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2e2e7b13c76b309955c79bf40cf67ff728c6d4be | EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mrs J Little Respondent: Marsh Services Ltd
Heard at: East London Hearing Centre On: 28 February, 1, 2 & 3 March; and in chambers on 6 April 2017
Before: Employment Judge C Hyde Members: Mrs G A Everett Ms T A Jansen
Representation Claimant: In person Respondent: Mr C Milsom (Counsel)
RESERVED JUDGMENT
The unanimous judgment of the Employment Tribunal is that:-
(1) The constructive unfair dismissal complaint brought under sections 94, 95(1)(c) and 98(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 was not well founded and was dismissed.
(2) The disability discrimination complaints brought under section 15 (disability related discrimination) and section 20 (failure to make reasonable adjustments) of the Equality Act 2010 were not well founded and were dismissed.
REASONS
1 Reasons are set out in writing for the above judgment as the judgment was reserved. These reasons are set out only to the extent that the Tribunal considers it is necessary to do so in order for the parties to understand why they have won or lost. Further the reasons are set out only to the extent that it is proportionate to do so.
2 All findings of facts were reached on the balance of probabilities.
Preliminaries
3 This hearing was concerned with the determination of claims which were set out in two claims forms presented on 6 September 2016 and 10 November 2016. Grounds of resistance were submitted in relation to the claims dated 6 October 2016 and 10 January 2017 respectively. Further, two preliminary hearings took place in respect of the claims: the first on 7 November 2016 before Employment Judge Prichard in respect of the first claim; and then a further preliminary hearing took place on 3 February 2017 before Employment Judge Russell.
4 At the hearing before Employment Judge Russell an agreed list of issues was arrived at as set out in that order. The issues are set out below with some further amendments which were made by the end of the full merits hearing.
5 This hearing was concerned with the determination of liability only including, if appropriate in relation to the unfair dismissal complaint, determination of Polkey and contributory fault issues, and whether there had been any unreasonable failure to follow the ACAS Code in respect of grievances. Remedy was to be determined later if appropriate. In relation to the disability discrimination complaints the Tribunal also had to determine the question of whether the claims were presented in time.
The issues
6 The issues which had been agreed before Employment Judge Russell were amended slightly by the end of the hearing. Thus in relation to paragraphs 4.1(d) and (e) in respect of the constructive dismissal complaint, the references to 13 August 2015 were amended to references to 30 July 2015 as the Claimant had intended to refer to the date on which she commenced her period of sickness absence. Further, paragraphs 4.1(i) and (k) were withdrawn by the Claimant, the Claimant having accepted during her evidence that the delays in receiving the outcomes of the grievance and the appeal were not unreasonable.
7 The final list of issues which the Tribunal needed to determine was as follows, adopting the numbering from Judge Russell’s Order which was used in the full merits hearing also:
Unfair dismissal claim
4.1 Did the Respondent conduct itself without reasonable or proper cause in a manner which did or was likely to destroy or seriously damage the implied term of trust and confidence? The Claimant relies upon the following conduct: (a) Comments about the Claimant on Facebook on 31 March 2015 made by her colleagues (Mr Donkor, Ms Goff, Ms Rowell and Ms Mandalay);
(b) Failure by Ms Rowell to deal with the Claimant’s complaint when raised informally on 13 April 2015;
(c) Inappropriate conduct by Ms Goff and Ms Rowell at a meeting on 14 April 2015;
(d) Isolation and ostracism from team from 14 April 2015 until 30 July 2015 when she commenced a period of sickness absence;
(e) Increased working hours between March 2015 and 30 July 2015;
(f) Inadequate support and/or unwarranted blame by Ms Goff and Ms Rowell during the same period;
(g) Failure to redeploy the Claimant to another team or department (such as GSP and/or Treasury);
(h) January 2016, reducing the Claimant’s pay and telling her that she must return to the same position or go onto SSP;
(i) Withdrawn
(j) 16 June 2016, rejection of her grievance and requirement to return to work;
(k) Withdrawn
(l) Even after her successful appeal, requiring the Claimant to return to work in her previous department;
(m) 21 September 2016 email from HR requiring the Claimant to attend a meeting in London, at which she could not be accompanied, and being told that her employment was likely to be terminated.
4.2 The Claimant relied upon the cumulative and individual effect of each of the above. Her case was that the final straw was the email on 21 September 2016.
4.3 If so, did the Claimant resign in response to the repudiatory breach without affirming the contract and/or waiving any breach?
4.4 If dismissed, has the Respondent established a potentially fair reason for dismissal? The Respondent relied upon capability, particularly managing attendance.
4.5 Was dismissal fair in all of the circumstances of the case, s.98(4) ERA? 4.6 Should there be any adjustment to any award to reflect?
(a) Whether a fair dismissal could/would have occurred in any event, Polkey
(b) Contributory fault
(c) Unreasonable failure to follow the ACAS Code in respect of grievances.
Disability
4.7 Does/did the Claimant suffer from the mental impairment of anxiety disorder from June 2015 to date?
4.8 Did any such mental impairment have a long term substantial adverse effect upon her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities?
Discrimination arising from disability, section 15 Equality Act 2010
4.9 Did the Respondent treat the Claimant unfavourably when it failed to refer her to Occupational Health for a second review in December 2015 and/or reduced her pay in January 2016; and/or required her to return to work in the same department or go onto Statutory Sick Pay, also in January 2016?
4.10 Did the Respondent treat the Claimant as aforesaid because of the “something arising” in consequence of the disability?
4.11 Did the Respondent show that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim?
4.12 Alternatively, had the Respondent shown that it did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that the Claimant had a disability?
Failure to make reasonable adjustments, section 20 Equality Act 2010
4.13 Did the Respondent apply the following provisions, criteria and/or practices (‘the provisions’) generally, namely: (a) requirement to work at the contracted place of work; (b) requirement to work in the contracted department.
4.14 Did the application of any such provision put the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled?
4.15 Did the Respondent take such steps as were reasonable to avoid the disadvantage? The Claimant contended that the following steps would have been reasonable: (a) providing additional counselling in December 2015; (b) allocating her to a different office/team (in particular GSP and/or Treasury); (c) allocating her to another office within driving distance of her home; (d) redeploying her to another company within the Respondent’s group of companies.
4.16 Did the Respondent not know, or could the Respondent not be reasonably expected to know that the Claimant had a disability or was likely to be placed at the disadvantage set out above?
Time/Limitation
4.17 Were the disability discrimination claims presented within time? If not, would it be just and equitable to extend time?
Evidence adduced/Documents produced
8 The parties agreed upon the contents of a trial bundle which was available at the beginning of the hearing. The bundle marked [R1] consisted of approximately 400 pages in three lever arch files. During the hearing further documents were added by agreement. Also at the beginning of the hearing the parties relied on a bundle of the witness statements which the Tribunal marked [R2]. The Tribunal however then also allocated exhibit numbers to each witness statement.
9 At the outset of the hearing a bundle of correspondence between the parties was also presented and marked [R3]. In the event, no reference was made to that bundle during the hearing.
10 Mr Milsom had prepared a chronology which was presented to the Tribunal on the first day and marked [R4]. In addition, at the Tribunal’s request Mr Milsom and the Claimant agreed on a timetable and approximate time estimates for the cross-examination of each witness. This document was produced on the second day of the hearing and was marked [R5].
11 The Claimant also produced a document which she had been directed to prepare at an earlier preliminary hearing which was marked [C1]. The document was headed: “Grievance Call/Meetings”. Further the Claimant produced a supplementary bundle of documents which the Tribunal marked [C2] which consisted of the ACAS guidance on use of social media, and a printout from the website of the Anxiety Centre.
12 Due to issues relating to the availability of witnesses for both parties, certain witnesses were called out of order. Thus the first witness was Ms Watts, Regional HR Business Partner at the material time and her witness statement was marked [R6]. Her evidence was given on behalf of the Respondent. The next witness was called on behalf of the Claimant and her evidence was also interposed. This witness was Mrs Adriana Rivas and her witness statement was marked [C3]. Next the Tribunal heard evidence from the Claimant whose witness statement was marked [C4] and then from the other witness on her behalf Mrs Julie Hardwick whose witness statement was marked [C5]. Mrs Hardwick’s evidence signalled the close of the Claimant’s case. 13 On behalf of the Respondent Mrs Kelly Rowell the Claimant’s former manager, gave evidence and her witness statement was marked [R7]. Her role at the relevant time was Customer Relationship Manager. The next witness on behalf of the Respondent was Ms Kirsty Dunn and her evidence in chief was set out in a witness statement which was marked [R8]. She was a former colleague of the Claimant’s. Finally, on behalf of the Respondent the Tribunal heard evidence from Mr Tim Pritchard whose witness statement was marked [R9]. He dealt with the Claimant’s appeal against the outcome of her grievance.
Closing submissions
14 The Claimant and Mr Milson both presented closing submissions in writing and were given the opportunity to supplement them orally. The Respondent’s submissions were marked [R10] and the Claimant’s submissions were marked [C6].
15 Further, Mr Milson relied on various authorities as follows:
- Habinteg Housing Association Ltd v Holleron [UKEAT/0274/14];
- Herry v Dudley Metropolitan Council [UKEAT/0100/16 and another];
- Trustees of Swansea University Pension and Assurance Scheme v Williams [2015] ICR 1197, EAT;
- Monmouthshire County Council v Harris [UKEAT/0332/14 and another];
- O’Hanlon v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2007] ICR 1359, CA;
- Griffiths v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2017] ICR 160 CA;
- HM Prison Service v Johnson [2007] IRLR 951, EAT;
- Project Management Institute v Latif [2007] IRLR 579, EAT;
- Smith v Trafford Housing Trust [2013] IRLR 86, HC;
- Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd [2017] IRLR 124, QBD;
- Assamoi v Spirit Pub Co (Services) Ltd [UKEAT/0050/11];
- Royal Bank of Scotland v McAdie [2008] ICR 1087, CA;
- W E Cox Toner (International) Ltd v Crook [1981] ICR 823, EAT;
- Wright v North Ayrshire Council [2014] IRLR 4, EAT;
- Brandeaux Advisers (UK) Ltd v Chadwick [2011] IRLR 224 (QB).
Photocopies of the reports of all the above cases were produced in a bundle for the Tribunal. Findings of fact and conclusions
16 The Respondent was part of a group of companies, Marsh & McLennan Companies (“MMC”) which was in the business of insurance. The Claimant’s employer Marsh Services Ltd (“Marsh”) was one of four companies within that group.
17 She commenced employment with the Respondent in June 2011 through an agency and became a permanent employee in February 2013. She was appointed as an EPi Analyst in the UK Finance Department of Marsh. The Finance Department was in a location in Witham, Essex referred to throughout the case as “The Hub”. She was then promoted to the position of Senior Accounting Technician in January 2015. Prior to the promotion, as of July 2014, the Claimant’s line manager was Kelly Rowell. Ms Rowell remained the Claimant’s first line manager through to the termination of the employment. At all relevant times the Claimant worked in the Accounts Payable/Procure to Pay Team (referred to hereafter as the “P to P Team”).
18 Initially the members of the P to P Team were the Claimant, Mr Donker and Mrs Julie Hardwick. The Claimant had a good and close working relationship with Mrs Hardwick who was employed by the Respondent from July 2013 to 15 July 2015 on a fixed term contract. From the second half of 2014, Ms Rowell took over management of that team, alongside the Projects Team which she was already managing. There were about nine members of the Projects Team, including Ms Goff, who was the leader of that team.
19 Ms Rowell’s management of the two teams was initially temporary but by the end of 2014, she was given permanent responsibility for managing the combined team. The Respondent had spent some time considering where the P to P team should sit in the Group structure.
20 Mr Donker left the Respondent’s employment in mid to late March 2015 but a new member of staff was recruited to replace him, by the name of Kirsty Dunn, on 21 March 2015. She joined the P to P Team shortly after Mr Donker had left. Ms Raafia Khan was recruited in April 2015 as the P to P Team Supervisor.
21 Another member of the team, Jenny Ahmed, was on maternity and/or sick leave. She was not said to be present during any of the material times that the Tribunal was concerned with. In any event she did not return to the Respondent at any time prior to the Claimant’s absence on sick leave at the end of July 2015.
22 At the very end of March 2015, shortly after leaving the Respondent’s employment, Lee Donker made derogatory comments on his Facebook account which were visible to other employees of the Respondent and to Mr Donker’s friends. The comments were ostensibly aimed at Mr Donker’s former colleagues, but did not name anyone specifically.
23 On 6 April 2015, the Claimant responded to Mr Donker’s messages also on Facebook, and on 13 April 2015 she raised concerns as to the comments entered on the Facebook account by one of her more senior colleagues Sue Goff with her manager Kelly Rowell (pp. 6-7). As a result of this a meeting took place between the Claimant, Ms Goff and Ms Rowell on 15 April 2015. The Claimant complained both about the comments by her work colleagues on Facebook and about the conduct of the meeting on 15 April 2015 by Ms Rowell and Ms Goff as part of her constructive unfair dismissal complaint.
24 Some two weeks after the meeting, Ms Rowell sent an email update to her manager David Rowley, in which she summarised the issue which had been brought to her attention about the Facebook entries; the action she had taken in terms of checking with the Claimant what she wanted to do about it; the subsequent meeting which she understood had been held to “clear the air” between the Claimant and Ms Goff on 15 April; and the outcome which she understood to have been in accordance with the Claimant’s wishes to draw a line under the incident and “move on” (p.7A). Ms Rowell also recorded in the email that she had also spoken to certain other members of the team, namely Tim, Rex, Mike and Julie – a reference to Julie Hardwick.
25 There was no request for action from Mrs Hardwick, the other person who the Claimant believed was affected by Mr Donker’s posts, although Mrs Hardwick was aware of the comments at the time. Indeed it was Mrs Hardwick’s position during the Tribunal hearing and that of Mr Donker at the time, that the comments were “childish”. At the Tribunal hearing, she accepted that the effect on her could be characterised as ‘water off a duck’s back’ and she had moved on.
26 Nothing further was said by the Claimant after the ‘clear the air’ meeting and she did not seek any follow-up from Ms Rowell.
27 The Tribunal considered in all the circumstances therefore that Ms Rowell’s email recording the way in which matters were left (at page 7A) was an accurate record of events.
28 It was not in dispute that from about the beginning of January through to the end of July 2015 the Claimant’s team and indeed the whole of the Finance department were working on a specific piece of work, namely a project which was referred to as a clean up of the R11 information in order that the R12 project could be launched. It was due to “go live” in the middle of August 2015 with a “black out” period starting on 28 July 2015 just prior to that. From March 2015, the Claimant worked more or less exclusively on that task and indeed it was not in dispute that she was the only person in the UK working for the Respondent with sufficient access to the relevant information in order to carry out the particular task allocated to her.
29 Further it was not in dispute that the Claimant had worked overtime prior to January 2015 but had not made any claims for payment for overtime. Ms Rowell spoke to her about this towards the end of 2014 as she did not consider that it was fair that other employees on similar pay and contract terms as the Claimant did overtime but were paid for it. She therefore encouraged the Claimant to submit appropriate overtime claims and she approved them in due course as the Claimant’s manager. There was undisputed evidence that the Claimant worked a considerable amount of paid overtime through to the end of her employment. Ms Rowell did not dispute during her evidence that the overtime was appropriately worked, namely that the Claimant had done work for the Respondent during that time. An issue was raised during the hearing about whether the Claimant had chosen to work the overtime hours more so over the weekend than during the week and it was said that she was paid more highly for working overtime at the weekends. The Tribunal did not consider that this was an indication that the Claimant carried out any more overtime hours than she needed to and the Tribunal was mindful that she was working towards an objective, namely to complete the clean up work by a looming deadline. We drew no adverse inference from the way the Claimant worked the overtime in the circumstances.
30 One of the consequences of the R12 project was that an increasing number of people within the hub were working overtime, in order to ensure that all of the necessary work was completed by the go live date. When Ms Rowell joined the team, she observed that the Claimant was not paid for overtime. She did not feel that this was fair and she therefore spoke to Mr Rowley, the overall manager of the Hub, to arrange for the Claimant to be paid overtime. Once this had been agreed, she informed the Claimant of this change and the Claimant was very grateful to her for arranging this.
31 Mr Rowley’s formal title was Head of RIS EMEA Accounting Operations (p.143). RIS stood for Risk Insurance Services. RIS was made up of Marsh Services Ltd and Guy Carpenter (another company in the group) and it covered risk insurance services operations in Western Europe.
32 As the R12 work got closer to the go live date, work levels began to increase.
33 The Tribunal was given overtime claim forms identifying the overtime worked by the Claimant and other members of staff for the periods from May to July 2015 inclusive. It was accepted by the Respondent that the Claimant was carrying out a lot of overtime but it was argued that she was not the only one doing so. The records tended to support that submission.
34 Ms Rowell disputed that she had been made aware on a regular basis as the Claimant contended that the Claimant was having difficulty coping with the work during the run up to the Claimant’s absence on leave at the end of July 2015. The Respondent’s position was that the first time that the Claimant informed her that she was feeling stressed was roughly two days before 30 July 2015 and that this was the first occasion on which she did so. It was not challenged that the Claimant had seen her doctor on about three occasions in the month or so prior to this but Ms Rowell disputed that the Claimant had fed back to her what were the reasons for these visits to the doctor and/or that she had been informed that the Claimant’s late arrival at work and/or early departure from work were in order for the Claimant to attend medical appointments.
35 The Tribunal had to determine whose account we accepted. It was clear from the background as already referred to, for example in relation to the overtime claims, that Ms Rowell had done what she could to assist the Claimant. She also gave an example of the one occasion on which she recalled the Claimant raising an issue about her workload, namely during a team meeting in which the Claimant said that she would not be able to “get across” the little iProcurement clean up and the APTB clean up work. Ms Rowell took on board the Claimant’s comments and removed this work from the Claimant and gave it to another member of the project team. This evidence by Ms Rowell was not disputed by the Claimant.
36 The Tribunal considered that these agreed pieces of evidence about the Claimant being invited to claim overtime, the absence of any query by Ms Rowell about the overtime being claimed, and also this example of Ms Rowell responding promptly to alleviate the Claimant’s workload when issues were raised about it, tended to support the Respondent’s case that Ms Rowell was not aware of any such issue of the Claimant reporting that she was feeling stressed or having difficulty coping with the work on any other occasions. In short, the Tribunal considered that if the Claimant had been reporting difficulties in coping and being put under undue stress as the Claimant alleges, it was likely on the balance of probabilities given our findings above that Ms Rowell would have addressed the concerns appropriately.
37 In addition, the Tribunal took into account the changes to the composition and management of the team in which the Claimant worked as outlined above.
38 The background set out in her witness statement and elsewhere about the reorganisations involving or affecting the P to P team was not in dispute. There was during that time some review by the Respondent as to where the P to P Team sat within the Respondent. When they were placed under Ms Rowell’s management this was potentially going to be a temporary measure until the Respondent decided where the team would sit permanently. The options were that it would be located either within the Finance department or the Procurement Team. During the time the Tribunal was concerned with, the P to P Team remained as part of the Finance department.
39 This background as to the merging of the P to P Team under Ms Rowell’s management with a larger team which she already managed is relevant to the Claimant’s contentions of being isolated or ostracised. She made those complaints in relation to timeframes which preceded the contentious issue of the comments on Facebook at the end of March 2015. She also described that she, Mrs Hardwick and Mr Donker were excluded from the activities of the rest of the team.
40 The team that Ms Rowell managed up to July 2014, before she was given the additional responsibility for managing Mr Donker, the Claimant and Mrs Hardwick, was the Projects Team which consisted of roughly nine people, one of whom was Sue Goff, along with a few administrative staff.
41 The first day of sickness absence for the Claimant was Thursday 30 July 2015. The last day worked therefore by the Claimant in the absence of contrary evidence was Wednesday 29 July 2015. She did not return to her work thereafter prior to her resignation. It was also not in dispute that she was certified unfit to work until the resignation in September 2016.
42 The Tribunal then considered some of the issues which related to findings of fact relevant for the constructive unfair dismissal complaint.
43 The conduct relied on by the Claimant in support of the constructive unfair dismissal claim included a complaint about the Facebook comments on 31 March 2015 made by Mr Donker, Ms Goff, Ms Rowell and Ms Mandalay. There was no dispute that the comments were originally made by Mr Donker on 31 March 2015, and then the others referred to above also made various comments.
44 Before raising this matter with Ms Rowell, the Claimant communicated directly online with Mr Donker between 6 April 2015 until 13 April 2015, the date on which she referred the matter to Ms Rowell. The Claimant raised the matter with Ms Rowell during the morning at approximately 9.30am on 13 April 2015 (p.6), as a complaint primarily about Ms Goff’s comments. Her correspondence with Mr Donker straddled this contact.
45 The evidence of the exchanges with Mr Donker was by way of screenshots. In the screenshots it was clear that on 6 April 2015 the Claimant challenged Mr Donker in robust language about his making what she saw as derogatory comments about herself on his Facebook page. There was no evidence on the documents before us that Mr Donker was prepared to give ground and accept that his comments were hurtful to the Claimant. He defended his actions on the basis that he believed he was responding to negative comments which he believed the Claimant had made about him. Mr Donker had left the Respondent’s employment in late March 2015.
46 Then the Claimant made her complaint to Ms Rowell about Ms Goff’s involvement in the comments on Facebook. This was done via the Respondent’s messaging service and it was also not disputed that Ms Rowell was frequently out of the office. While they were discussing some other matters the Claimant indicated that she wanted to have a chat with Ms Rowell when Ms Rowell was “next in the office” regarding Ms Goff. Ms Rowell indicated that she would be in the following day and asked if everything was OK. Miss Little referred her to the Facebook comments and complained that Ms Goff and others were putting comments regarding the Claimant and Mrs Hardwick on Facebook and that these had “really cut deep”. However the complaint at that point was about Ms Goff’s actions. Miss Little indicated to Kelly Rowell that she thought the matter needed to be “sorted before it gets anymore out of hand”. Ms Rowell readily agreed to discuss the matter with her the following day. Ms Rowell also noted that she knew that the Claimant and Ms Goff did not “really see eye to eye on things” but she stated that they could get the matter sorted.
47 It was not in dispute that the Claimant then met Ms Rowell the following day and they discussed the way forward. It was agreed that a meeting would take place between the three of them, namely the Claimant, Ms Rowell and Ms Goff to “clear the air”.
48 That meeting then took place on 15 April 2015. Before that however, and it was accepted that this was as a result of Ms Rowell having communicated with Lee Donker on 13 April 2015, Lee Donker sent a message to the Claimant at 2.51pm on 13 April 2015 acknowledging that he was perhaps “a bit rash and knee jerked” before and indicating that he believed that the Claimant had said unkind things about him and that he had become angry and he accepted that he should not have acted the way he did. He characterised his behaviour as acting “like a kid” and “very childish”.
11 49 Insofar as the Claimant complained about the comments written by Mr Donker, the Tribunal accepted the Respondent’s submission that that could not properly be a matter relied on in support of a constructive dismissal complaint because at the time he made the comments Mr Donker had already left the Respondent’s employment and the Claimant was aware of this.
50 The next person whose actions the Claimant complained about was Ms Goff. Ms Goff as far as the Tribunal could see was a colleague of the Claimant’s and not one of her managers. Ms Goff was in the Projects Team which was managed by Ms Rowell and then in late 2014 was in the same overall team as the Claimant also managed by Kelly Rowell, when Kelly Rowell took over those responsibilities temporarily between July and November 2014 and then thereafter. To that extent therefore Ms Goff’s actions were not the actions of the Claimant’s employer. Further, in any event, as set out above, when the Claimant raised this issue about Ms Goff’s actions Ms Rowell acted very promptly to address the Claimant’s concern in accordance with the Claimant’s wishes, namely the “clear the air” meeting.
51 The next person that the Claimant named in issue 4.1(a) as someone whose comments on Facebook she was unhappy with and which contributed to the constructive unfair dismissal was Ms Rowell. There was no record of the comments made by Ms Rowell but Ms Rowell accepted that she had said something along the lines of “cheeky I wash”. She included this in her update to Mr Rowley in the email of 27 April 2015 and subsequently he accepted this also in the grievance when she was being interviewed. Her response was to Mr Donker’s Facebook comments to the effect that he no longer had to work with people who did not wash/use soap.
52 First the Tribunal considered that Ms Rowell’s own response to this post by Mr Donker indicated that she did not initially see Mr Donker’s comment as something which was directed at the Claimant and/or Mrs Hardwick specifically but she clearly saw it as a general comment addressed to the team, including herself. This is the natural reading of her response.
53 Second, there was no suggestion that she made that entry after she became aware that the Claimant considered that the comments were directed at her i.e. at the Claimant. The Tribunal therefore did not consider that there were any comments that Ms Rowell on the Facebook page which were comments about the Claimant.
54 The fourth person about whom complaint was made in issue 4.1(a) was Ms Mandalay. Her Facebook handle/moniker was “fortunate Mandla”. It was clear that she had engaged in further conversation with Mr Donker about Mr Donker’s original comments about people not using soap and about having no longer to work with “Chavs” or people who did not dress smartly for work. After she started to engage with Mr Donker, he described conduct of his former work colleagues without naming names which she then picked up on in a subsequent post and characterised it as the conduct of “2faced bitches”.
55 At the time as can be seen from the messaging between the Claimant and Ms Rowell on 13 April 2015, the Claimant did not raise any objection to the comments by Ms Mandalay and directed her concerns only at the actions of Ms Goff. Further, the Tribunal took into account that Ms Mandalay was a team colleague of the Claimant’s as opposed to a manager. The Claimant could not possibly have reasonably seen the actions of Ms Mandalay especially in the context of Facebook comments on the private account of a former employee, as the actions of her employer.
Issue 4.1(b) was a complaint about the failure by Ms Rowell to deal with the Claimant’s complaint when it was raised informally by her on 13 April 2015. The findings of fact set out above did not establish the primary facts of this complaint in the Tribunal’s view. Ms Rowell dealt promptly with the Claimant’s issue when it was brought to her attention. It was accepted by the Claimant that Ms Rowell had contacted Mr Donker promptly after the Claimant had raised her concern about Ms Goff’s involvement in the comments with her on 13 April and as set out above Mr Donker had then apologised to the Claimant. Ms Rowell had taken this action even though Mr Donker was not her staff member any more, and the complaint was not about him. Then as set out above Ms Rowell had met with the Claimant and Ms Goff in accordance with the Claimant’s wishes for a meeting to clear the air.
The next issue under 4.1(c) was about inappropriate conduct by Ms Goff and Ms Rowell at the ‘clear the air’ meeting. The list of issues refers to that meeting as having taken place on 14 April 2015 but it appeared to the Tribunal that this was a typing error and there was no dispute that the ‘clear the air’ meeting took place on 15 April 2015. Although the Claimant did not set out a lot of detail she said on a number of occasions including in her witness statement that she was not happy about the way, as she saw it, Ms Goff and Ms Rowell turned the “the whole situation around on [her] saying that [she] had been slagging Sue Goff off to the office and [that she] was not a team player …”
The Claimant explained that she anticipated that Ms Rowell would act as a detached arbiter during the discussion and that she felt that she got involved on Ms Goff’s side.
This was a matter which the Claimant raised in her grievance which was presented by her solicitor Slater & Gordon dated 6 May 2016. The Claimant alleged also that Ms Rowell concluded the meeting by telling the Claimant that if she did not “sort her act out” and start being a team player, Ms Rowell would have to involve HR. The Claimant alleged that she asked if HR could be involved in any event due to the fact that the meeting had turned into a review about her performance, and that Ms Rowell refused to accede to this request.
In her evidence to the Tribunal Ms Rowell rebutted this allegation. She indicated that she had in any event spoken to Human Resources before the meeting on 15 April 2015 in order to get some guidance as to how to conduct the meeting and that she would have been quite happy, if it was appropriate and wanted by the parties involved, to pass the matter over to Human Resources. The Tribunal considered that this was a credible account and it was consistent with the way in which Ms Rowell had dealt with the Claimant earlier specifically in relation to the prompt way in which she had held the meeting with Ms Goff on 15 April and also her other actions in terms of setting up the meeting and also in communicating with Mr Donker so that he could apologise to the Claimant.
62 Miss Little alleged that Ms Rowell effectively got involved and sided with Ms Goff. Once again the Tribunal found Ms Rowell’s account that she said very little during the meeting as credible. The Tribunal has already referred above to her 27 April 2015 email in which she set out a frank and credible account of both her knowledge of the Facebook entry and about the Claimant raising the matter with her and the actions that she took. The 27 April 2015 email was also sent relatively contemporaneously. She noted that the Claimant had very aggressive body language and that they “walked through what had happened”. She indicated that the Claimant got a little aggressive verbally at one point and that she jumped in and said that if they could not clear the air and move forward then she would take the matter to Human Resources and work out next steps. She then continued that the Claimant indicated that she just wanted to draw a line and move on.
63 The Tribunal considered that Ms Rowell had indeed referred to bringing in Human Resources during the meeting but that it had not become necessary to do so because the Claimant had backed down and indicated that she also wanted to just draw a line and move on. Although the Claimant disputed that she had agreed that a line should be drawn and they should move on, this was consistent with the absence of any further action about this issue by the Claimant after 15 April 2015. Indeed, after the Claimant went off on sick leave the first record of her raising this issue with the Respondent was during the telephone conversation between herself and Ms Watts of Human Resources on 2 October 2015 (p.16a). She had clearly been in touch with someone else from Human Resources prior to that in about mid-September 2015 but there was no record in the notes of the Facebook issue being referred to.
64 Further, in the first Occupational Health report following a discussion with the Claimant on 20 August 2015 (pp.11-2) there was no reference to the Facebook comments. The closest reference to any such matter was the reference in the Occupational Health report to the Claimant telling the Occupational Health adviser about “some relational strain within her department and despite her raising it to management she feels it has not been acknowledged and therefore it further contributed to a lost sense of support and job satisfaction”.
65 In all those circumstances, the Tribunal concluded on the balance of probabilities that Ms Rowell’s account of the conduct of the meeting on 15 April 2015 was the more credible. Further, the Claimant made no complaint about Ms Rowell’s conduct of the meeting until considerably later i.e. in the grievance letter a year after the events i.e. in April 2016. Second, the Claimant behaved in a way which was consistent with Ms Rowell’s account that she had agreed that they would draw a line under the issue of Ms Goff’s comments, until she raised the matter some six months later in October 2015 with Ms Watts.
66 In all the circumstances therefore the Tribunal rejected the Claimant’s contention that the meeting had been conducted inappropriately by Ms Goff and Ms Rowell.
67 The Claimant also complained that she had been isolated and ostracised from the team from 14 April 2015 until 30 July 2015 when she commenced her period of sickness absence.
68 The Respondent drew the Tribunal’s attention to the Claimant’s oral evidence to the effect that there was evidence of isolation and ostracism in relation to not being invited to the Christmas party in December 2014. Mr Milsom relied on the fact that this incident occurred some four to five months prior to the timeframe which the Claimant identified in the list of issues as being the relevant timeframe for the incidents of ostracism complained about. He also pointed to the Claimant’s failure to have particularised this allegation.
69 It is also apparent from the dates on which the ostracism is alleged to have occurred in the list of issues, namely 14 April 2015 to 30 July 2015, that the Claimant was alleging that she was isolated and ostracised from the team after she raised concerns about Ms Goff’s involvement in the Lee Donker Facebook exchange. To that extent therefore her reference to not being invited to the Christmas 2014 party, which she also accepted during her evidence impacted on not just herself but also Mrs Hardwick and Mr Donker, did not support the picture of isolation or ostracism from 14 April 2015. Mrs Hardwick had not raised any issue about the Donker Facebook comments, so any adverse treatment of her could not have been a result of having taken that action.
70 The Claimant also described in her oral evidence that her perception was that there had always been a divide between the two teams which were eventually managed by Ms Rowell. The Tribunal considered that it was likely that the organisational changes described earlier accounted for that perception. Moreover, the Claimant’s contention that this had always been a divide further undermined the contention that there was isolation and ostracism as a result of having raised the concerns about Ms Goff’s involvement in the Facebook comments.
71 The Tribunal considered that there may well have been some delay in the two teams gelling once they came jointly under Ms Rowell’s management but this was inconsistent with the case put by the Claimant that she was isolated and ostracised from 14 April 2015 and because she described the divide being between the P to P Team of which she was a member and the Projects Team. The existence of the two teams patently did not arise from the Claimant having raised concerns about the involvement of Sue Goff on 14 April 2015.
72 Also in any event the Claimant accepted that she was reluctant to socialise with her work colleagues in activities which involved alcohol because of another health condition relating to her gall bladder. The Respondent did not seek to criticise the Claimant for this choice nor indeed does the Tribunal. However, it further paints a picture of the Claimant not socialising with her colleagues not because she was being isolated or ostracised by them but because of other issues which were completely unrelated to the actions of her colleagues.
73 The next issue raised by the Claimant under 4.1(e) was about increased working hours between March 2015 and 30 July 2015. The Tribunal has already set out above the background of the need for the work to be done which had been entrusted to the Claimant in relation to the preparation for the change over from the R11 to R12 system. The documentary evidence about the overtime worked by the Claimant certainly from May 2015 to July 2015 inclusive also confirms that she had increased working hours. The Tribunal considered however that it was important in considering the effect of this in the context of constructive unfair dismissal complaint to record that the Claimant was clear that this extra work was because she was working on a specific project which had a specific end date, namely at the end of July 2015 in prospect. Further, the Tribunal also considered that the findings above about the steps taken by Ms Rowell to assist the Claimant in terms of removing areas of her work which she was finding it difficult to cope with along with the R11 clean up work to somebody else also indicated that she was aware that the Respondent was prepared to assist her with this.
74 It was also noteworthy that although the Claimant had taken steps to bring her concerns about the Facebook comments to Ms Rowell’s attention in April 2015, there was no documentary evidence of any similar action taken by the Claimant in terms of complaint about her working hours between March 2015 and the end of July 2015 beyond the two occasions already set out above. On the balance of probabilities, we were not satisfied that the Claimant reasonably believed that the Respondent would not have assisted her if she had brought to their attention that she was finding the working hours difficult to cope with.
75 A further point that the Claimant made in this context was that there was a weekend when she was unable to work overtime and that she had told Ms Rowell about this. It was accepted by the Respondent that there was no-one else who could have worked on the project of R11 clean up during that weekend because only the Claimant had the relevant access. It was also not in dispute that when the Claimant indicated to Ms Rowell that she could not work that weekend that Ms Rowell agreed that that was fine. However, the Tribunal did not consider that this was evidence that the Claimant was telling Ms Rowell that she was having difficulty in keeping up with the work.
76 The next matter relied on by the Claimant in support of her constructive unfair dismissal complaint was at paragraph 4.1(f) in which she complained about inadequate support and/or unwarranted blame by Ms Goff and Ms Rowell during the period March 2015 to 30 July 2015. The Tribunal has already made findings about both aspects of this complaint in relation to support. The Tribunal assumed because this was not further clarified by the Claimant that the reference to unwarranted blame by Ms Goff and Ms Rowell was a reference to the Claimant’s allegations about the meeting of 15 April 2015. These have already been dealt with above and have not been found in the Claimant’s favour.
The Claimant’s sickness absence from 30 July 2015 to resignation in September 2016
77 The first sick note relied on by the Claimant was dated 30 July 2015 and certified that she was unfit for work for the next two weeks because of anxiety stress at work.
78 She apparently then contacted her employer to indicate that she had been signed off again for a further two weeks on about 13 August 2015 (p.9). The Respondent then arranged for the Claimant to be assessed by their occupational health service and this led to a telephone consultation on 20 August 2015 and a report of the same date to the Respondent. The occupational health adviser who assessed the Claimant on three occasions between August and October 2015 was Ms Elmarie Verwey. On each occasion, it was noted that a copy of the occupational health report was to be sent to the Claimant at the same time as it was released to Human Resources. The report to the Respondent included, among other matters, the following opinion:
“From a clinical point of view Mrs Little is fit and capable to perform her contracted duties; however her anxiety and exhaustion because of described work related concerns are the main barriers to her successful return to work and these concerns need to be addressed through an organisational rather than a medical approach.
It is unlikely that the Disability legislation will apply to her stress related health concern at the moment as it is reactive to perceived work circumstances and once resolved it is not expected to affect her ability to perform day to day activities.”
79 The adviser also made some recommendations. These included:
75.1 A workplace stress risk assessment as well as an independent mediation meeting between the Claimant, management and HR to discuss, clarify and resolve her perceived work concerns;
75.2 Once she was fit to return to work, a phased return was suggested;
75.3 A review of the Claimant’s workload to ensure that the Claimant had achievable targets that could be met within her contracted working hours; and the possibility of the Claimant contacting the available EAP if she felt it could be of benefit to her was also mentioned.
80 Ms Verwey also indicated that she thought that the Claimant may need some work time flexibility to attend medical appointments and reviews in the next two to three months once she was fit to return to work. She concluded the section on recommendation/opinion by stating that if the Claimant’s raised work concerns and the perceived relational conflict within the department could not be resolved the Respondent may wish to consider a move to a new department or team. However, she also stated that this was a managerial decision that should be considered on an HR level in line with organisational policies and procedures.
81 When describing the current situation Ms Verwey outlined symptoms which had been reported to her by the Claimant. In her descriptions of the symptoms however she distinguished between the Claimant’s current presentation as at August 2015 and the potential development of “more significant health concerns, higher levels of absence as well as a susceptibility to minor infections and ailments”. The Tribunal considered and the Claimant accepted in her evidence that the occupational health adviser was distinguishing between the current state of health for the Claimant and the potential for the development of more serious health concerns down the line. The Claimant commenced counselling through the auspices of an organisation paid for by the Respondent on 1 September 2015. It was agreed that this was for a course of eight sessions.
There was an update from the occupational health service on 14 September 2015 after Ms Verwey contacted the Claimant for a review assessment. The Claimant gave her consent for the information to be relayed to the Respondent. Ms Verwey noted:
“Ms Little tells me there has been some progress and improvement since our last consultation. She commenced counselling which she is finding helpful and she remains on medication as prescribed by her GP. She attended a review with her GP last week and it was advised that she continues with counselling for some further sessions before attempting a return to work. Ms Little has been signed off for a further four weeks but I am hopeful that with the support and therapy she is receiving she will continue to see improvement and be fit to return to work at the end of her current medical certificate.”
The Claimant spoke to occupational health on 20 August. The resulting report recorded that she had been signed off until 10 September 2015 with stress, anxiety and exhaustion. The update of 14 September 2015 recorded that she had been signed off for a further four weeks. That fit certificate was therefore due to expire on about 7 or 8 October 2015.
Based on this information therefore the Respondent would have been anticipating that the Claimant would be returning to work in early October 2015. The Tribunal has already referred to a conversation on the telephone between the Claimant and Ms Woods of the Human Resources Department who was dealing with her case but who was about to leave. When she left she handed over to Ms Saminder Watts.
Ms Watts as already stated above contacted the Claimant on 2 October 2015. Ms Watts made notes of her contact (p.16a) introducing herself to the Claimant on 2 October 2015. During that conversation, Ms Watts noted that the Claimant referred to the inappropriate Facebook entries, having spoken to Kelly (Rowell) and subsequently feeling that she was isolated and attacked. She also recorded that the Claimant had said that all the work was put on her and that she got headaches therefore she was signed off for two weeks. She complained that she subsequently got a text from Kelly and she felt attacked.
In fact the next fitness certificate was dated 2 October 2015 and the Claimant was signed off for four weeks with the diagnosis being anxiety aggravated by unfavourable work situation.
Occupational health then contacted the Claimant once again on 7 October 2015 for a review assessment to monitor her progress. The following was contained in the report:
“Ms Little tells me there has been a set back in her general mood and health since our last consultation. She tells me she had a phone conversation with her manager and experienced an anxiety attack shortly after speaking with her manager. In addition she developed ‘sleep seizures’ which may be a subconscious response to perceived stress and anxiety. Ms Little consulted her GP and was prescribed additional medication for these episodes which she is finding effective. She also continues with counselling every fortnight which she tells me is beneficial.
Ms Little has been signed off for a further four weeks but told me today she cannot foresee herself returning to the department as she feels it will impact on her health and well being in the future.
I explained to Ms Watts that these perceived issues need to be addressed and resolved internally and unfortunately there is little clinical advice I can add at this stage to support her return to work.
Recommendations from my previous report remain relevant in supporting a successful return to work once she is signed fit by her GP.”
Ms Verwey then referred back to her earlier recommendations and set them out again, as set out above in these reasons. She then continued:
“I have not arranged a further review with Ms Little at this stage as the main barrier to her return appears to be perceived and unresolved work issues and concerns. I am hopeful that once these stressors are addressed she would be fit to return to and render reliable service and attendance at work.
Please do not hesitate to refer her back should there be any change in her health status or if she has not been able to return to work in the next two months.”
89 It appears that Ms Rowell contacted the Claimant by telephone between 18 and 23 September 2015 and asked her to call her as occupational health had informed Ms Rowell that they were unable to get in touch with her and Ms Rowell therefore wanted to make contact with the Claimant. Ms Rowell’s evidence was that during the telephone call she asked the Claimant how she was doing and the Claimant told her that she was seeing a counsellor. Ms Rowell asked her again if there was anything she could do but the Claimant said there was not.
90 The Tribunal did not consider it necessary to make any further findings about this telephone contact because it was not something about which the Claimant complained in these proceedings. Ms Rowell also was not questioned further about this during her evidence.
91 Thereafter Ms Watts, HR business partner for MMC took over contact with the Claimant and Ms Rowell did not have any further involvement in speaking to the Claimant.
92 The occupational health report dated 7 October 2015 was the last such report in this case. Against the general findings of fact set out above the Tribunal then considered the specific issues identified in the list of issues.
In this case the Claimant alleged that she had been constructively dismissed and although she did not specifically allege that her dismissal was caused by any disability discrimination it appeared appropriate to the Tribunal, given the issues, to consider the allegations of disability discrimination during the employment under sections 15 and 20 of the Equality Act 2010 (“the 2010 Act”) first before determining the constructive unfair dismissal complaint.
The first matter the Tribunal considered was the question of whether the Claimant met the definition of a disabled person under the Equality Act 2010. The Respondent put the Claimant to proof as to whether she was a disabled person. The relevant timeframe for the Tribunal as agreed in the list of issues was from June 2015 to the termination of the Claimant’s employment. The Claimant relied on having a mental impairment at the material time which had a long term substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day to day activities. She relied on a diagnosis of “anxiety disorder” (p.365).
The Tribunal accepted the Respondent’s submission that this was not a condition identified in the World Health Organisation ICD although this was not necessarily fatal to the determination of the issue. There was certainly no evidence put before the Tribunal to indicate that it was identified as such in the ICD. Further, there was no evidence before the Tribunal which supported that diagnosis. There was one fit note out of the four that the Tribunal was shown covering a timeframe from 30 July 2015 through to the last dated 3 December 2015 for two months, which identified anxiety disorder as the diagnosis. The other fit notes (pp.7G, 17, 26) all reported that the Claimant presented with symptoms described as “anxiety, stress at work”. The diagnosis of anxiety disorder was simply in the fit note and there was no explanation why this diagnosis varied from that which had been provided previously or subsequently.
In addition to that the Tribunal had the evidence of the occupational health reports and also the subsequent evidence when the Claimant applied to the income protection insurance company (Unum) for payments because of her continued ill-health. Both these sources of information failed to support the Claimant’s case that she was disabled. In particular, Ms Verwey, the occupational health adviser stated:
“From a clinical point of view Mrs Little is fit and capable to perform her contracted duties; however her anxiety and exhaustion because of described work related concerns are the main barriers to her successful return to work and these concerns needs to be addressed through an organisational rather than a medical approach. …
It is unlikely that the Disability legislation will apply to her stress related health concern at the moment as it is reactive to perceived work circumstances and once resolved it is not expected to affect her ability to perform day to day activities.” (pp.11-12). The application for income protection to Unum led to the following comment from a report from Unum (p.101) as follows:
“Ms Little has reported anxiety and exhaustion due to work related concerns. It is indicated in the occupational health records and medical records that these are not the result of a significant mental health illness, but rather a manifestation of her work situation.
In addition, on review of her reported ability to function outside of the workplace and away from these concerns, it is reported by Ms Little that she can carry normal activities.”
There was further evidence before the Tribunal originating from the Claimant herself in which she agreed that the restriction on her ability to function was limited to the particular work situation in the finance department. This picture is inconsistent with meeting the statutory definition of being a disabled person.
The Tribunal adopted the submissions by the Respondent set out in paragraphs 18 to 21 of [R10] as to the Claimant not having been a disabled person at the material times. In the case of J v DLA Piper [2010] ICR 1052, Underhill P (at para 42) drew a distinction between two ‘states of affairs’ which could produce broadly similar symptoms of low mood and anxiety. The first state of affairs constituted a mental illness or condition, which was conveniently referred to as “clinical depression” and which was unquestionably an impairment within the meaning of the 2010 Act. The second state of affairs was not characterised as a mental condition at all but simply as a reaction to adverse circumstances (such as problems at work) or ‘adverse life events’. These observations were adopted in the case of Herry v Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council UKEAT/0101/16 at para 56.
It appeared to the Tribunal that these observations were fully consistent with and indeed assisted with applying the statutory definition of disability. The symptoms in the former category did not meet the necessary thresholds of severity (substantial adverse effect on the Claimant’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities), or longevity (lasting or likely to last 12 months etc). Further, the evidence in this case clearly established that the Claimant had developed an entrenched position in relation to her work situation (as in the Herry case) but that in other respects, she suffered no or little apparent adverse effect on normal day to day activities. The EAT held that in such a case, an Employment Tribunal is not bound to find that there was a mental impairment.
There was a dearth of evidence about how the claimed impairment affected the performance by the Claimant of normal day to day activities.
The Tribunal was satisfied in the circumstances that the Claimant was not a disabled person.
It followed therefore, as we did not find that the Claimant was a disabled person within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010, that she was not entitled to bring complaints of breaches of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to disability. However, the Tribunal considered that it might be helpful to the parties if we set our findings in relation to the factual matters complained of even though we did not find that the Claimant was a disabled person. These findings were also relevant to the constructive dismissal complaint.
105 The Claimant complained that the Respondent should have taken certain steps and that the failure to take those steps was a failure to make reasonable adjustments in breach of Section 20 of the 2010 Act. These were:
4.15(a) Providing additional counselling in December 2015; 4.15(b) Allocating her to a different office/team (in particular GSP and/or Treasury); 4.15(c) Allocating her to another office within driving distance of her home; and 4.15(d) Redeploying her to another company within the Respondent’s group of companies.
106 The Claimant relied on a PCP of “the requirement to work at the contracted place of work” and “the requirement to work in the contracted department”.
107 The evidence did not suggest that the Respondent ever placed such a requirement on the Claimant. The Claimant’s position as early as October 2015 onwards was that she could not see how things could be resolved “as the trust has been broken” (p.23). This remained her position during the grievance hearing when she stated: “I honestly don’t know what else could be done”. Instead she sought to explore the possibility of an exit package. In her eyes the relationship had broken down and was irretrievable: *HM Prison Service v Johnson* [2007] IRLR 951.
108 Even if the Tribunal were wrong about that, the Tribunal accepted the Respondent’s submission that in any event the adjustments would have had no prospects of enabling a return to work. The fact that counselling was offered and refused supported this. The Witham office was a single floor open-plan area. The Claimant’s stated desire to “avoid those that had upset her” would not have been addressed by transferring her to a different team in the same space. The Tribunal refers to the references above by the Claimant to all the people who she considered were implicated in the Facebook issue.
109 Further, the adjustments argued for in Issue 4.15(b) – (d) above were so vague as to be meaningless – allocating her to a different office/team/company. They did not shift the burden of proof to the Respondent: *Project Management Institute v Latif* [2007] IRLR 579 at paras 53 – 55. The Claimant’s failure to engage in discussion on the same subject alluded to by these adjustments in September 2016 was also relevant and undermined her case in this respect. 110 The Tribunal also considered whether there was any alternative role beyond those put to the Claimant and which she rejected. There was no evidence to suggest that there was such a role. There was no duty on the Respondent to create a role particularly where the grievance which was identified as the reason for redeployment was not upheld. The issue in the grievance was the bullying allegation against Ms Rowell. The Respondent had a simultaneous duty of care to all employees therefore it was not open to them fairly to treat those within the Claimant’s team as culpable in the absence of evidential support for that conclusion. It would have breached their duty of care to those employees.
111 The Tribunal considered therefore that even if we had found that the Claimant was a disabled person, the complaints alleging failure to make reasonable adjustments would not have been upheld.
112 It was unclear what the timeframe of the adjustments sought in the second to fourth subparagraphs above was. In practice however, they largely covered a period up to certainly the time that the Claimant put in her grievance as by then, as set out above, she was indicating that it was certainly not appropriate for her to return to work. There would therefore have been an issue as to whether the Claimant had brought the claim in time in any event. This is dealt with below also in relation to the Section 15 claims.
113 The Claimant also alleged that she had been subjected to discrimination arising from disability under Section 15 of the Equality Act 2010. The unfavourable treatment relied on by the Claimant was:
1.1. That the Respondent failed to refer her to occupational health for a second review in December 2015 and/or reduced her pay in January 2016; and/or
1.2. Required her to return to work in the same department or go onto statutory sick pay also in January 2016.
114 In relation to these allegations the Claimant was more specific as to the relevant timeframe. It is clear therefore that the claim was presented outside the three month time limit in respect of these allegations.
115 The early conciliation process was not relevant here as the time limit had already expired before the early conciliation process was started. The two claim forms were presented on 6 September and 10 November 2016 respectively. The matters complained about therefore were at the very least six months out of time.
116 The Claimant had sought legal advice by 1 February 2016 (reference in her GP notes p.215). Certainly, by early May 2016, solicitors on her behalf wrote to the Respondent setting out the details of her complaints. All the facts which were necessary for her to present the claim were fully known by that stage. The Claimant advanced no reason whatsoever as to why the time should be extended. In those circumstances therefore the Tribunal had no material on which to base a proper exercise of its discretion to extend time: *Habinteg Housing Association Limited v Holleron* UKEAT/0274/14.
117 The Tribunal therefore considered that we had no grounds on which we could properly exercise our discretion to extend time and therefore we had no jurisdiction to determine these complaints alleging that the Claimant had been the subject of disability related discrimination.
118 We then set out our findings and conclusions in relation to the constructive dismissal complaint.
119 The Claimant relied upon the implied term of mutual trust and confidence namely the obligation upon each party to the contract of employment not to “without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee”: Per Lord Nicholls in *Malik v BCCI* [1997] 3 WLR 95. It was held that the words “destroy or seriously damage” should not be diluted – not every blemish in an employment relationship should be transmuted into a breach of the implied term.
120 The treatment by the Respondent which the Claimant relied upon are set out at Section 4.1 of the Preliminary Hearing Order which listed the issues in this case (pp.364-365). These were the matters which were addressed during the hearing. The original numbering of those paragraphs as set out in the Order of Employment Judge Russell and as set out above in these reasons will be used below also in order to avoid any confusion.
121 The Claimant first relied at issue 4.1(a) on the comments about the Claimant on Facebook on 31 March 2015 made by her colleagues (Mr Donker, Ms Goff, Ms Rowell and Ms Mandalay).
122 As the Tribunal found above Mr Donker who made the initial comments was by 31 March 2015 an ex-colleague in that he had left the Respondent’s employment. The Claimant was aware of this and therefore she cannot rely on his comments as constituting a breach of her contract of employment with the Respondent. In any event as the Tribunal has found above Ms Rowell, despite the fact that Mr Donker had already left, took steps promptly without being requested to do so by the Claimant, to elicit an apology form Mr Donker which was forthcoming.
123 As to the three other members of staff cited by the Claimant in paragraph 4.1(a), the Tribunal accepted as accurate the submission that it has been held that the Courts should be slow to impose requirements on employee usage of social media in their social life even when such usage may touch upon work-related matters: *Smith v Trafford Housing Trust* [2013] IRLR 86, especially at paras 26-29, 57-59, 68 and 76. Against that legal background and in the circumstances of this case therefore the employer cannot sensibly be held vicariously liable for its employee’s comments on social media. This applies even more so to the position of Mr Donker which has already been dealt with above.
124 Further, the Tribunal considered that issues 4.1(a) and (b) were very closely related so they were dealt with together. Our findings of fact as set out above in relation to the actions of the other three colleagues tend to support the Respondent’s case that the Claimant could not reasonably have considered that these constituted breaches of the employment contract. The actions of Ms Mandalay were those of a colleague of the Claimant and the Claimant had no reasonable grounds for believing that they were the actions of her employer.
125 The actions of Ms Rowell as the factual findings above show were innocent in the sense that she did not interpret the comments as referring to the Claimant indeed she responded as if the comments could have been directed at herself. Thereafter once she was made aware of the Claimant having been upset by the comments she acted promptly to assist the Claimant to resolve any difficulties. As the Claimant’s line manager, the Claimant could not reasonably therefore have believed that there was anything in relation to these comments which was the action of her employer.
126 Insofar as complaint is made about Ms Goff’s comments on Facebook as the findings above set out, we had no evidence about what Ms Goff had actually written.
127 In all the circumstances given the findings above about how Ms Rowell dealt with the Claimant’s complaints about Sue Goff and the absence of any evidence about what Sue Goff’s comments were, the Tribunal did not consider that this was a matter which the Claimant could reasonably have treated as a breach of or contributing to a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence by her employer.
128 The Tribunal next addressed 4.1(c). Once again the findings of facts set out above meant that the Claimant had not established the primary facts to support her allegation that there was inappropriate conduct by Ms Goff and Ms Rowell at the meeting on 15 April 2015.
129 The Tribunal next addressed issue 4.1(d) – isolation and ostracism from team from 14 April 2015 to 30 July 2015 when the Claimant commenced a period of sickness absence. The Tribunal’s findings of fact above also indicate that the Claimant had not established that she was isolated and ostracised from the team in the period that she complains about.
130 Issue 4.1(e) – increased working hours between March 2015 and 30 July 2015. The findings of fact relating to this are set out above. In summary, we found that Ms Rowell did not compel the Claimant to carry out the increased working hours indeed she had prior to this timeframe as set out above arranged for the Claimant to claim payment for the overtime. Also, on the occasion when the Claimant indicated that she could no carry out overtime over a weekend Ms Rowell indicated that that was perfectly acceptable. Finally, the Tribunal found that there was an occasion when the Claimant brought to her attention that she was not able to do a particular task and Ms Rowell arranged for this task to be done by somebody else. 131 The Tribunal also took into account in this context that the project that the Claimant was working on was time limited with a go live date in August 2015. This was also relevant in determining whether the Claimant was reasonable in considering it as a breach of contract. The Tribunal did not consider that this was the case. We therefore rejected the contention that this was a matter which indicated that the Respondent had conducted itself without reasonable or proper cause in a manner which was likely to destroy or seriously damage the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.
132 Issue 4.1(f) appeared to be a global complaint addressing the issues already dealt with individually above.
133 The next issue relied on was 4.1(g) – failure to redeploy the Claimant to another team or department (such as GSP and/or Treasury). GSP stood for Global Source Procurement. The Claimant accepted during her evidence that the GSP and Treasury teams were also based in the Hub and indeed these teams would therefore have been in the same building and on the same floor as the team in which she previously worked. If she had worked in those teams, the GSP and/or Treasury, she would still have had interaction with the members of the team that she complained about. In that context therefore the Respondent’s failure to redeploy her to those teams would not have addressed the complaints and concerns that the Claimant expressed to them. In any event, the Tribunal accepted the Respondent’s submission that an implied term cannot override the express terms of the contract. The Claimant was expressly contracted to work in her specific role and there was no mobility clause in her contract.
134 The next issue was 4.1(h) – January 2016, reducing the Claimant’s pay and telling her that she must return to the same position or go onto SSP. The evidence did not support the Claimant’s contention that she was told this. The Respondent had a sick pay policy and in fact gave the Claimant more generous payment than was strictly necessary under the policy. A failure to provide ex gratia (voluntary) payments did not in the circumstances of this case amount to a breach of the implied term.
135 The next issue was 4.1(i) – which was withdrawn.
136 The next matter relied on by the Claimant was 4.1(j) – 16 June 2016, rejection of her grievance and requirement to return to work. There was no requirement imposed by the Respondent on the Claimant to return to work. Further, the Tribunal had regard to the detailed exercise carried out by the Respondent in assessing the Claimant’s grievance and accepted that the rejection of the grievance was based on evidence and was reasonable on the part of the Respondent. There was a clear consensus of evidence obtained by them which not only undermined the grievance but painted a different picture about the Claimant’s involvement in the issues in the workplace which was adverse to her. The essence of the grievance was an allegation of bullying of her by Ms Rowell. The findings of this Tribunal as set out above undermined the validity of that grievance. 137 This matter therefore could not in the Tribunal’s view either taken singly or with other matters constitute conduct which could support the constructive dismissal complaint.
138 The next issue was 4.1(k) which was withdrawn in relation to delay in deciding the grievance appeal.
139 The next issue was 4.1(l) – requiring the Claimant to return to her previous department. This was directed at the conduct of the Respondent in the period August to September 2016. The correspondence between the Claimant and the Respondent at about this time (pp.171-172, 182, 185-186) did not establish the primary facts relied upon by the Claimant. The Tribunal considered that the Respondent acted perfectly reasonably in communicating with the Claimant to set out clearly the position in relation to seeking to discuss a return to work and advising the Claimant of the potential options if she did not return to work.
140 Also, the Tribunal considered that the Claimant had rejected the opportunities to transfer to other posts and that the Respondent was not under a contractual duty to create an alternative post.
141 The Tribunal did not consider that in the circumstances the Respondent had breached the implied term in this respect.
142 The final matter relied upon by the Claimant was the email dated 21 September 2016 from Human Resources requiring her to attend a meeting in London at which she could not be accompanied, and being told that her employment was likely to be terminated.
143 Once again, the Tribunal did not find that the Claimant had established the primary facts. First, there was no requirement on the Claimant to attend the meeting since Ms Watts explicitly raised the possibility of the Claimant dialling in her attendance and of sending in written representations.
144 In relation to the issue of being accompanied, the Respondent gave the Claimant the option of being accompanied by either a member of her union or a work colleague. As a matter of fact, the Claimant was not a member of a union and ...
145 The initial invitation to the meeting on 26 September was in a letter dated 16 September 2016 (p.187-188). The Claimant rejected the opportunity of attending and also of making written submissions for various reasons including her ability to use public transport and the stress of participating in a conference call (p.189). It followed therefore if the Claimant immediately stated that she was not going to be attending the meeting that the issue of being accompanied was not material. The Claimant expressed her perception that the outcome was already predetermined.
146 The Tribunal considered that the Respondent set out carefully and appropriately the decision that they were considering in relation to the Claimant’s future employment. It is consistent with fair employment practice and indeed in accordance with the ACAS code that the employee should be on notice of the possible outcomes in such circumstances and should have a fair opportunity to express their views about such matters. The summary of the history which was set out by Ms Watts was accurate and the Tribunal considered that the Respondent acted reasonably and in accordance with its policies to review the Claimant’s continued employment at this stage. The Tribunal also considered that the Respondent had acted reasonably in not seeking a further occupational health report given the recommendations and the essence of the report from the occupational health service which was that there was no disability and that the issues were organisational/managerial.
147 The Claimant relied on the email of 21 September 2016 as the final straw. This was the email written by Ms Watts after having received the Claimant’s notification that she would not be attending the meeting of 26 September. In that email she sought to address the concerns raised by the Claimant in her email in response of 18 September 2016 (p.190-191). The Claimant helpfully sent an email with her comments on Ms Watt’s email back to Ms Watts on 21 September 2016 at 10.26am (pp.192-194).
148 It is now well-settled law that the final straw does not in itself need to be a breach of the contract but needs to be more than innocuous: Omilaju v Waltham Forest LBC (No 2) [2005] ICR 481.
149 The Tribunal did not consider that there was anything inappropriate or unreasonable in the terminology and the terms of the email sent by Ms Watts. In any event as set out above the Claimant had already decided that she had no trust in the Respondent and this had been the position for some months. This was also consistent with her refusal to attend the meeting. In all the circumstances, therefore even if the email could reasonably be viewed as constituting a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence, (which we did not consider to have been the case) the Claimant could not rely on it as causing the termination of the employment because she had already reached the view that there was no trust.
150 In all the circumstances, therefore, the Claimant had failed to establish that she was constructively dismissed. She was therefore not dismissed. She had resigned and was not entitled to claim unfair dismissal under Section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
Employment Judge Hyde
14 August 2017
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c56067a781509dff294aca9af1f264126c02c1cd | Methodology Note: UK Wood Imports & Exports
Introduction Statistics on UK imports and exports of wood and wood products (based on overseas trade statistics published by HM Revenue & Customs) are compiled by the Forestry Commission (in association with the Forest Service in Northern Ireland).
Data are released twice a year. *UK Wood Production and Trade: provisional figures* is released in May alongside the *Joint Forest Sector Questionnaire: provisional figures* submitted to the statistical office of the European Union (Eurostat). Final figures are released in *Forestry Statistics* in September and in the *Joint Forest Sector Questionnaire: final data*. Estimates for the current year and forecasts for the coming year are submitted at the same time to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) as part of the *Timber Forecast Questionnaire*.
The methodology and outputs relevant to UK wood imports and exports were reviewed in 2013. The review report is available at [www.forestry.gov.uk/forestry/ahen-589ddl](http://www.forestry.gov.uk/forestry/ahen-589ddl). The review identified a need to document the data analysis methods used in the production of the output.
This paper sets out the data analysis methods used to produce annual estimates of UK wood imports and exports.
Sources The data sources used to estimate UK wood production are described in the Sources section of *Forestry Statistics 2013*: [www.forestry.gov.uk/website/forstats2013.nsf/TopContents?Open&ctx=9314380047FD5FFD8025731E00475FD7](http://www.forestry.gov.uk/website/forstats2013.nsf/TopContents?Open&ctx=9314380047FD5FFD8025731E00475FD7). They comprise:
- Published overseas trade statistics for intra-EU trade and extra-EU trade produced by HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) and available at [www.uktradeinfo.com](http://www.uktradeinfo.com)
- Data from the Confederation of Paper Industries.
- Other data requests to relevant businesses concerning roundwood and chip exports.
- Estimates from the Expert Group on Timber and Trade Statistics: [www.forestry.gov.uk/forestry/infd-5rabj3](http://www.forestry.gov.uk/forestry/infd-5rabj3). Methodology
A two stage process is applied to the estimation of statistics on imports and exports of wood and wood products.
Stage 1: Initial estimates from HMRC data
The data obtained from HMRC cover quantities (weights and volumes) and values of wood and wood products imported to and exported from the UK.
Data are downloaded at annual level for all countries combined (total EU and total non-EU). Products are restricted to those related to wood, pulp and paper and are downloaded at the lowest level of detail available (combined nomenclature CN8 codes http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/tariff_aspects/combined_nomenclature/index_en.htm).
Some imports data are also obtained by country of origin, to enable estimates of source for the main categories (as reported in Forestry Statistics 2015, table 3.8).
This methodology has been revised from 2016, for the production of 2015 estimates, to download the more detailed flat files from HMRC, rather than using the “Build Your Own Tables” facility, to ensure that estimates for below threshold trade are picked up at detailed product level.
Data are downloaded from the HMRC website in comma-separated values (csv) format and converted to Microsoft Excel format, before being transferred to SAS, a statistical software package (www.sas.com).
Data processing and analysis takes place in SAS and Excel. The processing steps are documented as comments within the SAS code and in the Excel spreadsheets. The data are combined within SAS, aggregates are calculated and exported to Excel.
The initial estimates produced cover the following product categories (corresponding to the categories requested by international organisations in the Joint Forest Sector Questionnaire):
- Roundwood - woodfuel, industrial roundwood;
- Wood charcoal;
- Wood chips, particles, residues and wood pellets;
- Sawnwood;
- Wood-based panels - veneer sheets, plywood, particleboard, fibreboard;
- Pulp - wood pulp, other pulp;
- Recovered paper;
- Paper & paperboard - graphic papers (including newsprint), sanitary & household papers, packaging materials, other paper & paperboard. For industrial roundwood, sawnwood, veneer sheets and plywood, a softwood/hardwood breakdown is also estimated.
The HMRC trade data is initially assigned to JFSQ product codes on the basis of the latest cross-reference supplied by international organisations. The cross-reference provides guidance to countries on the allocation of detailed product codes to the categories covered in the JFSQ. A 6 digit level (Harmonised System, or HS) is available for use by all countries; for EU countries, trade data are also available at the 8 digit level (Combined Nomenclature, or CN). The initial UK estimates are therefore based on the 8 digit CN product codes. In producing these initial estimates, a factor of 0.5 is applied for products where only part of a code is assigned (generally for identifying tropical species).
Stage 2: Amendments to data
Historically, the initial estimates based on HMRC data have often necessitated adjustments, following liaison with practitioners in the trade. This is partly because detailed intra-EU wood trade data is obtained through a survey of businesses which trade above a particular value threshold. Businesses which trade below this threshold are only required to report the total value of their imports and exports. Therefore the trade data reported for individual products is based on a potentially biased survey. More information on HMRC statistics can be found at www.uktradeinfo.com.
In order to improve the initial aggregate estimates, amendments are then applied to specific product categories, making use of alternative data sources and expert advice. In particular:
- Revised import data for all the main solid wood and panel products are supplied by Timbertrends, under contract with the Forestry Commission. Raw HMRC data are purchased by Timbertrends and are downloaded, reviewed and where necessary, errors are corrected. This correction process is often based upon ‘correct’ data in close proximity to that in error. These errors are usually minor, but occasionally are significant.
- The Forestry Commission collects data on roundwood and chip exports directly from UK timber businesses that export these products.
- Expert advice on wood pulp and paper imports and exports is sought from the Confederation of Paper Industries.
The amendments made consist of routine changes, that are made regularly, and ad hoc changes (resulting from specific issues with that year’s data). Further details are provided in the Annex to this note.
The amendments are received, processed and applied to the initial estimates in Excel. They generally only relate to import and export quantities; values are normally left unchanged, as these are generally believed to be more accurate. However, when the quantity of a particular product category is set to zero, the corresponding value will also be set to zero.
Quality checks and unit conversions A number of quality assurance checks, corrections and imputations are carried out at several stages of the data processing and analysis. They include testing for completeness (missing, duplicate or incomplete records), consistency between categories (such as intra-EU, extra-EU and total trade), consistency with historical data, sense-check of unit values and general sense-check of the figures by the Expert Group on Timber & Trade Statistics.
Where required, figures are adjusted using standard FAO/ECE conversion factors, listed below:
| Product | m³ / tonne | |---------------------------------------------------|------------| | Fuelwood, including wood for charcoal | 1.38 | | Wood chips, sawdust, etc | 1.48 | | Industrial roundwood (wood in the rough) - softwood| 1.43 | | Industrial roundwood (wood in the rough) - hardwood| 1.25 | | Sawnwood - softwood | 1.82 | | Sawnwood - hardwood | 1.43 | | Veneer sheets | 1.33 | | Plywood, particleboard | 1.54 | | Hardboard | 1.053 | | MDF (medium density fibreboard) | 1.667 | | Insulating board - density 0.35-0.5 g/cm³ | 1.667 | | Insulating board - other | 4.00 | The following factors are used to convert to wood raw material equivalent, which indicates the volume of wood (in m$^3$ underbark) needed to produce one unit (tonne or m$^3$) of final product:
| Product | Measurement unit | Factor to wrme underbark | |----------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------| | Fuelwood | tonnes | 1.20 | | Wood charcoal | tonnes | 6.00 | | Chips, sawdust, etc | tonnes | 1.20 | | Industrial roundwood (rough, treated) | m$^3$ | 1.10 | | Industrial roundwood (in the rough) | m$^3$ | 1.00 | | Sleepers | m$^3$ | 1.58 | | Softwood sawnwood | m$^3$ | 2.00 | | Hardwood sawnwood | tonnes | 2.50 | | Wastepaper | tonnes | 2.80 | | Mechanical pulp | tonnes | 2.50 | | Chemical dissolving pulp | tonnes | 2.50 | | Sulphate pulp, unbleached | tonnes | 6.00 | | Sulphate pulp, bleached | tonnes | 4.50 | | Sulphite pulp | tonnes | 5.00 | | Semi-chemical woodpulp | tonnes | 2.75 | | Veneer (< 6mm) | tonnes | 3.45 | | Other wood-based panels | tonnes | 2.50 | | Woodwool, woodflour | tonnes | 1.70 | | Packing cases, pallets | tonnes | 2.00 | | Other manufactured wood | tonnes | 2.50 | | Newsprint | tonnes | 2.80 | | Writing & printing paper, uncoated | tonnes | 3.50 | | Other paper & paperboard | tonnes | 2.50 |
Notes:
1. A revised set of figures was produced in FC Technical Paper 19, "Revised Forecasts of the Supply and Demand for Wood in the UK" (Forestry Commission, 1996), but these have not been used in FC publications. Disclosure Statistics on imports and exports are primarily based on published HMRC overseas trade data, so no further disclosure checking is undertaken by the Forestry Commission. Results from survey data are checked for disclosure potential; results to date have not been disclosive.
Revisions Statistics on imports and exports are subject to revision after publication if revisions are made to the overseas trade statistics produced by HMRC. Figures may also be refined to take account of expert advice from the Expert Group on Timber & Trade Statistics and trade associations on trade in specific products.
The Forestry Commission’s revisions policy sets out how revisions and errors to statistics are dealt with, and can be found at: www.forestry.gov.uk/pdf/FCrevisions.pdf
More specific information on revisions to UK imports and exports statistics can be found in the quality report on UK Wood Production and Trade at www.forestry.gov.uk/pdf/ukwptqrpt.pdf ; and in the quality report on Forestry Statistics and Forestry Facts and Figures at: www.forestry.gov.uk/pdf/qrfs_fff.pdf.
Jeremy Darot / Sheila Ward Statistics, Forestry Commission Updated March 2016 Glossary
Conversion factor Numerical factor by which a quantity that is expressed in one set of units must be multiplied in order to convert it into another set of units.
Deliveries The quantities of UK-grown roundwood that is delivered to processors (mills) or for other uses (such as wood fuel and exports). Note that for sawmills and round fencing mills, the deliveries figure reported is actually the quantity of roundwood consumed by the mill, which may differ from the true deliveries figure if the levels of input stocks vary.
European Union (EU) Currently comprises 28 member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
Eurostat The statistical office of the European Union, situated in Luxembourg. Its task is to provide the European Union with statistics at European level that enable comparisons between countries and regions.
Forestry Commission (FC) The government department responsible for forestry matters in England, Scotland and (until March 2013) Wales. The Forestry Commission’s functions in Wales transferred to a new organisation, Natural Resources Wales, on 1 April 2013. The responsibility for forestry is devolved.
Forest Service (FS) An agency of the Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development.
Great Britain (GB) England, Wales and Scotland.
Hardwood The wood of broadleaved trees, such as oak, birch and beech; a term sometimes used for the broadleaved trees themselves.
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) The United Kingdom’s tax authority.
Pulp Fibrous material produced by mechanically or chemically reducing wood into its component parts from which pulp, paper and paperboard sheets are formed after proper slushing and treatment or used for dissolving purposes (dissolving pulp or chemical cellulose) to make rayon, plastics, and other synthetic products. Sometimes called wood pulp. Methodology note: UK wood imports & exports
**Roundwood** Trunk or branch wood, generally with a top diameter of 7 cm or more. Can be in the form of logs (14 cm top diameter or more) or small roundwood (7 to 14 cm).
**Sawnwood** Sawn timber - timber that has been cut into planks or boards from logs.
**Softwood** The wood of coniferous trees, such as spruce, pine and larch; a term sometimes used for the coniferous trees themselves.
**United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)** One of five regional commissions of the United Nations. Its mission is to promote pan-European economic integration. The UNECE Statistical Division is responsible for compiling international statistics on production and trade of wood products for Europe, the Russian Federation and North America.
**United Kingdom (UK)** Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
**Wood pellets** Sawdust or wood shavings compressed into uniform diameter pellets to be burned for heat or energy. Annex: Further information on amendments to trade data
Routine amendments to data
The following routine amendments are made to the initial estimates produced from HMRC data, to take account of alternative data sources and expert advice.
Industrial roundwood, chips & particles
- For exports, HMRC quantity estimates are replaced with data obtained by the Forestry Commission from businesses that export roundwood or chips. This provides consistency with UK timber statistics.
Sawnwood
- Code 44079131 (relating to Oak flooring) is excluded, as this is considered to be secondary processed sawnwood.
Plywood
- Codes relating to products containing both coniferous and non-coniferous material (44129490, 44129985) are allocated to the coniferous/ non-coniferous categories based on the majority of material (derived from average densities).
- Code 44123290 is excluded from the tropical sub-category. Although plywood under this code may have a tropical face, the majority of the wood is believed to be of temperate species.
Wood pulp, other pulp, recovered paper and paper & paperboard
- All HMRC quantity estimates are replaced with estimates produced by the Confederation of Paper Industries (www.paper.org.uk).
Ad hoc amendments to data
Ad hoc amendments may be made to correct apparent errors in the data after any routine amendments have been made. These adjustments are constantly reviewed and are applied where considered appropriate. Hence, they are not a permanent feature of the regular provision of data, but remain as part of the process of delivery of information where such adjustments are required.
Work is undertaken by Timbertrends to check and revise import data for all the main solid wood and panel products. This involves deriving average prices and average densities from the HMRC data on weights, volumes and values. These derived figures are then compared to identify outliers (records with unusually high or low average prices and/or densities). Where outliers suggest an error (for example, average densities for non-coniferous sawnwood are unusually low and more appropriate to coniferous sawnwood) amendments may be made to the HMRC data to adjust the relevant estimates to be reported.
Work for the Forestry Commission undertaken by Timbertrends relates to the production of annual estimates for the categories covered by the Joint Forest Sector Questionnaire only. However, efforts are made by the contractor to ensure consistency of the annual estimates produced for the Forestry Commission with the monthly estimates produced for the Timber Trade Federation.
Two examples of recent ad hoc amendments are provided below.
**Box 1: Example of correction to HMRC data**
For instance, in the October 2015 hardwood import data provided, the following entry was observed:
| Month | Country | Code | Value | Weight | Unit (m³) | |-------|---------|----------|--------|--------|-----------| | 201510| GERMANY | 44079200 | 369,249| 722,426| 32,920 |
There is a high probability that the units have been mis-recorded, as these data produced an average price and average weight which would have been clearly incorrect.
The units for this entry, based on average density, were changed to: 1,003 m³.
**Box 2: Sawnwood from Latvia and Estonia**
Regular checks undertaken on 2013 data identified a number of entries for sawnwood imports from Latvia and Estonia that had been coded as hardwood but that had average densities more closely associated with sawn softwood.
It was concluded that these entries were likely to have been mis-coded and the Forestry Commission estimates for coniferous and non-coniferous sawnwood imports were adjusted accordingly. This resulted in an increase of around thirty thousand m³ to the estimate of coniferous sawnwood imports in 2013 (and a corresponding decrease in non-coniferous sawnwood imports).
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e865fe043bdb72af539f775a1f9b4bfc42bd294d | Mobile Infrastructure Project – planning applications and masts Introduction
The government is committed to encouraging economic growth. A key part of which is promoting a modern, high quality, telecommunications (telecoms) system for communities across all parts of the UK. Good mobile coverage helps businesses to grow and people to stay in touch. This is essential for social inclusion, and of particular importance for people who are vulnerable or isolated. People are increasingly using mobile connectivity to access the internet, as more and more people own Smartphones and tablet devices. There are some rural locations without coverage, known as 'not-spots', where it is impossible to make or maintain a mobile connection. Many of these areas are of high environmental quality. In October 2011, the Chancellor announced that the government would invest up to £150m in the Mobile Infrastructure Project (MIP) as part of the National Infrastructure Plan to help stimulate economic growth. Mobile phone coverage to many homes and businesses in 'not-spots' will be extended by building new mobile telecom base stations.
The government has awarded a contract to Arqiva to design, build and manage the new infrastructure. The government will fund the cost of erecting the masts with the costs of using the new infrastructure shared between the four mobile network operators - Vodafone, O2, EE and Three - for the 20-year lifespan of the project. The project is now in the implementation phase. Following extensive planning work being carried out to confirm sites which can be linked back to the existing networks and provide coverage, Arqiva is expecting to make rapid progress in acquiring more sites and planning permission over the coming months. Appropriate sites will continue to be identified and more planning applications are expected to be submitted in the autumn of 2014. The government are following an accelerated programme to deliver a high number of schemes by spring 2015. It is quite possible that your local planning authority (LPA) has already been contacted to discuss roll-out in your area.
Mobile phone masts and the planning system
Not all telecoms development requires a planning application. The government has given licensed telecoms operators permitted development rights to carry out certain types of smaller scale telecoms development1.
Telecoms development will normally fall within one of three categories, as below:
1. Small Developments
The smallest scale telecoms development, those that are likely to have the least impact, have permitted development rights. Masts do not fall into this category.
LPAs are notified of these works and are able to make comment on them. Typically, however, LPAs are only given 14 days to comment and the operators do not have to take these comments on board.
______________________________________________________________________
1 Part 24 of The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 (as amended) relaxes planning controls on certain types of telecoms equipment. The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (Amendment) (England) Order 2001. 2. Development requiring 'prior approval'
Some smaller scale masts, which are likely to have greater impact than above, may come under 'permitted development' but require the 'prior approval' of the LPA. In such cases, an application will be submitted to the LPA for approval of the siting and appearance proposed. Prior approval applications have to be determined within 56 days or they are automatically allowed.
3. Development Requiring Planning Permission
Larger scale masts that are likely to have a greater impact require an application for planning permission. These include, for example, any masts located in sensitive areas such as conservation areas, the Broads, National Parks or Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs). There are also separate requirements for Listed Building Consent and Scheduled Ancient Monument Consent.
Applications for masts that require planning permission are dealt with under the normal planning procedures and will be assessed against a range of planning criteria as well as policies set out in an adopted development plan, such as a Local Plan and Neighbourhood Plan.
The importance of early engagement with applicants
Due to the tight timescales involved in the project there may not be adequate time for extensive engagement at the pre-application stage but Arqiva have already been in contact with the vast majority of planning authorities with MIP sites in their areas. Where authorities are contacted, it might be helpful if LPAs responded in a timely way to requests for discussions, and provide a clear point of contact for that consultation, bearing in mind the tight timescales. Early discussions can help to outline any concerns with the proposal to enable them to be resolved in good time before a decision.
Arqiva has, however, committed to carry out consultations with relevant stakeholders in accordance with the industry’s Code of Best Practice. This would include engagement with the LPA and, where appropriate, the local community.
There is, in addition, a Joint Accord which already exists between the Association of National Park Authorities, The National Association of Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) and main mobile network operators (MNOs), whose purpose is ‘to protect the special qualities of our finest landscapes while making the best possible provision for telecommunication services’.
How should planning applications be determined?
Planning law requires that the starting point for considering a planning application is the policies contained in the Development Plan. Decisions must be made in line with policies in the Development Plan unless there are valid and overriding reasons for not doing so, based on the merits of the case”. Account can be taken of all other relevant matters, usually
______________________________________________________________________
2 Section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 and section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 referred to as the ‘material considerations’. There are many such matters, including: national policy as set out in the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), other LPA strategies, the context and merits of the particular application, technical considerations and the views of those that have been consulted. LPAs will need to balance the merits of all these issues and come to a view as to whether it should grant or refuse permission.
Many LPAs will have policies in their Development Plans providing specific guidance on how mast proposals will be dealt with. LPAs may also have adopted Supplementary Planning Documents (SPDs) or Supplementary Planning Guidance (SPGs) or other adopted guidance, which relate specifically to either telecoms development or provide guidance on how development in rural areas will be considered. These, if they are up to date, will be material considerations. Some LPAs will have no specific policies in their Development Plan. In some cases, existing policies will be out of date and not compliant with the NPPF. Where there is no clear guidance in the Development Plan, LPAs will be reliant on weighing the national policies set out in the NPPF. Therefore, it is important to consider what the NPPF says on this subject.
The NPPF’s approach to telecoms development in rural areas
At the heart of the NPPF is a presumption in favour of sustainable development (paragraph 14). Planning policies should support economic growth in rural areas in order to create jobs and prosperity by taking a positive approach to sustainable new development (paragraph 28). Advanced, high quality communications infrastructure is essential for sustainable economic growth (paragraph 48). The aim should be to keep the numbers of radio and telecoms masts and the sites to a minimum consistent with the efficient operation of the network.
Existing masts, buildings and other structures should be used, unless the need for a new site has been justified. Where new sites are required, equipment should be sympathetically designed and camouflaged where appropriate (paragraph 43). LPAs should not impose a ban on new masts in specific areas (paragraph 44). LPAs must determine applications on planning grounds. They should not seek to prevent competition between different operators, question the need for the telecoms system, or determine health safeguards if the proposal meets International Commission Non-Ionising Radiation Protection guidelines for public exposure (paragraph 46).
How should prior approval applications be determined?
In considering prior approval applications, LPAs must restrict themselves to considering the acceptability of the proposal in relation to appearance and siting. Appearance of a mast includes its materials, colour and design. Consideration of siting may involve its impact on the ecological value of the site, the wider landscape and its proximity to buildings and housing.
Key considerations for planning applications
There is no doubt that the provision of new telecoms development in rural areas will create many challenges for LPAs. These are typically areas where there is a general approach of restraint on new development which might potentially have an adverse impact on the intrinsic qualities of the countryside. LPAs will need to balance the social and economic benefits of any particular telecoms development against its potential environmental impact. The principal issues that are likely to arise are landscape and visual considerations. However, other issues that may also arise relate to the potential impact on:
- areas of ecological importance, such as Sites of Special Scientific Interest, Special Protection Areas and other habitat designations;
- sites of known or suspected Archaeological Importance and Scheduled Monuments;
- heritage assets such as World Heritage Sites, Listed Buildings, Conservation Areas, Designed Landscapes and Historic Gardens;
- important landscapes such as National Parks, Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, National Scenic Areas, and those within the Green Belt;
- important landscape features such as protected woodland and trees.
In National Parks, the Broads and AONBs, which have the highest status of protection, great weight should be given to conserving landscape and scenic beauty. This does not preclude the provision of telephone masts but requires a landscape led approach to decision making.
Dealing with publicity and handling representations
There are no nationally prescribed requirements relating to publicity for prior approval applications. There are, however, national requirements for publicising planning applications; each LPA will have its own guidelines on the extent of publicity, at or above the national minimum.
It is important that appropriate weight is given to representations made by the local community and other interested parties. After all, they offer an important insight into the potential effects of a development. However, weight can only be given to those views where there are relevant planning considerations backed up by robust evidence.
Decisions cannot be made solely on the basis of the number or vociferousness of representations for or against a proposal. The Secretary of State said, in relation to the Localism act: "...local opposition or support for a proposal is not in itself a ground for refusing or granting planning permission unless it is founded on valid planning reasons."
Eric Pickles 28 June 2012
Key Tips
Ultimately good mobile coverage is important as it helps businesses to grow and people to stay in touch.
Some key advice to LPAs to assist them in dealing with planning applications for mobile masts proposed as part of the MIP roll-out, are set out below:
- These economic and social benefits need to be weighed against any environmental harm - but remember the presumption in favour of sustainable development.
- Decisions should be made in line with the Development Plan unless there are valid and overriding reasons for not doing so, based on the merits of the case.
- In the absence of up to date Development Plan policies, a decision should be made by consideration of the policies of the NPPF, taken as a whole.
- Decisions cannot be made solely on the basis of representations for or against a proposal; they must be based on valid planning grounds, weighing all the evidence and on the merits of the case.
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514bbff40764bbdff0e4a5d5217980335a40f4eb | VAT – MTIC – transactions connected with fraud – transactions effected by agent – agent knew or ought to have known that transactions were connected with fraud – whether knowledge of agent to be attributed to principal - preliminary issue on assumed facts
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (TAX AND CHANCERY CHAMBER) ON APPEAL FROM THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL (TAX CHAMBER)
Between:
MOBILE SOURCING LIMITED
- AND -
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
TRIBUNAL: MR JUSTICE MORGAN AND JUDGE GREG SINFIELD
Sitting in public at Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL on 25 and 26 April 2016
Mr Geoffrey Cox QC (instructed by The Khan Partnership LLP) for the Appellant Mr Michael Holland QC, Mr Christopher Foulkes and Mr Jamie Sharma (instructed by General Counsel and Solicitor for HM Revenue and Customs) for the Respondents
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2016 DECISION
RELEASE DATE: 17 June 2016
Tribunal Judges: Mr Justice Morgan and Judge Greg Sinfield:
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by Mobile Sourcing Ltd (“MSL”) against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Rachel Short) (“the FtT”), released on 8 December 2014. The FtT determined a preliminary issue arising in this case. The FtT decided that issue in favour of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) and MSL now appeals with the permission of Judge Greg Sinfield, given on 15 April 2015. The FtT’s determination was on the basis of assumed facts. In our decision we also will proceed on the basis of assumed facts. Unfortunately, there is now a dispute as to precisely what facts should be assumed.
2. In April 2006, MSL, acting through its agent Wigig.com Ltd (“Wigig”), engaged in transactions which involved the purchase and re-sale of mobile telephones. Those transactions were connected with fraud. The fraud was of the usual MTIC variety, a type of fraud which has been described in many earlier decisions of First-tier Tribunals and Upper Tribunals and which we need not describe again.
3. MSL has applied to HMRC to deduct input value added tax which it paid in connection with these transactions. HMRC have denied MSL’s entitlement to deduct input tax on the ground that MSL knew or should have known that it was participating in a transaction connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT. For this purpose, HMRC relies upon the statements of principle laid down by the Court of Justice in Axel Kittel v Belgium, Belgium v Recolta Recycling Joined Cases C-439/04 and C-440/04 [2006] ECR 1-6161 (hereafter “Kittel”). Those principles have consistently been followed in later decisions of the Court of Justice and they are helpfully discussed by the Court of Appeal in Mobilx Ltd v HMRC [2010] EWCA Civ 517.
4. MSL accepts that Wigig knew or should have known that the relevant transactions were connected with fraud. However, MSL contends that it did not itself know, nor should it have known, those matters. HMRC submits that even if MSL were able to prove that it did not itself know or should have known those matters, Wigig’s knowledge was to be attributed to MSL so that, in law, the position is taken to be that MSL did know or should have known that the transactions were connected with fraud. MSL submits, in response, that on the assumed facts of this case, the state of mind of Wigig was not to be attributed to MSL.
5. The parties agreed that instead of there being a lengthy hearing when all matters of fact would be explored and then determined, the FtT should be asked to determine the issues arising as to attribution on the basis of assumed facts. It was explained to us that both parties considered there were advantages to proceeding in that way. HMRC considered that if MSL were allowed to put forward its version of the assumed facts and if it failed on those assumed facts, then realistically that would be the end of MSL’s appeal. Similarly, MSL considered that if it identified assumed facts but the FtT held that even on those assumed facts Wigig’s state of mind was to be attributed to MSL, then MSL would save itself the time and expense involved in attempting to prove those assumed facts. Conversely, if the FtT were prepared to find in favour of MSL on the assumed facts, it would be worth MSL’s while to have a hearing at which it would attempt to prove those facts.
6. Before the FtT, the parties submitted that the issue as to attribution of Wigig’s state of mind to MSL was to be decided by reference to the principles identified by the Upper Tribunal in Greener Solutions v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2012] UKUT 18 (TCC) (hereafter “Greener Solutions”). In its Decision, the FtT applied those principles and found against MSL.
7. Since the Decision of the FtT, the Supreme Court has decided Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir (No. 2) [2016] AC 1 (hereafter “Bilta”) and we will apply the principles in Bilta to the relevant facts in reaching our Decision on this appeal.
The facts
08. For the purpose of identifying the facts which are to be assumed for the purpose of deciding the preliminary issue as to attribution, it is necessary to describe some of the procedural history of this case.
09. MSL’s appeal to the FtT appears to have been brought in around 2006. Over the years, there has been a series of adjournments of the intended hearing of that appeal. On 31 January 2014, MSL amended its Grounds of Appeal to the FtT and specifically contended that to the extent that HMRC would rely on the knowledge of Wigig to demonstrate that MSL knew or should have known that the relevant transactions were connected with fraud, such knowledge could not be attributed to MSL because Wigig knew or believed that its actions were detrimental to the interests of MSL in a material respect, such that “the fraud exception” (which we refer to below) should apply to prevent attribution of Wigig’s knowledge to MSL for the purposes of its claim to deduct input tax.
10. Following a hearing on 26 March 2014, the FtT (Judge Barbara Mosedale) directed that there should be a hearing of a preliminary issue on the question of attribution. The FtT directed that MSL should serve on HMRC a statement of the issues for determination and such statement should set out the facts which MSL would say that the FtT was to assume for that purpose. The FtT then directed that HMRC was to respond to this statement and seek to agree the preliminary issue or issues. The FtT’s directions stated that it would not resolve factual issues and that no evidence was to be relied upon at the hearing of the preliminary issues.
11. On 16 June 2014, MSL served its statement of the proposed preliminary issues. That statement identified the facts which MSL said should be assumed for the purpose of deciding those issues. On 30 June 2014, HMRC served its response stating that the facts to be assumed for the purpose of the preliminary issues were for MSL to identify; HMRC also identified its draft issues. On 25 September 2014, MSL responded with a different draft of the issues.
12. In its Decision, the FtT set out what it said were “the assumed set of facts provided by” MSL. It was not argued before us that the facts provided by MSL were not accurately set out by the FtT and we will adopt those facts for the purposes of our Decision.
13. The assumed facts as set out by the FtT at [6] were as follows:
“The parties agreed at the Tribunal that the assumed set of facts provided by the Appellant should form the basis of the Tribunal's decision;
(1) There was an agreement between MSL and independent third party entity Wigig whereby Wigig would carry out trades as agent for MSL using MSL's working capital in consideration for which Wigig would receive 50% of gross profits on each transaction as commission. (the "MSL Trades")
(2) MSL was not directly involved in carrying out the relevant transactions or the due diligence checks which were carried out on its behalf by Wigig.
(3) From early 2005 there was a further agreement with Wigig whereby MSL advanced funds to Wigig to allow it to trade on its own account and in its own name. In consideration for providing loan finance MSL was to receive 50% of the profit generated by trades carried out using its funds (the ‘Wigig Trades’).
(4) It was a term of the loan agreement that funds loaned to Wigig were for the sole purpose of allowing it to fund its own transactions and in particular the VAT ‘lock up’ on those transactions.
(5) It was a further term of the loan agreement that Wigig Trades would not involve giving or receiving trade credit so as not to put the loan balance at risk.
(6) MSL relied upon the assurances of the officers and employees of Wigig and in particular its director Richard Jones that (a) transactions were carried out conscientiously and properly with neither the knowledge nor the means of knowledge of the alleged connection to missing traders and (b) the terms of their agreement were being observed.
(7) Funds that were removed from or repaid to MSL's bank account to finance Wigig Trades were recorded in a loan account, the balance of which at any time represented the amount owed by Wigig in respect of funds loaned to finance its own trading.
(8) Wigig was given access and was a signatory to MSL's bank account and was responsible for dealing with money transfers.
(9) Wigig ceased trading in May 2006 and administrators were appointed in October 2009. Wigig had debtors in excess of £6m and trade creditors in excess of £7m. The final balance of the MSL loan account as at 15 May 2006 was in excess of £3m and this sum remains outstanding to MSL.
(10) Following receipt of a letter dated 6 April 2006 from HMRC informing Wigig that they would be withholding their February 2006 VAT reclaim, (relating to Wigig Trades) Wigig carried out no trades using MSL's funds until 28 April 2006 when it carried out trades on which the VAT "lock up" was in excess of £500 thousand.
(11) In April and May 2006 Wigig withdrew in excess of £1m from MSL's bank account which it used to fund trades on 28 April 2006.
(12) Had the trades on 28 April 2006 not been carried out and had the funds in excess of £1m not been withdrawn from MSL's bank account, the balance of MSL's loan would have been no higher the £2.2m rather than the final outstanding balance in excess of £3m.
(13) Wigig had received stock from its suppliers in respect of the May 2006 purchases before making payment and had released stock before receiving payment.
(14) Following receipt of the letter dated 6 April 2006 from HMRC, Wigig withdrew from its own bank account almost £400 thousand and distributed the same to its shareholders as dividends.
(15) On 27 September 2012 Richard Jones gave a director's disqualification undertaking in respect of Gold Digit Limited (an unrelated company) on the ground that he had conducted multiple transactions in respect of which he knew or possessed the means to know of their connection to fraud. Those transactions were carried out over a period that included the dates of the transactions which are the subject matter of this appeal.”
14. This statement of the assumed facts did not in terms deal with the knowledge of Wigig in all relevant respects. However, the FtT stated at \[2\]: “MSL appointed a third-party agent, Wigig to carry out due diligence and make trading decisions on its behalf including for the transactions to which the disallowed input tax relates (‘the Disputed VAT Trades’). It is not disputed that Wigig was properly appointed as MSL’s agent and that MSL is therefore liable for Wigig’s actions and imputed with Wigig’s knowledge. It is not disputed that Wigig knew or should have known that the Disputed VAT Trades for the 04/06 periods were connected with fraud.”
15. In the course of summarising the submissions made to it by counsel for MSL and for HMRC, the FtT referred to other matters which were contended for by MSL which were not necessarily within the assumed facts which MSL had earlier put forward. Perhaps in response to that, the FtT said at \[30\]:
“Both parties stressed the need to ensure that the Tribunal came to its decision on the basis of the assumed facts only and not any further extrapolation from those assumed facts. In coming to its decision the Tribunal has relied in particular on the following facts:
(1) The deals which are disputed by HMRC and for which input tax has been denied are MSL Deals for the 04/06 period which were carried out in MSL’s name by Wigig on 28 April 2006. The input tax reclaim is in MSL’s name. They are not deals for which funding provided through the MSL account to Wigig was required.
(2) The alleged fraudulent actions of Wigig in respect of the MSL bank account, being (a) the failure to notify MSL of HMRC’s letter 6 April 2006 (b) the withdrawal of significant sums in April and May 2006 from MSL’s bank account to fund trades (c) the payment of large sums by way of dividends to Wigig’s shareholders as dividends and (d) the creation of unauthorised debtors and creditors, all relate to Wigig’s loan agreement with MSL concerning the funding of Wigig Trades.”
16. Although the FtT had given MSL a free hand when identifying the facts which MSL wanted the FtT to assume for the purpose of the preliminary issues and although MSL had drafted its version of the assumed facts, it seems that MSL has throughout been referring to and relying on alleged matters of fact which were not stated in its draft of the assumed facts. For example:
(1) in his submissions to the FtT, Mr Cox QC, leading counsel for MSL, referred to matters of alleged facts which were not in MSL’s draft of the assumed facts;
(2) in its Grounds for Permission to Appeal which were presented to the FtT after the FtT Decision, MSL suggested that the FtT was wrong in law in failing to draw inferences of fact from the assumed facts; in its subsequent application to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal and in its skeleton argument on this appeal, MSL again contended that the FtT should have drawn inferences of fact from the assumed facts.
17. In their response to MSL’s suggestion that further facts should be inferred from the assumed facts, HMRC contended that if MSL had wanted the FtT to proceed on the basis of further facts, it should have expressly included those facts in its draft of the assumed facts. HMRC further submitted that on this appeal to the Upper Tribunal, MSL could not successfully argue that the FtT was wrong to decline to draw further inferences from the assumed facts unless it could show that the FtT was wrong in law in that respect and that would require the Upper Tribunal to find that the FtT’s decision not to infer further facts was perverse.
18. At the hearing, our reaction to these submissions was that there was considerable force in HMRC’s contention that MSL should not be relying on inference at all; if it had wanted the FtT to proceed on the basis of a particular fact it should have expressly included that fact in its draft of the assumed facts. Further, in so far as the FtT had been prepared to draw inferences but had declined to draw specific inferences contended for by MSL, then the Upper Tribunal could only reach a different conclusion from that of the FtT if the FtT had committed an error of law.
19. At the hearing, we raised with counsel for both parties the question as to what the situation would be if we declined to infer the matters which MSL contended should be inferred and we then decided the appeal on the basis of the facts assumed or found by the FtT. Would it then be open to MSL to contend that its full appeal to the FtT should proceed to a hearing before the FtT at which hearing MSL would be free to lead evidence to establish such facts as it could, and to contend on the basis of such facts that other facts were to be inferred, so that the FtT would make its ultimate decision having considered those matters? Such a course would seem to be wholly inconsistent with the original intention which was that MSL should put forward the facts which it said it would set out to establish (whether by proof or by inference) and that the parties would argue the preliminary issues on that basis. Conversely, it should be noted that when the FtT ordered that there be preliminary issues, it did not, in terms, order that if MSL lost the preliminary issues, then its appeal to the FtT would be dismissed.
20. We considered that MSL was largely responsible for the difficulties it had got itself into in relation to the facts to be assumed for the purposes of the preliminary issues. However, we were concerned that if we dismissed the appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the basis of our reading of MSL’s draft of the assumed facts, the matter might not be concluded and a fact finding hearing might have to be held. We therefore asked Mr Cox QC, leading counsel for MSL, to set out expressly the facts which he wished to contend should be taken into account for the purpose of deciding the appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the FtT’s decision on the preliminary issue.
21. Mr Cox considered the matter overnight and produced a note setting out the facts which he said we should take into account. For that purpose, he referred to facts which were expressly included in MSL’s draft of the assumed facts and matters put in argument to the FtT at the hearing before the FtT and, indeed, further matters. We will now set out the relevant facts set out in Mr Cox’s note (without the cross-references he gave us):
“The fraud on MSL
1. The sum of £1,010,000 was withdrawn by Wigig’s operators from MSL’s bank account in April and May 2006.
2. At this time, the directors and shareholder of Wigig paid themselves a purported dividend of £400,000 when the company was insolvent. It ceased trading in May owing £7 million with trade debtors of £6 million. According to the agreement between MSL and Wigig, there should have been no means by which Wigig should have been insolvent.
3. On 6 April 2006, Wigig had been informed that they would not receive VAT repayments from their February trades because they would be subjected to extended verification. From that point, Wigig knew that it was unlikely that they would be able to reclaim successfully on any further trades, whether in the name of Wigig or MSL.
4. Access by Wigig to the MSL bank account had to be justified by evidence of trading from Wigig’s operators. They carried out the disputed MSL trades on 28 April and further Wigig trades in early May.
5. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that the trades on 28 April in the name of MSL, and later in early May by Wigig, were principally intended as a pretext for the real objective of raiding the Appellant’s bank account.”
6. We have now set out the widest statement of all of the facts which MSL might be able to contend for as facts to be assumed for the purpose of deciding the preliminary issues.
The earlier authorities
23. As we will explain later in this Decision, the legal principles which we will apply in this case have developed somewhat from the statement of the principles which the FtT was asked to apply. However, in order to understand the decision of the FtT and the grounds of appeal which have been put forward, we will summarise the legal principles on which the FtT was asked to reach its decision. The FtT relied on the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Greener Solutions which was itself based on the decision in McNicholas
24. In *McNicholas*, the company had submitted VAT returns in which it claimed to deduct input tax which it had paid in respect of alleged transactions which had not genuinely occurred. The company’s site managers knew that the alleged transactions had not taken place. Section 60 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 had the effect that the company was liable to a penalty if it had done any act for the purpose of evading VAT or its conduct involved dishonesty.
25. The question arose as to whether the dishonest acts and intentions of the site managers should be attributed to the company. The judge (Dyson J) held that those acts and intentions should be attributed to the company. Even though such attribution did not result from the primary rules of attribution or the general rules of agency or the ordinary rules as to vicarious liability, it was appropriate in the relevant statutory context to attribute to the company the acts and knowledge of the persons who had a part to play in the making and receiving of the supplies involved in the VAT arrangements. This was appropriate in order to advance the policy of the statutory provisions which was to discourage the dishonest evasion of VAT.
26. The judge then considered a submission for the company that the facts and intentions of the site managers should not be attributed to the company because the case came within what was described as the *Hampshire Land* principle (see *Re Hampshire Land Co* [1896] 2 Ch 743); this principle has also been referred to as “the fraud exception” to attribution. In *McNicholas*, the company submitted that it was a victim of a fraud practised on it by the site managers and others. The judge held that the company could not sensibly be regarded as a victim of the fraud. It was submitted that the company would suffer a disadvantage if it were held that it was not entitled to deduct input tax as it had paid VAT in accordance with the dishonest invoices used in the fraud. Further, even if it were not denied the right to deduct input VAT it had suffered a cash flow disadvantage because it had paid the VAT shown on the dishonest invoices and only subsequently sought a credit in relation to input VAT.
27. In relation to the argument that the company was a victim of the dishonesty, the judge said:
“55. In my judgment, the tribunal correctly concluded that there should be attribution in the present case, since the company could not sensibly be regarded as a victim of the fraud. They were right to hold that the fraud was ‘neutral’ from the company's point of view. The circumstances in which the exception to the general rule of attribution will apply are where the person whose acts it is sought to impute to the company knows or believes that his acts are detrimental to the interests of the company in a material respect. This explains, for example, the reference by Viscount Sumner in *J C Houghton & Co v Nothard Lowe and Wills Ltd* [1028] AC 1 at 19 to making “a clean breast of their delinquency”. It follows that, in judging whether a company is to be regarded as the victim of the acts of a person, one should consider the effect of the acts themselves, and not what the position would be if those acts eventually prove to be ineffective. As the tribunal pointed out, in *In re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No 2)* [1995] 1 AC 456 the company suffered a large fine for contempt of court on account of the wrongful acts of its managers. The fact that their wrongful acts caused the company to suffer a financial penalty in this way did not prevent the acts and knowledge of the managers from being attributed to it.
56. The [breach of duty exception] is founded in common sense and justice. It is obvious good sense and justice that the act of an employee should not be attributed to the employer company if in truth, the act is directed at, and harmful to, the interests of the company. In the present case, the fraud was not aimed at the company. It was not intended by the participants in the fraud that the interests of the company should be harmed by their conduct. In judging whether the fraud was in fact harmful to the interests of the company, one should not be too ready to find such harm. In my view, the cash flow point made by [counsel] comes nowhere near being serious enough to trigger the principle.”
57. *McNicholas* was considered in some detail by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in *Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens* [2009] 1 AC 139, see, in particular, the Court of Appeal decision at [50] – [54] and [71] – [72] per Rimer LJ and the speech of Lord Walker in the House of Lords at [153] – [154].
58. *Greener Solutions* raised much the same issues as arise in the present case. The taxpayer company used a third party to carry out transactions on its behalf. The third party knew that the transactions were connected with fraud. The taxpayer claimed repayment of the input tax it had incurred in relation to the transactions. HMRC denied the claim on the basis of the principles in *Kittel*. The question was whether the knowledge of the third party should be attributed to the taxpayer. At [11], the Upper Tribunal said that it had not been suggested that EU law required attribution of knowledge to a company for the purposes of VAT in a manner different from the operation of attribution under domestic law. It added that it was for the national court to ascertain how knowledge of an individual is to be attributed to a company.
59. In *Greener Solutions*, the FtT held that the principle it should apply was as follows:
“The principle we derive from these authorities is that the *Hampshire Land* principle is of general application and applies to prevent the knowledge of the agent in breach of his duty to the company being attributed to a company where the company is a victim of his fraud. In determining whether there is a fraud against the company “one should consider the effect of the acts themselves, and not what the position would be if those acts eventually prove to be ineffective.” And “In judging whether the fraud was in fact harmful to the interests of [the company], one should not be too ready to find such harm.”
31. In *Greener Solutions*, HMRC did not challenge that statement of principle on their appeal to the Upper Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal agreed with the statement. The issue therefore was how the principle applied to the facts. In the course of applying the principle to the facts, the Upper Tribunal held that it was relevant to ask whether the fraud was aimed at the taxpayer. The Upper Tribunal also commented that the purpose of the principles in *Kittel* was to combat fraud and those principles would be seriously eroded if a taxpayer company could escape liability on the ground that it was an innocent company deceived by a fraudulent employee or director even where the company had been able to profit from the transaction conducted on its behalf. On the facts of the case, the Upper Tribunal held that the knowledge of the third party was to be attributed to the taxpayer.
*The decision of the FtT*
32. In addition to the parts of the Decision of the FtT which we have quoted above, the FtT discussed the legal principles which it should apply. It considered a number of authorities but it paid particular attention to the decision of the Upper Tribunal in *Greener Solutions*. At [12], the FtT said:
“… it was made clear in *Greener Solutions* by reference to earlier authorities that (i) the scope of those whose knowledge could be imputed to the principal whose VAT was alleged to be connected with fraudulent deals was wide; the knowledge of all employees and agents who are involved in making of the relevant supplies is imputed to the taxpaying entity (ii) the fraud exception is limited to circumstances in which the alleged fraud would cause significant harm to the entity which seeks to rely on the exception; a neutral result (such as the entity being able to claim input tax) was not sufficient to trigger the fraud exception (iii) in determining the harm suffered by the entity seeking to rely on the exception, the test to be applied is on the basis that the fraud has succeeded, not taking account of the costs and results of the failure of that fraud (including in the VAT context the denial of input tax).”
33. The FtT then set out the issues which MSL had said in its letter of 25 September 2014 were in dispute, as follows:
“(1) Are the activities of the person, which do not relate to misconduct of deals on behalf of MSL, relevant to the attribution of knowledge in respect of those deals?
(2) Did the person whose acts and or knowledge it is sought to impute to MSL know or believe that his acts and or knowledge, in the context of the agency agreement, were detrimental to the interests of MSL in this respect?
(3) Is MSL a true victim of fraud rather than simply being used as a vehicle for the commission of fraud against HMRC i.e. was the risk to his investment not limited to simply the possibility that HMRC would fail to re-pay its own or WIGIG’s VAT repayment claims.
(4) In judging whether MSL is to be regarded as a victim of the acts for that person, should consideration be given to the effects of the acts themselves, rather than what the position would have been had this act actually proved to be effective i.e. what did the fraudulent individuals intend to happen.
(5) As such, should the exception to the general rule of attribution apply?”
34. The FtT set out the submissions which had been made to it on behalf of the parties. It then gave its reasons for its decision. Its reasons are somewhat repetitious but they include the following statements:
(1) Wigig was an effective agent for MSL and in principle its fraudulent knowledge could be attributed to MSL;
(2) MSL could not rely on the fraud exception to attribution primarily because, to take advantage of the fraud exception, the acts of MSL’s agent had to be directly linked to the acts of which MSL was accused as principal and there was not a sufficient connection of that kind in this case;
(3) Greener Solutions made it clear that the fraud exception should be applied restrictively in the present context;
(4) there was not a direct connection between MSL’s VAT transactions and the alleged bank fraud practised by Wigig on MSL; MSL’s suggestion of a direct link was based on suppositions not stated in the assumed facts;
(5) the fraudulent actions of Wigig were not causative of MSL’s VAT transactions;
(6) it was possible that Wigig’s intention in accessing MSL’s bank account when it knew that HMRC were disputing Wigig’s VAT re-claims was to harm MSL; if the only fraud were the fraud on MSL’s bank account that would be sufficient to trigger the fraud exception but that was not the fraud in point;
(7) even if there were an “overarching fraud” as contended by MSL, the harm done to MSL did not arise from the successful result of the agent’s fraudulent activity; it was not possible to establish that the intended effect of the success of the relevant fraud was to cause harm to MSL.
The grounds of appeal
35. MSL has put forward the following grounds of appeal against the decision of the FtT:
(1) this case should be distinguished from McNicholas Construction and Greener Solutions because, in this case, MSL was the target of Wigig’s fraud which caused MSL significant harm;
(2) the principle of attribution rests upon the presumption that the agent will not keep material facts from the principal; in McNicholas Construction and Greener Solutions it was perfectly reasonable to attribute the agent’s knowledge to the principal as there was no fraud on the principal and the only victim was HMRC; in the present case, where there was a fraud on the principal it defied both logic and common sense to attribute the agent’s knowledge to the principal;
(3) the FtT made assumptions as to the facts which were not correct;
(4) contrary to the findings of the FtT, there was an obvious connection between Wigig’s fraud on MSL and the MSL trades; MSL had plainly demonstrated that the fact that the MSL trades were connected to fraud was relevant to Wigig’s fraud on MSL;
(5) if MSL had known about Wigig’s fraud on MSL, it would not have permitted Wigig to carry out the MSL trades;
(6) the FtT was wrong to distinguish between two frauds, one on MSL and one on HMRC; instead, there was one overarching fraud; the overarching fraud had two victims, MSL and HMRC but MSL was the primary victim; even if MSL was only a secondary victim, as a matter of common sense and justice, the knowledge of Wigig as to the MSL trades should not be attributed to MSL;
(7) a decision in favour of MSL on the issue of attribution would not undermine the policy in Kittel; in straightforward cases of a principal using an agent to carry out trades connected with fraud, the “fraud exception” will not apply; the “fraud exception” will only apply where the agent is engaged in a fraud against the principal going well beyond the normal incidence of carrying out deals connected with VAT fraud.
36. In Mr Cox’s skeleton argument, prepared for the appeal to the Upper Tribunal, he continued to rely on McNicholas Construction and Greener Solutions. He submitted that the authority of these decisions was not affected by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bilta. He addressed the FtT’s finding that the fraud by Wigig on MSL’s bank account was not relevant to the MSL trades. In that respect, MSL submitted that the fraud on MSL was relevant to the MSL trades because it made it illogical or absurd to suppose that Wigig would inform MSL of the connection of the MSL trades to fraud.
37. Mr Cox’s skeleton argument also addressed the application of the policy identified in Kittel in a case where HMRC contended that the knowledge of an agent, that the transactions were connected with fraud, was to be attributed to the principal. He submitted that it was repugnant to justice and common sense and the principle of proportionality that a taxpayer which was itself the object of a fraud by its agent should have the knowledge of the agent attributed to it and thereby be regarded as “an accomplice” (this is the phrase used in Kittel at [57]) of the persons committing the fraud on HMRC.
Bilta
38. We referred earlier to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bilta. We will now summarise the facts of that case and the principles established by it.
39. The first and second defendants were the sole directors of the first claimant, a company incorporated in England and registered for the purposes of VAT. The company purchased carbon credits recorded on the Danish Emissions Trading Agency Registry from traders carrying on business outside the United Kingdom, including the sixth defendant, a company incorporated in Switzerland, the sole director of which was the seventh defendant. Accordingly, the purchases were not subject to VAT. The first and second defendants, as directors, owed fiduciary duties to the company. The second and third claimants, the company's liquidators, claimed that a conspiracy existed to injure and defraud the company by trading in carbon credits and dealing with the resulting proceeds in such a way as to deprive the company of its ability to meet its VAT obligations on such trades. It was claimed that the defendants were knowingly parties to the business of the company with intent to defraud creditors and for other fraudulent purposes, and should therefore be ordered under section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to contribute to the company's assets. The sixth and seventh defendants, who were claimed to have dishonestly assisted the conspiracy, applied for orders that the claim be summarily dismissed as against each of them on the ground, among others, that the claim by the company was precluded by an application of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio on the basis that the pleaded conspiracy disclosed the use of the company by its directors and their associates to carry out a carousel fraud, the only victim of which was HMRC, and since the company was a party to the fraud it could not claim against the other conspirators for losses which it had suffered as a result of the fraud which it had carried out. This ground was rejected, in turn, by the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
40. The Supreme Court, consisting of seven judges, considered in detail the legal principles as to illegality and as to attribution. As regards illegality, Lord Neuberger stated at [15] that the relevant principles needed to be considered by the Supreme Court in a future case. Since this decision, the Court of Appeal has stated that there is uncertainty as to the proper approach to a defence based on illegality: see Sharma v Top Brands Ltd [2016] PNLR 12 at [37]. However, the present appeal does not involve the defence of illegality. As regards attribution, the judgments of the Supreme Court do not suffer from the same uncertainty and can now be regarded as an authoritative statement of the principles to be applied. As explained by Lord Neuberger at [7], the detailed judgments of Lord Sumption and of Lords Toulson and Hodge are essentially to the same effect as regards attribution. We consider that the judgments dealing with the subject of attribution do throw important new light on the principles to be applied with the result that some of the reasoning in earlier cases can no longer be regarded as valid.
41. In Bilta, the judgments considered the rules as to attribution of an agent’s knowledge to a principal and when attribution should apply. It was stressed that the key to the decision as to whether there is attribution of such knowledge depends on considerations of context and purpose. In the present case, there is no dispute that the primary rules as to attribution would result in the knowledge of Wigig being attributed to MSL, subject to MSL’s contention that this primary rule is subject to an exception, conventionally referred to as “the fraud exception”. Accordingly, we do not need to consider in detail the judgments in Bilta in so far as they consider the primary rules of attribution but we can concentrate on what is said about “the fraud exception”. We should however note, as a preliminary matter, that it is probably better to regard the so called exception as not a true exception but just part of the general rules dealing with considerations of context and purpose: see per Lord Neuberger at [9], per Lord Mance at [37] – [44] and per Lords Toulson and Hodge at [181]. Further, the expression “the fraud exception” is not an accurate statement of the scope of the exception (if it is an exception at all) because the exception applies in cases which do not involve fraud and includes certain cases of breach of duty. Notwithstanding these comments, it is convenient to describe the breach of duty exception as an exception to the primary rules of attribution, as that is how the argument was presented to us on this appeal.
42. When discussing the breach of duty exception, the Supreme Court in Bilta approved a distinction made by Patten LJ in the Court of Appeal in that case. The distinction was explained in detail by Lord Sumption at [84] in the passage set out below, although Lords Toulson and Hodge also approved the drawing of this distinction (see at [208]):
“84 … Patten LJ, delivering the leading judgment, considered that the answer depended on the duty which was sought to be enforced and the parties between whom the issue was raised. In an action against the company by a third party who had been defrauded, the company was responsible. But it did not follow that the company was to be treated as responsible for a fraud for the purposes of an action against the dishonest director. In such an action, the illegality defence cannot be available, whether the damages claimed arose from the liability which the company was caused to incur to a third party or from the direct abstraction of the company's assets. Patten LJ's reasoning on these points is encapsulated in paras 34 – 35 of his judgment:
“34. … attribution of the conduct of an agent so as to create a personal liability on the part of the company depends very much on the context in which the issue arises. In what I propose to refer to as the liability cases like El Ajou, Tan, McNicholas and Morris, reliance on the consequences to the company of attributing to it the conduct of its managers or directors is not enough to prevent attribution because, as Mummery LJ pointed out, it would prevent liability ever being imposed. As between the company and the defrauded third party, the former is not to be treated as a victim of the wrongdoing on which the third party sues but one of the perpetrators. The consequences of liability are therefore insufficient to prevent the actions of the agent being treated as those of the company. The interests of the third party who is the intended victim of the unlawful conduct take priority over the loss which the company will suffer through the actions of its own directors.
“35. But, in a different context, the position of the company as victim ought to be paramount. Although the loss caused to the company by its director's conduct will be no answer to the claim against the company by the injured third party, it will and ought to have very different consequences when the company seeks to recover from the director the loss which it has suffered through his actions. In such cases the company will itself be seeking compensation by an award of damages or equitable compensation for a breach of the fiduciary duty which the director or agent owes to the company. As between it and the director, it is the victim of a legal wrong. To allow the defendant to defeat that claim by seeking to attribute to the company the unlawful conduct for which he is responsible so as to make it the company's own conduct as well would be to allow the defaulting director to rely on his own breach of duty to defeat the operation of the provisions of sections 172 and 239 of the Companies Act whose very purpose is to protect the company against unlawful breaches of duty of this kind. For this purpose and (it should be stressed) in this context, it ought therefore not to matter whether the loss which the company seeks to recover arises out of the fraudulent conduct of its directors towards a third party (as in McNicholas and Morris) or out of fraudulent conduct directed at the company itself which Sir Andrew Morritt C accepted was what is alleged in the present case. There is a breach of fiduciary duty towards the company in both cases.”
43. The point made by Patten LJ, that the breach of duty exception critically depended upon the identity of the persons between whom the issue arose, appears to have been a new insight. Lord Sumption said so at \[86\]:
“86 The problem posed by the authorities is that until the Court of Appeal's decision in this case, they have generally treated the imputation of dishonesty to a company as being governed by tests dependent primarily on the nature of the company's relationship with the dishonest agent, the result of which is then applied universally. This was the point made by Lord Walker in Stone & Rolls at para 145, from which he resiled in Moulin. The fundamental point made by the Court of Appeal in this case and the Court of Final Appeal in Moulin is that, while the basic rules of attribution may apply regardless of the nature of the claim or the parties involved, the breach of duty exception does not. I agree with this. It reflects the fact that the rules of attribution are derived from the law of agency, whereas the fraud exception, like the illegality defence which it qualifies, is a rule of public policy. Viewed as a question of public policy, there is a fundamental difference between the case of an agent relying on his own dishonest performance of his agency to defeat a claim by his principal for his breach of duty; and that of a third party who is not privy to the fraud but is sued for negligently failing to prevent the principal from committing it.”
44. At [87] and [88], Lord Sumption further discussed the distinction to be made which depended upon the parties between whom the issue arose, he said:
“87 There are three situations in which the question of attribution may arise. First, a third party may sue the company for a wrong such as fraud which involves a mental element. Secondly, the company may sue either its directors for the breach of duty involved in causing it to commit that fraud, or third parties acting in concert with them, or (as in the present case) both. Third, the company may sue a third party who was not involved in the directors’ breach of duty for an indemnity against its consequences.
88 In the first situation, the illegality defence does not arise. The company has no claim which could be barred, but is responding to a claim by the third party. It will be vicariously liable for any act within the course of the relevant agent's employment, and in the great majority of cases no question will arise of attributing the wrong, as opposed to the liability, to the company. Where the law requires as a condition of liability that … the company should be personally culpable, as Lord Nicholls appears to have assumed it did in Royal Brunei Airlines, the sole function of attribution is to fix the company with the state of mind of certain classes of its agents for the purpose of making it liable. The same is true in cases like McNicholas, involving statutory civil penalties for quasi-criminal acts. It is also true of cases like El Ajou where the relevant act (receipt of the money) was unquestionably done by the company but the law required as a condition of liability that it should have been done with knowledge of some matter. This will commonly be the case with proprietary claims, where vicarious liability is irrelevant.” 45. At [93], Lord Sumption addressed arguments as to whether a person was a primary or secondary victim:
“93 This makes it unnecessary to address the elusive distinction between primary and secondary victimhood. That distinction could arise only if the application of the breach of duty exception depended on where the loss ultimately fell, or possibly on where the culpable directors intended it to fall. If, however, the application of the exception depends on the nature of the duty and the parties as between whom the question arises, the only question is whether the company has suffered any loss at all.”
46. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment of Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe delivered in the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Moulin Global Eyecare Trading Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2014) 17 HKCFAR 218, which was decided after the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bilta but before the decision of the Supreme Court in that case. Lord Walker regarded the insight of Patten LJ (referred to above) in Bilta as particularly illuminating. At [106], Lord Walker summarised the law as to the breach of duty exception in a number of propositions which included the following:
(1) the underlying rationale of the breach of duty exception is to avoid the injustice and absurdity of directors or employees relying on their own awareness of their own wrongdoing as a defence to a claim against them by their own corporate employer;
(2) the exception does not apply to protect a company where the issue is whether the company is liable to a third party for the dishonest conduct of a director or employee;
(3) the supposed distinction between primary and secondary victims, although sometimes a useful analytical tool, is ultimately much less important than the distinction between third party claims against a company for loss to the third party caused by the misconduct of a director or employee, and claims by a company against its director or employee (or an accomplice) for loss to the company caused by the misconduct of that director or employee.
The application of Bilta to the facts of this case.
47. It is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Bilta that it is important to have regard to the context in which the question of attribution arises and the persons who are relevant to the application or non-application of the breach of duty exception. If the question of attribution arose as between MSL and Wigig, for example in a claim by MSL against Wigig for damages for fraud, it is clear from Bilta that Wigig could not argue that its knowledge of the fraud should be attributed to MSL so as to give Wigig a defence. It would make no difference whether MSL was the primary victim of the fraud or only a secondary victim. When considering whether MSL had suffered loss, it would be irrelevant to consider whether MSL would have suffered loss if the fraud on HMRC had succeeded. In assessing whether the actions of Wigig were harmful to MSL, there would be no question of the court being slow to find such harm; the court would make the findings which were appropriate on the evidence before it. In other words, the distinctions which were drawn in McNicholas and applied in Greener Solutions as to when to apply the breach of duty exception would have no part to play in the context of a claim by MSL against Wigig.
48. If the facts of McNicholas were to recur and the matter were to be analysed after Bilta, we do not consider that a court or tribunal would adopt the original reasoning in McNicholas. That reasoning was resorted to when it was not appreciated, as it is now appreciated, that one could hold that the knowledge of a relevant person could be attributed to the company in a claim by a third party against the company and, at the same time, could hold that there was no such attribution in a claim by the company against the person who was in breach of duty. After Bilta, the reasoning in a McNicholas case would simply be that as between the company and HMRC, the company was responsible for the wrongdoing committed for it by the wrongdoer, even though that involved a breach of duty owed by the wrongdoer to the company.
49. We consider that the position is even more clear in the present case. MSL claims to be entitled to deduct input tax in relation to certain transactions. Those transactions were carried out for it by Wigig. MSL relies upon the actions of Wigig for the purpose of asserting an entitlement to deduct input tax. We consider that, applying the principles in Bilta, MSL is not able to rely upon the actions of Wigig to claim that entitlement and, at the same time, to resist the attribution to it of the knowledge of Wigig that the transactions were connected with fraud.
50. Following the decision in Bilta, we do not consider that it is necessary to consider whether MSL was a primary victim or a secondary victim. Nor is it necessary to ask whether Wigig committed two frauds on MSL or only one overarching fraud. The first suggested fraud was carrying out trades on behalf of MSL when it knew (if it did) that HMRC might be able to resist the deduction of input tax on the ground that the trades were connected with fraud. The second suggested fraud was Wigig drawing money from MSL’s bank account and using it for its own purposes and, in particular, purposes not authorised by its entitlement to draw on the account. We consider that it does not matter whether these two alleged frauds were connected or not.
51. Some of the cases dealing with the breach of duty exception make the point that where the exception applies, it is unlikely that the agent would make a clean breast of the wrongdoing to the principal. However, the cases do not establish that the question of attribution should ultimately turn on a factual inquiry as to whether it is likely in a particular case that the agent would make a clean breast of the wrongdoing to the principal. Accordingly, we do not consider that the answer in the present case involves such a factual inquiry. Accordingly, it is nothing to the point to submit that on the facts of this case it was unlikely that Wigig would admit to MSL that it was guilty of any kind of wrongdoing.
52. The result of this reasoning is that even if we were to assume all of the facts expressly set out in the list of facts to be assumed and the suggested inferences from those facts and also the matters which Mr Cox referred to in his note, we would conclude that as between MSL and HMRC the knowledge of Wigig is to be attributed to MSL; MSL is not able to invoke the breach of duty exception to allow it to rely upon the trades which Wigig effected for it and at the same time to deny attribution of Wigig’s knowledge to it.
53. In these circumstances, it is not appropriate to consider what our answer would have been if we had sought to apply the various distinctions identified in McNicholas and Greener Solutions. Nor is it necessary to consider whether MSL is entitled to ask us to proceed on the basis of facts which were not expressly set out in the list of facts to be assumed.
54. Mr Cox submitted that the conclusion which we have described above, based as it is on the application of the domestic law of attribution, would be regarded as infringing the requirement of proportionality in EU law. He submitted that the reasoning in Kittel would not extend to a case like the present where it is to be assumed that MSL did not know, nor ought it to have known, that the trades were connected with fraud and it would be disproportionate to deny it its entitlement to deduct input tax by reason of the knowledge of Wigig.
55. Mr Cox did not develop his submission as to proportionality in any detail. We note that in Greener Solutions, the Upper Tribunal stated that the question of attribution was to be dealt with as a matter of national law. Further, we do not see anything disproportionate in attributing Wigig’s knowledge to MSL when MSL seeks to rely upon the actions of Wigig for the purpose of asserting its entitlement to deduct input tax. In the end, Mr Cox’s submission came down to the assertion that we ought not to regard MSL as “an accomplice” (the phrase used in [57] of Kittel) by attributing to it the knowledge of Wigig when Wigig was defrauding MSL. However, this submission ultimately begs the question as to whether Wigig’s knowledge is attributed to MSL under domestic law. If Wigig’s knowledge is attributed to MSL, then as between MSL and HMRC, MSL is an accomplice to the others engaged in the fraudulent trades. Conversely, if Wigig’s knowledge is not attributed to MSL, then MSL is not to be regarded as an accomplice to those others. It is also nothing to the point that in the context of a claim by MSL against Wigig, where Wigig’s knowledge is not attributed to MSL, then MSL would not be regarded as an accomplice of Wigig.
The overall result
56. In the result, the appeal will be dismissed.
Costs
57. Finally, we direct that any applications as to costs are to be made in writing, to be served on the other party and on the Upper Tribunal within one month of the date of release of this decision.
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a93868025eacfcb8bb6c217ac522c3aba2b68355 | Information Management Assessment
Action plan progress review
Ministry of Defence
Reviewed June 2014
Published March 2015
Working with government to raise standards in information management Overview The Information Management Assessment (IMA) programme is the best-practice model for government bodies wishing to demonstrate commitment to the principles of good information management.
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) IMA was held between 12 and 23 September 2011, with interviews at Whitehall offices, Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), Navy Command HQ, HMS Diamond, Navy Historical Branch and the Portsmouth Flotilla. The IMA report was published in June 2012. A detailed action plan was produced by MOD and progress against this was formally assessed in June 2014.
This review summarises key progress since the 2011 IMA and highlights areas where focus is still needed. Key developments include: a transformation in the way information risk is defined and documented, the inclusion of information and records management within the Holding to Account process, and the creation of the Single Information Maturity Model (SIMM) which promises a flexible tool for self-assessment and identification of future goals. However, continued intense focus on information and records management will be required in the context of the realignment of information technology (IT) and information management functions. This is crucial for new systems to be trusted and well-used, and for MOD to realise the benefits of effective information and records management.
Key findings of the IMA 2011 The original IMA report rated MOD as ‘Good’ under five out of 20 headings on the IMA performance framework risk matrix and ‘Satisfactory’ under a further 11 headings.
It specifically highlighted a number of areas of good practice. These included the MOD information strategy (MODIS), which received high-level endorsement and was scheduled for regular review. MOD had also introduced the ‘Defence Information Management Passport’, an e-learning package. This was intended to educate staff and raise standards in records and information management. Two locations visited
______________________________________________________________________
1 The Holding to Account (H2A) process was developed with Commands/Top Level Budget (TLB) holders and process owners to support accountability on delivery of objectives within delegated budgets. on the IMA made completion of the ‘Defence Information Management Passport’ mandatory before assumption of duties.
In addition, the original IMA report also identified four ‘Development Needed’ areas and made 17 recommendations for improvement. In response to this MOD produced a departmental IMA action Plan.
**Context and progress against recommendations**
There are positive indications of MOD’s continued recognition of the importance of good information and records management. At the beginning of 2013–14, MOD established information as one of six overall priorities. Its March 2014 departmental improvement plan also specifically highlights the need to improve standards of information management, stating: ‘We recognise for information to be an asset and not a risk to Defence, we need to handle, manage and use it in the right way.’ MOD should be commended for this clear statement of intent and for its openness in engaging on this issue. New leadership is also flagged: ‘Challenging is an understatement, but we now have real clarity on the strategic issues we face and a new CIO to drive the work forward’ (foreword, Departmental Improvement Plan).
The 2014 MOD departmental improvement plan highlights the core role that the Chief Information Officer (CIO) will continue to play internally in driving forward information priorities. In this context, this review notes that the central CIO organisation was subsumed within Information Systems and Services (ISS) in January 2014 and the role of CIO was filled on a permanent basis in spring 2014. A new joint IT and information management strategy is expected to be produced in 2015.
This progress review places a particular emphasis on the following key developments since the 2011 IMA:
**Information risk**
MOD has worked proactively to define and formalise its understanding of information and records management related risk in a way that can easily be reported at a senior level, as a component of wider work to rationalise the department’s risk management framework. The model adopted supports clear communication and continuity of understanding, and the detailed Information Risk Assurance Matrix that MOD has developed is an excellent model of how to capture risk and define actions arising.
The matrix breaks down information and records management related risk under headings such as leadership, policy and guidance, culture and skills and IT tools. It is updated annually and presented to the Defence Board. Mitigating activity is plotted against each risk – for example, the need for training, updating policies or behavioural change – thus recognising the multi-faceted nature of both the risk and the ways of addressing it.
**Records Management and strategic impetus** MOD is currently placing an understandable strategic emphasis on improving technology provision. This is important from an information and records management perspective as well as a business one. However, while a supportive technology environment is crucial in removing key barriers to records creation, IT should not be regarded as an end in itself. MOD must ensure a continued focus on the information and records that technology should be supporting. This is important because, with new governance arrangements in place, MOD has the opportunity to produce a truly integrated strategy and vision for information and records management and IT.
**MOD’s programme of internal IMAs and the Single Information Maturity Model** Management controls were identified in the original 2011 report as a ‘Development Needed’ area, in part because no assessments within the department’s own internal programme of IMAs had been conducted that year.
MOD has since carried out two internal IMAs: the Strategic Weapons Project Team (SWPT) in the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) top level budget (TLB), and the Atomic Weapons Establishment. However, no further internal IMAs have taken place and none are currently planned.
This review recognises the Single Information Maturity Model (SIMM) as a useful and promising tool for assessing performance and driving improvement that should have wider impact across the organisation than a number of small internal IMAs if taken up and used as currently proposed. MOD should be commended on the development of the model and encouraged to pursue its piloting and implementation across the organisation. Designed to be a flexible self-assessment tool that will feed into the department’s Holding to Account process, it is, however, as yet still unproven.
The application of the SIMM is particularly important because reporting tools have yet to be rolled out to provide local and central oversight of performance in information storage and records creation. This was a key area of concern raised in the original IMA report. Without these, MOD cannot easily make a granular assessment of how new systems – and any alternatives – are being used, or establish a baseline.
**The Holding to Account process**
The original IMA report highlighted concerns over the consistency with which MODIS was interpreted within individual TLBs. TLBs now no longer write their own information strategies, but are expected to produce information directives and comply with information and records management requirements: this is assessed as a component of the wider Holding to Account process. The first report that we had sight of (May 2014) gives a frank overview that captures key issues for each TLB, and MOD is to be commended for the openness with which issues are set out. This review notes, however, that action points, although clear and well signposted, are quite broadly defined and allocated to Information Systems and Services rather than to TLBs. In addition, although an escalation route has been defined, it was not used in this instance.
This is a particular concern where significant gaps are identified in relation to TLBs, such as decisions not to produce information directives or end-of-year reports, or to commission IT equipment independently. In the former case, no specific action point is defined. In the latter case, the stated response relates only to improved future provision of IT by ISS. Information Management Passport Changes have been made to the way the Information Management Passport is delivered, condensing the time allotted to training. The proposed separate passport for senior staff has not been developed, but the aspiration is to offer master classes instead, and the passport itself now consists of two hours of training rather than four.
Electronic Document and Records Management System (EDRMS) roll out Records creation and storage were identified as ‘Development Needed’ areas in the original 2011 IMA report. The roll out of MOSS (Microsoft Office SharePoint Server) and Meridio (MOD’s EDRMS) is ongoing (‘Secret’ level to be rolled out in August 2014).
- All of MOD except Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) has enabled the use of MOSS. DIO was identified more generally in the Holding to Account report as at risk in relation to identification and management of information assets, so central oversight is required here to support the roll out.
- The search function had been disabled in MOSS because of security concerns, and as a consequence there may be some impact on users’ trust in the system that needs addressing as the roll out continues, especially with highly sensitive information.
- New systems are expected to reduce the burden on users, but will not remove it entirely, and concerns remain in key areas such as email capture.
Selection of historical records MOD reported that it had identified a total of 48,925 legacy records in the spring 2014 Records Transfer Report (RTR), one of the highest numbers reported among government bodies that transfer records to The National Archives. MOD’s response to the RTR indicates that this number may increase if further records sets are identified. MOD has a programme of work in place in relation to out-of-time records, but continued focus and emphasis is needed on this issue. This review notes, for example, that there has been no significant progress in assessing the status of records held by Naval Historical Branch, which was one of the recommendations in the 2011 IMA report. Knowledge management
Knowledge management was identified as a ‘Development Needed’ area in the 2011 IMA. An independent review of knowledge management initiatives within MOD and its agencies was carried out in 2013. This identified what knowledge management can achieve (‘increasing knowledge re-use, identifying knowledge gaps and increasing the quality and speed of decision making’) together with commonly occurring barriers (for example, lack of uptake, lack of reinforcement, cultural practices that inhibit knowledge sharing). A number of initiatives are underway – such as knowledge cafés – which are intended to focus on available tools and benefits, and the KIM Workforce Development Plan will be key to delivering these. This review also notes that there is now a knowledge stream within the Defence Learning Strategy. This remains a work in progress but MOD’s progress to date is recognised.
Next steps
The National Archives will continue to work closely with MOD so that the department is supported as it continues its work on records and information management. It is recommended that MOD focusses on the following:
- It is crucial that the priority so far attached to the Records Management Improvement Plan is maintained. Key lessons learned should be incorporated into strategy going forward.
- MOD should ensure that its focus on information risk is maintained so that the audit committee can track and interrogate the impact of strategy in reducing threat and enhancing opportunity.
- In combination with the use of the SIMM, MOD must now provide a clear plan on the use of reporting tools: identifying, for example, what will be monitored, how this information will be reported and used and what action will be taken as a result. Without metrics on records creation, it will not be clear to MOD whether systems are being used optimally and records are being created routinely in line with policy.
- Reporting on compliance with information and records management requirements within the Holding to Account process has had clear benefit, particularly in positioning performance in this area as a core business issue. MOD must ensure, though, that sufficient emphasis is given to compliance and that there is robust follow-through. MOD’s approach to documenting information risk demonstrates its understanding of the significant impact that a lack of information availability can have. As a component of mitigating that risk, it must drive consistent interpretation and application of information and records management principles across TLBs.
- MOD must continue to invest effort in culture change across TLBs as new IT systems are adopted. This is crucial to ensure that information is created, stored and shared correctly, both for daily work and for the future record.
- MOD needs to understand the number and age of records held to support compliance with the Public Records Act and to ensure that records are stored, disposed of or subject to a Lord Chancellor’s Instrument (LCI) as required.
Progress against on-going areas of concern raised in this review will be revisited at the time of the next formal IMA in 2016/17 and monitored via standard meetings with the departmental Information Management Consultant (IMC).
**IMA risk matrix**
| Governance and leadership | Assessed 2011 | Reviewed 2014 | |---------------------------|--------------|--------------| | Strategic management | | | | Business objectives | | | | Management controls | | | | Resourcing | | | | Risk management | | | | Records management | | | |----------------------------------------|---|---| | Creation | | | | Storage | | | | Appraisal, disposal and transfer | | | | Management | | | | Digital continuity | | | | Access to information | | | | FOI/Data protection | | | | Re-use | | | | Security | | | | Compliance | | | | Staff responsibilities and delegations | | | | Policies and guidance | | | | Training | | | | Change management | | | | Culture | | | | Commitment | | | | Staff understanding | | | | Knowledge management | | |
**Key to colour coding**
| Colour | Description | |--------|----------------------| | Green | Best Practice | | Stripes | Good | | Orange | Satisfactory | | Stripes | Development needed | | Red | Priority attention area |
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974d7ab2a9bb5a8acc7ca50ded2bdb1058b1054b | | Serial | Recommendation | Progress as at 24/6/20 | Status | |--------|----------------|------------------------|--------| | 1 | MOD to define, articulate and communicate strategic goals for information and records management, establishing a clear strategic vision. | The Defence Information Strategy was deferred pending the completion of the Functional Leadership Strategy work that has now completed. The development of the new Defence Information Strategy has now re-commenced with the Defence Information Policy staff already engaged with the Strategy development team to ensure that the KIM vision and strategic goals are embedded in this new version, and text has been submitted for inclusion in the updated document. From 1 June 2019, a new 1\* Information Steward, responsible for FOI, DPA, EIR and PRA information legislative aspects will be established. | Closed | | 2 | MOD to ensure sufficient coverage of information management related risk within its risk management framework. | With Cyber Defence and Risk now firmly embedded within the MOD’s Digital and Information Technologies Strategy as one of CIO’s alignment objectives, work on the Cyber Risk Management Strategy has commenced. | Ongoing | | 3 | MOD to define how legislative and business requirements for information and records management will be met in the MODNET Office 365 environment. | The actions to meet this recommendation have been completed. Records management functionality that complies with MOD requirements is now available on the MODNET Office 365 environment in the OFFICIAL domain. ISS will continue to investigate options on how to manage records well in an on-premise SharePoint implementation as part of its business as usual activities. | Complete | | 4 | MOD to establish a framework through which the right information management culture can be driven and maintained. MOD should ensure good information management principles are embedded in new ways of working to get the most out of the MODNET Office 365 environment. | The full review of KIM roles (the Footprint review) is ongoing, TLBs are contributing towards its development. Activity to tailor future H2A questionnaires to known risk areas and develop a Single Information Maturity Model is now planned for Q3 2021. A new 1\* Information Governance Steering Board, looking initially at Records Management Improvement has been created. This board will feed in to the 3\* CIO Council through Director Functional Integration & Transformation. An exercise to understand the training requirements for an updated Records Management training course is expected to complete in Sep 20. | Ongoing | | 5 | MOD to identify how it will ensure the digital continuity of its information and records through to the point of transfer or destruction. | The study looking at future review and disposal of MOD electronic records has paused but will be taken forward following the reorganisation of the Information Stewardship team. The review of the Digital Continuity policy is complete, and the revised version will be included in JSP 441 by 30 Jun 20. | Ongoing | | 6 | MOD to establish a clear roadmap for ensuring compliance with the Public Records Act, supported by mutually agreed working plans. | The application to the ACNRA for a Retention Instrument for legacy Service Personnel Records has been approved [RI 131]. A business case for funds to support the transfer of these records has been submitted, with a decision pending. Work to establish a Defence Electronic Archive or similar capability is paused until the reorganisation of the Information Steward team is complete. | Ongoing |
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cbd008b26c4f786db80a643b67862e79ddce5901 | Les Waters\
Manager, Licensing\
Railway Markets and Economics
E-mail: [email protected]
1 February 2019
To holders of:
- Train operator licences
- Station operator licences
- Light Maintenance Depot operator licences
- Network operator licences\
and
- Rail Safety and Standards Board
- Rail Delivery Group
Changes to licence conditions on safety and standards
In connection with our 2018 periodic review of Network Rail’s outputs and funding, we have consulted on the changes we propose to make to Network Rail’s network licence at the start of control period 6 (“CP6”), on 1 April 2019. Some of the conditions we are changing also appear in licences for operators of trains(^1), stations, light maintenance depots and other networks. I am writing to you regarding consequential changes that we propose to make in those licences at the start of CP6. There are some other consequential changes that we do not need to implement now, but we may propose to do so at a later date.
Condition 22 (Safety and standards) of Network Rail’s network licence requires the company to be a member of Rail Safety and Standards Board (“RSSB”) and to comply with the Railway Group Standards it issues. Aspects of the condition have become outdated, risking confusion for licence holders, particularly in relation to their duties under safety and interoperability legislation. With the support of RSSB’s Industry Standards Coordination Committee, we have developed a proposal to revise it.
As part of our July 2018 consultation on a draft network licence for Network Rail(^2), we outlined our intention to bring the condition up to date, including the ability for Network Rail to request the right to leave RSSB without being in conflict with its licence obligations. We formalised our proposals in our 20 December 2018 statutory consultation(^3). In brief, the changes we proposed were to:
- continue to require Network Rail to be a member of RSSB, but reflect that it may discontinue membership with ORR’s approval (thereby mirroring a provision in the RSSB constitution);
______________________________________________________________________
(^1) For holders of EU train operator licences, the conditions appear in their corresponding Statements of National Regulatory Provisions (SNRPs).\
(^2) [http://orr.gov.uk/\_\_data/assets/pdf_file/0019/28324/consultation-on-draft-network-rail-network-licence-july-2018.pdf](http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/28324/consultation-on-draft-network-rail-network-licence-july-2018.pdf)\
(^3) [http://orr.gov.uk/\_\_data/assets/pdf_file/0017/40058/statutory-consultation-on-proposed-changes-to-network-rails-network-licence-december-2018.pdf](http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/40058/statutory-consultation-on-proposed-changes-to-network-rails-network-licence-december-2018.pdf) • continue to require Network Rail to comply with Railway Group Standards that are relevant to its activities; and
• require Network Rail to comply with applicable Rail Industry Standards or to consult with persons it considers are likely to be affected (for example train operators) where it proposes to deviate from a Rail Industry Standard (in full or in part) and to deploy equally effective means of achieving its purpose.
We have recognised the importance of consistent approaches at the operator/infrastructure interface and therefore, as expected, are proposing to make similar changes to the equivalent conditions in other operator licences, including the ability of operators to cease RSSB membership without contravening their licences (or SNRPs) with ORR approval. These are shown in Annex A and Annex B. The proposed changes to the existing text in licences and SNRPs are shown in red.
The intended revisions have already been discussed widely by industry, but should you have any queries on this letter (including the annexes), please send them to:
Licensing Team Office of Rail and Road One Kemble Street London WC2B 4AN [email protected]
We currently intend to proceed to a formal statutory consultation proposing the changes in the second half of February 2019. We will consider any views received on our aforementioned 20 December statutory consultation before proceeding.
I am placing a copy of this letter on our website.
Les Waters Condition 8: RSSB membership
This would take effect in:
- Passenger train operators’ Statements of National Regulatory Provisions (SNRPs) and Railways Act 1993 licences
- Freight train operators’ Statements of National Regulatory Provisions (SNRPs)
- Non-passenger train operators’ Railways Act 1993 licences
1. If the SNRP [or licence] holder’s annual turnover has never exceeded £1 million and the SNRP [or licence] holder is not a franchise operator, paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not have effect until the SNRP [or licence] holder’s annual turnover exceeds £1 million for the first time. The SNRP [or licence] holder shall provide ORR with such information in respect of its annual turnover as ORR may from time to time require.
2. With effect from the date of the coming into force of this SNRP [or licence], except where ORR consents otherwise, the SNRP [or licence] holder shall: (a) become and thereafter remain a member of RSSB; (b) comply with its obligations under the Constitution Agreement and the articles of association of RSSB; and (c) exercise its rights under the Constitution Agreement and the articles of association of RSSB so as to ensure that RSSB shall act in accordance with the Constitution Agreement.
3. With effect from the date of the coming into force of this SNRP [or licence], the SNRP [or licence] holder shall (d) comply with the Railway Group Standards Code prepared by RSSB.
4. When an SNRP [or licence] holder first becomes subject to the obligations in paragraphs 2 and 3 his rights, obligations and liabilities associated with such membership shall commence on the same day, and the SNRP [or licence] holder shall complete the formal and legal documentation associated with such membership within three months of that date.
5. In this condition:
“franchise operator” includes an operator of last resort, under section 30 of the Act. Condition 9: **Railway Group Standards**
**Safety and standards**
This would take effect in:
- Passenger train operators’ Statements of National Regulatory Provisions (SNRPs) and Railways Act 1993 licences
- Freight train operators’ Statements of National Regulatory Provisions (SNRPs)
- Non-passenger train operators’ Railways Act 1993 licences
- Station licences, light maintenance depot licences and network licences issued under the Railways Act 1993.
1. The SNRP [or licence] holder shall comply with:
(a) the such Railway Group Standards as are applicable to its licensed activities; and;
(b) subject to paragraph 2, such Rail Industry Standards (or parts thereof) as are applicable to its licensed activities.
2. The SNRP [or licence] holder is not required to comply with an applicable Rail Industry Standard (or part thereof) where:
(a) it has, following consultation with such persons as it considers are likely to be affected, identified an equally effective measure which will achieve the purpose of the standard; and
(b) it has adopted and is complying with that measure.
3. In this Condition:
“Railway Group Standards” means standards authorised pursuant to the Railway Group Standards Code prepared by RSSB;
“Rail Industry Standards” has the meaning set out in the Standards Manual, established by RSSB.
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722d147322ee31e664200aec86b37df5d51ce7e5 | Dear John
Arriva Rail North Limited (Trading as Northern)
Compliance with Condition 6 your Station Licence and GB Statement of National Regulatory Provisions: Passenger
I am writing to you regarding the performance of Northern Rail in a number of key areas affecting consumers.
Complaint handling
As you will be aware, the 2015 ‘Guidance on Complaints Handling Procedures for Licence Holders’ (the Guidance) sets out that licence holders must respond to 95% of complaints within 20 working days. Our compliance monitoring data indicates that Northern have now failed to meet this obligation since rail period 11 2017-18. In response to our previous request, you provided information to show how you intended to return to compliance and agreed to provide weekly reports on your progress in doing so.
Your most recent report of performance for rail period 5 shows that 49% of complaints were responded to within 20 working days, and weekly reports indicate that there has been no improvement in performance. This demonstrates that the measures taken to date have not been successful in achieving the necessary compliance with the requirements.
Therefore, we ask that you provide a detailed, clear and achievable plan for improvement to both meet and remain within the required timescale for responding to complaints.
Disabled People’s Protection Policy (DPPP)
We have discussed with you on a number of occasions issues related to your Disabled People’s Protection Policy. We are interested in understanding your progress more generally on a range of DPPP matters including your scooter trials and plans for providing greater clarity on both your policy and its communication.
**Delay compensation**
You informed us that earlier this year Northern deployed a new Delay Repay (DR) application to provide greater efficiency in the handling of claims. It would be helpful to understand the arrangements you currently have in place to ensure that claims are handled appropriately and in a timely manner, and the measures you are taking to provide for the smooth introduction of DR15.
**ORR complaint handling survey**
We wrote to you on 9 August 2018, to request a copy of the template complaint closure email that you are currently using. This was to help us assess if the way in which the survey information and survey link are displayed is having a potential detrimental impact upon response rates. A review of our records have shown that you have not sent this to us. We therefore ask that you provide us with a copy of your complaint closure email.
**Next steps**
I shall be grateful if you will provide me with your plan to achieve compliance with the complaints handling requirements and a copy of your complaint closure email by **Friday 28 September 2018**.
We would also like to invite you to a meeting at our London office to discuss all of the issues outlined in this letter. My team will contact you to agree a suitable date and to finalise the agenda.
Please note that this letter and your reply will be published on our website.
Yours sincerely
Marcus Clements
CC. David Brown
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d96d10d68ccdff2052430c482459dc2c2e9c7230 | Dear Martin,
Compliance with Condition 5 of your Station Licence and GB Statement of National Regulatory Provisions: Passenger
I am writing to you regarding the performance of Northern and its compliance with its obligations under the Disabled People’s Protection Policy (DPPP).
In its DPPP, which we approved in July 2017, Northern committed to providing an Assisted Travel service which enables disabled and older people to arrange, in advance, the assistance they require for boarding and alighting trains and moving through your staffed stations. In 2017-18, the last year for which we have figures, Northern received over 45,000 booked assistance requests. As you will be aware, ORR has commissioned ongoing research into the experience of passengers who have booked assistance. The most recent research results show that at the stations managed by Northern, in rail periods 1-8 in 2018-19, 81% of passengers surveyed received all or some of the assistance they had booked in advance¹. We were particularly concerned that, although almost all reached their destination, 17% of passengers stated they had received none of the assistance they had booked. We note that Northern was also below the national average for ‘all assistance received’ in 2017-18.
It is clear that the ongoing level of reliability of service for passengers who require assistance is currently below that which we, and passengers expect. This can have a negative impact on their confidence of using assistance services. Therefore, I shall be grateful if you will explain the reasons for the shortfall in performance together with the steps you plan to take to improve the reliability of the assistance provided to passengers at stations, and on-board trains to achieve the necessary compliance with requirements.
Next steps
I shall be grateful if you will provide me with your response by Friday 12 April 2019. Please note that this letter and your reply will be published on our website.
¹ Based on a sample of 233 passengers surveyed by Breaking Blue. Data for the entire 2018-19 year will be published in the ORR consumer report, Measuring Up, in July. Yours sincerely
[Signature]
Marcus Clements
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5fab11660fc5cc9ef5361a21f0d9ef7303f5659d | Dear Alan
Compliance with Condition 5 of your Station Licence and GB Statement of National Regulatory Provisions: Passenger
I am writing to you regarding the performance of South Western Railway (SWR) and its compliance with its obligations under the Disabled People’s Protection Policy (DPPP).
In its DPPP, which we approved in August 2017, SWR committed to providing an Assisted Travel service which enables disabled and older people to arrange, in advance, the assistance they require for boarding and alighting trains and moving through your staffed stations. In 2017-18, the last year for which we have figures, SWR received over 73,000 booked assistance requests. As you will be aware, ORR has commissioned ongoing research into the experience of passengers who have booked assistance. The most recent research results show that at the stations managed by SWR, in rail periods 1-8 in 2018-19, only 78% of passengers surveyed received all or some of the assistance they had booked in advance(^1). We were particularly concerned that, although almost all reached their destination, 16% of passengers stated they had received none of the assistance they had booked. We note that SWR was also below the national average for ‘all assistance received’ in 2017-18.
Your DPPP also states “[t]here is a member of staff on every train who can help you on or off the train to the platform”. Transport Focus has received complaints of multiple failed assistances at Wareham station, details of which have already been shared with SWR. It is possible that the assistance failures at Wareham may be indicative of the challenges faced by staff in providing assistance at other unstaffed stations.
It is clear that the ongoing level of reliability of service for passengers who require assistance is currently below that which we, and passengers expect. This can have a negative impact on their confidence of using assistance services. Therefore, I shall be grateful if you will explain the reasons for the shortfall in performance together with the steps you plan to take to improve the reliability of the assistance provided to passengers at stations, including those such as Wareham, and on-board trains to achieve the necessary compliance with requirements.
(^1) Based on a sample of 116 passengers surveyed by Breaking Blue. Data for the entire 2018-19 year will be published in the ORR consumer report, Measuring Up, in July. Next steps
I shall be grateful if you will provide me with your response by Friday 12 April 2019. Please note that this letter and your reply will be published on our website.
Yours sincerely
[Signature]
Marcus Clements
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5c8fb50c760d00f9e7140029e011ebba5b18f40c | Dear Leader,
Support for Domestic Abuse Services: COVID-19
I would like to thank you for the work you are doing in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic.
As you will be aware, government is making available £750 million for frontline charities, including domestic abuse services. However, I also want to ask for your help in ensuring these services are well supported and equipped to deal with what are already challenging situations, and even more so during these uncertain times.
I am aware that a number of local authorities have already been working closely with their local domestic abuse safe accommodation providers, providing assistance and support where needed. However there is not a consistent picture across the country, and I am writing to you now to ask you to work closely with the domestic abuse services in your area, providing support where you deem it necessary in order to protect victims, for example by providing crisis funding to safe accommodation services.
You should also work closely with domestic abuse safe accommodation providers in your area to ensure that victims of domestic abuse and their families, including those from out of your area, can be provided with safe emergency accommodation with appropriate support to avoid further pressures on frontline homelessness services.
To support you work, the Government has announced a further £1.6 billion of additional funding for Local Government: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/communities-secretary-robert-jenrick-on-covid-19-response-18-april-2020.
Local authorities are able to use the additional £1.6 billion to help protect vulnerable people, including victims of domestic abuse. We also recognise that housing provision is key. In 2018, Government published statutory guidance designed to help local authorities ensure that victims of domestic abuse in a refuge or other form of temporary accommodation have appropriate priority under their social housing allocation schemes. Today, we published non-statutory guidance for social housing landlords making clear that both supporting victims of domestic violence and providing move-on accommodation count as essential moves, and that these should proceed during this period where safe to do so. It is more important than ever to free up valuable bed space within domestic abuse services, enabling more survivors to escape from potentially life-threatening situations and to access safety and support.
If you need additional accommodation to meet demand then you can book rooms through CTM (who are working with Crown Commercial Services) who can be contacted on 01274 726424 (choosing ‘Hotel Team’, then ‘Option 1’), or [email protected].
I would like to thank you once again for all the work you and your teams are doing in managing the delivery of support in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, through your local services, during these unprecedented times.
LUKE HALL MP
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9b6528a87a10a418f0f575683e876c1e35fe1b81 | These are some of the many letters sent by staff of the Great Western Railway Audit office at Paddington who had enlisted to fight in the First World War. Here you will find all the letters and transcripts from this collection that relate to the soldiers' experience of the conflict in the Dardanelles, Turkey. (RAIL 253/516).
1915, Dardanelles: Contents
Dardanelles: ‘an everlasting nightmare’ ................................................................. 2 Dardanelles: ‘caught dysentery’ ............................................................................. 5 Dardanelles: ‘got married a week before’ .............................................................. 7 Dardanelles: ‘heaps have cameras taking photos’ .................................................. 10 Dardanelles: ‘millions of flies’ .............................................................................. 14 Dardanelles: ‘parched with the heat’ .................................................................... 18 Dardanelles: ‘an everlasting nightmare’
Thomas Harold Watts, 18 June 1915, Dardanelles. Born: 28 August 1884, Regiment: Drakes Battalion, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, Died: 11 September 1953
Transcript
Dear Arthur,
I expect you are wondering why I have not written, but it is an awful effort to get all correspondence off, and be on active service at the same time. I can’t say that I am enjoying myself out here. It’s awfully hot, and we are eaten up by millions of flies. Life in the trenches is not a picnic either, we have about four or five days out of them and eight or nine in them. When we are not supposed to be resting, we have to go on working parties, digging etc., then wherever we are, we are always under shell fire, so it’s not much rest after all. The last shell we had in camp, there was four killed, and seventeen wounded.
I don’t miss that so much. I get a bath in a biscuit tin when I can, but when in the trenches I have to go all the time without a wash, so you can tell it is used in being dirty.
Don’t you think all the boys are still there, and is one better or not in being going to lose this year and where are you spending your half-holiday? I heard how it’s like a holiday, I see so tired I had had nothing to get away from this miserable waging.
Please remember to all the fellows who are left in the office. Mr. Miller & Co. 6 Bills and one Bill and all the boys generally. I don’t write to all separately, and also for details of my experiences you must still till I get back, if ever I do, of which sometimes I despair.
The papers tell you pretty full accounts, also they are rather anticipating events as to our advancing. How I must have old days, and thank you very much for All your kindness.
Wishing you all the best (etc.)
Yours very sincerely
(Signed), Harold Watts.
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/ We have been under fire for three months now, and we should like a rest as the strain is tremendous on one’s nerves. I don’t think the troops in France get it quite as bad. Then again, the only comforts we have are sent from home, as the country here is quite barren, and we cannot buy anything in shops, I would give a quid for a pint of beer down the club. Our food consists of half a loaf of bread per day, bacon and tea for breakfast, Bully beef and biscuits for dinner and Jam for tea and cheese. Lime juice is served out about four times per week, that is a drop is put into a dixie of water and a cup full served out per man, and rum is served out twice a week (sometimes) that is about four table spoonful each.
We live in a trench and it is a mercy it don’t rain otherwise we’d be washed away. The fighting just lately has been terrible. Our shells knock the enemy all ways and the sight in the trenches that we take is awful. We wear our respirators because of the awful smell of the dead. I’ll never get the sight out of my eyes, and it will be an everlasting nightmare. If I am spared to come home, I’ll be able to tell you all about it, but I cannot possibly write as words fail me. I can’t describe things.
Wouldn’t it be nice to be at Walmer again and you come down and see me again, I did enjoy that time, and also seeing Billy Dawson and Richardson. There seem to be a lot of French troops out here, but there seems to be no relief for us. Nobody loves us now Churchill has gone, we are nobody’s pets. It’s the army first here, except when there is work to be done, and then the Naval Division have to do it. You know both my brothers have commissions in the 4th Bedfordshires and are at Dovercourt. My wife tells me she has sent me three boxes of stuff, I received one box, and I fear that one transport has been floundered [sunk] and another has been torpedoed, so I expect that is where my other two boxes are. It’s awfully disappointing because I do look forward so to a bit of chocolate and a few biscuits from home. We get cigarettes and baccy served out to us, but it is too hot to smoke much, so that I don’t miss that so much. I get a bath in a biscuit tin when I can, but when in the trenches I have to go all the time without a wash, so you can tell I am used to being dirty. How are they all down the club, and is Emmie still there, and is she better or not? Is Paice going to Looe this year? And where are you spending your holidays? Lord how I’d like a holiday, I am so tired and would give anything to get away from this continual banging.
Please remember me to all fellows who are left in the office. Mr Miller and Goff & Hills and George Williams, and all the boys generally. I can’t write to all separately, also for details of my experiences you must wait until I get back, if ever I do, of which sometimes I despair.
The papers tell you pretty full accounts, although they are rather anticipating events as to our advancing. Now I must close old chap, and thank you very much for all your kindness. Wishing you all the best
Yours very sincerely,
Harold Watts. Dardanelles: ‘caught dysentery’
Ernest John Cowles, 29 September 1915, Malta. Born: 8 August 1893, Joined GWR: 29 June 1903, Regiment: Royal Buckinghamshire Hussars; Royal Army Medical Corps, Regiment number: 713; 434085, Rank: Corporal, Died: 1967
Transcript
Dear Mr Rogers,
Just a few lines to let you know I am still alive and have up to now succeeded in dodging those small pieces of lead which have been so frequently flying about the Peninsular [Dardanelles]. I expect you are wondering how I got here, also why Con. [convalescent] Camp. I will try and tell you briefly what happened since our leaving Egypt. We left Alexandria 13th August and landed at the new landing at Sulva Bay on the 18th under shell fire. Not a very nice kick off. Our first engagement was on the 21st when we took part in the big fight for Hill 70 and 971. I expect you read about it in the papers, for I see the Daily Sketch had a page full of it. They spoke of us as the Irresistible Yeomanry; very glowing words of our charge also. It was a very stiff go and we were fighting from 3pm the 21st until dark on the 22nd and never stopped advancing and retiring the whole time. We had the Hill on the night of the 21st but could not hold it, because no support was sent up, so the Yeomanry (those of us who were left) had to retire at night after charging and capturing three lines of Turkish trenches. Our Brigade (Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Dorset Yeomanry) was ordered to do the charging for the Division and I think we did fairly well from what the General said in his report. Of course we suffered pretty heavy. After five days on the Peninsular we did not have an Officer left in our regiment, and only barely half the men. I have seen a few of our Officers in the casualty list, but no men. I was very pleased to get the *GRW Magazine* while resting in dugouts on Chocolate Hill. I hope no more of the Audit boys have fallen since the last I saw. I suppose you are still pretty slack in the office. I find I’ve run away from the tale, but here in the Y.M.C.A. tent it is so crowded and the piano on the go, it is rather difficult to write. After resting from the big fight three days we went into the trenches for spells of five days, on one case seven days. After five weeks I caught dysentery and had to come away. I was put on a hospital ship and brought to St. Patrick’s Hospital, Malta. During those five weeks I was pretty lucky. The only close bullet was one through my right sleeve and grazing my arm. We all have some very narrow shaves from shrapnel. I had the sandbags of my dugout knocked down one day, but fortunately I was down to get water. Probably, if I had been inside I would have caught it properly. I expect to be here about a fortnight to three weeks before I go back. I am hoping the boys will be across before that, and the Turkish army cut in two.
I suppose the office still looks more empty than it ever did. How is Mr Jackson getting on in France? I see his regiment has been in action. I have often wondered how he would get on in trench warfare. I suppose McConnel is still going strong. Will not stop for more now as I shall lose the mail. Kind regards to Mr Cox and all the men on the section. Hope you are still enjoying the best of health and still dodging the bombs. Hope to write again soon. Yours truly,
E.J. Cowles. Dardanelles: ‘got married a week before’
George Shipley, 6 August 1915, at sea on route to the Dardanelles, Turkey. **Born:** 18 August 1878, **Regiment:** 10 Middlesex Regiment, **Regiment number:** 2594, **Rank:** Company Sergeant Major, **Died:** 2 December 1915
Transcript
Dear Nic,
First of all I must thank you and... the others who sent me their kind letters of sympathy in regard to my brother Sam. We all felt it very much at home and it was a great shock to our parents naturally, but it can’t be helped, as he was killed in a good cause.
I suppose you have heard how we left Bedford early on Sunday 18/7/15 and had a lovely trip down the old firm to Keyham, we were well laden and I was glad to get aboard and get to my berth in which I am very comfortable with two other Warrant Officers. The men and Sergeants are on the troop deck and none too comfortable but are jogging along alright now.
The first part of the voyage the sea was very quiet, we passed Gibraltar in a fog at night, so couldn’t see it. We then skirted the coast of Algeria and had a pleasant run to Malta where we stopped a full day. The higher officials went ashore for a few hours (including myself) and had a good time. I cannot mention troops or ships so refrain from doing so but there was a hell of a lot.
Our next stop was Alexandria for three days, where we had another look round including a route march for the Battalion. The sea is fairly rough at this end, rather surprising, but a lovely colour, light blue at day and dark at night. All lights out at 8.00, perfect darkness, there is no twilight to speak of, being dark at 7.30pm.
We then wondered where we were off to but eventually reached Port Said, stopped a day, went ashore, and off we go to the Dardanelles which we expect to reach tonight.
Our kits have been left behind in Egypt and all we have got we stand in. We are now passing through the Aegean sea, full of rocky islands, very much like the highlands of Scotland. Bullen has just lost his helmet over the side, but is otherwise well...
I am in the best of health at present and hope to go through alright. I expect you heard I got married a week before I left, a lot of us did the same thing, it was quite a common occurrence. Our old boat is a captured German liner and is full up but we have got a Greek crew with a few Portuguese thrown in and so are a mixed lot, especially with Welsh men aboard. How are things going at the office, I have been away nearly a year... I shall be glad to hear from you now and again just to keep in touch... I must close now as they say a mail is being collected before we land... Yours sincerely,
George Dardanelles: ‘heaps have cameras taking photos’
Thomas Harold Watts, 23 November 1915, Dardanelles, Turkey. **Born:** 28 August 1884, **Regiment:** Drakes Battalion, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, **Died:** 1953
Transcript
Dear Arthur,
I really must make this effort to write to you and let you know how I am progressing. Well so far as a little internal trouble I’m keeping fairly fit now that the cold weather has started, and on my present job I can doctor myself, I am prepared to stick this campaign until further orders.
We are now in our winter quarters and a very nice place it is. Right on the edge of the cliffs, with a beautiful sea below, it reminds me very much of Cornwall. Then just across is the island of Imbros, and the sunlight on those mountains is sometimes marvellous. On a quiet, warm day, with the birds singing, one wonders if there is a war on, but the blooming shells soon drive that idea away. It’s jolly cold now though, but we have been served out with nice thick underclothes, and waterproofs, and top boots and except for always living in the ground, our comforts have been looked after as far as possible. Our food is as good as anyone could want, also I’m now used to a lot that before I’d turn my nose up at, and so long as the ships can land the goods I don’t think we shall be so badly off.
Mind it does blow, and the sea gets awfully rough and then no ships can come near us. We have the sea on three sides and the Turks on the fourth, so we are truly between the devil and the deep sea. The Turks still find some ammunition from somewhere whether our guns and the warships knock the very dickens out of them. It’s very exciting to watch a battle especially now it’s on our side the guns are not like at Antwerp where we were the ones potted. Now I am too sleepy to continue and as the firing has quieted down I’m going to sleep and continue tomorrow.
5/12/15. I’ve not had a chance to finish this letter before, so here goes. We’ve had snow and rain and thunder and such lightening, and Lord it has been cold, everything frozen and even the water in my water bottle. But today has been beautifully mild and calm, almost like summer again. I have just received a packet of letters from my wife, written at different times since May, so am still in hopes that there may be some more back dates knocking around the world for me. We had three men killed last night in a little spasm, and today our guns and the Turks have been flinging dirt at each other. We used to duck once upon a time, as the shells came over, but now everyone seems curious to see what sort of a burst it will be and how much dust is knocked up, and heaps have cameras taking photos.
Enclosed is a bit of heather which grows in great profusion all over the peninsular. And the troops use in the trenches to boil their dixies on. And now about the office. Do you know but, it’s quite an effort to remember the routine now... I suppose Mr Millow is still with you and is there any chance of H.R.H. Goff joining say as a S.C. (probably Senior Clerk)? There is now a singing in the air and bang just as I write they’ve dropped one over to us. Sometimes a shell bursts, and when we are working at something we don’t even know it’s come along. It’s funny what you can get used. But to get back to the office. I expect you have heaps of ladies there now, lord I haven’t seen a woman since April. What do they look like? I expect they scent out the office, and how careful you all must be not to swear. We often laugh here at the thought that if ever we do return to civil life again, we’ll be digging a little hole in the garden to live in and stirring up our tea with a bit of stick or our finger and just spit on the floor when smoking and if a little tickling in our shirt, just hopping it off in the street.
I am out of paper (he is writing this on envelope), but it don’t matter. How are the lambs going? Here’s one that’s doing a little doing a little bleat far from home. I’d like to come you know, and have a rub at a bed and a roof, also a drop of beer perchance. Living in a hole for seven months now and the blue sky above gets a bit monotonous at times especially when the dirt will persist in falling on your face when you are trying to sleep and when it rains you’re up to your knees in no time, and that’s always at night. We had rum served out tonight and do you know, I can’t bear the stuff, just pause and think by the wayside, I can’t drink rum, in fact I hate it. How we do change by time. Now how is everyone down the club? Remember me to Emmie and Mrs Fellows and May. I understand that Mr Welsh and Mr Davies have been awfully kind to my wife, and I reckon its jolly good of them. This war seems to have found me so many kind friends, I don’t know what I’ll do to repay them all if I live through this...
What has become of Beaumont and Jackson, and is my pal Jimmy Edwards still alive,... Bert I’d like to send you a Turkish shell but the post office won’t accept them for transit, anyhow perhaps I’ll bring home a nose fuse for a paper weight. Do you know back in the summer I had a shell drop just off the seat of my trousers and it did not explode. Kaw! It was a bit of luck, I didn’t stop to pick him up though, in case he changed his mind later. Well now I’ve tried to remember everyone, but do you give heartiest good wishes to the office for a Merry Xmas and a victorious New Year and trusting you’ll all be safe from Zeppelins. Yours very sincerely,
T. Harold Watts Dardanelles: ‘millions of flies’
Harold William Cronin, 3 October 1915, Dardanelles. Born: 9 May 1880, Regiment: 4th Seaforth Highlanders. Rank: Promoted to Lieutenant in 5th Bedfordshire Regiment on 20 May 1915, Died: 2 December 1917 in Palestine, leaving £268 19s to his widow Muriel
Transcript
Dear Mr Welsh,
We were only out here a matter of a few hours before we went into the trenches; we were there for eight days and then came on to what is called a Rest Camp. I suppose it is called that to distinguish it from the trenches because the men are at work all day road and trench making and it comes under both rifle and artillery fire. We got here at 7 o’clock yesterday morning and were shelled at 9 o’clock.
In the trenches it was fairly bad, they are so narrow and smelly and one is being potted at and shelled all the time. A turn of eight days was really quite long enough because it is strenuous work and even when you do turn in for a rest you have to be ready to turn out at once on an alarm.
The country is really quite pretty and just like the hills and valleys of South Wales, but there are no brooks or rivers. It rains hard for a month each year usually about this time and then there is no more until the next rainy season. But although it is so gloriously sunny something is wrong with the place and it really isn’t as healthy as it looks. I think the flies have something to do with it as well as the heat and the still unburied dead bodies about. There are millions and millions of flies here and they are all over everything. Put a cup of tea down without a cover and it is immediately covered with dead ones, they are all round your mouth and directly you open it to speak or to eat in they pop. It is a game. We have all got nets of course, we should have been worried, no medicine by now if we hadn’t.
We get plenty of bully beef and army biscuits, but bread and fresh meat is still a luxury and it is not possible to buy anything. It must have been a ‘No Man’s Land’ because there are no houses or buildings of any kind to be seen and except the flies, the only living things are green canaries and lizards.
We live in dugouts built up the reverse sides of the hills. They are just holes really, but all the same they can be made very comfortable with a bit of digging and a few waterproof sheets. They are not shell proof by any means and the one I slept in during my first night here was knocked in completely by a shell pitching right into it. Fortunately I was not at home at the time. We have another now and I must try and get a photo of it and let you see what it is like. I must send you one of our Mess dugout too.
Everything here is named after the Regiment responsible for the making or taking. For instance the road we made from our trenches to this camp is called ‘New Bedford Rd’ and the ridge we took and now occupy is called on the army maps, Bedford Ridge. I have just been filling in and colouring my map and find it is one of the most, if not the most, advanced line of the lot. Standing on that ridge it is possible to see what a lot of country we have taken and now hold, but there is nothing to get wildly excited about. Each position is strengthened as much as possible before another attempt is made to push on and the whole thing is just steady progress. Something might happen suddenly, I only hope it does.
We have had some very big ships out here and they have been bombarding the forts heavily now for some few days, and there are cruisers, monitors etc. standing in the bay helping the land batteries to shell the trenches. You see a flash and then wait a long time before hearing the boom and the shriek of the shell passing over our heads, almost together, then look round quickly and see the burst of the shell in or over the trenches sometimes before hearing the explosion. The first we know of shells aimed at us is the bang of the explosion, and it is too late to get out of the way. Three officers were laid flat on their backs the other day without any hurt except to their dignity and farther on six men were buried without one being injured. It isn’t always like that though.
There is quite good bathing here when we can find time to go. As the beach is in full view of the enemy, and comes under their shell fire, it would not appeal to the nervous. We never keep closer together than ten yards when we are undressing and swimming in hopes that the Turk will not consider one man worth the price of a shell. We have had some casualties through the men keeping too close together, but after washing out of a teacup for a week or more it is worth a bit of risk to get rid of some of the trench dust and smell and feel and look clean again. And really is the best bathing I’ve ever had. The water is quite warm and clear.
All the hospital work is done on board a ship that stands in the bay. If the cases are serious or lengthy they are transferred to one of the hospital ships that calls daily and then go to either one of the bases or back to England. We land troops night or day in spite of the fact that they come under fire so it is possible for a man to be on his way back wounded, by the same ship that bought him from the base, without ever having landed.
We had a grand voyage out. All the officers had either staterooms or 1st Class cabins and the food mostly was just the same as we should have had on an ordinary cruise to India or Australia, wherever it is that the Cruise Line calls. The usual cabin stewards and waiters were in attendance and it was difficult to remember that we were not exactly on a pleasure trip. We did enjoy those two weeks...
Kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
H.W. Cronin, Lieutenant.
I am acting as captain until some of the others come back from hospital. Dardanelles: ‘parched with the heat’
George Shipley, 8 November 1915, Gallipoli, Turkey. Born: 18 August 1878, Regiment: 10 Middlesex Regiment, Regiment number: 2594, Rank: Company Sergeant Major, Died: 2 December 1915
Transcript
Dear Nic (Boyce),
Thanks very much for your interesting letter... I wondered when I would hear from someone at the office. Also many thanks for your good wishes and congratulations on my marriage which I have conveyed to my wife. I am sure she will thank you all very much.
Well to tell you a little about our experiences, we started off mysteriously one Sunday from Devonport on the captured German liner Derflinger, not a bad boat. The Warrant Officers had 2nd class quarters it was all right. Food was very fair. Submarine pickets\* every night for one of the four companies, lights out... at seven or half past. Stole by Gibraltar at night in a fog expecting it to be torpedoed. We did reach Malta in due course after skirting north African coast, spent a day there, went ashore, had a few drinks which we needed being very hot and then on to Alexandria for three days, ashore every night, not a bad place, of course the lower men didn’t go, except for a route march on the Saturday. Our movements were kept very secret and we couldn’t find out what was to be done with our division, we then pushed to Port Said and had a day there. All of a sudden, we received orders to sail and soon found we were off to Gallipoli as we were passing through the Aegean sea, which is as you know full of pretty islands. Some hours before reaching Lemnos, the naval guns could be heard booming and we ran into the magnificent harbour there full of shipping and life. After a day there, we pushed on to Imbros 4½ miles from Sulva Bay during the afternoon they treated us to a naval shelling of Achi Baba, which is really the other side of the peninsula, but they shoot over the hills and mountains here. It was a fine sight and many of our chaps went sick at once. At night (Sunday 9/8/15) our good ship made for Anafarta Bay where a new landing had been effected two days before. 900 rounds, four days’ rations each, as much as a man is expected to carry and they dumped us over the side in lighters [a type of flat-bottomed barge] at 7am, a short journey through the boom defences and we were ashore waiting for something to turn up.
Bivouacked on the beach and were put on unloading lighters till about 10 when the Turks spotted us and started shelling, two men killed and four wounded to start with and we lost a few more, wounded during the day although naturally we took what cover we could. I had one or two near me whilst getting a timber out of the hold of a lighter but managed to dodge them all right. At night my company received orders to take picks and shovels up into the firing line which was about five miles away half way up Chocolate Hill... Well Nic the 10th were soon in the thick of it as we advanced across the salt lake in extended order.
Rifle fire now we had to dodge and many of our chaps got hit rather seriously I have since found out. I was glad of a rest at the foot of the hill but had to push on again and deliver the goods, after feeling about in the dark for some time our guide led us in single file up behind the firing line, where we laid down, bullets were whistling round but we managed to escape them... The enemy were yelling for all they were worth and I was glad when our captain ordered us down again to the beach. This took us some hours and when we reached the place, the other three had gone up to reinforce the firing line, so up we went again the next day about 6pm, nearly all things are done here in the dark as we are in view all the time. We again advanced across the take from Lala Baba, my heels were nearly raw through new boots and I eventually had to rest for a fortnight later on. Well on our right was a hill burning furiously with many a chap caught in the flames and so perishing (not our regiment).
We finished on rather a feathered bed and did not find the other Company 'til next day, it was a night, we were all parched with the heat, and no water. Dried up and had to dig ourselves in, it's no light job this hiding being... like an ostrich, 'til you make a hole large enough to get into and make yourself head cover.
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2bf57a8af7ed1f477d6d85e0fea5ece885e4bc3c | These are some of the many letters sent by staff of the Great Western Railway Audit office at Paddington who had enlisted to fight in the First World War. Here you will find all the letters and transcripts from this collection that relate to the soldiers' experience of training in England before they were sent abroad.
1915, Training: Contents
Training: ‘do you like the photo?’ ................................................................. 2 Training: ‘drill before breakfast’ ..................................................................... 3 Training: ‘no signs of moving’ ........................................................................ 6 Training: ‘We are now fully equipped’ ............................................................ 7 Training: ‘do you like the photo?’ Harold George Giles, 17 May 1915, Churn Camp, Oxford, England. Born: 18 May 1898, Joined GWR: 7 August 1912, Joined up for service: 19 March 1915, Regiment: Royal Bucks Hussars, Regiment number: 2125; 205745, Rank: Private, Retired: Resigned from Audit office on 9 May 1920
Transcript
Dear Mr Jones
Just a line to let you know that I’m still alive and am moving to King’s Lynn on Wednesday next. Will write you later. How do you like the photo? Best regards to the office. From,
H. Giles Training: ‘drill before breakfast’
Arthur Smith, 4 April 1915, France. Born: 8 March 1895, Regiment: Railway Troop, Royal Engineers, Regiment number: 87760, Rank: Lance Corporal
Transcript
Dear Sir,
I have now been out in France a fortnight. I am getting on quite well in the army. Food is also good and plentiful. Of course, I find the life much rougher from that which I have been used to, but it is a fine experience all the same.
We were at Longmoor camp for a week where we were equipped and put through elementary drills. We slept in a big hut there and had a sack of straw and three blankets each. The huts, of which ours was one, were called Apple Pie and they are about a mile from the camp, so we had to be up about six every morning in order to march down for parade at the camp. The parade was at 7.15am. Some mornings we had an hour’s drill before breakfast. It was about 11pm I should think, when we arrived at Longmoor on 31st March, and consequently we went straight to our hut. No light was provided so we had to fish about for our beds in the dark. Fortunately it was moonlight, and after some time a lantern was brought. We were only too glad when getting up time came the next morning. It was before six. We were marched down to the camp and were inspected by the Sergeant Major and after waiting some time went into breakfast. Roast sausage was the chief item on the menu but to our amazement no knives and forks were supplied for us...Well, the only thing was to convey the sausages to our mouths with fingers.
The nearest thing to a knife and fork that some had was a pair of nail scissors so these were used. Personally I did not know whether to feel shocked or to laugh at the situation; it ended in the latter. We Audit fellows got to one table and we had to have a good laugh before we could eat much. It was a hopeless situation to be in. Don’t let this discourage anyone from coming but I warn him to bring a knife and fork with him. After the first day we were issued with kits and we treasure our knives and forks now. We came across on the mail boat Hantonia from Southampton to Havre. ... We had to sleep in huts there on the docks but the sleeping accommodation was better. We Audit fellows were able to keep together till last Saturday night, when Pond and I were sent off to different railheads. He is at 3rd Corps Railhead. We had to travel in horseboxes and during night time. We travelled in this manner Saturday, Sunday and Monday nights. French shunting is severe and we were shaken up. Saturday and Sunday we were about 30 in the trucks, Monday 17.
We were fortunate enough to get out into every town at which we stopped during the day. On Tuesday night another young fellow and I were stranded at a station somewhere in France, and we were instructed by the military authorities to sleep in the goods shed. We had to sleep on the deck of the shed and shunting was going on during the night. This was about the limit, I thought. I arrived finally at my destination about midday last Wednesday. Now I live in a truck at a small French station. There are two other Sappers and a Lieutenant here. We deal chiefly with gifts and comforts sent to the troops...
We are out in the country. I think this railhead is about seven miles from the firing line. Can hear the guns and see the star shells at night. I must ask you kindly to excuse me for writing in pencil because I have no pen and ink here. Would you mind letting this letter be treated as to the whole of the statistical department, please sir. With kindest regards to all. I am yours obediently,
Arthur Smith Training: ‘no signs of moving’
Sidney Broad Hodges, 30 December 1915, Longmoor, England. Born: 7 January 1884, Regiment: Royal Engineers, Railway Troop, Regiment number: 138032, Rank: Sapper, Died: 1956
Transcript
I might say we are all merry and bright and not down hearted yet.
Dear Mr Hunt,
Received card alright for which I must thank you very much. We are still at Longmoor and no signs of moving as I have been made cook’s mate and had to work very hard all through Xmas.
Sapper Hodges Training: ‘We are now fully equipped’
Nicholas Boyce, 9 November 1915, Longmoor Camp, England. Born: 21 October 1879, Joined GWR: 10 February 1896, Regiment: Railway Troop, Royal Engineers, Regiment number: 138015, Rank: Sapper, Retired: October 1939
Transcript
Dear Lack,
Many thanks for the photographs received. We all think they are good and on Saturday the six of us had out photo taken here in a similar position—in khaki. The two pictures together should make a lasting memento.
We have had little spare time since we have been training here. Having been through company drill mixed with route marches, physical drill, semaphore, knot tying and frog, long jumping etc. Some of our men were able to go to town on Saturday... but I myself with a few others have been under orders for overseas service now waiting to proceed, so popping up town seems out of the question for us. We are numbered in alphabetical order, and in the order we are sent out. We are now fully equipped. I enclose ... postage for the photographs. If you are printing any more you might save me one as I am afraid I have spoilt mine, it got bent in my overcoat pocket on Saturday. Please remember me to all at the office...
N. Boyce
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/
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8ac4f8cd301a8bdaeb3950cd51d9872d355aa70b | These are some of the many letters sent by staff of the Great Western Railway Audit office at Paddington who had enlisted to fight in the First World War. Here you will find all the letters and transcripts from this collection that relate to the soldiers' experience of the trenches. (RAIL 253/516).
1915, Trenches: Contents
Trenches: ‘a most awful time’ ................................................................. 2 Trenches: ‘a noisy business’................................................................. 4 Trenches: ‘an interesting souvenir’ ..................................................... 7 Trenches: ‘awfully desolate spot’ ......................................................... 9 Trenches: ‘being under fire’ ................................................................. 12 Trenches: ‘canaries in cages’ ............................................................... 15 Trenches: ‘dodging damned great bombs’ .......................................... 17 Trenches: ‘had a game of football’ ....................................................... 19 Trenches: ‘handling a Maxim’ ............................................................ 21 Trenches: ‘souvenirs sent over’ ........................................................... 23 Trenches: ‘swept continually with shells’ .......................................... 26 Trenches: ‘they were mostly mere boys’ ........................................... 29 Trenches: ‘up to our knees in water’ ................................................... 31 Weapons: ‘the biggest gruelling’ ....................................................... 33
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/ Trenches: ‘a most awful time’
Richard Frederick, Hull, 19 June 1915, France. Born: 4 June 1892, Joined GWR: 25 July 1908, Regiment: 1/6 Seaforth Highlanders, 1st Highland Infantry Brigade, Regiment number: 2161, Rank: Lance Corporal, Died: 1974
Transcript
Dear Gerald
Many thanks for letter which was somewhat a surprise to me. No the news was quite fresh as I do not hear from anybody in the office.
We have just come from the trenches where we were for seven days and had a most awful time. We were three days in the Reserve and put in the firing line where we took part in an attack and were also under a very heavy bombardment.
I am sorry to say we had many casualties thirty five killed and one hundred and thirty eight wounded and I can assure you it was an experience I shall never forget. Anyhow Williams, Kemball and myself came out quite safely.
I have seen Frost out here, of course his battalion (8th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders) are in the same brigade also, as a matter of fact, they were in the firing line the night we came out. I received a letter while I was in the trenches from Mr Slater. Yes, I heard about Chamberlain, jolly sad was it not, if you do hear from Dick James you might pass any news on to me...
Shall be glad to hear from you. I could write more, only am a wee bit tired after seven days in trenches.
I am yours sincerely, Fred Hull.
P.S. Of course you know my address. Remember me to all I know. Trenches: ‘a noisy business’
R.C.S. Frost, 15 July 1915, France. Born: 30 January 1888, Regiment: 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, Regiment number: 1998; 300470, Rank: Private; Second Lieutenant, Died: 1962.
Transcript
Dear Mr Hunt
Many thanks for your welcome letter volunteering so much interesting news of friends at the office. I wrote to Standew just before receiving your letter, but no doubt a few more lines will be acceptable. Beaumont seems to be doing the best of us all. I saw Williams and Hull about three weeks ago in a small town near here. Of course the Seaforths and Argylls (regiments) always move about together, but we don’t meet very often. I am glad to hear the old section is still in being, and not like the German Empire is fast becoming a thing of the past! And hope your three survivors will be allowed to keep the flag flying until the wanderers return.
I have been in the firing line several times, and at four different places, besides being in the support trenches at others. I hear this is called a mobile division which accounts for our gipsy life in France.
Our last turn in the firing line, for six days and six in the reserve was the most exciting of all.
It has been a quiet place for two months, until two days after our occupation, when the British exploded mines under some workings of the Germans near their trenches, to prevent them blowing our trench up. Well! That woke them up and the following Saturday they retaliated by opening rapid fire early in the morning.
However we were ready for them and quickly replied, so they then bombarded us, which to say the least of it was a noisy business. That eventually ceased and rapid firing was quickly in process again, followed by another shelling, which our guns again put a stop to. The whole affair lasted an hour and ten minutes, and although we believe an attack was intended, the Germans didn’t leave their trench, opposite to us. After putting our trench in order again which took some time, as the parapet was blown down for about three yards near me, and a shell burst amongst a lot of beef tins, scattering them and the contents in all directions, besides the bottom of the trench being littered with hundreds of empty cartridges, we proceeded with boiling water for tea, also to show the Huns by the smoke that we were still there. Only a hundred yards separated the two trenches, so it was always a case of “bob down” and the enemy were good shots, as we found out to our cost when they smashed the top glasses in two periscopes within half an hour one morning.
At present the division is resting, and I and two friends have erected a wee bivouac under an apple tree on a farm. It is quite cosy, in fine weather, but last night it was raining hard for several hours, so we had to beat a hasty retreat to an old barn. There is plenty of fruit about here, but the water supply is very bad.
Last Sunday morning we enjoyed our first hot bath since our arrival here. An old disused brewery has been turned into baths for troops, also under clothing is washed and disinfected, and kilts ironed there. Fifty tubs are provided for washing in and two large vats filled with cold water to plunge into afterwards.
I have not got any stripes yet, but have been studying signalling lately, so expect soon to be in the signal section.
I must close now to get this letter away, hoping Mr Taylor, Mr Woodhams, and yourself are keeping well, and with kind regards to you all.
Yours very sincerely,
‘Frosty’ Trenches: ‘an interesting souvenir’
Gilbert Williams, 7 October 1915. Born: 18 April 1894, Regiment: 1/6 Seaforth Highlanders, Regiment number: 2175, Rank: Private, Died: 1967. Note: Williams also fought in Second World War, and returned from war on 15 November 1948
Transcript
Dear Mr Hunt,
Thanks for the cigarettes and magazine, all very much appreciated and I want to confess something. I am terribly short of cigarettes just now. Don’t know how to get on.
So you had Peter Jackson up to see you a short time ago. Lord, how I wish I could get up to London. Some of our chaps have leave but this advance seems to have put a stop to it. That’s the only reason I am sorry for the long awaited advance. God knows it was really time we did do something if only to relieve the pressure on Eastern front. We are in this part of the line and are still sitting tight worse luck. I wish they would get a move on here as well. It has cost us a good many casualties, but I think the Germans, what with the bombardment they got and the counter attacks they delivered must have lost many more than us.
I have got an interesting souvenir. It is part of the framework of a German aeroplane, the fourth which our airmen have recently brought down in this neighbourhood. The machine gun in one of our planes had killed the German pilot and the machine getting out of control exploded, or at least the engine did, and the whole aircraft crashed to earth. God, it was an awful mess. Both the pilot and observer were killed, the former being bashed out recognition, but the latter survived the fall but died shortly afterwards. Our airmen seem to be the masters of the Germans now, although the taubes seem to be the faster machines, our men seem to have much spirit and initiative.
About a fortnight ago I saw a fleet of fourteen of our planes cross over our lines on a raiding expedition. They were in close formation, and the Germans sent up a rain of shells without doing any damage. The raid was very successful, I believe, two transport trains full of German reinforcements being wrecked, a large station destroyed.
Well that’s about all from me, let me hear from you soon. How is everybody up there? Best regards to all the section,
Yours very sincerely, Gilbert Williams Trenches: ‘awfully desolate spot’
R.C.S. Frost, 22 May 1915, France. Born: 30 January 1888, Regiment: 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, Regiment number: 1998; 300470, Rank: Private; Second Lieutenant, Died: 1962
Transcript
... I am much nearer the front now, and we moved here last Tuesday. It was a long march and of course done at night, and our present billet is a farm (or the remains of one) in a large village about ¾ mile from the trenches, more north than we were before, and nearer the Belgian frontier.
It is an awfully desolate spot and constantly under shell fire. This morning I was trying to get a sleep on the grass, when a shell burst in a tree, not fifty yards away, and sent a shower of leaves to the ground. Fortunately no one was hit, another burst in the same field ten minutes afterwards, then I thought it was time to shift! So went into a barn. There are a number of dugouts around, but they are so cold, and you might get buried inside. The farm is a vile place, with a lot of stagnant water around, and a lot of German soldiers are buried here. The barn where we sleep would be improved if a shell struck the roof, and ventilated it, in our absence! As the smell inside is bad, and makes it nearly necessary to wear a respirator! The rats seem to object to our company as they often have a free fight on top of us.
Last night was my first experience in the trenches, and we returned to billet this morning. The din is simply awful, and just lately the big guns have been giving the enemy ‘beans’ every night. I am glad to say we had no casualties, although the rifle fire was heard at times, especially on our left, where the Germans made an attack on the Indian troops. The British gun fire was simply terrific, all night, and the Germans did not reply very much. It was fine to watch the flashes of our guns at our backs, although the screaming of the shells overhead is at first rather ‘scaring’ to say the least of it!
However the news we hear from day to day at this part of the front is very cheerful, and encouraging. Yesterday I came across an Indian soldier who could speak English very well, and he thought another month would see the war over, also a German officer captured near here, said it could not go on very much longer. I for one hope these remarks will prove correct!
The church here is practically demolished, just some of the walls and tower standing, and the churchyard is in a bad state. Great holes have been made and bones exposed. In these holes is water sufficiently deep to drown anybody. Great stone vaults have been opened, and coffins and bodies can be seen.
Of course the place here is not inhabited except by soldiers. I have been through some of the big houses, and plenty of good carved furniture, pictures, fittings etc. still remain in them. I also have been in some of the gardens, and roses just coming into bloom can be seen in great numbers. I should like to see them at home!
Well I must close now, and hope you are all keeping well. Again thanking you all for our good wishes. Sincerely yours, S. Frost Dear Burgie,
Thanks awfully for your letter, glad to hear that you are all serene and that the G.W.R. is still flourishing without me, as a matter of fact I expect it’s better without me but still there you are. By Jove! I had no idea that the Audit had shoved so many fellows into khaki, its fine. Well the old Brigade has had some pretty varied experiences in this land of stinks and bad beer.
We landed at Havre last March and after a freezing night under canvas on the heights behind the town we had a rather weird train journey up country. There were about 10 of us per cattle truck with a few wisps of straw to sleep on. Our horses were boxed six in a truck, three with their heads facing the ‘engine’ and three facing the rear of the train. Two men sat on corn sacks between their bottoms. If they kept the shutters closed they had a beautiful journey as it was so warm with the horses...
At about 2am the old caboodle pulled up and we thought we were in for a dreary hang about, however the order came down to bring out the dixies... and fall in for something hot. I took our one up and the liquid smelt so good that with a little judicious wangling we managed to get another one full. When we tasted it, it was simply gorgeous. Boiling hot coffee and rum as only Frenchmen can make it, you know how. Gee but it did go down a treat.
Well after many jolts and bumps we arrived at our destination. It was miles from the firing line and a fearful hole at that. At nine next morning we were off again and went up further still, riding about 23 miles before we came to anchor at a rather dirty mining village...
After about three weeks in this show we shunted up and got our baptism. It’s a funny sensation being under fire for the first time but it soon wears off. One gets a rather nasty jolt when the first casualty occurs especially as it was in our case the finest fellow we had on the staff. He got a chunk of shell in the back of his neck and was killed on the spot.
We were in action at this place for about two months and took part in several bombardments, one of them being the one in which poor old Joey was killed. We had some pretty rough times but were very fortunate as regards casualties. Two month’s action and 2½ days’ rest, it doesn’t seem much but that’s what we got, and then at it again in a different part. This show had been occupied by the Germs and then by the French from whom we took over. The filth and stench was too awful for words, one of our batteries striking rather unlucky in coming across Germs buried just under the surface when they started digging their guns in. The air was blue for miles...
The next action we had was a hell of a show. The staff were put into a huge Chateau which was under observation and fire from three sides. And they didn’t half sling the lead about too. It’s marvellous that we didn’t get lifted skywards heaps of times, but still here we are. After a good spell in this show we came to rest again about 10 days or so ago.
We are having a good time here in the way of concerts, sports, boxing tournaments etc. The latter was great especially the bout between a Farrier Sergeant and a cook’s mate. They biffed at one another until neither could stand, it was awfully funny.
Little Seedy Ellis has got a snip job at a base. He came up today with a draught of men. He is having the time of his life and looks it by the dark circles under his eyes...
I am feeling wonderfully fit and well and would not have missed coming out for quids. I suppose you saw in the paper that two of our boys have got the Distinguished Conduct Medal. They were in Major Lord Gorell’s Battery; he is awfully bucked about it.
Well old man I must dry up. I hope you can read this disgusting scrawl, but will make that whiskered excuse ‘active service conditions’. Please remember me to all the boys and tell Long Liz that I would give anything for a barrel or two of the club bitter.
Sincerely, Dick James Trenches: ‘canaries in cages’
R.C.S. Frost, 6 July 1915, France. Born: 30 January 1888, Regiment: 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, Regiment number: 1998; 300470, Rank: Private; Second Lieutenant, Died: 1962
Transcript
... This trench of ours is a model in its own way, being fairly safe, and connected by good communication trenches. The Commanding Officer’s house of white sandbags is fitted with window, curtains, and window box with pansies in it. It is furnished with table and chairs also a large mirror. Of course this is quite a ‘one occasion’ affair and don’t imagine we are here town planning with model dwellings etc! But it will show you how soldiers can adapt themselves to circumstances. At the back of our trench is ripening corn and plenty of wildflowers in bloom.
We have also canaries in cages in the trench! But these are used by the miners for testing the air in the mines after the explosion, to see if it was possible to finish off their job. [Censored line] captured from the Germans a short time ago and during the stay we were kept busy with sandbags etc. and at night of course had to especially watch the enemy.
When in the reserve or support trenches fatigue work has to be done every night, such as carrying food, ammunition, material for the engineers etc. to the firing line, so you can guess it is nothing but continual ‘bob’ work (odd jobs). Trenches: ‘dodging damned great bombs’
William Albert Hastings, 11 July 1915, France. Born: 17 March 1888, Regiment: 4th Seaforth Highlanders, Regiment number: 2092, Rank: Sergeant, Died: 1937
Dear Effie,
Very pleased to receive your letter, like yourself I find my correspondence voluminous for me at times, especially since I have taken on the duties of Platoon Sergeant which takes up more time than one realises at first. We are still in the trenches and have been in action twenty four days consecutively and I don’t know long we shall keep it up. Had a dirty time yesterday morning dodging damned great bombs the blighters were presenting to us without exaggeration they were eighteen inches to a two feet long and made a hole about ten feet deep and fifteen feet diameter at least we did not wait to see them burst. They can be seen descending through the air and then a scoot is made to get as far as possible round the corner, the iron and dirt seem to be falling for a minute afterwards, they are disturbing. Dirty billets has not been with us the last 04 days he broke his glasses and would not buy new ones (went to the doctor & all that) and worked the rounds and was left behind with the Transport, don’t know whether he worked the ticket properly and got a safer job farther back should not blame him if he has, his nerves have been in shocking state, he’d brood a lot as you know that is absolutely fatal when you have a dirty job on like this. Have not seen either Front or Back line out here, do not seem to meet anybody fresh we are always in the same district and relieve the same crews generally, our gals the fresh in my opinion are jolly well except perhaps in declined instances which are given undue prominence by our shapes by prejudice probably. The casualties have certainly been enormous but a lot of them are a week old & one cannot form any opinion of what is going on by the lists, and I should not be allowed to say what I thought of our doings lately. Green is still with the Red Cross & not yet yet I think not likely to be in all probability. Only wish we could repeat our swimming performance off Ramor, specially the swimming evening ones. Have heard rumors of leave being, shortly but do not rely much on it have been offered a commission in this Battalion and I shall take it up if my papers go through satisfactorily. Kindest regards and wishes to Mrs Lewis, Your old Pal, Billy.
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/ they are disturbing. Dicky Gilson has not been with us the last twenty four days, he broke his glasses and would not buy new ones (went to the doctor and all that and worked the oracle and was left behind with the Transport, don’t know whether he worked the ticket properly and got a safer job farther back, should not blame him if he has, his nerves have been in a shocking state, he’d brood a lot as you know that is absolutely fatal when you have a dirty job on like this. I have not seen either Frost or Kemball out here, do not seem to meet anybody fresh as we are always in the same district and relieve the same crowds generally.
Our pals the French in my opinion scrap jolly well except in the isolated instances which are given undue prominence by our chaps by prejudice probably. The casualties have certainly been enormous but a lot of them are a week old and one cannot form any opinion of what is going on by the lists, and I should not be allowed to say what I thought of our doings lately. Cronin is still with the 5th Bedfordshires and not out yet, I think not likely to be in all probability. Only wish we could repeat our swimming performance off Penarth ‘specially the Wednesday evening ones. Have heard rumours of leave being given shortly but do not rely much on it, have been offered a Commission in this Battalion and I may take it up if my papers go through satisfactorily.
Kindest regards and wishes to Mrs Lewis,
Your old Pal,
Billy Dear Burgie,
Was very glad indeed to get your letters although, your news in regard to Joe [Chamberlain] comes as a shock. It was the first I had heard of him since he arrived in France in spite of the fact his regiment being quite close. Am afraid the 9th and few days following were rotten days for a good many battalions, our lot as much as any. We have been “in” since the 8th and have had a fairly trying time we were reinforced during this week, not before time as we were down to our last two hundred. Can’t tell how sorry I am to hear about Joe as you say he was “one of the best”. I hope you chaps have not been annoyed at my not answering your very welcome letters. I don’t pride myself much on writing good yarns though and opportunities are also hard to find. As you know I had a bit of a knock at Neuve Chappell but have quite got over that and am now in the best of health and spirits. I came across Len Phillips and Peter Hawes in different drafts of the London Scottish while down at Rouen both of them have now had some experience on the job I expect. Thank Mr Drewe very much for making inquiries, tell him I occasionally wish heartily to be on the old job again the quiet life will do for me after this. No I did not get Dick’s magazine or letter expect it went astray while I was in hospital. Thank him very much for sending them will you. Had a game of football about two weeks ago with R.G.A. Battery, the pitch being a serious drawback. I think it was a cabbage patch. Still we managed to get a good game in and most important of all, won. The weather here has on the whole been very good just lately only getting an occasional day’s rain. Last night we had a sharp thunderstorm, a new experience it had at least the effect of shutting all the other disturbances of our rest up so we did not grouse. Much obliged for all the information re the other fellows. Am glad most of them are getting on so well. Peacock seems to have come out top dog. The job alone from other examples seems to be a paying one, leaving out the holiday in Scotland. Well must close my epistle. Please remember me to Dick, Mr Horsley, Ransley and Drewe, Fox. Hoping both they, and yourself are, like myself O.K. [Line censored]. From yours faithfully,
E.W. Bratchell Trenches: ‘handling a Maxim’
Gilbert Williams, 16 November 1915, France. Born: 18 April 1894, Regiment: 1/6 Seaforth Highlanders, Regiment number: 2175, Rank: Private, Died: 1967. Note: Williams also fought in the Second World War, returning from war on 15 November 1948
Transcript
Dear Mr Hunt,
Please accept yourself and convey to the other gentlemen my best thanks for the State Express cigarettes. They are fine. Oh what a picnic it is in the trenches just now. We have been in the trenches 10 days up to now, and except for the last two days it has been raining almost steadily. The result is mud, mud and yet more mud, knee deep in places. But luckily we have long top boots from trench wear, so that the mud does not worry as much, except that is making our feet as cold as ice... We have been issued with fur jackets so we can keep our bodies warm. Just now the whole countryside is covered with snow and moving objects are distinguishable a long distance off. For instance this morning when I was on duty with the gun I could see the Germans walking down a road away behind their lines. I had several bursts at them with the gun but they were out of range. Made me damned mad I can tell you seeing the blighters and then not being able to lay them out.
You can’t realise the power one seems to possess when handling a Maxim. Personally I feel as if I could lay out the whole German army. We fire about a couple of thousand rounds every night into Fritz’s trenches just to keep them quiet. They (the Germans) have been trying to find the gun, both with their Maxims and with shells, but up to now, they’ve not succeed. Kind regards to everybody. Yours very sincerely,
Gilbert Williams. Trenches: ‘souvenirs sent over’
R.C.S. Frost, 3 November 1915, France. Born: 30 January 1888, Regiment: 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, Regiment number: 1998; 300470, Rank: Private; Second Lieutenant, Died: 1962
Transcript (extract)
...Several months ago, when we relieved the French of these trenches it was noticed how quiet the ‘atmosphere’ was, and it seemed quite in keeping with the beautiful hilly scenery. Since the British occupation however, things here have livened up considerably, and it has been found necessary to greatly strengthen the trenches, and make dugouts much deeper and safer, because of the various kinds of souvenirs sent over from the enemy.
Their latest was the aerial mine, of which no doubt you have read. It is exactly like an oil drum to look at, with wood ends, and explodes with a terrific report. I don’t think it can be fired from a gun, as it comes tumbling across in such an awkward manner. I don’t think we manufacture these articles at Woolwich as we can afford decent shells! We are not troubled very much by German artillery, but they make up for that with trench mortars and rifle grenades.
As a signaller I escape some of the hardships of trench life, especially now the winter has arrived, and much prefer duties which keep one under shelter to those of exposure at the parapet! Of course we have exciting times, when any wires are cut by trench mortars etc. and which need to be repaired at once wherever the break is.
Just lately I am having a lot of experience at making and fitting fireplaces in dugouts. We generally use biscuit tins to hold the fire and rummage among old houses in the village nearby for pieces of piping to take the smoke out, usually through the entrance as it is impossible to cut a hole through the roof on account of the sheet of iron. Fuel for burning is generally a problem but a small supply of coke is allowed and we add to it all kinds of wood etc. When sitting up at night it is surprising what good time we keep when waking up the next fellow to carry on, if there is no fire, but if a good fire is on, we get quite generous, and don’t mind allowing the next man an extra hour or so to sleep!
We have had several days of rain this week, which doesn’t tend to improve life in the trenches, or out. On our journey to billets last Saturday night, we took a road through a wood constructed by the Royal Engineers. It wasn’t quite finished, and in places was ankle deep in water, so our march was more of a paddle. Parts of this wood, which is in a valley had been purposely flooded, so the road had to be laid on faggots and will be a piece of work when finished.
We are fortunate in having dry billets, with beds raised above the floor and a small fire. Sheep skin coats have been issued to us, and are very warm. There is a fellow here now imitating a monkey and holding out a small cup to an audience seated on the beds, while another chap is playing an accordion! All we need now are top boots (tall rubber waders or gum boots designed to try and avoid the problem of trench foot) to paddle through the trenches! There is plenty of water about but very little to drink or wash in. It is a fine place for people who are good at finding excuses for not washing! But there are very good hot water baths here, only it isn’t any good having a bath unless one really needs it, on account of the colour of the water!!
We do very well though, for food and clothing both of which are good, and well supplied, and considering the many distant places it is sent from, it speaks well of the splendid way our Navy is doing ‘its bit’... Trenches: ‘swept continually with shells’
Edward Henry Cecil Stewart, undated, France. Born: 13 November 1891, Regiment: 1/5 Grenadier Company, London Rifle Brigade, Regiment number: 1167; 300717, Rank: Private, Died: 1 July 1916
... As long as you kept your head down you were comparatively safe, so as it went on, this was where I had my first escape. I was on sentry duty for a couple of hours, from 1am to 3am and was instructed to keep a sharp look out. I did not care for the idea of keeping my head above the trench and looking for beastly Germans, however it had to be done, it was quite uncanny to watch the enemy trench which appeared somewhat like a black wave and only sixty yards in front, then you would suddenly see the flash of their rifles and machine guns immediately after would come the report and nasty thuds on the sandbags which you might be resting against. I fired about five shots at their flashes (the only target to aim at) then another two shells which lodged in the parapet either side of my head leaving about 2 to 3 inches between me and certain death. I thought that near enough but it turned out that it was to have something nearer than that. Our casualties here amounted on the average, to about two per day killed, of course, we thought it terrible at the time at least I did.
Early April saw us relieved by another division and we were sent a few miles back for a well-earned rest, which consisted of physical drill and a run before breakfast. The remainder of the morning being spent in platoon drill musketry drills. After dinner we put the “cap on” our rest (why so called I do not know) by having a route march for two hours. We spent a few days like this and were dispatched with all possible speed to Ypres, here we went in to support the Canadians and spent a most unpleasant eight days, during which time we lost several hundred men, nearly all my friends who came out in the same draft and were killed or wounded, we had to retire, the best part being that the Germans did not find this out until two days after when we were more or less safely bivouacking in a very pretty wood. We stayed here for about a week; then we got to work again, digging reserve trenches just behind the front line, building up parapets which had been demolished by the enemy’s high explosive shells and such like, working all night and getting what sleep we could in the daytime. One morning we were awakened by the most awful din, it seemed as though hell had broken loose, shells were falling like summer rain. And people have often told me in the course of conversation it was raining shells and I admit I took it with a grain of salt, could not be possible I thought, but such I was surprised to find was possible and actually taking place there about 3.30am. This bombardment started and about half an hour later, I, with three others, were ordered to start reinforcing. We went up in fours, it being considered safer that way, half a mile over open ground we had to do, this being swept continually with shells, to give you a slight idea I can say the previous night, just in front of our reserve trenches was a beautifully green field, and the next morning it was as much as one could do to see any grass at all, simply one mass of craters, varying in diameter from ten to twelve paces.
I had gone about half the required distance when a shell fell only a yard from where I was, the force of the concussion [explosion] pitched me several yards to my left and I came down rather heavily, however I reached the first line without any further mishap, where we had to stay until midnight when we had to be relieved again owing to not having enough me to hold the trench. Our honours were one V.C. (Victoria Cross), two D.S.O. (Distinguished Service Orders), one Military Cross and one or two D.C.M. (Distinguished Conduct Medals).
The next day I paraded sick, my back paining me so much that I could not stand straight for a week after. I am now back with the regiment who are on the line of communications. We are having leave shortly and if possible will pay a visit to the Audit office. Have you any news of Chichester?
Yours truly,
(Rifleman) E.H.C. Stewart Trenches: ‘they were mostly mere boys’
Richard Gilson, 12 May 1915, France. Born: 20 September 1887, Regiment: 4th Seaforth Highlanders, Regiment number: 2076; 200415, Rank: Acting Colour Sergeant, Died: 1961
My dear Mother,
Have just come through a particularly nasty period. We went into the trenches on Wednesday night last and on Sunday morning at 5am our Artillery commenced bombarding the German trenches and after 20 minutes had elapsed we went over the parapet. My goodness what a reception the Huns had in store for us, they simply swept the ground with machine gun fire and shrapnel. Poor old ‘C’ coy. caught it hot and Neuve Chapelle seemed to be a fleabite compared with this. It was found impossible to make any advance in our quarter, so I dug myself in and awaited events. It was horrible suspense, as I seemed to be the only one untouched, all around me, and being personally acquainted with each man made matters worse, in fact, it’s all wrong to call them men, as they were mostly mere boys. About early afternoon I was hailed from the trench as to whether it was possible for me to get back. I replied in the affirmative and decided to run the risk of getting potted on the way. So I commenced crawling on my stomach until about a few yards from the parapet, then made a spring and rushed headlong over the top, nearly spoiling the features of a few who happened to be in the trench and were not expecting me. We were relieved that afternoon, but some of the fellows did not get in until nightfall and these experienced another bombardment... Billy Hastings is quite fit and the only pal left. We have been resting since and getting information about the (illegible) but by all reports we shall be up again soon. No rest for the wicked it is said, and if true we must surely be a bad lot.
What a terrible thing about the Lusitania, and with so many Americans aboard. Should imagine there will be more trouble. Have received box and letter dated 6th and am most thankful for everything you are all doing for me. (censored.)
As regards the pads, (masks of cotton pads which served as gas masks), all we were served out with were made ‘on the spot’ and consisted of a piece of gauze and tape and were steeped in a solution of bicarbonate of soda, prior to this charge. I lost all my belongings except the Gillette (razor) so should be glad of a few toilet requisites when next you are sending a parcel. Do not trouble about towel and perhaps Frank would get me a shaving brush. Must now close. Much love to all. From your affectionate son,
Dick Trenches: ‘up to our knees in water’
Jonathan George Symons, 10 November 1915, France. Born: 22 August 1875, Joined GWR: 28 October 1889, Regiment: 13 County of London Regiment (King’s Royal Rifles Corps), Regiment number: 6389, Died: 1941
Transcript
Dear Bert,
Just a few lines to let you know I am alright, hoping you are the same...
At the present time we are in dugouts. The weather is simply awful, raining day after day and especially night after night...To tell you the truth, while writing this letter I am wet through to the skin and not a dry thing for a change. We have got our winter fur coats and gum boots, but the latter cause more curses than you can imagine, for instance last night I was sent off to select dugouts for our platoon, which is number 37. It was pitch dark, no light allowed and in a strange place, well honestly I fell over at least 20 times got smothered in mud from head to feet and on the top of that wet though for it rained in torrents. On a round of inspection this morning to see if all were ‘comfortable’ I was ‘blended’ up hill and down dale, ‘Sergeant this’ and ‘Sergeant that’.
How can you expect men to live in this, and then to put a dampener on the lot, was the language from the occupiers who unfortunately were in a residence that fell in during the night. They took shelter under a tree from 2am after looking for me for half an hour or so, but they could not find
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/ me, for the only thing that would shift me, after settling down, if I may call it that, would be a ‘Jack Johnson’ and then I would have no option.
While in the trenches last week John and I were up to our knees in water and got our gum boots half full. The line is a bit quiet lately and only now and again do we get a shelling, but one gets used to it. That, to give you an idea, is like sitting at Paddington and hearing the engines screech.
After our stretch this time I shall be looking forward for a short leave for I have been here nearly three months now and we stand a good chance. Well I must now conclude...Yours sincerely
Jack Symons
P.S. Every other home down near the rest camp is an Estaminet (small French café) where they sell what they call ‘beer’, and as much as I like a drop of good beer I have given the stuff out here ‘best’ for is awful muc. Dear Bert,
Many thanks for your letter received a few days ago, also for the good old Woodbines which I got today. While I think of it in your letter you refer to a report published in the 6th monthly Magazine for August ’15, will you send me a copy, as I have not seen it.
Well, we have had about the biggest gruelling we could wish for. The Huns bombarded us in the trenches for over two hours with Jack Johnson shells, shrapnel, whizz bangs (terrible things) and trench mortars, blew
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/ the parapets to blazes and nearly blew the whole lot of us up. The General Officer Commanding has complimented us on our behaviour. We are now resting at a place called Vlamertinghe, just south of Ypres and a couple miles North of Poperinghe [Poperinge] in Belgium. We deserve a rest for we have spent thirty-nine days in dugouts and the trenches (except three days) and needless to tell you we are very crummy, which tends to spoil the rest we are having. I never thought I was going to another phase of them after South Africa. I was in Poperinghe (where I met Jackson a few weeks ago)...
The beauty of it out here is we can stand a pal a drink, and also have one with him. I suppose shall have to wait for my increase, being an absentee from the office, anyway they can add it on to my salary as soon as they like for I shall then be able to pay more income tax. I enclose a few postcards. They are showing in each card before and after, or during and after the bombardment of Ypres, so you can guess what the place looks like. Well Bert in conclusion I must tell you that one of our Sergeants who is on leave, posted this in London for me, that’s why I am able to give you a few details. Kind regards to all friends in the Audit,
Your sincere friend,
Jack Symons.
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1531837b8db59c5af8f76ffdd49c8a469629c214 | Here you will find all the letters and transcripts from this collection that relate to the soldiers' experience of hospital.
1916-18, Hospital: contents
Convalescence: ‘wounded by a bomb’ ................................................................. 2 Hospital: ‘beastly complaint’ ............................................................................. 5 Hospital: ‘preferable to France’ ........................................................................ 7 Dear Gerald,
No doubt, perhaps you had thought I had forgotten old friends at Paddington, but such is not the case. We so not have much spare time for letter writing now. To tell you of all our adventures since we left England would take too long here to relate but I will save for when I come home. Perhaps you have heard, we were only at Farnborough four days, before we were sent over there. By God, old chap we did have a time of it, the first fortnight. Living on bully beef and biscuits, travelling day and night and sleeping anywhere and doing long tramps with full kit on nearly done us in as we had no training. We managed to stick it through, but I thought poor Percy Smith would have to give in as he was very queer with toothache. The first six weeks we moved about from place to place doing all sorts of fatigue work, bar our own. Lambert, Smith, Collins and myself are now settled down in H— the place where Mr Laker’s son was so long at. Collins and Lambert have been fortunate enough to get temporary clerical work during the last months.
I was promised one when on the 17th of last month I was wounded by a bomb from a taube which landed clean through our billet at 12 o’clock at night, when we were all sound asleep. I caught it in the thigh, but luckily it was only a flesh wound, but I had some awful bruises from the debris which fell on it. I have been in hospital ever since at the base, but I am pleased to say I am now nearly well again and in a convalescent camp three miles from there, overlooking the sea. We are not allowed to put our address at the heading of a letter so I will put it here:
2AM /W.P. Mansbridge No.16929, Royal Flying Corps No. G 21 Hut no. 6 Convalescent Depot, A.P.O. S.17, British Expeditionary Force. After I am discharged from here, I shall be sent up to the base and then up the line with the “best of luck” as the Tommies say out here. I am hoping to get back to H— as I was so happy and with such decent fellows there, but I don’t think it probable. Lambert, Smith and myself, often used to talk of old times and wondered how things were at Paddington. I daresay Gerald, there are not many young fellows left in the Audit are there, has Mr Horsley gone? Do drop me a line when you have time, as I assure you old boy, it is a real treat to hear Paddington news. I have never felt in better health, army life certainly agrees with me also with Lambert. Billy Button is at headquarters, got a cushy job. I believe I saw him once there, but I have no idea where the other G.W. fellows are. I am afraid I am not very fluent with my French yet, I could have done with your services on several occasions. How are Mr Slater and other members of the Stats. (or is that department disbanded?) Please remember kindly to them. (Lines censored) Cannot stop to write more now as I am just off to a concert in the Y.M.C.A. hut in the camp here. (Lines censored)
Yours very sincerely
Dick Mansbridge
P.S. I am only about 12 miles from where you used to go to, so perhaps you can guess the place I am at, E- – – – s. [Etaples]. Do you ever hear anything of the other boys out here? Hospital: ‘beastly complaint’
Arthur Smith, 19 November 1916, Addington Park War Hospital, England. Born: 8 March 1895, Regiment: Railway Troop, Royal Engineers, Regiment number: 87760, Rank: Lance Corporal, Returned to office: 16 June 1919, Retired: 30 September 1955
Transcript
Dear Sir,
I expect you wonder what has become of me as you have not heard from me for such a long time. The reason is that since the 20th September I have been suffering with enteric (typhoid). The exact diagnosis of my case being para typhoid B. I have not been up three weeks until next Friday, but since I first got out of bed I have made splendid progress. I was in an isolation hospital in France for six weeks and previous to that in a General Hospital for eight days. I arrived here late last Wednesday night after a very decent journey. This is a beautiful palace surrounded by a park in which we can walk about and we are allowed to go to the post office which is quite near. I am quite happy and comfortable here, it is a splendid hospital. We have a concert or cinema nearly every night in the big hall. Food is good and plentiful. How long it will be before I am considered fit again I have no notion, as a rule it takes months for a person to get right again.
It is a very funny and beastly complaint. During to the whole time I have been in hospital I have received every attention and kindness. During the months of July and August when I was in the Somme district I had a very rough time, was nearly worked to death and had little sleep. At one period we had to commence work at 2am but we were supposed to rest in the day but we could not get any. However, it was all in a good cause and we got through it. Ambulance trains were loaded up at the station where I was and we saw some awful sights. English and German wounded. Perhaps I picked my fever up at this place, but one never knows. While I was in the isolation hospital in France I was kept for three weeks and two days on liquids but I am pleased to say that the doctor has now put me on ordinary diet. With the kindest regards and best wishes to all, I remain yours obediently.
A. Smith Dear Mr Hunt,
Many thanks for your most welcome and interesting letter safely received, and I am pleased to hear of the latest news about friends at the office and others in different parts of the world.
I have not had a line from H. Martin for many months, but I hear he has had leave recently, and no doubt he gave you a call. I hoped to have had that pleasure before this time, but I expect to be seeing you one of these fine days.
I am still a patient in hospital, and although at times the life is monotonous in this quiet place, it is preferable to France so I won’t grumble. The weather has been so rough and wild of late, that a lot our time is spent by the fireside, and many pleasant hours are passed in comparing notes with men who are patients from minesweepers.
We have had different men from this branch of the Navy for several weeks, and at present five are in my ward. Two of these are survivors from a minesweeper that was blown up by a German mine nearly a fortnight ago, just outside Dartmouth Castle. They are still clearing the sea outside here and the boats return to anchor in the river at night, and the pals of these men visit them this evening. The officers are also very good in calling and leaving gifts and the wounded Tommies share in the fruits thereof!
I have heard from Scotland that the 8th Argylls suffered heavily a short time ago in France, and in the newspapers today I notice the names of nine officers who I knew in France, including the Captain of my company who is killed. I don’t know if the 6th Seaforths, who are in the same brigade, were in action at the same time, but I shouldn’t be surprised, anyhow I hope [Gilbert] Williams came through safely if he was there.
I am enclosing two privilege forms, and will be glad if you will get them signed and returned. I have had some nice afternoons at Torquay and Paignton and was there during the rough weather a short time ago, when the Brixham trawler was wrecked and sea was so rough.
I hope this letter will find you very well and undisturbed at the old job. With kind regards to Messrs Taylor, Symons, and Woodhams and accept the same yourself.
Sincerely yours, ‘Frosty’.
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d6f7480f428d9875387b46dfed5f8e861417e6f6 | Here you will find all the letters and transcripts from this collection that relate to the soldiers' experience of the conflict on other battlefronts including Aden, Greece, Egypt and India.
1916-18, Different Fronts: contents
Aden: ‘hot sun, endless sand’ ................................................................. 2 East Africa: ‘sank in seven minutes’ ......................................................... 4 Egypt: ‘out of paper’ ............................................................................. 6 Egypt: ‘we are all as fit as ever’ ............................................................... 8 Greece: ‘not picked up the lingo’ ............................................................. 10 Greece: ‘fine view of Mount Olympus’ .................................................... 12 India: ‘had a game of footer’ ................................................................. 14 India: ‘bowled over with fever’ ............................................................... 16 Troop ship: ‘this ship was actually lousy’ ................................................. 20 Malta: ‘bathing and boating’ ................................................................. 24 Aden: ‘hot sun, endless sand’
Harry Beaumont, 2 March 1917, Aratia, Yemen, Born: 17 October 1873, Regiment: 1/6 East Surrey Regiment, Regiment number: 2297, Rank: Quarter Master Sergeant, Died: 1952
Transcript
Dear Bertie,
Many thanks for your long and interesting letter, which has now reached me, I will to it at length at a more opportune moment.
As you will see by above address I have left India. The regiment left the N.W. Indian frontier in January where the winter had been bitterly cold and embarked at Karachi after a three day’s train journey, then six day’s most pleasant voyage to Aden where we landed and now join part of the Aden Field Force. I have been stationed with a strong detachment on the desert in close proximity to a Turkish force who frequently shelled us, but without any material damage. The heat after the cold winter in India is very trying, scorching hot sun, endless sand and myriads of torturing flies. Life is very different here as compared to India. I never pictured myself riding across the Arabian dessert on a camel. Am pleased to say I am splendidly fit and well, but should be glad when the struggle is over and hope I shall be amongst those who return home safely.
Trusting you are well. Best of wishes, kind regards to the remnants of the Audit staff. Yours most sincerely
Harry Beaumont East Africa: ‘sank in seven minutes’
Frederick Jarrett, photographs, a typed extract and an account, August-November 1916. **Born:** 10 June 1891, **Regiment:** East African Mounted Rifles
**Transcripts**
**Photograph caption (left)**
Fred Jarrett (late of Stats. Dept) has seen field service in East Africa and ranks as a First Class Warrant Officer. He left England March 10th 1913 with Arthur Shipley of the Goods, who has also seen service with the East African Mounted Rifles. Both hope to be home on leave in the near future. (Since receiving this report, Fred has arrived in England on leave)
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/ Extract of office newsletter (top right)
Frederick Jarrett late of the Stats. Dept. who took part in the East African campaign in the early stages of the war was returning from leave in England, and left London on October 11th. At 7.40am, on October 20th the boat was torpedoed without warning in the Mediterranean and sank in seven minutes, but fortunately all passengers were saved being picked up by French torpedo boat although all baggage and cargo were lost. Fred states that he lost all he possessed with the exception of a pair of pyjamas (in which he had to take a lifeboat) his raincoat and wallet, and that the whole affair seems like a dream now but was real enough at the time. The passengers were landed in Algeria where they were well treated, and subsequently returned to England over land via Marseilles. He will make another attempt to dodge the submarines on November 18th when he sails for Mombassa on the Balmoral Castle via the Cape, there being too much excitement in the Mediterranean at present.
Extract of office newsletter (bottom right)
... Fred Jarrett, late of Stats. Dept. sends two interesting Photos of himself and herein can be seen a little account of his doings abroad with his friend Arthur Shipley, brother of our late colleague George Shipley. Egypt: ‘out of paper’
Henry Bullen, 24 July 1916, Egypt. **Born:** 25 April 1893, **Regiment:** 2/10 Middlesex regiment, **Regiment number:** 2858, **Rank:** Private, **Died:** 1942
**Transcript**
An employee at the Audit office added the following note at the top of the letter: Private H. Bullen, late of the Passengers dept, went through 11 months of Dardanelles campaign... Later moved to Malta, then to Egypt and Aden. Now encamped near Mount Sinai.
Dear Percy,
...I am sorry I have been so long replying to your letter, but I have had my hands rather full just lately, so hope you will not mind. As I cannot get at my kit bag at present I shall only be able to write you a short letter because I have nearly run out of paper envelopes, so I shall have to make up for it next time. Well my dear Percy I am glad to know yourself and all at home are in the best of health and please convey to your father and mother my appreciation of their good wishes sent to me.
I received your previous budget, but it arrived after I sent you the field postcard, my word it must take you a good time to write all those sheets of foolscap, but I delight in reading them, since being out here I find I cannot write an interesting letter. I am afraid my letters must often bore you, I have read your letter carefully and noted all the news about the office and some of our friends who are doing their share overseas, but the chief item you mention is poor old Rippington, it is the first time I have heard about him, poor old chap. I guess he was pleased to see you and I am sure it was an excellent idea of yours to send him some luxuries in the way of food with the proceeds of the money you collected for him at the office.
I sincerely hope our friends out in France will come out of the terrible ordeal safely, I note that Bob Court and several others have gone and my brother has been out there some weeks now, also I have two cousins who have been out there some considerable time and been in the thick of the fighting, I hope the advance will mean the rounding up of the Huns and from the latest news received here everything seems to be going well at present, am looking forward to seeing the office soon...
We are not having such an easy time as one would imagine, the heat is still very intense and the flies very troublesome and we have anything from an elephant to a cockroach creeping over our blankets at night time; the chameleon is our chief pet and will crawl over one’s body just like a tame mouse and the different colours they can change their body to suit the thing they settle on is wonderful.
Now I must close Percy as you will see the paper is nearly filled up, so hope you will not mind this time, please remember me to all at home and all inquiring friends... With best wishes...
Private H. Bullen Egypt: ‘we are all as fit as ever’
Harold William Cronin, 18 January 1916, Egypt. Born: 9 May 1880, Regiment: 4th Seaforth Highlanders; promoted to Lieutenant in 5th Bedfordshire Regiment on 20 May 1915, Died: 2 December 1917 at 35 Casualty Clearing Station in Palestine, leaving £268 19s to his widow
Transcript
Dear Mr Welsh,
A lot has happened since I last wrote to you and we have moved, and moved, and moved again, and still we are moving. There is nothing at all to say about the actual coming off. We were told to pack up, and having done so, were marched off and soon afterwards were making up a four for Bridge in quite a comfortable cabin and enjoying the unwanted luxury of electric light.
The only thing that struck one in coming away was that nothing had altered and it might easily have been the night I landed. The same old beach apparently full up with boxes of bully beef, tinned milk and jam, the same old destroyer, with its search light playing on the shore, keeping up its systematic bombardment and the same old swish of bullets around and dropping into the water. No sooner was Christmas here than we were packing up again, to come on here. A large town a few miles on the interior, it is a filthy rotten smelly hole and we always carried loaded revolvers and walked about in batches and were never out after dark. Probably the people are not ill disposed to us but some of them looked pretty villainous and it was better to be on the safe side...
We have had quite a good time and the regular hours and regular meals have backed everyone up well and now we are all as fit as ever-apparently.
Thanks very much for the Xmas card it was a bit late but then all our Xmas letters and parcels were on account of the way we have been moving about; we lost a good mail, too, on the Persia (S.S. Persia, which was torpedoed and sunk in December 1915). I am enclosing a few photos that might be of interest to you. I have some more snaps coming later on and will let you have some if they turn out to be any good. With kind regards. Yours sincerely,
H.W. Cronin Greece: ‘not picked up the lingo’
Francis Witt, 28 May 1916, Salonika, Greece. Born: 8 February 1893, Regiment: Royal Engineers, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force; transferred to Office of Superintendent of Line on 15 June 1914, Regiment number: 138069; WR296343, Rank: Sapper, Died: 1970
Transcript
Dear G. [Mr Burgoyne],
I guess you wonder what has become of me after this long silence, but you will see I am a good distance away from the homeland now. I arrived here early in April and since the start have been getting on quite well. You may be interested to know that Gray from your department is also here. It is rather strange that I should rub against him.
The weather is brilliant, cloudless skies day after day, but it is very hot. There are plenty of mosquitoes about. They are very tantalising. A net is practically a necessity for sleeping purposes. I am billeted in a warehouse, it is a very old place, and has stood hundreds of years. I should think, according to its general appearance.
I have not picked up the lingo yet, but French is chiefly spoken, and I much regret not having studied it more when I had the opportunity at home. This town is a queer sort of place as compared with some of the French towns we know, and am sure I shall not wish to see it again when once I leave. The cafés are not so gay as the French, but I manage to have fun occasionally. We have got a piano and gramophone to amuse ourselves with. I hope we shall be able to have another trip to Paris, when the war has cleared up, but of course when is a question nobody can answer yet awhile. Shall be very pleased to hear some news of you, and conclude now with all the best.
Yours sincerely, Frank. Greece: 'fine view of Mount Olympus'
David Joseph Robertson, 21 April 1916, Salonika, Greece. Born: 5 January 1877, Regiment: Railway Troop, Royal Engineers, Regiment number: 138054, Rank: Sapper, Returned to office: 5 May 1919
Transcript
Dear Mr Wood,
Just a few lines to let you know I arrived safely after visiting several places which I am not allowed to mention. This place is quite oriental as the fronts of the houses are for the most part looked after and kept in repair, while the backs are allowed to go, and it gives one a shock to see a fine building in the front, and then to go to the back and see it all neglected and ready to fall down. It is very hot here during the day and the swarms of flies and mosquitoes keep one very busy and I dread to think what it will be like in the summer. It seems strange to see oxen drawing carts and donkeys with packs on, but it is a very common sight here. I sometimes have to go to the big steamers in a small pinnace [ship’s boat] and when it is rough it requires some nerve to walk along the sides of barges that are pitching and tossing and then climb up the ship’s side by a rope ladder, but it comes easier in time. It is very mountainous here, and we get a very fine view of Mount Olympus and the snow-capped peaks. I had to go by motor up country the other day and I had to grip the side of the car as the roads are awful and sometimes there is only just room for the car to travel and a sheer drop on the other side. The labourers at the docks are Greeks and when they are taken on in the mornings it is a regular Babel ‘till the Military Policeman uses his persuader (truncheon) right and left and that calms them somewhat. I have not met Mr Cox’s son yet but should I do so I will make myself known to him. I have had to revert to sapper again as there are not sufficient men of our staff for us to remain N.C.O.s but if it is brought up to strength I am promised them again. The first person I saw here was Gray of the Stats (Statistical Department), and we are working together. Trusting that you are quite well and with kindest regards to Messrs Cox, Slater, Rogers and Hunt.
Am yours obediently,
D.J. Robertson India: ‘had a game of footer’
James Walter Hyam, 15 April 1918, Roorkee, India. Born: 24 July 1891, Regiment: 11 Hussars, C. Squadron; Royal Field Artillery; Royal Garrison Artillery, Regiment number: 223725; 184963, Rank: Gunner, Died: 1951
When James Hyam, also nick-named Fatty, wrote from India he used these three postcards which showed different scenes from Alexandria in Egypt where he had ‘a grand time’ en-route to India.
Transcript
My Dear Bertie,
Have arrived in India for the purpose of relieving some A1 (military fitness category meaning capable of active service overseas) men here who have been here for a long period. It’s not a bad show here just above Delhi but so d\_\_\_\_\_d hot: risen to 106 degrees in the shade and we have more hot weather just coming. Our parades are as follows 6.30-7.45 and 9 to 10 and finish for day. There is an abundance of sport and grub here. Fancy getting eggs laid too. A supper of say ½ new mutton chop, potatoes, peas, broccoli and tea 4d.
The things that are expensive are goods from England especially English soap, sauces, writing paper and of course we are unable to get English made fags. We had a grand journey from England; route was Southampton to Cherbourg then to Italy. In Italy we went to Alexandria, stayed there three days had a grand time, streets of red lamps etc. and lovely shops. No two houses in main stretch are alike. Then from Alexandria we come to Port Suez by train then on P. and O. Liner Kaiser I. Hind to Bombay had two days there and that’s a grand place too, lovely wide streets and grand buildings. They have a sea front very much like Hastings and all the big boys have their after dinner drive there and form a queue by shore. Some stuff there too. Lots of Europeans knocking about too. Had a game of footer for the Railway Operatives depot last night, 6pm, with King’s Own and won... But it was so ruddy warm and I felt like a wash out at finish. Kind regards to all. Give Bill Butler my address and ask him to drop a line.
J.W. Hyam, Fatty.
How are the tours going is Frosty still serving? India: 'bowled over with fever'
Harry Beaumont, 18 August 1916, Rawalpindi, India. Born: 17 October 1873, Regiment: 1/6 East Surrey Regiment, Regiment number: 2297, Rank: Quarter Master Sergeant, Died: 1952
Transcript
Dear Bertie,
Just a few lines to let you know how we are getting on out here, I forgot when I last wrote you last and what news I told you. We marched down from the hills, 9,000 feet up in the Himalaya Mountains last October to Rawalpindi, then shortly afterwards out to camp returning just before Xmas. In February I obtained a furlough and had a fine tour of places of interest, down to Delhi then right across India to Calcutta, had several letters of introduction from brother Freemasons to awfully nice people there and had a most enjoyable time, spent a few days at Agra on the return journey, travelled roughly just over 3,000 miles with several nights in the train. A few days after returning the regiment was placed under orders to march 83 miles to Noushera on the frontier border, where over 10,000 British and native troops were concentrated, a similar number at Peshawar farther down the frontier, in readiness for threatened trouble with the Afghans, whom German intriguers had been amongst. Noushera was a cruel place, nothing but a dust heap at the foot of the mountain. We spent several weeks there, training in mountain warfare, my word, it was chronic, the terrific heat and the awful climbing for miles day after day, with all transport on mules and camels through the rocky mountain passes. At one bivouac we encountered bad water, and about forty of our fellows went down with enteric fever [typhoid]. One died, but the others pulled through as they had been inoculated; a wonderful thing inoculation has proved to be in India.
Well in spite of the hard time, we returned to Rawalpindi in fine condition after the Afghan trouble had subsided for the time being, it is always liable to break out at any moment and we are always in readiness to move at any time.
Then we changed to another barracks in Rawalpindi in April, and have been stationed on the plains all the summer. The heat has been intense; one never goes outside after 10am; after tiffin at 1 o’clock the barracks and in fact everywhere is dead to the world until between 5 and 6pm, when sports such as tennis, cricket hockey and swimming at the baths are possible.
Every soldier has a punkah (fan) swinging over his bed all night and during the hours off duty during the day. Many men sleep out on the barrack square on their beds at night. During the past few weeks the monsoon has been on, with torrential rain which I would fail to describe. Now the intense heat of the sun is draining the moisture out of the earth with the result that it is like living in the moist fern house at Kew. Gardens, only worse, and many men are being bowled over with fever. Ever since arriving at India, getting on for two years ago, I have been as fit as a fiddle and enjoyed exceptional health, until a fortnight ago, when I was suddenly taken ill with sandfly fever, a most painful, lowering form of fever, and was carried to hospital and also found to be suffering from pleurisy. I was in bed several days subsisting on a small quantity of milk with the result that when I was allowed to get up I was too weak to stand. I was discharged after ten days and am getting on quite alright now, and am leaving on next furlough to a hill station in the Himalayas shortly to recuperate. In November we are on the move again, marching about 80 miles to a big camp, for manoeuvres of several weeks, returning again just before Christmas. But marching eighty miles in five days under an Indian sun is very different to cloudy England. Every regiment in India, both regular and territorial, is being heavily reinforced by drafts from England. We have had three drafts one consisting of nearly 300 men, then another of 67, now another of 84, bringing us up to nearly 1,100 men. There are thousands of British troops, mostly Terriers (members of the Territorial army) (there are only eight regular infantry regiments left in India) stationed at various frontier places, and all sorts of rumours prevalent about a big expedition moving during the next few months, all possible preparations are being made for it, well, if the Indian govt. make as disastrous a muddle of it when the fighting does come off as they made over the Mesopotamia campaign, then with foes like the ferocious Afghans there will be a terrible price to pay in life, for the country and the terrific heat will be enough without having to fight every inch of the way.
I had a very interesting letter from Mr Wood some time ago which I answered recently, also had one from Mr Price a few days ago. I can quite picture the changes which must have occurred in the staff of the Audit since I left. Of course you are over the age limit, so have not been called upon. I expect if, and when, I do return safely that life in England will seem very different under the altered conditions. I shall be glad to get home again and only wish I could see a prospect of doing so, with the conclusion of this terrible war. I have had a very enjoyable time in India (apart from soldiering which I always did enjoy, although I think I have had sufficient now) having made the acquaintance of awfully nice residents in ‘Pindi, and by virtue of rank, being allowed the privilege of wearing mufti makes it so much more comfortable when going out of barracks than being in a tight uniform in the climate.
I hear regularly from my wife and little one every week. Am glad to say they are well.
Please convey my kind regards to all those left in the office that I know. Trusting you are all fit and well and that we shall meet again before many more months elapse.
With best wishes
Yours most sincerely
Harry Beaumont Troop ship: ‘this ship was actually lousy’
Kenneth William Sharland, 26 July 1917, Pashan Camp, Kirkee, India. Born: 25 September 1888, Regiment: 1/6 East Surrey Regiment; Bedfordshire Regiment; Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment, Regiment number: 34173; 32376, Rank: Private, Died: Jan-Mar 1967
Transcript
My dear Mr Biggs
The writing mood is on me so I take the opportunity to send you a few lines to let you know how I am getting on, at the same time hoping that at some future date I may have the pleasure of hearing from you. Your letter is bound to be very interesting to me as I have not seen or heard from anybody at Paddington for over six months. I left Aldershot on March 16th and travelled as far as Durban via Sierra Leone and Cape Town on the White Star Liner Suevic. This part of the journey was delightful, the food and accommodation was very good for a troopship. Of course this is accounted for by the fact that it is an Australian troopship. Everything was done that could be to make the journey enjoyable for the one thousand seven hundred men on board. We stayed just outside Sierra Leone for three days but were not allowed to leave. We arrived at Cape Town on Saturday afternoon four weeks after leaving Keyham and had a route march round the town the same evening. The next day we were allowed to roam about at will all day and a right jolly time we had although it was very hot indeed for winter. Cape Town is a beautiful place and the inhabitants made our visit very enjoyable.
The patriotism of the South African is wonderful to us after the coolness of the English (especially Aldershot). On the Monday we sailed for Durban arriving there on the Thursday evening after a rather rough journey round the Cape. We did not land till the Saturday afternoon and then bid goodbye to the Suevic. She went on to Australia. We had two weeks at Durban and had a glorious time in a rest camp on Ocean Beach. Every day we went bathing and only had parades up to 12 noon each day. The trams were free to us all over the city and invitations were showered upon us by the English residents. You can rest assured that we were very sorry to leave such a delightful spot, still all good things come to end and we finally had to go on board the Laconia belonging to the Cunard company for four weeks’ misery, we lay in the harbour for one week longing to go ashore before we started on the last stage of our journey to India. This ship was actually lousy (infested with lice) and we had to put up with a shirt inspection every day. The food was bad and very little of it and to back it all up the canteen was rotten as well. I was glad to get to Bombay and get off such a rotten ship. I lost a stone in weight during that four weeks.
We arrived in India during the monsoon period and have had plenty of rain more than we like I can assure you. Kirkee is only about hundred miles from Bombay and is about six thousand feet above the sea. We will while here never have the extremes of weather as the climatic conditions are considered to be ideal here.
Strange as it may seem to English people native women do most of the work here, and actually act as bricklayers’ labourers carrying pans of ‘mortar’ on their heads, the men do very little indeed. Sunday is the same as any other day to them. As they have their own religious days when they have what they call Ram Jamees. All cartage is done by oxen and is rather slow and cumbersome. Kirkee Bazar is about three quarters of an hour’s walk from Pashan Camp and is rather interesting but is very dirty, children run about naked and the drainage and dwellings are very bad indeed. Cigarettes made by the Turkish tobacco company Bandra can obtained for eleven annas (former unit of Indian currency) per 100 (eleven pence) and are very good indeed, being better than the Nebka. Poona is the nearest city and is about five miles away. I walked there last Thursday to have a look round, this place boasts of one or two hotels and an Italian restaurant but is otherwise an exact counterpart of Kirkee and quite as dirty. The Italian restaurant is very good and is quite the equal of most London restaurants.
We do not receive a very many letters out here, as the mail is so uncertain, we never know when the next one will arrive.
When you are writing you must let me know all the news, I wonder whether your section will ever be established again as it was before.
Since I came out here I have taken up signalling and find it very useful, there is just a possibility I might be able to learn wireless, if so I don’t doubt that it might be useful to me, when we get back to Blighty if there is half a chance to do so I will cease it.
Our Battalion is at Aden and unless the signalling alters my destination I will eventually find myself there. It is not exactly the place I should choose if I had my own way but of course there is no choice about it. Well I think I have given you all the news now and am sure you are tired of reading this letter by now, so will close with best wishes to you all from, yours sincerely,
Kenneth W. Sharland Malta: ‘bathing and boating’
James Claude Kibblewhite, 1 September 1917, Malta. Born: 14 June 1895, Regiment: 2/13 Battalion London Regiment, Regiment number: 490602, Rank: Sergeant, Died: 20 December 1951
Transcript
Dear Sir,
I trust you will excuse the liberty I have taken in writing you, after such a long absence from England, but the difficulties of active service is my excuse, although I am sorry to say laziness has a lot to do with it.
No doubt you will wonder what I am doing wasting my time in Malta; well, I came here last January through an attack of dysentery followed by constipation, there I remained, and am likely to do so, unless something very unexpected happens.
I have been taken on the temporary staff, and am acting as parade staff sergeant, quite a nice easy position, except when we are receiving or sending troops away.
How are things in general, looking at Paddington, I suppose the office is full of ladies and men who are over the age limit. I saw a Great Western Magazine a few days ago, and I noticed that a large number of the ‘chiefs’ have retired, also that Artlett has not given up trying to bring sports honours to the Audit with the Bowls team.
The weather here is absolutely glorious, and our camp is right against the sea, we get some lovely bathing and boating, in fact it is almost as good as any resort in England.
We are about ten miles from Valletta, but we can always get a ride in a motor lorry or a gharry (horse-drawn cab) I have only met one G.W. man since I have been here and that is Cowles of the Agreements. He has been here since the Dardanelles; and he is acting chief clerk to the commanding officer of the Company Camp...
I have not given up hope of getting to England yet, as since I have been here I have contracted malaria, also my heart is not good enough to allow me to carry a pack for a while, so I have been marked unfit for over three months, and I may give you all a surprise by walking into the office one of these fine days.
Well, sir, when is the war going to end, I think it would have been all over now, bar the shouting, if it had not been for Russia.
I think the Great Western Railway according to the magazine have reaped a fair share of the awards for bravery etc, on the field.
Well, sir, I trust it will not be long before I have the pleasure of receiving a reply to my letter, and kindly remember me to all that are left of the old room 19... I am, Sir, Yours respectfully,
J.C. Kibblewhite Sgt.
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31e5321bcd6d8a25eb50f58070d055a9a86de882 | Here you will find all the letters and transcripts from this collection that relate to the soldiers' experience of the trenches.
1916-18, trenches: contents
Military kit: ‘no light weight’ ................................................................. 2 Trenches: ‘a big dose of gas shells’ .......................................................... 5 Trenches: ‘a veritable maze’ ................................................................. 8 Trenches: ‘Fritz was bombing us’ ......................................................... 10 Trenches: ‘it is a warm shop’ ............................................................... 11 Trenches: ‘there is Somme noise’ ......................................................... 13 Trenches: ‘anti-aircraft fire’ ................................................................. 16 Trenches: ‘Military Medal’ ................................................................. 18 Trenches: ‘towns shelled to pieces’ ...................................................... 19 Military kit: 'no light weight'
Frederick G. Woodhams, 16 February 1916, France. **Regiment:** 13 London Rifles, **Regiment number:** 1383, **Rank:** Private; Lance Corporal; Sergeant, **Died:** Killed in action on 16 August 1917, having been struck by shrapnel; prior to this, he had been wounded twice.
These are typed extracts of a letter that Frederick Woodhams had written to his family (RAIL 253/516). Below that is an article from the Illustrated London News, 1915 (ZPER 34/146s9). Transcript
The last time I wrote I think I told you we had lost our comfortable job on railheads. We have been shifted from General Headquarters and are at the most godforsaken hole there can possibly be in France. We had a rotten journey raining all the time. Reveille\* was at 4am and we eventually left the station about 10am. The accommodation consisted of the old cattle trucks, and rations of bully and biscuits. It was a very cold and uncomfortable journey.
We arrived at our destination about 4.30pm and after standing in the rain for 2½ hours with full pack on, we set out on a ten mile march. It’s the worst march I’ve ever done. The majority of us at the finish were absolutely knocked up and were only too glad to crawl into the billets before going to bed, which was about 12pm. They gave us a mug of tea (the first we had since six in the morning) and best of all a ration of rum.
The up to date soldier kit to carry about from place to place consists of 150 rounds of ammunition, inside the pack; overcoat, fur coat, two pairs socks, one pants, one shirt, ground sheet, iron rations [emergency food supply]. Outside pack; Mackintosh and mess tin, in haversack; cleaning kit, hold all, 24lbs rations, soap and towel, and on top of that extras such as handkerchiefs, plate, mug, tobacco, etc, two smoke helmets\* in a satchel slung over the shoulder, a respirator in the left flap of a tunic and field dressing on the right, and of course the rifle, in all it’s no light weight on a long march, it takes all one’s strength and staying power to keep going.
We are billeted in a barn and have a sea of mud to get through. We have no boards, so sleep on the ground, fires are not allowed in the billet and at night time it’s devilish cold.
In the village there is a little general shop (now nearly sold out), one pub where they sell something they charge 2½d for and call beer, there are no shops of any description and of course no amusements. Rations are not so good now (today’s dinner, Sunday, bully beef, stew and two potatoes between 35 men. We have a loaf and a bit (small loaf) and two tins of jam between seven men, the short bread issue being augmented by the world famous army biscuits.
Our captain is a perfect gentleman and about the most popular man in the regiment, the junior captain (an absolute sport) and the platoon officers are all very decent sort of fellows. We appear to be much better off in this respect than before, and certainly think that D. Co. has got as good a selection of officers as any other company in the battalion. One of our fellows ran across a number of Audit R.E.s and they enquired after Maggs and myself.
Freddy or
What’s left of him after some very stiff marching. Trenches: ‘a big dose of gas shells’
Richard Charles Stanley Frost, 23 August 1916, Devonport, England. Born: 30 January 1888, Regiment: 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, Regiment number: 1998; 300470, Rank: Private; Second Lieutenant, Died: 1962
Transcript
Dear Mr Hunt,
I expect you have heard at the office about me being in England suffering from gas poisoning, and as it is quite a long time since I last wrote to you, no doubt a few lines will be acceptable, to explain matters.
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/ We left the trenches at Vimy Ridge on July 5th, and marching back about 14 miles we eventually reached a village named Ostreville for the purpose of having a divisional rest. The signallers thought an orchard would be very convenient to erect bivouacs in, so when we were busy carrying out this idea an old Frenchman appeared at the scene, and raised objections. However he agreed at last to allow us in at one end of the orchard, thinking, I suppose, that we would wander about his place! We had an enjoyable time here for six days, and then had to return to our old billets near Mount St. Eloi until the whole of the division had retired. We guessed by this move that our ‘rest’ was over, and the following days were spent in marching, and travelling by motor lorries and train until we arrived at Mericourt Station on July 21st near Albert.
After a delightful swim in the river near the billet we marched off the following night, to take part in the ‘big push.’ We slept in an open field that night near Fricourt farm, and were rather rudely awakened by a few German shells landing near us.
For five days we were lying in reserve in this district, and occupied our time in watching an army of men at work in the valley, making roads, railways, boring for water and laying down water pipes, also practicing attacks in the old trenches. It was very interesting to see the great amount of artillery, busy practically all day and night, and to read their messages sent by visual signalling [often using lights] from a ridge across the valley.
Our period in reserve being up, we moved to Mametz Wood to lie there in support for five days, before going into the trenches at High Wood. On arrival at the edge of the wood at night, we were welcomed by a big dose of gas shells and shrapnel, which was applied steadily throughout the night by the German artillery. Having to assist in putting our signalling gear into a hole for safety, I was prevented from using my respirator for the first quarter of an hour, as we could not see on account of the darkness and dust made by the ammunition columns rushing along the road, and it was during this time that I must have breathed in enough gas to put me out of action. Afterwards of course respirators were used, when we were settled in holes by the roadside for the night.
I remained with the battalion until I was sent to the casualty clearing station on August 3rd and reached Rouen hospital the next day. I had to wait until the 9th and crossed the channel from Havre to Southampton on the New Zealand ship Marama, with about 800 other patients, the day after. It was a splendid boat with every convenience for carrying wounded men, and the sisters and orderlies were colonials.
It was last Friday week when I arrived here, and must say it is very comfortable and quiet. I had to remain in bed until last Saturday, but of course I cannot do any route marching yet! So I have to take life quietly, which is no hardship I can assure you after France. I am on an ordinary diet, and taking medicine.
I hear you have Mr Symons back again, is that so? And is he back in the same old spot? I hope he is pretty fit, although I suppose there must be something wrong with him, to be back again.
I suppose things are as quiet as usual with you. Have you had your holidays yet? This is about your time I believe. I shall be glad of a few lines when you have time, to hear the latest about the office. I hope you are keeping fit, also Mr J.B. Taylor and Mr Woodhams and with kind regards to you all. Yours sincerely,
Frosty.
P.S. It is a treat to write a letter without the censor’s shadow over one! Dear Mr Hunt,
Thanks very much for your letter which I received a week or two ago, also for the magazine.
We are in the trenches just now. In fact we seem to spend about three times as much time in as we do out. Also we are in a pretty warm spot, it was about here, towards the end of last summer that the French and German had some of the fiercest fighting of the war. The country around about is a veritable maze of trenches. The fighting at one time was so fierce that there was only time just to bury the dead in the sides of the trenches, and now that the trenches have crumpled one is constantly seeing the bones of men’s legs or their boots, or skulls sticking out from the sides of the trenches, pleasant, eh? There will be a pleasant smell here in the summer. I only hope we are not here then. In places we are only about twenty yards away from Fritz and company. Consequently all times the air is pretty thick with bombs, grenades and trench mortars. These last are pretty hellish sort of toys. They have an explosion like about ten earthquakes rolled into one. But even these are not the worst we have to put up with. The trenches being so close together there is of course any amount of mining going on. So one never knows when the particular lump of earth one is standing on is going to take a trip through the solar regions. When a mine does go up, there is some excitement knocking about I can tell you. Suppose for instance we were going to explode one, all the artillery in the neighbourhood is ranged on the spot and directly the mine is exploded, there is hell let loose on the crater. Of course as soon as he gets the range the enemy replies, so that the air is fairly full of everything that kills quickly. One can on these occasions always rely on a good many casualties. Since we have been in this spasm there have been five exploded in this neighbourhood, while others are expected to go up at any time. So much for conditions here.
How is everything in town? Pretty quiet I suppose. I see you’ve had the zepps (Zeppelins) over again? Is it a fact that one dropped in the Thames? (Lines censored.) That is about all the news, so will close, kindest regards to everybody. Yours very sincerely,
Gilbert Williams. Trenches: ‘Fritz was bombing us’
William Charles Frederick Wiggs, letter sent 23 December 1917, field card sent 8 January 1918, France. Born: 2 February 1881, Regiment: Royal Engineers, Railway Troop, Regiment number: 218855, Rank: 2nd Corporal, Died: Oct-Dec 1971
Transcript
Dear Mr Smith,
I hope you will accept my apology for not writing before. It has not been want of will it has been lack of opportunity. I wonder how you all are. I am fairly well now but was very queer for several weeks recently. I also often wonder how you are all getting on and should like to hear.
A matter of about five minutes ago Fritz was bombing us, and I have just got up off the ground where I was laying for about twenty minutes. One fellow has been hit, but not severely by shrapnel. This is his second visit this evening.
It will soon be twelve months since I left you. It seems a very long time ago. I am afraid I have very little I may tell you, so will conclude by asking you to accept my best wishes for the New year and desiring that you will remember me kindly to any enquiring friends. Believe me, dear Mr Smith, sincerely yours,
W. Wiggs Trenches: ‘it is a warm shop’
William Charles Davis, 15 March 1916, France. Born: 12 November 1884, Joined GWR: 12 January 1900, Regiment: Royal Army Medical Corps, Regiment number: 31223, Rank: Lance Corporal; Sergeant, Retired: 1944
Transcript
Sunday
Dear Charlie,
How are things going with you now? I expect like the rest of us will be glad when the better weather sets in for there is no doubt about it, it has been rough lately.
Since I last wrote to you we have shifted to another part of the line and it is a warm shop, for both sides must have all guns they can find and it is nothing but one long duel all day and every day but thank goodness it gives over a bit a night so that one can get on with their work. You see of a night the flashes of the guns can be seen so plainly that is why they do not fire a lot then.
Just on our right our people retook some trenches we had lost, oh what a rough time the poor devils had, snow and mud as much as you like and they had to lay in it for two days and grub could not be got to them. I expect there have been a few more from Paddington called up by now, it seems if the authorities mean to have all the men they want and if they can’t get them one way they will another, and it certainly looks as if they will be wanted for out here. One cannot see any signs of an early settlement. I see by the papers that the air raids have been busy in England again. I suppose you have not seen anything of them yet, has Rory Moore had any more frights? We have the taubes [German aircraft] over our hospital nearly every day or night and I can tell you we got some starts at times. The nearest we have to them since I have been here is just one yard from the main door, at 12.30 it blew in two pairs of double doors and shattered on end of the building to bits but not a great deal of damage to life which after all is the main thing. The arrangements we in work is five or six days up the line and four or five down if you are lucky. Of course at times these arrangements go to pot when there is an attack and we get a warm time and I should like to enlarge on these things but of course you understand I cannot.
Give my kind regards to all and trusting you are well.
Yours Will Trenches: ‘there is Somme noise’
Dear Mr W.H. Davies,
Hugh Andrew Skilling, 5 January 1917, France. Born: 17 April 1891, Regiment: 3 Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment; 7 London Brigade Field Artillery, Regiment number: 43228, Rank: Lance Corporal, Died: 1970
Transcript
Dear Mr W.H. Davies, Just a line to let you know I have not forgotten you. I received a letter on Tuesday 3rd of January 1917 which you sent to me on August 24th 1916. By the marking on the envelope it has been round to various regiments and officers, but it has arrived quite safe at last. I received the letter you wrote in October quite safe. I am sorry I have not written before but we were rather busy when I received your last letter and we could not send more than a field card for about a month. Well I am pleased to tell you that I am still going on first rate. I expect you will be surprised to hear that I have left the Northamptonshire Regiment and am now attached to the Army Printing and Stationary Services. We are opening a new branch in the photography line and I am here as a photographer.
I am unable to tell you more than this up to the present. I expect Harry will be pleased to hear this as he used to give me quite a lot of tuition in this respect.
There are only two of us here up to the present and as the dark rooms are not finished yet we are having an easy time. The Officer is away in England just now getting some more photographic apparatus so we are on our own and I am in charge.
We are billeted with a company of Australian electricians, mechanics, mining and boring engineers and are having a fine time. There are a good lot of fellows and make us very welcome. We had a grand Xmas with them and they know how to enjoy themselves. You can understand what a change this is after being in the line. Just before I came on this job we had over a month in and out of the line waiting to go over the top when the weather was favourable.
We went in for four days then out for a rest for about three days then back again. The water was over our knees in the trenches and it was impossible to use the communication trenches at all. We were holding the front line with two platoons (I should say our boys’ section of the line). Our platoon was twenty two strong including the Officer, and during the bombardment we had eight put out in ten minutes. There were no dugouts of any description there, so you can imagine what it was like to stand there for four nights. We hoped the weather would be alright so that we could go over and get it done with but it was not to be. We were out digging one night when they let us have it for five hours with gas shells, we had two chaps hit with them and put right out.
The sights and smells were awful, as a good many of the chaps lay just as they fell during the advance. It was impossible to bury them. Also there were about a dozen dead horses round about in the mud that were killed by shell fire while bringing up ammunition for the guns. Our guns never cease down there, as soon as one section stop, another lot open out so you can tell there is Somme noise.
The last time we came out, was for forty eight hours’ rest then in again and over, but the troops were in such a bad condition that the doctor sent in a report saying we were not fit for the line so two other regiments in our division went over in our place.
We were held in reserve and I am glad to say not required after all. Well I think this is about all, for now, I have been with the A.P. & S.S. since December 1st and I can tell you, I hope I shall stop here. I have no desire to go back to the line. Kindly remember me to all old friends. With kind regards to yourself and all on Section 4.
Yours sincerely, H.A. Skilling
No. 2 Section Advanced Section
Army Printing & Stationary Service... Trenches: 'anti-aircraft fire'
Frederick Ronald Morris, 26 April 1917, ‘in the field’, France. Born: 1 April 1893, Regiment: Royal Flying Corps, Regiment number: 16922, Rank: 1st class Air Mechanic, Returned to office: 10 March 1919, Retired: Resigned on 25 March 1925.
Transcript
Dear Mr Taylor,
No doubt you think that I have forgotten all about you and my friends of the Audit, but never let it be said (this is an army term, if you please.) Truth to tell I have been going to write time after time, but have had to put it off for various reasons. I am taking this opportunity of writing to you, while I am in charge of tonight’s guard. I get this job about once a week now, it’s not so bad, I have three men and a man in waiting; we mount at 5pm and dismiss at 7am. We make ourselves as comfortable as we can, in the guard tent, which just covers over the top of the sand bags, and these have got grass growing out of them now. The sand bags are about 4ft high and make a good protection. April 1\\textsuperscript{st} I got my two stripes up, after being a 1\\textsuperscript{st} Air Mechanic for 12 months, the Non-Commissioned Officers have a very decent mess here, and everything is ok. I am corporal in charge of wireless, photographic, electrical and all instruments used on aeroplanes, I have had a very good education on all those subjects, but the one I like best is the wireless, it’s far more interesting than photography, which is a very big thing indeed out here, and a lot depends upon a good photograph of the Hun lines...
Yesterday I saw a nice little game between one of ours and one of theirs, after our anti-aircraft fire had taken it up a bit higher, our machine went for it and got well over the top of it, then two more of ours came along and forced it down, she tried all manner of tricks, but down she came alright, and landed a clean machine, not broken in any part, and the two Huns inside it quite well.
We gave a revue (theatrical show) to our chaps here on the 13\\textsuperscript{th}, it went off alright, we started at 9pm and gave a two hours show, am enclosing programme, and will forward a photo of myself as the ‘oldest inhabitant’ as soon as I receive them from the Frenchman who took them...Kind regards to all of the section and the remainder of the agreements, and hoping you are fit and well. Good bye. Yours sincerely,
F.R. Morris Trenches: 'Military Medal'
William Charles Davis, January 1917. Born: 12 November 1884, Regiment: Royal Army Medical Corps, Regiment number: 31223, Rank: Lance Corporal; Sergeant, Returned to office: 10 February 1919 Retired: 12 November 1944
William Davis sent the card to E.H. Serjent who worked in the Great Western Railway Audit office at Paddington. Davis was also mentioned in the office newsletter for March 1917 for his bravery on the battlefront (RAIL 253/516). Read a letter from William Davis and see his photograph.
Transcript
Christmas card:
XXa “LIGHT” DIVISION, A few days’ rest in billets, January 1917.
With best wishes from W.C. Davis to all at the office.
Newsletter (extract):
.... (Davis) was presented with a wrist watch and pocket case, and silver pencil case on behalf of his colleagues as a token of their appreciation of the honour bestowed upon in receiving the Military Medal. Dear Charles,
Just a line to let you know I am getting on fine. I have been in France since Good Friday morning. Well it is not so bad, but of course not so comfortable as the office work.
We had the Lord Mayor of London over to see us the other Sunday when we were resting, he made a little speech.
How are all at the office? You might remember me to Mr Woodhams, Mr Jones and Mr Cowan and the boys also the girls. I suppose Mr Redford has retired by now.
We have been in the trenches since the 13th and I expect we shall go out shortly. Our little dugout has just been flooded out, a very heavy thunderstorm, but we have run it out. It is rotten to see how the towns have been shelled to pieces. I don’t suppose they will ever be rebuilt.
My brother was home on leave some time ago that is the second time so he has not got off badly. He has been promoted to Sergeant now. He seems to be getting on fine.
Have you seen Ernie Smith? How is he getting on, is he still in the A.P.C. (Army Pay Corps, non-fighting troops)? As I hear a lot have been transferred into line regiments.
Well here’s to the time when the war is all over and we are back in the same old place. The trenches where we were are only 25 to 30 yards from the Huns so had to keep a bit low.
My address is 3343 Lance Corporal J. Davies, No. 1 Platoon D Company, 6th City of London Rifles, B.E.F., France. You might drop me a line to let me know how you are getting on and any news,
Kind regards...
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671504f4383e17ad212a3f4e5913da0a0f6b5e4f | Here you will find all the letters and transcripts from this collection that relate to the soldiers' experience at the railheads on the Western front. Railheads were the nearest points to the front from which men and supplies travelled by train and were then taken to the battle line by motor vehicle or horse.
1916-18, Railheads, contents:
Railheads: ‘we are living in railway vans’ ................................................................. 2 Railheads: ‘a one-eyed hole’ .................................................................................. 4 Railheads: ‘there is no grumbling’ ........................................................................ 9 Railheads: ‘gun fire and rats’ ................................................................................ 11 Frederick Ernest Andrews, 16 October 1917, France. **Born:** 15 November 1879, **Regiment:** Railway Operation Division, Royal Engineers, **Regiment number:** 218857, **Rank:** Sapper, **Returned to office:** 26 May 1919, **Retired:** 15 November 1939
**Transcript**
Dear Mr Slater
Just a few lines to let you know how things are going with me, I have been going to write to before this, but on each occasion I have had to postpone it for some reason or other. I have been at this place since April. It is a fairly large city and has at one time been a very nice place, but it is now a heap of ruins, not a habitable house anywhere and no civilians, it is the nearest railhead to this part of the line and when we first came here things were pretty lively, but Fritz is gradually being pushed back here and has not troubled us for some time now I don’t mind if he has forgotten we’re here. Naldrett, Dawson and Anglesey and several other Audit chaps were up here a short time ago, but their detachment has now been moved to another part of the line, they are on the Light Railway and shift about more. It was nice to meet some of the old office pals again and I spent several pleasant hours with them while they were here, for I am the only G.W. man in this detachment. McMeeken is in the Railway Transport Officer's office about three miles from here and I see him occasionally. I was very sorry to hear of the deaths of Pond and Woodhams and no doubt there are other casualties amongst our office chaps but I seldom hear any office news. Our family has had to pay the penalty of war that so many thousands of families have done, for I am now the only one out here, one brother has just been discharged after nine months in hospital, the second one was killed at Ypres about a month ago and the third is now in a London hospital with a bad shrapnel wound in the thigh. I have had a variety of jobs, including navvy’s work, carrying rails and sleepers, guard, point oiler and various other jobs. I am now a checker and number taker which job suits me much better, for it combines a lot of indoor clerical work with outdoor checking and now that we have to face another winter out here, it will be something to spend a little of my time indoors for I still have memories of last winter under canvas, but I shall not be so badly off this winter for we are living in railway vans which will be much warmer. I have now been in France nearly nine months and there does not appear to be any prospect of leave, for there are more here who have been eighteen months without leave and at the rate the R.O.D. men are going at present it will be well into next year before my turn comes.
I understand that north London has suffered rather badly in the recent air raids but I hope you came through all right. My wife and family have had to get away from home, for it was upsetting their nerves and I am pleased to think that they are out of the danger zone. I am keeping fairly fit in health and always manage to keep cheery, which wants a bit of doing sometimes especially now the muddy season has started, but let’s hope this will be our last out here and by this time next year we may be all settling down to civilian life again. Please remember me to Mr Wood, Bert Hunt and all other Audit friends. Yours sincerely
F.E. Andrews... Montague Percy Pond, 5 April 1916, France. **Born:** 13 September 1888, **Joined GWR:** 19 May 1904, **Regiment:** Railway Troop, Royal Engineers, **Regiment number:** 87749, **Rank:** Sapper, **Died:** Killed in action on 6 May 1917
**Transcript**
Dear Mr Hunt,
I was very pleased to receive your letter for which many thanks. It took nearly a fortnight to reach me as I have changed about a good deal lately from one division to another and it has followed me around. I am pleased to say I am still keeping very fit and going on in about the same way. I think the last time I wrote we were living in trucks. Well we have now moved into huts about ten feet square, which are very comfortable although not quite as large as the trucks. They are well built and stand about a foot from the ground so keep very dry. We have two of them, one which we use as an office and the other to sleep and live in. We also have a tent which we use for keeping kits etc. in, but we shall probably sleep in it when the weather is a bit warmer.
We have had some lovely weather lately, quite like summer but rather cold at night. We had a great deal of snow last month also plenty of rain and wind, and were over the tops of our boots in mud. We are stationed at a very small village which stands very high (about 600 feet above sea level) you can guess it is a bit breezy at times. It is a one-eyed hole with only two cafes and no shops. We have all our meals cooked at one of the cafes, and we live very well although there is not very much variation in the menu. I have managed to have one or two musical evenings lately. The fiddle I bought appears to be a fairly good one but my fingers are not quite so nimble as they were. I am afraid I shall have to put in a month or two’s practice before I get back to where I was before I came out here. Glad to hear you have taken it up again. We shall be able to get a band for our next ‘lamb’ dinner whenever that will be.
Things do not seem to make much of a move round this way. We get plenty of aeroplanes over and see a good many fights in the air. There have also been a good many shells dropped not very far away from us, but we have managed to dodge them so far although, one of our fellows, who comes from the Midland Railway and who I worked with for some time, has been wounded and sent to base. There is only one G.W. man anywhere near me as far as I know and that is Colcott from Chief Goods Manager’s Office but he is some distance away and I hadn’t seen much of him. I was surprised to hear that Morris had gone into the R.F.C. (Royal Flying Corps) after being rejected for the Infantry. I was also surprised and sorry to hear about Jack Symons. I had heard nothing about it. How did it happen? It must be very quiet at the office now with so many gone. (Censored line). As you say it is quite a change from the old days. I have not yet come across any of those who joined the R.E. (Royal Engineers) Transport lately. Did you know that Arthur Watton has joined? We had a concert party belonging to one of the divisions stationed round here, staying in the village last week, and they gave us a show two nights running. They had a proper stage with scenery and footlights, everything complete. They were very good indeed. The programme consisted of songs, sentimental and otherwise, also a ‘Sketch’ and some Charlie Chaplin pictures which were very laughable as usual. Well, I don’t think I can tell you much more at present. Please remember me to all at the office.
Kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
M.P. Pond Sidney Smith, 19 March 1916, France. Born: 20 October 1881, Regiment: Railway Operatives Division, Royal Engineers, Regiment number: 218849, Rank: Sapper, Returned to office: 19 May 1919, Retired: 20 October 1941
Transcript
My Dear Elton and all,
I expect you are wondering why I have never written since leaving England. Well the fact is I have never had a chance for it has been a Cook’s Tour since I was last with you. Perhaps I had better try and give you some idea of my adventures from the time we last met. It was not many hours after seeing you all that we were dispatched for France...We landed at a town after a nice long trip... At this spot, a rest camp so called, we spent about a week. What with parades in the daytime for various reasons and employed at the docks all night, unloading flour was the job that came my way you can imagine the rest we had. However we then went on to another base and here owing to illness, we were all isolated for ten days and no letters could be sent. Within a day or two of being released from this I alone of all our boys was packed off to another depot so that was the last I have seen for the time being of our crowd, and have been on my own since. After a couple of nights at this depot I was sent to a point to get experience in the work I came here for. This turned out to be the best thing I had touched for the staff were billeted out and I slept in a feather bed which was great for it was under canvas... I soon found out that my luck was in and that happiness and comfort would be my lot whilst there... Alas my dream was soon dispelled, and after a week of civilised existence, I was sent for by the depot. After another 48 hours there I was sent away again to some other spot, but en route, was detained at a rest camp for two days, apparently owing to the absence of trains to the point I was going...
Covered vans are used here to convey soldiers about. Strange to say the actual truck I made this last journey in I saw again the next day loaded with sick horses, so being used for any purpose you can guess they cannot be compared to the carriages in which we made our daily trips to town and back. To continue my travels, the next day I was sent to the point I am now writing from, and which I think will be my residence for some little time as I have now taken up regular duties. It is a terrible, Godforsaken and desolate spot. There is naught to be seen except shell holes and rats and these latter are an abomination...There is little to be heard here at night except gun fire and rats and one soon gets used to both. I went to a village, the nearest here, about two miles away, on Sunday last and it was really an awful sight to see how it had been smashed by shell fire. You can now I trust realise the reason for my not writing before, in fact I have only written to my wife and father, and have only received one letter from each of them and that was a few days ago. I can tell you that I hunger for news of home after being here a month without a word... It is also almost impossible to buy anything for there is nowhere to get it...
I trust all is well with everyone at 164 and that poor old Sid is alright again. If Miss Welsh’s little affair has come off I wish her the very best of luck and trust she will have all happiness... Please write to me soon some of you. Lots of luck, and good wishes to you all. Your old pal,
Sid
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/ Railheads: ‘there is no grumbling’
Mark Anthony Russell, 4 February 1916, France. Born: 30 March 1883, Regiment: Railway Troop, Royal Engineers, Regiment number: 138053, Rank: Sapper, Died: 1965
The photograph shows John Higgs, whom Russell knew and who was also in the Railway Troop, Royal Engineers. (RAIL 253/516)
Transcript
My Dear Bertie
... I am pleased to say I am still in the same job and getting to understand the run of things. It is very interesting work, as you would imagine. It is a real line here, sometimes we are pushed and carry on till the early hours of the morning. I might say there is no grumbling about tea money, overtime or bonus quotas putting in as much as eighteen hours a day sometimes and it would not do to send deputations to the chief who is also hard at it, in his room; there is a special way of dealing with such in the army.
Of course one never knows how long this may last I may have marching orders to proceed elsewhere any day. Each day is absolutely a day unto itself here. We don’t count tomorrow.
I see you have been visited with a blizzard, we also have had a severe touch of winter and at the present moment it is snowing hard outside. The shutters are closed and the work is being carried on by lamplight, this is necessary owing to the glass having recently left the windows in small fragments some souvenirs [shells] having called upon us. When the weather is fine we are fresh air fiends now both day and night except that we close the shutters when snowing or raining. The latter it is often doing.
There are hosts of interesting things I could write you about but these will do later on when I have the pleasure of seeing you. Lieut. Dunton’s crowd was hereabouts, but I did not run up against him.
I suppose the Derby\* entries have commenced to run now. I met another GW fellow the other day, Sergeant Gregory, a Slough fellow. I think George Jones would know him. I have seen this fellow at Paddington but did not know him to speak to.
I had a letter from Longmoor Camp. Must correct information. J. Higgs is in the Railway Transport Engineers with another friend of mine, Watton of Windsor who was in the Finance office...
\*This was a voluntary recruitment policy in Britain created in 1915. The idea behind it was that men who voluntarily registered would be called to serve in the forces only when necessary. Men were classified according age and marital status, and single men were to be called first. Sidney Smith, 19 March 1916, France. Born: 20 October 1881, Regiment: Railway Operatives Division, Royal Engineers, Regiment number: 218849, Rank: Sapper, Returned to office: 19 May 1919, Retired: 20 October 1941
Transcript
My Dear Elton and all,
I expect you are wondering why I have never written since leaving England. Well the fact is I have never had a chance for it has been a Cook’s Tour since I was last with you. Perhaps I had better try and give you some idea of my adventures from the time we last met. It was not many hours after seeing you all that we were dispatched for France...We landed at a town after a nice long trip... At this spot, a rest camp so called, we spent about a week. What with parades in the daytime for various reasons and employed at the docks all night, unloading flour was the job that came my way you can imagine the rest we had. However we then went on to another base and here owing to illness, we were all isolated for ten days and no letters could be sent. Within a day or two of being released from this I alone of all our boys was packed off to another depot so that was the last I have seen for the time being of our crowd, and have been on my own since. After a couple of nights at this depot I was sent to a point to get experience in the work I came here for. This turned out to be the best thing I had touched for the staff were billeted out and I slept in a feather bed which was great for it was under canvas... I soon found out that my luck was in and that happiness and comfort would be my lot whilst there... Alas my dream was soon dispelled, and after a week of civilised existence, I was sent for by the depot. After another 48 hours there I was sent away again to some other spot, but en route, was detained at a rest camp for two days, apparently owing to the absence of trains to the point I was going...
Covered vans are used here to convey soldiers about. Strange to say the actual truck I made this last journey in I saw again the next day loaded with sick horses, so being used for any purpose you can guess they cannot be compared to the carriages in which we made our daily trips to town and back. To continue my travels, the next day I was sent to the point I am now writing from, and which I think will be my residence for some little time as I have now taken up regular duties. It is a terrible, Godforsaken and desolate spot. There is naught to be seen except shell holes and rats and these latter are an abomination...There is little to be heard here at night except gun fire and rats and one soon gets used to both. I went to a village, the nearest here, about two miles away, on Sunday last and it was really an awful sight to see how it had been smashed by shell fire. You can now I trust realise the reason for my not writing before, in fact I have only written to my wife and father, and have only received one letter from each of them and that was a few days ago. I can tell you that I hunger for news of home after being here a month without a word... It is also almost impossible to buy anything for there is nowhere to get it... I trust all is well with everyone at 164 and that poor old Sid is alright again. If Miss Welsh’s little affair has come off I wish her the very best of luck and trust she will have all happiness... Please write to me soon some of you. Lots of luck, and good wishes to you all. Your old pal,
Sid
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24479d6504949df9787100c8eab46c8f9b7a7900 | Here you will find all the letters and transcripts from this collection that relate to the soldiers' experience of training in England before they were sent abroad.
1916-18, training: contents
Training: 'had a military haircut' ................................................................. 2 Training: 'lectures on the body' ................................................................. 5 Training: 'a soldier's life' ........................................................................ 6 Training: 'in the pink' ............................................................................. 8 Training: 'the grub is alright' ................................................................. 9 Sidney Smith, undated, Longmoor Camp, England. Born: 20 October 1881, Regiment: Railway Operatives Division, Royal Engineers, Regiment number: 218849, Rank: Sapper, Returned to office: 19 May 1919, Retired: 20 October 1941
Transcript
Dear Mr Beak and all,
My address shows you I am well in now. Oh it is a different life and comes hard at first, four blankets on the floor and it is hard. I didn’t get used to it until last night which was my first night’s proper rest. The food is fair but served very rough and not enough after the drills you have to go through. The weather has of course been very bad and I am still in the same things as I left London last Monday. I look like a tramp and my collar, of the colour, something like the office grate. I was inoculated last Thursday but was not so bad but some of the fellows felt it. I expect I shall have a time with the next lot but hope I don’t as they have not got much sympathy and of course there is no comfort. A lot of fellows (about four hundred and fifty) have been shifted (Saturday and today) to Bordon and we shall all probably go when we get fitted out as they are making a new camp there with three new companies. It cannot be worse than here which is very dreary and lonely and the nearest village (Liss) is three miles away where several of us went on Saturday and Sunday and had tea. That place is I may say, truly rural. I have had a military hair cut tonight and feel that I look like Bill Sykes. I am afraid none of our young ladies would care to be seen walking up number 1 (platform at Paddington Station) with me as I look at the moment. (censored.)
There is no leave now, only when you get your overseas leave which is generally after six weeks here and when you come back you are the put on the draft so it isn’t long is it? George Jones and Isles will probably stay longer as they are to have false teeth but me, although as you know, I have got a very bad lot of teeth was passed and they are not touching mine. Army ways are funny and I have already found out a lot of which I trust I shall one day be able to tell you.
I forget to tell you we all got split up into different huts when we arrived and mine is about a mile away from the camp. It is very comfortable however much better accommodation than at the camp. Three other of our fellows were put in there with me and I found some others, also some very nice London & North Western Railway chaps, one of whom knew Mr Bryant and all the Fares office chaps. He was the head of the Season Ticket Office at Euston. I might say that they have been very good to me and assisted me more than some of our chaps, one or two of whom I am sorry to say have not done what they might to assist others and I (together with some of the others) have been surprised but of this more anon when we meet. Well I bid you all *adieu* for the present. I think of you all often and only wish I was back again but it has to be done and one can only hope the end will come soon. I hope poor old Syd Douce is getting on alright as we have not heard how he is. Now good luck to you all and every success and tell them all that could go to keep out of this life as long as they can. Goodnight.
I may say that four of our chaps who were lucky to get their outfit last week were moved to Bordon this afternoon: G. Holloway, Isles, Borrough, G.R.J. Jones. Yours very sincerely,
S. Smith. Training: ‘lectures on the body’
Frank Edward Secrett, Royal Army Medical Corps, 29 April, 1917, Blackpool training depot, England. **Regiment:** Royal Army Medical Corps, 97469, **Rank:** Private, **Enlisted:** 6 June 1916, **Discharged:** 21 July 1919
**Transcript (extract)**
... Am enclosing a photo of myself, it is, I have been told, not a good likeness, but there it is. We have any amount of lectures on the body etc., and presently have to pass an examination, if successful the red crosses are issued and also 4d (pennies) per day extra pay.
Leave is only granted once in nine months and then only six days at the most, in some cases only four is given, so I shall not be up yet, but will make a point of course of coming up to Paddington when I do get a chance.
Blackpool is a lovely place and the weather now is grand, although the first fortnight was bitterly cold.
Well I must now close, with a hope to hear from you shortly, please give my kind regards to all acquaintances.
F. Secrett Training: 'a soldier's life'
Routine of a soldier’s life told in a few well-known hymns composed by members of Heather Tent, Scotland. This was included in the newsletter for the Great Western Railway Paddington Audit office in May 1916. It was probably sent in by one of their staff who was training at a camp in Scotland and then typed out by the office. It provided a wonderful insight into the training schedule and possible thoughts surrounding it! Transcript
5.30 am Revielle Christians Awake
6.45 am House Parade Art though weary thou languid
7.00 am Breakfast Meekly wait and murmur not
8.15 am Company parade When he cometh
8.45 am Manoeuvres Fight the good fight
11.15 am Swedish Drill Here we suffer grief and pain
1.00 pm Dinner Come ye thankful people come
2.15 pm Rifle Drill Go labour on
3.15 pm Lecture by Officer Abide with me
4.30 pm Dismiss Praise God from whom all blessings flow
5.00 pm Tea What means this eager anxious throng?
6.00 pm Free for the night Oh what will the harvest be?
6.30 pm Out of bounds Oh Lord how happy shall we be
10.00 pm Last post All are safely gathered in
10.15 pm Lights out Peace Perfect Peace
10.30 pm Inspection of Guards Sleep on beloved
GOD SAVE THE KING Training: 'in the pink'
Frank Thayer Turner, 13 July 1916, Morn Hill Camp, Winchester, England. Born: 22 October 1897, Joined GWR: 13 April 1912, Regiment: Company 3/18 London Irish Regiment, Returned to office: 5 November 1917. He lost his right arm in the war. Died: 28 May 1937
Transcript
Dear Jim (Mr Porter)
Just a few lines to let you now things are going. Am having a fairly good time nothing at all to grumble about. I don’t think I shall be going to France for a few months yet. I met one of the chaps from the tickets department last week he is in the R.F.C. down here. Some of us were feet under canvas for a fortnight but owing to the wind and rain we were moved back to the huts. When we were under canvas, we used not get up till 8 o’clock, we were supposed to go on parade at 6.15am, but we dodged that. I enclose photo (not dressed for the occasion) outside our hut L20 or Hell 20 as it has been called. I am looking forward to seeing some of the office chaps when I am able to get leave. I hope your brother is getting on alright in France. Hoping you are ‘in the pink’ like myself,
Yours very sincerely
F. Turner. Please write as soon as poss. Training: 'the grub is alright'
Sydney Charles Douce, January 1916, Fovant Camp, Wiltshire. Born: 17 November 1882, Joined GWR: 28 November 1898, Regiment: 1/5 London Regiment; 3rd Battalion London Rifle Brigade; Royal Army Medical Corps, Regiment number: 3701; 202204; 536657, Rank: Private, Died: 1933.
Transcript
Dear Mr. Riches
The worst has happened. The War Office has sent us down to this place which is miles from nowhere. The camp however is made up of hundreds of huts is according to the ‘old uns’ at the game the finest they have ever been in, certainly everything is alright but the place is so muddy and my time is split up. One half getting frightfully dirty and the other getting myself clean again. However it’s all in the game and can’t be helped. There are twenty to a hut. The beds are three long boards on two trestles about eight or nine inches off the floor, a straw mattress and a straw pillow, and four blankets. Not a bit what I have been used to. However I am now quite comfortable in it and sleep like a top. Marvellous how you think we settle down to it. Don’t you think? We rise at 6.30am. Breakfast (porridge and bacon) at 7.30. Parade at 8.20. Drill till 10.30. Then half an hour’s rest. Then more drill up to 12.30. Dinner at 1 o’clock (meat and two vegetables and sweets). Parade again at 2.20. Then more drill which brings us up to 4pm. We are then dismissed for the day. Tea at 5pm (bread, butter and jam). After which we can do what we like until 9.15. By this time we have to be in our huts for the final day’s roll call and at 10pm. All lights have to be out. That’s what my day consists of at present. It may not seem much, and really it isn’t, but I am half the day cleaning up. The grub is alright but there is not quite enough of it at present. I think however this will be right as soon as they have made all necessary arrangements. For the time being the Non-Commissioned Officers seem to be a little overworked. This is the same every day, varied on two mornings a week with a long route march in the morning. Of course we only have half a day on Saturday and only a Church parade on Sunday. So altogether things are not so bad. The only thing is I can’t get away for weekends, as it would take up most of the time to travel to London and back. I shall try however and run up to town in a few weeks’ time if possible. Kind regards to all at ‘Omega’, and everybody at 164, W.1, including, yourself.
Yours, S.C.D.
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2171582ee55e48e3df084fab3a56a5419a3aeba3 | The Economic Impact of Tourism on Calderdale 2014
Prepared by: © Tourism South East Research Unit 40 Chamberlayne Road Eastleigh Hampshire SO50 5JH CONTENTS
1. Summary of Results 1
2. Table of Results Table 1: Staying trips by accommodation type 4 Table 2: Staying nights by accommodation type 4 Table 3: Staying spend by accommodation type 4 Table 4: Tourism day trips & spend 5 Table 5: Sector breakdown of trip expenditure 5 Table 6: Breakdown of other trip related expenditure 5 Table 7: Businesses in receipt of visitor spend 5 Table 8: Total income for local businesses 6 Table 9: Local employment supported 6 Table 10: Total jobs in tourism-related sectors 6
3. Appendix: Summary methodology 7
4. Glossary of Terms 8 Tourism Economic Impact Estimates
This report contains the findings of a study commissioned by Calderdale Council and undertaken by Tourism South East. The overall aim of the research is to provide indicative estimates of the volume, value and resultant economic impact of tourism on the destination.
The research involved the application of the Cambridge Tourism Economic Impact Model or ‘Cambridge Model’; a computer-based model developed by Geoff Broom Associates and the Regional Tourist Boards of England.
1. Summary of results
1.1 National and regional results
| Trips by domestic overnight visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------| | | 2013 | 2014 | % change | 2013 | 2014 | % change | | Trips | 10,004,000 | 9,465,000 | -5% | 101,800,000 | 93,000,000 | -9% | | Nights | 27,463,000 | 26,486,000 | -4% | 294,830,000 | 273,000,000 | -8% | | Spend | £1,792,000,000 | £1,735,000,000 | -3% | £18,700,000,000 | £18,085,000,000 | -3% |
| Trips by overseas overnight visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------| | | 2013 | 2014 | % change | 2013 | 2014 | % change | | Trips | 1,213,000 | 1,367,000 | 13% | 28,602,000 | 29,824,000 | 4% | | Nights | 10,389,000 | 11,209,000 | 8% | 216,975,000 | 232,846,000 | 7% | | Spend | £581,000,000 | £571,000,000 | -2% | £18,397,000,000 | £19,081,000,000 | 4% |
| Trips by day visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------| | | 2013 | 2014 | % change | 2013 | 2014 | % change | | Trips | 134,000,000 | 131,000,000 | -2% | 1,370,000,000 | 1,345,000,000 | -2% | | Spend | £4,225,000,000 | £4,147,000,000 | -2% | £45,101,000,000 | £46,024,000,000 | 2% |
| Total trips | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------| | | 2013 | 2014 | % change | 2013 | 2014 | % change | | Trips | 145,217,000 | 141,832,000 | -2% | 1,499,942,000 | 1,467,824,000 | -2% | | Spend | £6,598,000,000 | £6,453,000,000 | -2% | £82,125,550,000 | £83,190,000,000 | 1% |
- Results from GBTS reveal that 93 million domestic overnight trips were taken in England in 2014, a decrease of 9% compared with 2013. The value of domestic overnight trips fell by 3%, from £18.7 billion in 2013 to £18 billion in 2014.
- Across Yorkshire and the Humber, the volume of domestic overnight trips fell by 5% (from 10 million to 9.5 million), and reflecting the national trend, trip spend was also down by 3% compared to 2013 (from £1.79 billion to £1.73 billion).
- According to results from IPS, overseas visitors made a total of 29.8 million overnight trips in England, an increase of 4% compared with 2013. Trip expenditure also increased by 4% at the national level.
- Overseas visitor trip volume was also up for the region; total overnight trips taken by visitors from overseas to Yorkshire and the Humber increased by 13% (from 1.2 million to almost 1.4 million). However, in sharp contrast, the overall expenditure associated with trips by overseas visitors actually dropped by 2% according to the national survey. This is due to a higher volume of overseas visitors staying with friends and relatives and thus not incurring any costs on accommodation.
- Figures published in the Great Britain Day Visits Survey (2014) indicate that there were 1.3 billion Tourism Day Visits undertaken in England during 2014 (down 2% compared to 2013). Despite a small drop in volume, spend per head was up, leaving to an increase in day trip expenditure of 2%.
- At regional level, there were 131 million tourism day trips which was down by 2% on 2013. Unlike the national picture, day trip spend at regional level was also down by 2%.
### 1.2 Volume and value of trips – Calderdale results
- Despite the national and regional picture showing a drop in the volume and value of domestic overnight trips, the picture at destination level across Yorkshire was more variable. In Calderdale, the year saw a small drop of 1% in domestic overnight trip volume but an increase of 6% in trip spend (spend grew as a result of visitors spending more per head).
- Reflecting national trends, the number of trips made by visitors from overseas to Calderdale was up by 5% and their trip spend was up by 4% compared to 2013.
- In total, it is estimated that around £61.2 million was spent by all overnight visitors on their trip to Calderdale in 2014, up by 4% compared to 2013.
- It is estimated that around 5.6 million tourism day trips were made to Calderdale in 2014, a fall of 4% compared to 2013. Day trip expenditure generated £145.5 million in 2014, a small growth of 1%.
- In total, around £206.7 million was spent on trips to Calderdale in 2014 by overnight and day visitors. Twenty percent of this expenditure was made by domestic staying visitor; 7% by overseas staying visitors and 71% by day visitors.
- Further additional expenditure spent by visitors on second homes / boats and by friends and relatives, who visitors are staying with or visiting (either during overnight or day trips), needs also to be accounted for as this represents a significant additional source of income for local businesses. It is estimated that this ‘additional’ expenditure generated a further £16.5 million of direct turnover for local businesses in 2014.
- Of the £206.7 million estimated to have been spent by visitors on their trip, around £196.4 million directly benefited local businesses from hotels and restaurants to cafes, shops and attractions in Calderdale. Adjustments have been made to recognise that some spending on travel will take place outside the destination. It is assumed that 40% of travel spend will take place at the origin of the trip rather than at the destination. Also some expenditure on retail and food and drink will fall within the attractions sector and accommodation sector.
- In addition to the business turnover generated in those businesses directly receiving visitor income, successive rounds of expenditure, that is spending by these businesses on local supplies and spending by employers in the local area (multiplier spend), is estimated to have generated a further £63 million to the local economy.
- Drawing together direct business turnover, supplier and income induced expenditure, and the additional expenditure spent on second homes and by friends and relatives, the total value of tourism activity in Calderdale in 2014 is estimated to have been around £276 million, up by 2% compared to 2013.
- This income to the local economy is estimated to have supported around 4,031 Full-Time Equivalent Jobs. Many of these jobs are part-time or seasonal in nature and translate into an estimated 5,552 Actual Jobs, up by 2% compared to 2013.
- These jobs are spread across a wide range of service sectors from catering and retail to public service jobs such as in local government, and not just tourism. According to the Office of National Statistics, there are 102,000 employee jobs across Calderdale. Based on our estimates, total tourism related expenditure supported 5% of these jobs in 2014.
2. Tables of Results
2.1 Overnight trips by accommodation
| Table 1: Number of staying trips by accommodation stayed at | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |----------------------------------------------------------|----|---|----------|---|-------|---| | Serviced | 147,000 | 49% | 22,400 | 47% | 169,400 | 49% | | Non-serviced | 10,000 | 3% | 4,500 | 9% | 14,500 | 4% | | Group/campus | 4,000 | 1% | 700 | 1% | 4,700 | 1% | | Second homes | 6,000 | 2% | 1,200 | 3% | 7,200 | 2% | | Boat moorings | 3,000 | 1% | 0 | 0% | 3,000 | 1% | | Other | 10,000 | 3% | 2,700 | 6% | 12,700 | 4% | | Paying guests in private houses | 0 | 0% | 100 | 0% | 100 | 0% | | Staying with friends and relatives | 118,000 | 40% | 16,200 | 34% | 134,200 | 39% | | Total 2014 | 298,000 | 47,900 | 345,900 | | Total 2013 | 302,000 | 45,700 | 347,700 | | % change | -1% | 5% | -1% |
| Table 2: Number of nights by accommodation stayed at | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |----------------------------------------------------------|----|---|----------|---|-------|---| | Serviced | 249,000 | 37% | 72,000 | 17% | 321,000 | 29% | | Non-serviced | 53,000 | 8% | 66,000 | 16% | 119,000 | 11% | | Group/campus | 10,000 | 1% | 16,000 | 4% | 26,000 | 2% | | Second homes | 20,000 | 3% | 96,000 | 23% | 116,000 | 10% | | Boat moorings | 12,000 | 2% | 0 | 0% | 12,000 | 1% | | Other | 41,000 | 6% | 4,000 | 1% | 45,000 | 4% | | Paying guests in private houses | 0 | 0% | 1,000 | 0% | 1,000 | 0% | | Staying with friends and relatives | 296,000 | 43% | 170,000 | 40% | 466,000 | 42% | | Total 2014 | 682,000 | 424,000 | 1,106,000 | | Total 2013 | 685,000 | 413,000 | 1,098,000 | | % change | 0% | 3% | 1% |
| Table 3: Spend by accommodation stayed at | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |----------------------------------------------------------|----|---|----------|---|-------|---| | Serviced | £28,446,000 | 66% | £8,784,000 | 48% | £37,230,000 | 61% | | Non-serviced | £1,663,000 | 4% | £3,133,000 | 17% | £4,796,000 | 8% | | Group/campus | £273,000 | 1% | £666,000 | 4% | £939,000 | 2% | | Second homes | £409,000 | 1% | £613,000 | 3% | £1,022,000 | 2% | | Boat moorings | £603,000 | 1% | £0 | 0% | £603,000 | 1% | | Other | £2,067,000 | 5% | £40,000 | 0% | £2,107,000 | 3% | | Paying guests in private houses | £0 | 0% | £150,000 | 1% | £150,000 | 0% | | Staying with friends and relatives | £9,441,000 | 22% | £4,875,000 | 27% | £14,316,000 | 23% | | Total 2014 | £42,903,000 | £18,261,000 | £61,164,000 | | Total 2013 | £40,620,000 | £17,544,000 | £58,164,000 | | % change | 6% | 4% | 5% | 2.2 Tourism day trips
Table 4: Tourism Day trips and spend
| Trips | Spend | |-------------|-------------| | Total 2014 | £145,562,000| | Total 2013 | £144,787,000| | % change | -4% |
2.3 Sector breakdown of visitor expenditure
Table 5: Sector breakdown of trip expenditure
| Domestic | Overseas | Day | Total | |----------|----------|-----|-------| | Accommodation | £13,555,000 | 32% | £5,336,000 | 29% | £0 | 0% | £18,891,000 | 9% | | Retail | £5,485,000 | 13% | £5,156,000 | 28% | £62,780,000 | 43% | £73,421,000 | 36% | | Catering | £10,218,000 | 24% | £3,981,000 | 22% | £54,491,000 | 37% | £68,690,000 | 33% | | Attractions| £3,645,000 | 8% | £2,022,000 | 11% | £14,424,000 | 10% | £20,091,000 | 10% | | Travel | £10,001,000 | 23% | £1,766,000 | 10% | £13,866,000 | 10% | £25,633,000 | 12% | | Total 2014 | £42,904,000 | £18,261,000 | £145,561,000 | £206,726,000 | | Total 2013 | £202,953,000 | £73,421,000 | £206,726,000 | £206,726,000 | | % change | 2% |
2.4 Other trip related expenditure
Table 6: Breakdown of other trip related expenditure
| Second homes | £164,000 | | Boats | £120,000 | | Friends and relatives | £16,283,000 | | Total 2014 | £16,567,000 |
2.5 Business turnover derived from tourism and related expenditure
Table 7: Businesses in receipt of visitor spend on trip
| Staying tourists | Day visitors | Total | |------------------|--------------|-------| | Accommodation | £19,175,000 | 34% | £1,090,000 | 1% | £20,265,000 | 10% | | Retail | £10,534,000 | 19% | £62,153,000 | 44% | £72,687,000 | 37% | | Catering | £13,773,000 | 24% | £52,857,000 | 38% | £66,630,000 | 34% | | Attractions | £5,915,000 | 10% | £15,597,000 | 11% | £21,512,000 | 11% | | Transport | £7,060,000 | 13% | £8,320,000 | 6% | £15,380,000 | 8% | | Total(1) | £56,457,000 | £140,017,000 | £196,474,000 | | Other non trip related expenditure(2) | £16,567,000 | £0 | £16,567,000 | | Total direct 2014 | £73,024,000 | £140,017,000 | £213,041,000 | | Total direct 2013 | £70,209,000 | £139,271,000 | £209,480,000 | | % change | 4% | 1% | 2% |
(1) Adjustments have been made to visitor expenditure by sector to recognise that some spending on retail and food and drink will fall within attractions or accommodation establishments. A small proportion of day trip spend will also fall into ‘Accommodation’ where day visitors have eaten in restaurants/bars of hotels. Furthermore, it is assumed that 40% of travel expenditure occurs outside the destination.
(2) Apart from the spending associated with the individual trips, additional spending by non-visitors, e.g. friends and relatives with whom the visitor is staying with will also take place. Moreover, owners of second homes/boats will spend some money on maintenance, repair. Data is only available for additional expenditure made related to overnight trips. Table 8: Income for local business generated by trip expenditure
| | 2014 | 2013 | % change | |----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------| | Direct | £213,041,000 | | | | Supplier and income induced | £62,989,000 | | | | Total 2014 | £276,030,000 | | | | Total 2013 | £271,115,000 | | | | % change | 2% | | |
2.6 Employment supported by tourism and related expenditure
Table 9: Local employment supported by the visitor economy
| | 2014 | 2013 | % change | |----------------------|------|------|----------| | Total FTE Jobs | 4,031| 3,957| 2% | | Total Actual Jobs | 5,522| 5,421| 2% |
Table 10: Proportion of total jobs sustained across all sectors
| | Total | |----------------------|-------| | Total employed (3) | 102,000| | Tourism employment | 5,522 | | Tourism proportion | 5% |
(3) Total labour force is based on all employees incl. part-time (excludes government-supported trainees and HM Force and self-employment). The information comes from the Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) an employer survey conducted by ONS in December of each year. 3. Methodology
The Cambridge Model
The Cambridge Model is essentially a computer-based spreadsheet model that produces estimates from existing national and local information (e.g. accommodation stocks, inbound trips) of the level of tourism activity within a given local area. The volume of visits is translated into economic terms by estimating the amount of spending by visitors based on their average spend per trip. In turn, the impact of that spending can be translated to estimate the effects in terms of business turnover and jobs.
Estimates are based on a 3 year rolling average, thus smoothing out irregular fluctuations and avoiding any distortion arising from regional variations, giving us a more long term picture of the value of tourism and we would caution against year-on-year comparisons. As the Model utilises a standard methodology capable of application throughout the UK, it offers the potential for direct comparisons with similar destinations throughout the country.
The standard measures generated in this Model are: the total amount spent by visitors, the amount of income for local residents and businesses created by this spending, and the number of jobs supported by visitor spending.
The basic process of estimation used can be divided into three parts:
- visitor trips and visitor spending at a regional/county level derived from national survey sources (county/City)
- local supply data on accommodation, attractions and other factors specific to the area.
- the use of multipliers derived from business surveys in England to estimate full time equivalent and actual jobs generated by visitor spending in the area.
In its standard form, the Cambridge Model uses a range of local data including details of accommodation stock, local occupancy rates, population, employment, local wage rates and visits to attractions. It applies this locally sourced information to regional estimates of tourism volume and expenditure derived from the following national surveys:
- Great Britain Tourism Survey (GBTS)
- International Passenger Survey (IPS)
- Great Britain Day Visits Survey (GBDVS)
- Visits to Attractions Survey
- Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE)
- Census of Employment
- Census of Population
- Labour Force Survey
The sophistication of the economic impact estimates will depend on the availability of detailed reliable local information to supplement national and regional data sources. Where such data is available from local surveys, then local variations can be explicitly included. 4. Glossary of terms
Staying trips Staying trips comprise a visit which involves a stay away from home of at least one night. The study measures trips, rather than visitors as one visitor may make multiple trips to an area in a given period.
Tourism day trips A day trip is classified as a "tourism day visit" if it involves participation in one of fifteen leisure activities (full details of the definition used are included in the annual survey report); save lasted at least three hours (including travel); it’s not an activity which is undertaken "very regularly"; and is to a destination outside the respondent's place of residence (or place of work if this was the start point of the trip). The exceptions to this are trips to special public events, live sporting events and visitor attractions.
VFR Trips VFR trips are defined as a visit where the main purpose is visiting friends and relatives. Whilst many trips to visit friends and relatives will be accommodated in the homes of these friends/relatives, some will make use of other forms of accommodation. It should be also noted that other forms of trip, for instance for holiday or business purposes may stay with friends and relatives rather than in commercial accommodation.
‘Other’ Expenditure Apart from the spending associated with the individual trips, additional spending by non-visitors, e.g. friends and relatives with whom the visitor is visiting and/or staying with will also take place. Moreover, owners of second homes/boats will spend some money on maintenance, repair.
Economic multiplier Multipliers are used to estimate the economic impact of visitor expenditure. Visitor expenditure produces three effects. Direct effects are changes in the business sector directly receiving visitor expenditure. For instance, visitors staying in a hotel will directly increase revenue and the number of jobs in the hotel sector. Indirect effects are the changes in supplier businesses. For example, these indirect effects would be hotels purchasing more linen from local suppliers as a result of increased business. Induced effects are changes in local economic activity resulting from household spending. For instance, employees of the hotel and linen supplier spend their wages in the local area, resulting in more sales, income and jobs in the area.
Full Time Equivalent Jobs (FTE) For the purposes of the Model, a FTE is defined by the average annual salary plus employment costs in the sector concerned.
Direct jobs Jobs directly generated in those local businesses in which visitors spend money, i.e. hotels, catering establishments.
Indirect jobs Jobs created locally due to the purchases of goods and services by businesses benefiting from visitor expenditure, i.e. jobs with local suppliers.
Induced jobs Jobs created throughout the local economy because employees employed due to visitor expenditure spend their wages locally on goods and services such as food, clothing and housing. Actual Jobs Many jobs are seasonal or part-time in their nature in the tourism sector, so an adjustment is made to calculate the actual number of jobs from the number of FTEs. The adjustment made is based on the findings of surveys of tourism related businesses, and national employment surveys.
Great Britain Tourism Survey (BGTS) The Great Britain Tourism Survey is undertaken by TNS. The key characteristics of the survey include a 100,000 face-to-face interviews per annum, conducted in-home, and a weekly sample size of around 2,000 adults aged 16 years or over - representative of the GB population in relation to various demographic characteristics including gender, age group, socio-economic group, and geographical location. Respondents are asked about any overnight trips taken in the last four weeks. It provides basic headline data on the volume and value of domestic tourism at a national, regional and county level.
International Passenger Survey (IPS) The International Passenger Survey is conducted by Office for National Statistics and is based on face-to-face interviews with a sample of passengers travelling via the principal airports, sea routes and the Channel Tunnel, together with visitors crossing the land border into Northern Ireland. Around 210,000 interviews are undertaken each year. IPS provides headline figures, based on the county or unitary authority, for the volume and value of overseas trips to the UK.
Great Britain Day Visits Survey (GBDVS) The 2013 Great Britain Day Visits Survey aims to measure the volume, value and profile of Tourism Day Visits taken by GB residents to destinations in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Fieldwork is undertaken on a weekly basis, using an online methodology, and an annual sample of over 38,000 interviews.
United Kingdom Occupancy Survey (UKOS) As part of the EU Directive on Tourism Statistics adopted in 1995, the UK must report regularly on a specified range of statistics to Eurostat, the official statistical office of the European Union. Included in these statistics are monthly occupancy rates for UK serviced accommodation. The responsibility for providing this data lies with the four National Tourist Boards, and across England the survey is undertaken by The Research Solution on behalf of Visit England. A sample of establishments are recruited to the online survey and asked to complete a data form each month, giving details of their nightly occupancy. The data submitted is analysed to produce monthly occupancy rates for the whole of the area and for specific categories of type, size, location etc.
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) provides information about the levels, distribution and make-up of earnings and hours worked for employees in all industries and occupations. ASHE is based on a one per cent sample of employee jobs taken from HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) PAYE records. The ASHE tables contain UK data on earnings for employees by sex and full-time/part-time workers. The earnings information presented relates to gross pay before tax, National Insurance or other deductions.
Labour Force Survey (LFS) The LFS is a household panel survey designed to provide information on the UK labour market, with results produced each quarter. It has a sample of approximately 60,000 households. The LFS is the government’s largest continuous household survey and participation in the survey is voluntary. LFS data is weighted to enable the population estimates to be produced. The weighting also attempts to compensate for differential non-response among different subgroups in the population.
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c6930bba752d09e2041585bddfede219f9640266 | The Economic Impact of Tourism on Calderdale 2015
Prepared by: © Tourism South East Research Unit 40 Chamberlayne Road Eastleigh Hampshire SO50 5JH CONTENTS
1. Summary of Results 1
2. Table of Results Table 1: Staying trips by accommodation type 4 Table 2: Staying nights by accommodation type 4 Table 3: Staying spend by accommodation type 4 Table 4: Tourism day trips & spend 5 Table 5: Sector breakdown of trip expenditure 5 Table 6: Breakdown of other trip related expenditure 5 Table 7: Businesses in receipt of visitor spend 5 Table 8: Total income for local businesses 6 Table 9: Local employment supported 6 Table 10: Total jobs in tourism-related sectors 6
3. Appendix: Summary methodology 7
4. Glossary of Terms 8 Tourism Economic Impact Estimates
This report contains the findings of a study commissioned by Calderdale Council and undertaken by Tourism South East. The overall aim of the research is to provide indicative estimates of the volume, value and resultant economic impact of tourism on the destination.
The research involved the application of the Cambridge Tourism Economic Impact Model or ‘Cambridge Model’; a computer-based model developed by Geoff Broom Associates and the Regional Tourist Boards of England.
1. Summary of results
1.1 National and regional results
| Trips by domestic overnight visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------| | 2015 | 2014 | % change | 2015 | 2014 | % change | | Trips | 11,320,000 | 9,465,000 | 20% | 102,730,000 | 93,000,000 | 10% | | Nights | 30,880,000 | 26,486,000 | 17% | 299,570,000 | 273,000,000 | 10% | | Spend | £1,922,000,000 | £1,735,000,000 | 11% | £19,571,000,000 | £18,085,000,000 | 8% |
| Trips by overseas overnight visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------| | 2015 | 2014 | % change | 2015 | 2014 | % change | | Trips | 1,290,000 | 1,367,000 | -6% | 31,820,000 | 29,824,000 | 7% | | Nights | 10,355,000 | 11,209,000 | -8% | 241,427,000 | 232,846,000 | 4% | | Spend | £566,000,000 | £571,000,000 | -1% | £19,427,000,000 | £19,081,000,000 | 2% |
| Trips by day visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-----------------------|--------------------------|---------| | 2015 | 2014 | % change | 2015 | 2014 | % change | | Trips | 120,000,000 | 131,000,000 | -8% | 1,298,000,000 | 1,345,000,000 | -3% | | Spend | £3,701,000,000 | £4,147,000,000 | -11% | £46,422,000,000 | £46,024,000,000 | 1% |
| Total trips | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-------------|--------------------------|---------| | 2015 | 2014 | % change | 2015 | 2014 | % change | | Trips | 132,610,000 | 145,217,000 | -9% | 1,432,550,000 | 1,499,942,000 | -4% | | Spend | £6,189,000,000 | £6,598,000,000 | -6% | £85,420,000,000 | £82,125,550,000 | 4% |
- Results from GBTS reveal that 102.7 million domestic overnight trips were taken in England in 2015, a increase of 10% compared with 2014. The value of domestic overnight trips increased by 8%, from £18 billion to £19.6 million in 2015.
- Across the region of Yorkshire and the Humber, the volume of domestic overnight trips increased significantly by 20% (from 9.5m to 11.3m), and trip spend increased by 11% compared to 2014 (from £1.73b to £1.92b).
- According to results from IPS, overseas visitors made a total of 31.8 million overnight trips in England, an increase of 7% compared with 2014. Trip expenditure increased by 2% at the national level.
- Overseas visitor trip volume was, however, down for the region; total overnight trips taken by visitors from overseas to Yorkshire and the Humber decreased by 6% (from 1.36m to 1.29m). However, the overall expenditure associated with trips by overseas visitors to the region only dropped by 1% according to the national survey.
- Figures published in the Great Britain Day Visits Survey (2015) indicate that there were 1.3 billion Tourism Day Visits undertaken in England during 2015 (down 3% compared to 2014). Despite a small drop in volume, spend per head was up, leaving to an increase in day trip expenditure of 1%.
- According to the national survey, tourism day trips to the region fell in 2015; down from 131 million tourism day trips to 120 million day trips, a drop of 8%. Day trip spend at regional level was down by 11%.
1.2 Volume and value of trips – Calderdale results
- The picture at destination level across Yorkshire was more variable. Trends from the past few years show that in Calderdale there is steady year-on-year growth. 2015 saw a 4% increase in domestic overnight trip volume and an increase of 2% in trip spend.
- The number of trips made by visitors from overseas to Calderdale remained at the same volume as last year, though trip spend increased by 3% compared to 2014.
- In total, it is estimated that around £62.5 million was spent by all overnight visitors on their trip to Calderdale in 2015, up by 2% compared to 2014.
- It is estimated that around 5.56 million tourism day trips were made to Calderdale in 2015, a fall of 1% compared to 2014. Despite the small fall, tourism day visitors spent far more on their trip in 2015, leading to a 12% increase in trip expenditure.
- In total, around £224.9 million was spent on trips to Calderdale in 2015 by overnight and day visitors, up by 9% compared to 2014. Nineteen percent of this expenditure was made by domestic staying visitor; 8% by overseas staying visitors and 72% by day visitors.
- Further additional expenditure spent by visitors on second homes / boats and by friends and relatives, who visitors are staying with or visiting (either during overnight or day trips), needs also to be accounted for as this represents a significant additional source of income for local businesses. It is estimated that this ‘additional’ expenditure generated a further £16.5 million of direct turnover for local businesses in 2015.
- Of the £224.9 million estimated to have been spent by visitors on their trip, around £214 million directly benefited local businesses from hotels and restaurants to cafes, shops and attractions in Calderdale. Adjustments have been made to recognise that some spending on travel will take place outside the destination. It is assumed that 40% of travel spend will take place at the origin of the trip rather than at the destination. Also some expenditure on retail and food and drink will fall within the attractions sector and accommodation sector.
- In addition to the business turnover generated in those businesses directly receiving visitor income, successive rounds of expenditure, that is spending by these businesses on local supplies and spending by employers in the local area (multiplier spend), is estimated to have generated a further £67.5 million to the local economy.
- Drawing together direct business turnover, supplier and income induced expenditure, and the additional expenditure spent on second homes and by friends and relatives, the **total value of tourism activity in Calderdale in 2015 is estimated to have been around £298.3 million, up by 8% compared to 2014.**
- This income to the local economy is estimated to have supported around **4,348 Full-Time Equivalent Jobs.** Many of these jobs are part-time or seasonal in nature and translate into an estimated 5,965 Actual Jobs, up by 10% compared to 2014.
- These jobs are spread across a wide range of service sectors from catering and retail to public service jobs such as in local government, and not just tourism. According to the Office of National Statistics, there are 93,300 employee jobs across Calderdale. Based on our estimates, total tourism related expenditure supported 6% of these jobs in 2015.
2. Tables of Results
2.1 Overnight trips by accommodation
| Table 1: Number of staying trips by accommodation stayed at | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |-----------------------------------------------------------|----|---|----------|---|-------|---| | Serviced | 153,000 | 50% | 22,300 | 47% | 175,300 | 49% | | Non-serviced | 10,000 | 3% | 4,500 | 9% | 14,500 | 4% | | Group/campus | 4,000 | 1% | 700 | 1% | 4,700 | 1% | | Second homes | 6,000 | 2% | 1,200 | 3% | 7,200 | 2% | | Boat moorings | 3,000 | 1% | 0 | 0% | 3,000 | 1% | | Other | 10,000 | 3% | 2,700 | 6% | 12,700 | 4% | | Paying guests in private houses | 0 | 0% | 100 | 0% | 100 | 0% | | Staying with friends and relatives | 122,000 | 39% | 16,200 | 34% | 138,200 | 39% | | Total 2015 | 309,000 | 47,800 | 356,800 | | Total 2014 | 298,000 | 47,900 | 345,900 | | % change | 4% | 0% | 3% |
| Table 2: Number of nights by accommodation stayed at | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |-----------------------------------------------------------|----|---|----------|---|-------|---| | Serviced | 257,000 | 37% | 70,000 | 17% | 327,000 | 29% | | Non-serviced | 55,000 | 8% | 64,000 | 15% | 119,000 | 11% | | Group/campus | 10,000 | 1% | 16,000 | 4% | 26,000 | 2% | | Second homes | 21,000 | 3% | 95,000 | 23% | 116,000 | 10% | | Boat moorings | 13,000 | 2% | 0 | 0% | 13,000 | 1% | | Other | 41,000 | 6% | 4,000 | 1% | 45,000 | 4% | | Paying guests in private houses | 0 | 0% | 1,000 | 0% | 1,000 | 0% | | Staying with friends and relatives | 304,000 | 43% | 165,000 | 40% | 469,000 | 42% | | Total 2015 | 702,000 | 415,000 | 1,117,000 | | Total 2014 | 682,000 | 424,000 | 1,106,000 | | % change | 3% | -2% | 1% |
| Table 3: Spend by accommodation stayed at | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |-----------------------------------------------------------|----|---|----------|---|-------|---| | Serviced | £29,014,000 | 66% | £9,036,000 | 48% | £38,050,000 | 61% | | Non-serviced | £1,688,000 | 4% | £3,263,000 | 17% | £4,951,000 | 8% | | Group/campus | £279,000 | 1% | £666,000 | 4% | £945,000 | 2% | | Second homes | £421,000 | 1% | £618,000 | 3% | £1,039,000 | 2% | | Boat moorings | £614,000 | 1% | £0 | 0% | £614,000 | 1% | | Other | £2,081,000 | 5% | £40,000 | 0% | £2,121,000 | 3% | | Paying guests in private houses | £0 | 0% | £155,000 | 1% | £155,000 | 0% | | Staying with friends and relatives | £9,585,000 | 22% | £5,007,000 | 27% | £14,592,000 | 23% | | Total 2015 | £43,683,000 | £18,786,000 | £62,469,000 | | Total 2014 | £42,903,000 | £18,261,000 | £61,164,000 | | % change | 2% | 3% | 2% | 2.2 Tourism day trips
Table 4: Tourism Day trips and spend
| Trips | Spend | |-------------|-------------| | Total 2015 | £162,424,000| | Total 2014 | £145,562,000| | % change | -1% |
2.3 Sector breakdown of visitor expenditure
Table 5: Sector breakdown of trip expenditure
| Domestic | Overseas | Day | Total | |----------|----------|-----|-------| | Accommodation | £13,807,000 | 32% | £5,496,000 | 29% | £0 | 0% | £19,303,000 | 9% | | Retail | £5,581,000 | 13% | £5,300,000 | 28% | £70,055,000 | 43% | £80,936,000 | 36% | | Catering | £10,401,000 | 24% | £4,096,000 | 22% | £60,803,000 | 37% | £75,300,000 | 33% | | Attractions | £3,707,000 | 8% | £2,077,000 | 11% | £16,094,000 | 10% | £21,878,000 | 10% | | Travel | £10,187,000 | 23% | £1,817,000 | 10% | £15,472,000 | 10% | £27,476,000 | 12% | | Total 2015 | £43,683,000 | £18,786,000 | £162,424,000 | £224,893,000 | | Total 2014 | £206,726,000 | | | % change | 9% |
2.4 Other trip related expenditure
Table 6: Breakdown of other trip related expenditure
| Second homes | £164,000 | | Boats | £120,000 | | Friends and relatives | £16,283,000 | | Total 2015 | £16,567,000 |
2.5 Business turnover derived from tourism and related expenditure
Table 7: Businesses in receipt of visitor spend on trip
| Staying tourists | Day visitors | Total | |------------------|--------------|-------| | Accommodation | £19,593,000 | 34% | £1,216,000 | 1% | £20,809,000 | 10% | | Retail | £10,772,000 | 19% | £69,354,000 | 44% | £80,126,000 | 37% | | Catering | £14,062,000 | 24% | £58,979,000 | 38% | £73,041,000 | 34% | | Attractions | £6,037,000 | 10% | £17,403,000 | 11% | £23,440,000 | 11% | | Transport | £7,202,000 | 12% | £9,283,000 | 6% | £16,485,000 | 8% | | Total(1) | £57,666,000 | £156,235,000 | £213,901,000 | | Other non trip related expenditure(2) | £16,934,000 | £0 | £16,934,000 | | Total direct 2015 | £74,600,000 | £156,235,000 | £230,835,000 | | Total direct 2014 | £213,041,000 | | | % change | 8% |
(1) Adjustments have been made to visitor expenditure by sector to recognise that some spending on retail and food and drink will fall within attractions or accommodation establishments. A small proportion of day trip spend will also fall into ‘Accommodation’ where day visitors have eaten in restaurants/bars of hotels. Furthermore, it is assumed that 40% of travel expenditure occurs outside the destination.
(2) Apart from the spending associated with the individual trips, additional spending by non-visitors, e.g. friends and relatives with whom the visitor is staying with will also take place. Moreover, owners of second homes/boats will spend some money on maintenance, repair. Data is only available for additional expenditure made related to overnight trips. Table 8: Income for local business generated by trip expenditure
| | £ | |----------------------|---------| | Direct | 230,835,000 | | Supplier and income induced | 67,520,000 | | Total 2015 | 298,355,000 | | Total 2014 | 276,030,000 | | % change | 8% |
2.6 Employment supported by tourism and related expenditure
Table 9: Local employment supported by the visitor economy
| | 2015 | 2014 | % change | |----------------------|------|------|----------| | Total FTE Jobs | 4,348| 3,957| 10% | | Total Actual Jobs | 5,965| 5,421| 10% |
Table 10: Proportion of total jobs sustained across all sectors
| | Total | |----------------------|-------| | Total employed (3) | 93,300| | Tourism employment | 5,965 | | Tourism proportion | 6% |
(3) Total labour force is based on all employees incl. part-time (excludes government-supported trainees and HM Force and self-employment). The information comes from the Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) an employer survey conducted by ONS in December of each year. 3. Methodology
The Cambridge Model
The Cambridge Model is essentially a computer-based spreadsheet model that produces estimates from existing national and local information (e.g. accommodation stocks, inbound trips) of the level of tourism activity within a given local area. The volume of visits is translated into economic terms by estimating the amount of spending by visitors based on their average spend per trip. In turn, the impact of that spending can be translated to estimate the effects in terms of business turnover and jobs.
Estimates are based on a 3 year rolling average, thus smoothing out irregular fluctuations and avoiding any distortion arising from regional variations, giving us a more long term picture of the value of tourism and we would caution against year-on-year comparisons. As the Model utilises a standard methodology capable of application throughout the UK, it offers the potential for direct comparisons with similar destinations throughout the country.
The standard measures generated in this Model are: the total amount spent by visitors, the amount of income for local residents and businesses created by this spending, and the number of jobs supported by visitor spending.
The basic process of estimation used can be divided into three parts:
- visitor trips and visitor spending at a regional/county level derived from national survey sources (county/City)
- local supply data on accommodation, attractions and other factors specific to the area.
- the use of multipliers derived from business surveys in England to estimate full time equivalent and actual jobs generated by visitor spending in the area.
In its standard form, the Cambridge Model uses a range of local data including details of accommodation stock, local occupancy rates, population, employment, local wage rates and visits to attractions. It applies this locally sourced information to regional estimates of tourism volume and expenditure derived from the following national surveys:
- Great Britain Tourism Survey (GBTS)
- International Passenger Survey (IPS)
- Great Britain Day Visits Survey (GBDVS)
- Visits to Attractions Survey
- Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE)
- Census of Employment
- Census of Population
- Labour Force Survey
The sophistication of the economic impact estimates will depend on the availability of detailed reliable local information to supplement national and regional data sources. Where such data is available from local surveys, then local variations can be explicitly included. 4. Glossary of terms
Staying trips Staying trips comprise a visit which involves a stay away from home of at least one night. The study measures trips, rather than visitors as one visitor may make multiple trips to an area in a given period.
Tourism day trips A day trip is classified as a "tourism day visit" if it involves participation in one of fifteen leisure activities (full details of the definition used are included in the annual survey report); save lasted at least three hours (including travel); it’s not an activity which is undertaken "very regularly"; and is to a destination outside the respondent's place of residence (or place of work if this was the start point of the trip). The exceptions to this are trips to special public events, live sporting events and visitor attractions.
VFR Trips VFR trips are defined as a visit where the main purpose is visiting friends and relatives. Whilst many trips to visit friends and relatives will be accommodated in the homes of these friends/relatives, some will make use of other forms of accommodation. It should be also noted that other forms of trip, for instance for holiday or business purposes may stay with friends and relatives rather than in commercial accommodation.
‘Other’ Expenditure Apart from the spending associated with the individual trips, additional spending by non-visitors, e.g. friends and relatives with whom the visitor is visiting and/or staying with will also take place. Moreover, owners of second homes/boats will spend some money on maintenance, repair.
Economic multiplier Multipliers are used to estimate the economic impact of visitor expenditure. Visitor expenditure produces three effects. Direct effects are changes in the business sector directly receiving visitor expenditure. For instance, visitors staying in a hotel will directly increase revenue and the number of jobs in the hotel sector. Indirect effects are the changes in supplier businesses. For example, these indirect effects would be hotels purchasing more linen from local suppliers as a result of increased business. Induced effects are changes in local economic activity resulting from household spending. For instance, employees of the hotel and linen supplier spend their wages in the local area, resulting in more sales, income and jobs in the area.
Full Time Equivalent Jobs (FTE) For the purposes of the Model, a FTE is defined by the average annual salary plus employment costs in the sector concerned.
Direct jobs Jobs directly generated in those local businesses in which visitors spend money, i.e. hotels, catering establishments.
Indirect jobs Jobs created locally due to the purchases of goods and services by businesses benefiting from visitor expenditure, i.e. jobs with local suppliers.
Induced jobs Jobs created throughout the local economy because employees employed due to visitor expenditure spend their wages locally on goods and services such as food, clothing and housing. Actual Jobs Many jobs are seasonal or part-time in their nature in the tourism sector, so an adjustment is made to calculate the actual number of jobs from the number of FTEs. The adjustment made is based on the findings of surveys of tourism related businesses, and national employment surveys.
Great Britain Tourism Survey (BGTS) The Great Britain Tourism Survey is undertaken by TNS. The key characteristics of the survey include a 100,000 face-to-face interviews per annum, conducted in-home, and a weekly sample size of around 2,000 adults aged 16 years or over - representative of the GB population in relation to various demographic characteristics including gender, age group, socio-economic group, and geographical location. Respondents are asked about any overnight trips taken in the last four weeks. It provides basic headline data on the volume and value of domestic tourism at a national, regional and county level.
International Passenger Survey (IPS) The International Passenger Survey is conducted by Office for National Statistics and is based on face-to-face interviews with a sample of passengers travelling via the principal airports, sea routes and the Channel Tunnel, together with visitors crossing the land border into Northern Ireland. Around 210,000 interviews are undertaken each year. IPS provides headline figures, based on the county or unitary authority, for the volume and value of overseas trips to the UK.
Great Britain Day Visits Survey (GBDVS) The 2014 Great Britain Day Visits Survey aims to measure the volume, value and profile of Tourism Day Visits taken by GB residents to destinations in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Fieldwork is undertaken on a weekly basis, using an online methodology, and an annual sample of over 38,000 interviews.
United Kingdom Occupancy Survey (UKOS) As part of the EU Directive on Tourism Statistics adopted in 1995, the UK must report regularly on a specified range of statistics to Eurostat, the official statistical office of the European Union. Included in these statistics are monthly occupancy rates for UK serviced accommodation. The responsibility for providing this data lies with the four National Tourist Boards, and across England the survey is undertaken by The Research Solution on behalf of Visit England. A sample of establishments are recruited to the online survey and asked to complete a data form each month, giving details of their nightly occupancy. The data submitted is analysed to produce monthly occupancy rates for the whole of the area and for specific categories of type, size, location etc.
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) provides information about the levels, distribution and make-up of earnings and hours worked for employees in all industries and occupations. ASHE is based on a one per cent sample of employee jobs taken from HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) PAYE records. The ASHE tables contain UK data on earnings for employees by sex and full-time/part-time workers. The earnings information presented relates to gross pay before tax, National Insurance or other deductions.
Labour Force Survey (LFS) The LFS is a household panel survey designed to provide information on the UK labour market, with results produced each quarter. It has a sample of approximately 60,000 households. The LFS is the government’s largest continuous household survey and participation in the survey is voluntary. LFS data is weighted to enable the population estimates to be produced. The weighting also attempts to compensate for differential non-response among different subgroups in the population.
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4a02b82dfaee8438da8dfc836d691ff50538793b | The Economic Impact of Tourism on Calderdale 2016
Prepared by: © Tourism South East Research Unit 40 Chamberlayne Road Eastleigh Hampshire SO50 5JH CONTENTS
1. Summary of Results 1 1.1 Volume & Value of Tourism – National and Regional results 1 1.2 Volume & Value of Tourism – Calderdale 2
2. Methodology 3
3. Table of Results 4 Table 1: Number of staying trips by accommodation 4 Table 2: Number of nights by accommodation 4 Table 3: Spend by accommodation 4 Table 4: Tourism day trips and spend 4 Table 5: Total trips and expenditure 5 Table 6: Sector breakdown of trip expenditure 5 Table 7: Businesses in receipt of direct visitor spend following adjustment 5 Table 8: Income for local business generated by trip expenditure 6 Table 9: Local employment supported 6 Table 10: Proportion of total jobs sustained 6
Glossary of Terms 7 Tourism Economic Impact Estimates
This report contains the findings of a study commissioned by Calderdale Council and undertaken by Tourism South East. The overall aim of the research is to provide indicative estimates of the volume, value and resultant economic impact of tourism on the destination.
The research involved the application of the Cambridge Tourism Economic Impact Model or ‘Cambridge Model’; a computer-based model developed by Geoff Broom Associates and the Regional Tourist Boards of England.
The methodology used to collect data for both domestic day visits and overnight stays in 2016 has changed from the methodology used in previous years. This means that data cannot be directly compared between 2016 and previous years for both number of visits and spend. Comparisons have been shown throughout this report to provide some broad comparisons, however caution should be used when interpreting any direct year-on-year comparisons. Direct comparisons can be made in future years using 2016 data as baseline measures.
1. Summary of results
1.1 National and regional results
| Trips by domestic overnight visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------| | 2016 | 2015 | % change | 2016 | 2015 | % change | | Trips | 9,290,000 | 11,320,000 | -18% | 99,300,000 | 102,730,000 | -3% | | Nights | 27,110,000,000 | 30,880,000,000 | -12% | 288,000,000 | 299,570,000 | -4% | | Spend | £1,616m | £1,922m | -16% | £18,500m | £19,571m | -6% |
| Trips by overseas overnight visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------| | 2016 | 2015 | % change | 2016 | 2015 | % change | | Trips | 1,360,000 | 1,290,000 | 5% | 32,970,000 | 31,820,000 | 4% | | Nights | 11,480,000 | 10,355,000 | 11% | 245,700,000 | 241,427,000 | 2% | | Spend | £516m | £566m | -9% | £19,690m | £19,427m | 1% |
| Trips by day visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-----------------------|--------------------------|---------| | 2016 | 2015 | % change | 2016 | 2015 | % change | | Trips | 149,000,000 | 138,000,000 | 8% | 1,557,000,000 | 1,493,000,000 | 4% | | Spend | £4,370m | £4,256m | 3% | £53,534m | £53,385m | 0% |
| Total trips | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | |-------------|--------------------------|---------| | 2015 | 2015 | % change | 2016 | 2015 | % change | | Trips | 159,650,000 | 150,610,000 | 6% | 1,689,270,000 | 1,627,550,000 | 4% | | Spend | £6,502m | £6,744m | -4% | 91,724,000,000 | 92,383,000,000 | -1% |
- Results from GBTS reveal that 99.3 million domestic overnight trips were taken in England in 2016, a decrease by 3% compared with 2015. The value of domestic overnight trips decreased by 6%, from £19.6 billion to £18.5 billion in 2016.
- The volume and value of domestic overnight trips in Yorkshire and the Humber fell by 18% from 2015 to 2016 and expenditure fell by 16%.
- According to results from IPS, overseas visitors made a total of 32.97 million overnight trips in England in 2016, an increase of 4% compared with 2015. Trip expenditure increased by 1% at the national level.
- Overseas visitor trip volume increased by 5% in Yorkshire and the Humber in 2016 and nights increased by 11%, however overall spend fell by 9% in 2016.
- Figures published in the Great Britain Day Visits Survey (2016) indicate that there were 1.56 billion Tourism Day Visits undertaken in England during 2016, up 4% compared to 2015. Day trip expenditure remained at similar levels to 2015.
- Yorkshire and the Humber region outperformed the national average for day trips, with an 8% increase in visitor numbers and a 3% increase in spend.
1.2 Volume and value of trips – Calderdale results
- Recent trends for Calderdale show an overall increase in year-on-year tourism spending, driven by an increase in day trips and visits by those from overseas.
- Overall, an estimated 333,000 staying trips were spent in the District in 2016. It is estimated that 281,000 trips were made by domestic visitors and 52,000 were made by overseas visitors. Staying trips resulted in an estimated 1 million visitor nights spent in the District, 665,000 by domestic visitors and 369,000 by those visiting from overseas. Overall trip expenditure reached £65 million in 2016.
- Approximately 6.3 million tourism day trips were made to the District (lasting more than 3 hours and taken on an irregular basis) in 2016 generating an additional £188 million in trip expenditure.
- Total expenditure by visitors (overnight and day) to Calderdale is estimated to have been in the region of £253 million in 2016, up by 9% compared to 2015.
- Once adjustments are made to recognise that some of this expenditure will take place outside the District (e.g. it is estimated that around 40% of expenditure on travel such as the purchase of petrol, coach and train fares, will be made at source of origin or on-route), total direct visitor expenditure is reduced to £241 million.
- Additional tourism expenditure is however, generated by other sources, increasing the total amount of money spent in Calderdale. It is estimated that expenditure on second homes and on goods and services purchased by friends and relatives visitors were staying with, or visiting, generated a further total £14.7 million expenditure associated with overnights trips in 2016.
- This brings direct expenditure generated by tourism in Calderdale in 2016 to £255 million, an increase of 11% on 2015. With multiplier effects, the direct turnover is increased to over £328 million in total turnover as a result of a further £73 million being generated through indirect and induced effects.
- This tourism-related expenditure is estimated to have supported 4,633 FTE jobs in Calderdale. Once part-time and seasonal employment is added, the total number of jobs supported increased to 6,371 Actual jobs, up 7% from 2015. These jobs are spread across a wide range of service sectors from catering and retail to public service jobs such as in local government, and not just tourism. According to the Office of National Statistics, there were 102,700 employee jobs across the District. Based on our estimates, total tourism related expenditure supported 6% of these jobs in the District in 2016.
2. Methodology
The Cambridge Model
The Cambridge Model is essentially a computer-based spreadsheet model that produces estimates from existing national and local information (e.g. accommodation stocks, inbound trips) of the level of tourism activity within a given local area. The volume of visits are translated into economic terms by estimating the amount of spending by visitors based on their average spend per trip. In turn, the impact of that spending can be translated to estimate the effects in terms of business turnover and jobs.
The standard measures generated in this Model are: the total amount spent by visitors, the amount of income for local residents and businesses created by this spending, and the number of jobs supported by visitor spending.
As the Model utilises a standard methodology capable of application throughout the UK, it offers the potential for direct comparisons with similar destinations throughout the country.
The basic process of estimation used can be divided into three parts:
- visitor trips and visitor spending at a regional/county level derived from national survey sources (county/City).
- local supply data on accommodation, attractions and other factors specific to the destination.
- the use of multipliers derived from business surveys in England to estimate full time equivalent and actual jobs generated by visitor spending in the area.
In its standard form, the Cambridge Model uses a range of local data including details of accommodation stock, local occupancy rates, population, employment and local wage rates. It applies this locally sourced information to regional estimates of tourism volume and expenditure derived from the following national surveys:
- Great Britain Tourism Survey
- International Passenger Survey
- Great Britain Day Visits Survey
- Census of Employment
- Census of Population
- Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
The sophistication of the economic impact estimates will depend on the availability of detailed reliable local information to supplement national and regional data sources. Where such data is available from local surveys, then local variations can be explicitly included.
### 3. Tables of Results
#### Table 1: Number of staying trips by accommodation stayed at
| | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |----------------|------|------|----------|------|--------|------| | Serviced | 148,000 | 53% | 26,800 | 51% | 174,800 | 52% | | Non-serviced | 11,000 | 4% | 5,200 | 10% | 16,200 | 5% | | Group/campus | 3,000 | 1% | 1,100 | 2% | 4,100 | 1% | | Second homes | 6,000 | 2% | 800 | 2% | 6,800 | 2% | | Boat moorings | 3,000 | 1% | 0 | 0% | 3,000 | 1% | | Other | 4,000 | 1% | 1,400 | 3% | 5,400 | 2% | | Paying guests in private houses | 0 | 0% | 100 | 0% | 100 | 0% | | Staying with friends and relatives | 106,000 | 38% | 16,700 | 32% | 122,700 | 37% | | **Total 2016** | 281,000 | 52,100 | 333,100 | 33% | | **Total 2015** | 309,000 | 47,800 | 356,800 | 37% | | **% change** | -9% | 9% | -7% | |
#### Table 2: Number of nights by accommodation stayed at
| | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |----------------|------|------|----------|------|--------|------| | Serviced | 255,000 | 38% | 74,000 | 20% | 329,000 | 32% | | Non-serviced | 70,000 | 11% | 67,000 | 18% | 137,000 | 13% | | Group/campus | 10,000 | 2% | 16,000 | 4% | 26,000 | 3% | | Second homes | 16,000 | 2% | 21,000 | 6% | 37,000 | 4% | | Boat moorings | 13,000 | 2% | 0 | 0% | 13,000 | 1% | | Other | 28,000 | 4% | 2,000 | 1% | 30,000 | 3% | | Paying guests in private houses | 0 | 0% | 1,000 | 0% | 1,000 | 0% | | Staying with friends and relatives | 274,000 | 41% | 189,000 | 51% | 463,000 | 45% | | **Total 2016** | 665,000 | 369,000 | 1,034,000 | 45% | | **Total 2015** | 702,000 | 415,000 | 1,117,000 | 45% | | **% change** | -5% | -11% | -7% | |
#### Table 3: Spend by accommodation stayed at
| | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |----------------|------|------|----------|------|--------|------| | Serviced | £31,040,000 | 70% | £10,284,000 | 49% | £41,324,000 | 64% | | Non-serviced | £1,411,000 | 3% | £4,359,000 | 21% | £5,770,000 | 9% | | Group/campus | £275,000 | 1% | £599,000 | 3% | £874,000 | 1% | | Second homes | £457,000 | 1% | £210,000 | 1% | £667,000 | 1% | | Boat moorings | £590,000 | 1% | £0 | 0% | £590,000 | 1% | | Other | £1,462,000 | 3% | £14,000 | 0% | £1,476,000 | 2% | | Paying guests in private houses | £0 | 0% | £200,000 | 1% | £200,000 | 0% | | Staying with friends and relatives | £8,934,000 | 20% | £5,203,000 | 25% | £14,137,000 | 22% | | **Total 2016** | £44,170,000 | £20,869,000 | £65,039,000 | 22% | | **Total 2015** | £43,683,000 | £18,786,000 | £62,469,000 | 22% | | **% change** | 1% | 11% | 4% | |
#### Table 4: Tourism Day trips and spend
| | Trips | Spend | |----------------|-------|-------| | **Total 2016** | 6,298,000 | £187,699,000 | | **Total 2015** | 5,567,000 | £162,424,000 | | **% change** | 13% | 16% | Table 5: Sector breakdown of trip expenditure
| Sector | Domestic | Overseas | Day | Total | |-----------------|----------|----------|-----|-------| | Accommodation | £14,554,000 | 33% | £6,266,000 | 30% | £0 | 0% | £20,820,000 | 8% | | Retail | £5,370,000 | 12% | £5,790,000 | 28% | £80,972,000 | 43% | £92,132,000 | 36% | | Catering | £10,208,000 | 23% | £4,592,000 | 22% | £70,258,000 | 37% | £85,058,000 | 34% | | Attractions | £3,548,000 | 8% | £2,181,000 | 10% | £18,593,000 | 10% | £24,322,000 | 10% | | Travel | £10,490,000 | 24% | £2,040,000 | 10% | £17,875,000 | 10% | £30,405,000 | 12% | | Total 2016 | £44,170,000 | | £20,869,000 | | £187,698,000 | | £252,737,000 | | | Total 2015 | | | | £230,835,000 | | | | | % change | | | | 9% | | | |
Table 6: Businesses in receipt of visitor spend on trip
| Sector | Staying tourists | Day visitors | Total | |-----------------------------|------------------|--------------|-------| | Accommodation | £21,116,000 | 35% | £1,405,000 | 1% | £22,521,000 | 9% | | Retail | £11,049,000 | 18% | £80,162,000 | 44% | £91,211,000 | 38% | | Catering | £14,356,000 | 24% | £68,151,000 | 38% | £82,507,000 | 34% | | Attractions/entertainment | £5,989,000 | 10% | £20,106,000 | 11% | £26,095,000 | 11% | | Transport | £7,518,000 | 13% | £10,725,000 | 6% | £18,243,000 | 8% | | Total(1) | £60,028,000 | | £180,549,000 | | £240,577,000 | | | Other non trip related expenditure(2) | £14,701,000 | | | | | | Total direct 2016 | | | | £255,278,000 | | | | Total direct 2015 | | | | £230,835,000 | | | | % change | | | | 11% | | |
(1) Adjustments have been made to visitor expenditure by sector to recognise that some spending on retail and food and drink will fall within attractions or accommodation establishments. A small proportion of day trip spend will also fall into ‘Accommodation’ where day visitors have eaten in restaurants/bars of hotels. Furthermore, it is assumed that 40% of travel expenditure occurs outside the destination.
(2) Apart from the spending associated with the individual trips, additional spending by non-visitors, e.g. friends and relatives with whom the visitor is staying with will also take place. Moreover, owners of second homes/boats will spend some money on maintenance, repair. Data is only available for additional expenditure made related to overnight trips. Table 7: Income for local business generated by trip expenditure
| | Amount | |----------------------|--------------| | Direct | £255,278,000 | | Supplier and income induced | £72,776,000 | | Total 2016 | £328,054,000 | | Total 2015 | £276,030,000 | | % change | 19% |
Table 8: Local employment supported by the visitor economy
| | 2016 | 2015 | % change | |----------------------|------|------|----------| | Total FTE Jobs | 4,633| 4,348| 7% | | Total Actual Jobs | 6,371| 5,965| 7% |
Table 9: Proportion of total jobs sustained across all sectors
| | Total | |----------------------|-------| | Total employed (3) | 102,700| | Tourism employment | 6,371 | | Tourism proportion | 6% |
(3) Total labour force is based on all employees incl. part-time (excludes government-supported trainees and HM Force and self-employment). The information comes from the Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) an employer survey conducted by ONS in December of each year. Glossary of terms
Actual Jobs Many jobs are seasonal or part-time in their nature in the tourism sector, so an adjustment is made to calculate the actual number of jobs from the number of FTEs. The adjustment made is based on the findings of surveys of tourism related businesses, and national employment surveys.
Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) This is the main government survey of companies in the UK. It is conducted in two parts: one dealing with employment, the other with financial information.
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings The AHSE Survey provides information on wage levels by industry sector and occupation. The main strength of the AHSE is its large sample size. It is based on a 1% sample of employees who are members of PAYE. The coverage of full-time adult employees is virtually complete, and consequently the survey is representative of hours worked for full-time employees on adult rates of pay (although the survey is currently not weighted). The coverage of part-time employees is not comprehensive, as some part-time workers will have earnings below the income tax threshold. The AHSE is the best source for estimating full time earnings.
Direct jobs Jobs directly generated in those local businesses in which visitors spend money, i.e. hotels, catering establishments.
Economic multiplier Multipliers are used to estimate the economic impact of visitor expenditure. Visitor expenditure produces three effects. Direct effects are changes in the business sector directly receiving visitor expenditure. For instance, visitors staying in a hotel will directly increase revenue and the number of jobs in the hotel sector. Indirect effects are the changes in supplier businesses. For example, these indirect effects would be hotels purchasing more linen from local suppliers as a result of increased business. Induced effects are changes in local economic activity resulting from household spending. For instance, employees of the hotel and linen supplier spend their wages in the local area, resulting in more sales, income and jobs in the area.
Full Time Equivalent Jobs (FTE) For the purposes of the Model, a FTE is defined by the average annual salary plus employment costs in the sector concerned.
Indirect jobs Jobs created locally due to the purchases of goods and services by businesses benefiting from visitor expenditure, i.e. jobs with local suppliers.
Induced jobs Jobs created throughout the local economy because employees employed due to visitor expenditure spend their wages locally on goods and services such as food, clothing and housing.
International Passenger Survey (IPS) The International Passenger Survey is conducted by Office for National Statistics and is based on face-to-face interviews with a sample of passengers travelling via the principal airports, sea routes and the Channel Tunnel, together with visitors crossing the land border into Northern Ireland. Around 210,000 interviews are undertaken each year. IPS provides headline figures, based on the county or unitary authority, for the volume and value of inbound trips to the UK.
Labour Force Survey (LFS) The LFS is a household panel survey, continuous since 1992, with results produced each quarter. It has a sample of approximately 60,000 households. The LFS is the government’s largest continuous household survey and participation in the survey is voluntary. LFS data is weighted to enable the population estimates to be produced. The weighting also attempts to compensate for differential non-response among different subgroups in the population. LFS is designed to provide information on the UK labour market that can be used to develop, manage and evaluate labour market.
‘Other-trip’ Expenditure Apart from the spending associated with the individual trips, additional spending by non-visitors, e.g. friends and relatives with whom the visitor is visiting and/or staying with will also take place. Moreover, owners of second homes/boats will spend some money on maintenance, repair.
Great Britain Tourism Survey (GBTS) The Great Britain Tourism Survey is undertaken for VisitBritain and is based on 1,000,000 telephone interviews per each year. It provides basic headline data on the volume and value of domestic tourism at a national, regional and county level.
Staying trips Staying trips comprise a visit which involves a stay away from home of at least one night. The study measures trips, rather than visitors as one visitor may make multiple trips to an area in a given period.
Great Britain Day Visits Survey (GBDVS) Great Britain Day Visits Survey is undertaken for VisitBritain and is based on an annual sample of c. 35,000 adults in Great Britain. It measures a range of aspects of day-visits made to all areas of Great Britain.
Tourism day trips Day trips are defined as a visit to and from home for leisure purposes, undertaken on an irregular basis and lasting a minimum of three hours. The report excludes trips undertaken for business or study purposes, as these are not covered by the Leisure Day Visits Survey methodology. The definition of day trips adopted by this study is that used by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.
**United Kingdom Occupancy Survey (UKOS)** As part of the EU Directive on Tourism Statistics adopted in 1995, the UK must report regularly on a specified range of statistics to Eurostat, the official statistical office of the European Union. Included in these statistics are monthly occupancy rates for UK serviced accommodation. The responsibility for providing this data lies with the four National Tourist Boards, and across England the survey is undertaken by the Regional Tourist Boards. A sample of establishments is recruited to the survey and asked to complete a data form each month, giving details of their nightly occupancy. The data form is processed and analysed to produce monthly occupancy rates for the whole of the area and for specific categories of type, size, location etc.
**VFR Trips** VFR trips are defined as a visit where the main purpose is visiting friends and relatives. Whilst many trips to visit friends and relatives will be accommodated in the homes of these friends/relatives, some will make use of other forms of accommodation. It should be also noted that other forms of trip, for instance for holiday or business purposes may stay with friends and relatives rather than in commercial accommodation.
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a52e891e980f7e814024204d6e857ae617a01433 | The Economic Impact of Tourism on Calderdale 2017
Prepared by: Tourism South East Research Unit 40 Chamberlayne Road Eastleigh Hampshire SO50 5JH
## CONTENTS
| Section | Page | |----------------------------------------------|------| | Introduction | 1 | | National and regional results | 1 | | Volume and value of trips to Calderdale | 3 | | Overnight trips by accommodation | 5 | | Overnight trips by purpose | 7 | | Tourism day trips | 8 | | Value of tourism | 9 | | Employment | 10 | | Key results for 2017 | 11 | | Methodology | 12 | | Glossary of terms | 13 | Introduction
This report, commissioned by Calderdale Council and undertaken by Tourism South East, examines the volume and value of tourism and the impact of visitor expenditure on the local economy in 2017 and provides comparative data against previously published data from 2016.
The study involved the application of the Cambridge Tourism Economic Impact Model or ‘Cambridge Model’; a computer-based model developed by Geoff Broom Associates and the Regional Tourist Boards of England. In its basic form, the model distributes regional activity as measured in national surveys to local areas using ‘drivers’ such as accommodation stock and occupancy which influence the distribution of tourism at local level.
IMPORTANT - The methodology used to collect data for domestic day visits in 2016 has changed from the methodology used in previous years. This means that data was not able to be directly compared between 2016 and previous years for both number of visits and spend. Direct comparisons can be made in this year using 2016 data as baseline measures.
National and regional results
| Trips by domestic overnight visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------|----------|--------------------------|---------|----------| | Trips | 2017: 10,693,000 | 2016: 9,385,000 | 14% | 2017: 100,600,000 | 2016: 99,300,000 | 1% | | Nights | 2017: 29,028,000 | 2016: 27,008,000 | 7% | 2017: 299,400,000 | 2016: 288,000,000 | 4% | | Spend | 2017: £1,737m | 2016: £1,611m | 8% | 2017: £19,049m | 2016: £18,500m | 3% |
| Trips by overseas overnight visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------|----------|--------------------------|---------|----------| | Trips | 2017: 1,340,000 | 2016: 1,410,000 | -2% | 2017: 34,300,000 | 2016: 32,970,000 | 4% | | Nights | 2017: 11,470,000 | 2016: 11,480,000 | 0% | 2017: 253,130,000 | 2016: 245,700,000 | 3% | | Spend | 2017: £567m | 2016: £516m | 10% | 2017: £21,380m | 2016: £19,690m | 8% |
| Trips by day visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------|----------|--------------------------|---------|----------| | Trips | 2017: 149,000,000 | 2016: 149,000,000 | 0% | 2017: 1,505,000,000 | 2016: 1,557,000,000 | -3% | | Spend | 2017: £5,023m | 2016: £4,370m | 15% | 2017: £50,899m | 2016: £53,534m | -5% |
| Total trips | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------|----------|--------------------------|---------|----------| | Trips | 2017: 161,033,000 | 2016: 159,795,000 | 1% | 2017: 1,639,900,000 | 2016: 1,689,270,000 | -3% | | Spend | 2017: £7,327m | 2016: £6,497m | 13% | 2017: £91,308m | 2016: £91,724m | 0% |
- Results from GBTS reveal that 100.6 million domestic overnight trips were taken in England in 2017, an increase of 1% compared with 2016. The value of domestic overnight trips increased by 3%, from £18.5 million in 2016 to £19.1 million in 2017.
- Across the region of Yorkshire and the Humber, the volume of domestic overnight trips increased significantly by 14% (from 9.4m to 10.7m) and trip spend increased by 8% compared to 2016 (from £1.6m to £1.7m). According to results from IPS, overseas visitors made a total of 34.3 million overnight trips in England, an increase of 4% compared with 2016. Trip expenditure increased by a significant 8% at the national level.
Overseas visitor trip volume was slightly down for the region compared with 2016; total overnight trips taken by visitors from overseas to Yorkshire and the Humber decreased by 2% (from 1.4m to 1.3m). However, the overall expenditure associated with trips by overseas visitors to the region rose by 10% according to the national survey.
Figures published in the Great Britain Day Visits Survey (2017) indicate that there were 1.5 billion tourism day visits undertaken in England during 2017 (down 3% compared to 2016). Spend per head in day trip expenditure also decreased by 5% at a national level.
Due to the change in methodology, Visit Britain has reweighted the 2016 tourism day visits data. According to the national survey, there was no change in the number of tourism day trips to the region when compared with 2016, when, however there was a significant increase in tourism day visit spend of 15% at regional level.
In total, 161 million trips were made to the region in 2017, up 1% from 160 million trips in 2016. Volume and value of trips to Calderdale
- It is estimated that around 0.3 million overnight tourism trips were made to Calderdale in 2017, equivalent to that of 2016. Of these trips, domestic visitors made 82% of trips (271,000) and overseas visitors made up 18% of trips (58,800). Compared to 2016, the volume of domestic overnight trips decreased by 4% and the volume of inbound overnight trips rose by 13%, resulting in a marginal net change.
- The total number of nights spent in Calderdale by domestic visitors in 2017 fell from 0.67 million bednights to 0.66 million bednights (a decrease of 1% compared to 2016) and there was no change in the trip length of overseas visitors where the number of nights spent in Calderdale remained at 0.37 million bednights. This gave an overall decrease in the number of nights spent in Calderdale of 1%.
- In total, it is estimated that around £68.7 million was spent by all overnight visitors on their trip to Calderdale in 2017, a rise of 6%. Domestic visitor expenditure decreased by 1% and overseas visitor expenditure increased by 20%, resulting in a net increase of 6%.
- It is estimated that around 6.4 million tourism day trips were made to Calderdale in 2017, a rise of 2% compared to 2016. As a result day expenditure increased by 5%.
- In total, around £266.4 million was spent on trips to Calderdale in 2017 by overnight and day visitors, up by 5% compared to 2016. Sixteen percent of this expenditure was made by domestic staying visitor; 10% by overseas staying visitors and 74% by day visitors.
- Around £253.8 million directly benefited local businesses from hotels and restaurants to cafes, shops and attractions in Calderdale. Adjustments have been made to recognise that some spending on travel will take place outside the destination. It is assumed that 40% of travel spend will take place at the origin of the trip rather than at the destination. Also some expenditure on retail and food and drink will fall within the attractions sector and accommodation sector.
- However, further ‘additional expenditure’ spent by visitors on second homes / boats and by friends and relatives, whom visitors are staying with or visiting, needs also to be accounted for as this represents a significant additional source of income for local businesses. It is estimated that this ‘additional’ expenditure generated a further £13.3 million in direct turnover for local businesses in 2017.
- In addition to the business turnover generated in those businesses directly receiving visitor income, successive rounds of expenditure, that is spending by these businesses on local supplies (indirect impacts) and spending by employers in the local area (induced impacts), is estimated to have generated £267.1 million to the local economy (the multiplier impact).
- Drawing together direct business turnover, supplier and income induced expenditure, and the additional expenditure spent on second homes and by friends and relatives, the total value of tourism activity in Calderdale in 2017 is estimated to have been around £344.1 million, up by 5% compared to 2016.
- This income to the local economy is estimated to have supported 4,990 Full-Time Equivalent Jobs. Many of these jobs are part-time or seasonal in nature and translate into an estimated 6,884 Actual Jobs, an increase of 8% compared to 2016. These jobs are spread across a wide range of service sectors from catering and retail to public service jobs such as in local government, and not just tourism. According to the Office of National Statistics, there are 96,000 employee jobs across Calderdale. Based on our estimates, total tourism related expenditure supported 7.2% of these jobs in 2017, an increase of 1% on 2016. The Volume and Value of Tourism, 2017
Overnight trips by accommodation
Number of staying trips by accommodation stayed at
| | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |----------------------|------|-----|----------|-----|-------|-----| | Serviced | 141,000 | 52% | 32,700 | 56% | 173,700 | 53% | | Non-Serviced | 12,000 | 4% | 5,600 | 10% | 17,600 | 5% | | Group / campus | 4,000 | 1% | 1,300 | 2% | 5,300 | 2% | | Second homes | 7,000 | 3% | 1,000 | 2% | 8,000 | 2% | | Boat moorings(^1) | 3,000 | 1% | 0 | 0% | 3,000 | 1% | | Paying guests | 0 | 0% | 200 | 0% | 200 | 0% | | Other/mixed(^2) | 5,000 | 2% | 0 | 0% | 5,000 | 2% | | SFR | 101,000 | 37% | 17,900 | 30% | 118,900 | 36% | | **Total 2017** | 271,000 | 58% | 56,800 | 32% | 329,800 | 32% | | **Total 2016** | 281,000 | 52% | 52,100 | 13% | 331,100 | 0% | | % change | -4% | | 13% | | 0% | |
SFR = staying with friends/relatives
(^1) Information on boat use is not available for overseas tourists.
(^2) Trips which involve staying in more than one type of accommodation over the duration of the trip. For overseas trips these also include nights spent in transit, in lorry cabs and other temporary accommodation.
Overnight trips by type of accommodation
Number of nights by accommodation stayed at
| | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |----------------------|------|-----|----------|-----|-------|-----| | Serviced | 254,000 | 38% | 77,000 | 21% | 331,000 | 32% | | Non-Serviced | 91,000 | 14% | 74,000 | 20% | 165,000 | 16% | | Group / campus | 7,000 | 1% | 7,000 | 2% | 14,000 | 1% | | Second homes | 16,000 | 2% | 26,000 | 7% | 42,000 | 4% | | Boat moorings | 16,000 | 2% | 0 | 0% | 16,000 | 2% | | Paying guests | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | | Other | 12,000 | 2% | 0 | 0% | 12,000 | 1% | | SFR | 263,000 | 40% | 185,000 | 50% | 448,000 | 44% | | **Total 2017** | 660,000 | 62% | 368,000 | 50% | 1,028,000 | 44% | | **Total 2016** | 665,000 | 62% | 369,000 | 50% | 1,034,000 | 44% | | % change | -1% | | 0% | | -1% | |
Staying nights by type of accommodation
Staying nights 2016 v 2017
### Spend by accommodation stayed at
| Type of Accommodation | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |-----------------------|----------|-----|----------|-----|-----------|-----| | Serviced | £31,845,000 | 73% | £12,841,000 | 51% | £44,686,000 | 65% | | Non-Serviced | £1,396,000 | 3% | £5,641,000 | 23% | £7,037,000 | 10% | | Group / campus | £329,000 | 1% | £0 | 0% | £329,000 | 0% | | Second homes | £685,000 | 2% | £209,000 | 1% | £894,000 | 1% | | Boat moorings | £627,000 | 1% | £0 | 0% | £627,000 | 1% | | Paying guests | £0 | 0% | £0 | 0% | £0 | 0% | | Other | £775,000 | 2% | £0 | 0% | £775,000 | 1% | | SFR | £7,969,000 | 18% | £6,368,000 | 25% | £14,337,000 | 21% | | **Total 2017** | **£43,625,000** | **18%** | **£25,059,000** | **25%** | **£68,684,000** | **21%** | | **Total 2016** | **£44,170,000** | **18%** | **£20,869,000** | **25%** | **£65,039,000** | **21%** | | % change | -1% | | 20% | | 6% | |
#### Overnight spend by type of accommodation
- Paid accommodation: 78%
- Friends/relatives /second homes: 22%
#### Overnight spend 2016 v 2017
- UK
- Overseas
- Total Overnight trips by purpose
| Purpose | UK | Overseas | Total | |--------------------------------|--------|----------|-------| | Holiday | 134,000| 27,000 | 161,000| | Business | 82,000 | 12,000 | 94,000 | | Visits to friends/relatives | 48,000 | 16,900 | 64,900 | | Other | 7,000 | 2,300 | 9,300 | | Study | 0 | 500 | 500 | | **Total** | 271,000| 58,800 | 329,800|
Nights by purpose
| Purpose | UK | Overseas | Total | |--------------------------------|--------|----------|-------| | Holiday | 346,000| 136,000 | 482,000| | Business | 167,000| 27,000 | 194,000| | Visits to friends/relatives | 136,000| 174,000 | 310,000| | Other | 12,000 | 14,000 | 26,000 | | Study | 0 | 19,000 | 19,000 | | **Total** | 660,000| 368,000 | 1,028,000|
Spend by purpose
| Purpose | UK | Overseas | Total | |--------------------------------|--------|----------|-------| | Holiday | £18,558,000 | £11,464,000 | £30,022,000 | | Business | £14,655,000 | £4,342,000 | £18,997,000 | | Visits to friends/relatives | £7,696,000 | £6,590,000 | £14,286,000 | | Other | £2,716,000 | £1,082,000 | £3,798,000 | | Study | £0 | £1,580,000 | £1,580,000 | | **Total** | £43,625,000| £25,059,000| £68,684,000| Tourism day trips
Tourism Day trips and spend
| | Trips | Spend | |---------------|---------|-------------| | Total 2017 | 6,437,000 | £197,759,000 | | Total 2016 | 6,298,000 | £187,699,000 | | % change | 2% | 5% |
Proportion of tourism day visits within the county
- Yorkshire & The Humber: 96%
- Calderdale: 4%
Proportion of tourism day visits spend within the county
- Yorkshire & The Humber: 96%
- Calderdale: 4% The Volume and Value of Tourism, 2017
Value of tourism
Sector breakdown of trip expenditure
| Sector | Domestic | Overseas | Day | Total | |-----------------|----------|----------|-----|-------| | Accommodation | £14,171,000 | £7,680,000 | £0 | £21,851,000 | | Retail | £5,355,000 | £6,899,000 | £85,297,000 | £97,551,000 | | Catering | £10,218,000 | £5,512,000 | £74,030,000 | £89,760,000 | | Attractions | £3,475,000 | £2,524,000 | £19,595,000 | £25,594,000 | | Travel | £10,406,000 | £2,444,000 | £18,837,000 | £31,687,000 | | Total 2017 | £43,625,000 | £25,059,000 | £197,759,000 | £266,443,000 | | Distribution | 16% | 10% | 74% | 10% | | Total 2016 | £44,170,000 | £20,869,000 | £187,698,000 | £252,737,000 | | % change | -1% | 20% | 5% | 5% |
Breakdown of trip expenditure
| Sector | 2016 | 2017 | |-----------------|------|------| | Accommodation | £22,165,000 | £23,646,000 | | Retail | £12,131,000 | £12,481,000 | | Catering | £15,278,000 | £15,512,000 | | Attractions | £6,278,000 | £6,524,000 | | Transport | £7,710,000 | £8,044,000 | | TOTAL (1) | £63,542,000 | £66,067,000 | | Other non trip related expenditure (2) | £13,327,000 | £13,327,000 | | Total direct 2017 | £76,869,000 | £79,394,000 | | Total direct 2016 | £76,869,000 | £79,394,000 | | % change | 5% | 5% |
Businesses in receipt of visitor spend on trip
| Sector | Staying tourists | Day visitors | Total | |-----------------|------------------|--------------|-------| | Accommodation | £22,165,000 | £1,481,000 | £23,646,000 | | Retail | £12,131,000 | £84,444,000 | £96,575,000 | | Catering | £15,278,000 | £71,809,000 | £87,087,000 | | Attractions | £6,278,000 | £21,188,000 | £27,466,000 | | Transport | £7,710,000 | £11,302,000 | £19,012,000 | | TOTAL (1) | £63,542,000 | £190,224,000 | £253,766,000 | | Other non trip related expenditure (2) | £13,327,000 | £13,327,000 | | Total direct 2017 | £76,869,000 | £190,224,000 | £267,093,000 | | Total direct 2016 | £76,869,000 | £190,224,000 | £267,093,000 | | % change | 5% | 5% | 5% |
Proportion of visitor spend by business
Income for local business generated by trip expenditure
| Sector | Direct | Supplier & income induced | Total 2017 | Total 2016 | % change | |-----------------|--------|---------------------------|------------|------------|----------| | Accommodation | £267,093,000 | £77,008,000 | £344,101,000 | £328,054,000 | 5% | | Retail | £12,131,000 | £84,444,000 | £96,575,000 | £97,551,000 | 36% | | Catering | £15,278,000 | £71,809,000 | £87,087,000 | £89,760,000 | 34% | | Attractions | £6,278,000 | £21,188,000 | £27,466,000 | £25,594,000 | 10% | | Transport | £7,710,000 | £11,302,000 | £19,012,000 | £31,687,000 | 12% | | TOTAL (1) | £63,542,000 | £190,224,000 | £253,766,000 | £266,443,000 | 12% | | Other non trip related expenditure (2) | £13,327,000 | £13,327,000 | | Total direct 2017 | £76,869,000 | £190,224,000 | £267,093,000 | | Total direct 2016 | £76,869,000 | £190,224,000 | £267,093,000 | | % change | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% |
(1) Adjustments have been made to visitor expenditure by sector to recognise that some spending on retail and food and drink will fall within attractions or accommodation establishments. A small proportion of day trip spend will also fall into ‘Accommodation’ where day visitors have eaten in restaurants/bars of hotels. Furthermore, it is assumed that 40% of travel expenditure occurs outside the destination
(2) Apart from the spending associated with the individual trips, additional spending by non-visitors, e.g. friends and relatives with whom the visitor is staying will also take place. Moreover, owners of second homes/boats will spend some money on maintenance, repair. Data is only available for additional expenditure made related to overnight trips. Employment
Local employment supported by the visitor economy - Full time equivalent jobs (FTE)
| | Staying Visitor | Day Visitor | Total | |----------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------| | Direct | 1,148 | 2,559 | 3,707 | | Indirect | 337 | 392 | 729 | | Induced | 186 | 369 | 554 | | **Total FTE 2017** | **1,670** | **3,320** | **4,990** | | Comparison 2016 | 1,588 | 3,045 | 4,633 | | % change | 5% | 9% | 8% |
Proportion of FTE jobs
- Direct: 69%
- Indirect: 20%
- Induced: 11%
Number of FTE jobs 2016 v 2017
| | Staying | Day | Total | |----------------------|---------|-----|-------| | 2016 | 1,588 | 3,045 | 4,633 | | 2017 | 1,670 | 3,320 | 4,990 | | % change | 5% | 9% | 8% |
Local employment supported by the visitor economy - Estimated actual jobs
| | Staying Visitor | Day Visitor | Total | |----------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------| | Direct | 1,620 | 3,800 | 5,421 | | Indirect | 384 | 447 | 831 | | Induced | 212 | 421 | 632 | | **Total estimated actual jobs 2017** | **2,216** | **4,668** | **6,884** | | Comparison 2016 | 2,093 | 4,278 | 6,371 | | % change | 6% | 9% | 8% |
Proportion of estimated actual jobs
- Direct: 73%
- Indirect: 17%
- Induced: 10%
Number of estimated actual jobs 2016 v 2017
| | Staying | Day | Total | |----------------------|---------|-----|-------| | 2016 | 2,093 | 4,278 | 6,371 | | 2017 | 2,216 | 4,668 | 6,884 | | % change | 6% | 9% | 8% |
Proportion of total jobs supported across all sectors
| | Staying Visitor | Day Visitor | Total | |----------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------| | Total employed (3) | 96,000 | 96,000 | 96,000 | | Tourism employment | 2,216 | 4,668 | 6,884 | | **Tourism proportion 2017** | **2.3%** | **4.9%** | **7.2%** | | Comparison 2016 | 2.0% | 4.2% | 6.2% | | % change | 0.3% | 0.7% | 1.0% |
Tourism jobs as a Percentage of Total Employment
- Total employment: 93%
- Tourism jobs: 7%
______________________________________________________________________
(3) Total labour force is based on all employees incl. part-time (excludes government-supported trainees and HM Force and self-employment). The information comes from the Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) an employer survey conducted by ONS in December of each year. Key results for 2017
- **6.7 million trips** were undertaken
- **6.4 million** day trips *increase of 1% from 2016*
- **0.3 million** overnight visits *same as 2016 (plus/minus domestic vs inbound)*
- **1.0 million nights** in the area as a result of overnight trips *same as 2016*
- **£266.4 million** spent by tourists during their visit to the area *increase of 5% from 2016*
- **£22.2 million** spent on average in the local economy every month *new figure but calculating 2016 would have been 21.08 per month*
- **£68.7 million** generated by overnight visits *increase by 6% from 2016*
- **£197.8 million** generated from day trips *increase by 5% from 2016*
- **£344.1 million** spent in the local area as a result of tourism (taking into account multiplier effects) *increase of 5% from 2016*
- **6,884 jobs** supported, both for local residents and from those living nearby – suggest using this figure because it is the two figures below amalgamated.
