has been inflamed before: with desegregation as the catalyst in the 1960s, Roe v. Wade in the 1970s and Bush v. Gore in this decade. In each instance, the courts have survived intact. But never before has the attack been so focused, and backed by such prominent members of the federal government. This country was founded as a democracy, with three independent branches of government, but if Tom DeLay and his supporters are successful in foisting their Christian-conservative agenda upon the legal process, the danger of transformation into a theocracy is real. If that happens, then judges like Don Molloy, who answer to the law instead of Tom DeLay, might well become a thing of the history books. [email protected]

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| Magee v. State Magee v. State Johnny Ray MAGEEv.STATE of Mississippi. Johnny Ray Magee, appellant, pro se. Office of the Attorney General by Laura Hogan Tedder, attorney for appellee. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI CHANDLER, Justice. ¶ 1. In 1987, Johnny Ray Magee was convicted of robbing a liquor store and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment as a habitual offender.[1] We affirmed his conviction in 1989 [2] and dismissed his motion for post-conviction relief (" PCR" ) in 1992. In 2010, however, we granted Magee's request to amend his PCR on the basis of his claim of newly discovered evidence of juror misconduct. The Marion County Circuit Court held an evidentiary hearing to consider this new evidence. The judge found that, when the prospective jurors were asked whether any of Page 66 them had family or close friends in law enforcement, a juror's failure to disclose her belief that a local deputy sheriff was her fourth cousin did not amount to juror misconduct and did not prejudice jury selection. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of the amended PCR petition. We granted certiorari on the issues of whether the circuit court erred in finding no juror misconduct and whether the circuit court violated Rule 9.04 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court by allowing the last-minute testimony of a witness at the evidentiary hearing. We affirm the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief, holding that no juror misconduct occurred and that, even if a violation of Rule 9.04 occurred, the error was harmless and the issue was waived due to lack of a defense request for a continuance or mistrial. ¶ 2. After serving more than twenty years of a life sentence without the possibility of parole, Johnny Ray Magee learned that Judy Ann Echols, a member of the jury that convicted him, was a somewhat distant cousin to the late Thomas Echols, the deputy sheriff who served Magee his indictment and conducted his arrest.[3] During jury selection, Judy Ann did not respond to any of the following questions asked by Magee's attorney: (1) And these first few questions apply to you yourself, your family, and the people you consider to be your close friends. Are any of you or the other people that I have mentioned presently employed as any sort of law enforcement officer, whether it be local, state, or federal? Is anybody in that position at this time? (2) What about in the past, has anybody in your experiences in life so far ever been employed in law enforcement personally? What about your family members or close friends in the past? (3) Have you yourself or any of your close friends ever been members of any kind of law enforcement association such as the State Sheriff's Association or the National Rifle Association or any other group like that? Two jurors responded that they had brothers-in-law in law enforcement. Both of those jurors were empaneled without objection from the defense. ¶ 3. When asked at the evidentiary hearing why she did not respond to these questions, Judy Ann answered that she did not understand the questions and was not sure how to conduct herself, as it was her first time in court. She stated she believed Thomas to be her fourth cousin. Thomas lived five minutes from Judy Ann and they attended the same church. She " knew of" him but did not " know" him. She testified she had never discussed law enforcement matters with him. Judy Ann also " knew of" both Magee and Thomas because all three were in close (but not the exact same) grades of school together growing up. Testimony from other family members was admitted to show Thomas was likely a closer degree of kinship to Judy Ann than fourth cousin, but in no case closer than a second cousin.[4] ¶ 4. Magee also testified at the evidentiary hearing. He learned about Judy Ann's kinship to Thomas after Magee's daughter married Judy Ann's nephew. Magee claimed that Judy Ann told a prison-mate of his that Thomas had told her Magee was guilty. Magee also alleged he Page 67 called Judy Ann from prison to confront her, that she had admitted to talking with Thomas about the case before jury selection, but that she would not volunteer to testify because she did not want " to lose her freedom." Magee did not question Judy Ann about this alleged conversation at the evidentiary hearing or put on any evidence to corroborate his hearsay assertions. ¶ 5. The State's only witness was Cass Barnes, who had served with Judy Ann on the jury that convicted Magee. Barnes currently serves as the Chancery Clerk of Marion County. The State made a last-minute decision at the close of Magee's witnesses to call Barnes to testify. Barnes was not subpoenaed to be present for the hearing. Over Magee's objection, the judge called an hour and a half recess, during which the State arranged for Barnes to appear. The record does not explicitly reflect whether the defense interviewed Barnes during this recess. Barnes testified that, while he had a difficult time remembering a trial that happened so long ago, he did not remember any member of the jury making improper comments or referencing outside information. He stated that if he had, he would have reacted by informing the circuit judge. ¶ 6. We apply the " clearly erroneous" standard of review to a trial court's finding that a jury was fair and impartial. " It is ... a judicial question as to whether a jury is fair and impartial and the court's judgment will not be disturbed unless it appears clearly that it is wrong." Odom v. State, 355 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Miss.1978). The same standard applies generally to denial of post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. Johns v. State, 926 So.2d 188, 194 (Miss.2006). I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR IN APPLYING THE ODOM TEST. ¶ 7. Magee argues he is entitled to a new trial because Judy Ann's failure to answer the voir dire questions had a prejudicial effect on jury selection. Under Mississippi Code Section 13-5-69, a defendant has the right to question prospective jurors directly " with reference to challenges for cause, and for peremptory challenges." Miss.Code Ann. § 13-5-65 (Rev.2012). We have held that " [t]he failure of a juror to respond to a relevant, direct, and unambiguous question leaves the examining attorney uninformed and unable to ask any follow-up questions to elicit the necessary facts to intelligently reach a decision to exercise a peremptory challenge or to challenge a juror for cause." Odom, 355 So.2d at 1383. ¶ 8. When deciding on a motion for a new trial based on a juror's failure to respond during voir dire, the trial court should first " determine whether the question propounded to the juror was (1) relevant to the voir dire examination; (2) whether it was unambiguous; and (3) whether the juror had substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited." Odom, 355 So.2d at 1383. Second, " [i]f the trial court's determination of these inquiries is in the affirmative, the court should then determine if prejudice to the defendant in selecting the jury reasonably could be inferred from the juror's failure to respond." Id. The defendant deserves a new trial if such prejudice can be reasonably inferred. Id. We also emphasized in Odom that " no firm, unbending rule can be laid down that would control every situation that might arise on the voir dire of prospective jurors. Therefore, each case must be decided on an ad hoc basis considering the facts before the court." Id. Page 68 ¶ 9. Magee argues that the first step of the Odom test has been met, because the questions were relevant and unambiguous, and Judy Ann had " knowledge of the information sought to be elicited." It is undisputed that the questions were relevant and unambiguous. At issue is whether Judy Ann's knowledge that a somewhat distant cousin of hers was a local deputy sheriff can reasonably be considered within " the information sought to be elicited." We hold that, in this circumstance, the degree of kinship was too distant for the juror to have been expected to respond. ¶ 10. Similar cases, where we have found the Odom test satisfied and ordered a new trial, involved a much closer degree of relation. In Odom, a juror failed to reveal that his brother was a law-enforcement officer. Odom, 355 So.2d at 1382. That brother turned out to be directly involved in the investigation of Odom's case. Id. In Laney v. State, a juror failed to disclose that she had two brothers and a nephew in law enforcement. Laney v. State, 421 So.2d 1216, 1216-17 (Miss.1982). In that case, a death-penalty sentence was returned as punishment for the capital murder of a local law-enforcement officer. Here, as in those cases, the questions asked at voir dire focused on discovering whether jurors had " family and close friends" in law enforcement. But, unlike in those cases, Judy Ann's kinship to Thomas was simply too distant to be reasonably considered within the scope of the questions, especially given that, in practicality, the two did not appear to have an ongoing friendship or any significant level of interaction. ¶ 11. Magee argues that the prejudice prong of the Odom test has been met, because we can reasonably infer he would have exercised a strike on Judy Ann had he known she was related to the arresting officer. The lawyer who defended Magee at trial submitted an affidavit for the evidentiary hearing, stating that, while he did not remember this case specifically, his general practice in a similar situation would be that: [if a juror] had answered in the affirmative during voir dire that she was related by blood or marriage to a police officer involved in the investigation of the case, a challenge to the trial judge to strike her for cause and/or a peremptory strike, if any remained available to the defense during jury selection, would have been made to remove her from the venire panel. In Laney, where a law-enforcement officer had been murdered, we found " the fact that [the juror] was related to three law enforcement officers would, under the circumstances, be a very crucial issue. Defense counsel would certainly have exercised a challenge to her service on the jury." Laney, 421 So.2d at 1218 (emphasis added). And in Odom, as mentioned above, the juror's brother was directly involved in the investigation of the defendant. Odom, 355 So.2d at 1383. ¶ 12. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot find that the trial judge clearly erred in concluding that Judy Ann would not have been struck as a juror had the defense known she was a somewhat distant cousin of the arresting officer. Two other jurors with brothers-in-law in law enforcement were selected for Magee's jury without objection. The victim of the crime was not law enforcement. Thomas and Judy Ann were significantly more distantly related than a brother, brother-in-law, or nephew. Not only did they not have a close relationship or talk about law-enforcement affairs, no evidence was presented at the hearing that Thomas had been involved in the substantive investigation of Magee's case. Thomas's role apparently was limited to serving the indictment and conducting the arrest. ¶ 13. We emphasize, as we originally did in Odom, that circumstances like these must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The degree of kinship, connection, and knowledge required to be present before prejudice can be inferred will vary depending on the facts of each case. Given both the constitutional right to be tried in the locale of the crime and the fact that many communities are small and close-knit, it is not unusual for jury members to have some level of connection with or knowledge of the case. See Dubose v. State, 22 So.3d 340 (Miss.Ct.App.2009); Archer v. State, 986 So.2d 951 (Miss.2008); Wright v. State, 9 So.3d 447 (Miss.Ct.App.2009). This is why attorneys follow up affirmative responses to voir dire questions by asking the juror if he or she can be impartial regardless of the connection or knowledge. Juries would be difficult to empanel otherwise. ¶ 14. We also clarify an aspect of the circuit court's written findings on Odom after the evidentiary hearing. The court found Judy Ann did not have " substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited" in part because she did not " understand" the questions she was asked and was nervous and confused about how to conduct herself in court. But a juror's nervousness, failure to understand the voir dire questions, or confusion about the process cannot be grounds for denying a defendant the right to non prejudicial jury selection. The important question is whether prejudice in jury selection occurred as a result of the failure to respond, and prejudice potentially can occur regardless of a juror's reason for remaining silent. II. THE ADMISSION OF A LAST-MINUTE WITNESS AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING DID NOT RESULT IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. ¶ 15. Magee argues he is entitled to a new trial [5] because the judge allowed a last-minute witness to testify at the post-conviction-relief hearing in violation of Rule 9.04(I)(1)-(2) of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court, which states: If during the course of trial, the prosecution attempts to introduce evidence which has not been timely disclosed to the defense as required by these rules, and the defense objects to the introduction for that reason, the court shall act as follows: 1. Grant the defense a reasonable opportunity to interview the newly discovered witness, to examine the newly produced documents, photographs or other evidence; and 2. If, after such opportunity, the defense claims unfair surprise or undue prejudice and seeks a continuance or mistrial, the court shall, in the interest of justice and absent unusual circumstances, exclude the evidence or grant a continuance for a period of time reasonably necessary for the defense to meet the non-disclosed evidence or grant a mistrial. URCCC 9.04(I)(1)-(2). At the close of Magee's witnesses, the record reflects the following exchange: THE COURT: The State wants to call the Chancery Clerk of Marion County, Cass Barnes, who I understand is going Page 70 to a time prior to him being Chancery Clerk. He was actually a member of the jury that tried this particular case, and would have knowledge of any impropriety in the jury room. And the State has talked to and I guess it's safe to say the State feels like the State needs to go into any possible contamination with the jury deliberations. MR. SWEATT [PROSECUTOR]: He would honestly tell us, assuming he remembers, if there was any. I think he would remember if there were tainting. He might not remember. THE COURT: Well, whatever. All right. MR. KUYKENDALL [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, for the record I object. We're here today and had an opportunity to subpoena him and have him here for this morning for hearing. He's not here now and we'd object to any continuance. THE COURT: Since we're here to try to find out what the truth of the matter is, I'll overrule the objection and we'll just recess until 1:15 ... Are you going to call Mr. Barnes to have him here at 1:15? MR. SWEATT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: We'll be ready at that time.... (COURT PLACED IN RECESS AT 12:08 P.M. OFF RECORD) (PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE AS FOLLOWS AT 1:41 P.M.) ¶ 16. The record does not explicitly reflect whether the defense had a reasonable opportunity to interview Barnes during this recess as required by Rule 9.04(I)(1) or whether proceedings resumed without such an interview taking place. Proceedings resumed at 1:41 p.m. with the State directly examining Barnes. At that time, the defense did not claim unfair surprise or undue prejudice and seek a continuance or mistrial as required under Rule 9.04(I)(2). Magee's cross-examination of Barnes very effectively highlighted the vagueness of Barnes's memory of the trial. ¶ 17. We have stated that " [a] violation of Rule 9.04 is considered harmless error unless it affirmatively appears from the entire record that the violation caused a miscarriage of justice." Ben v. State, 95 So.3d 1236, 1249 (Miss.2012) (quoting Payton v. State, 897 So.2d 921, 942 (Miss.2003)); see also Ross v. State, 954 So.2d 968, 1000-01 (Miss.2007) (stating that the key question is whether the violation of Rule 9.04 prejudiced the defendant). Additionally, failure to request a continuance or mistrial when faced with an undisclosed witness or evidence results in waiver of the rule violation. See Comby v. State, 901 So.2d 1282 (Miss.Ct.App.2004), cert. denied, 901 So.2d 1273 (Miss.2005); Jackson v. State, 910 So.2d 658 (Miss.Ct.App.2005). ¶ 18. While not irrelevant, Barnes's testimony was in no way dispositive of the outcome of the hearing. An Odom analysis focuses on the defendant's right to be free from prejudice at jury selection. Prejudice warranting reversal can occur at voir dire even without additional evidence of overt misconduct at trial. Our decision, like the trial court's, is based primarily on the relatively distant degree of kinship and interaction between the juror and the law-enforcement officer, as well as the fact that the law enforcement officer was only tangentially involved with Magee's case. Even if the court violated Rule 9.04 by not allowing sufficient opportunity for the defense to interview the new witness, Barnes's testimony about what occurred at trial did not result in a miscarriage of justice and is not grounds for ordering a new evidentiary hearing. Moreover, Magee waived the issue by failing to request a continuance or mistrial. ¶ 19. Under the factual circumstances present here, we cannot find that the trial judge clearly erred in holding that no juror misconduct occurred. The distant degree of kinship and the attenuated level of interaction between Judy Ann and Thomas place their relationship outside the scope of the particular voir dire questions asked. The trial court did not clearly err in finding Magee was not prejudiced by Judy Ann's failure to disclose her kinship to Thomas. If the trial court violated Rule 9.04, the result was harmless error. Magee also waived the issue. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals as well as the trial court's denial of Magee's amended motion for post-conviction relief. ¶ 20. AFFIRMED. WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.