- **5,421 tourism jobs** directly supported
- **1,463 non-tourism related jobs** supported (linked to multiplier spend from tourism)
- **7.2% of population** employed as a result of tourism in Calderdale *an increase of 8% from 2016* Methodology
The Cambridge Model is essentially a computer-based spreadsheet model that produces estimates from existing national and local information (e.g. accommodation stocks, inbound trips) of the level of tourism activity within a given local area. The volume of visits is translated into economic terms by estimating the amount of spending by visitors based on their average spend per trip. In turn, the impact of that spending can be translated to estimate the effects in terms of business turnover and jobs.
Estimates are based on a 3 year rolling average, thus smoothing out irregular fluctuations and avoiding any distortion arising from regional variations, giving us a more long term picture of the value of tourism and we would caution against year-on-year comparisons. As the Model utilises a standard methodology capable of application throughout the UK, it offers the potential for direct comparisons with similar destinations throughout the country.
The standard measures generated in this Model are: the total amount spent by visitors, the amount of income for local residents and businesses created by this spending, and the number of jobs supported by visitor spending.
The basic process of estimation used can be divided into three parts:
- visitor trips and visitor spending at a regional/county level derived from national survey sources
- local supply data on accommodation, attractions and other factors specific to the area
- the use of multipliers derived from business surveys in England to estimate full time equivalent and actual jobs generated by visitor spending in the area
In its standard form, the Cambridge Model uses a range of local data including details of accommodation stock, local occupancy rates, population, employment, local wage rates and visits to attractions. It applies this locally sourced information to regional estimates of tourism volume and expenditure derived from the following national surveys:
- Great Britain Tourism Survey (GBTS) – information on tourism activity by GB residents;
- International Passenger Survey (IPS) – information on overseas visitors to the United Kingdom;
- Great Britain Day Visits Survey (GBDVS) - measures the volume and value of tourism day visits in Britain
- Visits to Attractions Survey – annual recording of visitor numbers to free and paid attractions in England
- Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) – contains UK data on employees earnings;
- Census of Employment – updated annually by the Office for National Statistics
- Census of Population – updated annually by the Office for National Statistics
The sophistication of the economic impact estimates will depend on the availability of detailed reliable local information to supplement national and regional data sources. Where such data is available from local surveys, then local variations can be explicitly included. Glossary of terms
Staying trips Staying trips comprise a visit which involves a stay away from home of at least one night. The study measures trips, rather than visitors as one visitor may make multiple trips to an area in a given period.
Tourism day trips A day trip is classified as a "tourism day visit" if it involves participation in one of fifteen leisure activities (full details of the definition used are included in the annual survey report); that lasted at least three hours (including travel); it's not an activity which is undertaken "very regularly"; and is to a destination outside the respondent's place of residence (or place of work if this was the start point of the trip). The exceptions to this are trips to special public events, live sporting events and visitor attractions.
VFR trips VFR trips are defined as a visit where the main purpose is visiting friends and relatives. Whilst many trips to visit friends and relatives will be accommodated in the homes of these friends/relatives (SFR), some will make use of other forms of accommodation. It should be also noted that other forms of trip, for instance for holiday or business purposes may stay with friends and relatives rather than in commercial accommodation.
‘Other’ expenditure Apart from the spending associated with the individual trips, additional spending by non-visitors, e.g. friends and relatives with whom the visitor is visiting and/or staying with will also take place. Moreover, owners of second homes/boats will spend some money on maintenance, repair.
Economic multiplier Multipliers are used to estimate the economic impact of visitor expenditure. Visitor expenditure produces three effects. Direct effects are changes in the business sector directly receiving visitor expenditure. For instance, visitors staying in a hotel will directly increase revenue and the number of jobs in the hotel sector. Indirect effects are the changes in supplier businesses. For example, these indirect effects would be hotels purchasing more linen from local suppliers as a result of increased business. Induced effects are changes in local economic activity resulting from household spending. For instance, employees of the hotel and linen supplier spend their wages in the local area, resulting in more sales, income and jobs in the area.
Full time equivalent jobs (FTE) For the purposes of the Model, a FTE is defined by the average annual salary plus employment costs in the sector concerned.
Direct jobs Jobs directly generated in those local businesses in which visitors spend money, i.e. hotels, catering establishments.
Indirect jobs Jobs created locally due to the purchases of goods and services by businesses benefiting from visitor expenditure, i.e. jobs with local suppliers.
Induced jobs Jobs created throughout the local economy because employees employed due to visitor expenditure spend their wages locally on goods and services such as food, clothing and housing. Actual jobs Many jobs are seasonal or part-time in their nature in the tourism sector, so an adjustment is made to calculate the actual number of jobs from the number of FTEs. The adjustment made is based on the findings of surveys of tourism related businesses, and national employment surveys.
Great Britain Tourism Survey (GBTS) The Great Britain Tourism Survey is undertaken by Kantar TNS. The key characteristics of the survey include a 100,000 face-to-face interviews per annum, conducted in-home, and a weekly sample size of around 2,000 adults aged 16 years or over - representative of the GB population in relation to various demographic characteristics including gender, age group, socio-economic group, and geographical location. Respondents are asked about any overnight trips taken in the last four weeks. It provides basic headline data on the volume and value of domestic tourism at a national, regional and county level.
International Passenger Survey (IPS) The International Passenger Survey is conducted by Office for National Statistics and is based on face-to-face interviews with a sample of passengers travelling via the principal airports, sea routes and the Channel Tunnel, together with visitors crossing the land border into Northern Ireland. Around 210,000 interviews are undertaken each year. IPS provides headline figures, based on the county or unitary authority, for the volume and value of overseas trips to the UK.
Great Britain Day Visits Survey (GBDVS) The methodology for the 2016 Great Britain Day Visits Survey altered compared with previous years. The changes implemented were - questionnaire improvements to make the survey more engaging and easy to complete; questionnaire revisions required as part of the ‘merging’ of GBDVS with the GBTS online piloting; and the weekly sample size contacted for the wider GBDVS/GBTS combined surveying increased from 673 to 1,000. Parallel testing of the survey approaches used before and after these changes found that these changes resulted in increased levels of visits reported by respondents by around +15%. The aims of the survey continue to be to measure the volume, value and profile of Tourism Day Visits taken by GB residents to destinations in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Surveying is undertaken on a weekly basis, using an online methodology, with a sample over 32,000 interviews.
United Kingdom Occupancy Survey (UKOS) As part of the EU Directive on Tourism Statistics adopted in 1995, the UK must report regularly on a specified range of statistics to Eurostat, the official statistical office of the European Union. Included in these statistics are monthly occupancy rates for UK serviced accommodation. The responsibility for providing this data lies with the four National Tourist Boards, and across England the survey is now undertaken STR on behalf of Visit England. The data is collected using a syndicated panel of more than 3,000 hotels and accommodation providers who are asked to complete a data form each month, giving details of their nightly occupancy. The data submitted is analysed to produce monthly occupancy rates for the whole of the area and for specific categories of type, size, location etc.
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) provides information about the levels, distribution and make-up of earnings and hours worked for employees in all industries and occupations. ASHE is based on a one per cent sample of employee jobs taken from HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) PAYE records. The ASHE tables contain UK data on earnings for employees by sex and full-time/part-time workers. The earnings information presented relates to gross pay before tax, National Insurance or other deductions.
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df8b3a7645da1476fb3c318e5884b567e6b74e26 | The Economic Impact of Tourism on Calderdale 2018
Prepared by: Tourism South East Research Unit 40 Chamberlayne Road Eastleigh Hampshire SO50 5JH
## CONTENTS
| Section | Page | |----------------------------------------------|------| | Introduction | 1 | | National and regional results | 1 | | Volume and value of trips to Calderdale | 3 | | Overnight trips by accommodation | 5 | | Overnight trips by purpose | 7 | | Tourism day trips | 8 | | Value of tourism | 9 | | Employment | 10 | | Key results for 2018 | 11 | | Methodology | 12 | | Glossary of terms | 13 | Introduction
This report, commissioned by Calderdale Council and undertaken by Tourism South East, examines the volume and value of tourism and the impact of visitor expenditure on the local economy in 2018 and provides comparative data against previously published data from 2017.
The study involved the application of the Cambridge Tourism Economic Impact Model or ‘Cambridge Model’; a computer-based model developed by Geoff Broom Associates and the Regional Tourist Boards of England. In its basic form, the model distributes regional activity as measured in national surveys to local areas using ‘drivers’ such as accommodation stock and occupancy which influence the distribution of tourism at local level.
National and regional results
| Trips by domestic overnight visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | |-------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------|----------|---------------------------|---------|----------| | Trips | 2018 | 10,207,000 | -5% | 2017 | 10,693,000 | -3% | | Nights | 2018 | 28,593,000 | -1% | 2017 | 29,028,000 | -1% | | Spend | £1,695m | £1,737m | -2% | £19,347m | £19,049m | 2% |
| Trips by overseas overnight visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | |-------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------|----------|---------------------------|---------|----------| | Trips | 2018 | 1,390,000 | 4% | 2017 | 1,340,000 | -5% | | Nights | 2018 | 10,410,000 | -9% | 2017 | 11,470,000 | -8% | | Spend | £603,73m | £567,000m | 6% | £19,790bn | £21,360bn | -7% |
| Trips by day visitors | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | |-------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------|----------|---------------------------|---------|----------| | Trips | 2018 | 130,000,000 | -13% | 2017 | 149,000,000 | -5% | | Spend | £5,066m | £5,023m | 1% | £53,036m | £50,899m | 4% |
| Total trips | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | Yorkshire and The Humber | England | % change | |-------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------|----------|---------------------------|---------|----------| | Trips | 2018 | 141,597,000 | -12% | 2017 | 161,033,000 | -5% | | Spend | £7,365m | £7,327m | 1% | £92,173m | £91,308m | 1% |
- Results from GBTS reveal that 97.4 million domestic overnight trips were taken in England in 2018, a decrease of 3% compared with 2017. However, the value of domestic overnight trips increased by 2%, from £19.1 million in 2017 to £19.4 million in 2018.
- Across the region of Yorkshire and the Humber, the volume of domestic overnight trips decreased by 5% (from 10.7m to 10.2m) and trip spend decreased by 2% compared to 2017 (from £1.74m to £1.70m).
- According to results from IPS, overseas visitors made a total of 32.7 million overnight trips to England, a decrease of 5% compared with 2017. Trip expenditure also decreased by a significant 8% at the national level. Overseas visitor trip volume was slightly up for the region compared with 2017; total overnight trips taken by visitors from overseas to Yorkshire and the Humber increased by 4% (from 1.34m to 1.39m). However, the overall expenditure associated with trips by overseas visitors to the region fell by 9% according to the national survey.
Figures published in the Great Britain Day Visits Survey (2018) indicate that there were 1.4 billion tourism day visits undertaken in England during 2018 (down 5% compared to 2017). However, spend per head in day trip expenditure increased by 4% at a national level.
According to the national survey, tourism day trips to the region fell in 2018; down from 149 million tourism day trips to 130 million day trips, a fall of 13%. However, day trip spend at regional level saw an increase of 1% compared with 2017 (from £5.02 million to £5.07 million).
In total, 142 million trips were made to the region in 2018, down 12% from 161 million trips in 2017. Volume and value of trips to Calderdale
- It is estimated that around 0.32 million overnight tourism trips were made to Calderdale in 2018, down by 4% on 2017. Of these trips, domestic visitors made 80% of trips (252,000) and overseas visitors made 20% of trips (64,400). Compared to 2017, the volume of domestic overnight trips decreased by 7% and the volume of inbound overnight trips rose by 10%, resulting in a net loss of 4%.
- The total number of nights spent in Calderdale by domestic visitors in 2018 fell from 0.67 million bednights to 0.63 million bednights (a decrease of 5% compared to 2017), however the trip length of overseas visitors in Calderdale increased by 15%. This gave an overall increase in the number of nights spent in Calderdale of 2%.
- In total, it is estimated that around £72.5 million was spent by all overnight visitors on their trip to Calderdale in 2018, a rise of 5%. Domestic visitor expenditure decreased by 1% and overseas visitor expenditure increased by 17%, resulting in a net increase of 5%.
- It is estimated that around 6.2 million tourism day trips were made to Calderdale in 2018, a fall of 4% compared to 2017. However, day expenditure remained static at £198 million.
- In total, around £270.5 million was spent on trips to Calderdale in 2018 by overnight and day visitors, up by 2% compared to 2017. Sixteen percent of this expenditure was made by domestic staying visitors; 11% by overseas staying visitors and 73% by day visitors.
- Around £257.6 million directly benefited local businesses from hotels and restaurants to cafes, shops and attractions in Calderdale. Adjustments have been made to recognise that some spending on travel will take place outside the destination. It is assumed that 40% of travel spend will take place at the origin of the trip rather than at the destination. Also some expenditure on retail and food and drink will fall within the attractions sector and accommodation sector.
- However, further ‘additional expenditure’ spent by visitors on second homes / boats and by friends and relatives, whom visitors are staying with or visiting, needs also to be accounted for as this represents a significant additional source of income for local businesses. It is estimated that this ‘additional’ expenditure generated a further £12.9 million in direct turnover for local businesses in 2018.
- In addition to the business turnover generated in those businesses directly receiving visitor income, successive rounds of expenditure, that is spending by these businesses on local supplies (indirect impacts) and spending by employers in the local area (induced impacts), is estimated to have generated £270.5 million to the local economy (the multiplier impact).
- Drawing together direct business turnover, supplier and income induced expenditure, and the additional expenditure spent on second homes and by friends and relatives, the total value of tourism activity in Calderdale in 2018 is estimated to have been around £348.9 million, up by 1.4% compared to 2017.
- This income to the local economy is estimated to have supported 5,062 Full-Time Equivalent Jobs. Many of these jobs are part-time or seasonal in nature and translate into an estimated 6,985 Actual Jobs, an increase of 1.5% compared to 2017. These jobs are spread across a wide range of service sectors from catering and retail to public service jobs such as in local government, and not just tourism. According to the Office of National Statistics, there are 97,000 employee jobs across Calderdale. Based on our estimates, total tourism related expenditure supported 7.2% of these jobs in 2018, equivalent to the number supported in 2017. The Volume and Value of Tourism, 2018
Overnight trips by accommodation
Number of staying trips by accommodation stayed at
| | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |------------------|------|------|----------|------|-------|------| | Serviced | 131,000 | 52% | 36,200 | 56% | 167,200 | 53% | | Non-Serviced | 10,000 | 4% | 5,900 | 9% | 15,900 | 5% | | Group / campus | 3,000 | 1% | 1,400 | 2% | 4,400 | 1% | | Second homes | 6,000 | 2% | 1,100 | 2% | 7,100 | 2% | | Boat moorings1 | 3,000 | 1% | 0 | 0% | 3,000 | 1% | | Paying guests | 0 | 0% | 200 | 0% | 200 | 0% | | Other/mixed2 | 5,000 | 2% | 0 | 0% | 5,000 | 2% | | SFR | 93,000 | 37% | 19,500 | 30% | 112,500 | 36% | | Total 2018 | 252,000 | 64,400 | 316,400 | 31% | | Total 2017 | 271,000 | 58,800 | 329,800 | 31% | | % change | -7% | 10% | -4% | |
SFR = staying with friends/relatives
Overnight trips by type of accommodation
| | 2017 | 2018 | |------------------|------|------| | Paid accommodation | 100,000 | 200,000 | | Friends/relatives /second homes | 500,000 | 1,000,000 |
Overnight trips 2017 v 2018
| | UK | Overseas | Total | |------------------|------|----------|-------| | Serviced | 241,000 | 84,000 | 325,000 | 31% | | Non-Serviced | 87,000 | 76,000 | 163,000 | 16% | | Group / campus | 7,000 | 7,000 | 14,000 | 1% | | Second homes | 15,000 | 27,000 | 42,000 | 4% | | Boat moorings | 16,000 | 0 | 16,000 | 2% | | Paying guests | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | | Other | 11,000 | 0 | 11,000 | 1% | | SFR | 249,000 | 229,000 | 478,000 | 46% | | Total 2018 | 626,000 | 423,000 | 1,049,000 | | Total 2017 | 660,000 | 368,000 | 1,028,000 | | % change | -5% | 15% | 2% |
Number of nights by type of accommodation
| | 2017 | 2018 | |------------------|------|------| | Paid accommodation | 100,000 | 200,000 | | Friends/relatives /second homes | 500,000 | 1,000,000 |
Staying nights 2017 v 2018
1 Information on boat use is not available for overseas tourists. 2 Trips which involve staying in more than one type of accommodation over the duration of the trip. For overseas trips these also include nights spent in transit, in lorry cabs and other temporary accommodation.
### Spend by accommodation stayed at
| | UK | % | Overseas | % | Total | % | |----------------|----------|-----|----------|-----|-----------|-----| | Serviced | £31,587,000 | 73% | £15,196,000 | 52% | £46,783,000 | 65% | | Non-Serviced | £1,386,000 | 3% | £6,350,000 | 22% | £7,736,000 | 11% | | Group / campus | £326,000 | 1% | £0 | 0% | £326,000 | 0% | | Second homes | £679,000 | 2% | £235,000 | 1% | £914,000 | 1% | | Boat moorings | £622,000 | 1% | £0 | 0% | £622,000 | 1% | | Paying guests | £0 | 0% | £0 | 0% | £0 | 0% | | Other | £766,000 | 2% | £0 | 0% | £766,000 | 1% | | SFR | £7,882,000 | 18% | £7,433,000 | 25% | £15,315,000 | 21% | | **Total 2018** | **£43,247,000** | **18%** | **£29,214,000** | **25%** | **£72,461,000** | **21%** | | **Total 2017** | **£43,625,000** | **17%** | **£25,059,000** | **20%** | **£68,684,000** | **20%** | | % change | -1% | | 17% | | 5% | |
#### Overnight spend by type of accommodation
- **Paid accommodation**: 78%
- **Friends/relatives/second homes**: 22%
#### Overnight spend 2017 v 2018
- **UK**: 2017: £20,000,000, 2018: £22,000,000
- **Overseas**: 2017: £40,000,000, 2018: £42,000,000
- **Total**: 2017: £60,000,000, 2018: £64,000,000 Overnight trips by purpose
| Purpose | UK | Overseas | Total | |--------------------------------|--------|----------|--------| | Holiday | 124,000| 30,100 | 154,100| | Business | 76,000 | 12,800 | 88,800 | | Visits to friends/relatives | 45,000 | 18,300 | 63,300 | | Other | 7,000 | 2,500 | 9,500 | | Study | 0 | 600 | 600 | | **Total** | 252,000| 64,400 | 316,400|
Nights by purpose
| Purpose | UK | Overseas | Total | |--------------------------------|--------|----------|--------| | Holiday | 328,000| 159,000 | 487,000| | Business | 158,000| 30,000 | 188,000| | Visits to friends/relatives | 129,000| 198,000 | 327,000| | Other | 11,000 | 15,000 | 26,000 | | Study | 0 | 21,000 | 21,000 | | **Total** | 626,000| 423,000 | 1,049,000|
Spend by purpose
| Purpose | UK | Overseas | Total | |--------------------------------|--------|----------|--------| | Holiday | £18,397,000 | £13,658,000 | £32,055,000 | | Business | £14,535,000 | £4,923,000 | £19,458,000 | | Visits to friends/relatives | £7,624,000 | £7,612,000 | £15,236,000 | | Other | £2,691,000 | £1,250,000 | £3,941,000 | | Study | £0 | £1,772,000 | £1,772,000 | | **Total** | £43,247,000 | £29,214,000 | £72,461,000 | Tourism day trips
Tourism Day trips and spend
| | Trips | Spend | |----------------|--------|-------------| | Total 2018 | 6,201,000 | £197,983,000 | | Total 2017 | 6,437,000 | £197,759,000 | | % change | -4% | 0% |
Proportion of tourism day visits within the county
- Yorkshire & The Humber: 95%
- Calderdale: 5%
Proportion of tourism day visits spend within the county
- Yorkshire & The Humber: 96%
- Calderdale: 4% Value of tourism
Sector breakdown of trip expenditure
| | Domestic | Overseas | Day | Total | |----------------------|----------|----------|-----|-------| | Accommodation | £14,051,000 | £8,955,000 | £0 | £23,006,000 | | Retail | £5,308,000 | £8,051,000 | £85,403,000 | £98,762,000 | | Catering | £10,128,000 | £6,435,000 | £74,110,000 | £90,673,000 | | Attractions | £3,444,000 | £2,923,000 | £19,614,000 | £25,981,000 | | Travel | £10,317,000 | £6,435,000 | £18,856,000 | £32,024,000 | | Total 2018 | £43,248,000 | £29,215,000 | £197,983,000 | £270,446,000 | | Distribution | 16% | 11% | 73% | | | Total 2017 | £43,625,000 | £25,059,000 | £197,759,000 | £266,443,000 | | % change | -1% | 17% | 0% | 2% |
Breakdown of other trip related expenditure
| | Second homes | Boats | Static caravans | Friends and relatives | Total 2018 | |----------------------|--------------|-------|-----------------|-----------------------|------------| | | £164,000 | £120,000 | £0 | £12,609,000 | £12,893,000 |
Businesses in receipt of visitor spend on trip
| | Staying tourists | Day visitors | Total | |----------------------|------------------|--------------|-------| | Accommodation | £23,337,000 | £1,482,000 | £24,819,000 | | Retail | £13,225,000 | £84,549,000 | £97,774,000 | | Catering | £16,066,000 | £71,886,000 | £87,952,000 | | Attractions | £6,666,000 | £21,209,000 | £27,875,000 | | Transport | £7,900,000 | £11,313,000 | £19,213,000 | | TOTAL(1) | £67,194,000 | £190,439,000 | £257,633,000 | | Other non trip related expenditure(2) | £12,893,000 | £0 | £12,893,000 | | Total direct 2018 | £80,087,000 | £190,439,000 | £270,526,000 | | Total direct 2017 | | | £267,093,000 | | % change | | | 1% |
Proportion of visitor spend by business
Income for local business generated by trip expenditure
| | Direct | Supplier & income induced | Total 2018 | Total 2017 | % change | |----------------------|--------|---------------------------|------------|------------|----------| | | £270,526,000 | £78,407,000 | £348,933,000 | £344,101,000 | 1.4% |
(1) Adjustments have been made to visitor expenditure by sector to recognise that some spending on retail and food and drink will fall within attractions or accommodation establishments. A small proportion of day trip spend will also fall into ‘Accommodation’ where day visitors have eaten in restaurants/bars of hotels. Furthermore, it is assumed that 40% of travel expenditure occurs outside the destination. Apart from the spending associated with the individual trips, additional spending by non-visitors, e.g. friends and relatives with whom the visitor is staying with will also take place. Moreover, owners of second homes/boats will spend some money on maintenance, repair. Data is only available for additional expenditure made related to overnight trips. Employment
Local employment supported by the visitor economy - Full time equivalent jobs (FTE)
| | Staying Visitor | Day Visitor | Total | |----------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------| | Direct | 1,194 | 2,562 | 3,755 | | Indirect | 351 | 393 | 744 | | Induced | 193 | 369 | 562 | | **Total FTE 2018** | **1,738** | **3,324** | **5,062** | | Comparison 2017 | 1,670 | 3,320 | 4,990 | | % change | 4.1% | 0.1% | 1.4% |
Proportion of FTE jobs
- Direct: 74%
- Indirect: 15%
- Induced: 11%
Local employment supported by the visitor economy - Estimated actual jobs
| | Staying Visitor | Day Visitor | Total | |----------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------| | Direct | 1,690 | 3,804 | 5,495 | | Indirect | 401 | 448 | 849 | | Induced | 220 | 421 | 641 | | **Total estimated actual jobs 2018** | **2,311** | **4,673** | **6,985** | | Comparison 2017 | 2,216 | 4,666 | 6,884 | | % change | 4.3% | 0.1% | 1.5% |
Proportion of estimated actual jobs
- Direct: 79%
- Indirect: 12%
- Induced: 9%
Proportion of total jobs supported across all sectors
| | Staying Visitor | Day Visitor | Total | |----------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------| | Total employed (3) | 97,000 | 97,000 | 97,000 | | Tourism employment | 2,311 | 4,673 | 6,985 | | **Tourism proportion 2018** | **2.4%** | **4.8%** | **7.2%** | | Comparison 2017 | 2.3% | 4.9% | 7.2% | | % change | +0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 |
Tourism jobs as a Percentage of Total Employment
- Total employment: 93%
- Tourism jobs: 7%
(3) Total labour force is based on all employees incl. part-time (excludes government-supported trainees and HM Force and self-employment). The information comes from the Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) an employer survey conducted by ONS in December of each year. Key results for 2018
- **6.5 million trips** were undertaken
- **6.2 million** day trips
- **0.3 million** overnight visits
- **1.05 million nights** in the area as a result of overnight trips
- **£270.5 million** spent by tourists during their visit to the area
- **£22.5 million** spent on average in the local economy every month
- **£72.5 million** generated by overnight visits
- **£198 million** generated from day trips
- **£348.9 million** spent in the local area as a result of tourism (taking into account multiplier effects)
- **6,985 jobs** supported, both for local residents and from those living nearby
- **5,495 tourism jobs** directly supported
- **1,490 non-tourism related jobs** supported (linked to multiplier spend from tourism)
- **7.2% of working population** employed as a result of tourism in Calderdale Methodology
The Cambridge Model is essentially a computer-based spreadsheet model that produces estimates from existing national and local information (e.g. accommodation stocks, inbound trips) of the level of tourism activity within a given local area. The volume of visits is translated into economic terms by estimating the amount of spending by visitors based on their average spend per trip. In turn, the impact of that spending can be translated to estimate the effects in terms of business turnover and jobs.
Estimates are based on a 3 year rolling average, thus smoothing out irregular fluctuations and avoiding any distortion arising from regional variations, giving us a more long term picture of the value of tourism and we would caution against year-on-year comparisons. As the Model utilises a standard methodology capable of application throughout the UK, it offers the potential for direct comparisons with similar destinations throughout the country.
The standard measures generated in this Model are: the total amount spent by visitors, the amount of income for local residents and businesses created by this spending, and the number of jobs supported by visitor spending.
The basic process of estimation used can be divided into three parts:
- visitor trips and visitor spending at a regional/county level derived from national survey sources
- local supply data on accommodation, attractions and other factors specific to the area
- the use of multipliers derived from business surveys in England to estimate full time equivalent and actual jobs generated by visitor spending in the area
In its standard form, the Cambridge Model uses a range of local data including details of accommodation stock, local occupancy rates, population, employment, local wage rates and visits to attractions. It applies this locally sourced information to regional estimates of tourism volume and expenditure derived from the following national surveys:
- Great Britain Tourism Survey (GBTS) – information on tourism activity by GB residents;
- International Passenger Survey (IPS) – information on overseas visitors to the United Kingdom;
- Great Britain Day Visits Survey (GBDVS) - measures the volume and value of tourism day visits in Britain
- Visits to Attractions Survey – annual recording of visitor numbers to free and paid attractions in England
- Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) – contains UK data on employees earnings;
- Census of Employment – updated annually by the Office for National Statistics
- Census of Population – updated annually by the Office for National Statistics
The sophistication of the economic impact estimates will depend on the availability of detailed reliable local information to supplement national and regional data sources. Where such data is available from local surveys, then local variations can be explicitly included. Glossary of terms
Staying trips Staying trips comprise a visit which involves a stay away from home of at least one night. The study measures trips, rather than visitors as one visitor may make multiple trips to an area in a given period.
Tourism day trips A day trip is classified as a "tourism day visit" if it involves participation in one of fifteen leisure activities (full details of the definition used are included in the annual survey report); that lasted at least three hours (including travel); it's not an activity which is undertaken "very regularly"; and is to a destination outside the respondent's place of residence (or place of work if this was the start point of the trip). The exceptions to this are trips to special public events, live sporting events and visitor attractions.
VFR trips VFR trips are defined as a visit where the main purpose is visiting friends and relatives. Whilst many trips to visit friends and relatives will be accommodated in the homes of these friends/relatives (SFR), some will make use of other forms of accommodation. It should be also noted that other forms of trip, for instance for holiday or business purposes may stay with friends and relatives rather than in commercial accommodation.
‘Other’ expenditure Apart from the spending associated with the individual trips, additional spending by non-visitors, e.g. friends and relatives with whom the visitor is visiting and/or staying with will also take place. Moreover, owners of second homes/boats will spend some money on maintenance, repair.
Economic multiplier Multipliers are used to estimate the economic impact of visitor expenditure. Visitor expenditure produces three effects. Direct effects are changes in the business sector directly receiving visitor expenditure. For instance, visitors staying in a hotel will directly increase revenue and the number of jobs in the hotel sector. Indirect effects are the changes in supplier businesses. For example, these indirect effects would be hotels purchasing more linen from local suppliers as a result of increased business. Induced effects are changes in local economic activity resulting from household spending. For instance, employees of the hotel and linen supplier spend their wages in the local area, resulting in more sales, income and jobs in the area.
Full time equivalent jobs (FTE) For the purposes of the Model, a FTE is defined by the average annual salary plus employment costs in the sector concerned.
Direct jobs Jobs directly generated in those local businesses in which visitors spend money, i.e. hotels, catering establishments.
Indirect jobs Jobs created locally due to the purchases of goods and services by businesses benefiting from visitor expenditure, i.e. jobs with local suppliers.
Induced jobs Jobs created throughout the local economy because employees employed due to visitor expenditure spend their wages locally on goods and services such as food, clothing and housing. Actual jobs Many jobs are seasonal or part-time in their nature in the tourism sector, so an adjustment is made to calculate the actual number of jobs from the number of FTEs. The adjustment made is based on the findings of surveys of tourism related businesses, and national employment surveys.
Great Britain Tourism Survey (GBTS) The Great Britain Tourism Survey is undertaken by Kantar TNS. The key characteristics of the survey include a 100,000 face-to-face interviews per annum, conducted in-home, and a weekly sample size of around 2,000 adults aged 16 years or over - representative of the GB population in relation to various demographic characteristics including gender, age group, socio-economic group, and geographical location. Respondents are asked about any overnight trips taken in the last four weeks. It provides basic headline data on the volume and value of domestic tourism at a national, regional and county level.
International Passenger Survey (IPS) The International Passenger Survey is conducted by Office for National Statistics and is based on face-to-face interviews with a sample of passengers travelling via the principal airports, sea routes and the Channel Tunnel, together with visitors crossing the land border into Northern Ireland. Around 210,000 interviews are undertaken each year. IPS provides headline figures, based on the county or unitary authority, for the volume and value of overseas trips to the UK.
Great Britain Day Visits Survey (GBDVS) The methodology for the 2016 Great Britain Day Visits Survey altered compared with previous years. The changes implemented were - questionnaire improvements to make the survey more engaging and easy to complete; questionnaire revisions required as part of the ‘merging’ of GBDVS with the GBTS online piloting; and the weekly sample size contacted for the wider GBDVS/GBTS combined surveying increased from 673 to 1,000. Parallel testing of the survey approaches used before and after these changes found that these changes resulted in increased levels of visits reported by respondents by around +15%. The aims of the survey continue to be to measure the volume, value and profile of Tourism Day Visits taken by GB residents to destinations in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Surveying is undertaken on a weekly basis, using an online methodology, with a sample over 32,000 interviews.
United Kingdom Occupancy Survey (UKOS) As part of the EU Directive on Tourism Statistics adopted in 1995, the UK must report regularly on a specified range of statistics to Eurostat, the official statistical office of the European Union. Included in these statistics are monthly occupancy rates for UK serviced accommodation. The responsibility for providing this data lies with the four National Tourist Boards, and across England the survey is now undertaken STR on behalf of Visit England. The data is collected using a syndicated panel of more than 3,000 hotels and accommodation providers who are asked to complete a data form each month, giving details of their nightly occupancy. The data submitted is analysed to produce monthly occupancy rates for the whole of the area and for specific categories of type, size, location etc.
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) provides information about the levels, distribution and make-up of earnings and hours worked for employees in all industries and occupations. ASHE is based on a one per cent sample of employee jobs taken from HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) PAYE records. The ASHE tables contain UK data on earnings for employees by sex and full-time/part-time workers. The earnings information presented relates to gross pay before tax, National Insurance or other deductions.
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e5796d1ea787d1eba367ae23286927db8bff381c | Calderdale pedestrian casualties
All pedestrian injuries 537
Injuries while crossing a carriageway 351
Injuries on peak commuting times 291
Injury severity
Child pedestrian injuries 163
Over 60 years old casualties 113
Casualties by age and gender
Car/taxi/minibus
HGV
Month January February March April May June July August September October November December
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
This is STATS19 data, subject to various disclaimers. It's collected by West Yorkshire Police, processed and validated by Leeds City Council and its recording is governed nationally by the Department for Transport. For more info, contact: [email protected] Calderdale car occupant casualties
All car occupant injuries: 1939 Injuries to children: 161 Injuries to Taxi occupants: 96 Injuries to Minibus occupants: 7
Injuries by main causation factors:
- Ped. cf: 0%
- Veh defects: 2%
- Vision aff.: 7%
- Road Env.: 7%
- Special: 8%
- Impairem.: 23%
- Behaviour: 16%
- Injudiciou...: 20%
- Driv/...: 63%
Injury Severity:
- Fatal: 18
- Serious: 171
- Slight: 1750
Month:
- January
- February
- March
- April
- May
- June
- July
- August
- September
- October
- November
- December
Age and gender of driver involved in collisions:
- Female: 202
- Male: 246
Injuries by type of junctions:
- Not at jct: 52%
- T-Stag jct: 25%
- Slip/cross rd.: 11%
- Other: 6%
This is STATSg data, subject to various disclaimers. It's collected by West Yorkshire Police, processed and validated by Leeds City Council and its recording is governed nationally by the Department for Transport. For more info, contact: [email protected] Calderdale HGV casualties
Injuries to all Goods Vehicle users
92
Injuries to HGV users
19
Injury by type of junctions
Not at jct: 75% T-Stag jct: 25%
Injury by main causation factors
- Ped. cl: 14%
- Veh defects: 2%
- Special: 4%
- Road Env.: 9%
- Behaviour /inexp: 10%
- Vision affected: 11%
- Injudicious act.: 16%
- Impairment/Distra.: 23%
- Driv/ rider error: 51%
Age and gender of drivers involved in collisions
- Female
- Male
This is STATS19 data, subject to various disclaimers. It's collected by West Yorkshire Police, processed and validated by Leeds City Council and its recording is governed nationally by the Department for Transport. For more info, contact: [email protected] Calderdale PSV casualties
Injuries to PSV users
36
Injuries at peak commuting times
20
Pedestrians injured by a PSV
14
Injuries by type of junction
- Not at jct: 64%
- T-Stag jct: 12%
- Slip/cr...: 10%
- Rndabout: 10%
Month
- January
- February
- March
- April
- May
- June
- July
- August
- September
- October
- November
- December
Injury severity
- Serious: 5
- Slight: 31
Age and gender of PSV casualties
- Female
- Male
This is STATS19 data, subject to various disclaimers. It's collected by West Yorkshire Police, processed and validated by Leeds City Council and its recording is governed nationally by the Department for Transport. For more info, contact: [email protected]
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7bae7bfcec9588bbe71945dced1c5d5a32875bb8 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Reported Road Casualties in 2019
Report to Senior Management Team (SMT)
Release date: 30 June 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – CALDERDALE DISTRICT
RTC STATISTICS OF 2019
The overall reduction in the number of casualties of all severities in Calderdale is reflected in all road user categories with the exception of motorbike riders. The slight reduction in the number of deaths (2) was accompanied by the increase in serious injuries, contributing to the slight increase of overall KSI in 2019. All child casualties reduced again in 2019 after remaining static between 2014 and 2016, but the number of serious injuries among children has barely improved in the recent three years. Overall, collisions resulting in high severity injuries to all road users, but particularly to vulnerable road users, remain a priority especially after the slight increase reported in 2019. Calderdale District in 2019: At a glance
- Overall reduction of all casualties, but numbers of those KSI have risen for the second consecutive year.
- All child casualties fell for the second year in row, but numbers of children KSI have barely changed in the recent five years.
- Pedestrian casualties of all severities and those KSI fell substantially in 2019.
- The number of cyclist casualties reduced marginally in 2019, but figures for those KSI have not improved since 2014.
- Powered two-wheeler (PTW) rider casualties continue to fluctuate in Calderdale.
- The numbers of car occupant casualties of all severities continue to decrease in the district; however, those KSI have not improved in recent years.
| Calderdale KSI in 2019 | % share | |------------------------|---------| | Car Occupant KSI | 36% | | Pedestrian KSI | 21% | | Cyclist KSI | 14% | | PTW KSI | 8% | | All KSI | 13.4% |
Table 1: Road traffic casualties since 2013 Killed or Seriously Injured (KSI) Casualties
| All KSI in Calderdale | Baseline (avg 05~09) | Previous 3 year | 2019 | 2019 change over 2005~09 | 2019 change over previous 3 year av | Previous 3 year av change over 2005~09 | |-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------|------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------| | Pedestrians | 27 | 19 | 16 | -41% | -14% | -31% | | Pedal Cyclists | 10 | 9 | 11 | 10% | 22% | -10% | | PTW | 24 | 13 | 16 | -33% | 20% | -44% | | Car Occupants | 47 | 25 | 27 | -43% | 7% | -46% | | Good Vehicles | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0% | 20% | -17% | | Bus Occupants | 1 | 1 | 2 | 100% | 100% | 0% | | Other road users | 0 | 0 | 2 | 100% | 500% | 100% |
| Age 0 to 15 | 16 | 8 | 9 | -44% | 17% | -52% | | Age 16 to 19 | 14 | 4 | 7 | -50% | 62% | -69% | | Age 20 to 29 | 24 | 16 | 25 | 4% | 56% | -33% | | Age 30 to 59 | 41 | 27 | 25 | -39% | -6% | -35% | | Age 60 plus | 16 | 15 | 10 | -38% | -32% | -8% | | All | 111 | 69 | 76 | -32% | 10% | -38% |
Table 2 Reported road traffic casualties by severity since 2010
Figure 1: Road collision KSI casualties and target trajectory to 2026 Overall
The KSI trend of recent years remains firmly downward despite the slight increase in 2018 and 2019. The numbers of those KSI among the most vulnerable road users (pedestrians, cyclists and motorbike riders) have barely improved in recent years, despite the encouraging reduction among pedestrians.
Collisions resulting in high severity injuries to all road users, but mostly to vulnerable road users, remain a priority and need to be actively and appropriately addressed.
## CALDERDALE DISTRICT TABULATIONS
| Description | End Table | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Accidents, Casualties, road user group totals | End table 1 | | All casualties by age groups | End table 2 | | Pedestrian casualties by age groups | End table 3 | | Pedal cycle casualties by age groups | End table 4 | | Motor cycle Rider + Pillion casualties by age groups | End table 5 | | Car driver casualties by age groups | End table 6 | | Car passenger casualties by age groups | End table 7 | | Goods occupant casualties by age groups | End table 8 | | Bus occupant casualties by age groups | End table 9 | | Long Term Comparisons | End table 10 |
If a particular tabulation is required that is not presented in this report, please contact:
Email: [email protected] Calderdale
Accidents
| | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | Average | 2019 | |--------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|------| | Fatal | 5 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 | | Serious| 85 | 73 | 57 | 55 | 57 | 65 | 63 | | Slight | 337 | 332 | 342 | 279 | 252 | 308 | 206 | | Total | 427 | 411 | 407 | 337 | 314 | 378 | 271 |
Casualties
| | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | Average | 2019 | |--------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|------| | Fatal | 6 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 2 | | Serious| 93 | 86 | 69 | 60 | 62 | 74 | 74 | | Slight | 524 | 465 | 477 | 387 | 344 | 439 | 290 | | Total | 623 | 557 | 555 | 450 | 411 | 519 | 366 |
Road User Groups
| | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | Average | 2019 | |--------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|------| | Pedestrian | 97 | 102 | 104 | 79 | 72 | 90 | 54 | | Pedal Cyclist | 46 | 44 | 40 | 38 | 30 | 39 | 29 | | PTW Rider + Pillion | 51 | 51 | 39 | 33 | 31 | 41 | 33 | | Car Driver | 238 | 224 | 215 | 197 | 158 | 206 | 143 | | Car Passenger | 163 | 112 | 123 | 90 | 98 | 117 | 86 | | Goods occupant | 18 | 14 | 21 | 10 | 16 | 16 | 15 | | Bus occupant | 9 | 4 | 10 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 4 | | Other | 3 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | | Total | 623 | 557 | 555 | 450 | 411 | 519 | 366 |
- The figures in the Average column of the following tables do not always sum to the total, due to rounding.
WY End table 1
## Calderdale
### All Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 6 | | 2014 Serious | 3 | 7 | 10 | 15 | 42 | 16 | 93 | | Slight | 4 | 52 | 50 | 137 | 219 | 62 | 524 | | Total | 7 | 59 | 62 | 154 | 262 | 79 | 623 | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 6 | | 2015 Serious | 3 | 8 | 11 | 15 | 33 | 16 | 86 | | Slight | 7 | 48 | 46 | 115 | 200 | 49 | 465 | | Total | 10 | 56 | 58 | 130 | 237 | 66 | 557 | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 9 | | 2016 Serious | 2 | 6 | 3 | 25 | 20 | 13 | 69 | | Slight | 9 | 49 | 32 | 112 | 212 | 63 | 477 | | Total | 11 | 55 | 36 | 140 | 236 | 77 | 555 | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | | 2017 Serious | 1 | 6 | 6 | 15 | 19 | 13 | 60 | | Slight | 3 | 50 | 26 | 83 | 156 | 69 | 387 | | Total | 4 | 56 | 32 | 98 | 178 | 82 | 450 | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 5 | | 2018 Serious | 0 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 31 | 15 | 62 | | Slight | 8 | 40 | 15 | 81 | 164 | 36 | 344 | | Total | 8 | 48 | 18 | 86 | 198 | 53 | 411 |
### Average
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 6 | | Average Serious | 2 | 7 | 7 | 15 | 29 | 15 | 74 | | Slight | 6 | 48 | 34 | 106 | 190 | 56 | 439 | | Total | 8 | 55 | 42 | 122 | 222 | 72 | 519 |
### 2019
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | | 2019 Serious | 0 | 9 | 7 | 25 | 23 | 10 | 74 | | Slight | 8 | 26 | 18 | 67 | 121 | 50 | 290 | | Total | 8 | 35 | 25 | 92 | 146 | 60 | 366 |
WY End table 2
## Reported Road Casualties in Calderdale - 2019
### Pedestrian Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **2014** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | Serious | 3 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 8 | 27 | | Slight | 2 | 23 | 6 | 3 | 23 | 12 | 69 | | **Total** | 5 | 28 | 9 | 4 | 30 | 21 | 97 | | **2015** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | | Serious | 2 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 25 | | Slight | 0 | 20 | 10 | 9 | 17 | 18 | 74 | | **Total** | 2 | 28 | 10 | 12 | 27 | 23 | 102 | | **2016** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 1 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 20 | | Slight | 5 | 15 | 4 | 15 | 29 | 16 | 84 | | **Total** | 6 | 18 | 4 | 21 | 33 | 22 | 104 | | **2017** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | | Serious | 1 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 13 | | Slight | 2 | 25 | 3 | 6 | 16 | 12 | 64 | | **Total** | 3 | 29 | 3 | 8 | 20 | 16 | 79 | | **2018** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | Serious | 0 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 20 | | Slight | 2 | 14 | 1 | 8 | 19 | 7 | 51 | | **Total** | 2 | 22 | 2 | 10 | 22 | 14 | 72 | | **Average**| | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | Serious | 1 | 6 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 21 | | Slight | 2 | 19 | 5 | 8 | 21 | 13 | 68 | | **Total** | 3 | 25 | 6 | 11 | 26 | 19 | 90 | | **2019** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 16 | | Slight | 1 | 4 | 3 | 10 | 16 | 4 | 38 | | **Total** | 1 | 11 | 4 | 11 | 19 | 8 | 54 |
WY End table 3
## Pedal Cycle Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **2014** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 13 | | Slight | 0 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 18 | 3 | 33 | | **Total** | 0 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 27 | 5 | 46 | | **2015** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 11 | | Slight | 0 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 11 | 2 | 33 | | **Total** | 0 | 7 | 9 | 7 | 18 | 3 | 44 | | **2016** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | | Serious | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 6 | | Slight | 0 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 21 | 2 | 32 | | **Total** | 0 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 26 | 3 | 40 | | **2017** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 8 | | Slight | 0 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 15 | 1 | 30 | | **Total** | 0 | 7 | 3 | 7 | 19 | 2 | 38 | | **2018** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 1 | 11 | | Slight | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 10 | 1 | 19 | | **Total** | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 20 | 2 | 30 | | **Average**| | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 10 | | Slight | 0 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 15 | 2 | 29 | | **Total** | 0 | 6 | 3 | 6 | 22 | 3 | 39 | | **2019** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | Serious | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 10 | | Slight | 0 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 18 | | **Total** | 0 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 11 | 2 | 29 |
WY End table 4
## Calderdale
### PTW Rider + Pillion Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | **2014** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 16 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 10 | 8 | 17 | 0 | 35 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 12 | 14 | 24 | 1 | 51 | | **2015** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 13 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 8 | 10 | 18 | 2 | 38 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 11 | 15 | 23 | 2 | 51 | | **2016** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 9 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 12 | 28 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 12 | 16 | 39 | | **2017** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 14 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 18 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 10 | 14 | 33 | | **2018** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 12 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 17 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 10 | 13 | 31 | | **Average**| | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 13 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 6 | 8 | 12 | 2 | 27 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 8 | 12 | 19 | 3 | 41 | | **2019** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 16 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 17 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 5 | 12 | 13 | 3 | 33 |
WY End table 5
## Calderdale
### Car Driver Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 10 | 3 | 20 | | **Slight** | 0 | 0 | 15 | 68 | 104 | 28 | 215 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 17 | 75 | 115 | 31 | 238 |
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 22 | | **Slight** | 0 | 0 | 6 | 56 | 124 | 15 | 201 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 8 | 60 | 132 | 24 | 224 |
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 14 | | **Slight** | 0 | 0 | 9 | 52 | 110 | 26 | 197 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 11 | 57 | 118 | 29 | 215 |
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 15 | | **Slight** | 0 | 0 | 10 | 44 | 96 | 32 | 182 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 10 | 48 | 101 | 38 | 197 |
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 11 | | **Slight** | 0 | 1 | 2 | 40 | 84 | 19 | 146 | | **Total** | 0 | 1 | 3 | 40 | 90 | 24 | 158 |
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 15 | | **Slight** | 0 | 0 | 8 | 31 | 61 | 28 | 128 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 9 | 37 | 67 | 30 | 143 |
### Average
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 16 | | **Slight** | 0 | 0 | 8 | 52 | 104 | 24 | 188 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 9 | 56 | 112 | 29 | 206 |
### 2019
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 15 | | **Slight** | 0 | 0 | 8 | 31 | 61 | 28 | 128 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 9 | 37 | 67 | 30 | 143 |
WY End table 6
## Calderdale
### Car Passenger Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | | **Serious**| 0 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 14 | | **Slight** | 2 | 26 | 18 | 42 | 43 | 16 | 147 | | **Total** | 2 | 27 | 23 | 44 | 49 | 18 | 163 |
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 11 | | **Slight** | 6 | 18 | 15 | 30 | 23 | 7 | 99 | | **Total** | 6 | 18 | 20 | 32 | 28 | 8 | 112 |
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | **Serious**| 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 7 | | **Slight** | 1 | 17 | 8 | 19 | 18 | 20 | 83 | | **Total** | 1 | 18 | 10 | 21 | 18 | 22 | 90 |
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 6 | | **Slight** | 4 | 22 | 8 | 19 | 33 | 5 | 91 | | **Total** | 4 | 22 | 9 | 19 | 38 | 6 | 98 |
### Average
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | **Serious**| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 11 | | **Slight** | 3 | 22 | 12 | 27 | 28 | 12 | 105 | | **Total** | 3 | 23 | 15 | 30 | 31 | 13 | 117 |
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 12 | | **Slight** | 7 | 15 | 2 | 12 | 24 | 14 | 74 | | **Total** | 7 | 15 | 4 | 22 | 24 | 14 | 86 |
WY End table 7
### Calderdale
#### Goods Occupant Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **2014** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 15 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 10 | 2 | 18 | | **2015** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | | Slight | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 12 | | **Total** | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 14 | | **2016** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | Slight | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 12 | 2 | 20 | | **Total** | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 12 | 2 | 21 | | **2017** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 | | Slight | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 7 | | **Total** | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 10 | | **2018** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 11 | 0 | 15 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 12 | 0 | 16 | | **Average**| | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | Slight | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 14 | | **Total** | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 16 | | **2019** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 13 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 9 | 1 | 15 |
WY End table 8
### Calderdale
#### Bus Occupant Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | **Slight** | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 9 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 9 |
| Year | Fatal | Serious | Slight | Total | |------|-------|---------|--------|-------| | 2014 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 2015 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | 2016 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | 2017 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | 2018 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
#### Average
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | **Serious**| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | **Slight** | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 7 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Year | Fatal | Serious | Slight | Total | |------|-------|---------|--------|-------| | 2019 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
**WY End table 9**
## REPORTED ROAD CASUALTIES IN CALDERDALE-2019
### Calderdale
| Year | Killed | Ser | KSI | Slight | Total | Pedestrians | Pedal Cyclists | PTW | Car | Car | Car | Goods | Bus | Others | |--------|--------|-----|-----|--------|-------|-------------|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------| | | | | | | | All Ages | All Ages | Users | Drivers | Pass | Users | Users | Users | | | 1981-85 | 21 | 236 | 257 | 825 | 1082 | 242 | 126 | 67 | 38 | 196 | 252 | 222 | 474 | 38 | | 1994-98 | 11 | 112 | 123 | 1106 | 1229 | 194 | 90 | 64 | 30 | 60 | 511 | 301 | 812 | 38 | | 2015-19 | 5 | 70 | 75 | 393 | 468 | 82 | 24 | 36 | 7 | 37 | 187 | 102 | 289 | 15 |
### Long Term Comparisons
| Year | Killed | Ser | KSI | Slight | Total | Pedestrians | Pedal Cyclists | PTW | Car | Car | Car | Goods | Bus | Others | |--------|--------|-----|-----|--------|-------|-------------|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------| | | | | | | | All Ages | All Ages | Users | Drivers | Pass | Users | Users | Users | | | 2004 | 13 | 111 | 124 | 1079 | 1203 | 166 | 65 | 33 | 13 | 89 | 556 | 279 | 835 | 53 | | 2005 | 7 | 104 | 111 | 842 | 953 | 107 | 37 | 41 | 15 | 79 | 461 | 203 | 664 | 32 | | 2006 | 14 | 109 | 123 | 821 | 944 | 117 | 43 | 29 | 11 | 60 | 469 | 234 | 703 | 18 | | 2007 | 10 | 90 | 100 | 760 | 860 | 103 | 42 | 32 | 9 | 63 | 379 | 245 | 624 | 23 | | 2009 | 9 | 96 | 105 | 683 | 788 | 109 | 38 | 28 | 6 | 69 | 348 | 195 | 543 | 26 | | 2010 | 3 | 78 | 81 | 614 | 695 | 80 | 32 | 29 | 5 | 43 | 307 | 194 | 501 | 26 | | 2011 | 7 | 83 | 90 | 555 | 645 | 89 | 45 | 44 | 11 | 57 | 270 | 143 | 413 | 24 | | 2012 | 2 | 94 | 96 | 520 | 616 | 94 | 36 | 44 | 10 | 54 | 250 | 147 | 397 | 16 | | 2013 | 4 | 86 | 90 | 476 | 566 | 76 | 28 | 49 | 7 | 50 | 233 | 128 | 361 | 18 | | 2014 | 6 | 93 | 99 | 524 | 623 | 97 | 33 | 46 | 4 | 51 | 238 | 163 | 401 | 17 | | 2015 | 6 | 86 | 92 | 465 | 557 | 102 | 30 | 44 | 7 | 51 | 224 | 112 | 336 | 14 | | 2016 | 9 | 69 | 78 | 477 | 555 | 104 | 24 | 40 | 6 | 39 | 215 | 123 | 338 | 21 | | 2017 | 3 | 60 | 63 | 387 | 450 | 79 | 32 | 38 | 7 | 33 | 197 | 90 | 287 | 10 | | 2018 | 5 | 62 | 67 | 344 | 411 | 72 | 24 | 30 | 4 | 31 | 158 | 98 | 256 | 16 | | 2019 | 2 | 74 | 76 | 290 | 366 | 54 | 12 | 29 | 9 | 33 | 143 | 86 | 229 | 15 |
WY End table 10
Calderdale District End Tables in 2019
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8e72b12a8655bf2de64f93e96baea77bae0618b7 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Reported Road Casualties in 2018
Report to Senior Management Team (SMT)
Date: 31 July 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – CALDERDALE DISTRICT
RTC STATISTICS OF 2018
The overall reduction in the number of casualties of all severities in Calderdale is reflected in all road user categories. The slight increase in the number of deaths (5) and serious injuries (62) has not affected the KSI long term trend, which remains downward. The increase of pedestrian and cyclist KSI have, however, affected the overall performance in 2018 and requires attention. Child casualties have reduced again in 2018 after remaining static between 2014 and 2016, but the number of serious injuries among children has barely improved in the recent three years. Overall, collisions resulting in high severity injuries to all road users, but particularly to vulnerable road users, remain a priority despite the overall reduction reported in 2018. Calderdale District in 2018: At a glance
- Overall reduction of all casualties, but numbers of those KSI continue to fluctuate.
- All child casualties have fallen for the second year in row, but numbers of children KSI barely changed in the recent five years.
- Pedestrian casualties of all severities fell marginally in 2018, but a 40% increase in those KSI contributed to a flat trend in the last five years.
- The number of cyclist casualties reduced marginally in 2018, but numbers of those KSI rose by eight to 38 in 2018.
- Powered two-wheeler (PTW) rider casualties continue to decrease in number in Calderdale, at a slower pace for those KSI.
- Numbers of car occupant casualties of all severities and of those KSI continue to decrease in Calderdale.
| Calderdale KSI in 2018 | % share | 2018 | |------------------------|---------|------| | Car Occupant KSI | 28% | 19 | | Child KSI | 31% | 21 | | Pedestrian KSI | 21% | 14 | | Cyclist KSI | 16% | 11 | | Other | 3% | 2 |
| All KSI | 6.3% | 67 |
Table 1: Road traffic casualties since 2013 Killed or Seriously Injured (KSI) Casualties
Table 2 Reported road traffic casualties by severity since 2010
| | Calderdale Baseline\* (avg 05~09) | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | Prev 3yrs avg | 2018 | 2018 vs prev 3yrs avg | 2018 vs baseline | Target by 2026\* | Reduction required from the current year | |------------------|-----------------------------------|------|------|------|---------------|------|-----------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------------------------| | Fatal | 10 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 6 | 5 | -17% | -50% | 5 | Target Hit | | Serious | 102 | 86 | 69 | 60 | 72 | 62 | -13% | -39% | 51 | -18% | | Slight | 763 | 465 | 477 | 387 | 443 | 344 | -22% | -55% | | | | Total | 875 | 557 | 555 | 450 | 521 | 411 | -21% | -53% | | | | KSI | 112 | 92 | 78 | 63 | 78 | 67 | -14% | -40% | 56 | -16% | | Child KSI | 16 | 11 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 8 | -8% | -49% | 8 | -3% | | Pedestrian KSI | 27 | 28 | 20 | 15 | 21 | 21 | 0% | -23% | 14 | -35% | | Cyclist KSI | 10 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 11 | 22% | 10% | 5 | -55% | | PTW KSI | 24 | 13 | 11 | 15 | 13 | 14 | 8% | -42% | 12 | -14% | | Car Occ KSI | 47 | 36 | 35 | 22 | 31 | 19 | -38.7% | -59.6% | 24 | Target Hit | | Other KSI | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | -45.5% | -41.2% | 2 | -15% |
Figure 1: Road collision KSI casualties and target trajectory to 2026
KSI trend of recent years remain firmly downward despite the slight increase in 2018. KSI among the most vulnerable road users (pedestrians, cyclists and motorbike riders) have barely improved in recent years, despite the encouraging reduction among motorbike riders. Collisions resulting in high severity injuries to all road users, but essentially to vulnerable road users, remain a priority and need to be actively and appropriately addressed. Contact Information
Jean Siakeu
Leeds City Council, Highways & Transportation, Transport Policy Transport Strategy. 8th Floor East, Merrion House, 110 Merrion Centre, Leeds LS2 8BB Tel 0113 378 7529 Email: [email protected] www.leeds.gov.uk END PAPERS
CALDERDALE DISTRICT TABULATIONS
Accidents, Casualties, road user group totals End table 1 All casualties by age groups End table 2 Pedestrian casualties by age groups End table 3 Pedal cycle casualties by age groups End table 4 Motor cycle Rider + Pillion casualties by age groups End table 5 Car driver casualties by age groups End table 6 Car passenger casualties by age groups End table 7 Goods occupant casualties by age groups End table 8 Bus occupant casualties by age groups End table 9 Long Term Comparisons End table 10
If a particular tabulation is required that is not presented in this report, please contact:
Email: [email protected] Calderdale
Accidents
| | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | Average | 2018 | |--------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|------| | Fatal | 4 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 5 | | Serious| 76 | 85 | 73 | 57 | 55 | 69 | 57 | | Slight | 329 | 337 | 332 | 342 | 279 | 324 | 252 | | Total | 409 | 427 | 411 | 407 | 337 | 398 | 314 |
Casualties
| | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | Average | 2018 | |--------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|------| | Fatal | 4 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 6 | 5 | | Serious| 86 | 93 | 86 | 69 | 60 | 79 | 62 | | Slight | 476 | 524 | 465 | 477 | 387 | 466 | 344 | | Total | 566 | 623 | 557 | 555 | 450 | 551 | 411 |
Road User Groups
| | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | Average | 2018 | |--------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|------| | Pedestrian | 76 | 97 | 102 | 104 | 79 | 92 | 72 | | Pedal Cyclist | 49 | 46 | 44 | 40 | 38 | 43 | 30 | | PTW Rider + | 50 | 51 | 51 | 39 | 33 | 45 | 31 | | Pillion | 18 | 18 | 14 | 21 | 10 | 16 | 16 | | Car Driver | 233 | 238 | 224 | 215 | 197 | 222 | 158 | | Car Passenger | 128 | 163 | 112 | 123 | 90 | 123 | 98 | | Goods occupant | 18 | 18 | 14 | 21 | 10 | 16 | 16 | | Bus occupant | 9 | 9 | 4 | 10 | 3 | 7 | 6 | | Other | 3 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | | Total | 566 | 623 | 557 | 555 | 450 | 551 | 411 |
- The figures in the Average column of the following tables do not always sum to the total, due to rounding.
WY End table 1
## Reported Road Casualties in Calderdale - 2018
### Accident Studies - Leeds City Council
Calderdale District End Tables in 2018
| Year | Fatal | Serious | Slight | Total | |------|-------|---------|--------|-------| | 2013 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 14 | | 2014 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 7 | | 2015 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 10 | | 2016 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 11 | | 2017 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | | 2018 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 8 |
### All Casualties
#### Age Groups
| Year | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | 2013 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | | 2014 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | | 2015 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 6 | | 2016 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 25 | 20 | 13 | 69 | | 2017 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | | 2018 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
### Average
| Year | Fatal | Serious | Slight | Total | |------|-------|---------|--------|-------| | 2013 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 9 | | 2014 | 0 | 7 | 47 | 54 | | 2015 | 0 | 8 | 39 | 48 | | 2016 | 0 | 19 | 114 | 134 | | 2017 | 0 | 29 | 201 | 233 | | 2018 | 0 | 31 | 164 | 198 |
### WY End Table 2
Calderdale District End Tables in 2018
## Pedestrian Casualties
### Age Groups
| Year | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | 2013 | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | Serious | 0 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | | | Slight | 7 | 17 | 3 | 13 | 13 | 10 | | | Total | 7 | 21 | 4 | 16 | 16 | 12 | | 2014 | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | Serious | 3 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 8 | | | Slight | 2 | 23 | 6 | 3 | 23 | 12 | | | Total | 5 | 28 | 9 | 4 | 30 | 21 | | 2015 | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | | | Serious | 2 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 5 | | | Slight | 0 | 20 | 10 | 9 | 17 | 18 | | | Total | 2 | 28 | 10 | 12 | 27 | 23 | | 2016 | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | Serious | 1 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 6 | | | Slight | 5 | 15 | 4 | 15 | 29 | 16 | | | Total | 6 | 18 | 4 | 21 | 33 | 22 | | 2017 | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | | | Serious | 1 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 | | | Slight | 2 | 25 | 3 | 6 | 16 | 12 | | | Total | 3 | 29 | 3 | 8 | 20 | 16 |
### Average
| Year | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | 2018 | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | | Serious | 0 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 7 | | | Slight | 2 | 14 | 1 | 8 | 19 | 7 | | | Total | 2 | 22 | 2 | 10 | 22 | 14 |
WY End table 3
### Pedal Cycle Casualties
#### Age Groups
| Year | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | 2013 | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | Serious | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 1 | | | Slight | 0 | 6 | 1 | 8 | 20 | 0 | | | Total | 0 | 7 | 2 | 10 | 29 | 1 | | 2014 | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | Serious | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | | | Slight | 0 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 18 | 3 | | | Total | 0 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 27 | 5 | | 2015 | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 1 | | | Slight | 0 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 11 | 2 | | | Total | 0 | 7 | 9 | 7 | 18 | 3 | | 2016 | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | | | Serious | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | | | Slight | 0 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 21 | 2 | | | Total | 0 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 26 | 3 | | 2017 | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | | | Slight | 0 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 15 | 1 | | | Total | 0 | 7 | 3 | 7 | 19 | 2 | | Average | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | Serious | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1 | | | Slight | 0 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 17 | 2 | | | Total | 0 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 23 | 3 |
#### WY End table 4
Calderdale District End Tables in 2018
### Calderdale
#### PTW Rider + Pillion Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | **2013** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 2 | 22 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 1 | 26 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 13 | 14 | 20 | 3 | 50 | | **2014** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 16 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 10 | 8 | 17 | 0 | 35 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 12 | 14 | 24 | 1 | 51 | | **2015** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 13 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 8 | 10 | 18 | 2 | 38 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 11 | 15 | 23 | 2 | 51 | | **2016** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 9 | | Slight | 0 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 12 | 2 | 28 | | **Total** | 0 | 2 | 5 | 12 | 16 | 4 | 39 | | **2017** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | Serious | 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 0 | 14 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 18 | | **Total** | 0 | 1 | 6 | 10 | 14 | 2 | 33 |
#### Average
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 15 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 13 | 1 | 29 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 10 | 13 | 20 | 2 | 45 |
#### 2018
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 12 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 17 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 3 | 10 | 13 | 5 | 31 |
WY End table 5
## Reported Road Casualties in Calderdale - 2018
### Car Driver Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | **2013** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 18 | | Slight | 0 | 1 | 8 | 51 | 135 | 19 | 214 | | **Total** | 0 | 1 | 10 | 58 | 143 | 21 | 233 | | **2014** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 10 | 3 | 20 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 15 | 68 | 104 | 28 | 215 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 17 | 75 | 115 | 31 | 238 | | **2015** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 22 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 6 | 56 | 124 | 15 | 201 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 8 | 60 | 132 | 24 | 224 | | **2016** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 14 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 9 | 52 | 110 | 26 | 197 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 11 | 57 | 118 | 29 | 215 | | **2017** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 15 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 10 | 44 | 96 | 32 | 182 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 10 | 48 | 101 | 38 | 197 | | **Average**| | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 18 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 10 | 54 | 114 | 24 | 202 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 11 | 60 | 122 | 29 | 222 | | **2018** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 11 | | Slight | 0 | 1 | 2 | 40 | 84 | 19 | 146 | | **Total** | 0 | 1 | 3 | 40 | 90 | 24 | 158 |
WY End table 6
## Reported Road Casualties in Calderdale - 2018
### Car Passenger Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | **Serious**| 1 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 16 | | **Slight** | 6 | 14 | 21 | 36 | 28 | 6 | 111 | | **Total** | 7 | 16 | 23 | 42 | 32 | 8 | 128 |
| Year | Fatal | Serious | Slight | Total | |------|-------|---------|--------|-------| | 2013 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 7 | | 2014 | 0 | 2 | 26 | 28 | | 2015 | 0 | 4 | 18 | 22 | | 2016 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 7 | | 2017 | 0 | 1 | 17 | 18 |
### Average
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | **Fatal** | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | **Serious**| 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 13 | | **Slight** | 4 | 20 | 15 | 31 | 27 | 12 | 109 | | **Total** | 4 | 21 | 19 | 35 | 30 | 14 | 123 |
| Year | Fatal | Serious | Slight | Total | |------|-------|---------|--------|-------| | 2018 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | | | 0 | 0 | 22 | 22 | | | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9 | | | 4 | 22 | 19 | 38 |
**WY End table 7**
### Reported Road Casualties in Calderdale - 2018
#### Accident Studies - Leeds City Council
**Calderdale District End Tables in 2018**
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | **2013** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 15 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 10 | 2 | 18 | | **2014** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 15 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 10 | 2 | 18 | | **2015** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | Slight | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 12 | | **Total** | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 14 | | **2016** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | Slight | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 12 | 2 | 20 | | **Total** | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 12 | 2 | 21 | | **2017** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 | | Slight | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 7 | | **Total** | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 10 |
**Average**
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | Slight | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 14 | | **Total** | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 9 | 2 | 16 |
**2018**
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|---------| | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 11 | 0 | 15 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 12 | 0 | 16 |
**WY End table 8**
## Calderdale
### Bus Occupant Casualties
| Age Groups | 0 - 4 | 5 - 15 | 16 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 59 | 60+ | All ages | |------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|----------| | **2013** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 9 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 9 | | **2014** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 9 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 9 | | **2015** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Slight | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | | **Total** | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | | **2016** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | Slight | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 8 | | **Total** | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 10 | | **2017** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | | **Average**| | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Slight | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 7 | | **Total** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 7 | | **2018** | | | | | | | | | Fatal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | Slight | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 5 | | **Total** | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 6 |
WY End table 9
## REPORTED ROAD CASUALTIES IN CALDERDALE-2018
### Calderdale
| Year | Killed | Ser | KSI | Slight | Total | Pedestrians | Pedal Cyclists | PTW | Car | Car | Car | Goods | Bus | Others | |--------|--------|-----|-----|--------|-------|-------------|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------| | | | | | | | All Ages | Child | | | | | | | | | 1981-85| 21 | 236 | 257 | 825 | 1082 | 242 | 126 | 67 | 38 | 196 | 252 | 222 | 474 | 38 | | 1994-98| 11 | 112 | 123 | 1106 | 1229 | 194 | 90 | 64 | 30 | 60 | 511 | 301 | 812 | 38 | | 2014-18| 6 | 74 | 80 | 439 | 519 | 91 | 29 | 40 | 6 | 41 | 206 | 117 | 324 | 16 |
### Long Term Comparisons
| Year | Killed | Ser | KSI | Slight | Total | Pedestrians | Pedal Cyclists | PTW | Car | Car | Car | Goods | Bus | Others | |--------|--------|-----|-----|--------|-------|-------------|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------| | | | | | | | All Ages | Child | | | | | | | | | 2003 | 4 | 106 | 110 | 1136 | 1246 | 150 | 61 | 44 | 15 | 78 | 563 | 328 | 891 | 45 | | 2004 | 13 | 111 | 124 | 1079 | 1203 | 166 | 65 | 33 | 13 | 89 | 556 | 279 | 835 | 53 | | 2005 | 7 | 104 | 111 | 842 | 953 | 107 | 37 | 41 | 15 | 79 | 461 | 203 | 664 | 32 | | 2006 | 14 | 109 | 123 | 821 | 944 | 117 | 43 | 29 | 11 | 60 | 469 | 234 | 703 | 18 | | 2007 | 10 | 90 | 100 | 760 | 860 | 103 | 42 | 32 | 9 | 63 | 379 | 245 | 624 | 23 | | 2008 | 9 | 96 | 105 | 683 | 788 | 109 | 38 | 28 | 6 | 69 | 348 | 195 | 543 | 26 | | 2009 | 9 | 111 | 120 | 711 | 831 | 109 | 43 | 34 | 9 | 74 | 365 | 207 | 572 | 17 | | 2010 | 3 | 78 | 81 | 614 | 695 | 80 | 32 | 29 | 5 | 43 | 307 | 194 | 501 | 26 | | 2011 | 7 | 83 | 90 | 555 | 645 | 89 | 45 | 44 | 11 | 57 | 270 | 143 | 413 | 24 | | 2012 | 2 | 94 | 96 | 520 | 616 | 94 | 36 | 44 | 10 | 54 | 250 | 147 | 397 | 16 | | 2013 | 4 | 86 | 90 | 476 | 566 | 76 | 28 | 49 | 7 | 50 | 233 | 128 | 361 | 18 | | 2014 | 6 | 93 | 99 | 524 | 623 | 97 | 33 | 46 | 4 | 51 | 238 | 163 | 401 | 17 | | 2015 | 6 | 86 | 92 | 465 | 557 | 102 | 30 | 44 | 7 | 51 | 224 | 112 | 336 | 14 | | 2016 | 9 | 69 | 78 | 477 | 555 | 104 | 24 | 40 | 6 | 39 | 215 | 123 | 338 | 21 | | 2017 | 3 | 60 | 63 | 387 | 450 | 79 | 32 | 38 | 7 | 33 | 197 | 90 | 287 | 10 | | 2018 | 5 | 62 | 67 | 344 | 411 | 72 | 24 | 30 | 4 | 31 | 158 | 98 | 256 | 16 |
WY End table 10
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269696c0e4fdc713d223e2473935a5a8b2594402 | CALL CREATING A LIVING LEGACY PROGRAM FOR VISUAL ARTISTS
Career Documentation for the Visual Artist: An Archive Planning Workbook and Resource Guide Getting artwork ready for sorting
Neal Ambrose-Smith
# Table of Contents
An Introduction to the Workbook ........................................... 1
» CHAPTER 1 Importance of Documenting and Archiving Your Work ............ 3
» CHAPTER 2 Getting Started and Setting Goals .................................... 9 Setting Manageable Goals ............................................. 10 Chapter 2 Worksheet .................................................. 11
» CHAPTER 3 Getting Assistance ..................................................... 15
» CHAPTER 4 The Legacy Specialist .................................................. 19 Getting Started with a Legacy Specialist ............................ 21 Chapter 4 Worksheet .................................................. 22 Chapter 4 Worksheet .................................................. 23
» CHAPTER 5 The Physical Inventory .................................................. 25 Steps for Organizing and Taking Care of Your Physical Inventory 26 Resources ................................................................. 29 Chapter 5 Worksheet .................................................. 30
» CHAPTER 6 The Record-Keeping System .......................................... 33 Spreadsheets and Databases .......................................... 35 Information Your Records Should Contain .......................... 37 Artwork Record ......................................................... 37 Unique inventory number ............................................. 37 Contact Record .......................................................... 40 Exhibition Record ....................................................... 40 Archive Record .......................................................... 41 Resources ................................................................. 42
» CHAPTER 7 Photographing Your Work ............................................. 45 Resources ................................................................. 46
» CHAPTER 8 Budgeting ................................................................. 47 Chapter 8 Worksheet .................................................. 49 A Final Note .............................................................. 50
Bios ................................................................. 51 Glossary ................................................................. 52 Overloaded storage shed An Introduction to the Workbook
This workbook was created to help an artist, artist’s assistant, Legacy Specialist, family member, or friend of an artist in the process of career documentation.
FOR ARTISTS:
This workbook will help you to:
» assess what you have or have not archived. » develop and/or improve on an inventory and archiving system. » set realistic archiving goals that are comprehensive and sustainable.
For many artists there can be a conflict between the desire to create and the need to concentrate on the “business” side of their art careers. Administrative and organizational tasks can get pushed aside, avoided, or addressed intermittently. It is our hope that this workbook will help you to approach the archiving of your artwork in a systematic way, as a series of steps that can be completed on a day-to-day basis.
The process of career documentation is about valuing your artwork and your career. At any point in an artist’s career, documenting and inventorying artwork can be an immensely personal and emotionally complex process. For emerging artists this can feel like a distraction from making work. For mid-career artists, it can be difficult to look back at what you’ve accomplished and to plan for the future. For mature artists with large bodies of work, it can be difficult to ultimately consider your own legacy.
The process requires that you assign value to what can often seem intangible, and the task, in its enormity, can at times be overwhelming and anxiety producing. Keep in mind the purpose of archiving, which is to value your artwork. Ultimately through creating a system of documentation, you will be closer to achieving your art career, life, and legacy goals. FOR LEGACY SPECIALISTS:
This workbook will help you to:
» understand how to work with an artist.
» develop and/or improve on an inventory and archiving system that works for this artist.
» understand difficulties that can arise while employed as a Legacy Specialist.
FOR FAMILY MEMBERS, PARTNERS, OR FRIENDS OF AN ARTIST:
This workbook will help you to:
» understand how imperative career documentation is for planning an artist’s estate.
» understand what role you can play in preserving the legacy of the artist.
The content of this workbook was greatly informed by the artists the Joan Mitchell Foundation worked with in our program Creating a Living Legacy (CALL). In 2007, we developed the CALL program to explore the needs and concerns of mature painters and sculptors in the documentation of their works. Working closely with four artists, CALL supported these artists as they began the process of creating a comprehensive inventory of their careers. Over the next three years, we asked the artists to share their experiences and insights with us.
In addition to working closely with these four artists, we hosted artist convenings, panels, and workshops. The Joan Mitchell Foundation is now excited to bring what we, along with the CALL artists, have learned from this experience to a larger community of visual artists. It is our intention that this workbook serve as a resource for artists throughout all stages of their artistic lives. To learn more about the CALL program, please visit our website: joanmitchellfoundation.org
SPECIAL THANKS
The Joan Mitchell Foundation would like to thank the four initial CALL artists: Mildred Howard, Elemore Morgan, Jr., Freddy Rodriguez, and Jaune Quick-to-See Smith. Without their artistic vision, openness, and willingness to share their experiences and knowledge, this project would not have been possible. Finally, we would like to dedicate this effort to the memory of Elemore Morgan, Jr., and to his wife Mary Morgan, an amazing artist and truly wonderful educator. CHAPTER 1
Importance of Documenting and Archiving Your Work
Why go through this process of documenting both your work and career?
The process of documentation is fundamentally about caring for your life’s work. On a practical level, the information that you gather can be crucial at any stage of your career. But what does this mean? Consider the following scenarios where documentation would be important to an artist’s career:
THE EMERGING ARTIST: » May wish to apply for a grant, fellowship, and/or commission and need to present documentation of prior projects and work. » May be asked to give an artist’s talk.
THE MID-CAREER ARTIST: » May have an opportunity to create a book or catalogue of their work that surveys all or some aspect of their career. » May regularly get requests for images to be used by other people such as reproductions in a textbook, art historical text, student paper, or for educational purposes and lectures. Having complete records for the images becomes is a necessity.
THE ESTABLISHED ARTIST: » A curator may visit their studio to plan a retrospective of their work. » An art historian may ask for documentation of the work that was in a seminal art exhibition many years ago. » May be considering what will happen to their work when you are no longer around.
“I have learned that if I don’t take care of my work, no one else will. If I don’t see the importance of archiving, why should anyone else see the importance?”
Mildred Howard
Jaune Quick-to-See Smith working on her CALL project
Neal Ambrose-Smith An Introduction to the Vocabulary
WHAT DOES CAREER DOCUMENTATION MEAN?
Career documentation includes all aspects of your career as an artist. It is a system created to document, detail, and demonstrate connections between your artwork, exhibition history, contacts, and archives.
Many artists begin inventorying their work by creating photo documentation of artworks. Photographing and storing your artwork can be a first step in the documentation process, but it should not be confused with the creation of a complete archive. A comprehensive system of career documentation requires an overarching organizational structure that documents all aspects of your career and catalogues their interconnection, including artwork and archive materials, sales and exhibition history, and contacts.
WHAT IS AN ARCHIVE?
An archive is what you will be compiling while you are in the process of career documentation. An archive is comprised of two parts:
» the physical inventory, which includes the artworks and archived materials documenting your career. » the records, which are the means of tracking everything in the physical inventory, including the artworks and archived materials.
WHAT ARE THE KEY COMPONENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL ARCHIVE?
A comprehensive archive of your work should include both a physical archive and a record-keeping system. The physical inventory includes the actual works of art still in your possession, but could also include catalogues, books, project proposals, correspondence, and other materials related to your career. The record-keeping system includes documentation on each artwork in the physical archive as well as art that you no longer own. This system also contains records of your contacts and information on your career.
WHAT IS A LEGACY SPECIALIST?
During the initial phase of the Living Legacy project, the Foundation discovered that the specialized skills required to work with an artist on career documentation exceeded those of an assistant. An assistant may move canvases around and sweep floors, but a Legacy Specialist can manage inventory, images, reproduction, archiving logistics, and much more. In later chapters of this workbook, we discuss in more detail the process of organizing your physical inventory and developing a record-keeping system. In addition we’ve included worksheets to help you prioritize steps in the archiving process. Keep in mind that these are suggestions; you should determine for yourself the best means of beginning the archiving process based on your individual needs.
The Stages of Career Documentation
It may be helpful to think of the process of career documentation as composed of a series of stages, which the Documentation diagram (previous page) illustrates.
The Joan Mitchell Foundation has learned from artists that the process of career documentation is ongoing, with artists returning to these stages at different points. The organization of your physical inventory and records may be at different stages for different bodies or types of work. For example, you may have a complete inventory list of your paintings, but have no records for your works on paper. Or you may have a comprehensive archive that relates to a specific exhibition, but no documentation for artworks that haven’t been shown.
What do you do when you are confronted with the amount of work to be archived?
For many artists, starting is the hardest and most overwhelming part of the process. It is essential that you define a method that is realistic, sustainable, and manageable for you. In the following chapters we will walk you through the stages of career documentation and help you create an archiving system that works for you. The worksheets will assist you in taking stock and setting realistic goals.
At this point in my career what do I prioritize?
There is no perfect answer and every studio situation will be different.
EMERGING ARTIST
Define a numbering system that is simple and makes sense to you and begin numbering all your work. Always number-shoot-enter data all artworks before they leave the studio: place your inventory number on your work, photograph the work, and upload the photo with all its data into a database.
MID-CAREER ARTIST
Numbering is usually a great place to start. It’s usually better to photograph works once they are numbered and record data once it is collected. You should still decide what is best for you. Don’t forget to number-shoot-enter data all artworks before they leave the studio.
ESTABLISHED ARTIST
You may decide to have a work partner or Legacy Specialist (see Chapter 3: Getting Assistance) and develop a plan together. There may be stacks of unorganized artworks and ephemera. Space is at a premium and sorting can become daunting. Think about preserving work space for artmaking. Then number the existing works before numbering-shooting-data entry, and sorting artworks into new drawers, boxes, folders, or piles. A computer can sort each work into a group of your choosing. The studio before the archive project, and the artist at work during the project
Neal Ambrose-Smith Chapter 1 Worksheet
CREATING A TIMELINE
Begin an outline for a timeline of your career and life as an artist. This may include points when you traveled or lived in new places, experienced new materials, or started new bodies of work. CHAPTER 2
Getting Started and Setting Goals
How do you begin the archiving process? Are you supposed to begin from the start of your artistic career? What do you even begin with?
The process of archiving, documenting, and organizing can be daunting. If you don’t have a system in place, even the thought of creating one can be intimidating. It can paralyze artists before taking a first step. Following are some suggestions gathered from many artists. In addition, the worksheets at the end of this section are designed to help you brainstorm solutions.
1. **Get help—don’t start alone.** Having someone to work with can make this process manageable. Similar to working with a trainer at the gym, having a Legacy Specialist who focuses on archiving can keep you committed to the work week after week. If you can’t afford a Legacy Specialist, consider finding an intern or taking on the challenge with another artist who is also creating an archiving system. If you have a lot to sort, set a day to go through the materials and ask a group of friends or volunteers in to help you.
2. **Invest in storage materials.** Get a folding table to work on and purchase bins for sorting. Secure extra flatfiles or a filing cabinet. Build basic shelves. Professional archiving materials, such as archival boxes and plastic sheet protectors, can be very expensive. A roll of glassine can be cut to size, minimizing waste. Don’t hesitate to get the supplies you need to ensure the safety of your work, but do consider what other materials are out there.
3. **Decide on a record-keeping system.** Decide which system will work best for you—will you start by keeping handwritten files or will you start on the computer? If you are working on the computer consider using a database system, however you can start with an Excel spreadsheet or Word document if you don’t have access to a database. Next, decide on an inventory numbering system to use.
4. **Build on what you have.** Records of your work exist everywhere. Do you have a website? Are there any galleries, nonprofits, or museums that have information about your work? Has a catalogue of your work been published? Before you begin, take a moment to think about what records you currently have or that may be accessible through galleries, dealers, or other institutions. You may be able to avoid redoing work that has already been done.
5. **Start from your résumé.** Use your résumé as a starting point to consider your exhibition history. Loan agreements and consignment forms will include information about which artworks were included in which shows.
6. **Start from the first thing you pick up in your space.** If you are using a database system, you can simply start with the top of the pile. You do not need to worry about sorting things, the program is designed to sort information for you.
7. **Start now.** Get in the habit of labeling, inventorying, and logging every new artwork you make and every work that leaves your studio. Set up a digital camera and take a snapshot of each new work. Sign, number (inventory number), and date each new artwork, and jot down the details in a notebook, on a clipboard, or enter them in a database.
8. **Start small.** When deciding what needs to be done, break the task down into manageable steps. For example, start with one flatfile drawer or all the work on one storage rack. Or begin to catalogue all your recent works on paper before you start an inventory of your paintings. Set an objective that makes it easy to estimate the time required for its completion and keep it relatively short. See the following page on developing a S.M.A.R.T. goal.
**Note:** This list was devised with special help from Jaune Quick-to-See Smith, who kindly shared her recommendations. “In the beginning I’m really glad that we started out slow, nobody knew what kind of process worked for this. Our first assistant had worked for a museum and felt that we should be just like a museum, which of course, turned out to be totally the wrong thing. Museums use abstract numbering systems as they deal with multitudes of art and artists. I need a numbering system that has meaning for me. When working with an individual artist it is not at all like a museum.”
Jaune Quick-to-See Smith
Setting Manageable Goals
Setting manageable goals is critical to beginning the process of archiving. It is easy to write down a long list of things that need to get done and then get overwhelmed by them. Instead, we recommend that you think about regularly setting goals that are realistic and timely. The goal worksheets at the end of this workbook will help you to create a clear plan of action in the coming weeks and months.
EXAMPLE OF AN UNREALISTIC GOAL: Archiving all of the work in my studio that I have done for the last 40 years.
EXAMPLE OF A MANAGEABLE GOAL: Within the next two weeks, I will dedicate 1 hour every day to inventorying all the artwork in one drawer of my flatfiles.
S.M.A.R.T. GOAL:
S-specific, M-measurable, A-attainable, R-realistic, T-timely.
» Specific goals depend on who, what, where, when, which, and why? » Measurable is accountability and tracking progress. » Attainable is a goal that motivates you towards achievement. » Realistic is a goal within your current abilities. » Timely is a goal with a time frame.
SUGGESTIONS:
» make all goals concrete. » make the goal something you can clearly state in one sentence. » make a clear end point. The accomplishment of the goal should be definite and visible. » make sure the goal is something you can complete—factor in time and space restrictions. » set a realistic date for completing your goal. Chapter 2 Worksheet
GOALS Clear goals are critical components to starting and sustaining your inventory process. Use the space below to brainstorm. Keep the goals specific, manageable, and achievable within a realistic time frame. Visualize the steps you would take to complete the goal. Use one short sentence to describe each.
LONG-TERM GOALS: DATE:
SHORT-TERM GOALS: DATE: Chapter 2 Worksheet
GOALS Select three short-term goals from your list that you would like to start with. Articulate each goal in one short sentence (longer sentences may indicate you are creating multiple goals). Take a moment to fill in the particulars of each below.
GOAL 1
PROJECTED DATE OF COMPLETION:
POTENTIAL OBSTACLES:
STEPS TO TAKE:
NOTES:
GOAL 2
PROJECTED DATE OF COMPLETION:
POTENTIAL OBSTACLES:
STEPS TO TAKE:
NOTES: GOAL 3
PROJECTED DATE OF COMPLETION:
POTENTIAL OBSTACLES:
STEPS TO TAKE:
NOTES:
GOAL 4
PROJECTED DATE OF COMPLETION:
POTENTIAL OBSTACLES:
STEPS TO TAKE:
NOTES: GOAL 5
PROJECTED DATE OF COMPLETION:
POTENTIAL OBSTACLES:
STEPS TO TAKE:
NOTES:
GOAL 6
PROJECTED DATE OF COMPLETION:
POTENTIAL OBSTACLES:
STEPS TO TAKE:
NOTES: CHAPTER 3
Getting Assistance
You are encouraged to get assistance. Many artists have not organized or archived their work simply because they require help or are lacking the necessary computer skills. Hiring a Legacy Specialist can answer these needs, but you do have other options based on the type of assistance you require and what you can afford. Think broadly about ways you can get help.
Consider what skills you need your Legacy Specialist to have. Do you need someone with good computer skills? Do you need someone who can help you with photography or scanning? Do you need someone who can build shelves in your storage space?
When archiving, keep in mind that it is in your best interest to be working alongside your Legacy Specialist, actively participating in the process. You need to be present for two reasons: first, you should be available to answer questions on your work. Second, you will want to make sure you understand how to use the organizational system being created and that it works for you.
Consider compiling a team of assistants that would encompass paid employees, contract laborers, as well as family or friends.
TYPES OF ASSISTANTS
The assistant: Assistants can work part-time or full-time; either way they should be paid by you as an employee. What this means is that they should be on your payroll, and you will be required to deduct state and federal taxes from their paycheck. They will have a set schedule and are expected to accomplish the tasks that you outline.
The independent contractor (Legacy Specialist): An independent contractor differs from an assistant as you will be hiring him or her for specific projects and frequently for a specific skill set—as a photographer for example. An independent contractor should outline the project for you what their project phases and timeline in a proposal. When paying an independent contractor, you do not have to remove any money from his or her paycheck for taxes or unemployment. However, you will need to provide both the IRS and the independent contractor with a 1099 form if the cost of the contractor’s services is more than $600. The independent contractor is responsible for his or her taxes on these earnings.
“With a young artist one Legacy Specialist could come in and get them going. But with an older artist like me and the amount of work I have, I see no other way than working with a team. If the artist is serious about creating an archive of work, they must be committed to the ‘big-dig.’”
Jaune Quick-to-See Smith LEGAL ISSUES IN HIRING AN ASSISTANT VERSUS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR:
Please note: artists frequently hire assistants and pay them as if they are independent contractors, as a means of avoiding paying taxes on the employee. This practice is illegal if the assistant is really an assistant working for you versus an independent contractor. If you do get caught, you are liable for back taxes and penalties. Contract labor is part-time work, 20 hours per week or less. Before hiring an assistant or an independent contractor, please consult an accountant.
The intern: Interns are usually unpaid or may receive a modest stipend for their time or traveling expenses. An intern can provide temporary or short-term help, however keep in mind that legally an intern should not be working the way an assistant or Legacy Specialist does. The purpose of an internship is to provide an educational opportunity. With an intern, it is necessary to define specific projects and learning goals for the duration of the intern’s time with you.
The best way to find interns is through a local college or university, especially those that offer credit for internships, or require internships in the completion of a degree. Consider approaching a local university’s fine arts, art history, or arts management department to locate potential applicants. Make sure to write up a description of what the intern might learn working with you or the type of experience he or she can expect to have.
Getting family and loved ones involved: It is very important in any archiving project that you engage the people whom you are close to. In particular, as you get older, you will want to make sure you have selected one or two people to be knowledgeable about your archive: how it is structured, how your work is stored, and what you value. Getting a son or daughter, partner or close friend involved in the archiving process is a wonderful way to ensure he or she understands your work and your wishes.
Involving your community: Many artists are teachers or leaders in their communities. They have engaged a range of people over the years to give them a hand on their work and their archives. By choosing to involve more people, these artists in turn found their communities more invested in them and their work.
Involving your gallery: Your gallery will most likely respond with enthusiasm to your organizational efforts. A gallery that you have worked with for any length of time will have information useful to your archive. Some galleries can be averse to sharing contacts and collector information. When working with a gallery, approach the topic early on in your relationship.
Find an archiving partner or start an archiving group: When The Joan Mitchell Foundation first started researching the process of career documentation the group of four artists were regularly brought together to share their archiving processes. We hadn’t foreseen how valuable these conversations would be to the artists. As mentioned earlier in the workbook, archiving can be an intensely emotional and tedious task. Getting support and advice, and sharing goals out loud can make the process more bearable. Build that support system by choosing to start the process with a buddy or a group of friends.
Organize a team to work with you: If you are an artist starting this process late in your career and you have a lot of work to archive, consider the team approach. A team utilizes a range of assistants, independent contractors, and interns in conjunction with a committed team player who is a family member or a close friend. This individual could also be the person who handles your estate. The tasks are divided between the team, while the person responsible for your estate is intimately informed about your archiving system. “Something that I didn’t do, but I would recommend is that there should be a signed contract spelling things out. What is going to be done and what is expected. This contract could be very formal.”
Freddy Rodriguez
ADVICE FOR LEGACY SPECIALISTS WORKING WITH ARTISTS
It takes a great deal of skill, patience, and servitude. It’s a commitment that can be taxing on the relationships of the artist and the assistant as well as their families. Contract workers can simply stop whenever they want, as they have no further legal obligation and there is simply nothing the artist can do or say about it. Professional commitment should supersede the legal obligation to finish the job and build relationships.
In the beginning of contract work between the artist and the Legacy Specialist there is a lot of catching up to do: telling stories, discussing how coffee should be made and when to take breaks, sharing ideas and learning something about each other—building a foundation of trust and understanding. What matters most is what you share, not what you know.
Be prepared to spend some time in discussion. These talks will inform the Legacy Specialist and provide him or her with important details about the artist and work. With the artist’s permission, these conversations could be recorded for the archive. The more information collected, the more complete the archive.
Establish work schedules and habits early on. In an artist’s studio everyone is a stranger, except for the dogs, and this applies to spouses and family. Strangers are difficult to work around and make it difficult for the artist to work. With a little time and dialogue a schedule can make it easier for everybody. Habits can include music, coffee, walking the dogs, and talking on the phone. Open communication between the artist and the assistant is vital to the relationship. “You need someone who is knowledgeable about art, but also someone who is committed and has an interest in what the job entails. You have to work with the assistant even if it is a limited amount of time, and even though I hate to supervise other people, I think it is necessary to make sure that the work is being done in a way, that when it is finished, it makes sense to you.”
Freddy Rodriguez CHAPTER 4
The Legacy Specialist
The individuals that the Foundation has trained to work with artists are called Legacy Specialists. They are defined by four categories of skills:
1. SOCIAL SKILLS
2. ORGANIZATIONAL SKILLS
3. ART APPRECIATION
4. TECHNOLOGY SKILLS
Social Skills include good communication, listening, and being respectful. Often many of the artists Legacy Specialists work with are older, so patience is a vital element in the relationship. Through being open to suggestion and asking questions, the Legacy Specialist can reassure the artist.
Organizational Skills involve inventory assessment, handling the physical and digital archive, including computers and equipment, and maintaining a clean and safe work area.
Art Appreciation covers a broad area: A basic understanding of art history and art identification, art mediums and health and safety, art-related packing and archiving materials, and art conservation. Furthermore, an appreciation and respect of the artist’s work is imperative.
Technology Skills cover computers and photography. A basic understanding of computers, art-related software, and scanning are necessary. Basic, rather than professional, photography skills are required as well.
Many of these skills can and will be learned on the job as the Legacy Specialist is a very specialized and unique worker. Example of the proper way to handle a painting, keeping the hand and fingers from pushing into the back of the canvas.
When a canvas is handled improperly damage to the painting may result. In the images at right, you can see where the knuckles are pushing into the back side of the canvas. A small dent could potentially crack the surface of a painting and or stretch it irreparably.
Not every assistant or Legacy Specialist will know the proper way to handle your art. Taking the time to share information is very important to the safety of the art and Legacy Specialist. Getting Started with a Legacy Specialist
Provide an overview of your work. It is critical that anyone helping you to create a record-keeping system be knowledgeable about your work. It is also critical that your archive be organized in a way that is logical to you. Take the time to write a guide outlining the series or themes of your artwork so that you can create a structure appropriate for your archive. Please refer to the Legacy Specialist worksheet at the end of this chapter for guidance.
Talk through your timeline. When working with a Legacy Specialist, it can be useful to give him or her a sense of the timeline of your life and career. This may seem a bit awkward at first, however the career overview will assist the Legacy Specialist in determining which artworks belong to specific points of your life.
Set realistic and regular goals. Work with your Legacy Specialist to set archiving goals; hold scheduled meetings to discuss your progress. Continue to have discussions about prioritizing critical artworks and artworks that can wait. Artwork for an upcoming show for instance, would need immediate documentation.
Have your Legacy Specialist keep a work log. The work log is another form of communication with the Legacy Specialist. This is especially useful when you are working with a team. The log records what they are currently working on as well as any questions they might have for you, in addition to tracking timelines for tasks.
Set aside time to answer questions. The Legacy Specialist will need time to get to know your work. They will have more questions for you in the beginning. As the project evolves, the process will stabilize, and the goals will become clearer.
Stay involved. Make sure you know everything your Legacy Specialist knows. Chapter 4 Worksheet
OVERVIEW OF YOUR ARTWORK
The purpose of this worksheet is to give you an opportunity to provide an introductory overview of your career. You can then use this career outline to help you create a plan for organizing your work and your records. In addition, this overview will assist the people helping you archive, handling your estate, or researching your work in the future.
1. Outline the types of work you do. Under each type include the materials you have historically used. For example: Painting: oil on panel, oil on canvas, acrylic on canvas.
2. Outline any dominant themes in your work or series you have created over the course of your career. Include a short description of each.
3. Is there anything else people should know about your artwork?
4. Finish the following statement: I will feel my legacy successful if... Chapter 4 Worksheet
PROJECTS FOR THE LEGACY SPECIALIST
Before a Legacy Specialist starts working with you, take a moment to outline five projects to focus on.
PROJECT 1
PROJECT 2
PROJECT 3
PROJECT 4
PROJECT 5 Metal flatfiles with large wheels mounted on plywood create a mobile base. Large wheels (5” or 7”) keep the files off the floor and make them extremely easy to move.
Example of a simple flatfile matboard box. The box is scored and folded. The seams are reinforced with linen tape for long life. These boxes are made to fit the artwork and do not exceed the flatfile drawer height. Keeping artworks in these boxes prevents the artwork from sliding around, catching on drawer parts, and bending corners, resulting in damage. CHAPTER 5
The Physical Inventory
A critical element to creating an archiving system, as well as caring for your artwork, is developing a method for physically organizing your studio and additional storage. Any records you keep will be more useful if they include information on the physical location of the artwork. As with many organizational tasks, making the decision and then setting up the system is the hardest part.
This section will orient you to some of the larger concerns about safely storing your artwork and related material. Keep in mind it is important to care for your work, but don’t feel as if you have to become a museum. See the end of this chapter for professional resources, including archival supply companies and books on conservation that will address, more thoroughly, the archiving of physical artworks.
“Personally going through this process has helped me to understand what I have done. It gives me the opportunity to access the work that I have done over all these years, and I think that is really important.
By having things in order, if I have to apply for a fellowship or send some slides out, it is all there and available. If someone is interested in writing about my work, or even if I need to find something that I have done in the past in terms of articles or reviews, I can just go to it. I don’t have to go through piles and piles of papers to find one thing.”
Mildred Howard Steps for Organizing and Taking Care of Your Physical Inventory
1. Evaluate your current storage methods and storage space based on the following suggestions:
- Keep the temperature consistent. Extreme temperature and temperature fluctuations are harmful to all types of artwork. The temperature fluctuations in uninsulated areas, such as an attic or basement, can cause many types of materials to expand and crack.
- Keep the humidity low. Ideally all artwork should be stored at humidity levels between 40% and 60%. Photographs, especially negatives or color prints, must be kept in a cool and dry location.
- Consider building a climate-controlled space if you work with very fragile materials or live in a warm climate. There are also storage services that provide climate-controlled spaces for artwork, however these can be expensive options. As an alternative we have seen artists use AC units to keep the storage space a consistent temperature.
- Try to control air quality. Dust, pollen, pollution, sand, all of these can be harmful to work. Evaluate which environmental factors you can control or eliminate.
- Avoid direct sunlight. Keep all stored artwork out of direct sunlight which can cause long-term damage to artwork.
- Avoid cement floors, which can retain moisture. Build shelves or racks to raise the artwork off the floor.
- Assess the likelihood of insect or rodent problems.
- Consider the types of natural disasters that could happen to your storage space, particularly flooding. If you live in an area prone to flooding, consider building a sealed space for your storage. Consider the sprinkler system. Though it is essential to have a sprinkler system for fire safety, if this system does go off it could result in unexpected water damage. We recommend you anticipate this potential damage by covering shelving units with plastic or tarps.
- Insurance. Getting insurance to cover the retail value of your artwork can be difficult and expensive. If renting you can consider renters insurance which can cover tools and computers. Insurers will require proof of value of artwork through an outside assessment, usually provided by a gallery or paid consultant.
2. Make sure you are properly preparing your artwork for storage.
Strategies for packaging and storing depend on the specific materials of the artwork. Below is a general list; for any unusual materials please refer to the resources listed at the end of this workbook.
2D ARTWORK
- Label and sign all works on paper: signature, year, inventory number.
- Keep unmatted, small, or loose work in drawers, boxes, or ideally metal flatfiles. Flatfiles reduce the possibility of damage from rodents and other animals and often insects.
- Store similar materials together and be aware of what materials can not be stored together. For example, separate all newspaper and other highly acidic paper from other types of paper.
- Place glassine between each work or at least on the top of each drawer.
- When storing work in plastic sleeves be sure it is acid-free plastic.
- Store large canvases or framed work vertically on shelves with acid-free cardboard between each to protect the surface.
- To prevent warping and damage to large paintings, attach a reinforcement directly to the stretchers on the back of the canvas. This reinforcing board can be made of Coroplast, foam core, or cardboard.
- Be careful when using foamcore for long-term storage of your artwork. Foamcore can be harmful to the surface of artwork.
- If you run out of space, consider rolling paintings. Make sure the work is dry and the surface is not too delicate. Roll the canvas around a cardboard or plastic tube with the painted surface to the outside. 3D ARTWORK Consider the materials of the artwork and what you can wrap around the object to protect it. Some artists will build crates, use large bins and boxes with blankets or plastic. Get several plastic bins to help with the sorting process. Label each bin by date span (a set of years) or by category (such as “exhibition materials”). You will then be able to sort broadly into the bins; returning to fine-tune the sorting process one bin at a time.
» Be sure to label the packaged work to easily identify it. Include handling and/or assembly instructions. » Larger pieces frequently have to be disassembled, then boxed up. » When wrapping objects use an acid-free plastic. » Be sure to carefully support objects that are boxed.
SKETCHBOOKS Store sketchbooks vertically on a bookshelf. Even a slight angle puts tension on the binding. If a sketchbook’s binding is already in a vulnerable state, store it horizontally without any weight on top.
PHOTOGRAPHS Store in boxes or flatfiles. Keep in a consistent, cool environment with low humidity. Consider the materials you will store them in, and make sure that any paper or cardboard has limited acidity.
VIDEOTAPES Keep all videotapes in spaces that are climate-controlled and dust-free. Videotapes should be stored vertically, as opposed to horizontally.
EPHEMERA Such as archived career materials, including documents, exhibition materials, books, photographs, etc. Store all papers in filing cabinets, bins, or boxes; books should be stored on shelves.
“Since we have such a large selection of work to deal with, we decided to divide the work up by decades. We have four flatfiles filled with work and each one represents a different decade. Once the pieces are sorted out by decade, we then sort them by year, and then by type and series (drawing, painting on paper, print) filing them as we go.”
Jordan James, Jaune Quick-to-See Smith’s Legacy Specialist outlining their studio process 3. Conservation and damaged works.
Start keeping a record of all damaged work. When looking for a conservator check with your gallery, a local museum, or framing shop to see whom they recommend.
4. Designating a space to sort.
For many artists, once an artwork is finished, it is packed and put into storage. To access what you have, you will need to define a space in your studio or storage to be used for unpacking and sorting.
» Set up folding tables to work on, creating enough surface area to sort.
» Get an extra flatfile or a series of bins, labeled with year or category, to sort materials.
5. Make a studio/storage map.
The storage map will provide you and others with what archivists call a “finding aid.” The map will identify each area of storage that you have artwork or archive materials in. Each flatfile, drawer, or section of shelving should be named and labeled and the corresponding label written on the map. When you create the record for each artwork, its physical location will also be documented. This is one of the ways to create a clear connection between your physical inventory and your record-keeping system.
6. To purge or not to purge.
Some works are simply tossed in the trash, some need to be hauled to the dump, and others can be reused, finished, or repaired. Consider a two-step process for purging. First create a pile or drawer for questionable or unfinished artworks. Materials can be reclaimed or recycled from this pile and this gives you time to revisit these works later. Step two is when you truly decide to purge or not to purge. The most important thing to remember is to destroy any works beyond recognition prior to their disposal.
7. Keep a list of supplies you need to buy or build in order to store your artwork and archived career materials, such as:
» Shelving systems or painting racks
» Cardboard, storage bins, boxes, or files
» Flatfiles for works on paper and photographs
» Glassine or other archival materials
» Archival plastics (acid-free plastics) made from polyester, polypropylene, or polyethylene
» Tape, scissors, box cutter, sharpies
“This project was way bigger than I even imagined. I didn’t really know what we were getting into until we started schlepping stuff around. I affectionately call this process the ‘big dig.’”
Jaune Quick-to-See Smith CALL CREATING A LIVING LEGACY
Resources
STORAGE AND STORAGE SYSTEMS FOR ARTISTS Art Boards art-boards.com/art_storage_system.htm Blick Art Materials dickblick.com/categories/conservation Container Store containerstore.com Archival Supply Companies Archival Methods archivalmethods.com Hollinger Metal Edge hollingermetaledge.com Light Impressions lightimpressionsdirect.com University Products universityproducts.com
BOOKS Konstanze Bachmann, Conservation Concerns: A Guide for Collectors and Curators (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 1992). Margaret Holben Ellis, The Care of Prints and Drawings (American Association for State and Local History) (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1996). Ralph Mayer, The Artist’s Handbook of Materials and Techniques, 5th ed. (New York: Viking, 1991). Marjorie Shelley, The Care and Handling of Art Objects: Practices in the Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1987). Jill Snyder and Joseph Montague, Caring for Your Artwork: A Guide for Artists, Collectors, Galleries, and Art Institutions (New York: Allsworth Press, 2001).
ONLINE CONSERVATION RESOURCES American Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works conservation-us.org The Exhibition Alliance exhibitionalliance.org The Getty Conservation Institute getty.edu/conservation The Institute of Conservation icon.org.uk The Library of Congress, Preservation loc.gov/preservation/resources/care National Parks Service, Conserve-O-grams cr.nps.gov/museum/publications/conserveogram/conserv.html Smithsonian Museum Conservation Institute si.edu/mci/english/learn_more/taking_care Arts & Business Council of Greater Boston, VLA, Estate Planning Webinars artsandbusinesscouncil.org/online-presentations.html Chapter 5 Worksheet Assessing Your Physical Inventory
STUDIO ASSESSMENT
01. Consistent temperature?
02. Air quality?
03. Artwork exposed to direct sunlight?
04. Artwork resting on cement floors?
05. Evidence of insects or rodents?
06. Are natural disasters a concern?
07. Physical dangers?
08. Insurance?
09. Artworks labeled?
10. Artworks packed properly?
Outline the current state of organization (or lack of organization) of your physical inventory:
List any systems you are using to keep track of your work: databases, inventory lists, digital images, or simply “in your head”:
Given the storage procedures detailed in this workbook, write down any concerns you have about the safety of your work: Chapter 5 Worksheet
Mapping Your Studio and Storage Space
Draw a map of your studio and/or storage space and label each area where artwork or your archives are currently stored. You will be noting these locations in your records as a way of linking your archiving system to the physical location. Make sure to leave a copy of the map in connection with your record-keeping system. An example of a record-keeping system using a recipe box. These cards could then be scanned later, uploaded to a computer, and added to a database or spreadsheet.
Another example of a record-keeping system: inserting slides into plastic sleeves in a three-ring binder. The slides are safe and ready for labeling and future scanning. CHAPTER 6
The Record-Keeping System
Artists keep track of their careers in a range of ways: with an inventory list of artworks, a detailed CV with exhibition information, an e-mail list of contacts, and a bibliography of publications. Each of these examples represents an important record-keeping category within an archiving system: artworks, exhibition information, contacts, and archive materials. This section provides an overview of record-keeping systems, the different options and equipment you may need for each, and the type of information you should be collecting for the record fields.
THREE EXAMPLES OF RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEMS
Below are three different examples of record-keeping systems. The first system involves handwritten information on a card or in a notebook and does not require a computer. The second two inventory systems both require use of a computer. We recommend people use a computer and in particular a database software system, however we want to emphasize that it is important to find the system you are most comfortable with.
1. Handwritten notecards or notebooks
Keeping an inventory list in a notebook or creating an index-card system is a simple starting point. When keeping handwritten records, make sure to pair an image with each entry. If you are uncomfortable with digital cameras, simply sketch the artwork for each record. In addition, make sure to photocopy all records and keep a copy in a secure location off-site.
Example of a documentation record
Neal Ambrose-Smith LIST OF WORKS FOR PENSECOLA MUSEUM SHOW:
01. What have you been missing? (2013), Oil on canvas, mixed media, 60" x 72"; NS13PG004
02. Learn our history in three videos (2013), Oil on canvas, mixed media, 60" x 96"; NS13PG005
03. I always say plow in all the fertilizer your pocketbook can stand (2011), Mixed media, 48" x 36"; NS11PG008
04. Coyote Goes Hunting at the Disco (2006), Intaglio-Type, 42" x 23"; NS06PR001
05. Story Teller (2007), Monotype, 30" x 22"; NS07PR005
06. Map of the Universe (2008), Monotype, 32" x 44"; NS08PR002
07. Singing the roof off (2008), Monotype, 32" x 44"; NS08PR003
08. Charlie Two Eagles exercising affirmative action (2008), Color Lithograph, 30" x 22"; NS08PR036
09. Going where no man has gone before (2008), Monotype, 22" x 30"; NS08PR016
10. Abstract in Your Home (2009), Neon, 71" x 71"; NS09SC002
11. Dancers (2011), Inverse Intaglio-Type, 39"; NS11PR095
12. Indian Heart (2011), Mixed media, 48" x 36"; NS11PG009
13. Indian Shoe (2012), Oil on canvas, mixed media, 60" x 48"; NS12PG003
14. Masquerade (2012), Mixed media, 39" x 25"; NS12PR034
15. Exposed, Strange and Weird (2012), Mixed media, 44" x 30"; NS12PR035
16. Fighter Sang Tenor (2012), Mixed media, 39" x 25"; NS12PR036
17. Detective Tom Scares Easy in 'Terror Powwow' (2012), Mixed media, 44" x 30"; NS12PR037
18. Skin whoops! (2012), Mixed media, 44" x 30"; NS12PR038
19. Zombies need romance (2012), Mixed media, 44" x 30"; NS12PR039
20. HiYo (2012), Mixed media, 64" x 39"; NS12PR040
21. Strange traits bred in darkness (2012), Mixed media, 64" x 39"; NS12PR041
22. All new stories (2012), Mixed media, 64" x 39"; NS12PR042
23. Tarot Powwow (2012), Mixed media, 64" x 39"; NS12PR043
24. Discovery (2013), Oil on canvas, mixed media, 60" x 48"; NS13PG003
25. Strange Planets (2012), Oil on canvas, mixed media, 60" x 72"; NS12PG005 Spreadsheets and Databases
26. Word document or Excel spreadsheet on the computer
A computerized record-keeping system has many advantages. It allows you to easily back-up your records, share the information with others, and even develop a system in which Legacy Specialists can do the inputting. A simple way to begin is to create an inventory list in a Word document or create a spreadsheet in Excel. Spreadsheets organize related information and group different categories of information (such as artwork, contacts, etc.) in separate columns or lists.
3. Database program on a computer—the most comprehensive system
A database is the best system for managing your records. Databases allow you to connect different types of information to each record without a need for repetition. They allow you to store a range of information—records for work, contacts, and press—all within the same system.
Looking at the database example on the previous page you will see that the “General Information” tab is open. There are multiple tabs for editions, images, copyrights, and more. This information can be linked in multiple locations. The potential for error is greater with the spreadsheet record-keeping method as changes to entries are not automatically replicated across worksheets; you must manually update the information in each location to keep your records up-to-date.
A database, on the other hand, allows data fields to be linked across the system. You can enter the collector’s name and link it to all related areas within the database; any changes you make to entries are automatically replicated in multiple locations. You can also perform searches that allow you to pull up all instances of a collector’s name or the name of an artwork that was included in a particular show. It is this linking of information that makes a database the most dynamic record-keeping system. “It is more than important, it is a lifesaver. I mean this is unbelievable, to have a database at your fingertips. You open this little thing on the computer and you can find everything you have done in your life. I mean how good is that? You don’t have to scratch your head and try to remember in which box to look.”
Freddy Rodriguez
A FINAL NOTE ON DATABASES
With databases, you have two options. You can purchase the software, such as Filemaker Pro, and build it out according to your needs, or you can purchase software customized for the needs of visual artists. Ask fellow artists what they are using. Use caution when buying a program that has been designed for a gallery and not an artist. Galleries frequently purchase complex database programs that have monthly or yearly service fees.
Filemaker Pro is one of the software programs in which many databases are designed. You can purchase pre-made databases or simply purchase the software to design something to your needs. If you are comfortable with computers and confident in your ability to learn a new program, you can design your own database system. For the beginning user it is not recommended.
BASIC EQUIPMENT TO CONSIDER
» Notebook or notecards if you are choosing not to use a computer
If using a computer you will need:
» Computer and external hard drive for backup » Printer » Digital camera and/or scanner
Software you might need:
» For images: Picasso, iPhoto, Aperture, Adobe: Photoshop, Lightroom, or Elements » For documents: Microsoft Word, Apple Pages, or Adobe Acrobat » For spreadsheets: Microsoft Excel or Apple Numbers » For a database: Filemaker Pro or a program designed for artists
Additional materials:
» Filing cabinet or filing boxes for paperwork and/or a fire-safe Information Your Records Should Contain
Now that we have outlined three types of systems, we will review the type of information to collect. Records should be kept for the following categories:
» Artwork » Contacts » Exhibitions » Archives
1. Artwork Record
You will be compiling records for all of the artwork in your studio and storage space, as well as for artwork you have sold or donated. From these records, you will create an inventory list.
Following is a list of fields that should be included in an artwork record:
» Inventory number » Title » Date » Medium » Size » Images » Locations (current/home) » Value/Price » Exhibitions » Installation Instruction/Care » People/Institutions » Notes
Unique inventory number
A unique numbering system allows you to identify and track each work you have made. The number should be listed both on the artwork (or packaging) and on the record. When creating an inventory numbering system, you should take into account the way you work. Inventory numbers are critical for artists who make many untitled works, prints, or work in multiples. This number should have meaning for you.
A standard example includes your initials, the year the work was completed, the category of work (for example: drawing versus painting), and a number for that individual work. The numbers given to individual pieces are usually chronological within the year or category of work. UNIQUE INVENTORY NUMBER EXAMPLES
JD2009DW27 or JD09DW27 This is the 27th drawing Jane Doe made in 2009 (i.e., Jane Doe, 2009, Drawing, #27)
JD09DWO27 This is the 27th drawing from the “Oceans” series that Jane Doe made in 2009
JD09DW0311 Jane Doe made this drawing on March 11, 2009
Account for multiples: Consider any prints or multiples you have done.
JD09PR0122 JD09PR0222 Jane Doe’s 2009 prints 1 and 2 from edition 22.
JD09IN1A or JD09IN101 Jane Doe’s 2009 installation. In these examples either “A” or “01” serve as an indicator of components.
If you are using a database system you won’t need special numbers for editions. The database can manage this special category.
Unknown year of creation: For some artists, there is a lot of undated work. If you can not remember the year, choose a number to signify the year is unknown. This number should correspond to a year that you will never be creating artwork, such as your year of birth. You want to keep track of the work that has an unknown year.
JDXXDW42 Jane Doe’s 42nd drawing from an unknown year (“unknown” is represented by the letters “XX”)
HOW TO USE YOUR INVENTORY NUMBER
» An inventory number should exist both on the artwork itself and in the artwork record.
» The number should also be listed on sales receipts, consignment forms, and exhibition loan records.
» Inventory numbers should never be altered, especially once the work has “entered the world.”
» Consider making inventory numbers for work that has been sold, given away, or perhaps even destroyed.
Final note: Keeping your numbering system simple is best. This number is designed to track your work and not necessarily contain more information than “artist” (JD), “year” (09), “category” (DW), and “number made that year” (001). Using two place holders or digits for artist, year, and type are more than adequate. Three digits for the “drawing number” made that year is, in most cases more than adequate as well, giving you 999 drawings for that given year. Using this system “JD09PG001” is easy to read and computer friendly. Alternating two letters with two numbers is easier to read as well. Periods can be hard to read on your work and can leave a serious dimple on the face of work. Dashes and other symbols might not make your job any easier and may confuse computers. Two digits for the year will allow for a century of “art tracking” information. A simple code for “type of work” is best. For instance: DW for drawing, PG for painting, PU for public art, SC for sculpture, and so on. Print edition numbers can be managed in a database or spreadsheet, further reducing confusing inventory numbers.
In essence, every work of art leaving your studio should have a number on it: paintings, sculptures, and every print in an edition. Each editioned print should be considered an independent work of art. Pick a numbering system that has meaning for you and is easy to read. Changing it later on can be costly and difficult.
**Previous numbering systems:** Galleries also create and assign inventory numbers to your work. Keep in mind that these numbers reflect a system designed for their organization, not for you. They should not to take the place of your inventory numbers. You should list the gallery number alongside your own inventory number in your archive record for that piece, connecting your inventory number to theirs.
**Title:** Full title of the artwork should be listed.
**Date:** This is the year the artwork was completed. If you are uncertain of the date, make a note of that. Dating is essential to determining an artwork’s value, as well as to understanding the chronology of an artist’s career.
**Medium:** List all of your materials, which will aid in the future care of your work as well as provide necessary information for historians and archivists.
**Size:** Include information on whether the work is framed or mounted and what those measurements are: in the order of height x width x depth.
**Images of your work:** An image (photograph, slide, or digital image) should be paired with the record and inventory number of each artwork in your system. The photograph does not need to be professional, just a snapshot meant solely for the purpose of identifying the work. This process can also help you to identify pieces that need to be documented professionally at a later date.
**Location of your artwork:** Consider creating at least two fields for location: one for the “home” of the artwork, and one for its current location (for work currently showing or on loan). Locations may include your home, studio, gallery, or storage. Also document the location for artworks owned by collectors, gifts, donated, or even work that has been destroyed. Although sold work can be hard to locate, you will want to consider tracking it, especially if you are planning a retrospective or catalogue at some point, for which this information will be needed.
**Artwork values according to date:** Always note the selling price of each piece and its value (the value may be higher than the selling price if it was discounted), along with the date and who made the sale. If you donate works to benefit auctions or gift pieces to friends, note the estimated value (usually determined for shipping or consignment purposes) and date as well.
All estimated values should correspond to a verifiable sales history. If you are an emerging artist and do not yet have a sales history for your work, ask around and take a look at what comparable artwork by artists at your career point is selling for.
Determining an appraisal value for your work, although an uncomfortable process, is very important when thinking to the future, and is vital for artists who are working on estate planning and taxes. If you don’t place a value on the artwork, someone might be forced to value it for you, if anything were to happen to you. There are some resources on estate planning at the end of this chapter.
**Exhibitions:** Your entire exhibition history should be linked to the artwork record.
**Installation and proper care instructions:** How is your work meant to be shown? Include hanging or floor instructions. If you make installations or sculptures with many components, document the parts, and include assembly and breakdown instructions. If you use unique materials that people may be unfamiliar with, include instructions on how best to care for the work.
**People or institutions affiliated with that artwork:** This field includes owners, curators, collectors, gallery directors, writers, etc. In addition you should list any collaborators, fabricators, or others who contributed to making the artwork.
**Notes:** You should include a notes field in which to document any related information about the artwork. In addition if you do not have an image of the artwork you can use this area for a short description or drawing. 2. Contact Record
For each individual and institutional contact your records should include the following fields.
» First Name » Last Name » Institution » Address » E-mail » Website » Phone Number » Notes
Contacts should include anyone who has shown interest in your work: fellow artists, curators, galleries, dealers, collectors, staff at support foundations, and “art fans.” These are people who may be able to help you as you undertake the process of documentation. In addition, you should
» keep your contacts list up-to-date with names, mail and e-mail addresses, websites, and other relevant information. » link your contacts to the related artwork or exhibitions in your archive system. » keep a record of where your artwork goes if you work independent of a gallery and/or sell directly from your studio. » create an agreement with your gallery regarding contacts. Often times galleries and dealers selling your work may not automatically divulge their clients’ and collectors’ information. When requesting client information from your gallery, you may consider working out an agreement that ensures you will respect the relationship the gallery has with their clients by not approaching these clients directly for sales. In ten or twenty years, around the time you may be planning a mid-career retrospective, you will want to follow up with these collectors to find out if they have kept the work, sold it, or donated it to an institution.
3. Exhibition Record
Your exhibition records expand on your CV, provide an in-depth look at your career, and help map the network of connections among your works, exhibitions, and reviews.
Exhibition records should include information in the following fields:
» Exhibition Title » Exhibition Dates » Opening Date » Location » Institution » Curator(s) » Images » Artwork » Exhibition Materials » Catalogue/Writer » Press » Notes
In addition to listing exhibitions, an exhibition record contains information on the pieces that were in each show (the artwork record should also cross-reference the exhibition), who the curators were, and, in the case of group exhibitions, who the accompanying artists were. Include all shows you participated in, regardless of their size, as you want to create a complete picture of your career development. You should also maintain an official CV that lists all your exhibitions, no matter how small a show may feel in retrospect. This comprehensive CV will be in addition to your working CV that has been edited down for length.
Exhibition images and materials: If you are able to, take an installation shot for each show or ask the gallery or venue to supply you with one. Retain the original press release, cards or flyers, and any other material related to each show.
Press reviews and listings, books, catalogues, etc: In addition to keeping copies of any press reviews and listings of you and your work, you will want to keep a record of which pieces and exhibitions were featured in each review. (This information should also be in your artwork record—note where the piece was reviewed, whether an image of the work was reproduced, and who wrote the review.)
4. Archive Record
Materials in your archives can provide other artists, future historians, and curators with information about your career development and how you conceptualize your work. In addition, many artists have found it useful to review copies of projects, proposals, and artist statements later in their career.
Archived material can include artist statements and project statements filed by date and/or body of work.
Applications, show and project proposals: File all of your grant or residency applications, and your show and project proposals even if you are not awarded them. They provide valuable information about your ideas and ambitions. When re-applying, access to past proposals can be useful in tracking development between applications and weeding out repetition.
List of all awards, fellowships, and residencies: List these, and in addition, the body of work or project related to each, if applicable.
Other materials: Sketchbooks, project sketches, correspondence, personal photographs, and other related material.
Records for archived material should contain information in the following fields:
» Name/Title » Type of Archived Material » Date » Location » Individual/Institution » Related Artwork » Exhibition » Notes
In the beginning this list might be small and simple, but leaving room to grow for future information is advised. For instance, many artists may only have titles and dates. Focus on available information. CALL CREATING A LIVING LEGACY
Resources
Please note: Filemaker Pro was used to build the database for the Foundation. Many other programs can be used, though we can not endorse their effectiveness and quality.
Filemaker Pro filemaker.com
GYST gyst-ink.com
Artworks artworkspro.com
Bento 4 filemaker.com/products/bento
ArtSystems artsystems.com
PrimaSoft primasoft.com
Legacy Specialists working with the Joan Mitchell database
Neal Ambrose-Smith Chapter 6 Worksheet Developing Your Inventory Numbering System
Considering the examples listed earlier in this chapter, and including specifics about your artwork, design an inventory numbering system that works for you.
1. Consider all types of work you do and draft the abbreviations for all types or mediums you use. For example: Drawing is DW
2. List the other elements of your work you’d like to keep track of. This may include multiples, series, or anything that is constant about the work. Do not include things that might change, such as framing or location.
3. Outline your inventory numbering system below: Example of a large-format copystand. The Speedotron strobes are mounted to the ceiling straddling a skylight. The skylight is blocked out and a Nikon D300 (50mm lens) is mounted in there. The camera is USB tethered to a laptop computer using Nikon’s Camera Control Pro 2 software. Focusing, shutter speed, aperture, white balance, and shutter release are all controlled on the laptop. The screen has an active view for correct placement of artworks. This could provide a continuous work flow of 150 artworks shot per hour, with two people.
Example of copy stand work area. A 50” x 60” flat board is covered with black cloth. Color bars are placed next to the artwork. The unique inventory number is read from the back of the artwork and assembled on the board as well. The numbers and letters are printed as white text on a black background from a computer. Extra numbers and letters are stored out of view from the camera, but the color bars and inventory number are kept in the shot. Having the inventory number in the shot avoids confusion later when editing the photos and entering them into a database or spreadsheet. CHAPTER 7
Photographing Your Work
Professional photography is very expensive and film increasingly obsolete. Many artists today are shooting their own work, digitally. While it is important to capture images of your work for documentation purposes, you’ll also want the best quality images possible. Here are two methods for lighting your work for digital photography and some helpful tips.
1. **Decide on your budget.** High quality photography can be achieved without spending too much money. Be firm on your budget.
2. **Digital cameras.** Most point-and-shoot cameras fit many budgets. Choose a camera with the highest resolution you can afford. Many are ten megapixel or higher. The higher the megapixel, the higher the resolution. Some cameras offer several image formats: JPEG, TIF, and RAW. RAW is the highest resolution because there isn’t any loss to the image due to compression, but you can still get high-quality images with JPEG. TIF is an uncompressed format that many cameras offer today, and is the preferred format for reproduction. If using a point-and-shoot camera, hot lamps are most likely the only option. Use the self timer and a tripod to avoid shaking the camera while photographing. DSLR cameras (digital single lens reflex) are very similar to 35mm film cameras in function and style. They have interchangeable lenses, are more expensive, and can be controlled via computer.
3. **Lenses.** Zoom in to 50mm or more with point-and-shoot cameras. This will eliminate barrel distortion or bending of your image. If you are using a DSLR then choose a 50mm or longer lens.
4. **Trapezoid.** Be sure to keep your camera and your work on the same plane to avoid a trapezoid affect. This is where the bottom of your image is wider than the top.
5. **Hot lamps.** Depending on what type of lamps used, they can get quite hot. Set them evenly spaced and pointing towards your work at 45 degree angles. Generally two lamps are adequate for works on paper 22 x 30” or smaller. More lamps may be required depending on the size of the work. Take some test shots and check them on your computer for even lighting, vignetting (dark edges), and hot spots (bright circles). Every light has its own color so be sure to use the same lamps on each side for accurate color correcting later.
6. **Flash.** Strobe systems or “flash” systems require a DSLR generally, although some point-and-shoot digitals have hot shoes or sync connections. Strobes can be quite expensive. Typically strobes work best with umbrellas. Point the strobes away from the work into the umbrellas, at 45 degree angles from the work. This will provide nice even lighting. White umbrellas are best. The larger the umbrella, the larger the light spread. Flash photography is difficult with shiny paint and reflective surfaces, so hot lamps may be the best choice without getting into advanced photography techniques.
7. **White balance.** Most digital cameras have a white balance setting. Typically shoot the white card and set the camera to the card shot. A color chart is imperative for reproduction. Be sure to mount or place the color chart so that it is in the shot. Each photo can be color corrected for reproduction. The color chart is cropped out once the image is corrected.
8. **Polarizer.** A polarizing filter can be purchased and attached to most DSLR cameras for shooting reflective surfaces and through glass, as in shooting framed art works. The polarizer twists to control which light waves pass through the lens, thereby eliminating reflections from glass. CALL CREATING A LIVING LEGACY
Resources
LIGHT SOURCES Hot lamp Bescor Portable LED Video 1-Light Kit Flash Elinchrom D-Lite-2 IT EL 20814KIT
CAMERAS Point-and-shoot/compact digital: » Canon PowerShot SX210 IS » Nikon COOLPIX L120
DSLR: » Nikon D3000 » Canon EOS Rebel XS 18-55IS
ONLINE SHOPPING B&H photo bhphotovideo.com
Ebay ebay.com
Craigslist craigslist.org
White balance card and color chart for digital xritephoto.com
Example of compact camera maximizing image area for artwork and color bars. Camera is placed about ten feet from wall in order to zoom in enough and prevent wide-angle-lens barrel distortion. A bubble level is used to make sure the lens and artwork are parallel. Capture setting is at the camera’s highest resolution. CHAPTER 8
Budgeting
Setting up a comprehensive inventory system can have a range of costs associated with it. In particular many archival materials can be expensive. When you start considering what supplies to order for archiving it can be overwhelming to consider the potential expenses. By building out a budget, however, you can develop a system that works with you without depleting your resources.
Below are highlighted areas where expenses can arise. In addition there are listed recommendations for mitigating expenses.
**Assistance:** Getting help in this process can be the most expensive part of it. It is also the most valuable for artists who simply have too much work to sort through on their own. As discussed in Chapter 6, consider what options you have in getting interns, bartering or getting a group of friends or family to help you on a specific project.
**Storage:** Many artists have to take on new spaces simply for storing artwork. When putting the work in storage you need to consider a few things. How frequently will you want access to the work? If you live in a city, storage can frequently be more expensive than storage outside of the city. You also need to consider whether the work is safe. It may be tempting to store everything in a friend's barn, however, rodents are a threat.
**Storage Materials/Containers:** Flatfiles are needed for storing works on paper and photographs. Though you can store much of that work in portfolios or boxes, metal flatfiles are safer in terms of protecting your artwork. When shopping for a flatfile consider checking Craigslist for your area.
Before purchasing archival boxes, consider building your own out of museum board and tape. For instructions on building archival boxes see: CALLResources.org
Much of your archival materials can be kept safely in simple plastic bins.
**Technology:** The new computer, scanner, and digital camera can all add up. These are tools that you will need, especially if you are developing a website. Ask your friends for recommendations for affordable cameras to purchase. Consider buying things second hand.
**Software:** Programs such as Photoshop can be prohibitively expensive for the individual artist. If you are affiliated with an educational institution you may be able to get a discount. Other options are freeware programs available on the web. These are programs that are developed for people to use for free. Programs such as Picasso might offer you the basic editing for digital images that you need, versus all the options that Photoshop has.
**Consider your time:** It can be a choice between spending your time working on this, or spending your time working on proposals for projects. Consider whether this is the best use of your time, or whether you’d prefer to hire someone to help.
Below we outline a few budget options and costs.
| BUDGET ONE: CHEAP | BUDGET TWO: AFFORDABLE | BUDGET THREE: EXPENSIVE | |-------------------|------------------------|-------------------------| | Digital camera, tripod, lamps | Digital camera, tripod, lamps | Digital camera, tripod, lamps | | $300–$500 | Computer | Computer | | | $1,500–$2,000 | Software | | | | Flatfile, glassine | | | | $3,000–$5,000 | These simple metal racks purchased at a local hardware store are versatile, adjustable, and are easily assembled or disassembled to relocate and modify. Dividers keep the artworks from touching the metal. Chapter 8 Worksheet
Developing a Budget
Outline potential expenses in the areas below:
ASSISTANCE:
STORAGE:
STORAGE MATERIALS/CONTAINERS:
TECHNOLOGY:
SOFTWARE:
OTHER EXPENSES: A Final Note
THE CALL RESOURCE BLOG
In addition to the workbook there is a blog created as an online learning tool for artists. This blog will include regularly updated links to related information found on the Internet or shared from artists. In addition, it will provide artists with more in-depth information on related issues, such as photographing work, affordable options for setting up your space, and technical advice. Please visit our blog at CALLResources.org.
ABOUT THE WORKBOOK
It is our hope that this workbook provides you with a comprehensive overview of career documentation, serving as a starting point from which to tackle this important aspect of your career. This workbook is a work-in-process, and we appreciate any thoughts or feedback. Please contact the Foundation at: [email protected] with questions or suggestions.
Finally, good luck with the work, and keep in touch.
Joan Mitchell Foundation, July 2013 Deputy Director for the Joan Mitchell Foundation, Christa Blatchford, oversees the Foundation’s national programs. Before her current position, Blatchford ran the Creating a Living Legacy program. Prior to JMF, Blatchford spent three years at the New York Foundation for the Arts as a Program Officer, working to provide professional development opportunities for artists. She has also worked with a range of nonprofit visual arts organizations, including Minetta Brook and Eyebeam. A practicing video and installation artist, Blatchford graduated from the Hunter College MFA program.
As Artist Support Associate for the Joan Mitchell Foundation, Shervone Neckles-Ortiz manages the New York City and national Creating a Living Legacy program and Career Management and Development Workshop Series. Before joining the Foundation, Neckles-Ortiz worked as an art education consultant and instructor for the NYC Department of Education, Pratt Institute, and other leading NYC arts organizations. As a mixed-media artist, Neckles-Ortiz has held residencies in areas as diverse as the Youlou Arts Foundation in St. Vincent and the Grenadines in the West Indies, The Center for Book Arts in New York, The Fabric Workshop & Museum in Philadelphia, and The Skowhegan School of Painting and Sculpture in Maine. Previous awards include grants from The Puffin Foundation, Joan Mitchell Foundation, and fellowships from Robert Blackburn Printmaking Workshop and Manhattan Graphics Center. Her work has been shown worldwide in both solo and group exhibitions. She earned an MA from Teacher’s College, Columbia University, and an MFA from Queens College.
Painter, printmaker, and educator Neal Ambrose-Smith is a consultant to the Joan Mitchell Foundation’s Creating a Living Legacy program. Ambrose-Smith has also worked as a Legacy Specialist, goldsmith, graphic designer, and freelance photographer for artists. His work is included in the collections of many national and international museums and institutions, including the New York Public Library, the Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian, Galerie D’Art Contemporain in Chamalières, France, and Hongik University in Seoul, Korea. He received his BA from the University of Northern Colorado and MFA from the University of New Mexico. Glossary
**Acid Free:** Material that yields a neutral pH of 7 or slightly higher on the pH scale.
**Antivirus Software:** A type of utility used for scanning and removing viruses from your computer. While many types of antivirus (or “anti-virus”) programs exist, their primary purpose is to protect computers from viruses and remove any viruses that are found.
**Archival:** Material with good aging properties and a neutral or slightly alkaline pH.
**Backup:** A copy of one or more files created as an alternate in case the original data is lost or becomes unusable. For example, you may save backup files in case a hard drive fails.
**Browser:** A program people use to access the World Wide Web. It interprets HTML code, including text, images, hypertext links, Javascript, and Java applets. After rendering the HTML code, the browser displays a nicely formatted page. Some common browsers are Microsoft Internet Explorer, Netscape Communicator, and Apple Safari.
**Byte:** Unit of measurement used to measure data. A group of binary digits or bits (usually eight) operate as a unit or byte. One byte contains eight binary bits, or a series of eight zeros and ones. Such a group is a unit of memory size.
**Career Documentation:** Collecting, collating, and organizing supporting material and records pertaining to an artist’s career for future reference. This may include photographs, audio and video recordings.
**Cloud:** Metaphor for the Internet. The phrase “cloud computing” means a type of Internet-based computing, where different services (servers, storage, and applications) are delivered to computers and devices through the Internet.
**Collection Management:** The supervision and organization of collected artworks, which may include their copyrights and provenance.
**Compact Digital:** Portable cameras particularly suitable for casual snapshots. Compact digitals are usually designed to be easy to use, sacrificing advanced features and picture quality for compactness and simplicity.
**Compression:** Reduces the size of one or more files. When a file is compressed, it takes up less disk space than an uncompressed version and can be transferred to other systems more quickly. Compression is often used to save disk space and reduce the time needed to transfer files over the Internet.
**Condition Report:** Documentation detailing an artwork’s complete physical appearance.
**Cursor:** Mouse pointer on screen.
**Data/Program Migration:** The act of digitally moving all program and related files from one computer to another.
**Database:** A computer program which collects data (information) on a specific topic that is stored in an organized manner. Most databases contain multiple tables, which may each include several different fields. For example, a company database may include tables for products, employees, and financial records. Each of these tables would have different fields that are relevant to the information stored in the table.
**Database Field:** A single category of information for which data is given in each individual record.
**Database File:** The entire database is also known as a database file.
**Database Record:** All information listed for one particular item (person, place, or thing) in the database file.
**Database Search/Find:** An operation to locate a specific record(s) that satisfies a statement or statements of criteria.
**Database Template:** Pattern or form that is used repeatedly for each record in a database file. When creating a database, the template is the blank form that comes up each time you add a new record to the database.
**Data Entry:** Each piece of information entered for each field.
**Desktop:** The primary user interface of a computer. When you boot up your computer, the desktop is displayed once the startup process is complete. It includes the desktop background (or wallpaper) and icons of files and folders you may have saved to the desktop. In Windows, the desktop includes a task bar, which is located at the bottom of the screen by default. In Mac OS X, the desktop includes a menu bar at the top of the screen and the Dock at the bottom.
**Download:** To transfer data or programs from a server or host computer to one’s own computer or device.
**Drag-and-Drop:** A common action performed within a graphical user interface. It involves moving the cursor over an object, selecting it, and moving it to a new location. Drop-Down Menu: Horizontal list of options that each contain a vertical menu. When you roll over or click one of the primary options in a drop-down menu, a list of choices will “drop down” below the main menu.
DSLR: Digital single-lens reflex cameras combining the optics and the mechanisms of a single-lens reflex camera with a digital imaging sensor, as opposed to photographic film.
Emergency Preparedness: Instruction or documentation of response actions for a disaster in the studio. Forming safety and action plans in case of flood, fire, or other related disaster. See studioprotector.org
File: A collection of data stored in one unit, identified by a filename. It can be a document, picture, audio or video stream, data library, application, or other collection of data.
File Format: Defines the structure and type of data stored in a file. The structure of a typical file may include a header, metadata, saved content, and an end-of-file (EOF) marker. The data stored in the file depends on the purpose of the file format. Some files, such as XML files, are used to store lists of items, while others, such as JPEG image files simply contain a block of data. Some file format extensions are: Document files: DOCs, RTF (Rich Text Format), and PDFs. Image files: JPEGs, GIFs, BMPs, and PSDs. Audio files: MP3s, AACs, WAVs, and AIFFs. Video files: MPEG, MOV, WMV, or DV formats.
File Extension: The suffix at the end of a filename that indicates what type of file it is. For example, in the filename “myreport.txt,” the .txt is the file extension. It indicates the file is a text document. Some other examples include .docx, which is used for Microsoft Word documents, and .psd, which is the standard file extension for Photoshop documents.
Filename: A text string that identifies a file. Every file stored on a computer’s hard disk has a filename that helps identify the file within a given folder. Therefore, each file within a specific folder must have a different filename, while files in different folders can have the same name.
Gigabyte: One billion bytes. A unit of computer memory or data storage capacity equal to 1,024 megabytes.
Hard Disk: When you save data or install programs on your computer, the information is typically written to your hard disk. The hard disk is a spindle of magnetic disks, called platters, that record and store information. Because the data is stored magnetically, information recorded to the hard disk remains intact after you turn your computer off. This is an important distinction between the hard disk and RAM, or memory, which is reset when the computer’s power is turned off.
Hyperlink: A word, phrase, picture, or icon in a computer document on which a user may click to move to another part of the document or to another document.
Host: A web hosting service is a type of Internet hosting service that allows individuals and organizations to make their own website accessible on the internet. Websites are hosted or stored on servers.
Import: A command typically located within a program’s File menu (File/Import...). Like the standard File/Open... command, Import is used for opening files, but it serves a more specific purpose. Instead of opening standard file types, Import is often used for importing parts of files, program settings, plugins, or other unconventional file formats. Some programs allow “drag-and-drop” from one file to another without having to import files.
Install: To install or load a program onto your computer before use. You can install a program or software update from a file downloaded from the Internet or from a hard drive or disc.
Intern: A student or a recent graduate undergoing supervised practical training in a working environment.
JPEG: A format for compressing images.
Kilobyte: A unit of memory or data. The kilobyte (abbreviated “k” or “kb”) is the smallest unit of measurement greater than a byte. It precedes the megabyte, which contains 1,000,000 bytes.
Legacy Specialist: A highly skilled expert in aiding the advancement and preservation of an artist’s career.
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pH: A measurement of acidity in archival materials.
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Resolution: The term to describe the number of dots, or pixels, used to display an image. Higher resolutions mean that more pixels are used to create the image, resulting in a crisper, cleaner image.
Restoration: The act of repairing a damaged artwork to its original condition.
Server: A computer or computer program that manages access to a centralized resource or service in a network.
Spreadsheet: A document that stores data in a grid of horizontal rows and vertical columns. Rows are typically labeled using numbers (1, 2, 3, etc.), while columns are labeled with letters (A, B, C, etc). Individual row/column locations, such as C3 or B12, are referred to as cells. Each cell can each store a unique instance of data. By entering data into a spreadsheet, information can be stored in a more structured way than using plain text. The row/column structure also allows the data to be analyzed using formulas and calculations.
Studio Assistant: A person who aids or supplements an artist. Tasks may include mixing paint, photographing artwork, and walking a dog. See also intern.
Studio Guide: A pamphlet or drawing offering basic information or instruction about an artist’s studio. A studio guide may contain safety instructions, emergency preparedness information, location of materials and artworks, and tips for fixing the fax machine.
Studio Manager: A person in charge of studio business affairs. Studio managers handle email, schedules, phone calls, employees, and potentially sales, contracts, and more.
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TIFF: Originally standing for Tagged Image File Format, is a file format for storing uncompressed images, popular among graphic artists, the publishing industry, and both amateur and professional photographers.
Upload: To transfer (data or programs), from one’s own computer or device to a server or host computer.
URL: (Uniform Resource Locator) The address of a World Wide Web page. A protocol for specifying addresses on the Internet.
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1d6d47cef99a18b0407a4e2f1f1eba07309a3448 | Cambridgeshire County Council Invoice Payments 2016/17
Regulation 113(7) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (and as set out in Procurement Policy Note 03/16 issued by Crown Commercial Services) introduced the following publication requirements:
After March 2017, all in-scope organisations must publish, on an annual basis and covering the previous 12 months,
i) the percentage of their invoices of suppliers and prime contractors invoices\* paid within 30 days
ii) the amount of interest paid to suppliers due to late payment and
iii) the total amount of interest that the contracting authority was liable to pay (whether or not paid and whether under any statutory or other requirement), due to a breach of Regulation 113.
\*Invoices deemed valid and undisputed.
The data for 2016/17 is as follows:
| Financial Year | %age invoices paid within 30 days | Interest (£’s) actually paid to suppliers | Interest (£’s) \*liable to be paid to | Number of invoices not paid within 30 days | |----------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | 2016/17 | 96.15 | £0.00 | £115,235.33 | 2311 |
Published 16 October 2017
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8b595687398e41e466d8b40ac688531293162dd8 | Cambridgeshire County Council Invoice Payments 2017/18
Regulation 113(7) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (and as set out in Procurement Policy Note 03/16 issued by Crown Commercial Services) introduced the following publication requirements:
After March 2017, all in-scope organisations must publish, on an annual basis and covering the previous 12 months,
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\*Invoices deemed valid and undisputed.
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| Financial Year | %age invoices paid within 30 days | Interest (£’s) actually paid to suppliers | Interest (£’s) \*liable to be paid to | Number of invoices not paid within 30 days | |----------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | 2017/18 | 95.81 | £0.00 | £140,847.07 | 2328 |
Published 13 September 2018
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28cf65a1cc7f5b73ee34e2bbb0ff94c02005a685 | Cambridgeshire County Council Invoice Payments 2018/19
Regulation 113(7) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (and as set out in Procurement Policy Note 03/16 issued by Crown Commercial Services) introduced the following publication requirements:
After March 2017, all in-scope organisations must publish, on an annual basis and covering the previous 12 months,
i) the percentage of their invoices of suppliers and prime contractors invoices\* paid within 30 days
ii) the amount of interest paid to suppliers due to late payment and
iii) the total amount of interest that the contracting authority was liable to pay (whether or not paid and whether under any statutory or other requirement), due to a breach of Regulation 113.
\*Invoices deemed valid and undisputed.
The data for 2018/19 is as follows:
| Financial Year | %age invoices paid within 30 days | Interest (£’s) actually paid to suppliers | Interest (£’s) \*liable to be paid to | Number of invoices not paid within 30 days | |----------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | 2018/19 | 64.66 | £0.00 | £854,006.32 | 16874 |
Published 4 March 2020
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ab3feadec60a875d8eefe03cdf8b970bfc02e697 | Towards standardised seabirds at sea census techniques in connection with environmental impact assessments for offshore wind farms in the U.K.
A COMPARISON OF SHIP AND AERIAL SAMPLING METHODS FOR MARINE BIRDS, AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO OFFSHORE WIND FARM ASSESSMENTS
Kees (C.J.) Camphuysen¹, Tony (A.D.) Fox², Mardik (M.F.) Leopold³ & Ib Krag Petersen
¹Koninklijk Nederlands Instituut Voor Onderzoek Der Zee (Royal NIOZ), The Netherlands ²National Environmental Research Institute, Denmark ³Alterra, The Netherlands
Final version: April 2004
This report was commissioned by COWRIE
Koninklijk Nederlands Instituut voor Onderzoek der Zee Royal Netherlands Institute for Sea Research
PO Box 59 1790 AB Den Burg Landsdiep 4 1797 SZ t’Horntje Texel
## Contents
Executive summary 4\
Recommended methodology for ship-based surveys 4\
Recommended methodology for aerial surveys 5
Introduction 6\
Aim of the project 8\
Existing approaches 9\
Objectives and methods of early offshore observations 9\
Recent work (1) Ship-based surveys 9\
Recent work (2) Aerial surveys 9
COWRIE research objectives 11\
Patterns in seabird distribution and abundance 11\
Evaluation of disturbance and habitat loss 12\
Migratory pathways 12\
Evaluation of collision risks 12
Natural variability 13\
Scale and variability 13\
Migratory pathways (routes, direction of flight, seasonal patterns) 13\
Weather effects 13\
Diurnal patterns and tidal influences 13\
Foraging areas 14\
Factors explaining seabird distribution and abundance 14
Survey techniques 15\
Line transect technique using parallel strips (ship and aerial surveys) 15\
Line-transect technique using individual distances to the track line for marine mammals 15\
Point transect techniques 16\
Seaduck and diver surveys from ships: modifications of ESAS protocol 17\
Geographical accuracy 17
Ship-based surveys 18\
Strip- and line-transect techniques for seabirds 18\
Behaviour of birds 19\
Flying height of birds 19\
Training of observers, observer quality 19\
Avoiding attraction 19\
Additional data 20\
Recommended methodology, ship-type, and observers 20\
Conclusions 20
Aerial surveys 22\
Transect bands 22\
Choice of airframe 22\
Survey flight speed and altitude 24\
Data collection and observer training 24\
Spatial precision and recording protocols 24\
Data format 25\
Species 25\
Constraints on counting methods 25\
Current methods of data presentation and analysis 26\
Potential future developments 26\
Recommended methodology, airframe characteristics, and observers 26 Executive summary
- The coastal and offshore waters of the UK are of global importance for several species of seabirds. The United Nations Law of the Seas and the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones gives coastal states extensive rights but also obligations over marine areas, including the assessment of potential effects of activities on the marine environment. The Crown Estate, as landowner of the seabed out to the 12 nautical mile territorial limit plays an important role in the development of the offshore wind industry by leasing areas of seabed for the placing of turbines. The planned erection of large numbers of offshore wind turbines has underlined our lack of knowledge relating to the distribution, abundance and habitat requirements (foraging ecology) of marine birds.
- As part of the Environmental Impact Assessments for offshore wind farms, the need for detailed knowledge on spatial and temporal patterns in seabird distribution has been identified. Dedicated censuses to sample the numbers and distribution of seabirds are a basic requirement for developers, to describe bird densities within, and in the immediate vicinity of, the construction area. Studies performed need to be related to some greater area studies, in order to assess the relative and the actual importance of the construction area for the species involved.
- This document evaluates existing census techniques and determine the best currently available methods for defining bird distribution and abundance at sea. The underlying question is twofold: (1) what are the research objectives and what data are required for EIAs for offshore wind farms, and (2) how good are existing census techniques at fulfilling the objectives?
- In order to assess the potential impact of the construction of an offshore wind farm and to understand how such a construction is likely to affect the birds associated with a site, dedicated research is required. The coupling of bird census data with geographical, hydrographical, and biological measurements is essential to begin to understand how an offshore construction such as a wind farm is likely to affect an area and how the seabirds associated with a site are most likely to respond. Natural variability issues are addressed and existing census techniques have been evaluated for their potential to provide data that can be used to describe habitat characteristics and area usage by seabirds.
- The two observation tools discussed in this study, aerial and ship-based surveys, potentially provide similar data for as far as basic seabird counts are concerned (accurate numbers, accurate maps). Census techniques are similar (distance techniques using parallel bands of known width), but the level of detail for individual species is considerably less during aerial surveys. Aerial surveys are quick, so enabling coverage of larger areas per unit time, and relatively cheap, whereas ship-surveys are more time-consuming.
- Data obtained during aerial surveys may be combined with environmental parameters in a correlative approach, whereas the advantage of a ship is that such parameters can often be collected simultaneously. The slower approach with vessels allows detailed observations on seabird behaviour (habitat utilisation, feeding conditions) and diurnal/tidal fluctuations in seabird abundance and distribution.
- The acquisition of information about migration routes, direction or height of flight, detailed spatial and temporal distribution require intensive radar and direct observation in the vicinity of a proposed wind farm development to determine bird use of the area and to predict collision impact probabilities under a range of differing temporal (day/night) and weather conditions. Similarly, assessment of actual collision risk and collisions after construction necessitates static measuring devices (such as infra-red movement triggered video surveillance and vibration detection equipment currently under development). However, these tools are not addressed further in this report.
Recommended methodology for ship-based surveys
Recommended census techniques for ship-based seabird surveys, as part of an EIA, are line-transects with sub-bands and with snap-shots for flying birds, and incorporating the full behaviour module recording detailed information on species, sex and age where feasible, foraging behaviour, flying height. Whenever possible, hydrographical data, such as sea surface temperature, salinity, water depth should be continuously and synoptically monitored. For a minimum set-up, the following techniques and qualifications are recommended.
- Line-transect methodology is recommended with a strip width of 300m maximum.
- Subdivision of survey bands to allow corrections for missed individuals at greater distances away from the observation platform (recommended subdivision for swimming birds: A= 0-50m, B= 50-100m, C=100-200m, D= 200-300m, E= 300+m or outside transect; all distances perpendicular to the ship).
- No observations in sea state 5 or more to be used in data analysis for seabirds, data not usable for marine mammals above sea state 3.
- Survey time intervals are recommended to be 1 or 5 min intervals (range 1-10m, longer time intervals are acceptable when less resolution of data is required; short intervals are preferred in small study areas), with mid-positions (Latitude, Longitude) to be recorded or calculated for each interval. Preferred ship's speed should be 10 knots (range 5-15 knots).
Preferred ship type is a motor vessel with forward viewing height possibilities at 10m above sea level (range 5-25m), not being a commercial or frequently active fishing vessel.
Preferred ship-size: stable platform, at least 20m total length, max. 100m total length
Bird detection by naked eye as a default, except in areas with wintering divers Gaviidae. Scanning ahead with binoculars is necessary, for example to detect flushed divers.
Two competent observers are required per observation platform equipped with range-finders (Heinemann 1981), GPS and data sheets: no immediate computerising of data during surveys to maximise attention on the actual detection, identification and recording.
Observers should have adequate identification skills (i.e. all relevant scarce and common marine species well known, some knowledge of rarities, full understanding of plumages and moults).
Observers must be trained by experienced offshore ornithologists under contrasting situations and in different seasons.
A high resolution grid should be deployed, covering an area at least 6x the size of the proposed wind farm area, including at least 1-2 similar sized reference areas (same geographical, oceanographical characteristics), and preferably including nearby coastal waters (for nearshore wind farms only).
Survey grid lines are recommended to be at least 0.5nm apart, maximum 2nm apart, and the grid should be surveyed such that time of day is equally distributed over the entire area (changing start and end time over the area to fully comprehend effects of diurnal rhythms in the area)
The cost-effectiveness of the ship-based surveys are greatly enhanced if the vessel can be equipped with an Aquaflow (logging surface water characteristics including temperature, fluorescence (chlorophyll), and salinity logging hydrographical information simultaneously).
The cost-effectiveness of the ship-based bird surveys can be greatly enhanced if combined with other surveys, such as those of marine mammals, for which a specialist observer and different methods will be required.
The cost-effectiveness can be further enhanced by counting birds on both sides of the ship, i.e. cover two strips, for which additional observers will be required.
**Recommended methodology for aerial surveys**
For a minimum set-up, the following techniques and qualifications are recommended.
- Twin-engine aircraft (for safety and endurance)
- High-wing aircraft with excellent all round visibility for observers (e.g. twin-engine Partenavia P-68 Observer)
- Line-transect methodology is recommended with sub-bands.
- Transects should be a minimum of 2 km apart to avoid double-counting whilst allowing the densest coverage feasible
- Flight speed preferably 185 km h(^{-1}) at 80 m altitude
- Subdivision of survey bands to allow calculations of detection probabilities (recommended are 44-163m, 164-432m, 433-1000m, with a declination in degrees from the horizon being 60-25°, 25-10°, and 10-4° respectively for the Partenavia P-68 at 80m)
- Use of an inclinometer to measure declination from the horizon
- Two trained observers, one covering each side of the aircraft, with all observations recorded continuously on dictaphone
- GPS positions are recorded at least every 5 seconds (computer logs flight track)
- The time of each bird sighting should be recorded, ideally to the nearest second, but within 10 seconds accuracy, using a watch attached to the window of the plane.
- No observations in sea states above 3 (small waves with few whitecaps)
- All waterbirds should be recorded to the best level of identification (species or group)
- Sampling units are single birds or groups of birds within the three transect bands Introduction
Major development of offshore wind power in the UK is expected in order to meet the UK Government's commitment to renewable energy targets (http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/). The Crown Estate, as landowner of the seabed out to the 12 nautical mile territorial limit plays an important role in the development of the offshore wind industry by leasing areas of seabed for the placing of turbines. The Crown Estate established a Trust Fund administered by a Steering Group drawn from the offshore wind industry, government and conservation organisations. The Steering Group, named COWRIE (Collaborative Offshore Wind Research into the Environment) has identified and prioritised environmental studies that will be commissioned to inform the offshore wind farm industry as a whole.
The requirement of many marine birds for shallow, productive, nearshore waters combined with the limited extent of this resource in the UK and with the preference of wind farm developers to site turbines in shallow waters has resulted in concerns of potential negative effects on seabirds. For these top-predators in the marine environment, the establishment of an offshore construction such as a wind farm could potentially have a number of negative as well as positive effects. Habitat loss, more specifically the loss of foraging areas, restrictions of commercial fisheries (and the associated reductions in discards and offal provided as artificial sources of food), and the risk of collisions and death are obvious negative side-effects. For migratory seabirds and coastal nesting birds with frequent foraging trips from land to offshore feeding sites, the barrier effects of offshore wind turbines in localised areas cannot yet be discounted and must be considered. Positive effects of the construction of turbines may be that offshore constructions could provide roosting platforms or locally enhance foraging conditions to such an extent that some species or populations might profit from them.
COWRIE (COWRIE Steering Group, 22nd August 2002) recognised that the coastal and offshore waters of the UK are of global importance for several species of resident and migratory marine birds. Many marine bird species utilise shallow productive waters at different stages of their annual cycle, yet the general understanding of the marine environment remains poor compared to that of terrestrial and freshwater systems. The planned erection of large numbers of offshore wind turbines throughout European coasts from Estonia to Spain has underlined our lack of knowledge relating to the distribution, abundance and habitat requirements (foraging ecology) of marine birds. The United Nations Law of the Seas and the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones gives coastal states extensive rights but also obligations over marine areas, including the assessment of potential effects of activities on the marine environment under Article 206. Increasingly, domestic and international legislation requires Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of development projects in offshore waters (e.g. the EIA and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directives of the European Union). Many states are already bound by international agreements and legislation (such as the Ramsar Convention and European Union Birds Directive) to maintain migratory bird populations throughout the annual cycle, including the provision of reserves and the general protection of habitat.
Proper EIAs should investigate all potential effects of the establishment and development of wind farms on marine wildlife, but that is beyond the scope of this document. As part of the EIAs for offshore wind farms, the need for detailed knowledge on spatial and temporal patterns in seabird distribution has been identified. Fundamental to this process, is the simple definition of the distribution and abundance of marine birds in time and space. As a minimum, there is a requirement upon states to define the most important bird areas (potentially for site safeguard) but ultimately the process should aim to describe the overall distribution and abundance of particular populations throughout their annual cycle. The process is severely hampered by natural variability and by the long-distance migratory nature of many marine species, which often use very distant areas for breeding, moulting, staging and wintering, such that there is great seasonal variation in their distribution and abundance. Factors affecting prey availability, including access to food supplies, also vary in time and space, and the general abundance of a species varies as a result of differential patterns of survival and reproductive output, imposing further variation on patterns of distribution and abundance.
The need for the establishment of common standards in survey of offshore marine birds has been drawn into sharp focus by the current proposals to construct large wind farms in marine waters around the coasts of Europe. Many of the proposed wind farms are extensive in area and most planned developments involve the construction of turbines 500-800 m apart, in wind farms covering several square kilometres, so the spatial scale of these developments necessitates mapping bird densities at high spatial resolution (of a few hundred metres) over extensive areas (tens of square kilometres). At the local level, dedicated censuses to sample the numbers and distribution of seabirds are a basic requirement upon developers, to describe bird densities within, and in the immediate vicinity of, the construction area. In order to assess the potential impact of the construction of, for instance, an offshore wind farm and to understand how such a construction is likely to affect the birds associated with a site, dedicated research is required. Any studies performed need to be related to some greater area studies, in order to assess the relative and the actual importance of the construction area for the species involved. The cumulative description of bird densities over time and space enables some assessment of the relative importance of the impact area relative to other areas used by the same species. The routine coupling of bird census data with geographical (e.g. depth, substrate, distance to land), hydrographical (water masses), and biological measurements (e.g. benthic communities, fish abundance) will further enhance the understanding of the actual habitat characteristics of a given area and their influence on the distribution of marine birds. Such data is essential to begin to understand how an offshore construction such as a wind farm is likely to affect the birds associated with a site.
Given the recent round of proposals for offshore wind farm developments in shallow inshore areas and the expected future developments in this area, it is essential to obtain some consensus on common standards and best practice in survey techniques used to describe the distribution and abundance of marine birds in key areas. For this reason, COWRIE has issued an invitation to tender for a project comparing ship and aerial sampling methods for marine birds and their applicability to offshore wind farm assessments. Despite reasonably complete data on broad distribution patterns of seabirds around the UK, lack of detailed understanding about local distribution, at the scale of wind farm sites, temporal variability of numbers and the underlying determinants of their timing of occurrence was identified. This document evaluates existing census techniques and determines the best currently available methods for defining bird distribution and abundance at sea. The underlying question is twofold: (1) what are the research objectives and what data are required for EIAs for offshore wind farms, and (2) how good are existing census techniques at fulfilling the objectives? Aim of the project
The overall aim of the project is to produce a standardised guidance document/manual for bird counts in relatively small areas of sea, using either ships or aircraft as observation platforms (but not necessarily always both), for all involved in the offshore wind energy industry. The protocol will offer guidance to optimise accuracy and minimise bias when estimating bird numbers, while taking into account spatial and temporal variability, underlying determinant factors and the specific needs of an individual project. Existing methodologies for sampling seabirds at sea have therefore been reviewed and compared; keeping in mind the need to provide information on the scale associated with offshore wind farms.
The outcome of this exercise, a set of guidelines, details the strengths and weaknesses of a range of recorded parameters within each method, the circumstances under which different approaches would be recommended, and recommends standard sampling procedures for both. This standardised protocol for conducting seabird surveys at sea in connection with any offshore wind farm development around the UK, using agreed common standards and optimal methodologies, will improve the comparability of data from different future studies. Consultation on the proposed methodology has been via written comments, based on a draft text posted at the COWRIE web site, and discussions at an international workshop in Aberdeen, Scotland, November 2003. This final document is the result of these consultations. The agreed protocol for assessing (changes in) seabird numbers in wind farm EIAs for the UK are guidelines for any organisation within the UK examining the problem at any site within the domain of the Crown Estate (shallow coastal seas) in the foreseeable future.
At the international workshop in Aberdeen, it was noted that a standardised protocol will never be able to meet the most detailed of specific requirements at certain sites. The protocol proposed here ensures adequate data sampling in marine (coastal) areas, using either aircraft or ship. Specific problems, such as highly localised flyways of foraging birds, complex shorelines, the location of migration routes, poor weather conditions, may not be addressed using this same protocol or may require specific adjustments. Since it will be hard to foresee all the peculiarities and research objectives for wind farms in UK coastal waters, the establishment of a board of experts is suggested. This board should be consulted where the protocol proposed here is insufficient, or when an adjusted research protocol has to be critically evaluated.
Seabirds at sea can be counted from either platform following appropriate observation protocols, and accurate density estimates can be obtained from the air as well as at sea level. Important differences occur, however, and these differences are most important when choosing to use either an aircraft or a boat. Ship-based surveys, for example, provide a higher level of accuracy in species identification and assessments of age and behaviour of seabirds at sea, important in studies where the distribution of seabirds in areas needs background information to explain and measure natural variability in the system. Aircraft can work areas that are completely or virtually inaccessible to ships of recommended size and may be more effective in counting certain species groups that are easily disturbed by traffic such as seaduck and divers.
The choice between either craft, apart from the issue of availability, has to be made with specific research objectives in mind. Since either method has both advantages and disadvantages, the strong points and weaknesses of ships and aircraft are highlighted in the present document, and linked to specific research objectives, so that any wind farm developer could make a choice based on local circumstances and particular requirements. There is not just one 'best' research tool to be recommended for all places and circumstances. The pros and cons of either method have been listed with annotations. Existing approaches
Objectives and methods of early offshore observations
Early researchers have used several methods for counting birds at sea (Powers 1982), but very few managed to collect and analyse their data in a systematic manner and tried to describe different areas on the basis of bird data. The sinking of the oil tanker Torrey Canyon at Land's End in 1967 and the associated mass mortality of (oiled) seabirds gave a clear sign, however, that our knowledge of the offshore distribution of seabirds was still very incomplete. When gas- and oil exploration activities in the North Sea developed rapidly in the 1970s, the need for adequate data became even more urgent. When asked for specific advice with respect to the densities of (vulnerable) seabirds in different areas of the North Sea, there was little more than maps of breeding colonies and the expectation that seabird numbers were probably relatively high in the waters around them. The Canadian Wildlife Service had developed and deployed a useful method to study seabirds at sea in Canada and to analyse the results with the use of a computer (Brown et al. 1975). This method, the strip-transect technique, formed the basis of work conducted by JNCC’s Seabirds At Sea Team formed in the late 1970s. The strip-transect method was thought to be the most useful at the time, cost-effective and repeatable (Tasker et al. 1984). The first results of this work were published in the early and mid-1980s (Blake et al. 1984; Tasker et al. 1987). The strip-transect method, with a snapshot for flying birds (explained later in this document), was adopted by most workers around the North Sea as an easy and repeatable standard method in an attempt to be able to join forces while mapping large areas of the North Sea. It should be highlighted that the method was refined soon after the publication by Tasker et al. (1984), using parallel narrow strips within the band transect to allow for corrections for birds missed at greater distances from the observation platform (Komdeur et al. 1992). With this modification, the line-transect technology became adopted (see below). The establishment of a joint database (the European Seabirds at Sea database, ESAS) was a further important step to collect, store and utilise a large amount of comparable data in a single format.
Recent work (1) Ship-based surveys
The ESAS strip-transect method (Tasker et al. 1984), slightly revised to a line-transect technique, is still the backbone of modern ship-based surveys of seabirds at sea in NW European waters (Camphuysen & Leopold 1994; Durinck et al. 1994; Stone et al. 1995; Skov et al. 1995; Bloor et al. 1996; Offringa et al. 1996; Pollock et al. 1997; 2000; Maes et al. 2000; Taylor & Reid 2001; Mitschke et al. 2001; Seys 2001; Skov et al. 2002). Results have been analysed to answer the more specific questions about the vulnerability of different sea areas for oil pollution, and vulnerability indices were used to transform plain densities at the species level into densities/levels of vulnerability (Tasker et al. 1990; Carter et al. 1993; Webb et al. 1995; Williams et al. 1995; Begg et al. 1997; Maes et al. 2000). Since the late 1970s, joint knowledge of offshore seabird distribution has increased substantially, as a result of several large programmes of seabirds at sea studies (NCC, later Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC), culminating in the establishment of the database. The standardisation of methodology at a very early stage, followed by the adoption of such methods by a large, international group of researchers and organisations (ESAS), were the backbone of a success-story that has resulted in a number of atlases summarising seabird distribution patterns in most of North West Europe and in the Baltic. Waterfowl counts in coastal wetlands have been conducted at least since the 1960s in many European countries, and offshore sites have increasingly been incorporated in the research set-up of these surveys (Rüger et al. 1986; Laursen 1989; Rose & Scott 1994; Delany et al. 1999).
More recently, ESAS has focussed more on the marine ecological background to the distribution of seabirds at sea (e.g. Harrison et al. 1994, Garthe 1997; Camphuysen & Webb 1999). Studies wished to address other aspects of the marine life of seabirds at sea by using ESAS data and shortcomings in the material led to further refinements, again while keeping the underlying framework intact (e.g. Camphuysen & Webb 1999; Camphuysen & Garthe 2001). The ESAS coding structure is now such that each of the outlying methods can be identified, so that although there is one joint database format, different methods can be entered and selected for subsequent analysis.
Recent work (2) Aerial surveys
Although aerial survey techniques have been used in European offshore waters for many years, their use has been relatively limited, possibly because of the high financial costs involved. Their development was accelerated in the 1960s, especially in Denmark, following the pioneering work of Joensen (1968, 1973, 1974). The technique at that time was highly limited by the ability of pilots and observers to navigate with any accuracy out of range of navigation beacons or sight of the coast. The surveys at that time were carried out at a variety of altitudes between 50 and 300 metres, according to weather conditions, habitat and species. The routes and extent of coverage undertaken varied between years, but essentially the technique aimed to record and describe all aggregations of seabirds encountered along the areas covered by the aerial survey aircraft (Joensen 1974). The objective at that time was to map the larger concentrations and assess the overall numbers and distributions of birds at the national level, rather than provide a statistical basis for comparisons in time and space. Joensen (1974) was well aware of the difficulties involved with sampling bird distributions based on this type of aerial survey, but these assessments were the first ever attempts to determine the numbers of birds using the offshore waters around Denmark and were a remarkable contribution at the time.
In Britain, aerial surveys have been conducted side by side with ship-based surveys, for example to cover coastal areas that are difficult or less efficiently to reach by boat (e.g. Barton et al. 1994b). German and Dutch surveys were initially mainly conducted as part of the international waterfowl census (Bräger 1990), but are increasingly used to survey marine areas for seabirds and marine mammals (Diederichs et al. 2002). In The Netherlands, aerial surveys covering the Dutch sector of the North Sea became established as a monitoring programme conducted by the Dutch government since the mid 1980s (Baptist 1990; Baptist & Wolf 1991, 1993; Baptist & Meininger 1996).
In Denmark, aerial survey methods were further developed in the late 1980s (Laursen et al. 1997) and subsequently extended to cover much of the Baltic Sea for wintering seaducks (Durink et al. 1994) and UK waters (Dean et al. 2003). For these surveys, the methods used varied with species and conditions in the survey areas. In shallow coastal waters, the coastline was followed 300-500 m from the shore, with supplementary coverage 1.5-2 km offshore. For “total counts” sea areas were defined on the basis of natural ecological, topographical or geographical units and attempts were made to fly each of these areas in a systematic fashion and assess the total numbers of birds present (Pihl & Frikke 1992). In the open sea, parallel tracks were flown at regular (2-3 km) intervals, always ensuring coverage of known reefs and shoals, with reduced efforts at water depths less than 10 m. During these flights, observers registered birds on both sides of the aircraft within 100 m of the observers (excluding the 10 m on either side directly below the aircraft; Laursen 1997). These strip transect approaches represented a considerable improvement on the previous methods and exploited the improvements in navigation aids at that time (notably the new satellite navigation techniques just becoming available).
At present, the Danish protocol as outlined below under “Aerial surveys” (or very similar derivatives) is deployed in the UK (e.g. JNCC, BTO, WWT), in Denmark and in Germany (BioConsult, FTZ/Univ. Kiel). The Dutch protocol for aerial surveys is rather different (Baptist & Wolf 1991) and is not recommended in this document. COWRIE research objectives
While the purpose of the present document is to evaluate existing techniques for ship-based and aerial surveys, in terms of their historical use, demonstrated efficiency, quality, and cost-effectiveness, it was suggested at the start of the project that research objectives should be made very clear. The following research objectives have been identified (COWRIE, London, 30 May 2003) and each of the research tools (platforms used, protocols and techniques deployed) will be evaluated with these goals in mind.
- Seabird distribution patterns
- Seabird abundance
- Migratory pathways
- Foraging areas
- Factors explaining seabird distribution and abundance
- Variability in spatial and temporal patterns
- Seasonal
- Diurnal
- Spatial
- Evaluation of collision risks
The objectives of these large-scale seabirds at sea programmes discussed earlier, partly overlap with the objectives for specific EIAs in marine coastal areas, but they are different, particularly in scale. For a better understanding of local areas, fine-scale distribution patterns have to be investigated while the diurnal, spatial and seasonal variability can only be understood with at least some basic knowledge of the type of birds found (breeding, transit, wintering, feeding) and underlying determinants of their timing and reason of occurrence in a given location. It is clearly understood that a full blown ecological study is not what has been asked for (COWRIE 2002). Yet, it is important that census techniques should not be evaluated just on their merits for measuring seabird abundance and distribution, but be set-up such that our understanding and appreciation of the underlying mechanisms will be enhanced, preferably at the same cost level. As a simple and straightforward example: where fisheries enhance foraging opportunities for certain species of seabirds locally and will thus increase seabird numbers in a given area, measuring trawler activity and the associated seabird movements and congregations simultaneously will increase our understanding as to how the two interact and how fisheries influence local bird numbers by providing an artificial food source (discards and offal). Natural variability issues are issues of great importance and some level of ecological understanding of sea areas is essential if any changes in seabird distribution and abundance have to be forecasted or evaluated.
It must be stressed here that aerial and ship-based surveys per se are unlikely to provide a complete answer on all research aims, but some research protocols will provide valuable data. Aerial and boat based studies of distribution patterns and absolute numbers in a given area, land and “pseudo-stationary” boat studies of migratory pathways, and collision risks estimated from boat survey data, are unlikely to be all accommodated by a single research tool, and it should be made clear at the onset of future research what a particular method is most likely to offer. Other tools will have to be deployed (e.g. radar, heat, impact or motion sensors, etc.) to answer the numerous questions underlying these topics, but these tools are not addressed in this project.
Observation-techniques should be evaluated for their potential to be used in different conditions such as visibility (day, night, fog, low cloud), weather circumstances (sea state, rain, ice cover) and water depth (accessibility of the area for research platforms chosen). The type (technical requirements) of craft and the quality and training of observers are further issues that need to be addressed.
The research objectives listed above can be lumped into two main categories; one mainly addressing changes in seabird distribution and seabird abundance (for example through potential habitat loss), the other mainly considering the risks for collisions (seabirds in flight hitting rotor blades or masts of turbines). As main research aims, we have summarised and annotated the objectives as follows:
1. Evaluation of effects of wind farms on seabird distribution and abundance
2. Evaluation of collision risks (in relation to density, migratory pathways, flying height and weather)
Site-specific knowledge should be obtained prior to any surveys to fine-tune the methodology, including bathymetry, geographical characteristics, results of previous surveys within the area, likelihood of use by breeding birds (nearby colonies), by migrants (flyways), by foraging birds (habitat descriptions), by wintering birds or moulting birds, by fisheries, by marine mammals and the use of the area for mining (platforms, vessels) and by shipping (traffic lanes).
Patterns in seabird distribution and abundance The first research aim is based on a more usual set of objectives for offshore surveys and the research protocols outlined below will produce data that serve our needs. Spatial patterns of seabirds should be studied with a high resolution given the size of planned wind farm sites, the expected variance in seabird presence and usage over the area and the need to enhance our understanding of underlying mechanisms. Temporal resolution should also be high, as seabird densities and behaviours, and thus, the risk of collisions or other impacts, may be highly variable at any one place. Seabird abundance (number of birds per unit area) needs to be assessed with a high accuracy and with clear confidence intervals. Inter-observer differences should be measured and minimized as much as possible and corrections should be made for animals missed (distance sampling techniques).
There is a rather large “but”, however, and this has to do with natural variability issues and the use that may need to be made of reported or forecasted abundance estimates. The reason why wind farm developers should address seabird distribution issues is that these patterns may be influenced by the building and/or subsequent operation of a wind farm in a coastal area. These effects may be clear (turbines take physical space and will trigger avoidance response at least to some extent), or they may be very subtle (enhanced or deteriorating foraging conditions for certain species). Changed use of an area is notoriously difficult to measure and distribution patterns are meaningless if explanatory factors are not considered. Distribution patterns should be described in a context of geographical characteristics (e.g. topography, bathymetry, sediments), oceanographical parameters (water masses, currents, river outflows etc.), food supplies, and anthropogenic influences (shipping, fisheries). Many of these data are more or less fixed over geological time-scales or at least many years, others are more variable and need to be measured simultaneously. As part of the evaluation of ecological mechanisms and factors underlying distribution patterns, the use of sea areas for foraging and feeding of the respective species should be examined. Pre-survey studies and survey protocols should accommodate this topic in as much detail as possible.
Evaluation of disturbance and habitat loss
Wind farms that appear in the open sea, will possibly scare birds away from the site. This will lead to disturbance (birds flying around or over the wind farm) or to habitat loss, through avoidance. At first, habitat loss seems a small problem, as projected wind farms are small in size compared to the vastness of the sea. However, the number and size of wind farms will increase rapidly in the future and this may lead to more excessive disturbance or more extensive habitat loss. This is particularly so, as most European wind farms will be situated in nearshore areas, that are by nature of a more limited extent than the open sea and that support important migration routes and specific habitats. Moreover, coastal waters are often relatively important for feeding, breeding, moulting, and migrating compared to waters further offshore. If many wind farms occur, one after the other along a migration route, the same birds will need to fly around many more obstacles than just those in the one wind farm that is under study at any particular time. Likewise, habitat loss will be cumulative for all the wind farms that occur in the same habitat, such as coastal sites around Britain and Ireland. Such sites are the only habitat (on a national scale) where specific coastal seabirds, such as divers or seaduck, come to winter in the North Sea. The amount of habitat lost (if any, this needs to be assessed first) should thus be compared to the total amount of that specific habitat available in the country, rather than to the total surface area of e.g. the North Sea. If habitats can be described in more detail in future, habitat loss may prove to be more severe in relative terms than can currently be estimated.
Migratory pathways
Migratory pathways, or intensively used flying routes (including foraging flights to and from breeding colonies) are not easily described from moving platforms such as aircraft or seagoing vessels. However, a detailed analysis of directions of flight of seabirds observed with time of day and time of year, and behavioural observations will fill in some aspects. Detailed studies of migratory pathways require more or less fixed (stationary) platforms of observation and the use of radar is to be recommended.
Evaluation of collision risks
Birds can only be hit by a rotor when they are flying and even then only when flying at rotor altitudes. As long as birds are on the water they are not vulnerable. Seabirds fly mostly rather low, below most rotor heights, but they may reach surprising altitudes on migration (e.g. Bergman & Donner 1971; Bergman 1974; Kerlinger 1982) or during soaring during the daytime (gannets, gulls). The risk may be assessed as a function of seabird density and the percentage of time spent in the air, at risky altitudes.
The research techniques evaluated in this document are not designed to evaluate collision risks in great detail. However, while previous surveys have produced two-dimensional distribution patterns (numbers of birds per unit area), ship-based survey designs could be adjusted such that a 3-D image for at least the lower layers of the atmosphere (up to a few hundred metres a.s.l.) can be produced. The distribution of flying height can be assessed during seabirds at sea counts from ships, by categorising any birds seen in flight to its altitude (classes used in Dutch studies are: 0-2m, 2-10m, 10-25m, 25-50m, 50-100m 100-200m, >200m; a system adopted from landbird migration monitoring programmes; Lensink et al. 2002). This provides an estimate of seabird numbers in flight per volume in different weather conditions; information that is very sparse, but important to evaluate seabird numbers potentially in conflict with moving rotor-blades. This may give a first impression of which birds will be at risk in a study area. Additional information may be gained from seawatching data (e.g. Krüger & Garthe 2001). As most collisions will probably take place during the night or during misty, rainy or very windy conditions, when observers will probably not be able to measure altitudes of flying birds from ships, additional work using radar will be needed to fully explore this. Natural variability
Seabirds are highly mobile animals, with long-distance migration and dispersion patterns. On top of that, seabirds may quickly respond to temporarily available food sources, such as discarding fishing vessels, tidally induced feeding opportunities, food (small fishes) being driven to the surface by underwater predators, etc. Such events may attract hundreds or even thousands of seabirds to a given spot and if this spot falls into a standard survey, the resulting enhanced densities greatly affect results. Seabirds at sea studies should therefore incorporate an evaluation of seasonal patterns, diurnal rhythms, and spatial variability caused by any external factors that can be identified. For most birds, seasonal patterns are such that areas should be surveyed at least on a monthly basis, but chosen in response to key moments in the annual cycle of the animals living in the area (wintering, migration, nesting, fledging, post-fledging care, moult, etc.). An appropriate planning of surveys (survey design) requires a review of existing knowledge of the animals expected to occur in the area studied. Diurnal patterns and tidal influences on seabird distribution should be measured and evaluated to allow an appropriate planning of surveys.
Seabird distributions around the British Isles are known mainly in broad terms (e.g. Stone et al. 1995), but in some parts, e.g. around some colonies, in greater detail (Webb et al. 1985; McSorley et al. 2003). Most distribution maps that have been produced so far are composites based on data from several survey years. Such overviews are suitable for determining an average base line situation, but the underlying data need to be re-analysed for temporal variance. As the ESAS data were not normally collected with a high temporal resolution in any one place, one will probably find for any particular site, that the data are fragmentary.
Scale and variability
Knowledge of bird densities at a large scale are not generally helpful when addressing more detailed questions relating to the cause of observed patterns in abundance and distribution, but are crucial to put local findings into context. Smaller flocks of seaduck and divers may utilise large coastal areas over a short space of time, moving from one spot to the other and vice versa in response to factors such as weather (exposure), tidal currents and food supply. Migration corridors can only be understood and described by combining data over large areas and by effort related observations revealing the often highly peaked seasonal patterns and diurnal rhythms. The usage of an area by coastal and/or pelagic seabirds and physical boundaries that are of significance to either of these need attention. It may be so that a physical boundary such as an hydrographical front is just within, or just beyond the study area, explaining many of the seabird movements and distribution patterns observed. It may also be that factors outside a study area will control bird numbers within a given study area.
Monitoring seabird numbers in a given area to reveal seasonal or gradual long-term trends or to study the spatial and temporal variability of seabird numbers in more localised areas in connection to certain environmental parameters requires a different approach. In these situations, statistical tests between densities in time and space are a prerequisite of the methods, together with the need for a high level of spatial resolution in localising birds. In particular, the process of environmental impact assessment, or the identification of geographical boundaries for the process of site safeguard, requires a high level of spatial precision to describe bird distribution and abundance and the ability to demonstrate changes in these densities.
Migratory pathways (routes, direction of flight, seasonal patterns).
Seabird movements over the North Sea can be swift or slow and peaks in occurrence may be in the timeframe of a couple of days or even hours only. Large-scale movements, e.g. from season to season may be inferred from sequential, monthly or bi-monthly maps that are available for all common species of seabird for large areas of sea around the British Isles. For instance, the slow migration (by swimming) of Common Guillemots across the North Sea, between the UK and the Kattegat/Skagerak area may be followed this way. Faster migrations, by birds moving on the wing will be harder to trace as these may happen within one month, over large distances. Surveys need to be planned to maximise the likelihood that migrants are actually recorded. Additional information on timing and direction of flight is available from many coastal, “seawatching” sites around the North Sea. Some information on seabird movements is available from offshore platforms, that have sometimes been manned by experienced seawatchers (Camphuysen et al. 1982; Platteeuw et al. 1985).
Weather effects
Seabirds are known to respond to adverse weather by movement, sometimes over large distances. This may lead to occurrence of offshore species in nearshore waters in connection with specific weather conditions (e.g. Blomqvist & Peterz 1984) or wrecks (e.g. Camphuysen & Leopold 1996). Obviously, any massive movement of seabirds may cross a wind farm site and affect densities therein temporarily. Some sites will be more prone to this than others, and emphasises requirement to survey during all weather conditions which are safe for the survey platform, not just nice weather! Risk assessments can use meteorological data to predict the likely frequency of weather events that may increase the potential for collision.
Diurnal patterns and tidal influences
Seabirds respond to offshore foraging conditions in various ways, but daylight and tidal influences are perhaps the most important factors for many birds to find and obtain prey. Diurnal rhythms may be such that a site is not used at all for some part of the day, with peak occurrences early morning, mid-day or just before sunset. Tidal currents influence distribution patterns greatly and seabirds may be expected to move in and out sites with the tide. For migratory seabirds, diurnal patterns in the intensity of migration require attention, for peak occurrences may take place at certain times of day.
Foraging areas Specific feeding areas at sea are poorly known. There are obvious concentrations of seabirds at sea around their colonies, but at larger distances from colonies, or in the non-breeding season, the situation is often less clear. Predictable feeding concentrations of seabirds and marine mammals are known to occur at frontal systems, around banks or other elevations on the seafloor, over shellfish banks (seaduck) and around fishing fleets.
Factors explaining seabird distribution and abundance Seabird distribution and abundance are governed on different time scales. There is a strong seasonal component that causes a large proportion of any population to be tied to specific areas in the breeding season (e.g. within flying range of colonies). Many seabirds move to specific areas to moult or winter, following broadly defined migration routes (offshore species) or more clearly defined narrow migration bands (coastal species). In the short run, fishing fleets or single fishing vessels will attract scavenging seabirds, but mainly at certain stages of the fishing process, e.g. when nets are hauled and by-catches and discards are put back into the sea (Camphuysen et al. 1995). Strong daily rhythms in movements have been observed in wintering offshore seabirds (Camphuysen 1999), while nearshore species such as gulls or cormorants often sleep on land and feed at daytime, at sea. Hence, abundance of a given species, at a given location at a given time will be a function of total numbers in the population, the time of year, and possibly the time of day, as well as less predictable factors such as presence of fishing vessels or approaching weather systems. Many factors need attention when seabird distribution patterns have to be understood, explained and perhaps even predicted. This includes information on habitat characteristics (e.g. water mass, geography, depth, distance to land, prey availability) as well as detailed information on the behaviour (habitat utilisation) of the birds studied.
Common Guillemots with young chicks, just prior to fledging (Farne Islands, summer 2003, CJ Camphuysen) Survey techniques
In an effort to standardise observations, techniques have been developed that provide an index of relative abundance corrected for observer effort and detection probability and several methods may now be deployed during ship-based or aerial surveys, including strip-transects, point and line-transect techniques. Direct counts are very not practical to cover large areas of sea, because animals move, the water moves, the observation platform moves, and many of the smaller animals are highly inconspicuous or submerged part of the time. Even with smaller sites, sub-sampling is normally required rather than a direct count of the entire population in the study area, and the techniques listed above are the most appropriate (Buckland 1982; Buckland & Turnock 1992; Buckland et al. 1993; Sutherland 1996). Exceptions are direct counts of single, concentrated, large flocks of seaduck caused by a concentrated resource of food (Offringa & Leopold 1991).
Combinations of methods are possible onboard (large) research vessels, if sufficient numbers of observers can be accommodated to operate simultaneously and independently. It would be naïve to assume that several different techniques could be deployed simultaneously by a single observer or by a very small team of (2) observers without significant loss of quality. Most ESAS associated ship-based surveys and most aerial surveys have deployed strip- or line-transect counts as the only technique. Within ESAS, much of the ship-based work has been realised by a single observer. With few exceptions, modern surveys are performed by at least two observers teamed up to work one transect (four observers if a double transect is worked). Mark-recapture techniques have thus far seldom been used, but could work with studies of marine mammals.
Line-transect technique using parallel strips (ship and boat surveys)
It appeared that there is confusion with terms and to avoid further confusion, terms used in this document are explained here. Ship-based survey techniques for the North Sea have been described as strip-transects (Tasker et al. 1984). The method required that all birds along the transect are detected within a pre-set perpendicular distance (the strip width). The strip width needed modification when necessary, i.e. be made narrower during adverse sighting conditions. As soon as the method was published, it was modified by the main users, to allow correction factors to be calculated for birds that were missed. To do that, birds seen on the water were ranked in 5 distance categories (A-E); distances perpendicular to the observation platform. The term strip-transect was not completely abandoned, although the method was now a form of line-transect technique (Komdeur et al. 1992). Aerial survey techniques, described in this document, have always been described as line-transect counts, even although the methods used were essentially identical to ESAS ship-based surveys: parallel distance bands as perpendicular distance groupings of animals observed to allow for later correction of individuals missed at greater distances. To add to the confusion, line-transect methodology in the strictest sense requires exact measurements of the perpendicular distance to the track line for every sighting and this method has been used and will have to be used for marine mammal surveys. While ship-based and aerial seabird surveys group animals in distance bands, perpendicular distances to the track line are calculated much more precisely by recording angle (°) and distance (m) for every individual sighting in marine mammal surveys.
The objective of this review is to use a method to generate population density estimates (D) over small areas of the marine environment based on the most effective sampling methods. One approach to this is to sail or fly extended transects and describe the distributions of birds encountered by observers along these trajectories, usually in terms of bird encounters per unit area (e.g. n km⁻²). Strip transect sampling involves travelling along such transects, counting all the birds encountered out to a predefined distance, effectively covering long linear corridors on either side of the observer (Buckland et al. 2001). Given k of such strips, each width 2w (w being the width of the area covered by one observer on either side of the count platform), each strip i has length lᵢ, hence the total length (L) can be denoted:
[ L = \\sum\_{i=1}^{k} l_i ]
The total number of birds counted in all the strips is n, denoted:
[ n = \\sum\_{i=1}^{k} n_i ]
Then density D is estimated by:
[ D = \\frac{n}{2wL} ]
To create a density estimate surface, it would be possible to cut the strips into sections along each transect in order to define the encounter densities over the study area. However, the basic assumption is that all objects within the strip are detected. Usually, however, no relevant data are collected at the time of the survey to test this assumption. This assumption is unlikely to be met, unless the strips are restrictively thin, which may in turn be highly inefficient, since many observed objects would be ignored to ensure all near objects were detected (Burnham & Anderson 1984).
Line transect (distance) sampling has far greater appeal as a modification of strip transect sampling. Instead of counting all objects out to a given distance in a strip of defined width, the observer records the distance of each object from the track line, hence “Distance Sampling” (Buckland et al. 2001). In this way, all objects on or near the track line are detected, but the method allows for a proportion of the objects present at the time the observer passes to be missed, within a given distance ( w ). In this case, as long as the observer ensures all objects on or near the track line are detected, true density can be estimated without bias from the detected objects. An analysis at species level is required, for species-specific differences exist in detectability.
This makes the method a more efficient use of data gathered by the observer, with large sample sizes for the same effort, especially when dealing with objects at low density. It also ensures unbiased density estimates, given that certain assumptions are met. The sampling design requires a number of random track lines, or a grid of track lines systematically positioned at regular intervals randomly superimposed on the study area. In this case, the encounter rate within a strip can be thought of in terms of an effective half-strip width of ( \\mu ) which represents the distance from the track line at which as many objects are detected beyond ( \\mu ) as are missed within ( \\mu ) of the track line. In this case, density ( D ) is estimated by:
[ D = n/2\\mu L ]
To estimate the effective half-strip width ( \\mu ) necessitates the determination of the detection function ( g(y) ), i.e. the probability of detecting an object given its distance ( y ) from the track line. This is derived from the population of object observations generated from the survey results, which will show in simple bi-plots the predictable reduction in detected objects with increasing distance from track line. In order to generate robust estimates of overall density, however, the method requires an assessment of ( g(0) ) (following the assumption in the model that objects on the track line are always detected; i.e. that ( g(0) = 1 )). In addition, the method also requires that (i) objects are detected at their initial position, prior to any movement in response to the observer and that (ii) distances to objects are accurately and consistently determined.
In most surveys, the detection probability decreases with increasing distance from the observer. Although the nature of the relationship between distance and the probability of detecting an object can vary considerably, it is relatively simple to model this relationship in such a way as to generate reliable estimates of true density. The process can also be simplified by “binning” observations. This means that rather than measuring the distance of every observation from the track line (for example using protractors and triangulation), observers can assign bird positions to bands of increasing distance from the observation platform. Even using binned data and when small percentages of the total number of objects are detected away from the track line, modelling offers a highly robust means of fitting detection functions (Buckland et al. 2001). Although there are a plethora of potential models that could be fitted to survey data, there is now a body of theory and experience behind such techniques. Furthermore, the use of likelihood ratio and goodness of fit tests, as well as Akaike’s Information Criterion enables objective selection between suitable models (Burnham & Anderson 1998).
Such model-fitting provides the most statistically robust method of estimating bird densities over extensive bodies of open sea based on the results of aerial or ship-based survey, and fulfills all the requirements of the methods outlined above, as long as the underlying assumptions are met. In particular, the opportunity to generate estimates with variance precision estimates offers the basis to make comparisons in time and space between bird densities as are required in the environmental impact assessment method.
**Line-transect techniques using individual distances to the track line for marine mammals**
This technique, or the *true* line-transect technique, is most appropriate for recording rare, elusive objects, such as marine mammals. With the need to carefully assess perpendicular distance from the track line for every individual or flock observed, this method is not practical to record seabirds at sea, not even in areas with relatively low densities. Line-transect techniques have been described by Buckland (1985), Buckland & Turnock (1992), and Borchers et al. (1998).
**Point-transect techniques**
Strictly speaking, a point transect requires the observer to remain at one point for a fixed period of time to record the targets at distances recorded in terms of concentric zones around the point (Buckland et al. 1993, Sutherland 1996). For seabirds and marine mammals it is not a very practical method and it hasn't been deployed anywhere, except on vessels where considerable time was spent on stations. The results will never be very reliable, however, because the assumption that the behaviour of the animals observed is independent of the observer is almost always violated: marine mammals and seabirds have a strong tendency to 'check-out' stationary platforms for foraging opportunities. A variation of the point-transect method has been deployed in a large-scale project where fishery intensity needed to be measured at the same time as seabirds were counted with the strip-transect method (Camphuysen et al. 1995). At frequent intervals, all active fishing vessels were counted within a fixed ( r ) set on the radar screen (assumed detection probability = 1). Each snap-shot has geographical information and a known surface area, allowing the calculation of densities (active trawlers km(^{-2})) and it results in a coarse distribution pattern of fishing activity. This technique has not and should not be deployed for seabirds or marine mammals at sea.
However, in the specific situation, where seabird densities need to be assessed in a fixed area, such as a wind farm at sea, the technique may prove useful, specifically when an observation base is present within the park. Such a base could be a stationary ship (but see above for problems mentioned in relation to such a base). A base, such as a central ‘command post’ such as a power collection station, equipped with an observation platform, could prove to be useful, as such a base would be an integral part of the wind farm. Animals being attracted to that base, or indeed the wind farm, would simply be part of the equation. As such point transect methods have not been used before properly at sea, and in any case not in a wind farm setting, this is an option that could be explored in the future.
**Seaduck and diver surveys: local modifications to ESAS database**
Methodological deviations were sometimes put in place because for example counts of large seaduck or diver concentrations from ships could not be performed successfully with the strip-transect protocols deployed up until then (Offringa & Leopold 1991; Offringa 1993; Leopold *et al.* 1995; Durinck *et al.* 1993). These modifications meant that dedicated observers continuously scanned the sea area ahead of the ship with binoculars, to detect the take-off of usually very wary seaduck and divers well ahead of the approaching platform. Line-transect techniques (distance sampling) could still be deployed by measuring angles and distances to flushed birds ahead of the ship (Durinck *et al.* 1993), but total counts have also been used, e.g. on very large (tens of thousands) groups of seaduck.
**Geographical accuracy**
The advent and wide availability of navigation aids (such as global positioning systems [GPS]) enable the identification of the precise position of a moving observer with accuracy. This enables pilots and skippers to establish waypoints and fly or sail along predetermined track lines with a very high degree of accuracy. Such equipment also enables surveyors to localise observations of individual birds, or flocks of birds, with similar accuracy. This means that, rather than smoothed or amalgamated sampled densities over grid squares, the surveyor can plot with an increasing degree of spatial accuracy all encounters with birds. This has a number of immediate benefits, which need to be considered, and taken advantage of, in designing any survey protocol. Not least of these benefits is that the observational unit becomes a flock or individual bird (aerial survey) or a number of records within a short time interval (ship survey) with a precise location, rather than a pooled average density. This enhances the opportunity to relate bird distributions to oceanographic, bathymetric or other physical/biological features of their environment that could influence their distribution and which could potentially contribute to modelling distribution and abundance in time and space. It should be stressed immediately that to appropriately relate the distribution of birds to oceanographic (and most biological) features, such data should be collected simultaneously.
Because the mapping of individual birds and groups of birds can be very precise, with accumulated knowledge and appropriate replication of survey, the variations in abundance and distribution of seabirds can be defined in such a way as to define spatial and temporal patterns in abundance and distribution. In particular, such detailed mapping of flocks and individuals will demonstrate with considerable confidence where and when seabirds consistently occur, where they occur less frequently and areas where their occurrence is rare. Using even a very simple GIS platform, this would immediately enable the zoning of potentially damaging operations in time and space that would minimise any potential effects on seabirds given a composite overview of annual changes in their distribution in a given area. The ability to provide these data with some statistical rigour based on individual positions provides an important tool to zone areas of importance for seabirds as well as define those areas where the birds almost never occur.
*Red-throated Divers in flight, Iceland, summer 2001 (CJ Camphuysen)* Ship-based seabird surveys
Strip- and line-transect techniques for seabirds
The standard strip-transect techniques used by the European Seabirds at Sea Database group (ESAS) have been outlined by Tasker et al. (1984). Modifications have been described by Komdeur et al. (1992), and what was called strip-transect technique thus far is basically identical to what is described as line-transect technique in the description of aerial surveys (see inset above under “Survey techniques”). The method involves a 300m wide band- or strip-transect operated on one side and ahead of the ship and short time-intervals (1, 5, or 10-minute periods) in a continuous series to sample short stretches of water with a known surface area, a known location and any other biological, geographical, or physical factors that could be associated by that area. To evaluate the bias caused by specific differences in detection probability with distance away from the observer, the transect is subdivided into narrower distance strata (A= 0-50m away from the ship, B = 50-100m, C = 100-200m, D = 200-300m, and E > 300m). A species-specific frequency distribution over these strata would indicate how many individuals were likely to have been missed in the furthest strata (Distance Sampling). All birds on water within 300m perpendicular to trackline of the ship are counted as ‘in transect’. To avoid an overestimate of bird numbers in flight, a regular snapshot of flying birds over the transect and within 300m distance ahead of the ship is performed (frequency of snapshots depending on ship’s speed: Tasker et al. 1984). Distance techniques, used to correct numbers of birds observed swimming to numbers believed to have been present on the water, cannot be deployed on birds in flight. Birds ‘outside transect’ are recorded either in a 90° or 180° scan ahead of the ship. Birds recorded in the scan are not used to calculate distances, and recording them has therefore a lower priority than recording birds in transect when abundance estimates are the main objective of a survey. Scan results may enhance assessments of age- and sex composition of certain populations or directions of flight by migrants and birds travelling to and from colonies simply by enlarging sample sizes and the scan accommodates sightings of rarer, highly mobile seabirds such as shearwaters, skuas, terns and migratory birds that would otherwise remain unrecorded, or flushed birds, e.g. divers and scoters.
Transect width is 300m by default, unless circumstances (sea state, visibility, small ship size) prevent the observers from doing so. However, it is recommended to discontinue systematic surveys in circumstances so poor that a minimum width of 200m cannot be maintained. Time-intervals deployed are variable, in response to specific needs. Tasker et al. (1984) proposed 10-minute intervals. Large-scale surveys are indeed usually performed with 10-minute intervals, but smaller scale surveys should be conducted with 5-minute or 1-minute intervals. For the preferred vessels and speeds deployed (see below), working on gradients over miles rather than tens or hundreds of miles, we would propose 5-minute intervals as a sensible default, 1-minute intervals for a more detailed approach. At a ship groundspeed of 10 knots (nautical miles per hour) a single 5-minute count would comprise an area of 1543 m x 300 m = 463,000 m² (50/60 of a nautical mile length, 300m width), whilst a 1-minute count would comprise an area of 309 m x 300 m = 92,650 m² (10/60 of a nautical mile length, 300m width). Each snapshot captures ± 300 m x 300 m = 90,000 m². For each time-interval a central geographical position (lat-long) is stored into the database. In most situations, this requires accurate logging of start- and end-positions, and a calculation of mid-positions afterwards.
Efficiency may be enhanced by operating two transects at the same time, one on each side of the ship. This will require extra observers, but no extra ship time. Sun-glare is a problem to take into account, as now both sides as opposed to the side with optimal light and sighting conditions need to be operated. Therefore, operating one transect (best side) is preferred over operating two transects for which usually one has much poorer light conditions. An advantage of operating two transects at the same time is, that with more surface area surveyed per count, chances of recording “false zero’s” decrease, and more accurate assessments of low densities may be achieved. Small-scale differences in seabird densities may also be better assessed this way.
The method assumes that target species behave independently of the observers/the observation platform. Therefore, ship-followers should not be recorded as animals in transect and in fact should be kept aside at all times. To avoid problems with ship-followers it is important to maintain a minimum speed of the platform (> 5 knots). At low speed, ship-followers have a stronger tendency to fly ahead of the vessel. Strip transect counts are excellent for counting seabirds at sea and the method does not require a random distribution of target animals to be successful. A careful assessment of distances (at least within the 300m boundary should be carefully set and maintained) is essential to avoid over- or under-estimations.
Following the demands to evaluate sea areas in a context of offshore wind farm developments, the methods have been evaluated again and new modules were attached to the standard methods by a number of (independent) researchers around the North Sea (Exo et al. 2003; Garthe et al. 2003; Hüppop et al. 2003). It is these newly proposed modules plus the original methods for ship-based and aerial surveys at sea that are evaluated in the present study, to set standards for future work around the UK, and hopefully elsewhere in Europe. Transect set-up recommendations for ship-based surveys
| Time intervals | Band width | Subdivision | Observers | Snap-shot | |----------------|------------|-------------|-----------|-----------| | Minimum | 1 min | 200m | A (0-50m) | 2 | 200m | | | | | B (50-100m) | | | | | | | C (100-200m) | | | | | | | D (>200m) | | | | Maximum | 10 min | 300m | A (0-50m) | - | 500m | | | | | B (50-100m) | | | | | | | C (100-200m) | | | | | | | D (200-300m) | | | | | | | E (>300m) | | | | Recommended | 5 min | 300m | A (0-50m) | ≥ 2 | 300m | | | | | B (50-100m) | | | | | | | C (100-200m) | | | | | | | D (200-300m) | | | | | | | E (>300m) | | |
1 Scale dependent, 5-min intervals produce valuable data on the gradient level of several nautical miles, 10-min counts may be more useful at larger scales. 1-minute counts are preferred and recommended when a high level of accuracy is required in very small study areas or for example in combination with hydrographical observations. Note that (total) band width, as well as the number of observers double if two strip transects are to be operated simultaneously.
Behaviour of birds A protocol has been provided to record behavioural aspects of the birds observed (Annex 1). Crucial are attempts to relate the presence of birds to any visible cues in the area (e.g. fishing vessels, front lines, floating matter, offshore installations, marine mammals) and to try and distinguish between birds that simply pass through an area (e.g. migrants, long-distance feeding flights) and birds that utilise a site for feeding, resting, or other activities. A careful recording of directions of flight, particularly in nearshore situations, will enhance the understanding of seabird movements in an area. Today’s practice is to record flight directions in octants (1 = no direction, 2 = northward, 3 = NE, 4 = E, 5 = SE, etc; ESAS Database protocol, see Annex 1).
Flying height of birds The distribution of flying height can be assessed during seabirds at sea counts from ships, by categorising any birds seen in flight to its altitude (classes used in Dutch studies are: 0-2m, 2-10m, 10-25m, 25-50m, 50-100m, 100-200m, >200m; a system adopted from landbird migration monitoring programmes; Lensink et al. 2002). This provides an estimate of seabird numbers in flight per volume in different weather conditions; this is important when evaluating seabird numbers potentially in conflict with moving rotor-blades.
Training of observers, observer quality A presumably large, but often neglected source of variation is inter-observer differences (van der Meer & Camphuysen 1996). Observers on board must be competent. Specifically, they must be well-trained both in terms of their identification skills as well as in their capacity to deploy the required survey technique (especially to record navigational data and deploy the snapshot technique for flying birds), and observers must have good eye-sight and be able to withstand rough seas and overcome sea-sickness. To become a competent observer, several boat trips under contrasting situations are required, normally involving several weeks of fieldwork under the supervision of a very experienced observer. Within ESAS, observers from different teams (internationally) are encouraged to try to organise joint cruises to be able to compare their work directly and to detect differences in interpretation of the prescribed methodology. Employing only experienced observers and frequent training will solve part of the problem of individual variation, but this source of variation (negative bias mostly) will in all likelihood be greatly reduced (no specific studies have been carried out on this topic), by using more than one observer to watch the same transect. Therefore, as recommend earlier, two observers should be employed on each side of the ship.
Avoiding attraction by birds Vessels at sea attract seabirds, even if they do not provide food. As a default, attracted birds (normally defined as those remaining with the ship for more than 2 minutes) should be coded as such and kept out of the analysis of densities in an area. From commercial fishing vessels, sensible data on seabird distribution at sea cannot be obtained and working on fisheries research vessels is only feasible if fishing operations are wide apart and separated by prolonged sessions of full-speed steaming. It is strongly recommended not to use fishing vessels for offshore surveys that have accurate abundance estimates as a prime objective.
Additional data Ship-surveys provide unique opportunities to obtain additional data. Vessels equipped with an Aquaflow could record characteristics of the surface water, such as temperature, fluorescence (chlorophyll), and salinity simultaneously with the bird counts. Water depth (depth sounder) and the presence of fish (acoustic survey) are further sets of data that will enhance the understanding of area usage by marine birds.
Recommended methodology, ship-type, and observers Recommended census techniques for ship-based seabird surveys, as part of an EIA, are line-transects with sub-bands and with snap-shots for flying birds, and incorporating the full behaviour module recording detailed information on species, sex and age where feasible, foraging behaviour, flying height. Whenever possible, hydrographical data, such as sea surface temperature, salinity, water depth should be continuously and synoptically monitored. For a minimum set-up, the following techniques and qualifications are recommended.
- Line-transect methodology is recommended with a strip width of 300m maximum.
- Subdivision of survey bands to allow corrections for missed individuals at greater distances away from the observation platform (recommended subdivision for swimming birds: A= 0-50m, B= 50-100m, C=100- 200m, D= 200-300m, E= 300+m or outside transect; all distances perpendicular to the ship).
- No observations in sea state 5 or more to be used in data analysis for seabirds, data not usable for marine mammals above sea state 3.
- Survey time intervals are recommended to be 5 (1) min intervals (range 1-10m, longer time intervals are acceptable when less resolution of data is required), with mid-positions (Latitude, Longitude) to be recorded or calculated for each interval.
- Preferred ship's speed should be 10 knots (range 5-15 knots).
- Preferred ship type is a motor vessel with forward viewing height possibilities at 10m above sea level (range 5-25m), not being a commercial or frequently active fishing vessel.
- Preferred ship-size: stable platform, at least 20m total length, max. 100m total length
- Bird detection by naked eye as a default, except in areas with wintering divers Gaviidae. Scanning ahead with binoculars is necessary, for example to detect flushed divers.
- Two competent observers are required per observation platform equipped with range-finders (Heinemann 1981), GPS and data sheets; no immediate computerising of data during surveys to maximise attention on the actual detection, identification and recording.
- Observers should have adequate identification skills (i.e. all relevant scarce and common marine species well known, some knowledge of rarities, full understanding of plumages and moults).
- Observers must be trained by experienced offshore ornithologists under contrasting situations and in different seasons.
- A high resolution grid should be deployed, covering an area at least 6x the size of the proposed wind farm area, including at least 1-2 sized similar reference areas (same geographical, oceanographical characteristics), and preferably including nearby coastal waters (for nearshore wind farms only).
- Survey grid lines are recommended to be at least 0.5nm apart, maximum 2nm apart, and the grid should be surveyed such that time of day is equally distributed over the entire area (changing start and end time over the area to fully comprehend effects of diurnal rhythms in the area)
- The cost-effectiveness of the ship-based surveys are greatly enhanced if the vessel can be equipped with an Aquaflow (logging surface water characteristics including temperature, fluorescence (chlorophyll), and salinity logging hydrographical information simultaneously).
- The cost-effectiveness of the ship-based bird surveys can be greatly enhanced if combined with other surveys, such as those of marine mammals, for which a specialist observer and different methods will be required.
- The cost-effectiveness can be further enhanced by counting birds on both sides of the ship, i.e. cover two strips, for which additional observers will be required.
Conclusions In attempting to draw together the various conclusions relating to the effectiveness of ship-based surveys, and in particular the approaches presented here, it is important to reconsider the objectives set for the method. These are summarised in Table 1.
Explaining seabird distribution in ecological terms is not just a scientific interest, but is essential to understand seabird occurrences from census data, to explain the (natural) variability of the data collected, or even to predict (future) occurrences (Maurer 2002; Scott et al. 2002). Ships work more slowly than aircraft, and therefore spend longer at sea. Whilst this may seem a disadvantage at first glance, seagoing vessels may offer better possibilities to record natural variability issues, such as tidal and diurnal patterns in seabird abundance resulting from shifts and patterns in area usage. Directions of flight and the (ecologically relevant) behaviour of seabirds can be studied in considerable detail, while (foraging) associations with for example fisheries, marine mammals, and oceanographical phenomena can be logged in great detail. These data enhance the possibilities for an ecological interpretation of the material collected and, hence, will be essential to evaluate the area studied for migrants, residents, (nearby) breeding birds, and winter visitors.
The cumulative distribution of encounters of individuals of given species can provide inference on foraging areas, but without detailed investigations of prey distributions, foraging behaviour and the conditions enhancing the availability of prey to foraging seabirds, there will be no difference with for example results from aerial surveys. The great benefit of ship-based surveys is the potential to collect data on foraging conditions (water masses, presence of prey) simultaneously (oceanography, acoustic survey, fisheries data) or near-simultaneously (benthic sampling) with foraging seabirds. In addition and in general terms, the incorporation of environmental covariates into spatial and temporal models to generate bird density surfaces can provide insight into the factors affecting birds abundance and distribution. The possibility to exclude non-residents (migrants) or non-foraging seabirds from actively searching and feeding seabirds will strengthen the analysis and will help with the interpretation of results.
As a contribution in the evaluation of collision risks, ship-based survey protocols can be easily modified as to collect data on the height of flight under different conditions. A three dimensional pattern of seabird distribution and abundance will result. Still, static measuring devices (such as infra-red movement triggered video surveillance and vibration detection equipment currently under development) are needed to measure the impact of windfarms more directly.
Table 1. Overview of effectiveness of ship-based strip-transect surveys, distance sampling, spatial and temporal modelling techniques in relation to specific tasks set under the process of environmental impact assessment of offshore windfarm development.
| | Strip transects | Distance sampling (line-transect) | Spatial modelling | Temporal modelling | Other approaches needed | |--------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------------| | Seabird distribution | Good | Better | Best | Best | Validation (double platform or other) | | Seabird abundance | Good | Better | Best | Best | Validation (double platform or other) | | Migration routes | Reasonable | No improvement | Better | Better | Combine with data collected at coastal sites (seawatching) | | Migration flight direction | Good | No improvement | Better | Better | Foraging associations recorded, oceanographical data directly coupled 3D radar studies of flight trajectories before/during/post-construction Infra-red video; vibration detectors post-construction | | Seasonal migration | Good | No improvement | Better | Better | | | Weather effects | Reasonable | Better | Best | Best | | | Foraging areas | Best | No improvement | Best | Best | | | Factors affecting | Best | No improvement | Best | Best | | | distribution and | Best | No improvement | Best | Best | | | abundance, diurnal | Best | No improvement | Best | Best | | | patterns and tidal | Best | No improvement | Best | Best | | | influences | Best | No improvement | Best | Best | | | Prediction of collision | Information of height of flight collected | No improvement | No improvement | No improvement | | | risk | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | | | Assessment of collision | Good | Better | Best | Best | | | risk | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | | | Assessment of disturbance and habitat loss | Good | Better | Best | Best | | Aerial seabird surveys
One of the objectives is to achieve the mapping of bird density distributions at the highest possible spatial precision, without causing disturbance to the underlying pattern of distribution, and while using analytical techniques that derive workable precision estimates about density estimates. The techniques reviewed, presented and recommended in Komdeur et al. (1992) were developed for the general description of bird numbers and distribution in offshore waters on a macro scale. This type of approach was used with success to analyse numbers and distribution at flyway, regional and national scales (such as those presented by Durink et al. 1994, Pihl & Laursen 1996, Laursen et al. 1997). However, these methods were never developed to generate fine scale density estimates of smaller areas of open sea, nor were the data they generated of a form that could support the use of analytical tools that would enable statistical comparisons of time series. Such analysis is fundamental, for example, in a situation where it is necessary to compare before, during and after seabird distributions during the construction of an offshore windmill park. This chapter concentrates upon the rationale behind the adoption of best-practice aerial survey techniques, with reference where appropriate to other techniques.
This part of the desk study is less of a review of aerial surveys than a justification of the methods adopted by the National Environmental Research Institute (NERI) in Denmark, simply because of the scarcity of information relating to different techniques. Wherever possible, some justification for the methods adopted are offered where there are appropriate experiences in the literature, but all too often there is little published to offer guidance on the best techniques available.
Transect bands
Experience suggests that assigning sample unit observations to one of three transect bands in the time available to process and record the information seems to be as much as can be dealt with under normal circumstances. Subdivision into further bands does provide benefits, especially with regard to generating density estimates for distance sampling. However, it is recommended that any further subdivision of bands is done on the basis of distances which equate to declination angle units of 5° or 10° apart to greatly aid the speed involved in checking distances using the inclinometer. It is also essential that any such further subdivision is carefully considered and subject to trials in the field, given that it must still be possible to assign all observations to these bands even at greatest rates of encounter. It is suggested that transect bands are identified by alphabetic codes to avoid confusion with flock numbers or registrations of time intervals.
Using the NERI system and the Partenavia P-68 observer aircraft (see below), transect bands A, B and C (defined below) are covered on both sides of the aircraft. Use of the inclinometer, to measure vertical declination from the horizontal (i.e. 0°) is encouraged at all times, to enable the observer to confirm the correct categorisation of birds or flocks in the correct transect bands. This method has been found to be better than using tape or striations on the bubble windows of survey aircraft or other methods such as wire tracers mounted externally (e.g. on wing struts see Figure 7.9 on p.261 of Buckland et al. 2001). The latter techniques necessitate flying without roll or yaw and protracted periods where the observers do not move their head relative to the markers. All data gathering assumes that there is a “dead angle” underneath the aircraft that the seated observers cannot cover, here considered to be an angle greater than 60° from the horizontal. Given a normal flight altitude of 250 feet (80m), the transect bands are defined as follows:
| Band | Boundary distances (in m.) perpendicular out from track line | Declination in degrees from the horizontal | |------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | A | 44-163 | 60-25 | | B | 164-432 | 25-10 | | C | 433-1000 | 10-4 |
Time is read from the watch, which is preferably attached to the window of the plane in an appropriate position to allow the observer unhindered access to read the time whenever necessary. It is only necessary to record minutes and seconds, recording the hour only when changing from one to the next. It is, of course, essential that the stopwatches be synchronised with the GPS used. Time should be recorded as often as practically possible. It may become necessary to pool more than one observation of birds under the same time record. The guiding principal should be that the more frequent the time recordings are, the greater the accuracy obtained in the final analysis.
The position assigned to each observation is made under the assumption that the time is recorded at the precise moment the observation passes abeam of the aircraft on the transect strip. This is normally the case, but if for reasons of observation density, recordings are made where this assumption is not met, and birds are recorded at times after the point of encounter, this fact should be noted on the tape.
Choice of airframe
One major prerequisite for the suitability of a particular aerial platform is that the aircraft flies at a speed slow enough to enable the onboard observers to count and identify birds over the widest area possible. In general terms, this means normal operational flying speeds of 250 km h⁻¹, and preferably less. With their ability to fly slower, helicopters offer the opportunity to fly transects at a greater range of speeds than fixed wing platforms. Whilst the cruising speed for most small helicopters at sea level is around 200 km h(^{-1}) (e.g. 230 km h(^{-1}) for an Aerospatiale SA 330 Puma, 200 km h(^{-1}) for a Bell 212, and 167 km h(^{-1}) for an Aerospatiale SA 318 C Alouette-Astazou), operational direct line flight speeds can be reduced yet further without compromise to safety. Unfortunately, a second major prerequisite on the method of data collection is the major assumption of many aerial survey methods is that birds are first detected by the observer in a distribution that is undisturbed. Helicopters are associated with intense noise, both high and low frequency, which is detectable at long distance and tends to be highly disruptive to waterfowl generally (Miller 1991, Mosbech & Glauder 1991, Holm 1997). Although habituation is known to occur under certain circumstances (Kahlert et al 1996, Holm 1997), this is unlikely to occur in the case of occasional surveys over large areas of marine waters. This disturbance of the detected distribution from the “natural” distribution creates considerable difficulties for the accuracy and precision of population estimates. Although attempts have been made to correct for the overestimation in numbers that invariably results, in practice, it is extremely difficult to calibrate for the disruption caused by the aircraft (e.g. Linklater & Cameron 2002).
Microlight aircraft also offer low survey speeds for wildlife surveys (e.g. Murn et al. 2002), but the combination of low speed and noise is also highly disruptive, the platform lacks necessary endurance and the associated safety hazards of operations at sea rule this out with regard to aerial survey for offshore wind farm developments. Safety and aircraft endurance is also a constraint on airframe – although a Piper Cub has a potential cruising speed of 110 km h(^{-1}), normal fuel tanks and loading only offer an endurance of 4 hours. This greatly restricts operations and the safety margin, especially with regard to diversions in the case of engine or other mechanical failure. The same restrictions apply to most single-engine aircraft, and flight safety rules in Europe effectively restrict operations in the offshore zone to twin-engine aeroplanes. For this reason, surveys in most western European countries have increasingly been carried out using twin-engine aircraft, most commonly high-wing aircraft that ensures best all round visibility for observers. Extensive experience has been obtained in Denmark in seabird surveys conducted from a high winged, twin-engine Partenavia P-68 Observer, designed for general reconnaissance purposes. Although other aircraft would undoubtedly be suitable for the purpose, the bubble windows in the side of this aircraft and the Plexiglas nose of this particular type make this aircraft eminently suitable for the task of aerial survey (see Figure 1). JNCC has been using a normal Partenavia P-68 (e.g. Dean et al. 2003) around the UK.
Figure 1. Partenavia P-68 Observer aircraft. Note the plexiglass nose for pilot and front seat observer, and bubble windows on both sides of the aircraft in the rear passenger panels (see on open door to right). Survey flight speed and altitude
The question of the appropriate flight speed and altitude is an intractable one to some extent, representing as it does a compromise between competing requirements placed on sampling. Flight speed is set to some degree by the nature of the aircraft, which is in turn determined by factors other than survey protocol (e.g. safety and endurance). Extensive previous experience with aerial survey, aircraft availability, high wing design, bubble and Plexiglas windows all confirmed the Partenavia as the natural choice for this work in Danish waters, but other factors may conspire in favour of other aircraft under other conditions. Optimal speed is a trade off between visibility and the time needed for adequate observation and rapid passage over birds sitting on the sea. Whilst there is therefore no good reason for flight speed to be set at 185 km h(^{-1}), subsequent experience has shown this to be a suitable level in terms of operational expediency and the ability of observers to record observations in good time.
Following the results of test flights in the Kattegat in August 1999, flight altitude during surveys was standardised at 80m at a cruising speed of 185km h(^{-1}) (Kahlert et al. 2000). This enables rapid approach to birds sitting on the sea, causing minimal disturbance, since the aircraft is over and to some extent beyond birds sitting on the sea before many react. Flying similar tracklines with the same aircraft at 150m dispersed birds at up to 2 km distance ahead of the plane, especially displacing birds into flight along the transect line. Since a fundamental assumption of the distance sampling technique is that birds are detected before or at the moment they react to the approaching plane, this makes 80m much more suitable than higher altitudes above the water surface for counting seabirds. There is no doubt that the optimal flight height is likely to vary with species and it is unlikely that there is a perfect combination of flight speed and altitude that offers best opportunities to survey all seabird species, but the experience of several years now is that this platform is as good as any alternative. There is no doubt that this issue would merit further experimentation to verify the best possible techniques, but it is important to maintain survey conditions as constant as possible under the circumstances. In reality, the use of distance sampling offers a robust method for estimation of bird densities, such that even if very small proportions of the numbers of a particular species present are detected (but critically including all on the trackline), the “loss” of observations resulting from flying “too” fast makes little difference to the precision of the estimates generated.
Data collection and observer training
During surveys, two observers, one covering each side of the aircraft, record all observations continuously on dictaphone, giving information on species, number, behaviour, transect band and time. Concentration needs to be maintained over extended periods of flying, and observers need to be able to maintain vigilance and avoid becoming drowsy. Prior to a survey, new observers must be introduced to technical equipment such as GPS, the PCs and the software used, dictaphones, inclinometers, stopwatches, etc and become proficient with their use, so that reactions become automatic. All observers require training in the recording routines, and new observers will need easy access to a graphic copy of recording protocol during flight, covering the methods for recording birds as well as human activities and environmental variables. There is no time during data collection for discussions about how to handle data or undertake unfamiliar tasks. Species identification of birds from an aircraft is a skill unfamiliar to most ornithologists and can take some time to acquire. Although observers must naturally have a good basic ornithological experience, particularly with coastal waterbirds, even the best observers need some guidance with specific identification difficulties involved with the unfamiliar experience of birds viewed from above.
Estimating the numbers of individuals in flocks is a challenge that many observers will be familiar with beforehand. However, these skills need honing in situations where flocks are viewed from above, often under unfavourable viewing conditions. Computer count simulation programmes can greatly assist observers to check their ability to estimate flock size. After each survey, the performance of inexperienced observers needs to be assessed. Species identification is one particular issue that should be checked against the other observations on track, but also an observer’s ability to designate observations in the correct transect bands, using the inclinometer to check judged distances, should be evaluated. New observers must be taken along on a survey with the sole aim of training and getting used to count conditions. Komdeur et al. 1992 suggested that it takes 150–200 hours of flying to become proficient in using aerial survey methods. We suggest this is unnecessarily demanding to be set as a standard for new aerial surveyors and suggest a minimum of 30 hours flying time, depending on individual skills, would be sufficient for most observers, accompanied and assessed by an experienced, qualified surveyor.
Spatial precision and recording protocols
The objective is to gain the maximum possible precision in recording the position of birds or groups of birds in the open sea. This is achieved using a Global Positioning System (GPS), recording the precise position of the counting observers if necessary every second. This enables the establishment of a relationship between bird observations and a time sequence, which can then be used to relate a single observation to a precise position in time and space. Pre-planned transect end points may be entered into the aircraft GPS as waypoints used in the navigation of the aircraft along the transect tracks.
Birds are assigned to three transect bands each side of the aircraft by use of an inclinometer, used to determine angles below the horizon, measured abeam from the flight direction of the aircraft. Beneath the Partenavia P-68 observer aircraft, a band 44 m wide on either side of the flight track cannot be seen by seated observers and should therefore be excluded from analysis. For other planes, this dead angle needs to be carefully assessed. Bird observations are assigned to transect bands based upon their distance from the track line beneath the plane and for the Partenavia P-68 observer aircraft as: 44-163 m (band A), 164-432 m (band B) and 433-1000 m (band C). To be able to incorporate differential detectability in the analysis of results from aerial surveys, the response of observed birds to the aircraft were assigned to the categories: sitting (on the water), diving, flushing or flying.
During aerial surveys, a computer logs latitude, longitude and time from a GPS (preferably differential GPS) at five-second intervals. The accuracy of GPS longitude and latitudinal must be about 10 metres. After the completion of a survey, tables of observation/count data and flight track data have to be created from the transcription of the dictaphone tapes. In situations where high densities of birds are encountered, some observations may have a common time reference. Grouping of observations should not extend over a period of more than 10 seconds, to keep overall positional accuracy within c. 250m of actual, but could potentially in cases of grouped observations, for 10 seconds extend to 500m.
Data format Throughout survey flights, all observations should be recorded onto a dictaphone tape. Each tape could start with information on type and call sign of aircraft, survey area identifier, date, observers, etc. for future reference. General details of the weather conditions, visibility, sea state should be reported onto tapes and then modified as often as this changes after the initial definition. The start of the flight along each transect line should be identified by recording the precise time at which each waypoint was passed, followed by the records of birds along its length, concluding with time at which the aircraft completed the transect. Any changes in observation conditions should be recorded between transects. Ideally, every observation record should contain the following data: species, numbers, response behaviour (i.e. in flight, flushed, swimming or diving), transect band, and time to the nearest second.
Species All waterbirds should be recorded and in cases where identification to species is not possible they should be recorded to the best level of accurate identification, i.e. “small gull”, “small diver”, “auk”, etc. Under this general heading, all human activities in offshore waters should be recorded as well. These observations may contribute to the patterns of observed bird distributions, and therefore offer a simple, but often effective variable that contributes to modelling avian distribution patterns. These observations could include static features, such as gill net markers, gas platforms, etc., which are indicators of human activity as well as more conventional moving vessels such as fishing boats, ships, ferries, wind-surfers, etc. Observations of marine mammals should be recorded too, preferably with a measure of the vertical angle to the animal abeam of the track line. However, all ancillary observations and records of this nature should only be recorded if there is no cost to the accuracy or precision of recording the primary species for which the survey was designed.
The unit sampled is either a single bird or a group of birds, insofar as all other information relates to this sample unit. In situations where a small discrete group of birds straddles one or more transect bands (see below) observations should be assigned to the transect band in which the mid-point of the flock is situated. In the case of species such as eider and common scoter, large aggregations of birds may occur over extensive areas with no discernible flock structure (as viewed from the point of view of the observer in the aircraft). In this case, the flock should be separated and assigned into the three transect bands as if they were separate sample units (even though they may represent members of one flock "unit" when seen at a greater spatial scale). As far as possible, observations should not be amalgamated into larger units before they are recorded on the Dictaphone, since it is important to try as far as possible to retain the most fine-grained spatial scale when recording each sample unit.
It is inevitable that the survey aircraft will displace some birds. Furthermore, the response of individual birds to the aircraft has a considerable effect on the detectability of the individual. Since distance sampling makes the assumption that birds are undisturbed at the point at which they are first detected, it is important that if the need arises, it is possible to carry out analysis on data that exclude, for example, birds flushed or flying. For this reason, all records of birds should have information on response behaviour, and under the normal protocol, four different responses are recognised and recorded: sitting, diving, flushing, and flying. In order to maintain the rhythm of observations, it is essential that these behaviours are recorded for every observation. When transcribed, these behaviours are converted to a numeric code for analysis (see below).
Constraints on counting conditions Survey results are highly sensitive to weather conditions. Surveys should not start when wind speed exceeds 6 m/s when detectability of birds is severely reduced. High wind speeds create greater sea surface featuring (e.g. white wave tops, greater shadowing), which means that observers are more likely to fail to see birds than under more optimal conditions. This becomes critical for the survey when observers are unable to detect all birds in the closest transect band to the aircraft. At regular intervals (and at least at the start of every transect line) sea state and an assessment of light conditions (glare) should be recorded. Additional recordings should be made whenever conditions change along the transect line. All recordings should be followed by a time recorded from the watch.
Sea state describes the sea surface conditions from mirror calm (0 Bft), through tiny ripples (1), small waves (2; no whitecaps), small waves (3; with few whitecaps), moderate waves (4; numerous whitecaps), larger waves with whitecaps forming bands (5), and large waves with dominant whitecaps forming broad bands (6). At sea states above 3, there is no point in undertaking surveys, the data quality will be poor. Glare is recorded as the angle of the sun to the flight direction, with a subjective assessment of intensity (i.e. low, moderate or high). The times at which encountered bouts of precipitation started and stopped should also be recorded, as these may impede visibility.
Observers should also record the times when land (including sand and mud exposed at low tide) is encountered within the transect bands (start and stop times).
**Current methods of data presentation and analysis**
The objective with current research programmes at NERI is to develop spatial modelling tools that enable the construction of continuous density estimate surfaces for single bird species over large areas of shallow sea. These surfaces will be of a suitable geographical resolution that enables a comparison of densities present before, during and after the construction of a windmill farm in the study area. Specifically, differences in the density estimates generated will (in combination with associated statistical precision) enable the calculation of the avoidance effect, not just within the confines, but also around the periphery of the wind farm to the distance dictated by the behavioural responses of the species concerned.
However, until these techniques are fully available, it is difficult to convert the aerial counts into estimates of bird density in any sub-sections of the study area, because of the detection probability functions associated with the counts at the time of the flights. For this reason, and because different sea areas are covered in different survey flights, to date, bird numbers have been presented in the form of birds encountered per unit km surveyed, or as total numbers encountered during a survey (see for example Kahlert et al. 2000). The high level precision achieved with the positions of all observations gives confidence in using this sample of actual observations to be used to interpret the overall distribution of birds in the general area. In particular, the encounter rate (i.e. the numbers of birds counted per unit length of transect effort) offers a robust interim measure of the relative densities of birds and their distribution throughout a count area.
**Potential future developments**
**Double Platform**
Further development along a number of lines of enquiry could be continued, particularly with respect to estimating detection probability using the methods of Borchers et al. (1998). The double-platform analysis methods can allow effective strip width to be estimated as a function of any number of covariates without the traditional line-transect assumption that all organisms in the observers’ path are detected. There remains much scope for further development of such techniques to look in depth at factors affecting effective strip width. While glare from the sun and sea states can greatly affect visibility and have a dramatic effect on effective strip width, an effort to quantify this important variable has to be made, for example by analysing the results with the sun intensity and sea state as quoted in categories during the surveys. Using the GIS platform we can calculate the angle between the individual observer’s core search angle relative to the angle of the sun, and thus get a value of the search condition in the transect bands.
**Spatial modelling**
Great advances have been made in developing statistical techniques that permit seabird density to be modelled as smooth functions of space, time and other variables, using the data gathered continuously along transect lines. The first phase has involved the identification of areas of consistently high seabird density, but the next challenge is to incorporate a temporal element to determine whether such patches of high density persist over time, i.e. incorporating inter- and intra-annual (i.e. inter-seasonal) effects into the modelled distributions. Further development should incorporate human activity as a source of deviance in the model from distributions predicted by the environmental covariates.
**Recommended methodology, airframe characteristics, and observers**
For a minimum set-up, the following techniques and qualifications are recommended.
- Twin-engine aircraft (for safety and endurance)
- High-wing aircraft with excellent all round visibility for observers (e.g. twin-engine Partenavia P-68)
- Line-transect methodology is recommended with sub-bands.
- Transects should be a minimum of 2 km apart to avoid double-counting whilst allowing the densest coverage feasible
- Flight speed preferably 185 km h(^{-1}) at 80 m altitude
- Subdivision of survey bands to allow calculations of detection probabilities (recommended are 44-163m, 164-432m, 433-1000m, with a declination in degrees from the horizon being 60-25°, 25-10°, and 10-4° respectively for the Partenavia P-68 at 80m)
- Use of an inclinometer to measure declination from the horizon
- Two trained observers, one covering each side of the aircraft, with all observations recorded continuously on dictaphone GPS positions are recorded at least every 5 seconds (computer logs flight track)
The time of each bird sighting should be recorded, ideally to the nearest second, but within 10 seconds accuracy, using a watch attached to the window of the plane.
No observations in sea states above 3 (small waves with few whitecaps)
All waterbirds should be recorded to the best level of identification (species or group)
Sampling units are single birds or groups of birds within the three transect bands
Conclusion
In attempting to draw together the various conclusions relating to the effectiveness of aerial surveys, and in particular the approaches presented here, it is important to reconsider the objectives set for the method. These are summarised for convenience in Table 2.
Advantages/disadvantages of using an aircraft as a platform for bird surveys in open offshore areas can be summarised under different headings. The speed of aircraft guarantees a rapid, simultaneous coverage of large areas, to provide a snapshot of distribution and density. A disadvantage of this is that due to short observation time there will be identification problems, reduced count accuracy, and loss of species. In addition, there is little time for supplementary observations (sex, age, behaviour, etc.). With the flying height of aircraft, a good perspective over an extensive area is provided, and an extended detectability gradient. The downside is that there is no additional information on biological, hydrographic or other environmental parameters collected simultaneously, although GPS registrations enable subsequent analysis of bird distributions in relation to such parameters obtained by other methods. The use of skilled observers and constant methods are essential for reliable data collection, just as with ship-based surveys, and so require trained, competent observers and suitable aircraft. In stable weather conditions, aerial surveys can rapidly cover huge areas. Surveys are highly weather dependent (high cloud, good visibility) and extended bad weather is highly disruptive. An advantage of the use of aircraft is that a switch between different study areas in event of poor weather in one or other can be made with relative ease. Aircraft are relatively cheap per unit area covered, but expensive overall if extensive coverage is required.
Aircraft are able to survey for most seabird species without causing excessive disturbance, at least prior to the arrival of the aircraft. This is not the case for ships which may disturb red-throated divers and common scoters at considerable distance ahead of the vessel, necessitating extensive use of binoculars to permit detection and some compromise of the survey methods.
The acquisition of information about migration routes, direction or height of flight, detailed spatial and temporal distribution require intensive radar and direct observation in the vicinity of a proposed wind farm development to determine bird use of the area and to predict collision impact probabilities under a range of differing temporal (day/night) and weather conditions. Similarly, assessment of actual collision risk and collisions after construction necessitates static measuring devices (such as infra-red movement triggered video surveillance and vibration detection equipment currently under development). Aerial platforms are not, therefore, appropriate for these aspects of wind farm EIA.
The cumulative distribution of encounters of individuals of given species can provide inference on foraging areas, but without detailed investigations of prey distributions and availability to foraging seabirds, the technique requires more detailed studies to confirm predator-prey interactions. Similarly, in general terms, the incorporation of environmental covariates into spatial and temporal models to generate bird density surfaces can improve model output and give insight into the factors affecting birds abundance and distribution, but it requires detailed ecological investigations to determine ultimate factors affecting bird distributions.
Aircraft offer great possibilities for adequate surveys in shallow areas or in waters with subsurface reefs and sandbanks, where seagoing research vessels are hindered or have no access at all. Aerial surveys are essentially very fast (high speed) and therefore relatively cheap, compared to ship-surveys, for covering relatively large sea areas.
Table 2. Overview of effectiveness of aerial transect methods, distance sampling, spatial and temporal modelling techniques in relation to specific tasks set under the process of environmental impact assessment of offshore windfarm development.
| Seabird distribution | Aerial transects | Distance sampling | Spatial modelling | Temporal modelling | Other approaches needed | |----------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------| | Good | Better | Best | Best | Validation (double platform or other) | | Seabird abundance | Good | Better | Best | Validation (double platform or other) | | Migration routes | Poor | No improvement | No improvement | 3D Radar | | Migration flight direction | Aerial transects | Distance sampling | Spatial modelling | Temporal modelling | Other approaches needed | |---------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------------| | Poor | No improvement | No improvement | No improvement | No improvement | 3D Radar | | Poor | No improvement | No improvement | No improvement | No improvement | 3D Radar | | Reasonable | Better | Better | Best | Best | 3D Radar | | Reasonable | Better | Better | Best | Best | 3D Radar | | Reasonable in conjunction with other data | Better | Better | Better | Better | Extensive research linking food availability and predation risk (including disturbance) |
| Weather effects | Aerial transects | Distance sampling | Spatial modelling | Temporal modelling | Other approaches needed | |-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------------| | Reasonable | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | 3D radar studies of flight trajectories before/during/post-construction | | Reasonable | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | Infra-red video; vibration detectors post-construction |
| Factors affecting distribution and abundance, diurnal patterns and tidal influences | Aerial transects | Distance sampling | Spatial modelling | Temporal modelling | Other approaches needed | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------------| | Reasonable in conjunction with other data | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | 3D radar studies of flight trajectories before/during/post-construction |
| Prediction of collision risk | Aerial transects | Distance sampling | Spatial modelling | Temporal modelling | Other approaches needed | |------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------------| | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | 3D radar studies of flight trajectories before/during/post-construction |
| Assessment of collision risk | Aerial transects | Distance sampling | Spatial modelling | Temporal modelling | Other approaches needed | |------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------------| | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | No contribution | 3D radar studies of flight trajectories before/during/post-construction |
| Assessment of disturbance and habitat loss | Aerial transects | Distance sampling | Spatial modelling | Temporal modelling | Other approaches needed | |-------------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------------| | Good | Better | Best | Best | Best | Infra-red video; vibration detectors post-construction |
*Northern Gannet in flight, Wee Bankie area, summer 2003 (CJ Camphuysen)* Transect sampling design
Systematically arranged parallel transect lines There are considerable advantages to the systematic coverage of open water habitats. Such featureless open water is naturally characterised by a range of physical and environmental factors that are likely to influence the abundance and distribution of the birds, but about which little can be inferred from the surface without taking measurements. A sampling approach that covers large areas of such habitat could be constructed on a random basis, but this process often results in clumping of transect lines which may actually bias the data collection. Preferentially, the sampling design should comprise a grid of systematically spaced line transects, randomly placed within the study area. Such a series of parallel lines has logistic advantages, in the sense that the ends of each transect can be entered into the GPS as a series of waypoints, travelled (sailed or flown) in succession across the study area, with relatively short turning and transit between the end of successive lines.
Grid orientation The most statistically efficient study design is a set of line transects running perpendicular to major environmental axes. In the case of survey for coastal seabirds, which tend to sort themselves according to food availability and water depth, the dominant environmental gradients are those running perpendicular to the shore (i.e. increasing depth out to sea). For this reason, it usually makes sense to plan the transects to run to and from the coastline out into deeper water. Using a set of line transects parallel to the coast may result in considerable sampling bias (contra: Baptist & Wolf 1991; 1993). However, in areas where deep estuarine channels extend out from the coast, the most significant environmental gradients may not be oriented parallel to the coast. Careful planning of transects is necessary, using charts and other suitable information sources, in order to reduce variance between transects.
Transect intervals In any analysis, such as distance sampling, the sampling unit is a single transect, not individual observations. Hence, there should be enough transects in each study area to generate confident estimates of numbers. Although it is impossible to define “how many is enough” without an extensive pilot study, ideally there should be around 20 transects in each separate study area. The other constraint upon line transect spacing is the distance to which seabirds are displaced, and hence the extent to which substantial double counting could occur. It is assumed that transects at less than 1 km intervals will run a high risk of double counting, while intervals of 2 and 3 km will reduce this risk.
Diurnal variation Diurnal patterns in seabird behaviour (e.g. foraging activity, tendency to roost, migration intensity) are prominent in most species, with important consequences for spatial patterns measured in relatively small areas. Transects should therefore be sampled such that peak occurrences are unlikely to be missed and this requires site-specific reviews of existing knowledge and a design of transects flown or sailed that doesn’t just include the most suitable time of day for researchers, ship’s crews and pilots, but does take diurnal patterns in the study objects (seabirds at sea) into account. Seabird behaviour
The behaviour of seabirds, where properly understood, gives vital information on the use that the animals make of the area surveyed. Foraging, feeding, and roosting or resting seabirds utilise an area in a radically different way than passage migrants and distribution patterns can be explained in terms of area utilisation based on behaviour aspects rather than on plain densities. Behaviour can only be observed from rather slow-moving observation platforms such as ships, while aerial surveys are not expected to produce significant results. A comprehensive protocol for behaviour recording and subsequent computer coding has been adopted by ESAS in recent years (Camphuysen & Garthe 2001). Annex 1 lists the codes currently in use by NIOZ; for a full description of the rationale and an explanation of the codes see the publication mentioned at:
http://wwwold.nioz.nl/en/deps/mee/projects/impress/publications.htm
The behaviour recording protocol is implemented without actually changing the core ship-based survey methods, so that historical data (abundance and distribution) can still be combined or compared with more recent surveys.
Actively foraging Northern Gannets, North Sea, summer 2003 (photo C.J. Camphuysen) Conclusions
Using spatial and temporal modelling techniques to estimate bird density over certain areas of open sea offers the best method for statistically detecting differences in the distribution and abundance of these birds before, during and post-construction of offshore wind farms. The advantage of using distance sampling to estimate bird densities based on bird surveys in open offshore areas is that it is a reasonably simple method which enables an estimation of bird densities incorporating covariates (such as light conditions, sea state, observers) in detection probabilities, with high precision and with confidence intervals to permit comparisons. The use of distance sampling and spatial modelling enables the use of environmental covariates to generate population estimates with greatly improved precision. Hence, the method is also robust as a means of deriving factors explaining seabird distribution and abundance. When the line-transect methods are deployed as described in this document, both aerial and ship-based surveys provide the data required. The main differences between aerial and ship-based surveys are:
1. Accuracy for species identification (lower with aerial surveys, higher with ship-based surveys)
2. Time needed to survey large area (shorter with aircraft, longer with ship-based surveys)
3. Access to shallow sea areas (potentially unlimited for aircraft, restricted for vessels)
4. Disturbance of some inshore species, such as Red-throated Divers and Common Scoter (less with aerial surveys, higher with ship-based surveys).
Consequent and accurate recordings of flight directions, height and flocking behaviour will provide insight to migratory pathways and for example colony movements associated with colony location. This is feasible only from ships. It should be realised that the precise mapping of migratory pathways will require considerable amounts of data, and that a more prolonged stay within the study area will result in more robust data. Consequent and accurate recordings of bird behaviour will provide essential insight in the ways of utilisation of an area by the respective species (e.g. as a feeding ground, as a stop-over during migration, as a roosting site, on transit only) and this is important information before, during and post-construction of offshore wind farms.
Delegates at the COWRIE workshop, held in Aberdeen, November 2003, were asked to compare the strengths and weaknesses of aerial and ship-based surveys, for application in offshore wind farm EIAs. It was agreed that, having reached some agreement on the recommended methodologies to be employed for both platforms, there was little point in comparing the accuracy of the two approaches. The meeting was in agreement that the use of the two platforms was complementary, in so far as ship- and aerial-based counts fulfilled different objectives. Hence, these were not an “either-or” option, but rather tools to be used to obtain different forms of data to inform the EIA process. For this reason it was agreed that a matrix was to be produced which attempts to develop further the simple strengths and weaknesses associated with each method provided in the main document (see above). In this matrix, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the recommended boat and aircraft count platforms has been summarised to achieve specific objectives likely to arise from the needs of EIAs.
The first tier of EIA necessitates collation of year-round baseline information for the proposed wind farm area and a larger contextual area, such as the UK strategic areas for wind energy development, (e.g. literature search, preliminary exploration of existing ESAS and seawatching data, evaluation of colony information and waterfowl censuses in the area), and baseline aerial and/or ship-based surveys, to determine spatial and temporal occurrence of birds in the area. Ideally, the baseline data will inform the next stage of the EIA process and the objectives of any further investigation. For example, surveys may identify offshore concentrations of terns, but explain nothing of the breeding colonies from which they originate. Such information requires a deeper level of investigation, at which point it becomes necessary to evaluate the two different platforms in order to fully assess their relative suitability to meet the specific goals of the more detailed investigations.
Rather than offer a set of prescriptions, or a decision tree, it was decided to provide a tabulation of the relative ability of aerial or ship-based counts to meet certain objectives likely to arise in an EIA. In Table 3, we list as many survey and/or monitoring objectives arising from EIA casework as we have been able to accumulate from our present experience. Table 3 aims to provide a clear objective, with an associated score (ranging from * for survey platform fulfils the objective to a limited degree, to \*\*\* for the best ability to fulfil the objective. These scores are based, where possible, on published sources and demonstrated ability of either platform to provide the necessary information. Footnotes have been provided as appropriate where clarifications or caveats are required for each objective. Table 3. Survey and/or monitoring objectives arising from Environmental Impact Assessment casework and the suitability of aircraft or ships for offshore surveys.
| SURVEY/MONITORING OBJECTIVE | AIRCRAFT | SHIP | |-----------------------------|----------|------| | **1. Physical features relating to survey area** | | | | Cover complex, low coastlines, skerries | \*\*\* | * | | Cover shallow water | \*\*\* | \*1 | | Survey extensive areas of open water | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | | Survey restricted areas of open water | \*2 | \*\*\* | | Survey distant offshore waters | * | \*\*\*3 | | **2. Complementary data, other than bird abundance and distribution** | | | | Achieve instantaneous gathering of complimentary oceanographic data (e.g. temperature, salinity profiles, fish distributions, etc.) during bird surveys | \*\* | \*\*\*5 | | Define seabird flight lines (e.g. commuter routes between colonies and feeding grounds) | * | \*\* | | Describe migration routes/pathways | * | \*\*7 | | Age/sex determination | * | \*\*\* | | Behavioural observations (Annex 2) | \*6 | \*\*\* | | Describe diurnal, tidal and other ephemeral patterns in bird distributions | * | \*\*\*8 | | Describe feeding patterns | * | \*\*\* | | Define foraging areas | * | \*\*\* | | **3. Logistic and other constraints** | | | | Avoid time/tide constraints | \*\* | * | | Intensive coverage of small areas | *2 | \*\*\* | | Simultaneous coverage over large areas | \*\*\* | * | | Ability to take advantage of short spell of good weather conditions | \*\* | * | | **4. Species surveys – distribution and abundance (demonstrated ability; published sources)** | | | | Survey diver abundance (Gavia spp.) | \*\*\* | \*\* | | Survey grebe abundance (Podiceps spp.) | \*\* | \*\* | | Survey Fulmar | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | | Survey shearwaters | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | | Survey storm-petrels | * | \*\*\* | | Survey Gannet | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | | Survey seaduck | \*\*\* | * | | Survey gulls | \*\*\* | * | | Survey auks | \*\* | \*\*\* | | Migrant species of other groups | \*\* | \*\*\* | | **5. Species groupings – identification to species (* = most unidentified, \*\*\* = nearly 100% identified)** | | | | Identify divers to species | \*\* | \*\*\* | | Identify grebes to species | * | \*\*\* | | Identify auks to species | * | \*\*\* | | Differentiate Velvet Scoter and Common Scoter | \*\* | \*\*\* | | Differentiate Lesser-black-backed and Great Black-backed Gulls | * | \*\*\* | | Differentiate Herring and Common Gulls | \*\* | \*\*\* | | **6. Other subjects relating to contributions to EIA** | | | | Evaluation of collision risk | 9 | 9 | | Predicting collision risk | 9 | 9 |
1 In waters less than 5-10 m, vessel draft can restrict access of boats, so special, flat-bottomed vessels may be required 2 Aircraft less suitable on grounds of cost-benefit 3 Less efficient for extensive areas and long transit movement 4 Only using modelled or remotely sensed data 5 Assuming suitable on-board equipment and expertise 6 Only at the level of flying/diving/swimming/flushing 7 Radar techniques more appropriate than either platform 8 Still requires radar or infra-red/light intensifier equipment to gather night time data (radar could be implemented on ship if stabilised) 9 Neither platform offers any basis for recording collisions and population damage resulting from this, both identify some of the species most prevalent (and therefore most at risk) in the immediate area, a flying height recording protocol on board vessels will provide information on birds that are particularly sensitive. Acknowledgements
This project has benefited from the critical input of a large number of people and we wish to acknowledge them all. Joining our discussions in the Aberdeen workshop were: Alex Banks (BTO), Colin Barton (Cork Ecology), Jenny Bell (Central Science Laboratory), Phil Bloor (DTW Oil and Gas Office), Charlotte Boesen (ENERGI E2 (DK)), David Borchers (St Andrews University), Kees Camphuysen (Royal NIOZ (NL)), Caoimhe Cawley (Coveney Wildlife Consulting Ltd.), Andrew Clarke (Ocean Marine Research Limited), John Coveney (Coveney Wildlife Consulting Ltd.), Anne Marie Coyle (Powergen), Peter Cranswick (WWT), Ben Dean (JNCC), Ansgar Diederichs (BioConsult SH (FRG)), Allan Drewitt (Independent consultant), Tony Fox (NERI (DK)), Jette Gaarde (Elsam Engineering (DK)), Mick Green (Ocean Marine Research Limited), Colette Hall (WWT), Carolyn Heeps (Crown Estate), Mike Kaiser (School of Ocean Sciences), Rowena Langston (RSPB), Genevieve Leaper (Independent consultant), Rick Lockwood (Ocean Marine Research Limited), Lucas Mander (Institute of Estuarine and Coastal Studies IECs), Steve Percival (Ecology Consulting), Ib Crag Petersen (NERI (DK)), Werner Piper (BIOLA (FRG)), Claire Pollock (Cork Ecology), Jim Reid (JNCC), Garry Riddoch (Environmentally Sustainable Systems), David Sales (Environmentally Sustainable Systems), David Simmons (Department Of Trade and Industry), Lucy Smith (WWT), Mark L. Tasker (JNCC), Dieter Todeskino (IBL Umweltplanung), Sian Whitehead (Cyngor Cefn Gwlad Cymru), and M.J.M. Poot, S. Dirksen & R. Lensink (Bureau Waardenburg). Written comments have been received from Paul Gill and D.I. Sales (Environmentally Sustainable Systems), Dieter Todeskino (IBL Umweltplanung), Sian Whitehead (Cyngor Cefn Gwlad Cymru), and M.J.M. Poot, S. Dirksen & R. Lensink (Bureau Waardenburg). Rowena Langston was instrumental, particularly in later phases of the project, by collecting and processing comments provided by Sarah Wood (CCW), Allan Drewitt (English Nature), Zoe Crutchfield, Mark Tasker and Andy Webb (JNCC) and draft-reading on behalf of COWRIE.
References
Anthony R.M., Anderson W.H., Sedinger J.S. & McDonald L.L. 1995. Estimating populations of nesting Brant using aerial videography. Wildlife Society Bulletin 23: 80-87. Baptist H.J.M. 1990. Errors of sampling, analysis of distribution and sampling methods. Meeting IWRB's Western Palearctic Seaduck Database, Knebel, Denmark. (Ook verkrijgbaar als RWS-notitie GWAO 90.13120). Baptist H.J.M. & Meininger P.L. 1996. Vogels van de Voordelta, 1975-1995. Rapport RIKZ-96.018, Rijksinstituut voor Kust- en Zee, Middelburg, 162pp. Baptist H.J.M. & Wolf P.A. 1991. Vogels monitoren per vliegtuig. Sula 5(1): 16-23. Baptist H.J.M. & Wolf P.A. 1993. Atlas van de vogels van het Nederlands Continentaal Plat. Rapport DGW-93.013, Dienst Getijdewateren, Rijkswaterstaat, Middelburg, 168pp. Barton T.R., Barton C., Webb A. & Carter I.C. 1994. Seabird distribution in inshore waters of the western United Kingdom between Wick and St. David's Head from aerial surveys in 1987-1991. Joint Nature Cons. Comm. Rep. No. 183, Aberdeen. Begg G.S., Reid J.B., Tasker M.L. & Webb A. 1997. Assessing the vulnerability of seabirds to oil pollution: sensitivity to spatial scale. Colonial Waterbirds 20: 339-352. Bergman G. & Donner K.O, 1971. Wind drift during the spring migration of the Common Scoter (Melanitta nigra) and the Long-tailed Duck (Clangula hyemalis). Die Vogelwarte 26: 157-159. Bergman G. 1974. The spring migration of the Long-tailed Duck and the Common Scoter in western Finland. Orn Fenn 51: 129-145. Blake B.F., Tasker M.L., Jones P.H., Dixon T.J., Mitchell R. & Langslow D.R. 1984. Seabird Distribution in the North Sea. Nature Conservancy Council, Huntingdon. Blomqvist S. & Peterz M. 1984. Cyclones and pelagic seabird movements. Mar. Ecol. Prog. Ser. 20: 85-92. Bloor P., Reid J., Webb A., Begg G. & Tasker M. 1996. The distribution of seabirds and cetaceans between the Shetland and Faroe Islands. JNCC Report No. 226, Joint Nature Conservation Committee, Aberdeen. Borchers D.L., Buckland S.T., Goedhart P.W., Clarke E.D. & Hedley S.L. 1998. Horvitz-Thompson estimators for double-platform line transect surveys. Biometrics 54(4) 1221-1237. Bräger S. 1990. Results of waterfowl aerial surveys on the Baltic coast of Schleswig-Holstein in 1986-1990. Summ. lect. Joint Meeting IWRB's West. Pal. Seaduck Database. IWRB Newsletter December 1990: 20. Brown R.G.B., Nettleship D.N., Germain P., Tull C.E. & Davis T. 1975. Atlas of Eastern Canadian Seabirds. Can. Wildl. Serv., Bedford Inst. Ocean., Dartmouth. Buckland S.T. 1982. Statistics in ornithology. Ibis 124: 61-66. Buckland S.T. 1985. Perpendicular distance models for line transect sampling. Biometrics 41: 177-195. Buckland S.T., Anderson D.R., Burnham K.P. & Laake J.L. 1993. Distance Sampling: Estimating Abundance of Biological Populations. Chapman and Hall, London. Buckland S.T., Anderson D.R., Burnham K.P., Laake J.L., Borschers D.L. & Thomas L. 2001. Introduction to Distance Sampling. Estimating the abundance of biological populations. University Press, Oxford. Buckland S.T. & Turnock B.J. 1992. A robust line transect method. Biometrics 48: 901-909. Burnham K.P. & Anderson D.R. 1984. The need for distance data in transect counts. Journal of Wildlife Management 48: 1248-1254. Annex 1
Recording seabird behaviour (applicable for ship-based surveys only)
A protocol has been provided to record behavioural aspects of the birds observed. Crucial are attempts to relate the presence of birds to any visible cues in the area (See “Associations and direction of flight”), e.g. fishing vessels, front lines, floating matter, offshore installations, or marine mammals and to try and distinguish between birds that simply pass through an area (e.g. migrants, long-distance feeding flights) and birds that utilise a site for feeding, resting, or other activities. A careful recording of directions of flight, particularly in nearshore situations, will enhance the understanding of seabird movements in an area.
| Behaviour codes | Behaviour | Associations and direction of flight | |-----------------|-----------|-------------------------------------| | 30 | Holding fish | Foraging 1 Flying, no apparent direction | | 31 | Without fish | Direction of flight 2 Heading N | | 32 | Feeding young at sea | 3 Heading NE | | 33 | Feeding, method unspecified | 4 Heading E | | 34 | Wading, filtering or probing | 5 Heading SE | | 35 | Scooping prey from surface | 6 Heading S | | 36 | Aerial pursuit | 7 Heading SW | | 37 | Skimming | 8 Heading W | | 38 | Hydroplaning | 9 Heading NW | | 39 | Pattering | 10 Associated with fish shoal Associations | | 40 | Scavenging | 11 Associated with cetaceans | | 41 | Scavenging at fishing vessel | 12 Associated with front | | 42 | Dipping | 13 Associated with line in sea | | 43 | Surface seizing | 14 Sitting on or near floating wood | | 44 | Surface pecking | 15 Associated with floating litter | | 45 | Deep plunging | 16 Associated with oil slick | | 46 | Shallow plunging | 17 Associated with floating seaweed | | 47 | Pursuit plunging | 18 Associated with observation base | | 48 | Pursuit diving, or bottom feeding | 19 Sitting on observation base | | 49 | Actively searching | 20 Deliberately approaching observ. base | | 60 | Resting or apparently asleep | 21 Associated with other vessel | | 61 | Courship display | 22 Associated with or on buoy | | 62 | Courship feeding | 23 Associated with offshore platform | | 63 | Copulating | 24 Sitting on offshore platform | | 64 | Carrying nest material | 25 Sitting on marking pole or stick | | 65 | Guarding chick | 26 Associated with fishing vessel | | 66 | Preening or bathing | 27 Associated with or on sea ice | | 67 | [still free for future use] | 28 Associated with land (e.g. colony) | | 68 | [still free for future use] | 29 Associated with sand banks | | 69 | [still free for future use] | 30 MSFA participant, no further details MSFAs | | 70 | Wheeling or swimming slowly | 50 MSFA participant, joined by others | | 71 | Escape from ship (rooster tail) | 51 MSFA participant, solitary diver | | 72 | Swimming fast, not avoiding ship | 52 MSFA participant, beater | | 73 | Breaching clear out of the water | 53 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 74 | At the bow of the ship | 54 MSFA participant, social feeder | | 75 | Apparently feeding: herding behaviour | 55 MSFA participant, solitary diver | | 76 | Apparently feeding: other behaviour | 56 MSFA participant, social feeder | | 77 | Calf at the tail of adult | 57 Type II MSFA participant | | 78 | Calf swimming freely in herd | 58 Type III MSFA participant | | 79 | Basking, afloat | 59 [still free for future use] | | 80 | Spy-hopping | 60 MSFA participant, beater | | 81 | Lob-tailing | 61 MSFA participant, solitary diver | | 82 | Tail/flipper slapping | 62 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 83 | Approaching ship | 63 MSFA participant, social feeder | | 84 | Only blow visible (whales) | 64 MSFA participant, solitary diver | | 85 | Only splashes visible (dolphins) | 65 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 86 | Acrobatic leaps | 66 MSFA participant, solitary diver | | 87 | Sexual behaviour | 67 MSFA participant, social feeder | | 88 | Play | 68 MSFA participant, solitary diver | | 89 | Sailing | 69 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 90 | Under attack by kleptoparasite | 70 MSFA participant, solitary diver | | 91 | Under attack (as prey) by bird | 71 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 92 | Under attack (as prey) by mar. mammal | 72 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 93 | [still free for future use] | 73 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 94 | [still free for future use] | 74 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 95 | [still free for future use] | 75 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 96 | Entangled in fishing gear or rope | 76 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 97 | Oiled | 77 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 98 | Sick, unwell | 78 MSFA participant, scrounger type | | 99 | Dead | 79 MSFA participant, scrounger type | Collection behavioural data
(1) Direction of flight (codes 1-9) The rationale behind records of direction of flight is that (sea-)birds move from A to B on purpose. Searching (foraging) birds may seem to move more or less randomly over the sea. Birds coded with a direction of flight must have a distance code 'F' by default, while marine mammals travelling about may combine a 'direction of flight' code with an indicator of swimming ('A'-E or 'W') by default. Nine codes are reserved for direction of flight, including 1 (no apparent direction) and 2-9 (octagon, N → NW). For specific areas, such as while recording seabird movements near colonies (flying to and fro), directions of flight may be of great interest (cf. Schneider et al. 1990; Camphuysen et al. 1995).
(2) Associations (codes 10-29) Fairly often, we can actually see where the birds are heading for, or why they are on a given spot: for example a feeding frenzy, a fishing vessel, or the breeding colony. In those cases, it is of greater significance to code their goal (association) rather than their direction of flight. Therefore, within the same database field, and with priority over direction of flight, codes for 'associations' of seabirds with certain surface phenomena are proposed.
Association codes have been devised for birds associating with near-surface fish shoals or marine mammals, with floating objects such as wood, rubbish, oil slicks, or sea weeds, with fronts in sea (often indicated by distinct lines separating two water masses or concentrations of flotsam), with the own observation base (by default not in transect), with buoys, markers, other vessels, offshore installations, sea-ice or with land. A group of birds flying towards a distant fishing vessel can now be coded as flying with a F under distance, and as associated with fishing vessel with code '26'. The behaviour field (see below) should now be left blank, to separate the approaching birds from actual scavengers around the ship, either 'searching' for prey, actually feeding, or perhaps resting near the ship (see behaviour codes below). Similar combinations can be made for e.g. birds flying towards land, or birds flying in association with or towards a front, overruling the 'direction of flight' code that would not have been particularly informative.
(3) Foraging behaviour (codes 30-49) Types of foraging behaviour were characterised following Ashmole (1971), but with some modifications such as the split use of 'scavenging' for birds feeding at fishing vessels and birds scavenging on a corpse, plus a distinction between 'surface seizing' (few, large prey) and 'surface pecking' (many, tiny prey). For use in shallow seas, 'wading' (and filtering or probing for prey) and 'scooping' (as in pelicans) were added. Contrary to Ashmole, there is no separation between wing- and feet-propelled diving, because we do not want to code what we cannot actually see. One of the most interesting aspects of test-cruises was, that certain seabirds did not always feed the way they should have done typically according to text books, but may change feeding techniques in particular situations. An approaching ship will trigger escape reactions of seabirds on the track line. Aerial species may simply fly off, but pursuit diving species such as auks may dive to escape from the vessel. It is up to the observer to discriminate between 'feeding dives' (code 48) and 'escape dives' (no code), but in case of doubt we recommend to refrain from coding. Of particular interest is the coding of 'searching' seabirds (code 49). The idea is, that seabirds actually 'foraging' (looking for prey) in a given area can be separated from those that are just there, even although the latter might use a sudden feeding opportunity. Potential feeding areas don't necessarily show off by the presence of actively feeding seabirds; prey density may for example be low or prey may be difficult to detect. Although any migrating seabird may interrupt swift flight to pick up a prey encountered by coincidence, any observer familiar with birds at sea will agree on the concept of separating actively searching individuals from birds that simply move about. Searching albatrosses and petrels circle consistently over certain patches (Veit & Prince 1997), with the head constantly pointing down or sideways. Searching Northern Gannets and terns may follow straight lines, but while peering down constantly. Shearwaters may settle and alight by distinct lines separating two water masses or concentrations of flotsam), with the own observation base (by default not in transect), with buoys, markers, other vessels, offshore installations, sea-ice or with land. A group of birds flying towards a distant fishing vessel can now be coded as flying with a F under distance, and as associated with fishing vessel with code '26'. The behaviour field (see below) should now be left blank, to separate the approaching birds from actual scavengers around the ship, either 'searching' for prey, actually feeding, or perhaps resting near the ship (see behaviour codes below). Similar combinations can be made for e.g. birds flying towards land, or birds flying in association with or towards a front, overruling the 'direction of flight' code that would not have been particularly informative.
(4) Complicated associations: multi-species (foraging) assemblages (codes 50-59) All birds, whether swimming or flying, that operate 'together' or stay tight in a particular area or in a particular movement are marked as distinct 'flocks'. Flocks comprising more than one species are called 'multi-species (feeding) associations' (MSFA's). Recent studies have shed some light on composition, structure and dynamics of MSFAs of seabirds (Sealy 1973; Hoffman et al. 1981; Porter & Sealy 1982; Maniscalco 1997), and on the specific role of different species in mixed-species assemblages (Bayer 1983; Grover & Olla 1983; Chilton & Sealy 1987; Hunt et al. 1988; Mahon et al. 1992; Camphuysen & Webb 1999; Ostrander 1999). MSFA's may be formed around fishing vessels (scavenging seabirds), in association with cetaceans and around sources of more natural prey (fish, plankton, carrion). Many MSFA's are formed by surface feeding or shallow plunging seabirds over concentrations of prey driven to the surface by underwater predators (predatory fish, cetaceans, seals or seabirds). Current knowledge suggests that these flocks represent an important behavioural mechanism in the exploitation of resources of food that are 'normally' out of reach for surface feeding seabirds. There is a great demand for additional observations... and quantifications, which we might fill in by careful descriptions and systematic coding of what can be seen at sea during routine cruises.
Camphuysen & Webb (1999) evaluated the available literature and terms and categorisations of the role of seabirds (or marine mammals) in multi-species feeding associations. Important categories are (1) initiators or producers (birds that actually start the feeding frenzy by locating a food patch), (2) joiners or scroungers (birds streaming into patches discovered by others) and (3) divers or beaters (often the triggers of MSFA formation). To categorise a bird correctly according to their system, individuals need to be followed and watched for some time, sparsely available in standard cruises. Prior knowledge of existing group structures and (potential) dominance hierarchies might help in understanding and recognising what is going on (See Camphuysen & Webb 1999, and Camphuysen & Garthe 2001 for further details).
(5) General behaviour (60-69) Besides foraging, seabirds can engage in a variety of other activities that one may wish to record. Particularly nocturnal feeders may sleep a lot during the day, while birds that have just joined a feeding frenzy often rest on water, incapable as they even may be to fly away (code 60). Mostly during spring, seabirds frequently perform courtship displays at sea (code 61), including courtship feeding (62), copulation (63; e.g. Atlantic Puffins Fratercula arctica), the handling of nest material (64), or chick guarding (65). Other coded activities include preening and bathing (66).
(6) Marine mammals (codes 70-89) Most seabird observers under ESAS record marine mammals, perhaps as a matter of lower priority but still, as if they were birds. To facilitate a rapid description of observed behaviour, we propose 20 behaviour codes that would suit most needs.
(7) Misfortune, disease and death (codes 90-99) Ten codes are reserved for 'birds under stress', including deceased individuals. Entangled, oiled, otherwise 'sick' or even dead animals may be encountered in places and seabirds under attack by other animals can be coded with the system provided below.
Height of flight Additional database field can be reserved to record the flying during seabirds at sea counts from ships, by categorising any birds seen in flight to its altitude. Classes used may be (from Lensink et al. 2002):
0-2m very low over the water 2-10m undulating flight or just below the horizon (with observer eye-height at c. 10 m asl) 10-25m at or just above the horizon 25-50m well above the horizon\* 50-100m flying high\* 100-200m flying very high\*
> 200m great height\*
\*Requires pre-survey training for example on land with reference heights in the landscape.
Recording prey Finally, as one of the most difficult tasks at sea, it may be possible to recognize prey caught or targeted by seabirds at sea. The ultimate record does not only include place, species, age and plumage, but also association, behaviour, and prey (and all that preferably within transect). Prey data are stored in a separate column in the birds file under ESAS and several of a potential of 100 codes (0-99) are attributed to various prey, summarised as follows: Fish prey (10) fish, no further details, (11) small fish, unidentified (ca. bill length), (12) medium fish, unidentified (ca. 2-5x bill length), (13) large fish, unidentified, difficult to handle, (14) sandeel ball, (15) clupeoid ball, (16) unidentified fish ball, or (17) capelin ball at surface, (20) gurnard, (21) herring or sprat, (22) sandeel, (23) gadoid fish, (24) flatfish, (25) regurgitated fish after aerial pursuit, (26) salmonid, (27) capelin; Miscellaneous prey (30) small particles, unidentified, (31) large object, unidentified, (32) jellyfish, (33) squid, (34) worm (e.g. Nereis), (40) crustacean, unidentified, (41) swimming crab, (42) starfish, (43) sea urchin, (45) bivalve, unidentified, (46) mussel; Carrion and corpses (50) carrion or big corpse, unidentified, (51) seal carcass, (52) whale carcass, (53) bird carcass, (54) litter, rubbish, (55) regurgitated unidentified prey after aerial pursuit, (56) bird kill (e.g. Bonxie), (57) excrements (e.g. from whales); Discards and offal (60) fishery waste, unidentified, (61) discarded roundfish, (62) discarded flatfish, (63) discarded offal, (64) discarded benthic invertebrate, (65) discarded starfish, (66) discarded crustacean (e.g. shrimp)
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57ce39f397b69bd21e432872d5e1af7a5a6268c4 | Defra Ministerial Team
Caroline Spelman Secretary of State
Jim Paice Minister of State for Agriculture and Food
Richard Benyon Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Natural environment and Fisheries
Lord Henley Parliamentary under-Secretary To ensure that we are able to deliver the priorities that Ministers set for us, we need to allocate our resources - people and money - to the activities we have agreed to carry out, and to organise ourselves to deliver those activities effectively.
We have therefore moved from an old, inflexible structure of Directorates and Divisions towards a model where most of our work across all areas is being delivered through programmes and projects. Specifically, we have reorganised our activities into a portfolio structure consisting of Board and Group programmes, projects and ongoing functions.
Working in this way will enable us to be more efficient, as we will be able to ensure priority work is properly resourced and funded in delivering Defra's strategic objectives. Secretariat Helen Ghosh Permanent Secretary (£140,000 – £144,999) (shows pay floor and pay ceiling range)
Secretariat
Deputy SRO Principal Private Secretary
Reports to Mike Anderson as SRO
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 5.00 | 1.00 | 11.00 | 11.00 | 8.00 | 1.00 | 1,134,530 |
Last revised: 7/22/2011 Green Economy and Corporate Services Andrew Whyte Director of Communications (£105,000 - £109,999)
Press Office Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO
Corporate Communications Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO
Strategic Communications and Campaigns and Marketing Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO
Customer Contact Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 4.00 | 6.80 | 11.00 | 19.00 | 29.16 | 29.34 | 10.81 | -- | 3,922,428 |
Last revised: 7/22/2011
Green Economy and Corporate Services
### Tom Taylor
**Director Strategic Expenditure Review** (£90,000 - £94,999)
#### Strategic Expenditure Review Project
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 1.85 | 1.60 | 1.60 | 4.00 | -- | 1.00 | -- | 402,691 |
Last revised: 7/22/2011
*Strategy and Evidence* Neil Serjeant Shared Services Ongoing Activity (£120,000 - £124,999)
Deputy SRO
Deputy SRO
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 4.00 | 1.00 | 11.81 | 15.53 | 23.20 | 48.75 | 103.13 | 2.00 | 5,288,559 |
Last revised: 7/22/2011
Strategy and Evidence Anne Marie Millar Director of Finance (£125,000 - £129,999)
Finance Ongoing Function
Deputy SRO Head of Financial Control
Deputy SRO
Deputy SRO
Deputy SRO
Deputy SRO
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 2.00 | 6.00 | 18.00 | 23.72 | 17.73 | 15.92 | 3.56 | -- | 3,232,166 | Martin Hurst SRO - Director Arms Length Bodies and Estates (£85,000 - £89,999)
Laboratory Agency Review
Arms Length Bodies Implementation Programme
Estates & Sustainable Built Environment Strategy and Ongoing Function
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 5.00 | 8.51 | 6.78 | 8.80 | 10.00 | 4.00 | 1.00 | 1,571,651 |
Last revised: 7/22/2011
Green Economy and Corporate Services Legal Group Chief Scientific Advisor Prof. Robert Watson Chief Scientific Advisor (£135,000 - £139,999)
Miles Parker Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser & Science Advisory Council and Kew Ongoing Function Evidence Programme Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution Science and Engineering Head of profession Ongoing Function
Mike Segal Deputy for Chief Scientific Advisor Ongoing Function Data Sharing Programme
Evidence Programme Data Sharing Programme Reporting to Mike Anderson
Green Economy and Corporate Services
Last revised: 7/22/2011 Miles Parker Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser (£90,000 - £94,999)
Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser Ongoing Function
Deputy SRO Evidence Programme
Science and Engineering Career Home Ongoing Function
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
Science Advisory Council and Kew
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 4.00 | 1.80 | 6.00 | 6.00 | 7.00 | 2.80 | 2.00 | -- | 1,263,515 |
Current structure subject to further changes in October 2010 Green Economy and Corporate Services
Last revised: 7/22/2011 Mike Segal Director Data Sharing Programme and Deputy for the Chief Scientific Officer (£90,000 - £94,999)
Data Sharing Programme
Deputy SRO
Reporting to Mike Anderson and the Evidence Programme
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 1.00 | 1.00 | 4.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | -- | -- | 529,184 | Food and Farming Group Andrea Young Director of Climate Change, Exotic Disease and Agency Relationship Portfolio (£65,000 - £69,999)
Agency Relationship Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO
AH/VLA Merger Project
- Deputy SRO
Exotic Disease Policy Programme
- Deputy SRO
Climate Change Mitigation from Agriculture and the Food Chain Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 6.52 | 2.00 | 11.83 | 3.00 | 16.80 | 7.80 | 4.00 | 1.00 | 2,128,421 |
Last revised: 7/22/2011 Sarah Hendry Director Farming for the Future, Animal Welfare and Responsibility and Cost Sharing (£85,000 - £89,999)
Responsibility and Cost Sharing Programme
- Deputy SRO Farming For the Future and Responsibility and Cost Sharing
Farming for the Future Programme
- Deputy SRO Farming For the Future and Responsibility and Cost Sharing
Animal Welfare Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 5.69 | 5.00 | 18.22 | 10.00 | 18.97 | 6.00 | 6.00 | 1.58 | 3,005,384 |
Last revised: 7/22/2011
Food & Farming Nigel Gibbens Chief Veterinary Officer (£115,000 - £119,999)
Current structure is subject to further changes in October 2010 Food & Farming
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 2.00 | 6.80 | 20.30 | 14.90 | 24.20 | 24.60 | 21.80 | 1.00 | 4.196,370 | Environment and Rural Group Sonia Phippard Director Water, Floods, Environmental Risk and Regulation (£115,000 - £119,999)
Better Regulation Programme
- Deputy SRO
Floods – Managing Flood & Erosion Risk Sustainable Programme
- Deputy SRO
Water Availability and Quality Programme
- Deputy SRO
Floods Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO
Water Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO
Chemicals, Pesticides & Nanotechnologies Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO
Sponsor for Environment Agency Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO
Drinking Water Inspectorate Ongoing Function
- Jeni Colbourne SRO - Chief Inspector of Drinking Water Reports to Sonia Phippard for pay and rations, and co-ordination. Reports direct to Ministers in the event of a crisis and in formal annual reports.
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 7.00 | 6.00 | 39.40 | 38.80 | 47.17 | 23.60 | 9.25 | -- | 6,758,041 |
Last revised: 7/22/2011 Neil Thornton Director of Waste and Resources Programme & Delivery Transformation Programme (£115,000 – £119,999)
Waste Programme
- Deputy SRO Waste Infrastructure Delivery Programme
- Deputy SRO Waste Strategy Ongoing Function
- Deputy SRO Head of Waste Regulation & Business Waste Ongoing Function
Delivery Transformation Programme [To close 1 October 2010]
- Deputy SRO Programme Manager Delivery Transformation Programme
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 4.60 | 2.00 | 16.00 | 12.26 | 30.70 | 16.00 | 9.53 | -- | 3,417,891 | Director of Marine and Fisheries (£100,000 - £104,999)
Marine Programme
Deputy SRO Sea Fisheries Conservation work stream
Deputy SRO Marine Environment Resources, strategy and Evidence work stream
Deputy SRO Marine and Freshwater Biodiversity work stream
Deputy SRO Sustainable Fisheries and Fisheries 2027 work stream
Deputy SRO Marine Stewardship work stream
| Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 4.00 | 3.60 | 27.70 | 12.60 | 37.10 | 11.00 | 8.00 | 1.00 | 4,076,244 |
Last revised: 7/22/2011 | Pay grade | SCS 1/1A | Grade 6 | Grade 7 | SEO | HEO | EO | AO | AA | Total cost | |-----------|----------|---------|---------|-----|-----|----|----|----|------------| | Number of staff (FTE) | 1.00 | 1.00 | | | | | | | 82,431 |
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d0c714ce51bfc39cf3363867df4b45b6ee4e463f | ### BUSINESS PLAN QUARTERLY DATA SUMMARY - JULY 2011
#### SPENDING
| Budget | £million | |--------|----------| | Total Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) | 2,796 | | of which Resource DEL (Cost, Depreciation) | 2,186 |
#### Input Indicators
| Indicator | Current | Previous | |-----------|---------|----------| | Total office space (sq ft) | - | 316,775 (2009-10) | | Cost per FTE (£) | - | 2009-10 | | Cost per sq ft (£) | - | 2009-10 | | Total procurement spend (£million) | 391.5 | 391.5 | | Percentage of staff using e-mail (2009-10) | 10.47 | 10.47 | | Average price of energy (£/KWh) | 0.064 | 0.064 |
#### Results
| Indicator | Current | Previous | |-----------|---------|----------| | Total office space (sq ft) | - | 316,775 (2009-10) | | Cost per FTE (£) | - | 2009-10 | | Cost per sq ft (£) | - | 2009-10 | | Total procurement spend (£million) | 391.5 | 391.5 | | Percentage of staff using e-mail (2009-10) | 10.47 | 10.47 | | Average price of energy (£/KWh) | 0.064 | 0.064 |
#### PEOPLE
| Whole Department Family - Workforce Size | Current | Previous | |----------------------------------------|---------|----------| | Payroll Staff (Full time equivalent) | 9,111 | 9,107 | | Non-departmental public bodies | 85,727 | | | Department Family | 21,818 | | | Average Staff Costs (£) | 88,517 | | | Contingent Labour (Full time equivalent) | 291 | | | Non-departmental public bodies | 505 | | | Department Family | 821 | |
#### Department and Agencies Only
| Workforce Density (Full time equivalent) | Current | Previous | |----------------------------------------|---------|----------| | Administration and Management Officers | 5,815 | | | Executive Officers | 1,086 | | | Higher and Senior Executive Officers | 1,981 | | | Total % | 18.1 | |
#### Workforce Dynamics
| Theme scores (%) | Current | Previous | |------------------|---------|----------| | Leadership and Managing Change | 29 | 29 | | My Work | 68 | 69 | | My Line Manager | 62 | 68 | | Organisational Objective & Purpose | 75 | 79 |
#### Notes:
1. For more information on time periods, please refer to measurement annex.
2. Numbers may not sum to totals due to rounding.
3. For cells that are marked as ‘not applicable’ (.) please refer to measurement annex for specific reasons.
4. For more information on time periods, please refer to measurement annex.
5. Any interpretation of the management information must give careful consideration to the caveats noted in the measurement annex. Many of the measures are not yet directly comparable because they do not have common definitions, time periods, or data collection processes.
Contact details: Public enquiries: Members of the public should contact the European Contact Unit on 08450 111 777. Press enquiries: Members of the media should contact the Media Unit on 02031588000.
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e82ea123de9a4efc5da30887c519ef4a8bd58be5 | The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs statement on publication of The National Archives’ Information Management Assessment report
June 2018
I am pleased to champion the publication of the report by The National Archives on how we are meeting our information management responsibilities.
During September 2017, The National Archives carried out an independent re-assessment of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, as part of the cross-government Information Assessment programme and reviewed how far we have progressed since their previous review in 2011.
I am encouraged to note that we have been assessed as satisfactory in most areas and responded positively to the digital and “Better information for better government” initiatives. There are a few areas where further development is needed and we have produced an action plan to address these.
Information is a key business asset and how we manage it is vital to our business efficiency, delivering services to our customers and collaborating effectively with business partners. We look forward to engaging with The National Archives in this programme of continuous improvement.
Clare Moriarty Permanent Secretary Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
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f3589bb29d5601fd7552bf6abfae680bd51adaf3 | Summary of the difference between the average salary of women and men in Defra. The difference is expressed as a percentage of the average male earnings and calculated for each grade and for all grades combined.
This information is a summary of work undertaken by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) for 2013 covering the Civil Service.
The overall gender pay gap position in Defra and its agencies generally reflects that of the Civil Service as a whole. This is largely driven by the distribution of male and female employees by grade and by full time / part time status. Men tend to account for higher proportions of the more senior positions. Women are much more likely to be working part-time. Small organisations are likely to see larger fluctuations in their pay gaps.
## Defra Gender Pay Gap 2013
### Median
| Grade | SCS | G6/G7 | SEO/HEO | EO | AO/AA | All grades | |-------|-----|-------|---------|----|-------|------------| | Defra (excluding Agencies) | 1.4% | 1.8% | 5.3% | 4.5% | 8.2% | 10.6% | | Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA) | 9.1% | 3.3% | 2.3% | 1.1% | -2.7% | 14.3% | | Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (CEFAS) | - | -3.8% | 12.7% | 0.0% | -5.2% | 13.9% | | Food and Environment Research Agency (FERA) | - | 5.7% | 3.1% | 1.3% | -3.1% | 17.3% | | Rural Payments Agency (RPA) | -0.9% | 3.8% | 3.9% | 3.1% | -2.1% | 5.4% | | Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD) | 24.9% | 6.0% | 5.7% | 4.0% | 5.9% | 19.1% |
### Mean
| Grade | SCS | G6/G7 | SEO/HEO | EO | AO/AA | All grades | |-------|-----|-------|---------|----|-------|------------| | Defra (excluding Agencies) | 1.0% | 2.5% | 2.8% | 2.1% | 0.5% | 11.4% | | Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA) | .. | 3.2% | 4.1% | 0.4% | -0.8% | 15.9% | | Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (CEFAS) | .. | 0.2% | 4.4% | 0.2% | -3.0% | 19.9% | | Food and Environment Research Agency (FERA) | - | 5.7% | 3.1% | 1.3% | -3.1% | 17.3% | | Rural Payments Agency (RPA) | -0.8% | 2.9% | 4.0% | 0.6% | -0.7% | 9.0% | | Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD) | .. | 0.2% | 7.2% | 2.9% | 2.6% | 17.5% |
**Notes:**
1. Positive values indicate that male salaries are higher than female; negative values indicate that female salaries are higher than male.
2. Percentages based on between one and five employees are replaced by “..”.
3. Not Applicable values are represented by “-“.
4. This information has been taken from the Office for National Statistics Civil Service Statistics 2013: [http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-319802](http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-319802)
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b417c37d443c0d2499c7ea5187ee08a6d478ef2d | | Name of Official | Mode of travel | Total transport costs | Date of Departure | Duration of stay (Nights) | Destination | |------------------|----------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------| | Alick Simmons | Rail | 199.00 | 09/02/2015 | 1 | 1 Brussels Midi | | Amy Holmes | n/a | n/a | 14/12/2014 | 3 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Rail | 162.00 | 25/01/2015 | n/a | Brussels Midi | | Amy Holmes | Rail | 69.00 | 26/01/2015 | n/a | London St Pancras (from Brussels Midi) | | Amy Holmes | Air | 539.16 | 27/01/2015 | n/a | Washington Dulles | | Amy Holmes | Air | 739.10 | 14/02/2015 | n/a | London Heathrow (from Dublin) | | Amy Holmes | Rail | 162.00 | 15/03/2015 | n/a | Brussels Midi | | Amy Holmes | Rail | 52.00 | 17/03/2015 | n/a | London St Pancras (from Brussels Midi) | | Colin Church | Rail | 183.00 | 13/01/2015 | n/a | Brussels Midi | | Colin Church | Air | 264.21 | 11/03/2015 | n/a | Berlin Tegel | | John Robbs | n/a | n/a | 09/12/2014 | 1 | n/a | | John Robbs | n/a | n/a | 14/12/2014 | 3 | n/a | | John Robbs | Rail | 162.00 | 25/01/2015 | 1 | Brussels Midi | | John Robbs | Rail | 99.00 | 26/01/2015 | n/a | London St Pancras (from Brussels Midi) | | John Robbs | Air | 117.98 | 03/02/2015 | 1 | Dublin | | John Robbs | Rail | 209.00 | 16/02/2015 | 1 | Paris Gare Du Nord | | John Robbs | Air | 96.95 | 03/03/2015 | 1 | Dublin | | John Robbs | Rail | 103.00 | 10/03/2015 | n/a | Brussels Midi | | John Robbs | Rail | 420.00 | 17/03/2015 | n/a | Paris Gare Du Nord | | John Robbs | Air | 81.99 | 31/03/2015 | n/a | Dublin | | John Robbs | Rail | 213.00 | 07/04/2015 | n/a | Paris Gare Du Nord | | Nick Joicey | Rail | 192.00 | 15/03/2015 | n/a | Brussels Midi | | Nick Joicey | Rail | 52.00 | 17/03/2015 | n/a | London St Pancras (from Brussels Midi) | | Nigel Gibbens | Rail | 82.00 | 12/01/2015 | 1 | Brussels Midi | | Nigel Gibbens | Air | 71.26 | 13/01/2015 | n/a | London Gatwick (from Brussels) | | Nigel Gibbens | Air | 97.44 | 05/03/2015 | n/a | Dublin | | Nigel Gibbens | Air | 55.07 | 24/03/2015 | n/a | Riga | | Sonia Phippard | n/a | n/a | 22/03/2015 | 2 | n/a | | City of accommodation (if different to destination) | Class of travel | Accommodation costs | |-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------| | Brussels | Economy | 126.31 | | Brussels | n/a | 266.31 | | n/a | Premium Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Premium Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Premium Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Premium Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | Brussels | n/a | 129.09 | | Brussels | n/a | 394.98 | | Brussels | Premium Economy | 86.28 | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | Dublin | Economy | 137.90 | | Paris | Economy | 123.12 | | Dublin | Economy | 134.15 | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Premium Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Premium Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | Brussels | Economy | 131.62 | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | n/a | Economy | n/a | | Brussels | n/a | 190.92 | Notes International Booking within Policy Rail journey was shown on Q3 report
Rail journey was shown on Q3 report Rail journey was shown on Q3 report
Hotel was billed in April so will appear in 15/16 Q1
No Availability Within Policy At Required Location
Hotel was booked prior to the event organisers agreeing to make bookings and which was subsequently cancelled. Refund not received yet.
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3e89a05f0039b3cb6f67d834f7edbdb3dd0e5572 | | Name of Official | Mode of transport costs | Date of Departure | of stay (Nights) | |------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------------| | Alick Simmons | n/a | 23/06/2014 | 1 | | Amy Holmes | n/a | 01/07/2014 | 3 | | Amy Holmes | n/a | 09/07/2014 | 1 | | Amy Holmes | Air 243.13 | 14/07/2014 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Rail 60.00 | 14/07/2014 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Air 529.13 | 16/07/2014 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Air 161.30 | 16/07/2014 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Air 255.88 | 08/09/2014 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Air 562.50 | 09/09/2014 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Rail 112.00 | 16/09/2014 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Rail 137.00 | 18/09/2014 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Air 251.68 | 26/09/2014 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Air 228.90 | 26/09/2014 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Air 216.41 | 28/09/2014 | n/a | | Amy Holmes | Air 177.10 | 30/09/2014 | n/a | | Colin Church | Air 163.94 | 08/09/2014 | n/a | | Ian Boyd | Air 1,045.94 | 25/08/2014 | n/a | | Ian Boyd | Air 133.10 | 31/08/2014 | 3 | | Ian Boyd | Air 1,196.60 | 01/09/2014 | n/a | | Jeremy Marlow | Air 859.10 | 01/07/2014 | n/a | | Jeremy Marlow | Air 4,535.28 | 02/07/2014 | | | John Robbs | n/a | 19/05/2014 | 1 | | John Robbs | Rail 99.00 | 03/09/2014 | n/a | | John Robbs | Rail 79.00 | 09/09/2014 | n/a | | John Robbs | Air 87.98 | 22/09/2014 | n/a | | John Robbs | Air 86.20 | 23/09/2014 | n/a | | John Robbs | Air 337.39 | 28/09/2014 | n/a | | Nicholas Joicey | Air 517.42 | 01/07/2014 | | | Nicholas Joicey | Air 1,991.02 | 02/07/2014 | | | Nicholas Joicey | Rail 179.00 | 17/09/2014 | n/a | | Nicholas Joicey | Rail 137.00 | 18/09/2014 | n/a | | Nigel Gibbens | n/a | 19/06/2014 | 2 | | Nigel Gibbens | Air 417.63 | 10/07/2014 | 1 | | Nigel Gibbens | Rail 79.00 | 30/07/2014 | n/a | | Nigel Gibbens | Air 151.30 | 05/09/2014 | n/a | | Nigel Gibbens | Air 264.58 | 22/09/2014 | n/a | | Nigel Gibbens | Air 60.48 | 29/09/2014 | n/a | | Nigel Gibbens | Air 83.61 | 30/09/2014 | n/a | | Nigel Gibbens | Air 137.00 | 03/10/2014 | n/a | | Nigel Gibbens | Air 228.18 | 13/10/2014 | 1 | | Peter Unwin | Rail 140.00 | 17/09/2014 | n/a | | Peter Unwin | Rail 137.00 | 18/09/2014 | n/a | | Sonia Phippard | n/a | 04/06/2014 | 2 | | Sonia Phippard | Rail 164.00 | 16/07/2014 | n/a | | Jeremy Marlow | Air 4,535.28 | 02/07/2014 | n/a | | Destination | City of accommodation (if different) | Class of travel | |------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------| | n/a | Brussels | n/a | | n/a | Washington Nat | n/a | | n/a | Dublin | n/a | | Brussels | Brussels | Economy | | London St Pancras (From Brussels Midi) | London St Pancras (From Brussels Midi) | Economy | | Milan Linate | Milan Linate | Economy | | London Heathrow (From Milan Linate) | London Heathrow (From Milan Linate) | Economy | | Copenhagen | Copenhagen | Economy | | Riga | Riga | Economy | | Brussels Midi | Brussels Midi | Economy | | London St Pancras (From Brussels Midi) | London St Pancras (From Brussels Midi) | Economy | | Berlin Tegel | Berlin Tegel | Economy | | London Heathrow (From Berlin Tegel) | London Heathrow (From Berlin Tegel) | Economy | | Milan Linate | Milan Linate | Economy | | London Heathrow (From Milan Linate) | London Heathrow (From Milan Linate) | Economy | | Rome Leonardo | Rome Leonardo | Economy | | Auckland | Auckland | Economy | | Wellington | Wellington | Economy | | London (From Wellington) | London (From Wellington) | Economy | | Chicago O Hare | Chicago O Hare | First | | London Heathrow (from Chicago O'Hare) | London Heathrow (from Chicago O'Hare) | Business | | n/a | Madrid | n/a | | Brussels Midi | Brussels Midi | Economy | | Brussels Midi | Brussels Midi | Economy | | Cologne | Cologne | Economy | | London Heathrow (From Cologne) | London Heathrow (From Cologne) | Economy | | Naples | Naples | Economy | | Chicago O Hare | Chicago O Hare | Business | | London Heathrow (from Chicago O'Hare) | London Heathrow (from Chicago O'Hare) | Business | | Brussels Midi | Brussels Midi | Economy | | London St Pancras (From Brussels Midi) | London St Pancras (From Brussels Midi) | Economy | | n/a | Brussels | n/a | | Brussels | Brussels | Economy | | Brussels Midi | Brussels Midi | Economy | | London Heathrow (From Brussels) | London Heathrow (From Brussels) | Economy | | Zurich | Zurich | Economy | | Amsterdam | Amsterdam | Economy | | Milan Malpensa | Milan Malpensa | Economy | | London Heathrow (From Milan Linate) | London Heathrow (From Milan Linate) | Economy | | Sofia | Sofia | Economy | | Brussels Midi | Brussels Midi | Economy | | London St Pancras (From Brussels Midi) | London St Pancras (From Brussels Midi) | Economy | | n/a | Heraklion | n/a | | Brussels Midi | Brussels Midi | Economy | | London Heathrow | London Heathrow | Business | | Accommodation costs | Notes | |---------------------|-------| | 95.05 | | | 296.13 | | | 108.71 | | | 198.93 | |
Business class flights were required as it was a working flight with the Secretary of...
| 153.03 | |
Adverse weather cancelled the original flight
| 219.09 | | | 129.24 | |
| 41.06 | |
| 222.98 | | Business class flights were required as it was a working flight with the Secretary of State. At the time of booking, the carrier did not offer a business class option and there was a business r Business class flights were required as it was a working flight with the Secretary of State. At the time of booking, the carrier did not offer a business class option and there was a business need to book first class tickets.
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e11a04bc6e8efb68df5b5e0d39ca7529f9afb8a5 | **THE WAR OFFICE.**
**Number.** KEPT
**Subject.** Miss M. H. Turton
Application for Admission to Q.A.M.I.N.S.
**Registered.** 18/6/37
**Former File.** Reserve.
**Other relevant Files.**
| Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | |-------------|------|-------------|------| | AMO | | | | | R. P.A. | | | | | A.M.D.A. | | | | | R. Press. | | | | | R. P.A. | | | | | A.M.D.A. | | | | | R. Press. | | | |
**Authority for final closing**
Initials
Branch
Date At the 650th Meeting of the S.S.Ctte held at the War Office on 12.7.1937, the enrolment of this lady in the Permanent Reserve was recommended. (Sr.)
A.M.D. 4. 13.7.1937
Matron-in-Chief G.A.I.M.N.S
[Signature]
P.T. Over. 6.
Inform of enrolment
Amend 14/1/375
NOTED ON LOOSE LEAF
7.
At the 98th Meeting of the Q.A.I.M.N.S.Ctte.
Approved.
Ch. Ray
Principal Matron Q.A.I.M.N.B. Secretary Q.A.I.M.N.S. Committee.
8.
Write an Annual Report
Amend 6/2/39
K.H.
(Anon. (not received))
9.
Under resignations
Amend 5/5/39
K.H.
NOTED ON LOOSE LEAF
10.
At the 690th Meeting of the S.S.Ctte held at the War Office on 22.5.1939, the removal of this lady's name from the Roll of the Permanent Reserve was noted. (Private affairs)
A.M.D.4. 22.5.1939
NOTED ON LOOSE LEAF
Ch. Ray
Matron-in-Chief Q.A.I.M.N.S.
At the 690th Meeting of the Q.A.I.M.N.S. Ctte.
Approved.
K.H. Jones
Principal Matron Q.A.I.M.N.B. Secretary Q.A.I.M.N.S. Committee. 2/Reserve T/725 (A.M.D.4.)
5th May 1939.
Madam,
I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 19th ultimo, and Army Form D.416, No.1017, and in reply to inform you it is regretted that owing to the circumstances mentioned therein you have found it necessary to resign your appointment with Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service Reserve. I am to state your name has been removed from the Roll accordingly.
The members of Queen Alexandra's Army Nursing Board desire me to convey to you their best wishes on your retirement.
I am,
Madam, Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) K. H. JONES.
Principal Matron, for Matron-in-Chief, Q.A.I.M.N.S. for Director-General, Army Medical Services.
Miss M.H. Turton, Nursing Staff, Royal Sea Bathing Hospital, Margate, Kent. Royal Sea Bathing Hospital Margate 19. 4. 39.
To the Matron in Chief.
Dear Madam,
I am sorry to have to inform you that I will have to resign from the Queen Alexandra's Nursing Reserve.
Owing to the loss of my mother & other private matters, & being the only daughter, I will probably have to give up my nursing & go home to take charge. It is with regret that I am returning my papers and badge.
Yours faithfully,
D. Turton SECRET.
No. 1017
Part I.
Members of Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service Reserve and Civil Hospital Reserve.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOINING IN THE EVENT OF A CALLING OUT OF THE WHOLE ARMY RESERVE AND THE MILITIA (WHICH INCLUDES THE SUPPLEMENTARY RESERVE).
Miss
Personal Number 2 Reserve T/725
First Army Hospital
Redhill, Surrey
1. In the event of a calling out of the whole Army Reserve and the Militia (which includes the Supplementary Reserve), which would be notified in the Press, and by the display of posters "Calling out of the whole of the Army Reserve and the Militia (including the Supplementary Reserve)" (Army Form D427), you are required to report immediately for nursing duties to:
20 10 General Hospital
Edinburgh
2. A railway warrant (for use only in the circumstances stated at (1) above) to cover the journey is annexed (Part II).
3. Please acknowledge receipt on Part III annexed with the least possible delay. An envelope for the purpose is enclosed.
4. In the event of Partial Mobilization, in which case no posters (Army Form D427) are displayed, you will take no action as regards joining unless you receive special instructions.
5. If medically unfit when mobilization occurs members of Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service Reserve will immediately telegraph to that effect to "DEHORTED LONDON."
This telegram, which will include the name and personal number of the member, will be followed within 24 hours by an explanatory letter addressed to the Under Secretary of State (A.M.D.4), The War Office, and accompanied by this Army Form and unused railway warrant when further instructions will be subsequently issued.
6. Attention is directed to the instructions on the back of this form.
A.M.D.4. The War Office, London, S.W.1.
Matron-in-Chief, Q.A.I.M.N.S.
1 Jan 1938
NOTES.—(i) Members of Q.A.I.M.N.S. Reserve who intend to be absent abroad for more than 6 months must notify the fact to the War Office and obtain permission for the retention of their names on the Roll.
Those who proceed abroad for less than 6 months must make arrangements that all letters sent to the address registered at the War Office will be forwarded.
(ii) In the event of your ceasing to belong to Q.A.I.M.N.S. Reserve from any cause, these orders should be returned at once to the Under-Secretary of State (A.M.D.4.), the War Office, London, S.W.1. SECRET
Part II.
Railway Warrant for Members of Q.A.I.M.N.S Reserve and Civil Hospital Reserve.
Payable by the Command Paymaster, Command Pay Office, Railway Branch, Aldershot.
No. 1017
Miss
Q.A.I.M.N.S. Reserve.
Civil Hospital Reserve.
Railway Warrant for the use only of members of Q.A.I.M.N.S. Reserve and Civil Hospital Reserve travelling on duty in Great Britain only.
(This warrant must be presented to the Booking Clerk at the place where the holder is authorised to commence the journey, when a ticket will be issued in exchange.)
To the Booking Clerk at (Station) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Date \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ 19
Please issue single journey ticket as under to bearer travelling on duty—
From \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ One Third Class,
To \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ EDINBURGH
at Military rates, the charges to be paid as above.
H. G. C. [Signature]
Under-Secretary of State for War.
This demand will be retained by the Booking Clerk issuing the through ticket as a voucher for the recovery of the fares by the Companies concerned.
Ordinary Fare. Amount payable.
£ s. d. £ s. d.
No. of ticket issued, third class \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
From \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
To \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Route via \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Booking Clerk \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Station \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Date \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
- 8943. Wt. 25571/505. 3,000. 11/36. Wy.L.P. Gp. 656
Catalogue Reference: WO/399/8500 Notes for guidance of members of Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service Reserve and Civil Hospital Reserve, who receive "Calling Up Notices" in the event of Mobilization.
In the event of calling out the whole Army Reserve, etc.
1. Part I of this form should be handed to the Matron on your arrival at the unit to which you are posted.
Part II entitles you to travel at public expense to your destination.
2. Members will take precedence amongst themselves according to their army seniority within Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service Reserve.
3. Provided a member has been examined and passed fit for active service by a military medical officer after joining the unit to which she has been posted, she will be required to provide herself with the regulation uniform and application for the necessary particulars should be made to the Matron or Sister in Charge of the Unit. 2/Reserve T/725 (A.M.D.4.)
6th February 1939.
Madam,
With reference to the attached Annual Report for the year 1938, I am directed to point out that the present employment and address shewn thereon, would appear to be that of your father.
I am, therefore, to request that you will kindly amend this to shew the nature and address of your present employment.
An envelope, which does not require a stamp, is enclosed for your reply.
I am,
Madam, Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) K. H. JONES.
Principal Matron, for Matron-in-Chief, Q.A.I.M.N.S. for Director-General, Army Medical Services.
Miss M.H. Turton, 20, Grosvenor Road, Sketty, Swansea, Glamorgan, Wales. Any further communication on this subject should be addressed to: The Under-Secretary of State, The War Office, London, S.W.1., and the following number quoted.
2/11/25 (Amid)
THE WAR OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.1.
14 JUL 1937
Madam,
In order to complete the records in this office, I am directed to request that you will be so good as to furnish the following particulars:
1. Date of birth
2. Religion
3. Name and address of next-of-kin (stating relationship)
4. Permanent home address
An envelope, which does not require a stamp, is enclosed for your reply.
I am, Madam, Your obedient Servant,
Miss M. A. Turton Nursing Staff East Surrey Hospital Redhill, Surrey
Principal Matron, for Matron-in-Chief, Q.A.I.M.N.S. for Director General, Army Medical Services.
R. 4498. 2/Reserve T/735. (A.M.D.4.)
14th July 1937.
Madam,
I am directed to inform you that your name has been added to the Roll of Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service Reserve, in the rank of Sister, and to add that a further communication on this subject will be addressed to in due course.
I am, Madam, Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) D. M. MARTIN
Matron-in-Chief, Q.A.I.M.N.S. for Director-General, Army Medical Services.
Miss M.H. TURTON, Nursing Staff, East Surrey Hospital, Redhill, Surrey. **QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S IMPERIAL MILITARY NURSING SERVICE. RESERVE**
**MEETING OF THE SELECTING SUB-COMMITTEE TO BE HELD AT THE WAR OFFICE**
**on**
**MONDAY 12th July, 1937.**
**Candidate for CONSIDERATION FOR ENROLMENT**
**Miss M.H. Turton**
| Age | 39 years (born 16.5.1898) | |--------------------------|---------------------------| | Health | Medical Cert. Satisfactory | | Social Status | Father described as a Grocer. | | Educated | Eastern House, Weston-Super-Mare. | | Age left School | 19 years | | Religion | C. of E. | | Qualifications | Trained at Middlesex Hpl. 1925 to 1938 Ward Sister East Surrey Hospital, Redhill at present. | | | S.R.N. | | Matron's References | Middlesex Hpl. Favourable | | | East Surrey Hpl. Redhill Favourable | | Social Reference | Mrs. Lewis Favourable |
**Recommendation of Matron-in-Chief:**
[Signature]
**Recommendation of Sub-Committee:**
[Signature] CONFIDENTIAL.
QUESTIONNAIRE.
For completion by the Matron-in-Chief or Principal Matron when a candidate for Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service Reserve has been interviewed prior to her appointment thereto.
Name of Candidate: Miss M. A. Sutton
1. Do you consider the candidate suitable, in every respect, for appointment as: (a) Sister.\
(b) Staff Nurse.
2. Would you give her an appointment in a hospital under your supervision?
3. Is she, in your opinion, a woman of intelligence, and able to command respect?
4. Is she, in your opinion, likely to prove a credit to Q.A.I.M.N.S. Reserve?
5. Any other remarks. Has held the post of Sister, East Surrey Hospital for 5 years. Should prove a useful member of Q.A.I.M.N.S. Reserve.
A.M.D.4. WAR OFFICE.
Date: 5.7.37.
Signature: C.H. Roy
Principal Matron, Q.A.I.M.N.S.
For Matron-in-Chief, Q.A.I.M.N.S.
RT. 9373. 2/Reserve T/725. (A.M.D.4.)
2nd July 1937.
Madam,
With reference to War Office letter, above number, dated 24th June 1937 and your reply thereto of the 1st instant, I am directed to inform you that arrangements have now been made for the interview at the War Office to take place at 3.15 p.m. on Monday next the 5th instant.
I am,
Madam, Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) D. M. MARTIN Matron-in-Chief, Q.A.I.M.N.S. for Director-General, Army Medical Services.
Miss M.H. TURTON, Nursing Staff, East Surrey Hospital, Redhill, Surrey. East Surrey Hospital Red Hill Surrey.
1. 9. 37
To the Matron, i.e. Chief.
Dear Madam,
Owing to the shortage of staff caused by holidays, it will not be possible for me to go up to London till next week.
I will call at 3 p.m. on Monday next - July 5th - for my interview if that will suit your convenience.
Yours truly,
F. Burton. THE WAR OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.1. 25th June 1937.
Madam,
In returning herewith by registered post your
Birth, Training & Sick Children & Women's training
certificates
forwarded with your application for appointment to Queen
Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service Reserve,
copies having been retained for reference, I am directed to
request that you will be so good as to acknowledge the receipt
of same.
A further communication will be sent to you in due course.
I am,
Madam,
Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) D. M. MARTIN.
Matron-in-Chief, Q.A.I.M.N.S. for Director-General, Army Medical Services.
Miss M.H. TURTON, Nursing Staff, East Surrey Hospital, Redhill, Surrey. 24th June 1937.
Madam,
I am directed to inform you that prior to your enrolment in Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service Reserve, it will be necessary for you to be interviewed and for that purpose I am to request that you will be so good as to call at the War Office, Room 359, at 3 p.m. any week-day (except Saturday) of next week.
It would be appreciated if you would kindly notify this office the day on which you will attend for interview. An envelope, which does not require a stamp, is enclosed for your reply.
I am to add that any reasonable claim for out-of-pocket expenses incurred by you in complying with this notification will be defrayed by the War Office in arrears. Your attention is drawn to the fact that tourist and other cheap travelling facilities are granted by Railway Companies and you should avail yourself of such if possible.
I am,
Madam, Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) D. M. MARTIN
Matron-in-Chief, Q.A.I.M.N.S. for Director-General, Army Medical Services.
Miss M.H. TURTON, Nursing Staff, East Surrey Hospital, Redhill, Surrey. Confidential.
THE WAR OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.1.
To
The Matron and Lady Superintendent of Nurses,
Miss Marjorie Hannah Turton
has applied for admission to Her Majesty's Service, and states that she was trained in your hospital, from 1925 to 1928.
Would you kindly answer the questions on the following page, and give me any other particulars you think may be of use in selecting Candidates? Your answers will be considered as quite private and confidential.
Believe me,
DEAR MADAM,
Yours very truly,
O. Ray.
PRINCIPAL MATRON. Matron-in-Chief, Q.A.I.M.N.S.
1936 June 1937
H.E.R.M.I.S. Envelope enclosed, which does not require a stamp. QUESTION.
01. Do you consider the Candidate suitable in every way for the post of Staff Nurse or Sister?
02. Would you give her an appointment in your own hospital?
03. Is she a good nurse, and has she the judgment and capacity for management and supervision?
04. Is she steady and reliable, and suitable to nurse officers and men?
05. Is she obedient and pleasant to work with?
06. Why did she leave?
07. Is she a woman of intelligence and education, and able to command respect?
08. Do you consider she is capable of controlling the orderlies placed under her?
09. Is she likely to do credit to the hospital in which she was trained, and to the Queen's Service?
10. Any other remarks.
Confidential.
ANSWER.
Yes, for the post of Staff Nurse.
Yes, as Staff Nurse.
Yes.
Yes.
On completion of training.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
Miss Turton was a good individual nurse, and had a pleasant manner. She should be a suitable candidate for the Q.A.I.M.N.S.R.
Date 21st June, 1937.
Signature
Matron and Lady Superintendent of Nurses. Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service. Reserve
Confidential.
THE WAR OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.1.
To
The Matron and Lady Superintendent of Nurses, East Surrey Hospital, Redhill, Surrey
DEAR MADAM,
Miss Margaret Annabel Burton
has applied for admission to Her Majesty's Service, and states that she was trained in your hospital, from to
Would you kindly answer the questions on the following page, and give me any other particulars you think may be of use in selecting Candidates? Your answers will be considered as quite private and confidential.
Believe me,
DEAR MADAM,
Yours very truly,
[Signature]
PRINCIPAL MATRON. Matron-in-Chief, Q.A.I.M.N.S.
[Date: 1936 June 19]
Envelope enclosed, which does not require a stamp. QUESTION.
01. Do you consider the Candidate suitable in every way for the post of Staff Nurse or Sister?
02. Would you give her an appointment in your own hospital?
03. Is she a good nurse, and has she the judgment and capacity for management and supervision?
04. Is she steady and reliable, and suitable to nurse officers and men?
05. Is she obedient and pleasant to work with?
06. Why did she leave?
07. Is she a woman of intelligence and education, and able to command respect?
08. Do you consider she is capable of controlling the orderlies placed under her?
09. Is she likely to do credit to the hospital in which she was trained, and to the Queen's Service?
10. Any other remarks.
ANSWER.
Yes.
She holds the appointment of Sister, at the East Surrey Hospital.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
This Nurse is a loyal Sister, and a good Woman.
Date 26.6.37
Signature
[Signature]
[Signature] Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service.
Confidential.
THE WAR OFFICE, LONDON, S.W. 1.
To
Mrs. P. S. Lewis
"Wood Cottage" Lower Road Swansea
Dear Madam,
Miss Marjorie Annah Tanton
has applied to Queen Alexandra's Army Nursing Board for admission to Her Majesty's Service, and has given your name for a reference.
Would you kindly answer the questions on the following page, and give any information you think may be of use in selecting Candidates? Your answers will be considered as quite private and confidential.
I am,
Dear Madam,
Yours faithfully,
Ch. Roy.
PRINCIPAL MATRON.
Matron-in-Chief,
Q.A.I.M.N.S.
19th June 1937
Envelope enclosed, which does not require a stamp. | Question | Answer | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1. Is the applicant of sound health, both of body and mind, of good moral character and high principles? | Good health of good moral character and high principles | | 2. Is she a woman of intelligence and education, and able to command respect? | Yes | | 3. How long have you known her and what have been your opportunities of personal acquaintance? | I have known her, and family for 20 years. I have seen her frequently during all her holidays for 15 years. Her father is a much respected man in this town, to whom she has a good home, to which she comes for all holidays she has. | | 4. Her previous history—especially during the last two or three months? | Bright disposition and a keen sense of humour. | | 5. Habits and disposition. | | | 6. Temper. | Very even tempered. | | 7. Manner. | A really nice manner. | | 8. Tact and judgment. | I should imagine very tactful. | | 9. Capacity for management and supervision. | Good. I should think, but information on that point can be found better by either of her previous employers. | | 10. Please add any additional information and remarks. | I have known Maynard Turton and her family for many years. I have always found her happy, cheerful, and she's a good Churchwoman. |
Date: June 21st 37 Signature: Olive. M. Lewis. THE BRISTOL ROYAL HOSPITAL FOR SICK CHILDREN AND WOMEN.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT
MARJORIE H. TURTON
was trained as a Nurse at this Institution for three years and during that period she nursed in the Medical and Surgical wards, and attended Lectures on Anatomy, Physiology, Medical and Surgical Nursing.
(Sgd.) William Garnett, President.
(Sgd.) A. Carling, Honorary Medical Officer.
(Sgd.) S.C. Mattick, Lady Superintendent.
BRISTOL, May 27th 1921. THE MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY
that MARJORIE TURTON
was received as a Probationer on the twenty second day of September 1925 and has completed a term of three years training in the Wards of this Hospital, both on day and night duty.
During this time her work has been good and her conduct good.
(Sgd.) F.J. Bentinck, Chairman. (Sgd.) M.G. Montgomery, Lady Superintendent. (Sgd.) Walter Yewley, House Governor.
Marjorie Turton has attended Lectures on Medical Surgical, and Gynaecological Nursing, also on elementary Anatomy and Physiology, and passed the usual examination.
(Sgd.) R.A. Young, M.D., F.R.C.P., Lecturer on Medicine. (Sgd.) G. Gordon-Taylor, F.R.C.S., Lecturer on Surgery. (Sgd.) Comyns Berkeley, M.A., M.D., M.C. Cantab. F.R.F., Lecturer on Gynaecology.
Dated the twenty ninth day of October 1928. PERSUANT TO THE BIRTHS AND DEATHS REGISTRATION ACTS, 1836 to 1900
REGISTRATION DISTRICT Coventry
1898 BIRTH IN THE Sub-District of St. John, Coventry, in the Counties of Coventry and Warwick.
No. 213.
1. When and Where born ..................... 16th May, 1898. 14, Grosvenor Road, U.D.
2. Name, if any ............................. Marjorie Hannah
3. Sex ........................................ Girl
4. Name and Surname of Father ............. George Paddock Turton
5. Name and Maiden Surname, of Mother .......... Bertha Louise Turton, formerly Jones
6. Rank or Profession of Father. Grocer (Master)
7. Signature, Description and Residence of Informant .......... Geo. F. Turton, Father. 14, Grosvenor Road, Coventry.
8. When registered ......................... 23rd June, 1898.
9. Signature of Registrar .................. Edwin Rainbow. This is to certify that I have examined Mrs. Hannah Turton and find her to be in good health and free from physical defects.
11/4/37.
[Signature]
[Date] QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S IMPERIAL MILITARY NURSING SERVICE RESERVE
FORM OF APPLICATION
01. Name in Full: Mayrie Harriet Burton
02. Date of birth (attach copy of entry of birth): May 16th 1895
03. Place of birth: Coventry
04. Profession or occupation of father: Engineer
05. Whether parents are living, and address: Father, 23, Grosvenor Road, Bally, Worcesters
06. Are you a British subject, a daughter of British subjects and of pure European descent? Yes
07. Whether single or widow (if a widow, profession or occupation of late husband and number of children, if any): Single
08. Religion: Church of England
09. Were educated and age on leaving school: Eastern House, Weston Super Mare, Nov. 19
10. State of health (attach Medical Certificate): Satisfactory
11. (a) In what hospital trained, and for what period - giving dates (attach Training Certificate) Middlesex Hospital, W.1. 1920 - 1925
(b) When did you leave, and what position did you hold? 1925. Staff Nurse
12. Are you State Registered? (attach certificate): Yes
13. Special qualifications (including C.M.H.) (attach certificates): Sister Children's Hospital, 65, Michael's Hill, Dublin
14. If you have had further nursing experience, state its nature, giving dates and places:
15. How and where are you at present employed? (State name and address of institution or employer): Ward Sister, East Grinstead Hospital, Redhill, Surrey
16. Are you a Candidate for any other Nursing Service? No
17. Are you in receipt of a Disability Pension? No
N.B. - Certificates must be forwarded in original; they will be returned by registered post in due course.
- Obtainable from Registrar General's Office, Somerset House, London, W.C.2. DECLARATION
(To be in the Candidate's own handwriting)
I, [Signature of Candidate],
a candidate for appointment to Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service Reserve,
do hereby declare that I have answered the preceding questions to the best of my knowledge
and belief, that I am fully aware of the terms and conditions of service under which I seek
appointment, and accept the same; that I am willing to serve under the Rules laid down in
the Regulations for the Medical Services of the Army, and in the Standing Orders for
Members of Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service, and, if enrolled, I undertake to serve at home or abroad if and when required to do so.
(Address) East Surrey Hospital
Redhill, Surrey
(Date) June 16th 1937
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fea303ce6bcb8b66d48ccbfe41c18966f6ec2340 | Home Office Information Management Assessment
The Home Office underwent an Information Management Assessment (IMA) by The National Archives (TNA) in mid 2015. I welcome this assessment, which has now been published.
I am pleased that it recognises a number of examples of good practice; and that the Department has been assessed as good or satisfactory in most areas. In particular, it highlights as good practice our management of information risk, and the steps we have taken to improve our digital records management through the iManage system.
I recognise, however, that there are areas where we can improve our management of information in the Home Office, and accept that we need to do more to address these shortfalls. We can do more to join up knowledge and information management governance; I see our new Knowledge and Information Management Executive Group as the key forum for this. We also need to do more to strengthen our policy and processes around information assets, and to build on the good progress we have made with our iManage records management system to extend control over all our digital information repositories.
We are committed to addressing these issues through our future IT and information management improvement plans, and have already started to develop an action plan with The National Archives to achieve the improvements required.
MARK SEDWILL
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2e9773a194da497634c67f4e2c730e5ed15db3a6 | Material Requirements for Infrastructure Development
Mr Son Quang Pham and Dr Michael Burrow University of Birmingham February 2018 About this report
The K4D Emerging Issues report series highlights research and emerging evidence to policy-makers to help inform policies that are more resilient to the future. K4D staff researchers work with thematic experts and DFID to identify where new or emerging research can inform and influence policy.
K4D services are provided by a consortium of leading organisations working in international development, led by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), with Education Development Trust, Itad, University of Leeds Nuffield Centre for International Health and Development, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM), University of Birmingham International Development Department (IDD) and the University of Manchester Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI).
For any enquiries, please contact [email protected].
Suggested citation
Pham, Son Quang, and Burrow, Michael (2018) Material Requirements for Infrastructure Development. K4D Emerging issues Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
Copyright
This report was prepared for the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) and its partners in support of pro-poor programmes. It is licensed for non-commercial purposes only. K4D cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this report. Any views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, K4D or any other contributing organisation. © DFID - Crown copyright 2018. Contents
1 Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 1 2 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 2 3 Financial requirements ...................................................................................................................... 4 4 Aluminium ......................................................................................................................................... 6 5 Cement ............................................................................................................................................... 9 6 Steel .................................................................................................................................................. 11 7 Wood ................................................................................................................................................ 12 8 Human resource requirements .......................................................................................................... 14 9 References ......................................................................................................................................... 16 1 Overview
This literature review aims to identify published studies providing projections of the global demand for, and remaining stock of, materials important for construction that could be constraints to the development of infrastructure worldwide.
Our review found very little evidence and few projections addressing this issue. Although a wide variety of materials could potentially constrain infrastructure development, in our research we were only able to identify good quality projections for four materials: aluminium, cement, steel, and wood. Estimates of the energy needs, water requirements and likely carbon emissions of mining and processing these resources are also provided.
Demand for all of the materials we were able to study is projected to increase exponentially, along with related trends such as population and economic growth. Although this suggests the possibility of exhausting the available reserves of raw materials, it is highly likely that substitution of alternative materials, changes in construction techniques, and scarcity enabling the exploitation of formerly uneconomic reserves may help prolong reserves of commodities. We did not identify any commodities that appear to be in near-term short supply on a global aggregate basis, although local shortages of individual materials are quite possible.
We also found several studies projecting the financial investment needed to meet the demand for infrastructure, so we have presented a summary of this information as well. We also attempted to estimate the skilled labour requirements in terms of the number of additional qualified consulting engineers which would be required to design and construct the additional road infrastructure required; we were unable to make similar estimates for other types of infrastructure due to limited information being available.
Our key findings are:
- The global infrastructure investment requirement for the period 2015-2030 is approximately $63 trillion (i.e. $3.9 trillion per year). This is an increase of about 56% of the current global infrastructure spend.
- Global production of aluminium is growing exponentially at a rate of 4.1% per year (Menzie et al. 2010). Assuming no changes in techniques, this suggests that known bauxite reserves could be exhausted by 2055.
- Global production of cement has been projected by the IEA (2009) to grow exponentially at a rate of 0.8% to 1.2% per year, but actual production has already far exceeded this projection due to high growth in emerging markets and developing countries. • Global production of steel is projected to grow exponentially at a rate of 1.4% per year (Accenture 2017). Assuming no changes in techniques, known iron ore reserves could be exhausted by 2070.
• Global production of wood is projected to grow exponentially at a rate of 1.9% per year (Turner et al. 2006). Although wood is in principle a renewable resource, water stress appears likely to be an important constraint, as one source suggests that future wood production could require as much water as 29% of total current global water consumption (World Water Exchange 2016).
Table 1 Estimated energy, water requirements and carbon emissions between 2015 and 2030
| Materials | Cumulative material demand (billion tonnes) | Energy per tonne of material (kWh/t) | Water (Litres) | CO₂ (kgCO₂) | Energy In total (TWh) | Water In total (Million m³) | CO₂ (Mt CO₂) | |-----------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------|-------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------| | Cement | 50.1 (1) | 110 | 307 | 914 | 5,518 | 15,400 | 45,850 | | Steel | 26.7 (2) | 5,700 | 28,500 | 2,000 | 152,147 | 760,733 | 53,385 | | Aluminium | 1.7 (3) | 72,000 | 88,000 | 20,900 | 120,967 | 147,849 | 35,114 | | Total | | | | | 278,632 | 923,982 | 134,349 |
Source: (1) adapted from IEA, 2010; (2) adapted from Accenture, 2017; (3) adapted from Menzie et al., 2010.
It should be emphasised that all of these projections have a high degree of uncertainty associated with them.
2 Methodology
The review question lends itself to an unbiased aggregation approach where the aim of the study is to identify a sufficient number of studies that provide relevant forecasts. With sufficient resources, such an approach would ideally seek to identify all relevant literature, but in keeping with the resource constraints of this particular study, careful consideration was given to locating a sample of studies most pertinent to addressing the research question. This was achieved by carrying out a key word search of titles and abstracts of studies via internet based search engines and via accessing databases and the websites of specific organisations. Following the initial screening process the full text of pertinent studies were retrieved for further scrutiny.
To be included in the scope, identified studies had to satisfy the following criteria:
i. Resources: raw and processed physical materials and human resources used in the investment, design, construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure (airports, bridges, commercial and residential buildings, dams, energy extraction/generation facilities, freshwater, storm water and sewage infrastructure, ports, power stations, railways, roads and telecommunications)
ii. Study design: Projections which determine the current and future resource requirements associated with planning, financing, building and maintaining infrastructure
iii. Language: English language only.
The review focused on identifying good quality studies which projected global demands, rather than those which focused on individual countries or groups of countries.
The primary raw materials used for the construction of physical infrastructure include clays, gravels, rock, sands and wood. Processed materials primarily used for physical infrastructure include asphalt / bitumen (processed from petroleum but also found naturally), bricks (made from clays), cement (i.e. clay, limestone or calcium silicate), ceramics (primarily from clays), concrete (i.e. cement plus sands and gravels of various sizes and water), foam (synthetic polystyrene or polyurethane), glass (melted sand and silicates), metals (primarily aluminium from bauxite; iron and steel from iron ore), paper (from wood) and plastics.
In our research, however, we were only able to identify good quality projections of the availability of four materials: aluminium, cement, steel and wood. Secondary sources of information were used to project the associated raw material requirements: bauxite for aluminium, limestone and clay for cement, and iron ore for steel. Estimates associated with the energy and water requirements and likely carbon emissions associated with mining and using these resources are also provided.
The study utilised the following databases, websites and search engines:
- Scopus
- Web of Science
- Google Scholar
- Google
- World Bank
- Asian Development Bank
- African Development Bank
- OECD
- New Climate Economy
- FindIT.bham.ac.uk. 3 Financial requirements
The review of the literature found estimates of the total global infrastructure investment requirement for the period 2015-2030 at 2015 prices ranging between $21.8 trillion and $96.6 trillion. The average across all of the studies was $63 trillion, equivalent to an annual investment of about $3.9 trillion per year which is 50% more than current annual infrastructure spending of $2.5 trillion per year (McKinsey & Company, 2016). Figure 1 shows the global cumulative projected investment in infrastructure by different authors. All estimates have been converted to 2015 prices and adapted for the period 2015-2030; the red line shows the average investment value of the projections.
Figure 1 Global cumulative investment for the period 2015-2030 by different authors (in 2015 US$)
Our review found six studies which estimated the investment needed for global infrastructure development (see Table 2). The studies apply a wide range of methodologies, estimate periods, definition of infrastructure, assumptions and scenarios. This results in significant differences in the projected infrastructure demand as well as the required investment to meet such demand. Table 2 Summary of projected financial requirements by different authors (in 2015 US$)
| Source | Global Infrastructure requirement (annual) | Global Infrastructure requirement (total) | Estimate period | What is included | |-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | GCEC, 2014 | $ 6 trillion/year | $96.5 trillion by 2030 | 2015-2030 | New construction & maintenance for Transport, Water & waste, Energy & Telecoms | | Bhattacharya et al., 2016 | $ 5 trillion/year | $80.5 trillion by 2030 | 2015-2030 | New construction & maintenance for Transport, Water supply & sanitation, Energy, & Telecoms | | Ruiz-Nuñez. & Wei , 2015 | $ 1.2 trillion/year | $8.1 trillion by 2020 | 2014-2020 | New construction & maintenance for Transport, Water supply & waste, Energy, & Telecoms | | Kennedy,& Morlot ,2013 | $ 3.2 trillion/year | $19.2 trillion by 2020 | 2015-2020 | New construction & maintenance for Transport, Water, Energy, & Telecoms | | McKinsey & Company, 2013 | $3.5 trillion/year | $62.1 trillion by 2030 | 2013-2030 | New construction & maintenance for Transport, Water supply & waste, Energy, & Telecoms | | Dulac, 2013 | $ 3.2 trillion/year | $128.6 trillion by 2050 | 2010-2050 | New construction & maintenance for road, railway and parking place |
A study by The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate (GCEC) (2014) projects that the world will need to invest about $88.6 trillion in infrastructure by 2030 (i.e. $ 5.5 trillion per year). The study is based on a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario and assumes that there will be no new policy actions to address additional infrastructure which might be required to tackle the effects of climate change and the requirements for additional energy security. The projections were calculated at 2010 prices and derived from sectoral estimates provide by OECD (2006 and 2012), the International Energy Agency - IEA (2012), and the analysis by Climate Policy Initiative (The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014). The projection includes the investment for replacement, maintenance and construction for transport (road, rail, airport, and port), water supply and waste (for both human and agricultural use), energy (power generation, electricity transmission and distribution, fossil fuel supply chain, and energy end-use sectors) and telecommunications infrastructure (fixed-line telephony and data, mobile telephony and data, broadband mobile communications).
Bhattacharya et al (2016) estimate that between $75 trillion and $86 trillion (at 2015 prices) of investment is needed for new construction and maintenance of core infrastructure (including energy, transport, water supply & sanitation, and telecommunication) for the period 2015 to 2030. They made the calculation based on the average infrastructure investment spending in 2015 and assumptions of GDP growth and investment rates. The uncertainties in these assumptions are the major limitation of the report.
Ruiz-Nuñez and Wei (2015) estimate that the required resource to satisfy new infrastructure demand while still maintaining existing global infrastructure will amount to $1.1 trillion (US$ 2011) or 2.2 percent of current world GDP per year over the period 2014 and 2020. To estimate the infrastructure investment demand Ruiz-Nuñez and Wei (2015) adopted Fay’s (2000) model and Yepes (2008) methodology to develop a model in which infrastructure investment requirement is estimated to satisfy the customer and producer demand for services given an expected GDP growth rate. The GDP growth rates between 2014 and 2020 were predicted from the average GDP growth rates of the previous five years.
McKinsey and Company (2013) projects global infrastructure needs through combining independent estimates of future needs by sector, including those of the OECD, IEA, and Global Water Intelligence (GWI). The report forecasts that $57 trillion, at 2010 prices, in global infrastructure investment will be required between 2013 and 2030. This figure includes the investment for transport, power, water and telecommunications infrastructure, with roads and power accounting for almost half of the demand. Similar to the above studies, McKinsey and Company’s report suggest that the infrastructure investment requirement up until 2030 is greater than the estimated value of today’s infrastructure worldwide.
Similar studies were also conducted by Kennedy & Morlot (2013) and Dulac, (2013). While Kennedy & Morlot (2013) focus on a wide range of infrastructure categories (transport, energy generation, transmission and distribution, water, and telecommunication), Dulac, (2013) only calculates the needs for roads, railways and parking demands. As a whole, Kennedy, & Morlot (2013) forecast that the world will need an investment of $18.7 trillion for infrastructure by 2020. For the transport sector, Dulac (2013) estimates an investment of $120 trillion (US$ 2010) is required by 2050.
4 Aluminium
Aluminium’s strength to weight properties and its resistance to corrosion make it an important material for the construction infrastructure and transport (trains and aircraft). Due to its light weight and electrical conductivity, aluminium is also widely in electricity transmission. Approximately 26% of aluminium production is used for the construction sector in 2016 (Statista.com, 2018). The demand for aluminium is expected to continue to increase to match with the exponential growth in global population, the increasing trend in globalization and urbanization. Menzie et al. (2010) project that aluminium consumption by 2025 is likely to reach 120 million tonnes per year, representing a compound growth rate of 4.1 % per year. The growth rate is expected to relatively slow in high-income countries, but remain rapid in low and middle income countries. At this growth rate, aluminium production will double after 15 years and triple after about 23 years. Figure 2 shows actual and predicted aluminium production from 1994 to 2025.
Figure 2 Global Aluminium Production between 1994 and 2025
Source: (1) US Geological Survey; (2) Menzie et al., 2010
Utilizing the Menzie et al. (2010) projection for the period 2015 to 2025 and extrapolating to 2030 the resulting accumulated aluminium demand is given in Figure 3. To meet this projected demand, the world will need to produce about 1.7 billion tonnes of aluminium by 2030. Typically four tonnes of bauxite is required to produce a tonne of aluminium (Ashraf, 2014; Australianbauxite.com, 2017). This means to produce 1.7 billion tonnes of aluminium by 2030, the world will need about 6.8 billion tonnes of bauxite. The total global bauxite reserves are estimated to be about 27.8 billion tonnes (The Bauxite Index, 2017). If the aluminium demand keeps growing at 4.1% per year, there are no significant changes in aluminium production technologies and no new bauxite reserves are found, current known world reserves of bauxite are likely to be exhausted by 2055. This projection is based on current trends continuing unchanged, but substitution, changes in construction techniques, and exploitation of formerly uneconomic reserves are likely to prolong reserves of bauxite.
The production of a tonne of aluminium requires 72,000 kWh of energy (Rankin, 2012; Low-tech Magazine, 2014), 88 m³ water (Zygmunt, 2007) and results in 21 tonnes of CO₂ (Rankin, 2012; Carbon Trust, 2011). To produce 1.7 billion tonnes of aluminium requires approximately 121,000 TWh of energy, 148 billion m³ water and result in about 35 billion tonnes of CO₂. The annual average amount of energy required for aluminium production to 2030 is 5% of the entire global energy consumption in 2015 (Ritchie and Roser, 2017). The carbon emission resulting from aluminium production is about 2.2 billion tonnes per year to 2030, which is equivalent to about 6% of the global carbon emissions in 2015. 5 Cement
Cement is an essential component of concrete, a fundamental material used in buildings, bridges, dams and roads. IEA (2009) suggests a cement production road map up to 2050 with two scenarios in which global cement demand may increase on average by 0.8% to 1.2% per year between 2006 and 2050, reaching between 3.7 and 4.4 billion tonnes per year in 2050. At the high demand growth rate, cement production would increase by 50% after about 30 years and double after 56 years.
Figure 4 shows the actual and predicted global cement production between 1994 and 2050. The blue line presents actual cement production between 1994 and 2016 derived from USGS’s database; the red and green lines show the range of cement demand projected by IEA (2010) between 2006 and 2050. Demand has in fact greatly exceeded IEA projections, possibly because IEA underestimated the growth of the cement market in emerging markets and developing countries. For instance, the projection suggests that China’s cement production will peak in 2015 at nearly 1.7 billion tonnes per year, whereas USGS (2017) reported that actual cement production in China was approximately 2.4 billion tonnes in 2015 (i.e. 40% higher than the forecast). Unfortunately, we were unable to find other projections of global cement requirements.
Figure 4 Global cement production between 1994 and 2050
Source: (1) US Geological Survey; (2) IEA, 2009 Adjusting IEA’s estimate in the high-demand scenario for the period 2015 and 2030, the accumulated cement demand is calculated and shown in Figure 5. By 2030 the world is predicted to require the production of about 50 billion tonnes of cement.
**Figure 5 Cumulative global cement demand 2015-2030**
*Source: adapted from IEA, 2010*
Typically about 1.65 tonnes of limestone and 0.4 tonnes of clay are quarried for each tonne of cement produced (British Geological Survey, 2005). This means to produce 50 billion tonnes of cement by 2030, there will be a need for about 83 billion tonnes of limestone and 20 billion tonnes of clay (see table 3).
**Table 3 Limestone and clay required to produce projected cement demand**
| Accumulated cement demand | Limestone per tonne of cement (*) | Clay per tonne of cement (*) | Limestone required | Clay required | |---------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|--------------| | (billion tonnes) | (tonnes) | (tonnes) | (billion tonnes) | (billion tonnes) | | **50.16** | 1.65 | 0.40 | 82.77 | 20.07 |
*Source: (*) British Geological Survey, 2005\*
To produce a tonne of cement requires about 110 kWh of energy (GNCS, 2017; IEA-ETSAP, 2010) and 307 litres of water (Lafarge, 2011; World Steel Association, 2015), and 914 kg CO₂ are produced (GNCS, 2017; NRMCA, 2012). This means to meet the projected cement demand of 50 billion tonnes by 2030 about 5,518 TWh of energy, 15 billion m³ of water will be required, and 46 billion tonnes CO₂ will be produced. Thus the annual average amount of energy required for cement production up until 2030 is 0.24% of the entire global energy consumption in 2015 i.e. 146,000 TWh, (Ritchie and Roser, 2017). As a result, between 2015 and 2030, the cement industry will create 2.9 billion tonnes of CO$\_2$ per year on average which is equivalent to 8.1% of the current global carbon emissions of 36 billion tonnes per year (Edgar, 2017). This share of carbon emission is similar to that reported by Andrew (2017) of 8% of global CO$\_2$ emissions per year.
6 Steel
The world’s steel consumption has more than doubled in the past twenty years, from 0.7 billion tonnes per year in 1994 to 1.6 billion tonnes per year in 2015 (USGS, 1996 & 2017). Steel demand is expected to grow at 1.4% per year, reaching about 2.0 billion tonnes per year by 2035 (Accenture, 2017). Construction is the largest steel-consuming sector, accounting for approximately 50% of global steel consumption (Lee and Dai, 2016).
Error! Reference source not found. shows global actual steel production from 1994-2015 (blue line) and predicted steel production to 2035 (red line) according to a study by Accenture (2017).
Figure 6 Global steel production between 1994 and 2035
By 2030 the world will need a total of about 27 billion tonnes of new steel produced (Error! Reference source not found.). Producing 1 tonne of crude steel typically requires about 1.4 tonnes of iron ore (World Steel Association, 2016). To produce 27 billion tonnes of crude steel will require 37.4 billion tonnes of iron ore by 2030. According to The Statistics Portal (2017), world reserves of iron ore as of 2016 are approximately 170 billion tonnes. Therefore if steel demand keeps increasing at a rate of 1.4%, there are no significant changes in steel production technologies, and no new iron ore reserves are found, current known world reserves of iron ore may be exhausted by 2070. This projection is based on current trends continuing unchanged, but substitution, changes in construction techniques and exploitation of formerly uneconomic reserves are likely to prolong reserves of iron ore.
Typically in order to produce a tonne of steel requires about 5,700 kWh of energy (Horvath, 2013; Rankin, 2012) and 28.5 m³ water (World Steel Association, 2015; Colla et al., 2017), and produces about 2 tonnes CO₂ (Horvath, 2013; Rankin, 2012). Thus, producing 27 billion tonnes of steel requires about 152,000 TWh of energy, 761 billion m³ water, and results in about 53 billion tonnes of CO₂. The annual average amount of energy required for steel production to 2030 is about 7% of the entire global energy consumption, 146,000 TWh, in 2015 (Ritchie and Roser, 2017), and the annual carbon emissions from steel production to the year 2030 may amount to about 3.3 billion tonnes per year, which is equivalent to about 9% of the global carbon emissions of 36 billion tonnes per year in 2015 (Edgar, 2017).
7 Wood
The studies identified which project the requirement of wood do so in terms of the value of wood harvested or consumed, rather than the mass of wood. This measure has therefore been used in the report. The amount of energy required and carbon emissions produced as a result of wood production are not provided because of a lack of good quality studies, but the amount of water required to produce wood is estimated.
Turner et al. (2006) report that global wood consumption value increased from US$348 billion per year in 1958 to US$597 billion per year in 2002. They also project that the wood consumption will continue to increase at 1.9% per annum, reaching US$1,023 billion per year in 2030. With this growth rate, global wood production value will double by 2038 (see Error! Reference source not found.). The construction sector accounts for about 25% of the global wood consumption (Ebohon and Rwelamila, 2001).
**Figure 8 Global wood production value between 2002 and 2030**
*Source: Turner et al., 2006*
According to Turner et al. (2006), between 2015 and 2030 at total the world will need about 39.7 billion m$^3$ of round wood; 7.9 billion m$^3$ of sawn wood; 1.8 billion m$^3$ of veneer/plywood; 2.5 billion m$^3$ of particle board; and 1.5 billion m$^3$ of fibrewood.
To grow and process such an amount of wood, about 21.2 trillion m$^3$ of water is required (see table 4). The annual average requirement for this is 29% of the global water consumption in 2015 of approximately 4.5 trillion m$^3$ (World Water Exchange, 2016). Table 4 Water required for wood production between 2015 and 2030
| Type of Wood | Water required per m³ (\*) | Product demand | Water required | |--------------------|---------------------------|----------------|----------------| | | (m³) | x 1000 m³ | Billion m³ | | Round wood | 293 | 39,733,053 | 11,642 | | Sawn wood | 580 | 7,921,641 | 4,595 | | Veneer/ plywood | 652 | 1,848,440 | 1,205 | | Particleboard | 847 | 2,524,682 | 2,138 | | Fiberwood | 1093 | 1,494,787 | 1,634 | | Total | | | 21,214 |
Source: (\*) Schyns et al. (2017)
8 Human resource requirements
As requested, we attempted to estimate the human resource requirements (considering in this case only skilled engineers, rather than all labour requirements) to meet road construction needs until 2030. The assumptions made are presented in Table 3. We were unable to provide similar estimates for other infrastructure types due to a lack of reliable data.
Based on figures provided by Dulac (2013), by 2030 the world will need to construct an additional of 14 million paved road lane-km at a cost of $18.2 trillion. This will require about 17 million man-years of qualified engineer design input, or roughly 1.2 million person-years per year. This is about four times the total number of civil engineering jobs in the US in 2016 (which was 303,500; US Department of Labour, 2016)⁵
Table 3 Assumptions for estimating human resource requirements
| Additional Road (lane-km) | 14,000,000 | |---------------------------|------------| | Average construction cost / km ($ million)¹ | 1.30 | | Total capital costs ($ million) | 18,200,000 | | Planning and Design Cost² | 10% | | Avg. salary ($/year)³ | 43000 | | Overhead cost /labour cost ⁴ | 150% | | Total person-years (2015-2030) | 17,438,140 | | Annual person-years | 1,162,543 |
1. Dulac, 2013
2. Hollar (2011) suggests that the preliminary engineering costs for highway projects on average are about 10.3% of capital costs.
3. Grant (2017) reports that the average salary for engineering graduates, by country, ranges from $6,379 to $79,243 per year. The average of this range, i.e. approximately $43,000 per year, has been used here.
4. Assuming that overhead costs, including support staff, are about 150% of the salary of a fee earning engineer (http://web.mit.edu/e-club/hadzima/how-much-does-an-employee-cost.html)
5. Here, civil engineers is defined as people who perform engineering duties in planning, designing, and overseeing construction and maintenance of building structures, and facilities, such as roads, railroads, airports, bridges, ports, channels, dams, irrigation projects, pipelines, power plants, and water and sewage systems. 9 References
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9cf047052fd510e78c11b90615db3b69f5f28e76 | Maternity policy
ORR’s maternity policy is intended to support you while you are pregnant both at work and during your period of absence due to maternity. It ensures terms and conditions relating to you are fair, equitable and comply with current legislation.
This policy applies to all permanent and fixed term female employees. It does not apply to agency staff, consultants or contractors who provide work under a contract for service. This policy is incorporated into your contract of employment.
Definitions
1. Certain terms used throughout this policy require clarification. These are defined as follows:
- **Compulsory Maternity Leave**: in accordance with Health & Safety legislation you must take a minimum of two weeks leave from the day of childbirth. These two weeks normally fall within the Ordinary Maternity Leave.
- **Ordinary Maternity Leave**: this is the initial period of leave due to pregnancy and childbirth. At the earliest, it may begin during the 11th week before the expected week of childbirth and will last for 26 weeks.
- **Additional Maternity Leave**: this is any absence additional, to Ordinary Maternity Leave. It will begin after the 26 weeks’ Ordinary Maternity Leave and may extend the absence period for a further 26 weeks from the end of the Ordinary Maternity Leave, to a maximum total of 52 weeks.
- **EWC: The Expected Week of Childbirth**: this means the week beginning with midnight between Saturday and Sunday in which it is expected the baby will be born.
- **Childbirth**: this means the birth of a living child or still birth after a pregnancy lasting at least 24 weeks.
- **Week of Childbirth**: this means the week beginning with midnight between Saturday and Sunday during which the child is actually born. DMP: Departmental Maternity Pay: for staff with the eligible continuous service these are the normal salary payments made by ORR whilst absent as detailed within this policy.
SMP: Statutory Maternity Pay: this is the minimum amount payable during the first 39 weeks of maternity leave. In order to qualify for Statutory Maternity Pay your average earnings must be more than the lower earnings limit for paying National Insurance contributions.
Maternity Allowance: this is an allowance paid by the Job Centre to provide you with some money to help you take time off work for the birth of your baby.
Relevant period: this is defined as the 8 weeks period ending in the 15th week before the expected date of birth.
Calculation of relevant period: when calculating average earnings during the relevant period, any payment received during the relevant period which is treated as earnings for National Insurance contribution purposes is included (even if the payment relates to a period outside of the relevant period e.g. bonus payments, temporary promotion payments). This will be recalculated to include salary increases due to take effect from the start of the relevant period up to the end of your paid maternity leave. Increases in pay taking effect during any period of unpaid maternity leave will only be applied upon return to work and will not be backdated.
Before your baby arrives
What maternity leave am I entitled to?
Ordinary Maternity Leave
2. You must take at least two weeks, and up to 26 weeks Ordinary Maternity Leave. This leave can commence during the 11th week before the expected week of childbirth when either:
- you provide at least 28 days’ notice of your intention to take maternity leave and the date you’d like your leave to begin. This notice should be in writing, using the maternity leave notification form.
- childbirth occurs earlier. Maternity leave begins automatically 1 day after childbirth occurs if the baby is born earlier, but you must inform ORR that the birth has occurred, in writing, at the earliest opportunity or Statutory Maternity Pay will be reduced; or
- you are absent during the four weeks before the expected week of childbirth, due wholly or partially to your pregnancy. You must inform ORR, in writing, as quickly as possible of the reason for your absence. Your Maternity Leave will then automatically begin. Additional Maternity Leave
3. You may take Additional Maternity Leave. This will begin after the 26 weeks of Ordinary Maternity Leave and may extend your absence by a further 26 weeks from the end of the Ordinary Maternity Leave. This may extend your maternity leave up to a maximum of 52 weeks.
4. ORR will assume that you will be taking the Additional Maternity Leave unless you inform HR or your line manager to the contrary.
Medical appointments
5. You are entitled to time off with pay to attend ante-natal clinics or visits to your midwife/doctor. Any appointments should be agreed in advance with your line manager or as soon as possible for emergency appointments. You will be required to provide and appointment card for your visits.
6. Attendance by partners at antenatal or scan appointments is encouraged, but proof of the appointment (except for the first hospital appointment where this is difficult to obtain) is required when applying to take paid time off work. Managers have discretion to agree up to two hours paid special leave for such appointments, within reasonable limits. This includes parents in a surrogacy arrangement to attend ante-natal appointments.
What maternity pay am I entitled to?
7. Details about maternity pay and qualifying periods are detailed below.
Employees with less than 26 weeks' service
8. If you have less than 26 weeks service with the civil service by the 15th week before your expected week of childbirth you may only be able to claim “Maternity Allowance”, which can be claimed from the Job Centre. This must be claimed before the birth of your baby in order to obtain the full benefit.
9. Example: if your baby is due on the 1 April 2008 you would need to have been employed continuously by the civil service from the week commencing 22 May 2007. This is 26 weeks before 18 December 2007 which is the 15th week before the expected week of childbirth.
Employees with 26 weeks' service or more but less than 52 weeks' service
10. Provided you have been continuously employed by the civil service for at least 26 weeks but less than 52 weeks up to and including the 15th week before the expected week in which the baby is due, you will receive:
- for six weeks, 90% of your previous average earnings; and
- for the next 33 weeks, Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP).
11. Average earnings are calculated over a “relevant period” defined as the 8 week period ending in the 15th week before the expected date of birth. Employees with 52 weeks service
12. Provided you have been continuously employed by the civil service for at least 52 weeks up to and including the 15th week before your expected week of childbirth you will receive Departmental Maternity Pay (full pay) for 26 weeks, then Statutory Maternity pay (SMP) for 13 weeks and 13 weeks at no pay.
13. Departmental Maternity Pay is only payable during Ordinary Maternity Leave. It may be reduced if you fail to comply with the notification provisions in this policy. It is illegal to receive normal pay from any employment and Statutory Maternity Pay at the same time. All SMP, therefore, ceases upon return to work (except when on ‘keeping in touch days’ section).
What do I need to do if I become pregnant?
14. It would be helpful if, as you know you are pregnant you let your line manager and HR know. You can then agree who else should know about your news and when. It is up to you when you decide to do this but at the very latest you must inform HR by the 15th week before your EWC that you are pregnant, as this is the minimum notice required to take maternity leave. HR will then arrange a meeting with you to discuss your pregnancy and maternity leave. Before this meeting you should complete the maternity leave planner. It does not matter if some of the information it requests is not yet available the planner can be amended later provided that you give at least 28 days’ notice in writing of the date you intend to start your maternity leave.
15. It is important you discuss your pregnancy with your line manager so that any reasonable adjustments can be made in your work. Also HR will make arrangements for you to receive a workstation assessment and an appointment with our occupational health advisers, if required. More details can be found in the health and safety section on the staff intranet.
16. A certificate stating the expected week of childbirth (Form MAT B1) will be issued to you by your registered medical practitioner or registered midwife. This will normally be around the end of the 13th week before the expected week of childbirth. This should be sent to HR as soon as it has been issued.
17. HR will then write to you within 28 days of receiving the notification of the date you intend your maternity leave to commence stating your expected date of return from maternity leave and any other leave agreed.
What do I do if a member of my staff tells me she is pregnant?
18. As a line manager you are responsible for ensuring that your employee follows the guidance detailed in this policy. Your specific responsibilities are detailed below:
- Make sure that your employee informs HR of her pregnancy if she has not already done so before her 15th week before her expected week of childbirth.
- Meet with your employee to discuss whether reasonable adjustments need to be made to her work and any health and safety concerns she may have. Complete a performance appraisal (break report) for before she goes onto maternity leave.
You will be responsible for authorising her attendance at any ante-natal classes or medical appointments related to pregnancy that she requires.
19. Any queries on the application or interpretation of this policy must be discussed with your HR officer prior to any action being taken.
Additional cover
20. The responsibilities of your employee during the maternity absence may be covered by a temporary employee. The temporary employee will be advised that they are replacing an employee currently on maternity leave.
Health and safety
21. In order to protect the health and safety of you and your unborn child it is in your best interests that we are informed as soon as is practicable that you are pregnant. Your job will then be assessed at the earliest opportunity and specific health and safety guidance and instruction will be provided as appropriate. This guidance usually applies prior to your absence, upon your return and whilst you are breast-feeding.
22. Whilst pregnant you must not lift, push or pull any package that might weigh 5kgs or more.
23. If during your pregnancy you have any concern regarding health and safety at work, you must seek advice from your manager, before undertaking any task that concerns you. You should also contact your HR officer if you have any health and safety related concerns that you feel have not been adequately addressed.
24. We reserve the right to request that you attend a medical consultation with our Occupational Health Adviser, and, if necessary, allocate work in accordance with the medical opinion. Acting on advice from a doctor regarding the health of you and your child, we may transfer you into a suitable alternative job, rather than put you or your colleagues’ safety or health at risk. This action would only be contemplated in extreme circumstances and would be carried out with full and proper consultation with you, it is your responsibility to co-operate fully with this process. In the unlikely event that a suitable alternative job is not available medical suspension from work on average earnings will be considered.
During your maternity leave
Keeping in touch days
25. During your maternity leave you will be entitled to take 10 'keeping in touch' days. These are days where you can return to work without losing departmental or statutory maternity pay and without being deemed as returning to work. You will be paid for attendance on these days at your normal salary rate (not at Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP)).
26. These days are designed to allow you to keep in touch with us by attending work, training sessions or to just keep in touch with your colleagues.
27. There is no obligation for you to take up these days but we would encourage you where practical to do so. If you would like to have a 'Keeping in touch' day then please speak to your line manager and HR at any time during your maternity leave.
**How will I be paid?**
28. Departmental maternity pay (full salary) will continue to be paid on a monthly basis in accordance with the normal payroll timetable.
29. **Statutory Maternity Pay** (SMP) will be paid as complete weeks, and you will continue to be paid on a monthly basis in accordance with the normal payroll timetable and payment method. SMP is subject to tax and national insurance deductions.
30. If you advise ORR that you will not be returning to work you will need to give your contractual notice period your P45 will then be made available as soon as possible. The date the contract of employment ends is the date upon which your notice period ends.
31. You will continue to receive a payslip during any unpaid additional maternity leave.
**Does going on maternity leave affect my employment?**
32. Your contract of employment will continue to apply throughout both your Ordinary and Additional Maternity Leave unless you or we provide notice of termination in accordance with your required contractual notice period as shown in your Statement of Terms and Conditions of Employment.
33. In the case of a fixed term appointment the contract will expire in accordance with the terms of that agreement. This will be dealt with separately from your maternity leave.
34. Whilst on Ordinary Maternity Leave, you will benefit from all of the terms and conditions which would have applied to you as if you had been at work instead of on maternity leave, except the terms and conditions regarding “remuneration” (where remuneration is defined as monetary wages or salary payable).
35. Whilst on Additional Maternity Leave the only terms of the contract that must apply in accordance with statute are ORR’s obligations of trust and confidence to you and your obligation of good faith to ORR. However, ORR will enhance these requirements by providing additional protection against dismissal.
36. The dismissal of an employee will automatically be unfair, regardless of your length of service or hours of work, if:
- it is on maternity-related grounds and takes place during your pregnancy or Ordinary/Additional Maternity Leave;
- it occurs after the end of your maternity leave of absence and is on the grounds that you have taken the benefits of that leave;
- it is on the grounds of a health and safety provision which could give rise to medical suspension; it is on the grounds of redundancy and ORR has not first complied with the requirement to offer you any suitable alternative vacancy which is available; or
- you are unfairly selected for redundancy for one of the above reasons.
37. If you were to be dismissed at any time and for any reason while you are pregnant or during your Ordinary/Additional Maternity Leave you will be entitled to receive a written statement of the reasons for your dismissal. This will be without having to request it, and will be regardless of your length of service or hours of work.
**What happens to my annual pay rise?**
38. Absence due to maternity will not affect the nature or timing of performance appraisals and pay increases. These reviews will continue to take place and you will participate within these procedures in the same manner as if you were attending work on a daily basis.
39. A performance appraisal (break report) must be completed by you and your manager just before the start of your maternity leave. Pay awards may affect the level of SMP. On no account will you suffer any detriment through not being at work on a daily basis at the time when these appraisal procedures are implemented.
**Pay awards and performance bonuses**
40. Any pay increases will be paid to you, if you are eligible while you are on maternity leave, in accordance with the terms of the relevant Pay Agreement. Any bonus payment due will be pro-rata’d to reflect your time at work plus any period of time on paid maternity leave during the relevant reporting period.
**What happens to my pension?**
41. If applicable, you will remain a member of the civil service pension scheme whilst on maternity leave.
42. There will be no change to the terms under which you and we pay contributions into your pension scheme during your maternity leave.
43. The same percentages of income will apply and pensionable service will continue to be accrued. However, contributions made by yourself and us will reduce in line with your salary. Your pension contributions will cease altogether during any period of unpaid leave although pensionable service would continue to be accrued.
**What happens if I am sick during my maternity leave?**
44. If you are sick during your maternity leave you do not need to take any action. However, if you are sick when you are due to return to work, you will need to inform your manager and HR. Your sickness absence will date from the end of your maternity leave. You will need to provide a doctor’s fit note for absences over 7 calendar days, as usual, refer to the Sickness Absence policy.
45. Rules on Statutory Sick Pay are complex while on maternity leave and HR will advise you whether or not you may be entitled to it. What happens to my annual leave?
46. Your normal annual leave allowance will continue to accrue during your ordinary and additional maternity leave in accordance with the Working Time Regulations 1998. You are also entitled to a day in lieu for any public or privilege holiday days occurring during your ordinary and additional maternity leave. These will be added to your annual leave entitlement and should be taken before returning to work.
47. You cannot take annual leave whilst on ordinary and additional maternity leave, but you are able to take annual leave before and/or after your maternity leave. You are advised to take any accrued leave before your maternity leave commences.
48. You should refer to the Leave policy to see the amount of carry forward you are allowed to have before you go on maternity leave.
49. Carry-over of excess annual leave entitlement from one leave year to the next, or payment in lieu of annual leave will only be allowed in exceptional circumstances, and so it is recommended that you consider taking excess annual leave either before or at the end of your maternity leave – your HR officer can help you with planning this.
50. If you wish to take your accrued annual leave at the end of your Ordinary Maternity Leave you must return to work immediately after the annual leave. Under these circumstances, your maternity leave will be considered ended, and you will not be able to take any untaken additional maternity leave.
What happens about my other benefits?
51. You may continue to access the Occupational Health Service throughout your maternity leave. You can also continue to receive gym membership subsidy, if applicable, even when you are on unpaid maternity leave.
After your baby is born
What do I do if I want to return to work?
52. You will be given support and positive encouragement to return to work so that we do not lose your skills and experience.
53. You must be employed up to and including at least one day into the 11th week before the expected week of childbirth in order to qualify for statutory provisions regarding the right to return to work. It is important to note that if you leave employment prior to the 11th week before childbirth you will lose your right to return to work.
51 You must not work for another employer whilst on Ordinary or Additional Maternity Leave. It is your responsibility to inform us if you do as entitlement to Maternity Pay will cease and your employment may also be terminated.
52. You may not return to work having taken less than two weeks maternity leave immediately after the birth of the baby (compulsory maternity leave).
53. If you wish to return before the end of the 26 week Ordinary Maternity Leave period or before the end of the Additional Maternity Leave period you must inform us in writing at least 8 weeks before your intended date of return otherwise we may delay your return to a date that gives 8 weeks’ notice of your return. You would not be paid during the time of the postponed return.
54. If you decide to return to work during or after your Ordinary Maternity Leave you are entitled to return to the same job on the same terms and conditions as if you had not been absent, unless a redundancy situation has arisen.
55. If you decide to return to work during or after your Additional Maternity Leave, you normally would be entitled to return to the same job on the same terms and conditions as if you had not been absent, unless a redundancy situation has arisen. However, if there is a reason, other than redundancy, which means that it is not reasonably practicable for you to return to the same job, you are entitled to be offered suitable alternative work.
56. ‘Suitable’ in this context means suitable to you and appropriate in the circumstances, although your decision must still be reasonable if the alternative employment is refused.
57. You have no right to delay your return beyond your ordinary and additional maternity leave entitlement. If you are sick you must provide a doctor’s certificate to this effect. If you do provide a doctor’s certificate then we will treat you as having returned, but as being absent due to sickness. If you do not return to work on the agreed date and we are not told of the reason why you have not returned then we will treat this as unauthorised absence and you may be subject to disciplinary action. We strongly advise you to speak to HR if you are concerned about your return to work day.
**Will I be able to change my hours when I return to work?**
58. If you wish to return to work and need to regularly work fewer or more flexible days, hours or locations than prior to the birth then your request will be considered sympathetically, having taken account of our business requirements.
59. Details of the various options available for part time and/or flexible working arrangements can be found on the staff intranet, and you can discuss your options with HR.
60. It must be stressed that we have the right to refuse such requests where operational requirements would make it impossible or uneconomical to adopt such a reduction or flexibility in hours of work and if this is the case the reasons will be explained in full to you and other options explored.
**What do I do if I decide not to return to work?**
61. If you decide not to return to work for any reason within 52 weeks from the start of your maternity leave period or take an agreed career break, you must work for a calendar month immediately after your maternity leave; otherwise you will have to refund your maternity pay less any Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) that you may have received.
62. If you resign you must give the required contractual notice in writing. If you qualify for Maternity Pay you will stay on payroll until your entitlement ceases at which time you will receive your P45.
63. However, for all other purposes your employment ceases at the end of the contractual notice period - upon which date all outstanding monies will be calculated and paid (such as payments for untaken annual leave or reimbursement of season ticket loans).
**General Data Protection Regulations and Data Protection Act 2018**
64. Personal data collected as part of this policy will be processed in accordance with the ORR’s Data Protection Policy, Privacy Notice and Records Retention schedule. The Privacy Notice explains what personal data ORR holds about you, how we collect it, and how we will use and may share information about you. Inappropriate access or disclosure of employee data constitutes a data breach and should be reported in accordance with the ORR’s security incident process immediately. It may also constitute a disciplinary offence, which will be dealt with under the ORR’s disciplinary procedure.
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85728ab8404f4ed1f5c373f7f7cd8ad3d7a16bb4 | LGA Conference on Safer Communities Wednesday 9 December
Prevent and local authorities Matt Collins, Head of Prevent Delivery Unit, OSCT The terrorist threat level is ‘severe’ – meaning that an attack in this country is ‘highly likely’.
But the threats we face have changed:
- Daesh is much larger and better resourced than AQ and is trying to create and establish a state;
- unlike AQ, Daesh is also trying to radicalise large numbers of people here and in other western countries and has attracted far more foreign fighters and supporters;
- its social media propaganda is intense.
Foreign fighters and supporters are encouraged either to travel or to conduct simple but effective terrorist attacks here. Syrian travellers and returnees
- 800+ people of security interest have travelled to Syria/Iraq since the conflict began; about 50% have returned. Many other have travelled for a range of reasons.
- High proportion of all early travellers were motivated by humanitarian not extremist issues.
- Greater proportion of all later travellers intend to join Daesh; fewer are returning.
- Greater proportion of later travellers are women and children; average age has decreased.
- Greater proportion of later travellers are being stopped before departure. Our response: Prevent
• Daesh makes Prevent more important
• The aim of Prevent is to *stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism* by: countering ideology and propaganda; supporting people at risk of radicalisation (Channel); and working with key institutions.
• Prevent is intended to pre-empt criminal activity – to protect and not to criminalise communities
• Prevent is prioritised according to risk – the greatest risk of radicalisation is currently from Daesh but extreme right wing organisations is also within the scope of the programme
• Prevent is not concerned with matters of faith but issues of ideology and radicalisation Prevent duty
• The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 places a duty on specified authorities to ‘have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’.
• The duty does not itself change the nature of our Prevent work – the strategy (2011) still stands and currently remains the basis for our work.
• Five key themes throughout the guidance which apply across all sectors: understand risks; ensure effective leadership; use the Prevent partnerships; develop capability/ knowledge; and establish appropriate information sharing arrangements.
• Effect of the duty has been: an increase in Prevent activity, notably in education and with Channel referrals, and to make application of Prevent more consistent Prevent duty: what it means for you
- Local authorities and Prevent coordinators continue to be vital for Prevent work.
- More even balance between the work of policing and contributions from other statutory partners.
- Local authorities are best placed to identify community based organisations who can deliver Prevent.
- Local authorities will be directly involved in the growing volume of casework in and outside of Channel, notably with families and children; legal issues – role of Family Courts – still to be clarified.
- The duty will require more training and familiarisation across all partners. Prevent: key issues
- We want to increase the number of community based organisations to support and deliver a range of Prevent initiatives. Keen to expand into existing third sector organisations.
- We are expanding Channel - now a mandatory requirement; referrals and current casework have increased sharply (notably from education); want to refer more people with links to Syria to the programme.
- We are facing growing numbers of people who need safeguarding outside of Channel for radicalisation reasons: new legal issues emerging.
- We are increasing work with social media providers to remove Daesh online propaganda in line with T’s and C’s. We are producing more guidance about online propaganda and sponsoring more effective online community based rebuttal of Daesh ideology. Countering extremism
• In October, the Government published a new Counter Extremism strategy.
• Prevent is one part of the strategy. But the strategy deals with harms other than terrorism which are caused by extremism – eg hate crime (including Islamophobia). Emphasises that extremism is important not only because it can legitimise and encourage terrorism.
• Strategy proposes stronger work to promote British values and to build community cohesion: both are important for Prevent but cannot be done from a counter terrorist team.
• Coordination between Prevent and wider counter extremism work will be essential… Conclusions
• Daesh is not more of the same: it brings a different kind of threat.
• Daesh makes Prevent increasingly important.
• The duty is part of our renewed response to the changing threat.
• It is based on the existing Prevent strategy and many organisations are already meeting its requirements.
• Local authorities have been for many years, and will continue to be, a key part of our response to the terrorist threat.
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bddb0c5323038e65c0f345383cb2a16db44332c8 | NORTHAMPTON BOROUGH COUNCIL
REPORT OF THE OVERVIEW AND SCRUTINY COMMITTEE
On the Call-in of the Cabinet decision of 5 December 2005:
THE SIXFIELDS AREA ACTION PLAN
1 Purpose To submit a report to Cabinet detailing the Committee’s findings following the Call-In Hearing that took place on Wednesday, 11th January 2006.
2 Context The Cabinet decision:
“That the report on the Sixfields Area Action Plan be received and noted but the proposals as circulated by the Chair outlined above be agreed as the way forward the preferred option and that the action plan be taken forward on this basis”
was called-in for Scrutiny by Councillors T Woods and B Hoare for the following reasons:
1 The decision is potentially unsafe and may put the Council at significant risk
2 The decision pre-empts proper evaluation of alternatives to provide the best possible District Centre facilities for the present and future residents of the South West District having a view to the needs of all stakeholders and of the wider needs of the town
3 The decision is potentially contrary to the emerging Local Plan that has been the subject of considerable consultation with residents and stakeholders.
4 The decision is likely to lead to considerable additional delays and uncertainties for all stakeholders
The Committee narrowed the basis of its Call-In hearing down to call-in reason 1. 3 Evidence The Committee heard evidence from:-
Internal Witnesses Councillor P Larratt Leader of the Council Councillor J Caswell Portfolio Holder Mairi McLean Chief Executive Clive Thomas Corporate Director David Taylor Corporate Director Steve Pointer Planning Policy and Conservation Manager Francis Fernandes Solicitor to the Council Jim Inch Senior Solicitor
External Witnesses Mr T Clarke Northampton Town Football Club Mr Cardoza Northampton Town Football Club Mr Hayes Chief Executive, WNDC Mr S Kelly Director of Planning, WNDC
A copy of the minutes of the Call In Hearing are attached at appendix A.
The following organisations submitted letters to the Committee providing comments on Cabinet’s decision of 5 December (Copies as at appendix B):
Drivas Jonas Northampton Town Football Club Ltd Hepher Dixon English Partnerships
4 Conclusions The Committee resolved that it was appropriate to recommend that the Cabinet reconsidered its decision and gives regard to the broader aspirations for the Sixfields Site. The Committee felt that it was about considering visionary perspectives for the town and the commitment to the Football Club and also about focussing on a vision for the wider Sixfields site.
Councillors raised concern about the decision being continued on the basis of just one option and suggested that all four options be considered together with a proper evaluation of all alternatives. The Committee realised that this could slow the process down but understood the need for evidence on which to base a decision.
Councillors discussed the Sixfields Area Action Plan and Town Centre Core Strategy and felt that it would be beneficial for the two to run in parallel. Core Strategy is the broader planning context and Area Action Plans are specific plans to develop an area. So the Area Action Plan needs to run in parallel following the development of the Core Strategy. The Committee wanted to raise awareness of laudable aspirations for the town and planning law. There is a need for greater separation in relation to the development of the Local Plan and the Council’s support for a viable Football Club.
Regarding the legal aspect, the Committee suggested that it informs Cabinet that it understands and endorses its desire to ensure high quality league football in Northampton but there is the need to consider the needs of the Football Club, local residents in the Sixfields area and the interests of the whole town.
5 Recommendations
Whilst the Overview and Scrutiny Committee supports the principle of promoting a viable football club in Northampton, it recommends:
(1) That in pursuing its aspirations to support the Northampton Town Football Club, Cabinet should keep its support of specific interests separate from its plan making activities for Sixfields. This will maintain the necessary distinction between the obligations of the Council as a Planning Authority and its other interests promoting social and economic activity in the town.
(2) That the Committee recommends to Cabinet that it reviews its decision to demonstrate that it has: (i) taken into account all the evidence; (ii) taken into account the wider community, social and economic interests in the development of its plan for the Sixfields area; (iii) properly evaluated all four options and that the resulting plan complies with all legislative requirements and Government guidance; and (iv) given regard to the compelling legal advice provided and taken steps to mitigate against any risk that may arise from future actions against the Council on the legitimacy of its plan making for the Sixfields area.
(3) That to ensure there is consistency in plan making, Cabinet consider running in parallel the development of the Area Action Plan for Sixfields and the Town Centre Area Action Plan.
REPORT AUTHOR: Councillor Brendan Glynane Chair of Overview & Scrutiny Committee
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9b81f0a0b18b91ad44a5de26fa0b4e2a47c917dd | Annex B: Terms of Reference
ORR Inquiry into May 2018 timetable disruption
Terms of Reference
Purpose
The inquiry will:
i. Identify factors that contributed to the failure to develop and implement an effective operational timetable in May 2018;
ii. draw conclusions about the management of operational risks created by major timetable changes, based on evidence about the causes and consequences of the disruption in May 2018, and its subsequent management; and
iii. where appropriate, make recommendations to the industry and government in advance of future major network changes for the benefit of passengers, other users and railway staff.
Scope
The inquiry will consider why the railway system as a whole failed to produce and implement a satisfactory operational timetable in May 2018.
It will gather evidence to draw conclusions and make recommendations as it sees fit, including but not limited to:
- The impact on passengers, both in advance of and following the timetable change, especially in the areas served by Northern and Govia Thameslink Railway;
- how well the industry’s overall network planning processes worked in preparation for May 2018 to identify and manage risks; particularly the coordination between Network Rail and train operators;
- the strength of industry assurance and accountability prior to major network change, especially where multiple companies and authorities are involved, and including the role of ORR;
- the role and capability of Network Rail as the system operator in the planning process, and in managing subsequent disruption;
- Network Rail’s role in delivering the network enhancements underlying the timetable changes; and the Department for Transport’s role in planning these enhancements;
- the Department for Transport’s approach to planning network changes through franchise specifications and rolling stock management, and the department’s role in managing risks around major network changes;
- the role of train operating companies in preparing for the timetable changes;
- the readiness of train operating companies to implement the timetable changes, including in assessing and mitigating risks and preparedness for disruption;
- the incentives created by industry structures and culture in identifying, managing risks and reporting risks; and
- how the industry works together to resolve network disruption when it happens.
The Inquiry will be conducted in addition to and alongside ORR’s existing monitoring and investigation activity that began in February 2018. This is looking into the compliance of Network Rail and the train operating with the terms of their licences in relation to the timeliness of the provision of timetable information to operators and passengers. This investigation is specifically examining:
- The effectiveness of Network Rail’s recovery plan to get back to a position where it is able to provide future timetable information to operators twelve weeks in advance of changes being made.
- The timeliness and accuracy of the communication with passengers from train operating companies in advance of the timetable changes, and the information provided to passengers during the subsequent disruption.
- The root causes of the problems in Network Rail’s role in planning and delivering the timetable changes, and the longer-term lessons to be learned.
For the avoidance of doubt, the Inquiry will also include in its analysis the role of ORR as the independent regulator in the approach to the May timetable changes, and may also make recommendations in this regard.
Structure & process
The Inquiry will have three phases:
1. Evidence gathering from passengers, passenger representative groups including Transport Focus, the rail industry and government regarding: a. What was planned vs what happened in May 2018; i. Infrastructure development ii. Timetable readiness iii. Industry preparedness b. How the whole-system planning processes functioned in preparation for May 2018, and when key decisions were made; c. The impact on passengers from the subsequent disruption.
2. Analysis of the problems and their causes: a. Gap analysis of what worked as planned; what didn’t work; what was missing entirely from: i. the preparedness of each party for the network and timetable changes; and ii. the strength whole-industry planning, risk assessment, assurance and resolution processes.
3. Develop recommendations for change: a. Conclusion’s concerning May 2018 network changes b. Recommendations looking ahead to planned future major network and timetable changes, to reflect the unprecedented scale of network growth planned in the next few years.
An interim report of Phase 1 and 2 will be published in September, followed by a final report including Phase 3 recommendations by the end of the year.
Governance
The ORR Board, chaired by Stephen Glaister, is responsible for the conduct of the Inquiry, which is being conducted under Section 51 of the Railways Act 2005 which permits ORR to provide information, advice and assistance to national rail authorities. The work is in response to a request made by the Secretary of State for Transport on 4th June 2018, and will be conducted by the ORR under the statutory framework that assures its independence from government or any other authority.
Stephen Glaister will chair the project board and be supported by expert panel of independent advisers. This panel will have particular regard for whether the ORR’s role as regulator of Network Rail and the train operating companies has been properly assessed by the Inquiry.
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68dd426671251b6a4705f93557f74d246efaca47 | Experiences of the 20th May rail timetable changes
Research findings prepared for the Office of Rail and Road
2nd August 2018 Contents
1. Background and method
2. Setting the context
3. Experiences of the 20th May rail timetable changes
- Disruption experienced
- Information provided
- Staff interactions
- Alternative transport options
4. Personal impact of the disruption
5. Suggested improvements Background and method Research background
Background to the study
The Project Board of ORR are conducting an inquiry into the 20th May 2018 timetabling changes on Northern Rail and Govia ThamesLink railway. To feed into this they wish to understand passenger experiences of the timetable changes and in particular the type of impact of any disruptions to passengers. In addition ORR wish to understand the point of view of frontline staff of these TOCs.
To explore experiences, we carried out both qualitative and quantitative research Method: qualitative research
4 x focus groups, each including 6-8 participants and lasting 1.5 hours. Groups took place on Monday 23 July, telephone interviews took place on Tuesday 24 July
The groups included:
- Commuters
- Leisure/ business passengers
- A range of routes typically travelled
- Passengers with a long term limiting illness or disability
Quotes and case studies included in these findings are taken from the people that we spoke to during the research. However, we have changed peoples’ names for anonymity. Method: quantitative research
- Survey of rail passengers who have travelled since the 20th May 2018
- 1,000 interviews across England and Wales only
- Internet panel survey
- Quotas set on age, gender and region
- Data is weighted
- Significance differences to the total are denoted by Setting the context Setting the context
Overall mixed satisfaction with services prior to 20th May rail timetable changes
Overall negative about existing services: overcrowding, delays, disruption (electrification)
“Shambolic is a complimentary word for it. Random trains not arriving, two carriages when there would normally be four.”
“I can’t remember a single journey that hasn’t been a few minutes late.”
“[If a train is stuck outside of the station and can’t get into the station there has been] no response, no one tells you what’s going on, you can be sat there for 15 minutes”
“Even if the train arrives, it’s a bad experience because you’re crammed on”
Generally positive about services; expectations of new, reliable ThamesLink trains
“There is always some type of occasional delay but no real impact to my daily plans”
“There were sometimes issues with Gatwick. It has always been a bit on and off anyway. That line is never great”
“I think everything was running fine for quite a while. It was an unusual period of everything working quite well, no delays and cancellations. It felt like it had finally figured itself out.”
“ThamesLink is usually reliable but for the last 2 years trains have been packed, it just feels normalised”
“I do think the service dipped slightly when they changed to new trains at the end of last year. You got a lot of trains breaking down. I am guessing it was teething problems caused by the old trains. After a while it did sort itself out.” Setting the context
Passengers mentioned a range of information sources for how they found out about the timetable changes
- Unclear why the changes would be beneficial, assume to improve the service (this can generate high expectations)
- Some noted that information provided on website was difficult to find or read/complex and off-putting
- Commuters more likely to have heard about timetable changes in advance
- GTR passengers not aware of staged introduction
"You had to make a bit of effort yourself. You had to log on, you had to look for your station, you have got to see where am I going. I found it a bit difficult to work out what I was doing so I didn’t even bother with the website. I looked up the National Rail app and just checked what my future train time was." (GTR Commuter)
"I was expecting, normally when there’s been timetable changes in the past there’s been minor tweaks here and there. So I was sort of expecting, you know it might be a few minutes different…I wasn’t really expecting it to be as drastic as what it was." (Commuter, Northern)
"Instead of timetable change maybe [poster should have said] timetable overhaul or complete restructure of the timetable or something along those lines. Might have made it seem like a bigger change." (Commuter, Northern) Setting the context
Staff mentioned a range of ways in which information was provided to passengers – although were not sure that these were always read.
Staff
Passengers were provided with: posters; leaflets; announcements; information in local press.
However, staff were sometimes unsure whether passengers had fully read the information meaning that whilst passengers may have been aware of the changes they had perhaps not realised the extent of this.
“We tend to find that a lot of passengers take things but they don’t necessarily read them [and therefore] they get half the story.”
Whilst there had been some internal briefings for staff, some felt that greater staff consultation could have been valuable.
Staff
Staff mentioned internal briefings, with some noting that during this there had been discussion of expectations of services on timetable, how to manage platform crowding and foot-flow, and customer handling training.
However, overall, staff felt that they did not get much information about the changes or what to expect before 20th May – although they recognised that this was probably because the TOC may not have had the final information to share.
Some suggested that greater staff consultation ahead of the changes, and the 20th May could have been helpful.
“There’s a tendency in the transport industry where decisions are taken and staff are rarely consulted, possibly until the last minute so the opportunity to highlight potential downfall doesn’t occur due to lack of consultation.” A04. Some train companies, brought in new timetables on the 20th May 2018. Was a new timetable brought in by any of the train companies that you have travelled with, since the 20th May 2018? Base: all respondents (1,000); TOC travelled with (GTR 255, Northern 126)
- These respondents have travelled with specified TOC since the 20th May but they may have also travelled with other TOC’s – data is therefore not entirely attributable to GTR and Northern
| | Percentage | |----------|------------| | All | 55% | | GTR\* | 94% | | Northern\*| 82% | A half of rail passengers were aware of the change to the timetables before their introduction on the 20th May 2018. Levels of awareness were much higher amongst GTR and Northern passengers.
| | | | |--------|--------|--------| | All | 51% | | | GTR\* | 75% | | | Northern\* | 62% | |
A05. Were you aware of these changes to the train timetables before their introduction on the 20th May 2018? Base: all respondents (1,000), TOC travelled with (GTR 255, Northern 126)
- These respondents have travelled with specified TOC since the 20th May but they may have also travelled with other TOC’s – data is therefore not entirely attributable to GTR and Northern How found out about new timetables
Amongst those who were aware of the change to the timetable before its introduction, notices on station(s) was the most commonly mentioned way of finding out about the change.
A06: How did you find out about the introduction of the new train timetables from the 20th May? Base: all those who were aware of change to the train timetable before their introduction (499); by TOC travelled with (GTR 225, Northern 126)
- These respondents have travelled with specified TOC since the 20th May but they may have also travelled with other TOC’s – data is therefore not entirely attributable to GTR and Northern
© GfK 2 August 2018, ORR Research Findings Perception on introduction of timetable
Nearly two thirds of those who travelled with a train company whose timetable changed incorrectly thought that the new timetable would be introduced in full on the 20th May.
- **New timetable introduced in full from 20th May**
- All: 59%
- GTR\*: 58%
- Northern\*: 59%
- 31%
- **Timetable introduced in stages**
- All: 35%
- GTR\*: 25%
- Northern\*: 25%
- **Neither**
- All: 4%
- GTR\*: 6%
- Northern\*: 6%
- **Don't know**
- All: 7%
- GTR\*: 10%
A07: Thinking about when you became aware of the change to the train timetables from the 20th May, which of the following did you think was true. Base: who travelled with a train company whose timetable changed (546); by TOC travelled with (GTR 225, Northern 126)
- These respondents have travelled with specified TOC since the 20th May but they may have also travelled with other TOC’s – data is therefore not entirely attributable to GTR and Northern Two thirds of rail passengers had experienced disruption since the 20th May 2018. The most commonly mentioned reasons for the disruption were problems with track/signal and changes to the timetable.
A08. Since the 20th May 2018, have any of the train journey(s) you have taken been affected by disruption? Base: All respondents (1,000); by TOC travelled with (GTR 255, Northern 126)
A10. Thinking about all the times you experienced disruption since 20th May 2018, what were the causes of the disruption you experienced? Base: All who suffered from disruption (603); by TOC disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73). * Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution
© GfK 2 August 2018, ORR Research Findings Experiences of the 20th May rail timetable changes Experiences of the 20th May rail timetable changes
Four key areas of experience explored across the research
- Disruption experienced
- Information provided
- Staff interactions
- Alternative transport options Disruption experienced A12 Thinking about the times you have experienced disruption since the 20th May 2018, whilst travelling with [train operator from A1]. In what ways were your train journeys affected?
The most commonly mentioned causes of disruption were train delays, followed by over-crowding.
- Train(s) delayed: 59% (All), 68% (GTR), 66% (Northern\*)
- Train(s) overcrowded: 43% (All), 43% (GTR), 52% (Northern\*)
- Train(s) cancelled with less than an hour between services: 28% (All), 32% (GTR), 48% (Northern\*)
- Train(s) cancelled with a gap of more than an hour between services: 25% (All), 34% (GTR), 35% (Northern\*)
- My normal/regular train service was removed from the timetable: 25% (All), 25% (GTR), 39% (Northern\*)
- Train(s) only ran part of the way/stopped short of final destination: 20% (All), 25% (GTR), 39% (Northern\*)
- Short train formation: 17% (All), 16% (GTR), 19% (Northern\*)
- Train incorrectly shown as cancelled but did run so I missed it: 15% (All), 14% (GTR), 19% (Northern\*)
- I didn't receive the assistance I booked: 5% (All), 5% (GTR), 5% (Northern\*)
- Other: 0% (All), 3% (GTR), 0% (Northern\*)
- Don't know: 2% (All), 2% (GTR), 2% (Northern\*)
* Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution. A12/A13 Thinking about the times you have experienced disruption since the 20th May 2018, whilst travelling with {train operator from A11}. In what ways were your train journeys affected? Base: All who experienced disruption since the 20th May (603); by TOC disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73)
© GfK 2 August 2018, ORR Research Findings Types of disruption experienced
Significant and repeated delays
Lucy Commuter, GTR, Mill Hill Broadway to St.Pauls (and sometimes travels to Gatwick for work) Lucy is a solicitor and regular commuter. Since the timetable changes her journeys have been significantly affected. In the first week of the timetable changes she was disrupted most mornings and evenings, by at least half an hour and often longer because of delays and cancellations. She tried to leave work early so she could go home and continue working there but was letting clients and colleagues down because she couldn’t guarantee when she would be home.
“That first morning, my journey is usually 33 minutes and it took me 2 hours. As soon as you are going past West Hampstead you have got two other lines connecting and it was absolute havoc, chaos! In the evenings I was saying to my boss yes call me at 7pm I will be home by then and I just wasn’t, it was appalling. It makes you really anxious because it is piling on stress added to everything else”
Raj Commuter and Leisure user, GTR, St Albans to Central London Raj is a regular commuter. Since the timetable changes his journeys are significantly longer. His journeys to work were disrupted by delays of more than 30 minutes and journeys home were also disrupted by multiple cancellations and delays at Farringdon. In the first week of the timetable changes he was constantly late for work and for a meeting with international clients. He was also late getting home which impacted his evening meals and amount of sleep.
“I need to get to work for 9am so am usually at the station for 7.30 but because of the changes I had to be there by 7am and I was still getting into work late. The journey home from work was worse, some trains were delayed by an hour or more and I wasn’t getting home till 8 or 9pm and then getting up early to be back at the station for 7am” Types of disruption experienced
Delays and cancellations often compounded by lack of information and overcrowding
Frustration around delays and cancellations were exacerbated by lack of information and last minute changes
“It was horrible, more people waiting and getting frustrated, you were getting more and more stressed and didn't know when the train was coming.” (GTR, Commuter)
Northern passengers also talked about frustration regarding short train formations and overcrowding – although felt that this was an ongoing issue for Northern train services
“They put two carriages on. There’s people rammed in with their shopping…I have never got on a train yet where I’ve sat on a seat coming back from Manchester.” (Northern, Leisure passenger) Types of disruption experienced
Delays and cancellations often compounded by lack of information and overcrowding
Jake
Commuter, Northern, Wigan to Deansgate
During the first week of the train timetable changes Jake had problems getting to work due to delays and he felt that the journeys home were even more difficult.
On one occasion he started by going to his usual station – Deansgate. However, he found that all of the trains were cancelled so decided to get the tram to Manchester Victoria because he knew that trains ran more regularly from that station. Once he got to Victoria it was very busy but he went to the platform he would usually use if getting a train from that station. A train pulled up so he got on it and sat down and waited for 10 minutes. There was then a tannoy announcement to say that there was not a driver for the train so to go to a different platform. Jake went to the other platform and got on the train, and waited. There was then another announcement to say that passengers should go back to the original train, so he went back to the first train. During the first week of disruption, Jake was at least an hour late home every night.
“That was a typical journey for the first week.” Types of disruption experienced
Train cancellations, delays and overcrowding were all key issues for staff
Staff
Overcrowding on platforms was something that staff were very aware of as they were concerned it could easily create a safety issue. Lack of information/last minute platform changes were identified as problems contributing to overcrowding.
“The overcrowding started to become a safety issue, we were having to keep people off the platform…and because people were getting desperate, if they thought a train was going to where they wanted to go they were running for it, regardless of whether it was safe to do so or not.”
Cancellations and delays were also made more complex by lack of information, and last minute information. Staff recalled examples where platform staff were informed that a train had been cancelled (and therefore did not send passengers to the train), only to be reinstated at the last minute. This meant that some trains left without being at full capacity.
“Platform staff were saying that one was cancelled, that’s why I didn’t send people over, and they’d said let it go at the last minute…that’s why we didn’t have time to get things sorted for your passengers.”
Although the reason for creating express services was understood by staff as a way to keep trains on track, they felt that turning a train into an express service at the last minute was detrimental to the passenger experience, and only caused further frustration.
“If a timetabled train eventually did leave, to get it back on course, they made it express and they miss all the stopping points…so you have to detrain all of the passengers that thought they were on their way home, which just fuelled the frustration.” Types of disruption experienced
For some, their usual service was no longer in the timetable
Sasha
Commuter – 2 days a week, GTR, New Cross Gate to Brighton
Sasha used to take either a Southern or ThamesLink train to work from New Cross Gate to Brighton, via East Croydon.
Since the timetable changes she now has to go via London Bridge which not only takes longer but is also more expensive.
“My old train doesn’t exist any more and I have no knowledge of it’s coming back. I don’t know if it’s a result of the timetable change. I am out of pocket twice a week by £3 because of having to go into Central London to change to a Brighton train”
Samuel
Commuter, GTR, Woolwich to Farringdon
Samuel recently moved to Woolwich and works in Farringdon. Prior to the timetable change he would take a train from his nearest station Woolwich Dockyard to Cannon Street and walk to Farringdon.
Since the timetable changes he now has to catch a train via Woolwich Arsenal station for trains serving Cannon Street or Farringdon and because Woolwich Arsenal is in a different zone he pays £40 per month more for his journeys.
“If the train is delayed or cancelled you can be waiting another 20 minutes for the train to Farringdon, whereas prior to the changes I was just getting a train that was every 12 minutes to Cannon Street and walking to Farringdon which is a lot simpler.” Compensation
Just under a fifth of those who had experienced disruption had been told that they could claim compensation for the disruption and this figure fell to just 5% of Northern passengers who had experienced disruption.
| | Yes - told | No but already aware | No and was not aware | Don't know | |----------------|------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------| | All | 18 | 44 | 34 | 4 | | GTR | 23 | 51 | 23 | 3 | | Northern\* | 5 | 36 | 57 | 2 |
% of all passengers who experience disruption claimed
- All: 32%
- GTR: 44%
- Northern\*: 18%
A24. Were you told, at the time of the disruption, that you could claim compensation for the disruption? A25. And did you claim compensation for the disruption? Base: All who have suffered from disruption since the 20th May (603), by TOC disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73). * Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution. Most participants had not claimed compensation. Some had not thought about it. Others anticipated that it would be complex and time consuming.
Were passengers aware that they could claim compensation?
- Some simply hadn’t considered claiming compensation
- There were queries about whether it was possible to claim for:
- Anytime tickets
- Loss of train from the timetable resulting in now travelling from a more expensive zone
- Most had not been informed about claiming compensation by the TOC/ staff
- A couple noted that train staff had mentioned it over a tannoy announcement
Claiming compensation
- Overall there was an assumption that claiming would be too difficult and complex
- There was some discussion around how much compensation would be paid, and the general assumption that it might be a few pounds at most, making it “not worth the effort”.
- One Northern season ticket holder said that they would claim now as they had heard from a colleague that you could claim for an entire month of travel
- One GTR season ticket holder claimed for each journey they were delayed on, out of principle
- Some suggested that there should be automatic compensation
“I did [claim for compensation] every single day that I could, because even though it was just 15 minutes, it works out to be something like 50p I don’t care, I’m going to do it for my 15 minutes.” (Commuter, GTR)
“[Claiming compensation is] too hard, you have to go to the website, fill in a form, it should be automatic…Thameslink know you are delayed, I shouldn’t have to fill in this long form. You can only claim if due to their issue, and I don’t know if you can claim for a timetable issue? It takes a long time to process. It’s my money, but I’m wasting time and money having to claim.” (Commuter, GTR) How well did the TOC do?
Fewer than two fifths thought that the TOC had dealt with the disruption well and this fell to around a quarter amongst GTR and Northern passengers who had experienced disruption.
Qualitative participants often felt that there was lack of customer service from the train company during the disruption.
“When trains are an hour late at the station they didn’t give us any water or food vouchers – they do on airlines, so they should on trains.” (GTR, Commuter)
A26 Overall, how well did the train company deal with the disruption(s), you have experienced since the 20th May 2018? Base: All who experienced disruption since the 20th May (603); by TOC disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73). * Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution. Did the TOC take steps to lessen the impact of the disruption?
Only a fifth reported that the TOC had taken steps to lessen the impact of the disruption.
A19. Did train company do anything to lessen the impact of the disruption on you/other passengers? Base: All who experienced disruption since the 20th May (603); by TOC disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73) * Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution
A20. What actions did train company take to lessen the impact of the disruption on you/other passengers? Base: All who said the train companies did something to lessen the disruption (137) Information provided Information provided
Previous Transport Focus research and ATOC PIDD ACOP guidance shows the importance of information provision during disruption.
However, participants felt that there was very little information provision throughout their experiences.
http://d3cez36w5wymxj.cloudfront.net/migrated/PF%20PIDD%20Rprt%20August14%20WEB.pdf
© GfK 2 August 2018, ORR Research Findings A16. Thinking about the times you have experienced disruption since the 20th May 2018, whilst travelling with (train operating company A11). How did you find out about the disruption?
Base: All who experienced disruption since the 20th May (603), TOC by disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73). * Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution
The most commonly used channel for information was the information screens on arrival at the train station. A16. Thinking about the times you have experienced disruption since the 20th May 2018, whilst travelling with (train operating company A11). How did you find out about the disruption?
Base: All who experienced disruption since the 20th May (603), TOC by disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73). * Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution
Information & Communications – channels used most frequently
Passengers who had experienced disruption on GTR and Northern were more likely to look at app/website before leaving for the train station than average. Rating of TOC on information provision
Around two fifths of passengers who experienced disruption gave the TOC a positive rating in relation to information provision. Ratings by GTR passengers were lower than average.
- **Amount of information provided**: 36%
- 23% GTR
- 27% Northern
- **Accuracy of information provided**: 41%
- 31% GTR
- 32% Northern
- **The usefulness of information provided**: 38%
- 27% GTR
- 24% Northern
- **The speed in which information about the disruption was provided**: 37%
- 25% GTR
- 34% Northern
A18. Now thinking about the times you experienced disruption, since the 20th May, how would you rate the train company on each of the aspects below? All who experienced disruption since the 20th May (603), TOC by disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73). * Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution
© GfK 2 August 2018, ORR Research Findings Overall two fifths of those who had experienced disruption reported they were provided with all the information they required to make decisions about their travel arrangements however this dropped significantly amongst GTR and Northern passengers.
I was provided with all the information that I required to make decisions about my travel arrangements
| | Agree | Neither | Disagree | |----------|-------|---------|----------| | All | 42 | 22 | 35 | | GTR | 26 | 17 | 55 | | Northern\*| 32 | 22 | 45 |
A21. Still thinking about the disruption you experienced. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Base: All who experienced disruption since the 20th May (603); by TOC disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73). * Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution Qualitative participants felt that there had been very limited information during the disruption.
- Staff had no more information than passengers could access via apps (National Rail).
- Information was not consistent with mismatches between station screen information and apps.
- There was lack of clarity about the reason for the delays.
- Some relied on apps to find information.
- Although these were not always helpful.
- One mention of Northern Fail app.
"I just think I had the exact information on my app as they did in the station…I swear some of the staff were looking on the national rail line to give information out…they should probably have better information rather than just a public service app.” (Northern, Commuter)
"[The Trainline app just says] there might be a replacement service, I need to know that, so I can make a decision.” (Northern, Commuter)
"Sometimes I am halfway to a station when I look on the app and it says your train is cancelled or still running and it doesn’t actually reflect what is happening at the station. When you get there the board says something else, the train is doing something else.” (GTR, Commuter)
- Northern passengers talked about the reasons for delays and cancellations being lack of drivers/ not knowing where drivers were.
- GTR passengers talked about signal failures.
- GTR commuters would have liked more detail, enabling them to use their own knowledge of transport options to decide how to continue their journey. Qualitative participants felt that there had been very limited information during the disruption.
- Delays kept creeping up by 1 minute
- Information was only provided at the last minute
- Announcements were not always heard
"I will get to Deansgate for my train and it is 22 minutes past, it will say it is due at 23 minutes past, that is fine, it is only one minute. Then I will get up to say 20 past and then it gets a bit closer and before you know it, it has been 20 minutes but instead of saying there is a 20 minute delay, I know obviously they are not mind readers, but it’s just seeming like that they tack a minute on every time and you are waiting and you don’t know whether shall I go to another station? Or shall I wait here and hopefully it will come eventually?" (Northern, Commuter)
"Surely they know way before minutes before the service that they are not going to make that journey. Surely it doesn’t have to be that last minute." (GTR, Commuter)
- Some noted that they usually used headphones on their journeys so may have missed announcements.
- A couple felt that announcements on trains were more detailed/useful than those at station/on platform
"They explain things on the tannoy, they are quite good at explaining things, quite apologetic, if it is going slow they will give you an inkling of why it was or why it is." (GTR, Commuter) Passengers were frustrated by the lack of information available feeling unable to make an informed choice about how to complete their journey
Julie
Leisure passenger, Northern, Bolton to Manchester
Julie had planned a night out in Manchester with some friends to see a show. She was aware that there had been some cancellations that day, so asked the member of staff at the ticket booth if the train was running, and was told that it was. Julie bought her ticket and went to the platform. She noticed that there were lots of people waiting but the train did not turn up. She waited for 20 minutes and during that time there was no information provided to passengers. She asked a member of staff but they were not able to confirm whether or when the train would be running.
"There was a disconnect, staff didn't know what was going on."
In the end Julie decided to find an alternative way to get into Manchester. She telephoned her husband to ask for a lift, but he was out with friends and had already had a drink. She decided to get a taxi to make sure that she was able to meet her friends in time. This cost her £25 and the original ticket had cost her £6.
"I ended up getting a taxi to Manchester because I couldn’t get a lift, it cost £25, and because of the delay I couldn’t have a drink before the show that I was going to see, and I was nearly late…I was so stressed by the time I got there." Staff’s greatest challenge during the disruption was lack of information
Staff
- Referring to a new timetable meant that staff felt that they were slower providing information to passengers (they were not able to refer to their knowledge/memory as they would have usually done)
- Staff struggled to get through to control room staff during the disruption, and did not receive information to update passengers. Whist this was frustrating, they recognised that everyone was in the same boat and nobody had information.
- This meant that they often used National Rail to find information – and were aware that this meant that they had no more information than passengers could themselves access
- Whilst some staff appreciated emails, others found that this type of information was not instant enough and would have preferred verbal/instant updates
“One of the questions that we were constantly asked was ‘how long have you known this train was cancelled, why couldn’t we have been told sooner.’”
“The worst thing, we couldn’t get any information, we were trying to find out why trains weren’t stopping at certain stations, we tried to get through to control…we couldn’t get information to give.”
“It wasn’t just that it happened, it’s that we couldn’t explain, we couldn’t give an alternative and this was down to information dissemination and I think the problem there was the people trying to sort it out…and the information dissemination wasn’t the top of their priority.”
“We found in some situations some passengers using apps had more information than we did.” When staff did get information this was often last minute and was not always heard
- Staff felt that getting information to passengers was difficult as the platforms were crowded and noisy, people were not listening to announcements and there was not enough board space to display all train information (given that so many were showing as delayed)
- The combination of last minute information, and the noisy environments meant that staff missed announcements, making it difficult to update passengers and meaning that in some instances trains left without being at full capacity
- It was suggested that staff could have been briefed about the current situation before going on shift to ensure they were up to date with any information available
“Our manager gave us a lot of information/paperwork but it’s different when it comes to putting it into practice. It was hard to make decisions if you don’t know if services are running or not”
“It was so busy on the platforms, and the platform staff were so stretched, they couldn’t hear the radios, they couldn’t hear the announcements. Trains were being cancelled, and then put another train on, on another platform, and the message didn’t get through to the passengers so trains were going half empty, we could have filled with passengers if we’d had time to get them over. It was a logistical nightmare to get people on to the right train.”
“You need it before the shift, not once you’re on the shift, you need to be briefed with it before...before you’re actually turning up to work.”
“Trying to call Control was very hard because everyone was trying to get them at the same time.” Staff interactions A half of passengers who experienced disruption said that staff were available to help passengers – this fell to less than two fifths of Northern passengers who had experienced disruption.
% staff available to help passengers
- All: 53%
- GTR: 53%
- Northern\*: 37%
A22. Were station staff available to help passengers during the disruption? Base: All who experienced disruption since the 20th May (603), TOC by disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73). * Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution. Overall, qualitative participants were sympathetic towards staff but frustrated that staff were unable to provide information.
- **Staff did not have enough information**
- “I felt really sorry for the staff because they were getting this flak left, right and centre.” (Northern, Commuter)
- “I don’t think it was on them. I think it was the people above them to either tell them what to say or say to them what to actually say to everyone that is asking we don’t have any information.” (GTR, Commuter)
- “Anyone you did ask didn’t give you any information of when trains were going to turn up, what the changes were, I went online to find out what was going on.” (Northern, Commuter)
- **Staff not visible**
- Some noted that there were not any staff at their station
- A couple already had a negative opinion of staff (Northern) and this was emphasised during the disruption
- A couple felt like more staff were at the station than usual (GTR)
- “There was no more staff than what there normally is on the train and there is no more information by them, there wasn’t anybody stood there saying this is happening or you know. I feel like they were a bit rude.” (Northern, Business passenger) Some felt that staff could have been more proactive in certain situations
Simon
Commuter, Northern, Stockport to Manchester
One morning during the disruption Simon needed to get the first train from Rochdale into Manchester. When he arrived, he was the only person at the station so he sat down on the concourse area for his train to arrive. Simon noticed that there were two guards at the station.
Five minutes before the train was due to depart there was an announcement to say that the train would be delayed. Simon waited, but there was no further information. After five or ten minutes he approached the guards to ask what was happening. He was told that the driver had not got out of bed yet, and was confused because of all of the timetable changes. They were unable to tell Simon when the train would arrive.
Simon felt that as the only person at the station waiting for this train, the guards could have come to him to inform him of the delay and provide any information that they had. He felt that the guards were just talking amongst themselves rather than thinking about providing information proactively to waiting passengers.
“I waited, no one approached me to tell me what happened.” Staff interaction
Some felt that staff really tried their best
Jake
*Commuter, Northern, Wigan to Deansgate*
On one occasion Jake decided to ask a member of staff to find out about a delayed train. The member of staff was unable to answer his query but said that they would go and try and find out. Jake thought that he probably wouldn’t see that member of staff again. But they did come back and apologised that they were unable to provide any further information, but would keep checking.
I thought I wouldn’t see them again, they probably are going for dinner or whatever, or coffee break, but he came back and he was like I am really sorry, I don’t really know what the situation was, but I will keep checking, you know. I didn’t get an answer out of him, but he did at least try and help, so I did feel a bit sorry for people like that.
Those less familiar with alternative travel options valued this type of information from staff
Tony
*Commuter (infrequent), GTR, Elstree/Borehamwood to Kings Cross*
Tony felt panicked when travelling during the disruptions, wondering whether he would be able to get to his destination. During this time Tony felt that staff were more useful than the screens available at the station. In particular Tony felt that the more detailed information that staff were able to provide was useful. This included information that trains were ‘stuck’ and alternative travel options. Staff interaction
Staff faced a range of passenger emotions but largely felt that passengers were sympathetic to staff’s situation
Staff
- Staff felt that all they could do was sympathise with passengers and apologise
- Being truthful about the situation (that they did not have any information to share) was considered the best policy
- Whilst some passengers were very angry (especially those who had consumed alcohol), largely, staff felt that passengers were understanding of the situation that staff were in
- Staff had not received specific training in advance of the timetable changes, but fell back on their own extensive experience
"At the weekend we had people who had had a drop more alcohol than they should have...and they weren’t sympathetic, it was almost at a physical stage then...that put us in a rather exposed situation."
"It was pretty horrendous, people were coming up literally crying because trains had been that delayed, they were going to be late at work, they were going to get the sack...it was absolute chaos."
"The majority of passengers were sympathetic to us because they understand that we were doing what we could."
"We were basically having to pacify the customers but you can only say sorry so many times before it starts to sound hollow."
"One of the night shifts I had to do was the worst. It works really well with more staff around especially with 1700 people coming off a train."
"I think we simply fell back on the fact that we’ve had years of dealing with passengers...the biggest problem is dealing with a passenger but you can’t tell them anything...all they want is you to be able to tell them what’s happening, what’s being done about it, and most importantly of all, how long until they’ll get to where they want to go."
"Sympathizing and apologizing with no answers to give people."
"My manager instructed me to book a taxi for any schoolkids going to exams." Alternative transport options Only a fifth of those who had experienced disruption had used a bus replacement service, although nearly a half reported that a bus replacement service had been available.
A23. During this disruption, was a bus replacement service available on your route? Base: All who experienced disruption since the 20th May (603), TOC by disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73). * Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution Alternative transport options
Bus replacements services were mentioned by Northern passengers. Whilst valued, these were considered slow and it was not always clear where these would be stopping.
Tania
Leisure passenger, Northern, Manchester to Bolton
Tania had been out with some friends for the evening in Manchester. She planned to get the 9.20pm train home. She arrived at the station and was told that there was a replacement bus service. A member of staff at the station asked her where she was going, and she told them that she was going to Bolton. They pointed her in the direction of the bus to take.
She got on the bus, and once they had left the station the driver announced where the first stop would be. Tania then realised that the bus would be stopping at a range of stops on the way to Bolton. She had thought that it was a direct service to Bolton.
"Nobody said anything, we had to do every stop on the way…I am like you are having a laugh, you know, I wish I had caught a flaming taxi."
Tania was surprised that there hadn’t been any staff working out how many people needed to go directly to Bolton, and how many needed other stops, and arranged the buses accordingly. One qualitative participant had been provided with a taxi home after his train was cancelled
Jake
*Commuter, Northern, Wigan to Deansgate*
Jake was visiting some friends in Preston at the weekend. He had planned to get the last train home. Throughout the evening he was checking the live tracker to ensure that the train was running on time. The live tracker said that the train was running on time.
Jake left his friend’s house with time to get to the station for the last train. When he got to the station, just before the train was due, it was cancelled. Jake was worried that he was going to be stranded.
“I was like really annoyed at first. I thought I’m going to be stranded in Preston…sat in Preston train station not really knowing what to do, and someone just shouted anyone for Wigan go to the front of the station.”
Staff told Jake that he would be given a taxi back to Wigan, and he was given a slip of paper to provide the taxi driver. Ultimately Jake was pleased that the train company had sorted out a way for him to get home.
“I was actually really impressed with how they dealt with it.” Personal impact of the disruption The top three most commonly mentioned impacts of the disruption were inconvenience, being late getting home and stress.
| Impact | All | GTR | Northern\* | |---------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----------| | Inconvenience | 51% | 63% | 64% | | I was late getting home | 46% | 46% | | | Stress | 41% | 51% | | | I was late for work | 34% | 40% | | | I had to take alternative mode of transport | 21% | 25% | | | I was late for an appointment/event/business meeting | 13% | 18% | 26% | | Incurred additional costs e.g. transport costs | 17% | 21% | 19% | | I was unable to travel that day | 10% | 13% | 19% | | I worked from home and had to re-arrange my day | 8% | 16% | | | Loss of earnings | 1% | 9% | 15% | | I was late getting to the airport | 2% | 7% | 18% | The most frequently mentioned impacts of the disruption were related to being late either getting home late or being late to work. Personal impact of the disruption
A range of impacts were cited across the qualitative focus groups
- Financial
- Employment
- Personal Safety
- Stress & Inconvenience
- Social impact
- Changing travel behaviour
- Trust in the railway Financial impact
Both long-term and one-off financial impacts were mentioned
**Short-term financial impacts**
- Paying for a taxi when train cancelled/ delayed
- Buying refreshments at the station whilst waiting for a delayed train/ for your next train
- Buying dinner because home too late to cook
- Tube/ bus/ tram fare to travel to alternative stations
**Omar**
*Commuter, GTR, Mill Hill Broadway to Farringdon*
Omar found that his journeys during the disruption were most difficult getting home after work. He struggled to get onto the platform at Farringdon, and often missed two trains before he was able to get on a train home.
"On the way home it really affects me. I can't get onto the platform…it's just an uncomfortable journey home."
Colleagues at work were in the same position during this time, so he found that they were understanding about the delays to his journey. During the time of disruption, and since then, he has started thinking about his return journey home much earlier than he used to. Around 3pm he now starts thinking about his home journey. When he and colleagues can see that there are lots of delays and problems with the trains, they will decide to get an Uber home. This is to avoid the stress of using the train, even though it is costing money.
"Sometimes we just Uber it to avoid the stress of having to get on the train. Obviously that is incurring a higher cost than any other method of travel would incur." Both long-term and one-off financial impacts were mentioned
**Long-term financial impacts**
- Taking a new route to work/increased travel ticket cost
- Routinely choose to take a taxi when travelling home late at night to avoid being ‘stuck’ at a station late at night (often noted by females)
- Loss of earnings
**Michelle** *Commuter, Northern, Bolton to Manchester/ Bolton to Blackpool*
Michelle works for a company where she is paid based on the hours that she works, and commission. During the disruption she was late for work, and this directly impacts on her salary for the month.
“Obviously if I am two hours late, then you don’t get paid for that time.”
Michelle also felt uncomfortable about being late to work.
Yeah with work, again boss, you know you feel like you are taking advantage even though you are not, when you walk in you feel like sorry, you come up with excuses as to why you are late, when it is not good enough really when you walk in late, so yeah I do feel like it affected that. Employment impact
Some felt that being late for work and meetings had a detrimental effect on their working lives
**Jake** *Commuter, Northern, Wigan to Deansgate*
Jake was frequently late into work during the first two weeks of disruption. Whilst he felt that his boss was fairly understanding, he is worried that it may have a lasting impact on the way in which he is perceived by his boss, in a competitive work environment.
“It didn’t help that the first couple of weeks coincided with quite a busy period at work. So I mean he never shouted at me or anything, but there was passive aggressive comments and a few times I stayed late in the evening, to 6pm instead of 5pm to make up the time. Just to make it up to get the work done. So yeah things like that. Just put a bit of strain on the relationship I would say, it was quite a stressful time at work and that added to the stress, which probably could have been avoided.”
**Raj** *Commuter and Leisure passenger, GTR, St Albans to Central London*
Raj often travels to meetings. During the disruption he had a meeting scheduled with some international clients.
Due to delays on the train he turned up 45 minutes late. Not only did he miss a significant portion of the meeting, but he also felt embarrassed that international clients travelling from another country had turned up on time, but he had not.
“I got to a meeting 45 minutes late, it looks very unprofessional.”
During the second/third weeks of disruption Raj decided to work from home to avoid delays travelling into and home from work. Personal safety impact
Safety was also a concern, particularly for female participants who noted that they were now concerned that trains late at night would be cancelled or delayed.
Elaine
*Commuter, GTR, West Sutton to Fenchurch Street*
Elaine enjoys going out in the evening with friends after work.
“In the evenings I have a drink and I want to be able to know that I have a train [to get home].”
Elaine usually plans to get the second to last train home from Fenchurch Street, and before the change to the train timetable she knew her alternative route from another nearby station if needed. During the disruption Elaine found that later trains were cancelled and her previous alternative route is no longer available and has been removed from the new timetable. This makes her question staying out late, as she is aware that she is travelling alone.
“Already when you are a single woman traveling alone home, you just don’t really want to be chasing around London.”
Becky
*Leisure passenger, Northern, Manchester to Blackpool*
Becky enjoys socialising with friends in the evening. Since the disruption she has started to think more about what time train she gets home and how safe the journey will be.
Becky now avoids getting the last train home because she is worried that it will be cancelled, and that she will be stranded at the train station. Also, the station is often dark and unmanned at night. If travelling with a group of friends they will decide to get a taxi because they cannot guarantee that the trains will be running.
“You don’t want to get the last train home because you don’t know what’s going on, we end up sharing a taxi back.” Stress and inconvenience
Many felt that they had to change their usual plans resulting in stress and inconvenience
Cynthia Leisure passenger, Great Northern, travelling from Kings Cross to Baldock
Cynthia was travelling up to Baldock to see her sister and stay with her for the weekend which she does at least twice a month.
Cynthia got on the train at Kings Cross as usual. There was no announcement on the train, but it did not stop at Baldock as indicated at Kings Cross. Cynthia had to phone her sister and tell her to come and pick her up in her car from a different station.
“It wasn’t communicated on the train that it wasn’t stopping. I had to get off at the next station after Baldock and wait for my sister so that caused a bit of inconvenience for her as she had to drive farther to get me.”
Mark Commuter and leisure user, Northern, Horwich to Manchester
On the Monday after the timetable change Mark was shocked to find that he would have to catch a train 45 minutes earlier than his normal morning train in order to get to work on time. He missed this train and there was a long wait for the next train so ended up having to cycle to another station near his home and catch a different train into Manchester which meant he was 75 minutes late for work. On the following days he had to catch the earlier train he had missed on the first day until the timetable settled down and introduced a more convenient later train.
“Now, getting on the 08.03 it’s quite quiet, probably because it’s an extra train which has suddenly been introduced, and it’s usually bang on time at my station but then towards Manchester it gets delayed by red signals so sometimes it has been 15-20 minutes late arriving” Social impact
Getting up earlier and getting home later was a consistent story across commuters
**Added time to journeys**
- Got up to get earlier train
- Got home later
- Still planning journeys on the basis that something will be cancelled/delayed → getting earlier trains in the morning
"I’m all right getting into work, it doesn’t affect my punctuality but on the way home really affects me, I can’t get on to the platform, I maybe miss 2 trains before the one I thought I would originally might get and it’s just an uncomfortable journey home." Commuter, Thameslink
"It’s the same old same old. They apologise but nothing changes, there’s nothing you can do, you have no options, it’s lump it or leave it" Commuter, Northern
"After 5.15 at Farringdon it’s literally cancellation after cancellation after cancellation to any destination. I think the only one that works is the one to Gatwick" Commuter, Thameslink Participants also had to cancel plans or curtail socialising due to the disruption
**Adam**\
*Commuter, Northern, Rochdale to Manchester Victoria*
Adam was already dissatisfied with train services before the changes to the rail timetable, experiencing delays and cancellations. Given his experiences during the timetable change disruption, he has cancelled evening plans because he feels that he cannot guarantee that he will get home in a reasonable time.
“I know how much of a hassle it is getting back, you don’t want that looming over you when you’re trying to get back…I wouldn’t do after work drinks now.”
**Paul**\
*Leisure passenger, Northern, Manchester to Preston*
Paul has a degenerative health condition. He frequently travels by rail for socialising, travelling with a friend. Both require assistance when travelling and often book Passenger Assistance. Paul and his friend made the decision not to travel during the first two weeks of the timetable change, having heard of the disruption. They decided to cancel their plans. This was because Paul was concerned that he would have to wait a long time for a train. Change in travel behaviour?
Two fifths had changed the times of the trains they catch to lessen the impact of any disruption.
Since the period of disruption, I have changed the times of the trains I catch to lessen the impact of any disruption
| | Agree | Neither | Disagree | |----------|-------|---------|----------| | All | 40 | 28 | 31 | | GTR | 46 | 28 | 23 | | Northern\*| 38 | 23 | 36 |
Commuters were more likely to agree compared with non-commuters (44% vs 31%)
A21. Still thinking about the disruption you experienced. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Base: All who experienced disruption since the 20th May (603); by TOC disruption (GTR 117, Northern 73). * Base less than 100 data should be treated with caution Changes to travel behaviour
A range of changes to travel behaviour were mentioned across the research. Some were short-term, during the disruption, and some were considered to be longer-term changes.
**Short-term changes**
- Avoided using train for first couple of weeks (e.g. worked from home)
- Avoided using ‘mid stations’ as less likely to get a train during disruption
**Longer-term changes**
- Generally avoiding late trains/ last train home
- Unlikely to risk taking the train to the airport
- Stopped using train (alternative option available)
- Using car more often
- Take taxi if travelling in a group
“He didn’t go out at all for a couple of weeks because it was unreliable and trains had been cancelled, he didn’t want to be stranded somewhere, and when you’re thinking it could be hours and you’ve not got other options, it’s not great is it” (Leisure passenger, Northern)
“I’ve used the train to go to Manchester airport because it goes direct, but you can’t sit down, it’s not worth the hassle, they’ve opened the railway up down there which is supposed to encourage people not to drive but you’re worrying the train’s late am I going to be on time at the airport” (Leisure passenger, Northern)
“Trains have become an individual means of transport, you wouldn’t go on the train with a group… it’s an inconvenience” (Leisure passenger, Northern) Short-term changes to travel behaviour
Some used a different mode of transport to avoid stress or overcrowding
**Leanne**
*Leisure passenger, Northern, Bolton to Manchester*
Leanne usually uses the train to go shopping in Manchester. During the disruption she travelled by train into Manchester to go shopping with her partner’s Mum.
One the way home Leanne initially thought that they would take the train. However, when she saw the crowds she decided that it would be better to take the bus. She wanted to make sure that her partner’s mum would be able to get a seat.
“She needs to be able to sit down. And nobody gets up and you’re squashed, and you’ve got shopping.”
**Kerry**
*Leisure passenger, Northern, Kearsley to Manchester Victoria/ Swinton/ Bolton*
Kerry’s daughter has a long-term health condition. Kerry usually takes the train with her daughter to hospital appointments.
Kerry decided not to use the train to get to the hospital during the disruption as she felt that the environment would be too distressing for her daughter.
“It would have been an absolute nightmare, and upsetting for my daughter, so I wouldn’t take that risk.”
Instead, Kerry arranged a lift by car.
“I can’t afford not to be there so I had lifts off people.” Long term changes to travel behaviour
Some have decided to use alternative modes on a long term basis
Elaine
*Commuter, GTR, West Sutton to Fenchurch Street*
Before the rail timetable changes, Elaine travelled from West Sutton to London Bridge using Southern. She always got a seat on this journey.
On the first day of the timetable change there were no direct trains from West Sutton so she has to take a train to Sutton where she changed to a Thameslink train. This train did run on the day, but she had to stand for the journey which took an hour.
Elaine now either drives to Sutton or Cheam, parks and takes the train, rather than going to her closest station, West Sutton. This costs her more and is having to change her season ticket to reflect the different transport modes/zones she is using.
“By the time I got to work I was exhausted.”
“It’s more of an effort, it messes up your vibe, you’re thinking too much about what you need to do.”
Adam
*Commuter, Northern, Rochdale to Manchester Victoria*
Adam was already dissatisfied with the train service, often finding that they were delayed, did not turn up or simply missed his station.
During the disruptions he decided to stop using the train and now uses the tram to get to work. This means an extra 25 minutes each way. Sometimes trams do not start early enough so he uses the bus.
“The amount of times I have gone into work and said ‘the trains didn’t turn up, or the train turned up and I couldn’t get on them’ and three trains will go through the station which you can’t get on. It’s infuriating. I’m willing to trade additional time for reliability, it’s a trade off…I just sleep less now.” Understanding reasons for the timetable changes
Overall participants queried why changes to the timetable had been made, especially where there were no discernible benefits
What are the benefits to the timetable changes?
- Some mentions of the 2020 Vision and assume that timetable changes part of this along with improved trains, longer trains/ more seats, security.
- However, none felt that the train company had been clear on why the timetable changes were happening or the scale of the changes.
- Most felt that there had been no improvement as a result of the timetable changes.
"It has to get worse before it gets better, I’m hoping it’s for the greater good either 6 months or a year down the line." (Commuter, Northern)
"I’ve talked to loads of people and I don’t see what benefits it’s had. I didn’t speak to anyone who saw it as this being this great new change." (Commuter, Thameslink)
"Even now, three months later when I’m looking at how I’m going to get home and they all say cancelled, cancelled, cancelled, this is why I’m not sure what they’ve done. I don’t understand" (Commuter, GTR)
"On the improvement thing I don’t think I’ve had more trains coming. The big thing they said was more trains and I definitely haven’t had more. I’ve got the same. They might be different services, but we’ve got the same amount of trains" (Commuter, Thameslink)
"It’s not changed for me. I still want the train to be on time, I expect it to be on time. There are still delays, people are still complaining. Replacement buses aren’t good enough, it’s more stress. It’s not reliable." (Commuter, Northern) Overall participants felt that their experiences during the disruption caused by the rail timetable changes had a negative impact on their feeling of trust, and relationship with the TOC.
**Key issue**
- **Lack of reliability**
- Reinforcing existing dissatisfaction
- The TOC was unprepared
- There has been no clear benefit to the passenger
- Lack of transparency and ownership from the TOC
For many – particularly Northern passengers – these experienced reinforced existing dissatisfaction with reliability and overcrowded service.
Lack of confidence in the timetable changes and the decisions made by the TOC:
- "It seemed as though there wasn’t enough thought put into it, I know in theory they are serving more areas, they have spread out where Thameslink goes, but in doing so they have disrupted more stations in my opinion. I’m not sure if it’s well thought out in that way." (Commuter, GTR)
This leads to discussions regarding the cost of rail tickets and perceptions that TOCs focus on shareholders and revenue protection.
- "There hasn’t been any transparency in my view to say that there is this person who is in charge or this is the person who you should complain to, or this is the person who is coordinating. I don’t understand why in two and a half months, why, from what I can see, a good 50% of the actual service still doesn’t work." (Commuter, GTR) Suggested improvements A range of suggested improvements were given by participants across the research
- More information
- Clearer cancellations (not adding minutes to delays then cancelling)
- Information at ticket machine
- TOC social media alerts (e.g. TfL twitter alerts)
- Live tracking to see progress/location of train
- More realistic/honest/accurate information
- Longer trains/more carriages
- Automatic refunds
- Open barriers
- More bus replacement services (GTR)
“In terms of the apps, I use the Network Rail one, you can’t set up a notification to say for example, where your station is or if you say I want to board a particular train every day there is no way of setting that notification for an alert.” (Commuter, GTR)
“Give you more detail about reason for delay rather than just saying ‘signal failure’ say more about it so you can gauge length of delay and calculate whether to stay or go somewhere else.” (Commuter, GTR)
“Information on the machine before booking my ticket would have been useful, it would have given me an option, they’ve taken my choice away.” (Leisure passenger, Northern) Suggested improvements
Staff improvements focused on their ability to provide more and clearer information to passengers
Staff
- Be able to turn off automatic announcements allowing tailored announcements to be made
- Have a designated individual at the station in charge of information dissemination
“We have a box in the booking office to write down customer complaints and concerns and management do take on board what we have to say but it takes ages to get direct feedback.”
“I think it would have helped if there had been a designated person put in charge of communication…to let them frontline staff know what was going on…somebody whose sole function wasn’t to sort a problem out, but to let everyone know what was going on.”
“What would have helped us would have been being able to turn the automatic announcements completely off and then the announcer actually say this is going from here…it’s a different tone. Somebody actually speaking and people can hear it clearer, they tend to listen to it, and it saves the announcer getting on the radio to tell us…everyone can hear it…even passengers were saying it.”
“Would be good to get a list of all trains cancelled for that day so staff can ask for additional ‘stop orders’ and to allow customers to use an alternative if they have got a wait of an hour till their next train. Customers don’t think it’s so bad if they have an idea of what else they can do.”
“It worked really well when more staff were around, especially for night shifts. And giving us more bus replacements on standby.” Thank you
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32923382c550e9cd603b166004ed9c2ab8295459 | Annex E: Analysis of service performance data
1.1 This annex summarises data on the disruption experienced by passengers in the weeks following the May 2018 timetable change. It demonstrates the severity of disruption on specific routes using different metrics: the number of trains removed from the published timetable, the number of minutes by which trains were delayed, the percentage of planned trains that did not run, and the volume of passenger complaints received by operators. The annex shows that there was a disproportionate level of disruption on GTR and Northern services, using regulatory data that is gathered and monitored by ORR. It also shows that there were material ‘knock-on’ effects on the performance of TPE. The annex concludes with a description of the potential safety consequences of the failure to manage disruption.
1.2 There were warnings of potential issues immediately prior to the introduction of the new timetable. Passengers were told that anticipated improvements to performance, capacity and service provision would not be immediately apparent.
1.3 On 16 May GTR warned that on some services ‘it will take a few weeks until we reach normal operation in the off peak’, but that nevertheless ‘we are keeping the changes [to the published timetable] to an absolute minimum, at quieter times of the day wherever possible’. On the Thameslink services passengers would experience ‘a limited short term implication at night, Monday to Friday, when a small number of services will not run’.¹
1.4 A bulletin from Northern on the 18 May stated that ‘some routes will see a deterioration in timetable services [and that] opportunities for resolving last-minute train scheduling problems have not been available’.²
1.5 These warnings did not give passengers an accurate impression of the scale of the disruption that was to follow. The weeks following the timetable change saw a threefold increase in delay minutes, a doubling of the percentage of trains cancelled, widespread confusion about train dispatch and stopping patterns, and a corresponding surge in the number of complaints. The evidence that passengers have submitted to ORR shows that there was a widespread and severe disruption to peoples’ work, social lives, and finances. This impact on passengers is set out in detail in the next chapter.
1.6 Disruption was not distributed evenly across the UK rail network. Some routes and operators were largely unaffected, while there was a significant level of disruption on the Northern route and on GTR's Thameslink and Great Northern routes.
¹ GTR stakeholder communication, 16 May 2018 ² Connections Express – The regular email bulletin for Northern Stakeholders, 18 May 2018. 1.8 The map below shows relative punctuality over time. It compares the ‘on-time’ performance of passenger services calling at stations across the national network in the weeks between the 20 May and 3 June (when a revised timetable was introduced), compared to the weeks immediately prior to the timetable change. The disproportionate levels of disruption experienced by passengers on the Northern route and GTR services are clearly shown.³
Diagram A: Relative on-time⁴ performance, showing 20 May – 3 June 2018, compared to 1 April – 19 May 2018
1.9 The ‘on time’ measure is calculated against the ‘plan of the day’, a daily schedule of services which is agreed by the operator and Network Rail at 22:00 the night before. However, these parties can agree to move to an emergency timetable (typically in response to adverse weather conditions).
³ Source: Network Rail performance data, submission to ORR.
⁴ On Time measures the proportion of recorded station stops that trains arrive at within one minute of the scheduled arrival time with no distinction made for long distance services. This covers 80% of all station stops which are equipped with the necessary recording equipment. In this case, the cancelled services will be excluded from the recording of punctuality and reliability measures ‘on the day’ including ‘on time’, the Passenger Performance Measure (PPM) and Cancellations and Significant Lateness(^5) (CaSL).
1.10 In order to present a full picture of cancellations, including those that were removed from the timetable prior to the ‘plan of the day’, figure B illustrates all cancellations across the national rail network. It shows the proportion of all trains(^6) that were cancelled before the plan of the day was agreed(^7), and partial(^8) and full cancellations made against the plan of the day.
Figure A: Proportion of trains cancelled pre-plan, in full, in part. (Source: ORR monitoring data)
Notes: Note: Monday 07 May and Monday 28 May were bank holiday Mondays, when services were affected by engineering work. Weekends are also likely to have a higher proportion of pre-plan cancellations caused by engineering work. Data is for GB franchised operators, excluding Merseyrail, owing to concerns about data quality.
1.11 This shows an increase in full cancellations in the two weeks after the timetable change, followed by an increase in pre-plan cancellations in the subsequent two weeks. This increase in pre-plan
______________________________________________________________________
(^5) Significant Lateness refers to trains that called at all scheduled station stops, but were between 30 and 119 minutes late at their destination.
(^6) Applicable trains within TRUST (Network Rail’s computer system used for monitoring the progress of trains and tracking delays on the GB rail network.)
(^7) Cancellations may have been replaced with a revised schedule of the same train (i.e. for instance a Sheffield to Hull train being cancelled and a revised Doncaster to Hull train being introduced). Such cases will feature as 2 trains in the TRUST applicable train count.
(^8) Part cancellations are trains on the day that either failed to complete their journey, did not stop at all scheduled stops, or were more than 120 minutes late at their destination. Full cancellations are trains on the day that failed to run any part of the journey. cancellations corresponds with the revised timetables introduced on 4th June by Northern, and 15 July by GTR, in an effort to provide passengers with a more reliable service.
1.12 The disproportionate extent of disruption suffered by passengers on the GTR and Northern routes is illustrated by the percentage of trains that were cancelled on these services, compared to elsewhere on the network.
1.13 Figure B shows the percentage of trains cancelled from the daily plan on the network as a whole, excluding those services run by GTR and Northern. Throughout the period in question, the percentage of trains ran by all other operators never fell below 96%.
Figure B: Trains planned / ran, excluding GTR and Northern. (Source: ORR monitoring data)
1.14 In comparison, the corresponding data for Northern and GTR is significantly worse. The following sections illustrate the level of cancellations, delay minutes and complaints for these two operators.
______________________________________________________________________
9 “Trains Planned” refers to the number of trains that are scheduled to run on the timetabled ‘plan of the day’, produced each day for the following day’s services. Trains Ran refers to how many trains that were scheduled to run actually did so. Data for these sources is collected by ORR as part of our regular performance monitoring function. GTR performance data
1.15 This section considers the performance experienced by passengers on GTR services. It shows data for the period prior to the introduction of the 20 May timetable and during the disruption which followed.
Train service cancellations and delays
1.16 Figure C presents data for the proportion of pre-plan and plan of the day GTR trains that were cancelled, either fully or partially. This illustrates an increase in full cancellations in the two weeks following the timetable change and a steady increase in pre-plan cancellations in the subsequent two weeks, as GTR worked to implement a reliable timetable.
Figure C: GTR cancellations, pre-plan and post-plan. (Source: ORR monitoring data)
Note: GTR services on Wednesday 09 May, Thursday 24 May, Saturday 26 May and Friday 19 June, were affected by industrial action.
1.17 Figure D below shows that the percentage of Trains Ran for GTR decreased by 7.5 percentage points for the two weeks after the timetable change (compared with the two weeks before the timetable change), before recovering somewhat in the following three weeks. The percentage of Trains Ran increased to above 90% following the introduction of a revised timetable, though this is still well below the 95% achieved in the two weeks before the timetable change. 1.18 With GTR planning to run on average 3,880 trains on a weekday, approximately 470 scheduled trains, more than one in ten did not run each day.
1.19 For those trains that did run, passengers experienced a sharp decline in punctuality. The graph in Figure E below shows that the number of minutes by which GTR's services were delayed (which can be attributed to GTR itself) more than trebled in week one of the timetable and had not returned to pre-20 May levels by late June.(^\\text{10})
______________________________________________________________________
(^{10}) Delay incidents producing three or more minutes of delay on Britain's railways are attributed to either Network Rail or a train operator. As well as infrastructure and operational delays such as signal failures and overrunning engineering works, delays caused by external factors such as severe weather, vandalism, cable theft and trespass are also attributed to Network Rail. This is because they are considered best placed to mitigate for such incidents. Figure E: GTR delay minutes (Source: ORR monitoring data) Passenger complaints and compensation claims
1.20 Provisional complaints information from GTR shows that it dealt with nearly 7,300 passenger complaints in period three (27 May to 23 June) 2018/19, a considerable rise compared to the corresponding period the year before, and a marked increase over the period immediately prior to the introduction of the new timetable. As the graph below demonstrates, passengers were most dissatisfied about timetabling and connection issues as well as train service performance, both of which showed a sharp escalation in rail period three.
Figure F: Provisional complaints data, GTR. (Source: ORR monitoring data)
1.21 Based on provisional delay compensation data from GTR, claims for delay compensation to GTR increased by 45% between periods one and two to 84,292 claims, and by 191% between periods two and three to 244,921 claims. Northern
1.22 This section considers the performance experienced by passengers on Northern services. It shows data for the period prior to the introduction of the 20 May timetable and during the disruption which followed.
Train service cancellations and delays
1.23 Figure G presents data for the proportion of pre-plan of the day and plan of the day Northern trains that were cancelled, either fully or partially. It illustrates an increase in full cancellations in the two weeks following the timetable change, and an increase in pre-plan cancellations in the subsequent two weeks which correspond with the interim timetables put in place on 4th June. The increase in pre-plan cancellations also corresponded with a decrease in part and full post-plan cancellations.
Figure G: Northern cancellations, pre-plan and post-plan (Source: ORR monitoring data)
1.24 The following chart (Figure H) shows that the percentage of ‘Trains Ran’ (as a proportion of services in the ‘plan of the day’) for Northern decreased by an average of 5.8 percentage points for the two weeks after the timetable change (compared with the two weeks before the timetable change), before recovering to a higher level in the following three weeks, following the introduction of a revised timetable on the 4th of June\\textsuperscript{11}. This revised timetable was intended to provide a greater degree of reliability and stability for passengers.
Figure H: Northern trains planned / ran (Source: ORR monitoring data)
1.25 With Northern planning to run on average 2,810 trains on a weekday, approximately 310 scheduled trains, more than one in ten each day did not run.
1.26 For those trains that did run, figure I below shows that the number of delay minutes on Northern Rail’s services more than doubled in week one and two of the new timetable, before recovering to pre-20 May levels following the introduction of a revised timetable.
\\textsuperscript{11} Figures for Trains Planned/Trains Ran have been adjusted to account for strike days on 9 May, 24 May, 26 May, and 19 June that are not accounted for under business as usual. This is to allow a more accurate comparison across the time period. Note: Monday 07 May and Monday 28 May were bank holiday Mondays, when GTR services were affected by engineering work. Data for these sources is collected by ORR as part of our regular performance monitoring function. Northern passenger complaints and claims for compensation
1.27 The third measure of performance, passenger complaints and compensation claims, reflects the dip in performance shown by the other two metrics. Based on provisional data for periods one - three (1 April to 23 June) the level of passenger complaints to Northern relating to train service performance (reliability and punctuality) increased sharply in rail periods two and three (29 April to 23 June) following the introduction of the new timetable, as shown in Figure J. This can be seen most clearly in the level of complaints from passengers that relate to train service performance, whereas the number of complaints that relate to other categories remains broadly consistent. 1.28 The number of claims submitted by passengers for delay compensation also increased accordingly. Based on provisional data on delay compensation supplied to ORR from Northern Rail, claims increased 146% between period one and two to 22,006 claims, and by a further 68% to 36,968 in period three (see Figure K, below).
Figure K: Provisional compensation claim figures, Northern (Source: ORR monitoring data) Disruption to other operators
1.29 The disruption to GTR and Northern services also had a knock-on effect on some services provided by, in particular, TransPennine Express (TPE). East Midlands Trains (EMT), and Virgin Trains East Coast (now London North Eastern Railway (LNER)) were also affected.
1.30 Whilst some of this impact was negative, there was evidence of train companies rising to the challenge to help passengers. For example as one of the regular GTR cancellations was a train used by LNER staff to get into work, LNER operated a service instead for staff which they extended for use by passengers. LNER also added an additional stop at Huntingdon on the early morning service from Kings Cross for school children, and more of their trains called at Stevenage(^\\text{12}).
1.31 DfT also responded to the issues through the establishment of a group involving affected train operators to discuss where the problems and issues were and how they were being addressed.
Figure L below shows that the number of delay minutes on TPE’s services (that can be attributed to other train operators) more than trebled in week one and remained high, and did not recover until week five.
Figure L: TPE Weekly delay minutes
1.32 Whilst the number of minutes that TPE passengers were delayed was considerably less than passengers using GTR and Northern Rail services, we are aware of the problems experienced by passengers using TPE’s services. In particular, congestion in the Central Manchester corridor quickly affected services, with trains being terminated short rather than running to the airport. At
(^{12}) LNER interview by ORR 25 July 2018. the other extremities of the TPE network trains were being terminated short to maintain times on the return journey. This led to passengers being left at stations such as Malton, York, and Stalybridge, some of which only have an hourly TPE service, or relied on Northern Rail connections which may not have been running. Many TPE services also serve Leeds and were affected by the station working issues at that station.\\textsuperscript{13}
**Safety**
1.33 Under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, railway operators have a duty to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the safety of passengers. It is clear that good planning and communication are key to making the best of abnormal arrangements. A lack of capacity, in terms of both infrastructure and rolling stock, combined with difficulties with passenger information, can potentially lead to increased safety risk. The most serious potential risks can include, for instance, people falling off crowded platforms.
1.34 Following the introduction of the timetable on 20 May, there were instances of very short notice cancellations (including after the train should have arrived at a station). To compound the situation, the information to staff and customers was inadequate resulting in platform crowding and train dispatch issues, and passengers having to rush between platforms at short notice with resulting risks to passengers. Some of these issues were particularly apparent at Harpenden station. Senior ORR staff met with senior representatives of GTR to discuss ORR’s concerns in relation to train dispatch and crowding and also visited the GTR control in order to identify the issues with wrong or missing information on Customer Information System screens, and GTR’s proposals to quickly resolve the situation. This included seeking assurance on the arrangements for the introduction of the 15 July interim timetable.
\\textsuperscript{13} TPE interview by ORR 18 July 2018.
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daae72e8439f6c08c2af9d33de2035c49d6ea875 | Dee River Basin District Flood Risk Management Plan 2015 – 2021
December 2015 This is a joint draft plan prepared by the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales who protect and improve the environment and make it a better place for people and wildlife. Dee River Basin District Flood Risk Management Plan December 2015 Foreword
The 2013 / 14 winter storms and flooding had significant impacts on many communities, businesses, infrastructure and the environment within the Dee River Basin District (RBD). In the future there could be more extremes in the weather with a changing climate leading to more frequent and more severe flooding.
Investment in flood risk management infrastructure not only reduces the risks of flooding but also supports growth by helping to create new jobs, bring confidence to areas previously affected by floods and creating and restoring habitats.
Risk Management Authorities (RMAs) are committed to producing Flood Risk Management Plans (FRMPs) required by the EU Floods Directive by December 2015. This FRMP is an important part of meeting that objective and aligns with the guiding principles of the National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy.
The FRMP will help promote a greater awareness and understanding of the risks of flooding, particularly in those communities at high risk, and encourage and enable householders, businesses and communities to take action to manage the risks. The FRMP will provide the evidence to support flood and coastal risk management decision making. The highest priority is to reduce risk to life.
Measures (actions) in FRMPs do not all have secured funding and are not guaranteed to be implemented. Money is allocated to RMA measures based on current Government policy that gives the highest priority to the areas at highest risk. The funding for flooding is devolved so RMA measures are funded by DEFRA in England, in Wales they are funded by Welsh Government.
This document has been produced in consultation with professional partners. The Flood Risk Management Plan (FRMP) sets out the proposed measures to manage flood risk in the Dee RBD from 2015 to 2021 and beyond.
In England and Wales, RMAs include Natural Resources Wales, the Environment Agency, Lead Local Flood Authorities (LLFAs), district councils (where there are no unitary authorities), internal drainage boards, water companies and highway authorities. These RMAs work in partnership with communities to reduce the risk of flooding. The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales would like to thank the organisations listed on the previous pages for their contributions and feedback during consultation.
Flood risk in England and Wales will continue to change as a result of a growing population and a changing climate. There are many ways to manage flood risk including maintaining and building new flood defences, building flood resilient homes and working more closely with nature to restore flood plains. Flood risk management planning is not new and RMAs have been able to draw on the experience of partners and earlier plans.
The FRMP also sets out how these measures can contribute to improving the environment and how they support the objectives of River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) and specifically the Severn RBMP that Natural Resources Wales and the Environment Agency has produced in parallel with this FRMP.
Tim Jones Executive Director Natural Resources Wales
Mark Sitton-Kent Director Operations West Environment Agency Contents
PART A ........................................................................................................................................... 8 Dee Flood Risk Management Plan .................................................................................................. 8
1. What is flood risk and who manages it? .................................................................................. 8
2. What is a Flood Risk Management Plan? .............................................................................. 12
3. The layout of this document .................................................................................................. 15
4. How the plan has been developed ....................................................................................... 16
5. How to manage risk ............................................................................................................. 19
PART B ........................................................................................................................................... 22 Managing flood risk in the Dee river basin district ...................................................................... 22 6. Getting to know the Dee river basin district ....................................................................... 22 7. Key Flood Risk Issues in the Dee river basin district .......................................................... 27 8. Sub-areas in the Dee river basin district .............................................................................. 38 9. Conclusions, objectives and measures to manage risk for the Dee river basin district ....... 39 10. Wales only section ............................................................................................................. 47 11. England only section ......................................................................................................... 59 12. Implementing the plan ....................................................................................................... 76
Annex 2 - CFMP and SMP policies .............................................................................................. 78 | Glossary and abbreviations | |-----------------------------| | **Catchment** | The watershed of a surface water river system | | **CaBA** | Catchment based approach: an approach to environmental planning that focuses on local engagement and partnerships | | **CFMP** | Catchment Flood Management Plan | | **Coastal Groups** | Voluntary coastal defence groups made up of maritime district authorities and other bodies with coastal defence responsibilities. | | **Cross Border Advisory Group (CBAG)** | Set up under The Flood Risk (Cross Border Areas) Regulations 2012 (SI No. 1102). A statutory group made up of representatives from SEPA, Environment Agency and local authorities within the cross border areas. | | **Cross Border Areas** | Those areas designated as ‘cross border’ under The Flood Risk (Cross Border Areas) Regulations 2012 (SI No. 1102). | | **Defra** | Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs | | **EA** | Environment Agency | | **EU** | European Union | | **FCERM** | Flood and coastal erosion risk management | | **Floods Directive** | The European Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) on the assessment and management of flood risks. | | **Flood Risk Area (FRA)** | Areas where the risk of flooding from local flood risks is significant as designated under the Flood Risk Regulations. | | **FRMP** | Flood Risk Management Plan – plan produced to deliver the requirements of the Regulations. | | **Government** | The term government is used within this report to refer to Defra (the Department for Environment, Flood and Rural Affairs) and Welsh Government. | | **Groundwater flooding** | Occurs when water levels in the ground rise above the natural surface. Low-lying areas underlain by permeable strata are particularly susceptible. | | **HRA** | Habitats Regulations Assessment: an assessment undertaken in relation to a site designated under the Habitats and Birds Directives | | **LLFA** | Lead local flood authority | | **Local FRM Strategy** | Local flood risk management strategy produced by LLFAs under the Flood and Water Management Act 2010. | | **Main river** | A watercourse shown as such on the main river map, and for which the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales has responsibilities and powers | | **National FCERM Strategy** | National flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy: these are strategies prepared under the Flood and Water Management Act 2010, by the Environment Agency for England and by Welsh Government for Wales. | | **Natural Resource Management** | The taking care of natural resources such as land, water, air, soil, plants and animals with a particular focus on how their management affects the quality of life for both present and future generations. | | **NRW** | Natural Resources Wales. NRW took over the functions of the Environment Agency in Wales on 1st April 2013. | | **Ordinary watercourses (OW)** | All watercourses that are not designated Main River, and which are the responsibility of Local Authorities or, where they exist, Internal Drainage Boards. | |-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | **PFRA** | Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment – these were required to be published by December 2011 and were the first stage in delivering the Regulations. | | **Ramsar** | Wetlands of international importance designated under the Ramsar Convention | | **Reservoir** | A natural or artificial lake where water is collected and stored until needed. Reservoirs can be used for irrigation, recreation, providing water supply for municipal needs, hydroelectric power or controlling water flow. | | **Risk management authorities (RMAs)** | Organisations that have a key role in flood and coastal erosion risk management as defined by the Act. These are the Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales, lead local flood authorities, district councils where there is no unitary authority, internal drainage boards, water companies, and highways authorities. | | **RFCCs** | Regional Flood and Coastal Committees | | **River Basin District (RBD)** | These are the reporting units to the European Commission for the Water Framework Directive and the Floods Directive. | | **RBMP** | River Basin Management Plan – plan required by the European Water Framework Directive. | | **River flooding** | Occurs when water levels in a channel overwhelms the capacity of the channel. | | **SAC** | Special Area of Conservation | | **SEA** | Strategic environmental assessment | | **SMP** | Shoreline Management Plan | | **SPA** | Special Protection Area | | **SSSI** | Site of Special Scientific Interest | | **Surface water flooding** | Flooding from rainwater (including snow and other precipitation) which has not entered a watercourse, drainage system or public sewer. | | **SWMP** | Surface Water Management Plan | | **Working with Natural Processes** | Taking action to manage flood and coastal erosion risk by protecting, restoring and emulating the natural regulating function of catchments, rivers, floodplains and coasts. An example of this is using land to temporarily store flood water away from high risk areas. | | **WG** | Welsh Government | PART A
Dee Flood Risk Management Plan
1. What is flood risk and who manages it?
The Flood and Water Management Act (2010) defines flooding as any case where land not normally covered by water becomes covered by water. Flood risk is a combination of two components: the chance (or probability/likelihood) that a location will flood from any source or type of flooding, and the impact (or consequence) that the flooding would cause if it occurred. Flood risk management is generally concerned with reducing harm which might take the form of property damage or physical injury to people and wildlife. However, flooding can also have beneficial effects too, in particular for wetland wildlife as well as some types of agriculture that are water dependent.
Figure 1: What is flood risk?
Risk captures the severity of, or related consequences produced by, a flood event. Impacts can be social, economic and environmental, for example the number of properties flooded and the level of associated economic damages. The consequences of a flood depend on the level of exposure and the vulnerability of those affected.
What is the likelihood of this happening and what does this mean?
Probability (or chance) is a measure of the likelihood that a defined event will occur. The probability of a flood event is typically defined as the relative frequency of occurrence of that flood being equalled or exceeded. Probability can be expressed as a fraction, percentage, a decimal or description, and should always make reference to a time period. For example, the industry refers to a 1 in 100 chance of flooding in any given year’ or a 1% annual probability of flooding’, which both refer to the same likelihood.
Assessing impacts of flooding prior to an event usually involves estimating the potential impact of flooding on people, property and the environment. The theoretical probability of flooding is illustrated by the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales’ Flood Maps which show flood risk for rivers and the sea, surface water and reservoirs. Flood models which are the basis for the flood maps use uniform rainfall scenario (the same amount of rainfall falling across the country), whereas in reality rainfall rates vary greatly from one town to another.
It is not possible to prevent all flooding, but there are a variety of actions which can manage these risks and their impacts on communities. Flood risk managers must identify all potential options to manage flood risk and balance the needs of communities, the economy and the environment. Risk management authorities should work in partnership with each other and communities to manage flood risk, ensuring that communities are part of the decision making process and understand and actively prepare for the risks. By working together risk management authorities should actively seek opportunities to coordinate risk management, encourage partnership funding and deliver multiple benefits. Roles and responsibilities
Table 1 and 2 show the RMAs involved in flood risk management in England and Wales their roles and responsibilities.
Table 1: Summary of responsibilities for risk management authorities
| Flood Source | EA / NRW | LLFAs | District | Water Company | Highways Authority | Internal Drainage Boards² | |--------------|----------|-------|----------|---------------|---------------------|--------------------------| | Strategic overview for all sources of flooding & coastal erosion | ✓ | | | | | | | Main River | ✓ | | | | | | | The Sea | ✓ | | | | | | | Surface Water | ✓ | | | | ✓ | | | Surface Water (on or coming from the Highway) | | | | ✓ | | | | Sewer Flooding | | | | ✓ | | | | Ordinary Watercourse | ✓ | ✓ | | | | | | Groundwater | ✓ | | | | | | | Reservoirs | ✓\* | ✓\* | ✓\* | ✓\* | ✓\* | ✓\* |
¹ Please note RMAs have different responsibilities for reservoirs such as regulation, asset management and flood incident response ² As of 1 April 2015 in Wales the 3 Internal Drainage Districts that were operated by independent boards were incorporated into NRW in April 2015.
Table 2: Roles and responsibilities of risk management authorities and others involved in managing flood risk
| Organisation | Roles and Responsibilities | |--------------|----------------------------| | Environment Agency | Permissive powers to manage flood risk from ‘main rivers’, the sea and reservoirs. Can use enforcement powers to require landowners to take action to minimise flood risk to others. | | Natural Resources Wales | Permissive powers to manage flood risk from ‘main rivers’, the sea and reservoirs. Can use enforcement powers to require landowners to take action to minimise flood risk to others. | | LLFAs | Upper tier local council or unitary council. Permissive powers to manage flood risk from surface water, ‘ordinary watercourses’ (non-main rivers) and groundwater. Enforcement powers are similar to Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales. Upper tier councils also manage highways. | | Water Companies | Dee Valley Water and Welsh Water manage the sewerage and water supply networks and any flood risk arising from them. Also manage flood risk to any critical infrastructure, such as water treatment plants and pumping stations. | | District Council (only in England) | By agreement with the upper tier Lead Local Flood Authority, the District Council may do some work to manage flood risk. District Councils are | Organisation | Roles and Responsibilities --- | --- Community Council (only in Wales) | By agreement with the upper tier Lead Local Flood Authority, the Community Council may do some work to manage flood risk. Maritime District Council | As District Councils, but also manage coastal erosion. As many coastal defences protect against both erosion and flooding from the sea, these Councils often do both in urban areas. Riparian Landowner | The owner of land next to a watercourse usually owns the land to the middle of the river (unless property deeds show otherwise). This ‘riparian landowner’ is responsible for maintaining the watercourse to allow free flow. Communities | Individuals at risk from flooding, or having flooded, are encouraged to form a Flood Action Group or other Community Group as a focus for understanding the issues, considering improvement options and implementing solutions. Non- RMA owners of flood defences | Features and structures that have been designated as a flood defence cannot be altered, removed or replaced without the consent of the responsible authority. Reservoir owners | In addition to their general duty of care for the public under common law, the owners of reservoirs with an above ground capacity of 25,000 cubic metres or more have a legal duty to have their reservoirs supervised and inspected regularly by experts; in order to prevent dam failures and the dangerous flooding that could result. Reservoir owners could fall into any of the above categories listed in the table.
Flooding from river and the sea
National Flood Risk Assessment (NaFRA) is an assessment of flood risk for England and Wales produced using local data and expertise. It shows the chance of flooding from rivers and the sea (both along the open coast and tidal estuaries). The data is presented in flood risk likelihood categories, which indicate the chance of flooding in any given year.
**High** - greater than or equal to 1 in 30 (3.3%) chance in any given year
**Medium** - less than 1 in 30 (3.3%) but greater than or equal to 1 in 100 (1%) chance in any given year
**Low** - less than 1 in 100 (1%) but greater than or equal to 1 in 1,000 (0.1%) chance in any given year
**Very Low** - these properties may have a greater than 1 in 1,000 chance of flooding in any given year if defences weren’t present. However, in reality the chance of flooding is reduced below a 1 in 1,000 chance by defences which NaFRA analysis includes.
The computer model used to produce NaFRA results estimates the likelihood of flooding from rivers and the sea, taking into account defences and the chance that they can fail or be overtopped. The results, which are presented in maps, databases and excel spreadsheets, can be used in conjunction with receptor data (number and type of properties and infrastructure) to estimate the consequences and economic damage associated with flooding from rivers and the sea.
Flooding from reservoirs Reservoir flood risk maps show the area that could be flooded if a large reservoir were to fail and release the water it holds. A large reservoir is one that holds over 25,000 cubic metres. This is a worst case scenario.
Existing flood management schemes and properties protected Risk Management Authorities work in partnership with each other and communities to manage flood risk. The Flood Risk Management Plan sets out the current and proposed measures to manage flood risk across the Dee RBD. However, RMAs have been undertaking a range of activities to manage flood risk for many years. Details of these activities can be found in Section 7 Error! Reference source not found.. In some parts of the Dee RBD flood management schemes are in place to reduce flood risk. The Environment Agency Flood Map for Planning and NRW Flood Risk Map shows the flood defences that protect against fluvial and tidal floods.
Important flood defences in the Dee catchment include:
- the River Dee flood embankments in Chester
- Sealand main drain flood basin at Clifton Drive, Chester
- Finchetts Gutter outfalls and debris screens at Sealand Road in Chester
2. What is a Flood Risk Management Plan?
Flood risk management plans (FRMPs) highlight the hazards and risks from rivers, the sea, surface water, groundwater and reservoirs and set out how risk management authorities (RMAs) will work together with communities to manage flood risk.
What is the FRMP for?
Flood Risk Management Plans (FRMPs) are produced every 6 years and describe the sources and risks of flooding within a river basin district and catchment. They also include information on how risk management authorities (RMAs) plan to work together with communities and businesses to manage and reduce flood risk. Over the 6 year planning cycle the FRMP will help promote a greater awareness and understanding of the risks of flooding, particularly in those communities at high risk, and encourage and enable householders, businesses and communities to take action to manage the risks. FRMPs along with River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) help all those involved in managing water to make decisions that are best for people and the environment.
Why are FRMPs being prepared?
This is the first cycle of implementing the Flood Risk Regulations 2009. As a result of this legislation, lead local flood authorities must prepare FRMPs in Flood Risk Areas, where the risk of flooding from local flood risks is significant (for instance from surface water, groundwater and ordinary watercourses). The Environment Agency (EA) and Natural Resources Wales (NRW) are required to prepare FRMPs for all of England and Wales covering flooding from main rivers, the sea and reservoirs, in line with government guidance.
Flood risk and coastal erosion management activities require careful planning to ensure that appropriate, sustainable, options are selected and that they are implemented properly. Actions should be planned effectively, for the long-term, and provide a clear picture of what will be done to manage risk and provide multiple benefits. This may include, for example, linking with other plans such as river basin management plans (RBMPs) and supporting biodiversity, habitat creation or improving water quality. Natural Resources Wales, the Environment Agency and LLFAs are developing FRMPs by drawing existing information together and building on existing Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management plans such as: Catchment Flood Management Plans (CFMPs), Shoreline Management Plans (SMPs) and Local Flood Risk Management Strategies (LFRMS) (see Figure 1).
The Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales and lead local flood authorities are developing FRMPs by drawing existing information together, building on and supplementing the existing planning process (see What types of flood risk are included in the FRMP?)
The FRMP covers the flood risks that the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales are responsible for. This is a joint FRMP which the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales have acted jointly to produce.
The FRMP draws from relevant information, in particular, flood hazard and flood risk maps published under the Flood Risk Regulations. It summarises the risk of flooding from rivers, the sea and reservoirs.
The FRMP draws relevant conclusions from the flood and hazard risk maps about risks and opportunities. It sets out and prioritises what needs to be done to manage those risks. The FRMP shows how flood risk management measures co-ordinate with measures outlined through river basin management planning under the Water Framework Directive (WFD).
Find out more about flood risk management on the Natural Resources Wales and GOV.UK websites. What the plan does? This FRMP aims to deliver the aims of the Environment Agency’s National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy in England and the Welsh Government’s National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy in Wales by setting out the measures to manage flood risk now and in the future. The FRMP will:
- Help develop and promote a better understanding of flood and coastal erosion risk
- Provide information about the economic and environmental benefits to inform decision makers
- Identify communities with the highest risk of flooding so that investment can be targeted at those in most need
Measures in FRMPs do not all have secured funding and are not guaranteed to be implemented. Money is allocated to all RMA measures in the same way and is based on current Government policy that gives the highest priority to lives and homes.
What types of flood risk are included in the FRMP? The FRMP covers the flood risks that the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales are responsible for. This is a joint FRMP which the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales have acted jointly to produce.
The FRMP draws from relevant information, in particular, flood hazard and flood risk maps published under the Flood Risk Regulations. It summarises the risk of flooding from rivers, the sea and reservoirs.
The FRMP draws relevant conclusions from the flood and hazard risk maps about risks and opportunities. It sets out and prioritises what needs to be done to manage those risks. The FRMP shows how flood risk management measures co-ordinate with measures outlined through river basin management planning under the Water Framework Directive (WFD).
Find out more about flood risk management on the Natural Resources Wales and GOV.UK websites. Figure 2: Flood risk management plans and their relationship to other planning initiatives (adapted from the National Flood and Coastal Risk Management Strategy for England) 3. The layout of this document
We have divided the plan into two parts:
Part A sets the scene for the FRMPs - what they are, what they are for and how we have developed them.
Part B goes on to describe the River Basin District (RBD), the flood and coastal erosion risk and the proposed approach to managing that risk.
How we have developed the plan
Section 4 describes how in partnership the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales have prepared this draft FRMP.
How to manage risk
Section 5 describes some of the terminology we are using, such as ‘conclusions’, ‘objectives’ and ‘measures’, and how they relate to flood and coastal erosion risk management in this context.
The River Basin District
Section 6 of the plan introduces the Dee RBD. The flood and coastal erosion risks are set out for the RBD in section 7. We also introduce the ‘sub-areas’ that divide the RBD further.
The sub-areas
Section 8 introduces each of the sub-areas which make up the RBD.
The risk conclusions, management objectives and measures
Sections 9 to 11 set out the risk conclusions, objectives and measures for the RBD and sub-areas.
Implementing the plan, monitoring and reporting
Section 12 sets out the proposals for implementing the plan, including co-ordination with the implementation of the RBMPs prepared under the WFD. 4. How the plan has been developed
The approach to developing FRMPs
In 2013 the government agreed that the preferred approach to developing FRMPs would be for the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales to work in partnership with other RMAs, in particular LLFAs, to pool information to develop an overall plan for managing all sources of flood risk and coastal erosion. For the first cycle of production of FRMPs, joint FRMPs are not being pursued in Wales. In preparing this draft FRMP, RMAs have built on relevant information from existing work (see What types of flood risk are included in the FRMP?
The FRMP covers the flood risks that the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales are responsible for. This is a joint FRMP which the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales have acted jointly to produce.
The FRMP draws from relevant information, in particular, flood hazard and flood risk maps published under the Flood Risk Regulations. It summarises the risk of flooding from rivers, the sea and reservoirs.
The FRMP draws relevant conclusions from the flood and hazard risk maps about risks and opportunities. It sets out and prioritises what needs to be done to manage those risks. The FRMP shows how flood risk management measures co-ordinate with measures outlined through river basin management planning under the Water Framework Directive (WFD).
Find out more about flood risk management on the Natural Resources Wales and GOV.UK websites. The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales are co-ordinating the development of this FRMP with the RBMP so that there is an integrated approach to overall water management for the benefit of people, the environment and the economy.
Table 3: Sources of FRMP information according to flood risk
| Flood risk | Existing plans and FRMP information | |-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Flooding from main rivers | River Dee Catchment Flood Management Plan | | Flooding from the sea | North West England and North Wales Shoreline Management Plan SMP2 | | Flooding along estuaries | Estuary Management Plans | | Flooding from reservoirs | Reservoir Plans |
Consultation and engagement
Consultation and engagement on this FRMP helped improve, inform and shape the plan. By consulting others we have reached a better final plan.
We consulted on the FRMP from 10 October 2014 to 31 January 2015. As a result of feedback from the consultation we have improved the information on existing flood risk management and made clearer links between the FRMP and river basin management plans. We’ve also shown more clearly how flood management actions help to improve the environment.
We also sought views on the measures within this final plan during the draft FRMP consultation. These measures are the intention for delivery. However, the majority of these measures are currently unfunded and each will be subject to assessment and justification to secure funding and if appropriate, prioritised on a National basis before delivery.
How the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales plan and set objectives
Objectives set out what RMAs want to achieve to manage the risk of flooding. Flood Risk Management Plans (FRMPs) contain objectives for managing flood risk. Objectives are a common set of goals agreed by risk management authorities. They state the main ways in which work is directed to make a difference and reduce flood risk. They cover people, the economy and the environment. The objectives are split into the 3 categories to help demonstrate the balance of objectives across the plans but the categories aren’t assigned a weighting in the FRMP. Objectives are used to plan and prioritise investment programmes to target investment in the most at risk communities. Prioritisation is then done at an England wide level and Wales wide level. This takes into account the risk but also considers other factors such as; cost benefits, the level of investment to date and other aspects such as the potential for external funding opportunities.
This plan covers areas in England where the Environment Agency is the responsible authority for flood risk management (with regard to main rivers, the sea and reservoirs) and areas in Wales where Natural Resources Wales is the responsible authority for flood risk management (with regard to main rivers, sea and reservoirs). Where the draft plan crosses the national boundary, agreements and arrangements are in place to enable both organisations to develop the draft plan jointly and ensure that impacts either side of the boundary are understood and agreed by the each authority.
Management of flood and coastal erosion risk in England and Wales is driven by the National Strategies for Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management for England and Wales, respectively. These strategies provide the framework for flood and coastal erosion risk management work in the RBD. The overarching principles of the strategies were used to determine objectives for the RBD that consider people, the environment and economic activity. Where objectives are specific to only England or Wales, they are captured in the England or Wales only sections. How each authority delivers against their FRMP objectives differs in England and Wales, as described in the following sections.
**England**
Measures to meet the objectives include actions taken forward from the SMP2 (except in the small number of locations where these now differ following development of more up to date strategies), incomplete actions from the CFMP where still relevant, and from existing flood risk management strategies. Over time the aim is to also include actions from more local flood risk management strategies produced by LLFAs for their areas. This first plan includes a number of ongoing, agreed and newly proposed actions at the community level. Over time, the Environment Agency shall be considering further community level actions within the RDB. The aspiration is to add these in future cycles of the plan.
Funding to RMAs to manage flood risk from watercourses, surface run-off and groundwater is mainly provided by Defra as flood and coastal erosion risk management grant in aid (FCRM GiA). Highways authorities and water authorities can apply for GiA funding for projects to reduce flood risk which wouldn’t ordinarily be within their remit. Regional Flood and Coastal Committees can also raise local levy to fund local priority projects and works in partnership with others.
Government promotes nationally consistent approaches to assessing and managing flood and coastal erosion risk and RMAs prioritise public investment in flood and coastal risk management works according to Treasury and Defra guidance.
The Environment Agency has a role in allocating FCRM GiA and local levy funding to RMAs. Risk Management Authorities bid for the funding through medium term planning and projects are selected on the basis of the outcomes delivered, costs and benefits. Taking a risk-based management approach, resources are targeted to ensure that public money is spent on the works that provide the greatest benefits to society, and that this money is spent efficiently and effectively.
Under Defra’s partnership funding approach, government funding towards schemes is based on the numbers of households protected, the damages being prevented and other benefits that would be delivered. For schemes to proceed where they are not fully funded by government either the costs would need to be reduced or the remainder of the funding provided through local contributions. The approach helps achieve the best value for public money and encourages others to contribute where it is in their interests to do so.
**Wales**
In order to deliver measures to meet the FRMP objectives, Natural Resources Wales takes a risk based community approach to prioritise where to best direct investment. This is informed by the strategic framework provided by CFMPs and SMPs. The strategic framework set by these plans enable Natural Resources Wales to make short term decisions to manage present day risk whilst also considering the longer term prediction of risk (for further information on CFMPs and SMPs please refer to Annex 2).
The risk based community approach of present day risk is done through the Natural Resources Wales Communities at Risk Register. This is a tool that considers a number of factors to give an indication of where the most vulnerable communities at risk of flooding from main rivers and the sea are located across Wales. This is then used to plan and prioritise the Natural Resources Wales investment programme to target investment in the most at risk communities. Prioritisation is then done at a Wales-wide level and takes into account the risk calculation from the Communities at Risk Register but also considers other factors such as the cost-benefit ratio, level of investment to date and other aspects such as the potential for external funding opportunities. There is also a facet of Natural Resources Wales work which is reactive to severe weather events, where severe damage may have occurred, leading to the need for emergency works.
All major flood alleviation schemes in Wales undergo appraisal work to assess options and to understand the costs and benefits of progressing work; this is done in accordance with Treasury guidance.
**Strategic Environmental Assessment and Habitats Regulations** A Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) was undertaken to consider the significant environmental effects of the flood risk management plan. Natural England, Historic England and the Marine Management Organisation were consulted on the scope of the proposed assessment in December 2013, and the environmental report sets out the results of the SEA. The report describes the environmental effects that are significant within the RBD and identifies measures to mitigate any adverse effects. Opportunities to improve the environment are also considered. The SEA took account of the environmental effects of flood risk management measures in the FRMP. The focus was on the combined effects of the programme of protection measures across a catchment or flood risk area, rather than individual measures at specific locations.
The scope of the SEA was informed by the consultation with Natural England, Historic England and the MMO as well as with Natural Resources Wales, Scottish Environment Protection Agency, Historic Scotland and Scottish Natural Heritage in January 2014. The SEA took account of the environmental effects of flood risk management measures in the FRMP. The focus was on the combined effects of the programme of protection measures across a catchment or flood risk area, rather than individual measures at specific locations.
Using the same assessment approach for both the RBMP and FRMP allows us to compare the environmental effects directly and consider the interaction between the two plans. The likely positive impacts of the FRMP are identified in the SEA, as well as mitigation required to manage the negative effects and opportunities to deliver greater environmental benefits. Indicators are also set out that indicate the effect of the plan on significant environmental receptors, taking advantage of existing monitoring that is already carried out by the Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales and others.
A Habitats Regulations assessment has been carried out on the FRMP to consider whether the plan affects designated sites (Special Areas of Conservation, Special Protection Areas and Ramsar sites). Initial assessment suggests that significant effects are not likely.
How FRMPs have been co-ordinated with river basin management planning
The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales lead on the development of flood risk management plans and river basin management plans (RBMPs). We aim to co-ordinate work effectively, and support others to do the same, so that there is an integrated approach to overall water management for the benefit of people, the environment and the economy.
Each river basin district has a Liaison Panel made up of representatives for the key sectors. Members bring their experience, knowledge and their sector views acting as a two-way channel between the panel and their sector. This way of working provides an open forum to discuss and influence the development of the RBMPs to help us improve water quality.
Find out more about river basin management plans on the Natural Resources Wales and GOV.UK websites.
Co-ordinating with the RBMP:
- Dee RBMP
5. How to manage risk
Involving communities’ leads to more effective flood and coastal erosion management. RMAs will continue to work with communities and other stakeholders to manage risk by:
- assessing the sources of flood risk and drawing conclusions about the risks
- setting out what RMAs are trying to achieve and establishing risk management objectives
- determining the best approach to achieving the objectives: by identifying the right measures and prioritising them
The conclusions, objectives and proposed measures are set out for consultation within this draft FRMP. Following feedback from the consultation RMAs will work with interested parties to finalise the FRMP and:
- seek to secure the necessary funding
- implement the measures, with clarity on which organisation is accountable for which measures
- monitor and review how the plan works
RMAs will monitor, and report annually, on progress in implementing the measures set out in the final FRMP published in December 2015. As RMAs, we will continue to work in partnership, ensuring a forward look of prioritised proposals for managing flood risk. The next review of the FRMP under the Flood Risk Regulations will be completed by 2021.
National flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for Wales
The Welsh Government National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy provides the framework for flood and coastal erosion risk management in Wales. The framework is centred around four key objectives and the measures to meet those objectives.
- Reducing the consequences for individuals, communities, businesses and the environment from flooding and coastal erosion;
- Raising awareness of and engaging people in the response to flood and coastal erosion risk;
- Providing an effective and sustained response to flood and coastal erosion events;
- Prioritising investment in the most at risk communities.
Natural Resources Wales plans and implements flood risk management work for which Natural Resources Wales are responsible within the framework set by the National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy.
In order to deliver the measures from the National FCERM Strategy, Natural Resources Wales takes a risk based community approach to prioritise where to best direct investment. This is informed by the strategic framework provided by Catchment Flood Management Plans and Shoreline Management Plans. The strategic framework set by these plans enable us to make short term decisions to manage present day risk whilst also considering the longer term projection of risk. National flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for England
The national flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for England (2011) provides the overarching framework for future action by all RMAs to tackle flooding and coastal erosion risk in England. The overall aim of the strategy is to ensure the risk of flooding and coastal erosion is properly managed by using the full range of options in a co-ordinated way. It encourages more effective risk management by enabling people, communities, business, infrastructure operators and the public sector to work together to:
- ensure a clear understanding of the risks of flooding and coastal erosion, nationally and locally, so that investment in risk management can be prioritised more effectively;
- set out clear and consistent plans for risk management so that communities and businesses can make informed decisions about the management of the remaining risk;
- manage flood and coastal erosion risks in an appropriate way, taking account of the needs of communities and the environment;
- ensure that emergency plans and responses to flood incidents are effective and that communities are able to respond effectively to flood forecasts, warnings and advice;
- help communities to recover more quickly and effectively after incidents.
The strategy recognises that difficult decisions have to be taken on where activities can and can’t be carried out at both national and local levels. As such, six guiding principles have been identified to help guide these decisions and the processes by which they are taken. These guiding principles are:
1. Community focus and partnership working
2. A catchment and coastal "cell" based approach
3. Sustainability
4. Proportionate, risk-based approaches
5. Multiple benefits
6. Beneficiaries should be encouraged to invest in risk management.
This FRMP has been developed to meet the legal requirements of the Flood Risk Regulations. In doing so, the national flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for England has also been taken into account, in particular its guiding principles.
Measures for managing risk
There are different approaches to managing flood and coastal erosion risk – these are known as measures and are described below:
**Preventing:** by avoiding putting people or the environment at risk of flooding, for example, one way of preventing risks arising would be by not building homes in areas that can be flooded.
**Preparing:** by taking actions that prepare people for flooding, for example, by improving awareness of flood risk, or by providing warning and forecasting for floods so that people can take precautions to safeguard their valuables.
**Protecting:** by protecting people from the risk of flooding. For example, by the maintenance or refurbishment of existing defences or using waterproof boards over doors and airbricks, people can protect their properties from the damaged caused by flood water.
**Recovery and review:** by learning from when flooding happens and how to recover from it, for example, by improving the availability of recovery services such as providing temporary accommodation, after flooding has occurred. RMAs will only use this measure type where flooding has been experienced and a recovery and review action is being undertaken.
Flood and coastal erosion risk management may require a combination of measures outlined above. FRMPs bring together measure from existing sources, particularly CFMPs, SMPs, local flood risk management strategies and the 6 year programme. The development and completion of these measures is often dependent on partnerships and the provision of funding.
The risk management authorities should work in partnership with communities to understand the community perspective of flooding and coastal erosion. The aim is to help communities understand and actively prepare for the risks, and encourage them to have direct involvement in decision-making. Where there are Flood Action Groups or other community groups, these become a clear focus for the community to bring together all the relevant information its residents and businesses may have. Where no such group is in existence, all relevant RMAs should endeavour to engage with communities to impart information and understanding about local flood risk. Working together to share knowledge, all relevant RMAs can work with communities on managing local risk. This becomes an opportunity for the RMAs to explain what steps they propose to take, talk about the likelihood of funding for any construction works, explore any other funding sources and advise residents and businesses what they can do to help themselves. It also gives the community the opportunity to shape the proposals.
**Partnership working**
Managing flood and coastal risks and particularly local flood risks requires many organisations to work together in partnership.
Partnership working allows organisations to pool expertise and resources to enable what they do to be as efficient and effective as possible. It encourages the sharing of knowledge, data and expertise and provides opportunities to manage cross boundary issues, ensure consistent approaches and develop and test innovative approaches to delivery. PART B
Managing flood risk in the Dee river basin district
6. Getting to know the Dee river basin district
Introduction The River Dee RBD (shown in Figure ) covers an area of approximately 2,200km², the majority of which is situated in north east Wales with the eastern part of the RBD in England. The River Dee is approximately 110km long from its source in the Snowdonia National Park to where its estuary discharges into Liverpool Bay.
From its source the River Dee flows eastwards to Llyn Tegid, an integral part of the River Dee system. Upstream of Llyn Tegid the river is fast flowing in a narrow incised valley, whilst downstream of the lake the valley bottom and natural floodplain opens out to approximately 1km wide. The natural river system is modified through flow control at the Bala sluices located where the River Dee is joined by the River Tryweryn. From Bala, the river flows north eastwards towards Corwen where the River Alwen joins the Dee. There are two major reservoirs in the upper reaches of the Alwen catchment, Llyn Brenig and Alwen Reservoir.
The River Dee continues in an easterly direction through Llangollen and downstream to Erbistock, once again following a narrow incised valley. Between Erbistock and Chester the floodplain is flat and very wide, with the main tributaries; Rivers Ceiriog, Clyweddog and Alyn, joining the Dee along this reach.
Downstream of Chester Weir the river was canalised over 200 years ago and flood defences, which are still maintained today, were constructed to protect land from tidal inundation. The River Dee is normally tidal up to Chester Weir; however this boundary is exceeded for spring high tides when tidal influence can affect river levels as far upstream as Shocklach, 15km upstream of Chester Weir.
The Dee RBD comprises a range of landscapes including mountains, steep sided wooded valleys, the plains of Cheshire and the mudflats in the estuary. The different topography within the Dee River Basin District gives rise to different flooding responses. In the west the steep slopes give rise to more rapid runoff and faster flooding responses, whereas runoff occurs more slowly on the gently sloping land in the east.
Water The River Dee is an important source of drinking water for nearly 3 million people in Wales and North West England. Given the importance of maintaining this supply, opportunities to abstract for other purposes are very limited and carefully regulated. Reservoirs in the upper part of the RBD store water and regulate flow in the Dee. They sustain abstractions for public and industrial water supply and modify flood response in the river. The strategic importance of the Dee for water supply has led to it becoming one of the most regulated rivers in Europe and in 1999, the lower part of the Dee was designated as the UK’s first Water Protection Zone.
There are 115 water bodies across the district comprising rivers, lakes, groundwater and the Dee estuary. In 2009, 28% of the water bodies were at “good” status, this rose to 30% in 2013. Significant water issues identified for the Dee are; physical modifications, pollution from sewage and waste water, pollution from rural areas and invasive non-native species.
**Climate**
UKCIP (UK Climate Impacts Programme) predicts that, by the 2050s, temperatures across Wales could rise by 1.1 to 4.1°C. Annual average rainfall in Wales is predicted to remain roughly the same as present, but there is likely to be a large difference in the patterns of summer and winter rainfall. Increased winter rainfall is expected as a result of increased storminess, leading to intense, but short-lived, rainfall events. Summer rainfall may decrease and short duration droughts (12-18 months) are likely to become more frequent.
Future sea level rise along Wales’ coast is likely to result in more severe coastal erosion and inundation events in low-lying coastal areas. The relative sea level rise around Wales is predicted to be 36cm by the 2080s. These extremes impact on water related issues such as decreased water availability and an increase in people and properties at risk from the effects of flooding.
**Figure 3: The Dee River Basin District**
**Society and health**
The population of the district is generally stable at around 458,000. Chester, Wrexham and Deeside (the conurbation including Connah’s Quay, Queensferry, Pentre, Sandycroft and Hawarden Airport) are the main urban areas in the RBD. Other significant towns in the RBD are Bala, Llangollen, Corwen, Flint, Mold, Buckley, Whitchurch, Neston, Heswall and West Kirby. There are some health inequalities evidenced by greater social deprivation in urban areas. Significant housing growth along with creation of jobs and services is proposed in many towns.
**Land use**
The upland catchment is predominantly rural, with sheep farming on the poorer areas of grassland and significant areas of commercial forestry. Frequent flooding in the lower Dee between Bangor-on-Dee and Chester has resulted in very little urban development and the area is extensively used for agriculture, particularly intensive dairy farming on the fertile land in and around Wrexham and on the Cheshire Plain. Arable farming dominates on the Wirral side of the estuary and around Deeside and Sealand. Approximately 6% of the catchment is urban with Wrexham, Chester, and Deeside being the main urban centres accounting for over 60% of the population. Canalisation of the tidal section of the River Dee downstream of Chester has enabled urban development to take place on both banks. Changes in land use within the catchment have led to physical changes to the water environment and pollution from industry and diffuse rural pollution.
There is growing evidence that woodland measures can help to slow down or even reduce flood flows, particularly within smaller catchments. Strategic tree planting and woodland management can help reduce flood risk in a number of ways:
- greater water use and interception by trees compared to other vegetation types helps to reduce run-off volumes.
- Woodland soils have greater capacity to absorb and store rainwater during flood events due to their more open structure and the presence of root systems; this also aids interception of overland flow from adjacent land;
- The ‘hydraulic roughness’ of trees and other woodland features can help to slow the flow of overland flood water.
- soils under woodland are also generally better protected from erosion risk, thereby reducing delivery of sediment to watercourses and reducing pollutants in the water.
Therefore, ‘woodland measures’ for flood risk reduction include woodland creation – in the right place and to the right design – and the installation of woodland features such as large woody debris dams to both reconnect watercourses with already wooded riparian zones and floodplains and to slow down flood flows.
The 2011 ‘Woodland for Water’ report detailed the evidence behind these conclusions. As a result opportunity mapping was produced to help identify where targeted woodland measures could help to reduce flood risk. Priority locations fall into three categories:
Floodplains – where hydraulic roughness from woodland cover slows the flow and encourages the deposition of sediment;
- Riparian zones – to intercept overland flow, protect river banks from erosion, and help slow the flow of water;
- Wider catchment planting – to protect sensitive soils from erosion, increase infiltration rates, and intercept sediment in run-off from adjacent land.
While opportunity maps can identify priority catchments where woodland creation and management can help reduce flood risk, it is important that woodland is located in the right part of the landscape and then designed and managed appropriately in order to maximise their contribution to reducing flood risk.
Land drainage for agricultural purposes was historically an important element of operational activity in flood and coastal erosion risk management. Today the prime driver for investment in water management for flooding and drainage is one of risk reduction to people and property, and for the improvement of the environment. RMAs prioritise investment according to government policy, the respective National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategies for England and Wales and HM Treasury Green Book on economic appraisal. Government policy gives the highest priority to lives and homes.
**Economic activity**
The economy of the River Dee RBD is characterised by:
- Forestry, tourism, cottage industries and hill farming in the upper Dee,
- Mainly agriculture (arable and pasture) in the lower Dee area
- Retail, commercial and industrial activities in and around Chester, Wrexham, Deeside and tourism in Chester itself • Industrial development (manufacturing and commercial) adjacent to the Dee Estuary, on both banks
Retail and distribution, health and education, and manufacturing and construction are the three most significant employment sectors in the Dee RBD. Commerce is important, particularly in Chester and the other urban areas. Tourism, farming and rural industries, and transport and communications, although smaller, are key in sustaining rural communities. Fisheries and the Dee cockle beds are also important to the local economy.
Recreation and tourism The diversity of the landscape in the River Dee RBD offers a wide range of recreational activities and opportunities which contribute to people’s quality of life and bring economic benefit from tourism. The majority of visitors to the River Dee RBD enjoy informal recreation such as: walking, camping, water sports, angling, horse-riding, mountain biking and rock climbing. Popular areas for recreation include the Clwydian Mountains, River Dee Valley, and the lakes and reservoirs (Bala, Celyn, Brenig and Alwen). Tourism is a major part of the local economy, especially within Snowdonia National Park, Llangollen, Chester and Erddig near Wrexham.
Infrastructure The RBD contains regionally important infrastructure, including railways (for example the Chester to Holyhead mainline), primary roads (for example the A55 and A483), energy infrastructure, canals, the Hawarden Airport, ports (including the Port of Mostyn) and industrial and commercial development alongside the Dee Estuary. Recently there has been an increasing demand for hydropower, with a number of sites being investigated.
Landscape Agriculture and forestry dominate the upper reaches of the district and there are a variety of landscape and settlement patterns. The upper catchment includes part of the Snowdonia National Park and is predominantly rural in character. In the mid to lower catchment, the landscape changes to rolling hills that gradually form the Cheshire Plain. The most tranquil areas of the district are in the upper reaches with the mid to lower reaches being more disturbed by traffic and settlements around Wrexham and Chester. In the lower reaches, urban development has had a significant impact and many river channels and floodplains do not function naturally.
Biodiversity The Dee RBD is hugely varied, from the mountains of Snowdonia to the internationally important mudflats of the Dee Estuary. The importance of this habitat is reflected by a variety of international, national and local nature conservation designations. There are 7 Special Areas of Conservation (SACs), 3 Special Protection Areas (SPAs) and 3 Ramsar sites. The River Dee itself is a SAC and Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). The tidal Dee estuary is also a SPA and Ramsar wetland.
Many of the SSSIs (approximately 70) have close links with the water environment. Water bodies and wetland areas within the district support a number of protected species (for example otter, water vole) and priority species listed in the UK Biodiversity Action Plan (for example White-clawed Crayfish and Freshwater Pearl Mussel). The highly modified nature of the Dee has lead to there being 45 barriers to fish migration in the district. Invasive species in the RBD include Japanese Knotweed, Himalayan Balsam and North American Signal Crayfish.
Many of the sites with environmental designations are affected by flooding and may be dependent on periodic flooding to maintain their habitats and species. Fisheries are important in all the rivers within the River Dee RBD and there are a significant number of stretches of river that are designated under the Freshwater Fish Directive and are important for salmon and other species.
Cultural heritage The River Dee RBD area has a diverse historic environment resulting from over 6000 years of human settlement, including remnants of Neolithic and Bronze Age settlements in the River Dee Valley, and Roman settlements in Bangor-on-Dee and Chester. The Pontcysyllte Aqueduct and Canal is a World Heritage Site and there are 5 landscapes listed on the Register of Landscapes of Historic Interest in Wales. There are around 400 scheduled ancient monuments and numerous registered park and gardens, listed buildings and heritage sites. Many structures directly associated with the water environment have listed status, for example mills, bridges, weirs and sluices. Archaeological features associated with the flood plain and land saturated by groundwater can be put at risk from drying out, erosion or inundation.
Geology
The underlying geology of the bedrock in the River Dee RBD results in the clear topographical distinction between the upland areas in the west and the low areas in the east, with the escarpment of the Welsh foothills near to Llangollen providing the divide.
The upper River Dee and River Alwen catchments west of Llangollen are underlain almost entirely by fine grained sedimentary mudstones and siltstones. These older consolidated rocks are largely impermeable, encouraging overland flow. Rainfall falling in these steeper, upland areas gives rise to high run-off rates, and a rapid response within the watercourses. The overlying superficial deposits help in attenuating surface flows from rain in the drier summer months, but when waterlogged will also contribute to the fast responding surface water flows.
The River Alyn rises in the centre of the RBD and drains an area of faulted and fractured carboniferous limestone and coarse sandstones. The limestone is a major aquifer where much of the rainfall percolates through the rock to contribute to groundwater flows. Throughout its length the River Alyn is affected by numerous sinkholes and mine shafts with the consequence that the course of the river can run dry in prolonged periods without rainfall.
The middle, lower and tidal Dee sub-catchments predominantly drain the wide low lying Cheshire Plain, with sandstone bedrock underlying much of the area. The superficial deposits in this part of the catchment comprise glacial till, glacio-fluvial sand and gravel and more recent river terrace deposits and alluvium of fluvial origin.
Soil
Soil types in the RBD are strongly influenced by topography, with a clear difference between the upper Dee, and the lower Dee. The upper Dee contains some areas of peatland habitat (for example upland blanket bogs). When in good condition these areas are valuable for biodiversity, carbon storage and sequestration, regulation of stream base flows, water runoff and nutrient regulation and retention. However, they mainly have low permeability and are interspersed with seasonally waterlogged soils.
Seasonally waterlogged impermeable soils dominate the Lower Dee catchment with significant areas of loamy and sandy free draining soils. Soils with a high groundwater table occur downstream of Chester, and upstream in the River Dee valley from Worthenbury in the south to Aldford in the north. The impermeable soils covering most of the lower catchment give rise to higher rates of runoff to the rivers and streams although the relatively flat topography through much of the lower Dee means that flooding response times are longer. Where there are high groundwater levels and flat areas with seasonably waterlogged soils any flooding is slow to recede. 7. Key Flood Risk Issues in the Dee river basin district
Sources of risk
Based on historic flooding and the latest flood risk information the main sources of risk in the Dee River Basin District are described below.
River flooding
This occurs fairly frequently in the upper sub-catchments of the River Dee, River Alwen and River Alyn. In the remainder of the catchment, floodplains are generally wider, with flooding affecting large areas of agricultural land and urban areas such as Wrexham, Mold, Chester, and the Deeside and Sealand communities. The River Dee at Chester responds slowly to heavy rainfall, taking up to 3 or 4 days to peak following a rainfall event.
Tidally influenced river flooding
Downstream of Farndon, the River Dee is influenced by high tides which regularly exceed the Chester weir level, resulting in flow reversals on the river. These tides can restrict the discharge of tributary rivers into the Dee. The most severe flooding can occur when extreme tidal events coincide with high river flows.
The sea
Communities on the North Wales coast are at risk of flooding, particularly when high tides coincide with large waves and / or a storm surge.
Reservoirs
The River Dee is highly regulated by controlled releases from reservoirs in the upper catchment. The main reservoirs in the RBD are Bala (Llyn Tegid), Llyn Celyn, Llyn Brenig and Alwen reservoir, which means that areas downstream of these could be flooded if a large reservoir were to fail, however, reservoir flooding is extremely unlikely to happen.
Other sources
Surface Water flooding is extensive in the Lower Dee (Mold and Wrexham) and Dee estuary sub-catchments (Deeside, Sealand and Chester), and also in the lower reaches of the River Alyn catchment near the confluence with the River Dee. (Note, surface water flood risk is the responsibility of Lead Local Flood Authorities. For further information on surface water flood risk, contact the relevant Local Authority).
Groundwater and sewer flooding has occurred in some areas and caused road flooding and some property flooding. These are localised issues and flood risk from these sources is considered to be low at a catchment scale.
Managing flood risk in less populated areas
The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales flood risk management work is focused where each pound of public money spent can provide the greatest amount of economic benefit. River maintenance work and capital improvement schemes tend to have greatest cost-benefit in more populated areas where flood risk is greater to people and property. In sparsely populated areas Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales work seeks to strike a balance between natural flooding of the flood plain, which attenuates downstream flooding and use of these areas for other purposes, including agriculture and habitat. Internal Drainage Boards are organisations which are jointly funded by landowners and others to manage drainage of land and operation of pumping stations to benefit agricultural productivity. Managing flood risk in urban areas
Larger settlements have resulted in many man-made structures affecting the river environment, from river channel retaining walls, to weirs and culverts. Culverts beneath roads and properties are particularly common in dense urban areas. These come in all shapes and sizes with those on ‘main rivers’ generally (but not always) being larger than those on smaller watercourses and surface water drains. These structures inhibit wildlife and vegetation, restrict flows and increase flood risk from blockages. To counter this risk, the Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales and LLFAs do frequent ‘man-entry’ inspections (larger culverts) and CCTV surveys (smaller structures) and carries out repairs when necessary. During heavy rainfall they may monitor water levels at structures and send teams to clear debris from culvert inlet screens where safe to do so. Examples of debris are: tree branches, leaves, garden refuse and obstructions such as shopping trolleys, or gravel and boulders in more extreme conditions. Problems with debris at culverts arise on both small and large watercourses. Levels can rise quickly and flooding on some can start in less than two hours from a blockage occurring, making preventative action very difficult.
Historical flooding
Prior to 1800, flooding mainly affected agricultural land and isolated properties. Industrial development after 1800 focused development on towns and villages, many of which were located near to rivers, and often partly within the natural floodplains, to make use of water power. This resulted in greater flooding impacts on people, their homes and workplaces. These changing development patterns have influenced historical flood risk management over the past 200 years.
The River Dee RBD has a long history of flooding, with records dating back to the 13th Century. The River Dee itself has suffered significant flooding many times, with probably the most extensive instances occurring in 1890, 1946, 1964 and 2000.
During autumn 2000, exceptional rainfall caused widespread flooding throughout the Dee RBD. Many areas, which had no previous record of flooding, were affected on this occasion. The main towns and villages affected in the Upper Dee were Bala, Llandrillo, Llannerch-y-medd, Corwen. Those affected in the middle and lower Dee were Trevalyn, Mold, Rhydymwyn, Rossett, Bangor-on-Dee, Nant Alyn, Pentre (Queensferry) and Cefn Mawr. 613 residential properties and 25 businesses were flooded. 182 people had to be evacuated and 90 caravan and chalet holiday homes were flooded, almost all in the lower Dee. About half the flooding resulted from main rivers and the remainder being due to ordinary watercourses and surface water flooding. There was no reported loss of life or serious injuries.
In December 2013, a tidal surge coinciding with a high spring tide caused some localised flooding to areas along the Dee estuary.
Climate Change
There is clear scientific evidence that global climate change is happening now. Over the past century sea levels have risen around England and more winter rain falling in intense wet spells. Climate changes can affect flood risk in several ways and the impacts will vary depending on local conditions and vulnerability. Risk management authorities should consider climate change within the development of all plans.
Wetter winters and more intense rainfall may increase river flooding and cause more surface runoff, increasing localised flooding and erosion. In turn, this may increase pressure on drains, sewers and water quality. Storm intensity in summer could increase even in drier summers, so RMAs need to be prepared for the extreme events. Rising sea or river levels may also increase local flood risk inland or away from major rivers because of interactions with drains, sewers and smaller watercourses. Even small rises in sea level could add to very high tides so as to affect places a long way inland.
Lower emissions could reduce the amount of climate change further into the future, but changes are still projected at least as far ahead as the 2080s. UK Government’s Flood Foresight (2014) re-endorses the findings of the 2008 foresight work, stating that in general terms climate change is likely to increase river flood risks by 2080 by between 2 and 4 times, and coastal flood risk by 4 to 10 times. Increases in the frequency of flooding would affect people’s homes and wellbeing, especially for vulnerable groups.
**Future risk**
Future flood risk will be largely influenced by climate change, with changes in land use and rural land management also having an impact. The number of properties at risk will increase unless actions are taken to manage the increasing risks.
Future increase in flood risk is likely to be concentrated in towns located near the mouth of rivers or where there are tidal influences. This is where the effects of sea level rise and increased river flows will combine, resulting in more frequent, extensive flooding. The most significant increases in future risk are likely to occur in Deeside, Sealand and Chester.
The following maps illustrate the broad scale of flood risk across the RBD. You can see this information in more detail at the links below. In parallel to flood risk management planning, the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales are updating RBMPs across England and Wales. You can consider the pressures on the water environment and what plans are proposed using the additional links below.
Find out more about flood risk on the Natural Resources Wales and GOV.UK websites. Flood and coastal erosion risk to people
Map of flooding from rivers and sea: Map of flooding from reservoirs: Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk to Economic Activity
Map of flooding from rivers and sea: Map of flooding from reservoirs: Flood and coastal erosion risk to the natural and historic environment
Map of flooding from rivers and sea: Map of flooding from reservoirs:
### Key Statistics
Table 4: Summary of flood risk to people, economic activity and the natural and historic environment across the Dee river basin district.
| River and Sea | Total in RBD | High risk | Medium risk | Low risk | Very low risk | |---------------|--------------|-----------|-------------|----------|---------------| | **Risk to people:** | | | | | | | Number of people in area: | 458,100 | 3300 | 2500 | 20,500 | 150 | | Number of services: | 900 | 30 | 10 | 60 | \<10 | | **Risk to economic activity:** | | | | | | | Number of non-residential properties: | 67,250 | 1100 | 1200 | 4,500 | 50 | | Number of airports: | \<10 | 0 | 0 | \<10 | 0 | | Length of roads (km): | 350 | \<10 | \<10 | 14 | 0 | | Length of railway (km): | 127 | \<10 | \<10 | 20 | 0 | | Agricultural land (ha): | 86,416 | 5,777 | 1,868 | 2,820 | 20 | | **Risk to the natural and historic environment:** | | | | | | | Number of EU designated bathing waters within 50m: | \<10 | \<10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Number of EPR installations within 50m: | 56 | \<10 | \<10 | 20 | 0 | | Area of SAC within area (ha): | 29,700 | 3,200 | 100 | 150 | 0 | | Area of SPA within area (ha): | 23,300 | 2,150 | 150 | 300 | 0 | | Area of RAMSAR site within area (ha): | 3,250 | 2,550 | 100 | 300 | 0 | | Area of World Heritage Site within area (ha): | 4,250 | 200 | 10 | 100 | 10 | | Area of SSSI within area (ha): | 34,250 | 4,000 | 195 | 403 | 0 | | Area of Parks and Gardens within area (ha): | 3,048 | 156 | 50 | 50 | 0 | | Area of Scheduled Ancient Monument within area (ha): | 550 | 10 | \<10 | \<10 | 0 | | Number of Listed Buildings within area: | 4,400 | 150 | 50 | 200 | \<10 | | Number of Licensed water abstractions within the area: | 200 | 50 | 10 | \<10 | 0 | Table 5: Summary flood risk from reservoirs to people, economic activity and the natural and historic environment across the Dee river basin district.
| Reservoirs | Total in RBD | Maximum extent of flooding | |------------------------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------| | **Risk to people:** | | | | Number of people in area: | 458,100 | 12,400 | | Number of services: | 900 | 50 | | **Risk to economic activity:** | | | | Number of non-residential properties: | 67,250 | 3,600 | | Number of airports: | 0 | 0 | | Length of roads (km): | 350 | 50 | | Length of railway (km): | 100 | \<10 | | Agricultural land (ha): | 86,400 | 8,300 | | **Risk to the natural and historic environment:** | | | | Number of EU designated bathing waters within 50m: | \<10 | 0 | | Number of EPR installations within 50m: | 50 | \<10 | | Area of SAC within area (ha): | 29,650 | 1250 | | Area of SPA within area (ha): | 23,350 | 100 | | Area of RAMSAR site within area (ha): | 3,250 | 550 | | Area of World Heritage Site within area (ha): | 4,250 | 450 | | Area of SSSI within area (ha): | 34,250 | 2,050 | | Area of Parks and Gardens within area (ha): | 3,050 | 250 | | Area of Scheduled Ancient Monument within area (ha): | 550 | 50 | | Number of Listed Buildings within area: | 4,400 | 500 | | Number of Licensed water abstractions within the area: | 200 | 50 | 8. Sub-areas in the Dee river basin district
Introduction Where possible, this plan has been co-ordinated at RBD scale covering the whole of the Dee RBD. As the Dee RBD covers parts of both England and Wales, there are elements of flood risk management work that are not applicable to the whole RBD and just cover the Welsh section or the English section, due to different administrations. This plan includes two large strategic areas, as shown in Figure 4. These are:
- The English part of RBD
- The Welsh part of RBD
This will enable risk conclusions, objectives and measures to be developed for the English Dee as a strategic area and the Welsh Dee as a strategic area.
The Dee RBD is unique from the other RBDs that cover England and Wales in that the Dee is an RBD only and is not split into smaller WFD Management Catchments. In addition, there are no Flood Risk Areas as designated under the Flood Risk Regulations in the Dee RBD.
Figure 4: Dee RBD showing Catchments, Flood Risk Areas and other Strategic Areas 9. Conclusions, objectives and measures to manage risk for the Dee river basin district
This draft plan sets out the type of measures proposed to manage the risk. In developing the proposed measures the RMAs contributing have:
- drawn conclusions from hazard and risk maps and other sources of information: this helps us all to understand the risks or opportunities the RMAs are aiming to manage
- developed risk management objectives (related to people and society, the economy and the environment) that set out the outcomes RMAs are trying to achieve
- identified the likely approach to managing risk: using the following categories: preventing, preparing, protecting and recovering and review
These conclusions, objectives and measures are set out for the Dee RBD. Conclusions, objectives and measures for the sub areas are set out in the following sections.
Conclusions and objectives for the Dee RBD
The following conclusions and objectives have been set out for the Dee RBD.
Rivers and Sea flood risk
In the Dee RBD there are approximately 26,400 people at flood risk from main rivers and the sea; over 3000 of these are considered to be at high risk. The proportion of the population at medium or high risk of flooding from rivers and the sea is relatively low, at less than 2%.
Large areas of agricultural land are at risk, including over 5,700 hectares at high risk of flooding. Parts of the road and railway networks are at risk and many of the environmentally designated sites in the RBD are also at risk.
Reservoir flood risk
The hazard maps show the largest area that might flood if a reservoir were to fail. The chances of a reservoir failing and causing flooding are very low; however the extent of flooding from a reservoir can perpetuate a long way from its source. This is because the local geography, such as valleys, can channel flood water long distances. In the RBD there are 12,408 people and 48 services at risk from flooding from reservoirs.
Under the Reservoirs Act 1975 the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales regulate all reservoirs with a capacity of 25,000 cubic metres or more above ground level, which could escape in the event of a dam failure. We are currently going through a process of identifying which of the reservoirs with a capacity of 25,000 cubic metres or more is ‘high-risk’. ‘High-risk’ reservoirs will be those reservoirs that are predicted, in the event of an uncontrolled release of water, could endanger human life.
In the future the Environment Agency will continue to maintain a register of all reservoirs with a capacity of over 25,000 cubic metres in England, but will only fully regulate the ‘high-risk’ reservoirs. In Wales, Natural Resources Wales will identify and register reservoirs with a capacity of over 10,000 cubic metres and these will also be subjected to the risk classification process.
Surface water flood risk
Lead Local Flood Authorities are responsible for managing the risk of flooding from surface water, defined as rainwater on the ground surface that hasn’t entered a watercourse, drain or sewer. This type of flooding can begin to occur within minutes of intense rain, so it is almost impossible to forecast for. Problems can quickly occur in several places, and although these might be over a small area, a Local Council’s resources can quickly become stretched. It is good practice to plan for drains and watercourses becoming overwhelmed in a flood, such as by analysing the flow paths that floodwater may take. Once these are known, steps can be taken to ensure they are kept free from obstructions such as buildings and to consider whether roads and open space can be used to safely channel water away. Surface water flooding is a problem across the Dee, whether due to run-off from fields and down roads in rural and semi-rural areas, or from roofs and paved surfaces in built-up areas, sometimes due to insufficient capacity of drains and sewers.
In the long-term, SuDS may relieve some pressures. In the short-term, local councils have identified the places where properties are at greater risk of surface water flooding and will gather more data for some of these before considering a range of measures according to circumstances. Some of this will involve working closely with the Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales and water companies to jointly understand complex interactions between the drainage, sewer and watercourse systems. It is important to note, though, that laying a bigger drain is often not the solution, as this can simply pass the problem onto the watercourse it discharges into and that could then flood.
**Groundwater flood risk**
LLFAs are responsible for managing the risk of flooding from Groundwater. Groundwater is naturally stored in the ground below the water table level. When the water table rises and reaches ground level, water starts to emerge on the surface and flooding can happen. This may be because the ground slopes, or because of break in the rock layers. Once on the surface this groundwater may flow or pond. Groundwater flooding is closely linked to geology and is less common in the Dee than in other locations, such as south east England where chalk is quite common.
**Sewer flood risk**
Water companies are responsible for sewers which take away wastewater and any surface water which drains into these sewers. Better outcomes can be gained by considering flood risk from sewers and other sources and then managing actions in an integrated manner with other organisations. However, this is not a mandatory requirement of Flood Risk Management Plans.
**Objectives**
The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales have developed a set of eight overarching objectives for this plan at RBD level, shown in Table 6.
These objectives were developed and agreed based upon understanding of flood risk and issues that are important now or in the future. Their suitability has been reviewed against the National FCERM Strategies for England and Wales and the flood risk management plan requirements and are deemed to sufficiently reflect the key objectives of flood risk management work in England and Wales.
### Table 6: Objectives for the Dee FRMP River Basin District
| FRMP Objective Number | FRMP Objective | Social | Environmental | Economic | |-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------|----------| | 1 | Reduce the risk and impact of flooding on people and communities (from main rivers, reservoirs and the sea). | Y | Y | Y | | 2 | Increase resilience of services, assets and infrastructure to the risk of flooding. | Y | Y | Y | | 3 | Improve understanding of flood risk so that decisions are based upon the best available information. | Y | Y | Y | | 4 | Improve community awareness and resilience to flooding. | Y | | Y | | 5 | Provide an effective and sustained response to flood events. | Y | | Y | | 6 | Allocate funding and resources for all sources of flooding on a risk basis. | Y | Y | Y | | 7 | Incorporate and promote an integrated approach to flood risk management, working with natural processes at a catchment scale, to provide multiple benefits to people and the environment. | Y | Y | Y | | 8 | Incorporate climate change adaption into all aspects of flood risk management. | Y | Y | Y | | 9 | Seek opportunities to deliver RBMP measures through Flood Risk Management | Y | Y | Y |
### Measures across the Dee RBD
The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales are responsible for many flood risk management activities across the Dee RBD.
- **Preventing risk:**
- We provide advice and support to the government.
- We regulate all ‘high-risk’ reservoirs in accordance with the Reservoirs Act 1975.
- We work closely with local planning authorities, developers, businesses and infrastructure operators to help them understand the consequences of flood risk in the locations they choose for development. We provide advice on how new development can be designed to be more resilient to flooding. This helps to prevent inappropriate development through the planning process and ensures there is no increase in run-off from new developments.
- We ensure works in, over, under and next to main rivers do not increase flood risk or cause pollution through effective consenting. We use the consenting process to identify opportunities to improve the water environment.
- We undertake a prioritised programme of mapping and modelling to ensure our flood risk information remains up to date and fit for purpose. We use this data to prioritise and allocate funding in locations that are most at risk, and to influence sustainable development and emergency response.
- We contribute to research and development, and work with partners to identify best practice for reducing runoff through land use change, whilst contributing wider benefits where possible (biodiversity, soil conservation and water quality improvements).
- We work with local authorities, emergency services and other key partners and explore opportunities for joint outcomes.
**Preparing for risk:**
- We undertake hydrometric monitoring across Wales to inform our flood warning service.
- We undertake flood forecasting and alert households and individuals of potential flood events.
- We undertake work to maintain and improve our flood forecasting, flood warning and flood incident management services. We focus on areas for improvement as highlighted by recent flooding events and routine exercises.
- We undertake a risk based programme to increase awareness of flood risk, what actions they need to take and encourage registration to Floodline.
- We take account of future flood risk when making our decisions, including consideration of climate change.
- We review Asset System Management Plans regularly with regard to maintenance, funding requirements and asset condition related works across each catchment.
- We provide a flood incident response service 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
- We have on-site reservoir plans in place for all ‘high-risk’ reservoirs.
- We provide advice and information to Local Resilience Fora to enable them to reduce the impact of flooding.
- We seek to work collaboratively with our partners to find innovative approaches to managing flood risk.
**Protecting from risk:**
- We maintain high risk flood and coastal risk management assets, prioritising our efforts on those at highest risk.
- We undertake an asset inspection programme to ensure our flood risk management assets are at the appropriate standard.
- We undertake a maintenance programme to replace / refurbish flood risk management assets, including pumping stations and outfalls, prioritising our efforts on those which have the highest flood risks.
- We deliver our Flood and Coastal Risk Management Capital Programme which includes building flood defences and implementing innovative ways of managing the landscape to hold and slow down water to help reduce flood risk to communities.
- We seek opportunities to undertake Natural Flood Management by using all appropriate tools available, such as Woodland Creation maps.
**Recovery and review of risk:**
- We deliver an effective and co-ordinated response to flood incidents and provide a physical response on the ground where required.
- We undertake post-event reviews to learn and improve the service we provide. Contributing to broader benefits
This Plan has been produced alongside the Second Cycle Dee River Basin Management Plan. The alignment of planning programmes and study areas has allowed consideration of how the plans interact and how the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales can work to deliver multiple benefits in the most efficient way, throughout the six year planning cycle.
Introduction
Through the development of this Dee FRMP, Natural Resources Wales and the Environment Agency have considered the aims and objectives of the National Flood and Coastal Erosion strategies for England and Wales. In order to take these strategies forward, this plan sets out a range of social, economic and environmental objectives that include wider benefits alongside the delivery of flood risk management outcomes – see the following sections. These have been informed by considering how the FRMP relates to other plans and wider policies and objectives. In particular, how the FRMP links to the River Basin Management Plans to contribute to a more integrated approach to water management planning, and also to the priorities of Natura 2000 sites that are the subject of recent Site Improvement Plans (Prioritised Improvement Plans in Wales). The following sections provide more details of this.
In delivering the programme of measures set out in the FRMP, the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales look for the potential in all measures to improve the local natural, built and historic environment, and so to achieve environmental benefits alongside economic and social gains. These include environmental improvements to meet obligations set out through the Water Framework Directive and Habitats and Birds Directives as well as other domestic commitments that link to flood and coastal erosion risk management. Such work to achieve FRMP measures will always seek to avoid, wherever possible, and minimise potential damage to habitats, including those protected by legislation, the ecological status of watercourses, heritage assets (designated and non-designated) and the character and appearance of the local landscape and townscape.
The Environmental Report of the FRMP describes the likely environmental effects of the FRMP. It also outlines high-level mitigation measures required to manage potential negative effects and highlights opportunities for delivering broader environmental benefits.
Early engagement with key partners and stakeholders and other relevant interests will help to identify potential opportunities for delivering broader environmental benefits. This may include the following:
- Central Government – including Environment Agency, Natural England, Natural Resources Wales, Historic England, Cadw, Sport England, Forestry Commission, Marine Management Organisation
- Local Government and Regulators – including Local Authorities (planning and regeneration, conservation, archaeology, ecology, landscape, public rights of way), Internal Drainage Boards, AONB conservation boards and National Park authorities
- Industry and Business – including Local Enterprise Partnerships, navigation and renewable energy interests
- Non-Government Organisations – including Local Wildlife Trusts, Catchment Partnerships, River Trusts, Local Wildlife Groups, Canals and River Trust, Woodland Trust
- Water Industry – including water companies
- Agriculture and Rural Land Management – including landowners, NFU
- Recreation, Leisure and Amenity – including angling / fishing/ sport clubs/societies, local residents
- Local communities – including parish and town councils and local community groups
In parallel to flood risk management planning, the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales work with others to improve the quality of the water environment through River Basin Management Planning. The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales aims to co-ordinate effectively between the FRMP and River Basin Management Plan so that all organisations can do more for the environment.
**Other Plans and Partnerships**
Table 7 sets out the key themes from a review of the main other plans and strategies that the Dee FRMP would be expected to influence. The purpose of the review is to take account of the objectives of these key documents in the assessment with a view to aligning and ensuring compliance of the plan with other policies and legislation. The plan review can also help to identify where other planning processes and organisations may be able to work with the flood risk management planning process. The following summary of the plan review is based on the Environmental Report for the Dee FRMP.
**Table 7 Key influences from the plans review**
| Category of plan/strategy | Common themes relevant to the FRMP | Key plans | |---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------| | Water and flood risk management | • Protection, improvement, sustainable management and use of the water environment in terms of quantity and quality – for the benefit of the human and natural environment.\
• Flood risk management measures could place pressure on water bodies and any measure to be implemented would have to be Water Framework Directive compliant.\
• The update to the Dee River Basin Management Plan has been prepared in parallel the FRMP. In support of integrated planning, the SEA identifies where there is the potential for the two plans to deliver positive effects and areas where there may be potential conflicts and require early consideration to develop mutually beneficial solutions. | • National flood and coastal erosion risk management strategies for England and Wales\
• Water for people and the environment: Water resources strategy for England and Wales\
• Water white paper: Water for life\
• A Water Strategy for Wales\
• Dee RBMP (draft update)\
• Catchment flood risk management plans\
• Shoreline management plans\
• Fluvial River Dee FRMS\
• Dee Estuary Flood Risk Management Strategy\
• Surface water management plans\
• Water resource management plans\
• River Restoration Strategies\
• Nutrient management plans | | Biodiversity | • Protection and enhancement of important habitats and species, both from a statutory basis (International and National conservation designations and protected species) and through policy.\
• Promotion of coherent ecological networks.\
• Promotion of working with natural processes and sustainable development/management.\
• Tackling the issue of non-native invasive species\
• Flood risk management measures could place pressure on habitats and species, and work against natural processes. | • Natural environment white paper: The natural choice: Securing the value of nature\
• Biodiversity 2020: A strategy for England’s wildlife and ecosystem services\
• Wales Biodiversity Framework\
• Environment Strategy for Wales\
• Coastal squeeze: Implications for flood management. The requirements of The European Birds and Habitats Directives. Defra policy guidance.\
• The invasive and non-native species framework strategy for Great Britain\
• Wales National Habitat Creation Programme\
• Green infrastructure strategies\
• Local biodiversity action plans | | Landscape | • Protection of existing sensitive landscapes (such as National Parks and AONBs)\
• Promotion of actions to improve water | • All Landscapes Matter\
• AONB and National Park management plans \[Mendip Hills, | | Quality and Water Quantity, Protect and Enhance Habitats, and Restore the Wider Landscape Character | Cotswolds, Shropshire Hills, Malvern Hills, Wye Valley and Brecon Beacons | | --- | --- | | Flood risk management measures could place pressure on sensitive landscapes, and lead to changes in water quality, quantity and change in habitat type. | Local landscape strategies |
**Climate**
- Long term aims for reduction of carbon dioxide emissions including reference to binding targets, and wide-reaching policies across all sectors to deliver reductions.
- Requirements to adapt to climate change and associated threats, the need for increased resilience to climate change.
- Likely increase in flooding and coastal erosion due to climate change.
- Managing the environment in a changing climate
- Climate Change Strategy for Wales
- The national flood and coastal erosion risk management strategies for England and Wales
**Marine and Coastal**
- Sustainable economic growth within the marine environment that balances benefits to society with the needs of local communities and protecting nature conservation.
- Coastal flood risk management measures can enable growth
- Coastal flood risk management measures would need to be in alignment with planning policies.
- UK Marine Policy Statement
- Wales Fisheries Strategy
**Cultural Heritage**
- Sustainable development in relation to historic assets through conservation and enhancement.
- The historic environment could be affected by flood risk management measures e.g. through the construction of new flood risk management schemes, implementation of fish/eel passage on flood risk management assets, etc and as such any such measures would need to be appropriately assessed.
- The Government’s Statement on the Historic Environment for England
- Valuing the Welsh Historic Environment
- Heritage at Risk Registers
**Resource Management**
- Promotion of sustainable waste and resource management and the protection and enhancement of the environment.
- National Waste Strategy for Wales
- Metal Mines Strategy for Wales
- Minerals and Waste Plans
**Planning**
- Promotion of sustainable growth
- Promotion of water-based recreation and tourist opportunities
- Flood risk management measures can enable growth.
- Flood risk management measures would need to be in alignment with planning policies.
- Development activities could place pressure on the water bodies and would need to be appropriately management and assessed to ensure no detrimental effect to the water environment.
- National Planning Policy Framework
- Planning Policy Wales
- Local Development Plans/ Unitary Development Plans
**Forestry and Farming**
- Protection, management and enhancement of woods and forests to provide economic, social and environmental benefits e.g. managing flood risk in a sustainable way, and helping to reduce water pollution
- Sustainable farming practices that deliver environmental benefits e.g. biodiversity, landscape, cultural heritage, water quality
- Government Forestry and Woodlands Policy
- Woodland Strategy for Wales
- Wales – A new Strategy for Farming Links with the Dee River Basin Management Plan
The main aims of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) are to return rivers and the water environment to a state, as free from human influence as possible. Aspects of this include reversing some of the ways in which water bodies have been physically modified in the past, improving water quality and bio-diversity and improving the quality of bathing waters. To achieve this, work by the Water Companies, farmers and business is regulated by the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales, complemented by a programme of works by the Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales and others to remove some structures from rivers.
The Dee FRMP promotes a range of benefits that will contribute to the RBMP through re-naturalisation, water quality improvements, bathing water improvements and natural flood management. 10. Wales only section
The following section considers the objectives and measures that are applicable to the Wales only side of the RBD (these will include objectives and measures that are applicable at a scale that is larger than a single catchment but not applicable across the border in the RBD. This also includes community specific measures that are within the Wales only section).
Sustainable flood risk practice in Wales is increasingly focused on working with natural processes to create more flexible and adaptive solutions that provide increased resilience to our changing and uncertain climate. Natural Resources Wales actively seek opportunities to undertake natural flood management by using all appropriate tools available to us, such as the Woodland Creation maps.
By working with natural processes to deliver flood risk management other benefits are provided such as restoring/maintaining soil drainage capacity, creating/restoring habitats, enhancing biodiversity, capturing carbon, reducing sedimentation and improving water quality. This approach has the potential to achieve greater value for money because it enables the development of multi-functional projects which provide a wide range of ecosystem services and benefits to society.
Through the flood risk management planning and river basin management planning process Natural Resources Wales have determined where priority water bodies coincide with communities at risk to identify opportunities to deliver more holistic natural resource management through flood risk management projects and operations.
Where a flooding problem is identified in Wales, the first step is to fully understand the cause to determine what management response might be appropriate. Natural Resources Wales aim to consider non-structural solutions first and implement these where it is possible to do so, such as flood warning and awareness raising so people and communities are able to plan and prepare for flooding.
If the flood risk is at a level that without intervention will pose a serious threat to people and property, Natural Resources Wales, in consultation with the community and environmental experts, will consider solutions to reduce and manage the threat of flooding.
It is through this process of assessing different risk management options that Natural Resources Wales will consider all the options that could reduce the risk of flooding, including how the river interacts with the natural flood plain and options to retain water, amongst all other solutions. Potential options are considered for their technical feasibility and cost amongst many other factors in order to select the preferred option.
If an option is identified as having the potential to retain water close to the point where it has fallen, Natural Resources Wales will aim to work closely with land owners and managers, and communities to develop the solution that will not only slow the flow of water into the watercourse but also can create improved landscape and environment.
The flood risk maps for the Welsh Dee area are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Flood Risk Maps
Figure 5: Flood Risk from Rivers and the Sea in the Welsh Dee area
Figure 6: Flood Risk from Reservoirs in the Welsh Dee area Conclusions and Objectives for the Wales section of the Dee
Conclusions
The majority of the Dee catchment is situated in Wales and includes Queensferry, Mold, Wrexham, Llangollen and Bala. The River Dee responds relatively slowly to rainfall, taking a few days to peak in the downstream reaches following rainfall events further up the catchment. The river Dee becomes tidally locked on spring tides and this tidal impact can be observed as far upstream as Holt.
The highest risk areas in the Welsh part of the RBD are those communities situated along the tidally affected stretch of the River Dee, downstream of Chester. The primary flood risk here is from high tide levels; however a combination of high tides and a fluvial event can lead to high river levels in the transition zone. The communities considered to be at highest risk in this area are Garden City and Deeside, Connah's Quay and Shotton, Queensferry and Sandycroft, Sealand, Bretton and Lache.
Further out in the estuary and on the coastal areas of the Dee RBD, communities including Flint, Bagillt, Walwen and Whelston, Greenfield, Ffynnongroyw, Talacre and Gronant are at highest risk. In the upper and middle catchments, the primary flood risk is from main rivers, with the highest risk areas being Bala, Ffrith, New Broughton, Cefn-Mawr, Bangor-is-y-coed and Mold.
Objectives
The Welsh Government National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy objectives set the framework for flood and coastal erosion risk management work within Wales as follows:
- **Reducing the consequences** for individuals, communities, businesses and the environment from flooding and coastal erosion.
- **Raising awareness of and engaging people in the response** to flood and coastal erosion risk.
- **Providing an effective and sustained response** to flood and coastal erosion events.
- **Prioritising investment** in the most at risk communities.
Every flood risk management action undertaken in Wales has the National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management strategy objectives as the overarching deliverable.
Sitting under the National Strategy objectives, Natural Resources Wales has developed a set of eight objectives for this plan. The majority of these objectives were developed and agreed by the CFMP steering groups based upon understanding of flood risk and issues that are important now or in the future. Their suitability has been reviewed against the National Strategy and flood risk management plan requirements and is deemed to still sufficiently reflect the key objectives of flood risk management work in Wales. The sub-objectives were developed by considering the three main aspects of sustainable flood risk management:
1. Social: people and communities
2. Economic: potential cost and economic benefit
3. Environment: cultural heritage, landscape and habitat diversity.
The principles of sustainable flood risk management remain the key deliverables for the flood risk management work of Natural Resources Wales.
Table 8 provides details on the eight FRMP sub-objectives and how they link to the Welsh Government National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy and the aspects of sustainable flood risk management.
### Table 8: FRMP objectives for Wales
| FRMP Objective Number | Wales FRMP Objective | Link to Welsh Government National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy Objectives | Principles of sustainability | |-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------| | 1 | Reduce the risk of harm to life from flooding to people and communities from main rivers, reservoirs and the sea. | 1, 3 | Y | | 2 | Increase resilience of services, assets and infrastructure to the current and future risk of flooding. | 1, 3 | Y | | 3 | Improve understanding of current and future flood risk so that decisions are based upon the best available information. | 1, 3 | Y, Y, Y | | 4 | Improve community awareness and resilience to current and future flooding. | 2 | Y | | 5 | Work with others to provide an effective and sustained response to flood events. | 3 | Y | | 6 | Allocate funding and resources for all sources of flooding on a risk basis. | 4 | Y, Y, Y | | 7 | Incorporate the natural resource management into the delivery of flood risk management. | 1, 4 | Y, Y, Y | | 8 | Seek opportunities to deliver RBMP measures through Flood Risk Management | 1 | Y, Y, Y |
### Selecting measures to achieve objectives
Any measure that Natural Resources Wales undertakes as part of this Flood Risk Management Plan will be for the purpose of meeting the sub-objectives set out above, and ultimately, those set out in the Welsh Government National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy. The measures within this plan have been selected after:
- considering the source and severity of the risk;
- what risk management processes are already in place;
- how the risk might change in the future; and
- what the options to address the risk are. The most appropriate measure is selected after considering all of these factors along with the technical feasibility and the cost. The appropriate measure is then assessed against the plan objectives to ensure the proposed measure is in keeping with the preferred Welsh approach.
The measures within the latter sections of this plan are linked to the relevant plan objectives so it is possible to see which measures will deliver which objectives.
There are a number of communities within the catchment where there is still more to be done to manage and reduce the risk of flooding. In the Welsh Dee area there are many ongoing, agreed and proposed measures to manage risk from 2015 to 2021. Figure 7 summarises these measures in the Wales part of the RBD. Some of these measures are described in the following sections and are detailed in Natural Resources Wales’ delivery plan in Table 8. Measure terminology
The following table introduces the terminology used to describe and categorise the measures within this Flood Risk Management Plans.
| Priority score | Description | |----------------|--------------------------------------------------| | 1 | Critical - Needs attention - immediately | | 2 | Very High - Needs attention - short term (year 1) | | 3 | High - Needs attention - medium term (year 2-3) | | 4 | Medium - Needs attention - medium term (year 4-6) | | 5 | Low - Good status - no intervention required for > 6 years |
| Implementation status | Description | |-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Not started | Could mean that: | | | • The technical and/or administrative procedures necessary for starting the construction or building works of a project have not started. | | | • The advisory services are not yet operational and have not provided any advisory session yet. | | | • The research, investigation or study has not started, i.e. contract has not been signed or there has not been any progress. | | | • The administrative file has not been opened and there has not been any administrative action as regards the measure. | | On-going | Could mean that: | | | • The administrative procedures necessary for starting the construction or building works have started but are not finalised. | | | • The advisory services are operational and are being used. | | | • The research, investigation or study has been contracted or started and is being developed. | | | • An administrative file has been opened and at least a first administrative action has been taken. | | Complete | Could mean that: | | | • The works have been finalised and the facilities are operational. | | | • An advisory service that has been implemented and has been finalised, | | | • The research, investigation or study has been finalised and has been delivered. | | | • The administrative act has been concluded (e.g. the regulation has been adopted, etc.). | Measures across the Welsh Dee area
Across the Welsh Dee area there are 73 measures to manage flood risk including:
**Preventing risk: 12 measures**
- We propose to continue with our programme of reviewing and updating hydraulic models in the future, to include communities such as Connah’s Quay and Shotton, Gronant, Queensferry and Sandycroft.
- We are reviewing and updating hydrology in new and existing models to ensure we and our partners are using the latest guidance and methodologies, for example at Greenfield, Mold, and Llong.
- We have built new hydraulic models to assess the current and future risk at specific locations, for example Leeswood, Walwen and Wheston.
**Preparing for risk: 39 measures**
- We propose to further improve our existing flood warning service, for example at Bretton, Connah’s Quay and Shotton, Bagillt, Ffynnongroyw, Flint, Garden City and Deeside, Gronant, Rossett and Burton, and Talacre.
- We are improving the flood forecasting model for the River Alyn which would improve information and the provision of flood warnings to many communities along its reach.
- We are maintaining community plans for specific locations including; Bagillt, Bangor-is-y-coed, Ffynnongroyw, Garden City and Deeside, Queensferry and Sandycroft, Sealand and Talacre.
**Protecting from risk: 22 measures**
- We propose to implement alternative risk reduction measures (such as individual property protection at Cefn-Mawr and New Broughton.
- We are maintaining existing defences and carrying out regular inspections to check their integrity at specific locations such as; Bagillt, Bala, Ffrith, Ffynnongroyw, Greenfield, Gronant, Lache, Mold, Sealand and Talacre.
- We have carried out structural assessments on existing structures to ensure they are fit for purpose, for example at Garden City and Deeside.
**Recovery and review of risk:**
- We will undertake our actions in the Delivery Plan resulting from our Wales Coastal Flooding Review into the winter 2013/14 coastal storms and flood events in Wales. Integrated natural resource management
Integrated natural resource management is a key element of the Welsh Government’s legislative programme. The Well Being and Future Generations Act, the Planning Act and the Environment Bill, together with the Wales National Marine Plan, set out a new statutory framework and process for the integrated management and sustainable use of natural resources in Wales.
This new framework for managing natural resources, will build on the UN ecosystem approach, defined as ‘an integrated strategy for the management of natural resources’. The Environment Bill, expected to receive Royal Assent by spring 2016 will legislate for a more joined-up management process, focused on delivering a healthier, more resilient Wales through economic, social and environmental benefits.
This starts by introducing a new prioritisation process - to identify and characterise the key pressures on our natural resources and to explore the opportunities for the sustainable management of these resources within a defined geographical area. By recognising and better understanding the challenges faced, the tools used to safeguard and deliver environmental benefits (of which flood risk management plans are one) can be applied in a more integrated and joined-up way – better reflecting the needs of that place. An integrated approach to natural resource management is currently being trialled across Wales in three catchment areas, the Dyfi, Tawe and Rhondda.
The natural resource management framework is still being developed in Wales but the flood risk management plans reflect the essential elements of the new approach in the following ways:
**Be area based.**
The flood risk management plans are set at a variety of spatial scales. This enables the focus for managing flood risk to be delivered at the spatial scale most relevant for communities, stakeholders and level of flood risk.
**Involve stakeholder engagement throughout.**
It is essential that RMAs involve stakeholders, including local authorities, communities, developers and industry, throughout the process of drawing up and implementing the flood risk management plans. This will ensure RMAs are targeting our effort in the right places.
**Plan and present at the most appropriate scale.**
The Floods Directive requires that RMAs produce and review management plans at the river basin scale. For some management actions, this scale is appropriate. For others, management actions are best considered at the catchment or community scale. RMAs plan our flood risk management work at the scale which is most appropriate to deliver most for communities and stakeholders.
**Plan for the long term.**
To create a sustainable Wales Natural Resources Wales need to consider the opportunities and constraints Wales will face in the long term. Flood risk management plans consider both short term and long term objectives and measures for the management of flood risk are reviewed every six years.
**Plan to deliver multiple benefits.**
We need to ensure that future activities deliver multiple, long term benefits for the environment and for the economy and society in Wales. All decision making must therefore reflect the long-term well-being goals for Wales and be underpinned by the principles of sustainable management.
Sustainable flood risk practice in Wales is increasingly focused on how working with natural processes can be used to create more flexible and adaptive solutions that provide increased resilience to a changing and uncertain climate.
**Be evidence based.**
To develop this flood risk management plan the best available evidence from a range of sources has been used, building on both our knowledge and that of our stakeholders and local communities. Natural Resources Wales will continue to build and improve this evidence base. People focussed. The natural resource planning process will need to reflect the principles of co-production and stakeholder engagement. The overarching aim should deliver outcomes that are equitably distributed and focussed on delivering long term benefits for the people of Wales.
By working with others the aim is to:
- Understand all the issues (not just flood risk) and how they interact;
- Understand how the issues are affecting the current local benefits and future sustainability;
- Involve local people, communities, organisations and businesses in making decisions that affect their area by sharing evidence, knowledge and experience;
- Identify which issues to tackle as a priority.
FRM National Measures for RBMP & FRMP
The Dee RBMP sets out National Measures proposed for delivery by Flood Risk Management in Wales. These measures are set out below and demonstrate Natural Resources Wales’ commitment to integrated natural resource management through our activities.
1. **Identify opportunities to improve the water environment through existing programmes of work and scheme designs for Flood Risk Management.** Potential synergies and conflicts between RBMP measures and FRMP measures in specific communities at risk have been identified and will be incorporated into the Communities at Risk Register to identify where multiple benefits can be delivered through projects. Those actions that can be delivered within the next 6 year planning window are documented in the delivery plans in Section 9.
2. **NRW will seek opportunities and influence others to utilise natural flood risk management measures where appropriate.** FRM will work with the Area Natural Resource Management teams in the development of the Area Based Statements to ensure flood risk is integral in the consideration of Natural Resource Management, including identifying opportunities to deliver Natural Flood Risk Management. FRM will support the work of others to identify opportunities and implement measures to secure flood risk benefits as part of planned programmes of work/projects.
3. **Implement managed realignment and intertidal habitat creation through the National Habitat Creation Programme (NHCP).** Continue with this programme of work, delivering coastal compensation habitat to offset predicted losses brought about through coastal squeeze, as identified in the SMP2’s.
4. **In waterbodies designated as heavily modified due to flood and coastal protection, mitigation for NRW owned assets and activities will be reviewed and delivered on a prioritised basis.**
5. **Contribute to the achievement of the WFD objective and favourable conservation status at priority Water Level Management sites.** Continue working with protected sites colleagues and land owners in the delivery of Water Level Management Plans.
6. Contribute to research and development to identify best practice for managing hydromorphological pressures in the water environment
Flood risk management is one of the top ten reasons a waterbody fails to meet the objective set under the WFD in Wales. This is why it is important to ensure that where action is needed to manage the risk of flooding, an option is selected that at least maintains the ecological status or potential of a water body, and also seeks opportunities for improvement.
Figure 7: Summary of measures in the Wales side of the RBD Table 9: Wales only measures
Note: Natural Resources Wales are the responsible authority for all measures in this table and all are planned to be delivered in the first FRMP cycle (2015 – 2021).
This table provides a list of measures Natural Resources Wales intend to undertake within this catchment over the coming years, subject to resourcing, economic assessment and funding justification.
| Location | Source | Measure Name | Measure | Link to FRMP objective | Priority | Measure Status | |---------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|------------------------|----------|----------------| | Bagill | Sea | Improve existing flood warning service | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Very High | Ongoing | | | | Maintain completed community flood plan | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 4, 5 | High | Ongoing | | | | Maintain existing defences and inspection regime | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Very High | Ongoing | | Bala | Main River | Develop scheme appraisal for flood alleviation scheme | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | High | Ongoing | | Bangor-is-y-coed | Main River | Design and construction of flood alleviation scheme | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Very High | Ongoing | | | | Maintain completed community flood plan | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 4, 5 | Very High | Ongoing | | Bradley | Main River | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Ongoing | | Breton | Main River / Sea| Undertake initial assessment and feasibility work for reducing flood risk | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Medium | Not Started | | Caergwrle | Main River | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Not Started | | Cefn-Mawr | Main River | Implement alternative risk reduction measures | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 6 | Medium | Not Started | | Cefn-y-bedd | Main River | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Ongoing | | Connah's Quay and Shotton| Main River / Sea| Build hydraulic model | M2 - Prevention | 1, 2, 3 | High | Not Started | | | | Derive hydrology | M2 - Prevention | 1, 2, 3 | Very High | Not Started | | | | Improve existing flood warning service | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Not Started | | | | Maintain existing defences and inspection regime | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Very High | Ongoing | | | | Maintain existing defences and inspection regime | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Not Started | | | | Undertake hydrometric surveys | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | High | Not Started | | | | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Not Started | | | | Maintain completed community flood plan | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Not Started | | | | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Not Started | | | | Maintain completed community flood plan | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Not Started | | | | Undertake initial assessment and feasibility work for reducing flood risk | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | High | Not Started | | | | Carry out structural assessment on existing structures to ensure they are fit for purpose | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Very High | Complete | | | | Improve existing flood warning service | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Very High | Not Started | | | | Maintain completed community flood plan | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 4, 5 | Very High | Ongoing | | | | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Very High | Not Started | | | | Maintain existing defences and inspection regime | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Very High | Ongoing | | | | Review or update hydraulic model | M2 - Prevention | 1, 2, 3 | High | Ongoing | | | | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Not Started | | | | Maintain completed community flood plan | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Not Started | | | | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Not Started | | | | Maintain existing defences and inspection regime | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Very High | Not Started | | | | Build hydraulic model | M2 - Prevention | 1, 2, 3 | High | Not Started | | | | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Not Started | | | | Maintain existing defences and inspection regime | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Very High | Ongoing | | | | Review or update hydraulic model | M2 - Prevention | 1, 2, 3 | Very High | Complete | | | | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Ongoing | | | | Undertake hydrometric surveys | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | High | Not Started | | | | Maintain existing defences and inspection regime | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Very High | Ongoing | | | | Review or update hydraulic model | M2 - Prevention | 1, 2, 3 | Very High | Ongoing | | | | Undertake hydrometric surveys | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | High | Not Started | | Location | Source | Measure Name | Measure | Link to FRMP objective | Priority | Measure Status | |---------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|------------------------|----------|----------------| | New Broughton | Main River | Implement alternative risk reduction measures | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Medium | Not Started | | New Broughton | Main River | Undertake hydrometric surveys | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | High | Not Started | | Padeswood | Main River | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Ongoing | | Pen-y-florodd | Main River | Implement alternative risk reduction measures | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Medium | Not Started | | Queensferry and Sandycroft| Main River / Sea| Carry out structural assessment on existing structures to ensure they are fit for purpose | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | High | Not Started | | | | Improve existing flood warning service | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Very High| Not Started | | | | Maintain completed community flood plan | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 4, 5 | Very High| Ongoing | | | | Review / update hydrology | M2 - Prevention | 1, 2, 3 | Medium | Not Started | | | | Undertake hydrometric surveys | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | High | Not Started | | Rossett and Burton | Main River | Improve existing flood forecasting model | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Medium | Ongoing | | Sealand | Main River / Sea| Improve existing flood warning service | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | High | Not Started | | | | Maintain completed community flood plan | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 4, 5 | Very High| Ongoing | | | | Maintain existing defences and inspection regime | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Very High| Ongoing | | | | Undertake hydrometry and telemetry improvements | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | Very High| Complete | | Sealand Basin Wales | Main River / Sea| Improve existing flood warning service | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | High | Not Started | | | | Maintain existing defences and inspection regime | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Very High| Ongoing | | Talacre | Sea | Build hydraulic model | M2 - Prevention | 1, 2, 3 | Medium | Complete | | | | Improve existing flood warning service | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 2, 4 | High | Not Started | | | | Maintain completed community flood plan | M4 - Preparedness | 1, 4, 5 | Very High| Ongoing | | | | Maintain existing defences and inspection regime | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Very High| Ongoing | | Walwen and Wheston | Sea | Build hydraulic model | M2 - Prevention | 1, 2, 3 | Medium | Complete | | | | Review / update hydrology | M2 - Prevention | 1, 2, 3 | Medium | Complete | | | | Undertake initial assessment and feasibility work for reducing flood risk | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | High | Not Started | | Wrexham | Main River | Undertake initial assessment and feasibility work for reducing flood risk | M3 - Protection | 1, 2, 8 | Medium | Not Started | 11. England only section
The following section considers the objectives and measures that are only applicable to the England only side of the RBD (these will include objectives and measures that are applicable at a scale that is larger than a single catchment but not applicable across the border in the RBD). The flood risk maps for the Welsh Dee area are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10.
The English Dee area covers 500km² of the River Dee catchment, including Chester, part of the Wirral, and tributaries east of the River Dee. The River Dee itself forms the entire western boundary of the English Dee area, and flows northwards through Chester to the Dee Estuary. The area covers the Dee catchment that falls within England, from Whitchurch in the south east, through Tattenhall and Chester, the Dee Estuary at Queensferry and the south western shoreline of the Wirral, including Heswall. The hydrological catchments in this area are the Dee Estuary, Lower Dee and Worthingbury.
The River Dee is fed by a number of tributaries, including Shotwick Brook, Finchett's Gutter and Wych Brook. The total length of Main Rivers in the English Dee area is 265 km. River flows are influenced by regular high spring tide levels and extreme tide levels up as far as Farndon.
In the lower Dee Catchment, altering arable farming practices on steeper sloping ground where appropriate could increase infiltration and water retention and hence reduce run-off rates. Wetlands outside the flood plain in the lower catchment could attenuate peak run-off rates. Conversely livestock farming can reduce infiltration and increase run-off through land trampling by cattle. Land drainage in the lower catchment can increase run-off rates.
Figure 8: Overview map of the English Dee area Partnership Working
The English Dee area is covered by 4 local authorities; Cheshire West and Chester Council, Wrexham Council, Flintshire Council and Shropshire Council.
Welsh Water, United Utilities and Dee Valley Water are the water and sewerage providers in this catchment and they actively participate in partnership working to identify and address flood risk issues within the River Dee catchment.
In addition to those partners mentioned The Environment Agency will also work closely with the Regional Flood and Coastal Committee, and Natural England.
Broader benefits and Natural Flood Management
Natural flood management and ‘slowing the flow’ techniques such as restoration of peat moorland, woodland creation, wetlands and ponds, encourage greater infiltration of water into the ground and/or hold water back. This reduces peak flows in minor watercourses and across the surface of undeveloped land. The Environment Agency will work with many other organisations and within partnerships to consider the application of these methods and to develop a programme of them alongside more traditional solutions, such as building raised flood defences. Programmes will include the 6 year program of Environment Agency and Lead Local Flood Authority projects. This more natural approach can reduce sediment volumes entering rivers, filter out contaminants and enhance habitats.
Natural flood management can be used as a stand-alone solution for protecting small clusters of property and providing a small measure of climate change resilience. It may be especially appropriate where small communities suffer frequent flooding - measures may be less effective in larger floods when they could be overwhelmed and when land may be more saturated, but even then they could reduce the peak flow slightly. In addition, natural flood management it could be combined with property level protection measures to isolated properties, or with raised defences in the case of larger communities at risk of flooding. Similar techniques may be applied in or on the fringe of urban areas where they may be referred to as green infrastructure, or sustainable drainage systems.
Measures to satisfy Water Framework Directive objectives will be located upstream or along stretches of water with poor water quality or habitats. Locations where these coincide may require input from more stakeholders to work in collaboration, perhaps using funding from multiple sources. These are likely to provide greater benefit for a given investment and so have a high priority.
Sustainable Urban Drainage Systems (SuDS) include green roofs, ponds, swales, porous pavements and soakaways. When applied to developments they have an important role in delivering multiple benefits. SuDS attenuate and filter run-off to reduce flood risk and improve water quality. They also conserve and benefit biodiversity and help with climate change adaptation (eg. urban heat island effect).
Consequently, in the context of planning for flood risk, the Environment Agency encourages Local Planning Authorities to adopt a Green Infrastructure approach and SuDS form a significant aspect of this. It should be planned and managed in a similar way to critical infrastructure, because it is a climate change adaptation response that will help build a community’s overall resilience – reduced flood risk, increased shading, drought tolerance and protection of urban ecosystems.
The following table summarises the WFD outcomes expected to be delivered through flood risk management programmes by the end of the cycle 2 of the RBMP by 2021: Table 10: RBMP outcomes related to Environment Agency flood risk management programmes by 2021
| Type of FCERM programme actions | No of actions | Hectares of water dependent habitat created or improved to help meet the objectives of WFD | Hectares of intertidal habitat created to help meet the objectives of WFD for protected areas | Kilometres of rivers protected under EU Habitats/Birds Directive improved to help meet the objectives of WFD | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | FCERM actions in Site Improvement Plans of water dependent sites designated under the EU Habitats and Birds Directives that will deliver a WFD outcome. | 3 | 4 | 0 | 187 | | FCERM actions addressing remedies and threats to water dependent sites designated under the Wildlife & Countryside Act 1981 (SSSIs) that will deliver a WFD outcome. | 1 | 18 | 0 | 0 | | FCERM actions addressing requirements for consent of flood works such as planning, EIA, HRA etc. | 2 | 21 | 0 | 0 | | FCERM actions that deliver WFD outcomes from works that contribute to the Eel Regulations. | 4 | No of eel barrier easements or removal = 4 | | | | **Total** | **10** | **43** | **0** | **187** |
Links to Dee RBD Designated Site Plans (from .GOV.UK)
The FRMP aims to contribute to the specific plans of designated conservation sites and these are set out as proposed actions in specific plans and related to FCERM and the relevant Risk Management Authorities. These include actions in the Dee RBD Site Improvement Plans for the following European designated sites:
**Dee RBD Natura 2000 sites with Site Improvement Plans**
- Brown Moss
- Chew Valley Lake
- Fens Pool
- Lyppard Grange Ponds
- River Clun
- River Wye
- Dee Estuary Mor Hafren
- Walmore Common
- West Midlands Mosses
- Wye Valley Woodlands/Coetiroedd Dyffryn Gwy These plans have been developed by Natural England, in conjunction with NRW for sites that cross the border such as the River Wye (SAC) and Dee Estuary SAC/SPA/Ramsar site. For every European site in Wales (apart from cross-border sites) NRW are leading on the development of Prioritised Improvement Plan (PIPs). These are currently subject to consultation and include the River Usk.
There is strong evidence that woodland measures can reduce flood flows, particularly but not only within smaller catchments. Trees help reduce flood risk in a number of ways:
- greater water use by trees compared to other vegetation types reduces run-off and also creates greater capacity for woodland soils to absorb rainfall during flood events;
- higher infiltration rates of forest soils resulting from the extensive rooting systems of trees reduces run-off to watercourses and aids interception of overland flow from adjacent land;
- Floodplain and riparian woodland can slow down flood flows, increase temporary storage and thereby delay the transfer of flood water downstream;
- soils under woodland are generally protected from erosion risk, reducing delivery of sediment to watercourses.
Therefore, ‘woodland measures’ for flood risk reduction include both targeted woodland creation – in the right place and to the right design – and woodland management such as the installation of features such as large woody debris dams to reconnect watercourses with already wooded riparian zones and floodplains.
The 2011 ‘Woodland for Water’ report detailed the evidence behind these conclusions. As a result opportunity mapping to be used to identify where in the country to target woodland measures to help reduce flood risk. Priority locations fall into three categories:
- Floodplains – where hydraulic roughness from woodland cover slows the flow and encourages the deposition of sediment;
- Riparian zones – to intercept overland flow, protect river banks from erosion, and help slow the flow of water;
- Wider catchment planting – to protect sensitive soils from erosion, increase infiltration rates, and intercept sediment in run-off from adjacent land.
While opportunity maps can identify priority catchments where woodland creation and management can help reduce flood risk, it is important that woodland is located in the right part of the landscape and then designed and managed appropriately in order to maximise their contribution to reducing flood risk.
Development planning and control
Risk management authorities (RMAs) work together to avoid inappropriate development of the floodplain. The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) sets out government policy on new developments, which must be applied by local planning authorities when making land use planning decisions. The Environment Agency is a statutory consultee for planning applications except for minor developments in areas at risk of flooding from rivers and the sea and large developments where flooding from rivers and the sea is very unlikely. RMAs work in partnership to advise developers on planning consultations in high risk areas. The final decision for development in the floodplain is made by the local planning authorities. Permitting decisions on development is an opportunity to integrate SuDS, Sustainable Urban Drainage Systems, that mimic the natural drainage of the land and reduce surface water run-off.
Maintenance
In England the Environment Agency and other RMAs carry out maintenance work in line with government policy to provide the greatest benefits to people and property at risk of flooding within the available funding. Maintenance work to maintain channels, assets and structures is carried out under the Environment Agency’s permissive powers to ensure that assets are fit for purpose. A risk-based approach to assess the need and justification for works and investment is directed towards those activities that will contribute most to reducing flood risk per pound of funding.
Maintenance activities are divided into four main areas:
- operation (inspecting and operating assets);
- conveyance (improving the flow of water in a channel);
- structures (maintaining structures and assets);
- Mechanical, Electrical, Instrumentation, Control and Automation (carrying out minor repairs and replacements to pumps and tidal barriers).
The Environment Agency extract a national picture of maintenance needs from System Asset Management Plans (SAMPs) these systems are ranked based on their cost/benefit ratio. The Environment Agency annual maintenance programme includes a range of activities that are prioritised and timetabled using information from asset inspections, maintenance standards, characteristics of the assets, levels of flood risk and from legal and statutory obligations.
Six year investment programme
In December 2014 the government set out a 6 year plan for investment in flood and coastal erosion risk management (2015/16 to 2020/21). The latest published figures show the current funding profile of each year. Each year RMAs are invited to submit details of proposed FCERM capital works to the Environment Agency. These proposals are combined with Environment Agency proposed schemes to form a programme of work. Investment in FCERM is prioritised according to government policy, and in line with the government’s National FCERM Strategy and HM Treasury Green Book on economic appraisal. Government policy gives the highest priority to lives and homes and all FCERM projects should at least have a benefit cost ratio greater than 1:1. All FCERM schemes are prioritised against a consistent set of criteria applied to all risk management authorities (RMAs). This ensures a fair distribution of funding based on agreed priorities, principles and needs. Measures in FRMPs do not all have secured funding and are not guaranteed to be implemented. Money is allocated to all RMA measures in the same way and is based on current Government policy that gives the highest priority to lives and homes.
The published programme can be found here. Measures from the 6 year investment programme are included in the FRMP. In subsequent years the FRMP will inform which proposed FCRM capital works are submitted to the investment programme.
Long term investment scenarios
The Environment Agency’s long-term investment scenarios study published in December 2014, presents a new analysis of the costs and risks of flood and coastal erosion risk management in England. The study sets out the link between national investment in flood and coastal erosion risk management, and the outcomes in terms of economic risk and numbers of properties at risk. The study found that the annual economic ‘optimum’ investment need over the next 10 years is broadly in line with current expenditure (about £750 million, including public and third party contributions). The study shows that over the next 50 years optimal investment in FCERM is expected to rise by 10-20% (in present day terms). A key finding of the study is that even if average annual investment is sustained at an optimal level there will still be significant numbers of properties at high and medium flood risk in 50 years time meaning new and innovative approaches will be needed. LTIS estimates that, by 2021, the six year programme could reduce overall flood risk by up to 5% on the assumption that planned capital, maintenance and incident management activities are maintained.
Coastal Erosion & Shoreline Management Plans
The Environment Agency has the coastal Strategic Overview in England. The coastal overview joins up coastal management activities to ensure flooding and erosion risk is managed effectively. The overview encourages authorities to work together in partnership to achieve effective management of coastal flooding and erosion risks. Work to tackle coastal erosion is the responsibility of district or unitary councils. Local authorities have operational powers relating to managing coastal erosion under the Coast Protection Act 1949 and the Floods and Water Management Act 2010. Local Authorities lead on coastal risk management activities and undertake works on sea flooding and coastal erosion where they are best placed to do so. This is undertaken in collaboration with the Environment Agency.
Shoreline Management plans are non-statutory, high level planning documents. They are large scale assessments of the risk associated with coastal processes, and a policy framework to reduce these risks to people and the developed, historic and natural environment in a sustainable manner. They set the strategic direction for how the coast is wanted to be managed over the next 100 years. SMPs identify the most sustainable approaches to managing coastal erosion and flooding risks in the short, medium, and long term.
During the development of Shoreline Management Plans, a range of partners and the public were extensively consulted and involved in the decision making processes.
This FRMP also draws some coastal erosion information from the Shoreline Management Plan 2 (SMP2), however, the full Shoreline Management Plan has not been included in this FRMP. The SMP measures included in this FRMP are those that are most relevant for sea flooding and flood risk issues. You can access further information and the full SMPs here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/shoreline-management-plans-smps/shoreline-management-plans-smps.
SMPs remain the primary high level strategic planning documents on the coast, as they also contain information on coastal erosion risk management, and their content can be updated or changed using an established auditable process. These changes will be reflected in the FRMPs as they are updated on a six-yearly cycle. These changes may be prompted by changes in the evidence base guiding management decisions in SMPs, including evidence emerging from experience of the ongoing implementation of RBMPs. In this way, the Programme of Measures in RBMPs, the action plan and information in the FRMP, and the ‘living’ SMP documents should successfully inform and read-across to each other.
The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 established the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) to produce marine plans, administer marine licensing and manage marine fisheries in English waters. It introduced marine planning in the UK through production of a marine policy statement and more detailed marine plans setting spatial policy at a more local level. Eleven marine plans covering English waters are anticipated by 2021.
Marine plans will inform and guide marine users and regulators across England, managing the sustainable development of marine industries such as wind farms and fishing, alongside the need to conserve and protect marine species and habitats. At its landward extent, a marine plan will apply up to mean high water, including estuaries and the tidal extent of rivers. All public bodies making authorisation or enforcement decisions capable of affecting the marine area must do so in accordance with the Marine Policy Statement (MPS) or marine plans (where they are in place) or state reasons for not doing so. Marine licensing, administered by the MMO is the main environmental and development control system below high water.
Further information can be found on the MMO web pages on GOV.UK https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/marine-planning-in-england Flood Risk Maps
Figure 9: Flood Risk from Rivers and the Sea in the English Dee area Figure 10: Flood Risk from Reservoirs in the English Dee area Conclusions and objectives for the England section of the Dee
Conclusions
This part of the Dee catchment covers a significant area; and includes Whitchurch, Farndon, Chester and Queensferry.
The River Dee at Chester responds slowly to heavy rainfall, taking up to 3 or 4 days to peak following a rainfall event. The river becomes tidally locked on spring tides and this tidal impact can be observed as far upstream as Farndon. The weir at Chester regularly drowns out and the flow is often reversed through the city because of the tidal influence. This weir acts as a flow control to allow recreational navigation upstream.
The primary flood risk downstream of Chester is from high tide levels. A tidal surge with a high spring tide occurred in December 2013 and caused flooding along the Dee and Mersey estuaries. In Chester, the Groves were inundated and the canal basin at Dee Lock experienced high levels. There was flooding recorded to one business and one property along the River Dee.
In Chester and further upstream, the combination of a fluvial event with high tides is a scenario that could lead to high river levels and potential flood risk to properties alongside the river. Fluvial flood risk in the catchment is limited to isolated rural properties.
The interface with the Canal at Dee Lock is an area that the Environment Agency are working in partnership with Cheshire West and Chester and the Canal and River Trust to reduce the risk of flooding.
Just downstream of Farndon, there are a number of dwellings by the river's edge that would be inaccessible during a flood event as the surrounding area is floodplain. This can be a regular occurrence. In working with Cheshire West and Chester and the property owners, the Environment Agency now issue a flood warning to this area from which residents are able to take the appropriate action. Other flood warning areas have also been developed in Chester.
Properties that flooded in December 2013 are benefitting from the Local Governments Repair and Renew Grant to improve flood resilience.
Key flood defence assets within English Dee Catchment are the River Dee flood embankments in Chester, Sealand Main Drain Flood Basin at Clifton Drive, Chester and Finchett's Gutter outfalls and debris screens at Sealand Road, Chester. Critical infrastructure would include the Scottish Power Substation in Chester.
Supporting Communities that Remain at Risk is an Environment Agency project to pre-plan for the use of temporary defences. This project is a great opportunity to have prepared plans and equipment for more communities to maximise the use of the extra time flood forecasting investment has bought us in helping to protect them.
There is key environmental interest as the River Dee is designated as SSSI and SAC and therefore the Environment Agency have to implement mitigation measures to reduce habitat and ecological impacts. This will be in partnership with Natural England and Natural Resources Wales and a programme will be developed to look at this.
Previously the Dee CFMP considered possible increases in flood levels, extent and risk if climate change were to increase flood flows by 20%. Climate projections since then suggest flood flows could increase by more than that but acknowledge significant uncertainty. No additional analysis is proposed at this stage; instead the preferred approach is to emphasise the uncertainty in climate change impacts. Planners, Emergency Planners, Asset Managers should consider what should be reasonably done to address realistic worse case scenarios.
The CFMP, written in 2008/09, sets out how flood risk can be managed sustainably within the catchment. The FRMP summarises some of that information but in no way changes the approach developed in the CFMP, which was the subject of substantial consultation. Objectives
The objectives in the Dee Flood Risk Management Plan are aligned with the second cycle River Basin Management Plan. They state the main ways in which work is directed to make a difference and reduce flood risk. They cover people, the economy and the environment. The objectives are split into the 3 categories to help demonstrate the balance of objectives across the plans but the categories aren’t assigned a weighting in the FRMP. Objectives are used to plan and prioritise investment programmes to target investment in the most at risk communities. Prioritisation is then done at an England wide level and takes into account the risk but also considers other factors such as; cost benefits, the level of investment to date and other aspects such as the potential for external funding opportunities.
Social
1. Minimise impact to people and property and to critical infrastructure and services from rivers, the sea, surface water, groundwater, reservoirs & sewers
2. The water environment shall be enjoyed by people and provide opportunities for recreational amenity
3. Promote the consideration of environmental benefits to people (ecosystem services) as part of work to manage flood risk
Economic
4. Minimise flood risk impact to the local economy so that business is resilient and sustainable growth is supported
Environmental
05. Promote an integrated approach to water management
06. Work with river, estuarine and coastal processes to conserve and enhance natural hydro-morphology (sediment movement and physical features) and water quality
07. Promote natural flood risk management and protection of soils
08. Deliver a clean and safe water environment with benefits for the wider environment. The water environment will have diverse flora and fauna which benefits from natural flood management techniques, ‘green infrastructure’ and improved ecological connectivity
09. Support climate change adaptation by making space for water, both inland and at the coast
10. Conserve built and natural heritage wherever possible
Measures across the English Dee area
Across the English Dee area there are 21 measures to manage flood risk. Measures in FRMPs do not all have secured funding and are not guaranteed to be implemented. Money is allocated to all RMA measures in the same way and is based on current Government policy that gives the highest priority to lives and homes.
Preventing risk: there are no measures proposed over and above existing flood risk work.
Preparing for risk:
- Produce local community flood plans covering key communities including; Tattenhall, Whitchurch, Farndon, Aldford, Neston, West Kirby and Heswall (7 measures at different locations).
- Support Cheshire Constabulary in Developing Multi-Agency Flood Plans for Cheshire County.
- Improve existing Flood Awareness Plans to encourage more people to sign up to and respond to flood warnings as well as using self-help methods to protect themselves and their properties. • Encourage and support our partners to produce local long term plans to manage all sources of flooding at Chester.
• Produce local community flood plans covering key communities including Malpas, Shocklach, Almere, Eccleston and Lower Kinnerton (5 measures at different locations).
Protecting from risk:
• Encourage the owners and operators of storm water pumping stations and associated infrastructure to undertake an assessment of their current and future risks to determine their resilience to flooding. Develop a flood resilience and adaptation plan as appropriate.
• Identify where working with natural processes/natural flood management can help to reduce flood and coastal erosion risk and help catchments both adapt and become more resilient to the impacts of Climate Change
• Dee Lock Flood Risk Management scheme
• Inform the owners/operators of the storm water pumping stations and associated infrastructure of their flood risks now and in the future.
• Incorporate Climate Change allowances into flood risk management works
• Identify where working with natural processes/natural flood management can help to reduce flood and coastal erosion risk and help catchments both adapt and become more resilient to the impacts of Climate Change
Recovery and review of risk: there are no measures proposed over and above existing flood risk work. | Measure ID | Place | Measure Name | Measure Details | Source of flood risk or coastal erosion | Category of objective | Category of Measures | Timing | Priority | Measure Owner | Statutory or voluntary measure | Plan Type | |------------|-------|--------------|----------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------|----------|---------------|--------------------------------|-----------| | ACT5831 | Whitchurch | DEE03.013A | Produce local community flood plans covering key communities including Whitchurch. These local plans will be based on an understanding of the current and future risks of flooding, both probability and consequence. The local plans will identify all the potential action that could be undertaken to manage the local risks. They will identify what actions are currently undertaken and will identify the gaps where more could be done. They will identify what additional actions are proposed. | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M4 - Preparedness | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | ACT5852 | Malpas | DEE03.013C | Produce local community flood plans covering key communities including Malpas. | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M4 - Preparedness | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | ACT5853 | Tattenhall | DEE03.013B | Produce local community flood plans covering key communities including Tattenhall. | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M4 - Preparedness | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | ACT5854 | Middle Dee | DEE03.014 | Support Cheshire Constabulary in Developing Multi-Agency Flood Plan for Cheshire County | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M4 - Preparedness | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | Measure ID | Place | Measure Name | Measure Details | Source of flood risk or coastal erosion | Category of objective | Category of Measures | Timing | Priority | Measure Owner | Statutory or voluntary measure | Plan Type | |------------|-------|--------------|----------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------|----------|---------------|--------------------------------|-----------| | ACT5855 | Shocklach | DEE05.012A | Produce local community flood plans for Shocklach. These local plans will be based on an understanding of the current and future risks of flooding, both probability and consequence. These local plans will identify all the potential action that could be undertaken to manage the local risks. They will identify what actions are currently undertaken and will identify the gaps where more could be done. They will identify what additional actions are proposed. | Flooding from rivers (main river) | Prevention, protection, preparedness etc | FRMP Planning Cycles e.g. 2015 - 2021; 2021 - 2027 etc | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | ACT5856 | Farndon | DEE05.012B | Produce local community flood plans for Farndon. These local plans will be based on an understanding of the current and future risks of flooding, both probability and consequence. These local plans will identify all the potential action that could be undertaken to manage the local risks. They will identify what actions are currently undertaken and will identify the gaps where more could be done. They will identify what additional actions are proposed. | Flooding from rivers (main river) | Prevention, protection, preparedness etc | FRMP Planning Cycles e.g. 2015 - 2021; 2021 - 2027 etc | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | ACT5857 | Almere | DEE05.012C | Produce local community flood plans for Almere. These local plans will be based on an understanding of the current and future risks of flooding, both probability and consequence. These local plans will identify all the potential action that could be undertaken to manage the local risks. They will identify what actions are currently undertaken and will identify the gaps where more could be done. They will identify what additional actions are proposed. | Flooding from rivers (main river) | Prevention, protection, preparedness etc | FRMP Planning Cycles e.g. 2015 - 2021; 2021 - 2027 etc | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | Measure ID | Place Name | Measure Name | Measure Details | Source of flood risk or coastal erosion | Category of objective | Category of Measures | Timing | Priority | Measure Owner | Statutory or voluntary measure | Plan Type | |------------|------------|--------------|----------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------|----------|---------------|---------------------------------|-----------| | ACT5858 | Aldford | DEE05.012D | Produce local community flood plans for Aldford. These local plans will be based on an understanding of the current and future risks of flooding, both probability and consequence. These local plans will identify all the potential action that could be undertaken to manage the local risks. They will identify what actions are currently undertaken and will identify the gaps where more could be done. They will identify what additional actions are proposed. | Flooding from rivers (main river) | Prevention, protection, preparedness etc | FRMP Planning Cycles e.g. 2015 - 2021; 2021 - 2027 etc | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | ACT5859 | Eccleston | DEE05.012E | Produce local community flood plans for Eccleston. These local plans will be based on an understanding of the current and future risks of flooding, both probability and consequence. These local plans will identify all the potential action that could be undertaken to manage the local risks. They will identify what actions are currently undertaken and will identify the gaps where more could be done. They will identify what additional actions are proposed. | Flooding from rivers (main river) | Prevention, protection, preparedness etc | FRMP Planning Cycles e.g. 2015 - 2021; 2021 - 2027 etc | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | ACT5860 | Lower Kinnerton | DEE05.012F | Produce local community flood plans for Lower Kinnerton. These local plans will be based on an understanding of the current and future risks of flooding, both probability and consequence. These local plans will identify all the potential action that could be undertaken to manage the local risks. They will identify what actions are currently undertaken and will identify the gaps where more could be done. They will identify what additional actions are proposed. | Flooding from rivers (main river) | Prevention, protection, preparedness etc | FRMP Planning Cycles e.g. 2015 - 2021; 2021 - 2027 etc | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | Measure ID | Place | Measure Name | Measure Details | Source of flood risk or coastal erosion | Category of objective | Category of Measures | Timing | Priority | Measure Owner | Statutory or voluntary measure | Plan Type | |------------|-------|--------------|----------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------|----------|---------------|---------------------------------|-----------| | ACT5861 | Lower Dee | DEE05.013 | Support Cheshire Constabulary in Developing Multi-Agency Flood Plan for Cheshire County | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M4 - Preparedness | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | ACT5862 | Neston | DEE06.014A | produce local community flood plans for all the communities in the estuary area including Neston. These local plans will be based on an understanding of the current and future risks of flooding, both probability and consequence. The local plans will identify all the potential action that could be undertaken to manage the local risks. They will identify what actions are currently undertaken and will identify the gaps where more could be done. They will identify what additional actions are proposed. | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M4 - Preparedness | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | ACT5863 | West Kirby | DEE06.014B | Produce local community flood plans for all the communities in the estuary area including West Kirby. These local plans will be based on an understanding of the current and future risks of flooding, both probability and consequence. The local plans will identify all the potential action that could be undertaken to manage the local risks. They will identify what actions are currently undertaken and will identify the gaps where more could be done. They will identify what additional actions are proposed. | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M4 - Preparedness | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Statutory | FRMP | | Measure ID | Place | Measure Name | Measure Details | Source of flood risk or coastal erosion | Category of objective | Category of Measures | Timing | Priority | Measure Owner | Statutory or voluntary measure | Plan Type | |------------|-------|--------------|----------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------|----------|---------------|---------------------------------|-----------| | ACT5864 | Heswall | DEE06.014C | Produce local community flood plans for all the communities in the estuary area including Heswall. These local plans will be based on an understanding of the current and future risks of flooding, both probability and consequence. The local plans will identify all the potential action that could be undertaken to manage the local risks. They will identify what actions are currently undertaken and will identify the gaps where more could be done. They will identify what additional actions are proposed. | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M4 - Preparedness | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Environment Agency | Statutory FRMP | FRMP | | ACT5865 | Chester | DEE07.002 | Inform the owners/operators of the stormwater pumping stations and associated infrastructure of their flood risks now and in the future. | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M3 - Protection | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Environment Agency | Statutory FRMP | FRMP | | ACT5866 | Chester | DEE07.003 | Encourage the owners and operators of stormwater pumping stations and associated infrastructure to undertake an assessment of their current and future risks to determine their resilience to flooding. Develop a flood resilience and adaptation plan as appropriate. | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M3 - Protection | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Environment Agency | Statutory FRMP | FRMP | | ACT5867 | Chester | DEE07.012 | Improve existing Flood Awareness Plans to encourage more people to sign up to and respond to flood warnings as well as using self help methods to protect themselves and their properties. | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M4 - Preparedness | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Environment Agency | Statutory FRMP | FRMP | | Measure ID | Place | Measure Name | Measure Details | Source of flood risk or coastal erosion | Category of objective | Category of Measures | Timing | Priority | Measure Owner | Statutory or voluntary measure | Plan Type | |------------|-------|--------------|----------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------|----------|---------------|---------------------------------|-----------| | ACT5868 | Chester | DEE07.014 | Encourage and support our partners to produce local long term plans to manage all sources of flooding at Chester. These plans should include an assessment of the consequences of flooding, including from overtopping of defences, and actions to manage these. They should consider future options and investment needs for defences, emergency planning and response, and development control issues to avoid inappropriate development in high risk areas. | N N Y N N N N N N Y | M4 - Preparedness | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Environment Agency | Statutory FRMP | FRMP | | ACT6057 | Dee Locks, Chester | DEE07.015 | Dee Locks Flood risk Management scheme - Improve the standard of protection for Dee Locks gates to bring it in line with the adjacent flood embankments along the lower Dee. | N N N N N N N N N Y | M3 - Protection | 2015 - 2021 | High | Environment Agency | Environment Agency | Statutory FRMP | FRMP | | ACT7020 | NW and Dee RBD wide | NWRBD.001 | Incorporate Climate Change allowances into flood risk management works | N N N N N N N N Y N | M3 - Protection | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Environment Agency | Non statutory FRMP | FRMP | | ACT7022 | NW and Dee RBD wide | NWRBD.002 | Identify where working with natural processes/natural flood management can help to reduce flood and coastal erosion risk and help catchments both adapt and become more resilient to the impacts of Climate Change | N N N N N N N N Y N | M3 - Protection | 2015 - 2021 | Moderate | Environment Agency | Environment Agency | Non statutory FRMP | FRMP | 12. Implementing the plan
This draft FRMP sets out ongoing, agreed and proposed measures to manage flood risk. Implementing the measures set out in the final FRMP will be through a number of established mechanisms, as set out in the National FCERM Strategies for England and Wales.
The Catchment based approach in England
The catchment based approach encourages local engagement and participation in decision-making. As the Environment Agency finalise and implement this plan we will seek to engage further with relevant catchment partnerships in order to deliver flood risk management outcomes and broader benefits.
Natural Resource Management in Wales
Natural Resources Wales is developing its implementation of the ecosystem approach and Area-Based Natural Resource Management (NRM). The current area of focus is on designing and embedding the ecosystem approach. This has begun with three trial areas which will help to shape future delivery of natural resource management, including flood risk management in Wales.
Monitoring delivery of actions
It is a requirement of the Flood Risk Regulations that this Flood Risk Management Plan must be reviewed, and if necessary updated, every 6 years. The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales will undertake and publish the review, and will prepare an updated Flood Risk Management Plan if required.
In the interim years, RMAs will review the measures within the FRMP on an annual basis. The progress of delivery of each measure will be assessed and updated. There will be no published update from each annual review so for the most up to date information on what actions are happening in your area, please contact us.
We may also need to add actions in response to flooding that might be experienced during the six year cycle of this FRMP. If this is the case, measures will be added and monitored without an update to this report on an ad-hoc basis.
## Annex 1 - Sources of information for the draft FRMP
| Strategy | Purpose and scope of plan or strategy | Drivers | Lead authority | |-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | **Catchment Flood Management Plans (CFMPs)** | Current and future inland flood risk management across all catchments. These plans set out preferred policies for managing river flooding in England and Wales. | Voluntary plans. Published in 2009-10. | Natural Resources Wales and the Environment Agency | | **Shoreline Management Plans (SMPs)** | Current and future coastal flood and coastal erosion risk management. These plans set out preferred policies for managing the coastline of England and Wales. | Voluntary plans. Second round of SMPs published in 2010-13. | Coastal Groups (comprising NRW, EA, LLFAs and others) | | **River, estuary and coastal strategies** | Outline investment proposals for flood and coastal erosion risk management. Prepared to support an investment proposal for funding. | Voluntary plans. | Risk Management Authorities | | **Reservoir Flood plans** | These include on-site and off-site flood plans that set out procedures for the management of flood risk in the event of an emergency. On-site plans deal with the management of the on-site risk and off-site plans deal with the risk in areas adjacent to the reservoir. | Voluntary plans. | On-site Flood Plans are developed by the owners of the reservoir. Off-site Flood Plans are developed by the Local Resilience Forums. | | **System Asset Management Plans** | Plans that set out the maintenance regime for asset systems. | Voluntary plans. | Owners and operators of assets. | Annex 2 - CFMP and SMP policies
Catchment Flood Management Plans (CFMPs)
The CFMPs published by the Environment Agency in 2009 set out the preferred policy approach to managing flood risk from the main rivers in England and Wales through broad areas known as policy units. The policy units and associated policies within the CFMPs were determined by considering the extent, nature and scale of current and future flood risk across the whole catchment in order to show the broad area where the policy decision should be applied.
The six pre-defined policies that were adopted are illustrated in Figure 11 and can be described as:
- **Policy 1** – no active intervention (including flood warning and maintenance). Continue to monitor and advise.
- **Policy 2** - Reduce existing flood risk management actions (accepting that flood risk will increase over time).
- **Policy 3** - Continue with existing or alternative actions to manage flood risk at the current level.
- **Policy 4** - Take further action to sustain the current level of flood risk into the future (responding to the potential increases in risk from urban development, land use change and climate change).
- **Policy 5** - Take further action to reduce flood risk.
- **Policy 6** - Take action with others to store water or manage run-off in locations that provide overall flood risk reduction or environmental benefits, locally or elsewhere in the catchment.
It is important to note at this point that these are the current strategic policies for undertaking flood risk management work and will be adopted by this plan. Future review will be included within the overall Flood Risk Regulations cycle of delivery if deemed necessary.
The action plans contained in the CFMPs are now largely complete. Where actions are outstanding and yet to be delivered, they have been brought forward into this FRMP. This Plan now contains all the actions applicable to main river flood risk and supersedes those in the CFMP. Figure 11: Dee CFMP Policies Shoreline Management Plans (SMPs)
In addition to CFMPs, SMPs were produced in partnership by Coastal Groups to set the strategic direction for the management of the coast for the next 100 years. SMPs are non-statutory policy documents for coastal defence management planning. They provide a large-scale assessment of the risks associated with coastal evolution and present a policy framework to address these risks to people and the developed, historic and natural environment in a sustainable manner.
The first edition SMPs were created in the late 1990s. The second edition plans (SMP2s) were produced by consultants for Coastal Groups from 2005 onwards. There is one shoreline management plan, the North West England and North Wales Shoreline Management Plan, which falls within the Dee RBD.
SMP2s address a 100 year timeframe across 3 epochs being Epoch 1 (short-term) = years 0 to 20, Epoch 2 (medium term) = years 20 to 50 and Epoch 3 (long term) = 50 to 100 for proposed management of the coastline.
One of four policies can be applied per Epoch to each coastal management unit (i.e. defined length of coastline) and these policies are:
- No Active Intervention (NAI): where there is no planned investment in coastal defences or operations, regardless of whether or not an artificial defence has existed previously.
- Hold the Line (HTL): an aspiration to build or maintain artificial defences so that the current position of the shoreline remains.
- Managed Realignment (MR): by allowing the shoreline to move backwards or forwards naturally, but managing the process to direct it in certain areas.
- Advance the Line (ATL): by building new defences on the seaward side of the original defences.
As the SMP2s were recently completed, they will remain as plans in their own right and where applicable and appropriate, certain sea flooding actions have been brought forward into this Flood Risk Management Plan. Would you like to find out more about us or about your environment?
Environment Agency Call us on: 03708 506 506 (Monday - Friday, 8am - 6pm) Email: [email protected] Or visit our website: www.gov.uk/environment-agency Incident hotline: 0800 807 060 (24 hours) Floodline: 0345 988 1188 / 0845 988 1188 (24 hours)
Natural Resources Wales Call us on: 0800 065 3000 (Monday - Friday, 8am - 6pm) Email: [email protected] Or visit our website: www.naturalresourceswales.gov.uk Incident hotline: 0800 807 060 (24 hours) Floodline: 0345 988 1188 (24 hours)
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04788ff4215a2b96b1ba84868b03bddefba4005f | Flood risk management plan
Severn river basin district summary
What are flood risk management plans?
Flood risk management plans (FRMPs) describe the risk of flooding from rivers, the sea, surface water, groundwater and reservoirs. FRMPs set out how risk management authorities will work together and with communities to manage flood and coastal risk over the next 6 years. Risk management authorities include the Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales, lead local flood authorities (LLFAs), local councils, internal drainage boards, Highways England, South Wales Trunk Road Agency, North Wales Trunk Road Agency (NWTRA) and water and sewerage companies.
Each EU member country must produce FRMPs as set out in the EU Floods Directive 2007. Each FRMP covers a specific river basin district. There are 11 river basin districts in England and Wales, as defined in the legislation. A river basin district is an area of land covering one or more river catchments. A river catchment is the area of land from which rainfall drains to a specific river.
Each river basin district also has a river basin management plan, which looks at how to protect and improve water quality, and use water in a sustainable way. FRMPs and river basin management plans work to a 6-year planning cycle. The current cycle is from 2015 to 2021. We have developed the Severn FRMP alongside the Severn river basin management plan so that where possible flood defence schemes can provide wider environmental benefits.
The Severn RBD FRMP is a joint plan prepared by the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales in partnership with 5 LLFAs. The FRMP includes information relating to ‘main rivers’ (larger rivers and streams which are marked on an official document called the main river map), the sea and reservoirs for the whole river basin district. It also includes information on local flood risk in the 5 LLFA areas, including surface water flooding (flooding which happens when drainage systems become overloaded with high volumes of rainfall), groundwater flooding and flooding from ‘ordinary watercourses’. ‘Ordinary watercourses’ are smaller rivers, streams, ditches and so on, which are not marked on the main river map). Some water companies have provided measures relating to sewer flooding.
Flood risk in the Severn river basin district
The Severn river basin district covers 21,500km². The River Severn is the longest river in Britain, stretching 350km from its source to the mouth of the Bristol Channel. The Warwickshire Avon and the Teme are the River Severn’s main tributaries (smaller rivers flowing into the main river).
The River Severn goes through a varied landscape within the river basin district, from the uplands of Wales, down through valleys and rolling hills through central England, to the lowlands of the Severn Estuary.
The river basin district also covers the rivers that drain directly into the Severn Estuary in south-east Wales, including the Wye, Usk and Taff, and in the south-west, including the Bristol Avon.
The river basin district is made up of 10 catchments (2 in Wales, 6 in England and 2 cross-border catchments) and 8 flood risk areas (6 in Wales and 2 in England), as shown in figure 1. Flood risk areas (FRAs) are specifically defined areas with a high risk of surface water flooding.
In the Severn river basin district:
- about 32,600 people are at high risk of flooding from rivers and the sea (more than a 1 in 30 (3.3%) chance of being flooded in any year); • 67,400 people are at medium risk of flooding from rivers and the sea (less than a 1 in 30 (3.3%) but more than a 1 in 100 (1%) chance of being flooded in any year); • 260,000 people are at risk of flooding from reservoirs; • about 120,000 people are at medium to high risk of surface water flooding; • flooding from sewers occurs in some towns and cities.
Figure 1: Catchments, FRAs and Wales and England only areas in the Severn river basin district Characteristics of the Severn river basin district
Part B of the FRMP gives a full description of each catchment, including the factors affecting flood risk and statistics for the river basin district.
Severn Uplands, Teme and Shropshire Middle Severn catchments
In the north of the Severn river basin district, the rivers Severn and Teme run through steep valleys. Here the rivers respond rapidly to rainfall, so flooding can happen relatively quickly.
Reservoirs, such as Llyn Clywedog and Lake Vyrnwy, provide flood storage and are used to regulate flows downstream on the River Severn. They are also used for public water supply.
Further downstream the land becomes flatter as the rivers reach the Shropshire plain. The area where the River Vyrnwy joins the River Severn is important for flood storage and plays a key role in reducing flood risk downstream to places such as Shrewsbury.
On the Shropshire plain, flooding can last for several weeks. Similarly where the Teme meets the River Severn, flooding can last for long periods during the winter.
Wye, Usk and South East Valleys catchments
The rivers in these catchments start in the uplands hills in the west and flow south-east through steep-sided valleys, characterised by a mixture of woodland and managed grassland.
Several rivers run through the steep valleys of the South East Valleys catchment and there are many towns in narrow valley floors. These rivers respond quickly to rainfall and are prone to surface water flooding. Flood levels can rise suddenly, increasing risk to life.
In the lower Wye and Usk catchments the flood plains widen and are intensively farmed. There is frequent flooding of farmland here. Natural water storage areas, including the Letton Lakes in the Wye catchment, help reduce and control river flows. During flooding, these lakes help reduce peak flow downstream in Hereford.
Towns at risk of fluvial flooding from the Wye and its tributaries include Builth Wells, Glasbury, Hereford, Monmouth, Hay-on-Wye, Ross-on-Wye and parts of Leominster on the River Lugg. A number of smaller towns and villages are also at risk from the Wye and its tributaries.
The rivers drain into the Severn Estuary, with a number of major towns and cities at risk of tidal flooding. Worcestershire Middle Severn, Severn Vale and Warwickshire Avon catchments
In the east of the river basin the River Severn runs north to south, with the Warwickshire Avon joining it at Tewkesbury. The landscape is characterised by woodland and open farmland on undulating hills, leading to a broader, flatter flood plain further downstream.
There is a long and well documented history of river flooding in this area. The most recent flooding happened in 2007 and early 2014. In 2007 properties flooded in riverside towns along both the Severn and Warwickshire Avon. Since 2007, risk management authorities have constructed or improved flood defence schemes, reducing flood risk for a number of communities, for example the Horsbere Brook and Daniels Brook schemes in Gloucestershire, and at Broom on the River Arrow in Warwickshire.
The River Severn has flood plains over 1 mile wide as it gets closer to the Severn Estuary. When the river floods, water can take many weeks to drain from the flood plain, which delays the recovery of communities affected by flooding. Gloucester and villages along the Severn from Haw Bridge to Minsterworth are at risk of both river and tidal flooding, with tidal flooding dominating downstream of Minsterworth.
Bristol Avon and North Somerset Streams catchment
In the south of the river basin district, the Bristol Avon catchment has areas of both tidal and river flood risk.
Much of the catchment benefits from flood defences, however there are still a large number of properties at high risk of flooding. This is because the flood plain is so large and there are over 1.3 million people living in the catchment. The River Avon goes through some large urban areas including Malmesbury, Chippenham, Melksham, Bradford on Avon, Bath, Keynsham, Bristol and Avonmouth.
Flat land next to the Severn Estuary is at risk from tidal flooding. Sea walls protect Weston-super-Mare and Clevedon from flooding. Existing flood risk management in the Severn river basin district
Flood defence schemes Risk management authorities have worked together to reduce the risk to many thousands of properties. Since 2007, risk management authorities have constructed or improved flood defence schemes in the Severn river basin district reducing the risk of flooding to communities. These include:
- flood defence schemes along the River Severn, at Welshpool, Llandrinio, Shrewsbury, Bewdley, Worcester (Hylton Road), Kempsey, Upton–upon-Severn, Uckinghall, Deerhurst, Prestbury and Cheltenham;
- flood defence schemes on the River Wye, protecting areas of Hereford, Hampton Bishop and Ross-on-Wye;
- flood defence schemes on Horsbere and Daniels brooks, protecting parts of Gloucester;
- a flood defence scheme on the Warwickshire Avon in Rugby protecting large parts of the town;
- a flood storage area to the north of Kidderminster, which reduces the risk of flooding in the town centre from the River Stour;
- a new flood alleviation scheme in Newport in the Usk catchment;
- new flood defences in the Bristol Avon catchment, protecting communities such as Wrington, Chew Magna and Radstock.
There have also been a number of other flood defences constructed in smaller communities, including community-led schemes. Many of these schemes protected properties from flooding in 2012 and 2014.
Risk management authorities have also trialled temporary flood defences in several locations including at Ironbridge and Bewdley.
Following the flooding of early 2014, the Environment Agency assessed the damage to flood defences and carried out repair works during the summer and autumn of 2014.
Risk management authorities are considering schemes in the future which include:
- building upstream storage areas, such as reservoirs;
- improving existing defences and constructing new defences;
- introducing measures to prevent surface water flooding, such as retrofitting SuDS into established drainage systems;
- providing property-level protection, such as door barriers.
When managing flood and coastal erosion risks, risk management authorities consider opportunities to work with 'natural solutions' wherever possible. For example appropriately located and designed woodland can help reduce flood risk. Opportunity mapping is being used to identify and then promote locations where woodland creation can deliver multiple benefits for flood risk, water quality and the wider environment.
Natural Resources Wales is developing a new 'ecosystem approach' to managing all aspects of the environment, including flood risk. The Rhondda valley in the South East Valleys catchment is a pilot study for the new approach. This includes work to restore large areas of upland peat bog, which will help slow run-off rates. This will mean rainwater will take longer to reach rivers, which is important following intense rainfall.
Improving knowledge, flood forecasting and warning Risk management authorities use computer models to improve their knowledge of flood risks and simulate how rivers could react to high flow rates. This is called 'hydraulic modelling'. Hydraulic modelling can tell us how deep the water could be and the potential extent of flooding.
Natural Resources Wales is carrying out a modelling exercise in the south-east of Wales, including tidal flood risks as part of the risk prioritised approach. Natural Resources Wales developed a flood forecasting model for the Usk catchment in early 2014 and is now developing a model for the Upper Wye. The Environment Agency has built trial Gloucester tributary forecasting models to help understand the complex urbanised flooding. It has also improved the existing Gloucestershire Frome forecasting model. It is currently improving the River Chelt model and will extend the River Wye model to include forecasts at Ross-on-Wye and other locations. The models will improve the existing flood warning service in these catchments.
**Incident management planning and raising awareness** Risk management authorities develop multi-agency flood response plans and work closely with communities to help them prepare for and recover from floods.
**Development planning and control** The Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales and local councils also manage and reduce flood risk through the planning system. Planning officers use advice from the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales to assess new developments to make sure they are appropriate and safe, and will not increase the risk of flooding elsewhere.
**Maintenance** Watercourses and existing flood defences require ongoing maintenance. Risk management authorities carefully prioritise maintenance activities to sections of rivers and the coast that provide the most benefit to people and property. The aim of maintenance activities is to provide a sustainable way of managing flood risk whilst minimising the environmental impact of maintenance operations. The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales carry out routine inspections of flood defences, maintenance and clearance of sluices and weed screens, aquatic weed cutting, grass cutting, various repair works and enforcement action.
**Roles and responsibilities** Managing flood and coastal risks, and particularly local flood risks, requires risk management authorities to work together.
In the Severn river basin district, the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales work with 29 LLFAs, 9 internal drainage boards (6 in England and 3 internal drainage districts in Wales, which have been incorporated into NRW), Highways England, the Trunk Road Agencies in Wales, and water and sewerage providers to manage flood risk.
The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales have permissive powers to manage flood risk from 'main rivers', the sea and reservoirs. They can use enforcement powers to require landowners to take action to minimise flood risk to others. Individual owners have primary responsibility for protecting their land and property from flooding. Main rivers are larger streams and rivers that are marked on an official document called the 'main river map'. All other rivers are known as 'ordinary watercourses'. Table 1: Summary of responsibilities for risk management authorities
| Flood Source | EA / NRW | LLFAs | District | Water Company | Highways Authority | Internal Drainage Boards² | |---------------------------------------------------|----------|-------|----------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------------| | Strategic overview for all sources of flooding & coastal erosion | ✓ | | | | | | | Main River | ✓ | | | | | | | The Sea | ✓ | | | | | | | Surface Water | | ✓ | | | | | | Surface Water (on or coming from the Highway) | | | | | ✓ | | | Sewer Flooding | | | | | ✓ | | | Ordinary Watercourse | ✓ | ✓ | | | | | | Groundwater | | ✓ | | | | | | Reservoirs | ✓\* | ✓\* | ✓\* | ✓\* | ✓\* | ✓\* |
- Please note RMAs have different responsibilities for reservoirs such as regulation, asset management and flood incident response ² As of 1 April 2015 in Wales the 3 Internal Drainage Districts that were operated by independent boards were incorporated into NRW in April 2015.
You can find out more about which risk management authority is responsible for different types of flooding in Part A of the FRMP.
Objectives of the FRMP
The risk management authorities have agreed social, economic and environmental objectives for 2015 to 2021 following discussion and consultation with other organisations and communities. You can see the objectives for the whole river basin district in section 8 of Part A of the FRMP. There are more detailed objectives for individual catchments, which you can see in section 4 of Part B of the FRMP.
The FRMP objectives build on the aims and objectives in the ‘National flood and coastal erosion strategy for England’ (www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-flood-and-coastal-erosion-risk-management-strategy-for-england) and the ‘National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy for Wales’ (http://gov.wales/topics/environmentcountryside/epq/flooding/nationalstrategy/strategy/)
Measures for 2015 to 2021
The actions in FRMPs are known as ‘measures’. These are specific projects or investigations to work towards achieving the objectives. They explain where and how risk management authorities will focus effort and investment to reduce flood risk.
The measures in FRMPs are grouped under 4 categories: preventing risk, preparing for risk, protecting from risk, and recovery and review. You can read more about the categories in Section 4 of Part A in the FRMP. Examples from the Severn river basin district for each category:
Preventing risk Measures in the Severn river basin district to prevent flood risk include:
• avoiding inappropriate development in flood risk areas; • encouraging sustainable development that takes account of the potential impacts of climate change; • operating and maintaining existing flood defences and providing appropriate levels of river and watercourse maintenance; • encouraging people who own land by a river to fulfil their riparian owner responsibilities; • encouraging others, e.g. utility providers, to assess the resilience to flooding of their assets.
Preparing for risk Measures in the Severn river basin district to prepare for risk include:
• maintaining and improving the flood forecasting, flood warning and flood incident response management service; • working with local resilience forums to enable them to reduce the impact of flooding; • working with partners and communities, especially those in catchments that respond quickly to rainfall, to understand the risks of flooding and developing plans to manage the risks; • working with communities and partners to encourage land management to reduce flood risk.
Protecting from risk These measures are to reduce the likelihood of flooding affecting people and property in specific locations or in locations that have flooded in the past. Measures to protect from risk, include:
• continuing to inspect flood defences and river channels and to carry out maintenance where necessary; • continuing to provide a flood warning service to communities at risk; • reviewing the effectiveness of raised defences and carrying out a programme to replace or refurbish flood defences; • working with communities to investigate, develop and implement new flood defence schemes or improve existing defences; • exploring opportunities to restore flood plains in rural areas.
Recovery and review Measures in the Severn river basin district for recovery and review include:
• continuing to improve and develop services based on lessons identified following flooding and feedback from communities and partners; • LLFAs carrying out investigations after flooding to produce a recommendations report and help communities to recover from floods more quickly; • developing procedures for recording floods to help rapid recovery.
Further information on measures in the Severn river basin district For details of measures see Part B of the FRMP. You can also see a full list of all measures and the categories they relate to in Part C of the FRMP. Monitoring progress
There is no guarantee that every measure in the FRMP will be completed. This is because priorities change, new data may become available or funding may change, which may mean the programme changes.
Over the 6-year cycle, the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales will monitor the measures and report on progress. All the risk management authorities involved will work together to achieve the objectives and reduce costs.
How we listened to your comments
We carried out a consultation on the FRMP between 10 October 2014 and 31 January 2015. As a result of feedback from the consultation we have improved the information on existing flood risk management and made clearer links between the FRMP and river basin management plans. The FRMP now shows more clearly how flood management actions help to improve the environment.
We’ve split the FRMP into 4 sections to make it easier to understand. The sections are as follows:
| Section | Who is the section for? | |---------|-------------------------| | Summary document | For people who want an overview of the plan. | | Part A: background and river basin district-wide information | For people who want some legislative background and river basin district-wide information. | | Part B: catchment summaries | For people who want the detail of the sub-areas and flooding statistics. Includes the catchments based on the Water Framework Directive management catchments, Flood Risk Areas (identified through the Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment) and other strategic areas across the river basin district. | | Part C: appendices | For people who want to see the measures for implementation across the river basin district and the measures for individual communities in England. |
The measures that relate to Wales only are found in the Welsh Strategic Area. The measures tables for all Welsh catchments are reported in Part B and not in the Part C: Appendices, as the Welsh measures relate to the highest risk communities by catchment. The Welsh measures are continually updated and the measures in the FRMP are indicative although correct at time of reporting. The RBD-wide measures that affect Welsh Catchments are found in the Appendices.
The measures that relate to the River Basin District, the English Strategic Area and English catchments are contained in the appendices.
Further information about your flood risk
Find Part A, Part B and Appendices for the Severn FRMP (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/severn-river-basin-district-flood-risk-management-plan)
Find FRMPs for other river basin districts (www.gov.uk/government/collections/flood-risk-management-plans-frmps-2015-to-2021)
Look at the river basin management plan for your area (https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/river-basin-management-plans-2015) In England
Check your current risk of flooding on our live flood warning service (www.gov.uk/check-if-youre-at-risk-of-flooding)
Check your risk of flooding from different sources on our interactive maps (www.gov.uk/prepare-for-a-flood/find-out-if-youre-at-risk)
In Wales
Check your current risk of flooding (naturalresources.wales/flooding/alerts-and-warnings/flood-alerts-and-warnings)
Check your risk of flooding from different sources on our interactive flood risk maps (naturalresources.wales/our-evidence-and-reports/maps/flood-risk-map)
Partners
This is a joint plan prepared by the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales in partnership with the following risk management authorities:
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84af7fbcbcc4e3b04a9c5041dc8fbf6cb7af214d | Severn River Basin District Flood Risk Management Plan 2015-2021
PART A - Background and River Basin District wide information
December 2015 This is a joint plan prepared by the following Risk Management Authorities: Foreword
The 2013 / 14 winter storms and flooding had significant impacts on many communities, businesses, infrastructure and the environment within the Severn River Basin District (RBD). In the future there could be more extremes in the weather with a changing climate leading to more frequent and more severe flooding.
Investment in flood risk management infrastructure not only reduces the risks of flooding but also supports growth by helping to create new jobs, bring confidence to areas previously affected by floods and creating and restoring habitats.
Risk Management Authorities (RMAs) are committed to producing Flood Risk Management Plans (FRMPs) required by the EU Floods Directive by December 2015. This FRMP is an important part of meeting that objective and aligns with the guiding principles of the National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy.
The FRMP will help promote a greater awareness and understanding of the risks of flooding, particularly in those communities at high risk, and encourage and enable householders, businesses and communities to take action to manage the risks. The FRMP will provide the evidence to support flood and coastal risk management decision making. The highest priority is to reduce risk to life.
Measures (actions) in FRMPs do not all have secured funding and are not guaranteed to be implemented. Money is allocated to RMA measures based on current Government policy that gives the highest priority to the areas at highest risk. The funding for flooding is devolved so RMA measures are funded by DEFRA in England, in Wales they are funded by Welsh Government.
This document has been produced in consultation with professional partners. The Flood Risk Management Plan (FRMP) sets out the proposed measures to manage flood risk in the Severn RBD from 2015 to 2021 and beyond.
This plan should be read in conjunction with the following:
- Welsh lead local flood authority flood risk management plans, including Blaenau Gwent County Borough Council, Cardiff City Council, Caerphilly County Borough Council, Rhondda Cynon Taff County Borough Council, Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council and Torfaen County Borough Council;
- Lead Local Flood Authority Local Strategies listed in Part B.
In England and Wales, RMAs include Natural Resources Wales, the Environment Agency, Lead Local Flood Authorities (LLFAs), district councils (where there are no unitary authorities), internal drainage boards, water companies and highway authorities. These RMAs work in partnership with communities to reduce the risk of flooding. The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales would like to thank the organisations listed on the previous pages for their contributions and feedback during consultation.
Flood risk in England and Wales will continue to change as a result of a growing population and a changing climate. There are many ways to manage flood risk including maintaining and building new flood defences, building flood resilient homes and working more closely with nature to restore flood plains. Flood risk management planning is not new and RMAs have been able to draw on the experience of partners and earlier plans.
The FRMP also sets out how these measures can contribute to improving the environment and how they support the objectives of River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) and specifically the Severn RBMP that Natural Resources Wales and the Environment Agency has produced in parallel with this FRMP.
Gareth O’Shea Executive Director for Operations South Natural Resources Wales
Mark Sitton Kent Director of Operations, West Environment Agency Format of the flood risk management plan
Flood Risk Management Plans have been divided into four sections to help readers identify and access information relevant to them. This is Part A. The plan is divided into the following four parts:
| Name | Audience | |-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Summary Document | For those who want a high level overview of the plan | | **Part A: Background and river basin district wide information** | For those who need some legislative background and RBD wide, high level information | | Part B: Catchment Summaries | For those who want the detail of the sub-areas and flooding statistics. This section includes the catchments based on Water Framework Directive (WFD) management catchments, Flood Risk Areas (identified through the Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment) and other strategic areas across the RBD | | Part C: Appendices | For those who want to see the detailed program of work for individual communities in England |
The measures (actions) that relate to Wales only are found in the Welsh Strategic Area. The measures tables for all Welsh catchments are reported in Part B and not in the Part C: Appendices, as the Welsh measures relate to the highest risk communities by catchment. The Welsh measures are continually updated and the measures in this plan are indicative although correct at the time of publication. The RBD-wide measures that affect Welsh Catchments are found in the Appendices.
The measures that relate to the River Basin District, the English Strategic Area and English catchments are contained in the appendices.
The other parts of the flood risk management plan are located on [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/severn-river-basin-district-flood-risk-management-plan) The layout of this document
This is Part A, Background and river basin district wide information – this explains what FRMPs are and how the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales have developed them and then describes the Severn RBD.
Section 1: What is flood risk and who manages it This explains what flood risk is, who is responsible for managing the risk and what their roles are.
Section 2: What is a Flood Risk Management Plan What a FRMP is, why the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales are producing a FRMP and describes the kind of information that is included in the FRMP.
Section 3: how has the plan been developed? Section 3 describes how in partnership the Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales, LLFAs and other RMAs have prepared this FRMP.
Section 4: how to manage risk Section 4 describes some of the terminology used, such as 'conclusions', 'objectives' and 'measures', and how they relate to flood and coastal erosion risk management.
Section 5: getting to know the river basin district Section 5 of the plan introduces the Severn RBD. The ‘sub-areas’ are also introduced which divide the RBD further.
Section 6: key flood risk issues in the river basin district The flood and coastal erosion risks are set out for the RBD in section 6.
Section 7: the sub-areas Section 7 introduces each of the sub-areas in turn. This section outlines the catchments based on Water Framework Directive (WFD) management catchments, which make up the RBD, then the FRAs (identified through the Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment) across the RBD.
Section 8: conclusions, objectives and measures for the Severn RBD Section 8 sets out the risk conclusions, objectives and measures for the RBD.
Section 9: implementing the plan, monitoring and reporting Section 9 sets out the proposals for implementing the plan, including co-ordination with the implementation of the RBMPs prepared under the WFD. Section 9 concludes with how the measures will be monitored and reported.
Find out more Throughout this document you will be directed via hyperlink to more detailed sources of information using ‘find out more’ boxes. Contents
Foreword ........................................................................................................................................... v Format of the flood risk management plan ...................................................................................... vi Contents ........................................................................................................................................... viii Glossary and Abbreviations ............................................................................................................. ix
Part A ................................................................................................................................................ 1
1. What is flood risk and who manages it? ......................................................................................... 1
2. What is a Flood Risk Management Plan? ....................................................................................... 6
3. How has the plan been developed? ................................................................................................. 11
4. How to manage risk ....................................................................................................................... 16
5. Getting to know the Severn river basin district ............................................................................ 20
6. Key flood risk issues in the Severn River Basin District ............................................................... 29
7. Sub-areas in the Severn RBD ......................................................................................................... 51
8. Conclusions, objectives and measures to manage risk for the Severn RBD ......................... 53
9. Implementing the plan .................................................................................................................... 65
## Glossary and Abbreviations
| Abbreviation | Description | |--------------|-------------| | AONB | Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty | | BAP | Biodiversity Action Plan | | Catchment | The watershed of a surface water river system | | CaBA | Catchment based approach: an approach to environmental planning that focuses on local engagement and partnerships | | CFMP | Catchment Flood Management Plan | | Coastal Groups | Voluntary coastal defence groups made up of maritime district authorities and other bodies with coastal defence responsibilities. | | Cross Border Advisory Group (CBAG) | Set up under The Flood Risk (Cross Border Areas) Regulations 2012 (SI No. 1102). A statutory group made up of representatives from SEPA, Environment Agency and local authorities within the cross border areas. | | Cross Border Areas | Those areas designated as ‘cross border’ under The Flood Risk (Cross Border Areas) Regulations 2012 (SI No. 1102). | | CWS | County Wildlife Site | | DCLG | Department for Communities and Local Government | | Defra | Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs | | EA | Environment Agency | | EIA | Environmental Impact Assessment | | EPR | Environmental Protection Regulations | | EU | European Union | | FCERM | Flood and coastal erosion risk management | | Floods Directive | The European Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) on the assessment and management of flood risks. | | Flood Risk Area (FRA) | Areas where the risk of flooding from local flood risks is significant as designated under the Flood Risk Regulations. | | FRM | Flood Risk Management | | FRMP | Flood Risk Management Plan – plan produced to deliver the requirements of the Flood Risk Regulations. | | Government | The term government is used within this report to refer to Defra (the Department for Environment, Flood and Rural Affairs) and Welsh Government. | | Groundwater flooding | Occurs when water levels in the ground rise above the natural surface. Low-lying areas underlain by permeable strata are particularly susceptible. | | Ha | Hectares | | HLS | Higher Level (Environmental) Stewardship | | HRA | Habitats Regulations Assessment: an assessment undertaken in relation to a site designated under the Habitats and Birds Directives | | Km | Kilometres | | LDF | Local Development Framework | | LLFA | Lead Local Flood Authority | | Local FRM Strategy | Local flood risk management strategy produced by LLFAs under the Flood and Water Management Act 2010. | | Main river | A watercourse shown as such on the main river map, and for which the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales has responsibilities and powers | | MSFW | Making Space for Water | | National FCERM Strategy | National flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy: these are strategies prepared under the Flood and Water Management Act 2010, by the Environment Agency for England and by Welsh Government for Wales. | | Natural Resource Management | The taking care of (or management of) natural resources such as land, water, air, soil, plants and animals with a particular focus on how their management affects the quality of life for both present and future generations. | | NNR | National Nature Reserve | | **NRW** | Natural Resources Wales. The NRW took over the functions of the Environment Agency in Wales on 1st April 2013. | | **Ordinary watercourses (OW)** | All watercourses that are not designated Main River, and which are the responsibility of Local Authorities or, where they exist, Internal Drainage Boards. | | **PFRA** | Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment – these were required to be published by December 2011 and were the first stage in delivering the Regulations. | | **PU** | Policy Unit | | **Ramsar** | Wetlands of international importance designated under the Ramsar Convention | | **Reservoir** | A natural or artificial lake where water is collected and stored until needed. Reservoirs can be used for irrigation, recreation, providing water supply for municipal needs, hydroelectric power or controlling water flow. | | **Risk management authorities (RMAs)** | Organisations that have a key role in flood and coastal erosion risk management as defined by the Act. These are the Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales, lead local flood authorities, district councils where there is no unitary authority, internal drainage boards, water companies, and highways authorities. | | **RFCCs** | Regional Flood and Coastal Committees | | **River Basin District (RBD)** | These are the reporting units to the European Commission for the Water Framework Directive and the Floods Directive. | | **RBMP** | River Basin Management Plan – plan required by the European Water Framework Directive. | | **River flooding** | Occurs when water levels in a channel overwhelms the capacity of the channel. | | **SAC** | Special Area of Conservation | | **SAM** | Scheduled Ancient Monument | | **SAMP** | System Asset Management Plan | | **SEA** | Strategic Environmental Assessment | | **SFRA** | Strategic Flood Risk Assessment | | **SMP** | Shoreline Management Plan | | **SPA** | Special Protection Area | | **SSSI** | Site of Special Scientific Interest | | **SuDS** | Sustainable Drainage Systems | | **Sewer flooding** | Flooding caused by overloaded sewers or blockages or defects within the sewerage network | | **Surface water flooding** | Flooding from rainwater (including snow and other precipitation) which has not entered a watercourse, drainage system or public sewer. | | **SWMP** | Surface Water Management Plan | | **UKCIP** | United Kingdom Climate Impact Projections | | **Working with natural processes** | Taking action to manage flood and coastal erosion risk by protecting, restoring and emulating the natural regulating function of catchments, rivers, floodplains and coasts. An example of this is using land to temporarily store flood water away from high risk areas. | Part A
1. What is flood risk and who manages it?
The Flood and Water Management Act (2010) defines flooding as any case where land not normally covered by water becomes covered by water. Flood risk is a combination of two components: the chance (or probability/likelihood) that a location will flood from any source or type of flooding, and the associated impacts (or consequences) of the flooding. Flood risk management is generally concerned with reducing harm which might take the form of property damage or physical injury to people and wildlife. However, flooding can also have beneficial effects too, in particular for wetland wildlife as well as some types of agriculture that are water dependent.
Figure 1.1: What is flood risk?
Risk captures the severity of, or related consequences produced by, a flood event. Impacts can be social, economic and environmental, for example the number of properties flooded and the level of associated economic damages. The consequences of a flood depend on the level of exposure and the vulnerability of those affected.
What is the likelihood of this happening and what does this mean?
Probability (or chance) is a measure of the likelihood that a defined event will occur. The probability of a flood event is typically defined as the relative frequency of occurrence of that flood being equalled or exceeded. Probability can be expressed as a fraction, percentage, a decimal or description, and should always make reference to a time period. For example, flood risk terminology may refer to ‘a 1 in 100 chance of flooding in any given year’ or ‘a 1% annual probability of flooding’. Both of these expressions refer to the same likelihood of flooding.
Assessing impacts of flooding prior to an event usually involves estimating the potential impact of flooding on people, property and the environment. The theoretical probability of flooding is illustrated by the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales Flood Maps which show flood risk from rivers and the sea, surface water and reservoirs. Flood models which are the basis for the flood maps use uniform rainfall scenarios (the same amount of rainfall falling across the country at the same time), whereas in reality rainfall rates vary greatly from one area to another.
It is not possible to prevent all flooding, but there are a variety of actions that can be taken to manage flood risk and the impacts of flooding on communities. Flood risk managers must identify all potential options to manage flood risk and balance the needs of communities, the economy and the environment. Risk management authorities should work in partnership with each other and communities to manage flood risk, ensuring that communities understand these risks, are involved in the decision making process, and can actively prepare for the risks. By working together risk management authorities should actively seek opportunities to coordinate risk management, encourage partnership funding and deliver multiple benefits. Roles and responsibilities
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the RMAs involved in flood risk management in England and Wales and their roles and responsibilities.
Table 1.1: Summary of responsibilities for risk management authorities
| Flood Source | EA / NRW | LLFAs | District Water Company | Highways Authority | Internal Drainage Boards² | |--------------|----------|-------|------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------| | Strategic overview for all sources of flooding & coastal erosion | ✓ | | | | | | Main River | ✓ | | | | | | The Sea | ✓ | | | | | | Surface Water | ✓ | | | | | | Surface Water (on or coming from the Highway) | | | ✓ | | | | Sewer Flooding | | ✓ | | | | | Ordinary Watercourse | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | | | Groundwater | ✓ | | | | | | Reservoirs | ✓\* | ✓\* | ✓\* | ✓\* | ✓\* |
¹For reservoirs with a capacity of 25,000 cubic metres or more ²As of 1 April 2015 in Wales the 3 Internal Drainage Districts that were operated by independent boards were incorporated into NRW in April 2015.
Table 1.2: Roles and responsibilities of risk management authorities and others involved in managing flood risk
| Organisation | Roles and Responsibilities | |--------------|----------------------------| | Environment Agency | The Environment Agency has a strategic overview of all sources of flooding and coastal erosion (rivers, the sea, groundwater, reservoirs and surface water). It has permissive powers to manage flood risk from 'main rivers', the sea and reservoirs. The Environment Agency can use enforcement powers to require landowners to take action to minimise flood risk to others. | | Natural Resources Wales | Permissive powers to manage flood risk from 'main rivers', the sea and reservoirs. Can use enforcement powers to require landowners to take action to minimise flood risk to others. | | LLFAs | Upper tier local council or unitary council. Permissive powers to manage flood risk from surface water, 'ordinary watercourses' (non-main rivers) and groundwater. Enforcement powers are similar to Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales. Upper tier councils also manage highways. | | Water Companies | Water companies manage the sewerage and water supply networks and any flood risk arising from them. Also manage flood risk to any critical infrastructure, such as water treatment plants and pumping stations. | | District Council (only in England) | By agreement with the upper tier Lead Local Flood Authority, the District Council may do some work to manage flood risk. District Councils are the Local Planning Authority. | | Community Council (only in Wales) | By agreement with the upper tier Lead Local Flood Authority, the Community Council may do some work to manage flood risk. | Organisation | Roles and Responsibilities --- | --- Internal Drainage Boards | Each Internal Drainage Board is a local public authority established in areas of special drainage need in England and Wales. They have permissive powers to manage water levels within respective drainage districts. Internal Drainage Boards undertake works to reduce flood risk to people and property and manage water levels to meet local needs. In Wales the 3 Internal Drainage Districts that were operated by independent Boards were incorporated into NRW in April 2015.
Maritime District Council | As District Councils, but also manage coastal erosion. As many coastal defences protect against both erosion and flooding from the sea, these Councils often do both in urban areas.
Navigation Authorities | The navigation network throughout the RBD is managed by a number of agencies, including Environment Agency, NRW, Canal and River Trust (CRT), the Avon Navigation Trust, Bristol Port Company and Bristol City Council. Although not a designated RMA, CRT manages its network in a way that minimises risk of flooding.
Highways England, South Wales Trunk Road Agency (SWTRA), North Wales Trunk Road Agency (NWTRA) | Highways England, NWTRA & SWTRA look after the motorways and major A roads focussing on the most important national routes, while councils manage the roads serving local communities. Having information about the condition of drainage assets they hold a Drainage Data Management System (also known as HADDMS) to identify flooding issues and places at particular risk, including private property, supporting a risk based programme of drainage renewal works.
Riparian Landowner | The owner of land next to a watercourse usually owns the land to the middle of the river (unless property deeds show otherwise). This ‘riparian landowner’ is responsible for maintaining the watercourse to allow free flow.
Individual property owners | Individual owners have primary responsibility for safeguarding their land and property from flooding. There is no legal right to be provided with protection from flooding or the effects of flooding.
Communities | Individuals at risk from flooding, or having flooded, are encouraged to form a Flood Action Group or other Community Group as a focus for understanding the issues, considering improvement options and implementing solutions.
Non-RMA owners of flood defences | Features and structures that have been designated as a flood defence cannot be altered, removed or replaced without the consent of the responsible authority.
Reservoir owners | In addition to their general duty of care for the public under common law, the owners of reservoirs with an above ground capacity of 25,000 cubic metres or more have a legal duty to have their reservoirs supervised and inspected regularly by experts; in order to prevent dam failures and the dangerous flooding that could result. Reservoir owners could fall into any of the above categories listed in the table.
Existing flood management schemes and properties protected
Risk Management Authorities work in partnership with each other and communities to manage flood risk. The Flood Risk Management Plan sets out the current and proposed measures to manage flood risk across the Severn RBD. However, RMAs have been undertaking a range of activities to manage flood risk for many years. Details of these activities can be found in Section 6.
In some parts of the Severn RBD flood risk management schemes are in place to reduce flood risk. The Environment Agency Flood Map for Planning and NRW Flood Risk Map shows the flood defences that protect against fluvial and tidal floods. This information was used to produce an overview of the flood defences within the Severn RBD. The Severn RBD contains a total of 3600 structures. The raised defences have a combined length of 390 km.
Some of the communities recently benefitting from flood management schemes are listed below; • **Riverside, Newport, Gwent** – sheet piling and masonry wall, completed 2011. Protects approximately 400 properties.
• **Maes-Y-Felin, Rhondda Cynon Taf** – earth embankment and masonry wall, completed 2008. Protects approximately 80 properties.
• **Rhymney Bridge, Cardiff** – improvements to flood wall, completed 2014. Protects approximately 30 industrial and retail units.
• **Coleham Head, Shrewsbury** – masonry wall and demountable defence, completed 2011. Protects approximately 80 properties.
• **Broom, River Arrow, Warwickshire** – flood walls and earth embankments, completed 2012. Protects approximately 70 properties.
• **Marcliff, River Avon, Warwickshire** – flood walls, earth embankments, culvert improvement & watercourse realignment, completed 2012. Protects approximately 20 properties.
• **Hereford** – River Wye, masonry wall and demountable defences, completed 2008. Protects approximately 200 properties.
• **Upton on Severn, Worcestershire** – earth embankment and masonry wall, completed 2011. Protects approximately 65 properties.
• **Kempsey, Worcestershire** – earth embankment and pumping station, completed 2011. Protects approximately 70 properties.
• **Uckinghall, Worcestershire** – earth embankment and masonry wall, completed 2010. Protects approximately 30 properties.
• **Pershore, Worcestershire** – earth embankment and masonry wall, completed 2010. Protects approximately 60 properties.
• **Horsbere Brook, Gloucestershire** – flood storage area, completed 2011. Protects approximately 350 properties.
• **Daniels Brook, Gloucestershire** – channel works, completed 2011. Protects approximately 200 properties.
• **Lydney, Gloucestershire** – masonry wall, completed 2012. Protects approximately 60 properties.
• **Weston-super-Mare** – Seafront Enhancement Scheme completed 2010. Protects approximately 4,500 properties. North Somerset Council lead.
• **Bristol, City Centre** – Floating Harbour Tidal Flood Gate Refurbishment completed 2010. Protects approximately 400 properties. Bristol City Council lead.
• **Pill, Bristol** – Tidal Defence Scheme completed 2010. Protects approximately 100 properties.
**Flood risk information**
The Severn Flood Risk Management Plan covers flood risk from rivers and the sea, reservoirs and selected areas of surface water flood risk (Bristol Flood Risk Area only – as identified in Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment (PFRA)). The following section outlines flood risk classifications for the various sources.
**Flooding from river and the sea**
National Flood Risk Assessment (NaFRA) is an assessment of flood risk for England and Wales produced using local data and expertise. It shows the chance of flooding from rivers and the sea (both along the open coast and tidal estuaries). The data is presented in flood risk likelihood categories, which indicate the chance of flooding in any given year.
**High** - greater than or equal to 1 in 30 (3.3%) chance in any given year
**Medium** - less than 1 in 30 (3.3%) but greater than or equal to 1 in 100 (1%) chance in any given year Low - less than 1 in 100 (1%) but greater than or equal to 1 in 1,000 (0.1%) chance in any given year
Very Low - these properties may have a greater than 1 in 1,000 chance of flooding in any given year if defences weren’t present. However, in reality the chance of flooding is reduced below a 1 in 1,000 chance by defences, which NaFRA analysis includes.
The computer model used to produce NaFRA results estimates the likelihood of flooding from rivers and the sea, taking into account defences and the chance that they can fail or be overtopped. The results, which are presented in maps, databases and excel spreadsheets, can be used in conjunction with receptor data (number and type of properties and infrastructure) to estimate the consequences and economic damage associated with flooding from rivers and the sea.
Flooding from reservoirs Reservoir flood risk maps show the area that could be flooded if a large reservoir were to fail and release the water it holds. This is a worst case scenario. A large reservoir is one that holds over 25,000 cubic metres.
Flooding from surface water The maps and statistics contained in this plan are based on the Updated Flood Map for Surface Water (uFMfSW) published in December 2013. The uFMfSW assesses a range of flooding scenarios (annual probability of flooding is shown in brackets):
High - 1 in 30 (3.3%) Medium - 1 in 100 (1%) Low - 1 in 1000 (0.1%)
The uFMfSW replaced the ‘Areas Susceptible to Surface Water Flooding’ maps produced in 2010 by the Environment Agency. For further information about how the statistics relating to surface water are generated please see Annex 4. 2. What is a Flood Risk Management Plan?
Flood risk management plans highlight the hazards and risks from rivers, the sea, surface water, groundwater and reservoirs and set out how RMAs will work together with communities to manage flood risk. Some water companies have provided measures related to sewer flooding, and it is anticipated that future cycles of the FRMP will include more information on sewer flooding.
What is the FRMP for?
Flood Risk Management Plans (FRMPs) are produced every 6 years and describe the sources and risks of flooding within a river basin district and catchment. They also include information on how risk management authorities (RMAs) plan to work together with communities and businesses to manage and reduce flood risk. Over the 6 year planning cycle the FRMP will help promote a greater awareness and understanding of the risks of flooding, particularly in those communities at high risk, and encourage and enable householders, businesses and communities to take action to manage the risks. FRMPs along with River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) help all those involved in managing water to make decisions that are best for people and the environment.
Why are FRMPs being prepared?
This is the first cycle of implementing the Flood Risk Regulations 2009. As a result of this legislation, LLFAs must prepare FRMPs in Flood Risk Areas, where the risk of flooding from local flood risks is significant (as identified in Preliminary Flood Risk Assessments (PFRAs)) for instance from surface water, groundwater and ordinary watercourses. Natural Resources Wales and the Environment Agency are required to prepare FRMPs for all of Wales and England covering flooding from main rivers, the sea and reservoirs. Further information on what is a flood risk management plan can be found on the GOV.UK website.
Flood risk and coastal erosion management activities require careful planning to ensure that appropriate, sustainable options are selected and that they are implemented properly. Actions should be planned effectively, for the long-term, and provide a clear picture of what will be done to manage risk and provide multiple benefits. This may include, for example, linking with other plans such as river basin management plans (RBMPs) and supporting biodiversity, habitat creation or improving water quality. Natural Resources Wales, the Environment Agency and contributing LLFAs are developing FRMPs by drawing existing information together and building on existing Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management plans such as: Catchment Flood Management Plans (CFMPs), Shoreline Management Plans (SMPs) and Local Flood Risk Management Strategies (LFRMS) (see Figure 2.1). Figure 2.1: FRMPs and their relationship to other planning initiatives (taken from the National FCERM Strategies for England and Wales) What the plan does
The FRMP will help deliver the requirements of the National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy in England and the Welsh Government's National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy in Wales by setting out the measures to manage flood risk now and in the future. The FRMP will:
- Help develop and promote a better understanding of flood and coastal erosion risk
- Provide information about the economic and environmental benefits to inform decision makers
- Identify communities with the highest risk of flooding so that investment can be targeted at those in most need.
Measures in FRMPs do not all have secured funding and are not guaranteed to be implemented. Money is allocated to RMA measures based on current Government policy that gives the highest priority to the areas at highest risk. The funding for flooding is devolved so RMA measures are funded by DEFRA in England, in Wales they are funded by Welsh Government.
What types of flood risk are included in the FRMP?
The FRMP covers the flood risks that the RMAs are responsible for (see table 1.2 for roles and responsibilities).
The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales have worked in partnership with other RMAs to pool the information needed to develop the FRMP. Some RMAs have a statutory duty to produce a FRMP as they have areas designated as Flood Risk Areas (see table 2.1: LLFAs contributing to this FRMP and table 2.3: LLFAs and Flood Risk Areas in separate FRMPs). Other LLFAs have included information on a voluntarily basis. All lead local flood authorities were invited to contribute to this plan, with those listed below in table 2.2 choosing to do so. It is hoped that other RMAs will contribute to future cycles of the FRMP, which will allow all sources of flooding to be more comprehensively captured.
Some water companies have provided measures relating to sewer flooding in this FRMP and the intention is to include more information relating to sewer flooding in future cycles of the FRMP.
Areas of significant ‘local flood risk’ were identified from historic flood records and analysis of potential future flooding from surface water, groundwater and ordinary watercourses. In England ‘Flood Risk Areas’ were designated on the basis of there being at least 30,000 people in properties at risk of flooding, or 150 critical services (for example - schools, hospitals, nursing homes, power and water services). In Wales, the threshold agreed by Ministers for ‘Flood Risk Areas’ is 5,000 people at risk of flooding. A lower threshold was selected in Wales to reflect the nature of risks in Wales including the smaller size settlements and the risks in the South Wales valleys.
The Flood Risk Areas were determined by locally agreed surface water flood maps produced in 2010 by the Environment Agency and supplemented with data from Lead Local Flood Authorities where available.
In the Welsh part of the RBD there were six local authorities that have Flood Risk Areas and are required to produce FRMPs. For this cycle of the FRMP production it was decided that the local authorities would produce their FRMP separately. The remaining local authorities in Wales are voluntarily producing their own separate FRMPs. Table 2.1: LLFAs contributing to this FRMP
| Flood Risk Area and Voluntary Information | Lead Local Flood Authorities | |------------------------------------------|-----------------------------| | Bristol Flood Risk Area | Bristol City Council | | Includes voluntary information from outside Flood Risk Area from all councils | North Somerset Council | | | Bath and North East Somerset | | | South Gloucestershire Council | | West Midlands | The following LLFA’s within the Severn RBD bordering the Severn FRMP have fed into the Humber FRMP: | | | Wolverhampton City Council | | | Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council | | | Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council |
Table 2.2: Additional RMAs who have voluntarily provided information for the Severn FRMP
| Flood Risk Area and Voluntary Information | Lead Local Flood Authorities | |------------------------------------------|-----------------------------| | Lead Local Flood Authorities | Somerset County Council |
Table 2.3: LLFAs and Flood Risk Areas in separate FRMPs
| Flood Risk Area and Voluntary Information | Lead Local Flood Authorities | |------------------------------------------|-----------------------------| | South Wales Flood Risk Areas | Blaenau Gwent County Borough Council (statutory) | | | Cardiff City Council (statutory) | | | Caerphilly County Borough Council (statutory) | | | Rhondda Cynon Taff County Borough Council (statutory) | | | Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council (statutory) | | | Torfaen County Borough Council (statutory) | | Voluntary | Newport County Borough Council (voluntary) | | | Monmouth County Council (voluntary) | | | Powys County Council (voluntary) | | | Vale of Glamorgan County Borough Council (voluntary) |
Find out more about flood risk management:
- [Link to FRMP guidance in England](#)
- [National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy for England](#)
- [National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy for Wales](#)
- [Flood and Coastal Change](#)
- [Interactive flood maps](#) Figure 2.2: Sources of flood risk information included in this FRMP
3. How has the plan been developed?
The approach to developing FRMPs
In 2013 the Government agreed that the preferred approach to developing FRMPs would be for the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales to work in partnership with other RMAs, in particular LLFAs, to pool information to develop an overall plan for managing all sources of flood risk and coastal erosion. In preparing this FRMP, RMAs have built on relevant information from existing work (see Figure 2.1 and Table 3.1). Of particular importance are the Local Flood Risk Management Strategies developed by all LLFAs. In drawing measures together, RMAs have revisited priorities and ensured that there is a shared understanding of the risks and how best they can be managed.
The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales are co-ordinating the development of this FRMP with the RBMP so that there is an integrated approach to overall water management for the benefit of people, the environment and the economy.
Table 3.1 shows the sources of FRMP information. These plans remain active. In England the future need for Catchment Flood Management Plans (CFMPs) as the strategic plan for river and estuary flooding is being reviewed in 2015 and 2016. As with all of the plans listed in Table 3.1, all relevant actions have been brought together in FRMPs. Irrespective of the review, the actions will be being taken forward by the FRMP. The CFMP long term policies have not been carried forward in England but relevant CFMP objectives have been brought into the FRMP.
Find out more:
- Interactive flood maps
- River Basin District Maps
Table 3.1: Sources of FRMP information according to flood risk
| Flood risk | Existing plans and FRMP information | |------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Flooding from main rivers | Catchment Flood Management Plans (CFMPs): Eastern Valleys, Wye and Usk, Severn Tidal Tributaries, River Severn, Bristol Avon, Taff & Ely, North & Mid Somerset | | | **Fluvial Severn Flood Risk Management Strategy** | | Flooding from the sea and along estuaries, | Shoreline Management Plans (SMPs): Anchor Head to Lavernock Point | | coastal erosion | **Estuary Management Plans:** Severn Estuary Flood Risk Management Strategy | | Flooding from reservoirs | Reservoir Plans and Reservoir Flood Risk Maps: Severn River Basin District | | Flooding from surface water, groundwater and | Local Flood Risk Management Strategies (LFRMSs): Bristol City Council, North Somerset Council, Bath & North East Somerset, South Gloucestershire Council | | ordinary watercourses | Surface Water Management Plans (SWMPs): Bristol City Council | Consultation and engagement
Consultation and engagement on this FRMP helped improve, inform and shape the plan. National public consultation took place between October 2014 and January 2015.
Blaenau Gwent County Borough Council, Cardiff City Council, Caerphilly County Borough Council, Rhondda Cynon Taff County Borough Council, Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council and Torfaen County Borough Council also have a legal responsibility to consult on the FRMP they are producing and have done so separately.
Environment Agency consultation document 12i – https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/update-to-the-draft-river-basin-management-plans
NRW consultation document – http://naturalresources.wales/media/674720/dfrmp-consultation-response-update.pdf
Objective setting
This plan covers areas in England where the Environment Agency is the responsible authority for flood risk management (with regard to main rivers, the sea and reservoirs) and areas in Wales where Natural Resources Wales is the responsible authority for flood risk management (with regard to main rivers, sea and reservoirs). Where the plan crosses the national boundary, agreements and arrangements are in place to enable both organisations to develop the plan jointly and ensure that impacts either side of the boundary are understood and agreed by each authority.
FRMPs contain objectives for managing flood risk. These objectives are a common set of goals agreed by risk management authorities and they state the main ways in which work is directed to make a difference and reduce flood risk. They cover people, the economy and the environment. The objectives are split into the 3 categories to help demonstrate the balance of objectives across the plans but the categories aren’t assigned a weighting in the FRMP. Objectives are used to plan and prioritise investment programmes to target investment in the most at risk communities. Objectives are prioritised at an England-wide level and Wales-wide level. This takes into account the risk, but also considers other factors such as cost benefits, the level of investment to date and other aspects such as the potential for external funding opportunities.
The Severn FRMP contains an overarching set of objectives for the river basin district as a whole. Below this are separate sets of objectives for the Welsh part of the Severn and English part of the Severn. In Wales there are a set of objectives, listed in part B, that apply to all the catchments in Wales. These objectives ensure a consistency of approach in Wales and link to both the National FCERM Strategy and the measures as indicated in the tables at the catchment level. In England there is a set of objectives that relate to the whole of the English Severn and there are also separate English catchment objectives, which can differ from one area to the next and allow RMAs to focus on locally important improvements. All levels of objectives are linked. The English measures tables in the appendices show which category of objective relates to each measure. Management of flood and coastal erosion risk in England and Wales is driven by the National Strategies for Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management for England and Wales, respectively. These strategies provide the framework for flood and coastal erosion risk management work in the RBD. The overarching principles of the strategies were used to determine objectives for the RBD that consider people, the environment and economic activity.
The Severn RBD FRMP catchment objectives are based on those set in the Catchment Flood Management Plans (CFMPs) and the Shoreline Management Plans (SMP2s) previously developed for the whole of England and Wales in partnership with other RMAs, and Local Flood Risk Management Strategies prepared by contributing LLFAs to meet the requirements of the Flood & Water Management Act 2010.
Where objectives are specific to only England or Wales, they are captured in the England or Wales only sections.
How each authority delivers against their FRMP objectives differs in England and Wales.
**Wales**
In order to deliver measures to meet the FRMP objectives, Natural Resources Wales takes a risk based community approach to prioritise where to best direct investment. This is informed by the strategic framework provided by CFMPs and SMPs. The strategic framework set by these plans enable Natural Resources Wales to make short term decisions to manage present day risk whilst also considering the longer term prediction of risk (for further information on CFMPs and SMPs please refer to Annex 3). The risk based community approach of present day risk is done through the Natural Resources Wales Communities at Risk Register. This is a tool that considers a number of factors to give an indication of where the most vulnerable communities at risk of flooding from main rivers and the sea are located across Wales. This is then used to plan and prioritise the Natural Resources Wales investment programme to target investment in the most at risk... communities. Prioritisation is then done at a Wales-wide level and takes into account the risk calculation from the Communities at Risk Register but also considers other factors such as the Benefit: Cost appraisal, level of investment to date and other aspects such as the potential for external funding opportunities. There is also a facet of Natural Resources Wales work which is reactive to severe weather events, where severe damage may have occurred, leading to the need for emergency works.
All major flood alleviation schemes in Wales undergo appraisal work to assess options and to understand the costs and benefits of progressing work. This is done in accordance with Treasury guidance.
**England**
Measures to meet the objectives include actions taken forward from the SMP2 (except in the small number of locations where these now differ following development of more up to date strategies), incomplete actions from the CFMP where still relevant, from existing flood risk management strategies and the 6 year capital investment plan. Over time the aim is to also include actions from more local flood risk management strategies produced by LLFAs for their areas. This first plan includes a number of ongoing, agreed and newly proposed actions at the community level. Over time, the Environment Agency shall be considering further community level actions within the RDB. The aspiration is to add these in future cycles of the plan.
Funding to RMAs to manage flood risk from watercourses, surface run-off and groundwater is mainly provided by Defra as flood and coastal erosion risk management grant in aid (FCRM GiA). Highways authorities and water authorities can apply for GiA funding for projects to reduce flood risk which wouldn’t ordinarily be within their remit. Regional Flood and Coastal Committees can also raise local levy funding for local priority projects in partnership with others.
Government promotes nationally consistent approaches to assessing and managing flood and coastal erosion risk and RMAs prioritise public investment in flood and coastal risk management works according to Defra policy and Environment Agency guidance.
The Environment Agency has a role in allocating FCRM GiA and local levy funding to RMAs. Risk Management Authorities bid for the funding through medium term planning and projects are selected on the basis of the outcomes delivered, costs and benefits. Taking a risk-based management approach, resources are targeted to ensure that public money is spent on the works that provide the greatest benefits to society, and that this money is spent efficiently and effectively.
Under Defra’s partnership funding approach, government funding towards schemes is based on the numbers of households protected, the damages being prevented and other benefits that would be delivered. For schemes to proceed where they are not fully funded by government either the costs would need to be reduced or the remainder of the funding provided through local contributions. The approach helps achieve the best value for public money and encourages others to contribute where it is in their interests to do so.
**Strategic Environmental Assessment and Habitats Regulations**
A Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) was undertaken to consider the significant environmental effects of the FRMP. Natural England, Historic England, Natural Resources Wales, Cadw and the Marine Management Organisation were consulted on the scope of the proposed assessment in December 2013, and the environmental report sets out the results of the SEA. The report describes the environmental effects that are significant within the RBD and identifies measures to mitigate any adverse effects. Opportunities to improve the environment are also considered in order to deliver greater environmental benefits where possible. The SEA identified the potential environmental effects of flood risk management measures in the FRMP. The focus was on the combined effects of the programme of protection measures across a catchment or flood risk area, rather than individual measures at specific locations.
A similar approach has been used for the RBMP and FRMP which allows us to compare the environmental effects directly and consider the interaction between the two plans. Indicators are also set out that will be used to monitor the effect of the plan on significant environmental receptors, taking advantage of existing monitoring that is already carried out by the Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales and others.
A Habitats Regulations assessment has been carried out on the FRMP to consider whether the plan affects designated sites (Special Areas of Conservation, Special Protection Areas and Ramsar sites). The assessment concluded that the plan is not likely to have a significant effect on European Designated Sites.
For information on the Severn FRMP contribution to broader benefits and links with the Severn River Basin Management Plan see Section 8.
How FRMPs have been co-ordinated with river basin management planning
The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales lead on the development of FRMPs and RBMPs. The aims are to co-ordinate work effectively, and support others to do the same, so that more can be done for the environment when flooding is managed. Information on how consultation has shaped the plans was published jointly with RBMPs. The FRMP measures of the plans are linked to RBMP and Water Framework Directive objectives, so that the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales know where flood risk projects contribute to environment outcomes. How the FRMP contributes to wider benefits is covered in Section 8 of this plan.
Co-ordinating with the RBMP:
- Severn RBMP
4. How to manage risk
Involving communities leads to more effective flood and coastal erosion risk management. RMAs will continue to work with communities and other stakeholders to manage risk by:
- assessing the sources of flood risk and drawing conclusions about the risks;
- setting out what RMAs are trying to achieve and establishing risk management objectives;
- determining the best approach to achieving the objectives by identifying the right measures and prioritising them.
The conclusions, objectives and proposed measures are set out within this FRMP. During the 6 year planning cycle set out in the Flood Risk Regulations (2009) RMAs will work with partners and interested parties to:
- seek to secure the necessary funding, including from partners;
- implement the measures, with clarity on what each organisation is accountable for;
- monitor and review how the plan works.
RMAs will monitor, and report annually, on progress in implementing the measures set out in the FRMP. RMAs will continue to work in partnership, ensuring that they can maintain a forward look of prioritised proposals for managing flood risk. The next review of the FRMP under the Flood Risk Regulations will be completed by 2021.
National flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for Wales
The Welsh Government National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy provides the framework for flood and coastal erosion risk management in Wales. The framework is centred around four key objectives and the measures to meet those objectives.
- Reducing the consequences for individuals, communities, businesses and the environment from flooding and coastal erosion;
- Raising awareness of and engaging people in the response to flood and coastal erosion risk;
- Providing an effective and sustained response to flood and coastal erosion events;
- Prioritising investment in the most at risk communities.
Natural Resources Wales plans and implements flood risk management work for which Natural Resources Wales are responsible within the framework set by the National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy.
In order to deliver the measures from the National FCERM Strategy, Natural Resources Wales takes a risk based community approach to prioritise where to best direct investment. This is informed by the strategic framework provided by Catchment Flood Management Plans and Shoreline Management Plans. The strategic framework set by these plans enable us to make short term decisions to manage present day risk whilst also considering the longer term projection of risk.
National flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for England
The national flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for England (2011) provides the overarching framework for future action by all RMAs to tackle flooding and coastal erosion risk in England. The overall aim of the strategy is to ensure the risk of flooding and coastal erosion is properly managed by using the full range of options in a co-ordinated way. It encourages more effective risk management by enabling people, communities, business, infrastructure operators and the public sector to work together to:
- ensure a clear understanding of the risks of flooding and coastal erosion, nationally and locally, so that investment in risk management can be prioritised more effectively;
- set out clear and consistent plans for risk management so that communities and businesses can make informed decisions about the management of the remaining risk;
- manage flood and coastal erosion risks in an appropriate way, taking account of the needs of communities and the environment;
- ensure that emergency plans and responses to flood incidents are effective and that communities are able to respond effectively to flood forecasts, warnings and advice;
- help communities to recover more quickly and effectively after incidents.
The strategy recognises that difficult decisions have to be taken on where activities can and can’t be carried out at both national and local levels. As such, six guiding principles have been identified to help guide these decisions and the processes by which they are taken. These guiding principles are:
1. Community focus and partnership working
2. A catchment and coastal "cell" based approach
3. Sustainability
4. Proportionate, risk-based approaches
5. Multiple benefits
6. Beneficiaries should be encouraged to invest in risk management.
In support of the guiding principles for delivering multiple benefits the national strategy advocates:
- Flood risk management solutions should enhance the environment;
- FCRM should avoid damaging the environment, including the historic environment;
- FCRM should wherever possible seek to work with natural processes;
- FCRM should always seek to provide environmental benefit as required by the Habitats, Birds and Water Framework Directives.
This FRMP has been developed to meet the legal requirements of the Flood Risk Regulations. In doing so, the national flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for England has also been taken into account, in particular its guiding principles.
**Measures for managing risk**
There are different approaches to managing flood and coastal erosion risk – these are known as measures and are described below:
The text below sets out how measures are displayed in this document.
**Preventing:** by avoiding putting people or the environment at risk of flooding, for example, one way of preventing risks arising would be by not building homes in areas that can be flooded.
**Preparing:** by taking actions that prepare people for flooding, for example, by improving awareness of flood risk, or by providing warning and forecasting for floods so that people can take precautions to safeguard their valuables.
**Protecting:** by protecting people from the risk of flooding. For example, by the maintenance or refurbishment of existing defences, building new defences or incorporating property resilience measures such as using waterproof boards over doors and airbricks to reduce the damaged caused by flood water.
**Recovery and review:** by learning from when flooding happens and how to recover from it, for example, by improving the availability of recovery services such as providing temporary accommodation, after flooding has occurred. There will be a disproportionately low amount of actions in this category as recovery and review can only occur in the aftermath of floods. Flood and coastal erosion risk management may require a combination of the measures outlined above. FRMPs bring together measures from existing sources, particularly CFMPs, SMPs, local flood risk management strategies and the 6 year investment plan. The development and completion of these measures is often dependent on partnerships and the provision of funding.
**Working with communities**
The risk management authorities should work in partnership with communities to understand the community perspective of flooding and coastal erosion. The aim is to help communities understand and actively prepare for the risks, and encourage them to have direct involvement in decision-making. Where there are Flood Action Groups or other community groups, these become a clear focus for the community to bring together all the relevant information its residents and businesses may have. Where no such group is in existence, all relevant RMAs should endeavour to engage with communities to impart information and understanding about local flood risk. Working together to share knowledge, all relevant RMAs can work with communities on managing local risk. This becomes an opportunity for the RMAs to explain what steps they propose to take, talk about the likelihood of funding for any construction works, explore any other funding sources and advise residents and businesses what they can do to help themselves. It also gives the community the opportunity to shape the proposals.
**Box 1. Case Study Box**
**Kenilworth (Avon catchment)**
After flooding in December 2012 the Environment Agency worked with affected residents in Kenilworth to establish the Kenilworth flood action group. The group of affected residents and partner organisations lead on raising awareness of the group amongst the community, reporting issues to the relevant authorities and increasing the resilience of the properties via developing a flood plan and investigating property level protection.
The Environment Agency was able to establish a flood warning service and worked with the group to ensure affected residents were registered for the service and understood what to do when they receive a warning.
The community took part in the Defra community engagement pathfinder project and gained funding to set up a CCTV camera so they can monitor the Finham Brook when they are away from home. This gives residents extra peace of mind alongside the warning service.
Flooding in Kenilworth, November 2012 Partnership working
Managing flood and coastal risks and particularly local flood risks requires many organisations to work together in partnership. The main RMAs in the Severn are the Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales, lead local flood authorities, district councils, internal drainage districts (in Wales), internal drainage boards (in England), highways authorities and water and sewerage companies.
Partnership working allows organisations to pool expertise and resources to enable what they do to be as efficient and effective as possible. It encourages the sharing of knowledge, data and expertise and provides opportunities to manage cross boundary issues, ensure consistent approaches and develop and test innovative approaches to delivery.
Regional Flood and Coastal Committees (RFCCs) were first established in 2011 following the Flood and Water Management Act 2010, replacing the former Regional Flood Defence Committees. The English Severn RBD is covered by the English Severn and Wye RFCC. It covers an area of 11,500 sq km and some 2,520 km of designated Main River.
The RFCC plays a key role in local funding and approving programmes of work that protect communities from flooding. The RFCC supports the Environment Agency and Lead Local Flood Authorities in working with these communities and other partners to identify and bring in funding. The Environment Agency annually submits the 6 year investment strategy to the RFCC, which contains the funding bids for the Environment Agency and LLFAs for the next 6 years.
Flood risk partnership groups exist in the counties of Gloucestershire, Worcestershire, Herefordshire, Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin, Northamptonshire, North Somerset, Bristol City, South Gloucestershire, Bath and North East Somerset. In Wales there are flood risk groups that are based on the four Local Resilience Forum areas. These are attended by the local authorities and NRW. 5. Getting to know the Severn river basin district
Introduction
The Severn River Basin District (RBD), shown in Figure 5.1, covers an area of just over 21,500 km². The River Severn is the UK’s longest river, stretching 350km from its source to the mouth of the Bristol Channel. The RBD has a varied landscape from the uplands of Wales, down through valleys and rolling hills of central England, to the lowlands and the Severn Estuary. As well as the River Severn and its main tributaries, the Warwickshire Avon and the Teme, the district includes the rivers of South East Wales, including the Wye, Usk and Taff, and those of the South West, including the Bristol Avon, that drain directly into the Severn Estuary.
The area is home to more than 5.75 million people, and includes major urban centres such as Bristol, Cardiff, Coventry, Worcester, Shrewsbury and Gloucester. The water bodies of the Severn RBD are made up of 7,512 km of river, 76 lakes, and 36 canals, 40 areas of groundwater and 545 km² of estuary. The sheer size of the RBD gives rise to the huge variety of land uses, geology, topography and other descriptive factors. The catchment contains a diverse range of habitats associated with its upland areas, river valleys and floodplains, farmed landscapes and urban areas.
The river has a variety of flooding issues along its length and given the complicated nature and volume of tributaries there is a need to take a catchment-wide view to all changes within the RBD. Activities must seek to avoid passing risk on to others within the catchment without prior agreement.
Figure 5.1: Overview of the Severn RBD Water
The main reason water is abstracted in the Severn RBD is to supply water for the general public. The headwaters of many of the rivers have been modified by dams to form reservoirs that ultimately supply drinking water. Water released from these reservoirs helps regulate river flow and can impact on river wildlife (such as the migration of fish) if there is insufficient flow variation. The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales work in partnership with water companies to regulate flow on the Severn and Wye. Agriculture and horticulture also rely heavily on abstractions. While the amount of water abstracted for agriculture is relatively low compared to other uses, it usually takes place when flows are naturally at their lowest.
Reducing abstraction is often difficult as an alternative source of water will usually need to be found. These options may be costly and can bring new environmental issues. Other solutions to tackle unsustainable abstraction are likely to include channel modifications to increase water depths and flow velocities at low flows, Water Level Management Plans or flow augmentation arrangements linked to abstraction.
Pressure on rivers and underground water stores is likely to grow due to climate change and increases in population. Actions to manage the demand for water and encourage people to use water more efficiently will be particularly important where there are acute pressures on water resources. This will involve working with water companies through Water Resource Management Plans and working with farmers and industry groups via initiatives such as on-farm reservoirs (although these may be expensive and require planning) and water audits to build resilience around water supplies. Installing water efficiency measures in the home is also an important area of activity.
Flood risk management systems and drainage
There is a wide variation in the characteristics of rivers and subsequently the nature of flooding throughout the district.
The majority of the district is of a rural nature with much of this comprising agricultural land use; hence it is considered that in most areas the biggest impact on the natural flood regime comes from the management of the land for these purposes.
The upland areas within the RBD that are dominated by the Welsh Mountains and Brecon Beacons have many watercourses which respond rapidly to high levels of rainfall as a result of the steep topography. Annual rainfall totals of up to 2500mm are experienced in these areas. Examples can be found within the south east valleys of Wales, such as the Rivers Taff, Rhymney, Esk and Ebbw and the upper reaches of the Rivers Usk, Wye and Severn in Wales. Similar conditions can also occur in other parts of the RBD where rainfall totals are similar to the national average of 700mm per annum but where the topography is steeper such as along the Cotswold escarpment, in the Forest of Dean and Mendip Hills.
Longer more sustained flooding is experienced over a significant area of the district in the middle to lower lengths of the larger watercourses such as the Rivers Wye, Severn, Warwickshire Avon and Bristol Avon. Here the topography is much flatter and the geology comprises mudstones and clays that have low permeability and thus can become easily saturated. It is in these areas where many of the medium to smaller sized communities at high flood risk can be found. In addition, the groundwater table in these areas is normally high, contributing further to the level of flood risk.
The Rivers Severn, Wye, Bristol Avon, Usk and most of the Southern Welsh watercourses enter the Bristol Channel/Severn Estuary resulting in a risk to these confluence areas from tidal flooding. This is most prevalent along the coastlines of Wales and North Somerset, extending up the River Severn as far as Gloucester. Areas adjacent to the coast are relatively flat with very little elevation. This means that tidal inundation can affect large areas with brackish water. Many of the areas adjacent to the coast are provided with a level of protection by defences.
There is a risk of surface water and sewer flooding in some urban locations. The rivers originating or running through such areas may also respond rapidly to rainfall due to water running off the increased area of impermeable surfaces. Within the RBD there are many examples of flood defences which reduce the risk of flooding to major urban areas, local communities, essential infrastructure and agricultural land. These defences take the form of earth embankments, flood walls, outfall structures, barrage, attenuation areas, engineered channels and individual property level protection.
Climate change and adaptation
There is clear scientific evidence that global climate change is happening now. Over the past century sea level rise around England and Wales has been observed and more winter rain falling in intense wet spells. Climate changes can affect flood risk in several ways and the impacts will vary depending on local conditions and vulnerability. Risk management authorities should consider climate change within the development of all plans.
Wetter winters and more intense rainfall may increase river flooding and cause more surface runoff, increasing localised flooding and erosion. In turn, this may increase pressure on drains, sewers and water quality. Storm intensity in summer could increase even in drier summers, so there is a need for better preparation for extreme events. Rising sea or river levels may also increase local flood risk inland or away from major rivers because of interactions with drains, sewers and smaller watercourses. Even small rises in sea level could combine with very high tides, with the potential to affect places a long way inland.
Lower emissions could reduce the amount of climate change further into the future, but changes are still projected at least as far ahead as the 2080s. UK Government’s Flood Foresight (2014) re-endorses the findings of the 2008 foresight work, stating that in general terms climate change is likely to increase river flood risks by 2080 by between 2 and 4 times, and coastal flood risk by 4 to 10 times. Increases in the frequency of flooding would affect people’s homes and wellbeing, especially for vulnerable groups.
According to UKCIP (UK Climate Impacts Programme), by the 2020s temperatures across the RBD could rise by up to 3°C under a low or high emissions scenario (50% probability level). Summer rainfall may decrease by up to 20% and winter rainfall may increase by up to 20% under either scenario. These extremes impact on water related issues such as decreased water availability and an increase in people and properties at risk from the effects of flooding. The increased frequency and intensity of rainfall events in combination with fast responding catchments will be the greatest threat to the upper areas where a relatively large number of small to medium sized communities are distributed over a wide area. The greatest threat to the lower catchment is from sea level rise which could increase flood risk significantly along the Severn Estuary and surrounding low-lying areas, and potentially change the character of a significant amount of agricultural land and valuable habitat.
Society and health
Over 5.75 million people live and work in small or medium sized towns and cities within the RBD. Over 33,000 are at high risk from flooding, with a further 63,000 at medium risk. There is a wide variety of community types within the area, from those in heavily urbanised areas to rural villages and farms. Health and poverty are inextricably linked and access to resources, including open space and the natural environment, is a key part of improving these factors. The nature of the Severn RBD being so large means that it is a microcosm of the wider issues facing the country as a whole. From a flooding perspective, communities within this basin district are vulnerable from a variety of issues and different flooding sources. Flooding can have impacts on the social welfare and health of the population, as was seen during and following the July 2007 floods. Many of the measures aimed at flood risk prevention, preparedness, protection and recovery and review seek to address potential impacts on the health, wellbeing and the safety of communities. Land use
Much of the RBD is rural in character, with land managed for agriculture and forestry. This includes improved grassland for extensive beef and sheep farming, large dairy farms, and some arable and specialist horticulture such as orchards and fruit. The major woodland use types are coniferous and deciduous woodland distributed throughout the catchment, for example around Ironbridge Gorge, Breiddon Forest and the Wyre Forest, much of which is ancient woodland.
The way in which land is managed can significantly impact on natural resources including the water environment. A combination of incentive, advisory and regulatory measures help farmers and other land managers protect the environment. For instance, Cross Compliance and Nitrate Vulnerable Zone rules, agri-environment schemes (Countryside Stewardship, Tir Gofal), Catchment Sensitive Farming, and incentives are available for woodland management and planting. Such schemes can be beneficial for the water environment by helping to store water, manage water levels and improve water quality.
The catchment is also characterised by urban centres that are built along the Severn and its tributaries. These population centres vary from small to medium in the upper catchments to large urban and sub-urban areas in the lowland floodplains. In urban areas a key challenge is the non permeability of many surfaces resulting in poor infiltration rates and high surface water flows. The coastal areas around the Severn Estuary have a very particular challenge, with much of the land being reclaimed and heavily reliant on ancient systems of drainage ditches, and lying at or near sea level.
There is growing evidence that woodland measures can help to slow down or even reduce flood flows, particularly within smaller catchments. Strategic tree planting and woodland management can help reduce flood risk in a number of ways:
- Greater water use and interception by trees compared to other vegetation types helps to reduce run-off volumes;
- Woodland soils have greater capacity to absorb and store rainwater during flood events due to their more open structure and the presence of root systems; this also aids interception of overland flow from adjacent land;
- The ‘hydraulic roughness’ of trees and other woodland features can help to slow the flow of overland flood water;
- Soils under woodland are also generally better protected from erosion risk, thereby reducing delivery of sediment to watercourses and reducing pollutants in the water.
Therefore, ‘woodland measures’ for flood risk reduction include woodland creation – in the right place and to the right design – and the installation of woodland features such as large woody debris dams to both reconnect watercourses with already wooded riparian zones and floodplains and to slow down flood flows.
The 2011 the ‘Woodland for Water’ report detailed the evidence behind these conclusions. As a result ‘opportunity mapping’ was produced to help identify where targeted woodland measures could help to reduce flood risk. Priority locations fall into three categories:
- Floodplains – where hydraulic roughness from woodland cover slows the flow and encourages the deposition of sediment;
- Riparian zones – to intercept overland flow, protect river banks from erosion, and help slow the flow of water;
- Wider catchment planting – to protect sensitive soils from erosion, increase infiltration rates, and intercept sediment in run-off from adjacent land.
While opportunity maps can identify priority catchments where woodland creation and management can help reduce flood risk, it is important that woodland is located in the right part of the landscape and then designed and managed appropriately in order to maximise their contribution to reducing flood risk. Flood and coastal risk management and agriculture
Land drainage for agricultural purposes was historically an important element of operational activity in flood and coastal erosion risk management. Today the prime driver for investment in water management for flooding and drainage is one of risk reduction to people and property, and for the improvement of the environment. Investment is prioritised according to government policy, the respective National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategies for England and Wales and HM Treasury Green Book on economic appraisal. Government policy gives the highest priority to lives and homes.
Economic activity
The key sectors of economic activity within the RBD relate to business, transport, health and industry. Agriculture is the dominant land use within the RBD and a significant contributor to the local economy. The catchment contains a mix of livestock (beef and sheep) and arable farms along with horticultural production. The post-industrial economy has seen clusters of small businesses flourish in the form of small industrial estates.
Recent decades have seen a major transformation in the economy and profile of the area. The traditional industrial base of the towns and cities have continued to decline, allowing significant areas of former industrial and dock land to be released for new housing and employment opportunities. Outside the major cities the catchment comprises a mixture of urban, semi-urban and rural communities. In these areas a growth corridor has emerged along the M5, M4, with secondary growth areas along the larger A-road network.
Recreation and tourism
The natural environment of the district is valued for its navigational and recreation uses and is an attraction for the people who live and work there, plus the many tourists who visit.
The whole catchment, including its rivers, reservoirs and canal network, is very popular with walkers, anglers, naturalists, canoeists and boat users.
Numerous nature reserves and country parks across the catchment also contribute to the local tourist economy. Much of the recreation and tourism in the catchment is focused around the landscape and outdoor pursuits. Activity holidays centred on hiking, cycling, mountain biking, horse riding, golf and water sports are popular and numerous.
The area provides a variety of recreational activities, for example, parts of the River Stour and its tributaries are located within the Cotswolds, which is popular with walkers and the Severn, Avon and Wye catchments, which are important for anglers and water sports. Major tourist centres include Stratford on Avon and Bath, in addition to the historic riverside towns of the River Severn such as Shrewsbury and Worcester as well as Ludlow on the River Teme, Monmouth in the Wye Valley and the Forest of Dean.
Infrastructure
Much of the Infrastructure in the RBD may be affected by flooding, as demonstrated in the 2007 floods, which affected many of the main roads, railways, power and water provision sites. Some of the infrastructure at risk includes the main London to South Wales railway line, power lines, the Severn Tunnel and associated structures and also the M4, M5, M48 M50 and M54 motorways. Several trunk road routes cross the catchment, mainly radiating out from Shrewsbury, Hereford, Worcester, Cardiff and Bristol linked by a network of A and B roads were also affected. Major transport routes, such as motorways and trunk roads can contribute significantly to increasing flood risk through accelerated run-off. Similarly extensive urban development has resulted in increased surface run-off and loss of permeable groundwater aquifers, thus also exacerbating flood risk.
Due to the nature of the Severn RBD it also houses some significant reservoirs that provide water resources to the Midlands and North West of England as well as providing other abstraction uses. These reservoirs lie in the upper reaches of the Severn, Taff and Usk. There is a barrage in Cardiff which may provide additional assistance with any tidal issues and help alleviate some flooding in the Cardiff area from fluvial issues. Landscape
The sheer size of the RBD gives rise to the huge variety of land uses, geology, topography and settlement patterns that are reflected in its diversity of landscapes extending from the Welsh uplands, through the farmed lowlands as well as the area's river valleys and floodplains. Many of the district’s landscapes are of recognised national importance and include the Brecon Beacons National Park in addition to Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) such as the Cotswolds, Malvern Hills, Shropshire Hills, Wye Valley and Mendip Hills. National Parks and AONBS are nationally protected areas with a statutory purpose that includes conserving and enhancing natural beauty, which also extends to wildlife, landscape features and cultural heritage.
National Character Area profiles produced by Natural England describe the character of the landscape across the England parts of the RBD, whilst landscape character assessments produced by local authorities provide a detailed understanding of local character and distinctiveness. Countywide historic landscape characterisation also provides a detailed understanding of the evolution of landscapes and their historic character.
Woodland, including ancient woodland and ancient trees, is an integral component of the district’s landscape as well as providing wildlife habitat, natural resources, recreational opportunities and heritage interest. There is also increasing evidence to show that woodland can contribute to mitigating downstream flood risk and improve water quality. Landscape-scale mapping initiatives such as provided by the Midlands Woodlands for Water, has identified priority areas for woodland creation and the improved management of existing woodlands to reduce downstream flood risk and achieve the objectives of the Water Framework Directive.
Figure 5.2: Topographic map of the Severn RBD
Biodiversity
The RBD includes many important habitat and wildlife areas of international, national and local importance. The European Sites within the RBD encompass a wide diversity of habitat types including: freshwater rivers, lakes, canals and other wetlands, and estuarine, coastal and marine habitats. Other habitats include woodlands, grasslands and heathlands. Some European sites such as the Severn Estuary have more than one designation; Special Protection Area (SPA), Special Area of Conservation (SAC) and Ramsar site. This reflects the importance of the estuarine and river system of the Severn which is one of the most diverse in the UK for fish species and a key migration route to and from spawning grounds in many tributaries for species, such as salmon, sea trout, sea and river lamprey, twaite and allis shad and eel. The estuary is also an important feeding and nursery ground for many fish species, particularly allis shad and twaite shad. The immense tidal range of the Severn Estuary results in extensive areas of intertidal habitats, comprising mudflats, sandflats, sandbanks, shingle and rocky platforms, together with adjacent areas of saltmarsh and lowland grazing marsh. These habitats and the food sources they support attract internationally important assemblages of overwintering and migratory birds, such as gadwall, dunlin, shelduck, redshank and greater white-fronted goose.
The area is ecologically rich and contains part of the West Midland Meres and Mosses, a series of lakes and peatland formed back in the Ice Age, which are internationally recognised as Ramsar sites for the importance of their unique natural habitat. Fourteen separate Ramsar sites exist within the Midland Meres and Mosses complex which include the ‘Fenns, Whixall, Bettisfield, Wem and Cadney Mosses’ complex near Wem – one of the largest blocks of lowland raised bog in England.
Some European sites are designated primarily due to the species they support, such as the populations of great crested newts at Granllyn in Wales and Fens Pools in Dudley, the fresh water pearl mussel of the River Clun and the aquatic plant species (floating water plantain) associated with the Montgomery Canal and Brown Moss. A number of sites within the RBD are designated for supporting important populations of bat species, including sites at Bath and Bradford-on-Avon, North Somerset and Mendip, Wye Valley and Forest of Dean, Usk, Mells Valley, and Vyrnwy. Other sites are designated for supporting important invertebrate species. This includes the wet grassland sites of Aberbargoed and Blaen Cynan that support populations of marsh fritillary butterfly, and the rare invertebrate’s species, such as the violet click beetle, associated with ancient tree habitats at Bredon Hill and Dixton Wood.
A primary reason for the designation of the River Wye and Usk SACs is the range of fish species they support. Many of the European sites within the RBD are designated in respect of their qualifying habitats, such as riverine habitats of the Wye and the lakes, ponds, mires and bogs of the West Midland Mosses. Other qualifying habitats subject to SAC designation include the woodlands of the Wye Valley and Avon Gorge, the Cardiff and Cotswolds beechwoods, the alluvial forests associated with Coed y Cerrig, and the oak woods of Sugar Loaf and Coedydd Llaw-y-Glyn. Other designated habitats represented in the RBD include the chalk grasslands of Salisbury Plain, the limestone grasslands of the Mendips, and the extensive Molinia meadows associated with Cwm Cadian and Drostre Bank. Designated upland habitats and heathlands are also represented in the Brecon Beacons and Berwyn and South Clwyd Mountains together with the transitional dry heathland habitats of the Stiperstones and Hollies. Within the RBD sites designated for their wetland habitats range from the upland mires of Elennyd to the lowland raised bogs at Fenn’s Whixall, Bettisfield, Wem and Cadney Mosses and Llangorse Lake, the largest lake in South Wales.
There are 450 SSSIs within the catchment, of which around 200 are designated for their water-interest, such as the River Teme throughout its entire length. Coniferous and deciduous woodland is scattered throughout the catchment, for example around Ironbridge Gorge, Breiddon Forest (Lake Vyrnwy) and the Wyre Forest, (much of which is ancient woodland). The River Teme, upper River Severn and River Vyrnwy provide particularly good aquatic habitat. Protected species such as otter, Atlantic salmon, marsh warbler, raft spider, club tailed dragonfly, caddisfly and white-clawed crayfish are known to exist in these areas. Around the Severn-Vyrnwy confluence and the Severn and Avon Vale there is a wide range of wetland habitats, for example wet woodland, reedbed and fen.
Other designated sites across the RBD include National Nature Reserves, such as the Wyre Forest and Sutton Park (Birmingham) in addition to local nature reserves and wildlife sites managed by local authorities, wildlife trusts and other organisations such as the Woodland Trust. and RSPB. Ancient woodland sites are distributed across the RBD. Ancient woodlands are complex ecological communities that have developed over centuries, and contain a high proportion of rare and threatened species, many of which are dependent on the particular conditions that this habitat affords.
The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales work closely with statutory and other agencies to ensure that opportunities are maximised to protect and enhance the designated sites, in accordance with the relevant river restoration, water level and nutrient management plans. The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales also work with partner organisations and landowners to deliver habitat creation and enhancement schemes on non-designated land that contribute towards meeting the England Biodiversity Strategy targets.
**Historic Environment**
The RBD has a wealth of designated and non-designated heritage assets, as associated with historic riverside towns such as Shrewsbury, Hereford, Worcester, Monmouth and Tewkesbury and the internationally recognised World Heritage Sites of Ironbridge Gorge, Blaenavon Industrial Landscape and the City of Bath. The heritage assets within the district make an important contribution to the character and distinctiveness of its landscapes and settlements as well as support the local tourism economy.
The catchment includes a wide variety of archaeological sites. These range from burial chambers of the prehistoric period to military installations dating from the Second World War. There are Roman towns, including Glevum (Gloucester) and Viriconium (Wroxeter) and Roman roads such as the Fosse Way and Watling Street. Numerous Anglo-Saxon earthworks and defensive works were built in the Montgomery Valley and other parts of the Welsh Marches region. Offa’s Dyke is one key example.
Medieval towns were established for example at Shrewsbury and Worcester, where half-timbered buildings, city walls and medieval street patterns still exist. Important medieval features, with probable monastic origins also survive in a recognisable form. Expansion of coal mining and wider industrialisation of the area in the 18th century followed by the subsequent 20th century industrial decline has also left an impact on the historic character of many urban and rural areas within the district. The mining heritage of the district, for example, is also of recognised cultural and nature conservation interest, such as, Huglith Mine Site of Special Scientific Interest, (SSSI) and Snailbeach Lead Mine (Scheduled Monument) within the Seven Uplands catchment and the Blaenavon World Heritage Site in the South East Valleys.
Many heritage assets are also of historic landscape value such as features associated with the communications network, field patterns, hedgerows, ancient woodland, ancient trees and water management systems such as the network of water meadows along the River Lugg in Herefordshire. Indeed across the district there are many designated and non-designated heritage assets that are directly associated with the water environment, for example, dams, water mills and bridges. Lydney Harbour on the River Severn is a designated Scheduled Monument, whilst studies in Herefordshire are serving to increase the understanding of the significance of historic weirs and watermill landscapes to the water environment.
Extensive deposits of peat are of archaeological interest and include intertidal and submerged deposits in coastal areas as well as palaeo-environmental remains associated with former river channels and floodplains. Some examples of these are Goldcliff near Newport and in the coastal areas of Somerset and extending to Bristol and Gloucestershire. Important inland peat deposits include the Shropshire Meres and Mosses and upland areas in Wales. Across the district there is a particularly high number and wide range of landscapes of historic interest. Examples of these in Wales include the Gwent Levels, Merthyr Tydfil, The Rhondda, Lower and Middle Wye Valley, Elan Valley, Vale of Montgomery, Tanat Valley and Clywedog Valley.
**Geology**
The River Severn RDB exhibits a varied and interesting geological setting. The source is the mid Wales Cambrian mountains composed of the Cambrian, Ordovician and Silurian impermeable hard rock’s of slate, shale and sandstone. The river flows rapidly down onto softer Permo-Triassic mudstone and sandstone rocks of the Shropshire lowlands. The Severn then makes a deep cutting through the Carboniferous coal measures of the Ironbridge gorge, and on through the permeable Triassic sandstone hills. At Worcester the river flows out into the expansive Severn Vale and Estuary, composed primarily of poor draining Triassic and Jurassic mudstones, extensively overlain by fluvial terrace sand and gravel deposits.
The Teme catchment rises in the Welsh borderland and south Shropshire Hills, primarily situated in a sequence Silurian limestone and shale, or Devonian sandstone and mudstones, until its confluence with the Severn at Worcester.
The Warwickshire Avon catchment is dominated by Jurassic rocks, rising in the Northamptonshire and Cotswold limestone uplands, flowing out into the Vale of Evesham Lias mudstones, overlain by thick sequences of sand and gravel glacial drift deposits. The Cotswold limestone escarpment extends south to the Bristol Avon, there are also extensive Carboniferous limestone outcrops in the Bristol area.
The uplands of the South Wales catchments comprise Devonian Sandstone and shale sequences, with Carboniferous Limestone to the south of the Brecon Beacons. The steep topography resulting from these resistant rocks gives rise to rapid runoff.
Soil
The soils of the RBD are dominated by loam in the upper reaches and a more clay based soil as the Severn approaches the Severn Estuary. Around the Severn Estuary the soil becomes heavily clay dominated as a result of historic inundation. Soils in the mid to lower river basin are dominated by deep, well-drained and fertile Brown Soils, with scatterings of Surface Water Gleys and Groundwater Gleys. Brown soils occur in different forms from slowly permeable soils to less permeable loams and clayey soils. The subsurface layers are highly valued for agricultural purposes but the low permeability of the underlying geology means that during heavy rainfall the soil becomes quickly saturated. The reduced capacity of the soil will lead to increased surface run-off and an increase in the catchment response to rainfall. Increased surface runoff will also exacerbate rates of soil erosion with the potential to impact on soil fertility and yields. Across the RBD there are initiatives to provide help and support to farmers to enable them to manage their soils in a sustainable way. 6. Key flood risk issues in the Severn River Basin District
This section, including the maps and statistics illustrate the broad scale of flood risk across the RBD. You can see this information in more detail at the links below.
The plan should be used in conjunction with the Severn RBD River Basin Management Plan (RBMP). This has been produced to identify the state of, and pressures on, the water environment. It considers the technical and economic viability of beneficial actions, set objectives and coordinate/monitor delivery of agreed actions. In so doing it sets direction to maintain and improve the quality of all surface, ground water and coastal waters.
The FRMP should also be used to identify objectives and measures at all scales that complement the aims of the Water Framework Directive by providing environmental benefits as part of and in addition to any flood risk management benefits.
Find out more
- Interactive flood maps for flooding from rivers, the sea, reservoirs and surface water
- Severn RBMP
- Current Ecological and Chemical Status of Water Bodies
- The Environment Agency maintenance programme for rivers and sea
Flood risk issues within the river basin district
The Severn RBD covers approximately 21,500 km² with a total population of just over 5.66 million people. Approximately 100,000 people, just under 2% of the population, are at medium to high risk of flooding from rivers and the sea.
Other sources of flooding include from reservoirs where 260,000 people, 4.5% of the total population in the RBD, are at risk of flooding. Approximately 120,000 people, just over 2% of the total population within the RBD, are at medium to high risk of flooding from surface water sources. LLFAs are responsible for managing the risk of flooding from groundwater. Groundwater flooding is closely linked to geology and is less common in the Severn than in other locations, such as south east England where chalk is quite common. There is a risk of sewer flooding in some urban locations.
Tidal flood risk affects the whole Severn estuary. Wave action increases the flood and erosion risk south of the Severn Bridges. Near Gloucester, the greatest flood risk is caused by high fluvial flows.
There are over 100,000 properties currently at risk from the Severn Estuary in the 1% annual probability flood event. Also at risk of tidal flooding are 430 km² of agricultural land, sections of motorway, A-roads and other roads, mainline and local line railways and railway stations, strategic power lines to South East Wales and power stations and many sub-stations, telephone exchanges, schools and holiday caravans.
There are around 200 kilometres of existing flood defences along the Severn Estuary providing protection for many homes, businesses, agricultural land and infrastructure. All defences have a finite lifespan due to the wear and tear they suffer over time. The impacts of climate change and sea level rise are likely to reduce the lifespan of defences, as well as the standard of protection they provide.
In some circumstances people could be at risk of flooding from a combination of sources and therefore may be included in more than one of the above categories.
Due to its size, RBD wide events are extremely rare, though large parts have been affected during individual incidents. More detail is given in the catchment summaries set out in Part B of the plan.
The most recent major events that have impacted on large areas of the RBD include those of 1947, 1968, 1998, 2000 and 2007. Other smaller more localised events, such as those experienced in 2014, though not resulting in significant numbers of property flooding, can be very disruptive to communities within the area affected. Historically, infrastructure and many of the transport links connecting communities have been built within floodplains. Road flooding causes access issues and travel disruption. Water can take many weeks to drain from the floodplain and this delays the recovery of the communities affected by flooding. Flooding events have been recorded throughout the RBD since the thirteenth century.
Table 6.1: Recent significant flood events in the Severn river basin district
| Date | Source of Flooding | Impacts on Severn RBD | |---------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | March 1947 | Fluvial and Surface Water| Widespread damage and disruption across the Severn RBD, including Monmouth, Worcester, Bewdley, Gloucester and Shrewsbury. For many people the 1947 event is still the highest recorded event in living memory. | | 1960 | Fluvial | Major floods in and around Gloucester and the River Wye. Hereford recorded its highest level. | | December 1965 | Fluvial | Major flooding on the River Frome following a rapid snow melt. | | July 1968 | Fluvial | Gauges on the River Avon recorded levels of 3.71m at Warwick and 4.15m at Evesham. According to reports of the flooding, Lydney town centre was under 4 feet of water during this period. This event prompted the introduction of flood warnings. | | December 1979 | Fluvial | Major flooding across the South Wales valleys. Thousands of properties affected including central Cardiff. | | February 1990 | Fluvial | Major floods in Gloucester and Worcester | | Easter 1998 | Fluvial | Two fatalities, approximately 1,050 properties and 1,400 caravans flooded in the RBD. Widespread flooding of highways and farmland particularly affected the Warwickshire Avon. | | October 1998 | Fluvial | This event was the largest of the preceding 30 years and impacted communities including Shrewsbury, Ironbridge, Bridgnorth, Bewdley, Worcester and Hereford. | | Autumn 2000 | Fluvial and Surface Water| Autumn 2000 was the wettest on record over England and Wales. Prolonged rainfall compounded run-off and high river levels. Communities affected by these floods included Tewkesbury, Upton-upon-Severn and Gloucester. This event was the largest on record for the Lower Severn catchment. | | December 2000 | Fluvial and Tidal | High tide combined with high river levels resulted in a flood peak in Gloucester of 4.61m and flooded 45 properties in the Gloucester and Tewkesbury areas. The lower Wye had repeated floods at Ross on Wye and Monmouth. | | February 2002 | Fluvial | Flooding during February 2002 affected a number of communities along the Severn including Shrewsbury, | | Date | Source of Flooding | Impacts on Severn RBD | |--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | February 2004 | Fluvial | Lower magnitude incident than Autumn 2000 but caused flooding in areas of Bewdley and Shrewsbury. | | Summer 2007 | Fluvial and Surface Water | The period of May to July was the wettest since records began in 1766, with an average rainfall of 414.1mm across England and Wales. This was well over double the usual expected rainfall for that period. The resulting flooding was widespread, causing disruption and damage throughout the Severn catchment. In total over 14,000 properties were flooded from a combination of flooding from main river, ordinary watercourse and surface water. Major infrastructure such as road and rail networks were impacted. Mythe water treatment works in Tewkesbury flooded leaving 350,000 people in Gloucestershire without water for over a week. Hampton Bishop was evacuated. | | February 2011 | Fluvial | Significant flooding occurred along the River Vyrnwy resulting in the highest levels recorded since records began in many locations. | | December 2012 | Fluvial and Surface Water | Flooding at various locations across North Somerset affected over 50 properties. | | December 2013 | Fluvial | Localised flooding around Bath. | | January/February 2014 | Fluvial | Flooding across the Severn RDB including the length of the River Severn and Severn Estuary. |
There is a wide variation in the characteristics of rivers and subsequently the nature of flooding throughout the district. Hence given the complex nature of flooding, there is a need to take a catchment-wide view of all changes within the basin district. Activities must seek to avoid passing risk on to others within the catchment without prior agreement.
Flood risk is influenced by a range of factors including climate change, changes in land use (particularly further urban development within the floodplain, but potentially also development elsewhere within the catchment), and changes in land management practices. A driver is the change in the factor affecting flood risk, not the factor itself as set out below:
- Urban development, both within the catchment and river corridor. An increase in urban areas can lead to increased surface water run-off and a more rapid rise in peak flows as the area of impermeable surface increases.
- As discussed in the Land Use section in Chapter 5, changes in land use management practices, supported by current agri-environmental initiatives, can lead to beneficial changes in surface water flows and field run off within the context of economically viable farm business.
- Climate change. Milder wetter winters and increases in intensive rainfall events could increase flows in rivers on a more frequent basis and increase demands on the urban drainage networks. Sea level rise will increase tidal flood risk in the Severn Estuary. Box 2. Case Study Box Congresbury Yeo Tidal Banks (CYTB)
Background to the problem Protection of a part of the low lying land against flooding alongside the Severn Estuary, south of Bristol in the Congresbury Yeo river estuary, is achieved by earth banks. As the Severn Estuary has the second highest tidal range in the world tidal flood risk is significant. The combination of settlement at the bank crest, rising sea level and the deteriorating condition of the existing tidal defences is leading to an increased likelihood of a breach (caused by overtopping) of the Congresbury Yeo tidal embankments. Breaching is possible for tidal events with a 2% annual chance. If left unchecked, these breaches will propagate, ultimately placing 39,741 properties at risk of flooding for extreme tidal events of 1% (1 in 100) AEP and above. Affected areas include properties in Worle and Weston-super-Mare. It would take less than 3 hours for flood water to reach Worle presenting a risk to life.
The solution to the problem The scheme comprises the construction of 1328m of new set-back embankment and the raising of 2356m of existing bank. This will reduce flood risk to properties to 1.3% chance over the next 25 years and enable the creation of 7.57 ha of intertidal habitat.
This scheme provides a cost-effective opportunity to create new areas of intertidal habitat, addressing the overall decline in such habitat throughout the Severn Estuary. The project is to deliver new saltmarsh with landowner agreement. This provides environmental benefits which align with the Severn Estuary Flood Risk Management Strategy. Land management and flooding
The Severn Uplands, Shropshire Middle Severn, Wye and Usk catchments all have large rural upland areas with moderate to high rainfall and relatively quick runoff rates. Appropriate changes to land management in these (and some other) areas include: afforestation, wet woodland, re-introducing river meanders, setting back some rural river defences and digging/creating ponds. These can reduce rates of surface water runoff. Where catchment areas are large it would take major change to achieve even a small reduction in flood flow. However, land management change can achieve a measurable flood risk benefit in upland areas, typically where catchment areas are less than 10km². Monitoring data is starting to provide the evidence of this, so further land use change for flood risk benefit can become more than just an aspiration. Such changes could make a difference to flash flooding too.
Box 3. Case Study Box
The Gloucestershire Frome Rural SuDS project
The Stroud Frome catchment encompasses 236Km², including the Frome, Slad, Nailsworth and Painswick valleys, draining the Cotswold escarpment into the Severn estuary in Gloucestershire. The Stroud Valleys have a long history of flooding and suffered extensive flooding during the summer of 2007. In 2009 the Environment Agency investigated a series of options for improving flood protection in Stroud and villages in the Stroud valleys. A flood storage scheme was not viable, but the local community enthusiastically supported the development of a pilot project to implement Rural Sustainable Drainage Systems (RSuDs)\* in the Frome catchment.
Flood risk
- Stroud is the main centre of population in the catchment with many smaller villages and isolated houses scattered throughout the catchment.
- Flash flooding – the Slad valley has been designated as a rapid response catchment at risk of potentially destructive flash flooding.
- Land use change, from livestock to arable, on the upper escarpment has increased the rate of surface run-off, increasing erosion and flood risk in the valleys.
- The very steep valleys and extensive spring lines result in rapid surface run-off and river flows and provide limited floodplain storage potential.
Diffuse sediment pollution:
- Land use change on the upper escarpment and cattle poaching in the valleys has increased sediment in watercourses reducing water quality and increasing pollution.
- Phosphate levels in river water exceed WFD standards and rising levels of artificial chemicals (e.g. pesticides and industrial chemicals) in groundwater systems.
In 2014, the Environment Agency in partnership with Stroud District Council (SDC) established the Frome Rural SuDS project. SDC appointed a fulltime Project Officer funded through Local Levy from the English Severn and Wye RFCC, to promote the project aims and implement a series of demonstration projects. The aims of the project are:
“To create a river catchment where water management is fully integrated into land management practices. Where public bodies, private companies and local communities work together to manage water within the landscape, creating valuable habitat for wildlife and people, and limiting flood risk downstream.” The Gloucestershire Frome Rural SuDS project (continued)
In 2014/15, working with local community flood action groups and key landowners including the National Trust and Gloucestershire Wildlife Trust the project officer has implemented a range of projects including:
- Dillay / Slad Brook: 20 in stream large woody debris structures to slow flows Stock fencing and spring fed cattle drinks to reduce erosion and sediment in stream.
- Sheepscombe Brook: 16 in stream large woody debris structures to slow flows. 4 track culverts and soakaways to reduce sediment and surface flows.
- Toadsmoor Valley: 18 in stream large woody debris structures to slow flows.
Project funding during 2014/15 was £60k, comprising Stroud DC £5k, Gloucestershire CC £30k, Environment Agency £20k and National Trust/Glos Wildlife Trust £5k (In Kind).
\*RSuDS is one of the titles under which projects of this type have been developed in recent years. The national R&D project has adopted the title Working with Natural Processes (WWNP) and Natural Flood Management (NFM) is also widely used.
As part of flood and coastal risk management work and in partnership with other RMAs the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales monitor and adapt to future changes in the RBD by undertaking the following activities:
- strategic planning
- flood risk management investigations
- hydraulic and hydrological modelling
- flood forecasting and warning
- incident management planning
- engaging with local communities
- flood improvement works
- development planning and control
- maintenance work
- enforcement Flood risk from rivers and the sea
Table 6.2: Summary of flood risk to people, economic activity and the natural and historic environment across the Severn RBD.
| River & Sea | Total in RBD | High risk | Medium risk | Low risk | Very low risk | |-------------|--------------|-----------|-------------|----------|---------------| | **Risk to people:** | | | | | | | Number of people in area: | 5,664,400 | 32,600 | 62,100 | 240,650 | 33,050 | | Number of services: | 12,760 | 450 | 290 | 540 | 150 | | **Risk to economic activity:** | | | | | | | Number of non-residential properties: | 765,450 | 13,550 | 13,750 | 34,550 | 6,300 | | Number of airports: | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Length of roads (km): | 4,090 | 90 | 90 | 180 | 40 | | Length of railway (km): | 1,480 | 50 | 50 | 110 | 20 | | Agricultural land (ha): | 1,157,450 | 47,400 | 17,000 | 26,800 | 9,250 | | **Risk to the natural and historic environment:** | | | | | | | Number of EU designated bathing waters within 50m: | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Number of EPR installations within 50m: | 467 | 29 | 20 | 41 | 6 | | Area of SAC within area (ha): | 82,050 | 15,500 | 400 | 150 | 200 | | Area of SPA within area (ha): | 50,950 | 11,250 | 400 | 50 | 150 | | Area of RAMSAR site within area (ha): | 19,450 | 10,800 | 250 | 50 | 200 | | Area of World Heritage Site within area (ha): | 6,700 | 150 | 50 | 100 | 50 | | Area of SSSI within area (ha): | 112,950 | 16,950 | 1,650 | 5,850 | 400 | | Area of parks and gardens within area (ha): | 29,150 | 950 | 450 | 450 | 200 | | Area of Scheduled Ancient Monument within area (ha): | 6,900 | 200 | 100 | 150 | 50 | | Number of listed buildings within area: | 62,400 | 1,800 | 1,080 | 2,740 | 710 | | Number of Licensed water abstractions within the area: | 4,360 | 1,530 | 180 | 120 | 60 |
Note: SAC - Special Area of Conservation SPA - Special Protection Area SSSI - Site of Special Scientific Interest Ramsar - wetland site of international importance EPR installations - those registered under the Environmental Permitting Regulations The following maps illustrate the broad scale of flood risk across the RBD from all sources. You can view them in more detail in the links set out at the end of this section.
Figure 6.1: Map of flooding from rivers and sea - risk to people Figure 6.2: Map of flooding from rivers and sea – risk to economic activity Figure 6.3: Map of flooding from rivers and sea – risk to natural and historic environment
Rivers and Sea Flood Risk Map Severn River Basin District
Risk to the Natural and Historic Environment
Flood Risk Source Rivers and Sea
- High
- Medium
- Low
- Very Low
Reporting Boundaries
- River Basin District
- River Basin Districts (Neighbouring)
- Management Catchment
Internationally Designated Sites
- Bathing waters that may be adversely affected by surface water run-off
- EPR (Environmental Permitting Regulations) installations within 50m of Risk
© Environment Agency copyright and/or database right 2014. All rights reserved. © Natural Resources Wales copyright and/or database right 2014. All rights reserved.
This map is reproduced from Ordnance Survey material with the permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationary Office © Crown copyright. Unauthorised reproduction infringes Crown copyright and may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings. Environment Agency, 100250360, 2014. Natural Resources Wales, 100010741, 2014.
Copyright resides with the data suppliers (see cover sheet for details) and the map must not be reproduced without their permission.
Some information is a snapshot of information that is being maintained or continually updated by the originating organisation.
Contact Us: Environment Agency - National Customer Contact Centre, PO Box 54, Rotherham, S60 1BF. Telephone: 03708 566 606 (Mon to Fri, 8am to 6pm). Email address: [email protected] Contact Us: Natural Resources Wales - Customer Care Centre, Ty Cambria, 29 Newport Road, Cardiff, CF24 0TP. Telephone: 0300 065 9000 (Mon-Fri, 8am - 5pm). Email address: [email protected] Reservoir flood risk
The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales regulate large raised reservoirs (with a capacity of 25,000 cubic metres and above) with regard to flood risk and provide guidance to reservoir ‘undertakers’ to help them manage their assets. Enforcement action may then be taken to seek improvements in some circumstances. The ‘flood risk map for reservoirs’ for the Severn RBD, which can be found on the gov.uk website, shows what is at risk, including people, economic activity and the environment.
The statistics and maps below illustrate the extent of reservoir flood risk across the Severn RBD. Table 6.3. Summary flood risk from reservoirs to people, economic activity and the natural and historic environment across the Severn RBD.
| Reservoirs | Total in RBD | Maximum extent of flooding | |------------------------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------| | **Risk to people:** | | | | Number of people in area: | 5,664,400 | 261,750 | | Number of services: | 12,760 | 730 | | **Risk to economic activity:** | | | | Number of non-residential properties: | 7,654,60 | 36,620 | | Number of airports: | 3 | 0 | | Length of roads (km): | 4,090 | 200 | | Length of railway (km): | 1,480 | 100 | | Agricultural land (ha): | 1,157,450 | 34,000 | | **Risk to the natural and historic environment:** | | | | Number of EU designated bathing waters within 50m: | 2 | 0 | | Number of EPR installations within 50m: | 467 | 23 | | Area of SAC within area (ha): | 82,050 | 6,050 | | Area of SPA within area (ha): | 50,950 | 3,950 | | Area of RAMSAR site within area (ha): | 19,450 | 3,350 | | Area of World Heritage Site within area (ha): | 6,700 | 100 | | Area of SSSI within area (ha): | 112,950 | 8,100 | | Area of parks and gardens within area (ha): | 29,150 | 1,400 | | Area of Scheduled Ancient Monument within area (ha): | 6,900 | 300 | | Number of listed buildings within area: | 62,400 | 3,360 | | Number of Licensed water abstractions within the area: | 4,360 | 900 |
Note: SAC - Special Area of Conservation SPA - Special Protection Area SSSI - Site of Special Scientific Interest Ramsar - wetland site of international importance EPR installations - those registered under the Environmental Permitting Regulations Figure 6.4: Map of flooding from reservoirs – risk to people 6.5: Map of flooding from reservoirs – risk to economic activity Figure 6.6: Map of flooding from reservoirs - risk to the natural and historic environment
Reservoirs Flood Risk Map
Severn River Basin District
Risk to the Natural and Historic Environment
Flood Risk Source Reservoirs
- Maximum extent of flooding
Internationally Designated Sites
- Bathing waters that may be adversely affected by surface water run-off
- EPR (Environmental Permitting Regulations) installations within 50m of Risk
Reporting Boundaries
- River Basin District
- River Basin Districts (Neighbouring)
- Management Catchment
© Environment Agency copyright and/or database right 2014. All rights reserved. © Natural Resources Wales copyright and/or database right 2014. All rights reserved.
This map is reproduced from Ordnance Survey material with the permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office © Crown copyright. Unauthorised reproduction infringes Crown copyright and may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings. Environment Agency: 100053380; 2014. Natural Resources Wales: 100015741; 2014.
Copyright resides with the data suppliers (see cover sheet for details) and the map must not be reproduced without their permission.
Some information is a snapshot of information that is being maintained or continually updated by the originating organisation.
Contact Us: Environment Agency - National Customer Contact Centre, PO Box 54, Rotherham, S60 2BY. Telephone: 03708 566 506 (Mon to Fri, 8am to 6pm). Email address: [email protected] Contact Us: Natural Resources Wales - Customer Care Centre, Ty Cambria, 29 Newport Road, Cardiff. CF24 0TP. Telephone: 0800 065 3000 (Mon-Fri, 8am - 6pm). Email address: [email protected] Surface water flood risk
Lead Local Flood Authorities are responsible for managing the risk of flooding from surface water, defined as rainwater on the ground surface that hasn’t entered a watercourse, drain or sewer. This type of flooding can begin to occur within minutes of intense rain, so it is almost impossible to forecast. Problems can quickly occur in several places, and although these might be over a small area, a local council’s resources can quickly become stretched. It is good practice to plan for drains and watercourses becoming overwhelmed in a flood, such as by analysing the flow paths that floodwater may take. Once these are known, steps can be taken to ensure they are kept free from obstructions such as buildings and to consider whether roads and open space can be used to safely channel water away. Surface water flooding is a problem across the Severn catchment, whether due to run-off from fields and down roads in rural and semi-rural areas, or from roofs and paved surfaces in built-up areas, sometimes due to insufficient capacity of drains and sewers. The most notable surface water flooding in recent times includes Gloucestershire and Worcestershire in 2007, Caerphilly in 2009 and Rhiwbina in Cardiff 2009.
In England, from 15 April 2015, Lead Local Flood Authorities became a statutory consultee on planning applications in relation to surface water drainage arrangements for major development.
In Wales, the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 (Schedule 3), which has not been commenced, requires new developments to include SuDS features that comply with national standards. The Welsh Government proposes to publish interim national standards on an advisory basis until such time as it determines the most effective way of embedding SuDS principles in new developments in the longer term. These interim non statutory national standards and guidance are for the design, construction, operation and maintenance of SuDS serving new developments of more than one house in Wales. While these standards apply for new developments, the SuDS approach is increasingly being applied to existing developments to address sewerage capacity and local flood risk problems. The interim standards will therefore provide a useful framework for the delivery of such retrofit schemes.
To date in both England and Wales, most measures to limit run-off have been below ground, such as underground storage tanks or over-sized sewers. SuDS are usually above ground. They limit site run-off and can filter out some silt and contaminants. Common types of SuDS are ponds which fluctuate in level with rainfall, swales (wide grass ditches), soakaways and permeable pavements (block paving, sometimes with gravel beneath). The approach to be adopted requires infiltration to be considered first, then attenuation and discharge to a watercourse as the next option and only if these are impractical should attenuation with discharge to a sewer be considered. Retro-fitting of SuDS to existing buildings and land is also a way of reducing peak flows in drains/sewers and watercourses and so helping to reduce flooding and pollution.
The River Severn FRMP has 7 defined Flood Risk Areas. Only Bristol Flood Risk Area is consolidated into this FRMP. The LLFAs within Wales have opted to produce their first cycle FRMPs independently but in co-ordination with this FRMP. The maps and statistics on the following page therefore only cover surface water flood risk for Bristol. Table. 6.4. Summary flood risk from surface water to people, economic activity and the natural and historic environment across the Bristol Flood Risk Area (BFRA)\*
| Surface Water | Total in BFRA | High risk | Medium risk | Low risk | |---------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|----------| | **Risk to people:** | | | | | | Number of people in area: | 570,600 | 38,400 | 14,900 | 15,200 | | Number of services: | 611 | 35 | 11 | 13 | | **Risk to economic activity:** | | | | | | Number of non-residential properties: | 32,400 | 2,600 | 2,200 | 300 | | Number of airports: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Length of roads (km): | 110 | \<10 | \<10 | 10 | | Length of railway (km): | 50 | \<10 | \<10 | \<10 | | Agricultural land (ha): | 3,550 | 100 | 50 | 250 | | **Risk to the natural and historic environment:** | | | | | | Number of EU designated bathing waters within 50m: | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Number of EPR installations within 50m: | 7 | 3 | 0 | 1 | | Area of SAC within area (ha): | 100 | 0 | \<50 | \<50 | | Area of SPA within area (ha): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Area of RAMSAR site within area (ha): | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Area of World Heritage Site within area (ha): | 2,900 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Area of SSSI within area (ha): | 250 | \<50 | \<50 | \<50 | | Area of parks and gardens within area (ha): | 500 | \<50 | \<50 | \<50 | | Area of Scheduled Ancient Monument within area (ha): | \<50 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Number of listed buildings within area: | 2,300 | 40 | 10 | 10 | | Number of Licensed water abstractions within the area: | 20 | \<10 | 0 | 0 |
Note: SAC - Special Area of Conservation SPA - Special Protection Area SSSI - Site of Special Scientific Interest Ramsar - wetland site of international importance EPR installations - those registered under the Environmental Permitting Regulations
\*For the Bristol Flood Risk Area (BFRA), the property counting method uses Bristol City Council (BCC) parameter settings for the portion of the area within the BCC boundary (4m buffer, 0.25 proportion wetted perimeter) and national settings for the portion of the BFRA outside the BCC boundary (2m buffer, 0.5 proportion wetted perimeter). The different parameter settings ensure that the property counting method accords with the different flood modelling methodology used in each portion of the area. Figure 6.7: Map of flooding from local sources – risk to people Figure 6.8: Map of flooding from local sources – risk to economic activity Figure 6.9: Map of flooding from local sources – risk to the natural and historic environment
Bathing waters that may be adversely affected by surface water run-off
Risk to the Natural and Historic Environment
Internationally Designated Sites
- Bathing waters that may be adversely affected by surface water run-off
- EPR (Environmental Permitting Regulations) Installations within 50m of Risk
© Environment Agency copyright and/or database right 2013. All rights reserved. © Natural Resources Wales copyright and/or database right 2013. All rights reserved.
This map is reproduced from Ordnance Survey material with the permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationary Office © Crown copyright. Unauthorised reproduction infringes Crown copyright and may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings. Environment Agency: 002025200, 2013. Natural Resources Wales: 002019741, 2013.
Copyright resides with the data suppliers (see credit sheet for details) and the map must not be reproduced without their permission.
Some information is a snapshot of information that is being maintained or continually updated by the originating organisation.
Contact Us: Environment Agency - National Customer Contact Centre, PO Box 54, Rollestone, Waltham, OX12 8BY. Telephone: 03708 500 500 (Mon to Fri, 8am to 8pm). Email address: [email protected] Contact Us: Natural Resources Wales - Customer Care Centre, Ty Cambria, 29 Newport Road, Cardiff, CF24 0TP. Telephone: 0800 005 3000 (Mon-Fri, 8am - 6pm). Email address: [email protected] Sewer flood risk
6 water and sewerage companies supply water across the Severn River Basin District and are responsible for sewers which take away wastewater and any surface water which drains into these sewers. Better outcomes can be gained by considering flood risk from sewers and other sources and then managing actions in an integrated manner with other organisations. However, this is not a mandatory requirement of Flood Risk Management Plans.
The FRMP promotes partnership working across all RMA’s, including water companies, to encourage the identification of opportunities to deliver measures in support of flood protection, prevention and resilience, including land and catchment management initiatives. RMA’s, including water companies are also encouraged to work together to deliver joined up advice and information about flooding (including sewer flooding) to support community engagement and awareness measures.
Groundwater flood risk
LLFAs are responsible for managing the risk of flooding from Groundwater. Groundwater is naturally stored in the ground below the water table level. When the water table rises and reaches ground level, water starts to emerge on the surface and flooding can happen. This may be because the ground slopes, or because of a break in the rock layers. Once on the surface this groundwater may flow or pond. It can also be caused by water moving through the superficial sediments near to rivers, where the sediments allow the movements of water more readily than less permeable sub-surface rocks.
The severity of groundwater flooding in the Severn catchment is largely unknown. However, in areas such as Birmingham, where industry has reduced and the volumes of water being abstracted from groundwater sources has fallen, the likelihood of groundwater flooding is increased as the groundwater sits at higher levels.
A study conducted by British Geological Society (BGS) showed a large quantity of superficial sediments near to the main channels of the River Severn and its tributaries and in its upland areas which may suggest that groundwater flooding could occur in these regions.
Coastal Erosion & Shoreline Management Plans
The Environment Agency has the coastal Strategic Overview in England and Natural Resources Wales has the coastal Strategic Oversight in Wales. These functions seek to join up coastal management activities to ensure flooding and erosion risk is managed effectively. Authorities are encouraged to work together in partnership to achieve effective management of coastal flooding and erosion risks.
Local authorities have operational powers relating to managing coastal erosion under the Coast Protection Act 1949 and the Flood and Water Management Act 2010. Local Authorities lead on coastal erosion risk management activities in collaboration with the Environment Agency in England and Natural Resources Wales in Wales.
Shoreline Management Plans (SMPs) are non-statutory, high level planning documents. They are large scale assessments of the risk associated with coastal processes, and a policy framework to reduce these risks to people and the developed, historic and natural environment in a sustainable manner. They set the strategic policy direction for how the coast should be managed over the next 100 years. SMPs identify the most sustainable approaches to managing coastal erosion and flooding risks in the short, medium and long term. During the development of SMPs a range of partners and the public were extensively consulted and involved in the decision making processes.
This Flood Risk Management Plan also draws some coastal erosion information for England only from the relevant SMPs. However, the full Shoreline Management Plan has not been included in this FRMP. The SMP measures included in this FRMP for England and Wales are those that are most relevant for sea flooding and flood risk issues. You can access further information and the full SMPs for England and Wales here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/shoreline-management-plans-smps/shoreline-management-plans-smps.
In England, SMP content can be updated or changed using an established auditable process. These changes will be reflected in the FRMPs as they are updated on a six-yearly cycle. These changes may be prompted by changes in the evidence base guiding management decisions in SMPs, including evidence emerging from experience of the ongoing implementation of RBMPs. In this way, the Programme of Measures in RBMPs, the action plan and information in the FRMP, and the ‘living’ SMP documents should successfully inform and read-across to each other.
The Marine Management Organisation in England
The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 established the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) to produce marine plans, administer marine licensing and manage marine fisheries in English waters. It introduced marine planning in the UK through production of a marine policy statement and more detailed marine plans setting spatial policy at a more local level. Eleven marine plans covering English waters are anticipated by 2021.
Marine plans will inform and guide marine users and regulators across England, managing the sustainable development of marine industries such as wind farms and fishing, alongside the need to conserve and protect marine species and habitats. At its landward extent, a marine plan will apply up to mean high water, including estuaries and the tidal extent of rivers. All public bodies making authorisation or enforcement decisions capable of affecting the marine area must do so in accordance with the Marine Policy Statement (MPS) or marine plans (where they are in place) or state reasons for not doing so. Marine licensing, administered by the MMO is the main environmental and development control system below high water.
Further information can be found on the MMO web pages on GOV.UK https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/marine-planning-in-england
Find out more:
- Interactive flood maps for flooding from rivers, the sea, reservoirs and surface water
- Severn RBMP
- Current Ecological and Chemical Status of Water Bodies
7. Sub-areas in the Severn RBD
Introduction There are a number of sub-areas within the Severn River Basin District (RBD), as shown in Figure 7.1 and outlined below. These are:
- English part of RBD
- Welsh part of RBD
- Catchments (which are set out according to WFD Management Catchments)
The measures that relate to Wales only are found in the Welsh Strategic Area. Due to the differences in the ways of working between Natural Resources Wales and the Environment Agency the measures tables for all Welsh catchments are reported at a community level, in Part B. NRW has a prioritised list of communities which requires the reader to understand the context of the community within its catchment. For this reason the Welsh measures appear in the relevant catchment detail and not in the Part C: Appendices. The Welsh measures are continually updated and the measures in this plan are indicative although correct at the time of publication. There are no Welsh related measures in the appendices, however the RBD-wide measures that affect Welsh Catchments are found in the appendices.
The measures that relate to the River Basin District, the English Strategic Area and English catchments are contained in the appendices.
Flood Risk Areas were identified in the Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment as areas that require flood risk management plans for local sources of flooding.
Figure 7.1: Severn RBD showing Catchments, Flood Risk Areas and Wales and England only sections **English / Welsh part of RBD:** Where possible, this plan has been co-ordinated at RBD scale covering the whole of the Severn RBD. As the Severn RBD covers parts of both England and Wales, there may be elements of flood risk management work that are not applicable to the whole RBD and may just cover the Welsh section or the English section due to different administrations. This plan includes two large strategic areas:
- English Severn
- Welsh Severn
This will enable risk conclusions, objectives and measures to be developed for the English Severn as a strategic area and the Welsh Severn as a strategic area. The Teme, Severn Uplands and Wye catchments have areas in both strategic areas.
**Catchments:** These are areas where the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales focus engagement to enable a catchment based approach to water management. They are set out according to WFD management catchments. There are 10 catchments in the Severn RBD, as listed below:
- Severn Uplands (cross border)
- Shropshire Middle Severn (English strategic area)
- Worcestershire Middle Severn (English strategic area)
- Teme (cross border)
- Warwickshire Avon (English strategic area)
- Severn Vale (English strategic area)
- Wye (cross border)
- Usk (Welsh strategic area)
- South East Valleys (Welsh strategic area)
- Bristol Avon & North Somerset Streams (English strategic area)
The cross border catchments are split into Wales and England to reflect the difference in approach to measures. The English measures are listed in Annex 1 whereas the Welsh measures are incorporated in the catchment detail in Part B.
**Flood Risk Areas:** These are areas identified through Preliminary Flood Risk Assessments as areas of potentially significant local flood risk (for instance surface runoff, groundwater and ordinary watercourses), for which FRMPs need to be prepared.
The Bristol Flood Risk Area is included within this FRMP and is entirely within the Bristol Avon & North Somerset Streams catchment.
The West Midlands Flood Risk Area is included within the Humber FRMP.
The Flood Risk Areas in Wales form separate individual FRMPs. 8. Conclusions, objectives and measures to manage risk for the Severn RBD
This plan sets out the type of measures proposed to manage the risk. In developing the proposed measures the RMAs contributing have:
- drawn conclusions from hazard and risk maps and other sources of information: this helps us all to understand the risks or opportunities the RMAs are aiming to manage;
- developed risk management objectives (related to people and society, the economy and the environment) that set out the outcomes RMAs are trying to achieve;
- identified the likely approach to managing risk using the following categories: preventing, preparing, protecting and recovering and review.
We have set out the following conclusions and objectives for the Severn RBD as a whole:
Conclusions
The Severn RBD covers an area of approximately 21,500 km² and water bodies are made up of over 7,500 km of river, 76 lakes, 36 canals, 40 areas of groundwater and 545 km² of estuary.
The large size of the RBD gives rise to a huge variety of land uses, geology, topography and other factors that have an influence on flood risk.
The large majority of the RBD, approximately 90%, is classified as rural, with over 55% of land being used for agricultural purposes.
Flooding from Rivers and the Sea
The percentage of the population at medium or high risk of flooding from rivers and the sea is relatively low, at less than 2%, for the majority of the catchment as most urban development has historically been located in areas of higher ground.
The percentage of non-residential properties at medium or high risk in the RBD is also relatively low at just under 4%.
In specific locations, mostly in the vicinity of urban areas where rapid post war expansion has taken place, these percentages may increase slightly.
Of the 12,000 km² of agricultural land within the catchment approximately 6% is at high to medium risk. This is mostly associated with the lower lying areas adjacent to the major watercourses such as the Rivers Severn, Wye, Warwickshire Avon and Severn Estuary, though a number of these areas are protected by agricultural defences that reduce the risk of flooding, and subsequent impact.
Flood risk is influenced by climate change, changes in land use and changes in land management practices.
Reservoir Flooding
In the Severn RBD there are a number of large raised reservoirs that hold at least 25,000m³ of water above natural ground level. The hazard maps show the largest area that might flood if a reservoir were to fail. The chances of a reservoir failing and causing flooding are very low. However the extent of flooding from a reservoir can be up to 50 miles from its source. This is because the local geography, such as valleys, can channel flood water long distances.
Many of these features are located in the upland areas of the RBD such as the Welsh Mountains, Brecon Beacons, Cotswold and Mendip Hills.
In the RBD there are approximately 260,000 people, as well as infrastructure and areas of environmental importance at risk of flooding from reservoirs.
The percentage of the population at risk of flooding from reservoirs is again low, at approximately 4.5%, whilst the percentage of non-residential properties at risk in the RBD is also low at just under 5%. Should failure occur, though, localised impacts could be severe. These low figures are due to the vast nature of the RBD and many of the main urban centres in the catchment being some distance downstream of the larger reservoirs such as Lyn Clywedog. This percentage however changes significantly in parts of the catchment such as the Welsh Valleys where there is significant urban development downstream of large reservoirs.
The impact on agricultural land within the catchment would be much greater with approximately 20% at risk.
**Surface Water Flooding**
Surface water flooding is usually the product of brief but intense storms.
This type of flooding occurs in rural areas when the ground is unable to absorb the high volume of water that falls on it in a short period of time. The water remains on the surface and flows along the easiest flow path towards a low spot in the landscape.
Within urban areas the non-permeability of many surfaces such as paved roads is often responsible for the ground not being able to absorb the water. Poorly maintained or inadequate drainage systems can then exacerbate the problem, leading to flow routes appearing and/or ponding of water to depths that can be a danger to life.
The percentage of the population at a medium to high risk of flooding from surface water is similar to that of fluvial flooding at approximately 2% whilst the percentage of non-residential properties at medium to high risk in the RBD is also low at just under 3%.
The impact on agricultural land within the catchment is again low with approximately 3% at medium to low risk.
Surface water flooding is a risk in some urban locations within the district. Within these more localised areas the percentage of people and properties at risk may be higher.
**Sewer flooding**
Sewer flooding occurs when blockages or extreme water volumes result in water backing up in the sewer system and overflowing into roads, gardens or homes. There has been significant investment in reducing sewer flooding by the water companies in recent years, e.g. £20million of improvements to sewer capacity in Leamington Spa, and continued investment from water companies and partnership working initiatives are aiming to reduce the risk further.
The pressures of climate change and increasing populations look likely to increase the risk of sewer flooding.
**Groundwater flooding**
Groundwater flooding is the emergence of groundwater at ground level, when water rises up from the underlying rocks, particularly following extended periods of sustained high rainfall. Groundwater flooding is closely linked to geology and is less common in the Severn than in other locations, such as south east England where chalk is quite common.
Groundwater flooding could be a problem in the Severn catchment due to the quantity of superficial sediment and reduction of industry around Birmingham, however, the lack of available data for the region makes it impossible to quantify the problem at this time or identify specific areas that are likely to be at risk. Studies being undertaken by British Geological Society and UK Groundwater Society will help to highlight these areas of risk in the future.
**Working with others**
There is a continued need to work in partnership with others, where possible, to achieve flood risk management measures which will alleviate flooding from multiple sources, as well as providing wider environmental and other benefits to improve the natural, rural and built environment consistent with the principles of sustainable development. One example of this type of collaboration can be seen in the current review into how Clywedog and Vyrnwy reservoirs are used to provide water resources and ecological benefits in the Severn Catchment. The collaboration ensures that the study presents a balanced view of the effects on all aspects of the catchment and considers more than just the flood management issues. Box 4. Case Study Box
The Clywedog and Vyrnwy Flood Benefits Review.
Natural Resources Wales (NRW) were directed by Welsh Government to carry out an independent assessment of the Operating Rules of Llyn Clywedog and Lake Vyrnwy. The Study was to look at the benefit and cost of increasing the storage, by reducing the operational water levels, within the reservoirs. The study reviewed the whole year, and considered the capacity to provide increased flood attenuation without jeopardising its primary statutory purpose of augmenting the water resources of the River Severn in England and in Vyrnwy’s case direct public water supply. NRW also wanted to look at the cumulative effects of the Severn on the Vyrnwy and vice versa at the confluence.
The review was instigated in response to views that the timing and scale of water releases from both reservoirs may have adverse cumulative effects on the land downstream, particularly to the agricultural industry.
The review was carried out in partnership with the Environment Agency (EA) in England and took into account the requirements of water resources and the water companies’ needs for abstraction particularly during dry/drought years, including the hydropower requirements of Severn Trent Water who own and operate Llyn Clywedog.
The main purposes of the review were:
- Extend a previous study which investigated the role of Clywedog in flood risk management to include the role of Vyrnwy;
- Ensure that the understanding of flood risk benefits is based on up to date data, information and flood risk and water resource models;
- Engage with stakeholders to understand their concerns about the current operation of the reservoirs;
- Identify whether there could be any additional flood benefits from changing the reservoir operation and management;
- Understand whether there would be any water resources impacts from a change in reservoir operation;
- Review the effects of combined reservoir releases and timings thereof on the Severn-Vyrnwy confluence area.
A key to producing this review was to ensure that all stakeholders had an opportunity to input their knowledge and to understand their views. The review process ensured that local knowledge from a liaison group made up of local political representatives, farmers, landowners and the public was input at the outset of the project. NRW also understood that any recommendations had to be credible and realistic to ensure that the partner organisations would be prepared to look into possibly implementing them in future.
The review is expected to deliver its findings in 2015. Objectives
The objectives that have been set are in line with the National Flood and Coastal Risk Management Strategies for Wales and England. These objectives set out the key factors that the measures should aim to tackle. They cover social, economic and environment factors.
Table 8.1: Objectives for the Severn river basin district
| Objective | Environmental | Economic | Social | |-----------|---------------|----------|--------| | 1 Manage flood and coastal erosion risks, taking account of the needs of communities businesses and the environment and working with natural solutions wherever possible. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | 2 Reduce the risk from flooding to people and households. | ✓ | ✓ | | | 3 Develop and promote a better understanding of flood and coastal risk and use this to prioritise investment in risk management. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | 4 Ensure that wherever possible investment in flood and coastal risk management provides environmental, social and economic benefits, protects and enhances the natural, built and historic environment and supports the achievement of WFD objectives. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | 5 Target resources to reduce the risk of flooding to communities with the highest flood risk. | ✓ | ✓ | | | 6 Set out a clear and consistent plan for flood risk management so that communities, businesses and other organisations can make informed decisions about the management of flood risk and associated opportunities for delivering environmental benefits. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | 7 Raise awareness of and engage people, businesses and organisations on flood and coastal erosion risk to encourage them to take action to manage the risks they face. | ✓ | ✓ | | | 8 Provide an effective and sustained response to flood and coastal erosion events. | ✓ | ✓ | | | 9 Households and businesses at high risk of flooding can receive an appropriate flood warnings service. | ✓ | ✓ | | | 10 Encourage emergency plans and responses to flood incidents to be effective and communities to respond effectively to flood forecasts, warnings and advice. | ✓ | ✓ | | | 11 In support of integrated catchment based water management, facilitate decision-making and action at the appropriate level (individual, community, or local council, river catchment, coastal cell or national), foster partnership working and ensure early engagement with stakeholders. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | 12 Maintain Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales flood and coastal risk management assets at or above required condition. | ✓ | ✓ | | | 13 Reduce the risk of flooding from reservoirs to people, property, infrastructure and the environment. | ✓ | ✓ | |
Measures across the Severn RBD as a whole
Many measures are specific to a catchment or smaller area. However, there are some important actions which apply across the whole Severn RBD. These are shown here and not repeated at each catchment level. Measures in FRMPs do not all have secured funding and are not guaranteed to be implemented. Money is allocated to RMA measures based on current Government policy that gives the highest priority to the areas at highest risk. The funding for flooding is devolved so RMA measures are funded by DEFRA in England, in Wales they are funded by Welsh Government.
**Preventing risk:** There are 9 measures already in place to prevent flood risk at the River Basin District level (Measure codes M21/M23/M24, in Annex 1), including:
- work with others to avoid inappropriate development in the floodplain;
- ensure no increase in run-off from new developments through planning advice;
- increase awareness and encourage landowners to fulfil their riparian landowner responsibilities;
- promote flood resilience and flood proofing;
- ensure a robust, risk based, revenue maintenance programme exists that prioritises flood risk management works across each catchment.
**Preparing for risk:** There are 7 measures already in place to prepare for flood risk at the River Basin District level (Measure codes M41/M42/M43/M44 in Annex 1), including:
- provide advice and information to Local Resilience Forums and local communities to enable them to reduce the impact of flooding;
- maintain and improve the flood forecasting, flood warning and flood incident management service;
- raise awareness with key partners, land owners and land managers of their roles in flood risk management and explore opportunities for joint outcomes;
- provide a flood incident response service 24 hours a day, 7 days a week;
- Natural Resources Wales and Environment Agency work closely to consider the benefit or detriment to the whole river basin in all decision making and activity.
**Protecting from risk:** There are 7 measures already in place that protect from flood risk at the River Basin District level (Measure codes M32/M34/M35 in Annex 1):
- work with landowners, local and national government to encourage best farming practices to reduce rapid surface water run-off and soil erosion;
- work with Natural England and other partners and landowners to identify opportunities for floodplain restoration;
- secure funding and deliver emergency works where needed for assets;
- incorporate climate change allowances into flood risk management works;
- identify where working with natural processes can help improve resilience to climate change.
**Recovery and review of risk:** There is 1 measure in place to recover and review following flooding at the River Basin District level (Measure code M53 in Annex 1):
- improve and develop services based on lessons identified following flood events. Flood Risk Management Plan contribution to broader benefits and links with the Severn River Basin Management Plan
Introduction Through the development of this Severn FRMP, the aims and objectives of the National Flood and Coastal Erosion strategies for England and Wales have been considered. In order to take these strategies forward, this plan sets out a range of social, economic and environmental objectives that include wider benefits alongside the delivery of flood risk management outcomes – see the following sections. These have been informed by considering how the FRMP relates to other plans and wider policies and objectives. In particular, how the FRMP links to the River Basin Management Plans to contribute to a more integrated approach to water management planning, and also to the priorities of Natura 2000 sites that are the subject of recent Site Improvement Plans (Prioritised Improvement Plans in Wales). The following sections provide more details of this.
Other Plans and Partnerships Table 8.2 sets out the key themes from a review of the main other plans and strategies that the Severn FRMP would be expected to influence. The purpose of the review is to take account of the objectives of these key documents in the assessment with a view to aligning and ensuring compliance of the plan with other policies and legislation. The plan review can also help to identify where other planning processes and organisations may be able to work with the flood risk management planning process. The following summary of the plan review is based on the Environmental Report for the Severn FRMP.
Table 8.2 Key influences from the plans review
| Category of plan/strategy | Common themes relevant to the FRMP | Key plans | |---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------| | Water and flood risk management | • Protection, improvement, sustainable management and use of the water environment in terms of quantity and quality – for the benefit of the human and natural environment.\
• Flood risk management measures could place pressure on water bodies and any measure to be implemented would have to be Water Framework Directive compliant.\
• The update to the Severn River Basin Management Plan has been prepared in parallel with the FRMP. In support of integrated planning, the SEA identifies where there is the potential for the two plans to deliver positive effects and areas where there may be potential conflicts and require early consideration to develop mutually beneficial solutions. | • National flood and coastal erosion risk management strategies for England and Wales\
• Water for people and the environment: Water resources strategy for England and Wales\
• Water white paper: Water for life\
• A Water Strategy for Wales\
• Severn RBMP (draft update)\
• Catchment flood management plans\
• Shoreline management plans\
• Fluvial River Severn Flood Risk Management Strategy\
• Severn Estuary Flood Risk Management Strategy\
• Surface water management plans\
• Water resource management plans\
• River Restoration | | Category of plan /strategy | Common themes relevant to the FRMP | Key plans | |---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------| | **Biodiversity** | • Protection and enhancement of important habitats and species, both from a statutory basis (International and National conservation designations and protected species) and through policy.\
• Promotion of coherent ecological networks.\
• Promotion of working with natural processes and sustainable development/management.\
• Tackling the issue of non native invasive species\
• Flood risk management measures could place pressure on habitats and species, and work against natural processes. | • Natural environment white paper: The natural choice: Securing the value of nature\
• Biodiversity 2020: A strategy for England’s wildlife and ecosystem services\
• Wales Biodiversity Framework\
• Environment Strategy for Wales\
• Coastal squeeze: Implications for flood management. The requirements of The European Birds and Habitats Directives. Defra policy guidance.\
• The invasive and non-native species framework strategy for Great Britain\
• Wales National Habitat Creation Programme\
• Green infrastructure strategies\
• Local biodiversity action plans | | **Landscape** | • Protection of existing sensitive landscapes (such as National Parks and AONBs)\
• Promotion of actions to improve water quality and water quantity, protect and enhance habitats, and restore the wider landscape character\
• Flood risk management measures could place pressure on sensitive landscapes, and lead to changes in water quality, quantity and change in habitat type. | • All Landscapes Matter\
• AONB and National Park management plans [Mendip Hills, Cotswolds, Shropshire Hills, Malvern Hills, Wye Valley and Brecon Beacons]\
• Local landscape strategies | | **Climate** | • Long term aims for reduction of carbon dioxide emissions including reference to binding targets, and wide-reaching policies across all sectors to deliver reductions.\
• Requirements to adapt to climate change and associated threats, the need for increased resilience to climate change.\
• Likely increase in flooding and | • Managing the environment in a changing climate\
• Climate Change Strategy for Wales\
• The national flood and coastal erosion risk management strategies for England and Wales | | Category of plan /strategy | Common themes relevant to the FRMP | Key plans | |---------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------| | | coastal erosion due to climate change. | | | Marine and Coastal | • Sustainable economic growth within the marine environment that balances benefits to society with the needs of local communities and protecting nature conservation.\
• Coastal flood risk management measures can enable growth\
• Coastal flood risk management measures would need to be in alignment with planning policies. | • UK Marine Policy Statement\
• Wales Fisheries Strategy\
• Welsh National Marine Plan (in preparation) | | Cultural heritage | • Sustainable development in relation to historic assets through conservation and enhancement.\
• The historic environment could be affected by flood risk management measures e.g. through the construction of new flood risk management schemes, implementation of fish/eel passage on flood risk management assets, etc and as such any such measures would need to be appropriately assessed. | • The Government’s Statement on the Historic Environment for England\
• Valuing the Welsh Historic Environment\
• Heritage at Risk Registers | | Resource management | • Promotion of sustainable waste and resource management and the protection and enhancement of the environment. | • National Waste Strategy for Wales\
• Metal Mines Strategy for Wales\
• Minerals and Waste Plans | | Planning | • Promotion of sustainable growth\
• Promotion of water-based recreation and tourist opportunities\
• Flood risk management measures can enable growth.\
• Flood risk management measures would need to be in alignment with planning policies.\
• Development activities could place pressure on the water bodies and would need to be appropriately management and assessed to ensure no detrimental effect to the water environment. | • National Planning Policy Framework\
• Planning Policy Wales\
• Local Development Plans/ Unitary Development Plans | | Forestry and Farming | • Protection, management and enhancement of woods and forests to provide economic, social and environmental benefits e.g. managing flood risk in a sustainable way, and helping to reduce water pollution\
• Sustainable farming practices that deliver environmental benefits e.g. | • Government Forestry and Woodlands Policy\
• Woodland Strategy for Wales\
• Wales – A new Strategy for Farming | Links with the Severn River Basin Management Plan
The main aims of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) are to return rivers and the water environment to a state as free from human influence as possible. Aspects of this include reversing some of the ways in which water bodies have been physically modified in the past, improving water quality and bio-diversity and improving the quality of bathing waters. To achieve this, work by the water companies, farmers and business is regulated by the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales, complemented by a programme of works by the Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales and others to remove some structures from rivers.
The Severn FRMP promotes a range of benefits that will contribute to the RBMP through re-naturalisation, water quality improvements, bathing water improvements and natural flood management.
In the English section this is further detailed in Part B, section 2.1.
Severn opportunities for linked work
In delivering the programme of measures set out in the FRMP, the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales look for the potential in all measures to improve the local natural, built and historic environment, and so to achieve environmental benefits alongside economic and social gains. These include environmental improvements to meet obligations set out through the Water Framework Directive and Habitats and Birds Directives as well as other domestic commitments that link to flood and coastal erosion risk management. The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales also work to avoid, wherever possible, and minimise potential damage to habitats, including those protected by legislation, the ecological status of watercourses, heritage assets (designated and non-designated) and the character and appearance of the local landscape and townscape. The Environmental Report of the FRMP describes the likely environmental effects of the FRMP. It is also outlines high-level mitigation measures required to manage potential negative effects and highlights opportunities for delivering broader environmental benefits.
Early engagement with key partners and stakeholders and other relevant interests will help to identify potential opportunities for delivering broader environmental benefits. This may include the following:
- Central Government – including Environment Agency, Natural England, Natural Resources Wales, Historic England, Cadw, Sport England, Forestry Commission, Marine Management Organisation;
- Local Government and Regulators – including Local Authorities (planning and regeneration, conservation, archaeology, ecology, landscape, public rights of way), Internal Drainage Boards, AONB conservation boards and National Park authorities;
- Industry and Business – including Local Enterprise Partnerships, navigation and renewable energy interests;
- Non Government Organisations – including Local Wildlife Trusts, Catchment Partnerships, River Trusts, Local Wildlife Groups, Canals and River Trust, Woodland Trust;
- Water Industry – including water companies;
- Agriculture and Rural Land Management – including landowners, NFU; • Recreation, Leisure and Amenity – including angling / fishing/ sport clubs/societies, local residents; • Local communities – including parish and town councils and local community groups.
Further details of how the measures support environmental objectives in the FRMP for England are outlined in Part B, Section 2.1 and in the measures tables in Annex 1.
In parallel to flood risk management planning, the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales work with others to improve the quality of the water environment through River Basin Management Planning. The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales aims to co-ordinate effectively between the FRMP and River Basin Management Plan so that all organisations can do more for the environment.
Examples of projects that are delivering broader benefits are outlined below:
**Puxton and Stourvale Marshes, Kidderminster Water Level Management Plan**
Puxton SSSI and Stourvale SSSI lie on opposing floodplains of the River Stour in Kidderminster. Combined, they provide just under 23 hectares of floodplain wetland habitats including damp, marshy grassland, tall fen, with small patches of open water and carr woodland which support a diverse array of wetland and riparian plants, insects and birds. These sites are remnants of the once extensive marshland areas along the Stour Valley and they also provide a precious area of green space close to Kidderminster town centre.
The condition of both SSSIs has been recorded as ‘unfavourable’ in recent years, caused by a range of factors including woodland encroachment, lack of grazing, catchment-wide groundwater abstractions, urban development across adjacent land areas, construction of the Kidderminster Flood Alleviation Scheme and historic dredging of the River Stour.
To investigate all potential ways to bring these sites back into ‘recovering’ or ‘favourable’ condition strong partnerships have been developed between Natural England, Wyre Forest District Council, the Environment Agency and Severn Trent Water and many different options have been considered over the past three years. As a result, the partnership has now established detailed groundwater monitoring across both sites, arranged long term tenancy of SSSI areas not owned by Wyre Forest District Council which has then allowed land stewardship funding to support extensive tree removal works and restoration of grazing across both sites. The Environment Agency has installed site information boards and Wyre Forest District Council has engaged with the local communities about the ongoing works with positive results. Organisations are also working together to improve water management across both sites. Over the next few years the SSSIs will be monitored by Natural England for recovery and re-establishment of the vegetation and animal communities for which they were originally designated. Whilst 4 ha of Puxton SSSI has been assessed as ‘favourable’ since 2013, it is anticipated that the current works will significantly improve the condition of the rest of the site areas over the next 2-3 years.
**Slow the Flow – Shropshire Rivers**
The rivers of Shropshire have dramatically changed in character over the years through the influence of land management changes in the uplands and lower valleys. This has resulted in faster response rates to rain events, high flow velocities and increased flood risk to rural communities; reduced groundwater storage leading to lower summer flows; extensive loss of riparian habitat and natural gravel beds essential to many key species. Using the principles of Woodlands for Water and Rural SuDS the aim is to work with key partners, local communities and landowners to identify opportunities to implement small scale land management projects, including woodland planting, that demonstrate the benefits of working with natural processes to restore sustainable river environments. The projects will contribute to reducing flood risk, improving water quality, reducing erosion/silt and enhancing riparian habitats and increasing groundwater storage to improve summer low flows.
Find out more:
- Severn RBMP
- National Planning Policy Framework
9. Implementing the plan
Implementation in Wales FRMPs in Wales are produced every 6 years and summarise the risk of flooding from rivers, the sea and reservoirs. The plans draw relevant conclusions about the risk of flooding and set out and prioritise what needs to be done to manage the risk, now and in the future. Natural Resources Wales takes a risk based community approach to inform, plan and prioritise the investment programme to target investment in the most at risk communities. Funding is provided from Welsh Government Flood Defence Grant in Aid and is allocated in line with government policy and priorities.
Implementation in England FRMPs are produced every 6 years and describe the sources, risks and measures to manage flooding within a river basin and catchment. Implementing the measures in the FRMP will be carried out by RMAs working with partners and communities. RMAs are invited to submit details of proposed flood and coastal erosion risk management work to the Environment Agency who administer funds on behalf of Defra. These proposals are combined with Environment Agency proposed schemes and local RFCC funded projects to form a programme of work. Funding is allocated in line with government policy and priorities.
The catchment based approach The catchment based approach encourages local engagement and participation in decision-making. As the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales finalise and implement this plan they will seek to engage further with relevant catchment partnerships in order to deliver flood risk management outcomes and broader benefits.
Monitoring delivery of measures During the planning and implementation cycle the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales will monitor progress in delivering the measures set out in the FRMP. Environment Agency will report progress annually to the relevant Regional Flood and Coastal Committees and the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales will review the FRMP every 6 years, as required by the Flood Risk Regulations. Would you like to find out more about us or about your environment?
Environment Agency
Call us on: 03708 506 506 (Monday - Friday, 8am - 6pm) Email: [email protected] Or visit our website: www.gov.uk/environment-agency Incident hotline: 0800 807 060 (24 hours) Floodline: 0345 988 1188 / 0845 988 1188 (24 hours)
Natural Resources Wales
Call us on: 0800 065 3000 (Monday - Friday, 8am - 6pm) Email: [email protected] Or visit our website: www.naturalresourceswales.gov.uk Incident hotline: 0800 807 060 (24 hours) Floodline: 0345 988 1188 (24 hours)
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0555e2df1ce6f40e9a7c8e79a41d54bf60e15ceb | London Local Authorities Act 2007
Provisions on the Penalty Charge Notice in Relation to Littering From Vehicles
Revised Guidance December 2013 CONTENTS
01. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 2
02. Advantages of the PCN regime ............................................................................. 2
03. Background to the PCN regime ............................................................................ 3
04. How to use the powers under Section 24 (littering from vehicles) ...................... 4
05. Contents of PCNs .................................................................................................. 4
06. Service of Notices ................................................................................................. 5
07. Payment .................................................................................................................. 6
08. Representations ..................................................................................................... 7
09. Appeals ................................................................................................................... 10
10. Charge Certificates .............................................................................................. 11
11. Debt recovery ....................................................................................................... 12
APPENDIX A – Form of Notice .................................................................................. 14 APPENDIX B – Notice of Acceptance letter ............................................................... 18 APPENDIX C – Notice of Rejection letter ................................................................. 19 APPENDIX D – Charge Certificate ............................................................................ 22
Disclaimer: This Good Practice Guide has been produced to aid understanding of the new provisions in the London Local Authorities Act 2007 on Penalty Charge Notices in relation to littering from vehicles. It cannot be relied upon in place of the legislation. For any matters arising from the legislation, the legislation itself must be consulted.
1. Introduction
1.1. The London Local Authorities Act 2007 (the 2007 Act), as amended by the London Local Authorities Act 2012, introduced a new decriminalised enforcement regime in London in relation to littering from vehicles. It also contains a set of standard provisions that can be used for other enforcement activities, if future legislation permits.
1.2. Under the 2007 Act, London boroughs have the power to issue civil fines (penalty charge notices or PCNs) for littering from vehicles. Since 18 June 2012, London boroughs have been able to enforce PCNs served under the 2007 Act.
1.3. This is the first time that it has been possible to serve PCNs in respect of environmental breaches. As there is no precedent in this area, London Councils has produced this good practice guide, which has been developed in consultation with the London boroughs councils.
1.4. This guide covers PCNs issued under the 2007 Act for littering from vehicles. A separate guide has been produced in respect of waste receptacle related breaches. It should be noted that this guide has been produced to aid understanding of the new regime. It cannot be relied on in place of the legislation. For any matter arising from the legislation, the legislation itself must be consulted.
1.5. Since the 2007 Act came into force, littering from vehicles has been decriminalised in London and is only enforceable through the PCN route set out in the 2007 Act. It is not possible to issue a fixed penalty notice for littering from vehicles.
2. Advantages of the PCN regime
2.1. One of the factors for introducing a PCN regime to enforce low-level anti-social behaviour is the cost to the local authority. Costs become an issue when Fixed Penalty Notices (FPNs) are unpaid or the offender chooses to go to court rather than discharge his liability by paying the fixed penalty. The costs for a local authority to prepare a case for the magistrates’ court are far higher than using the appeals system that is available in respect of PCNs.
2.2. The key point to remember is that the use of FPNs or PCNs as an enforcement option is ultimately about getting people to change their behaviour and to stop the anti-social activity. For the majority of people receiving a PCN or FPN, it is likely they will not differentiate between the two and see both as a fine to be paid. 2.3. As with any enforcement regime being used for the first time, local authorities should allow for a well-publicised lead-in period before any notices are issued.
2.4. Local authorities should also develop a communications strategy to raise public awareness of the new powers. This will help to manage public expectations of what the new powers can achieve and might also gain public support for the new regime.
3. Background to the PCN regime
3.1. The London borough councils already have the power to serve PCNs in respect of certain offences which have been decriminalised. For instance, under the Traffic Management Act 2004, PCNs can be served for parking contraventions, under the Local Authorities Act 1996 for bus lane contraventions and under the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003 for certain moving traffic contraventions.
3.2. As mentioned, the 2007 Act contains provisions which enable the making of penalty charges for waste receptacles and littering from vehicles. It also makes provision for future legislation providing more opportunities for enforcement by PCN.
3.3. The procedure for penalty charges under the 2007 Act, and in future legislation, is set out in sections 61 to 67.
3.4. Under section 61 of the 2007 Act, where a borough council have reason to believe that a penalty charge is payable to them, they may serve a PCN on a person who seems to be the appropriate recipient. The section also sets out the information which must be included in a PCN.
3.5. Section 62 allows the Lord Chancellor to make regulations entitling persons to make representations to councils and appeals to adjudicators in respect of penalty charges under section 61.
3.6. Section 63 makes provision about the appointment of adjudicators to hear appeals in relation to penalty charges. It also sets out the requirements which must be met by adjudicators appointed under the section.