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Appeals court upholds controversial Wisconsin union law A federal appeals court on Friday upheld a controversial Wisconsin law that restricts the power of public-sector unions, the passage of which sparked an unsuccessful effort to recall the state's Republican governor, Scott Walker. By a 2-1 vote, the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago found that the law is constitutional, rejecting claims that it violated the equal protection and First Amendment rights of union members. It reversed part of a March 2012 ruling by U.S. District Judge William Conley in Madison, Wisconsin. Seven of Wisconsin's largest public-sector unions, including the Wisconsin Education Association Council, had sued to overturn the law. Leon Dayan, a lawyer representing the unions, did not respond to requests for comment. The law, known as Act 10, had been enacted in 2011 by Wisconsin's Republican-led legislature as part of an effort to close a multi-billion dollar state budget deficit. It barred public sector workers known as "general employees" from collective bargaining on issues other than base wages, imposed tough recertification requirements, and barred employers from automatically deducting union dues from paychecks. A select group of "public safety employees" and their unions were not subject to these new requirements. Writing for the 7th Circuit majority, Circuit Judge Joel Flaum said Conley correctly upheld the statute's limits on collective bargaining. But the 7th Circuit also reversed Conley's decision to void provisions that provided for annual union recertification votes, and which banned the automatic dues deductions. Circuit Judge David Hamilton dissented from the part of the decision on dues deductions. In a statement, Walker called the decision a victory for state taxpayers. He said Act 10 was needed to help Wisconsin close a $3.6 billion deficit without tax increases, mass layoffs of public sector employees, and cuts to programs such as Medicaid. Walker survived a recall election last June, after the law's passage had sparked nationwide protests and efforts to remove him from office. The law also forced most state workers to pay more for health insurance and pensions, and curbed pay raises. Last September, in a Wisconsin state court proceeding, Dane County Circuit Court Judge Juan Colas declared the law unconstitutional because it violated the free speech and equal protection rights of union members. [ID:nL1E8KEPF3] Wisconsin has been appealing that decision. The case is Wisconsin Education Association Council et al v. Walker et al, 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Nos. 12-1854, 12-2011 and 12-2058. (Reporting by Jonathan Stempel in New York; Additional reporting by Karen Pierog and Nate Raymond; Editing by Gerald E. McCormick and Tim Dobbyn)

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SCC rules that case on EI contributions "bound to fail" Arguments fail to convince the Supreme Court of Canada to rule in favour of contributors to employment insurance. Ottawa (21 July 2014) —When the federal government used the surplus of Employment Insurance contributions to reduce the deficit, workers across the country were outraged. "That money belongs to the people who have diligently paid their Employment Insurance premiums throughout their lives," said James Clancy, National President of the National Union of Publicand General Employees (NUPGE). "When the government used the funds like their own private trust fund, it was an act of betrayal for workers." The Confédération des syndicats nationaux, Quebec’s second-largest trade union, with more than 300,000 members, and Lee Syndicat National des Employés de l’Aluminium brought the case to the Supreme Court, alleging that the funds were not being used for their designed purpose. But in 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) ruled that the government was within its "taxation power" to determine how to use the surplus. Conservative government closed old EI account, transfering money into general revenues In 2010, the Conservative government decided to close the old employement insurance account and transfer the $57 billion balance into the government's general revenue. The move prompted the Confédération des syndicats nationaux and Federation des travailleurs et travailleuses du Quebec to bring the issue back to court. The lower court originally sided with the federal government saying that the money belonged to the government, not to EI contributors, but the Québec Court of Appeal overturned that ruling. The government appealed to the Supreme Court. In a 7-0 ruling today, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the case would not proceed because it was "bound to fail." The ruling stated, "Although the proper administration of justice requires that the courts' resources not be expended on actions that are bound to fail, the cardinal principle of access to justice requires that the power be used sparingly, where it is clear that an action has no reasonable chance of success." The SCC ruled that the federal government actions had already been dealt with in the 2008 Supreme Court decision. More and more Canadians do not qualify for EI or are receiving reduced benefits "Meanwhile, Canadians are finding it harder and harder to even access Employment Insurance," says Clancy. "We have people not having enough hours to qualify, being forced to move in order to accept jobs, and receiving much lower benefits than ever before. We need to revamp the EI system to ensure it is making a difference for those who desperately need it." NUPGE The National Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE) is one of Canada's largest labour organizations with over 340,000 members. Our mission is to improve the lives of working families and to build a stronger Canada by ensuring our common wealth is used for the common good. NUPGE Issues and Campaigns: Parliament Watch Printer-friendly versionSend by email

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Don’t missPolicy Watch’s comprehensive coverage of N.C.’s sweeping anti-LGBT law Don’t missPolicy Watch’s comprehensive coverage of N.C.’s sweeping anti-LGBT law Uncategorized Protesters gather for a second time in Wilmington to speak out against private Christian school’s new anti-gay policy By Lindsay Wagner November 25, 2013 1 Comment In Uncategorized Print This Post WECT in Wilmington reports that for the second week in a row, dozens gathered outside of Myrtle Grove Christian School yesterday to protest the school’s new anti-LGBT policy. A group of approximately 50 people gathered outside of the school to protest a policy that they claim promotes hate. Myrtle Grove recently announced that the school would require applicants and current students to sign a policy that obligates them to denounce homosexuality. Gay students and students from gay families would be barred from attending the school. The private Christian school is listed in the directory of recognized private schools by the state of North Carolina. That list is maintained by the Division of Non-Public Education and all schools on that list will be eligible for taxpayer-funded school vouchers beginning with the 2014-15 school year. Rep. Marcus Brandon (D-Guilford), a key proponent of school vouchers who fought for them during the last legislative session, told NC Policy Watch last week he believes schools that discriminate against the LGBT community should not get one taxpayer dollar. Equality NC, an organization that is dedicated to securing equal rights and justice for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) North Carolinians, will hold a press conference tomorrow in Wilmington in response to new laws allowing public funding of anti-gay schools. Previous PostNeed health insurance? Check out this map of costsNext Post A hard truth about unemployment One Comment Chuck Anziulewicz November 25, 2013 at 11:10 am I really don’t care if a private Christian school wants to discriminate against Gay people or Muslims or Jews or Atheists or whomever … but they absolutely must not be allowed to benefit from taxpayer dollars in the process. Changing hats, but my focus remains on education Dear NC Policy Watch readers, It’s been a ...

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A&A Law and Enforcement Plante & Moran Scores Big on Fortune's 'Best Companies' List Jan 24th 2002 0 Leading the small group of CPA firms that made the latest annual Fortune 100 Best Companies to Work For list is Michigan-based Plante & Moran, once again breaking into the top ten on the prestigious list. The list captures the top workplaces in the country for 2001 that have been in business for at least seven years and that have at least 500 employees. Plante & Moran ranked 7th on the list, exceeding last year's 10th place ranking and the 1999 ranking of 17th. Also making an appearance on the list is Deloitte & Touche in 35th place, down from last year's 32nd place and the 1999 ranking of 31st, and Ernst & Young, 87th place for 2001, up from its 98th place ranking in 2000. E&Y ranked 86th in 1999. Noticeably missing from this year's list are Andersen and Enron, both of which placed on the list last year. Companies nominate themselves for the list. For the 2001 list, 279 companies applied, up from 234 the previous year. Employees are surveyed, and the companies respond to a questionnaire. This year 44,848 employees participated in the surveys. Criteria for inclusion on the list are varied depending on what makes certain types of employees satisfied. This year's candidates showed willingness to come up with creative ways to keep employees happy and to treat them with respect and dignity in the face of a recession and substantial cutbacks in many industries. This year's survey was unique in that it encompassed the reaction of companies to the tragedies of September 11. Companies that rose to the top were those that provided corporate donations to relief groups, guaranteed the difference between military pay and an employee's regular salary in the case of those who had to serve in the military, and provided creative alternatives such as retraining and generous severance to victims of necessary layoffs. View the complete list.Trending TagsCareers Careers Firms Replies