3.7. Section 64 enables the Lord Chancellor to make regulations for or in connection with the enforcement of penalty charges. Such regulations may make provision for offences and may also make provision in relation to warrants of execution to be executed by certificated bailiffs. Regulations have now been made under this section (and section 82), namely the Penalty Charges Enforcement (London) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/1234).
| Old regime\*: Fixed Penalty Notice (FPN) | Under the fixed penalty notice regime, the offender would have had to be identified. | |----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | *This option is not available now | | | New regime: Penalty Charge Notice (PCN)| There is no need to identify the person discarding litter from inside the vehicle as the owner* of the vehicle is held responsible. | | | * presumed to be the registered keeper | 3.8. Section 65 makes provision about certificated bailiffs, and in particular about their authorisation, and the conditions which must be met before bailiffs are certificated under Section 65.
3.9. Section 66 makes provision for the setting of the levels of penalty charges payable under Part 4.
3.10. Section 67 sets out reserve powers of the Secretary of State in cases where he believes the levels of penalty charges have been set too high by the Council. In such cases, he may make an objection, and the levels of fixed penalties may not come into force unless or until his objection has been withdrawn.
3.11. Section 24 of the 2007 Act, which concerns littering from vehicles, is a penalty charge provision.
3.12. By virtue of section 24 a penalty charge is payable to a borough council with respect to a motor vehicle or a pedicab by the owner of the motor vehicle or pedicab if a person inside or on board throws litters from that vehicle.
4. How to use the powers under Section 24 (littering from vehicles)
4.1. Section 24 concerns littering from vehicles. It enables a London borough council to serve a PCN on the owner of a vehicle in cases where the council has reason to believe that a littering offence under section 87 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 has been committed by a person inside the vehicle.
4.2. Section 24 decriminalises that offence and provides that the owner of a vehicle is liable for the charge. The owner of the vehicle is presumed to be the registered keeper at the DVLA (section 24(11)).
4.3. Owners of public service vehicles, taxis and private hire vehicles are all exempt from penalty charges under the section where the person acting in contravention is a passenger (section 24(3)).
4.4. Part 4 of the 2007 Act makes general provision about representations against PCNs and appeals to adjudicators.
4.5. Grounds on which representations can be made in respect of the PCN are set out in subsection (6) and include the grounds that the person who received the PCN never was the owner of the vehicle, that there was no contravention of section 87 and that the recipient was a vehicle hire firm. These are set out in full in section 8.3 (Grounds for representations against a PCN served in circumstances where someone has littered from a vehicle) below.
5. Contents of PCNs
5.1. Section 61 sets out details which must be included in PCNs. A PCN must –
- State the grounds on which the council believe the penalty charge is payable;
- State the amount if the penalty charge which is payable;
- State that the penalty charge must be paid before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the notice;
- State that if the penalty charge is paid before the end of that period of 14 days beginning with the date of the PCN, the amount of the penalty charge will be reduced by the specified proportion;
- State that if the penalty charge is not paid before the end of the 28 day period, an increased charge may be payable; • State the amount of the increased charge; • State the address to which the payment of the penalty charge must be sent; • State that the person on whom the PCN is served may be entitled to make representations under section 62(1) (representations and appeals) of the 2007 Act; and • Specify the form in which any such representations are to be made.
5.2. In addition, s. 61 enables the Secretary of State to prescribe additional matters which must be included in a PCN and the time within which a PCN must be served.
Additional details to be collected for a PCN issued in respect of a breach under section 24 (littering from vehicles)
5.3. In addition, in respect of PCNs concerning littering from vehicles, it would best practice to include – • Name of enforcement authority • Date of notice • Vehicle registration number (from number plates) • Location (e.g. the full name of the street) • Date and time(s) of contravention • Photographic evidence, if possible • Contravention code and description • Unique PCN number • How to pay (methods of payment) • Address for payment / correspondence • Vehicle location description (e.g. position in street) • Make of vehicle • Colour of vehicle • Vehicle excise licence (tax disc) number.
5.4. A template form of notice is included at Appendix A of this guide.
6. Service of Notices
6.1. At all stages it is essential that the enforcement authority takes all reasonable steps to ensure that the appropriate notices are served on the person to whom they are addressed. If the enforcement authority believes that service has not taken place then enforcement action cannot proceed. It is therefore important to have procedures in place for dealing with returned (undelivered) post as such items have not been served.
6.2. It is recognised that there will be cases where service is not easy. These include cases where service is refused or where the vehicle owner cannot be identified. Where service is denied or refused, the enforcing authority should consider taking other steps, such as hand delivery, to give a higher degree of likelihood of service.
6.3. At the end of the day, some vehicle owners cannot be traced. In these circumstances the enforcing authority may have to consider writing off the penalty. PCN issued under Section 24 (littering from vehicles)
6.4. Where littering from a vehicle has been observed, and the vehicle’s registration number has been noted, a PCN for this offence may be served by post to the owner of the vehicle.
6.5. The local authority will normally contact the Driving and Vehicle Licencing Agency (DVLA) for information on the owner, but where the DVLA does not have that information other sources of information may help.
6.6. Like the parking and bus lane regimes, the 2007 Act only makes the registered keeper the presumed owner. If the enforcing authority has better information, it can be used, but the DVLA will most likely be the first port of call. Information may come from, for example, residents’ parking permit applications, bailiffs or Companies House (subject to any data protection limitations). Councils should use all available avenues to an owner, while taking care not to enforce against an innocent party, bearing in mind the possibility of a vehicle being cloned or something similar.
7. Payment
Borough provision
7.1. An extensive range of payment options, by which penalty charges can easily be paid, will serve the best interests of local authorities and PCN recipients.
7.2. If possible, authorities should provide a number of payment centres distributed throughout their catchment area, and these should be open for as long and on as many days as possible. Likewise the opportunity for telephone and online payments should be available for as long and on as many days as possible.
7.3. Obviously when siting payment centres due consideration must be given to accessibility and to the safety and security of staff and customers both inside and in the immediate vicinity of the centre. Observance by CCTV video cameras should be considered.
7.4. Where the person served with a PCN makes a payment and representations against the PCN at the same time, the cheque may be held pending the outcome of the representations and appeals procedure.
7.5. If the representation or the appeal succeeds and a payment has been held by the enforcing authority, the payment will need to be returned. It is important that the money is returned as quickly as possible, ideally with a letter/Notice of Acceptance of the representations made advising that a refund is due. Refunds should take place within 28 days of a decision informing the recipient of this.
7.6. Although there is a limit on the time during which payment of PCNs can be made at the discounted rate, allowances may be made for exceptional circumstances (e.g. unforeseeable delays due to breakdown in postal service).
Methods of payment
7.7. In order to make payment as accessible as possible, authorities should ensure that facilities are in place for the following methods of payment for the settlement of PCNs
- Cash in person
- Personal & company cheques in person and by post\*
- Sterling travellers’ cheques in person • Debit & credit cards by electronic terminal in person or by telephone (including using automated phone payment systems)\*\* • Debit & credit cards by post or online\*\*
* In normal circumstances, personal cheques should only be accepted to the limit of a supporting guarantee card. Unsupported personal cheques and company cheques should normally only be accepted if the authority can be confident that they will be honoured. Any policies relating to this should be made clear at payment points.
\*\* Local authorities may not add a surcharge for credit/debit card payments.
8. Representations
8.1. It is important to have a good quantity of high quality data readily available to staff who are considering representations against the PCNs. This means staff should have ready access to all original PCN data, any photos, enforcement authority notes, updated owner details and any other relevant information which could help them.
8.2. Similarly, this information should be readily available to those dealing with cases which are subject to an appeal to an adjudicator, so the information can be easily supplied to the adjudicator.
8.3. It is important for an enforcing authority to ensure that there are sufficient resources to deal promptly with any complaints, queries and formal representations, and that all enforcement, ticket processing and customer care staff are well trained in customer care and possess a good knowledge of the legislation.
8.4. If the systems, procedures and working practices set up by the authorities to check (and if appropriate, cancel) contested PCNs are efficient, reliable and consistent, the proportion of PCNs which result in an appeal to the adjudicator should be small. In contrast, if the data supplied is unreliable and a large number of PCNs are dismissed on technical grounds (e.g. invalid PCN) both the adjudicator and the public will lose confidence in the authorities’ operation with a consequent increase in the proportion of PCNs being contested and taken to, and cancelled by, the adjudicator.
Reasons for cancelling PCNs
8.5. An enforcing authority is under a duty to consider all representations made and any supporting evidence provided in response to a PCN. Notice of a decision to accept (or reject) representations made should be given to the person making the representation. A PCN must always be cancelled when satisfactory evidence is produced to support any of the statutory grounds for making representations.
8.6. In addition, enforcing authorities can always exercise discretion and consider cancelling PCNs under other circumstances.
Hired vehicles
8.7. Under section 24(6)(d) of the 2007 Act, it is possible for a recipient of a PCN which is a vehicle hire firm to make representations against a PCN for littering from vehicles. The relevant ground is that when the PCN was issued: • the vehicle was hired under a vehicle hiring agreement; and • the person hiring it had signed a statement assuming liability in respect of any PCNs issued during the currency of the agreement.
8.8. Under these circumstances, if a PCN has been issued to the vehicle-hire firm, this should be cancelled and a new PCN issued to the person hiring the vehicle who is deemed to be its owner for the purposes of the PCN (see section 24(9)).
8.9. The vehicle-hire firm making representations in response to the PCN will need to provide satisfactory evidence in support and this is likely to require the name and address of the hirer and a copy of the hire agreement.
8.10. A template Notice of Acceptance letter is attached at Appendix B of this guide.
Statutory representations
8.11. A local authority may disregard any representations that are made outside the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of the PCN; however, authorities have the discretion to accept late representations and should do so when the person being charged gives a valid reason for the delay and has strong grounds for representations.
8.12. The people considering statutory representations should be independent of PCN issuing staff and the function of considering these representations should not be contracted out. There are statutory grounds for representations that can be made to an enforcing authority. Authorities are not constrained to these grounds and may exercise discretion as to whether or not to cancel PCNs on other grounds and it is important that authorities exercise their discretionary powers responsibly and reasonably.
8.13. Representations should only be accepted in writing, in order to avoid confusion, and should contain the name, address and signature of the person making them. If representations are made electronically by email, or online, the name of the person making them is likely to be in the message header or in the message and can be taken to be a signature. In such cases it is advisable to validate the message content (e.g. by sending an acknowledgement of receipt containing a copy of the original message) so no later changes to the representations can be made.
8.14. If the authority rejects their representations, the PCN recipient may appeal to the adjudicator.
Grounds for representations against a PCN served in circumstances where someone has littered from a vehicle
8.15. The relevant grounds for representations against a PCN served where someone has littered from a vehicle are set out in section 24(6) of the 2007 Act. The grounds are:
(a) that the recipient- i) never was the owner of the vehicle in question; ii) had ceased to be its owner before the date on which the penalty charge was alleged to have become payable; or iii) became its owner after that date;
(b) that no person inside the vehicle acted in contravention of section 87 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (i.e. by littering from the vehicle);
1 People from the same team as PCN issuing staff may consider representations, such as managers, but they should not be issuing PCNs themselves (c) that at the time the alleged contravention took place the person who was in control of the vehicle was in control of the vehicle without the consent of the owner; (d) (except in the case of a pedicab) that the recipient is a vehicle-hire firm and- i) the vehicle in question was at the material time hired from that firm under a vehicle hiring agreement; and ii) the person hiring it had signed a statement of liability acknowledging his liability in respect of any penalty notice issued in respect of the vehicle during the currency of the hiring agreement; or (e) that the penalty charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case.
Results of representations
8.16. The Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) Representations and Appeals Regulations 2007 (“the Appeals Regulations”) (SI 2000/3482) apply in relation to representations, appeals and adjudicators (see section 62(9) of the 2007 Act).
8.17. A local authority must serve its response to any representations within 56 days of receiving them. If this deadline is not achieved then the authority is deemed to have accepted the grounds relied on in the representations. In these circumstances, the PCN must be cancelled (see, for instance, Regulation 5(2) and 5(5)) of the Appeals Regulations.
8.18. If representations are not accepted the authority must issue a “Notice of Rejection” which must: • State that a Charge Certificate may be served unless before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of the Notice of Rejection the penalty charge is paid or the person on whom the notice is served appeals to an adjudicator against the penalty charge; • Indicate the nature of an adjudicator’s power to award costs; and • Describe in general terms the form and manner in which an appeal to an adjudicator must be made. • The Notice of Rejection may also contain such other information as the enforcement authority considers appropriate (see, for instance, Regulation 6).
8.19. The Notice of Rejection should explain that the representations have not been accepted and should not be, or appear to be, in any way be bullying or threatening.
8.20. As part of good practice, an appeal application form should be included with each Notice of Rejection. This is important even when the enforcing authority does not believe that the PCN recipient is seeking to establish a genuine ground of appeal as it allows the appellant to attempt to establish a ground at appeal. As requested by the Parking and Traffic Appeals Service (PATAS), and to assist in processing the appeal, the “official use” box on the back of the appeal application form should be completed with: • the name of the person that the Notice of Rejection was sent to; • the relevant PCN number(s); • the vehicle registration number, and • the date of the Notice of Rejection
8.21. If representations have been rejected for being served out of time, it is not necessary to send an appeal form or explain the appeal process.
8.22. Appeals should be made to the adjudicator within 28 days of service of the Notice of Rejection but the adjudicator has discretion to accept appeals out of time. Authorities will be informed in appropriate cases, and if an appeal has been accepted out of time, should take steps to cancel any Charge Certificate that may have been issued.
8.23. When a PCN recipient has made representations or an appeal but accepts either the authority’s or, at a later stage, the adjudicator’s decision that payment is due and then pays within 14 days of that decision, the legislation does not require the enforcing authority to apply the statutory discount to the payment, and normally an authority would not be expected to do so. Authorities could, however, decide to do so in a few exceptional cases, or on the recommendation of the adjudicator.
8.24. A template Notice of Rejection letter is included at Appendix C of this guide.
Elected members and representations
8.25. Elected members may wish to review their representations policies, particularly where they concern the exercise of the enforcing authority’s discretion, to ensure consistency with published policies. However, elected members and unauthorised staff should not, under any circumstances, play a part in deciding the outcome of individual representations. This is to ensure that only fully trained staff makes decisions on the facts presented. The authority’s standing orders should be specific as to which officers have the authority to consider representations concerning, and/or make decisions on PCNs. There should also be a clear audit trail of decisions taken with reasons given for those decisions.
9. Appeals
9.1. The Schedule to the Appeals Regulations provides the procedure in adjudication proceedings. While enforcing authorities may send a representative to an appeal, the system has been developed so that, in most cases, an enforcing authority will send documentary evidence without the need for a representative to attend.
9.2. Authorities need to provide sufficient evidence to prove their case and so have to consider what is necessary in each particular case.
9.3. PATAS has produced a practice manual for enforcing authorities called Parking and Traffic Adjudicators at the Parking and Traffic Appeals Service - Practice Manual for London Enforcement Authorities. It includes details of appeal procedures and can be found at: http://www.patas.gov.uk/tmaadjudicators/manual.htm.
(It should be noted that this manual is for parking appeals. While it may provide guidance for littering from vehicles, it should not be relied upon. For any questions, authorities should contact PATAS: [email protected] or telephone 020 7520 7200)
9.4. PATAS sends daily reports to authorities listing new appeals, outcomes of appeals, and details of out-of-time appeals.
9.5. Authorities must make sure that all necessary information is supplied to PATAS as soon as possible after it is requested and always by the set deadlines. They should also ensure that all information and documentation sent to PATAS is also copied to the appellant, ensuring that it will reach the appellant at least three clear days before the scheduled hearing date. Similarly they should receive from PATAS a copy of any information or documentation submitted by the appellant.
9.6. In London, the adjudication centre is equipped with payment facilities. If the enforcing authority has signed up to the Payment Information Exchange system then details of the payment, together with the payment itself, will be passed through.
9.7. Decisions made by adjudicators should normally be considered as final and any directions given by adjudicators must be complied with immediately. Although the Appeals Regulations do allow for reviews of decisions to be requested, the grounds for these are limited and include:
- The decision was wrongly made because of an administrative error;
- A party failed to appear or be represented at a hearing for some good reason;
- There is new evidence and the existence of this could not have been reasonably known of or foreseen before the decision;
- The interests of justice require a review (see paragraph 12 of the Schedule to the Appeals Regulations).
9.8. It should be noted that an adjudicator’s findings of fact are normally regarded as final and will only be overturned if they are plainly incompatible with the evidence that was before the adjudicator. The mere fact that a party disagrees with these findings is not a ground for review.
9.9. Should an appellant send an appeal to an enforcing authority by mistake, it should be forwarded immediately to PATAS.
10. **Charge Certificates**
10.1. The Penalty Charges Enforcement (London) Regulations 2012 (“the 2012 Regulations”) make provision about the enforcement by London borough councils of penalty charge notices under Part 4 of the 2007 Act. They should be read in conjunction with the Appeals Regulations.
10.2. Where a PCN has not been paid before the end of the “relevant period”, the enforcing authority may serve on the recipient a Charge Certificate, which is the formal notification that the penalty charge in question has been increased by “the application surcharge” (Regulation 3(1)) of the 2012 Regulations.
10.3. The “relevant period” (as described in regulation 3(2) and (3) of the 2012 Regulations) is:
- If no representations have been made to the authority, the “relevant period” is 28 days beginning with the date on which the PCN is served (a period of 35 days is recommended);
- If representations are made, a Notice of Rejection is served by the borough council and no appeal against the notice is made, the “relevant period” is 28 days beginning with the date of which the Notice of Rejection is served (again a period of 35 days is recommended);
- If representations are made, a Notice of Rejection is served by the borough council, an appeal against the Notice of Rejection is made, and the adjudicator does not allow the appeal, but recommends the council to cancel the PCN, the “relevant period” is 28 days beginning with the date on which the council notifies the appellant that it does not accept the recommendation; (again a period of 35 days is recommended);
- If representations are made, a Notice of Rejection is served by the borough council and an unsuccessful appeal against the Notice of Rejection is made, the “relevant period” is 28 days beginning with the date on which the adjudicator’s decision is served on the appellant (again a period of 35 days is recommended).
- If an appeal against a Notice of Rejection is made and withdrawn before the adjudicator serves Notice of the Decision, the “relevant period” is the period of 14 days beginning with the date on which the appeal is withdrawn. 10.4. So, for instance, if representations have not been made or have not been successful, any part payment received within the timescales above may result in a Charge Certificate requesting the outstanding balance. The penalty charge cannot be increased until the Charge Certificate is issued.
10.5. If a person contacts an enforcing authority and says that the Charge Certificate is the first notice they have received of the alleged contravention, the authority should consider allowing the recipient to make payment of either the reduced or the full penalty charge (without the Charge Certificate increase) or make representations, upon receipt of which the Charge Certificate should be cancelled.
10.6. If a person served with a PCN makes a representation to the enforcing authority that the PCN has not been properly served and the authority rejects that representation, the authority must then serve a Notice of Rejection on that person. The Notice of Rejection must describe the form and manner in which an appeal to an adjudicator must be made. In practice, an appeal form will be enclosed with the Notice of Rejection.
10.7. If the enforcing authority chooses not to accept representations from the person on the ground that the PCN was not properly served, for example where a PCN recipient frequently makes this claim, they should explain the procedure for making a witness statement at the next stage of the process.
10.8. A template Charge Certificate for s.24 breaches is included as Appendix D of this guide.
11. Debt recovery
11.1. Sections 4 and 5 of the 2012 regulations provide that where a Charge Certificate remains unpaid after 14 days from the date of service, an enforcing authority may register the charge as a debt at the county court. A fee of £5 is charged for the registration, which is added to the amount of the penalty charge payable and an Order for Recovery is issued.
11.2. Once the court makes an order, the person against whom it is made has 21 days from the date of service of the court order in which to either pay the outstanding charge or make a witness statement on the following grounds, that either:
- the PCN in question was not received; or
- representations were made to the enforcing authority concerned but no Notice of Rejection was received;
- an appeal was made to an adjudicator against a Notice of Rejection but (i) no response to the appeal was received, or (ii) the appeal had not been determined by the time the Charge Certificate was served, or (iii) the appeal was determined in the person’s favour or
- the person has paid the penalty charge in question.
11.3. If the court accepts the witness statement, the Order for Recovery and the Charge Certificate will be cancelled. In case a) above, the PCN will also be cancelled, and the enforcing authority may then issue a new PCN to the same person. In cases b), c) and d), the PCN is not cancelled and the authority must pass the details to the adjudicator for a decision. As with an appeal case, the adjudicator’s decision is final.
11.4. If a witness statement is not made within the 21 day time period, the authority may apply to the court for a warrant of execution.
______________________________________________________________________
2 For a copy of the appeal form, contact [email protected] or telephone 020 7520 7200 Bailiffs
11.5. If the PCN recipient has failed to pay the monies owed to an enforcing authority, then that debt may be recovered by way of a warrant of execution. The legislation provides for use of certificated bailiffs, rather than ordinary county court bailiffs, to pursue such execution.
11.6. Warrants are issued for one year. While they are in place, other forms of debt recovery must not be used directly by the enforcing authority.
11.7. In January 2012, the Ministry of Justice revised the National Standards for Enforcement Agents. In future, every member of a bailiffs’ firm will have to be certificated. It will be for the enforcing authorities themselves to enter into arrangements for using such bailiffs, whether in-house or contracted out. It will not be for the county court to make these arrangements. APPENDIX A – Form of Notice\*
[Enforcement Authority Name]
PENALTY CHARGE NOTICE (PCN)
London Local Authorities Act 2007 Sections 24 and 61: Littering from vehicles
PCN Number: Date of this Notice: Vehicle Registration Number: Make: The <London Borough> believes that a penalty charge is payable on the following grounds: [Contravention code] – [Contravention description] Location: [Detailed contravention location] Date of Contravention: [Contravention date] Time: [Contravention time]
The penalty charge is £100 The penalty charge must be paid before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of this notice.
A reduced charge of £60 is payable in the following circumstances: If the penalty charge is paid before the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the date of this notice, the amount of the penalty charge will be reduced by [40% to £60].
HOW TO PAY
You may pay this penalty charge online, by telephone, by post or in person. Full details on these methods of payment can be found on the detachable payment slip.
Please make cheques and postal orders payable to [payee details], and write the PCN number and vehicle registration number on the back. Please do not send post-dated cheques, as they will not be accepted.
Please do not make any payment if you want to challenge this PCN.
Data Protection Statement The [Enforcement authority name] will use information, including personal information, collected through the issuing of this Penalty Charge Notice for the enforcement of other contraventions and it may also be used for compatible purposes. The information may be disclosed to London Councils, other enforcement agencies and third parties where it is necessary and lawful to do so e.g. for the prevention and detection of crime. All information will be processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.
\*If you would like to request a Microsoft Word version of this sample document please email: [email protected] HOW TO MAKE A REPRESENTATION
You may make representations to us against the imposition of the penalty charge in this PCN. Representations may be made online at [webpage], by email to [email address], by fax to [fax number] or by post to [correspondence address]. You may wish to use the form attached to this notice. Please include any available supporting evidence. Representations must include the name, postal address and signature of the person making them. If representations are made online or by email then the name of the person making them must be in the message header or main body text, and will be taken to be the signature of that person.
The authority may disregard any representations received outside the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of the PCN.
The statutory grounds for making representations are listed below. Whether or not any of the statutory grounds apply, you may also give other compelling reasons why we should cancel the penalty charge or refund any sum paid on account of the penalty charge. The statutory grounds for representation are that:
(a) You- (i) Were never the owner of the vehicle in question, (ii) Had ceased to be the owner before the date on which the penalty charge was alleged to have become payable; or (iii) Became its owner after that date; (b) No person inside the vehicle acted in contravention of the said section 87 (c) That at the time the alleged contravention took place the person who was in control of the vehicle was in control of the vehicle without the consent of the owner; (d) You are a vehicle-hire firm and- (i) The vehicle in question was on hire under a hiring agreement at the time of the contravention, and (ii) The person hiring the vehicle had signed a statement of liability in respect of any penalty charge notice issued in respect of the vehicle during the period of the hire agreement; or (e) The penalty charge exceeds the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case.
If you are making representations to the effect that you acquired the vehicle after the date of the alleged contravention, or ceased to be the owner of the vehicle before that date, then your representations must include the name and address of the person from whom you acquired the vehicle, or to whom you disposed of it, if you have that information.
If you are a hire firm and are making representations to the effect that the vehicle was on hire at the time of the alleged contravention then your representations must include the statement of liability signed by the person hiring it.
A person who knowingly or recklessly makes a false representation regarding a material fact is guilty of an offence and on summary conviction may be liable for a fine of up to £5,000.
We will consider your representations and any supporting evidence, and serve a notice on you of our decision, within the period of 56 days beginning with the date on which we receive your representations, except where we have decided to disregard your representations by reason of their being received after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of this PCN. If we accept your representations, we will cancel this PCN and you will not have to pay the penalty charge. If you have made representations within the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which this PCN is served, or if you have made representations outside that period but we have not disregarded them, and we do not accept those representations, you will receive a Notice of Rejection. This will state, amongst other things, that you may appeal against the Notice of Rejection to an adjudicator and it will give information about the time limits for appealing to an adjudicator.
If the penalty charge is not paid before the end of the [period of 28 days beginning with the date of this notice], an increased charge by 100% to £[increased amount] may be payable.
At the end of this PCN you will find a form which you may find helpful as a means of making representations. However, you do not need to use it and you may make representations in any of the ways set out above. HOW TO PAY
BY TELEPHONE: On [Payment phone number] between [times] on [days] using one of the debit or credit cards listed on the payment slip.
BY INTERNET: Go to [website address] and follow the online instructions.
BY POST: Complete the payment slip and return to [payment address] with either:
- a cheque or postal order payable to [payee details] or
- your payment or card payment authorisation All cheques and postal orders must have the PCN number and vehicle registration number written on the back. Please send a stamped self-addressed envelope if you would like a receipt.
Any other form of payment, including cash, will not be accepted.
IN PERSON: Complete the payment slip and bring it with your PCN and payment to [payment centre address(es)] between [times] on [days]. Payment can be made either by cheque, postal order, credit or debit card or in cash. If you pay by cash, please ensure that you obtain a receipt.
Please do not make any payment if you want to challenge this PCN
Payment slip- Please return with all payments sent by post or made in person. Penalty Charge Notice number: [PCN number] VRM: [VRM] Date of Notice: [Date of notice] Time served: [issue time]
The full penalty charge is £[full amount]. A reduced charge of £[reduced amount] is payable if paid before the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the date of this notice.
Mr/Mrs/Ms/Miss: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Address: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Postcode: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Only complete the details below if you are making payment by credit or debit card.
Please debit my MasterCard / Visa / Maestro / Delta (delete as appropriate):-
Card Number: \_\_ \_\_ / \_\_ \_\_ / \_\_ \_\_ / \_\_ \_\_ Amount: £ \_\_ \_\_ Date: \_\_ \_\_ Card Issue Date: \_\_ / \_\_ Card expiry date: \_\_ / \_\_ Issue number: \_\_ Name of Cardholder: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Signature of Cardholder: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
MAKING REPRESENTATIONS
You may find the following form helpful as a means of making representations. However, you do not need to use it and you may make representations in any of the ways set out above.
If you think any of the grounds below applies, please indicate which by ticking the relevant box or boxes. In all cases, please give details in the space provided.
☐ The alleged contravention did not occur. – Please explain why you think no contravention took place ☐ I never was the owner of the vehicle or I was not the owner of the vehicle at the time of the alleged contravention or I became its owner after that date. – Where you ceased to be the owner of the vehicle before the date of the alleged contravention, you must include a statement of the name and address of the person to whom the vehicle was disposed of, if that information is in your possession. If you became the owner of the vehicle after that date, you must include a statement of the name and address of the person from whom the vehicle was acquired, if that information is in your possession. Please supply evidence of the disposal/acquisition (e.g. a sales receipt). ☐ At the time the alleged contravention took place the person who was in control of the vehicle was in control of the vehicle without consent of the owner. – Please enclose any evidence (e.g. police crime report, insurance claim). ☐ I am/We are a hire firm and the vehicle in question was at the material time hired from the firm under a hiring agreement; and the person hiring it had signed a statement acknowledging liability in respect of any penalty charge involving the vehicle during the period of the hire agreement. – You must include a statement of the name and address of the person to whom the vehicle was hired at the material time. Please also supply a copy of the hire agreement and the statement acknowledging liability.
- The penalty charge exceeds the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case. – Where you think you are being asked to pay more than you should legally pay.
- That the penalty charge has already been paid in full, or has been paid at the reduced amount within the specified period. – Please provide details of the payment method, date and amount.
- Any other ground you wish to raise.
| Details: | | --- |
(Please continue on another sheet if necessary)
**Ownership details:** I was not the owner/keeper of the vehicle when the PCN was issued because:
- I have never owned the vehicle.
- I disposed of the vehicle before the contravention on: Name of person from whom acquired/to whom disposed:
- I acquired the vehicle after the contravention on: Address of person from whom acquired/to whom disposed:
- We are a hire firm and the vehicle was on hire at the time.
Please make sure you sign the following declaration if you want us to consider your representations.
I confirm that the above information is correct to the best of my knowledge. I understand that making a false statement may result in prosecution and a possible fine of up to £5,000.
(name in BLOCK CAPITALS) .................................................................
(position in company, if relevant) ..................................................
(signature) ................................................................. (date) ................. APPENDIX B – Notice of Acceptance letter\*
London Borough of London [Correspondence name & address]
Mr A B Smith 99 Any Street Anywhere NE1 4BO
[Letter date]
Dear Mr Smith,
**Penalty Charge Notice: [PCN number]**
Thank you for your letter of [Reps letter date] in which you made representations about the above Penalty Charge Notice (PCN).
I am pleased to tell you that we have accepted your representations that you should not have to pay the penalty charge and we have cancelled the Penalty Charge Notice. You should therefore hear no more about this matter.
If you want any help or more information, please telephone our helpline on [Helpline phone number]
Yours sincerely,
Fred Quimby Environmental Services Officer
*If you would like to request a Microsoft Word version of this sample document please contact: [email protected]* APPENDIX C – Notice of Rejection letter\*
London Borough of London [Correspondence name & address]
Mr A B Smith 99 Any Street Anywhere NE1 4BO
[Letter date]
Dear Mr Smith,
Penalty Charge Notice: [PCN number]
Thank you for your letter of [Reps letter date] in which you made representations about the above Penalty Charge Notice.
We have read your letter but do not consider that you have made out the grounds for cancelling the Penalty Charge Notice. This letter is issued as a formal Notice of Rejection of your representations.
We have rejected your representations because [Reasons for rejection].
Therefore, before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date that this letter was served on you (i.e. the date it was delivered), you must either pay the penalty charge of £[amount payable] or appeal to the independent Adjudicator.
If you want to pay, please see the How to Pay section at the end of this letter.
If you want to appeal, please read the guidance notes attached to the appeal form enclosed with this letter, then complete the appeal form and send it to the Parking and Traffic Appeals Service, PO Box XXX, Chertsey, KT16 6BW. Please do not send the appeal form to us. The Adjudicator will consider your appeal and make a final decision. Please note that an adjudicator cannot normally award costs against you but may do so if he considers that you have acted frivolously, vexatiously or wholly unreasonably. Equally the adjudicator may award costs against an authority that he considers has acted frivolously, vexatiously or wholly unreasonably.
If you do not pay or appeal before the end of the 28 day period, the penalty charge may increase by 100% to £ [full amount + 100%] and we may serve a Charge Certificate seeking payment of this increased amount. At that stage, you may have missed the opportunity to appeal. If the increased charge is not then paid within a further 14 days, we may apply to the county
\*If you would like to request a Microsoft Word version of this sample document please email: [email protected] or for a copy of the appeal form contact: [email protected] or telephone 02 7520 7200 court to recover the charge as if it were a debt payable under a county court order.
If you want any help or more information, please telephone our helpline on [Helpline phone number]
Yours sincerely,
Fred Quimby Environmental Services Officer
HOW TO PAY
Please make cheques and postal orders payable to “[Payee details]” and write the penalty charge notice number on the back. Please do not send post-dated cheques as they will not be accepted.
If you want to pay by post, please fill in the payment slip below and send it with your payment or card payment authorisation to: [Payment address]. If you want a receipt, please enclose a stamped addressed envelope. Please do not send cash through the post.
If you want to pay in person, please go to [Payment centre address] between [Times] on [Days]. If you pay by cash it is very important to get a receipt, in case there is any later query about your payment.
Or you can pay by calling our telephone payment line on [Payment phone number] between [Times] on [Days] using one of the following debit or credit cards – [List of accepted cards]. Payment slip – please return with all payments sent by post
Penalty Charge Notice Number: [PCN number] issued in: [Contravention location] at: [End time] on [Contravention date] Mr/Mrs/Ms/Miss: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Address: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Postcode: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Only complete the details below if you are making payment by MASTERCARD VISA, SWITCH or DELTA card. Please debit my MasterCard / Visa / Switch / Delta card (delete as appropriate) Amount £ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Card Number: \_\_ \_\_ / \_\_ \_\_ / \_\_ \_\_ / \_\_ \_\_ Switch Issue Number: \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ (Switch 19 numbers)
Card Issue Date \_\_ / \_\_ Card Expiry Date \_\_ / \_\_
Name of Cardholder: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Signature of Cardholder: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ APPENDIX D – Charge Certificate\*
CHARGE CERTIFICATE London Local Authorities Act 2007
Owner Name Owner Address 1 Owner Address 2 Owner Address 3 Town Postcode
Date: [Issue date]
Penalty Charge Notice No: [PCN number]
Date of contravention: [Contravention date] Location of contravention: [Contravention location]
We sent you a Penalty Charge Notice on [Notice issue date] which explained that as the person we believe is the owner (or hirer) of the vehicle, registration number [VRM], you had to pay a penalty charge, or write to us explaining why you believed you did not have to pay it.
We are now sending you this Charge Certificate because (include as appropriate) [you did not respond to the PCN / you wrote to us but we did not accept your reasons for not having to pay the penalty charge and you did not then appeal to the adjudicator / you appealed to the adjudicator but your appeal was rejected], and the charge has not been paid.
As a result, the penalty charge has now increased by 100% to £[full amount + 100%].
You must pay this increased amount before the end of the period of 14 days, beginning with the date this certificate was served (the date it was delivered). See overleaf for details of how to pay.
If we do not receive payment before the end of the 14 day period, we may register the charge as a debt at the county court and ultimately we may pass the case to bailiffs to recover the debt.
We strongly advise you to deal with this matter now as if it is passed to bailiffs they will add their costs, which will significantly increase the amount that will need to be paid.
If you have any questions about this Charge Certificate, please telephone our helpline on [Helpline phone number]
\*If you would like to request a Microsoft Word version of this sample document please email: [email protected] **HOW TO PAY**
Please make cheques and postal orders payable to “[Payee details]” and write the penalty charge notice number on the back. Please do not send post-dated cheques as they will not be accepted.
**If you want to pay by post,** please fill in the payment slip at the bottom of this page and send it with your payment or card payment authorisation to: [Payment address]
If you want a receipt, please enclose a stamped addressed envelope.
Please do not send cash through the post.
**If you want to pay in person,** please go to [Payment centre address] between [Times] on [Days]
If you pay by cash it is very important to get a receipt, in case there is any later query about your payment.
**Or you can pay by telephone** on [Payment phone number] between [Times] on [Days] using one of the following debit or credit cards – [List of accepted cards].
______________________________________________________________________
**Payment slip** – please return with all payments sent by post
Penalty Charge Notice Number: [PCN number] VRM: [VRM]
issued in: [Contravention location] at: [End time] on: [Contravention date]
Mr/Mrs/Ms/Miss: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Address: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
______________________________________________________________________
Postcode: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
**Only complete the details below if you are making payment by MASTERCARD, VISA, SWITCH or DELTA card.**
Please debit my MasterCard / Visa / Switch / Delta card (delete as appropriate)
Amount £ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Card Number: \_\_ \_\_ / \_\_ \_\_ / \_\_ \_\_ / \_\_ \_\_
Switch Issue Number: \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ (Switch 19 numbers)
Card Issue Date \_\_ / \_\_ Card Expiry Date \_\_ / \_\_
Name of Cardholder: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Signature of Cardholder: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_
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e864bfc05f01bff765ed04f88e2ba913f1c65b79 | Natural Resources Wales wants to work with partner organisations and the community to design and deliver flood risk management improvements for Llanfair Talhaiarn, which will reduce the risk of flooding from the Nant Barrog river.
What has happened to date? We have completed an appraisal of the flood risk to Llanfair Talhaiarn from the Nant Barrog and have now come up with our preferred option for mitigating the flood risk to the village. We want to hear comments from residents and stakeholders.
What works are planned? Our preferred option is to improve the top section of the culvert, improve the trash screen arrangements and undertake some localised wall raising work. We also hope to create some upstream storage areas to manage the peak flows of water.
Why don't you replace the whole culvert? We considered replacing the whole culvert, but we can’t go ahead with this for technical, environmental and economic reasons. The cost of replacing the whole culvert would far outweigh the financial benefits that could be generated.
Would improving the top end of the culvert mean that the bottom end of the culvert wouldn't be able to cope? We have considered this in our assessment, and will be replacing all manhole covers along the length of the culvert with specially designed covers to allow for increased flows.
Why aren’t you making the culvert bigger at the downstream end – is this not a pinch point? Our analysis found that it is the upstream section of the culvert that causes flooding in Llanfair Talhaiarn. Replacing the downstream section of the culvert would also be particularly challenging as it passes very close to buildings.
What allowance is there for climate change? Our design will provide protection for a present day one in 100 year flood incident – in other words a flood incident that has a one per cent risk of happening in any given year. We cannot provide a higher standard to allow for future climate change at this time. However, we will continue to investigate plans for Natural Flood Risk Management in the upper catchment to alleviate the effects of future climate change. If the upstream works are not completed, what will happen? If we are unable to deliver the upstream works, our proposed scheme would provide a one in 75 years standard of flood protection.
If you are sealing the culvert is there a risk of water coming out elsewhere and causing flooding? We have considered this in our design and will be raising a short section of floodwall downstream of the culvert to ensure we don’t cause flooding elsewhere.
Will your proposal stop all flooding? No. We can’t ever stop all flooding. The scale of protection will always be limited by the capacity of the culvert. The scheme will increase the capacity of the culvert and raise the standard of protection. But if a rainfall event happens, that exceeds the culvert design, flooding will still occur.
Is the design finished? No, at this stage we have only competed the outline design. As part of the detailed design phase we will be consulting with landowners and stakeholders that are impacted by the proposed works to make sure that their concerns are addressed. We will also be working with Conwy County Borough Council to ensure they are happy with the works.
When will the design be done? We are currently in the appraisal phase on the project. A business case is being prepared that will hopefully be submitted for approval by NRW in May 2016. Subject to this approval and available funding, we hope to progress detailed design later in 2016.
When will the construction work be done? Funding for the construction phase of the work has not yet been approved. The works will have to take place in the summer, when hopefully river levels will be low, so that we can temporarily manage the flow in the culvert during the work. If all approvals are received and funding is available, we may be able to complete the work in the summer of 2017.
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7cf91c660e38c37882d7a95933ae7ff4bafc9d5a | The Impact of Transient Noise Levels in London
Lisa Lavia Noise Abatement Society
London Lorry Control Scheme Review - Operators Workshop 9 March 2017 1 Introduction to the NAS 2 Noise is a Public Health Concern 3 Defra: Noise Policy Statement for England 4 Soundscape: Design Led Solutions Ensure Better Outcomes
Lisa Lavia, Noise Abatement Society London Lorry Control Scheme Review, Operators Workshop 9 March 2017 NAS – Championing Public Concerns
Since 1959: UK’s only NGO dedicated solely to noise pollution and soundscape education and solutions
National Noise Helpline John Connell Awards Love Your Ears™ Sounding Brighton Launched Quiet Mark™
Silent Approach™ Soundscape Approach
@noise_abatement www.noiseabatementsociety.com Noise is a Public Health Concern
London Lorry Control Scheme Review - Operators Workshop 9 March 2017 Noise - A Public Health Concern
‘the health impacts of noise are a growing concern among both the general public and policymakers in Europe’
World Health Organization, 2011 Scale of the Problem: Does Noise Pollution Matter? It’s expensive and a threat to public health.
- ‘At least one million healthy life years are lost every year from traffic related noise in western Europe.’ World Health Organisation, 2011
- ‘Noise pollution costs UK taxpayers £7 billion to £10 billion per annum: the highest environmental cost following air pollution at £16bn.’ Defra Defra: Noise Policy Statement for England
London Lorry Control Scheme Review - Operators Workshop 9 March 2017 UK Government’s Policy on Noise
Noise Policy Statement for England Aims
• Promote good health and a good quality of life through the effective management of noise within the context of Government policy on sustainable development.
• Avoid significant adverse impacts and mitigate and minimise adverse impacts on health and quality of life from environmental, neighbour and neighbourhood noise
• Where possible, contribute to the improvement of health and quality of life through the effective management and control of environmental, neighbour and neighbourhood noise
• “the effective management of noise requires a co-ordinated and long term approach that encompasses many aspects of modern society”
Source: Defra UK Government’s Policy on Noise
Applies concepts from toxicology to noise impacts
NOEL – No Observed Effect Level • This is the level below which no effect can be detected. In simple terms, below this level, there is no detectable effect on health and quality of life due to the noise.
LOAEL – Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Level • This is the level above which adverse effects on health and quality of life can be detected.
SOAEL – Significant Observed Adverse Effect Level • This is the level above which significant adverse effects on health and quality of life occur.
Source: Defra UK Government’s Policy on Noise
• Not possible to have a single objective noise-based measure … applicable to all sources of noise in all situations.
• SOAEL is likely to be different for different noise sources, for different receptors and at different times.
• Further research needed regarding what may constitute a significant adverse impact on health and quality of life from noise.
• NPSE provides necessary policy flexibility until further evidence and suitable guidance is available.
• Decisions regarding statutory nuisance decided by LAs based on local context
Source: Defra Soundscape: Design Led Solutions Ensure Better Outcomes
London Lorry Control Scheme Review - Operators Workshop 9 March 2017 Sound vs Noise - The Urban Design Challenge
’The great challenge is not [just] to decrease the adverse health effects (in noisy areas), but to create good and health promoting soundscapes.’
Professor Birgitta Berglund, Stockholm University, ENNAH Conference, London, 2011 Soundscape\* - How Humans Perceive Sound
• Defined as ‘the acoustic environment as perceived or experienced and/or understood, by a person or people, in context’ (ISO 12913-1:2014)\*
• Recognises sound as a resource, rather than noise as waste
Image: courtesy of Dr Östen Axelsson, [email protected] Design in Social and Cultural Use Values\* and Set Acoustic Objectives
Soundscape holistic design and management – using acoustic ‘shared space’ objectives based on context and use
- Based on sociotope mapping (“places for people”) - developed by the City of Stockholm Urban Planning Administration 2000 – 2002 Tuning urban design - e.g. screening, reflection, absorption Community Engagement Soundscape Conceptual Model\*
Soundscape management must be in response to local characteristics and requirements.
Soundscape’s interdisciplinary approach helps communities with diverse “social use” profiles where traditional approaches may not work/have failed.
Intelligent, context-sensitive soundscape approaches provide new options for designers and planners and better solutions.
- Lavia, L., Dixon, M., Witchel, H.J., Goldsmith, M., (2016). Applied Soundscape Practices. In J. Kang & B. Schulte-Fortkamp (Eds.), Soundscape and the Built Environment. London, UK: CRC Press.
Model - Original design by: Jorunn Hustoft for Noise Abatement Society Soundscape Planning for Transportation Removing noise as a barrier. Permission to grow.
- **24/7 window** ‘permission to grow’
- **Quiet(er) vehicles & equipment**; refined operations, colleague training
- **Reduced carbon** emissions
- **Better air quality** and amenity
- Improved **road safety for cyclists** and vulnerable road users
- Novel solutions, new metrics, **new design principles** to allow concurrent activities at all times
- Crucial to meet **rapid urbanisation** trends & Night Time Economy growth Thank You and Questions
Lisa Lavia [email protected]
London Lorry Control Scheme Review - Operators Workshop 9 March 2017
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f94a783b7922b8262a6b68cf21f661e39dcbb8cc | London labour market projections
# Contents
Caveats and issues to be aware of 4\
Executive summary 5
1. Introduction 9
2. London’s demand for labour 10
3. London’s supply of labour 34
4. Assessment of the balance between demand and supply of labour in London 50\
Glossary 53\
Office for National Statistics data sources 61\
Appendix 1: Caveats and issues to be aware of 64\
Appendix 2: London’s detailed employment (employees) structure and index of specialisation 66\
Appendix 3: Medium-term projections 70\
Appendix 4: Long-run employment projection scenarios 73\
Appendix 5: Employment projections methodology 91\
Appendix 6: Population projections methodology 101\
Appendix 7: Higher Education in London 105\
Appendix 8: Borough level projections 118\
Appendix 9: Accessibility Employment Projections for London - technical report 121\
Appendix 10: London Employment Sites Database 121\
Endnotes 122 Caveats and issues to be aware of
Projections and forecasts are typically based on a number of simplifying assumptions and are, in part at least, only as reliable as the data on which they are based.
These facts should not be underestimated when considering the employment projections (and associated occupation and qualification projections) set out in this report because there are both significant simplifying assumptions and data limitations (including quite frequent data revisions) associated with this analysis.
As a result, this report does not claim to illustrate the exact path of London’s labour market into the future with associated, precise, estimations of the numbers of people required to be trained in various qualifications. Instead, the report provides a description of London’s labour market as it stands today, together with a broad indication of the possible future path of London’s labour market (and associated qualification requirements) based on a number of simplifying assumptions. The aim is that by being clear about the data limitations and simplifying assumptions used, readers can determine for themselves the amount of weight they place on the reported findings.
More detail on some of the most significant limitations which readers should bear in mind when considering the results from this analysis are set out in Appendix 1. Executive summary
London is specialised in a range of service activities ... Over the past 30 years or so London has seen strong growth in employment of professional and business support services. Over the same period there has been a large decline in manufacturing employment.
London currently specialises in finance and insurance; professional, scientific and technical activities (eg management consultancy, legal activities and accountancy); information and communication (including computer programming, motion picture activities and publishing); real estate; and, business support services (cleaning and private security for example). It does not specialise in land-intensive activities such as agriculture; mining and quarrying; manufacturing; and electricity and gas.
... which tend to require a high level of qualifications. Over 60 per cent of jobs in professional and business support services; public services; information and communication; and finance and insurance (which themselves account for 60 per cent of jobs in London) are in the manager and administrators; professional; or, associate professional and technical occupations.
These three occupation categories are currently filled in London with a high proportion of people holding an ordinary or higher degree (typically around 60 per cent or more for each occupation category).
Overall, just under half of all jobs in London are held by people holding an ordinary or higher degree.
London’s labour market has proved surprisingly resilient during the recent recession ... London’s labour market has shown surprising resilience in the period since the recession. Whilst the decline in output experienced in the recession was sharper than that experienced in both the 1990s and 1980s recessions, unemployment has risen, and employment fallen, by less this time around.
... with employment forecast to grow over the next few years ... GLA Economics’ latest medium term projection is for London’s employment to grow in each year from 2012 to 2015.
... and employment projected to grow by over 850,000 over the next 30 years or so. The number of jobs in London is projected to increase from 4,896,000 in 2011 to 5,757,000 in 2036. This equates to annual average growth of just over 35,000 jobs per year and results in over 850,000 more jobs in London by 2036. London labour market projections
Employment growth is projected to occur in some service sectors ... In the next few years GLA Economics forecast employment growth in most sectors. Over the longer term, just under half of all the employment increase expected in London in the period to 2036 is in the professional, real estate, scientific and technical activities sector. Information and communication, administrative and support service activities, and accommodation and food service activities are also expected to see large increases in employment numbers. This suggests a continuation of London’s specialisation in these areas.
... but with continuing projected declines in manufacturing and some other sectors. In the shorter term GLA Economics forecast declines in employment in manufacturing and other (public and private) services. In the longer term, manufacturing, wholesale, transportation and storage, and public administration are all projected to see declines in employment in London over the period to 2036.
Projected growth in professional occupations and managers and administrators ... This development of London’s industrial structure is projected to increase the demand for professional occupations significantly in London (an increase of over half a million professional occupations is projected by 2036). Managers and administrators are also projected to see a large rise in numbers (increasing by 222,000 over the same period). These two occupation groupings are projected to account for around 45 per cent of all jobs in London in 2036.
... but continuing decline in clerical and secretarial occupations ... Clerical and secretarial occupations are the only occupation group expected to see a decline in demand in London over the period to 2036 (projected to decline by 325,000 between 2011 and 2036). As a result, clerical and secretarial occupations are projected to decline to around 5 per cent of London’s jobs by 2036.
... leading to increased demand for higher level qualifications. These projected shifts in employment and occupations are projected to increase significantly the demand for ordinary and higher degree level qualifications over the period to 2036. Demand for ordinary and higher degree level qualifications is projected to increase by 800,000 over this period. As a result, the proportion of jobs in London requiring either an ordinary or higher degree is projected to reach 53 per cent by 2036, with the proportion of jobs with no qualifications reaching less than 5 per cent.
Moreover, the annual level of turnover in the labour market is significant ... Whilst such projections provide a useful indication of the likely trends in London’s employment over time, on their own, it can be argued that such projections provide a misleading picture of the potential future job opportunities and qualification requirements for London’s existing and future workforce. This is because the labour market is not a static entity; instead it is subject to significant flows.
Over the course of a year, for example, many people leave their jobs for various destinations. Some people will retire, some will choose to leave London (and not commute back in), some will take time off work to have children, some will shift from one occupation or sector to another, some will fall long-term sick and some will die. For the capital’s economy to continue to function effectively all these moves out of employment have to be replenished.
... with at least half a million people leaving their occupation in 2012 in London ... Analysis suggests that just over half a million people left their occupation in London in 2012. This illustrates that there is a potentially significant level of education and training requirements each and every year in London’s labour market just from replenishing those that leave their occupation within a year. This requirement is well in excess of that illustrated through the analysis of employment stock projections (where a ‘net’ increase of just over 35,000 jobs a year is projected) and for a number of reasons is likely to be an underestimate of the actual level of turnover. ... with much of the replenishment coming from ‘within’ the labour market. Much of this out-flow from occupations in any single year will be replenished by those who may be considered as being within the labour market, for example those moving into employment from other occupations, those moving back into employment from a period of ‘economic inactivity’ (for instance returning after a period of sickness or after a period of maternity leave), or those moving back into employment from a period of unemployment. However, part of the replenishment comes from what might be considered as ‘outside’ the labour market - from ‘in-migration’ (that is from outside London’s borders) and from education for instance. In addition, much of the replenishment from ‘within’ the labour market may well have education and training requirements.
London’s population is subject to significant flows ... Turning to the supply of labour to London’s economy, in each year over the past decade or so, more than 150,000 international migrants have moved to London. This inflow to London’s population has been partly offset by an outflow of at least 80,000 London residents emigrating overseas in each year. Domestically, in each year over the past decade or so, at least 150,000 people have moved to London from other regions of the UK. This inflow to London’s population has been more than offset by the more than 200,000 London residents moving to other regions of the UK each year.
... with commuters adding to London’s workforce. In 2011, those that lived and work in London were supplemented by almost 800,000 commuters into the capital, equivalent to around 16 per cent of jobs in London. This is an increase of around 100,000 over the last decade or so.
London’s working age population is projected to increase by almost 1 million between now and 2036 ... London’s population aged between 16 and 64 (London’s working age population) is projected to increase from 5.7 million in 2011 to over 6.6 million by 2036.
... and to become increasingly highly skilled. The proportion of London’s working age population that is qualified to at least ordinary degree level is projected to increase over the projection period to 44 per cent (having sat at 24 per cent in 1997). The proportion without any qualifications is projected to more than halve from its 1997 share of 16 per cent to 7 per cent in 2036.
The projected growth in London’s working age population in employment is slightly lower than the projected growth in jobs in London ... Assuming a static employment rate over the projection period, suggests the number of London residents in employment will increase by around 680,000. This is lower than the projected extra 861,000 jobs over the projection period.
... but once the potential growth in older workers employment and potential trends in commuting are accounted for, the employment and population projections do not seem out of line with a balanced labour market (in terms of quantities). It is likely that over the projection period there will be an increase in the employment of people aged 65 or over. Moreover, over the past decade and a half the ratio of commuters to resident workers in London has remained reasonably stable. Once account is taken of the potential future trends in these two areas (ie the employment of older workers and commuting into London (from outside London’s boundaries)), then (depending on the exact assumptions made) the level of jobs projected for London’s economy and the population projections appear to be broadly consistent with a balanced labour market (in terms of quantities). London labour market projections
The projected growth in London’s working age population in employment and qualified to at least ordinary degree level is lower than the projected growth in London jobs at this qualification level …
The employment projections show an increase of 800,000 jobs requiring at least an ordinary degree over the projection period (2011 to 2036). The population projections show an increase in the number of London residents of working age population in employment and qualified to at least ordinary degree level of 560,000.
… suggesting an increase in the employment rate for London residents with at least an ordinary degree to balance the demand for and supply of labour at this qualification level.
For the reasons outlined above, there is likely to be an increase in the number of older workers (those aged 65 and over) in London’s labour market over the projection period, many of whom may be qualified to degree level or higher. There may also be an increase in the number of commuters qualified to degree level or higher over the projection period. Whilst accounting for these potential future trends, it would appear that there is likely to need to be an increase in the employment rate for London residents’ with at least an ordinary degree to bring the labour market into balance (in terms of quantities). That is, the level of jobs projected for London’s economy and the population projections are largely consistent with a balanced labour market (in terms of quantities), albeit with potentially some increase in the employment rate of London residents qualified to degree level or higher.
1. Introduction
The objective of this work is to provide the London Enterprise Panel with an overview of London’s labour market and its likely short and long term path together with its potential future skills/qualifications requirements.
The paper starts with a consideration of how employment in London has evolved over time and the resulting specialisations in London’s employment structure. The paper then looks at a long-run projection for London’s employment (over the period of the London Plan), broken down by sector. The analysis also looks at the likely changes in occupations and required qualifications as a result of these projections. The final consideration in terms of London’s labour market demand is an analysis of the level of annual churn in London’s labour market and the potential qualification requirements deriving from this.
The paper then turns to the supply side of London’s labour market focusing on how London’s population has changed over time, how its qualification profile has changed and the types of degrees currently being studied in London. The projection for London’s working age population over the London Plan period is then considered together with the potential future qualification profile of London’s working age population.
The paper then briefly summarises the balance between the demand for and supply of labour suggested from this analysis. A series of appendices provide more detail on the methodologies used in projecting employment and population for example as well as a shorter term forecast for London’s employment (and related occupation and qualification requirements) and employee and population projections by London borough. 2. London’s demand for labour
Main findings
- Over the past 30 years or so London has seen strong growth in employment of professional and business support services.
- Just under half of all jobs in London are held by people holding an ordinary or higher degree.
- London’s labour market has shown surprising resilience in the period since the recession with unemployment rising, and employment falling, by less than in previous (recent) recessions.
- GLA Economics’ medium term projection is for London’s employment to grow in each year from 2012 to 2015.
- In the longer term the number of jobs in London is projected to increase by, on average, 35,000 jobs per year – resulting in over 850,000 more jobs in London by 2036.
- Just under half of all this employment increase is expected to come from the professional, real estate, scientific and technical activities sector.
- The demand for professional occupations is projected to increase significantly in London (by over half a million) in the period to 2036.
- As a result, the demand for ordinary and higher degree level qualifications are projected to increase significantly (by over 800,000) over the period to 2036.
- The proportion of jobs in London requiring either an ordinary or higher degree is projected to reach 53 per cent by 2036, with the proportion of jobs with no qualifications reaching less than 5 per cent.
- There is significant turnover in the labour market; analysis suggests that just over half a million people will leave their occupation in London in 2012 (although this is likely to be an underestimate of the actual level of turnover).
- This level of turnover suggests a potentially significant education and training requirement over time even in areas projected to decline in employment over the projection period.
Introduction
This section starts with a consideration of how employment in London has evolved over time and the resulting specialisations in London’s employment structure. It then looks at a long-run projection for London’s employment broken down by sector. The analysis also looks at the likely changes in occupations and required qualifications as a result of these projections. The section concludes with a consideration of the level of annual churn in London’s labour market and the potential qualification requirements deriving from this. London’s economy and its impact on London’s labour market
In considering London’s future employment trajectory and its associated demand for skills it is useful to have an understanding of the main forces impacting on the London economy. To that end, ultimately, growth in an economy’s income per head depends very much on the ability to raise productivity, i.e., the economy’s ability to produce more for a given level of resource. There are many spurs to productivity including improvements in the skills and abilities of an economy’s workforce - the subject of this analysis. Another, important, spur to productivity, which has implications for the skills and qualifications required in an economy, is an economy’s openness to trade. Indeed, both economic theory and evidence show that economies which trade more tend to grow faster.
Openness to trade increases the returns to innovation, itself a driver of growth and productivity, on account of increased market size and also enables the economy to benefit from access to new technology (by importing new technology from other places). Perhaps most importantly, openness to trade brings greater competition which encourages firms to be as efficient as possible. In effect it encourages different countries and/or regions to concentrate on different areas of production, focusing on their respective comparative advantage.
Structural change and specialisation
This drive to higher productivity through competition, innovation and openness to trade has contributed to structural change in the UK economy (as elsewhere in the world), encouraging domestic resources to shift from less productive to more productive uses. As shown later, this shift has had significant consequences for the skills and qualifications workers need to work in London’s economy.
As a result of such economic forces, London has seen a significant shift toward service activities over past decades. This is shown in Figure 2.1. London labour market projections
Figure 2.1: Change in broad London sectors over time
The chart shows that over the past couple of decades or so employment in many service sector areas have shown strong growth (particularly business service type sectors). The professional, real estate and business service category includes activities such as management consultancy, legal, accountancy, architectural, real estate as well as business support services such as cleaning, private security and employment agencies for example. Significant activities within the accommodation, entertainment, recreation and other services category include restaurants, hotels, event catering, public houses, sports and personal services for example. Significant activities within the information, communication, financial and insurance category include financial and insurance activities, computer programming, motion picture activities and publishing. Over the same period employment in manufacturing has fallen significantly.
Figure 2.2 looks in more detail at the current industrial structure of London’s economy. The chart shows that economic activity in London is concentrated in financial and insurance services, and some other business services.
Source: 1996 to 2011: ONS Workforce Jobs series; before 1996: GLAE Economics using various ONS sources and modelling assumptions These broad sector headings hide a range of different economic activities and differing degrees of specialisation within particular sectors. When examined at a more disaggregated level, London specialises in such things as securities, fund management (amongst other financial services), media and other creative activities (for example: television, film, music, publishing, computer consultancy and programming) and other professional services (like legal, accountancy, management consultancy, advertising, market research and architectural activities). Its employment is not concentrated in land-intensive sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, primary industries and freight transport.
Appendix 2 breaks down the employment data into more detailed sub-sectors (by Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] code) allowing for a more comprehensive analysis of the employment structure of London’s economy.
This shift of employment into services has impacted on the types of occupations found in London’s labour market. The London Story(^2) showed that London employers have increasingly employed high skilled workers over recent decades. Analysis suggests that the growth in London’s employment over the past two decades has been in managers, professionals and associate professional occupations. Figure 2.3 shows the occupation profile of London’s broad sectors in 2011. The chart shows that managers, professional and associate professional occupations account for 60 per cent or more of all occupations in finance, insurance, information and communication services, professional business and business support services and public sector activities (with these three broad sectors accounting for 60 per cent of jobs in London in 2011). As Figure 2.4 shows, these three occupations tend to employ a high proportion of highly qualified individuals. For example, almost 80 per cent of jobs in professional occupations are held by people educated to ordinary or higher degree level. Overall, almost half (46 per cent) of London’s jobs in 2011 were filled by people holding ordinary or higher degree level qualifications.
**London’s labour market performance since the recession**
Compared to the experience of recent recessions, London’s labour market has shown surprising resilience in the period since the recession. The decline in output experienced in the recession was steeper, and for the UK larger, than that experienced in both the 1990s and 1980s recessions; however, unemployment has risen, and employment fallen, by less this time around.
Experian’s estimates of real GVA(^6) shows London’s GVA fell by 5.3 per cent over seven quarters during this recession compared to a 6.2 per cent decline over nine quarters in the 1990s(^7) (see Figure 2.5). London labour market projections
Figure 2.5: Percentage change in London GVA(^a) from UK GDP peak
(\\text{100 = London GVA at time of UK GDP peak})
(\\text{quarter from UK GDP peak})
(\\text{1990s} \\quad \\text{2008})
(\\text{a At constant prices})
(\\text{Source: Experian})
Given that London’s output during this latest recession did not fall by as much (in total), or last as long, as in the 1990s (according to Experian’s estimates) it is perhaps not too surprising that London’s labour market has also been less impacted. London’s claimant count rate(^8), has risen by 1.8 percentage points to date since the start of the recent recession, compared to 5.2 and 5.3 percentage points in the 1990s and 1980s recessions respectively(^9). Further, whilst it may still be too early to say definitively, London’s claimant count rate seems to have peaked at 2.1 percentage points above its rate when UK output peaked. In the 1990s and 1980s recessions the claimant count unemployment rate increased by 6.6 and 6.3 percentage points respectively before declining (see Figure 2.6). Employee jobs\\textsuperscript{10} in London in this recession have also been less affected than previously and less so than the GVA declines would have implied. Within three and a half years from the UK GDP peak, employee jobs had recovered to their pre-recession peak levels. Employee jobs are now 2.7 per cent higher than their pre-recession level, but were 8.6 per cent lower in the same space of time in the 1990s. The difference in the percentage fall in employee jobs during the 1990s and 2008 in London (11.3 percentage points) is significantly larger than that for the UK (3.0 percentage points). This is more to do with London experiencing a much greater decline than the UK in employee jobs during the 1990s recession.
In summary, estimates from Experian suggest that, unlike the UK, London did not experience as great a decline in output during the 2008 recession as it had during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the shorter period over which output declined in London in 2008 means that the rate of decline was significantly faster than the recessions of the 1990s and 1980s. At the same time, both the UK’s and London’s labour market have held up relatively well and, although London’s labour market deteriorated by more than the UK during the 1990s recession, it has performed better than the UK’s labour market during the 2008 recession (see Table 2.1). London labour market projections
Table 2.1: Summary of output and labour market indicator performances for London and the UK over recessions
| | London | UK | |--------------------------------|--------|-----| | Peak to trough output decline (%) | 2008 | 5.3 | 6.3 | | | 1990s | 6.2 | 2.9 | | | 1980s | - | 4.6 | | Year-on-year growth of output over peak-to | 2008 | -3.1| -5.1| | | 1990s | -2.8| -2.4| | | 1980s | - | -3.7| | Percentage point change in claimant rate | 2008 | 1.8 | 2.4 | | | 1990s | 5.2 | 3.2 | | | 1980s | 5.3 | 6.3 | | Change in employee job numbers (%) | 2008 | 2.7 | -1.6| | | 1990s | -8.6| -4.6| | | 1980s | - | -8.5|
1 London figures are derived from Experian’s regional GVA estimates. UK figures are derived from ONS GDP estimates. 2 From UK output peak to eighteen quarters (four and a half years) after.
The reasons behind the labour market’s resilience during the recent recession and subsequently is the focus of much research at the moment. Some analysis by GLA Economics seems to suggest that moderation in real wages (especially relative to other countries), continued employment growth in the public sector and strong levels of corporate profitability moving into the recession (and correspondingly low rates of business failures during the recession) were the main factors that might explain this surprisingly strong labour market performance during the recession and, to some extent at least, since.
London’s projected demand for labour
GLA Economics produce a medium term forecast for London’s economy every six months. The labour market impacts over the next three years or so from the latest forecast are set out in Appendix 3.
Employment projections
Looking at the longer term, GLA Economics project employment to grow by around 0.7 per cent per annum on average from 2012 to 2036. This means that the number of jobs in London is projected to increase by 861,000 from the 2011 value of 4,896,000 to 5,757,000 in 2036 (this equates to annual average growth of just under 36,000 jobs per year). Given the level of uncertainty around the economy and its impact on the labour market at the moment two different scenarios around this central projection are set out in Appendix 4. One scenario sets out the position with a faster growth assumption, the other with a slower growth assumption. London labour market projections
Box 2.1: Methodology for GLA Economics employment projections
GLA Economics’ long-run employment projections use historic data on the relationship between employment and output together with an assumption of future output growth to project employment over the long term. As such the projections do not attempt to plot the exact path of employment over time, accounting for each and every economic cycle, but rather look at the likely long-term trend in employment. The projections for sectors are also constructed in this way, but to ensure that the sector level results add up to the London-wide employment projections they are constrained to that total. Further detail on the methodology is provided in Appendix 5.
The shorter-term forecast for London’s employment, covering the next few years, is provided in Appendix 3.
Figure 2.8: London’s historic and projected employment (1984-2036)
Source: GLA Economics Working Paper 52, Workforce Jobs series (ONS), GLA Economics calculations
Whilst London-wide employment is projected to grow this is not the case for all sectors within London. Indeed, there are large differences in projected employment amongst sectors. Table 2.2 shows that employment growth for sectors is projected to range from 2.0 per cent year-on-year growth (for professional, real estate, scientific and technical activities) to a 5.2 per cent year-on-year decline (for manufacturing). Figures 2.9 and 2.10 also show how projected employment numbers differ across sectors. Professional, real estate, scientific and technical activities are projected to see an increase of 422,000 jobs by 2036. This accounts for just under half of all the employment increase expected in London. Information and communication, administrative and support service activities, and accommodation and food service activities are also expected to see large increases in employment numbers. Table 2.2: Summary of employment projections by sector, 2011-2036
| Sector | Employment growth per annum with London output growth of 2.5% per annum | Absolute change in employment numbers ('000 jobs) | |--------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------| | Professional, Real Estate, Scientific and Technical Activities | 2.0% | 422 | | Information and Communication | 1.5% | 168 | | Administrative and Support Service Activities | 1.5% | 210 | | Accomodation and Food Service Activities | 1.5% | 158 | | Other Services | 1.3% | 52 | | Arts, Entertainment and Recreation | 0.9% | 41 | | **Total London Employment** | **0.7%** | **861** | | Education | 0.5% | 52 | | Health | 0.4% | 61 | | Retail | 0.2% | 19 | | Construction | -0.1% | -7 | | Financial and Insurance Activities | -0.3% | -22 | | Public Administration and Defence | -1.0% | -48 | | Transportation and Storage | -1.1% | -66 | | Wholesale | -1.8% | -66 | | Primary & Utilities | -3.3% | -18 | | Manufacturing | -5.2% | -95 |
Source: GLA Economics calculations
Figure 2.9: Employment projections for London’s larger sectors
Source: GLA Economics Working Paper 52, Workforce Jobs series (ONS), GLA Economics calculations London labour market projections
Figure 2.10: Employment projections for London’s smaller sectors
Source: GLA Economics Working Paper 52, Workforce Jobs series (ONS), GLA Economics calculations
Occupation projections
The employment data used to inform on London’s employment structure and projections of London’s employment does not contain information on occupations. Such information has to be derived from alternative sources. In order to provide information on occupations in London the Annual Population Survey (APS) has been used for 2004-11 together with the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the earlier periods (2001-2003). However, it should be noted that these surveys, because of their sample size at the London level, produce less robust results than the employment surveys used for projecting employment. Moreover, the amount of historical data available on occupations is more limited than that for employment. As a result, a relatively limited amount (of less robust) data has been used to project occupations when compared to the employment projections. For this reason, caution is required when using the occupation projections - particularly at longer time horizons.
To construct occupation projections for London, the shares of occupation within sectors over time are used as a guide to future trends of occupation shares by sector. The occupation shares can then be applied to the sector employment results (derived from the employment projections) to derive absolute figures for occupations by sector. Further details of the methodology used can be found in Appendix 5.
A summary of the expected demand for occupations is presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 and Figure 2.11. Demand for professional occupations in London is projected to see a large increase from its current position. A total 549,000 more jobs (equivalent to a 1.6 per cent year-on-year increase) is expected between 2011 and 2036 (Table 2.3). This makes up nearly two thirds of the total job increases expected in London over this period. A large proportion of the increase in professional occupations (nearly a quarter) is expected to come from the information and communication sector (Table 2.4). Table 2.3: Average year-on-year change in occupations within sectors (2011 to 2036)
| Sector | Managers and Administrators | Professional Occupations | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | Craft and Related Occupations | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | Total | |---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------| | Primary & utilities | -2.5% | -2.6% | -4.1% | -10.3% | -6.1% | -12.9% | -2.2% | -3.4% | | Manufacturing | -3.9% | -1.8% | -7.1% | -8.9% | -9.3% | -4.1% | -12.0% | -5.4% | | Construction | 0.6% | 1.9% | -6.2% | -5.4% | 0.0% | -6.8% | -0.9% | -0.1% | | Wholesale | -1.8% | 2.0% | -4.0% | -4.5% | -0.4% | -2.9% | -1.8% | -1.8% | | Retail | -0.1% | 3.6% | -0.1% | -3.5% | -2.3% | 0.3% | -2.3% | 0.2% | | Transportation and Storage | -2.4% | 1.4% | -1.3% | -3.4% | -0.9% | 0.2% | -1.6% | -1.2% | | Accomodation and Food Service Activities | 0.0% | 7.6% | 3.1% | -0.3% | 0.6% | 1.3% | 1.9% | 1.5% | | Information and Communication | 3.6% | 2.4% | 0.7% | -6.1% | -4.6% | -6.3% | -4.9% | 1.6% | | Financial and Insurance Activities | 0.6% | 1.9% | -0.9% | -6.5% | -1.9% | -3.3% | -7.8% | -0.3% | | Professional, Real Estate, Scientific and Technical Activities | 3.6% | 0.6% | 2.1% | -4.7% | 10.8% | 0.4% | -0.4% | 2.1% | | Administrative and Support Service Activities | 1.4% | 1.6% | -4.3% | -4.5% | 3.6% | -3.5% | 3.4% | 1.6% | | Public Admin and Defence | -0.8% | 1.2% | -1.8% | -5.7% | -8.0% | 2.2% | -1.4% | -1.0% | | Education | 0.0% | 0.8% | 3.6% | -4.4% | -2.9% | -0.2% | -5.6% | 0.6% | | Health | 0.5% | 0.8% | 1.5% | -2.8% | -0.4% | 0.5% | -1.8% | 0.5% | | Arts, Entertainment and Recreation | 2.4% | 5.7% | -1.2% | -5.5% | -2.9% | 1.7% | -4.1% | 0.9% | | Other Services | 1.2% | 4.5% | 1.9% | -5.2% | -4.4% | -0.6% | -7.2% | 1.3% | | **Total London** | **1.3%** | **1.6%** | **0.3%** | **-4.4%** | **1.8%** | **0.0%** | **0.9%** | **0.7%** |
Source: GLA Economics calculations London labour market projections
Table 2.4: Absolute change in occupation employment (jobs) by sector (000s, 2011 to 2036)
| Sector | Managers and Administrators | Professional Occupations | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | Craft and Related Occupations | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | Total | |---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------| | Primary & utilities | -2 | -3 | -2 | -3 | -1 | -4 | -18 | | | Manufacturing | -14 | -8 | -20 | -12 | -19 | -3 | -19 | -95 | | Construction | 5 | 20 | -9 | -12 | -1 | -3 | -7 | -7 | | Wholesale | -13 | 7 | -20 | -14 | -2 | -9 | -13 | -66 | | Retail | -1 | 41 | -1 | -14 | -6 | 18 | -18 | 19 | | Transportation and Storage | -10 | 7 | -6 | -12 | -2 | 1 | -44 | -66 | | Accomodation and Food Service Activities | 0 | 24 | 16 | -2 | 11 | 11 | 98 | 158 | | Information and Communication | 54 | 127 | 21 | -16 | -8 | -6 | -3 | 168 | | Financial and Insurance Activities | 13 | 50 | -25 | -51 | -1 | -5 | -3 | -22 | | Professional, Real Estate, Scientific and Technical Activities | 148 | 39 | 109 | -56 | 181 | 2 | -1 | 422 | | Administrative and Support Service Activities | 25 | 14 | -43 | -28 | 38 | -28 | 232 | 210 | | Public Admin and Defence | -4 | 18 | -28 | -37 | -2 | 7 | -2 | -48 | | Education | 0 | 40 | 51 | -14 | -2 | -3 | -20 | 52 | | Health | 4 | 45 | 30 | -28 | 0 | 17 | -8 | 61 | | Arts, Entertainment and Recreation | 13 | 66 | -18 | -15 | -2 | 6 | -8 | 41 | | Other Services | 4 | 62 | 14 | -10 | -4 | -5 | -10 | 52 | | **Total London** | **222** | **549** | **67** | **-325** | **176** | **1** | **171** | **862**|
Source: GLA Economics calculations
Note: Total London may not add to total from London-wide employment projections due to rounding.
Clerical and secretarial occupations are the only occupation group expected to see a London-wide decline in demand. The number of jobs in this occupation group is projected to decline by 325,000 from 2011 to a total of 165,000 by 2036. This equates to a year-on-year decline of 4.4 per cent. Almost half of this trend is driven by declining demand from the finance and insurance, professional/real estate/scientific/technical activities and public administration and defence sectors. Managers and administrators are also projected to see a large rise in the number of jobs, increasing by 222,000 (or 1.3 per cent increase per annum) over the 2011 to 2036 period. This increase is largely driven by an increase in the professional, real estate, scientific and technical activities sector.
**Figure 2.11: Changes in Occupation Demand (2001 to 2036)**
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey, ONS Labour Force Survey, ONS Workforce Jobs series and GLA Economics calculations London labour market projections
Figure 2.12: Changes in occupation shares
Figure 2.12 shows the change in the shares of occupations in London’s jobs over time. It shows that in 2001 just over 30 per cent of London’s jobs were in managerial or professional occupations. This share is projected to increase to just under 45 per cent by 2036. In contrast clerical and secretarial occupations are projected to decrease from accounting for just under 15 per cent of London’s jobs in 2001 to less than 5 per cent in 2036. As shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 this decline in clerical and secretarial occupations is seen across all London’s sectors.
Qualification projections
Information on the qualifications held by those working in jobs in London is taken from the APS (for the same reason that this source was used for occupations data). It should be noted that in 2011, ONS changed the approach to collecting data on people’s highest educational qualifications in order to obtain more information on qualifications obtained abroad, which had previously been reported as ‘other’. This change produced a structural break in the time series. GLA Economics has developed a method to project this change backwards for earlier years (see Appendix 5 for more information).
To construct the likely projection of qualifications held by those working in jobs in London a slightly different methodology to that used for occupations was used. The shares of qualification held by occupation is used as a guide to future trends of qualification by occupation. However, given the growth in the numbers of people holding a degree or higher over the past decade or so, using this methodology without constraint would produce, by 2036, largely implausible results (because of the recent, almost explosive, increases in the numbers holding a degree or higher). As a result, the qualification projections were constrained on the basis that the recent growth in graduate degrees is unlikely to be sustainable into the future. Further details of the methodology used can be found in Appendix 5.
A summary of the expected demand for qualifications is presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 and Figure 2.13. The number of jobs in London requiring higher degrees is projected to rise by 1.7 per cent per annum over the 2011 to 2036 period. This is largely driven by the projected increase in professional occupations over this period. The number of jobs requiring ordinary degrees or equivalent is also projected to see large increases, again driven by growth in professional occupations.
Table 2.5: Year-on-Year Change in Qualification Employment within Occupations (2011 to 2036)
| Occupation | Higher degree | Ordinary degree or equivalent | Higher education | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |------------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------| | Managers and Administrators | 1.9% | 1.6% | 1.0% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 0.5% | -1.0% | 1.3% | | Professional Occupations | 2.0% | 1.6% | 1.2% | 0.9% | 1.4% | 0.3% | 1.8% | 1.6% | | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | 1.1% | 0.7% | -0.1% | -0.6% | -0.3% | -1.6% | -1.1% | 0.3% | | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | -2.4% | -3.3% | -3.7% | -5.0% | -5.0% | -8.3% | -8.9% | -4.4% | | Craft and Related Occupations | 2.9% | 2.6% | 2.1% | 0.6% | 1.9% | 2.7% | 0.8% | 1.8% | | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | 1.7% | 0.9% | 0.5% | 0.1% | -0.6% | -0.6% | -1.4% | 0.0% | | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | 2.6% | 1.5% | 0.9% | 0.1% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 0.5% | 0.9% | | **Total London** | **1.7%** | **1.1%** | **0.6%** | **-0.1%** | **-0.1%** | **0.5%** | **-0.2%** | **0.7%**|
Source: GLA Economics calculations
Table 2.6: Absolute change in qualification employment (jobs) by occupation (000s, 2011 to 2036)
| Occupation | Higher degree | Ordinary degree or equivalent | Higher education | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |------------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------| | Managers and Administrators | 57 | 116 | 11 | 20 | 18 | 5 | -4 | 222 | | Professional Occupations | 224 | 253 | 30 | 19 | 17 | 2 | 3 | 549 | | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | 40 | 71 | -1 | -19 | -9 | -12 | -3 | 67 | | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | -12 | -79 | -19 | -69 | -91 | -38 | -16 | -325 | | Craft and Related Occupations | 7 | 32 | 16 | 17 | 31 | 65 | 8 | 176 | | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | 7 | 27 | 8 | 4 | -20 | -11 | -14 | 1 | | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | 13 | 44 | 10 | 2 | 38 | 52 | 14 | 171 | | **Total London** | **336** | **464** | **55** | **-27** | **-15** | **62** | **-13** | **862**|
Source: GLA Economics calculations London labour market projections
Figure 2.13: Changes in Qualification Demand (2001 to 2036)
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey, ONS Workforce Jobs series and GLA Economics calculations
Figure 2.14: Shares of qualifications as a percentage of all jobs
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey, ONS Workforce Jobs series and GLA Economics calculations The proportion of jobs in London requiring either an ordinary or higher degree is projected to reach 53 per cent by 2036 - up from 46 per cent in 2011. The proportion requiring a higher education qualification of some sort or another rises to just over 60 per cent by 2036 (ie just over three out of every five jobs will require a higher education qualification).
**Labour market turnover**
The earlier employment, occupation and qualification projection sections have provided an outline of the potential future path of the stock of employment. Whilst this provides a useful indication of the likely areas of change within the capital’s economy, on their own, such projections would provide a misleading picture of the potential future job opportunities and qualification requirements for London’s existing and future workforce. This is because the labour market is not a static entity; instead it is subject to significant flows.
Over the course of a year, for example, many people leave their jobs for various destinations. Some people will retire, some will choose to leave London (and not commute back in), some will take time off work to have children, some will shift from one occupation or sector to another, some will fall long-term sick and some will die. For the capital’s economy to continue to function effectively all these moves out of employment will have to be replenished. The annual out-flow from employment, which needs to be replaced, is sometimes referred to as the level of gross replacement demand. The majority of this gross replacement demand is usually satisfied from within the labour market - for example, by people moving from one job to another, from people returning from long-term sickness or unemployment etc. However, an appreciation of these flows highlights that even in sectors or occupational classes which are projected to be in decline, new staff will be required to replenish those leaving employment and this is likely to derive some training, skill or qualification requirements.
Whilst the concept of labour market churn and replacement demand is a relatively easy one to comprehend, estimating it through modelling with existing data sources is rather more difficult. The methodology used by GLA Economics is outlined in Box 2.2.
**Box 2.2: Methodology for modelling replacement demand**
Employment flows within the London population aged 16 to 64 were examined between 2001 and 2012 utilising data provided by the ONS (the Labour Force Survey (April to June quarter) was used for this purpose). Data on the proportion of London’s employed workforce who left their occupation and data on the proportion entering London’s employed workforce was collected for each year. The data available suggest that, for the most part, the proportions leaving for various destinations (or joining from various origins) do not vary significantly over time (accepting some variation for the stage of the cycle). As a result, the proportions leaving employment, and joining employment were averaged over the 2001 to 2012 period. For the purposes of projecting the level of replacement demand, these average ‘leaving’ and ‘joining’ rates are assumed to remain constant in future years.
These proportions are then applied to the employment projections outlined earlier to estimate the number of jobs likely to ‘turnover’ (in terms of changes in occupation) in any single year. Whilst the figures relate to jobs, for ease of exposition, in this section we refer to people moving occupations (whilst accepting this is a simplification). London labour market projections
Turnover by occupation
Table 2.7: Summary of estimated average outflows from occupations in 2012 (using data from 2001 to 2012)
| Occupation | Percentage outflow from occupation (%) | Absolute number leaving the occupation | |-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| | Managers and administrators | 9.1 | 59,800 | | Professional | 6.7 | 83,100 | | Associate professional and technical | 9.8 | 91,900 | | Clerical and secretarial | 11.8 | 56,500 | | Craft and related | 8.9 | 30,900 | | Personal and protective services and sales | 13.9 | 87,500 | | Plant and machine operatives and elementary | 13.8 | 103,300 | | **TOTAL** | **10.4** | **512,900** |
Source: GLA Economics calculations using data from Labour Force Survey (April to June quarters) and GLA Economics’ employment projections
Table 2.7 shows that, using the average rate at which individuals left their occupation over the 2001 to 2012 time period and applying it to the projection for the number of jobs in London in 2012, just over half a million people are projected to leave their occupation in 2012. This illustrates that there is a potentially significant level of education and training requirements each and every year in London’s labour market just from replenishing those that leave their occupation within a year – well in excess of that illustrated through the analysis of employment stock projections.
It should be noted that in this analysis, due to data limitations, occupations are used as a means of getting at the potential ‘replacement demand’ generated through labour market turnover in any given year. However, for a number of reasons, this may well underestimate the actual level of turnover that generates replacement demand and associated education and training requirements. First, this analysis does not pick up any individuals who leave their employment but subsequently take up another job in the same occupation. It is more than likely that at least some of these individuals will have education and training requirements. Second, the data source used for this analysis only looks at changes that occur over the period of a year. It may well be that many individuals change jobs or occupations more than once within the course of a single year, again potentially deriving education and training needs. As a result, the thrust of the labour market turnover analysis is to illustrate the fact that there are likely to be substantial and on-going education and training needs across London’s workforce, irrespective of the employment projections set out earlier.
As noted earlier, much of the out-flow from occupations in any single year is replenished by those who may be considered as being within the labour market, for example those moving into employment from other occupations, those moving back into employment from a period of ‘economic inactivity’ (for instance returning after a period of sickness or after a period of maternity leave), or those moving back into employment from a period of unemployment. Part of the replenishment however comes from what might be considered as ‘outside’ the labour market - particularly just in replenishing those that leave their occupation within a year from ‘in-migration’ (that is from outside London’s borders) and from education. Table 2.8: Summary of estimated flows out of, and into, occupations in 2012 (based on data from 2001 to 2012)
| Occupation | Absolute number leaving the occupation | Met by internal supply\* | Net requirement from education/new entrants | |-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------| | Managers and administrators | 59,800 | 45,000 | 14,800 | | Professional | 83,100 | 65,400 | 17,700 | | Associate professional and technical | 91,900 | 78,000 | 13,900 | | Clerical and secretarial | 56,500 | 47,600 | 8,900 | | Craft and related | 30,900 | 19,600 | 11,300 | | Personal and protective services and sales | 87,500 | 66,600 | 20,900 | | Plant and machine operatives and elementary | 103,300 | 82,200 | 21,100 | | **TOTAL** | **512,900** | **404,300** | **108,600** |
\*Note: ‘Met by internal supply’ means met by all inflows excluding inflows from education or from 16 year olds entering the labour market.
Source: GLA Economics calculations using data from Labour Force Survey (April to June quarters) and GLA Economics’ employment projections
Table 2.8 shows the extent to which the outflows from each occupation are met by other inflows (excluding inflows from education and from 16 year olds). It shows that the vast majority of outflows from each occupation are met by inflows from other occupations, from inflows from unemployment or inflows from other states.
Table 2.9 shows the results of applying the same assumptions to the projected employment levels in 2036. The Table shows that, in line with the projected growth in employment, the amount of turnover in the labour increases as well. The table shows that over 575,000 people are projected to leave their occupation over the course of the year in 2036 - again highlighting the potentially substantial and on-going education and training needs across London’s workforce.
Table 2.9: Summary of estimated flows out of, and into, occupations in 2036 (assuming earlier employment stock projections).
| Occupation | Absolute number leaving the occupation | Met by internal supply\* | Net requirement from education/new entrants | |-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------| | Managers and administrators | 79,500 | 59,800 | 19,700 | | Professional | 119,300 | 93,800 | 25,500 | | Associate professional and technical | 98,000 | 83,200 | 14,800 | | Clerical and secretarial | 19,700 | 16,600 | 3,100 | | Craft and related | 46,700 | 29,600 | 17,100 | | Personal and protective services and sales | 87,400 | 66,600 | 20,800 | | Plant and machine operatives and elementary | 126,700 | 100,800 | 25,900 | | **TOTAL** | **577,300** | **450,400** | **126,900** |
\*Note: ‘Met by internal supply’ means met by all inflows excluding inflows from education or from 16 year olds entering the labour market.
Source: GLA Economics calculations using data from Labour Force Survey (April to June quarters) and GLA Economics’ employment projections
Table 2.9 shows that in spite of the decline projected in some occupations, each year there is likely to be a significant level of turnover in each occupational class - meaning there is a potential requirement for education and training needs across all occupational classes. London labour market projections
Turnover by qualification
As noted above, the level of turnover in the labour market may result in education and training requirements to fill the jobs vacated in any single year. To provide an indication as to the potential education and training requirements derived from turnover in the labour market this section looks at the likely qualification requirements of the jobs vacated in any single year.
This analysis should be considered as indicative only as it relies on some further simplifying assumptions. The main simplifying assumption (made, in part, due to data limitations) is that the qualification requirements of the jobs vacated in any occupation class are the same as the qualification profile for that occupation class as a whole.
Table 2.10: Summary of likely qualification requirements resulting from labour market turnover in 2012 and 2036
| Qualification level | 2012 | 2036 | |---------------------|------|------| | | Absolute number leaving the occupation | Not met by internal supply | Absolute number leaving the occupation | Not met by internal supply | | Higher degree | 56,000 | 11,900 | 79,000 | 17,400 | | Ordinary degree or equivalent | 146,400 | 31,000 | 181,100 | 39,800 | | Other Higher Education | 37,000 | 7,800 | 42,500 | 9,300 | | ‘A’ level or equivalent | 90,000 | 19,100 | 87,100 | 19,200 | | GCSE Grades A\*-C or equivalent | 80,800 | 17,100 | 79,700 | 17,500 | | Other qualification | 66,000 | 14,000 | 75,200 | 16,500 | | No qualification | 36,700 | 7,800 | 32,700 | 7,200 | | TOTAL | 512,900 | 108,600 | 577,300 | 126,900 |
Source: GLA Economics calculations using data from Labour Force Survey (April to June quarters) and GLA Economics’ employment projections
Table 2.10 shows that in 2012 around 47 per cent of the likely qualification requirement from those vacating their occupation are at the higher education (or higher) level. This requirement is projected to increase to over 50 per cent by 2036.
Nevertheless the main finding from the turnover work is that in any single year there will be a large level of turnover in London’s labour market, across occupations and likely across the qualification spectrum as well. This is likely to result in potentially significant education and training requirements over time even in areas projected to decline in employment over time. 3. London’s supply of labour
Main findings
- Over the past decade or so, more than 150,000 international migrants have moved to London each year.
- This inflow to London’s population has been partly offset by an outflow of at least 80,000 London residents emigrating overseas in each year.
- Domestically, in each year over the past decade or so, at least 150,000 people have moved to London from other regions of the UK.
- This inflow to London’s population has been more than offset by the more than 200,000 London residents moving to other regions of the UK each year.
- In 2011, those that live and work in London were supplemented by almost 800,000 commuters into the capital, equivalent to around 16 per cent of all jobs in London. This is an increase of around 100,000 over the last decade or so.
- London’s population aged between 16 and 64 (London’s working age population) is projected to increase from 5.7 million in 2011 to over 6.6 million by 2036.
- The highest qualification level of London’s population is projected to continue to increase over time with 44 per cent of London’s population projected to have an ordinary degree or higher qualification by 2036 (up from 24 per cent in 1997).
- The economic activity projections suggest there will be an increase of 680,000 in the number of Londoners in employment between 2011 and 2036.
- Using unconstrained population projections suggests London’s working age population could increase by 1.2 million over the projection period.
- Applying the economic activity assumptions to this figure suggests that over 800,000 more London residents would be in employment by 2036.
Introduction
This section starts with a consideration of how London’s population has evolved over time. It then looks at a long-run projection for London’s working age population and breaks this down by an estimate of those likely to be in work and those likely to not be in work. The analysis also looks at the likely changes in qualifications of the working age population as a result of these projections (again broken down by an estimate of those likely to be in work and those likely to not be in work). London’s population over time Following a peak in London’s total population of 8.6 million in 1939, the post-war period saw the number of people living in London fall steadily to a low of 6.8 million in the early 1980s. Since then the population has followed an upward trend. According to the 2011 Census, London’s total population stood at 8.2 million, an increase of 1 million people (or 14 per cent) on the 2001 estimate.
The way people live has also changed dramatically over this period. The London of the 1930s was characterised by larger households with 8.6 million people housed in just 2.5 million households at an average of 3.5 persons per household. In contrast, today’s population make up 3.27 million households at an average of 2.5 persons per household.
Figure 3.1: Trends in London’s individual and household populations 1901-2011
Source: Census
Of the 8.2 million total, 5.7 million people are aged 16-64; in what follows this group is referred to as the working age population (see Box 3.1). Between 1992 and 2011 the working-age population grew at an average annual rate of just under 1 per cent with a peak of over 2 per cent in 2001 and a low of 0 per cent in 1993. Box 3.1: Changes affecting the point at which people retire
There are a number of, relatively recent, changes which are likely to increase the point at which people choose to retire.
In recent years, the Government has raised the future State Pension Age for both men and women.
Recent years have also seen a significant decline in the availability of final salary pension schemes and their replacement with, arguably, less generous defined contribution schemes. There has also been a decline in annuity rates over recent times.
Recent changes around the ‘default retirement age’ (the Employment Equality (Repeal of Retirement Age Provisions) Regulations 2011) mean that it is possible that many people aged over 65 will continue to work.
These changes are relatively recent such that statistics on their combined impact are rather limited at this stage. In particular, it is difficult to interpret what the exact long-term impact of these changes is likely to be.
For the purposes of considering the supply of labour to London’s labour market, analysis has focused primarily on the population aged 16 to 64. In 2011, this age group accounted for around 98 per cent of all jobs in London. However, it is acknowledged that the over 65 age group is likely to play a greater part in London’s labour market in the future than it has to date.
The components of change in London’s population are complex. The 2011 Census showed London continues to see the results of high fertility rates manifested in the numbers in the size of the pre-school aged population, with six local authorities in the top ten nationally in terms of the proportion of the population aged 0-4. This is the continuation of a decade long trend which will contribute to a swelling working-age population in the coming years. The capital also continues to be a net importer of long-term international migrants (LTIMs). In 2010, inflows of LTIMs to London totalled 161,000 while outflows amounted to 113,000 generating a net inflow of just under 50,000 migrants (see Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Long-Term International Migration, London, 12-month periods ending at quarter 4 of year given, thousands
Source: Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) estimates year ending December 2011, ONS In terms of domestic long-term internal migrants, London has traditionally been a large exporter, though trends in the numbers arriving in and leaving the capital have converged in recent years resulting in a much smaller outflow of people. In 2003 net outflow totalled 113,000, by 2011 this had fallen to 45,000 (see Figure 3.3).
**Figure 3.3: Internal (UK) migration, London, 12-month periods ending at quarter 3 of year given, thousands**
*Source: NHS Central Register moves within the UK and Isle of Man year ending September 2011, ONS/Patient Register Data Service*
Figure 3.4 shows London’s working aged population by economic status between 1992 and 2011. In 1992, following the 1990s recession, 66.7 per cent of working age Londoners were in employment. This share rose steadily to a 2001 employment rate of 70.1 per cent before falling back during the early part of the last decade and then climbing again to a pre-recession peak of 70.4 per cent in 2008. By 2011, the employment rate stood at 68.1 per cent, the lowest since 1997. However, 2012 has seen more encouraging news in terms of both employment levels and the employment rate. The latest available figures (September – November 2012) show 69.7 per cent of working age Londoners were in employment. London labour market projections
Figure 3.4: London’s population aged 16-64 by economic status, 1992-2011, four quarter averages
Source: Labour Force Survey, ONS
However, supply to London’s labour market is not restricted to the population resident within its boundaries. In 2011, those that live and work in London were supplemented by almost 800,000 commuters into the capital, equivalent to around 16 per cent of jobs in London.
Figure 3.5: Working-age commuters to London, 1992 – 2011
Source: Labour Force Survey London’s projected supply of labour
Population projections
According to GLA projections, the working age population will surpass the six million mark by 2017. By around 2025 GLA projections show a levelling off of numbers in this age-group, though this is in large part due to a lack of detail surrounding likely future housing stock which acts as a constraint on the GLA projections (see Figure 3.6)(^\\text{13}).
Box 3.2: GLA Population Projections – Methodology
The GLA produces population projections at local authority level for Greater London. For the 2011 round of projections, the 2001 mid-year estimate populations were used as the base population. An initial, unconstrained, projection was produced from this using a cohort component model to apply actual and forecast births, deaths and migration.
This initial projection is then constrained to projected numbers of dwellings. To do this, population projections are converted into households using household formation rates derived from the DCLG 2008-based household projections. The resulting households are compared with the estimates of available household spaces. Migration parameters are adjusted until a population is generated that yields a set of households consistent with the available dwellings.
For these projections, the development trajectories adopted are based on capacity identified in the 2009 Strategic Housing and Land Availability Assessment (SHLAA). Because the trajectories are based upon a limited identified capacity, the annual rate of development declines significantly beyond 2021. Coupled with an assumed decrease in average household size over time, the result is a much reduced rate of population increase beyond 2021 compared with the period up to that point (and compared with the unconstrained projections). More detail on this methodology is set out in Appendix 6.
It is important to bear this feature of the projections in mind when interpreting the results of projecting London’s labour market supply and its skills profile since projected shares of economic status and qualification levels are applied to these base populations. London labour market projections
Figure 3.6: London’s population aged 16-64
Source: ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates 1992-2000, GLA Population Projections 2001-2036
Economic activity projections
Projections of economic status within the working age population have been produced to give an indication of likely supply to the labour market in future years. The projections split the population into two groups; ‘in work’ and ‘not in work’. To be clear, those ‘not in work’ are comprised of the unemployed and the economically inactive. These two groups have been aggregated to mitigate issues with sampling variability, particularly among the unemployed which are traditionally the smallest sub-group. In order to project future numbers of each group, the average share of the population accounted for by each group over the period 1992 to 2011 is taken and held constant against the overall working age population projections. The shares are as follows: in work = 68.4; not in work = 31.6.
According to these projections, the number of London residents in work is projected to increase by 680,000 over the projection period. Given the nature of the population projections (ie constraining to housing stock over time), this breaks down into an increase of 386,000 over the next decade but with only 294,000 more in the following decade and a half.
Qualification projections
As noted earlier, changes to the approach to collecting data on people’s highest educational qualifications in 2011 resulted in a structural break in the qualifications time series (see Appendix 5 for more details).
Projections of the qualification levels of labour market supply use the same methodology as applied to the employment projections with the exception that the projected shares are applied to the population projections discussed earlier in this section. For more information on the method used to project qualification shares please see Appendix 5. Qualifications of the working age population
London’s supply of labour will be more highly qualified in 2036 than it was in 2011. As Figure 3.7 and Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show, the strongest growth in terms of qualifications will occur in the higher and ordinary degree categories with average annual growth rates of 1.3 and 1.0 per cent respectively. This growth will yield an increase of more than 680,000 individuals qualified to at least ordinary degree level between 2011 and 2036. The only qualification category to see a decline in numbers over this period is the no qualification group, where an average year on year change of -0.3 per cent will lead to a reduction of 37,000 in the numbers of people who do not have qualifications by the end of the period.
Figure 3.7: Changes in qualification of the population aged 16-64, London, 2001 – 2036
Source: GLA estimates and projections based on data from the Labour Force Survey and the Annual Population Survey, ONS London labour market projections
Table 3.1: Average year on year change in numbers within qualifications, population aged 16-64, London, 2011-2036, per cent
| Higher degree | Ordinary degree or equivalent | Higher education | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |---------------|-------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------| | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.6 | -0.3 | 0.7 |
Source: GLA Projections
Table 3.2: Absolute change in qualifications of the population aged 16-64, London, 2011-2036, thousands
| | Higher degree | Ordinary degree or equivalent | Higher education | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |----------------|---------------|-------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------| | Constrained | 240 | 439 | 51 | 106 | 67 | 101 | -37 | 968 | | Unconstrained | 267 | 501 | 64 | 138 | 96 | 126 | -22 | 1,170 |
Source: GLA Projections
As a result of the above, the two qualification categories which see the largest increases in their share of the total are ordinary and higher degree. In 1997, the two categories accounted for 23.5 per cent of the total. By 2011, 40 per cent of the working age population were qualified to at least ordinary degree level and by 2036 this will increase still further to 44 per cent. In contrast the largest reduction in terms of qualification share will be those with no qualifications. The proportion without any qualifications will have more than halved from its 1997 share of 16 per cent to 7 per cent in 2036.
The increase in higher education qualifications is considered in more detail in Appendix 7. That appendix looks at the growth in higher education in London in recent years, the type of subjects studied and the quality of some of London’s higher education offer. The appendix shows that just over two-thirds of London graduates take employment (or further study) in London following the completion of their studies, though this varies by subject. It shows that London is not an insignificant first destination for many graduates from other Russell Group universities. The appendix also shows some analysis of degree subject (focusing on single degree subjects) by sector. Qualifications of the in-employment group
There are significant differences within the population in terms of skills profile, with those in work more highly qualified than those who are not in work. As noted earlier, the number of Londoners in work is projected to increase in absolute terms over the projection period. Within this overall increase, separate qualification categories will either expand or contract (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). For instance, those qualified to at least ordinary degree level are projected to increase by 560,000, however, those who do not have qualifications are projected to see a fall in absolute terms of 34,000.15 London labour market projections
Figure 3.9: Changes in qualification of the in-employment population aged 16-64, London, 2001 – 2036
Source: GLA estimates and projections based on data from the Labour Force Survey and the Annual Population Survey, ONS
Table 3.3: Average year on year change in numbers within qualifications, in-employment population aged 16-64, London, 2011-2036, per cent
Source: GLA Projections
| Higher degree | Ordinary degree or equivalent | Higher education | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |---------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------| | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.6 | -0.7 | 0.7 |
Table 3.4: Absolute change in qualifications, in-employment population aged 16-64, London, 2011-2036, thousands
Source: GLA Projections
| | Higher degree | Ordinary degree or equivalent | Higher education | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |----------------|---------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------| | Constrained | 206 | 354 | 33 | 40 | 13 | 69 | -34 | 681 | | Unconstrained | 229 | 405 | 42 | 59 | 29 | 84 | -29 | 819 |
In 1996, taken together, those with an ordinary or higher degree accounted for less than 30 per cent of the total in-employment population, by 2011 this had risen to 48 per cent and by 2018 the share is projected to pass 50 per cent, finishing at 53 per cent in 2036. Again those with no qualifications is projected to see the largest proportional fall in their share of the in-employment total going from 13 per cent to 4 per cent between 1996 and 2036. It is increasingly clear that in order to find paid employment in London an individual is likely to need a qualification of some description (Figure 3.10). Figure 3.10: Qualification share as a percentage of in-employment population aged 16-64, London, 1996, 2011, 2036
Source: GLA estimates and projections based on data from the Labour Force Survey and the Annual Population Survey, ONS
Qualifications of the not-in-work group Between 2011 and 2036 the not-in-work, working age population is projected to expand by 288,000 people. As mentioned earlier this group is less well qualified than those who are in work. However, the projections suggest that the skill level of the not-in-work population will improve over the projection period. Those qualified to at least ordinary degree level are projected to account for 24.4 per cent of the total in 2036 compared with 21.9 per cent in 2011. In contrast the share of those without qualifications is projected to fall from almost 18 per cent in 2011 to 15 per cent in 2036. London labour market projections
Figure 3.11: Changes in qualification of the not-in-employment population aged 16-64, London, 2001 – 2036
Source: GLA estimates and projections based on data from the Labour Force Survey and the Annual Population Survey, ONS
Table 3.5: Average year on year change in numbers within qualifications, not-in-employment population aged 16-64, London, 2011-2036, per cent
| Higher degree | Ordinary degree or equivalent | Higher education | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |---------------|-------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------| | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.6 |
Source: GLA Projections
Table 3.6: Absolute change in qualifications, not-in-employment population aged 16-64, London, 2011-2036, thousands
| | Higher degree | Ordinary degree or equivalent | Higher education | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |----------------|---------------|-------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------| | Constrained | 34 | 85 | 18 | 67 | 55 | 32 | -2 | 288 | | Unconstrained | 38 | 97 | 22 | 79 | 67 | 42 | 7 | 352 |
Source: GLA Projections
Figure 3.12 shows the gradual trend in improved qualification levels among the not in work population. The proportion qualified to at least ordinary degree level will double between 1996 and 2036, whilst the share of those without qualifications halves over the same period. There is comparatively little change among other qualifications groups. Qualifications of commuters
Commuters are an important component of supply to the London labour market and in 2011 accounted for around 16 per cent of the capital’s jobs. Figure 3.13 shows that commuters to the capital (those that are employed in Greater London but are resident outside its boundaries) have become increasingly highly skilled over the last 15 years. Those qualified to ordinary degree level or higher accounted for 46 per cent of the commuter population in 2011 compared with 27 per cent in 1997. This is broadly similar to the equivalent share among those who are both employed and resident in London. All other qualification categories have seen a decline in share over this time with the partial exception of those whose highest qualification is GCSE where there has been a fall in share of just one percentage point. London labour market projections
Figure 3.13: Qualification share as a percentage of the in-commuter population aged 16-64, 1997 and 2011, per cent
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Annual Population Survey 4. Assessment of the balance between demand and supply of labour in London
Main findings
- The employment projections show an increase in the number of jobs in London of 861,000 between 2011 and 2036.
- London’s working age population, in employment, is projected to increase by 681,000 between 2011 and 2036.
- Taking account of potential future trends in the employment of older workers and commuting, suggests that the level of jobs projected for London’s economy and the population projections are largely consistent with a balanced labour market (in terms of quantities).
- The employment projections show an increase in the number of jobs requiring degree level or higher qualifications of 800,000 between 2011 and 2036.
- The number of London residents qualified to degree level or higher and in employment is projected to increase by 560,000 between 2011 and 2036.
- Taking account of potential future trends in the employment of older workers and commuting (at degree level or higher), suggests that the level of jobs projected for London’s economy and the population projections are largely consistent with a balanced labour market (in terms of quantities), albeit with potentially some increase in the employment rate of London residents qualified to degree level or higher.
Introduction
This section brings together the employment projection analysis set out in Section 2 and the population projection analysis set out in Section 3 to consider the extent to which the demand for and supply of labour are in balance over the projection period.
Overall balance of demand and supply for labour
The employment projections set out in Section 2, show an increase in the number of jobs in London of 861,000 over the projection period.
Section 3 shows that London’s working age population is projected to increase by almost one million over the 2011 to 2036 period. The economic activity assumptions used in that Section suggests this breaks down into an increase of 681,000 London residents in work and 288,000 not in work.
If, for the purposes of this section we assume that each job matches to one person then there are around 180,000 extra jobs to be accounted for as between the two sets of projections (ie 861,000 - 681,000). There are a number of ways that these ‘extra jobs’ could be accounted for. For instance, the jobs could be accounted for: by London residents - raising the employment rate in London; by commuters - increasing the level of commuting into London from outside its boundaries; and, by an increase in the employment of older workers (ie those aged 65 or over). Taking each of these possibilities in turn, if all the jobs were taken by London residents then it would lead to an increase in the employment rate of just under 3 percentage points.
If, instead, all the jobs were taken up by an increase in commuting then the level of commuting into London from outside its boundaries would increase by around 23 per cent over the projection period (25 years). This compares to an increase in commuting of around 15 per cent over the past 14 years or so.
An increase in employment for the 65 and over age group is a realistic proposition given the forces acting to encourage longer working lives (see for instance Box 3.1). If all the ‘extra jobs’ were taken by those aged 65 or over it would lead to a near three-fold increase in the employment of this age group over the projection period (equivalent to an increase in this age group’s employment rate of around 12 percentage points).
Perhaps more realistically these ‘extra jobs’ are likely to be accommodated by a combination of all three of these factors in combination with price signals from the market (in terms of changes in wages over time). To that end, analysis using a number of different assumptions about the future growth in commuting and the employment of older workers suggests that a variation in the employment rate of London residents of between +/- 2 percentage points is likely to be sufficient to see the labour market in balance. Whilst, the extent to which the labour market will be in balance in 2036 will depend on a range of factors, this analysis suggests that, broadly speaking, the employment projections and population projections do not appear to be wildly inconsistent with one another in terms of London’s future labour market balance.
The demand and supply for degree or higher qualifications
In terms of qualifications, the employment projections suggest an increase in demand for degree or higher level qualifications of 800,000 over the projection period. The population projections suggest an increase in the number of London residents at degree or higher, in-work, of 560,000.
Again this suggests the need to account for around 240,000 jobs as between the two projections. Similarly to the analysis above these ‘extra jobs’ could be accounted for through an increase in the employment rate of London residents qualified to degree or higher; an increase in commuters qualified to degree level or higher; and, an increase in the employment of older workers with a degree or higher level qualification.
Analysis using a number of different assumptions about the future growth in commuting and the employment of older workers suggests an increase in the employment rate of London residents qualified to degree level or higher of between 0.5 to 7 percentage points is likely to be sufficient to see the labour market in balance. Whilst, the extent to which the labour market will be in balance in 2036 will depend on a range of factors, this analysis suggests that, broadly speaking, the employment projections and population projections do not appear to be wildly inconsistent with one another in terms of London’s future labour market balance at this qualification level. London labour market projections
Unconstrained population projections The analysis of the balance of demand and supply has to this point considered the GLA’s constrained population projections.
The analysis is largely similar when using the unconstrained population projections. Looking at total labour market balance - the growth in jobs of 861,000 can largely be accounted for by London residents in employment (growth of 819,000). This suggests little requirement for jobs to be taken by either increased commuting or older workers. In the unconstrained population scenario there is, therefore, a greater likelihood of a slight reduction in London residents’ employment rate (to account for any increase in older worker employment or commuting) when compared to the constrained population projection scenario.
In terms of qualifications, the growth in degree or higher level jobs (of 800,000) can largely be accounted for by London residents in employment (634,000). The unconstrained population projection scenario suggests there is less pressure on the employment rate of London residents qualified to degree or higher to increase than in the constrained population projection scenario. Glossary
Claimant count unemployment The claimant count records the number of people claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA). People claiming JSA must declare that they are out of work but capable of, available for, and actively seeking work during the week in which the claim is made. This administrative measure will be affected by the forthcoming transition to Universal Credit.
Claimant count unemployment rate The number of claimant count unemployed residents in an area expressed as a percentage of the sum of claimants and workforce jobs in the area. Published at national or regional level.
Commuter In this document a commuter is someone who crosses over the Greater London boundary for the purposes of accessing a workplace on a regular basis.
Default Retirement Age Between October 2006 and September 2011 a Default Retirement Age of 65 was in force, meaning that employers could not retire employees below age 65 unless the decision could be ‘objectively justified’. In October 2011, the Default Retirement Age was abolished and it became illegal to retire an employee of any age without objective justification.
Demography/Demographics Demography refers to the scientific discipline that deals with aspects of population – including change, births, deaths, and migration. It often involves making projections of future populations levels and structural compositions.
Economic activity Economically active people are those adults who are actively engaged in the economy and are in, or are seeking work. In strict terms we include people of working age who are either in employment, or are unemployed but actively seeking work and are available for work.
Economic activity rate The economic activity rate is the proportion of a population engaged in economic activity. It is conventionally measured by dividing the economically active by the population of working age. Activity rates can also be calculated for specific groups such as males or females or for age groups.
Economic growth The increase in the value of goods and services produced by an economy and usually measured (at the London level) by GVA. London labour market projections
Economic inactivity Economically inactive people are those adults who are not employed or actively engaged in seeking work such as retirees, students, people looking after the family home and the sick and disabled. In strict terms, the economically inactive includes those not in employment, not classified as unemployed (by the ILO measure), or not either actively seeking work or available for work.
Economic inactivity rate The economic inactivity rate is the number of economically inactive people expressed as a percentage of the total working age population. It can be calculated for any population group.
Employee Someone who works for a person or organisation other than themselves. The relationship between employee and employer is usually defined by a contract of employment, which sets out the obligations of each party. An employee job is one held by an employee, or which is vacant, waiting to be filled. An employee may hold more than one employee job (e.g. two part-time jobs).
Employment Generally, employment includes both those who are contracted into employment (employees) and the self-employed. There are also two ways of looking at employment: the number of people in employment or the number of jobs. These two concepts represent slightly different things, as one person can have more than one job. People aged 16 or over are classed as employed by the Labour Force Survey (LFS), if they have done at least one hour of work in the reference week surveyed or are temporarily away from a job (e.g. on holiday). Employed people can be classified into one of four categories: employees, self employed, unpaid family worker (doing unpaid work for a family-run business) or participating in a government supported training programme. Much of the demand side analysis in this document uses the concept of jobs.
Employment rate Employment rates can be presented for any population group as the proportion of that group who are in employment. The main presentation of employment rates is the proportion of the population of working age who are in employment.
Expansion demand Expansion demand is the need for new employees as a result of net growth in economy. It is a product of both expansion and contraction in total employment in employing organisations. For example, if in the London economy the manufacturing sector decreased employment by 30,000 employees, yet the financial services were expanding their total number of employees by 80,000 – the economy’s total expansion demand would be the difference of the two: 50,000 employees.
Forecasting Forecasting is concerned with the production of estimates of future events. They can be based on the output of econometric models, based on previous performance and patterns, assumed to be a guide to the future, or they can be based on individuals’ (e.g. employers, analysts) views on what is likely to happen. Forecasts should always be used with care, increasingly so as they become more detailed or localised, or try to look further into the future. It is never possible to predict the future with absolute certainty: there are many uncertainties, as well as gaps in our knowledge and understanding of past and present performance as a guide to future events. Sudden shocks or changes are also by their nature unpredictable.
Further education institutions (FE(I)) Usually a college, delivering post-compulsory education and courses, often of a vocational nature.
Gross value added (GVA) GVA is the total value of output of goods and services produced in an area less ‘intermediate consumption’ (the value of goods and services used to produce the output). Higher education institution (HEI) A Higher Education Institution is an organisation that delivers courses of higher education qualifications and degrees. A higher education institution is usually a university but also sometimes specific schools and institutes whose purpose is to provide higher-level education which is accredited by a university.
Higher education statistics agency (HESA) The Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) is a central body responsible for collecting and compiling statistical data on Higher Education establishments in the UK. HESA was set up in 1992 and receives data from all the UK universities. These data are held centrally and analysed to give trends in higher education. HESA collects three main streams of records from its institutions, related to: student data; staff data; and finance data. Website: http://www.hesa.ac.uk
Household A single person or group of people living at the same address as their only or main residence, who either share one meal a day together or share the living accommodation (i.e. a living room).
Human capital Human capital is a loose catch-all term for the practical knowledge, acquired skills and learned abilities of an individual that make them potentially productive and thus equip him or her to earn income in exchange for labour. Varying levels of past investment in human capital provides one of the main explanation for the size of wage and salary differentials among individuals.
ILO unemployment The ILO (International Labour Organisation) definition of unemployment is the internationally agreed definition, used by the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and many other countries, including the UK. Under ILO guidelines, all people aged 16 and over can be classified into one of three states: in employment; ILO unemployed; or economically inactive. ILO unemployed people are:
- without a job, want a job, have actively sought work in the last four weeks and are
- available to start work in the next two weeks or
- out of work, have found a job and are waiting to start it in the next two weeks.
In general, anybody who carries out at least one hour’s paid work in a week, or who is temporarily away from a job (e.g. on holiday) is in employment. Those who are out of work but do not meet the criteria of ILO unemployment are economically inactive.
Index A method of showing numbers relative to a fixed base (often 1 or 100). In labour market data, it is often used to show changes in a variable (e.g. unemployment) in different areas over a period of time, starting from a fixed point, e.g. January 2010. Using employment as an example, if an index over three years were created, with January 2010 chosen as the first point (i.e. set as 100), and unemployment halved over the period to January 2012, the index value at that point would be 50.
Industry Industry is used in economics terms to categorise the activity of an employing organisation and is also referred to as a sector of the economy.
Labour demand Demand is generally the quantity of a good or service that people wish to buy. Labour demand refers to the total number of workers or even working hours required by employers, and is usually measured in this document by the number of jobs. Demand is influenced by the customer’s (employer’s) purchasing power, the price of the good or service (the wages and other costs of employing someone) and the availability of alternatives (e.g. machines). London labour market projections
Labour force The labour force is the number of people potentially available for work and is sometimes also called the economically active population. The size of the economically active population is given as those people on the labour market at any time, and includes those in work and those seeking work. It does not have to be restricted to working age people. Often, some people that are older than retirement age remain economically active.
Labour market Labour refers to actual and potential people’s input into economic production. Actual in terms of people in work, potential in terms of people who are not in work but could notionally work. A market is an organised exchange between buyers and sellers of a good or service. The labour market is the mechanism, or market place in which buyers and sellers of labour engage. The term labour market is not so strictly defined in practice and usage though – it is used widely in its broadest sense to cover a wide range of issues that are concerned with labour and the market for labour over time, and generally is concerned with elements of labour supply and labour demand, and how these interact. For example, we are still interested in children and the subjects they study as this has implications for labour supply in the future.
Labour supply The labour supply is made up of the total of workers making their services available to employers. The supply of labour is determined by a number of factors, including the population of working age, their economic activity rate, the number and nature of available jobs, wage levels and the influence of alternative sources of income. Individuals can offer varying levels of times and days they will work, skills and experiences they can potentially provide an employer with, or attach various conditions to making their labour available (such as working hours, pay and other benefits).
Labour turnover Labour turnover is the total of both the inflow and outflow of workers employed by an enterprise. Workers may leave an employer for reasons of changing job, caring responsibilities, retirement, or even death. Employers may dismiss their employees because of poor performance, or because they are no longer required due to changes in technology or demand. Even where a company’s headcount is static, a significant percentage of the workforce will often leave and be replaced over the course of a year.
London Plan The Mayor’s spatial development strategy for Greater London.
Migration Migration is the movement of people between different areas. There can be “push” and “pull” reasons for migration. In labour market usage, the availability of suitable employment opportunities is a major factor influencing migration.
‘Not in work’ All those of working age who are either unemployed or who are in some way economically inactive. This is a far wider definition than just those who are ‘unemployed’.
Occupation Occupation is a classification or description of a job, type of job, job title or job role. For example, ‘nursing’ would be described as an occupation. When discussing occupations, their names usually infer details about the kind of work performed or job – a set of tasks or duties, usually structured by employers; and the levels and types of skill deployed in the job.
Officially, the UK government sets out systematic classifications of occupations in its Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). When analysing the labour market and aspects of employment, SOC is often used to divide up people or employees by the types of job they do. Office for National Statistics (ONS) The Office for National Statistics is the UK government agency responsible for collection and publication of official statistics. In 2008, ONS became independent and answerable to the UK Statistics Authority. As the UK’s largest statistical producer, it is at the centre of the UK statistical system. A wide range of information, guides and statistics can be accessed at: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html
Productivity The value of output (goods and services) produced per unit of input (productive resources) used. Thus an increase in productivity means producing more goods and services with the same amount of resources, or producing the same goods and services with fewer resources, or some combination of these two possibilities. While productivity is often measured or referred to only in terms of the productivity of labour (output per man-hour), a more precise and complete view of the sources of productivity incorporates the effects of all inputs to production, including capital, land and materials.
Projections Projections is a term often used to refer to estimates of future values of future performance of the economy. Projections can commonly be an extension of existing trends. They are commonly differentiated from forecasts - which may include fluctuations and cycles - by being linear and constant. Projections are often used for demographics, which are much less subject to short-term fluctuations and changes than business and economic trends.
Qualifications In a labour market context, a qualification is an endowment or achievement (often formally certified) that demonstrates an individual’s competence and proficiency in a specified area of activity. Qualifications are often used as conditions of entry to particular jobs, and sometimes as a proxy for measuring the broader and more amorphous concept of skills. However, not all skills require or lead to qualifications, and vice versa.
Replacement demand Replacement demand is demand for new employees created by the need to replace employees that permanently leave their jobs because they retire, are deceased, migrate from the area, or move to another occupation.
Russell Group Initially established in 1994 as a group of 19 leading universities in the UK engaged in public research. In 2012 the Group admitted five new members, all of which had previously been members of the ‘1994 Group’ of smaller universities established in response to the formation of the Russell Group.
Sampling error/variability When surveys of people, organisations and businesses, are conducted most of the time only a proportion of them are surveyed. It is often unrealistic to survey absolutely everyone – they may not all respond and reply, and it may be too costly. So a sample of the population is taken and the results are interpreted as indicative of the whole population. However, there is a risk that surveying a subset of the population cannot be guaranteed to be exactly representative of the full group’s views, actions, or characteristics. Therefore there is the likelihood of some kind of variability or sampling error. Careful design of surveys and choice of sampling techniques can reduce the likely extent of variability but it can never be eliminated. The likely size of sampling error can be estimated using mathematical and statistical techniques.
Seasonally adjusted Features of the labour market that statistics are collected on, such as unemployment are affected by seasonal influences like weather, the opening and closing of schools, holidays and other seasonal events. Seasonal events will hide underlying trends that could be significant for interpreting an economic time series. Removal of seasonal influences from the statistical counts should allow for assessing only the real changes over time, thus allowing for a better analysis of the more important underlying reasons for month-to-month changes. London labour market projections
Self-employment Self-employed individuals work for themselves and generally pay their National Insurance themselves. The self-employed can be sole traders, or business owners, including partners. Unlike those with employee-status jobs, the self-employed generally will not have a formal contract of employment with the organisation contracting their services.
Skill(s) At its broadest level, a skill is a special ability to do something. In the context of the labour market it relates to a special ability to perform a task in work. In defining what a skill is, it is not a clear and unambiguous concept – for example a skill may be a personal characteristic such as friendliness (for use in work tasks that require customer contact); or it may be learnt such as numeracy. A skill can be simple and easy to learn, or it may be very complex and require many years to learn.
As a result, skills can be difficult to measure – qualifications are sometimes used to indicate types and levels of skill, but the two concepts are not the same. An individual can have a skill without it being represented by a qualification. Some skills are hard to accredit to qualifications, especially personal characteristics or attributes.
Standard deviation The standard deviation offers some measure of the ‘closeness of fit’ of a calculated average to the population or set of values that it is calculated from. For example, calculating the standard deviation in the weekly hours of full time employees will show how well the average (40 hours in 2002) captures the diversity of working weeks: if the cases are clustered together (i.e. most people work close to the average of 40 hours), the standard deviation is small. When the examples are spread far apart (i.e. if the average is based on a wide variety of results) there is a large standard deviation.
Standard error The standard error is an estimate of the scale of the standard deviation, and a means of expressing the accuracy and reliability of results from a random sample survey. The standard error of a statistic depends on the sample size. In general, the larger the sample size the smaller the standard error, although the error cannot be completely removed.
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Standard Industrial Classifications (or SIC) is a method of classifying industries into certain groups or categories by activity according to an established standard set by the UK government. The Standard Industrial Classification sometimes uses letters or codes as shorthand to describe the type of industry – for example, you may find an industry referred to as SIC61 rather than by its name or title (Telecommunications). This analysis has used SIC(2007).
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) The Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) is a classification system used to define occupational areas and job types according to an established standard set by the UK government. The structure of the SOC is based on two main concepts:
- the kind of work performed or job – a set of tasks or duties, usually structured by employers
- the concept of skill – defined for as the skill level - the complexity of the tasks and duties to be performed; and skill specialisation – the field of knowledge required for competent, thorough and efficient conduct of the tasks.
State pension age The age at which someone can claim a state pension, although people can choose to defer the receipt of their state pension beyond this age. Currently the state pension age for men is 65. It was 60 for women until 5 April 2010, but women’s state pension age began to increase thereafter and will reach 65 by November 2018. In reality, people do not necessarily retire at state pension age – they can and do retire if they are younger or older. Time series data Time series data are values or results obtained over intervals of time. They are usually gained from the measurement of one variable (e.g. the number of people in employment), using the same method over consistent intervals of time. An example of time series data would be the Labour Force Survey (LFS) results that have been used to track unemployment on a consistent basis every quarter since 1992.
Training Training is the process of coaching in or accustoming an individual to a mode of behaviour or performance; or to make proficient with specialized instruction and practice. In the labour market context it refers to the process of improving workforce skills, either by employer instruction or by educational institutions, on or off the job, and with or without formal qualifications.
UCAS points score A means of differentiating students at A level and other post-GCSE examinations. For example, at A-level an A\* counts as 140 UCAS points whereas an E grade at AS level counts as only 20 UCAS points. The system is not used universally by UK universities.
Unemployment Unemployment, in terms of its use to describe a group of people whom we may be concerned about, it is more correctly described as ‘people who are not in work or employment but who want to work’. However, there are a variety of ways of precisely classifying and measuring it. Unemployment has long been one of the most difficult and contentious of labour market statistical measures. In the UK there are two key statistical measures of unemployment – that of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Claimant Count.
The most widely recognised definition of unemployment is that of the ILO, the measure used by the Labour Force Survey. This records as unemployed, those who have undertaken no paid work in reference week (i.e. when they are interviewed), are starting, or are available to start work in the next fortnight and have actively sought work in the preceding four weeks. No account is taken of the individual’s age, family status or eligibility for unemployment related benefits. This definition is commonly referred to as ILO unemployment.
The Claimant Count is an administrative measure of those eligible for unemployment related benefits, i.e. Jobseekers Allowance, National Insurance credits. Those eligible for these benefits do not include all those in the ILO measure and the eligibility criteria for the relevant benefits have been altered over time. Therefore, the claimant count is often seen as a partial measure of unemployment. It is, however, free from sampling errors (it is a 100% count) and is available for very small geographical areas and by age and duration of benefit claim.
Unit wage costs The Office for National Statistics calculates unit wage costs as the average of total wages and salaries per job.
Wages Wages (and earnings) relate solely to financial income from paid work, e.g. salaries and bonuses but not including non-financial perks. These terms are not synonymous with income, which is a more widely encompassing definition, including benefits, share dividends and bank/building society interest, etc. Only limited official information is available on earnings at the local level, mostly related to average hourly and weekly earnings.
Workforce The number of people available for work. A generic term that can be used in reference to a country or area, a particular type of work, or even an individual organisation. London labour market projections
Workforce jobs Workforce jobs are calculated by summing employee jobs, self-employment jobs from the Labour Force Survey, HM Forces and government-supported trainees. They are a measure of jobs rather than people. For example if a person holds two jobs, each job will be counted in the workforce jobs total.
Working age Working age is defined in this work as all those aged between 16 and 64.
Workplaces A specific site or geographic location where people are employed. Workplaces differ from enterprises, employers or organisations - which may be a collection of workplaces controlled from a central point. This can affect the way statistics are gathered: for example, employees at a local workplace may be recorded by their employer’s registered address, which may be in a different area. Office for National Statistics data sources
Annual Population Survey (APS) The APS uses data combined from two waves from the main Labour Force Survey (LFS) with data collected on a local sample boost. The data sets comprise 12 months of survey data and are disseminated quarterly. The achieved sample size is approximately 320,000 respondents. The APS provides information on the same topics as the LFS but, because of the larger sample size, more detailed breakdowns can be produced including analyses of industry sector and occupation at the London level.
Business Register Employment Survey (BRES) BRES publishes employee and employment estimates at detailed geographical and industrial levels. It collects comprehensive employment information from businesses in England, Scotland and Wales. Independently collected Northern Ireland data are then combined to produce estimates on a UK basis. BRES uses the IDBR as its sampling frame.
BRES is regarded as the definitive source of employee and employment statistics by industry. Employment is obtained by adding the number of working owners to the number of employees employed by a business. In terms of data, the survey sample of approximately 80,000 businesses is weighted up to represent the GB economy covering all sectors.
One of the strengths of BRES is that estimates are provided at detailed geographical levels. It should be noted BRES is a sample survey and produces estimated employment figures. These estimates are of a good quality at higher levels of geography (for example region), but the quality of the estimates deteriorates as the geographies get smaller.
BRES is an annual publication. The first BRES estimates were for 2009 and were published in December 2010. Both BRES, and the Annual Business Inquiry part 1 (ABI/1) which it replaced, are snapshots; they are not designed to be used as time series figures.
Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR) The IDBR is a list of about two million businesses registered in the UK and contains data on employment, business size and financial performance. It is used for selecting samples for surveys of businesses and to produce analyses of business activity, location and size. It is maintained largely by updates from HM Revenue & Customs, Companies House and surveys conducted by ONS specifically for maintaining the Register.
The IDBR covers all parts of the economy, but misses some very small businesses and some non-profit making organisations. It provides more than 99% coverage of economic activity. For research purposes, the IDBR allows detailed analysis of employing organisations and workplaces in terms of numbers of enterprises, employment and turnover. Further analysis can be undertaken by industrial classification, location and legal status. London labour market projections
Labour Force Survey (LFS) The LFS is the largest regular household survey in the UK. It collects information about the personal and economic circumstances of those interviewed, including age, gender, employment and unemployment, skills and qualifications and pay.
The sample is made up of approximately 41,000 responding UK households per quarter. Respondents are interviewed for five successive waves at three-monthly intervals and 20% of the sample is replaced every quarter. The LFS is designed to be representative of the entire population of the UK.
The LFS is conducted using standardised techniques under the auspices of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), making EU and international comparisons possible. It provides the official measure of unemployment using the ILO definition (see Glossary).
Mid-Year Population Estimates The Mid-Year Population Estimates refer to the population that is usually resident on 30 June of the reference year. They are published annually. This product is the official set of population estimates for the UK and its constituent countries, the regions of England and Wales and for local authorities, consisting of a consistent time series of annually published estimates from 1981 onwards. The estimates are compiled using the cohort component method and a combination of registration, survey and administrative data sources.
Estimates for Mid-2011 are based on results of the 2011 Census, updated to the mid-year reference date. Estimates for Mid-2002 to Mid-2010 for England and Wales have been revised in line with the 2011 Census and were published on 13 December 2012. Revisions for estimates at sub-national level are planned for publication in Spring 2013.
Regional Gross Value Added (GVA) statistics Regional Gross Value Added (GVA) is a legal requirement of the European Union (EU) statistical body, Eurostat. Estimates are compiled in compliance with the European System of Accounts 1995 and are consistent with the standards set out in the United Nations System of National Accounts 1993. They are published annually in December.
GVA is the value generated by any unit engaged in the production of goods and services. It is measured at current basic prices, excluding taxes (less subsidies) on products. GVA plus taxes (less subsidies) on products is equivalent to Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Regional GVA is measured using the income approach, which involves adding up the income generated by resident individuals or corporations in the production of goods and services. It is calculated gross of deductions for consumption of fixed capital, which is the amount of fixed assets used up in the process of production in any period.
The GVA estimates are shown by Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) regions. NUTS is a hierarchical classification of spatial units that provides a breakdown of the EU’s territory for producing comparable regional statistics. Workforce Jobs (WFJ) series WFJ is a quarterly measure of jobs in the UK and is the preferred measure of short-term employment change by industry. It is a compound measure that draws on a range of sources and is the sum of Employee Jobs (EJ), Self-Employment Jobs (SEJ), Government-Supported Trainees (GST) and Her Majesty’s Forces (HMF). The London jobs series compiled by GLA Intelligence uses the EJ and SEJ components of the WFJ series.
The WFJ series is a measure of jobs rather than people. For example if a person holds two jobs, both jobs will be counted in the total.
The components of the WFJ series come from different sources: EJ is measured primarily by employer surveys, SEJ is from the LFS and GST and HMF are from administrative sources. EJ, which is by far the largest component, comes mainly from the Short Term Employment Surveys (STES). The sample for STES is approximately 24,100 businesses per quarter. In common with other business surveys conducted by ONS, the sampling frame for WFJ is the IDBR.
Further information on ONS sources is available at: www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/quality/quality-information/index.html Appendix 1: Caveats and issues to be aware of
This appendix sets out some of the most significant limitations which readers should bear in mind when considering the results from the analysis in this paper.
GVA data Data on London’s GVA is used in developing the employment projections. However, there is no official source of real GVA available at the regional level. Instead, nominal GVA data is produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on an annual basis (although with a significant lag - London’s nominal GVA for 2011 was released in December 2012 for example). The regional GVA series is available from 1997 onwards. As a result, a number of assumptions about London’s GVA have to be made in the development of employment projections - namely how to produce a real GVA series for London for available data and how to best estimate London’s GVA prior to 1997 (and for most recent data where this is not available from official sources).
Employment data The time horizon to be considered by the next London Plan is the period to 2036 - almost two and a half decades away. To project employment over this period with a reasonable degree of confidence, a significant historical period of data would be desirable. Instead, official data on London’s employment over time is only available on a consistent basis back to 1996. As a result, using official data only, 16 years of historic data would be used to project employment 24 years into the future. GLA Economics has developed a consistent employment time series for London jobs back to 1984 using ONS business surveys (in particular Workforce Jobs series) and the Labour Force Survey. Whilst this provides 28 years of historical data, this length of data is far from ideal when projecting forward employment. Similar issues are encountered when producing estimates of employment by industry sector on a consistent basis over time.
Occupation data The ONS’s Workforce Jobs series – which is the main source of data for the historical series of London jobs by sector – does not contain information on occupations. Such information has to be derived from alternative survey sources: ONS’s Labour Force Survey and the Annual Population Survey. These only provide a time series for occupations on a consistent basis from 2001. In addition, whilst estimates of occupations by sector can be produced from this source, because of its sample size at the London level, some of these estimates are subject to significant sampling variability. As a result, a relatively limited amount of data has been used to project occupations when compared to the employment projections. This means that the occupation projections (and the qualification projections which are derived from these projections) should be treated with even more care than the employment projections because of the additional data limitations and necessary simplifying assumptions. Qualification data Data on highest educational qualification is taken from the same sources as the occupation data: the Labour Force Survey and the Annual Population Survey. In 2011, the ONS improved the questions on people’s educational qualifications in order to obtain more information on qualifications obtained abroad, which had previously been reported as ‘other’. This produced a structural break in the time series between 2010 and 2011. To produce the consistent time series required for its projections, GLA Economics needed to find a way to deal with this structural break. It developed a method of projecting the change backwards for earlier years, making a number of assumptions (see Appendix 5).
Turnover analysis To fully understand the dynamics of the labour market it would be useful to have data on individuals moving between jobs. Unfortunately such data does not exist. Instead, in order to provide an indication of the level of turnover in the labour market only, changes in broad occupations have been used. However, this may well underestimate the actual level of turnover in the labour market. First, this analysis does not pick up any individuals who leave their employment but subsequently take up another job in the same occupation. Second, the data source used for this analysis only looks at changes that occur over the period of a year. It may well be that many individuals change jobs or occupations more than once within the course of a single year. As a result, the thrust of the labour market turnover analysis is to illustrate the fact that there are likely to be substantial and on-going education and training needs across London’s workforce – although the absolute scale is likely to be underestimated.
Model and methodological simplifications The models and methodologies used in this analysis are aimed at providing a simplified model of the real world in order to provide a best estimate of what is likely to occur in the future. It is important to appreciate that such models/methodologies are, therefore, subject to a number of simplifying assumptions: the appendices set these out. The projections, therefore, aim to provide a broad indication of the future path of London’s labour market (and associated qualification requirements) based on a number of transparent, simplifying assumptions. Nevertheless, the results from projecting labour market indicators are likely to be subject to particular uncertainty at the moment given the general level of uncertainty in a number of areas – for instance debate about the underlying level of productivity growth in the labour market; the impact of tuition fees on the take up of higher education in the longer term; the impact of changes (and future changes) to legislation on migration to the UK; the impact of changes in state pension age, the nature of state and private pensions and the default retirement age; and, more generally uncertainty as to the future path of economic growth for example.
All of this suggests that this analysis should be treated with a degree of caution when interpreting the results. Appendix 2: London’s detailed employment (employees) structure and index of specialisation
Table A.2.1: London’s industrial structure and main specialisations, 2011
| Sector | London employee jobs | Share of total London employee jobs | London share of GB employee jobs | Index of specialisation | |--------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------| | Total London economy | 4,287,049 | 100 | 16.1 | 1.0 | | **K : Financial and insurance activities** | | | | | | of which: | | | | | | 6430 : Trusts, funds and similar financial entities | 7,750 | 0.2 | 72.0 | 13.3 | | 6612 : Security and commodity contracts brokerage | 37,438 | 0.9 | 68.6 | 11.4 | | 6630 : Fund management activities | 21,089 | 0.5 | 67.7 | 10.9 | | 6499 : Other financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding, n.e.c. | 15,059 | 0.4 | 51.5 | 5.5 | | 6619 : Other activities auxiliary to financial services, except insurance and pension funding | 47,304 | 1.1 | 38.5 | 3.3 | | 6419 : Other monetary intermediation | 144,103 | 3.4 | 32.8 | 2.5 | | 6622 : Activities of insurance agents and brokers | 31,164 | 0.7 | 29.3 | 2.2 | | 6629 : Other activities auxiliary to insurance and pension funding | 19,139 | 0.4 | 24.1 | 1.7 | | **J : Information and communication** | 328,256 | 7.7 | 31.5 | 2.4 | | of which: | | | | | | 6020 : Television programming and broadcasting activities | 14,596 | 0.3 | 82.8 | 25.0 | | 5912 : Motion picture, video and television programme post-production activities | 9,433 | 0.2 | 81.0 | 22.2 | | 6391 : News agency activities | 7,788 | 0.2 | 77.4 | 17.8 | | 5920 : Sound recording and music publishing activities | 5,220 | 0.1 | 72.9 | 14.0 | | Sector | London employee jobs | Share of total London employee jobs | London share of GB employee jobs | Index of specialisation | |--------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------| | 5911 : Motion picture, video and television programme production activities | 34,421 | 0.8 | 67.8 | 11 | | 5814 : Publishing of journals and periodicals | 22,331 | 0.5 | 57.0 | 6.9 | | 5811 : Book publishing | 10,603 | 0.2 | 46.0 | 4.4 | | 6202 : Computer consultancy activities | 81,541 | 1.9 | 28.5 | 2.1 | | 6209 : Other information technology and computer service activities | 34,625 | 0.8 | 27.3 | 2.0 | | 5813 : Publishing of newspapers | 11,862 | 0.3 | 26.1 | 1.8 | | 6201 : Computer programming activities | 29,380 | 0.7 | 25.6 | 1.8 | | M : Professional, scientific and technical activities | 522,767 | 12.2 | 27.1 | 1.9 | | of which: | | | | | | 7021 : Public relations and communication activities | 8,841 | 0.2 | 56.3 | 6.7 | | 7311 : Advertising agencies | 34,744 | 0.8 | 41.8 | 3.7 | | 7320 : Market research and public opinion polling | 20,241 | 0.5 | 41.6 | 3.7 | | 7312 : Media representation | 6,065 | 0.1 | 41.1 | 3.6 | | 7410 : Specialised design activities | 13,512 | 0.3 | 39.9 | 3.5 | | 7111 : Architectural activities | 21,158 | 0.5 | 36.8 | 3.0 | | 7420 : Photographic activities | 5,707 | 0.1 | 35.1 | 2.8 | | 6910 : Legal activities | 91,998 | 2.1 | 32.2 | 2.5 | | 6920 : Accounting, bookkeeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy | 75,233 | 1.8 | 29.3 | 2.2 | | 7022 : Business and other management consultancy activities | 92,312 | 2.2 | 29.0 | 2.1 | | 7490 : Other professional, scientific and technical activities n.e.c. | 22,882 | 0.5 | 28.8 | 2.1 | | 7010 : Activities of head offices | 49,107 | 1.1 | 25.3 | 1.8 | | L : Real estate activities | 99,461 | 2.3 | 24.5 | 1.5 | | of which: | | | | | | 6832 : Management of real estate on a fee or contract basis | 25,520 | 0.6 | 30.5 | 2.3 | | 6831 : Real estate agencies | 32,907 | 0.8 | 28.2 | 2.0 | | N : Administrative and support service activities | 450,082 | 10.5 | 20.7 | 1.4 | | of which: | | | | | | 8230 : Convention and trade show organizers | 5,811 | 0.1 | 34.3 | 2.7 |
## London labour market projections
| Sector | London employee jobs | Share of total London employee jobs | London share of GB employee jobs | Index of specialisation | |--------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------| | 7810 : Activities of employment placement agencies | 47,115 | 1.1 | 32 | 2.4 | | 8010 : Private security activities | 54,711 | 1.3 | 30.1 | 2.2 | | 7912 : Tour operator activities | 6,545 | 0.2 | 26.8 | 1.9 | | 8299 : Other business support service activities n.e.c. | 47,116 | 1.1 | 25.1 | 1.7 | | 7911 : Travel agency activities | 12,436 | 0.3 | 23.2 | 1.6 | | 8121 : General cleaning of buildings | 86,356 | 2.0 | 22.7 | 1.5 | | **S : Other service activities** | **111,890** | **2.6** | **20.3** | **1.3** | | of which: | | | | | | 9412 : Activities of professional membership organisations | 13,052 | 0.3 | 47.8 | 4.8 | | 9411 : Activities of business and employers membership organisations | 5,511 | 0.1 | 41.2 | 3.6 | | 9491 : Activities of religious organisations | 16,935 | 0.4 | 29.0 | 2.1 | | **R : Arts, entertainment and recreation** | **113,627** | **2.7** | **17.5** | **1.1** | | of which: | | | | | | 9001 : Performing arts | 10,737 | 0.3 | 37.3 | 3.1 | | 9003 : Artistic creation | 6,638 | 0.2 | 34.0 | 2.7 | | 9102 : Museum activities | 8,378 | 0.2 | 30.9 | 2.3 | | 9313 : Fitness facilities | 9,144 | 0.2 | 24.4 | 1.7 | | **H : Transportation and storage** | **207,541** | **4.8** | **17.1** | **1.1** | | of which: | | | | | | 5110 : Passenger air transport | 34,884 | 0.8 | 51.7 | 5.6 | | 4931 : Urban and suburban passenger land transport | 46,140 | 1.1 | 36.4 | 3.0 | | 5223 : Service activities incidental to air transportation | 12,539 | 0.3 | 28.9 | 2.1 | | 4910 : Passenger rail transport, interurban | 10,511 | 0.2 | 24.3 | 1.7 | | 5221 : Service activities incidental to land transportation | 15,314 | 0.4 | 22.3 | 1.5 | | **I : Accommodation and food service activities** | **308,758** | **7.2** | **17.0** | **1.1** | | of which: | | | | | | 5629 : Other food service activities | 7,588 | 0.2 | 30.2 | 2.2 | | 5621 : Event catering activities | 48,163 | 1.1 | 23.0 | 1.6 | | **O : Public administration and defence; compulsory social security** | **223,434** | **5.2** | **16.1** | **1.0** | | Sector | London employee jobs | Share of total London employee jobs | London share of GB employee jobs | Index of specialisation | |--------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------| | P : Education | 348,171 | 8.1 | 13.9 | 0.9 | | G : Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles | 548,002 | 12.8 | 12.9 | 0.8 | | of which: | | | | | | 4634 : Wholesale of beverages | 7,817 | 0.2 | 26.6 | 1.9 | | 4742 : Retail sale of telecommunications equipment in specialised stores | 6,056 | 0.1 | 24.2 | 1.7 | | 4645 : Wholesale of perfume and cosmetics | 5,202 | 0.1 | 23.0 | 1.5 | | Q : Human health and social work activities | 413,938 | 9.7 | 11.8 | 0.7 | | F : Construction | 126,453 | 2.9 | 10.4 | 0.6 | | of which: | | | | | | 4110 : Development of building projects | 18,602 | 0.4 | 31.8 | 2.4 | | E : Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities | 17,149 | 0.4 | 9.8 | 0.6 | | D : Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply | 7,329 | 0.2 | 6.4 | 0.4 | | B : Mining and quarrying | 2,950 | 0.1 | 5.2 | 0.3 | | C : Manufacturing | 102,285 | 2.4 | 4.4 | 0.2 | | A : Agriculture, forestry and fishing | 561 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
Note: 4 digit SIC codes are included where the code accounts for 5,000 or more employees in London and has an index of specialisation greater than or equal to 1.5 Appendix 3: Medium-term projections
Introduction This appendix considers the likely path of London’s employment over the period 2012 to 2015 using information from GLA Economics’ medium-term forecasting model. The appendix then looks at what this medium term outlook for London’s employment, by sector, means for the likely path of occupations and qualification requirements in the next few years.
Medium-term forecast for London’s employment It is necessary to distinguish carefully between the GLA’s long-term employment projections, which have been presented previously, and this medium-term forecast, which is based on the GLA’s medium-term planning projections. Trend projections, which are what the long-term projections are, do not incorporate cyclical variations. The actual course of employment will vary around the projection.
Trend projections are essential for planning purposes in order to provide the capacity required to accommodate the needs of the economy over the long-term. However, for shorter-term business planning purposes, estimates of the numbers of jobs in each year are required. The medium-term planning projections provide these estimates. As time progresses and more data become available, it becomes possible to identify turning points in the data; whether underlying trends are continuing; and/or, new trends are being established.
It should be noted that any economic forecast is what the forecaster views as the economy’s most likely future path and as such is inherently uncertain. Both model and data uncertainty as well as unpredictable events contribute to the potential for forecast error. GLA Economics’ medium-term forecast is based on an in-house model built by Volterra Consulting Limited.
The medium-term forecast model forecasts employment for seven broad sectors of the economy as well as for total employment. These sectors are:
- manufacturing
- construction
- transportation and storage
- distribution, accommodation and food service activities
- financial services
- business services
- other (public & private) services
Further details on these sectors are provided in Appendix A of the Autumn 2012 London’s Economic Outlook. Further, in the results presented here the historic level data for 2011 will be used as the staring point for any levels estimate. Overall employment forecast The medium term forecast growth rates for total and sector employment in London is provided in Table A.3.1 and Chart A.3.1 below. Following respectable growth in 2012, total employment is forecast to grow at a modest but increasing rate over the remainder of the forecast period. A similar picture holds true for most of the individual sectors, although manufacturing and other (public & private) services are forecast to experience declines in employment over the forecast period.
Table A.3.1: Summary of sector and total employment forecast (per cent)
| Annual growth rates | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | |------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------| | Manufacturing | -2.6 | -0.8 | -0.6 | -1.9 | | Construction | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.5 | | Transportation and storage | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 1.3 | | Distribution, accommodation and food service activities | 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 | | Financial services | -0.6 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | | Business services | 3.0 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.1 | | Other (public & private) services | -1.2 | -1.0 | -0.9 | -0.7 | | London civilian workforce jobs total | 1.0 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
Source: GLA Economics’ medium-term forecast
Chart A.3.1: Summary of sector and total employment forecast (per cent)
Source: GLA Economics’ medium-term forecast
The forecast level for sector and total employment in London for 2012 to 2015 is given in Table A.3.2 below. Total employment is forecast to reach just under five million jobs by 2015 (an increase of just over 50,000 jobs from 2012), with the largest employing sectors remaining business services, other (public & private) services and distribution, accommodation and food service activities. London labour market projections
Table A.3.2: Summary of sector and total employment forecast (level)
| Employment level (thousands) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | |------------------------------|------|------|------|------| | Manufacturing | 126 | 125 | 124 | 122 | | Construction | 256 | 258 | 260 | 261 | | Transportation and storage | 266 | 268 | 272 | 275 | | Distribution, accommodation and food service activities | 987 | 987 | 992 | 997 | | Financial services | 366 | 367 | 368 | 368 | | Business services | 1538 | 1565 | 1597 | 1630 | | Other (public & private) services | 1378 | 1365 | 1352 | 1343 | | **London civilian workforce jobs total** | **4944** | **4953** | **4973** | **4998** |
Source: GLA Economics’ medium-term forecast
Medium-term occupation projections
Occupation projections for each sector were performed under the assumption that each occupation in a given sector grew from their starting level in 2011 at the same rate as the sector as a whole. This methodology was used as there is limited available evidence to justify assuming divergent occupation growth rates over the medium-term forecast horizon. A forecast for total occupation levels in London over 2012 to 2015 was also performed, with this adjusted to take account of all sectors of London’s economy. The results for total occupation levels is given in Table A.3.3 below.
Table A.3.3: Summary of total employment forecast for occupations (level)
| Employment level (thousands) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | |------------------------------|------|------|------|------| | Managers and Administrators | 641 | 643 | 647 | 651 | | Professional Occupations | 1181 | 1183 | 1186 | 1191 | | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | 921 | 924 | 928 | 933 | | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | 493 | 494 | 495 | 497 | | Craft and Related Occupations | 341 | 342 | 344 | 345 | | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | 628 | 626 | 626 | 627 | | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | 739 | 742 | 747 | 753 | | **Total** | **4944** | **4953** | **4973** | **4998** |
Source: GLA Economics’ medium-term forecast
Medium-term potential qualification requirements
Potential qualification requirements for London’s total workforce were also calculated over the medium term; with it assumed that the required qualification levels would grow from their level in 2011 in line with the growth rate of total employment, Table A.3.4 below summaries the results.
Table A.3.4: Summary of total qualification for London’s workforce (level)
| Qualification level (thousands) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | |---------------------------------|------|------|------|------| | Higher degree | 676 | 677 | 680 | 683 | | Ordinary degree or equivalent | 1615 | 1618 | 1624 | 1633 | | Higher education | 360 | 361 | 362 | 364 | | GCE, A-level or equivalent | 794 | 796 | 799 | 803 | | GCSE grades A\* – C or equivalent | 708 | 709 | 712 | 715 | | Other qualifications | 526 | 527 | 529 | 532 | | No qualification | 265 | 265 | 266 | 268 | | **Total** | **4944** | **4953** | **4973** | **4998** |
Source: GLA Economics’ medium-term forecast Appendix 4: Long-run employment projection scenarios
This appendix looks at two scenarios around the GLA’s central projections for employment over time. The first scenario looks at a scenario where growth is faster than is assumed in the central projections whilst the second scenario looks at the projection if growth is slower than assumed.
Scenario 1: Faster than assumed growth The methodology for the two scenarios considered is the same as that for the central scenario (explained in Appendix 5) except rather than assume a year-on-year growth rate in London’s output of 2.5 per cent the faster growth scenario assumes a growth rate of 3.0 per cent and the slower growth scenario assumes 2.0 per cent. The results from the two scenarios show how sensitive our central projection results are to the growth assumption.
If London’s output were to grow at 3.0 per cent year-on-year employment would be projected to grow at 1.1 per cent each year from 2012 to 2036. This means that the number of jobs in London will increase by 1,606,000 from the 2011 value of 4,896,000. This equates to a 32.8 per cent increase.
Figure A.4.1: London’s historic and projected employment with faster growth (1984-2036) London labour market projections
Whilst London-wide employment is projected to grow even more this is still not the case for all sectors within London. Large differences are still expected across sectors. Table A.4.1 shows that employment growth for sectors is projected to range from 2.5 per cent year-on-year growth (for Professional, Real Estate, Scientific and Technical Activities) to a 4.7 per cent year-on-year decline (for Manufacturing). Figures A.4.2 and A.4.3 also show how projected employment numbers differ across sectors. Professional, real estate, scientific and technical activities are projected to see an increase of 563,000 jobs by 2036. This accounts for over a third of all the employment increase expected in London. Information and communication, administrative and support service activities, and accommodation and food service activities are also expected to see large increases in employment numbers.
Table A.4.1: Summary of employment projections by sector, 2011-2036
| Sector | Employment growth per annum with London output growth of 3.0% per annum | Absolute change in employment numbers ('000 jobs) | |--------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------| | Professional, Real Estate, Scientific and technical activities | 2.5% | 563 | | Information and Communication | 2.0% | 237 | | Administrative and support service activities | 2.0% | 297 | | Accomodation and food service activities | 2.0% | 225 | | Other services | 1.8% | 77 | | Arts, entertainment and recreation | 1.4% | 68 | | **All sectors** | **1.1%** | **1606** | | Education | 1.0% | 105 | | Health | 0.9% | 136 | | Retail | 0.7% | 75 | | Construction | 0.4% | 26 | | Financial and insurance activities | 0.2% | 23 | | Public Admin and defence | -0.5% | -25 | | Transportation and Storage | -0.7% | -40 | | Wholesale | -1.3% | -51 | | Primary & utilities | -2.8% | -16 | | Manufacturing | -4.7% | -91 | Figure A.4.2: Employment projections for London’s largest sectors
Figure A.4.3: Employment projections for London’s smallest sectors London labour market projections
Scenario 1: Occupation Projections (faster growth)
The methodology used to construct occupation projections for sectors is the same as the central scenario (see Appendix 5) except that the faster growth scenario employment projections are used.
A summary of the expected demand for occupations is presented in Tables A.4.2 and A.4.3 and Figure A.4.4. Demand for Professional Occupation in London is projected to see a large increase from its current position. A total 771,000 more jobs (equivalent to a 2.1 per cent year-on-year increase) is expected between 2011 and 2036 (Table A.4.2). This makes up nearly half of the total job increases expected in London over this period. A large proportion of the increase in Professional Occupations (over a fifth) is expected to come from the Information and Communication sector (Table A.4.3).
Table A.4.2: Year-on-Year Change in Occupation Employment within Sectors (2011 to 2036) Table A.4.3: Absolute change in occupation employment by sector (000s, 2011 to 2036)
| Managers and Administrators | Professional Occupations | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | Craft and Related Occupations | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | Total | |-----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------| | Primary & utilities | -2 | -3 | -2 | -3 | -1 | -3 | -16 | | Manufacturing | -13 | -6 | -20 | -12 | -19 | -3 | -91 | | Construction | 10 | 27 | -9 | -12 | 14 | -2 | -3 | | Wholesale | -10 | 9 | -19 | -14 | 0 | -8 | -10 | | Retail | 7 | 50 | 3 | -13 | -5 | 47 | -15 | | Transportation and Storage | -8 | 10 | -4 | -11 | -1 | 6 | -32 | | Accomodation and Food Service Activities | 8 | 27 | 20 | 1 | 20 | 17 | 132 | 225 | | Information and Communication | 66 | 164 | 38 | -16 | -8 | -5 | -3 | 237 | | Financial and Insurance Activities | 24 | 68 | -12 | -49 | 0 | -5 | -3 | 23 | | Professional, Real Estate, Scientific and Technical Activities | 181 | 77 | 146 | -53 | 207 | 5 | 0 | 563 | | Administrative and Support Service Activities | 36 | 19 | -40 | -26 | 46 | -25 | 287 | 297 | | Public Admin and Defence | -1 | 28 | -22 | -36 | -2 | 9 | -1 | | Education | 1 | 71 | 63 | -13 | -2 | 4 | -19 | | Health | 10 | 77 | 43 | -24 | 0 | 35 | -6 | | Arts, Entertainment and Recreation | 17 | 78 | -11 | -14 | -2 | 8 | -8 | 68 | | Other Services | 7 | 74 | 19 | -10 | -4 | 0 | -9 | | **Total London** | **333** | **771** | **193** | **-304** | **243** | **82** | **288** |
Note: Total London may not add to total from London-wide employment projections due to rounding.
Clerical and Secretarial Occupations are still the only occupation group expected to see a London-wide decline in demand. These are projected to decline by 304,000 from 2011 to a total of 186,000 by 2036. This equates to a year-on-year decline of 4.0 per cent.
Managers and administrators also projected to see large rise in numbers = 333,000 (equivalent to 1.8 per cent annual growth). This growth is largely driven by an increase in professional/real estate/scientific and technical activities sector. London labour market projections
Figure A.4.4: Changes in Occupation Demand (2001 to 2036)
Figure A.4.5: Changes in occupation shares Qualification Projections (faster growth) Looking at qualifications, the highest growth rate of any qualification class is in higher degrees, where growth of 2.2 per cent per annum is projected for the 2011-2036 period.
Table A.4.4: Year-on-Year Change in Qualification Employment within Occupations (2011 to 2036)
| Qualification | Higher degree | Ordinary degree or equivalent | Higher education | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |---------------|---------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------| | Managers and Administrators | 2.4% | 2.1% | 1.5% | 1.2% | 1.4% | 1.0% | -0.5% | 1.8% | | Professional Occupations | 2.5% | 2.1% | 1.7% | 1.4% | 1.9% | 0.8% | 2.3% | 2.1% | | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | 1.6% | 1.2% | 0.4% | -0.1% | 0.2% | -1.1% | -0.6% | 0.8% | | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | -1.9% | -2.9% | -3.2% | -4.5% | -4.5% | -7.8% | -8.5% | -4.0% | | Craft and Related Occupations | 3.4% | 3.1% | 2.6% | 1.1% | 2.4% | 3.3% | 1.3% | 2.3% | | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | 2.2% | 1.4% | 1.0% | 0.6% | -0.1% | -0.1% | -0.9% | 0.5% | | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | 3.1% | 2.1% | 1.4% | 0.6% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.0% | 1.4% | | **Total London** | **2.2%** | **1.6%** | **1.1%** | **0.4%** | **0.4%** | **1.0%** | **0.3%** | **1.2%** |
In terms of absolute increases, ordinary degree or equivalent are projected to see the greatest absolute increase in numbers (increase of 731,000, equal to 45 per cent of total increase in jobs). This growth is largely driven by the growth in professional occupations.
Higher degrees are also projected to see large increases in numbers, an increase of 466,000 over the projection period. Again, this is largely driven by demand from professional occupations. London labour market projections
Table A.4.5: Absolute change in qualification employment by occupation (000s, 2011 to 2036)
| Occupation | Higher degree or equivalent | Ordinary degree or equivalent | Higher education | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------| | Managers and Administrators | 78 | 163 | 19 | 36 | 29 | 11 | -2 | 333 | | Professional Occupations | 301 | 356 | 46 | 32 | 25 | 7 | 4 | 771 | | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | 62 | 134 | 7 | -3 | 5 | -9 | -2 | 193 | | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | -10 | -71 | -17 | -65 | -86 | -38 | -16 | -304 | | Craft and Related Occupations | 9 | 41 | 21 | 33 | 42 | 83 | 14 | 243 | | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | 10 | 45 | 17 | 24 | -4 | -2 | -9 | 82 | | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | 16 | 62 | 16 | 15 | 62 | 85 | 32 | 288 | | **Total London** | **466** | **731** | **108** | **71** | **73** | **137** | **20** | **1607** |
Figure A.4.6: Changes in Qualification Demand (2001 to 2036) In 2004, 34 per cent of jobs had the highest qualification of higher degree or ordinary degree/equivalent. This share grew to 46 per cent in 2011 and is projected to reach 53 per cent by 2036 (figure A.4.7). This is unchanged from the central projection in the main text.
**Figure A.4.7: Shares of qualifications as a total of all jobs**
**Scenario 2: Slower growth assumption**
If London’s output were to grow at 2.0 per cent year-on-year (as compared to the central projection assumption of 2.5 per cent year-on-year) employment would be projected to grow at 0.2 per cent each year from 2012 to 2036. This means that the number of jobs in London will increase by 198,000 from the 2011 value of 4,896,000. This equates to a 4.1 per cent increase. Whilst London-wide employment is projected to grow this is not the case for all sectors within London. Indeed, there are large differences in expected employment amongst sectors. Table A.4.6 shows that employment growth for sectors is projected to range from 1.5 per cent year-on-year growth (for Professional, Real Estate, Scientific and Technical Activities) to a 5.7 per cent year-on-year decline (for Manufacturing). Figures A.4.9 and A.4.10 also show how projected employment numbers differ across sectors. Professional, real estate, scientific and technical activities are projected to see an increase of 296,000 jobs by 2036. This is almost one and a half times as large as the total change in jobs across London sectors. Information and communication, administrative and support service activities, and accommodation and food service activities are also expected to see large increases in employment numbers. Table A.4.6: Summary of employment projections by sector, 2011-2036
| Sector | Employment growth per annum with London output growth of 2.0% per annum | Absolute change in employment numbers ('000 jobs) | |--------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------| | Professional, Real Estate, Scientific and technical activities | 1.5% | 296 | | Information and Communication | 1.0% | 107 | | Administrative and support service activities | 1.0% | 133 | | Accomodation and food service activities | 1.0% | 99 | | Other services | 0.8% | 30 | | Arts, entertainment and recreation | 0.4% | 18 | | **All sectors** | **0.2%** | **198** | | Education | 0.1% | 6 | | Health | 0.0% | -5 | | Retail | -0.3% | -32 | | Construction | -0.6% | -35 | | Financial and insurance activities | -0.7% | -62 | | Public Admin and defence | -1.4% | -69 | | Transportation and Storage | -1.6% | -89 | | Wholesale | -2.3% | -80 | | Primary & utilities | -3.7% | -20 | | Manufacturing | -5.7% | -99 |
Figure A.4.9: Employment projections for London’s largest sectors London labour market projections
Figure A.4.10: Employment projections for London’s smallest sectors
Occupation Projections (slower growth) The methodology used to construct occupation projections for sectors is the same as the central scenario (see Appendix 5) except that the slower growth scenario employment projections are used.
A summary of the expected demand for occupations is presented in Tables A.4.7 and A.4.8 and Figure 4. Demand for Professional Occupation in London is projected to see an increase from its current position. A total 351,000 more jobs (equivalent to a 1.1 per cent year-on-year increase) is expected between 2011 and 2036 (Table A.4.7). This is 1.7 times larger than the total job increases expected in London over this period. A large proportion of the increase in Professional Occupations (over a quarter) is expected to come from the Information and Communication sector (Table A.4.8). Table A.4.7: Year-on-Year Change in Occupation Employment within Sectors (2011 to 2036)
| Sector | Managers and Administrators | Professional Occupations | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | Craft and Related Occupations | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | Total | |-------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------| | Primary & utilities | -3.0% | -3.1% | -4.6% | -10.8% | -6.6% | -13.3% | -2.7% | -3.9% | | Manufacturing | -4.4% | -2.3% | -7.6% | -9.4% | -9.8% | -4.6% | -12.4% | -5.9% | | Construction | 0.1% | 1.4% | -6.7% | -5.9% | -0.6% | -7.3% | -1.4% | -0.6% | | Wholesale | -2.3% | 1.5% | -4.5% | -5.0% | -0.9% | -3.4% | -2.3% | -2.3% | | Retail | -0.6% | 3.1% | -0.6% | -4.0% | -2.8% | -0.2% | -2.7% | -0.3% | | Transportation and Storage | -2.8% | 0.8% | -1.8% | -3.9% | -1.4% | -0.3% | -2.1% | -1.7% | | Accomodation and Food Service Activities | -0.5% | 7.1% | 2.6% | -0.9% | 0.1% | 0.8% | 1.4% | 1.0% | | Information and Communication | 3.0% | 1.9% | 0.2% | -6.5% | -5.1% | -6.8% | -5.4% | 1.1% | | Financial and Insurance Activities | 0.1% | 1.4% | -1.4% | -7.0% | -2.4% | -3.8% | -8.3% | -0.8% | | Professional, Real Estate, Scientific and Technical Activities | 3.1% | 0.1% | 1.5% | -5.2% | 10.3% | -0.1% | -0.9% | 1.5% | | Administrative and Support Service Activities | 0.9% | 1.1% | -4.8% | -5.0% | 3.1% | -4.0% | 2.9% | 1.1% | | Public Admin and Defence | -1.3% | 0.7% | -2.3% | -6.1% | -8.5% | 1.7% | -1.9% | -1.5% | | Education | -0.5% | 0.3% | 3.0% | -4.9% | -3.4% | -0.8% | -6.0% | 0.1% | | Health | 0.0% | 0.3% | 1.0% | -3.3% | -0.9% | 0.0% | -2.3% | 0.0% | | Arts, Entertainment and Recreation | 1.9% | 5.1% | -1.7% | -6.0% | -3.4% | 1.2% | -4.6% | 0.4% | | Other Services | 0.7% | 4.0% | 1.4% | -5.7% | -4.9% | -1.1% | -7.7% | 0.8% | | **Total London** | **0.7%** | **1.1%** | **-0.2%** | **-4.9%** | **1.2%** | **-0.5%** | **0.4%** | **0.2%** | London labour market projections
Table A.4.8: Absolute change in occupation employment by sector (000s, 2011 to 2036)
| | Managers and Administrators | Professional Occupations | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | Craft and Related Occupations | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | Plant and Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | Total | |------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------| | Primary & utilities | -2 | -3 | -2 | -3 | -3 | -1 | -5 | -20 | | Manufacturing | -15 | -10 | -21 | -12 | -19 | -3 | -19 | -99 | | Construction | 1 | 14 | -10 | -13 | -15 | -3 | -10 | -35 | | Wholesale | -16 | 5 | -22 | -15 | -5 | -10 | -16 | -80 | | Retail | -9 | 33 | -5 | -15 | -7 | -8 | -21 | -32 | | Transportation and Storage | -12 | 4 | -8 | -13 | -3 | -2 | -54 | -89 | | Accomodation and Food Service Activities | -6 | 20 | 12 | -4 | 2 | 6 | 67 | 99 | | Information and Communication | 43 | 93 | 5 | -17 | -9 | -6 | -4 | 107 | | Financial and Insurance Activities | 2 | 35 | -37 | -52 | -1 | -6 | -3 | -62 | | Professional, Real Estate, Scientific and Technical Activities | 118 | 5 | 77 | -59 | 158 | 0 | -3 | 296 | | Administrative and Support Service Activities | 15 | 9 | -46 | -30 | 30 | -30 | 184 | 133 | | Public Admin and Defence | -6 | 10 | -34 | -39 | -2 | 5 | -2 | -69 | | Education | -1 | 13 | 41 | -15 | -2 | -10 | -21 | 6 | | Health | 0 | 17 | 19 | -31 | -1 | 1 | -9 | -5 | | Arts, Entertainment and Recreation | 10 | 56 | -25 | -16 | -2 | 4 | -9 | 18 | | Other Services | 2 | 51 | 10 | -11 | -4 | -8 | -10 | 30 | | **Total London** | **124** | **351** | **-46** | **-344** | **117** | **-70** | **67** | **199**|
Note: Total London may not add to total from London-wide employment projections due to rounding.
Clerical and Secretarial Occupations are still expected to decline. Under the slower growth scenario, associate professional/technical occupation and personal/protective/service occupation jobs are also projected to decline - both affected by declines in administrative and support service activities.
Managers and administrators are projected to see a rise in numbers of 124,000 (equivalent to growth of around 0.7 per cent a year). This growth is largely driven by an increase in the professional/real estate/scientific and technical activities sector. Figure A.4.11: Changes in Occupation Demand (2001 to 2036)
Figure A.4.12: Changes in occupation shares London labour market projections
Qualification Projections (slower growth)
Looking at qualifications, the highest growth rate is for higher degrees (with growth equivalent to 1.2 per cent per annum over the 2011 to 2036 period).
Table A.4.9: Year-on-Year Change in Qualification Employment within Occupations (2011 to 2036)
| Qualification | Higher degree | Ordinary degree or equivalent | Higher education | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |---------------|---------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|----------------|-------| | Managers and Administrators | 1.4% | 1.1% | 0.5% | 0.2% | 0.4% | 0.0% | -1.5% | 0.7% | | Professional Occupations | 1.5% | 1.1% | 0.6% | 0.4% | 0.9% | -0.2% | 1.3% | 1.1% | | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | 0.6% | 0.2% | -0.6% | -1.1% | -0.8% | -2.1% | -1.6% | -0.2% | | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | -2.9% | -3.8% | -4.2% | -5.5% | -5.5% | -8.7% | -9.4% | -4.9% | | Craft and Related Occupations | 2.4% | 2.1% | 1.5% | 0.1% | 1.4% | 2.2% | 0.3% | 1.2% | | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | 1.2% | 0.4% | 0.0% | -0.4% | -1.1% | -1.1% | -1.9% | -0.5% | | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | 2.1% | 1.0% | 0.4% | -0.4% | 0.5% | 0.4% | -0.1% | 0.4% | | **Total London** | **1.2%** | **0.6%** | **0.1%** | **-0.7%** | **-0.6%** | **0.0%** | **-0.7%** | **0.2%** |
Ordinary degree or equivalent is projected to see the greatest absolute increase in numbers with an increase of 226,000 over the projection period. This is largely driven by growth in professional occupations.
Higher degrees are also projected to see large increases in numbers of around 220,000 from 2011-2036. Again, this is largely driven by demand from professional occupations. Table A.4.10: Absolute change in qualification employment by occupation (000s, 2011 to 2036)
| Occupation | Higher degree or equivalent | Ordinary degree or equivalent | GCE, A-level or equivalent | GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent | Other qualifications | No qualification | Total | |------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-------| | Managers and Administrators | 39 | 73 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | -6 | 124 | | Professional Occupations | 156 | 161 | 16 | 8 | 10 | -2 | 2 | 351 | | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | 20 | 16 | -8 | -33 | -21 | -15 | -4 | -46 | | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | -14 | -86 | -20 | -72 | -95 | -39 | -17 | -344 | | Craft and Related Occupations | 5 | 24 | 11 | 3 | 21 | 50 | 3 | 117 | | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | 5 | 11 | 0 | -15 | -34 | -20 | -17 | -70 | | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations | 10 | 27 | 4 | -10 | 17 | 22 | -2 | 67 | | **Total London** | **220** | **226** | **7** | **-114** | **-94** | **-5** | **-41** | **199** |
Figure A.4.13: Changes in Qualification Demand (2001 to 2036)
In 2004, 34 per cent of jobs had a highest qualification of higher degree or ordinary degree/equivalent. This increased to 46 per cent by 2011 and is projected to reach 53 per cent by 2036 (figure A.4.14). This projection is unchanged from central scenario in the main text. London labour market projections
Figure A.4.14: Shares of qualifications as a total of all jobs
- Higher degree
- Ordinary degree or equivalent
- Higher education
- GCE, A-level or equivalent
- GCSE grades A\* - C or equivalent
- Other qualifications
- No qualification Appendix 5: Employment projections methodology
To construct long-term employment projections for London, GLA Economics use a trend-based methodology. This looks at the historical relationships between output and employment (or productivity) to ascertain the future relationship between the two. This provides an indication of the output growth required to keep employment in London stable (or for the employment growth rate to be zero). Combined with an assumed output growth rate for London, these two assumptions determine the projected employment growth. Further details on the methodology can be found in GLA Economics Working Paper 51: Employment Projection for London by sector and trend-based projections by borough, December 2011.
The methodology clearly relies on good output and employment data for London. Any changes (and new data) in the historic series to either of these will affect the projections.
GLA Economics use the headline workplace-based GVA (or output) estimates from the ONS Regional Accounts publication. Since the last employment projections were published in 2011 (Working Paper 51) the available time series for London’s output (or London’s workplace-based current price GVA) is significantly shorter. Historically, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) published London GVA data from 1989. However, as part of the move to estimate regional GVA on a Standard Industrial Classification 2007 (SIC 2007) basis the official series now only goes back to 1997. To estimate London’s GVA prior to this the UK’s GVA growth rate has been applied. This method has also been used to estimate London’s GVA for 2011. As in Working Paper 51, London’s GVA estimates have been converted to real prices (i.e. adjusted for inflation) by using the UK GVA deflator.
Table A.5.1 shows the revisions for London’s output. On average, the revisions have increased output by 0.4 percentage points. However, three years – 1989, 2002 and 2009 – have the largest revisions. If these outliers are removed, the average revision falls to 0.3 percentage points.
For employment, GLA Economics have developed a consistent time series for London jobs back to 1984 using ONS business surveys (in particular the Workforce Jobs series) and the Labour Force Survey. There have been revisions to London’s historic employment numbers since GLA Economics’ last employment projections (Table A.5.2). The only significant change (with a percentage change greater than 0 per cent at one decimal place) was for 2010 data. This change is associated with ONS Workforce Jobs series revisions published in March 2012. Nonetheless, this revision of 1.3 per cent is relatively small compared to some revisions previously seen (see, for example, Table 1 in Working Paper 51). London labour market projections
Table A.5.1: London real GVA growth – current and previous data
| Year | Working Paper 51 data (2011) | Current data (2012) | Change (percentage points) | |------|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------| | 1985 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 0.3 | | 1986 | 2.8 | 4.1 | 1.3 | | 1987 | 3.8 | 5.2 | 1.4 | | 1988 | 4.2 | 5.3 | 1.1 | | 1989 | 4.8 | 2.6 | -2.1 | | 1990 | 0.7 | 2.3 | 1.6 | | 1991 | -2.5 | -1.4 | 1.1 | | 1992 | -0.4 | 1.1 | 1.5 | | 1993 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 0.3 | | 1994 | 3.4 | 4.4 | 1.0 | | 1995 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 0.9 | | 1996 | 3.9 | 3.0 | -0.9 | | 1997 | 4.9 | 3.9 | -1.0 | | 1998 | 6.2 | 6.0 | -0.2 | | 1999 | 6.2 | 5.9 | -0.3 | | 2000 | 5.6 | 4.3 | -1.4 | | 2001 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 1.6 | | 2002 | 1.4 | 4.2 | 2.7 | | 2003 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 0.0 | | 2004 | 3.4 | 3.0 | -0.4 | | 2005 | 3.8 | 3.1 | -0.7 | | 2006 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 0.4 | | 2007 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 0.1 | | 2008 | 1.9 | 1.2 | -0.7 | | 2009 | -4.4 | -1.5 | 2.9 | | 2010 | 1.3 | -0.1 | -1.4 | | 2011 | | | | | | Average growth (1985-2010) | 2.8 | 3.2 |
Source: GLA Economics based on ONS Regional GVA data Table A.5.2: Total London employment – current and previous data
| Year | Working Paper 51 data (2011) | Current data (2012) | Change (000s) | Change (%) | |------|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|------------| | 1984 | 4,094 | 4,094 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1985 | 4,126 | 4,126 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1986 | 4,085 | 4,085 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1987 | 4,183 | 4,183 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1988 | 4,262 | 4,262 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1989 | 4,282 | 4,282 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1990 | 4,211 | 4,211 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1991 | 4,012 | 4,012 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1992 | 3,858 | 3,858 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1993 | 3,803 | 3,803 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1994 | 3,897 | 3,897 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1995 | 3,960 | 3,960 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1996 | 3,934 | 3,935 | 1.0 | 0.0 | | 1997 | 4,070 | 4,070 | 0.5 | 0.0 | | 1998 | 4,263 | 4,264 | 1.1 | 0.0 | | 1999 | 4,426 | 4,426 | -0.1 | 0.0 | | 2000 | 4,598 | 4,598 | 0.4 | 0.0 | | 2001 | 4,619 | 4,619 | -0.4 | 0.0 | | 2002 | 4,546 | 4,546 | 0.1 | 0.0 | | 2003 | 4,577 | 4,578 | 0.7 | 0.0 | | 2004 | 4,556 | 4,556 | 0.3 | 0.0 | | 2005 | 4,658 | 4,658 | -0.2 | 0.0 | | 2006 | 4,709 | 4,709 | 0.2 | 0.0 | | 2007 | 4,759 | 4,758 | -0.9 | 0.0 | | 2008 | 4,903 | 4,902 | -0.8 | 0.0 | | 2009 | 4,803 | 4,801 | -2.1 | 0.0 | | 2010 | 4,837 | 4,773 | -63.9 | -1.3 | | 2011 | | 4,896 | | |
Source: GLA Economics based on ONS data (particularly Workforce Jobs Series)
The changes to London’s historical output and employment series have affected historical productivity (output per job). Figure A.5.1 shows the logged ratio of employment to output (the inverse of productivity). On such a chart the negative gradient is equal to the output growth that is required to maintain stable employment. In Figure A.5.1 a fitted local regression curve (or trendline) has been added to highlight the historical trend. The gradient of this trendline over the period 1984 to 2011 is -2.5, which implies that output growth of 2.5 per cent would have been required for employment to remain stable over this period. As in Working Paper 51, half of the medium term trend and half of the long term trend have been used to project future productivity. This produces a projection of productivity growth of 1.8 per cent per annum. Combined with a forecast output growth of 2.5 per cent per annum (unchanged from Working Paper 51) this yields a growth rate of 0.7 per cent per annum.
**London’s Sector Employment Projections**
Employment projections for London’s sectors are constructed in a similar way to the London-wide projections. GLA Economics begin by examining the historic trend of employment (employees and self-employed jobs) as in Table A.5.2, broken down by sector, against London level GVA for each sector (or, more specifically, logged sector employment over London GVA). Depending on the characteristics of the historic productivity trends in each sector a judgement is made on the trends that are most likely to direct future developments. To reconcile the forecasts that this method produces with that produced for London as a whole, the sector forecasts are constrained to the London total using the sector forecast proportions. The results of this method and the trend periods used in the projections are summarised in Table A.5.3. London’s Occupations by Sector
The methodology used to estimate occupational demand by sector is similar to the methodology used for sector employment. The method begins by analysing the relationship between employment in each occupation and London total employment (specifically, log of employment by occupation over total employment). This is done separately for each sector and for the SOC 2010 occupations listed in Table A.5.4. It should be noted that the data for employment by occupation within sectors are only available on a consistent basis from 2001 onwards.
Given the short time series available for occupation-level employment, the trend over the entire period is used to project forward i.e. the overall trend (between occupation employment and total employment) from 2001 to 2011 is projected to continue until 2036. However, for the education sector this method did not seem sensible as there were clear breaks in the series for a couple of occupations. Specifically a different trend was taken for the following two occupations within the education sector:
- Professional occupations: here half the trend from 2001 to 2011 and half the trend from 2007 to 2011 is taken,
- Associate professional and technical occupations: here half the trend from 2001 to 2011 and half the trend from 2004 to 2011 is taken.
| Occupation | Trend for projections to 2036 | Resultant productivity trend (per cent per annum) | Output growth required for stable employment | Employment growth per annum with London output growth of 2.5% per annum | |-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Primary & utilities | from 1984 to 2011 | 5.8 | 6.0% | -3.3% | | Manufacturing | from 1984 to 2011 | 7.9 | 8.1% | -5.2% | | Construction | 3/4 trend from 1984 to 2011 | 1/4 trend from 1999 to 2011 | 2.6 | 2.6% | -0.1% | | Wholesale | from 1984 to 2011 | | 4.3 | 4.4% | -1.8% | | Retail | 1/2 trend from 1984 to 2011 | 1/2 trend from 2005 to 2011 | 2.3 | 2.3% | 0.2% | | Transportation and Storage | from 1984 to 2011 | | 3.7 | 3.7% | -1.1% | | Accomodation and food service activities | from 1984 to 2011 | | 1.1 | 1.0% | 1.5% | | Information and Communication | from 1984 to 2011 | | 1.0 | 0.9% | 1.5% | | Financial and insurance activities | 1/2 trend from 1984 to 2011 | 1/2 trend from 1996 to 2011 | 2.8 | 2.8% | -0.3% | | Professional, Real Estate, Scientific and technical activities | from 1984 to 2011 | | 0.6 | 0.5% | 2.0% | | Administrative and support service activities | 3/4 trend from 1984 to 2011 | 1/4 trend from 1998 to 2011 | 1.0 | 1.0% | 1.5% | | Public Admin and defence | 3/4 trend from 1984 to 2011 | 1/4 trend from 1998 to 2011 | 3.5 | 3.5% | -1.0% | | Education | 1/2 trend from 1984 to 2011 | 1/2 trend from 1990 to 2011 | 2.0 | 1.9% | 0.5% | | Health | 3/4 trend from 1984 to 2011 | 1/4 trend from 1991 to 2011 | 2.1 | 2.0% | 0.4% | | Arts, entertainment and recreation | 1/2 from 1984 to 2011 | 1/2 from 1996 to 2011 | 1.6 | 1.6% | 0.9% | | Other services | 1/2 from 1984 to 2011 | 1/2 from 1996 to 2011 | 1.2 | 1.2% | 1.3% | | Total London Employment | 1/2 from 1984 to 2011 | 1/2 from 2003 to 2011 | 1.8 | 1.8% | 0.7% | London labour market projections
Table A.5.4: SOC 2010 Occupation Groups Used
| | | |---|--------------------------------------| | 1 | Managers and Administrators | | 2 | Professional Occupations | | 3 | Associate Professional and Technical Occupations | | 4 | Clerical and Secretarial Occupations | | 5 | Craft and Related Occupations | | 6 + 7 | Personal and Protective Service Occupations + Sales Occupations | | 8 + 9 | Plant And Machine Operatives + Other Occupations |
The results from this method provide GLA Economics with estimates based on the ONS LFS and APS. However, this is different to the data for London-wide and sector level employment forecast. Employment for London as a whole and by sector comes from GLA Economics’ London historic jobs series. In order to make the occupation level analysis consistent, the shares of employment by occupation for each sector have been applied to the historic jobs series (as recommended by the ONS). This has been done for both the historic and projected occupation employment (using the projected employee and self-employed jobs for the latter).
London level occupation projections are then derived by summing numbers across individual sectors.
London’s Qualification by Occupation
Historic data on the highest qualification held by those employed comes from the same source as the data for occupation employment i.e. from the ONS LFS/APS and is available from 2001. The qualification groups which are used in this work are listed in Table A.5.5. However, in 2011 the ONS changed the approach to collecting data on people’s highest educational qualifications in order to obtain more information on qualifications obtained abroad, which had previously been reported as ‘other’. This produced a structural break in the time series between 2010 and 2011. GLA Economics developed a method to project this change backwards for earlier years (see Figure A.5.2).
Table A.5.5: Highest Qualification Categories Used
| | | |---|--------------------------------------| | 1 | Higher degree | | 2 | Ordinary degree or equivalent | | 3 | Higher education | | 4 | GCE, A-level or equivalent | | 5 | GCSE grades A\*-C or equivalent | | 6 | Other qualifications | | 7 | No qualification |
Once the historic data has been adjusted (so that it is consistent with the 2011 ONS method) the trend for each qualification (for each occupation) is projected using a logarithmic time trend. The trend is projected off from the last data point available (2011). This method ensures that qualifications do not grow uniformly over time, but instead, and arguably more realistically, approach some finite number (i.e. it ensures that the growth of qualification employment is asymptotic over time). These are then converted to shares within each occupation (based on the total that results from applying the method to all qualification categories). These shares are then applied to the occupation-level employment projections. Note that since the occupation projections were reconciled to be consistent with the historic London jobs series this process ensures that the qualification projections (based on LFS/APS employment) are also consistent with the London jobs projections. Finally, the historic data are reconciled to London jobs series employment projections by applying the shares to the historic occupation totals.
London total qualification projections are then taken as the sum of each qualification across occupations. Figure A.5.2: Smoothing method to control for 2011 step change in ONS ‘highest qualification’ method
1. First, it is necessary to calculate the share of employment by highest qualification for each occupation.
2. It is also necessary to estimate the percentage point change in the employment shares by qualification from one year to the next.
3. Is the percentage point fall in ‘other’ qualification share between 2010 and 2011 outside of the range exhibited previously? In other words, does the change between 2010 and 2011 fall outside of the maximum and minimum values for ‘other’ qualifications from Box2?
- No
- No adjustment to the data necessary
- Yes
- 4. Are there any other qualification categories whose change from 2010 to 2011 falls outside the historic year-on-year changes (calculated in Box2)?
- No
- 5. Apply the annual average year-on-year change in ‘other’ qualifications to the share in 2010. This provides an estimate of the share that would have been expected in 2011 had the ONS approach remained unchanged. The difference between this value and the actual share is then (a) subtracted, for each historic year, from the share of ‘other’ qualifications, and (b) distributed to all other qualification categories proportionately (based on their relative shares each year). These shares are then applied to the totals to convert back to numbers.
- Yes
- 6. Is the change from 2010 to 2011 positive?
- No
- 7. Apply the method in Box 5 distributing the share proportionately from ‘other’ qualifications only to those qualifications whose change was positive and outside of the historical year-on-year changes. London labour market projections
Borough Employment Projections
Borough employment projections are generated by applying a set of rules to three different projections for borough employment. These are, employment based on:
- Continued historic trends,
- Transport accessibility, and
- Workplace capacity.
The rationale is that trend-based forecasts for employment in the Boroughs need to be “reality checked” against forecasts for transport (to get employees to jobs) and forecasts for workspace (to accommodate employees once they have arrived). Our ‘rules’ for resolving differences between the three sets of forecasts are set out in detail below. Briefly, they constrain projected Borough employment below the trend-based forecast if there is either inadequate forecast transport or inadequate forecast workspace, or they allow the trend-based forecast to be exceeded if there is either plentiful forecast transport or plentiful forecast workspace.
The method for each of these is described below.
Borough employment based on continued historic trends
As explained in GLA Economics Working Paper 51, borough employment projections are based on employee numbers only (i.e. they do not include the self-employed). The historic series uses information from the Census of Employment (1981-1990), the Annual Employment Survey (1991-1997), the Annual Business Inquiry (1998-2007) and the Business Register and Employment Survey (2008-2011). More information on how these have been constructed into one consistent series can be found in GLA Economics Working Paper 52.
In order to construct borough employment projections it is necessary to first construct projections for London as a whole for employees only. This is done using a similar method described above. First, we look at the historic trend of London employee jobs and GVA (or productivity) as well as the implied self-employment jobs (taken as the difference of London employee and self-employed jobs and London employee jobs only) and GVA to ascertain the future relationship for employees and self-employed (separately) with GVA. For the implied self-employment jobs the entire historical trend is used to project forward. For employee jobs, half the trend from 1984-2011 and half the trend from 2003-2011 is taken. A forecast 2.5 per cent per annum GVA growth rate is then applied to determine employment growth rates. To reconcile the forecasts that this method produces with that produced for London employees and self-employed combined, the forecasts are constrained using the employee to self-employed forecast proportions. This method produces a 0.6 per cent year-on-year growth rate for employee jobs in London from 2012 to 2036.
The borough-level employee jobs are then estimated using the same method to project sector-level employment. In other words, the historic trends of employment by borough against London GVA are analysed. Depending on the characteristics of the historic productivity trends in each borough a judgement is made on the trends that are most likely to direct future developments (ignoring transport and workplace capacity constraints). The results are then constrained to the total London-wide employee job projections (as estimated above) using the borough forecast proportions. The results of this method and the trend periods used in the projections are summarised in Table A.5.6. Full results of the borough level employee projections (including an assessment of capacity and accessibility at the borough level are set out in Appendix 8). | Location | Trend for projections to 2036 | Resultant productivity trend (per cent per annum) | Employee growth per annum with London output growth of 2.5% per annum | Employee change from 2011 to 2036 with London output growth of 2.5% per annum | |--------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Barking and Dagenham | from 1981 to 2011 | 4.7 | -1.7% | -16,610 | | Barnet | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.7 | 0.2% | 6,330 | | Bexley | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.8 | 0.2% | 2,910 | | Brent | from 1981 to 2011 | 3.6 | -0.7% | -15,310 | | Bromley | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.6 | 0.4% | 8,790 | | Camden | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.4 | 0.6% | 43,390 | | City of London | 1/2 trend from 1981-2011 | 2.8 | 0.2% | 16,680 | | Croydon | 1/2 trend from 1981-2011 | 3.8 | -0.8% | -20,820 | | Ealing | from 1981 to 2011 | 3.5 | -0.6% | -15,900 | | Enfield | from 1981 to 2011 | 3.2 | -0.3% | -5,760 | | Greenwich | 1/2 trend from 1981-2011 | 2.7 | 0.2% | 4,240 | | Hackney | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.8 | 0.2% | 3,990 | | Hammersmith and Fulham | from 1981 to 2011 | 1.8 | 1.2% | 41,130 | | Haringey | 1/2 trend from 1981-2011 | 3.2 | -0.3% | -3,900 | | Harrow | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.8 | 0.2% | 2,970 | | Havering | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.8 | 0.1% | 2,130 | | Hillingdon | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.1 | 0.8% | 40,210 | | Hounslow | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.5 | 0.5% | 15,600 | | Islington | from 1981 to 2011 | 1.7 | 1.3% | 66,200 | | Kensington and Chelsea | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.4 | 0.5% | 16,380 | | Kingston-upon-Thames | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.8 | 0.1% | 2,300 | | Lambeth | 1/2 trend from 1981-2011 | 2.7 | 0.2% | 6,450 | | Lewisham | 1/2 trend from 1981-2011 | 3.0 | -0.1% | -1,380 | | Merton | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.5 | 0.4% | 7,120 | | Newham | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.3 | 0.7% | 13,980 | | Redbridge | 1/2 trend from 1981-2011 | 2.6 | 0.3% | 5,340 | | Richmond-upon-Thames | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.4 | 0.6% | 10,600 | | Southwark | 1/2 trend from 1981-2011 | 0.9 | 2.1% | 122,730 | | Sutton | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.8 | 0.2% | 3,240 | | Tower Hamlets | from 1981 to 2011 | 0.2 | 2.8% | 230,330 | | Waltham Forest | from 1981 to 2011 | 2.5 | 0.4% | 6,270 | | Wandsworth | 1/2 trend from 1981-2011 | 2.4 | 0.5% | 14,550 | | Westminster, City of | 1/2 trend from 1981-2011 | 2.7 | 0.2% | 39,190 | | All London Employees | 1/2 trend from 1984-2011 | 2.0 | 0.6% | 653,350 |
Note: Change in employee jobs rounded to the nearest 10 London labour market projections
**Borough employment based on transport accessibility** Projections by Borough of the employment (employees only) that can be sustained, given improvements in transport infrastructure, are made by modelling the relative “pull” of the London boroughs, projected by a ‘gravity model’ reflecting changes in accessibility resulting from scheduled investments in London’s transport. These projections were done for us by SKM Colin Buchanan.
**Borough employment based on workplace capacity** Projections by Borough of the employment (employees only) that can be sustained given new sites for businesses. These projections were done for us by Roger Tym & Partners (part of Peter Brett Associates).
Once all three methods have been estimated a set of rules are employed to determine what employment by borough is actually expected to be (see Appendix 8 for the results). The rules are as follows:
| Ordering of Projections | Projection Rule | Justification/Comments | |-------------------------|----------------|------------------------| | If Trend > Capacity | At Trend projection if Trend < Capacity + 10% for all boroughs. At Capacity + 10% if trend is above this enhanced level of capacity | The trend projection is feasible if employers have scope to reach it by squeezing in extra workers. If not then the capacity constrains employment even after allowing for such squeezing in. | | If Trend > Accessibility| To Accessibility projection for most boroughs. To Trend if Trend < Accessibility + 10% for Camden, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Tower Hamlets, Hammersmith and Fulham, Southwark, and Lambeth. To Accessibility +10% for Camden, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Tower Hamlets, Hammersmith and Fulham, Southwark, and Lambeth, if Trend > Accessibility +10% for these boroughs. | The trend projection for certain inner London boroughs is feasible if workers are willing to travel for longer into them. Otherwise the accessibility-based projection constrains employment. For certain inner London boroughs it constrains employment after allowing for some additional willingness to travel on the part of workers. | | If Trend > both Capacity and Accessibility | Use rules above. Employment constrained to whichever constraint produces the lowest number. | | | If Trend < Capacity | To Capacity based projection | A plentiful supply of site capacity increases the attractiveness of the location so that historic performance can be bettered. | | If Trend < Accessibility| To Accessibility based projection | Improved accessibility increases the attractiveness of the location so that historic performance can be bettered. | | If Trend < both Capacity and Accessibility | To the lowest of the Capacity and Accessibility based projections | The historic trend can be bettered, to the extent allowed by the lower of the Capacity and Accessibility factors | Appendix 6: Population projections methodology
1. Population Projections: Projection process explained The GLAs borough-level population projections are produced using a cohort component projection model. Estimates and projections are produced from the starting point of the 2001 mid-year estimate. This starting population is aged-on a year, and deaths, births and migration are accounted for such that an estimated population for mid-year 2002 is arrived at. This process is repeated, using the final population calculated in each loop as the starting population for the next.
Beyond the last year with actual data available, values for births, deaths and migration flows are projected using age specific probabilities for fertility, mortality and migration generated from historical trends. At this stage the projection is unconstrained by development.
The process of generating the final projected population is an iterative one. Candidate population projections are created and converted into households by applying a set of Household Representative Rates (HRR) - derived from the DCLG household projections. The number of households that the population forms is compared to the available household spaces implied by the housing trajectory. Migration flows are adjusted until a population is found which yields a number of households that matches the available household spaces.
This process is undertaken for each borough individually and the London total is an aggregation of the borough level results.
Figure A.6.1 illustrates the process of producing the GLAs borough-level projections. The data used in the 2011 projections are listed below:
**Births and Deaths** Births from historic ONS mid-year estimates (MYE) were used for births to mid-year 2002 to 2010. ONS calendar year births for 2010 were used as a proxy for births to mid-year 2011.
**Fertility and mortality trends** Age Specific Fertility Rate (ASFR) and Age Specific Mortality Rate (ASMR) trends beyond 2011 were taken from the “Principle” assumptions used in the 2010-based ONS National Population Projections (NPP) for England. Proportional changes in these rates were used to roll the estimated 2011 ASFR rate forward to 2031.
**Dwellings**
**Historic dwelling changes** For 2002 to 2004, borough-supplied figures were used. For 2005 to 2011, completions data from the London Development Database were used together with CLG vacancy data to estimate changes in the number of dwelling spaces available.
**Projected dwelling changes** If no development data was provided by the local authority, development trajectories were based on the Strategic Housing and Land Availability Assessment (SHLAA) carried out in 2009. Where ward-level development data was provided by local authorities, this was used as supplied. If borough-level data only was provided, then this was distributed between wards according to the proportions in the SHLAA.
**Migration data**
**Domestic flows** For 2002 to 2010, domestic migration flows were taken from moves recorded in the National Health Service Central Register (NHSCR). International flows For 2002 to 2005, international flows were based on the ONS MYE values, modified to fit with capacity as estimated using development data/CLG household formation rates.
For 2006 to 2010, the ONS inflow estimates using the Migration Statistics Improvement Programme (MSIP) methodology were used unchanged.
Migration rates and characteristics Age and gender characteristics of migrant flows are based on data from the 2001 Census. Adjustments were made – primarily to the rates governing migration to domestic locations outside of London – such that the numbers of children and the elderly better fit with other sources of evidence (namely child benefit claims and GP registrations).
Future migration trends International inflows are assumed constant beyond 2010 and fixed at the mean inflow for the last five years of historic data.
All other migration flows are projected forward using constant age and gender specific probabilities. The probabilities used are an average of the previous five years of probabilities that have been scaled to fit estimated flows and populations.
Household formation rates Rates were taken from the 2008-based DCLG household projections. For three boroughs (Newham, Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest), household formation rates were adjusted to give total populations more consistent with other sources of evidence (the revised international flows from MSIP and the boroughs’ own population count data that made use of cross-linked administrative datasets).
Additional sources of information Age specific migration rate data from the 2001 Census was modified such that the final projections of 0-15 year old children gave better agreement with GP registration and child benefit claim data.
2. HESA leaver and destination surveys The data used in the Higher Education section of the report are predominantly based on results from the Higher Education Statistics Agency’s Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education Survey.
The DLHE survey covers full-time and part-time qualifiers who were of UK and other EU domicile at the point of entry, it excludes those domiciled outside the EU. The survey includes those qualifiers who completed their programmes during the academic year 2010/11, that is, the period 1 August 2010 to 31 July 2011. The reference date for those obtaining the qualification between 1 August 2010 and 31 December 2010 was 19 April 2011, and the reference date for those obtaining the qualification between 1 January 2011 and 31 July 2011 was 10 January 2012.
The purpose of splitting the collection in this way is to bring the gap between the date of qualification and the reference date closer to the six-month target. The survey covers qualifiers from the 165 UK higher education institutions (HEIs). Of these, 164 were publicly-funded and one, The University of Buckingham, was privately funded.
The data capture is undertaken by HEIs but the procedure is prescribed by HESA and, with some degree of detailed flexibility, is uniform across all institutions, regardless of size, nature, and location. A standard questionnaire printed by HESA is used; this is also available in Welsh, for use on request in Welsh institutions only.
Data from the DLHE return has been linked to the student record collection to allow analysis by student characteristics such as level of qualification, mode of study and subject of study. London labour market projections
3. UCAS points data The UCAS points data used in this report were provided under strict terms of use by the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service. The particular breakdowns used are not available through the UCAS website.
For further information regarding UCAS statistics please visit the website below or use the contact details provided beneath.
http://www.ucas.com/about_us/stat_services/stats_online/
[email protected] or 01242 544 896
4. Shanghai University’s Academic Ranking of World Universities For more information on the rankings used in this report, please visit the website below
http://www.arwu.org/ Appendix 7: Higher Education in London
This appendix looks the higher education system in London. It starts by looking at the numbers entering higher education in London and how that has changed over the past 15 years or so. The appendix looks at the subjects studied and what region graduates from London universities first start to work in (and how that varies by subject). The appendix also briefly considers the ranking of some of London’s higher education institutions.
Numbers entering London’s higher education system Over the past twenty years or so there has been a significant expansion of higher education in the UK. Since 1995/6 the total number of students at London Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) has increased from 257,000 to 410,000 by 2010/11 - an increase of 60 per cent over the period (an additional 150,000 students).
In London the rate of growth in higher education students has been highest for postgraduate study (increasing by 92 per cent between 1995/6 and 2010/11). The number of overseas students at London HEIs has also increased significantly - rising from 39,000 in 1995/6 to over 100,000 in 2010/11.
Table A.7.1: London and UK higher education institution student enrolment trends
| | London HEIs (000s) | UK HEIs total (000s) | % change 1995-96 to 2010-11 | % change 1995-96 to 2010-11 | |----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------| | | 1995-96 | 2007-08 | 2010-11 | 1995-96 | 2007-08 | 2010-11 | 1995-96 | 2007-08 | 2010-11 | | Total students | 257 | 367 | 410 | 60 | 1,720 | 2,400 | 2,562 | 49 | | Undergraduate | 190 | 250 | 274 | 44 | 1,350 | 1,805 | 1,913 | 42 | | Postgraduate | 67 | 102 | 129 | 92 | 370 | 501 | 589 | 59 | | Further education | - | 15 | 8 | - | 94 | 61 | | | | Writing up or sabbatical | - | 9 | 6 | - | 50 | 44 | | | | Full-time | 170 | 244 | 294 | 73 | 1,108 | 1,495 | 1,694 | 53 | | Part-time | 87 | 124 | 116 | 34 | 612 | 904 | 868 | 42 | | UK HE students | 217 | 272 | 300 | 38 | 1,524 | 1,964 | 2,073 | 36 | | Overseas HE students | 39 | 79 | 103 | 163 | 196 | 342 | 428 | 118 |
Source: Students in Higher Education Institutions (Higher Education Statistics Agency) London labour market projections
Of the overall expansion of 153,000 enrolments between 1995/96, 49,000 are accounted for by Group 1 institutions (includes Imperial, LSE, SOAS, UCL, Birkbeck etc) and a further 36,000 for Group 2 institutions (includes Brunel, Kingston, Roehampton etc). That is, almost half of all growth in enrolments are accounted for by the two highest ranked sets of institutions.
Table A.7.2 shows that the pattern of enrolments and qualifiers by degree subject is very similar as between London and UK HEIs. London has a slightly higher share of enrolments/qualifiers for medicine & dentistry and creative arts & design and computer science.
Table A.7.2: London and UK higher education institution student enrolment and qualifier patterns by subject area (2010-11)
| Subject Area | Enrolments by subject area (% total) | Qualifiers by subject (% total) | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------| | | London HEIs | UK HEIs excluding London | percentage point difference | London HEIs | UK HEIs excluding London | percentage point difference | | Medicine & dentistry | 5 | 2 | 2.3 | 4 | 2 | 2.4 | | Subjects allied to medicine | 12 | 13 | -0.3 | 12 | 11 | 0.7 | | Biological sciences | 7 | 8 | -1.6 | 6 | 7 | -1.6 | | Veterinary science | 0 | 0 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0.2 | | Agriculture & related subjects | 0 | 1 | -0.5 | 0 | 1 | -0.5 | | Physical sciences | 2 | 4 | -1.9 | 2 | 4 | -1.7 | | Mathematical sciences | 2 | 2 | -0.2 | 1 | 1 | -0.1 | | Computer science | 5 | 4 | 1.0 | 5 | 4 | 1.1 | | Engineering & technology | 6 | 7 | -0.6 | 6 | 7 | -0.9 | | Architecture, building & planning | 3 | 3 | 0.3 | 3 | 3 | 0.3 | | Social studies total | 9 | 9 | -0.3 | 10 | 9 | 0.4 | | Law total | 4 | 4 | 0.6 | 5 | 4 | 1.0 | | Business & administrative studies | 15 | 15 | 0.0 | 16 | 18 | -1.7 | | Mass communications & documentation | 3 | 2 | 1.1 | 3 | 2 | 1.2 | | Languages | 4 | 6 | -1.9 | 4 | 5 | -1.6 | | Historical & philosophical studies | 3 | 4 | -1.2 | 3 | 4 | -1.1 | | Creative arts & design | 11 | 7 | 5.0 | 11 | 7 | 4.2 | | Education | 8 | 10 | -2.0 | 9 | 11 | -2.4 | | Total | 100 | 100 | 0.0 | 100 | 100 | 0.0 |
Source: Students in Higher Education Institutions (Higher Education Statistics Agency)
Table A.7.3 shows the percentage of leavers from London HEIs by subject area. It shows that the percentage of leavers from non-medical STEM subjects has fallen over time (particularly among physical sciences and engineering & technology). In contrast, both creative arts & design and education have seen significant increases in the percentage of leavers that those subjects account for over the period 1996-96 to 2010-11. Table A.7.3: London higher education institution student enrolment leaver trends by subject. Percentage of leavers by subject, 1995-96 to 2010-11
| Subject | 1995-96 | 2004-05 | 2007-08 | 2010-11 | |--------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | Medicine & dentistry | 3 | 4 | 4 | 6 | | Subjects allied to medicine | 7 | 11 | 11 | 10 | | Biological sciences | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | | Veterinary science | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Agriculture & related subjects | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Physical sciences | 5 | 3 | 2 | 2 | | Mathematical sciences | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | Computer science | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | | Engineering & technology | 10 | 5 | 5 | 4 | | Architecture, building & planning | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | | Social studies | 11 | 8 | 9 | 8 | | Law | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | | Business & administrative studies | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | | Mass communications & documentation | 1 | 4 | 4 | 4 | | Languages | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | | Historical & philosophical studies | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | | Creative arts & design | 9 | 12 | 13 | 13 | | Education | 10 | 13 | 13 | 14 | | Combined | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
Source: HESA Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education Institutions Survey
Tables A.7.4 and A.7.5 look at the employment (or study)\\textsuperscript{28} destination of leavers from London HEIs, in terms of region, both 6 months and 3 years after graduation. Almost seven in ten graduates from London HEIs in 2010/11 entered employment in London. The next most popular employment destination for graduates of London HEIs was the South East, followed by the East region. Overall just over 12,000 graduates who studied in London chose employment outside London in 2010/11, 6 months after graduating (down 5,000 on the 2007/08 figure). The first destination survey suggests that a greater proportion of those who previously sought employment overseas appear to be remaining in the UK and entering employment in London. London labour market projections
Table A.7.4: London higher education institution leaver employment destination trend (first destination)
| Employment Destination | 2004-05 | 2007-08 | 2010-11\* | Qualifiers from London HEIs taking up employment outside London, 2010-11 | |------------------------|---------|---------|----------|--------------------------------------------------| | London | 65 | 66 | 69 | 5,240 | | South East | 13 | 13 | 13 | 2,480 | | East of England | 6 | 6 | 6 | 915 | | South West | 2 | 2 | 2 | 420 | | East Midlands | 1 | 1 | 1 | 570 | | West Midlands | 1 | 1 | 1 | 360 | | Yorkshire and the Humber| 1 | 1 | 1 | 420 | | North West | 1 | 1 | 1 | 130 | | North East | 0 | 0 | 0 | 220 | | Scotland | 0 | 0 | 1 | 195 | | Wales | 0 | 0 | 0 | 60 | | Northern Ireland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1180 | | Outside UK | 6 | 7 | 3 | 12190 | | Totals | 100 | 100 | 100 | 12190 |
Source: HESA first destination survey
Table A.7.5: London higher education institution leaver employment destination trend (3 - year destination)
| Employment Destination | Longitudinal employment desintation (% London HEI leaver total 2004/05\*) | Longitudinal employment desintation (% London HEI leaver total 2006/07\*) | |------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | London | 68 | 71.6 | | South East | 15 | 12.0 | | East of England | 6 | 7.1 | | South West | 2 | 2.3 | | East Midlands | 1 | 1.1 | | West Midlands | 1 | 1.4 | | Yorkshire and the Humber| 1 | 1.0 | | North West | 1 | 1.0 | | North East | 0 | 0.4 | | Scotland | 3 | 0.9 | | Wales | 1 | 0.7 | | Northern Ireland | 1 | 0.4 | | Outside UK | - | - | | Totals | 100 | 100 |
Source: HESA longitudinal destination survey
Turning to London’s attractiveness to graduates who studied outside London, Table A.7.6 shows that London attracts graduates from across the UK, but particularly from the neighbouring regions of the South East and East. Moreover, the attractiveness of London appears to rise between 6 months and 3 years after graduation. In every region except Northern Ireland a greater proportion of students are in employment in London 3 years after graduation when compared to 6 months after graduation. Overall, in 2010/11, just over 25,000 graduates who studied outside London subsequently took up employment in the capital, more than double the estimated number studying in London but finding employment outside London. Table A.7.6 Trend in leavers to first employment destination London by higher education institution location
| HEI location | HEI location (Percentage entering first destination employment in London) | ‘Injection’. 2010-11 qualifiers from non-London HEIs taking up employment in London, 2010-11 | 2010 Longitudinal Survey of 2006-07 leavers. 2010 employment destination (% qualifiers in each region taking up employment in London in 2010) | |-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | London | 65 66 70.8 | | 71.6 | | South East | 17 19 23.1 | 6,645 | 26.9 | | East of England | 19 20 21.8 | 3,350 | 30.9 | | South West | 12 13 14.7 | 3,240 | 22.4 | | West Midlands | 8 8 9.2 | 2,060 | 14.6 | | East Midlands | 9 13 13.5 | 2,830 | 20.1 | | Yorkshire and the Humber | 7 8 9.1 | 2,230 | 13.7 | | North West | 5 6 6.5 | 2,065 | 9.6 | | North East | 7 8 9.0 | 1,300 | 20.1 | | Scotland | 4 4 4.9 | 1,060 | 6.5 | | Wales | 4 5 5.3 | 785 | 7.1 | | Northern Ireland | 0 1 1.6 | 90 | 1.5 | | UK domiciled | 18 18 \*\*20.3 | −25,655 | 23.6 |
Source: HESA first destination and longitudinal destination surveys
Figure A.7.1 looks at the proportion of students that first take up employment in London following their studies for each of the UKs Russell Group universities. Unsurprisingly, the London institutions dominate the highest shares of leavers entering employment in the capital. Indeed the top five institutions are all in London, followed by Oxford and Cambridge.
Outside London and Oxbridge, Durham, Warwick and Bristol universities have the next largest shares of leavers taking up their first employment in London. London labour market projections
Figure A.7.1: Russell Group of universities - percentage of HEI leavers’ first employment destination is London, 2010-11
Table A.7.7 shows that London is most successful at retaining graduates in subjects like mathematical science, law, business and administrative studies and mass communication and documentation. It is less successful at retaining graduates from veterinary science, medicine and dentistry, engineering and technology and physical sciences. Over the last six years London has become more successful in retaining graduates across every subject grouping.
In terms of ‘attraction rates’, the capital attracts a relatively high share of mathematical science, languages and historical and philosophical study graduates. In comparison, London attracts a relatively small share of medicine and dentistry, veterinary science, education and engineering and technology graduates.
Source: HESA first destinations survey Table A.7.7: Retention and attraction trends of HEI graduates’ first destination to London by subject area
| Subject Area | Retention rates | Attraction rates | |-------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------| | | Percentage of London HEI leavers with London as first employment destination | Percentage of non-London UK HEI leavers with London as first employment destination | | | 2004-05 | 2007-08 | 2010-11 | 2004-05 | 2007-08 | 2010-11 | | Medicine & dentistry | 50 | 45 | 51 | 2 | 6 | 7 | | Subjects allied to medicine | 67 | 68 | 69 | 4 | 5 | 6 | | Biological sciences | 63 | 68 | 70 | 9 | 9 | 11 | | Veterinary science | 6 | 15 | 17 | 3 | 4 | 2 | | Agriculture & related subjects | 34 | 31 | 34 | 4 | 4 | 4 | | Physical sciences | 55 | 51 | 62 | 8 | 9 | 12 | | Mathematical sciences | 74 | 77 | 83 | 16 | 21 | 25 | | Computer science | 75 | 73 | 78 | 9 | 10 | 12 | | Engineering & technology | 45 | 46 | 51 | 7 | 9 | 9 | | Architecture, building & planning | 67 | 63 | 70 | 10 | 12 | 16 | | Social studies | 71 | 71 | 80 | 13 | 15 | 16 | | Law | 72 | 69 | 81 | 10 | 10 | 12 | | Business & administrative studies | 70 | 71 | 81 | 11 | 13 | 16 | | Mass communications & documentation| 75 | 74 | 81 | 14 | 16 | 17 | | Languages | 69 | 68 | 76 | 15 | 18 | 21 | | Historical & philosophical studies | 72 | 73 | 74 | 15 | 17 | 20 | | Creative arts & design | 62 | 67 | 69 | 13 | 16 | 16 | | Education | 62 | 66 | 72 | 4 | 3 | 4 | | Combined | 62 | 66 | 94 | 9 | 11 | 14 |
Source: HESA first destinations survey
Table A.7.8 shows that London has three HEIs in the top 100 global HEIs according to the Shanghai Jiao Tong University rankings. London labour market projections
Table A.7.8: Shanghai Jiao Tong University international university academic rankings 2004, 2009 and 2011
| University | Ranking | Change 2004 to 2009 | Change 2004 to 2011 | |-----------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------------------| | | 2004 | 2009 | 2011\* | 2004 | 2009 | 2011\* | | Harvard | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Stanford | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Cambridge | 3 | 4 | 5 | -1 | -2 | | | Oxford | 8 | 10 | 10 | -2 | -2 | | | UCL | 25 | 21 | 20 | 4 | 5 | | | Imperial College London | 23 | 26 | 24 | -3 | -1 | | | Manchester | 78 | 41 | 38 | 37 | 40 | | | Edinburgh | 47 | 53 | 53 | -6 | -6 | | | Bristol | 60 | 61 | 70 | -1 | -10 | | | King’s College London | 77 | 65 | 68 | 12 | 9 | | | Sheffield | 69 | 81 | 97 | -12 | -28 | | | Nottingham | 80 | 83 | 85 | -3 | -5 | | | Birmingham | 93 | 94 | 102-150 | -1 | - | | | Queen Mary and Westfield College | 202-301 | 152-200 | 201-30 | - | - | |
Source: Academic Ranking of World Universities - 2011, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Table A.7.9 and Figure A.7.2 look at the entry requirements to higher education in London HEIs in terms of UCAS point scores.
Table A.7.9 shows that for both London and the UK as a whole the average points score of accepted students is rising, particularly in the share of those amassing 360 points or more. Overall, London HEIs are require slightly less in terms of UCAS points than the UK average.
Table A.7.9: UK and London Higher Education Institution UCAS acceptance trends
| UCAS points | All UK HEIs | 80-239 | 240-359 | 360+ | |-------------|-------------|--------|---------|------| | 2002 | 33.0 | 36.0 | 31.0 | | 2005 | 26.0 | 36.0 | 38.0 | | 2009 | 20.0 | 36.0 | 44.0 | | 2011 | 16.0 | 36.0 | 47.9 |
| London HEIs | 80-239 | 240-359 | 360+ | |-------------|--------|---------|------| | 2002 | 37.0 | 33.0 | 30.0 | | 2005 | 36.0 | 34.0 | 31.0 | | 2009 | 27.0 | 33.0 | 40.0 | | 2011 | 22.3 | 33.5 | 44.2 |
Source: UCAS, GLA Intelligence Unit
Figure A.7.2 shows the wide variation across subject areas in terms of the share of total acceptances accounted for by students with 360 or more UCAS points. More than seven in ten students accepted onto medicine and dentistry courses in 2011 had at least 360 points, compared to just 15 per cent in technologies. A total of six subject areas had at least a fifty per cent share whilst a further five had less than 20 per cent of successful applicants achieving 360 plus UCAS points. Figure A.7.2 Percentage of acceptances to UK Higher Education Institutions with 360+ UCAS points (2011)
Source: UCAS, GLA Intelligence Unit
Single degree subject by sector
This section of the appendix presents two tables looking at the relationship between single degree subject and sector. Table A.7.10 shows the percentage of jobs in each sector by single subject degree area. Table A.7.11 shows the percentage of each sector’s jobs which are accounted for by different single subject degree areas. For instance, the tables show that of the jobs within the Finance and Insurance sector held by people who have a single subject degree, 33 per cent are held by people who have a degree in business and administrative studies. Similarly, of the jobs held by people who have a degree in medicine and dentistry, 79 per cent are in the human health and social work sector. London labour market projections
Table A.7.10: Percentage(^1) of jobs in each sector by subject of single subject degree, 2004-2011
| Subject of single subject degree | Primary & utilities | Manufacturing | Construction | Wholesale and motor trades | Retail | Transportation and storage | Accommodation and food service activities | Information and communication | |----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------------------|--------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------| | Medicine and dentistry | 2 | 1 | .. | .. | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | Subjects related to medicine (incl. pharmacology and nursing) | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 3 | 2 | 1 | | Biological sciences (incl. psychology) | 5 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 3 | | Veterinary science, agriculture and related subjects | .. | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | | Physical and environmental sciences | 15 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 4 | | Mathematical sciences and computing | 9 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 21 | | Engineering | 17 | 16 | 22 | 8 | 4 | 18 | 5 | 7 | | Technologies (incl. mining, metallurgy, polymers & textiles) | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | Architecture, building and planning | 3 | 2 | 21 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 0 | | Social sciences | 5 | 7 | 10 | 14 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 7 | | Law | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | | Business and administrative studies (incl. management, finance and accounting) | 17 | 19 | 18 | 30 | 21 | 23 | 35 | 12 | | Mass communication and documentation (incl. journalism and publishing) | .. | 2 | 1 | .. | 3 | 1 | 2 | 9 | | Linguistics, classics and related subjects (incl. English literature) | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 8 | | European languages and literature | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | | Other languages and literature | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | History, archaeology, philosophy and religious studies | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 7 | | Creative arts and design (incl. music, drama and film studies) | 2 | 9 | 5 | 9 | 14 | 4 | 10 | 11 | | Education | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | All degrees | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
Source: Annual Population Survey
Notes: The symbol ‘..’ denotes values which have been suppressed for disclosure control
1. Percentage calculated using annual averages for years 2004 to 2011. Average used due to the variability of the underlying data which produces unreliable results for single years Table A.7.10 cont: Percentage(^1) of jobs in each sector by subject of single subject degree, 2004-2011
| Subject of single subject degree | Financial and insurance activities | Real Estate, Professional, Scientific & technical | Administrative and support service activities | Public administration and defence; compulsory social security | Education | Human health and social work activities | Arts, entertainment and recreation | Other service activities | |---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------| | Medicine and dentistry | 0 | 0 | .. | 2 | 1 | 14 | 0 | 1 | | Subjects related to medicine | 1 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 38 | 1 | 5 | | (incl. pharmacology and nursing)| | | | | | | | | | Biological sciences | 3 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 7 | | (incl. psychology) | | | | | | | | | | Veterinary science, agriculture | 0 | 1 | .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | and related subjects | | | | | | | | | | Physical and environmental | 6 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 5 | | sciences | | | | | | | | | | Mathematical sciences and | 15 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 4 | | computing | | | | | | | | | | Engineering | 6 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 4 | | Technologies (incl. mining, | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | metallurgy, polymers & textiles)| | | | | | | | | | Architecture, building and | 1 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | | planning | | | | | | | | | | Social sciences | 17 | 9 | 12 | 17 | 9 | 12 | 5 | 10 | | Law | 7 | 16 | 5 | 13 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | | Business and administrative | 33 | 19 | 23 | 12 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 14 | | studies (incl. management, | | | | | | | | | | finance and accounting) | | | | | | | | | | Mass communication and | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 2 | | documentation (incl. journalism | | | | | | | | | | and publishing) | | | | | | | | | | Linguistics, classics and related subjects (incl. English literature) | 2 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 7 | 5 | | European languages and literature| 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | Other languages and literature | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | | History, archaeology, philosophy | 4 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 11 | 14 | | and religious studies | | | | | | | | | | Creative arts and design (incl. | 1 | 9 | 13 | 3 | 12 | 3 | 38 | 9 | | music, drama and film studies) | | | | | | | | | | Education | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 28 | 2 | 3 | 5 | | All degrees | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
Source: Annual Population Survey
Notes: The symbol ‘..’ denotes values which have been suppressed for disclosure control
1. Percentage calculated using annual averages for years 2004 to 2011. Average used due to the variability of the underlying data which produces unreliable results for single years London labour market projections
Table A.7.11: Percentage(^1) of jobs from each subject of single subject degree(^2) by sector(^3), 2004-2011
| Subject of single subject degree | Primary & utilities | Manufacturing | Construction | Wholesale and motor trades | Retail | Transportation and storage | Accommodation and food service activities | Information and communication | |----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|--------------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------| | Medicine and dentistry | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | Subjects related to medicine (incl. pharmacology and nursing) | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | Biological sciences (incl. psychology) | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 6 | | Veterinary science, agriculture and related subjects | .. | 6 | 9 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 4 | | Physical and environmental sciences | 3 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 10 | | Mathematical sciences and computing | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 29 | | Engineering | 2 | 10 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 14 | | Technologies (incl. mining, metallurgy, polymers & textiles) | 1 | 11 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 11 | | Architecture, building and planning | 1 | 1 | 20 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | Social sciences | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 7 | | Law | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 6 | | Business and administrative studies (incl. management, finance and accounting) | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 8 | | Mass communication and documentation (incl. journalism and publishing) | .. | 3 | 1 | .. | 4 | 1 | 1 | 35 | | Linguistics, classics and related subjects (incl. English literature) | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 20 | | European languages and literature | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 11 | | Other languages and literature | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 5 | 3 | 3 | 19 | | History, archaeology, philosophy and religious studies | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 12 | | Creative arts and design (incl. music, drama and film studies) | 0 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 13 | | Education | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
Source: Annual Population Survey
Notes: The symbol ‘..’ denotes values which have been suppressed for disclosure control
1. Percentage calculated using annual averages for years 2004 to 2011. Average used due to the variability of the underlying data which produces unreliable results for single years. Table A.7.11 cont: Percentage(^1) of jobs from each subject of single subject degree(^2) by sector(^3), 2004-2011
| Subject of single subject degree | Financial and insurance activities | Real Estate, Professional, Scientific & technical | Administrative and support service activities | Public administration and defence; compulsory social security | Education | Human health and social work activities | Arts, entertainment and recreation | Other service activities | All sectors | |---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|------------| | Medicine and dentistry | 1 | 2 | .. | 7 | 5 | 79 | 1 | 1 | 100 | | Subjects related to medicine (incl. pharmacology and nursing) | 1 | 3 | 2 | 8 | 6 | 66 | 1 | 1 | 100 | | Biological sciences (incl. psychology) | 6 | 16 | 2 | 12 | 15 | 22 | 3 | 2 | 100 | | Veterinary science, agriculture and related subjects | 6 | 26 | .. | 6 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 100 | | Physical and environmental sciences | 14 | 19 | 3 | 11 | 14 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 100 | | Mathematical sciences and computing | 21 | 12 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 100 | | Engineering | 11 | 18 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 100 | | Technologies (incl. mining, metallurgy, polymers & textiles) | 9 | 15 | 6 | 3 | 13 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 100 | | Architecture, building and planning | 2 | 54 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 100 | | Social sciences | 17 | 15 | 4 | 13 | 10 | 15 | 2 | 2 | 100 | | Law | 11 | 44 | 2 | 17 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 100 | | Business and administrative studies (incl. management, finance and accounting) | 22 | 22 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 100 | | Mass communication and documentation (incl. journalism and publishing) | 2 | 16 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 100 | | Linguistics, classics and related subjects (incl. English literature) | 5 | 13 | 5 | 9 | 20 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 100 | | European languages and literature | 12 | 16 | 5 | 9 | 17 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 100 | | Other languages and literature | 8 | 10 | 5 | 12 | 12 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 100 | | History, archaeology, philosophy and religious studies | 7 | 16 | 5 | 12 | 16 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 100 | | Creative arts and design (incl. music, drama and film studies) | 2 | 18 | 5 | 3 | 17 | 4 | 19 | 2 | 100 | | Education | 1 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 75 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 100 |
Source: Annual Population Survey
Notes: The symbol ‘..’ denotes values which have been suppressed for disclosure control
1. Percentage calculated using annual averages for years 2004 to 2011. Average used due to the variability of the underlying data which produces unreliable results for single years. Appendix 8: Borough level projections
Introduction This appendix outlines the employee projections (consistent with the London level projections) at the borough level. Appendix 5 sets out the methodology for preparing these borough level employee projections. The appendix then presents the population projections at the borough level. Appendix 6 sets out the methodology for preparing these borough level population projections.
Borough level employee projections Table A.8.1 outlines the (triangulated) borough employee projections over the projection period. The table shows that the number of employees is projected to increase by 653,000 over the projection period.
Six boroughs, Westminster, City, Camden, Islington, Southwark and Tower Hamlets account for half of all employee growth projected for London as a whole over the projection period.
Borough level population projections Table A.8.2 outlines the borough population projections over the projection period. The table shows that 8 boroughs, Tower Hamlets, Newham, Southwark, Greenwich, Lambeth, Barnet, Barking & Dagenham and Islington account for just over half of the total population growth projected over the 2011 to 2036 period. Table A.8.1: Borough employee triangulated projections 2001 - 2036
| Borough | 2001 | 2006 | 2011 | 2016 | 2021 | 2026 | 2031 | 2036 | |-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| | Barking and Dagenham | 48 | 45 | 47 | 47 | 48 | 50 | 52 | 53 | | Barnet | 113 | 110 | 111 | 113 | 118 | 123 | 119 | 122 | | Bexley | 64 | 63 | 62 | 67 | 64 | 64 | 66 | 67 | | Brent | 99 | 93 | 96 | 97 | 100 | 104 | 108 | 112 | | Bromley | 96 | 105 | 94 | 96 | 98 | 100 | 102 | 104 | | Camden | 262 | 260 | 286 | 298 | 310 | 321 | 333 | 345 | | City of London | 326 | 322 | 361 | 372 | 382 | 393 | 405 | 417 | | Croydon | 138 | 128 | 112 | 113 | 118 | 122 | 126 | 130 | | Ealing | 116 | 119 | 116 | 116 | 118 | 120 | 123 | 126 | | Enfield | 96 | 93 | 91 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 95 | 97 | | Greenwich | 63 | 65 | 68 | 70 | 73 | 76 | 79 | 82 | | Hackney | 93 | 79 | 88 | 88 | 90 | 93 | 96 | 100 | | Hammersmith and Fulham | 110 | 119 | 119 | 126 | 135 | 141 | 146 | 152 | | Haringey | 61 | 62 | 58 | 58 | 60 | 64 | 67 | 71 | | Harrow | 69 | 68 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 65 | 66 | 67 | | Havering | 75 | 75 | 69 | 73 | 76 | 71 | 72 | 72 | | Hillingdon | 174 | 185 | 180 | 195 | 196 | 203 | 206 | 209 | | Hounslow | 133 | 116 | 124 | 124 | 128 | 132 | 137 | 142 | | Islington | 156 | 170 | 177 | 193 | 201 | 208 | 215 | 223 | | Kensington and Chelsea | 128 | 113 | 112 | 115 | 119 | 123 | 127 | 128 | | Kingston-upon-Thames | 77 | 74 | 69 | 69 | 70 | 71 | 73 | 75 | | Lambeth | 116 | 120 | 124 | 128 | 128 | 131 | 136 | 140 | | Lewisham | 63 | 61 | 58 | 60 | 63 | 65 | 68 | 71 | | Merton | 65 | 65 | 68 | 68 | 71 | 73 | 76 | 76 | | Newham | 75 | 73 | 74 | 77 | 80 | 83 | 86 | 89 | | Redbridge | 64 | 60 | 64 | 66 | 69 | 71 | 69 | 70 | | Richmond-upon-Thames | 70 | 68 | 71 | 73 | 75 | 78 | 79 | 80 | | Southwark | 166 | 162 | 184 | 198 | 204 | 211 | 219 | 227 | | Sutton | 65 | 63 | 66 | 63 | 65 | 68 | 70 | 73 | | Tower Hamlets | 160 | 196 | 229 | 231 | 238 | 245 | 253 | 261 | | Waltham Forest | 56 | 59 | 57 | 60 | 62 | 64 | 63 | 64 | | Wandsworth | 103 | 107 | 102 | 107 | 112 | 115 | 123 | 127 | | Westminster, City of | 585 | 584 | 608 | 616 | 631 | 648 | 668 | 688 | | **All Boroughs** | **4,086** | **4,081** | **4,208** | **4,332** | **4,459** | **4,590** | **4,724** | **4,861** |
Source: GLA Economics projections based on data from Business Register and Employment Survey, Colin Buchanan and Roger Tym & Partners
## London labour market projections
### Table A.8.2: Borough working age population projections (constrained and unconstrained) Population aged 16-64
| Borough | Constrained 2011 | Constrained 2036 | Difference 2011-2036 | Unconstrained 2011 | Unconstrained 2036 | Difference 2011-2036 | |--------------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------| | Barking & Dagenham | 119,200 | 168,600 | 49,400 | 119,200 | 167,300 | 48,100 | | Barnet | 235,400 | 290,800 | 55,400 | 235,400 | 289,600 | 54,200 | | Bexley | 147,700 | 155,200 | 7,500 | 147,700 | 167,100 | 19,400 | | Brent | 216,500 | 240,400 | 23,900 | 216,500 | 260,100 | 43,600 | | Bromley | 197,400 | 203,300 | 5,900 | 197,400 | 222,800 | 25,400 | | Camden | 160,500 | 187,100 | 26,600 | 160,500 | 192,400 | 31,900 | | City of London | 5,700 | 8,200 | 2,500 | 5,700 | 6,500 | 800 | | Croydon | 240,900 | 276,500 | 35,600 | 240,900 | 284,400 | 43,500 | | Ealing | 233,700 | 260,800 | 27,100 | 233,700 | 269,300 | 35,600 | | Enfield | 204,500 | 218,500 | 14,000 | 204,500 | 256,800 | 52,300 | | Greenwich | 173,700 | 231,500 | 57,800 | 173,700 | 202,300 | 28,600 | | Hackney | 178,600 | 219,800 | 41,200 | 178,600 | 222,100 | 43,500 | | Hammersmith & Fulham | 136,300 | 154,800 | 18,500 | 136,300 | 148,300 | 12,000 | | Haringey | 181,100 | 208,400 | 27,300 | 181,100 | 218,400 | 37,300 | | Harrow | 158,400 | 171,900 | 13,500 | 158,400 | 185,800 | 27,400 | | Havering | 150,800 | 174,500 | 23,700 | 150,800 | 181,400 | 30,600 | | Hillingdon | 182,800 | 201,500 | 18,700 | 182,800 | 225,500 | 42,700 | | Hounslow | 176,200 | 189,000 | 12,800 | 176,200 | 215,400 | 39,200 | | Islington | 155,400 | 200,800 | 45,400 | 155,400 | 194,800 | 39,400 | | Kensington & Chelsea | 114,500 | 121,200 | 6,700 | 114,500 | 111,500 | -3,000 | | Kingston upon Thames | 109,500 | 117,900 | 8,400 | 109,500 | 129,400 | 19,900 | | Lambeth | 226,400 | 282,700 | 56,300 | 226,400 | 269,500 | 43,100 | | Lewisham | 193,400 | 230,600 | 37,200 | 193,400 | 236,900 | 43,500 | | Merton | 138,300 | 147,300 | 9,000 | 138,300 | 163,600 | 25,300 | | Newham | 219,600 | 297,800 | 78,200 | 219,600 | 294,800 | 75,200 | | Redbridge | 184,400 | 203,700 | 19,300 | 184,400 | 242,900 | 58,500 | | Richmond upon Thames | 124,900 | 125,000 | 100 | 124,900 | 137,400 | 12,500 | | Southwark | 212,900 | 274,000 | 61,100 | 212,900 | 256,800 | 43,900 | | Sutton | 125,400 | 127,300 | 1,900 | 125,400 | 149,000 | 23,600 | | Tower Hamlets | 190,000 | 288,100 | 98,100 | 190,000 | 263,500 | 73,500 | | Waltham Forest | 178,600 | 203,900 | 25,300 | 178,600 | 224,000 | 45,400 | | Wandsworth | 229,400 | 269,300 | 39,900 | 229,400 | 260,900 | 31,500 | | Westminster | 162,200 | 182,300 | 20,100 | 162,200 | 183,900 | 21,700 |
*Source: GLA Population Projections, 2012 Round* Appendix 9: Accessibility Employment Projections for London - technical report Appendix 10: London Employment Sites Database
Appendix 9: Accessibility Employment Projections for London - technical report. This appendix is available as a separate pdf to this report.
Appendix 10: London Employment Sites Database. This appendix is available as a separate pdf to this report. Endnotes
1 Trade and the Global Economy: The role of international trade in productivity, economic reform and growth’, HM Treasury 2004 (chapter 2).
2 See for example, Krugman and Obstfeld (2003).
3 Figure 2.1 aggregates different SIC 2007 sector categories for ease of exposition. As a result, Manufacturing, construction and utilities consists of SIC codes A-F; Wholesale, retail, transportation and storage consists of SIC codes G-H; Public admin, health and education consists of SIC codes O-Q; Professional, real estate and business services consists of SIC codes L-N; Accommodation, entertainment, recreation and other services consists of SIC codes I and R-U; and, information, communication, financial and insurance consists of SIC codes J-K.
4 For the purposes of this work the index of specialisation is calculated as: (London employment in sector / London total employment) / (Rest of GB employment in sector / Rest of GB total employment). Therefore if the index of specialisation is greater than 1, then this shows that London has a greater share of its total jobs in the sector being examined than does the rest of GB. As such it can be regarded as an area in which London has some specialisation. The higher the index of specialisation above 1.00, the greater the degree of specialisation. By contrast if the index of specialisation is less than 1, then this shows that the rest of GB has a greater share of its total jobs in the sector being examined than does London. The closer the index of specialisation gets to zero, the smaller London’s role in the sector being considered is compared to the rest of GB. The index of specialisation is calculated using employee data from the Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) for 2011 (see Appendix 2). Regional GVA is 2010 (industry) data (released December 2012).
5 Globalisation, Skills and Employment: The London Story, GLA Economics, 2007 - see: http://www.london.gov.uk/lseb/docs/thelondonstory.pdf
6 Experian estimates of real GVA are used because estimates of regional GVA, on a timely basis, are not produced by the ONS (and inflation-adjusted estimates are not produced at all). The Experian numbers are therefore used here to provide an indication of how London’s economy is likely to have performed over the recession. Data for the 1990s recession from Experian is based on old ONS GVA data on a SIC 2003 basis (the new GVA data on SIC 2007 basis only goes back to 1997). For more information on how the Experian estimates are calculated please see: http://www.london.gov.uk/publication/working-paper-44-londons-labour-market-recent-recession (in particular page 9). 7 The corresponding GVA numbers for the UK – based on Experian estimates, which are an unrevised version of the latest ONS estimates – show a 5.9 per cent GVA fall over six quarters during this recession but only a 1.7 per cent GVA decline over five quarters in the 1990s. Note that the fall in GVA in the UK during the 1990s recession is smaller than the GDP fall of 2.5 per cent. When compiling the National Accounts the ONS ensure that these two measures (ABMI measuring GDP and ABMM measuring GVA) have an equal growth rate in the latest quarter and differ by no more than 0.2 in the back series when looking at quarter-on-quarter growth. However, these tolerances do not seem to have always been in place, and the 0.8 per cent difference in output decline during the 1990s recession is likely to be a cumulative effect of differences along the quarterly path.
8 Note that ILO unemployment figures for London do not start until 1992 and cannot therefore be used to assess labour market performance over the 1990s recession.
9 The ‘peak periods’ are 1979 Q4 (for the 1980s recession); 1990 Q2 (for the 1990s recession); and, 2008 Q1 (for the most recent downturn).
10 Note that ILO employment rate figures for London do not start until 1992 and do not therefore cover the 1990’s recession.
11 See for example: The productivity conundrum: interpreting the recent behaviour of the economy, ONS (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/elmr/the-productivity-conundrum/interpreting-the-recent-behaviour-of-the-economy/art-interpreting-the-recent-behaviour-of-the-economy.html); The productivity conundrum: explanations and preliminary analysis, ONS (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/elmr/the-productivity-conundrum/explanations-and-preliminary-analysis/art-explanations-and-preliminary-analysis.html); Bank of England Inflation Report, November 2012 (in particular page 33 - http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/inflationreport/ir12nov.pdf); and, The labour market, productivity and inflation (speech given by Martin Weale – see: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech621.pdf).
12 London’s labour market in the recent recession, GLA Economics, 2010, see: http://www.london.gov.uk/publication/working-paper-44-londons-labour-market-recent-recession
13 Whilst the GLA population projections which are used for London Plan purposes are constrained by information about the future housing stock, unconstrained population projections are also produced. Such unconstrained population projections see London’s working age population increasing by more than 1.2 million over the 2011 to 2036 period (or annual growth of around 0.9 per cent per annum).
14 Based on unconstrained projections these figures are broadly speaking 820,000 more people in work and around 350,000 more people not in work by 2036.
15 For unconstrained population projections those qualified to at least ordinary degree level increase by 634,000 whilst those with no qualifications would decrease in number by 29,000.
16 This is a simplification as some people in the labour market have two, or more, jobs.
17 As set out in Section 3 the economic activity assumptions assume a static employment rate over time.
18 See: http://www.london.gov.uk/publication/london%E2%80%99s-economic-outlook-autumn-2012
19 See: http://www.london.gov.uk/publication/working-paper-51-employment-projections-london-sector-and-trend-based-projections-borough London labour market projections
20 Due to data limitations the GVA growth rate used for 1985 to 1989 and 2010 in Working Paper 51 and for 1985 to 1997 and 2011 for the current data is the growth rate of UK GVA and not specifically the growth rate for London’s GVA.
21 2011 data for the current data series is a provisional estimate as the data has yet to be benchmarked to Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES).
22 Due to data availability, the GVA growth rate used for 1984 to 1996 and 2011 is the growth rate of UK GVA and not specifically the growth rate for London GVA.
23 Data prior to 2011 are based on a Standard Occupational Classification 1990 (SOC 1990) for which there is no available conversion matrix. Data from 2001 to 2003 come from the ONS Labour Force Survey April–June quarter. Data from 2004-2011 are from the ONS Annual Population Data. Further details on the historical data is available on the ONS website (reference number 000344): http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/what-we-do/publication-scheme/published-ad-hoc-data/labour-market/august-2012/index.html.
24 Specifically, by applying a least-squares linear regression where employment for each qualification is a dependant on logarithmic time.
25 Data on highest qualification by occupation is available from 2001. However, for Plant and Machine Operatives and Other Occupations (SOC groups 8 and 9) some data before 2004 is disclosive, and thus unavailable. As a result, only the trend from 2004 is used to project qualification within the plant/machine operatives and other service occupations group.
26 For a fuller account see http://www.london.gov.uk/who-runs-london/mayor/publications/business-and-economy/employment-projections-2031
27 See: http://www.london.gov.uk/publication/working-paper-52-londons-jobs-history-technical-paper
28 The follow up surveys ask leavers if they are in work or work and further study. In what follows we just use ‘work’ to cover both destination types.
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12ad635a5bd735f310835466a62506e823f10d1e | 24+ Advanced Learning Loans: Application Information
Release date: 30 January 2014
Next Updated: 27 February 2014
Coverage: England 08/04/2013 – 31/12/2013
For further information contact:
Statistician: Jessie Evans [email protected]
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Level 2 1 Victoria Street London SW1H 0ET
Further Education & Skills 24+ Advanced Learning Loans: Application Processing and Breakdown Information
1. This is a Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) report for the 24+ Advanced Learning Loans (ALL) system and covers application data from 1-31 December 2013, as well as containing cumulative data from launch of the loans system (8 April 2013) to 31 December 2013.
2. The report contains an outline of the source of the data as well as headline information from the data.
3. The report contains tables of data regarding application processing and breakdowns of received applications by provision type, age and sex (information as given in application forms).
4. This report is published monthly. The next publication will be Thursday 27th February 2014. CONTENTS
Main Headlines 3 Data Sources 3 Other Related Statistics 3 Table Guide 4 Tables 5 MAIN HEADLINES
- The total number of applications received from 8 April to 31 December 2013 was **57,181** (excludes ineligible applications).
- The total number of applications received from 1-31 December was **2,271** (excludes ineligible applications).
- The total number of processed applications (including ineligible applications) from 1-31 December was **1,751**.
- The largest amount of applications received (**827**, excluding ineligible applications) from 1-31 December was in the **24-30** age band.
DATA SOURCES
The data used to produce this monthly report are sourced from the Student Loans Company (SLC) application database. Data cover applications for 24+ ALLs received from programme launch on 8th April 2013 until 31st December 2013. It should be noted that the data refer to all received applications (both unprocessed and processed, but excluding those ineligible, cancelled, deleted and in data entry) for 24+ ALLs. Therefore, application figures are not necessarily indicative of actual learner starts.
The data used in this report are sourced from an operational database that is updated on an ongoing basis, and therefore month to month application figures may fluctuate due to further processing of received applications. This may sometimes result in total application figures from launch in a particular table category increasing more or less than would be expected based on the previous month’s submitted applications, or even decreasing from one month to the next.
OTHER RELATED STATISTICS
On Thursday 30th January 2014 the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills also published the Further Education and Skills Statistical First Release, which for the first time contains figures relating to learners participating in FE in the first quarter of the academic year (August 2013 to October 2013) who were funded through the 24+ Advanced Learning Loans system. The Student Loans Company also published their 24+ Advanced Learning Loans Paid in England publication, which includes information on payments made to FE providers on behalf of learners 24+ Advanced Learning Loans in the first quarter of the academic year.
It should be noted that each of these publications use a different reference period and different data sources to this publication, and therefore figures are not directly comparable. See the links below for more details.
BIS Further Education and Skills Statistical First Release: [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/learner-participation-outcomes-and-level-of-highest-qualification-held](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/learner-participation-outcomes-and-level-of-highest-qualification-held)
SLC 24+ Advanced Learning Loans Paid in England: [www.slc.co.uk/media/705979/slcosp012014.pdf](www.slc.co.uk/media/705979/slcosp012014.pdf) The next release of the SFR and the Student Loans for FE in England publications will be in March 2014, and will relate to the period of November 2013 to January 2014.
TABLE GUIDE
This section provides a brief summary of what is included in each table of this report. Application data tables show both a ‘Monthly total’ (applications received between 1-31 December, inclusive) and ‘Total from launch’ (applications received between 8 April and 31 December, inclusive).
- **Table 1** shows the overall processing position of received applications for 24+ ALLs since the launch of the programme. It includes the total applications received, processed, awaiting further information from learner and in progress/work in hand.
- **Table 2** shows a further breakdown of processed applications.
- **Table 3** shows figures for received applications broken down by provision type, with figures for applications received in December as well as for the 13/14 academic year to date.
- **Table 4** shows figures for received applications broken down by age and sex, with figures for applications received in December as well as for the 13/14 academic year to date. Table 1. Overall Processing Position of 24+ ALL Applications
| | Total 1-31 December 2013 | Total 13/14 to date | |--------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------| | Total applications received (excluding ineligible) | 2,271 | 57,181 | | Total processed | 1,751 | 49,281 | | Awaiting further information from learner | 507 | 5,644 | | In progress/work in hand | 137 | 3,585 |
Table 2. Further Breakdown of 24+ ALL Processed Applications
| | Total 1-31 December 2013 | Total 13/14 to date | |--------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------| | Processed | 1,751 | 49,281 | | Ineligible | 124 | 1,329 | | Waiting for customer signature | 378 | 2,361 | | Ready for payment | 1,249 | 45,591 |
Notes: 1 Excludes applications Cancelled, Deleted, In Data Entry and Ineligible. Table 3. Received Applications by Provision Type
| Reporting Period | A Levels | QAA Access to HE | QCF Certificate L3 | QCF Certificate L4 | QCF Diploma L3 | QCF Diploma L4 | Higher Apprenticeship | Advanced Apprenticeship | Unknown | Grand Totals | |------------------------|----------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------------|--------------------------|---------|--------------| | 1-31 December 2013 | 10 | 271 | 386 | 25 | 1,348 | 66 | 34 | 91 | 40 | 2,271 | | Total 13/14 to date | 1,041 | 19,176 | 6,376 | 228 | 26,160 | 2,456 | 183 | 512 | 1,049 | 57,181 |
Table 4. Received Applications by Age and Sex
| Age Group | Total 1-31 December 2013 | Total 13/14 to date | |-----------|--------------------------|---------------------| | 24-30 | 827 | 24,143 | | 31-40 | 789 | 19,404 | | 41-50 | 462 | 9,992 | | 50+ | 165 | 2,767 | | Unknown or un-reconciled | 28 | 875 | | Male | 601 | 14,432 | | Female | 1,670 | 42,749 | | Grand Total | 2,271 | 57,181 |
Notes:
Applications received from candidates of unknown age will be followed up to obtain further information from the learner. Data are based on received applications, including those not yet fully processed, and therefore figures are not necessarily indicative of actual learner starts.
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93c49a33832e48386c679dcf265de08d3b0e032a | A Green Future: Our 25 Year Plan to Improve the Environment Contents
Foreword from the Prime Minister ........................................................................................................ 4 Foreword from the Secretary of State .................................................................................................. 6 Executive summary ............................................................................................................................... 9 Introduction: Our new approach to managing the environment ......................................................... 15 The actions we will take ....................................................................................................................... 31 Chapter 1: Using and managing land sustainably ................................................................. 32 Chapter 2: Recovering nature and enhancing the beauty of landscapes ......................... 56 Chapter 3: Connecting people with the environment to improve health and wellbeing ................................................................................................................................. 71 Chapter 4: Increasing resource efficiency and reducing pollution and waste ........ 83 Chapter 5: Securing clean, healthy, productive and biologically diverse seas and oceans ........................................................................................................................................ 104 Chapter 6: Protecting and improving our global environment ........................................ 110 Putting the Plan into practice ............................................................................................................. 128 Foreword from the Prime Minister
Our natural environment is our most precious inheritance. The United Kingdom is blessed with a wonderful variety of natural landscapes and habitats and our 25 Year Environment Plan sets out our comprehensive and long-term approach to protecting and enhancing them in England for the next generation.
Its goals are simple: cleaner air and water; plants and animals which are thriving; and a cleaner, greener country for us all. We have already taken huge strides to improve environmental protections, from banning microbeads which harm our marine life to improving the quality of the air we breathe to improving standards of animal welfare. This plan sets out the further action we will take.
By using our land more sustainably and creating new habitats for wildlife, including by planting more trees, we can arrest the decline in native species and improve our biodiversity. By tackling the scourge of waste plastic we can make our oceans cleaner and healthier. Connecting more people with the environment will promote greater well-being. And by making the most of emerging technologies, we can build a cleaner, greener country and reap the economic rewards of the clean growth revolution.
The success of the 5p plastic bag charge in reducing the use of carrier bags by 83% shows the difference which government action can make, and demonstrates that protecting our environment is a job for each one of us.
This is a national plan of action, with international ambition. As well as setting an example for others to follow in our treatment of the countryside, rivers, coastlines and air, we will also bring the United Kingdom’s international influence to bear in pursuit of a cleaner and safer world.
From reducing our carbon emissions and building resilience against the extreme weather associated with climate change, to leading international action to protect endangered species, the UK is an international champion for the protection of our planet and we will build on our record in the years ahead.
When the United Kingdom leaves the European Union, control of important areas of environmental policy will return to these shores. We will use this opportunity to strengthen and enhance the protections our countryside, rivers, coastline and wildlife habitats enjoy, and develop new methods of agricultural and fisheries support which put the environment first. We hold our natural environment in trust for the next generation. By implementing the measures in this ambitious plan, ours can become the first generation to leave that environment in a better state than we found it and pass on to the next generation a natural environment protected and enhanced for the future.
The Prime Minister Foreword from the Secretary of State
It is this Government’s ambition to leave our environment in a better state than we found it. We have made significant progress but there is much more to be done. The 25 Year Environment Plan that we have published today outlines the steps we propose to take to achieve our ambition.
Environment is – at its roots – another word for nature, for the planet that sustains us, the life on earth that inspires wonder and reverence, the places dear to us we wish to protect and preserve. We value those landscapes and coastlines as goods in themselves, places of beauty which nurture and support all forms of wildlife.
Respecting nature’s intrinsic value, and the value of all life, is critical to our mission. For this reason we safeguard cherished landscapes from economic exploitation, protect the welfare of sentient animals and strive to preserve endangered woodland and plant life, not to mention the greening of our urban environments.
But we also draw from the planet all the raw materials we need to live – food, water, air and energy for growth. So protecting and enhancing the environment, as this Plan lays out, is about more than respecting nature. It is critical if the next generation is to flourish, with abundant natural resources to draw on, that we look after our and their inheritance wisely.
We need to replenish depleted soil, plant trees, support wetlands and peatlands, rid seas and rivers of rubbish, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, cleanse the air of pollutants, develop cleaner, sustainable energy and protect threatened species and habitats.
Previous Governments, here and in other nations, have made welcome strides and driven environmental improvement. Yet as this 25 Year Plan makes clear, there is much more still to do. We must tread more lightly on our planet, using resources more wisely and radically reducing the waste we generate. Waste is choking our oceans and despoiling our landscapes as well as contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and scarring habitats. The success of the 5p plastic bag charge in reducing the use of carrier bags by 83% shows the difference which government action can make, and demonstrates that protecting our environment is a job for each one of us.
The Plan outlines ways to reduce the use of plastics that contribute to pollution, and broader steps to encourage recycling and the more thoughtful use of resources. Over the lifetime of this Plan, we want to eliminate all avoidable plastic waste.
The Government’s Clean Growth Strategy – the sister document to this Environment Plan – sets out how we will deliver the clean, green growth needed to combat global warming. We will do what is necessary to adapt to the effects of a changing climate, improving the resilience of our infrastructure, housing and natural environment.
Population growth and economic development will mean more demand for housing and this Government is committed to building many more homes. However, we will ensure that we support development and the environment by embedding the principle that new development should result in net environmental gain – with neglected or degraded land returned to health and habitats for wildlife restored or created.
Most of our land is used, however, for agriculture not housing. The new system of support that we will bring in for farmers – true friends of the earth, who recognise that a care for land is crucial to future rural prosperity – will have environmental enhancement at its heart.
We will support farmers to turn over fields to meadows rich in herbs and wildflowers, plant more trees, restore habitats for endangered species, recover soil fertility and attract wildlife back. We will ensure broader landscapes are transformed by connecting habitats into larger corridors for wildlife, as recommended by Sir John Lawton in his official review.
Our plan for a new Northern Forest, to which we are contributing more than £5 million, will be accompanied by a new review of National Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty.
Planting more trees provides not just new habitats for wildlife – it also helps reduce carbon dioxide levels and can reduce flood risk.
We will work with nature to protect communities from flooding, slowing rivers and creating and sustaining more wetlands to reduce flood risk and offer valuable habitats.
Beyond our coastlines, we must do more to protect the seas around us and marine wildlife. Leaving the EU means taking back control of the waters around these islands. We will develop a fishing policy that ensures seas return to health and fish stocks are replenished. We will also extend the marine protected areas around our coasts so that these stretches of environmentally precious maritime heritage have the best possible protection.
Internationally, we will lead the fight against climate change, invest to prevent wildlife crime, pursue a ban on sales of ivory, and strengthen partnerships to tackle illegal wildlife trade beyond borders, including investigating the feasibility of an anti-poaching taskforce.
We will underpin all this action with a comprehensive set of environmental principles. To ensure strong governance, we will consult on plans to set up a world-leading environmental watchdog, an independent, statutory body, to hold Government to account for upholding environmental standards. We will regularly update this Plan to reflect the changing nature of the environment.
While this 25 Year Environment Plan relates only to areas for which HMG is responsible, we will continue to work with the devolved administrations on our shared goal of protecting our natural heritage. These actions will, we hope, ensure that this country is recognised as the leading global champion of a greener, healthier, more sustainable future for the next generation.
The Rt Hon Michael Gove MP
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Executive summary
This 25 Year Environment Plan sets out government action to help the natural world regain and retain good health. It aims to deliver cleaner air and water in our cities and rural landscapes, protect threatened species and provide richer wildlife habitats. It calls for an approach to agriculture, forestry, land use and fishing that puts the environment first.
The Plan looks forward to delivering a Green Brexit – seizing this once-in-a-lifetime chance to reform our agriculture and fisheries management, how we restore nature, and how we care for our land, our rivers and our seas.
Our ambitious proposals will tackle the growing problems of waste and soil degradation – issues that affect our urban areas as well as our countryside. They seek to improve social justice by tackling the pollution suffered by those living in less favourable areas, and by opening up the mental and physical health benefits of the natural world to people from the widest possible range of ages and backgrounds.
We also set out how we will tackle the effects of climate change – still perhaps the most serious long-term risk to the environment given higher land and sea temperatures, rising sea levels, extreme weather patterns and ocean acidification, which harms marine species.
The UK Government has a role in protecting and improving the environment both at home and abroad. We will show leadership on conservation, climate change, land use, sustainable global food supplies and marine health.
We will champion sustainable development, lead in environmental science, innovate to achieve clean growth and increase resource efficiency to provide benefits to both our environment and economy, and keep our pledge to hand over our planet to the next generation in a better condition than when we inherited it.
We will also set gold standards in protecting and growing natural capital – leading the world in using this approach as a tool in decision-making. We will take into account the often hidden additional benefits in every aspect of the environment for national wellbeing, health and economic prosperity, with scientific and economic evidence to the fore.
Since the UK Government is responsible for a number of policies and programmes which affect sectors across the UK and internationally, some aspects of the Plan will apply to the UK as a whole. In other areas where environmental policy is devolved and responsibility rests with the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, the proposals in this Plan apply to England only.
More broadly, we will work with the Devolved Administrations as we leave the EU to uphold environmental standards and go further to protect our shared natural heritage. We will continue to work with the Devolved Administrations on areas where common frameworks will need to be retained in the future. This Plan does not pre-empt these discussions. Our 25-year goals
By adopting this Plan we will achieve:
1. Clean air.
2. Clean and plentiful water.
3. Thriving plants and wildlife.
4. A reduced risk of harm from environmental hazards such as flooding and drought.
5. Using resources from nature more sustainably and efficiently.
6. Enhanced beauty, heritage and engagement with the natural environment.
In addition, we will manage pressures on the environment by:
07. Mitigating and adapting to climate change.
08. Minimising waste.
09. Managing exposure to chemicals.
10. Enhancing biosecurity.
Our policies
We will take action on a number of fronts, looking to join up policies in a way that maximises benefits and value for money. We have identified six key areas around which action will be focused. These are:
- Using and managing land sustainably (chapter 1).
- Recovering nature and enhancing the beauty of landscapes (chapter 2).
- Connecting people with the environment to improve health and wellbeing (chapter 3).
- Increasing resource efficiency, and reducing pollution and waste (chapter 4).
- Securing clean, productive and biologically diverse seas and oceans (chapter 5).
- Protecting and improving the global environment (chapter 6). Putting the Plan into practice
This Plan is a living blueprint for the environment covering the next quarter of a century. It is an ambitious project, made even more so by our use of a natural capital approach, a world first.
As recommended by the Natural Capital Committee, making the vision of a healthier environment a reality requires solid foundations: comprehensive, reliable data; strong governance and accountability; a robust delivery framework, and everyone to play a role.
Leaving the EU presents a unique opportunity to set in motion the behavioural and institutional changes necessary to build sustainable, enduring growth as well as an improvement in our wellbeing. Critical to delivering the outcomes we want to see is an effective governance structure underpinned by environmental principles – on which we will consult early in 2018. We will develop a set of metrics to assess progress towards our 25 year goals.
We will report on progress annually and refresh the Plan periodically to make sure that our actions continue to target the right improvements and make a real difference. Although the Plan is government-led, everyone in society can play their part in improving the natural world, recognising its full value to all.
The Plan sits alongside two other important government strategies. The Industrial Strategy sets out how we will boost productivity across the UK through five foundations – ideas, people, infrastructure, business, environment, and places. Clean Growth is one of the four Grand Challenges laid out in the strategy that will put the UK at the forefront of industries of the future, ensuring that it takes advantage of transformational global trends.
The Clean Growth Strategy sets out the UK’s reaffirmed ambition to promote the ambitious economic and environmental policies to mitigate climate change and deliver clean, green growth. A summary of our policies
Chapter 1: Using and managing land sustainably
1. Embedding an ‘environmental net gain’ principle for development, including housing and infrastructure
2. Improving how we manage and incentivise land management i. Designing and delivering a new environmental land management system ii. Introducing new farming rules for water iii. Working with farmers to use fertilisers efficiently iv. Protecting crops while reducing the environmental impact of pesticides
3. Improving soil health and restoring and protecting our peatlands i. Developing better information on soil health ii. Restoring vulnerable peatlands and ending peat use in horticultural products by 2030.
4. Focusing on woodland to maximise its many benefits i. Supporting the development of a new Northern Forest ii. Supporting larger scale woodland creation iii. Appointing a national Tree Champion
5. Reducing risks from flooding and coastal erosion i. Expanding the use of natural flood management solutions ii. Putting in place more sustainable drainage systems iii. Making ‘at-risk’ properties more resilient to flooding
Chapter 2: Recovering nature and enhancing the beauty of landscapes
1. Protecting and recovering nature i. Publishing a strategy for nature ii. Developing a Nature Recovery Network iii. Providing opportunities for the reintroduction of native species iv. Exploring how to give individuals the chance to deliver lasting conservation v. Improving biosecurity to protect and conserve nature
2. Conserving and enhancing natural beauty i. Reviewing National Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty
3. **Respecting nature in how we use water** i. Reforming our approach to water abstraction ii. Increasing water supply and incentivising greater water efficiency and less personal use
Chapter 3: Connecting people with the environment to improve health and wellbeing
1. **Helping people improve their health and wellbeing by using green spaces** i. Considering how environmental therapies could be delivered through mental health services ii. Promoting health and wellbeing through the natural environment
2. **Encouraging children to be close to nature, in and out of school** i. Helping primary schools create nature-friendly grounds ii. Supporting more pupil contact with local natural spaces
3. **Greening our towns and cities** i. Creating more green infrastructure ii. Planting more trees in and around our towns and cities
4. **Making 2019 a Year of Action for the environment** i. Helping children and young people from all backgrounds to engage with nature and improve the environment. ii. Supporting the 2019 Year of Green Action
Chapter 4: Increasing resource efficiency and reducing pollution and waste
1. **Maximising resource efficiency and minimising environmental impacts at end of life.** i. Achieving zero avoidable plastic waste by the end of 2042 ii. Reducing food supply chain emissions and waste iii. Reducing litter and littering iv. Improving management of residual waste v. Cracking down on fly-tippers and waste criminals vi. Reducing the impact of wastewater
2. **Reducing pollution** i. Publishing a Clean Air Strategy ii. Curbing emissions from combustion plants and generators iii. Publishing a Chemicals Strategy iv. Minimising the risk of chemical contamination in our water v. Ensuring we continue to maintain clean recreational waters and warning about temporary pollution
Chapter 5: Securing clean, healthy, productive and biologically diverse seas and oceans
1. Introducing a sustainable fisheries policy as we leave the Common Fisheries Policy
2. Achieving good environmental status in our seas while allowing marine industries to thrive
Chapter 6: Protecting and improving our global environment
1. Providing international leadership and leading by example i. Tackling climate change ii. Protecting and improving international biodiversity
2. Helping developing nations protect and improve the environment i. Providing assistance and supporting disaster planning ii. Supporting and protecting international forests and sustainable global agriculture
3. Leaving a lighter footprint on the global environment i. Enhancing sustainability ii. Protecting and managing risks from hazards iii. Supporting zero-deforestation supply chains
Putting the Plan into practice
- Consulting on setting up a new independent body to hold government to account and a new set of environmental principles to underpin policy-making.
- Developing a set of metrics to assess progress towards our 25-year goals.
- Refreshing the 25 Year Environment Plan regularly to ensure that collectively we are focusing on the right priorities, using the latest evidence, and delivering better value for money.
- Strengthening leadership and delivery through better local planning, more effective partnerships and learning from our four pioneer projects.
- Establishing a new green business council and exploring the potential for a natural environment impact fund.
- Work closely with a large range of stakeholders over the coming year to identify their contribution to the goals set out in this Plan. Introduction: Our new approach to managing the environment
We are blessed with magnificent and diverse landscapes, coastlines and seas. The environment is one of our most valuable assets and helps define us as a nation.
The uplifting sights, sounds and smells of our natural and urban environments are integral to our daily lives. More fundamentally, the environment is life-giving. It nourishes and nurtures all life, human, animal or plant. We rely on our blue and green spaces for food, water and the air we breathe. Each vital element is a gift from a healthy, well-functioning planet. In turn, we are healthier and feel better the more time we spend out and about in the natural world.
Our environment underpins our wellbeing and prosperity…
This is not the whole story of what our environment gives us. The natural world also underpins our nation’s prosperity and wellbeing. We often talk of being ‘enriched’ by our environment. In recent years we have come to realise that the environment does indeed deliver calculable economic benefits. Initiatives to protect and improve our natural world and cultural heritage are acts of stewardship by which we discharge our debt to it, and so are moral imperatives in themselves, but they are also economically sensible. A healthy environment supports a healthy economy. That is why this 25 Year Environment Plan builds on our Industrial Strategy and Clean Growth Strategy, to transform productivity across the country and drive green innovation.
The UK is not alone in grappling with these challenges. By taking a leading role, and developing the technologies, skills and services needed to manage our relationship with the natural world more thoroughly, we can also grow our economy by exporting our expertise around the world.
The economic benefits that flow from the natural world and our natural heritage have begun to take a greater prominence in policy-making, thanks in part to the ground-breaking work of Professor Dieter Helm’s Natural Capital Committee (NCC). We see these benefits in increased productivity from our natural resources and a lessening of the demands placed on them. We see them in the boost to our mental and physical wellbeing.
...and helps bring about a fairer society
A healthier environment also helps deliver social justice and a country that works for everyone. For example, pollution affects us all but it is the most disadvantaged in society who suffer more. The poorer you are, the more likely it is that your house, and your children’s school and playground are close to highly-polluted roads, and the less likely you are to enjoy ready access to green spaces.¹
We want everyone to benefit from getting close to nature (Photo: Forestry Commission / John McFarlane).
Through this Plan we want to ensure an equal distribution of environmental benefits, resources and opportunities. At present, children from minority ethnic backgrounds and lower income homes are the least likely to visit our countryside. This should change, so that everyone has the chance to benefit from getting close to nature and appreciating all it has to offer. In turn, they will want to protect and enhance the world around them.
¹ The term “green space” is used in a broad sense in this document, and includes a range of environments known as “green infrastructure”, including parks, playing fields, woodland, street trees, rights of way, allotments, canal towpaths, green walls and roofs. Blue spaces include a broad set of blue infrastructure, including canals, rivers, streams, ponds, lakes and their borders as well as features of the coastline that provide people with access to the coast. We face big challenges in conserving and improving our natural world…
Our landscapes – our hills, valleys and plains – were created by age-old geological processes but the way our rural and urban environment looks now owes as much to the work of people as nature. Down the centuries, we have shaped and adapted our rural and urban landscape to suit our purpose, not always aware of the lasting effects of our actions – for good or ill – on the appearance and health of the environment.
The scale of human impact on the planet has never been greater than it is now. At a global level, the 20th century brought many technological benefits and changes to our way of life, but we have also experienced unprecedented expansion in population, consumption, energy use, waste and pollution, and the conversion of land to agriculture.
The effects on wildlife and habitats are stark. We are in danger of presiding over massive human-induced extinctions when we should instead be recognising the intrinsic value of the wildlife and plants that are our fellow inhabitants of this planet. Furthermore, human-induced climate change threatens unpredictable and potentially irreversible damage to our planet.
It is in everyone’s interest to be part of the solution. Over the next 25 years we must safeguard the environment for this generation and many more to come. We plant trees knowing that it will not be us, but our children and grandchildren, who get to enjoy their shade. In the same way, we should take a long view of how our stewardship today can lead to a healthier and culturally richer planet tomorrow. We have already set out our plans to better conserve our heritage assets².
We all have a stake in our environment. Everyone can play a part, because government and environmental organisations cannot achieve the necessary improvements on their own.
Conversion of land to agriculture. Tea plantation, Malaysia.
² The Heritage Statement 2017, Department for Digital, Culture Media and Sport, 2017 Industrial Strategy and the 25 Year Environment Plan
Our Industrial Strategy, published in November 2017, and our 25 Year Environment Plan set out our approach to safeguarding our environment and future-proofing our economy for generations to come. They are complementary approaches that reinforce one another given the relationship between the environment and the economy.
The Industrial Strategy sets out our approach to boosting productivity across the country, raising living standards and improving the quality of life for all our citizens, through strengthening the five foundations of productivity: innovation, people, infrastructure, places and the business environment.
It sets out Grand Challenges to put the United Kingdom at the forefront of the industries of the future, directing the focus of government and engaging the private sector to ensure we take advantage of major global trends, and improve people’s lives and the country’s productivity. The four Grand Challenges are:
- Artificial Intelligence and Data Economy – putting the UK at the forefront of the artificial intelligence and data revolution.
- Clean Growth – maximising the advantages of UK industry from the global shift to clean growth.
- Future of Mobility – becoming a world leader in the way people, goods and services move.
- Ageing Society – harnessing the power of innovation to help meet the needs of an ageing society.
Environmental protection is at the heart of the strategy, as our Clean Growth Grand Challenge shows, and is also evident in our investment in clean innovation, the support for zero-emission vehicles, and measures to tackle local air pollution.
Similarly, the 25 Year Environment Plan will help boost the productivity by enhancing our natural capital – the air, water, soil and ecosystems that support all forms of life – since this is an essential basis for economic growth and productivity over the long term. Long-term action is needed, not just at home but abroad too. Pollution, whether in our oceans or airborne in our cities, does not respect national borders. This country has much to be proud of with a record of global environmental leadership. This Plan sends a message that the UK intends to take on an even more prominent international role in protecting the planet.
…and a natural capital approach will help us meet them
Long-term action requires us to take difficult choices, some with considerable economic consequences, about conservation. In the past, our failure to understand the full value of the benefits offered by the environment and cultural heritage has seen us make poor choices. We can change that by using a natural capital approach. When we give the environment its due regard as a natural asset – indeed a key contributor – to the overall economy, we will be more likely to give it the value it deserves to protect and enhance it. This is why, as signalled in our Industrial Strategy, over coming years the UK intends to use a ‘natural capital’ approach as a tool to help us make key choices and long-term decisions.
The value of natural capital is routinely understated. If we look at England’s woods and forests, for example, as a national asset, using a natural capital approach, the value of the services they deliver is an estimated £2.3bn. Of this sizeable sum, according to a recent study, only a small proportion – 10% – is in timber values. The rest derives from other benefits provided to society, such as human recreation and carbon sequestration – the process by which trees lock-up and store carbon from the atmosphere.
What is natural capital?
Natural capital is the sum of our ecosystems, species, freshwater, land, soils, minerals, our air and our seas. These are all elements of nature that either directly or indirectly bring value to people and the country at large. They do this in many ways but chiefly by providing us with food, clean air and water, wildlife, energy, wood, recreation and protection from hazards.
Only 10% of the value of the services woods and forests provide is through timber.
This value is not captured by traditional accounting methods and is too often ignored in management and policy decisions.
But when we use a natural capital approach, we are more likely to take better and more efficient decisions that can support environmental enhancement and help deliver benefits such as reduced long-term flood risk, increases in wildlife, and a boost to long-term prosperity. It is an approach that can improve our decisions at every level – from international agreements to everyday decisions by individuals. Individual small choices – which coffee to buy and in which kind of cup; whether to drive to work or take the train – add up to a big impact on the environment.
A natural capital approach is equally relevant for those making decisions involving the use of significant public funds.
Over the next 25 years, our policy choices will be better-informed with a natural capital approach. Not all aspects of natural capital – the contribution of wildlife, for example – can be robustly valued at present and we do not always need to know a monetary value to know that something is worth protecting. For this reason we regard it as a tool, not an absolute arbiter. It is just one tool among many in the formation of policy but a very powerful one in ensuring that we think of our responsibility to future generations to hand on a country, and a planet, in a better state than we found it.
Small individual choices add up to a big impact on the environment (Image: WRAP). We have already made progress…
Measures we have taken over recent decades to bolster and protect our environment mean that:
- Our rivers, beaches and air are cleaner than they were 50 years ago;
- Since 1970, emissions of potentially damaging sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides have fallen by 96% and 69% respectively and since 1980 ammonia emissions have fallen by 10%;
- The UK was at the forefront of international efforts that have phased out 98% of ozone depleting substances globally, under the UN Montreal Protocol. We also played a leading role in amending the Protocol in 2016 to deliver a phase down of hydrofluorocarbons (potent GHGs) by 85% globally by 2036;
- Since 1990, greenhouse gas emissions have been cut by 42%;
- Household recycling levels have almost quadrupled since the turn of the century;
- We have more stringent protection at national and international level for our most precious landscapes;
- Since 2010, our flood defence programme has been protecting more homes, with 250,000 homes better protected;
- 35% of England’s seas are now within designated marine protected areas, safeguarding important and vulnerable habitats and species;
- Over 95% of our terrestrial and freshwater protected sites in England are now in good condition, or have management in place to ensure that they are recovered;
- Populations of animals have been successfully recovered or reintroduced: there are now over 2,000 breeding pairs of red kites in the UK; otters are now found in every English county and we are testing the waters with the Eurasian beaver in Devon and the Forest of Dean. This progress is the result of many different policies, plans, Commissions, commitments and regulations and we are grateful to the vital players who have contributed; our farmers, fishers, businesses, and environmental and conservation groups among many others.
…but all of us have much more still to do…
This Plan sets out policies which will protect and enhance the environment but also urges all of us to think about how we can contribute.
Tiny changes in our daily decisions can make a tangible and immediate difference, such is the power of group action – whether it is the bags we use to carry groceries, the fuel we burn to keep warm, or the transport we use to get around.
Changes in our daily decisions can make a tangible and immediate difference
…so we will work across society to secure lasting change
Momentum for positive change is growing and in government as well as society as a whole we must harness this in coming months and years. Government will help bring about change in a variety of ways, using both incentives and regulation where necessary, to make sure that responsible attitudes towards the environment become the norm. Many businesses are also playing their part. Fast-food outlets are introducing segregated recycling bins with separate sections for paper cups, plastics and liquids. Other retailers are swapping plastic straws for paper ones, and replacing plastic coffee stirrers with wooden ones.
We will work with all parts of society and all sectors of the economy as we implement the 25 Year Environment Plan to leave the environment in a better state than we found it.
We will invite bodies and people to reduce the environmental impact of their actions, and do more to help communities and individuals to engage with nature and enhance what they find there.
The illustration below sets out the goals and main policy areas to work towards reducing pressures on the environment and increase the key benefits that it provides. Our 25-year goals
We will achieve:
- Clean air
- Clean and plentiful water
- Thriving plants and wildlife
- Reduced risk of harm from environmental hazards such as flooding and drought
- Using resources from nature more sustainably and efficiently
- Enhanced beauty, heritage and engagement with the natural environment
We will manage pressures on the environment by:
- Mitigating and adapting to climate change
- Minimising waste
- Managing exposure to chemicals
- Enhancing biosecurity
Our policies will focus on:
- Using and managing land sustainably
- Recovering nature and enhancing the beauty of landscapes
- Connecting people with the environment to improve health and wellbeing
- Increasing resource efficiency, and reducing pollution and waste
- Securing clean, productive and biologically diverse seas and oceans
- Protecting and improving the global environment What we want to achieve
Below, we set out goals and targets for each of the environmental benefits and pressures we have identified. We will refresh them regularly to make sure they are sufficiently ambitious and reflect the latest evidence.
We will work with leading scientists, economists and environmentalists, including the Natural Capital Committee (NCC), to develop, by the end of 2018, a set of metrics that will chart our progress towards a better environment, ensuring transparency and accountability.
Some of the targets derive from our membership of the EU while others go further than EU rules require. Some are already legally-binding while others are not.
We are committed to consulting on how the government should be held to account for environmental outcomes by a new independent, statutory body. This consultation, to be launched early in 2018, will consider the best way to ensure government fulfils its environmental obligations and responsibilities. Further information is provided in later sections.
Goals and targets
Increasing the benefits from the environment
Using the natural capital framework set out by the NCC, we have framed our goals for environmental improvement over the next 25 years around six primary goods and benefits offered by a healthy environment.
1. Clean air
We will achieve clean air by:
- Meeting legally binding targets to reduce emissions of five damaging air pollutants. This should halve the effects of air pollution on health by 2030.
- Ending the sale of new conventional petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2040.
- Maintaining the continuous improvement in industrial emissions by building on existing good practice and the successful regulatory framework.
2. Clean and plentiful water
We will achieve clean and plentiful water by:
- Improving at least three quarters of our waters(^3) to be close to their natural state(^4) as soon as is practicable by:
o Reducing the damaging abstraction of water from rivers and groundwater, ensuring that by 2021 the proportion of water bodies with enough water to support environmental standards increases from 82% to 90% for surface water bodies and from 72% to 77% for groundwater bodies.
o Reaching or exceeding objectives for rivers, lakes, coastal and ground waters that are specially protected, whether for biodiversity or drinking water as per our River Basin Management Plans.
o Supporting OFWAT’s ambitions on leakage, minimising the amount of water lost through leakage year on year, with water companies expected to reduce leakage by at least an average of 15% by 2025.
o Minimising by 2030 the harmful bacteria in our designated bathing waters and continuing to improve the cleanliness of our waters. We will make sure that potential bathers are warned of any short-term pollution risks.
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(^3) 75% target reflects current River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) analysis of where benefits outweigh costs; waters includes rivers, lakes, groundwater aquifers, estuaries and coastal waters
(^4) As set out in international benchmarks and defined in statutory guidance to the Environment Agency provided for its work in developing RBMPs 3. Thriving plants and wildlife
We will achieve a growing and resilient network of land, water and sea that is richer in plants and wildlife.
At sea, we will do this by:
- Reversing the loss of marine biodiversity and, where practicable, restoring it.
- Increasing the proportion of protected and well-managed seas, and better managing existing protected sites.
- Making sure populations of key species are sustainable with appropriate age structures.
- Ensuring seafloor habitats are productive and sufficiently extensive to support healthy, sustainable ecosystems.
On land and in freshwaters, we will do this by:
- Restoring 75% of our one million hectares of terrestrial and freshwater protected sites to favourable condition, securing their wildlife value for the long term.
- Creating or restoring 500,000 hectares of wildlife-rich habitat outside the protected site network, focusing on priority habitats as part of a wider set of land management changes providing extensive benefits.
- Taking action to recover threatened, iconic or economically important species of animals, plants and fungi, and where possible to prevent human-induced extinction or loss of known threatened species in England and the Overseas Territories.
- Increasing woodland in England in line with our aspiration of 12% cover by 2060: this would involve planting 180,000 hectares by end of 2042.
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5 We will develop more detailed targets as part of our post 2020 strategy for nature. We will focus restoration and creation on protected or priority habitats (habitats of principal importance under the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act)
6 For example bees and other pollinating insects 4. Reducing the risks of harm from environmental hazards
We will reduce the risk of harm to people, the environment and the economy from natural hazards including flooding, drought and coastal erosion by:
- Making sure everyone is able to access the information they need to assess any risks to their lives and livelihoods, health and prosperity posed by flooding and coastal erosion.
- Bringing the public, private and third sectors together to work with communities and individuals to reduce the risk of harm.
- Making sure that decisions on land use, including development, reflect the level of current and future flood risk.
- Ensuring interruptions to water supplies are minimised during prolonged dry weather and drought.
- Boosting the long-term resilience of our homes, businesses and infrastructure.
5. Using resources from nature more sustainably and efficiently
We will ensure that resources from nature, such as food, fish and timber, are used more sustainably and efficiently. We will do this by:
- Maximising the value and benefits we get from our resources, doubling resource productivity(^7) by 2050.
- Improving our approach to soil management: by 2030 we want all of England’s soils to be managed sustainably, and we will use natural capital thinking to develop appropriate soil metrics and management approaches.
- Increasing timber supplies.
- Ensuring that all fish stocks are recovered to and maintained at levels that can produce their maximum sustainable yield.
- Ensuring that food is produced sustainably and profitably.
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(^7) Simply put, resource productivity is a measure of the value (in terms of GDP) we generate per unit of raw materials we use in the economy. 6. Enhancing beauty, heritage and engagement with the natural environment
We will conserve and enhance the beauty of our natural environment, and make sure it can be enjoyed, used by and cared for by everyone. We will do this by:
- Safeguarding and enhancing the beauty of our natural scenery and improving its environmental value while being sensitive to considerations of its heritage.
- Making sure that there are high quality, accessible, natural spaces close to where people live and work, particularly in urban areas, and encouraging more people to spend time in them to benefit their health and wellbeing.
- Focusing on increasing action to improve the environment from all sectors of society.
Managing environmental pressures
As well as maximising the benefits of a healthier environment we also need to manage the growing pressures on the environment that are the result of human actions. 7. Mitigating and adapting to climate change
We will take all possible action to mitigate climate change, while adapting to reduce its impact. We will do this by:
- Continuing to cut greenhouse gas emissions including from land use, land use change, the agriculture and waste sectors and the use of fluorinated gases. The UK Climate Change Act 2008 commits us to reducing total greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80 per cent by 2050 when compared to 1990 levels.
- Making sure that all policies, programmes and investment decisions take into account the possible extent of climate change this century.
- Implementing a sustainable and effective second National Adaptation Programme.
8. Minimising waste
We will minimise waste, reuse materials as much as we can and manage materials at the end of their life to minimise the impact on the environment. We will do this by:
- Working towards our ambition of zero avoidable waste by 2050
- Working to a target of eliminating avoidable plastic waste by end of 2042.
- Meeting all existing waste targets – including those on landfill, reuse and recycling – and developing ambitious new future targets and milestones.
- Seeking to eliminate waste crime and illegal waste sites over the lifetime of this Plan, prioritising those of highest risk. Delivering a substantial reduction in litter and littering behaviour.
- Significantly reducing and where possible preventing all kinds of marine plastic pollution – in particular material that came originally from land.
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8 Avoidable means what is Technically, Environmentally and Economically Practicable. 9. Managing exposure to chemicals
We will make sure that chemicals are safely used and managed, and that the levels of harmful chemicals entering the environment (including through agriculture) are significantly reduced. We will do this by:
- Seeking in particular to eliminate the use of Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) by 2025, in line with our commitments under the Stockholm Convention.
- Reducing land-based emissions of mercury to air and water by 50% by 2030.
- Substantially increasing the amount of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) material being destroyed or irreversibly transformed by 2030, to make sure there are negligible emissions to the environment.
- Fulfilling our commitments under the Stockholm Convention as outlined in the UK’s most recent National Implementation Plan.
10. Enhancing biosecurity
We will enhance biosecurity to protect our wildlife and livestock, and boost the resilience of plants and trees. We will do this by:
- Managing and reducing the impact of existing plant and animal diseases; lowering the risk of new ones and tackling invasive non-native species.
- Reaching the detailed goals to be set out in the Tree Health Resilience Plan of 2018.
- Ensuring strong biosecurity protection at our borders, drawing on the opportunities leaving the EU provides.
- Working with industry to reduce the impact of endemic disease. Section 1 - The actions we will take
Through history we have taken too much from our natural world and put back too little, in part because the many benefits that the environment provides are not fully understood or measured.
In this section we set out the actions we will take to put that right and deliver the goals described above.
The lifespan of this Plan is a quarter of a century – a deliberate decision that extends it far beyond the five-year Parliamentary cycle and thus takes account of the longer-term needs of the environment. Not every proposal will – or needs to – take immediate effect, but in this Plan we lay the foundations for lasting future improvements to our natural world. Chapter 1: Using and managing land sustainably
At a glance
We will:
- Embed an ‘environmental net gain’ principle for development, including housing and infrastructure.
- Improve the way we manage and incentivise land management, including designing and delivering a new environmental land management system.
- Improve soil health, and restore and protect peatlands – this will include developing a soil health index and ending the use of peat in horticulture.
- Expand woodland cover and make sure that existing woodlands are better managed to maximise the range of benefits they provide – this will include supporting the development of a new Northern Forest and appointment of a national Tree Champion to support our approach.
- Take action to reduce the risk of harm from flooding and coastal erosion including greater use of natural flood management solutions.
As we leave the EU, we have a once-in-a-generation chance to change our approach to managing our land so that we secure and enhance the benefits of the environment far into the future.
The new approach will recognise good practices that build up and bolster natural and heritage assets. It will also take account of the negative effects of a range of land uses and activities. It will require a balance of incentives and regulations – influencing decisions so that we use land in a way that supports cost-effective, sustainable growth.
1. Embedding an ‘environmental net gain’ principle for development including housing and infrastructure
This Plan recognises the government’s ambitions for a major increase in housebuilding (300k extra homes a year by the middle of the next decade) and infrastructure investment, and the importance that these have for people’s lives and economic growth. We want to put the environment at the heart of planning and development to create better places for people to live and work. We will seek to embed a ‘net environmental gain’ principle for development to deliver environmental improvements locally and nationally. This will enable housing development without increasing overall burdens on developers.
We want to establish strategic, flexible and locally tailored approaches that recognise the relationship between the quality of the environment and development. That will enable us to achieve measurable improvements for the environment – ‘environmental net gains’ – while ensuring economic growth and reducing costs, complexity and delays for developers.
Current policy is that the planning system should provide biodiversity net gains where possible. We will explore strengthening this requirement for planning authorities to ensure environmental net gains across their areas, and will consult on making this mandatory – including any exemptions that may be necessary. This will enable those authorities to develop locally-led strategies to enhance the natural environment, creating greater certainty and consistency and avoiding increased burdens on developers, including those pursuing small-scale developments. We would expect this should have a net positive impact on overall development.
Some local authorities, major private developers and infrastructure companies have already implemented a net gain approach. Our immediate ambition is to work in partnership with other Government bodies, local planning authorities and developers to mainstream the use of existing biodiversity net gain approaches within the planning system, update the tools that underpin them and reduce process costs on developers. We have already implemented an innovative, strategic approach to great crested newt licensing in the planning and development process and will look to build on and further streamline protected species licensing.
In future, we want to expand the net gain approaches used for biodiversity to include wider natural capital benefits, such as flood protection, recreation and improved water and air quality. Those approaches will sit alongside existing regulations that protect our most threatened or valuable habitats and species. They will enable local planning authorities to target environmental enhancements that are needed most in their areas and give flexibility to developers in providing them. We will explore the ways in which new data, tools and strategies can support development that brings wider environmental improvement, including linking with fresh initiatives, such as the Nature Recovery Network into the planning system (see later sections). Actions we will take include:
- Making sure that existing requirements for net gain for biodiversity in national planning policy are strengthened, including consulting on whether they should be mandated alongside any exemptions that may be necessary.
- Working with interested parties to reduce costs to developers by expanding the net gain approaches used for wildlife to also include wider natural capital benefits such as flood protection, recreation and improved water and air quality - streamlining environmental process, whilst achieving net environmental gains.
- Working with interested parties to improve and expand the range of tools and guidance that support biodiversity net gain approaches, including through the future incorporation of natural capital measures.
- Working with MHCLG and development professionals to explore ways in which design can contribute to environmental improvements, leading to better places in which to live and work and a reduced environmental footprint.
- Producing stronger new standards for green infrastructure.
- Exploring ways in which national spatial data and strategies could support and improve the benefits achieved through environmental net gain.
- Exploring the potential for district protected species licensing to be expanded and include more species, delivering better outcomes for wildlife and a more streamlined process for development.
- Exploring, through ongoing MHCLG-led reforms of developer contributions, how tariffs could be used to steer development towards the least environmentally damaging areas and to secure investment in natural capital.
- Determining appropriate locations to pilot a revolving land bank for rural areas. Housing and planning
Around 11% of land in England is developed. New building takes place on an average of 17,000 hectares of undeveloped land each year.
About 12% of land in the United Kingdom is designated as Green Belt land, and we remain committed to protecting it. The Green Belt plays an important role in preventing urban sprawl through the planning process.
Used positively, the planning system can protect key natural and historic assets and encourage high-quality green infrastructure in urban areas.
Environmental protections already enshrined in national planning policy will be maintained and strengthened.
- **New development will happen in the right places**, delivering maximum economic benefit while taking into account the need to avoid environmental damage. We will protect ancient woodlands and grasslands, high flood risk areas and our best agricultural land.
- **High environmental standards for all new builds**. New homes will be built in a way that reduces demands for water, energy and material resources, improves flood resilience, minimises overheating and encourages walking and cycling. Resilient buildings and infrastructure will more readily adapt to a changing climate.
- **Enhancement of the Green Belt** to make this land ‘breathing space’ for our urban populations to enjoy, and our diverse wildlife to flourish, while delivering the homes this country needs.
Positive environmental outcomes can help reduce local opposition to development, shorten the planning process, cut operating costs for infrastructure and increase the desirability of new homes. 2. Improving how we manage and incentivise land management
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been one of the main drivers of land use and management over the last 45 years, and has caused significant environmental damage. As we deliver a Green Brexit that puts environmental policy at the heart of England’s domestic and international priorities, farming and agricultural policy is a key area of focus.
£3.2bn is spent in the UK under the CAP. £2.59bn of this is spent under ‘Pillar 1’ – the ‘basic payment scheme’ (BPS). This pays farmers according to the amount of land they own, rather than the outcomes they achieve. It concentrates money in the hands of those who already have significant private wealth, without improving environmental outcomes. There have been efforts to improve this by ‘greening’ one third of BPS payments – but scholars have recently found these to be largely ineffective. Just £0.64bn – 20% of the total – is spent on environmental stewardship programmes under ‘Pillar 2’.
One of the first challenges we face is how to optimise sustainable food production. We will seek to support truly sustainable productivity growth. For example, planting over-winter cover crops (grown between periods of regular crop production) can increase yield and also improve soil health. Other measures include reducing soil compaction through subsoiling or effective crop rotation. We also know that small copses, hedgerow trees and individual trees play an important role in breaking up monocultures of arable crops.
In calling for everyone to work together to improve the land for our environment we recognise that there is a complex picture of land ownership in England, with over 40% of farmland being tenanted. We will work with all of those who shape our land to design our future policy.
Research and innovation are part of the answer. Agri-tech developments can significantly improve farm performance, in terms of both profits and the environment. Properly implemented precision farming, resource efficiency, and better livestock and crop management can achieve more effective sustainable productivity growth. An example from the Agri-tech Catalyst programme is Saturn Bioponics’ and ValeFresco’s successful trial of a vertical hydroponic growth system for Pak Choi at a polytunnel operated by ValeFresco. This has demonstrated between a three- and four-fold increase in crop yield on the same land area, with reduced input requirements (water, fertiliser and pesticides) and improved crop quality. Saturn Bioponics has received a government productivity award for its work.
i. Designing and delivering a new environmental land management system
Leaving the CAP means we can do much more for our environment. After a period of stability to ensure a smooth transition, we will move to a system of paying farmers public money for public goods. The principal public good we want to invest in is environmental enhancement. We will introduce a new environmental land management system to deliver this. It will incentivise and reward land managers to restore and improve our natural capital and rural heritage. It will also provide support for farmers and land managers as we move towards a more effective application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle (whereby for costs of pollution lie with those responsible for it).
A new environmental land management scheme will help us deliver more for the environment (including mitigation of and adaptation to the effects of climate change) and provide flexibility, putting more management decisions in the hands of farmers.
In the past, such schemes have supported the creation of nesting and food resources for nationally scarce farmland bird and pollinator species, increased breeding populations of cirl buntings, stone curlews and the marsh fritillary butterfly. They have also help to conserve important heritage assets.
For future schemes, we will aim to keep bureaucracy to a minimum, as well as design a more user-friendly application process. We will continue to invest in technical advice to support farmers and land managers in delivering the outcomes and to help them to work together to achieve benefits at landscape and catchment level. We will also explore where capital grants could support the adoption of long-term sustainable land management practices.
We will set out our proposals for a new system in a Command Paper later this spring and consult widely with farmers and other stakeholders. We will work closely with the devolved administrations on a framework that works for the whole of the UK and reflects the needs and individual circumstances of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England. As part of this, we will continue to engage regularly with all the devolved administrations to explore options on the design and appropriate extent of the forthcoming Agriculture Bill.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Working with land managers and others to consider the role of a new environmental land management scheme that encourages broad participation and secures environmental improvements.
- Retaining and further improving targeted support for more complex environmental improvements, backed up by specialist advice.
- Exploring new and innovative funding and delivery mechanisms as part of a new environmental land management system. These may include private payments for eco-system services, reverse auctions and conservation covenants (see later section).
As we implement the new environmental land management system, we will monitor and evaluate its effectiveness in delivering our ambition for a sustainable farming sector. ii. Introducing new farming rules for water
Farming can be a powerful force for environmental enhancement but it currently generates too many externalities such as emissions from livestock and pollution from fertilisers and pesticides. Overall, farming is now the most significant source of water pollution and of ammonia emissions into the atmosphere in the UK. It accounts for 25% phosphate, 50% nitrate and 75% sediment loadings in the water environment, which harms ecosystems.9
Last year, we published new simplified rules for all land managers designed to reduce water pollution from agriculture. These new rules come into force on 2 April 2018.
The new rules will require every farmer to identify and manage risks to water on their land and start taking precautions to reduce ammonia emissions, thereby reducing pollution and soil erosion, and improving resource efficiency.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Enforcing regulations for new farming rules for water from April 2018.
- Reviewing the progress of the new rules after three years.
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9 The impact of agriculture on the water environment: summary of the evidence, Defra, 2014 iii. Working with farmers to use fertilisers efficiently
By ensuring fertilisers are used efficiently, we can cut the air and water pollution that harms public health and the environment, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Poor storage of manure and slurry can lead to the release of harmful chemicals and gases such as ammonia (in 2015, more than four-fifths of ammonia emissions in the UK stemmed from agriculture). This can cause acid rain, combine with pollution from traffic and industry to form smog, and harm soils and vegetation.
Ammonia is also disseminated through the poor storage of manure and slurry, deposit of manure, and the spreading of manures, slurries and mineral fertilisers. This pollution could be substantially reduced through consistent use of good nutrient management practices. We have already taken action.
Through the Farming Ammonia Reduction Grant Scheme, we have provided practical help for farmers by funding slurry store covers, which can reduce emissions during storage by up to 80%.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Putting in place a robust framework to limit inputs of nitrogen-rich fertilisers such as manures, slurries and chemicals to economically efficient levels, and make sure they are stored and applied safely.
- Introducing clear rules, advice and, if appropriate, financial support.
- Working with industry to encourage the use of low-emissions fertiliser, and reviewing the levels of take-up using data from the British Fertiliser Practice Survey. iv. Protecting crops while reducing the environmental impact of pesticides
We must protect people and the environment from the risks that pesticides can pose. At the same time, farmers need to protect their crops. We should put Integrated Pest Management (IPM) at the heart of an in-the-round approach, using pesticides more judiciously and supplementing them with improved crop husbandry and the use of natural predators. More can be done in the way we breed our plants for traits beyond productivity, making better use of genetics and the resources held in gene banks to ensure their natural resilience to pests and diseases.
For too long, IPM has simply been viewed as good practice for farmers to do voluntarily. By making IPM central to our approach we will encourage wider investment in research and development. By reducing the use of pesticides in the round and deploying them in a more targeted way, it is possible to reduce the impact on the environment while keeping open a sufficient diversity of options to avoid the build-up of resistance and the need for higher doses.
We recently announced that the UK supports further restrictions on the use of neonicotinoid pesticides because of the growing weight of scientific evidence they are harmful to bees and other pollinators. Unless the scientific evidence changes, the Government will maintain these increased restrictions after we leave the EU. Independent research shows an overall decline in the UK’s wild bee diversity over the last 50 years. Pesticides are recognised as one of the potential pressures in the Government’s national pollinator strategy, first published in 2014, which sets out a collaborative plan to improve the state of bees and other pollinators.
We will develop our existing strong regulation of pesticides and work with others on different approaches to minimise the impacts of pesticide use in farming. The Government will review the UK National Action Plan for the Sustainable Use of Pesticides in 2018.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Ensuring that the regulation of pesticides continues to develop with scientific knowledge and is robust and fit for purpose, so as to protect people and the environment. We will maintain this direction after exiting the EU.
- Putting Integrated Pest Management (IPM) at the heart of a holistic approach, by developing and implementing policies that encourage and support sustainable crop protection with the minimum use of pesticides.
- Reviewing the UK National Action Plan for the Sustainable Use of Pesticides in 2018.
- Supporting further restrictions on neonicotinoid pesticides, in line with scientific evidence. Any continuing use should be limited and permitted only where the environmental risks are shown to be very low. Farming
Our farms provide so much more than just food. They provide recreational activities to an estimated value of £200m for farms and nearly £300m a year for woods. Furthermore, the way farmland and woodland filter the air is valued at £182m and £794m per annum.(^\\text{10})
But, agriculture is still a major source of water pollution. It is the primary cause of 30% of Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) in England being in an unfavourable condition. Our traditional farmland birds have declined by more than half since 1970.
A natural capital approach will help us build a new environmental land management system which values the benefits of the environment and uses the most effective incentives. We can learn from current agri-environment schemes.
**Broadly accessible schemes** such as Entry Level Stewardship combine environmental protection with conservation objectives and can be applied throughout the country. They fit easily into a farm business.
**Targeted schemes** focus on environmentally sensitive sites. They generally require management for protected species or habitats and are supported with specialist advice. In England, land managers undertake this type of management through Higher Level Stewardship or Higher Tier Countryside Stewardship agreements.
These schemes have helped populations of marsh fritillary butterfly and the short haired bumblebee to recover, particularly on sites of special scientific interest; enabled improvements in water quality; and protected and restored landscape and heritage assets, including blanket bogs which are major carbon stores.
An example of a success story from Higher Level Stewardship comes from EJ Barker and Sons, a family-owned partnership based in North Suffolk. They demonstrate how high quality and high yielding crop production and farmland biodiversity can be successfully integrated. Their work has allowed species such as grey partridge, great crested newt, turtle dove, yellowhammer, linnet, skylark, brown hare and the barn owl to thrive. Species-rich grassland, wild bird seed mix and pollen and nectar mixes have been established on non-profitable 'marginal' areas of farmland. They manage 30 ponds and 43km of hedgerows for the benefit of bird and insect species.
(^{10}) [UK Natural Capital: ecosystem accounts for freshwater, farmland and woodland](https://www.ons.gov.uk), ONS, 2017 Figures adjusted for 2017 prices 3. Improving soil health and restoring and protecting our peatlands
Healthy and fertile soil is the foundation for farming and forestry. The quality and type of the soil, in part determined by underpinning geology, also influences the distribution of plant species and provides a habitat for a wide range of organisms.
We need to ensure healthier soils by addressing factors in soil degradation such as erosion, compaction and the decline in organic matter.
The Common Agricultural Policy has encouraged the kind of farming that too often leads to poorer soil health. We see this in poorer productivity owing to nutrient depletion, declines in levels of humus, and erosion and compaction of soils. We currently lack sufficient data to know just how badly our soil has been affected and this Plan aims to correct that.
i. Developing better information on soil health
Farmers and land managers can struggle to monitor the quality of their soil, which in turn makes it difficult to improve. We will develop a soil health index (including indicators such as the level of humus and biological activity in the soil) that can be used on farms to check whether their actions are having the desired effect.
At the moment, data on soil health is held piecemeal by different institutions and businesses. It is not easy to access or use. Defra will invest at least £200,000 to help create meaningful metrics that will allow us to assess soil improvements, and to develop cost-effective and innovative ways to monitor soil at farm and national level.
Working with a range of academic and other partners we will build on the best available existing knowledge, such as the programme of soil monitoring in the Countryside Survey. We will seek out ways to work with farmers to achieve good soil management practices, including appropriate tillage choices, reintroducing grass leys into arable rotations and the use of cover crops.
Actions we will take include:
- Working with the industry to update the 2001 guidance on crop establishment and optimal tillage choice.
- Defra will invest at least £200,000 to help develop soil health metrics and test them on farms across the country.
- We will investigate the potential for research and monitoring to give us a clearer picture of how soil health supports our wider environment goals. ii. Restoring our vulnerable peatlands and ending peat use in horticultural products by 2030.
Our peat bogs and fens are important habitats that provide food and shelter for wildlife, help with flood management, improve water quality and play a part in climate regulation. Most peat soils support ecosystems that are sensitive to human activities including drainage, grazing, liming and afforestation. This makes them susceptible to degradation if poorly managed.
Over the last 200 years, we have lost 84% of our fertile peat topsoil in East Anglia. The fens there could lose the remainder in just 30-60 years given current land management practices and a changing climate\\textsuperscript{11}.
While peatlands are our largest terrestrial carbon store, drained peatlands release their carbon, adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. Organic or peat soils make up 11% of England’s total land area, over 70% of which are drained or in poor condition. Although our drained lowland peatland makes up only a small proportion of the agricultural land in England, these are among our most fertile soils and play an important part in the nation’s food supply. Conventional agricultural production using current techniques on drained peatland is, however, inherently unsustainable.
In view of this, we intend to create and deliver a new ambitious framework for peat restoration in England. Where it is not appropriate to restore lowland peat, we will develop new sustainable management measures to make sure that the topsoil is retained for as long as possible and greenhouse gas emissions are reduced.
\\textsuperscript{11} Managing the land in a changing climate, CCC, 2013 We will also pursue work already under way to restore peatlands. Funding for peatland projects over three years will become available in April 2018, the result of a £10m peatland grant scheme launched in July 2017.
The scheme will improve the condition of peatlands in England, cutting carbon emissions and delivering a slew of environmental benefits.
In 2011 we introduced a voluntary target for amateur gardeners to phase out the use of peat by 2020 and a final voluntary phase-out target of 2030 for professional growers of fruit, vegetables and plants. If by 2020 we have not seen sufficient movement to peat alternatives, we will look at introducing further measures.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Announcing successful bids for the peatland grant scheme in February 2018, with funding made available in April.
- Publishing an England Peat Strategy in late 2018.
- Continuing to jointly fund research with the industry to overcome the barriers to peat replacement in commercial horticulture. This will report in 2020.
- Continuing to support the industry as it puts the Responsible Sourcing Scheme for Growing Media into practice.
Hair's-tail Cottongrass, an important plant of peat bogs seen here on the Humberhead Peatlands NNR (Photo: Natural England/Peter Roworth). Maintaining soil health in farming
Making appropriate tillage or rotation choices are just two of a range of beneficial practices that can improve soil health, maintain good soil structure and in turn increase crop yields and reduce the risk of environmental damage. This positive impact is, however, entirely dependent on understanding the suitability of each practice for particular locations, soil types and crops, and when and how they should be carried out.
Government is already helping farmers to select location-appropriate management practices, through outcome-based soils rules and through both the Farming Advice Service and the Catchment Sensitive Farming Service. Government has also worked with Research Councils to improve our understanding of soil condition and resilience, the results of which are feeding into advice to farmers.
Case study: G’s Cambs Farms, Cambridgeshire
For the last 40 years, G’s farms have followed an intensive farming model where crop managers were focused on the field for that one year, as part of the rotation. A strategy was pursued to crop the land for everything they could harvest so artificial fertiliser and pesticides were used. Yield remained flat for 30 years on high performing land.
Five years ago the farm began to explore a longer term approach to growing crops, setting ambitious targets to increase yields, reduce the need for artificial fertilisers and pesticides and work more closely with the local environment. They applied a consistent approach to cropping, reduced tillage, compost, cover cropping and focus on improving soil health.
As a result, the farms have seen increases in yield increase of as much as 10% in crops, with a very quick development in soil ability and health. The farm now grows around 750 hectares of cover crops, which are being grazed by sheep over winter, up from 50 hectares five years ago. The next step is for the farms to further develop their understanding of the link between soil health, plant health, animal health and ultimately human health. 4. Focusing on woodland to maximise its many benefits
We will increase tree planting by creating new forests, and incentivising extra planting on private and the least productive agricultural land, where appropriate. This will support our ambition to plant 11m trees.
We will take the opportunities of other landscape scale interventions, including when scoping a Nature Recovery Network, to drive extensive woodland planting while enhancing our distinctive landscapes. We will also work with industry and support Grown in Britain to increase the amount of home grown timber used in England in construction, creating a conveyor belt of locked-in carbon in our homes and buildings. A wide range of economic and environmental benefits will flow from commercial afforestation to meet the growing demand for timber.
We will not focus solely on planting, however; we will also support increased protection of existing trees and forests. Pests and diseases threaten the wide range of benefits we derive from trees and plants. We want to make sure our trees can withstand future threats.
Beyond the economic benefits, the Government recognises the significant heritage value and irreplaceable character of ancient woodland and veteran trees. We are committed to ensuring stronger protection of our ancient woodlands, making sure they are sustainably managed to provide a wide range of social, environmental, societal and economic benefits.
i. Supporting the development of a new Northern Forest
We will support the planting of a forest that crosses the country in a belt of trees, using the M62 corridor as its spine. With £5.7 million of government funding, we will support the existing partnership of the Community Forests and the Woodland Trust to accelerate and further develop the Northern Forest. This will deliver accessible community woodland to a large swathe of England and at the same time help us to meet our statutory carbon budget requirements. This area has an increasing population, meaning that future generations will benefit from this new forest.
Looking up into the crown of an Ash tree (Photo Forestry Commission / Isobel Cameron)
We will make sure that landowners, farmers and key forestry stakeholders help lead the work, and that it balances the various environmental, social and economic benefits of forestry. We will explore the best use of innovative forms of private sector finance, including philanthropic, social and commercial investment. Through new approaches to environmental land management we will support extra woodland creation, incentivising more landowners and farmers to plant trees on their land, including for agroforestry and bio-energy production purposes.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Working with landowners, farmers, key stakeholders and local people to identify and target areas most suitable for and likely to benefit most from woodland creation.
- Supporting Community Forests so that they can play a leading role in urban tree planting, both as part of the Northern Forest and in wider partnerships to bring trees and green infrastructure to towns and cities across England.
- Promoting the Northern Forest as a key contributor to the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ initiative.
**ii. Supporting larger scale woodland creation**
We want to increase the long-term supply of English-grown timber, given strong current and projected demand. We will maintain our Public Forest Estate, keeping it in trust for the nation, reflecting the value of the social and environmental benefits it provides so that future generations continue to enjoy them.
We will also increase the long-term supply of English grown timber, by enabling industry to plant sustainable, productive woodland and forestry that meets the highest standards of design and management.
We intend that this continued support of the Public Forest Estate will protect and enhance it. We want our continuing promotion of large scale woodland creation to give investors the confidence to renew and expand wood-processing capacity, thereby securing the supply of current wood products and stimulating further innovation with new products such as cross-laminated timber used in construction.
We will provide the policy framework to enable a long-term programme of forestry and woodland expansion, helping us move towards the pathway for carbon reduction set out in the Clean Growth Strategy. We will strengthen domestic carbon offset mechanisms to encourage private sector investment and develop markets for domestic carbon reduction. This will encourage more businesses to offset their emissions in a cost-effective way, through planting trees. We will also explore how we might extend this approach to other land activities.
As a start, we will introduce a reporting framework for businesses to drive demand for Domestic Offset Units or Credits. We will also introduce a Forest Carbon Guarantee scheme, using the existing Woodland Carbon Code. Given strengthening domestic demand for domestically grown timber, this risk-sharing mechanism will help to attract investors. We will encourage larger-scale woodland and forest creation, and direct commercial investment in new productive planting towards Forestry Investment Zones, using an inclusive approach to their selection. This will help to create the conditions associated with increased carbon sequestration, greater confidence in domestic timber supply and associated economic benefits. A wide range of environmental benefits will flow from productive forestry planting: these will be maximised if investment zones are developed and planned at a landscape scale, consistent with catchment-based approaches to flood risk management.
As for forestry, while 58% of woodland in England is already in active management, the UK imports around 80% of the wood it consumes so there is a clear opportunity for UK wood - particularly in extracting hardwoods from our broad leaved woodlands. The availability of domestic softwood is set to decline owing to a lack of conifer planting over the last 20 years. Pests, diseases and overpopulations of deer and grey squirrels are a major threat to trees that prevent woodland from realising its full potential. Our commitment to increasing hardwood timber supplies, means we will focus particularly on increasing the proportion of broadleaf woodlands that are sustainably managed.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Designing a new woodland creation grant scheme, involving landowners, farmers and key forestry stakeholders in the process. We want landowners to plant trees on their marginal land, while encouraging agroforestry.
- Exploring how this new grant scheme could specifically incentivise larger scale afforestation to meet carbon goals and wider environmental benefits at a landscape scale.
- With BEIS and MHCLG, working with stakeholders and the Cumbria catchment pioneer, engaging with Local Enterprise Partnerships to identify suitable areas for large scale woodland creation, and promoting Forestry Investment Zones to attract community, commercial and landowner investors.
- Working with our partners to develop new public/private partnership models of investment for research into the healthy environment, including for research on plant and tree health.
- Working with industry and supporting Grown in Britain to increase home grown timber used in England in construction. iii. Appointing a national Tree Champion
We will appoint a national Tree Champion to promote the unique blend of social, economic and environmental benefits offered by trees and forests and make sure that the right trees, in terms of biosecurity, value for money, air quality impact and biodiversity among other criteria, are planted in the right places, in line with the UK Forestry Standard.
By bringing together key players across national and local government and the sector, the Tree Champion will help to drive a step change in tree planting.
The role will also involve supporting our manifesto commitments and national targets, including the delivery of one million urban trees and a further eleven million trees.
The Tree Champion will encourage joined-up thinking on issues for trees and will support the mitigation and management of the impact of pests and diseases on the extent, connectivity and condition of the nation’s tree-scape. He or she will also explore opportunities to further strengthen protection for ancient woodland.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Working with the Tree Champion and the Forestry Commission to design and develop a future grant scheme aimed at larger scale afforestation to meet carbon reduction goals and wider environmental benefits.
- Asking the Tree Champion to draw on the Mackinnon review of forestry in Scotland.
We will drive extensive woodland planting while enhancing our distinctive landscapes. (Photo: Michael Gibbs). 5. Reducing risks from flooding and coastal erosion
Flooding and coastal erosion cannot be eliminated but they can be managed, to protect lives, communities and economic growth – for example through town centre regeneration and tourism. Climate change is increasing the risk of flooding and coastal erosion, and population growth means more people are likely to live in affected areas. Ensuring the effective and safe economic use of land can unlock productivity improvements, a key aim of our Industrial Strategy.
In recent years we appear to be seeing greater incidents of flooding. Across Europe, the number of people affected by floods rose dramatically in the latter half of the 20th Century; in England, December 2015 was the wettest calendar month overall since records began in 1910.
Between 2010 and 2015, government invested more than £1.7bn on improving flood defences for more than 250,000 homes, more than 28,000 commercial properties and more than 800,000 acres of agricultural land.
Between 2015 and 2021 we are investing £2.6bn in more than 1,500 flood defence projects to make 300,000 homes more resilient. Since April 2015, this investment has already provided 350 new flood and coastal erosion schemes, providing better protection for 100,000 further homes.
The situation, however, is likely to intensify as temperatures continue to rise: a warmer atmosphere can hold more moisture, leading to heavier rainfall; oceans are likely to become more acid, polar ice reduce and sea-levels rise.
Without any further investment in flood defences, the number of properties at medium or high risk could rise from 0.75 million to 1.29 million in 50 years.
We will take further steps to reduce our vulnerability and exposure to the growing risks and potential impact of flooding.
In 2019, we will update the national flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy, looking to strengthen joint delivery across organisations. We will look at current partnership arrangements ahead of a review of funding needs beyond 2021, seeking to attract more non-public sector investment, and make sure all relevant agencies are able to respond quickly and effectively to support communities if and when flooding does occur.
The Environment Agency will use its role in statutory planning consultations to seek to make sure that new developments are flood resilient and do not increase flood risk. We will look to strengthen the relevant protections in the National Planning Policy Framework. In addition, we will also focus on:
i) Using more natural flood management solutions where appropriate;
ii) Increasing the uptake of sustainable drainage systems, especially in new developments; and
iii) Improving the resilience of properties at risk of flooding and the time it takes them to recover should flooding occur.
i. Expanding the use of natural flood management solutions
By working with natural processes, we can better protect ourselves from hazards such as flooding. Natural Flood Management involves the use of a variety of measures including tree planting, river bank restoration, building small-scale woody dams, reconnecting rivers with their flood plains and storing water temporarily on open land.
We should not expect that such measures alone will offer protection in areas of greatest risk or in the face of the most significant flood events. Good integrated flood management will see these incorporated alongside more traditional defences.
We are investing £15m up to 2021 to further explore the use of Natural Flood Management, whose wider benefits include better wildlife habitats, recreation opportunities and water quality. These were set out in the Environment Agency’s evidence directory, published in 2017, which included 65 case studies on working with natural processes from a flooding and coastal risk management perspective.(^\\text{12})
**Actions we will take include:**
- Learning from the £15m Natural Flood Management funding to develop our knowledge, identifying and promoting practical solutions for local implementation.
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(^{12}) Working with natural processes to reduce flood risk, Environment Agency, 2017 Working with natural processes and natural flood management
Natural flood management can play an important role in flood and coastal risk management. Techniques such as building leaky debris dams can reduce soil erosion and trap sediment, protect water courses and manage water flow.
Hills to Levels Project, Somerset
The drained, farmed landscape of the Somerset Levels provides a testing case for working with natural process, one which local partners have risen to address.
Work is underway to ‘slow the flow’ of water from the hills to the Levels, across a large catchment (2,871km²). The project’s measures are working to improve infiltration of rainfall into soils, intercept runoff by diversion and attenuation, slow the flow in-stream and attenuate flood water on re-connected floodplains.
So far this has helped protect properties in the upper catchment that suffer from surface water flooding and 150 properties in and around the Somerset Levels. The project has provided approximately 15,000m³ of floodwater storage in water attenuation features alone. ii. Putting in place more sustainable drainage systems
Surface water flooding poses a significant and increasing risk, which can lead to sewer flooding and environmental pollution. We will look at improving how Lead Local Flood Authorities, water and sewerage companies, highways authorities and other risk management authorities work together to manage it.
Sustainable drainage systems (SuDS), such as permeable surfaces, storage tanks and ponds, reduce the risk of surface water flooding. People and wildlife enjoy improved surroundings in urban areas, and water quality is better. SuDS can also help communities adapt to climate change.
Water and sewerage companies can also help to improve surface water management. The Government’s strategic priorities and objectives for Ofwat, the water industry regulator, set out how we expect companies to be challenged to develop a mix of solutions to meet current and future water management needs. This includes improved partnership working with local authorities to manage flood risk and adoption and maintenance of SuDS.
Actions we will take include:
- Amending Planning Practice Guidance to clarify construction and ongoing maintenance arrangements for SuDS in new developments, tightening links with planning guidance for water quality and biodiversity.
- Considering changes to the National Planning Policy Framework and Building Regulations in the longer term to encourage SuDS.
- Improving existing arrangements for managing surface water flooding, and the outcomes delivered by Lead Local Flood Authorities and other risk management authorities, including water companies. iii. Making ‘at-risk’ properties more resilient to flooding
Not all flooding can be prevented. Properties at risk should be more resilient, and better equipped to prevent water coming in and to deal with it more quickly if it does. Effective measures include flood barriers, non-return valves on wastewater pipes, airbrick covers, and flood-resistant coatings on walls.
A government and industry action plan from 2016 showed that consumers lacked confidence in these measures. We will support the insurance and construction sector in developing a voluntary Code of Practice to encourage consumers and businesses to make properties more flood resilient by the end of 2018.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Supporting an industry-owned voluntary code of practice to promote consumer and business confidence in measures to reduce the impact of flooding on buildings, and on those who live and work in them. Chapter 2: Recovering nature and enhancing the beauty of landscapes
At a glance
We will:
- Develop a Nature Recovery Network to protect and restore wildlife, and provide opportunities to re-introduce species that we have lost from our countryside.
- Conserve and enhance the natural beauty of our landscapes by reviewing National Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs) for the 21st century, including assessing whether more may be needed.
- Respect nature by using our water more sustainably.
We know how much the countryside and scenery mean to people: nearly 60% of adults surveyed in 2015 said these were what made them most proud of Britain.(^\\text{13})
226 million visits were made to the public forest estate in 2016,(^\\text{14}) while the estimated 95 million people who visit National Parks and surrounding areas each year spend more than £4bn and support 68,000 jobs.(^\\text{15}) Our goal is to make sure that our policies balance the needs of a growing, vibrant society with the ability to access green space.
From the confirmation of the first National Park in the Peak District in 1951, to England’s youngest National Park, the South Downs, in 2010, the creation of designated landscapes – which also include Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs) – has been among the outstanding environmental achievements of the past 100 years. They provide a patchwork of stunning, and protected, landscapes.
In England, a quarter of our landscape is designated in this way, around 10% as National Parks and 15% as AONBs. We will make sure they continue to be conserved and enhanced, while recognising that they are living landscapes that support rural communities.
(^{13}) Taking part survey 2014/15, Department for Digital Culture Media and Sport, 2015
(^{14}) Natural Capital Account 2016-17, Forest Enterprise England, 2017
(^{15}) Valuing England’s National Parks, National Parks England, 2013 As planning authorities, National Parks can shape the way development is used to contribute to their social, economic and environmental enhancement. While development is not prohibited in National Parks or AONBs, major development should take place only in exceptional circumstances.
Protected sites (including our National Nature Reserves, Special Areas of Conservation, Special Protection Areas and Sites of Special Scientific Interest) have safeguarded many of our best wildlife habitats, but the wider environment needs to be considered too. Extensive data on species and ecological communities across terrestrial, freshwater and coastal habitats in the UK shows significant losses over the last 50 years, driven in large part by historic land use change and pollution.
In order to help leave the environment in a better condition for the next generation, we need to restore and create areas of wetland, woodland, grassland and coastal habitat, to provide the greatest opportunity for wildlife to flourish and to promote the wider economic and social benefits that healthy habitats offer.
Taking this approach will help us improve the overall status of threatened species, such as hen harrier and curlew, and will help prevent extinction, as well as providing opportunities for reintroduction of species such as beavers. We will give priority to species in England that are threatened either globally or in the UK, or those that are internationally significant.
We will also improve the overall status of declining species groups, such as butterflies and other pollinating insects, birds, bats and wildflowers.
Pressures on nature are felt across the world. Our actions contribute to significant global efforts in line with UN Sustainable Development Goal 15(^\\text{16}), which calls on us to ‘recover sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.
1. Protecting and recovering nature
We will support nature’s recovery and restore losses suffered over the past 50 years. We will develop a strategy for nature to tackle biodiversity loss, develop a Nature Recovery Network to complement and connect our best wildlife sites, and provide opportunities for species conservation and the reintroduction of native species. We will also explore introducing conservation covenants. These actions will help us create a healthier and richer natural environment.
(^{16}) UN Sustainable Development Goal 15: Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss. i. Publishing a Strategy for Nature
We place the utmost importance on our commitments to biodiversity and nature conservation under international agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
Biological diversity, or ‘Biodiversity’, is simply the variety of life on Earth – the variety of ecosystems or habitats, of species and of the genetic diversity they contain. We value wildlife in its own right but biodiversity also underpins much of the economic and social benefit we gain from nature.
To implement our international commitments at home we will publish a new strategy for nature, building on our current strategy, Biodiversity 2020. This will coordinate our action in England with that of external nature conservation and academic partners, as well as farmers and land managers. We will ensure the strategy joins up with other plans and strategies, including on the marine environment, pollinators and peatland. Where appropriate, we will continue to work with the devolved administrations to coordinate action across the UK.
The strategy will help us protect our most important wildlife sites and species and draw in new investment alongside government funding. It will demonstrate best practice at home and help us to deliver on our ambition to lead international action against the degradation of habitats and loss of species.
Actions we will take include:
- Working with our partners to learn lessons from the existing strategy, Biodiversity 2020, in developing our new strategy.
ii. Developing a Nature Recovery Network
Through changes in the way we manage our land, we will develop a Nature Recovery Network providing 500,000 hectares of additional wildlife habitat, more effectively linking existing protected sites and landscapes, as well as urban green and blue infrastructure.
Such a network will deliver on the recommendations from Professor Sir John Lawton(^\\text{17}): recovering wildlife will require more habitat; in better condition; in bigger patches that are more closely connected.
As well as helping wildlife thrive, the Nature Recovery Network could be designed to bring a wide range of additional benefits: greater public enjoyment; pollination; carbon capture; water quality improvements and flood management.
(^{17}) Sir John Lawton is author of *Making Space for Nature*, 2010 The network could contain a range of land cover types, including new woodland and coastal habitats. Other parts of the network covering peatland, grassland or scrub will lend themselves to environmentally sensitive farming and livestock management, within a wider patchwork of agricultural activity.
We will identify what a network could look like and the steps that are needed to make this happen. For example, we will investigate putting in place up to 25 new catchment or landscape scale nature recovery areas to significantly expand wildlife habitat. These would help build resilience to climate change, and provide opportunities for species and ecosystem recovery, and for the reintroduction of formerly native species, as well as for local community engagement and business development.
We will look initially at opportunities for nature recovery through peatland restoration, natural flood management and woodland planting. We will also look at establishing wildflower recovery areas. This would make it easier for people to visit flower-rich meadows, grasslands and heathland close to their homes. These could be linked to new and existing green infrastructure to extend wildlife corridors into towns and cities, and provide opportunities for conserving wildflowers and insect pollinators.
We want to see local communities and businesses more involved. Data and mapping tools under development will help us come up with proposals that offer the maximum wildlife, economic and social gain.
Voluntary partnerships and private sector sponsorship will help broaden the funding base for this exciting network. We will also continue to work with partners around our National Nature Reserves encouraging wildlife to brim over and colonise new sites.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Investigating how we roll out a Nature Recovery Network which will provide an additional 500,000 hectares of wildlife habitat building on other plans for landscape-scale recovery for peatland, woodlands and natural flood management.
- Considering how landscape-scale restoration of wildflower-rich grassland, meadows and heathlands could be part of the Nature Recovery Network to provide better access for people alongside improved habitat for pollinating insects.
- Considering delivery options for the Nature Recovery Network over the next two years, as we develop and pilot our new environmental land management system and investigate the use of other new and innovative funding mechanisms.
- Evaluating the wider economic and social benefits as we develop the network. The role of landscape-scale restoration in recovering nature
A new Nature Recovery Network will require input from a range of stakeholders. Benefits will extend beyond wildlife to recreation, carbon capture and water management, attracting more support and securing a wider range of funding. We will develop maps and advice to show where actions to improve and restore habitats would be most effective.
We can learn from previous initiatives that have delivered landscape-scale change. Examples include Nature Improvement Areas; areas of up to 50,000 hectares which brought local groups together to improve both rural and urban environments, creating new habitat for wildlife to thrive and ensuring people will enjoy them for generations to come. Similar but smaller scale is the bottom-up farmer cluster concept, helping farmers collectively deliver greater benefits for soil, water and wildlife at a landscape scale, developed by the Game & Wildlife Conservation Trust with Natural England. Another interesting example is Sir Charles Burrell’s Knepp Estate, where he has allowed free-roaming animals to shape the land into a mixture of habitats from grassland and scrub to open-grown trees and wood pasture. Turtle doves, rare bats, 2% of the UK’s population of nightingales and a vast population of purple emperor butterflies now thrive there.
We will encourage dynamic management of nature to augment our network of protected sites. We will also build on opportunities for wildlife from peatland restoration or woodland planting, and continue to work with partners around our National Nature Reserves and other important sites, or on externally funded projects such as the ‘Back from the Brink’ species recovery programme, to allow wildlife to recover, brim over and colonise new sites. The result will be an expanding patchwork of high value habitats, as well as sympathetically-managed farmland, woodland and urban greenspace. iii. Providing opportunities for the reintroduction of native species
Conservation efforts to date have focused on safeguarding our most precious or threatened species. The condition of protected sites has started to improve over the last decade, and we have seen some of our threatened species start to recover.
However, we have still lost many formerly native species from England - such as the white-tailed eagle, the orange-spotted emerald dragonfly and the beaver.
As well as lost species, others, such as the pine martin, fen orchid or hen harrier, are found in only a few sites within their former range. Their reintroduction, when carefully planned and managed, can enrich our natural environment and provide wider benefits for people.
We will also provide opportunities for species recovery and reintroduction as we develop our Nature Recovery Network. Natural England will continue to work with partners and local communities on species reintroduction and recovery projects that support nature conservation and help towards meeting economic and social goals.
Actions we will take include:
- Developing and consulting in 2018/19 on a code and best practice guidance for assessing the merits and risks of species reintroduction projects, taking account of their contribution to global and domestic conservation priorities, community engagement and wider social and economic impacts.
- Publishing the code and guidance to sit alongside existing international guidelines to inform future funding and consenting decisions on reintroduction projects.
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18 IUCN Guidelines for reintroductions and other conservation translocations, International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2013 iv. Exploring how to give individuals and organisations the chance to deliver lasting conservation
We will assess the potential role of conservation covenants to enable landowners to create a legally-binding obligation with respect to their land that delivers lasting, conservation benefits for future generations.
Covenants would be overseen by a responsible body to maintain standards, and could allow landowners to protect treasured features on their land such as trees or woodland for purely altruistic reasons. In some cases, they might also be used in a business context to secure the long-term maintenance of existing or newly created wildlife or heritage assets.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Following the Law Commission report into conservation covenants, assessing the demand and potential for these to secure long-term benefits from investment in nature conservation and other environmental outcomes, as well as the need for safeguards.
- Working with landowners, conservation groups and other stakeholders we will review and take forward the Law Commission’s proposals for a statutory scheme of conservation covenants in England.
v. Improving biosecurity to protect and conserve nature
Ash trees are among more recent victims of biosecurity hazards, proof of the devastation that can be wreaked by disease that spreads swiftly from country to country. Ash dieback is a chronic fungal disease that has already ravaged ash trees across Europe, and could lead to the loss of over 90% of one of our most common broadleaved trees.
Disease outbreaks affect communities and our ability to trade with other countries, as well as harming animal welfare. By strengthening biosecurity we can better protect the nation’s animals, cultivated crops, wild plants, trees and forests from pests and diseases.
Disease is not the only threat to native plant and animal species: invasive non-native species can also cause them to decline. This can lead to the threat of extinction, and costly and lasting damage to the character of rare natural habitats. The proliferation of invasive non-native species can also prompt unwelcome changes in the wider ecosystem that climate change might further exacerbate.
Quagga mussels are an example of a supremely successful invader. These filter feeders multiply at such a rate that they strip phytoplankton and nutrients from freshwater systems, significantly altering the food web and habitat. They also block pipes and filters, causing problems that water companies must pay to resolve. The zebra mussel, a similarly invasive species, is now widespread across England.
By adopting a policy of early and effective intervention, we can save time and money, and spare the environment from greater impacts from breaches in biosecurity. The prompt eradication of the extremely invasive water primrose in Great Britain, for example, is estimated to provide a cost saving of approximately £240m compared to late stage eradication.
Strengthening biosecurity around livestock will mean healthier animals, and in turn more productive farming. This then leads to a reduction in both greenhouse gas emissions and the consumption of antimicrobials: helping tackle the effects of climate change and the risk of antimicrobial resistance.
In following the recommendations made by Lord O’Neill in the Independent Review of Anti-Microbial Resistance, we have already worked with industry to reduce the use of antibiotics in animals, achieving a 27% reduction in sales of antibiotics for use in livestock and fish farmed as food between 2014 and 2016.19
We already have in place strong protections, including stringent border measures. Our Plant Health Inspectors consistently make more interceptions of harmful organisms than in any other EU Member State. Even so, the threats to plants and animal health is increasing, driven by the movement of goods and people.
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19 Veterinary Antimicrobial Resistance and Sales Surveillance Report, Veterinary Medicines Directorate, 2016 In future we will continue to lead the way internationally on tighter biosecurity. The newly appointed Tree Champion will work closely with Defra’s Chief Plant Health Officer to drive the protection of tree health across England. Our revised Plant Health Biosecurity Strategy in 2020 will set out the strategic framework to protect plant health and we will continue to deliver the GB Invasive Non-native Species Strategy (2015) in order to protect natural capital in England from invasive non-native species.
We will continue to take early, pre-emptive action based on evidence of a threat to stop pests and disease arriving here.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Developing plans to reduce the risk from all high priority pathways for invasive non-native species introduction into England.
- Working with partners to raise awareness of invasive non-native species and the need for strong biosecurity.
- Maintaining an alert system to detect high priority invasive non-native species and implement contingency plans to rapidly eradicate them where feasible.
- Engaging with industry as we develop proposals to drive improvements in animal health. We will work with the devolved administrations and stakeholders to develop policies.
- Publishing a Tree Health Resilience Plan later in 2018 to protect against tree pest and diseases and improve resilience of trees to withstand threats.
- Working with industry to place biosecurity at the centre of buying practices – including encouraging the development of a biosecure supply chain for woodland creation.
2. Conserving and enhancing natural beauty
Some of England’s most beautiful landscapes and geodiversity are protected via a range of designations including National Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs). Some landscapes are also internationally recognised through UNESCO World Heritage Site and Global Geoparks status (for example the Lake District, the Cornwall and West Devon mining landscape and the North Pennines). Collectively, they comprise some of our unique, most cherished and valuable natural assets.
Over the next 25 years we want to make sure they are not only conserved but enhanced. Many of the policies set out in the rest of the Plan will contribute to making all areas more beautiful. In this section, we focus mainly on the designated areas.
i. Reviewing National Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty
The UK’s first National Parks were created by an Act of Parliament in 1949 following the government’s 1947 Hobhouse Report, which remains the basis for most protected landscape designation in England today. Now, 70 years on, the Government will commission a review for the 21st Century. This will consider coverage of designations, how designated areas deliver their responsibilities, how designated areas are financed, and whether there is scope for expansion. It will also consider opportunities to enhance the environment in existing designations, and expand on the existing eight-point plan for National Parks to connect more people with the natural environment.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Commissioning a 21st Century ‘Hobhouse’ Review of National Parks and AONBs.
- Working with National Park Authorities to continue to deliver the 8-Point Plan for National Parks 2016-2020. National Park Authorities have already met the target to engage directly with over 60,000 young people a year in schools’ visits, and will double this figure.
- Working with National Park Authorities and AONB Partnerships and Conservation Boards to deliver environmental enhancement, including through demonstrator projects, and engaging with communities through their statutory management plans.
- Identifying opportunities for environmental enhancement in all of England’s 159 National Character Areas and monitoring indicators of our landscape’s character and quality to improve landscapes for people, places and nature. Promoting landscape quality and natural beauty
Westmorland Dales Hidden Landscapes Project
The Westmorland Dales includes the largest area of limestone pavements in the UK and is within the area that was designated as a further part of the Yorkshire Dales National Park in 2016. Parts of the area are also designated as a Special Site of Scientific Interest (SSSI) and a National Nature Reserve. It contains a unique assemblage of cultural heritage including a remarkably intact pattern of historic settlements and associated earthworks, prehistoric stone circles, cairns, and burial mounds. The Coast to Coast path and the Pennine Bridleway also cross the Dales.
The Westmorland Dales Hidden Landscapes project, located within the Yorkshire Dales National Park, is an example of an approach which could be applied to the wider countryside or urban environments. It aims to engage the local community and develop skills, increasing understanding of the area’s significant natural and cultural heritage.
Initial approval for a £3.5m grant to unlock and reveal the hidden heritage and landscape of the Westmorland Dales has been given by the Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) through its Landscape Partnership programme. HLF funding is enabling Friends of the Lake District and the Yorkshire Dales National Park Authority to develop detailed plans with a wide range of partners. Initial ideas include grassland restoration and woodland projects, flood mitigation and the safeguarding of important archaeological heritage. The goal is to engage people in the natural beauty and unique heritage of their local landscape.
Walkers on the Orton Fells (looking south to the Howgills), Westmorland Dales HLF project 3. Respecting nature in how we use water
It is vital that we maintain sustainable supplies of water for future generations. We recognise that this will require both reducing demand and increasing supply.
i. Reforming our approach to water abstraction
Abstraction is the process of taking water from source, either temporarily or permanently, with most being used for irrigation or drinking water. Groundwater supplies and rivers are refilled naturally by rainfall and snow melt. If too much water is extracted too fast, supplies may become depleted: ‘over-abstracted’. Groundwater sources can, in some cases, take decades to recharge if they are emptied.
Our indicators suggest that as many as one-in-five of our surface waters are over-abstracted. This leads to physical changes that, along with other changes we make to watercourses, risk reducing the diverse range of plant and animal life. While we will support abstractors to access the water they need to operate efficiently, we will continue to amend licences in cases of unsustainable abstraction and support and encourage innovation. One way of improving access to water is to encourage water trading and storage where it is needed most, and we intend to reform our approach here. We aim to introduce more low flow controls to protect the environment and replace seasonal constraints to allow extra abstraction at high flows. We will develop a stronger catchment focus that brings together the Environment Agency, abstractors and catchment partnerships to address unsustainable abstraction and to improve access to water. These local solutions will be captured in updated abstraction licensing strategies. To help abstractors make the best use of water and protect the environment we will modernise the abstraction service to provide real-time information on water availability. We will report to Parliament in 2019 on progress made on abstraction reform. This will include updates on these actions and the actions we have set out in our water abstraction plan.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Making sure that water companies take a leading role in addressing unsustainable abstraction as part of the Water Industry National Environment Programme, due in March 2018.
- Regulating all significant abstractions that have been historically exempt to make sure that they also play a part in protecting the water environment by 2022.
- Updating ten abstraction licensing strategies by 2021 and all remaining strategies by 2027 to capture agreed solutions to environmental pressures in catchments.
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20 Water abstraction plan 2017, Defra, 2017 ii. Increasing water supply and incentivising greater water efficiency and less personal use
Water companies must develop and implement robust long-term plans that develop new water resources where needed. New supplies will include large infrastructure, such as reservoirs and water transfers, which are needed to make sure the water industry can provide sufficient water for homes and businesses and reduce abstraction from some sources to protect the environment.
Two factors tend to affect demand on the public water supply: efficiency of use and leakage control. Water companies must take bold action to reduce water demands, both now and for the future.
We want to see water use in England fall - the average person currently consumes 140 litres per day. With the average bath using around 80 litres and each flush of an old-fashioned toilet using up to 13 litres, there is action we can take to ensure we are using our water supply most efficiently. We will work with the industry to set an ambitious personal consumption target and agree cost-effective measures to meet it.
We also want to see the amount of treated water lost through leakage continue to fall, year-on-year. All water companies will need to match the levels of leakage reduction achieved by the sector’s top performers.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Consulting in 2018 on a National Policy Statement for water resources that will streamline the planning process for new large infrastructure schemes, leading to net environmental benefits, as set out in the Industrial Strategy.
- Working with the water industry and its five-year business planning cycles to make sure it puts in place long-term strategies to increase resilience, and manage supply and demand (for further details, please see our strategic steer to Ofwat).
- Working with the industry and the group led by the NGO Waterwise to improve water efficiency and customer involvement to explore the impact of introducing new water efficiency measures.
- Taking forward measures that will make significant water savings where practical and cost effective to do so.
- We will work with industry to determine appropriate targets for personal water consumption and the measures needed to achieve them. Chapter 3: Connecting people with the environment to improve health and wellbeing.
At a glance
We will:
- Help people improve their health and wellbeing by using green spaces including through mental health services.
- Encourage children to be close to nature, in and out of school, with particular focus on disadvantaged areas.
- ‘Green’ our towns and cities by creating green infrastructure and planting one million urban trees.
- Make 2019 a year of action for the environment, working with Step Up To Serve and other partners to help children and young people from all backgrounds to engage with nature and improve the environment.
Spending time in the natural environment – as a resident or a visitor – improves our mental health and feelings of wellbeing. It can reduce stress, fatigue, anxiety and depression. It can help boost immune systems, encourage physical activity and may reduce the risk of chronic diseases such as asthma(^{21}). It can combat loneliness and bind communities together.
A wide range of activity is under way to help people experience these benefits. A number of outdoor sports and leisure organisations, green space managers, environmental organisations and schools encourage people to participate in activities in green spaces.
The forest school approach encourages children to explore nature and have a relationship with the outdoors. The new science and geography curriculum and qualifications encourage pupils to undertake fieldwork as part of their course of study.
(^{21}) Evidence Statement on the links between natural environments and human health, University of Exeter and Defra, 2017; Urban green spaces and health, World Health Organisation Regional Office for Europe, 2016, 9-10. Farms in both rural and urban locations host groups of school children and share their knowledge about the environment and where food comes from.
Some health professionals have adopted a practice known as ‘green prescribing’, a type of social prescribing where nature-based interventions are used to treat people with health conditions. Examples of interventions include gardening, conservation, care farms and green gyms.
We are fortunate to have accessible natural spaces in every county, mostly free to enter, and a network of public rights of way.
One of the most ambitious ways we are opening up the natural world is through the England Coast Path. When it is complete (by 2020) it will be the longest such path in the world, giving hikers, walkers and joggers public access rights to foreshore, beaches, dunes and cliffs for a distance of 2,700 miles.
However, there is more to do. The number of people who spend little or no time in natural spaces is too high. Recent data from the Monitor of Engagement with the Natural Environment survey tells us that some 12% of children do not visit the natural environment each year.
In the most deprived areas of England, people tend to have the poorest health and significantly less green space than wealthier areas.
In healthcare and school settings, and despite some excellent examples of pioneering practice, the possible benefits of contact with nature to promote good mental health or support early interventions for mental health problems are often overlooked.
This Plan sets out ways in which we will make it easier for more people, from every background, to enjoy nature.
1. Helping people improve their health and wellbeing by using green spaces
Our aim is for more people, from all backgrounds, to engage with and spend time in green and blue spaces in their everyday lives. The Industrial Strategy Grand Challenge for an Ageing Society sets out our aim to help older citizens lead independent fulfilled lives, continuing to contribute to society. A thriving and healthy environment is a vital part of this, and a powerful tool for combatting isolation and loneliness.
Different generations enjoying the Peak District (Photo: Pippa Langford).
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22 Care farms are working farms that provide health, social or educational care services for individuals from one or a range of vulnerable groups. Through existing commitments made in *Sporting Future – a New Strategy for an Active Nation*, and in line with our ambition to reduce childhood obesity, the Government supports programmes that encourage physical activity, including in outdoor settings.
We will scope out how we could connect people more systematically with green space to improve mental health, using the natural environment as a resource for preventative and therapeutic purposes. This will be in line with the Prevention Concordat for Better Mental Health and support the Government’s new commitments on children’s mental health.
Our ambition includes encouraging mental health service providers to explore the potential offered by environmental therapies and doing more to spread the word about the benefits of nature. The Government will promote collaboration between the health and environment sectors, at national and local level.
i. Considering how environmental therapies could be delivered through mental health services
We will consider how NHS mental health providers in England can establish new working arrangements with environmental voluntary sector organisations to offer appropriate therapies – such as gardening, outdoor exercise and care farming – in natural settings to people with mild to moderate mental health conditions and who may be struggling to overcome loneliness and isolation.
This work will build on the pioneering work of South West Yorkshire Trust and the Rotherham, Doncaster and South Humber NHS Trust, working in partnership with Voluntary Action Rotherham, who have developed social prescribing alongside traditional mental health services. The Rotherham project was recently shortlisted for a Health Service Journal award. As part of a development of social prescribing across England, specialist social prescribing teams could help to connect patients with environmental support. In support of this work, the Personalised Care Group in NHS England will explore how its own universal model supports people who would benefit from community and environmental programmes.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Considering how NHS mental health providers in England could work with environmental voluntary sector organisations to offer mental health therapies.
- Sharing lessons learned from existing social prescribing programmes widely so others can adopt best practice.
- Developing standardised tools for service providers to support the roll-out of social prescribing across England. We will do this by seed-funding a project, led by The Conservation Volunteers and supported by NHS England.
**ii. Promoting health and wellbeing through the natural environment**
We will launch a three-year ‘Natural Environment for Health and Wellbeing’ programme, focused on supporting local authorities, health organisations, health professionals, teachers and planners in promoting the natural environment as a pathway to good health and wellbeing. Mental health problems and early interventions will be an initial area of interest, however the programme will be charged with considering other health issues, such as obesity, where children and adults would benefit from better access to nature. To make sure that it reaches as many people as possible, we would welcome the programme being replicated at local level. Ideally, we would like access to the natural environment put at the heart of all local Health and Wellbeing Board strategies.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Establishing a cross-government alliance on environment and health to design and oversee the ‘Natural Environment for Health and Wellbeing’ programme.
- Supporting the alliance to review evidence, develop tools and support local authorities, commissioners, and professionals.
2. Encouraging children to be close to nature, in and out of school
Playing and learning outside is a fundamental part of childhood, and helps children grow up healthy. Some children are lucky enough to have a family garden; others will not and it is important that we find other ways to give them better access to the great outdoors. We know that regular contact with green spaces, such as the local park, lake, or playground, can have a beneficial impact on children’s physical and mental health.
The initiatives we outline below are designed to encourage and support outdoor activities, particularly where a child has no access to a family garden. Government will make available £10m of funding to support these initiatives.
i. Helping primary schools create nature-friendly grounds
We will launch a Nature Friendly Schools Programme to help more communities create the kind of school grounds that support learning about the natural world and also keep children happy and healthy.
The government will provide support for schools in our most disadvantaged areas that wish to create nature friendly grounds and to design and run activities that support pupil’s health and wellbeing through contact with nature.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Developing a Nature Friendly Schools programme for schools in our most disadvantaged areas with input from stakeholders that can be opened to schools from autumn 2018.
Junior botanist - Castor Hanglands NNR near Peterborough (Photo: Justin Tilley). ii. Supporting more pupil contact with local natural spaces
We want to make it easier for schools and Pupil Referral Units to take pupils on trips to natural spaces on a regular basis where they can combine learning with feeling healthier and happier. This might involve class visits to a city farm, a local nature reserve, woodland or National Park. In cases of individual need, a pupil might go to a care farm on a bespoke itinerary.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Developing a programme to support schools and Pupil Referral Units in our most disadvantaged areas in establishing progressive programmes of nature contact for their pupils, which can be opened to schools from autumn 2019.
- Supporting the expansion of school outreach activities delivered by community forests.
- Supporting a national expansion of care farming by 2022, trebling the number of places to 1.3m per year for children and adults in England.
3. Greening our towns and cities
Green and blue spaces in our built environment are essential to health and happiness. Yet urban greenspace is unequally distributed. The provision of more and better quality green infrastructure, including urban trees, will make towns and cities attractive places to live and work, and bring about key long-term improvements in people’s health. Better green infrastructure will promote local social interaction and help to develop strong community networks through participation and shared achievements.
We want to encourage more investment, in part by doing a better job of explaining what ‘good’ green infrastructure actually looks like. We will do this by defining a set of standards in close consultation with stakeholders, including the Parks Action Group.
Green and blue spaces in our built environment are essential to health and happiness (Photo: Forestry Commission / John McFarlane).
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23 This can include green infrastructure in new developments, upgrading of existing green infrastructure and retro-fitting of new green infrastructure in areas where provision is poor. i. Creating more green infrastructure
Our aim is to improve existing green infrastructure by encouraging more investment while making sure there is a presumption for sustainable development. Initially, we will focus on areas where we know that there is not enough accessible green infrastructure, or that what is there is of poor quality.
We will draw up a national framework of green infrastructure standards, ensuring that new developments include accessible green spaces and that any area with little or no green space can be improved for the benefit of the community. This will involve finding out what local authorities, developers and other stakeholders think is most important, and where good practice is being demonstrated. There is likely to be some cross-over with the work of the Parks Action Group, whose members’ knowledge will be captured and shared. Consistent with the Industrial Strategy we will make sure the important contribution made to economic growth by high-quality environmental assets and green infrastructure are taken into account when we make decisions.
Actions we will take include:
- Supporting the Parks Action Group in its work to help England’s public parks and green spaces meet the needs of communities now and in the future.
- Continuing our ground-breaking work with Exeter University to update the world-leading Outdoor Recreation Valuation Tool (ORVal) in 2018.
- Establishing a cross-government project, led by Natural England, that reviews and updates existing standards for green infrastructure by summer 2019.
- Supporting Local Authorities to assess green infrastructure provision against these new standards.
- Working with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to see how our commitments on green infrastructure can be incorporated into national planning guidance and policy. ii. Planting more trees in and around our towns and cities
Having more trees in and around our town and cities, close to where people live and work, brings people closer to nature and improves air quality, with consequent positive health impacts.
In urban areas, we will work with stakeholders to plant one million new trees. This is in addition to the 11 million trees we will plant across the country and will help with a number of other environmental challenges.
In determining our approach to meeting the aspiration of 12% overall tree cover by 2060, we will consider how to bring woodland creation closer to where people live. We will review approaches such as the National Forest Company (NFC) in the East Midlands, in which local authorities work to increase tree and woodland cover and provide one-to-one advice to landowners. The NFC model has led to more than 8.5 million trees being planted and has attracted over £1bn of inward investment over the past 25 years.
One of the advantages of the NFC has been that by planting in urban fringes these woodlands have maximised the beneficial value of public access and enjoyment. We will also draw on the existing network of forests in and around our largest towns and cities under England’s Community Forest programme, which was set up in 1990 as a series of partnerships between local authorities, the Forestry Commission and Natural England.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Continuing to work with stakeholders to develop and implement a programme to plant one million trees in England’s towns and cities by 2022.
- Working with stakeholders to develop and implement a manual for local authorities and other urban tree-planting organisations to shape their procurement and maintenance practices for urban trees.
- Introduce new requirements to ensure councils properly consult if they are considering removing street trees. Green infrastructure in urban areas
Urban residents prize the parks, playing fields, woods, street trees and footpaths that make their district an attractive place. People in greener surroundings have longer and healthier lives. Green infrastructure brings wider benefits, including sequestering carbon, absorbing noise, cleansing pollutants, absorbing surface water and reducing high temperatures. The number and condition of green spaces has declined and current investment is confined to specific projects. We risk losing more good quality green spaces.
As we build more homes, preserving and creating green spaces in towns is more important than ever. Local authorities and developers need to take account of all the benefits when deciding how much land to allocate as green space.
The Canal & River Trust, supported by the Esmee Fairbairn Foundation and People’s Postcode Lottery, successfully implemented a three-year ‘Community Roots’ partnership project around the Huddersfield Narrow and Rochdale canals to encourage more visitors. Local people, many of whom do not normally visit the canals, took part in creating art trails, paddle boarding, healthy walks and angling tasters, as well as ecological surveys, canal clean-ups and dredging. Now the canals are cleaner and more attractive. The project attracted more than 1,200 new volunteers, many of which now have new conservation skills.
The Mersey Forest programme in the North West is creating green spaces. As England’s largest Community Forest, the Mersey Forest partnership have planted more than nine million trees creating a 1,300km² network of woodlands, open spaces, urban gardens and street trees in some of the most disadvantaged areas of Merseyside and Cheshire. Its planting schemes deliver a wide range of benefits including increased flood resilience, enhanced biodiversity and improved health and wellbeing for local people. Its award winning ‘Nature4Health’ programme encourages local communities at risk of developing health problems such as diabetes, obesity or depression, to get out into the Forest through conservation activities, mindful walking and forest schools, significantly improving their physical and mental health. 4. Making 2019 a year of action for the environment
Our goal is to see more people from all backgrounds involved in projects to improve the natural world. We will make 2019 a year of action for the environment, putting children and young people at its heart. This year of green action will provide a focal-point for organisations that run environmental projects, and will encourage wider participation.
Evidence suggests that while many people are already keen to get out there and help the environment, we should aim for many more to do so. Among younger people alone, and across all kinds of social action, the government-funded National Youth Social Action survey of 2016, found that in a group of 10-20 year olds, 42% of young people participated in meaningful social action, whilst another 42% took no part in social action24.
i. Helping children and young people from all backgrounds to engage with nature and improve the environment
Working with Step Up to Serve, #iwill campaign partners, and other youth and environmental partners, we will develop an environment theme for the #iwill campaign in 2019 (the 2018 theme is health, linked to the 70th anniversary of the NHS).
24 Defined in the National Youth Social Action Survey 2016 as ‘practical action in the service of others to create positive change’ and covers a wide range of activities that help other people or the environment, such as fundraising, campaigning, tutoring/mentoring and giving time to charity. The #iwill campaign is a movement led by all sectors that by 2020 aims to make involvement in meaningful social action a part of life for all 10-20 year olds. We will work with partners from the environmental and youth sectors to promote environmental opportunities that attract young people from all backgrounds. As part of this, we will work with the National Citizen Service (NCS) Trust, to enable more participants to have contact with and improve natural environments both during the NCS experience and afterwards.
We will engage young people in the design of this programme. Legacy partnerships will sustain opportunities for young people to engage with the environment into the future.
In 2019 a wide range of engagement activities will be planned to coincide with the 70th anniversary of National Parks and the centenary of the Forestry Commission.
**Actions we will take include:**
- In partnership with Step Up to Serve, supporting the 2019 #iwill environment-themed year, with design input from young people.
- Evaluating progress in increasing young people’s environmental social action, including #iwill campaign activity in 2019, and sharing lessons to sustain good practice.
- At the same time, exploring with youth sector partners the potential for piloting a natural environment programme with youth groups that encourages use of natural environments through social action. This would aim to reach more young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. ii. Supporting the 2019 year of green action
Government will build on the 70th anniversary of National Parks and the centenary of the Forestry Commission and #iwill campaign activities in 2019 to encourage adults and children to take positive steps to help the natural environment. We will focus on the simple things that people can do, and how these also support good health.
A series of public engagement activities for 2019 will link to initiatives on waste reduction, cleaner air or other aspects of pro-environmental behaviour. We will look to get the business community and voluntary sectors involved in these activities, and urge them, with the education sector, to develop their own initiatives throughout the year to engage communities and raise awareness.
We expect 2019 to be the foundation of a five-year programme that will help turn the commitments in this 25 Year Environment Plan into action.
Actions we will take include:
- Drawing together targeted activities to make it easier for people to get involved in improving the natural world and spread the word about environmental issues.
- Working with partners from the business and voluntary sectors to make these activities happen.
- Scoping out an evidence-based behaviour change strategy to enable further actions by individuals, communities, businesses and government beyond 2019. Chapter 4: Increasing resource efficiency and reducing pollution and waste
At a glance
We will:
- Make sure that resources are used more efficiently and kept in use for longer to minimise waste and reduce its environmental impacts by promoting reuse, remanufacturing and recycling.
- Work towards eliminating all avoidable waste by 2050 and all avoidable plastic waste by end of 2042(^{25}).
- Reduce pollution by tackling air pollution in our Clean Air Strategy and reduce the impact of chemicals.
Dealing with waste and pollution costs businesses and householders millions of pounds each year and causes significant environmental and wildlife damage.
Pollution is a form of waste that pervades the environment: the atmosphere, water, land and oceans.
Over the next 25 years, we must significantly cut all forms of pollution and ease the pressure on the environment. We must ensure that noise and light pollution are managed effectively.
We need to stop producing so much waste in the first place. We can do this by being more ‘resource efficient’, which not only eases pressure on the environment and our stocks of natural resource but reduces costs too, boosting productivity.
Sustainable growth can go hand in hand with less waste and a smarter use of resources. We know that well-designed and delivered regulation, taxes and charges contribute to cleaner growth: the landfill tax has been instrumental in reducing the amount of waste dumped in the ground by 44% since 2000. The aggregates levy has hugely incentivised use of recycled aggregate.
(^{25}) Avoidable means what is Technically, Environmentally and Economically Practicable. We must also ensure that we are not simply exporting waste to other countries. Better intelligence about criminal activity and targeted inspections are estimated to have cut illegally-exported electrical and household waste from England by 17% between 2014 and 2016, saving the UK economy £2.75m over the two years.26
We will improve and develop our regulatory framework so that it provides strong environmental protection and standards while promoting economic growth: providing certainty for investment, stimulating markets and innovation, and setting a baseline for all.
1. Maximising resource efficiency and minimising environmental impacts at end of life.
We are committed to working towards our goal of zero avoidable waste by 2050 and doubling resource productivity over the lifetime of this Plan. In order to do this, and to maximise the value we get from our resources during their lifetime, we need to look at their whole life-cycle – from production, to usage and what we do with them at the end of their lives. We have committed to develop a new national Resources and Waste strategy to achieve this.
Our Industrial Strategy promotes the move towards a regenerative, circular economy. The economy exists within the natural world, and cannot be separated from it.
Energy and materials are essential contributions to the production of goods and services, and a healthy economy depends on a healthy environment. We want more efficient production processes and better designed products that reduce waste (cutting material costs) and use recycled/reused materials wherever possible.
We want products that reduce waste and use recycled/reused materials wherever possible.
We need to make data more available to support processes such as industrial symbiosis – i.e. where two or more industrial facilities or companies join up and the wastes or by-products of one become the raw materials of another. We must also develop business models that challenge inefficient production practice and on this we will work with industry to explore options for making waste tracking data universally digitised.
We are committed to supporting comprehensive and frequent waste and recycling collections which protect local amenity and ensure that products are recycled as much as possible, returning high quality materials back to the economy.
26 Regulating for people, the environment and growth, Environment Agency, 2017 This will help stimulate internal UK markets and support strong secondary materials markets as well as exports abroad.
The government will shortly set out plans for a Bioeconomy Strategy which will build on the UK’s strengths to ensure we can develop a world-class bio-based economy by removing our dependence on finite fossil resources. Bioscience and biotechnology has the potential to create new solutions that are economically and environmentally sustainable as well as resource-efficient. This will not only increase productivity but will also enable clean growth across all our towns, cities and communities.
As a package, these actions will see us manage resources more sustainably and divert more waste away from landfill, reducing the associated environmental impacts.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Publishing a new Resources and Waste strategy in 2018 aimed at making the UK a world leader in resource efficiency. It will set out our approach to reducing waste, promoting markets for secondary materials, incentivising producers to design better products and how we can better manage materials at the end of life by targeting environmental impacts. i. Achieving zero avoidable plastic waste by end of 2042
Plastic is an incredibly versatile material that forms a key component of many products we use today. As a packaging material, it is safe, secure, hygienic and cheap. It is tough and long-lasting, which is why it is also a disaster for the environment. Production of most virgin plastics requires fossil fuels, and when we have finished with them, they are difficult to dispose of in a way that does not harm the natural world.
It is estimated that 8.3 billion tonnes of plastic have been produced since the 1950s. Without urgent action to cut demand, this is likely to be 34 billion tonnes by 2050, the majority of which will end up in landfill or polluting the world’s continents and oceans. In the UK alone, during its recent Great British Beach Clean Up the Marine Conservation Society found 718 pieces of litter for every 100m stretch of beach surveyed. Of this, rubbish from food and drink made up at least one fifth.
Urgent action to reduce plastic waste in the marine and open environment is needed and is vital for the future of our planet and a considerable economic opportunity, including for developing countries that stand to benefit from more productive land, healthier seas, and ecotourism.
Re-using and recycling plastics is critical, and also reduce our reliance on fossil fuels for the production of virgin plastics. These changes would also stem the damaging flow of plastics into the environment, where they devastate wildlife and the wider natural environment. Reducing the plastic flow into our seas would also reduce the risk of toxins being transferred up the food chain. To address this issue we will work to eliminate all avoidable plastic waste over the lifetime of this Plan through a four point plan taking action at each stage of the product lifecycle – production, consumption and end of life.
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27Production, use, and fate of all plastics ever made, Geyer, et al. Science Advances. Vol 3, no.7, 2017 Actions we will take include:
- Looking across the whole lifecycle, launching a call for evidence in 2018 seeking views on how the tax system or charges could reduce the amount of single use plastics waste.
1. At the production stage, we will encourage producers to take more responsibility for the environmental impacts of their products and rationalise the number of different types of plastic in use by:
- Working with industry to rationalise packaging formats and materials formats to make sure that more plastics can be easily recycled and the quality of collected recycled plastics is improved.
- Reforming our Producer Responsibility systems (including packaging waste regulations) to incentivise producers to take greater responsibility for the environmental impacts of their products. This will include exploring extending producer responsibility requirements to plastic products not currently covered by our existing regimes to create a better market for recycled plastic.
- Building on our microbeads ban by exploring whether we can ban other problematic materials where suitable alternatives exist.
- Analysis by Innovate UK shows that we have invested approximately £54m of public research and development money on plastics innovation in the past seven years but we must accelerate the pace of research to ensure a higher proportion of plastic is re-usable, recyclable and recycled and that British companies are at the forefront in developing this technology – a key ambition of the Clean Growth Grand Challenge. We will therefore work with BEIS, Innovate UK, Research Councils and industry to bring forward a bid for the next round of Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund awards later in 2018 to help develop a pipeline of new, more sustainable materials that will have a lower environmental impact.
- Encouraging the development of bio-based, biodegradable and environmentally-friendly plastic through the Bioeconomy Strategy.
2. At the consumption stage, we will reduce the amount of plastic in circulation through reducing demand for single-use plastic by:
- Removing all consumer single use plastics from the central government estate offices.
- Extending uptake of the highly successful 5p plastic bag charge to small retailers, exploring whether compulsory options are needed if voluntary agreements prove ineffective.
- Supporting water companies, high street retailers, coffee shops and transport hubs to offer new refill points for people to top-up water bottles for free in every major city and town in England. The water industry plans to create a nationwide network of refill points, and an app to help people find the nearest place to refill their bottles with water free of charge.
- Working with retailers and the Waste and Resources Action Programme (WRAP) to explore introducing plastic-free supermarket aisles in which all the food is loose.
3. At the end of use stage, we will make it easier for people to recycle by:
- Continuing to support the industry led on-pack recycling labelling system and encourage all brands and retailers to use this systems to provide information to householders.
- Continuing to implement the Litter Strategy to reduce plastic litter and littering behaviour.
- Implementing voluntary and regulatory interventions that can cut the amount of commonly littered items, and improve recycling and packaging reuse. This includes considering advice from the Voluntary & Economic Incentives Working group (set up under the Litter Strategy), which is currently looking at measures to reduce littering and promote recycling of drinks containers.
4. At the end of life/waste management stage, we will improve the rate of recycling
- Through the Framework for Greater Consistency, WRAP is working with industry and local authorities to ensure that a consistent set of materials are collected by all local authorities. We want to accelerate this shift to consistency in the materials collected.
- Working with the waste management industry and re-processors to significantly increase the proportion of plastic packaging that is collected and recycled. • We will work with the Research Councils to help develop a standard for biodegradable plastic bags as part of emerging work on a national Bioeconomy Strategy (while also recognising the need to avoid microplastics pollution).
Collaborative industry action: • WRAP is working to develop a new cross-sector (business, government and NGOs) commitment to tackle plastic waste. This will align with the Ellen MacArthur Foundation’s New Plastic Economy and have an initial focus on plastic packaging.
Demonstrating international leadership: • We will do more to help developing nations tackle pollution and reduce plastic waste, including through UK aid. • Work through the UN, G7 and G20 to tackle marine plastics pollution at an international level. • Work with the International Maritime Organization to address the control and prevention of ship-source pollution.
ii. Reducing food supply chain emissions and waste
The Government is working to make the way we eat and drink in this country more sustainable. The aim is to cut by one fifth the greenhouse gas intensity of food and drink consumed in the UK, and also per capita UK food waste by 2025. This will set the UK on a path to meet an even more ambitious UN target – halving per capita global food waste at retail and consumer levels by 2030.
The work is being done through The Courtauld Commitment 2025, a bold voluntary agreement involving organisations along the agri-food supply chain from producer to consumer. The commitment addresses key issues, including reducing waste from consumers by for example rolling out guidance on applying ‘Use By’ dates only where there is a food safety reason to use it, and looking across supply chains to find efficiencies. Reductions achieved will be measured using global best practice methodology.28
Contracting parties – including food businesses and local authorities – are also guided by elements of the Plan for Public Procurement and Catering Services, including the ‘balanced scorecard’ which ranks a range of relevant criteria (sustainability in production, health and nutrition, resource efficiency, social-economic value and so on).
28 Courtauld Commitment, 2025 These criteria will help to deliver real environmental improvements, including entrenching UK production standards, reducing food waste, encouraging the use of seasonal fresh produce and encouraging menus to identify and celebrate the provenance of the food on offer.
Recycling food waste is also a key priority. We will work towards no food waste entering landfill by 2030. Many local authorities have introduced separate collection of food waste and we will work to support an increase in numbers so that the amount of food waste sent to landfill continues to decline. We will also take action to support the redistribution of unsold edible and nutritious surplus stock from food businesses to individuals in need. As a starting point, WRAP announced at the end of last year a new £0.5m fund for charities who redistribute surplus food from food businesses to those in need.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Continuing to work closely with WRAP, food businesses, local authorities and other organisations to meet Courtauld 2025.
- Ensuring that as food and catering contracts come up for renewal, central government departments and their agencies adopt the balanced scorecard approach to deliver benefits to the environment, consumers and businesses alike.
- Funding for charities who redistribute surplus food from food businesses to those in need. iii. Reducing litter and littering
The Litter Strategy for England sets out our aim to clean up the country and cut both litter and littering behaviours by means of better education, enforcement and ‘binfrastructure’ (the design, number and location of public litter bins and so on).
The Litter Strategy also sets out a compelling economic case for all businesses to invest in anti-litter activities – perhaps by adopting voluntary measures that aim to increase recycling and reduce litter, or through product design, behavioural research and investment in campaigns. We will also work with relevant industries to tackle particular red flags such as discarded fast-food packaging, smoking-related litter and chewing gum.
We will deliver a new national anti-litter campaign and work on developing a culture that teaches young people not to litter.
We will take stronger action against those who litter. Subject to parliamentary approval, new regulations will give councils outside London the power to fine keepers of vehicles from which litter is thrown, and we have laid new regulations to increase fixed penalties for littering and related offences. We will provide improved guidance on the appropriate and proportionate use of these powers, and encourage councils to be transparent about enforcement activity.
Finally, we will seek to improve the infrastructure in place for people to dispose of litter. Working with Highways England we will tackle litter on the Strategic Road Network and update the Code of Practice on Litter and Refuse to clarify expected standards. We will produce new guidance on ‘binfrastructure’ to help local areas reduce levels of litter, as set out in our Litter Strategy for England. We are committed to encouraging the use of behavioural insights to develop and test new ways to reduce litter. We have also launched a new ‘litter innovation fund’ to pilot and evaluate small scale local research projects that have the potential for wider application.
**Actions we will take include:**
We will continue to implement the Government’s Litter Strategy for England, including:
- Introducing new regulations to improve local authorities’ enforcement powers, supported by new guidance on its proportionate use.
- Developing a national anti-littering campaign, led by the government and funded by the private sector.
- Distributing a £450,000 litter Innovation Fund to pilot, implement and evaluate small scale local research projects that could be replicated more widely. Tackling marine litter
Turtles choke on plastic bags because they mistake them for a jellyfish. Dolphins drown, tangled up in discarded plastic packaging. Albatrosses somehow find floating rice bags in the furthest reaches of the South Atlantic, far from human populations, and unwittingly feed them to their hungry chicks on the island of South Georgia. Millions of single-use bottles jostle their way around the oceans, carried on the currents even to the remotest and most fragile Pacific atolls. Latest estimates suggest that around 12 million tonnes of plastics enter the oceans each year. The annual cost of marine plastic pollution is estimated to be at least $4.7 billion to the consumer goods industry alone.
The UK is committed to leading efforts to protect the marine environment. To tackle marine pollution, we will pursue a sustainable, international and transboundary approach that prioritises reducing global reliance on plastics, increases economically viable recycling processes, and promotes maritime practices that prevent harmful matter entering the seas.
An estimated 12 million tonnes of plastics enter the oceans each year (Photo: Surfers against sewage)
Tackling marine litter requires coordinated global and regional strategies. At present, more is needed to enforce existing programmes, regulations and standards at every level.
In many cases, better waste management on land will prevent waste reaching the sea – this is why we need a joint land/marine approach. We need more information on what works well in terms of preventative measures and what will fundamentally change human behaviour. Better waste collection and management, together with a more sustainable plastics life cycle, are key to solving the issue. Since plastic marine litter presents significant risks to business, the private sector can play a major role in addressing it. It also presents opportunities: at present, $80-120 billion in annual economic value is lost to the global economy because single-use plastic packaging is not captured after use\\textsuperscript{31}/\\textsuperscript{32}.
Solutions to the marine plastics problem range from industry innovations and government regulations to partnerships between stakeholders. Recent examples of government actions include the 5p plastic bag charge and the ban on the manufacture and sale of rinse-off personal care products containing microbeads. The challenge is how to scale up these efforts. We will work with waste management services and producers to support policies that deliver high quality and quantity recycling, minimise environmental impact and ensure well-functioning secondary material markets (the use of recycled material in preference to virgin raw materials). This will allow us to divert more waste from landfill, manage resources more sustainably and design products that promote a more resource efficient economy. More detail will be set out in the Resources and Waste Strategy.
We should be bold not only about plastics but also about other marine pollution and muster international support for action. We will promote the use of port reception facilities and champion laws which concern dumping wastes and other matter at sea.
Finally, we should prioritise, where feasible, a clean-up of the marine environment where litter poses a threat to human health, biodiversity, wildlife or sustainable use without harm to associated ecosystems, as agreed at the 2017 United Nations Environment Assembly – \\textit{Toward a pollution free planet}.
\\textsuperscript{29} \\textit{Stemming the Tide: Land-based strategies for a plastic-free ocean}, Ocean Conservancy & McKinsey Center for Business and Environment, 2015
\\textsuperscript{30} \\textit{Plastics and Sustainability: A Valuation of Environmental Benefits, Costs and Opportunities for Continuous Improvement}, Trucost, 2016
\\textsuperscript{31} \\textit{The New Plastics Economy — Rethinking the future of plastics}, World Economic Forum, Ellen MacArthur Foundation and McKinsey & Company, 2016
\\textsuperscript{32} The ocean economy’s output is measured in terms of the ocean based industries’ contribution to economic output and employment. Source: \\textit{The trillion dollar ocean}, OECD, 2016 Insights: Jolly, C. and Stevens, B iv. Improving management of residual waste
Since 2000 we have diverted significant quantities of residual waste – i.e. waste that cannot be reused or recycled – from landfill through the development of energy from waste (EfW) facilities. These generally recover energy from the waste to produce electricity. In 2016/17, some 38% of waste collected by Local Authorities went to EfW compared with 16% that went to landfill. More can be done however. We want to make sure that materials ending up in the residual waste stream are managed so that their full value as a resource is maximised and the impact on the environment of treating them is minimised.
We will continue to encourage operators to maximise the amount of energy recovered from residual waste while minimising the environmental impact of managing it, for example by utilising the heat as well as electricity produced. The actions set out in this Plan will help us build on this to ensure that the value of residual waste as a resource is fully realised and that emissions of carbon dioxide during the energy recovery process are kept as low as possible. We must bear in mind that any infrastructure must be able to adapt to future changes in the volume and make-up of residual waste generated and developments in technology. That way, waste is not locked into residual waste treatment processes when it could be reused or recycled.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Exploring different infrastructure options for managing residual waste beyond electricity, including the production of biofuels for transport and emerging innovative technologies.
- Looking at ways to increase the use of heat produced at waste facilities through better connections to heat networks. The facilities will become more efficient and emit less carbon dioxide.
- Investigating ways to cut carbon dioxide emissions from EfW facilities by managing the amount of plastics in the residual waste stream. We will link this with any opportunities to recycle more plastics or reduce the amount used. v. Cracking down on fly-tippers and waste criminals
Waste crimes have a long-term impact on the natural environment – they pollute air, water and land. Fly-tipping and poorly-run waste sites lead to problems with fumes, dust, vermin and insect infestations. Furthermore, waste fires can cause significant disruption to roads, railways and schools, making lives a misery.
The Environmental Services Association (ESA) estimated that waste crime cost the UK economy between £568m and £808m in 2013; in 2015, it cost the English economy at least £604m. It undermines legitimate businesses, evade taxes and run up clearing-up costs for the public sector running into millions of pounds. The cost to local authorities of clearing fly-tipped waste was £57.7m(^{33}) in 2016/17; these figures do not take in the cost borne by other landowners forced to deal with illegal waste disposal.
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(^{33})Fly-tipping statistics for England, Defra, 2017
**Actions we will take include:**
- Seeking to eliminate waste crime and illegal waste sites over the lifetime of this Plan, prioritising those of highest risk.
- Working with industry to explore options to introduce electronic tracking of waste.
- As part of our Resources and Waste Strategy, to be published in 2018, developing a new strategic approach to prevent, detect and deter waste crime.
- Taking a partnership approach to deal with the issue with industry, regulators and local authorities. vi. Reducing the impact of wastewater
If it is not properly collected and treated, wastewater (i.e. water from residential premises, industrial wastewater and contaminated rainwater) causes harm to the water environment.
In its strategic policy statement to Ofwat, the government makes it clear that we expect the regulator to challenge water and sewerage companies to improve the way they manage wastewater to meet the needs of customers while protecting the environment. For example, the Thames Tideway Tunnel, a brand-new 15-mile long ‘super-sewer’ now being built, will help clean up the River Thames in London by capturing the large volumes of sewage pollution that currently overflow into it each year from the over-stretched sewer system.
We expect companies to provide robust and transparent plans for the 2019 price review using the available outputs from the Water UK-led 21st Century Drainage Programme and the emerging long-term planning methodology for drainage and wastewater management plans. These will provide a clear framework for engagement and consultation with key stakeholders and help deliver lasting resilient plans that provide clear benefits for customers and the environment.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Working with industry to create a more robust wastewater planning and investment process that will help provide better outcomes for both customers and the environment.
- Continue to support the Thames Tideway Tunnel project to achieve significant environmental benefits allowing the River Thames’s biodiversity to flourish.
2. Reducing pollution
We know that people who live in city centres and near busy roads – often those on the lowest incomes in society – are most likely to be exposed to dangerous levels of air pollution. Epidemiological studies reveal that long-term exposure to this kind of pollution reduces life-expectancy, mainly through an increased risk of mortality from cardiovascular and respiratory conditions, and lung cancer.
We have long been at the forefront of global efforts to reduce pollution and improve air quality. The first Clean Air Act, in 1956, had a significant impact on pollution in our towns and cities, relegating ‘peasouper’ smogs to history. Our integrated approach to tackling pollution from industry – ensuring industry adopted the best practices available; involving industry in developing high standards – was truly innovative and has proved effective in reducing emissions. Our international partners have since adopted and built upon this approach.
The quality of our air has also significantly improved owing to our tough regulatory frameworks. Emissions of sulphur dioxide alone have fallen by nearly 95% since 1990. Stringent pollution limits have prompted industry to invest in cleaner processes and abatement technology. Fuels and products have been reformulated to reduce emissions at source. There has been a welcome shift in fuel use away from coal towards cleaner forms of energy.
The UK’s determination to improve air quality is reinforced by our commitment to meeting ambitious, legally-binding targets to cut emissions of five pollutants – ammonia, nitrogen oxides, non-methane volatile organic compounds, fine particulate matter and sulphur dioxide – by 2020 initially, and by 2030 for a deeper cut. Our commitment to meeting these legally binding targets is not affected by the UK’s departure from the EU.
Our goal is for everyone to tread more lightly on the natural environment. To achieve this we will need to expand on many of the initiatives set out in the Clean Growth Strategy.
To manage the risks of chemicals and promote their safe production, transport and use, the chemicals industry is subject to a number of regulations to address potential impacts on both human health and the environment. Despite the rapid growth in this industry these processes are recognised as providing effective controls and measures to prevent harmful substance release in the UK.
The UK is a signatory to four multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) where we are active participants, working towards achieving our goals whilst also supporting developing nations. By maintaining comprehensive emissions inventories we can demonstrate significant declines since 1990 of many harmful substances, including mercury and all persistent organic pollutants banned under the Stockholm Convention.
We need to seek more ways to tackle the release of harmful substances in our air, water and land.
To tackle air pollution we are already taking action to target both businesses and individuals. We are bringing forward legislation to cut industrial emissions from medium combustion plants and generators. At present, these are significant but largely unregulated sources of air pollution. We are also working with Local Authorities and others to advise householders about the impact of the domestic burning of wood and house coal – which together account for nearly 40%(^{34}) of total emissions of harmful particulates that can cause heart and lung damage. In September 2017, the ‘ready to burn’ wood certification scheme was launched. This industry initiative supported by Defra persuades people to move away from wet, unseasoned wood to ‘ready to burn’ wood, which can halve emissions from this source.
We also announced that we will end the sale of new conventional petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2040. We published our plan to tackle roadside nitrogen dioxide concentrations, and have made £475m of new money available to support local authorities with the biggest pollution problems to tackle hotspots in their areas – part of a wider £3.5bn spending commitment to air quality and cleaner transport.
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**Future of Mobility Grand Challenge**
The transport sector is responsible for around 40% of the UK’s final energy use, and contributes to local air quality issues. Through our ‘Future of Mobility’ Grand Challenge, announced in the Industrial Strategy, we will become a world leader in shaping the future of mobility, including the low carbon transport of the future.
We have identified four early priorities:
- Establishing a flexible regulatory framework to encourage new modes of transport and new business models.
- Seizing opportunities and addressing the challenges of moving from hydrocarbon to zero emission vehicles.
- Preparing for a future of new mobility services, increased autonomy, journey-sharing and a blurring of the distinctions between private and public transport.
- Exploring ways to use data to accelerate the development of new mobility services and enable the more effective operation of our transport system.
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(^{34}) National Atmospheric Emission Inventory, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2015 i. Publishing a Clean Air Strategy
We will publish a new Clean Air Strategy for consultation in 2018. This will set out how we will continue to seek improvements to public health, protect the environment, support clean growth, and work towards our legally-binding ceilings on UK emissions of air pollution. It will include looking at approaches to improve how farmers use fertilisers and reduce ammonia emissions to the air. It will set out how over the long term we will work towards a shift away from using solid fuels to heat people’s homes, to reduce air quality pollution.
We will review the strategy regularly and report publicly on our progress in reducing national emissions of air pollution.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Publishing a Clean Air Strategy in 2018.
- Exploring options to address pollution from coal and wet wood.
- Applying sulphur standards to smokeless fuels.
ii. Curbing emissions from combustion plants and generators
Medium-sized combustion plants (MCPs), which are used to generate heat for large buildings and for power generation, are a largely unregulated source of emissions of air pollutants. It is important that we control their impact on the environment.
Similarly, the recent rapid growth of low-cost, small scale flexible power generators poses significant risks without appropriate controls. These generators are often fuelled by diesel and emit high levels of nitrogen oxides, posing a threat to both local and national air quality.
We are taking forward legislation to tackle emissions from medium-sized combustion plants and generators. This will provide an estimated 43% of the sulphur dioxide emissions reduction, 9% of the reduction for particulate matter, and 22% of the nitrogen oxides emissions reduction required to meet our targets for 2030. Additionally these controls will contribute to reducing urban nitrogen dioxide concentrations.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Legislating to set limits on the levels of air pollutants that MCPs and generators can emit. iii. Publishing a Chemicals Strategy
Chemicals provide substantial benefits to society but their widespread use in industry, agriculture, food systems and homes has led in some cases to pollution of land, water, air and food. We will publish a new Chemicals Strategy to tackle chemicals of national concern that will build on existing approaches. This new strategy will set our priorities for action and detail how we will achieve our goals. It will support collaborative work on human biomonitoring, address combination effects of different chemicals and improve the way we track chemicals across supply chains.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Publishing an overarching Chemicals Strategy to set out our approach as we leave the EU.
- Exploring options to consolidate monitoring and horizon-scanning work to develop an early warning system for identifying emerging chemical issues.
- Considering how we will address tracking of chemicals in products to reduce barriers to recycling and reuse whilst preventing a risk from harmful chemicals.
- Working internationally to strengthen the standardisation of methods that assess chemical safety in support of the mutual acceptance of data to identify and share information on emerging concerns and new approaches to risk assessments. iv. Minimising the risk of chemical contamination in our water
Chemicals get into our water via a wide range of sources, including water treatment plants, use of agricultural pesticides, abandoned infrastructure such as mines, atmospheric deposition and road runoff. We want to tackle risks from chemical contaminants in English waters, including groundwater, and make sure that levels of contaminants entering fresh water bodies (which may be transported to coasts and seas) neither increase nor give rise to pollution.
The way we have approached the problem of polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs), used as flame retardants in home products, is a case in point. These enter the aquatic environment through domestic wastewater treatment works. As a result of source control measures such as banning their use in certain products, PBDE emissions have notably declined, averting the need for more expensive water treatment. We plan to carry on enforcing source control restrictions on harmful products and requiring water companies to monitor trends in their treated effluents.
Greater transparency and a more systematic, cost-effective and common-sense approach, can yield impressive results in protecting human health and wildlife. As with the PBDEs example, stakeholders will be encouraged to take ownership of problems. They will also be expected to take an active role in seeking and adopting solutions to contamination by chemicals of emerging concern.
Decisions on managing risks will be proportionate and based on the weight of evidence, so that for example a high level of certainty will be needed before a decision is made to invest in expensive treatment technology to reduce chemicals from treated wastewater effluents.
As well as source control mechanisms (regulations on chemical management or changes in individuals’ behaviour) actions to manage prioritised substances will range from environmental interventions around the pathway-to-the-water environment; point source (end-of-pipe) controls; and taking no further action where controls already exist that can address concerns and evidence shows they are effective. We will look to the water industry and manufacturers of pesticides and other agri-sector industries to deliver these various approaches. They will be encouraged to develop good practices, and voluntary and catchment-based initiatives to protect drinking and/or groundwater resources. In addition, cleaning up pollution from abandoned metal mines will protect aquatic organisms and deliver economic and environmental benefits for local communities.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Implementing a strategy with a framework that prioritises current issues such as antimicrobial resistance, the presence of pharmaceuticals and micro-plastics. Our goal is to improve water quality, reverse the deterioration of groundwater, and reduce emissions of harmful substances.
- Working with stakeholders, including water companies and Blueprint For Water, to draw up a roadmap for individual (or groups of) chemicals that takes account of planning timelines for chemicals’ regulation, river basin management and the water industry.
- Working with the agricultural sector on priority plant protection products, such as insecticides and herbicides of concern, to assess the progress that voluntary initiatives are making in dealing with them.
- Engaging with national and international academic specialists, industry, policy makers and regulators to bring together robust evidence and to identify emerging priorities that merit further investigation. v. Ensuring we continue to maintain clean recreational waters and warning about temporary pollution
Swimmers and paddlers must be confident that the water they are entering is clean. We have identified ‘bathing waters’ to give the public peace of mind, focusing on areas where we expect the greatest number of people to be. Over the last couple of decades we have significantly cleaned up our bathing waters: in 2017, a full 98.3% of waters met our standards for clean water.
Posing a lesser risk to health is one immediate benefit of cleaner bathing waters. Also valuable is the longer-term boost to local economies through increased tourism.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Working with the Environment Agency and water companies to continue to maintain our high standards of clean bathing water.
- Making sure that all those with a role to play take action to improve water quality by, for example, removing misconnected plumbing, improving surface water drainage and land management, and maintaining private sewage systems to a high standard.
- Continuing to develop the Environment Agency’s forecasting and warning system so that bathers are warned of a possible short-term pollution problem, perhaps owing to spill from overloaded sewers during heavy rain, or the tide overlapping land used for grazing. This will bolster public confidence in bathing waters. Chapter 5: Securing clean, healthy, productive and biologically diverse seas and oceans
At a glance
We will:
- Implement a sustainable fisheries policy as we leave the Common Fisheries Policy.
- Achieve good environmental status of our seas while allowing marine industries to thrive, and complete our ecologically coherent network of well-managed marine protected areas (MPAs).
Our seas and oceans are an integral part of our history, economy and way of life. Oceans supply nearly half of the oxygen we breathe, absorb over a quarter of the carbon dioxide we produce, play a vital role in the water cycle and climate system, and are critical for biodiversity and ecosystem services. Our marine environment supports our economy with crucial jobs, seafood and raw materials.
The UK has 17,820km of mainland coastline and the widest range of marine habitats of any coastal waters in Europe. They are home to a rich diversity of plankton, invertebrates, fish and higher predators, with around 8,500 species of animal and plants. Left alone by people, many aspects of marine ecosystems continually renew themselves.
But too often human activity depletes stocks more rapidly than they can recover and renew.
Two of the major threats are ocean acidification (OA) and damage to coral reefs.
OA is a direct result of CO₂ emissions from human activities around the world and can effectively be tackled only at international level. The “Because The Ocean” declaration, signed by the UK, highlights the relevance of ocean protection in the implementation of the Paris Agreement and calls for all parties to include ocean protection in their Nationally Determined Contributions, both in mitigation and adaptation action, including the conservation or creation of marine habitats important for carbon actions, known as their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).
35 State of Nature, RSPB, 2016
36 The Paris Agreement requests each country to outline and communicate their post-2020 climate sequestration. As a consequence, consistent and widespread monitoring to support identification of OA trends at a global level is required. The UK will continue to support this, and work with others to drive innovation in monitoring and collecting data to support policy and the activities of vulnerable ocean states. This will help us to improve our understanding of OA conditions and the ecosystem response to them, optimising forecasts for OA and its impacts.
Coral reefs are under direct and sustained pressure. The UK’s ambition is to champion and support their conservation and biodiversity in UK and Overseas Territories’ (OTs’) waters and around the world. We welcome the fact that 2018 has been made the International Year of the Reef by the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), recognised by the UK as the key international body for the conservation of coral and related habitats. We will increase engagement with ICRI and work with OTs to encourage the adoption of best sustainable management practice of coral reefs, as well as their associated ecosystems. We want to provide sustainability for fisheries and ensure food security while upholding social and cultural wellbeing.
We are taking steps to secure international natural capital to deliver multiple benefits. Mangroves, for example, play an important role in healthy coastal ecosystems, sequestering carbon and supporting aquaculture as well as contributing to the wellbeing and prosperity of coastal communities.
We have invested £10.1m to work with coastal communities to protect mangroves in Madagascar, Indonesia and wider South East Asia.
Seas and oceans do not respect regional or international boundaries. Given the transboundary nature of the marine environment it makes sense to work with others to achieve our objectives effectively and efficiently. We will look to work with all UK administrations and other countries that are neighbours of our seas through OSPAR(^{37}) in delivering our ambitions for the marine environment. Using and managing our seas sustainably will require multilateral collaboration: this provides an opening to influence international diplomacy as we have done for many decades. Our commitments to deliver the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) including the 14(^{th}): “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”, will guide many of our priority work areas. We will work domestically and internationally to deliver our commitments under SDG14.
As part of our commitment to the oceans, the UK will continue to work with the Commonwealth Secretariat and our Commonwealth partners to draw up an ambitious plan for a Commonwealth Blue Charter. It will look to apply the principles and values of the Commonwealth Charter to oceans, to include maintaining sustainable marine environments, developing prosperous blue economies, delivering fair ocean governance and ensuring a safe and secure maritime environment.
(^{37}) The OSPAR Convention (1992) is the mechanism by which 15 countries and the EU cooperate to protect the marine environment in the North East Atlantic. We will build on the success of the Commonwealth Marine Economies programme where the UK is working with Small Island Commonwealth States to enable them to use their marine space sustainably.
Overall, some aspects of the UK marine environment are improving. About 30% of fish stocks are now at sustainable levels, for example, and since 2010 the proportion of large fish in the North Sea has climbed sharply to levels not seen since the 1980s. We must still seek to ease the impact of human activity, however, particularly on seabed habitats and fish populations.
We need to understand the full value of the marine environment and incorporate that into the decisions we take: this is key to the ‘natural capital’ approach that has informed this 25 Year Environment Plan. An understanding of marine economic, social, historical and environmental values can help incentivise behaviours and practices that support stewardship and sustainability. Using this approach will allow us to be explicit about the choices we make about how best to protect and manage the marine environment, looking at them in the context of the values associated with our seas and oceans.
The fishing industry is a good example of natural capital in action. This vital industry is dependent on a healthy marine environment. We need to make sure that we have healthy fish stocks free of persistent pollutants and heavy metals, and that fish stocks are exploited sustainably, in order to ensure the long-term viability of the fishing sector.
In turn, by fishing at sustainable levels we will help to protect the wider marine ecosystems that underpin the fish species we rely on.
To do this, we cannot look at fish stocks in isolation. We must also protect the marine environment that is their vital habitat, protecting and improving it by joining forces with local stakeholders to find the most appropriate ways of drawing down the riches of the sea in a sustainable way.
1. Introducing a sustainable fisheries policy as we leave the Common Fisheries Policy
The Government will take advantage of the opportunities offered by leaving the EU to bring in a world-class fisheries management system that is based on the principle of maximum sustainable yield and helps to restore and protect the marine ecosystem. We will work with the devolved administrations as well as the UK fishing industry and other stakeholders to end wasteful discarding, put in place the right incentives to ensure compliance, and collect data and use science in the policy decisions we make. We will implement science-based plans as part of our approach to managing fisheries sustainably and to recovering fish stocks to sustainable levels in the shortest time feasible. Once we have left the EU, the Government will publish an annual statement on the state of fish stocks of interest to the UK. An ecosystem approach to fisheries management will account for, and seek to minimise, impacts on non-commercial species and the marine environment generally, including through technical conservation measures.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Publishing a Fisheries White Paper ahead of the new Fisheries Bill, setting out our future approach to sustainable management as we leave the EU.
- Pursuing this approach with action at all levels, including in fisheries negotiations with the EU and other countries.
2. Achieving good environmental status in our seas while allowing marine industries to thrive
Leaving the EU also gives us the opportunity to review how best to manage our seas. The UK Marine Strategy sets out our overall ambitions for the marine environment, the targets we want to achieve and how we achieve those targets.
Based on an improved understanding of the value of the marine environment, we will deliver effective management of our seas to make sure they are resilient to climate change while delivering the full range of goods and services. Realising the vision of the Plan will require us to manage a range of pressures, from marine pollution and eutrophication (adversely enriching a water body with nutrients) to fishing and other maritime development.
Recognising that species are mobile and marine environments are inter-connected, it will require us to work closely with other government departments and countries.
To help achieve this we will:
- Review all our marine targets and indicators to align them with the objectives set out in this Plan and develop a marine online assessment tool (MOAT) to look at the marine environment and the pressures affecting it.
- Deliver the marine spatial planning and licensing systems needed to support proportionate management of the marine environment whilst enabling growth and providing greater certainty for industry and investors.
We will complete the full series of England Marine Plans by 2021 and ensure they work cohesively with adjacent marine plans, whether they are developed within the UK or by neighbouring countries. We will continue to implement a marine licensing regulatory regime that supports sustainable development while protecting the natural capital and wellbeing of the marine environment and all local authorities with a coastal interest will be signed up to the Coastal Concordat by 2021. Building on current plans to complete our ecologically coherent network of well-managed MPAs, we will move to a whole-site approach to protect sites of greatest biodiversity interest. We will adapt our approach to respond to changing pressures on the marine environment, including climate change, and develop new and innovative techniques to help with their management. These might include remote sensing, earth observation satellites and the use of autonomous vehicles.
This will protect marine habitats and the species they support. It will increase their resilience so these marine assets are better able to respond to long-term pressures and damaging human activities, and recover more swiftly from individual events such as storms and pollution incidents.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Completing in 2018 a major assessment of how far our seas have moved towards good environmental status since 2012.
- Using that assessment to review our targets and put in place an updated strategy that will deliver the objectives in this Plan and associated international obligations for our seas. Regular review dates will ensure that we remain on track.
- Putting in place the remaining marine plans for England, and working with partners in the devolved administrations to support those for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The aim is to complete the series of UK marine plans by 2021.
- Consulting on the third tranche of Marine Conservation Zones in the first half of 2018, with designations within 12 months of that date. This will complete our contribution to the international ecologically-coherent network of MPAs in the North East Atlantic by including a representative range of the species and habitats found in our seas.
- Extending work to protect mangroves for local communities to Indonesia in 2019 and to more communities in South East Asia. Sustainable fishing
Historically, we have fished unsustainably and this has vastly depleted fish stocks. Without effective regulation and management, fisheries can suffer from what is called the ‘tragedy of the commons’ where open access to a common valuable resource results in a tendency to over-exploit. Unsustainable fishing practices do not just deplete fish stocks; they threaten the environment and marine ecology and can also have an impact on coastal communities. While overfishing may provide immediate benefits in the form of increased income, it limits the availability of resources in the longer term and thereby jeopardises the livelihood of fishers. It also undermines the resilience of our marine ecosystem and its ability to support sustainable fisheries in the future.
An ecosystem approach to fisheries management aims for more sustainable management and accounts for, and seeks to minimise, impacts on non-commercial species and the marine environment generally. One such intervention is ‘achieving Maximum Sustainable Yield’ (MSY). To bring overfishing under control, from 2006 EU fisheries management began to adopt the concept of setting quotas to prevent further depletion of fish stocks. This was further strengthened in 2011, and MSY, with its aim of restoring stock populations and maintaining them at sustainable levels, was adopted as a central objective in 2013. MSY represents a reference point or range based on scientific advice that indicates the level at which a species can be fished without harming the stock in the long term. While this might mean in practice that fishermen cannot fish as much in the short-term, it allows fish stocks to rebuild over time and ensures that the resource is available to us for much longer.
Hake stocks in the North-East Atlantic are an example of how stocks can be rebuilt, and illustrate the potential effect of MSY on stock sizes. Between 1985 and 2004, these stocks were in continual decline owing to overfishing. At the lowest point in 2003, 2,500 tonnes were landed in the UK, at a value of £6m at current prices. From 2006, the EU moved towards setting Total Allowable Catches (the amounts fishermen are allowed to catch) in line with MSY. As a result, stocks are now around five times larger, allowing the UK to land 14,000 tonnes of Hake valued at £35m. Chapter 6: Protecting and improving our global environment
At a glance
We will:
- Provide international leadership and lead by example in tackling climate change and protecting and improving international biodiversity.
- Help developing nations protect and improve the environment by providing assistance and supporting disaster planning.
- Support and protect international forests and sustainable agriculture.
- Leave a lighter footprint on the global environment by enhancing sustainability and supporting zero deforestation supply chains.
We all live on one planet. We cannot improve the UK’s environment in isolation from the wider global environment – we must protect and enhance both. Systems that regulate life on earth – terrestrial ecosystems, the world’s oceans, freshwater and the climate exist in feedback loops.
Damage we cause can be multiplied, creating conditions hostile to our existence. An effective response requires joint action on a global scale. We want to be sure that tropical rainforests, coral reefs, abundant wildlife and the astonishing beauty of the natural world survive to thrill and support the livelihoods of future generations.
Our Clean Growth Grand Challenge, announced in the Industrial Strategy, will ensure that we approach these challenges with economic opportunities and productivity enhancement in mind.
Environmental pressures are increasing everywhere. Major ecosystems (such as seas and oceans) that support billions of people are under threat. Natural disasters, climate change and catastrophic environmental degradation cause economic problems worldwide. Pollution observes no national borders. Emissions that affect land, air and water in one country can have a harmful impact on ecosystems and human health in others. The poorest people and countries in the world are often the most vulnerable and likely to be hardest hit by the degradation of natural environments – the soil, water, seas, forests and wildlife. Climate change and the deterioration of natural environments are prime drivers of poverty, food insecurity and instability, and can trigger conflict and migration.
The illegal wildlife trade is the fourth most lucrative transboundary crime, with an estimated value of up to £17bn per year. It is not only animals that are poached and killed, but prized tropical hardwoods that are illegally felled and shipped around the world. The despoliation of forests destroys traditional sources of food for forest animals, clean water, medicines for indigenous people and building materials.
Achieving global change is not easy. But by showing international leadership, supporting developing countries and reducing our own environmental footprint, we can make a real difference. With much at stake, we need to work together to confront pressing challenges. The whole of the UK is fully committed to this most vital cause. From our proposals for some of the world’s strictest measures on ivory sales to combating deforestation, cutting greenhouse gases while promoting clean economic growth, the UK has championed environmental protection. Among the most difficult challenges is securing binding pledges from multiple nations. In 2015, the UK helped to secure the Paris Agreement, the first truly global, comprehensive climate change agreement. And we continue to lead by taking action at a domestic level - since 1990 we have cut UK emissions by 42% while our economy has grown by two-thirds. The UK’s Climate Change Act 2008 was the first in the world to introduce legally-binding emissions targets: it is hailed as having led the world in driving domestic action, both to reduce emissions and to identify and adapt to the pressures we face as our climate changes. It is an example of UK leadership above and beyond the requirements of EU membership.
The Clean Growth Strategy, published in October 2017, set out our plans to build on the successful decarbonisation of the power sector while looking further across the whole of the economy and natural environment. It includes ambitious proposals surrounding housing, business, transport, the natural environment and green finance. The Clean Growth Grand Challenge, announced in the Industrial Strategy, will ensure the UK reaps the economic rewards that this global transformation will create for those that lead the way.
The Government’s most recent UK climate change risk assessment (CCRA), based on the independent evidence report of the Committee on Climate Change, highlights risks to a number of our natural assets – including soils, freshwater resources, natural carbon stores, marine ecosystems, farming, forestry, wildlife and habitats.
We will address these risks through the second National Adaptation Programme, to be published later in 2018. This will set out how we will adapt to a range of projected climate impacts.
Emissions from the natural resources sectors have halved since 1990 and further action to reduce them are set out in the Clean Growth Strategy.
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38 Provisional UK emissions statistics, BEIS, 2017 39 Quarterly National Accounts Statistical bulletins, ONS, 2016 Climate change is far from the only global threat. Across the world, biodiversity and the habitats that support it are coming under unprecedented pressure. The UK as a party to the CBD and to numerous conventions that protect marine, migratory and endangered species will work to improve the global environment: indeed, we ourselves are custodians of globally significant biodiversity in the UK’s OTs, which support unique ecosystems.
As such, we are committed to implementing these conventions domestically, and to supporting developing countries to meet their obligations. Our long-standing Darwin Initiative, established 25 years ago at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, has so far supported over a thousand projects in 159 countries. It helps nations rich in biodiversity but poor in financial resources to conserve, and sustainably use, their natural resources. So far, the Darwin Initiative has established 20,315 permanent field plots around the globe, provided 32,957 training weeks and produced 2,660 species or habitat management plans for overseas governments or agencies. Recent projects funded through this initiative have helped protect the snow leopard, protected and restored mangroves in the Philippines in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, and supported commercially successful and sustainable coffee co-operatives in Ethiopia.
We are also committed to protected cultural and natural heritage around the world. The UK’s heritage organisations deliver education, training, consultancy, conservation and renovation programmes to many parts of the globe. Many heritage professionals and practitioners from other countries come to the UK each year to develop their skills, learn about heritage protection and management in the UK, and benefit from the knowledge of our heritage sector.
Our OTs boast some of the world’s most delicate and complex ecosystems and habitats. Working in partnership with the OTs, natural capital assessments are being undertaken to improve understanding of the full value of these unique environments, and through the Blue Belt programme 4 million km² of ocean around the OTs will be protected by 2020, further conserving vital habitats and species. The timeline below illustrates some of our most important commitments.
- **Convention on Wetlands / Ramsar Convention** comes into force in UK (1976)
- Convention on the conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources.
- **Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)** (1976)
- UK signs to ensure the international trade in wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival.
- **Bern Convention** (1979)
- International legal instrument covering natural heritage.
- **UNCLOS** (1982)
- Legal framework for all ocean activities including conservation and resources.
- **Global Moratorium on Whaling comes into force** (1986)
- The International Whaling Commission vote to ban commercial whaling.
- **Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer** (1987)
- Reduce production and consumption of ozone depleting substances.
- **Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty** (1991)
- Designates Antarctica a natural reserve for peace and science.
- **Darwin Initiative** (1992)
- Support for developing countries to conserve biodiversity & reduce poverty.
- **Kigali amendment to the Montreal Protocol** (2016)
- A mandate for countries to phase down the production and usage of HFCs.
- **Paris agreement** (2015)
- To keep global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
- **New York Declaration on Forests** (2014)
- Global timeline to cut natural forest loss by 2020, and strive to end it by 2030.
- **UK Climate Change Act** (2008)
- UK introduces climate change legislation setting emission targets.
- **Kyoto Protocol** (1997)
- Treaty on the reduction of green house gas emissions.
- **Convention on Biological Diversity signed by UK** (1992)
- Convention establishing commitments on conserving biodiversity.
- **UN Framework Convention on Climate Change** (1992)
- Treaty to establish the Climate Change Convention to deliver global action.
- **OSPAR** (1992)
- Convention on the protection of the North East Atlantic marine environment.
- **Basel Convention** (1992)
- Adoption of key convention on movements of hazardous wastes. In 2016, we also played a key part in securing a global deal to reduce the use of hydrofluorocarbon greenhouse gases under the Montreal Protocol, helping to avoid close to 0.5°C of global warming by the end of this century.
In line with our commitments under the Paris Agreement, the UK has committed at least £5.8bn through its International Climate Finance between 2016 and 2020 to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change, reduce deforestation and support cleaner economic growth. Our portfolio of projects has so far supported 34 million people in coping with the effects of climate change and avoided 9.2 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent emissions. We also work closely with Multilateral Development Banks to help direct their finance to support low carbon transition and encourage them to be innovative and ambitious.
The UK has also shown global leadership in tackling the illegal wildlife trade (IWT). In 2014, Defra, DFID, the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office worked closely together to make the first international IWT conference – hosted in the UK – a success. The conference secured ambitious agreements from more than 40 governments to take urgent, coordinated action to combat IWT and was hailed as a turning point in global efforts to tackle these damaging activities.
The UK has consistently supported increased protection for vulnerable marine species across different environmental agreements. We continue to play a leading role championing the conservation and welfare of all whales, dolphins and porpoises both in the UK and internationally. We play an active role in the International Whaling Commission (IWC) where we strongly support the global moratorium on commercial whaling and will continue to lead calls for those countries that still engage in commercial whaling practices to stop.
We have announced measures to clamp down on the trade in ivory, which contributes to the slaughter of almost 20,000 elephants every year. We intend to introduce a total ban on UK sales, and the import and export of ivory for sale to and from the UK, that could contribute either directly or indirectly to the continued poaching of elephants, with only a limited number of narrowly-defined exemptions. These proposals will put the UK front and centre of global efforts to end this trade.
We have also been at the forefront of global action to halt deforestation, supporting ambitious action. This includes the REDD+ Framework under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), covering countries’ efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the New York Declaration of Forests – a far-reaching set of commitments to halve (in 2020) and then halt (by 2030) the loss of natural forests, recover forests and croplands, and support private sector-led
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40 UK Climate Finance Results, Department for International Development, 2017 commitments to eliminate deforestation from the supply chains of key agricultural commodities.
So that we can keep this momentum going, we must intensify our efforts to protect and improve the global environment, with all relevant government departments and stakeholder groups working together to ramp up global environmental action.
We want to keep the average global temperature rise below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and aim for a rise below 1.5°C. We want to reduce our carbon emissions by at least 80% from 1990 levels, and achieve this by 2050. We want to halt and then reverse the decline in global biodiversity, and increase the adoption of sustainable agriculture and fishing. Our goal is to help prevent the extinction of known threatened species, and improve and sustain their conservation status. As we move to tackle poaching and the illegal import/export of threatened goods, we will not overlook the illegal felling of rare tropical hardwoods.
Delivering the UN Sustainable Development Goals
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and make sure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity. Delivering the relevant environmental aspects of UN Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030) for the UK requires cross-government, cross-industry and individual participation.
There is a huge socio-economic and environmental dividend to be gained through SDG implementation. The Business & Sustainable Development Commission has estimated that the economic prize to business of implementing the SDGs could be up to US$12 trillion (£9 trillion) globally by 2030. The government now has the opportunity to create the right market conditions to harness the socio-economic and environmental opportunities presented by the relevant SDGs.
We are committed to delivering the SDGs across government and have set up a cross-Whitehall Sustainable Development Forum to co-ordinate and facilitate implementation of SDGs in the UK, with ongoing scrutiny from the Environmental Audit Committee who will hold us to account on SDG reporting and delivery. In addition, we aim to present our Voluntary National Review to the United Nations in 2019. A report published in March 2017 set out examples of the UK’s work towards achieving these goals, both domestically and internationally. On Sustainable Cities and Communities: Air Quality, for example, we have agreed legally-binding UK targets to reduce emissions of key air pollutants by 2020 and 2030. We are engaging at local, national, and international level and working closely across the UK.
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41 Agenda 2030: The UK Government’s approach to delivering the Global Goals for Sustainable Development - at home and around the world, Department for International Development, 2017 Government to create a healthier environment through a new programme of Clean Air Zones that will benefit people and the economy.
As a developed country, the UK should drive progress on certain SDGs where domestic consumption has an impact on other countries. These include SDGs 13 (climate change), 7 (energy), 14 (life below water), 15 (life on land) and 12 (sustainable consumption and production). We are already investing in projects that build the capability of developing countries to meet the SDG targets. We are using finance mechanisms that will attract more private finance into environmental projects and focus investment where it can provide the greatest benefit and bring real, meaningful results. We will continue to take coordinated and ambitious action, building on our existing achievements, to reduce the UK’s impact on the environment at home and abroad, and help developing countries to meet their targets.
We cannot do any of this in isolation. Action will only succeed when we agree international standards that protect the environment while also facilitating fair practice in international trade which avoids improving our domestic environment at the expense of the environment globally.
The policies we will implement to protect and improve our global environment are set out below.
1. Providing international leadership and leading by example
The UK will be at the forefront of global efforts to protect and improve the natural world, driving the international community to adopt higher standards. Our leadership is respected in part because of our enduring commitment to high standards, domestically and internationally, and the depth and quality of our scientific expertise.
From working with developing nations, to chairing a working group protecting rhinos, and continuing to strongly support the prohibition of commercial mining in Antarctica, the UK remains an energetic and committed flag-bearer for environmental reform.
We have consistently used our membership of international fora to deliver high-level agreements on key environmental issues. The UK is party to more than 300 treaties and agreements related to marine and terrestrial environments, food and agriculture, chemicals and waste, genetic resources, and plant and animal health – each with an important role in protecting and improving the natural world.
We will continue to lead by example on the crucial environmental challenges, meeting the ambitious goals to which we are committed under these agreements. As existing agreements progress, or become open for renewal, or new instruments are proposed, we will leverage all our influence to secure international commitment to global targets that are even more ambitious and stretching.
i. Tackling Climate Change
As set out above, the Climate Change Act we adopted in 2008 was a prime example of early leadership: it introduced five-year caps on greenhouse gases, known as ‘carbon budgets’, which have been used as a model for action across the world and are reflected in the Paris Agreement. We will continue to set an example, reducing our emissions from 1990 levels by at least 80% by 2050 and publishing our second sustainable and effective National Adaptation Programme in 2018. We will use our diplomacy on the international stage to encourage more ambitious global action.
The UK’s recent Clean Growth Strategy is another example of domestic commitment to environmentally sustainable growth, a model to others as they develop their long-term emission reduction plans ahead of 2020. Again, we will also reflect this commitment in our international work.
The Clean Growth Grand Challenge within our Industrial Strategy will seek to maximise the advantages for UK industry from the global shift to clean growth – through leading the world in the development, manufacture and use of low carbon technologies, systems and services that cost less than high carbon alternatives.
A core part of the Clean Growth Strategy is our commitment to phase out unabated coal fired electricity by 2025.
The move away from coal towards cleaner sources of power is one of the most effective decisions governments can make to comply with the Paris Agreement. To this end, the UK, alongside Canada, forged the Powering Past Coal Alliance. Launched in November 2017 at COP23, the UN climate change talks in Bonn, the global group already includes more than thirty government and twenty businesses and aims to grow further and continue to engage the private sector, ahead of December 2018, building a groundswell for this vital transition.
Using our leading role in the UNFCCC, through which the Paris Agreement was established, we will urge the international community to meet the goals enshrined in the text – in particular, as a first step, through securing robust and integral rules and standards. This is vital for future environmental security: current global commitments under the Agreement are insufficient to limit average temperature rise to well below 2°C.
Actions we will take include:
- Working to secure robust and integral rules and standards that underpin the goals of the Paris Agreement.
- Show global leadership by phasing out unabated coal-fired electricity by 2025. ii. Protecting and improving international biodiversity
We will use the UK’s influence to build support for an ambitious post-2020 international biodiversity strategy, rooted in a natural capital approach that emphasises the importance of nature’s contribution to people, their health and prosperity, and the links with the SDGs and the Paris Agreement. We will work with partners internationally to make sure that a robust evidence base informs the adoption of ambitious, realistic and measurable post-2020 targets at the 15th Conference of the Parties of the CBD in 2020. These targets should help to strengthen a natural capital approach and transform the way in which decisions are made at all levels, to value, conserve and recover global biodiversity, thereby sustaining a healthy planet and delivering benefits essential for all people.
We will press ahead with activities inspired by the aims of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) to ensure the sustainability of legal trade in wild flora and fauna, and to protect species such as lion, elephant and dugong, a marine mammal related to manatees. The UK chairs the CITES working group on proposals to combat illegal killing and trafficking of rhinos. Our aim overall is to make sure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival.
An important part of our commitment to protect wild animal and plant populations is our work on combatting illegal trade. We aim to reduce illegal trade in wildlife by working to eradicate the market for IWT products, ensuring effective legal frameworks, strengthening law enforcement and providing sustainable alternative livelihoods. To help secure this ambition we will bring global leaders back to London in 2018 for the international IWT conference – convening a global coalition against IWT and reaffirming political commitment at the highest level. We will tackle IWT as a serious organised crime that affects people as well as animals.
The UK’s OTs are home to rich, globally important biodiversity, with many species found nowhere else in the world and a variety of spectacular marine and terrestrial ecosystems. Local people rely heavily on societal benefits from the environment in the form of tourism, disaster mitigation and the provision of food and clean water.
With their vast marine areas, the OTs offer an opportunity to lead the world in marine protection. The Blue Belt of marine protection around our OTs, conserves habitats and the species they support, increases resilience to long-term pressures such as climate change and damaging human activities in surrounding areas, and supports sustainable economic development for the long term.
Climatic changes in the Polar Regions are having dramatic consequences, and these consequences have global impacts. The UK has consistently been at the forefront of protecting the environment of the Arctic and the Antarctic and will continue to use its leading role in the Antarctic Treaty System and our sovereign interests in the South Atlantic to protect Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. We led the work to create the first ever Marine Protected Area in Antarctic waters in 2009, strongly supported the designation of the world’s largest Marine Protected Area in the Ross Sea region, and continue to work towards the development of a network of protected areas around the Southern Ocean. A UK-led initiative ensures that marine areas newly exposed from ice shelf collapse or retreat, such as occurred at the Larsen C ice shelf in 2017, are protected from commercial fishing activities for scientific study. The UK remains fully committed to the Protocol on Environmental Protection and its ban on commercial mining in Antarctica. We will continue to work with the Arctic States to further our understanding, and enhance the protection of the fragile environment, and to advocate that only sustainable and responsible development takes place in the high North.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Taking a leading role in developing an ambitious post-2020 international biodiversity strategy.
- Hosting the IWT conference in 2018, we will work with other nations to drive coordinated global action in the fight against IWT.
- We will strengthen partnerships to tackle IWT beyond borders, including investigating the feasibility of an anti-poaching taskforce.
- Continuing to provide targeted financial help to developing nations in order to manage biodiversity and tackle the illegal wildlife trade.
- Developing new techniques to manage protected areas in the OTs, for example by introducing the use of remote sensing, earth observation satellites and use of autonomous vehicles.
- Working with our OTs we will continue the implementation of the Blue Belt programme, including supporting efficient monitoring and enforcement of large scale protected areas.
- We will continue to support the global moratorium on commercial whaling and lead calls for those countries that still engage in commercial whaling practices to stop.
- Playing an active role in securing a new international agreement for the conservation and sustainable use of marine areas beyond national jurisdiction.
2. Helping developing nations to protect and improve the environment
The actions taken by developing countries, which often suffer the worst effects of climate change, are key to improving the global environment, particularly as their economies grow over coming decades. If we are to protect and improve the global environment, we must work with developing countries to support them in strengthening their resilience to climate change, support sustainable development and conserve biodiversity.
i. Providing assistance and supporting disaster planning
The UK will use Official Development Assistance and our scientific and technical expertise to help developing countries understand and manage their environments sustainably.
We have already pledged at least £5.8bn of International Climate Finance from 2016-20, playing our part in the collective effort by all developed countries to mobilise at least $100bn of climate finance a year by 2020 from public and private sources. We are one of the largest providers of this kind of finance. Our aim is to target funds in areas where the money will have a transformative effect, to leverage in further finance, and to build on UK strengths and experience.
To help achieve our environmental ambitions we will continue our work on the UK’s Darwin Initiative and Darwin Plus funds, which aim to help deliver long-term strategic outcomes for the natural environment in the UK’s Overseas Territories and developing countries.
The next rounds of the Darwin Initiative, Darwin Plus and the Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge Fund are expected to open for applications in spring 2018.
The UK will continue to support countries with National Adaptation Programmes of Action and disaster risk plans. Through UK-funded programmes such as Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED), the UK can demonstrate global leadership and reduce the impact of humanitarian disasters. We will support further engagement with climate-related policies on a national, regional and international scale, in particular in drawing up processes for Adaptation Plans.
The UK has built up a wealth of expertise while improving the performance of its own economy and energy systems over the past quarter of a century. We are sharing the lessons learned with partner countries, supported by the £1.2bn cross government Prosperity Fund that has been set up to tackle barriers to sustainable and inclusive growth between 2018 and 2021. Prosperity Fund programmes in China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South East Asia will provide expertise about regulating clean energy markets, improving the flow of finance to low carbon projects, and building up capacity to improve regulation. We will build on the experiences of the Commonwealth Marine Economies programme which is working with 17 Commonwealth small island developing states to combat the effects of climate change, ocean acidification, extreme weather events, pollution, over fishing, loss of habitat and to enable conservation and sustainable use of their marine space. Actions we will take include:
- Continuing to help support developing countries on high priority environmental projects.
- Doing more to help developing nations tackle pollution and reduce plastic waste, including through UK aid.
- Continuing to deliver the UK’s Darwin Initiative and Darwin Plus programmes.
- Assisting countries in preparing, producing and implementing National Adaptation Programmes of Action.
- Sharing UK expertise with emerging economy partners through Prosperity Fund programmes.
- Helping to produce national capacity building plans (complementing existing national and regional plans) for developing Blue Economies of small island developing states by 2025.
- Continuing to improve the flow of finance to low carbon projects and ensure proper regulation of clean energy markets. This will help emerging markets to improve medium-term regulation.
ii. Supporting and protecting international forests and sustainable global agriculture
Forests support 90% of the world’s biodiversity, regulate water quality, and mitigate climate change by absorbing and storing huge quantities of carbon from the atmosphere. More than 1.6 billion people depend on forests for food, medicine and livelihoods. Illegal logging increases greenhouse gas emissions and results in the loss of biodiversity. It can also have a devastating impact on the people who live in forests or rely on them for their livelihoods.
But there is a balancing act to perform with the ever increasing need for productive agriculture. Sustainability is particularly important in agriculture. Two billion people are supported through smallholder farming in developing countries: these enterprises produce over 70% of the world’s food. With the global population expected to reach nearly 10 billion by 2050, these farmers must become even more productive if we are to be sure of having enough food for all.
We cannot continue with the current massive conversion of forests and other natural habitats into farmland. Already, high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition persist despite an increase in global supply, and climate change ratchets up the pressure to produce food and other crops sustainably.
To tackle these challenges, we are working to make agricultural systems more productive, sustainable and resilient to climate change through strategic investments. As part of the Clean Growth Grand Challenge, the Industrial Strategy White Paper set out our ambition to put the UK at the forefront of the global move to high-efficiency agriculture through the new Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund 'Transforming food production: from farm to fork'. The Department for International Development (DFID) has also significantly increased the money it puts into agriculture, raising it from £243m in 2011/12 to £484m in 2014/15. This covers the world’s largest climate change adaptation programme focused on smallholder farmers - the International Fund for Agriculture Development’s (IFAD) multi-donor Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP).
Through the support of UK International Climate Finance, we are helping to make sure that this agricultural development happens in the right way, supporting developing countries to halt deforestation, protecting the world’s most biodiverse forests and establish sustainable livelihoods to eradicate poverty. In Brazil, for example, we are supporting farmers to protect and restore forest landscapes in the Amazon, Atlantic Forests and Cerrado by helping them access private sector loans to fund the transition into low carbon sustainable agriculture.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Ensuring deforestation remains a priority when targeting future Official Development Assistance spend.
- Continuing to work with multilateral development organisations so that momentum is maintained on key environmental issues.
- Remaining firmly committed to halting illegal logging and combating deforestation, and devising new solutions to support and recognise improvements in forest governance. Adapting the Ethiopian Coffee Economy to Climate Change
Scientists from Royal Botanical Gardens Kew worked with cooperatives in Ethiopia to produce a higher value export coffee sold through Waitrose and other retailers, showing what successes can be achieved. Yayu Forest Coffee is the upshot of a three-year, £315,790 project funded by the Darwin Initiative, aimed at securing both local livelihoods and the local environment.
Ethiopia is the world’s fifth largest coffee producer. Its exports of Arabica coffee beans generate a quarter of the country’s export earnings and provide livelihoods for around 15 million people. Arabica has a very narrow tolerance of environmental fluctuations – particularly temperature and rainfall. The fear was that the traditional ‘forest-friendly’ method of coffee production in Ethiopia could be jeopardised due to the effects of climate change.
Four fifths of coffee in Ethiopia is grown under forest canopy – a production method that is good not only for the growers but also the natural environment and local people. Forests that are seen to ‘pay their way’ are conserved rather than converted to other uses, which could then run the risk of threatening the stock of natural capital and damaging ecosystem services such as water cycling and soil protection.
Scientists from RGB Kew, in collaboration with Ethiopian researchers, began to study the impact of climate changes on coffee production and come up with options for the future. They identified that climate change could reduce viable coffee producing areas by up to 60% in the absence of adaptation strategies. Conversely, the research also showed that a positive adaptation approach could actually lead to increased production.
As a result, one of the forest coffee cooperatives, along with Union Coffee is now producing a higher value export product – achieving better margins at no extra cost to the natural world. The UK’s involvement helped to produce sustainable and resilient local livelihoods while conserving valuable local biodiversity. 3. Leaving a lighter footprint on the global environment
Our vision for the natural world of the future is one in which economic growth, development and environmental protection go hand in hand wherever you are in the globe and this approach was at the heart of our Industrial Strategy. It is in everyone’s best interests to avoid any ‘race to the bottom’. For centuries the UK has been a great trading nation and the legacy of this is that we remain a leader in understanding and promoting the importance of the environment.
i. Enhancing sustainability
As is the case with all our environmental work we set out to be an example for others, focusing attention on how to create and drive up standards everywhere. We will do this by making sure that our consumption and impact on natural capital are sustainable, at home and overseas.
We believe that environmental sustainability should be at the very heart of global production and trade, and we will be a passionate advocate for it. We will develop a trading framework that supports foreign and domestic policy, sustainability, environmental and development goals. In this way we will help make sure that the global environment is properly protected, and that threats of extinction are greatly reduced.
We will use natural capital approaches to help guide us and as part of this encourage better uptake of natural capital reporting, standards and accounting across government and businesses, in conjunction with key initiatives such as the Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures and the Natural Capital Coalition Protocol.
Actions we will take include:
- Working in partnership with industry to explore the possibility of developing additional tools that support businesses to identify sustainable supply chains.
- Establishing appropriate mechanisms to screen policies and strategies for potential negative environmental effects overseas.
- Using our prominence as innovators to develop new approaches and techniques that help take account of natural capital.
- Hosting an international conference to discuss new ways of incorporating natural capital approaches to long-term policy making. ii. Protecting and managing risks from hazards
We are committed to maintaining high standard of protections for consumers, workers, and the environment in our trade agreements.
As part of this we will work on the international stage under frameworks such as the Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management to set long-term aspirational goals after 2020.
We will support countries to develop effective chemical and waste management regimes, and thus facilitate existing and future trade whilst minimising the risk of adverse effects from harmful chemicals and wastes.
We will develop methods to identify substances of concern: our aim is to substantially reduce deaths and ill-health arising from hazardous chemicals and wastes. We will use existing multilateral environment agreements, such as the Stockholm and Basel Conventions to ban and restrict chemicals of global adverse impact and develop guidelines to support safe movement of hazardous waste internationally.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Maintaining high standard of protections for consumers, workers, and the environment in our trade agreements.
- Playing a leading role in developing goals for international chemical management beyond 2020.
- Supporting countries to develop effective chemical and waste management regimes.
- Understanding if further R&D is needed into methods to identify substances of concern and supporting other countries to do the same.
- Setting up international partnerships over the sustainable use and production of chemicals. These will make it easier to share data, skills and fresh approaches to risk assessment and management. iii. Supporting zero-deforestation supply chains
The UK is determined to make good on its clear commitments to support companies to implement zero-deforestation supply chains. This stems from our endorsement of the Amsterdam Declarations and the New York Declaration on Forests.
We will continue to invest in reducing environmental risk in key sourcing countries. In one example of this we will work directly with local producers under the Partnerships for Forests programme: this supports zero-deforestation commitments led by the private sector, and deepens demand for sustainably produced commodities in our own markets while helping the transition to sustainable farming practices. This shows how the sustainable trade model can help drive economic growth in developing countries.
Palm oil and cocoa are key commodities linked to deforestation for which viable measures of sustainability already exist and on which we are working in partnership with industry. We intend to expand this approach to look at other internationally traded commodities linked to deforestation. Our goal is to create demand-side incentives for sustainable international sourcing at home, while supporting supply-side improvements by influencing, and investing in better resource governance in trading partner countries. This initiative would build on the range of existing partnerships aimed at making specific commodities more sustainable.
**Actions we will take include:**
- Establishing a cross-government global resource initiative in 2018 to work with businesses, NGOs, producer countries and intermediary countries. This will bring together key actors to identify actions across supply chains that will improve the sustainability of products and reduce deforestation.
- Convening a roundtable discussion over one chosen commodity as a scoping exercise to explore the sustainability of key supply chains. Section 2 - Putting the Plan into practice
At a glance
We will:
- Consult on setting up a new independent body to hold government to account and a new set of environmental principles to underpin policy-making.
- Develop a set of metrics to assess progress towards our 25 year goals and undertake a second ‘National Ecosystem Assessment’ type initiative beginning in 2022.
- Refresh the 25 Year Environment Plan regularly to ensure that collectively we are focusing on the right priorities, using the latest evidence, and delivering better value for money.
- Strengthen leadership and delivery through better local planning, more effective partnerships and learning from our four pioneer projects.
- Establish a green business council and explore the potential for a natural environment impact fund.
- Work closely with a large range of stakeholders over the coming year to identify their contribution to the goals set out in this Plan.
This Plan is a living blueprint for the environment covering the next quarter of a century. It is an ambitious project, made even more so by our use of a natural capital approach, a world first.
Turning the vision into reality requires solid foundations: comprehensive, reliable data, strong governance, a robust delivery framework, and everyone to play their part.
This Plan will be revised and refreshed over the next 25 years to take account of fast-moving changes in technology, science, data and society. Our starting point however, is that we will:
1. Set a clear, long-term direction with flexibility to adapt to new evidence and circumstances.
2. Provide robust and credible reporting, governance and accountability.
3. Put in place strong local leadership and a more integrated delivery framework.
4. Resource, set incentives and support innovative finance, including from the private sector.
5. Make sure everyone plays their part in delivering the improved environment we all want.
6. Setting long-term direction with flexibility to adapt to new evidence and circumstances
The goals for the next quarter of a century are set out earlier in the document. They provide a long-term agenda that everyone can work towards.
We have also outlined the next policy steps Government will take, working with stakeholders. This and future governments will need to build on and refine these policies in the light of developing scientific and economic understanding, and changes in society and the natural world.
The Plan coincides with the once-in-a-generation opportunity presented by our leaving the EU. We will make the most of the chance to improve our environmental policy framework, align it with the ambitious goals we have set, and lead from the front in pursuit of higher standards across the world.
The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill will ensure that the body of existing EU law, including environmental law, continues to hold sway in the UK. Key underlying principles of existing policy, such as the ‘polluter pays’ principle and the precautionary principle, are reflected in this legislation and in the historic judgements of the European Court, also covered by the Bill.
We will be consulting on the development of a policy statement on environmental principles to underpin policy-making post-EU Exit. This will provide maximum certainty about environmental regulations as we leave the EU.
Currently, EU rules create a consistent approach across the UK in a range of policy areas. While the UK Government and devolved administrations make different choices on implementation in some policies, these common rules provide a number of benefits, including making it simple for businesses from different parts of the UK to trade with each other, helping the UK to fulfil its international obligations and protecting our common resources.
Outside of the EU, we will need to ensure that we do not create any new barriers to living and doing business within our own union. For these reasons, there will be some areas where we will continue to need common frameworks. We have already started discussions with the devolved administrations on where common frameworks may be required.
After leaving the EU, we will build on the many benefits provided by EU environmental regulation, and make sure that our policy framework delivers an environment of which we can feel even more proud, in a cost-effective way to taxpayers. Our work will build on the immense progress achieved in recent years, both locally and nationally.
Should we identify opportunities for improving environmental regulation, we will consult upon them before making changes. We remain fully committed to implementing within the UK those international agreements to which this country is a party and will continue to lead their application globally, working in partnership across the UK and internationally. i. Measuring progress towards our goals
We recognise the need for rigorous scrutiny and will create a framework which will specify how progress is to be measured.
At present, we have well-developed systems that monitor many aspects of our environment but these will need to evolve to accommodate the needs of the Plan and a greater emphasis on using a natural capital approach.
We will develop better measures in areas such as:
- soil health;
- how ecological systems are functioning;
- the human health benefits associated with a better environment; and
- the overseas impact of domestic consumption.
We will also engage widely over the next six months as we develop a comprehensive set of metrics that we can use to monitor progress.
The box below gives more detail on how these indicators and measures might be produced and used.
As a first step we will review which of our current indicators and monitoring programmes remain relevant and can be reworked to take account of natural capital.
Because this is the first time in the world that government strategy centres on natural capital considerations, we will need reliable measurements of all the key relationships between natural capital and its benefits. We will carry out research to establish which measures give us the best insight into how natural capital changes as time passes – these will include the quantity and quality of natural capital, and where it is vested. The national metrics are likely to be supplemented by local metrics, tailored to a narrower set of needs and circumstances.
Both types of metrics will take advantage of rapidly-advancing new technologies. Remote sensing, environmental DNA (i.e. nuclear or mitochondrial DNA released from an organism into the environment) and ever-smarter mobile phones have the potential to revolutionise how we monitor changes in natural capital in ways currently technically impossible or prohibitively expensive. Satellite data, for example, can allow improved monitoring and enforcement in fisheries, or can record more accurately and with greater frequency how land is being used. Underwater vehicles (marine robots) will help us map and monitor Marine Conservation Zones.
Metrics and monitoring will be regularly reviewed to check we are measuring the right things at the right time and in the most cost-effective way. This will ensure that it is not the blind pursuit of targets that drives us, but rather the most appropriate policies and incentives for improving the environment.
Further details of requirements for a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework can be found in Section 5 of the supporting Evidence Report. Measuring the impact of the 25 Year Environment Plan
Metrics are a critical part of the 25 Year Environment Plan. They enable us to comprehend the complexity of the environment and allow us to:
- understand how the environment as a whole is changing – the pressures, the state of assets and the flow of benefits;
- assess the effectiveness of our policies and show how we are delivering our domestic and international commitments; and,
- inform decisions and promote action within and outside government, locally and nationally.
We have a large number of existing indicators and associated statistics, data and monitoring systems. A natural capital approach will require careful selection of these and development of further indicators.
| Goals of the 25 YEP. | Examples of existing indicators relevant to each goal\* | |----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------| | Clean air | Emissions of key pollutants; number of high or moderate air pollution days; area of sensitive habitats with excessive levels of air pollution. | | Clean and plentiful water | Water quality in rivers and lakes, bathing waters, and groundwater; inputs of hazardous substances to the marine environment. | | Thriving plants and wildlife | Extent and condition of protected sites on land and at sea; status and trends of wild species and habitats. | | Reduced risk of harm from environmental hazards | Number of households better protected from flooding. | | More sustainable and efficient use of resources | Area of sustainably managed and harvested woodland; fish stocks harvested within safe limits; amount of raw materials consumed per person and resource productivity. | | Enhanced beauty, heritage and engagement with the natural environment | Area of woodland; people visiting the natural environment and volunteering for conservation activities. |
\*We will also need to measure pressures on the environment: e.g. greenhouse gas emissions and removal, waste and resource management, chemical emissions, and pest/non-native species establishment. We propose that we measure both the actions that we take (‘performance measures’) and long-term progress towards our goals (‘outcome indicators’). This will enable us to check progress annually within a longer-term context, looking across all the goals of the 25 Year Environment Plan.
Understanding how different interventions contribute to a number of outcomes will help us review their effectiveness and strengthen the synergies between them.
Analysing trends and considering groups of indicators together will provide a more robust assessment of environmental change.
**Examples of links between performance measures and outcome indicators**
| Performance measures | Outcome indicators | |----------------------|--------------------| | Number of trees planted | Removal of greenhouse gases by forests | | Area of land under agri-environment schemes | Water quality in rivers, lakes and bathing waters | | Length of water courses improved | Trends in wild species (e.g. pollinators, farmland birds, fish) | | Areas of seas covered by marine protected areas (MPAs) | People visiting the natural environment | ii. Using benefits of better evidence for better decision-making
Good evidence is the cornerstone of effective policy making. The natural capital approach will help place science and economic evidence at the forefront of decision-making, ensuring that policies are aligned with our desired environmental outcomes and yield the best return on every pound spent.
In order to improve our understanding of our natural capital we will:
- Continue to work with the Office for National Statistics (ONS) to develop a full set of natural capital accounts for the UK that are widely understood and shared internationally. Taken with the new outcome indicators, these accounts will provide a much richer picture of changes to the environment over time.
- Improve our understanding and valuation of the benefits of natural capital through our own research and working with the research community, learning from best practice abroad where appropriate.
- Better incorporate the full spectrum of natural capital and the value of the benefits it provides into analysis and appraisal across government. We will also develop new digital tools and maps to make the use of robust economic values easier for everyone (see box on recreational values below).
- Improve monitoring and evaluation of policies so that both costs and benefits can be more accurately estimated in future analysis. Valuing outdoor recreation using a new online tool
The University of Exeter, funded by Defra, developed the Outdoor Recreation Valuation (ORVal) tool in order to quantify recreational values provided by accessible greenspace in England.
ORVal is an online map-based application that allows users to explore accessible greenspace across England in a user-friendly, intuitive way. Based on a cutting-edge, world-leading statistical model of recreational demand, ORVal brings data together and provides information that can now be included in the decisions made by communities, government and businesses.
The online tool is in map form, giving people the opportunity to explore recreational opportunities close to them. It also helps connect them with their local environment, both in urban as well as in rural areas as the map below shows. At present we cannot robustly value everything we wish to in economic terms; wildlife being a particular challenge. On the NCC’s advice, we propose to undertake risk assessments of the threats facing our natural assets, and use the findings in strategic decision-making and prioritisation exercises for future iterations of this Plan.
Over the long term, we will work with research councils, academic, professional and voluntary bodies to help to develop a more relevant, accessible and transferable knowledge base and the skills to support better decisions – all based on a sound understanding of natural capital and the effectiveness of interventions to improve it.
We will seek out innovative ways to collect and analyse data about our natural environment and how people engage with it, building on the digital revolution. We will promote research that sets the UK’s action in a global context, taking account of what happens in our dependencies and the impact we have on the world. iii. Refreshing the 25 Year Environment Plan
We propose to update the Plan at least every five years, following progress reviews (see section below on reporting). During the first five year period we may update the Plan more frequently to capitalise on the opportunities of leaving the EU.
Learning lessons – innovating through pioneer projects
Defra has created four pioneer projects to inform the development and implementation of the 25 Year Environment Plan. Each pioneer is located in a different area of England and is led by part of the Defra group, working closely with local partner organisations.
Defra asked the pioneers to explore four broad objectives:
- Applying a natural capital approach to decision making;
- Developing innovative funding opportunities;
- Demonstrate integrated approaches to planning and delivery; and
- Building our understanding of ‘what works’ in practice.
The pioneers started in 2016 and have since been exploring policies that feature prominently in this Plan. The locations offer a range of environmental challenges and circumstances against which to test ourselves, and also reflect pre-existing strong partnerships and relevant initiatives in each area. The pioneers are working with partners on what they learn to adapt or propose future projects to meet the four objectives. Defra has asked the pioneers to be ambitious and to take managed risks; to learn from what does not work as well as what does. As a result, and as intended, each pioneer has approached their objectives in a different way according to their local circumstances and the priorities of their respective partners.
The four pioneers
Cumbria Catchment Pioneer
The Catchment Pioneer is led by the Environment Agency (EA). The devastation caused by the floods of 2009 and 2015 and the subsequent response provides the starting point and has shaped the way affected communities engage with their environment. The pioneer is encouraging communities to take a broader interest in how the management of land and water affects them, using a natural capital approach.
Priorities for this pioneer include: testing new governance models for the environmental management of river catchments as a whole; looking at how the different agencies can work better together to improve the process of securing environmental permits needed for development schemes; and testing the application of innovative finance mechanisms, for example a ‘visitor giving’ scheme. These objectives are closely linked with many policies in this Plan, supporting for example increased tree planting, restored peatlands, the delivery of a new environmental land management system and work with the Lake District National Park Authority to conserve and enhance natural beauty and cultural heritage.
**North Devon Landscape Pioneer**
The Landscape Pioneer is led by Natural England (NE) and is based in the North Devon UNESCO Biosphere Reserve. This pioneer is testing the use of natural capital in determining environmental priorities and agreeing actions to target them. At its heart is an innovative process for creating a shared plan that identifies where investment in natural capital is most needed and securing new investment for those projects in the pioneer area.
The pioneer has already mapped how existing funding for natural capital is distributed across the Biosphere Reserve. The pioneer then identified the ecosystem services that are provided by the different land uses and worked with stakeholders to value them and assess how they change over time. Investment priorities – such as saltmarsh restoration or natural flood management – will be established jointly with partners, based on this assessment.
The pioneer will trial a new local governance model, design and trial a payment-by-results environmental land management scheme for farming, and test natural capital as a tool for engaging communities with the benefits provided by their environment. The pioneer will also promote net environmental gain through strategic planning to expand North Devon’s most valued natural capital. It will look to support more tree planting and greater enjoyment of our coastal areas.
**Greater Manchester Urban Pioneer**
The Urban Pioneer is led by the EA and covers the whole of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA). This pioneer is focused on how environmental enhancements can improve people’s lives. It is built on a strong partnership with the GMCA – an enthusiastic supporter of a natural capital approach with extensive devolved responsibilities including health, skills, planning, and economic development. The pioneer is supporting GMCA in understanding how natural capital helps deliver these objectives and the benefits of investing in it, including through the development of a natural capital account for the GMCA area.
The pioneer has supported the GMCA in committing to achieving a biodiversity net gain through planning and development across the city region. The pioneer is also working with the GM Mayor to increase public engagement with the environment through its 2018 Green Summit. Other Plan policies that the pioneer will look to support include urban tree planting, natural flood management, sustainable drainage and creating green infrastructure.
**Marine Pioneer**
The Marine Pioneer is led by the Marine Management Organisation (MMO). It operates in two separate locations, covering areas of coast and sea based on the North Devon Biosphere and the Suffolk Coasts and Heaths Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty.
Applying a natural capital approach to the marine environment has not been attempted before on this scale: this is a great opportunity to develop our understanding. The pioneer is working with partners to produce practical tools for capturing natural capital in decision making, and using natural capital to identify environmental priorities and investment opportunities. The pioneer is undertaking a natural capital assessment of saltmarsh restoration and is developing a fisheries partnership with the industry and others to test regional management opportunities and create a market for sustainably-caught local fish.
Other Plan policies that the pioneer will look to support include sustainable fisheries, better managed MPAs and development of the planning and licensing system.
**The pioneers’ continuing role**
Defra expects the pioneers to make an important contribution to the future iterations of the 25 Year Environment Plan. Updates following the UK’s exit from the EU will be a key opportunity to share good practice from the pioneers across the country. With foundations now in place, the pioneers can make quick progress on their existing objectives, and on testing and supporting the policies in this Plan.
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2. Reporting on progress, governance and accountability
Transparency and accountability are key features of successful reform programmes and will be built into our environmental reforms.
Defra will act as ‘owner’ of the Plan on behalf of government. The department will lead on developing future iterations and overseeing delivery at a strategic level, working closely with other government departments, local authorities, businesses, the public and other stakeholders.
i. Reporting on progress
We will put in place regular and transparent reporting of progress against our new metrics, including to Parliament. We propose to report annually on the plan itself. Reports will cover the progress against performance measures and an analysis of recent outcome indicator monitoring. As the monitoring cycles for different outcome indicators will vary in frequency and timing, each annual report will place greater emphasis on a slightly different set of metrics, and in so doing build up over a time a more complete picture of overall progress towards the 25 year goals.
Alongside partners within government, such as the Office for National Statistics, and interested parties outside, including environmental organisations, we will continue to publish regular official and national statistics, giving everyone information on how the environment is changing. We will adhere to the UK’s Code of Practice for Statistics and ensure that all the statistics we produce are trusted and high quality, and meet user needs. We will continue to invest in the systems that we use to collect data on the environment and people’s engagement with it. As far as we can, we will make the data collected available externally for others to use.
In addition, government will arrange for comprehensive assessments of natural capital to take place on a roughly 10 year cycle. The UK National Ecosystem Assessment (NEA), completed in 2011, was the first comprehensive assessment of the state of ecosystem services in the UK. It has been hugely influential in the development of natural environment policy in England, the devolved administrations, and internationally.
A second assessment to be started in 2022 will provide an updated picture of the state of the environment at Brexit. Building on annual progress reports, this will involve a more detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of policies and measures. In it, we will take account of new scientific knowledge and explore future scenarios and policy options.
The assessment will be repeated towards the end of the 25-year period to assess outcomes and inform future planning.
ii. Ensuring independent oversight and accountability
We intend that there should be robust and thorough oversight of progress against the Plan. Government will launch a consultation in early 2018 on establishing a new, world-leading, independent, statutory body to give the environment a voice, championing and upholding environmental standards as we leave the European Union. We will consult widely on the precise functions, remit and powers of this new body, including any significant role in scrutinising and advising on the 25 Year Environment Plan, subject to consultation.
3. Supporting strong local leadership and delivery
At present many organisations and partnerships pursue their own plans, across different areas and boundaries. In places there is good coordination between them, but in other places opportunities for joining up and integrating environmental work are missed.
At a local level we want environmental effort to be guided by the goals we have outlined but also to reflect local needs and priorities as well as being more integrated and efficient. Work has already started. The larger environmental delivery bodies in the Defra Group, have aligned around a common geography of 14 areas. Each now has its own Area Integrated Plan (effectively, a joint statement of intent between the Environment Agency, Natural England and the Forestry Commission) that we propose to develop into natural capital plans. These will be aligned with the 25 Year Environment Plan (ensuring a clear line of sight to national government) but be particularly relevant to the local area or geographies within them.
The aim is for the 14 areas to work together, using a natural capital approach, bringing in other partners to maximise the environmental benefits that can be achieved from better coordination across individual remits. Lessons from the pioneer projects will provide vital information as they develop and implement natural capital plans in their respective areas. They also provide a valuable opportunity to test approaches.
The organisations involved may vary by area according to need, but should include Local Enterprise Partnerships, leading businesses and utility companies, Local Nature Partnerships, Catchment Partnerships, local authorities, National Park Authorities and water companies. The level of involvement of external parties will vary between areas but it is key that the plans for each are co-designed and delivered.
Ultimately, we want to move towards an approach in which the 14 local areas are mapped and managed more as a system, with a ‘system operator’ responsible for the strategic management of the natural capital in accordance with respective local plans. We recognise that this is a long way from where we are now and that considerable work is required to map out how this might operate in practice. We will continue to explore innovative ideas, such as the natural capital trust idea which seeks to channel funding to agreed priorities (See box below), to make progress.
Innovation in governance – a natural capital trust
The West of England Nature Partnership (WENP) is working closely with local authorities and the West of England Combined Authority to explore how the establishment of a Natural Capital Trust for the West of England could both enable development and investment in natural capital, improving the quality of life for people across the region.
Defra has provided support for this project as the model has the potential to be replicated across the country. Such a model could improve the strategic allocation of funding generated from developer contributions and payment for ecosystem services schemes to have maximum benefit to the protection and enhancement of a region’s natural capital. 4. Funding, financing and incentivising improvement in natural capital
We now have strong evidence on how natural capital underpins the economy, supports long-term growth and benefits human health and wellbeing. We know carefully-planned investments in natural capital assets can deliver significant value for money and generate economic returns that rank favourably with those generated by more traditional infrastructure investments. When the NCC examined a range of natural capital investment types in their third report to government, it found that the benefit:cost ratios ranged from 3:1 to 9:1(^{42}). In other words, for every pound spent, the nation received £3 to £9 back in economic value.
The right mix of public and private funding and financing for projects that protect and enhance natural assets will be crucial to the successful delivery of this ambitious plan. To date, such projects have typically been resourced through subsidies and grants from government and the EU, the Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) and philanthropic foundations as well as local authorities, environmental organisations and private sector investment, notably by water companies.
While data for direct spending on improving natural capital is not consistently gathered across all sectors, HM Treasury and Defra estimate that central government funding for this in England amounted to approximately £805m in 2015-16. Spending at UK level by environmental organisations with a biodiversity or nature focus was £236m in 2014-15(^{43}) and the HLF awards around £100m per year to UK natural heritage project.
(^{42}) The State of Natural Capital: Protecting and Improving Natural Capital for Prosperity and Wellbeing, NCC, 2015
(^{43}) This value is likely to be an underestimate as the indicator does not include all NGOs with an environment or customer focus. Biodiversity 2020: a strategy for England’s wildlife and ecosystem service: Indicators, Defra, 2017 Philanthropic and Lottery funding for the environment
The Esmée Fairbairn Foundation (EFF) is one of the largest independent grant-makers to the natural environment sector in the UK. Innovative funding models used by EFF include a £10m fund which is used to purchase pieces of land with a high conservation value that come on to the market in the UK. The land is purchased directly by EFF and simultaneously leased to a pre-approved conservation organisation with the option for them to buy it in two years’ time at the price EFF paid for it, plus a small interest charge. This provides the conservation organisation with a window to fundraise.
EFF has also committed a social investment of £400,000 to the South Midlands Newt Conservation Partnership to support its role in a pilot scheme testing an innovative approach to the protection of great crested newts through the planning system. The EFF investment will help kick start a longer-term programme supporting over 100 habitats, leading to the creation of up to 1,000 ponds, 500 hectares of grassland and 100km of hedgerows over 10 years, with the investment being repaid over time through compensation payments from developers.
The HLF uses money raised by National Lottery players to help people across the UK explore, enjoy and protect the heritage they care about. This includes natural heritage and HLF provides around £100m of grant funding to UK landscape and nature projects each year, with a particular focus on connecting people with nature. Defra will work with HLF, as recommended in the recent DCMS-led tailored review, to consider how HLF can engage with the 25 Year Environment Plan and to explore whether alternative options to pure grant-giving would support the sustainability of the natural heritage sector.
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44 Tailored review of Heritage Lottery Fund/National Heritage Memorial Fund, Department for Digital, Culture, Media & sport, 2017 Case study: Water companies innovating in natural capital investment solutions
**South West Water’s (SWW) Upstream Thinking scheme**, a partnership with the Wildlife Trust and the Rivers Trust involves joint investments between farmers and the water company aimed at making sure that land is managed in such a way that potential pollutants do not run off into surrounding water courses. It is much cheaper for SWW to tackle pollution up front than pay to remove it once it has affected the water: as such, it is part of a long-term sustainable approach to managing costs by reducing ongoing maintenance and/or deferring large capital investments; it also helps keep down customers’ bills.
**Wessex Water’s EnTrade scheme** uses an innovative reverse auction online platform to determine the optimal mix of payments to encourage farmers to grow cover crops to reduce nitrogen run-off in Poole Harbour. As with the SWW scheme, it is a more efficient way of tackling pollution.
**United Utilities’ (UU) Sustainable Catchment Management Programme (SCaMP)** works with farm tenants and in conjunction with partners such as the RSPB, Natural England and the Forestry Commission. Between 2005 and 2015, UU invested over £22m in moorland restoration, woodland management, farm infrastructure improvements and watercourses to protect and improve water quality and the surrounding natural environment, while delaying or reducing the need for future capital investment in additional water treatment.
For the current price review (PR19 – the process through which Ofwat regulates to set the price, investment and service package for customers), Ofwat is proposing higher rewards for water companies that deliver innovative and stretching outcomes, including for environmental performance. Ofwat also expects water companies’ business plans to embed natural capital approaches at catchment scales. These incentives could spur a shift towards significant innovation in delivering more environmental benefits, supported by private capital.
2017 saw the first UK public utilities green bonds issued. Anglian Water issued a green bond that raised £250m to fund projects which contribute to their sustainability strategy. Tideway, the company responsible for delivering the Thames Tideway Tunnel supported by contingent government financing, issued a £250m green bond which was three times oversubscribed, demonstrating the strength of demand in the market for sustainable investment opportunities. A second green bond issue means that Tideway is now the largest issuer of corporate green bonds in Sterling with a total amount of £450m. i. Continuing public investment
This initial iteration of the 25 Year Environment Plan contains a mix of confirmed policies and longer-term aims, with further announcements over the coming years. Public funding sources will continue to play an important role in protecting and enhancing the natural environment. A significant proportion of UK taxpayer’s money is currently channelled via the European Commission. Brexit brings with it a unique opportunity to make sure public funding is targeted at our most pressing priorities as enshrined in this Plan, achieving maximum impact including by stimulating private investment. For example, Government’s near £6m investment in the Northern Forest will help unlock further investment from a range of sources which could generate more than £2bn for the country’s economy.
A new environmental land management system will use public money to deliver public goods through simple and effective administration. The Government has also committed to underwrite the funding awarded to UK projects on a competitive basis by the EU, for example through the LIFE Programme, even where projects continue beyond the UK’s departure from the EU. We will work with partners to develop post-EU exit arrangements and scope the potential for novel funding streams and incentives, including levies and charges. Ultimately we need to ensure that we all face the right incentives to take action on the environment.
Everyone should bear the full cost of practices that negatively impact on it and face a suite of incentives that make positive practices in their economic interests. The 5p plastic bag charge and consequent reduction in plastic bag use is a powerful example.
ii. Catalysing private investment
Increased private sector investment in natural capital will equally be crucial. The development of natural capital thinking, data and tools will usher in more opportunities to generate revenue from projects that improve the natural environment. By measuring the benefits of natural capital improvements we will sharpen the business case for private sector investment and help to unlock new markets, funding streams and private finance for natural environment projects.
The Government will take steps to encourage private sector investment wherever possible, targeting public funds at projects that provide purely public goods.
Such private sector opportunities were previously identified and explored by the industry-led Ecosystems Markets Task Force. Between 2012 and 2015, Defra funded three rounds of pilot projects to both improve the environment and generate revenue. The pilots offered valuable evidence of the opportunities and challenges associated with innovative funding approaches. We have since seen pioneering schemes from water companies, and environmental NGOs working with businesses and other organisations willing to fund environmental improvements because benefits accrue to them. The RSPB and Oliver Wyman will shortly publish a discussion paper on large-scale domestic conservation finance.
More recently, a report for Defra identified projects and initiatives involving private sector expenditure that protect or enhance natural capital; The Aldersgate Group also published a paper exploring the current state of play in the natural capital finance market and ways to increase investment.
Clean Growth Strategy and Green Finance Taskforce
HMG’s Clean Growth Strategy sets out a series of policies and proposals to develop new green finance solutions to mobilise more private capital into sustainable technology and infrastructure projects in sectors such as energy, water, waste and air quality. This includes setting up a Green Finance Taskforce, comprising senior representatives from the finance industry and government, to develop ambitious policy proposals which could further accelerate private sector investments to help deliver the Clean Growth Strategy and 25 Year Environment Plan.
Shortly, the Green Finance Taskforce will make recommendations to government on how to accelerate private sector investment in sustainable projects and infrastructure by building on the UK’s strength in green finance. In the following examples we set out a number of innovative market mechanisms that can capture and monetise more of the benefits from the natural environment in order to generate revenue streams or cost savings.
- Listed companies can invest in tree planting and peatland restoration projects to offset their residual carbon emissions – for example by using the Woodland Carbon Code or Peatland Code.
- Housing and infrastructure developers can invest in habitat creation projects as a cost-effective way of fulfilling their obligations to compensate for habitat loss under the National Policy Planning Framework. Natural England’s metric does this by converting damage to biodiversity into a comparable unit.
- Providers of infrastructure can invest in natural flood management projects to increase their resilience. The Green Alliance and National Trust’s work on natural infrastructure schemes explores how an area-based market in avoided costs could deliver environmental improvements by bringing together groups of land managers to sell natural services such as flood protection to groups of beneficiaries.
- Product and supply chain certification schemes allow goods produced to certain environmental standards to be sold at a price premium, enhancing brand value, helping ensure resilience of supply and securing access to markets. The practice of benchmarking of such schemes could help improve consumer awareness and drive higher environmental standards.
- Business in the Community (BITC) has been working with businesses that are already investing in natural capital to ensure resilience of supply, provide a healthy attractive environment for their employees and to meet environmental standards. There is an opportunity to align this investment to make sure that it is used to the best effect in communities. For example, the Landscape Enterprise Network approach developed by BITC, Nestle and 3Keel identifies the businesses working within a landscape and maps the natural capital that they are reliant on, enabling more effective investment and a greater understanding of shared needs.
- Matched crowd-funding schemes combine crowdfunding and institutional funding to get great ideas off the ground. A recent report from Nesta looked at the impact of such schemes by analysing a £251,500 matched crowdfunding pilot involving the HLF.
- Visitor giving schemes are a simple way to invite voluntary donations from tourists, inspiring them to help look after the places they love. Nurture Lakeland’s visitor giving scheme enables tourism businesses to collect contributions from their customers: the money supports a host of projects across Cumbria to protect the beautiful landscape, support communities and promote the region’s heritage. Case study: Kingsbrook, Aylesbury Vale
- putting nature at the heart of development
The RSPB joined forces with Barratt Developments to set a new benchmark for nature friendly housing developments – the first national agreement of its kind in the UK. At Kingsbrook, some 2,450 new homes, new schools and community facilities have been designed in a way that puts nature at the heart of proposals. Around 60% of Kingsbrook will be green infrastructure, including 250 acres of accessible, wildlife-rich open space, orchards, hedgehog highways, newt ponds, tree-lined avenues, fruit trees in gardens, bat, owl and swift nesting boxes and nectar-rich planting for bees.
Aylesbury Vale District Council has been instrumental in promoting this approach from the start and are now looking to adopt these principles in planning their garden town. This is good for people and business as well as wildlife. Barratt expects the value and saleability of its homes to be improved by the quality of greenspace and there is evidence that local businesses can also be boosted by a green setting. For the community, greenspace can improve children’s educational prospects and their connection to nature, and contribute to improved mental and physical health and wellbeing. The Kingsbrook project will be carried out over about a decade with a comprehensive monitoring programme, developed and overseen by RSPB scientists.
Barratt have a unique national partnership with the RSPB helping to translate the lessons learnt at Kingsbrook across their development portfolio, having rolled out a ‘Growing with Nature Guide’, embedding a biodiverse approach to all developments, and planting high value plant species that support more wildlife. We want the Plan to help organisations make more of these innovative ideas. To that end, the Government will:
- Set up a stronger domestic carbon offset mechanism and carbon guarantee scheme. These will encourage private sector investment and develop markets for domestic carbon sequestration. Businesses will be encouraged to plant trees as a cost-effective way to counterbalance their residual carbon emissions; we will also explore how we could extend this approach to include other land activities. First, we will introduce a reporting framework for businesses that drives demand for Domestic Offset Units or Credits. Government will also explore whether a Forest Carbon Guarantee scheme is viable, using the existing Woodland Carbon Code as a way of sharing the risk to attract investors and increase demand for domestically grown timber.
- Embed an ‘environmental net gain’ principle for development, including housing and infrastructure and explore options to introduce a system of conservation covenants in English law. This will provide long-term assurance that compensatory habitats will be maintained to the standard required.
- Test, encourage and embed natural flood management solutions in the appropriate places, and alongside more traditional defences where needed, including new ways of financing schemes (see chapter 3).
- Work with partners to consider whether benchmarking of environmental products and supply chain certification schemes could make consumers more aware of them, and drive higher standards.
- Consider the results of Natural England’s pilot of the BITC Landscape Enterprise Network approach in the Hampshire Avon catchment and assess how to encourage better uptake. Working with businesses on natural capital investment
Business in the Community works to create healthy communities with successful business at their heart. As well as their Landscape Enterprise Network initiative referenced above, BITC’s Water Resilient Cities programme has been working with schools and NHS sites in Manchester to explore an innovative way of financing the retrofitting of sustainable drainage features (SuDS – e.g. green roofs and rain gardens).
A scoping study has identified benefits from a strategic roll out of SuDS in public estates across Greater Manchester, having investigated the time taken to pay back the upfront capital costs through savings made from reduced surface water charges in the schools’ water bills. The SuDS measures would bring benefits to the schools and wider communities in the form of air and water quality, flood risk reduction, education, health, carbon sequestration, urban cooling and biodiversity. More information is available on the BITC website.
- Work with partners to determine the potential for a domestic natural environment impact fund. Such a facility could provide technical assistance and financing for projects that use the kind of market mechanisms listed above (see box below).
- Government will establish a green business council to advise government on setting the right conditions to stimulate environmental entrepreneurism. We will work with partners to determine its exact focus (see box below).
A Natural Environment Impact Fund
The government wants to build on the momentum for more private sector financing and drive further progress in the use of market mechanisms that capture the value of natural capital.
Defra will work with a range of partners on stimulating innovation in designing and implementing projects that can improve the natural environment and generate revenue to pay for project costs. We will convene interested parties to explore the potential for a facility to blend capital from a range of sources (e.g. public, private philanthropic) to provide technical assistance funding and repayable finance to projects with the potential to improve the natural environment and generate revenue. Such a blended facility could issue a mix of grants and loans on a long-term repayment basis at below-market rates to help address some of the market failures that have to date limited the take up of return-generating natural environment projects. This would encourage innovation, help to develop the evidence base and develop a track record that could lead to such projects attracting mainstream investment and the creation of new natural capital markets.
A Green Business Council
The government will also work with partners to establish a green business Council for advice on the following:
- Actions by government to encourage, incentivise and create the right conditions for private sector innovation in green enterprise and environmental entrepreneurialism.
- Developing and articulating the ‘business case’ for companies to assess, address and report on natural capital risks and opportunities in their operations and supply chains.
- Positioning the UK as an international leader in providing knowledge-based goods and services, contributing to the protection of natural capital and its sustainable use.
- Options on how to develop new natural capital markets – for example, in exploring how more revenue streams could be generated to make natural capital assets investable.
- Seeking opportunities for new sector-specific environmental initiatives, inspired by the Courtauld Commitment and the plastic bag levy; enabling more water company investment in natural capital solutions.
5. We will work across society to secure lasting change
We want this Plan to speak to everyone – citizens, local councils, charities, NGOs, businesses. It is important that everyone who impacts on the environment and derives benefits from it plays their part. We all need to adopt a long-term and committed approach of ‘Do more: harm less’.
It is clear that momentum for positive change is growing and we must harness this in coming months and years. Government will help bring about change in a variety of ways, using both incentives and regulation where necessary, to make sure that responsible attitudes towards the environment become the norm. Many businesses are also playing their part. Fast-food outlets are introducing segregated recycling bins with separate sections for paper cups, plastics and liquids, proclaiming their ‘ambition to send zero waste to landfill’. Other retailers are swapping plastic straws for paper, and replacing plastic coffee stirrers with wooden ones. Another example is the work of water companies, high street retailers, coffee shops and transport hubs who we will support to offer new refill stations for people to top-up their water bottles in every major city and town in England. The water industry will also fund the scaling up of an app to enable the public find their nearest refill station.
Consumers are beginning to realise that their plastic cotton bud has a lifespan that far outlasts their fleeting usefulness, but there is much further to go.
This Plan sets out how government is leading, and we will now work with all parts of society and all sectors of the economy over the coming year to identify their contribution to improving the environment.
Conclusion
We humans and the stunning multitude of other living creatures on this earth are completely dependent on each other. Our beautiful green and blue planet is our shared and only home. We have a choice. We can destroy and degrade our natural capital for short term gain, and leave an impoverished inheritance for future generations. Or we can preserve and enhance the world - for ourselves, for future generations and for all the other creatures who share the globe with us.
This Government has chosen the path of preservation and enhancement. Our Plan sets out an ambitious agenda for the next 25 years. Delivery of the Plan will require sustained and committed effort not just from government but from organisations and individuals across our nation. This needs to be a shared endeavour and the Government intends to work collaboratively with partners across the nation and globally to make a reality of its aspirations. We call on all organisations and individuals – in this country and globally - to join us in our commitment to improving the environment.
We can preserve and enhance the world - for ourselves, for future generations and for all the other creatures who share the globe with us (Photo: Rich Lukey).
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7f2a63e4f2f02d3e8ef12af4c373215897c0f01e | Adult social care risk assessment facilitated self-assessment workshop and action planning The offer
Alongside our updated adult social care risk awareness self-assessment tool, we are offering system leaders in health and social care a free workshop of up to one and a half days to undertake the self-assessment exercise with support from skilled and experienced facilitators in a confidential and peer-supported environment. The workshop offers a structured, 360 degree look at risk in adult social care and is open to senior leaders in councils (and their system partners where this would be helpful).
The offer includes brokering additional support where a more in-depth look at some of the risk domains would be helpful and could include finance and resources, workforce, safeguarding, commissioning and markets and reducing delayed transfers of care. We can offer this opportunity at individual council, sub regional or regional level and it will be tailored to specific requirements eg where local variations of the self-assessment tool have been developed. Context
The LGA’s Care and Health Improvement Programme (CHIP) developed a new approach to risk in adult social care during 2015, underpinned by the introduction and widespread adoption of a risk awareness self-assessment tool. Individual councils and regions have increasingly made use of this voluntary self-assessment tool, adapting it to meet local need where helpful, to identify and mitigate local and regional risks in adult social care. The tool has also been used by directors of adult social care to facilitate discussions with chief executives, chief finance officers, elected members and other system leaders and to develop mitigation actions.
Building on positive feedback from the sector, the LGA commissioned a refresh of the risk tool in 2016. To complement this, we are now offering councils (and system partners where helpful) the option of an external, independently facilitated workshop to undertake the self-assessment along with local senior system leaders. Specialist support where needed from LGA Care and Health Improvement Advisers (CHIAs) and principal advisers is also on offer.
Benefits
• a tried, tested and trusted sector-led improvement approach to assessing risk in adult social care • an updated risk awareness tool which can be used flexibly to support self-assessment at local, sub regional and regional level depending on local circumstances • clear signposting and brokerage to other sector-led improvement tools and support offers where required, including tailored, specialist support to councils most at risk of financial failure • supporting directors of adult social care experiencing or anticipating financial and/or other risk to develop and communicating a coherent narrative about adult social care system-wide risks • directors, chief executives, chief finance officers and elected members can define and understand their financial and/or other risks and communicate these to other system leaders.
What’s on offer?
• a free full-day facilitated workshop on site plus a half day action planning/review follow-up meeting • highly skilled and experienced facilitators with credibility and senior level experience in local government, health and adult social care • pre-workshop discussion with the LGA, local CHIA and system leader(s) sponsoring the workshop to ensure it is tailored to local need • an active, engaging peer led conversation to prompt open and honest group discussion in a safe and confidential environment • an agreed, locally owned action plan including brokerage for other support tools and offers from the LGA • a confidential summary of learning points and action plan from the workshop • a follow up action planning/review session (if required). What we ask
• commitment from senior system leaders to participate in the workshop and support implementation of action plans • completion of agreed pre-event tasks • agreeing the workshop date, venue and refreshments and a contact to liaise with the LGA • willingness to share learning and experience about both the process and outcomes with the LGA in an anonymised form.
Contact
For further information and to discuss how to plan a session to meet your needs, please contact your CHIA or email [email protected]
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5bef6aed1c2555c3d58b531ec68344b1d6548702 | Application for removal or variation of a condition following grant of planning permission.
Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990
You can complete and submit this form electronically via the Planning Portal by visiting www.planningportal.gov.uk/apply
Publication of applications on planning authority websites Please note that the information provided on this application form and in supporting documents may be published on the Authority’s website. If you require any further clarification, please contact the Authority’s planning department.
Please complete using block capitals and black ink. It is important that you read the accompanying guidance notes as incorrect completion will delay the processing of your application.
| 1. Applicant Name and Address | 2. Agent Name and Address | |-------------------------------|--------------------------| | **Title:** MR & MRS | **Title:** MR | | **First name:** | **First name:** ANDREW | | **Last name:** PECKETT | **Last name:** GEE | | **Company (optional):** | **Company (optional):** AXIS ARCHITECTURE | | **Unit:** | **Unit:** | | **House number:** | **House number:** | | **House suffix:** | **House suffix:** | | **House name:** FIVEWAYS | **House name:** TALBOT CHAMBERS | | **Address 1:** MAYNARD ROAD | **Address 1:** 2-G NORTH CHURCH STREET | | **Address 2:** | **Address 2:** | | **Address 3:** | **Address 3:** | | **Town:** GRINDELFORD, HOPE VALLEY, | **Town:** SHEFFIELD | | **County:** DERBYSHIRE | **County:** SOUTH YORKSHIRE | | **Country:** UK | **Country:** UK | | **Postcode:** S32 2JD | **Postcode:** S1 2DH | 3. Site Address Details Please provide the full postal address of the application site.
Unit: [ ] House number: [ ] House suffix: [ ]
House name: FIVEWAYS Address 1: MAYNARD ROAD Address 2: Address 3: Town: GRINDLEFORD, HOPE VALLEY County: DERBYSHIRE Postcode (optional): S32 2JD
Description of location or a grid reference, (must be completed if postcode is not known): Easting: [ ] Northing: [ ]
4. Pre-application Advice Has assistance or prior advice been sought from the local authority about this application? [ ] Yes [ ] No
If Yes, please complete the following information about the advice you were given. (This will help the authority to deal with this application more efficiently).
Please tick if the full contact details are not known, and then complete as much as possible:
Officer name: TERESA CRITCHLOW Reference: PLANNING OFFICER Date (DD/MM/YYYY): 11/03/2014
Details of pre-application advice received:
5. Description Of Your Proposal Please provide a description of the approved development as shown on the decision letter, including the application reference number and date of decision in the sections below:
ALTERATIONS AND EXTENSIONS TO DWELLING HOUSE
Reference number: NP/DD/0710/0692 Date of decision (DD/MM/YYYY): 04/05/2011
Please state the condition number(s) to which this application relates:
01. [ ]
02. [ ]
03. [ ]
04. [ ]
05. [ ]
06. [ ]
07. [ ]
08. [ ]
09. [ ]
10. [ ]
Has the development already started? [ ] Yes [ ] No
If Yes, please state when the development started (DD/MM/YYYY):
Has the development been completed? [ ] Yes [ ] No
If Yes, please state when the development was completed (DD/MM/YYYY):
6. Condition(s) - Removal Please state why you wish the condition(s) to be removed or changed:
SUBSTITUTION OF SCHEME DRAWINGS LISTED ON CONSENT NOTICE IN ORDER TO REGULARISE WORKING AMENDMENTS TO APPROVED SCHEME
If you wish the existing condition to be changed, please state how you wish the condition to be varied:
DEVELOPMENT TO BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH: 26308 (04) 01 REV K; 26308 (04) 02 REV M; 26308 (02) 01 REV P and 26308 (02) 02 REV P 7. Ownership Certificates and Agricultural Land Declaration
One Certificate A, B, C, or D, must be completed with this application form
CERTIFICATE OF OWNERSHIP - CERTIFICATE A
Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2010 Certificate under Article 12
I certify that the applicant certifies that on the day 21 days before the date of this application nobody except myself, the applicant was the owner\* of any part of the land or building to which the application relates, and that none of the land to which the application relates is, or is part of, an agricultural holding\*\*
NOTE: You should sign Certificate B, C or D, as appropriate, if you are the sole owner of the land or building to which the application relates but the land is, or is part of, an agricultural holding.
- "owner" is a person with a freehold interest or leasehold interest with at least 7 years left to run. \*\* "agricultural holding" has the meaning given by reference to the definition of "agricultural tenant" in section 65(8) of the Act.
Signed - Applicant: Or signed - Agent: Date (DD/MM/YYYY):
CERTIFICATE OF OWNERSHIP - CERTIFICATE B
Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2010 Certificate under Article 12
I certify that the applicant certifies that I have given the requisite notice to everyone else (as listed below) who, on the day 21 days before the date of this application, was the owner\* and/or agricultural tenant\*\* of any part of the land or building to which this application relates.
- "owner" is a person with a freehold interest or leasehold interest with at least 7 years left to run. \*\* "agricultural tenant" has the meaning given in section 65(8) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
| Name of Owner / Agricultural Tenant | Address | Date Notice Served | |-------------------------------------|---------|--------------------| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Signed - Applicant: Or signed - Agent: Date (DD/MM/YYYY): 7. Ownership Certificates and Agricultural Land Declaration (continued)
CERTIFICATE OF OWNERSHIP - CERTIFICATE C
Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2010 Certificate under Article 12
I certify/ The applicant certifies that:
• Neither Certificate A or B can be issued for this application • All reasonable steps have been taken to find out the names and addresses of the other owners\* and/or agricultural tenants\*\* of the land or building, or of a part of it, but I have/ the applicant has been unable to do so.
- "owner" is a person with a freehold interest or leasehold interest with at least 7 years left to run. \*\* "agricultural tenant" has the meaning given in section 65(8) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
The steps taken were:
| Name of Owner / Agricultural Tenant | Address | Date Notice Served | |-------------------------------------|---------|--------------------| | | | |
Notice of the application has been published in the following newspaper (circulating in the area where the land is situated):
On the following date (which must not be earlier than 21 days before the date of the application):
Signed - Applicant: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Or signed - Agent: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date (DD/MM/YYYY): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
CERTIFICATE OF OWNERSHIP - CERTIFICATE D
Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2010 Certificate under Article 12
I certify/ The applicant certifies that:
• Certificate A cannot be issued for this application • All reasonable steps have been taken to find out the names and addresses of everyone else who, on the day 21 days before the date of this application, was the owner\* and/or agricultural tenant\*\* of any part of the land to which this application relates, but I have/ the applicant has been unable to do so.
- "owner" is a person with a freehold interest or leasehold interest with at least 7 years left to run. \*\* "agricultural tenant" has the meaning given in section 65(8) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
The steps taken were:
| Name of Owner / Agricultural Tenant | Address | Date Notice Served | |-------------------------------------|---------|--------------------| | | | |
Notice of the application has been published in the following newspaper (circulating in the area where the land is situated):
On the following date (which must not be earlier than 21 days before the date of the application):
Signed - Applicant: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Or signed - Agent: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date (DD/MM/YYYY): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
8. Planning Application Requirements - Checklist
Please read the following checklist to make sure you have sent all the information in support of your proposal. Failure to submit all information required will result in your application being deemed invalid. It will not be considered valid until all information required by the Local Planning Authority has been submitted.
The original and 3 copies of a completed and dated application form: ☐
The original and 3 copies of other plans and drawings or information necessary to describe the subject of the application: ☐
The correct fee: ☐
The original and 3 copies of the completed, dated Ownership Certificate (A, B, C or D – as applicable) and Article 12 Certificate (Agricultural Holdings): ☐ 9. Declaration I/we hereby apply for planning permission/consent as described in this form and the accompanying plans/drawings and additional information. I/we confirm that, to the best of my/our knowledge, any facts stated are true and accurate and any opinions given are the genuine opinions of the person(s) giving them.
Signed - Applicant: Or signed - Agent: Date (DD/MM/YYYY): 10/06/2014
10. Applicant Contact Details
| Telephone numbers | Extension number: | |-------------------|------------------| | Country code: | National number: | | | Extension number:| | Country code: | Mobile number (optional): | | Country code: | Fax number (optional): | | Email address (optional): |
11. Agent Contact Details
| Telephone numbers | Extension number: | |-------------------|------------------| | Country code: | National number: | | | Extension number:| | Country code: | Mobile number (optional): | | Country code: | Fax number (optional): | | Email address (optional): |
12. Site Visit
Can the site be seen from a public road, public footpath, bridleway or other public land? Yes ☑ No
If the planning authority needs to make an appointment to carry out a site visit, whom should they contact? (Please select only one)
☑ Agent ☐ Applicant ☐ Other (if different from the agent/applicant’s details)
Contact name: Telephone number:
Email address:
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838c8ab36ea3a14bfb177cde4db47583323d3622 | | Department family | Entity | Date | Expense type | Expense area | Supplier | Transaction number | Amount | |-------------------|--------|------|--------------|--------------|----------|--------------------|--------| | BLOOD TRANSFUSION SERVICE | BLOOD TRANSFUSION SERVICE | 07/06/2012 | Blood Transfusion Service | PATHOLOGY | NHS BLOOD AND TRANSPLANT | 0015002037 | 89,281.74 | | Clinical Haem FP10 | Clinical Haem FP10 | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | PATHOLOGY | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 89,281.74 | | DR CHETI | DR CHETI | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | CANCER SERVICES | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 1,661.51 | | FP10 DERMATOLOGY | FP10 DERMATOLOGY | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | UNPLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 2,844.59 | | FP10 CARDIOLOGY | FP10 CARDIOLOGY | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | UNPLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 2,363.14 | | FP10 DIABETES & ENDOCRINOLOGY | FP10 DIABETES & ENDOCRINOLOGY | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | UNPLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 715.60 | | FP10 ELDERLY CARE | FP10 ELDERLY CARE | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | UNPLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 360.86 | | FP10 ELDERLY CARE STROKE CLINIC | FP10 ELDERLY CARE STROKE CLINIC | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | UNPLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 141.71 | | FP10 ELDERLY FALLS CLINIC | FP10 ELDERLY FALLS CLINIC | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | UNPLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 129.77 | | FP10 ELDERLY NEUROLOGICAL | FP10 ELDERLY NEUROLOGICAL | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | UNPLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 3,440.89 | | FP10 ELDERLY PARKINSON'S | FP10 ELDERLY PARKINSON'S | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | UNPLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 120.16 | | FP10 GASTROENTEROLOGY | FP10 GASTROENTEROLOGY | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | UNPLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 11,031.23 | | FP10 PAIN CLINIC | FP10 PAIN CLINIC | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | UNPLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 676.10 | | FP10 RESPIRATORY CARE | FP10 RESPIRATORY CARE | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | UNPLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 793.13 | | MISC FP10HP | MISC FP10HP | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | PLANNED CARE - MEDICAL STAFF | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 11,748.61 | | OBS/GYNEA WARD DRUGS | OBS/GYNEA WARD DRUGS | 07/06/2012 | FP10s | OBSTETRICS AND GYNAECOLOGY | PRESCRIPTION PRICING AUTHORITY | 0015002037 | 3,438.51 | | PHARMACY DEPARTMENT | PHARMACY DEPARTMENT | 07/06/2012 | Prescription Charges | | | | | | LAUNDRY SERVICES | LAUNDRY SERVICES | 21/06/2012 | Other General Supplies & Serv | | | | | | CMU CARDIOLOGY | CMU CARDIOLOGY | 07/06/2012 | Prosthesis - Other | | | | | | Incontinence Supplies | Incontinence Supplies | 14/06/2012 | Dressings | | | | | | CYTOLOGY | CYTOLOGY | 07/06/2012 | Laboratory Equipment - Dispos | | | | | | Trust Wide | Trust Wide | 07/06/2012 | Creditor - NHS | | | | | | ELECTRONICS DEPARTMENT | ELECTRONICS DEPARTMENT | 14/06/2012 | Med & Surg Mtc | | | | | | HOSPITAL REDEVELOPMENT | HOSPITAL REDEVELOPMENT | 21/06/2012 | Business Rates | | | | | | Trust Wide | Trust Wide | 22/06/2012 | Creditor - NHS | | | | | | DIVISIONAL SLR INCENTIVE | DIVISIONAL SLR INCENTIVE | 07/06/2012 | Purchase of Tangible Asset | | | | | | Trust Wide | Trust Wide | 07/06/2012 | Creditor - NHS | | | | | | CATARACT SUITE | CATARACT SUITE | 07/06/2012 | Nurse Qualified PBS-7 | | | | | | CATARACT SUITE | CATARACT SUITE | 07/06/2012 | Nurse Unqualified PBS-4 | | | | | | MR RAMANATHAN | MR RAMANATHAN | 07/06/2012 | Consultants | | | | | | MR SANDRAMOULI | MR SANDRAMOULI | 07/06/2012 | Services-NHS - Sub Contr HCare | | | | | | MR SANDRAMOULI | MR SANDRAMOULI | 07/06/2012 | Consultants | | | | | | MR SANDRAMOULI | MR SANDRAMOULI | 07/06/2012 | OPTOMETRY SERVICE | | | | | | MR SHUN SHIN | MR SHUN SHIN | 07/06/2012 | Consultants | | | | | | MR YANG | MR YANG | 07/06/2012 | Consultants | | | | | | OPHTHAL MR BHATNAGAR | OPHTHAL MR BHATNAGAR | 07/06/2012 | Consultants | | | | | | OPHTHALMOLOGY JUNIOR MED | OPHTHALMOLOGY JUNIOR MED | 07/06/2012 | Other Career Grades | | | | | | OPHTHALMOLOGY JUNIOR MED | OPHTHALMOLOGY JUNIOR MED | 07/06/2012 | Specialised Registrars | | | | | | Ophthalmology OPD | Ophthalmology OPD | 07/06/2012 | HCA PB3-7 | | | | | | CORPORATE PA'S | CORPORATE PA'S | 08/06/2012 | Other Establishment Exp | | | | | | CMU CARDIOLOGY | CMU CARDIOLOGY | 14/06/2012 | Prosthesis - Other | | | | | | Trust Wide | Trust Wide | 15/06/2012 | Creditor - NHS | | | | | | CONNECTING FOR HEALTH | CONNECTING FOR HEALTH | 07/06/2012 | SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE | | | | | | BLOOD TRANSFUSION SERVICE | BLOOD TRANSFUSION SERVICE | 07/06/2012 | Blood Transfusion Service | | | | | | AMBULANCES | AMBULANCES | 07/06/2012 | Other Transport Costs | | | | | | AMBULANCES | AMBULANCES | 07/06/2012 | Other Transport Costs | | | | | | IMAGING DEPARTMENT | IMAGING DEPARTMENT | 21/06/2012 | Med & Surg Equipment | | | | | | Trust Wide | Trust Wide | 07/06/2012 | Creditor - NHS | | | | | | AMBULANCES | AMBULANCES | 28/06/2012 | Other Transport Costs | | | | | | SUPPORT SERVICES DIRECTOR | SUPPORT SERVICES DIRECTOR | 21/06/2012 | Domestic Waste | | | | | | LAUNDRY SERVICES | LAUNDRY SERVICES | 21/06/2012 | Other General Supplies & Serv | | | | | | LAUNDRY SERVICES | LAUNDRY SERVICES | 21/06/2012 | Other General Supplies & Serv | | | | | | Department family | Entity | Date | Expense type | Expense area | Supplier | Transaction number | Amount | |-------------------|--------|------|--------------|--------------|----------|--------------------|--------| | Trust Wide | Trust Wide | 21/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL HOSPITAL CO PLC | 0070007650 | 1,561,172.83 | | 12 Portland Street | 12 Portland Street | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 1,109.00 | | 8/9 Bentley Lane | 8/9 Bentley Lane | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 3,475.00 | | Anchor Meadow | Anchor Meadow | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 4,793.00 | | Bentley Health Centre | Bentley Health Centre | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 1,829.00 | | Broadway | Broadway | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 1,536.00 | | Darlaston Health Centre | Darlaston Health Centre | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 1,563.00 | | Forrester Street MC | Forrester Street MC | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 435.00 | | Lichfield Street Surgery | Lichfield Street Surgery | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 5,066.00 | | Pinfold Health Centre | Pinfold Health Centre | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 2,712.00 | | Pleck Health Centre | Pleck Health Centre | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 141.00 | | Refuse-Dartmouth House | Refuse-Dartmouth House | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 3,332.00 | | Refuse-Hatherton Centre | Refuse-Hatherton Centre | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 2,323.00 | | Refuse-Moat Road | Refuse-Moat Road | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 2,104.00 | | Rushall HC | Rushall HC | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 588.00 | | Sina Health Centre | Sina Health Centre | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 1,186.00 | | SOFT SERVICES - ABLEWELL | SOFT SERVICES - ABLEWELL | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 6,642.00 | | Soft Services-78/80 Ida Road | Soft Services-78/80 Ida Road | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 2,731.00 | | Soft Services-Beechdale Centre | Soft Services-Beechdale Centre | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 5,400.00 | | Soft Services-Blackwood HC | Soft Services-Blackwood HC | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 1,682.00 | | Soft Services-Blakenall Meadow | Soft Services-Blakenall Meadow | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 6,168.00 | | Soft Services-Brace Street HC | Soft Services-Brace Street HC | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 7,253.00 | | Soft Services-Brownhills | Soft Services-Brownhills | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 3,071.00 | | Soft services-Collingwood PMS | Soft services-Collingwood PMS | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 83.00 | | Soft Services-Sheffield Clinic | Soft Services-Sheffield Clinic | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 8,725.00 | | Soft Services-Short Heath Clinic | Soft Services-Short Heath Clinic | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 6,043.00 | | Soft Services-Willenhall HC | Soft Services-Willenhall HC | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 5,955.00 | | St Johns MC | St Johns MC | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 75.00 | | Sycamore Hse - Utilities | Sycamore Hse - Utilities | 07/06/2012 | SERVICES FROM OTHER NHS BODIES | Estates & Facilities | WALSALL PRIMARY CARE TRUST | 0070007650 | 1,319.00 | | Trust Wide | Trust Wide | 07/06/2012 | Creditors - NHS | Trust Wide | NHS SUPPLY CHAIN | 0070008666 | 98,422.26 | | MINOR WORKS | MINOR WORKS | 28/06/2012 | UNITARY PAYMENT | HOSPITAL REDEVELOPMENT | THE WALSALL HOSPITAL CO PLC | 0070008777 | 32,852.60 | | PFI Unitary Payment | PFI Unitary Payment | 28/06/2012 | UNITARY PAYMENT | HOSPITAL REDEVELOPMENT | THE WALSALL HOSPITAL CO PLC | 0070008781 | 26,735.68 | | Trust Wide | Trust Wide | 08/06/2012 | Creditors - Trade | Trust Wide | ROCHE PRODUCTS LTD | 0080099406 | 25,841.88 | | Trust Wide | Trust Wide | 07/06/2012 | Creditors - Trade | Trust Wide | ABBOTT LABORATORIES LIMITED | 0090099725 | 25,354.08 | | Trust Wide | Trust Wide | 21/06/2012 | Creditors - Trade | Trust Wide | ABBOTT LABORATORIES LIMITED | 0090101190 | 25,354.08 | | **TOTAL** | | | | | | **3,718,534.09** |
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48dd042ba2df9d6c5768640dcc8f921f6c5bd616 | Staff Register of Interests and Gifts & Hospitality City of York Council Internal Audit Report 2015/16
Directorate: Customer and Business Support Services Responsible Officer: AD – Customers and Employees Service Manager: Executive Support Assistant to Chief Executive Date Issued: 26th July 2016 Status: Final Reference: 19100/003
| Actions | P1 | P2 | P3 | |---------|----|----|----| | Overall Audit Opinion | Limited Assurance | Summary and Overall Conclusions
Introduction In accordance with the council’s Employee Code of Conduct, all employees are required to declare any personal interests which may conflict with the interests of the council or adversely affect the performance of their duties. Such disclosure protects employees from accusations of impropriety. Declarations should be made in accordance with guidance notes on registers of interests and declarations of conflicts of interests. A confidential register is held centrally in the business support hub.
Additionally, each directorate should hold a register or registers to record offers of gifts and hospitality along with details of rejection, or acceptance and subsequent distribution.
Objectives and Scope of the Audit The purpose of this audit was to provide assurance to management and members that procedures and controls within the system will ensure that:
• registers are kept and completed in accordance with guidelines and these are easily accessible to staff • declarations of interest are made by all relevant staff • registers are reviewed regularly by appropriate officers • information about staff interests is held securely and cannot be accessed inappropriately.
The audit covered staff registers of interest and gifts & hospitality; members’ declarations were not included.
Key Findings Since the 2012-13 audit, directorate registers of interest have been successfully combined into one central register, however this has not been updated since March 2014. However, related party declarations have been completed on an annual basis for Chief Officers as part of the Final Accounts process.
In the majority of cases acceptance of gifts has been appropriate, and authorised by a senior officer, and there were also instances of gifts not being accepted, which demonstrates awareness of appropriate conduct. However, not all registers have been authorised or reviewed by the appropriate senior officers.
At the time of the audit policies and guidance were unclear and they still remain difficult to locate/access, (for example, they are not easily searchable) and update and improvement was needed to clarify exactly what the council requires in respect of declarations of interests and gifts and hospitality. Monitoring and oversight by senior officers is also needed to ensure the requirements the council sets out are adhered to, and that registers of both interests and gifts are operating effectively as a mechanism for ensuring a culture of transparency and integrity within the council.
Maintenance and upkeep of the staff register of interest and registers of gifts & hospitality has recently become the responsibility of the Executive Support Assistant to the Chief Executive. While it is accepted that there will be a transitional period in the handover of the administrative process, ultimate responsibility and oversight is with senior officers to ensure controls are in place and operating effectively.
**Overall Conclusions**
It was found that the arrangements for managing risk were poor with significant control weaknesses in key areas and major improvements required before an effective control environment will be in operation. Our overall opinion of the controls within the system at the time of the audit was that they provided Limited Assurance. 1 Gifts and Hospitality
| Issue/Control Weakness | Risk | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Acceptance of gifts has not always been authorised by an appropriate officer. | Lack of scrutiny or oversight may mean gifts are accepted inappropriately resulting in the integrity of officers, or the council at large, being called into question. | | Guidance is not sufficiently clear to explain processes and requirements in respect of gifts and hospitality. | Staff may fail to understand policy requirements leading to inappropriate acceptance of gifts/hospitality. |
Findings
The 'Gifts and Hospitality Policy' is available on the intranet, and includes guidance on the types of gifts and hospitality that are acceptable as well as general guidance such as reviewing the registers and using the appropriate template, however this guidance includes a broken link to a template document, and therefore needs to be updated.
The 'Gifts and Hospitality Policy' also contains guidance relating to declarations of interest. Two paragraphs on page 2 relate to declarations of interest without any background information or explanation as to why this is included or how it relates to declarations of gifts, and moreover it is not clear either from the title of the policy or the introductory paragraphs that guidance on declaring interests is included in this document. Staff looking for this information would be unlikely at first glance to identify that it was contained within this policy.
In the majority of cases, entries on registers of gifts had been authorised by a senior officer. A number of registers contained only declarations for individual directors, and in the majority of these cases entries had not been authorised by the Chief Executive, and in one case the authorisation field contained the name of the director receiving the gift/hospitality.
Although the entries reviewed did not seem inappropriate, they should still be authorised by the chief executive to ensure gifts are not accepted inappropriately. All staff, including directors, should be made aware of the process and requirements for declaring gifts/hospitality following refresh of guidance documentation.
Agreed Action 1.1
Immediate guidance will be reviewed and updated by senior officers responsible for setting out the council’s requirements in respect of declarations of interest (under all circumstances) and gifts/hospitality to ensure:
| Priority | Responsible Officer | |----------|---------------------| | 2 | AD – Customers and Employees |
- There is a policy/guidance document setting out the background, requirements and process;
- It is clearly stated who should review entries and how frequently this should be done;
- Information and documents held on the intranet are up to date and links are not broken;
- Guidance is easy to locate and accessible by all staff.
- Guidance should continue to make clear that the responsibility for providing declarations of interest and gifts/hospitality is the responsibility of all staff.
**Agreed Action 1.2**
When guidance has been updated, it should be communicated to staff at all levels and across all directorates, and they should be required to read the updated policies to ensure that the council at large has an understanding of the purpose of both registers of interests and gifts, and their responsibilities in respect of both. This will be communicated via Buzz and as part of inductions for new staff.
| Priority | 2 | |----------|---| | Responsible Officer | AD – Customers and Employees | | Timescale | Implemented |
**Agreed Action 1.3**
Future declarations will be authorised by the appropriate officer.
| Priority | 2 | |----------|---| | Responsible Officer | ESA to Chief Exec | | Timescale | Immediate | 2 Register of Interests
| Issue/Control Weakness | Risk | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Guidance is not sufficiently clear to explain processes and requirements in respect of declarations of interest. | Staff may fail to understand policy requirements leading to not declaring relevant interests |
Findings
Section 8 of the employee code of conduct states that ‘Employees should declare in writing to their Chief Officer any financial or non-financial interests which they consider could conflict with the interests of the Council or adversely affect the performance of their duties.’ It does not specify which employees are expected to do this as a matter of course, nor signpost to appropriate policies and guidance detailing this.
The guidance in these paragraphs indicates that, 'All relevant staff (chief officers, service managers and identified staff groups) should complete an 'interests' declaration annually', however it does not clarify which groups are 'identified staff groups' or who has responsibility for determining this.
There exist two types of conflict of interest forms: those for ‘Declaration of Staff Interests’, and for ‘Conflicts of interest’. The available guidance suggests that the two forms should be used in different situations – the former by staff asked to routinely complete declarations of financial and non-financial interests, and the latter for staff who are not asked to do this as a matter of course, but “where the employee has not been formally asked to declare their interests and/or the conflict of interest is of a temporary nature.”
The information on the intranet directs those looking for guidance on declaration of interests towards guidance on temporary conflicts of interest, despite the guidance for the latter indicating that they are considered to be two different situations. Additionally, the guidance and forms are either difficult to locate or in some cases unavailable. Where forms are available they are not linked in guidance documents, nor accessible from the same intranet page.
Declarations of interest held on the staff register are from March 2014, and therefore are out of date. The guidance (currently held in the gifts and hospitality policy, as noted in finding 1) states that, 'All relevant staff (chief officers, service managers and identified staff groups) should complete an interests declaration annually', however this does not appear to have been undertaken for 18 months. However, the annual declarations by Chief Officers had been completed as part of the process for completing the 2014-15 accounts, therefore there are records of interests declared for these staff, although this is a separate process. Responsible officers may wish to combine the processes for obtaining declarations for both finance and corporate governance purposes. Agreed Action 2.1
Guidance will be reviewed and updated by senior officers responsible for setting out the council’s requirements in respect of declarations of to ensure:
- There is a policy/guidance document setting out the background, requirements and process;
- It is explicitly stated which staff are required to complete declarations as a matter of course and what process should be followed to enable this;
- It is clearly stated who should review declarations and how frequently this should be done.
- There is one form covering all types of declaration of interest to avoid confusion;
- Information and documents held on the intranet are up to date and links are not broken;
- Guidance should continue to make clear that the responsibility for providing declarations of interest and gifts/hospitality is the responsibility of all staff.
| Priority | 2 | |----------|---| | Responsible Officer | AD – Customers and Employees | | Timescale | Implemented |
Agreed Action 2.2
Consideration will be made to combining the process for the final accounts declarations and the annual returns as part of policy/process review
| Priority | 2 | |----------|---| | Responsible Officer | AD – Customers and Employees | | Timescale | 31 July 2016 | Audit Opinions and Priorities for Actions
### Audit Opinions
Audit work is based on sampling transactions to test the operation of systems. It cannot guarantee the elimination of fraud or error. Our opinion is based on the risks we identify at the time of the audit.
Our overall audit opinion is based on 5 grades of opinion, as set out below.
| Opinion | Assessment of internal control | |-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | High Assurance | Overall, very good management of risk. An effective control environment appears to be in operation. | | Substantial Assurance | Overall, good management of risk with few weaknesses identified. An effective control environment is in operation but there is scope for further improvement in the areas identified. | | Reasonable Assurance | Overall, satisfactory management of risk with a number of weaknesses identified. An acceptable control environment is in operation but there are a number of improvements that could be made. | | Limited Assurance | Overall, poor management of risk with significant control weaknesses in key areas and major improvements required before an effective control environment will be in operation. | | No Assurance | Overall, there is a fundamental failure in control and risks are not being effectively managed. A number of key areas require substantial improvement to protect the system from error and abuse. |
### Priorities for Actions
| Priority | Description | |----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Priority 1 | A fundamental system weakness, which presents unacceptable risk to the system objectives and requires urgent attention by management. | | Priority 2 | A significant system weakness, whose impact or frequency presents risks to the system objectives, which needs to be addressed by management. | | Priority 3 | The system objectives are not exposed to significant risk, but the issue merits attention by management. | Where information resulting from audit work is made public or is provided to a third party by the client or by Veritau then this must be done on the understanding that any third party will rely on the information at its own risk. Veritau will not owe a duty of care or assume any responsibility towards anyone other than the client in relation to the information supplied. Equally, no third party may assert any rights or bring any claims against Veritau in connection with the information. Where information is provided to a named third party, the third party will keep the information confidential.
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6ae229ff2de9e3694e8a413b44330dff68a32dee | Internal Consultation Response relating to:
- NP/DDD/0514/0536 (6520)
- Elton Old Hall, Main Street, Elton,
- Listed Building Consent - To restore the original stone gate posts at the front of the property as agreed on the 20th September 2006 (NP/DDD/0906/0869)
Planning Officer: Steven Wigglesworth
Statutory Designations: Elton Old Hall was listed Grade II on the 12 July 1967. Please see the following link for the relevant list description, http://list.english-heritage.org.uk/resultsingle.aspx?uid=1157912. The property is believed to date from the 17th century with early 18th century and later alterations and additions. Laid out in T-plan, the structure is two storeys with attic space to the south wing. The building is constructed from coursed rubble gritstone with gritstone dressings whilst the roofs are covered with Welsh slate and concrete tiles.
The north gable end to the property directly fronts the street, with a gritstone boundary wall containing the north-west corner of the curtilage to the building. The site is located within the historic core of the settlement and the Elton Conservation Area. The Elton Conservation Area was designated on 5 July 1996 and a character appraisal of this Conservation Area was adopted, by the Authority, on the same day.
Detailed comments/justification This listed building consent application proposes the re-instatement of the upper part of the gate-piers at Elton Old Hall.
The gate-piers are positioned within the front section of the boundary wall, to the north-west of the site. The remains of the former gate piers comprise two short gritstone piers, plain in design, set on a base made up on two courses of stonework with the upper course slightly splayed. The gate-piers were listed in their own right in July 1967. The list description for the piers described the feature as, 'Stone and square on plan with ball finials. C.18.Group Value'. However, the gate-piers were de-listed in 14 December 1983, presumably because they had been altered, i.e. the ball finials and top section removed.
A listed building consent was granted, in 2006, for the introduction of a top section to the gate-piers. This design was more understated than the current proposal. A listed building consent application was submitted for the current proposal in June 2014 and there were concerns about the initial design. Following extensive research, a sketch showing the former gate-piers was sourced from the Youth Hostel Association's archivist. The proposed design for the upper section of the gate-piers was amended in line with this drawing.
I confirm that, in this instance, I have no objection to the principle of re-instating the upper part of the gate-piers as shown in the revised drawing, submitted 25 July 2014. There is also no objection to the proposed size, mass and general design. I would suggest that the base to the ball finials and the top of the cornice to the piers are slightly amended, but this item can be a condition.
The proposed works will make good a historic feature that contributes to the setting of listed building and the character and appearance of Elton Conservation Area. In addition, the proposed re-instatement works are based on evidence of the former gate-piers. As such, this listed building consent application is in line with local and national planning policy. I therefore recommend approval with the following conditions. Suggested mitigation/conditions/footnotes
1. Full details of the proposed cornice to the gate-piers and base of the ball finials, particularly the design, shall be submitted and agreed in writing with the Authority, prior to commencement of this work.
2. Full details of the proposed stone and its tooling shall be submitted and agreed in writing with the Authority, prior to commencement of this work.
3. There shall be a recess to the internal face of the stone pier to match the lower part of the gate-piers. Hi Steven / Rebecca,
Please find attached amended design for gateposts at Elton Old Hall (NP/DDD/0514/0536) as discussed during the site visit on Monday 21st July.
Best wishes
Martin – 07876 232022
My Country Houses Ltd | www.myCountryHouses.co.uk | call 01629 734 414 | near Chatsworth | Peak District Derbyshire 1 hour: manchester nottingham sheffield 2 hours: london st pancras to chesterfield
5\* ELTON OLD HALL c1668 (Delightful Derbyshire Hall, 6-14 guests) www.eltonoldhall.co.uk
5\* PORTLAND HOUSE c1870 (Gorgeous Gentleman’s Residence, 12-24 guests) www.portlandhouse1870.co.uk
Hi Martin Please find the attached Regards Mark
R M Eaton Stonemasonry www.rmeaton.co.uk 2650 overall height
Hall
650
600
470 Mr. and Mrs. Harrop - The Old Youth House - Exon. Proposed restoration of gateposts - Caroline Whittle - R.M.H. Exton Stonemason.
Proposal
Approv. £ 2080 Prop. £ 2450.
Existing
Proposal
Supply & fitting inc VAT from John Martin Volunteer Archivist for YHA (England and Wales)
1 Feversham Drive Kirkbymoorside North Yorkshire YO62 6DH Tel 01751 431572
[email protected]
Dear Rebecca Waddington
Thank you for your query concerning Elton Youth Hostel's gateposts. I am working as YHA's volunteer archivist.
I have searched through illustrations of the hostel in the Archive catalogue and my own collection and can find only one, a postcard sketch, that shows the original ball finials. It is dated 1954. A later postcard shows the finials to be missing. I hope that they provide sufficient evidence. The postcards also show that other alterations were made to the side garden wall and window provision early during YHA's ownership. You may be interested to correct your file notes: Elton Hall was a Youth Hostel from 1942 to 2003. It was purchased by them in 1942. If you have any further historical information on the house, I would appreciate it for our own historical file. If you client would like further information about the house's youth hostel years, please pass on my contact details.
Kind regards
John Martin | Description | |-------------| | Stone and square on plan with ball finials. C.18. Group value. |
**Site Plan**
- Old Lead Mine
- New Lead Mine
- Buck Lane
- East End
**Date**
- 14.12.83
**DELISTED ON**
- 14.12.83
**APRIL 1984** | District Code Number | Description | Inspection Date | Initials | State of Building | Use | Grams | Notes | |----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|----------|-------------------|-----|-------|-------| | | High boundary wall, gateway reduced in height, approx. 85 cm high. Some blocks from wall survive on site, but no evidence of ball finials apart from 1 ball finial to be seen in the first yard of a cottage opposite. | 13/12/77 | | | | | |
Peak Park Joint Planning Board, Aldern House, Baslow Road, Bakewell, Derbyshire DE4 1AA. Bakewell 2861
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116c7ffde1d89e5871052a423ed614a457ffbcf6 | Combi-Alu & Combi-Alu + Outward Opening Windows Combi-Alu & Combi-Alu + Outward Opening Windows
Combi-Alu windows are now specified on a regular basis across the construction industry due to the attractiveness of not only a maintenance free solution, but also for improved thermal, acoustic and aesthetic qualities over all aluminium alternatives.
These factors make it a very popular choice on many large projects for commercial and residential use, but also for domestic use on individual homes for both new build and renovation. With enhanced security options to provide compliance with Secured by Design, and many additional glazing options for safety or comfort, this system caters for the whole market, and is available at a very competitive price.
Combi-Alu +
1. Energy efficient low-e triple glazing with a total u-value of 1.02W/m²K (pine) or a double glazed low-e unit (Combi Alu) with total u-value of 1.50W/m²K
2. The glazing unit is embedded into the sash by 15mm, improving thermal insulation.
3. Aluminium box sections preserve the life of timber, and ensure a maintenance free product.
4. Laminated (engineered) sections of either Pine or Oak provide enduring warp-free performance.
5. Factory finished to a whole range of colours and stains.
6. Additional flap gasket adding extra weather tightness.
Specification
- Strong box profile aluminium frame externally with engineered timber profiles internally • Pine or Oak internally • Polyester powder coated or anodised aluminium externally • Factory applied paint, stain or clear lacquer internally • Casement and reversible hinges • All multi-point locking • Externally beaded, drained and ventilated • Double glazed with overall u-value of up to 1.5W/m²K • Triple glazed with overall U-value of up to 1.0W/m²K • SECURITY TESTED TO BS7950 (security test referred to for Secured By Design Specifications) • Competitive price Combi-Alu & Combi-Alu + Outward Opening Windows
Profiles Combi Alu products are manufactured using laminated (engineered) and finger jointed timber for optimum strength and aluminium box sections externally. All timber is from carefully selected sources with full FSC certification and all timber profiles are preservative treated using environmentally friendly substances after undergoing final machining. Oak profiles are non-finger jointed and a pine option with selected timber (no finger jointing) is available.
Types Fixed window Top Swing Reversible (TT180) Top Hung (TS45) Side Swing 90 (SS90) Side Hung Balcony Doors (Outward Opening)
Glazing Externally beaded with a drained and ventilated design. 28mm double glazed units 40mm triple glazed units Soft coat low-e coatings Argon gas filling Overall u-value of 1.02W/m2k (triple glazed) or 1.5W/m2K (double glazed) Thermal insulated bars (optional)
Many variants available including: Toughened glass Laminated glass for enhanced security and safety Acoustic (up to 40dB) Solar control (clear & tinted) Self cleaning Standard obscure glass is sandblasted (fig 2) Optional patterned versions available such as “Crepi” (fig 1).
Structural Glazing Bars Structural bars know as transoms (horizontal) or mullions (vertical) are used to separate 2 pieces of glass in either a fixed or an opening light, and also as the structural element between an opener and a fixed when built into 1 frame. Structural transoms and mullions on the Combi-Alu system are 66mm wide.
Decorative Glazing Bars Decorative glazing bars are a slimmer, more elegant solution to create a more traditional appearance. The decorative glazing bars available for the Combi Alu system are either within the sealed unit, but without internal or externally planted bars; OR with a 28mm bar internally, dummy spacer bars, and with 28mm aluminium externally.
Glazing Bars Two types; structural & decorative:
Side Swing 90
Top Swing Reversible
Structural Glazing Bars
Planted Decorative Glazing Bars
Non Planted Decorative Glazing Bars
RAL Classic (All colours) Pine Stains Combi-Alu & Combi-Alu + Outward Opening Windows
Ironmongery Pack Entrance and balcony doors have several options as regards handles and locks. The following options are available:
- Handle with thumb turn lock inside only (BPK 1)
- Handle with thumb turn inside, handle only outside (BPK 2)
- Handle with thumb turn inside, handle and locking cylinder outside (BPK 3)
- Handle with locking cylinder inside only (BPK 4)
- Handle with locking cylinder inside, handle only outside (BPK 5)
- Handle with locking cylinder inside and outside (BPK 6)
- Handle with thumb turn and child safety lock inside only (BPK 7)
Finish As the frames are made from 2 components - the aluminium and the timber, it is a standard option to choose different colours inside and out at no extra cost with the combi alu system. All paints and stains used are water based micro-porous products from Teknos. Actual timber stain samples are sent out upon receipt of order to help assist in the correct colour choice for your project. Factory applied paint finishes from the RAL classic range (approx 250 colours) or the NCS range (approx 2000 colours) can also be selected. Aluminum cladding is finished with a polyester powder coating to a choice of colours from the RAL Classic range. Standard RAL colours are white RAL 9016 on timber and white RAL 9016 and anthracite grey RAL 7016 on alu-clad all in 30% gloss level.
Trickle Vents Building regulations require the use of trickle vents to allow correct ventilation of buildings for health reasons. Trimvents are used on the Combi-Alu system which are fitted discreetly into the soffit on the head of the frame.
Accessories
- Trickle vents to outer frame = trimvent (fig 3)
- SAA key locking Hoppe Handles (fig 4)
- Opening restrictors (standard on TT180)
- Protective film to glazed units for protection
- Low aluminium threshold on doors
- Aluminium cill extensions
Performance Tested & certified by BM Trada for compliance to:
- BS 6375 Part 1 & 2 - Performance windows and Doors
- BS 7950 - Specification for enhanced security performance of windows (required for Secured by Design compliance)
- Acoustic possibilities up to 40dB Rw
- Thermal insulation of 1.02W/m²K
Cill Flashing Detail Aluminium Cill Flashings made to order (dimension ‘x’) to prevent water ingress into structural openings. They are polyester powder coated to match the external finish of the product.
Oak Stains
Fig 1 (Crepi) Fig 2 (Sandblasted) Fig 3 (Trimvent) Fig 4 (Hoppe Handle) Design Possibilities Combi-Alu & Combi-Alu +
Side Hung
- W = 440 - 970
- H = 580 - 1670
TS45
- W = 440 - 1670
- H = 420 - 1670
Balcony Doors
- W = 679 - 1060
- H = 1800 - 2400
SS 90
- W = 440 - 970
- H = 580 - 1670
TT 180
- W = 540 - 1670
- H = 550 - 1600
Looking for some technical support? If you need help choosing your profile, window/door type, glazing options or you just want some general information then please do not hesitate to contact our customer support team who are always on hand to offer you expert advice.
Customer Support 01777 874510 Combi-Alu Double Glazed, 1:5 Scale
Fixed head, cill & Jamb
Opening head, cill & jamb
Door head & cill
Combi-Alu + Triple Glazed, 1:5 Scale
Fixed head, cill & Jamb
Opening head, cill & jamb
Door head & cill
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9b971b5be36f2e849cf02a5160655652e5642cac | Phase D Operations During This Phase (Dates 2021 to end of 2025)
1. Mineral extraction will progress in a northerly direction within the eastern half of the quarry to a basal level of 225m aOD. Watering will continue to a maximum depth of 225m aOD.
2. A new ramp will be created in the south-eastern corner of the quarry to provide access into the quarry void.
3. On completion of the new access ramp, the existing ramp in the north-east will be removed and the material placed in the western restoration area.
4. The new access ramp will be processed in the quarry void and temporarily stockpiled before being used in the asphault plant or transported off site.
5. This phase will release approximately 950,000 tonnes of limestone.
6. Approximately 102,800m³ of tipped material will be removed from the Deep Dale Tip area and the majority transported to the western restoration area.
7. To provide access for vehicles removing material from the lower part of Deep Dale, a temporary access track will be created along the Deep Dale valley floor. A cutting will be created to provide access into the quarry void.
8. Section of Footpath 37 south of Deep Dale Tip remains closed for the duration of Deep Dale restoration operations.
Note: Drawings based on geotechnical designs by Quayle Design and based on end of phase position.
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5010ef8e5142fb7c68bb63b9bd33b3a502ae399c | FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE BRITISH BEHAVIOUR ABROAD REPORT 2013
Overview of total worldwide figures of Consular assistance over the past five years
| Year | Total Consular assistance cases | Drug Arrests | Arrests (including drug arrests) | Deaths | Hospitalisations | Rapes | Sexual Assaults | Other Assistance | Lost and stolen passports/Emergency travel documents | |--------|---------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------|--------|------------------|-------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------| | 2008/09| 19,387 | 991 | 6,919 | 5,629 | 3,146 | 116 | 154 | 3,423 | 29,774 | | 2009/10| 19,839 | 994 | 6,439 | 5,930 | 3,689 | 132 | 140 | 3,509 | 27,272 | | 2010/11| 19,228 | 799 | 5,700 | 5,972 | 3,752 | 115 | 163 | 3,526 | 25,969 | | 2011/12| 19,874 | 816 | 6,015 | 6,237 | 3,739 | 127 | 154 | 3,602 | 28,659 | | 2012/13| 19,244 | 669 | 5,435 | 6,193 | 3,599 | 138 | 172 | 3,707 | 28,783 | Top 20 countries where British nationals required the most Consular assistance from 1 April 2012 - 31 March 2013
The following chart is ordered by number of total Consular assistance cases, from highest to lowest. 2012-2013 figures correspond to 1 April 2012 – 31 March 2013.
| Country | Number of Visitors¹ | Number of British Residents² | Drug Arrests | Total Arrests / Detention | Total Deaths | Hospitalisation | Rape | Sexual Assault | Total Other Assistance | Total Assistance | |------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|--------------|-----------------|------|----------------|------------------------|-----------------| | Year | 12-13 | 12-13 | 12-13 | 11-12 | 12-13 | 11-12 | 12-13| 11-12 | 12-13 | 12-13 | | Spain | 13,653,846 | 795,784³ | 103 | 141 | 1,599 | 1,909 | 1,492| 1,755 | 899 | 1,105 | | USA | 3,800,000 | 829,000 | 159 | 147 | 1,120 | 1,305 | 153 | 210 | 140 | 143 | | France | 17,100,000 | 400,000³ | 28 | 27 | 134 | 142 | 820 | 778 | 211 | 197 | | Thailand | 870,164 | 50,000 | 36 | 38 | 188 | 204 | 389 | 296 | 285 | 217 | | Greece | 1,920,794 | 35,000 | 14 | 8 | 87 | 111 | 165 | 147 | 359 | 494 | | Germany | 2,162,489 | 141,706³ | 10 | 15 | 121 | 118 | 516 | 366 | 34 | 32 | | Cyprus | 1,069,190 | 59,000 | 25 | 29 | 150 | 164 | 220 | 237 | 105 | 102 | | United Arab Emirates | 1,000,000 | 100,000 | 13 | 11 | 244 | 201 | 54 | 63 | 54 | 28 | | Portugal | 1,900,000 | 35,900³ | 12 | 4 | 27 | 19 | 194 | 210 | 116 | 83 | | Australia | 592,400 | 1,101,021³ | 2 | 12 | 106 | 112 | 87 | 94 | 69 | 42 | | Turkey | 2,582,054 | 51,000 | 4 | 6 | 44 | 64 | 114 | 110 | 107 | 115 | | India | 787,000 | 36,000 | 7 | 4 | 42 | 39 | 103 | 107 | 80 | 67 | | Canada | 724,000 | 609,000 | 14 | 21 | 132 | 123 | 139 | 103 | 19 | 17 | | China | 1,187,706 | 284,600³ | 10 | 8 | 119 | 149 | 72 | 59 | 46 | 39 | | Egypt | 1,034,000 | 15,000 | 0 | 6 | 32 | 66 | 49 | 53 | 130 | 120 | | Philippines | 113,282 | 15,000 | 7 | 2 | 27 | 20 | 94 | 89 | 34 | 25 | | Italy | 2,676,121 | 59,120³ | 9 | 7 | 37 | 22 | 67 | 135 | 89 | 92 | | Pakistan | 275,351 | 43,000 | 3 | 1 | 21 | 25 | 39 | 19 | 10 | 6 | | Netherlands | 2,500,000 | 45,000 | 1 | 6 | 78 | 57 | 43 | 40 | 8 | 11 | | New Zealand | 189,056 | 250,000 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 33 | 115 | 127 | 11 | 13 | | Total Worldwide Figures | 653 | 816 | 5,435 | 6,015 | 6,193 | 6,237 | 3,599 | 3,739 | 138 | 127 |
¹ Number of visitors includes British nationals and their dependants ² Number of British residents includes British nationals and their dependants ³ Figures for 2012-2013 ⁴ Figures for 2011-2012 The following chart is ordered by the country that Britons are most likely to require assistance. The chart has been calculated by taking the number of assistance cases divided by the number of visitors and residents combined.
| Country | Number of Visitors | Number of British Residents | Visitors and residents combined | Total Assistance 2012/13 | |--------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------| | Philippines | 113,282 | 15,000 | 128,282 | 272 | | Thailand | 870,164 | 50,000 | 920,164 | 1,141 | | Pakistan | 275,351 | 43,000 | 318,351 | 238 | | Cyprus | 1,069,190 | 59,000 | 1,128,190 | 565 | | New Zealand | 189,056 | 250,000^4 | 439,056 | 188 | | India | 787,000 | 36,000 | 823,000 | 352 | | United Arab Emirates | 1,000,000 | 100,000 | 1,100,000 | 436 | | Greece | 1,920,794 | 35,000 | 1,955,794 | 715 | | USA | 3,800,000 | 829,000 | 4,629,000 | 1,548 | | Germany | 2,162,489 | 141,706^3 | 2,162,489 | 705 | | Spain | 13,653,846 | 795,784^4 | 14,449,630 | 4,658 | | Egypt | 1,034,000 | 15,000 | 1,049,000 | 336 | | Canada | 724,000 | 609,000 | 1,333,000 | 345 | | China | 1,187,706 | 284,600^4 | 1,472,306 | 338 | | Australia | 592,400 | 1,101,021^4 | 1,693,421 | 373 | | Portugal | 1,900,000 | 35,900^4 | 1,935,900 | 403 | | Turkey | 2,582,054 | 51,000 | 2,633,054 | 371 | | Italy | 2,676,121 | 59,120^4 | 2,735,241 | 271 | | France | 17,100,000 | 400,000^4 | 17,500,000 | 1,358 | | Netherlands | 2,500,000 | 45,000^4 | 2,545,000 | 188 |
1 Figures are based on the latest visitor numbers provided by individual country authorities 2 *Global Brit: Making the most of the British diaspora, 2010* 3 Federal Government statistics, including military and their dependents (based on 2011-12 data) 4 Figures are based on British Embassy/High Commission estimates for 2012-13 Notes:
Total Worldwide Figures: includes all countries
Top 20 List: Compiled using total assistance services for all countries decided by the following attributes: Arrest; arrest – drugs; assault – sexual; rape; death; hospitalisation; and other assistance.
Other Assistance includes: Abduction; Assault - General; Child - Access; Child - Abduction; Child - Custody; Forced Marriage; Missing Persons; Mental health; Repatriation; Welfare; missing person reports. ‘Other assistance’ does not include any advice and self-help enquiries.
REPORT FINDINGS AND FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TRAVEL ADVICE
HOSPITALISATIONS
Report findings:
- Spain continues to be the country with the highest number of Britons hospitalised (899 cases). The number of hospitalisations are lower than last year as is the case for a number of other popular holiday hotspots on the Mediterranean
- Consular staff have been working more closely with local hospitals to make them more aware of the types of cases where the FCO can add value. FCO staff have also strengthened ties with charities who support British nationals in less critical situations which allows the FCO to focus on the most vulnerable
- Proportionally Brits are most likely to be hospitalised in Thailand (285 cases) followed by the Philippines
- The number of hospitalisation cases handled in Thailand has increased by around a third (31%) to 285 cases. Many of these are linked to the ageing British population in the country and road traffic accidents
FCO advice:
- Research the health risks of the country you are visiting online as soon as possible before travelling, so you can get the right vaccinations and preventative measures (e.g. malaria tablets) if required. Visit http://www.nhs.uk/livewell/travelhealth/Pages/Travelhealthhome.aspx for more information • Ensure your medication is legal in the country you are visiting – contact the Embassy of the country to which you are travelling and visit http://www.nathnac.org and www.nhs.uk for more information
• If you hire a moped or quad bike, check the small print of your travel insurance to make sure you are covered and always wear a helmet
• Remember most insurers won’t pay out if you injure yourself or others when you’ve been drinking alcohol – check your policy’s small print
DEATHS ABROAD
Report findings:
• 1,492 British nationals died in Spain, followed by France (820) and Germany (516)
• As a proportion, Brits are significantly more likely to die in the Philippines than in any other country - there are large numbers of elderly British expats who live in the Philippines, which accounts for most of the hospitalisation or death cases – relatively few tourists die or are hospitalised
FCO advice around death abroad:
• No matter how old or how fit you are, take out comprehensive travel insurance – if an uninsured person dies whilst abroad any treatment they have received and their repatriation to the UK is unlikely to be covered. Bringing a body back to the UK can cost thousands of pounds.
• If you are living in the UK and a relative or friend dies when abroad, then you should contact the FCO on 020 7008 1500. If you are abroad, you should contact the relevant Embassy, High Commission or Consulate.
• It is essential that the death is registered in the country where the person died. The FCO can advise you how to do this. The FCO can advise you about bringing a body and personal belongings back to the UK and provide support during a distressing time.
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
Report findings:
- Overall there was a 20% increase in reported rape cases from 2010-11 and a 9% increase on cases reported last year
- The highest number of reported sexual assaults occurred in Spain (39), 42% of which were reported to have occurred in the Balearic Islands
FCO advice on rape and sexual assault abroad:
- We encourage anyone who is a victim of rape or sexual assault overseas to contact their nearest Embassy or Consulate for support. There are contact details for Embassies on the FCO website at: https://www.gov.uk/government/world/organisations We can offer support in a number of ways including explaining local procedures, accompanying people to the police station, helping them deal with local authorities and medical staff and contacting friends or family at home if requested
- We would encourage people to take the same precautions they would at home to avoid putting themselves at risk – for example keeping an eye on their friends; never accepting car rides from strangers, and asking their hotel to recommend a taxi firm; and never leaving food or drinks unattended, so they can't be spiked ARRESTS, DRUG ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS
Report findings:
- The overall number of arrests has decreased by 10%. Most cases were handled in Spain (1,599) followed by the USA (1,120) and the United Arab Emirates (244)
- Although the overall number of arrests has decreased some countries have seen an increase in cases, including the United Arab Emirates, Italy and the Netherlands
- Drug arrests involving Brits abroad have dropped to their lowest (653) since the report first launched in 2009 with a decrease of 32% compared to the number of cases in 2009/10, when figures were at their highest.
- Most drug arrest cases were handled in the USA (159) followed by Spain (103)
FCO advice:
- Don’t take risks with the law abroad – or you could end up throwing years of your life away in a foreign prison
- Think about what you are doing at all times and trust your instincts – do not take risks that you would not at home. Many countries have a zero-tolerance approach to offences involving drugs and alcohol and sentences can be long
- It is a good idea to research the local laws and customs of the country you are visiting - there may be serious penalties for breaking a law that might seem trivial at home. Country-specific local laws and customs can be found at www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice KNOW BEFORE YOU GO CAMPAIGN
The British Behaviour Abroad figures have been released as part of the Know Before You Go (KBYG) campaign which encourages British nationals to prepare for their foreign travel so they can avoid preventable problems. The campaign works with around 600 travel industry partners to communicate its messages to help Britons stay safe and healthy abroad.
It’s important to know how the FCO can help you when you’re abroad:
| The FCO can: | The FCO can’t: | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | • Issue you with an emergency travel document | • Help you enter a country if you don’t have a valid passport or necessary visas | | • Give you a list of local lawyers, interpreters, doctors or funeral directors | • Give you legal advice | | • Contact friends and family back home for you if necessary | • Get you better treatment in hospital or prison than is given to local people | | • Provide information about transferring funds | • Pay any bills or give you money | | • Visit you in hospital or if you have been arrested | • Make travel arrangements for you |
Before you travel, visit [www.gov.uk/knowbeforeyougo](http://www.gov.uk/knowbeforeyougo) to get the latest travel advice about your destination, and make a note of the number of the nearest British Embassy or Consulate to where you are staying, so you can ask for help if you need it.
Report updated on 15 August 2013
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b2487ada535a09a31b18fab6fe1da7f9ce6e49a7 | British Library
Annual Report and Accounts 2016/17 Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 4(3) and 5(3) of the British Library Act 1972
Laid before the Scottish Parliament by the Scottish Ministers 12 July 2017 Laid before the National Assembly for Wales by the [First Secretary] 12 July 2017 Laid before the National Assembly for Northern Ireland 14 July 2017
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 12 July 2017 Contents
Chairman and Chief Executive’s Introduction 4
Annual Report 2016/17 Our Purposes 7 Custodianship 8 Research 12 Business 16 Culture 20 Learning 24 International 28 Public Lending Right 32 Enabling Living Knowledge 34 Key Performance Indicators 36 Grants and Donations 38
Annual Accounts 2016/17 41 Statement of Directors’ and Accounting Officer’s Responsibilities 42 Financial Review 43 Reference and Administrative Details 46 Sustainability Report 47 Remuneration Report 50 Governance Statement 55 The Certificate and Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General to the Houses of Parliament and the Scottish Parliament 62 Statement of Financial Activities 63 Balance Sheet 64 Cashflow Statement 65 Notes to the Accounts 66 Chairman and Chief Executive’s Introduction
In a year of dramatic events on the global stage, we are proud that this has been an exceptional year for advancing the Library’s international purpose, working with partners around the world to advance knowledge and mutual understanding.
Our cultural engagement in China is unprecedented in its depth and breadth, most vividly illustrated with the signing of an exhibition agreement with the National Library of China at 2016’s UK-China High Level People to People Dialogue in Shanghai. Some of the Library’s most iconic objects, including an early Shakespeare Quarto, will star in exhibitions across China through to 2019. The initiative was launched to acclaim at both the National Library of China at 2016’s UK-China High Level People to People Dialogue in Shanghai and here in King’s Cross, the Knowledge Quarter – of which the Library is a founder member – was established as a company limited by guarantee in its second year of operation. That is testament to how rapidly it has grown and the strength of the networks built between 80 local organisations involved in advancing and disseminating knowledge. It is an engine of collaboration in the local area, on topics including improvements to public realm, skills sharing and cultural engagement. Our openness to partnership working is also shaping the development of our estates and buildings. Our 42-acre site in Boston Spa, Yorkshire, at the geographical heart of the UK, is key to the national knowledge infrastructure and stores 70% of the Library’s collections. Our vision for the future of Boston Spa is taking shape, envisaging a renewed centre of excellence in physical and digital collection management.
In London, we were delighted that our St Pancras Transformed development vision was approved by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and HM Treasury. This will ultimately deliver 100,000 square feet of new space, at no cost to the Exchequer, for the Library and The Alan Turing Institute (the national institute for data science, headquartered at the British Library in St Pancras) to grow into. The space will create new opportunities to deliver learning activities for people of all ages, provide spaces for entrepreneurs and small businesses to engage with our thriving Business & IP Centre, and for bold new cultural exhibitions and events.
The transformation of our iconic London building has already begun. This year we opened a Members’ Room offering a peaceful retreat from the academic environs of our Reading Rooms and the buzz of our public spaces. Our refurbished Knowledge Centre offers a superb 255-seat Theatre, with a new bar and updated conferencing facilities. A new restaurant and coffee shop improves the catering options available to our users in this landmark building.
This physical transformation is already amplifying the human life of the Library. Major exhibitions ranged from a celebration of the cultural phenomenon that was Punk 1976–78 to an exploration of 400 years of Shakespeare in Ten Acts. Our accompanying cultural programme has brought some of the most inspiring and thought-provoking subjects to life, from the Hip Hop Shakespeare Company’s unique storytelling to Margaret Atwood receiving the 2016 PEN Pinter Prize, and from Grayson Perry’s use of maps in his art to Sir John Major’s family roots in the music halls of England. We welcomed almost 1.5m people to the Library and continued to deliver excellent service, with around 95% of users expressing satisfaction with our Reading Rooms and exhibitions. In common with many London cultural institutions, we experienced a small but disappointing reduction in our overall visitor numbers. In response, we are making improvements to our Treasures Gallery to ensure that our core offer continues to inspire and engage in future years.
We launched a well-received Membership scheme in November with over 1,700 signing up in the first five months for the unique benefits offered by the scheme. This has been an important step for the Library, helping to cement our status as a leading cultural heritage institution and creating vital financial support to care for our collection.
Underpinning these exciting developments is the continued growth and curatorial development of our collection. This year, that meant adding over 330,000 physical items and 180 terabytes of digital content, and undertaking the preservation of over 18,000 heritage objects. Despite the ceaseless growth in demand each year that our collection and preservation duties entail, we are performing impressively on sustainability, driving down carbon emissions by 37.6% since our baseline year of 2009/10.
All these achievements and more have been made possible through careful financial planning and efficient use of resources; and through the tireless efforts of our staff, steadily bringing to life our Living Knowledge vision with energy, creativity and passion.
Baroness Blackstone Chairman
Roly Keating Chief Executive Our Purposes
The British Library’s six purposes define everything that we do and explain the enduring ways in which the funding we receive helps deliver tangible public value. By fulfilling each of these purposes we aim to achieve our wider objective of making our intellectual heritage available to everyone, for research, inspiration and enjoyment.
1 Custodianship We build, curate and preserve the UK’s national collection of published, written and digital content
2 Research We support and stimulate research of all kinds
3 Business We help businesses to innovate and grow
4 Culture We engage everyone with memorable cultural experiences
5 Learning We inspire young people and learners of all ages
6 International We work with partners around the world to advance knowledge and mutual understanding We build, curate and preserve the UK’s national collection of published, written and digital content
Our role in collecting the nation’s intellectual and cultural heritage is at the heart of everything we do, from the millions of items we make available to researchers via our Reading Rooms to the growing suite of material we share online with audiences around the world.
This core purpose includes preserving the nation’s sound heritage through the Save Our Sounds programme, which works to protect recordings at risk of degrading or becoming unplayable as formats evolve. This year, we were awarded a £9.5m National Lottery grant toward Unlocking Our Sound Heritage, a major £18.8m preservation and access project. This will create the first ever national network of sound preservation centres, who will work with the British Library to save almost half a million unique and vulnerable recordings. These will be used to create a new web resource to open up access to audiences, which will go live in 2019. Save Our Sounds is part of our Heritage Made Digital programme of work, which will include in 2017/18 projects working on the digitisation of Indian printed books, key Ethiopic manuscripts, and particularly fragile British newspapers from the 19th century.
The collection of printed works (including books, newspapers, serials, music scores, maps and atlases) continues to grow at pace with over 330,000 items added this year through legal deposit. Our physical collection occupies over 720 linear kilometres of shelf space, 70% of which meets international archival standards. Preservation of the collection is a substantial undertaking, with over 18,000 items preserved this year using techniques such as binding, rebinding, minor repairs and boxing.
Opposite: ‘Criterion’ hard-back notebook, with notes and scenarios for novels. Part of the P G Wodehouse archive, acquired this year; Below: Storage void of the National Newspaper Building at Boston Spa. Photo by Kippa Matthews. The growth of our digital collections continues to accelerate. Over the past year we added nearly 73,000 e-books and over 1.12m e-journal articles to our digital library system (bringing our total digital collection of e-books and e-journal articles to more than 120,000 and 2m respectively). The Library also delivers the UK Web Archive and, in 2016, conducted the fourth UK domain web crawl harvesting some 70 terabytes of content. This is estimated at approximately 2billion web assets (including web pages, images, videos and documents) and some 12m websites. We anticipate continued growing demand pressures in digital collection, storage and preservation; upgrading our capacity is a strategic priority as we build our vision for our Boston Spa site in Yorkshire.
In addition to legal deposit, our expert curatorial teams continued to collect and preserve for the nation a range of inspiring cultural heritage content including:
- **The P G Wodehouse Archive** The personal archive of P G Wodehouse (1881–1975), best known for his series of comic novels featuring Jeeves and Wooster, has come to the British Library on loan from Sir Edward Cazalet, Wodehouse’s step-grandson, and is to be made publicly available for the first time.
- **Elgar’s Unfinished Pomp and Circumstance March** Sketches by Sir Edward Elgar (1857–1934) for an unfinished sixth march in the renowned Pomp and Circumstance series were acquired with assistance from the Friends of the British Library. Originally presented by Elgar to the violinist W H Reed (d. 1942), they supplement the Library’s pre-eminent holdings of Elgar manuscripts.
- **The Archive of Will Self** Will Self’s dystopian visions and outrageous scenarios hold up a distorting mirror to contemporary British society. Prolific as a writer of fiction and as a journalist, Self is also prominent as a public intellectual, broadcasting at times controversial views in the national media. The archive acquired by the Library comprises diaries, working notebooks, audio-visual material and the author’s computer hard drive and correspondence with authors including J G Ballard, John Banville, Iain Sinclair, Martin Amis and Oliver Sacks.
- **Poems by Swinburne** Autograph poems, essays and plays by Algernon Charles Swinburne (1837–1909) were acquired with assistance from the Friends of the British Library, supplementing the Library’s pre-eminent collection of Swinburne manuscripts and letters.
- **Archive of Joan Bakewell** Joining the Library’s growing collection of contemporary archives in the field of politics and public life, the archive of broadcaster Joan Bakewell documents her pioneering career in television journalism and her remarkable personal and professional journey from pre-war Stockport to the post-millennial corridors of the House of Lords.
- **One of the earliest known Handel manuscripts.** The Library acquired the autograph manuscript of ‘Se tu non lasci Amore’, by composer Georg Frideric Handel. Written in Naples, it is one of the earliest Handel manuscripts known. It was acquired with assistance from the Friends of the British Library, the Friends of the National Libraries, and The Handel Institute.
**Custodianship: Our plans for 2017/18**
- Develop a compelling strategic vision for Boston Spa Renewed as a centre of excellence for physical and digital collection management
- Successfully procure a technology solution that will enhance our technical capacity to collect, preserve and guarantee access to digital items. Our collection continues to support a diverse range of research activity, with the Library playing a key role in the nation’s research infrastructure. We provide access to the latest findings across all disciplines alongside vast heritage and legal deposit collections. We meet the information needs of a global audience, including professional researchers from higher education, public sector bodies including the NHS, pharmaceutical and other companies and people undertaking personal research.
Our Reading Rooms were accessed almost 400,000 times in 2016/17 and satisfaction levels remain consistently high. Just over 95% of Readers described themselves as ‘very’ or ‘quite satisfied’ with the Library’s services and facilities. Over 1.65m items were accessed on site, and just under 3.7m items were consulted online. Our document supply service, British Library On Demand, provided researchers across the globe from Albania to Zambia with access to some 300,000 documents.
We actively stimulate innovative research methods. The British Library Labs team hosted a series of competitions and received over 400 expressions of interest from researchers who wanted to explore new digital scholarship approaches to open up the Library’s digital collections. We supported researchers with advice, content and resources to discover new insights, such as Hannah Rose-Murray who made use of the Library’s newspaper and image archives (via Flickr) to map the 19th-century black abolitionist movement in the UK.
We continue to support the changing needs of our research users. In December 2016, we agreed a new data strategy, built on the vision that data will be as integrated into our services as text is today. This strategy is linked into another important development: our key partner The Alan Turing Institute, the UK’s institute for data science, began its first academic year based in their new premises here at St Pancras. Over 100 researchers are now working on a range of data science challenges, including Fin Tech, cyber-security, and computing and data analytics.
We support and stimulate research of all kinds
Opposite: Researchers in St Pancras. Photo by Pete Carr. Below: Artist Michael Takeo Magruder used our digitised 19th Century Maps as part of an art project called Imaginary Cities. He took historic digitised maps and transformed them into compelling 2D, 3D printing and virtual art pieces. © Michael Takeo Magruder, Imaginary Cities (London & Paris studies), 2017. In November 2016, our status as an independent research organisation (IRO) was expanded to give us eligibility to conduct research for all UK Research Councils. The external support that we are able to secure as an IRO enables a wide range of research-driven projects, programmes, studentships, fellowships and placements across the Library.
Arts, Humanities and Research Council (AHRC) projects involving the Library have included Native Routes: Early Americas and the UK, Digital Delius, Reading Aloud in Britain Today and Cross-Language Dynamics: Reshaping Community. Our research capability in the social sciences has also grown through Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) collaborative doctoral studentships, a strategic partnership with ESRC North West Doctoral Training Partnership, and the launch of a new postdoctoral research fellowship with the British Sociological Association. We renewed our involvement as a partner in the Cohort & Longitudinal Studies Enhancement Resources project with co-funding from ESRC and the Medical Research Council. The project brings together a number of longitudinal studies tracking the experiences of people living in the UK, so that researchers can share data, skills and insight.
Our collaborative doctoral programme was extended by further AHRC-funded studentships commencing in 2019 and our current cohort of 30 PhD students continue to provide new, innovative and energetic input into collaborations to enhance our research, culture, international and custodianship purposes. We also launched a new placement scheme offering professional development opportunities to funded PhD students from across the UK and overseas. Our Open Days for first-year PhD students were attended by 600 students from across the UK discovering the resources and services available to them at the Library.
Research: Our plans for 2017/18
- Improve our digital services to the research community as part of our ‘Everything Available’ portfolio. This includes piloting new discovery services for publications and data, enhancing remote access to our collections and new tailored delivery models as well as new services for using Library content, for example through machine interfaces
- Develop our partnership with The Alan Turing Institute, formulating key data challenges in the libraries and heritage sectors, with a view to developing a unique, collaborative research programme
- Work with partners in the higher education and culture sectors to improve the UK’s digital research infrastructure through new services for curating, sharing and re-using digital heritage objects, data and research outputs.
In November 2016, our status as an independent research organisation (IRO) was expanded to give us eligibility to conduct research for all UK Research Councils. The external support that we are able to secure as an IRO enables a wide range of research-driven projects, programmes, studentships, fellowships and placements across the Library.
Arts, Humanities and Research Council (AHRC) projects involving the Library have included Native Routes: Early Americas and the UK, Digital Delius, Reading Aloud in Britain Today and Cross-Language Dynamics: Reshaping Community. Our research capability in the social sciences has also grown through Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) collaborative doctoral studentships, a strategic partnership with ESRC North West Doctoral Training Partnership, and the launch of a new postdoctoral research fellowship with the British Sociological Association. We renewed our involvement as a partner in the Cohort & Longitudinal Studies Enhancement Resources project with co-funding from ESRC and the Medical Research Council. The project brings together a number of longitudinal studies tracking the experiences of people living in the UK, so that researchers can share data, skills and insight.
Our collaborative doctoral programme was extended by further AHRC-funded studentships commencing in 2019 and our current cohort of 30 PhD students continue to provide new, innovative and energetic input into collaborations to enhance our research, culture, international and custodianship purposes. We also launched a new placement scheme offering professional development opportunities to funded PhD students from across the UK and overseas. Our Open Days for first-year PhD students were attended by 600 students from across the UK discovering the resources and services available to them at the Library.
Research: Our plans for 2017/18
- Improve our digital services to the research community as part of our ‘Everything Available’ portfolio. This includes piloting new discovery services for publications and data, enhancing remote access to our collections and new tailored delivery models as well as new services for using Library content, for example through machine interfaces
- Develop our partnership with The Alan Turing Institute, formulating key data challenges in the libraries and heritage sectors, with a view to developing a unique, collaborative research programme
- Work with partners in the higher education and culture sectors to improve the UK’s digital research infrastructure through new services for curating, sharing and re-using digital heritage objects, data and research outputs. This year over 73,000 people visited the Business & IP Centre in London, and we provided over 8,400 small business owners and aspiring entrepreneurs (up 32% on the previous year) with direct advice, guidance and training through our extensive programme of one-to-one advice sessions, webinars and workshops, covering topics ranging from digital marketing to securing business finance. The Centre celebrated 10 years of supporting London’s small business and entrepreneur community, a period in which over half a million people accessed its services, supporting the creation of 5,000 businesses and 12,000 jobs.
We continue to expand the national network of Business & IP Centres, working with 11 public libraries across the UK. This year, new centres opened in Exeter and Northampton and pilots in Hull Central Library and Norwich Millennium Library were launched in addition to existing centres in Leeds, Sheffield, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham and Newcastle. Together, the network supported over 16,500 people, with women (59%) and Black and Asian minority ethnic groups (35%) particularly well represented. We continued our sell-out series of Inspiring Entrepreneurs networking events featuring high profile business and innovation role models, which were webcast live from St Pancras and screened to our Business & IP Centre partners across the country and around the world. In November 2016, as part of Global Entrepreneurship Week, we featured Chrissie Rucker of the White Company and Nick Wheeler of Charles Tyrwhitt Shirts who managed to set up two global brands whilst raising a family of four children. In February, our Internet Icons event featured Ella Mills, founder of Deliciously Ella, Aron Gelbard, co-founder of Bloom & Wild, Sarah Wood, co-founder of Unruly and Rupert Hunt, founder of SpareRoom.
In June 2016, we were awarded another round of European funding to support our award-winning Innovating for Growth Programme. This is designed to help established businesses to scale up and grow by offering £10,000 worth of bespoke business advice over a three-month period. For example, Emma Hammett’s First Aid for Life company, which delivers a full range of practical and online training, has grown by 30% year on year since participating in the programme.
In addition, we are helping start-ups to create robust new businesses through a two-day accelerator programme. We have supported more than 240 businesses over four years and have seen 70% of them either increase their turnover or take on extra staff within one year of completing the programme. These services were successful in reaching a broad and diverse range of people; 43% of businesses supported were owned by women and 39% by Black and Asian minority ethnic entrepreneurs, and together their turnover increased by £77m.
In July 2016, we were delighted to announce that Julie Deane OBE, founder of The Cambridge Satchel Company, had been appointed Entrepreneur in Residence at the British Library. Julie is passionate about the role of libraries in supporting entrepreneurs and was author of the Self-Employment Review, commissioned by the Prime Minister’s Office and published by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (formerly Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) in February 2016.
In September 2016 the Centre marked its 10th anniversary by holding a Start-up Day. We invited London-based people with a business idea to attend a full day of free workshops, information sessions and inspirational talks with role model entrepreneurs. Here they learnt how the Centre could help them turn that business idea into a reality. Over 750 people took part and the next Start-up Day is planned for September 2017.
Julie said of her new role:
‘The British Library is one of the iconic institutions of London and is not merely a landmark, but also plays a pivotal role in the life of this great city. I could not feel more honoured to have been offered the role of Entrepreneur in Residence, following in the footsteps of such greats as the late Dame Anita Roddick, who was the first person to take on this role. I am excited that I can play a part in supporting the transformation of libraries into places where small businesses can grow and so help the next generation of entrepreneurs.’
In September 2016 the Centre marked its 10th anniversary by holding a Start-up Day. We invited London-based people with a business idea to attend a full day of free workshops, information sessions and inspirational talks with role model entrepreneurs. Here they learnt how the Centre could help them turn that business idea into a reality. Over 750 people took part and the next Start-up Day is planned for September 2017.
Below left: Emma Hammett receives a London Business Award for her First Aid for Life company; Below right: Life coach Rasheed Ogunlaru delivering a Networking for Success workshop. Photo by Sam Lane.
Below: Entrepreneur in Residence Julie Deane OBE, founder of The Cambridge Satchel Company speaking at September’s Start-up Day to mark the 10th anniversary of London’s Business & IP Centre. Photo by Sam Lane. We engage everyone with memorable cultural experiences
‘Dazzling...a show of shows guaranteed to disarm even the most jaded visitor’ was how Times Literary Supplement described our Shakespeare in Ten Acts exhibition. It showcased ten key performances that have shaped Shakespeare’s status as a cultural icon, exploring the diversity of interpretations and media used to bring his texts to life over the past four hundred years. We also collaborated with the Library of Birmingham to open Our Shakespeare, an exhibition featuring objects from both institutions including a copy of the First Folio and Laurence Olivier’s annotated 1955 screenplay of Macbeth.
Our Maps of the 20th Century: Drawing the Line exhibition opened in November 2016. It drew upon the Library’s incredible collection of over four million maps to shed new light on 20th-century historical narratives. It attracted over 55,000 visitors and was acclaimed by The Independent as ‘a blockbuster exhibition.’
Opposite: Quentin Blake: The Roald Dahl Centenary Portraits exhibition. Photo by Luca Sage; Below: Hip Hop Shakespeare Late event. Photo by Paul Hampartsoumanian. Alongside these major exhibitions, we used our free gallery spaces to tremendous effect to reach new audiences through a diverse programme. Punk 1976–78 celebrated the 40th anniversary of the musical and cultural phenomenon, starting with the Sex Pistols’ breakthrough in 1976. We celebrated some of the most popular entertainers of Victorian times such as Dan Leno, the original pantomime dame and billed as the ‘funniest man on earth’, through our Victorian Entertainments: There Will Be Fun exhibition. Over 100,000 visitors engaged with it before it closed. And we were also privileged to host the inaugural show of a set of Quentin Blake: The Roald Dahl Centenary Portraits to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of Roald Dahl.
Beyond London, our first ever touring programme reached over 40,000 visitors across the UK. Our Alice in Wonderland exhibition was hosted by the Laing Art Gallery in Newcastle and the Willis Museum in Basingstoke; Picture This: Children’s Illustrated Classics was shown at the River and Rowing Museum in Oxfordshire; Punk 1976–78 went on tour to the Sunderland Museum & Winter Gardens.
Alongside our cultural exhibitions, this year saw a significant expansion of our programme of public events. Since October 2016, the number of events we stage has nearly doubled, with talks, discussions, performances and more taking place most evenings and regularly at the weekends. These events are critical to the Library’s ability to open up its unique cultural heritage resources, and create inspiring and engaging moments with audiences. Our wide range of speakers included Sir John Major, John Lydon, Margaret Atwood and Grayson Perry.
Sky Arts ran the first ever TV series dedicated entirely to showcasing the Library’s collection and expertise. Treasures of the British Library took the form of six hour-long episodes featuring celebrities such as Lord Winston, Jamie Cullum and Julia Donaldson, uncovering every area of the Library’s collection from sound recordings to newspaper archives. Each featured celebrity donated an item to the collection, for example poet Benjamin Zephaniah donated his poem ‘What Stephen Lawrence Has Taught Us’.
Culture: Our plans for 2017/18
• Continue to grow and sustain an expanded cultural offer for the Library’s audiences
• Deliver a major exhibition and events programme to mark the centenary of the Russian Revolution: Russian Revolution: Hope, Tragedy, Myths from April 2017
• Deliver a major exhibition and events programme for Harry Potter: A History of Magic from October 2017
• Continue to expand our reach across the UK with new touring and co-curated cultural experiences and greater engagement with public libraries. In 2016/17 our digital learning resources reached over 7 million unique browsers, significantly exceeding the previous year’s figure of 5.7 million and our target of 5.8 million. This is testament both to the increasing popularity of our existing online resources, and also to the wide range of new content exploring Shakespeare, 20th-century literature and Renaissance literature, which launched during the year. The Shakespeare and Renaissance Writers section of Discovering Literature now showcases over 300 treasures from our collection, ranging from a witchcraft pamphlet and a magician’s mirror to accounts of shipwrecks and descriptions of the ‘New World’. The 20th-century section of Discovering Literature also features a rich treasure trove of over 300 items, including T S Eliot’s draft of The Waste Land with hand-written annotations by Ezra Pound, Virginia Woolf’s travel notebook, George Orwell’s notes for Nineteen Eighty-Four and the draft manuscript of Hanif Kureishi’s The Buddha of Suburbia.
We inspire young people and learners of all ages
Opposite: Children’s drawings from the Festival of Maps family event. Photo by Nicola Pomery; below left: Annotated copy of T S Eliot’s The Waste Land, from Discovering Literature: 20th century; below right: Witchcraft pamphlet: A Rehearsal both Strange and True, 1579, from Discovering Literature: Shakespeare and Renaissance writers. We also delivered two MOOCs (Massive Open Online Course), with 8,246 people from around the world participating in free courses on Shakespeare and Propaganda. Overall, we had just over 21.5 million visitors to our website, behind our target of 25 million due in part to some substantial redevelopment work undertaken this year. That work is a long term investment in our digital offer and will enable us to continue engaging large numbers of users around the world.
On-site at St Pancras, 5,000 students and teachers took part in our schools programme accompanying Shakespeare in Ten Acts which included workshops, special events and collaborations with Shakespeare’s Globe, the Guardian Education Centre and UK Literacy Association. Building on the success of our popular maps workshops for primary schools, this year’s Maps and the 20th Century: Drawing the Line exhibition engaged over 3,500 students. Both programmes made a significant contribution to the 35,000 teachers and students that engaged in our on-site programmes overall.
We received a grant from The Sackler Trust towards our Family and Community Engagement Programme, which also receives funding through the John Lyon’s Charity. This has enabled us to deliver an expanded programme of activities and increase our outreach work within the local community, such as bespoke events for deaf families and a project with looked-after children. The programme continues to grow in strength and popularity.
In 2016/17 we also saw the delivery of the first full year of a new charged-for adult learning programme which offers a broad range of sessional courses, creative master classes and study days. Twenty courses were offered this year on topics including Gothic literature, bookbinding and conservation, sacred texts and illustrations inspired by the exhibitions Alice in Wonderland and Victorian Entertainments: There Will Be Fun. Feedback from participants has been excellent, with 92% rating the experience as very good or excellent.
Learning: Our plans for 2017/18
- Complete the next phases of Discovering Literature adding content on 20th-century playwrights in May 2017 and completing the final sections on Old and Middle English and the Restoration and 18th century
- Launch a new Chinese language version of the Discovering Literature site to accompany our touring exhibitions in China and Hong Kong
- Deliver an ambitious learning programme to accompany Harry Potter: A History of Magic. We have been very active on the global stage this year, with around 250 separate engagements relating to over 50 countries, as well as hosting 33 diplomatic visits and more than 80 professional visits to the Library. We continue to take a leadership role, particularly in Europe, through our Chief Executive’s chairmanship of the Conference of European National Librarians (CENL), which comprises 46 national libraries from across Europe.
Our already ambitious China activities have expanded further as we took part in a high-level UK delegation to Shanghai as part of the 2016 UK-China High Level People to People Dialogue. The visit also marked the commencement of ‘The British Library in China: connecting through culture and learning’ project, a three-year long cultural exchange between the UK and China. For the very first time, the British Library will display a number of iconic English literary treasures in mainland China and Hong Kong. Early editions and handwritten manuscripts by writers and playwrights including William Shakespeare, Charlotte Brontë and Arthur Conan Doyle, will feature in a series of exhibitions in cities across China and on the Library’s first Chinese language learning platform. As part of the *Two Centuries of Indian Print* project, which is seeking to digitise thousands of early printed South Asian language books dating from 1713–1914, we have digitised and catalogued 1,000 early printed Bengali books, and scanned over 6,000 Vernacular Tracts, thanks to funding received from the Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy, the Arts and Humanities Research Council, and the Newton Fund. This work underpins a wider programme of engagement with library professionals and researchers in India.
We presented a digital scholarship workshop at Jadavpur University, hosted a series of seminars on South Asia Book History, and held community workshops to showcase our collection. We have also signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Digital Library of India to share metadata and digitised content, an initiative accompanied by two highly successful loans: King George III’s edition of Shakespeare’s First Folio to the CSMVS Museum in Mumbai, and a facsimile of the Magna Carta showcased at the Jaipur Literary Festival.
We entered into a new digitisation partnership, generously funded by The Polonsky Foundation, with the Bibliothèque nationale de France to digitise 800 illuminated manuscripts from the period 700–1200, making them available online for the first time. In addition, our partnership with the Qatar Foundation continued apace in its goal of making newly digitised content relating to the Gulf region, predominantly from the Library’s India Office Records archive, available online. The Qatar Digital Library has been viewed by just under half a million users from 222 countries. Our digitisation project with the National Library of Israel has now yielded 68,000 pages of the Library’s Hebrew Manuscripts collection.
We were also pleased to welcome our first Chevening Fellows, who have joined us as part of the UK government’s international awards scheme for developing global leaders. Our first two Fellows joined us in October from Pakistan and Nigeria to work on their research projects. These are year-long placements which we will be hosting in each of the next three years.
**International: Our plans for 2017/18**
- Build on our ‘British Library in China’ project by touring our literary treasures in Wuzhen from September to November 2017 and Shanghai in February 2018 for the first time
- Further develop our partnerships with Indian institutions, and host the Jaipur Literary Festival at the British Library in London for the first time in May 2017
- Deepen our relationships with international partners in the USA, the Middle East, and across Europe, including hosting a visit from Dr Carla Hayden, the 14th Librarian of Congress. Public Lending Right
The British Library administers Public Lending Right (PLR), the scheme through which authors are remunerated for loans made by public libraries. The scheme recognises the value of such loans to the reading public and registered UK authors are hugely supportive of PLR. The Library also administers Irish PLR on behalf of the Irish Government.
For the PLR year from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016, PLR registered over 25,000 new ISBNs. Over 2,000 authors and other contributors registered for PLR for the first time and we collected data on over 43 million loans from the 29 library authorities that took part in the sample. The data was converted to national estimates and paid at a Rate Per Loan of 7.82 pence. In total, over £6m was distributed to 22,201 authors, illustrators and other contributors, whose books were borrowed from UK public libraries. The maximum payment threshold is £6,600 for the top-lending authors and the minimum payment is £1, ensuring an equitable distribution of the fund across a large community of creators. In March 2017, the PLR Advisory Committee agreed to maintain the thresholds at the current rates for another year.
The payments in February 2017 were followed up by the announcement of the most borrowed authors and titles for the previous year. As in previous years, crime titles proved hugely popular and US thriller writer James Patterson topped the chart of most borrowed author for the tenth year running. The most borrowed title was *The Girl on the Train* by Paula Hawkins, while childrens’ authors once again featured dominantly with seven childrens’ authors in the top ten most borrowed authors including Julia Donaldson, Francesca Simon, Jacqueline Wilson and Roald Dahl.
PLR’s Advisory Committee Chair, author and historian Tom Holland commented:
‘At a time when cuts to the UK’s library service have generated much pessimism about its prospects, the release of the PLR figures serves as a reminder of the tremendous service it continues to provide across the country, and how highly treasured it is by the public. Authors, too, have good reason to be grateful for it: not just for the role it plays in fostering the reading habit, but because PLR constitutes a statement on behalf of the entire country on the value that it places on writing.’
New legislation enables remote e-lending to be eligible for PLR in future. This has cleared the way for authors and contributors to be paid for remote e-book loans in the same way as for loans of physical books. This is an important change to the scheme which reflects the changing nature of library service provision and ensures that authors and content creators can be compensated fairly for the use of their work. We are now working with stakeholders to ensure a successful implementation within two years.
Following a market research exercise in August, an extensive amount of work has been undertaken on mapping PLR’s IT systems with a view to improving user experience, including automated registration and mobile platforms. The new system will also incorporate remote e-book loan data collection and payment. This is all part of a wider strategic review to ensure the long-term future of the PLR service for users.
Right: Children’s Laureate and Illustrator Chris Riddell donated this image to be used in PLR’s campaign to encourage more authors to register. Enabling Living Knowledge
Delivery of our Living Knowledge purposes is underpinned by a range of enabling activities which ensure that we maximise the resources at our disposal and continue to deliver a cost-effective service to world-class standards.
Finance and Planning Our Strategic Leadership Team engaged in the second year of a comprehensive corporate planning process, which applied increased levels of scrutiny to budgets. This led to the refresh and renewal of the financial strategy originally approved by the British Library Board in 2015/16, ensuring that activities and spending in departments across the Library remain strategically aligned to our Living Knowledge purposes, as well as identifying opportunities for efficiency savings through new ways of working.
Continuous Improvement We have a strong emphasis on continuous improvement throughout the Library, across departments and functions ranging from people management to collection care. We collaborate with other public sector bodies to share best practice, and we embed the principles and behaviours of continuous improvement across the Library’s normal business, thus enabling services to be delivered in a cost-effective manner.
Commercial Strategy We launched a number of initiatives during the year designed to improve the services available to users and deliver improved commercial return. These new and growing revenue streams ultimately ensure the Library can continue to deliver on its Living Knowledge aspirations.
Our new Membership programme was launched in October 2016 with a dedicated Members’ Room at St Pancras and a Members’ Bar in the renovated Knowledge Centre. Membership sales have been strong in the first five months and reached 1,700 by the end of March.
At St Pancras, our catering offer was significantly upgraded with the refurbishment of our Euston Road coffee shop, a new coffee bar in the front entrance hall and the new Terrace Restaurant. Alongside these changes, we recruited a dedicated commercial events team to support a substantial increase in our commercial events activity.
We launched a new Online Shop and a Box Office which are designed to improve online retail and ticketing sales and build our capacity for growth over the next few years. We continue to deliver our strong Crime Classics publishing brand, this year opening a dedicated Pop-up Shop for the Christmas retail period.
IT Strategy Our IT strategy seeks to replace many of the Library’s core digital systems and infrastructure with new, more flexible solutions that will enable the Library to deliver its purposes.
We implemented new infrastructure and systems to support our commercial strategy along with further improvements to our website.
Development of core digital library systems has delivered new functionality for collections management and our legal deposit library partners, while the implementation of new digitised sound ingest workflows for Save Our Sounds will enable improved preservation of our historic sound collection. Substantial work on specifying requirements for a new digital asset management and preservation system has been undertaken in preparation for procurement in 2017/18.
Upgrades to the Library’s internal automated book retrieval system, search and discovery tool and universal viewer technologies have improved users’ experience of accessing our collection. In addition, mobile and unified communications solutions, including faster and more reliable public and staff WiFi, have been rolled out.
People Strategy This year we were accredited as a Living Wage employer and introduced Open Minds (our inclusive leadership programme) and unconscious bias training for all staff. We have appointed an Apprenticeships Manager to plan and implement our first apprenticeships scheme as well as streamlining a number of harassment policies and introducing a mediation service to help improve the working life of our staff through better employment relations. These steps reflect our commitment to our organisational values, in particular embracing equality, fairness and diversity.
Our People Strategy sets out a vision for the Library to be a workplace that inspires staff, who place users at the heart of everything they do. The past year has seen increasing levels of staff engagement, rising from 3.77 (out of 5.0) in 2015/16 to 4.02 in 2016/17. We have agreed a volunteer policy and are in the early stages of launching this scheme across the Library.
Fundraising The British Library is extremely grateful to all its donors and supporters, whose generosity enables us to promote learning and scholarship and share our collection with the public for research, inspiration and enjoyment, as well as maintain our position as one of the world’s greatest research libraries.
The Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) confirmed the £9.5m grant previously earmarked in 2014 for Unlocking Our Sound Heritage and, thanks to generous additional funding received from the Garfield Weston Foundation, Foyle Foundation and many others, we look forward to commencing this major partnership project in 2017 to save almost half a million unique and vulnerable historic sound recordings from across the UK and open them up to the public.
This year saw the end of the HLF Funded Catalyst: Endowments Programme, through which the Library has built up a £2m ‘Knowledge Fund’ endowment to support access and collections-based activities. As well as several legacy gifts and large individual donations, we received several hundred small donations in response to an appeal to support the fund, which we will continue to grow into a vital additional sustainable income stream.
Thanks to a very generous grant from The Polonsky Foundation, we were able to announce a major new partnership project with the Bibliothèque nationale de France to digitise 800 illuminated manuscripts from the period 700–1200 from our respective collections and make them freely available online to researchers and the public.
Thanks to a generous donation from the Dr Michael and Anna Brynberg Charitable Foundation, we will be able to employ a spoliation researcher to investigate the history and provenance of two collections we believe might have been spoliated during the Nazi period.
We are very grateful to the Dangoor family who have provided very generous seed funding for the Library’s website Discovering Sacred Texts. It will explore the richness and diversity of the Library’s collection of sacred texts, alongside articles written by academics, faith leaders and practitioners from Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism as well as other lesser-known faiths which are well represented in the collection. The website will be launched later next year and will follow a similar structure to Discovering Literature, also supported by Dangoor Education, with over 2,000 digitised images at its core.
A significant grant from The Sackler Trust has made a huge difference to the number of groups and communities we have been able to reach through our Family and Community Engagement Programme, enabling us to run additional outreach projects, to widen and diversify our audience.
### Key Performance Indicators
#### CUSTOMER SERVICE – Quality
| | Target 2016/17 | Actual 2016/17 | Actual 2015/16 | Actual 2014/15 | |----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------| | Satisfaction with Reading Room services | 95% | 96% | 97% | 94% | | Customer Satisfaction – ease of finding information on the Library’s website | 90% | 87% | 88% | 86% | | Satisfaction with our exhibitions (customer enjoyment rating) | 85% | 95% | 96% | 96% |
#### OUR PEOPLE
| | Target 2016/17 | Actual 2016/17 | Actual 2015/16 | Actual 2014/15 | |----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------| | Employee engagement (rating out of 5) | 3.8 | 4.02 | 3.77 | 3.58 |
#### FINANCE AND ECONOMIC
| | Target 2016/17 | Actual 2016/17 | Actual 2015/16 | Actual 2014/16 | |----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------| | Commercial income generated | £12,697 | £13,658 | £13,240 | £13,760 | | Charitable giving: donations and sponsorship | N/A | £7,449 | £5,486 | £6,771 | | Rate of charitable giving i.e. donations and sponsorships to Grant in Aid | N/A | 7.9% | 5.9% | 7.2% |
#### OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
| | Target 2016/17 | Actual 2016/17 | Actual 2015/16 | Actual 2014/16 | |----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------| | Print items added to the collection through legal deposit | 326 | 334 | 373 | 402 | | Digital items added to the collection through legal deposit | 152 | 174 | 95 | 66 |
#### BUSINESS
| | Target 2016/17 | Actual 2016/17 | Actual 2015/16 | Actual 2014/16 | |----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------| | Jobs created | 250 | 636 | 390 | 305 |
#### CULTURE
| | Target 2016/17 | Actual 2016/17 | Actual 2015/16 | Actual 2014/16 | |----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------| | Culture visitors to St Pancras | 1,045 | 915 | 967 | 1,188 |
#### LEARNING
| | Target 2016/17 | Actual 2016/17 | Actual 2015/16 | Actual 2014/16 | |----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------| | Visitors to British Library Learning website | 5,883 | 7,041 | 5,726 | 3,597 |
#### INTERNATIONAL
| | Target 2016/17 | Actual 2016/17 | Actual 2015/16 | Actual 2014/16 | |----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------| | Items digitised through international partnerships | N/A | 1,573 | 1,432 | 1,306 |
______________________________________________________________________
1. Data now collated nationally and reported one year in arrears.
2. New measure added in 2015/16 with data calculated retrospectively.
3. These measures are included in the British Library’s Management Agreement with DCMS for the period 2016–2020.
______________________________________________________________________
7,041,000 visitors to the British Library Learning web pages 19% above target
174,000 Digital publications added to the collection through legal deposit 14.5% above target – an increase of 83% over last year Grants and Donations
The British Library would like to thank all those who have given their support during the period April 2016 to March 2017, including:
Donors and Supporters The American Trust Grants and Donations and the Friedberg Jewish The National Library of Israel Decorative & Fine Arts Societies The National Association of The Mercers’ Company for Studies in British Art The Paul Mellon Centre The Andrew W Mellon Foundation Peter and Krystyna Holland The Hobson Charity Limited Heritage Lottery Fund The Golsoncott Foundation Goldhammer Family Foundation Friends of the British Library Finnis Scott Foundation The CPF Trust The Ernest Cook Trust The Clothworkers’ Foundation Paul Chrzanowski Charitable Foundation Dr Michael and Anna Brynberg Foundation Inc British Library American British Academy William and Judith Bollinger Foundation The Eric Anker-Petersen Charity The Arcadia Fund The Art Fund Arts Council England Joanna and Graham Barker Harriet Blair-Flis The Blavatnik Family Foundation William and Judith Bollinger British Academy British Library American Foundation Inc British Library Trust Dr Michael and Anna Brynberg Charitable Foundation Paul Chrzanowski The Clothworkers’ Foundation The John S Cohen Foundation The Egremont Trust The CPI Trust Chris and Eddie Dapre European Community European Research Council The Exilarch’s Foundation and Dangoor Education Finnis Scott Foundation Marc Finch Fund Friends of the British Library Goldhammer Family Foundation The Golsoncott Foundation Heritage Lottery Fund The Robson Charity Limited Peter and Krysyna Holland The Indigo Trust The Kirby Laing Foundation John Lyon’s Charity The Andrew W Mellon Foundation The Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art The Makers’ Company The National Association of Decorative & Fine Arts Societies The National Library of Israel and the Friedberg Jewish Manuscript Society National Central Library, Taipei Newton Fund The P F Charitable Trust Michael Palin CBE Mark Pigott KBE, KStJ The Polonsky Foundation Edith and Ferdinand Porjes Charitable Trust Qatar Foundation The Radcliffe Trust The Reed Foundation Inc Research Councils UK Roshan Cultural Heritage Institute The Stuart Rossiter Trust The Ruddock Foundation for the Arts The Sackler Trust Giles Sandeman-Allen Shouky and Doris Shaheen Shandong University Shoreham Charitable Trust Sino-British Fellowship Trust Bei Shan Tang Foundation Sir Siegmund Warburg’s Voluntary Settlement Revd John & Mrs Carol Wates The Wellcome Trust The Garrick Weston Foundation Tony and Maureen Wheeler British Library Patrons Caravaggio’s Circle David and Kate Barclay Judith Bollinger Sir Trevor and Lady Susan Chinn The Clore Duffield Foundation Lord and Lady Egremont Michael G Katakis Clive Richards OBE DL The Most Hon the Marquess of Salisbury Philip and Catja ten Bosch-de Haas S and C Westwell Patrons Kay Anderson Sir David Arculus Alain Aubry Sirdar Aly Aziz The Nicholas Bacon Charitable Trust The RAND Trust Mrs S Beada The Lord Browne of Madingley Alison Carnwath and Peter Thomson Lord Charles Cecil The John S Cohen Foundation Anne Cygler Michael Diamond Sam Fogg Lawrence Gough Mr and Mrs Edward Harley Heather Jackson Lesley and Brian Knox Russell Lloyd Mark and Liza Loveday Kate McLuskie Michael Palin CBE Dr Jean R Perrette Mark Robbins Ms Louisa Service OBE Francesca Valli John Walton Mr & Mrs Michael Wilson William Zachs Dr Allen Zimbler Adopt a Book Nick Austin Chris and Eddie Dapre Liz Judson in memory of Margaret Judson And many others. Corporate Sponsors Daniel Crouch Rare Books Dr Martens Google Digital Garage Great Northern Hotel Microsoft Mintel RELX Group Trenton UK2.net Vistaprint Legacies Marquess of Salisbury The Most Hon the Clive Richards OBE DL Lord and Lady Egremont Sir Trevor and Lady Susan Chinn Judith Bollinger David and Kate Barclay Curators’ Circle Tony and Maureen Wheeler The Eric Anker-Petersen Charity The Garrick Charitable Trust Nicholas and Judith Goodison Christopher and Gilda Haskins Lesley Knox Templeton Religion Trust Jennifer Wingate Yale Center for British Art American Trust for the British Library Chairman’s Council Ms Katherine Ashton and Mr Brian D Young Ms Caroline Bacon Mr Roger S Baskes Mr R Dyke Benjamin Mr and Mrs Ralph Brown Mr Patrick Donovan Mr Simon Eccles Ms Florence Fearrington Ms Sibyl R Golden Dr Peter N Heydon Ms Sibyl R Golden Ms Florence Fearrington Ms Sibyl R Golden Dr Peter N Heydon Ms Luci R Johnson Ms Eavlyn Lee Mr Jon A Lindserh Mr Howard Phipps Jr Mr David N Redden Mrs Ruth E Robinson Mrs Jane Gregory Rubin Dr Caroline Rubinstein and Mr Phillip Winagar Mr David Rumsey Mr James B Strick Mr James P Spica Mr Stephen Stamas Ms Gwendolyn van Paaschens Mrs Lisa von Clemm Ms Christine Zuromskis President’s Circle Ms Virginia Barbat Ms Judith Ogden Thomson Patrons Mrs Catherine Morrison Golden Mr J Kevin Graffagnino Mr Sumit Guha Mr Richard P Henke Mr Arthur Holzheimer Ms Cheryl Hurley Mr Alastair Kirkpatrick Ms Patricia Klingenstein Mr Anthony Kneer Ms Ada Jung Lamont Ms Shaunaugh Robbins Ms Mary Coxe Schlosser Dr Barbara A Shailor Mrs Tessa Smith Mr David Solo Mrs Selvia Samuk-Tanenbaum Mr Winston Tabb Ms Susan Jaffe Tane Mr J Thomas Touchton Foundations Baskes Family Foundation Caritas Foundation of Western Kansas Golden Family Foundation The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation Holzheimer Fund The Samuel H Kress Foundation The Mosaic Foundation Pine Tree Foundation of New York The Reed Foundation The Michael and Louisa von Clemm Foundation The Friends of the British Library Friends Council Chairman: Ferdinand Mount Deputy Chairman: Christopher Wright Treasurer: Keith Stephenson Secretary: Edmund King Council members: Graham Allatt Nicolas Bell Caroline Brazier Martin Dickson Jane Dobson Lindsay Duguid Nina Evans Celia Gould The Lord Hemingford Jo Hunt Norman James Stephanie Kenna Anthony Payne Andrew Prescott David Shaw Government Funders Department for Culture, Media and Sport (Core Grant-in-Aid) Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Department for Communities and Local Government European Regional Development Fund (deployed by Greater London Authority) And others who wish to remain anonymous. STATEMENT OF DIRECTORS’ AND ACCOUNTING OFFICER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
Under the British Library Act 1972, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport has directed the British Library to prepare for each financial year a statement of accounts in the form and on the basis set out in the accounts direction. The accounts are prepared on an accruals basis and must give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Library and of its net incoming resources, recognised gains and losses, and cash flows for the financial year.
In preparing the accounts, the Accounting Officer is required to comply with the requirements of the Government Financial Reporting Manual and, in particular, to:
• observe the accounts direction issued by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, including the relevant accounting and disclosure requirements, and apply suitable accounting policies on a consistent basis • make judgements and estimates on a reasonable basis • state whether applicable accounting standards as set out in the Government Financial Reporting Manual have been followed, and disclose and explain any material departures in the financial statements • prepare the financial statements on a going concern basis • confirm that, so far as they are aware, there is no relevant audit information of which the British Library’s auditors are unaware and that they have taken all the steps that they ought to have taken to make themselves aware of any relevant audit information and to establish that the Library’s auditors are aware of that information • confirm that the Annual Report and Accounts as a whole is fair, balanced and understandable and that they take personal responsibility for the Annual Report and Accounts and the judgements required for determining that the Annual Report and Accounts are fair, balanced and understandable.
The Department for Culture, Media and Sport has appointed the Chief Executive as Accounting Officer of the Library. The responsibilities of an Accounting Officer, including responsibility for the propriety and regularity of the public finances for which the Accounting Officer is answerable, for keeping proper records and for safeguarding the Library’s assets, are set out in Managing Public Money published by HM Treasury.
There is a clear division of responsibility between the Chairman and the Chief Executive. The Chairman is responsible for the leadership of the British Library Board, ensuring its effectiveness on all aspects of its role. They facilitate both the contribution of Board members and also constructive relations between the Board and the Executive. They represent the Library to its external stakeholders at the highest levels. The Chief Executive has responsibility for the overall organisation, management and staffing of the Library, for the formulation of strategy and for the successful delivery of results. As Accounting Officer they are responsible for its procedures and controls in financial and other matters.
Rt Hon Baroness Blackstone PC Chairman 30 June 2017
Roly Keating Chief Executive and Accounting Officer 30 June 2017
FINANCIAL REVIEW
Overview of Financial Position
The British Library’s income for 2016/17 was £118.0m (£117.8m in 2015/16), of which £93.9m (79%), the primary source of funding, was Grant in Aid received from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (£93.0m (79%) in 2015/16).
Income from the provision of charitable activities was £13.8m (£13.8m in 2015/16), in line with last year. Income from document supply continued to fall during the year, although performance was better than expected and above the target set. Exhibition ticket sales were down on last year, a year which included the very successful Magna Carta exhibition, which also impacted on the performance of the Shop and publishing operations. Income was increased from licensing and royalty activities, sale of commercial events and leasing out office space in our St Pancras building in line with our commercial strategy. A membership scheme was successfully launched in the autumn which will help to increase income in future years.
Voluntary Income was £9.7m (£9.9m in 2015/16), in line with last year. The contributions from philanthropic donations, research grants and funding for digitisation projects continues to provide critical funding in support of the Library’s purposes. Investment income was £6.6m (£1.0m in 2015/16). During the year we revisited our investment and treasury management policies which resulted in a small loss of income as we moved our financial investments between investment companies and between banks. Historically low base interest rates also led to reduced returns.
In March 2016 the DCMS Secretary of State announced that the Library’s Grant in Aid would be maintained in cash terms over the current spending review period, 2015/16 to 2019/20. In addition, an extra £1.6m was provided to support the international project to take several literary treasures to China over the same period. Although the Grant in Aid settlement was a positive outcome, in real terms, this represents a 5% reduction to the resource budget by 2019/20 and it still resulted in the Library having to continue to make on-going reductions in its core operating expenditure. However, the Library has been able to continue to make investments in heritage acquisitions and digitisation projects funded by philanthropic donations and grants.
The Library’s continued focus on efficiency has contributed to the delivery of significant operational savings required in order to match reductions in core Government funding in this and future financial years. Voluntary Exit programmes were launched during the year to reduce staffing in the Document Supply and Finance areas.
Resources expended were increased to £138.3m in the year (£137.5m in 2015/16) due to higher staffing costs in line with the pay increase and the increase in national insurance contributions due to the ending of the contracting out allowance. Expenditure on developments, including the ongoing cost of a project to develop land on the St Pancras site, were lower than last year’s levels although substantial progress in delivering the Living Knowledge strategy was made on a number of fronts.
The Library has established procedures to ensure that the cost allocation and charging requirements set out in HM Treasury and Office of Public Sector Information guidance are met. The Library is included in a Government scheme which allows certain spending control privileges to organisations in the Museums and Galleries sector. Under these ‘freedoms’, the Library is exempt from a number of controls including Government procurement policy, the 1% pay award limit and control on property spend. It also allows the Library to use its reserves in a more flexible way, subject to informing the Department for Culture, Media and Sport of any requirement as part of the Treasury’s supplementary review estimate.
Revenue expenditure on acquisitions for the collections was £11.5m (£11.4m in 2015/16), reflecting the flat-cash allocation of Grant in Aid to our acquisitions strategy. Capital expenditure was £1.4m (£1.9m in 2015/16), with the acquisition of a number of heritage items supported by donations and grants. The Public Lending Right (PLR) Grant in Aid allocation for the year was £6.6m (£6.6m in 2015/16). Total PLR payments made in 2017 were £6.1m, paid to 22,201 authors (£6.4m paid to 22,607 authors in 2016). The rate per loan approved for the year was 7.82pence (7.67pence in 2016). Expenditure includes £61,442 unpaid at the year end because some authors’ addresses are unknown to PLR, or because authors’ assignees have not made probate claims. (The payments to authors in 2015/16 included an additional payment of £0.3m due to an error in the original calculation and a decision, approved by DCMS, to pay all authors based on the recalculated figures).
There was a net reduction in the movement of funds before revaluation in the year of £17.6m, of which £19.4m was due to a revaluation in the year of £17.6m, transferred from Legal and General in several instalments during the year.
At the start of the year fund values stood at £19.7m and increased steadily over the year on the back of increases in the UK stock market. A further £3.5m was invested during the year from donations received and placed in the government-supported Catalyst Endowment Scheme. At the end of the year, investments stood at £24.3m, this included a gain of £1.9m which was realised as part of the process of transferring investments to the new investment managers.
The financial risks relating to investments continue to be managed by:
- a broad asset allocation which minimises the exposure to adverse factors which may affect one or more classes of assets
- maintaining a relatively high liquidity level
- regularly monitoring investment performance.
Investments held as fixed assets are included at market value at the year end. The Statement of Financial Activities (SOFA) includes any realised and unrealised investment gains and losses arising on revaluation and disposals throughout the year.
Payment of Creditors The Library observes the principles of the Better Payment Practice Code, and it is the policy of the British Library Board to pay all creditors within 30 days of receipt of the invoice unless separate arrangements have been agreed with the supplier. For the year ended 31 March 2017, 94% of invoices were paid within the agreed 30-day period (95% in 2015/16).
Related Party Transactions Details of related party transactions are disclosed on page 87 at note 23.
Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance In accordance with HM Treasury Code of Good Practice and Chapter 3 of Managing Public Money, the Annual Governance Statement is included on pages 55 to 61.
So far as the Accounting Officer and the British Library Board are aware, there is no relevant audit information of which the Library’s auditors are unaware, and the Accounting Officer and British Library Board have taken all the steps that they ought to have taken to make themselves aware of any relevant audit information and to establish that the Library’s auditors are aware of that information. The Library recognises that its activities impact on society and the environment at local, regional and global levels through the resources it consumes, the waste it produces, the travel and work patterns it encourages amongst its staff and the products it buys. The Library needs to provide stable and reliable collection storage while seeking to minimise the impact that its buildings and operations have on the environment. The measures undertaken to help with this include robust monitoring and targeting of utility consumption and waste production across its estate and investing in energy and waste reducing initiatives wherever possible. This has resulted in a significant and sustained reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
### Greenhouse Gas Emissions
| | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2016/17 | |----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | Non-Financial indicators (1,000 tonnes CO₂ emitted) | | | | | | | Gross emissions Scope 1 (direct) | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 | | Gross emissions Scope 2&3 (indirect) | 18.2 | 17.5 | 16.4 | 14.0 | 12.4 | | Total gross emissions | 20.3 | 19.2 | 18.4 | 16.2 | 14.7 | | Total net emissions | 20.3 | 19.2 | 18.4 | 16.2 | 14.7 | | Related energy consumption (million kWh) | | | | | | | Electricity: Non-renewable | 32.9 | 31.3 | 29.2 | 24.9 | 21.9 | | Electricity: Renewable | – | – | – | – | – | | Gas | 10.7 | 9.0 | 10.6 | 11.7 | 11.9 | | Gas Oil | 3.6 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 2.6 | 3.0 | | Other | – | – | – | – | – | | Financial indicators (Emillion) | | | | | | | Expenditure on energy | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2.7 | | CRC license expenditure (2011/12 onwards) | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | | Expenditure on accredited offsets | – | – | – | – | – | | Expenditure on official business travel | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | The Library adopted the ‘Greening Government’ target to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 23% from a 2009/10 baseline, for our estate and for business-related transport. This target has now been extended to cut emissions by 57% by 2020. At the end of 2016/17 net emissions have reduced by 37.6%.
The main direct causes of carbon emissions from the Library are electricity, gas and oil consumption. An energy saving action plan is in place and progress is being made as opportunities and budgets allow for investment in energy saving plant and lighting. The energy reductions in 2016/17 have been achieved by continuing this programme, including lighting, HVAC controls (energy saving control valves) and plant operating times.
There was an increase in air travel during the year as a result of the increase in international engagement activity.
We shall focus on improving the recycling percentage by closer scrutiny of the waste streams, allowing us to identify and remove recyclable material currently lost in the general waste stream.
The re-use of redundant material continued in 2016/17, though in smaller volumes. The material appropriate for re-use varies, from the giveaway of coffee grounds for gardens and allotments at our Boston Spa site to redundant furniture being re-homed locally within the Camden area to community centres, business start-ups, educational institutions or charities. The Library is committed to the new ‘Greening Government’ commitments; we will maintain a ‘zero to landfill’ policy and are reflecting on how to meet these targets up to 2020.
There are no financial indicators for the waste element as these costs are embedded in service contracts and the actual element that relates to the removal of the waste is not identified separately.
### Waste
#### Hazardous and non-hazardous volumes by disposal routes
| Year | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2016/17 | |------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | Total | 164.0 | 39.6 | 60.0 | – | – | | Non-hazardous waste | 27.5 | 27.5 | 64.4 | – | – | | Construction waste to landfill | 997.0 | 448.1 | 408.1 | 431.2 | 301.4 | | Landfill | – | – | – | – | – | | Reused/recycled | 190.7 | 178.2 | 147.7 | 143.0 | 172.0 | | Composted | – | – | – | – | – | | Incinerated with energy recovery | – | – | – | – | – | | Incinerated without energy recovery | – | – | – | – | – | | Total waste | 1,379.2 | 693.4 | 680.2 | 574.2 | 473.4 |
#### Non-hazardous waste (excluding construction) volumes by disposal routes
| Year | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2016/17 | |------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | Total | 164.0 | 39.6 | 60.0 | – | – | | Non-hazardous waste | 27.5 | 27.5 | 64.4 | – | – | | Construction waste to landfill | 997.0 | 448.1 | 408.1 | 431.2 | 301.4 | | Landfill | – | – | – | – | – | | Reused/recycled | 190.7 | 178.2 | 147.7 | 143.0 | 172.0 | | Composted | – | – | – | – | – | | Incinerated with energy recovery | – | – | – | – | – | | Incinerated without energy recovery | – | – | – | – | – | | Total waste | 1,379.2 | 693.4 | 680.2 | 574.2 | 473.4 |
In the financial year 2016/17, the Library produced 473 tonnes of waste. This represents a total waste reduction from the previous year of 17.6% with an impressive 42.5% less waste being produced when measured against HM Treasury’s ‘Greening Government’ baseline year of 2009/10.
These results have been achieved by working very closely with our cleaning and waste management contractor with both parties adhering to the principles and innovations laid out by the Government’s WRAP initiative. We employ a strict hierarchy of prevention, re-use, recycle, energy recovery and treatment/disposal, with prevention then re-use through others being the most favoured options and energy recovery being the last resort for waste from our sites. It is important to note that no waste from the Library is sent direct to landfill; all non-recyclable waste is incinerated to provide energy. In addition to this, food waste is sent to anaerobic digestion, creating both fertiliser and gas for energy generation.
The previous year’s increase in waste generated, related largely to refurbishment works, has subsided, although this has also decreased commensurately the percentage of waste recycled. In the coming year we shall focus on improving the recycling percentage by closer scrutiny of the waste streams, allowing us to identify and remove recyclable material currently lost in the general waste stream.
The re-use of redundant material continued in 2016/17, though in smaller volumes. The material appropriate for re-use varies, from the giveaway of coffee grounds for gardens and allotments at our Boston Spa site to redundant furniture being re-homed locally within the Camden area to community centres, business start-ups, educational institutions or charities. The Library is committed to the new ‘Greening Government’ commitments; we will maintain a ‘zero to landfill’ policy and are reflecting on how to meet these targets up to 2020.
There are no financial indicators for the waste element as these costs are embedded in service contracts and the actual element that relates to the removal of the waste is not identified separately.
### Finite Resource Consumption
#### Non-Financial indicators (tonnes)
| Year | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2016/17 | |------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | Total | 164.0 | 39.6 | 60.0 | – | – | | Non-hazardous waste | 27.5 | 27.5 | 64.4 | – | – | | Construction waste to landfill | 997.0 | 448.1 | 408.1 | 431.2 | 301.4 | | Landfill | – | – | – | – | – | | Reused/recycled | 190.7 | 178.2 | 147.7 | 143.0 | 172.0 | | Composted | – | – | – | – | – | | Incinerated with energy recovery | – | – | – | – | – | | Incinerated without energy recovery | – | – | – | – | – | | Total waste | 1,379.2 | 693.4 | 680.2 | 574.2 | 473.4 |
#### Non-Financial indicators (000’s metres³)
| Year | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2016/17 | |------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | Total | 164.0 | 39.6 | 60.0 | – | – | | Non-hazardous waste | 27.5 | 27.5 | 64.4 | – | – | | Construction waste to landfill | 997.0 | 448.1 | 408.1 | 431.2 | 301.4 | | Landfill | – | – | – | – | – | | Reused/recycled | 190.7 | 178.2 | 147.7 | 143.0 | 172.0 | | Composted | – | – | – | – | – | | Incinerated with energy recovery | – | – | – | – | – | | Incinerated without energy recovery | – | – | – | – | – | | Total waste | 1,379.2 | 693.4 | 680.2 | 574.2 | 473.4 |
Office benchmarks for water consumption and reduction are not suitable for St Pancras as approximately 60% of water used is for cooling of Reading Rooms, collection storage areas, public exhibition spaces and the Knowledge Centre. The increasing number of visits by members of the public to our exhibitions and member facilities in St Pancras is increasing the volume of water consumed by these activities.
The Library has an internal target to reduce water consumption by 2% per year from a 2009/10 baseline. At the end of 2016/17 water consumption had reduced by 32%.
Biodiversity Action Planning
Our St Pancras building has some designed-in climate change adaptations. Our Boston Spa site has biodiversity and natural environment features. We seek to achieve appropriate BREEAM ratings for new buildings; the British Library Centre for Conservation building at St Pancras is rated ‘Excellent’ and the Newspaper Storage Building at Boston Spa, which incorporates a small Tri-Generation plant, has a ‘Very Good’ rating.
Sustainable Procurement
The Library complies with DCMS/CCS (Crown Commercial Services) sustainable procurement policies, but our existing contracts do not yet contain requirements for supply chain reporting. Our new procurement policy states our commitment to responsible procurement including promotion of continuous improvement in the reduction and efficient use of energy, water and raw materials and to verify suppliers’ environmental policies and procedures, working towards continuous improvements in sustainability. Remuneration Policy The remuneration policy for the British Library’s senior managers is set by the Remuneration Committee, a standing committee of the British Library Board without executive powers which fulfils the following responsibilities:
• to keep under regular review the terms and conditions of the Chief Executive; • to undertake an annual review of the Chief Executive’s salary and to determine their performance bonus and inform the Board; • to consider the recommendations of the Chief Executive in relation to the annual review of the salary and performance bonuses of the Executive Team and similarly for any other equivalent paid senior staff; • to represent the Board in relation to considerations relating to the terms and conditions of all other Library employees and approve the annual pay remit; and • to carry out any other review and make any other recommendations which, in its opinion or at the request of the Chief Executive, it believes to be relevant to the Board’s statutory responsibilities in relation to the terms and conditions of the Library’s employees.
The Remuneration Committee is informed in its decisions by external benchmarking and through the Library’s performance management process.
Service Contracts Although members of Library staff are not civil servants, appointments are made in accordance with the Civil Service principle that requires appointments to be on merit and on the basis of fair and open competition.
The Library’s senior managers covered by this report hold appointments which are open-ended until they choose to retire. However those in post prior to 1 October 2006 have a contractual right to retire at age 60, should they so choose. The Chief Executive has a six-month notice period; other senior managers have a three-month notice period. All are members of the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme and, as such, early termination of their contract would result in the individual receiving compensation as set out in the Civil Service Compensation Scheme.
Remuneration and Pension Entitlements (audited) Remuneration includes: gross salary; overtime; reserved rights to London weighting or London allowances; recruitment and retention allowances; private office allowances and any other allowance to the extent that it is subject to UK taxation. Performance pay or bonuses are disclosed separately.
Bonuses are based on performance levels attained and are made as part of the appraisal process. They relate to performance in the previous year.
No benefits in kind were received by the Executive Team or Chairman.
Reporting bodies are required to disclose the relationship between the remuneration of the highest-paid director in their organisation and the median remuneration of the organisation’s workforce.
The banded remuneration of the highest-paid director in the organisation in the financial year 2016/17 was £170–175k (2015/16 was £155–£160K). This was 6.56 times (2015/16 was 6.06) the median remuneration of the workforce, which was £26,312 (£26,000 in 2015/16).
In 2016/17, no-one received remuneration in excess of the highest-paid director. Total remuneration includes salary, non-consolidated performance-related pay and benefits in kind. It does not include employer pension contributions and the cash equivalent transfer of pensions.
The following tables show the pension entitlements of, and the salary paid during the year to, the Chairman and Board Members and the Executive Team.
Remuneration for Non-pensionable Board Members (audited):
| Name | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | Term Start Date | Term End Date | |-----------------------------|---------|---------|-----------------|---------------| | Rt Hon Baroness Blackstone PC | 37.0 | 37.0 | 01.09.10 | 31.08.18 | | Mr David Barclay | 9.1 | 9.1 | 26.01.11 | 25.01.19 | | Dr Robert Black CBE | 9.1 | 9.1 | 20.06.12 | 19.06.20 | | Mr Jonathan Callaway | 9.1 | 9.1 | 01.04.15 | 31.03.19 | | Ms Tracy Chevalier | 9.1 | 9.1 | 01.04.15 | 31.03.19 | | Mr Martin Dickson | 9.1 | 9.1 | 01.04.15 | 31.03.19 | | Lord Fellowes GCB GCVO PC (until 11.12.16) | 6.8 | 9.1 | 30.09.12 | 11.12.16 | | Lord Janvrin GCB GCVO PC (from 1.1.17) | 2.3 | – | 01.01.17 | 31.12.20 | | Dr Stephen Page | 9.1 | 9.1 | 26.01.11 | 25.01.19 | | Mr Patrick Plant | 9.1 | 9.1 | 15.05.12 | 14.05.20 | | Sir John Ritblat | 9.1 | 9.1 | 01.04.15 | 31.03.19 | | Dr Simon Thurley CBE | 9.1 | 9.1 | 01.04.15 | 31.03.19 | | Professor Dame Helen Wallace DBE | 9.1 | 9.1 | 01.04.15 | 31.03.19 |
No pension contributions were made on behalf of the above Board Members in the year. The Board Members’ remuneration is in accordance with the British Library Act 1972.
During the year, a total of £1,739 (£1,802 in 2015/16) was paid to two (two in 2015/16) Board Members for travel expenses. Remuneration and Pension Details for the Executive Team (audited):
| Salary £000 | Bonus Payments £000 | Pension Benefits £000 | Total £000 | |------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------| | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | | Roly Keating, Chief Executive | 155–160 | 150–155 | 10–15 | – | 59 | 59 | 230–235 | 210–215 | | Caroline Brazier, Chief Librarian | 125–130 | 125–130 | 10–15 | 10–15 | 22 | 39 | 155–160 | 180–185 | | Philip Spence, Chief Operating Officer | 140–145 | 140–145 | 10–15 | 10–15 | 38 | 44 | 190–195 | 195–200 | | Richard Boulderstone, Chief Digital Officer until 10 April 2015 | – | 5–10 | (9/11 120–125) | – | – | 13 | – | 20–25 | | Frances Brindle, Director until 28 February 2015 | – | – | 5–10 | – | – | – | – | 5–10 | | Steve Morris, Chief Financial Officer until 30 June 2015 | – | 35–40 | (9/11 130–135) | 10–15 | – | 28 | – | 75–80 |
1 The value of pension benefits accrued during the year is calculated as (the real increase in pension multiplied by 20) plus (the real increase in any lump sum) less (the contributions made by the individual). The real increase excludes increases due to inflation or any increase or decrease due to a transfer of pension rights.
The Chief Executive and members of the Executive Team are eligible for contractual non-consolidated annual bonus payments of up to 10% of basic salary.
Bonuses were paid to three of the Executive Team in 2016/17. In 2015/16 bonuses were paid to four of the Executive Team and two of the Executive Team waived their contractual bonus payment.
In addition, for 2016/17 the annual pay award agreed by the Remuneration Committee for the Chief Officers was 2%, the same percentage as that agreed for all staff and in line with Government policy.
| Accrued Pension at pension age as at 31/3/17 | Real increase in pension and related lump sum at pension age £000 | CETV at 31/3/17 £000 | CETV at 31/3/16 £000 | Real increase in CETV £000 | |---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------| | Roly Keating, Chief Executive | 15–20 | 2.5–5 | 212 | 162 | 33 | | Caroline Brazier, Chief Librarian | 20–25 plus lump sum of 65–70 | 0–2.5 plus lump sum of 2.5–5 | 530 | 480 | 22 | | Philip Spence, Chief Operating Officer | 20–25 | 0–2.5 | 401 | 353 | 24 |
Library staff are eligible to become a member of one of the Principal Civil Service Pension Schemes (PCSPS), schemes that provide retirement-related benefits to all eligible employees. Pension benefits are provided through the Civil Service pension arrangements. From 1 April 2015 a new pension scheme for civil servants was introduced – the Civil Servants and Others Pension Scheme or alpha, which provides benefits on a career average basis with a normal pension age equal to the member’s State Pension Age (or 65 if higher). From that date, all newly appointed Library staff and the majority of those already in service joined alpha. Prior to that date, staff participated in the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme (PCSPS).
The PCSPS has four sections: three providing benefits on a final salary basis (classic, premium or classic plus) with a normal pension age of 60; and one providing benefits on a whole career basis (nuvos) with a normal pension age of 65.
These statutory arrangements are unfunded with the cost of benefits met by monies voted by Parliament each year. Pensions payable under classic, premium, classic plus, nuvos and alpha are increased annually in line with Pensions Increase legislation. Existing members of the PCSPS who were within 10 years of their normal pension age on 1 April 2012 remained in the PCSPS after 1 April 2015. Those who were between 10 years and 13 years and 5 months from their normal pension age on 1 April 2012 will switch into alpha sometime between 1 June 2015 and 1 February 2022.
All members who switch to alpha have their PCSPS benefits ‘banked’, with those with earlier benefits in one of the final salary sections of the PCSPS having those benefits based on their final salary when they leave alpha.
Employee contributions are salary-related and range between 3% and 8.05% of pensionable earnings for members of classic (and members of alpha who were members of classic immediately before joining alpha) and between 4.6% and 8.05% for members of premium, classic plus, nuvos and all other members of alpha. Benefits in classic accrue at the rate of 1/80th of final pensionable earnings for each year of service. In addition, a lump sum equivalent to three years initial pension is payable on retirement. For premium, benefits accrue at the rate of 1/60th of final pensionable earnings for each year of service. Unlike classic, there is no automatic lump sum. Classic plus is essentially a hybrid with benefits for service before 1 October 2002 calculated broadly as per classic and benefits for service from October 2002 worked out as in premium.
In nuvos a member builds up a pension based on their pensionable earnings during their period of scheme membership. At the end of the scheme year (31 March) the member’s earned pension account is credited with 2.3% of their pensionable earnings in that scheme year and the accrued pension is uprated in line with Pensions Increase legislation.
Benefits in alpha build up in a similar way to nuvos, except that the accrual rate is 2.32%. In all cases members may opt to give up (commute) pension for a lump sum up to the limits set by the Finance Act 2004.
The accrued pension quoted is the pension the member is entitled to receive when they reach pension age, or immediately on ceasing to be an active member of the scheme if they are already at or over pension age. Pension age is 60 for members of classic, premium and classic plus, 65 for members of nuvos, and the higher of 65 or State Pension Age for members of alpha. (The pension figures quoted for officials show pension earned in PCSPS or alpha – as appropriate. Where the official has benefits in both the PCSPS and alpha the figure quoted is the combined value of their benefits in the two schemes, but note that part of that pension may be payable from different ages).
The partnership pension account is a stakeholder pension arrangement. The employer makes a basic contribution of between 3% and 8.05% of pensionable earnings for members of classic and 12.5% up to 30 September 2015 and 8% and 14.75% from 1 October 2015 (depending on the age of the member) into a stakeholder pension product chosen by the employee from a panel of providers. The employee does not have to contribute, but where they do make contributions, the employer will match these up to a limit of 3% of pensionable salary (in addition to the employer’s basic contribution). Employers also contribute a further 0.8% of pensionable salary up to 30 September 2015 and 0.5% of pensionable salary from 1 October 2015 to cover the cost of centrally-provided risk benefit cover (death in service and ill health retirement).
Further details about the Civil Service pension arrangements can be found at the website www.civilservicepensionscheme.org.uk
Cash Equivalent Transfer Values
A Cash Equivalent Transfer Value (CETV) is the actuarially-assessed, capitalised value of the pension scheme benefits accrued by a member at a particular point in time. The benefits valued are the member’s accrued benefits and any contingent spouse’s pension earned in PCSPS or alpha is a payment made by a pension scheme or arrangement to secure pension benefits in another pension scheme or arrangement when the member leaves a scheme and chooses to transfer the benefits accrued in their former scheme. The pension figures shown relate to the benefits that the individual has accrued as a consequence of their total membership of the pension scheme, not just their service in a senior capacity to which disclosure applies. The figures include the value of any pension benefit in another scheme or arrangement which the individual has transferred from another pension scheme or arrangement and uses common market valuation factors for the start and end of the period.
Real Increase in CETV This reflects the increase in CETV effectively funded by the employer. It does not include the increase in accrued pension due to inflation, contributions paid by the employee (including the value of any benefits transferred from another pension scheme or arrangement) and uses common market valuation factors for the start and end of the period.
GOVERNANCE STATEMENT
Governance Framework The British Library The British Library is the national library of the United Kingdom, formed in 1973 under Section 1(1) of the British Library Act 1972 ("the Act"). It is a non-departmental public body, an arm’s-length body funded by a combination of Grant in Aid allocated by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and income secured through commercial, fundraising, sponsored and charging activities. A management agreement letter from the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport sets out the Library’s Grant in Aid allocation and conditions.
The British Library is an exempt charity under the Charities Act 2011 and complies with the duty under section 17 to have due regard to public benefit guidance published by the Charities Commission.
Objectives and Activities Section 1(2) of the Act placed the Library under the control and management of the British Library Board ("the Board"), the duty of which is to manage the Library as a national centre for reference, study and bibliographical and other information services in relation both to scientific and technological matters and to the humanities.
The objectives of the Library are set out under Sections 1(3) and 1(4) of the Act. The Library is required to make its services available to the public and, in particular, to institutions of education and learning, other libraries and industry. It may carry out and sponsor research, contribute to the expenses of library authorities or other persons providing library facilities, and make any part of its collections, or of its premises, available in connection with events of an educational, literary or cultural nature. Under Section 2, the Schedule to the Act empowers the Board to impose charges for any services provided, or for the loan or use of any item from its collections, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State.
Living Knowledge sets out the British Library’s vision for its future development as it looks ahead to 2023, the year of its 50th anniversary as the national library of the UK. Living Knowledge explains how the Library contributes to research, culture, education and economic prosperity, for the benefit not just of the UK but of users and partners around the world. The Library’s mission is to ‘make our intellectual heritage accessible to everyone, for research, inspiration and enjoyment’. Living Knowledge sets out six core statements of purpose for custodianship, research, business, culture, learning and international activities.
The Board The constitution and further provisions of the Board are set out in the Act. The Chairman and members of the Board are all appointed by the Secretary of State, with the exception of one member who is appointed by HM The Queen. One member of the Board is appointed after consultation with Scottish Ministers. Members are normally appointed for four-year terms, with consecutive appointments restricted to two terms. All are part time with the exception of the Chief Executive who is the only full-time executive member of the Board. The Chairman and Board select one of their members to be Deputy Chairman.
Members of the Board have corporate responsibility for ensuring that the Library complies with any statutory or administrative requirements for the use of public funds and ensuring that high standards of corporate governance are observed at all times. The Board establishes the overall strategic direction of the organisation. It approves the Library’s annual corporate business plan and annual budget. It also oversees the delivery of planned results by monitoring performance against agreed strategic objectives and targets.
The responsibilities of the Chairman and the Chief Executive are set out in the Statement of Directors’ and Accounting Officer’s Responsibilities on page 42.
The Board meets five times a year, with one of those meetings substantially devoted to the review and development of strategy. The Chief Operating Officer and Chief Librarian are normally present during Board meetings. Board Committees
The Board has delegated certain responsibilities to committees of the Board, as follows.
| Committee | Key Responsibilities | |----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Audit Committee | A standing committee without executive powers which supports the Board and the | | | Accounting Officer in their responsibilities for issues of finance, risk, control and | | | governance by reviewing the comprehensiveness, reliability and integrity of assurances | | | provided to them. | | Remuneration Committee | A standing committee without executive powers which makes recommendations to the Board | | | with regard to the performance, pay and employment terms and conditions of the Chief | | | Executive, and which considers the recommendations of the Chief Executive in relation | | | to the Chief Librarian, the Chief Operating Officer and other staff. | | Capital Projects Committee | A limited-life committee without executive powers, whose primary responsibility is to | | | assist the Board in overseeing the achievement of the objectives of the St Pancras | | | Transformed Programme. | | Investment Committee | A limited-life committee without executive powers, formed to review and make | | | recommendations to the trustees of the British Library's trust funds with regard to | | | investments. |
Board and Committee Membership
| Chairman | Current term | Expires | Board | Audit | Remun. | Cap Pr | Invest. | |----------------------------|--------------|---------|-------|-------|--------|--------|---------| | Rt Hon Baroness Blackstone PC | 2nd | 31.8.2018 | Chair | – | Member | – | – | | Deputy Chairman | | | | | | | | | Mr David Barclay | 2nd | 25.1.2019 | Member | Member | Chair | – | Member | | Chief Executive | | | | | | | | | Mr Roly Keating | 1st | 11.9.2019 | Member | – | – | Member | – | | Non-Executive Board Members| | | | | | | | | Dr Robert Black CBE | 2nd | 19.6.2020 | Member | Chair | – | – | – | | Mr Jonathan Callaway | 1st | 31.3.2019 | Member | – | – | Chair | – | | Ms Tracy Chevalier | 1st | 31.3.2019 | Member | – | – | – | – | | Mr Martin Dickson | 1st | 31.3.2019 | Member | Member | Member | – | Member | | Lord Fellowes GCB GCVO PC (until 11.12.2016) | 3rd | 11.12.2016 | Member | Member | – | – | – | | Lord Janvin GCB GCVO PC (from 1.1.2017) | 1st | 31.12.2020 | Member | – | – | – | – | | Dr Stephen Page | 2nd | 25.1.2019 | Member | – | – | Member | – | | Mr Patrick Plant | 2nd | 14.5.2020 | Member | – | – | Chair | – | | Sir John Ritblat | 1st | 31.3.2019 | Member | – | – | – | – | | Dr Simon Thurley CBE | 1st | 31.3.2019 | Member | – | – | Member | – | | Professor Dame Helen Wallace DBE | 1st | 31.3.2019 | Member | Member | – | – | – |
Committee members with relevant professional experience:
| Ms Berenice Smith | 3rd | 31.10.2018 | Member | – | – | – | – |
2 Board members’ biographies are available at: www.bl.uk/aboutus/governance/blboard/memberslist/
Board Performance
Board and Committee Business
The Board received annual reports from the Chairs of the Audit Committee and Remuneration Committee, plus minutes of each meeting of the Audit Committee, Capital Projects Committee and Investment Committee. The Board received quarterly reports on financial and business performance, delivery of strategic change initiatives, and risk management. The Board also approved financial and business plans for the next year.
In addition to regular business, significant issues that were considered by the Board during 2016/17 included:
- Plans, and the procurement of a commercial development partner, to adapt and extend the Library’s iconic building in St Pancras, making it one of the UK’s most open, creative and innovative public spaces for the 21st century
- Developing ideas for the future of the Library’s estate and operations in Boston Spa, including a potential range of new storage and collection management facilities
- Progress in the delivery of Living Knowledge and key purposes including Business, Learning and Culture
- The creation and launch of a new Membership scheme for individuals wishing to join the Library
- Launch of the Living Knowledge Network, a partnership with national and public libraries in major towns and cities throughout the UK, plus extension of the network of Business & IP Centres to two more libraries in Exeter and Northampton
- New arrangements for volunteers and a strategy for apprenticeships
- Review of the Library’s purchasing strategy for the acquisition of digital and printed journal content
- Progress in the implementation of the Library’s development strategy and commercial business strategy for the next five years.
The Audit Committee kept the management of risk, and the Library’s top strategic risks, under review throughout the year. The Committee reviewed reports from RSM, the Library’s internal auditors, including progress reports on the implementation of recommendations. The Committee agreed a suitable programme of work for 2017/18. Members of internal and external audit attended each meeting of the Audit Committee and their work was considered by the Committee. During the course of its work in 2016/17, the Committee did not identify any particular issues to draw to the attention of the Board or Accounting Officer.
The Remuneration Committee approved, on behalf of the Board, annual bonus recommendations for the Chief Executive, Chief Librarian and Chief Operating Officer, plus the annual pay remit for staff in 2016/17.
The Capital Projects Committee oversaw the selection and procurement, via competitive dialogue, of property developer Stanhope plc as a commercial partner, with architects Rogers Stirk Harbour & Partners, to develop land in the north of the Library’s St Pancras estate and provide improved facilities within the current St Pancras building.
The Investment Committee made recommendations to the trustees of the Library’s trust funds which resulted in the transfer of assets to two different investment funds. Board Effectiveness
New board appointees’ induction includes interviews with key staff about strategic issues and the services of the Library, briefing material on the Library’s governance framework and background, and the offer of training on board members’ responsibilities and requirements or expectations relevant to the Library as a public body.
Board members have annual appraisals with the Chairman and the Board undertakes an annual assessment of its own effectiveness on the basis of a self-evaluation questionnaire. The review of 2016/17 confirmed that the Board has good skills-based membership, but members recommended that consideration should be given by the Secretary of State in future consideration should be given by the Board to the Library’s business continues to evolve. The survey also confirmed that the Board was generally effective with sound processes, that Board members receive timely and accurate information for all areas for which they are responsible and that they have confidence in the robustness of that data. The Board considers the quality of information sufficient for it to conduct its role.
Separately, the Board’s Audit Committee also carried out a self-evaluation based upon the National Audit Office’s check list, which also confirmed that the Library has good practices and controls and that the work of the Committee is effective. Internal Audit provides assurances on the quality of management information through individual audit reviews in a cyclical three-year programme.
The Library complies with the requirements of Corporate governance in central government departments: code of good practice, 2017 as adapted to the circumstances of the Library as an arm’s-length body.
Management
Responsibility for managing the Library is delegated to the Chief Executive who, as Accounting Officer, is personally responsible to Parliament for the stewardship of public money and the Library’s assets, and for ensuring that the resources allocated to the Library under the authority of Parliament are used for the purposes intended by Parliament.
Management of the Library is led by the Chief Executive, Chief Librarian and Chief Operating Officer, and includes the following areas of responsibility:
- Collections and curation
- Digital scholarship
- Digital marketing
- Corporate affairs
- Development and fundraising
- Governance
- Strategy development
RISK ASSESSMENT
Internal Controls and Risk Management Framework
The Chairman is responsible to the Secretary of State for ensuring that the Library fulfils its statutory purpose as set out in its founding legislation; it complies with charity law; relevant Library policies are consistent with those of the Secretary of State; and the Library’s affairs are conducted with probity. The Board assesses the risks facing the Library and satisfies itself that the risk management and internal control systems are effective.
The Accounting Officer is personally responsible for the Governance Statement and for making sure that: a sound system of internal control exists and is maintained; the public funds and assets for which he is personally responsible are safeguarded in accordance with the responsibilities assigned in Managing Public Money; and ensuring compliance with the requirements of the Library’s Management Agreement with DCMS.
During 2016/17, in support of the UK Anti-Corruption Plan 2014, the Library responded to a DCMS Counter Fraud Functional Standards Questionnaire and considered how to improve its controls against fraud and bribery. Public accountability training was delivered to almost 70 staff who regularly make financial and non-financial commitments on the Library’s behalf.
The Library adheres to a risk management policy framework endorsed by the Board which, line with the risk standard ISO 31000 and HM Treasury guidance (Orange Book: Management of Risk – Principles and Concepts), lays out its policies and procedures for managing risk. The framework also reflects identified best practices, sets out clear roles and responsibilities in managing risks and includes a statement of the Library’s risk appetite. Risk management is increasingly integrated in business planning decisions, whether big or small, rather than being a separate management action. During 2016/17 we focussed on the controls and assurances for risks, giving confidence that risks are being managed effectively and efficiently.
The Library draws a clear distinction between strategic risks and operational risks. Strategic risks are defined as ‘those business risks that, if realised, could fundamentally affect the way in which the organisation exists or provides services in the next one to five years. These risks will have a detrimental effect on the organisation’s achievement of its key business objectives. The risk realisation will lead to failure, loss or lost opportunity’. The Strategic Risk Register is reviewed annually by the Board; annually by the Strategic Leadership Team; four times a year by management’s Audit and Risk Group; and three times a year by the Board’s Audit Committee.
Operational risks are held within risk registers which are regularly reviewed by the management team.
At the end of each financial year, the Chief Executive, Chief Librarian and Chief Operating Officer complete a declaration that they have reviewed and are managing all identified risks. If warranted, operational risks may be escalated to the Strategic Risk Register.
The Library aims to manage risk within risk appetite levels agreed by the Board, rather than eliminating all risks to achievement of its policies, aims and objectives. Five levels of risk appetite have been established: Minimum, Low, Modest, Moderate and Maximum. Management and the Board’s Audit Committee review the risk appetite levels annually in the light of any changes within the Library or outside in the external landscape in order to ensure that the system of internal control remains effective. Any proposals to change risk appetite levels are reviewed and agreed by the Board.
Effectiveness of Internal Controls
During the year, the Board and the Board’s Audit Committee both completed reviews of their effectiveness by self-assessment. Members were satisfied both that effective controls and an institution-wide risk management process were in place, and that they receive appropriate information and reports on a timely basis.
In observance of Public Sector Internal Audit Standards, the Head of Internal Audit provides an annual opinion on the overall adequacy and effectiveness of the Library’s risk management, control and governance processes based on a plan of sixteen internal audit reviews throughout 2016/17, the Head of Internal Audit rated the Library as having an adequate and effective.
Head of Internal Audit provides an annual opinion on the overall adequacy and effectiveness of the Library’s risk management, control and governance processes based on a plan of sixteen internal audit reviews throughout 2016/17, the Head of Internal Audit rated the Library as having an adequate and effective.
Assessment of Principal Risks in 2016/17
A full review and assessment of the Library’s register of strategic risks was completed during the year. The updated register included the following:
- **Stakeholder Relationships** (Appetite: Moderate). The Library continues to need specialist and skilled staff in a competitive market and so we have started to update our People Policies in line with our new People Strategy. Regular updates to the Board provide assurances that we are largely compliant with our risk management, governance and internal control but recommended some further enhancements to ensure that the framework remains adequate and effective.
Managing Financial Risk
The Library’s budgetary framework delegates budget responsibilities from the Chief Executive, as Accounting Officer, to the Chief Officers. As part of this responsibility the Library requires each Strategic Leadership Team manager to review their financial performance on a monthly basis and regularly, to advise the Chief Officers of any potential deviation from budget and to report any remedial actions being taken to address it.
Financial performance is reported monthly to the Chief Officers and quarterly to the Board. During the year, our four-year financial strategy was updated as part of the annual corporate planning process. Forecasts are reported to DCMS on a monthly basis and regular contact is maintained with their appointed finance manager. We also implemented a new finance team structure which provides greater resilience by ensuring the right skills and capacity are in place to deliver a fit-for-purpose finance service.
Managing Information Risk
The Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO) of the Library is supported by a Corporate Information Information Governance Group covering information compliance, information management and information security. During 2016/17 the main focus of activity was on:
- Data protection, including preparations for the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 2016 which will take effect in May 2018. The regulation establishes new rules for the use of personal data in the digital era, affecting our custodianship of collections and the operation of customer databases including our members, suppliers and partners.
- Freedom of Information and support of the Government’s transparency agenda.
- Information Management through continued improvement in our records management.
- Information Security policy, aligned with ISO 27001.
- Implementation of Cyber Essentials, including post-exit arrangements, to test our business continuity arrangements at both tactical and strategic levels.
Health and Safety
The Health and Safety (H&S) team is tasked with ensuring that the Library’s legal and moral obligations are met and the health, safety and welfare of staff and visitors are met in full. Over the last 12 months across all Library sites 1,304 staff attended nine types of training course on health and safety matters. During the year a total 91 accidents were reported under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) – compared with 95 in 2015/16 – comprising 51 accidents involving members of staff and 40 involving visitors, contractors and other non-staff members. The majority of these accidents were slips, trips and falls, especially during the winter and wet weather. The Library adheres to all salient points within the British Standards Institute’s BS OHSAS 18001 guidance.
The average sickness absence for staff during the year, excluding unpaid absence and maternity leave, was 8.03 days per employee (7.72 days in 2015/16).
Whistleblowing
The Library has a whistleblowing policy which was written in consultation with our recognised Trade Unions and is made widely available to all staff on the Library’s intranet. In a majority of instances the most appropriate place for a worker to raise concerns will be with their line manager or a more senior manager; in other cases concern may be reported to the Chair of the Audit Committee as a member of the British Library Board or, in their absence, to the Deputy Chairman. There were no instances of whistleblowing reported in 2016/17. CERTIFICATE OF THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL TO THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT AND THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT
I certify that I have audited the financial statements of the British Library for the year ended 31 March 2017 under the British Library Act 1972. The financial statements comprise: the Statement of Financial Activities, the Balance Sheet, the Cash Flow Statement and the related notes. These financial statements have been prepared under the accounting policies set out within them. I have also audited the information in the Remuneration Report that is described in that report as having been audited.
Respective responsibilities of the Board, Accounting Officer and auditor
As explained more fully in the Statement of Directors’ and Accounting Officer’s responsibilities, the Board and Chief Executive as Accounting Officer are responsible for the preparation of the financial statements and for being satisfied that they give a true and fair view. My responsibility is to audit, certify and report on the financial statements in accordance with the British Library Act 1972. I conducted my audit in accordance with International Standards on Auditing (UK and Ireland). Those standards require me and my staff to comply with the Auditing Practices Board’s Ethical Standards for Auditors.
Scope of the audit of the financial statements
An audit involves obtaining evidence about the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements sufficient to give reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error. This includes an assessment of: whether the accounting policies are appropriate to the British Library’s circumstances and have been consistently applied and adequately disclosed; the reasonableness of significant accounting estimates made by the British Library; and the overall presentation of the financial statements. In addition, I read all the financial and non-financial information in the Annual Report to identify material inconsistencies with the audited financial statements and to identify any information that is apparently materially incorrect based on, or materially inconsistent with, the knowledge acquired by me in the course of performing the audit. If I become aware of any apparent material misstatements or inconsistencies I consider the implications for my certificate. I am required to obtain evidence sufficient to give reasonable assurance that the expenditure and income recorded in the financial statements have been applied to the purposes intended by Parliament and the financial transactions recorded in the financial statements conform to the authorities which govern them.
Opinion on regularity
In my opinion, in all material respects, the expenditure and income recorded in the financial statements have been applied to the purposes intended by Parliament and the financial transactions recorded in the financial statements conform to the authorities which govern them.
Opinion on other matters
In my opinion: • the part of the Remuneration Report to be audited has been properly prepared in accordance with Secretary of State directions made under the British Library Act 1972; and • the information given in the Governance Statement, Financial Review and Sustainability Report sections of the Annual Report for the financial year for which the financial statements are prepared is consistent with the financial statements.
Matters on which I report by exception
I have nothing to report in respect of the following matters which I report to you if, in my opinion: • adequate accounting records have not been kept or returns adequate for my audit have not been received from branches not visited by my staff; or • the financial statements and the part of the Remuneration Report to be audited are not in agreement with the accounting records and returns; or • I have not received all of the information and explanations I require for my audit; or • the Governance Statement does not reflect compliance with HM Treasury’s guidance.
Report
I have no observations to make on these financial statements.
Sir Amyas C E Morse Comptroller and Auditor General 5 July 2017
National Audit Office 157–197 Buckingham Palace Road Victoria London SW1W 9SP
ANNUAL ACCOUNTS
The British Library Board Statement of Financial Activities for the year ended 31 March 2017
| Notes | Unrestricted funds £000 | Restricted funds £000 | Total £000 | Unrestricted funds £000 | Restricted funds £000 | Total £000 | |-------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------| | Income and Endowments from: | | | | | | | | Donations and legacies | 2 | 1,631 | 8,041 | 9,672 | 452 | 9,467 | 9,919 | | Charitable Activities | 3 | 13,500 | 280 | 13,780 | 13,251 | 548 | 13,799 | | Investment Income | 4 | 381 | 268 | 649 | 525 | 478 | 1,003 | | Other Incoming Resources | | | | | | | | Grant in Aid | 5 | 93,911 | – | 93,911 | 93,043 | – | 93,043 | | Total Income and Endowments | 109,423 | 8,589 | 118,012 | 107,271 | 10,493 | 117,764 | | Expenditure on: | | | | | | | | Raising Funds | 773 | – | 773 | 582 | – | 582 | | Investment Management costs | 3 | 11 | 14 | 6 | 20 | 26 | | Charitable Activities: | | | | | | | | Access | | | | | | | | Content / Acquisitions | 41,981 | 1,629 | 43,610 | 41,542 | 1,555 | 43,097 | | Developments | 11,445 | 1,937 | 13,382 | 15,193 | 1,633 | 16,826 | | International | (632) | 2,453 | 1,821 | (578) | 2,196 | 1,618 | | Navigation | 20,620 | 1,492 | 22,112 | 18,959 | 1,804 | 20,763 | | Public Engagement | 14,321 | 601 | 14,922 | 13,286 | 55 | 13,341 | | Web | 1,486 | 56 | 1,542 | 2,035 | 18 | 2,053 | | Public Lending Right to Authors | 6,080 | – | 6,080 | 6,400 | – | 6,400 | | Total Expenditure | 6 | 129,546 | 8,770 | 138,316 | 129,436 | 8,041 | 137,477 | | Net Gains / (losses) on investments | 11 | 719 | 1,947 | 2,666 | (275) | (822) | (1,097) | | Net income / (expenditure) | (19,404) | 1,766 | (17,638) | (22,440) | 1,630 | (20,810) | | Transfer between funds | 17 | 29 | (29) | – | – | – | | Other Recognised gains / (losses) | | | | | | | | Gains / (losses) on revaluation of fixed assets | 9 | 288,222 | – | 288,222 | 18,139 | – | 18,139 | | PLR Reserve movement | 9 | – | 9 | – | – | – | | Net movement in funds | 268,856 | 1,737 | 270,593 | (4,301) | 1,630 | (2,671) | | Reconciliation of Funds | | | | | | | | Fund balances brought forward at 1 April | 1,328,490 | 22,086 | 1,350,576 | 1,322,791 | 20,456 | 1,353,247 | | Fund balances carried forward at 31 March | 1,597,346 | 23,823 | 1,621,169 | 1,328,490 | 22,086 | 1,350,576 |
All recognised gains and losses are included within the Statement of Financial Activities and all the Library’s activities are classed as continuing.
The notes on pages 66 to 88 form part of these accounts. The British Library Board Balance Sheet as at 31 March 2017
| Notes | 2016/17 £000 | 2015/16 £000 | |-------|--------------|--------------| | Fixed assets | | | | Intangible assets | 8 | 55 | 90 | | Tangible assets | 9 | 1,490,797 | 1,226,674 | | Heritage assets | 10 | 68,109 | 65,848 | | Investments | 11 | 24,256 | 19,722 | | Total fixed assets | | 1,583,217 | 1,312,334 | | Current assets | | | | Stocks | 13 | 935 | 1,041 | | Debtors and prepayments | 14 | 12,042 | 12,113 | | Short Term Deposits | 15 | 16,500 | 27,000 | | Cash at bank and in hand | 15 | 27,466 | 17,454 | | Total current assets | | 56,943 | 57,608 | | Current liabilities | | | | Creditors: amounts falling due within one year | 16 | (18,819) | (19,212) | | Provisions: amounts falling due within one year | 20 | (172) | (154) | | Total current liabilities | | (18,991) | (19,366) | | Net current assets | | 37,952 | 38,242 | | Total assets less current liabilities | | 1,621,169 | 1,350,576 | | Net assets | | 1,621,169 | 1,350,576 |
Represented by:
Income funds
Restricted funds | 17 | 23,823 | 22,086 |
Public Lending Right | 9 | – |
Unrestricted funds:
Fixed Asset reserves | 18 | 411,637 | 390,737 |
Revaluation Reserve | 17 | 1,118,366 | 873,787 |
Donated Asset reserve | 17 | 28,958 | 28,088 |
Designated Funds | 17 | 7,135 | 5,853 |
General funds | 17 | 31,241 | 30,025 |
Total funds | | 1,621,169 | 1,350,576 |
The notes on pages 66 to 88 form part of these accounts
The financial statements on pages 63 to 65 and accompanying notes on pages 66 to 88 were approved by the Board on 20 June 2017, and were signed on their behalf by:
Rt Hon Baroness Blackstone PC Chairman 30 June 2017
Roly Keating Chief Executive and Accounting Officer 30 June 2017
The British Library Board Cash Flow Statement for the year ended 31 March 2017
| Notes | 2016/17 £000 | 2015/16 £000 | |-------|--------------|--------------| | Cash Flows from operating activities: | | | | Net Cash provided by (used in) operating activities | 15 | 7,911 | 4,508 | | Cash flows from investing activities: | | | | Dividends, interest and rents from Investments | 4 | 649 | 1,003 | | Purchase of property, plant and machinery | 8.9 | (4,919) | (2,305) | | Purchase of heritage assets | 10 | (1,391) | (1,933) | | Donated assets | 10 | (870) | – | | Disposal of Investments at cost | 11 | 22,058 | 1,470 | | Purchase of investments | 12 | (23,926) | (972) | | Net Cash provided by (used in) investing activities | | (488) | 1,771 | | Change in cash and cash equivalents | | (488) | 1,771 | | Cash and cash equivalent brought forward | | 44,454 | 42,683 | | Cash and Cash equivalents carried forward | | 43,966 | 44,454 |
Analysis of Cash and Cash Equivalents
Cash in Hand | 27,466 | 17,454 |
Notice Deposits | 16,500 | 27,000 |
Total Cash and cash equivalents | | 43,966 | 44,454 |
The notes on pages 66 to 88 form part of these accounts
The financial statements on pages 63 to 65 and accompanying notes on pages 66 to 88 were approved by the Board on 20 June 2017, and were signed on their behalf by:
Rt Hon Baroness Blackstone PC Chairman 30 June 2017
Roly Keating Chief Executive and Accounting Officer 30 June 2017 NOTES TO THE ACCOUNTS
1. ACCOUNTING POLICIES
a) Accounting convention
The Accounts have been prepared in accordance with the accounts direction given by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport with the approval of HM Treasury, in accordance with Section 5(3) of the British Library Act 1972. A copy of the accounts direction can be obtained from the British Library, 96 Easton Road, London NW1 2DB.
Accordingly, the Accounts have been prepared under the historical cost convention as modified by the revaluation of land and buildings and in accordance with the Statement of Recommended Practice ‘Accounting and Reporting by Charities’, issued January 2015, (the ‘SORP’), the Charities Act 1993, the Charities (Accounting and Reports) Regulations 2016, the Financial Reporting Manual, FRS 102 and generally accepted accounting practice so far as considered appropriate or as modified by HM Treasury guidance.
Within the Statement of Financial Activities (SOFA), the Library reflects its costs against its charitable activities as required by the FRS 102 SORP.
In addition, modified historic cost accounting has been utilised more fairly to represent the current cost of the Library’s most significant assets, where the comparison with historic values shows a material difference.
The Board has considered the implications of recent reductions in the government grant, and believes that there are no material uncertainties about the Library’s ability to continue and the accounts have therefore been prepared on the going concern basis.
b) Incurring resources
Grant in Aid received from DCMS is allocated to unrestricted funds in the year in which it is received.
Provision of Services income is recorded on an accruals basis and is shown net of Value Added Tax and has been classified under headings that aggregate all costs related to the category. Provision of Services income is allocated against the functions set out in the British Library Act 1972.
Donations are included in the Statement of Financial Activities on a cash received basis, or where all entitlement criteria of probability and measurability as per the Statement of Recommended Practice (FRS 102 SORP) have been met by the Balance Sheet date.
UK Grants from government bodies, funds from the EU, and other grants are recognised in the Library’s Accounts when the grantor’s terms and conditions have been satisfied.
Investment income relates to interest received on daily bank balances and dividends from the Fixed Asset Investments. These are recorded on an accruals basis.
The Library charges for some of the exhibitions it holds and this income is recorded in the Provision of Services on a cash received basis.
Where income is received in advance, and the Library does not have entitlement to these resources until the goods or services have been provided, the income is deferred in the accounts.
c) Taxation
The British Library Act 1972 states that ‘the Board shall be a body corporate and that, for the purposes of the Charities Act 1960, the Board shall be an exempt charity’. The British Library enjoys exemption under the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 for profits from primary purpose trading activities as an exempt charity. Income from profits on non-primary purpose activity is subject to Corporation Tax at the prevailing rate.
The British Library is able to recover VAT relating to the expenditure for primary purpose activities; any irrecoverable VAT is apportioned across the strategic priority cost categories detailed in note 6.
d) Valuations
In accordance with FRS15, regular professional valuations of land and property and structural plant and machinery assets are carried out, having regard to the importance of the estate to the operation of the department but, in any event, at least once in every five years.
In the interim years, land, property, and plant and machinery are valued using either relevant price indices or interim desk top valuations. Other categories (office equipment, IT equipment and vehicles) are not valued due to the short life and low value items included.
e) Fixed assets
The threshold for capitalising assets is £20,000.
The Library holds and conserves a number of collections made up of books, journals, newspapers, sound and music recordings, patents, databases, maps, manuscripts and much more. In accordance with the Financial Reporting Manual, FRS15 and FRS30 (Heritage Assets), assets acquired before 1 April 2001 have not been capitalised, since reliable estimates of cost or value are not available on a cost benefit basis. Additions to the collection acquired since 1 April 2001 are capitalised and recognised in the Balance Sheet under Heritage Assets. The assets are classified by whether the items were bought by, or donated to, the Library. The cost or value of the acquisition is used where such a cost or valuation is reasonably obtainable. Such items are not depreciated or re-valued. Collection items with values below the capitalisation threshold are expensed when the expenditure is incurred.
Items donated to the collection by third parties, either by gift of the asset or ‘in lieu of tax’, are capitalised at current value on receipt. Donated assets are not depreciated since, given their infinite useful life and high residual value, any depreciation charge would be immaterial. As the assets are not depreciated they are subject to an annual impairment review.
An overview of the scope of the British Library Collections is set out at Note 10 on page 76.
Depreciation is provided on all tangible fixed assets other than freehold land and collection items. Amortisation is provided on all intangible assets.
Impairment reviews are carried out at the end of each reporting period in accordance with FRS11 to ensure that the carrying values of the assets do not exceed their recoverable amount.
Expenditure on building Digital Infrastructure is capitalised on an annual basis. Any directly attributable costs for the digital programmes are capitalised and depreciated in line with other computer equipment.
Any costs associated with the development of internal systems including web redevelopment are capitalised if software or intangible and amortised over the estimated useful life up to three years. This is due to the systems providing long-term benefit to the Library.
Depreciation rates are calculated to write off the cost or valuation of each asset, less estimated residual value, evenly over its expected useful life, as follows:
Freehold buildings Over the remaining useful life as at the valuation date, up to a maximum of 75 years.
Plant and Machinery and Office Equipment 3 to 25 years
Computer Equipment 3 to 5 years
Motor Vehicles 4 years
Assets in the course of construction No depreciation is charged until the building is operational and supporting the activities of the Library.
Intangible / Licences 3 years or over the life of the licence
f) Government grant
Grant in Aid from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport is allocated to general purposes and is taken to the SOFA and recognised in the period in which it is received.
g) Stocks
Stocks are stated at the lower of cost or net realisable value. Provision is made against slow-moving and obsolete stock. Any stocks of consumables held are considered written-off at the time of purchase.
Stocks held in respect of book-binding activities are recorded at cost. As this stock is not of a general nature it would not be cost-effective to test the realisable value in determining which provides the lower valuation.
h) Foreign currencies
Assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies are translated at the rate of exchange ruling at the year end. Transactions in foreign currencies are translated at the rate ruling at the time of the transaction. All exchange differences are taken to the SOFA.
Transfer between funds will occur when Library or Restricted funds are utilised by an opposite category of fund. Transfers may also occur during the purchase of tangible and heritage assets if a restricted fund is required to contribute to the purchase. These transfers are reflected in the transfer column in note 17 on pages 81 and 82.
i) Financial Instruments
The Library has applied FRS25 Financial Instruments: Presentation, FRS26 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement and FRS29 Financial Instruments: Disclosure.
Financial Assets
Investments comprise restricted funds that have been invested in unit trusts traded on an active market. These have been classified as available for sale and recognised at fair value, being the bid price on the Balance Sheet date. Income generated is recognised as restricted investment income on the SOFA, allocated to the restricted fund which holds the investment and re-invested into the capital investment. Unrealised investment gains and losses are interest received on unrestricted cash balances. Unrecognised gains and losses arising from changes in the fair value are recognised in the SOFA and taken to a Fair Value Reserve. Recognised gains and losses on disposal of investments are recognised in the SOFA. Trade debtors are recognised at carrying value, reduced by appropriate allowances for estimated irrecoverable amounts.
Financial Liabilities Trade creditors are short-term and are stated at carrying value in recognition that these liabilities fall due within one year. Customer deposits are stated at cost and are repayable on demand. Provision for employees known to be leaving the organisation within one year under early retirement or early severance terms are accounted for under financial liabilities.
l) Resources Expended All expenditure is accounted for on an accruals basis and has been classified under headings that aggregate all costs related to the category, including an apportionment of overhead and support costs as shown in note 6 on page 70.
a) Costs of generating funds are those incurred in seeking voluntary contributions and do not include the costs of disseminating information in support of the charitable activities.
b) Charitable activities are based on the functions of the Library set out in the British Library Act 1972.
i. Access – Costs associated with making the British Library services available including Document Supply and Reading Rooms.
ii. Content/Acquisitions – Costs associated with maintaining a comprehensive collection of books, manuscripts, periodicals, films and other recorded matter. Includes legal deposit processing, acquisitions, collection development and storage.
iii. Developments – Major projects / development expenditure including the Newspaper Programme, UK Research Reserve and Digital Initiatives.
iv. International – Costs associated with the Government priority of active engagement in countries with a resonance with the Library’s collections and audiences.
v. Navigation – Costs associated with being a national centre for reference, study and bibliographical services, including cataloguing, curatorial and bibliographic services costs.
vi. Public Engagement – Exhibition costs and costs of Learning programmes, running the British Library Shop and Visitor Services.
vii. Web – Costs associated with the operation, content and development of www.bl.uk to increase the Library’s impact beyond its physical locations.
viii. Public Lending Right to Authors – Annual payment to authors under Public Lending Right.
c) Governance costs includes the costs of Board Membership remuneration, legal fees, internal and external audit fees, and staff costs associated with the preparation of the statutory accounts.
m) Provisions The Library provides for legal or constructive obligations which are of uncertain timing or amount on the balance sheet date on the basis of best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the obligation. Provisions are recognised where there is a present obligation as a result of a past event, it is probable that a transfer of economic benefit will be required to settle the obligation and a reliable estimate of the amount can be made.
n) Estimation Techniques In preparation of the accounts a number of estimation techniques are used:
• Index-linked revaluations are used in the interim years between professional revaluations. The Library’s land and building are re-valued using an appropriate index provided by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors. Plant and Machinery assets are re-valued using an appropriate index provided by the Office for National Statistics.
• To establish that the correct costs are included in the correct period, it is assumed that, as over 96% of the Library’s serial subscriptions operate on a calendar year renewal, the same allocation is applied to all serial expenditure.
• The financial statements include an accrual for outstanding holiday pay due to employees as at 31 March. The accrual is calculated by pro-rating remaining leave over the holiday calendar period and 31 March.
o) Contingent Liabilities Contingent liabilities are disclosed in line with FRS 102 SORP. Contingent liabilities are recognised when there is either: a possible but uncertain obligation, or a present obligation that is not recognised because a transfer of economic benefit to settle the possible obligation is not probable; or the amount of the obligation cannot be estimated reliably.
p) Early Departures All redundancy and other departure costs have been paid in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Compensation Scheme and are accounted for in full in the year of departure.
q) Pensions Past and present employees are covered by the provisions of the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme (PCSPS) and Civil Servants and Others Pension Scheme (alpha). The defined benefit schemes are unfunded and are contributory public service occupational pension schemes made under the Superannuation Act 1972. We recognise the expected cost of these elements, on a systematic and rational basis, over the period during which it benefits from employees’ services by payment to the PCSPS/alpha of amounts calculated on an accruing basis. Liability for payment of future benefits is a charge on the PCSPS/alpha. In respect of the defined contribution schemes, we recognise the contributions payable for the year.
2. VOLUNTARY INCOME
| | 2016/17 | 2016/17 | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | | £000 | £000 | £000 | £000 | | Donated Assets | 870 | – | 870 | – | | Other Donations and UK Grants | 761 | 6,642 | 7,403 | 7,817 | | EU Grants | – | 1,399 | 1,399 | 2,102 | | Total Voluntary Income | 1,631 | 8,041 | 9,672 | 9,919 |
The £1.4m received in EU grants relates to five grants. The Library is the lead partner for two of these projects, therefore the Library receives the gross grant from the EU funding body for these projects and then distributes payment to other EU partners. In year the library made payments totalling £1.2m to the other EU partners.
3. INCOME FROM CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES
Income from Charitable Activities includes Document Supply and other information services, sponsorship income, licensing and royalties, publication sales, exhibition entrance fees, retail income and income for performing Public Lending Right facilities for the Irish Government. The Income from Charitable Activities can be further analysed by both business and geographical segments.
A) CLASSES OF BUSINESS
| | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |----------------------|---------|---------| | | £000 | £000 | | Access | 5,013 | 5,116 | | Content / Acquisitions | 82 | 88 | | Developments | 1,217 | 523 | | International | – | – | | Navigation | 1,156 | 1,440 | | Public Engagement | 5,057 | 5,484 | | Web | – | 10 | | Other (Support) | 1,255 | 1,138 | | Geographical Segments: | 13,780 | 13,799 | | United Kingdom | 10,907 | 11,224 | | Overseas | 2,873 | 2,575 | | | 13,780 | 13,799 | 4. INVESTMENT INCOME
| | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |----------------------|---------|---------| | Interest receivable | 237 | 380 | | Dividends receivable | 412 | 623 | | Total investment income | 649 | 1,003 |
5. OTHER INCOMING RESOURCES
GRANT IN AID
Total Grant in Aid drawdown by the British Library Board was £93.9m, with £1.3m allocated for capital projects/improvements (£93m received in 2015/16, £3.2m for capital). The Library’s Grant in Aid total also included £6m for distribution to authors by Public Lending Right. Grant in Aid funding is available for running costs, capital improvements and collection purchases.
6. NET COST OF RESOURCES EXPENDED
| | Staff Costs | Other Direct Costs | Depreciation | Allocated Support Costs | Total Cost | Income | Allocated Support Income | 2016/17 Net Cost | 2015/16 Total Net Cost | |----------------------|-------------|-------------------|--------------|-------------------------|------------|-------|-------------------------|------------------|------------------------| | Costs of Generating Funds | 536 | 237 | – | – | 773 | – | – | 773 | 582 | | Investment Management Fees | – | 14 | – | – | 14 | – | – | 14 | 26 | | Access | 14,710 | 1,512 | 387 | 17,451 | 34,060 | 5,546 | 63 | 28,577 | 26,789 | | Content / Acquisitions | 8,065 | 13,634 | 36 | 21,875 | 43,610 | 2,824 | 79 | 40,865 | 40,653 | | Developments | 3,164 | 2,621 | 825 | 6,772 | 13,382 | 4,756 | 24 | 8,650 | 13,694 | | International | 1,663 | 158 | – | 1,821 | 2,452 | – | (631) | (665) | | | Navigation | 9,588 | 1,714 | – | 10,810 | 22,112 | 2,919 | 39 | 19,232 | 16,200 | | Public Engagement | 2,808 | 4,492 | 16 | 7,606 | 14,922 | 5,788 | 27 | 9,161 | 7,092 | | Web | 421 | 322 | 21 | 778 | 1,542 | 51 | 3 | 1,494 | 1,985 | | Public Lending Right to Authors | – | 6,080 | – | 6,080 | – | – | 6,080 | 6,400 | | Support Costs | 40,955 | 30,784 | 1,285 | 65,292 | 138,316 | (24,336) | 235 | 114,215 | 112,756 |
In accordance with the FRS 102 SORP, the non-Grant in Aid income and total costs of the organisation have been categorised by the Library’s activities as set out in the British Library Act 1972. When costs cannot be directly attributed to one of the Library’s objectives, they have been allocated to activities on a basis consistent with the use of resources. The support costs have been allocated using the overhead allocation model in place within the Library. The model allocates the costs based on usage and percentage expenditure incurred in directly undertaking an activity.
a) staff costs
| | Library Staff | Agency | Total | |----------------------|--------------|--------|-------| | | £000 | £000 | £000 | | Wages and salaries | 42,984 | 2,092 | 45,076| | Social security costs | 4,224 | – | 4,224 | | Employer Contributions | 8,431 | – | 8,431 | | Voluntary redundancy/restructuring programme for former employees – in-year exit costs | 886 | – | 886 | | Board Members’ remuneration – see () on page 72 | 337 | – | 337 | | Total | 56,525 | 2,092 | 58,617|
Civil Service compensation scheme exit packages
| Exit package cost band | Number of non-compulsory departures agreed | Number of compulsory departures agreed | Total number of exit packages by cost band | |------------------------|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | £000 | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | | £10,000 | 2 | 2 | – | – | 2 | 2 | | £10,001 – £25,000 | 5 | 9 | – | – | 5 | 9 | | £25,001 – £50,000 | 16 | 17 | – | – | 16 | 18 | | £50,001 – £100,000 | 2 | 3 | – | – | 2 | 3 | | Total number of exit packages | 25 | 31 | – | 1 | 25 | 32 | | Total Resource cost £ | 884,643 | 1,022,422 | – | £36,448 | 884,643 | £1,058,870 |
There were no compulsory departures in 2016/17 (one in 2015/16).
The Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme (PCSPS) is an unfunded multi-employer defined benefit scheme in which the Library is unable to identify its share of the underlying assets and liabilities. A full actuarial valuation was carried out as at 31 March 2012. Details can be found in the resource accounts of the Cabinet Office: Civil Superannuation (www.civilservice-pensions.gov.uk).
For 2016/17, employers’ contributions of £8,307,173 were payable to the PCSPS (2015/16: £8,058,664) at one of four rates in the range 16.7% to 24.3% of pensionable pay, based on salary bands. The scheme’s actuary reviews employer contributions every four years following a full scheme valuation. The contribution rates reflect benefits as they are accrued, not when the costs are actually incurred, and reflect past experience of the scheme.
Employees can opt to open a partnership pension account which is a stakeholder pension with an employer contribution. Employers’ contributions of £123,605 (2015/16: £121,979) were paid to one or more of the four appointed stakeholder pension providers. Employer contributions are age-related and ranged from 3% to 12.5% of pensionable pay up to 30 September 2015 and 8% and 14.75% from 1 October 2015. Employers also match employee contributions up to 3 per cent of pensionable pay. In addition, employer contributions of between 0.5% and 0.8% of pensionable pay, were payable to the PCSPS to cover the cost of the future provision of lump-sum benefits on death in service and ill-health retirement of these employees. i) Board Members’ remuneration
| | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |----------------------|---------|---------| | Fees and salaries | 309 | 290 | | Social security costs| 28 | 24 | | **Total** | 337 | 314 |
The Board Members’ remuneration shown on page 51 of the Remuneration Report includes all Board members including the Chairman.
ii) Senior employees
The following number of employees, (excluding the Executive Team for whom details of remuneration are contained in the Remuneration Report, members of the British Library Board and the Chairman) received remuneration falling within the following ranges:
| | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |----------------------|---------|---------| | No. of employees | | | | £60,001 – £70,000 | 9 | 12 | | £70,001 – £80,000 | 11 | 12 | | £80,001 – £90,000 | 6 | 6 | | £90,001 – £100,000 | 1 | 1 | | £100,001 – £110,000 | 1 | – | | £110,001 – £120,000 | 1 | 1 |
All of the above employees are members of the PCSPS pension scheme except one who is not in any pension scheme.
iii) Off-payroll engagements
Following the Review of Tax Arrangements of Public Sector Appointees published by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury on 23 May 2012 and implemented on 23 August 2012, departments and their arm’s-length bodies must publish information on their highly paid and/or senior off-payroll engagements.
a. For all off-payroll engagements as of 31 March 2017, for more than £220 per day and that last for longer than six months:
| | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |----------------------|---------|---------| | Number that have existed for less than one year at time of reporting | – | | | Number that have existed for between one and two years at time of reporting | 1 | | | Number that have existed for between two and three years at time of reporting | – | | | Number that have existed for between three and four years at time of reporting | – | | | Number that have existed for four or more years at time of reporting | 1 | | | **Total** | 2 | |
The required evidence and declarations were obtained for all off-payroll engagements.
b. For all new off-payroll engagements, or those that reached six months in duration, between 1 April 2016 and 31 March 2017, for more than £220 per day and that last for longer than six months:
| | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |----------------------|---------|---------| | Number of new engagements, or those reaching 6 months in duration, during the period | 2 | | | Number of the above which include contractual clauses giving the department the right to request assurance in relation to income tax and National Insurance obligations | 2 | | | Number for which assurance has been requested | 2 | | | Of which: | | | | Number for whom assurance has been received | 2 | | | Number for whom assurance has not been received | – | | | Number that have been terminated as a result of assurance not being received | – | |
c. For any off-payroll engagements of board members and/or senior officials with significant financial responsibility between 1 April 2016 and 31 March 2017:
| | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |----------------------|---------|---------| | Number of off-payroll engagements of board members and/or senior officials with significant financial responsibility during the financial year | – | | | Number of individuals that have been deemed board members and/or senior officials with significant financial responsibility during the financial year | 2 | |
The average number of full time equivalent (FTE) staff during the year was:
| | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |----------------------|---------|---------| | Staff directly employed by the British Library Agency | | | | Total (FTE) Restated | | | | Chief Executive’s Office | 19 | 19 | | Chief Librarian’s Office | 682 | 692 | | Chief Operating Officer’s Office | 815 | 850 | | **Total** | 1,516 | 1,561 | | **Average FTE** | 45 | 45 | | **Total (FTE)** | 1,407 | 1,407 | b) Other direct costs
| | 2016/17 £000 | 2015/16 £000 | |----------------------|--------------|--------------| | Acquisitions for the collections | 11,514 | 11,449 | | Research & Grants | 822 | 1,044 | | Conservation and binding services | 847 | 146 | | Administration, equipment, supplies and services | 30,990 | 31,556 | | Non-recoverable VAT | 56 | 194 | | Loss on disposal of fixed assets | 128 | 95 | | Author Payments | 6,080 | 6,400 | | **Total** | **50,437** | **50,884** |
The above table is exclusive of staff costs.
7. RESOURCES EXPENDED
This is stated after charging:
| | 2016/17 £000 | 2015/16 £000 | |----------------------|--------------|--------------| | External Auditors’ remuneration | 68 | 69 | | Rent on land and buildings | 126 | 339 | | Lease/rental payments on equipment | 247 | 289 | | Depreciation on fixed assets | 28,925 | 29,929 | | Bad debt provision movement | 30 | 34 | | Stock Provision movement | 32 | 18 |
The auditors’ remuneration is for the audit of the Annual Report and Accounts: there was no non-audit work performed during 2016/17, (nil in 2015/16). During the year the Library took advice on taxation matters totalling £32k.
8. INTANGIBLE ASSETS
| | Development 2016/17 £000 | |----------------------|--------------------------| | Cost | | | At 1 April 2016 | 2,883 | | Additions | (5) | | Disposals | | | At 31 March 2017 | 2,878 | | Amortisation | | | At 1 April 2016 | 2,793 | | Charge for year | 30 | | Disposals | | | At 31 March 2017 | 2,823 | | Net Book Value at 31 March 2017 | 55 | | Net Book Value at 31 March 2016 | 90 |
Intangible assets comprise development work and technical architecture costs for the British Library website. All intangible assets have been valued on the basis of purchase price. The assets are all depreciated over a period of three years, consistent with the IT equipment policy.
9. TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS
a) Movements
| | Land and Buildings £000 | Plant and Machinery £000 | Office Equipment £000 | Motor Vehicles £000 | Computer Equipment £000 | AICC £000 | Total £000 | |----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-----------|------------| | Cost or Valuation | | | | | | | | | At 1 April 2016 | 948,185 | 346,200 | 10,043 | 38 | 21,875 | 23 | 1,326,364 | | Additions | – | 1,631 | – | – | 1,064 | – | 2,229 | | Transfers | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4,924 | | Revaluation | 187,479 | 58,546 | – | – | – | – | 246,025 | | Disposals | – | (411) | (245) | – | (675) | – | (1,331) | | At 31 March 2017 | 1,135,664 | 405,966 | 9,798 | 38 | 22,264 | 2,252 | 1,575,982 | | Depreciation | | | | | | | | | At 1 April 2016 | 10,593 | 60,350 | 9,679 | 25 | 19,043 | – | 99,690 | | Charge for year | 9,436 | 16,905 | 135 | 4 | 2,415 | – | 28,895 | | Revaluation | (16,096) | (26,101) | – | – | – | – | (42,197) | | Disposals | – | (320) | (208) | – | (675) | – | (1,203) | | At 31 March 2017 | 3,933 | 50,834 | 9,606 | 29 | 20,783 | – | 89,185 | | NBV At 31 March 2017 | 1,131,731 | 355,132 | 192 | 9 | 1,481 | 2,252 | 1,490,797 | | NBV At 31 March 2016 | 937,592 | 285,850 | 364 | 13 | 2,832 | 23 | 1,226,674 |
Assets in the Course of Construction (AICC) represent work on the development of internal computer systems.
The Modified Historic Cost Accounting indices for the land and building adjustments are provided by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. For the Building Structural Fit Out adjustment, the indices are taken from the Producer Prices Index (MM22) March 2013 available from the Office for National Statistics for Plant and Machinery. Valuations are provided by Deloitte Real Estate.
b) Valuations
On 31 March 2017 a desktop valuation of the Library’s freehold properties at St Pancras was carried out by an external valuer, Deloitte Real Estate, a regulated firm of Chartered Surveyors. The valuation was prepared in accordance with HM Government Financial Reporting Manual (‘FReM’) Guidance, International Valuation Standards (‘IVS’) and the requirements of the RICS Valuation – Professional Standards January 2014 (revised April 2015) (Global and UK Edition). The St Pancras properties are treated as specialised properties and were valued on a Depreciated Replacement Cost (DRC) basis. The land and main building was valued at £1,361m and the Centre for Conservation at £28.2m. These valuations include some plant and machinery that is included in Fixtures & Fittings and Equipment.
The Boston Spa site was revalued at £59m as at 31 March 2014 by Deloitte Real Estate, using the ‘Depreciated Replacement Cost’ basis of valuation. The values for Boston Spa buildings have been subsequently impacted by indexation, capitalised additions and improvements and depreciation. The next revaluation of Boston Spa is due 31 March 2019.
All land and buildings are freehold. The historic cost of the land and buildings is £465m. 10. HERITAGE ASSETS
The British Library
The British Library is the national library of the United Kingdom and one of the world’s greatest research libraries. It is one of the six legal deposit libraries of the United Kingdom and it receives copies of all publications produced in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. The Library’s collection is one of the largest in the world, holding over 150 million items in all known languages and formats, including books, journals, newspapers, magazines, sound and music recordings, patents, databases, maps, manuscripts, stamps, prints, drawings and much more. It is unique in its breadth, depth and scope. Many items are priceless and irreplaceable.
Heritage Assets in the British Library
In accordance with the FREM, additions to the collection acquired / donated since 1 April 2001 are capitalised and recognised in the Balance Sheet under Heritage Assets. Heritage Assets are held by the Library for preservation and conservation purposes and do not attract any depreciation as they are deemed to have an infinite life. Due to the size and unique nature of the collection it is not possible to value Heritage Assets acquired prior to 1 April 2001. The cost of doing so would be prohibitive.
All items within the British Library collection contribute to the development of knowledge and culture. The collection is carefully developed and managed through a series of policies governing all aspects of acquisitions, preservation and access. A summary of the main policies can be found at www.bl.uk/aboutus/stratpolprog/coldevpol/.
As the Library exists to preserve and make available the intellectual heritage of the UK together with purchased and donated material, it does not normally dispose of material in its collections and never disposes of items from the collection accepted under legal deposit. Disposal is governed by the British Library Act and by the policy of the British Library Board.
Preservation and Management of the Library’s Assets
The Preservation Department’s role is to safeguard the collections from harm while enabling continued and appropriate access to them. All activities are underpinned by the Library’s core preservation principle of risk management and mitigation. The general public can learn more about this by visiting the Preservation web pages. This is available in hard copy and on our web pages at www.bl.uk/aboutus/stratpolprog/coldevpol/discovermore.
Acquisitions
Within the Library’s acquisition policies, there is a distinction made between unique heritage items and contemporary, research-level academic publications. In our Heritage Acquisitions Policy, heritage items are defined as items acquired to be used preponderantly for primary sources for research, forming part of the Library’s collection of unique materials. Under this definition, all heritage items are major acquisitions, whether purchased or donated. All such major acquisitions require significant due diligence and many have cultural property issues. We have clear policies to govern such acquisitions, including an ethical acquisitions policy which can be found at www.bl.uk/aboutus/stratpolprog/coldevpol/ethical.pdf.
Catalogues
The Library has a duty to catalogue items in the collection and for this there is a planned programme of work. All catalogues are listed on the website and can be accessed by members of the public.
Valuation of Heritage Assets
Heritage assets are valued as part of the acquisition process as they are added to the collections. We do not have a systematic retrospective programme of valuing heritage items which have been in our collections for many years, although such valuations are carried out for individual items in specific circumstances e.g. items on loan to us. The cost of such a programme of valuation would be prohibitive, both in terms of direct cost and time to complete. For items where copies exist in other institutions or collections, it can take many days to identify if there are relevant market valuations from records of auction prices or sales catalogues. For rare or unique materials no such market valuation exists so individual expert valuations are required. Commercial rates for such expert valuation can be of the order of £750 per day. Rare heritage items can take many days (if not weeks, in the case of manuscript collections) of expert work to arrive at a valuation, so a systematic retrospective programme of such work would be prohibitively expensive.
Valuation of Heritage Assets
Heritage Assets Donated
| Valuation | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | 2014/15 | 2013/14 | 2012/13 | |-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | £000 | No. of Items | £000 | No. of Items | £000 | No. of Items | £000 | No. of Items | £000 | No. of Items | £000 | No. of Items | | At 1 April | 37,760 | 305 | 35,827 | 290 | 33,710 | 274 | 30,117 | 257 | 28,338 | 230 | | Additions | 1,391 | 9 | 1,933 | 15 | 2,117 | 16 | 2,732 | 17 | 1,779 | 27 | | Transfers | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | | Disposals | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | | At 31 March | 39,151 | 314 | 37,760 | 305 | 35,827 | 290 | 33,710 | 274 | 30,117 | 257 |
11. INVESTMENTS
| Market Value at 1 April | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |-------------------------|---------|---------| | £000 | 19,722 | 21,317 |
| Acquisitions funded by dividends reinvested | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |-------------------------------------------|---------|---------| | £000 | 412 | 598 |
| Purchases at Cost | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |-------------------|---------|---------| | £000 | 23,514 | 374 |
| Disposals at Cost | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |-------------------|---------|---------| | £000 | (22,058) | (1,470) |
| Unrealised Gain / (Loss) | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |--------------------------|---------|---------| | £000 | 741 | (1,183) |
| Realised Gain on Disposal | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |---------------------------|---------|---------| | £000 | 1,925 | 86 |
| Market Value at 31 March | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |--------------------------|---------|---------| | £000 | 24,256 | 19,722 |
| Analysed by: | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |--------------|---------|---------| | £000 | | |
| Listed Securities | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |-------------------|---------|---------| | £000 | 24,256 | – |
| Fixed Income | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |--------------|---------|---------| | £000 | – | 4,397 |
| Equities | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |----------|---------|---------| | £000 | – | 15,065 |
| Cash Trusts | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |-------------|---------|---------| | £000 | – | 260 |
| Geographical Analysis | 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |-----------------------|---------|---------| | £000 | 24,256 | 19,722 |
Investments are only held for the purpose of the Library’s restricted and designated funds, with their aim to achieve an appropriate balance between income generation and capital growth particular to the fund. FRS29 ‘Financial Instruments: Disclosures’ requires entities to provide disclosures which allow users of the accounts to evaluate the significance of financial instruments for the entity’s financial position and performance and the nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments during the period. The majority of financial instruments relate to contracts to buy non-financial items in line with the Library’s expected purchase and usage requirements and the Library is therefore exposed to little credit or liquidity risk. The Library holds a portfolio of quoted investments and therefore is subject to some market risk. All ‘Financial Instruments’ are recorded at fair value as per the requirement of FRS 102.
Credit Risk The Library is exposed to credit risk of £1.7m of trade debtors. However this risk is not considered significant as major customers are familiar to the Library. The Library has recovered 99% of trade debtors over the last two years. Bad and doubtful debts are provided for on an individual basis. Write-offs in the year for bad debts amounted to a recovery of £26k (£4k recovery in 2015-16).
Liquidity Risk As around 79% of the cash requirements of the Library are met through Grant in Aid from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, financial instruments play a more limited role in creating risk than would apply to a non-public sector body of a similar size. The remaining income is self-generated and is volatile. Remote Document Supply is still the major source of self-generated income. The Library has sufficient unrestricted funds to cover its current liabilities.
Market Risk The Library holds some restricted fund balances in unit trust investments, as shown in note 11 on page 77, and so is subject to some market risk. An unrealised gain of £741k has been recorded this year compared to a £1.2m loss in 2015/16. Additional information on the Library’s investment policy is given in the Trustees’ Annual Report.
Foreign Currency Risk The Library has an international customer and supplier base and so is subject to a degree of foreign currency risk. In 2016/17, net foreign currency exchange gains of £40k were recognised (£43k loss in 2015/16). As part of the Library’s treasury management strategy, the risk of fluctuations is managed through a variety of policies, including holding bank accounts in foreign currencies, to enable us to match our foreign currency transactions as a means of mitigating our currency risk.
Interest Rate Risk Risks relating to interest rates are managed by budgeting conservatively for investment income. The table below shows the interest rate profile of the Library’s financial assets. The benchmark for the Library’s floating rate investments is 0.1%, 15 basis points below the Bank of England base rate.
Investment Income Profile The table below shows the interest rate profile of the Library’s financial assets. As the Library has no finance leases or loans, financial liabilities have been omitted from this table. The benchmark for the Library’s floating rate investments is 15 basis points below the Bank of England base rate at 0.1%.
| Floating/ Fixed Rate | Cash | Listed Securities | 2016/17 Total | 2015/16 Total | |----------------------|------|------------------|---------------|---------------| | Sterling | 43,252 | – | 24,256 | 67,508 | 63,828 | | Dollar | 461 | – | – | 461 | 69 | | Euro | 127 | – | – | 127 | 204 | | Yen | 126 | – | – | 126 | 75 | | Total | 43,966 | – | 24,256 | 68,222 | 64,176 |
Customer deposit account balances represent payments from customers in advance of supply of goods/services. The Library holds a number of Fixed Term Deposits with varying maturity dates and interest rates.
### a) Analysis of change in net funds
| | As at 1 April 2015 £000 | Cash Flows £000 | As at 1 April 2016 £000 | Cash Flows £000 | As at 31 Mar 2017 £000 | |----------------------|-------------------------|----------------|-------------------------|----------------|------------------------| | Government Banking Services (GBS) cash at bank | 6 | – | 6 | (1) | 5 | | Commercial cash at bank | 42,654 | 1,783 | 44,437 | (487) | 43,950 | | Cash in hand | 23 | (12) | 11 | – | 11 | | **Total** | **42,683** | **1,771** | **44,454** | **(488)** | **43,966** |
### b) Statement of Cash Flow notes – Reconciliation of net income/(expenditure) to net cash flow from operating activities
| | 2016/17 £000 | 2015/16 £000 | |----------------------|--------------|--------------| | Net income / (expenditure) for the reporting period as per the SOFA | 270,593 | (2,671) | | Depreciation Charges | 28,925 | 29,929 | | (Gains) / Losses on investments | (2,666) | 1,097 | | Dividends, interest & rents from investments | (649) | (1,003) | | Loss / (profit) on the sale of Fixed Assets | 128 | 287 | | Revaluation of Fixed Assets | (288,222) | (18,139) | | Decrease / (increase) in stocks | 106 | (8) | | Decrease / (increase) in debtors | 71 | (2,112) | | Increase / (decrease) in creditors | (375) | (2,845) | | Increase / (decrease) in provisions | – | (27) | | **Net Cash provided by (used in) operating activities** | **7,911** | **4,508** |
### 16. CREDITORS
| | 2016/17 £000 | 2015/16 £000 | |----------------------|--------------|--------------| | Amounts falling due within one year | | | | Trade creditors | 2,187 | 4,274 | | Monies held on deposit for customers | 3,483 | 3,422 | | Other creditors | 730 | 882 | | Taxation and social security | 2,035 | 1,836 | | Accruals | 6,316 | 5,957 | | Deferred income | 4,068 | 2,941 | | **Total** | **18,819** | **19,212** |
### b) Deferred Income
| | £000 | |----------------------|------| | At 1 April 2016 | 2,941 | | Release from previous year | (2,941) | | Incoming resources deferred in the current year | 4,068 | | At 31 March 2016 | 4,068 |
Deferred income relates to grants received and voluntary income recognised against project milestones and progress, and membership and subscription fees which are recognised over the period of the contract.
### 17. STATEMENT OF FUNDS
| | As at 1 April 2016 £000 | Transfers To / (From) £000 | Expenditure £000 | Incoming Resources £000 | Unrealised Gains and (Losses) £000 | As at 31 March 2017 £000 | |----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------| | **Unrestricted funds** | | | | | | | | General Funds | 30,025 | 1,412 | (86,905) | 86,709 | – | 31,241 | | Designated Funds (Fixed Assets) | 390,737 | – | (29) | 20,900 | – | 411,608 | | Designated Funds (Revaluation Reserve) | 873,787 | – | (43,643) | – | 288,222 | 1,118,366 | | Public Lending Right Reserve | – | – | – | 9 | – | 9 | | **Designated Funds** | | | | | | | | Shaw Fund | 4,785 | (150) | (3) | 221 | 719 | 5,572 | | Collection Care Restoration Fund | 457 | – | (33) | – | – | 424 | | Membership and General Donations | 531 | (7) | – | 156 | – | 680 | | Others | 80 | (53) | (135) | 567 | – | 459 | | Donated Asset Reserve | 28,088 | – | – | 870 | – | 28,958 | | **Total unrestricted funds** | 1,328,490 | 1,202 | (130,748) | 109,432 | 288,941 | 1,597,317 |
### 17. STATEMENT OF FUNDS (continued)
| Restricted funds | As at 1 April 2016 | Transfers To / (From) | Expenditure | Incoming Resources | Unrealised Gains and (Losses) | As at 31 March 2017 | |------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------| | | £000 | £000 | £000 | £000 | £000 | £000 | | David and Mary Eccles Centre for American Studies | 10,598 | (1) | (376) | 199 | 1,267 | 11,687 | | Dingwall No.2 | 1,435 | – | (1) | 24 | 211 | 1,669 | | Save our Sounds Fundraising | 349 | – | – | 864 | – | 1,213 | | HLF/DCMS Catalyst Endowment (Neighbour) | 1,125 | (30) | – | 116 | – | 1,211 | | HLF/DCMS Catalyst Endowment | 752 | – | (1) | 217 | 95 | 1,063 | | Ginsburg Legacy | 694 | – | (36) | 23 | 114 | 795 | | Polonsky Pre-1200 | – | (18) | (79) | 720 | – | 623 | | Two Centuries of Indian Print | 324 | (234) | (199) | 699 | – | 590 | | Sir Henry Thomas | 443 | – | (6) | 7 | 64 | 508 | | The Medd Fund | 408 | – | – | 13 | 57 | 478 | | Hebrew Manuscripts Digitisation Project Phase 2 | 339 | (122) | (164) | 397 | – | 450 | | Mellon Save Our Sounds IT Project | – | – | (26) | 455 | – | 429 | | British Library Digitisation Campaign | 302 | – | – | 24 | – | 326 | | Qatar project | 285 | (605) | (1,841) | 2,452 | – | 291 | | Helen Wallis | 329 | (15) | (70) | 48 | – | 292 | | Exhibitions Public Services | 174 | – | (167) | 271 | – | 278 | | Consolidated Endowment | 241 | – | – | 6 | 3 | 250 | | T S Blakeney | 201 | – | – | 4 | 29 | 234 | | Anthony Panizzi Foundation | 190 | – | (2) | 3 | 28 | 219 | | Skinner Legacy | 230 | – | (14) | – | – | 216 | | The Jacob Fund | 211 | – | – | – | – | 211 | | Discovering Sacred | – | – | – | 200 | – | 200 | | Collection and Preservation Restricted Fund | 182 | 1 | (62) | 72 | – | 193 | | Technical and Human Infrastructure for Open Research (THOR) EC-Funded Project | 184 | – | (742) | 747 | – | 189 | | Business & IP Centre (BIPC) – European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) Shared Operation | 146 | – | (364) | 385 | – | 167 | | The Sir John Ritblat Gallery: | | | | | | | | Treasures of the British Library | 227 | – | (65) | – | – | 162 | | UK PubMed | 157 | – | (1) | – | – | 156 | | Educational Projects | 282 | (8) | (181) | 57 | – | 150 | | Business & IP Centre Phase 2 | 158 | 18 | (84) | 53 | – | 145 | | Medieval Manuscripts Exhibitions | 193 | (2) | (54) | – | – | 137 | | Spratt-Bigot Request | 122 | – | (8) | 3 | 16 | 133 | | Bridgewater | 112 | – | – | 2 | 17 | 131 | | Legal Deposit Libraries Committee Project | 142 | (45) | – | 32 | – | 129 | | Family and Community | 5 | (1) | (23) | 140 | – | 121 | | Fitzgerald | 104 | – | (3) | 2 | 15 | 118 | | Boult | 105 | – | – | 1 | 11 | 117 | | American Trust for the British Library | 76 | – | (2) | 39 | – | 113 | | BL City Partners | 130 | (2) | (56) | 35 | – | 107 | | Others | 3,285 | (133) | (2,935) | 2,469 | 20 | 2,706 | | Other (deficit funds) | (2,154) | (5) | (35) | (2,190) | – | (4,384) | | Total restricted funds | 22,086 | (1,202) | (7,597) | 8,589 | 1,947 | 23,823 | | Transfer to unrestricted Fixed Asset reserves | – | – | 29 | – | – | 29 | | Total Funds | 1,350,576 | – | (138,316) | 118,021 | 290,888 | 1,621,169 |
The fair value reserves included within the funds stated above are:
| Reserve/ Fund (including as Fair Value) | As at 1 April 2016 | Unrealised gains/losses under Fair Value | As at 31 March 2017 | Reserve/ Fund net of Fair Value at 31 March 2017 | Reserve/ Fund as at 31 March 2017 | |----------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------| | | £000 | £000 | £000 | £000 | £000 | | Eccles | – | 540 | 540 | 11,147 | 11,687 | | Shaw Fund | – | 44 | 44 | 5,528 | 5,572 | | Dingwall No 2 | – | 73 | 73 | 1,596 | 1,669 | | HLF/DCMS Catalyst Endowment | – | 8 | 8 | 1,055 | 1,063 | | Ginsburg Legacy | – | 7 | 7 | 788 | 795 | | Sir Henry Thomas | – | 22 | 22 | 486 | 508 | | The Medd Fund | – | 3 | 3 | 475 | 478 | | Consolidated Endowment | – | 1 | 1 | 249 | 250 | | T S Blakeney | – | 10 | 10 | 222 | 232 | | Anthony Panizzi Foundation | – | 10 | 10 | 209 | 219 | | Spratt-Bigot Request | – | 6 | 6 | 129 | 135 | | Bridgewater | – | 6 | 6 | 125 | 131 | | Sir Adrian Boult | – | 4 | 4 | 113 | 117 | | Fitzgerald | – | 5 | 5 | 113 | 118 | | Others | – | 2 | 2 | 2,551 | 2,553 | | Restricted Fair Value Reserve | – | 741 | 741 | 24,786 | 25,527 |
The fair value represents the difference between historic cost and market valuation at the Balance Sheet date.
Restricted funds are given to the Library for specific purchases for the collection or for projects that are related to the aims and objectives of the Library. Designated funds are monies which have been identified by the British Library Board for a specific purpose. All the funds with balances of over £100,000 at 31 March 2017 are listed above, with a brief description as to the aims of the fund shown below. Other restricted funds comprise individual amounts less than £100,000.
The restricted funds in deficit at the year end represent four funds for which, due to the administration restrictions of these funds, costs are expended first and subsequently reclaimed from the external funding organisations. Future income streams should more than cover the shortfall and future costs involved in the projects.
The transfers of £1.2m relate to internal charges or income applied to the restricted funds for the use of Library facilities and services.
______________________________________________________________________
4 See explanation on page 83 for deficit funds Designated Funds
Shaw Fund Established by a Charity Commission order dated 13 September 2000, with the income being available for the general purposes of the British Library Board. At a meeting in September 2003, the Board adopted the following expenditure policy for the Shaw Fund income:
“To be applied as an addition to other sources of funding, for the benefit of the readership of the British Library; for the acquisition of manuscripts and other materials, to support specific projects of a scholarly or research nature, and for other similar purposes as the Board may determine”.
Collection Care Restoration Fund This fund represents money recovered by the Library following action taken in respect of damage / theft to the Collection. These monies have been reserved in order to repair the damage caused to the Collection items.
Membership and General Donations A range of externally received funds, with the funds being available for the general purpose of the British Library, as decided upon by the Executive Team.
Restricted Funds The David and Mary Eccles Centre for American Studies Founded by the late Viscount and Viscountess Eccles, to further the establishment of a Centre for American Studies.
Dingwall No. 2 Founded by Dr Eric John Dingwall, for the purchase of fine editions or the subscription of foreign periodicals.
Save our Sounds Fundraising Income raised externally to support the Save Our Sounds programme.
HLF/DCMS Catalyst Endowment (Neighbour) A bequest left to the Library for the purchase of musical manuscripts printed edition and documents of musical interest to supplement (not replace) the Library’s normal yearly allotment of funds for that purpose.
HLF/DCMS Catalyst Endowment To build a long-term endowment fund from donations and Heritage Lottery Fund matched funding. This will provide a sustainable annual income stream that will be used to enhance the Library’s collections, increasing access and engagement to them.
Ginsburg Legacy An endowment from the estate of Henry Ginsburg to fund the full time permanent post of ‘Henry Ginsburg Curator for Thai, Lao and Cambodian Collections’.
Polonsky Pre-1200 A collaborative project funded by The Polonsky Foundation with the Bibliothèque nationale de France to digitise 800 pre-1200 manuscripts and provide free online access.
Two Centuries of Indian Print The Fund’s aims are to catalogue and digitise the Library’s early printed South Asian books, dating from 1713–1914, as well as to fund innovation research into Indian book history and the digital humanities and to fund capacity-building workshops for partner institutions in India.
Sir Henry Thomas Founded in 1981 by Miss Amy Thomas for the purchase of books relating to the culture and literature of Spain.
The Medd Fund For the conservation of manuscripts in the Board’s collections written by British composers working since 1950.
Hebrew Manuscripts Digitisation Phase 2 Polonsky Foundation Grant funding for the digitisation of 1250 Hebrew Manuscripts from the British Library Collection.
Mellon Save Our Sounds IT Project Andrew W Mellon-funded project called Enhancing Discovery and Access for Sound collections, part of the wider Save Our Sounds programme.
British Library Digitisation Campaign To raise funds from external sources to support the Library’s Digitisation Programme.
Qatar Fund For the British Library and the Qatar Foundation ten-year partnership delivering online access to archives and manuscripts relating to modern Gulf History and the development and transmission of scientific knowledge in the Islamic world.
Hellen Walls Donations in memory of Helen Walls (1923–1995), the first British Library Map Librarian. Primary purpose of the fund is to finance the Walls fellowships.
Exhibitions Public Service The fund is used for the development of future exhibition projects.
Consolidated Endowment Account Founded in 1975, the fund is to be used for any purpose approved by the British Library Board where there has not been adequate provision made through government Grant in Aid.
T S Blakeney Founded in 1977 by Thomas Sydney Blakeney, for the purchase of western manuscripts.
Anthony Panizzi Foundation Founded in 1982 by an anonymous donor, for the advancement of public education by funding a lecture or series of lectures in the subject of advanced bibliography.
Skinner Legacy A legacy from Dr Joyce Skinner to be used for conservation.
Jacob Fund A legacy from William Jacob to be used solely for the conservation of British books and literary periodicals.
Discovering Sacred Donation from the Exilarch’s Foundation to fund the Library’s online learning resource called Discovering Sacred Texts.
Collection and Preservation Restricted Fund Donations and grants to assist preservation.
Technical and Human Infrastructure for Open Research (THOR) EC Funded Project A 30 month EC Funded project to establish seamless integration between articles, data and researches across the research lifecycle.
Business & IP Centre (BIPC) – European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) Shared Operation The fund is to support entrepreneurial growth for the Business & IP Centre.
The Sir John Ritblat Gallery: Treasures of the British Library A donation from Sir John H Ritblat for the Treasures Gallery.
UK PubMed Project To fund a new online resource to promote free access to research and further biomedical discovery.
Educational Projects Funds raised from external sources to support the Library’s Learning activities with schools and young people.
Business & IP Centre (BIPC) Funds raised from external sources to support the Library’s Learning activities with schools and young people.
Fitzgerald Air Mail Fund The trust was founded in 1953 by Mrs Fitzgerald with the aim of preserving and cataloguing the Fitzgerald Air-Mail collection of stamps.
Sir Andrew Boult Founded through a public appeal, for commissioning and production of recordings of musical lectures or similar functions.
American Trust for the British Library (ATBL) Donations from ATBL to pursue Library objectives, such as acquisitions or cataloguing.
British Library City Partners The fund will allow the British Library and the Library of Birmingham to deliver a cultural partnership to allow the British Library to share its collections, knowledge and expertise with staff and users of the Library of Birmingham. 18. REVALUATION RESERVE MOVEMENT
£000 At 1 April 2016 873,777 Arising in year 246,025 Realised (752) Backlog (673) Disposals (11) At 31 March 2017 1,118,366
19. COMMITMENTS UNDER OPERATING LEASES
| Operating Leases which expire | Buildings 2016/17 £000 | 2015/16 £000 | Equipment 2016/17 £000 | 2015/16 £000 | |------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-------------------------|--------------| | Within one year | 40 | 40 | 118 | 37 | | Two to five years | 120 | 120 | 10 | – | | More than five years | 144 | 200 | – | – | | Total | 304 | 360 | 128 | 37 |
20. PROVISION FOR LIABILITIES AND CHARGES
A provision has been made in full for employees leaving the organisation under early retirement or Civil Service Compensation Scheme terms. The provision represents the estimated future costs to the Library, for both staff who have left and staff who are known to be leaving in 2016/17.
| Early Retirement/Severance Provision | Other Liability and Charges | 2016/17 Total £000 | 2015/16 Total £000 | |-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------| | At 1 April | 17 | 137 | 154 | 419 | | Additional Provision | – | 19 | 19 | 43 | | Release of Provision | – | – | – | (243) | | Utilisation of Provision | (1) | – | (1) | (65) | | At 31 March | 16 | 156 | 172 | 154 | | Less: Provisions falling due within one year | (16) | (156) | (172) | (154) | | Amounts falling due after one year | – | – | – | – |
Redundancy and other departure costs have been paid in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Compensation Scheme, a statutory scheme made under the Superannuation Act 1972. Exit costs are accounted for in full in the year of departure. Where the Library has agreed early retirements, the additional costs are met by the Library and not by the Civil Service pension scheme. Ill-health retirement costs are met by the pension scheme and are not included in the table.
21. ANALYSIS OF NET ASSETS BETWEEN FUNDS
| Fund balances at 31 March 2017 | Unrestricted Funds £000 | Restricted Funds £000 | Total £000 | |--------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------| | Intangible fixed assets | 55 | – | 55 | | Tangible fixed assets | 1,490,797 | – | 1,490,797 | | Heritage assets | 68,109 | – | 68,109 | | Investments | 5,471 | 18,785 | 24,256 | | Current assets | 42,774 | 14,169 | 56,943 | | Current liabilities | (9,860) | (9,131) | (18,991) | | Non-current liabilities | – | – | – | | Total net assets | 1,597,346 | 23,823 | 1,621,169 |
22. CAPITAL COMMITMENTS
| 2016/17 | 2015/16 | |---------|---------| | £000 | £000 | | Contracted and not provided for | 234 | – | | Authorised, but not contracted for | 80 | – |
The contracted capital commitment figure relates to a gas main replacement project and software development.
The authorised but not contracted item relates to software development.
23. RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The British Library is a Non-Departmental Public Body, sponsored by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport is regarded as a related party. During the year the Library has had a number of material transactions with the Department and other entities for which the Department is the sponsor, for example: Arts Council England, the BBC–PSG group, the British Film Institute, the British Museum, the Heritage Lottery Fund, Historic England, the Imperial War Museum, the Natural History Museum, the Science Museums Group, the Victoria and Albert Museum, the Royal Museums Greenwich – National Maritime Museum, The National Archives and the National Portrait Gallery.
During the year a number of Board members contributed to the Library’s Corporate Membership Scheme.
The Library sets aside office space and equipment for the Friends of the British Library to undertake some of their duties. However there is no direct financial support from the Library to the Friends of the British Library.
The Library also entered into material related party transactions with other related parties during the year, as set out overleaf: 24. POST BALANCE SHEET EVENTS
There were no reportable events between 31 March 2017 and the date the accounts were authorised for issue.
The accounts were authorised for issue by the Accounting Officer and Board of Trustees on the date the C&AG certified the accounts.
25. CONTINGENT LIABILITIES
British Library Newspaper Digitisation project.
The British Library has undertaken the digitisation of millions of pages from the archive using a commercial partner to take on the costs of digitisation in return for being able to exploit the digitisations commercially.
The supplier has warranted in its contract with the Library that use of the digitisations will not infringe copyright, or give rise to any possible action for defamation and has undertaken to cover any liability falling on the Library as a result of any such claims (in addition to the cost of defending the action) up to £5m.
DCMS has agreed to underwrite any liability which arises beyond that, for the duration that such claims might arise. It is considered that a claim in excess of £5m would be extremely unlikely but in the event that the liability is called, provision for any payment will be sought through the normal Supply procedure. The British Library extends thanks to everyone who has contributed to the development of the Annual Report and Accounts 2016/17.
Produced in-house. © British Library Board 2017.
British Library 96 Euston Road London NW1 2DB
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T +44 (0)330 333 1144 @britishlibrary /britishlibrary
www.bl.uk Cover image: British Western Front Trench Model, 1917 displayed in our Maps of the 20th Century: Drawing the Line exhibition which opened in November 2016. It drew upon the Library’s incredible collection of over four million maps to shed new light on 20th-century historical narratives. Photo by Tony Antoniou.
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23eadd2852acca3d5526bed44efa42dbbe59c217 | 13 September 2007
Mr Bill Daly Commercial Director Colas Rail Limited Stephenson House 2 Cherry Orchard Road Croydon CR9 6JA
Dear Mr Daly,
Colas Rail Limited
This letter confirms that the Office of Rail Regulation’s (ORR’s) general approval for third party liability insurance (TPLI) arrangements’ applies to the TPLI obligations of Colas Rail Limited (Company number 2995525) with the following variation(s):
| Section in ORR’s general approval | Variation | |-----------------------------------|-----------| | 3d – cover is on an ‘occurrence’ basis. | Cover provided above primary layer is on a ‘claims made’ basis. |
This variation applies while this condition is met:
| No. | Condition | |-----|-----------| | 1 | You can and will cover any claims that could be made against you as if you were covered by occurrence based insurance. |
While you meet this condition, you may rely on the general approval with the variation set out above. This means that you only need to provide us with a broker’s confirmation that cover is in place in accordance with the general approval as varied by this letter when you renew your cover. A template confirmation letter can be found on our website.
http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/3rdptyins_genapp-230207.pdf You do not need to send us director’s and auditor’s statements detailing your self-insurance arrangements, insurance certificates or full policy documentation. You should however satisfy yourselves that you have a reasonable expectation of being able to meet your self-insurance obligations, and keep appropriate records in case we want to see them.
If you have any questions, my colleague Gordon Herbert ([email protected], 020 7282 3964) will be pleased to help.
A copy of this letter will be placed on ORR’s public register.
Please forward a copy of this letter to your insurance brokers.
Yours sincerely,
Robert M. Plaskitt
Rob Plaskitt
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6f5844203a5dc86d45748829d62570bd62f54303 | 30 January 2013
P. A. Mather Director of Risk Management – International Harsco Corporation Harsco House Regents Park 299 Kingston Road Leatherhead Surrey KT22 7SG
Dear Mr Mather
Harsco Rail Limited: Variation from ORR’s general approval
The Office of Rail Regulation’s (ORR’s) general approval for third party liability insurance (TPLI) arrangements has been in place since 1 March 2007.
This letter confirms that the general approval applies to Harsco Rail Limited’s (Harsco’s) TPLI obligations with the following variation:
| No. | Section in ORR’s general approval | Variation | |-----|-----------------------------------|-----------| | 1 | 3b - where an aggregate limit of indemnity applies, this limit will be reinstated at least once if the limit is exhausted. | Automatic reinstatement is not required. You will however immediately seek reinstatement if your cover is ever eroded by more than US$25million. | | 2 | 3d - cover is on an ‘occurrence’ basis. | Cover is on an ‘occurrence first reported’ basis. | | 3 | 3g - the operator will provide cover for any difference between its contractors’ or sub-contractors’ cover and that required by this general approval. | Not required to the extent that Harsco only uses contractors or sub-contractors covered by appropriate TPLI that complies with ORR’s requirements. |
This variation applies while four conditions are met:
| No. | Condition | |-----|-----------| | 1 | Harsco only conducts train operations for which a Railways Act non-passenger licence is required. It ceases to apply if Harsco carries out any licensable activity for which a Railways Act passenger licence or European freight or passenger licence is required. | | 2 | You will notify ORR if your level of TPLI is eroded by US$25million or more. | | 3 | If you cease to be covered by your current occurrence first reported based insurance programme you will arrange an Extended Claims Notification extension |
Page 1 of 2 for a period of at least seven years or other alternative arrangements that are agreed with ORR.
4 You will not use or employ any contractors or sub-contractors other than route conductors with appropriate TPLI cover.
We may at any time modify or revoke this variation after consulting you if it appears to us to be requisite or expedient to do so, having regard to the duties imposed on us by section 4 of the Railways Act.
While you meet these conditions, you may rely on the general approval with the variations set out above. This means that you only need to provide us with a broker’s confirmation that cover is in place in accordance with the general approval as varied by this letter when you renew your cover. We ask that a letter is sent once a year in any event, even if no changes have been made. Please also keep appropriate records. You should also let us know if there are any material changes to your World Wide Global General Liability program.
A copy of this letter will be placed on ORR’s public register.
Please forward a copy of this letter to your insurance brokers.
Yours sincerely
[Signature]
Rob Plaskitt
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74cbc6d37a28b34e75baff2fb6a589b1254eee08 | “Self-sufficient local government: 100% Business Rates Retention” A joint consultation response by London Councils and the Greater London Authority
About this response
1. This is a joint response on behalf of London Councils (representing the 32 boroughs and the City of London) and the Greater London Authority (GLA). It has been agreed by the 33 Leaders of London’s local authorities and the Mayor of London.
2. It firstly sets out a joint position on how we believe the reforms should be implemented in London in order to benefit not just the capital but the local government sector – and the UK economy - as a whole. This develops a set of key principles that were agreed by London Councils Leaders’ Committee and the Mayor of London in June, and formally submitted to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government on 1st July.
3. Appendix 1 then includes detailed responses to the consultation questions.
Introduction
4. Since the Chancellor’s announcement that local government would retain 100 per cent of business rates by 2020 in October 2015, London Government has been working collaboratively to develop a strategic pan-London response to the reforms. We welcome the consultation on the reforms to the business rates retention system required in order to make local government “self-sufficient” by 2020, and its commitment to “explore with London [along with Greater Manchester and Liverpool combined authorities] options for moving to 100% business rates retention ahead of the full roll-out of the business rate reforms.”
5. London Government has long held the view that it should be granted control of a wide range of local taxes, including business rates. The re-convened London Finance Commission (reporting in autumn 2016) is likely to recommend greater fiscal devolution and tax raising powers for London. London’s continued economic growth is vital to the country as a whole; maintaining that growth during a period of uncertainty in which the UK will leave the EU – and managing a rapid increase in population – will be a huge challenge. Devolving business rates (and other revenue streams) will help build a joint, city-wide approach that can incentivise, prioritise and manage the public services and infrastructure investment London needs to continue its contribution to the public life and economic success of the UK.
6. However, there are two major threats to the Government’s policy objective of promoting growth and self-sufficiency: 1) the issue of business rates appeals - which is now widely recognised across the sector; and 2) the fact that there is an overall “fixed quantum” of business rates – which, as a result of its interaction with the revaluation process, distorts incentives and undermines the economic credibility of the tax. A devolved approach would give London Government the opportunity to address both issues – even without the power to increase the rates bills for individual taxpayers.
7. Furthermore, London’s population will continue to grow much more rapidly than that of the rest of the country. This brings opportunities and challenges not only in the successful management of the capital’s economic growth, but also in securing a sustainable financial future for its public services. In considering the future assessment of relative needs and the services to be transferred, it will be essential that any London deal secures genuinely devolved control over a level of resources sufficient to manage the financial risks involved.
8. In June 2016, London Government collectively agreed a set of principles that would inform the design of each of the key elements of a devolved business rates retention system for the capital. This response expands on those principles and sets out a clear vision for how a London business rates retention system would operate.
**Issues with the current local government finance system**
9. London Government believes there are issues with the current local government finance system that must be addressed if local government is to be put on a sustainable financial footing over the long term, in a world where business rates and council tax will fund virtually all local government services from 2020. The current funding system breeds uncertainty; is too complex and lacks transparency; and is too centralised with a lack of local control.
**Uncertainty**
10. London Government believes the current local government finance system does not provide local authorities with the stability needed to budget effectively over the medium to long term. We welcome the 4 year settlement which will give some degree of certainty over one element of local government funding - Revenue Support Grant (RSG) - until 2019-20, however uncertainty exists over other funding streams. Ring-fenced grants often have their own complex funding formulae that are frequently recalculated. The extent to which local authorities can benefit from Council Tax varies widely because of historic decisions and out of date valuations. And, most importantly, the level of retained business rates varies across the country and bears little correlation with economic growth. The four year settlement sets out targets for retained business rates – but there is no guarantee local authorities will meet them, in large part due to the impact of business rates appeals, and the failure of the current retention system to incentivise growth.
11. The uncertainty caused by business rates appeals is the biggest issue government must resolve with the current retention scheme. It disproportionately affects London boroughs, which receive more appeals, and where appeals are generally of higher value and take longer to clear than elsewhere. The aggregate provision for appeals across all 33 London billing authorities as at 31 March 2016 exceeds £925 million. The current backlog of appeals on the 2010 rating list in London is proportionately much higher than the rest of the country and progress on reducing this backlog also appears to have been much slower in the capital particularly in central London.
12. The unpredictability of appeals meant the Government underestimated the call on the safety net in the first three years of the retention system. As a consequence, an additional £195 million was top-sliced nationally from RSG: funding that would otherwise have benefited all authorities. The GLA incurred a deficit against its baseline of £120 million in the first two years of the scheme due to the impact of provisions for appeals but was ineligible for a safety net payment.
13. More broadly, the 50 per cent scheme has failed to incentivise growth sufficiently. Analysis of publicly available data on business rates confirms this – with negative growth in the first three years of the system despite strong economic growth across London. Aside from the uncertainty caused by appeals, the growth incentive is weak for several reasons:
- the 50 per cent growth retention rate is too low (we believe should have been 100 per cent from outset);
- there is a levy on disproportionate growth for tariff authorities;
- the definition of growth only applies to physical rather than revaluation growth – this makes it difficult for local authorities in built-up areas, like London, to benefit financially from the current system any additional physical growth often requires the demolition of existing buildings first; and
- growth is lost when the system is reset, which acts as a disincentive for developments as the “cliff edge” of the reset draws closer.
Transparency and complexity
14. Uncertainty is compounded by the second main issue with the local government finance system: its sheer complexity, which leads to a real (and perceived) lack of transparency.
15. This begins with the Spending Review process whereby HM Treasury agrees departmental spending allocations behind closed doors, and DCLG is left with a Departmental Expenditure Limit from which RSG is calculated. Existing funding burdens, such as pressures caused by people with No Recourse to Public Funds or those claiming Council Tax Support, are reportedly taken into account when agreeing the overall funding control total for the DCLG (and thereby the overall level of RSG), however, it is not clear how.
16. The needs assessment which drove the original funding baselines in the business rates retention system, and to a large extent the distribution of RSG, is incredibly complex and opaque making the original funding distribution at the start of the current retention system difficult to understand. By seeking to account for differences between such a diverse range of organisations, with budgets ranging from £2 million to well over £1 billion, the current needs assessment has evolved to be unavoidably complex. This has resulted in different parts of the sector being forced into competition to argue for the factors that matter most to their areas.
17. Continual tweaking of the methodology for calculating RSG has meant that changes to the distribution of funding since 2013-14 have often been difficult to understand. “Rolling in” certain grants and responsibilities (such as Council Tax Support and Local Welfare Provision), while keeping others as visible lines within RSG, has further added to the confusion, impeding the ability of local authorities to understand whether there is a fair level of funding for the services they are required to deliver. The confusion over the calculation of the “transition grant” in the 2016-17 LGF Settlement is the latest example of how this lack of transparency permits central manipulation without appropriate accountability.
18. Finally, the business rates retention scheme architecture is too complex. The scheme was supposed to be simpler than the previous system of formula grant and specific grants. Due to the fact that it is a partial retention system involving different shares for different tiers of government, there are complex accounting arrangements and there have been a growing number of reliefs with differing qualification criteria often requiring compensation via section 31 grant the system has become increasingly opaque and difficult to understand even for Finance professionals. In addition because there is an overly complex way of forecasting and accounting for appeals, this has resulted in a scheme in which it is difficult to assess accurately whether there has been growth against a baseline or not, let alone one in which business rates growth follows wider economic growth.
Lack of local control
19. The third main issue with the current system of local government finance is that there is too much central control by government. London Government believes that decisions over funding of, and expenditure on, local public services should be taken as close as possible to the tiers of government delivering those services. The current finance system remains overly-centralised. Compared with other developed countries, the UK is an outlier in the level of tax raised and spent locally.¹
20. Ring-fencing certain government departments, while others bear greater proportionate cuts, has an impact in funding available to local authorities. This not only impacts on the overall level of core funding, but affects the way in which local government is able to use its financial resources. Despite government attempts to rationalise grant funding streams following the 2010 Spending Review, there has been a gradual increase in the number of ring-fenced and targeted grants. These often have their own complex formulae, such as the Public Health Grant, which have their own bureaucratic and time-consuming machinery to administer.
21. In addition, there are many services that local government has a statutory duty to deliver, but is required to charge for at a level determined by central government rather than local councillors. The result is that there are a number of services which leave councils with an overall net deficit each year. We believe the government should reduce the number of nationally set charges; make locally determined charges the norm; allow local authorities to recover full costs, even for charges set at the national level; and
¹ http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmcomloc/503/50305.htm remove central controls on planning application fees, building control charges, land searches and licencing fees.
22. Finally, there has been too much central control over council tax which has restricted long term sustainable financial planning. Apart from business rate supplements which are also levied by local authorities, it is the only tax that requires a referendum to increase tax rates above a threshold and reinforces central control over local government. The current council tax system also means local government has little freedom and flexibility to fund existing unfunded burdens, like NRPF, or underfunded services, like Temporary Accommodation, or services that see a sudden large increase in demand because it has limited fiscal options. We believe that local government should be permitted greater control over the funding of the services it delivers – this would not only ensure local public services are adequately funded but would, ultimately, strengthen local democratic accountability.
Rationale for a London retention system
23. London Government believes an effective local government finance system must address these issues. We believe the best solution for London – and for the country as a whole - would be to establish a devolved business rates retention system run by London Government with only minimal ongoing input from central government. Successful, self-reliant local government will help drive economic success as well as providing effective and responsive public services.
24. London drives economic growth of the whole country; has a unique property tax base; and has some unique public service pressures because of its population density, demographic profile and levels of migration. London’s circumstances may, therefore, require different solutions to other parts of the country in implementing 100 per cent business rates retention.
London’s economy
| Economic argument 1) Allowing London control over business rates will encourage wider economic growth for London and therefore the rest of the UK economy. |
25. London’s role as a financial and business centre has helped it lead the economic recovery. It is a centre for high productivity growth industries, such as professional and financial services, and the information and communications sector. London’s international competitiveness in these markets is evidenced by the significant level of service exports (over £100 billion) that it achieves and its trade surplus with the rest of the world. This economic activity results in significant fiscal surpluses to the country as a whole.
26. London generates significant levels of taxation, contributing £140 billion (over 20 per cent) of the UK’s tax revenues in 2014-15(^2), well in excess of the public expenditure devoted to London (£95 billion), leaving a net fiscal contribution of £45 billion(^3).
(^2) Centre for Cities, “10 years of tax – How cities contribute to the national exchequer” (July 2016) 27. London is a global city competing with other global cities. Maintaining London’s international competitiveness, particularly once the UK leave the European Union, is therefore crucial to economic activity and the fiscal stability of the country as a whole. The nature of many of the businesses in London is such that if they were to look to relocate elsewhere the choice would be another international city rather than another city or location in the UK. It is therefore in the best interests of the whole country for London’s economy to remain strong.
28. London Government believes that a locally controlled business rates system for London would help deliver this, ensuring greater economic growth for London as a whole than one in which the parameters were controlled by central government. Freedom and flexibility to design a more responsive and sustainable business rates system in London, alongside other property taxes, will not only benefit public services in London but will encourage wider economic growth that will benefit whole UK economy.
29. Arguments in favour of re-balancing the economy by enhancing one area at the expense of others are misleading. Economic growth is not a zero sum game. Rather, London must be given the tools to unlock even greater growth for the rest of the country. The Crossrail project (for which almost a third of the funding comes from a supplement on business rates) for example, is forecast to add an estimated £42 billion to the UK economy. Its supply chain has supported the equivalent of around 55,000 jobs across the country with two thirds of its suppliers being located outside London – the majority of which are SMEs.
30. It should be noted that London’s economy is interlinked with the greater South East and that business rates growth depends, to some extent, on housing and transporting that workforce. Any significant devolution of business rates to the capital therefore would require a recognition of this by London’s leaders and ongoing dialogue with areas outside of the capital.
**Economic argument 2) decoupling London’s rates system from the rest of the country would prevent the perverse impact of London’s property market holding down values (and rates yields) in the rest of the country.**
31. London accounted for 42 per cent of the national growth in RV in 2010: a trend that has persisted since the late 1990s. Chart 1 below shows that London as a region has consistently experienced far greater revaluation growth than other regions in the last 18 years. It is likely that this will continue for the 2017 revaluation with rating agents forecasting a significant increase in London (possibly over £1 billion) but with rateable values expected to drop overall in England. If London’s business rates yield did rise by £1 billion in 2017, rates yield in the rest of the country would reduce by that amount (around 2 per cent).
32. If these trends continue, under the current valuation system and assuming the current 5 year revaluations continue, we estimate that by 2040 almost 60% of all business rates income will be generated in London – double the current proportion. This is, arguably
______________________________________________________________________
3 HMT: Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis (PESA) data 2014. unsustainable, as an ever increasing proportion of the national business yield will come from a, relatively, small number of properties in central London, thereby increasing the exposure of the entire country’s business rates values to the volatility of that unique property market.
33. In addition, with the incidence of business rates likely to continue to fall on an increasingly small number of London businesses, the risk of these businesses appealing their rates valuations – and the consequential impact on the entire system of those appeals – becomes larger, further adding to the unsustainability of the current system.
Chart 1 – Rateable Value by region – 1998-99 to 2016-17
34. Under the current system of revaluation, London’s disproportionately high valuation growth leads to a corresponding reduction in business rates payable elsewhere in the country at each revaluation. When business rates were only used to fund local government indirectly, the distributional effect of revaluations had no impact on councils. Under a national retention system, however, a relative increase in London’s rateable values would lead to an increase in London's aggregate tariff and a corresponding reduction in the growth rewards and incentives available to the rest of the country.
35. This is exemplified by looking at what the impact of 2010 revaluation would have been had London boroughs been taken out of the system. The overall national average growth in RV was 21% across England; this included an increase of 34% for London’s RV. Excluding London, the average growth across England was 16%. The resultant impact of London’s disproportionate growth was that 70 local authorities, whose growth was between 16% and 21%, saw their gross yield of rates decline when, had London been excluded, their rateable value and, therefore gross yield, would have grown. Table 1 below shows that London’s disproportionate growth held the multiplier down by around 2p, saving ratepayers outside London a collective £633 million. Table 1 – Comparison of 2010 revaluation figures for local authorities outside of London excluding and including London from the multiplier calculation
| | London boroughs included | London boroughs excluded | Difference | |----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------| | Total RV (£m) | 40,270 | 40,270 | 0 | | Total Gross rates (£m)| 16,390 | 17,023 | 633 | | Multiplier (£) | 0.407 | 0.423 | 0.016 | | No. of LAs increasing gross yield: | 117 | 187 | 70 | | No. of LAs decreasing gross yield: | 176 | 106 | -70 |
Source: London Councils’ analysis of DCLG data
36. Table 2 below shows the impact at the regional level. Rather than reducing by £294 million the overall business rates yield would have been £339 million higher (a net difference of £633 million or 3.9 per cent). Each region would have benefitted by 3.9 per cent compared with what actually happened in 2010-11, with the South East and North West standing to gain the most in net terms (as a result of their higher starting base position).
Table 2 – 2010 Gross business rates yield by region - actual vs modelled excluding London (£m)
| Region | 2009-10 | Actual values | Values if London had been excluded | Net difference (£m) | |----------------------|---------|---------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------| | | | 2010-11 | Change in gross rates (£m) | 2010-11 | Change in gross rates (£m) | | | | | | | | | | | Rest of England | 16,684 | 16,390 | -294 | 17,023 | 339 | 633 | | North East | 835 | 855 | 20 | 888 | 53 | 33 | | North West | 2,673 | 2,671 | -2 | 2,775 | 101 | 103 | | Yorks & Humber | 1,899 | 1,911 | 12 | 1,985 | 86 | 74 | | East Midlands | 1,568 | 1,426 | -142 | 1,482 | -87 | 55 | | West Midlands | 2,088 | 1,971 | -116 | 2,047 | -40 | 76 | | East of England | 2,268 | 2,248 | -20 | 2,335 | 67 | 87 | | South East | 3,552 | 3,416 | -136 | 3,548 | -4 | 132 | | South West | 1,800 | 1,889 | 89 | 1,962 | 162 | 73 |
Source: London Councils modelling based on VOA data
37. This shows how the current relative system of valuation, whereby London’s underlying economic growth continues to outstrip the rest of the country, has the perverse effect of keeping rate payers’ bills lower (and therefore local authority business rates yields lower) in the rest of the country. If the same happens in 2017 (as is likely), business rates baselines will fall around the country outside London – ultimately making those local authorities more reliant on top-up grant, less self-sufficient and less able to benefit from growth in their areas. This clearly undermines the government’s policy aim of using business rate retention to incentivise growth across the country as a whole.
38. London Government believes the tax base should be allowed to rise or fall in response to changes in the economy rather than to fit a pre-defined total. Whether local government then chooses to maximise income against that tax base, or to cut rates as RV rises, should be a matter of (local) political discretion and accountability.
39. “De-coupling” London’s business rates system from the rest of the country would prevent the capital’s robust property market from continuing to distort the operation of the national system and to allow business rates baselines to increase outside of London at a rate which reflects local authorities’ own economic investment and growth.
London’s business rates tax base
40. Given the nature of London’s economy, its business rates tax base is very different to that of the rest of England. London has 16 per cent of the rateable properties in England but these represent 28 per cent of the rateable value (likely to increase to over 30 per cent after the 2017 revaluation). Chart 2 below shows almost half of the Rateable Value (RV) of London’s business rates tax base is accounted for by offices compared with just 15 per cent for rest of England; while industrial properties account for a much smaller proportion of London’s RV than the rest of England (just 9 per cent compared with 27 per cent nationally).
41. Within London, just four authorities (Westminster, the City of London, Camden and Tower Hamlets) account for 50 per cent of London’s total RV; and a third of London’s total RV is accounted for just by offices in these four authorities (£5.4 billion in 2015). This different make-up in RV, and the relative concentration of RV in offices in only a few boroughs, suggests that different tools and solutions may be more appropriate for London than for elsewhere in the country.
Chart 2 – Business rates tax base by sector - London compared with rest of England
| London | Rest of England | |--------|----------------| | OFFICE | 45% | | RETAIL | 23% | | INDUSTRY | 9% | | OTHER | 23% | | OFFICE | 30% | | RETAIL | 15% | | INDUSTRY | 28% | | OTHER | 27% |
Source: VOA, ‘NNDR Stock of Properties’, at 31 March 2015
London’s unique public service pressures
42. London’s demographic profile is notably different to the rest of the country, creating pressures on public services in the capital that are manifestly different from
______________________________________________________________________
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/449291/NDR_Stock_of_Properties_Tables.xls elsewhere. With some of the most deprived areas of the country sitting alongside the most affluent, London has some of the most complex social problems that come with being Europe’s largest and most diverse city.
43. It is the most ethnically diverse region in the country with more than a third of residents born outside the UK, and the highest proportion of households where English is not the first language (26 per cent). Its population is also more transient and mobile than the rest of England, meaning boroughs are serving populations with increasingly complex needs.
44. Overall, London continues to show significant relative deprivation: nearly two thirds of London’s lower super output areas (LSOAs) have above average levels of deprivation (according to the 2015 Index of Multiple Deprivation). Just under a quarter of London’s LSOAs fall within the most deprived 20 per cent of England.
45. Despite being the smallest region by area, London has the second largest population of the UK’s 12 regions (estimated to be 8.8 billion in 2016(^5)). By 2020 it will have overtaken the South East to become the most populous region of the country, and by 2040 more people will live in London than Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland combined. This population density creates unique challenges for public services in the capital, most notably in housing, transport and healthcare.
46. However, it is London’s disproportionate levels of population growth that really set it apart from the rest of the country when it comes to demand for public services. Over the period to 2039, London’s population is forecast to increase by 24% (to over 11 million), double the rate (12%) of the rest of England (see Chart 3 below).
**Chart 3 – Estimated change in population by region – 2016 to 2039**
Source: ONS, 2014-based Sub-National Population Projections
(^5) 2014-based National and Sub-National population projections (ONS) 47. Any new system of local government funding must therefore be able to respond to such changes, and the consequent increase in demand for services, in order to ensure sustainability over the long term.
48. In the more immediate future, the latest projection estimates forecast London’s population will rise from 8.8 million in 2015 to 9.3 million by 2020 (an increase of 5.4 per cent). This is more than twice the anticipated rate of increase for the rest of England (2.5 per cent) over the same period. London will account for 30 per cent of all population growth in England over that period. This disproportionate growth is across the board: Chart 4 (below) shows above average growth in every demographic cohort.
Chart 4 – Projected population growth – London v rest of England 2016-2020
49. London’s larger relative working age population means that growth in adults aged 18-64 will have a particularly disproportionate impact in London (accounting for 56 per cent of the national growth in that demographic by 2020) compared with other areas. This will put pressure on services related to the working population such as skills, employment support and transport, but in particular will drive greater demand for social care for adults with physical and learning disabilities and mental health issues.
50. Within London, in relative terms, larger than average growth in the 0-18 and the over 65 population will place noticeably bigger demands on London Government to deliver children’s services and schools places, as well as health and adult social care for the elderly. Adults and Children’s social care are by far the biggest areas of expenditure for local authorities – with some London boroughs spending over 70 per cent of their budget on social care. The far greater than average growth of adults with learning and physical disabilities, and those with mental health problems, will place huge cost pressures on the capital’s social care budgets.
51. London Government believes it is imperative that London has stable and sustainable funding mechanisms that have the capacity to grow sufficiently to meet such rising demand.
**London Government’s vision for a London retention system**
52. London’s unique position as the driver of the UK economy and the very different demand drivers for public services means there is a strong case for delivering 100 per cent business rates retention differently in the capital. Government has recognised this by naming London as a pilot area to trial certain elements of the new system prior to the start of the full retention system. London Government will work closely with government to develop the London pilot from April 2017 onwards, however London Government wishes to go further than this and develop an autonomous business rates retention system. Our vision for how this would operate is set out below. While we will continue to explore opportunities to pilot early reforms of the system, we recognize that our vision for business rates within London represents fundamental change that would have to be implemented alongside the wider national reforms
A. **Retention level**
53. London Government has consistently called for the full devolution of business rates to the capital. This was one of the recommendations of the 2013 London Finance Commission (along with further control of the full suite of property taxes), and is likely to be advocated in the 2016 London Finance Commission, as part of a push for broader fiscal devolution. It was also a central ask in London Councils’ 2015 Spending Review submission.
54. In 2016-17 the government expects London boroughs to collect £6.7 billion in business rates(^6), retaining half £3.4 billion, and paying a tariff of £345 million. London Government therefore retains around £3 billion - or 90 per cent of its local share of rates (45 per cent of the overall total business rates). By 2019-20 inflation alone would see the overall quantum rise to £7.3 billion and, with an estimated increase of around £1 billion due to the 2017 Revaluation(^7), the total by 2019-20 would be £8.4 billion.
55. Table 3, below, shows that London is likely to have headroom of around £4.0 billion by 2019-20: that is the amount by which business rates would exceed current spending responsibilities. Full retention in 2019-20 would, therefore, require London Government to finance additional responsibilities from business rates (beyond TfL grant already announced) for around £4.0 billion of services to match the available resources in order to be “fiscally neutral”.
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(^6) This is calculated using the GLA’s business rates baseline divided by 0.2 (its 20% retained share), to aggregate up to a total London business rates “target”
(^7) Current modelling suggests the overall RV could increase by around 30 per cent, meaning a corresponding increase in rates yield of around £1 billion. Table 3 - Forecast London business rates post transfers and revaluation (£bn)
| | 2016-17 | 2017-18 | 2018-19 | 2019-20 | 2019-20 (post transfer of central share) | |----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|------------------------------------------| | Total business rates | 6.735 | 7.867 | 8.099 | 8.358 | 8.358 | | Central share | 3.368 | 2.596 | 2.673 | 2.758 | 0.000 | | Retained share (BRB) | 3.357 | 5.271 | 5.426 | 5.600 | 8.358 | | Baseline Funding | 3.012 | 4.179 | 4.274 | 4.383 | 4.383 | | Tariff or “headroom” | -0.345 | -1.092 | -1.153 | -1.217 | -3.975 | | % of total rates retained | 45% | 53% | 53% | 52% | 52% |
56. It is important to reiterate that full retention of business rates would not result in London having extra money to spend on the same services being delivered elsewhere, but in London being required to deliver additional services that are currently delivered by central government departments and funded through other means (mainly by general taxation).
57. The issue of the percentage retained is inextricably linked with the question of the responsibilities that are transferred (see section B below). It is possible (without disadvantaging the rest of the country) to fund all of the services and grants proposed for transfer within the anticipated business rates to be collected in London with (see Table 4 in section B below).
58. However, if the national approach to transfers requires a continued contribution from London to support services elsewhere, London Government would prefer one overall aggregate tariff to be paid to government each year, combined with the freedom for London to set its own tariffs and top-ups to distribute the remaining retained sum (see section D below). The aggregate tariff, would be calculated using a funding and business rates baseline for London as a whole (determined by a national reset by central government), and would be a share deducted from every London billing authority’s business rates take (in a similar way to the central share currently), and then London Government would set top-ups and tariffs to balance to zero within London. This would effectively disentangle London from the national system except for an overall aggregate needs assessment (funding baseline) and enable funding and business rates baselines to be set within London.
Ask 1 – London Government seeks to explore full retention of the business rates collected in the capital by 2020; if London does not retain 100 per cent of its business rates, we ask that the tariff is one single payment at the aggregate London level
B. Additional Responsibilities
59. London Government believes, when determining the existing grants and new responsibilities that should be funded by business rates, priority should be given to responsibilities that maximise London Government’s ability to improve the life of Londoners, the effectiveness and efficiency of its public services, and the future economic success of the capital.
60. We would therefore wish to prioritise the transfer of grants and responsibilities that:
- have a direct relationship to business;
- help tackle key infrastructure challenges, including housing and transport; and
- have a compelling public service reform case to be delivered more efficiently and effectively by local government.
61. We believe the government should first consider the outcomes the sector is aiming to achieve, and then design local public services around them. This will require greater exploration of the funding necessary to deliver those outcomes. However, the list set out in the consultation document is a helpful starting point, which we have used to identifying grants and responsibilities we feel are suitable candidates to be transferred in Table 4.
62. The grants and responsibilities listed below are grouped by whether they are a new responsibility or existing grant, and then by which of the three principles set out above they meet. Estimated values for London in 2019-20 are set out in the fourth column. In determining the levels of funding to be devolved in relation to new responsibilities the Government should take into account the costs of administration as well as any initial set up costs including relating to the transfers of assets and staffing.
Table 4 – Existing grants & new responsibilities - Suitable candidates for transfer in Addition to TfL Capital Grant
| Existing grant or responsibility | Reason(s) | Estimated London value in 2019-20 (£bn) | |----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------| | Skills - 16-19 funding | New responsibility | Business link/PSR | 0.499 | | Adult Education Budget | New responsibility | Business link/PSR | 0.400 | | Careers Service | New responsibility | Business link/PSR | 0.097 | | Work and health programme | New responsibility | Business link/PSR | 0.014 | | Youth Justice | New responsibility | PSR | 0.054 | | Valuation Office Agency | New responsibility | PSR | 0.032 | | Affordable Housing capital funding | Grant | Infrastructure | 0.417 | | Transport capital (outside London) | Grant | Infrastructure | n/a | | Early Years funding within DSG | Grant | PSR | 0.748 | | Public Health Grant | Grant | PSR | 0.628 | | Revenue Support Grant | Grant | PSR | 0.538 | | Improved Better Care Fund | Grant | PSR | 0.247 | | Housing Benefit Admin Subsidy | Grant | PSR | 0.033 | | Independent Living Fund | Grant | PSR | 0.019 | | CT Support Admin Subsidy | Grant | PSR | 0.015 | | Rural Service Delivery Grant | Grant | PSR | n/a | | **Total grants & responsibilities** | | | 3.741 | | **Total “headroom” in 2019-20** | | | 3.975 | | **Remaining capacity** | | | 0.234 |
NB: The RSG figure here is net of the GLA’s RSG which will be funded from business rates from April 2017. TfL Capital grant is also excluded as this will be transferred in 2017-18. The estimated figure for 16-19 skills funding excludes 6th form and academy providers at this stage. 63. Table 4 includes all of the grants listed in the consultation document (with the exception of Attendance Allowance). In addition, (and in line with Adult Education Budgets which is mentioned as a devolved responsibility in Devolution Deal areas), we believe there is a strong argument for devolution of 16-19 skills funding, and National Careers Service funding, which have clear links to business and growth, and could be delivered more efficiently by local government.
64. The transfer of TfL capital funding in 2017-18 sets a precedent for other similar transfers under 100 per cent retention. The need to build more homes is the biggest issue facing London’s public services in the medium term. We believe there is a strong argument, therefore, for using business rates – as a relatively stable income stream – to fund affordable housing rather than relying upon grant funding from government.
65. We believe the government is right to consider the responsibilities already transferred to areas with devolution deals. Those areas have been able to show why they warrant the additional responsibility and have negotiated bespoke packages for their own areas. We expect to see (and would support) devolution of a common core package of services funded from bus rates across the whole sector – but would want to see flexibility for additional transfers beyond that where feasible and appropriate. Some of the more universal elements of the existing devolution deals, which have a clear link to business and economic growth, lend themselves to being transferred to the whole sector for example Adult Education Budget and transport capital grants.
66. Table 4 shows London is likely to have more than enough business rates headroom to fund all of these responsibilities from 2019-20, however if a national solution requires an on-going London tariff, London’s priorities would be to transfer those responsibilities which best support its ability to promote growth and implement local public sector reform.
Ask 2 – London Government would prioritise the transfer (over and above what has already been decided) of:
- Skills - 16-19 funding
- Adult Education Budgets
- Careers service
- Work and health programme
- Capital funding for Affordable Housing; and
- Early Years funding.
Local control
67. London Government does not believe it is appropriate or acceptable to transfer the risk of future spending commitments that London Government is unable effectively to influence. Any transfer of responsibility must therefore be based on a realistic assessment of its in-built spending pressures and be accompanied by a corresponding devolution of policy control.
68. As such, we are united with colleagues across the sector in our opposition to the responsibility for providing Attendance Allowance (or a similar such welfare benefit) being transferred to local government. We firmly believe this should remain centrally administered by the Department for Work & Pensions and should not therefore be transferred to local government. The government has provided no detail about how any new Attendance Allowance administration arrangements would work if devolved to local government or the levels of control and influence the sector would have over the scheme, or any evidence that the in-built spending pressures this would bring has been considered. This is disappointing given the size of the funding involved (£5 billion nationally), and the likely increase in demand for this benefit that will result from an aging population. There is no reason to suggest business rates as a funding stream, and local government as a sector, would be better placed to deliver this benefit than central government through general taxation.
Beyond 2020
69. In support of broader ambitions for devolution and public service reform, London would also wish to continue exploring approaches that transferred service responsibilities – and appropriate revenue sources – above and beyond those that could be financed entirely by retained business rates beyond 2020. We believe this should be through devolution of further tax raising powers (in line with the likely recommendations of the 2016 London Finance Commission).
Ask 3 - London Government would wish to agree prior to the start of the 100 per cent retention system a robust mechanism for negotiating and agreeing with central government any new responsibilities that are to be delivered in the capital beyond 2020
C. Revaluations
De-coupling London
70. As set out in paragraphs 31-39 (above), there is a strong argument for de-coupling London’s business rates valuations from the rest of the country in order to provide a closer link to economic conditions throughout the whole country and enable all areas to benefit from growth.
71. The 2017 revaluation is likely to lead to an overall increase in business rates in London – based on past trends and current information from rating agents’ – whose forecasts have suggested underlying business rates liabilities for London ratepayers could increase by up to £1.1 billion in 2017-18 compared to 2016-17, due to the combined effect of the revaluation and the RPI uplift in the multiplier based on the assumption rateable values in London will increase by an average of 8% compared to a forecast reduction nationally. If such an outcome materialises once the valuations are published on 30 September, this will have the perverse effect of keeping rate payers’ bills lower (and therefore local authority business rates yields lower) in the rest of the country - ultimately making those local authorities more reliant on the top-up grant and less self-sufficient.
72. London Government would urge the Government to ensure that a fair transitional relief scheme is introduced to phase in the changes in bills arising from the 2017 revaluation over five years – ideally with very limited increases in 2017-18. This is necessary because of the significant volatility in rates bills which result from the expected relative increases in rateable values in London and is not conducive to delivering a robust and sustainable taxbase across the whole of England. This is not in the interests of London ratepayers or indeed those in the rest of the country and could be avoided in future if the capital operated its own revaluation arrangements. This is also a further illustration as to how the current arrangements undermine the government's policy aim of using business rate retention to promote growth across the country as a whole.
73. London Government believes sub-national areas that can show to government they are willing and capable of delivering devolved control of business rates should be allowed to retain the benefit of increases in their taxbase. The principal underpinning this argument is that the tax base should be allowed to rise or fall in response to changes in the economy rather than to fit a pre-defined total. Where RVs increase, local government could either (a) leave the multiplier untouched, and therefore raise greater resources to meet local needs; or (b) reduce the multiplier while maintaining spending; or (c) some combination/trade-off between the two. Whether local government then chooses to maximise income against that tax base, or to cut rates as RV rises, should be a matter of (local) political discretion and accountability, taking into account the views of the local business community.
74. Breaking the link between revaluation and the fixed quantum of tax yield benefits both those areas where commercial property markets are strong and those where they are not. In each of these cases set out above – without increasing the burden on individual taxpayers – accountability and the relationship between local business and politicians will be significantly improved. It would also prevent the capital’s robust property market from continuing to distort the operation of the national system and to allow business rates baselines to increase outside of London at a rate which reflects local authorities’ own economic investment and growth.
Ask 4 - London Government asks that the Government considers ending the principle of "fixed yield" revaluations, and that London's business rates be "de-coupled" from the national valuation system.
Keeping revaluation growth
75. Whether London’s valuations can be decoupled from a national system or not, London Government would at least want to see a system in which it was possible to retain some element of revaluation growth in order to correct one of the major defects in the current arrangements: the fact that growth is measured as physical rather than revaluation (underlying economic) growth.
76. One of the biggest reasons why there is a weak growth incentive in the current system is that growth is measured purely in terms of physical growth rather than taking into account any underlying revaluation or economic growth, even though the latter is likely to reflect increased profitability and therefore additional tax revenues for central government. This limits the ability of local authorities to benefit from the growth in rental values derived, in part, from their investment in making their local areas more attractive as a business destination, for example through incentivising businesses to locate there, improving the public realm and transport links. It also has the strange (in purely economic terms) impact of incentivising growth of businesses with large physical floor space and not necessarily businesses that generate high GVA.
77. While the estimated business rates tax take in London could increase by over £1 billion in April 2017, the government’s commitment to redistribution means that the GLA/Mayor and boroughs will derive no additional financial benefit (although they are likely to bear the brunt of any complaints from ratepayers). Meanwhile local authorities outside the capital have even less incentive to invest in their local business environment as any gains are stripped out by the redistributive impact of the national revaluation.
A London Valuation system
78. As set out above (paragraph 11), the impact of incorrect valuations leading to ratepayers challenging their rates bills through appeals is the biggest issue with the current retention system. This has significantly eclipsed any incentives local authorities have had to grow business rates and clouded any measurement of actual business rates growth.
79. London, with around 16% of the national business rates hereditaments, has seen a disproportionate level of total appeals against the 2010 ratings list (22%) and a £960 million provision for appeals at the end of March 2016 (32% of the national total).
80. There are structural weaknesses in the appeals process, which the “Check Challenge Appeal” reforms are trying to address. However there are more fundamental issues with the performance of the Valuation Office Agency that stem firstly from the valuation basis (meaning a high level of incorrect calculations to start with); and, secondly, in failing to deal with the backlog of appeals efficiently. Analysis of VOA data based on the position at 31 March 2016 shows the number of unresolved appeals as a percentage of the number of properties in the local rating list across the 33 London billing authorities ranged from just over 10% to as much as 40% compared to the England average of about 15%. The relative backlog is notably higher in those London boroughs with the highest business rates taxbases in England such as the City of London, Hillingdon, Tower Hamlets and Westminster, where the materiality of any appeals will tend to be greater in financial terms as a result. By contrast in Wales which has its own devolved arrangements the relative backlog was only 9%. A differential rate of appeals clearance means some local authorities have lost out financially relative to others – both in terms of higher appeals provisions and higher safety net payments until these appeals are cleared.
81. To address these issues, a more efficient and effective system could be established if London Government was given the ability to determine the basis of valuation and to administer the system through the establishment of separate London Valuation Office Agency. The exact process of valuation would be for London Government to determine collectively; however, this could include a system of self-assessment or a formula based system which could enable more frequent – ideally annual - valuations that would be more responsive to underlying economic conditions.
**Ask 5 - London Government calls for the ability to determine its own valuation system to be administered by a regional valuation office for London.**
D. **Resets: balancing needs and resources**
82. Finding the appropriate balance between risk and reward - meeting need and incentivising growth - is perhaps the biggest challenge in setting up the 100 per cent retention system. London Government recognises the need to have sufficiently long periods between resets of the business rates baselines to incentivise growth, whilst also ensuring that changing needs are recognised in the funding baselines on a regular basis. The government has proposed 'partial' resets of both funding and business rates baselines on the same timetable. Emerging consensus from the “systems design” working group is that 5 yearly partial resets (of both funding and business rates baselines) requires further exploration, but could form a suitable solution at the national level.
83. We believe that, within a London retention system, the frequency of resets should be determined locally by London Government. As such, we would seek to manage future resets of business rate and funding baselines taking into account the overall balance between spending need, council tax base, the speed of change and the desire to maintain incentives within a devolved system. We think that it may be possible to reset funding and business rates on different timetables, for example with business rates baselines being set over a longer period (10-15 years for example) and funding baselines being reset more frequently (every 3 years for example), and would explore options around this.
84. How resets within London relate to national resets will ultimately depend on the degree of autonomy a London retention system has.
**Ask 6 – London Government calls for the ability to manage future resets of business rate and funding baselines, and their impact, within London.**
85. London Government would advocate a system of equalisation continuing through tariffs and top ups but, as set out earlier (Ask 1), one where they balance to zero within London. If London was required by government to pay a tariff at the outset of the system, this would be paid collectively as a share rather than having individual business rates and funding baselines being directly set by the national assessments.
86. There is common agreement across the sector that any new needs assessment system should be less complex and more responsive to changes than the current system. A potential solution could involve a two-stage approach to assessing need. The first stage would be an assessment of needs at a suitable sub-national level, followed by a more local/sub-regional approach to allocate within these areas. London Councils has undertaken some initial analysis of how a two stage system could work in practice finding evidence to support the conclusion made by the Independent Commission on Local Government Finance that there is greater divergence within regions/sub-national areas than between them. The modelling suggests it is possible to allocate resources in a much more simplified and transparent way to these areas based primarily on population and deprivation variables.
87. In setting funding baselines within a London system, London government would not seek to invent a needs formula from scratch, but to be able to vary the individual assessments for London’s local authorities from the national needs formula over time to reflect London’s rapidly-changing circumstances, including significant issues such as housing need, population growth/churn and specific London cost pressures; a future London needs assessment would continue to reflect the unique circumstances of the City of London.
88. We would also wish to be able to determine locally the extent to which wider resource capacity (council tax raising ability) is taken into account and the extent to which any transitional arrangements may be necessary by, for example, providing a degree of transitional protection for boroughs and the GLA in both the transition from a national needs assessment to a local one, and indeed following local resets.
89. London Government believes a local solution for distributing funding would:
- be less complex and therefore more transparent;
- be more responsive to population changes; and
- give London boroughs and the GLA more collective ownership over the process and therefore would build trust that the system is fair.
Ask 7 – London Government proposes a two-stage process in which a regional needs assessment for the capital would be combined with the ability to vary a needs formula within London over time to reflect local circumstances.
E. Determining allocation of resources between tiers of London Government
90. The reforms to 100% business rates retention raise some important issues and questions for two tier areas. It is important for the reforms to be equitable, and for all tiers to work together to find the best possible solution.
91. In principle, it is our view that the allocation of resources in London should follow the responsibilities to be funded – as is proposed for 2017-18 where the GLA share is forecast to increase to 37% following the agreed transfer of TfL capital funding and the proposed transfer of the GLA’s RSG. The final split of rate income between the Boroughs and the GLA should, as a starting point, reflect the agreed package of responsibilities undertaken by each. Any future revision of that split should be periodically agreed and managed by London Government, in line with changes in responsibility over time and any “resets” of the system.
**Ask 8 – London Government asks for the ability to decide collectively for itself how business rates are shared between the boroughs and the GLA.**
**F. Setting Business Rates – flexibilities**
**Control over setting the multiplier(s)**
92. London Government would wish to explore options for either a collectively agreed single multiplier across London, or two separate multipliers with the Mayor of London being granted the ability to set a proportion of the rate on a London wide basis, and boroughs collectively setting the rest of the multiplier. These two shares of the overall multiplier would be determined by the funding and retention split as set out above. We would want to explore the relative advantages and disadvantages of options for either a defined, periodically-reviewed split of income between the boroughs and the GLA, or for the establishing a separate Mayoral rate. Northern Ireland already operates a system incorporating a multiplier set province-wide and a separate one set locally, and we believe a similar arrangement would be possible in London and in two tier areas in the rest of England.
**Ask 9 – London Government initially seeks the flexibility to determine the business rates multiplier(s) in London, agreed collectively between the Mayor and London’s borough Leaders over a defined period.**
93. Following successful implementation of a London scheme, however, we would want to return to the issues of full control of rate setting – including the safeguards that would be required to prevent a disproportionate tax burden on business – along with a broader range of fiscal devolution as envisaged by the London Finance Commission.
**The Infrastructure Levy**
94. Short of being given powers to raise the overall multiplier, London Government – despite not being a Combined Authority area – would, at the very least, wish to be able to raise the 2% infrastructure levy offered to other areas. London’s infrastructure needs are different from those of the rest of the country London government considers that the Mayor of London should have the power to introduce an infrastructure levy in addition to the existing business rate supplement which is committed to fund Crossrail 1 until the mid-2030s. The legislation should provide for this to be possible even if this is not the Government’s current default policy position. If necessary, the Secretary of State could be given specific powers to approve the introduction of new levies for authorities not automatically eligible to fund specific projects – subject to appropriate consideration by the local LEP. The Business Rates Supplement (BRS) that funds Crossrail has been a large success, and shows how London’s property market can sustain additional taxation when the benefits of infrastructure development are made clear to businesses.
95. In addition, we believe there should be a broadly defined definition of “infrastructure” that includes affordable housing. The Government will also need to give consideration as to the mechanism by which the LEP should approve the introduction of a new infrastructure levy. Subject to the proposals being in compliance with the final prospectus approved by the LEP the annual tax setting responsibilities should in our view lie with the directly elected Mayor in the context of London’s governance arrangements.
Ask 10 – London Government asks that the 2% infrastructure levy is made available to the Mayor of London.
Reliefs and Discounts
096. Mandatory reliefs awarded in London amounted to around £650 million in 2016-17, and are currently set by central government. London Government believes these could be used more constructively to improve local economies if devolved to London Government.
097. We believe London Government should have the collective ability to set the qualification criteria and thresholds of the existing mandatory reliefs currently set by central government (and the discretionary elements of those schemes), as well as determining new mandatory relief schemes periodically when deemed necessary. This would include the small business rates relief threshold. Where individual boroughs or the Mayor wished to offer additional discounts over and above a collective scheme agreement, this could be achieved through adjustments to their retained rates. We therefore believe the power to offer business rates discounts directly should be extended to the Mayor of London, where these were more generous than those being offered by billing authorities, although these would be paid for from the GLA share of retained rates.
098. Locally determined reliefs and discounts would encourage greater dialogue and engagement between London Government and businesses and empower local authorities to respond to the specific needs of their local economies, for example leading the regeneration of high streets and town centres by incentivising cafes, arts and culture spaces, workspace or civic uses. Collective control over reliefs would also facilitate more strategic planning to meet other statutory duties for example, by tailoring reliefs to incentivise the provision of healthy food retailers (rather than fast food outlets) they could help promote better public health outcomes.
099. These reforms could create a far stronger platform on which to increase incentives to support economic growth, promote broader policy objectives and link councils more closely to their business communities. G. Distributing the benefits of growth
100. Under the current 50% retention system, boroughs in theory benefit from 30% of growth in rates in their area above the assumed baseline: 20% goes to the GLA and 50% to Government. In practice, the impact of appeals and the timing of the initial baseline calculations have meant that there has, to date, been no real correlation between boroughs’ economic growth and business rates growth, and similarly between this overall business rates growth and retained business rate income.
101. These problems should, as far as possible, be designed out of the system in the transition from 50% to 100% retention. In the longer run, the retention and distribution system must be capable of delivering greater and more certain rewards if it is genuinely to incentivise growth.
102. The first, and most basic, option would simply distribute growth according to the retention shares between the boroughs and the GLA. Under a London system that continued, for instance, to have a 60:40 split between the boroughs and the GLA, any growth would continue to be retained in those proportions. However, were the Mayor and the boroughs to have separate multipliers which changed at different rates each year, the growth retention split between the boroughs and the GLA would vary each year depending on how their respective multipliers changed.
103. However, London’s economy is a complicated system in which different parts of the capital will have different, but inter-related, roles to play. For the economy to keep growing in a sustainable manner, we need to expand the overall business premises capacity, but also to find ways to house, train, transport and provide access to leisure and culture for millions of people around the capital. We may therefore want to use some of the proceeds of growth to facilitate additional investment, and to create targeted rewards that incentivise contributions to the capital’s overall success beyond hosting new business properties.
104. An alternative option could, therefore, see retained rates split into 3 shares:
- one for the individual borough;
- one for the GLA; and
- a third for an overall central pool to be distributed according to collective priorities.
105. The relative shares would be for the boroughs and the GLA to agree at the outset of the new system, and could be reviewed periodically in line with collective priorities. So if, for instance, London Government collectively agreed a pool share of 10%, again assuming a 60:40 starting split the remaining 90% would be split 60:40 between the individual borough and the GLA. The overall shares of any growth would therefore be 54:36:10 (boroughs:GLA:pool). A separate Mayoral rate, varied at a different rate to a borough rate, would again have an impact on the borough:GLA part of this split.
106. London Government would establish a robust governance arrangement prior to the start of the system to:
- agree the size of the pool share;
- decide priorities for how it is used; and
- decide mechanisms for its distribution.
107. Once the system is up and running, an ongoing governance/decision making forum would be required regarding the pool.
Ask 12 – London Government asks for the ability to determine collectively how the proceeds of growth are shared within London
H. Managing risk: Safety nets and the Central list
Safety Net Mechanism
108. If the move to 100% retention is to be successful then the need to share and manage risk effectively will be essential. London Government is supportive of introducing a devolved London pooling arrangement to manage risk and uncertainty and ensure resources are allocated in the most efficient way.
109. We support the Government’s intention to end the system of levies on growth; however, it is important to ensure that authorities experiencing one off shocks to their rates base have the support of an appropriate safety net mechanism. If the issue of appeals could be addressed by managing a proportion of these centrally this would also serve to reduce the call on the safety net mechanism in future. Were London to establish a devolved business rates retention system, significant consideration would be given to how this safety net mechanism would work and, importantly, to how it should be funded. Options include earmarking a proportion of a collective growth distribution pool or retaining an element of the rates income from a regional “London list” of infrastructure assets within the capital (see para 111).
110. However, we believe London’s future approach to managing risk should not be separated from the questions of the overall proportion of rates retained (see section A) or the degree of devolved control over the business rate taxbase (sections E to G). In essence, the greater the degree of autonomy, the more reasonable it will be to expect London to manage its collective risk for itself. Conversely, the more London remains part of a national system, and the more limited its control of the taxbase, the more London should expect to look to Government to share some of that risk. Of particular significance here would be if Government retained levers over the setting of the tax such as the method of indexation or the thresholds for reliefs. Under these circumstances London Government would expect government to provide a degree of support in managing the impact of changes to these central levers that could impact on London’s business rates take.
111. Under a fully devolved London retention system, therefore, in which 100 per cent of the rates were retained in the capital, London Government would expect to manage and fund the safety net mechanism. Under a system whereby London continued to pay a tariff to fund the rest of the sector, we would expect to share the funding of a London safety net with the rest of the sector.
Ask 13 – Under a devolved retention system, London Government asks that the safety net mechanism and thresholds are determined locally by London Government
Reducing the size of the central list as far as possible
112. The central list has been identified as a potential source of funding for future safety net arrangements. Where responsibility for such arrangements is devolved, it would be appropriate also to maximise local access to the rates derived from properties currently held on the central list. London Government considers that, unless there is a clear case for an assessment to be on the central list, it should therefore sit on a local list. This would also increase opportunities and incentives to maximise the value and use of such assets where possible.
113. For example, the central list currently includes a large proportion of Transport for London’s network and rail infrastructure, including the London Underground, DLR and TfL station carparks, which could be transferred to the local rating list, so that London could retain the full benefits of the investment it makes to improve the capital’s transport infrastructure.
114. Alternatively it TfL’s assessments could be moved to an area or London regional list in order that the capital can benefit from all of the business rates growth arising from transport investment. TfL also considers there would be operational efficiencies from combining these onto a single assessment. Responsibility for collecting any rates due from the London area list including the TfL assessments could be given to a single London billing authority but the entire proceeds should be made available London wide, potentially via the London redistribution pool.
115. There may also be an argument for separating out those parts of the Network Rail assessment which are now administered by TfL – for example the TfL rail and London Overground assessments – to be transferred over as well. This is an option which we would be keen to explore, at least in relation to station infrastructure including car parks even if it is not practical to transfer the actual rail network elements.
Ask 14 - London Government would seek to transfer central list properties to either a local or regional list wherever possible, including the transfer of TfL’s separately identifiable assessments potentially as a single TfL operational assessment. I. Governance
116. A regional approach to managing business rates in London will require appropriate mechanisms to ensure that robust, timely and accountable decisions can be taken to raise and distribute tax revenues. In return for the level of devolution and autonomy London Government is asking for, central government will require reassurance that London is capable of governing such a system collectively. The governance structures and decision making mechanisms will, therefore, be vital.
Building on existing structures
117. London Government is well placed to develop a collective governance model to enable a devolved business rates retention system. London is the only region in England with a regional tier of government. London’s 33 local authorities and the Mayor of London have developed a mature relationship that has gradually evolved since 2000.
118. London Councils is the representative body for the 32 London boroughs and the City of London Corporation. Its Leaders’ Committee is its main decision-making body. The Committee includes the Leaders of each London borough council and is chaired by the Chair of London Councils. Meeting eight times a year, Leaders’ Committee sets policy and takes decisions on the latest developments affecting London local government. There is also a smaller cross-party Executive Committee which guides the organisation’s day-to-day work.
119. In 2010 the Mayor of London and Chair of London Councils agreed the London City Charter, which called on Government to “recognise the maturity, efficiency and accountability of London’s unique system of self-government and to take decisive steps to devolve further powers, responsibilities and fiscal capacity to London’s elected governments”8. The Charter established the regular meetings of the Congress of Leaders, which currently meets at least twice a year, whose membership consists of the Mayor of London, the Leaders of each London Borough and the Chairman of the Policy & Resources Committee of the City of London Corporation. This has formed the basis of joint decision making between the two tiers of government ever since.
120. Deputy Mayors from the Greater London Authority attend as observers and to support the Mayor. The Congress of Leaders therefore consists of thirty four members who represent their own mandate but also consider both the city-wide and local interests of London. The Congress is chaired by the Mayor, with the Chairman of London Councils as the Deputy Chair of the Congress. The London Assembly also provides scrutiny over the decisions of the Mayor of London and has the ability to amend his annual budget subject to securing a two third majority.