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Tag Archives: heterosexual marriage LGBT advocates blast divorce case ruling Posted on 02 Sep 2010 at 10:43pm Tweet Lambda Legal attorney calls 5th District’s decision ‘worst of opinions,’ warns further appeals could set damaging precedent for marriage Read the full opinion written by Justice Kerry P. FitzGerald John Wright | Online Editor [email protected] Ken Upton Texas is justified in prohibiting same-sex marriage — and divorce — because gay couples can’t procreate and because children are better off raised by heterosexual parents, according to a ruling handed down by a state appeals court in Dallas this week. But these prohibitions don’t unfairly target same-sex couples because Texas also prohibits bigamous and polygamous heterosexual marriage, and because gay couples do enjoy some state protections, such as the ability to seek protective orders from domestic violence, the court said. Allowing same-sex couples to divorce in Texas would redefine the fundamental institution of marriage, according to the court’s opinion. And if same-sex couples want more legal rights, they should petition the Texas Legislature, not the judiciary. Dallas’ 5th District Court of Appeals ruled Tuesday, Aug. 31 that a gay couple legally married in Massachusetts cannot obtain a divorce in Texas. The ruling overturned a district judge’s decision last year that declared the state’s marriage bans unconstitutional. Democratic District Judge Tena Callahan’s October 2009 decision allowing the gay couple to seek a divorce was appealed by Republican Attorney General Greg Abbott. LGBT advocates slammed Tuesday’s long-awaited, 38-page ruling in the case, which came from an all-Republican, three-judge panel of the appeals court. “It was the worst of opinions,” said Ken Upton, a Dallas-based senior staff attorney at Lambda Legal, the national LGBT civil rights group. “It reinforced all of the old arguments we thought we were moving away from. “These are stupid arguments with no real basis,” Upton added. “They’re made up just to oppress us. It [the opinion] is an example for people who thought we’d made progress everywhere — welcome to Texas.” Upton, who isn’t involved in the case, said the ruling will have a limited legal impact because, for now at least, it’s binding only in Texas’ 5th District. But he called the ruling psychologically damaging to the LGBT community and said it steals momentum from recent court victories, including a federal judge’s decision last month declaring California’s Proposition 8 unconstitutional. Equality Texas, the statewide gay-rights group, issued a statement calling the appeals court’s ruling in the gay divorce case “homophobic, outdated and uninformed.” “The Fifth District Court of appeals has taken the most extreme, the most conservative view possible on each issue before it,” Equality Texas said. “It’s not as if they wanted to just overturn the trial court’s decision, they wanted to smash it into the ground and discourage anyone from ever filing a pro-LGBT suit ever again. “The ruling harkens back to a view of the world from generations past — a world where LGBT people were content to live in closets, and were afraid to demand to be treated with dignity and respect. A dignity and respect that this court goes out of its way to completely deny,” Equality Texas said. The extreme nature of the panel’s ruling “lowered the bar” for another court to overturn it, according to Equality Texas. But Upton, long a critic of the gay divorce case, said he hopes the decision isn’t appealed, because the Texas Supreme Court could inflict more damage by laying down a broader precedent. ON APPEAL | James Scheske, left, and Pete Schulte, attorneys for the plaintiff in the Texas gay divorce case, respond to questions during a press conference after oral arguments in the same-sex divorce case were heard earlier this year. Scheske said this week that whether they appeal the case to the Texas Supreme Court depends on what is best for their client. (David Taffet/Dallas Voice) “You have to pick your courts,” Upton said. “You have to pick the place where you think you’re going to have a fair chance of convincing someone. I just don’t think that was the Dallas court of appeals, and I certainly don’t think it’s the Texas Supreme Court. “I guess we could go file one in Mississippi or Alabama if we wanted some more losses that say bad things about gay parents,” Upton added, “but we don’t want to reinforce that message when the momentum is on the side of equality.” Attorneys for the Dallas man seeking a divorce from his husband, identified in court documents as J.B., said this week that no final decision had been made about whether to appeal. “I expect an appeal, but that’s ultimately our client’s decision,” said James Scheske of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, the Austin law firm representing J.B. J.B.’s attorneys have 45 days, or until Oct. 15, to appeal the decision, but Scheske said he expects to know within two or three weeks. In response to concerns about the potential impact of a negative ruling from the Texas Supreme Court, Scheske said his job is to represent his client. “I have a client who has a valid marriage that needs to end,” Scheske said.“The people who are at the advocacy groups, they’re all very well-intentioned, but they need to think about what my client’s position is, and what would they propose he do?” J.B. married his husband, H.B., in Massachusetts in 2006 before moving to Texas and filing for divorce in January 2009. Massachusetts, where same-sex marriage has been legal since 2004, has a residency requirement for divorce. “My duties go to my client, not to what some advocacy group thinks is the best thing to do for some movement,” Scheske said. “I don’t represent a movement; I represent an individual.” Peter Schulte, the gay Dallas attorney who serves as co-counsel for J.B., said his client was unavailable for comment this week. Scheske called the appeals court’s ruling “disappointing.” “This opinion singles out one group of citizens, same-sex couples, and denies them the same rights that everybody else has,” he said. Scheske also represents an Austin woman who’s seeking a divorce from her wife. After the Travis County district judge granted a divorce to the lesbian couple earlier this year, Attorney General Abbott appealed. Jerry Strickland, a spokesman for Abbott, praised the Dallas ruling this week. “Because the Constitution and laws of the State of Texas define marriage as the union of one man and one woman, the court correctly ruled that Texas courts do not have authority to grant a same-sex divorce,” Strickland said. “Further, the court rejected the parties’ constitutional challenge and instead ruled that Texas’ definition of marriage is entirely consistent with the U.S. Constitution.” The Attorney General’s Office was assisted in the case by the right-wing, Plano-based Liberty Institute. “The court’s ruling strikes down an activist judge’s attempt to take the law into her own hands,” Liberty Institute President Kelly Shackelford told The Fort Worth Star-Telegram. The decision came from Justice David L. Bridges, R-Fate, who was elected to the court in 1996; Fitzgerald, R-Dallas, who was appointed by Gov. George W. Bush in 1999; and Robert M. Fillmore, who was appointed by Gov. Rick Perry in 2009. This article appeared in the Dallas Voice print edition September 3, 2010.

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You are here : Home / The long road to justice / Towards the quashing of the case without appeal / The review process The whole truth and nothing but the truthOn 4 December 1903, writing in La Petite République, Jaurès expressed his reservations if the Court of Cassation were to overturn the judgment and send the case back to the court martial, which would give the last word to "the military tribe and the caste mentality." Speaking about the proceedings, Jaurès said, "The truth must be known; the duty of the Court of Cassation's-and the supreme interest of the convicted innocent man-is to drive the investigation forward until every obscurity will have been removed. No matter how probative the new dossier is, it will not exempt the judges from the decisive effort needed to resolve all of the problems (…) It is not enough for the innocent man to be legally rehabilitated. In addition, we must crush, in every corner of the affair that remains dark, any nests that could one day give rise to new lies and new stories. The whole inquiry, the whole light, the whole truth; this must be the order of the day of those who would leave the conscience of the country in definitive safety."On 24 December, "staggered at the sight of so many forgeries," the review commission issued a unanimous decision in favor of review; the following day, the minister wrote to the public prosecutor in order to point out two pieces of evidence that would establish the innocence of the condemned man: a forgery in which the writing was altered, and another in which the date was changed. Manuel Baudoin wrote his brief until 17 January 1904, and concluded that the request for review was admissible, that the Rennes judgment should be overturned and that supplemental information could be introduced. Based on expert assessments, the conclusions of Dreyfus's lawyer were filed on 30 January; they were supplemented on 1 February by a forty-page memorandum by Dreyfus, who stated that neither the bordereau nor the secret dossier contained "the least suspicion" against him, but that what remained was "the formal and absolute proof of the guilt of Esterhazy."The Court of Cassation's investigationAfter two days of debates that were open to the public, the Court of Cassation declared the request for review admissible, and decided upon a supplemental investigation that would begin three days later. Beginning on 8 March, the Court was given every piece of evidence, including those of related cases and the secret diplomatic dossier. Vincent Duclert has pointed out that that the documents from the sealed general staff cabinet were examined until 15 March, the "large secret dossier" until 29 March, and the 220 diplomatic documents until 18 June. After receiving a general officers' report that ruled out the idea that certain terms in the bordereau could have been used by an artilleryman, and having heard other experts as well as Alfred Dreyfus, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation closed its investigation on 28 November 1904. In Dreyfus's view, the investigation had "completely and definitively dashed all of the alleged charges brought against [him] and had laid bare every criminal acts of [his] accusers." His enemies' methods had been simple: favorable evidence had been suppressed or concealed, while other documents had been altered and total forgeries had been created. In filing before the Court, Captain Targe announced that his minister had stipulated that he "point out these intrigues in order that they be condemned by the Court, and so that any future reference to them will be impossible." The end of the investigation had this goal in mind. << PreviousThe investigation of Captain TargeNext >>From closing arguments to the Moras report Public prosecutor Baudoin List of pieces of evidence in the review trial archivesdoc_diversPrince Albert I of Monaco...Paul Painlevé testifies at...Documents used during the...Dreyfus's statement to the...

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Letter: Kansas should change way it selects judges In a democracy like ours, should lawmakers be selected democratically? Stephen J. WareLaw professor, University of Kansas To the editor:In a democracy like ours, should lawmakers be selected democratically? Not according to the Journal-World (Court, politics, Nov. 23), which wants some of our state's most important lawmakers selected in a deeply undemocratic process that makes the votes of some citizens count far more than the votes of others.The lawmakers in question are our state's appellate court judges. Judges are lawmakers? Yes. Judges have routinely made law throughout our country's history and even earlier, going back to England. This judge-made law, called the "common law," has generally worked well and continues today to govern thousands of cases including those involving contracts, property rights and bodily injuries.Common law rules differ from state to state. States with more liberal judges tend to have more liberal common law, while states with more conservative judges tend to have more conservative common law. The political leanings of appellate judges, rather than trial judges, are especially important because appellate judges have much more power over the direction of the law.In short, the appellate judges of Kansas, like those of other states, are tremendously important lawmakers. What is unusual about the lawmaking judges of Kansas is how they are selected. None of the other 49 states uses the system Kansas uses to pick its two appellate courts. And for good reason, because the Kansas system is a shockingly undemocratic way to select lawmakers.At the center of the Kansas system is the Supreme Court Nominating Commission and most of the members of this commission are picked in elections open to only 10,000 people, the members of the state bar. The remaining 2.8 million people in Kansas have no vote in these elections.This violates basic equality among citizens, the principle of one-person, one-vote. The current system elevates one small group and treats everyone else like second-class citizens. Kansas lawyers tend to be fine people but they're not superheroes. They don't deserve more power than lawyers have in any of the other 49 states. In a democracy, a lawyer's vote should not be worth more than any other citizen's vote.So the problem is not that Kansas has a nominating commission but how that commission is selected. As Washburn Law Professor Jeffrey Jackson wrote, democratic legitimacy "would appear to favor a reduction in the influence of the state bar and its members over the nominating commission because they do not fit within the democratic process. Rather, the more desirable system from a legitimacy standpoint would have a greater number of the commission's members selected through means more consistent with the concept of representative government."Bar groups in Kansas claim that this violation of our democratic principles is the only way to get competent judges. But the bar provides no evidence that judges selected in lawyer-favoring systems are better than judges selected in the more open and democratic appointment systems used by a dozen other states.Kansas should follow those states' lead so that our state's courts can have democratic legitimacy as well as professional competence.

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Harold Hoffman: An Evolving Class Action Plaintiff Klein Moynihan Turco LLP We have previously written about an established class action plaintiff who is making a name for himself throughout the Internet marketing industry by virtue of his liberal use of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) to bring class action lawsuits. In the past, we had seen such suits in connection with the advertising and sale of consumer products (such as flowers, espresso machines and commercial email advertisements in general), however, we have recently seen a distinct pivot in Harold Hoffman’s focus towards pharmaceutical and nutraceutical products, including herbal extracts, vegetable extracts, oils, dietary supplements and the like. What is the nature of the new Hoffman allegations? The allegations made by Hoffman in this most recent series of lawsuits typically involve claims of deceptive advertising-based CFA violations, including: (1) that the subject product has not been properly classified as a drug with the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”); (2) that the label of the subject product fails to include certain FDA-required disclaimer language; or (3) that the subject product is improperly advertised or marketed as having certain nutritional, health or medicinal benefits in violation of federal law and FDA regulations. In many of these recent lawsuits, Hoffman has sought to parlay alleged violations of the federal Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act into consumer fraud-based nationwide class action lawsuits, exposing defendant companies to potentially crippling liability. What Should You Do If Hoffman or Any Other CFA Plaintiff Sues You? The failure to quickly identify the defenses available to the various versions of CFA class action lawsuits may result in manufacturers, advertisers, and marketers alike finding themselves on weak footing when defending the claims brought against them. Therefore, it is critical to engage counsel knowledgeable in the intricacies of these complex issues in order to minimize the expense of defending such suits, whether brought by a formidable litigator such as Hoffman, or other CFA plaintiffs. Extensive experience with the aggressive defense of marketing and advertising-related lawsuits, as well as class action lawsuits generally, has allowed us to formulate arguments informed by the most effective legal theories related to New Jersey CFA claims, positioning our clients to achieve favorable resolutions. The best defense to a lawsuit, however, is to take the necessary steps to avoid the prying eyes of class action plaintiffs altogether. Retaining and working closely with counsel that understands the nuances of the laws governing advertising and marketing practices will go a long way towards ensuring that a class action complaint never gets filed in the first place. Klein Moynihan Turco LLP - David O. Klein Filed under Nutraceutical Illinois’ New Anti-Fantasy Sports Bill and the Need for Fantasy Sports Lawyers * Yahoo Awarded Over $1.5 Million in Sweepstakes Promotion Lawsuit * New Facebook Policy Restricts Ad Targeting * FTC Settles with Data Broker * Fax Marketing and the TCPA

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A Mississippi Lawmaker Would Support Another Vote on the State Flag by Desare Frazier on Mississippi State Flag Supporters who want Mississippi's confederate emblem removed from the state flag are mounting a campaign to bring the issue to a vote. Initiative 55, The Flag for all Mississippians could be on the ballot in 2018. In 2001, a majority of Mississippians voted to keep the flag. But Republican House Representative Randy Boyd says it may be time to put it on the ballot. "I think that's what probably needs to be done, if enough people call for it. I have no problem with it. I'm not attached to the flag either way, but I do want the people of Mississippi to give their voice," said Boyd.Boyd doesn't think it's the job of the legislature to change the flag. Mississippi College School of Law Professor Matt Steffey says the issue has gained momentum because of the Charleston Nine shootings and it's not going away. Those who oppose taking the confederate emblem off the state flag are sponsoring Initiative 54, but it will likely die. Supporters disagree with the changes Attorney General Jim Hood made to wording that would appear on the ballot. They plan to re-file. Steffey says lawmakers will likely address the issue in 2016."It is easy to see how the legislature might take it up as early as 2016. Particularly after the hum bum of the election cycle is over. I think that is an ideal time," said Steffey.Speaker of the House Phillip Gunn has previously come out in support of changing the state flag. The governor's office did not respond to a request for comment about the latest Initiative 55. In the past, Governor Phil Bryant has said he stands by the 2001 vote. previous post Jackson Woman Galvanizes Support To Change Flag Through Ballot Box Battling the West Nile Virus in Mississippi

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TOPICS > Politics U.S. Civil Court System Needs Major Overhaul, New Book Declares October 18, 2011 at 12:00 AM EST 556912558825588U.S. Civil Court System Needs Major Overhaul, New Book DeclaresIn "Rebuilding Justice: Civil Courts in Jeopardy and Why You Should Care," co-authors Rebecca Love Kourlis and Dirk Olin examine problems and potential improvements in the U.S. civil court system, where 30 million cases are filed every year. Ray Suarez and Kourlis discuss the authors' call for a major overhaul of the system.2011-10-18 18:50:00disabled2156095000e6CDpWI1o9U200963200961http://www.pbs.org/newshour/episode/pbs-newshour-weekend-full-episode-dec-10-2016/PBS NewsHour Weekend full episode Dec. 10, 2016On this episode for Saturday, Dec. 10, the CIA has determined that covert Russian hacking was in fact an attempt to help Donald Trump win the White House. And later, a comparison of President-elect Donald Trump and Ronald Reagan. Alison Stewart anchors from New York.2016-12-10 12:00 amhttp://newshour-tc.pbs.org/newshour/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/RTX2UDJ9-320x196.jpgPXUUtf9GjnA200948200942http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/similar-trump-reagan/How similar are Trump and Reagan?Donald Trump often invoked Ronald Reagan on the campaign trail this year, and did so again as President-elect last week at a North Carolina rally as he described his plans for the military. But just how similar are the two men? As NewsHour Weekend Correspondent Jeff Greenfield explains, their differences are a testimony about how much our political landscape has changed over the past 35 years.2016-12-10 15:40:00http://newshour-tc.pbs.org/newshour/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/reagan-320x196.jpg2365912749sdCbvRTPIgg200935200936http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/russia-aimed-help-trump-hacking-cia-finds/Russia aimed to help Trump through hacking, CIA findsThe Washington Post reported that the CIA has determined that Russian hacking was, in fact, an attempt to help President-elect Donald Trump win the White House. Trump’s team questioned the report’s credibility in a statement Friday. Greg Miller of the Washington Post, who helped break the story, joins Alison Stewart.2016-12-10 15:27:00http://newshour-tc.pbs.org/newshour/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/RTX2UDJ7-320x196.jpg23659127681XsYKNRPBEY In "Rebuilding Justice: Civil Courts in Jeopardy and Why You Should Care," co-authors Rebecca Love Kourlis and Dirk Olin examine problems and potential improvements in the U.S. civil court system, where 30 million cases are filed every year. Ray Suarez and Kourlis discuss the authors' call for a major overhaul of the system. PBS NewsHour Weekend full episode Dec. 10, 2016How similar are Trump and Reagan?Russia aimed to help Trump through hacking, CIA finds http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rss/media/2011/10/18/20111018_9_civilcourts1.mp3SEE PODCASTS RELATED LINKSSupreme Court Weighs Constitutionality of Routine Jailhouse Strip Searches How Fairly Were Strauss-Kahn, Diallo Treated by Justice System? GWEN IFILL: Finally tonight, a portrait of the American judicial system. The highest court in the land began its term this month with an unusually high number of consequential cases awaiting appeal, touching on subjects from health care reform to illegal immigration. Drawing less attention are the 30 million civil court cases filed every year over everyday issues like traffic tickets, divorce and personal injury. A new book, “Rebuilding Justice: Civil Courts in Jeopardy and Why You Should Care,” argues Americans don’t understand how the courts work and that the system itself needs a major overhaul. Ray Suarez talked with the book’s co-author on the campus of Georgetown University Law Center’s Supreme Court Institute. RAY SUAREZ: Rebecca Love Kourlis, welcome. REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS, “Rebuilding Justice: Civil Courts in Jeopardy and Why You Should Care”: Thank you so much. RAY SUAREZ: Well, the book reads like a 230-page indictment. What’s the problem? REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS: Well, it’s not that complicated — or it shouldn’t be. If you get in a car wreck, and there’s an argument about who should be paying damages, your assumption is that you can go to court to have that case resolved. The truth of the matter is that’s probably the last place you want to be, because the fees and the costs will ultimately be more than your car is worth, even if you drive a really nice car. Or businesses — businesses need confidence in the fact that if they have a contract dispute, they can go to court, get a resolution for a reasonable amount of money in a reasonable amount of time. So, the first thrust is, we have to convince people that this really matters, that it’s very important to our social contract to have a civil justice system that is accessible, efficient and accountable. RAY SUAREZ: Instead of making trials faster or cheaper or better, you say the tech revolution made them slower and more expensive and churned up a lot of extraneous material in the process. REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS: It sure has. First of all, very few cases are getting to trial. Only 1 percent of civil cases actually get to trial. All the rest of them settle, and not necessarily on the merits. They settle because one or both of the parties have run out of money or think they’re going to run out of money. Into that process, then drop the electronic age. It’s no longer a box of documents that the attorneys are going to uncover in the discovery process. It is millions of documents, emails and text messages and voice messages, all of which are the discoverable. The corporate attorneys will say that a lawsuit that would require $2 to $3 million in legal fees, so a big lawsuit, can require another $2 to $3 million in the costs of producing and reviewing electronic information. RAY SUAREZ: So, no more continuances, no more lawyers appearing before judges and asking for another three weeks to review all the documents? That — doesn’t that drive the cost? REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS: Yes. RAY SUAREZ: Isn’t that contributing a lot to the cost? REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS: Absolutely it does. And there are cases, as I’m sure you know, where everybody shows up in the courtroom ready to go, witnesses, you know, all of the evidence, and the case gets continued because the judge has a criminal case on which there’s going to be a speedy trial expiration or a juvenile case. That can’t happen. Civil cases are really important. And they need to be treated as really important, both by the funding entities and by the judges and lawyers handling them. RAY SUAREZ: A lot of the people who want to see civil court reform are just saying, let’s just blow up the process. Put very high limits on getting your ticket punched to get into court, so cut out the stuff at the bottom, or putting a cap on awards and saying, these great big cases, forget it. A company shouldn’t be in jeopardy of being run out of business by losing one case — sort of the two ends of the rope being cut off by people who want to really, severely change the way we do that. Are those answers? REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS: No, I don’t think so, at least not fundamental answers. The answer is to fix the system. The answer is to assure that anyone with a legitimate claim or a legitimate defense has access to a system that works, and to assure that judges are weeding the wheat from the chaff because they understand that’s part of their job. You know, all of us, if in a position where we would need to be a plaintiff or in a position where we were sued as a defendant, we want to know that we can go to court and that there will be a cost-effective, just process in place. RAY SUAREZ: One of the ways that people are talking about addressing dysfunctional courts is looking at the way judges are chosen. We have kind of a mix in the United States, don’t we? REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS: Oh, it’s a hodgepodge. There are almost no two states that are exactly alike. RAY SUAREZ: And what’s the problem there? REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS: Oh, the problem is huge. Let’s remember, first of all, that federal judges are appointed for life. As much as you can decry the political process at the outset, they’re appointed for life. And that’s part of the United States’ constitutional promise. States are all over the map on this front. States, many states, have partisan, contested elections. Other states have systems that look like the federal system. And then there are a bunch of states that are in between, that have achieved this balance between impartiality and accountability. RAY SUAREZ: But in a country that doggedly resists having the same answers to the same questions when it comes to how we run our state, can you recommend a model that would work in Missouri and Florida? REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS: Sure. Sure. And, in fact, we do. The appointing authority, usually the governor, appoints, and then that judge serves a provisional term in office, during which there’s a judicial performance evaluation, a report card, if you will. And that’s about the kinds of things we have been talking about. Is the judge running the courtroom well? Is the judge making decisions in a timely and understandable way? Is the judge well-prepared, knowledgeable on the law? That information is packaged and available to the voters. And then the voters vote yes, no, up, down on that particular judge as to whether they want that judge to stay in office. RAY SUAREZ: Have televised trials, have reality TV shows, have court TV shows, which have now proliferated across syndicated television, helped Americans understand how their legal system works? REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS: Oh, I suppose, at some level, all the way back from “Perry Mason” to current court TV, it’s important to keep the court system in the minds of the public. And there are pieces of information that come through that are helpful, but there’s a lot of information that’s inaccurate and is, in fact, destructive. The fundamental premise that people don’t get — and I bet if you walked out into the street now, or maybe even if you were to ask law students or lawyers — the fundamental problem is this notion that judges, like members of the executive or legislative branch, have some duty to listen to their constituency, to put their finger in the air to see which way the wind is blowing before they make a decision, rather than being accountable just to the rule of law and the Constitution, and having as their job description impartiality and integrity and a fealty to the laws and fact in a particular case. RAY SUAREZ: “Rebuilding Justice: Civil Courts in Jeopardy and Why You Should Care,” Rebecca Love Kourlis, thanks a lot. REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS: Thank you. book civil court court system Georgetown University Justice Sandra Day O'Connor Law Rebecca Love Kourlis Rebuilding Justice