Decisions required to set up and run a devolved retention system
8 http://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/download/file/fid/11161 121. The proposals set out in this paper generate three classes of decisions for London to Government address:
- **Initial set-up**: decisions and agreement with Government on the scheme design, including the level of retention, responsibilities transferred, the basis and frequency of revaluations, and resets, the allocation of resources between GLA and boroughs, the multiplier(s), the framework for discounts and reliefs, the distribution of growth proceeds, the operation of a regional safety net and a regional list. Such decisions would need to be taken collectively – and unanimously – by the Mayor of London and Leaders.
- **On-going tax-setting and resource allocation**: annual decisions such as setting the multiplier(s) and allocating the collective growth pool; periodic decisions such as agreeing revised baselines and changes to the needs formula. These decisions would need to be taken collectively by the Mayor and Leaders, building on the existing Congress arrangements, with appropriate voting and other principles consistent with the London Finance Commission in 2013, built in to ensure the appropriate protection of minority interests within London.
- **Technical underpinning and review**: it may require two independent technical commissions to manage on-going work around valuation (including the performance of a regional VOA) and the operation of the tax, and around maintaining the needs formula and distribution model. Political oversight of these commissions could be undertaken by the Governance structures described above.
**Existing principles**
122. The London Finance Commission identified a set of principles upon which such governance could be based. These were expanded in evidence submitted to the CLG Committee inquiry into fiscal devolution in April 2014. These governing principles are as follows:
- **Each element of London government should have a stake**: Elected leaders of all London local authorities and the Mayor of London must be able to feel confident about the governance arrangements for the new finance system.
- **No exclusion**: No one borough or group of boroughs can be excluded from the benefits of London’s success or become disempowered from addressing local needs.
- **No over-riding**: Interests of the Mayor cannot be overridden by the boroughs or vice versa.
- **No deadlock**: Arrangements must prevent or break deadlock. We believe that this can be achieved through suitable voting arrangements and clarity about which tier
______________________________________________________________________
9 Extract from a joint letter from Boris Johnson, Mayor of London and Mayor Jules Pipe, Chair of London Councils to Clive Betts MP, Chair of the Communities and Local Government Committee, 10 April 2014, submitted as evidence to the Committee’s review of Fiscal Devolution of government is responsible for decision-making, as reflected in the principles below.
- **Enforcement**: The system must enforce binding decisions and these decisions must reflect a clear initial consensus – even if there are disagreements from time to time about individual decisions.
- **Simplicity and clarity**: The reformed system should be as simple as possible. It should avoid the need for annual decision-making between different sections of London government. It should seek to distinguish clearly the responsibilities of the GLA, Boroughs and London Assembly.
- **Stability**: Existing responsibilities should be maintained where possible.
- **... But potential for reform.** Provisions in the ‘devolution settlement’ should enable, by agreement, periodic property tax reform and changes to any within-London distribution arrangements. Such reforms would be distinct from the ‘Day 1’ operation of a devolved system. There should also be a presumption that the more significant reforms were proposed, the longer they would be phased in.
- **Practical operations**: decisions would be taken by the Mayor or Borough politicians as appropriate. However, a joint GLA and London Councils Officer Group would provide standing technical advice and support for politicians to decide matters where there is significant joint interest under the above arrangements. This might be independently chaired.
- **Decision rules**: Any new system would require a set of decision rules, some of which would be reflected in legislation. For instance, Parliament might legislate for periodic property revaluations to be carried out by devolved authorities. There are various options for the rulebook governing changes within London following devolution but here is one example:
- Mayor would need to agree any decision and by converse would have a veto
- Boroughs would need to agree to any decision by their own rules (e.g. two-thirds majority)
- The London Assembly would retain its existing powers to amend or reject the Mayor’s tax and spending decisions, which would be enhanced commensurate with the increase in the Mayor’s powers.
123. The Mayor of London has re-formed the London Finance Commission to review, refresh and revise its original recommendations in light of the changed circumstances, following the UK’s vote to leave the European Union. It will report by the end of 2016. We will follow the work of the commission closely, and anticipate that it will re-visit the governance principles outlined above in the context of recommendations on broader fiscal devolution.
**London Government will work with government collectively build on these principles to define and establish appropriate governance arrangements to manage a devolved business rates system.** APPENDIX 1 – Detailed responses to the consultation questions
Question 1: Which of these identified grants / responsibilities do you think are the best candidates to be funded from retained business rates?
124. London Government favours prioritising the transfer of responsibilities that maximise its ability to improve the life of Londoners, the effectiveness and efficiency of its public services, and the future economic success of the capital. We therefore favour transferring in grants and responsibilities that:
- have a direct relationship to business;
- help tackle key infrastructure challenges, including housing and transport; and
- have a compelling public service reform case to be delivered more efficient and effectively by local government.
125. As stated above (section B), we believe the government should first consider the outcomes the sector is aiming to achieve, and then design local public services around them. This will require greater exploration of the funding necessary to deliver those outcomes. London Government supports the grants and responsibilities listed in Table 4 being transferred to local government. Of the existing grants listed in the consultation, this includes:
- Revenue Support Grant
- Rural Services Delivery Grant
- Transport for London Capital Grant
- Public Health Grant
- Improved Better Care Fund
- Independent Living Fund
- Early Years funding
- Youth Justice funding
- Local Council Tax Support Admin Subsidy & Housing Benefit Pensioner Admin Subsidy
126. London Government does not believe it is appropriate or acceptable to transfer the risk of future spending commitments that we are unable effectively to influence. Any transfer of responsibility must therefore be based on a realistic assessment of its in-built spending pressures and be accompanied by the corresponding devolution of policy control. As such, we are united with colleagues across the sector in our opposition to the responsibility for providing Attendance Allowance (or a similar such welfare benefit) being transferred to local government. We firmly believe this should remain centrally administered by the Department for Work & Pensions.
127. The government has provided no detail about how the new Attendance Allowance administration arrangements would work if devolved to local government or the levels of control and influence the sector would have over the scheme, or any evidence that the in-built spending pressures this would bring has been considered. This is disappointing given the size of the funding involved (£5 billion nationally), and the likely increase in demand for this benefit that will result from an aging population. There is therefore no reason to suggest business rates as a funding stream, and local government as a sector, would be better placed to deliver this benefit than central government through general taxation.
128. In relation to the transfer of TfL’s capital grant, which has already been agreed by government, it is important that the funding allocations set out in its 2015 Spending Review letter until at least 2020-21 are honoured. Within the rates retention system, the agreed annual increases to the capital grant should, therefore, be achieved by an offsetting reduction in the tariff payment made by the GLA and, under any future London governance model in which London pays continues to pay a tariff, through the aggregate tariff payment. It is also essential that the design of the new system should seek to minimise any adverse impacts on the credit ratings, funding stability or funding relationships of local authorities, the GLA and TfL.
**Question 2: Are there other grants / responsibilities that you consider should be devolved instead of or alongside those identified above?**
129. London Government believes the following grants and responsibilities should be devolved to those areas that are ready and willing to take them on (subject to sufficiently robust governance arrangements being in place) as part of the business rates reforms:
- Capital funding for Affordable housing;
- Careers Service;
- Skills funding for 16-19 year olds;
- funding for the Work and Health programme; and
- the Valuation Office Agency.
130. We would, therefore, welcome further discussions with government regarding the practicalities of delivering these.
131. London Government is aware the Valuation Office Agency (VOA) is currently partly funded from the Local Government Resource DEL (£161 million nationally in 2016-17). In order that the VOA is made more responsive and accountable to London Government for decisions and performance that directly affect the income and financial risk of boroughs and the GLA, we would favour the creation of a devolved Valuation Office for London – either as a separate administrative body or a regional office - which would focus solely on business rates and council tax valuations and appeals within London. This would ensure that the VOA was directly accountable to London Government (see section C above for further details) for its performance particularly in relation to the administration of appeals. As such, we believe the grant funding provided to the VOA from within the Local Government Resource DEL should be considered for transfer under the 100 per cent retention system. London’s share of the £161 million would be roughly £50 million – which equates to less than 6% of the provisions set aside for appeals refunds by London billing authorities in their 2015-16 accounts. Question 3: Do you have any views on the range of associated budgets that could be pooled at the Combined Authority level?
132. London has a unique governance and administrative structure within England, being the only region with a regional tier of government. As such there are no combined authorities in the capital.
133. However, as set in section D above, London Government would favour moving to managing the distribution of business rates revenues on a regional basis in the capital alongside whatever package of devolved funding and responsibilities is ultimately agreed. This would facilitate closer co-operation between the capital’s local authorities and ensure that resources are targeted more effectively taking into account local circumstances.
Question 4: Do you have views on whether some or all of the commitments in existing and future deals could be funded through retained business rates?
134. We believe the transfer process should prioritise those things local government as a whole has already said it wants. These are inevitably reflected in existing devo deals. For example, all existing deals include elements of skills and employment: it would be perverse not to fund these through business rates more widely.
135. We agree that the Adult Education Budget and transport capital grants should be included as they both have clear links to business and economic growth. TfL capital funding and bus services operators funding are already (or will be by April 2017) funded through business rates in London. However, we do not believe Local Growth Fund money should be included, as this is a finite resource for one off projects rather than funding for ongoing services. We believe the same principle applies to investment funds, which should therefore also be excluded.
136. London Government renews our ask for the devolution of the Adult Education Budget, as well as funding for the Careers Service and 16-19 skills, with agreement to be reached by the end of 2016-17 (ideally with a commitment made in the 2016 Autumn Statement). We envisage 2018-19 would be a shadow year with full devolution secured from 2019-20. This is subject to a resolution of our outstanding concerns in relation to the proposed changes to the Adult Education Budget funding formula which may be disadvantageous to London. Although limited detail has been shared on this to date by central government, we understand that the new funding formula for allocating locality budgets will redistribute funding across localities, resulting in a change to the average funding per head for the 19+ working population with a skills or employment need. We would therefore welcome dialogue with DCLG and the DfE as to how this budget might be devolved and what restrictions may be put in place in relation to the future use of this funding. Question 5: Do you agree that we should continue with the new burdens doctrine post-2020?
137. London Government agrees that the new burdens doctrine should continue beyond 2020. Local government should be given access to adequate resources - either through central government funding or through additional tax-raising capacity – to deliver any new responsibilities or deal with changes of circumstance resulting in increased funding pressure on existing responsibilities (that would also constitute new burdens). We would envisage that these would initially be funded through s.31 grants, having been assessed as new burdens in the same way as now.
138. Whether these grants continue as separate funding streams or “rolled in” to funding baselines at future resets will be an important decision for any future government. London Government believes that, any new burdens that are rolled in to the system should be transferred with corresponding freedoms and flexibilities to raise the equivalent levels of funding, for example the power to vary the multiplier, or (if this is already permitted), further tax raising powers (in line with the recommendations of the London Finance Commission).
139. As set out above (Ask 4), London Government would wish to agree prior to the start of the 100 per cent retention system a process for negotiating and agreeing with central government any new responsibilities that are to be delivered in the capital.
CHAPTER 4
Growth and redistribution
Question 6: Do you agree that we should fix reset periods for the system?
Question 7: What is the right balance in the system between rewarding growth and redistributing to meet changing need?
Question 8: Having regard to the balance between rewarding growth and protecting authorities with declining resources, how would you like to see a partial reset work?
140. As set out above (section D), London Government recognises that a balance must be struck between incentivising growth - by ensuring that growth (including revaluation growth) is retained for a meaningful length of time - and providing a sustainable level of resource for all local authorities to deliver services - by updating needs assessments regularly. We believe London Government should be able to determine that balance between risk and reward in London by being able to reset business rates and funding baselines for the authorities in the capital.
141. If government retains control over national resets, London Government agrees with the principle that reset periods should be fixed prior to the start of the 100 per cent retention system. Any alternative, whereby government changed the reset periods on an ad hoc basis, would cause too much uncertainty for local authority funding.
142. We believe that it is desirable, and should be possible, to reset needs (funding baselines) and resources (business rates baselines) on different timescales. On the funding side of the equation, it is desirable that baselines reflect changing levels of need on a regular basis – this is particularly relevant in London where population growth and churn is far higher than many other parts of the country. However, on the resources side of the equation, it is preferable to reset business rates baselines less frequently – in order to retain a strong growth incentive. The government should, therefore, explore resetting funding and business rates baselines on different timescales (and any devolved London system would explore these options).
143. However, within the resources side of the equation, we recognise that overly long reset periods could be problematic. Since developments can take a number of years to be agreed and built – often requiring existing buildings to be demolished – a long reset period (10-15 years for example) is logical. At the same time, we recognise the need to protect authorities that, through no fault of their own, see their business rates base altered significantly through the impact of a single large ratepayer or a one off economic shock, by resetting their business rates baselines within a reasonable time period so that they can regain the financial incentive to grow their rates income. We believe the government’s suggestion of partial resets should therefore be explored further, and would welcome further detailed modelling to show how this could work, and the potential impact that different degrees of “partiality” would have on the system (i.e. varying the percentage from 50% proposed in the consultation). Again, any devolved London system would explore options around partial resets.
144. We would also favour business rates resets being aligned with revaluations, so that local authorities are able to predict revenues over a set period without further turbulence being introduced into the system.
145. Certainty and stability of funding is critical in relation to the delivery of transport and other major infrastructure schemes. For example, TfL modelling suggests that a ‘steady state’ level of c. £1 billion per annum of capital funding in real terms is likely to be required for renewals of the TfL network, together with c. £1.4 billion per annum for “normal” new capital investment to respond to anticipated increases in demand. It is therefore desirable that any system reset takes into account the impact on investment in infrastructure.
Redistribution between local authorities
Question 9: Is the current system of tariffs and top-ups the right one for redistribution between local authorities?
146. London Government agrees that the current system of tariffs and top ups should be maintained. The arrangements work relatively well and are broadly understood across the sector.
147. As set out above (section C), we believe a devolved London business rates retention system would benefit London and the rest of the country. Within such a system we would continue to equalise through tariffs and top-ups in the same way as the national system, however we would control to set business rates and funding baselines within London so that tariffs and top-ups balance to zero within London and, if London were to continue to pay an aggregate tariff, this would be paid as a share by all boroughs.
**Impact of revaluations**
**Question 10: Should we continue to adjust retained incomes for individual local authorities to cancel out the effect of future revaluations?**
148. There is an inherent difficulty with the current system of revaluation in that it acts as a redistributive mechanism rather than being one which is responsive to changing absolute level rental values. In effect the total business rate take for England is fixed at whatever level the Government determines it should be rather than being a buoyant tax where revenues move proportionately in line with the growth in property values. A notable exception to this is the Crossrail Business Rate Supplement where revenues rise in direct proportion to the increase in rateable values – ensuring that those ratepayers benefiting from increases in property values as a result of infrastructure investment make a greater contribution towards its financing over time.
149. As set out in section C above, London Government believes the tax base should be allowed to rise or fall in response to changes in the economy, rather than to fit a pre-defined total. Breaking the link between revaluation and the fixed quantum of tax yield benefits both those areas where commercial property markets are strong and those where they are not. It would also prevent the capital’s robust property market from continuing to distort the operation of the national system and to allow business rates baselines to increase outside of London at a rate which reflects local authorities’ own economic investment and growth. As a result, the accountability and the relationship between local business and politicians will be significantly improved.
150. However, in the event that the current national arrangements are maintained, including the fixed quantum, London Government agrees that there should be an adjustment to retained incomes for individual authorities to cancel out the effect of future revaluations.
151. However, as set out above (section C, paragraph 77), because growth does not include revaluation growth local authorities see no benefit from investing in making their local areas more attractive as a business destination. London Government believes a proportion of revaluation growth should be retained at revaluations. This would reflect the fact that rising relative rental values and business rates income are also likely to be matched by relative increases in revenues from central government taxes – including stamp duty, income tax, corporation tax and VAT. In effect the Treasury sees the gains in tax revenue – but the relevant local authorities do not see the additional benefit in respect of business rates income.
152. This could be financed either using a proportion of central list revenues or via a top slice within the overall local government finance settlement.
Combined Authority Mayoral Areas – Additional Powers
**Question 11: Should Mayoral Combined Authority areas have the opportunity to be given additional powers and incentives, as set out above?**
153. As set out at length in the first half of this response, London Government would favour moving to a fully devolved system with the Mayor and the leaders of the 33 local authorities taking over responsibility for the allocation and distribution of resources within an appropriate governance structure. It would be odd for the nature of the existing devolution arrangement in London to result in the Mayor and Leaders of London not having the same flexibilities (e.g. infrastructure levy) available to other mayoral areas. We therefore consider that London should receive at least the same additional incentives as will be offered to combined authorities outside London whether or not they have a Mayoral structure.
Tier Splits
**Question 12: What has your experience been of the tier splits under the current 50% rates retention scheme? What changes would you want to see under 100% rates retention system?**
154. As set out above (section E, Ask 8) we believe the final split of responsibilities should determine the retention shares between the GLA and the boroughs within London.
155. The current 50% local share of business rates income is apportioned between the GLA and the 33 London billing authorities on a 40% to 60% ratio. This was subject to a local agreement between the GLA and London Councils acting on behalf of the 33 billing authorities. Indeed London was the only part of the country where a different tier split was negotiated and agreed with central government.
156. At the time of negotiation it wasn’t known what the final balance of funding would be between the two tiers, which ultimately ended up at around 67%:33%. The GLA therefore became a tariff authority taking a higher share of London’s rates income (40%) than the GLA’s share of baseline funding within the system (approximately 33%). This has meant the GLA has taken on a greater level of risk if rates income falls albeit for greater potential reward if there is growth against its baseline – in recognition of its ability to spread upsides and downsides across all 33 billing authorities.
157. London Government considers that the tier split in the capital has worked relatively well – and provides a suitable starting point on which to build up to 100% retention, subject to addressing issues such as business rates appeals.
158. With effect from April 2017 – following the rolling in of the £960 million TfL capital grant and £148 million of the GLA’s RSG – London Government supports the consequential 17% increase in the GLA’s share to 37% and a reduction in the central share to 33%. The final tier split following 100% retention will be agreed by London Government taking into account the funding and responsibilities devolved to each tier.
**Fire Funding**
**Question 13: Do you consider that fire funding should be removed from the business rates retention scheme and what might be the advantages and disadvantages of this approach?**
159. London Government opposes transferring London’s fire and rescue funding out of the business rates retention system in London. This need not prevent a different treatment in the rest of England, where responsibility for this function is being transferred to Police and Crime Commissioners in 2017.
160. It is our understanding from Government officials that any transfer in of the GLA’s RSG in 2017-18 to the rates retention system would be subject to the proviso that this would not preclude any fire and rescue and policing elements being moved out of the retained rates system and paid for instead via Home Office grant in light of the transfer of responsibility for fire services to Police and Crime Commissioners outside London. The GLA is also unique in having an element of police funding within the rates retention system relating to MOPAC’s notional share of the Mayor’s council tax freeze grant allocations from 2011-12 onwards.
161. It is the Mayor of London’s strong preference, however, that fire and rescue funding in the capital should continue to be paid through the rates retention system in recognition of the different administrative arrangements which will exist compared to the rest of England – even if fire funding in the rest of England is paid via Home Office direct grant. This would also facilitate better joint working across London Government including with MOPAC, TfL and the GLA if fire funding formed part of a wider Mayoral resource.
162. This different treatment would not in our view prevent the Home Office making redistributive changes to needs allocations for fire services as these could simply be adjusted for in the case of the GLA annually through a revision to its tariff payment either upwards or downwards with a corresponding transfer of funds between Government departments. Similarly the element of resources for London policing – approximately £35 million should in our view remain within the rates retention system – on the expectation that the Mayor would continue to pass this onto the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime as is set out in the Mayor’s proposed budget for the next three years. This relates to prior year council tax freeze grant revenues – and it is the Mayor who is responsible for setting council tax levels for policing in London outside the City of London. Lessons Learned From Enterprise Zones
Question 14: What are your views on how we could further incentivise growth under a 100% retention scheme? Are there additional incentives for growth that we should consider?
163. London Government is supportive of the principle of using enterprise zones and designated areas to provide the certainty of funding required to support large-scale infrastructure and transport projects. Such designations are being used effectively in London to date to finance the infrastructure needs of the Croydon Growth zone, the proposed new Thameslink station at Brent Cross in Barnet, the Royal Docks in Newham and the Northern line extension to Battersea Power station. The Government should continue to operate these areas outside the retention system in line with the statutory designations already approved by Parliament and ensure that no changes are made which might undermine those schemes already in place.
164. However, it is important to recognise that EZs hypothecate income that is therefore not available to be redistributed to meet needs. Under a devolved London retention system, London Government would expect to be able to decide collectively any future EZ-type arrangements to support specific infrastructure investment or other growth-promotion schemes – via the London growth redistribution pool if appropriate.
165. As mentioned above (Q10), we would also support the Government introducing a mechanism whereby local authorities were able to retain part of the growth in rates income at a revaluation while continuing to provide protection to areas seeing reductions in bills via the tariff and top up mechanism. Under the regulations in place enterprise zones and other designated areas are able to retain any revaluation related growth.
166. If a fully devolved London approach were not agreed, we would nonetheless encourage the Government to consider how the business rates retention arrangements for Enterprise Zones and other designated areas could be enhanced to allow full retention of stock as well as revaluation growth. This could include examining options facilitating the full capture and recycling of any land value uplift from transport and other infrastructure projects, which often cause significant increases to rateable values in their catchment areas. The Mayor is currently preparing proposals on land value capture for HM Treasury to consider for the 2016 Autumn Statement, and one of the principal reforms required to ensure the capturing of value uplifts from commercial property is full retention of revaluation growth. This could be piloted in designated areas and potentially rolled out more widely over time.
Sharing Risk, Appeals and Future Position of Central List
Question 15: Would it be helpful to move some of the ‘riskier’ hereditaments off local lists? If so, what type of hereditaments should be moved? 167. London Government considers that unless there is a clear and evident case for an assessment to be on the central list it should be on a local or regional list (as set out in section H, ask 14). This would improve local accountability with businesses and enhance the capacity and responsibility of local government to promote all types of economic growth within its area – and, within a devolved regional system – to share the risk of economic decline.
168. We would, therefore, oppose proposals that would, for example, move airport assessments such as Heathrow Airport onto the central list or indeed local power stations or other complex assessments. Planning functions will continue to reside locally and such assessments are also important sources of local employment linked to other supplies and the wider economic base of a locality.
169. We also note that in London requests for transfers to the central list were submitted in London in 2010 following the introduction of the Crossrail BRS – as business rate supplements and the proposed new infrastructure levy can only be charged on assessments on the local list. This strengthens the case for minimising the size of the central list to ensure ratepayers benefitting from infrastructure and transport projects locally are required to contribute towards their costs.
**Question 16: Would you support the idea of introducing area-level lists in Combined Authority areas? If so, what type of properties could sit on these lists, and how should income be used? Could this approach work for other authorities?**
170. As set out above (Ask 14), we believe a regional or area-level list could be appropriate in London. This clearly supports regional devolution, for which we are in favour, and would promote greater collaboration between TfL and the boroughs to incentivise growth for which the whole of London could gain if this was linked to a London wide pool. It could also, potentially, provide some capacity to manage collective risk through a regional safety net.
171. At present TfL’s rail infrastructure network (e.g. London Underground, DLR, London Overground and in due course Crossrail) and stations (including station car parks) are on the central rating list either independently (LU and the DLR) or as part of the Network Rail cumulo. This means that all rates income and related growth is paid to the Government – rather than to London local authorities. Given TfL’s capital investment grant is to be moved into rates retention, it would be logical for all TfL’s assessments to be moved either to the local rating lists of the 33 London billing authorities or to a regional London list, so London can benefit from all of the business rates growth arising from the transport investment it makes.
172. There may also be an argument for separating out those parts of the Network Rail operational assessment which are now administered by TfL – for example TfL rail which will in due course become the Elizabeth (Crossrail) line and London Overground assessments – to be disaggregated and moved to a regional list. Question 17: At what level should risk associated with successful business rates appeals be managed? Do you have a preference for local, area level (including Combined Authority), or across all local authorities as set out in the options above?
Question 18: What would help your local authority better manage risks associated with successful business rates appeals?
173. As set out above (section H), London Government believes risk should be managed at regional level for the capital – provided sufficient control over the system to manage the risk is devolved: if it were not, then some of the risk would have to be shared with central government. In a devolved London retention system, whereby London Government had control over setting business rates – administered by a regional VOA for London – we would expect to manage the appeals risk within the capital.
174. However, under a continued national system, we consider that appeals relating to errors made by the VOA – so called “tone of the list” appeals with an adjustment date going back to the commencement date of the list – should be funded centrally by the Government. ‘Tone of the rating list’ amendments to property valuations have nothing to do with physical changes on the ground and do not arise from local decision making – and the associated costs should not, in our view, be borne locally while central government retains oversight and responsibility for the VOA.
175. As part of its long term review of business rates the Government highlighted the difficulties which can arise when large numbers of appeals are lodged by ratepayers resulting in there being a large backlog. Ratepayers face delays in having their appeals assessed and local authorities face significant uncertainty under the rates retention system as a result of having to set aside significant sums in provisions in order to meet potential refunds to ratepayers which may not ultimately materialise.
176. The aggregate provision for appeals across all 33 London billing authorities as at 31 March 2016 exceeds £925 million. We remain very concerned that the current backlog of appeals on the 2010 rating list in London is significantly higher than the national average in both absolute and relative terms. Progress on reducing this backlog also appears to have been much slower in the capital particularly in central London.
177. As illustrated in Figure A1 below, the number of unresolved challenges at 31 March 2016 equated to 22 per cent of all hereditaments on the rating list in London – more than 50 per cent higher than the national average and nearly 250% higher than in Wales which operates its own revaluation and tax setting arrangements. In the City of London the number of outstanding challenges to the rating list at 31 March 2016 equated to 40 per cent and in five other boroughs (Harrow, Hillingdon, Tower Hamlets and Westminster) exceeded 30 per cent respectively of the total number of hereditaments in those areas (Figure A2). While there have been some reductions since that date, the refocusing of VOA resources onto the 2017 revaluation has meant that the backlog has barely moved in some billing authorities as further appeals have been lodged subsequently.
178. This backlog has both local and national implications given that the Corporation of London, the London boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Hillingdon and Westminster City Council – which continue to have amongst the largest backlogs in England as a proportion of their rating lists – account for nearly 15 per cent of the national business rates tax take. Indeed at current levels of progress it is unlikely that the backlog in those billing authorities will be cleared before 2019-20 or later.
179. In advance of the introduction of the new 2017 rating list, we would urge CLG and HM Treasury as the sponsoring departments to ensure that the Valuation Office – working closely with the Valuation Tribunal and rating agents – seeks to prioritise clearing the outstanding rating appeals across London as at 31 March 2016 as soon as possible. This is essential in order to provide certainty both for the businesses appealing and for local authorities in setting their future budgets and determining realistic forecasts of rating income.
180. Similarly we consider that, for the 2017 revaluation period, the clearance rates for appeals should be consistent across all English regions and billing authority areas in the interest of fairness to ratepayers and local authorities. This means that any new targets set for the VOA must focus not just on the number of appeals outstanding but the materiality of the assessments under appeal i.e. any clearance targets should take into account the scale of rateable value being appealed. Any separate target relating to reductions in number of appeals outstanding should also have to be delivered in every local authority area rather than just nationally – with the Valuation Office Agency being required to publish the performance data at a local level.
181. We trust that the Government will monitor the success of the new ‘Check Challenge Appeal’ system and consider making further reforms if it does not result in a reduction in the volume of appeals for the 2017 rating list.
**Question 19: Would pooling risk, including a pool-area safety net, be attractive to local authorities?**
**Question 20: What level of income protection should a system aim to provide? Should this be nationally set, or defined at area levels?**
182. London Government would favour introducing a devolved system and managing such risks as a regional level. However, as set out above, this is dependent on the level of devolution of control over the parameters of the system. In essence, the greater the degree of autonomy, the more reasonable it will be to expect London to manage its collective risk for itself. Conversely, the more London remains part of a national system, and the more limited its control of the taxbase, the more London should expect to look to Government to share some of that risk.
183. Under a fully devolved London retention system, therefore, in which 100 per cent of the rates were retained in the capital, London Government would expect to manage and fund the safety net mechanism. Under a system whereby London continued to pay a tariff to fund the rest of the sector, or where a national valuation system remained, we would expect to share the funding of a London safety net with the rest of the sector.
184. Within a devolved system, the level of income protection should be a matter for local determination. However, if a national system remained, we would support the retention of a national safety net mechanism set at a percentage of baseline funding. We believe the government should consider options whereby different tiers of authority may have different safety net thresholds depending on their gearing and service responsibilities, with protections to avoid authorities reducing rates income via changes to provisions deliberately to go into a safety net situation.
185. In the interim (before the start of the 100 per cent retention system), there is a strong argument for the safety net threshold (currently 92.5% of baseline funding) to be reassessed. As RSG reduces towards 2020, Baseline Funding will become a larger proportion of a local authority’s Settlement Funding Assessment. Government should therefore consider whether the safety net threshold should be changed to 95% or another figure.
CHAPTER 5
Altering the Multiplier – Decision Making and Scope of Powers
Question 21: What are your views on which authority should be able to reduce the multiplier and how the costs should be met?
186. London Government would want to explore the relative advantages and disadvantages of options for establishing a separate Mayoral rate alongside one for the 33 billing authorities (see section F, ask 9, above). The choice between such approaches should, ultimately, be a matter for London Government, but we believe the basic principle should be that the costs should align with accountability for the decision.
187. The Government should, therefore, design primary legislation which permits flexible local approaches with any detailed arrangements being a matter for secondary legislation which can evolve and be amended more easily over time.
Question 22: What are your views on the interaction between the power to reduce the multiplier and the local discount powers?
188. London Government believes the powers to reduce the multiplier and to offer discounts are both potentially valuable, but as tools to address different issues.
189. Reducing the multiplier could (subject to tax competition concerns) be a way to address the overall attractiveness of the business environment in a given area – in a world where local government was retaining revaluation growth it could also offer a way in which business in general could share in the benefit of overall growth in business efficiency and success.
190. Discounts, on the other hand, offer more targeted tools to support particular sectors (for example to small businesses or charities) or local areas (for example high streets) – or to incentivise broader policy objectives such as promoting public health or environmental sustainability).
191. London Government would wish to explore options for either a collectively agreed single multiplier across London, or two separate multipliers with the Mayor of London being granted the ability to set a proportion of the rate on a London wide basis, and boroughs collectively setting the rest of the multiplier. These two shares of the overall multiplier would be determined by the funding and retention split as set out above. We would want to explore the relative advantages and disadvantages of options for either a defined, periodically-reviewed split of income between the boroughs and the GLA, or for the establishing a separate Mayoral rate.
192. We believe London Government should have the collective ability to set the qualification criteria and thresholds of the existing mandatory reliefs currently set by central government (and the discretionary elements of those schemes), as well as determining new mandatory relief schemes periodically when deemed necessary. This would include the small business rates relief threshold. Where individual boroughs or the Mayor wished to offer additional discounts over and above a collective scheme agreement, this could be achieved through adjustments to their retained rates.
**Question 23: What are your views on increasing the multiplier after a reduction?**
193. Under the proposals as currently set out, in order for local authorities to have the power to lower the multiplier, the Government will presumably need to set a baseline national non domestic multiplier, which authorities will vary their local rates against, to be uprated annually (presumably by RPI until 2019-20 and by CPI from 2020-21 onwards).
194. The consultation paper highlights the challenges that might arise were a local authority to decide to reduce its multiplier below the notional national multiplier but then determine at a later date that it wished to reverse this in full or in part. It is the view of London Government that this should be a matter for local decision and that authorities should be permitted to revert back to the national multiplier in a single financial year – irrespective of the reduction made in prior years.
**Question 24: Do you have views on the above issues or on any other aspects of the power to reduce the multiplier?**
195. As set out above, London Government would also wish to explore options for either a collectively agreed single multiplier across London, or two separate multipliers with the Mayor of London being granted the ability to set a proportion of the rate on a London wide basis, and boroughs collectively setting the rest of the multiplier. A similar arrangement already operates successfully in Northern Ireland. These two shares of the overall multiplier would be determined by the funding and retention split as set out above. We recognise delivering this this would pose administrative challenges, but consider it desirable that there should be a legislative mechanism which facilitates a London wide approach to setting all or part of the multiplier. agreed collectively by the Mayor and boroughs. We would want to explore the relative advantages and disadvantages of options for either a defined, periodically-reviewed split of income between the boroughs and the GLA, or for the establishing a separate Mayoral rate.
196. The Government will also need to consider whether the Secretary of State should have intervention powers in exceptional circumstances – recognising that any safety net payment mechanism could be used to mitigate the effect of local decisions and that authorities would still need to meet their fixed tariff payments as now.
197. The Government will also need to consider what the implications the new system would have for NNDR reporting, accounting and budgeting – for example would there need to be a review of the NNDR 1 reporting timetable to facilitate an earlier tax setting process and, under a multi-tier approach, would preceptors with tax setting powers be able to determine their own business rates appeals provisions (as an example) and other deductions?
**Infrastructure levy for Mayoral Combined Authorities**
**Question 25: What are your views on what flexibility levying authorities should have to set a rateable value threshold for the levy?**
198. London Government believes the levying authority should have the power to set the threshold – which may well vary dependent on the nature of the infrastructure project being funded. In practice, we consider that a £50,000 threshold in the current BRS legislation is appropriate in the capital for any levy introduced, however we would want to reserve the right to review this for future levy proposals.
199. To date only the Greater London Authority has used the BRS Act powers to finance £4.1 billion of the costs of the Crossrail project - £800 million as a direct contribution and £3.3 billion of borrowing which will be financed and repaid by the mid-2030s using BRS revenues. The Crossrail BRS has been set at a rate of 2p since April 2010 with a qualifying rateable value threshold of £55,000.
200. We recognise that, were there to be a similar blanket £50,000 threshold for the infrastructure premium, the sums that could be generated in BRS in areas with lower tax bases than London would inevitably be much lower. Lower thresholds may therefore be appropriate for other parts of England to ensure that the tax base is sufficient to raise an adequate level of revenues.
**Question 26: What are your views on how the infrastructure levy should interact with existing BRS powers?**
201. London Government considers – subject to the support of the business community – that the Mayor of London should have the ability to introduce a levy to fund a specific project in addition to the Business rate supplement which is committed for Crossrail until the mid-2030s.
202. We consider that the areas eligible to introduce the levy should be determined via secondary legislation so that the tax can evolve over time to changing local government structures.
203. In our view the BRS Act should be retained and expanded to include the ability to levy both supplements – where supported by business and, if necessary, the Secretary of State to fund a specific major project. This would, in our view, provide sufficient flexibility to allow the Mayor of London to operate both supplements where there was clear support.
204. We would have reservations about introducing a wholly new piece of legislation to deliver what is likely to be a similar tax in structure – the only practical difference being the mechanism by which the introduction of the supplement must be approved. There are also several pieces of existing secondary legislation which were required for the BRS relating to the accounting, administration and collection arrangements – which could equally be applied to the new levy.
205. If the Government decides to develop separate legislative arrangements for the new levy, there is a risk that there could be difficulties in maintaining and updating two separate legislative processes. London Government has, for example, experienced difficulties in securing amendments to the existing BRS regulations on a timely basis.
206. In our view, there should be a single piece of legislation building on the BRS Act 2009 and associated regulations with the proviso that no amendments are made which would undermine the existing Crossrail BRS, which is required to finance the repayment of £3.3 billion of GLA debt.
207. We would also support an amendment to section 10 of the BRS Act (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/7/section/10) to ensure that, where a levying authority opts to make a variation to the policies not set out in the final prospectus which merely result in a reduction in the tax rate or number of ratepayers liable to the BRS, this should not automatically trigger a ballot of ratepayers. The current wording has prevented the GLA from raising its £55,000 threshold for the BRS between revaluations as it did not foresee in 2010 that the Government would delay the next revaluation until 2017. Tax reductions should not trigger automatic ballots in our view.
**Question 27: What are your views on the process for obtaining approval for a levy from the LEP?**
208. London Government believes business rates devolution provides a real opportunity to promote greater accountability of local politicians for business rates decisions and build more meaningful engagement with the business community. The Government will also need to give consideration as to the mechanism by which the LEP should approve the introduction of a new levy. Subject to the proposals complying with the final prospectus approved by the LEP, the annual tax setting responsibilities should in our view lie with the directly elected Mayor working in the context of London’s governance arrangements
**Question 28: What are your views on arrangements for the duration and review of levies?**
209. We consider that the arrangements should operate on a consistent basis with the BRS – once the decision has been agreed by the LEP (subject to a review of LEP governance structures). The levying authority/Mayor should be required to report annually to the LEP and ratepayers – as applies to the BRS – but, unless there are any fundamental changes which are inconsistent with any final prospectus introduced before implementation, the annual review and approval of the levy should be a matter for the elected Mayor to determine.
210. In terms of the duration of any levy the Business Rate Supplements (Accounting) (England) Regulations 2010 as currently worded prevent a BRS being used for projects such as Crossrail where the payback/debt repayment period exceeds ten years. This needs to be amended for the BRS and reflected in the regulations for the new levy to ensure that longer term schemes can be funded via the new levy as well as the GLA’s Crossrail BRS which have a debt repayment date of 25 years or longer. Mayors should also have the ability to extend the length of any levy if necessary through the publication of a revised prospectus subject to this extension being approved by the LEP.
**Question 29: What are your views on how infrastructure should be defined for the purposes of the levy?**
211. The Government has stated that the new premium must be applied to fund ‘new infrastructure’. The 2009 BRS Act requires that business rate supplement revenues must be used to support economic development priorities (i.e. revenue or capital) but explicitly excludes expenditure on:
- Education and children’s services
- Social services
- Delivering planning functions and
- Housing
212. The legislation for the levy will need to be clear what authorities may use the infrastructure premium for. London Government would favour extending the ‘infrastructure’ definition to include projects which fund the provision of affordable housing in areas of high cost/high demand where there is support for this from the business community. It should also be able to be used to upgrade existing infrastructure as well as deliver ‘new’ infrastructure.
213. In relation to the need for medium and longer term certainty in relation to infrastructure funding the GLA and Transport for London would welcome a discussion as to how the future capital funding of London’s transport network will operate in future and how resources might be made available to support specific projects such as Crossrail 2.
214. If central government concludes that it is desirable to maintain the ability to reset the system at periodic intervals, then London and central government will need to agree a method of deriving the funding need for new capital investment in transport infrastructure across London’s transport network. This will also need to include an agreement on how to fund the capital requirements for any future extensions of the existing network which cannot be covered through business rates as transport investment is by nature lumpy, discontinuous and significant in scale. For example, it would not be sensible to treat Crossrail 2 as part of the normal local government needs. And there are other examples of projects which are large or involve both local responsibilities in London and the national rail system.
**Question 30: What are your views on charging multiple levies, or using a single levy to fund multiple infrastructure projects?**
215. We believe it should be possible to have multiple levies funding different projects across the combined authority and/or London area, providing that the appropriate prospectuses have been consulted on and approved for each scheme.
216. A BRS must be levied on a consistent basis across the levying authority area and, therefore, it is not possible to apply a higher rate in billing authorities (or other defined localities) where ratepayers were most likely to benefit from the proposed investment (e.g. they have stations on the proposed rail, metro or tram link). This differs from the community infrastructure levy where differential rates are permitted within a billing authority and in the case of the Mayor of London’s CIL between London boroughs.
217. There may also be a case to permit levying authorities to apply different rates for the levy across their area in proportion to the estimated benefits from the infrastructure projects being funded from the levy (e.g. for a transport project ratepayers in areas on the rail/tram route would pay a higher rate) as applies for the Community infrastructure levy.
218. This would need to be agreed collectively through London Governance/combined authority arrangements, but would ensure that those ratepayers who benefit most from any investment pay the largest contribution. This might also be a mechanism which could facilitate multiple projects being funded from the levy across an area – as otherwise it will only be practical to use it to fund very large regional schemes where there is a clear benefit right across London or the combined authority area.
**Question 31: Do you have views on the above issues or on any other aspects of the power to introduce an infrastructure levy?**
219. We would welcome a dialogue with Government to see what lessons can be learned from the success of the Crossrail BRS in London before the new levy is introduced. We would also be keen to review the BRS Act and associated regulations to ensure they remain fit for purpose and provide a solid basis to ‘bolt on’ the proposed new levy.
220. Other questions which the Government will need to consider include:
- Does the initial prospectus, consultation and final prospectus model for introducing a BRS provide a suitable model for the infrastructure premium?
- Should the levying authority be able to depart from its final prospectus variation powers without recourse to a further consultation process where it is simply proposing reducing the tax rate or the number of ratepayers liable?
- Should reliefs operate in parallel to NNDR on a pro rata basis and should empty properties and BID areas be eligible for a more generous treatment subject to the determination of the levying authority as applies for the BRS?
221. London Government considers that the BRS has worked well in London and the Government should seek to replicate similar arrangements for the new infrastructure levy – via a bolt on to the existing BRS Act rather than a completely separate piece of legislation. We endorse the initial prospectus, consultation and final prospectus model used for the BRS as a basis for the development of any future levies.
222. Before levying a BRS, levying authorities are required to prepare an initial prospectus - which prior to the localism act merely had to be consulted upon but thereafter had to be put to a ballot of eligible ratepayers – and a final prospectus. The items required to be included in the prospectus are set out in schedule I of the Act. A copy of the Crossrail BRS final prospectus is available at https://www.london.gov.uk/file/5474/download?token=oCSh_HNt
223. We also favour a consistent approach on reliefs between NNDR, BRS and the new levy. Reliefs for the BRS operate on a consistent and pro rata basis with ratepayers’ national non-domestic rating bills with two exceptions. Firstly, the levying authority may exempt all empty properties as a class from paying the BRS – irrespective of their eligibility for empty rate reliefs – and, secondly, it may apply an offset to reduce the BRS liability for ratepayers in business improvement districts (BIDs).
224. The Act also permitted business improvement districts to charge property owners a levy subject to a ballot where local ratepayers were subject to a BRS (so called ‘BRS-BID’ levies under Schedule II). This latter policy has not been adopted so far in practice given the difficulty of identifying property owners although two BIDs in central London have expressed an interest in introducing such a scheme.
225. We would also support an amendment to section 10 of the BRS Act (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/7/section/10) to ensure that, where a levying authority opts to make a variation to the policies not set out in the final prospectus which merely result in a reduction in the tax rate or number of ratepayers liable to the BRS, this should not automatically trigger a ballot of ratepayers. London Government would also support a review of the accounting and year end reporting arrangements for the BRS set out in the current secondary legislation as well as given local areas to agree different arrangements for apportioning cost of collection allowances to reflect the fixed costs which many smaller billing authorities incur. Details on these proposals have already been submitted by the GLA with the support of billing authorities.
226. Section 18 of the BRS Act requires the levying authority to give written notice to each billing authority in its area prior to the financial year for which it intends to impose a business rate supplement. Levying authorities are also required to provide an annual update to ratepayers for annual billing. This should be maintained and required for the new levy as well.
Ch.6 ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Balance of Local and Central Accountability
Question 32: Do you have any views on how to increase certainty and strengthen local accountability for councils in setting their budgets?
227. London Government firmly believes that devolution of funding and tax raising powers to fund the services local authorities deliver will improve local accountability – provided it comes with genuine devolution over control of those powers and of the services and responsibilities that will be transferred. Specifically in relation to business rates, a devolved London retention system would, in our view, strengthen the relationship between London government, businesses and local communities, and improve accountability of locally elected politicians to their electorates.
228. As set out in paragraphs 9-22, the current funding system breeds uncertainty; is too complex and lacks transparency; and is too centralised with a lack of local control. These issues must be addressed if local government is to be put on a sustainable financial footing over the long term, in a world where business rates and council tax will fund almost all local government services from 2020.
229. We welcome the recent multiyear settlement, and the degree of certainty this brings (although it is really only RSG that is guaranteed over the next 4 years, which is a diminishing part of the overall funding of local government). True multiyear, medium term financial planning will only be possible under the 100 per cent business rates retention system if reset and revaluation periods are set over time periods that provide funding certainty, and if local authorities are given greater freedom over other elements of the finance system such as the setting of fees and charges and council tax. The annual capping of council tax constrains one of the levers local authorities have over their ability to raise resources and restricts council tax setting policy to an annual timeframe.
230. The timing of settlements under the current system has proved a particular barrier to certainty. For the last four years, the settlement has been announced extremely late in December. While there may be reasons for this, and it may be helpful for central government, it creates significant uncertainty for local government over funding assurance needed to set their budgets and council tax levels for the following financial year. We believe the new finance system should be set up to give local authorities as much time as possible in order to deliver robust budgets that have been through thorough scrutiny processes.
231. Specifically in relation to the timetable of the business rates retention system, the government should review the arrangements for completing NNDR1 (budget) forms (or their equivalent under the new system), which aren’t sent out until January giving a very short time period for completion. In addition, deadlines for completing the NNDR3 (outturn) returns should be brought forward to late April/early May – the latter being essential to deliver on the earlier accounts closure timetable from 2017-18.
232. Greater certainty can only be achieved by less interference from central government. The recent legislation impacting on the Housing Revenue Account is an example of significant changes in government policy creating huge uncertainty in local authority budgets. Authorities had established long term (30 year) plans under the “self-financing” reforms, which were subsequently rendered meaningless as a result of the mandated social rent reduction and ‘higher value void’ levy. Genuine devolution must mean genuine relinquishing of central control.
**Question 33: Do you have views on where the balance between national and local accountability should fall, and how best to minimise any overlaps in accountability?**
233. London Government believes that the current imbalance of power between local and central government in control over local public services must be redressed. The London Finance Commission (2013) concluded that “London’s government needs to be given greater freedom to determine and use the resources raised from taxpayers”(^\\text{10}). It set out a vision of more accountable and sustainable way of funding public services. London (and, indeed, England as a whole) is an extreme outlier compared with other cities and countries, with only 7 per cent the taxes raised determined by the city’s government: the equivalent figure in New York is over 50 per cent.
234. We believe the current default assumption, that Central Government must retain a high degree of control in the name of accountability, must be reversed and move instead to a world where local government is responsible for determining the level of spending and investment it needs to meet local priorities, and for raising the funding to meet that need. The primary accountability should be between local government and its electors and taxpayers. In short, decisions should be made as close as possible to residents and service users, and should be local by default.
235. The balance between national and local accountability should reflect the extent of devolution in each case. Greater devolution of powers will of course need to accompanied by stronger governance and accountability arrangements to ensure that money is well spent, and the best value is obtained for the ratepayer.
(^{10}) Raising the Capital (2013): [https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/Raising%20the%20capital_0.pdf](https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/Raising%20the%20capital_0.pdf) Accounting for Local Tax Income
Question 34: Do you have views on whether the requirement to prepare a Collection Fund Account should remain in the new system?
236. London Government believes the requirement to prepare a Collection Fund Account should be maintained. The Collection Fund Account brings transparency to the different payments that are made to distribute the rates collected by authorities. However, we consider that authorities should be able to use the collection fund adjustment account to manage variations in income including safety net payments to ensure that authorities do not end up building up artificially large reserves to meet future sums owed.
237. Under the current arrangement, any Collection Fund loss (or surplus) does not impact on the General Fund outturn until one or two years after they are incurred. Although this may be partly beneficial for authorities, as it allows them longer time to deal with the losses, it is not aligned with the system of levies and safety net payments, which are accounted for in the year of the loss/ surplus. This is then likely to mean that the authority has a high level of reserves set aside to fund the loss in future years as it impact on the General Fund bottom line.
238. We believe that the timing differences between the revenue and CFAA accounting treatments for unexpected variations in NNDR yield should therefore be harmonised.
Calculation of Balanced Budget Requirement
Question 35: Do you have views on how the calculation of a balanced budget may be altered to be better aligned with the way local authorities run their business?
239. There is an argument for requiring local authorities to approve a financing requirement – including retained rates income - rather than council tax requirement, as this better reflects the reality of setting local council budgets, in which overall spending is set at a level to meet the resources available, rather than council tax being set at a level to meet desired spending. This would partially reverse the changes made through Part 5 Chapter 1 of the Localism Act 2011 – prior to that Act local authorities agreed a budget requirement including general government grants. This change would require consequential changes to the GLA Act and the London Assembly’s amendment powers in relation to the Mayors budget.
Collection of business rates data
Question 36: Do you have views on how the business rates data collection activities could be altered to collect and record information in a more timely, efficient and transparent manner?
240. London Government supports retaining the current NNDR1 and NNDR3 reporting arrangements – albeit the timetables for both should be earlier than now. The detail as to how this will operate should be considered further by the Accounting working group in consultation with CIPFA and the IRRV.
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30d7bd8ab5e3c33e0f24f259515f7cfc7d88b843 | CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 2 THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO THE TRIBUNAL
CHAPTER 2A - INTRODUCTION
2A-i INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2B - EVIDENCE COLLECTED IN 1972
2B-I NICRA Statements ........................................................................................................ 2 2B-II The RMP/SIB Statement Taking Process .................................................................... 2 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 2 Purpose of SIB Investigation ............................................................................................ 4 Limited briefing ................................................................................................................ 6 Information received by SIB ............................................................................................. 7 Briefing to Investigators .................................................................................................. 8 Few SIB Investigators were available in the wake of Bloody Sunday ............................. 10 Nature of Interviews ....................................................................................................... 11 Use of Junior Personnel .................................................................................................. 13 A large number of statements were taken each day ....................................................... 17 The State of Soldiers Giving Statements shortly after the Event .................................... 18 Other Matters Relevant to the Statement Taking Process .............................................. 25 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 31 2B-III The Widgery Inquiry Statements ............................................................................ 32 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 32 The Purpose and Procedure ............................................................................................ 33 The Speed of the Exercise ............................................................................................... 35 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 36 2B-IV Oral Evidence to the Widgery Inquiry .................................................................... 37
CHAPTER 2C - EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY THE PRESENT INQUIRY
2C-I Documentary Evidence from Government Sources .................................................. 39 Contemporaneous Government Documents .................................................................. 39 Documents Relating to the Representation of the Army before the Widgery Inquiry .... 40 Intelligence Materials Relating to Terrorist Activities .................................................. 41 2C-II Bloody Sunday Inquiry Statements ......................................................................... 46 CHAPTER 2D - THE IRA AND THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE PRESENT INQUIRY
2D-I Attempts by the IRA to Influence Journalists’ Accounts ........................................ 191 2D-II Threats by the IRA To Witnesses before this Inquiry ........................................ 197 2D-III The Non-Disclosure of the Names of Gunmen and Members of the IRA Civilians .................................................................................................................. 201 Journalists .............................................................................................................. 205 2D-IV The refusal of former members of IRA to assist this inquiry .............................. 231 2D-V The credibility of former members of the IRA .................................................. 235 2D-VI Intelligence material on civilian witnesses ...................................................... 239 2D-VII Lack of transparency of the IRA evidence and its effect on the search for the truth 239 2D-VIII The Attempted Manipulation of the Inquiry by the IRA ............................... 240
CHAPTER 2E - OTHER MISSING EVIDENCE
2E-I Missing Army Photographs .................................................................................. 241 2E-II Missing Civilian Photographs and Cine Film ..................................................... 242 2E-III Missing NICRA Materials ................................................................................ 242 2E-IV Missing Mahon Materials ................................................................................ 242 2E-V Infliction ............................................................................................................ 242 2E-VI Observer B ....................................................................................................... 247 2E-VII Evidence in the possession of the security service ........................................ 251 2E-VIII Witnesses the Inquiry wished to call but concluded it could not call .......... 252 2E-IX Witness Trace requests from the Lawton Team: Accepted but not acted on 253 2E-X The Tribunal’s Failure to order witnesses to reveal the source of information 254
CHAPTER 2F - SECRET EVIDENCE
2F- Secret Evidence .................................................................................................... 255
CHAPTER 2G - EVIDENCE OF SOLDIER 027
2G-I INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 262 2G-II 1975 ACCOUNT ................................................................................................. 262 027 is author of 1975 account .................................................................................. 262 Symbolic importance of 027's 1975 account ................................................................. 265
2G-III ALLEGATIONS INVOLVING CLIENTS OF Mr Anthony LAWTON ......................... 268 Lieutenant 119: "we want some kills" ............................................................................. 268 Lieutenant 119: gun pits incident .................................................................................... 269 Lance Corporal F: fired immediately from Kells Walk Wall at no discernible target .... 270 Private INQ 0635: fired from Kells Walk Wall ............................................................... 273 Cease fire order over radio and move into Glenfada Park North ................................. 274 Lance Corporal F: shooting in Glenfada Park North ..................................................... 276 Major Loden: assaulted prisoner .................................................................................... 278 Lt Colonel Wilford: "send F and G to SAS" .................................................................... 279 Dum dum bullets passed around prior to deployment into Bogside ......................... 279 Private INQ 0635, dum dum bullets and the early fabrication of ammunition returns 282
2G-IV OTHER MATTERS RELEVANT TO CREDIT ......................................................... 285 Widgery Inquiry: fabrication of statement ..................................................................... 285 Fantasy and 1975 memoire ............................................................................................. 287 Dealings with Sean Patrick McShane ............................................................................. 288 Destruction of Diary ....................................................................................................... 290
2G-V 027's dealings with the inquiry .............................................................................. 291
2G-VI The threat to which 027 claimed he was exposed .............................................. 308 First Incident .................................................................................................................. 308 Second Incident ............................................................................................................. 309 Third Incident ................................................................................................................ 309
2G-VII SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS .................................. 311
CHAPTER 3
THE RELEVANT LAW
CHAPTER 3A - THE RELEVANT LAW
A-I The Tribunal's terms of reference and the relevance of the criminal law ............... 1
A-II The Tribunal's Approach to Evidence ................................................................. 4 The Burden of Proof ..................................................................................................... 4 The Standard of Proof ................................................................................................. 5 Circumstantial Evidence ............................................................................................. 14
3A-III The Law of Self Defence, section 3, Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967 and the Yellow Card ................................................................. 17 Self -Defence and Defence of Another ....................................................................... 17 Section 3 Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967 ................................................ 28 The Yellow Card ......................................................................................................... 39 Special Features of the Present Case ......................................................................... 40
3A-IV Summary of Principal Submissions on Self-Defence, Defence of Another, Prevention of Crime and Effecting or Assisting in Lawful Arrest ......................... 50 VOLUME 2
CHAPTER 4
THE PROVISIONAL AND OFFICIAL IRAS
CHAPTER 4A - THE RELEVANT LAW
4A-I The Provisional and Official IRAs – Introduction .................................................. 1
CHAPTER 4B - THE PROVISIONAL IRA
4B-I Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3 4B-II PIRA and the Bloody Sunday Inquiry ........................................................................ 3 The Precedence of the “Republican Code of Honour” .................................................. 3 The Green Book .............................................................................................................. 8 Intimidation .................................................................................................................... 8 Stage Management of PIRA Evidence ........................................................................... 11 4B-III Structure and Discipline .......................................................................................... 17 Structure ......................................................................................................................... 17 Youth .............................................................................................................................. 19 Newly recruited Officials ............................................................................................... 23 Effect of Internment ...................................................................................................... 25 PIRA 24 and Martin McGuinness .................................................................................. 26 Discipline ....................................................................................................................... 27 4B-IV Weapons .................................................................................................................. 30 In Short Supply .............................................................................................................. 30 Weapons Dumps ............................................................................................................. 31 4B-V Modus Operandi ......................................................................................................... 32 General ........................................................................................................................... 32 The Exploitation of Riots ............................................................................................... 33 Ambush .......................................................................................................................... 40 Sniper Attack .................................................................................................................. 41 4B-VI PIRA/OIRA Relations .............................................................................................. 42 4B-VII The Decision to take No Action ............................................................................ 43 4B-VIII The Movement of Weapons .................................................................................. 49 “Arms were not withdrawn” .......................................................................................... 50 “We took all our weapons out to the Creggan Estate” .................................................. 52 “They were brought to a central Location...Creggan was too vulnerable” .................. 53 Weapons rejected at Creggan so returned to Bogside .................................................... 55 4B-IX The Creggan and Brandywell Mobile Patrol Units .................................................. 57 The Myth of the Military Threat to the Creggan and the Brandywell ......................... 58 The size of the Creggan and Brandywell Patrols ......................................................... 62 Creggan and Brandywell Cars deploy to the Bogside .................................................... 64 The Attack on the Old Dairy ......................................................................................... 65 CHAPTER 4C – THE OFFICIAL IRA
4C-I Introduction ........................................................................................................ 108 4C-II The Structure and Organisation of the Official IRA ........................................ 108 Extent and Structure .............................................................................................. 110 Decision Making .................................................................................................... 112 The Official Fianna ............................................................................................... 118 Discipline ............................................................................................................... 123 4C-III OIRA Policy Towards the British Army .......................................................... 126 4C-IV The Standing and Attitude of the Official IRA at the Time of Bloody Sunday .... 133 Defensive Policy? .................................................................................................. 143 The Need to Protect Civilians .............................................................................. 146 Weapons/Control of Weapons ............................................................................. 159 Control of Bogside weapons ................................................................................ 171 OIRA Gunmen on Bloody Sunday ....................................................................... 205 4C-V Propaganda after the event ............................................................................. 224 4C-VI OIRA evidence before this tribunal ............................................................... 234 4C-VII Conclusions .................................................................................................. 247 VOLUME 3
CHAPTER 5
SENIOR OFFICERS: PLANNING FOR AND ACTIVITIES ON 30 JANUARY 1972
CHAPTER 5A - BACKGROUND TO THE MARCH
Background to the March
CHAPTER 5B - PROLOGUE TO THE MARCH
Prologue to the March: 7th January to 25th January 1972
CHAPTER 5C - PLANNING AT HQNI
Concept of Operations The Need for an Arrest Operation Selection of 1 PARA Location for the Arrest Operation Tactics Risks to the Marchers
CHAPTER 5D - ORDERS TO 8 BRIGADE
Orders to 8 Brigade
CHAPTER 5E - PLANNING AT 8 BRIGADE
Intelligence Concept of Operations Troops to Task Arrest Operation Consultation Secure Communications Approval of the Operation Order
CHAPTER 5F - THE BRIGADE COMMANDER'S ORDERS
Brigade Planning for the Arrest Operation The Purpose of the COORDINATING Conference The Content of the Conference CHAPTER 6A - OUTLINE SUBMISSIONS
6A-I Overview of Sector 1 Submissions ................................................................. 3
CHAPTER 6B - THE PROGRESS OF THE MARCH
6B-I The Progress of the March ............................................................................. 4
CHAPTER 6C - THE BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES TO THE SHOOTING OF JOHN JOHNSTON AND DAMIEN DONAGHY
6C-I The Rioting in Sector 1 - Introduction ............................................................. 8 The Relevance of the Rioting at Barriers 12 and 14 .............................................. 8 6C-II Events at Barrier 14 ....................................................................................... 9 6C-III Rioting at Barrier 12 .................................................................................... 26 Introduction and Summary .................................................................................. 26 Location .................................................................................................................. 27 Military Personnel Present at Barrier 12 .............................................................. 28 Events at Barrier 12 on Bloody Sunday: ............................................................... 29 Evidence of CS Canisters thrown at the Troops by the Crowd ......................... 39 A Second wave of Gas / Rubber Bullets Temporarily Clears the Area Immediately in Front of Barrier 12 ................................................................. 40 Rioting Resumed from Behind Corrugated Iron Shields .................................... 43 The NICRA Banner is Paraded in Front of Barrier 12 ......................................... 46 Rioting Continued after the NICRA Banner was Withdrawn ............................... 53 The Nature and Severity of the Rioting at Barrier 12 ......................................... 56 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 64 6C-IV Events on the Waste Ground Prior to the Shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston ................................................................. 64 Timing of the Rioting in the Vicinity of the Derelict Building ......................... 64 Rioters Assemble in and around the Laundry Waste Ground and Target Soldiers in the Derelict Building ................................................................. 69 The Precise Location and Targets of the Rioters .............................................. 76 The Severity of the Riot ....................................................................................... 81 Nail Bombs .......................................................................................................... 95 Civilian Evidence of The Scale of Rioting in and around the Laundry Waste Ground ................................................................. 104 Rioting was in Progress at the Moment that Live Shots were Fired ................ 109 Evidence Relating to Noise in Vicinity of Derelict Building ............................. 112 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 114 CHAPTER 6D - THE SHOOTING OF DAMIEN DONAGHY
6D-I Introduction ........................................................................................................... 115 6D-II When Was Damien Donaghy Shot? ........................................................................ 115 6D-III Where Was Damien Donaghy Shot? .................................................................... 128 The North West Corner of the Laundry Waste Ground .............................................. 133 6D-IV What was Damien Donaghy Doing when He was Shot? ...................................... 137 Summary .................................................................................................................... 137 Damien Donaghy’s Actions When He was Shot – His Various Accounts ................. 137 Additional Civilian Evidence of Donaghy’s Actions .................................................. 145 What Might it have been Thought that Donaghy was Doing when he was Shot? ....... 157
CHAPTER 6E - THE SHOOTING OF JOHN JOHNSTON
6E-I Introduction ........................................................................................................... 173 6E-II When was John Johnston Shot? ............................................................................ 174 Summary .................................................................................................................... 174 6E-III What Was John Johnston Doing when he was Shot? ........................................... 182 Summary .................................................................................................................... 182 John Johnston’s Evidence .......................................................................................... 182 Civilian Evidence regarding Mr. Johnston’s Activities .............................................. 184 In which Direction was John Johnston Facing at the Time he was shot? .................. 189 6E-IV Where was JOHN Johnston Shot? ....................................................................... 193 Summary .................................................................................................................... 193 John Johnston’s Evidence .......................................................................................... 195 Civilian Evidence ...................................................................................................... 197 6E-V John Johnston’s Injuries ....................................................................................... 202 Cause of Death .......................................................................................................... 203 How many Bullets Struck John Johnston? .................................................................. 211
CHAPTER 6F - THE SHOTS FIRED BY SOLDIER A AND SOLDIER B
6F-I Introduction and Summary .................................................................................... 219 6F-II The contradictory and changing nature of the allegations levelled against soldiers A and B ........................................................................................................... 221 Allegations Made In Opening .................................................................................... 221 Allegations Relating to the RMP Map ........................................................................ 225 Allegation arising out of the mis-transcription of Soldier A’s RMP statement .......... 230 6F-III Soldier A and Soldier B’s Subjective Belief ......................................................... 232 The Honesty of the Soldiers’ Accounts ..................................................................... 232 The Reasonableness of Soldier A’s and Soldier B’s Belief ......................................... 233 6F-IV Did Either Soldier A or Soldier B Intend to Shoot Damien Donaghy or John Johnston? ........................................................................................................... 234 Damien Donaghy ....................................................................................................... 234 CHAPTER 6G - CIVILIAN GUNMEN IN SECTOR 1
6G-I OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................. 243 Civilian Evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry ................................................................. 244 OIRA Evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry ................................................................. 245
6G-II Defence and Retaliation Order ................................................................................. 245
6G-III OIRA 1’s shot from a balcony in Columbille Court ................................................. 248 OIRA 1’s Various Accounts Of Shooting From Columbille Court .................................. 248 OIRA 1’s Shot ..................................................................................................................... 290 The Altercation on the Stairs ............................................................................................ 325
6G-IV Civilian Evidence of Other Gunmen In Sector 1 ..................................................... 329 Evidence of other Gunmen Armed with Rifles ................................................................. 329 Evidence of Handguns ...................................................................................................... 332
6G-V Military Accounts Of Sector 1 firing ....................................................................... 343 The Presbyterian Church Shot .......................................................................................... 343 Incoming Rounds experienced by Soldiers at Barrier 12 ............................................... 350 Incoming Rounds Experienced by Soldiers behind Barrier 13 ....................................... 353 VOLUME 5
CHAPTER 7
SECTOR 2
CHAPTER 7A - DEPLOYMENT
7A-I Initial Deployment ........................................................................................................... 1 Firing As the Pigs Moved Down Rossville Street ................................................................. 1 The Rioters Attacked the Pigs as they Drove Down Rossville Street ......................... 11 7A-II Firing as Pig 1 Arrived on the Waste Ground ............................................................. 16 7A-III The Soldiers' actions having Debussed from Pig 1 .................................................. 24
CHAPTER 7B - LIEUTENANT N'S FIRST ENGAGEMENT
7B-I Lieutenant N at the chamberlain street alleyway; ......................................................... 30 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 30 The Arrest of Mr Clarke and the Confrontation with the Crowd: Introduction ............ 30 7B-II Lieutenant N Fires Three Warning Shots over the Crowd ........................................ 36 7B-III the timing of lieutenant N's shots ............................................................................. 46 7B-IV soldiers S and V and the Alleged Assault on Charles Mcmonagle ....................... 47 7B-V conclusion .................................................................................................................... 50
CHAPTER 7C - EVENTS IN THE CAR PARK OF THE ROSSVILLE FLATS
7C-I Introduction .................................................................................................................... 51 7C-II Rossville street was clear of marchers as the pigs deployed .................................... 51 7C-III Pig 2 arrives in the rossville flats' car park ............................................................... 52 7C-IV Alana Burke ................................................................................................................ 57 7C-V The Rioting in the rossville flats car park ................................................................. 60 7C-VI Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 80
CHAPTER 7D - GUNMEN IN THE CAR PARK OF THE ROSSVILLE FLATS
7D-I Introduction .................................................................................................................... 81 7D-II The Gunman / Gunmen in the Rossville Flats ............................................................ 82 7D-III Father Daly's Gunman ............................................................................................... 104 7D-IV Other probable Sightings of Gunmen ...................................................................... 112 7D-V Automatic Firing Continued After the Soldiers Returned Fire ............................... 113 7D-VI The Soldiers' Reactions ............................................................................................ 131 7D-VII Other Activity in the Car Park ................................................................................ 136 The Peres sequence of Photographs – Block 3 Retaining wall ....................................... 136 Paddy Brown Near the Group Helping Jack Duddy ......................................................... 141 7D-VIII conclusion .............................................................................................................. 146 CHAPTER 8A - MORTAR PLATOON IN SECTOR 3
8A-I Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 Debussing in Rossville Street .................................................................................. 1 Soldier U comes under attack .................................................................................. 6 8A-II Soldiers P and 017 at the Kells Walk Ramp ..................................................... 8 Exposed Position ...................................................................................................... 8 8A-III Incoming Rounds ............................................................................................... 9 8A-IV Soldiers P and 017 targeted by Rioters ............................................................ 10 The Rioters Waited to Confront the Soldiers from the Rubble Barricade ............... 10 “Get them” .............................................................................................................. 12 P and 017 attacked .................................................................................................. 14 Surge forward from Rubble Barricade ..................................................................... 16 Rioters target soldier P and 017 from Columbelle Court Alleyway ....................... 19 8A-V The Nail Bomber ................................................................................................. 20 The Evidence of soldiers P and 017 ........................................................................ 21 The Prevalence of Nail Bombs in Londonderry ...................................................... 22 Military Corroboration ............................................................................................ 23 Photographic Evidence ............................................................................................ 24 Nail Bombs in the Glenfada Park Area ..................................................................... 25 The “Yellow Card” .................................................................................................. 27 Removal of Nail Bomber ......................................................................................... 28 8A-VI Soldier P’s Movements following his Engagement with the Nail Bomber ......... 28 8A-VII Gunmen ........................................................................................................... 30 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 30 Diagram: Evidence of Civilians with Handguns in or Around Sector 3 on 30th January 1972... 32 Evidence .................................................................................................................. 33 Gunmen Conclusion ................................................................................................. 48 8A-VIII Unidentified Casualties .................................................................................. 49 8A-IX Missing Photographs ....................................................................................... 51 8A-X Soldiers P and 017 Movement East ................................................................... 51 8A-XI Soldier P: Vehicle Escort to Aitnagelvin .......................................................... 52 8A-XII Soldier P’s State of Recollection .................................................................... 52 8A-XIII Soldier U’s Engagement .............................................................................. 54 Location of Gunman ............................................................................................... 55 Soldier U’s shot ....................................................................................................... 56 8A-XIV Hugh Gilmore ................................................................................................. 58 Medical and Expert Evidence .................................................................................. 58 Civilian Evidence .................................................................................................... 60 Chronology .............................................................................................................. 71 CHAPTER 8B - GUINNESS FORCE IN SECTOR 3
8B-I Call Signs 71 and 71 Alpha ................................................................. 92 8B-II Call Sign 71 ......................................................................................... 94 8B-III Call Sign 71 Alpha ........................................................................... 94 8B-IV Orders ............................................................................................... 95 8B-V The Presbyterian Church Shot .......................................................... 97 8B-VI Deployment into the Bogside ............................................................ 100 By Vehicle To the North East Corner of Rossville Street ......................... 100 On Foot into the Bogside ........................................................................... 103 Incoming Fire .............................................................................................. 107 8B-VII Call Sign 71 Alpha on the west side of Rossville Street ............... 109 Moving in Support of Anti Tank Platoon .................................................. 109 Elements of Call Sign 71 Alpha do not deploy to the Kells Walk Wall .... 111 Replacing Anti Tank Platoon at the Kells Walk Wall ............................... 112
Guinness Force at the Kells Walk Wall ....................................................... 113
8B-VIII Sequence of Events ...................................................................... 113 8B-IX The Significance of leopard crawling ............................................. 120 8B-X Gunmen Behind the Rubble Barricade .............................................. 121 The Sighting of Weapons ......................................................................... 121 The Rear Crawling Man .......................................................................... 122 The Front Crawling Man ......................................................................... 123 8B-XI Response to An imminent threat .................................................... 127 The Soldiers’ Assessment ......................................................................... 127 Other Relevant Considerations ................................................................ 129 8B-XII Restraint ......................................................................................... 129
Movement from the Kells Walk Wall ....................................................... 131
8B-XIII To the Columbille Court Car Park ................................................. 131 8B-XIV Those remaining in the area of Rossville Street ......................... 133 8B-XV Taking the Arrestees North ............................................................ 134 CHAPTER 8C – MICHAEL KELLY, WILLIAM NASH, JOHN YOUNG AND MICHAEL MCDAID
8C-I Introduction .................................................................................................................. 186 8C-II Michael Kelly .................................................................................................................. 187 Soldier F’s Evidence ........................................................................................................... 187 Michael Kelly – civilian evidence ....................................................................................... 188 Why did Soldier F not mention this incident before 19 February? .................................. 215 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 220 8C-III WILLIAM NASH, John Young and Michael McDaid .................................................. 221 Counsel’s First Report ........................................................................................................ 221 Questions and Allegations put during Oral evidence ....................................................... 223 The City Walls Theory ....................................................................................................... 228 8C-IV Civilian Evidence ........................................................................................................ 233 Where in relation to Rubble barricade did John Young, William Nash and Michael McDaid fall? .................................................................................................................................... 234 Which Way were William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid Facing when They were Shot? .................................................................................................................................... 239 The Conduct of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid in area of Rubble Barricade ............................................................................................................................. 245 Arrest Theory ...................................................................................................................... 246 8C-V Chronology .................................................................................................................. 249 8C-VI Missing Casualties and Missing Photographs ............................................................... 253 8C-VII Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 253 VOLUME 8
CHAPTER 10
SECTOR 5
CHAPTER 10A - INTRODUCTION
Sector 5 - Introduction ................................................................. 1
CHAPTER 10B - SOLDIER F'S TARGET IN SECTOR 5
10B-I Soldier F's account in 1972 .................................................. 2 10B-II Soldier F's evidence to the Present Tribunal ......................... 8 Soldier F's Current Recollection ............................................. 9 10B-III Corroboration of Soldier F's Account ................................ 22 The evidence of Lieutenant 227 ............................................. 22 The Man Firing a Pistol Near the Fahan Street Steps ................. 34 10B-IV Conclusion ........................................................................ 44
CHAPTER 10C - SHOOTING FROM GLENFADA PARK
10C-I Introduction ........................................................................... 47 10C-II Other soldiers in Glenfada Park firing into Sector 5 ............... 47 Two or more soldiers in kneeling positions in the entrance to Glenfada Park north pointing their rifles across Rossville Street .................................................. 48 A volley of shots fired into Sector 5 which has not been accounted for .................................................. 53 10C-III Conclusion ........................................................................ 66
CHAPTER 10D - BERNARD MCGUIGAN
10D-I Did Soldier F Shoot Bernard McGuigan? ............................... 66 Soldier F's 'Admission' in the Witness Box ............................... 66 The forensic evidence ............................................................. 78 The Eyewitness Testimony ...................................................... 79 Conclusion ............................................................................. 138
CHAPTER 10E - PATRICK DOHERTY
10E-I Introduction ........................................................................... 140 10E-II The Orientation of Patrick Doherty's Body as he crawled towards the alleyway behind Joseph Place .................................................. 140 Introduction ........................................................................... 140 The Photographic Evidence .................................................... 141 The Eyewitness Testimony ...................................................... 149 The Pathology of the Bullet Wound ......................................... 158 Conclusion ............................................................................. 163 10E-III The Gap in Time Between the Shootings of Patrick Doherty and Bernard McGuigan ................................. 163 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 163 Bernard McGuigan went to the aid of Patrick Doherty .............................................. 164 Other evidence also suggests Patrick Doherty was shot significantly more than a few seconds before Bernard McGuigan ........................................................................ 170 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 174
CHAPTER 10F - THE WOUNDED IN SECTOR 5
10F-I Introduction ........................................................................................................ 175 10F-II Patrick Campbell ............................................................................................... 175 The location of Mr. Campbell when he was shot ....................................................... 175 When was Patrick Campbell shot? ............................................................................. 179 10F-III Daniel McGowan ............................................................................................ 180 The assistance Mr. McGowan provided to Mr. Campbell ........................................ 180 The location of Mr. McGowan when he was shot ..................................................... 181 10F-IV Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 183 CLOSING SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENTS OF MR ANTHONY LAWTON
VOLUME 1
CHAPTERS 1-3
INTRODUCTION, THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AND THE LAW CHAPTER 1
1A-1 INTRODUCTION.
This section introduces our submissions, contained in eight volumes and ten chapters, and explains the way in which they have been organised.
Despite the frequency with which we have stated that we represent individual soldiers, there is a still a perception that we represent the Army or the Ministry of Defence. We do not. We represent 484 individuals. For convenience, and for the avoidance of doubt, we set out below the names or ciphers, as appropriate, of the individuals whom we represent.
| SOLDIERS GIVEN CIPHERS BY THE WIDGERY INQUIRY | |-----------------------------------------------| | A | Z | 028 | 123 | 159 | | AB | 001 | 030/232 | 124 | 162 | | AC | 003 | 032 | 126 | 164 | | AD | 004 | 033 | 127 | 200/240 | | B | 006 | 034 | 128 | 201 | | C | 007 | 035 | 130 | 203 | | D | 008 | 038 | 131 | 204 | | F | 009 | 039 | 132 | 205 | | J | 010 | 041 | 133 | 206 | | K | 013 | 042 | 136 | 207 | | M | 014 | 106 | 137 | 208 | | N | 016 | 107 | 139 | 210 | | O, 228 | 017 | 109 | 140 | 211 | | P | 018 | 110 | 142 | 213 | | Q | 019 | 112 | 145 | 217 | | R | 020 | 113 | 146 | 221 | | S | 021 | 115 | 147 | 221A | | T | 022 | 117 | 148 | 223 | | U | 023 | 120 | 152 | | | V | 025 | 121 | 154 | | | Y | 026 | 122 | 156 | | | INQ0002 | INQ0366 | INQ0763 | INQ1152 | INQ1834 | |---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | INQ0005 | INQ0370 | INQ0765 | INQ1155 | INQ1853 | | INQ0007 | INQ0371 | INQ0767 | INQ1157 | INQ1869 | | INQ0010 | INQ0372 | INQ0768 | INQ1163 | INQ1872 | | INQ0012 | INQ0375 | INQ0772 | INQ1164 | INQ1873 | | INQ0013 | INQ0382 | INQ0773 | INQ1171 | INQ1874 | | INQ0014 | INQ0391 | INQ0778 | INQ1173 | INQ1877 | | INQ0015 | INQ0398 | INQ0782 | INQ1174 | INQ1883 | | INQ0017 | INQ0402 | INQ0785 | INQ1194 | INQ1888 | | INQ0019 | INQ0404 | INQ0796 | INQ1195 | INQ1891 | | INQ0020 | INQ0405 | INQ0802 | INQ1197 | INQ1900 | | INQ0021 | INQ0406 | INQ0806 | INQ1208 | INQ1901 | | INQ0022 | INQ0418 | INQ0807 | INQ1210 | INQ1903 | | INQ0024 | INQ0420 | INQ0812 | INQ1217 | INQ1905 | | INQ0025 | INQ0422 | INQ0815 | INQ1231 | INQ1908 | | INQ0054 | INQ0423 | INQ0819 | INQ1236 | INQ1917 | | INQ0058 | INQ0428 | INQ0832 | INQ1237 | INQ1918 | | INQ0061 | INQ0429 | INQ0834 | INQ1241 | INQ1919 | | INQ0063 | INQ0437 | INQ0836 | INQ1252 | INQ1923 | | INQ0066 | INQ0441 | INQ0840 | INQ1257 | INQ1924 | | INQ0067 | INQ0444 | INQ0841 | INQ1260 | INQ1935 | | INQ0078 | INQ0452 | INQ0849 | INQ1266 | INQ1939 | | INQ0081 | INQ0455 | INQ0852 | INQ1275 | INQ1940 | | INQ0095 | INQ0457 | INQ0876 | INQ1280 | INQ1951 | | INQ0113 | INQ0468 | INQ0881 | INQ1288 | INQ1954 | | INQ0118 | INQ0473 | INQ0883 | INQ1298 | INQ1955 | | INQ0119 | INQ0486 | INQ0887 | INQ1305 | INQ1957 | | INQ0122 | INQ0487 | INQ0889 | INQ1310 | INQ1958 | | INQ0123 | INQ0494 | INQ0891 | INQ1318 | INQ1982 | | INQ0127 | INQ0512 | INQ0896 | INQ1324 | INQ1984 | | INQ0131 | INQ0521 | INQ0897 | INQ1326 | INQ1986 | | INQ0133 | INQ0522 | INQ0904 | INQ1333 | INQ1990 | | INQ0139 | INQ0528 | INQ0907 | INQ1334 | INQ1997 | | INQ0145 | INQ0532 | INQ0912 | INQ1335 | INQ2000 | | INQ0146 | INQ0535 | INQ0914 | INQ1336 | INQ2001 | | INQ0151 | INQ0538 | INQ0915 | INQ1342 | INQ2002 | | INQ0152 | INQ0551 | INQ0917 | INQ1343 | INQ2032 | | INQ0153 | INQ0554 | INQ0921 | INQ1348 | INQ2033 | | INQ0155 | INQ0555 | INQ0933 | INQ1350 | INQ2037 | |---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | INQ0166 | INQ0558 | INQ0945 | INQ1413 | INQ2038 | | INQ0171 | INQ0559 | INQ0947 | INQ1521 | INQ2041 | | INQ0172 | INQ0581 | INQ0951 | INQ1527 | INQ2043 | | INQ0177 | INQ0583 | INQ0956 | INQ1538 | INQ2044 | | INQ0178 | INQ0588 | INQ0957 | INQ1540 | INQ2045 | | INQ0189 | INQ0589 | INQ0960 | INQ1544 | INQ2047 | | INQ0206 | INQ0594 | INQ0966 | INQ1548 | INQ2050 | | INQ0214 | INQ0598 | INQ0967 | INQ1560 | INQ2054 | | INQ0228 | INQ0603 | INQ0975 | INQ1570 | INQ2056 | | INQ0229 | INQ0604 | INQ0979 | INQ1579 | INQ2057 | | INQ0235 | INQ0614 | INQ1010 | INQ1581 | INQ2065 | | INQ0245 | INQ0627 | INQ1016 | INQ1593 | INQ2067 | | INQ0248 | INQ0633 | INQ1027 | INQ1603 | INQ2078 | | INQ0251 | INQ0635 | INQ1030 | INQ1751 | INQ2079 | | INQ0254 | INQ0637 | INQ1032 | INQ1758 | INQ2089 | | INQ0255 | INQ0639 | INQ1041 | INQ1761 | INQ2105 | | INQ0261 | INQ0646 | INQ1043 | INQ1764 | INQ2117 | | INQ0262 | INQ0657 | INQ1044 | INQ1770 | INQ2121 | | INQ0268 | INQ0663 | INQ1045 | INQ1779 | INQ2146 | | INQ0275 | INQ0665 | INQ1046 | INQ1782 | INQ2148 | | INQ0290 | INQ0682 | INQ1056 | INQ1784 | INQ2149 | | INQ0292 | INQ0691 | INQ1058 | INQ1788 | INQ2160 | | INQ0293 | INQ0693 | INQ1059 | INQ1790 | INQ2225 | | INQ0295 | INQ0707 | INQ1068 | INQ1791 | INQ2236 | | INQ0300 | INQ0722 | INQ1077 | INQ1799 | INQ2238 | | INQ0301 | INQ0723 | INQ1087 | INQ1803 | INQ2241 | | INQ0304 | INQ0727 | INQ1093 | INQ1805 | INQ2242 | | INQ0321 | INQ0736 | INQ1096 | INQ1822 | INQ2245 | | INQ0325 | INQ0738 | INQ1111 | INQ1823 | INQ2554 | | INQ0350 | INQ0740 | INQ1112 | INQ1824 | INQ2565 | | INQ0352 | INQ0747 | INQ1124 | INQ1825 | INQ2584 | | INQ0360 | INQ0748 | INQ1139 | INQ1826 | INQ2592 | | INQ0362 | INQ0753 | INQ1141 | INQ1829 | INQ2597 | | INQ0364 | INQ0754 | INQ1147 | INQ1832 | | Against the overwhelming majority of these individuals, no allegation of misconduct has been made, formally or at all. In the absence of “Salmon letters”, we have attempted to identify what we believe are the main issues and to address them in these submissions, without unnecessary repetition, and, where possible, with economy. We do not consider it appropriate to address every issue which was opened by counsel to the Inquiry or touched upon by counsel for the other Interested Parties. Rather, we have sought to address what, on the basis of our present understanding, we believe to be the main issues before the Tribunal. Where appropriate, we have provided analyses of exhibited documents, including some which were not examined, or not fully considered, during the course of the evidence.
We have attempted to present our submissions in chapters 6-10 below in accordance with the sequence of sectors adopted by the Tribunal throughout its proceedings. To the extent that they inevitably overlap, in time or in the relevance of more general aspects of the evidence, we have attempted to avoid duplication. This involves cross references between chapters. We have, where it has been thought to be helpful, reproduced maps and photographs for reference purposes, but, where matters of detail are important, the Tribunal will obviously wish to consider these submissions with the benefit of the best quality prints that are available to them. The content of the following Chapters may be summarised as follows.
Chapter 2 addresses certain general issues concerning the evidence available to the Tribunal.
Chapter 3 contains our submissions upon legal issues.
Chapter 4 considers the significance of evidence deriving from (and withheld by) the IRA, with separate consideration given to the positions of the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA.
Chapter 5 deals with plans for the march on the 30th January 1972 and the events of the day from the perspective of the senior officers. It also addresses, on behalf of our clients, the various ill-defined allegations of conspiracy made against politicians, civil servants and senior officers.
Chapters 6-10 contain our submissions relating to events in Sectors 1-5, respectively.
A significant volume of documentary evidence has been served by the Inquiry in recent weeks, since the close of oral evidence. We understand that yet further material is still undergoing the redaction process. Self evidently we cannot address what we have yet to see, and time has not permitted us to take account of what has recently been served, but we will consider everything that we have and, if appropriate, will deal with it by way of supplementary submissions or in our submissions in reply. In particular we should record that the Tribunal's letter dated 11th March 2004, in which they explain the steps which were taken to invite and require members of the IRA to cooperate with the Inquiry, could not be taken into account when chapters 2 and 4 of these submissions were drafted.
ANTHONY LAWTON Assistant Treasury Solicitor 18th March 2004. CHAPTER 2
THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO THE TRIBUNAL
CHAPTER 2A - INTRODUCTION
2A-i INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 2B - EVIDENCE COLLECTED IN 1972
2B-I NICRA Statements
2B-II The RMP/SIB Statement Taking Process
Introduction
Purpose of SIB Investigation
Limited briefing
Information received by SIB
Briefing to Investigators
Few SIB Investigators were available in the wake of Bloody Sunday
Nature of Interviews
Use of Junior Personnel
A large number of statements were taken each day
The State of Soldiers Giving Statements shortly after the Event
Other Matters Relevant to the Statement Taking Process
Conclusion
2B-III The Widgery Inquiry Statements
Introduction
The Purpose and Procedure
The Speed of the Exercise
Conclusions
2B-IV Oral Evidence to the Widgery Inquiry
CHAPTER 2C - EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY THE PRESENT INQUIRY
2C-I Documentary Evidence from Government Sources
Contemporaneous Government Documents
Documents Relating to the Representation of the Army before the Widgery Inquiry
Intelligence Materials Relating to Terrorist Activities
2C-II Bloody Sunday Inquiry Statements
Introduction
Passage of Time and its Effects on Memory
The Eversheds Process
Read Only statements
2C-III Civilian Evidence to This Inquiry Passage of Time and its Effects on Memory ................................................................. 90 Folklore and Myth ........................................................................................................ 90 Pressures on Civilian Witnesses .................................................................................. 111 The Mahon Interviews ................................................................................................. 134 2C-IV Deliberate withholding and suppression of evidence ........................................ 161 The Evidence Collected by Paul Mahon ...................................................................... 161 Fulvio Grimaldi and the photograph of Father Daly’s gunman .................................... 176 Missing photographs: Sector 3 ..................................................................................... 178
CHAPTER 2D - THE IRA AND THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE PRESENT INQUIRY
2D-I Attempts by the IRA to Influence Journalists’ Accounts .................................... 191 2D-II Threats by the IRA To Witnesses before this Inquiry ........................................ 197 2D-III The Non-Disclosure of the Names of Gunmen and Members of the IRA .......... 201 Civilians .................................................................................................................. 205 Journalists .............................................................................................................. 224 2D-IV The refusal of former members of ira to assist this inquiry ............................... 231 2D-V The credibility of former members of the ira ...................................................... 235 2D-VI Intelligence material on civilian witnesses ....................................................... 239 2D-VII Lack of transparency of the IRA evidence and its effect on the search for the truth 239 2D-VIII The Attempted Manipulation of the Inquiry by the IRA ................................. 240
CHAPTER 2E - OTHER MISSING EVIDENCE
2E-I Missing Army Photographs .................................................................................. 241 2E-II Missing Civilian Photographs and Cine Film ...................................................... 242 2E-III Missing NICRA Materials ................................................................................ 242 2E-IV Missing Mahon Materials ................................................................................ 242 2E-V Infliction ............................................................................................................. 242 2E-VI Observer B ....................................................................................................... 247 2E-VII Evidence in the possession of the security service ......................................... 251 2E-VIII Witnesses the Inquiry wished to call but concluded it could not call ............. 252 2E-IX Witness Trace requests from the Lawton Team: Accepted but not acted on .... 253 2E-X The Tribunal’s Failure to order witnesses to reveal the source of information .... 254
CHAPTER 2F - SECRET EVIDENCE
2F- Secret Evidence ...................................................................................................... 255
CHAPTER 2G - EVIDENCE OF SOLDIER 027
2G-I INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 262 2G-II 1975 ACCOUNT ................................................................................................. 262 027 is author of 1975 account ................................................................................ 262 Symbolic importance of 027's 1975 account ................................................................. 265
2G-III ALLEGATIONS INVOLVING CLIENTS OF Mr Anthony LAWTON .......................... 268 Lieutenant 119: "we want some kills" ............................................................................. 268 Lieutenant 119: gun pits incident ..................................................................................... 269 Lance Corporal F: fired immediately from Kells Walk Wall at no discernible target. 270 Private INQ 0635: fired from Kells Walk Wall ............................................................... 273 Cease fire order over radio and move into Glenfada Park North .................................. 274 Lance Corporal F: shooting in Glenfada Park North ....................................................... 276 Major Loden: assaulted prisoner ..................................................................................... 278 Lt Colonel Wilford: "send F and G to SAS" .................................................................... 279 Dum dum bullets passed around prior to deployment into Bogside .............................. 279 Private INQ 0635, dum dum bullets and the early fabrication of ammunition returns. 282
2G-IV OTHER MATTERS RELEVANT TO CREDIT ......................................................... 285 Widgery Inquiry: fabrication of statement ...................................................................... 285 Fantasy and 1975 memoire. ............................................................................................. 287 Dealings with Sean Patrick McShane .............................................................................. 288 Destruction of Diary ........................................................................................................ 290
2G-V 027's dealings with the inquiry ................................................................................. 291
2G-VI The threat to which 027 claimed he was exposed .................................................. 308 First Incident .................................................................................................................... 308 Second Incident ............................................................................................................... 309 Third Incident .................................................................................................................. 309
2G-VII SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................... 311 THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO THE TRIBUNAL
CHAPTER 2A
2A-1 INTRODUCTION.
2A1 In this Chapter we propose to address thematically certain aspects of that evidence which is before this Inquiry and, indeed, that which is not. CHAPTER 2B
EVIDENCE COLLECTED IN 1972.
2B-I NICRA STATEMENTS
2B-1 We adopt the submissions of the Aitken team on the subject of NICRA statements, which submissions we have seen in draft.
2B-2 While we would accept that each NICRA statement must be considered on its merits in the light of all the evidence, there are serious concerns as to the NICRA statement taking process and as to the content of a significant number of NICRA statements. As a result, the Tribunal should exercise particular caution before accepting NICRA statements as either accurate or comprehensive. This is particularly so when an individual gave a NICRA statement in 1972, but has not given evidence, written or oral, to this Inquiry.
2B-II THE RMP/SIB STATEMENT TAKING PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
2B-3 During the course of the present Inquiry a great deal of criticism has been directed at the quality of the statements taken by the Royal Military Police. Indeed, the Irish Government's case advanced in strenuous support of the creation of this Inquiry relied heavily on the very detailed criticism which Prof. Walsh had made of alleged inconsistencies on the basis of RMP statements. However, in considering this body of evidence it is essential to have in mind the limited purpose the statements were intended to fulfil and the circumstances in which they came into existence.
2B-4 The RMP statements taken in the immediate aftermath of Bloody Sunday under the direction of Warrant Officer 1st Class Wood were never meant to be anything more than brief contact reports. They were gathered for the purpose of getting basic information up the chain of command as quickly as possible. This was a fact finding mission.
2B-5 The investigation continued following the announcement of the establishment of the Widgery Inquiry. In most respects the nature of the investigation remained the same. The early statements taken under WOI Wood were its foundation. Further statements were taken according to the same procedures, often by the same personnel and under the same pressure of time. These further statements were not intended for the use of the Widgery Inquiry but for provision to the Army legal team. At this stage, the aim was to get information to the Army Legal Team as quickly as possible.
2B-6 Interviews that took place on the night of Bloody Sunday and in the early hours of the next day were conducted with soldiers who were inevitably tired, by investigators who were armed with little background information. Many of the investigators would have had little knowledge of Londonderry.
2B-7 Properly trained Special Investigation Branch (SIB) investigators were thin on the ground and had to be supplemented with corporals from the RMP, some of whom had very little training or experience. Nevertheless, soldiers were allocated to interviewers on a cab rank basis. In many cases, the junior NCOs from the RMP were detailed to take some of the most important statements. Individual interviewers had to take large numbers of statements over a short period of time.
2B-8 Notwithstanding the fact that this incident concerned the killing and wounding of civilians by soldiers in circumstances that were bound to be controversial, the soldiers gave interviews under compulsion, without caution
1 Wood's Brief and Aide Memoire. CW1.48. and without the benefit of legal advice or representation. This was the deliberate policy of the SIB which sought to justify it on the basis that the statements were being taken for a limited purpose only, and could not subsequently be used to the prejudice of the soldiers concerned.
2B-9 It now transpires that “RMP maps” were marked up at some stage after the interviews – and not by the soldiers concerned. Timings in the body of the statements may have come from WOI Wood’s briefing to his men rather than from the soldiers themselves. It also appears that investigators would replace references by soldiers to specific weapons with less definitive terminology. So, a soldier’s reference to a rifle might result in a statement about a “long straight object”. As a result, in many instances the oral statements of the interviewees had been materially altered by those taking the statements.
2B-10 The statements were not meant to stand up to the detailed scrutiny of a public inquiry. Defects and inadequacies in the statements produced may not have been the fault or the responsibility of the soldiers making the statements and the soldiers should not be prejudiced by criticisms directed at the statements.
PURPOSE OF SIB INVESTIGATION
2B-11 The purpose of the investigation conducted under the direction of WOI Wood in the wake of Bloody Sunday was strictly limited; its aim was to supply information to HQNI as quickly as possible.
2B-12 WOI Wood gave unequivocal evidence about the limited nature of the investigation. The SIB actions could not be said to constitute a full and exhaustive investigation.2
2B-13 The Aide Memoire accompanying WOI Wood’s Brief for Investigators of 14th July 1971 added:
a. The information is required for higher command to answer immediately any allegations that may be raised by civilians.
b. It is not a normal SIB “investigation” as such...
... you are only there to find out what has happened. Assessment of criminal responsibility is not your task in these enquiries.3
2B-14 Wood was asked during his oral evidence:
Q. Can we summarise the situation, then, by saying this: that you were really trying to get the basic information up the chain of command as quickly as possible?
A. Exactly.
Q. What you were not doing at this early stage was producing statements for the purposes of a criminal trial?
A. No way at all.
Q. Or indeed a public inquiry?
A. Other than a Coroner’s Inquest.4
2B-15 Lt Col Overbury agreed:
The evidence to be collated included the statement made by each soldier who had fired live rounds on 30 January. Each statement had been made to the military police in accordance
2 CW1.1, paragraph 5 and Day 383/146/6 3 CW1.48 4 Day 383/147/7 with Standing Operational Procedures... They were certainly not made in contemplation of providing evidence to a Tribunal of Inquiry.(^5)
2B-16 Further statements were taken from the soldiers following the establishment of the Widgery Inquiry. Col Overbury’s evidence was that:
Once it was announced that there would be a Tribunal of Inquiry and the Army Tribunal team was set up. The SIB was requested to carry out a full investigation, in the course of which they decided to interview many of the soldiers again. This investigation was not a criminal investigation. None of the soldiers had been charged with any offence and I was certainly not aware that any was even suspected by the military authorities of having committed an offence. The purpose of the investigation was to find out exactly what had happened.(^6)
2B-17 At this stage, the methods used remained the same; the “full investigation” was conducted according to the terms of WOI Wood’s Brief,(^7) often by the same personnel. The SIB did not seek to replace the statements taken by him and his men but to add to them. Whereas the aim under WOI Wood had been to get information to Command as quickly as possible, subsequent statements were taken to get information to the Army Legal Team as quickly as possible.(^8)
LIMITED BRIEFING
2B-18 Those conducting the interviews were given very little background information in advance.
(^5) CO1.2, paragraph 7 (^6) CO1.41, paragraph 27 (^7) Overbury at Day 243/12/15 and Day 243/77/25 (^8) CO1.7, paragraph 17 of Overbury’s Report of Army Tribunal Team of 25(^{th}) March 1972. INFORMATION RECEIVED BY SIB
2B-19 According to WOI Wood:
_Belfast and country IS investigations were not instigated from a briefing note in the sense of an operations log circulated after the event. We did receive these logs but they came far too late to be of use to us._
2B-20 Time would always be of the essence and he again notes:
_It would not have been possible to accomplish the amount of work we did if we had waited for a consolidated report of the night's events._
2B-21 Instead, the SIB would gather such information as it could from sources that were immediately available, such as radio reports or interim reports from RMP Operations or Brigade.
2B-22 WOI Wood recalled in oral evidence that:
_All the regiment, all the higher command would have in the way of a briefing that they could give us was that there had been a shot fired at this location, under these claimed circumstances._
2B-23 The situation was the same in the wake of Bloody Sunday. It is not surprising that the SIB received little information in advance of the investigation, when the express purpose of their deployment was to gather information for Command.
______________________________________________________________________
9 CW1.60, paragraph 31 10 CW1.60, paragraph 33 11 CW1.60, paragraphs 32-33 12 Day 383/152/20 BRIEFING TO INVESTIGATORS
2B-24 It follows that WO1 Wood was unable to pass much information to his men in advance of the interviews they were to conduct.
2B-25 His evidence was that:
Service investigators received no instructions before an IS enquiry... They were not told much beyond, say, that a patrol of X Company of Y Regiment in Z street had opened fire on some civilians and claimed to have hit them.(^{13})
2B-26 This is reflected in the evidence of INQ 2064:
In general... we were not briefed as to what the incident involved or what issues we were expected to cover with the witness. If we received any briefing at all, it was given in outline only by the Sergeant Major...(^{14})
2B-27 INQ 2064 expanded upon this in oral evidence:
Q. Would you have known anything about the soldier before he came into that interview room to speak to you?
A. In what respect?
Q. Would you have known what his particular involvement in the incident you were investigating was supposed to be?
A. No, not normally, no.
Q. Would you have known any details about his conduct in the past?
A. No.
(^{13}) CW1.61, paragraph 34 (^{14}) C2064.1, paragraph 6 Q. Would you have known how long he had been serving in Londonderry?
A. No. 15
2B-28 Corporal Brobson's evidence was to similar effect:
Q. Before you began an interview with a particular soldier, were you at least aware in outline of the circumstances of the shooting incident that that soldier had been involved in?
A. I do not think I was, no. 16
2B-29 He was challenged by Michael Mansfield QC:
Q. ...when you went you understood that people, civilians, had been killed; you knew that?
A. No.
Q. You did not even know that?
A. No.
Q. What did you know when you went?
A. Not very much. I am afraid.
Q. Is that right. that you did not even know that people had been killed?
A. I have really no recollection of details of deaths at this stage, the early stage.
Q. I do understand that, but you knew that people had been killed by soldiers, did you not, in general terms?
A. On this particular day?
Q. When you went to take statements?
15 Day 252/16/11 16 Day 275/110/2 A. No, I did not.
Q. Why did you think you were taking statements?
A. Well, because I had been detailed to.
Q. Just that?
A. Precisely.17
WOI Wood acknowledged that some of the investigators arriving in the wake of Bloody Sunday would have received no briefing at all:
Q. You say that you would then have briefed the interviewers before you started interviewing. Would this have been a group briefing or would you have briefed individuals as you tasked them to do particular statements?
A. We would have aimed to have a group, but it was inevitable that some would have turned up later.18
FEW SIB INVESTIGATORS WERE AVAILABLE IN THE WAKE OF BLOODY SUNDAY
There was only a small pool of fully trained SIB investigators to call upon. WOI Wood was in charge of a "very small" SIB detachment based at Lisburn.19 There was a single SIB investigator based at Londonderry, Sergeant Major INQ 1831, and he was absent on other duties on 30th January 1972.20 WOI Wood himself was absent on other duties for the week from 31st January.21
17 Day 275/130/10 18 Day 383/127/1 19 CW1.55, paragraph 2 20 CW1.67, paragraph 1; paragraph 9, C1831.1, paragraph 9 21 CW1.10, paragraph 62 He therefore had to draw on his personnel from Lisburn to assist with the Londonderry statement taking process. The limited briefing these men received was thus compounded in many cases by a lack of knowledge of Londonderry.
After WOI Wood left, investigators were also brought in from England.22
**NATURE OF INTERVIEWS**
The information sought at the interview stage was very basic indeed.
This much was reflected in the oral evidence of Assistant Provost Marshal Lieutenant Colonel INQ1383:
> Well, I think the crux of this was that I wanted them to concentrate their efforts on who had fired; how many rounds they had fired; who they had fired at; what the line of fire was; I wanted all the statements to be taken from every man who had fired and how many rounds and I wanted all this to be consolidated in a general plan so that we got to the truth of what actually had happened as quickly as possible.23
WOI Wood explained how this was interpreted in practice:
55. The statements were prepared in a very standard way. We would make a note of who the soldier was, what he was doing on the day, what he was armed with and where he was put on duty.
56. The interviews would be conducted in a question and answer session. We knew the sequence of events and we knew the information we wanted from experience of taking statements on other jobs...
______________________________________________________________________
22 e.g. WOI INQ 1835. 23 Day 304/99/18 57. ... in relation to the events of that day we had to work under great pressure of time and confined ourselves to compiling the normal contact reports.
58. There was no time to spend talking and then writing up afterwards, we just had to get down to business. The interviewer would write the statement out in longhand during the course of the interview and the interviewee would then sign it at the end of the interview. We would not write down what was said word for word as most of the interview was merely grunts; we would turn what we were told into what looked like a proof of evidence on the spot. The witness would not be sent a copy of the statement...24
2B-37 He was asked in oral evidence about his reference to the “grunts” that would come from the interviewees:
Q. That may be a slightly extreme description of the situation, but you were dealing with soldiers who may not have been particularly articulate, particularly after the type of situation they had been in?
A. (Witness nodding). That is exactly -- what you take is exactly right.25
2B-38 Warrant Officer 2nd Class INQ 1835 gave similar evidence, especially in relation to the compilation of what were essentially contact reports. He described how:
I took short, almost proforma, statements setting out that the soldier was on duty that Sunday and that he was at such and such a point and that he had occasion to fire. We took what were really very short statements identifying targets.26
24 CW1.9 25 Day 383/149/8 26 C1835.5, paragraph 29 The speed with which the statements had to be taken was an important factor. WOI Wood observed:
*The inability of the Army to issue an immediate and fully comprehensive explanation of the incident was damaging to relations with the community.*
The important interviews that led to the early RMP statements were therefore conducted by men who had a very limited understanding of what had taken place or where it had taken place, who were asking questions with a limited aim and who were under a considerable pressure of time.
**USE OF JUNIOR PERSONNEL**
RMP corporals, the largely untrained SIB "aides," were relied on to a heavy extent in the statement taking process that followed Bloody Sunday. In many cases, the least experienced personnel were taking some of the most important statements.
WOI Wood was questioned about this:
*Q.* The fact is: at the time you were involved, the SIB was overstretched with the work it had to do in the short period of time it had to do it?
*A.* Yes, we, we never had the luxury that we had an immense amount of time or resources.
*Q.* And you became reliant, to a heavy extent, on the use of your corporals, the junior personnel who were attached to your company?
______________________________________________________________________
27 CW1.55, paragraph 4 28 *pace INQ 2052, Day 252/5/20* A. They were invaluable, yes.29
2B-43 Yet, according to him:
None of these junior NCOs had received any formal training in law or investigative procedures. Some of them would have taken part in an in-theatre training course which was designed to instruct them in the procedures of taking statements from soldiers involved in IS incidents.30
2B-44 He accepted that the use of “some” in this paragraph indicated that there may have been corporals who had not received even the basic in-theatre training.31
2B-45 Sergeant Major INQ 1831 stated in his BSI statement:
Obviously it would have been good practice to interview those involved in the shootings first, using the most senior and experienced investigators available. Members of the RMP did some interviewing and recording of statements as well as SIB investigators. They were trainees and would not have recorded statements from those Paras involved in the shootings but only back-up and corroborative statements.32
2B-46 However, he was quite wrong to suggest that junior personnel had not been used to take the important statements. He accepted in oral evidence that the good practice could not, in fact, have been followed in the wake of Bloody Sunday.33
2B-47 What had happened was that statements were allocated as between fully fledged SIB investigators and RMP junior NCOs on a random basis. WOI Wood explained:
29 Day 383/154/6 30 CW1.67, paragraph 2 31 Day 383/155/3 32 C1831.2, paragraph 11 Shooting incident statements on Bloody Sunday were taken on a cab rank basis by whoever was available, whether an SIB investigator or [RMP corporal] statement-taker. Pressure of work and lack of resources made this necessary.34
2B-48 The statements taken by two RMP corporals serve as good examples:
2B-49 Corporal INQ 1855 had taken thirteen statements by 1800hrs on 1st February 1972. All were from soldiers who had fired live rounds, although it is right to note that the final six were secondary statements.
2B-50 Corporal Brobson, who was only eighteen at the time and had only been attached to the SIB since the end of 1971, took statements from a number of the soldiers who had fired live rounds and from the commander of one of the platoons most heavily involved.35
2B-51 The statements taken by Corporal Brobson and INQ 1855 are set out in the two tables OS7.59-60, reproduced below.
33 Day 258/143/15 34 CW1.62, paragraph 45 35 Day 275/125/6
### 2B-52
**Statements taken by Corporal INQ 1855 (OS7.59)**
| Date/Time | Statement taken from | |-----------|----------------------| | 30.01.72 | O | | 2130 | | | 31.01.72 | V | | 0025 | C | | 0130 | D | | 0200 | F | | 0240 | R | | 0630 | | | 01.02.72 | K | | no time given | | | 1400 | N | | 1430 | O | | 1710 | AC | | 1730 | AD | | 1745 | AB | | 1800 | AA |
### 2B-53
**Statements taken by Corporal Brobson (OS7.60)**
| Date/Time | Statement taken from | |-----------|----------------------| | 30.01.72 | Y | | 2130 | | | 31.01.72 | H | | 0210 | M | | 1235 | 119 | | 1320 | E | | 1400 | F | | 1410 | G | | 1420 | | A LARGE NUMBER OF STATEMENTS WERE TAKEN EACH DAY
2B-54 The limited personnel available, the pressure of time and the many soldiers to be seen inevitably meant that individual members of the SIB/RMP took large number of statements each day.
2B-55 Corporals such as Mr. Brobson and INQ 1855 took very many statements indeed. As appears from the table below, WOI Wood had taken nine statements by 0200 hours on 31st January, in eight cases from soldiers who had fired live rounds.
| Date/Time | Statement taken from | |-----------|----------------------| | 30.01.72 | flz 4/1118 |
36 OS7.59-60, infra 37 OS7.62 Interviewing on this scale might allow for the gathering of basic information in a short period of time but it did not result in carefully produced statements. Often no more than half an hour was allowed for an interview with a soldier who had opened fire, notwithstanding the fact that a civilian may have been injured or killed as a result.
**THE STATE OF SOLDIERS GIVING STATEMENTS SHORTLY AFTER THE EVENT**
The members of 1 Para. in question had left Holywood Barracks in the early morning of 30th January. They had travelled to Londonderry and waited there for some time before deploying into the Bogside. It is their evidence that during the deployment they came under attack and responded with live fire. Many were then required to give witness statements late at night or in the early hours of the following morning. Soldiers from the 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment (1 R ANGLIAN) and 22 Light Air Defence Regiment (22 LAD RA) were also questioned that evening and night.
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38 C1853.13 The soldiers would have been tired. It is common sense that a tired witness may not produce a good witness statement (and a tired interviewer may not take one).
WOI Wood felt he could not win:
*I was always aware that we might later be criticised, for example, by those representing the soldiers, whatever we did. If we saw the soldier early, there would be a suggestion that he was tired and confused and that we were not in possession of all the facts. If we left it until the soldier was rested, there would be someone who would claim that the soldier and his companions had had a chance to agree a story, or that the soldier's actual recollection had been changed by conversations with others who might have been involved.*
This did not unduly trouble him; his view was that the soldiers he and his colleagues saw were fit for interview. However, it is important to consider what kind of interview he was then considering. This was not a normal investigation; his overriding concern was to gather basic information as quickly as possible. In those circumstances, he was not prepared to wait to take statements from properly rested soldiers.
It is also material that the attitude of soldiers to members of the RMP was inevitably one of apprehension.
Soldiers were tired when they gave their statements, which were affected as a result. For example, Soldier C finished giving his statement to an RMP Corporal at 0130 hours on 31st January. He made certain corrections to it when he gave a further statement to the Treasury Solicitor on 5th March. He explained:
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39 CW1.59, paragraph 26 I would like to point out that when my statement was taken I had been up for over 20 hours and was exhausted. This could be why these mistakes arose.40
Sir Basil Hall, solicitor to the Widgery Inquiry was aware of the problem. He stated:
In my view the SIB statements made on the night of 30 January immediately after the events of Bloody Sunday were made under conditions which were likely to have been stressful and before any decision had been made to have a Tribunal of Inquiry. As stated in my memorandum of 16 March 1972 to Mr Ware,41 I did not regard such a statement given to the SIB as being a proper basis for examination in chief and for this reason fresh statements were taken from all relevant witnesses. As anyone who has taken witness statements will appreciate, there can be differences in the memory of events immediately after they occurred and after later consideration in less stressful circumstances. It does not surprise me therefore that there are some inconsistencies between what soldiers may have said to the SIB officers and that which is recorded in their statements to the inquiry.42
Denial of Judges’ Rules Protections
Time was of the essence. WO1 Wood noted:
HQNI’s requirement for the expeditious reporting of IS incidents was paramount. It was necessary to find a method of interviewing soldiers outside the constraints imposed by criminal legislation, mainly the Judges’ Rules relating to the giving of a caution.43
40 B68.018, paragraph 27 41 Mr Ware, Treasury Solicitor at paragraph 3, KH2.13 42 KH2.10 paragraph 31(a) 43 CW1.57, paragraph 15 The soldiers, therefore, gave their statements under compulsion, without caution and without representation.
WOI Wood acted deliberately to avoid such "constraints", notwithstanding the fact that many of the soldiers concerned had been involved in incidents in which live rounds had been fired with grave results. As he said in oral evidence:
_We knew that was the only way it could be done..._
**Statements given under Compulsion**
Following his posting to Lisburn, WOI Wood suggested to the Assistant Provost Marshal, Lieutenant Colonel INQ 1383 that a protocol be drafted to deal with the situation following an Internal Security incident. His proposal included:
_Military witnesses to be required to make their statements or reports as part of their military duties and to be under compulsion to answer questions put to them._
This proposal was adopted.
WOI Wood's understanding was that, in so acting, he would not compromise the interests of the soldiers he interviewed because, following the case of Smith, they could simply be re-interviewed with all of their legal entitlements:
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43 Day 383/158/7\
45 Day 383/159/2\
46 CW1.56, paragraph 10(iii)\
47 INQ 1384 at Day 304/140/18\
48 (1959) 43 Cr. App. R. 121 The practical effect of this process was that the question of self-incrimination did not arise in any initial IS investigation into what had happened. The soldier's mandatory statement was not a bar to subsequent investigation undertaken in accordance with the Judges' Rules that would protect his interests.49
2B-70 This is not the place to debate whether WOI Wood was in fact correct. We accept that this was his honestly held belief. However, in the second round of interviews that followed the establishment of the Widgery Inquiry, the element of compulsion was deliberately continued. Lieutenant Colonel Overbury recounted how:
...all the soldiers involved were ordered to attend a meeting at their barracks. I was introduced as an officer from the Army Legal Services. I then explained to them [what] my duties were in respect of the Inquiry ordered by the Prime Minister. I then formally ordered them, on the authority of the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland, to make such further statements as were necessary, to make all statements relating to the events under inquiry available to the Tribunal and to give evidence thereon at the Tribunal. I then told them that I had the authority to inform them any statement they had made or would make or any evidence they gave to the Tribunal could not and would not be used in evidence against them in any subsequent proceedings arising out [of] their actions on 30 January 1972.50
2B-71 Whereas WOI Wood justified the use of compulsion on the basis that it was the only way he could get at the information in the time available to him, Colonel Overbury suggested its continuation was, paradoxically, to protect the soldiers. They were being protected from incriminating themselves in the very statements they were being forced to make.
49 CW1.58, paragraph 20 50 CO1.3, paragraph 12 Soldiers were not cautioned
2B-72 WOI Wood's evidence was that:
In no case did we take any contact report statement under caution.51
2B-73 A caution was not necessary, he felt, where the interviewers were not making an assessment of criminal responsibility but were simply there to find out what had happened.52
2B-74 The situation persisted once the Widgery Tribunal had been announced. The further interviews conducted by the SIB were again without the benefit of caution. Colonel Overbury commented:
This investigation was not a criminal investigation. None of the soldiers had been charged with any offence and I was certainly not aware that any was even suspected by the military authorities of having committed an offence.53
2B-75 In oral evidence, he confirmed that he believed no caution was necessary:
Q: So far as that investigation is concerned, would any of those statements have been taken under caution?
A: No, sir, because that would have been for the purpose of the Tribunal of Inquiry, and it was not necessary to caution soldiers for that purpose.54
51 CW1.2, paragraph 5 52 CW1.48 53 CO1.42, paragraph 27 54 Day 243/11/5 Soldiers were not represented
2B-76 The soldiers received no advice in advance of their interviews and were not represented at them. Yet, the statements were being taken about an event that was bound to be controversial. In theory an interviewee could ask for his officer to be present at such interviews but in practice it did not happen at all.55
2B-77 The interests of the soldiers were simply never considered during the RMP statement taking process.
2B-78 With hindsight, Colonel Overbury realised that the soldiers suffered as a result. His Report of Army Tribunal Team of 23rd March 1972 referred to the fact that:
Individual soldiers were required to undergo interview and to make statements so often that their memory and/or morale was affected. It is clearly essential for the soldier to have placed on record his account of events as soon as possible by a competent investigator. He should not, thereafter, be interviewed for further particulars until all further statements have been considered and analysed ...56
and that:
Consideration must always be given to the standing of the individual soldier at an early stage and legal advice should be obtained if there is any possibility that his evidence might incriminate him.57
55 CW1.9, paragraph 55 and C2052.1, paragraph 6 Day 252/17/3 56 CO1.8, paragraph 29 57 CO1.8, paragraph 31 It has now been established by the Ruling of the present Tribunal delivered on 20th July 1999, which rejected a claim by former soldiers to legal professional privilege in documents relating to the Widgery Inquiry, that, notwithstanding the grave allegations many faced, soldiers were not legally represented in those proceedings.
**OTHER MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE STATEMENT TAKING PROCESS**
**Maps**
Marked-up maps were attached to many RMP statements, showing the position of the soldier in question and of his target. Military witnesses have been questioned in detail about the positioning of arrows on maps, on the incorrect assumption that the soldiers placed them there.
WOI Wood's evidence was that the normal practice in Belfast during interview with a soldier was to refer to and mark up a map. The soldier would then sign the map at the end of the interview. As far as Bloody Sunday was concerned, it had been WOI Wood's evidence that:
> I had made enough copies of the plans of the area to enable one plan to be marked up in each interview and each of the investigators was given plans of the area to mark up and attach to the soldiers' statements. I cannot remember whether the plans had building names on it, but as the statements that we took contain place names, they must have done as neither the interviewees nor the interviewers would have known the names of the buildings otherwise.
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58 CW1.63, paragraphs 50 and 54 59 CW1.9, paragraph 52 This was qualified during his oral evidence by his acceptance that locations may have been described in the body of the statements and not marked on a map:
The question with regard to the marking up of the maps, if they had had sufficient copies, then I would have expected them to use marked-up maps. If they had not had sufficient copies, then I would have expected them to use the map for explanation purposes and to make it clear in the text of the statement, exactly what they were talking about.
Q. One possible scenario is that there was a map that could be consulted or looked at for place names, street names and the like, but there were not sufficient copies of it for it to be marked up at that time?
A. That is a possibility.
Q. And that would, therefore, result in a description in a statement rather than a marked-up map?
A. Yes, in any statement in any case there would be the two, the soldier would describe in the body of his written statement where he was and where other people were and he would also mark that on the map if the map was available.60
The evidence strongly suggests that maps were marked up by persons unknown at some stage after the statements had been taken. Not one of the maps is signed by the relevant soldier.
WOI Wood, therefore, stated:
The possibility is that during the follow-up inquiry someone said, now we have got maps, we will use them and they were created at that time. Or it is possible that the maps were created from the text of the statement the soldier had made.61
60 Day 383/160/2 61 Day 383/161/1 The case of Soldier A provides a good example of how and when maps were used by the RMP. His RMP statement contained a description of his own position and that of the nail bomber he engaged. It made no reference to a marked-up map. Indeed, his subsequent "SA" statement to the Treasury Solicitor included a correction of the description but again no reference to a map. The map attached to Soldier A's statement is not signed by Soldier A and comes to us already typed up in a generic format.
The title "Plan of Shooting Incident which occurred in Londonderry on 30 Jan 72 involving Soldier..." is the same as that which occurs on most RMP maps, with only the soldier's letter changing. Even the description of the
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62 B1 63 B9 target is generic with: "Position of gunman/bomber" allowing for one of the options to be struck through. The typing, use and shape of boxes and shape of arrows remain the same throughout the RMP maps.
2B-87 Added complications arise from the fact that the map which was used for marking was not itself up to date. It shows, at the most critical location, buildings which were no longer there at the time of Bloody Sunday. It is unfortunate that this was not appreciated at the time when the soldiers were being questioned, when the map was being marked up or when criticisms were made by Prof. Walsh and in Counsel to the Inquiry's Report concerning the precise location of an arrow in what was mistakenly described as the "alleyway".
2B-88 There is evidence to support WOI Wood's suggestion that maps would have been available at interview to consult – if not to mark up. However, the maps used at that stage may not have been very clear. Soldier A, for example, referred to the confusion caused by the use of "a one inch map" on which he could not locate his position exactly.
2B-89 It was Colonel Overbury's view that maps were generally not as helpful to the soldier as photographs. His Report of Army Tribunal Team concluded:
Much greater use must be made of photographs in the interviews of witnesses, whose accurate recollection of facts is more likely to result from the study of photographs than from maps.
64 B3 65 The laundry building on the south side of William Street is shown on the RMP map but was no longer standing at the time of Bloody Sunday, as photographs such as P201 demonstrate. 66 B20.026 67 CO1.8, paragraph 30 For all of these reasons, it would be dangerous to place much reliance on the RMP maps. It would certainly be unjust to hold individual soldiers accountable for apparent discrepancies that exist between RMP maps and subsequent descriptions or marked-up photographs.
Timings
It is now apparent from the evidence of WOI Wood that timings which appear in RMP statements may have come from his briefing, rather than from the soldiers themselves.
His evidence was that:
I would have asked at Brigade HQ what the sequence of events was and then I would have briefed my men on the basis of that information. I don't think I was given the logs; I think the information was merely passed on orally. Therefore, the timings of events in the statements would have been from briefings that I would have given.68
He confirmed this in oral evidence.69
Terminology
Where relevant, a soldier would usually inform his interviewer that he had seen a specific type of weapon, such as a rifle. However, it was RMP policy at the time to replace specific references with less definitive terminology, for reasons WOI Wood explained in his oral evidence.
68 CW1.8, paragraph 51 69 Day 383/128/21 For example, the RMP statement of Soldier M refers to his sighting of two crawling men pushing:
*long black stick shaped objects.*
Soldier M commented about this phrase in his Eversheds statement:
*I am sure I would not have said this; I would have been quite firm in that interview that the two men were carrying what I was sure to be weapons.*
Corporal Brobson, who took M’s statement, agreed that the phrase might have come from him and not from M.
WOI Wood took the statement of Soldier AC, which records both:
*I saw he was holding a long straight object in both hands. He had hold of the object as if it were a rifle.*
and:
*I saw a puff of smoke from the long straight object and heard the sound as of a shot fired.*
WOI Wood was asked during his oral evidence:
*Q. Is that the kind of language that would have been used by the soldier or is that the type of non-leading terminology something that you might have inserted?*
*A. The soldier would say it was a rifle. He was quite clear it was a rifle from the outset. We had had situations put to us that the man may well have been carrying a walking stick in an* unorthodox manner, or whatever. If we had said in the statement that the man was carrying a rifle when he was first seen at some 100 yards or whatever, someone would say what sort of rifle was it, bolt or piston-operated, did it have a long or short magazine, straight or curved magazine -- if the soldier said it was this or that or the other, then the accusation would be that he had the eyes of an eagle and that was totally impossible. If he said he could not remember it had a long or straight magazine, the question would come back that he was obviously mistaken and therefore it must have been a walking stick.
So we adopted the position that what was seen was a long straight object, if it was talking about a rifle. If it was a handgun, then obviously we had a different terminology for that. If it was a blast bomb, we had different terminology for that...
2B-100 The absence of a reference to a specific weapon in an RMP statement does not, therefore, signify that the soldier concerned was unsure of what he had seen. Furthermore, it does not follow that his reference to a specific weapon in a subsequent statement marks a hardening of his evidence.
2B-101 We will, where appropriate, comment on examples of the questioning of individual soldiers on the misconceived basis that he choice of phrases such as "long black stick shaped object" was theirs.
CONCLUSION
2B-102 RMP statements were gathered for the purpose of getting basic information up the chain of command or to the Army Widgery Legal Team as quickly as possible. They were never intended to stand up to the detailed scrutiny of a public inquiry. In many cases, junior RMP NCOs were detailed to take statements, including some of those from the soldiers most involved in the day's events. Individual interviewers had to take large numbers of statements over a short period of time. The end result was often a brief statement which did not cover all of the potentially relevant evidence the soldier had to give. Soldiers gave interviews under compulsion, without caution and without the benefit of legal advice or representation. Interviews that took place on the night of Bloody Sunday and in the early hours of the next day were conducted with soldiers who were inevitably tired, by investigators who were armed with little background information.
In those circumstances, it would neither be safe nor fair to hold a soldier accountable for all inaccuracies in, omissions from, or inconsistencies arising from his RMP statement or statements.
2B-III THE WIDGERY INQUIRY STATEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Mr Basil Hall (later Sir Basil Hall) of the Treasury Solicitor's Department was appointed as Solicitor to the Widgery Tribunal. In that capacity he was responsible for the gathering of evidence for the Tribunal.
The evidence was produced in the form of witness statements obtained as a result of interviews conducted under the direction of Mr Hall by lawyers from the Treasury Solicitor's office. Mr. John Heritage, Mr. Chris Leonard, Mr. Michael R. Hirst and in some cases by Mr Hall himself. The Tribunal has
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74 Day 383/150/14 75 See Chapter 8B. 76 KH6.2 paragraph 4. copies of anonymised versions of all of these statements. These copies are all unsigned and undated. The original statements (whether signed or not), the manuscript drafts and the notes of interview have not been traced but the Tribunal has heard evidence of the procedures that were adopted.
2B-107 It is clear that the Solicitor and his staff worked in very difficult circumstances and under great pressure of time. In a very short period, they interviewed and obtained statements from 52 civilians, nine RUC Officers, 46 media witnesses and 58 military witnesses. The statements from military witnesses were given the reference prefix S.A. (Statement Army) and a number.
THE PURPOSE AND PROCEDURE.
2B-108 After referring to the statements taken by the RMP, to which he referred as "SIB statements", Mr. Hall in his post-Widgery Report said:
I would not myself regard a statement given to SIB as a proper basis for an examination in chief and, accordingly, fresh statements were taken from all whom it seemed probable would be called...
2B-109 The statements were prepared as the evidence in chief but, in the event, the military witnesses were taken through their evidence by Counsel representing the Ministry of Defence.
2B-110 Guidance notes for those involved in the process had been prepared by Mr. Hall. The notes specified that questions would be based on information the
77 KH2.3 paragraph 11. 78 KH2.15, paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 8. 79 KH2.13. 80 KH2.21-23. Tribunal had received, but witnesses were not to be shown copies of statements by other witnesses or any other material in the possession of the Tribunal.81
Those taking the statements of soldiers had access to the RMP statements that had been made previously by most of the relevant soldier witnesses.82 The interviewer was usually on his own83 and the interview took the form of questions and answers. The soldiers were usually accompanied by an Officer from Army Legal Services although that representative was not acting on behalf of the soldier. Colonel Overbury stated in his evidence:
Q. Simply to help Lord Saville with his question, do you recall whether there was any debate, despite the strained relationships between Counsel and the solicitors involved, as to whether anybody was acting for the individual soldiers?
A. No, sir. It was impossible for the Directorate of Army Legal Services to act for individual soldiers. They cannot do it. They have to be represented by outside Counsel.
Q. That of course did not happen in this case?
A. No, sir.
LORD SAVILLE: And the Directorate of Army Legal Services would know that, would he not?
A. He would, sir, yes.84
Mr. Heritage thought that he made a verbatim note, by way of statement, and read it over to the witness and that thereafter a fair copy would be made for signature. In one instance, he believes a typist may have been present to take
81 KH2.23. 82 KH6.3, paragraph 6 83 KH2.4, paragraph 12 84 Day 243/125/7 -20 down the statement for immediate signature or forwarding to Counsel as a corrected draft and in another case, (Soldier 027), the initial draft was prepared from the RMP statements.85
2B-113 The position with regard to signature of the statements is far from clear. No signed versions have been produced but both Mr. Hall86 and Mr. Heritage87 believe the statements were signed. There was some speculation that statements were sent to Army Legal Services for them to obtain signatures but there is no firm evidence of this.88
THE SPEED OF THE EXERCISE.
2B-114 The Widgery Tribunal was formally opened on the 14th February 1972 and a direction was made to the effect that all witnesses be interviewed and statements taken from them. The oral hearings began on the 21st February and were underway before the military witnesses were interviewed and made statements.
2B-115 There was clearly intense pressure on those taking the statements. Mr Heritage speaks of the team
... often struggling to keep pace with the large number of witnesses who were giving evidence each day89
and states:
85 KH6.4, paragraph 8 86 KH2.4, paragraph 15 87 KH6.4, paragraph 8 88 Day 250/159/18 89 KH6.2 paragraph 4 I retain a faint recollection that on occasions, under heavy pressure of time, we shortened our procedure either by having a typist present to take down the statement for immediate signature or by forwarding the statement to Counsel in the form of a corrected draft. In at least one case (Soldier 027) I proceeded by using the SIB statement as a basis, obtaining and recording more detailed evidence on important points.90
2B-116 Mr. Hall, in his report dated 16th March 1972, outlined lessons to be learned from events and suggested more people should have been involved in assembling the evidence. He said:
In the situation in which we were, we were at time only one day ahead of the Tribunal and in some cases witnesses were examined on draft, unsigned statements.91
CONCLUSIONS
2B-117 These statements were drafted by lawyers and not by the witnesses. They were the product of interviews subject to severe time constraints conducted by interviewers who were under pressure to produce the statements quickly from soldiers who had received no legal advice but who had effectively been ordered to make them. There is some evidence to suggest that not all of them were signed by the witnesses, but the information available does not reveal which ones may have fallen into this category. Having regard to all of the circumstances, it would be unfair for the Tribunal to hold against individual soldiers the fact that certain matters are not contained in their statements.
90 KH6.4, paragraph 8 91 KH2.14. The present Inquiry has the advantage of a complete transcript of the oral evidence given to the Widgery Inquiry in Coleraine in 1972.
A number of witnesses before the present Inquiry have stated in their evidence that, while they now have no recollection of a given event on Bloody Sunday, if it was referred to in their evidence to the Widgery Inquiry then it did in fact occur.
In assessing the weight which should be accorded to the different categories of evidence before it, the present Tribunal may consider that, in general terms, the oral evidence of witnesses before the Widgery Inquiry in 1972 is likely to have been founded on a more accurate recollection of what occurred than more recent accounts. Of course, a witness could have been mistaken both in 1972 and today and a witness who was intent on lying would have been as capable of attempting to do so in 1972 as today; but a truthful witness would have been much more likely in 1972 to have had an accurate recall of what occurred.
Whatever view is taken of the many criticisms which have been made of its procedures, the Widgery Inquiry undoubtedly had the advantage of having been convened immediately after the events of Bloody Sunday. As a result, the events would have been fresh in the minds of those who gave oral evidence.
Moreover, the oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry was tested by cross examination. It is, of course, the case that that Inquiry has been criticised on the ground that the questioning of soldiers might have taken a different course in certain particulars if Mr. McSparran had been supplied with copies of the statements made by soldiers to the RMP. However, having regard to the nature of those statements, the purpose for which they were produced and the circumstances in which they were taken, it is our submission that the significance of those statements has been greatly exaggerated for reasons considered at length in Section 2BII, above.
While it is the case that certain difficulties have been experienced in understanding some parts of the evidence given in 1972 - we have in mind, for example, the failure to trace the scale model of the Bogside produced for the Widgery Inquiry and the difficulty in interpreting precise locations referred to by witnesses - the present Inquiry is, in our submission, likely to find the oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry of assistance. CHAPTER 2C
EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY THE PRESENT INQUIRY
2C-1 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE FROM GOVERNMENT SOURCES.
CONTEMPORANEOUS GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
2C-1 The present Inquiry has the great advantage of having received disclosure of contemporaneous documents produced by the United Kingdom Government and the Government of Northern Ireland, relating to the situation in Northern Ireland and in Londonderry in particular, in the months preceding Bloody Sunday, the prospect of and planning for the civil rights march and the immediate aftermath of Bloody Sunday.
2C-2 These documents bear a range of markings. Many are marked "Secret" or "Perimeter". In the normal course of events these documents would not have been expected to be disclosed to the public for many decades, if ever. As Mr. Christopher Clarke QC observed in opening:
All of this material was, in 1972, highly secret. Most of it is stamped with the words "secret", "restricted", or "Perimeter" or all three. But for the existence of this Inquiry much of it would still be either secret or unknown.¹
2C-3 Some idea of the range of documents disclosed is apparent from the following remarks of Mr. Clarke in his opening statement.
The materials to which I have been referring at some considerable length include the following: minutes of GEN 47, the relevant Cabinet Committee; minutes of the Northern Ireland Cabinet; minutes of the Joint Security Committee of Northern Ireland; minutes of the Director of Operations Committee of Northern Ireland; minutes of the Northern Ireland Policy Group or Northern Ireland Policy
¹ Day 3/98. Committee of the Ministry of Defence; current situation reports of the Ministry of Defence; intelligence summaries of Headquarters Northern Ireland; operational summaries of Headquarters Northern Ireland; internal security instructions from Headquarters Northern Ireland; directives from the Commander of Land Forces and an appreciation of the military situation by him; operational directives for the headquarters of the 8th Infantry Brigade; intelligence summaries of the 8th Infantry Brigade; papers and briefing notes at the highest level both in the military and in Government, including but not limited to, briefs to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to the Secretary of State for Defence and others from, amongst others, the Chief of the General Staff and the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence.2
2C-4 As a result, the present Inquiry is as well placed as it could be at this late date to assess the conduct of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Governments in relation to Bloody Sunday.
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE REPRESENTATION OF THE ARMY BEFORE THE WIDGERY INQUIRY
2C-5 The disclosure provided by the Government included documents relating to the representation of the Army before the Widgery Inquiry in 1972 which remained in the possession of the Government.
2C-6 As a result, this Inquiry has been given copies of all surviving documents relating to the representation of the Army before the Widgery Inquiry, including briefs to counsel and notes prepared by counsel. The Inquiry has disclosed this material to all interested parties.
INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS RELATING TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
2C-7 In January 1999, at an early stage in this Inquiry Mr. Lawton requested that the Inquiry should, as a matter of urgency, approach the security
2 Day 3/97 to Day 3/98 services, and particularly GCHQ, with a view to inviting them, and if necessary requiring them, to produce whatever information they possessed in relation to the activities of terrorist organisations which was relevant to the Inquiry's search for the truth. This request was repeated on a number of occasions thereafter.
2C-8 On 21st February 2001, Mr. Tate, the Solicitor to the Inquiry, wrote to the interested parties setting out the Tribunal's "preliminary thoughts" on the issue of civilian witnesses and intelligence material. The interested parties were invited to submit written submissions on this issue in advance of an oral hearing. That hearing, at which the security services were represented, took place in May 2001 and resulted in a Ruling of the Tribunal dated 1st June 2001.
2C-9 In that ruling the Tribunal decided to seek disclosure of certain categories of directly relevant intelligence material from the security services. It rejected the submission on behalf of some of the families, that it should not seek disclosure of this directly relevant material.
We cannot accept this submission, since it seems to us that we would be in derogation of our duty to conduct as
3 Letter from Mr. Lawton to Mr. Ridd, Solicitor to the Inquiry, 13th January 1999.
"It seems to me therefore that, as it appears that the Tribunal has not been successful in identifying any of the gunmen by interviewing the civilian witnesses so far, it should now as a matter of urgency approach the security services, and particularly GCHQ, with a view to inviting and, if necessary, requiring them, to produce whatever relevant information is available. By "relevant information" I have in mind particularly not only information from sources within the Bogside (be those informers, phone taps, other intercepted communications, information obtained during subsequent investigations, or any other source) about what actually happened and which civilians were involved in firing shots on Bloody Sunday, but also any information (whether obtained before or after Bloody Sunday) relating to the planning of activities of and by, for example, the IRA on Bloody Sunday." thorough an Inquiry as possible if we did not at least investigate and consider what material of this nature was held by the agencies.
It rejected a submission that calling for this material would lead people to believe that it was not acting in an impartial and independent way and added
The fact that the Tribunal has asked the agencies to produce directly relevant material does not, as it seems to us, indicate any partiality or lack of independence, but merely a desire to explore all avenues of inquiry properly open to us.
The Tribunal had identified the following categories of directly relevant material.
(1) "Material that would add to the Inquiry's knowledge and understanding of the events of Bloody Sunday. In other words information that throws any light either on the plans made by any paramilitary organisation for Bloody Sunday or on the actual events of that day."
The Tribunal observed that the agencies had already been asked to produce this material and had assured the Inquiry that it had been produced.
(2) "Material that would identify those persons who are not presently witnesses before the Inquiry who might reasonably be supposed to be likely to have, or to be able to provide, information about the planning of the paramilitary organisations for Bloody Sunday or about the actual events of the day."
______________________________________________________________________
4 At paragraph 37 5 At paragraph 39 The Tribunal considered that this was too broad a formulation and that it would be a virtually impossible task for the agencies to search for this material. It therefore asked the agencies, at least in the first instance, to confine their search to material in the files of those individuals identified to them by the Inquiry, namely those individuals from or in respect of whom the Inquiry has or expects to have some evidence about Bloody Sunday.
(3) "Material in relation to the Inquiry's witnesses that contains information that tends to show or which permits one reasonably to suppose that those witnesses have, or are able to provide, information about the planning of the paramilitary organisations for Bloody Sunday or about the actual events of the day."
The Tribunal requested disclosure of this material.
2C-11 The Tribunal observed:
Despite the difficulties and delays that will be likely to attend the process, we repeat that it seems to us that our duty to explore all available avenues that could extend our knowledge of what happened on Bloody Sunday must lead us at least to start on the process of discovering whether the agencies have any directly relevant material, while appreciating that ... this may cause delays and we may not in the end be able to use some at least of that material.6
2C-12 The Tribunal correctly identified the crucial importance of this material. Its importance was increased by the fact that the Inquiry was clearly experiencing difficulty in establishing from civilian witnesses who had been involved in the various manifestations of the IRA at the time of Bloody Sunday. However, this fact also limited the effectiveness of the search requested under category 2.
6 At paragraph 48 However, the Tribunal declined to seek disclosure of certain other material which, the soldiers' representatives had maintained was directly relevant to the Inquiry's search for the truth. It did so in the following terms.
There remains the suggestion raised by the soldiers that we should add to the categories of relevant material any information in the possession of the agencies which relates to the general practice of paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland, for example their tactics, their use of vantage points and sniper positions, their use of crowds as cover, or their procedures for dealing with casualties or fatalities. As to this we accept the submission of Counsel for the agencies that this would again require a trawl through their entire files on the troubles in Northern Ireland. We further accept that a suggested limitation to the years 1968-1972 inclusive would be of no real assistance, since the files are not kept in date order. If any such information appears from materials relating to the list of identified individuals to which we have referred, then it seems to us that it can and should be provided, but to go beyond this seems to us to be a wholly impracticable suggestion.7
In our respectful submission, this part of the Tribunal's ruling has resulted in a most serious lacuna in the information which might have been made available and, as a result, has impaired the Inquiry's ability to discover the truth of what occurred on Bloody Sunday.
Unfortunately, there was, even following the Tribunal's ruling of 1st June 2001, a very considerable delay in making the material provided by the agencies available in any form to the interested parties. We do not underestimate the very considerable volume of work involved in producing, examining and redacting these documents. However, the fact that intelligence material on civilians became available only at a late stage has had a number of serious consequences for the Inquiry.
7 At paragraph 48 No provision had been made in advance for the allocation of ciphers to individuals who were now identified as having had involvement with terrorist organisations. When ciphers were allocated to these individuals, it was not possible to employ the same ciphers to link the individuals with other material before the Inquiry, which had been disclosed to the interested parties and the public, in which they had been identified by name. As a result there has been not only a loss of transparency in the Inquiry's proceedings but a loss of information to the interested parties which could have been avoided.
The impact of these matters on the proceedings before the Inquiry is considered subsequently in Sections 2D and 2F. INTRODUCTION
Following the creation of this Inquiry, a huge number of witness statements "BSI statements" were taken by solicitors acting on behalf of the Inquiry. The vast majority of these were taken by Eversheds, Solicitors.
The passage of time and its effect on memory are inevitably substantial obstacles in the path of this Inquiry's search for the truth of what occurred over thirty years ago. In this section we address the difficulties and dangers inherent in such an investigation after so many years, the procedures adopted by Eversheds in taking statements and the status and reliability of those BSI statements which are evidence before the Inquiry but which have not been tested by calling the witness to give oral evidence.
PASSAGE OF TIME AND ITS EFFECTS ON MEMORY
Introduction
In 1972, Noreen Donnelly gave a statement in which she recorded a number of events that she witnessed on Bloody Sunday, including these startling statements:
... a man said to me "Look at the man on the flats with a gun" But I was unable to see him... As I was about to enter the arch at Kells Walk a boy told me to go back. Don’t come in here as the boys have guns up in the flats. There are about thirty...
By the time she gave her BSI statement, there was not much of the day’s events that she could remember:
I’m afraid I have very little memory of events on Bloody Sunday and given that I made a statement at the time ... I see little point in going over this old ground. The detail in my original statement will obviously be so much better than anything I could remember today, even though I can’t recall any of the events recorded in it.
She identified a number of problems associated with an attempt to recall memories so long after the event:
The problem is that these events took place 30 years ago. That combined with the fact that everyone in Derry has seen television footage from Bloody Sunday for years and years means it is, in my view, useless to try and remember anything independently now. I’m very suspicious of long term memory anyway because I know it can play tricks. I do feel guilty that I can’t remember more but I have tried and I simply can’t.
She added:
I am totally amazed at people who say they can remember it all. I know a terrible thing like this affects people’s memory in different ways and sometimes you block things out but, quite honestly, after thirty years I am surprised anyone can remember anything.
The European Court of Human Rights recently commented on the difficulties inherent in a factual investigation into events which occurred many years ago. In Finucane v. United Kingdom (Application 00029178/95), Judgment of 1st July 2003, the Court held that the United Kingdom was in breach of the procedural obligation imposed by Article 2 ECHR. However, in considering the appropriate remedy it observed:
As regards the applicant's views concerning provision of an effective investigation, the Court has not previously given any indication that a Government should, as a response to such a finding of a breach of Article 2, hold a fresh investigation into the death concerned and has on occasion expressly declined to do so (Ülkü Ekinci v. Turkey, no. 27601/95, judgment of 16 July 2002, § 179). Nor does it consider it appropriate to do so in the present case. It cannot be assumed in such cases that a future investigation can usefully be carried out or provide any redress, either to the victim's family or by way of providing transparency and accountability to the wider public. The lapse of time, the effect on evidence and the availability of witnesses, may inevitably render such an investigation an unsatisfactory or inconclusive exercise, which fails to establish important facts or put to rest doubts and suspicions. Even in disappearance cases, where it might be argued that more is at stake since the relatives suffer from the ongoing uncertainty about the exact fate of the victim or the location of the body, the Court has refused to issue any declaration that a new investigation should be launched (Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, judgment of 18 June 2002, § 451). It rather falls to the Committee of Ministers acting under Article 46 of the Convention to address the issues as to what may practically be required by way of compliance in each case (cf. mutatis mutandis, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 1 April 1998 (Article 50), Reports 1998–II, p. 723, § 47).
We draw particular attention to the Court's observations on the passage of time and its effect on evidence. The Court was there concerned with the murder of Mr. Finucane which took place on 12th February 1989, some 14 years before the judgment. In the present Inquiry the Tribunal is asked to make findings in relation to events which occurred more than twice as long ago. The deleterious effect on a witness's memory of the passage of time, the risk that recollections may become contaminated by information received from other sources and the fact that the memory can play tricks create substantial problems for this Inquiry. These matters are considered in greater detail below.
Memory Loss
Memories fade over time. The earliest BSI statements were taken over a quarter of a century after the events described in them. Statements were still being taken well over thirty years after Bloody Sunday. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the solicitors taking them were faced with a number of witnesses who could no longer recall what they had seen on the day.
For the purposes of submissions regarding memory loss, we have deliberately considered witnesses who gave accounts, however brief, in 1972. In that way comparison can be made between their description of a specific event then and the state of their recollection now.
Detective Sergeant Cudmore made a statement shortly after Bloody Sunday. It records that he was on duty in the area of Great James Street where he witnessed rioting, the use of baton rounds and gas, and the deployment of Paratroopers through military barriers. He also heard low velocity gunfire. Yet he retains no memory of this at all:
I can see by reading a statement which I made at the time, that I was on duty in Great James Street on the day of the march. I can recall coming back to Londonderry from Belfast on the morning of the march. There was mammoth traffic jams because the Army had set up road blocks and I was concerned that I would be late starting work. However, apart from this, I have no recollection of what happened on the afternoon of the march. Although my statement shows that I was on duty in the City Centre that afternoon, I have no memory of being there to police the march.... I have no memory of seeing the Civil Rights march, and I honestly have no recollection of what I heard and saw that afternoon.\\textsuperscript{12}
2C-28 He further has no recollection of interviewing six of the Bloody Sunday injured in the weeks that followed.\\textsuperscript{13}
2C-29 Ken Murphy witnessed the shooting of a youth in Glenfada Park on Bloody Sunday, according to the brief statement he made the next day.\\textsuperscript{14} He gave his BSI statement twenty-eight years later, by which time he could no longer recall what he had seen:
4. I went to the flat a couple of weeks ago and stood outside for 20 minutes or so trying to recall what I had seen on Bloody Sunday. I am afraid it was a total blank.
5. I gave a statement in 1972 about what I saw on Bloody Sunday, and this is attached. Now I can remember absolutely nothing about what is described in this statement, nor giving the statement itself. However, if I said it at the time then it was true.\\textsuperscript{15}
2C-30 Perpetua Gray’s brief statement from 1972 recounts events she witnessed in Barrack Street.\\textsuperscript{16} Her BSI statement was taken almost thirty years after Bloody Sunday.\\textsuperscript{17} She could recall nothing of the events when she gave that statement:
As I have said, I know I ended up in a house in Barrack Street but I don’t remember anything about coming out of the house or being with Brenda Doherty or seeing any soldiers. Brenda says in her statement at Appendix 2 that I
\\textsuperscript{12} JC26.005 \\textsuperscript{13} JC26.007 paragraph 13 \\textsuperscript{14} AM457.004 \\textsuperscript{15} AM457.3; signed 31\\textsuperscript{st} January 2000 \\textsuperscript{16} AO63.1 \\textsuperscript{17} Statement signed 26.10.01 talked to a soldier. I have no recollection of this but it sounds like the sort of thing I would do. I was certainly bold in those days. I don't remember the incident referred to the statement at Appendix 1 involving an injured man or the man being searched or the flash of the gun in the soldier's hand. All I have is a very clear memory that I had defied my father in the first place [by going on the march] and I had to get home before he did and even if I did get home in one piece I would never be able to tell anyone where I'd been.18
2C-31 The 1972 account now seems alien to her:
My husband has said to me that in the 24 years we've been married, not once can he remember that day ever being mentioned between us.... When he heard about the statements that mentioned my name he said to me "How could you have forgotten this?" I agree with him – if all that happened how is it I don't remember it? It feels as though these are somebody else's recollections, not mine.19
2C-32 The eight-line statement Margaret Gallagher gave shortly after the event records that she saw two people being shot on Bloody Sunday. She no longer recalled these significant incidents when solicitors took a statement from her for the purposes of this Inquiry, almost thirty years later. As in the case of Perpetua Gray, the statement she gave in 1972 is now unfamiliar to her:
5. It never occurred to me that anyone would want to talk to me about Bloody Sunday until some fella came to find me. I was actually at my brother's house when he called and he said that I had made a statement already and therefore I should come and give evidence to the new inquiry. At first I was so convinced I hadn't made a statement I said to him that they must have the wrong person....
6. I really would like to help the new inquiry and I can understand why, having seen the attached statement, people might think that I have some interesting recollections of the
18 AO63.003 paragraph 9 19 AO63.003 paragraph 10 day. However, this statement just doesn't register with me at all.20
2C-33 Ken Murphy, Perpetua Gray and Margaret Gallagher had only brief 1972 statements from which to try, unsuccessfully, to refresh their memories. Another witness was confronted with photographs of himself actually taken on Bloody Sunday – but could still not recall the incident depicted.
2C-34 It was suggested in the course of the proceedings that Ciaran Donnelly’s photograph P641 shows the stage at which Michael Kelly's body had been brought from the rubble barricade around the gable end of Glenfada Park North. Patrick Moyne has identified himself (indicated with an arrow) next to the group carrying the body.21
2C-35 P642 was taken by the same photographer shortly afterwards, as Michael Kelly’s body was carried within Glenfada Park North. Again, Mr. Moyne has identified himself with the group in the photograph (indicated with an arrow).22
20 AD83.002; statement signed 23.10.01 21 Day 162/31/8 22 Day 162/32/09 Mr. Moyne was apparently interviewed shortly after Bloody Sunday. The short note produced of the interview includes the following:
*Pat Moyne, pictured in Irish Times pic carrying Kelly body across glenfada park says that he believes that the body was put down at the entrance to the alley way leading into abbey park when firing started in glenfada. It was not until there was a lull in the firing that the body was taken in to No. 8 Abbey Park.* ...
Yet Mr. Moyne's BSI statement makes reference neither to the photographs nor to the events described in the interview note. It transpires that, notwithstanding the photographs and the note, Mr. Moyne no longer recalls having helped to carry a body.
This difficulty is particularly acute in the case of those witnesses whose first recorded accounts of Bloody Sunday were given in their BSI statements. They have faced particular difficulties in recalling events that took place so many years ago. This is for the obvious reason that they
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23 AM444.008 24 Day 162/32/18 gave no contemporary statements or interviews from which they could refresh their memories.\\textsuperscript{25}
\\textit{Memory Contamination}
2C-39 The loss of memory over time may be the most obvious of the difficulties faced by those taking statements for the purposes of this Inquiry, but it is certainly not the only one. Between Bloody Sunday itself and the provision of the BSI statements, witnesses' recollections have also been affected, or "contaminated", by information from many other sources. The witnesses have, consciously or subconsciously, often found it difficult to disentangle their own recollections from information they have since received from a variety of sources. For example, they may have discussed events with others involved; or read newspaper articles and books about the day, or watched television news, documentaries or films about Bloody Sunday.
2C-40 For the purposes of these submissions we refer to the evidence of three witnesses closely affected by the events of Bloody Sunday. They have had good reason to interest themselves in the large body of information produced since the day. Consequently, they are good examples of witnesses whose recollections are at risk of contamination.
2C-41 Michael Bradley, who was shot on Bloody Sunday, was quite clear about the dangers involved in giving a BSI statement so long after the event:
\\textit{MR CLARKE: Mr Bradley, do you have with you your statement which was sent to the Tribunal in September 1999?}
\\textit{A. Yes, I have a statement here in front of me.}
\\textsuperscript{25} See, for example, the evidence of Manus McDaid (\\textbf{AM 169; Day 407/124/9}) considered below at paragraph 2C-53. Q. I believe you want to make it clear at the start that the statement represents your best recollection of the events of Bloody Sunday, but that having read numerous articles and seen numerous programmes and talked to numerous people, you find it difficult to determine what you actually remember and what you have learned as a result of your researches; is that right?
A. That is correct.26
2C-42 Mr. Bradley was a particularly important witness. He was interviewed by Eversheds and he signed a BSI statement in which he said that his recollection was as clear as crystal and that he could see the scene as clear as if it was yesterday. (AB66.4, AB66.5, paras. 15, 17.) Nevertheless, when he came to give his oral evidence he drew the Tribunal's attention to the concern referred to above. He also made a number of corrections to his statement including one on the ground that he believed that he had been influenced by what he had seen and heard after Bloody Sunday.
2C-43 John O'Kane, who was Gerry McKinney's brother-in-law, has given similar evidence:
Q. ... you have told the Tribunal how difficult it is to separate out things that you believe happened in the light of conversations that you have had with other people; that is the truth, is it not?
A. That is the truth, yes.
Q. There is obviously, particularly if I may say so in the light of the tragedy that befell your family, a lot of conversation and people telling other people what happened and it is difficult to sort out what you can honestly remember yourself from the many, many stories that other people have told you about what they saw?
A. Yes.27
26 Day 94/1/10 27 Day 163/45/2 John Nash, whose father and brother were both shot on Bloody Sunday, suggested that he was alive to the same dangers:
... can I say as well, Mr Clarke, I have done extensive research, I have been researching many, many years into Bloody Sunday and basically what I have done here is try and leave out any of the research material that I have done. What I have done here is basically try to give to this Inquiry a true and as accurate account of the memories that I have.
Could I say as well that I have also contacted many, many witnesses in order that they come and give statements to this Inquiry and in contacting those witnesses, I have also had to listen to their memories of what they seen that particular day. So basically what I have -- what I am actually trying to say is, in giving this statement, although there may be inaccuracies within this statement, you know, I could have given a statement of 20 or 30 pages that could possibly have been accurate in every way, shape and form, but I wanted to give to this Inquiry the memories that I have, not the memories that other people have.28
However, Mr. Nash was not as successful in this regard as he claims. The version of events set out in his BSI statement has demonstrably been contaminated by information received from other sources. In that statement he discussed the shooting of Barney McGuigan:
As I was pushed through the other side of the Rossville Flats by the force of the crowd, I saw a man fall. I later found out it was Bernard or Barry McGuigan. I can't say which way he was facing or from where he was shot, I saw it all very quickly.29
The statement suggests both that Mr. Nash saw a person shot, and that the person was Barney McGuigan. However, Mr. Nash's oral evidence demonstrated that neither suggestion was necessarily correct:
Q. ... Can you say that he was shot?
28 Day 97/86/7 29 AN6.002 paragraph 13 A. I cannot.
Q. Did you see what happened to him?
A. I did not. There again, um, I was in a state of total shock and panic and there again it was just a glance again. Obviously through conversations that I had had, probably later on, someone had mentioned to me that this -- you know, Barney McGuigan was shot at or around that particular point and I automatically assumed...30
2C-47 It now appears that Mr. Nash saw a person fall, no more, and then made certain assumptions based on information he had received from others. Mr. Nash's BSI statement, read without reference to his oral evidence, therefore gives a very misleading account.
2C-48 The difficulties experienced by Messrs. Bradley, O'Kane and Nash will inevitably have been experienced, to varying degrees, by other witnesses. Witnesses honestly mistaken about what they actually saw themselves on Bloody Sunday may nevertheless appear to be coherent and convincing about what they describe in interview. The written BSI statements that result will contain no clues that some of the information they contain comes from or has been influenced by other sources.
Memory Distortion
2C-49 The memory can become distorted for a variety of other reasons. It is sufficient for the purposes of these submissions to refer to the fact that one's memory can play tricks, such a phenomenon becoming more likely the longer the period that elapses between the incident in question and one's attempt to recall it.
30 Day 97/85/23 John O'Kane also gave an account in his BSI statement of seeing Damien Donaghy and John Johnston shot, when he had not in fact witnessed the event:
I heard two or three distinct shots, which I recognised as gunfire. They seemed to come from the direction of Ritchie's factory. As the shots rang out, two men fell to the floor. At the time I was facing Columbille Court with my back to the Grandstand bar and the men were on my left about ten feet away from me, at the point marked D on the map. I actually saw the two men fall, I remember that one was an older man and that one was a young lad but I cannot remember what they were wearing or what they looked like. The men would have been standing amongst the other people in the crowd when they were shot [Emphasis added].
When Mr. O'Kane gave oral evidence to the Tribunal, he accepted in answer to questions from Christopher Clarke QC that he had merely been told about these shootings. Edwin Glasgow QC elicited how it came to be that he gave an account of actually seeing the men shot in his BSI statement:
Q. ... If you want to look at them, please tell me, otherwise I will not bother with the statements; you told Mr Clarke, who asked you questions first of all, that in your statement to Eversheds you had said that you actually saw the men fall and when that was written down, you honestly believed that was the picture?
A. At that time, yes.
Q. Yes, indeed. Indeed, in your supplemental statement, the last statement you have made so as to clear matters up to the best of your belief, you actually looked at that passage and said that you remembered those events in the way in which you had described them, particularly in that paragraph. Again, even at that date, you honestly believed you had seen the men fall?
31 AO48.2 paragraph 8, emphasis added. 32 Day 163/002/01 – Day 163/004/25 A. Yeah, well, that -- them supplementary statements that I made were 20-something years --
Q. Nearly 30 years?
A. Nearly 30 years after, but at the time, like I said in my written statement, that they were shot as we were going up in that direction.
Q. I am not criticising, and I entirely accept that, sir. The point I wanted was this: you yourself have had the experience that you can share with all of us, of actually having an honest mental picture of something that you believe you saw, although you subsequently come to realise that you could not have done; that is right, is it not?
A. Yeah, that is right. You are referring to the two that is shot at the back of the Grandstand Bar?
Q. Yes.
A. Yeah, on reflection I would say now that, you know, I did not actually see them, it happened before.
Q. Yes, and Mr Clarke helped you with your earlier statements, which you very frankly accepted, but it still does not alter the fact that when you truthfully made both your statements to Eversheds, you honestly believed in your own words that you actually had a mental picture of something that actually you had not seen?
A. That is correct, yeah.33
2C-52 It became clear that Mr. O'Kane did not, in fact, see the two men shot. Something had happened to his memory during the intervening three decades that led him to believe that he had. The BSI statement therefore contained an honest but inaccurate account of what the witness had actually seen on the day.
2C-53 Manus McDaid, who had no 1972 statement to which he could refer, gave the following very precise account of three officers standing on the Kells
33 Day 163/45/24 Walk pram ramp. The recollection, whilst no doubt genuinely held, is inaccurate; it is at odds with all of the other evidence received by the Tribunal.
17. I could also see three army personnel standing halfway up the pramway to the south of Kells Walk, about 30 feet away from me. They were standing at the southern-most end of the pramway, at the top of the first elevated section, before it doubled back and rose further in a northerly direction....
18. I believe these three men were officers. They had peaked caps rather than helmets, and carried three stars or studs on each of their shoulders. They were wearing normal khaki clothes, rather than camouflage battledress, and they did not appear to be wearing flak jackets or coats. They had short jackets on with webbing belts.
19. The three army officers were white and were standing in a line shoulder to shoulder looking south from the end of the pramway. Two of them were tall and quite young looking. The third, who stood between them, was older and shorter. The officer on the far right of the group had binoculars and appeared to be looking beyond the rubble barricade towards Free Derry Corner.
20. The officers did not appear to be carrying weapons although I could only see them from the waist up and they may have had pistols below my line of vision. They certainly had no guns in their hands. I was struck by how relaxed and casual they looked despite the gunfire going on around them. At no time did I see them crouch or take cover.34
2C-54 Mr. McDaid's memory has played tricks on him, whether or not he is able to acknowledge the fact:
Q. I should tell you that your evidence of three apparent officers being on the pram ramp is difficult to square with some of the evidence the Tribunal has heard and I do not think that any soldier or indeed any civilian speaks of someone shooting from the position where you saw the
34 AM169.003: map is at AM169.005 soldier fire six or seven shots. Is it possible that over the years your memory has played you tricks?
A. No. 35
Military Witnesses: Special Considerations.
2C-55 In this Inquiry a substantial number of the soldiers we represent face serious allegations of criminal wrongdoing. All have given their account in BSI statements. In a number of instances the passage of time has meant that they too have sometimes found it difficult to remember details about the day's events.
2C-56 An example is provided by Soldier M who was one of three soldiers to fire from the wall at Kells Walk at two men crawling from the rubble barricade towards the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. It has been suggested that he may have shot Kevin McElhinney. 36 His BSI statement includes a description of the moment when his attention was drawn to the crawling men:
... My next memory is of Soldier 039 pointing out two men to me. These men were south of the rubble barricade and were crawling along the western edge of Block 1 of Rossville Flats and were moving in a southerly direction. They were on their hands and knees, and both of them were carrying or dragging what looked very much like weapons of some kind... 37
2C-57 In his oral evidence he was pressed for further detail about this description. He explained the difficulty he faced in recalling events in such a degree of detail after such a long period of time:
Q. ...Again, if your impression as you have described it this morning is correct, [the weapons] would have been at least
35 Day 407/124/9 36 Counsel's First Report paragraph 15.5, page 18. 37 B372.004 paragraph 23 partly shielded from your view by the upper part of the men's bodies; is that not right?
A. I do not know, sir.
Q. Why do you not know?
A. Because I am relying on memories that are not clear and I believe that they were visible. If people are crawling with their body slightly raised, you can get clear views.38
2C-58 Soldier M gave his BSI statement over twenty-eight years after Bloody Sunday. His oral evidence was given a further three and a half years after that. He should not be criticised or disadvantaged in any way because his memory is no longer clear.39
2C-59 It is relevant to consider the analogous situation of a defendant in a trial at the Crown Court, where he is accused of an offence alleged to have taken place many years before. In such cases, the trial judge will be bound to refer to the issue of delay when summing up the case to the jury. In so doing, he or she may adapt the specimen direction, extracted below, which refers to the prejudicial effect of delay on those accused of offences:
We are now concerned with events which are said to have taken place a long time ago. You must appreciate that because of this there may be a danger of real prejudice to a defendant. This possibility must be in your mind when you decide whether the prosecution has made you sure of the defendant's guilt.
... You should make allowances for the fact that with the passage of time memories fade. Witnesses, whoever they may be, cannot be expected to remember with crystal clarity events which occurred [... ago]. Sometimes the passage of time may even play tricks on memories.
38 Day 365/091/17 39 M's BSI statement was signed on 24.03.00; he gave oral evidence on 15.09.03 (Day 365). You should also make allowances for the fact that from the defendant's point of view, the longer the time since an alleged incident, the more difficult it may be for him to answer it... You only have to imagine what it would be like to have to answer questions about events which are said to have taken place [...] years ago to appreciate the problems which may be caused by delay. Even if you believe that the delay in this case is understandable, if you decide that because of this the defendant has been placed at a real disadvantage in putting forward his case, take that into account in his favour when deciding if the prosecution has made you sure of his guilt.40
2C-60 In our submission the Tribunal would be bound to give considerable weight to these considerations when considering the position before this Inquiry of individuals facing grave allegations of criminal conduct.
THE EVERSHEDS PROCESS
Introduction
2C-61 In 2000 Mr. Peter Watkin Jones, the commercial litigation partner who headed the team of Eversheds solicitors taking BSI statements, was interviewed by Times journalist Fiona Bawdon. The resulting article appeared in the Law Supplement of the newspaper on 4th April 2000. The article, "Bloody Sunday – not just an exercise in memory", explained the technique employed in taking BSI statements and included the following statement:
The soldier walked in briskly and sat down. His account of his part in the events of January 30, 1972 ... lasted no more than five minutes. That's all I can remember, he explained.
Undaunted, the lawyer sitting opposite him began gently probing ...
Gradually, and to the soldier's amazement, a more detailed picture began tumbling out. Using a questioning technique
40 Crown Court Bench Book Specimen Directions, April 2003 update. called cognitive interviewing, the lawyer was able to access his long-closed memory. Eight hours later, the soldier was still talking.
Afterwards, drained, the soldier said: "I've told you things today I didn't know I knew. I've told you things I've never told my family.
His experience was far from unusual. Many of the 1,300 people questioned by Eversheds ... were also prompted into recalling events with startling clarity. The thousands of pages of signed statements that Eversheds amassed will form the basis of the inquiry...
2C-62 The article suggests that the cognitive interviewing technique, as employed by Eversheds, successfully unlocked memories, and that BSI statements drafted following interview contained detailed accounts of what witnesses had actually seen on Bloody Sunday. We consider below whether that really was the case.
Cognitive Interviewing
2C-63 The cognitive interviewing procedure has been developed in the past twenty or so years by psychologists such as the Americans Fisner and Geiselman. At its base is a set of principles derived from cognitive theory. The aim of the cognitive interview is to assist witnesses to retrieve recollections of particular events and thereby to obtain their testimony.
2C-64 Interviewees are encouraged to report everything they can remember about the event in question. They may also be asked to describe the feelings they experienced at the time and features external to the incident, such as the physical area in which they found themselves. This is done in an attempt to recreate the context in which memories were originally made. They may be asked to recall events in different temporal orders in a
41 See, for example, Fisner and Geiselman, Memory-enhancing Techniques for Investigative Interviewing. The Cognitive Interview. (1992). further attempt to unlock certain recollections. These techniques, derived from cognitive theory, have been enhanced by principles from the social psychology of communication, whereby the interviewer will, for example, try to establish a rapport with the interviewee. The technique as adopted by Eversheds led to interviews that generally followed the same pattern:
(1) The interviewee is greeted and the purpose of the interview is explained;
(2) The “Free Recall Stage”: the interviewee is asked to report everything he can recall of the day’s events;
(3) The “Detailed Recall Stage”: the account just given is probed and the interviewer attempts to prompt further recollections, by reference to maps or photographs if necessary; and
(4) Only at end, is reference made to earlier statements or accounts given by the interviewee in 1972 or over the years that followed.42
In addressing the use made of cognitive interviewing techniques on behalf of this Inquiry, we wish to emphasise that we accept that interviews have been carried out by Eversheds in good faith. Nevertheless, we do submit that the resulting product, the BSI statements, should be treated with some caution. In particular, we have concerns as to the nature of the interviewing techniques applied and the particular difficulties inherent in undertaking such an exercise in relation to events which occurred so many years ago.
There are great difficulties in effectively employing the technique in circumstances where recollections are unclear because of the passage of time or may have become contaminated by information from other
42 Donna Hoath of Eversheds briefly describes the typical interview at AR10.16 paragraph 3. sources. One should be wary of claims such as that made in the Times article that
"Many of the 1,300 people questioned by Eversheds ... were also prompted into recalling events with startling clarity."
Liam Mailey gave his BSI statement twenty-seven and a half years after Bloody Sunday. Understandably, there was much he could not remember when he gave his initial account to Eversheds interviewers during the "Free Recall Stage". The cognitive interviewing technique enabled him to flesh out these bare recollections, but not always with information about incidents he witnessed on Bloody Sunday. He was asked in oral evidence:
Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
A. The contents of the statement are accurate in as much as that is the statement that I made. However, given the techniques that were used to try and remind me of the day, I think this is probably a montage of various days that I was photographing rather than a single day.43
The topic was returned to later. Mr. Mailey found himself in a similar position to the soldier referred to in the article in The Times, in that initially he remembered relatively little of the day's events:
Q. -- you found, inevitably, that it became something of a "montage" was the description you used, I think?
A. Yes, yes. I think it is, I think the technique was quite good in as much as I went on that night up to London, um, they said "how much do you remember of the day" and I said "very little, other than inside the flats, but the rest of the day is a complete blank", and he got an awful lot of words from me.
However, this is achieved by describing an image which then I recognised and input some meat to it. However, it is
43 Day 163/93/22 quite difficult because I have been out there every single day, so some of the images were not necessarily of that day and I know that at least a couple of them subsequently turned out to be wrong.
Q. ... I am sorry to interrupt you, but it meant, did it not, that when the statement came back to you for your signature, it was not a question of it being unrecognisable, but you would not have expected a flowing statement such as was produced to have been possible when you first went to the interview?
A. Yes, I am very impressed with the technique, but it is not exactly precise.
...
A. I think what, what then happened subsequently is that you are shown your statement of several years ago and that turned out to be a better trigger.
However, I still have a considerable difficulty in remembering details of that day."
In Mr. Mailey's case, therefore, the cognitive interview produced a montage of events taken from a number of different days. This was not the desired effect but was perhaps to be expected after such a long period of time. The soldier interviewee from the Times article suggested that Eversheds had managed to unlock "things ... I didn't know I knew". His initial five minute recollection had been transformed into an eight hour discussion of the events of Bloody Sunday. It is possible that in his particular case uncontaminated recollections were indeed unlocked. We suggest, however, that such claims should be treated with extreme caution. The dangers identified by Mr. Mailey are inherent in all statements produced by the use of cognitive interviewing techniques.
44 Day 163/133/13 Hugh Gilmore's brother, Bernard, gave a BSI statement in which he described two incidents, that certainly did not take place on Bloody Sunday. The first concerned a group of soldiers at the Creggan cemetery:
2. After Mass that day, I went up to the Creggan through the moor. This must have been at about 12.00 noon. There is a cemetery there at the flashpoint at Brandywell. I noticed at the cemetery wall there were about 20 jeeps along the moor. A group of Paratroopers were standing there...
3. One particular para stands out in my mind. He had fair hair and tattoos everywhere on his hand. He was standing separately from the other paras, shepherding people past. I would say he was approximately 30 years of age and was 5'7". His chest was about 40" and he had blue eyes. I remember that he had no gaiters on his trousers. His rifle was strapped to his wrist and he was holding it...
Mr. Gilmore then described how the Paratrooper and his colleagues made intimidating and abusive comments at civilians as they passed by. When it came to his oral evidence, he was asked:
MR CLARKE: Mr Gilmore, do you have with you your statement of 14th July 1999 to this Tribunal?
A. I have, yeah.
Q. I believe that there are some corrections or qualifications that you would like to make to it?
A. Yeah, please.
Q. Firstly, in paragraphs 2 to 4, you describe an incident in the cemetery wall in the Brandywell in relation -- you describe the activities of somebody you think was a paratrooper. Am I right in thinking that you now think that that incident may have occurred at some time other than on Bloody Sunday?
A. Oh, it definitely did, yeah.
45 AG38.001 paragraphs 2 to 4 Q. When did it occur? A. I am not quite sure -- Motorman, maybe.
Q. You think it may have been Operation Motorman? A. Yeah.
Q. That is to say some considerable time after Bloody Sunday? A. Yes. it definitely occurred on another day.
The detailed description of the incident contained in the BSI statement was revealed in further questioning to have been "just something I related to Bloody Sunday" because: "...there were a lot of soldiers there and a lot of people being harassed...". He could not say when the incident actually took place, accepting it may not have been during Operation Motorman either.
Mr. Gilmore's BSI statement also contained a description of a barrier in Little James Street:
...I looked along Little James Street briefly. The Police had formed a barricade across the street. Behind the police were cameramen and photographers, perhaps 30 or 40. There were about eight or ten Landrovers parked up in front of the police. The police and the Landrovers were effectively forming a barricade across the street...
However, in oral evidence, Mr. Gilmore again accepted that this may be a reference to something that happened on another occasion:
Q. If we look at page 38.2, the second page of your statement, you have again, I accept honestly and helpfully, corrected the mistakes you made about what was going on at the barriers with the Land Rovers and the Pigs -- the
______________________________________________________________________
46 Day 087/194/2 47 Day 88/40/10 48 AG38.002 paragraph 11 barricade and the soldiers and the rubber bullets flying over from Chamberlain Street.
Again, if I may put it to you collectively, all together: are those things that may have been seen on another day or simply that you think your recollection is in any event at fault?
A. Could be, could be happening another day. It could happen another day and I just recall it Bloody Sunday, because most of the activity was happening on that waste ground so, um... 49.
2C-75 Mr. Gilmore's BSI statement, therefore includes detailed reference to these incidents but with no suggestion that they may, in fact, have occurred on another occasion. The following suggestion was therefore put to him:
Q. ... you will accept if we had simply read your statement we would have got a very, very misleading understanding of what you were trying to say to this Tribunal?
A. Exactly, yes, I understand that, yes. 50
2C-76 There are other instances which suggest that the reliability of detailed recall prompted by cognitive interviewing techniques is subject to some doubt. Pauline McDermott states at an early stage of her BSI statement 51:
I have tried desperately hard over the years to forget about what happened on Bloody Sunday. I don't know whether it is because of this or because my memory has faded with the passing of time, but I can't recollect with any great accuracy the events of that day.
2C-77 Nevertheless, the statement continues with a long and detailed account provided by her during a cognitive interview. Most strikingly, her
49 Day 88/41/24 50 88/42/13 51 AM186.2, para. 6 recollection at the time of making her BSI statement conflicted in many important respects with an account she gave on 1st February 1972.
Information Provided by the Interviewer.
2C-78 Further problems arise where the central tenets of the cognitive interview are not adhered to. The aim is to probe and to prompt the interviewee's own recollections. These are not obtained if it is the interviewer who provides the information. This is not to suggest that anything underhand has taken place. However, there is inevitably a risk that, in an attempt to prompt recollections or in a subconscious attempt to seek coherence between the statements of interviewees of a particular type, interviewers may supply particular details. There is evidence that this has occurred on occasion.
2C-79 Thus, for example, Simon Winchester observed in the course of his oral testimony:
...where there were two grassy slopes in 1972, there are clearly only one in 1999, and when the lawyer from Eversheds took me to suggest where I had gone after coming out of the gap between blocks 2 and 3 and gone up that flight of steps, I believe it is probable that I may have confused Fahan Street East which has a low wall to its -- well, behind me if I am facing into the Bogside -- with the much larger wall, the city wall, which I would have reached had I gone even further up the grass slope. So I think that answers in a way the altitude question, in other words, was I on Fahan Street or was I at the bottom of the city wall.52
2C-80 John Friel's BSI statement includes this evidence about the march on Bloody Sunday:
52 Day 116/173 ...our parents warned us to be careful and to watch ourselves. We had heard that there was to be no IRA involvement. People were told it was safe to march.53
Yet not all of that information came from him:
Q. The only other matter I want to ask you about is this: you have told the Inquiry that in one respect at least a suggestion was made to you by those taking your statement, the people from Eversheds, that then appeared in the statement as if it was your thought, the suggestion "people were told it was safe to march"?
A. I quite vividly remember where I gave the statement to Eversheds. There was two young ladies and while I was telling them that the IRA were not going to be in attendance at the march, one of them said to me "and people were told it was safe to march" and I have marked here in my statement, I nodded an assent, but those are not my words.54
2C-81 William Nellis's BSI statement contained the following account:
I crossed the road at Fahan Street West into Abbey Park...I recall that number 6, which was the end house of the first row of four, had its door open and a number of people around it. I have marked it with a D on the attached map (grid reference E14). I went in to the house and saw a youth who I knew was Joseph Mahon, my younger son's friend, lying on a sofa or couch...55
2C-82 It was Mr. Nellis's oral evidence that the number and precise location of the house he was referring to was inserted by the statement-takers:
Q. You have said in paragraph 19 of your statement that you recall seeing the youth you said it was in 6, Abbey Park. In fact the Tribunal has a statement from Isabel McCourt who lives at
... You will see in paragraph 6 that she refers to a young man who was injured and was lying on the settee; do you see that?
... you will see in paragraph 8 there she actually says that she later found out the man on the settee, on the sofa, was Joe Mahon.
If I could ask you to look at AM141.6, which is the map that was attached to her statement, and where she has marked --
A. I would like to make some correction here now: I did not say the number of the house, that was put on by the people who were taking the -- I, I mentioned the houses in this vicinity and they says "this would have been number 6", so I did not mention any number -- I did not see a number on a door, if that would be of any use.56
2C-83 INQ1799 was a member of C Company, 1 PARA. His BSI statement describes where he went after passing through barrier 14:
I believe that I turned left (south) into Chamberlain Street and when I was at about position A (grid reference O13) on the attached map, I remember seeing a civilian gunman directly in front of me...57
2C-84 Information about the route he took south came not from him but from the statement takers
Q. ... I have shown you video footage which shows you in the area of the waste ground at Eden Place. I have explained to you the evidence of Lieutenant 110. It raises the question that you may be mistaken when you say that you initially deployed down Chamberlain Street?
A. I have to say I do not think I am mistaken. It was put to me that I deployed down Chamberlain Street. I am afraid I did not read the signposts of where I was deploying at the time. What I can confirm is that the rioters we saw when we first deployed were in fact facing barrier 14, therefore on
56 Dav 165/48/13 57 C1799.004 paragraph 31 William Street; that left turn may or may not have been taken, but it is not a conscious memory on my part.
Q. You do not have a recollection of turning down Chamberlain Street?
A. No, I do not.58
He was questioned further about this:
Q. When you were initially asked you indicated, that is the Eversheds statement, that you went into Chamberlain Street?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. What you said when you were asked by Mr Rawat was that you were not mistaken about Chamberlain Street, it was suggested to you that you had gone into Chamberlain Street; who suggested it?
A. I think Eversheds, in the map that was up in front of us. There certainly was not a photograph like this.
Q. Why did you agree with it?
A. Because I did not have a distinct memory as to which way the pursuit had gone and that was a plausible explanation. We could have gone straight forward or to the left.
Q. It was not because you had a distinct memory?
A. No, it was not.
Q. When you told them you were aware, were you, that you could be completely wrong?
A. Not "completely wrong," no.
Q. Why did you not just say to them, "I cannot be certain"?
A. Because I was certain that I was pursuing a group of people to my front, um, and the exact direction of that pursuit could have been a straightforward frontal move or
58 Dav 314/140/22 it could have been off to the left. I was not in a position to be clear about the difference of those streets, having not really seen a map before.59
2C-85 His responses demonstrate the particular difficulties faced by an interviewee, who is asked about an incident that occurred many years before, by an interviewer who is also suggesting an answer.
2C-86 Gerry Doran was one witness who commented on how Eversheds pointed out to him that he had identified the wrong person in the wrong place, and he was told by his interviewers James Wray's location when he was shot.60
Failure to Reflect in the Statement what was actually said in Interview
2C-87 Eversheds produced written statements based on what had been said at interview. Inevitably, and appropriately, this would involve the transformation of often lengthy conversations into coherent written accounts. This is a difficult task and it was not always conducted successfully. The statements produced did not in each case include all of the relevant information imparted at interview, nor did they always accurately reflect what was said at interview.
2C-88 At the time of Bloody Sunday, Dick Grogan was a reporter with the Irish Times. He was interviewed by Eversheds but the statement produced subsequently omitted some of the information he had given. He was asked in oral evidence:
Q. Because you say -- I do not suggest you are seeking to resile from it -- that the witness statement we had is really a summary of a conversation?
A. Oh, yes.
59 Day 314/169/9. 60 Day 157/182/9. Q. You say "oh, yes" with some emphasis, sir, for the record; is that because you felt there was a bit more that you said than is in this summary?
A. Well, we spoke for quite a while, so obviously there was more. You know, I presume the person who summarised it chose to take what pieces he thought were most relevant.
Q. I do not seek to criticise the statement-taker, as far as you were concerned it was more a summary than your statement?
A. Oh, yes, yes.
Q. Did you feel, therefore, when you signed the statement that there were extra bits that you wanted to put in?
A. Not at that time. Certainly over the couple of years since and having had recourse to the evidence given here, certain things that I would have mentioned then would have seemed to me to have assumed more significance, such as my recollection of seeing a Saracen enter the Bogside at about 10 o'clock that morning.
At the time I thought pretty well nothing of that, I did not know was it a regular thing, but subsequently obviously I thought it might have been more significant and might have been dealt with in more detail.61
2C-89 The fault was not Mr. Grogan's. He could not have been expected to insert the missing information into his draft statement, when he himself was unsure of its relevance. This raises the question of what relevant information may have been omitted from other witnesses' statements.
2C-90 John Nash's BSI statement did not, according to him, accurately represent what he said at interview. He was asked in oral evidence about part of that statement:
Q. In the same paragraph, you have a sentence which reads:
61 Day 189/23/3 "I turned around as they came in. As the soldiers debussed they came out firing a large volley of shots."
I think you would prefer that to read:
"They came out firing a volley of shots?"
A. Can I say whilst making the statement at this particular point I myself became rather excited and I think the girl who was actually writing down what I was saying, the fact that I became excited, I was speaking very quickly and I think, no fault of the girl's, that she had great difficulty in understanding what I was trying to say. At that time as well I can quite clearly remember that we had a tea or coffee break and the paragraphs from 9 to 11 are basically the same conversation that I was having, so we have, you know, more or less, in a full conversation, that conversation is broken down by -- into paragraphs, which is not really in any sense a true reflection of what I was trying to say. But as I say, no fault of the girl, it was probably, and I would accept that that was my fault.62
2C-91 We do not suggest that the Eversheds interviewers had an easy task, particularly when dealing with excitable witnesses. However, an incident such as Bloody Sunday will inevitably result in excitable and emotional interviews in some cases. It is the task of the interviewers to ensure they have understood what has been said, and then accurately to reflect that in the written statement. A statement that does not provide a "true reflection" of what was said at interview is flawed.
Failure to obtain pertinent Documentation
2C-92 It has also been established that Eversheds interviewers did not always seek all relevant documentation from the witnesses they were interviewing.
62 Day 97/77/19 Simon Winchester had significant information to give and, as a journalist, potentially important written records to which he could refer. The interviewing solicitors were apparently not interested in the records:
Q. ... The only question I would ask you is this: you openly told the solicitors to the Inquiry that you might have your old notebooks and you would look for them. This is not a criticism of you, but did Eversheds not ask you to see if you could produce your notebooks for them?
A. In a way that I was relieved to find was rather casual, they did not. I say "relieved" because it would be incredibly onerous to look for them.
Q. Eversheds struck you as being casual when it came to discussions about your notebooks, notwithstanding the fact that your statement referred to the fact that you had met members of the IRA, that was your view; they were casual about that, were they?
A. About the specific point about producing my notebook, I would say that was --
Q. Nobody has written to you to ask you to find your notebook?
A. Nobody has demanded for them, no, so I thought there is no pressure. I am not going to dig through my garage, and anyway they are probably not there.63
Michael Starke, who was also a journalist at the time of Bloody Sunday, was interviewed by Eversheds. He explained the nature of that interview when he came to give oral evidence. It was also only when he came to give oral evidence that he produced a number of photographs and documents. He was asked:
Q. You were interviewed by Eversheds, was that in 1998?
A. Yes, it was, yes.
63 Day 116/141/4 Q. When you were interviewed by Eversheds, did they ask you if you had any contemporaneous documents or photographs?
A. As I recall, not. The discussion was long and discursive - some of it is reflected in long and discursive matters in the statement -- but as far as I recall they did not ask me for any specific documents or photographs.
2C-95 Written records of events and other contemporaneous documents are among the most important source of evidence to an Inquiry that is conducted so long after the event. A failure to seek such documents from all relevant witnesses as a matter of course, may have led to a significant loss of information. We only know of instances where questioning before the Tribunal has disclosed the fact, or the possibility, that documents existed, or may have existed, which were not asked for.
Reticence: Withholding Information
2C-96 The success of the Eversheds statement taking process relied to a great extent on gaining the trust of those they interviewed, a point not missed by the April 2000 Times article by Fiona Bawdon, which has already been referred to above. It continued:
There was huge initial distrust to overcome. The Widgery Inquiry, set up immediately after the shootings, which had largely exonerated the Army, had left terrible scars in the community. A posse of English lawyers descending on a city (which had already suffered enough) was unlikely to be welcomed with open arms. "We knew we'd have to earn their trust," says Mr Jones. "We knew we'd be seen as part of the Establishment. One wrong word from any of us, and we'd all be going home." The soldiers, too, had their reasons for being suspicious.
... Mr Jones introduced a dress code: strictly informal, so as not to intimidate the interviewees. Suits were out. Jumpers were in. Some lawyers apparently found this the hardest part of what was a challenging project by any standards: they had to be sent back to change two or three times before finally emerging sufficiently dressed down.65
In fact, many witnesses refused to provide information of the most vital nature. This is addressed in detail in the following sections of these submissions.
Others gave accounts deliberately designed to hide the truth of what had taken place. Damien Donaghy lied to Eversheds. His BSI statement includes this claim:
7. ... I did not get involved with the lads throwing stones and I did not throw any stones myself. It was not a serious disturbance. I would not even describe it as a riot.
8. I watched the young lads throwing stones for no more than a couple of minutes...66
His oral evidence quickly revealed that this was not the truth:
MR CLARKE: Could we have on the screen AD120.5. Mr Donaghy, do you have with you your statement to this Tribunal, signed on 18th May 1999?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Are the contents of that statement true, to the best of your knowledge and belief?
A. I would like to add to it, Mr Clarke.
Q. Please do.
A. "After discussions with my legal representatives and because the main reason we are here is for the truth to be told, I may wish to admit that I threw stones. I also would
65 Bloody Sunday – not just an exercise in memory, The Times, 4th April 2000. 66 AD120.006 The solicitors were not to blame for drafting a statement which repeated lies spoken at interview. It would, however, be wrong for them to suggest or for the Tribunal to work on the basis that they had in fact always successfully gained the confidence of all of those whom they interviewed. The Donaghy example is significant because it demonstrates that even someone who had called for the establishment of a new Inquiry into Bloody Sunday, and who had claimed to seek the whole truth about the day’s events, was not forthcoming at interview. His statement conveyed a misleading account of Bloody Sunday.
READ ONLY STATEMENTS
Many of the BSI statements referred to in these submissions were revealed to be flawed only after the witnesses’ accounts were probed in oral evidence. Their written statements presented a misleading picture of the events of Bloody Sunday. Nevertheless, the Tribunal could not realistically have heard oral evidence from all witnesses who had given BSI statements. It is, of course, accepted that the Tribunal had to decide where it was reasonably necessary for it to call witnesses to give oral evidence. No criticism is made of that. However, the Tribunal should remain alert to the inevitable risk, or probability, that some potentially important information may have been lost.
The Tribunal has stated through its solicitor that when it considers a witness’s disputed evidence:
67 Day 70/1/12 68 Damien Donaghy can be seen in a photograph, campaigning for a new inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday, behind a sign which reads “Time for truth”, at www.bloodysundaytrust.org/educampaign.htm. It will ... carefully assess his written statement, and in deciding to what extent it should be accepted or rejected or how much weight it should be given, the Tribunal is likely to pay particular attention to its inherent plausibility, its internal consistency and the extent to which it fits in with other evidence before the Tribunal.69
Such an approach may allow the Tribunal successfully in certain cases to identify and disregard parts of statements which contain inaccurate accounts of what witnesses claim to have seen on Bloody Sunday. This may be the case where, for example, a witness has confused other incidents with those of Bloody Sunday. However, it is questionable how successful the approach can be in other cases. The situation the Tribunal faces is one in which:
(1) The recollection of many witnesses has become contaminated with information about Bloody Sunday received from a number of different sources. The written BSI statements that result contain no clues that some of the information they contain comes from or has been influenced by these other sources;
(2) Interviewers have, on occasion, themselves supplied particular details during interview, leading to statements that do not accurately reflect a witness’s own recollection;
(3) Interviewers did not always seek all relevant documentation from the witnesses they were interviewing. Written records of events and other contemporaneous documents are among the most important source of evidence to an Inquiry that is conducted so long after the event. A failure to seek such documents as a matter of course may have led to a significant loss of information;
69 Letter dated 16.01.03 from John Tate to Anthony Lawton. In practice, the trust of many witnesses was not gained by Eversheds. Some witnesses failed to provide information of the most vital nature; others gave accounts deliberately designed to hide the truth of what had taken place; and
Underlying everything is the problem created by the passage of time. The risk of memories being lost, becoming contaminated or otherwise distorted inevitably increases the longer the interval between the event in question and the attempt to recall it.
There is, therefore, a real danger that the stated approach of the Tribunal to disputed but untested BSI statements may not reveal flaws in the statements caused in these circumstances.
**Damien Friel**
One example is provided by the evidence of Damien Friel. In his BSI statement, Damien Friel gave a graphic and detailed account of a soldier with a red beret firing indiscriminately from the pram ramp at the southern gable wall of Kells Walk. Mr. Friel says he witnessed this from a small window in 2 Keils Walk.70
Mr Friel gave oral evidence on Day 159. He was questioned at some length by Mr. Christopher Clarke Q.C. and members of the Tribunal as to the view from the window in question and was then questioned by Mr. Peter Clarke Q.C. specifically on behalf of Soldiers C and D.71
*MR CLARKE: Mr Friel, are you saying that by pushing your cheek against that window pane you could see down the pram walk?*
*A. Yes.*
70 AF30.4 paragraph 21 71 Day159/156/15 Q. Are you sure you did not stick your head out of the window?
A. I do not think so.
Q. I am not suggesting there were not soldiers there, I do suggest that there were no more than seven rounds fired by two soldiers, but I am bound to question whether you could actually see right the way down that pram ramp from that window, which is recessed in any event; you are sure you did?
A. Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: Mr Friel has a clear recollection of this. The building is still there; we could always go and look for ourselves if we got the permission of the people in whose building it is.
2C-107 We invited the Tribunal to follow up Lord Saville's suggestion of a view and this took place on the 15th May 2002 with representatives of the interested parties and photographers present. Both still and video pictures were taken. Correspondence about the procedure to be adopted ensued, and we asserted that Mr. Friel could not possibly have seen what he claims to have seen from the window and requested that he be recalled. After the photographs72 and video73 were distributed we renewed our submission for Mr. Friel to be recalled. Seven more letters followed to which no, or no satisfactory, response was received until a few days before the close of evidence on the 10th February 2004, when the Inquiry informed us that medical evidence had been received and Mr. Friel was unfit to be recalled.
2C-108 The view and the video and photographs taken at the view, establish that Mr. Friel could not physically have seen those events. His evidence on this issue was clearly wrong and must be rejected.
72 P8.1125-1129 73 Video 68 We refer to the matters set out below at paragraphs 2C-251 to 2C-256.
Evidence Relating to Damien Donaghy
We refer to one last body of evidence to demonstrate the dangers inherent in relying on untested BSI statements. A number of witnesses gave evidence as to what Damien Donaghy had been doing immediately before he was shot. However, some probing of their accounts when they gave oral evidence revealed that they had not actually been aware of Mr. Donaghy until after he had been shot.
Reference has been made above to the mistaken account given by John O'Kane.74
Eugene Lafferty's BSI statement included this claim:
Bubbles and Mr Johnston were just walking along at the time when they were shot. They did not do anything at all to warrant being shot. I know this for certain because they were so close to me.75
Yet, Mr. Lafferty accepted in oral evidence that he could not actually say what Damien Donaghy or John Johnston were doing before they were shot:
Q. Had you had any reason to notice either of them before that moment; did you even know that they were there?
A. No, the crowd, there was that many.
Q. The crowd was too thick?
A. When you seen the crowd moving.
74 See paragraphs 2C-50 - 2C-52, above. 75 AL1.008 paragraph 10 Q. I entirely understand that, that is why I remind you of the video in case you had seen it. It was so dense you would not be able to recognise or see anybody on the extreme opposite pavement?
A. No.
Q. But it was after these gentleman had been shot that you realised that you knew one of them? A. Yes.
Q. I say, not unreasonably, you assumed that both of them had simply been coming down with the crowd along with you?
A. I presumed, yes.
Q. You presumed that?
A. Yes.
Q. If the Tribunal is given evidence by people who actually saw what they were doing, you would not be in any position to dispute that because you did not see them until after they had been shot?
A. Well, I would not be able to dispute it.76
2C-114 John McGee’s BSI statement records that:
No one around me was doing anything which, in my view, justified live shots I did not see anyone throwing stones or anything else at the soldiers on the roof and I am certain that neither Damien Donaghy nor those around me were engaged in anything sinister.77
2C-115 However, Mr. McGee conceded in oral evidence that he had not in fact seen Damien Donaghy until after Donaghy had been shot:
Q. Had you seen him before you saw him lying on the ground?
76 Day 064/119/02 77 AM223.1 paragraph 3 Jim Doherty’s BSI statement included this account about Donaghy and Johnston:
I was standing directly behind both men when I saw them shot. At the time they were shot, both men were simply standing and looking across towards Little James Street. They were not doing anything or holding anything. There was no stone throwing going on at that time.79
However, Mr. Doherty was to concede, in answer to questions from Christopher Clarke QC, that:
(1) he had not seen Damien Donaghy before he was shot;
(2) he did not see whether Damien Donaghy had been throwing stones; and,
(3) people were throwing stones at the time.80
Gerry Duddy said in his BSI statement:
Bubbles was doing nothing wrong, nothing to justify him getting shot...81
During his oral evidence he conceded that he had not in fact been aware of Damien Donaghy before he was shot.82
In our submission the Tribunal should be alive to the real danger that its acceptance in evidence of disputed but untested BSI statements may result
78 Dav 065/037/04 79 AD73.3 paragraph 11 80 Dav 065/073/22; Dav 065/102/07; Dav 065/105/10 81 AD146.2 paragraph 6 82 Dav 059/132/19 – Dav 059/132/21 in unfairness. The Tribunal will understand that this is a matter of particular concern to those who face allegations of serious wrongdoing. 2C-III CIVILIAN EVIDENCE TO THIS INQUIRY
2C-121 In this section we address a number of matters of which the Tribunal should take account in assessing the evidence of civilian witnesses. In particular, we address the effect of passage of time on memory, the effect of the folklore which has grown around the events of Bloody Sunday, the unique pressures to which the people of Derry have been exposed in relation to their evidence, the desire in certain quarters to present evidence which portrays soldiers in the worst possible light and, in certain instances, the deliberate suppression and withholding of evidence.
PASSAGE OF TIME AND ITS EFFECTS ON MEMORY
2C-122 The citizens of Londonderry are in the same position as all other witnesses so far as the passage of time and its effect on memory are concerned. Notwithstanding the impact which the events of Bloody Sunday are bound to have had on those who witnessed them, the passage of more than thirty years will inevitably have had a deleterious effect on the ability of witnesses to recall those events with accuracy.
2C-123 This matter has been considered in detail in Section 2C-II, paragraphs 2C-20 to 2C-54 above, in connection with BSI statements.
FOLKLORE AND MYTH
2C-124 It is an unfortunate fact that the events of Bloody Sunday have been overlaid with myths which are demonstrably untrue but which have nevertheless achieved wide currency. This is, perhaps, not entirely surprising given the horrific nature of what undoubtedly occurred and its impact on individuals and the entire community. As a result many may have become persuaded that they witnessed things which simply did not occur. Some may have come to claim for themselves a direct part in the events of the day which is not founded in fact. We do not suggest that the propagation of such folklore is necessarily the work of persons with dishonest motives. On the contrary, many will have become convinced that they are in fact giving a truthful account. A number of factors may be in play here. In some cases there may be an unconscious assumption of involvement or desire to have been involved. Some witnesses may have been influenced sub-consciously by an unwillingness to accept that they failed to see what others are claiming to have seen. In some cases guilt or grief may have played a part. On the other hand, there may be cases where individuals are motivated by a desire to embellish or exaggerate what they actually witnessed in order to support what they believe to be the truth of what occurred, or simply to depict the acts of soldiers in the worst possible light.
The currency of such myths has not been limited to the city where the events occurred. With the aid of the media they have, over the years, been retailed world-wide. A striking example is provided by the report which appeared in The Guardian immediately after Bloody Sunday. The author, Simon Winchester, was asked about it in his evidence.
Taking it as shortly as I may, can I ask you to remind yourself of what you actually wrote the following day and which, understandably, caused considerable interest. If we go to M83.44, this is the article --
A. So written the same day, not the day following.
Q. Appeared the following day. It is really the very well-known opening sentence, that:
"The tragic and inevitable doomsday situation which has been universally forecast for Northern Ireland arrived when soldiers, firing into a large crowd of civil rights demonstrators, shot and killed 13."
Was that intended to describe a single incident in which soldiers had fired into a crowd of demonstrators killing 13, which is, with respect, the way it reads; was that what you were intending to tell the world had happened?
A. I believe so, unless I am misunderstanding your question, that is indeed what I -- Q. A single incident in which a group of soldiers had fired into civil rights demonstrators and shot 13 of them; that is the way you saw it, is it?
A. In summary, I think it is how the world regards the events of 30th January.
Q. Forgive me, the world may, prior to this Inquiry, have regarded them as that partly as a result of what you wrote, but the 13 you knew or you know now to have been shot over a very wide area, over a matter of at least half an hour in different incidents, did you not know that?
A. Of course I knew it -- I beg your pardon, of course I knew it. To summarise in one paragraph the events of that day, to conflate the events of 30 minutes into one sentence, I think this -- I think the paragraph, the introduction to the story, which is after all only an introduction, serves as well as does the headline above it.83
Nevertheless, it is inevitable that the folklore which has come to accompany Bloody Sunday has a particular currency in Derry itself. In approaching the evidence of civilians, the Tribunal will have to bear in mind the potential distorting effect of myth on the evidence of entirely honest witnesses.
Nell McCafferty has acknowledged to the Tribunal the effect of time and legend on the reliability of memory and testimony. She described seeing James Wray come towards the house in which she was sheltering and his falling.84 She admitted that “Memory plays tricks”,85 and that her memory is vague on many details and may be “totally untrue”.86 She acknowledged the power of emotion in distorting memory, admitting that she may have imagined seeing James Wray because, “I am feeling rotten about it.”87 She acknowledged how convincing false memories can be, explaining that she
83 Dav 116/155 - Day 116/156. 84 Dav 168/135/4 85 Dav 168/128/21 86 Dav 168/134/7 would trust the article she wrote immediately after Bloody Sunday more than her later memory, but saying “the later memory is so vivid”. 88
2C-128 John O’Kane recognised that parts of his evidence may have been unintentionally incorrect. He admitted that although he claimed in his BSI Statement to have seen Damien Donaghy and John Johnston shot, actually they were shot before he got there, and that he had heard about it from people in the crowd. Crucially, he said, “I actually thought that I seen it”. 89 He explained that it is perfectly possible to have
an honest mental picture of something that you believe you saw, although you subsequently come to realise that you could not have done. 90
2C-129 Mr O’Kane gave a less intense example. He explained how it is possible to go to another country, and
say to yourself “I think I was here before”, but actually have seen it on TV, maybe years ago; that is what you are actually saying. 91
2C-130 Ben Keaveney, a witness with experience of counselling trauma victims, gave the Tribunal a very good description of how this mythologizing process can work its effect:
I still have a vision of him [James Wray] lying on the floor, but that could be just something that has been imposed by reading about it, although emotionally, which is maybe not the best way to give evidence, emotionally I feel that I saw him, I feel that he was there... 92
87 Dav 168/134/14 88 Dav 168/137/3 89 Dav 163/2/22 90 Dav 163/47/10 91 Dav 163/49/3 92 Dav 160/37/22 In the following paragraphs we set out, by way of example, certain instances in which stories have grown in the telling and have achieved the status of accepted truth.
**Alana Burke**
The evidence concerning the injury to Alana Burke is particularly instructive. Alana Burke was knocked down by Pig 2 as it entered the Rossville Flats car park. However, for some witnesses this was no accident; for some it is part of the accepted truth of Bloody Sunday that Alana Burke was deliberately chased by the driver of the Pig and then crushed by it against the wall of the Rossville Flats.
The person who disposes of the myth is Alana Burke herself. She accepted in 1972 that she could not say that she was knocked down deliberately, and she has never maintained that she was crushed against the wall of the Rossville Flats by the Pig. However, this has not in any way inhibited the propagation of the myth.
______________________________________________________________________
93 She has explained that whilst watching the riot at Barrier 14 she had been gassed and the heavy coat she was wearing had been drenched by the water cannon. (Day 76/75/4) As a consequence she had been very sick (Day 76/75/4) and was, in her own words, “in quite a sorry state”. (Day 76/96/15-Day 76/97/6) When the Pigs entered the Bogside she began to run south towards the Rossville Flats but, as she explained to Christopher Clarke QC, she “could not move because I was laden down. My clothes were covered in dye, it was a long coat and I was so heavy I could not move, I seemed to be rooted to the spot. (Day 76/82/3) Miss Burke explained what happened in her BSI Statement:
> At this time I was looking for the female friend that I had lost and I was terrified. Everyone was running towards the alleyway between Block 1 and Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. Lorney McMonagle tried to pull me out of the way but he let go and I was hit by a Saracen which entered the Rossville Flats car park from Rossville Street. I was hit just behind the wire fence on the courtyard side. (AB 101.1 paragraph 5)
Miss Burke spoke of the incident in interviews she gave shortly after Bloody Sunday, whilst she was still in Altnagelvin Hospital. She said to The Irish News (L139), “I couldn’t say it was deliberate”; and the Evening News quoted her as saying “I could not say if the Saracen deliberately ran me down” (L94). Anthony Harkin considered that Alana Burke was singled out by the Pig driver as “easy prey”.
As I ran, the army vehicles overtook me. The first one seemed to swing in east, from the north and driving towards me. It seemed to me that the Saracen driver was trying to hit people with the vehicle. Because I knew Saracens did not turn very easily, I thought that I would wait until it was almost at me and then jump to one side in order to get out of the way. The next moment it swerved to the east. Just before it swerved, I noticed a group of girls come running south out of the alleyway. One of them was wearing a bright red coat and I believe that this caught the driver’s eye; he saw an easier prey. The next moment I saw the Saracen hit the girl in the red coat. The impression I had was of seeing her bowled over. When she hit the ground she rolled out of the way and I don’t know whether the Saracen actually drove over her or not.”
Antoinette Coyle, a Knight of Malta, saw Alana Burke in a house in Joseph Place, and has said that Alana Burke told her she had been “crushed by a Saracen against a wall”.
John Lafferty reported in 1972 that in one of the ambulances was a girl called Burke “who had been crushed by a Saracen”.
Frank Campbell is another who gave an account in his 1972 statement of how he met a young girl at the front of the Flats who was crying, she was in a bad way. She told me she had been squashed by a Saracen. I took her into one of the houses.
Curiously, however, by the time that he came to give his BSI Statement, Mr Campbell’s evidence went a lot further. He claimed to be an
______________________________________________________________________
94 AH 11.3 paragraph 13 95 AC 85.8 paragraph 33; Day 95/69/25-66/70 96 AL 2.4 97 AC 137.3 paragraph 10; Day 121/7/12 eyewitness to the Pigs deliberately trying to run down Alana Burke and other people. He maintained this unequivocally in oral evidence.98
Q.... And you say that these vehicles were being deliberately driven at people?
A. Yes, they surprised me, because I was always brought up to respect law and order and to see people who were supposed to be there, you know, providing law and order, deliberately driving at people -- they were definitely deliberately driving at people.
Q. Just to be clear about it, you do mean, do you, that the drivers of those vehicles were deliberately attempting to run people down?
A. Yes.
Q. And not just driving towards people in the expectation they would get out of the way?
A. No, no.
Q. What was it that enabled you to tell that they were deliberately trying to run people down?
A. If you are driving into an area, you drive in and park. They were not driving in and parking, they were driving round in circles, you know, at a speed. You know, one or two of them pulled up and parked, you know. The other ones drove round in circles and to me they were trying to knock down people.
Q. Can we look at what you say in the second half of paragraph 9? You say here: "A couple of Saracens kept driving around the wasteground and another three or four stopped in the area of the Rossville Flats car park, approximately where I have marked .. on the map. There would have been at least five to six in total. At this point I could not hear any shooting." .... Is that really correct, that a couple of vehicles kept driving round the wasteground?
A. Yes, round where D and E are.
98 Day 121/7/4-8/17 Mr Campbell said that he doubted that his memory was playing tricks on him about that, and that to the best of his recollection "there was other ones [Pigs] in there [the Car Park] driving around." Mr Campbell was "definite, very positive" about his allegation that Alana Burke was deliberately run into, and that she was standing near to him at his point F, roughly in the centre of the east side of Block 1 of the Flats. He said that had he not got her out of the way, "the Saracen would have squashed her against those block of flats, the bottom of them." He was sure of the location, even having been shown by Mr Roxburgh the position that Alana Burke herself marked as the point where the Saracen hit her which was nearer to the fence on the waste ground. Mr Campbell remained adamant that his recollection – rather than hers - was correct. He went on:
... I picked her up she was where I am talking about at F. She was hit first and then the Saracen drove at her again and that is when I caught her and ran with her behind the wall behind over towards block 2.
Q. Can you recall where the vehicle that hit Miss Burke had come from?
A. No, not exact, no. It was in there just driving around at the time .... The impression I got at that time was that she was running away, because to me it was more of a glancing blow. If it had have hit her full on, it would have killed her, you know. It was more of a glancing blow from the side of the Saracen.
Mr Roxburgh pointed out to Mr Campbell that Alana Burke’s recollection was that she did not meet him until she had crawled through the alleyway. out of the car park. Despite this he remained confident that his recollection was correct.\\textsuperscript{105}
\\textit{No, to my recollection, when she was hit and again when the Saracen tried to ram her against the high flat wall, that is when I caught her and I ran with her.}
2C-141 Mr Campbell also claimed to see "other people" being hit by the vehicles but could not say how many\\textsuperscript{106}.
2C-142 The account of Alana Burke being crushed against the wall was clearly current in the Bogside during the days following Bloody Sunday. Murray Sayle of the Sunday Times felt able to report:\\textsuperscript{107}
\\textit{A Saracen raced into Rossville Flats parking area. The crew saw that they were not in the spot allocated by the operational plan, and the driver reversed the vehicle against a low retaining wall (crushing Alana Burke) and raced out to its allotted position.}
2C-143 Christopher Clarke QC asked Mr Sayle from where he had received that information. He replied:\\textsuperscript{108}
\\textit{A. I can tell you. From a number of witnesses, and I think one of them was Chapman.\\textsuperscript{109} That would be my recollection. Certainly from a number of witnesses, because we asked them: did they remove to exactly the same place... The only time in the entire sequence of events that anybody could tell us that the actions of the military had been other than purposeful, i.e. pre-planned, because no orders were}
\\textsuperscript{105} Day 121/12/16-121/13/23 \\textsuperscript{106} AC 137.3 paragraph 10; Day 121/15/16-16/12. Mr Campbell's BSI evidence is at odds with his 1972 NICRA Statement as to when he first saw Alana Burke; he also claimed in 1972 to have been knocked down himself but said in his oral evidence to this Inquiry, denying authorship of the 1972 statement, that he was definitely not knocked down. (AC 137.7; Day 121/16/13 -20/14) The driver of Pig 2 has always acknowledged that as the Pig slowed to a halt it accidentally hit a man who got up and ran away. \\textsuperscript{107} M71.28 \\textsuperscript{108} Day 217/65 - 67/11 \\textsuperscript{109} Mr Chapman did not say this in either his statement or his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry. being shouted and backing off they crushed this unfortunate young lady -- clearly unintentionally, that is a pretty big vehicle and it is a very narrow street. That is where that comes from.
Q. I think you did speak to Alana Burke?
A. I cannot remember, but certainly I or Derek did, yes. I cannot specifically remember speaking to her.
Q. Can we have on the screen AB101.9. She has given evidence to this Tribunal. She was indeed hit by a Saracen at approximately the apex of the arrow as shown on this picture as it was entering into the car park and not shot as the driver reversed against a low retaining wall and there does not seem to be a low retaining wall anywhere near the arrow. Should we infer that this description of what happened to Alana Burke is unlikely to have come from her?
A. I do not know. I understand -- she was not shot, was she, I thought she was crushed. Forgive me, I heard you to say shot. She was, and my understanding, and what sticks in my mind is that the Saracen backed on to her and caught her between the wall and -- the exact details, where it happened, I cannot now help you with, it was a long time ago.
2C-144 Other accounts of soldiers driving with malicious, near homicidal intent abound. William Harley alleged that a Pig knocked down a man, and then, as he tried to get away, kept going at him such that it seemed to Mr Harley that "he was turning his wheels deliberately to try and run the man over on the ground."(^{10}), although he accepted in questioning by Edwin Glasgow QC that in fact this might be more a matter of interpretation.(^{11})
2C-145 Thomas Harkin claimed to have been knocked down deliberately by a Pig that was equipped with spikes, and which circled round before hitting him.(^{12}) Such was the Pig driver's determination to run him over, Mr
(^{10}) Day 77/5 (^{11}) Day 77/47/16-48/1 (^{12}) Day 113/40/3 Harkin said that the vehicle seemed to try to reverse back over him, and he was only spared by his friend pulling him out of the way. William Harley, despite being an eyewitness to the Pig's arrival in the car park, did not see this episode. James Quinn, Mr Harkin's companion in the same episode, gave a different account of the incident.
**Bernard McGuigan**
2C-146 The death of Mr. McGuigan has acquired an additional macabre dimension as a result of the many accounts of what subsequently happened to what is believed to be his eyelid but is variously described as his eyelid, eye or eyebrow. Whilst it may well be the case that part of Mr McGuigan's eyelid was recovered and placed in a matchbox shortly after the firing had finished, the number of people who claim involvement in this at various stages is simply not credible.
2C-147 Seeing the eyelid, let alone picking it off the wall, must have been an unforgettable and horrifying experience. James McCafferty, for example, described seeing a perfectly formed eyelid complete with eyelashes. John Friel said, "I have simply never seen anything like it", and Patrick Kelly could not look at it stuck on the wall "as it was too terrible." It might be thought that the person who actually performed this task, and those who saw him or her do it, would not easily forget it. Similarly, those who had not performed the task would not, ordinarily, seek to trespass upon the experience and claim it for themselves.
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113 AH 106.2 paragraph 7 114 Dav 77/10 115 Day 113/154/11 – 158/10 116 AM 60.3 paragraph 13 117 AF 32.7 paragraph 33 118 AK 21.10 paragraph 34 Yet, somehow, eight individual witnesses either claim to have undertaken the gruesome task of removing the eyelid from the wall, or name different people who did. Eileen Collins said that she put it in a matchbox and gave it to a priest. Eileen Doherty said that it was Jim Friel who, "very angry about the whole thing", knocked the eye to the ground. Kathleen Doherty remembered telling her friend Sheila not to touch the eyelash that she, Sheila, had lifted from the ground. John Duffy saw Mickey Rooney pick the eyelid off the wall and put it in a matchbox; however, curiously, Michael Rooney said that it was John Duffy who "removed the eyelash from the wall and put it in a matchbox", and then "place[d] the matchbox on top of the stone which was on top of the banner." Alan Harkens remembers Jack Murray "picking up Barney McGuigan's eyelid and putting it in a matchbox". Donna Harkin thought that her father put the eyelid in a matchbox and laid it on Mr McGuigan's body. John McDevitt told how he personally took the eyebrow or eyelid with eye lashes on it down and put it in a matchbox and then placed the matchbox "in one of Mr McGuigan's pockets". However, Noel Millar also lifted the eyelid off the wall (with a matchstick) and put it in a matchbox and placed it near Mr McGuigan's head.
The original location of the eyelid varies. Eight witnesses claim to have seen it stuck to the gable end of Block 1. Approximately fifteen saw it on the gable end of Block 2. A number are unspecific as to which wall it was
119 AC 72.4 paragraph 22 120 AD 64.9 paragraph 19 121 AD 77.2 paragraph 9 122 AD 160.3 paragraph 20 123 AR 28.6 paragraph 22 124 AH 8.4 paragraph 18; he picked it up from the ground – Day 96/18/22-19/3 125 AH 13.7 paragraph 45 126 AM 191.2 paragraph 11 127 AM 477.2 paragraph 8 stuck. Three saw it on the ground and Eileen Collins says it was stuck to the threepenny bits.\\textsuperscript{128}
In the same way, the accounts of the timing of witnessing the eye vary wildly and irreconcilably. At least ten people said that the eye was removed from the wall whilst Mr McGuigan’s body was still there. Other accounts vary from its still being on the wall after Mr McGuigan’s body had been removed to its being still in public circulation up to a day later. Noel Kelly saw the matchbox containing the eyelid on top of a brick just after the body had been moved.\\textsuperscript{129} John McGhee saw on the gable end of Block 1, after Mr McGuigan’s body had been removed, a piece of flesh that someone pointed out as being an eyebrow.\\textsuperscript{130} Patrick Moore saw the eyelash still on the wall, although this time in the middle of the gable end of Block 2, after Mr McGuigan’s body had been taken away, and a group of people resolving to remove it.\\textsuperscript{131}
However, the following day, according to Alfie McAleer, someone was running around showing the matchbox and its contents to people, such that he was moved to exclaim:
\\begin{quote} How weird can this town get – there are people grieving and this idiot is running around with a piece of skin in a matchbox.\\textsuperscript{132} \\end{quote}
James McCafferty remembers the next day having to shoo a dog away from a box placed on the blood soaked ground “so that it did not interfere with the eyelid”.\\textsuperscript{133} Seamus McConell saw, the next day, a sombre group of men discussing the matchbox and its contents (an eyelash with skin
\\begin{itemize} \\item \\textsuperscript{128} AC 72.4 paragraph 22 \\item \\textsuperscript{129} AK 17.13 paragraph 16 \\item \\textsuperscript{130} AM 224.5 paragraph 32 \\item \\textsuperscript{131} AM 417.6 paragraph 31 \\item \\textsuperscript{132} AM 37.10 paragraph 27 \\item \\textsuperscript{133} AM 60.3 paragraph 13 \\end{itemize} attached to it).\\textsuperscript{134} Carmel McCallion saw two eyelids on two red bricks on the ground the following day.\\textsuperscript{135} When Eileen Collins removed it from the wall, it was early the next morning\\textsuperscript{136} Michael Rooney saw John Duffy take it down the following day\\textsuperscript{137} but John Duffy saw Michael Rooney pick it off the wall and put it in a matchbox sometime not long after the shooting had finished\\textsuperscript{138}.
The eye and its matchbox also appears to have ranged far and wide. Eileen Collins gave it to a priest.\\textsuperscript{139} Gerard Doherty put it on Mr McGuigan’s body.\\textsuperscript{140} Seamus Doherty saw it on Mr McGuigan’s chest.\\textsuperscript{141} Noel Doherty saw that a boy had an eyelid in a matchbox near the entrance to Block 1 about an hour after the shooting.\\textsuperscript{142} Vincent Harkin thought that the matchbox was on the floor whilst the body was still there.\\textsuperscript{143} Noel Kelly saw it by some bricks.\\textsuperscript{144} but John McDevitt had put it in one of Mr McGuigan’s pockets.\\textsuperscript{145} Noel Millar put it on the ground next to his head.\\textsuperscript{146} James Toye thought that somebody had placed it where Mr McGuigan was lying and made an altar there.\\textsuperscript{147} To Alfie McAleer’s dismay, the next day it was on public display in its matchbox, surrounded by groups of men.\\textsuperscript{148} The likelihood is that before he was shot Mr. Johnston was doing nothing which would have drawn people's attention to him. Despite this, and notwithstanding Mr. Johnston's own evidence about what he was doing when he was shot, there are witnesses who have claimed that Mr. Johnston was engaged in various acts of heroism. Their evidence is of no assistance in discovering the truth about the shooting of John Johnston but serves as a further illustration of the manner in which myths have come to cloud the events of Bloody Sunday.
One suggestion is that Mr. Johnston was remonstrating with the soldiers who had fired.
Eddie Doherty embellishes his account with details which appear nowhere in the account of Mr. Johnston himself:
A...he was looking towards the GPO, you know, and you know, my recollection is that he was remonstrating with them, you know that they shot this young lad you know.
Q. When you say that he was remonstrating, what did he appear to be doing?
A. You know, he was sort of pointing. I recall he possibly was pointing, you know. He seemed a bit angry that this young lad was shot, you know.149
An alternative myth is that John Johnston was going to help Damien Donaghy when he was shot. This myth has persisted, despite the fact that it was expressly denied by John Johnston when he gave evidence to the Widgery Tribunal.150 This may be partly due to the fact that Damien Donaghy has recounted it in his various accounts:
149 Day 065/9 150 AJ5.8 paragraph A. In an undated first hand account which Damien Donaghy gave whilst he was still in hospital he stated,
"...Shouted to a man I'd been shot. He came over, that man, and he was shot, when he was helping me."(^{151})
Damien Donaghy told Praxis,
"Johnson went to lift me, he was shot too".(^{152})
The story was repeated in Damien Donaghy's BSI statement:
I was told some time afterwards by Michael Deakin, who died about two and a half months ago, that John Johnston was bending down to lift me up when he too was shot. I did not know Mr. Johnston at that time.(^{153})
Others have given similar accounts of John Johnston's activities at the time he was shot.
Noel Kelly gave the following account in his BSI statement:
An older man (I have since recognised him from pictures I have seen as being John Johnston) went over to help the boy but, as he was standing over him, there was another shot and he fell to the ground, almost on top of the boy.(^{154})
William Kearns, in what appears to be a NICRA statement, said the following:
This boy was standing at the corner. A shot rang out. The bullet pierced his leg. I didn't know at this time whether it was a rubber bullet or not. I was running back again to the waste ground. I looked back to see if the boy was alright. He made to get up and fell again. I was going to help him
(^{151}) AD120.26 (^{152}) AD120.25 (^{153}) AD120.6 paragraph 11 (^{154}) AK17.9 paragraph 6 to get up when this old man started to help him. When he got to the boy, he got shot.\\textsuperscript{155}
2C-164 William Curran told Praxis:
Johnston, I didn't know Mr Johnston at all, but he had made to lift Donaghy at the same time as I had, but I heard Johnson say oh, my leg, and he got a ricochet, I think. I think it was a ricochet he got in the leg.\\textsuperscript{156}
2C-165 Mr. Curran was asked about his BSI statement, which was to the same effect as remarks in his Praxis interview, when he gave evidence on Day 055:
Q. Then you describe in paragraph 15 how immediately after seeing Bubbles Donaghy: "I approached him and stood at his feet. I glanced round and saw an older man, who I now know as John Johnston, coming to help Donaghy as well. When Johnston was about five or six feet away from me, I saw him clutch his shoulder. I cannot remember precisely where he was in the waste ground when he was shot." Can you tell us in what direction Mr Johnston was moving, where he had come from and where he was going to?
A. Well, I had my back to him and I came from my right side, indicating that he must have come up William Street or came behind me through the waste ground.
Q. You had your back to him and you were facing in what direction?
A. I was facing Bubbles Donaghy's, yes. I saw Mr Johnston out of the tail of me eye and I assumed he was coming to help Donaghy.
Q. That was an assumption on your part?
A. Yes.
2C-166 Betty Curran's BSI statement is in similar terms to that of her husband's:
\\textsuperscript{155} AK44.1 \\textsuperscript{156} O6.8 I subsequently heard that Mr Johnson had been hit too. He had been running over to Bubbles when he fell.\\textsuperscript{157}
Charles McDaid's statement to the Widgery Tribunal gives the same impression:
I then saw a youth fall on the west side of William Street ... I called on him to lie still and then I saw a man run out to this boy from the direction of Columbille Court and I shouted to him to stay down as the soldiers were firing live rounds and not rubber bullets. By this time people were pushing up William Street to see what was happening and I turned towards them to keep them back. Upon doing so there was more gunfire and someone shouted that the man had been shot.\\textsuperscript{158}
There are major inconsistencies between Mr. McDaid's oral evidence to the Widgery Tribunal\\textsuperscript{159} which was to the effect that he did not see the man who was shot, and the evidence that he gave to the present Inquiry which was that he had seen John Johnston hit.
Q. If we go back to paragraph 19 at AM161.3, we should correct paragraph 19 so as to read: "As I saw him in the area marked "F", Johnson was moving forward in a westerly direction"?
A. Yes.
Q. You shouted to him, "get down, they are firing live rounds", and you then heard another shot, again from a northerly direction, and he went down; you think that he was hit on the leg?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you hear any more shots other than the two followed by the one that you have described?
A. No.
\\textsuperscript{157} AC130.2 paragraph 12 \\textsuperscript{158} AM161.14 \\textsuperscript{159} AM161.16 paragraph F Q. Mr Johnston, you did not know him at the time; is that right?
A. Not by name. I knew him by seeing him in the town, he was a prominent man.
2C-169 Surprisingly Mr. McDaid claimed to have no present recollection of seeing a young boy being hit.160
2C-170 John Johnston expressly denied that he had been going to assist the injured Damien Donaghy. He was asked in terms when he gave evidence to Lord Widgery:
Q. Had you gone to assist the boy?
A. No.
Q. Did you not turn round to him at all?
A. No.161
Charles McMonagle
2C-171 In the same way, we would draw attention to Don Mullan’s book “Eye Witness Bloody Sunday” which includes a photograph of a Knight of Malta lying on the ground as two soldiers make their way south towards the Rossville Flats car park. Beneath the photograph appears the caption:
In direct violation of the Geneva Convention, a young Knights of Malta paramedic is in a crumpled heap having been attacked by two members of 1 Para.162
2C-172 The Knight of Malta is Charles McMonagle.163 In a statement in his own handwriting which he made in 1972 he explained that he had been
160 060/143 161 AJ 5.8 paragraph A 162 Don Mullan, Eye Witness Bloody Sunday The Truth, Wolfhound (1998). knocked to the ground by the crowd while he was tending to a casualty. He was then confronted by a soldier who, when Mr. McMonagle pointed to his Maltese cross on his uniform breast, released him. In his BSI statement he said that he was confronted by a soldier who, when he pointed to his Red Cross, roughed him up and went through his kit. However, in his oral evidence he accepted that the account he had given in 1972 was correct. He explained that he had been knocked to the ground and "trampled under foot" initially by the fleeing crowd, and not by the soldiers. The soldier then pointed his rifle at him whilst he ascertained who he was and whether he was a threat. The soldier then let him go. While Mr. McMonagle may have been brusquely treated, he himself accepts that he was not the victim of violence as stated by Mr. Mullan.
PRESSURES ON CIVILIAN WITNESSES
2C-173 Many witnesses appearing before this Inquiry have emphasised the character of the Bogside and the Creggan as a small and intimate community. It is undoubtedly the case that over the last thirty-two years the members of that community have shown sympathy and support for those who have suffered as a result of the events of Bloody Sunday, not least in their call for a new Inquiry into the events of that day. Moreover, there are widely held convictions among local people as to what occurred on Bloody Sunday. While such solidarity is, in certain respects, commendable, it also possesses less attractive features. In some quarters, minds may be closed to any truth other than "our truth". Many witnesses have told the Tribunal that they know the truth of what occurred that day. Furthermore, there is a real danger that any departure from or
163 AM 367 164 AM 367.20. 165 102/143 disagreement with the shared conviction of what occurred – a conviction which, as we have demonstrated, is sometimes distorted by folklore which has come to be accepted as the truth - will be regarded in Londonderry as an act of disloyalty.
However, there are other, much more sinister forces at work in Derry. Throughout the years of the Troubles the various groupings of the IRA had a stronghold in Derry and demonstrated time and again their capacity for murderous violence directed not only against what they considered to be the forces of an occupying power but also against civilians who transgressed their notions of loyalty. Despite the current ceasefire, it is clear that the Provisional IRA remains hugely influential in Derry, as do a number of individuals who were prominent in its leadership during the Troubles. The Tribunal will not need to be reminded that during the period when it has been operating in the city dissident Republican terrorist organisations have carried out and continue to carry out a bombing campaign in and around Londonderry and that it was eventually determined that it was too dangerous for military witnesses to attend there to give their evidence. Moreover, the Tribunal has recently received compelling and disquieting confirmation of attempts by terrorists or former terrorists to suppress evidence to this Inquiry.
166 In February 1999 Channel 4 broadcast a documentary which included footage from a propaganda video made by the Continuity IRA. A representative of that organisation stated that it showed a cell of the Continuity IRA and that the film had been shot “in a house in the Bogside in Derry”. Hooded terrorists were shown handling weapons including a grenade, an AK47, a Magnum handgun and an American-made M203, factory produced, grenade launcher. The terrorist stated:
_We’re experienced volunteers....We’ll be starting a military campaign sooner rather than later. Targets will be Security, Brits, Cops, that type of thing. Bit of commercial, Banks, Tax Offices._
167 See, further, Section 2DII, below. As a result, the people of Derry have been subjected to the most extraordinary pressures so far as their evidence to this Inquiry is concerned.
In our submission it has been obvious during the hearings at which civilians have given oral evidence that many were under great pressure not to depart from a shared perception among the people of this city as to the truth of what occurred on Bloody Sunday. Liam Clarke, in an article entitled "Bloody Sunday truth fails to eclipse "the big Derry myth"" published in the Belfast edition of the Sunday Times on 15th February 2004, refers to "the big Derry myth" in the following terms.
This shared myth was forged in the trauma of that awful day and cherished ever since. It says that the IRA had planned and done nothing and that the army had launched a premeditated attack with the intention of killing as many people as possible. Anything else is an attempt to let the army off the hook.
In the course of this article he refers to an advertisement which appeared in the Derry Journal on Friday 13th February 2004, the last day of the Inquiry's sittings to hear evidence.
The ad was taken out by the families of the dead and wounded of Bloody Sunday. Like much of the evidence given at the tribunal it was misleading.
It was addressed to "all those in the Derry community" who had provided evidence to the Bloody Sunday tribunal. "You delivered the truth with dignity and you did not waver under intense, at times, hostile examination", it said. The ad noted, truthfully, that the process of giving evidence was traumatic for many, but didn't say that the trauma often arose because they were frightened of or unwilling to tell the truth.
A list of witnesses so commended was published with the advertisement and, while many told the truth, it is clear that there were quite a few on it who had admitted lying about Bloody Sunday, who gave incredible accounts, or who had unexplained memory lapses. Others not on the list provided sick notes when the time came to give evidence.
Liam Clarke concluded: What does all this prove? It certainly doesn't prove that the Paras didn't shoot 14 people dead and it doesn't suggest that they were justified in doing so.
What it does show is that the pressure on people to keep within the consensus in their community is immense, even when immunity from prosecution is guaranteed to those giving evidence. There are worse things to be feared than prosecution and they include death, maiming and being shunned in your local peer group.
The fears of the people of Derry are perhaps most acute when it comes to naming those involved in Republican terrorism in 1972. The Tribunal will be mindful of the fact that many civilian witnesses have refused to identify persons they knew to have been members of the IRA on Bloody Sunday.168
In the course of his evidence Mr. Eamonn McCann made the following comments:
One last question: in relation to other persons who have been asked names and to reveal names, can you give perhaps the Tribunal some insight into the difficulties that that creates personally for them?
A. I think it has created a great difficulty for individuals. It has also created a certain degree of apprehension among people who are potential witnesses or witnesses for the future, in that they believe they are being put in the position of being, um, invited, indeed pressurised, into becoming, in effect, informers.
That in general terms runs directly counter to the ethos of the community that people come from, but more than that, knowledge is being ascribed to them which they do not have. I repeat again, it should be kept in mind that the IRA is a secret organisation, that it has on many occasions killed people who have revealed its secrets. I am not for a moment suggesting that people feel under threat of death over the question of giving evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, certainly not. I am just indicating the strength of
168 This is considered further in Chapter 2D III. the IRA's belief in its own secrecy and desire to maintain its own secrecy and people are -- many people are troubled in Derry about what appears to be the balance, of the tone and pattern of questioning at the Inquiry in relation to this matter.
They feel like they are in the position of -- it is as if they were people who were in a Post Office and somebody came in and shot it up and then discover that they are questioned as to what they might have done or what the dead might have done to have provoked the assault on the Post Office, and the pressure is put on them to reveal knowledge which they might have, but which they do not really have at all, about anything that what other individuals there might have done to precipitate this event and they feel it is unfair and it contradicts the expectation which many people had of this Tribunal, because after all nobody at all, that this Tribunal has challenged the fact that all those who died or were wounded on Bloody Sunday, died or were wounded by British Army bullets.169
2C-181 Others have been more forthright and, we would submit, more realistic in their assessment of the pressures on witnesses before this Inquiry.
2C-182 Nell McCafferty has written with great eloquence of the dilemma of the civilian witnesses. ("Derry breathes a sigh of relief", Sunday Tribune, 6th May 2001.)
It has not been much reported that people have been reduced to tears during testimony before Saville, as they tried to avoid answering direct questions about people whom the inquiry suspects were members of the IRA. You could be wrong, and could inadvertently put that person in danger. You could be right and put that person in danger, all these decades later, when loyalist paramilitaries are still killing Catholics. You could face unspecified sanctions if you refuse to name people, Saville has softly warned.
And you could put yourself in danger, a nervous woman told me, who hopes that she will not be called to testify...
169 Day 87/71/06 - Day 87/72/22. With regard to the Official IRA she asks:
...what if the names of suspected members of the Official IRA are put to future witnesses? There is a heartfelt longing that these men would name themselves and get it over with and get everybody else off the rack.
She explains that there was at first a huge sense of relief when it became known that Martin McGuinness was prepared to admit that he had been a member of the Provisional IRA.
At first there was a huge wave of relief. Unlike the dogs in the street, those who have testified at the Bloody Sunday inquiry in Derry have gone through grammatical hoops trying not to name Martin McGuinness as a leading IRA figure. Relatives of the dead had called for the full truth to be told, but some relatives agreed off the record that they dreaded being put to the test under oath.
She explains how Eamon Deane was the first person to agree on the record in response to questioning in this Inquiry that he believed Mr. McGuinness to be a member of the IRA.
He answered the question fully and truthfully last Tuesday after Sinn Fein leaked the contents of the first draft of McGuinness's proposed testimony. He felt a burden fall from him, he grinned recalling last weekend's confirmation of a front-page report in this newspaper in March. He would, he insists, have told the full truth anyway. He was lucky, he says, that he did not know the identities of the five men who were with McGuinness when Deane met them some distance away from the scene of the massacre, even as the shooting continued. He was lucky in that had he known the others, naming them might have amounted to informing.
For, as Miss McCafferty explains, Mr. McGuinness's confirmation that he was an IRA member:
...has paradoxically opened another chasm. He will not name any other member of the IRA who was in his company that day. Does that mean that those who might name them are, by contrast, informers? The position of those regarded by the IRA as informers is an uncomfortable one. Peter Taylor's record of an interview with Martin McGuinness in 1972 states:
"Informers know the penalty", McGuinness once coldly told me. "Death".
The former commander of the Derry Brigade can be ruthless as well as charming.(^{170})
In his evidence to this Inquiry Denis Bradley was asked by Arthur Harvey QC about the culture which gives rise to a civilian reticence to name members of the IRA:
Q. If I take you just to develop that matter in relation to the names of persons who, within this community in 1972 were either known or believed to be members of the Provisional IRA or the Official IRA; would it be correct to say that within this community there is still -- the Bogside, Long Tower, the Creggan -- there is still an old-fashioned rural, parochial atmosphere in which a lot of people claim to know more about other people's business than their own?
A. If I say that -- if I say yes to that I may have difficulty living within the city for a while.
Q. Is it not an Irish tradition?
A. It is an Irish tradition and I understand and I will accept what you are interpreting.
Q. In other words, people will collectively in the terms of a community consciousness be aware of quite a lot, but be reluctant to speak to outsiders lest it be regarded as a betrayal?
A. Yes.
Q. Would that be one of the reasons why so many persons may know or believe members of the Provisional IRA in 1972 but are genuinely embarrassed and reluctant to name them?
(^{170}) M112.55. A. Yes.
Q. Is there also a feeling within Derry that there is an absolute moral responsibility upon those persons who were members of organisations in Derry in 1972 to come forward and assist this Inquiry?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it also correct to say that there is a feeling that ordinary decent people are being embarrassed to the point where it is almost intolerable when they are asked the names of individuals who will not come forward themselves?
A. To my knowledge, some people have come close to having nervous breakdowns.171
Liam Clarke and Kathryn Johnson refer to this state of fear in Martin McGuinness: From Guns to Government, 2nd Ed., where they state:
Paddy Ward, the commander of the Fianna who was given nail bombs by McGuinness before he gave orders for their withdrawal when he realised the scale of the British military presence, has agreed to give evidence to the Saville Inquiry and is in correspondence with W. J. Tate, Solicitor to the Inquiry. Ward no longer lives in Derry, so is subject to no threats from the IRA. Others are not so fortunate. It is clear that witnesses, among them former IRA men, will remain reluctant to testify before Lord Saville as long as Martin McGuinness remains reluctant to admit the truth of his actions on Bloody Sunday. (at p. 12)
Kathryn Johnson states in her BSI statement:
In particular I wish to assert journalistic confidentiality in relation to certain sources. A number of people have asked that their identities be kept confidential and as I state on page 11 of the book, for this reason and for legal reasons a number of people have been given pseudonyms. I have been asked by Eversheds to contact such sources and ask them to release us from any obligations of confidentiality, or to ask them to make statements to this inquiry. Without exception,
171 Day 140/175/3-176/13 we have already asked all such sources if they intended to give evidence to the Inquiry. Almost without exception, all such sources have made it plain to us their wish not to be identified and their fears of what might happen should they be identified.\\textsuperscript{172}
and gave evidence:
\\textit{Can I make it clear, we spoke to a wide variety of people, politicians, clergymen, policemen, former Republicans and the people who would still describe themselves as Republicans, but we do not wish to give away any information about those sources, except what was publicly stated in the book. Some of these people still live in Republican areas and are fearful for their lives should their identities be disclosed.}\\textsuperscript{173}
\\textbf{The IRA Official Line}
2C-190 On the night of Bloody Sunday the IRA sent out a clear signal that the public line was to be that there had been no relevant IRA shooting on Bloody Sunday. A note of the press conference held by the Official IRA at midnight on 31\\textsuperscript{st} January 1972 records that:
\\textit{The officer claimed that the IRA Official wing had at no time fired shots in the immediate vicinity of the area where the deaths occurred.}
\\textit{...}
\\textit{He could not speak for the Provisionals but to the best of his knowledge there was no shooting at all against the Army in the William Street / Rossville Flats area.}\\textsuperscript{174}
2C-191 The Provisional IRA issued a similar statement that night. A note of the press conference records that:
\\textsuperscript{172} M111.2, paragraph 10 \\textsuperscript{173} Day 387/18/04-11 \\textsuperscript{174} ED12.4-5 The officer commanding the city's IRA Provisional Brigade said: "At no time did any of our units open fire on the British army prior to the army opening fire."
"In order to avoid any possibility of danger to civilians the Derry Provisional Command of the IRA ordered all weapons out of the total route of the march area this morning."(^{75})
One consequence of such a clear statement by both sections of the IRA is that the civilian population of Londonderry was left in no doubt that if they spoke out about having seen gunmen on Bloody Sunday they were contradicting the official IRA line.
**Civilian Reticence and Notable Exceptions.**
The Tribunal has heard evidence from a number of civilian witnesses who have indicated that under no circumstances would they have mentioned seeing civilian gunmen in statements they made in 1972.
Peter McGrisken was asked by Mr Roxburgh why he had failed to mention in his contemporary statement a confrontation he had witnessed between members of the Official and Provisional IRA. He replied:
> At the time I, it is hard to say, there was no way I wanted to mention a thing like that, as you say.(^{176})
James Norris was asked by Ms McGahey about a similar omission:
> Q. In your statement in 1972 you did not refer to having seen the gunman with a revolver; why was that?
> A. Possibly because after the shootings that I felt it was inappropriate to mention that there was a gunman there and it was only as a result of Bishop Daly speaking out on television that I felt confident enough to come forward and say that.
(^{75}) ED12.1-2
(^{176}) Day 106/113/7-16 Q. Was that this time, to this Tribunal?
A. Yes.
Q. Why was it inappropriate in 1972?
A. Well, I felt the mood in the city after the shootings did not lend itself to it.\\textsuperscript{177}
David Capper witnessed a gunman fire a pistol near the Shiels' house\\textsuperscript{178} at soldiers in a derelict buildings close to the church.\\textsuperscript{179} For "diplomatic" reasons he had given the impression to the Widgery Inquiry that he had not seen the gunman as he had not wanted to get involved in identity parades.\\textsuperscript{180} In his oral evidence to this Inquiry he explained that when he had seen the gunman fire he had been in a crowd of twenty or thirty people who had scattered.\\textsuperscript{181} It is clear from this oral evidence that this Inquiry could and should have heard about this incident from many other witnesses.
Monica Barr is one of only a handful of witnesses to have mentioned seeing a civilian gunman, a man firing a pistol from Block 1 of the Rossville flats, in the statement she made to NICRA. Having done so she was so scared that she never mentioned seeing the gunman to anyone again:
Q. I asked you earlier about the taped statement that you gave. Do you remember giving the statement?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Do you remember having any discussions at all with anybody about having seen a gunman fire from the Rossville Flats?
\\textsuperscript{177} Day 147/114/6 -18 \\textsuperscript{178} Day 73/69 \\textsuperscript{179} Day 73/11/9-14. \\textsuperscript{180} Day 73/65/7-14 \\textsuperscript{181} Day 73/123/13 -Day 73/124/5 A. No. I remember -- I can remember that I did give a statement at the time. I do not remember giving a taped statement, but because of the fact that I had seen the gunman that day, I did not make any statement to anybody else about it.
Q. Because you had seen one? A. Yes.
Q. Why not, why did you not want to give a statement to anyone else? A. I do not know, I was just scared at the time because of the way things were at that time.
Q. Did anybody tell you that you should not talk about having seen -- A. No.
Q. A civilian gunman? A. No, it was just me myself, I did not want to talk about it.(^{182})
The pressures which were operating in 1972 are all too apparent from the evidence to this Inquiry of Manan McMenamin. Mrs. McMenamin explained that she had wrestled with her conscience regarding whether she ought to come forward and tell this Inquiry that she had seen a gunman on Bloody Sunday.
I hate myself for saying this; I have never told anybody about this before, not even my husband and we have been married for over 25 years. I feel disloyal to the innocent men who died on Bloody Sunday, but I did see him and I feel that the truth must now be told.(^{183})
Peter Clarke QC asked Mrs. McMenamin:
(^{182}) Day 148/16/25-Day 148/17/22 (^{183}) AM363.2 paragraph 7 Q. Can you give us a rough estimate given the stewards had some words with this gunman? How many people you witnessed seeing that gunman; what is the smallest figure?
A. I never spoke to anybody about that gunman.
Q. How many people did you see who must have seen him, 20?
A. I would say there was such panic there that I could not speak for other people, but there could be maybe half a dozen people may have seen them.
Q. And your mother?
A. We never spoke about it, never.
Q. That was just the last point. Your mother saw him as well?
A. I do not know, we did not speak about it.
Q. It is not something one spoke about, was it, a gunman on that day was not something you mentioned in the Bogside?
A. I never spoke about it to anybody; I never mentioned it to my husband; I have never spoken about this until now. There could have been an unspoken thing there with my mother and myself, but she never mentioned it to me.
Q. May I ask, because you have had to screw up your courage to make a statement, have you not, it has been very difficult?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Indeed. Was it any particular incident that prompted you to make that courageous step?
A. I felt that the truth had to come out and I felt that, I felt I did not, I did not say to begin with because it was disloyal to the people who were innocent because I could have been shot that day and now I feel the truth has to come out, you cannot hide behind it any longer and I just think if everybody tells the truth, there will be some closure here.(^{154}) 2C-200 It is no surprise given the conditions operating in Derry in 1972 that the civilian population was genuinely fearful of the consequences of giving details about members of the IRA and the extent of paramilitary activity on Bloody Sunday.
Civilian Evidence to the Present Inquiry
2C-201 In this regard, matters have changed very little since 1972. It is apparent that a large number of witnesses are still unwilling to provide information about the IRA. Some have expressly stated that their refusal stems from a fear of the consequences.
2C-202 Charles McGill did not refer in his NICRA statement to having seen a gunman and men with nail bombs on Bloody Sunday. Although he told Eversheds about them, he refused to include any reference to what he had seen in his first signed statement to the present Inquiry. His reasons are contained in the Eversheds note which is attached to his second statement:
[Mr McGill]... says that he has to live around here and he only gave us the information after we assured him that his statement would only be signed when he had amended it as he wished and was happy with it. Although he allows me to write this information down, he stressed it was not to go in his statement.(^{185})
2C-203 His second statement, signed two days before he gave evidence, confirms:
The reason why I did not want this information to be put in my Eversheds statement is explained in the Eversheds note. However, I also I did not want people to use as an excuse to detract from the enormity of what I had seen that day.(^{186})
2C-204 Implausibly, when he gave evidence, just two days after signing his second statement, Mr McGill claimed that fear had played no part in the
(^{185}) AM230.11 (^{186}) AM230.10 paragraph 12 significant omissions from his various statements and he had simply not wanted to "detract from seeing cold blood murder."\\textsuperscript{187}
Bernard Doyle made it clear that he would give no information about the IRA for fear of reprisals:
\\begin{quote} Q. If you had seen members of the Provos or the Stickies firing guns you would not tell anyone, would you?
A. They were not firing -- there were nobody firing any guns that day, no way. The only people fired guns that day was the Army and that is all.
Q. But you see the problem is for some reason it is a laughing matter in some parts of this chamber?
A. I am not laughing at anybody.
Q. But some people were just earlier?
A. I am laughing at nobody.
Q. You are not frightened of the Provos now, are you?
A. I, I will be honest with you.
Q. Please do?
A. I live in Derry and I have to live in Derry.
Q. Absolutely?
A. We will put it that way.
Q. So you would not tell us about the Provos?
A. No way.
Q. Come what may?
A. No way.\\textsuperscript{188} \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{187} Day 069/165/18-19 \\textsuperscript{188} Day 180/148/6-25 James Deeney voiced the following concerns of civilians about coming forward and giving evidence to the Tribunal:
A. I wanted to ask a question of the Tribunal: effectively I did not have the option of anonymity. All the soldiers did whether they wanted it or not and, you know, it seems to me that that is, um, more favourable treatment, you know, for the army, you know. What if I have a job, reputation or whatever, what if I travel round Northern Ireland, you know what I mean, what about my reputation, what about my safety and so on and so on? I, effectively, did not have the option of anonymity.
.... A. I make no bones about it. What I am or what I was, you know what I mean, but supposing that I would have had a reputation with, say, professional work colleagues or whatever, you know, I would have been much more reluctant to come forward, you know, giving that, if you know where I am coming from.
LORD SAVILLE: I can understand that, Mr Deeney, and there are circumstances, as I have just said, where we would consider granting anonymity to individuals, but quite often in inquiries of this kind, the search for the truth does involve people necessarily being embarrassed or put in difficult circumstances and simple embarrassment, I am afraid, is not something we would necessarily take into account if we felt that such embarrassment, if we gave it full force and effect, would impede us for our search for the truth. Our object is to search for the truth about what happened on Bloody Sunday and we will do so as fairly and justly as we possibly can.
A. I have no doubt you will try, but I did not use the word embarrassment, and also maybe some people might have to travel round different parts of Northern Ireland because of, say, a work situation or whatever and some of those areas could maybe be hostile, you know.189
It can be inferred from the alterations made to Mr Deeney’s statement that he personally had anxieties about admitting to knowing the identity of a member of the IRA. In his first BSI statement Mr Deeney refers to seeing
189 Day 086/168/8-170/23 some members of the Official IRA coming out of a house with a rifle. He confirmed to Edmund Lawson Q.C. that his draft BSI statement had included a sentence in which he said that he vaguely knew one of the gunmen, but was not prepared to name him. This sentence had been removed from the final version of his statement; probably, he agreed, at his own request.\\textsuperscript{190}
2C-208 Kieran Gill gave a third supplemental statement detailing the risk to his personal safety if he was ordered to disclose his IRA sources:
\\begin{quote} It is my understanding that both organisations continue to exist and continue to have access to weapons.
There would be a very high risk that on the hypotheses which I have given ... the PIRA and OIRA would learn what I had done...
It is notorious that PIRA and OIRA exact revenge on those whom they regard as informers. Individuals within the organization may also behave in this way on their own initiative. It is also obvious that they would not be dissuaded from such reprisals because I was acting under the compulsion of an order from the Tribunal.\\textsuperscript{191} \\end{quote}
2C-209 Patrick Moore was asked by Edwin Glasgow QC about corrections which he sought to make to his BSI statement regarding a member of the IRA:
\\begin{quote} Q. Could we look, please, together at paragraphs 26 to 28? There are the two sentences I would ask you to take in mind together, if you would. Firstly, the first line of paragraph 26, where you said in the statement:
"Taking cover with us behind the wall was a known republican" and the second sentence which you corrected when you first gave your evidence:
"The person who I recognised as a republican" and you now say "who I was told was a republican". Without \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{190} Day 086/148/9-152/13 \\textsuperscript{191} M105.31 paragraphs 5-8 wishing to be rude, Mr Moore, can you say why your statement, as taken and signed by you two years ago, clearly indicated you did know this man to be a republican; how is it you have changed your mind about that, if you have?
A. It is not really I have changed my mind, it is just it is not interpreted the way I said it, that is all I can say. I understand what you are saying as well.192
2C-210 Patrick Moore also refers in his BSI statement to seeing “TV people, a politician and known republicans” but responding to a question by Gerard Elias Q.C. he stated that he could not name any of these individuals.193
2C-211 Francis Duddy claimed that he could not be sure who had been in the bookies with him and on that basis initially declined to give any names of others who might have been there, save positively to deny that Martin McGuinness had been present.194
2C-212 Patsy Murphy denies having any knowledge of civilian gunmen195 despite the fact she is recorded as having given a joint Praxis interview with Nuala O’Donnell, the note of which records that “They both confirm Nell’s gunman story, but their memories are not as good as Nells”.196 The ‘Nell’ referred to is Nell McCafferty who refers to seeing two men with rifles near the Bogside Inn.197
2C-213 Other witnesses have claimed, without giving a particular reason, that they are simply unable to help in relation to membership or activities of the IRA. The Tribunal has given a clear indication that it is aware that in a number of cases where witness have not given a reason for refusing to
192 Day 98/61/12-Day 98/62/5 193 Day 098/65/12-66/14 194 Day 089/104/16-105/14 195 Day 165/66/18-71/7 196 M59.1 197 M54.3 paragraph 6 answer questions about the IRA, fear of terrorist reprisals may have played a part in this decision. On the final day of oral evidence Lord Saville commented:
In a number of instances during the course of taking oral evidence at this Inquiry, witnesses have refused to answer questions. These witnesses include journalists and members or ex-members of paramilitary organisations as well as others... 198
Having dealt with the first two categories of witness Lord Saville stated:
In the case of others the refusal was, in some instances, to provide similar information. Here no particular reason was advanced to justify the refusal, though to our minds it is possible, at least in some cases, that fear of possible reprisals from paramilitary organisations still active, may have been the reason.
In some of these cases, therefore, the refusal may be justifiable on the grounds that to require an answer would be to breach the individual's rights under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 199
Priests as Protected Spokesmen
Dennis Bradley gave illuminating evidence of the pressure under which the civilian community had been at the time of Lord Widgery's Tribunal not to speak of paramilitary activity:
A. There was no inhibition among the clergy who went forward to Widgery and whom the rest of the community would not have gone forward without, to tell the truth about Bloody Sunday vis-a-vis the gunmen that they saw; that was a conscious decision. I mean we were consciously aware that there were evidence to two gunmen having fired shots and we decided as a group of people to go forward to Widgery and to give that evidence, and also encourage
198 Day 427/119/10-14 199 Day 427/120/11-20 other people to go forward. That was 27 years ago, whatever it was.
Q ..... But would it be right to say that of your own knowledge, for example, a very, very large number of people must have seen the gunman that you are now talking about in Columbille Court and the confrontation with the Provisionals and decided not to tell anybody about it? So that you can deal with the whole thing, I put that to you because you refer to him having fired in circumstances where there were thousands of people milling about and of the fact that Columbille Court was crowded at the time. Does it not follow that if that incident is true, the one you have recounted on a number of occasions, that some of which appear to claim that you were present, there must have been in your own words "thousands", but I will settle for scores of people who saw that incident, but have chosen for some reason not to give evidence about it; can you comment on that
A. Give evidence to who?
Q. First of all to Lord Widgery. Why did people not simply come out and tell the truth --
A. Because I think that people considered -- my best interpretation of the answer to the question that you are asking me is that people made the opinion -- rightly or wrongly, they may have been wrong, I will acknowledge they may have been wrong -- that we were talking, all of us were talking about Father O'Gara's gunman. That may have been an assumption and the truth of the matter is that we as the clergy and the priests of this town decided we would tell the story because we had seen it and that other people would not put themselves in that exposed position, and our attitude to that has been that the Republican movement itself must ultimately tell that story because only they know it and the rest is interpretation, and therefore all we could give would be our visual view of it.
Q. Does it boil down to this, I do not say this remotely critically: your understanding may be that because the clergy were prepared to come forward and give personal accounts of those gunmen that they saw; it was not necessary for ordinary civilians to potentially put themselves on the wrong side of the IRA by giving evidence about what they had also seen?
A. I think that is reasonably accurate. I also just would add the thing that I think that people probably thought it was the same gunman anyway, but I cannot be totally sure about that, but I think your interpretation is reasonably accurate.
Q. There may be a large number of people who did see gunmen on the day, but who honestly believed, in your view, that because the clergy were going to speak to it, they were relieved of the fear and the worry of having to give evidence against the IRA?
A. Well, if there had been sightings of all these other gunmen that you refer to by other people I would have certainly been told of it and I would have put it somewhere into a statement if I had been told it, maybe not at Widgery but I would have put it into other evidence somewhere throughout the last 30 years.
Q. It was not only Widgery, Mr Bradley, was it? It was when you made your statement to NICRA you made no mention of your knowledge of that gunman even in that statement?
A. Yes, but I was caught then as I am caught now between circumstantial, told, rumour evidence and factual evidence which I had to sign to as having actually seen and I have always been in that situation and tried to handle it as honestly as I can.
Q. Did you not think it was important, at least from NICRA's point of view, in investigating the truth of what happened that you, as a Catholic priest and a hugely respected man in this city, knew of an incident that had taken place with a civilian gunman; did you not think it right to tell them?
A. Because I thought it was already being told in a better fashion than I could tell it by some people who had already seen it, rather than me who had been told it second, or third or fourth hand.200
2C-215 It appears therefore that the approach adopted by the clergy in 1972 may have had the effect of inhibiting others from providing full accounts of what they witnessed on Bloody Sunday.
200 Day 140/206/1-140/209/16. Moreover, not all of the priests were forthcoming in 1972, despite their protected position. Father Carolan failed to mention in 1972 that he heard automatic fire, yet was able to mention it in his BSI statement.201
The Mahon interviews.
The fact that, nearly thirty years later, some witnesses were only prepared to talk 'off the record' to Paul Mahon is further evidence that there remains concern amongst civilian witnesses about the repercussions of their admitting to having seen IRA activity in the Bogside on Bloody Sunday. This matter is addressed in detail below.
Discussion
In these circumstances, the reluctance of civilian witnesses to give evidence of the activities of gunmen on Bloody Sunday is entirely understandable. However, as a result, the Tribunal should accord very considerable weight to the evidence against interest of a civilian who tells of having seen a gunman on the day, even if dozens of other witnesses say that there were no gunmen present.
John Barry, who as a journalist investigating the events of Bloody Sunday met many of the same difficulties faced by the Tribunal, articulated the logic of this approach:
One of the difficulties in trying to unravel what the, what the IRA in general had done that day was that there was clearly a reluctance on the part of many -- I do not say all in the community, but the reluctance on the part of many -- to talk about it and therefore we tended to place -- I certainly tended to place -- more weight upon people who said: yes, I did hear something; I did see something or -- and certainly I would have placed most weight upon someone who was, at least according to this note, a self-
201 H3.3 paragraph 10 proclaimed IRA man who said: yes, I did do something. I would have placed most weight upon that. As a general proposition, and I ask you to believe I am not being facetious here, but as a general proposition I do remember repeatedly telling my colleagues or reminding my colleagues of a saying which I have found very useful, which is a rubric by the great mathematician CS Hardy, who once advised his pupils that when the Archbishop of Canterbury says he believes in God, that is just in the way of business; it is when he says he does not that you can take it he means it, and that weighed with us on the question of what the IRA had done that day and what the civilian witnesses said.202
THE MAHON INTERVIEWS
2C-220 At a late stage in its proceedings the Inquiry disclosed to the interested parties a series of transcripts of interviews conducted by Paul Mahon. Although Mr. Mahon was and remains convinced that soldiers acted unlawfully and without justification on Bloody Sunday he was not prepared to withhold from the Inquiry evidence which might be inconsistent with that view.
2C-221 These interviews are a useful indicator of what a substantial number of local people were prepared to say when they believed their words would never come to the attention of The Bloody Sunday Inquiry. It is interesting that not one of the civilian witnesses who gave an interview to Mr. Mahon ever mentioned to the Inquiry that he had done so.
2C-222 The Tribunal is now aware of vital discrepancies between the accounts given by individuals to Mr. Mahon and their evidence to this Inquiry.
2C-223 The interviews that have been disclosed to the Tribunal were ostensibly recorded on the understanding that the recording machine would be switched off if an interviewee wished to say anything about the activities
202 Day 194/41/07-194/42/03. of the IRA, another person's membership of the IRA, or other facts deemed adverse to the interests of the families.
A number of the videos upon which the interviews were recorded have been put out of the Tribunal's reach. The inescapable inference to be drawn from the circumstances of their removal is that the videos which are still outstanding contain material which someone did not want the Tribunal to hear. This issue is further addressed in Section 2C IV, below.
To the civilians who spoke to him, Paul Mahon's objective appeared identical to that of the families. He became an employee of Brendan Kearney, Kelly & Co., the solicitors instructed by Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley. Often enough, Michael Bradley was present at the interviews. He and Mr. Mahon were clearly people to whom witnesses felt they could speak privately and without compunction. Things could be said here in safety which could not be said elsewhere. That is why the Mahon interviews are so telling. They reveal traces of the truth which, it appears, some were anxious to keep from the Tribunal.
John Kelly
John Kelly is the brother of Michael Kelly and former chairman of the families' campaign for a new inquiry. In his BSI statement John Kelly was unequivocal about the activities of the IRA on Bloody Sunday:
There were no civilians carrying firearms, nail bombs or other weapons on that day....
______________________________________________________________________
203 For example, see: X4.17.74 paragraph 2 204 For example, see: X4.18.50-51 205 For example, see: X4.27.54-55 206 AM19.8 paragraph 24 207 AM19.13 paragraph 27 208 AK13.1 paragraph 1 Mr. Kelly confirmed the truth of his BSI statement on oath before the Tribunal when he was called to give evidence. However, with the disclosure of the interview he gave to Paul Mahon, it has become clear that Mr. Kelly knew about at least three of the gunmen who were present on Bloody Sunday.
First, in that interview he discussed OIRA 1’s shot in Columbille Court. He suggested he had first-hand knowledge of what happened:
PM: And was he a member of the Official IRA? JK: I don’t know. PM: Right, OK. JK: Quite a possibility. PM: Right, so he was a maverick. JK: Maverick. PM: OK. Do we know or are we theorising here? JK: No, it’s a fact. PM: Right, because the army would say, oh, yes... JK: He was a maverick. PM: They would say there was another 10 of them. JK: No. PM: How do we know that’s not the case and that he was a maverick? JK: Because I was there. Whether Mr. Kelly had personally seen OIRA1 fire a shot is unclear. However, he gave evidence to the Tribunal that no civilians had guns on Bloody Sunday when he knew this to be untrue. Furthermore, he was certainly aware that this gunman had fired a shot before the launch of the arrest operation:
PM: Right. What was the timescale when that was fired? Was that before the pigs had actually come into Rossville Street area? Before the Paras had actually come through the barricade?
JK: [Nodding] Yeah.
PM: OK, so from the army's point of view it was quite legitimate for them to say at this stage that there was at least one gunman with a high velocity rifle in that area and possibly there might be more.
JK: [Nods]
PM: It would have been legitimate for them to have said that at that stage.
JK: Right, fair enough, yeah.
PM: OK.
JK: I can't argue against that. 213
Secondly, the interview also reveals that Mr. Kelly knew that a member of the Official IRA with a handgun was at the bottom of Chamberlain Street. However, Mr. Kelly did not personally hear him fire his pistol:
PM: ... That there was in fact a gunman alongside the wall in Chamberlain Street.
JK: In Chamberlain Street, yes.
PM: Right. And he's been identified I believe as, again, a member of the Official IRA.
213 X4.17.29 JK: [Nodding]. Uh hum.
PM: And again, he's been classed as another gunman, right? And he was firing a revolver, I believe. Now you said before that as far as you're concerned, he didn't fire any shots at all.
JK: That's right.
PM: But the Bishop [Daly] says that he definitely fired one shot.
JK: Uh huh.
PM: And possibly two.
JK: I never heard anything.
PM: OK. 214
2C-231 Thirdly, Mr. Kelly told Mr. Mahon about visiting a civilian who had been injured in a gun battle at some point after the main shootings:
JK: ... don't forget too, you know, in relation to the IRA, a deal was struck on the day that no guns would be there during the march. There was no guns there apart from the two that we were talking about earlier on. But there was a reaction after that when people, when guns started coming in from the Creggan and there was a bit of shooting went on I think later that night. I think there was some people shot that night, I'm not sure. There was one man I visited who was shot for definite that night. There was a gun battle [indecipherable] and he was hit. He was hit in the backside [laughing] but he, you know, he lived. 215
2C-232 As an Interested Party before this Inquiry who has been frequently in attendance at its hearings, there can be little doubt that Mr. Kelly would have been aware of the importance of the Tribunal identifying each and every person who was injured by gunfire on Bloody Sunday. It was made clear by Edwin Glasgow QC during his opening that the issue of
214 X4.17.29 215 X4.17.73 paragraph 6 unidentified casualties was central to the issues for the Tribunal to decide. But Mr. Kelly said nothing to the Tribunal of visiting the wounded man.
Mr. Kelly also gave an account which was inconsistent with that he gave to Mr. Mahon when telling the Tribunal:
Q. Was either your friend or you taking any part in the riot that was going on?
A. During the period of the riot we stood and watched what was going on. In those days, like, I was just a married man, I had two children at the time and, and I did not take part in riots at that time. So myself and Jim just watched what was going on. As I said in my statement there, it became uninteresting after a period of time. 216
In his account to Paul Mahon he had frankly admitted throwing a stone:
JK: ... Now to be truthful, I was over at the barricade in William Street...
PM: Right.
JK: ... to see what was going on. I threw a stone. 217
Similarly, Mr. Kelly failed to inform the Inquiry, by whatever means, that he was aware that Damien Donaghy had also been throwing stones:
JK: That was young “Bubbles” Donaghy we called him.
PM: Right.
JK: He was part of the... he was coming down William Street and of course he sees this fight with the Para and he starts throwing stones. 218 Mr. Kelly has spent the last ten years calling for the truth about Bloody Sunday to come out. The Tribunal will recall the speech he made at the end of his evidence:
LORD SAVILLE: Do you have any further questions? Mr Kelly, thank you very much.
A. Could I say something, please, in relation to the fact that my mother was to give evidence to this Inquiry, my mother was there on Bloody Sunday. She was in Kells Walk -- flat at Kells Walk and she witnessed some of the things that happened in Rossville Street on the day itself. What I can say to you is that 30 years on my mother still prays that the truth and justice will come out of this Inquiry and she has great faith in this Inquiry. What I can say to you from her is that hopefully that you will not allow the interference of English courts in relation to -- especially what is going on now at the present time, the venue and in the past, anonymity, distract from what your job -- I am talking about the Tribunal here -- is here to do. Hopefully -- and we see it as an opportunity for the truth of what happened on Bloody Sunday to come out of this Inquiry.219
In an interview he gave to Joanne O'Brien before this Inquiry was announced,220 Mr. Kelly talked about what his family had been through since the day Michael Kelly was killed, and said:
Maybe that's one of the driving forces behind me in relation to this campaign. I want to see it come to a successful conclusion for my mother and the rest of them.221
The Mahon tapes raise a question as to what may be considered a successful conclusion.
219 Day 167/088/20 220 See in particular AK13.21-23 221 AK13.23 paragraph 2 The transcript of Michael Havord's interview with Mr. Mahon reveals that he was aware that an individual who was shot on Bloody Sunday received covert treatment for his injuries at Letterkenny Hospital:
MH: Paddy Devlin then told me that he came to [indecipherable] area. There was somebody wounded and Paddy Devlin gave the guy his car to get him to Letterkenny. I remember that because it was quite a brand new car. In them days, you know, we didn't all have cars in those days.
PM: Right. And who was the wounded person, do you know?
MH: I don't know his name.
PM: No and how was he wounded, can you remember?
MH: I think he was shot in the arm, I think.
PM: Right.
MH: He went to Letterkenny, anyway.
PM: He definitely went to Letterkenny?
MH: Yeah.
PM: Right.
MH: Paddy Devlin lent him his car to get him across the border.
PM: And someone drove him?
MH: Someone drove him, yes.
PM: To Letterkenny, right. 222
222 X4.13.38 Although Mr. Havord did not say this in evidence, it is unlikely that he was unaware of its significance. His BSI statement gave a very different impression:
On the corner of Westland Street and Lecky Road we were met by someone who said that someone had been shot and needed to get them to hospital. I remember Paddy Devlin giving them the keys of his car and telling them to take it to the hospital. I remember it was a fairly new car at the time.
Mr. Havord was also able to give evidence concerning the timing of the arrival of a car containing armed men in the vicinity of the Bogside Inn. This is how Mr. Havord put it when he told Mr. Mahon about it:
MH: So I headed up to Creggan. You know, I must tell you now that that's when I seen the first Republican gunmen.
PM: Yes, right.
MH: Arriving down from the Creggan.
PM: This is before you actually... you came out of the house that you were in Westland Street.
MH: No, it would have been just before we went in.
PM: Before you went into the house, right.
MH: Yes, because I can remember the car pulled up and four of them jumped out...
PM: Right.
MH: And Fenner Brockway turned around to me and he said, "I don't want to see this." Mr. Havord went on to confirm to Mr. Mahon that the men were definitely armed and that they received every encouragement from the crowd at Free Derry Corner. 225
In his evidence to the Tribunal, Mr. Havord changed his account so that the timing of the arrival of the IRA was after Fenner Brockway had been taken into Mrs. McCourt's house to use her telephone:
Q. You then describe going towards Mrs McCourt's house, getting into her house, Lord Brockway phoning the BBC and then, as you came out of her house in Westland Street, a car came screeching down the road. How long were you in her house?
A. I have not a clue. It was long enough for Fenner Brockway -- I said the BBC, I actually believe now it was the Home Office, I do not know. But he had already been in and had his say on the telephone to them, so it could have been maybe half an hour. 226
Mr. Havord told the Tribunal that he was against violence:
There was only two avenues that one could have taken: one was the civil rights way, the other was the paramilitary way. The paramilitary way, I would not have believed in and basically, as an Englishman, I would have considered it treason. 227
He had given a rather different account to Mr. Mahon a year earlier:
MH: I didn't notice they were definitely rifles. I didn't look too closely because, umm, I kind of trained my self, being an Englishman involved in, if you like, on the Nationalist side...
PM: Yes.
225 X4.13.40 226 Day 125/045/15 227 Day 125/009/14 MH: I kind of trained myself to ignore that detail because... then I always... I honestly considered going into the Republican movement.
PM: Right.
MH: Especially after Bloody Sunday.
PM: Yes.
MH: But I just said to myself, I wouldn't trust [indecipherable].
PM: Yes.
MH: My concern was because it was so obvious that the security forces had intelligence.
PM: Yes.
MH: And I just thought I would have been a number one suspect.
PM: Indeed.
MH: I would say that's probably why I never actually became involved with the... the Republican movement.228
2C-246 Bearing in mind that Mr. Havord was the Derry Civil Rights Association representative on the NICRA Executive Committee and one of the organisers of the march, it is perhaps not surprising that he did not reveal his views on political violence to the Tribunal.229
Francis Dunne
2C-247 Francis Dunne told Mr. Mahon on 31st March 1998 that his impression was that Father Daly's Gunman fired a pistol blindly around a wall at soldiers on the waste ground:
228 X4.13.40-41 229 AH46.1 paragraphs 5-7 PM: You actually said something interesting, he pointed this round...
FD: That's what I thought very stupidly, you know, because he didn't look. He could have shot a civilian.
PM: He didn't look at any time around the corner?
FD: Aye, his body wasn't round the corner, you know what I mean, he didn't have from what I could see and from the impression I formed, he just sort of edged along the wall, popped it round the corner.... Without looking....
PM: Did you get the impression that he fired at all?
FD: Well, I couldn't see any reason, you know what I mean.230
2C-248 Although Mr. Dunne did mention in his BSI statement made in 1999 seeing Father Daly's Gunman, he did not say that his impression was that the gunman fired a number of blind shots at the soldiers:
The impression I had was that he had a handgun in his right hand and he was edging along the wall towards Block 1. I did not see him fire any shots and I did not see the soldiers firing at this time. 231
2C-249 Later in his statement he referred to the evidence he had given to the Widgery Inquiry, saying:
The only comment I have on this evidence relates to page 26 of the transcript and paragraphs E and F. I refer in these paragraphs to the fact that someone may have been shooting back at the army. I cannot now recall the exact details but someone may have in fact fired a shot or two. This was after all the army shooting. There was definitely some shooting but I do not know where it was from. I was
230 X4.8.20-21 231 AD173.27 paragraph 22 not in a position to say if there was any shooting at the army. 232
Edmund Lawson QC asked him about this when he was in the witness box.
Q. You indicate then that, being charitable towards them, you assumed someone had fired towards the army at that stage?
A. Yes, but you know, hindsight is a wonderful thing and, um, I must admit that it has also struck me that it was possibly the army shooting from the wall that may have caused the same impression, so you know I am, I am just -- to some degree I am recording the fact that there was shooting from different directions. I was not sure who was shooting, but I was certainly quite clear of the shooting that came from the army. 233
Daniel Hutton
Daniel Hutton gave false evidence to the Tribunal about the shooting of Alex Nash. On Bloody Sunday Mr Hutton observed the Rubble Barricade from the junction of Rossville Street and Fahan Street West, i.e., from the south. 234
In his undated BSI statement, he said:
I do not know for certain where Mr. Nash had been shot from, but believed that he had been shot from the north of the Rubble Barricade. I may have formed this impression as I recall seeing a soldier by himself to the west of Rossville Street at the southern end of Kells Walk at the approximate point marked "L" on the attached map (grid reference K12) who was kneeling on one knee. The soldier had a foot up on a wall with his rifle to his chest or shoulder. 235
232 AD173.31 paragraph 42 233 Day 090/085/05 234 AH93.4 paragraph 16 235 AH93.5 paragraph 17 Mr. Hutton was not called to give evidence.
The transcript of the interview he gave to Paul Mahon on 18th July 1998 reveals a more candid account.
DH: When Mr. Nash was shot, I could see over Rossville Street, I couldn't see any soldiers shooting back at me. I thought the shooting was coming from the Walls to be honest with you, but again the Walls were a fair bit away so I couldn't identify if anyone was shooting from there or not.
PM: Right.
DH: With Mr. Nash being shot where he was shot he was at the barricade.
PM: Yes.
DH: Thinking back, it would have been nearly impossible for someone to shoot him from Rossville Street.
PM: Why not?
DH: Because he was behind the barricade, he was ducking and trying to get to Willie, you know. I remember so well that he was hiding down and then trying to get out the next thing I knew he was shot and [indecipherable].
PM: Weren't there soldier down there?
DH: There were soldiers here, but at that stage when I looked around I didn't see soldiers now. 236
Mr. Hutton went on to indicate to Paul Mahon how wedded he was to this account:
DH: I have always maintained whoever talked to me that Mr. Nash was shot from the Walls. It was the only way he could have shot from where he was at, but again it's an
236 X4.15.12-13 Dr. Raymond McClean told Paul Mahon about how, in the early 1970s, he had refused to testify in a proposed prosecution against a member of the IRA about the medical treatment he had given to him. It appears from this account that he had contacted the IRA and had taken instructions from them.238
Mr. Hutton maintained this account to everybody except the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, it seems.
Raymond McClean
Dr. Raymond McClean told Paul Mahon about how, in the early 1970s, he had refused to testify in a proposed prosecution against a member of the IRA about the medical treatment he had given to him. It appears from this account that he had contacted the IRA and had taken instructions from them.238
Dr. McClean did not tell the Bloody Sunday Inquiry about this. In fact, when he was called to give evidence, he told the Tribunal on oath that he did not know anybody in the IRA at the time of Bloody Sunday.239 To Paul Mahon, he had suggested that he did have at least some idea of who were those members of the IRA who had fired shots on Bloody Sunday, but he stopped short of naming them:
I have some indication of who they were, and they certainly were mavericks, but I don't want to go into that.240
Similarly, he told Paul Mahon about hearing automatic fire when he was treating Damien Donaghy and John Johnston in the Shiels' house.241
237 X4.15.16 238 X4.20.43-44 239 Day 175/101/18 240 X4.20.5 paragraph 4. See also the statements made by Dr. McClean to Peter Taylor for Remember Bloody Sunday considered below at paragraphs 2D-39-2D-41. 241 4.20.15 at line 1 whereas he told the Tribunal that these shots were not in a "regular pattern."\\textsuperscript{242}
\\textit{Fulvio Grimaldi}
Although Fulvio Grimaldi was not a member of the local community he was manifestly sympathetic to it. He revealed to Paul Mahon on 5\\textsuperscript{th} July 1998 that he knew he had taken a photograph of a civilian gunman:
\\begin{quote} PM: You took a picture of a man at the wall... FG: Yeah. PM: ...a gunman.... FG: Yeah. PM: ...which is not here.... FG: Yes, yes. PM: ... because it has mysteriously gone missing from the public records office. \\textsuperscript{243} \\end{quote}
... ...
FG: ... I only remember that people grabbed a person with a revolver.... And said "you're mad", "you're crazy" and "fuck off" and things like that.\\textsuperscript{244}
To the Inquiry, Mr. Grimaldi gave a different account:
\\begin{quote} I know that some people say there was a civilian gunman in the car park at that time, but I never saw him. Susan believed that one of the photographs I took in the Rossville Flats car park showed a civilian gunman. I have heard that someone has taken one of the pictures I took in the Rossville Flats car park and has blown it up to produce a very fuzzy picture of a man who they say is the gunman. I \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{242} Day 175/027/24 – Day 175/028/02 \\textsuperscript{243} X4.48.45 \\textsuperscript{244} X4.48.53 did not specifically take a picture of that man, he just happened to be there. If he was a civilian gunman, I was not aware of it at the time.
Patrick O'Donnell
In some instances the Mahon interviews not only illustrate the reticence of some witnesses but also reveal how some witnesses gave the Tribunal accounts which were calculated to present British soldiers in the worst possible light. Compare for example the following accounts of Patrick O'Donnell. This is his BSI statement, signed on 5th May 1999:
I was trying to hold a hanky to my shoulder and the soldiers were shouting abuse at me and poking me in the back, telling me to "get my fucking hands up" and calling me a "Fenian bastard". They were squealing at the top of their voices. They knew that I had been shot because Father Bradley or someone else told them. They must have known because one of the soldiers said "You have a bullet to carry – and you can have another one."
This is what Patrick O'Donnell said a few months earlier when Paul Mahon asked him to describe the behaviour of the soldiers who arrested him:
PM: What did they say? Can you remember?
PO'D: Well it was... they was just shouting, you know what I mean.
PM: Right, were they abusive?
PO'D: Aye, sort of a bit, only when they discovered... maybe they seemed a bit more abusive to me when they discovered I was shot.
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245 M34.60 paragraph 44 246 AO35.3 paragraph 18 247 X4.30.18-19 Patrick O'Donnell's failure to mention that the soldiers involved in his arrest threatened to shoot him when Mr. Mahon specifically asked him what the soldiers had said is curious. This omission and the fact that Patrick O'Donnell never mentioned this threat in any of his contemporary statements suggest that some witnesses may have given the Tribunal sensationalised accounts. However, the allegation Mr. O'Donnell made was taken seriously enough by counsel to the Tribunal to put it to Soldier J and Widgery 119.248
Malachy Coyle
There are other instances where the Mahon interviews reveal how witnesses were at pains to present the actions of British soldiers to the Tribunal in the worst possible light. Malachy Coyle told Paul Mahon on 26th March 1998 that the soldiers he saw in Glenfada Park looked as though "they were military alert to danger and they were kneeling down or standing up."249
Mr. Coyle plainly did not want the Tribunal to think that the soldiers he saw looked as if they were under threat. He tried to retrieve a similarly frank account he had let slip in the BSI statement he signed on 26th November 1998:
Q. ...Crossed out very carefully in the statement is:
"As they ran into the car park, they were all (with the exception of the soldier without a helmet) in a slightly crouched position and seemed to be taking care to look around and obtain cover. I had the impression that they were afraid of being shot at themselves and were looking for snipers." Did you at least say that, even if you have changed your mind about it afterwards, or are you saying you never even said that?
248 Put to Soldier J at: Day 370/81/17; put to Widgery 119 at: Day 363/166/07 249 X4.45.52 paragraph 8 A. I do not think it was part of my initial statement, no. I do not know, those two things were in and when I read them, I did not, I cannot — I am almost positive I did not say that, you know. The other one too, which I countersigned, I did not say that either, you know.
Q. I have to ask you, Mr Coyle, because it might have quite serious implications.
A. I understand that, it is not a case of changing it to make it look good. I cannot remember having said that.
Q. You cannot remember having said it?
A. Having said it. I got the transcript, I think the next day, and when I read I went down to Paddy and I says, "Look, that there is not right, I do not know what it is doing in there". I do not know who put it in there, but it was not me.
Q. Whoever put it on there, the coincidence is this, Mr Coyle: there is at least a large measure of truth in that?
A. I do not know, maybe, as I said, to the best --
Q. Do you remember? A. I do not remember, I do not remember seeing soldiers....
Joseph Friel
2C-267 Joseph Friel also tried to portray British soldiers in the worst possible light. In his BSI statement he described a member of 1 PARA firing from just above the hip:
There were three or four soldiers - one at the front and two, possibly three, right behind him. I could not say whether they were wearing helmets. The soldier in front was moving forward at no great pace and was firing. He had his gun in front of him at just above waist height and was moving it from side to side — not swinging it, just moving it a few inches from left to right. The other soldiers were not firing their weapons.
250 Day 156/094/01; for the deleted passage see: AC97.5 paragraph 32 251 AF34.3 Joseph Friel told the Tribunal under oath that his memory of this was crystal clear:
Q. Finally, as far as the Glenfada car park is concerned, can I be absolutely clear about this: did you see the soldiers coming in with one of them with a gun at his hip or is that an unclear recollection?
A. That is one of the few memories that I would say was totally crystal clear because, as I said, I came that close to being killed, that could have been my last vision on this entire earth.252
The picture he presented to Paul Mahon was different. He suggested that the soldier who fired was in a crouched position:
PM: Right, so they're now coming in under the ramp, which runs there above on the William Street end of Glenfada Park. They are at ground level, and how many soldiers are there again?
JF: Three.
PM: There are three soldiers and one of them stands out.
JF: Because he, as I'm saying, he came down and crouched [with] the gun, pointed. The other two as I was saying it's many years ago but it's like fresh in your memory.
PM: Yes.
JF: They were coming around just like that.
PM: Right. So we had three soldiers. We had one of them crouched, right? You say that his gun.... He was in a firing position?
JF: He was shooting.
PM: Where was he shooting? Did he have his rifle against his shoulder? No. Oh, so his rifle was halfway
252 Day 155/115/21 between his hip and his shoulder? His rifle was in this position?
JF: Right here.
PM: Right. So he was shooting....
JF: He wasn't in an aiming position.
PM: Right.
JF: He was like that.
PM: And the other two soldiers, they in fact were not shooting at all.
JF: Not shooting at all. Not that I saw. 253
Joseph Friel also disclosed to Mr. Mahon that he had been on the march on Bloody Sunday. 254 He even told Mr. Mahon that his image appears on video at the front of the march, although he did not provide the Tribunal with this information. 255 The explanation he gave for attempting in his BSI statement of 21st July 1999 to deceive the Tribunal about his presence on the march was as follows:
My reason for misstating the position was that I had given the same account in my statement to the Widgery Tribunal and felt that I should keep the two accounts consistent. I had given the incorrect account to the Widgery Tribunal because at the date of the march I was a tax official in the Inland Revenue in Derry and in the climate of that time I was concerned that, if my superiors discovered that I had taken part in what was a proscribed march, it might result in my dismissal from secure employment. Having recently reflected on the matter and bearing in mind that I am no longer a government servant, I have decided that I ought to set the record straight. 256 However, Mr. Friel told Paul Mahon that he had not been in the least concerned about losing his job with the Inland Revenue:
PM: Yes. OK. So he [John Bierman] was trying to get a sensational story about you working for her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes or...
JF: It actually appeared in one of the papers that Joe Friel says... the way it was put was [never fear of losing your job]. That was more or less the last [you] really think about.
PM: Yes.
JF: About losing your job.
PM: Indeed, indeed.
JF: More or less you work for the Queen and you're not afraid to speak. 257
Joseph Friel's interview with Paul Mahon revealed a further inaccuracy in his evidence to the Inquiry. He told the Tribunal under oath that he headed towards Free Derry Corner to hear the speeches:
Q. Tell us if you need the map, but can you just describe in your own words how you went south: did you go down Rossville Street or across the wasteground, or where?
A. I cannot mind.
Q. No recollection?
A. No recollection whatsoever.
Q. Were you in fact heading for your home, your father's flat?
A. No, I was heading towards the platform where the speeches were being made. When the army I see come in, the last thing that I mind was actually Bernadette Devlin.
257 X4.9.38 Bernadette Devlin was speaking. What she was saying I have not a clue now. 258
However, when Joseph Friel spoke to Paul Mahon he gave the following account:
PM: Were you actually... was it your intention to actually go home then, to actually go to the Rossville Flats, or to just get away from the immediate vicinity of the riot?
JF: Well to tell you the truth I was just going home for a cup of tea.
PM: Were you? Right. You thought you'd have a cup of tea. Right.
JF: The crowd as far as I was [involved in the usual rioting] and then got all the [spares] to go back up to Free Derry Corner and listen to the speeches. I was never a man for all those speeches.
PM: No.
JF: I think that all politicians are rubbish.
PM: Right, right.
JF: So I had no intention of even going to the platform. So I was going back to the flats. 259
Michael Bridge
On the assumption that he told the truth to Mr. Mahon, Michael Bridge told a very significant and apparently calculated lie on oath to the Tribunal. In his BSI statement he described what happened after he had seen Jack Duddy shot:
258 Day 155/100/10 259 X4.9.5 I believe I got within a couple of yards or so of Jack Duddy and the small group around him. I turned and saw a soldier. I cannot describe this soldier in detail save that I believe he was wearing a helmet without a visor. He was standing with his rifle in an aiming position at his shoulder pointing in my direction. He was in the position I have marked with a C...
I walked no more that 3 or 4 paces towards the soldier in position C. I believed he was responsible for shooting Jack Duddy. I identified this soldier probably because he was closest to me, probably no more than 20 yards or so. As I walked, I was holding my arms and hands in a questioning / despairing gesture. My hands were open with palms facing upwards held up to about shoulder height with my arms bent. I had nothing in my hands and I believe there is absolutely no way in which the soldier could have perceived me as a threat.
I cannot remember precisely what I was shouting to the soldier but I was certainly giving him a mouthful saying something along the lines of "what the fuck do you think you are doing?" People have said that I was saying "shoot me, shoot me" but I do not recall this. The best I can say is that I was giving this soldier a mouthful of abuse. I was so annoyed and upset by the sight that I was not acting rationally. I do not believe I would have been in that position if I had been [sic] I do not believe I threw a stone.
Michael Bridge gave sworn testimony to the Tribunal that he did not throw any stones in the moments before he was shot:
Q. You say there that you do not believe you threw a stone. Could we have on the screen a portion of the transcript: day 84, page 149? This is a portion of the evidence of Billy Gillespie. I want to show you this passage so that you may deal with it. In line 5, he says this: "Mickey, I will never forget –
LORD SAVILLE: Perhaps you better start at the beginning. MR CLARKE: The question was there: "Question: You describe how when you got to the car park you picked up some stones to throw; were there other people throwing stones at that stage? "Answer: Yes, there were a few and as I say Mickey Bridge was there and Mickey, I will never forget, had half a red brick and there was a soldier had come to the corner of the first flats and Mickey lifted the brick and I threw me stones. Mickey threw his and Mickey was shouting something. Then he shouted 'shoot me [it must be] bastards', something like that, you know, and the next thing the soldier just standing there and he just shot like that there. He was standing up at the time when he fired the gun." Then he goes on to describe your injury?
A. Well –
Q. Is there any truth in that?
A. No, I was aware -- I was here when he gave his evidence, like I was when most people gave their evidence here. He is not relating the same situation that I was in. 263
Michael Bridge's BSI statement was supplied to the Inquiry on 30th September 1999 with a covering letter from his solicitors Brendan, Kearney, Kelly & Co., which read as follows:
I enclose herewith statement in respect of Mr Michael Bridge as requested. I confirm that the draft faithfully and accurately records the account which he gave and that the account which he gave represented his best recollection of the events at that stage. 264
In fact Michael Bridge played a tape cassette to Paul Mahon during his interview with him and this was recorded on video. On that cassette recording Michael Bridge admitted that he had thrown stones at a soldier moments before he was shot:
Yeah, he was dead, he was down, obviously dead.... [I turned anyway, and I gathered up some stones] and the soldiers at this time were... the Saracens, were \[just at the
263 Day 093/051/11 264 AB84.1 high flats on the wasteground\]. There was one soldier in particular. He was [along a wall]. I started throwing stones at him. [Indecipherable references to hands in the air and verbal abuse] 'You can shoot anybody, so shoot me?' It sounds stupid, but you'd never believe that they would do it you know. But he shot. He shot five or six shots \[at me into the leg.... 265
Discussion
2C-278 The discrepancies revealed by the Mahon interviews are in many instances in themselves highly relevant to the Inquiry's search for the truth. However, they also give rise to a wider issue. If the Tribunal concludes on the basis of this evidence that a number of witnesses have not been prepared to give to the Inquiry a full and frank account of what they witnessed on Bloody Sunday - whether for reasons of fear, an unwillingness to cause hurt, loyalty to their perception of the interests of the families, an unwillingness to advance the possibility of this Inquiry reaching a conclusion inconsistent with their conviction as to what occurred, a desire to portray British soldiers in the worst possible light, or any other reason - it has to consider whether these are isolated instances or whether they are symptomatic of a more general attitude among civilian witnesses towards this Inquiry. While there is no doubt that many civilian witnesses will have given truthful evidence to the Inquiry, to the best of their ability, there is at the very least a real danger that many others, in addition to those whose lack of candour has been fortuitously exposed, will not have been entirely frank in their evidence and will have withheld pertinent facts from the Inquiry. In this regard we draw attention to the fact that the records of a substantial number of interviews conducted by Mr. Mahon have been deliberately placed beyond the reach of this Inquiry. 266 While, ultimately, it is impossible to know what facts have
265 X4.3.5 paragraph 1. The full contents of the tape cassette have not been disclosed to the interested parties. 266 See Section 2C IV, below. been concealed from the Inquiry, it seems probable that the most serious instances of witnesses withholding or falsifying evidence have not come to light. As a result, it is submitted that the Tribunal should approach the civilian evidence to this Inquiry with extreme caution.
2C-IV DELIBERATE WITHHOLDING AND SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE.
2C-279 In earlier sections of this submission, we have drawn attention to the reticence of witnesses and their reluctance to come forward and tell the truth about the events of the day, and particularly to speak of matters which might be thought either to be contrary to the interest of the deceased and wounded or the IRA or to provide any justification, however remotely, for the shooting of live rounds by the soldiers. This section deals with another serious issue, namely the attempted or actual suppression of evidence.
THE EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY PAUL MAHON
2C-280 Paul Mahon went to University in 1994 as a mature student and obtained a degree in contemporary political studies. During the course of his studies, he became interested in Northern Ireland affairs and Bloody Sunday in particular. He wrote a dissertation entitled “Bloody Sunday – Murder and Justice Denied in the Name of the Crown”267 During the period of his research and study, Mr. Mahon came into contact with members of the BSJC and he provided Messrs Madden and Finucane with copies of material he had obtained in the course of his research. After completing his degree in 1996, Mr. Mahon obtained sponsorship to continue his research into the events of Bloody Sunday.
267 AM19.2 Paragraphs 3 to 5 Unfortunately, a mistake has occurred in relation to the numbering of this statement. The reference AM 19 has been allocated to both Liam Mailey and Paul Mahon. During the course of 1998, Mr. Mahon, with the active assistance of some of those intimately concerned with the BSJC, conducted a large number of interviews with eye witnesses. Those interviews were generally, if not always, recorded on video and/or audio tape with the consent of the interviewee. At the time, Mr. Mahon was working as a freelance researcher and he considered, it would seem quite rightly, that the tapes were his property. These tapes were eventually made available to the Tribunal in June 2002. The tapes themselves have never been distributed to the Interested Parties. We understand that there may have been redaction difficulties with the transcription exercise but it was, nonetheless, unfortunate that the bulk of the transcripts was not made available to the Interested Parties until 31st October 2003.
In July 1999, Mr. Mahon apparently began working virtually full time for Messrs Brendan Kearney Kelly & Co ("BKK"), the solicitors representing Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley in connection with this present Inquiry. One of his tasks for BKK was to assist in the preparation of the response on behalf of Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bridge to Counsels Report No. 1. Mr. Mahon prepared a draft of the response which was submitted for approval internally by BKK and their counsel in September 1999. The response, which was in the event in the form of the draft prepared by Mr. Mahon, was submitted to the Tribunal by letter from BKK dated 15th December 1999.
The circumstances surrounding the 'leak' of the response to the press are irrelevant, but, in summary, the press reported (Mr. Mahon says
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268 Day 412/175/05 269 Day 412/007/02 270 AM19.19 paragraph 45 271 AM19.19 paragraph 45 272 AM19.415 273 AM19.20 paragraph 46 misreported)\\textsuperscript{274} that the submission contained an acknowledgement that the first shot on Bloody Sunday had been fired by the IRA. What the response actually said was:
\\begin{quote} We would hesitate to concur that enough substantial evidence exists for the Inquiry to assert 'apparently fired from somewhere in the region of Rossville Flats' but we would agree that sufficient significant evidence does exist to establish an incoming shot towards the Army's position fired at 15.55 in the sector. \\end{quote}
We have some difficulty in understanding where the heresy can lie in that concession, but it appears, on any view of the evidence, that it caused major offence to some – and that Mr Mahon was blamed.
The Tribunal will, no doubt, review the sequence of events that followed publication as asserted in detail by Mr. Mahon in his statement,\\textsuperscript{275} not least because they must be relevant to the hotly contested issue as to his credibility, but the consequences for Mr. Mahon (as he alleges) resulting from him being held responsible for the apparently approved, but unacceptable response may be summarised as follows:-
(a) He became the subject of vilification and threats: serious threats were passed on to him through Mr. Brendan Kearney.
(b) He was excluded from discussions about the repercussions.
(c) His employment was terminated.
(d) Further and more direct threats were made.
(e) Some of his research material went missing.
\\textsuperscript{274} Dav 412/012/22 \\textsuperscript{275} AM19.20 paragraphs 46 to 57 The nature and level of the threats has been challenged but the other consequences listed have not.
When Mr. Mahon went to work for BKK, he took with him his whole archive and this was placed in an office known as the "Bloody Sunday Office" which was on the top of the building. So far as Mr. Mahon was aware, it was alarmed and secure. At the time of his dismissal, Mr. Mahon sought and obtained from Mr. Kearney an undertaking that his research material would be safe and not touched. Mr. Mahon went, by arrangement, on or about the 20th January 2000, to collect his material and discovered that it had been removed to an attic and secured. He removed the available material to his home in Donegal and, when he checked, he found that a significant number of video tapes and audio back up tapes was missing. On reporting this to Mr. Kearney, his unchallenged evidence is that he was informed that it would not be in his interests to follow up the missing material or words to that effect. He made further attempts to ascertain what had happened to the tapes and was told by Mr. Bradley that Mr. Bridge had removed them. After a meeting, at which Mr. Bridge admitted removing the tapes (although he did not say how he obtained access to a locked room in his solicitor's office) Mr. Mahon reported the matter to the Police and he made a statement. This set out Mr. Mahon's account of what happened at the meeting attended by Mr. Mahon and his wife with Mr. John Kelly and Mr. Bridge on the 25th February 2000. In his statement to this Tribunal, Mr. Mahon asserted that Mr. Bridge threatened him with violence. It may be important to record at this point that counsel for Mr. Bridge and Mr. Bradley (instructed by BKK) did not
276 AM19.375 277 AM19.21 paragraph 52 278 AM19.376 279 AM19.375-381 280 AM19.23 paragraph 59 challenge any part of Mr. Mahon's testimony when he gave evidence on Days 411, 412, and 413.
Detective Sergeant. Kelly records, in note form, a telephone conversation he had with Mr. Bridge on the 13th March 2000 in which Mr. Bridge is recorded as having referred him to Mr. Kearney. On the 23rd March 2000, a letter from BKK was delivered to the Police, the full text of which reads;
_We enclose a number of tapes which have been given to us._ _We have been instructed that ownership of these tapes rests with those who appear on them._
On the assumption that these were the tapes returned by the Police to Mr. Mahon on the 19th April 2000, the letter is extraordinary: it does not reveal who had "given" them to BKK; and it puts forward a claim as to ownership so manifestly wrong in law, that it is difficult to see how that assertion was conscionably made.
In a further statement made to the Police on the 22nd April 2000, Mr. Mahon acknowledged that he had received three video tapes and one audio tape. There remained a number of "missing tapes." Unfortunately, Mr. Mahon did not keep records of the persons he interviewed nor an inventory of the tapes he had made and so, with a limited number of exceptions, it is not possible to identify now which tapes have gone missing and who was recorded giving interviews on them. Mr Mahon is, however, able to say with certainty that video tapes of interviews with the following are missing:
1. "Mad Dog" Doherty;
2. George Downey;
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281 AM19.282 282 AM19.381 Mr. Mahon’s evidence is that the primary sources for his information about the gunman at Columbcille Court were George Downey, “Mad Dog” Doherty, Michael Bradley and PIRA 1. The information from Mr. Bradley was given informally and was not recorded. Mr. Mahon’s interview with PIRA 1 was video taped, and a transcript has been provided. There is, however, no reference in the interview to the Columbcille Court gunman. It was confirmed by Mr. Mahon in evidence to the Tribunal that he did, indeed, hear about the Columbcille Court gunman from PIRA 1 but that that part of the interview took place whilst the tape was deliberately switched off. Mr Mahon was quite categoric in stating that he interviewed the other two sources of this information, “Mad Dog” Doherty and George Downey, on video. The tapes of these interviews are now missing.
Although OIRA 1, who fired a .303 rifle at a soldier, and OIRA 2, his colleague who was with him at the time, have admitted the substance of the incident, it is still a hugely controversial issue and Mr. Mahon’s interviews with “Mad Dog” Doherty and George Downey are likely to have provided relevant evidence. The late Danny McGowan has given a variety of conflicting accounts as to his movements and activities on the day but ill health, and sadly his death recently, have prevented the Tribunal hearing evidence from him by way of elucidation. The interview he gave to Mr. Mahon may well have provided answers to some of the questions that arise as a result of the inconsistencies.
Another of the missing tapes recorded an interview with Pearse McCaul. The Tribunal will recall that Mr McCaul spoke, in his BSI statement, of removing an unidentified body from the rubble barricade into Glenfada Park North before Michael Kelly was moved. Mr McCaul was then one of the party which began to carry Michael Kelly’s body towards the north east corner of Glenfada Park North but, for some unknown reason, diverted their path to make for the south west corner. The Tribunal will bear in mind not only Mr McCaul’s evidence that it was not the presence of soldiers which caused this diversion but also the evidence of other civilian witnesses of there being both gunmen and young men with nail bombs in the north east corner. Mr McCaul was only two feet away from Jim Wray when he was shot, close, it is submitted, to at least two OIRA gunmen, in all likelihood including OIRA 1. The Tribunal will also recall the evidence of Paul Mahon himself about being told by Liam Wray about the apology offered by the Official IRA to Mr Wray’s brother as to this very incident. It is, we submit, therefore, highly likely that the tape of the interview with Mr McCaul would have been of real interest to those who are anxious that the whole truth be told to this Tribunal.
290 Day 412/147/14 291 Day 412/167/08 292 Day 412/167/01 293 AM93.3 paragraphs 13-14 294 Day 164/128/18 295 See Chapter 9 of these submissions. 296 AM93.4 paragraph 17 corrected from north west to south west at Day 164/095/05 The fifth of those tapes known to be missing is that recording an additional interview with Michael Bridge. One of the tapes returned to Mr. Mahon via the Police was of an interview with Mr. Bridge but another is still missing. Since, on his own unchallenged admission, it was Mr. Bridge who removed the tapes from the offices of BKK, it must be disturbing to the Tribunal that it is left to speculate as to what it was that was said to Mr. Mahon in a recorded interview that the Tribunal may not hear.
It is convenient to refer at this point to a further ‘missing’ video tape, that relating to an interview Paul Mahon conducted with Joe Mahon. Mr. Paul Mahon has not asserted that this tape was stolen, but his evidence is that the tape was given to Mr. Bradley who in turn, gave it to Joe Mahon. It is significant that Joe Mahon is said to have been concerned and worried about the nature of the interview. Mr Joe Mahon was the source of evidence, described by Christopher Clarke QC in opening, as being “of the most graphic character,” of the alleged “execution” of Jim Wray. Joe Mahon’s version of this event, which has now made its way into “docu-drama” has, in our submission, been proved by forensic evidence to be fallacious. Other than to a very small number of people, it is not known what Mr. Joe Mahon told Mr. Paul Mahon but it seems that the Tribunal has been deprived by Mr. Joe Mahon himself, and for reasons known only to him, of seeing and hearing what he said to Mr. Paul Mahon when first interviewed. The Tribunal is bound to ask itself why.
297 See Chapter 9 of these submissions. 298 Day 412/167/25 299 AM19.381 300 Day 412/147/14 301 Day 421/106/12 302 Day 029/004/23 303 Greengrass documentary 304 See the evidence of Dr Shepherd at Day 230/096/15-097/13 At a preliminary hearing on the 27th September 1999, Lord Saville announced that the parties had been asked to confirm in writing that they had produced to the Tribunal all relevant material in their possession other than that for which privilege was claimed. He recorded that BKK had provided that confirmation. The date is significant because, by then, Paul Mahon had been working for them for about three months and, as is recorded above, all of his research material was in the offices of BKK. According to Mr. Mahon’s evidence, the existence of his material in their offices was considered when the letter of confirmation was given:
Q. Then your statement continues, I want your help about this: "That was why he felt able to tell the Inquiry that he had no material relevant to Bloody Sunday. I eventually picked up the material from the offices of BKK." That penultimate sentence I have read to you, that was why he felt able to tell the Inquiry he had no material relevant to Bloody Sunday, that indicates, does it, that it was acknowledged that the material was yours?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Expressly so?
A. Expressly so.
There can be little doubt that, in circumstances where solicitors physically had documentary material that was plainly relevant and obviously of evidential importance in their own “Bloody Sunday Office”, it – or at least its existence - should have been disclosed. Even if non-disclosure might have been justified on the basis that Mr. Mahon still owned the material (which he may well have done), there really can be no doubt at all, given the relationship between Mr. Mahon on the one hand and BKK, Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley on the other, that had BKK wanted the Tribunal to have the material, Mr. Mahon would have
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305 Preliminary hearing 27th September 1999 306 Day 412/178/05 agreed to that. Indeed, had Mr Mahon not agreed one would have thought that BKK would have terminated their relationship with him and brought the existence of the material to the Tribunal’s attention. There could be no question of Legal Professional Privilege arising in the circumstances in which the interviews had taken place. The inference is that someone had concluded that the Tribunal should not see the material in question.
After the dismissal of Mr. Mahon and after a failed attempt to retrieve from the Tribunal the submission that had been lodged in response to Counsel’s Report No. 1, BKK prepared and submitted on the 23rd February 2000 a short Addendum to their response. This asserted that, since “our report was prepared in September 1999”, they had reviewed and analysed Mr. Capper’s Eversheds statement, the Tribunal’s analysis of Mr. Capper’s tape and the transcript of a radio broadcast by Mr. Capper on 7th January 2000 and concluded that Mr. Capper’s evidence did not support the proposition that there was a shot fired towards the Army’s position at or about the relevant time. The Addendum then says
*It appears, therefore, that the only evidence to support the proposition that there was such a shot must be the evidence of the soldiers who allege that they heard it.*
It is very difficult to see, in the light of the evidence available to BKK, Mr. Bridge and Mr. Bradley, how that statement can be justified.
It will be borne in mind that the information that had been given to Mr. Mahon was that the individual who had fired from Columbcille Court was OIRA 1, and Mr. Bradley himself had identified this individual to Mr. Mahon. It will also be recalled that, when Mr. Mahon was in a meeting on the 4th January 2000 with BKK, Mr. Bridge and Mr. Bradley at BKK’s
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307 AM19.427 308 September is, of course, when Mr. Mahon says he submitted his draft to BKK and counsel for consideration. It was not sent to the Tribunal until 15th December 1999. offices, there was an interruption when OIRA 1 arrived at the office, and the meeting so far as Mr. Mahon was concerned came to an end. This evidence was also not challenged on behalf of Mr. Bridge and Mr. Bradley although, through his counsel, OIRA 1 provided the Tribunal with his version of events:
Q. Before we stray into that area, Mr Mahon, if we just take it in stages. The first thing I suggest to you is that the meeting did begin downstairs, you did come from upstairs, but only Mr Bridge was there when the meeting began and Mr Bradley join the meeting a short time later?
A. No, my recollection was they were both there.
Q. Why I say that to you is that OIRA 1 will say Mr Bradley was actually giving him a lift that day to collect his car from the garage and he called into the offices of Kearney Kelly because this meeting was taking place. OIRA 1, who is a long-term acquaintance of Mr Bradley was sitting in the car outside that office, with Mr Bradley's wife, while Mr Bradley went in and he met you and the meeting continued for some 20 minutes or so?
The Tribunal may have little difficulty in preferring Mr. Mahon's account to that put on behalf of OIRA 1.
The attempts to deprive the Tribunal and the Interested Parties of the Mahon interview tapes are in vivid contrast to the actions of those involved in respect of the tapes of Mr. Mahon's interviews with INQ 2003. This witness told the Tribunal that he telephoned Messrs McCartney & Casey. The sequence of events thereafter is set out in some detail by Mr. Mahon in his statement. Suffice it to say that Mr. Mahon interviewed the former member of 1 PARA at great length in
309 AM19.12 paragraph xii 310 AM19.20 paragraph 49 311 Day 412/140/22 312 C2003.45 313 AM19.15 paragraph 38 November 1999 and that some of what Mr. Mahon was told was potentially harmful to the Parachute Regiment and to some of the individual soldiers. The transcripts of these interviews were distributed to the Interested Parties on the 6th June 2000. It is not known if the Tribunal received the tapes and had them transcribed, or if BKK arranged for the transcripts to be made but, whichever is the case, there was clearly no attempt to suppress the evidence of INQ 2003.
2C-299 There is, moreover, considerable controversy about the relationship between Messrs Madden and Finucane and Mr Mahon and about their actions with regard to his research work. Mr Mahon was clearly well known to that firm and had made available to them photographs and other information as long ago as 1996. Unlike BKK, however, Madden and Finucane and those for whom they act have, through Barry MacDonald QC, sought strenuously to explain and defend their position in the face of allegations by Mr Mahon. In these circumstances, in the knowledge that the Tribunal will wish to deal with the allegations made by Mr Mahon, these submissions attempt no more than a summary of the allegations and, where appropriate, a brief comment upon them.
2C-300 There is, first, a dispute between Mr. Mahon and Madden & Finucane as to whether or not he was ever employed by them. Mr. Mahon asserts that a letter of appointment that Madden & Finucane claim to have written was never received by him, he was never employed by them and that the letter was “written for the file” in order that Madden & Finucane could assert a claim for Legal Professional Privilege on behalf of their clients over the material collected by Mr. Mahon and thereby avoid production of it to the Tribunal. There is, it seems, a head-on conflict about this, although, in a letter commenting upon the allegation dated 15th January
314 AM19.4 paragraph 9 315 A copy of the letter dated 7th May 1998 has been produced to the Tribunal: AM19.412 2004\\textsuperscript{17}, Mr. Madden does not say, in terms, that it was handed or delivered to Mr. Mahon or received by him at the time it was written. He says that it was clearly not posted "and my assumption is that it was intended to deliver it by hand."
2C-301 The second area of dispute relates to an alleged threat made by Mr. Madden during the course of a telephone conversation which took place on the 30\\textsuperscript{th} November 1999. Mr Mahon claims that, after learning for the first time of the purported letter of employment and denying any knowledge of such employment, he was threatened that if he failed to give an undertaking that, in effect, legal professional privilege attached to the material he had collated, Mr Madden "would take certain action including telling the families"\\textsuperscript{18} It appears that the telephone call made by Mr. Madden is not denied, but the threat is.\\textsuperscript{19}
2C-302 Thirdly, Mr. Mahon claims that Madden & Finucane, as a means of interfering with or preventing his research, created difficulties for him with his University by complaining about the way in which he was conducting his interviews. There was an exchange between Mr. Mahon and Mr. MacDonald\\textsuperscript{20} on Day 412 but there does not, in fact, seem to be a very great deal of difference between the competing versions. Mr. Mahon says that a call was made complaining about him and Mr. MacDonald asserts that his solicitors were checking Mr. Mahon's credentials and indicated that "there was some concern in Derry... about the way in which you were conducting interviews."\\textsuperscript{21} As it appears that Mr. Mahon had been providing information and assistance to Madden & Finucane since
\\textsuperscript{16} AM19.22 paragraph 58 \\textsuperscript{17} AM19.410 \\textsuperscript{18} Dav 413/025/09 \\textsuperscript{19} Dav 413/074/09 \\textsuperscript{20} Dav 412/072 \\textsuperscript{21} Dav 412/071/16 1996\\textsuperscript{322}, it does seem a little odd that his credentials were being checked two or three years later.
2C-303 Fourthly, Mr. Mahon claims that it was Madden & Finucane who provided him with a copy of the Soldier 027 statement (in late 1998 or early in 1999) on "the understanding that I would stop conducting interviews"\\textsuperscript{323} He claims that this condition was imposed by Liam Wray and Charlie McGuigan\\textsuperscript{324} neither of whom is represented by Madden & Finucane. Nevertheless, it does appear from the questions asked and suggestions put that there was concern about the extent of Mr. Mahon's interest in the activities of the IRA on the day. It also appears, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Mahon did not interview any other witnesses after that time.
2C-304 Finally, there was a dispute about a restriction said to have been placed upon Mr. Mahon in respect of the presentation that he made to Madden & Finucane and counsel with Don Mullen. Mr Mahon said that he had been told by Peter Madden that he did not want IRA activity dealt with within the presentation.\\textsuperscript{325} This, too, is denied by Mr. Madden, and Mr. MacDonald pointed to the fact that Mr. Mahon did refer to Father Daly's Gunman as supporting Mr. Madden's denial and evidencing Mr. Mahon's dishonesty.\\textsuperscript{326}
2C-305 Neither we, nor those we represent, had any involvement in any of these matters. Indeed, until the evidence of Mr. Mahon was introduced at a late stage, we were not aware of them. We have set out our understanding both of the facts and of the quite serious contradictory allegations that have
\\textsuperscript{322} AM19.2 paragraph 6 \\textsuperscript{323} AM19.7 paragraph 20 \\textsuperscript{324} Day 412/184/08 \\textsuperscript{325} Day 412/153/16 \\textsuperscript{326} Day 413/057/09 been made. The only submission that we wish to make is that the Tribunal should determine what happened and why it happened because, all that appears to be plain to us is that the Tribunal has not received the information and assistance which it was and is entitled to expect. That has disturbing implications in respect of this Tribunal’s quest to discover the truth and the whole truth as to what happened on Bloody Sunday.
FULVIO GRIMALDI AND THE PHOTOGRAPH OF FATHER DALY’S GUNMAN
2C-306 Fulvio Grimaldi photographed the gunman who became known as Father Daly’s Gunman yet he failed to mention him and claimed not to have seen him. John Barry of the Sunday Times Insight Team explained how the photograph came to light only when the Insight Team noticed that a couple of negatives were missing from a sequence of film Mr Grimaldi had provided. Edwin Glasgow QC asked Mr Grimaldi about this. Mr Grimaldi denied that he had withheld the film and stated his belief that the Sunday Times Insight Team were responsible for a lot of “trickery”, echoing his earlier dark assertion to Christopher Clarke Q.C. that “one knows in the service of whom the Sunday Times Insight team works ... they were in the pay of the British Secret Service.”, and describing Peter Pringle as “dishonest”.
2C-307 In his BSI Statement Mr. Grimaldi said he was not aware of a civilian gunman in the car park and, by way of excuse, likened his photograph of Father Daly’s Gunman to “taking a picture of an ant in a flowerbed.” Although he said in oral evidence that had he seen a gunman he would
327 M34.3 paragraph 12 328 M34.50 letters F-G; M34.71 paragraph 111; M34.76 paragraph 117.8 (a) 329 M3.5 paragraph 20 330 Day 131/160-162 331 Day 131/44 332 Day 131/92 333 M34.60 paragraph 44 have mentioned it,\\textsuperscript{334} he refused to acknowledge the evidence put before him during his oral evidence that clearly established that the photograph was indeed of a gunman.\\textsuperscript{335}
2C-308 Furthermore, Mr. Grimaldi's evidence to this Inquiry is impossible to reconcile with the statements he made in an interview with Paul Mahon. This has been considered in detail at paragraphs 2C-260 to 2C-261, above.
2C-309 It will be recalled that it was Mr. Grimaldi who presented in a most theatrical manner to the Widgery Tribunal bullets that he claimed he had picked up on Bloody Sunday.\\textsuperscript{336} Close examination proved that they had been fired into sand and distorted.\\textsuperscript{337} Mr. Grimaldi said in his BSI Statement that he collected some of the bullets himself and that the cartridges were given to him "\\textit{later on}". He denied any attempt to distort or interfere with the bullets that were given to him.\\textsuperscript{338}
MISSING PHOTOGRAPHS: SECTOR 3
2C-310 Significant photographs taken in sector 3, and particularly of the rubble barricade, are missing.
\\textit{Eamon Melaugh}
2C-311 Amongst the photographs taken by Eamon Melaugh were these in Sector 3:
\\begin{itemize} \\item \\textsuperscript{334} Dav 131/43 \\item \\textsuperscript{335} Dav 131/41-47 \\item \\textsuperscript{336} M34.52 letter B \\item \\textsuperscript{337} D500.1 \\item \\textsuperscript{338} M34.74 paragraph 117.5(a) \\end{itemize} (1) one photograph of two soldiers on the West side of Rossville Street, and therefore probably of P and O17; and
(2) ten to twelve photographs of activity at the rubble barricade. The barricade photographs included:
(3) one of Michael McDaid before he was shot;
(4) five or six of dead or wounded people lying behind the barricade; and
(5) one of civilians standing in the area of the barricade.
Mr. Melaugh was still able to describe the McDaid photograph and to differentiate it from another photograph of Mr. McDaid:
... the photograph I was referring to that I personally took - that I gave to this individual, young McDaid is actually standing on top of the rubble, here he is walking past the rubble in the middle of the road [referring to Robert White's photograph P650]. The picture I am referring to actually shows him standing on top of the rubble, I can remember that vividly.
It is Mr. Melaugh's current recollection that this photograph was taken after the shooting had stopped and after he had photographed the bodies of Bernard McGuigan, Paddy Doherty and others. That cannot be correct and, in fact, in 1972 Mr. Melaugh had told Mr. Keville that he had photographs (plural): of young McDaid seconds, two seconds before he was shot dead... 344
Clearly, then, Mr. Melaugh’s Sector 3 photographs were of great potential significance. Yet, not one of them has reached this Tribunal. According to Melaugh, this was because the negatives went to John Lloyd of Time Out in 1972 and he did not return them. 345 This may not account for all of the missing negatives. None of Mr. Melaugh’s rubble barricade photographs was used in the consequent Time Out article, calling into question whether they were amongst the “selection” of photographs Mr. Lloyd agrees he received from Mr. Melaugh. Mr. Lloyd adds that those he did receive should have been returned by Time Out’s photo editor. 346
The fact that negatives were sent to John Lloyd certainly cannot account for the absence of the prints taken before they were sent off. We now know what happened to the only print of the McDaid photograph. 347 Mr. Melaugh’s BSI statement includes the following paragraph:
A couple of weeks after Bloody Sunday I was on the street in the Bogside area talking with a friend and showing him the photographs that I’d taken on Bloody Sunday when two members of Sinn Fein came up uninvited and listened in. 348
It was expanded upon in oral evidence:
... Now, the person who identified young McDaid asked me could he keep a copy of the print, and I immediately gave it to him.
Q. Do you know who that was?
344 AM397.071 345 Day 143/58/13 346 M101.001 paragraphs 3 to 4: AM397.073 is the Time Out article, published in 26th May to 1st June 1972 issue. 347 Day 143/61/9 348 AM397.008 paragraph 77 A. No, I simply cannot remember. At the time I believed him to be a member, whoever he was, of the Provisional IRA; I can remember that, but I honestly and sincerely cannot remember his name.349
He was further asked:
Q. Could I come to paragraphs 77 to 79. In these paragraphs you describe an incident when two members of Sinn Fein came up uninvited and listened in when you were talking about a friend and showing him photographs that you had taken on Bloody Sunday. Is this the same incident you have been describing where the man?
A. I think it is, I am fairly certain it is, yes.
Q. You are referring earlier to one man who you understood to be a Provisional; is it in fact two men you understood to be Provisionals?
A. I honestly cannot remember. I know for certain it was one guy.350
Certain people, whether they were members of Sinn Fein, the Provisional IRA or acting on their own initiative were obtaining important photographs from local photographers in the wake of Bloody Sunday. Mr. Melaugh is not the only photographer to have experienced this. Another, Robert White, suggests that photographs were destroyed as part of a deliberate attempt to suppress evidence of certain types of civilian activity on Bloody Sunday. It is therefore interesting to note Mr. Melaugh’s response to the following question:
Q. So any photographs that you took that show marchers, save for those showing some injury, are now missing?
A. Yeah.351
349 Day 143/52/16 350 Day 143/62/13 351 Day 143/113/22 We learn more about the activities of the Provisional IRA from an amateur photographer from the Creggan, Sam Gillespie. He took photographs on Bloody Sunday including, at a relatively late stage in the proceedings, a photograph in the area of the rubble barricade. He does not suggest that any of the photographs he took on Bloody Sunday have gone missing, but he does recall a visit he received soon afterwards:
...shortly after Bloody Sunday a person who I knew to be a member of the IRA personally asked me for the photographs which I refused to give. I will not disclose his name.
Mr. Gillespie gave some further information during the course of his oral evidence to the Tribunal:
Well, the day after Bloody Sunday this person came to me and said they were collecting up all the films that people had -- they wanted to see the photographs that people had taken the day prior to it and they asked me for the film, and I would not give it to him.
Q. Did he say why he wanted them?
A. He did not say why he wanted them, I did not ask him why he wanted them. I just would not give him the film for the photographs.
Q. Do you know which wing of the IRA he was a member of?
A. He was in the Provisional IRA at the time, I think.
The Provisional IRA had good intelligence about who had taken photographs on the day:
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352 P426 353 AG36.7 paragraph 32 354 Day 142/67/4 Q. Would I be right in thinking, Mr Gillespie, that as a well-known keen amateur photographer --
A. No, I am not a well-known, I just like playing with a camera --
Q. People know a lot about what everybody does in this city, but you were quite well-known as a keen photographer in this city, were you not?
A. No, no, I was not.
Q. How would anybody, let alone a Provisional IRA man, know that you had been taking photographs at all or do you think that maybe it had just come out in the information after Bloody Sunday?
A. Like I say, I gave the film to my brother to be developed. My brother gave it to his friend, his name escapes me --
Q. A number of people knew?
A. A number of people knew I had this film, right.
Q. And a very short time people knew he had been taking photographs, you get a visit from a Provisional IRA man who wants to get his hands on your film?
A. The words the man said to me, "we are trying to get the photographs" -- anybody who had taken any photographs on that day of Bloody Sunday and he asked me would I give him the film, and I said "no". That was the end of that and I have never seen that man since.355
Robert White
2C-322 Mr. White is quite clear about why certain of the photographs he took on Bloody Sunday are now missing. His BSI statement includes this account:
Photographs numbered 14, 15, 19 and 23 are not attached to this statement. When these negatives were developed, I was asked to destroy these photos because they showed
355 Day 142/99/3 people rioting and could be used as evidence against them. I have kept no copies of these negatives.356
2C-323 He did not know who had asked him to destroy the photographs:
At the time there was many people coming to my house and there was photographers, other photographers, relatives, now only a few relatives of the people concerned, the people who had been killed, there was reporters and somebody, somebody came -- now I do not recall who it was -- somebody came and asked me to destroy two negatives. Now there is four -- I destroyed four because there was people rioting. You could see the faces and they had stones in their hands.357
2C-324 Mr. White has given no further information as to the identity of the "somebody" who requested or required him to destroy this evidence. White was present in Sector 3 from the arrival of the military vehicles in Rossville Street to the shooting of Hugh Gilmore. It is a real possibility that amongst the destroyed photographs was one or more taken in that area.
Ciaran Donnelly
2C-325 Only four of Ciaran Donnelly's photographs of the rubble barricade have reached the Tribunal, two of which appear to have been deliberately damaged:
______________________________________________________________________
356 AW11.003 paragraph 14: White's contact sheet is at P233.055 357 Day 137/98/5 Important photographs are missing. Mr. Donnelly explained to Christopher Clarke QC:
Well, the main pictures, I would think, that are missing, are the pictures taken from a pram ramp looking back. I was trying to get the standard Bogside rioting picture, taken from behind the rioters, the backs of their heads looking towards the army and the army vehicles were in the background with the rioters in the foreground. Two of the men who were on the rubble barrier were shot while I was taking those pictures. So there would be pictures, or there were pictures of the men on the barrier before they had fallen.358
He was asked by Edwin Glasgow to confirm this:
Q. The photographs that are missing, the ones you can remember, are photographs taken at the very time when two men were being shot on the barricade?
A. That is what appears to be missing.359
The missing photographs were taken after EP27/9:
A. There were pictures taken between those two times.
Q. Between which two times?
A. Between frames 16 and 17.
358 Day 71/3/14 359 Day 71/75/13 Q. Those are the ones that had not survived?
A. It must have been the other camera body with the other film.\\textsuperscript{360}
Q. But the films you took after this, which to your recollection involve films taken of people on the barricade?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. When the shooting has started?
A. Yes.\\textsuperscript{361}
2C-329 The photographs corresponding to frames 16 and 17 are EP27/9 and EP27/11.\\textsuperscript{362} The latter was taken after Mr. Donnelly had moved into Glenfada Park North.
2C-330 Only two photographs taken by Mr. Donnelly during the time he was at ground level behind the barricade survive; they are partially damaged.\\textsuperscript{363} The negatives have been deliberately scratched. It is unknown when this took place. EP27/8 has a series of scratches on its right hand side, over the area corresponding to the eastern portion of the rubble barricade. The area that is partially obscured includes, according to Arthur Harvey QC, Kevin McElhinney standing on the rubble barricade.\\textsuperscript{364} The left hand side of EP27/9 is similarly scratched in an apparent attempt to hide the identity of the person shown there.
2C-331 Mr. Donnelly drove straight to Dublin after the day’s events and handed over his negatives to the Irish Times. He explains:
\\textsuperscript{360} Day 71/34/17 \\textsuperscript{361} Day 71/78/12 \\textsuperscript{362} Exposures 16 and 17 on Contact Print P233.040 \\textsuperscript{363} Day 71/77/4 \\textsuperscript{364} Day 47/60/24 Unfortunately only a small proportion of these survived as a flood damaged the Irish Times photographic library.\\textsuperscript{365}
2C-332 It must be assumed that amongst the negatives destroyed by the flood were those of the missing barricade photographs.
\\textit{Missing Photographers}
2C-333 Fulvio Grimaldi took approximately three photographs from the window of 12 Garvan Place in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats of the events in and around Rossville Street below him.\\textsuperscript{366} Only one of the photographs survives, so far as we are aware, which means that photographs taken by Mr. Grimaldi of potential importance to the events of Sector 3 are missing.\\textsuperscript{367}
2C-334 \\textbf{P428} was also taken by a photographer based in the Rossville Flats. It was initially attributed to Mr. Grimaldi.
\\textsuperscript{365} M22.022 paragraph 12 \\textsuperscript{366} M34.45 paragraph A; Day 131/73/6 \\textsuperscript{367} P520 There can be no doubt that it captures a significant moment in the events of Sector 3 (and Sector 4). It was taken before the military shooting in Glenfada Park North and before members of the Anti Tank Platoon reached the gable wall there. Yet, it was not taken by Fulvio Grimaldi, who had not arrived in Block I by that stage. He arrived at 12, Garvan Place only after the shooting of Patrick Doherty, Bernard McGuigan, Hugh Gilmore and Kevin McElhinney. Furthermore, as Mr. Grimaldi commented himself, P428 was taken from a different location within Block 1 from his own.
______________________________________________________________________
368 M34.2 paragraphs 8-10 369 Day 131/187/6 2C-336 It must follow that P428 was taken by another photographer, who was present at a different location in Block 1 from Mr. Grimaldi’s. The photographer’s identity is unknown, as is the fate which met any other photographs he or she may have taken. We suggest that events such as those disclosed in P428 make it very unlikely that only one photograph was taken at this time.
2C-337 This is not the only “missing photographer”. Those present in 2 Kells Walk, overlooking the rubble barricade, speak of a photographer who was taking pictures from that location of the events below. The flat in question is indicated on the photograph below.(^{370})
(^{370}) EP23/9; see also AB80.4 paragraph 21 and AB80.6. 2C-338 Brian Power clearly recalled the photographer being in 2 Kells Walk:
He was beside me some of the time and certainly took photographs inside the flat and I think he worked for The Daily Mail. I bought the Daily Mail the next day to see if his photographs were there, but I never saw any.(^{371})
2C-339 Mary Breslin also remembered the photographer:
I just remember that he was difficult to understand, had long blond hair and was carrying a square camera with a long lens. He spent the time in the flat at the other window overlooking Rossville Street with Brian [Power].(^{372})
2C-340 Damien Friel, whose account has been discredited in other respects, had no reason to lie about the presence at 2 Kells Walk of a “cameraman”, who stepped outside the door onto the balcony facing Rossville Street, presumably to take photographs or to film.(^{373})
2C-341 The identity of this photographer is unknown. None of the photographs he took (or the footage he filmed) from the vantage point of 2 Kells Walk has reached the Tribunal.
(^{371}) AR18.3 paragraph 16; confirmed Day 425/26/2 (^{372}) AB80.3 paragraph 20 (^{373}) AF30.14; AF30.4 paragraphs 17 to 18. Many Sector 3 photographs are now missing, particularly those taken of events in the area of the rubble barricade. There is now strong evidence that photographers were approached shortly after Bloody Sunday by members of the Provisional IRA and that photographs may have been suppressed at this stage. Other photographs have, apparently, suffered a variety of fates. Some were loaned to a journalist but never returned, others were destroyed in a flood. There is also now compelling evidence that two further photographers were active in Sector 3. They have yet to be identified and only one of their photographs has reached the Tribunal. The fate of the rest of their work is unknown. It is now clear that the Tribunal cannot assume that the photographs which remain tell the whole story of what took place in this part of the Bogside on Bloody Sunday. CHAPTER 2D
THE IRA AND THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE PRESENT INQUIRY
2D-1 ATTEMPTS BY THE IRA TO INFLUENCE JOURNALISTS' ACCOUNTS
2D-1 In 1972 both wings of the IRA sought to influence and control reporting in the media of the events of Bloody Sunday.
2D-2 The Provisional IRA, in particular, moved swiftly to take control of the Press. They took steps to control access to the Bogside by the media and approached photographers to confiscate their images.
2D-3 The following article, to which Mr. Martin McGuinness was referred by Christopher Clarke Q.C. appeared in the Derry Journal on 14th April 1972:
This is a report in the Derry Journal three days later, on 14th April. Could we highlight the columns that begin, "Provos to issue Bogside press cards." The article records:
"Derry command of the Provisional IRA announced on Tuesday that they are to place strict sanctions on access to the Free Derry area of certain pressmen operating in the Derry area.
"The command said that they had for some time given pressmen a free hand in the barricaded areas, but they had become increasingly disturbed at certain press reports ..."
..."Mr Martin McGuinness, O/C Derry battalion of the Provisional IRA, said he would like to make it known that he took particular exception to a story about himself headed 'The boy who rules Free Derry,' which appeared in Tuesday's edition of the Daily Express."
2D-4 Brian Cashinella gave the following evidence:
If we look at O2.2, the next page, you were asked this question:
"Question: So how much authority did the British forces have in free Derry?"
And you described how they had not got any, the only writ that ran in free Derry was the writ of the IRA.
You went on to say this:
"They even had their own mayor, the mayor of free Derry who was a big Orwellian-type figure with a big slouched hat. He used to issue passports to Free Derry which he had to sign."
A. Vincent Coyle.
Q. This is Vincent Coyle?
A. Vinny Coyle, yes.²
2D-5 Sam Gillespie, a photographer, was approached by a PIRA man and asked for photographs.
Q. Can we go to paragraphs 32 on AG36.7: you say that shortly after Bloody Sunday a person that you knew to be a member of the IRA personally asked you for photographs, which you refused to give.
When you say "the photographs", what photographs did he ask for; all your photographs or some specific photographs?
A. Well, the day after Bloody Sunday this person come to me and said they were collecting up all the films that people had -- they wanted to see the photographs that
¹ Day 390/12/4-22 ² Day 110/34/22-35/11 people had taken the day prior to it and they asked me for the film, and I would not give it to him.
Q. Did he say why he wanted them?
A. He did not say why he wanted them, I did not ask him why he wanted them. I just would not give him the film for the photographs.
Q. Do you know which wing of the IRA he was a member of?
A. He was in the Provisional IRA at the time, I think.
Q. You say you will not disclose his name?
A. No, I will not disclose it, no.
Q. Sorry?
A. I will not disclose his name.
Q. Would you be prepared without disclosing his name publicly to do what a number of other witnesses have done, and to write down what his name is?
A. No. I will not write his name down.
Q. Why is that?
A. Well, just what I said, on the statement: I will not disclose his name.
Q. That is just a statement; is there any particular reason?
A. No, well, I thought perhaps -- people did not know this man was in the IRA or was a member of the Provisional wing. I believed him to be a member of the Provisional wing of the IRA.
Q. You knew him to be according to this paragraph?
A. Yes, yes, I had reason to believe that he was a member of the Provisional wing of the IRA.3
3 Day 142/66/22-68/13 Robert White gave evidence to this Inquiry that he had been asked to destroy negatives, but could no longer recall who had made this request. He destroyed four negatives showing people rioting, because it was possible to see their faces and stones in their hands.
John Cooke of the Press Association gave evidence to this Inquiry that he was taken blindfolded to a house where he arrived at about midnight on Bloody Sunday. A crowd of people, including "the unofficial mayor of the Bogside", Vinny Coyle, were present. Mr. Cooke believes the photographer was also present. By this time the Provisional IRA were already in possession of photographs including P6/666, a photograph of Hugh Gilmore attributed to Eamon Melaugh. Mr. Cooke was shown upwards of twenty photographs which were
almost without exception ... all of shooting victims,... Even after 30 years I recall the one thing that struck me with some force was that, almost without exception, where you could see the wounds on people's bodies, the exit wounds appeared to be on the front of their bodies, typically the chest area."
The Tribunal may conclude that it is inherently unlikely that Mr. Cooke invented that account or that it is other than essentially accurate. If that be right, it must follow that either a number of the photographs he was shown were of unidentified casualties - because his very vivid descriptions can fit very few of the known casualties and none who, it would appear, could have been photographed for the IRA on the evening of Bloody Sunday - or photographs which had no immediate relevance to Bloody Sunday were being produced to mislead journalists. In either case, they have not been produced to this Inquiry.
______________________________________________________________________
4 Day 137/98/7-16 5 Day 137/98/7-16 6 Day 199/48/4-10 7 M16.6 paragraph 9 Mr. Cooke also stated that he had contacted PIRA in order to get photographs because
[\\text{at that time they were the - more or less the authority in the Bogside.}^8]
Peter Stewart, a BBC journalist, gave evidence of threats made to him by both the Provisional and Official IRA following a bulletin on the Six O’Clock News. As a result of these threats Mr Stewart was granted anonymity for the purposes of the Widgery Inquiry where he was referred to as ‘Observer A’. A letter written by his solicitors to the Treasury Solicitor’s Department in February 1972 indicated that the IRA had approached him whilst he was still in Northern Ireland, that threats against his life had been made by both wings of the IRA and that he had received anonymous telephone calls at his home on his ex-directory number.(^9)
Mr Stewart had written a piece that was broadcast on the BBC Six O’Clock News on the evening of Bloody Sunday which included the report that the soldiers had met a fusillade of terrorist fire.(^10) It is significant that his statement to Lord Widgery does not include any reference at all to shots fired at soldiers.(^11) In his BSI statement he qualified the word “fusillade”,(^12) and in oral evidence to the present Inquiry he said he was prepared to stand by his contemporaneous reference to “a fusillade of terrorist fire” although he thought “a fusillade of fire” would be more accurate.(^13) He now attributes the IRA threats to the fact that his
______________________________________________________________________
(^8) Day 199/36/02-06. (^9) Day 113/68/24-70/21 (^10) M88.11 (^11) M88.8-10 (^12) M88.6 paragraph 17 (^13) Day 113/83-4 initial report, in the time available, referred to there being only two or three casualties.\\textsuperscript{14}
2D-12 The danger to members of the press was also referred to by John Barry who spoke of the likely consequences of a journalist disclosing the identity of a particular gunman:
\\begin{quote} we were journalists working in what was still a no-go area where there were gunmen who killed people and my worry was that if we learnt too much about the identities of particular gunmen and if, let us say, the Army were the next day or next week to come in and raid a house and pick them all up, then my worry was we might well be suspected of being the sources, in which case we would be killed.\\textsuperscript{15} \\end{quote}
2D-13 Simon Winchester gave evidence that shortly after Bloody Sunday he had been ‘warned’ by members of the Provisional IRA about having made the ‘foolish mistake’ that the IRA had fired first.
\\begin{quote} I should think it was more like the summertime now, we have moved on. But they arrested me and I was interrogated outside the dance hall, a rather bizarre scene. And then finally a more senior member of the group was brought from a house nearby, who identified me, and he said "He is the fellow that reported for the Guardian on Bloody Sunday. He is all right, except he made the foolish mistake of saying we fired the first shot; we did not. So let that be a warning to you and go back to the dance". I did not.\\textsuperscript{16} \\end{quote}
2D-14 The fact that both the Provisional and Official IRA were capable of threatening independent journalists connected to major news organisations is an indication of their power and self-confidence. It is clear that they would have had no hesitation in intimidating local civilians who showed
\\textsuperscript{14} Day 113/89-90 \\textsuperscript{15} Day 194/129/10-17 \\textsuperscript{16} Day 116/72/13-23 any sign of stepping out of line so far as the para-militaries' official account of Bloody Sunday is concerned.
2D-11 THREATS BY THE IRA TO WITNESSES BEFORE THIS INQUIRY.
2D-15 We have considered at length above the climate of fear which still prevails in Derry and its impact on the willingness of civilians to give a true account of what they witnessed on Bloody Sunday. However, this is not the full extent of the problem faced by this Inquiry. There is clear evidence that witnesses before this Tribunal have been intimidated.
2D-16 It has been alleged by witnesses before this Inquiry that senior current members of the Provisional IRA have "visited" potential witnesses. In their book Clarke and Johnston state (at page 261);
There are persistent rumours that other senior IRA figures, including the OC, were "visited" by current senior IRA men after McGuinness's announcement, in an attempt to prevent them giving their own version of events.
2D-17 In his article in the Sunday Times on 6th May 2001 Liam Clarke stated:
The visits were from IRA men of such reputation that as one man put it: "It is the next best thing to sending round the grim reaper".
Sources suggest that McGuinness' boss at the time, the actual officer commanding the IRA, is among those who have been warned off giving evidence.
2D-18 This is, of course, highly relevant in the light of the statement made by PIRA 24 to the agent of the Inquiry. This matter is considered further at paragraph 2D-24 and Chapter 4, below.
2D-19 In a BSI statement dated 30th May 2003 Kathryn Johnston states:
17 Section 2C-III, above. I have been asked what I know about the persistent rumours that former senior IRA figures including the OC were "visited" by current senior IRA men after McGuinness' announcement that he was going to give evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry in an attempt to prevent them giving their own version of events. I have also been asked about the reference to the "grim reaper". There have been various articles in the Sunday Times referring to this. We have good evidence that McGuinness tried to attack the army on several occasions, e.g. the incident at the bookmakers and the one shot which was heard at the time and the attempts to get the guns from the cars early in the day. There is also the evidence of the Fianna being given nail bombs and the volley of shots at the Walls. I have been told (though will not say specifically by whom other than commenting that I have also heard this from sources in Derry) that the visits to prevent people giving evidence were carried out by Willie McGuinness, Martin McGuinness' younger brother, and by Raymond McCartney. I have also evidence that a senior IRA man in 1972 was asked recently, after McGuinness announced that he was going to give evidence, to meet a third party. He was then questioned by Raymond McCartney about his intentions and basically told to keep quiet. I will not disclose my source for this.
Liam Clarke in a statement also made on 30th May 2003 states:
I confirm that I wrote the section about persistent rumours that former senior IRA figures were visited by current senior IRA men after McGuinness' announcement that he was going to give evidence to the Inquiry in an attempt to prevent them giving their own version of events. It also came to our attention through people telling us, directly or via a third person, that this had happened to a friend. One person who I will not name confirmed this to us as having happened to him. These were people who were in the Provos at the time. I confirm that Martin McGuinness' brother, Willie McGuinness, is the Grim Reaper and that the other "visitor" is Raymond McCartney. The gist of their message was "do not get involved, Martin will deal with it."
18 KM3.77 19 M112.7 paragraph 53 20 M111.21 paragraph 179 In the course of her oral evidence to the Inquiry Kathryn Johnston declined to state whether any of their informants was someone who claimed himself to have been visited on the ground that:
...the IRA are well aware of the people that they have visited and were I either to confirm or deny it, it would identify them."21
Ms Johnston did confirm however that more than one person had told her of threats that were being made in relation to individuals who might otherwise have come forward to this Inquiry.22 She refused to give information about her sources on the grounds that they believed disclosure of their identities would result in their lives being at risk.23
Raymond McCartney gave evidence on Day 228. He avoided giving a direct answer to the question posed by Lord Saville as to whether or not he had any knowledge of threats made to individuals in connection with their giving evidence to the inquiry:
LORD SAVILLE: You were shown a newspaper article which suggested that somebody might have put the frighteners on somebody; but you do not know anything about that at all?
A. Well as a Republican, any article by Liam Clarke has to be taken with a large dose of scepticism.
LORD SAVILLE: That may be, I am not going to make any comment on that at all. Are you personally in a position to – you would be like to know if there was any good reason why these people should not come forward.
A. No.
LORD SAVILLE: You cannot think of one yourself.
21 Day 387/74/15-75/07. 22 Day 387/79/5-15 23 Day 387/72/10-73/3 A. I cannot think of one, no.24
2D-24 In the closing moments of its hearings of evidence the Tribunal witnessed a dramatic demonstration of the forces at work in Derry and the attempts which have been made to obstruct the Inquiry's search for the truth by suppressing evidence. In the course of his evidence PIRA 24 accepted that he had told "the man who came with the subpoena" that he had been discouraged from giving evidence and that a couple of boys had come and told him that he would not be giving evidence, but sought to deny that what he had told him was true.25 In addition he denied that there had been any reference to houses being burnt. In our submission the Tribunal can be left in no doubt that PIRA 24 did in fact tell "the man who came with the subpoena" that he had been threatened to prevent him from giving his evidence and that this statement of his, at least, was true.26 Given the central importance of the highly contentious and well reported issue as to threats to the Inquiry's witnesses, it is unfortunate that a detailed note of what PIRA 24 had said was not immediately made available to the Tribunal.
2D-III THE NON-DISCLOSURE OF THE NAMES OF GUNMEN AND MEMBERS OF THE IRA
2D-25 From the outset of its search for the truth of the events of Bloody Sunday, the Inquiry has stated that it attaches the greatest importance to discovering the identity of gunmen and members of both wings of the IRA who played a part that day so that it could obtain their evidence. On the first day of his opening statement Christopher Clarke QC observed:
Mr McGuinness is not alone in not replying to the Inquiry's invitations to give evidence. We have written to a number of
24 Day 228/29/3-14 25 Day 427/115/14 26 Day 427/115/14 people, something of the order of 40, whom we have reason to think may have been members of, or connected with the IRA in this city on 30th January 1972, with some honourable exceptions they have not replied.
One can, of course, readily understand a reluctance to assist. But this is the year 2000, not the year 1972. As I have already indicated, no one need fear in the light of the Attorney General's undertaking that by giving evidence to this Tribunal they will incriminate themselves. If any of the relevant persons believe that they have a claim to anonymity they can apply to this Tribunal. As I said yesterday, now is the time to speak, not least because if people will remain silent it may be said by some that silent they were because they had something to hide.27
On Day 87 the Tribunal heard a submission by Arthur Harvey QC that:
where there are reasonable prospects of obtaining the information from the former IRA members themselves, then until all other avenues have been exhausted, Counsel should refrain from pressing witnesses to reveal what they merely suspect or believe.28
Lord Saville observed:
The reason, which you will appreciate, which I hope everyone appreciates, as to why our Counsel has been asking the sort of question he has, is that until recently there has been -- we have had no other avenues open to us to try and find those people who we think, on reasonable grounds, should be able to help us with Bloody Sunday. We have said over and over again that, we would like those people to come forward.
Mr Harvey QC has said the same. We hope that those appeals will bear fruit, but you will appreciate our basic duty is, acting as fairly and properly as we can, to discover the whole truth about Bloody Sunday. I repeat our appeal to all concerned to come forward. If they have a genuine basis for seeking anonymity, we will consider and deal with it as fairly as we can. But it is our basic duty to discover the
27 Day 8/45/19 – Day 8/46/12. 28 Day 87/5/15 whole truth. If the only way we can do that, unsatisfactory though it is, is to ask questions about rumours and who knew who and so on, we are forced to adopt that method.
It is not a satisfactory method, for, among other things, the reasons you have expressed, but we have a duty to do it, we cannot just let that slide away because people are not prepared to help us. If they are not prepared to help us we must do what we can ourselves to discover who they are and whether they have information which leads to the whole truth about Bloody Sunday.
...
I repeat, it is not a satisfactory way, that is why I would like all concerned to listen to the appeal of the Tribunal and indeed to listen to the appeal made by Mr Harvey QC the other day to come forward. They are protected by the Attorney General's undertaking and they will be protected by us, as I said in the opening statement now nearly three years ago, if they have genuine fears for their safety.
But it is the fact we are now three years into this Inquiry and these people have not yet come forward. That concerns us, because this Inquiry cannot last forever and it is only fair to all concerned that we have as much information as early as possible.
Therefore we are, I repeat, on occasion driven to adopting this unsatisfactory method because there is nothing else we can do.
Once again I repeat the appeal that the Tribunal has made and that Mr Harvey made a couple of weeks ago, and we hope that bears fruit, and if people come forward we will do our utmost to treat them fairly and properly.29
2D-28 Many witnesses before this Inquiry have admitted knowing the names of individual gunmen or members of the IRA but have refused to name them, even privately, to the Tribunal. On each occasion of a refusal by a witness to provide such information, the Chairman, in an attempt to persuade the witness, has emphasized the vital importance of the withheld information
29 Day 87/6/22 to the Inquiry's search for the truth. However, the Inquiry, which has been granted the powers to compel testimony contained in the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, has declined to compel them to do so. In consequence the Tribunal has been deprived of the opportunity to make inquiries about these individuals and to obtain their evidence.
2D-29 It is likely, given the environment in which the Inquiry has had to operate, that a further consequence of the Tribunal's failure to order disclosure of names has been to send a message to those witnesses who had not at that stage given evidence that there would be no sanction or consequences for their refusal to do so.
2D-30 It is undoubtedly the case that in some cases fear of the consequences has prevented some civilians from giving evidence about particular gunmen and members of the IRA. However, in other cases the refusal to "name names" or to refer to gunmen stems from a misguided sense that to reveal this information would be a distraction from what the witnesses regard as the 'real issue', namely, what the Army did wrong on Bloody Sunday. An example of a witness who expressed these sentiments was Father McLaughlin who claimed to have no idea who was in charge of the Provisionals or Officials in his area, or in Derry as a whole. He was clearly irritated that he had even been asked about this:
You see, I think you are -- I came in here to help the Tribunal and I -- somehow I feel that your questions are away from the reason for my being here. I am not holding -- coming in with a lot of knowledge or information about the IRA, Official or Provisional, and I think that your questions really do not fit in with my motive of coming here to help the Tribunal to get to the basis of what happened on the day when a number of people, of Derry people, were shot in the streets.
30 Day 57/134/19-135/19 31 Day 57/135/4-13 In our submission, in cases in which there was no legal basis for the refusal to answer questions the Tribunal should have used its powers to require answers.
CIVILIANS
One of the most telling examples of the wholesale reluctance on the part of civilians to give evidence about members of the IRA is the discovery, at a very late stage in the proceedings and only after the great majority of civilians had given evidence, that the OIRA gunman, "Red Mickey" Doherty, was working on a market stall opposite the Guildhall up until his death in 2003. It is clear that Mr. Doherty fired shots on Bloody Sunday and was injured by the military returning fire. It was accepted by Martin McGuinness that this fact was widely known:
To tell you the truth, when I spoke to Eversheds I had no thoughts in my head whatsoever about Red Mickey Doherty, but it is true to say that in the course of the last 30 years, it did become widespread knowledge that Red Mickey Doherty, as he is described, was wounded in the aftermath of the murders of 14 people and the wounding of 13 others by soldiers on Bloody Sunday.32
Hugh Deehan, who assisted in the treatment of Mr Doherty, sought to suggest that he had all but disappeared. He claimed, "I said I only seen him once in the market and never afterwards."33
The circumstances surrounding the discovery of Mr Doherty's whereabouts are fully considered in Chapter 4.
Denis Bradley attempted to justify his refusal to give evidence about members of the Provisionals on the basis that he was known, and spoken
32 Day 391/228/1-8 33 Day 182/85/5-6 to, in his capacity as a Roman Catholic priest. He was asked by Christopher Clarke QC:
Q. Leaving aside for a moment anything that you may have been told either in the confessional or in circumstances that amount to that, would I be right in thinking that in and around January 1972 there were some people, apart from Mr McGuinness, who were known or widely reputed to be members of the Provisionals?
A. There would have been some, yes.
Q. Are you able to tell us who they were?
A. No, I am not, but I mean, I do not think it is necessary for me to. You can -- I mean, I think it is appropriate that you ask them. I presume that the Republican movement --
Q. We have to find out who they are first?
A. I obviously believe that there are people coming forward to tell you that.
Q. The wall of silence, apart from Mr McGuinness, in relation to the Provisionals is remarkably strong. The Officials --
A. You must understand I am in a very difficult position vis-a-vis this. I find these lines very difficult to know and I am genuinely -- I am very conscious if there is any kind of wall of silence it should not be there and I am very, very strong and have been strong over the years that when this Tribunal sat all bodies, and that included the various branches of the IRA, must come forward and give evidence and tell what they knew because that was certainly the position that the group of priests, of whom I was a member at the time, took from the very first day after Bloody Sunday and we never changed that line of moving forward, and I believe that if they have not come forward, should come forward. But I walk a very difficult line here and I am very uncomfortable in it.
Q. I am sure you are and I do not want to make life any more uncomfortable than necessary, but the Tribunal does want to know whether your position is that you know the identities of a number of people, but do not wish to say either because the information was given to you in confidence or for reasons -- or that you do not know because insofar as you do know, the position may come that if the wall of silence remains impenetrable, the Tribunal may have to ask you to come back; do you follow?
A. Yes, but even when it asks me to come back, it does not shift my uncomfortableness. I know the Tribunal has a job to do and has a certain remit and I support fully 100 per cent that remit, but my difficulty is that I took very seriously, obviously wearing a Roman collar and that all that period of time that was the position in which I talked and negotiated at times with people and as I have already said, that was not always just the Provisional IRA, sometimes it would have been members of the British Army and the difficulty was that sometimes, without stating it, the assumption in those people's heads was that they were talking to a priest.
Q. I follow that and that may have to be addressed hereafter. As I understand it, there are also people who, regardless of anything that was said to you by them, you know to have been or very strongly reputed to have been Provisionals at the time whose identities you know?
A. I am not too sure that is true. That is the difficult line I walk because I think that most of the people who would have been involved in the IRA -- in my parish I refer to -- at that time would have been known to me as a priest and would have spoken to me as a priest.
Q. With the warning that we may have to come back to this at a later date, I am going to move now from the Provisionals to what you say about the Officials.34
Bernadette McAliskey (nee Devlin) also refused to answer questions from Counsel to the Tribunal. She refused to reveal the name of Person Y on Video 25, or assist with identifying any other individual apart from herself.
But you know who is being talked about as Y?
A. Yes, and before -- that is what I am just going to say, that -- I am not even going to deal with the rights or wrongs of it and I think it is better to say it before I see it so that it has no impact on the position. I am not getting into
34 Day 140/103/15-106/11 identifying persons, whether they are — at any level if you show me a picture of John Hume, I will not be identifying him either, I will be identifying myself.
... A. It makes absolutely no difference. The point of principle is that I am not identifying anybody other than myself, whether it is to say: is it them? Did they win the lottery? Because once I identify anybody I then have to come to a position as to why I may not identify the next person and inferences may be drawn from why I may or may not identify persons and so I am best to do it before I look at anybody, to tell you that in principle I have never assisted Her Majesty's Government in identifying a citizen of this country other than myself. I do not propose to start now.
Q. That is because there are some people who you do not want to identify?
A. There may be people, yes, that I do not want to identify, there may be people -- there may be a million reasons for it and if I proceed beyond this point, we narrow down the potential of what they may be. So it is, I think fairer to everybody, before I see anything to point out that that I think is my position.
Q. We will see if we can approach it if you are not prepared to help us in that respect, in another way. Thank you.35
2D-37 Mrs McAliskey was referred by Christopher Clarke Q.C. to a summary of an interview she had given to Praxis:
Q. May we have a look at KD4.31? ...This is another Praxis document...It purports or appears to be a summary of what they thought they had learnt from speaking to you ...it has an additional paragraph that follows, which reads this:
"IRA was raw then and everyone knew who was in, and their business. Crack about it then, not now. So it would have come out if they had started it, and they would have
35 Day 112/72/21-74/10 been blamed and lynched. Ostracised and not able to live here any more at the very least. 36
...
Q. On one reading of the document, if it is a reliable summary of at least part of the interview, you were telling the Channel 4 people, in relation to what must pretty clearly be this city:
"Everyone knew who was in the IRA and their business"; is that something that you knew?
A. I do not think that, at any point, I might have said with any -- taking it back to the document in terms of what I would say to reporters and what I would not, I might at some point have made -- which has now become legendary in this country, courtesy of Mr Mitchel -- reference to what the dogs on the street might know, and it is in that context that one might say the dogs in the street might have known at that point who was or who was not in anything.
The reality would be that the only people who know who are in the IRA are the IRA and, to the best of my knowledge, not everybody in the IRA knows who else is in it. So if you are asking me as a factual statement: would everybody have known who was in the IRA? No, they would not. Would anybody have cared? Probably not.
Q. I was asking you a more specific question, which was whether you knew who was in the IRA in this city in 1972?
A. No, I would not have had any knowledge that was reliable of who was in the IRA. I may have had my own personal opinions, but, like most other people, it was not a matter of significant importance to me at that time whether people were or were not in the IRA. 37
2D-38 Many civilians have insisted that they did not know the name of a single member of the IRA in Londonderry at the time of Bloody Sunday. In some cases this was demonstrably untrue.
36 Day 112/57/21 - 112/58/09. 37 Day 112/59/17-60/21 Dr. McClean was also questioned by Christopher Clarke QC:
A. I did not know anybody was in the IRA at that time.
Q. You did not know anybody?
A. No.
Q. You could not have identified or named a soul, could you?
A. No. 38
Christopher Clarke Q.C. pointed out to Dr. McClean that this answer appears to contradict what he told Peter Taylor for Remember Bloody Sunday:
MR CLARKE: ...Dr McClean, I wanted to show you this in the light of some answers you gave a moment ago about not knowing anybody in the IRA...it is a transcript we have received of an interview of you and your wife by Peter Taylor for the "Remember Bloody Sunday" documentary that he made for the 20th anniversary...
"Raymond: No, I mean we knew at the time who to talk to. I would not now, quite frankly, I just would not know now, I would not know how to contact any of the paramilitary movements now but at the time, as I say, we were so recently divorced from the civil rights movement, we all knew each other."
On one reading of that passage you appear to have been saying: "Whatever may have been the position 20 years later I knew the people in the IRA at the time, or perhaps their political representatives, and I went and talked to them." 39 Dr. McClean did not accept that. However, his evidence on this point is also difficult to reconcile with statements he made when interviewed by Paul Mahon. 40
James Ferry was a member of Provisional Sinn Fein in 1972, and had up until October 1971 been living in Derry. His conviction, following a raid on his home in May 1976, for having in his possession bomb making equipment and a firearm and ammunition suggests that, by that time at least, he had himself joined the Provisional IRA, although he denied this. 41 Despite these credentials his response to Mr Rawat’s questions was that he had no knowledge at all of members of the Provisional IRA:
Q. And a member of Provisional Sinn Fein in Derry. As a member of Provisional Sinn Fein at the time of Bloody Sunday, were you aware of who the senior commanders of the Derry Brigade of the Provisional IRA were at the time of Bloody Sunday?
A. No, I would not have been privy to that.
Q. Did you know Martin McGuinness in 1972?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you aware in 1972 of the position that he held in the Derry IRA?
A. No, totally unaware.
Q. At the time of Bloody Sunday did you know anyone who was in the Provisional IRA in Derry?
A. No.
Q. Were you aware, on 30th January 1972, what were the orders of the Provisional IRA in relation to Bloody Sunday?
40 X.4.20.43-44 (This matter is considered at Section 2C, above, at paragraphs 2C-257-9.) 41 Day 179/02/7-24 Day 179/11/15-12/23 A. No, I was totally unaware of any orders or anything like that.
Q. I am sorry, I did not catch your last answer?
A. No, I was totally unaware of any orders that were being given to the IRA, to anybody.
Q. Did you subsequently learn after Bloody Sunday what the orders of the Provisionals were in relation to 30th January 1972?
A. No.
Q. Can you assist in any way at all as to what position was being taken by the Provisionals towards the march that was held on 30th January 1972?
A. No, I would not be aware of any orders that were given.
Q. Can you help at all as to what activities they did or did not take part in on Bloody Sunday?
A. No.
Q. Mr Ferry, thank you, those are all my questions.42
2D-43 Peter McGrisken claimed,
"I did not know anybody, I did not know any IRA men by name, I did not want to know any IRA men by name."43
2D-44 This led Mr Roxburgh to put to him his earlier evidence to the Inquiry:
Q. I just wondered what you meant when you said -- I do not want to read too much into it for the Tribunal -- your words were:
"We knew who was who and what was what."
Did you intend there to say that it was generally known who were the leaders of the IRA in this city? If not, what
42 Day 179/12/24 - 179/14/10. 43 Day 106/113/20-22 does the phrase "we knew who was who and what was what" mean?
A. You seen people driving about Creggan, Creggan area and rumour would have it, "he is a Sticky", "he is a Provo", so ...
Q. Is it just that you did not know their names?
A. No, I did not know their names, no.
Q. You knew, for example, Martin McGuinness's name?
A. I knew Martin McGuinness's name, yes.44
2D-45 Mr. McGrisken denied that he would have known what position Martin McGuinness held.45
2D-46 John Barrett refers in his BSI statement to seeing a man sheltering in the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. He recognised the man as a member of the Official IRA:
Q. I am not going to ask you to say his name out loud, but are you prepared to write down the name of this man?
A. I have no idea what you call him even.
Q. You have no idea of his name?
A. No.
Q. How did you recognise him as a member of the Official IRA?
A. Well, he was, everybody knew, but they did not know people by name.
Q. Everybody knew?
A. People within the IRA, the Official IRA, but they did not know them by name.
44 Day 106/113/23-106/114/13 45 Day 106/114/14 -106/114/18 Q. Had someone pointed him out to you as a member of the Official IRA prior to Bloody Sunday?
A. No, no, no, just everybody sorta knew but they had no names.
...
Q. Do you know whether this man is still in Derry?
A. I have not a clue, I have not seen him from that day.
Q. So after that day you did not see him at all?
A. No, never seen him.
Q. How long before Bloody Sunday had you known that this stranger was a member of the Official IRA?
A. Well, you see, the way it was everybody knew one another as such, but, like, I know a lot of people in Derry, I know them to see, but I do not know their names, that is just the way it is.46
The inherent improbability of a universally recognisable member of the IRA disappearing from Derry was explored with Mr Barratt by Peter Clarke QC:
Q. Because it was a small community, the Bogside and the Creggan, was it not?
A. That is right.
Q. Virtually everyone on the march could almost name everyone else?
A. Not really, no. I know a lot of people in Derry, right, a know of a hell of a lot and I do not know their names.
Q. You know a hell of a lot?
A. I do not know what you call them, but.
46 Day 141/20/6-22/5 Q. If, as we were told yesterday, they go missing from the Creggan or the Bogside, people realise within days, do they not?
A. I dare say if a photo came up and the name had come up, I knew that fella, but I never ever knew his name.
Q. The initial IRA member, the Sticky you saw in the alleyway, disappeared after that day?
A. Never seen him since.
Q. Never saw him again?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever hear anyone saying in the Creggan: "have you seen that Sticky? He seems to have disappeared"?
A. I have no knowledge, I have no idea.
Q. Nobody spoke about it at all?
A. No.
Q. You certainly had not the faintest idea what his identity?
A. No idea, I have no knowledge of it.
Q. How did you know he was a Sticky?
A. I heard everybody on about -- everybody sort of knew him, but I did not know the name.
Q. When was it talked about?
A. I have no idea.
Q. Try to help us, would you?
A. I am only telling you what I know, I do not know, I do not know the fella's name.
Q. You knew he was a Sticky? A. Well, everybody knew, like. How can I explain it, um, everybody knew, but they did not know his name. I did not know his name anyway.47
Charles McDaid refused to give any details about members of the IRA:
Q. We will hear evidence in this Tribunal from Mr McGlinchey -- he was a Provisional -- from Mr Tester who said that he was the Command Quartermaster of the Officials. Was he one of the known Stickies?
A. Not to me.
Q. Are you prepared to tell us who the other known Stickies were?
A. No.
Q. Are you prepared to tell us who the other known Provisionals were?
A. No.
Q. Why is that?
A. I prefer not to. I did not see them on the march, why should I express names?
Q. Unfortunately we have very little means of finding out directly from the IRA what they did or did not do without knowing who they are, and our knowledge in that respect is very limited, and they alone are the people who can tell us what they planned and what they did or did not do, but you do not wish to say who they are?
That is right...
MR CLARKE: Yes, my question was whether you are prepared to tell us, if necessary only to the Tribunal in the first instance, who the people were whom you on 30th January 1972 knew to be either Stickies or IRA Provisionals?
47 Day 140/33/24-35/16 A. That would not be right for me as it was hearsay to me who they may have been and what they were in. They were secret organisations, nobody can tell that.48
2D-49 He was asked by Gerard Elias Q.C. about the reasons for his refusal:
MR ELIAS: Can I ask one further matter so we are clear about it, and I shall not pursue that, sir: you have no fear of the IRA or any element of it, do you, in declining to name names at this stage?
A. No.
Q. So it is nothing to do with fear?
A. No.49
2D-50 Eugene Lafferty’s brother, Eamonn, was shot dead by the army on 18th August 1971. He is described at entry 107 in Lost Lives as being “an adjutant on the IRA’s Derry brigade and OC of the Creggan Unit”. Mr Lafferty refused to talk about his brother or give any information at all about members of the IRA. He was asked by Christopher Clarke QC about whether Martin McGuinness had attended a commemoration ceremony for his brother:
Did Mr McGuinness appear at the commemoration ceremony?
A. I have no comment to make, sir.
Q. Was he the Provisional IRA leader?
A. I could not tell you.
Q. Would you tell us if you knew?
A. No.50 Mr Lafferty was asked generally about his knowledge of the IRA. His claim not to have known any members of the IRA is particularly incredible given that he and his brother lived in the same house.\\textsuperscript{51}
\\textbf{Q.} You are not prepared to give any evidence at all, whether you know of it, about who had any position in the IRA as of the date of Bloody Sunday?
\\textbf{A.} I have already told you I did not know anybody in the IRA, sir. I have already stated – you mentioned adjutants and that, I did not know.
\\textbf{Q.} You knew your brother?
\\textbf{A.} Yes, knew my brother, but only as my brother.
\\textbf{Q.} Are you saying you did not know he was in the IRA?
\\textbf{A.} I am making no comment, sir.
\\textbf{Q.} If you will not tell us, you will not tell us.\\textsuperscript{52}
John Mitchell McLaughlin denied that he knew whether his political colleague Martin McGuinness was or ever had been a member of the IRA. He was pressed by Christopher Clarke in re-examination:
\\textbf{Q.} Are you saying that in 1972, when you knew Mr McGuinness went with others to see the British Government, you did not think he went as a representative of the IRA; is that really your evidence?
\\textbf{A.} Well, let me speak for myself. I have been as part of a delegation meeting with the British Government and I was not there representing the IRA, I was representing Sinn Fein.
\\textbf{Q.} Could you answer my question: in 1972, did you really think that Mr McGuinness was visiting the British Government otherwise than as a representative than of the IRA? A. It is not a matter that I have any information on or opinion on.
Q. No information or opinion, right. When you saw the programme "Provos", which I think came out in 1997 or 1998, these two clips, the one you saw this morning and this one, were new to you, were they?
A. No, I certainly was aware -- I was very much aware of the events of 1972.
Q. It is apparent from the first clip and indeed the second, the press conference, that Mr McGuinness is described in terms as "the Commander of the Provisionals in Derry"; you have seen that, we can see from looking at the programme. Did you ever discuss that with Mr McGuinness?
A. No.
Q. He was then your close political colleague?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you really saying that you never asked him whether that was true?
A. Yes, that is my position, yeah.
Q. Never at all?
A. Martin McGuinness has never discussed IRA membership with me, never.
Q. You have never asked?
A. No.
Q. Although you have known him for many years?
A. Indeed.
Q. And you work with him daily?
A. Indeed.
Q. And you ask this Tribunal to believe that you do not know to this day whether Mr McGuinness ever is or ever has been a member of the IRA?
A. I have already said, and I will repeat for your benefit: it was my practice throughout my political career not to invite myself or not to interest myself in issues that were outside my field of activity. I was involved in Sinn Fein and I simply did not want to know that information because it was dangerous information.
Q. Can I have a clear answer to my question: you do not know to this day whether Mr McGuinness is, or ever has been, a member of the Provisional IRA; is that your evidence?
A. That is my evidence and I have made it clear: I never once, and I would not ask any individual if they were members of the IRA. Indeed anyone who would confirm that to me, I would regard as being in some way suspect or unreliable.
Q. Your answer to me about Mr McGuinness is a truthful answer, is it?
A. Absolutely.53
2D-53 Thomas Barr refused to give names of paramilitaries even privately to the Tribunal.54 He was asked by Edwin Glasgow Q.C. about the reason for this refusal:
A. The only thing I could ever say at that time or now would be based on rumour and speculation, and I am not prepared to do that. I had no definite knowledge of who any of the individuals were.
Q. The truth is there would be an element of assumption on your part, there would be an element of guesswork and you are not prepared to do that?
A. Exactly, yes.55
2D-54 Christopher Clarke QC asked John Radcliffe about the general level of awareness in relation to the identity of those in the Provisional IRA. As
53 Day 080/119/24-122/12 54 Day 180/161/14-23 55 Day 180/161/6-13 Mr Clarke suggested, Mr. Radcliffe’s evidence no doubt represents the view of many civilians:
A. As far as I am concerned what people did was their own business, it was no concern of mine and as long as my family and anyone concerned with me was not involved in any violence whatsoever, I was quite happy with that.
Q. Mr Radcliffe, please understand, I am not seeking by these questions to criticise you for that attitude because I suggest it was widespread, but it did mean that quite a lot of blind eyes were turned, were they not?
A. Again, I can only speak for myself, I cannot speak for other people, I am just saying that as I see it, I speak as I see and, as far as I was concerned, I made no efforts whatsoever to find out anybody else’s business, either legal or illegal.56
The level of reluctance to give even apparently innocuous information about others is demonstrated by William Smyth’s reaction to being asked by Mr Topolski about who had been involved in the NICRA statement taking progress.
Can you help the Tribunal with the kind of people that were doing the statement-taking apart from teachers?
A. Well, there were some people unemployed, there were some people in other employment other than teachers. I do remember some of them, but I am not going to spout out names here because my name was spouted out and I did not know it was happening and here I am today trying to answer something that I was not guilty of.57
Seamus Carlin reacted in a similar fashion to Mr. Rawat’s request for assistance in identifying people in the same photograph which had been shown to Mr Bradley:
56 Dav 220/71/22-72/10 57 Dav 083/159/9-21 We know it is a photograph taken on Bloody Sunday and what assistance you have been able to give us today is that the gentleman marked with the blue arrow is Alex Bradley?
A. I resent the fact that you point a blue arrow at Alex Bradley. Alex Bradley was a peaceful, normal person, that I have known all my life to be a good and respectable person who would have no part in any kind of behaviour that is untoward and you should not be -- you are implicating Alex Bradley in this.
Q. If it is some comfort, Mr Carlin, Mr Bradley was shown this photograph himself and if my recollection is correct, an arrow, possibly not in blue, was pointed at him and he was able to say that that was him shown in the photograph.
A. Alex Bradley is not a terrorist; he had nothing to do with it, and I know and I can guarantee he had nothing to do with it and I was an Irish soldier. Alex Bradley had nothing to do with anything that went wrong that day.