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You are here: Parliament home page > Parliamentary business > Publications and Records > Hansard > Commons Debates > Public Bill Committee Debates > Standing Committee on Bills Employment Bill [back to previous text] Mr. Hammond: I can understand how those watching our proceedings might find it curious that such joy can be elicited by the acceptance of an amendment dealing with the simple deletion of a single word. However, had they thought up, written down and tabled some 180 to 190 amendments and had not a single one prove acceptable to the Government, they would perhaps understand a little better. On this Column Number: 415 occasion, my joy has been compounded by the intervention of the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West. Apart from anything else, he has given me an idea for an amendment that I could table on Report. That would enable the Minister to repeat his trick—assuming that the hon. Gentleman does not table one first. Amendment No. 166 must be taken together with amendment No. 167, which would delete new section 171ZS(8). Subsection (8) states: ''In such cases as may be prescribed, a person's normal weekly earnings shall be calculated in accordance with regulations.'' Subsection (6) states that ''a person's normal weekly earnings shall, subject to subsection (8) below, be taken to be the average weekly earnings which in the relevant period have been paid to him or paid for his benefit''. We therefore return to a debate that we had this morning: ''normal weekly earnings'' means ''average weekly earnings'', except in such cases as may be prescribed. In the cases that may be prescribed, ''earnings shall be calculated in accordance with regulations.'' It is all clear. Normal earnings are average earnings unless the Secretary of State says by regulations says that they are something else, as yet unspecified. That situation seems to me not entirely satisfactory, but no doubt the Minister has some explanation and can give us an example of a problem that he will need to address by making regulations that deal with particular cases in which ''normal weekly earnings'' cannot be ''average weekly earnings''. I take it that we are not talking here simply about the bonus example that we had this morning. [Interruption.] Perhaps we are talking simply about that, in which case we shall find out soon. I shall now discuss amendment No. 168. Subsection (7) provides a definition for the purposes just of subsection (6) of ''earnings'' and ''relevant period''. Why does there need to be a different definition of those terms for subsection (6)? What is the distinction between subsection (6) and the rest of this part of the Act, in terms of the appropriate definition of ''earnings'' and ''relevant period''? Alan Johnson: Amendments Nos. 166, 167 and 168 would remove provisions allowing us to specify in regulations how average weekly earnings are to be calculated. They would be unworkable, leaving it unclear to employers and employees how to determine whether an adopted parent had met the earnings conditions to qualify for statutory adoption pay and how much statutory adoption pay a parent was entitled to receive. Removing the subsections would open up numerous possibilities for misinterpretation of the way in which a person's normal weekly earnings and average weekly earnings should be calculated. The debate that we had this morning on amendment No. 127 and the amendments grouped with it is relevant here. Column Number: 416 Mr. Hammond: The amendments do not leave out subsection (6), but merely delete the reference in subsection (6) to its being subject to subsection (8). They seek to leave out subsection (8) and the reference in subsection (6) to subsection (8). Alan Johnson: Subsection (8) covers the situation in which a person is not paid weekly. Subsection (6) provides for calculation of weekly earnings. We need subsection (8) as well to deal with people who are paid monthly or over another period. I have a long explanation of the way in which the calculation works, but as the hon. Gentleman is on a roll I do not want to punish him by going through all that. It is quite a complex calculation, but one on which we consulted widely. As I said previously, we proposed to change it and it was employers who said to leave it as it was. As in so many other cases, the subsections reflect the approach taken for statutory maternity pay. Primary legislation for SMP similarly allows for calculation of a person's normal and average weekly earnings to be set out in regulations. I believe that that enables us to provide the detail of how such earnings are to be calculated that employers and employees need to avoid uncertainty. We shall make use of the regulation-making powers provided for in this part to explain in detail how weekly earnings should be calculated for the purpose of statutory adoption pay. Mr. Prisk: If removing subsection (7) would cause greater confusion, could it not be that subsection (7), by giving the Minister future powers to change the definitions, could itself be the root cause of the confusion? Alan Johnson: I do not think so. We have stuck rigidly to the tried and tested measures that we have used for statutory maternity pay. We have ensured that statutory adoption pay—and paternity pay—mirrors those procedures. It is a system to which employers are used and on which they have received advice and guidance over a long period. The amendments would be unworkable and would do a disservice to employers and employees. I hope that, with that clarification, the hon. Gentleman will seek to withdraw the amendment. Mr. Hammond: I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. In light of what he has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill. Mr. George Osborne (Tatton): I am happy to speak on the amended clause—indeed, happy to speak on a clause that we have successfully amended. This is the first time in this Committee that we have done so. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge on spotting the mistake and getting the amendment accepted. I cannot resist also congratulating the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West. Earlier in the Committee he supported us when he was not supposed to and then he managed to oppose us when he was not supposed to do that either, but he, like me, is a new boy here, and we are learning as we go along. As the briefing documents provided for the Bill show, there are 2,700 domestic adoptions each year. Although that is a small number in the overall scheme of things, it is incredibly important to the children concerned, to the families concerned—many of whom would otherwise be childless—and to society as a whole that society is seen to care for those children who cannot be cared for by their natural families. I very much welcome the Government's stated intention of increasing the number of adoptions. I read that their target is to increase the number by a third. They say that by 2003 there may be as many as 3,850 adoptions. In all sincerity I wish them every success in achieving that target and hope that they exceed it. I believe that statutory paid adoption leave will help. I freely admit that it is not something that the Conservatives, or previous Labour Governments, did. One could argue that Governments of all persuasions have not done enough to make adoption easier for parents. Therefore, I very much welcome the provision. Mr. Prisk: I share my hon. Friend's support for the principle, but does he in turn share my concern that in the debate on the clause there seemed to be a lack of consistency on the Government side? My hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge argued that the Government had failed to be consistent. They have argued for consistency all the way through in maternity, paternity and adoption, and yet that has not been applied in the clause. Mr. Osborne: My hon. Friend makes a good point and anticipates my remarks. The crucial period for an adoptive family is the initial weeks when a child is placed with the family. It is arguable that it is even more important that time is given for an adoptive family, because the children are often not newborn, but may be one, two or three years old, or even older. They have to adjust to the new family that they find themselves in and the adoptive parents have to adjust to the new child that has arrived in their life, often much more grown up than would be the case in a natural family. I therefore share the concern expressed by my hon. Friends the Members for Runnymede and Weybridge and for Hertford and Stortford that statutory adoption pay will be set at only £100 a week for the majority of those who will claim it. This is a good opportunity to bring this new and welcome scheme of paid adoption leave into line with maternity leave. I cannot believe that there would be enormous costs to the Exchequer if people were allowed, for the first six weeks or so, to— Mr. Hammond: My hon. Friend might do the Committee a service if he were specifically to ask the Minister whether his Department has made an estimate of that cost. Mr. Osborne: I am happy to do so. I understand that the current estimate of the cost is £10 million to the Exchequer for the year 2003-04. I should be interested to know, if the Minister wishes to intervene, what the additional cost to the Exchequer would be if paid adoption leave were brought into line with paid maternity leave. Mr. Kevin Hughes (Doncaster, North): I should be grateful if the hon. Gentleman would enlighten the Committee. He is arguing for more money to be paid but the shadow Chancellor is on the record as saying that he would reduce Government spending. How does the hon. Gentleman's argument fit with the policy of the shadow Chancellor and the Tory party to cut public expenditure? Mr. Osborne: I am grateful for that helpful intervention. Sadly, at this early stage of my parliamentary career I am not yet in the position of drafting shadow Budgets. However, I want to make two points. First, my right hon. and learned Friend the shadow Chancellor has decided, in light of recent experience, to put improvements in public services ahead of tax cuts. Secondly, under a Conservative Government the economy would grow much faster and there would be more tax receipts. There would certainly be enough to meet what would, I believe, be the small cost of bringing paid adoption leave into line with paid maternity leave. ©Parliamentary copyright 2002 Prepared 15 January 2002

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Register Home»Argentina»Country/Situation Specific Position Papers Status of Argentines Abroad Publisher UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Status of Argentines Abroad, 13 November 1984, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/44c7878e4.html [accessed 11 December 2016] A. Application of Cessation Clauses of the UNHCR Statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention 1. Recent developments in Argentina, including the restoration of constitutional rule in the country may duly be considered as events which make the cessation clauses contained in paragraph 6 A (e) of the UNHCR Statute, and Article I.C (5) of the 1951 Convention generally applicable to Argentines abroad. It is therefore considered that Argentines who left Argentina, particularly after 1976, and were recognized as refugees, can in principle no longer refuse to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality since the grounds for maintaining refugee status have ceased to exist. 2. With respect to refugee status under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, it must naturally be left to the governments of the asylum countries concerned to formally determine their position in this respect, should Representatives advise them of UNHCR position. B. Legal and Practical Consequences 3. As far as UNHCR is concerned, persons falling under Section A above have in principle ceased to be refugees. Former refugees who still find themselves outside Argentina will henceforth have the status of ordinary aliens whose continued stay in the asylum country will depend upon the authorization of the Government concerned. 4. Argentines who consider that they have valid reasons for not availing themselves of the protection of the Argentine Government should be afforded an opportunity to present – either to UNHCR or to the authorities of their country of residence – the reasons why they wish to maintain their refugee status. Such cases should be examined on their merits, and if it appears that a favourable decision or recommendation may be indicated, should be referred to Headquarters for advice. 5. In the case of former refugees being allowed to continue residing in the host country, the UNHCR Representative should fix a reasonable time limit for the cessation of UNHCR material assistance. In countries where UNHCR is not represented, the UNDP Resident Co-ordinator may be consulted in this connection. 6. No assistance towards resettlement in third countries can be accorded to Argentines to whom the cessation clauses apply. C. Individual Voluntary Repatriation 7. All Argentine refugees or former refugees who qualify for repatriation and who wish to be repatriated under our auspices should register with UNHCR or our operational partner for repatriation under the 1985 repatriation project by 31 March 1985, and should have reached their final destination by 31 August 1985. In countries where UNHCR is not represented, the UNDP Resident Co-ordinator may be consulted in this connection. 8. It is considered that, in the absence of strong reasons to the contrary, Argentine refugees or former refugees who have not repatriated by that date will have clearly demonstrated that they are not willing to return now to their country of origin in spite of the changes described in 2, thus excluding themselves from UNHCR repatriation assistance. 9. The need to complete a cycle of study prior to repatriation would ordinarily be a valid ground for postponing repatriation. Cessation clauses Voluntary repatriation

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Place an Ad This Just In Study on racial disparity in Vt. justice due soon By WILSON RINGThe Associated Press | January 12,2014 MONTPELIER — A study seeking to determine if members of minority groups are treated more harshly by the Vermont criminal justice system than white defendants should be finished before the Legislature adjourns this spring, said the official leading the study.When the Legislature commissioned the study by the Vermont Center for Justice Research in 2012, it set December as the deadline for the report. But it was delayed because of problems getting the required information from the FBI, according to Max Schlueter, the center’s executive director.Now his organization and the FBI have agreed on the information that will be provided and they are now working to determine the mechanics of how the information will be shared.Schlueter briefed the House Judiciary Committee on the progress of the study Friday.“The Legislature asked us to look into disparities in sentencing,” Schlueter said before the hearing. “But in large part they were really interested in whether or not the sentences of people of color, how does that compare with sentences for white defendants.”Schlueter said there was no disagreement that minorities are disproportionately represented in Vermont’s criminal justice system. It’s an issue that in one form or another has bedeviled Vermont law enforcement for some time. Separate studies released in 2012 determined minorities were more likely to be stopped by police than white drivers.Schlueter said that going beyond traffic stops, anecdotal evidence leads many to believe there are more minorities in Vermont prisons because they came to the state and committed serious crimes. And before arriving in Vermont many already had significant criminal records that would prompt prosecutors and judges to seek lengthier sentences against them.But statistically it has been impossible to determine if the minority defendants are being treated more harshly because the studies have only looked at the defendant’s Vermont record. To make an accurate comparison, a study needs to take into account the complete history of the individual.So the Legislature appropriated $20,000 and the federal government added another $23,000 to get the entire criminal history of a representative sample of defendants over a five-year period.Schlueter said his office and the FBI have agreed to share the records, specifically looking at histories of charges that include domestic violence, assault and marijuana and cocaine possession.“It’s a troubling question and our goal, really, is to either put it to rest and say, ‘you know, the courts are in fact color blind’ or say ‘that’s a good story about all these bad guys coming up from the Bronx, but it really isn’t true,’” Schlueter said.

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Timothy Schaffer Sentencing Continued By MaryJo Johnson on Fri 08/06/2010 03:00pm Schaffer_Timothy_Medium.JPG Timothy Paul Schaffer After being found guilty on June 3rd of Aggravated Assault and Battery, Timothy Paul Schaeffer was initially scheduled to be sentenced Friday morning in 4th Judicial District Court. The charges stemmed from an incident in the early morning hours of October 24, 2009 at Willy's Lounge in Sheridan, where Schaeffer and another after-hours poker player, Brian “Beaver” Legerski got into a fight that resulted in Schaeffer brandishing a flare gun and using a taser on Legerski. His trial was not a smooth one, with Schaeffer resorting to angry, obscenity-ridden outbursts over the two days. In several subsequent hearings after a twelve-person jury found him guilty, Schaffer went before Judge John Fenn with complaints about his counsel, who at the time was Court-appointed Public Defender Robert Jones. At a hearing on July 20th, Judge Fenn ruled to allow a Motion to Fire Robert Jones, and Schaffer took on his own case Pro Se. As part of that hearing, Jones said that he had no problem withdrawing from representing Schaffer, but to remind the defendant that if he waived his right to counsel and went Pro Se, he must understand that he wouldn't be assigned another attorney. In what turned out to be a bit of a blind side to State's attorneys Dianna Bennett and Darci Arsene Friday morning, Judge Fenn told the Court that he's received numerous letters from Schaffer, including a Motion to Be Appointed an Attorney. Judge Fenn said that sentencing would be continued until the Court could appoint him another Public Defender. The whole process took about three minutes and court was adjourned, leaving a baffled prosecution wondering why the judge made the change. Source URL (retrieved on 12/10/2016 - 7:35pm): http://www.sheridanmedia.com/news/timothy-schaffer-sentencing-continued11785