Q. The reason for my questions is simply to identify the names of people shown in the photograph, I am not --
A. Your reason was to establish a photograph which is out of date, chronologically wrong, you will accept that, it is wrong, it was taken three hours --
LORD SAVILLE: Mr Carlin, could you look at me, please, I am the Chairman. I think you are a bit at crossed purposes. What we are trying to do is find out as much as we can about what happened on the day.
The fact we are pointing arrows at somebody is not casting any imputations on them at all. What we are trying to do is to identify people who were there, that is all that Mr Rawat is doing with you.
Now, we have identified this individual. Are you able to help us with the names of any other of the civilians that you can see in this picture?
A. I realise, I realise that you are trying to get to the truth and I will assist you. Yes, I know Alex Bradley; I know no other people in this photograph. LORD SAVILLE: You do know, did you say, or you do not know?
A. I do not know anyone in this picture.58
2D-57 Paul McDaid claims not to have been a member of any paramilitary organisation at the time of Bloody Sunday. It is apparent from the fact of his conviction on 11th December, 1973 for causing an explosion and possession of a bomb in Londonderry on 31st August 1972, that fairly shortly after Bloody Sunday Mr. McDaid was a member of the IRA and took a major part in the activities of that organisation.59 Despite this Mr. McDaid claimed he could not help the Tribunal identify any members of either branch of the IRA who had been present in Londonderry on Bloody Sunday.60
JOURNALISTS
2D-58 A number of journalists are particularly well placed to give evidence about the IRA’s activities on Bloody Sunday. However, the journalists who have given evidence to the Inquiry have, almost without exception, refused to name their sources.
Kathryn Johnston
2D-59 Miss Johnston refused to identify to the Tribunal any of her sources who had provided information about events in the Bookies.61 She was asked by Christopher Clarke Q.C. about notes of an interview conducted in Spring 2001 with Peter Doherty (a pseudonym). Miss Johnston claimed that she and Mr. Clarke had disposed of much of the material which they had amassed:
58 Day 163/158/2-159/23 59 Day 204/5/10-6/4 60 Day 204/7/22-8/15 61 Day 387/47/22-48/9 Prior to publication of the book we had amassed a great deal of material and quite simply got rid of it. We were also aware that some of these people are fearful for their lives if their identity were to be publicly known.62
2D-60 Miss Johnston refused to confirm whether or not the man with the assumed name, Peter Doherty, had given evidence to the Inquiry or whether he had been present on Bloody Sunday, on the grounds that it would potentially lead to his being identified.63 This refusal was curious given that she claims to have read and agreed with the contents of Liam Clarke’s statement in which he states that the man known as Peter Doherty was not present on Bloody Sunday.64
2D-61 At the conclusion of her evidence Lord Saville told Miss Johnston:
LORD SAVILLE: Ms Johnston, thank you very much indeed. Of course, you appreciate the problem that both you and I have, which is that you have your confidentiality agreements that you made with these individuals. We have the public duty of trying to find out everything we can about Bloody Sunday. I think what we will do at the moment is we will have to leave over the question as to whether or not we should reach the conclusion that in some or all instances we would have to make an order that you disclose us that information. Of course, before we did that, we would have a proper legal argument from your counsel. I will have to leave it like that for the time being and I hope you appreciate why.
A. I appreciate that.65
Liam Clarke
62 Day 387/153/09 - 153/23 63 Day 387/54/9-55/25 64 M112.2 paragraph 11 65 Day 387/53/3-7 Liam Clarke made his position equally clear in respect of naming his sources when asked by Christopher Clarke Q.C. to confirm whether he had ever spoken to the OC of the Official IRA:
A. I am not going to comment on anybody who is not named in the book on whether we spoke to him or not, certainly anybody from Derry.66
Kieran Gill
Kieran Gill declined to give the name of the man who he recalled had been the OC of the Official IRA in Derry on the basis that his memory may not be reliable:
It would be as useful as pub talk is. I do not think it would be of any use to the Tribunal.67
Lord Saville at the conclusion of Gill's evidence outlined areas which Gill had refused to give information:
LORD SAVILLE: ... I think there are three instances in which you are not prepared voluntarily to disclose your source: the one we have just been talking about, which is the OIRA man?
A. Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: The man concerned with the loading of weapons into a car in the Creggan; is that right?
A. That is correct. I do not know the name --
LORD SAVILLE: That is what I was going to ask.
A. I know who the Provisional IRA officer in charge of him is -- was, I think that is -- sorry for the confusion --
66 Day 387/165/17-19 67 Day 203/116/16-117/6 LORD SAVILLE: It is almost certainly my fault, Mr Gill. You know who the Provisional officer in charge of him was but are you declining to identify him?
A. He would be the one I would be declining to identify.
LORD SAVILLE: I follow, yes. Then the third one is the, am I right, PIRA man who, if I may put it like this, put you on to the OIRA man; is that right?
A. That is correct.
LORD SAVILLE: Those are the three cases. As I understand it, you take the view that your duty of confidence as a journalist means that you cannot voluntarily give us the names of those three?
A. That is correct. 68
Mary Holland
Ms Holland confirmed that she knew, but was not prepared to reveal, the name of the Official IRA sniper she interviewed shortly after Bloody Sunday; she would not say either if he was Mickey Doherty, referred to in the Sunday Times notes as “Mary Holland’s lad”. 69 She was not ordered to disclose the identity of her source:
LORD SAVILLE: Ms Holland, the Chairman again. We are not minded at this moment to require you to identify your source. If the situation changes then of course we would notify you and in the circumstances of course you would be entitled to have legal advice and representation.
Thank you for coming to give evidence today. There is that possible prospect, that we will ask you to come back to identify the source and what you said you would refuse and there would then be a debate about the clash between the confidentiality of journalists and the duty of this Tribunal to try and seek the truth.
68 Day 206/127/17-128/15 69 Day 200/54/17-55/5 Day 200/67/7-15 I will have to leave you with that prospect, but if it arose then I repeat, you would be entitled to have legal advice and representation here.
A. Thank you very much.70
Simon Winchester
2D-66 Simon Winchester described an occasion on which he was arrested and spoken to by Provisionals:
This talk that you had, where did this take place?
A. The first one -- there were several -- it was at a dance hall in Rathmullan, County Donegal, where I was with another colleague of mine from The Guardian, and we were both arrested by the Provos and taken outside with a view to being roughed up, I think, because it was assumed, I think once again from my dress, that I was not a reporter or a civilian, I was a member of the British Army going over to dance in County Donegal, which was obviously not a prudent thing to do.
... they arrested me and I was interrogated outside the dance hall, a rather bizarre scene. And then finally a more senior member of the group was brought from a house nearby, who identified me, and he said "He is the fellow that reported for the Guardian on Bloody Sunday. He is all right, except he made the foolish mistake of saying we fired the first shot; we did not. So let that be a warning to you and go back to the dance". I did not.71
2D-67 Mr. Winchester confirmed that although he did not know the identity of the individuals who had spoken to him he had later spoken to other more senior members of the IRA. Christopher Clarke Q.C. asked:
Q. Do you know the identity of these people?
A. I did. I am sure I have them in my notebook, yes.
70 Day 200/92/21-92/11 71 Day 116/72/2-23 Q. Do you still have your notebook?
A. Well, it is in — I live in the United States, as you know. It is somewhere buried in the garage. I produced them to Widgery, though. But if you are asking me to say precisely who they were now, I really cannot.
Q. But if we had a look at your notebook, would it reveal it?
A. It might. I am not sure that I would be content. I do not know what the rules of the Inquiry are about confidential sources, but I would certainly regard my IRA contacts as confidential.
Q. Your notebook, was it shown to the Widgery Tribunal?
A. I believe it was.72
John Cooke
2D-68 John Cooke refused to name a member of staff at the City Hotel in Londonderry whom he suspected of having links to the Provisional IRA:
...What I was meaning to say was that I did not recall his name with any certainty, but even if I did I would feel constrained in giving that name without his permission.
Q. Is there anything you can tell us about this person?
A. I have given it a lot of thought since then and I really cannot put a name to this person with any certainty. If I was 100 per cent certain I would -- I would be, I would be happy to try and pursue it, but I cannot recall that with any certainty. But even if I did, without his permission as a source even though it has been a long time, I would not be comfortable in giving that name.73
2D-69 Mr Cooke was not pressed for the details of this individual.
72 Day 116/73/9-74/1 73 Day 199/33/15-34/10 Peter Taylor
2D-70 Peter Taylor confirmed that he had approached some of his sources in the Official IRA to discuss his obligation of confidentiality.
A. I did approach those involved with the Official IRA sources and indicated to them what my position was on the revelation of their names and I got the answer that I expected to get, which is "you are quite right in not revealing the names because the meeting and the information that was given to you was given to you in the strictest confidence and we expect you to abide by that."74
Eamon McCann
2D-71 Eamon McCann refused to name members of either branch of the IRA.75 He justified this refusal in terms of his journalistic position:
A. My position in regard to this question in general is that all and any information of that kind which came to me and which I have subsequently used -- and I have used all of it, I think, over the years in my journalistic work -- is confidential and it would be unprincipled of me as a journalist to take any step which would reveal the identities of those people and I shall not do so.76
2D-72 He was asked by Lord Saville to reflect on his position overnight, but Mr. McCann confirmed his stance the following day. He was asked by Arthur Harvey Q.C.:
Q. Finally, Mr McCann, your attitude at the moment appears to be that as a journalist you are not prepared to reveal the sources of the information that you have?
A. Yes, that is correct.
74 Day 218/26/18-27/2 75 Day 086/185-7 76 Day 086/190/17-24 Q. You are not prepared at the moment to name anyone whom you actually of your own knowledge now know was involved in the shooting?
A. That is correct.77
He was not ordered to disclose the names of members of IRA but warned by Lord Saville that it may be necessary to recall him:
As everybody I hope appreciates, we are obviously anxious to trace and talk to anyone who might reasonably be supposed to be able to give us relevant information about Bloody Sunday. At the same time we are concerned not to prejudice genuine claims for anonymity and we understood you yesterday, Mr McCann, to express the same concern.
In those circumstances, and having considered the matter, we have decided that, for the time being at least, we should not seek to obtain from Mr McCann the names of those who might have been involved with the IRA on Bloody Sunday. Mr McCann, you will appreciate that if other avenues of inquiry prove fruitless, it may be necessary to recall you to question you further on those matters, but we will not do that today.
A. I understand.78
The Tribunal's Ruling of 13th February 2004.
In its Ruling of 13th February 2004 the Tribunal explained why it did not propose to take any further action to compel the disclosure of the information withheld.
As a result of witnesses withholding relevant information from the Tribunal, the evidence of IRA membership and activity on Bloody Sunday is materially incomplete.
77 Dav 087/70/15-23 78 Dav 087/01/12-02/01 Notwithstanding the importance attached by this Inquiry to identifying the members of the Official and Provisional IRA in Londonderry on Bloody Sunday, it appears that a substantial number have not been traced and of those who have been traced, a number have not given evidence.
Former members of both wings of the IRA who have given evidence have maintained the stance that they remain bound by the Republican code of honour forbidding them from naming those who were members of the IRA, or non-members who assisted them. Thus the first draft statement to the Inquiry of Martin McGuinness concludes:
I wish to make it clear that I will not provide the Inquiry with the identities of other members of the IRA on 30 January 1972 or confirm the roles played by such persons whose names are written down and shown to me. I have been advised by my lawyers that the undertaking given by the Attorney General does not extend to such persons nor am I confident that their identities would be protected. As a Republican I am simply not prepared to give such information.79
Throughout the course of his evidence Mr McGuinness invoked the Republican Code of Honour to defend his refusal to provide relevant information about the IRA. He was questioned on this by Andrew Nichol QC:
Q. It is part of the code of honour, is it not, not to become an informer?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Or betray your comrades? A. Absolutely.
and again by Gerard Elias Q.C:
The code of honour of which I speak applies to me and other IRA members can make up their own mind, their own judgment about that. I do believe that it is a common thread running through membership of the IRA; that there is a code of honour that you do not disclose information about other IRA volunteers or about people who help the struggle for freedom in Ireland.
2D-79 The following exchange during Mr. McGuinness's evidence is particularly significant:
MR CLARKE: ... One of the questions that I asked you was where the dump was into which the arms were placed. Are you prepared to answer that question and if not, why not?
A. Well, I feel I cannot answer that question because there is a Republican code of honour. The people who would have allowed us to use their houses, such as the two occasions that you have identified to me, are people who would have placed great faith in those IRA members who were using the house. For me to identify who these people are would be a betrayal, in my view. On many occasions over the course of the last three decades I have been in interrogation centre after interrogation centre, sometimes for a week at a time, and I have never ever, on any occasion, given the name of a single person who was associated with me or with the IRA. To do so would have been a gross act of betrayal and I just could not do that. I do understand that we are in a different situation; I am not in an interrogation centre, at least I think I am not in an interrogation centre, but I have a duty, in my view, stretching back 30 years, to those people and I am not prepared to break my word to them under any circumstances. Lord Saville requested Mr. McGuinness later that day to seek permission from the occupiers of houses in which arms were dumped and where the IRA met to reveal their location. However, the next day Mr. McGuinness informed the Tribunal that he had requested such permission and been refused and he stressed that responsibility for the need to "clarify" matters lay with Lord Saville who had "given the impression that I was referring to two different houses".
It will not have escaped the attention of the Tribunal that in answer to a grossly leading question put by counsel who represented both PIRA 24 and Mr. McGuinness, PIRA 24 assented to the suggestion that the "difference of recollection" between himself and Mr. McGuinness could be explained by the fact that there were two different premises, the very point on which Mr. McGuinness had sought to correct Lord Saville.
The falsity of the account given by Mr. McGuinness was confirmed when PIRA 24 revealed in his evidence that the building in which the meeting had taken place was derelict on Bloody Sunday, a fact which had also been confirmed by PIRA 8 in his unchallenged testimony.
Mr. McGuinness was, of course, one of the most prominent of those who called for this Inquiry to be created in order that the full truth of Bloody Sunday might be established.
A similar stance was adopted by the OIRA witnesses who followed the example of their then commanding officer OIRA 3 who stated that:
______________________________________________________________________
83 Day 390/166/10 84 Day 391/1/9 85 Day 427/112/23 86 Day 427/32/10 87 Day 418/80/20 I am not prepared to discuss issues which relate to the organisation of the Official I.R.A. prior to or after the events of Bloody Sunday. I will not identify the number or names of any volunteers who were members of the Official I.R.A. I will not discuss the nature of the armoury available to the Official IRA at or around this time.
The Tribunal will find similar sentiments expressed by OIRA1, OIRA2, OIRA4 and OIRA 5. Each has also made clear that such reluctance is based not on Article 2 considerations but, as expressed here by OIRA 3 and echoed by each of his former colleagues, on
... my Republican duties and beliefs.
Such a position has been, in part, abandoned by OIRA witnesses as they have succumbed to pressure from the Tribunal to respond to questions about OIRA structure and weaponry in 1972. However, as the Tribunal is aware, these witnesses have not co-operated to the extent of revealing crucial information about the identity of other members of the organisation.
In the light of the uncompromising position adopted by former members of both wings of the IRA, it is hardly surprising that civilian witnesses feel genuinely fearful of the consequences of giving evidence about the IRA.
Membership of or association with either of the wings of the IRA would be highly relevant to the willingness of a witness to tell the truth about the events of Bloody Sunday.
______________________________________________________________________
88 AOIRA3.1 paragraph 4 89 AOIRA1.8 paragraph 27 90 AOIRA2.1 paragraph 3 91 AOIRA4.1 paragraph 5 92 AOIRA5.1 paragraph 5 93 AOIRA3.1 paragraph 4 The Provisional IRA's "Green Book" makes clear that a member's overriding loyalty is to the IRA and the achievement of its aims.
The Irish Republican Army, as the legal representatives of the Irish people, are morally justified in carrying out a campaign of resistance against foreign occupation forces and domestic collaborators. (Page 5)
Volunteers are expected to wage a military war of liberation against a numerically superior force. This involves the use of arms and explosives. (Page 5)
The Army as an organization claims and expects your total allegiance without reservation. It enters into every aspect of your life. (Page 6)
The position of the Irish Republican Army since its foundation in 1916 has been one of sustained resistance and implacable hostility to the forces of imperialism, ....(Page 12)
Members of the IRA regard the United Kingdom institutions as an occupying force in Ireland and refuse to recognise the legitimacy of courts in the United Kingdom:
The Irish Republican Army, its Leadership, is the lawful government of the Irish Republic, all other parliaments or assemblies claiming the right to speak for and to pass laws on behalf of the Irish people are illegal assemblies, puppet governments of a foreign power, and willing tools of a occupying force. (Page 4)
They can be expected to have no higher regard for a Tribunal established by the resolution of both Houses of the United Kingdom Parliament.
Similarly, General Order No. 1 (as amended by the Army Council October 1973), according to its preamble:
Deals with the attitude of Volunteers towards Courts, Parliaments and Institutions of Government in occupied Ireland and in the 26 county state. These were established by the British Imperial Government to maintain control in Ireland. In effect, they are still imposed on the Irish people by the British Imperial Government. The Green Book identifies the judiciary as an element of the enemy in the following passage:
The enemy, generally speaking, are all those opposed to our short-term or long-term objectives....
Some examples: We have enemies through ignorance, through our own fault or default and of course the main enemy is the establishment....
The establishment is all those who have a vested interest in maintaining the present status quo in politicians, media, judiciary, certain business elements and the Brit war machine comprising, the Brit army, the UDR, RUC(r) [reserve], Screws, Civilian Searchers. The cure for these armed branches of the establishment is well known and documented. But with the possible exceptions of the Brit Ministers in the 'Northern Ireland Office' and certain members of the judiciary, the overtly unarmed branches of the establishment are not so clearly identifiable to the people as our enemies as say armed Brits or RUC.
It is our task therefore to clearly identify them to the people as such and again depending on the existing conditions and our ability to get our defensive before our offensive, effect a cure. Execution, as earlier stated, is not the only way of making this category of establishment enemy ineffective: we can variously expose them as liars, hypocrites, collaborators, make them subject of ridicule etc.... (Page 20)
Members of the IRA are trained in resisting interrogation and in lying. (The Green Book, Lecture 4(a)). General Order No. 1 (5) states:
Interrogation: If arrest or interrogated a Volunteer shall:
(a) Refuse to give any account of his movements, activities or associates, when any of these have any relation to the organisation or personnel of Oglaigh na hEireann.
(b) Refuse to make or sign any statements.
(c) Any volunteer committed to prison forfeits all rank.
Minimum penalty for a breach of any of these orders: Dismissal with ignominy. (SPECIAL NOTE) This general order does not cover a charge of treachery which might arise following interrogation as noted in Par. 5 above.
2D-95 It is submitted that General Order No.1(5) is of particular relevance to the present issue.
The Army expects that volunteers won't disclose information on themselves or on others. That is what is expected from you, and this is no easy task. (Green Book, Page 6)
2D-96 It appears that there are no inactive members of the IRA. General Order No.10 provides:
(a) Membership of the army is only possible through being an active member of any Army Unit or directly attached to General Headquarters. Any man who ceases to be an active member of a Unit or working directly with General Headquarters, automatically ceases to be a member of the Army. There is no reserve in the Army. All volunteers must be active.
2D-97 The fact that a witness is or has been a member of a terrorist organisation pledged to bring to an end by the use of violence the British presence in Northern Ireland is bound to be relevant to the weight which the Tribunal can properly give to the evidence of that witness.
2D-98 Association with the IRA falling short of membership is also relevant to a witness's credibility. As the Green Book states:
SUPPORT: Basically we have two types of support, Active and Passive.
1. ACTIVE SUPPORT: We as members of the movement are active supporters as are the people who billet us, hold our dumps, provide transport, contribute to our collections etc.
2. PASSIVE SUPPORTERS: are those who condone our activities by not informing, when they see an IRA operation being set up, know of IRA Billets, Call Houses etc, who attend Republican funerals even if only in an observer capacity. (Page 19) As regards the relevance of participation in terrorist activities, it is submitted that it is self-evident that witnesses who are or have been prepared to kill British soldiers would have no compunction about lying about the conduct of British soldiers on Bloody Sunday in order to incriminate them.
2D-VI INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL ON CIVILIAN WITNESSES.
This has been addressed at Section 2C I above.
2D-VII LACK OF TRANSPARENCY OF THE IRA EVIDENCE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH.
The fact that intelligence material became available at a late stage in the proceedings in conjunction with the fact that former members of the IRA were very slow in coming forward to assist the Inquiry has led to one particularly acute difficulty.
The Tribunal held that these individuals were entitled to anonymity. Accordingly, the Inquiry allocated ciphers to a number of persons who were said to have been members of the IRA in 1972 in Londonderry. However, the actual names of those persons were likely to have appeared already in a number of ways in proceedings before the Inquiry:
1. It was likely that a number of these individuals had already given evidence to the Tribunal under their own names.
2. A number of these individuals may have been referred to in oral evidence by other witnesses.
3. A number of these individuals may have been referred to in documents – contemporaneous documents, notes or statements – which are before the Inquiry.
In each of these cases it is now impossible for those representing the soldiers, to connect the ciphers it has allocated (or further ciphers as necessary) to the evidence which has been given (whether oral or documentary).
2D-104 It is therefore likely that a number of witnesses have given evidence, or been referred to, who are known to the Tribunal to be persons who are said by others to have been members of the IRA in 1972 and possibly active in that capacity on Bloody Sunday. It is now very difficult for the Tribunal publicly to investigate those claims without defeating the anonymity of the individuals concerned. It is also, of course, impossible for those representing the soldiers to connect the ciphered individuals to persons who have given evidence or who have been referred to in evidence or in documents under their own names. The result is that the soldiers' representatives are denied access to potentially very important information.
2D-105 The result has been that the Tribunal's investigation of the IRA could not be conducted wholly in public and there has been a loss of transparency. More fundamentally there has been a loss of information to the interested parties which causes them prejudice in making their submissions.
2D-106 In these circumstances it is submitted that the Inquiry is under a particularly onerous duty to ensure that it is itself provided with all information and is in a position to make the connections which the interested parties and the public are not.
2D-VIII THE ATTEMPTED MANIPULATION OF THE INQUIRY BY THE IRA
2D-107 This subject is considered in detail in Chapter 4. CHAPTER 2E
OTHER MISSING EVIDENCE
2E-1 MISSING ARMY PHOTOGRAPHS
2E-1 On this topic we adopt the submissions of the Aitken team which we have seen in draft.
2E-2 In particular, we submit that it is not open to the Inquiry to draw any adverse inference from the fact that these photographs have gone missing, inter alia for the following reasons:
(1) The Widgery Inquiry was aware that the Army had taken these photographs and that they were in the possession of the Army.¹
(2) There is almost contemporaneous evidence that photographs were produced "on demand" for the use of the Widgery Tribunal and counsel for the Army.²
(3) From the evidence available to this Inquiry, it seems likely that the Army photographs covered the march and were of doubtful quality. See in particular the evidence of Mr. Harding³ and INQ 2030⁴.
(4) The Inquiry and the Ministry of Defence have undertaken extensive searches for the photographs.
(5) There was no systematic policy for the preservation of such material. Following the conclusion of the Widgery Inquiry there
¹ Overbury, Memorandum, 1st March 1972. CO1.274 ² Overbury, Report of the Army Tribunal Team, 23rd March 1972, paragraph 21. CO1.5 - CO 1.9 ³ Day 275/22/7 would have been no particular reason to preserve this material. In these circumstances, Mr. Harding is probably correct in his conclusion that the material was probably destroyed not long after the Widgery Inquiry was completed on the grounds that it was of no further use.
2E-II MISSING CIVILIAN PHOTOGRAPHS AND CINE FILM.
2E-3 On this topic we adopt the submissions of the Aitken team which we have seen in draft.
2E-4 With regard to the missing photographs of the eastern side of Rossville Street we also rely on the matters set out at Section 2C IV, above.
2E-III MISSING NICRA MATERIALS.
2E-5 On this topic we adopt the submissions of the Aitken team which we have seen in draft.
2E-IV MISSING MAHON MATERIALS.
2E-6 This topic is addressed at Section 2C III, above.
2E-V INFILCTION
2E-7 The Security Service has disclosed to the Inquiry documents relating to the debriefing in 1984 of an agent known as “Infliction”. As in the case of Observer B, these documents strongly support the conclusion that there were terrorist gunmen operating in the Bogside on the afternoon of Bloody Sunday and that the IRA opened fire on the Army first. The importance of this evidence to the Inquiry's search for the truth is obvious.
2E-8 It is apparent from the documents disclosed to the interested parties and from the statement of Officer A that Infliction had been "a former prominent member" of the Provisional IRA. According to this evidence, Infliction claimed that Mr. Martin McGuinness admitted to him on a number of occasions that he had personally fired the shot (from a Thompson machine gun on single shot) from the Rossville Flats which precipitated the Bloody Sunday episode. It also appears from this evidence that that information was disseminated within the Government of the United Kingdom shortly after it was obtained.
2E-9 The significance of these allegations cannot be doubted. Mr. Christopher Clarke QC, Counsel to the Inquiry, observed on Day 8 of his opening statement:
The importance of this evidence [of Infliction], if it is true, is obvious.
Similarly, Mr. Treacy QC stated on Day 57:
If one takes "Infliction" and Observer B, the allegations that are contained in that material, we respectfully submit, are of crucial significance.
2E-10 Mr. Mansfield QC, Mr. Coyle and Mr. Mallon observed in their Written Submissions dated 23rd May 2002;
The Security Service suggestion that the evidence of A and B is "unlikely to assist" ... because Infliction is not an eyewitness is a gross misevaluation. Infliction is claiming that Martin McGuinness confessed on more than one occasion, shortly after Bloody Sunday, to firing the first
5 Day 8/47 6 Day 57/21 shot, and Officer A is supporting him by endorsing his material in retrospect as reliable ... Should the Tribunal also assess the material as reliable it can hardly be regarded as [of] "low probative value".7
2E-11 The Secretary of State for the Home Department claimed public interest immunity in respect of certain documents and parts of documents relating to Infliction. The relevance of the material for which public interest immunity was claimed and the fact that it was likely to assist the soldiers before the Inquiry is apparent from the following statement of Mr. Philip Sales, on behalf of the Secretary of State, at the oral hearing on 27th May 2002. Mr. Sales observed;
"Indeed, we go so far as to say that the risk of disclosure posed by the questioning envisaged here in relation to these witnesses would be so great that if this were a criminal trial – and I refer to the example given by Mr. Lloyd Jones - the prosecution would have to be dropped and that is how serious the risk to Infliction is assessed to be.8
The claim for public interest immunity was upheld.
2E-12 In the course of the hearing on 27th May 2002, the following exchange took place;
Mr. Clarke: So far as the practicalities are concerned, I think it is appropriate to observe that whatever decision the Tribunal reaches will produce an unsatisfactory result because, at any rate from the Inquiry's point of view the only wholly satisfactory result would be for the Inquiry to call "Infliction" to give evidence before it.
Lord Saville: Of course, we have thought about this, Mr. Clarke, and I think it is appropriate at this moment to say we are satisfied that to call or indeed to make any attempt to call the individual known as "Infliction", who is
7 At paragraph 5(e) 8 Day 214/95 - Day 214/96 overseas, would be in breach of the rights of that individual under Article 2 of the Convention on Human Rights.
Accordingly, we shall proceed upon the basis that "Infliction" will not be called to give evidence at this Inquiry. We considered that this was a matter of such great importance to this Inquiry's search for the truth and the restoration of public confidence, that we lodged written submissions dated 31st May 2002 on this issue and requested that the Tribunal hear argument on whether it was possible for Infliction to give evidence to the Inquiry by any means. We accepted that Infliction could not give evidence in person in the usual way. Moreover, we accepted that even the use of devices such as an audio link with voice distortion might give rise to an insuperable risk to his life, because the answers to some of the questions he was likely to be asked might tend to reveal his identity. Nevertheless, we submitted that the Tribunal could take the following steps without any infringement of Infliction's Article 2 rights.
(1) Infliction could be interviewed on behalf of the Inquiry and a statement relating to these allegations could be taken. Alternatively, Infliction could be asked to produce a short written statement for the benefit of the Inquiry dealing with these allegations. Redactions could then be agreed by the Inquiry, legal representatives of Infliction and the Security Service.
(2) The Tribunal could hear Infliction's evidence at an in camera hearing at which only Counsel to the Inquiry was present and permitted to ask questions. If necessary or appropriate, Infliction's evidence could be given by a video or audio link from a remote location anywhere in the world and not necessarily from the State in which he is now living. The Tribunal is expressly authorised by statute to hear evidence in private in cases where it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest expedient to do so.\\textsuperscript{10}
(3) It might even have been possible for the Tribunal to take Infliction's evidence by employing a delayed action technique.
2E-13 The Tribunal did not accede to this request, nor did it hear argument on the point. On Day 220 (13th June 2002) the Chairman announced:
\\begin{quote} We have also considered a written submission on behalf of a number of the soldiers in relation to "Infliction". In essence this submission is that the Tribunal should consider, if it has not already done so, other ways of taking evidence from this witness.
The position is before I made the announcement a few days ago that we would not be calling "Infliction", we had considered whether there were any ways at all in which we could take evidence from him, including those suggested in the submission to which I have referred.
We are satisfied that the position is such that there are no means that we could employ without breaching the human rights of this individual.\\textsuperscript{11} \\end{quote}
2E-14 We are not in a position to gainsay the Tribunal's conclusion. However, we respectfully submit that, as a result, the Tribunal has been denied access to highly relevant evidence concerning what actually occurred on Bloody Sunday and which was likely to assist individual soldiers facing allegations of murder. We would respectfully ask the Tribunal to bear this in mind when, as we expect, we are met by submissions that no weight
\\textsuperscript{10} Section 2, Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 provides;
"A Tribunal to which this Act is so applied as aforesaid- (a) shall not refuse to allow the public or any portion of the public to be present at any of the proceedings of the Tribunal unless in the opinion of the Tribunal it is in the public interest expedient to do so for reasons connected with the subject matter of the inquiry or the nature of the evidence to be given."
\\textsuperscript{11} Day 220/79 - Day 220/80 can be attached to material relating to Infliction because he has not made a statement and his account has not been tested before the Inquiry.
2E-VI OBSERVER B
2E-15 The documents disclosed by the Government to the Inquiry included documents relating to the activities of Observer B. In due course the Inquiry obtained a statement from Observer B. The documents and the statement were served on the interested parties in a heavily redacted form. This evidence supports a vital part of the soldiers' case, that is that there were terrorist gunmen operating in the Bogside on the afternoon of Bloody Sunday and that the IRA opened fire on the Army first.
2E-16 In his statement Observer B provides a first-hand account of IRA auxiliaries drilling in the area of Rossville Street on the Tuesday and the Thursday prior to Bloody Sunday, a process which included concealing themselves on the landings of Block 2. He provides a second-hand account from A and B of events on Bloody Sunday: of men running from the Rossville Flats to a car and throwing two Thompson sub-machine guns, a rifle and a pistol into the boot before driving off, and it is said that the back of the car was full of Thompsons. He provides a second-hand account from X that the Fianna were planning to attack the Army to draw them into the area and then fall back leaving the soldiers vulnerable to sniper fire. He provides a second-hand account, again from X, that when the shooting started he saw the IRA auxiliaries firing from the balconies, presumably from the Rossville flats; that the soldiers reached the flats faster than the rioters had expected, causing them to run; that the auxiliaries also panicked when the soldiers reached the flats and they stashed their weapons in the dry risers. He provides a second-hand account, again from X, that the first shot he heard was the thud of a
12 KO 2.1-KO 2.15.1 Thompson and the statement that X was convinced that the IRA had fired first that day.
2E-17 According to James, his handler in the Security Service, Observer B was the source of a lot of very useful information.
"He pinpointed just about everything we knew about Londonderry"(^3)
2E-18 The significance of the evidence of Observer B has to be considered in a context where there is a considerable quantity of indirect evidence before this Inquiry that the Security Forces had received intelligence as to the intentions of the IRA prior to 30th January 1972. For example, the Headquarters Northern Ireland Operational Summary for the week ending 28th January 1972 included the statement that:
"Intelligence reports indicate that the IRA are determined to produce a major confrontation by one means or another during the march."(^4)
2E-19 Similarly, the weekly Intelligence Report for the week ending 29th January 1972 included the statement:
"Apart from the hard core of professional hooligans who will certainly be seeking to exploit the situation as the rally disperses, if not before, gunmen may be present."(^5)
2E-20 However it appears that the Inquiry may not have discovered any primary record of the intelligence referred to in these reports. (In this regard we draw attention to the observations of Mr. Clarke in his opening statement.(^6) The oral evidence of Observer B would therefore have
(^3) KJ 2.1, paragraph 5 (^4) G83.526 (^5) G85.529 (^6) Day 3/115 Whether the material relating to Observer B in respect of which a claim to public interest immunity was upheld provides such a primary record of the intelligence referred to is a matter within the knowledge of the Inquiry but not of the interested parties. provided a vital opportunity to test his evidence so as to enable the Tribunal to assess the veracity of his account and the likelihood that he was the source of the intelligence referred to.
2E-21 The importance of Observer B's evidence was all the greater in the light of:
(1) the successful claim for public interest immunity in relation to certain material relating to Observer B;
(2) the inability of the Inquiry to trace A, B, C or X referred to in the statement of Observer B;
(3) the fact that the persons identified in the statement of Observer B as IO1 and IO2 are dead.
2E-22 The veracity of Observer B's evidence is fiercely contested on behalf of some of the families. Thus Ms Smyth, on behalf of the clients of Madden and Finucane pointed out that "he must have been a man skilled in deception" and that "he may have been influenced by financial inducements to provide false information to the Security Service" Mr. Mansfield QC goes so far as to contend that the Observer B documents are a fabrication. In a written submission he alleged that there had been:
A co-ordinated cover-up of the truth by all those most intimately concerned with the day"
and stated that "this overwhelming desire to ensure that the truth is withheld can be exemplified", inter alia:
By very late disclosure of the existence of the totally incredible allegations made by Observer B and no doubt
17 Day 34/95; Day 34/124 18 Day 34/88 - Day 34/92 originally brought into existence as back stop justification, should any be required.\\textsuperscript{19}
2E-23 In all the circumstances it is not possible to overstate the importance of the evidence of Observer B to the Inquiry's search for the truth. Ms. Smyth, counsel for the clients of Madden and Finucane, observed that
\\textit{The evidence of Observer B lies at the whole heart of the controversy that has raged over the last 28 years}\\textsuperscript{20}
and she described the evidence of Observer B as:
\\textit{probably the single most important piece of evidence which the Tribunal may have to consider.}\\textsuperscript{21}
2E-24 By a letter dated 13\\textsuperscript{th} April 2000 the Inquiry notified the interested parties that it had agreed to Observer B's application to give evidence by video link "because the state of his health would not permit him to give his evidence in person in the Guildhall."
2E-25 Observer B had made an application for further relief. Following oral argument Mr. Hoyt delivered the ruling of the Tribunal on Day 35 (15\\textsuperscript{th} June 2000). Observer B's applications for anonymity and redaction of his statement and accompanying documents were successful but his application to give evidence by audio link was refused. The Tribunal ordered that viewing of the video link should be limited. Mr. Hoyt, delivering the ruling of the Tribunal, observed:
\\textit{...there is little doubt that the evidence of Observer B is likely to be important.}\\textsuperscript{22}
\\textsuperscript{19} OS2.5 \\textsuperscript{20} Day 34/91 \\textsuperscript{21} Day 34/93 \\textsuperscript{22} Day 35/20/3 - Day 35/20/5. However, it is most unfortunate that, despite the fact that he was known to be in poor health, Observer B did not give evidence by video link or by any other means.
In its Ruling of 19th December 2002 the Tribunal announced at paragraph 55 that it had recently been informed of Observer B's death.
Although the Inquiry has the statement of Observer B, those we represent are disadvantaged because he did not give oral evidence. His oral evidence was likely to assist the soldiers before this Inquiry. However, as matters now stand, we confidently expect that submissions will be made to the Inquiry on behalf of other interested parties that no weight can be attached to his evidence because it has not been tested during oral testimony.
2E-VII EVIDENCE IN THE POSSESSION OF THE SECURITY SERVICE
Reference has been made in Section 2C I, above, to the Tribunal's ruling of 1st June 2001 in which it declined to seek disclosure from the security agencies of material directly relevant to the mode of operation of the IRA including their tactics, their use of vantage points and sniper positions, their use of crowds as cover, and their procedures for dealing with casualties or fatalities. In our submission, information on these matters in the possession of the security agencies would have greatly assisted the Tribunal, in particular in its assessment of the evidence that wounded terrorists received treatment on Bloody Sunday in field stations in Londonderry and in hospitals in the Republic.
As a result there is a most serious lacuna in the information before this Inquiry and the Inquiry's ability to discover the truth of what occurred on Bloody Sunday has been impeded. This matter is addressed in detail in the submissions by the Aitken team which we have seen in draft and which we adopt in this regard.
2E-VIII WITNESSES THE INQUIRY WISHED TO CALL BUT CONCLUDED IT COULD NOT CALL.
2E-31 By letter dated 10th February 2004 the Tribunal advised the Interested Parties that in respect of thirty one named witnesses "it will be impossible" for them to be called to give oral evidence. The reasons given included the following:
(1) The witness was unavailable for reasons of ill health.
(2) The witness could not be called by virtue of Article 2, ECHR.
(3) The witness resides out of the jurisdiction and was unwilling to attend.
(4) The Tribunal had not been able to make contact with the witness.
(5) The witness was uncooperative but the Tribunal had decided not to subpoena him.
2E-32 The Inquiry made it clear in its letter that the Interested Parties are not to be told into which category each of these witnesses falls, because that would indicate which of the witnesses were not being called because of the operation of Article 2 ECHR and that would infringe the individual's Article 2 rights.
2E-33 The reasons why a given witness has not given evidence will, of course, be known to the Tribunal. In these circumstances there is an additional
23 At paragraph 48 burden upon the Tribunal to bear in mind these reasons and, where appropriate, to draw proper inferences from the failure of a witness to assist the Inquiry. Equally, the Tribunal will be in a position to reject a submission that an adverse inference should be drawn if, on the basis of information available to it but not to the Interested Parties, there is a good reason for a witness not having given evidence.
2E-IX WITNESS TRACE REQUESTS FROM THE LAWTON TEAM: ACCEPTED BUT NOT ACTED ON.
2E-34 From time to time, and in accordance with agreed procedures, we have invited the Tribunal to interview and obtain witness statements from a number of witnesses who, it appeared to us, may be able to provide material evidence to the Tribunal. We feel bound to observe that there appears to have been some reluctance on the part of the Inquiry to provide updated information about the progress made with these witnesses.
2E-35 In some cases, the Inquiry has been successful, an interview has taken place, a statement obtained and distributed in the usual way and the witness has either been called and has given oral evidence or has been designated to the knowledge of the Interested Parties as “read”.
2E-36 There have been a number of cases where, despite the fact the Inquiry agreed that the witness was likely to be able to provide material evidence, such evidence has not been forthcoming. On some occasions this has been due to matters which are obviously outside the control of the Inquiry such as the death of the potential witness or an inability to trace him.
2E-37 In some cases, however, witnesses have been traced but have been uncooperative and yet the Tribunal has decided not to use its powers to compel attendance despite, in some cases, a very long time lapse. For example, the Tribunal accepted the justification for seeking to obtain evidence from four particular witnesses in March 2001. It was not until the 10th March 2004 that we were notified that these witnesses were uncooperative but that no subpoena would be issued. It was with some disappointment that we learned from the same letter dated 10th March 2004 that in the case of some witnesses who were to be traced the “Inquiry has decided not to obtain a statement from this witness” with no explanation as to what had influenced the change of intention.
We cannot say that as a result the Tribunal has necessarily been deprived of further evidence that may have assisted its search for the truth. However, it is surprising that, having been satisfied of the justification for obtaining evidence, there are so many examples where the Tribunal appears not to have pursued the search for that evidence as vigorously as it might.
THE TRIBUNAL'S FAILURE TO ORDER WITNESSES TO REVEAL THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION.
This topic has been addressed at Section D3, above. CHAPTER 2F
SECRET EVIDENCE
2F-1 The Inquiry has received very large quantities of evidence which it has not been possible to disclose to the Interested Parties for a variety of reasons, including public interest immunity and the Article 2 rights of individuals. In some instances, it has been necessary to redact documents so as to withhold names or other information; in others, it has, no doubt, been necessary to withhold entire documents or groups of documents.
2F-2 While we have argued against the withholding of evidence from the interested parties in certain instances, we accept that in certain circumstances this has been unavoidable. In particular, we have consistently maintained that disclosure should not be made if that would give rise to a serious possibility that individuals would be subject to the risk or increased risk of attack.
2F-3 We have argued throughout that the Inquiry is entitled, and indeed bound, to receive all relevant evidence and to take it into account in its search for the truth, even if it cannot be disclosed to the interested parties. This approach has been opposed on behalf of at least some of the families. In our submission, however, while this approach is unsatisfactory in a number of important respects, it is simply not open to an inquisitorial body charged with discovering, as best it can, the truth of what occurred to rule out of its consideration evidence which is relevant and which is available to it. Were it to have done so, the conclusions of this Inquiry would be open to challenge on the ground that proper account had not been taken of all relevant evidence, one of the criticisms made of the Widgery Inquiry.
1 See, for example, Day 57/192 - Day 57/193 The disadvantages which flow from the Inquiry's inability to disclose certain evidence before it to the interested parties and their legal advisers are, nevertheless, considerable. As a result, not only has the transparency of the Inquiry's proceedings been impaired but its search for the truth has been impeded. The interested parties have inevitably been denied any opportunity to rely on this evidence, to take account of it in assessing other evidence, to use it as a basis for the questioning of witnesses or to deploy it in their final submissions. Moreover, had it been possible to disclose this evidence to interested parties, they might well have been in a position to connect it with other evidence and to draw to the Tribunal's attention such links, the significance of which might otherwise be lost.
An example of the resulting difficulties that arise in practice is provided by the evidence contained in one of the Mahon tapes which were provided to the Interested Parties at an advanced stage of the Inquiry. In a video taped interview, Mr. Barry Liddy, who died before he was able to give a statement or oral evidence to this Inquiry, told Mr. Paul Mahon that there was a young man who had been injured on Bloody Sunday in the bed opposite him in the Altnagelvin Hospital who had a 9mm German Luger pistol under his pillow. Mr Liddy goes on to describe how, when he discharged himself from the Hospital on the 31st January 1972, the young man came out with him and was dropped off at the Bogside Inn. The young man who had the gun was said by Mr. Liddy to have been killed in a car accident about five or six years before the interview, i.e. in 1991 or 1992. Significantly, Mr. Michael Bradley was present during the course of this interview and participated in a discussion which also involved Mrs.
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2 That Mr. Liddy did, in fact, discharge himself on 31st January is evidenced by the Hospital records D1107 3 X4.49.110 Sally Liddy where the participants were trying to recall the name of the young man in question.4
Apart from what is revealed by this taped interview, the Tribunal has, so far as we are aware, received no evidence at all relating either to the injured young man or the existence of a weapon in the hospital on the night of Bloody Sunday. The hospital records obtained by the Tribunal in relation to the casualties admitted are incomplete and do not assist.5 It is clear that a name was given to Mr. Mahon, but it has been redacted where it appears in the transcript. The Tribunal therefore knows the name as do Mr. Bradley and Mrs. Liddy but despite the fact that the individual concerned may well have been dead now for over ten years, the Tribunal considers that the effect of Article 2 is that the Interested Parties cannot be informed of the name.
We have no knowledge as to what, if any, enquiries have been made by the Inquiry to ascertain whether the information given to Mr. Mahon could be corroborated. The presence in the Altnagelvin Hospital that evening of a person injured on Bloody Sunday with a gun in his possession is potentially of great importance in the search for the truth. Unhappily, it is a matter on which we are left largely in the dark.
Furthermore, this state of affairs inevitably places constraints on the Tribunal and its counsel. While the members of the Tribunal will be able to take account of this evidence in its deliberations leading to its final report, it has not been possible for counsel to the Inquiry to pursue lines of questioning with witnesses based on this material. As a result, certain avenues of investigation which may have been indicated by the undisclosed material remain unexplored. Furthermore, the Tribunal will
4 X4.49.128 5 AS17.5 not be able to reveal in its final report any undisclosed material which has led to or supported a particular conclusion.
We would draw particular attention to one difficulty which now confronts the Tribunal and of which, we are confident, the Tribunal is already aware. In its deliberations the Tribunal will have to take account of all the evidence before it, including redacted or undisclosed material. Because the content of the redacted and undisclosed material is not within the knowledge of the interested parties they have not been able to make submissions in relation to it or to link it to other material whether disclosed or not. Thus, for example, it will be necessary for the Tribunal to link the evidence of PIRA 24 to all other material relating to him and his activities, whether disclosed to the Interested Parties or not, including material referring to him in his true name. It will be necessary for the members of the Tribunal to be aware of precisely which material has not been made available to the Interested Parties and to make all appropriate links between that withheld material and individuals and events. While we are acutely aware of the burden this places upon the Tribunal, there is, in our submission, a particular duty of the greatest importance on the Tribunal to carry out this exercise with scrupulous care, because the interested parties are not able to do so for themselves. The analogy may be drawn with a judge in adversarial proceedings who is under a duty to keep under review the relevance of material for which public interest immunity is claimed. However, whereas the judge in that situation has merely to take decisions in relation to disclosure, the Tribunal in this Inquiry is subject to the much more onerous obligation of taking full account of that material in arriving at its conclusions.
Another difficulty arises where information is known to some or all of the Interested Parties but they are unable to make use of it without prejudicing the position of persons who have been granted anonymity. For example, the names of some of those members of the IRA who were granted anonymity are known to us; indeed, some were granted only partial anonymity because full anonymity was impossible by the time they made their applications for anonymity. There is a very good example of the difficulties faced by the interested parties in these circumstances where, because the name is known, it is possible to link the individual concerned with another matter which may well have influenced the activities of the anonymous witness but it is not possible to refer to the linking material as that would lead to a loss of anonymity. The difficulty in formulating this submission highlights the problem.
The difficulties referred to above arise in a particularly acute form where, as here, allegations of serious criminal wrongdoing are made against individuals. In the case of courts hearing adversarial proceedings different approaches to public interest immunity are adopted in civil and criminal proceedings. In civil proceedings a document which is relevant and material must be disclosed unless it is confidential and a breach of confidentiality would cause harm to the public interest which outweighs the harm to the interests of justice caused by non-disclosure. However, in criminal proceedings the determinative question is whether the documents might be of assistance to the defence. Furthermore, the criminal
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6 R. v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, ex parte Wiley [1995] 1 A.C. 274, 281. 7 The matter is addressed in the following terms in the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions (the Scott Report)
K6.14 Despite the weight of the judicial statements to which I have referred, it is not, in my opinion, apparent that in the cases in question the exercise performed by the judge can accurately, or usefully, be described as a "balancing exercise". Each of the cases to which I have referred, R. v. Clowes, R. v. Keane and R. v. Brown (Winston) concerned documents which might have been of assistance to the defence. The dicta of the Lord Chief Justice in R. v. Keane and of Lord Justice Steyn in R v Brown (Winston) suggest that it is not possible to have public interest factors in favour of non-disclosure which are of such weight as to tip the scale against disclosure of such documents. A document which might be of assistance to the defence would, I think, always be a document that might "prove the defendant's innocence or avoid a miscarriage of justice." If that is an accurate assessment the determinative question on a PII claim in a criminal case is whether the documents might be of assistance to the defence. If the posing of that question and the reaching of an answer are to be described as a "balancing exercise", so be it; but it is important to recognise that the exercise is, nonetheless, one of a quite different character from the "balancing exercise" performed in civil cases. (Emphasis added) authorities establish that the interests of justice include "allowing a defendant to put forward a tenable case in the best possible light" and require that a defendant must not be deprived, by reason of public interest immunity, of the opportunity of casting doubt upon the case against him. As a result, in a criminal trial documents which might be of assistance to the accused must be disclosed or the prosecution must be abandoned.
Abandoning the proceedings is not an option here. Accordingly, it must be left to the Tribunal to ensure that those individuals who face allegations of criminal wrongdoing are treated fairly. This places a particularly heavy responsibility on the Tribunal. In particular:
1. The Tribunal should act with great caution before upholding a serious allegation against an individual on the basis of evidence which has not been disclosed to that individual and to which he has had no opportunity to respond.
2. The Tribunal is required to take full account of evidence which may assist an individual facing allegations of criminal wrongdoing.
3. The Tribunal is required to keep under review the significance of undisclosed material, a matter which may change significantly during the course of the Inquiry, and to take full account of it in its deliberations and in arriving at its conclusions.
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8 R. v. Agar 90 Cr. App. R. 318, 323. 9 R. v. Hallett [1986] Crim L.R. 462 referred to in R. v. Agar 90 Cr. App. R. 318 at p. 323. CHAPTER 2G
THE EVIDENCE OF SOLDIER 027
2G-I INTRODUCTION
2G-1 In this section we address the circumstances in which 027 gave his 1975 account of Bloody Sunday and compare the symbolic importance which that account came to assume with our suggestion as to its actual merit. We address the specific allegations made by 027 against our clients in his 1975 and other accounts. We also consider other matters relevant to 027's credibility.
2G-2 In brief, our submission is that 027's evidence was so tainted by exaggeration, fantasy and deceit as to be of no assistance to the Tribunal in its search for the truth. It is also unfortunate that such exaggerated and questionable accounts were given the prominence and publicity that was accorded to them, and that they had the influence which they would appear to have had.
2G-II 1975 ACCOUNT
027 IS AUTHOR OF 1975 ACCOUNT
2G-3 The Inquiry has two documents from 1975 detailing 027's experiences during the period 1971-1972. The first document is the memoire(^1) which includes a description of Bloody Sunday. The second document(^2) is entitled *Interview with 027 dtd 9 November 1975* and deals with the period from 4(^{th}) November 1972.
(^1) B1554 - 1565.013 (^2) B1565.015 - 1565.025 The 1975 memoire
2G-4 It is now beyond doubt that the 1975 memoire was written by 027. In 1998, his solicitor told the Solicitor to the Inquiry:
"The statement referred to in the Irish Government's Assessment of New Material dated June 1997 was a summary of a diary kept by my client. It was prepared for his own purposes and was not intended for publication. He informs me that he believes it to be substantially accurate though he has discovered some relatively minor errors in it."³
2G-5 Shortly thereafter, 027 gave a statement containing a similar acknowledgement to his solicitor.⁴
2G-6 In 2000, 027 told Eversheds:
It subsequently transpired that amongst that material [sent to Sean Patrick McShane] was an account in statement form, of my memory of Bloody Sunday. Probably in 1975, I spent some time trying to make a coherent whole out of the contemporaneous notes that I had, in my field book, my diary and the scraps of paper on which I had written my experiences. It was very much a personal record and was never meant for dissemination. As far as I recall, it was not specifically produced with BS in mind.⁵
He confirmed this in his oral evidence in 2002.⁶
The 1975 interview
2G-7 We suggest that this is a transcript of answers given by 027 in a taped interview with the man who called himself Sean Patrick McShane.
³ Letter from Geoffrey Bindman to Philip Ridd, then Solicitor to the Inquiry, dated 21.07.98, B1565.124 ⁴ Four page statement given to Geoffrey Bindman on 27th July 1998, B1565.371-2 ⁵ B1565.055 paragraph 173 ⁶ Dav 249/71/11 References in the document to "tape distortion" and the like certainly support this contention.(^7)
2G-8 We adopt Christopher Clarke QC's questioning on Day 247 in this regard:
\[Q. \\text{ Could we have B1565.015. This appears to be a transcript of an interview with you, dated 9th November 1975, New York. Did you give an interview which was taped when you were in New York and met this journalist [McShane]?} \]
[A. \\text{ We certainly engaged in lengthy conversation. I do not have a recollection of being interviewed in the form that it was recorded in some way.} ]
[Q. \\text{ ...Are you simply saying you do not recollect giving an interview, or that this is not an interview of you?} ]
[A. \\text{ I remember having a long conversation with this guy, but I do not recall it being taped.} ]
[Q. \\text{ Can we take it that, whether you recall that or not, this represents what you would have told him?} ]
[A. \\text{ From what I have seen of it in recent times, it would appear to be so.}^8 ]
2G-9 Continuity between the 1975 memoire and interview reflects the fact that they come from the same source. For instance, one sees at B1565.012 a reference in the memoire to the incident in which Robert McKinney was killed:
"I...can honestly say that the shooting of Mr McKinnie (sic) on Thursday 7(^{th}) September during the ambush which I later describe was an enjoyable experience..."
2G-10 That incident is then described in some detail in his interview, commencing at B1565.021.
(^7) See, for example, B1565.024
(^8) Day 247/51/19 SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF 027'S 1975 ACCOUNT
2G-11 In our submission, the symbolic importance which 027's 1975 account came to assume was out of all proportion to its actual merit or credibility.
The establishment of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry
2G-12 The 1975 memoire was one of the major factors leading to the establishment of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.
2G-13 Tom McGurk's article, Soldier A eyewitness file handed over to Irish Government, was published in the Sunday Business Post on 16th March 1997. Referring to 027 as "Soldier A", McGurk summarised his sensational claims about Bloody Sunday:
Soldier A's testimony is likely to provide compelling grounds for a new inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday. Among the many startling new allegations made in the soldier's statement are that:
the Paras were briefed by a senior officer the day before they went to Derry "to get some kills";
a ceasefire order was given during the shooting on Rossville Street after some of the first victims had been killed;
the Glenfada Park shootings (the second wave of killings) took place after and in direct contravention of this order;
the testimony suggests that those shot in Glenfada were standing with their hands in the air and that one was shot by a soldier shooting from the hip;
the soldiers made widespread use of non-issue dumdum bullets (banned under the Geneva Convention Rules);
Sean O Mahony had received a copy of the 1975 memoire about Bloody Sunday from Sean Patrick McShane and had, in turn, passed it on to McGurk (BSI statement M92.1 paragraph 4). Widgery's notion that the army fired only 108 bullets was based on efforts by soldiers to conceal the use of such rounds;
perhaps most significant of all is the claim in the soldier's testimony that the evidence he was prepared to give to the tribunal was destroyed and he was given an altered version written for him. The tribunal was sitting before the Lord Chief Justice of England and enjoyed the equivalent legal status of the High Court.¹⁰
2G-14 The memoire was subsequently referred to in the Irish Government report, Bloody Sunday and the Report of the Widgery Tribunal, An Assessment of the New Material¹¹, which suggested:
"If the [1975] transcript is authenticated, then it represents the most significant new evidence yet to come to light regarding the actions of soldiers on the ground during Bloody Sunday, particularly what happened in the Glenfada Park, and the nature of the Widgery Tribunal. The allegation that Counsel for the Tribunal fabricated evidence, if verified, would represent a fatal blow to the tribunal's credibility."¹²
2G-15 The 1975 memoire was one of the important pieces of "new material" that led the Prime Minister to announce the establishment of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry in 1998.¹³
2G-16 Referring to the whole of 027's 1975 account, the present Solicitor to the Inquiry's Memorandum to all Interested Parties of 14th August 2000 states:
The allegations contained in these documents are a central part of the subject matter of this Inquiry. It was apparent to the Tribunal at the outset that if Private 027 were either to
¹⁰ B1565.072 ¹¹ Mr. McGurk had passed a copy of the memoire to the Irish Government (M56.4 paragraph 17). ¹² U218 ¹³ House of Commons Official Report Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 29th January 1998. give evidence voluntarily or be compelled to do so, his was likely to be evidence of the utmost importance. If he were to confirm the account attributed to him in the documents submitted to the Irish Government, his evidence would implicate a number of other individuals in grave wrongdoing. If on the other hand he were to withdraw the earlier account or deny its authenticity, the allegations based upon that account might be exposed as false. 027's 1975 account was tested during his oral evidence to this Inquiry. Very little of it survived. Important allegations were withdrawn, placed "in context", overtaken by inconsistent accounts or otherwise left unsubstantiated.
Influence on subsequent evidence
2G-17 We further suggest that, inevitably, 027's widely reported, but unfounded, allegations have influenced the evidence of others. We take by way of example one part of his description of events in Glenfada Park from the 1975 memoire:
"H fired from the hip at a range of 10 yards. The bullet passed through one man and into another and they both fell, one dead and one wounded. He then moved forward and fired again, killing the wounded man."
2G-18 It now transpires that 027, on his own admission, does not recall seeing any rounds fired in Glenfada Park and may not even have been there at this time. Nevertheless, we submit that the accounts of at least seven witnesses may have been influenced by this passage. None had mentioned an incident of this type in 1972. All subsequently gave
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14 B1565.097, paragraph 5 15 B1565.006 16 B1565.373, paragraph 5 (Four page statement to Geoffrey Bindman 27th July 1998); Day 246/85/4 and Day 249/136/20. See the section entitled Lance Corporal F: shooting in Glenfada Park, below, where this is dealt with in greater detail. 17 Joseph Mahon (AM18), Paddy McCauley (AM97), Pearse McCaul (AM93), John O’Kane (AO48), Benn Keaveney (AK2), Vincent Harkin (AH34) and Frances Lyttle (AL36). statements to Eversheds incorporating an allegation of a similar nature to that of 027\\textsuperscript{18}.
2G-III ALLEGATIONS INVOLVING CLIENTS OF MR ANTHONY LAWTON
LIEUTENANT 119: “WE WANT SOME KILLS”
2G-19 027’s 1975 account of Bloody Sunday begins with his description of an informal briefing given to 027 and his “muckers” in the Anti-Tank Platoon by Lt 119 at barracks the night before their deployment to Londonderry:
\\begin{quote} We were all in high spirits and when our Lt. said “lets teach those buggers a lesson – we want some kills tomorrow” to the mentality of the blokes to whom he was speaking, this was tantamount to an order (i.e. an exoneration of all responsibility).\\textsuperscript{19} \\end{quote}
2G-20 The claim carries with it the clear implication that Lt 119 exhorted his men to commit murder: to kill for no justifiable reason. It is refuted by 119 in its entirety.\\textsuperscript{20} Recent attempts by 027 to place the allegation “in context” have effectively amounted to its withdrawal. 027 has claimed that talk of “getting kills” must be seen in the context of an expectation that the Paras would be engaged by gunmen in Londonderry. He told Christopher Clarke QC in oral evidence:
\\begin{quote} “Specifically it means if a gunman engages you, you shoot the gunman.”\\textsuperscript{21} \\end{quote}
2G-21 A fuller explanation can be found in his draft book:
\\begin{quote} \\textsuperscript{18} This was raised with 027 by Edwin Glasgow QC in oral evidence at Day 249/51/16 \\textsuperscript{19} B1565.003 \\textsuperscript{20} BSI statement, B1752.012 paragraph 15 \\textsuperscript{21} Day 246/25/5 \\end{quote} The Paras were coming and we were not going to be messed about, we would assert ourselves if the IRA, the enemy decided to take us on and this seemed unavoidable, after all we were going into their own back yard.
A further explanation is contained in his Eversheds statement:
"The comment "we want some kills tomorrow" needs to be put into the context in which it was made. We were going into the Bogside, a no go area, a piece of British territory that had been taken over by terrorists. We were told to be prepared for any eventuality and there was a strong impression that we would encounter gunmen. Until that time, we had been facing the IRA in Belfast who were always illusive and hidden from view. The following day, we were to go in strength into their stronghold, the Bogside, and for once they would have to come out and face us. They would have nowhere else to go. We were sure that a confrontation was going to occur and that we were about to face gunmen. On the one hand there was an element of bravado, but on the other there was the natural apprehension of going into a situation, which led to a heightened sense of emotion and tension."
In fact, by the time he spoke to Eversheds, 027 could no longer even be sure that the remarks had first come from 119.
027's original claim has therefore turned into a description of an informal discussion, which may not have been commenced by 119, about returning fire at gunmen. No allegation of impropriety can be maintained against 119 in these circumstances.
**LIEUTENANT 119: GUN PITS INCIDENT**
027 has also described an incident after Bloody Sunday in which his platoon had been digging gun pits. He and his colleagues decided to teach their new lieutenant a lesson for refusing to release them from their duties. The lieutenant was tied to a vehicle and driven through gorse bushes.
He had learnt his lesson; he did not report it. For a Lieutenant to keep running to a Captain with problems all the time would not have helped his cause.21
2G-26 It transpired in oral evidence that the lieutenant in question was 119, not a new man, and that the circumstances leading to the incident were quite different from those described by 027.
Edwin Glasgow QC: “You see, 119 will tell this Tribunal that he did indeed get engaged in some horseplay, as he puts it with you, in a digging incident, the night when he took you all for a drink in the local pub when, after a long tour of duty, he left your company. And you, true to your nature, have simply exaggerated that incident out of all recognition, even forgetting that this was the Lieutenant who had commanded your platoon for so many months. Do you want to comment on that? Have you really forgotten that, 027?
A. I accept what you say, sir.26
2G-27 027’s initial description of the incident provides a further example of his propensity to distort the truth by exaggerating aspects of an innocuous event. By coincidence, the description again concerned 119 and an allegation of teaching someone a lesson.
LANCE CORPORAL F: FIRED IMMEDIATELY FROM KELLS WALK WALL AT NO DISCERNIBLE TARGET.
2G-28 In his 1975 memoire 027 described the deployment of Anti-Tank Platoon to the Kells Walk wall, north of the Rossville Street rubble barricade:
25 BSI statement, B1565.032 paragraph 41 26 Day 249/36/6 "I was with the leading group of half a dozen as we reached a small garden at the corner of Kells Walk. At this point approx 100 yds short of the crowd F went into the kneeling position and fired at the centre of the crowd from behind a low wall... I raised my rifle and aimed but on tracking across the people in front of me could see women and children although the majority were men, all wildly shouting, but could see no one with a weapon, so I lowered my rifle".27
2G-29 The allegation was repeated in 027's Eversheds statement. 027 further explained there that F arrived at the wall and started to fire at the crowd "without pause or hesitation"28 However, in this account 027 suggested that F fired from beside and not behind the wall.
Immediate firing from the wall
2G-30 The photographic evidence gives the lie to the allegation that F fired immediately in the way 027 described. We suggest that 23/8 and 23/9, below, depict Anti-Tank Platoon soldiers deploying to the Kells Walk wall. Christopher Clarke QC has made a similar observation29.
27 B1565.005 28 B1565.039 paragraph 83 29 Day 46/52/22 EP23 photographs showing deployment of Anti-Tank Platoon.
2G-32 027 accepted in oral evidence that it was likely he was among the group of soldiers shown running towards the camera(^{30}). Yet those same photographs show that none of the leading group of soldiers fired immediately upon reaching the wall. Instead they ran past it and had to double back before taking up positions.
**Firing at no discernable target**
2G-33 027 has recently made a number of comments that explain why he would not necessarily have seen what F was firing at (if, indeed, 027 spoke the truth when he claimed not to have seen F’s target). He has acknowledged that he was describing matters from his own, limited perspective(^{31}) and described in his draft book how:
> "Even when you see an action unfold right in front of your face, what you see will differ from what the men standing beside you see."(^{32})
2G-34 Crucially, he has now also accepted that he never actually directed his attention specifically to what F was firing at.(^{33}) Indeed, for part of the relevant time he was adjusting his own position and therefore not carefully observing the area of the rubble barricade.(^{34})
2G-35 F’s evidence in 1972 was that he observed a number of people behind the rubble barricade and fired at a man who “was attempting to throw what looked like a bomb”.(^{35}) Tragically, his shot killed Michael Kelly. It is our submission that the Tribunal will learn nothing about the circumstances of
(^{30}) Day 249/45/1\
(^{31}) Day 249/162/2\
(^{32}) B1565.314\
(^{33}) Day 246/55/24\
(^{34}) Day 246/55/3\
(^{35}) “SA” statement, B137 paragraph 4 the shooting from the evidence of 027, which, for the reasons given above, is wholly unreliable.
**PRIVATE INQ 0635: FIRED FROM KELLS WALK WALL**
2G-36 027's 1975 memoire included an allegation that Pte INQ 0635 also fired from the area of the Kells Walk wall:
> G immediately jumped down beside [F] and also opened fire just beyond the wall on the pavement. INQ 635 also commenced firing.(^{36})
2G-37 027's recent evidence about INQ 0635's activities at the Kells Walk wall has been quite different. He told Eversheds:
> I cannot now be sure and it may be that he did not fire at all.(^{37})
2G-38 In oral evidence, he commented on the above passage in his Eversheds statement to Christopher Clarke QC:
> there is a good deal of doubt expressed in what I am saying there.(^{38})
2G-39 We submit the Inquiry should disregard what 027 said on this topic in 1975. He has now expressed serious doubt about an allegation that is denied by INQ 0635 and totally uncorroborated by other evidence.
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(^{36}) B156.005.
(^{37}) B1565.040 paragraph 91
(^{38}) Day 249/41/10 CEASE FIRE ORDER OVER RADIO AND MOVE INTO GLENFADA PARK NORTH
Timing and means of communication of cease fire order
2G-40 027 maintains that he received a cease fire order by radio from Major Loden, which he passed on to those around him in the vicinity of the Kells Walk wall. We submit that no such order was given at this time.
2G-41 027 wrote in his 1975 memoire:
After an eternity of timeless moments and sights Loden's voice came over the radio and ordered a cease-fire...I shouted the order "cease-fire" and ran along the line tapping them on their shoulders. The firing slacked and died as the crowd dispersed. H, E, G and F and myself then leapt the wall, turned right and ran down Kells Walk into Glenfada Park...39
2G-42 027's earliest remaining account of the incident, the statement he gave to the SIB on 5th February 1972, was quite different:
Then came a shout from our rear to "cease fire". I cannot say who gave the original order because it was repeated by those near me.40
2G-43 It therefore referred to a shouted order that was passed on to 027, rather than a radio message he passed on to others. 027 was unable to explain the discrepancies between the 1972 and 1975 accounts to Mr. Clarke in oral evidence41.
39 B1565.006 40 B1565.083 41 Day 247/20/17 Major, now Lt. Colonel, Loden’s evidence is of a shouted order given at a later stage, after members of the Anti-Tank Platoon had entered Glenfada Park. He has explained:
*A shouted order like this allowed me to give an instantaneous command...No previous order to stop firing had been given out by me over the radio.*
The shouted command can be heard on Video 3 at 05:54. 027’s suggestion of an earlier command, be it shouted or by radio, is wholly uncorroborated and, we submit, incorrect.
**Reason for entry into Glenfada Park**
027’s allegation about the cease fire order creates a false impression about the background against which elements of the Anti-Tank platoon deployed into Glenfada Park North and opened fire there.
In our submission, the soldiers entered Glenfada Park North for legitimate reasons. Their reasons for doing so are set out in Chapter 9.
It would appear that 027 does now accept there was a legitimate reason for the deployment, albeit not exactly as described by 119 or F. He wrote in his draft book:
*A group of soldiers then moved quickly down Kells Walk to intercept those from the crowd who had dispersed to their left into the complex of flats ahead of us.*
He confirmed in oral evidence that the draft book accurately reflected his current state of knowledge.
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42 BSI statement, B2283.008, paragraph 48 43 paragraph 49 44 B1565.311 45 Day 249/49/1 LANCE CORPORAL F: SHOOTING IN GLENFADA PARK NORTH
2G-49 027's description of events in Glenfada Park is amongst the most sensational of the claims made in the 1975 memoire. He gave a graphic description of leaping the Kells Walk wall and following E, F, G and H into Glenfada Park North. He claimed to have observed that:
[ H \\text{ fired from the hip at a range of 10 yds. The bullet passed through one man and into another and they both fell, one dead and one wounded.} ]
2G-50 According to 027, H then fired again into the wounded man, E shot at one man and a fourth man was killed by either G or F. The circumstances of the Glenfada Park shootings were that:
[ \\text{When we first appeared, darkened faces, sweat and aggression, brandishing rifles, the crowd stopped immediately in their tracks, turned to face us and raised their hands. This is the way they were standing when they were shot.} ]
2G-51 It now transpires that 027, on his own admission, may not actually have seen any of this. He was certainly unable to substantiate these claims in any way:
[ \\text{It is inappropriate after 26 years for me to claim with any degree of certainty that any particular individual behaved in the way described... All I can say with any assurance is that the troops mentioned in the document were amongst those who entered Glenfada Park at the time of the shootings.} ]
027 made a similar concession in his Eversheds statement.
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46 B1565.006 47 B1565.00 48 B1565.007 49 Four page statement to Geoffrey Bindman 27th July 1998, B1565.373, paragraph 5 50 B1565.044, paragraph 114 He went further in his oral evidence to admit that he did not recall seeing any rounds fired in Glenfada Park and, significantly, that he may not have been there at the material time at all:
Sir Allan Green QC: "027, I have to ask you this: I accept that you were in Glenfada Park at some stage, but could you have been there at a time when the shooting had stopped and you did not actually see any of it; is that a possibility?
A. (Pause). My current memory of the events in Glenfada Park (or lack of memory) does allow for that possibility, yes.
Further, the suggestion that those in Glenfada Park North were shot with their hands in the air is demonstrably false and contradicts all civilian eyewitness evidence. Sir Allan Green summarised the pathology evidence to 027 and added:
When you say in your 1975 memoir, "This is the way they were standing when they were shot," that does not apply to any single one of the three people that I have listed for you, does it, if the pathological evidence is accurate?
A. That would appear to be the case, sir, yes.
F’s evidence to the Widgery inquiry was that he fired twice at a nail bomber in Glenfada Park and that he subsequently fired a further two rounds from the south east corner at a gunman positioned at the far end of the Rossville Flats. It is clear from his recent concessions that 027 cannot help the Tribunal with what took place at this time in Glenfada Park North.
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51 Day 246/85/4 52 Day 249/136/20 53 Day 249/125/3 54 "SA" statement, B137, paragraphs 5-6 MAJOR LODEN: ASSAULTED PRISONER
2G-55 027 claimed in 1975 that Major Loden assaulted a civilian detainee. We submit this is a further example of an incident with some basis in fact that was exaggerated by 027 for dramatic effect. 027 may agree.
2G-56 He said in his 1975 memoire:
I remember seeing one [prisoner] marched to Major Loden's APC and then to my astonishment the Major leaning out of the back of the vehicle and smacking the character on top of the head with a baton.55
2G-57 027 was unable to substantiate the account in oral evidence. He was asked by Christopher Clarke QC:
Q. Do you have any recollection now of that incident? A: No, I do not
Q. Again, should we suppose this to be what you recalled in 1975 as something that you yourself had seen, or is it something else? A. I am afraid I cannot offer an explanation for why it is there.56
2G-58 He was later questioned by Edwin Glasgow QC:
Q. Major Loden has told this Inquiry that in the early stages of the arrest, at a time when I suggest you could not see, he did indeed get involved in a physical arrest with a man, and indeed struck him with his baton, and that may have been something that you were told had happened. Do you think that is also something that you have simply, at some stage, elevated into something that you saw in very much more dramatic circumstances, and have been
55 B1565.008 56 Dav 246/108/19 prepared to tell about your officer, although you had no knowledge of it? Is that a possible explanation?
A. That seems possible, yes, sir.57
LT COLONEL WILFORD: “SEND F AND G TO SAS”
2G-59 027 has suggested that Lt Colonel Wilford and Sergeant Major 202 discussed Soldiers F and G on Bloody Sunday, almost as soon as the main action had subsided. According to 027, they acknowledged that “there was a problem with these two soldiers” and Col Wilford said “they had better be packed off to the SAS”58
2G-60 We submit this is an inherently unlikely account and is pure invention. 027 well knew that selection for the SAS was not by a CO nominating troublesome soldiers to serve with the Regiment. Furthermore, why, if the allegation is true, did 027 fail to mention it in his otherwise forthcoming 1975 memoire? He first mentioned it in his 2000 Eversheds statement. Confusingly, he there described his recollection of events as both “vague” and “distinct”59.
2G-61 The allegation should now be disregarded in light of 027’s concession in oral evidence that it may only be his “inaccurate interpretation” of “what I believe I heard”60
DUM DUM BULLETS PASSED AROUND PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT INTO BOGSIDE
2G-62 027 described to Eversheds how his section waited in their pig after arriving in Londonderry. He alleged that:
57 Day 249/55/22 58 B1565.046, paragraph 124 59 “I have a memory, which although vague is still distinct…” (B1565.046 paragraph 124) 60 Day 249/112/20 During the course of our wait "dum dum bullets" were passed around the back of our section pig.\\textsuperscript{61}
He added:
\\textit{I remember holding one of the dum dums in my hand and looking at it. It was the first time I had handled such a thing.}\\textsuperscript{62}
2G-63 We submit this is complete fabrication. The claim is wholly uncorroborated. Indeed, 027 himself failed to mention it in his 1975 memoire, where he was otherwise prepared to detail the presence and use of dum dum rounds on Bloody Sunday.
2G-64 He was singularly unable to assist with any further detail about the incident in oral evidence and there contradicted his evidence to Eversheds by suggesting he could only remember a single round being circulated:
\\textit{Christopher Clarke QC: "Can you recollect approximately how many of these bullets were passed round?}
\\textit{A. No, I cannot.}
\\textit{Q. Can you give us no idea? Are we talking about somewhere between 1 and 5 or are we talking about a large number or something in between?}
\\textit{A. I can only say that I personally handled one.}
\\textit{Q. Did you see others?}
\\textit{A. I do not now recall.}
\\textit{Q. Are you saying that you can only now recall seeing one dum dum bullet being passed around?}
\\textit{A. I can only remember the one that I held, it was passed to me and I looked at it and passed it on.}
\\textsuperscript{61} B1565.037, paragraph 71 \\textsuperscript{62} paragraph 72 Q. Why was it being passed on; why was it being circulated? A. I do not know.
Q. Did nobody say something about it? A. Not that I recall, no.
Q. Did it appear to be part of somebody's supply for use on that day? A. I cannot speculate on that.
Q. Do you know whose bullet it was? A. No, I do not.63
2G-65 027's claim also needs to be considered in the light of his acknowledgement that there would have been no "functional" reason for using a dum dum bullet:
A 7.62 round, without being tweaked, causes a very substantial exit wound and a fair shock to the system, wherever it hits. It can go through a brick wall. From a functional point of view there was no need to tamper with rounds.64
2G-66 In fact, there would have been a functional reason not to use a dum dum. It would be less accurate, its tip having been gouged with a knife.
63 Dav 246/36/16 64 BSI statement, B1565.037, paragraph 73 PRIVATE INQ 0635, DUM DUM BULLETS AND THE EARLY FABRICATION OF AMMUNITION RETURNS.
Use of dum dum bullets on Bloody Sunday
2G-67 027 alleged that INQ 0635 fired a large number of dum dum bullets into the crowd on Bloody Sunday and that several colleagues acted in a similar way. 027 wrote in his 1975 memoire:
When we finally got back into the "pig", everyone, including myself, was laughing and joking on an intense wave of excitement as we worked out how many rounds we had fired. Several of the blokes had fired their own personal supply of dum dums. INQ 635 for one fired 10 dum dums into the crowd but as he still had his official quota he got away with saying he never fired a shot in the subsequent investigations. This happened with several people in my vehicle.65
2G-68 027 has effectively withdrawn these claims in evidence to this Inquiry. He acknowledged in his Eversheds statement that:
I could not have known that at the time. I do not know what that part of the statement was based on, to what degree it was anecdotal, or what was in my head at the time that I wrote it.66
2G-69 When Mr Clarke QC asked him whether this was an invented account, 027 could only say: "I have no reason to doubt it or to believe it, I just have no memory of it now."67 The questioning continued:
Q. How could you have learned that INQ635 had fired 10 bullets into the crowd and that they were dum dum bullets?
A. That is a valid point, I could not have known that, so I accept your comment.
65 B1565.008 66 B1565.057, paragraph 177.15 67 Day 247/7/5 Q. You could not have known it from your own eyes, the only other method in which you could have known it in one sense, is if somebody told you, which could have been either INQ635 or somebody else or simply regimental or battalion talk. Are you able to tell us now which, if any, of those it might have been?
A. No, I have no recollection relating to this particular comment.68
2G-70 This is one of two serious allegations levelled against INQ 0635 by 027 in 197569. 027 is unable to substantiate either allegation now. Both are denied by INQ 0635 and we submit are evidence only of 027’s antipathy towards INQ 0635 in 1975.
Fabrication of ammunition returns
2G-71 In his Eversheds statement, 027 developed the suggestion that members of his platoon fabricated ammunition returns. His evidence on this point is marred by self-contradiction.
2G-72 He told Eversheds that he and his colleagues returned to their vehicle:
The mood in the back of the pig was not so much euphoria as a release of tension. There was almost a silence...70
2G-73 That contrasts with his 1975 description of “laughing and joking on an intense wave of excitement” in the pig.
2G-74 The Eversheds statement continues with 027’s explanation that, before the ammunition check, they recognised “there was a problem that had to be explained away”:
68 Day 247/7/8 69 See above for the allegation that INQ 0635 opened fire from the Kells Walk wall. 70 B.1565.047, paragraph 27 ...there was therefore some sorting going on. It gave us a period to discuss alibis and ammunition. The topic of conversation was who had fired what, what number of rounds we thought would be acceptable and justifiable, and how to account for the rounds that were fired.\\textsuperscript{71}
2G-75 That is in direct contradiction with the account 027 gave in his draft book, where he suggested the men became concerned about the number of rounds fired only when they were making their returns to their sergeant – and then only in relation to a single soldier. There is no allegation in the book that returns were fabricated:
\\textit{As things settled our Platoon Sergeant called for an ammunition check, which was part of our normal procedure. The tally was noted as each man stated in turn how many rounds he had expended, it became apparent that one soldier had fired twenty two...From that moment it was obvious that that particular tally was going to cause us problems to explain.}\\textsuperscript{72}
2G-76 This may explain why, when he gave oral evidence, 027 could not "precisely" remember why there was any need to discuss what number of rounds fired would be justifiable\\textsuperscript{73}. He had no recollection of any talk in the pig of why or how colleagues had fired their weapons\\textsuperscript{74}. Most importantly, leaving aside the question of H, he had no "detailed" recollection of anybody getting away with saying that they had never fired a shot when in fact they had.\\textsuperscript{75}
2G-77 027's self-contradictory and uncorroborated evidence about the fabrication of ammunition returns should therefore now be disregarded.
\\textsuperscript{71} B.1565.047, paragraph 128 \\textsuperscript{72} B1565.313 \\textsuperscript{73} Day 247/4/24 \\textsuperscript{74} Day 248/44/7 \\textsuperscript{75} Day 247/8/5 2G-IV OTHER MATTERS RELEVANT TO CREDIT
2G-78 In this section we deal with other matters we suggest are relevant to the issue of 027's credibility although they do not specifically relate to our clients.
WIDGERY INQUIRY: FABRICATION OF STATEMENT
2G-79 Two statements were produced in 027's name in 1972. He gave the first in February to the Royal Military Police. The second was made in March for the Widgery Inquiry. He claimed that both contained largely fabricated accounts. Although he was responsible for the lies in the first, he had decided to tell the truth by the time of the second. He described in his 1975 memoire what happened when he tried to do so:
I rattled off everything I had seen and done. The only thing I omitted were names and the manner in which people had been shot apart from that I told the truth, which I wanted to convey. Then to my utter surprise one of these doddering old gentlemen said "dear me Private 027, you make it sound as though shots were being fired at the crowd, we can't have that can we?" And then proceeded to tear up my statement. He left the room and returned ten minutes later with another statement which bore no relation in fact and [I] was told with a smile that this is the statement I would use when going on the stand.
"What a situation! The Lord Chief Justice of Great Britain, the symbol of all moral standings and justice having his minions suppress and twist evidence, with or without his knowledge who can tell?"
2G-80 There are several problems with this account.
76 B1565.011 027's wish to convey the truth to the Widgery Inquiry
2G-81 There are serious inconsistencies in 027's evidence on this score. His first action on arriving at Coleraine, apparently intent on telling the truth, was to lie:
...we spent some time pouring over photographs along with the SIB trying to establish which shots had been fired by whom and from where – what a farce, we were all grinning at each other and drawing lines haphazardly all over the place with the result that the authorities finished up with a series of sophisticated looking spiders webs, which bore no relation to fact.77
2G-82 He was never intent on telling the whole truth. What new information did he try to give to the Widgery lawyers? None, according to his evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, where he referred to having given a "watered down"78 account:
"It was an attempt to justify the soldiers' actions as far as they were known, without being specific about connecting particular individuals with incidents."79
2G-83 He told Christopher Clarke QC in oral evidence:
I wished to avoid doing anything which would reflect badly on the Army.80
2G-84 027 could therefore have said nothing to the Widgery lawyers that required suppression.81
77 1975 memoire, B1565.010-011 78 BSI statement, B1565.053, paragraph 164 79 B1565.053, paragraph 163 80 Day 247/28/19 81 027 conceded this in response to a question from Hugo Keith (Day 249/159/20) The “Supplementary Statement” of 8th March 1972.
2G-85 The statement at B1565.114 is the key to understanding what actually took place at Coleraine. It provides the missing link between 027’s RMP and “SA” statements. 027 had forgotten about its existence, remaining unaware of it even when he spoke to Eversheds.
2G-86 027 went to Coleraine only once, on 8th March 1972. We now know that he gave two statements to Widgery Inquiry lawyers on that day, both of which survive. Far from withdrawing his evidence to the RMP, the signed “Supplementary Statement” clarified and augmented it. He was then asked to sign a composite “SA” statement that simply brought together the RMP and supplementary statements. 027 did so with no complaint. There had been no impropriety on the part of the Widgery lawyers.
2G-87 027 had taken an innocent event, the production of the composite statement and, by a process of exaggeration and deceit, turned it into an allegation of high-level malfeasance.
FANTASY AND 1975 MEMOIRE
2G-88 In our submission, many of the allegations levelled by 027 against our clients and others are the product of exaggeration or invention. An insight into the state of his mind when he made many of the more sensational allegations comes, surprisingly, from 027 himself. He spoke to Edwin Glasgow QC about the 1975 memoire:
I appreciate now that it is couched in language and terminology which seems perhaps -- perhaps it reflects a slightly unhinged mind at the time.
82 Day 247/30/25 83 Day 249/155/21 84 Day 248/101/11 He told Sir Allan Green QC:
*From my current standpoint, sir, I can see that it does not stand up as a rigorous piece of accurate reporting. It stands for what it is, it is an account of someone who had had experiences which had influenced his thinking and I cannot account for it from my present standpoint, sir.*
Nor did he deny the suggestion also put to him by Sir Allan that he was a "fantasy merchant":
*I believe, sir, I was living in an environment where there is — an element of fantasy was par for the course, it was in the nature of a large number of men in an unusual situation.*
**Dealings with Sean Patrick McShane**
The many inconsistencies in 027's evidence about his dealings with Sean Patrick McShane further undermine his credibility.
027 has repeatedly claimed that he wrote his 1975 memoir for purely personal reasons and that it was never meant for dissemination. Yet he forwarded that document to Mr. McShane.
He further claimed that there was never any agreement between the two of them that they would in any way collaborate in the production of a book. That denial seems hard to maintain in the face of a letter from 027 to Mr. McShane dated 24th November 1975 in which 027 wrote:
*...My documents and so forth, which I mentioned have been posted from England and should arrive within a week, I anticipate that you will be in receipt of a weighty parcel from me in approximately three weeks.*
______________________________________________________________________
85 Day 249/131/6 86 Day 249/153/2. 87 e.g. BSI statement B1565.055, paragraph 173 88 B1565.055, paragraph 173 89 Day 249/81/9 "I must say if you can extricate anything from what I write and set it down in legible form, for me it will be a half dormant ambition fulfilled. The more I write the more I seem to remember to write about.
"As far as 25% goes that is something, which I never anticipated, what can I say, but terrific, I shall do my best to earn it. In fact the whole affair could not have happened at a more expedient time, as I am in the process of losing my job. However, I shall keep you posted of any developments or change of address."
The Tribunal also has the evidence of Sean O Mahony and Tomas Mac Ruairi of the publishing company FDR Teoranta. They were approached by Mr. McShane in late 1975 or early 1976 with a view to publishing a book on Bloody Sunday:
The author was to be the soldier ghosted by McShane...as far as I am concerned the narrative document [027's 1975 memoire] was to be the basis for the book.
027 claimed in oral evidence that money had not been the motivation for his dealings with McShane. Such a statement was at odds with his account to Channel 4, where he revealed that he had considered the financial element of their agreement to be a matter of some importance. He spoke to Lena Ferguson about Mr. McShane:
He disappeared completely. I was unable to get in touch with him, had no further contact and I was irritated for a while because it was a collaborative thing and there was money involved... DESTRUCTION OF DIARY
2G-96 In 1997, 027 destroyed the field notebook that contained his contemporaneous or near contemporaneous record of the events of Bloody Sunday. The notebook would arguably have provided 027’s most compelling account of Bloody Sunday because of its proximity in time to the events recorded in it. 027’s reasons for destroying it are not convincing.
2G-97 He told Eversheds that he did so out of alarm over where the press and media interest in his story was going. Yet he was the one who first sought contact with the media, who agreed to be interviewed by Radio Ulster and who gave a televised interview to Channel 4.
2G-98 He told the Tribunal in reply to questions from Edwin Glasgow QC:
I realised, sir, that it was a contentious document which was potentially -- ramifications might spring from it, and I was in an agitated, concerned state of mind; and I did not wish the thing to go out of my hands, so I destroyed it.
2G-99 It is difficult to reconcile the explanation that he did not want the notebook to get out of his hands with his claim that he had already disclosed much of its contents on television during his interview with Channel 4.
2G-100 He told Lord Saville:
The destroying the notebook was just in a state of apprehension and anxiety, just a generalised feeling. It was
______________________________________________________________________
96 B1565.059, paragraph 186 97 See his letter to the Newsletter B1565.088 98 On Talkback B1565.089 99 Day 249/63/16 an impulsive moment which I actually regret at this point...\\textsuperscript{100}
2G-101 It defies logic, when in a state of generalised apprehension, to destroy the one document that would corroborate one's version of events.
2G-102 We suggest that the real reason for the destruction of the notebook was that it contained material that was significantly inconsistent with his 1975 memoire and with subsequent accounts.
2G-103 027 claimed that it was a coincidence that his other diary from the period was also no longer in his possession. His explanation of how that came to be lost was even less credible than the reasons given for the destruction of the notebook:
\\begin{quote} I did have a second diary which was other events which was part of the tackle that was stolen in Paris, on the metro by a bunch of transvestites.\\textsuperscript{101} \\end{quote}
2G-V 027'S DEALINGS WITH THE INQUIRY.
2G-104 On 14\\textsuperscript{th} August 2000 Mr. Tate, the Solicitor to the Inquiry, published a Memorandum concerning 027 and his dealings with the Inquiry.
2G-105 On 11\\textsuperscript{th} September 2000 Mr. Anthony Lawton wrote to the Inquiry requesting disclosure of documents relating to the dealings of 027 with the Inquiry and the Northern Ireland Office. Despite repeated requests over a period of two years, the Inquiry failed to disclose any of the documents sought at that time. On 22\\textsuperscript{nd} June 2002 the Tribunal dismissed an application for disclosure on behalf of the clients of Mr. Anthony Lawton
\\textsuperscript{100} Day 249/100:18 \\textsuperscript{101} Interview with Lena Ferguson, B1565.255 made on the ground that the documents were relevant to 027's pending application for screening.\\textsuperscript{102}
2G-106 The documents were, however, eventually disclosed by the Inquiry to interested parties on 12\\textsuperscript{th} September 2002, shortly before 027 gave his oral evidence. As the following paragraphs show, they provide a wealth of relevant information as to 027's conduct and the course of dealings by which he extracted from the Northern Ireland Office, acting on behalf of the Inquiry, the benefits he demanded.
2G-107 The documents demonstrate 027's intent to extract the maximum pecuniary advantage from the authorities concerned. He demanded payments for his evidence which were far in excess of those which would have been justified as necessary for his protection, on any view as to the threat to which he claimed to be exposed. His attempted explanation of his conduct, made in the course of his oral evidence;
\\begin{quote} All of these -- the financial aspects which we are talking about are in fact irrelevant. They were a means to an end to achieve a situation in which I was able to come to this Inquiry to give my evidence.\\textsuperscript{103} \\end{quote}
is impossible to reconcile with the documentary evidence.
2G-108 027 approached negotiations with the Northern Ireland Office and the Metropolitan Police in the hope of obtaining a large cash payment to spend as he pleased in return for his evidence.
(1) A memorandum of 24\\textsuperscript{th} November 1999 relating to the initial contact between the Metropolitan Police and 027 records:
\\begin{quote} The subject was very nervous throughout. He clearly had no idea what he actually wanted or what we could do. He \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{102} Day 224/147 et seq \\textsuperscript{103} Day 249/11/9 was asked directly what we could do for him to satisfy his fears for his safety. He then danced and prevaricated around what he wanted without actually stating what this was.
....
It became apparent that he was very embarrassed about asking for financial assistance as he had clearly assumed he could ask for a large sum of money from the NIO, which he would be left to spend as he wished.
....
We then explained our procedures. He seemed surprised that he wasn't going to get any cash but eventually accepted this was the case.104
(2) A Northern Ireland Office memorandum dated 25th January 2000 records 027's dissatisfaction with the Metropolitan Police's proposal:
...the Met were not living up to the agreement which Bindman had reached with the NIO. [027] was alleging that after our meeting with Bindman, Bindman told him that he could have whatever he wanted. He was not satisfied with what was being offered, so he was going to put the pressure on by speaking to Bindman himself.
...
[027] was obviously playing hard ball.105
(3) A Northern Ireland Office memorandum dated 26th January 2000 records a conversation with the Metropolitan Police;
[Metropolitan Police Officer] said that things were going well and that everything was agreed except [027] wanted a big bundle of money up front. [----] made it clear that the Met were standing firm against this; it would torpedo his credibility as a witness and was not how they went about things.
...
He said that the elements of the package were all in place but [027] was insisting on having a lump sum up front and a house bought for him. The Met were resisting and that would be their advice to us.\\textsuperscript{106}
According to a Detective Inspector in the Metropolitan Police, 027 sought to increase the sums to be paid for the acquisition of a car without any attempt to justify the increase on grounds of security.
\\textit{It was agreed with the [ ] that a ceiling of [ ] would be put on the purchase of a motor vehicle. That [027] should identify a motor vehicle over the next three weeks to be ready on our return when we would be in a position to make a purchase. [027] agreed to do this.}
On the journey home as if premeditated but out of context [027] announced that it was now obvious that in order to get the vehicle [ ] required [ ] would need substantially more than the [ ] we were offering. I was a little surprised and reiterated that to [027] that the figure originally set would not be changed.\\textsuperscript{107}
In his oral evidence 027 denied having made that request.\\textsuperscript{108} However, it is submitted that the Detective Inspector’s account is likely to be accurate in view of his recall of the precise circumstances of the request and his reaction.
027’s demands considerably exceeded the sums which the Metropolitan Police and the Northern Ireland Office regarded as justifiable given the level of threat which they had identified.
\\textsuperscript{106} B1565.178-9 \\textsuperscript{107} B1565.173 \\textsuperscript{108} Day 249/7/7 (1) 027 demanded a lump sum payment to enable him to buy a house outright.
(a) The Metropolitan Police memorandum of their meeting with 027 on 20th January 2000 records the following:
The subject kept repeating his desire to have a lump sum with which to purchase a house. There is no doubt that he has already planned to purchase his own property. He stated that [ ] had seen a property valued at [ ] which was suitable to [ ] needs. Even this we found to be excessive having seen that day brand new houses for [ ]. When we reiterated again that we would only rent, he intimated that we could give him 'Rental money' which he could then use to pay a mortgage. We explained that we would require to see a rental agreement for a suitable property and that the payments would be monthly. He said at this stage "Well perhaps I should give them one page of my statement each month".
In his oral evidence 027 stated that this had not been a serious suggestion. However, the fact remains that the Inquiry did not secure 027's statement until after it had been forced to accept 027's terms.
(b) On 21st January 2000 the Detective Chief Inspector's note records
At about 7.45 pm, we received a call from the subject who stated that he had spoken to his solicitor that day and had been advised not to discuss the matter any further until certain conditions were met. He therefore was calling to cancel the meeting. He then stated that the offer was not sufficient, quoting £4,200 for accommodation just did not do it.
In his oral evidence 027 stated that he did not recall that specifically.
______________________________________________________________________
109 B1565.166 110 Day 249/6/15 111 B1565.174 I just make the point again that this was a negotiation. 112
(c) A Northern Ireland Office memorandum dated 25th January 2000, at which date 027 was not satisfied with what was being offered, records:
[Met Police Officer] said that the stumbling block had been the lump sum. The Met were refusing to get in the business of buying him a property, not least because he had never owned one in the UK. [----] thought that this was probably brinkmanship. [027] is trying to get as much as possible out of the deal – which is no more than to be expected. 113
(d) A Northern Ireland Office memorandum dated 26th January 2000114 records 027’s position that he had not been offered enough money up front for accommodation. He was offered £4,000 and he wanted £20,000. In the event, of course, he got the £20,000 he demanded.
(e) A letter from the Northern Ireland Office to the Inquiry dated 29th February 2000, records that 027 regarded the package offered by the Metropolitan Police and the Northern Ireland Office as totally unacceptable.
He had no resources and needed a lump sum payment up-front to help him buy a house. 115
(f) A Northern Ireland Office e-mail of 7th March 2000 states:
"He wants £20k up front to put down a deposit on a house. He has seen one he wants to buy for £40k. In effect the £20k isn’t negotiable.
112 Day 249/7/24 113 B1565.176 114 B1565.180 115 B1565.201 Nothing other than an up front payment and extended payments will be acceptable to him.
[027] was asking for £20k up front as a deposit but we had it on good authority for our experts that he could buy a new two bedroom house or flat for £25-30k.\\textsuperscript{116}
In his oral evidence 027 stated that he had not specified the figure of £20,000.
That was not a figure which emanated from me. Naturally my solicitor was representing me in attempting to achieve the aims which I was after, which ultimately were the security of my family.\\textsuperscript{117}
(2) 027 demanded that the monthly payment in lieu of earnings be for more than 1 year.
(a) The Metropolitan Police considered that 027's demands for payments in lieu of earnings were unjustified. In particular they considered that his demands conflicted with paragraph 10, Witness Protection Principles which states;
"The time period of one year is deemed by experience to be a sufficient respite to allow a [----] to seek suitable employment and to integrate [----] into the local society."\\textsuperscript{118}
Initially 027 wanted to be paid for 5 years.\\textsuperscript{119}
(b) A Northern Ireland Office memorandum dated 26\\textsuperscript{th} January 2000 records 027's demand that he be paid for much
\\textsuperscript{116} B1565.206, See also B1565.207 \\textsuperscript{117} Day 249/10/8 \\textsuperscript{118} Witness Protection Principles, paragraph 10, B1565.187 \\textsuperscript{119} B1565.191, See also B1565.201 longer than a year because the Inquiry would go on for much longer than that.\\textsuperscript{120}
(c) A Northern Ireland Office e-mail of 7\\textsuperscript{th} March 2000 states;
\\textit{He wants the terms of the monthly payments extended to cover the life of the Inquiry 'and a bit after that'.}
\\textit{Nothing other than an up front payment and extended payments will be acceptable to him.}\\textsuperscript{121}
(3) 027 demanded £100 per month to pay for life insurance when the Metropolitan Police regarded such a payment as unjustified.
(a) At a meeting with representatives of the Northern Ireland Office on 17\\textsuperscript{th} November 1999 027's demand for life insurance was rejected as without precedent and unnecessary.\\textsuperscript{122}
(b) At a meeting with representatives of the Metropolitan Police in November 1999 027 was insistent that he be provided with life insurance. He was told that this was not normal. The whole idea was to keep him alive.\\textsuperscript{123}
(c) A Northern Ireland Office memorandum dated 26\\textsuperscript{th} January 2000 records a further demand for life insurance.\\textsuperscript{124} The payments which the Tribunal agreed to make to 027 were in excess of those necessary to protect him. Furthermore, they infringed paragraph 5 of the Witness Protection Principles (the "like for like" principle);
The witness should not suffer as a result of being in the witness protection programme. Every effort is made to replicate the living conditions previously enjoyed without any financial burden to the witness. ("like for like") The converse is that the witness's situation should not be physically or financially enhanced. 125
This is apparent from a comparison of 027's financial position at the time of the Agreement and the sums paid to 027.
(1) 027's financial position at the time of the Agreement:
(a) In receipt of income support between August 1997 and October 1998 at a rate of approx £180 per month. 126
(b) Living in council accommodation.
(c) 027 reported to the Northern Ireland Office that he had only £400 in his bank account. 127
(d) In November 1999 Mr. Bindman stated he did not think that 027 had anything to put to his name. He was "scraping along trying to earn some money by writing". 128
(2) Sums paid by Northern Ireland Office to 027 up to his giving evidence:
(a) In lieu of earnings 28 x £1,400 = £39,200.
125 B1565.185-6 126 B1565.132-3 127 B1565.148 128 B1565.130 (b) Life insurance 28 x £100 = £2,800.
(c) 'Loan' for property £20,000 (not repayable if he gives evidence).
(d) Payment for car £6,000.
(e) Total: £68,000 (tax free).
(3) Further sums due following his evidence: £4,500.
(4) In addition he has been resettled abroad, with a new identity, at public expense.
2G-114 027 has made a clear capital gain: a house in return of his evidence.
2G-115 027 has received monthly payments "in lieu of earnings" which are far in excess of what he was "earning" or would have "earned".(^{129}) Between 22(^{nd}) August 1997 and 29(^{th}) January 1998 and 18(^{th}) April 1998 and 9(^{th}) October 1998 027 was in receipt of benefit (approximately £180 / month). This should be contrasted with the sum of £1,400 per month he received pursuant to Clause 3(a) of the Agreement.
2G-116 Furthermore, 027 had received £100 per month in respect of life insurance where:
(a) The purpose of all other payments was to keep him alive.
(b) The Northern Ireland Office indicated that they would not require to see a policy.
(^{129}) See benefit schedules B1565.132-3 The agencies recognised that the payments to 027 were excessive.
Early in the negotiations the Northern Ireland Office doubted that a security package could be justified in 027's case. The Northern Ireland Office agreed to continue to press 027 to give proper grounds for his concerns about the threat to him.
It was important from HMG's perspective that we were seen to press as hard as possible on this. In the final analysis it may be impossible to devise a threat assessment which, in itself, would justify giving a security package to the individual concerned; there may have to be an element of political judgement in this as well.(^{130})
In January 2000 when 027 contended that the proposals of the Northern Ireland Office and the Metropolitan Police were insufficient he was firmly told by the Metropolitan Police
\[\\ldots\\text{that [---] would only be entitled to council accommodation and that the salary which was tax free was very generous. I went on to say that the Like for Like principle had not been adhered to as he did not have property [-----] nor employment. He stated that this was a subjective opinion. I reminded him that the impression we were given all along was that [----] only had £400 in a bank account [---] and no other financial means. Was he now saying that that was false. He immediately said that his situation [----] was brought about by his involvement with the enquiry.}(sic)(^{131})
It should be noted that this passage refers to the proposal originally made by the Northern Ireland Office and the Metropolitan Police. The Tribunal ultimately agreed to 027's demand, departing yet further from the "like for like" principle.
(^{130}) B1565.136-7 (^{131}) B1565.174 A Metropolitan Police memorandum dated 26th January 2000 concerning a meeting with the Northern Ireland Office records
We made it clear to [---] that the package was more than generous. We also recommended that we stand firm and do not give in to any demands made by the subject or his solicitor on his behalf.(^{132})
The Tribunal sought an explicit assurance that the package proposed by the Metropolitan Police and the Northern Ireland Office fully complied with principle 3 of the Witness Protection Principles (i.e. that it did not amount to an inducement).(^{133}) The Northern Ireland Office was able to give such an assurance in relation to the package which it and the Metropolitan Police had proposed but was not able to give such an assurance in relation to that demanded by 027. Nevertheless, the Inquiry ultimately agreed to the package demanded by 027.
A letter from the Northern Ireland Office to the Inquiry dated 29th February 2000 makes clear that the Northern Ireland Office and the Metropolitan Police regarded 027's demands (which the Inquiry ultimately met in full) as excessive and unacceptable.
We have discussed the latest position with the Met. Their advice, reflected in the comments below, is that we should not accept [027's] demands. We agree with that position...
On the first point, the lump sum payment up-front to buy a house, we believe there is a real risk that this could be perceived as HMG 'buying' his evidence. He would be making a clear capital gain – a house in exchange for his evidence. ...
I am sure that the Inquiry will want to give its own consideration to this issue. When we outlined the package to you earlier this month, you asked for a written assurance that it did not involve the acquisition of evidence through
(^{132}) B1565.183
(^{133}) B1565.188 coercion by financial gain or promise of gain. We were confident of giving that assurance, on the basis of the Met's proposals. Were we to accept [027's] demand for a lump sum, however, we no longer believe that such an assurance could be given.
[027] also wants the one-year term of the package extended. Again, we believe it will be difficult to do this because it would go against the purpose for which the package of measures is provided; it is intended simply to allow [027] to establish himself during a short, transitional period. The Met are quite clear that it is not their practice to get into the business of underwriting individual's long term financial security; that is something for the individual's themselves. We would not feel comfortable departing from their advice.
[027's] reaction to the Met's proposals leaves us in a difficult situation. We are fully prepared to underwrite a package of security measures for him but this must be done in a way which not only meets the requirements of his safety but also takes proper account of the legal principles in Section 78 of PACE as well as the NIO's responsibility to justify the necessary expenditure. I fear that [027's] demands do not meet these tests.134
2G-124 027 and those representing his interests were very conscious of the importance of his evidence to the Inquiry.
2G-125 On 26th August 1999 Mr. Bindman, 027's solicitor, met representatives of the Home Office. He took with him Jane Winter of British Irish Rights Watch. A Home Office letter of 13th September 1999 records that Jane Winter said that her organisation took the view that the Inquiry would be pointless if 027 did not give evidence because his evidence was unique as far as they were aware.135
134 B1565.202-3, emphasis added. 135 B1565.134 A letter from Mr. Bindman to the Northern Ireland Office dated 3 May 2000 states
...he is an important witness without whose evidence the Inquiry cannot but be prejudiced.\\textsuperscript{136}
Against this background, and that of 027's many attempts to tell his story, his statement in oral evidence that;
\\textit{My significance in this to the Inquiry I could not estimate, and I was reacting to what others were telling me.}\\textsuperscript{137}
is less than convincing.
027 repeatedly threatened to refuse to give evidence to the Inquiry unless his demands were met in full.
Mr. Ridd, who was then the solicitor to the Inquiry, recorded of the meeting of 1\\textsuperscript{st} June 1998,
...it seemed well nigh certain that showing any shortage of sympathy would have resulted in an instant close down of cooperation followed by disappearance.\\textsuperscript{138}
Mr. Ridd's memorandum of the meeting on 1\\textsuperscript{st} June 1998 states:
\\textit{Soldier 027 said that he did not understand the mechanics of the system, but that it was up to the Inquiry to present an acceptable solution to him. He made it clear that he would cooperate only on agreed terms and that he would walk away if the Inquiry could not accommodate him and that the Inquiry would get nowhere without his cooperation.}\\textsuperscript{139}
In his oral evidence 027 attempted to justify his attitude towards the Inquiry in the following way;
\\textsuperscript{136} B1565.211 \\textsuperscript{137} Day 249/17/7 \\textsuperscript{138} B1565.117 \\textsuperscript{139} B1565.118 It is not a threat, sir. I was being realistic about the situation I found myself in. I was on my own. The Inquiry was sitting in Derry and, naturally, I could not have, as an individual, gone to Derry and made my own arrangements to give my evidence.\\textsuperscript{140}
2G-132 It is submitted that the suggestion that 027 was compelled to drive such a hard bargain with the Northern Ireland Office, in order to enable him to give evidence to the Inquiry is transparently false.
2G-133 At a meeting at the Home Office on 26\\textsuperscript{th} August 1999 Mr. Bindman stated that 027 was "fed up at the length of time it is taking to resolve the matter of his personal safety and if the matter is not concluded to his satisfaction in the next 6-8 weeks he is likely to change his mind about giving evidence and go into permanent hiding".\\textsuperscript{141}
2G-134 A Northern Ireland Office memorandum of 26\\textsuperscript{th} November 1999 refers to a meeting between the Northern Ireland Office and the Metropolitan Police on 24\\textsuperscript{th} November 1999. The Metropolitan Police reported of their meeting with 027 on the previous evening:
...he appeared to think that he would be able to leave with a briefcase of money. He had said that unless the security measures had been put in place, he would not allow his solicitor to release a lengthy statement which he said he had made.\\textsuperscript{142}
2G-135 The Metropolitan Police's memorandum of their meeting with 027 on 20\\textsuperscript{th} January 2000 (quoted at paragraph 2G-111 above, but repeated here for convenience) records the following:
\\textsuperscript{140} Day 149/14/5 \\textsuperscript{141} B1565.135 \\textsuperscript{142} B1565.154 The subject kept repeating his desire to have a lump sum in which to purchase a house. There is no doubt that he has already planned to purchase his own property. He stated that [ ] had seen a property valued at [ ] which was suitable to [ ] needs. Even this we found to be excessive having see that day brand new houses for [ ]. When we reiterated again that we would only rent, he intimated that we could give him 'Rental money' which he could then use to pay a mortgage. We explained that we would require to see a rental agreement for a suitable property and that the payments would be monthly. He said at this stage "Well perhaps I should give them one page of my statement each month".143
2G-136 A letter from the Northern Ireland Office to the Inquiry dated 29th February 2000 records that 027 has rejected the proposal. He was demanding a five year package and a lump sum of £20,000.
Bindman made it clear that if we did not improve the package to meet his client's requirements then his evidence would be lost to the Inquiry.144
2G-137 In his oral evidence 027 confirmed that he believed that the threat to walk away from the Inquiry was made with his authority and on his instructions.145
2G-138 A Northern Ireland Office e-mail of 7th March 2000 records a meeting with Mr. Bindman.
Soldier A is angry and fed up it is taking so long to sort out his 'reasonable' demands.
... If his two demands are not met by Friday he will walk away from the Inquiry.146
143 B1565.166 144 B1565.201 145 Day 249/12/11 146 B1565.206 and see also B1565.207 In a letter from Mr. Bindman to the Northern Ireland Office dated 4th May 2000, Mr. Bindman states:
Further delay which might be caused by the need for reconsideration by the Secretary of State could well result in his evidence not being available to the Inquiry.(^{147})
027 did, in fact, go to earth. During the period between August 1998 and September 1999 he deliberately placed himself beyond the reach of the Inquiry. Despite the most strenuous efforts, the Inquiry failed to trace 027. Mr. Tate, the Solicitor to the Inquiry, stated in his Memorandum of August 2000:
The Inquiry therefore made extensive efforts over a period of many months during 1999 to locate Private 027. The services of an experienced tracing agent were employed, summonses were served on a number of utility companies and other organisations for the production of records that might have shown where he was to be found. After exhaustive researches it proved impossible to discover his current address.(^{148})
In his oral evidence to the Inquiry, 027 said that he had not known anything about this.
I was always contactable through my solicitor throughout this period, so I do not understand that.(^{149})
In his new book 027 states:
The Inquiry had inexplicably failed to take up the offer of looking at my evidence by January 1999, that is after it had been available to them for six months. Neither Jane Winter nor my solicitor could understand why this should be the case; in fact they were mystified. As a result I decided the only way forward was to do something myself, so I decided to write this book instead.
(^{147}) B1565.212\
(^{148}) B1565.098\
(^{149}) Dav 249/18/14 The Tribunal is perhaps uniquely placed to judge the truth of these assertions.
027 was anxious to prevent details of the payments he was to receive being made public. At the meeting between Mr. Bindman and Ms. Winter and representatives of the Northern Ireland Office on 17th November 1999, Ms Winter told the Northern Ireland Office that 027 "was particularly concerned that the details of any package should not be made known to MoD". It is submitted that this was intended to be a reference to the lawyers representing the clients of Mr. Anthony Lawton.
THE THREAT TO WHICH 027 CLAIMED HE WAS EXPOSED.
In a letter of 21st January 2000 to a Metropolitan Police Chief Inspector, one of his colleagues, whose name has been redacted, reported that he and another senior police officer had met with Soldier 027 "with the purpose of establishing his background and exploring the threat". Minute 16C attached to the letter recorded what Soldier 027 had told the officers about his involvement with the Inquiry, including about alleged potential or actual threats to his physical safety or that of his acquaintances. Soldier 027 referred to three specific alleged incidents.
FIRST INCIDENT
The first incident was said to have taken place in March 1997.
He states that on the day of the [Channel 4] broadcast he stayed in London. When he returned back to [redacted] where he had only been for about three weeks a neighbour allegedly approached him and explained the following:
______________________________________________________________________
150 B1565.144 151 See the reference to "MoD barrister Edwin Glasgow" at B1565.166 152 B1565.167 They had observed three men in a van outside his property for about two days.
He states that he immediately left his possessions in the accommodation and returned back to [redacted].
The officers receiving the information commented about it:
...The subject stated that neither he nor the neighbour reported the matter to the police.
The subject was asked for information that might enable us to further investigate this incident.
He was unable to remember the address where he was staying or the property management agency from which he rented it. Despite the fact this was only three years ago.
He states he did not give his address to the [redacted]. How did these men find him?
There is no other information, nor is there any further enquiries that can be taken to corroborated this incident.
There is therefore no credible information to substantiate this incident.
SECOND INCIDENT
Soldier 027 reported to the officers that a further incident had taken place in November/December 1997. He subsequently accepted this incident could be innocently explained.
THIRD INCIDENT
The officers were told of an incident, said to have taken place in January 1998:
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153 B1565.170 154 B1565.170, original emphasis. 155 B1565.170 - B1565.171 The subject stated that his friend from [redacted] whom he had previously stayed with was attacked and assaulted.
The subject stated that his friend was attacked by two men and beaten up because of the Bloody Sunday enquiry.
When asked why he thought this he stated initially that the friend "looked like me".
When pressed as to why this meant they were connected to the enquiry he then said that one of the men said "Keep your mouth shut".
The subject refused to give any details of the male.
He did say the male went to hospital for treatment by could not name the hospital.
When asked how the connection was made or the address known the subject was not able to answer. Later he stated that he had applied for housing benefit from the house and that he could have been traced from that.(^{156})
2G-150 Soldier 027 had apparently given a more lurid version of events to Jane Winter of British Irish Rights Watch. Her attendance note of a conversation with him on 14(^{th}) January 1998 suggested that his friend had been dragged out of his car, beaten up, thrown through the front door, and then dragged back outside. He added:
They offered him a block of concrete and said, "That's your one chance. Give it your best shot, because afterwards we're going to kill you." They mentioned Bloody Sunday, blood money, the SAS, that friends of theirs had been killed, and people who dealt with the media...(^{157})
2G-151 Soldier 027 had on another occasion taken matters a stage further by suggesting that he had also been beaten up during this incident and that the assailants were "former colleagues". This was the information provided to a representative of the Home Office Organised and
(^{156}) B1565.171
(^{157}) B1565.114.1 International Crime Directorate during a meeting on 26th August 1999 with Miss Winter and Geoffrey Bindman, Soldier O27's solicitor. Mr Bindman had previously accepted on his client's behalf that "The assault was not reported to the police."
In relation to this third incident, the officers commented:
There is no other information, nor is there any further enquiries that can be undertaken to corroborate this incident.
There is therefore no credible information/evidence to substantiate this incident.
In our submission, these accounts are totally incredible.
2G-VII SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
It is now beyond doubt that O27 is the author of the 1975 memoire at B1554-1565.013, which includes an account of Bloody Sunday. We suggest the Interview with O27 dtd 9 November 1975 at B1565.015 - 1565.025 is a transcript of answers given by O27 in a taped interview with Sean Patrick McShane.
O27's 1975 account contains many sensational claims that were picked up by journalist Tom McGurk in 1997, were further considered in the Irish Government Report and which constituted one of the important pieces of "new material" that led the Prime Minister to announce the establishment of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. We have submitted that the
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158 B1565.134; Letter from The Central Unit to W J Tate, dated 13th September 1999. 159 B1565.128; Letter from Geoffrey Bindman to Philip Ridd, dated 10th August 1998. Soldier O27 denied having given such information to his solicitor at Day 249/21/10 160 B1565.171, original emphasis. 161 B1565.072 162 U218 symbolic importance this account has assumed is out of all proportion to its actual merit.
2G-156 027 has made many allegations, some of the most serious nature, against our clients. He has been unable to substantiate any of them.
2G-157 He alleged first in 1975 that Lieutenant 119 incited his men the night before Bloody Sunday to get some kills. Recent attempts by 027 to place the allegation “in context” have effectively amounted to its withdrawal. His explanation now is that any talk of “getting kills” was made during an informal discussion and must be seen in the context of an expectation that the Paras would be engaged by gunmen in Londonderry. As he said to Christopher Clarke QC:
Specifically it means if a gunman engages you, you shoot the gunman.
027 is now unable even to maintain that the remarks were first made by his lieutenant Lt. 119, is therefore exonerated of any suggestion of impropriety.
2G-158 The suggestion that Lance Corporal F fired immediately upon reaching Kells Walk wall and at no discernible target has similarly not been maintained with any credibility. Photographs taken on the day prove that none of the leading group of Anti Tank Platoon soldiers, in whose number were both F and 027, stopped and fired immediately from the wall in the way 027 had described. EP23/8 – 9 show that instead they ran past it and had to double back before taking up positions. In any event, 027 now accepts he would not necessarily have seen F’s target. He has recently
163 B1565.003 164 Day 246/25/5 165 B1565.035, paragraph 58 166 A claim made both in the 1975 memoire and his BSI statement (B1565.005; B1565.039, paragraph 83) admitted that he never actually directed his attention specifically to what F was firing at.\\textsuperscript{167}
2G-159 027 has made two grave allegations against Private INQ 0635. We have suggested that both claims are groundless and are evidence only of his antipathy towards our client in 1975. The 1975 memoire included an allegation that INQ 0635 fired from the Kells Walk wall.\\textsuperscript{168} It follows from the fact 0635 made no such declaration in 1972 that the claim brings with it an allegation that 0635 suppressed relevant information in his ammunition return and in his dealings with the SIB. 027's recent evidence has been quite different. He told Eversheds that he could not now be sure he was correct in his claim "and it may be that [INQ 0635] did not fire at all."\\textsuperscript{169} 027 confessed in oral evidence that there was "a good deal of doubt" in his mind about this allegation.\\textsuperscript{170}
2G-160 027 maintains that he received a cease fire order from Major Loden whilst he and his colleagues were still at the Kells Wall. However, his 1975 account, that he received a radio message and passed it onto his colleagues, is in direct contradiction with the version in his RMP statement, which referred to a shouted order that was passed on to 027. The 1975 account is further undermined by a total lack of corroboration of any such order being made at this stage. On the other hand, Major Loden's evidence, of giving a shouted order after elements of Anti Tank Platoon had deployed into Glenfada Park North, can be verified by reference to the actuality footage of the day; he can be heard on video 3 at 05:54.
\\textsuperscript{167} Day 246/55/24 \\textsuperscript{168} B156.005 \\textsuperscript{169} B1565.040, paragraph 91 \\textsuperscript{170} Day 249/41/10. 027's second allegation concerning 0635, that he fired dum dum bullets on Bloody Sunday, is referred to below. 027's claim about the cease fire order, if true, would have included a claim that the order was contravened by the Glenfada Park deployment. His recent acceptance that there was a legitimate reason for that movement undermines any claim to the contrary. He now states that he and his colleagues moved quickly to intercept some members of the crowd who were dispersing into that area.\\textsuperscript{171}
027 gave a graphic description in 1975 of the way in which F and others opened fire in Glenfada Park North. His description of events in this area is amongst the most sensational of the claims contained in the 1975 memoire and yet his recent evidence is characterised by a complete inability to substantiate it - quite the reverse. Typical of his written accounts in recent years is this: "It is inappropriate after 26 years for me to claim with any degree of certainty that any individual behaved in the way described"\\textsuperscript{172} It transpired in oral evidence that 027, on his own admission, may not actually have seen any of the shooting in Glenfada Park North – and may not even have been in that location at this time.\\textsuperscript{173} If he was behaving as Soldier 119's radio operator should have acted, he should have been behind Soldier 119 and would have entered Glenfada Park North after all shooting had ended. This was 119's recollection.\\textsuperscript{174} The pathology and eyewitness evidence further gives the lie to 027's claim that those who were shot in Glenfada Park North had their hands in the air.\\textsuperscript{175}
The claim made in 1975 that Major Loden assaulted a civilian detainee on Bloody Sunday needs now to be seen in the light of 027's surprising
\\textsuperscript{171} Draft book of 1998/1999 at B1565.311, verified in oral evidence at Day 249/49/1 \\textsuperscript{172} B1565.373, paragraph 5 Statement to Geoffrey Bindman \\textsuperscript{173} Day 246/85/4 and Day 249/136/20 \\textsuperscript{174} See Chapter 9 \\textsuperscript{175} Day 249/125/3 admission in oral evidence that it may suffer from exaggeration. We have submitted that 027 took an incident that he probably had not seen himself, in which Major Loden quite properly became involved in an individual's arrest, and spun it into an allegation of misconduct by his company commander.
027 also made allegations against his commanding officer. Lieutenant Colonel Wilford and Sergeant Major 202 were said to have acknowledged, at an early stage after Bloody Sunday's main action, that there was a problem with Soldiers F and G. Colonel Wilford is alleged to have said that they should be sent off to the SAS. In our submission this is an inherently unlikely account, which had not been made in the 1975 memoire because it had not been invented by then.
The claim that dum dum bullets were passed around his pig prior to the deployment into the Bogside was made by 027 in his Eversheds statement. We have submitted this allegation is complete fabrication. 027 failed to mention it in his 1975 memoire, where he was otherwise prepared to detail the presence and use of dum dum rounds on Bloody Sunday. By the time he came to give oral evidence, he claimed to be able to remember only a single such round being circulated, he did not know why it was being passed round, he did not recall any conversation about it and he did not know to whom it belonged.
027's second allegation from 1975 involving INQ0635 was that he fired a large number of dum dum rounds into the crowd on Bloody Sunday and that several of his colleagues acted in a similar way. This claim has effectively been withdrawn. 027 volunteered to Eversheds that he could
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176 Day 249/55/22 177 BSI statement, B1565.046, paragraph 124 178 B1565.037, paragraphs 71-72 179 Day 246/36/16. not have known that at the time and added to Christopher Clarke QC in oral evidence that he also could not now say that he had been given the information by others.
Ammunition returns were not fabricated, contrary to another claim made by 027 in 1975. This allegation is undermined by the account he subsequently gave in his draft book. He suggested there that his colleagues became concerned about the number of rounds fired only when they were actually making their returns to their sergeant – not before – and then in relation to Soldier H only. The draft book contains no allegation that returns were fabricated and 027's oral evidence was that he had no "detailed" recollection of anybody concealing the use of rounds.
Other allegations and matters raised by 027 do not directly affect our clients but are generally relevant to the issue of 027's credit.
027's claims in relation to his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry provide an excellent example of his propensity to distort and exaggerate an incident for dramatic effect. This became apparent when 027 accepted that the original account he gave to Widgery lawyers, the one he claimed had been destroyed and replaced, was "watered down", "an attempt to justify the soldiers' actions...without being specific about connecting particular individuals with incidents" and avoided "anything which would reflect badly on the Army". In other words, it was an account that there could have been no reason to suppress.
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180 B1565.057, paragraph 177.15 181 Day 247/7/8 182 B1565.313 183 Day 247/8/5 184 B1565.053, paragraph 164 185 B1565.053, paragraph 163 186 Day 247/28/19 027 was right to claim that two statements had been prepared in his name whilst he was at Coleraine. What he had not realised was that both survived. Far from withdrawing his evidence to the RMP, the signed "Supplementary Statement" clarified and augmented it. He was then asked to sign a composite "SA" statement that simply brought together the RMP and supplementary statements, which he did with no complaint. There had been no impropriety on the part of the Widgery lawyers.
The many inconsistencies in 027's evidence about his dealings with Sean Patrick McShane further undermine his credibility. He maintained that the 1975 memoire was never meant for dissemination yet he forwarded precisely that document to McShane. He claimed there was never any agreement between the two of them to collaborate in the production of a book, yet a letter of his to McShane has survived and suggests exactly the contrary. 027 claimed in oral evidence that money had not been his motivation for his dealings with McShane, yet the same letter spoke of 027's pleasure to be receiving 25% at an otherwise difficult time for him financially.
The Tribunal is left to consider why 027 destroyed the field notebook that contained his contemporaneous record of the events of Bloody Sunday. He has claimed that he did so out of alarm over where press and media interest in his story would go yet he was the one who established contact with the press and who cooperated in various media interviews. He said also that he had destroyed it because he did not wish it to get out of his
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187 B1565.114 188 Day 249/155/21 189 B1565.055, paragraph 173 190 Day 249/81/9 191 M92.9 192 B1565.059, paragraph 186 hands\\textsuperscript{193}, yet on his own account he had just disclosed large parts of it in an extensive interview with Channel 4. He told Lord Saville he destroyed it in a state of generalised apprehension\\textsuperscript{194} yet he had previously suggested it was the one document that would corroborate his version of events. We have submitted that the real reason for doing away with the notebook was that it contained material inconsistent with 027's 1975 memoire and subsequent accounts.
2G-173 027 has extracted from the Inquiry very substantial sums of money as a pre-condition to his giving evidence.
2G-174 027 is a witness whose evidence is so generally tainted that it would be unsafe – and unfair – to rely on anything he has said on any subject.
\\textsuperscript{193} Day 249/63/16 \\textsuperscript{194} Day 249/100/18 CHAPTER 3
THE RELEVANT LAW
CHAPTER 3A - THE RELEVANT LAW
3A-I The Tribunal's terms of reference and the relevance of the criminal law ........................................... 1 3A-II The Tribunal's Approach to Evidence ........................................................................................................ 4 The Burden of Proof ........................................................................................................................................ 4 The Standard of Proof ..................................................................................................................................... 5 Circumstantial Evidence ................................................................................................................................. 14 3A-III The Law of Self Defence, section 3, Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967 and the Yellow Card ................................................................................................................................. 17 Self-Defence and Defence of Another ............................................................................................................. 17 Section 3 Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967 .................................................................................... 28 The Yellow Card ............................................................................................................................................. 39 Special Features of the Present Case ................................................................................................................ 40 3A-IV Summary of Principal Submissions on Self-Defence, Defence of Another, Prevention of Crime and Effecting or Assisting in Lawful Arrest ......................................................................................... 50 CHAPTER 3
THE RELEVANT LAW
3A-1 THE TRIBUNAL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
3A-1 The terms of reference of this Inquiry are to "inquire into a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972 which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, taking account of any new information relevant to the events on that day."
3A-2 This is an inquisitorial Inquiry which is charged with the task of trying to discover the truth about what occurred on Bloody Sunday. In performing that function it will, no doubt, be appropriate for the Tribunal to address questions of responsibility for what it finds occurred where it considers it may fairly do so.
3A-3 Very grave, albeit largely unparticularised, allegations of criminal conduct are made against many of the soldiers we represent. For example, the following submission was made on behalf of the family of James Wray;
The second matter to be weighed in the balance, sir, is the importance of the subject matter of the proceedings, and the Ministry of Defence says in the skeleton argument at page 6 that this is a public Inquiry, not a criminal trial, and that perhaps reveals the ultimate fallacy, the underlying shortcoming in the Ministry's argument, because the tone of that proposition really betrays a fundamental failure to grasp the enormity of the event which is being considered by this Inquiry and the gravity of the burden on this Inquiry. This Inquiry concerns a massacre of innocent civil rights protesters by a highly disciplined unit of the British Army under the eyes of its commanding officer with the Commander Land Forces in close attendance and it was committed during the course of a planned operation that was sanctioned at the highest levels of Government, both at Stormont and Westminster.¹
3A-4 While these are not criminal proceedings, many of the issues before the Tribunal necessarily touch on questions of criminal responsibility. This is apparent, for example, from the analysis in Counsel’s Report No. 1;
13.9 ... I use the expression "justified" to cover justification both under the general law and under the Yellow Card i.e. the standing instructions to soldiers as to the circumstances in which they could open fire. As to the former, it is not, of course, for the Tribunal to determine any criminal charge. If, however, the Tribunal were to conclude that any particular shot was both aimed and unjustified under the general law certain consequences would, in all probability, follow. Having regard to the lethal character of a 7.62mm bullet fired from an SLR there seems little room for doubt that anyone, who fired an aimed shot from such a weapon at someone, intended to cause either death or serious injury; and, in the light of the decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Clegg [1995] 1 A.C. 482, unless firing with such intent was justified (being in self defence or in defence of another person or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders), then, absent any other defence, the firer of any such shots which killed somebody would be guilty of murder; and the firer of any such shot which seriously wounded someone would be guilty of wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do so.
3A-5 Counsel to the Inquiry are correct in their view that it is not for the Tribunal to determine any criminal charge. This Tribunal has no power to do so. It is no part of the function of a public inquiry to determine questions of the guilt or innocence of individuals on criminal charges.
3A-6 However, there will clearly be circumstances in which it will be appropriate for the Tribunal to come to a conclusion as to whether conduct
¹ Mr MacDonald, T/S 30th September 1999, p.52/2-9. See also the submissions of Mr Harvey: Days 44:28, 44:133, 46:57, 47:3, 47:44, 47:105, 47:112, and 47:113; Ms MacDermott Day 49:5-6; and Lord Gifford Day 49:23. 33 and 134. was or was not justified. That is an important part of its function. Before it could properly criticise conduct it would have to be sufficiently confident of its factual findings. In the case of the subject matter of the present Inquiry, any conclusion as to whether conduct was or was not justified would have to be informed by the application of principles of the criminal law. Moreover, counsel to the Inquiry in the passage quoted above are correct, in our submission, to point out that certain consequences may, with varying degrees of likelihood, follow from a finding that conduct was not justified. It will be our submission that it is for precisely this reason that the Tribunal would have to be confident to the highest degree of the factual basis for its criticism of conduct as unjustified.
Furthermore, it would not be appropriate for this or any similar Inquiry to determine the guilt or innocence of any individual on a criminal charge because, there having been no criminal trial with the safeguards that that entails, it would not be fair to do so. The procedure followed before a public inquiry differs fundamentally from that of a criminal trial. This reflects their different functions and the differences in their outcomes. In the proceedings before this Inquiry individual soldiers have not enjoyed many of the protections considered essential in a criminal trial. We refer to the following matters by way of example.
(1) They have not been given advance notice of allegations against them.
(2) They have been required to give evidence and have done so as witnesses of the Inquiry.
(3) They have not enjoyed the protection of the rules of evidence
(4) They have been denied their right to remain silent.
(5) They have not been afforded any opportunity to call evidence in their defence. (6) They have been denied access to evidence which might have assisted them in resisting the allegations made against them.
3A-8 To the extent that this Tribunal may be required to apply principles of criminal law, these are to be found in the common law and statute law in force in Northern Ireland in January 1972. Subsequent judgments of the courts of Northern Ireland and the House of Lords on appeals from Northern Ireland are binding on this Tribunal to the extent that they are declaratory of the common law and the meaning and effect of legislation in force at the relevant time. Decisions of the courts of England and Wales and other common law jurisdictions will be of considerable persuasive authority, as they are before the courts of Northern Ireland.
3A-11 THE TRIBUNAL'S APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
THE BURDEN OF PROOF
3A-9 Even in the case of inquisitorial proceedings, such as those before the present Inquiry, there is a burden on the Tribunal when making an allegation of wrongdoing to make that allegation good. Moreover, this Inquiry has a clear adversarial aspect. Interested parties have been permitted to make allegations against other interested parties. As a result, some of the soldiers we represent face very serious allegations made by other interested parties. Here again it is for those making such allegations to make them good.
3A-10 The Inquiry should approach such allegations, whether made by the Inquiry, interested parties or witnesses on the basis that it is for those who allege wrongdoing to prove their allegations to the required standard. In particular, in the case of allegations of unlawful killing there is a burden on those making the allegations to prove to the required standard that the conduct in question was not justified, for example on grounds of self-defence, defence of another, the prevention of crime or effecting a lawful arrest. In our submission, while it may be appropriate for the Tribunal to arrive at conclusions in certain areas by applying the civil test of balance of probabilities, any allegation of serious misconduct must be proved to the criminal standard. In this Inquiry serious allegations implying criminal conduct are made. This alone necessitates the application of the criminal standard of proof in the consideration of such issues.
Furthermore, as has often been said, it is the function of this Inquiry to try to discover the truth about what occurred on Bloody Sunday. In this regard the function of this Inquiry differs fundamentally from that of a court in litigation.
In a contest purely between one litigant and another, such as the present, the task of the court is to do, and be seen to be doing, justice between the parties - a duty reflected by the word "fairly" in the rule. There is no higher or additional duty to ascertain some independent truth. It often happens, from the imperfection of evidence, or the withholding of it, sometimes by the party in whose favour it would tell if presented, that an adjudication has to be made which is not, and is known not to be, the whole truth of the matter: yet if the decision has been in accordance with the available evidence and with the law, justice will have been fairly done.
This Inquiry is subject to a higher duty. In reporting its findings to Parliament the Inquiry will have to be confident to a high degree of the accuracy of those findings, in particular if it makes adverse findings of serious wrongdoing. Having regard to the importance of the subject matter of the Inquiry, the duration of its investigative process, and the nature of the allegations made, it is unthinkable that the Inquiry could pronounce on the very grave allegations made against individuals unless the Tribunal were sure. If, after such a prolonged and intense inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday, the members of the Tribunal were able to say no more than that they think it more likely than not that the conduct of a given soldier was unjustified but they cannot be sure, such a conclusion would be pointless. Moreover, such a finding would be so immensely damaging to the soldier concerned as to be unjust.
3A-14 There is a further reason why it would be unfair to apply any standard other than the criminal standard in considering allegations of wrongdoing. The individuals facing such allegations have not been afforded the safeguards which protect a Defendant in a criminal trial, or indeed in civil proceedings. In these circumstances it is all the more important that the criminal standard is satisfied.
3A-15 In any event, even if the Tribunal were to conclude that the balance of probabilities was an appropriate standard to apply, it would be compelled in the fair application of that standard to adopt an approach which would, in its result, be virtually indistinguishable from the application of the criminal standard. The more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence which is required to overcome the unlikelihood of what is alleged and thus to prove it. In Re H (Minors) Lord Nicholls explained the matter as follows;
"The balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an event occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence of the event was more likely than not. When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes
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2 Air Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade [1983] AC 394 per Lord Wilberforce at p.438. 3 See, for example, the matters mentioned in paragraph 3A-7, above. 4 Re Dellow's Will Trusts [1964] 1 W.L.R. 455; Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 247. 5 [1996] A.C. 563. that the allegation is established on the balance of probability. Fraud is usually less likely than negligence. Deliberate physical injury is usually less likely than accidental physical injury. A step-father is usually less likely to have repeatedly raped and had non-consensual oral sex with his under age stepdaughter than on some occasion to have lost his temper and slapped her. Built into the preponderance of probability standard is a generous degree of flexibility in respect of the seriousness of the allegation.
On a strict analysis, this does not mean that where a serious allegation is in issue the standard of proof required is higher. However, it does mean that the inherent probability or improbability of an event is itself a matter to be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event occurred. The more improbable the event, the stronger must be the evidence that it did occur before, on the balance of probability, its occurrence will be established. Ungoed-Thomas J. expressed this neatly in In re Dellow's Will Trusts [1964] 1 W.L.R. 451, 455:
"The more serious the allegation the more cogent is the evidence required to overcome the unlikelihood of what is alleged and thus to prove it."
However, as Lord Nicholls observed in In Re H (Minors) the result is in reality much the same as the imposition of a higher standard of proof.6 The House of Lords has now acknowledged this reality in R. (McCann) v. Crown Court at Manchester7.
This substantially accords with the approach adopted in authorities such as the well known judgment of Morris L.J. in Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 247, 266. This approach also provides a means by
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6 In Re H (Minors) [1996] A.C. 563 per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead at pp. 586. See, to similar effect, R. (McCann) v. Crown Court at Manchester [2003] 1 AC 787 per Lord Steyn at p. 812.
7 [2003] 1 AC 787, considered below. which the balance of probability standard can "accommodate one's instinctive feeling that even in civil proceedings a court should be more sure before finding serious allegations proved than when deciding less serious or trivial matters."(^8)
In approaching the evidence the Tribunal would also be required to be mindful of the consequences which would follow if any allegation of serious wrongdoing were upheld. In *Gough v. Chief Constable of the Derbyshire Constabulary*(^9) the Court of Appeal considered what standard of proof applied when the court was asked to make a football banning order under section 14B, Football Spectators Act 1989. Lord Phillips MR, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, rejected the submission that the proceedings were criminal in character. They neither required proof that a criminal offence had been committed, nor involved the imposition of a penalty. The proceedings were civil in character. However, he continued;
"90 It does not follow from this that a mere balance of probabilities suffices to justify the making of an order. Banning orders under section 14(B) fall into the same category as antisocial behaviour orders and sex offender orders. While made in civil proceedings they impose serious restraints on freedoms that the citizen normally enjoys. While technically the civil standard of proof applies, that standard is flexible and must reflect the consequences that will follow if the case for a banning order is made out. This should lead the justices to apply an exacting standard of proof that will, in practice, be hard to distinguish from the criminal standard: see *B v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary* [2001] 1 WLR 340, 354 and *R (McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester* [2001] 1 WLR 1084, 1102.(^10)"
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(^8) *In Re H (Minors)* [1996] A.C. 563 per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead at pp. 586-7.
(^9) [2002] QB 1213.
(^10) [2002] QB 1213 at pp.1242-3. Similarly, in *R. (McCann) v. Crown Court at Manchester* the House of Lords held that although applications for anti-social behaviour orders under section 1, Crime and Disorder Act 1998 were civil in domestic law and although they could not be classified as criminal for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR, given the seriousness of the matter involved the court must be satisfied to the criminal standard of proof that a defendant had acted in an anti-social manner before making such an order.
Lord Steyn observed:
> Having concluded that the relevant proceedings are civil, in principle it follows that the standard of proof ordinarily applicable in civil proceedings, namely the balance of probabilities, should apply. However, I agree that, given the seriousness of matters involved, at least some reference to the heightened civil standard would usually be necessary: *In re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof)* [1996] AC 563, 586D-H, per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. For essentially practical reasons, the Recorder of Manchester decided to apply the criminal standard. The Court of Appeal said that would usually be the right course to adopt. Lord Bingham of Cornhill has observed that the heightened civil standard and the criminal standard are virtually indistinguishable. I do not disagree with any of these views. But in my view pragmatism dictates that the task of magistrates should be made more straightforward by ruling that they must in all cases under section 1 apply the criminal standard. If the House takes this view it will be sufficient for the magistrates, when applying section 1(1)(a) to be sure that the defendant has acted in an anti-social manner, that is to say, in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as himself. The inquiry under section 1(1)(b), namely that such an order is necessary to protect persons from further anti-social acts by him, does not involve a standard of proof: it is an exercise of judgment or evaluation. This approach should facilitate correct decision-making and should ensure consistency and predictability in this corner of the law. In coming to this conclusion I bear in mind that the use of
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11 [2003] 1 AC 787 hearsay evidence will often be of crucial importance. For my part, hearsay evidence depending on its logical probativeness is quite capable of satisfying the requirements of section 1(1).
3A-21 Lord Hope of Craighead observed;
81 As Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR observed in the Court of Appeal in the McCann case [2001] 1 WLR 1084, 1101, para 65, anti-social behaviour orders have serious consequences. It was with this point in mind that, at p 1102, para 67, he commended the course which the Recorder of Manchester followed in the Crown Court when he said that, without intending to lay down any form of precedent, the court had decided to apply the standard of being satisfied so that they were sure that the statutory conditions were fulfilled before they would consider the making of an order in the case of each defendant. I too would endorse this approach, for the following reasons.
82 Mr Crow for the Secretary of State said that his preferred position was that the standard to be applied in these proceedings should be the civil standard. His submission, as it was put in his written case, was that although the civil standard was a single, inflexible test, the inherent probability or improbability of an event was a matter to be taken into account when the evidence was being assessed. He maintained that this view was consistent with the position for which he contended, that these were civil proceedings which should be decided according to the civil evidence rules. But it is not an invariable rule that the lower standard of proof must be applied in civil proceedings. I think that there are good reasons, in the interests of fairness, for applying the higher standard when allegations are made of criminal or quasi-criminal conduct which, if proved, would have serious consequences for the person against whom they are made.
83 This, as I have already mentioned, was the view which the Court of Session took in Constanda v M 1997 SC 217 when it decided that proof to the criminal standard was required of allegations that a child had engaged in criminal conduct although the ground of referral to a children's hearing was not that he had committed an offence but that
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12 [2003] 1 AC 787 at p. 812. he was exposed to moral danger. There is now a substantial body of opinion that, if the case for an order such as a banning order or a sex offender order is to be made out, account should be taken of the seriousness of the matters to be proved and the implications of proving them. It has also been recognised that if this is done the civil standard of proof will for all practical purposes be indistinguishable from the criminal standard: see B v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary [2001] 1 WLR 340, 354, para 31, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ; Gough v Chief Constable of the Derbyshire Constabulary [2002] 3 WLR 289, 313, para 90, per Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR. As Mr Crow pointed out, the condition in section 1(1)(b) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 that a prohibition order is necessary to protect persons in the local government area from further anti-social acts raises a question which is a matter for evaluation and assessment. But the condition in section 1(1)(a) that the defendant has acted in an anti-social manner raises serious questions of fact, and the implications for him of proving that he has acted in this way are also serious. I would hold that the standard of proof that ought to be applied in these cases to allegations about the defendant's conduct is the criminal standard. 13
In the present proceedings, there is no question of the Tribunal applying any sanction or imposing any restriction on the freedom of any person. Nevertheless, the findings of the Tribunal may well be highly significant. As Lord Denning M.R. observed in Re Pergamon Press:
But this should not lead us to minimise the significance of their task. They have to make a report which may have wide repercussions. They may, if they think fit, make findings of fact which are very damaging to those whom they name. They may accuse some; they may condemn others; they may ruin reputations or careers. Their report may lead to judicial proceedings. It may expose persons to criminal prosecutions or to civil actions. 14
13 [2003] 1 AC 787 at pp. 825-6. 14 [1971] Ch 388 at p. 399. The consequences of a finding by this Tribunal of serious wrongdoing could not be more grave. A finding by this Tribunal that a soldier had by his unjustified act killed one of the deceased on Bloody Sunday would be likely to bring with it all the opprobrium and ruin which a finding of guilt of a grave criminal offence would bring. Employing the words of Lord Hope of Craighead, cited above, this Inquiry provides an outstanding example of a situation in which there are good reasons, in the interests of fairness, for applying the higher standard when allegations are made of criminal or quasi-criminal conduct which, if proved, would have serious consequences for the person against whom they are made.(^{15})
We draw particular attention to the approach adopted by Sir William Macpherson in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. That was "an inquiry into every aspect of the policing of the murder [of Stephen Lawrence]".(^{16}) One area of the inquiry concerned allegations of collusion or corruption by police officers. The Chairman was in no doubt that in considering such allegations the appropriate standard was the criminal standard and that any other approach would be "wholly unfair".
Furthermore in this area of the Inquiry it is necessary to indicate that the standard of proof to be applied must be the criminal standard. That is to say we can only reach a conclusion adverse to the MPS or individual officers if we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that collusion or corruption is established. In other areas of the case we are entitled to reach conclusions upon a balance of probability; and we are entitled also to voice suspicions should they be found validly to exist. The standard of proof is not so rigid that we cannot make findings or indicate that a situation may exist otherwise than by applying the well known principles which govern litigation. But where such a serious allegation as collusion with criminals or corruption is made it would be wholly unfair to reach any adverse
(^{15}) [2003] 1 AC 787 at para. 82.
(^{16}) Report of the Macpherson Inquiry, para. 7.40. conclusion without being sure that such a conclusion was justified as a matter of evidence and proper inference.\\textsuperscript{17}
3A-25 A similar approach had been employed by Lord Justice Scarman in 1972 in his Report into certain shootings and riots in Northern Ireland. The Report states:
\\textit{It will be observed that on some, but not all, of the matters referred to us we have made findings. We would emphasise that we have considered ourselves entitled to make findings only in those instances in which we have felt sure that we know the truth. We have been at pains to indicate those matters on which we have made positive findings.}\\textsuperscript{18}
3A-26 Accordingly it is submitted that, in addressing the allegations which lie at the heart of this Inquiry, the Tribunal should apply an exacting standard of proof which is or is indistinguishable from the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If the Tribunal is to make an adverse finding of serious misconduct, it must be sure.
\\textbf{CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.}
3A-27 In circumstances where there exists no direct evidence of a matter, it may nevertheless be permissible to draw an inference from the existing evidence which is accepted as reliable, i.e. to come to a conclusion which may logically be drawn from the primary facts. However, if the primary facts cannot be established, one cannot begin to draw inferences.
3A-28 Inference is to be distinguished from conjecture or speculation, i.e. guessing or making up theories without reliable evidence to support them, neither of which is permissible. Thus in \\textit{Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries} [1940] AC 152 Lord Wright observed:
\\textsuperscript{17} Report of the Macpherson Inquiry, para. 8.5. \\textsuperscript{18} At paragraph 8. My Lords, the precise manner in which the accident occurred cannot be ascertained as the unfortunate young man was alone when he was killed. The Court therefore is left to inference or circumstantial evidence. Inference must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation. There can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other facts which it is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical certainty as if they had been actually observed. In other cases the inference does not go beyond reasonable probability. But if there are no positive proved facts from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture. 19
In considering whether such an inference may be drawn, it is essential to consider all the relevant surrounding evidence. In DPP v. Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 Lord Simon of Glaisdale observed:
Circumstantial evidence is evidence of facts from which, taken with all the other evidence, a reasonable inference is a fact directly in issue. It works by cumulatively, in geometrical progression, eliminating other possibilities. 20
Before a fact finding body could properly make a finding implying criminal misconduct it would have to be able reasonably to dismiss the possibility of any alternative version of events which did not involve the individual's guilt and it would have to be sure that any such alternative explanation was untrue. Where the allegation is of criminal wrongdoing, the circumstances must exclude any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. In Chamberlain v. R. (1984) 51 ALR 225 Gibbs C.J. and Mason J. in the High Court of Australia expressed the matter in the following terms:
It follows from what we have said that the jury should decide whether they accept the evidence of a particular fact, not by considering the evidence directly relating to
19 At pp. 169-70. 20 At p. 758 A-B. that fact in isolation, but in the light of the whole evidence, and that they can draw an inference of guilt from a combination of facts, none of which viewed alone would support that inference. Nevertheless the jury cannot view a fact as a basis for an inference of guilt unless at the end of the day they are satisfied of the existence of that fact beyond reasonable doubt. When the evidence is circumstantial, the jury, whether in a civil or in a criminal case, are required to draw an inference from the circumstances of the case; in a civil case the circumstances must raise a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged, and in a criminal case the circumstances must exclude any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence (see Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 at 358; and Barca v R (1975) 7 ALR 78; 133 CLR 82 at 104). The statement by Lord Wright in Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 at 169, that "there can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other facts which it is sought to establish" is obviously as true of criminal as of civil cases. The process of reasoning in a case of circumstantial evidence gives rise to two chances of error: "first from the chances of error in each fact or consideration forming the steps and second from the chance of error in reasoning to the conclusion": Morrison v Jenkins (1949) 80 CLR 626 at 644. It seems to us an inescapable consequence that in a criminal case the circumstances from which the inference should be drawn must be established beyond reasonable doubt. We agree with the statement in R v Van Beelen, supra (at 379), that it is "an obvious proposition in logic, that you cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the truth of an inference drawn from facts about the existence of which you are in doubt".
One aspect of the passage cited above was explained by the High Court of Australia in Shepherd v. The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573. Dawson J., with whom Toohey J. and Gaudron J. concurred, and with whom Mason C.J. concurred in a separate judgment, observed:
"It is, I think, quite plain that, in saying that a "fact as a basis for an inference of guilt" must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, their Honours are referring to an intermediate fact which is a necessary basis for the ultimate inference. They must be doing so, for it is otherwise not possible to say, as they do previously, that the jury can draw an inference of guilt from a combination of facts, none of which viewed alone would support the inference. And of course it is quite correct to say that an intermediate fact which is an indispensable step upon the way to an inference of guilt, whether it be a fact derived from a single piece of evidence or a conclusion of fact drawn from a body of evidence, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt if the ultimate inference is to be the only reasonable hypothesis.(^{21})
He also observed:
*It will generally be sufficient to tell the jury that the guilt of the accused must be established beyond reasonable doubt and, where it is helpful to do so, to tell them that they must entertain such a doubt where any other inference consistent with innocence is reasonably open on the evidence.*(^{22})
3A-32 Different formulations express the same essential notion. Unless the only rational hypothesis(^{23}) is one of criminal misconduct or, in other words, a possible innocent explanation can be "wholly rejected and excluded"(^{24}), the party making an allegation of criminal wrongdoing will have failed to prove to the required standard his case based on adverse inference.
3A-III THE LAW OF SELF DEFENCE, SECTION 3, CRIMINAL LAW (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1967 AND THE YELLOW CARD
**SELF-DEFENCE AND DEFENCE OF ANOTHER.**
3A-33 The principles governing self-defence and defence of another are rules of the common law. The principles set out in the following paragraphs in relation to self-defence apply *mutatis mutandis* in the case of defence of another.(^{25})
3A-34 The great majority of the authorities referred to in this section are criminal cases but reference is also made to civil authorities on self-defence.
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(^{21}) At paragraph 8.
(^{22}) At paragraph 5.
(^{23}) *R. v. Onufrejczyk* [1955] 1 All ER 247. In a criminal prosecution, once the issue is raised, it is for the prosecution to prove to the criminal standard that a use of force resulting in death or injury was unlawful i.e. that the Defendant did not act in lawful defence of himself or another. Similarly, in the present proceedings it is for those making allegations to prove that the conduct in question was not justified on grounds of self-defence or defence of another. The standard of proof applicable in the present proceedings has been considered at paragraphs 3A-11-3A-26, above.
A person who is attacked or believes that he is about to be attacked is entitled to use such force as is reasonably necessary to defend himself. However, a person only acts in lawful self-defence if in all the circumstances he believes that it is necessary for him to defend himself and if the amount of force which he uses in doing so is reasonable.
Force used in self-defence is unreasonable and unlawful if it is out of all proportion to the nature of the attack, or is in excess of what is really required of the defendant to defend himself. When deciding whether or not the force used by an individual was reasonable it is necessary to have regard to all the circumstances of the case including the nature of the attack, the number of attackers and whether the attackers were armed. However, it is particularly important to bear in mind the following observation of Lord Oaksey in Turner v. MGM Pictures Ltd.:
*If you are attacked with a deadly weapon you can defend yourself with a deadly weapon or with any other weapon which may protect your life. The law does not concern itself with niceties in such matters. If you are attacked by a prize-fighter you are not bound to adhere to the Queensbury rules in your defence.*
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24 *McGreery v. DPP* [1973] 1 WLR 276. 25 See generally, *R v Duffy* 50 Cr App R 68 and *R v Chisam* 47 Cr App R 130. 26 [1950] 1 All E R 449 at p. 471. Failure to retreat when attacked and when it is possible and safe to do so, is not conclusive. It is simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether it was necessary for the person attacked to use force and whether the force used was reasonable. It is not necessary that he should demonstrate by his actions that he does not want to fight.27
However, an individual faced with an attack cannot be expected to weigh with precision the exact degree of force which would be reasonable in the circumstances.
If there has been an attack so that defence is reasonably necessary it will be recognised that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his necessary defensive action. If a jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken. A jury will be told that the defence of self-defence, where the evidence makes its raising possible, will only fail if the prosecution show beyond doubt that what the accused did was not by way of self-defence.28
As Holmes J. observed in the United States Supreme Court, "detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."29 This observation is all the more apposite in circumstances where individuals are confronted or believe they are confronted by highly skilled terrorists who have provided abundant evidence of their murderous capacity and intent. In this regard we draw particular attention to the admitted policy of the Official IRA to shoot to kill any British soldier seen on the streets of Derry.
27 R v Bird 81 Cr App R 110. 28 Palmer v. The Queen [1971] AC 814, per Lord Morris of Borth y Gest at p. 832. 29 Brown v. United States (1921) 256 U.S. 335. In Northern Ireland, Kelly LJ, sitting as a judge of the Crown Court, observed in *R. v. Fisher and Wright*:
> In assessing the credibility of the elements of the defences of self-defence and the prevention of crime, the court should endeavour to put itself in the situation of the accused at the material time including the length of time he had for decision and resist reaching conclusions on hindsight.
It is now clearly established that an individual who has or may have made a mistake as to the relevant facts is entitled to be judged by the facts as he honestly believed them to be. Moreover, this is so even if his mistaken belief was unreasonably held. Thus in *Gladstone Williams*[^31], where the Defendant's defence to a charge of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm was that he was preventing the complainant from attacking a third party, the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal held that it had been a misdirection to instruct the jury that the defendant had a defence only if he believed on reasonable grounds that the complainant was acting unlawfully. Referring to *Kimber*,[^32] a case of indecent assault, the Court stated:
> The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the defendant's belief is material to the question of whether the belief was held by the defendant at all. If the belief was in fact held, its unreasonableness, so far as guilt or innocence is concerned, is neither here nor there. It is irrelevant. Were it otherwise, the defendant would be convicted because he was negligent in failing to recognise that the victim was not consenting or that a crime was not being committed and so on. In other words the jury should have been directed first of all that the prosecution have the burden or duty of proving the unlawfulness of the defendant's actions: secondly, if the defendant may have been labouring under
\[^30\]: 10th February 1995. \[^31\]: (1983) 78 Cr App R 276, Lord Lane LCJ, Skinner and McCowan JJ. \[^32\]: [1983] 1 WLR 1118; (1983) 77 CR App R 225. *Kimber* was in turn an application of the principle stated in *Morgan* [1976] AC 182, see Lawton LJ in *Kimber* at p. 1122 or p. 229. a mistake as to the facts, he must be judged according to his mistaken view of the facts; thirdly, that is so whether the mistake was, on an objective view, a reasonable mistake or not.
In a case of self-defence, where self-defence or the prevention of crime is concerned, if the jury came to the conclusion that he defendant believed, or may have believed, that he was being attacked or that a crime was being committed and that force was necessary to protect himself or to prevent the crime, then the prosecution have not proved their case. If however the defendant's alleged belief was mistaken and if the mistake was an unreasonable one, that may be a powerful reason for coming to the conclusion that the belief was no honestly held and should be rejected.
Even if the jury come to the conclusion that he mistake was an unreasonable one, if the defendant may genuinely have been labouring under it, he is entitled to rely upon it.33
This authority has been repeatedly applied by the Court of Appeal34 and by the Privy Council35. In Beckford v. R Lord Griffiths, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, accepted that prior to the decision of the House of Lords in DPP v. Morgan36 the whole weight of authority supported the view that it was an essential element of self-defence not only that the accused believed that he was being attacked or in imminent danger of being attacked but also that such belief was based on reasonable grounds.37 The question was therefore whether the Court of Appeal in Gladstone Williams was right to depart from the law as declared by his predecessors in the light of the decision of the House of Lords in Morgan. He considered that it was.
33 At p; 281. 34 Jackson [1985] RTR 257; Asbury [1986] Crim LR 258, CA; Fisher [1987] Crim LR 334, CA. 35 Beckford v. R. [1988] AC 130. The position would be different in a civil claim for negligence. See e.g. Carswell CJ in Fitzsimmons v. The Chief Constable of the RUC, 14th October 1994. 36 [1976] AC 182. 37 See e.g. Fennell (1970) 54 Cr. App. R. 451 per Widgery LJ. The common law recognises that there are many circumstances in which one person may inflict violence upon another without committing a crime, as for instance, in sporting contests, surgical operations or in the most extreme example judicial execution. The common law has always recognised as one of these circumstances the right of a person to protect himself from attack and to act in the defence of others and if necessary to inflict violence on another in so doing. If no more force is used than is reasonable to repel the attack such force is not unlawful and no crime is committed. Furthermore a man about to be attacked does not have to wait for his assailant to strike the first blow or fire the first shot; circumstances may justify a pre-emptive strike.
It is because it is an essential element of all crimes of violence that the violence or the threat of violence should be unlawful that self-defence, if raised as an issue in a criminal trial, must be disproved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fail to do so that accused is entitled to be acquitted because the prosecution will have failed to prove an essential element of the crime namely that the violence used by the accused was unlawful.
If then a genuine belief, albeit without reasonable grounds, is a defence to rape because it negatives the necessary intention, so also must a genuine belief in facts which if true would justify self-defence be a defence to a crime of personal violence because the belief negatives the intent to act unlawfully.38
The Privy Council therefore expressly approved the passage from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Gladstone Williams cited above.39
These developments have now received the approval of the House of Lords in B(A Minor) v. DPP.40 Lord Nicholls, with whom Lord Irvine L.C. and Lord Mackay concurred, expressed the position as follows:
38 [1988] AC at p. 144. 39 At pp. 144-5. In Blackburn v. Bowering [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1324, the Court of Appeal, presided over by Sir Thomas Bingham M.R., applied the same approach to the exercise by the court of its contempt jurisdiction in respect of an alleged assault on officers of the court while in the execution of their duty. The existence of the presumption [that a mental element is an essential ingredient of an offence unless Parliament has indicated a contrary intention either expressly or by necessary implication] is beyond dispute, but in one respect the traditional formulation of the presumption calls for re-examination. This respect concerns the position of a defendant who acted under a mistaken view of the facts. In this regard, the presumption is expressed traditionally to the effect that an honest mistake by a defendant does not avail him, unless the mistake was made on reasonable grounds. Thus, in Reg v. Tolson (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 168, 181, Cave J. observed:
"At common law an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances, which, if true, would make the act for which a prisoner is indicted an innocent act has always been held to be a good defence. This doctrine is embodied in the somewhat uncouth maxim 'actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.' Honest and reasonable mistake stands on the same footing as absence of the reasoning faculty, as in infancy, or perversion of that faculty, as in lunacy ... So far as I am aware it has never been suggested that these exceptions do not equally apply in the case of statutory offences unless they are excluded expressly or by necessary implication."
The other judges in that case expressed themselves to a similar effect. In Bank of New South Wales v. Piper [1897] A.C. 383, 389-390, the Privy Council likewise espoused the "reasonable belief" approach:
"the absence of mens rea really consists in an honest and reasonable belief entertained by the accused of facts which, if true, would make the act charged against him innocent."
In Sweet v. Parsley Lord Diplock referred, at p. 163, to a general principle of construction of statutes creating criminal offences, in similar terms:
"a general principle of construction of any enactment, which creates a criminal offence, [is] that, even where the words used to describe the prohibited conduct would not in any other context connote the necessity for any particular mental element, they are nevertheless to be read as subject to the implication that a necessary element in the offence is the absence of a belief, held honestly and upon reasonable grounds, in the existence of facts which, if true, would make the act innocent."
The "reasonable belief" school of thought held unchallenged sway for many years. But over the last quarter of a century there have been several important cases where a defence of honest but mistaken belief was raised. In deciding these cases the courts have placed new, or renewed, emphasis on the subjective nature of the mental element in criminal offences. The courts have rejected the reasonable belief approach and preferred the honest belief approach. When mens rea is ousted by a mistaken belief, it is as well ousted by an unreasonable belief as by a reasonable belief. In the pithy phrase of Lawton L.J. in Reg. v. Kimber [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1118, 1122, it is the defendant's belief, not the grounds on which it is based, which goes to negative the intent. This approach is well encapsulated in a passage in the judgment of Lord Lane C.J. in Reg. v. Williams (Gladstone) [1987] 3 All E.R. 411, 415:
"The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the defendant's belief is material to the question of whether the belief was held by the defendant at all. If the belief was in fact held, its unreasonableness, so far as guilt or innocence is concerned, is neither here nor there. It is irrelevant. Were it otherwise, the defendant would be convicted because he was negligent in failing to recognise that the victim was not consenting ... and so on."
Considered as a matter of principle, the honest belief approach must be preferable. By definition the mental element in a crime is concerned with a subjective state of mind, such as intent or belief. To the extent that an overriding objective limit ("on reasonable grounds") is introduced, the subjective element is displaced. To that extent a person who lacks the necessary intent or belief may nevertheless commit the offence. When that occurs the defendant's "fault" lies exclusively in falling short of an objective standard. His crime lies in his negligence. A statute may so provide expressly or by necessary implication. But this can have no place in a common law principle, of general application, which is concerned with the need for a mental element as an essential ingredient of a criminal offence.
The traditional formulation of the common law presumption, exemplified in Lord Diplock's famous exposition in Sweet v. Parsley, cited above, is out of step. with this recent line of authority, in so far as it envisages that a mistaken belief must be based on reasonable grounds. This seems to be a relic from the days before a defendant in a criminal case could give evidence in his own defence. It is not surprising that in those times juries judged a defendant's state of mind by the conduct to be expected of a reasonable person.41
Similarly, Lord Steyn, with whom Lord Hutton concurred on this issue, rejected the possibility of holding that the mens rea of the statutory offence there under consideration was made out if the Defendant's mistaken belief were unreasonable:
Counsel for the Crown did not argue, in the alternative, that the belief must be held on reasonable grounds. Nevertheless, I initially regarded such a requirement as an acceptable solution. A basis for this view would be Lord Diplock's observation in Sweet v. Parsley [1970] A.C. 132, 163. This view is however contrary to the way in which our criminal law has subsequently developed. In Reg. v. Morgan [1976] A.C. 182 the House of Lords held by a majority of three to two that when a defendant had sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, genuinely believing that she did consent, he was not guilty of rape, even if he had no reasonable grounds for his belief. The importance of this decision for the coherent development of English law was not immediately appreciated. The next stage in the development was the decision of the Court of Appeal in Reg. v. Williams (Gladstone) [1987] 3 All E.R. 411. The charge was assault. The defendant argued that he used force in the honest belief that he was protecting somebody else from an unlawful assault. Holding that the jury had been materially misdirected, the Court of Appeal, applying the logic of Morgan's case, held that if the defendant believed, reasonably or not, in the existence of facts which would justify the force used in self-defence, he did not intend to use unlawful force. The decision in Williams's case was followed and approved and applied by the Privy Council in Beckford v. The Queen [1988] A.C. 130. It was held that if the defendant honestly believed the circumstances to be such as would, if true, justify his use of force to defend himself from attack and the force was no
41 At pp. 461-2. more than reasonable to resist the attack, he was entitled to be acquitted of murder, since the intent to act unlawfully would be negatived by his belief, however mistaken or unreasonable. Morgan's case was described, at p. 145, as "a landmark decision in the development of the common law." There has been a general shift from objectivism to subjectivism in this branch of the law. It is now settled as a matter of general principle that mistake, whether reasonable or not, is a defence where it prevents the defendant from having the mens rea which the law requires for the crime with which he is charged. It would be in disharmony with this development now to rule that in respect of a defence under section 1(1) of the Act of 1960 the belief must be based on reasonable grounds. Moreover, if such a special solution were to be adopted, it would almost certainly create uncertainty in other parts of the criminal law. It would be difficult to confine it on a principled basis to section 1(1).42
3A-45 Similarly in R v Oatridge43 the Court of Appeal emphasised that in cases where a defendant was not under actual or threatened attack, but honestly believed that he was, the jury should be directed to consider whether the degree of force used by the defendant was commensurate with the degree of risk which he believed to be created by the attack under which he believed himself to be.
3A-46 In Northern Ireland, Lord Lowry observed in Thain44:
...even where the deceased was completely unarmed and was not about to attack the accused in any way, the accused is entitled to succeed on the defence of self-defence and to be acquitted if he honestly believed that the deceased was about to attack him and endanger his life, although, of course, if the accused's belief that the deceased was armed and was about to attack him was unreasonable, this would be an argument for rejecting the evidence that he honestly
42 At pp. 477-8. 43 94 Cr App R 367 44 Thain [1985] N.I. 457. believed that the deceased was armed and was about to fire at him.45
3A-47 In *R. v. Fisher and Wright* Kelly LJ, sitting as a judge of the Crown Court referred to this passage and commented:
*I do not think that Lord Lowry in the foregoing intended to imply that an unreasonable belief inevitably meant a dishonest belief. What Lord Lowry said was that it would be an argument for rejecting honest belief and he did adopt the familiar passage of Lord Lane CJ in *Gladstone Williams* 78 Cr App Rep 276 at p. 281...*
3A-48 Kelly LJ had observed earlier in his judgment:
*...when the issue is the basic one as to whether an accused was in fact acting in self-defence or in the prevention of crime or in effecting an arrest the fact that he honestly believed he was can be relied on by him unless and until the Crown establishes beyond reasonable doubt that he held no such belief. It follows that if the facts reveal that he was not under attack or threatened attack at the material time but he honestly believed he was then the same burden falls on the Crown...*
3A-49 The principle is helpfully stated by Sir John Smith:
\*"The general principle, however, is that the law allows such force to be used as is reasonable in the circumstances as the accused believed them to be, whether reasonably or not. For example, if D believed that he was being attacked with a deadly weapon and he used only such force as was reasonable to repel such an attack, he has a defence to any charge of an offence arising out of his use of that force. It is immaterial that he was mistaken and unreasonably mistaken."\*46
3A-50 The critical question is therefore: Taking the circumstances and the danger as the individual honestly believed them to be, was the amount of force which he used reasonable? Where the criminal standard of proof applies,
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45 At p. 462D. if it was or might have been, the unlawfulness of the conduct is not established.
3A-51 Where the criminal standard of proof applies, whether the plea is self-defence or defence of another, if the defendant may have been honestly mistaken as to the facts, he must be judged according to his mistaken belief of the facts: that is so whether the mistake was, on an objective view, a reasonable mistake or not. The position was summarised by Hutton LCJ in *R. v. Elkington* as follows:
*A number of decisions of the highest courts, the House of Lords, the Privy Council and the Court of Appeal in England, have made it clear that where an accused raises the defence that he killed or injured a person in self-defence or in defence of a third person, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in defence of himself or another person or that the force which he used was unreasonable. And these decisions also make it clear that in deciding whether the Crown has proved that the force used was unreasonable beyond a reasonable doubt the tribunal of fact must have regard not to what actually happened, but to what the accused at the relevant time honestly believed was happening. Moreover the courts have made it clear that the tribunal of fact must assess this, not retrospectively in the calm of the courtroom, but by putting itself in the positions of the accused and deciding the question taking account of the situation which the accused was in and of the pressures to which he was subjected and of the time in which he had to act.*
**SECTION 3 CRIMINAL LAW (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1967**
3A-52 At all times material to this Inquiry, defences relating specifically to the prevention of crime or the arrest of offenders have been regulated by statute. Section 3, Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967 provides:
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46 Smith and Hogan, *Criminal Law*, 10th Ed., 276. 47 21st January 1993, Hutton LCJ sitting as a judge of the Crown Court. A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.
Subsection (1) shall replace the rules of the common law as to the matters dealt with by that subsection.
3A-53 Subsection (1) is identical to subsection 3(1), Criminal Law Act 1967, which applies to England and Wales and subsection (2) is to the same effect as subsection 3(2), Criminal Law Act 1967.
3A-54 There is inevitably a considerable overlap of the justifications on grounds of self-defence, defence of another, the prevention of crime and lawful arrest. A single situation may involve a number of these justifications. Thus, a person who is under attack and defends himself is also acting in prevention of crime. On the other hand there will be situations in which self-defence and defence of another will not be available but the statutory defences will be available.
When a person has two defences (private defence and public authority; private defence and provocation, etc.), he is allowed the benefit of whichever is the more favourable to him on the facts.48
3A-55 However, although section 3, Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967 makes no reference to the defence of self-defence or defence of another, there is a compelling case for concluding that to the extent that those common law defences may have differed in effect from the statutory defence, they have been modified by that section.
Private defence and the prevention of crime are sometimes indistinguishable. If D goes to the defence of E whom P is trying to murder, he is exercising the right of private defence but he is also seeking to prevent the commission of a crime. It would be absurd to ask D whether he was acting
48 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd Ed. (1983) 505. in defence of E or to prevent murder being committed and preposterous that the law should differ according to the answer. He was doing both. The law cannot have two sets of criteria governing the same situation and it is submitted that s 3 of the Criminal Law Act is applicable.49
This passage was expressly approved by Hutton LCJ in R. v. Elkington.50
3A-56 Section 3 is a rule of both civil and criminal law. When the use of force is reasonable in the circumstances it is justified in every sense and gives rise to neither civil nor criminal liability.51
3A-57 As in the case of self-defence and defence of another, it is for those alleging that killings or woundings were criminal to prove that the conduct in question was unlawful and in particular that it was not justified on grounds of the prevention of crime or effecting an arrest. The standard of proof applicable in the present proceedings has been considered at paragraphs 3A-11 -3A-26, above.
3A-58 The Northern Ireland courts have held that the objectives of the use of force are to be determined by the court applying an objective test. Kelly v Ministry of Defence52 was a civil claim arising from an incident in which the second and third plaintiffs had been passengers in a car driven by K whose estate was the first plaintiff. The vehicle was driven through an Army checkpoint hitting two soldiers. The patrol fired into the car killing the driver and causing the car to crash. The two passengers were ordered out of the car. One ran away and members of the patrol shot and wounded him before arresting him. The soldiers maintained that they believed the
49 Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 10th Ed., 280, referring to Criminal Law Act 1967 applicable in England and Wales. See also the observations of Lord Lloyd of Berwick in R. v. Clegg [1995] 1AC 482, at p. 496 E-H. c.f. Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd Ed. (1983) 505. 50 Hutton LCJ sitting as a judge of the Crown Court, 21st January 1993. 51 Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 10th Ed., 278. 52 [1989] NI 341 occupants of the car to be terrorists and relied on section 3, Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967.
Carswell J., the trial judge, approached the defence under section 3, Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland), 1967 in two stages. First he addressed the issue of what were the facts and circumstances each soldier honestly and reasonably believed existed at the time. (This issue is addressed below. For the reasons set out below, the reasonableness of an honestly held belief is irrelevant to questions of criminal liability. The position is different in a civil claim for negligence.) Secondly, he addressed the question whether, given that belief, it was reasonable to fire in the prevention of crime or to effect arrest. In addressing this second issue the judge first referred to the subjective evidence of the soldiers. The sergeant had given evidence that his reason for firing was to effect the arrest of the driver. Some of the other soldiers had said their reason was to apprehend the occupants. The judge found that the object of their firing was to stop the escape of the occupants of the car. However, notwithstanding the stated objectives of some of the soldiers, Carswell J. applied an objective test and held that the reasonableness of the force was truly to be based in the prevention of crime and not in effecting arrest.
The justification for the shooting accordingly has to be found in the prevention of crime or the arrest of offenders. I consider that on the evidence the intention of the soldiers in shooting at the car covered both these objectives. Although some of them expressed it in terms only of arresting the occupants of the car, I think that consideration of the soldiers' evidence as a whole shows that they intended to stop the car, with the object of apprehending the occupants and preventing them from escaping and carrying out further terrorist missions. The one act of stopping the car might readily have achieved both objectives, on the facts which the soldiers believed to be correct, and can be regarded as directed towards both. In any event, it seems to me to be correct in principle that the justification should be judged objectively. Section 3(1) of the Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967 appears to be objective in its terms, and to refer to the actual justification for the use of force, rather than that which the user himself considers to be the justification. Accordingly, if a person using force intends to do so for one of the objects referred to in section 3(1), and the court holds that the force was not reasonable in the circumstances if one has regard only to that object, but was reasonable for achieving one of the other objects, then I think that that use of force comes within the section.
On appeal the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland upheld the judge's approach. O'Donnell L.J. observed:
It is clear that he held, and in my opinion rightly held, that the objectives in the section, that is, the prevention of crime or the effecting of an arrest, are not to be determined on the perpetrator of the force's evidence but by the court using an objective test.
He then cited the passage from the judgment of Carswell J. set out above and continued:
Before this court, Mr Kerr for the respondent underlined the correctness of this passage and its implications in this way. He submitted that in the trial judge's second stage, the perpetrator of force need not in evidence select one or more of the objectives in section 3(1), that is, the objectives of the prevention of crime or effecting arrest. The reasonableness of the force cannot be challenged for example on the ground that a soldier is unable to articulate either of these objectives. Nor, he submitted, need a soldier before or at the time of using force, have in his own mind either of them. The presence or absence of an objective or either of them is a matter for the court to be arrived at objectively.
That the court or jury alone should be the arbitrator in this way seems to me to be in the best interests of justice. They need not be bothered with the assertions of unscrupulous users of force as to their motives. Instead they would seek to apply the judgment of the reasonable man. It also appeals to common sense when one realises that the same rights under section 3(1) are given to a civilian who will be quite unaware of the section not to speak of its stated objectives. O'Donnell L.J. also considered that the correctness of this objective approach was confirmed by the speech of Lord Diplock in *Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference No. 1 of 1975*.
To the extent that *Kelly* may be considered inconsistent with the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland in *Thain*[^54], it is submitted that the reasoning in *Kelly* is to be preferred. *Kelly* accords with Glanville Williams' principle of unknown necessity.[^55] Sir John Smith makes the following observation on *Kelly*:
> It has been held in a civil action in Northern Ireland that for the purpose of an identical provision [i.e. section 3, Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967], the objectives of the use of force are to be determined, not by the evidence of the user of the force, but by the court, applying an objective test. D, a soldier, said that his purpose in shooting was to arrest the occupants of a vehicle whom he believed on reasonable grounds to be determined terrorists who would probably continue to commit terrorist offences if they got away; but the court held that the use of force was not reasonable to make an arrest but was justified because it was reasonable to prevent crime. If this is right (and it is a persuasive opinion) in a civil action, it is also right in criminal law. The only difference is that in the criminal case, D need not have reasonable grounds for his honest belief in the circumstances.[^56]
There are also compelling practical considerations in support of the application of an objective test in determining the purpose of the use of force. A soldier confronted by terrorists or persons he believes to be terrorists has no time to analyse the inter-relationship between self-defence, defence of another, effecting an arrest and the prevention of crime. In many situations a number of these justifications are likely to be in play simultaneously. The soldier needs to deal with the situation with
\[^53\]: [1977] AC 105 at p. 138. \[^54\]: [1985] N.I. 457. \[^55\]: Glanville Williams, *Textbook on Criminal Law*, 1st Ed. (1978) 457. which he is confronted. On many occasions, his response will be purely intuitive. It would be wrong to require him to have undertaken a nice analysis of the applicability of possibly overlapping justifications. More fundamentally, it would be wrong to determine the question by reference to his subjective view, formed in extremis, as to the purpose he was intending to achieve by the use of force.
Accordingly it is submitted that the defence under section 3, Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland), 1967 is not dependent upon the user of force having formed a subjective intention to use force for a particular purpose. Nor is it necessary that the use of force should be justified for any given purpose which he had in mind. It is sufficient if the use of force was objectively justified for one of the purposes identified in the provision.
Whether it was necessary in any given situation to use force for one of these purposes and, if so, whether the degree of force used was reasonable in the circumstances are in a criminal trial essentially jury questions. However, Sir John Smith provides assistance as to the correct approach and appropriate standard:
*It cannot be reasonable to cause harm unless (i) it was necessary to do so in order to prevent the crime or effect the arrest and (ii) the evil which would follow from failure to prevent the crime or effect the arrest is so great that a reasonable man might think himself justified in causing that harm to avert that evil. It is likely, therefore, that even killing will be justifiable to prevent unlawful killing or grievous bodily harm, or to arrest a man where there is an imminent risk of his causing death or grievous bodily harm if left at liberty.*
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56 Smith and Hogan, *Criminal Law*, 10th Ed., 278. 57 Smith and Hogan, *Criminal Law*, 10th Ed., 279, original emphasis. As in the case of self-defence and defence of another, the standard of reasonableness requires one to have regard to all the circumstances of the incident.
The standard of reasonableness should, ..., take account of the nature of the crisis in which the necessity to use force arises for, in circumstances of great stress, even the reasonable man cannot be expected to judge the minimum degree of force required to a nicety.(^{58})
Thus in Reed v. Wastie(^{59}) Lord Lane observed:
In the circumstances one did not use jewellers' scales to measure reasonable force.
In Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference No. 1 of 1975(^{60}) Lord Diplock stated:
What amount of force is "reasonable in the circumstances" for the purpose of preventing crime is, in my view, always a question for the jury in a jury trial, never a "point of law" for the judge.
The form in which the jury would have to ask themselves the question in a trial for an offence against the person in which this defence was raised by the accused, would be: Are we satisfied that no reasonable man (a) with knowledge of such facts as were known to the accused or reasonably believed by him to exist (b) in the circumstances and time available to him for reflection (c) could be of opinion that the prevention of the risk of harm to which others might be exposed if the suspect were allowed to escape justified exposing the suspect to the risk of harm to him that might result from the kind of force that the accused contemplated using?
To answer this the jury would have first to decide what were the facts that did exist and were known to the accused to do so and what were mistakenly believed by the accused
(^{58}) Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 10th Ed., 279.
(^{59}) [1972] Crim LR 221.
(^{60}) [1977] AC 105. to be facts. In respect of the latter the jury would have had to decide whether any reasonable man on the material available to the accused could have shared that belief...
The jury would have also to consider how the circumstances in which the accused had to make his decision whether or not to use force and the shortness of the time available to him for reflection, might affect the judgment of a reasonable man. In the facts that are to be assumed for the purposes of the reference there is material upon which a jury might take the view that the accused had reasonable grounds for apprehension of imminent danger to himself and other members of the patrol if the deceased were allowed to get away and join armed fellow-members of the Provisional I.R.A. who might be lurking in the neighbourhood, and that the time available to the accused to make up his mind what to do was so short that even a reasonable man could only act intuitively. This being so, the jury in approaching the final part of the question should remind themselves that the postulated balancing of risk against risk, harm against harm, by the reasonable man is not undertaken in the calm analytical atmosphere of the court-room after counsel with the benefit of hindsight have expounded at length the reasons for and against the kind and degree of force that was used by the accused: but in the brief second or two which the accused had to decide whether to shoot or not and under all the stresses to which he was exposed.
In many cases where force is used in the prevention of crime or in effecting an arrest there is a choice as to the degree of force to use. On the facts that are to be assumed for the purposes of the reference the only options open to the accused were either to let the deceased escape or to shoot at him with a service rifle. A reasonable man would know that a bullet from a self-loading rifle if it hit a human being, at any rate at the range at which the accused fired, would be likely to kill him or to injure him seriously. So in one scale of the balance the harm to which the deceased would be exposed if the accused aimed to hit him was predictable and grave and the risk of its occurrence high. In the other scale of the balance it would be open to the jury to take the view that it would not be unreasonable to assess the kind of harm to be averted by preventing the accused's escape as even graver - the killing or wounding of members of the patrol by terrorists in ambush, and the effect of this success by members of the Provisional I.R.A. in encouraging the continuance of the armed insurrection and all the misery and destruction of life and property that terrorist activity in Northern Ireland has entailed. The jury would have to consider too what was the highest degree at which a reasonable man could have assessed the likelihood that such consequences might follow the escape of the deceased if the facts had been as the accused knew or believed them reasonably to be."
It will be apparent that Lord Diplock's formulation of the issues of law addresses the question of a mistaken understanding of the facts on the basis that a Defendant should be judged by his mistaken understanding of the facts only if his mistake is reasonable. In other words, a genuine but negligent mistake as to the facts would not afford a defence. This approach accorded with the widely held view in 1976 when that case was decided in the House of Lords. However, since that decision a subjective approach to criminal liability has prevailed. The reasoning which led the Court of Appeal and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to accept, in Gladstone Williams and Beckford respectively, that in cases of self-defence a Defendant must be judged by his mistaken understanding of the facts even if that understanding was unreasonable, applies equally to cases of acts in the prevention of crime or effecting lawful arrest. Similarly, the reasoning of the House of Lords in B (A Minor) v. DPP applies equally here. Furthermore, issues in relation to self-defence and the prevention of crime frequently arise from a single factual situation. It is unthinkable that the two defences could impose different approaches to questions of mistaken belief. It is submitted therefore that Sir John Smith is clearly correct in his view that the second paragraph of the above passage must now be read as if "reasonably" were omitted. Accordingly, a genuine but unreasonable mistake may afford a defence to a criminal charge not only on grounds of self-defence or defence of another but also
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61 At p. 137-8. Emphasis added. 62 See, in particular, Morgan [1976] AC 182. 63 (1983) 78 Cr App R 276. 64 [1988] AC 130. 65 [2002] 2 AC 428. 66 Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 10th Ed., 279. on grounds of the prevention of crime or effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders. Moreover, section 3, Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967 is required to be interpreted in this way in its application to events which occurred in Northern Ireland in 1972.
However, when read subject to this important qualification, the speech of Lord Diplock in Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference No. 1 of 1975 provides valuable guidance. In particular we would draw attention to the following features:
(1) The essential question is whether a person in that situation might reasonably conclude that the prevention of the risk of harm to which others might be exposed if the suspect were allowed to escape justified exposing the suspect to the risk of harm to him that might result from the kind of force that the actor contemplated using.
(2) It is essential to have regard to the precise opportunity - "the circumstances and time available to him for reflection" - available to the actor to assess the situation with which he was confronted and to balance the nature of the threat with available courses of conduct. In particular, it is essential to have regard to how the circumstances in which the accused had to make his decision whether or not to use force and the shortness of the time available to him for reflection, might affect the judgment of a reasonable man.
(3) The tribunal of fact has to assess the highest degree at which a reasonable man could have assessed the likelihood that consequences such as the killing or wounding of soldiers by
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67 [1977] AC 105. terrorists might follow the escape of the deceased if the facts had been as the accused knew or believed them to be.
THE YELLOW CARD.
3A-70 With regard to the use of force in self-defence, in defence of another, in the prevention of crime and the effecting of a lawful arrest, soldiers are subject to the same rules as any other citizen.
3A-71 The Yellow Card gives instructions to soldiers. It is also intended to provide guidance to soldiers on questions of acute difficulty which, when they arise, are likely to call for instantaneous decisions. Its contents are not immutable. It went through a number of editions. The version current on Bloody Sunday was the fourth edition which had been revised and published in November 1971.
3A-72 The Yellow Card distinguishes between troops operating individually and collectively. In opening Mr. Christopher Clarke QC observed:
The Tribunal may think that if the circumstances were that soldiers making arrests or protecting those who were, were fired on from various sources and had to defend themselves, they were not acting collectively for the purposes of these instructions since, having to make an instantaneous response to fire against them, they were not and could not be under the immediate control of a superior officer for the purposes of taking collective action as a group. (Day 4: 91)
3A-73 As Mr. Clarke QC observed in his opening:
The card was not and is not a source of law. It was an attempt to provide in a manner intelligible to those who might have to decide whether or not to have to fire lethal weapons a guide as to whether they could do so. It could not and did not legislate for every circumstance. (Day 4: 82-83.)
3A-74 The Yellow Card is not and does not purport to be a comprehensive statement of the circumstances in which the use of force by soldiers would be justified in law. It is submitted that a soldier who uses force in conformity with the Yellow Card would act in a manner which is justified in law. However, conduct which does not accord with the requirements in the Yellow Card may nevertheless be legally justified. The use of force in circumstances other than those identified in the Yellow Card may well be justified on grounds of self-defence or defence of another. Thus, the Yellow Card does not expressly permit the use of force against an acid bomber but there would be many circumstances in which a soldier would be justified in firing to defend himself or another from such an attack. Similarly, the Yellow Card barely addresses questions of the justifiable use of force in the prevention of crime or in effecting arrests, although it is touched on in paragraphs 10, 11 and 18.
It follows therefore that the assessment of conduct by reference to the Yellow Card is likely to prove a fruitless exercise. The central issues in this Inquiry must be determined by reference to the legal principles identified above and not by reference to the guidance in the Yellow Card.
SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE PRESENT CASE.
The situations which this Inquiry is investigating give rise to particular questions in relation to the application of these principles of justification on grounds of self-defence, defence of another, prevention of crime and effecting lawful arrest in the circumstances prevailing in Londonderry on Bloody Sunday.
(1) Soldiers on duty in Londonderry on Bloody Sunday were under a legally enforceable duty to prevent crime and to arrest offenders. The matter was expressed as follows by Lord Diplock in Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference No. 1 of 1975:
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68 [1977] AC 105, at pp. 136-7. There is little authority in English law concerning the rights and duties of a member of the armed forces of the Crown when acting in aid of the civil power; and what little authority there is relates almost entirely to the duties of soldiers when troops are called upon to assist in controlling a riotous assembly. Where used for such temporary purposes it may not be inaccurate to describe the legal rights and duties of a soldier as being no more than those of an ordinary citizen in uniform. But such a description is in my view misleading in the circumstances in which the army is currently employed in aid of the civil power in Northern Ireland. In some parts of the province there has existed for some years now a state of armed and clandestinely organised insurrection against the lawful government of Her Majesty by persons seeking to gain political ends by violent means - that is, by committing murder and other crimes of violence against persons and property. Due to the efforts of the army and police to suppress it the insurrection has been sporadic in its manifestations but, as events have repeatedly shown, if vigilance is relaxed the violence erupts again. In theory it may be the duty of every citizen when an arrestable offence is about to be committed in his presence to take whatever reasonable measures are available to him to prevent the commission of the crime; but the duty is one of imperfect obligation and does not place him under any obligation to do anything by which he would expose himself to risk of personal injury, nor is he under any duty to search for criminals or seek out crime. In contrast to this a soldier who is employed in aid of the civil power in Northern Ireland is under a duty, enforceable under military law, to search for criminals if so ordered by his superior officer and to risk his own life should this be necessary in preventing terrorist acts. For the performance of this duty he is armed with a firearm, a self-loading rifle, from which a bullet, if it hits the human body, is almost certain to cause serious injury if not death.
(2) In the case of self-defence it is often appropriate to consider whether the actor had the opportunity to withdraw to a place of safety, thereby avoiding the attack. It may be appropriate to direct a jury that while the Defendant need not show by his actions that he does not want to fight, the possibility of retreat, if it was safe for him to do so, is a factor - but only one factor - which may be taken into account in deciding whether it was necessary to use force and if so whether the amount of force used was reasonable. There can be no sensible application of this principle to soldiers who are acting under orders to move into a particular area and there come under attack or believe that they have come under attack. Furthermore this principle cannot apply where a soldier is seeking to prevent the commission of crime or to arrest a resisting suspect.
(3) In considering the use of force to arrest an individual, a distinction falls to be drawn between a fleeing suspect and a resisting suspect. Where the suspect flees, the justification for the use of force rests on section 3. Where, however, the suspect resists arrest both section 3 and self-defence come into play. Glanville Williams provides the following analysis:
Where the suspect forcibly resists lawful arrest, Hale lays it down as clear law that the officer may in the last resort use fatal force, irrespective of the crime for which he is arresting. This legal result is achieved by combining the law of arrest with the right of self-defence. An officer who is endeavouring to effect an arrest is not obliged to give back, but may press forward against resistance, meeting the resistance with self-defence according to the usual rules, except that he is clearly under no duty to retreat. As the struggle gains in ferocity, and the offender is obliged to use more and more extreme measures against the officer if he is to avoid being disabled, the point is reached at which the officer comes to fear that he will himself suffer death or grave harm unless he retreats or uses extreme violence, and in such circumstances he may use that violence. The fact that section 3 and the right of self-defence act together in this way shows that the right of defence remains separate from section 3.
Where the offender is armed with a lethal weapon, the fatal point in the struggle may be reached quickly, the legal analysis of the situation being in no way affected. Nor is the legal position any different in theory where both parties are armed with firearms. In such circumstances, the officer must, for his own protection, shoot first if the other shows any sign of reaching for his gun. If the suspect is being besieged and is armed, the police are frank that when they decide to shoot, they shoot to kill. Presumably the law allows this, even though the result is that the police bring back not a suspect but a corpse. Their duty is not merely to arrest but, if they cannot arrest a dangerous offender, to prevent him from continuing at liberty. However, we have no explicit authority on the question since the Act of 1967; and the police have to recognise that public opinion is sensitive on the use of guns by the police.
These rules apply whether the suspect is presenting his face to the officer or is engaged in a "running fight", firing perhaps from the rear of a car. American authorities apply them where an arrest is validly made by a private person, and on principle this is clearly right.
Since the right to kill a resisting criminal depends upon the law of self-defence combined with the rule that an arrester need not attempt to withdraw, it applies to all manner of lawful arrests and not merely to arrest for serious crimes. If a desperado, wanted on any ground, barricades himself with arms in a house he may be deliberately shot if that is the only way to quell his dangerous resistance. Under section 18 Offences against the Person Act it is a crime to wound to resist arrest ... and where this crime is committed or attempted, an additional ground is furnished for shooting the resisting criminal, even when his original crime was not of a character to justify the use of fatal force in arrest apart from resistance. The arrester, as soon as the weapon is used against him, may ignore the original charge and proceed to use force on the basis that he is arresting for the crime of attempting to wound to resist arrest.69
(4) In considering the application of section 3, the belief of the actor as to whether the person he fires at is or is not a terrorist will be of great importance. Thus in Clegg70 the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland having concluded that there was evidence to raise the defence under section 3, went on to consider whether there had been any miscarriage of justice by reason of the judge's decision to the contrary. The Court of Appeal pointed out that there was no suggestion in Private Clegg's evidence that he thought that the driver of the vehicle was a terrorist or that if the driver escaped he would carry out any terrorist offences in the future. In those circumstances,
69 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd Ed. (1983) 510-511. 70 R v. Clegg [1995] AC 482. the use of lethal force to arrest the driver of the car was in the view of the Court of Appeal "so grossly disproportionate to the mischief to be averted" that any tribunal of fact would have been bound to find that the force used was unreasonable. On the other hand, very different considerations apply where force is used against a person who is or is believed to be a terrorist. It is particularly significant that Lord Diplock in Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference No. 1 of 1975 considered that harm to be averted which would justify the use of lethal force to prevent the escape of a terrorist would include the killing or wounding of members of a patrol by terrorists in ambush, and the effect of this success by members of the Provisional I.R.A. in encouraging the continuance of the armed insurrection.
(5) When acting in prevention of crime it is not necessary to apprehend that the crime will be committed immediately. However, the force used must be immediately necessary.
Need it be apprehended that the crime will be committed immediately?
No. But the force used must be immediately necessary. You may use force if it is immediately necessary to disarm a man who is running off to commit a crime elsewhere.
In this regard we draw attention, once again, to Lord Diplock's formulation referred to in the previous sub-paragraph:
On the facts that are to be assumed for the purposes of the reference there is material upon which a jury might take the view that the accused had reasonable grounds for apprehension of imminent danger to himself and
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71 See the speech of Lord Lloyd of Berwick in the House of Lords at pp. 490-1. 72 [1977] AC 105, at p. 138. 73 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd Ed. (1983) 494. other members of the patrol if the deceased were allowed to get away and join armed fellow-members of the Provisional I.R.A. who might be lurking in the neighbourhood.
While Lord Diplock is clearly correct in concluding, in the circumstances he postulates, that it would be sufficient that there were reasonable grounds for apprehension of imminent danger to the actor or other members of the patrol if the terrorist were allowed to get away and join fellow terrorists, he clearly considered that the defence would also be available where the use of force was immediately necessary to prevent a crime in the future. This is apparent from the following passages:
...I propose to deal with the reference on the basis that the accused's honest and reasonable belief was that the deceased was a member of the Provisional IRA who, if he got away, was likely sooner or later to participate in acts of violence. (at p. 135G)
In the instant reference the relevant purpose for which it is to be assumed that force was used by the accused is the prevention of crime. (at p. 137D)
In many cases where force is used in the prevention of crime or in effecting an arrest there is a choice as to the degree of force to use. On the facts that are to be assumed for the purposes of the reference the only options open to the accused were either to let the deceased escape or to shoot at him with a service rifle. A reasonable man would know that a bullet from a self-loading rifle if it hit a human being, at any rate at the range at which the accused fired, would be likely to kill him or to injure him seriously. So in one scale of the balance the harm to which the deceased would be exposed if the accused aimed to hit him was predictable and grave and the risk of its occurrence high. In the other scale of the balance it would be open to the jury to take the view that it would not be unreasonable to assess the kind of harm to be averted by preventing the accused's escape as even graver - the killing or wounding
74 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd Ed. (1983) 503. of members of the patrol by terrorists in ambush, and the effect of this success by members of the Provisional I.R.A. in encouraging the continuance of the armed insurrection and all the misery and destruction of life and property that terrorist activity in Northern Ireland has entailed. The jury would have to consider too what was the highest degree at which a reasonable man could have assessed the likelihood that such consequences might follow the escape of the deceased if the facts had been as the accused knew or believed them reasonably to be. (at p. 138D)
The potential breadth of this principle has been criticised by Sir John Smith in (1994) NLJ 356. Similarly, in R. v. Fisher and Wright, 10 February 1995, Kelly LJ, sitting as a first instance judge, stated:
It is at least clear that the fear of imminent danger is an essential requisite for the defence of self-defence. ... If Lord Diplock is correct, that requisite is no longer a necessary one under section 3 of the 1967 Act for the defence of the prevention of crime. The only way, it seems to me, to hold the Diplock principle within reasonable and sensible bounds is for the courts to adopt the policy that only in the most exceptional cases can the use of force be reasonable to prevent crime that is not imminent.
Kelly LJ also stated that he knew of no criminal case in which the Diplock principle had been applied by the courts in Northern Ireland.
However, in McCullagh v. Chief Constable of the RUC, 27th March 1992, a civil case, Carswell J. provides an excellent example of the application of the Diplock principle:
In the present case the mischief which the police could prevent by firing at the car was the escape of a group of terrorists. They were reasonably regarded, as I have found, by the police officers as persons who were so intent on escaping capture that they were prepared to run down a policeman standing in their way and to risk killing or injuring him. Persons so determined to escape capture would be likely to be active and hardened terrorists, who would very probably continue to commit terrorist crimes if allowed to go free. They would then retain their liberty to engage in the type of attack upon the community practised by members of terrorist organisations. The harm to which the driver was exposed when the police officers aimed at the car was predictable and grave and the risk of its occurrence was high. But in my opinion the kind of harm to be averted (as the officers reasonably thought) by preventing their escape was even higher - the freedom conferred on dangerous terrorists to resume their activities of dealing in death and destruction and, in Lord Diplock's words, "encouraging the continuance of the armed insurrection and all the misery and destruction of life and property that terrorist activity in Northern Ireland has entailed".
While the potential breadth of the principle remains open for argument, and while, if necessary, we would contend that Lord Diplock's statement of the law should be applied, it will be submitted that in each of the situations in which a soldier we represent fired in order to prevent the commission of crime there existed an imminent threat that crime would be committed so as to justify the soldier's conduct. Accordingly, it is submitted that the Tribunal will not be required to rule on whether Lord Diplock's statement does, in this respect, represent the law.
(6) The soldiers who entered the Bogside on Bloody Sunday had no real opportunity to use graduated force, whether to defend themselves or others, to effect arrests or to prevent crime. In particular they had no choice as to the weapons with which they were armed. Hence Lord Diplock's observations in Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference No. 1 of 1975:
For the performance of this duty he is armed with a firearm, a self-loading rifle, from which a bullet, if it hits the human body, is almost certain to cause serious injury if not death.
73 [1977] AC 105, at pp. 137 and 138. In many cases where force is used in the prevention of crime or in effecting an arrest there is a choice as to the degree of force to use. On the facts that are to be assumed for the purposes of the reference the only options open to the accused were either to let the deceased escape or to shoot at him with a service rifle. A reasonable man would know that a bullet from a self-loading rifle if it hit a human being, at any rate at the range at which the accused fired, would be likely to kill him or to injure him seriously.
In Clegg Lord Lloyd referred to the first of these passages:
I would particularly emphasise the last sentence in the above quotation. In most cases of a person acting in self-defence, or a police officer arresting an offender, there is a choice as to the degree of force to be used, even if it is a choice which has to be exercised on the spur of the moment, without time for measured reflection. But in the case of a soldier in Northern Ireland, in the circumstances in which Private Clegg found himself, there is no scope for graduated force. The only choice lay between firing a high-velocity rifle which, if aimed accurately, was almost certain to kill or injure, and doing nothing at all. 76
(7) The reality of the situation was that soldiers on duty in Londonderry that day had to take a split second decision as to whether to use potentially lethal force in circumstances where they believed they were under terrorist attack. In these circumstances the expression "the agony of the moment" is entirely appropriate. These soldiers were confronted with circumstances in which even a reasonable man could only act intuitively. 77
76 [1995] AC 482 at p. 498. 77 See the observations of Lord Diplock in Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference No. 1 of 1975 at pp. 138, 139. (8) Notwithstanding the nature of the weapons with which they were armed, it does not follow that those soldiers who fired live rounds on Bloody Sunday necessarily intended to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm. In the particular circumstances in which they were placed it would be hardly surprising if they failed to foresee the likely consequences of their acts beyond the immediate consequence of preventing attack or preventing the attacker from getting away. This was the case in the legal proceedings in Northern Ireland which gave rise to Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference No. 1 of 1975 where Lord Diplock commented:
MacDermott J. was not satisfied that when he fired the fatal shot the accused had in fact formed the intention of killing or seriously injuring the deceased. So even if it be assumed that the force used by the accused was not "reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime" there could be no question of his being guilty of the crime of murder rather than that of manslaughter. The learned judge's finding, which is one of fact, appears to be consistent with the view that in the agony of the moment the accused may have acted intuitively or instinctively without foreseeing the likely consequences of his act beyond preventing the deceased from getting away. 78
(9) If a man shoots in self-defence and by mistake kills an innocent bystander he is not guilty of murder or manslaughter.79 Sir John Smith explains this as follows:
The intent which is transferred [in transferred malice] must be a mens rea, whether intention or recklessness. If D shoots O with intent to kill, because O is making a murderous attack on him and this is the only way in which he can preserve his own life, he does not intend an actus reus (in the broader sense,...)for to kill in these circumstances is justified. If, however, D misses O and
78 At p. 139. 79 Foster's Crown Cases, 1743-61, 299; Archbold, 2004, 17-24. inadvertently kills P, an innocent bystander, he does cause an actus reus but he is not guilty of murder for there is no mens rea (in the broader sense) to transfer; the result which he intended was a perfectly lawful one.80
3A-IV SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL SUBMISSIONS ON SELF-DEFENCE, DEFENCE OF ANOTHER, PREVENTION OF CRIME AND EFFECTING OR ASSISTING IN LAWFUL ARREST.
3A-77 Our principal submissions on this area of the law may be summarised as follows:
(1) In a criminal prosecution it is for the prosecution to prove to the criminal standard that a use of force resulting in death or injury was unlawful. The prosecution must prove that the use of force was not justified. The same principles should apply here.
(2) A person who is attacked or believes that he or another is about to be attacked is entitled to use such force as is reasonably necessary to defend himself or that other.
(3) When deciding whether or not the force used by an individual was reasonable it is necessary to have regard to all the circumstances of the case.
(4) Even in a normal situation, failure to retreat when attacked and when it is possible and safe to do so, is not conclusive. It is simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether it was necessary for the person attacked to use force and whether the force used was reasonable.
80 Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 10th Ed., 91-2. (5) An individual faced with an attack cannot be expected to weigh with precision the exact degree of force which would be reasonable in the circumstances.
(6) An individual acting in self-defence who has or may have made a mistake as to the relevant facts is entitled to be judged by the facts as he honestly believed them to be. Moreover, this is so even if his mistaken belief was unreasonably held. The critical question is therefore: Taking the circumstances and the danger as the individual honestly believed them to be, was the amount of force which he used reasonable?
(7) Section 3 Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967 is a rule of both civil and criminal law. When the use of force is reasonable in the circumstances it is justified in every sense and gives rise to neither civil nor criminal liability.
(8) It is for those making allegations of wrongdoing by soldiers to prove that the conduct in question was not justified on grounds of self-defence or defence of another, the prevention of crime or effecting or assisting in a lawful arrest.
(9) The defence under section 3, Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland), 1967 is not dependent upon the user of force having formed a subjective intention to use force for a particular purpose. The objectives of the use of force are to be determined by the court applying an objective test. It is not necessary that the use of force should be justified for any given purpose which the user had in mind. It is sufficient if the use of force was objectively justified for one of the purposes identified in the provision.
(10) Even killing will be justifiable to prevent unlawful killing or grievous bodily harm, or to arrest a man where there is an imminent risk of his causing death or grievous bodily harm if left at liberty. (11) Under section 3, the standard of reasonableness requires one to have regard to all the circumstances of the incident.
(12) A genuine but unreasonable mistake may afford a defence to a criminal charge on grounds of the prevention of crime or effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders.
(13) Under section 3, the essential question is whether a person in that situation might reasonably conclude that the prevention of the risk of harm to which others might be exposed if the suspect were allowed to escape justifies exposing the suspect to the risk of harm to him that might result from the kind of force that the actor contemplates using.
(14) It is essential to have regard to the precise opportunity available to the actor to assess the situation with which he was confronted and to balance the nature of the threat with available courses of conduct. In particular, it is essential to have regard to how the circumstances in which the accused had to make his decision whether or not to use force and the shortness of the time available to him for reflection, might affect the judgment of a reasonable man.
(15) The tribunal of fact has to assess the highest degree at which a reasonable man could have assessed the likelihood that consequences such as the killing or wounding of soldiers by terrorists might follow the escape of the deceased if the facts had been as the accused knew or believed them to be.
(16) The Yellow Card is not and does not purport to be a comprehensive statement of the circumstances in which the use of force by soldiers would be justified in law. A soldier who uses force in conformity with the Yellow Card would act in a manner which is justified in law. However, conduct which does not accord with the requirements in the Yellow Card may nevertheless be legally justified. Accordingly, the assessment of conduct by reference to the Yellow Card is unlikely to be determinative.
(17) Soldiers on duty in Londonderry on Bloody Sunday were under a legally enforceable duty to prevent crime and to arrest offenders. They were under a duty, enforceable under military law, to search for criminals if so ordered by his superior officer and to risk their own lives should this be necessary in preventing terrorist acts.
(18) In the case of self-defence it is often appropriate to consider whether the actor had the opportunity to withdraw to a place of safety, thereby avoiding the attack. There can be no sensible application of this policy to soldiers who are acting under orders.
(19) Where a suspect resists arrest both section 3 and self-defence come into play. A soldier who is endeavouring to effect an arrest is not obliged to withdraw, but may press forward against resistance, meeting the resistance with self-defence according to the usual rules, except that he is clearly under no duty to retreat. As the struggle gains in ferocity, and the offender is obliged to use more and more extreme measures against the soldier if he is to avoid being disabled, the point is reached at which the soldier comes to fear that he will himself suffer death or grave harm unless he retreats or uses extreme violence, and in such circumstances he may use that violence. Where the offender is armed with a lethal weapon, the fatal point in the struggle may be reached quickly, the legal analysis of the situation being in no way affected. Nor is the legal position any different in theory where both parties are armed with firearms. In such circumstances, the soldier must, for his own protection, shoot first if the other shows any sign of reaching for his gun. Their duty is not merely to arrest but, if he cannot arrest a dangerous offender, to prevent him from continuing at liberty. (20) In considering the application of section 3, the understanding of the actor as to whether the person he fires at is or is not a terrorist will be of great importance.
(21) When acting in prevention of crime it is not necessary to apprehend that the crime will be committed immediately. However, the force used must be immediately necessary. Thus, one may use force if it is immediately necessary to disarm a man who is running off to commit a crime elsewhere.
(22) The soldiers who entered the Bogside on Bloody Sunday had no real opportunity to use graduated force, whether to defend themselves or others, to effect arrests or to prevent crime. In particular they had no choice as to the weapons with which they were armed.
(23) The reality of the situation was that soldiers on duty in Londonderry that day had to take split second decisions as to whether to use potentially lethal force in circumstances where they believed they were under terrorist attack. These soldiers were confronted with circumstances in which even a reasonable man could only act intuitively.
(24) Notwithstanding the nature of the weapons with which they were armed, it does not follow that those soldiers who fired live rounds on Bloody Sunday necessarily intended to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm.
(25) If a man shoots in self-defence and by mistake kills an innocent bystander he is not guilty of murder or manslaughter. CLOSING SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENTS OF MR ANTHONY LAWTON
VOLUME 2
CHAPTER 4 THE IRA CHAPTER 4
THE PROVISIONAL AND OFFICIAL IRAS
CHAPTER 4A - THE RELEVANT LAW
4A-I The Provisional and Official IRAs - Introduction ........................................... 1
CHAPTER 4B - THE PROVISIONAL IRA
4B-I Introduction ........................................................................................................... 3 4B-II PIRA and the Bloody Sunday Inquiry ................................................................. 3 The Precedence of the “Republican Code of Honour” ............................................. 3 The Green Book ........................................................................................................... 8 Intimidation .................................................................................................................. 8 Stage Management of PIRA Evidence ..................................................................... 11 4B-III Structure and Discipline .................................................................................. 17 Structure ..................................................................................................................... 17 Youth ........................................................................................................................... 19 Newly recruited Officials ............................................................................................ 23 Effect of Internment .................................................................................................... 25 PIRA 24 and Martin McGuinness ............................................................................. 26 Discipline ..................................................................................................................... 27 4B-IV Weapons ........................................................................................................... 30 In Short Supply .......................................................................................................... 30 Weapons Dumps .......................................................................................................... 31 4B-V Modus Operandi .................................................................................................. 32 General ....................................................................................................................... 32 The Exploitation of Riots ............................................................................................ 33 Ambush ....................................................................................................................... 40 Sniper Attack .............................................................................................................. 41 4B-VI PIRA/OIRA Relations ....................................................................................... 42 4B-VII The Decision to take No Action ..................................................................... 43 4B-VIII The Movement of Weapons ......................................................................... 49 “Arms were not withdrawn” ..................................................................................... 50 “We took all our weapons out to the Creggan Estate” ............................................. 52 “They were brought to a central Location...Creggan was too vulnerable” ............. 53 Weapons rejected at Creggan so returned to Bogside ............................................. 55 4B-IX The Creggan and Brandywell Mobile Patrol Units ......................................... 57 The Myth of the Military Threat to the Creggan and the Brandywell ..................... 58 The size of the Creggan and Brandywell Patrols ..................................................... 62 Creggan and Brandywell Cars deploy to the Bogside ............................................. 64 The Attack on the Old Dairy ..................................................................................... 65 4B-X Provisional ira Shots from the Bogside Inn ..................................................... 73 The Decision to take no action .................................................................................. 73 CHAPTER 4C – THE OFFICIAL IRA
4C-I Introduction.................................................................108 4C-II The Structure and Organisation of the Official IRA..........................108 Extent and Structure......................................................110 Decision Making..........................................................112 The Official Fianna.......................................................118 Discipline.................................................................123 4C-III OIRA Policy Towards the British Army......................................126 4C-IV The Standing and Attitude of the Official IRA at the Time of Bloody Sunday..................................................133 Defensive Policy?..........................................................143 The Need to Protect Civilians...........................................146 Weapons/Control of Weapons...........................................159 Control of Bogside weapons............................................171 OIRA Gunmen on Bloody Sunday........................................205 4C-V Propaganda after the event................................................224 4C-VI OIRA evidence before this tribunal........................................234 4C-VII Conclusions............................................................247 CHAPTER 4
THE PROVISIONAL AND OFFICIAL IRAS - INTRODUCTION
4A-1 The Tribunal has heard from a number of witnesses who have admitted membership of one or other wing of the IRA. It is accepted that these terrorist organisations operated largely independently at the time of Bloody Sunday and, for that reason, their evidence is dealt with separately below.
4A-2 There are, nonetheless, factors common to all those paramilitaries who have given evidence which the Tribunal will no doubt wish to bear in mind in considering their accounts.
4A-3 Members of both wings of the IRA have provided limited cooperation and only then at a very late stage. We submit that this reflects their joint objective of orchestrating and coordinating their evidence in the light of that which the Tribunal had already heard. The purpose, no doubt, was to prevent the Tribunal from finding the truth about Bloody Sunday, particularly so far as the involvement of these organisations is concerned.
4A-4 Both OIRA and PIRA witnesses have demonstrated their intention to withhold information from and a willingness to lie to this Tribunal. Neither tactic will come as a surprise from individuals who have long refused to recognise the legitimacy of courts of law and who continue to profess their overriding loyalty to the Republican cause above all other considerations. The Tribunal might expect witnesses, whose primary objective during their time in the IRA was to kill members of the Security Forces, to have no compunction about lying in order to condemn those soldiers who were their declared enemies. CHAPTER 4B
THE PROVISIONAL IRA
4B-I INTRODUCTION
There has been a cynical attempt on the part of Provisional IRA witnesses to manipulate these proceedings and to exploit them for their own advantage. Their obstructive approach is explained by the fact it is now possible to demonstrate that Provisional IRA witnesses were very probably involved in a series of armed attacks on the Security Forces on Bloody Sunday, at least one of which took place at a very early stage indeed.
4B-II PIRA AND THE BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY
PIRA witnesses have shown a marked reluctance to come forward and to provide any assistance to the Tribunal. When they have come forward, they have done so late in the day, on their own terms and with their own objectives. The Tribunal may conclude that such an approach is inconsistent with a group of witnesses who are willing to tell the whole truth and who have nothing to hide.
THE PRECEDENCE OF THE "REPUBLICAN CODE OF HONOUR"
It was neither the desire nor the intention of the Provisional IRA witnesses to provide all relevant information about Bloody Sunday to the Tribunal. They made no secret of this fact. The witnesses explained that their "Republican code of honour" or their "oath of allegiance" was such that they must refuse to disclose certain categories of information, however helpful they might be to the Tribunal in its search for the truth.
1 See also Chapter 2, above, where the refusal of former members of the IRA to assist this Inquiry is further considered. PIRA 14 held “a very senior position” within PIRA in the Republic at the time of Bloody Sunday. He made it quite clear in his BSI statement where his loyalties lay:
1. I wish to make it clear that I have not come forward to this Tribunal voluntarily. I am extremely unhappy at being required to attend under subpoena...
2. I also wish to clarify my position as regards any potential conflict which may occur between my oath of allegiance as a Republican and the oath I will take to tell the truth to this Tribunal... if a question puts me in conflict with my existing oath of allegiance I will have to refuse to answer as I am not prepared to lie under oath nor am I prepared to break my oath.
PIRA 24 was Officer Commanding the PIRA Derry Battalion. He stated in his BSI statement:
I am not prepared to name other members of the Republican movement, unless such volunteers have already come forward and declared their names openly.
He refused to give information to the Tribunal even when its relevance and importance was explained to him. For instance, he was asked by Edwin Glasgow QC to name the Quartermasters of the five Companies of the Derry Battalion:
Q. The difference between what has been said and what you are saying is that any of the quartermasters could, without your specific authority, have authorised an operation and, for all you know, you might not have been told about it; you were just dependent upon what they tell you and you believing them?
A. You are depending on people’s belief for to tell you the truth.
Q. Of course. In that case I am suggesting that it is absolutely essential that this Tribunal can check, at least with those officers, so that they may have their evidence as well as you. Will you please write down on a piece of paper the names of the quartermasters who were authorised to give authority for operations?
______________________________________________________________________
2 Day 421/016/19 3 APIRA 14.1 4 APIRA 24.5 paragraph 21 A. No.
Q. Again, I ask that you -- in view of the evidence that you have given -- be directed to give that information confidentially to the Tribunal?
A. I am not giving any names.
Q. What the Tribunal --
A. That was established before we came in here.
...
LORD SAVILLE: PIRA 24, what is being requested of you is to provide the Tribunal with those names, not to give the names in public because, of course, those individuals may have a right to anonymity just as you do. But are you prepared to provide the Tribunal, in confidence, with those names so that if indeed those people are entitled to anonymity they will not lose that right; are you prepared to do that?
A. No.5
Martin McGuinness, Adjutant to the Derry Battalion, adopted precisely the same obstructive approach. Mr McGuinness had refused to give answers to several questions in the early stages of his oral evidence to the Tribunal, causing Lord Saville to intervene in the following terms:
LORD SAVILLE: Mr McGuinness, it is the Chairman speaking: you have refused to tell us whether you were in the Officials; you refused to tell us when you became O/C; you are not telling us whether Mr Keenan was in fact the explosives officer; you are not prepared to tell us the address of the house in the Bogside where you gave instructions that the volunteers were not to engage the Army on Bloody Sunday; you are not prepared to identify where the arms dump was; I fail to understand why you are not answering those questions, in view of the fact that at the beginning of your statement you express your anxiety that this Tribunal should seek to establish the full truth about the circumstances of Bloody Sunday. What we shall do now is to rise for a few moments and I would ask you to consider answering these questions, because if you do not, two things will happen: firstly, you are depriving us of the
5 Day 427/041/23 opportunity of discovering the full facts and matters relating to the events of Bloody Sunday and, secondly, of course, it will be suggested in due course that the reason you are not answering these questions is that you have something to hide?6
There was a short break during which Mr McGuinness was allowed to discuss matters with his legal advisers and after which Lord Saville explained the ambit of the Attorney General’s undertaking, although it was inconceivable that Mr McGuinness had not already been fully advised on that matter. Questions were then put again to Mr McGuinness:
MR CLARKE: Let us take them, if we may, in reverse order. One of the questions that I asked you was where the dump was into which the arms were placed. Are you prepared to answer that question and if not, why not?
A. Well, I feel I cannot answer that question because there is a Republican code of honour. The people who would have allowed us to use their houses, such as the two occasions that you have identified to me, are people who would have placed great faith in those IRA members who were using the house. For me to identify who these people are would be a betrayal, in my view. On many occasions over the course of the last three decades I have been in interrogation centre after interrogation centre, sometimes for a week at a time, and I have never ever, on any occasion, given the name of a single person who was associated with me or with the IRA. To do so would have been a gross act of betrayal and I just could not do that. I do understand that we are in a different situation; I am not in an interrogation centre, at least I think I am not in an interrogation centre, but I have a duty, in my view, stretching back 30 years, to those people and I am not prepared to break my word to them under any circumstances.
LORD SAVILLE: Do I understand from that answer, Mr McGuinness, that your duty of honour overrides the desire the families have to get to the full truth of the events of Bloody Sunday.
A. No, I think getting to the full truth of the events of Bloody Sunday is very important indeed. It is my own view, and I know you differ from this view, that identifying where the building is does not in any material way assist this particular Tribunal. I understand the need for the Tribunal to have that information, but this is a deeply personal thing for me. For me to give the location of these buildings and in doing so identify the people who own these buildings would be a gross act of betrayal and I just cannot do it.
LORD SAVILLE: I am bound to say I understand your answer as being that you feel that your duty of honour overrides the desire of the families for the Tribunal to discover the whole truth about the events of Bloody Sunday.
A. Can I say that is not my position.?
4B-9 Mr McGuinness, who had supported the call for the new Inquiry, refused to give it any real co-operation. He held that his Republican code of honour trumped any legal or moral duty he owed to the Tribunal or, indeed, towards the families of those killed on Bloody Sunday and towards the wounded. Further, he implied that he would be the arbiter of what information it was relevant for the Tribunal to receive – and what he would withhold. In other words, he dictated the limited terms of his appearance at the Inquiry.
4B-10 PIRA witnesses generally defined their own terms of reference to the Tribunal. There are, therefore, numerous examples of PIRA witnesses who held more junior positions in the organisation at the time of Bloody Sunday also refusing, on principle, to disclose information. For example:
(1) Michael Clarke:
I am not prepared to name anyone; not even those who have since died. If people want to come forward and to give evidence to the Inquiry, it is a matter for their conscience, not mine. I stress that I do not wish to stymie the Inquiry, I want the Inquiry to get to the truth. I am simply not prepared to break the oath.
(2) Gerard Doherty:
______________________________________________________________________
7 Day 390/050/16 8 AC157.13 paragraph 14 I am not prepared to name any other people who were in the movement.9
(3) Sean Keenan:
I have been asked whether I met Gerry (Mad Dog) Doherty that day. It is possible that I did but I do not remember it. He was not the volunteer I was with. I will not name that volunteer, or others involved in the movement.10
THE GREEN BOOK
4B-11 The approach of these witnesses is further explained in the light of the Provisional IRA’s “Green Book”, which makes clear that a member’s overriding loyalty is to the IRA and the achievement of its aims. The Green Book is considered in detail in chapter 2.
INTIMIDATION11
4B-12 There may have been something altogether more sinister underlying the Republican “code of honour”.
4B-13 Liam Clarke and Kathryn Johnston wrote in the notes to their book on Mr McGuinness:
Martin McGuinness announced in May 2001 that he would give evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry....
There are persistent rumours that other former senior IRA figures, including the OC, were ‘visited’ by current senior IRA men after McGuinness’ announcement in an attempt to prevent them giving their own version of events.12
9 AD65.19 paragraph 4 10 AK46.2 paragraph 10 11 See chapter 2, above, where the threat of the IRA to witnesses before this Inquiry is further considered. 12 T492.15, From Guns to Government. There is indeed startling evidence that even the most senior member of the Provisional IRA in Derry on Bloody Sunday has been threatened in relation to his evidence to the Inquiry. He was questioned by Edwin Glasgow QC:
Q. PIRA 24, that is a question I ask you to answer on oath: you have not been discouraged by anybody from giving evidence?
A. That is correct.
Q. That would mean that you have not suggested to anybody that you have been discouraged?
A. Um.
Q. Is that true?
A. Where are you leading; are relying to the subpoena here?
Q. I am asking you the question: have you told anybody that you have been put under pressure or discouraged from giving evidence?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. You have. Who did you tell?
A. The guy that was coming with the subpoenas.
Q. And you explained one of the reasons why you did not want to give evidence was that you were being discouraged from doing so?
A. Yes. 13
PIRA 24 then suggested he had not in fact been intimidated at all; rather he claimed to have lied about this in order to gain information:
Q. Who was doing the discouraging or would you rather not say? I am not asking you to name him.
A. No-one was doing the discouraging, and if you let me elaborate on that, could you?
Q. What do you want to say?
13 Day 427/63/5 A. The guy that came with the subpoenas, right, he also had a list with him with other people's names on it, roughly about 18 names, so he came in and sat down beside me, how are you doing and all the rest, and I got into his confidence and he let me see the list of the rest of the people that was being subpoenaed. That was my intentions that was why I had the banter with him.14
PIRA 24's explanation is inherently improbable. What is more, it is in direct conflict with the account given by the Tribunal's agent who visited PIRA 24. The agent's version of events was obtained hastily and in time to allow Christopher Clarke QC to ask PIRA 24 further questions about the incident:
Q. Is it right that you told him that you were willing to help but that a couple of boys had come and told you that you would not be giving evidence?
A. That is right, and the reason for that was to get into his confidence to find out what names was on the sheet of paper that he was going to deliver.
Q. Was there some reference to houses being burnt?
A. No.
Q. The man who came to deliver the letter says that you were his first port of call on the day, you could not have known whether that was true or not, but that the only lists that he ever had were summaries which he made at the end of each day of what he had achieved during the day and that he did not show to you any names or tell you any names of persons he was contacting?
A. I can tell you now that I saw all the names and I remembered at least half of them.
Q. Is it right that for a while thereafter you went to some lengths to avoid the successful service of a subpoena on you?
A. Yes.15
The Solicitor to the Inquiry has informed the Mr Anthony Lawton's Team that a written report has been requested from its agent in respect of this incident. The
14 Day 427/63/24 15 Day 427/116/12 report is likely further to undermine PIRA 24’s suggestion that he lied about the intimidation. It is significant that the agent’s own version of events would appear to corroborate the information given by Mr Clarke and Miss Johnston in the notes to their book.
4B-18 The concern and overwhelming probability must be, if the former commander in Derry has been intimidated in this way, many others will have been too.
STAGE MANAGEMENT OF PIRA EVIDENCE
4B-19 There has been a cynical attempt on the part of certain former members of the IRA to manipulate these proceedings and to exploit them for their own advantage. This is entirely in accordance with the orders contained in the Green Book:
EXPLOIT A SITUATION OR CREATE A SITUATION AND THEN EXPLOIT IT.
Exploiting a situation simply means taking advantage of our enemy’s political or military mistakes.16
4B-20 PIRA 24 was OC of the Derry Battalion and, therefore, a significant witness. Yet, he came forward only at the last minute, and only under subpoena.17 He agreed he would not have come forward at all without that element of compulsion.18 In a move unprecedented even by the low standards of co-operation set by other PIRA witnesses, PIRA 24’s BSI statement was not served on the Interested Parties until 0140 hours on Day 426, 12th February 2004. This was the day on which he was to start giving oral evidence. His evidence concluded on Day 427, making PIRA 24 the final witness to give oral evidence to the Tribunal.
4B-21 By refusing his limited co-operation until the very last possible moment, PIRA 24 did not have to commit himself to any line of evidence until he had heard what all
16 G.139.944 17 AIPRA24.1 paragraph 2 18 Day 427/81/7 other relevant witnesses had said, and, indeed, how they had been questioned by counsel for the Inquiry and those representing the soldiers.
4B-22 It was not only PIRA 24 who delayed the service of his evidence on the Tribunal. In fact, the majority of PIRA witnesses who came forward to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry did so very late in the day. This is to be deprecated but was, unfortunately, the entirely predictable reaction of a secretive organisation with information to hide. Put another way, if the PIRA witnesses had nothing to hide, why did they not come forward at an early stage and with unrestricted terms of reference?
4B-23 There was an inordinate delay by Mr. McGuinness in producing a statement to this Inquiry and no satisfactory explanation was ever offered. The Solicitor to the Inquiry wrote to Mr. McGuinness on 6th April 1999 14th May 1999, 2nd July 1999 and 6th July 1999 seeking his co-operation and asking him to make a statement. None of those letters received a response. A further letter of 22nd December 1999 received no response. On 10th April 2000 the Solicitor to the Inquiry wrote once again to Mr. McGuinness, drawing his attention to the allegations made by Infliction (which had been made public by Christopher Clarke QC on Day 8, 6th April 2000). Yet again no response was received. It was not until 13th December 2000, when Mr. McGuinness applied by counsel for interested party status, that his counsel indicated for the first time that Mr. McGuinness did intend to make a statement but he wished first to be granted interested party status and to have the opportunity to examine all the relevant evidence before the Inquiry.19
4B-24 On that occasion, when Mr. McGuinness applied for interested party status, the Tribunal expressed some puzzlement as to why it was necessary for Mr. McGuinness to survey the entirety of the material before the Inquiry before giving a witness statement. Mr. Hoyt observed during the course of argument:
With all the material that is before the Tribunal, the hundreds of statements that have been given in similar circumstances, surely it is not necessary for you to review all of those for Mr McGuinness
19 Day 61/197/05 to Day 61/199/08 In rejecting the application that he be granted full interested party status before he produced a witness statement, the Tribunal made some particularly pertinent observations.
LORD SAVILLE: We have heard an application this afternoon by Mr McGrory, on behalf of Mr Martin McGuinness, for full interested party status in this Inquiry.
The point the Tribunal immediately raised with Mr McGrory when this application was put forward was why Mr McGuinness has been unable to, or unwilling to provide a statement to the Tribunal to date.
Mr McGrory's submission was that it would be a great injustice to his client if he was asked to give a statement before the question of full party status was settled in his favour and he sought to expand upon that submission by pointing out that Mr McGuinness would appear to be an extremely important witness, who, on one view, played a central role in the events of Bloody Sunday and that, accordingly, Mr McGuinness required the best possible legal advice and, indeed, that legal advice could not be given until the lawyers in question had read, assimilated and considered all the material which the Tribunal has collected to date and, indeed, on one view of what Mr McGrory was saying, any material that hereafter comes to light.
We are quite unconvinced that it would be any injustice at all to Mr McGuinness were he to provide to this Tribunal now a statement of his recollections of during and concerning Bloody Sunday. It seems to us that that request, which has been made to hundreds of witnesses, can be answered as well by Mr McGuinness as it has been answered by all those witnesses.
We indicated to Mr McGrory that the Tribunal would view with great sympathy an application for represented status in front of this Inquiry in view of allegations that have been made concerning Mr McGuinness, but we disagree fundamentally with him in his suggestion that any injustice will be caused to Mr McGuinness by requiring him first to provide a statement to the Tribunal. Mr McGrory is aware, we reminded him during the course of the argument, that Mr McGuinness would of course be entitled to have his own lawyer present when such a statement was taken so that Mr McGuinness's interests could be properly protected.
It seems to us entirely unnecessary for his lawyers to be provided with the plethora of material, which is now before the Inquiry. If as matters proceed things come to light which require Mr McGuinness to give further information or for him further to consider, that can be done with no prejudice to him at all.
In those circumstances, we are not disposed to rule in favour of the application for full party status of Mr McGuinness unless and until he provides this Tribunal with a statement of his recollection of, during and concerning the events of Bloody Sunday.21
4B-26 By their delay in coming forward to assist the Inquiry, the former terrorists have earned for themselves the inestimable advantage of being able to tailor their evidence to accord with the factual situation as it emerged from the other evidence. Edwin Glasgow QC's mixed metaphor - "drip feeding of evidence to fill the holes as they appear" - is particularly apt to describe what took place before this Inquiry in the last four months of its sittings.
4B-27 The following table demonstrates that in many cases statements were given and served very late in the day - and after very shortly before the witness in question was called to give oral evidence to the Tribunal.
21 Day 61/197/05 to Day 61/199/08 | Witness | Statement signed | Statement distributed | Date of Oral Ev. | |-------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|------------------| | Clarke, Michael AC157 | 2.12.03 | 4.12.03 | 8.12.03 Day 402 | | Dobbins, Eddie AD195 | 16.10.03 | 17.10.03 | 20.11.03 24.11.03 Days 399, 400 | | Doherty, Gerry AD65 | 17.10.03 | 17.10.03 | 24.11.03 Day 400 | | Keenan, Sean AK46 | 16.10.03 | 17.10.03 | None | | McFeely, Denis AM7 | 12.1.04 | 13.1.04 | 14.1.04 Day 409 | | McGilloway, Daniel AM507| 16.10.03 | 17.10.03 | None | | McGilloway, Vera AM506 | 16.10.03 | 17.10.03 | None | | McGuiness, Martin KM3 | 6.10.03 | 19.12.01 6.10.03 | 4.11.03 5.11.03 Days 390, 391 | | Moore, Patrick AM505 | 16.10.03 | 17.10.03 | 9.12.03 Day 403 | | O'hEara, Gerry AO79 | 17.10.03 | 17.10.03 | 16.12.03 Day 406 | | PIRA 1 | 8.1.04 | 12.1.04 | 14.1.04 Day 409 | | PIRA 8 | Unsigned | 28.1.04 | 29.1.04 Day 418 | | PIRA 12 | 17.4.02 | 21.1.04 | None | | PIRA 14 | 4.2.04 | 4.2.04 | 4.2.04 Day 421 | | PIRA 17 | 4.12.03 | 8.12.03 | 10.12.03 Day 404 | | PIRA 18 | Unsigned | 9.1.04 | 13.1.04 Day 408 | | PIRA 19 | 12.1.04 | 14.1.04 | 27.1.04 Day 416 | | PIRA 20 | 14.1.04 | 19.1.04 | None | | PIRA 23 | 4.2.04 | 4.2.04 | 5.2.04 Day 422 | The table helps to demonstrate the level of orchestration involved in the attempt to discredit the evidence of Paddy Ward, whose statement had cast considerable doubt on the evidence of Mr McGuinness. Mr Ward started to give oral evidence on Monday, 20th October 2003. On that date Christopher Clarke QC made the following statement:
*I think it might be helpful if I just said a little before Mr Ward's evidence begins ... the Tribunal received, at the end of last week, a number of statements, which are not anonymous, and without a claim to anonymity which the Tribunal, for its part, circulated as soon as it was able to do so.*
Mr Clarke then referred to the following eight witnesses:
(1) Michael Clarke
(2) Eddie Dobbins
______________________________________________________________________
22 Day 385/4/17 As the table reveals, all, save for Michael Clarke, signed statements on Thursday 16th or Friday 17th October. Those statements were served on Friday 17th October, that is on the Friday before the Monday on which Mr Ward’s evidence was to start. Mr Clarke’s solicitor, whose statement was signed and distributed at a later date, sent the Tribunal a letter, which set out what would appear in his statement.
Mr Clarke observed:
Those eight statements contradict in whole or in part the evidence that Mr Ward is to give.23
Provisional IRA witnesses and others with relevant evidence to give, could, when they felt the need arose, respond rapidly to the call for evidence. The fact is that they felt the need arose only when Mr McGuinness required protection.
4B-III STRUCTURE AND DISCIPLINE
STRUCTURE
There is confusion among the PIRA witnesses as to the terminology to be applied to the various PIRA units in Derry. Some, such as Michael Clarke, referred to the Derry “Battalion”24 whereas others, like Eddie Dobbins, referred to the Derry
23 Day 385/6/1 24 AC157.6 paragraph 12 "Brigade". The organisation in Derry was comprised of units to which some referred as "Companies", and some as "Sections". Others considered Sections, in fact, to be sub-divisions of Companies. For the sake of clarity we refer in our submissions to the Derry Battalion – its various Companies – and the Sections within those Companies.
There was conflicting evidence from PIRA witnesses as to the number of Companies within the Derry Battalion. Its OC, PIRA 24, suggested there were five Companies at the time of Bloody Sunday, one each in Creggan, Bogside, Brandywell, Shantallow, and Waterside. Others suggested there were rather fewer. Michael Clarke, for example, stated there were only two.
There were, furthermore, inconsistent accounts about the total PIRA membership in Derry in January 1972. PIRA 24 put it as high as 60, to include active service volunteers and those in intelligence and other roles. Martin McGuinness put it in the region of 40 to 50 volunteers. Others put it significantly lower: PIRA 26, for example, estimated it at 20 to 25 volunteers, not including himself. PIRA 1 claimed there were about 20 to 30 volunteers in Derry but that only about a dozen of them would have been trained and in active service at the time.
It can be argued that these discrepancies as to terminology and structure are insignificant, and no more than the inevitable result of the passage of time on the memories of the PIRA witnesses. While some lack of recollection of detail would have been wholly understandable, that degree of contradiction on a simple matter is more consistent with a desire to mislead.
25 AD195.1 paragraph 2 26 For example, PIRA 24; Day 426/43/16 27 For example, Eddie Dobbins; Day 399/81/7 28 Day 426/43/16 29 AC157.6 paragraph 12 30 Day 426/43/16 31 KM3.22 paragraph 83(4) 32 APIRA26.1 paragraph 5 It is not clear how defined was the role of the Fianna, or youth wing, within the Provisional IRA at the time of Bloody Sunday. The Tribunal has received divergent accounts of what, precisely, the role of the Fianna consisted. PIRA 8, for example, stated that “the Fianna was just a bunch of boy scouts. We never used the Fianna for operations…” Martin McGuinness added:
... I had no dealings whatsoever with the Fianna. The Fianna were basically a scouting organisation. The Fianna were, were basically a youth wing of republicanism and I suppose many people who had joined the Fianna saw the Fianna as some sort of a training ground for an aspiration at a later stage to become a member of the IRA.
Q. Was it in fact a training ground for later membership of the IRA?
A. They certainly, in my view, saw themselves as such and I have no doubt whatsoever that they engaged in, in drilling and training, although they had no access whatsoever, in the Derry area, to explosives or weapons of any description.
Gearoid O’Heara suggested that the role of the Fianna at the time of Bloody Sunday was:
... gathering information, collecting intelligence, um, just being on the barricades sometimes throughout the night; being at riot scenes and sometimes involved in riots, um, and just being, just being people who could be relied on to provide information on what was happening throughout Derry. That claim should be contrasted with the evidence of Eddie Dobbins, that members of the Fianna might, in certain circumstances, be involved in the movement of arms and explosives:
Q. How many occasions did a member of the Fianna become involved in going to a dump and picking up something in there?
A. I have no idea. Numerous occasions.
Q. Why did you not tell the Tribunal, when they were asking you about the Fianna and their role, that the Fianna were involved in the movement of arms or explosives?
A. They were not involved in the movement of arms and explosives.
Q. Mr Dobbins, what do you call carrying them from a safe house out to an Active Service Unit?
A. Yes, they had took them from the house and given them to us, that was it.
Q. Mr Dobbins, why did you not tell Eversheds what you are telling me now?
A. I was never asked.
Q. You were not asked?
A. No.
Q. You were asked about whether the Fianna had involvement with arms --
A. I was asked whether the Fianna had dumps of their own and had their own explosives and their own weapons, and I said: no, categorically no.
Q. But you accept that on numerous occasions they did have contact with arms and explosives?
A. Not for operational reasons.
Q. On numerous occasions they had contact with arms and explosives? A. Yes, but not for operational reasons.
Q. They were going to be used for operational reasons?
A. They were not going to use them.37
4B-40 It would seem, therefore, that the Fianna had a more involved role than some suggest. The very existence of the Fianna signified the involvement of a group of young people in the activities of the Provisional IRA in Derry.
Youthful Volunteers
4B-41 It is clear that several of the fully-fledged volunteer members of the Provisional IRA were very young indeed.
4B-42 PIRA 19’s evidence was that there were maybe thirty older volunteers in Derry and about 20 “youngsters” like himself. He was sworn in as a full volunteer on the Thursday before Bloody Sunday, aged only 17. His figures, if correct, demonstrate that about 40% of the PIRA membership in Derry at the time of Bloody Sunday consisted of junior personnel.38
4B-43 There was no bar to these youthful members taking positions in active service units. James O’Hagan, a sixteen year old, was killed on 19th August 1971 on active service. Lost Lives includes the following description of the circumstances of his death:
He was found fatally injured after what appeared to be an accidental shooting on land at Limavady Road, which was owned by the sister of a Unionist MP...
4B-44 James O’Hagan’s father was taken to the property in question:
“When I got there, I found my son dying”. In a follow-up operation police and soldiers found bloodstains, a Smith and Wesson revolver, ammunition, a spent cartridge, fusewire and 25 lb of
37 Day 399/143/3 38 APIRA19.1 paragraph 1; APIRA19.2 paragraph 10; Day 416/149/10 gelignite in the stable. The property was also owned by the Unionist MP's sister...
Although just 16 James O'Hagan is listed on the republican roll of honour as a full member of the IRA rather than its young wing, the Fianna. The teenager, the eldest of a family of six, had just finished his school term at St Brecan's school a few weeks earlier.39
PIRA 24 was asked about James O'Hagan by Gerard Elias QC. The OC claimed to have “inherited” young O'Hagan from the previous command:
Q. You have told us a number of times yesterday of your concern for what you described as "the wee 'uns", the youngsters?
A. That is right.
Q. You are aware, are you, of the death of James Christopher O'Hagan, a 16-year-old volunteer?
A. Yes.
Q. Who lived in Derry?
A. Yes.
Q. When you were OC?
A. I did become OC later on then.
Q. How had he become involved with the organisation in such a way that he was involved with weapons and explosives?
A. It is something that I inherited, it is something that I did not set up myself. I inherited it from the, from the previous officers.40
PIRA 24 ultimately accepted that some volunteers may have been sworn in who were younger than 18 and claimed that this would have been “without us realising how young they were”.41 The Tribunal has heard that Gerry Doherty was also was 16 when he joined PIRA. It is claimed that he lied about his age and no checks
39 Lost Lives, 1999 entry number 109, page 91 40 Day 427/90/23 41 APIRA24.2 paragraph 9 were carried out to ascertain his real age. PIRA 18 joined at the age of 17 in 1971.
Shortly after Bloody Sunday, young volunteers made no attempt to hide their ages. PIRA 26 joined in April or May 1972 shortly after his sixteenth birthday. "No one checked my age, and I was not aware that there was a minimum age." RM2 joined PIRA after Bloody Sunday, in May 1972. He was 16. He was asked by Gerard Elias QC:
*When you were sworn into the Provisional IRA after Bloody Sunday, you were 16, I think.*
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. Were there a number of other people of the same sort of age with you or were you exceptional in your youth?
A. Um, there would have been probably other people round about my age applying to join the IRA at that time.
Q. You did not have to conceal your age in any way?
A. Um, no.
The "wee 'uns" were not kept out of the way, as the death of James O'Hagan demonstrates. On the contrary, it is clear that very young personnel indeed were used in Provisional IRA active service units at the time of Bloody Sunday.
**NEWLY RECRUITED OFFICIALS**
Members of the Provisional IRA had a very low regard for those in the Official IRA. Most would apparently have shared the view of Father Bradley (as he then was) that the Officials:
______________________________________________________________________
42 Day 400/73/10; Day 400/159/19 43 APIRA18.8 paragraph 34 44 APIRA26.1 paragraph 4 45 Day 424/68/7 were mainly disliked in the city. It was an old Catholic thing. They were seen as Marxist left wing and were not particular about who joined them. They were inclined to be considered "gangsterish". There were some very irresponsible people in their organisation.\\textsuperscript{46}
4B-50 It may, therefore, be of some concern that shortly before Bloody Sunday, a number of ex-Officials had joined the Provisional IRA. PIRA 24 stated that, following the incident in which INQ 2245 was captured - and then released - by the Official IRA in Derry:
\\textit{about a third of the Official membership at the time came over to us that week. We therefore gained more support, without having to take any action.}\\textsuperscript{47}
4B-51 That important evidence was wholly unchallenged on behalf of the Official IRA.
4B-52 INQ 2245 was captured by the Official IRA on 17\\textsuperscript{th} January 1972, less than two weeks before Bloody Sunday.\\textsuperscript{48} Edwin Glasgow QC asked PIRA 24 whether he was concerned about his acquisition of so many former members of the Official IRA:
\\textit{Q. You have been very candid in telling the Tribunal that your regard for the Officials had been low, you did not think of them as being an organised, disciplined organisation in the way that you were?}
\\textit{A. Yes, that is right. Well ...}
\\textit{Q. When you acquired a third of the Officials from that ill-disciplined organisation, what was done in the short time before Bloody Sunday to ensure that the ill-disciplined Officials who had joined you took on the discipline of the Provisional organisation immediately?}
\\textit{A. Well, we did not just let them -- we did not bring them in and give them a unit of their own, we spread them out so that we could look after them.}
\\textsuperscript{46} H1.7 paragraph 18 \\textsuperscript{47} APIRA24.3 paragraph 13 \\textsuperscript{48} C2245.4 paragraph 18 Q. At the time of Bloody Sunday one-third of the original membership of the Officials were spread out among your volunteers?
A. That is correct.49
4B-53 Many of the ill-disciplined Officials had become members of the Provisional IRA shortly before Bloody Sunday and certainly not sufficiently in advance of that day’s events to allow for appropriate re-training.
EFFECT OF INTERNMENT
4B-54 An organisation that included a significant proportion both of very young personnel and of newly recruited ex-Officials required a firm and experienced leadership to keep it in order. The Derry Provisional IRA was commanded by PIRA 24, who, on his own admission could not devote the necessary time to the enterprise and who left office within two weeks of Bloody Sunday.50
4B-55 In fact, PIRA 24 had himself only joined PIRA in April or May 1971. Only four months or so later, in August 1971, he took charge of the Provisionals in Derry.51 This was a rapid rise through the ranks, prompted by necessity rather than any innate skills he may have possessed. He became OC by default, when the Provisional IRA in Derry lost most of its command cadre in the months before Bloody Sunday:
when internment happened in 1971, many of the officers who were set over me were lifted and I was left in charge.52
4B-56 His second in command in Derry, Martin McGuinness, was only 21 at the time of Bloody Sunday.53 The OC was twenty-eight.54 The Provisional IRA in Derry were
49 Day 427/56/20 50 APIRA24.19 paragraph 69(2); Day 390/52/24 51 Day 426/29/7 to Day 426/39/5 52 APIRA24.1 paragraph 4; and see Day 426/29/9. 53 KM3.1 54 APIRA24.2 paragraph 1 therefore commanded by youthful and, in the case of the OC at least, inexperienced men. Internment had stripped it of the older, more experienced officers.
PIRA 24 AND MARTIN MCGUINNESS
4B-57 Within two weeks of Bloody Sunday Martin McGuinness, who had been Adjutant, became OC of the Derry Command of the Provisional IRA. PIRA 24 gives an elaborate explanation in his BSI statement as to why Martin McGuinness took over as OC of the Derry Battalion so shortly after Bloody Sunday. PIRA 24 claimed:
I had problems at home with my wife and child being ill and my mother-in-law suffering from cancer. I was wearing myself down and felt I was going no where. I knew I had left Martin in charge more times than I should have done and consequently, I went to the Chief of Staff myself... I told him I needed a break as OC. I could not give the job 100%... I never considered [Martin McGuinness] as seeking to take over my role, or undermining my role. We are friendly up to today.
4B-58 PIRA 24’s claim to have friendly relations “up to today” with Martin McGuinness is inconsistent with Mr McGuinness’s own evidence on the point. Mr McGuinness could only say that he thought PIRA 24 was alive, that he did not know about his state of health, nor did he know why the OC had failed to come forward at that stage.
4B-59 Furthermore, PIRA 24’s claim to have stood down to allow him to rest and spend more time with his family does not ring true when one learns of the role he took up immediately afterwards. He became Brigade Quartermaster in Dublin, a role that would have required a high level of involvement and one which, presumably, took him away from his family:
55 Day 390/52/24 56 APIRA24.19 paragraph 69(17)(2) 57 Day 390/8/22 MR CLARKE: ... you were asked some questions about why PIRA 17 should have said that there was no truth in the account apparently given by Ivan Cooper of your becoming quartermaster after Bloody Sunday and, as I understood you, you thought there might have been some confusion on his part and you said that you moved into an upper job as quartermaster.
Could you explain what you meant by "upper job"?
A. Um, I think the, the job that PIRA 17 had was local, was in the Derry command. I moved into brigade command.
Q. Brigade command means where, exactly?
A. In control of Dublin.
Q. In control of?
A. Control of Dublin.58
4B-60 We are not in a position to suggest precisely why PIRA 24 ceased to be Derry OC. We suggest, however, that the timing of his removal from office, two weeks after Bloody Sunday, is suspicious.
DISCIPLINE
4B-61 We have already suggested that it is a matter of some concern that the Provisional IRA in Derry were constituted of a number of youthful volunteers and ex-Officials. The command structure, which should have exerted a degree of control on its membership, had been more than decimated by internment, leaving PIRA 24 in charge. These were not the circumstances in which one would expect a disciplined regime to exist. It plainly did not.
4B-62 It is, therefore, of no surprise to learn of Martin McGuinness's concern over the hotheads in the Derry Provisional IRA. In an interview with PRAXIS, he claimed that weapons were kept out of the area of the march on Bloody Sunday and he was asked why:
58 Day 427/114/23 Simply because people felt that if you had Republicans on the march who had arms with them and the situation did develop where soldiers would fire on either with rubber bullets or snatch bullets or things like that, that there was always a risk that somebody who was hot headed. You know cos at that time you're talking very young, the average age of volunteers would have been quite young. And you always ran a serious risk that there would be a flare-up situation and that someone would open fire on a snatch squad or on like an armoured vehicle or something like that which would have been quite useless when you consider the defences that the British had at that time...59
Charles Coyle was Manager of the Pop Inn on Bishop Street. His BSI statement included the following account of the concern of the local commanders of two hotheads in possession of weapons in the run up to the march:
It was ... let known through the grapevine that the IRA would be stood down on the day of the march. As manager of the pub I played a part in spreading that message by word of mouth. It was also suggested in the newspapers at the time. I am unable to name names, but I can say that I knew certain people and that my information was very accurate. In particular, I knew an IRA man from the Brandywell who had been ordered by IRA leaders in the Lisfannon area to contact all IRA members in his area and get them to hand in their weapons before Sunday. This chap was panicking because he was unable to get in touch with one or two hotheads who were lying low. He was asking around in the Pop Inn if anyone had seen them, but in the end he was able to contact these men.60
It is not known to which wing of the IRA these hotheads belonged. Mr Coyle's account is wholly inconsistent with evidence of both wings of the IRA that weapons were strictly controlled; it further suggests that weapons might be held away from arms dumps. Mr Coyle claims that the men were contacted in the end. It is not known, however, whether the hotheads did in fact return their weapons. The fact that such people existed in the organisation and had access to weapons is in itself of concern.
59 KM3.64 60 AC88.1 paragraph 4 PIRA 18 was only 18 years old. He may have been one such hothead. He was on suspension at the time of Bloody Sunday (for stealing and burning a van belonging to the Official IRA) but felt it appropriate to participate in the rioting at Barrier 14 by throwing a gas canister at the Army.
Eddie Dobbins was part of an armed mobile unit on Bloody Sunday. He claims to have been ordered to patrol the Creggan whilst the march was taking place in the Bogside. However, his immediate response on learning that there was shooting in the Bogside was to leave the Creggan: “we decided that we must go and check out what was going on”. Mr Dobbins explained how they arrived in the Bogside and:
After sitting in the car for a short while and talking to people who came up to us, our section leader decided that he needed to investigate further and got out of the vehicle. He had an M1 carbine concealed inside his coat...
We discuss below whether his unit did in fact receive orders confining it to the Creggan. It is Mr Dobbins’ evidence that he did, however; and he has admitted breaching those orders by deserting his post and making for the Bogside at the first sign of action there:
Q. ... Did anybody order you to go down into the Bogside? A. No.
Q. In going, were you not, then, breaking the orders you had been given to stay in the Creggan? A. Technically, you could say that, yes.
Q. Why did you do that? A. Because, as I said, we wanted to find out what was going on.
______________________________________________________________________
61 APIRA18.1 paragraph 2; APIRA18.3 paragraph 11 62 AD195.1 paragraph 5 63 AD195.2 paragraph 11 64 AD195.1 paragraph 14 Q. Did you also, having heard that soldiers had killed people, want to take the British Army on?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Is that why you went?
A. To find out -- to see what was happening and then take it from there.65
4B-68 The presence in the organisation of hotheads and a potential example of the breach of the most basic of orders on Bloody Sunday show that the Provisional IRA was an organisation in which discipline was a problem. It is notable that while Martin McGuinness volunteered this problem in his interview with PRAXIS, neither he nor any of the other members of the Provisional IRA Command Staff now acknowledge it. The problem was exacerbated by matters already referred to: the presence of youthful personnel and ill-disciplined ex-Officials in the organisation, and the lack of a leadership that could or would devote sufficient time to exercising an appropriate degree of restraint and control.
4B-IV WEAPONS
IN SHORT SUPPLY
4B-69 The Provisional IRA in Derry conducted a damaging guerrilla war against the Security Forces with a relatively small number of weapons.
4B-70 Martin McGuinness stated:
I have been asked as to the nature and extent of the weapons available to the IRA on 30 January 1972. The IRA did not have a large arsenal... At the time the IRA had about ten rifles of different kinds, some of them very old, about half a dozen short arms, and perhaps two or three sub-machine guns. We are talking a very small number...66
65 Day 399/105/23 66 KM3.21 paragraph 81 Eddie Dobbins was asked a similar question:
Q. ... Do you know, even roughly, how many weapons were available to the Derry brigade of the Provisional IRA?
A. 10, 15, at the most.
Q. Is that to the whole of the Derry brigade or to your battalion?
A. That would be the whole of the Derry brigade.
Q. How do you know that?
A. Because they were at a premium, they were always short of weapons and they always needed weapons and they were divided up equally among the battalions.67
PIRA 24 and PIRA 17 (the OC and Quartermaster respectively) both claimed to be able to state precisely what weapons were held at the time of Bloody Sunday; they gave accounts that were broadly consistent with each other’s and with that of Mr McGuinness. PIRA 24 added that he had a private reserve dump in Donegal where some further less good weapons were held.68
PIRA 19 and PIRA 26 have on similar evidence, therefore, claimed that there were more volunteers than weapons.69
Working weapons being at a premium, it follows that every opportunity would be taken to keep them safe when they were not in use and, when they became stranded or were abandoned, to recover them.
WEAPONS DUMPS
The evidence taken as a whole suggests that each Company had its own weapons dump.70 Sean Keenan suggested that Sections might even have their own dumps:
67 Dav 399/99/7 68 APIRA24.8 paragraphs 30 and 33; APIRA17.8 paragraph 44; confirmed Day 404/14/18 69 APIRA26.2 paragraph 8; APIRA19.1 paragraph 11 Each section only had a few weapons of its own. The Quartermaster was responsible for overall weaponry, including its condition. He didn't necessarily know where the dumps used by sections were as long as he was happy that the weapons used were securely dumped or looked after. The section leader was the person who knew where the weapons for the section were dumped, as he had to give them out as required. I believe the Adjutant would also have known where some of the weapons were. Therefore if anybody needed a weapon you had to find the Adjutant or the section leader.
The normal situation would, therefore, be that weapons were distributed throughout Derry. There would be logic in this; it would be unwise to keep all weapons in one location, for the obvious reason that, if that location was compromised, the full Derry arsenal would be lost in one go. There would also be a clear advantage in maintaining a series of local weapons dumps: it avoided the need to transport valuable weapons to a central dump through areas in which they might be seized.
PIRA witnesses, unhelpfully, refused to disclose the precise locations of weapons dumps in Derry. However, the Tribunal can assume that there was at least one in each area that had a Company. It is now clear that there were in fact two dumps in the Bogside. PIRA 24 stated that one of them was on the boundary of the Bogside and the Brandywell. It may well have been in the area of the Gasworks, as we discuss below. Another was near to Rossville Street.
4B-V MODUS OPERANDI
GENERAL
Martin McGuinness explained the primary purpose of the Provisional IRA in Derry at the time of Bloody Sunday was to attack the Security Forces.
70 See, for example, PIRA 17 at Day 404/78/15 and Eddie Dobbins at Day 399/99/15 and Day 399/101/10. 71 "Section" is defined by Mr Keenan as consisting four or five people; AK46.5 paragraph 25. It is true that there was a war situation; the primary purpose of the IRA was to attack the British Army and those military forces supporting them and there was also a strategy in place in the centre of Derry to attack business premises in order to stretch the British Army and to gain maximum advantage over what were undoubtedly superior -- numerically, that is -- military forces.
Q. When you say there was a war situation and the primary purpose of the IRA was to attack the British Army, should we understand that in the absence of any specific orders to the contrary, the position was that if a volunteer could kill a member of the Security Forces, he should take the opportunity to do so?
A. It is true that -- and this obviously bears no relevance whatsoever to the events of Bloody Sunday, but it is true that volunteers at that stage were in a liberated area; they had considerable ease of movement through that liberated area and if the opportunity arose to attack members of the British forces and those who supported them, they had the right to carry out military action against them, yes.
Q. When we talk about the British forces and those who supported them that, of course, included what was then known as the RUC?
A. Yes.74
4B-79 The organisation sought to achieve this purpose in a different ways.
THE EXPLOITATION OF RIOTS
4B-80 PIRA 24 acknowledged the relationship between rioting and terrorism:
We used to look out for likely recruits amongst the rioters to see whether they had the right attitude and spot those who were useful and then encourage them to join in.75
4B-81 He stated that PIRA gunmen would exploit riots in order to fire at the Security Forces:
72 AK46.6 paragraph 29 73 APIRA24.8 paragraphs 31 to 33; Day 426/93/8 74 Day 390/34/14 75 APIRA24.2 paragraph 5 I have been asked about whether marches or riots were used by the Provisional IRA as shooting opportunities. Marches were never used by us for those sorts of purposes, although it was possible that riots or their aftermath might be so used. What we used to do was to send a well known volunteer down to a riot in order to clear the rioters from the street. There were a couple of our volunteers who were so well known so that you only had to see them on the streets for people to get off sides so an operation could commence.76
PIRA 24 was questioned further by Christopher Clarke QC about this:
Q. ... Do we understand from that that a technique that was used was to send a well-known volunteer down when there was a riot going on; his appearance would make people get off-sides and he would then be able to shoot at the Security Forces, if he got the opportunity?
A. Yes, not necessarily the fella that was sent down, the fella was sent down would be only to clear the streets.
Q. To clear the streets for what purpose?
A. For the purpose of an operation.
Q. What do you mean by "an op"ration"?
...
A. "ell, operations were operations that were carried out against the British Army.
Q. That means shooting them, does it?
A. Yes.
Q. And on occasion – we've heard some evidence to this effect, that the crowd would part; a gunman would appear; he would fire and then the crowd would come together again and the gunman would escape; is that something that happened?
A. I do not think the crowd would have come back for a while.77 PIRA 24 was not the only witness to deny that gunmen would exploit marches. The distinction between marches and riots loses much of its significance when it is recognised that marches at the time would inevitably result in riots. Bloody Sunday demonstrates that riots could repeatedly flare up during the currency of a march. They could well take place in close proximity to those who were continuing to march or to gather for the purposes of a mainly peaceful demonstration. As PIRA 24 commented:
> there would always have been rioting. Any march that ended up down at Free Derry Corner, there would always have been rioting, even a Saturday there would have been rioting. So we just assumed that there would have been rioting.78
The Tribunal has received a great deal of evidence about PIRA gunmen’s exploitation of riots. PIRA 8 explained that:
> ... a riot would go through 3 stages until only the hard core were left. This would involve several of the young Derry guys who did not know the meaning of fear. At the end of a riot, there was the possibility of the army and the Provisional IRA getting involved in the gunfire...79
He was asked to explain the three stages in oral evidence to the Tribunal:
> The first stage was usually where everybody that was rioting was there just (sic). The second stage was where people thought it was getting a bit too dangerous and they would leave and then you were left then with a third stage, which was the hardcore rioters.
Q. Is it your evidence that it was during the third stage when only the hardcore were present that there might be firing between the IRA and the Army?
A. Yes.80
He was also asked to confirm the normal way in which the gunmen would operate during riots:
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78 Day 426/88/13 79 APIRA8.1 paragraph 5 Q. In the months leading up to January 1972, it is right, is it not, that the Provisional IRA had used riots as cover from which to shoot at the British Army?
A. I have known of occasions when that has happened, yes.
Q. On occasion an IRA sniper would take up a sniping position first of all; is that right?
A. I have known occasions when this has happened, yes.
Q. And then somebody within the crowd would part the rioters to give him a clear line of sight; is that right?
A. I would agree with that, yes.
PIRA 19 gave further information on the same topic:
Q. Were you ever involved in a riot where the IRA opened fire on the Security Forces?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Was that in the Bogside?
A. In the Bogside, yes.
Q. Do you remember any occasions, for example, when a crowd of rioters was told to make way so that a gunman had a clear line of fire?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Was that in the Bogside as well?
A. In the Bogside, yes.
Q. So in those kind of situations, would it be right to understand that the IRA was in some way controlling the rioters?
A. Not really controlling them. When they arrived to maybe take some shots, they would tell you to get out of the road.
Q. Did you know in advance that the IRA were going to do this or did they just appear on the scene without warning? A. They usually turned up without warning.82
4B-88 Gerry Doherty’s BS1 statement contained the following:
It was the case that if there was a riot going on, the IRA may have sought targets and used the riot as an opportunity to lodge an attack. A riot, after all, was a confrontation, and there would be troops working on the periphery. The rioters would be aware that they may be told to get offside so that an attack could be made.83
4B-89 He was asked in oral evidence to the Tribunal:
Q. Would a soldier working on the periphery of a riot situation be regarded as fare game as a target to be shot if possible:
A. Yes.84
4B-90 Major Robin Alers-Hankey of the Royal Green Jackets was shot in such circumstances. The corresponding entry in Lost Lives records that:
...he died in a London hospital four months after he had been shot by the IRA during disturbances near [Londonderry] city centre. He was shot in the stomach as he deployed his troops to protect firemen who had been attacked by stone throwers when they were dealing with a blaze at a timber yard, at the junction of Abbey Street and Frederick Street.85
4B-91 He died on Bloody Sunday.
“Scatter”
4B-92 There is evidence about one of the gunmen who would fire in these circumstances. He was nicknamed “Scatter”. Edwin Glasgow Q.C. elicited the following information about him from PIRA 19:
82 Day 416/140/8 83 AD65.22 paragraph 25 84 Day 400/140/12 85 Lost Lives, item number 256, page 149. Q. May I ask you one question, please, lower down the page, about "Scatter", paragraph 19. You have referred to him. He was a young man who you say often turned up with his Thompson; that is right, is it?
A. As far as I am aware, yes.
Q. You have been told, I have no reason to doubt it, that he was interned actually at Bloody Sunday and do you recall that now, or do you just accept it because it is told to you?
A. No, I just accept it.
Q. Very well. He was quite a recognisable character who was well-known at riots, was he not?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. Am I right in thinking he is referred to by one person -- we do not want to know his name, of course -- as being noticeable by quite powerful glasses, he had dark-rimmed, quite heavy glasses?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. The suggestion being perhaps his eyesight was not perhaps terribly good and not perhaps the best marksman?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. That is all right, is it? But he would quite often turn up with a gun that was recognised as his, in that he always used it?
A. Yes.
Q. And a Thompson, as we know, is notoriously unreliable and makes an unforgettable noise; that is right, is it not?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. But it was quite often used, even by just that one man at riots, even if those riots followed marches?
A. As far as I could understand, yes.(^6)
(^6) Day 416/167/5 Whether or not "Scatter" was operational on Bloody Sunday, PIRA 19's information provides an insight into the lack of care that might be exercised by and expected of PIRA gunmen when exploiting a riot situation.
Many other witnesses gave evidence of the ways in which PIRA gunmen would exploit riots.87
Michael Clarke gave evidence that PIRA volunteers might also throw nail bombs at riots:
Nail bombs were usually thrown towards the end of a riot. In fact, when they were thrown, they usually ended a riot as people did not stand around waiting for a response from the Army. The rioters were given a "Republican nod" before any bombs were thrown.88
It cannot be doubted that nail bombs were often thrown at soldiers in Derry. Father Daly's evidence to Lord Widgery was that it was "a very frequent occurrence".89 Frank McCarron, who knew a great deal about rioting in Londonderry, confirmed to the Tribunal that Father Daly was correct. He was asked:
Q. This Inquiry has heard evidence from Father Daly and others that in the weeks and months preceding Bloody Sunday, it was a very frequent occurrence in Derry for nail bombs to be thrown; that was your experience as well?
A. Yes, you would have heard them.
Q. How often would you hear nail bombs going off in Derry at about the time of Bloody Sunday?
A. I would not be too sure. Probably you could say regularly.
Q. Regularly?
87 PIRA 18 at APIRA18.8 paragraph 36; PIRA 20 at AD196.8 paragraph 42; and Eddie Dobbins at AD195.5 paragraph 19.17. 88 AC157.7 paragraph 20 89 H5.041 paragraph A; confirmed at Day 075/61/5 In January 1972, the primary purpose of the Provisional IRA was to attack the Security Forces. An important method of attack was the exploitation of riots by gunmen and nail bombers. The claim that the gunmen and bombers were absent from the riots accompanying the Derry march should therefore be viewed with suspicion. There would have been a firm expectation that they would be present.
**AMBUSH**
The ambush was another method employed by the Provisional IRA in pursuance of its primary purpose to attack the Security Forces. One example demonstrates the brutal and bloody determination with which this policy was pursued. Two RUC officers were murdered by PIRA just three days before Bloody Sunday, as they drove to the Rosemount police station.
The Irish News of Friday 28th January 1972 reported how:
*Two Derry policemen died yesterday when an RUC patrol car in which they were passengers was riddled with bullets.*
*They were Sergeant Peter Gilgunn (26) and Constable David John Montgomery (20). Sergeant Gilgunn...was a Catholic. Constable Montgomery...was a Protestant.*
*...A third policeman in the car...was wounded in the arm and leg but his condition is not serious...The driver of the car and another policeman escaped injury...*
*The shooting took place at 8.25 am when the police car, a blue Cortina, was on its way up Creggan Road from the central police station in Strand Road to the Rosemount police station...*
*As the car passed an alleyway below Helen Street, a man opened fire. At Helen Street two more men opened up with a burst of automatic fire. Seventeen of the 30 bullets fired struck the car and* Sergeant Gilgun[n] and Constable Montgomery were hit in the chest and face...
The men who attacked the car were all armed with automatic weapons. One with a Thompson sub-machine gun and the other two with Sterlings. Two of them were spotted by British troops on duty at Rosemount barracks and a soldier fired four rounds at one of them but missed.
It is believed that the men who fired the shots had studied the routine of police and police cars which went to Rosemount every morning. The cars used alternate routes – the one used yesterday and another up through Rosemount.91
4B-100 It is not disputed that this was a PIRA operation.92
4B-101 The successful completion of the operation was a source of satisfaction for the members of the Provisional IRA. PIRA 19, who was sworn in on the day of the murders, recalls how:
People were in good spirits because there had been two successful hits on the RUC that day.93
4B-102 These must be the very people who claim to have fired no rounds on Bloody Sunday, save, perhaps, for some fired later on “symbolically” at the City Walls.
SNIPER ATTACK
4B-103 We consider below the shots fired both at the Echo Observation Post on the Embassy Ballroom and at the Presbyterian Church, suggesting they may part of a pattern of early rounds fired at military targets by the Provisional IRA. The sniper attack was certainly another aspect of the PIRA modus operandi.
91 L18 92 PIRA 24; Day 427/37/1 93 PIRA19.2 paragraph 8 There is clear evidence of the very poor relations that existed between the Provisional and Official IRA at the time of Bloody Sunday.
No one incident demonstrates the differing approaches of the two organisations better than the capture by the Officials of INQ 2245. He was a private in The 1st Battalion, The Royal Scots Regiment, who had met a Derry girl during his posting in the City in 1971. He had returned to visit her in Derry in January 1972, claiming to her family that he was a sailor. The Derry Officials clearly worked out that this was not the case and kidnapped him. He was interrogated but the decision was ultimately taken to release him. This was on 17th January 1972.
Such a decision was unacceptable to the Provisionals, who apparently learnt of it, or were perhaps able to guess it would be the likely outcome. As INQ 2245 was being taken out of the building at the Creggan Heights shops where he had been interrogated, Martin McGuinness and a number of PIRA men appeared in an attempt to capture him for themselves. Reg Tester was called as back up and the Officials were able successfully to get INQ 2245 away.
The decision by the Officials to let the soldier go, and not to kill him, was hugely unpopular with the Provisionals. PIRA 8 was asked about the incident:
Q. And in a nutshell, the Officials had let a soldier go and the Provisionals had felt, bluntly, that he should have been executed?
A. That is correct, yes.
Even PIRA 24 (who made the unlikely claim that he had stage managed the whole situation to make it look as if the Provisionals wanted to capture the soldier but
______________________________________________________________________
94 The statement of INQ 2245 is at C2245.1 et seq. 95 C2245.7 paragraphs 39 to 42 96 Day 418/76/5 had in fact deliberately held his men back so that INQ 2245 could escape) agreed that some had wanted him shot.
4B-109 The Sunday Times learnt of an incident on Bloody Sunday that reflected the anger of the Provisionals caused by the soldier’s release:
The following incidents are hard to place timewise but are authenticated by staff officers:
Towards the end of the action, about when our M1 man was heading home, an Official who had taken no part in the action and was not, therefore, carrying was attacked by 3 or 4 Provos walking down Westland St towards the Bogside Inn. The Provos threw him to the ground and said “You’re the bastard that let the soldier go”. This referred to an incident some days earlier when the Officials had captured a British soldier stupid enough to be visiting his Creggan fiancée. After interrogation, the soldier was allowed to go free, a decision which infuriated the Provos, and some of the Officials too we understand.”
4B-110 As the journalists’ note records, it was not just the Provisionals who were angered by the conduct of INQ 2245’s captors. PIRA 24 has told the Tribunal that about a third of the Official membership in Derry defected to the Provisional in the week following the release of the soldier.
4B-111 The Provisionals therefore distinguished themselves from their Official rivals by their more aggressive and murderous stance against the Security Forces.
4B-VII THE DECISION TO TAKE NO ACTION
4B-112 The Tribunal has not been given the truth about PIRA plans and preparations prior to the Bloody Sunday march.
97 APIRA24.3 paragraph 13 98 APIRA14.6 paragraph 38 99 and see Jacobson at Day 191/203 100 APIRA24.3 paragraph 13 PIRA 24 and the other senior PIRA officers have claimed that a decision was expressly taken before Bloody Sunday that no action was to be taken for the duration of the march, other than the manning of two patrols in areas outside the Bogside. Indeed, orders were issued to the men to refrain from any action. This raises the question why it was necessary to give such orders to a force of supposedly disciplined and restrained men, who would not be inclined to take action against the Security Forces during a march and would in any event not do so without specific orders. The difficulties in the PIRA case are nicely demonstrated by the inconsistent evidence given by PIRA witnesses about assurances sought prior to Bloody Sunday by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and others.
PIRA 24 claimed in his BSI statement:
*My memory is that my “inner circle” talked about the intended march on the Thursday before Bloody Sunday. The consensus was that we would do nothing on the Sunday, but that we would think on it, and decide what to do the following day. On the Friday there was a further meeting in the evening. I decided that there should be no action. Everybody present agreed... I decided that we would not be taking any action on Sunday...*
Edwin Glasgow QC asked him why it was necessary to order his men to refrain from action:
*Q. Why was it necessary to give people an order, effectively to do nothing?*
*A. (Pause). The people that was, that was doing nothing was not given an order to do nothing. The people that was doing something was given an order to do nothing.*
*Q. But you say you went to the lengths of ensuring that all volunteers knew that nothing was to be done, save those who were given specific instructions, as to which we will come back later. In addition to that, you even stopped people in the street and told them. What I am asking you is, if people were effectively being told*
______________________________________________________________________
101 AIPRA24.11 paragraph 46 to do nothing, what was the point of telling people that they were to do nothing?
A. It sounded a good idea at the time.
Q. It sounded a good idea at the time?
A. Yes.102
Martin McGuinness raised the associated issue of the request by NICRA for an assurance that the Provisional IRA would take no action during the Bloody Sunday march:
On Thursday the 27th January 1972 I was told that an approach had been made to the OC by people representing the Civil Rights movement proposing that the IRA accept that Derry City should be peaceful in order to facilitate what was expected to be a huge, peaceful demonstration against the introduction of internment.
The following day, Friday evening, I was asked by the OC for my opinion on this request. By this stage I was aware of the ongoing reports of a substantial military build-up in the City. Taking everything into consideration I expressed a view in favour of the suggestion... On Saturday morning I again met the OC. At this meeting I was instructed to issue orders to all Volunteers that the IRA would not engage militarily with British Forces to ensure that the Civil Rights march passed off peacefully.103
Mr McGuinness was asked whether the assurance was given:
Q. Were the representatives of the civil rights people told, so far as you were aware, of what decision the Army had made?
A. Yes, I believe they were.
Q. Do you know how and by whom that decision was told them?
A. I have always presumed that it was the O/C who told them.
Q. But you do not know whether it is or not?
A. Well, I am almost certain that it was.
102 Day 427/12/7 103 KM3.1 Q. Do you know who he told?
A. I do not, no. I always presumed that he told the people who made the first approach.
PIRA 8 gave evidence confirming that of Mr McGuinness:
I was aware that an assurance had been given that we would have no activity in the area of the march. I think I became aware of that a couple of days before Sunday when a senior member of the movement told me that this assurance had been given.
Ivan Cooper MP claims to have been concerned that the Provisionals could not be trusted during the march and claims personally to have requested assurances from PIRA 24 and other high-ranking members if the Provisional IRA:
12. I was concerned that the IRA would view the march by the dynamic and powerful civil rights movement as an opportunity to create a confrontation with the military and the security forces. Therefore, a few days prior to the march, I approached an intermediary and asked him to make arrangements, on my behalf, for me to meet a representative of the IRA. I met four members of the RA, three of whom I already knew. I made it absolutely clear that the march would have to be a non-violent march with no involvement by the IRA, failing which I would use my influence to seek to have the march cancelled. I sought an assurance to this effect.
13. I received confirmation 48 hours after my meeting with the IRA that the IRA would locate itself on the Creggan Estate and would confine itself to the Creggan Estate whilst the march proceeded...
Mr Cooper was asked in oral evidence to the Tribunal:
Q ... When you use the expression "to create a confrontation," what sort of confrontation were you apprehending?
A. I was not apprehending any confrontation, I was concerned that the IRA would endeavour to use the civil rights march as an opportunity to fire shots or something else at the military. In other
104 Day 390/36/4 105 APIRA8.2 paragraph 8 106 KC12.2.1 words, I was concerned that they would use the civil rights march.\\textsuperscript{107}
4B-121 He added that the intermediary to whom he referred in his statement was Paddy Devlin MP.\\textsuperscript{108} Amongst the four members of the Provisional IRA that he met were PIRA 24, PIRA 17 and one of either PIRA 9 or 10.\\textsuperscript{109}
4B-122 Interestingly, Mr Cooper is said to have given a different account to Sunday Times journalist John Barry, in 1972, about the seeking of assurances. He disputes the journalist's note of their conversation.\\textsuperscript{110}
4B-123 Father McIvor was asked by Christopher Clarke QC about a television programme in which he had participated:
\\begin{quote} Q. ... I wonder if we could have up on the screen 09.1. What is about to appear on the screen, I hope, is a transcription, if one sees at the top, of an interview that appears to have taken place with you in relation to a television programme "Remember Bloody Sunday"...
If we go to 09.3, there is a passage in it -- if we could highlight the bottom of the page -- which is an answer of yours in which you are recorded as saying this:
"Well, to put the whole thing in context, it has to be said the Creggan people had a great reliance on their clergy. They looked to them for everything practically. You were not just a priest, you were everything that they thought they needed, so every sort of inquiry, advice was sought from the clergy from the priest and at the time of the march a lot of apprehension was being brought my way by parishioners about whether they should in fact attend the march on Sunday, and one of their worries was that the march would be used that an organisation, the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA at the time might see an opportunity to cause trouble and I think that that was the biggest thing I remember about most of the people I talked to." \\end{quote} Is that correct; were your parishioners concerned that one or other wing of the IRA might seek an opportunity to cause trouble on the march?
A. That is correct.
Q. You go on to say: "That there was this soul-searching going on as to whether they should attend or not. They wanted to -- I mean civil rights was something that they wanted to be involved in, but in the back of their minds was this worry, this fear, and I remember talking to a considerable number of people who were just thinking the thing through, whether they should go or not, but the big worry was trouble, was there going to be trouble."
It looks from that as if this was a real, sizeable concern at the time?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. You were asked this: "And how did you respond to that? -- the top of the next page:
"Answer: Well, as best I could. We did not work in isolation in the parish; the city was divided into four or five parishes, but really it was all one parish and everybody was -- the priests at that time, everybody was very friendly with each other and I remember having a discussion with two of my other colleagues, one from the Long Tower parish and one from Pennyburn about the particular issue, about the apprehensions and so on, and a decision was made by us and others to go and see if we could come up with any news for our people and my colleague in the Pennyburn parish did come back a few days later and say that he said quite categorically that he had been given guarantees, bona fide guarantees that neither the Provisional IRA nor the Official IRA, who were very active at that time, would become involved in the march."
Can you recall who your colleague was in the Pennyburn parish about whom you appear to have been speaking there?
A. I can recall who the gentleman was and he is no longer with us; he has passed on.
Q. Who was he?
A. His name was Father Tom O'Garragh (sic).
Q. Did you understand from him who had given him the bona fide guarantees? However, the Tribunal is faced with a body of evidence which directly contradicts that given by Mr McGuinness, Mr Cooper, Father McIvor and others. PIRA 24, one of those with whom Mr Cooper claims to have met, stated:
*I have been referred to the evidence given to this Inquiry by Ivan Cooper in relation to assurances which he says were given by the Provisional IRA to the organisers of the march. To be frank, it did not happen. There were other people such as Hugh Logue who would have been the sort of person I would have expected to have approached me in relation to the march if any such approach were to be made, or Brigid Bond who might have asked for some sort of assurance. However, I cannot remember any time that anyone came and asked me for assurances. Neither did anybody else.*
Similarly, it is PIRA23’s evidence that:
*I am not aware of any promises being made. I am not sure that there was any need to give assurances.*
The Tribunal may feel that the combined evidence relating to the worries of civil rights workers, politicians, priests and their parishioners is the more compelling. That would mean that those in the know (be they local politicians, local priests or members of NICRA) had real misgivings about the Provisional IRA’s powers of self-restraint during the Derry march.
**THE MOVEMENT OF WEAPONS**
A variety of conflicting claims have been made about the removal and storage of PIRA weapons in preparation for the Derry march. Each of the following suggestions has been put forward over the years:
(1) “Arms were not withdrawn”;
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111 Day 055/39/8 112 APIRA24.10 paragraph 44 113 APIRA23.2 paragraph 15 (2) "We took all our weapons out to the Creggan Estate";
(3) "They were brought to a central location...Creggan was too vulnerable"; and
(4) Weapons were rejected at Creggan and so were returned to Bogside.
"ARMS WERE NOT WITHDRAWN"
4B-128 Philip Jacobson interviewed a "senior member of the Provisionals" in 1972, whom Mr Jacobson identified as Martin McGuinness. Mr McGuinness told him that weapons were not withdrawn from volunteers in advance of the Derry march:
He told me that on the Saturday evening before the march, the Provisional command staff sent out firm verbal orders forbidding members to carry arms on the march. Many Provisionals did attend the march, some we believe, as stewards. Arms were not withdrawn, but this senior Provisional officer told us he had been present all the time and was confident that none of his men had defied the ban.
4B-129 Mr McGuinness made a similar suggestion in a further interview, this time with PRAXIS. The interviewer put the following scenario to him:
Q. ... after the march there would be a riot and then a build-up to a situation. The explosives or guns for that build-up to some sort of operation would have been way out of the area until after the march had cleared?
A. Absolutely. I am not saying that there wasn't guns in the Bogside area or the ? area or in close vicinity to the march, there probably was, but I would say they were in houses, a few like dumps and things like that there, but there was no way you had units of the IRA marching through the crowd, you know, armed to the teeth to attack the British Army, that just did not happen.
4B-130 Christopher Clarke QC sought an explanation from Mr McGuinness:
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114 Day 191/112/4 115 KM3.5 Q. That passage is not terribly clear, but it appears to be an indication that although there were not, as you put it, IRA marching armed to the teeth to attack the British Army, there were guns around in houses or dumps in close vicinity to the march; do you follow?
A. Oh, I do indeed, yes.
Q. How did you come to say that?
A. Well, I do not recall even doing the interview, but I presume from what you have said that it can be shown that this was an interview that I gave. I would appreciate more information about that, if that is possible, but I actually also think that it is important to make the point that in the course of interviews over the years many things were said; it is not like appearing before a Tribunal where you have to be absolutely meticulous and accurate or as meticulous and accurate as you can be about what particularly happened.
On this occasion there is no conflict whatsoever in relation to the intentions of -- or the disposition, indeed, of the IRA on the day. What is in question here is this business about weapons being in dumps, so obviously there is a difference between this interview and the testimony that I have given to the Tribunal, the accurate testimony is the testimony to the Tribunal.117
4B-131 Edwin Glasgow QC raised with Mr McGuinness the fact that, prior to his BSI statement, he had never claimed that weapons were withdrawn on Bloody Sunday and enclosed in a dump:
Q. It is right to say you had never given any account of that -- I do not say that critically, just as a matter of historical record -- you had never told anybody about weapons being withdrawn and put in a dump, until you made statements for this Inquiry?
A. Well, as I say, I have done many interviews down the years. There can be no comparison whatsoever between doing television or print interviews for journalists and the type of inquiry which we are engaged in at the moment. This obviously has to be a much more considered situation and obviously down the years I did not Mr McGuinness’s explanation that he “did not relate...every exact detail” might be more convincing if he had made no mention of weapons in the early interviews. That, however, was not the case. He expressly stated that “arms were not withdrawn” and that there “probably were” weapons in different locations in the close vicinity of the march. It is impossible to reconcile those interviews with accounts given later by Mr McGuinness and his PIRA colleagues. The early McGuinness interviews totally undermine later suggestions that weapons were removed to a single, closed dump.
"WE TOOK ALL OUR WEAPONS OUT TO THE CREGGAN ESTATE"
The Tribunal is in possession of the galley proofs of an Observer article that was pulled from the newspaper pending the Widgery Tribunal. The article included information suggesting that PIRA weapons were withdrawn to the Creggan:
The section leader of the Provisional IRA covering the Bogside, says:
“Our volunteers were under the strictest orders not to take any weapons into the area. It could have been far too dangerous for the community. We took all our weapons out to the Creggan estate where members of the Provisionals guarded them. Most of our members, at least 50, took part in the march, unarmed.”
PIRA 24 has certainly suggested it was his intention that weapons should be taken to the Creggan. In his BSI statement, he claimed:
My instructions for the day, which I deal with later, were that the weapons should be taken out of the Bog and taken up to the Creggan.
______________________________________________________________________
118 Day 391/190/19 119 ED24.9 120 APIRA24.8 paragraph 31 That is at least partially consistent with information PIRA 24 gave in an interview with Peter Taylor:
Peter Taylor: You ordered weapons to be taken out of the Bogside?
A: Most of the weapons were taken out of the Bogside and the rest of the weapons were taken away from the route of the march.
Peter Taylor: Why was that necessary?
A: So that there would not be any weapons there and that it would continue to be a peaceful demonstration, [a]s what was planned.\\textsuperscript{121}
One of the major difficulties with this claim is that PIRA 24 now suggests that weapons were not, in fact, stored at the Creggan dump on Bloody Sunday. We deal with PIRA 24's latest account, below.
"THEY WERE BROUGHT TO A CENTRAL LOCATION...CREGGAN WAS TOO VULNERABLE"
PIRA 17, the Quartermaster, and Martin McGuinness both undermine any suggestion that weapons were removed to and kept in the Creggan. PIRA 17 does so in no uncertain terms, questioning his OC's logic in the process. PIRA 17 explained in his BSI statement that the dump to which arms was taken was not in the Creggan:
\\textit{Creggan was too vulnerable an area. It bordered the city and there was access along the Buncrana Road to heavy army vehicles if they wanted to use it...} \\textsuperscript{122}
It was PIRA 17's evidence that all PIRA weapons were gathered at an undisclosed location. Some were allocated to the cars that were to patrol in the Creggan and Brandywell and the rest were taken to a central dump. PIRA 17 was present at each stage of the process. Christopher Clarke QC asked
\\textit{Q. ... You have made it clear that what happened in the early morning of Bloody Sunday was that weapons were brought to a}
\\textsuperscript{121} \\textbf{X1.74.1}: PIRA 24 does not dispute that he is the interviewee: \\textbf{Day 426/148/2}; \\textbf{Day 427/1/10}.
\\textsuperscript{122} \\textbf{APIRA17.9 paragraph 47} central location; that some were designated for to be used by Active Service Units and the remainder were designated to go to the central dump.
A. Yes.
Q. You have said that on a number of occasions. I want to be clear as to which operations you yourself were physically present at, taking first the central location. Were you physically present there when the weapons arrived at that place?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you there at the central location when the weapons that had been designated to go to the Active Service Units left that central location?
A. Yes.
Q. So far as the dump is concerned, were you physically present when the remainder of the weapons were received into the dump?
A. Yes.\\textsuperscript{123}
In contradiction of his earlier accounts, Martin McGuinness now also claims that weapons were moved to a central dump.\\textsuperscript{124} He claimed in oral evidence to the Tribunal that he was "instrumental" in the process:
Q. ... Did you yourself organise that or did somebody else?
A. I believe that I was instrumental in organising that, yes.
Q. Is what happened that a car went round to the various units and picked the weapons up or what happened?
A. Well, I really cannot remember that. I think what would have happened was that the weapons would have been brought to a place where I was and I would then have, with assistance, moved those weapons to the closed dump.
Q. When you say that the dump to which they were moved was a closed dump, what exactly do you mean by "closed"?
\\textsuperscript{123} Day 404/167/21 \\textsuperscript{124} KM3.21 Paragraph 81 A. It was closed in such a fashion that no-one could get at it.
Q. Was it a house, a building, a store; what sort of a dump was it?
A. Well, it was a building in the Bogside area.125
4B-140 We consider the Bogside location of the central dump in further detail below.
WEAPONS REJECTED AT CREGGAN SO RETURNED TO BOGSIDE
4B-141 There is finally the attempt by PIRA 24 to reconcile two earlier, conflicting suggestions made in relation to PIRA weapons. He now suggests that he did order that they be removed to the Creggan - and that they were taken there. The added twist in the new account is a claim that they were rejected by the local commander in the Creggan and had to be returned to the Bogside for storage there.
4B-142 The logic of removing weapons from the Bogside to the Creggan has been called into question by PIRA 17, as we have discussed above. PIRA 24 has sought to justify such a move:
My main reason for making the decision that no action would be taken was the actions of the Paratroopers at Magilligan.126
4B-143 The logic there may not be immediately apparent. PIRA 24 was asked to explain what he meant. He did so by suggesting that, having learnt of the Paras' approach at Magilligan, he was concerned that they might find any weapons left in the Bogside:
... I assumed what would have happened, that the Paras might have rushed because they would have been maybe a bit gamer than the ordinary, regular soldiers and if we had had guns in that area, they might have found them. They might have took over the area for a day or two and searched, I do not know. I just wanted them out, okay?
125 Day 390/46/4 126 APIRA24.12 paragraph 50 Q. Firstly, you did not need the guns for the march, but was the concern that if you left them in the Bogside, one event might lead to another and the Paras might come in and find them?
A. Yes, there might have been a search afterwards and they might have found them.\\textsuperscript{127}
4B-144 It is, therefore, surprising that on PIRA 24's own account, all of the PIRA arsenal, bar the weapons in the patrolling cars, was ultimately gathered together in the one area that was most at threat on Bloody Sunday: the Bogside. PIRA 24 claimed in his BSI statement that:
\\textit{My instructions for the day ... were that the weapons should be taken out of the Bog and taken up to the Creggan. This was something which Martin McGuinness, as Adjutant, and the Quartermaster would have dealt with. I found out later on the Saturday night that they did this, but when they got to the Creggan, the OC of the Creggan told them that the did not want to touch his closed dump up there. He did not want to open it up. I understand that the weapons were transported back down again to the Bog. I knew that the only place they would be able to put them was the dump on the perimeter of the Brandywell and the Bog...}\\textsuperscript{128}
4B-145 PIRA 24's latest account therefore entails a procession of vehicles from the Bogside to the Creggan, the rejection of the weapons by a Creggan commander in breach of his orders and the unseemly and risky return of the weapons to the Bogside. Neither the Creggan OC, nor Martin McGuinness nor PIRA 17, all of whom would have been involved, mention anything of the sort taking place.
4B-146 A finding that there is, in fact, truth in the story would suggest that the OC's orders were deliberately breached, and would raise the possibility that volunteers who advocated a more proactive approach on Bloody Sunday wished to have weapons available in the Bogside.
4B-147 However, PIRA 24, Martin McGuinness and PIRA 17 do now all claim that weapons were ultimately gathered together and stored centrally on Bloody
\\textsuperscript{127} Day 426/88/18 \\textsuperscript{128} APIRA24.8 paragraph 31 Sunday. PIRA 24 and Mr McGuinness make it clear that the central location was in the Bogside. The Tribunal is accordingly seriously being asked to contemplate a situation in which weapons were removed from volunteers to be kept in the one place where:
(1) the march would reach its height and where marchers would gather to make their protest;
(2) the Army was sure to be present at its periphery; and
(3) all weapons, save for those with the patrol cars, would be lost if the dump were compromised.
4B-148 Martin McGuinness's earliest accounts made it clear that weapons were not withdrawn to a single, closed dump on Bloody Sunday. Nonetheless, inconsistent and unconvincing attempts have been made to suggest that they were. The Tribunal may wonder why senior PIRA witnesses have felt it necessary to invent such a web of lies, unless they have important issues to conceal.
4B-IX THE CREGGAN AND BRANDYWELL MOBILE PATROL UNITS
4B-149 PIRA 24 claims to have made the following decisions:
I decided that there would not be any action on Sunday, the arms were to be taken out of the Bog, and there would be a car in each of the Brandywell and the Creggan on normal patrol duty.(^{129})
4B-150 We consider in this section the evidence relating to the Brandywell and Creggan cars. We accept that Provisional IRA "active service units" were patrolling in cars at the time of the march on 30(^{th}) January 1972 and even that those cars patrolled in the Creggan and Brandywell. However, we do not accept that the two cars marked the limit of armed PIRA activity during the march and we call into question the
(^{129}) APIRA24.11 paragraph 46 suggestion that the cars were confined to a roving defensive role in the Creggan and the Brandywell at all relevant times.
THE MYTH OF THE MILITARY THREAT TO THE CREGGAN AND THE BRANDYWELL
4B-151 It has been suggested by some that there was a need for an armed Provisional IRA presence in the Creggan and the Brandywell because both areas were vulnerable to military incursion whilst many of their inhabitants were away at the march. However, the risk of a military incursion has now been shown to be a myth.
4B-152 It was Martin McGuinness’s evidence that:
Following the meeting [on Friday 28th January] I spoke with the command staff and all active service volunteers. I relayed the decision taken by the OC. Without exception everyone I spoke to accepted that our approach to the march was sensible. A little concern was expressed that against the back-drop of such a large demonstration which would see a large number of people from the Creggan and Brandywell areas marching to the city centre, that the British Army might attempt incursions into these two areas. Instructions were issued that a small number of volunteers, which from memory numbered eight people in the form of two units, should remain armed and vigilant as a contingency in these two areas.130
4B-153 Eddie Dobbins was a member of the Creggan Company. He claims that he was told at a meeting on Bloody Sunday that:
I was to be on patrol in the Creggan in a car in case the British army decided to come in and take over the no go areas. I was told I was there with my section to ensure they did not. The Creggan was likely to be a ghost town with everybody on the march and I recall that the streets were deserted...131
130 KM3.2; confirmed Day 390/37/20 131 AD195.1 paragraph 5 PIRA 8 was in the Brandywell active service unit. It is his evidence that he was given his orders for Bloody Sunday by Martin McGuinness, probably two days beforehand. His BSI statement includes the following account:
2. I was told to get together a unit and to patrol around the Brandywell in case there was a raiding party sent into the back of the Brandywell whilst the march was going on.
3. I can recall that the possibility of the army seeking to reclaim the no go areas of the Creggan, Bogside and Brandywell had been discussed at the time...I think that what I was expecting was that there might be some sort of snatch squad or raiding party sent in through the back; there were interfaces where the army often used to try and raid in to the area such as [Bishop] Street or Foyle Street. When this happened, the army never came in with more than twenty people or so and a patrolling car would be able to slow down any such incursion and maybe put off the raiding party from proceeding with its operation. I therefore expected that if there was any armed confrontation on Bloody Sunday, it would be me and my unit that would be involved in it.
PIRA 8’s claim that he “expected” his unit would be involved in an armed confrontation with invading soldiers should be contrasted with what the Creggan Company’s Michael Clarke had to say about the analogous situation in the Creggan. He denied that a single armed unit would take on the might of the Army. He stated:
It was thought that the Army was planning an incursion into the Creggan on the day of the march. I was told if it had therefore been decided to suspend operations for the duration of the march. I was to remain however in the Creggan as a member of an Active Service Unit (“ASU”). This meant staying in the area to patrol and look our for, and report on, Army activities. It was not the intention to take on the Army if they decided to enter the Creggan... As far as
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132 Day 418/87/10 133 “Ship Street” in the BSI Statement was corrected to Bishop Street in oral evidence, Day 418/59/12. 134 APIRA8.1 135 AC157.6 paragraph 12 I can recall, this involved around 6-7 volunteers who used two cars, possibly three.\\textsuperscript{136}
4B-156 The simple truth is that there was no immediate threat to the Creggan or the Brandywell; the cars were not patrolling to defend those areas from invasion.
4B-157 PIRA24 debunks the myth in unequivocal terms:
\\begin{quote} I had seen the Army was not coming up to the Creggan, but on Saturday evening were massing in the town itself and I told the OC of the Creggan this. They were positioned around the Cathedral and at the top of the Bog Road, on the Walls and on the Embassy building. There seemed to be nothing threatening the Creggan. Also, I knew that Paisley’s march would be coming to the Guildhall on the Sunday and all this pointed to that being the likely area of operation of the security forces, and not the Creggan and the Brandywell. I therefore was sure that no invasion was planned on the day to re-take the no-go area.\\textsuperscript{137} \\end{quote}
4B-158 Edwin Glasgow QC raised with PIRA 24 the inconsistencies between his and Martin McGuinness’s evidence on this issue, with surprising responses from the Derry OC:
\\begin{quote} Q. Can we move to the second topic regarding the Creggan: that, too, the Tribunal has learnt, after six years, in the last but one day of the sitting, that there was no truth at all in the story that the Creggan needed guarding, indeed that was a black propaganda myth put out by the British authorities. Is that seriously your evidence, on oath?
A. Yes.
...\\end{quote}
\\begin{quote} Q. And any volunteer who was driving around the Creggan or the Brandywell in the belief that they were there to defend those areas against possible attack, was completely mistaken?
A. They would not have been so foolish as to take on the British Army in a confrontation with a couple of old guns in a car. \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{136} AC157.13 paragraph 43 \\textsuperscript{137} APIRA24.10 paragraph 41 Q. I ask you again: the story about a possible invasion was black propaganda by the British Government?
A. Yes.
Q. So if any volunteers give this Tribunal evidence that they were driving around with guns in the Creggan or the Brandywell in the belief that they were defending it against a possible attack from the British Army, they are mistaken?
A. That is right. 138
4B-159 PIRA 23 similarly debunks the myth. Significantly, he was OC of Creggan Company:
5. I have been asked whether there was any mention of a possible incursion by the Army into the "no-go" areas on the afternoon of the march. I would have known from our intelligence sources if this was going to happen. There was no such intelligence...
6. As I have said, we were just expecting a normal day in the Creggan. 139
4B-160 During his oral evidence, PIRA 23 was asked by Lord Saville:
... Again, I want to make sure I understand your evidence correctly: if I have got it right what I am understanding is this, that you had a very good source of intelligence, so good that if there had been any plans by the Army to invade the Creggan, you are sure you would have known about it; is that right?
A. Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: Of course, am I right in thinking it would not just be you who would know that, this would be something that would be known to the command staff of the whole of the Provos in Derry; is that right?
A. Yes. 140
4B-161 PIRA 23 had spoken with PIRA 24 about this:
138 Day 427/16/15 139 APIRA23.1 140 Day 422/10/11 Q. Do you remember a discussion with the command staff OC about any intelligence that had been received relating to 30th January?
A. Yes.
Q. When did that discussion take place?
A. The day before.
Q. What do you remember being told?
A. I asked would the Army possibly come into the Creggan. They said no. 141
4B-162 The claims made by Martin McGuinness and others that there was a need to patrol the Creggan and the Brandywell to protect those areas from invasion by the Army have, therefore, been exposed as false. They were probably made in a further attempt to demonstrate that armed members of PIRA were anywhere but in the Bogside at the time that the Army fired its rounds.
THE SIZE OF THE CREGGAN AND BRANDYWELL PATROLS
4B-163 PIRA 24 and Martin McGuinness have both claimed that they ordered a small number of volunteers, in the form of two units, to patrol in the Creggan and Brandywell. The Tribunal is now in receipt of information that suggests a far greater number of volunteers were on active service on Bloody Sunday.
4B-164 The Commander of the Creggan Company, PIRA 23, has revealed that there were three cars involved in the Creggan patrol. One carried four volunteers together with their weapons. The Quartermaster’s car was also in use together with a spare car that was parked in the Creggan. That was not the full extent of the Creggan patrol. There were also approximately four volunteers patrolling on foot. 142
141 Day 422/12/25 142 APIRA23.1 paragraph 2: 422/6/6 to 422/7/4 It was also Michael Clarke’s recollection that the Creggan patrol was greater than just one car; he suggested it:
... involved around 6-7 volunteers who used two cars, possibly three.(^{143})
Mr Clarke stated that he was not patrolling in one of the cars.(^{144}) He was therefore undertaking his duties in some other way, perhaps as part of a foot patrol.
There is also evidence, which would tend to suggest that the Brandywell patrol was larger than a single car; that of the freelance photographer, Michael Sheil, is that:
The thing that I remember seeing there that afternoon was that there were two or three cars containing men that I knew to be members of the Provisional IRA stationary in a side street lined by terraced housing near the Brandywell recreation ground. One of the cars had what I presumed to be weapons on the back seat covered by a rug. I also remember seeing Martin McGuinness near one of the cars at one point. He later got into a car driven by someone else and left the area.(^{145})
He, therefore, saw two to three PIRA cars in the Brandywell on the afternoon of the march.
The Tribunal will, therefore, wish to consider whether PIRA 24 and Martin McGuinness have deliberately attempted to underplay the nature of the PIRA armed presence in Derry on the afternoon of the Bloody Sunday march and, if so, to what purpose. For reasons we give below, we suggest that members of the Provisional IRA were involved in a number of exchanges with the military that afternoon. We further suggest that the claim that a limited number of volunteers were on duty, safely away from the Bogside, is merely a ruse to hide this fact.
(^{143}) AC157.13 paragraph 43 (^{144}) Day 402/36/7 (^{145}) M74.1 paragraph 3 CREGGAN AND BRANDYWELL CARS DEPLOY TO THE BOGSIDE
4B-170 It is, therefore, not surprising to discover that active service units from both the Creggan and the Brandywell made for the Bogside on Bloody Sunday.
4B-171 As soon as Eddie Dobbins and the crew of the Creggan patrol car heard that there was shooting in the Bogside: "we decided that we must go and check out what was going on". In so doing, he and his armed colleagues were entering an area in which there was meant to be no PIRA armed presence, or so we have been led to believe. Mr Dobbins explained how they arrived in the Bogside and:
After sitting in the car for a short while and talking to people who came up to us, our section leader decided that he needed to investigate further and got out of the vehicle. He had an M1 carbine concealed inside his coat...
4B-172 PIRA 8 describes a similar scenario with the Brandywell car. "Bad news travels quick" as he put it in his BSI statement, and he soon learnt what was taking place in the Bogside:
22. I then decided to go down and find out what had happened. No one summoned us or sent for us. I drove the car down Stanley's Walk and parked it up by Elmwood Terrace...
23. ... I told one of the volunteers to stay with the car... The three of us made our way down Blucher Street...
4B-173 The Tribunal has received the record of an interview conducted by the RUC in the early 1970s with a person whose name has been blanked out. It includes this account about PIRA 8 on Bloody Sunday:
After the shooting started, we ran along the Lecky Road towards the Brandywell. I saw PIRA 8 on Lecky Road at Stanley's Walk with a rifle. There was another man with him who had a rifle as well.
146 AD195.2 paragraph 11 147 AD195.1 paragraph 14 148 APIRA8.4 paragraph 21 149 APIRA8.4 PIRA 8 denies that he was in the location of Stanley’s Walk with a rifle after the shooting had started. There is therefore a direct conflict between the information contained in the intelligence document and PIRA 8’s evidence.
We are not in a position to determine whether the Creggan and Brandywell cars were indeed under orders confining them to those respective areas, or whether the units were, in truth, permitted to pass where they wished. If the former situation applied, Mr Dobbins, PIRA 8 and their colleagues were in gross breach of their orders. However, if the latter applied, heavily armed PIRA volunteers operating as mobile Active Service Units were at liberty to enter the Bogside on Bloody Sunday, in addition to the gunmen already there.
THE ATTACK ON THE OLD DAIRY
We have referred above to PIRA 8’s claim that there was the threat of military incursion into the Brandywell, which called for the deployment of an armed patrol to guard that area. More precisely, PIRA 8 was apparently concerned about:
... some sort of snatch squad or raiding party sent in through the back; there were interfaces where the army often used to try and raid in to the area such as [Bishop] Street or Foyle Street.
It is, therefore, surprising that he also claims to have taken his active service unit to the area of the old City Dairy, to the south west of the Brandywell recreation grounds. Mr Glasgow asked PIRA 8 why he had not taken his unit to the area where he perceived the actual threat:
Q. Incidentally, if the risk was of the Army coming in from the area that you have identified as Bishop Street and Foyle Street which are off the extreme top right-hand corner of this map, about three-quarters of a mile away, why did you choose to spend the entire time that you were there in directly the opposite direction, about
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150 INT1.285 151 Day 418/52/2 152 “Ship Street” in the BSI Statement was corrected to Bishop Street in oral evidence, Day 418/59/12. 153 AIPRA8.1 paragraph 4 three-quarters of a mile down to the southwest from the area of which you have told the Inquiry, on oath, you anticipated the risk of insurgency?
A. It is quite simple. At that time, when we were in that area, we were not aware of any shots or any Army activity whatsoever.
Q. But why were you there if you told the Inquiry the truth and that the risk that you had foreseen was of soldiers coming through one or more of the barriers about three-quarters of a mile away to the northeast?
A. Well, we were there, we were watching the Army who had a sangar near the garage. That is the reason why we were there, we were watching a sangar.154
4B-178 This statement that he was watching soldiers at the Old Dairy location does not answer the question raised by Mr Glasgow: Why was he doing this, if the purpose of his patrol was to guard against an invasion that he believed would occur in the Bishop Street / Foyle Street area?
4B-179 There is an even more perplexing question to be answered: how, if PIRA 8 is telling the truth about observing the Old Dairy, did he miss an attack on that location which must have taken place right under his nose?
4B-180 PIRA 8 took his active service unit to the area of the Old City Dairy, at a leisurely pace:
17. As the march was disappearing around the corner of the Bogside Inn, and with no particular urgency as the mood of the day was reasonable and relaxed and laid back, I drove the car and the volunteers up to the Brandywell and parked outside McCann's chippy which was on the Lecky Road. This road was out towards Letterkenny Road. At the end of the road, the army used to occupy the old City Dairy which was behind the Shell Mex Garage.
18. The four of us got out of the car and I locked the car and kept the key. None of us got any weapons out of the boot.155
154 Day 418/67/19 155 APIRA8.3 He and his men spent half to three quarters of an hour “going up to see what they could see going on in the area of the old City Dairy”. They arrived some time between 3.00 or 4.00 pm and went up to within 25 metres of the Dairy.
“Nothing was happening” but, instead of moving off to the area of Bishop Street and Foyle Street, PIRA 8 and his men simply moved to the other side of the Old City Dairy. They drove to Southway, parked up and spent a further half to three quarters of an hour observing the Sangar at the Dairy through binoculars. “Again, nothing was happening in this area as far as we could see.” In oral evidence, PIRA 8 accepted they might even have been in that position for longer than 45 minutes.
We extract below entries from the transcripts of two different radio logs:
(1) 1 Royal Anglian Log; and
(2) 8 Infantry Brigade Log.
The logs record four incidents of gunfire at the Old City Dairy location, which we have listed as 1 to 4 in the table. Each incident was recorded in both logs and, accordingly, we reproduce below two entries per incident. The shorter, first entry comes from the Royal Anglian log and the fuller second version comes from the transcript of Mr Porter’s tape.
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156 APIRA8.4 paragraph 18 157 Day 418/25/21 158 APIRA8.4 paragraph 19 159 Day 418/27/5 160 Transcript of 1 Royal Anglian Radio Log 161 Transcript of Mr Porter’s Tapes of Army Radio Transmissions on 30 January 1972 with 8 Infantry Brigade Log Entries | Incident No. | Serial | Time | To | From | Event | Page Ref | |-------------|--------|-------|-----|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | 1 | 65 | 1550 | + | H3 | 2 shots fired at this loc from Kildrum Gds. No cas strike was seen off grd no fire returned | W102 | | 324 | 1549 | 0 | 54A | | Hello, Zero, this is 54 Alpha. We’ve just had two shots fired at call sign Hotel 3 from the area of Kildrum Gardens. Strikes seen on the ground in front of their location. No casualties and no fire returned. Over. | W125 | | 2 | 78 | 1625 | + | H3 | At 1623 1 shot at this loc no strike no cas from prefabs no fire returned. | W102 | | 447 | 1627 | 0 | 54A | | ...re one shot fired from the prefabs, right in front of their location. No casualties. The gunman not seen. Over. | W133 | | 3 | 80 | 1630 | + | H3 | 3 more shots at 12 loc 1 rd returned no hit claimed | W103 | | 462 | 1630 | 0 | 54A | | Hello, Zero, this is 54 Alpha. A further 3 shots at 16:29 again at Hotel 3’s location have come from somewhere half way up the hill to their front, i.e. towards Kildrum Gardens. One round was returned. We’ll give you further details but no ca...no hits claimed. Over. | W134 | | 4 | 90 | 1649 | + | H3 | at 1645 short burst from prefabs one rd returned no hit claimed. 42531589 | W103 |
162 Kildrum Gardens is between Rathlin Drive and Southway, north west of the old City Dairy. 163 Timing of corresponding entry in 8 Inf Bde Log, serial 136. 164 Timing of corresponding entry in 8 Inf Bde Log, serial 178. 165 Timing of corresponding entry in 8 Inf Bde Log, serial 180. Between approximately 1549 and 1645, the logs record that a total of 6 rounds and a burst from a machine gun were fired at the soldiers at the old City Dairy; they returned 2 rounds. As we have seen, PIRA 8 has told the Tribunal that he arrived in the area of the Dairy at some time between 3.00 and 4.00 pm and remained there, to one side of the Dairy or the other, for an hour to an hour and a half, or more. On his evidence, he somehow managed to miss this gunfire in its entirety.
The Tribunal has received evidence from the soldiers involved in the exchanges. They were members of the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment posted at the Regiment’s Brandywell location at the old City Dairy/Mex Garage complex.
Gunner Y of that Regiment was posted there. It is probable that incident 3 refers to his exchange with a gunman. He recorded in a 1972 statement that he heard incoming gunfire and that his colleagues pointed out to him the location of the sniper who had fired:
It was the middle of the pathway which runs from the south of the Coach Road to the south east corner of the city cemetery. The pathway is fenced by bushes about 3 feet in height.
Gunner Y saw the gunman reappear:
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166 Timing of corresponding entry in 8 Inf Bde Log, serial 199. 167 Day 382/17/10 He was young and clean shaven with shoulder length dark hair, dressed in a light blue jumper and a dark jacket.\\textsuperscript{168}
The gunman raised a weapon to his shoulder and fired two shots. Gunner Y returned a single aimed round. The map which accompanied Gunner Y's RMP statement marked the relevant positions in this way:
Hugh Kelly lived at \\underline{[redacted]} at this time. He certainly was aware that the 22 LAD RA's Brandywell location was under fire on Bloody Sunday. His BSI statement describes an attack that took place at approximately 4.45 pm:\\textsuperscript{169}
\\textit{Behind our house was a thick hedge which gave a good view of the army posts ... On the day in question I believe the fire was directed at ... an army post on top of the Mex filling station... I do not think}
\\textsuperscript{168} B859 \\textsuperscript{169} Day 174/141/6 that there were many shots fired, or that the army retaliated or returned fire.\\textsuperscript{170}
4B-191 It is probable that incident 4 in the table refers to Bombardier X’s exchange with a gunman.\\textsuperscript{171} Bombardier X was also based at 22 LAD RA’s Brandywell location. He explained in 1972 how:
... a burst of automatic fire which I would say was about 8 or 10 shots went overhead in the direction of the river. I could see the direction from where these shots had come between two derelict buildings to my left on the opposite side of the Letterkenny Road. The corrugated iron had been placed over what was left of the roof and formed a sort of tunnel... I could see the profile of a man leaning against the side of the tunnel. I am positive that this was the direction from which the shots had come.
Immediately after the firing had taken place I saw this man run down the tunnel away from my direction and I fired one shot after him.\\textsuperscript{172}
4B-192 Sergeant 020 was positioned with X. His RMP statement recorded that:
At about 1645 hours I heard a burst of automatic fire directed at my section. The rounds hit the roof of the garage above our heads. The burst was low velocity. As the burst was fired myself and X saw the muzzle flash, from the burst about 100 metres to our right.
The gunman was in an old building between Foyle Road and Anne Street... we saw the man in the centre of the building where there was a hole in the wall.
I ordered X to fire at the gunman. He fired one aimed shot at the gunman...\\textsuperscript{173}
4B-193 The map accompanying Sergeant 020’s RMP statement was marked to show the relevant locations. We reproduce it below. He has amended it and recalls now that his men were spread out between A-B and that he was with Bombardier X in the
\\textsuperscript{170} AK10.3 paragraph 19 \\textsuperscript{171} Day 380/115/14 \\textsuperscript{172} B841 \\textsuperscript{173} B1500.010 sangar in the circle marked C. The gunman was located in one of the buildings between E and F.\\textsuperscript{174}
4B-194 It is inconceivable that PIRA 8 could have remained oblivious to the attack on the 22 LAD RA location if, as he claims, he was in position watching it at the time. There are only two possibilities.
4B-195 The first is that PIRA 8 was present during and, possibly, participated in the attack. The logs show that the first shots were fired at the Army no later than 1549. This was approximately twenty minutes before the 1 PARA passed into the Bogside. Further shots were fired at 1623, 1629 and 1645. A finding that this is what in fact occurred would have important implications for the PIRA case generally because it would give the lie to the suggestion that Provisional gunmen were operating defensively on Bloody Sunday. It would mean that, from an early
\\textsuperscript{174} B1500.002 paragraph 10; B1500.003 paragraph 18 stage in the afternoon, they were searching out military targets and trying to kill soldiers.
4B-196 The only other possibility is that PIRA 8 was not where he said he was. In other words, he has lied about being close to the old City Dairy and he was actually engaged in other activities in a different location. If so, why did he feel the need to lie, and what was he really up to?
4B-X PROVISIONAL IRA SHOTS FROM THE BOGSIDE INN
THE DECISION TO TAKE NO ACTION
4B-197 Several high-ranking officers in Derry Provisional IRA have told the Tribunal of the organisation's decision to take no action following the Army shooting in the Bogside. They have suggested that an armed response was not appropriate in the circumstances.
4B-198 PIRA 24 made it clear in his BSI statement that:
I then decided to stand everybody down and said that all weapons were to be off the street from the two cars. It would have been crazy to think of taking on the Army. Whereas people were angry and in shock, there was agreement to this course of action. There was to be no action taken until after the funerals. Volunteers were sent out to tell people.175
4B-199 Likewise, Martin McGuinness has stated that an armed response was not appropriate in the circumstances:
...I decided that it was better to let the world see what the British army had done. If we brought weapons into the area we would give the British army an excuse to go further. Therefore the decision was taken not to engage the British forces.176
4B-200 PIRA 17, Battalion Quartermaster, claims to have been of a similar mind:
175 APIRA24.14 paragraph 60 176 KM3.12 paragraph 27 We met up at our usual meeting place in the Bogside. I am not prepared to specify the place. A decision was taken very early on by the IRA that for obvious reasons there would be no return fire and that the arms dump would not be opened. The obvious reasons were that we thought the army were trying to bait us into a gun battle and we should not take that bait with so many innocent civilians still around.\\textsuperscript{177}
4B-201 He has also stated:
\\textit{I have always believed that the decision was correct. The OC was present and the Adjutant too, together with other volunteers... We were very aware that the army was serious and we were not going to be drawn into a dog fight with them.}\\textsuperscript{178}
4B-202 The OC of the Creggan Company, PIRA 23, explained that:
\\textit{People were shocked and frightened and it was felt that the sight of guns on the streets would only make matters worse.}\\textsuperscript{179}
4B-203 All of these sentiments are inconsistent with a further decision that was apparently taken on Bloody Sunday.
\\textbf{THE DECISION TO SHOOT AT THE CITY WALLS}
4B-204 PIRA 24’s explanation for his decision that shots should be fired at a military position on the City Walls is inexplicable in the context of the evidence we have set out above:
\\textit{At the time, of course, people wanted to get hold of guns in order to retaliate and I thought that if they heard guns, this would quieten them down as they would think the IRA was still there and operational. I therefore made the decision, in the company of Martin McGuinness, to fire a couple of shots at the Walls which would, in my view, stop people asking for weapons and which had
\\textsuperscript{177} APIRA17.6 paragraph 33 \\textsuperscript{178} APIRA17.3 paragraph 77 \\textsuperscript{179} APIRA23.2 paragraph 11 the added advantage that the Army would know that we were still there and that this might encourage them to leave the area.\\textsuperscript{180}
4B-205 So unlikely is this explanation that we suggest it is a lie.
THE TIMING OF THE SHOTS
4B-206 Mr McGuinness claims that these rounds were fired “symbolically” and late in the day:
\\textit{Much later in the evening I was party to a decision made by the IRA to fire a number of shots, symbolically, at the British Army observation post on Derry Walls. This decision was not taken until at least one and a half hours after the British army shooting had ended. Following the decision, shots were fired from the vicinity of the Bogside Inn by an IRA volunteer. I was not however present when this incident occurred.}\\textsuperscript{181}
4B-207 We suggest that they were fired with the intention of killing a soldier or soldiers. We further suggest that the first shots discharged on Bloody Sunday from this location at the City Walls by the Provisional IRA were fired shortly after 1 PARA deployed into the Bogside.
4B-208 The radio logs provide very firm evidence of the early timing of shots fired from the area of the Bogside Inn at the City Walls. The incident was well reported, as the table below demonstrates. The radio logs clearly indicate that an exchange took place at or around 1614 hours.
\\textsuperscript{180} APIRA24.14 paragraph 61 \\textsuperscript{181} KM3.18 paragraph 58(8) Private AD of The Royal Anglian Regiment agrees that the radio messages extracted above appear to relate to an engagement in which he was involved. He was positioned on the first floor of a derelict house at 21 Long Tower Street, just below the City Walls and close to the Double Bastion, home of Roaring Meg, at the south west corner of the Walls.
The soldier saw a civilian with a rifle come out of an archway and take up a position just south of the Bogside Inn. He fired over AD's head and, presumably, at a target on the Walls. AD returned two rounds, the second of which found its target. A crowd gathered around the gunman’s body and dragged it into Meenan Square.\\textsuperscript{185}
4B-211 The locations of Private AD and the gunman are marked on the map below:
4B-212 Not one PIRA witness accounts for these early rounds, which were fired from the same location and at the same target as the late “symbolic” shots about which they have actually made admissions. We suggest it is now clear that Provisional volunteers on active service were operating in the heart of the Bogside at an early stage in the proceedings, shooting at soldiers.
4B-XI THE STANLEY’S WALK “CALL HOUSE” AND SHOTS FIRED FROM THE GASWORKS
4B-213 We deal in this section of our submissions with evidence of a meeting in the PIRA “call house” in Stanley’s Walk, the sighting of an armed member of the
\\textsuperscript{185} B933: Private AD agreed in oral evidence to the Tribunal that his 1972 account likely to be the most accurate (Day 382/82/8; Day 382/90/7) Provisional IRA in the area of Stanley's Walk and with the presence of Thomas McGlinchey, of PIRA, in the area of the gasworks on the other side of Stanley's Walk. He was searching for a weapon. We observe that it is likely that all of this was taking place at exactly the time that a member of the Royal Anglian Regiment, Soldier AC, was involved in an engagement with two gunmen – situated in the gasworks.
**MEETING AT STANLEY'S WALK ON 30TH JANUARY 1972**
*The Location of the Stanley's Walk “Call House”*
4B-214 Martin McGuinness made it clear that meetings of PIRA Command Staff both prior to and shortly after the Bloody Sunday march took place at the same address:
> A. Well, firstly, I want to clarify in relation to my evidence yesterday some matters.
> Lord Saville has given the impression that I was referring to two different houses; the first where volunteers met me to receive orders for Bloody Sunday; the second the house where the volunteers congregated after the killings. In fact, this is one and the same house. This was, on those days, our command base which we referred to as 'the call house' and it was moved every few days, but on that Saturday and Sunday it was in fact the same house.
4B-215 However, he refused to give the locations of the “call house” or of the Bogside arms dump on the basis that to do so would entail compromising a tacit assurance given to the families whose premises these were, or, as he put it:
> Now, the questions put to me about this and the location of the arms dump, therefore, relate to two separate premises. Now, I undertook to consider approaching the families who allowed us the use of these two premises as requested by Lord Saville and, after very careful consideration and with deep reservations, I did so last evening.
> I have been in contact with members of both families connected with these premises. In both cases they have asked me not to reveal the names or the location of the premises, and I have to say that does not surprise me, this is what I expected and, in my view, their attitude is totally understandable. I think it has to be remembered that the people who provided us with logistical support -- including the use of the premises -- did so at great personal risk, they could have been arrested or killed as a result. They did so because of their deep commitment to the cause of Irish freedom and always on the basis that their trust in the IRA would not be betrayed.
The IRA was at that stage -- and still is in terms of British law -- an illegal organisation. We could not have survived as an Army without the logistical support of people in our community, but those who gave us this support were acting illegally under British law; they were, and still are, open to arrest and prosecution and, even if not prosecuted, they would undoubtedly suffer intense and sustained harassment.
In addition to these considerations, those I spoke to last evening in both cases pointed out to me that their families are by now quite extensive, well-dispersed and not confined to the West Bank of the Foyle. These family members, some of whom may not even be committed Republican supporters, would be put at grave risk of attack by Loyalist paramilitaries who have killed many Republicans and who continue to target Republicans.
They may also suffer in terms of victimisation, in terms of employment or where they now live, and there actually may be all sorts of other wide-ranging situations that they could find themselves in as a result of their names being disclosed.
So, for all these reasons, I am not prepared to betray the confidence or put at risk people who sheltered, helped or put their trust in me. I think -- I have to say that they have my deepest gratitude and respect and I will never reveal their names.
Having just refused to give information of the greatest relevance to the Tribunal, Mr McGuinness then castigated the Ministry of Defence for having been "most unhelpful":
I think also that I am absolutely confident that the families of those who were murdered on Bloody Sunday understand my position on this matter and I think also I need to say that as far as the people of this city are concerned, there is a very, very strong view in the city that the group which has been most unhelpful to this Tribunal right throughout the course of the Tribunal has been the British Ministry of Defence.\\textsuperscript{186}
PIRA 24 also refused to disclose the location of the Bogside arms dump.\\textsuperscript{187} He was, however, happy to give the location of the Stanley’s Walk meeting house:
Q. But you do recall it was a derelict house, it was not a house --
A. It was a house -- what actually happened, the old houses would have been knocked down and the people were re-housed and we just moved, we just took it over.
Q. You deliberately took over a house where you would not be putting those people who had lived there to any danger?
A. No, that is right.
Q. It was not necessary to ask anybody’s permission?
A. It was not necessary to ask for permission.
Q. If it was derelict and nobody was connected with it at the time, there could be no earthly reason why you do not tell us the address. You are not exposing anybody to any danger by doing that?
A. That is right.
Q. In that case, if you are not exposing anybody to any danger, I premise it by that, please tell the Tribunal what the address was?
PIRA 24 then marked the approximate location of the “call house” on a photograph:
MR GLASGOW: Photograph 223 may help. If you find P223 and enlarge the bottom left-hand corner. Does that help?
A. Somewhere around there. Somewhere in that area, I just cannot tell you exactly what house it is. (Marked with blue arrow - APIRA 24.29)
\\textsuperscript{186} Day 391/1/9 \\textsuperscript{187} APIRA24.8 paragraphs 31 to 33; Day 426/93/8 Q. Very well. We have the area. Perhaps that photograph can be saved with the blue arrow, as your best approximation --
A. It is an approximate area, because there was houses knocked down and I just would not be sure, you know.
Q. You confirm there is no reason --
A. I confirm that it was one of those houses.
Q. There is no reason why if we can discover the address, why that address should not be known to anybody?
A. If we discover the address, okay, there is no problem. It is somewhere around there, it might be two houses out.
Q. You are not putting anybody at any danger by giving that at all?
A. Not at all, no.\\textsuperscript{188}
\\textsuperscript{188} Day 427/31/14
We recreate the marking he made on P223, below: It is now clear that the “call house” was in a derelict building, exposing Mr McGuinness’s reason for not disclosing its location as false. This was a clear example of Mr McGuinness withholding information from the Tribunal in reliance on the Republican “code of honour” in circumstances where such considerations simply did not apply.
The Location of the Bogside Arms Dump
Not one member of PIRA has agreed to disclose the location of the Bogside weapons dump. However, the Tribunal has two clues which may lead it to conclude that the dump was in the area of the gasworks.
PIRA 24 was prepared to admit that the dump was “on the perimeter of the Brandywell and Bogside area”. The gasworks would certainly fall in that area.
What is more, the Tribunal knows that Thomas McGlinchey, a member of the Provisional IRA, made for the gasworks when he was looking for a weapon to fire on the Army. On Bloody Sunday, he was the driver of the coal lorry which led the march from the Creggan to the place where marchers were to gather to listen to the speeches. His BSI statement included this description of events:
09. I drove the lorry down Rossville Street, past the rubble barricade. I parked at Free Derry Corner... my work was done...
10. I was still sitting in the driver’s seat when suddenly the shooting started... I got out of the lorry immediately...
Mr McGlinchey next described taking his wife and another woman to an address in St Colomb’s Wells. His narrative continued:
11. I do not recall where the shooting came from. I was more interested in getting hold of a rifle to shoot back at the soldiers and to defend the people in the crowd. I wasn’t the only one looking for a gun. I went to a place near Cable Street, where I thought I would
189 APIRA24.8 paragraph 32 have been able to get a gun, but there were none around (at that time, arms were tightly controlled by a few people).
4B-225 He went to the gasworks, according to his oral evidence to the Tribunal:
MR CLARKE: The last matter: can we have on the screen P216? You told us that the place where you thought you would have been able to get a gun was the gas place near Stanley's Walk or Cable Street. This is a photograph of the area and I think we can see that the gasworks were then off Stanley's Walk which is marked on the plan. (Marked in red) Am I right in thinking that Cable Street runs at right angles to Stanley's Walk?
A. Yes.
Q. There is the gasworks; is that the place you thought you might be able to get a gun?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it in one of the buildings we can see in the photograph?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell us which one it is?
A. Around here. (Indicating)
Q. Sorry, where?
A. Where I am pointing.
Q. That is to say just above the gas container on the left; is that right?
A. (Witness nodding)
4B-226 No marked photograph was saved during the course of Mr McGlinchey's oral evidence; we have, therefore, recreated the location indicated on P216 from the explanation given by Mr Clarke: Mr McGlinchey’s actions, combined with the clue given by PIRA 24, strongly suggest that there was a weapons dump at the gasworks.
The Meeting
A meeting took place at the “call house” at about 4.30 or 4.45 pm, according to PIRA 24. It is not clear who was present; the Tribunal has received conflicting evidence in this regard, as becomes apparent from Edwin Glasgow QC’s questioning of PIRA 24:
Q. ... PIRA 8 has told the Tribunal that you were at the meeting but Martin McGuinness was not ... PIRA 19 says that you were there and Mr McGuinness was not. But your recollection is that you were there, Martin McGuinness was there and PIRA 8 was there?
A. Yes, for --
Q. That is right?
A. Okay.
PIRA 17 and PIRA 23 were probably there too:
______________________________________________________________________
192 Day 427/31/3 193 Day 427/36/15 (1) PIRA 17, the Quartermaster, “wanted to get to the heart of the Bogside to a place I knew that other members of the IRA would be”. He was “focused on getting to speak to the people who might know what had happened” and went to “our usual meeting point in the Bogside”, where he met with the OC.
(2) PIRA 23, the Creggan OC, also admits going to the Stanley’s Walk location.
PIRA 8 was in the vicinity too. We have already discussed how PIRA 8, from the Brandywell Company, left the Brandywell for the Bogside, and referred above to an RUC document suggesting he was seen “on Lecky Road at Stanley’s Walk with a rifle”.
The situation was, therefore, one in which there were several members of PIRA in Stanley’s Walk at approximately 4.30 or 4.45 pm. At what is very likely to have been a similar time, one member admits that he was looking for a rifle in the gasworks over the road, and a further member still was apparently seen in Lecky Road/Stanley’s Walk with a rifle.
This was taking place at the same time that Soldier AC was engaged in a shooting incident with gunmen in the gasworks.
ROYAL ANGLIAN ENGAGEMENT WITH GUNMEN IN GASWORKS
The Radio Logs
We have referred above to the engagement at approximately 1614 hours between the Royal Anglians’ Private AD and a gunman at the Bogside Inn. Private AD
194 APIRA17.6 paragraph 30 195 APIRA17.6 paragraph 33 196 APIRA17.6 paragraph 33 197 APIRA23.2 paragraph 9, Day 422/14/2 was situated at the top of Long Tower Street, just below the City Walls. Private AC of the same Regiment was in a building close by. He was involved in two engagements with gunmen situated in the gasworks (incidents 1 and 2, below). According to the radio logs, these took place at or about 1635 and 1638 respectively.
Relevant entries from the Army radio logs are contained in the table below:
| Incident No. | Log | Serial | Time | To | From | Event | Page Ref | |--------------|-----|--------|------|----|------|-------|----------| | 1 | Porter(^{199}) | item 492 8 Inf Bde Log serial: 187 | 8 Inf Bde log DTG: 1635 | 0 | 54A | We have just heard further shots fired at our call sign Quebec 21 at junction Bishop St/Long Tower. Ah, 2 shots returned. Details later. Out | W135 | | | 8 INF BDE | 187 | 1635 | 1 RA | 2 shots fired at Q21, 1 shot returned, details to follow.(^{200}) | W49 | | | 8 INF BDE COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE | | 1637 | | | Q21 2 shots fire and returned | W79 | | 2 | Porter | item 504 8 Inf Bde Log serial: 192 | 8 Inf Bde log DTG: [1639] (^{201}) | 0 | 90A | ...We just heard three shots fired at OP Kilo on the City Walls – wrong, 2 shots fired. Three shots have been returned by Quebec call signs. | W136 | | | 8 Inf Bde | 192 | 1639 | 22 Lt | ...2 shots at wall – Q21 returned 3 shots. | W49 | | | 22 Lt AD Regt RA | 68 | 1638 | Ops | 3 shots fired at sniper by 1 RA c/s | W97 |
(^{199}) Transcript of Mr Porter's Tapes of Army Radio Transmissions on 30 January 1972 with 8 Infantry Brigade Log Entries
(^{200}) Incorrect – the fuller Porter log shows that 2 rounds were returned.
(^{201}) The actual time given in the Porter Log is “1640”. This time has been inserted in error; it should read “1639”, as does the corresponding entry in the 8 Inf Bde log from which the Porter log times are derived. Incident 1
The first incident is recorded in the Porter transcript of the 8 Infantry Brigade radio traffic. Call sign 54 Alpha of the Royal Anglians reported:
*We have just heard further shots fired at our call sign Quebec 21 at junction Bishop St/Long Tower. Ah, 2 shots returned. Details later. Out.*
The shots were logged at 1635 on the 8 Brigade log. The target was given as the Anglians' Quebec 21, which was the call sign posted at the top of Long Tower Street.
Private AC was positioned in a derelict house on the east side of Long Tower Street, on the corner directly opposite the junction with Howard Street. He was on the second floor, lying prone next to a large hole where a window had once been. He was armed with an SLR. Private 011 was in the same building and had a riot gun. AC sighted a gunman with a rifle in the gap between two huts on the line of the ridge of Celtic Park, on the western edge of the gasworks. The gunman fired over AC's head and, therefore, up in the direction of the City Walls. Private AC returned two rounds, the second of which probably found its target. The gunman was dragged away. This was the first of AC's two engagements and, although AC's RMP statement timed the incident at about 1645 hours, the radio logs demonstrate that it was in fact approximately ten minutes earlier.
Private 011 gave an account that is consistent with that of Private AC.
Gunner 124 and Private 156 were both located at the Double Bastion on the City Walls, just above Private AC's position. They were both aware of this engagement. In 1972, they recorded having heard two rounds being fired at their location, with a military sniper, who must have been Private AC, returning fire from a derelict house about 50 metres to their left. The two soldiers both timed the engagement at 1634 hours, which would coincide with the incident actually being logged a minute later at 1635.208
**Incident 2**
4B-240 The Porter log contains this report of the second incident from 22 LAD RA’s call sign 90 Alpha:
...\*We just heard three shots fired at OP Kilo on the City Walls – wrong, 2 shots fired. Three shots have been returned by Quebec call signs.\*209
4B-241 Observation Post Kilo was situated at the south west corner of the City Walls, close to the Double Bastion and, thus close to Soldier AC’s location.210 Although it was Private AC’s evidence that the second incident took place about fifteen minutes after the first, the radio logs demonstrate that in fact there was a shorter interval of approximately four minutes. The incident took place no later than 1638 because the corresponding entry in the 22 LAD RA log was made then.211
4B-242 Private AC became aware of a second gunman in the same location at the gasworks as the first. The gunman fired at him with a rifle. Private AC returned three rounds, the third of which probably found its target. This gunman was then dragged away.212
______________________________________________________________________
208 Gunner 124: RMP statement at B1775 (he stated in his oral evidence to the Tribunal that this accurately recorded the incident and its timing; Day 358/13/16 and Day 358/25/4). Private 156: RMP statement at B1934 (he too stated in his oral evidence to the Tribunal that this accurately recorded the incident and its timing; Day 348/123/15 and Day 348/125/15).
209 Serial 504, W136
210 G133.904
211 Serial 67, W98
212 B921 Private 011 gave a similar account of this encounter and added that the gunman’s fire went overhead; it would therefore have continued in the direction of the Walls.\\textsuperscript{213}
Major 159, 22 LAD RA, was on the City Walls at the relevant time and probably not far from the Double Bastion. He heard two further rounds fired from the Bogside towards that location at about 1638 hours, which were clearly the incoming rounds recorded in the 22 LAD RA log.\\textsuperscript{214}
The map accompanying Private AC’s RMP statement was marked to show the location of the soldier and of the gunmen he engaged. We have added to the same map markings demonstrating:
(1) The approximate location of the Stanley’s Walk “call house” as indicated by PIRA 24; and
(2) The approximate location to which Thomas McGlinchey went in search of weapons, as described above:
\\textsuperscript{213} B927; confirmed Day 349/119/7.
\\textsuperscript{214} B1952; confirmed Day 349/119/7. At the very least, members of PIRA must have been aware of the exchanges between the gunmen and Private AC. The correlation of:
(1) the location of Private AC’s gunmen and of the members of the Provisional IRA congregating in and around Stanley’s Walk and the gasworks; and
(2) the timing of the meeting at the “call house” and of Private AC’s engagements with the gunmen,
make this inevitable. Indeed, it suggests that this was a PIRA attack. That being so, here is yet another example of firing by PIRA members at soldiers on Bloody Sunday about which there have been no admissions. It further undermines attempts by PIRA witnesses to suggest that their armed activities on Bloody Sunday were confined to a few late shots at the City Walls from the Bogside Inn area. On the morning of Day 390, Mr Clarke asked Mr McGuinness:
Q. Can we have KM3.4, please. Could we highlight the first half. You describe how you thought that snatch squads would be deployed to apprehend stone throwers and you refer to the fact your house had been raided with intention of arresting you for internment a few months earlier. You decided it would not be sensible to run the risk of being arrested so you moved away along Chamberlain Street with the intention of listening to the speeches at Free Derry wall. Do you have any recollection now of approximately how long you were at the barrier before you moved away?
A. Well, I cannot be accurate, but it was a short while.
Q. A short period?
A. Yes.
Q. I mean, times are difficult, are we talking about five or ten minutes?
A. I think you are talking about something in the region of five minutes, I am not really certain, but it was not that long a period, because I knew that there was a prospect of the snatch squads being used and I was not going to be arrested and interned needlessly.
After the luncheon adjournment, Mr Clarke returned to the issue of timing and suggested that, on the face of it, Mr McGuinness had described what he was doing for no more than ten minutes of the half hour leading up to the entry of the Army into the Bogside and the commencement of its firing there:
Can you give us any idea of how long it had taken you to get from the top of Chamberlain Street down to the spot on the west side of Joseph Place?
A. I think just a couple of minutes. Q. The reason that I ask you for these approximate times is that a question arises in relation to the timing that you have described. You told me before we broke that you were at the top of Chamberlain Street or that area for a short time, about five minutes or so and that as you say it cannot have taken you very long to get down from the top of Chamberlain Street to Joseph Place. Your evidence is that you were up at the top of Chamberlain Street shortly before the stoning began and it is possible with some degree of precision to time when the stoning began. I can show you how if you like, but it appears to have begun at just before 3.40 and we know that the Army came into the Bogside at approximately 4.10; we know that because there is a picture which shows the Guildhall clock at 4.10 as the Army vehicles came in. They must have come in either at the time or very shortly after you had reached Joseph Place because you heard firing from that position. The problem that I am suggesting to you is that there appears to be something like a half hour gap between the stoning starting and the Army coming in and the firing, therefore, beginning. There is a half-hour gap but your account of your movements only deals with, at best, something like ten minutes of that period. Do you follow the point I am making?
A. I do, indeed, but I did say that those were approximate times, that does not necessarily mean it was five minutes, it could have been much longer.
Q. What, as much as half an hour?
A. Well accumulated, yes, absolutely, but I mean, I cannot be certain.
Q. What were you doing for half an hour between the time when you got to the barrier and the time when you ended up at Joseph Place, if it was half an hour?
A. I did say that I was part of the several hundred people who marched on to William Street. I have given approximate times; those times could be wrong, but it is 30 years later and it is very hard to be accurate in all of this.217
In other words, there is a twenty minute period potentially missing from Mr McGuinness's account of this crucial early period. It will be for the Tribunal to determine whether the missing time can be innocently explained, as Mr
217 Day 390/82/25 McGuinness suggests it can be, or whether he was up to something during those twenty minutes, which he has since tried to hide. We suggest the latter is likely to be the case, in circumstances where Mr McGuinness has otherwise claimed to have a very clear recollection of his activities on Bloody Sunday.
We are not in a position to state what Mr McGuinness was doing during the missing twenty minutes, or generally during this early stage in the events of Bloody Sunday. The Tribunal has received evidence which points to several possibilities.
**DUFFY'S BOOKIES**
Des Clinton, the pseudonym of an IRA man interviewed by Liam Clarke and Kathryn Johnson for their book on Martin McGuinness, suggests that Mr McGuinness was part of a group to gain entry to Duffy's Bookmakers, via its back door in High Street. The window upstairs looked on to William Street and Clinton apparently believed that Mr McGuinness planned to bomb the soldiers below from that location. He was unable to, as word arrived that the Army was about to deploy through Barrier 14. Clarke and Johnston rely on another source to suggest that, as he left the building, Mr McGuinness fired a shot from a Thompson sub machine gun. Mr McGuinness denies having been in the bookies.
A further account has some similarities with the one given in the Clarke and Johnston book. The note made by the Sunday Times' John Barry of his interview with Ivan Cooper in 1972 is hotly disputed by Mr Cooper. However, Mr Barry maintains that it reflects what Mr Cooper told him. Mr Cooper is recorded as having suggested that Mr McGuinness and two others were in a house in William Street almost down by Chamberlain Street. "Their plan was to fire through the
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218 *From Guns to Government*, 2003 ed, page 72 219 Day 391/212/25 220 Day 193/122/2; Day 193/120/24 doorway at soldiers, who IC says were occupying some of the houses on the other side of W[illiam] St. The troops moved in, and the trio were trapped”. Mr McGuinness and the others dismantled the Thompsons that they were carrying and “put them up their jerseys” and ran off with the crowd. Mr Cooper apparently went on to describe what took place when Mr McGuinness reached the rubble barricade. Mr Barry records his own scepticism of what he was told, noting that “It reeks of “minimum approach” to me”.221
4B-253 There was definitely some activity in Duffy’s bookies; a number of witnesses report it, although they do not mention Mr McGuinness’s involvement. Francis Duddy, for example, describes entering with a group of people and going up to the first floor room, and looking through the window at barrier 14, below, “trying to figure out the best way to get behind the soldiers”. It was shortly afterwards that soldiers came through the barrier. Mr Duffy and the others present with him left the building and made down Chamberlain Street.222
4B-254 There is, furthermore, a body of evidence suggesting that several members of PIRA were in the vicinity of the bookies at approximately this time. PIRA 14 has stated that he was with his younger brother, who was also a member of PIRA, in the general area of Chamberlain St/Eden Place/High Street when they bumped into Sean Keenan and Martin McGuinness.223 There is also the note of an interview conducted by the RUC in the early 1970s, which includes this report:
I was at the march on Bloody Sunday. I was in Chamberlain Street just before the shooting started. I saw PIRA 8, [redacted], 'Mad Dog' Doherty, [redacted] in Chamberlain Street near the junction of William Street.
I saw Martin McGuinness had a Thompson SMG under his coat. I don’t know if any of the others were armed or not as I didn’t notice
221 KC12.68 222 AD144.2 paragraphs 7 to 12; Day 89/104/16 223 APIRA14.2 paragraph 12 any guns. Neither do I know if McGuinness fired the Thompson or not... 224
INFLICTION
4B-255 The Tribunal has also received evidence about “Infliction”, who was an agent who apparently reported to his handler about Martin McGuinness in 1984. He claimed that Mr McGuinness told him he had fired the shot on Bloody Sunday from the Rossville Flats that “precipitated the ‘Bloody Sunday’ episode, using a Thompson sub machine gun. 225
4B-256 It will be for the Tribunal to decide whether there is any truth in these accounts, in the absence of Mr McGuinness’s own explanation of what he was doing during the missing twenty minutes.
4B-XIII OTHER EVIDENCE SUGGESTIVE OF PIRA ACTIVITY ON BLOODY SUNDAY
WITNESS X
4B-257 Witness X was interviewed by two interviewing Special Branch officers some time after Bloody Sunday. Detective Sergeant Samuel Davidson and Detective Constable William Kilfedder both stated that they had no reason to doubt that the typed record of his interview was anything other than an accurate account of what they were told, although neither recalled the actual interview so long after the event. 226 Detective Sergeant Davidson made the further point that the interview note appeared to have been for intelligence purposes only. 227
4B-258 The heavily redacted note of Witness X’s interview records that he told the officers:
224 INT1.74 225 KA2.7 226 JK6.5 paragraph 11; JD1.3 227 JD1.3 PIRA 24 gave evidence to the Tribunal that on 29th January 2004, he bumped into Witness X whilst out shopping. Coincidentally or otherwise, that was the date on which Witness X was scheduled, but failed, to give evidence to the Tribunal. After he failed to appear, Lord Saville informed the hearing chamber that an issue had arisen as to his health. The Tribunal will decide how convincing was PIRA 24’s account of the circumstances in which he met Witness X. The following arises from the questioning of PIRA 24 by Gerard Elias QC:
Q. What time of day did you meet him? A. I do not know. If it is going incriminate him I am not going to answer it.
Q. I am sorry? A. If it is going to incriminate the man, I am not going to answer the question.
Q. You are not going to tell this Tribunal what time of day you met him unless that incriminates him, is that it? A. If it is going to incriminate that particular guy, I ain’t going to answer the question, okay.
Q. Did he tell you that he was due to give evidence here? A. He told me that the Special Branch had made up evidence that he was supposed to have given, but it was all lies.
Q. That is what you have told us yesterday? A. Yes.
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228 AX1.2 229 APIRA24.9 paragraph 37 230 Day 418/87/22 Q. I am asking you the question: did he tell you that he was due to give evidence here -- A. No. Q. -- that day? A. No. Q. Did he tell you whether he was under any pressure, either to give evidence to this Tribunal or not? A. No. Q. Was he apparently fit and well? A. He did not look too well. Q. He was doing his shopping, was he, with you? A. No, he was not doing shopping with me. Q. He was doing his shopping, was he? A. I do not know what he was doing. Q. He was in the shop, was he? A. Aye, but he might not have been doing shopping. Q. Was he meeting you? A. He was not meeting me, no. Q. You put no pressure of any kind on him, did you? A. Not at all. Q. Thank you very much.231
4B-260 In his BSI statement, Witness X denied any knowledge of the interview and claimed not even to have been a member of PIRA.232 The Tribunal has access to the unredacted material relating to Witness X that is not available to the Interested Parties. It will therefore be for the Tribunal to assess how much weight to attach to the allegations contained in the Special Branch note.
DEIDRE McNAMARA
Deidre McNamara is the daughter of a former Vice President of Sinn Fein, Derry Kelleher. "He was well acquainted with a number of people who were active in the provisional wing of the IRA." She has given a statement to the Tribunal in which she recounts a conversation she had with her father in 1975. She states: "I recall with some clarity, even at this distance in time, what was said because of the significant impact that my father's words had on me." It is therefore her evidence that:
I clearly recall my father saying to me that "the Provos" had "set up" the civil rights march which had taken place. By the use of the words "set-up" he was not implying organisation he was giving me a very clear message of having subverted the civil rights march which had taken place. He said that the "Provos" used the march as a means of moving the focus of the civil rights movement, which had previously espoused non-violent means, into something which was different in character, namely something prepared to embrace and use violence. He was explicit in his description, saying that the "Provos" strategy was to use the march to provoke the British military forces into firing their weapons and thereby create the appearance that the violence and mayhem which would follow had been caused by the British military forces acting in a seemingly unprovoked way.
When the Tribunal has reviewed the evidence given by those PIRA witnesses from whom it did eventually hear and has considered the many inconsistencies in
233 AM511.1 paragraph 1 234 AM511.1 paragraph 2 235 AM511.2 paragraph 6 236 AM511.2 paragraph 7 the accounts given about fundamental matters, it may conclude that the evidence of Deidre McNamara merits consideration.
PIRA 14
4B-264 PIRA 14 claims that he was in Derry on Bloody Sunday “solely because I wanted to go to the civil rights march”.237 We suggest that it is suspicious that PIRA 14, who held a very senior position in the Provisional IRA in the Republic,238 should have been there at all.
PRESENCE OF PROVISIONAL IRA PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF THE RUBBLE BARRICADE
4B-265 According to PIRA 14’s BSI statement, he, his brother and Colm Keenan were all at the Rossville Street rubble barricade at the same time as Hugh Gilmore.239 PIRA 14’s bother and Mr Keenan were also members of the Provisional IRA.240 PIRA 14 was asked by Edwin Glasgow QC:
Q. So that is three members of the IRA standing in the immediate proximity of Mr Gilmore when he is shot?
A. Yes.
Q. That is right. Is your evidence still that none of them was armed?
A. Yes.241
4B-266 PIRA 26, PIRA 14’s brother, describes where they went in relation to the rubble barricade:
When we got to Rossville Street, my brother went ahead of us, and in fact had gone just across to the North side of the rubble barricade to the point marked E on the attached map. I stopped just
237 Day 421/7/19 238 Day 421/16/19 239 Day APIRA14.3 paragraph 18 240 Day 421/82/18 241 Day 421/83/4 PIRA 26's plan places point C directly north of the eastern end of the rubble barricade. Points D and E are just to the south of the barricade, again at its eastern end.\\textsuperscript{241}
PIRA\\textsuperscript{1} was also near to the rubble barricade. It is his evidence that he pulled George Roberts from the barricade into the safety of the gable of Glenfada Park North.\\textsuperscript{244} He was one of those arrested at the Glenfada Park North gable and taken to Fort George.
We are not in a position to make specific allegations against these members of the Provisional IRA arising from their positions near the barricade. The Tribunal may, however, consider it surprising that there was such a concentration of volunteers in this one area at a time when soldiers suggest they were engaging armed civilians.
**CIVILIAN GUNMEN TABLE**
The 159-page Civilian Gunman Table contains a very significant number of accounts of the activities of armed civilians on Bloody Sunday. Importantly, the Table excludes sightings of gunmen allegedly made by soldiers. It cannot therefore be suggested that it presents a picture of what was taking place in and around the Bogside that has been distorted by untruthful soldiers' accounts. On the contrary, many of the entries relate to evidence given by civilians, who had much to lose from speaking about such things. The pressures on civilian witnesses to omit references to gunmen in their accounts of Bloody Sunday is an issue that is addressed in chapter 2. In many cases it has not been possible to identify the gunman involved, or indeed the IRA wing to which he belonged. It is likely that at
\\textsuperscript{242} APIRA26.3 paragraph 22 \\textsuperscript{243} APIRA26.9 \\textsuperscript{244} AMS08.3 paragraphs 15 to 18 least some of the sightings referred to in the Table relate to Provisional IRA gunmen.
THE SHOTS AT THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH AND THE EMBASSY BALLROOM
4B-271 The Echo Observation Post was situated in an elevated position on the Embassy Ballroom, close to Waterloo Place. One high velocity shot was fired at the OP at 1611 hours, as the radio logs show:
| LOG | SERIAL | TIME | TO | FROM | EVENT | PAGE REF | |-----|--------|------|----|------|-------|----------| | Porter245 | item 399 | 0 | 90A | At 1611 hrs, one shot at Echo. No strike. Over | W130 | | 8 Inf Bde Communications Centre | 1617 | 90A | At 1611 1 shot at echo no strike | W75 | | 22 Lt AD Regt RA | 58 | 1612 | Ops | Bde | 1 x shot at OP “E” no strike observed | W97 |
4B-272 Three military witnesses, all of whom were at the Echo OP, corroborate the radio reports.246 It is not known by whom this round was fired.
4B-273 Soldiers on a roof adjoining the Presbyterian Church were targeted by a sniper at a time before the military deployment through the barriers into the Bogside. Again, it is not known by whom. Our full submissions in relation to that incident are in Chapter 6G.
245 Transcript of Mr Porter’s Tapes of Army Radio Transmissions on 30 January 1972 with 8 Infantry Brigade Log Entries 246 Lieutenant 009: B1390, B1392.4 paragraph 22; Captain 021: B1507, B1509.4 paragraph 27 and Soldier 108: B1717. We have suggested, above, that shots fired from the Bogside Inn at soldiers on the City Walls were discharged at approximately 1614 hours. These shots were fired by a member of the Provisional IRA.
The rounds fired at the Echo OP and the Presbyterian Church have similarities with those fired at the City Walls. In all three cases, shots were fired at targets in elevated positions, at an early stage in the proceedings. We therefore raise the possibility that they are part of a pattern of early shots that is attributable to the Provisional IRA.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Provisional IRA witnesses have shown a marked reluctance to come forward and to provide any assistance to the Tribunal. When they have come forward, they have done so late in the day, on their own terms and with their own objectives. The Tribunal may conclude that such an approach is inconsistent with a group of witnesses who are willing to tell the truth and who have nothing to hide.
It was neither the desire nor the intention of the Provisional IRA witnesses to provide all relevant information about Bloody Sunday to the Tribunal. They made no secret of this fact. The witnesses explained that their "Republican code of honour" or their "oath of allegiance" was such that they must refuse to disclose certain categories of information, however helpful they might be to the Tribunal in its search for the truth.
There may have been something altogether more sinister underlying the Republican "code of honour". There is startling evidence that even the most senior member of the Provisional IRA in Derry on Bloody Sunday, PIRA 24, has been threatened in relation to his evidence to the Inquiry. The concern and overwhelming probability must be, if the former commander has been intimidated in this way, many others will have been too.
There has been a cynical attempt on the part of Provisional IRA witnesses to manipulate these proceedings and to exploit them for their own advantage. PIRA 24 came forward only at the last minute. In a move unprecedented even by the low standards of cooperation set by other PIRA witnesses, PIRA 24’s BSI statement was not served on the Parties until 0140 hours on Day 426, 12th February 2004. This was the day on which he was to start giving oral evidence. His evidence concluded on Day 427, making PIRA 24 the final witness to give oral evidence to the Tribunal. There had previously been an inordinate delay by Martin McGuinness in producing a statement to this Inquiry, for which no satisfactory explanation was ever offered.
A high level of orchestration was involved in the attempt to discredit the evidence of Paddy Ward, whose statement had cast considerable doubt on the evidence of Mr McGuinness. Mr Ward started to give oral evidence on Monday 20th October 2003. Yet, it was only on Friday 17th October that the statements of seven witnesses (and a solicitor’s letter summarising the evidence an eighth) were served. In each case, the aim of the witness was to discredit Mr Ward. It is clear that this body of evidence was deliberately held back until the last conceivable moment.
While some lack of recollection on the part of Provisional IRA witnesses about the structure of their organisation at the time of Bloody Sunday would have been wholly understandable, the high degree of contradiction in their evidence is more consistent with a desire to mislead.
It is not clear how defined was the role of the Fianna within the Provisional IRA at the time of Bloody Sunday. It would seem, however, that this youth wing had a more involved role than some suggest. The very existence of the Fianna signified the involvement of a group of young people in the activities of the Provisional IRA in Derry. The Fianna did not constitute the only involvement of young personnel in the Derry Provisional IRA at the time of Bloody Sunday. The Tribunal has received evidence which shows that several full volunteers joined PIRA when they were just sixteen or seventeen. In fact, sixteen year old James O’Hagan had been killed on active service in the Summer of 1971.
Members of the Provisional IRA had a very low regard for those in the Official IRA. It may therefore be of some concern that shortly before Bloody Sunday, approximately one third of the Official membership had defected to the Provisional IRA, according to PIRA 24. The defection was certainly not sufficiently in advance of that day’s events to allow for appropriate re-training.
An organisation that included a significant proportion both of young personnel and of newly recruited ex-Officials required a firm and experienced leadership to keep it in order. Derry PIRA was commanded by PIRA 24, who, on his own admission could not devote the necessary time to the enterprise and who left office within two weeks of Bloody Sunday. Internment had stripped the Provisional IRA of the older, more experienced officers.
These were not the circumstances in which one would expect a disciplined regime to exist. We suggest it did not. In particular, we draw attention to evidence pointing to the existence in the organisation of “hotheads”, who could not be trusted to exercise a sufficient degree of self-control.
We suggest that the timing of PIRA 24’s removal from office, within two weeks of Bloody Sunday, is suspicious. PIRA 24’s claim to have stood down to allow him to rest and spend more time with his family does not ring true when one learns that he took up a position at Brigade level in Dublin, a role that would have required a high level of involvement and one which, presumably, took him away from his family.
The Provisional IRA in Derry conducted a damaging guerrilla war against the Security Forces with a relatively small number of weapons. Working weapons being at a premium, it follows that every opportunity would be taken to keep them safe when they were not in use and, when they became stranded or were abandoned, to recover them.
Martin McGuinness explained the primary purpose of the Provisional IRA in Derry at the time of Bloody Sunday was “to attack the British Army and those military forces supporting them”. The organisation sought to achieve this purpose in different ways, including the regular exploitation of riots by gunmen and nail bombers. The claim that the gunmen and bombers were absent from the riots accompanying the Derry march should be viewed with suspicion. There would have been a firm expectation that they would be present. The ambush of a police car in Derry and the murder of two police officers three days before Bloody Sunday further demonstrate the brutal and bloody determination with which the PIRA policy of attack was pursued.
4B-289 There is clear evidence of the very poor relations that existed between the Provisional and Official IRA at the time of Bloody Sunday. The Provisionals distinguished themselves from their Official rivals by their more aggressive and murderous stance against the Security Forces.
4B-290 PIRA 24 and other senior PIRA officers have claimed that members of the organisation were ordered to take no action for the duration of the Derry march (other than the manning of two patrols in areas outside the Bogside). It is interesting to note that, whilst claiming to have issued such orders, the senior officers maintain there was no need for them. They have suggested that their men would not have conducted attacks without orders to do so, and certainly not whilst a march was taking place.
4B-291 There is conflicting Provisional IRA evidence as to the request, by members of NICRA and others, to seek assurances about PIRA’s conduct during the march. For example, whilst Martin McGuinness asserts that such assurances were sought and given, PIRA 24 denies that this was the case.
4B-292 Certain Provisional IRA witnesses, including Martin McGuinness, now claim that PIRA weapons (other than those with two mobile patrols outside the Bogside) were gathered together and stored centrally in a single dump on Bloody Sunday. Mr McGuinness’s earliest accounts had in fact made it clear that weapons were kept in different locations on that day, including in the near vicinity of the march. The inconsistency in his evidence is symbolic of an inconsistency in the PIRA evidence generally on this issue. In this case, the inconsistency is evidence of an attempt to create the untruthful impression that most Provisional IRA volunteers did not have access to weapons on Bloody Sunday.
4B-293 PIRA 24 and Martin McGuinness have both claimed that they ordered two armed mobile active service units to patrol in the Creggan and Brandywell on Bloody Sunday. It has been suggested by some PIRA witnesses that there was a need for an armed presence in the Creggan and the Brandywell because both areas were vulnerable to military incursion. However, the risk of a military incursion has now been shown to be a myth. The suggestions were probably made in a further attempt to demonstrate that armed members of PIRA were anywhere but in the Bogside at the time that the Army fired its rounds.
PIRA 24 and Mr McGuinness both claim that the numbers involved in the two mobile patrols were small. The Tribunal is now in receipt of information that suggests more volunteers were on active service than the senior officers are prepared to admit. We have suggested that the claim that a limited number of volunteers was on duty, safely away from the Bogside, was merely a ruse to hide this fact that the Provisional IRA was involved in a series of armed attacks on Bloody Sunday.
PIRA 8 was a member of the Brandywell patrol. He claims that he was watching soldiers at the old Dairy/Mex Garage location as part of his duties on Bloody Sunday, which is surprising in the light of his evidence that the concern was of an incursion from the area of Bishop Street and Foyle Street area. It is even more surprising that, on his evidence, he missed a concerted attack on the old Dairy. The radio logs demonstrate that the attack took place at precisely the time he was claims to have been there.
Several high-ranking officers in Derry PIRA have told the Tribunal of the organisation's decision to take no action following the Army shooting in the Bogside. They have suggested that an armed response was not appropriate in the circumstances. That stance is totally inconsistent with a further decision that was apparently taken on Bloody Sunday to fire shots "symbolically" at soldiers on the City Walls, at a late stage in the proceedings. In fact, it is now clear from the radio logs that shots were fired from the Bogside Inn at the City Walls at or around 1614 hours – and so at an early stage, shortly after members of the Parachute Regiment passed into the Bogside. Not one PIRA witness accounts for these early rounds, which were fired from the same location and at the same target as those about which they have actually made admissions. The Echo Observation Post was situated in an elevated position on the Embassy Ballroom, close to Waterloo Place. One high velocity shot was fired at the OP at 1611 hours, as the radio logs show. This round and the one fired at soldiers on a roof adjoining the Presbyterian Church have similarities with those fired at the City Walls. These were early shots fired at targets in elevated positions. We therefore raise the possibility that they are part of a pattern of early shots that is attributable to the Provisional IRA.
A meeting took place involving various volunteers in the “call house” in Stanley’s Walk at 1630 or 1645 hours, according to PIRA 24. At about the same time, an armed member of the organisation was seen in the area of Stanley’s Walk and volunteer Thomas McGlinchey was on his own admission in the area of the gasworks on the other side of Stanley’s Walk. He was searching for a weapon. It is likely that all of this was taking place at exactly the time that a member of the Royal Anglian Regiment was involved in an engagement with two gunmen – situated in the gasworks. The radio logs show that these gunmen were engaged at about 1635 and 1638 hours. At the very least, members of PIRA in the “call house” must have been aware of the exchanges. Indeed, we suggest it is likely that this was a PIRA attack.
There is a twenty minute period potentially missing from Mr McGuinness’s account of the crucial early period of Bloody Sunday between the stoning at Barrier 14 and the entry of the Parachute Regiment into the Bogside. Mr McGuinness maintains that the missing time can be innocently explained as the side-effect of an imperfect recollection. In circumstances where Mr McGuinness has otherwise claimed to have a very clear recollection of what he did on Bloody Sunday, we suggest it is much more likely that he was engaged in some activity during those twenty minutes, which he has since tried to hide. In this regard, it will be for the Tribunal to decide whether there is any truth in accounts relating to activity at Duffy’s bookies and in the evidence of Infliction.
The Tribunal has access to the unredacted material relating to Witness X that is not available to the Parties. It will therefore be for the Tribunal to assess how much weight to attach to the allegations contained in the note of the interview conducted with him by members of RUC Special Branch branch. Deidre McNamara is the daughter of a former Vice President of Sinn Fein, Derry Kelleher. It is her evidence that her father told her that the Provisional IRA had subverted the Derry march, as she put it, "to provoke the British military forces into firing their weapons and thereby create the appearance that the violence and mayhem which would follow had been caused by the British military." The Tribunal may now conclude that her evidence merits consideration.
The 159-page Civilian Gunman Table contains a very significant number of accounts of the activities of armed civilians on Bloody Sunday. In many cases it has not been possible to identify the gunman involved, or indeed the IRA wing to which he belonged. It is likely that it at least some of the sightings referred to in the Table relate to Provisional IRA gunmen. WITNESS X: ADDENDUM TO FINAL SUBMISSIONS
1. The initial Lawton Team submissions regarding Witness X are at pages FS7-490 to FS7-493 (paragraphs 4B-257 to 4B-261). We make these further submissions following the oral evidence of Witness X on 27th January 2005 (Day 435), when further relevant matters came to light.
2. We stress once again that in making our submissions about Witness X we have not had sight of the relevant unredacted and undisclosed material. We are therefore totally reliant on the Tribunal carefully to assess such material and to have regard to it where appropriate.
3. We now further submit that there is virtually no truthful information in the witness statement given by Witness X to this Inquiry on 9th February 2000, which is at AX1.3. He lied then, and has lied in oral evidence, in an attempt to hide the fact that:
(1) he was a member of the Provisional IRA; and
(2) he did indeed give the interview to the RUC in 1972, which the Tribunal has distributed in redacted statement form at AX1.1-2.
WITNESS X'S STATEMENT TO THE INQUIRY
THE RUC INTERVIEW STATEMENT (AX1.1-1.2)
4. Witness X claimed at paragraph 3 of his Eversheds statement that:
I have absolutely no knowledge of this interview nor the contents of the note.
He seemed also to suggest that the 1972 statement might relate to someone other than himself. He noted that his “is a fairly common name, I know of at least five in County Derry. The date of birth is incorrect” (paragraph 4). He added in a similar vein that “I was arrested in 1972...However, so was about half my family and very probably half the people in Creggan” (paragraph 5). 5. It is plainly dishonest for Witness X to suggest that he had no knowledge of the 1972 interview, when:
(1) at paragraph 6, he actually gave details about the interview ("I was asked about my movements"); and
(2) in oral evidence, he claimed to be able to give further details: "There was documents threw down in front of me, I was hit in prison for three or four days, I was hit and abused, documents were put [in] front of me." He claims he probably would have given his name and address but no other answer (Day 435/42/13 to Day 435/43/9. See also his earlier evidence at Day 435/6/7 to Day 435/6/20).
6. Furthermore, the Tribunal has good grounds for concluding that Witness X did give the information contained in the 1972 statement. The Tribunal knows that the statement accurately records:
- his full name (Day 435/7/24 to Day 435/8/1);
- the address at which he was living at the time of the interview (Day 435/8/2 to Day 435/8/4);
- his date of birth (save for the year, which is given as 1972 and was "obviously a mistake") (Day 435/8/5 to 435/8/15); and
- the date on which he was interviewed by the RUC (Day 435/9/20 to 435/9/24).
7. That date is redacted from the disclosed version of the interview notes. Nevertheless, we now know that it was in 1972, at some stage after the summer (Day 435/40/20 to Day 435/42/9). In our initial Witness X submissions, we referred to the evidence of one of the interviewing RUC officers, Detective Sergeant Davidson. He made the point that the interview note appeared to have been for intelligence purposes only.(^1) The significance of the timing of the interview is that it was after Lord Widgery’s Report had been published. Therefore, it cannot sensibly be suspected or claimed that the 1972 statement was concocted by the RUC with the aim either of propaganda generally or of influencing the Widgery Inquiry specifically.
8. Witness X refused, on advice from his lawyer, to comment on whether any of the further information contained in the 1972 statement was accurate. Edmund Lawson QC asked him:
[Q:\\text{Was there anything that was recorded by the RUC in 1972 and attributed to you that was or might have been accurate? Anything at all...apart from your name and address and date of birth?}]
[A:\\text{Sorry Sir, there was confusion (as heard) there, it would be unwise of me, under instructions from counsel, to answer that question} \\text{ (Day 435/47/5 to Day 435/47/12).}]
Witness X again refused to answer one of Mr Lawson’s questions:
[Q:\\text{...did you make any kind of statements to the RUC officers after you had been lifted?}]
[A:\\text{Sir, I have been advised by my counsel not to answer that question} \\text{ (Day 435/48/21 to Day 435/48/25).}]
The Tribunal will have access to material that will help it to determine whether the 1972 statement does indeed contain further accurate information. We submit that Witness X’s refusal to answer Mr Lawson’s questions permits one to draw the inference that it does.
(^1) JD1.3; FS7-490, paragraph 4B-257. See also Mr Kilfedder’s evidence at JK6.4 (and the oral evidence at Day 423/35/18 to Day 423/36/1; Day 423/59/24 to Day 423/60/7; and Day 433/32/3 to 433/33/3). 9. Witness X's lawyers seem to have accepted that the 1972 interview was indeed given by their client. We presume that they relied on instructions from their client to reach that conclusion.
(1) The letter from J.B. Stelfox & Company to the Inquiry of 9th November 2001 enclosed (our emphasis): "our client's redacted statement". A highly redacted version of the 1972 statement was included (pages 54-55 of the Witness X bundle).
(2) Part B of Witness X's anonymity application included at paragraph 5 the information that: "He was interviewed by police and the document, which is the relevant document, refers to activities on Bloody Sunday" (page 38 of Witness X bundle).
10. It is possible from information that is in the public domain to work out what took place following the interview.
(1) The 1972 statement was certainly taken seriously by the Army. It is accurately reflected in the Intsum at G134C.906.12.
(2) INQ 2241 brought it to the attention of Colonel Tugwell, who retains a fairly accurate recollection of the information he was given. He wanted Witness X to be re-interviewed (paragraph 48, B1333.70; see also INQ 2241 at 284/83/16-284/86/20).
(3) INQ 2241 therefore sought a re-interview (letter at G134B.906.9).
(4) The RUC attempted to re-interview Witness X, who then refused to talk about Bloody Sunday (G134B.906.8).