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Sentencing of man accused of abduction deferred The attorney for a Lisbon man accused of abducting a 9-year-old girl from the Stonington police department parking lot on New Year's Eve, triggering an Amber Alert and leading police on a multi-state chase said the entire incident has been "blown out" of proportion.Attorney Anthony Basilica, who is representing Daniel E. Candales, 42, said Thursday in court that his client was on his way to drop off his 5-year-old daughter at the Stonington Police Department. Basilica said that Candales brought his girlfriend to the drop-off because she was intoxicated and didn't want to leave her alone with her 9-year-old daughter.Basilica said Candales and the girlfriend got into an argument at the police station and that Candales took off, hoping to diffuse the situation and calm her down. Basilica said that Candales didn't realize that the girlfriend had left her cellphone in his car, and he wasn't able to communicate with her.Basilica said that when police started to chase him, he didn't pull over because of his previous dealings with them and that he simply panicked.After the brief court hearing, Basilica said his client realized that he made a mistake and should have pulled over.Prosecutor Mary Jean Kanabis objected to the notion that Candales didn't mean to flee, saying that the girlfriend had shined a flashlight in front of the car so that he would stop and that Candales refused to comply with police lights and sirens to pull over. Police also have said they tried to stop Candales from leaving the parking lot.Candales' ex-wife also was present in court and told Judge John Nazzaro that their 5-year-old daughter had witnessed Candales strike his girlfriend while they were on the way to Stonington police."This is very frustrating for me," the woman said. "My daughter is afraid of him."Candales had pleaded no contest last January to five counts of violation of a protective order and third-degree assault. He was placed on GPS monitoring and ordered to take domestic violence classes. If he had successfully completed the court's order, he would have been given a suspended sentence. Now, he faces up to eight years in prison.Nazzaro deferred sentencing so that the Judge Kevin McMahon, who had made the agreement, could revisit the case and decide what the next step would be.Nazzaro, however, noted that the case was serious and did increase the bonds. He placed a $25,000 cash only bond on each of the six cases that he pleaded out to last January and increased the Stonington case by an additional $10,000. Candales had made a $175,000 cash bond in connection with the chase.Candales was expected to post his $160,000 bond. Nazzaro said if Candales did make bond, he would be subject to GPS monitoring and home confinement.The court also issued protective orders for the two minor children and ordered that Candales stay away from the girlfriend's home. The court also appointed an attorney for the 9-year-old.According to police, Candales drove his pickup truck with a plow and sander attached to the police station parking lot about 7:05 p.m. for a custody exchange with his ex-wife. When a police officer came outside and told Candales not to leave, he drove off with the 9-year-old girl in the cab.Stonington police spotted Candales and pursued him through Pawcatuck and Westerly before Hopkinton police took over the pursuit. Candales later crossed back into Connecticut on Route 49, and Hopkinton police broke off the chase. A bulletin was put out to local departments for Candales, who owns a landscaping and snow plowing business in Lisbon.By locating and tracking his cellphone signal, police took Candales and the girl into custody in Richmond, R.I. The girl was uninjured.Stonington police charged him with two counts of risk of injury to a minor, breach of peace, engaging police in pursuit, reckless driving and first-degree unlawful restraint.Candales' case was continued to Jan. 17.After the hearing, the ex-wife's attorney, Gregory Carnese, said his client was hoping that Candales would have been sentenced Thursday."Hopefully, he will get what he deserves," Carnese [email protected] Charges mounting in Lisbon man's domestic violence case Man in Stonington New Year's Eve abduction released on bond Two states will charge man involved in alleged abduction, police chase Girl safe after Stonington abduction; suspect in custody

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New London — Lawyers representing the estate of a 6-year-old boy who drowned July 4 at a municipal beach on Pequot Avenue have filed an “intent to sue” against the city, naming four city lifeguards and employees.Jason M. Burdick of the law firm Messier, Massad and Burdick of New London, filed the document Tuesday in City Hall on behalf of the estate of Anthony Bernoudy.The one-page document names Leona Podeszwa, Rachel Smithson, Fiona Hook and Nora Greene as “the employees responsible for the drowning death of Anthony Bernoudy.” It also says supervisors, trainers and others responsible for park safety will be sued in their capacity as city employees.The youngster, who was at Greens Harbor Beach with his family July 4, was last seen around 5:30 p.m. near the water. After an intensive search on land and water by his family, police, firefighters and boaters, an emergency diver found the boy in the water at about 11:10 p.m. a short distance from the beach. He was taken to Lawrence + Memorial Hospital in New London, where he was pronounced dead. He would have been a first-grader at Jennings Elementary School.At the time, City Recreation Director Tommie Major said park hours were 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. during the week and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on weekends. The four lifeguards on duty on July 4 left for the day at 5 p.m., he said.The Day also has a pending Freedom of Information request to the police department for the report of the police investigation.Burdick and City Law Director Jeffrey Londregan could not be reached to comment Tuesday.But at Monday’s City Council meeting, Londregan said in order to sue a municipality, an intent to sue must be filed within six months. The statute of limitations for filing a lawsuit is two years, he [email protected]

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BoA sued for Providence landmark neglect The Art Deco-style Industrial National Bank Building, known as "the Superman building," in downtown Providence stands vacant as the fight over its renovation goes to court. Published November 12. 2013 12:01AM By MICHELLE R. SMITH Associated Press Providence, R.I. - The owner of Rhode Island's tallest building is suing Bank of America for more than $23 million, saying it neglected the Art Deco-style skyscraper, leaving behind crumbling facades and other problems when it left it vacant earlier this year.Newton, Mass.-based developer High Rock says the 26-story building, known locally as the Superman building for its resemblance to the Daily Planet building in the old "Superman" TV show, is unrentable because of the work that must be done. Its lawsuit was filed in U.S. District Court in Providence in July and is due for its first hearing Thursday.Bank of America denies that it breached its lease and has countersued, saying it is High Rock that has breached the lease, and asking for attorney's fees.A spokesman for High Rock and its lawyer would not comment on the lawsuit. A spokesman for Bank of America and its lawyer did not immediately return messages seeking comment.The 428-foot-tall building is the distinguishing feature on the Providence skyline and had been used as a bank since it opened in 1928, first for the Industrial Trust Co., then its successor Fleet. Fleet sold the building in 2003 to Westminster Office and agreed to lease the entire building back from the company for 10 years.Bank of America acquired Fleet in 2004 and assumed the lease. High Rock purchased the building in 2008, and the bank's lease term ended on April 30. By the time Bank of America left, it had been occupying only about 20 percent of the building's nearly 350,000 square feet.High Rock says in its lawsuit that under the terms of the lease, Bank of America and Fleet before it were responsible for keeping the building in good condition, complying with laws and codes and for making any repairs. The company says the bank ignored repeated reports that pointed out problems and repairs needed at the building.Bank of America "adopted a purely reactive facade maintenance program that did as little as possible, as late as possible, and at as low a cost as possible," the lawsuit says. It goes on to say the bank would put up safety staging above the street to catch falling brick and stone, then collect it in pails and store it in the building's basement.The bank denies the allegations.High Rock has been saying for months that the building needs extensive renovations. In April, shortly after the bank moved out, it floated a plan to get $39 million in state support to redevelop the building as apartments, but lawmakers rejected the idea.

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CHINS finding establishes only status of child Jennifer NelsonJanuary 6, 2010 Child in need of services, Court opinions, Courts, Indiana Supreme Court, Justice Frank Sullivan Jr., Juvenile Case Back to TopE-mailPrint Justices uphold admitting juvenile's confession Justices order adoption petitions moved to juvenile division based on local rule Supreme Court vacates parental termination for jailed mom Divided court upholds principal’s conviction of failure to report child abuse Indiana makes gains in permanent placement A finding that a child is in need of services only establishes the status of the child and means the child is a CHINS even if one parent isn't involved in the reasons for the determination, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled today. The issue as to whether a child can be deemed a CHINS with respect to one parent, but not the other arose in the case In the matter of N.E., a child in need of services; N.L. (father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services, No. 49S02-0906-JV-270. N.E.'s father, N.L., appealed the finding that N.E. was a child in need of services and the juvenile court's decision to not place his daughter with him. N.E.'s mother has four children with four different fathers and the children were removed from her home after the Department of Child Services alleged they were CHINS because of domestic violence in the home. The court then established N.L.'s paternity and placed N.E. in his custody, but removed N.E. to foster care a week later due to concerns about her paternal grandfather's drug problems. N.L. lived with his parents. At a fact-finding hearing, a guardian ad litem stated N.E. had lived with her father for an extensive period of time and there was no doubt she was appropriately cared for there. The juvenile court found the children to be wards of the state, but made no specific findings as to N.L. or reasons for not placing N.E. with him. The Indiana Court of Appeals was split in its reversal, ruling the state hadn't proved that N.E. was a CHINS with regard to her father. Judge Nancy Vaidik dissented, arguing a CHINS determination regards only the status of the child. The justices agreed with Judge Vaidik that a CHINS determination establishes the status of a child alone. The conduct of one parent can be enough for a child to be adjudicated a CHINS, and to adjudicate the culpability on the part of each parent would be at a variance with the purposes of a CHINS inquiry, wrote Justice Frank Sullivan. "Said differently, the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents," he wrote. The juvenile court properly adjudicated N.E. as a CHINS because the mother failed to protect the children against the domestic violence in the home. In these circumstances, the CHINS petition didn't have to make any allegations with respect to N.L., the justice wrote. The justices also agreed with the Court of the Appeals that the trial court's reasons for finding N.E. to be a ward of the state failed to take into account the time she spent in her father's care or why she shouldn't have been placed with him. The omission of these facts are important because when a juvenile court makes a decision during a CHINS hearing as to whether a child will be a ward of the state or orders services, this could potentially interfere with the parents' rights in bringing up their children, wrote Justice Sullivan. Also, statute requires a juvenile court to enter a decree that is least restrictive and consider placing a child with a blood relative before other out-of-home placements, he continued. The justices vacated that part of the juvenile court's judgment pertaining to N.E. because it may have interfered with N.L.'s rights to raise his daughter, and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

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Pay raise for judges, sheriffs gets final passage Tuesday, June 04 2013 BATON ROUGE- Judges and parish sheriffs have won legislative backing for their pay raises. With a 29-7 vote, the Senate gave final passage Tuesday to a bill outlining five years of pay raises for judges. Sheriffs can get the salary hikes, because a law allows them to get the same raises as district court judges. The bill now goes to Gov. Bobby Jindal, who has said he'll sign it into law. Shortly after the Senate passed the pay raise bill, the House gave final passage to a judicial budget that includes the new $2.5 million to cover the costs of the salary increases in the upcoming fiscal year that begins July 1. The House vote was 62-30 to send the budget bill to Jindal.

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What is a Dismissal Without Prejudice? When a judge dismisses a case without prejudice, the plaintiff can bring the case back to court if desired. A dismissal without prejudice may be requested when a settlement is reached out of court. A dismissal without prejudice is a dismissal of a legal case that permits the plaintiff to bring the claim again, unlike a dismissal with prejudice, in which the matter is considered final. There are a number of reasons for a case to be dismissed without prejudice, including on the plaintiff's request or because the judge feels that the plaintiff cannot prove the case. For defendants, it is important to be aware that this type of dismissal carries some risks because it leaves them exposed to the possibility that another case will be filed. In legal terms, “prejudice” has to do with rights and privileges. In this case, it indicates that the privileges and rights of the plaintiff are not waived, truncated, or terminated. This allows the plaintiff to refile in the future, if this is desired. When a judge dismisses with prejudice, it indicates that the right to bring suit again on the same claim has been terminated and the dismissal is final. Sometimes, a plaintiff will request a dismissal without prejudice to allow him to refile the case. Another reason to actively request this type of dismissal might be if the plaintiff and the defendant can reach a settlement, which would make the legal case unnecessary. Judges may also determine that there are problems with the case that merit a dismissal. Cases can be dismissed before they even start, or at any point during the presentation of the case in court. Ad When a case is dismissed without prejudice because a settlement has been reached, it leaves the possibility of refiling open. This is to the advantage of the plaintiff because it means that, if the other party fails to uphold the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff can bring the case back to court. In this case, the plaintiff would file a motion for a dismissal, which would likely be granted after the reaching of a settlement had been demonstrated. On the other hand, judges will dismiss with prejudice when they feel that the matter can be taken no further, even with a refiling. If the plaintiff filed a nuisance suit, failed to abide by the rules of the court, or acted in bad faith, the judge will be more likely to dismiss with prejudice so that the case cannot be taken before a court again. Once dismissed with prejudice, the issue is considered settled in the eyes of the law, no matter how the parties to the suit might feel. Ad What is an Order for Dismissal? What is a Dismissal Letter? What is the Difference Between a Dismissal with Prejudice and a Dismissal Without Prejudice? What is Constructive Dismissal? What is Voluntary Dismissal? What is a Court Docket? What is a Stipulation? A voluntary dismissal with the right to refile the case is good for the plaintiff. The case will be amended and refiled in a perfect manner to finally win in court. Sometimes it gets dismissed to rid the case of persons no longer class members. anon157519 I'm glad my granddaughter was only four when she told the judge what happened. she told what her dad wife did to her but then got scared. the bad part is CYS wouldn't help the child so now if it happens again, it can go back to court. rosoph It's a good thing that the request for dismissal without prejudice exists. I know that if I were the plaintiff in a case, and maybe we had agreed on a settlement, I would want the option to bring the claim again. You never know if the other person is going to come through on their part of the settlement. reader888 How interesting! I always thought that once a case was dismissed, it was over forever. You know, the whole can't be tried twice for the same crime thing. I guess it's a bit different in cases that aren't necessarily criminal in nature. Post your comments

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Are Named in Suit on Holocaust - WSJ Legal Beat Chase Manhattan, J.P. Morgan Are Named in Suit on Holocaust Paul Beckett Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal NEW YORK -- In the first Holocaust-related class-action lawsuit to involve U.S. banks, Chase Manhattan Corp. and J.P. Morgan & Co. were named in a case filed Wednesday on behalf of Holocaust survivors and victims' relatives that seeks reparations for assets allegedly seized during the Nazi occupation of France. The suit is related to one filed in federal court in Brooklyn last December. That suit claimed that seven French banks and Barclays Bank, a unit of Barclays PLC of the United Kingdom, aided the expropriation of...

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Troy Davis' Last Request Troy Davis’ last words before his execution on Wednesday night included this call: The tragedy of American capital punishment must be brought to an end. Photo by World Coalition Against the Death Penalty Sarah van Gelder posted Sep 22, 2011 After twenty years of attempts to prove his innocence, Troy Anthony Davis was put to death by the state of Georgia on Wednesday night. Shortly before his execution, his sister Martina Davis-Correia made an emotional appeal for an end to "the atrocities" that are happening in jails and prisons. (Davis-Correia wrote about her years of effort to win the release of her brother in the "Beyond Prisons" issue of YES! Magazine.) And in this video, she and others cast doubt that Davis was in fact the person who murdered Mark MacPhail. Crowds of Davis supporters gathered outside the prison in Jackson, Georgia, where the execution took place, outside the White House, and in other cities from Portland, Ore., to Paris. Hundreds of thousands signed petitions, wrote letters, and made phone calls. President Jimmy Carter, Pope Benedict XVI, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu were among those asking for clemency. The twitter hashtags #TroyDavis, #MrDavis, and others related to the case were trending worldwide on Wednesday night as people from around the world waited to see if a person whose guilt is in doubt would be executed. Troy Davis was declared dead at 11:08 pm EST. Thomas Ruffin, attorney and witness to the execution, told Democracy Now! that among Davis' last words was a request was for "an end to the madness of capital punishment." The day before his execution, Davis said this: "The struggle for justice doesn't end with me. This struggle is for all the Troy Davises who came before me and all the ones who will come after me. I'm in good spirits and I'm prayerful and at peace. But I will not stop fighting until I've taken my last breath." Troy Davis' life, and the ending of his life by the state of Georgia, have brought renewed urgency to efforts to end the death penalty and the racial bias in the criminal justice system, which punishes people of color far more harshly than their white counterparts. Interested? Colorlines' photo essay from "a wrenching night of global solidarity."Why real justice means fewer prisons.Why? The death penalty drains money from strapped state budgets, and police chiefs don't consider it effective in deterring crime. Inside Sister Helen Prejean's crusade to change the pope's mind on the death penalty. Sarah van Gelder is the co-founder and executive editor of YES! Magazine. Think Outside the BarsStates Reconsider the Death PenaltyChoose Life: End the Death Penalty

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Search Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure Rule 435. Use of Deposition. A. Original available for inspection. The attorney having custody of the original transcript shall make it available for inspection by the parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court. B. Only portions to be used submitted to court. If a deposition, or portions thereof, are to be used at trial, or are to be used either in support of, or in opposition to, a pretrial or post-trial motion, only those portions to be used shall be submitted to the court at the outset of the trial or at the filing of the motion or response thereto, insofar as their use can be reasonably anticipated by the party seeking to introduce such evidence. For purposes of this Rule, and unless a genuine issue of authenticity is raised, a moving party need not produce the original transcript, but may rely on the submission of relevant excerpts from copies of the original transcript. C. Return after final disposition. Depositions, or portions thereof, which have been submitted to the court pursuant to this Rule shall be returned to appropriate counsel after final disposition of the case. (Adopted April 2, 2014, effective for early adopters July 1, 2014, effective statewide July 1, 2015.)

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Commissioners, county attorney spar over access to jail probe | New Hampshire Contact us Commissioners, county attorney spar over access to jail probe BRENTWOOD — County commissioners say they are frustrated about not being given full access to a criminal investigation in the wake of a county jail employee being charged with giving her husband $12,000 in overtime and other pay for shifts he never worked..On Tuesday, the Rockingham County Attorney’s office delivered a report to county commissioners providing some details from their investigation into Ann Marie Nelson, 55, of Chester, who is charged with overpaying her husband, Keith, who worked as a corrections officer at the Rockingham County jail...County Commissioner Kevin Coyle said that the commission sent a letter to the county attorney’s office a week ago, requesting the records to the investigation as part of an effort to determine if any new measures need to be taken to shore up accounting practices...“I think we are hamstrung by not having the investigation, and by not knowing all we need to know,” Coyle said on Tuesday. The sheriff’s department and county attorney’s office are in the process of a wider audit, delving into years’ worth of payroll records of current and former employees...County Attorney James Reams said prior to the report, his office has provided some information to county commissioners. The report was delivered to Commissioner Chairwoman Katharin Pratt on Tuesday, Reams said...He said that he is prohibited from sharing all the facts of the case with commissioners at this stage due to the state’s Rules of Professional Conduct, which bars lawyers from making comments about a person under investigation...“One of our broader concerns is to make sure (Nelson) gets a fair trial,” Reams said. Nelson remains free on bail, and faces up to 7 ½ to 15 years in state prison if she is convicted.Nelson’s husband, Keith, has not been charged in the case...Reams said his office has not yet determined whether anyone else will face criminal charges. He said that so far the investigation has showed that policies at the jail regarding overtime were not followed...“We know now that safeguards were ignored,” Reams said. Indictments say Nelson funneled money from last July until about May 15. “We are going backwards from there to see when it all went off the rails,” Reams said...Coyle said he disagreed with Reams’ assessment about safeguards being ignored. “Unfortunately, what they would do is they would go to any supervisor to sign off (on overtime),” Coyle said. “That’s not the way it’s supposed to work.”..Jail employees were supposed to be using the supervisor who approved the overtime to sign off on it, said Coyle.He said that commissioners have since spoken to jail staff to ensure policies about overtime are being followed closely...Coyle also noted that the investigation was prompted by a jail administrator flagging questionable paperwork in May.“She got caught because of the checks and balances,” Coyle said, referring to Nelson...Reams said that his office hopes to complete the probe against Nelson within the next 60 days, but that a broader audit encompassing all payroll records that are available will [email protected]..

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Constitutional Court ruling a major gain by Dominican media Santo Domingo.- The Dominican Association of Newspapers on Sunday said it’s satisfied with the Constitutional Court ruling striking down several articles of the law on Expression and Dissemination of Thought, which were part of the criminal liabilities for defamation, or the so-called crimes against honor. It called the decision historical by consolidating guarantees established in Dominican Republic’s Constitution and which it affirms also puts the country in line with international agreements. The ruling responds to a lawsuit filed Feb. 25, 2013, by the editors-in-chief of newspapers El Día, Rafael Molina Morillo; Listin Diario, Miguel Franjul and Osvaldo Rafael Santana, El Caribe, and Press and Law Foundation president Namphi Rodríguez, and which was claimed by all national newspapers on July 3, 2014, it comes to give concrete results in the fight for called decriminalization of press offenses or word he says. “As we stated in our press release of July 3, 2014, Dominican society has patiently and eagerly awaited the time when these legislative hindrances that pend like a sword of Damocles over the throat of freedom of expression disappears from our legal system.”

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Learn More About Mass Transit Accident Litigation in South Burlington, Vermont Homemass transit accident litigationvermontsouth burlington South Burlington is a city in Chittenden County, Vermont, in the United States. As of the 2000 census, the city population was 15,814. It is one of the anchors of the Burlington-South Burlington metropolitan area. It is composed of multiple sets of suburban neighborhoods and a commercial center, which is in the process of being converted to a downtown. It is also home to the state's largest mall, the University Mall. The city borders Lake Champlain and has a public park and beach, "Red Rocks". Mass Transit Accident Litigation Lawyers In South Burlington Vermont What is mass transit accident litigation? Cases involving individuals who have been injured in crashes and collisions involving commercial airlines, railroads, oceangoing vessels, and government-operated municipal bus and rail systems. Some of the most common mass transit accidents are caused by sudden starts and stops, speeding, intoxication of operators and slippery floors. Buses are often involved in accidents with other motor vehicles, pedestrians, and bicyclists. Trains sometimes come derailed or have toxic spills that affect many people. People who are injured in mass transit accidents may be compensated for their injury, lost income, and pain and suffering. Answers to mass transit accident litigation issues in Vermont Federal court opinions concerning mass transit accident litigation in Vermont 486 US 24 Dh Holmes Company Ltd v. McNamara 488 US 252 Goldberg v. D Sweet Gte Sprint Communications Corporation 485 F2d 460 Life of the Land v. S Brinegar 487 F2d 849 Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality Inc v. A Volpe 489 F2d 390 Natural Resources Defense Council Inc v. Environmental Protection Agency 527 F2d 786 Cady v. C B Morton 530 F2d 215 State of Maryland v. Environmental Protection Agency 534 F2d 1289 Sierra Club v. F Froehlke 535 F2d 165 Friends of Earth v. Carey 599 F2d 1333 Atlanta Coalition on Transportation Crisis Inc v. Atlanta Regional Commission Homemass transit accident litigationvermontsouth burlington

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When less is more. SlateJurisprudenceThe law, lawyers, and the court.March 21 2007 6:12 PM When Less Is More The nutty legal syllogism that powers the Bush administration. By Dahlia Lithwick John Yoo At first it sounds like a defensible argument: The power to do something substantial includes the power to do something less so. If the president has the power to appoint ambassadors, for instance, he probably also has the power to invite them over for dinner. If I have the legal authority to control and care for my son, this probably includes the power to choose his T-shirts. Dahlia Lithwick writes about the courts and the law for Slate, and hosts the podcast Amicus. Lately we're hearing an awful lot of this greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power analysis. As the president recently noted: "I have broad discretion to replace political appointees throughout the government, including U.S. attorneys. And in this case, I appointed these U.S. attorneys and they served four-year terms." He claims that his power to appoint all 93 U.S. attorneys includes the power to fire them for any reason. Or, as his supporters routinely argue, since Bill Clinton fired all 93 U.S. attorneys when he took office and no one peeped, the power to fire all 93 when you take office must include the lesser power to fire only eight midterm. Advertisement Marty Lederman at Balkinization points to a second instance of this kind of thinking this weekend, in an interview given by John Yoo to the British weekly Spectator, and reprinted in the Montreal Gazette. Yoo, author of the infamous "torture memo" that came out of the Office of Legal Counsel in August of 2002 and became public in the summer of 2004, continues to defend the legality of the president's right to torture suspects. (The OLC subsequently withdrew the memo.) Yoo's argument rests largely on more of this same "greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power" analysis. As he explains to his interviewer, "Look, death is worse than torture, but everyone except pacifists thinks there are circumstances in which war is justified. War means killing people. If we are entitled to kill people, we must be entitled to injure them." He goes on to say, "I don't see how it can be reasonable to have an absolute prohibition on torture when you don't have an absolute prohibition on killing." Hmmm. This argument has some legal force behind it, at least by analogy. In 1986, the Supreme Court said in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico that "the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.'' In other words, wrote Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist for the majority, if Puerto Rico could do away with gambling altogether, it could certainly limit—without running afoul of the free-speech laws—advertising about gambling. Like I said, it sounds sort of logical. Except, as Justice John Paul Stevens noted in his dissent in that case, whether or not the state has the power to outlaw gambling, "The First Amendment surely does not permit Puerto Rico's frank discrimination among publications, audiences, and words." The court hasn't exactly rushed to embrace this reasoning from Posadas in subsequent cases. And that's probably because—paraphrasing Stevens' dissent here—at bottom this logic is insane. Imagine if that sort of syllogism were really an acceptable form of legal analysis: Professor Garrett Epps at the University of Oregon law school wonders whether the president's greater power to pardon might somehow give him the "lesser" power to direct a verdict of acquittal in criminal trials. Duke University's Erwin Chemerinsky posits that since the government can draft people, it can maybe just exercise its lesser power to keep them from criticizing the war. And Harvard Law School's Laurence Tribe observes: "You might as well argue that because the Constitution permits California to shut down the state-run law school where John Yoo teaches, the Constitution would permit it to choose the 'lesser' step of just firing professor Yoo for his outlandish views." Or—as my 3-year-old patiently explains to me every once in a while—the greater power to stay up past his bedtime and watch movies clearly includes the lesser power to eat the entire box of Oreos. Advertisement The greater-than-lesser-than argument is nothing more than a "debater's point," says the University of Virginia's Jody Kraus. It assumes that the speaker has some basis from which to claim that the lesser power is, indeed, well, lesser. You can certainly say that the power to ban speech is lesser than the power to ban gaming. Or you could say the opposite. I, for one, feel a lot more strongly about my right to speak than my right to split eights and aces. So, by what measure, other than Yoo's assertion, is the power to water-board someone "lesser" than the power to kill? And if it is, why does Yoo draw the line at water-boarding rather than eye-gouging which is, by his logic, still better than death? You can similarly claim, Kraus notes, that since the state has the greater power to execute criminals, it also has the "lesser" power to "stick him in oil, just for a minute or so." The real trick, as Jack Balkin of Yale Law School points out, is convincing your listener that the same rules and norms that govern the "greater" category also govern the "lesser." You need to convince them that if the state is allowed, for instance, to execute criminals, any laws regarding cruel and unusual treatment simply go away. In the case of the U.S. attorney firings, that would mean insisting that the same rules and norms that govern presidential authority over U.S. attorney appointments govern everything to do with the Justice Department's oversight of individual (partisan, political) criminal investigations and prosecutions. You would similarly need to insist that the rules that govern the president's power to kill someone during wartime also govern his authority to torture a suspect during an undeclared war on terror. Professor Dave Glazier makes this point very clearly at the blog Balkinization. So, can you claim that the laws of war somehow vaporize the laws governing everything else that may be incident to war? Yoo does seem to contend just that. His argument appears to be that executive power in wartime vaporizes the laws governing virtually everything else. And if that's truly your starting point, I suppose all the other constraints imposed by those other "lesser" laws—from being required to obtain a FISA warrant to having to give a lawyer and a court date to Americans picked up in Chicago—would evaporate as well. All of which explains, I imagine, some of the nuttiest legal positions taken by the president over the past years. If you assert absolutely vast "greater" powers, it's cheap and easy to swallow up those pesky little "lesser" ones. I don't know how much longer this trope will have currency for the Bush administration. But I would suggest that their greater power to offer this as a serious legal argument does not trump our lesser power to laugh at it.

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Time to holster US gun laws ON NOVEMBER 30 last year, 22-year-old Jared Lee Loughner walked into a Sportsman's Warehouse store in Tucson, Arizona, and bought a Glock 19 semi-automatic handgun, serial number PWL699. He passed the instant background check required by US federal law. Under the lax state gun laws, he was then allowed to conceal and carry his pistol without a permit. On Sunday, Loughner was charged with using the gun in a rampage in a parking lot outside a Tucson supermarket that left 20 people shot, six of them fatally. Among the dead, a federal judge, John Roll; among the wounded, a Democratic congresswoman, Gabrielle Giffords, who was shot in the head at point-blank range while addressing a public meeting.It is easy to view this terrible crime as the work of a single, apparently deluded person rather than as the embodiment of a culture of violence in a nation whose powerful gun lobby prides itself in the constitutional right to bear arms. As a Republican senator said of Saturday's shooting spree, "But the weapons don't kill people. It's the individual that killed these people." Yes, but if it's easier for the individual to acquire a weapon, it's easier for that person to kill, whatever his state of mind.In Arizona, as of last year, when the gun laws were further relaxed, it is ridiculously easy to obtain weapons of deadly power: any law-abiding resident aged over 18 can buy or possess a firearm, although one has to be at least 21 to buy a handgun; guns are permitted almost everywhere - including in the state Capitol and public buildings - except a business or doctor's office; and concealed weapons are allowed in places that serve alcohol, as long as the owner isn't imbibing.Although the shootings are the latest in an appallingly regular series of rampages in various parts of the US, there is still remarkable reticence in tackling the country's diverse and confusing gun laws. Political timidity is part of it - the National Rifle Association and its ilk have demonstrated their considerable persuasive force at the polls - but so too is a national mindset that confuses the right of protection with the right to kill. But laws and attitudes can change: witness, in Australia, the Howard government's gun amnesty after the Port Arthur massacre in 1996. Maybe the attempted assassination of a member of the US Congress and the attempted killing of other officials, not to mention those who died or were wounded in this senseless spree, might at last bring about commonsense reform of gun laws.

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Goode charged with hindering, witness tampering linked to New London homicide Lance Goode turns to look around the courtroom as he appears before Judge Kevin McMahon Thursday, May 8, 2014 on Hindering Prosecution and Tampering with a Witness charges related to the August 2013 murder of Jesus "Gee" Pinero. Karen Florin Lance Goode, who has a lengthy criminal history and is suing the New London police, was arraigned Thursday in connection with the Aug. 29, 2013, shooting death of Jesus “Gee” Pinero. Goode, 45, of 98 Williams St. is charged with first-degree hindering prosecution and tampering with a witness, crimes that could land him in prison for up to 15 years if he is convicted. New London police said they arrested him following a motor vehicle stop on Garfield Avenue. Goode has a pending civil rights lawsuit against city police claiming a former city police officer planted drugs on him during one arrest and that he was brutalized and bitten by a police dog during another. His wife, Lillian, whose minivan was seized during the homicide investigation, was in court Thursday and said her husband would be fighting the new charges. At the arraignment, Goode stood before Judge Kevin P. McMahon, who has told Goode more than once that it might be a good idea if he moves out of the area. McMahon set Goode’s bond at $50,000 cash and transferred the case to the Part A court where major crimes are tried. Goode’s next court date is May 20. His wife said he would be unable to post bond. Pinero, 29, died of multiple gunshot wounds after being shot near Connecticut Avenue and Prest Street. Earlier this week, city police retrieved his alleged killer, 28-year-old Keith Ramel Delvalle, from the Rikers Island jail complex in New York City and brought him back to Connecticut to face charges of murder, criminal possession of a firearm, carrying a pistol without a permit, unlawful discharge of a firearm, criminal use of a firearm and commission of a Class A felony with a firearm. Arrest warrant affidavits containing details of the case have been sealed by the court. Goode told The Day in September 2013 that he had been questioned by the police in connection with the case and that detectives seized his wife’s Town & Country minivan after telling him a “person of interest” had been in the car. He said a man he knows was one of many people wanted for questioning by the police. Goode said he has nothing to do with the shooting. Goode has prior convictions for possession of narcotics, sale of narcotics, assault and failure to appear in court, according to Bail Commissioner Timothy Gilman. He has a pending reckless driving case stemming from September 2013, when police said he fled from detectives when they tried to stop him on Ocean Avenue to question him about the Pinero homicide. Delvalle, the accused shooter who was arraigned earlier this week, was presented in the major crimes court Thursday for the first time. Judge Hillary B. Strackbein raised his bond from $49,900 cash to $175,000 cash, appointed attorney John E. Franckling to represent him and continued the case to May 15. State’s Attorney Michael L. Regan is prosecuting. Another man arrested in connection with the Pinero homicide, Lance J. Brown of Uncasville, posted $200,000 bond on April 26 after being held since December. Police said they identified him through DNA on a Glock pistol, one of two guns that were found at the scene. They allege Brown was returning fire at Delvalle. He is charged with criminal possession of a firearm, carrying a pistol without a permit, first-degree reckless endangerment and illegal discharge of a firearm. Brown is due back in court May 15. There was no DNA evidence linking the other gun — a .25-caliber pistol found on the ground nearby — to Delvalle, according to court testimony. [email protected] Special report: New London Police Department in Turmoil New London judge reduces Lance Goode's bond Defendant in New London murder case has new lawyer Judge denies Goode’s request for bond reduction in hindering, tampering case Goode pleads not guilty to involvement in homicide case New London murder suspect arraigned

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Ethics Allegations 'Unfounded,' Whitfield Says Soring Gaited Horses Equine Welfare & Legislation Horse Industry News Print Email Whitfield said the complaint has nothing to do with whether or not the PAST Act will move out of the House committee and to the full House floor for a vote before Congress ends session December. Photo: Photos.com Editor's Note: This article was updated on Aug. 1 to reflect additional information obtained by TheHorse.com. U.S. Representative Ed Whitfield (R-Kentucky), the primary sponsor of a measure that would ban the use of performance packages on Tennessee Walking Horses in training and competition, said ethics allegations against him are unfounded and have nothing to do with congressional review of the legislation. Introduced last year HR 1518, or the Prevent All Soring Tactics (PAST) Act, would amend the Horse Protection Act of 1970 to forbid the use of action devices, including metal chains, stacks, and pads (known as performance packages). In addition, the PAST Act would increase federal penalties for anyone who sores a horse and would require the USDA to assign a licensed inspector if a Tennessee Walking Horse show management indicates its intent to hire one. Whitfield's bill remains pending in the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce. In a July 25 written statement, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ethics indicated it had received an ethics complaint against Whitfield on July 10. The complaint alleges that Whitfield's wife, Constance Harriman Whitfield, a consultant for the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), unfairly influenced the congressman regarding the legislation. “The ethics complaint alleges that I would not have introduced the bill were it not for her, and that she unethically lobbied my office in favor of the PAST Act,” Whitfield said. “None of that is true.” Stephanie Twining, HSUS spokeswoman, declined to comment on the complaint, Whitfield said the ethics complaint was filed by 13 PAST Act opponents, including Mike Inman, CEO of the Tennessee Walking Horse National Celebration, among others. “They filed the complaint because they were scared that we were going to pass it (the legislation),” Whitfield opined. In a July 31 written statement, Inman said Whitfield's claim concerning the formal complaint filing is untrue. “The release from Whitfield's office saying myself or others filed a formal complaint with the House Ethics Committee is blatantly false and I have no idea what motivation they had to produce such a lie,” Inman's statement said. Further, in a July 30 press release, the Performance Show Horse Association (PSHA) said the organization sent a letter to House Ethics Committee Chairman Representative K. Michael Conaway (R-Texas) and to Representative Linda T. Sánchez (D-California), a ranking member of that committee, on Dec. 23, 2013. That letter was sent in response to Whitfield's comments during a November 2013 subcommittee hearing, the release said. The release states that Conway and Sánchez are members of the House Ethics Committee, but are not representative of the Office of Congressional Ethics, which is where a formal complaint must be filed. That letter was signed by the same 13 individuals cited by Whitfield, the release said. In its letter, the PSHA did allege that Whitfield's wife inappropriately lobbied in support of the PAST Act. Further, the PSHA release said the signers requested advice “on the proper process and procedures to file a complaint.” But the release states that Conway and Sánchez did not respond to the letter and a formal complaint was never filed. “The PSHA stands behind the statements in the letter, but it did not intend (to) nor did it file a formal complaint,” the release said. Meanwhile, Whitfield said he as hired a attorney to answer the complaint. “The Ethics Committee has their way to handle a complaint when one's filed, (and) I have an attorney representing me,” Whitfield said. The committee said in its statement that it will announce its course of action in this matter on or before Nov. 10. In the meantime, Whitfield said the complaint has nothing to do with whether or not the PAST Act will move out of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and to the full House floor for a vote before Congress ends session December. “That would be all up to the Republican leadership if they want to bring the bill to the floor,” Whitfield said. The PAST Act remains pending. Pay Homage to War Horses This Veteran's Day Equine Collapse: Once in a Lifetime?

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