2 See also INQ 2225, who believes he spoke to one of the RUC interviewing officers shortly after the interview (paragraph 58, C2225.10). 11. Colonel Tugwell presumes that Witness X’s refusal to co-operate further was because he had been “intimidated by internment camp discipline” (paragraph 48, B1333.71). We suggest this is correct. Witness X now accepts that he was, indeed, interned following the interview (Day 435/40/17 to Day 435/40/20). The Tribunal will doubtless have material relating to his internment that will provide further information as to the activities of Witness X and his reliability as a witness of truth.
MEMBERSHIP OF THE IRA
12. Witness X falsely asserted at paragraph 7 of his Eversheds statement that:
I have never been a member of the Provisional or Official IRA.
The Tribunal will probably have access to information which contradicts this assertion and which demonstrates that he was, in fact, a member of the Provisional IRA.
13. Nonetheless, Witness X repeated in oral evidence his claim that he had never been a member of PIRA (Day 435/4/22 to Day 435/4/25). However, when specifically asked whether this was really true, he responded (our emphasis):
I was never a member – I was not a member of either of the wings of the IRA on Bloody Sunday (Day 435/5/4 to Day 435/5/8).
14. He did not refer to the situation post Bloody Sunday. When Edmund Lawson QC asked Witness X to do so, he claimed:
I have been asked by Lord Saville in this Inquiry to come to answer questions about Bloody Sunday and that is what I intend to do; not what happened after Bloody Sunday (Day 435/37/8 to Day 435/37/11).
15. When he was asked about the blanket denial contained in paragraph 7 of his Eversheds statement, Witness X gave the improbable explanation that (our emphasis):
From my recollection, but I could be wrong, I would say that question was asked to me about Bloody Sunday and that is the truth. I was never a member of the Provisional IRA or the Official IRA on Bloody Sunday (Day 435/38/8 to Day 435/38/11).
16. The Tribunal ruled at the conclusion of Witness X’s oral evidence that he was not entitled to refuse to answer questions about his membership of the IRA, but added that “no purpose whatever will be pursued by taking the matter further” (Day 435/56/7 to Day 435/56/13).
17. The names of “Mad Dog” Doherty and “Ducksie” Doherty, both sometime members of the Provisional IRA, appear in the 1972 statement at AX1.2. Witness X claimed at paragraph 9 of his Eversheds statement that these names:
...are completely unknown to me.
It quickly became apparent during the course of his oral evidence that this was yet another lie. Witness X admitted that, in fact, he knows both “Ducksie” and “Mad Dog” Doherty – although he denied that he knew either at the time of Bloody Sunday (Day 435/16/21 to 435/16/15).
18. Witness X has unconvincingly sought to distance himself from the Provisional IRA and its members. The truth is that he was a member of PIRA and was accordingly in a position to give the information contained in the 1972 statement.
19. The only credible and sensible explanation for the catalogue of lies that X has told is that he now wishes to distance himself from what he did say about Bloody Sunday in 1972 and to deny his role in the IRA – and those two deceptions are self-evidently and directly related to one another.
WHEREABOUTS ON BLOODY SUNDAY
20. What was Witness X actually doing at the relevant time on Bloody Sunday? He told Eversheds, at paragraph 2 of his statement, that (our emphasis):
I remember the evening of Bloody Sunday. I was in my mother and father’s house with some of my brothers and sisters.
21. Witness X was therefore coy about his whereabouts at the time of the march. In oral evidence he suggested that at all relevant times he would have been at home. At home, as he explained, did not mean that he would actually have been indoors. He might have been out in the Creggan (Day 435/32/24 to Day 435/33/2).
22. The Tribunal may be in possession of undisclosed material which assists it to determine the significance of: (1) Witness X’s failure to account to Eversheds for his whereabouts at the time with which this Inquiry is primarily concerned; and
(2) his admission that he might have been out in the Creggan at that time.
LACK OF CO-OPERATION WITH THE BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY
23. In January 2004, the Tribunal issued a subpoena requiring Witness X to attend to give evidence. This was because he had previously refused to do so (Day 435/53/22 to Day 435/54/6).
24. He was due to give oral evidence on 29th January 2004 (Day 418). He failed to appear, ostensibly for health reasons. The Tribunal will, or should, know the truth about this but it would appear that his failure to attend on that day is properly to be regarded as evidence of his refusal to co-operate with the Inquiry and had nothing to do with his state of health. In this regard we refer the Tribunal to:
(1) Its own ruling of 9th December 2004, in relation to Witness X’s application to set aside the subpoena, which included this finding at paragraph 4 (Witness X bundle page 46):
The information provided in January 2004 by Witness X’s solicitors, including the medical evidence, was insufficient to satisfy us that Witness X should not give oral evidence, whether at that time or at all.
(2) The evidence of PIRA 24, who claims to have bumped into Witness X at the shops that very day. Witness X denies meeting PIRA 24 in this way (Day 435/24/15 to Day 435/24/16).
(3) His later reliance on another excuse for failing to attend: his fear of loss of anonymity. This excuse was given in his application of 30th November 2004 to set aside the subpoena (Witness X bundle pages 41-45). However, Witness X did not seek
3 See our submissions at FS7-491 to FS7-492, at paragraph 4B-259. to rely on it in oral evidence (Day 435/55/10 to Day 435/55/13). This was probably sensible, bearing in mind the Tribunal’s ruling of 9th December 2004 had also included the finding at paragraph 11 (Witness X bundle page 48) that:
_We are not satisfied that fear of compromise of his anonymity was a reason for Witness X’s failure to attend on 29 January 2004._
The submission was arguably doomed from its inception, in circumstances where Witness X had previously very publicly claimed:
\_I fully intended to make my identity known when I came to the inquiry. I have nothing to hide...\_4
25. This history of non-cooperation is legitimately to be relied upon as evidence that Witness X did not want to have to answer further questions about the 1972 statement, believing he had successfully explained it away in his February 2000 statement to Eversheds.
"JOINT OPERATION"
26. The Lawton Team has never suggested that there was a “joint” PIRA – OIRA operation on Bloody Sunday in the sense of a pre-planned and co-ordinated assault on the Army. We do, however, maintain that both wings of the IRA fired on soldiers on Bloody Sunday and it is quite possible that they did so “jointly” in the sense that they were firing for the same purpose, from the same area and at the same time. We would further submit that anyone observing, participating in, or commenting on that activity would have referred to it as “joint”.
27. We submit that Witness X did indeed give the information contained in the 1972 statement to the RUC and that its significance is that it described both wings of the IRA in operation in the same area of the Bogside and at the same time on Bloody Sunday, which description was essentially accurate. It is in that way that we suggest the Tribunal should read the words “joint operation” at AX1.2.
4 Derry Journal 30th April 2002 (Witness X bundle page 53). ANTHONY LAWTON
Assistant Treasury Solicitor
25th February 2005. CHAPTER 4C
THE OFFICIAL IRA
4C-1 INTRODUCTION
Former members of the Official IRA have finally admitted to this Tribunal that OIRA gunmen did fire at soldiers, not at a late stage but very early in the day on Bloody Sunday - a fact denied and concealed by them and many of the people of Derry for many years.
4C-2 It will by now be clear to the Tribunal, however, that those OIRA witnesses who have appeared before it have been far from truthful and have, indeed, admitted only that activity which the Tribunal was bound to find proven in any event. Those witnesses have persisted in misrepresenting: the true nature and tendencies of the Official IRA in January 1972; the nature of their orders for the day of Bloody Sunday; the extent to which arms were available and/or issued to its members that day and the true extent of the activities of OIRA gunmen both in presenting an armed threat to and firing upon soldiers.
4C-3 The Tribunal has finally come to learn that the Official IRA was not, in 1972, the disciplined, intellectually focused organisation dedicated to defensive policy that these witnesses claimed in their early written statements. Rather, it was a poorly disciplined and violent group bent on the murder of as many British Soldiers as possible. Having, from the outset, issued press statements denying any OIRA firing on Bloody Sunday, the Official IRA has sought for many years to avoid responsibility for its role in the tragic events of 30th January 1972. It continues to seek to do so before this Tribunal.
4C-II THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF THE OFFICIAL IRA
4C-4 Those witnesses who have given evidence to this Tribunal have been reluctant to cooperate in confirming the membership, command structure, weaponry and extent of the membership of the Official IRA as at 30 January 1972. While they have all claimed in words similar to those of OIRA 5 that they wish to: Assist in the truth of the events of 30 January 1972 becoming known and providing some finality to the proceedings.
They have also followed the example of their then commanding officer OIRA 3 in stating that:
*I am not prepared to discuss issues which relate to the organisation of the Official I.R.A. prior to or after the events of Bloody Sunday. I will not identify the number or names of any volunteers who were members of the Official I.R.A.. I will not discuss the nature of the armoury available to the Official IRA at or around this time.*
The Tribunal will find similar sentiments expressed by OIRA1, OIRA2, OIRA4 and OIRA 5. Each has also made clear that such reluctance is based not on Article 2 considerations but, as expressed here by OIRA 3 and echoed by each of his former colleagues, on
... *my Republican duties and beliefs*.
Such a position has been, in part, abandoned by OIRA witnesses as they have succumbed to pressure from the Tribunal to respond to questions about OIRA structure and weaponry in 1972. These witnesses have not, however, as the Tribunal is aware, cooperated to the extent of revealing crucial information about the identity of other members of the organisation.
While some information has now been given by these and other OIRA witnesses as to the structure and organisation of the Official IRA, it has undoubtedly emerged as a result of pressure exerted by the Tribunal rather than any desire on their part to reveal the truth about Bloody Sunday, so that the Tribunal will no
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1 AOIRA5.5 paragraph 2 2 AOIRA3.1 paragraph 4 3 AOIRA1.8 paragraph 27 4 AOIRA2.1 paragraph 3 5 AOIRA4.1 paragraph 5 6 AOIRA5.1 paragraph 5 7 AOIRA3.1 doubt wish to treat such evidence with caution bearing in mind the declared loyalties of these former paramilitaries.
**EXTENT AND STRUCTURE**
4C-8 The Tribunal has been told by a number of witnesses, such as OIRA1, OIRA2, and Reg Tester, that the OIRA as at January 1972 had some 20-30 volunteers including the Command Staff, divided between sections in the Creggan and the Bogside.
4C-9 The Tribunal has heard evidence from OIRAs 6, 7, 8 and 11, all of whom were volunteers in one of two sections in the Creggan although all claim not to have been part of the Creggan force allegedly appointed to defend the area on the day.
4C-10 The Tribunal has heard nothing from any member of the Bogside Section other than the Command Staff members OIRA1 and OIRA2. There is intelligence evidence to suggest, however, that “Red Mickey” Doherty was the OC of the Bogside Section. The Tribunal has, of course, been denied the benefit of hearing from Mr Doherty. The circumstances in which that situation came about were highlighted by Paul Mahon on Day 412 and are examined in detail in Chapter 2, above.
4C-11 The Command Staff is said to have comprised some six volunteers headed by OIRA 3, the OC appointed a few days before Bloody Sunday. The second in command or Adjutant is said to have been OIRA4, and Reg Tester has confirmed that, as Quartermaster, he considered himself to be third in command. Also on the Command Staff were OIRA1, OIRA2 and OIRA 5.
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5 Day 395/009/21 6 Day 392/011/20-21 7 Day 414/007/25 8 AOIRA6.2 paragraph 11 9 INT1.345 10 AT6.6 paragraph 1
FS7 506
IV 110 The refusal of witnesses to name other members, or even to describe their roles or fully to explain the structure of the organisation has, of course, had the effect of denying the Tribunal a full understanding of the workings of the Official IRA while also obstructing examination and can only have been calculated to prevent the Tribunal from getting to the truth about what happened on Bloody Sunday.
Some witnesses have openly refused to name their former colleagues as OIRA 1 emphasised to Gerard Elias QC:
*I have already made my position clear: I am not prepared to talk about other people's roles in the organisation, it is entirely up to them to describe their own roles*.
Others have claimed not to know the identity of other members or understand the command structure of the organisation. OIRA 6, for example, displayed a typical lack of willingness to assist in the following exchange with Ms McGahey:
*Q. In your statement you refer to the OC, who is known to us by the cipher OIRA 3. Is it right you knew he was on the command staff?*
*A. I had a rough idea, yes.*
*Q. Did you not know who was the head of the Official IRA in Derry?*
\*A. We were not told that.......
...Q Then you go on to describe OIRA 3 and his ability to keep discipline. It does seem from that, does it not, that you did know that OIRA 3 was the OC of the Official IRA in Derry?\*
*A. I probably did know.*
*Q. You must have known, must you not?*
*A. It all depends, you see, to be quite honest with you. I had never much contact with the command staff at all. Any information that I was given come down through my section leader*. The tactics adopted by this group of witnesses in giving evidence is examined in Part 4A - VII of these submissions but it is noted at this stage that any denial of knowledge of the identity of other members must be incredible in an organisation of such size, and was indeed confirmed to be so by Reg Tester.
Q. Yes. Whilst it may well have been desirable that they would not spread around their full names and any more details than were necessary, they would all, you would expect, be known to each other in the same way you knew them?
A. Yes, they would. Mind you, it was a little different for me because I was not a local man. They all knew each other because they had all grown up together.
Q. They knew each other as Derry men?
A. I was an outsider.
Q. Indeed.
A. So I would not know them so well.
Q. But they all knew each other beforehand –
A. Yes.
DECISION MAKING
The Tribunal has heard from a number of members of the Command Staff that decisions were taken collectively, as might be expected of a declared socialist organisation. On other occasions, however, witnesses, even when members of the Command Staff, have sought to plead ignorance of orders and activities relating to both Bloody Sunday and other crucial events when it has suited them to decline to assist the Tribunal.
Clearly, where the OIRA witnesses have sought to persuade the Tribunal of the existence of a particular decision or policy they are happy to speak of collective decision making and accept their role in and knowledge of the process. Thus OIRA1 speaks of the decision to collect weapons:
Q. "I remember that it was the general order on 30th January 1972 that all weapons should be collected up to the Creggan." Did this order come from the OC?
A. Well, in -- technically the OC was the person responsible for all those orders, yes. The decision to do that was one which was discussed and collectively agreed with by the staff."
4C-17 OIRA 2 agreed:
Q. "On that day [that is 30th January] we had orders, insofar as it was agreed that we would not precipitate a situation which would cause the Army to react." Did that order come from the O/C?
A. That order would have come from the O/C, yes.
Q. Was it a decision that he would have made himself or did the command staff meet to determine what the policy would be?
A. The command staff met and decided what the policy would be."
4C-18 In relation to more problematic issues, however, it seems that orders were taken by and known only to the OC. Thus the Tribunal heard OIRA 1's evidence when questioned by Edmund Lawson QC as to his knowledge of the posting of snipers on Bloody Sunday:
Q. You were in the Bogside unit, as you have told us. You, therefore, were aware, were you, of the disposition of Red Mickey Doherty with a weapon in a sniper's position?
A. I would have been aware that the, the OC of the organisation would have posted people as and where he saw fit. I was not aware of the actual details until after the incident.
Q. You would have been aware of the posting of people by the OC at the time?
17 Day 395/029/05-12 18 Day 392/028/05-14 A. No, I would not -- what I am saying is, I would have been aware that the OC would have told people to go to wherever he decided he wanted them to go. I personally had no knowledge of that particular posting until after the event.19
OIRA 2 pleaded equal ignorance and deference to the OC in the matter of the posting of snipers:
Q. Could we have the rest of the column, please. As a member of the command staff, would you not have expected to know if marksmen had been positioned covering Rossville Street and William Street?
A. Well, not necessarily because at the end of the day it is up to the -- the O/C himself can basically make any decision that he wants and he does not necessarily because it is an Army, you know, it is not to consult -- he does not have to consult everybody. Somebody may have taken a decision to position marksmen in the places that it says on this clip, but personally I was not aware of it.20
OIRA 2, as a member of the Command Staff, was equally keen to stress his ignorance of the orders relating to snipers when questioned about the statements attributed to the acting OC in the Observer galley proofs. Thus he said when questioned by Mr Lawson:
A. Well, what you need to do here is you need to ask the individual who made the statement. I did not make the statement, so, therefore, I do not know.
Q. As a member of command staff you do not know?
A. You are talking about the nitty gritty, you know. Not everybody had to know everything about the nitty gritty. As I say, you need to ask -- direct your question to the person who made that statement. The person who made that statement was not me.21
And when the point was pursued by Mr Elias:
19 Day 396/126/21-127/002 20 Day 392/102/19-103/05 21 Day 393/030/08-16 Q. Would you find that, as a member of command staff, astonishing if, indeed, on the day, there were snipers posted and you had no knowledge of it; would that be a rather astonishing state of affairs?
A. No, not particularly, no, because it would be possibly -- I am speculating here -- it could possibly be on a need-to-know basis.
Prior, however, to the emergence of evidence of “Red Mickey” Doherty’s activities on Bloody Sunday, OIRA 2 had been happy to assert in his written evidence to this Tribunal that:
...no one was ordered to take up sniping positions of any kind as this would have been contrary to the orders to remove weapons and maintain a defensive stance.
Addressing the same issue, OIRA 5 too felt able to say in written evidence that:
I can confirm that no volunteer was ordered to take up any sniping position or to be in a position to take any action against the Army in the Bogside on Bloody Sunday.
OIRA 5 elected to take a different line in oral evidence from that of OIRA 2, however, claiming that the decision making process of the Command Staff was, indeed, a collective one:
A. The O/C in many ways was the conduit through which all instructions were to be given. The command staff was a collective body; it took decisions collectively; it was responsible for the organisation as whole and the command staff would have been responsible for interpreting any instructions which were given to it by the headquarters staff.
Q. After the command staff had deliberated and decided what ought to be done, the O/C was then the conduit for those orders?
A. Quite.
OIRA 5 continued to be emphatic when questioned by Mr Lawson:
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22 Day 393/125/19-25 23 AOIRA2.9 paragraph 30 24 AOIRA5.10 paragraph 43 A. There was no decision taken to place gunmen in and around the city.
Q. None? A. None.
Q. Is that something about which the collective decision-making body would, in your experience, have been consulted? A. Of course.
Indeed, contrary to the evidence of OIRAs 1 and 2, OIRA 5 confirmed that all of Command Staff would have known about snipers if they had been present as alleged in the Observer galley proofs:
A. I would have been in a position to know about it, yes.
Q. As a member of command staff? A. Indeed.
Q. And OIRA 2 presumably would have been in an identical position to you? A. Should have been, yes.
Q. And OIRA 1? A. Yes.
Q. And OIRA 4? A. Indeed.
OIRA 5 himself was, however, inconsistent as to the extent of the Command Staff's knowledge about OIRA activities; when questioned by Mr Lawson about assertions in the Observer galley proofs that OIRA snipers were on duty on Bloody Sunday his evidence was:
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25 Day 393/148/12-22 26 Day 393/181/02-09 27 Day 393/189/10-19 Q. How can you say it was untrue?
A. Well, I have just told you it was untrue.
Q. I dare say you have, sir, but it may be the Tribunal may be reluctant to make a decision based solely on your say-so. Tell us why you are able to assert that it is untrue?
A. Because I was a member of the command staff and would have known that.
Q. You would have known about this if it had happened?
A. Indeed.
Q. Did you know about the shooting of Gunner Ham on 29th December 1971?
A. No, I did not.
Q. You did not?
A. Well, I do not have any details about it, so no, I do not know.
Q. You heard that referred to this morning?
A. I did, yes.
Q. It does not mean anything to you?
A. No.
It is clear that if, as is claimed, the Official IRA was an organisation of some 20 to 30 men, located in a close knit community and led by a Command Staff of six, it is highly likely that every volunteer knew a great deal about the other members and their activities and that the Command Staff were privy to all of the orders pertaining to Bloody Sunday. Any claim to the contrary is merely an attempt to obstruct this Tribunal in discovering the truth about the Official IRA's activities. The Tribunal has also heard contradictory evidence from members of the Official IRA about the existence of a Fianna linked to the Official IRA. Intelligence material available to the Tribunal clearly suggests that there was such an organisation in place in January 1972.
INT1.317 records an interview by the RUC conducted at some time in the early 1970s, although the date has been redacted. The interviewee is reported as having given the police information about how one could join the Fianna (Official). He is also recorded as making specific reference to Gerard Donaghy's membership of and role in the Official Fianna organisation.
INT1.333, a record of an interview of a different person where again the date of the interview has been removed, refers to the fact that "It was the Official Fianna who stole the Army uniforms from the cleaners." According to a confidential intelligence report, this theft took place from Peerless Dry Cleaners on 9th January 1972.29
INT.28/29 makes further reference to both Gerard Donaghy and Denis McFeely being members of Official Fianna.
Indeed, some members of the OIRA Command Staff were prepared to admit recalling the Official Fianna. OIRA 2 told the Tribunal in some detail about a Fianna affiliated to the OIRA:
Q. I would like to leave now the organisation of the Official IRA in Derry and ask you about a separate -- I believe related -- organisation, which is the Fianna. At about January 1972, we have heard evidence that there was a Fianna which was allied to the Provisional IRA. Was there also one allied to the Official IRA?
A. As far as I know, there was a Fianna affiliated to the Official IRA.
29 G51.311 Q. Did you have any involvement in that at all?
A. Absolutely no contact with the Official IRA Fianna\\textsuperscript{30}....
...Q. Did the Official IRA command staff give any instructions to the Official Fianna about how they should behave on Bloody Sunday?
A. Well, I would imagine that -- I would say they obviously would have done, yes.
Q. The command staff would have given such an instruction?
A. Somebody on the command staff no doubt would have talked to whoever was in charge of the Fianna, but probably would have called the Fianna together and explained to them what the orders of the day were supposed to be.
Q. Would the command staff have discussed among themselves what orders should be given to the Official Fianna?
A. No, not necessarily, because whoever was designated, the command staff obviously had a meeting before Bloody Sunday, had decided upon the orders of the day, and the O/C would probably have said to somebody on the command staff "call a meeting of the Fianna and pass on these instructions"; I would imagine that is the way it would have been, it would have been done.
Q. That does suggest, does it not, there was quite a link between the Official IRA and the Official Fianna, if the Official IRA were in a position to give orders to the Fianna?
A. Well, I imagine there would be a link all right between the Official IRA and the Official Fianna\\textsuperscript{31}....
Q. In the days leading up to Bloody Sunday and indeed the meeting you have talked about on the morning of Bloody Sunday, do you remember there being any discussion at the command staff about the orders that should be given to the Fianna?
A. Not specifically about the orders that should be given to the Fianna, just about the orders for the day, for the organisation as a whole, which would have included the Fianna\\textsuperscript{32}.
\\textsuperscript{30} Day 392/017/02-11 \\textsuperscript{31} Day 392/019/13-020/12 \\textsuperscript{32} Day 392/020/19-021/02 OIRA 11 also recalled the Official Fianna:
A. I was never a member. I knew that it existed and that is was the younger side of things.(^{33})
Q. When you are talking about the Fianna in paragraph 15, are you talking about Fianna linked to the Officials or linked to the Provisionals?
A. Probably both.
Q. Each wing had a Fianna, did it?
A. Yes, I think so.(^{34})
OIRA 9 also confirmed in his BSI statement that there was an Official Fianna(^{35}) and the Tribunal will recall Mr O'hEara's evidence on day 406 to the effect that he was OC of just such an organisation.
Others have, however, been keen to deny the existence of an Official Fianna.
OIRA 7 is recorded by Eversheds as saying that:
I have been asked about the Fianna. This was made up of teenagers under 16. They were used by the Officials to take messages and as look-outs but not to throw nail bombs.(^{36})
But then claimed in oral evidence never to have heard the word “Fianna” prior to his Eversheds interview.
A. First of all as I said yesterday the word Fianna was actually given to me by Eversheds, my preference would have been to describe a group of young 14 or 16-year olds who hung around wanting to do whatever they could do.(^{37})
(^{33}) AOIRA11.3 paragraph 15 (^{34}) Day 422/051/19-24 (^{35}) AOIRA9.5 paragraph 22 (^{36}) AOIRA7.4 paragraph 19 (^{37}) Day 399/067/12-16 The Tribunal will then recall OIRA7's evasiveness when questioned further by Gerard Elias QC as to the existence in 1972 of an Official Fianna:
A. To my organisation -- or to my knowledge and recollection the organisation, the Fianna, as described by Eversheds and alluded to by you, did not exist.
Q. What do you mean "as described by Eversheds"? A. When they talk about the Fianna? Q. Yes. A. My assumption is they are talking about an organisation called - - that its full title would have been Fianna Eireann.
Q. What was Fianna Eireann? A. Youth of Ireland. Q. What was the organisation? A. On 30th January 1972 I was unaware of the existence of the Fianna, I did not know if the Fianna existed or it did not.
Q. Is that the truth, OIRA 7? A. That is what I am saying.
OIRA 8 claims to have been unaware that there was ever a Fianna with any links to the Official Republican movement. OIRA1 told the Tribunal that it did not exist.
Q. I would like to ask you next about a separate topic which is that of the Fianna. OIRA 2 told the Inquiry that there was a Fianna associated with the Official Republican Movement; is that right? A. No. Q. There was no Fianna? A. No. Q. None at all?
A. Not that I am aware of, no.
...Q. OIRA 2 said, when he had given evidence, said the command staff would have given instructions to the Official Fianna about the way in which they should behave?
A. No.
Q. He is wrong?
A. Yes. ...
...If there were individuals in the city who had come from a Fianna background and considered themselves as supporters of the Official IRA, well, I am not in a position to say they did not do that, but they were not organised into any kind of coherent organisation with any direct relationship to the Official IRA.
OIRA 5 denied that there was any formal organisation called Fianna Eireann attached to the Official Republican movement and Reg Tester also preferred not to acknowledge the existence of an Official Fianna:
I do not remember the Official IRA having a Fianna movement.
Why certain members of the OIRA Command Staff should be so keen to deny the existence of the Fianna in the context of an inquiry into Bloody Sunday is not immediately clear. The Tribunal will, however, have noted the presence of two of its alleged members, Gerard Donaghy and Denis McFeely, in the Glenfada Park area when soldiers entered that area. The Tribunal will no doubt, when perusing the evidence in relation to Sector 4 as examined in Chapter 9, consider the significance of their presence at that time in an area where considerable OIRA activity took place and young boys were seen by civilian witnesses carrying nail bombs. The Tribunal will judge whether it is likely or even conceivable that the
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40 Day 395/013/08-16 41 Day 395/017/02-08 42 Day 395/016/09-15 43 Day 393/169/20-22 44 AT6.14 paragraph 55 evidence of such civilian witnesses was mistaken or fundamentally unreliable. In making that judgement it will also consider why it was necessary for so many lies to have been told, in the context of this Inquiry, by OIRA witnesses about the Fianna, if indeed the members of Fianna did nothing on Bloody Sunday which required concealment.
**DISCIPLINE**
4C-39 A number of the OIRA witnesses have also attempted to persuade the Tribunal that the Official IRA was a disciplined organisation, firmly controlled by its OC of a few days, OIRA 3.
4C-40 OIRA 1 told the Tribunal that:
"there were clear lines of reporting and discipline. The OC... would have rigidly imposed discipline, and would have taken any breach of his orders very seriously."
4C-41 OIRA 6 told the Tribunal that:
*OIRA 3 was an OC who kept discipline*
Although the Tribunal will recall his later uncertainty, referred to above, as to whether he in fact knew who the OC was at all.
4C-42 The Tribunal has, however, heard considerable evidence both from within and without the Official IRA to the effect that the organisation was far from well-disciplined. Indeed, the admitted behaviour of members of the Official IRA on Bloody Sunday is in itself sufficient to demonstrate a pervasive lack of discipline.
4C-43 OIRA 7, for example, admitted that, despite the danger of internment, he was happy to push himself to the front of the rioting crowd:
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45 AOIRA1.4 paragraph 7 46 AOIRA6.2 paragraph 11 Q. And there on Bloody Sunday itself, do you think you were behaving in a disciplined manner?
A. No, I think I was, um, shall we say, overenthusiastic. That is if that photograph that we looked at -- I mean, I say I was at the front of William Street; I was throwing -- I was on William Street and I did throw some stones.
Q. Yes. So you went to the front of the rioting, so to speak?
A. I need not necessarily have been at the front.
Q. Close to it?
A. Yes...
Even more significantly, of those members of the Official IRA who admit to firing on Bloody Sunday, two admit to doing so, in areas heavily populated by civilians, out of pure anger and frustration, entirely disregarding the question of orders.
Reg Tester admitted that even taking his car down to the Bogside was in itself foolish and born out of temper:
If our two cars had got stopped, we could have got into terrible trouble with all our weaponry in the cars. However, the mood that I was in was that I wanted to hit back.
As regards his firing or attempts to fire he said that:
The truth is that having heard what I had heard, that people were being shot by the army, my simple reaction was wanting to hit back. I didn’t analyse what the orders were to see whether this would have been stretching them or breaching them.
OIRA 4 also described, in written evidence, the moment at which he decided to shoot in a crowded area out of pure temper:
______________________________________________________________________
47 Day 398/140/02-13 48 AT6.10 paragraph 30 49 AT6.11 paragraph 34 I just lost my temper. The Brits were gunning down innocent civilians. I took my short weapon out of my pocket and fired two, possibly three, shots towards the Saracen at point D. I did it out of pure anger at what was happening around me........I was just firing out of pure frustration.50
4C-47 By OIRA 4’s own admission, it was only when civilians remonstrated with him that he claims he desisted from shooting. He says that:
I was still mad as hell but these people brought me to my senses.51
4C-48 Both Reg Tester and OIRA 4 then admit to firing in locations and circumstances which were calculated to attract return fire and which were, therefore, bound to endanger civilians.
4C-49 Indeed, the local population, who knew well the men they were dealing with, held a very different view of the Official IRA from that which its members have attempted to portray to this Tribunal. Father Bradley’s view, as expressed in his BSI statement, was that:
The Official IRA however was a different and disparate group. They were mainly disliked in the city. It was an old Catholic thing. They were seen as Marxist left wing and were not particular about who joined them. They were inclined to be considered “gangsterish”. There were very irresponsible people in their organisation. The Provisionals were much more careful about who was allowed in and were more disciplined. When I was therefore told that an Official IRA gunman had fired a shot but the Provisionals had taken him away or disarmed him, I believed what I was told.52
4C-50 Thomas McGlinchy also told this Tribunal when questioned by Edwin Glasgow QC that the Official IRA was less disciplined, less well-controlled and less well-organised than the Provisionals,53 and the Tribunal will recall the allegations put by Mr McGrory to Kathryn Johnston on Day 387 of this Inquiry that the Official
50 AOIRA4.17 paragraph 16 51 AOIRA2.18 paragraph 17 52 H7.3 paragraph 18 53 Day 053/041/04-08 IRA was an organisation which was engaged in acts of extortion, robbery and counterfeiting. Such allegations receive some support from Father Bradley who thought that:
*I think there was an impression that perhaps some robberies were happening that were carried out by the Official IRA and people were not always very sure why they were happening. So I think there was that feeling that perhaps they were not being as responsible in their organisational sense as -- I also think there was an impression that some people who had been within the Provisional IRA and had been asked to leave the Provisional IRA were then allowed to join the Official IRA; I think that is where some of that impression came from.*
4C-III OIRA POLICY TOWARDS THE BRITISH ARMY
4C-51 Early suggestions that the Official IRA was, in all but an absurdly narrow sense, a "defensive" organisation have also been shown in the course of oral evidence to be entirely misleading. It is clear that the "Defence and Retaliation" policy applicable in January 1972 was interpreted by the Official IRA as justifying its members firing not only upon any Army movement into the no-go areas but also upon soldiers outside those areas for their mere presence in Northern Ireland.
4C-52 OIRA 2 was the first to explain to the Tribunal the nature of this policy which had been in force since the introduction of internment in August 1971. He initially said, when questioned by Catherine McGahey, that the policy required the British Army to shoot live rounds first, and meant that no offensive action was to be started by OIRA. He maintained that the British Army coming into the Bogside to make arrests would not justify Official IRA firing.
4C-53 OIRA 2 later admitted, however, when questioned by Mr Lawson, that in fact the policy was quite different:
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54 Day 387/107-108 55 Day 140/108/19-109/04 56 Day 392/032/02 A. Let us put it like this, Mr Lawson: Derry was occupied by members of the British forces at the time, as you are well aware, therefore, in the broadest sense, attacks on members of the British Armed Forces could be clearly seen as part of a defence and retaliation strategy just because of the very fact that they happened to be present....
...A. I think I have already outlined to you what, what I understand by defence and retaliation. The very fact that members of the Armed Forces were present on our streets was seen as -- any action against them would have been seen as retaliatory.
Q. Any action against them would have been seen as? A. Retaliatory.
Q. That is retaliation, not defence? A. That would be retaliation in the broadest interpretation of the word, as I would understand it.
Q. Retaliation for the fact of his being a British soldier and a member of the occupying forces? A. You have got it in one.
Q. Nothing to do with him shooting anybody? A. As I said, you have got it in one.
Q. That was the policy, was it? You are telling us this as a member of the command staff of the Official IRA as at January 1972, that was the policy in existence then? A. Yes.
4C-54 OIRA 5 agreed with OIRA 2's interpretation when questioned by Mr Lawson:
Q. Was that policy, as it was described this morning, by OIRA 2, in practice the way it was used, defensive and retaliatory? A. That is correct.
Q. He got it right, did he?
57 Day 393/010/24 58 Day 393/012/22-013/15 A. Yes, he did.
Q. He did, including that if you were a British soldier in uniform on the streets of Derry, that was sufficient justification for being shot dead?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. It was in accordance with the policy?
A. Exactly.
OIRA 1 was equally in no doubt, when questioned by Ms McGahey, as to the nature of this policy to take any opportunity to murder British soldiers, even if they were outside the no-go area:
A. My view is that if the British Army moved into the areas in which we lived, we were entitled to defend those areas by trying to put them back out.
Q. If a soldier, for example was in William Street, which is not part of Free Derry, did you feel you were entitled to shoot him simply because he was present as a member of the occupying force?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you entitled to shoot a British soldier anywhere in Northern Ireland?
A. If it was in line with the defence order and retaliatory policy, yes.
.... Q. Your policy of retaliation entitled you, you believed, to open fire on a soldier simply walking down the street in Derry?
A. If there had been activity prior to that by the British Army which we believed required retaliation, yes.
Q. Could that be action taken days or even weeks earlier?
A. Yes. OIRA 1 was unequivocal in his responses to Mr Lawson:
Q. We have heard from OIRA 2 and there, in unequivocal terms, from OIRA 5, that defence and retaliation as a policy extended to permitting the shooting dead of a British soldier on the streets of Derry, whatever he was doing; was that your understanding of the application of the policy at the time of Bloody Sunday?
A. Yes.
The only other member of the Command Staff from whom the Tribunal has heard full oral evidence, Reg Tester, eventually agreed with this interpretation of Defence and Retaliation. Questioned by Christopher Clarke QC he said:
Q. But it would be consistent with the policy, would it, for the staff to decide to take the opportunity to shoot a soldier who came in in a patrol into the area of the Bogside or –
A. Yes.
Q. Is it right that the policy of retaliation could involve shooting at Security Forces in response to action that might have been taken by the Security Forces days or weeks, possibly even months earlier?
A. I suppose so. You -- you make your plans and you take the action when you consider it appropriate and, if necessary, safe to do so.
Q. And whether or not the soldier or soldiers against whom you take action form -- are presenting any form of threat at the time when you shoot them?
A. Yes.
When Mr Lawson questioned him he initially said that:
Q. So a British soldier or soldiers in an ordinary patrol walking down William Street, they would not be regarded as fair game?
A. I suppose some people would have regarded them as fair game, but it would not have been, it would not have been the policy at the time to just open up on them for literally no reason whatsoever other than the fact that they were standing there\\textsuperscript{64}.
But, on further questioning, it became clear that Mr Tester in fact agreed with OIRA 1's interpretation that the policy in force in January 1972 was to murder British soldiers at every opportunity:
\\textit{A. Well, if they had invaded there would not have been much we could do, we did not have the manpower or the weapon-power to do anything about that. But a small incursion, if -- let us put it this way, if they were threatening, if they came into the area, they threatened people in the area, we would have opened up on them if it was practical to do so\\textsuperscript{65}.}
Referred by Mr Lawson to OIRA 1's evidence he conceded that it was not necessary even for there to be an incursion into the no-go areas to justify shooting within the policy:
\\textit{Q. "Question: If a soldier, for example, was in William Street, not part of Free Derry, did you feel you were entitled to shoot him simply because he was present as a member of the occupying force? "Answer: Yes." That was the answer of OIRA 1, then a member of the command staff. Did that reflect the policy of the Official IRA, as you understood it to be at the time of Bloody Sunday?}
\\textit{A. No, I see. Yes, it would have done.}
\\textit{Q. It did?}
\\textit{A. But not from my personal point of view.}
\\textit{Q. Is this the key to it: that the policy of the organisation was to permit the shooting on sight of a British soldier even if he was not in Free Derry, simply because he was present as a member of an occupying force, as the enemy, that was the policy at the time, but not one which you personally carried out?}
\\textit{A. That is correct\\textsuperscript{66}... ...}
\\textsuperscript{64} Day 414/134/04-11 \\textsuperscript{65} Day 414/132/22-133/03 \\textsuperscript{66} Day 414/137/10-138/03 Q. A British soldier being on the street warranted being shot dead on sight in retaliation for the fact that he was a member of the occupying force and was here?
A. Correct
OIRA 4, while his evidence could not be fully explored, agreed that entry by soldiers into the Bogside would indeed merit shooting under the policy:
Q. And those orders to maintain a defensive stance of the area, did they mean that if anybody from the Army or police came into the area it would be open to a volunteer to shoot him or them if they did so?
A. If it was defending the area, yes.
Q. Just so we are clear, you say, "if it was defending the area;" assume that a body of soldiers came into the Bogside; would part of the defence of the Bogside involve shooting at soldiers who came into it?
A. It was a no-go area, I would agree.
As far as ordinary volunteers were concerned, there was, it appears, little doubt about the nature of the policy. While OIRA 7 made an attempt to couch his description in "defensive" terms, his interpretation clearly envisaged firing at any soldier who dared to enter the no-go areas:
... most of what we did by way of 'action' was defensive. We operated from behind the barricades as it was our job to protect the no-go areas. ... By defensive, I mean able to respond to an attack or an incursion. The Officials did not go seeking out the Army in an attempt to create or develop an attack.
OIRA 8 was more forthright
Q. If the Army carried out an arrest operation without opening fire with real bullets.
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67 Day 414/139/05-08 68 Day 394/008/25-009/08 69 AOIRA7.3 paragraph 12 A. Yes.
Q. Would the standing orders permit retaliation for that arrest operation?
A. Yes, it could well be, I mean, if they made an incursion into the area to arrest people and it was safe to do so, we would have a crack at them.
Q. That would be counted as retaliation within the definition?
A. Yes.70
4C-62 As was OIRA 6:
Q. Was the very presence of an Army patrol sufficient for you to fire at it?
A. To me, yes, but I had, I had to go through my section leader.
Q. What, if anything, did an Army patrol have to do in order to justify you firing in defence?
A. Nothing, really.
Q. Just had to be there?
A. Just had to be there.
Q. Could it be anywhere in Derry?
A. Possibility.
Q. Your policy of defence was simply to take the opportunity to attack the Army when it presented itself?
A. This was my, my own thoughts.71
He confirmed, when questioned by Mr Lawson, that:
Q. As far as you were concerned, you would take any chance you could to shoot a member of the British Army; that is right, is it?
A. That is correct.72
70 Day 410/031/24-032/09 71 Day 413/154/12-25 Even OIRA 11, who claimed to know very little about anything, knew that:
Q. What instructions were you given about when you could use weapons?
A. Well, basically, as far as I know now, I never used any myself, like, but so far as I know there was -- the no-go area at the time and you took your chances, whatever it was, now.
Q. To –
A. You took your chances or whatever it was to attack –
Q. If you got a chance to shoot at a soldier you should take it?
A. That was the thing then, like.
Q. That was the general understanding; it was pretty vague by the sound of things; is that right?
A. That is right.
Q. Soldiers were fair game to be shot at?
A. Yep72.
4C-IV THE STANDING AND ATTITUDE OF THE OFFICIAL IRA AT THE TIME OF BLOODY SUNDAY
OIRA policy towards the British Army as at January 1972 could, then, hardly be clearer. While termed “Defence and Retaliation”, the policy in fact encouraged any gunman to take any opportunity to murder any member of the British Army present in Derry, whether within or without the no-go area. OIRA Command Staff have confirmed to this Tribunal that the policy did not require such a soldier to be presenting a threat, his mere presence as a member of an occupying force was sufficient to justify action under the umbrella of either “retaliation” or “defence”. Occasions when the Army entered the no-go areas and/or simply carried out an arrest operation were clearly expressed to be instances in which shooting at
72 Day 413/185/19-22 73 Day 422/063/04-063/19 soldiers was not only justified but expected, as were occasions on which a specific incident of shooting by the British Army was seen to require “retaliation”.
In January 1972, that policy coincided with a time when the Official IRA had a particular need to assert their reputation amongst the Derry population as men of action and stem the flow of volunteers to the Provisional IRA, who were perceived to offer more opportunities to attack soldiers and policemen. While no OIRA witness gave evidence of the defection of a third of their members to the Provisional IRA, PIRA 24’s evidence, given on Days 426/427 that this is what had occurred was not challenged by Counsel for members of the Official IRA.
Father Bradley has explained to the Tribunal the low esteem in which the Official IRA was held in Derry at that time.
because the Officials were not highly thought of in this particular area, remember this is very much Provisional IRA country and the Officials were not particularly highly thought of... ...
... the Provisional IRA were stronger or growing stronger and the Official IRA were perhaps finding it more difficult to get numbers
Ivan Cooper told the Tribunal, when questioned by Christopher Clarke QC, that:
I can tell you, Mr Clarke, that the Official IRA had practically no support at that time in this city.
Certainly, there was a general perception that OIRA were talkers rather than men of action. Michael Clarke, PIRA explosives officer, has told the Tribunal that:
A. You can infer whatever you like. As far as I know there was a split between the -- in the IRA, people that stayed with OIRA were people that rather talk than fight.
______________________________________________________________________
74 Day 140/092/01-04 75 Day 140/108/04-06 76 Day 419/076/04-06 77 Day 402/112/25-113/03 PIRA 24, the OC of the Provisionals, also said with some disdain when referring to the Official IRA in his BSI statement that:
Yes, there was a cat and mouse game about stealing weapons from one another, but there were no real bad feeling (sic) about that even. After all, the Officials weren’t going to use the weapons anyway.78
Anthony Martin, speaking of the shooting of William Best on 21 May 1972, confirmed to Paul Mahon the extremes to which the Official IRA were, in that period, being driven by their rivalry with the Provisional IRA. Speaking, initially, of the Provisional IRA he said:
they watched people. They didn’t want... because the Stickies were involved with the CRA... they thought, ah the Stickies are going to do it because we got a rivalry... Ranger Best got shot because of that rivalry... And would be alive today only for the fact that the Provies goaded the Stickies saying “Oh, you chicken bastards” you know. So they took the guy out and headed him.79
Following the shooting of William Best, a soldier in the British Army on home leave in the Creggan, the Official IRA released a statement which sets out in no uncertain terms their mindset in this period:
The ruthlessness shown by British forces against the people of Free Derry could only be answered in similar terms. Regardless of calls for peace from slobbering moderates, while British gunmen remain on the streets in the Six Counties the [Official] IRA will take action against them.80
Moreover, there is persuasive evidence that the incident involving the abduction on 18th January 1972 of INQ2245 had left the Official IRA with the reputation of being too “soft”, and exacerbated the problem of the loss of members to the
78 APIRA24.9 paragraph 36 79 X4.18.49 80 Lost Lives p.189 Provisionals. According to the evidence of PIRA 8, this incident actually led to physical violence between OIRAs and PIRAs on Bloody Sunday.\\footnote{Day 418/076}
British Intelligence had at the time picked up on the disquiet caused by the incident as recorded in INT2.25 dated 27th January 1972, just three days before Bloody Sunday.
following a row between the Officials and the Provisionals over the recent affair of handling of Private [blank] kidnapped by the Officials on 18th January, some of the Officials were against releasing the soldier and the Provisionals are making capital out of this, the Provisionals said they would have shot the soldier.
Journalists were at the time also aware of the difficulties which the incident had created for the Officials. Vincent Browne reported in the Sunday Press on 6 February 1972 that:
It was crucial to the Officials that they should take some effective action in defence of the Bogside in the circumstances. Their prestige had been somewhat knocked a few weeks previously when, having captured a British soldier while visiting his fiancee in the Bogside they let him go after interrogation.\\footnote{L171}
Members of the Provisional IRA have confirmed that this was the case. PIRA 11 told John Barry in an interview conducted in 1972 that:
They took...fearful stick when they released the soldier they found in the Bogside. People "even women" he said with wonder and possible distaste said they should have shot him.\\footnote{M45.35}
OIRA witnesses themselves have, however, been reluctant to admit either any knowledge at all of the INQ2245 incident or that there was a perception in the days and weeks before Bloody Sunday that they were too "soft".
\\footnote{Day 418/076} \\footnote{L171} \\footnote{M45.35} Even members of the OIRA Command Staff, such as OIRA 2, claim to have known nothing about the abduction of INQ2245.
A. I do not really know and I am not aware of the incident.
Q. Not at all?
A. I am just not aware of the incident, not at all.
Q. Was it not something of which the command staff were aware?
A. Well, possibly somebody on the command staff may well have been made aware of it. A couple of volunteers might have apprehended a soldier and then went and told somebody on the command staff. I remember hearing something about it afterwards, but I did not hear any detail about it, if that is what you are asking me.
Q. You have absolutely no knowledge at all of this incident?
A. I have no knowledge of it, no.
OIRA 5, while admitting that he recalled the incident, denied ever hearing of any suggestion that the Official IRA was too soft in releasing INQ2245:
Q...you, then, would have been involved, would you, in discussion, collectively, about what happened to the Scottish soldier on 17th/18th January?
A. Yes, I might have been, yes.
Q. You remember that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. You remember, do you, that there was feeling in some quarters that you collectively, exercising your collective decision-making responsibilities, had been too soft?
A. No.
Q. You do not remember that?
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4C-77
4C-78 A. No, I do remember that and it is not true.
Q. You do remember it and it is not true?
A. I do remember discussions took place and it is not true that people said that we were too soft.
Q. No-one said that?
A. No.
Q. This was no suggestion of that?
A. I have no memory of it.
Q. Was there any perception that came to your ears, whether you agreed with it or not, that the Official IRA was being too soft?
A. No.
Q. In or about January 1972?
A. No.
Q. You never heard a hint of it?
A. No.
4C-79 OIRA 1 similarly denied, when questioned by Mr Lawson, that there was any such perception either within or without the Official IRA.
Q. What about this general question: do you agree or disagree generally that there may well be some perception in some quarters that the Official IRA was too soft at the time?
A. No.
Q. You disagree?
A. There was not that perception.
Q. Was there any perception arising out of the handling of the abduction of the Scottish soldier that the IRA, the Official IRA, had there been too soft? A. No.
Q. None at all? A. No.
Q. Is that right? Was there any disagreement within your organisation as to his having been released, as opposed to killed? A. No.
Q. Was there, as far as you were aware, any attack being made on you by any other organisation, or specifically the Provisionals, that you had been too soft and, again, released him, rather than killing him? A. Not that I recall.
Q. No? A. No.
Reg Tester was one of very few prepared to admit both knowledge of the incident involving INQ2245 and that it had caused disquiet within the Official IRA and exacerbated the factional row brewing between the Officials and Provisionals, although the evidence of some PIRA and other witnesses suggests that he very much "underplayed" the extent of the problems which the incident caused. He said in his BSI statement:
There was one Official IRA volunteer who wanted to shoot the soldier, and he was the one that left soon after and went to join the Provos.
When questioned by Mr Lawson, he expanded upon his written evidence.
Q. That then refers to those incidents leading to a factional row between the Officials and the Provisionals or that being brewing; do you see that? A. Yes.
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88 Day 395/166/21-25 89 Day 395/167/12-22 90 AT6.14 paragraph 53 Q. Is that right?
A. Yes, there was a little bit of to and froing.
Q. Cannot have done relations much good, could it? You had a pretty dim view -- as a member of the command staff -- a pretty dim view of the Provisionals anyway, did you not?
A. That is correct.
Q. That was not helped by the row that there was and the stand-off there was on the night 18th January or thereabouts --
A. That is correct.
Q. -- concerning the kidnapped soldier, is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. It is said in the intelligence report that "the Officials had boasted that they would wipe out the Provisionals". I do not know if you had or not, I suppose you might have done; propaganda?
A. Probably.
Q. I expect they were boasting they were going to wipe you out, were they?
A. They would have been doing the same thing.
OIRA 2 also conceded, when questioned by Mr Lawson about the incident, that the perception that the Official IRA was becoming too soft was an issue at the time.
A. No, that is not what I am saying to you at all. What I am saying to you quite simply is: maybe some members of the organisation felt that the organisation was being too soft when they allowed this soldier to go.
Q. It caused, did it not, dissension between your organisation and the relatively new Provisional organisation?
______________________________________________________________________
91 Day 414/148/08-149/07 92 Day 392/150/21-24 A. It may well have caused some people to say -- it is quite possible that that happened.
Q. And it led to the suggestion that is being made that you, the Officials, were simply not tough enough, not hard enough, not violent enough; did it not?
A. Well, that is your reading of the situation, you know.
Q. It may be my reading; is it a correct reading?
A. It is people's perceptions, you know, it may well be that some people perceived that the Official IRA were too soft.
4C-82 He confirmed that view when he returned to continue his evidence on Day 393 and was again questioned by Mr Lawson:
A. What I said to you on Thursday, and I am looking at it now, it is people's perceptions. You know, it may well be that some people perceived that the Official IRA were too soft. It may well be that some people did perceive they were too soft, yes.
Q. That was a perception of which you would have been aware as a member of command staff in January 1972?
A. I would imagine so, yes.
Q. And were, to your knowledge, steps taken to seek to change that perception?
A. Not as far as I am aware.
4C-83 OIRA 6 admitted that he was one of those who felt that the Official IRA's decision to release INQ2245 was "soft"
I confess that deep down, I too thought that the Command Staff had been soft in releasing him, but I have never heard the suggestion that an operation be mounted on Bloody Sunday as an opportunity to counter the impression that the Official IRA had gone soft.
93 Day 392/152/05-17 94 Day 393/003/14-24 95 AOIRA6.9 paragraph 52 While OIRAs 2 and 6 claim to be unaware of any suggestion that the poor standing of the Official IRA could be addressed by decisive action on the day of Bloody Sunday, it is clear from the evidence of Liam O’Comain, who describes himself as being “on the fringes” of the Official IRA, that the idea had most certainly occurred to some. He told Kathryn Johnston and Liam Clarke that:
There is an interesting twist to Bloody Sunday. There was an element within the Officials that definitely made a decision to open up on Bloody Sunday, and they did. It was nothing to do with Bishop Daly’s gunman. I [O’Comain presumably] I was on the fringes then but I tell you this, there was an element there and the thought at the time was that if we can have some form of death on Bloody Sunday, it might pull the Officials back in line again. They might be forced into a situation to place a bit more hope in.
Mr O’Comain claimed in his statement to this Tribunal and in his oral evidence that this aspect of the information he gave to Ms Johnston and Mr Clarke was based on rumour and a lie. Indeed he claimed that he told more lies than truth in the information which he gave to them. The Tribunal will, however, recall the detail in which Mr Lawson scrutinised Ms Johnston and Mr Clarke’s notes together with Mr O’Comain when it became clear that in fact Mr O’Comain verified as correct every part of those notes bar the passage set out above.
It is clear from such examination that Mr O’Comain’s attempts to repudiate his statement about the “interesting twist” to Bloody Sunday as mere fantasy is entirely disingenuous. He, as a member of the Official IRA on Bloody Sunday, clearly believed that there was “an element within the Officials that definitely made a decision to open up on Bloody Sunday, and they did”.
______________________________________________________________________
96 Day 417/032/12 97 Day 417/052/01-03 98 AO82 99 Day 417/030/05-053/07 100 With the exception of one reference to Patsy O’Hara which he no longer recalled. 101 Day 417/015/04 There is then persuasive evidence that the Official IRA felt, in the period leading up to Bloody Sunday, under particular pressure to prove themselves capable of decisive and violent action.
Nor should it be forgotten, when considering the particular role that retaliation played in OIRA policy on Bloody Sunday, that two civilians, Peter McLaughlin and Peter Robson, had been shot by British Forces the day before, a fact of which, as OIRA 1 confirmed to Mr Lawson, the OIRA Command Staff were well aware.
Q. The shooting to which you refer is a reference to the shooting earlier the same day of two young men called Robson and McLaughlin; is it not? A. Yes.
Q. Is that right? A. Yes.
Q. You presumably heard about that shooting, had you, by the time that you went down to Columbille Court that evening? A. Well, yes, I must have heard about it.
The Tribunal should bear in mind that one member of the OIRA Command Staff had a compelling personal reason for retaliating on Bloody Sunday. This connection was, of course, unknown to those representing the soldiers when they examined this witness. Official IRA Orders for Bloody Sunday
DEFENSIVE POLICY?
The context in terms of arms, policies and attitude in which the Official IRA formulated their policy for Bloody Sunday is set out above. OIRA witnesses nevertheless claimed, in their early statements to this Tribunal, that the Official IRA was determined to adopt a purely defensive stance on Bloody Sunday. Hence the OC's statement to this Tribunal that:
102 Day 395/184/10-19
FS 7. 539
IV 143 There should be a defensive mode only. No units or volunteers were to incite any confrontation with the British Forces, nor was anyone to commence any offensive action against the security forces.\\textsuperscript{103}
This was clearly the "party line" at the time these statements were drafted as similar sentiments were included in the statements of:
OIRA1:
No one was to actively engage the British Army in an offensive manner. Any action of that nature would surely have led to civilian casualties which would have been totally unacceptable.\\textsuperscript{104}
OIRA2:
I recall that on Bloody Sunday we had specific orders that we were not to take part in any active operations during the march, nor were we to incite or instigate any form of contact with the British Forces.\\textsuperscript{105}
OIRA4:
We were to maintain a defensive stance and no one was to initiate any contact with the army or police.\\textsuperscript{106}
And OIRA5:
The orders were that there were to be no weapons in the Bogside and that no volunteers were to be carrying weapons on the march.\\textsuperscript{107}
In fact, while OIRA witnesses attempted in these statements to convince this Tribunal of the peaceable nature of their intentions on Bloody Sunday, the former Command Staff have agreed that in fact the policy of Defence and Retaliation, the murderous nature of which they have also explained, remained in place on Bloody Sunday. Thus OIRA3 stated in his second statement to this Tribunal that:
There was no need for a formal meeting (on the morning of Bloody Sunday) because everyone in the organisation was aware of the general OIRA directives which had been in place as standing orders for some time.(^{108})
4C-93 OIRA 5 confirmed in oral evidence that:
A. No, the position on defence and retaliation was the standard regulations that were issued and they stood on the day of Bloody Sunday, there were no changes to that.(^{109})
4C-94 OIRA1 also confirmed in oral evidence that:
Obviously the defence and retaliation policy continued to apply.(^{110})
And, when questioned further by Mr Lawson, that:
Q. There were those orders, before Bloody Sunday there were no special orders as such, were there?
A. No, the standing orders were reiterated.
Q. The standing orders which, in effect, were -- in terms of the use at least of violence -- were the defence and retaliation orders; is that right?
A. Yes.(^{111})
And he agreed with OIRA 5's interpretation:
Q. A policy which, as OIRA 5 -- because this is he -- confirmed then remained in force on Bloody Sunday. OIRA 5 then confirmed that the policy was straightforward, did not really need any embellishment for Bloody Sunday; "precisely" he said; you would agree with that, would you not?
(^{108}) AOIRA3.18 paragraph 10 (^{109}) Day 393/147/23-25 (^{110}) Day 395/003/12 (^{111}) Day 395/174/24-175/05 A. Yes\\textsuperscript{112}.
OIRA 2 also agreed, when questioned by Mr Lawson, that there was no change in policy for Bloody Sunday.
\\textbf{Q. So the policy actually adopted on Bloody Sunday was no different, you tell us, from the general policy in force at that time?}
\\textbf{A. Yes}\\textsuperscript{113}.
As did Reg Tester, when questioned by Mr Clarke:
\\textbf{Q. Is what happened in the period leading up to Bloody Sunday, so far as orders were concerned, that there was simply a confirmation that the current defence and retaliation policy would continue to apply?}
\\textbf{A. Yes}\\textsuperscript{114}.
While OIRA\\textsuperscript{3} claimed, in his second statement, that Defence and Retaliation should, in the context of Bloody Sunday, be interpreted to mean that:
\\textit{The general standing OIRA directives in place at the time and which were well known to volunteers, were defensive. This meant that no action against the army or RUC was to be initiated, but that defensive or retaliatory action was permitted if the army/RUC initiated action themselves.}
The true meaning of that policy has been explained in no uncertain terms to this Tribunal by every member of the Command Staff who has appeared before it.
\\textbf{THE NEED TO PROTECT CIVILIANS}
There has been an attempt to suggest that there was in effect a gloss on the usual policy by virtue of the fact that civilians would be in attendance at the march on Bloody Sunday.
\\textsuperscript{112} Day 395/175/18 \\textsuperscript{113} Day 393/004/13 \\textsuperscript{114} Day 414/032/21-25 That misleading “gloss” was put forward very early by members of the OIRA Command Staff. Reg Tester told Philip Jacobsen of the Sunday Times Insight team in an interview carried out on 3rd February 1972 that:
On the morning of the march... staff officers decided to re-emphasise the existing orders that Officials should only open fire on the Army if they were shot at first, if the Army had shot at other civilians and in any case, never to open fire in a crowd situation.(^{115})
And in a further interview with Peter Pringle in March 1972, Mr Tester said that:
The Officials, by contrast (to the army), could not afford to risk hitting any civilians.(^{116})
A similar suggestion was apparently made by the acting OC of the Official IRA whose comments were recorded in the Observer galley proofs as:
We cannot use the weapon because it would be too dangerous, only a madman would be prepared to start a shoot-out in an area crowded with people...... We had two marksmen on duty, but with strict instructions not to use their weapons until the area was clear of civilians.(^{117})
Similar claims that OIRA gunmen would not have considered firing in areas populated by civilians have been put forward in evidence to this Tribunal. OIRA 1 claimed that:
The orders were that no-one was to actively engage the British Army in an offensive manner. Any action of that nature would surely have led to civilian casualties which would have been totally unacceptable.(^{118})
And OIRA 2 claimed in relation to OIRA 1’s shot that:
(^{115}) ED20.30\
(^{116}) S34\
(^{117}) ED24.9\
(^{118}) AOIRA1.4 paragraph 6 I would imagine that no shots would have been fired at all had there been a large number of people about.(^{119})
4C-102 OIRA 7 also claimed that OIRA gunmen would always hold fire when civilians might be present:
Q. Did the orders permit retaliation with lethal force if the Army mounted an arrest operation?
A. Depending on the circumstances. I mean, at all times we would not have been allowed to retaliate, for instance, if there were people, you know civilians about.(^{120})
And OIRA 8 had been briefed with a similar “party line”
I mean, at all times we would not have been allowed to retaliate, for instance, if there were people, you know civilians about.(^{121})
...during a riot we would not have opened fire if there was civilians about.(^{122})
4C-103 OIRA 5, indeed, claimed that the whole population of Derry would have been aware of this aspect of the Official IRA’s orders on Bloody Sunday:
The organisers and our relatives would have been well aware that we would not take risks with the lives of innocent civilians.(^{123})
4C-104 Manifestly this was not the case, however, as there is clear evidence that the local population did not perceive there to be any such policy in place and were, in fact, extremely concerned by the prospect of OIRA gunmen operating in the vicinity of the march. Events proved these concerns to be justified.
4C-105 Father McIvor, Curate of St Mary’s Church at the time of Bloody Sunday, had concerns about the Official IRA. He was referred by Christopher Clarke QC to an
(^{119}) Day 393/052/24-25 (^{120}) Day 410/031/19-23 (^{121}) Day 410/031/21-23 (^{122}) Day 410/035/21-22 (^{123}) AOIRA5.9 paragraph 40.11 interview he gave for the purposes of a television programme "Remember Bloody Sunday":
Well, to put the whole thing in context, it has to be said the Creggan people had a great reliance on their clergy. They looked to them for everything practically. You were not just a priest, you were everything that they thought they needed, so every sort of inquiry, advice was sought from the clergy from the priest and at the time of the march a lot of apprehension was being brought my way by parishioners about whether they should in fact attend the march on Sunday, and one of their worries was that the march would be used that an organisation, the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA at the time might see an opportunity to cause trouble and I think that that was the biggest thing I remember about most of the people I talked to...124
... there was this soul-searching going on as to whether they should attend or not. They wanted to -- I mean civil rights was something that they wanted to be involved in, but in the back of their minds was this worry, this fear, and I remember talking to a considerable number of people who were just thinking the thing through, whether they should go or not, but the big worry was trouble.....125
4C-106 Father McIvor confirmed to this Tribunal that:
Q. Is that correct; were your parishioners concerned that one or other wing of the IRA might seek an opportunity to cause trouble on the march?
A. That is correct...
... Q. It looks from that as if this was a real, sizeable concern at the time?
A. Yes, it was.126
4C-107 Father Bradley also told the Tribunal about his particular fears in relation to the Official IRA whom he described in his BSI statement as both "very irresponsible"
124 Day 055/039/22-44 125 Day 055/040/17-25 126 Day 055/041/01-03 and "gangsterish". While he did not feel that the Provisional IRA would endanger civilians, he had no such confidence in the Official IRA.
I had held a fear about the Official IRA's activities that day. I had gone on the march aware that the Provisionals were not going to be there. I knew this because I was aware of who they were...my parish was densely populated with the Provisionals. Members of the youth club I ran were members of the Provisionals I would have said to them that they had better not be on the march. They had assured me that they would not be. I was not sure however of the Official IRA. Generally the Provisionals were conscious that there was a mass of "their people" on this march who didn't want them there. If there were any Provisionals on the march, I feel sure they would not have been armed.
Certainly, others felt the need to seek assurances from the Official IRA whom they clearly did not trust to avoid putting civilians in danger as a matter of general policy.
Ivan Cooper has told this Tribunal that he had concerns that the Official IRA might use the march as an opportunity to attack the Armed Forces, and for that reason sought assurances from them. He received none. Mr Cooper told Mr Clarke:
Q. Had you had yourself any contact on this or communication on this score with the Officials?
A. I had spoken informally to two members of the Officials, but as I have said in my statement their star was on the wane at this particular time. The number of people that they had on the ground were diminishing rapidly, but I did have informal contact with two people.
Q. What was the upshot of that?
A. They did not give me any undertakings.
And confirmed, when questioned by Mr O'Donovan, that he was, indeed, concerned that the Official IRA might use the march to attack the Armed Forces. Q. You had a formal meeting with representatives of the Provisional IRA; did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. You followed that up then by a less formal meeting with members of the Official IRA?
A. Yes.
Q. Presumably the purpose of those meetings was to ascertain what precisely those paramilitary bodies proposed to do on the day of the march?
A. That is correct.
Q. And I suppose in particular you wanted to know whether they would be using it as an opportunity to open fire upon the Armed Forces?
A. That is correct.
Q. Would I be right in thinking that your major concern was that if they did so there was a real risk that civilians would be at risk of injury or, worse still, being killed?
A. That was my primary thinking.29
It became clear, when Mr Cooper was questioned by Mr Lawson, both that he did approach members of the Official IRA because of his misgivings as to how they might behave at the march and that he received no assurances from them or from any other quarter that they would not do exactly as he feared.
Q. Is this right, that the purpose of your seeking, even informal assurances, was to ascertain precisely what the OIRA, the Officials as one of the paramilitary bodies proposed to do on the day of the march; you wanted to know precisely what they were going to do?
A. Yes.
Q. Right, and in particular you wanted to know whether they would be using it as an opportunity to open fire upon the Armed Forces? A. Any type of confrontation which could lead to loss of life or potential loss of life.
Q. Is it right that in particular you wanted to know whether they, that is the Officials, would be using it, the march, as an opportunity to open fire upon the Armed Forces –
A. Or, or to throw any type of bombs, petrol bombs or nail bombs or anything of that type.
Q. So you agree you wanted in particular to know if they were going to be opening fire or using any other kind of violence on Bloody Sunday; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. That was your particular concern?
A. Yes
Q. When you spoke informally to, as you recall, to members of that organisation, you did not get any assurance, did you?
A. No.
Q. They gave you no undertaking?
A. They were, they were individuals; they were not in a position to give me an undertaking. What they said was, that they would go back to their organisation.
Q. Yes, and?
A. I never heard after that.
Q. They gave you no undertaking –
A. No.
Q. -- at all, did they?
A. No.\\textsuperscript{130}
... Q. Just think about it: did you have credible information that satisfied you that the Officials would not be opening fire? A. No. Q. You did not? A. No.\\textsuperscript{11}
Michael Havord, the Public Relations Officer of the Derry Civil Rights Association, also felt the need to seek assurances from the Official IRA and approached Malachy McGurran to seek such an assurance from him that there would be no violence on the march\\textsuperscript{12}.
OIRA I was extremely reluctant to assist the Tribunal as to the role of Malachy McGurran in providing assurances to NICRA. Referring to Mr McGurran, OIRA I was asked:
Q. He is, I believe, publicly acknowledged to be a senior figure within the Republican movement in 1972; is that right? A. Yes.
Q. Was he in a position to give an assurance on behalf of the Official IRA in Derry? A. I have no idea.
Q. You were on the command staff? A. Yes.
Q. So you must surely as a member of the command staff know whether or not Mr McGurran could speak for the leadership of the Derry— A. No, I do not know whether he spoke on behalf of the leadership or not, I have no idea.
Q. You were one of the leadership; were you not?
\\textsuperscript{11} Day 420/040/07-12 \\textsuperscript{12} Day 125/015/15 A. Yes\\textsuperscript{133}.
4C-113 OIRA 2 was prepared to admit to recalling a little more:
Q. Do you know a man called Michael Havord?
A. No.
Q. He was a public relations officer of the Derry Civil Rights Association; does that help at all?
A. The name rings a bell, but I mean, I do not know him.
Q. He has given evidence to the Inquiry. What he says is he approached Malachy McGurran, whom he knew to be a chairman of the Republican Clubs and a senior figure within the Republican movement. He sought assurance from Mr McGurran there would be no violence on the march from the Republican movement. Do you have any knowledge at all of that?
A. I think I heard something about it all right, and, um, well, presumably Malachy McGurran could well have been in a position to give them some kind of verbal assurance that there would be no activity on the day.
Q. Would Malachy McGurran have known what the command staff's orders were?
A. Malachy McGurran would have been known what the command staff's orders were, yes\\textsuperscript{134}.
4C-114 Eamon Melaugh has given evidence to this Tribunal that he approached members of both the Provisional and the Official IRA and advised them not to bring weapons or be provoked into firing on 30th January\\textsuperscript{135}. Indeed, he provided the Tribunal with the names of six Officials whom he approached so that the Tribunal will be in a position to compare Mr Melaugh's evidence with that of those so named.
\\textsuperscript{133} Day 395/006/20-007/10 \\textsuperscript{134} Day 392/024/06-25 \\textsuperscript{135} Day 143/066/13-19 There is then no doubt that the local population and its representatives did not trust the Official IRA to operate a policy of avoiding confrontation with the military when civilians might thereby be endangered. Far from that, they saw an urgent need to pursue the OIRA for assurances about just that fact. Such assurances were not, according to the OIRA Command Staff themselves, forthcoming.
OIRA 3, the OC, has told the Tribunal in his first written statement that:
As far as I am aware there were no formal or informal approaches to the Official IRA about assurances over weapons or operations. No such approaches were made to me. No assurances were given.
And repeated in his second statement that:
No one spoke to me about assurances about weapons or anything else that day.
OIRA 1 agreed that:
So far as I am aware no such formal or informal assurances were either sought from the Official IRA or given by it.
And continued to deny in oral evidence any knowledge of any assurance.
OIRA 2 gave similar evidence
As far as I recall I gave no assurances and I think it unlikely that the other members gave assurances.
As did OIRA 5
136 AOIRA3.12 paragraph 49 137 AOIRA3.27 paragraph 47 138 AOIRA1.19 paragraph 80 139 Day 395/007/08 140 AOIRA2.13 paragraph 3 As far as I am aware no such formal or informal assurances or commitments were either sought or given\\textsuperscript{141}.
The Tribunal will, however, have noted that Mr O’Donovan, Counsel to the OIRA witnesses, put to Ivan Cooper that Mr Cooper had, indeed, had a meeting with his clients to ascertain whether they intended to use the march as an opportunity to open fire on the Armed Forces and to express his concern that civilians would, if they did so, be at risk of being killed or injured\\textsuperscript{142}. It is clear that, following that meeting, no assurances were forthcoming to Mr Cooper from the Official IRA.
OIRA 9, who claims to have been the OC of the Official IRA immediately before OIRA 3 has, at a very late stage indeed, produced a statement to this Tribunal to say that he attended a meeting with Malachy McGurran and Brigid Bond at which assurances that there would be no military activity on the day of the march were offered to NICRA\\textsuperscript{143}.
Quite why, if this was the case, no other member of the Command Staff was aware of the meeting, or how effective such an assurance could be if OIRA 3 himself, the OC on the day of the march, was ignorant of it is not at all clear.
What is clear is that the suggestion that the Official IRA was an organisation that would have eschewed all military activity for fear of endangering civilians is not borne out by those in the community who had experience of dealing with them. Instead the people of Derry clearly felt the need to seek special assurance from them. The evidence which OIRA witnesses have given to this Tribunal would suggest that any request for such an assurance would have been met with a response to the effect that “of course we will not shoot if there are civilians around, we never do”. Such a response would in any event have been unlikely to satisfy those seeking assurances, contradicting as it would their own everyday experience of the Official IRA’s behaviour. In fact, far from receiving any
\\textsuperscript{141} AOIRA5.9 paragraph 40 \\textsuperscript{142} Day 419/157/08-158/01 \\textsuperscript{143} AOIRA9.1 paragraph 3 assurances it would appear, in reality, that the concerns of the local population were met with silence from the OIRA Command Staff.
Moreover, the behaviour of OIRA gunmen on the day of Bloody Sunday itself completely belies the existence of any standing policy to avoid confrontation where civilians might be endangered.
OIRA 4, for example, having claimed that "you couldn't just use your own people as human shields", clearly managed to put such concerns aside when he decided to open fire at the Chamberlain Street gable end in a fit of temper. He had to be reminded by others present, such as the then Father Daly, that he was endangering their lives.
Reg Tester admitted that when, as he claims, he attempted to fire from a balcony in Rossville Street "There were a lot of civilians around". While he now claims to have desisted because he recognised the danger to civilians, the fact remains that such concerns did not stop him from pulling the trigger.
A. I could see them moving around and it suddenly dawned on me, bearing in mind that I was extremely angry and upset, like anybody else in my position, I wanted to strike back, but I realised after a minute that, thank God, that my rifle had jammed, because I could not see the soldier really clearly enough and there was still civilians wandering around.
Nor does such behaviour appeared to have caused their commanding officer the concern that might be expected had an embargo against firing in the vicinity of civilians actually existed. The alleged disciplinarian, OIRA3, said in his BSI statement of Reg Tester's shots or attempted shots in Rossville Street:
He was not instructed to take up a firing position and as I have said it was too dangerous to put someone there with so many people
144 AOIRA4.23 145 AOIRA4.23:49 146 Day 414/052/19-20 147 Day 414/054/05-11 about. He acted out of anger and frustration and I understand his feelings....
There is certainly no suggestion that OIRA 3 applied any sanctions following such a blatant disregard of his alleged orders.
4C-127 OIRA 3 also said that he found OIRA 4's and OIRA1's shots to be "entirely within the standing orders".
4C-128 OIRA 5 agreed, commenting on the shots fired by OIRA 4:
Q. His explanation was, apparently at least, to the effect that he fired a couple of shots at approaching Pigs from the car park area?
A. That is my very vague memory of it, yes.
Q. That, you recall, do you, was accepted to be a proper application of the defence and retaliation policy?
A. In the circumstances, yes, it was.
Q. That was the collective decision?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. It was a collective approval that was given, was it?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. Not the CO's decision and his alone?
A. No, it was his decision to -- it was his responsibility to ensure that those decisions were carried out. It was a collective decision.
Q. A collective decision that what OIRA 4 had done was within the policy?
A. Yes, it was.
148 AOIRA3.22 paragraph 23 149 AOIRA3.26 paragraph 40 150 Day 393/196/03-19 The approval of OIRA 4's actions by, according to OIRA 5, the entire Command Staff clearly gives the lie to any suggestion that such standing orders included a prohibition against firing in circumstances where civilians might be endangered.
**WEAPONS/CONTROL OF WEAPONS**
It is, therefore, clear that the Official IRA operated at the time of Bloody Sunday a policy towards the British Army which would have justified shooting any soldier present within or without the no-go areas, particularly in the event that there had been recent shooting of civilians. That policy also placed particular emphasis on defending against any incursion into the no-go areas which included the Bogside and Brandywell as well as the Creggan. It is in pursuance of that policy that the Tribunal will judge the credibility of OIRA witnesses' accounts of the orders they allege were given in relation to the distribution of weapons on Bloody Sunday.
The evidence of the OIRA witnesses as to the quantity of weapons within the control of the Official IRA in January 1972 has been inconsistent and unreliable. The picture which they have attempted to present, of there being a minimal quantity of weapons within their control, and, furthermore of the weapons they did possess being in poor or non-working condition, is entirely contradicted by the evidence of their own Quartermaster, Reg Tester.
Most of the OIRA witnesses have attempted to persuade this Tribunal that all available weaponry was tightly controlled by the Command Staff, more particularly the Quartermaster, Mr Tester. OIRA 7 told the Tribunal that:
*Q. I follow, but are you saying that if you needed a weapon, you would need the authority both of the quartermaster and another member of the command staff, or are you saying something different?*
*A. I think in the main I am saying, um, both, from my memory.*
*Q. The quartermaster and another?*
______________________________________________________________________
151 Day 414/114-115 Mr Tester and others had also originally told the Tribunal that a strict audit was kept of shots fired by OIRA volunteers by means of ammunition checks carried out by Mr Tester himself, not least because ammunition was in such short supply. He said in his first statement that:
Each volunteer had to account for each round of ammunition issued to him and god help him if he couldn't account for it.
OIRA2 told the Tribunal that in 1972 ammunition was in such short supply that any shots fired always had to be reported to the OC and the Quartermaster.
In fact, the suggestion that firing by members of the Official IRA was at any time strictly controlled or seriously examined by their OC as being within or without orders is entirely undermined by OIRA3's own comments about the events of Bloody Sunday. He first concedes that his only means of monitoring firing was to keep physical control of the weapons himself. Asked if an unauthorised shot was fired he says he can say only that:
I do not think this could have happened but if they did it could not have been while the Brits were shooting at us because I know exactly where the weapons were during that time.
Moreover, he is happy later to abandon all control, saying:
If anyone had a blatter after that, that is not something I can comment on.
It was only at the very late stage of Day 414, when Mr Tester himself gave evidence, that the Tribunal finally learnt the truth about the lax control of weapons and ammunition within the Official IRA. It then became quite clear that Mr Tester could not, in fact, have had in place the system of control that he alleged as he
______________________________________________________________________
152 Day 398/013/21-014/03 153 AT6.1 paragraph 4 154 AOIRA2.17 paragraph 19 155 AOIRA3.26 paragraph 42 was, for some considerable time, entirely ignorant of the shots that had been fired on Bloody Sunday itself.
Furthermore, it has emerged that, contrary to all the evidence of other OIRA witnesses, Mr Tester and the other members of the Command Staff had no control over the weapons of the Bogside Section at all, either before or on Bloody Sunday.
Orders re Weapons on Bloody Sunday
The Tribunal has been told on numerous occasions that weapons were withdrawn to the Creggan on Bloody Sunday upon the instruction and under the control of the Quartermaster, Mr Tester. The Tribunal will have noticed, however, the blatant inconsistency in the terms of those orders as described in the developing evidence of OIRA witnesses.
The Tribunal will have noted the description of the terms of the order given in the first round of OIRA statements: that arms were to be taken to the Creggan and Brandywell. These were the terms of the order as described by the OC in his statements:
... Some volunteers were based and ordered to remain in the Creggan and Brandywell areas... these units remained in the area with the weapons available
I am certain that all weapons were recovered and secured in the Creggan or Brandywell...
Other members of the Command Staff followed OIRA 3 in their initial statements in suggesting that weapons would be taken to both areas.
156 AOIRA3.2 paragraph 7 157 AOIRA3.8 paragraph 32 The orders that no weapons were to be left in the Bogside area and they were all to be removed to the Brandywell and Creggan areas were repeated. All weapons would be stored in dumps in the Brandywell and Creggan areas\\textsuperscript{158}.
An order was confirmed on the morning for all weapons not already recovered to be retrieved and stored in the Creggan and Brandywell areas\\textsuperscript{159}.
All the weapons were to be retrieved and brought into the Brandywell and Creggan areas\\textsuperscript{160}.
OIRA 5 also agreed, in his first statement, that weapons were to be taken to "Creggan and the Brandywell"\\textsuperscript{161}.
That position was, for some reason, abandoned when OIRA Command Staff members came to give further statements and oral evidence, when the Tribunal heard from numerous OIRA witnesses that all OIRA weapons were transported to the Creggan only.
OIRA 1 said, in his second written statement, that:
\\textit{I remember that it was the general order on January 1972 that all weapons should be collected up to the Creggan}\\textsuperscript{162}.
Similar evidence was given by OIRA 2
\\textsuperscript{158} AOIRA1.4 paragraph 10 \\textsuperscript{159} AOIRA2.2 paragraph 5 \\textsuperscript{160} AOIRA4.2 paragraph 9 \\textsuperscript{161} AOIRA5.2 paragraph 9 \\textsuperscript{162} AOIRA1.26 paragraph 12 A. Well, the simple answer to the question is: all weapons that were controlled by the Official IRA were to be brought to the Creggan.\\textsuperscript{163}
OIRA 4 agreed that
\\textit{The volunteers would stay in the Creggan}\\textsuperscript{164}
4C-144 OIRA 2 was asked about the change.
\\textit{Q. Do you know now from your own knowledge whether any weapons were left in the Brandywell?}
\\textit{A. Um, no, I have no knowledge of any weapons being left in the Brandywell}\\textsuperscript{165}.
4C-145 There was also a lack of consistency in the reasons for taking them there. OIRA3 certainly stated that the reason for moving weapons out of the Bogside was to defend the Creggan and Brandywell
\\textit{We did feel that there may be an attempt to get British Forces into the Creggan and Brandywell areas while many people were on the march}\\textsuperscript{166}.
4C-146 OIRA 1 appeared to agree.
\\textit{It is not a question of removal of weapons, the cars were told to come to Creggan. It made sense, the march was down in the Bogside. The Bogside, if you want, was well protected, there were thousands of people in it. The Creggan was basically empty and people said: "what do you do about the cars?" Bring them all up to the Creggan, I do not think it was any more complicated than that}\\textsuperscript{167}.
\\textit{LORD SAVILLE: Let us see if I can pick some of that up: if I got you directly -- do correct me if I am wrong, because you were speaking quite fast, I quite understand it is difficult to slow down
\\textsuperscript{163} Day 392/050/24 \\textsuperscript{164} Day 394/007/19-22 \\textsuperscript{165} Day 392/051/08-11 \\textsuperscript{166} AOIRA3.2 paragraph 7 \\textsuperscript{167} Day 395/030/18-25 sometimes -- there was a possibility, but not rated particularly highly, that with the Creggan empty, because people were on the march, the Army might take it as an opportunity to get in there; is that right?
A. Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: Was that, then, the reason for moving the arms up there?
A. I would say that would have been the motivating reason, yes.
LORD SAVILLE: Another reason has been suggested, which is that they were moved up there so as to avoid the risk of any hot heads who might get their hands on the weapons, using them against the Army during the course of the march; was that discussed at all?
A. No.
OIRA 2 seemed equally sure in his prepared statement but less so when questioned in oral evidence. In his first statement he said that arms were moved:
in order to remove them from the Bogside. This was partly to be in preparation for any attempt made by the Army to enter and control what had become “no go” areas.
In answer to questions put by Ms McGahey, however, he was less convinced about the possibility of incursions into the Creggan.
Q. You say in your statement that you cannot now recall whether there was a fear of incursion into the Creggan by the Army, but that your view was that the Creggan and the Brandywell were probably safe from incursion; is that right? A. Um, we were not very sure.
And, questioned by Mr Lawson, he felt that other reasons may have played a role also:
A. To remove them from the Bogside or any other areas because of the fact that the civil rights march was taking place.
168 Day 395/033/16-034/09 169 AOIRA2.2 paragraph 5 170 Day 392/051/02-07 Q. There was no sensible fear, was there, that the Security Forces were going to go into the Bogside?
A. Well, nobody really knew what the Security Forces -- what their intentions were.
Q. You were not expecting that to happen; were you?
A. As I say, we did not really know.
Q. Was there concern that if the weapons were not removed, mavericks or those who were not disclosed (sic) to follow the orders, might use the weapons?
A. No, that was not the issue because the members of the organisation were fully aware of what the orders were on the day and bringing the weapons back up to Creggan was simply a way of ensuring that all the weaponry could be accounted for on the day.
Q. It is not a matter for (sic) accounting for the weapon as a counting exercise, this was to get the weapons out of the way so they could not be used?
A. Well, I suppose that is probably true, that is one interpretation, yes.71
Upon further questioning, OIRA2 became even less sure as to the reasons for moving the weapons:
LORD SAVILLE: Mr Lawson, excuse me a moment; OIRA 2 it is the Chairman. Can you help because I do not quite understand, it may be my fault: what was the reason for getting all the weapons back up to the Creggan?
A. Just to make sure that they were secure.
LORD SAVILLE: It seems to follow from that that you must have thought there was at least a possibility that the Army would come into the Bogside; is that right?
A. Well, I suppose the possibility was that they may well -- that they may have come in and decided to search -- engage in a very, very thorough search. So, as a precaution, the idea was just to remove -- to remove the weaponry to a safer location, presumably in Creggan.
71 Day 393/037/08-038/04 MR LAWSON: Was there a fear that they might do a very, very thorough search?
A. I would imagine there probably was, aye.
He finally admitted, when questioned further by Mr Lawson, that the order made little logical sense at all:
Q. Was there any concern that guns had to be removed from the Bogside in case people would use them if they were there?
A. No, that was not, that was not the reason that the guns were removed from the Bogside and brought to the Creggan.
Q. If this be true, why not simply leave them there, they were secure, were they not?
A. Mr Lawson, I do not know, it probably seemed like a good idea at the time.
A policy of moving all weapons out of the Bogside to the Creggan also makes little sense in the context of the OIRA policy, still in force on Bloody Sunday, to defend the no-go areas, as it was clearly in the minds of some of the Command Staff, at least, that the British Army were all too likely to fire on the marchers. OIRA1 apparently predicted just such an outcome:
It was not out of the ordinary for shots to be fired and for someone to be shot by the Army at these types of demonstrations for no good reason.
While I was angered by the shooting, I was not particularly surprised by it. Shootings on marches or protests by the army had happened before. It was not therefore an unreasonable assumption that the army had shot two people without reason.
And later said:
______________________________________________________________________
172 Day 393/038/14-039/05 173 Day 393/039/25-040/09 174 AOIRA1.29 paragraph 28 175 AOIRA1.37 paragraph 94 A. I was looking up Rossville Street because I wanted to know what was going on. It was not out of the ordinary for shots to be fired and for someone to be shot by the Army at these types of demonstrations for no good reason. I had seen it all before and it was not, in that sense, sensational.
Q. Had you previously witnessed somebody being shot by the Army at a demonstration?
A. I had witnessed innocent civilians being shot on all sorts of occasions.176
4C-152 OIRA I expanded further on this topic when questioned by Mr Lawson:
Q. Is it true you were not particularly surprised by the shooting by the soldiers?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. That is correct. Thank you. Is it also correct that it was not out of the ordinary for people, according to you, for people to be shot by the Army at such demonstrations as this?
A. Well, I think that what I said -- I am not sure exactly the words in my statement, but what I was inferring was that it was not unusual for the Army to shoot unarmed civilians in different circumstances.
Q. In the course of a demonstration?
A. Possibly in the course of a demonstration, possibly in the course of a confrontation, possibly in the course of when nothing was happening.
Q. Is it true that it was not out of the ordinary for shots to be fired by the Army at these types of demonstrations for no good reason?
A. Yes, it would not be true to say that the Army opened fire in the manner they did on Bloody Sunday on a regular basis on demonstrations. It would be true to say that the Army, on various occasions, had opened fire on innocent civilians in a number of different situations.177 Harbouring such expectations, it would have been inconceivable that the OIRA Command Staff would, in applying their own policy of Defence and Retaliation, remove all their weapons into the Creggan so that the people of the Bogside were left, in their estimation, defenceless.
There must be some doubt as to whether there were, in reality, men deployed to defend the Creggan, as the OIRA witnesses claim, or whether this alleged plan is simply a device to persuade this Tribunal that weapons were removed from the Bogside. The Tribunal has, after all, heard from eleven members of the Official IRA in Derry out of a claimed total membership of 20 to 30(^{178}). Seven of those witnesses were attached to the Creggan section(^{179}) but only one, Reg Tester, claims to have been part of the force deployed in the Creggan and is unable to recall any of those who were with him on the day(^{180}). Whether, if there was indeed a plan to defend the Creggan, six of the very limited number of members of the Creggan section, including their OC, OIRA 3(^{181}), would have been omitted from that operation is a matter for the Tribunal to consider.
A decision to remove all Official IRA weapons to the Creggan then makes little sense in terms of declared Official policy at the time. Nonetheless the position which this Tribunal was long asked to accept was that put forward by Mr Tester in his first statement:
*Prior to Bloody Sunday I had received an order from the Officer in Command of Derry to ensure all weapons belonging to the Official IRA were collected from the Bogside and taken to the Creggan*(^{182})
It has, of course, emerged in the course of his evidence, however, that the suggestion that he was controlling all of the weapons available to the Official IRA
______________________________________________________________________
(^{178}) See for example evidence of OIRA 1 that there were 25 members at most. Day 395/195/20-25
(^{179}) OIRA's 3,4,6,7,8, 11 and Reg Tester.
(^{180}) AT6.10 paragraph 28
(^{181}) According to the evidence of OIRA 7 at Day 398/132/19 and Reg Tester at Day 414/009/22
(^{182}) AT6.2 paragraph 7 on the day is entirely false. He was not in fact aware, he says, that weapons were being carried by volunteers on the day, or that they had fired.
4C-157 Regarding OIRA 1’s shot, he said in his first BSI statement that:
_A long time afterwards I found out that a volunteer member of the Official IRA had the sporting rifle .303 that was missing at the time... I heard that the volunteer had fired one in return although I have never been able to confirm this for a fact._
4C-158 By the time he made his second statement, Mr Tester had revised his estimate of the time before he heard about a shot having been fired:
_It would therefore have been a couple of days before I heard about another Official IRA volunteer firing a weapon, as mentioned at paragraph 16 of my first statement._
4C-159 In oral evidence he claimed that by “a long time” he had indeed meant a matter of days:
_Q. You say "at least", but do you mean that it was within days or weeks, as opposed to months or years?_
_A. It would have been days._
4C-160 Whether Mr Tester heard of OIRA 1’s firing within days, weeks, months or years, it is quite clear from the evidence he gave that this individual most certainly had not been required to account to him “for every round of ammunition fired by him”.
4C-161 It was Mr Tester’s claim that he has been ignorant for some 30 years of the fact that this shot was fired by OIRA 1, a man he regarded as a more junior, co-member of the six man Command Staff. He told the Tribunal that, until the date of this Inquiry, he had understood the shot fired across William Street to have been the work of “Red Mickey” Doherty. Questioned by Mr Clarke, Mr Tester seemed
______________________________________________________________________
183 AT6.3 paragraph 16 184 AT6.13 unconcerned by this lapse in the alleged practice of OIRA gunmen reporting shots to him:
Q. When you learnt within weeks that some volunteer had fired across the street, would you not have been told who that volunteer was?
A. No, not necessarily, it would have – it was up to the OC.(^{186})
4C-162 Mr Tester was also, he claimed, ignorant of there having been any firing at all in Barrack Street, shooting which it is now admitted was in fact carried out by Mickey Doherty.
Q. When was it that you learnt that a weapon was issued to a volunteer on observation duties at a location unknown to you.
A. I would not have known about that now, until I heard it given in evidence here. At the time I had no knowledge of it, therefore, I have no recollection of it.(^{187})
4C-163 The Quartermaster and third in command of the Official IRA in Derry, confirmed his complete ignorance of any of the activities of even the co-members of the Command Staff in the Bogside on Bloody Sunday.
Q. So you have got a volunteer who was issued with a weapon which he actually used and in the course of which he was wounded. It is really the position, is it, that you, as the quartermaster of the Officials, did not hear of that for 30 years, or more than 30 years?
A. That is correct. It might seem strange, but ...
Q. Until recently you thought that it was OIRA 4 who fired across William Street?
A. No.
Q. You thought it was Mickey Doherty, sorry, who fired across William Street. Thank you. Did you learn at the time that OIRA 4 had fired?
(^{185}) Day 414/070/11-13 (^{186}) Day 414/071/07-11 (^{187}) Day 414/043/04-09 A. Um, no.
Q. Did you learn at the time that OIRA 1 had fired anywhere?
A. No, I did not. You see, with not being in the Bogside I really had no accurate picture of what went on there. I knew nothing of any of our volunteers with weapons, other than I assumed that the OC had his pistol with him and when I eventually heard the reports that came out long, long after about Father Daly's gunman, I thought to myself, well there was only one of ours down there possibly with a pistol, and I know it would not have been him who fired.
The Tribunal now knows that much of the reason for Mr Tester's ignorance (if ignorance it be), if not for his earlier claims to be able to account for the OIRA's weapons, lay in the fact that he did not control the Bogside Section's weapons at all.
CONTROL OF BOGSIDE WEAPONS
That the Bogside Section's weapons were held separately was indeed the account published in 1972 by The Sunday Times Insight Team following their interview with a staff officer who, according to Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobsen, was Reg Tester:
Officials on bloody Sunday. PP/PJ interview with staff officer 15/3/72
The officials' orders of the day for Sunday, drawn up the previous day, were as follows:
1. There were to be no weapons in the Bogside except for those held by the Bogside Official unit, and those were to be kept in several safe dumps. All other Official weapons were to be kept in two cars which would be on hand in the Creggan.
2. Nobody was to initiate firing on the army
Although he later corrected himself, OIRA 1 initially endorsed the account published in The Sunday Times as being "broadly correct". The Officials decreed that there were to be no weapons in the Bogside except those held by the Bogside Official Unit – and these were to be held in two cars on patrol in the Creggan.(^{188})
4C-167 He “corrected” this prior to attending to give his oral evidence
The account could be read as suggesting that the weapons of the Bogside OIRA unit were to be held in several safe dumps within the Bogside, such a suggestion is inaccurate(^{189})
but conceded that Mr Tester was the man who would have known.
A. Because there was only about half a dozen weapons available to the Bogside unit at any one time. There was only maybe about 12 or 15 weapons in the entire area and they were all in Creggan.
Q. Was it Mr Tester’s responsibility to ensure that they all went back to the Creggan?
A. It would have been his overall responsibility to ensure that, yes(^{192}).
4C-168 He said that it was Mr Tester and the OC who took them
Q. Did you drive any of the cars up from the Bogside to the Creggan?
A. No.
Q. I am not asking you for a name, but do you know who did?
A. No.
Q. How do you know that any weapons in the Bogside were taken to the Creggan?
A. Because I am aware of the responsibilities of the OC, I am aware of the responsibilities of the quartermaster, and I am aware of the decisions of the staff. I personally did not go to the Creggan
(^{188}) Day 414/046/04-047/03 (^{189}) Day 190/093 & 191/112 (^{190}) L211 (^{191}) Day 395/003/06-10 (^{192}) Day 395/038/19-039/01 to inspect those cars, but I am assured by them they did, and I take their word for it.\\footnote{Day 395/039/05-17}
4C-169 It was from OIRA 6 that the Tribunal first heard that each section kept its weapons separately.
\\textit{Every section kept itself to itself and would look after its own weapons.}
4C-170 Mr Tester, when he gave evidence on Day 414, finally revealed the true position to the Tribunal:
\\begin{quote} Q. Except there is this important exception, is there not, that as you have indicated in your evidence today, a number of weapons had been entrusted by you to the Bogside section?
A. That is correct.
Q. And responsibility for the safe custody of those weapons rested with whomsoever was in charge of that section, presumably?
A. That is correct.
Q. Yes. To the best of your knowledge and belief those weapons were held securely –
A. That is correct.
Q. -- at dumps or locations within the Bogside; is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. In addition, there were certain weapons, as you have told the Tribunal today, there were certain weapons that were held in dumps on the Creggan?
A. That is correct.
Q. In addition to which there were weapons kept in the boots of the car or cars?
A. The bulk was in the boots of cars, the two cars I had. \\end{quote}
\\footnote{AOIRA6.8 paragraph 43} Q. So Bogside rifles, that is the sporting rifle and the Red Mickey rifle, if I can call it that, those two were apparently out that afternoon; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Whether there were other rifles or weapons from the Bogside creche, you simply cannot say?
4C-171 It is quite clear that Mr Tester did not know where the Bogside Section's weapons were on Bloody Sunday.
Q. And those that were in the Bogside would have been in what sort of places?
A. That I could not say, because that was up to the officer who was in charge down in the Bogside as to where he kept his weapons. 195
4C-172 He certainly was not in a position to deny the account given in PIN 437 of weapons being stored in a car in Glenfada Park.
On that account (PIN 437), if it was given and if it is true, a body of arms were removed from a car in which they had been stored in Glenfada Park. You, as I understand it, were not aware where the Bogside arms were kept on the day?
A. No, I was not. 196
4C-173 Indeed, he confirmed as accurate exactly that Sunday Times report which OIRA 1 had clearly told the Tribunal was "inaccurate":
Q. What you have just said is consistent with what you are recorded as telling Peter Pringle because what you are recorded as saying, is this: "There were to be no weapons in the Bogside except for those held by the Bogside Official Unit and those were to be kept in several safe dumps." That is obviously, is it not, a reference to the safe dumps in the Bogside that you have just been talking about?
A. Yes. 197
195 Day 414/029/19-23 196 Day 414/082/06-11
FS7 570
IV 174 Mr Tester's evidence makes it clear that the Bogside Section operated entirely outside his control and without his knowledge. He did not know where its weapons were kept and no report was made to him if its members opened fire, despite his role in issuing ammunition to the section. So much is evident from his complete ignorance of Mickey Doherty's firing in Barrack Street on Bloody Sunday.
Q. The position is: you did not know that this weapon had been issued at the time; is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. You did not know who had issued it?
A. No.
Q. You do not know where it came from?
A. No, I did not at the time.
Q. How does that come about, that a weapon under your overall responsibility is issued without your knowing that it has been issued or to whom it has been issued or from where it has been taken?
A. The only answer I can give you to that is the fact that, unlike the opposition, the British Army, I do not have a nice quartermaster's stores with weapon racks in it; I do not have a system of signing in and signing out. In other words, we are not quite perfect and things can happen without one's knowledge on occasions.
Q. If this weapon was issued, it must presumably at some stage have been returned, or do you not even know whether that happened?
A. The only thing I can say there is it must have been one of the Bogside unit's weapons, which I did not control directly.
Q. Is what you are referring to in this sentence, the rifle that must have been issued to Micky Doherty, who fired from the Barrack Street area at a soldier, hitting his flak jacket; is that what you are talking about in this sentence? A. I could not honestly say. I did not know about Micky Doherty having a weapon.
Q. You say that you only learnt in the course of this Inquiry that a weapon had been issued to a volunteer on observation duties at a location unknown to you. What was it that you learnt in the course of this Inquiry?
A. Precisely that.
Q. Is that from the evidence that has been given to the Inquiry or by something that somebody has told you whilst the Inquiry was going on?
A. I heard it in the evidence here.
Q. Which evidence are you referring to?
A. Oh, I do not know who it was, I have only been here a few times. If you want me to be quite accurate about it.
Q. I would?
A. Until comparatively recently I never knew of any shots being fired other than the one that was fired across William Street. I never knew there was anybody else with a weapon in the Bogside until comparatively recently, with all the publicity that this Inquiry has produced. I was always under the impression, because nobody ever actually told me different, I actually thought it was Micky Doherty who had fired the shot across William Street. I now know, of course, that it was not.
Nor can Mr Tester verify that all the Creggan Section's weapons were present
Q. All you can say is that the bulk of the weapons was in the back of the cars?
A. That is correct.
Q. Where was the Thompson (with a P)? A. The Thompson, I think, was in the boot of one of the cars.
Q. Do you remember? A. I am not certain. I mean, a whole load of weapons were put into the boots of the cars; I did not keep a list and I certainly cannot remember what the precise weapons were.(^{199})
Q. It follows, does it not, from the evidence you have given today that if it be the case -- and the Tribunal has heard evidence about this -- that OIRA 1, OIRA 4 and Red Mickey Doherty did fire on the day using IRA weapons, there was no account made to you by any of those individuals?
A. No.
Q. That is correct, is it?
A. That is correct.
Q. It further follows, does it, that no account was made to you in respect of any of those shootings by the OC of the Bogside or any quartermaster who might have been in place there?
A. That is correct.
Q. Should we understand the position to be this: that if the OC assigned, that is to say your OC, if you like --
A. Yes.
Q. -- assigned a volunteer to a particular task which required a weapon to be issued, that volunteer would come to you to be issued with the weapon and with the relevant ammunition that would go with it?
A. If he had been from Creggan in particular, that is correct. But as they -- I have already explained, the Bogside had their own supply of weapons down there, and ammunition, of course.
Q. Issued by you, as I understand it?
A. Issued from main stores by me to be cared for and used as and when necessary or when ordered, um, by the OC.
Q. But never accounted for to you?
A. But never accounted to me(^{200}).
(^{199}) Day 414/109/07-111/022
(^{200}) Day 414/151/16-152/20 Now that the Tribunal has been told something of the truth of weapons control or lack of it on Bloody Sunday, it can more easily assess the degree to which attempts to mislead have been made by other members of Official IRA. It is quite clear that, when OIRA3 said
"...my orders on the day were that the weapons were to be in the Creggan... I received no report from any other volunteer or Command Staff member suggesting that any weapon was unaccounted for or was not where I ordered it to be."
he was lying.
And when OIRA 1 categorically rejected the Sunday Times notes, suggesting that Bogside weapons were kept separately, he too was misleading the Tribunal.
**Gunmen in the Bogside on Bloody Sunday**
The Tribunal has been presented with repeated denials that there were any volunteers on active service in the Bogside on the day of Bloody Sunday.
OIRA witnesses initially made efforts to deny that there were any armed volunteers at all on active service on Bloody Sunday or a third weapon at large in addition to those fired by OIRAs 1 and 4. OIRA 3 said in his first statement that:
*I can confirm that there were no units on active duty during the day on Bloody Sunday.*
OIRA 1, a member of the Bogside Section, also categorically denied that his was active on the day:
**Q. Was there a Bogside unit or a section on duty on that day?**
**A. No.**
______________________________________________________________________
201 AOIRA3.10 paragraph 38 202 AOIRA3.2 paragraph 5 203 Day 395/124/23-25 OIRA 2, in his first statement, was also adamant that:
*I know that there were no operations planned or carried out in the Derry area on Bloody Sunday and can confirm that there were no active units operational on that day*.
*The only people with any form of weapon other than the .303 we put in the car were the army.*
The Tribunal now knows, however, that the rationale that there could not have been offensive action by gunmen in the Bogside because all the weapons were under the control of the Quartermaster, Mr Tester, is based upon evidence about weapons control that is patently false.
The Command Staff have also had to concede that there were gunmen in the Bogside because, but only because, it has emerged that at least OIRA 1, “Red” Mickey Doherty and Father Daly’s gunman fired on the day. OIRA 3, in his first statement, confined his admissions as to gunmen to OIRA 1 and OIRA 4:
*The only weapons which were outside of those areas have already been mentioned in this statement and were a .303 rifle and a handgun.*
By the time he came to give his second statement, however, this position was clearly unsustainable so that he had to change his evidence to account also for Mickey Doherty’s presence:
*There were only three OIRA units on active duty that day, one unit each in cars in relation to the expected incursions in the Creggan and Brandywell, and a third unit, a single volunteer, who was posted in a house somewhere in Bishop’s Gate.* The subsequent efforts of all OIRA witnesses to portray these three admitted gunmen as exceptions from a general "no weapons to be carried in the Bogside" rule are far from persuasive.
**Personal Protection Weapons**
OIRA witnesses have attempted to persuade the Tribunal that OIRA 4, far from being part of any operation of defence and retaliation on Bloody Sunday, was, out of habit yet uniquely amongst OIRA members, carrying a personal protection weapon on the march.
OIRA 4 told the Tribunal that he carried this weapon for his own protection only.
*Q. You say that you were carrying this as a personal protection weapon. From whom were you protecting yourself?*
*A. Well, it was the no-go area; I was protecting myself against possibly British soldiers or the RUC.*
Such an explanation must presumably include the intention of OIRA 4 to fire the weapon should soldiers enter the Bogside as it is difficult to see how otherwise he would protect himself "against British Soldiers or the RUC".
The Tribunal has also heard that all members of the Command Staff were authorised to carry such weapons. The Tribunal will recall the evidence of OIRA 2, OIRA 3, OIRA 5 and OIRA 4 to the effect that it was entirely normal and authorised for Command Staff members to carry shortarms for personal protection. OIRA 3 confirmed that there would have been no need for special
______________________________________________________________________
208 Day 394/011/16-20 209 Day 393/096/11-18 210 AOIRA3.24 paragraph 34 211 AOIRA5.21 paragraph 39.5 212 AOIRA5.5 paragraph 22 authorisation to do so on Bloody Sunday\\textsuperscript{213} and, indeed, OIRA4 has confirmed that he carried such a weapon on the day, as he did almost every day\\textsuperscript{214}.
It is for the Tribunal to consider whether it is persuaded that, while all Command Staff members were authorised to carry personal protection weapons on the march, only OIRA 4 felt it appropriate and necessary to do so. The Tribunal will recall that Mr Lawson questioned OIRA2, a Command Staff member, as to his alleged decision to go unarmed to collect a weapon from Columbcille Court on Bloody Sunday:
\\begin{quote} Q. So what was, and obviously recognised at the time, to be a dangerous operation?
A. That is correct.
Q. A member of the IRA at the time when carrying out a dangerous operation of a quasi military nature, what would you take with you?
A. Could you repeat the question, please.
Q. I will be blunt about it if it is not clear: what guns did you take with you?
A. We did not take any guns with us.
Q. Why not, you were embarking on a dangerous military operation to recover guns and if you had been stopped by the military, you could have been shot dead, you are saying you took no weapons at all, neither of you?
A. That is correct.
Q. What was going to happen if you had been stopped, were you simply going to surrender meekly?
A. I do not know.
Q. Had you thought about it?
A. No.\\textsuperscript{215} .... \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{213} AOIRA3.24 paragraph 34 \\textsuperscript{214} AOIRA4.15 paragraph 4 ... For the avoidance of doubt you were authorised to carry a handgun for your sole protection?
A. I was authorised but I did not carry a handgun.
Q. So was OIRA 1?
A. He did not carry a handgun either to the best of my knowledge
Q. He was authorised?
A. He would have been authorised, yes.
Q. As you have told us, despite the dangerous mission on which you were engaged neither of you chose to arm yourselves?
A. The only weapon in our control was the .303.
OIRA2 was certainly under the impression that at least two members of the Command Staff were carrying personal weapons on Bloody Sunday and told Mr Lawson that:
Q. Were you aware of no other gunmen, apart from what you later heard, about the man who came to be known as Father Daly's gunman. Let us put him to one side, he was mentioned at your evening debriefing; was he not?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Were you aware of no other gunmen that day?
A. I was aware that another member was carrying a sidearm for personal protection.
Q. Where was he?
A. I am not quite sure.
Q. Was he a member of the command staff?
A. He was a member of the command staff, yes.
Q. That is apart from OIRA 4 who apparently volunteers himself to be Father Daly's gunman? A. That is correct.
Q. So in addition to him, in addition to OIRA 4 there was another member of the command staff carrying a sidearm?
A. It may well have been the quartermaster.
Q. Mr Tester?
A. That is right.
Q. Anybody else?
A. Not as far as I am aware, no.
4C-190 It is apparent from his article in the Sunday Press on 6th February 1972 that Vincent Browne was told that more than one volunteer was armed on the march:
The Officials had an Active Service Unit of four men on duty. They were all either to be armed during the parade or to have immediate access to arms should they become necessary. In addition, a number of other volunteers in the parade were armed for their personal protection.
4C-191 Mr Browne no longer recalls the circumstances in which he obtained the information contained in this article but assumes he spoke to members of the Official IRA.
4C-192 The Tribunal will also need to consider whether, if there were indeed a plan to guard the Creggan and the acute shortage of weapons which OIRA witnesses allege, a member who was not on active duty would have been casually permitted to take one of the valuable, lethal weapons for no defined reason. OIRA 4 himself says that:
I didn't always carry it as it would only be available if not needed elsewhere.
217 Day 393/023/01-023/22 218 M8.2 219 Day 203/087/20-25 220 AOIRA4.15 paragraph 4 The circumstances in which he could carry a weapon were:
So long as everyone knew the weapon was in my possession and it wasn't needed anywhere else.(^{221})
OIRA 2 stated, in his first statement, that:
It was policy that if weapons were available, Command Staff could have one for personal protection.(^{222})
And yet OIRA 4 himself acknowledged that there was a shortage of weapons to defend the Creggan where, it was alleged, the Official IRA's efforts were to be concentrated:
There would have been no point in all the volunteers staying in the Creggan simply to protect it rather than going on the march because, as I have said, we simply didn't have the weapons for everyone to be armed.(^{223})
OIRA 6 made the point himself, saying:
If the Official IRA had been awash with weapons then people might have been able to get easy access to weapons. That simply wasn't the case. Weaponry was very limited in number and very few weapons worked. Weapons were therefore needed for patrolling and volunteers, like me, would simply not have been allowed to carry a personal weapon around with them.(^{224})
OIRA 6 was clear when questioned by Mr Lawson
Q. Weapons were needed, were they, for patrolling?
A. Yes, whatever weapons we had in the section, yes.
Q. So the few weapons that you had had to be reserved for those who were going on patrol?
A. Yes.
(^{221}) AOIRA4.15 paragraph 4 (^{222}) AOIRA2.17 paragraph 19 (^{223}) AOIRA4.16 paragraph 6 (^{224}) AOIRA6.7 paragraph 37 Q. Is that right? A. Yes, that is right.
Q. When you were not on patrol there would never be any question of you having a weapon, would there? A. No.
Q. If you were not on duty even more so, there would never be any question of you having a weapon; would there? A. That is correct.225
4C-198 OIRA 8 estimated the arsenal of the Creggan section as
We had a couple of .303s, a Thompson and a couple of handguns.226
And OIRA 3, the OC, confirmed that
As OC, I knew we had to have all our guns readily available to use in the area we might need them.227
4C-199 Why, in those circumstances, would OIRA 4 have been allowed to take a pistol for no operational reason at all?
4C-200 The evidence given as to the circumstances in which OIRA 4 was in possession of a handgun was entirely undermined by Mr Tester who apparently believed that only the OC would carry a weapon of this kind. In his first statement he had said, having seen a video of Father Daly’s gunman, that:
I can confirm that although the Commanding Officer had a pistol at the time, he would not have been on his own firing at soldiers as this gunman was.228
4C-201 He remained confident, in his second statement, that only the OC had been issued with a pistol on the day:
225 Day 413/177/08-20 226 AW14.15 paragraph 15 227 AOIRA3.17 paragraph 7 228 AT6.3 paragraph 17 The volunteers were not going on the march armed with the exception of the OC who would always have access to a pistol\\textsuperscript{229}.
I thought that the OC would have had the weapon and I did not know that someone else had it on the day. There was only one pistol and it is clear to me know, that the OC had given it to another person. At the time I assumed that he would have held it as he always did\\textsuperscript{230}.
Putting aside the fact that OIRA 3 had only had three days in which to establish the habit of “always” holding a pistol (he had only been OC for that length of time), it is clear from the evidence of OIRA 4 and OIRA 3 that the former had not simply borrowed the OC’s gun. Mr Tester was questioned about his evidence on this point by Mr Clarke:
\\textbf{Q.} The reason I am asking about this is because the man known as Father Daly’s gunman, who is OIRA 4, in his evidence to the Tribunal, says that the gun that he had was his own gun, he did not take the OC’s gun, he simply carried his own and, in his written evidence to the Tribunal -- he has not given oral evidence yet -- the OC accepts that there was a gun in the possession of another volunteer, which would seem to be OIRA 4, but he does not suggest that it was his gun. In those circumstances, can you be clear that the OC had given his pistol somebody else?
\\textbf{A.} If he says different, I cannot argue with that, can I?
\\textbf{Q.} I am not sure: are you conscious now that one of the guns that was out on the day was the OC’s own pistol?
\\textbf{A.} Well, he would certainly have initially carried it. If you say that somebody has already said that it was not his gun that he had, um, then I have to accept that. It means there is a pistol somewhere which, with the march of time, I cannot now account for\\textsuperscript{231}.
Mr Tester has now admitted that he had no idea that OIRA 4 was carrying a pistol on the march:
\\textsuperscript{229} AT6.9 paragraph 23 \\textsuperscript{230} AT6.13 paragraph 47 \\textsuperscript{231} Day 414/039/03-21 Q. Plainly unless you were being disingenuous there -- I am not suggesting you were -- you did not know at the time of OIRA 4 having volunteered that he was the gunman?
A. No, I did not.
Q. And you had no idea in the year 2000, as the ex-quartermaster of the Derry Official IRA, that OIRA 4 had had a gun that day?
A. No, I did not know.
Q. You did not learn of that until this Inquiry got going?
A. No, I did not.232
4C-204 He had previously suggested that he was in a position to say that there was only one pistol at large that day, and that that was with the OC. He had also said that, while he could not speak for the Bogside Section, all weapons issued in the Creggan would be dealt with by and accounted for to him. The misleading nature of such evidence is fully apparent from the fact that a Creggan Section member who was also a member of the Command Staff had a weapon on the day, of which Mr Tester knew nothing.
4C-205 The Tribunal should, therefore, not accept OIRA 4’s account of why he had a gun.
4C-206 Regardless of his reasons for carrying a weapon, OIRA 4 provided a clear demonstration of the lack of discipline within the Official IRA in opening fire in the manner in which he describes. OIRA 4 admitted:
I just lost my temper...I did it out of pure anger at what was happening around me233
I was just so angry and firing out of frustration234
4C-207 OIRA 4’s evidence was, of course, never tested in oral examination. Had we had the opportunity to do so, they would have probed with OIRA 4 the question of
232 Day 414/124/08-125/08 233 AOIRA4.17 paragraph 16 234 AOIRA4.18 paragraph 18 whether he was, indeed, the man known as “Father Daly’s gunman”, a fact of which the Tribunal cannot be entirely confident. Had his examination proceeded, OIRA 4 would also have been questioned as to where, if he was indeed Father Daly’s gunman, he then went, what he did and to whom he spoke. Given the attention which, on his own evidence, he had attracted to himself, it is surprising that no one admits to having seen him or his weapon after it was used in the limited circumstances claimed.
**Broken weapons**
4C-208 The Tribunal is also aware that there was, on any view of the evidence, another weapon present in the Bogside, the rifle fired by OIRA 1 from Columbcille Court. The Tribunal is asked by the Official IRA to believe that this was yet another exception to the “no weapons” rule, this time because the weapon was broken.
4C-209 OIRA 1’s admission that he fired this shot is a clear example of the Official IRA admitting only that which they are no longer in a position to deny before this Tribunal. The evidence of numerous civilians who knew that OIRA 1 had fired is set out in full in Chapter 6. The extent of knowledge of this shot amongst the Derry population is summed up by Paul Mahon who said when questioned by Mr Lawson that:
> A. Mr Lawson, let me put it this way: someone once said to me in this city, the dogs in the street knew that that shot had been fired.
4C-210 Whether this Tribunal would have learnt as much had there not been other, independent evidence of the shot is another matter. The Tribunal will recall the evidence of the highly respected Mr Barry of the Sunday Times Insight Team as to his experience in Derry:
> Q. You say that your experience up to that time was that nationalist sympathisers had a near genius for not mentioning the presence of
______________________________________________________________________
235 Day 412/163/17-19 the IRA when giving their versions of some event, and you initially met that in Derry?
A. Yes.
Certainly Mr Tester conceded when questioned by Mr Lawson, that civilians must have been complicit in concealing his, allegedly attempted, firing in the area of Rossville Street:
A. There was just a large crowd that was milling around the junction of Lecky Road and Rossville -- and Westland Street.
Q. But a large crowd of people who plainly saw that you were an IRA man with a weapon that day who could if they had wanted to obviously have come along to tell this Inquiry about that many months or years ago?
A. I suppose so.
The Official IRA were, however, faced with consistent and documented military evidence of incoming fire as well as the fact that OIRA 1 himself had spoken of his shot to both John Barry and Gerard Kemp.
While the fact that at least one shot was fired by OIRA 1 could not be denied, Mr Tester's evidence, given on Day 414, must establish conclusively that the account given by OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 of attending Columbille Court to collect a broken weapon was entirely spurious. He not only denied ever receiving a rifle with a defective sight for repair but also said that he would never encourage volunteers to move a weapon between the Bogside and the Creggan unless absolutely necessary. Indeed, OIRA 1 and 2's account had already been shown in the course of their oral examination to be incapable of belief, a matter addressed in Chapter 6 of these submissions.
236 Day 193/095/25 237 Day 414/141/17-24 238 PIN 437 239 L210 240 Day 414/129/11-25 241 Day 414/112/10-113/13 Nor should it be accepted that OIRA 1 fired in response to Army fire as it appears to be clear, from the evidence surrounding his shot (if indeed he fired only once) as set out in Chapter 6, that he fired prior to the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. Such a conclusion is unsurprising bearing in mind the Official IRA’s policy, examined in detail above, of attempting to pick off British soldiers whenever the opportunity arose.
The Tribunal should not, in our submission accept the account of OIRAs 1 and 2 that they fired only in response to Army firing. The Tribunal will nevertheless note that, even on the discredited account of OIRA 2, the policy of Defence and Retaliation was open to liberal application on Bloody Sunday.
Q. Your evidence is that you heard noise and a confrontation. You had no idea, did you, whether the soldier who you could see had fired any shots?
A. That is correct.
Q. And you actually had no idea whether anyone had fired any shots at all?
A. That is correct too.
Q. In those circumstances a shot at the Army by the Official IRA would surely not be a defensive shot?
A. Yes, but if you go further back up to the start of paragraph 11, I actually heard somebody shouting "Two boys have been shot" and I would have automatically assumed that the shooting would have come from the Army.
Q. And you had assumed what you had heard was right? A. And I assumed what I had heard was right, yes.
Q. Was just hearing that shouting from the crowd enough for you to break the very strict orders that there should be no firing at the Army?
A. Well, hearing the shouting from the crowd, I automatically assumed that shots had been fired, that first strike had happened and that the Army had engaged in the first strike. Q. And you felt that that entitled you to take action in defence or retaliation?
A. In a word: yes.242
4C-216 OIRA 2 has said that the OC was
perfectly comfortable that this action was within the policy of defence and retaliation.243
4C-217 Such a reaction is of course hardly surprising bearing in mind the true nature of the Defence and Retaliation policy which was to shoot any soldier who dared to be in Northern Ireland.
Red Mickey Doherty
4C-218 The Tribunal is also asked to believe that the incident of firing by “Red Mickey” Doherty was yet another exception to the rule that the Official IRA would not engage the Army on the day of Bloody Sunday. Unfortunately, the Tribunal has not had the benefit of the late Mr Doherty’s evidence, despite what is now known to have been his very close proximity to the very location of the oral hearings in Derry. This issue is relevant to, and touched upon in, a number of Chapters in this submission. It is, of course, particularly material to this section.
4C-219 The Tribunal will recall the way in which, on day 412, Paul Mahon called attention to the failure of any party to draw the attention of the Tribunal to Mr Doherty’s presence before his death. The absence of Mr Doherty from the witness box indeed appears to have provided some amusement to members of the Republican community such as Liam O’Comain who volunteered the following poem which he presumably felt reflected well on himself and would appeal, if not to the Tribunal, then at least to those in the Guildhall and elsewhere who shared his evident contempt for the Tribunal’s efforts to establish the truth about Bloody Sunday:
242 Day 392/077/13-078/12 With respect:
They sought him here. They sought him there, Saville sought him everywhere. Is he in Derry, Where does he dwell, That gentle giant, "Red Mickey?"
Some explanation of the efforts made to obtain a statement from Mr Doherty was provided by Mr O'Donovan on the last day of these hearings. He explained that Mr Canavan, his instructing solicitor, had made contact with Mr Doherty through one or more OIRA witnesses in Autumn 2002 and remained in contact with him from that time in an attempt to obtain his formal instructions.
Mr O'Donovan stated that the Tribunal, via its solicitor Mr Tate, was kept informed by Mr Canavan of the state of Mr Doherty's health and the efforts that were being made to involve him in the Tribunal process but that, apparently due to Mr Doherty's deteriorating health, it was not possible to obtain a witness statement from him before his death.
Since these submissions were prepared and circulated, the Inquiry has written to the Interested Parties setting out its knowledge of the steps taken to obtain evidence from Mr Doherty. It appears that the Inquiry had no direct contact with Mr Doherty at any time, although the importance of Mr Doherty's evidence was recognised at an early stage in the Inquiry.
The surprising absence of any evidence from Mr Doherty was raised before the Tribunal by Mr Glasgow on the 24th September 2003. It is, we submit, regrettable that the Tribunal did not obtain evidence from Mr Doherty, or at least provide any
243 AOIRA2.19 paragraph 28 244 Day 417/041/04-11 explanation as to its absence prior to Mr O'Donovan's statement on the very last day of the Tribunal sittings.
4C-225 Several OIRA witnesses have given thoroughly disingenuous evidence about Mr Doherty's presence as a sniper. OIRA 1 told the Tribunal:
Q. As far as you are aware, would it have been possible for a volunteer who was detailed to stay in the Creggan to have obtained a weapon and gone down to the Bogside?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. Because they would have been in cars with more than one person and not one person would have been allowed to get out, take one of them and walk away with it.(^{245})
4C-226 In fact, as a fellow member of the Bogside Section, OIRA 1 would have known full well that Mr Doherty had not obtained his weapon from the Creggan at all but from the cache kept by the Bogside Section themselves, which was outside Mr Tester's control.
4C-227 OIRA 5 attempted to create a new category of "close to the Bogside" weaponry in order to explain Mr Doherty's presence with a rifle.
A. How did he have a weapon?
Q. Yes.
A. He would have been -- he would have fallen outside the terms of reference for the recall of weapons in the Bogside; he was not in the Bogside.
Q. So Red Mickey Doherty was not in the Bogside?
A. Well, Barrack Street is not part of the Bogside.
Q. What part of the city is Barrack Street?
(^{245}) Day 395/052/12-19 A. It is towards Bishop Street.
Q. Into what part of the city does it fall, insofar as the administration areas of the IRA are concerned?
A. Well, it falls out on the, on the edge of an area probably known as the Bogside, but it is not actually part of the Bogside itself. It is an area -- well, it is very difficult for me to describe, other than it was not described -- it was not, in my view, it was not part of the Bogside.
Q. It was not part of the Bogside --
A. It was, it was outside of the area in which the march and meetings were to take place.
Q. Yes. So the collection of weapons from the Bogside and their removal to the Creggan involved, what, the collection of some of the weapons from the Bogside, but if you took a view that a particular street or area fell outside what one might precisely call the Bogside, that weapon was to be left in the hands of the volunteer?
A. In that particular instance it probably did.246
It is difficult to follow how such an explanation can possibly be reconciled with the OIRA evidence that weapons were recalled to the Creggan not because there was a need to remove them from the Bogside but because they were needed in the Creggan. Nor is it credible that, as OIRA 5 suggested when questioned by Mr Elias, Mr Doherty was the only exception to the general rule.
Q. How many other volunteers were left with weapons on the fringes of the Bogside, as you have put it, because they did not fall within the precise area?
A. I am certain that none other were, were covered by that.
Q. Just the one exception?
A. One exception.247
OIRA 1 said in his first statement that:
246 Day 393/201/21-202/22 I recall that that night there was a meeting of the command staff. I was at that meeting and I became aware at that meeting that one of the volunteers had been injured in an incident after the shooting had calmed down.\\textsuperscript{248}
In fact, he knew about and had seen Mr Doherty earlier in the day. His explanation, when questioned by Mr Lawson, for his failure to mention this in his earlier statement is far from convincing:
\\textbf{Q.} When were you first aware of that?
\\textbf{A.} When I was told by someone in the street that there was a person wounded in Vinny Coyle's house.
\\textbf{Q.} Who was it who told you that?
\\textbf{A.} I do not recall who it was.
\\textbf{Q.} Did you go to Vinny Coyle's house?
\\textbf{A.} Yes.
\\textbf{Q.} There is no reference then, is there, in this statement to your having gone to Vinny Coyle's house or seeing a wounded man there?
\\textbf{A.} No.
\\textbf{Q.} Something you were concealing?
\\textbf{A.} No, something I just had not thought about when I was making the statement; at the Eversheds interview, a lot of these details became a bit more clear in my mind.
\\textbf{Q.} Something you had not thought about when making this statement, that you had seen a member of the Official IRA wounded that day?
\\textbf{A.} I was asked to comment about this type of thing in my original statement, I said that at the meeting that night -- I think what I was saying was, that is when it became common knowledge or knowledge within the staff. I personally, and maybe I had
\\textsuperscript{247} Day 393/205/01-06 \\textsuperscript{248} AOIRA1.11 paragraph 38 overlooked it when I made this statement, had actually known about that earlier on in the day.(^{249})
4C-231 OIRA 2 admitted that the evidence he had given about weapons being collected in the Creggan was wholly undermined by Red Mickey’s presence:
Q. So as an observer, all weapons, as we understand it -- and you have given detailed evidence and other OIRA members are to come and give detailed evidence -- all weapons having been recalled and accounted for to the Creggan area, how was it that Red Mickey Doherty had a weapon to fire?
A. I have no idea how he had a weapon to fire.(^{250})
4C-232 OIRA 2 suggested that Mr Tester would be able to assist the Tribunal as to Mr Doherty’s posting on the day:
Q. Can you assist the Tribunal about this: from what you have told us, in the light of the questions that you have answered about this, I am not clear as to what role the command staff played. Can you help about this: if snipers were posted, would you, as a member of the command staff, necessarily have known?
A. Not necessarily.
Q. Who would have known?
A. I presume -- you would need to ask -- you are saying to me about somebody having a gun in a certain position, then I am sure you would need to ask the person who was in charge of the weapons whether or not this was true.
Q. So that would have been on the day, who?
A. Um, Mr Tester.
Q. Let me ask the question again, then -- Mr Tester would be able to tell us; would you, as a member of the command staff on the day -- whatever you may remember now -- would you have known on the day whether or not snipers, that is armed persons, were posted at various places in and around the city, or not?
(^{249}) Day 396/117/18-118/17
(^{250}) Day 393/124/09-15 A. Well, my answer to that, Mr Elias, is that I have no knowledge of such activities; I have no knowledge of such activities.
Mr Tester, in the event, claimed when he came to give evidence that he could not assist at all. Regarding Mr Doherty he said in his BSI statement that:
A weapon was issued to a volunteer who was on observation duties at a location then unknown to me.
In oral evidence it became clear that he was ignorant not only of Mr Doherty's location but of his very existence as a sniper on the day.
Q. Do I understand from that that you subsequently learnt what that location was?
A. No, it does not. It just means that I did not know it then and I do not know it now.
Q. Who had issued the weapon?
A. As far as I know, it must have been the OC himself.
Q. It was not you?
A. No.
Q. Do you know when the weapon was issued?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Or what exactly the observation duties were?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Why would somebody need a weapon for the purpose of observation duties?
A. You would have to ask the person who ordered him.
Q. What is the –
A. I cannot speak for him.
______________________________________________________________________
251 Day 393/124/21-125/18 252 AT6.8 Q. What is the basis of what is contained in this sentence. You say: "A weapon was issued to a volunteer who was on observation duties at a location then unknown to me." If it was not you who issued the weapon, how do you come to say what is set out in this sentence?
A. Do you mean how do I know about it?
Q. Yes?
A. I have since learned.
Q. From whom?
A. From talking to others.
Mr Tester then suggested that the only witness who could assist the Tribunal as to Mr Doherty's role on the day was the OC. The account which OIRA 3 now gives in his BSI statement, and on which he has not made himself available to be questioned, is that:
This volunteer had been placed in a house in Barrack Street as an active unit because of the possible incursion into the Creggan and Brandywell areas. He had heard shooting in the Bogside and didn't know what was going on and a Brit must have seen him and shot at him.
OIRA 3 entirely fails to mention that this gunman fired at soldiers and that, according to the evidence of Soldiers AA and AB, it was this incoming fire to which their shots were fired in response.
This military account was supported by the account given by the gunman himself to the Observer's Mary Holland to the effect that he was a member of OIRA and had been in an empty house on the corner of Cooke Street and Joyce Street with orders to cover Bishop Street. She reported in her article, published in the Observer on 6 February 1972, "How the IRA gained a sniper" that:
______________________________________________________________________
253 Day 414/041/11-042/13 254 AOIRA3.22 paragraph 25 ...He was wounded by a soldier returning fire from a house opposite after he himself had fired at a soldier in the street beneath. He thinks his bullet grazed the soldier's flak jacket, but did not injure him... He was hit in the thigh by one bullet and another ricocheted off a wall to graze the flesh of his eye.
4C-238 Bearing in mind Mr Tester's evidence, the Tribunal will question whether Mr Doherty was, in fact, acting under the command of the OC at all or had obtained his weapon and his orders from the OC of the Bogside Section, in respect of whose identity there has been a universal refusal on the part of OIRA witnesses to assist the Tribunal.
4C-239 Intelligence material suggests that the OC of the Bogside Section was Mr Doherty himself. John Barry of the Sunday Times Insight team recorded, in PIN 437, having been told by OIRA 1 that he himself was OC of the Bogside Section.
4C-240 Mr Tester claimed not to recall who was OC of the Bogside Section.
Q. I do not ask you to give a name, at least not publicly here, but are you in a position to tell the Tribunal who it would have been in 1972 in the Bogside that could account for which weapons were issued and which ammunition was subsequently accounted for?
A. Whoever was the, was the officer in charge or section leader, whichever it was, in charge of the Bogside unit.
Q. That individual could give us that information. Just answer this question yes or no: do you know who that person was?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Do you mean by that that you now cannot remember or you would not have known at the time?
A. I may well have known at the time, but I certainly cannot remember now. I spent the last 30 years trying to forget everything. When questioned by Mr Lawson, OIRA declined to assist:
Q. You will not help us to discover who was in charge of the Bogside that day? A. I certainly will not. Q. No? A. No. Q. That is against your principles, is it? A. Yes, well, I mean, I have been asked on a number of occasions, in other locations, I did not give it then, I do not intend to give it now.258 Q. Was it a member of command staff? A. I am not prepared to discuss it. Q. Will you be prepared to tell the Tribunal privately? A. No. Q. You appreciate the importance of the issue as to what was happening with the Bogside unit on the day of Bloody Sunday; do you not? A. No, actually I do not appreciate the significance. Q. You do not? A. No. Q. And you do not understand that anybody else might take the view that it would be interesting to discover what the Bogside unit of the Official IRA was doing — A. You have already discovered what they were doing. They were doing nothing, the weapons were in Creggan. Q. Because you tell us? A. Yes.
258 Day 395/170/02-15 Q. And we should take that –
A. And if someone else was to come and tell you the same thing, you could go through the same procedure, so I have no intention of taking it any further.
Q. That is a considered reaction, is it?
A. Yes.
Q. Under no circumstances will you assist in that regard?
A. Yes.259
4C-242 Once again the Tribunal is asked to accept that the Bogside unit of the Official IRA was “doing nothing” because “the weapons were in Creggan” an assertion which, following the evidence of Mr Tester, the Tribunal knows to be wholly false.
4C-243 The Tribunal should not accept that there were only three OIRA weapons present in the Bogside on Bloody Sunday, all of which were there for wholly exceptional reasons and all of which were fired. The OIRA witnesses have proved either unable or unwilling to assist the Tribunal as to the whereabouts of the Bogside unit’s weapons on the day. All that is known is that they were clearly never taken to the Creggan as claimed by many OIRA witnesses.
4C-244 Nor, it is suggested, is Mr Tester to be wholly relied upon as to his alleged control of the weapons belonging to the Creggan Section, because he apparently had no idea that a member of that section, OIRA 4, was armed on the day.
4C-245 Mr Tester has clearly been involved at various stages in efforts to conceal from the Tribunal the full extent of Official IRA activity on the day of Bloody Sunday. In his first statement signed in March 2000 he said:
On the morning of the march there were two weapons missing; the pistol which was carried by the OC at all times and a Sporting (cut down) .303 rifle260.
259 Day 395/171/06-172/03 By the time he gave his second statement, signed in November 2003, he had decided to change his evidence to say
*On Bloody Sunday I knew there were three weapons out*(^{61}).
*I rifle in the Bogside, I small calibre pistol and a rifle allocated to a volunteer*(^{62}).
Mr Tester declined to admit at that stage that he knew nothing about any weapons belonging to the Bogside Section and would not expect to.
It would also seem inconceivable that if, as is claimed, all firing was reported at a Command Staff meeting on the evening of Bloody Sunday, Reg Tester as Quartermaster and third in command would remain ignorant of all of the firing on the day. Certainly his initial claim to this Tribunal that
*Each volunteer had to account for each round of ammunition issued to him and god help him if he couldn't account for it*(^{63})
can now be seen to be entirely spurious.
The Tribunal may conclude that Mr Tester's claimed ignorance is disingenuous and an attempt to conceal his knowledge of the true extent of OIRA firing on the day, for Mr Tester appears, in talking to the press in the past, to have known far more of the firing which took place than he now admits. Certainly, he said of OIRA 1, in his interview with Peter Pringle at S34, that:
*Q. "This man had been in the immediate area when Donaghy and Johnston were shot. Being a member of the Bogside unit, he had access to a weapon and rushed to his position."*
Mr Tester also maintained, when questioned by Mr Lawson, to have been ignorant until very recently of the fact that Mr Doherty fired or suffered an injury.
(^{260}) AT6.2 paragraph 9 (^{261}) AT6.7 paragraph 12 (^{262}) AT6.10 paragraph 27 (^{263}) AT6.1 paragraph 4 Q. So if we have the whole of that page, it was conveniently the last page of the statement. On 26th March 2000, you were unaware, were you, of Red Mickey Doherty having been wounded on Bloody Sunday?
A. Yes.
Such a claim appears highly unlikely in view of the fact that the injuries to Red Mickey were well-publicised by Mr Tester's own OC in the immediate aftermath of the incident. Mr Tester appears to have been unaware of this publicity:
Q. Can we have XI.25.14 back on the screen. The transcription that is provided to this Inquiry and is being used ends with the words "as a consequence," as we have just heard what OIRA 3 said was: "As a consequence a volunteer of the Official Irish Republican Army was wounded in the leg and the neck"; you heard that, as everybody here did?
A. Yes.
Q. Plainly, as you would now recognise, a reference to the injury or injuries suffered by Red Mickey Doherty?
A. Yes.
Q. Being spoken of on the night of Bloody Sunday by your OC, OIRA 3?
A. Yes.
Q. How recently was it that you appreciated that Red Mickey Doherty had been injured on Bloody Sunday?
A. It would have been some time over the past few years. When exactly, I am afraid, I do not recall.
Q. We are talking of recently?
A. Since I started reading the evidence being given here.
Q. Since the setting up of this Inquiry?
A. Yes. Q. So for the best part of 30 years preceding that, you had remained completely ignorant –
A. Yes.
Q. -- of Red Mickey Doherty having been injured, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that when you first became aware or thought you were aware that Red Mickey Doherty had fired a shot on Bloody Sunday, also when the Inquiry was set up?
A. I think I heard about that a little bit earlier.
Q. That will do. So a little earlier than the setting up of this Inquiry?
A. Oh, yes, much earlier, years ago.
Q. Years ago, but not immediately after Bloody Sunday?
A. No.
Q. No, quite a long while after Bloody Sunday?
A. Yes.
Q. I will not ask you to put a period on it. You in fact then for many years were under the misapprehension that Red Mickey had fired the shot across Rossville Street?
A. I was.
Q. You were only disabused of that shortly before coming here to give evidence, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Despite being a member of the collective decision-making command staff body, you tell us you knew nothing at all about Red Mickey or the other shooting that had gone on on Bloody Sunday until recently?
A. Strange though that may seem, that is correct.(^{265})
(^{265}) Day 414/102/25-104/24 And yet the “staff officer” interviewed by Peter Pringle in 1972, who Mr Pringle confirmed was Reg Tester\\textsuperscript{266}, appeared by that time to know all about the firing in Barrack Street. Mr Pringle’s notes record that:
\\textit{An official fired and was wounded in the leg elsewhere near somewhere near Bishop Street early in the march. This is almost certainly Mary Holland’s man. We are getting more details\\textsuperscript{267}.}
4C-252 Whatever the circumstances in which “Red Mickey” fired, it seems he was not the only one to have done so as the OC has said in the statement he presented to this Tribunal that:
\\textit{I am aware of some incidents which occurred between the end of the military shooting and the arrest operation and the Command Staff meeting at which it was determined that there would be no further action. In one of those incidents I am aware that a volunteer was injured...} \\textsuperscript{268}
What were the others?
**OIRA Gunmen on Bloody Sunday**
4C-253 The OIRA evidence is a concerted attempt to suggest that these three individuals were entirely exceptional amongst members of the Official IRA in being armed on Bloody Sunday.
4C-254 Indeed it is clear that the existence of these three gunmen has been acknowledged by the OIRA witnesses only once it became clear that their presence and actions could not realistically be denied. In fact there is persuasive evidence that there were others on active service in the Bogside and the Tribunal may well conclude that they were part of a concerted effort to apply the Defence and Retaliation policy by shooting British soldiers.
\\textsuperscript{266} Day 191/112/15-19 \\textsuperscript{267} S37 \\textsuperscript{268} AOIRA3.7 paragraph 27 Certainly the existence of OIRA active service units became known to the Press shortly after Bloody Sunday.
The Observer galley proofs include extracts from an interview with the acting OC of the Officials who explained that there were at least two marksmen on duty on Bloody Sunday. OIRA 3 claims not to recall talking to anyone at the Observer but does not deny doing so.
According to the acting OC quoted by the Observer:
"First you must understand that we do not look on a riot situation as any great opportunity for us. We cannot use the weapon because it would be too dangerous, only a madman would be prepared to start a shoot-out in an area crowded with people. Our policy is to have marksmen stationed so that they can, if it looks promising, use the situation when a riot is over. We know the pattern here. The riots start in the afternoons and in the winter they usually end when darkness falls. It gets cold and people start drifting away for their tea.
On Sunday most of the members were taking part in the march and were unarmed. We had two marksmen on duty, but with strict instructions not to use their weapons until the area was clear of civilians. One was covering Rossville Street from the corner of William Street and Rossville Street. Another was in the Little Diamond covering William Street.
The marksmen were armed with rifles and there were sub-machine-guns in the cars."
Vincent Browne had also been told of OIRA units on active service
The Officials had an Active Service Unit of four men on duty. They were all either to be armed during the parade or to have immediate access to arms should they become necessary. In addition, a number of other volunteers in the parade were armed for their personal protection. ....
... There have been reports that all IRA arms in the area had been moved out before the march to ensure that there would be no There are a number of civilian witnesses who corroborate press reports of Official IRA activity in the area which are now denied. The Tribunal will recall that the account given to the Observer by the acting OC of the Officials referred to two Official IRA marksmen, one of whom was stationed in Little Diamond in order to cover William Street.
David Tereshchuk reported hearing a single, isolated rifle shot fired at about 1600. His evidence to the Widgery Tribunal was that the shot had emanated from the direction of the Little Diamond.
The same shot appears to have been heard by Simon Winchester who was near the City Cabs office at the time. He reported that:
*When I was in William Street standing by the City Radio Cabs office, I heard a single shot which I thought came from the direction of the Little Diamond.*
Stephen McGonagle gave a detailed description in his BSI statement of a man with a pistol or revolver standing slightly south of the junction of Rossville Street and William Street apparently lying in wait for soldiers, but disarmed before they arrived. Such a location of course fits exactly with that of the other “marksman”... referred to by the acting Official IRA OC who spoke to the Observer, although he is reported as saying that they were armed with rifles. Mr McGonagle said:
I could see a young man of about seventeen or eighteen walking around this area. This young man was wearing a gabardine raincoat which I remember thinking was strange as it was a fair day and not raining. I saw the young man put his hand into the left pocket of his coat and pull out either a pistol or a revolver. He held this in his left hand pointing towards the ground. The young man was walking around as if he was looking for a vantage point from which to open fire.
That there was, indeed, at least one gunman actively stationed in Rossville Street was confirmed by Reg Tester in an interview he gave to Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson:
We fired only one shot in the area and that was after the Army had finished shooting. A soldier went into the street by himself and our man covering Rossville Street thought he could get him. "He fired one shot and then realised it would be dangerous to go on because, although the immediate street was clear, people were huddled in doorways and running to safety whenever the firing stopped.
Vincent Browne reported in an article published in The Sunday Press on 6 February 1972 an account of firing by an OIRA gunman with a short arm in William Street:
When the second volley of British gunfire occurred, the four members of the Active Service Unit were immediately alerted. Two of them had, in fact, to return to a maisonette in the Bogside to collect a couple of rifles.....
Meanwhile, the two other members of the unit moved into what they described as sniping positions but what in fact were only street corners. Both of these were armed only with short arms, .38 revolvers. After the second burst of Army gunfire, the Officials took up positions and one shot was fired by one of the men with the short arms at a soldier in William Street, but it missed. No other shot was
276 ED 24.9 277 AM253.5 paragraph 25-26 fired then by anybody until the actual murderous assault on the Bogside by the paratroopers.278
4C-265 Clearly, this was not a reference to OIRA 1’s firing but to an additional OIRA gunman firing with a pistol in the William Street area. Such a man was seen by David Capper who said in his BSI statement that:
I then saw a short man of about 30 to 40 years of age wearing, I think, a brown overcoat, fire one round from a pistol toward some soldiers who were in a derelict building near the Presbyterian Church on the other side of William Street. After the pistol was fired the man placed the pistol into his coat pocket and ran off. I cannot remember in which direction he ran. The assembled crowd scattered as soon as the shot was fired and I went back to the junction of Rossville Street and William Street (Grid Reference N9) to observe the riot down by barrier 14.279
4C-266 Mr Capper expanded in his evidence to this Tribunal:
Q. Did you actually see the man fire?
A. No, I did not see him fire. I heard the bang, looked round and I could see him put a handgun into the coat and then blend into the crowd, he was -- it all happened very, very quickly and I could not have identified him, so that is why, in the initial one I said I did not see anybody.
Q. You say that he appeared to fire one round from a pistol towards soldiers who were in a derelict building near the Presbyterian Church; are you able to tell us which building that was?
A. No, um, just one of the derelict buildings in that area.
Q. Do you know whether –
A. Sorry, I did not see him point, um, I just heard the bang and looked round and he was putting it back in his coat, but he was facing out in that general direction (indicating).
Q. When you say "facing out in that general direction", towards the north, towards where the Presbyterian Church was?
278 L171 279 M9.1 paragraph 5 A. Yeah.
4C-267 Explaining why he failed to tell the Widgery Tribunal that he had actually seen this man, he said
Q. You have told this Tribunal that in fact you could identify a gunman who appeared to be in his 30s or his 40s wearing a brown coat and carrying a small pistol. Can you recollect which is the case –
A. Oh, I did see somebody definitely and I saw the guy who had fired the shot, but at that time giving evidence it was, how can I put it, diplomatic not to say that you had identified or -- because you would have been in the position then of maybe attending identification parades and in the light of subsequent events, the firing of that one shot became pretty irrelevant.
Q. Mr Capper, you do not feel any such embarrassment in front of this Tribunal?
A. No.
4C-268 Derek Humphrey, a staff reporter for the Sunday Times, had also heard of a shot fired with a short arm in William Street.
"...An Official IRA man told us that he had fired a pistol shot at soldiers stationed in a derelict building on the N side of William St near the GPO building. This shot, however, was only fired in response, we were told, to the Army shooting Damien Donaghy from the roof of the GPO building itself. We were also told that the pistol shot was followed by John Johnson being hit by an Army shot also coming from the roof of the GPO building as he went to Donaghy's assistance.
4C-269 Mr Humphrey said, when questioned by Christopher Clarke QC, that he had verified this account with the gunman himself.
Q. You spoke to this man yourself, did you?
A. Yes. Q. Not through an intermediary, you actually saw him? A. No.
Q. Did he describe where he was at the time when he fired this shot? A. I cannot recall, sir.
Q. What was described as a pistol shot, was it? A. Definitely, yes.
Q. One only or more than one? A. One, one shot from one pistol.283
And Philip Jacobson and Peter Pringle were told of it in an interview conducted on 3 February 1972 with a senior member of the Official IRA who, they told this Tribunal, was Mr Tester284.
We have established beyond doubt that a member of the Official IRA fired a single shot from a .45 pistol at an army sniper on the roof of the post office sorting building on Wm St... The Ira man was in a burnt out house on the corner of William St and Rossville Street. He believes he hit the soldier but we have been unable to confirm this from the Army. The range, almost 100 yards, was extreme for an accurate pistol shot285.
Mr Tester claims now not to recall this interview:
Q. Do you recall giving an account of this shot across William Street, if I can put it neutrally, to journalists shortly after Bloody Sunday? A. No, I do not.
Q. Did you ever understand that the shot that went across William Street was from a pistol?
283 Day 217/159/025-160/010 284 Day 191/111/23 285 ED20.30-31 A. I have never heard that claim.
4C-272 Thomas Mullarky also reported in 1972 hearing a shot fired from a revolver while he was in William Street.
I estimate 4 to 5 shots were fired at this time. A little later I heard a single shot, loud, a revolver I thought, but could not place where it came from.
4C-273 Mr Mullarkey confirmed to this Tribunal that, while he did not recall this now, the account he gave at the time would have been correct.
4C-274 Chris Myant, a journalist then working for the Morning Star who assisted with the taking of NICRA statements, said in his BSI statement that:
One young woman among those coming to give statements, said to me that she was sure that somebody had fired a hand gun in William St. She was very young, about 18 yrs old. I asked if she was absolutely sure and she said she wasn’t sure when it had been but she was sure what she had seen. She didn’t want to say any more about it and didn’t want to make a formal statement. I couldn’t figure out whether she was frightened about what would happen to her if she spoke or whether she was hysterical and got it wrong – I felt at the time it was the latter. Nobody else mentioned this... I do not recall the woman’s name...
4C-275 Mr Myant did not, of course, know, at the time he formed his view of this young woman’s evidence, that her sighting of a man with a pistol in William Street was, in fact, corroborated by a number of other witnesses.
4C-276 PIN437, a note of an interview which John Barry has said he conducted with OIRA 1, also refers to an additional OIRA gunman firing in Sector 1. This man:
Ran up to what OIRA1 swears was the northwest corner of Glenfada, that is the corner towards Wm St and furthest from the
286 Day 414/036/10-16 287 AM452.2 288 Day 069/057-058 289 M91.4 paragraph13 flats. OIRA1 says he got up on a balcony — on the front of C. Court, he said the bloke told him later, — and got in a couple of shots with the .22 automatic.
Further reference was made to this shooting in interview with Gerard Kemp, which he again attributed to OIRA 1:
'One guy got on to a balcony and fired at the Paras'.
Sector 2
OIRA 4 has admitted that a pistol was fired from the gable end of Chamberlain Street. The fact that one of the OIRAs fired here is, of course, something which even the Official IRA could hardly deny in the face of the evidence of Father Daly and the one surviving photograph of this gunman. The Tribunal will, of course, be concerned as to what happened to the others.
The various and contradictory accounts of civilian witnesses as to when this man fired are examined in Chapter 7D of these submissions. No doubt the Tribunal will consider whether in fact there was more than one pistol man operating in this area.
Certainly, the Sunday Times Insight team considered this to be a possibility, reporting that:
"One and possibly two IRA gunmen were in fact operating in the car park. But the Army never saw the first gunman ..."
While Peter Pringle could not now recall the basis for such a suggestion, he confirmed that, for the Sunday Times to record their conclusions in this way, they themselves had had to be satisfied that there was sufficient evidence so to do. He explained in this exchange with Edwin Glasgow Q.C.
I should say that it ought to be clear from this article that we are being as scrupulously fair as we could have been to the question of what the IRA did on this day. Therefore, if there is a possibility that there was a second gunman, either identified by eyewitnesses or heard as a low velocity shot, then we have included it in our final article, in order to be as objective as possible.
Q. Would that too, sir, have to pass the rule of thumb test: that it must have been corroborated by at least one person, or might it have just depended on one account?
A. In principle it would have passed that test.
The Tribunal may also wish to compare the various descriptions of “Father Daly’s Gunman” given by civilian witnesses. The descriptions given by, for example, Robert Brady, Geread Greeve, Bernard Gilmore and Father Daly himself are hardly consistent and OIRA 4’s claim that he was a man who usually wore glasses but did not do so on Bloody Sunday out of “vanity” must be highly suspicious.
The Tribunal will, therefore, have to consider whether there was in fact more than one Official IRA pistol man in the area of the Rossville Flats car park, evidence as to which the OIRA witnesses, principally OIRA 4, have preferred to accept as all referring to “Father Daly’s Gunman”, no matter what the discrepancies in such evidence. The discrepancies should be borne in mind when considering the claim that, of all members of the Official IRA Command Staff, only OIRA 4 was armed with a personal protection weapon on the day. The Tribunal should consider, in particular, the role of OIRA 3 who was of course the man Reg Tester believed to be carrying a short arm on the day and who was also in the vicinity of the Rossville Flats car park.
Sector 3
There is also evidence of an additional Official IRA gunman firing from the door to the Rossville Flats. Soldier U spoke, in his second RMP statement, of seeing a pistol fired from the doors of the flat, the round ricocheting off of the rubble barricade to hit Alexander Nash. Soldier U repeated this account in his BSI statement.
The circumstances surrounding this incident are examined in full in Chapter 8A of these submissions as is the evidence of Kieran Gill that the gunman who fired in this way was a member of the Official IRA.
Mr. Gill worked for the Derry Journal at the time of Bloody Sunday and also became involved in assisting the Sunday Times Insight Team in their investigations. In his first BSI statement he said that:
I received information from PIRA that a member of the Official IRA on Bloody Sunday had a revolver and had fired it. I was told his name and we found his address. Peter Pringle and I went to his home and knocked on his door and he answered it. He recognised both of us. We told him that the Provos had said that he had fired a revolver on Bloody Sunday. I said something like “So you shot Mr Nash!” The man looked horrified. He admitted that he had fired a revolver around a door of the Rossville Street flats. He said that he had fired the revolver after the army had fired between 100-150 rounds and there was a lull in the shooting. There were people lying outside in front of the flats dead and there was a feeling in the flats that the soldiers were coming towards there and that people were frightened that they were going to come into the flats and continue to shoot... The man said that he had put his hand around the door and fired the revolver up Rossville Street to make them stay away. He said that he fired 3-4 shots. We said to him that he might have shot Mr Nash in the arm.
Mr. Gill confirmed this account both in oral evidence to the Tribunal and in a further statement, which he gave after contacting the OIRA gunman. The gunman refused to come forward and now denied any involvement in the shooting:
I showed my source... paragraph 59 of my statement. My source’s reaction was to say that he had no recollection of the conversation. He also denied having shot a revolver at the door of the Rossville Street flats. Despite these comments I still believe that the account which I gave in my statement is correct.
OIRA1 has admitted that he was the man whom Kieran Gill approached in this way but insists that Mr Gill is a liar and that the contact which Mr Gill had with him in 1972 as well as the incident itself are fictitious. It is wholly unclear as to why Mr Gill should ever have taken what would, quite obviously, have been an exceedingly dangerous risk of telling what would have been provocative lies in 1972, let alone why he should persist with them today.
The Tribunal should not in our submission accept that Mr Gill either lied or gave anything other than an accurate report of these matters, not least as Alexander Nash’s own son, John Nash, told Jimmy McGovern about a man who was apparently resident in Dublin and who had admitted shooting his father:
...my father has been telling me for the last twenty seven years that he was shot by a soldier... but then you have... some other fucking eejit and I actually went down to the Republic of Ireland. I went into a Sinn Fein office and apparently this is only a few years back way this guy says that he is the person responsible for shooting me Da...
...The argument is that he, he is just ...well the argument is that he just stuck he’s hand out the door and he fired you know what I mean well ... this is... a soldiers statement... you know what I mean and I do not believe that statement... you know what I mean because I you know there is nobody dis... because if the points his hand out the door and there is quite a number of people at that door as you can see... you know what I mean like... and I know some of the people that are......the likes of Jimmy Green ... people like that there... who are there standing at the door... and he said now they never seen no gunman at that point.
This information was not given in John Nash’s initial BSI statement. A further statement was, therefore, taken from him and he was recalled to give oral
______________________________________________________________________
300 M105.29 paragraph 14 301 Day 395/148/21-22 302 Day 395/149-150 evidence. He was asked about the McGovern transcript by Bilal Rawat for the Tribunal:
Q. Reading it alone by itself, what you appeared to have told Mr McGovern was that you went to confront someone who claimed to have shot your father, a civilian who claimed to have shot your father and so whose name was known to you; do you follow?
A. Yes.
Q. But your evidence is that that is not the position at all?
A. That is absolutely not the case. You know, had I have ever known of any -- the name of any individual who would have made such a statement as that, the first people to know that name would be the Inquiry. I have done absolutely nothing over the last six years but do my best and my utmost best to assist this Inquiry. If I have given the impression that I actually knew the name of this gunman, then I have given, in this particular interview, I have given a wrong impression and I apologise for that.
Q. Because it seems to be the impression that Mr McGovern had because he then asks you, he says:
"It is strange for a Sinn Fein man to say 'It was I who shot him' because he must have been an idiot" and you do not appear to have corrected him at that point.
Were you surprised when you saw this transcript again and saw what Mr McGovern's impression had been?
A. I have a -- I have never actually seen this particular part of the transcript.
Q. This particular page?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. It is attached to your supplementary statement?
A. Yes, I did not read it.
Q. Was there any reason why you chose not to read it? A. No, not really.
Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobsen also recorded, in their notes of an interview with Mr Tester on 15 March 1972, his own account of firing an M1 from the balcony of a flat in the area of Westland Street at a soldier standing by the lead pig in Rossville Street. Their notes record that:
When the M1 man arrived on the balcony, people were looking out of their front doors which are not in the line of return fire. The Official fired one shot at a Para standing beside the lead Pig that had drawn up a little way beyond the barricade outside the Rossville Flats entrance. He does not think he hit the man, who did not react at all; the M1 then jammed.
Mr Tester admitted in his evidence to this Tribunal that he did indeed attempt to fire such a shot but that his rifle jammed before he was able to do so:
I can only repeat, my recollection is that the rifle jammed when I attempted to fire it and I did not get off a shot; that is my recollection.
Q. Is it possible that with the passage of the years your recollection is faulty?
A. Quite possible.
Q. You know Peter Pringle, you describe him as a friend; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. He is not a man who is likely to invent something, is he?
A. No, I do not think so.
Q. Putting it broadly, is it possible that, understandably, your memory has played you false and that this account, which must have come from you, because you are the only man with an M1 carbine in this location at this stage, is it possible that this account, written down within about six weeks of the events, is accurate? Moreover, both the Sunday Times notes and a civilian witness Seamus Duffy bear witness to there being other armed men with Mr Tester. The Sunday Times notes record that:
_The other two both carried .303 Lee Enfield Number 4 rifles._
Mr Duffy said in his BSI statement that:
_I thought all the shooting had been coming from Rossville Street and so it would be safe at the Bogside Inn. Ivan Cooper, our local MP was huddling people against a wall in the courtyard. As I came into the courtyard I saw three boys who I believe were members of the Official IRA. I knew one of them who was called Tester. I could see that he had a long rifle which he kept down his over-trousers. I could see the butt of the rifle in his right armpit. One of the other boys had a cream jerkin on and I am sure that he also had a gun or something like that under his jacket. The third boy did not seem to have any weapons on him. The other two boys with Tester were younger than him._
Mr Tester has denied being with others who were armed.
Sector 4
There is considerable evidence of Official IRA activity in the Glenfada Park area which is fully examined in Chapter 9 of these submissions but which has again been denied by the OIRA witnesses.
The Tribunal will recall the information passed to John Barry by, he believes, OIRA 1 which included reference to additional Official IRA firing. The authenticity of Mr Barry’s interview notes is examined in Chapter 9 of these submissions. They included a reference to the fact that
OIRA1 says he knows that a man from the Creggan Section of the Officials got in a couple of shots in the car park from a .38 pistol.(^{312})
It may be that such reference is to the admitted actions of Father Daly’s gunman in the car park of the Rossville Flats, although, if he was OIRA4, his own evidence is that he was armed with a .32 pistol.(^{313})
The Tribunal will have noted, however, the reference in Mr Kemp’s article L210, the product, it is claimed, of a further interview with OIRA1, to the fact that:
A second OIRA gunman fired with the pistol.
This reference to firing with the pistol certainly appears to refer back to the preceding quote from OIRA1 “I told some of the boys to get their weapons out of their cars”. The Tribunal may well conclude OIRA1, is in fact, referring to a pistol being fired in the area, having been retrieved from one of the cars in Glenfada Park.
The Tribunal has also seen the notes of an interview conducted by John Barry with Ivan Cooper in which Mr Barry records Mr Cooper as referring to another Official IRA gunman, OIRA 6, operating in Glenfada Park.
IC [Ivan Cooper] had seen the Officials in the march, but nowhere else. And IC only heard later that OIRA 6 had fired a revolver in Glenfada Park. IC told Ivan Cooper that OIRA 6 had been running around mad with a pistol all afternoon says that he fired very, very early.(^{314}).
Mr Cooper has denied giving this information to Mr Barry, although there would appear to be no other source from which Mr Barry is likely to have received the name of OIRA 6. Indeed, it is not clear from where Mr Cooper would have
(^{312}) AOIRA1.1 (^{313}) AOIRA4.15 paragraph 4 received OIRA 6's name if not via an intermediary such as Mr CIV2 as OIRA 6 claims that he did not in fact know Mr Cooper315.
Whether OIRA 6's claim to know nothing of CIV2, the alleged original source of the information, is credible, bearing in mind Mr CIV2's own estimation of himself as a prominent citizen of Derry, is a matter for the Tribunal which will recall the questioning of OIRA 6 by Mr Lawson on this point.
Q. Did you know of CIV2? A. I have never heard of the man.
Q. Someone who, according to him, ran a substantial business in Derry? A. CIV2 (Witness shaking head) No.
Q. Ran a business called Derry Office Supplies until 1971, when he sold or transferred it. Does that ring any bells? A. No, I never heard of that at all, to be quite honest with you.
Q. And then was involved in the selling of ice-cream machines and cash registers from Donegal, but still coming to Derry? A. No.
Q. You had never heard of him? A. Never heard of him.
Q. In this very, very small place? A. That is true316.
Certainly, OIRA 6's account of his activity on the day is extremely odd as highlighted by Mr Lawson's questioning of him on Day 413 of evidence:
314 KC12.71 315 Day 413/163 316 Day 413/197/04-21 Q. You have virtually no recollection of what happened during the main part of the violence on Bloody Sunday, have you? A. No, I have not.
Q. Is it right that while you were sitting on the wall having your cigarette and you became aware of people running away down Rossville Street, that as far as you were concerned there was nothing unusual going on at that time? A. No, that is correct.
Q. You did not hear any vehicles? A. No.
Q. You did not see any Army vehicles? A. No, I did not, I was out of view.
Q. You did not hear a single shot fired? A. I heard banging all right, but I took it for granted it was rubber bullets or gas.
Q. Do you have any recollection of hearing any shooting of live rounds on the day? A. No, only what I heard people shouting.
Q. None at all? A. No.
Q. And you being somebody who was not only in the Official IRA, but someone with particular knowledge about weaponry, you, of course, would recognise the sound of live rounds being fired; would you not? A. Probably, probably so, yes. I was not paying any particular attention to anything going on.
Q. You were not paying particular attention? A. No, I was just sitting there having a cigarette.
Q. And you clearly remember sitting there having a cigarette, do you? A. Yes.
Q. But you have no recollection whatever of hearing a single live round fired? A. What is the problem there? I was not paying any attention. Q. Is that true?
I was not paying any attention.
Q. Is that the truth?
A. Probably so.(^{317})
4C-306 OIRA 6 was not keen to come forward to defend himself against the allegation included in the Sunday Times notes. The Tribunal will recall that OIRA 6’s name was first mentioned by Mr Clarke in opening on Day 7 of the hearing, on 5th April 2000.(^{318}) He has claimed that he first heard of this, and received papers from the Inquiry, approximately 18 months before he came to give evidence.(^{319}) He did not, however, agree to assist the Tribunal until a month or two before he gave evidence, more than three and a half years after his name was first mentioned as that of an OIRA gunman.
4C-307 Most extensive is the information given to both John Barry and Gerard Kemp by OIRA 1 as to the movement of rifles in Glenfada Park. The Tribunal has now been presented with considerable evidence to suggest that there were OIRA gunmen in Glenfada Park who were very likely to have provoked the fire which killed at least some of the dead and injured in Sector 4, including Jim Wray. The topic is fully examined in Chapter 9 of these submissions.
Sector 5
4C-308 The Sunday Times notes, authenticated by an Official IRA staff officer, who Peter Pringle confirms was Reg Tester,(^{321}) state that there was additional firing by an OIRA gunman in Sector 5.
(^{317}) Day 413/189/20-191/10 (^{318}) Day 007/060/07 (^{319}) Day 413/195/16 (^{320}) Day 413/196/15 (^{321}) Day 191/112/15-19 An Official fired two .32 pistol shots from the lane behind Joseph Place up at the Walker OP. It was hopelessly out of range but the man was infuriated and frustrated; it was also risky since he was in full view of the walls and the lane was crowded with panicky people.
Whether this firing is likely to represent an additional OIRA gunman or further firing by one of those gunmen who were active in Sector 2 is unclear. Mr Tester claims not to recall anything of this incident or of giving the information to Peter Pringle:
Does that bring back any memories?
A. None whatsoever.
OIRA 3 denied, in his BSI statement, that this account could be correct as:
I would know exactly what weaponry everybody had and what was in their magazine. I would check the ammunition when the weapon came back, so not only would the volunteer tell me if they had fired when they returned from active duty, but I would know by checking their ammunition as well.
Quite how OIRA 3 could reconcile this story of strict control with his earlier assertion that he would not know (or apparently care) if his men had "had a blatter" late in the afternoon is far from clear.
The Official IRA has always publicly denied its part in the events of Bloody Sunday.
On the evening of 30th January itself, an OIRA officer gave a press conference giving an entirely misleading picture of OIRA activity on the day. Reporters and
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322 S37 323 Day 414/064/16-17 324 AOIRA3.32 paragraph 56.28 325 AOIRA3.26 paragraph 42 photographers were summoned from a hotel in the city and taken to a conference where they were told:
...The officer claimed that the IRA official wing had at no time fired shots in the immediate vicinity of the area where the deaths occurred....
...He could not speak for the Provisionals but to the best of his knowledge there was no shooting at all against the Army in the William Street/Rossville Flats area.
...The officer, who was not named, agreed that there had been certain "military activity" on the part of the officials outside the immediate district and during an exchange with troops one volunteer received leg and neck injuries.
Members of the Official IRA had taken part in the march 'as private citizens', he said but none had been armed.
...Shortly afterwards members of the IRA had decided not to use arms in the immediate area because this would have given the Army an excuse for more shooting, said the officer.
OIRA 3 also gave a televised interview in the immediate aftermath of the march. Video 25, transcript 9 records an RTE interview with an OIRA man on 30.1.72.
15:56 Can you tell us what happened?
15:58 Well, today the official IRA, first of all I would like to give you the attitude of the official IRA on the civil rights association demonstration here today. Official IRA policy was that all guns were called to a centralised point we had absolutely no intentions of using guns because... Like we could never see the murder that has happened today with the British Army. We were in complete support of the mass demonstration as we always have been official [INAUDIBLE] Members of our organisation participated in march, unarmed as citizens protesting against internment.
...The official IRA again, when the British Army forced the people into Rossville Street, were not armed. The members of the official IRA assembled at a central point, we decided that we would not use guns in the vicinity of the riot area, where the riot was taking place and where the British Army was shooting indiscriminately because we knew if we did shoot the British Army would shoot even more people down. What we did do was, we took our units and sections in the Derry City area, took our positions outside the area where the riot was taking place. sniping positions. These were at the other side of town, Bishop Street, Hamilton Street and other areas outside the barricaded area as a consequence of this a volunteer of the Official Irish Republican Army was wounded in the leg and the neck.
... 19:52 Can you speak for the provisional IRA as well?
19:56 I cannot, no, the best of my knowledge... there was no guns used today at all, there was no shooting today at all before the British Army opened up and when the British Army did open up there was shooting but it was not in the immediate vicinity of this, the riot or where the British Army were shooting. There was sniper fire by our men but it was not in that area.
Mary Holland also published a letter in her own newspaper in the following terms:
In my story from Londonderry last Sunday I quoted an IRA marksman who admitted to firing at a British soldier on Bloody Sunday. What was not made clear -- mainly because another story due to appear in the same issue giving a detailed reconstruction of events of that Sunday was held out for fear of prejudicing evidence to be given to the Widgery Tribunal -- was that the marksman I quoted says he fired his shot at 5 pm after the confrontation with the British Army had taken place and more than a mile away from where it occurred. "The IRA insists that none of its marksmen fired a shot within the area where the killings took place and that such shots as were fired at the British Army came only after the first 13 civilians had been killed."
OIRA1, indeed, admitted when questioned by Edmund Lawson QC that he was willing to lie in order to conceal the truth of OIRA activity on Bloody Sunday.
Well, in 1972 it was decided that, given the propaganda that was coming out from the British establishment and the claims that there
328 X1.25.13-15 329 M42.3 were gunmen all over the place and given that people you represent had said that they were fired upon by hundreds of gunmen and hundreds of shots and given the fact that half the world's press were in here trying to find these gunmen, we just decided it would not be right to give them any excuse by admitting to any shot.
Q. In other words, it would be better to lie?
A. Yes.
4C-317 OIRA 7 provided another example of Official IRA evasiveness when giving accounts to the Press. In a transcript of a programme called, "The Road to Bloody Sunday", he was asked about the carrying of weapons on Bloody Sunday:
Question: And no-one else that you know of did?
4C-318 His answer was:
Everyone was told that no weapons were to be carried
4C-319 He was questioned about that reply by Mr Lawson:
Q. I see. When you made or gave the interview you did for that purpose, the purpose of the film, obviously you knew at that time, did you not, about the shot that had been fired by one of your Official colleagues in Columbille Court?
A. I did, yes.
Q. Because you knew about that on the day; did you not?
A. I did, yes.
Q. You had also become aware on or after Bloody Sunday of the man who had fired a pistol, had you not, in the Rossville Flats car park?
A. I think he describes it as a revolver, yes, I became aware of that.
Q. All right, a revolver, I am happy to call it that.
A. Yes. Q. Did you learn that on or about Bloody Sunday? A. I learned it after Bloody Sunday.
Q. Long after? A. It would not have been very long after.
Q. Certainly you learnt of it before 1997?... A. Yes, I would say so331.
...Q. Do you still say your answer in 1997 was not, then, deliberately evasive and designed to mislead?
It was not designed to mislead. It was not a lie, I made a point of not telling a lie332.
4C-320 OIRA3 admitted, in his BSI statement, that the Official IRA knowingly lied to the press about their actions on Bloody Sunday, saying that:
I thought it better to say nothing, or deny the shots, rather than give the Brits an excuse for their actions1.
4C-321 Tellingly, he goes on to say that:
Since then we have agreed with the families, having been approached by them, that we would explain OIRA's involvement, and exactly how it came about that volunteers discharged their weapons so that there could be no doubt that they in no way provided an excuse for the Paras to open up and kill innocent people2.
4C-322 The OIRA witnesses have then, according to OIRA 3, come forward still with the agenda of proving that they were in no way responsible for provoking fire on Bloody Sunday, an agenda which is reflected in the limited and misleading evidence which they continue to give as to OIRA activity on the day.
331 Day 398/106/11-107/05 332 Day 398/121/08-11 OIRA 2 has indeed provided a telling example of the way in which the OIRA witnesses continue to promote the same “propaganda” about their role on Bloody Sunday so far as they are able.
Ms McGahey initially drew OIRA2’s attention to the misleading and self-serving account of Bloody Sunday that he gave at an anti-internment demonstration in Kilburn on 5th February 1972 where he:
said that the IRA had not fired back until the firing had been going on for 20 minutes and then only in a gallant attempt to draw the troops’ fire from the innocent.
queried whether a 16-year-old boy with four bullets in his back could have been a terrorist.
And
claimed that he saw innocent people, as he thought, diving for cover “but when I got to them I found them lying in pools of blood”.
All of these claims were admitted by OIRA 2 to be untrue or, as he preferred to term it, “a wee bit of poetic licence”, employed in addressing an Irish audience immediately after Bloody Sunday.
In fact OIRA2 told the same lies to this Tribunal as was demonstrated when he was questioned by Mr Lawson:
Q. Did you actually see bodies that day?
A. No, because, um, I was trying to get away because of the total confusion that actually happened on the day. When we left the immediate area that we were in, we were trying to move away in the opposite direction.
Q. Because that is something fairly memorable, is it not, seeing bodies lying on the ground?
333 INT2.70 paragraph 15 334 Day 392/124/12 A. It would be, yes.
Q. You have no recollection of that?
A. I have no recollection of seeing any actual bodies, no. I would'a seen photographs the following day.
Q. Why, in that case, did you say this: "My memories of the rest of the day are of seeing people running and hiding and of bodies lying on the ground"?
A. As I say, it could have been a wee bit of poetic licence, you are addressing a meeting of Irish people in London, so one might have got carried away a wee bit, you know, with the occasion.
Q. I was not referring in fact to the meeting that you addressed in London, I was referring to the statement that you delivered to this Tribunal, we will see it on the screen. AOIRA 2.7, please, paragraph 22, would you expand that. This is the statement that you produced in, we are told about, January 2002, as you have confirmed this morning, with the assistance of your own solicitors and prior to preparing the so-called Eversheds statement. In it, as you can see, in the fourth line of the paragraph on the screen, you solemnly declared this: "My memories of the rest of the day are of seeing people running and hiding and of bodies lying on the ground." So far as the last phrase is concerned, that is simply not true?
A. I have gone on to say there, if you notice: "These are not coherent memories as the time was frantic."
Q. It is not true, whether it is coherent or not? A. No, I am not saying that it is not true, what I am saying is that in the state of confusion that existed at the time and, even when I was submitting that statement through our solicitors, um, it may well be the case that that was -- that obviously was included.
Q. And it was not true?
A. Those are your words.
Q. Do you remember seeing bodies lying on the ground?
A. I cannot honestly remember whether I saw bodies lying on the ground. Q. About two minutes ago when I asked you the question you gave a simple: no to that. Which is it, do you want to qualify the note (sic)?
A. No, I do not want to qualify it at all.(^{335})
OIRA2's willingness to embellish his evidence regardless of the truth was again demonstrated when he was questioned by Mr Lawson about the shots he had heard while in Columbille Court:
A. Well, I have already told the previous counsel that I have no recollection of actually hearing any shots. I am not sure. I may have done, I am just not sure.
Q. Are you in a position to assert that you can confirm that the shots were high velocity shots?
A. Which shots are we talking about here?
Q. The shots that allegedly preceded the rifle being fired?
A. I would imagine they would have been, yes.
Q. Can you definitely confirm that to be the position?
A. I cannot definitely confirm it.
Q. Why did you do so when you made this same statement for the benefit of the Inquiry?
A. Because --
Q. Just a minute, you ought to look at it, page 3, please, paragraph 9, where you said, did you not, in this statement of about January 2002, that you heard a number of high velocity shots with a gap between them. You cannot remember exactly at this time, but you believe there could have been two or three shots, right. You go on to say that you could not specify the time between them. Lest there be any doubt about the matter, concluded the paragraph by saying: "From my experience living in Derry at that time I can definitely confirm that these were high velocity shots." That is what you said, is it not?
A. That is what I said, yes. Q. And you were in no position whatsoever to do that, were you, OIRA 2? A. Well, according to the way that you are putting it, the answer to the question would be that I probably was not, but again I think, in the general state of confusion possibly what I said there, you know, was, um, just a reflection of how things happened on the day.
Q. It was at best, was it not, a serious exaggeration? A. No, I would not accept that.
Q. You would accept it was an exaggeration, presumably? A. No, I would not even accept it was an exaggeration.
Q. What, when you said "I could definitely confirm these were high velocity shots", when you at least were unsure whether you had heard any shots; is that not an exaggeration? A. It could well be, yes.336
The Official IRA has, in its formal dealings with the Press and in its evidence to this Tribunal, sought to avoid any acknowledgement of its role on Bloody Sunday beyond that which it has been forced to concede. Evidence suggests, however, that, in addressing a local audience, certain Officials, immediately after Bloody Sunday at least, had not abandoned their hope of having proved themselves to the Derry citizenry by way of their decisive action on the day. Such individuals may well have been those to whom Liam O'Comain referred when he told Liam Clarke and Helen Johnston that there was:
an element within the Officials that definitely made a decision to open up on Bloody Sunday, and they did
and that that element felt that
if we can have some form of death on Bloody Sunday, it might pull the Officials back in line again. They might be forced into a situation to place a bit more hope in.
336 Day 392/128/23 Willie Breslin has given evidence that Father Daly’s gunman, maintained the hope that the tragic events of Bloody Sunday might still assist the Official cause.
Mr Breslin describes in his BSI statement an encounter in Nell McCafferty’s house when he told one of the Official Republicans that "there is five dead". The Official replied that "I know, it may be the best thing that has ever happened".
Mr Breslin identified this man as being the man who was carrying a revolver in the Rossville Flats car park and who shot some pistol shots from the gable end of Chamberlain Street. He knew this because he recognized the man from the photograph published by Fulvio Grmialdi.
OIRA 4, representing himself as Father Daly’s gunman, denies having uttered these words. Mr Breslin, however, remained positive, when questioned by Mr O’Donovan, of what he heard:
A. It is the sort of offensive statement that leaves a mark on your mind and it left a mark on my mind, and I lost respect for the gentleman when he said it. I understood what he meant when he explained it, but I thought it was extremely insensitive and very offensive.
Q. I am merely suggesting that he never said that.
A. I am absolutely certain that he did.
The circumstances in which Mr Barry obtained the information contained in PIN 437 also indicates that OIRA 1, another potential member of the “element” referred to by Mr O’Comain, was keen to claim his shots when speaking on what he took to be “home ground”, in his local, Republican pub.
The Tribunal will recall Mr Barry’s evidence that:
337 AB112.11 paragraph 63-65 338 Day 194/191/02-14 339 AOIRA4.23 paragraph 52 340 Day 194/194/20-195/01 I recall the name and I recall having met him and I am sure that at least one of those occasions must have been in the Bogside Inn because I recall going to the Bogside Inn as a way of meeting a lot of people at that time, we all used to go there, but I have no recollection -- I come back: I have no recollection of the circumstances of the gathering of this note.
The explanation for OIRA 1's frankness with Mr Barry lies in the information given in OIRA 2's BSI statement that:
*Half the time you didn't know who you were talking to when you were in there (the Bogside Inn) having a pint but you trusted most people as the strangers were always with locals.*
It would appear that, in the immediate aftermath of Bloody Sunday at least, the Official IRA had one version of events for the citizens of Derry while it had and has quite another for the national Press and this Tribunal.
Members of the Official IRA have attempted from the outset to orchestrate their evidence to this Tribunal. OIRAs 1-5 initially declined to be interviewed by Eversheds so that only their unsigned, undated, self-prepared statements were circulated to the parties on 26th April 2002. It appears that those OIRA witnesses then refused to expose themselves to further questioning by the Inquiry, as indicated by Mr Tate's letter of 8th May 2002 stating that it was the Inquiry's position that it wanted OIRA1-5 to be interviewed by Eversheds but "whether we shall succeed in that objective is open to debate". Indeed, it would appear that almost a year passed before cooperation was secured in the provision of interviews and further statements by these witnesses, all of which were signed on 3rd March 2003.
Statements from other OIRA witnesses followed only at a much later stage.
______________________________________________________________________
341 Day 194/093/11-18 342 AOIRA2.21 paragraph 42 By delaying their evidence in this way the OIRA witnesses were able to assess the vast bulk of the civilian evidence given to the Tribunal before providing their own accounts of Bloody Sunday. Such an approach was clearly essential to their policy of revealing to this Tribunal only that which is already in the public domain, a point which was raised with OIRA 1 by Mr Lawson on Day 396.
Q. Is that your position, OIRA 1, and that of your colleagues: that you will deal with those matters which the Tribunal has already heard about from some other independent source, but you will actually reveal nothing new?
A. You know, I cannot reveal something I do not know. Lawson
The suggestion that the OIRA witnesses have tailored their evidence to account only for what could not realistically be denied was also explored by Mr Clarke with Mr Tester on Day 414.
Q. One view that the Tribunal might be invited to take, which I would like to raise for your comment, is that the Official IRA could not realistically have maintained a fiction that no shots had been fired because the shot across William Street, the shot seen by Father Daly and Micky Doherty's shot or shots at a soldier in Barrack Street were not realistically deniable and that it has therefore adopted plan B, which is to be economical with the truth about the circumstances in which the undeniable shots were fired and about other shooting which is deniable because it cannot be clearly laid at the door of the Official IRA.
Mr Tester could not assist.
Q. And amongst the members of the Official IRA has there been an attempt to play down, so far as possible, any evidence that might reflect badly on the Officials?
A. I do not think so.
Q. Do you know one way or the other?
______________________________________________________________________
342 Day 396/131/16-20 344 Day 414/75/14-25 Those OIRA witnesses who have withheld evidence until the very late stages of this Inquiry (OIRA 9, for example, signed his BSI statement on 9th January 2004) have also inhibited questioning of the OIRA witnesses themselves as Lord Saville acknowledged when the matter was raised by Mr Lawson:
MR LAWSON: I am sure not and I was not for a moment intending to suggest that, but it is unsatisfactory that we should be cross-examining members of the organisation if there are other statements in existence from other members, the contents of which we are entirely unaware of.
LORD SAVILLE: I entirely agree, but that in turn is a function of the fact that some witnesses -- and I include the OIRA people among them -- have only chosen to come forward at a very late stage.
It is also quite clear that, in giving their first statements to the Tribunal, the OIRA witnesses coordinated the evidence they intended to give. OIRA 1’s denial, when questioned by Mr Elias, that they had corroborated in this way is simply not credible in the face of even a brief textual comparison of those statements.
Q. Before you got involved, did you speak with your other colleagues, as you call them, OIRA s 1 to 5? A. No.
Q. Not at all? A. No.
Q. Did you have any meetings with them of any kind together or separately? A. No.
Q. So when you made your statement to your solicitor, the first statement, did you make that on your own? A. Did I make it on my own? Well, I think you can talk to my solicitors as to how I made that statement.
Q. You do not want to tell the Tribunal about that?
A. I mean, what do you want me to say: yes, I spoke to my solicitor.
Q. Do you want to tell the truth, OIRA 1?
A. Yes, and the truth is, yes, I spoke to my solicitors; yes, I made a statement; if you have any questions further than that, then I suggest you ask my solicitor to confirm it.
Q. I am asking you: did you make your statement alone or with other OIRA members?
A. I made my statement alone.
Q. Alone?
A. Yes.
Q. None of the others were present when you made it?
A. No.
Q. Were the words of your statement -- that is your first statement to your solicitors -- were they yours?
A. Yes.
Q. So if this Tribunal sees -- it is entirely a matter for them of course, we could go through it, I shall not trouble to do it this afternoon -- if the Tribunal sees similar phrases and similar sentiments in the statements of OIRA witness after OIRA witness that is because those are the words that happened to tumble out of that witness's mouth quite independently; would that be right?347
4C-343 The fact that the OIRA witnesses have, indeed, discussed the evidence they intended to give was highlighted by the almost comical exchange between OIRA 6 and Mr Lawson on Day 413:
Q. Was Reg Tester the quartermaster at the time of Bloody Sunday?
A. If the man says there he was, that is, that is his statement.
347 Day 396/145/18-147/05 Q. Try again: was Reg Tester the quartermaster on Bloody Sunday?
A. Well, according to the statement he was.
Q. According to which statement?
A. The one you are giving me.
Q. The statement you have got in front of you?
A. It says here, aye.
Q. Paragraph 4?
A. That is right, if the man says he was quartermaster, he must have been quartermaster, then.
Q. Whose statement is that in front of you, OIRA 6? What does it say on the top of it, after "The Bloody Sunday Inquiry," it says "I ..."
A. Paragraph 4, you are on about.
Q. At the top of the page, can you see where it says, in big letters, "The Bloody Sunday Inquiry"; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Look to the line underneath it, does that say "I, OIRA 6"?
A. Yes.
Q. Right. I appreciate your memory may not be all that it was, OIRA 6, but this is the statement you made some 48 hours ago, is it not?
A. That is correct, aye.
Q. Right. In which you were happy, 48 hours ago, to say in paragraph 4 that you have got in front of you?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Without equivocation "the quartermaster was Reg Tester", you refer to him as such; "the quartermaster, Reg Tester"?
A. Yes, I got this information from somebody else.
Q. From whom did you get it?
A. I, I was told. Q. By? A. By a person that told me that – Q. By? A. -- reg Tester was the quartermaster and it was okay to mention his name. Q. Who told you it was okay to mention his name? A. I am not giving any names. That is what I was told. Q. I am going to ask you again? A. His name is down there. Q. When were you told it was okay to mention his name? A. Not too long ago. Q. How long ago? A. Actually within the last week or fortnight. Q. Who told you? A. (Pause). I am not giving any names who told me. Q. Why not? A. Because I do not want to give any names out. Q. Why not? A. Because I do not want to. Q. Just because you do not want to? A. That is correct. Q. I will ask you again. A. I am not giving any names. Q. I will give you one more chance: why not give us the name, if what you are saying is the truth? A. Because I do not want to give you names. Q. Is he present here today? A. I think he is up there somewhere. Q. You say "up there somewhere", you are pointing to the public gallery?
A. Aye.
4C-344 The Tribunal will recall OIRA 6's Counsel requesting an adjournment at this point in case the question "might tend to identify someone in the public gallery" (as indeed OIRA 6 had clearly indicated). His client's suggestion, on his return to the witness box, that he had misunderstood the question and had in fact been given this information by "someone in Eversheds" is simply incredible and a further example of the readiness with which lies were told to the Tribunal by OIRA witnesses who wished to prevent information becoming known.
4C-345 OIRA 1 also denied, when questioned by Mr Elias, that there had been any discussion between him and his colleagues:
MR ELIAS: Before making your first statement, OIRA 1, did you discuss with any of your colleagues, and if so which –
A. No.
Q. – the events of the day or what you were to say?
A. No.
Q. Or pool your recollections or anything of that kind?
A. No.
Q. To your knowledge did any of your colleagues meet together?
A. No.
Q. So your statement, the Tribunal should take it, your statement to your solicitor in the first instance was a statement which arose out of your mouth, your recollection with no input from anyone else in terms of assisting your recollection?
A. Well, obviously the input that I would have had would have been my memory, the current events that are taking place, things which
348 Day 413/170/08-173/01 349 Day 413/175/11-17 would have jogged my memory and, in the consultation with my solicitor as I developed my statement, some things may have occurred that I had not thought about, but essentially, yes, the statement is my statement.
Mr Tester was, however, frank enough to admit that there had been discussion between the OIRA witnesses before giving evidence:
Q. Can you help about this: the Tribunal has heard from a number of Official IRA witnesses now. I think I am right in saying that all of them, let me simply say most for the purposes of my question, most of them have made two statements to this Tribunal, in the first of which they have referred, as you did in your statement, to two weapons being unaccounted for and in a statement made a year later, each of them has referred to three weapons being unaccounted for, as you have; do you follow?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you assist the Tribunal, have you had discussions, for example, with OIRA 3, who falls into that category, having made a statement in March 2002 and another statement in March 2003, in which he refers to two in the first and three in the second, as you did?
A. I have spoken to him.
Q. About this very issue?
A. About this issue, yes.
Q. You have spoken, have you, with OIRA 3 about the fact that when you both put into your first statements the existence of two apparently missing weapons, if I can use your terminology, it actually now appears that you will have to be saying there were three. You have spoken to OIRA 3 about that, have you?
A. Yes.
Q. And discussed it with him?
A. I have.
Q. And with other members of the Official IRA?
______________________________________________________________________
350 Day 396/150/02-24 A. No, only with OIRA 3.
Q. Only with him from your point of view? A. Yes.
Q. Has there been any directive given, if I can use the expression 'from on high' that this information may be given or may not be given? A. No, there has not.
Q. So the change as between your first and second statement and OIRA 3's first and second statement may have come about because of discussions that you and he had together, but just the two of you? A. Yes.351
OIRA 7 was also forced to concede that he had met with his colleagues despite his earlier denials.
Q. Having made your Eversheds statement, did you have any group meeting, that is to say you and other OIRAs, if I may call them that, you together with other members or former members of the IRA? A. No.
Q. You are sure about that; are you? A. Did I meet and talk with any of them? Q. Did you meet, let us forget the talk? A. Did we meet? Q. Yes. A. Yes, I would have met people in, in the lobby here.
Q. Was there a group meeting which included you, OIRA 7, and other OIRA members? A. Not that I was at.
351 Day 414/154/21-156/10 Q. Because I simply read a note from your solicitor which has been provided to us in the information that has come this morning: "I can confirm that the first group meeting including OIRA 7 occurred after the interview with Eversheds." Do you know what that means?
A. I thought you meant the subversive meeting. Yes, we met with the instructing solicitor.
Q. Who is "we"?
A. Um, myself and –
Q. Give no names, the ciphers?
A. I think, um, OIRA 3, OIRA 4 and OIRA 5, from, from my recollection.
Q. When was this; how far are you having to remember?
A. I do not think -- it was not that long ago.
Q. Are we talking about days or weeks; how long before you signed your statement on 10th November, if you like?
A. I think, I think it may have been before that. Yes, I think it was before that, but I am not sure how long before that.
Q. It may have been nine or ten days ago or perhaps a little longer?
A. Yes, it may have been, yes.
Q. Who was there, is the question I am asking you?
A. I just told you who was there.
Q. You seem a little doubtful about it?
A. Sorry, I am looking at ... I know OIRA 3 was there; OIRA 4 was there; OIRA 5 was there and, um, --
Q. Without giving any names, were there any other, as you might describe them, former colleagues who have not got ciphers, present?
A. Yes, there was one, yes.
Q. A former member of the IRA, in other words, who is not ciphered who is not coming forward to this Tribunal? .....We are talking of Mr Tester? A. Yes.
Q. Anyone else who was not falling into that category, any other former colleagues? Each of the OIRA witnesses has also, on a number of occasions, attempted to "hide" behind a purported uncertainty as to the terms of the Attorney General's undertaking on self-incrimination in order to avoid giving details which might have proven uncomfortable for the Official IRA. Mr Lawson challenged OIRA 2 as to his use of this tactic which was widespread amongst his colleagues:
Q. "I have been made aware of suggestions that it was a common practice to transfer people out of Derry for treatment or even burial." Right?
A. Yes.
Q. You go on to say: "Having sought legal advice ... I cannot comment on whether or not this was a general practice." Let me ask you, please, a simple question for a simple answer; did it happen?
A. To my knowledge, no.
Q. Why on earth did you have difficulty in answering the question that you purport to have there?
A. I do not really know.
Q. You do not know?
A. I do not know why I had difficulty in answering the question the way it is reported there.
There is a clear conspiracy amongst the members of the OIRA to keep the truth from this Tribunal as is clearly demonstrated by their joint adherence to palpable lies. The Tribunal will have noted for example the willingness of OIRA 3 to support the entirely incredible suggestion that OIRAs 1 and 2 "were on neutral duty to return a stored weapon to the Quartermaster," an explanation which the Quartermaster himself has repudiated.
______________________________________________________________________
352 Day 399/41/12-43/24 353 Day 393/115/17-116/08 354 AOIRA3.23paragraph 30 Such a conspiracy extends to a willingness to “tow the party line” on important issues no matter what the witnesses actual recollection, as became clear when OIRA 4 was required to justify the content of his statement to this Tribunal:
OIRA 4 had said in his first “prepared” statement that:
There was a concern that the distraction caused by the march and the large numbers of people who would leave the Creggan and Brandywell areas would be seen as an opportunity for the Army to enter those areas and try to take control.
Yet in his second statement, compiled after interview with Eversheds, said that
I cannot remember anyone saying they thought the Brits were going to try to get back into the Brandywell and Creggan because we were all down in the Bogside on the march or that all our weapons would be held up in the Creggan.
By the time he gives oral evidence he can say only that concern at the Creggan being deserted “is what I think I recall”.
Equally regarding the order to remove weapons from the Bogside, OIRA 4 said in his first statement that:
All the weapons were to be retrieved and brought into the Brandywell and Creggan areas.
And yet concedes in oral evidence that:
Q. Do you have any recollection now of orders being given that the weapons would be removed and taken to the Creggan and the Brandywell?
A. No, I, I cannot remember. Indeed it became increasingly clear as he was further questioned by Mr Toohey that OIRA4 has repeated evidence he has been instructed to give and can now neither recall nor justify.
Q. For instance, Mr Clarke has just asked you about the sentence at the foot of 4.2, in which you say: "It was ordered that all the weapons in our command would be removed from the Bogside and brought to the Creggan and the Brandywell where they would be stored in mobile stores and would be accompanied by volunteers...... Do you have any recollection of that particular order being given, either on the Sunday or on the preceding Saturday?
A. I am not sure, to be honest.
And to Mr Clarke's question
Q. On the morning [that is on the morning of the march] and at the start of the march, I was with the OC when he confirmed the orders...
What did you mean when you said, "he confirmed the orders"?
A. I do not know really what I mean there. He probably just must have mentioned to me.
There is no doubt either of the willingness of a number of civilians to conceal the activities of the Official IRA. As Mr Lawson put to Mr Tester in respect of his allegedly attempted fire:
A. There was just a large crowd that was milling around the junction of Lecky Road and Rossville -- and Westland Street.
Q. But a large crowd of people who plainly saw that you were an IRA man with a weapon that day who could if they had wanted to obviously have come along to tell this Inquiry about that many months or years ago?
360 Day 394/15/08-20 361 AOIRA4.3 paragraph 13 362 Day 394/16/05-08 A. I suppose so\\textsuperscript{363}.
4C-VII CONCLUSIONS
4C-357 It is clear that Official IRA policy at the time of Bloody Sunday was to shoot British soldiers whenever the opportunity presented itself. As well as such opportunistic firing the Officials also considered it their responsibility to defend the no-go areas, including the Bogside. Even if they considered the presence of the local population and rioting crowds to be the first line of defence against the Army, they would and did fire when that failed.
4C-358 The rationale put forward by all of the OIRA witnesses that there could not have been Official firing in the Bogside, outside of the three incidents of which the Tribunal already knew, because the weapons had all been removed from the Bogside has proved to be entirely spurious. The Tribunal now knows that the weapons belonging to the Bogside Section and some at least of those belonging to the Creggan Section were at large.
4C-359 The Tribunal should, it is submitted, also conclude that the first shot fired on Bloody Sunday was that fired by OIRA 1. While the fact that this firing took place had to be admitted, the attempts made to explain the circumstances in which that firing took place, and to justify it, have been shown beyond doubt to have been a tissue of lies and should, it is submitted, be rejected in their entirety by the Tribunal.
4C-360 Civilian evidence, together with accounts given to the Press, also demonstrate that the three gunmen which the Official IRA concede were operating on the day were not isolated exceptions. There were other Official gunmen in the area, in all likelihood as part of an operation to carry out Official IRA policy of Defence and Retaliation. Some of those gunmen fired at the British Army.
\\textsuperscript{363} Day 414/141/17-24 4C-361 The actions of those Official IRA gunmen attracted military fire which, it is acknowledged, killed and injured civilians.
4C-362 The Official IRA have been engaged in elaborate attempt since the very day of Bloody Sunday itself to conceal the truth of their role in the events of Bloody Sunday. They continue to attempt to do so. CLOSING SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENTS OF MR ANTHONY LAWTON
VOLUME 3
CHAPTER 5
SENIOR OFFICERS: PLANNING AND ACTIVITIES ON 30 JANUARY 1972 CHAPTER 5H - OPERATION FORECAST
Preparations in Londonderry ................................................................. 198 The Build Up ......................................................................................... 204 Serial 294 ....................................................................................... 205 Serial 315 ....................................................................................... 207 Serial 320 ....................................................................................... 209 Serial 324 ....................................................................................... 211 Serial 329 ....................................................................................... 212 Serial 336 ....................................................................................... 213 Serial 338 ....................................................................................... 214 Serial 343 ....................................................................................... 215 Serial 348 ....................................................................................... 218 Serials 353 to 359 ........................................................................... 223 Serial 365 ....................................................................................... 224 Separation ............................................................................................. 226 Serial 367 ....................................................................................... 234 The Order to launch the Arrest Operation ........................................... 236 The Size of the Arrest Force ............................................................. 238 Location of the Arrest Operation ...................................................... 243 The Arrest Operation ........................................................................... 252
CHAPTER 5I - REPORTING OPERATION FORECAST
Reporting Operation Forecast ............................................................ 261
CHAPTER 5J - THE CONSPIRACY ALLEGATION
5J-I The case for the existence of a plan within a plan ....................... 290 Allegations made on behalf of the families ....................................... 294 5J-II The allegation is not made out .................................................. 321 CHAPTER 5A
BACKGROUND TO THE MARCH
5A-1 In Op Directive 3/71 Brigadier Cowan, Commander 8 Infantry Brigade, reported:
... a resurgence of street hooligan activity, after a long period of comparative peace, on the streets of Londonderry towards the end of June.2
5A-2 He assessed the prospects in terms of security for the immediate future as follows:
Outlook. The present level of explosive attacks is likely to be continued, especially those directed against the Security Forces. As the Orange Order marching season gets into full swing, the Brady Group can be expected to defend their Catholic areas and repel incursion, and to take advantage of the parades to draw the Security Forces into positions from which they could be attacked.3
5A-3 The commander of the battalion carrying out the City task at any given time was to:
... pursue the policy of further isolation of minority extremists and hooligan elements, by establishing contact and liaison with the local population, local leaders of industry, civil leaders and other key communicators.4
5A-4 Brigadier Cowan signed Op Directive 3/71 on 2nd July 1971. Of the days immediately thereafter his successor, Brigadier MacLellan, was later to write:
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1 G1.1 2 G1.2 paragraph 1(a)(6) 3 G1.4 paragraph 1(e) 4 G1.6 paragraph 5(d)(1)(d) Within two days of the Directive(^5) being signed, the situation changed dramatically. On 4 July the IRA mounted a campaign in the City with the short term aim of so disrupting the life of the City that the Apprentice Boys Annual Celebrations on August 12(^{th}) would have to be cancelled. The campaign opened with an ever increasing number of shooting incidents on succeeding days, until reaction by the Security Forces to the IRA gunmen led to the return of fire and the death of two of the rioters.(^6)
The effect of this first ever return of fire in Londonderry instantly turned the Catholic community from benevolent support to complete alienation.(^7)
5A-5 Major General Ford succeeded Major General Farrar-Hockley as Commander Land Forces on 29(^{th}) July 1971. Within a fortnight the Province saw the institution of internment. On 20(^{th}) August Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo, the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland, held his meeting with the Committee of Thirty, as a result of which the military profile was to be reduced in Londonderry in the hope that moderate opinion would prevail.
5A-6 Brigadier MacLellan, writing in November 1971, continued:
The subsequent introduction of internment, followed in its turn by the erection and dismantling of barricades throughout the Bogside and Creggan, all combined to lead to a situation in which the Security Forces were faced by an entirely hostile Catholic community.(^8)
On 20 August it was decided that the military profile in Londonderry should be lowered, in the hope that moderate opinion would win the day. This has proved to be a pious hope. At present neither the RUC nor the military have control of the Bogside and Creggan areas, and law and order is not being effectively maintained. No military
(^5) Op Directive 3/71 2(^{nd}) July 1971 (^6) Op Directive 4/71, G27.196 paragraph 1(a)(2) (^7) Op Directive 4/71, G27.196 paragraph 1(a)(3) (^8) Op Directive 4/71, G27.196 paragraph 1(a)(3) routine patrols take place in those areas and the mob rule of the gun prevails.9
5A-7 There was general recognition that the attempt to give moderate opinion a chance not only failed but permitted the extremists to consolidate their hold on the Bogside and Creggan10. In his Appreciation (relating to the whole Province) of 4th October 197111, the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Michael Carver, wrote:
In Londonderry the situation in the Creggan and Bogside is such that there are virtually “no go” areas, with about 200 extremists and .... “hard core” hooligans operating unchecked. The influence of the “Committee of 30” has clearly failed to improve matters. One alternative is to let the present situation continue. But it is desirable to reassert the full range of military and police activities throughout the city; and if there is an IRA/Blaney build-up in Londonderry with a bomb offensive in the city centre of the Protestant areas it may become imperative to go into the Bogside and root out the terrorists and the hooligans.12
5A-8 Recommending his Option 3, General Carver (admittedly with little consultation with the GOC Northern Ireland13) thought an operation to restore law and order in Londonderry would be necessary:
To continue our present policy, but to remove those restraints on the operations which the GOC Northern Ireland wishes to carry out, which are motivated by a desire not to disturb the current “political initiatives”. This option would certainly include intensification of border operations, including humping and cratering of roads, and an operation in Londonderry.14
9 Op Directive 4/71, G27.196 paragraph 1(a)(4) 10 Gen Ford, told Desmond Hamill that this was a policy with which he never agreed: Day 253/026/03 11 Military Appreciation of the Security Situation in Northern Ireland as at 4th October 1971, at G14B.86.9 12 G14B.86.12 paragraph 14 13 G14B.86.8 14 G14B.86.15 paragraph 23 When (it is thought) interviewed by Desmond Hamill in 1984 General MacLellan repeated the sentiments of the Op Directive 4/71 in relation to the Committee of Thirty:
_We had already tried the softer approach – started by Tuzo with the White Line or the 42 Line – and this patently had not worked_.
_MPs would come and I would brief them. A recurring theme was that we had tried the Tuzo initiative but it hadn’t worked. Mob rule runs in the Catholic areas. 80% of people perfectly OK. 20% not OK and of those only a few pulling triggers. But there was a friendly sea in which they could swim._
General Steele, Brigade Major 8 Brigade from 1970 to 1972, wrote in his statement to this Inquiry:
_Having followed a policy of containment under command of Brigadier [Cowan] until July 1971, it became clear in the second half of 1971 that the policy had to change. Between July and October 1971 Brigadier [Cowan] did his best to contain the increasing disorder._
In his first draft statement for the Widgery Inquiry Brigadier MacLellan summarised the position so far as the hooligans were concerned as follows:
_Ever since the Army arrived in Londonderry, towards the end of 1969, there have been in existence organised gangs of hooligans who have thrived on violence and who have presented a special problem to the Security Forces. They specialise in rioting attacks on the Security Forces, hijacking of cars and destruction of property. Until July 1971 the Security Forces were able to contain these hooligan gangs, and a considerable number of them were arrested and charged with disorderly behaviour. It was also possible to conduct extensive scoop up operations of these rioters,_
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15 B1279.003.001 16 B1279.003.015 17 BSI Statement, B1315.001 paragraph 3 the last of which was in February 1971 when 27 of them were arrested in one swoop.
But since July 1971, when the IRA campaign opened in Londonderry, and the shooting started, the hooligan gangs have been operating under cover of snipers in nearby buildings. This has had the effect of strictly limiting the scope of hooligan arrest operations that we have been able to mount; no longer are we able to use snatch squads and out-flanking manoeuvres, as these entail deployment on foot and expose our troops to sniper fire.
About 25-50 hooligans turn out almost every afternoon in the William Street area, now a derelict no-mans land, where they are opposed by about two platoons. In the ensuing stone throwing attacks, a few nail bombs are usually included, and some shots fired, either by gunmen operating from within the crowd, or sniping from nearby buildings. The troops are obliged to use street fighting techniques to counter the gunmen and these do not lend themselves to the arrest of the hooligans, as attempts to close with them bring the troops into the killing zone of the snipers.
It will be clear from this that the Londonderry hooligans present a serious threat, not only to the commercial areas of the City, but also to the lives of the Security Forces whose duty it is to deal with them.18
5A-12 General Ford issued a Province wide Directive for Internal Security Operations on 26th October 1971.19 Not surprisingly this is a document which concerns the need to defeat the terrorists, in respect of which see the content of the Background paragraphs (paragraphs 1 to 420), General Outline (paragraphs 6 and 7), the Conclusion (paragraphs 14 to 16) and the Tasks, both first and second priorities, for all Brigades in the Province (paragraphs 8 and 9):
18 Brig MacLellan's Statement, First Draft, B1279.018 paragraphs 15-19 19 Commander Land Forces' Directive for Future Internal Security Operations, G23.166. MOD on Distribution List: G23.168 20 G23.165 21 G23.167 The first priority task is the defeat of the IRA's campaign of violence.22
The second priority is to overcome threats to law and order from all other directions, including in particular inter-sectarian strife. However much the first priority task brings us into conflict with one section of the community, we must retain our sectarian impartiality. Furthermore, we must avoid unnecessary alienation of Roman Catholic opinion because the rejection by the Catholics of IRA violence is an essential ingredient of our ultimate success.23
5A-13 Only under Additional Tasks are the hooligans referred to, and then in the context of the particular problems of each Brigade area. Given the difficulties the hooligans had been creating for the Security Forces in Londonderry since they had received the support of the gunmen (ie from July 1971) it would be remarkable if there had been no mention of them.
8 Inf Bde. Additional Tasks.
a. Progressively impose the rule of law on the Creggan and Bogside. Hooligan fringe activity is to be vigorously countered: arrest operations are to continue to be mounted; and normal patrols are to be restarted as soon as practicable.
5A-14 This Directive was a means of passing orders down the chain of command:
MR CLARKE: Would it be fair to say that this Operational Directive represented in effect a deliberate change of gear?
A: It was a change of gear, and in relation to the new instructions which had come down from above.
Q: That is what we have just been looking at.24
5A-15 Brigadier Cowan handed over command of 8 Brigade to Brigadier MacLellan on 27th October 1971. In the notes he prepared for his
22 G23.165 paragraph 8, which carries four particular steps to be taken to this end. 23 G23.166 paragraph 9 24 Day 253/035/06 successor he summarised his own concerns and priorities, the DYH very much to the fore, in the following terms:
*Gunmen alone no real problem as soldiers could deal and population wouldn't object. But this not the case. RC resent invasion of homeland so gunmen, 25,000 hostile population plus active hooliganism. ... But fact you are in a containing posture should not inhibit dealing when he comes out and makes trouble but reserve required as key areas must not be uncovered and you must not be sucked in to sniper nest on ground of his choosing. ... Cutting off for snatch is still on if you can work it. Policy arrest as many as you can.*
5A-16 On the day Brigadier MacLellan took command of the Brigade a bomb attack on an Observation Post at Rosemount Police Station in Brooke Park killed two soldiers, Lance Bombadier Tilbury and Gunner Stephens of 45 Med Regt RA. Less than two weeks later, on 9th November, Lance Corporal Curtis of 1 R ANGLIAN was fatally shot on the Foyle Road.
5A-17 Continuing the process of passing orders down the chain of command, Brigadier MacLellan issued a Directive to his Brigade on 10th November 1971. It was this Directive which described the failure of the initiative with the Committee of Thirty and summarised its effects. A week later Brigadier MacLellan was host to a visit from the Leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition. His briefing included the following concerns about the Security Force’s inability to maintain law and order in the Bogside and Creggan:
*Law and order not being effectively maintained. Present tactics - active containment of Bogside and Creggan plus attrition by patrols eg lifts, searches, ie military working from outside. ... Convinced must restore law and order in Bogside and Creggan painlessly as possible - means saturation - more troops to enable moderates to speak*
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25 At B1279.041 26 *Lost Lives*, page 111 27 *Lost Lives*, page 117 28 Op Directive 4/71, at G27.196 without fear. Occupation will be regarded as invasion represented as punitive and repressive but when dust settles majority glad, believe occupation to restore law and order.29
General Ford visited Londonderry on 12th December 1971, not returning to Lisburn until 14th December. He was clearly on an extensive fact finding mission, as on 14th December 1971 he produced his paper ‘Future Military Policy for Londonderry: An Appreciation of the Situation by CLF’ 30. Adding his own contemporary voice to those who saw the policy of 20th August 1971 as a failure, the General’s major concern was the terrorists. Having regard to the passages set out above, he had clearly been listening to his hosts, the senior commanders in 8 Brigade:
3. None of the expectations of the meeting with the “Committee of Thirty” have materialised. At present neither the RUC nor the military have control of the Bogside and Creggan areas, law and order are not being effectively maintained and the Security Forces now face an entirely hostile Catholic community numbering 33,000 in these two areas alone. Between 4 July and 13 December the Security Forces have suffered 22 casualties from the gunmen – 7 of which were fatal; there have been 380 confirmed shooting incidents; 1932 rounds have been fired at us – 364 being fired in reply and 1741 lbs of explosives have been used in 211 explosions (not counting 180 nail bombs). There are present 29 barricades up, 16 of which are impassable to 1 ton armoured vehicles.31
4. Until mid November, the policy adopted after the meeting of 20 August generally obtained, namely, no military routine patrolling in the Bogside and Creggan, and no military initiative other than that demanded in response to aggression or for specific search or arrest operations.32
5. Since 3 December, when the force level was increased by one battalion, the Security Forces have been carrying out
29 Brig MacLellan’s notes, at G30A.226.001 30 G41.263 31 G41.263 32 G41.264 battalion strength operations in the hostile areas. These have included recce and fighting patrols in depth and arrest, search and barricade clearance operations.33
6. ... Although a fair rate of attrition has been maintained against the terrorists, the three month containment phase between 20 August and 3 December has enabled the extremists to increase their hold on the Catholic community, and to recruit and train more volunteers. ... our best estimate is that the activists total some 1000, of whom half can be counted as the hooligan element, who themselves have a hard core of 250. The IRA strength is estimated at 100, of whom at least 40 are active gunmen.34
7. Meanwhile the extremists have made good use of the period of limited military activity. There are now sentries and searchlights on all major obstructions during the hours of darkness and an efficient alarm system of sirens, hooters and car horns has been established. Groups of men are organised, each under a leader and 30 to 40 strong, who appear at very short notice to deploy to prearranged positions. As a result of these precautions surprise has become almost impossible to achieve.
5A-19 The General has also clearly taken note of what the local commanders have said about the risks of alienating the non-violent Catholic population. Included in his analysis of the disadvantages of what he was referring to as Course 2 is the following:
Due to the rapid reaction, numerical strength and aggressive tactics of the opposition, the Security Forces are forced to use baton rounds and CS gas in large quantities. The former are ineffective and the latter, being an area weapon indiscriminate in nature, causes havoc amongst large sections of the community who are not involved, not intend to be involved in violence.35
5A-20 The General’s conclusions demonstrate the professionalism of his approach:
33 G41.264 34 G41.264 paragraph 6 35 G41.268 paragraph 15 19. The policy of restricting military activity in Londonderry as a result of the meeting on 20 August has produced no apparent beneficial result. The moderates have failed to assert their influences and the Bogside and Creggan areas are completely dominated by the extremists. The pause for political activity is now over and some new initiative is clearly necessary if the present stalemate is to be broken.
20. The only way to restore law and order in the Bogside and Creggan is to adopt Course 3 and there is no doubt that this is the best military solution. The difficulty of course is that the problem is not entirely a military one; indeed it can be argued that there is really no military necessity to enter the area at all, since it could be contained form the outside until such a time as a solution is reached elsewhere in the Province. The political disadvantages of Course 3 are considerable. It will be represented as repressive against one section of the community and will generate an emotive reaction, which could become politically counterproductive. It also requires 7 battalions, which cannot be provided from within N Ireland and therefore means a reinforcement of 3 additional battalions of infantry.36
21. Taking into account the history of Londonderry, the fact that it is almost universally recognised as something different from the rest of the Province, the proximity of the border, the Republican reaction and the fact that the IRA may well call off their campaign if defeated in Belfast, all lead to the conclusion that the decision whether to adopt Course 3 at the present time is entirely a political one. Circumstances could however change if for example the IRA were to amount (sic) an offensive from the hostile areas into other parts of the city.37
22. There seems to be little military value in continuing the Course 2 Policy compared with the antagonism which it is arousing in the community. It is true that gunmen may be shot, some intelligence may be gained and our ability to enter the area is demonstrated, albeit only in battalion
36 G41.271 37 G41.271. These sentiments do not sit easily with Mr Harvey's attempt to portray Gen Ford as politically insensitive Ford and cager to please the hard line Protestants. See Mr Harvey's Opening Statement at Day 044/003/22 strength and with copious use of CS gas. However the basic fault of this policy remains its temporary nature and its very harmful effect on those who might otherwise be prepared to forsake the IRA cause. It can be argued that all that it achieves is to drive the community further into the arms of the IRA and to increase the danger of a massive reaction. The wisdom of continuing with Course 2 is therefore in doubt unless the introduction of Course 3 were imminent.38
23. The best that can be said of Course 1 is that it does not stir the pot unduly in Creggan and the Bogside, but it must be recognised that the price to be paid is the fact that a community of 33,000 citizens of the UK will be allowed to remain in a state of anarchy and revolt. The containment aspect of this policy can certainly be achieved and the temptation to adopt this course until a cessation of hostilities elsewhere in Ulster is strong and certainly attractive from a political point of view. Some limited military benefit will also accrue in that some pressure is brought to bear on the IRA provided that the offensive aspect is given sufficient emphasis.39
24. To summarise, although Course 3 is the correct military solution to the problem of restoring law and order in Londonderry, the political drawbacks are so serious that it should not be implemented in the present circumstances. The dangers inherent in persisting with Course 2 are in no way balanced by the limited military gain and the right answer in the present circumstances is to adopt Course 1. In order to avoid comparison with the previous Course 1 which was adopted up to mid November40 and was too defensive and defeatist in concept, it might be best to call it Course one and a half.41
25. It is recommended that the present policy in Londonderry should be abandoned in favour of Course 1 as described in this Appreciation.42
38 G41.272 39 G41.272 40 This is a specific reference back to the policy in place prior to the Directive, which was dated 26.1.0.72 and resulted in 8 Bdc’s Directive of 10.11.71 41 G41.272 42 G41.272 In all senses General Ford was recommending a lower profile and therefore less provocative approach by the military:
Mr Clarke: Then your formal recommendation was that the present policy in Londonderry should be abandoned in favour of Course 1, as described in this appreciation. It looks from that, does it not, that in one sense you were reverting to a less provocative approach?
A: Yes.
Q: This policy, as I understand it, was approved by the Secretary of State; is that right?
A: Yes. I was not aware, until last week when I actually read the third draft of my Widgey statement, that the entire appreciation, after approval by General Tuzo, was forwarded to London.
Q: Until then you had known it had gone to Tuzo, but no more; is that right?
A: I know that the content of it had gone, but I did not know that the actual appreciation word for word had been sent right up to the top.
Q: Did you know that your recommendation had been approved by the Secretary of State?
A: Yes.43
General Ford’s next visit to Londonderry took place on 7th January 1972, just over a week after the fatal shooting of Gunner Ham of 22nd Regt on Foyle Rd44. It is ‘almost certain’45 that he went at the behest of General Tuzo in the wake of the Joint Security Committee meeting the previous day. The Minutes of that Meeting record that:
The Prime Minister mentioned that the Strand Traders Association had asked him to meet a deputation about a spread of violent activity into the William Street area of the
43 Day 253/042/07 44 Lost Lives, page 135 45 Gen Ford at Day 253/045/10 city. The Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Home Affairs stressed the harm that this was doing to business interests in the area and the danger of further spread. The GOC undertook to discuss the situation on the spot with the Association.
5A-23 General Ford accepted during his evidence to this Tribunal that his Memorandum to the GOC was likely to have been the paper dated 10th January 1972 originally attached as Annex B to the third draft statement for the Widgery Tribunal. The version of the memorandum available to the Tribunal is unsigned. There is in fact no evidence of there ever having been a signed version, and when he and General Ford met in 1998 General Tuzo had no recollection of ever having seen it.
5A-24 As to the situation then pertaining in Londonderry, it contains a summary of the information General Ford learned, the impressions he obtained and the conclusions he came to. It formed part of the reporting process it was incumbent upon him to carry out, given his own responsibilities, including the specific task that there is (effectively) a record of him having been given. It also records the orders he gave to Commander 8 Brigade in view of the impending NICRA march, to be held on 16th January.
5A-25 Although during his evidence to the Tribunal General Ford was criticised for writing it, paragraph 1 of the 10th January Memorandum simply shows a senior officer reporting on an important aspect of the situation as he found it in one of the Brigade areas for which he was responsible, an area in which there had been a steady and serious deterioration in the security situation over the preceding six months. It was his responsibility to attempt to assess the approach the local commanders were taking to the violence in Londonderry.
46 G47.291 47 Memorandum ‘The Situation in Londonderry as at 7th January 1972’, at G48.299 48 Day 254/003/06 49 Day 253/003/02 The Commander Land Forces was fully entitled, on the basis of the description of the difficulties they gave him, to form the view (right or wrong) that the attitude of some of the senior officers he met (including the Brigade Commander) was a cause for concern:
Neither foot nor mounted patrols now operate beyond the bend in William Street to the west of Waterloo Place as a regular feature of life. They claim that all foot patrols are put at risk from snipers from the Rossville Flats area (the ground all around here dominates the William Street area) and that if mounted patrols move in pigs, the pigs are surrounded by yobbos and this means that dismounted men must go with them with the consequential sniper reaction. They claim that the bombers (and of course there are only one or two each day) are mostly teenagers carrying small 5-10 pound devices who operate in the thickness of the shopping areas and cannot be detected by the considerable number of three man infantry patrols. Because of the number of ruined buildings and back alleyways which lead into the general area from the Bogside they claim it is impossible to either confine public movement or control it. In addition the vast majority of people in the shopping area not only give no help to our patrols but, if they saw a youth with a very small bag which might contain a bomb, they would be likely to shield the youths movements from the view of our patrols.
In paragraph 3 of the Memorandum General Ford reported on his meeting with the Strand Traders Association. Far from complying with all of the demands of these Protestant businessmen, the Commander Land Forces agreed to the construction of gates in an alleyway, said he would examine the practicability of establishing more Observation Posts and a military
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50 G48.299 paragraphs 1-2. See the next quotation. 51 At Day 258/026/11 Arthur Harvey QC suggested to Gen Ford that an attitude on the part of the Brig Comd whereby the latter felt he had to accept the situation as he found it was 'radically different' to a situation in which the Brig Comd was failing to produce an initiative. If not identical, these two formulations are intimately related, the latter failure being the direct result of the former attitude. 52 Memorandum 10th January 1972, G48.299 paragraph 2 53 Recorded at the end of G48.300 paragraph 3. Gen Ford did not just invent these invent these: Day 253/047/10 position at the west end of William Street and told them that they must themselves impose restrictions on access to their premises.
Paragraph 4 records both what the General had been told about the security situation and the conclusions he drew:
This situation is difficult enough but it is not beyond our capacity to deal with using normal IS methods and equipment, although I feel it probably needs the establishment of a further military base at the west end of William Street (this is now being examined as a matter of urgency, with the Stardust Club being the likely choice).
At paragraph 5 General Ford reported what he had been told by the military in Londonderry about the hooligan problem in Londonderry:
MR CLARKE: That looks, I think we have already established, have we not, as if that was an assessment given to you by the Army.
A: Yes.
There is no doubt that paragraph 5 of the Memorandum reflects the view of the commanders who had to deal with the problem. The Brigade Commander’s evidence to Lord Widgery about their impact was as follows:
A: The violence was spreading, sir. It was our intention and we have managed to contain it on the William Street line,
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54 Which appears to have been a consideration for him for his own, purely military reasons, in any event: see G48.300 paragraph 4, and below. 55 G48.299 paragraph 3(a) 56 G48.300 57 Despite Lord Gifford’s protestations about the use of the term hooligan the first use of the term Hooligan was not by the military. Some of these individuals appear to have used it to describe themselves with a degree of pride: see Eamonn McCann at AM77.31-32 and Day 087/158/06-159/13. The error in the description lay in any implication that these people were necessarily young: Patrick McCallion, for example, AM74, a witness who was prepared to admit that he was a regular rioter, was 29 in 1972. See Day 071/158/12-159/16 58 Day 253/054/01 which is being destroyed by arson, and so on, and there is definite pressure on the commercial area.
Q: North of it?
A: North of it.
Q: And there was a definite threat and risk to the Security Forces?
A: Yes, sir. Since July, when the gunmen have come on the streets to support the hooligans, the soldiers containing these riots and hooliganism have come under fire on many occasions.59
The former Commanding Officer of 1 Coldm Gds described to this Tribunal both his experiences of the DYH and the difficulties of catching them:
There was, however, in addition to the terrorists, a hardcore known as the 'Derry Young Hooligans' who were a constant irritation to the decent people of the City. The name Derry Young Hooligans was actually a complementary description as these were nasty, brutish young thugs who threw stones and petrol bombs, burnt cars and broke into houses. It was quite clear to me that they would exploit the march to their own ends in that there would almost certainly be either a riot or they would act as 'come ons' to the soldiers and the RUC, in effect inviting us to catch them but putting the soldiers and RUC officers in a position where snipers could open fire on them. They had often exploited such opportunities in the past.
The Derry Young Hooligans were regarded as a front for the IRA; they worked in conjunction with the IRA. They were basically young people with strong Republican tendencies.60
The hooligans were an absolute menace and in particular they were destroying a lot of the buildings in the shopping centre and towards Waterloo Place and they were also constantly provoking the forces of law and order, whether
59 B1246 60 BSI Statement, C598.1 paragraphs 6-7 they were RUC or military. And they were extremely difficult to engage; they were very fleet-of-foot; they knew the area very well and they had a very good system of watching their backs and we simply were not successful in arresting them.61
5A-32 The difficulties the hooligans caused for the military were clearly given to General Ford in stark terms:
Against the DYH ..... the Army in Londonderry is for the moment virtually incapable.62
5A-33 And their impact in terms of security in the City, albeit obvious, was on any view serious:
This incapacity undermines our ability to deal with the gunmen and bombers and threatens what is left of law and order on the West bank of the Foyle.63
5A-34 The sentence of this long paragraph which has been particularly seized upon reads as follows:
I am coming to the conclusion that the minimum force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected ring leaders amongst the DYH, after clear warnings have been issued.
5A-35 At the same time little attention has been given to the context in which the observation was made or its actual terms:
(1) the Army could not prevent the hooligans from breaking the law, including threatening the lives of the soldiers, with the internal security weapons that were available:
The weapons at our disposal are ineffective. This is because the DYH operate mainly in open areas where they can avoid the gas (and some have respirators, many have make- shift wet rag masks) and in open order beyond the accurate range of baton rounds. Alternatively, they operate in built up areas where, because of their tactics and the personal protection they have, CS gas has to be used in vast quantities and to such an extent that it seeps into nearby buildings and affects innocent people, often women and children. Attempts to close with the DYH bring the troops into the killing zones of the snipers.64
(2) General Ford had not formed a final view: he was ‘coming to the conclusion’;
(3) while there is no doubt that the 7.62 SLR adapted to fire .22 ammunition remained a lethal weapon, General Ford did as a matter of fact draw the distinction between on the one hand causing less damage to the targeted individual and on the other the danger of injury to more than one person:
I believe we would be justified in using 7.62 mm but in view of the devastating effects of this weapon and the danger of rounds killing more than the person aimed at, I believe we must consider using rifles adapted to fire HV .22 to enable ring leaders to be engaged with this lethal ammunition.
(4) in terms of the practicalities, the only step reported was that thirty of the adapted weapons had been sent to 8 Brigade for zeroing and familiarisation training. The weapons were in the Province as part a long standing initiative (which originated with HQNI under General Tuzo’s predecessor) to provide the troops with a weapon less likely to cause injury to more than the person targeted in the internal security environment. There was a long way to go before the weapons could be a part of the standard equipment carried by the troops:
64 G48.300 paragraph 6 MR CLARKE: Are you saying that paragraph 6 was simply an idea, the details of which would have to be worked out later if it was to be put into effect?
A: Absolutely. It is purely an idea. A first suggestion.65
(5) the weapons were not to be used operationally without authorisation. General Ford appreciated that a change in the Yellow Card would have been required before his thoughts were ever to become policy in the Province.
5A-36 Furthermore, little attention was paid to the terms of paragraph 766:
If this course is implemented, as I believe it may have to be, we would have to accept the possibility that .22 rounds may be lethal. In other words, we would be reverting to the methods of IS found successful on many occasions overseas, but would merely be trying to minimise the lethal effects by using the .22 round. I am convinced that our duty to restore law and order requires us to consider this step.
5A-37 Whether General Ford had got the technicalities right or not, his intentions were and remain clear:
MR GLASGOW: General Ford, there is one matter, if I may, to put to you on the memo of the visit on 7th January which we have as G48.29. It has been put to you so many times, but there is one passage, reminding yourself of G48.29. Perhaps we should go straight to G48.300. Do you remember the infamous paragraph 6 at the bottom of the page?
A. Yes.
Q. There are two matters I would like you to deal with if you can, General Ford, when you say in this paragraph the sentence: "I believe we would be justified in using 7.62-millimetre, but in view of the devastating effects of this weapon and the danger of rounds killing more than the person ..." Are there two dangers being referred to, two
65 Day 253/060/14 66 G48.301 undesirable consequences being referred to? Or is it just the risk of more than one person being killed?
A. No, I think there are two.
Q. What is the first? When you say: "... in view of the devastating effects of this weapon ..." ... is that simply a further illustration of the concern that more than one person might be killed? Or is it something else and, if so, what?
A. The problem is that the 7.62 is very likely to kill.
Q. In answer to Lord Saville you have said that you would know that the intention and the orders of the soldiers would have been to aim to kill with what is a potentially lethal weapon?
A. Yes.
Q. So the risk of somebody being killed is something that you accept was anticipated?
A. Yes.
Q. Could we go over the page and look at the top sentence of the following page. Again may I ask you what this means: "If this course is implemented, as I believe it may have to be, we would have to accept the possibility that .22 rounds may be lethal." What did you mean by that?
A. A .22 round would really only be lethal, as I understand it, if it hit you in an absolutely vital place.
Q. Which is what, as you accept, the soldiers were expected to aim for?
A. To aim for, yes.
Q. This sentence where you are expressing the view that it has to be accepted that there is a possibility that .22 rounds may be lethal, does that have anything to do with your intentions or your desires or your anticipation of what might happen?
A. What I wanted was to disable the people concerned if we used this weapon. That was the primary aim. Q: Accepting the possibility that they might be killed? A: Of course, accepting it, yes.67
While Eversheds had recorded the surprise of many officers at General Ford's thinking (or the thinking as explained to them by the Eversheds interviewers), little interest68 was shown in the fact that General Ford was not alone in thinking that the arrangements current in January 1972 disadvantaged the troops. This is a passage from the evidence to this Tribunal of Colonel Jackson:
MR GLASGOW: Could we go, please, to the third page of your statement, which we have at CJ2.3, and could you please help the Tribunal with paragraphs 9 and 10. In paragraph 9 you wrote, or your statement records, that: "The Yellow Card in Northern Ireland was different to the ones under which we operated in Aden and Malaya. In comparison with them it is restrictive: in retrospect too restrictive, when operating against bombers and stone throwers." In what way did you consider the Yellow Card was too restrictive when your soldiers were operating against stone throwers, Colonel?
A: Against stone throwers?
Q: Yes, that is the word you use, the second of the two phrases?
A: I said bombers and stone throwers.
Q: So you did. Now would you answer my question?
A: I have, and probably you have also, copies of the Yellow Card.
Q: Yes.
A: You also have the MoD instruction of October 1971, which led to the amendment of the Northern Ireland Yellow Card in November 1971.
67 Day 260/118/05 68 Not even from Counsel to the Tribunal Q: Yes.
A: Here we have, and to my mind at that time, something confusing, a bit of confusion, but I go back, if I may, to when I first went to Northern Ireland in December 1969, while we were on standby, the spearhead battalion to go to Belfast, and I asked in Belfast, because I saw a lot of people using petrol bombs, and I said "what does the Yellow Card say in Northern Ireland about petrol bombs?" The remark I got back was, "We do not take action against petrol bombers," although the Yellow Card says you may fire after due warning against a person throwing a petrol bomb, after due warning, but it does not say you may fire without warning at a petrol bomber, and it states that firearms include grenade, nail bomb or gelignite-type bomb, not petrol bombs. So the petrol bombing was a very, to my mind, funny area.
Q: That was why, sir, with respect, I asked you about stone throwers. May I say I accept the force of the point you have made, that the Yellow Card may have been inadequately clear, insufficiently clear about various types of bomber. I will repeat my question if I may, because it may be important to others of whom the same question or similar questions have been asked: in what way did you consider that the Yellow Card was too restrictive when your troops were operating against stone throwers?
A: Well, it did not mention stone throwers.
Q: And it should have done, should it?
A: In Aden in 1967, it mentions stone throwers, but only for escorts and mobile patrols and it states: "If you are only stoning, tell your driver to keep going and get away. Do not fire unless the stoning is so serious that you really believe the vehicle may be stopped altogether and that you, the driver or your passengers will be seriously injured." The one thing about Yellow Cards, if I may say so, is that in Aden the opening gambit, to my mind, was very good; it gives individual responsibility and says: "Always use the minimum force necessary to achieve your aim."
Q: I am sure that is very laudable, sir. Please would you answer my question?
A: If you use what in your opinion is the minimum force, you need never fear the consequences.
Q: Again, sir, I am sure that is right and I am sure that is very laudable and it may well be that you are recorded here in your statement as saying something that you did not really mean to say. If so, it is right that you should have the opportunity of correcting it. But I will respectfully suggest that it is an important point, in a statement made to a solicitor to this Inquiry. May I ask the question again — and I mean no disrespect to you, sir, please listen to it, sir. If you refuse to answer my question, that is a matter for you: in what way did you believe that the Yellow Card was too restrictive when your soldiers were operating against stone throwers?
A: It did not give any direction and stone throwing was a big issue in Northern Ireland. There should have been some directive to my soldiers about stone throwing.
Q: Something less restrictive that enabled them to shoot stone throwers in certain extreme conditions; is that the point?
A: Yes, whatever the lawyers or the Ministry of Defence saw fit. But there was no direction.
Q: Whether that be right or wrong is a matter for others to comment on, but you believed that thought ought to have been given to the question of whether or not things had reached such a stage that some kind of fire might have to be directed at rioters, as distinct from shooters; that is fair, is it?
A: Yes.
Q: Very well, thank you, sir. 69
Paragraph 8 of the Memorandum is concerned with the NICRA march which, at the time the Memorandum was drafted, was anticipated the following weekend, to which this Submission will now turn.
69 Day 286/040/01 CHAPTER 5B
PROLOGUE TO THE MARCH: 7TH JANUARY TO 25TH JANUARY 1972
5B-1 There is no doubt that Brigadier MacLellan was right when, in his letter to General Ford of 15th March 1972, he wrote that for the purposes of his discussions with Chief Superintendent Lagan on 24th January 'the question of whether the march should or should not be stopped was academic'. He would in fact have been right had he been speaking of his discussions with General Ford on 7th January 1972, as the policy decisions in relation to marches had by then already been taken, above the level of both of these officers, in the wake of marches far removed from Londonderry (on 25th December 1971 and 2nd January 1972): these marches were to be stopped.2
5B-2 It is against that background that paragraph 8 of CLF's memo of 10th January 1972 must be read:
I told Commander 8 Brigade that he was to prepare a plan over this weekend based on the assumption that the march was to be stopped as near to its starting point as was
1 G128.849 2 See the NISEC paper dated 5th January 1972 at G53.318 and paragraph 7 of the PUS' Memo written to the Secretary of State on 6th January 1972, at G46A.288.2. The final decision was taken at the JSC meeting of 13th January, in the Minutes of which (at G52.315) the Chief Constable can be seen 'emphasizing the importance of stopping marches decisively, leaving no room for infiltration.' The Brigadier could have added that the Chief Superintendent would have known as well as he did that any discussion as to whether or not to stop the march was academic, as a joint RUC/Army Instruction (G59.362) on the subject had been issued to the RUC and police on 19th January 1972 (just five days before the meeting), which stated that 'It is essential that the prohibition be strictly enforced'. 3 G48.301 For these purposes it is accepted that this is indeed the date of the document. It is not accepted, as has been suggested, to Gen Ford at Day 258/049/22, that this memo was tabled at the JSC Meeting of 13 January 1972: the document tabled was clearly the NISEC document, as is apparent from its location in amongst the JSC documentation at G52 to G54. practical and taking into account the likelihood of some form of battle (therefore he must choose a place of tactical advantage) and also the fact that the minimum damage must be done to the shopping centre. ... It is the opinion of the senior commanders in Londonderry, that, if the march takes place, the DYH backed up by the gunmen will undoubtedly take over control at an early stage.
5B-3 The steps General Ford has taken in respect of the forthcoming march are, as one would expect, entirely consistent with the developments that have been taking place at the levels of command and responsibility above him and (it being safe to assume that he would have seen it) the NISEC paper of 5th January 1972:
(1) he takes it as read that the march is to be stopped as near to its starting point as possible;
(2) the likelihood of violence is to be factored into the planning for the event ('some sort of battle'. Violence as a consequence of stopping marches was specifically drawn to the JSC's attention in the NISEC paper of 5th January 4).
5B-4 The General has also clearly listened to and taken note of the local commanders' (certainly Brigadier MacLellan and possibly Chief Superintendent Lagan5) views about the prospects of violence at the event and is reporting these views up the chain of command. These local views are without doubt accurately recorded in the Memo, as they are set out expressly in the document produced by Headquarters 8 Brigade as a result of these discussions, the outline plan for the march on 16th January6. There is nothing to suggest that at this stage the Chief Superintendent was voicing any disagreement with the notion that the march was going at some stage to have to be stopped, either in his own discussions with the
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1 G53.318 2 Day 253/078/15 3 G49.302 paragraph 4(b), (h) and (k) CLF or in any discussion he may have had with the Brigade Commander for the latter to pass on.
5B-5 The plan produced on 10th January 1972 in accordance with the General’s instructions provided for the RUC to be in the vanguard of the effort to block the path of the march. It is at the very least likely that there had been some consultation with the RUC during the course of its preparation: the lack of information as to the intentions of the organisers available to both the uniformed and Special branches of the local police are noted at paragraphs 2 and 3, and Chief Superintendent Lagan’s need for massive reinforcements in the event of a police lead operation is recorded at paragraph 4e.
5B-6 Despite suggestions to the contrary before this Tribunal, the reaction of HQNI in general or of General Ford in particular to this plan is and will remain unknown. The event of 16th January 1972 having been cancelled or postponed, there were clearly other things to focus on until it became known that the event was to be revived for 30th January. There is in particular no evidence that the plan was simply rejected, by the CLF or anyone else. If what was put to General Ford by Mr Clarke, that the General ‘simply rejected’ the plan, was intended to imply a rejection of the plan without good reason, the suggestion has no evidential basis and is not accepted. It may well be that had the march proceeded on the earlier date as originally planned the Security Forces would have managed it as set out in the original plan.
7 G49.302 8 In his questioning of General Ford Christopher Clarke QC made the assumption that the central concept of this plan, ie that the RUC rather than the Army would block the route of the march, came from 8 Brigade: see Day 254/049/10. We do not accept or understand that assumption. 9 In particular by Christopher Clarke QC to Gen Ford, at Day 254/10/01: ‘I think it must follow that you must simply have rejected that proposal’. The gap in the evidence in relation to planning for a Londonderry march continues until 24th January 1972, when the march now proposed for 30th January was discussed by Brigadier MacLellan and Chief Superintendent Lagan at a meeting at Ebrington Barracks also attended by the Chief Superintendent’s deputy, Superintendent McCullagh.
Chief Superintendent Lagan’s evidence to Lord Widgery about this meeting resulted in a degree of controversy in 1972. This must now be resolved in favour of General MacLellan given his evidence to this Tribunal that at the time, so far as he was concerned, the fact that the Government had decided that the march was going to be stopped was effectively his starting point. Chief Superintendent Lagan’s evidence as set out in his statement has not been tested as he has not appeared as a witness before this Tribunal. The meeting was not, of course, a formal meeting for the purposes of joint military/Army planning for the event: the Chief Superintendent had asked for this opportunity to air his own views. While this controversy was raised with General MacLellan by Christopher Clarke QC, who asked in particular whether for reasons of politeness or other reasons he might not have communicated his view of the proposal to allow the march to proceed with photography for later prosecutions to the Chief Superintendent (a suggestion which General MacLellan did not accept), no Interested Party asked about it.
The meeting ended with both the Chief Superintendent and the Brigadier stating that they would report to their superiors. Chief Superintendent Lagan apparently submitted a report to the Chief Constable. Given the
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10 See Brigadier MacLellan’s letter to Gen Ford dated 15th March 1972, at B1279.001 11 Day 261/043/20 12 At JL1.4, and dated 13th December 1998 13 Day 261/043/20 14 Day 261/039/14-045/03 15 Day 261/041/10 16 JL1.10 paragraph 51 Chief Constable’s views as recorded in the minutes of the JSC meeting of 13th January, see note 2 above, it is doubtful whether any report along the lines claimed by Chief Superintendent Lagan would have been acceptable to him. Brigadier MacLellan reported by way of his signal to CLF of 24th January 1972.17
5B-10 Entirely consistently with what he has always maintained about what happened at the meeting, Brigadier MacLellan reported (i) that the Chief Superintendent was urging identification and photography for the purpose of prosecutions rather than confrontation; and that (ii) for his part he agreed with the Chief Superintendent that the consequences of stopping the march would be very serious, sufficiently serious to render his present force levels inadequate.18
5B-11 What, if any, thinking about the revived march had been going on at HQNI prior to 25th January 1972 is now impossible to discern. As of that date, however, the general approach being taken by General Ford (and therefore presumably General Tuzo) becomes clear. Brigadier MacLellan’s note of his telephone conversation on 25th January19 shows that 8 Brigade was to cordon off the Bogside and Creggan approaches and was required to prevent damage to the commercial and Protestant areas of the City. As to force levels, the Brigade Commander would receive additional assistance in the form of the Province Reserve (1 KOB), the 39 Brigade Reserve (1 PARA) and possibly a further battalion from outside the Province. The note shows that CLF at that stage saw 1 PARA in a ‘counter attack’ role, going ‘round the back’ to arrest three to four hundred rioters. This was to be a military operation. The Brigade
17 G70A.441.001 18 G70A.441.002 paragraph 2 19 B1279.081 Commander’s plan, with a marked up map, was to be with CLF by the following morning, the 26th January 1972.20
There has been debate before this Tribunal as to the reasons for the change in approach between the 10th January, when 8 Brigade submitted its plan for the RUC to be in the vanguard, with a modest reserve at Drumahoe, and 25th January, when the Army are to replace the RUC and will also provide for a reserve force which would enable it to arrest the hooligans (the provision for an arrest force will be dealt with in the next section of this Submission). The tenor of much of the debate appears to have been critical of General Ford, there being an assumption that he rejected the 8 Brigade plan to have the RUC to the fore without good reason.21 If this is the case, the assumption is not accepted and was not based on any evidence.
The witnesses who were asked about the difference in the two plans during the course of this Inquiry concentrated on the different expectations of the size of the march on the two occasions: General MacLellan thought a march of 1,000 would have been well within the capabilities of the RUC while, so far as he could remember, the predictions were for a ‘vast’ march on 30th January22; General Steele remembered there having been much greater certainty in respect of the 30th January march, in respect of which people were talking of an
20 At Day 253/077/06 Mr Clarke put it to Gen Ford that there would have been no problem asking the police, in particular Chief Superintendent Lagan, about the likely size of this march. Gen Ford answered, correctly, that the proper way for things to be done was in accordance with the chain of command. But in reality, by the time he spoke to Brig MacLellan on the telephone on 25th January Gen Ford had received the Chief Superintendent’s views on both the likely size of the march and the consequences of stopping it, as both are recorded in Brig MacLellan’s signal of the previous day. The normal channels had proved to be effective.
21 Christopher Clarke QC’s suggestion to Gen Ford, at Day 254/010/01: ‘I think it must follow that you must simply have rejected that proposal’, already referred to.
22 Day 261/037/13 attendance of 10,000 when the Brigade started to plan for it; and General Ford saw the size of the march on the later date as a decisive factor.
These answers are supported by the contemporaneous documentation: the plan for the 16th January march anticipated one thousand marchers if it was to be ignored by the Security Forces and two to three thousand if the Security Forces were to stop it; the Operation Order for Operation Forecast recorded an estimate of between 3,000 to 8,000 or 12,000 marchers; the Notes for the Co-Ordinating Conference put the estimate at 20,000, with an actual expectation of 5,000; and a newspaper published an advertisement for a ‘gigantic’ anti-internment march.
While these responses did not appear to satisfy Counsel to the Tribunal (Mr Clarke in the case of General Ford and Mr Rawat in the case of General Steele), they are in fact an answer to the question raised. Brigadier MacLellan’s evidence is that a small march, of 1,000 or so, would have been within the capabilities of the RUC but a larger one would not. In the plan dated 10th January, when the estimate of the numbers was either 1,000 or between 2,000 and 3,000 (depending on the Security Force’s reaction) Headquarters 8 Brigade recorded (presumably having consulted the RUC on this issue as well as that of expected
23 Day 266/035/23 24 Day 254/048/03 25 G49.302 paragraph 4(a) 26 G95.564 paragraph 1(e)(1) 27 G88.537 Serial 1 remark 2(b) 28 KH8.5 29 Having asked for and received Gen Ford’s answers on this issue at Day 254/011 and then moved on to discuss other topics, Mr Clarke then returned to it at Day 254/047, asking ‘What had caused the change from the earlier to the later proposal?’ 30 ‘... can you help us with why there was such a change in approach, other than the fact that you were not too certain of how many people were going to turn up?’ Day 266/035/19. In fact Gen Steele was saying that they were much more certain of the number – it was a large number who were likely to attend. 31 Day 261/037/13 numbers) that 'massive reinforcements will be required by Comd N Div if he is to conduct such an operation.'
5B-16 It is not now possible to tell whether or not those reinforcements were available or could ever have been mobilised, but there is no reason to suppose other than that the numbers spoke for themselves. Once the decision had been taken that this march was to be stopped at some stage along its route security force personnel were going to be required in large numbers; and once security force personnel were going to be required in large numbers the reality was that the Army would have to manage the march.
5B-17 Although the anticipated numbers of marchers was of itself a persuasive reason for the change in approach, there is also the issue of violence, to which General Ford attempted to turn, with only partial success:
Mr Clarke: It seems, to the uninitiated, a very dramatic change of approach.
A: It is a definite change of approach. But of course the size of this march, and the indications of the extent of the rioting that was likely to take place, dictated the fact that the Army would have to be in control from the start.
Q: I follow the point that you make about size, because the sort of numbers that appear to have been in contemplation for the earlier march were 2,000 plus; the numbers that appear to be talked about at this stage are somewhere between 8 to 12,000, which is self-evidently much greater. But you say at the end of this paragraph that we see on the screen, 7.25, that: "... the forecasts of the size of the later march and its potential repercussions for law and order in Londonderry were such that large numbers of troops would be required ..." What were you referring to by the phrase "its potential repercussions for law and order in Londonderry"?
32 G49.302 paragraph 4(e) 33 Day 254/048/03 A: Had not Lagan reported by then that there would be extensive repercussions? And had we also not by then — or by then received also intelligence reports of the violence that was likely to follow? I think we had.
Q: Yes. Paradoxically, Lagan had prophesied violence if the march was stopped. In fact, the report that is the subject of the signal was a report as at the 26th January, which, as it happens, was the Wednesday actually after the plan had been conceived.
A: Yes.
Q: When you say "potential repercussions for law and order", do you mean simply that, because of the size of the march and the number of hooligans who were expected to be there, you had to adopt a different approach from that which had been put forward by 8th Brigade in early January?
A: Yes.
5B-18 It goes without saying that larger numbers on the march could be expected, certainly so far as security force planning was concerned, to result in greater involvement in and therefore levels of violence. But the evidence on this issue is more specific than that, and in one important respect it was not shown to General Ford. There are two aspects: (i) gunmen; and (ii) hooliganism.
5B-19 What was not shown in this context to General Ford in this context was the evidence going to the activity of the gunmen during the two weeks leading up to 30th January 1972 and the threat assessments in the two documents relating to the marches. What he was given was the following:
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34 Mr Clarke did not explain the basis of his suggestion that that the concept which became the approach of the document of 10th January originated in 8 Brigade rather than in HQNI or more particularly with Gen Ford. It will be recalled that the overall concept for the march of 30th January, ultimately contained in the Operation Order for Operation Forecast, was given to Commander 8 Brigade by Gen Ford over the telephone on 25th January. Gen Ford had been in Londonderry on 7th January and had ordered Commander 8 Brigade to prepare this plan and submit the document and it is at the least possible that the concept to go in the plan formed a part of their discussions. There is no possibility that the Brig would have submitted a plan with a central concept which contradicted any wishes expressed by the General. Summarising the memorandum: it appears to propose RUC to play a large part in attempting to halt the march; local units to be engaged with the reserve of two companies of the province reserve being deployed at Drumahoe Factory. That summary took no account of an important rider, contained in paragraph 4f of the 10th January plan. It reads:
This RUC cordon technique will not be used if there is a threat from gunmen. In this event Army action will be necessary from the time the entire parade has got under way.
While the document contains the inevitable reference to a threat from gunmen, it does not do so in the terms seen by the time the Operation Order for Operation Forecast was drawn up during the night of 26/27th January, by which time the threat included:
IRA terrorist activity, to take advantage of the event, to conduct shooting attacks against the Security Forces, and bombing attacks against Business, Shopping and Commercial premises in the City Centre.
This paragraph raises the possibility that some information, albeit not precise, about IRA intentions did come to the attention of the Security Forces between 10th and 25th January 1972: it may be that the source was not an RUC source, but the one the Director of Intelligence referred to in his later signal to Commander 8 Brigade (in that signal the source is described as 'known to' Brigadier MacLellan: this person may have come
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35 Day 254/008/06 36 G49.303 37 At paragraphs 4b (Some gunmen are certain to be sheltering behind the hooligan ranks) and 8 (Army action will only take place if the RUC have been brushed aside, or if gunmen are present from the start of the event) 38 G95.565 paragraph 2(b) 39 G81A.511.1. Gcn Ford cannot now remember the outcome of D Int's visit to Londonderry in the week commencing 10th January 1972: see Day 253/077/03. And neither can the D Int, David: KD2.1 paragraph 7 to the knowledge of the Brigadier when the Director of Intelligence visited Londonderry in the week commencing 10th January 1972).
5B-22 Alternatively, it may be that the Threat paragraph of the Operation Order (above) resulted from the level of IRA activity in Londonderry in the period under discussion, which Brigadier MacLellan described in 1972 as follows:
In the two weeks prior to the march, the IRA was particularly active within the City and the Security Forces were fired on in 80 confirmed incidents, in which 319 rounds were fired, and a total of 84 nail bombs were thrown at them. Security Force casualties during this period were 2 killed and 2 wounded. A feature of some of these attacks was the use of hooligan crowd cover.40
5B-23 That this was a factor in General Ford’s mind can be seen in his 1972 statement, which contains the following at paragraph 14: ‘In the two weeks prior to the march, the IRA had been particularly active’.41
5B-24 While during the course of his evidence to this Tribunal General Ford was shown Brigadier MacLellan’s signal of 24th January 1972, its precise terms were not drawn to his attention in this context. In the signal Brigadier MacLellan was reporting that the local police commander envisaged ‘intense violence’ if (as it was going to be) the march was stopped42, and increased violence that ‘will continue for days’.43 On any view the situation described would present a serious challenge to the Security Forces.
5B-25 Given the evidence that there is about the capabilities of the RUC (in particular the need for massive reinforcements given that the march was to
40 Brig MacLellan’s 1972 Statement, B1233 paragraph 19. Confirmed to Lord Widgery at B1247 41 B1143 42 G70A.441.001 paragraph 1(b) 43 G70A.441.001 paragraph 1(c) be stopped) an Army operation on 30th January 1972 was the only possible outcome. The issue has been debated before the Tribunal, but no one has been able to suggest that the RUC could have handled the violence that in fact took place.
5B-26 It was Chief Superintendent Lagan's predictions of the likely scale of the violence which also necessitated the provision of a reserve in a position to carry out an arrest operation. And those predictions were passed on to General Ford the day before he and Brigadier MacLellan spoke about the 30th January march on the telephone. CHAPTER 5C
PLANNING AT HQNI
As at 25th January 1972, the earliest date in relation to which there is evidence of the thinking of HQNI as the 30th January march approached, General Ford, who knew that the march was to be stopped at some point along its route, had at least the following information available to him:
1. the local RUC’s estimate of both the size of the march: eight thousand to twelve thousand; and the likely repercussions of putting into effect the decision to stop it: ‘intense violence’ and ‘increased violence’ and ‘smaller marches’ continuing for days;
2. presumably sight or at least an awareness of an earlier RUC assessment that no trouble was anticipated, which could no longer
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1 At Day 260/008/08 Sir Louis Blom-Cooper asked whether he had got in touch with NICRA, which had its headquarters in Belfast. General Ford replied that any information from NICRA would have reached him by way of RUC channels. The question was a naïve one. The Security Forces were, entirely correctly anticipating that NICRA would not be able to control the hooligans; and NICRA was not in any event an organisation that could be trusted: both the military and Special Branch felt, also correctly that NICRA had an unhealthy relationship with the Official IRA: see INQ 2225’s BSI Statement, C2225.3 paragraph 12 (a view Michael Mansfield QC chose to challenge with Gen Ford Day 260/056/17 but not with INQ 2225). As Col Roy Jackson told this Tribunal, when asked by Ms McGahay (at Day 285/029/22) whether he recalled receiving any intelligence to the effect that the IRA would not fire because of the numbers of people present, ‘No. We could not allow that to be part of the operational plan.’
2 Reported by Comd RUC N Div to Comd 8 Bdc, reported on up the chain of command by means of the latter’s signal to CLF of 24th January 1972
3 G66.411. Somewhat surprisingly there has been a degree of controversy in relation to the status of this document: in his Opening Arthur Harvey QC referred to it as ‘an appendix to document G64.380 ... the overall Special Branch assessment’ at Day 045/005/21, and Barry MacDonald QC referred to it in similar terms as ‘an appendix to the Special Branch assessment for the relevant period’ when questioning INQ 2225 at Day 384/146/03. The problem may arise out of the misdescription of this document in the Index to Volume 3 of Bundle G: ‘Appendix B to Special Branch Assessment for Period Ending 19 January 1972’. The first three headings of the Minutes of the Meeting of the JSC of 20th January (G63.377) are 1 Special Branch Assessment for the Period ended 19 January 1972, 2 Schedule of Incidents and Situation Report and 3 Forthcoming Events. The documents that follow the be relied on given the information he had received in Commander 8 Brigade's signal of 24th January;
(3) the information given to him about Londonderry on 7th January 1972, when he had had discussions with Commander 8 Brigade, Commander N Division and the Commanding Officer of the City Battalion Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson. So far as presently material this amounted to:
(a) the opinion of the senior commanders that if the march were to take place, however good the intentions of the organisers might be, the Derry Young Hooligans, backed up by the gunmen, would undoubtedly take control at an early stage;
(b) what he had been told about the DYH: gangs of tough teenage youths who had developed sophisticated tactics of brick and stone throwing, destruction and arson and who acted under the cover of snipers. Brigadier MacLellan later described the situation to Lord Widgery in the following terms:
Apart from the use of firearms against static military positions and the observation posts, a large number of unemployed youths gathered daily at the points of entry into the areas which were guarded by troops in order to attack them with stones and other missiles. Nail bombs were used with great frequency during these attacks. Great
Minutes carry those very same headings and appear in that very same order. The document in question was clearly produced for the Meeting, and relates to a different item on the agenda to the item under which the Special Branch Assessment was considered. This arrangement needs to be contrasted with the Minutes of the JSC Meeting of 27th January 1972, where there was no Special Assessment to be considered (as these were produced fortnightly) but Forthcoming Events is still an item on the Agenda, the discussion under this heading was recorded in the Minutes, and the document headed Forthcoming Events (G78.484, clearly produced weekly) is in the same place in the annexures, after the Schedule of Incidents and Situation Report for that period. use was made by gunmen of the cover offered by the gangs of youths which made it increasingly difficult to engage the youths at close quarters in order to effect arrest. The situation has now arisen that the behaviour of these youths backed by gunmen and bombers, has created a serious threat, not only to the commercial areas of the city but also to the lives of the security forces whose duty it is to deal with them.4
(c) what he had been told about the Army’s current inability to deal with the DYH:
Against the DYH – described by the People’s Democracy as “Brave Fighters in the Republican cause” – the Army is for the moment virtually incapable.
The Brigade Commander’s analysis of this, set out in the first draft of his statement for the Widgery Tribunal, but no doubt consistent with that given when he saw the General on 7th January, was simple:
Until July 1971 the Security Forces were able to contain these hooligan gangs, and a considerable number of them were arrested and charged with disorderly behaviour. It was also possible to conduct extensive scoop-up operations of these rioters, the last of which was in July 1971 when 27 of them were arrested in one swoop. But since July 1971, when the IRA campaign opened in Londonderry, and the shooting started, the hooligan gangs have been operating under cover of snipers in nearby buildings. This had the effect of strictly limiting the scope of hooligan arrest operations that we have been able to mount; no longer are we able to use snatch squads and out-flanking manoeuvres, as these entail deployment on foot and expose our troops to sniper fire.5
4 1972 Statement, B1229 paragraphs 3- and 4 5 B1279.018. In his BSI Statement Col Roy Jackson made great claims for his ‘Derry Hook’: see CJ2.4 paragraphs 19- 21. Col Jackson appears to have forgotten that the last such operation by his battalion took place as long before 30th January 1972 as 16th July 1971, a date which coincides with the time the Brigadier says that IRA sniping put an end to large arrest operations. The abandonment of operations such as these may explain why the CO of the other battalion resident in the area by 30th January 1972, Col Peter Welsh, had never heard of the statistics for injuries and damage to property in Londonderry so far that year. Gunner Ham had been fatally wounded on the Foyle Road just over a week before the General’s visit, and on 9th November 1971 Lance Corporal Curtis had been shot dead on the Foyle Road and Lance Bombadier Tilbury and Gunner Stephens had been murdered in a bomb attack on the Rosemount Police Station on 27th October 1971. In all there had been twenty two Security Force casualties, seven of them fatal, in three hundred and eighty shooting incidents between 4th July and 13th December 1971. In the same period there had been two hundred and eleven explosions and one hundred and eighty nail bombs;
possibly some information from the Director Intelligence, who had been to Londonderry on what is likely to have been 9th January and was to report on the 10th. There is no record of any such information and no one has any recollection as to whether there was any or not, but David’s later signal to Commander 8 Brigade, of 27th January 1972, does include the phrase ‘the source known to you’; the most likely occasion for Brigadier MacLellan to have become aware of such a source was perhaps during discussions about the source on this visit.
the hook: Day 283/045/01, although Captain INQ 1495, a Company Commander (and previously, during the same tour, the Adjutant of) in 1 R ANGLIAN does not remember the phrase ‘Derry Hook’ being in use at the time: Day 304/052/16 6 29th December 1971. Lost Lives, page 135 7 Lost Lives, page 117 8 Lost Lives, page 111 9 Future Military Policy for Londonderry, An Appreciation of the Situation by CLF, G41.263 paragraph 3 10 David, not surprisingly at this remove and given his age and health, does not now remember his visit: see KD2.1 paragraph 7, Day 330/007/01 and Day 330/070/13. It cannot be assumed after more than 30 years, that just because there are no contemporaneous records and no present memories, such information did not exist. 11 G81A.511.1 (6) 8 Brigade's requirement for additional troops in order to contain the march.
(7) at least one and probably more than one newspaper advertisement publicising a 'gigantic' march.\\textsuperscript{12}
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
5C-2 The outcome of HQNI's consideration of this material can be seen at least in part in Brigadier MacLellan's note of his telephone discussion with the Commander Land Forces on 25\\textsuperscript{th} January 1972: in accordance with the requirement that the march would have to be stopped, 8 Brigade was to block the path of the march and prevent damage to the shopping and Protestant areas of the City; in view of the large numbers of people anticipated and the increased levels of violence (hooliganism and gunmen), the blockades were to be protected by troops able to fire volleys of baton rounds and 'snipers' (the inverted commas appear in the Brigadier's note); the additional forces required to achieve the massive containment effort would be provided: the Province Reserve, 1\\textsuperscript{st} Battalion the King's Own Border Regiment (1KOB), the 39 Brigade Reserve, 1\\textsuperscript{st} Battalion the Parachute Regiment (1 PARA), and possibly a further battalion from outside the Province (in the event Tactical Headquarters and two companies of the 3rd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (3RRF)).
5C-3 Given the situation the military faced, these arrangements are what would be expected. The controversy here arises, of course, out of the specific task envisaged for 1 PARA:
\\textit{In addition CLF 'saw' 1 PARA in reserve in the City to 'counter-attack ie go round the back to arrest 300 - 400 rioters.'}
\\textsuperscript{12}KH8.5 THE NEED FOR AN ARREST OPERATION
5C-4 A significant amount of time has been spent with the senior officers during the course of this Tribunal on the issue of General Ford’s decision to establish an arrest force for the march on 30th January 1972. In its deliberations the Tribunal will no doubt take note of the fact that there is no evidence from military or police witnesses that either the creation of a reserve for the purpose, or the idea of it ‘going round the back’, was in any way an unreasonable step. Such controversy as there is (and it is not as extensive as some have chosen to paint it) goes not to whether there should have been provision for an arrest operation but to whether the arrest operation should have been carried out by a local battalion or a non-local battalion, and in particular before this Tribunal, by 1 PARA.
5C-5 As Brigadier MacLellan said to Desmond Hamill:
_We had for months being trying to arrest hooligans – and if there was a suitable opportunity to scoop up a bundle at the barrier it had my approval and Lagan’s approval._
5C-6 And as Col Jackson told this Tribunal:
_Although I did not question the, then, need to arrest hooligans, the actual arrest operation needed to careful planning in that (all agreed) there had to be separation between the hooligan element and the marchers ..._
5C-7 The reason for this uniformity of approach amongst the Londonderry commanders may derive from their common appreciation of the dangers
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13 At Day 256/018/07 Gerard Elias QC put it to Gen Ford, as a criticism, that there had not been any consultation with 8 Brigade on the wisdom of carrying out an arrest operation: see Day 256/018/07. Mr Elias did not explain what he says the answer to any such consultation would have been. This quotation and the one that follows from Col Jackson show that General Ford would not have met with any objection from the Londonderry commanders.
14 At B1279.003.006
15 Supplemental BSI Statement, CJ2.48 paragraph 6 posed by the DYH\\textsuperscript{16}, and there is no doubt that the idea of taking the opportunity that a large riot would present, to arrest a large number of hooligans all in one go, was attractive to many.\\textsuperscript{17} General Ford and General Steele voiced this view during their evidence to this Tribunal\\textsuperscript{18}, as did Brigadier MacLellan to Desmond Hamill and in the first draft of his statement for Lord Widgery:
\\begin{quote} The event on the 30\\textsuperscript{th} January appeared likely to present a suitable opportunity to arrest a great number of these hooligans.\\textsuperscript{19} \\end{quote}
5C-8 The overall desire to arrest the hooligans was no doubt felt more acutely in the context of a march of the size now expected. On a general level it was a military necessity for the Brigade to have the capacity to mount a large arrest force, and such a need could only be met by having a predesignated force in a central location ready to move, with flexibility, at short notice to deal with rioting that threatened the integrity of the containment operation. Even at this general level it would have been a dereliction of duty on the part of senior commanders not to have provided adequately for such a contingency.
5C-9 But the provision of such a force was not only a necessity at this general level. General Ford was asked a number of questions on this issue by Counsel to the Tribunal\\textsuperscript{20} and Counsel for one of the Interested Parties\\textsuperscript{21},
\\begin{itemize} \\item \\textsuperscript{16} See, for example, the description of them given to this Tribunal by Gen INQ 0598 in his BSI statement at \\textbf{C598.2 paragraphs 6-7} (not drawn to the attention of the Tribunal by anyone, despite its similarity to the views expressed by Gen Ford in 1972). The views Brigadier MacLellan held are set out above, at paragraph 5C-1(3)(b). \\item \\textsuperscript{17} As a proposition it would not have surprised them: it was well within ‘course one and a half’ of Gen Ford’s December 1971 Appreciation and the Tribunal has received Gen INQ 0598’s photographs of 1 Coldm Guards carrying out an arrest operation by chasing hooligans down Rossville Street. \\item \\textsuperscript{18} \\textbf{Day 254/049/17} and \\textbf{Day 266/045/09} respectively \\item \\textsuperscript{19} Brig MacLellan’s Statement, First Draft, B1279.018 at paragraphs 15 and 19 \\item \\textsuperscript{20} For example at \\textbf{Day 254/049/17} and \\textbf{Day 255/053/11} \\item \\textsuperscript{21} Ellis McDermott QC at \\textbf{Day 259/070/10} \\end{itemize} the general tenor of which was critical. His answer was as it had been in 1972: the large number of people who were expected to attend this march, one purpose of which was to defy the ban on marches, meant that the hooligans would turn out in great numbers and were likely to be joined by others resulting in very serious violence, sufficiently serious to threaten the security of the City.
The problem faced by General Ford in giving his evidence on this issue is illustrated by the following passage from his evidence:
Mr Clarke: Is it fair to say that you had reached a clear decision that it would be desirable, if opportunity had presented itself, to arrest several hundred of the hooligans with a view to halting their activities?
A: With a view to arresting them and putting them in front of the Courts.
Q: Yes. Was part of the thinking that on this occasion, that is to say 30th January, there would in all probability be a lot of hooligans, and also a large number of troops, so that this was an opportunity to arrest them that was not to be missed?
A: It was an opportunity to arrest them. And I also recall there was that message saying that it was very likely that, in the day, they would be determined to break right through to the Guildhall. And that was something which was very uppermost in my mind, because I foresaw not only violence against the barriers, but also, when the march was over, and all the speeches were over, and the last speakers like Bernadette Devlin had raised the temperature, I foresaw the DYH being reinforced by quite a number of the locals who sympathised with them anyway -- a proportion who did -- and all of them making for the troop positions.
Q: Why did you think that was going to happen, as opposed to the march tailing off, people going, listening to speeches that might or might not be very interesting and then everything dying down?
A: Because we had an intelligence report, which is quoted in one of these documents, saying that they were determined to get to the Guildhall. Was it not to avenge Magilligan, or something like that? I am afraid, I am sorry, I do not have the quotation. Q: If we could have the report back on the screen, it is G81A.511.5. It is item four that you are referring to; is it not?
A: May I just read it. (Pause). That is the one I am thinking of, yes.
Q: This is a report that I think you have no recollection of seeing?
A: No, but I must have seen it. I have no recollection. Well, I must not say — I mean, I find it very difficult to believe the Director of Intelligence would give information to one of my brigade commanders, but would also not give it to the GOC, to whom he is responsible for all intelligence — and this was a very important one — and possibly either he — either the GOC or he would give me a copy, or drop by and tell me the content or show me the content. I think it is just — things happened that way. I mean, he would not tell the Brigade Commander only. I mean, that would be very irregular.
Q: Two points: paradoxically, this signal which was sent on 27th January is in fact highly unlikely, is it not, to have affected the basic plan, which must have been being put into operation during the beginning of that week?
A: Highly unlikely.
Q: Secondly, if one looks at the signal, it indicates that marchers will be armed with sticks and stones, the IRA will use the crowd as cover, and the marchers are determined to get to the Guildhall come what may. Why should one assume from that that, if they were prevented from going to the Guildhall and everybody went off to a meeting at Free Derry Corner, that after the meeting was all over they would all come back again?
A: I thought the temperature would be raised by the later speakers; not the early speakers, the later speakers.22
5C-11 General Ford may well have been mistaken in thinking that he had relied upon the Director Intelligence's Signal to Commander 8 Brigade of 27th January. That was a document the General had no present recollection of.
22 Day 254/049/17 seeing (the sight he had of it would, after all, have been more than thirty years ago). Mr Clarke failed, however, to show General Ford the only document to which he could really have been referring, Brigadier MacLellan’s Signal of 24th January, containing Chief Superintendent Lagan’s opinions as to what would happen in terms of violence in the event that the march was at some stage stopped:
Bravo: He believes massive confrontation with SF will shatter such peace as is left in City, create intense violence and remove last vestiges of moderate goodwill etc
Charlie: He forecasts increased violence and smaller marches eg factory workers, WAC etc will continue for days until ban is clearly seen to be impossible to impose effectively (as SF cannot seal Bogside permanently without bring the City to a halt).
Mr Clarke returned to this issue at Day 255/53/11, when General Ford was again not shown the Signal of 24th January. It was of course because of the concern of prolonged rioting that the warning order Headquarters 39 Brigade received in respect of the Londonderry operation was for PARA to be away for up to four days.
Although Mr Rawat attempted, when questioning General Steele, to present the challenges facing the Security Forces in the run up to 30th January 1972 as akin to those presented by the regular Saturday afternoon matinee, it is clear that General Ford was not alone in taking the Chief Superintendent’s predictions to heart. Brigadier MacLellan’s description to Lord Widgery of the seriousness of the position applied as much at this, the planning stage, as it did at the moment he ordered the launch of the arrest operation:
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23 G70A.441.001 24 B1208.35 paragraph 7.9 25 Day 266/044/09 A \[to Mr Stocker\]: I had not that advice [ie Lagan's advice that the march should not be stopped] in mind but the advice about hooliganism. The situation as I saw it about the hooligans was this, that if we had not done anything about it there would have been arson, hijacking of cars, and so on, in William Street. This would then have led at the end of the meeting, which would have presumably been fairly emotional, to a number of people at the meeting joining with the hooligans with a grave risk of them breaking through the barricades or a barrier into the City Centre, rioting going on in the commercial areas, my reserve having to be launched and general control being lost of the situation. This was a factor I considered.
Q: I think that leads on to the next question, in other words, you considered that it was essential in the interests of security to order the arrest operation?
A: I did.26
5C-14 It had no doubt been this thinking that had resulted in the Brigade Major including, with the Brigade Commander's approval, the following passage in the Threat assessment section of the Operation Order for Operation Forecast:
Hooligan reaction to the general excitement of the event, in the form of stone, bottle and nail bombing of troops, arson of private premises and vehicles, and a high degree of violence throughout the City. Although this violence is expected to continue throughout the event, it will intensify during the closing stages of the event, especially in the William Street/Rossville Street area; it is possible that hooligan violence may continue thereafter for several days.27
26 At B1277. At Day 255/055/22 Mr Clarke asked General Ford whether he had 'discussed with Brig MacLellan [his] view that, even if things appeared to die down at the barriers, the likelihood was that the hooligans would unite with others after the march and storm the barriers.' General Ford could not remember, but the answer Brigadier MacLellan would have given had he done so is available for all to see.
27 G95.565 paragraph 2(c) The Notes prepared for the Co-Ordinating Conference include the following:
3. Hooligan reaction – continuing after event.
It is with this evidence: (i) as to the general desire amongst the local commanders for the DYH to be arrested; (ii) as to the wish of each of the local infantry battalions to carry out the operation; and (iii) as to the specific reasons why this might be necessary on 30th January, in mind that the Tribunal needs to consider a subsidiary criticism of General Ford put by Gerard Elias QC:
There was not, was there, any real consultation with brigade on the wisdom of carrying out an arrest operation?
Mr Elias did not explain to the Tribunal or to General Ford what it was being suggested the result of any such consultation would or should have been, but the reality of the position was surely obvious: the arrest operation was approved by the Brigade Commander, who definitely knew what Chief Superintendent Lagan was saying; and the local commanders, who may or may not have known the Chief Superintendent’s views, actually wanted to carry it out themselves.
To the extent that there was disagreement in 8 Brigade with what was proposed by HQNI the debate revolved around the Commander Land Forces’ decision that 1 PARA would provide the arrest force.
SELECTION OF 1 PARA
Attempts have been made, during this Inquiry and before, to argue that 1 PARA was the wrong battalion for the arrest task on the grounds that it was not appropriate to use either (a) any battalion that did not know Londonderry; and/or (b) a battalion with the reputation of 1 PARA, either
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28 G88.537 Serial 2 29 Day 256/018/07 in the sense that it was too robust for Londonderry or that it behaved improperly.
So far as the claim that 1 PARA behaved improperly was concerned, it is an indication of the paucity of the evidence that the issue was barely raised with General Ford. Simon Hoggart had written his article in The Guardian of 25th January 1972, but his sources, the two junior officers, had come up with very little (in reality just the well known incident in Andersonstown the previous August, the rights or wrongs of which are now impossible to resolve) and he had never bothered to speak to the allegedly complaining Commanding Officers about whom he was writing; on any objective view the behaviour of one or even two members of C Company 1 PARA at Magilligan Beach the week before could never have been sufficient to inhibit the operational availability of a much needed reserve battalion; and it took Sgt O to point out that Mr Macdonald’s reliance on an incident during the first week of Internment when five Catholics were shot dead was an incident involving a completely different battalion, 2 PARA.
General Ford’s evidence has always been to the opposite effect: that for perfectly proper reasons the character and experience of 1 PARA, together with the surrounding circumstances viewed as a whole, made them an entirely reasonable choice for this operation. His reasons for choosing 1 PARA are set out in paragraph 5.2 of his BSI statement:
5.2 I selected 1 PARA for this part of the operation for the following reasons:
______________________________________________________________________
30 Mr Clarke, at Day 254/027/15, limited his questions to 8 Brigade, asking the General whether he ever became aware, before 30th January 1972 or afterwards, of disquiet among local units as to the use of 1 PARA on the day: he replied that he did not, and none of the Interested Parties attempted to contradict him.
31 L7-L9
32 Day 335/156/22 (i) The units in 8 Brigade were already committed in areas which they knew around the perimeter of the City.
(ii) The City battalion (that is the one covering the William Street area etc) was 22 Light Air Defence Regiment Royal Artillery. This was not an infantry battalion but an artillery regiment temporarily being used in an infantry role and was not suited for a major arrest operation.
(iii) The Province Reserve (1 KOB) were my reserve. They only became operational on 13 January 1972 and had no experience of arrest operations, major or minor. A major arrest operation would certainly have been beyond their capabilities until at least the middle of February or so.
(iv) As the reserve battalion of 39 Brigade in Belfast, 1 PARA were not committed to permanently holding any particular area.
(v) The third Brigade in Northern Ireland had no reserve battalion.
(vi) 1 PARA had been in the province for well over a year. They had much experience, more than any other battalion in Northern Ireland, both in carrying out arrest operations and in coming under and countering terrorist fire.
(vii) They could be spared for three or four days by Commander 39 Brigade.33
None of the local commanders subscribed to any argument that 1 PARA's robust approach was such that it should be ruled out. General Ford was not alone in his view of the appropriateness of using 1 PARA: General Tuzo must have agreed34, and General Kitson35 certainly had a high opinion of the battalion for its work in Belfast. But that view was not limited to senior commanders outside Londonderry. General Steele told this Tribunal:
33 B1208.031 34 See Gen Ford's evidence at Day 254/018/23. This must be right, given that the 39 Brigade was going to be without its reserve for a number of days. 35 BSI Statement, CK1.7 paragraph 2(e). I knew that they were very tough and fit; I knew they were very well trained; I knew that they were vastly experienced in internal security operations in Northern Ireland and I personally thought they would do a very good job.36
5C-23 Colonel Ferguson of 22nd Regt was of a similar view:
My thinking was that 1 PARA were a very mobile and well equipped unit and that we should take advantage of the fact that many from the Creggan were going to be out on the march. ... I would have had no reason or justification to say that 1 PARA should not be used in an arrest role.37
5C-24 As was General INQ 0598, Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion the Coldstream Guards (1 Coldm Gds) at the time:
1 PARA were the [Province38] Reserve Battalion, based in Belfast and it was entirely sensible that they would be involved. As the Province Reserve Battalion their role was to support the resident battalions where and whenever needed. I did not think it was surprising at all that the paras were going to be involved. We could have done the job they were given but in order for us to have done so 1 PARA would have had to come into Londonderry and take over our regular duties. They would then have had to be relieved by us after the march.39
5C-25 It is important to consider what the two other 8 Brigade Commanding Officers, Colonel (now General) Welsh of 2nd Battalion the Royal Green Jackets (2 RGJ) and Colonel Jackson of 1st Battalion the Royal Anglian Regiment (1 R ANGLIAN), have actually said on this issue. Of the two of them, only the Commanding Officer of 2 RGJ had any real reason for
36 Day 266/049/06 37 BSI Statement, B1122.10 paragraph 54. This passage was not drawn to the attention of the Tribunal by Counsel to the Tribunal (on this occasion Mr Roxburgh) and was not challenged by any of the Interested Parties. See in contrast the interest in the evidence of Gen Welsh and Col Jackson to the contrary, discussed below. 38 Corrected in oral evidence to 39 Brigade: Day 272/002/11 39 BSI Statement paragraph 15, at C598.3. This passage was not drawn to the attention of the Tribunal by Counsel to the Tribunal (on this occasion Miss McGahcy) and was not challenged by any of the Interested Parties. See in contrast the interest in the evidence of Gen Welsh and Col Jackson to the contrary, discussed below. speaking up at the time, as it was his Adjutant who had complained about the conduct of one or two members of C Company 1 PARA at the Magilligan demonstration the previous weekend. While the journalist Peter Taylor has recorded an anonymous officer assumed to be General Welsh as saying, 20 years after the event, that he had rung the Brigade Commander to say that it was 'mad' to bring the Paras in, the context for that comment was no wider than what had taken place at Magilligan the previous weekend, and, as General Welsh himself pointed out in his evidence to the Inquiry, Magilligan was an event which resulted in no known casualties, to which he paid little attention at the time.
General Welsh was specifically asked about the Peter Taylor passage at Day 282/33/5. The effect of his answers is that little weight can be attached to it as a record of his thoughts at the time. The General made two specific points:
Ms McGahey: You are the Royal Green Jacket senior officer who spoke to Peter Taylor, is that right?
A: Yes, but I certainly did not say to Pat MacLellan that it would be mad to bring in the Paras. One does not speak to one's superior officer like that.
Q: Did you tell Peter Taylor that you had told Brigadier MacLellan it was mad?
A: I dare say I did. 20 years -- I think I saw Peter Taylor 20 years after the event. I might have -- I have no idea what word I used. Peter Taylor says I said "mad", that was very much hindsight at that stage. All I can promise you, I would not have said, "You are mad to do it" to Pat MacLellan.
40 Peter Taylor, "Provos", T234 page 117 41 The passage reads: 'Not all Army officers thought it a good idea given what had happened at Magilligan the weekend before. One of the Royal Green Jackets' senior officers had phoned the Brigade Commander, Brig Robert MacLellan, to say it was 'mad' to bring the Paras in, only to be told by the Brigadier that he had his orders and he was going to carry them out'. 42 Day 282/012/09, Day 283/030/09 and Day 282/014/24. Q: Was it your view that it was mad to use the Paras?
A: No, I have told you that — no. I tell you that I thought it possibly unwise after their behaviour at Magilligan, and anyway I wanted the job.
And nothing should be read into the fact that the Brigadier responded by just saying that he had had his orders:
Q: Did you gain any impression as to whether Brigadier MacLellan was content with the orders he had received?
A: With the?
Q: Orders he had received?
A: I have no reason to think he was not and one is not used to discussing, not with your boss, whether he liked his orders or not. It was as much a personal thing as anything else. You know, one did not join the Army to do nothing and apart from one battalion — one company under somebody else's command, we had more or less nothing to do on that day.
Whatever the precise words he used were, General Welsh accepts that his own wishes - to be more involved - had made a contribution to the view he was expressing. This is a problem which presents itself rather more acutely in the case of Colonel Jackson, who may well have had rather less insight. So far as any attack on the integrity of 1 PARA (rather than any complaint that a non Londonderry battalion was going to carry out the arrests) was concerned, Colonel Jackson's present day opinions are contained in the following passage from his evidence:
Ms McGahey: I would like to turn now to the co-ordinating conference. You have headed it the "Orders Group
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43 Day 282/037/13 44 Day 282/036/08 45 When Mr Harvey put it to Gen Welsh that he had contacted Brig MacLellan 'to ask why your battalion was not to be used in the arrest operation', Lord Saville intervened to point out that that was not what the General's BSI Statement said at paragraph 13, namely that he asked the Brigadier why 2RGJ 'could not take a more active role'. Day 282/059/13. Meeting" of 28th January. Could I have paragraphs 34 and 35 on the screen, please. In paragraph 34 you identify those who attended the co-ordinating conference on 28th January. You say you had first learnt from the brigade order that 1 Para were to be in Londonderry for the march on the Sunday, and you were not happy with this. We know from your statement that you were not happy with the role given to 1 Para, but this rather seems to suggest you were unhappy with the fact they were going to be present at all. Is that right, or is that a wrong way of interpreting this?
A: No, I think you are right. I would have been rather more pleased if 1 Para had stayed in Belfast.
Q: Why were you unhappy about the fact that they were to be present at all?
A: We had heard about the previous confrontation the week before, and --
Q: Was that at Magilligan?
A: At Magilligan; from not only the military sources, but also civilian contacts we had, and they were not happy with what happened at Magilligan.
Q: Can I stop you there. Who were the civilian contacts that you had?
A: These would be through the RUC; this would be through me walking round, talking to people I knew, that I had previously known after -- previously known during the 16 months we had been there; people I had talked to. They did not like the idea, in the nicest way, of the red beret being in Londonderry. They thought that they would be in some way intimidated.
Q: Sticking for a moment with your civilian sources, do you remember now the names of anybody that you knew who could be a source of information about what was going on in Derry?
A: It is some years now, it is 30 years; and my wanderings around the Bogside and Creggan, I do not think they would be probably living in the area any more.
Q: Some individuals were prominent civilians within Derry, were they not? An obvious example is Mr John Hume. Did you know Mr Hume?
A: Yes, I did. I met Mr Hume on a number of occasions. Q: Did you know him at the time? A: Yes, I had met him previously. Not on the 30th January, shall we say, but I had met him previously, yes.
Q: Did you discuss with him the events at Magilligan? A: No, I did not.
Q: Did you discuss with him before the march on 30th January? A: No.
Q: -- what was likely to happen on that march? A: No, I had no input at all on 30th January.
Q: Do you remember now any other prominent citizens of Derry with whom you held discussions in January 1972? A: No, I do not.
Q: You have said that you had heard about the previous confrontation at Magilligan, and you had heard from various sources that people did not want the Paras back. Was that because the Parachute Regiment were alleged to have behaved with unnecessary force? A: Yes, I think so. That would be correct.
Colonel Jackson's attempt to give direct evidence of feelings against 1 PARA at the time is unconvincing, to say the least: it is based on speaking to civilians during his 'wanderings around the Bogside and Creggan', an activity that must have ceased some considerable time before January 1972. (It was a feature of Col Jackson's evidence to this Tribunal that he appeared to have difficulty in distinguishing the state of affairs at 30 January 1972 from the early days of his tour, when there was contact between the military and Catholic civilians). Col Jackson was in any event unable to name a single one of these contacts and did not discuss the march with John Hume. His unconvincing answer may have been because of the more realistic sentiment underlying his claim that 1 PARA were not wanted:
Q: Your objection was that it was not that the Paras would go in and do a bad job, but that your men were the most appropriate for the job?
A: We would do a better job, I think.
The real basis for Col Jackson's current views emerged during the questions and answers on this issue:
Q: Was there any reason to believe that that would happen again?
A: Well, we were in Londonderry, and I think the newspapers we had covered Belfast, and I think a lot of people read into the general newspapers and the media that in fact, with due respect to the regiment, you know, they were a tough regiment. It was not just us in Londonderry saying it; I mean, it was the whole province saying it. By "tough", I mean they were tough, they were brought up to be tough. We were just as tough in Londonderry, but we were not allowed to be tough because we were restricted by Headquarters Northern Ireland for anything we might think of doing, shall we say.
Q: Was there any reason to think that the Parachute Regiment would not equally be restricted by HQNI from being tough if it had a role on 30th January?
A: I had no idea what the Parachute Battalion was told, and this, I think, is one of the gaps in my education, because I do not know what they were told and whether they had discussed anything on 30th January with either Brigadier MacLellan or General Ford. I was not privy to any discussion of how the action should be carried out.
Q: As far as you were concerned, it was perfectly possible that the orders given to the Parachute Regiment were: "We know that you are particularly tough; we know you have a reputation for toughness; but on 30th January you must act with restraint"?
47 Day 285/021/08 A: I would not like to comment on that. I have no idea.48
5C-31 The only evidence before the Tribunal of any attempt to report on this issue from the military perspective is the article by Simon Hoggart, to which reference has already been made. Colonel Jackson has presumably been reminded of it as a result of the proceedings of this Tribunal.
5C-32 Where there may have been genuine dissension from the two resident Commanding Officers is as to the wisdom of conducting the arrest operation with a battalion from outside the Brigade, that did not possess knowledge of the ground. And both now claim to have made contact with Brigadier MacLellan to express their concerns: General Welsh’s evidence as to his effort to change the Brigade Commander’s mind has been referred to above; Colonel Jackson’s claim to have done the same thing is more problematic and less convincing. Although he claims in his BSI Statement49 to have discussed the issue with the Brigadier after the Co-ordinating Conference, when interviewed for the Channel Four film ‘Sunday’ he said:50
I kept trying to go in and see the MacLellan, knocking on his door, but I was told he was busy all day.
5C-33 This note is consistent with the fact that neither the Brigade Commander (who did remember being spoken to by the Commanding Officer of 2 RGJ) nor the Brigade Major can remember any discussion on the issue with Colonel Jackson.
5C-34 Whether or not both or just one of them said it in 1972, it is important to analyse what each of these officers is, and perhaps more importantly, is not saying. General Welsh has told this Tribunal that his complaint was that 2 RGJ did, and 1 PARA did not, know the ground on which the arrest
48 Day 285/019/08 49 C12.8 paragraph 40 50 The typed note is at C12.55 operation was to take place; and that they knew, and liked, the people of Londonderry and understood how best to approach them (ie more sensitively, perhaps, than 39 Brigade did the people of Belfast).51
But the primary factor was knowledge of the area, and General Welsh was certainly not saying that these factors were or should have been decisive:
Q. Did you consider, when you made your representation to the brigadier, when you made your communication to him, were you considering then the benefits of using local troops, quite apart from what you may have seen then as the detriment of using the Paras?
A: The main advantage was the local troops knew the area, but then how overriding that should be, I do not know.52
Furthermore, the General was sensitive to the fact that his opinions were coloured by the fact that he thought in any event that his Battalion should have been selected:
Q: Muddling up what was already on the ground is on the scales, if you like, on one side and the benefits of using what I might call the local troops was on the scale in the other; would that be a fair way of looking at it?
A: Yes, but I am prejudiced about the use of the local troops.
Q: Entirely understandably. Putting aside your prejudice if you are able to?
A: I cannot.53
Colonel Jackson could not put aside his prejudices either, but lacked the insight of General Welsh.54 The extent to which his evidence has been relied upon during the course of the Inquiry necessitates a close
51 Day 282/034/25 52 Day 282/058/16 53 Day 282/058/04 54 An effect, perhaps, of the bitterness he still feels at the what he perceived as the lack of recognition his Battalion received at the end of its tour: see Day 285/81/17 examination of what Colonel Jackson has in fact said. His start point on this issue was that 'no military commander would place a battalion in a situation where the troops did not know the ground over which they may be required to deploy nor have any knowledge of local conditions'(^{55}) (an ideal recognised throughout military history more in the breach than the observance), 'military madness' as he put it to Channel Four(^{46}). But when asked about it during his oral evidence:
[Q:] ... As far as you were concerned, you thought a military commander would not make this decision?
[A:] Absolutely.
[Q:] Therefore you thought it must have been a political decision?
[A:] Correct.
[Q:] Did you have any reason, beyond your disagreement with the decision, to think that it was a political decision?
[A:] Well, I mean, that was it; I did not think a military commander would do it, so it must be political.
[Q:] As far as you knew this decision could in fact have been taken at a military level at HQNI?
[A:] It could have been.
[Q:] You say in paragraph 42 your belief that, with Brigadier MacLellan's short experience of operations in Londonderry, he had been sat upon by those also with little knowledge of Londonderry. Did he tell you anything to give you that impression?
[A:] No. It is probably a chap who served in Londonderry for quite a few months, and you get newcomers coming in. I mean, in the nicest way -- I mean, General Ford had only been in Northern Ireland for six months or so; Brigadier MacLellan less than that; and I think CO 1 Para had only arrived in July 1971 or something. That was after our -- if
(^{55}) BSI Statement, CJ2.9 paragraph 41 (^{46}) CJ2.56 I may say so — our nice quietish period in Londonderry. So they had only met hostile reaction, shall we say, in their period of — period in Northern Ireland.
Q: Is it simply your view that decisions had been made — and wrong decisions had been made — by those who did not have the experience that you did of Londonderry?
A: Yes. I mean, you may think that rather peculiar, but I had been there and I had certain views. It is probably that I thought — inaccurately, as it happens — that I should have been consulted, or should have been asked to have an input — only an input — into what they were thinking.
Colonel Jackson’s feeling that he should have been consulted, when combined with his bitterness at the lack of recognition his Battalion received when they left Northern Ireland and his evidence about being excluded from the supposed meeting at Ballykelly on the evening of 30th January, (of which there is no other evidence and, given the overwhelming probability that someone else would have remembered a meeting attended by the officers who are said to have been there, can only be a figment of his imagination), provides the context for his evidence to this Inquiry. Nevertheless, the chain of command dictated that General Ford communicate with the Brigade Commander. This is the advice that Brigadier MacLellan would have received from his Brigade Major, who had been in the City longer than Colonel Jackson and who had a wider (ie Brigade level) perspective on its problems:
Q. ... Did you think there were going to be any difficulties associated with using a unit from another city as the arrest force?
A. No, I did not, so long as there was time for proper reconnaissance and so long as there was time for the soldiers to receive proper orders groups at battalion, company and platoon level, I saw no difficulty about it.\\textsuperscript{36}
It is in any event clear that Colonel Jackson, contrary to his bold statements about military madness, would (as would the Brigade Major) have been satisfied with the selection of an outside battalion had there been provision for reconnaissance; and that reconnaissance, a standard step in battle procedure which General Ford was entitled to expect, would have remedied the problems he says he foresaw. It is also clear that, despite his insistence that he should have been consulted, consultation with Colonel Jackson would have produced nothing more than the obvious - the need for information and reconnaissance.
Mr Elias: You told the Tribunal yesterday -- I do not want to go back over the ground as to why it was inadvisable in your view for 1 Para to be used for the arrest operation, but you did answer Ms McGahey yesterday and tell the Tribunal, you may recall the exchange, you did not know what the Paras had been told before they went in. What I wanted to ask you, Colonel, is this -- it may be it is rolled up with another question which I will ask you at the same time so you can consider the two. You also had indicated you made the brigade major aware that you were prepared to speak with Colonel Wilford if it would assist him?
A: Correct.
Q: My questions, therefore, are these: what should the Paras have been told, if they were to be used as the arrest operation and/or what should or what could Colonel Wilford have been told or advised by you that would have assisted him?
A: If I could do the second one first: there were certainly routes into the area where the arrest operation was going to take place and the obstacles on those routes and the best way round the routes, through it, depending on what had been agreed with brigade of the arrest operation. From my own point of view, if I could now revert to the first one very quickly, is that I would have discussed with the brigadier what my arrest philosophy was for the day, because it would not necessarily have been purely my own battalion involved, it would have been companies of other battalions in their blocking positions. One can always look in hindsight at, shall we say, a nice little battle area, and I would have preferred, of course, for my whole battalion to have been involved with me, rather than anybody else in blocking positions.
Q: Leaving that aside, because I am asking that you consider the position, the Paras having been directed to carry out the operation, what should they have been told?
A: Well, they should, they should have discussed with the brigade commander their modus operandi and how they intended to do the arrest operation.
Q: You have told us about the importance of the geography; I do not go back over that. At the end of the day, Colonel, so we know your position, are you saying that the use of the Paras for this operation was not in fact remediable, if you like, by any further detail that might have been given to them, or are you saying if they were going to be used, they could have been put right, as it were, by there being sufficient information?
A: Yes, I think it would have been rather nice, when I went to Belfast, for instance, the first thing I did was to get to know as much as I could about the area in which I was operating. I know the Paras were in and out in less than a day, but this is what should have been discussed virtually on the ground with the brigadier.
Q: Had that been discussed in sufficient detail, then the Parachute Regiment could appropriately have carried out the task; is that your position?
A: If they knew the access areas; if they had recce'd them. In Londonderry, as everyone will know, the access areas changed on a daily basis, because something – an alleyway may be blocked, a vital alleyway. People had to know. It had to be patrolled, so access must be. And there was this
59 Despite the apparent strength of his views, Col Jackson does not appear able to answer the question, which is: what should I PARA have been told? thing, I informed all battalions coming into Londonderry, was this business about the echo in Derry, because of the topography and geography, which I believe you know anyway, in that it is very, very difficult, without seeing the flash or a burst of smoke, to know the location of gunfire or explosions and in Derry it was terrible, you could look one way and the explosion is the other way and until you know about that, and you have to be very, very careful, you can get disorientated.60
Colonel Jackson also recognised the military reality that knowing the ground is an ideal that cannot always be met and that reserve units very often do not know the ground over which they have to operate (precisely the position 1 PARA were in as the 39 Brigade Reserve):
Mr Harvey: ... [referring to 1 R ANGLIAN end of tour report] Can you say what disadvantage a soldier would have in seeking to effect an arrest operation in the heart of the Bogside without any knowledge of the topography or the tactics of the local population, a section of whom may have been involved in unruly or disorderly or even riotous behaviour?
A: I know you are taking a specific instance in view, but the point is of course that the Army are deployed on many occasions in areas they are not conversant with, myself in Belfast in 1971; and there you have to learn quickly, if I may say, by reconnaissance, prior reconnaissance.61
And had Colonel Jackson been consulted by the Brigadier, the likelihood is that so would CO 1 Coldm Gds and CO 22nd Regt. Their views have been set out at paragraphs 5C-23 and 5C-24 above. Both Mr Clarke and Mr Elias asked General Ford whether he had or should have consulted the Commanding Officers in 8 Brigade as to who should be selected do do the arrest operation. Both Colonel Jackson and Colonel Welsh might have said that they should do it, but not necessarily for the right reasons. In the
60 Day 286/086/20 Col Jackson is talking about reconnaissance and the provision of information, both steps Gen Ford was entitled to expect as a standard step in battle procedure. This applies equally to Col Jackson’s answers to Arthur Harvey QC at Day 287/008/10 and Day 287/016/2 61 Day 287/018/08 unlikely event that the General had received such views through the Brigade Commander, it was the General’s task to weigh up the competing arguments and make the decision.
5C-42 There are two further similarities about General Welsh and Colonel Jackson: both have said that the outcome of the operation on 30th January 1972 could have been the same as it turned out to be had their battalions done the operation and both (although one now cannot accept it) thought in the wake of the event that they were glad that they had not got the job. As to the first of these issues, General Welsh put it this way:
I dare say what happened might have happened, the same or worse, had we been there.(^{62})
5C-43 Colonel Jackson told the Tribunal:
If we would have gone in, I am sure – well, I do not know what would have happened.(^{63})
5C-44 And even when pushed harder:
Q: And had the Royal Anglians been given the arrest operation, you have absolutely no doubt that they would have been able to carry it out with professionalism?
A: Yes. Of course, this is supposition.
Q: You do not wish to go there, Colonel; I entirely respect that.
A. I was not there.(^{64})
5C-45 This evidence is entirely consistent with what he had written in his first statement to the Tribunal:
But I do not say the results would have been any different.(^{65})
(^{62}) Day 282/059/05\
(^{63}) Day 285/048/14\
(^{64}) Day 287/023/23 General Welsh dealt with the second issue as follows:
My reaction at the end was, "Thank goodness we did not have that job".
It is not surprising that from his present standpoint Colonel Jackson cannot now see himself holding such a view, but his Adjutant of the time has a clear recollection that he did:
I do not recall there being any great concern at the time about the use of 1 Para. As Adjutant, I would have been involved in the making of the 1 Royal Anglian plan for the day, but I have no recollection of doing so. All I recall is talking to [Colonel Jackson] about what we were expected to do. I remember he was pleased that our battalion was to be holding the ring rather than mounting an arrest operation, because there was always so much work to do afterwards, taking rioters to court, etc. He was even more pleased after the events of the day unfolded that that was what we had been doing.
Rather than denying that this was his view in 1972, Colonel Jackson was only able to say that he could not 'recognise himself' in the statement, after which he returned to his (in military terms, unprofessional) theme of affront, both personal and now collective in the form of the soldiers of 1 R ANGLIAN, in relation to whom he had later to accept he had no evidence and none of whom expressed any such view to this Tribunal. His later answer, that he 'did not obviously broadcast the fact that I was not happy' is equally unsatisfactory.
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65 BSI Statement, CJ2.14 paragraph 66 66 Day 282/059/06 67 BSI Statement, C1924.3 paragraph 11 68 He used this phrase twice, at Day 285/038/08 and Day 285/038/23 69 See Day 287/020/19, where, despite the leading questions from both Mr Harvey and Lord Saville, Col Jackson cannot say he has any evidence of such feelings on the part of the soldiers in his battalion. 70 Day 286/067/13 When looked at carefully Colonel Jackson's presently expressed views on the selection of 1 PARA for the arrest task on 30th January 1972 do not amount to criticisms at all, certainly not at the level of General Ford. But even if they did, if there were valid arguments for and against General Ford has simply made a reasonable choice between two alternative views. The greater weight of the evidence of military opinion the Tribunal has heard on this issue is, moreover, in agreement with the General.
Some specific arguments were raised with General Ford over and above, although related to, knowledge of the ground:
(1) On the basis that once the barriers were closed no one would be permitted through, Mr Clarke expressed surprise at General Ford's evidence that it was better to have the local troops with knowledge of local personalities, particularly emergency personnel, on the barriers:
Q: The note of puzzlement in my voice arises because, from everything we have seen, it appears to have been the plan that, up to a certain point, the barriers would be open and people could go through them. They would then be closed and nobody would be allowed to go through them whether they were a nurse, a doctor or whomsoever: was that not the position?
A: That is the position.
Q: What is the relevance of 1 Royal Anglian, for instance, knowing who were local nurses and midwives?
A: Because if you have a strange -- a new unit who are in there, they will not know the local personalities.
Q: Why is it relevant if nobody is going to be let through once the barriers are down?
.....
71 While telling the General that this was the case Mr Clarke did not identify any document or evidence to which he is referring. Q: But is the position not that there was a containment line, effectively, around where the march was going to go, insofar as you got close to the city centre, and either the barriers would be open — in which case anybody — good, bad or indifferent — could go through; or they would be closed, in which case nobody could go through. And it did not matter what knowledge you had about who was good and who was bad.
A: I do not think it was as simple as that on the ground ...
In fact, far from everything available to the Tribunal indicating that no one at all would be allowed through the barriers, the Operation Order for Operation Forecast (as approved by General Ford) provides:
**Blocking Points**
(1) Each blocking point must be constructed so that the road can be completely closed if required. There will be the odd exception, mainly on a medical emergency basis, when people will be allowed to pass through the check point one by one.
(2) No vehicles are to be allowed to pass through the blocking points once they have been established, except for those carrying passengers, necessarily, to or from a medical or bonafide civil emergency.
(2) A number of Counsel relied on the idea of the 'quite complicated geography of the Bogside' without ever explaining to General Ford the respects in which it was being said that the area over which the arrest operation might be conducted was complicated, and notwithstanding the fact that the essence of the case that they were
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72 Day 254/013/24 73 G95.568 paragraph 7(c) 74 Mr Clarke at Day 254/020/05, from whom the phrase 'quite complicated geography of the Bogside' is taken; and Mr Elias at Day 256/025/01. Mr Elias bases his question on Gen Ford's memo to the GOC of 10th January 1972 at B1128 paragraph 2, but that is dealing with confining public movement and controlling it, neither of which 1 PARA was ever going to do during Operation Forecast. putting to him was that his plan had been for the arrest operation to be confined to the immediate vicinity of the junction of William and Rossville Streets. Neither the witness nor the Tribunal were referred to any evidence of military opinion to the contrary, an example of which is provided by General INQ 0598, at the time Commanding Officer 1 Coldm Gds (who had himself, as the Tribunal has seen in his photographs, conducted arrest operations down Rossville Street):
At the time, the Province Reserve Battalion was based in Belfast. It was not necessary to have a detailed knowledge of the streets for the scoop up operation which 1 PARA were to undertake. It was only a small area; about a quarter of a mile from the junction of Rossville Street and William Street to Free Derry Corner. Any commander in Northern Ireland would have used the Province Reserve for such an operation, it was just coincidental it was the paras. If the paras had been committed to do a night operation then local knowledge might have been needed. I remember when we were the Province Reserve Battalion based at Ballykinler we were sent to Londonderry to undertake a night arrest operation. We had to call at about 30 different addresses in the Creggan and arrest 30 people or so. I think that for that operation each vehicle had a guide from a local unit.
(3) Mr Harvey asserted to General Ford that the local Battalions maintained a profile, including photographs, of rioters and that this profile would have been available to the soldiers on the barriers.
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75 This is a very different view to that of Colonel Jackson and stands unchallenged by any Interested Party. 76 BSI Statement, at C598.3 paragraph 16. It is worth noting that the answer to the night problem was not that this battalion did not do the operation but that they were provided with guides. 77 Day 258/067/07 There was not in fact any evidence that any profile or photographs were “available to soldiers on the barriers”. While on any particular occasion some of the soldiers attending a riot might recognise a few of the hooligans from previous occasions, this is a serious exaggeration of the position. The rotation of troops between the County and City tasks prior to December 1971 and, when in the City, between the different company base locations, together with the wearing of face masks by the hooligans, would have reduced any effective personal recognition to at most the odd hard core case. Furthermore neither 1 R ANGLIAN nor 2 RGJ had been in the City since 21st December 1971, and on 30th January 1972 the numbers of people involved and the ferocity of the attack would have made the recognition of individuals almost impossible. The Tribunal has seen the montage\\textsuperscript{78} which was issued to patrol commanders going on to the streets, and it was limited to photographs of those suspected of involvement in terrorist offences. The evidence of Captain 021, who was the Intelligence Officer of the City Battalion as at 30\\textsuperscript{th} January 1972, is that he would use the montage to brief the patrol commanders ‘on the people shown and give instructions on their apprehension if any were seen when on patrol’. Such intelligence was not directed at rioters and hooligans, and there is no evidence that any equivalent document was produced that did.
Without identifying the basis for his theory, Mr Harvey attempted the same exercise with General Welsh, who had commanded his battalion during periods when it was carrying out the City task, with the following result:
\\textit{Q: And your particular soldiers would have had specific advantages in that having served in the city, it would have}
\\textsuperscript{78} Produced by Soldier 021 in his second BSI Statement as MONTAGE A at B1509.71. The montage has not been distributed to the Interested Parties by the Inquiry. been part of their duty to be aware of those persons who would be of interest to the Security Forces, either because of paramilitary connections or because of their involvement in hooliganism?
A. No, I think you are putting that too strongly. There are so many hooligans around that you went probably by what they were wearing and their age, whether they were hooligans or not.
Q: Each soldier would have access to intelligence information about those persons who were regularly engaged in hooliganism, would they not; that is part of having an intelligence section attached to each battalion whose specific duty is to keep each individual soldier appraised of persons, their activities, sightings of where they are, friends they keep, that was part and parcel of being a resident battalion; was it not?
A: Well, perhaps it was or should have been, but I was not conscious that we did all that and our -- you see, the hooligans that we were used to, although it appeared on the streets, William Street, wherever it was, daily, and threw stones at us, but whether we had them down by name or had them photographed, I do not recollect that.
Q: There were photographers attached to each battalion, were there not?
A: I suppose we had -- yes, I mean, my memory is not as good as it should be but I dare say we had people who went round taking photographs. I think they are more for PR purposes than for the hooligans.79
(4) Mr Clarke showed General Ford the Standing Orders for Internal Security Duties in Northern Ireland of 1st Battalion the King's Own Scottish Borderers (1 KOSB)80, and in particular the following provision81:
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79 Day 282/060/23 80 Day 254/016/05 81 G24.187.020 It is generally better to use reinforcing troops to man the baseline, and use those soldiers with local knowledge of the area to carry out flanking movements.
As the General answered, this is a document with no authority outside the unit that has created it. It will have been written by the Operations Officer, a Captain, for the CO, and will reflect no more than the way in which the unit in question wishes things to be done, should that Battalion or any of its sub-units receive a reserve from another unit.
(5) It was put to General Ford that a local battalion would have known about the difficulties of getting past the wall at the Presbyterian Church. Whilst it is not at all clear that the local battalions would in fact have excluded the wall as a point of entry, this is an example of an issue which is at far too great a level of detail for General Ford.
(6) While it is clear that it was General Ford who decided that 1 PARA would carry out the arrest role, there is also no doubt that this choice made sense so far as 8 Brigade's then deployment was concerned. General Ford, the Brigade Commander, the Brigade Major, the Commanding Officer of 1 Coldm Gds and the Commanding
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82 Day 254/017/05 83 Day 256/050/16 84 Captain INQ 1495, OC A Coy 1 R Anglian, has told the Tribunal that he recommended it as a point of entry to officers of 1 PARA in Londonderry for a reconnaissance prior to 30 January 1972. See C1495.2 paragraph 15 and Day 304/063/03. 85 Day 254/015/19 and Day 258/072/07: 'It is much more complicated, and the fact that I chose 1 Para, in the end, was, in my mind, the best -- and still is, by the way -- the best solution taken overall'. 86 Sec Brig MacLellan's evidence to Lord Widgery at B1264 87 Day 266/048/01 and Day 268/151/12 88 Gen INQ 0598, BSI Statement, C598.3 paragraph 15, and set out at paragraph 5C-24 above. Officer of 2 RGJ have all made the point that it made sense not to disrupt current tasking and dispositions. The issue will be discussed in greater detail in a later section of this Submission, but with this degree of military opinion in its favour, there is no room for arguing that, other than offending the personal but not professional sensibilities of those commanding officers who wanted to do the operation themselves, the use of one of the additional battalions in this role was anything other than the right answer for 8 Brigade.
And the selection of 1 PARA as the arrest force was the right answer for Belfast, part of the wider, Province-wide picture the Commander Land Forces had to take account:
But I can only say again that when I look at the whole picture, which is what I had to do, including denuding Belfast of its reserve battalion, to have denuded them for possibly five days, and I think that Brigadier Kitson would have found that unacceptable.
Q. Why would they have had to have been there for five days?
A. Because they would have had to have taken over one of the battalion positions and all that goes with it, which is a big task, as you have already described yourself, to get to know an area, to do it in under 36 hours, I think.
Q. But this was a specific operation, they could have maintained static positions, they could have occupied the periphery?
A. Which area would they have taken over then?
Q. Does it matter?
A. Yes, you have to find one which they can take over to meet those considerations.
Q. Surely the Army was up to that?
89Day 282/034/12 and Day 282/057/02 A. You cannot move the battalions around. They are in those set positions. I have not here got the boundaries and the areas of responsibility of the various companies. These can be explained no doubt in due course, and will be, to you.90
5C-52 Mr Harvey’s question ‘Does it matter?’ in relation to which part of the 8 Brigade Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) 1 PARA could have taken over, appears to have been based on a fundamental misconception as to the practicalities of installing one battalion in the place of another for a number of days, albeit on a temporary basis. This is an issue about which the Tribunal should accept the evidence of the very experienced military witnesses who were qualified to give it. Of the senior commanders (ie Commanding Officers and above) only Colonel Jackson resisted the idea that it was better for the troops to remain where they were, carrying out the tasks they were carrying out and would continue to carry out after the operation was over.
LOCATION FOR THE ARREST OPERATION
5C-53 It appeared to be evident from the very early stages of the military evidence before this Tribunal that the Tribunal (certainly the Chairman) and its Counsel had a very clear idea both that the location for the arrest operation was preordained and where that location was to be. It may be that this view is based on a misinterpretation of the terms of the Operation Order, which will be dealt with in a later section of this Submission. The only evidence of General Ford’s thoughts at this much earlier stage is what is written in Brigadier MacLellan’s note of their telephone conversation of 25th January:
CLF sees 1 PARA in reserve in City to ‘counter attack’ ie go round the back to arrest 300 – 400 rioters.
90 Day 258/075/22 It is unrealistic to attempt to view this “idea” as anything other than what it appears to be on the page – a very general concept of how the arrest force might achieve its task. It is not, and could never have been, an order. There is no attempt to descend to detail, as the detail is for those who would be responsible for carrying out the task. If it was not possible for PARA to do anything that might be described as ‘going round the back’ and some other approach had to be adopted the Commander Land Forces could not (and would not) complain. And it certainly does not go into location, as that must depend on the location of the rioting:
LORD SAVILLE: Before you answer that question, you were asked did you involve yourself in the question of the routes that were to be taken, and you said: "No, I did not", and indeed you have told us that before. In those circumstances, can you really say, General Ford, that where they would go would not be in a complex area of the Bogside?
A. I think the answer, sir, is that in general terms I did not see them going deeply into the Bogside at the time that I gave the outline orders, no.91
This is an idea, a starting point, aimed no doubt at dealing with the speed of the DYH once flight had been decided upon. ‘Encirclement’, ‘envelopment’ or ‘cutting off’, or even (had he heard of it) ‘something along the lines of the Derry Hook’ would at this stage have done just as well. The process must be seen flexibly, without the rigidity being applied to it by many who asked questions on this issue92:
A (to Mr Elias): If the Brigadier wanted them to go down Rossville Street, they could go down Rossville Street, that was his decision.
91 Day 260/108/10 92 See, for example, Arthur Harvey QC at Day 257/020/21: ‘The arrests are not now being made at Little James Street/William Street. This arrest operation has now moved into Rossville Street. That was not what was contemplated by the operational order that you both directed and approved.’ Q. It was not the plan you envisaged, was it?
A. Ah, I did not envisage a plan as detailed as that. Nowhere in my orders did I give any such detail.
Q. I suggest there should have been, for 1 Para, quite detailed provision for withdrawal, or the potential for withdrawal if civilians were put at risk because of their proximity to the action?
A. I think I am not in a position to answer that question, the detailed plan was not made by me.93
5C-56 This idea of a general initial concept, without any order to that effect, is consistent with the existence of any general impression that the Commander Land Forces may have had as to how such an approach might develop. It is known that he had visited Londonderry on at least two occasions before 30th January 1972 and that he had looked out over the Bogside and Creggan from the City Walls. A combination of what he had been told about the difficulties of catching the rioters and a knowledge of the geography of the area gained from these visits would have enabled him to form a general view of what an arresting force might need to do to effect arrests.
5C-57 The one thing that certainly cannot be read into this note is any notion that General Ford was laying down any boundaries, in particular a southern limit, for the operation. While he might have told Lord Widgery that what he had envisaged was a need for the arrest force to get behind the hooligans94, it does not follow that that is what he was requiring of the Brigadier, with a prohibition upon arrests outside the general area he had had in mind:
Q: You were certainly of the view that the troops should not be deterred by any artificial boundary line from going into areas to which previously they were not going?
93 Day 256/039/01 94 B1202 at E A. The limits of the arrest operation were obviously to be decided by the Brigade Commander and I did not place any limits on it.95
The illogicalities that result from a rigid application of this early thinking, combined with the misreading of the Operation Order, can be seen from the following passage (with particular reference to the passages underlined), taken from Arthur Harvey QC's questions to General Ford:
Mr Harvey: And your expectation was that, so far as the plan, the plan would be that as defined in the operation order, namely, the arrests were to be made at the junction of William Street/Rossville Street?
A. Apparently so, yes.
Q. William Street/Rossville Street junction was covered by massive anti-sniper fire on the part of the Army, because that was part of the brigade operation order?
A. Presumably so, yes. Of course I was not aware of the locations, but obviously that was -- the part of the plan was to deploy them and no doubt either the brigade or the battalion commanders concerned would have deployed them appropriately.
Q. That in fact was part of your instruction to be included in the plan, because if one refers to the third draft of your statement at 1208.78, the very final line: "The maximum number of soldiers were to be 'in the shop window'. They were to be covered by deployment of observation posts and by a very large number of snipers, in the anti-sniper role."
A. Yes.
Q. The real problem with that is that the troops who were executing an arrest operation at the location of William Street and Rossville Street had the protection and the cover of anti-sniper fire, which had been specifically directed by you, was included in the brigade operation order and was also transferred into the orders of the resident regiments?
A. Yes, presumably so.
95 Day 258/100/07 Q. But as soon as they went up Rossville Street they lost that cover?
A. There might have been other cover, I do not know.
Q. But your plan envisaged that these snipers were to be so located as to dominate the areas of the barricades where you anticipated the sniper fire would in fact take place?
A. That is true.
Q. So if one looks at the plan that you envisaged, the use of vehicles to go further up Rossville Street, jeopardised the lives of the soldiers because that movement denied them the protection that you envisaged for them when they were carrying out the arrest operation?
A. No, but if they went in their vehicles, they had the protection of the vehicles and -- may I finish --
Q. Sorry, General Ford.
A. And I do not know what the circumstances were at that time, whether a firefight had started or not, and I have said previously, once of course fire really opened, then, of course, the whole position -- the whole situation is changed.
Q. But General Ford, one of the important matters of planning is to try and maintain that zones of danger are not exceeded by soldiers so as to place themselves in greater danger?
A. Not necessarily so. If the situation developed differently from what was anticipated, then local decisions would have to be made.96
But it was not just the William Street/Rossville Street junction which was covered by the deployment of snipers and Observation Posts. What the Operation Order in fact provided was:
The Containment Line and the area within it are to be dominated by physical military presence, by OP observations and by sniper posts.97
96 Day 258/010/15 The result of this presentation of the evidence is a nonsense. The area within the Containment Line goes a lot further than just the junction of William Street and Rossville Street, and the protection of the counter-sniper posts would not be lost by a move down Rossville Street. It is difficult, moreover, to understand Mr Harvey’s reading of the Operation Order as requiring that the junction itself would be covered by sniper fire, as that is precisely where Mr Harvey is proposing that the arresting soldiers (again according to his reading of the Operation Order) were to be operating: on that basis it was the one area where there would be no gunmen.
The questions also ignore the obvious practicalities of the situation so far as fire from the Rossville Flats was concerned:
Q: In any event, if the arrest operation had been confined to what has been called Aggro Corner, the top of Rossville Street-William Street, would the troops have been exposed to fire from the same place, the Rossville flats?
A: Yes.98
The mischief of misinterpretation of the terms of the Operational Order is compounded by its vigorous application, as is illustrated by this passage from General Ford’s evidence to this Tribunal (again the questions and answers which are important for these purposes are underlined):
Mr Clarke: You said, if I heard you rightly, that you envisaged that the troops would go into the Bogside a relatively small distance, perhaps 200 to 300 yards. We have a scale at the bottom of this map which shows what 200 yards amounts to. By my reckoning, depending slightly where you take it from, but if you were to take it from the junction between William Street and Rossville Street, 200 yards would take you to about the south of Block 1, and 300 yards would take you to Free Derry Corner.
97 G95.568 paragraph 7(g) 98 Brig MacLellan to Lord Widgery, at B1259 A. Yes.
Q. Is that what you envisaged, that the troops would go as far as the south of Block 1 or as far as Free Derry Corner?
A. Certainly not going as far as Free Derry Corner, no.
Q. What about going as far as the south of Block 1?
A. I did not really envisage that.
Q. Because that is what 200 or 300 yards would take you to?
A. Yes. I did say 200 to 300 yards without reference to the map this morning. I am now doing the same on my map here, and I do agree with the distances you have just given.
Q. Leave aside the distance, looking at the street names and the buildings on the map, are you able to say how far you envisaged the troops going into the Bogside?
A. No. I am not; not precisely, no.
LORD SAVILLE: Sorry to interrupt: if we take one of the two axes mentioned in the operational plan, one of them was described as the William Street/Little James Street area.
A. Yes, sir.
LORD SAVILLE: Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I recall that, sir.
LORD SAVILLE: In effect that would -- if you were trying to cut off people rioting, say at barrier 12 or even barrier 13, and you wanted to get behind them, if you got as far as the junction between William Street and Rossville Street, you would be about 100 yards behind the barrier, would you not?
A. Yes, sir.
LORD SAVILLE: As I think you were saying the other day, if you take the operational plan, if you take the two axes and you forget for the moment the axis for Little Diamond, which is off to the left of this map, the axis for the possible scoop-up operation, its southernmost boundary is approximately the south side of William Street and no further south, is it not? A. It is, sir, yes, if you take it — yes.
MR CLARKE: Is it likely that was as far as you reckoned the operation would go?
A. On that — well, I think I envisaged going a little further than that; I would say a little further than the south side of William Street because I think it would be inevitable that you would have to operate, to some extent, south of William Street.
Q. A bit?
A. Yes, I am sure of that.
Q. That would not envisage, would it, going down into here or here or here? (Indicating).
A. No, not at that time, no, not when I gave out my outline orders.
Q. For the sake of the transcript, here was into Eden Place and Pilot Row, and the front of the Rossville Flats and Glenfada Park North.99
By the time Mr Clarke asked General Ford whether he was now able to say how far he had envisaged troops going into the Bogside the General had already correctly pointed out that (i) his planning did not descend to that level of detail: see paragraph 5C-55 above; and (ii) that the limits of the operation were to be set by the Brigadier: see paragraph 5B-57 above. The basis for the Chairman’s suggestion that the southernmost boundary of the scoop operation was no further south than the south side of William Street is not clear. What is clear from Mr Clarke’s follow up is that General Ford was not accepting the Chairman’s suggestion.
So far as the evidence is concerned, the only possible conclusion is that General Ford, while having a general impression of the area and how the operation might (all other things being equal) develop, was in no position to impose any boundaries and properly left that level of planning to those
99 Day 260/139/22 more closely involved in conducting the arrest element of the operation. This was the analysis of the process given by both General MacLellan\\textsuperscript{100} and General Steele.\\textsuperscript{101}
**TACTICS**
5C-65 General Ford was in no better position to dictate the tactics for the operation than he was its precise location. There is no evidence that at this (or any) stage he attempted to do so and there is no evidence from any military witness that he should have done so. Despite statements from the General to this effect he was asked for detailed information on tactical issues by a number of questioners, in particular in relation to how the arrest operation was to be carried out, including snatch squads, Containment Lines and Stop Lines, and provision for withdrawal in the event of shooting.
5C-66 A number of suggestions were made to General Ford in relation to the manner in which the arrest operation was to be conducted. It was put, for example, that C Company 1 PARA's move through Barrier 14, described by Arthur Harvey QC as 'a classic snatch squad operation' did not comply with the General's 'plan' that the arrest force should get behind the rioters:
*MR HARVEY:* General, yesterday morning before we broke we were dealing with the question of a scoop-up operation. As you indicated, that certainly the origins of the word was something that concerned you. Can I ask you to look at your own diary of events, which is at page 1208.57. If we could look at the second paragraph: "The mob, having been subjected to baton rounds and the water cannon and now seeing snatch squads of 1 Para in readiness, began to break up Chamberlain Street and William Street. At about 1610 barrier 14 was lifted and Company 1 Para went in after the mob in a 'sweep-up'"
\\textsuperscript{100} Day 261/051/07 \\textsuperscript{101} Day 268/156/10 operation." That is a classic snatch squad operation, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. That is not going in behind anyone; that is simply a mob which is behaving in a disgracefully unruly way in front of a number of troops who simply pursue them?
A. That is this element of this operation. It is only one element of a battalion operation.
.....
Q. Certainly so far as this part of the operation was concerned, there was absolutely no question of going round the back, it is a classic snatch operation?
A. No, I do not know if there is something going round the back or not, I do not know what instructions had been issued by the Battalion Commander or at a higher level, or what.102
At no stage, however, did the General issue an order that the arresting force go round the back103, or indeed that it go anywhere. Even if there had been such an order it could not possibly have required all of the troops involved to go round the back. The General has not been reminded that that 'going round the back' is a description which could be given to the actions of a different company, in a different part of the operation - Support Company getting themselves to the south of the rioters by using their vehicles.
Both Mr Elias and Mr Harvey took the General through their own theories about Stop Lines. It is not clear on what instructions or evidence those theories were based. As there had been no mention of such lines in any
102 Day 257/001/09 103 Gen Ford's evidence to Lord Widgery (at B1202) that unless the troops could get behind the hooligans there was no point in launching the operation reflected his understanding of the causes of 8 Brigade's failure to arrest them, not any notion that he had ordered that this was what the troops must do, regardless of circumstances on the ground. evidence of the officers involved in planning the operation, Mr Elias did so by reading such lines into General Ford's evidence to Lord Widgery:
Mr Elias: If we look at your evidence to Lord Widgery at B1202. I appreciate you remember little, if anything, now of the day, but this is what you were saying at the time, or shortly after at letter C to D: "Question: It says at sub-para(c) 'The scoop-up operation is likely to be launched on two axes [this is looking at the order, as you appreciate] one directed towards hooligan activity in the area of William Street/Little Diamond, and one towards the area of William Street/Little James Street'? "Answer: That is correct. "Question: Would that appear to be envisaging highly local operations for scooping up rioters at the two barricades, situated in those areas? "Answer: Yes. Of course, 'local' is a difficult term to define." Pause there, the questioner asked you whether it envisaged scoop-up rioters at the two barricades. You answered yes, making the point about local, a difficult term to define: "Question: Was it envisaged on the 26th January that the scoop-up operation would involve troops going to the northern end of the Rossville Flats? "Answer: The northern end of the Rossville Flats was not specifically mentioned, but the principle, if you would like me — it was always intended that if an opportunity occurred the scoop-up operation would be such that someone would be able to get behind the hooligans. Otherwise there was no object in launching it." That was your belief too, was it not, you had to get behind them otherwise it was a fruitless, hopeless exercise?
A. That was true.
Q. Because once they had fled, chasing after them was not only what was not envisaged by the order, as we have seen, but it was not going to be the way that you wanted the operation efficiently to be carried out?
A. No, but if — I am so sorry.
Q. Please?
A. No, but if gunmen intervened, which I believe they did, then the whole situation changes.
Q. I follow that. Can we read on, what you said at the time: 'Question: That is what my Lord would probably have expected. You wanted to get behind them and then [please note these words] trap them between the troops and the barricades? "Answer: That is correct." You went on in the later answer, I point it out, you say here there was no discussion about the meeting of details about the scoop-up operation; a matter for Brigade Commander, is what you said at the time. What you were envisaging and what you said in those answers, I suggest, was that there would be a scoop-up operation, by sending in troops, the Paras, who would run a line, a stop line down, very close to William Street and trap hooligans between that stop line and the barricades, which we know as barriers 12 and 14 in particular?
A. Well, of course, by "very close" I do not quite know how I answer that question. Local, certainly. But how far back, I cannot say.104
Mr Elias then embarked on a whole series of questions based on the assumption that there had in 1972 been a requirement for Stop Lines, the effect of which is a number of meaningless answers from the General:
Elias: Was there a need, General Ford -- whoever gave them -- for there to be detailed orders outlining the stop lines which the Paras were to take up in order to fence in the rioters?
A. Again, after all this time it is very difficult to say, but I would have thought there possibly would be alternative plans.
Q. That may be so. Contingencies in the event of this happening rather than that?
A. Yes.
Q. But the need for the Paras to know precisely where they were going to form the stop line, in the event of a particular situation arising, is plain, is it not?
A. They would know that, yes.
Q. If they did not exist, whose fault was that?
A. If there was no stop line at all behind?
Q. Yes.
104 Day 256/030/03 A. (Pause). But there was. A company went in behind; that was the stop line, surely, as I understand it. I do not know the detailed plan.\\textsuperscript{105}
Mr Elias then suggested that this interpretation of what General Ford had said to Lord Widgery was consistent with the evidence of his client, Company Sergeant Major Lewis:
\\textit{We will look shortly at what one of the company Sergeant Majors says about the plan and its execution.}
Mr Elias later drew his Stop Line on a map for another witness, Brigadier MacLellan.\\textsuperscript{106} The problem with this exercise, and particularly the dangers of doing it with a witness who has already said he took no part in the process involved and has no recall of detail, can be seen when that exchange is compared with what Mr Elias' client, Major Lewis, actually said about it when he came to give his evidence:
\\begin{quote} Q. But as you were about to go through the barrier, did you have some notion in your own mind, Major, that there was some form of stop line —
A. No, sir, no.
Q. On that day, whatever may have happened on other days, you did not expect there to be a line of soldiers somewhere behind the rioters, stopping them?
A. No, sir, no.
Q. It would have been totally impractical to do that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you could not conceivably, in a situation where you anticipated the probability, or at a minimum the possibility of fire being directed from the Rossville Flats, it would have been madness to put a line of soldiers across the wasteground? \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{105} Day 256/037/01
\\textsuperscript{106} Day 263/077/02. The marked plan was never in fact saved. A. Yes, sir.
Q. Waiting for you to come in; would it not? A. Yes, sir, yes.
Q. You also — whatever may have happened on other days — you did not believe that you were going into an area which had in any sense been sealed off? A. No, sir.(^{107})
5C-72 Despite what had been written in Major Lewis's statement(^{108}), he did not expect to see any sort of Stop Line on 30(^{th}) January 1972 and there are no grounds for arguing that General Ford either did provide or should have provided for one.
5C-73 Mr Harvey's exposition was equally confusing, starting with an assumption on his part that there was to be a 'Containment Line'.
Q: If the 1st Parachute Regiment was to be held centrally behind the blocking points, where was the containment line that the rioters were to be driven into? A: At that stage I did not know what detailed plan Brigadier MacLellan would make and so I told him to hold the whole thing centrally, which would allow him the maximum flexibility to deploy them as he so wished when he made his detailed plan.
Q: ..... Surely one of the most important matters to launch an operation would be to know where was the containment line? A: Yes, well, I mean, the fact that I wanted the battalion to be held centrally was, that in the first stage of the planning. Then comes the detailed planning by the Brigadier and then he can — he is aware of my overall intention; he then has to make a plan according to what he thinks is going to happen and so on, and the geography.
(^{107}) Day 373/110/02 (^{108}) BSI Statement, B2111.024 paragraph 165 Q: But really if one looks at what you said, it is the regiment should be held centrally behind the blocking points in the William Street area. If an opportunity arose, launch, in a scoop-up operation, to arrest as many rioters and hooligans as possible; it makes absolutely no mention whatsoever of a containment line?
A: No, I would not make that mention myself because they would be held initially centrally and then the Brigadier would have made plans as to how he intended to carry out the arrest operation, if he decided to do so.
LORD SAVILLE: Mr Harvey, I am being a little slow. Can you tell me what you mean by a containment line?
MR HARVEY: A containment line in a standard riot, one has two ways of dealing with it. Firstly you simply launch an arrest operation through the lines of containment, that is the blocking points.109
LORD SAVILLE: Yes.
MR HARVEY: If you are looking for an arrest operation which is more complicated, you have a snatch operation launched forward at a number of rioters, but driving them into blocking points where they can be arrested, either by those pursuing them or those into whose arms they are being driven; is that not right? Is that right, General Ford?
A. Sorry, sir, I did not realise you were asking me. Yes, generally.
Q. There are two ways of conducting arrest operations: one is where you have a containment line such as the blocking points that existed in William Street, Little James Street, Sackville Street, Lower Road, where the troops come from behind the rioters and drive them into the containment line?111
109 Mr Harvey did not explain what he meant by a 'standard riot'. It was a similar question from Mr Harvey, in a similar although not identical context, that prompted Gen Welsh to say to him: 'I think you know a lot more about it than I do.' Day 282/072/04.
110 Confusingly the barriers are described as the lines of containment.
111 Now it appears that the blocking points are the containment line, rather than the line of containment. A. Yes, we do not always call it a containment line. What you mean is the forces who are endeavouring to get round the back of the rioters to stop them dispersing.
Q. Getting round the back of them still means that they can run forward, it depends what they are running forward into?
A. I am not quite with you there, I am terribly sorry.
LORD SAVILLE: I do not think I am, Mr Harvey. You have these barricades and what are we assuming, that there is likely to be some rioting in the vicinity and in order to mount an effective scoop-up operation you have to get behind those rioters; is that what you are --
MR HARVEY: No, I am not.
LORD SAVILLE: I am being slow this morning.
MR HARVEY: What I am suggesting is, you have two ways of doing it. You have chosen to use the word "containment line". I am simply trying to find out what does that mean. The vast majority of rioters are simply arrested by snatch squads who move forward from behind blocking points, pursue them and arrest them; that is right, is it not?
A: That is the normal way of doing it, but we know it did not work in Londonderry because they were too clever, too many alleys, et cetera, et cetera.
Q: If there was to be a special arrest operation on your instructions, holding the arrest troop centrally behind blocking points is just the old-fashioned snatch squad method, is it not?
A: No, that was a merely initial order. After that Brigadier MacLellan, he knew that the requirement was to envelop the rioters if possible. That would make quite clear, how he was going to do that was entirely up to him.
Q. As part of the concept of your operation, you have not even mentioned it in this particular draft statement?
______________________________________________________________________
112 This is in fact the first time Gen Ford utters the words 'containment line', responding to correct Mr Harvey's use of it. A. I would not need to. I had already said, I think it is right, over the telephone, in the first conversation -- although I am speaking from memory now -- that I said we wanted to envelop, or words to that effect, the rioters if it was at all possible to do so. That, I think, was earlier than this.
Q. That is so. But in this particular document what you are bringing together is information from a number of different sources, all of which are meant to encompass the instructions -- both written and oral -- that you have provided to Brigadier MacLellan. There is absolutely no mention of driving these rioters into a containment line?
A. First of all, as I said just now, I never used the word "containment line," as such. But there is no doubt in my mind that the aim of the arrest operation was to envelop these rioters if it was possible to do so, and I do not think there was any doubt in Brigadier MacLellan's mind either.113
The problems demonstrated in this passage arise because of the questioner's desire to impose rigid (and poorly understood) concepts onto a situation that needed to be flexible and responsive, with a witness who has correctly said on a number of occasions that he was not part of the detailed decision making process.
Mr Elias also put the proposition that there should have been provision for withdrawal in the orders to 1 PARA and, by implication, that such an order should have come from General Ford. This may be another example of the difference of approach between lawyers and soldiers, as withdrawal as an immediate response to incoming fire is a step available in all situations to commanders on the ground. While taking the decision to withdraw in such circumstances and putting it into effect may need to be justified later, no specific order is required from higher up the chain of command. General Ford initially answered that it all depended upon the
113 Day 256/070/08 circumstances. On being shown what Colonel Wilford had said about withdrawal in his interview with Channel Four, he ultimately agreed with Mr Elias's suggestion that it would have been appropriate for him to have 'discussed at least with the Brigadier this contingency that maybe there would be circumstances where 1 PARA would have to withdraw'.
While in reality this formulation of the contingency under discussion is nothing more than a statement of the obvious, General Ford's concession also needs to be read in the light of the facts that (i) Colonel Wilford had not yet given his oral evidence about his interview with Channel Four; and (ii) the questions were asked (and, of course, Colonel's Wilford's answers to the interviewer given) with no regard to the practicalities of events on the ground or as to how any such discussion at the level of General and Brigadier might impact on events as they unfolded on the ground.
Major Lewis, on the other hand, was asked about the practical implications:
Q ... the suggestion has been made, Major, that when the firing started at your men they should have withdrawn; what do you say to that?
A. It would not have been up to me at the time, sir, or, indeed, it is not up to me to comment now. If there had been a need to withdraw the men, it would have been the decision of the company commander or, indeed, the battalion commander --
Q. Is it what you would have expected?
A. Um, after time, yes, sir.
Q. After? A. After a time, yes.
Q. Are you able to say what sort of time?
A. I would say when it became known that we were consolidated in the Rossville Flats area, Glenfada Park area, then I would have expected, as there was, a decision to, to pull back.\\textsuperscript{117}
While it is easy to assert that withdrawal of troops once firing breaks out should be discussed at the higher levels of command, a withdrawal in such circumstances is a step which carries its own dangers for the troops on the ground (how, for example, were the commanders to ensure that all the troops could move back, including those being engaged by gunmen and those involved in physical struggles with rioters?) and it cannot happen until the situation is sufficiently under control to enable it to be done safely. This reality is reflected in Major Lewis' answers to Mr Glasgow: the only time withdrawal would have been practically possible was once the incident which placed them in danger was over and, the position having been consolidated, the troops could be safely withdrawn. Contrary to Mr Elias' suggestions to witnesses on this subject, for his part Major Lewis was not able to contemplate a withdrawal until this consolidation of the position had taken place.
RISKS TO THE MARCHERS
Two types of risk need to be considered: (i) the risk of people not rioting getting caught up in the arrest operation and getting arrested; and (ii) the risk of people not using firearms getting caught up in a firefight and sustaining injury.
So far as the former is concerned there was without doubt a recognition on the part of General Ford\\textsuperscript{118} and a number of other military witnesses that
\\textsuperscript{117} Day 373/125/14 \\textsuperscript{118} Day 256/059/22 during the course of an arrest operation in a riot situation there was a risk that non rioters might get arrested:
... we were going to do a scoop-up operation, as I described, I think, yesterday that in a scoop-up operation you do not necessarily only pick up the rioters — did I say that yesterday? I cannot remember now. But that is an element of a scoop-up operation, that you may pick up other than rioters and so if there were people in the wasteground, then, sadly, they might get involved also.(^{119})
5C-81 This statement is no more than one of common sense: the exact course of such an operation once launched could never be precisely predicted. However much time may be allowed for “bystanders” to distance themselves from a riot, there are always people who stay in the area of a riot to watch it. Rioters might see those who are just watching as a source of refuge and the rioting is unlikely to stop just because an arrest operation has started: indeed there is a considerable amount of evidence available to this Tribunal, dealt with elsewhere in these Submissions, that shows that the rioters would retreat to what they saw as a safe distance from the troops and continue rioting from there. The use of dye in the water cannon was obviously and undoubtedly intended to make it easier to identify and exclude those who had not been involved in rioting but who might otherwise be arrested in a scoop-up operation.
5C-82 The position so far as innocent victims of a firefight is concerned is rather different: so far as General Ford was concerned, there would be no firing from the troops without firing from the IRA(^{120}). What he and those advising him had to assess was whether the IRA would intervene. While there is no concrete evidence of the process that was undertaken (either at HQNI or as between General Ford and Brigadier MacLellan), the evidence indicates that the assessment was that (i) the IRA would not fire
(^{119}) Gen Steele at Day 267/077/25
(^{120}) Used here so as to include all elements of violent republicanism with the inclination and the wherewithal to shoot at the troops. from amongst the peaceful element of the crowd\\textsuperscript{121}; (ii) if there was going to be armed intervention from the IRA it was likely to be related to the activities of the hooligans\\textsuperscript{122}; (iii) the precautions that were being taken, including the provision of a large number of soldiers visibly in the counter-sniper role and the encouragement of the presence of the media, would be sufficient to deter the IRA from firing\\textsuperscript{123}; and (iv) if there was to be firing at the troops it would be nothing more than sporadic sniping\\textsuperscript{124} or 'not substantial'\\textsuperscript{125}. As at 25\\textsuperscript{th} and 26\\textsuperscript{th} January 1972, which is the relevant time for any consideration of this issue, there is no reason to suppose that this was anything other than an accurate assessment of the risk the IRA presented.
This was the risk that had to be balanced against the need to provide for an arrest operation, already discussed above. It was not open to General Ford to omit to make such provision, necessary if the Army was to be able to fulfil its obligations to protect the lives of its troops, to maintain law and order and to protect property, on the grounds that the IRA might indulge in sporadic sniping at either the soldiers on the barriers or those attempting to effect the arrests.
The likelihood must be that General Ford had received one further important piece of information from 8 Brigade:
\\textit{Question: Some of the people in that area, for example, were journalists. Would you expect such a person to be arrested?}
\\textsuperscript{121} \\textit{Day 258/010/11}. This was a view shared by Brig MacLellan: see his 1972 statement, at B1232 paragraph 18
\\textsuperscript{122} \\textit{Day 255/009/15}: 'Q: So is the answer to my question: that you did foresee that, when the arrest force came to arrest the hooligans, that would or might lead the IRA to shoot at the Army? A: It might well'.
\\textsuperscript{123} \\textit{Day 256/043/14}
\\textsuperscript{124} Gen Ford's evidence to Lord Widgery, at B1203
\\textsuperscript{125} \\textit{Day 258/010/07} Answer: When you conduct a scoop-up operation of that kind you will arrest all those people who are in the area, including journalists.
Question: And I suppose it would follow from that, including local residents who just happened to have wandered out into the area?
Answer: They would not be there, sir. Our experience is that the normal residents about their lawful business do not hang about when hooligans are there.\\textsuperscript{126}
Despite the relatively small perceived risk of IRA intervention and the fact that there were likely to be few peaceful civilians in the area, further precautions (in addition to the deterrent effect of large numbers of soldiers 'in the shop window' and the encouragement to the Media already identified) could be, and were in the event, taken. The extent to which the following measures were discussed between the Commander Land Forces and the Brigade Commander on 26\\textsuperscript{th} January 1972 will never now be known, but the former would no doubt have known of them, and by definition given them his approval:
(1) an attempt was made to minimise the risk of non rioting civilians being arrested by means of dye in the water fired by the water canon at rioters at the barricades;
(2) the arrest operation was only to be considered in the event of serious violence (ie the throwing of stones, bottles or nail bombs) or an attempt to breach the containment line;
(3) the arrest force could only move on the order of the very senior officer commanding the whole of the operation on 30\\textsuperscript{th} January 1972, Commander 8 Brigade;
\\textsuperscript{126} Lt Col Steele to Lord Widgery, at B1312 (4) the Brigade Commander would only give that order if he was satisfied that there was adequate separation between those whose actions necessitated the arrest operation and those who were demonstrating peacefully.
This is the context in which the orders General Ford gave Brigadier MacLellan on 26th January 1972 must be considered, and it is to that topic which this Submission now turns. CHAPTER 5D ORDERS TO 8 BRIGADE
5D-1 Brigadier MacLellan’s note of the telephone conversation he had with the Commander Land Forces on 25th January 1972 includes the following:
Plan with marked map to be with CLF by 0830 WED 26 JAN (to include admin para).1
5D-2 Having provided the Brigade Commander with an overall concept, the General now required 8 Brigade to fill in the detail. The detail was then discussed at the meeting between the commanders and their senior operational staff officers (the Brigade Major 8 Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Steele; and the GSO1 Operations at HQNI, Lieutenant Colonel INQ 1877) on the afternoon of the 26th January.
5D-3 While this was the occasion at which the General gave his orders, there is no doubt that the meeting provided an opportunity for discussion:
My outline plan, based on the concepts given to me by the Commander Land Forces, was duly forwarded to Headquarters Northern Ireland during the night 25th/26th January. Having read my outline plan the Commander Land Forces telephoned me during the morning of 26th January and instructed me to attend a meeting with him at Headquarters Northern Ireland that afternoon to discuss the plan.2
5D-4 The plan with marked map has not survived, and it is not now possible to reconstruct the discussions that took place during the course of the meeting, as (as is to be expected) none of the participants has anything like a comprehensive memory of the deliberations.3 What can safely be
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1 G69.435 2 Brig MacLellan’s first draft Statement for Lord Widgery, B1279.015 paragraph 7 3 Gen Steele told the Tribunal that it was the CLF who used the term ‘scoop up’ and that that was a phrase which did not require explanation: see Day 266/048/14 and Day 266/049/01 assumed is that (i) the discussion was sufficiently wide ranging for the 8 Brigade officers to be able to produce the detailed Brigade order overnight; (ii) (on the basis that the Operation Order was to meet with the Commander Land Force's approval) the conclusions of the meeting were consistent with the terms of the written Operation Order dated 27th January; (iii) (on the basis that there was little point in keeping anything back and risking a subsequent failure to meet the approval of the Commander Land Forces) by the end of the meeting Brigadier MacLellan had given the General a comprehensive description of 8 Brigade's thinking and approach to the operation as it was at the date of the meeting.
What is known is that, as one would expect, at some stage during the meeting the Commander Land Forces gave Commander 8 Brigade his orders. The Brigade Major made a note of these orders and they duly appeared in the Operation Order as it was finally drawn. The note the Brigade Major made at the meeting has not survived but its contents ultimately found their way into the first draft of Brigadier MacLellan's statement for the Widgery Tribunal.4
Given the manner in which some of the issues were raised with or in relation to the military witnesses, in particular General Ford, these orders merit careful reading. They appear at paragraph 8 of the draft statement5, as follows:
(1) The containment of the Creggan march would be a military operation with RUC in support, and the military in command at all levels;
4 See Gen Steele's evidence to this Tribunal, at Day 266/046/12 5 At B1279.015 (2) The dispersal of illegal marches in other parts of the City, and the control of the actual Meeting Point, in Shipquay Place, would be an RUC responsibility with the Military in support.
(3) Any action required to deal with an organised protest sit-down would be an RUC responsibility, and that troops would not be used to disperse such a protest.
(4) The event was to be handled in as low a key as possible, and for as long as possible. To this end:
(a) Troops were to take no action against the Marchers until either an attempt was made to breach the blocking points, or violence erupted, in the form of stone, bottle and nail bomb attacks against the Security Forces.
(b) CS gas was not to be used throughout the event, except as a last resort, and only if troops were about to be over-run, and the rioters could no longer be held off with baton rounds and water canon.
(c) Ringleaders of the March need not necessarily be arrested on the spot, but should be identified and arrested at a later stage.
(d) If the March took place entirely in the Bogside and Creggan it was to be permitted to continue unchallenged.
(e) Blocking points should be emplaced as late as possible before the arrival of the march to allow normal traffic to flow until the last possible moment.
(5) Once the blocking points had been emplaced no Marchers were to be allowed to proceed through them, except in cases of genuine emergency. (6) The hooligan element was not to be permitted to damage Business, Shopping and Protestant areas of Londonderry. To this end he directed that Tactical Headquarters and 3 companies of the 1st Battalion the Parachute Regiment should be held centrally behind the blocking points in the William Street area and if an opportunity arose launched in a scoop up operation to arrest as many rioters and hooligans as possible.
(7) Blocking points were to be established as far forward as possible, to keep any violence in the Bogside and Creggan areas, and prevent it from overflowing into the Business and Shopping areas.
(8) The maximum number of soldiers were to be ‘in the shop window’. They were to be covered by deployment of Observation Posts and snipers in the anti-sniper role. These Observation Posts and snipers were to be deployed to every possible vantage point.
(9) A full photographic record was to be made of the event, including cine colour photography from a helicopter. The developed and printed films were to be delivered to Headquarters Northern Ireland by 1800 hrs on 30th January.
A number of points need to be made about these orders:
(1) Sub-paragraph (1) above reflects the formal decision taken by the Director of Operations’ Committee, which had taken place earlier in the day;
(2) the provision at paragraph 7b(1) of the Operation Order that 8 Brigade intended to ‘deal with any illegal marches in as low a key as possible and for as long as possible’ originated with the Commander Land Forces. Suggestions to the contrary made by Mr Arthur Harvey QC during his Opening Statement do not appear to have taken Brigadier MacLellan’s 1972 description of General Ford’s orders into account;
(3) a number of Counsel put it to Generals Ford and MacLellan that there was a degree of inevitability about the launching of the arrest operation on 30th January 1972. For the most part the proposition was based on a particular reading of the Operation Order for Operation Forecast, the precise terms of which will be discussed below in the section of this Submission which deals with the Order. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the proposition appears to ignore General Ford’s requirement that the event be handled in as low a key as possible ‘for as long as possible’;
(4) despite suggestions made to him to the contrary (in particular by Mr Harvey), it is clear that even at this early stage General Ford was drawing a very clear distinction between three groups of people: the marchers, who would be permitted to continue unchallenged if they remained within the Bogside and Creggan [sub-paragraph 4(d) above]; the ringleaders of the march, who (a concession from, and no doubt in recognition of the potentially inflammatory consequences of, the NISEC paper’s recommendation of ‘on the spot arrests of ringleaders’) did not need necessarily to be arrested on the spot, but should be identified and arrested at a later stage [sub-paragraph 4(c)]; and the hooligans, who were not to be permitted to damage ‘Business, Shopping and Protestant areas of Londonderry’. General Ford’s orders for the hooligans and for the arrest force (Tactical Headquarters and 3 companies of the 1 PARA ‘to be held centrally behind the blocking points in the William Street
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7 Day 045/051/23 8 Day 256/081/05 9 NISEC 11 ‘Measures to Control Marches’, G53.318 paragraph 4(b) area and if an opportunity arose launched in a scoop up operation to arrest as many rioters and hooligans as possible’) appear in the same sub-paragraph [sub-paragraph (6) above].
(5) in addition to expressly stating that the march was to be handled in as low a key as possible for as long as possible, General Ford included a number of measures clearly designed to (a) minimise the risk of violence: the troops were to take no action unless there was an attempt to breach the blocking points or serious violence was directed against them [sub-paragraph 4(a) above]; and there was no requirement for the immediate arrest of ringleaders [sub-paragraph 4(c)]; and (b) to encourage any prospects for a peaceful event by minimising the disruption to those demonstrating peacefully or going about their own business in the area: CS gas was only to be used in extremis [sub-paragraph 4(b)]; only the ringleaders were to be photographed for the purpose of later prosecution [sub-paragraph 4(c)]; and the barriers were to be closed as late as possible to permit normal traffic for as long as possible [sub-paragraph 4(e)].
The list of orders is as important for what it does not include as for what it does. In particular:
(1) there was no order that the arrest force ‘go round the back’. While without doubt this was how by way of a general concept the General saw the arrest operation achieving a degree of success which had eluded 8 Brigade since the previous July, he did not legislate that they must do so. To have done so would have limited the options of the commanders on the ground unnecessarily with potential harm for the prospects of any operation that had to be mounted. No military witness before this Tribunal has subscribed to the idea that General Ford should have involved himself in the manner in which the arrest operation was to be carried out;
(2) there was no order that 8 Brigade arrest three to four hundred rioters. The terms of the order from the General are clear: 'to arrest as many rioters and hooligans as possible' [sub-paragraph (6)]. This phrase later appeared in the Operation Order as the purpose of the arrest operation and was passed on to Commanding Officer 1 PARA as his battalion's mission;
(3) there was no order that the marchers and hooligans be separated prior to the commencement of any arrest operation. Given the purpose of the meeting the probability must be that the issue of separation was discussed at the meeting (which is General Ford's evidence to this Tribunal), though there was no requirement for an order to that effect. Again, the Commander Land Forces, who had provided a framework for a low key event, quite properly did not descend into the detail of how it was to be achieved:
Q: General [Steele], I want to move on now, if I may, to an issue about which you have been asked a lot already, that is the orders for the arrest operation on 30th January 1972. General Steele, so far as these orders are concerned, the start point is the meeting you and the brigade commander attended with the CLF on 26th January 1972, that is a meeting you have been asked about already. At that meeting, as I understand it, you were instructed to carry out, in the right circumstances, a scoop-up operation?
A: Yes.
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10 And consequently there was no 'fatal flaw' in the planning, which the General would have 're-evaluated' had the Brigadier and Brigade Major informed him of it: see Day 268/001/09 11 G95.568 paragraph 7(e) 12 G.95.570 paragraph 9(f)(1) 13 Day 257/036/11 – 037/04 Q: Did you receive from General Ford any more than that instruction, and I say "any more", by that I mean in terms of guidance, how you were to carry it out, what tactics were to be adopted?
A: No.
Q: Would you tell the Tribunal that that was how it should have been, or that the general should have given you such guidance?
A: I was content that, having been given the order to conduct an arrest operation and having been allotted the troops to do it, that it was up to 8 Brigade to execute his direction and write the order.¹⁴
(4) there was no order to the effect that the arrest operation must take place, regardless of how things developed on the ground. Mr Clarke’s questions on this issue were put from a legalistic perspective, based on the absence of a provision in the Operation Order for the operation not to take place once there had been violence at the barriers, in particular if there had been violence but it was dying down without the arrest operation having been launched¹⁵. The commencement of the operation did not require and was not in any event susceptible to legislation from higher command. It was (and had of necessity to be) a matter, as General Ford told the Tribunal¹⁶, of judgement for the commanders on the ground. The senior of those commanders, Brigadier MacLellan, was asked about inevitability at the Widgery Tribunal:
A: ... . My intention throughout was to do everything to reduce the risk to the absolute minimum to the non-violent marchers and, to this end, I certainly was not prepared to
¹⁴ Day 268/155/18 See also Gen Ford’s evidence to this Tribunal at Day 255/060/24 ¹⁵ Day 254/067/07 – 072/12. This discussion was in any event somewhat academic as at the time the order was given rioting satisfying the criteria which did appear in the Operation Order was continuing: see, for example, Brig MacLellan’s Supplementary Statement for the Widgery Tribunal, at B1226 paragraph 28 ¹⁶ Day 254/072/11 launch the arrest operation unless there was serious disorder and rioting and, indeed, we had gone up the scale and, furthermore, I would only do it if the rioters and the non-violent demonstrators were widely separated.
Q: To put it another way, ... was the launch of the arrest operation regarded before this day began as inevitable.
A: No.
Q: Would it have been launched at all unless the main body of peaceable marchers was well separated from the rioters?
A: No, sir.17
(5) there was no order as to the location at which the arrest operation should be conducted. No military witness has subscribed to the idea that the Commander Land Forces should have involved himself in this issue. General Ford described the position so far as orders on this subject were concerned from his own and the Brigade Commander's perspective, in the following terms:
Q: Would you agree with me that if I have fairly stated the facts — and somebody will certainly correct me if I have not — the way in which the plan appears to have been executed seems to have been inconsistent upon the basis upon which it was to take place in the first place?
A. I mean, it is very difficult for me to answer that because you are now — you are getting into the detail of the operation with which I was not concerned. I laid down certain parameters, which have been met. Now you are asking me to say whether what actually happened, as described by you, is in accordance with Brigadier MacLellan's orders, and I do not think — the business of separation is essential, but he had — he was in a position to know when separation was complete, and I cannot comment on the time that he made this decision. I do not know when the time was, in fact.
Q. The reason I am asking is that what took place is said to have taken place in accordance with operation orders that
17 Brig MacLellan's evidence to Lord Widgery, at B1252. you approved. Do you think that they ought to have provided that the arrest force was not to go down Rossville Street and into the car park of the Rossville Flats and as far as it did go?
A. No, I do not think so at all. No-one knew what the situation was going to be, and Brigadier MacLellan had to play it as the situation developed.\\textsuperscript{18}
In receipt of their orders and having, it must be assumed, discussed any issues that arose out of them, Commander 8 Brigade and his Brigade Major returned to Londonderry to complete their plans for the march and to draw up the Operation Order.
\\textsuperscript{18} Day 255/007/12 CHAPTER 5E
PLANNING AT 8 BRIGADE
'You see, nothing is perfect in this world of riots, all sorts of things can happen.'
5E-1 The Brigade Commander and his Brigade Major were no doubt able to discuss the orders that had to be given during the return journey from Lisburn, and the Tribunal knows that the order was drafted by the Brigade Major that night and discussed with the Brigade Commander the following morning, before its dispatch to HQNI where it was approved by the Commander Land Forces.
5E-2 As is to be expected, the orders given by the General appear without alteration in the Brigade Order. The best record of 8 Brigade thinking in relation to the operation on 30th January 1972 is the Operation Order itself.
INTELLIGENCE
5E-3 The expectations of Headquarters 8 Brigade at the time the Operation Order was finalised are (in so far as it was felt that intelligence was going to impact on this particular event) summarised in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Operation Order. So far as the march itself is concerned, the upper end of the available estimates of its size was that given by Chief Superintendent Lagan at his meeting with Brigadier MacLellan on 24th January 1972, as being between eight and twelve thousand. The aim was to march to Shipquay Place. Whether based on actual intelligence or instinct formed by experience, it was anticipated that a hooligan element, almost certainly supported by snipers and petrol and nail bombers, would
1 Col Derek Wilford, at Day 312/042/13 2 G95.564 paragraph 1(e)(1) accompany the march; and it was thought that bombers might intensify their efforts to destroy the business and shopping areas of the City Centre during the march while the attention of the Security Forces was elsewhere.4
Crucial though any such information would have been to the Security Forces, there is no mention here (as there is no mention of it in any pre-march documentation) of any IRA plan to move its weapons out of the Bogside5, or to impose any sort of prohibition against firing at the soldiers, or to offer any assurance (for what any such assurance may have been worth) to the organisers of the march that its members would do no more than attend as marchers, if at all.
The position was in fact quite the contrary. The 8 Brigade threat assessment included the following:
b. IRA terrorist activity, to take advantage of the event, to conduct shooting attacks against the Security Forces, and bombing attacks against Business, Shopping and Commercial premises in the City Centre.
c. Hooligan reaction to the general excitement of the event, in the form of stone, bottle and nail bombing of troops, arson of private premises and vehicles and a high degree of violence throughout the City. Although this violence is expected to continue throughout the event, it will intensify during the closing stages of the event, especially in the William St/Rossville St area; it is possible that hooligan activity may continue thereafter for several days.6
Whether or not there was hard intelligence to support the fears set out in sub-paragraph b, there was an identified source for all that is in sub-
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3 G95.565 paragraph 1(f) 4 G95.565 paragraph 1(g) 5 At Day 285/060/16 Col Jackson observed that 'We know that the majority of the weapons were up in the Creggan area, having been taken to the Creggan area.' When asked about this evidence by Lord Gifford QC Col Jackson confirmed that his apparent subscription to this story about IRA weaponry only occurred after the event, rather than before it. 6 G95.565 paragraph 2(b)-(c) paragraph c. The sub-paragraph elaborates on what Chief Superintendent Lagan had told Brigadier MacLellan on 24th January. As General Steele made clear in his evidence to this Tribunal:
A: Yes, it is, and all that information with regard to the march, which I recall is in the first page of the operation order, I would have received from the RUC, from Chief Superintendent Lagan.7
Q: I was going to ask you about that: you received your information through the Intelligence Services; did you not?
A: Mainly through the RUC, yes.
Q: You would get it through the Intelligence Services; you did not have any direct contact with either Chief Superintendent Lagan or any of his officers, did you?
A: No, that is not true. I did have contact with Superintendent Lagan and I believe that Superintendent Lagan -- I do not know if I am right in saying this -- but I believe he had contact with the NICRA organisation.
Q: Could you look at 1315.004, paragraph 16 of your statement, you say: "I was not involved in any meetings or discussions between Brigadier MacLellan and Chief Superintendent Lagan of the RUC, nor was I involved in any follow-up discussions between Brigadier MacLellan and the CLF." We know there was a meeting between Chief Superintendent Lagan and Brigadier MacLellan on 24th January, but you were not present at that meeting, as I understand it?
A: No, I was not, but I would have got the information from the brigade commander.8
With the approval of the Commander Land Forces, 8 Brigade was listening to, and passing down the chain of command, the warnings of serious violence given by the local police.9
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7 In other words, 8 Bde listened to Chief Superintendent Lagan. And Gen Ford approved the order as drafted. 8 Day 268/124/04 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
5E-8 As would be expected, much of the content of this section of the Operation Order, paragraph 7, originated with the Commander Land Forces in the form of the orders given to the Brigade Commander on 26th January: sub-paragraphs a(1) and (2) appear in the record of the General's orders which ultimately appeared at paragraph 8 a. and b. of Brigadier MacLellan's first draft statement for the Widgery Tribunal; sub-paragraph b(1) of the Order appears in Brigadier MacLellan's draft statement at paragraph 8d; sub-paragraph c of the Order is Brigadier MacLellan's paragraph 8e; sub-paragraph d of the Order is Brigadier MacLellan's paragraph 8c; sub-paragraph e of the Order is Brigadier MacLellan's paragraph 8f; sub-paragraph h of the Order is Brigadier MacLellan's paragraph 8g; and sub-paragraph j of the Order is an elaboration of Brigadier MacLellan's paragraph 8h. The elaboration was required because of the way 8 Brigade were thinking about the arrest operation, and is addressed below.
5E-9 So far as the arrest operation is concerned, no concept is given, no tactics are laid down and no limitations or boundaries are imposed upon the arrest operation. The arrest force is to be held centrally behind the check points, which means no more than that it is to be kept in reserve in a location or locations central to the event and convenient for the fastest possible deployment whenever and wherever it is required. What is provided, to all readers of the Order but in particular to the commander who is to carry out the arrest operation if it is required, is the mission: to
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9 The Tribunal has at G66.411 a police document containing the prediction 'no trouble anticipated' in relation to the Londonderry march. Whatever the status of that document (as to which see the footnote 3 to paragraph 5C-1(2) above), it had been prepared for the JSC meeting of 20th January 1972 and had clearly been compiled on 19th January at the latest, as the first entry in the document refers to an event in Cookstown on 20th January (G66.409). By 27th January 1972 the document had clearly been overtaken by events.
10 B1279.015 arrest, not any particular number of rioters, but as many rioters as possible.\\footnote{1}
TROOPS TO TASK
5E-10 This section of the Order, paragraph 9, provides each unit and independent sub-unit with the role it is to take for the event, and is relevant to the controversy that has been created in relation to the selection of 1 PARA for the arrest role.
5E-11 Despite suggestions to the contrary, there has been no claim that the commitments of the units in 8 Brigade were the sole reason for General Ford's selection of 1 PARA as the arrest force. The General's position is that those commitments (complemented, of course, by 1 PARA's relative availability) were an important factor that weighed in favour of the use of a battalion not committed to the ongoing tasks that ordinarily went with responsibility for the security of a particular area of the City. To look at the issue from 8 Brigade's perspective, the use of one of the additional battalions for this particular, non area-specific task (i.e. the arrest operation) left the resident battalions in place, avoiding more disruption to the troops than was absolutely necessary and maintaining a seamless control of the City according to tried and tested operational procedures, both between and within units, from the period of the run up to the march to its aftermath.
5E-12 The tasks that are relevant here are not therefore (as questions from both Mr Harvey\\footnote{4} and Mr Clarke\\footnote{15} suggest) those which arose out of the roles
\\footnote{1}{Operation Order Operation Forecast, \\textit{G95.568 paragraph 7(e)}} \\footnote{2}{Arthur Harvey QC at \\textit{Day 258/065/13}: 'And it would be incorrect for anyone to state that 1 PARA were used as the arrest force because the other regiments had already been allocated their specific areas of responsibility?'} \\footnote{3}{BSI Statement, \\textit{B1208.031 paragraph 5.2}} \\footnote{4}{\\textit{Day 258/065/13}, set out at footnote 2 above; and \\textit{Day 258/070/17}} \\footnote{15}{\\textit{Day 254/019/04}: 'The first reason you give is that "the units in 8 Brigade were already committed in areas which they knew around the perimeter of the City". That was only so, was which the units in 8 Brigade were to be allocated specifically for the march on 30th January. The material tasks for these purposes are the duties the units of 8 Brigade ordinarily carried out within their own Tactical Areas of Responsibility, and which were no doubt seriously stretching them day after day, regardless of the march, and had been doing so since the reorganisation of the Brigade’s deployment was completed on 21st December 197116: 1 Coldm Guards the Creggan and the open countryside of the Enclave; 22nd Regt in the City, including the Bogside; 2 RGJ the whole of RUC Divisions O and P, including a two company17 task at Magilligan Camp and the Sperrins; and 1 R ANGLIAN the whole of RUC Division N, including a company task as far away as Strabane.
While it is understandable that lawyers might underestimate the difficulties of lifting a battalion out of its permanent area and putting in another one for an unknown period18, and the time it would take to install its replacement, the officers who have given evidence to this Tribunal (Colonel Roy Jackson might be considered an exception; his position will be looked at further) did not. It should be borne in mind that Chief Superintendent Lagan’s warnings about the length of time the violence might continue had resulted in a warning order to 39 Brigade that 1 PARA might be out of its area for up to 4 days, and that is the time scale upon which any change over would have to have been planned. If there had been no violence during the march 1 PARA would have been required back in Belfast within the day; if it had been required to take over the area of one of the resident battalions the change over would have to have been reversed before it could have been completed.
16 8 Brigade Op Directive 4/71 of 10th November 1971, at G27.196 17 Operation Order Operation Forecast, at G95.570 paragraph 9(g)(1) 18 See for example, Mr Harvey at Day 258/070/17 ‘It is easily arranged, General Ford .....’ The coincidence of General Ford's selection of 1 PARA and 8 Brigade's own requirements is reflected in this evidence from General Steele:
The two resident battalions of 8 Brigade were, of course, already committed on their own tasks in RUC Divisions N, O and P and so it made absolute sense that if there was to be an arrest force, then it should be a separate entity and the CLF felt that 1 PARA should be the people to do it.19
This view was shared by General INQ 0598, who was the Commanding Officer of 1 Coldm Gds on 30th January 1972:
1 PARA were the [Province20] Reserve Battalion, based in Belfast and it was entirely sensible that they would be involved. As the [Province21] Reserve Battalion their role was to support the resident battalions where and whenever needed. I did not think it was surprising at all that the paras were going to be involved. We could have done the job they were given but in order for us to have done so 1 PARA would have had to come into Londonderry and take over our regular duties. They would then have had to be relieved by us after the march.22
General INQ 0598 explained some of the problems when he was asked about this evidence by Mr Harvey:
Q: I am not trying to get you to say anything, I am simply asking you to comment. Ultimately your regiment was well capable of carrying out an arrest operation; is that right?
A: Yes, but we would have had to have been relieved of all our posts we had and all the operations which we were doing the day before so we could be taken back, rehearse what we were going to do and then the following day we would have had to take over all those places again, very cumbersome.22
General Welsh, then Commanding Officer 2 RGJ, was of a similar view:
19 Day 266/048/01 20 Corrected in oral evidence to 39 Brigade: Day 272/002/11 21 BSI Statement, C598.3 paragraph 15 22 Day 272/042/12 Q: Was any reason ever given to you for the use of the Parachute Regiment instead of the Royal Green Jackets?
A: Oh, yes, I think — I mean — it was quite clear we, at that time — I think the roles in the battalions had changed and we were in the county, and it would have meant taking us out of the county role and going into the city and it would have meant mucking up all the battalions, I think, so that was a plain reason, which I did not appreciate too much at the time.23
5E-18 As was the Brigade Commander, who put it this way in 1972:
Q: ... why was it that [1 PARA] were selected particularly to carry out this operation, as opposed to other Units who had greater knowledge of the area and the rioters who would be involved?
A: First the units under my command already, not the reinforcements, were committed to tasks which they were carrying out. Secondly, there was no point in doing any juggling about, as I understood it.24
5E-19 The one senior officer from 8 Brigade who now at least holds a different view is Colonel Jackson, then Commanding Officer 1 R ANGLIAN:
Q: Insofar as you are suggesting, sir, [1 PARA] could have taken over your role, the roles played by your regiment, would you reflect on that; do you think that was necessarily a bad thing, or something that could not have sensibly been done?
A: When was that, which roles are you talking about?
Q: The roles you were actually, now you have been reminded of the fact you were the County Regiment substantially working in Strabane at the time, at least 1 Company of 1 Para would have had to replace 1 Company Royal Anglians in Strabane?
A: Well, yes, I mean they could have done a county role as far as I was concerned, yeah.
23 Day 282/033/10 24 Brig MacLelland to Lord Widgery at B1264 Q: You really think it would have been, I do not mean to sound rude, it would have been sensible to bring in a very severe battalion, not only into the city for an in-and-out operation in a day, but to get them to replace an established regimental role in the county and Strabane, that would have been a sensible way of using a reserve battalion?
A: I would have preferred it to have had an in-and-out battalion, whatever its --
Q: Yes, but assuming they were to be used, whoever it was, whatever reserve battalion was going to be used, would it have been militarily sensible to swap over an established county resident battalion, working as you were principally in Strabane, with all the physical movement that that would have taken, to put at least one company of the Parachute Regiment there?
A: Well, it would only have been for a few hours. I mean, the Operation Forecast was only literally from 12 o'clock until that evening, it was only half a day.
Q: You could not sensibly have replaced a company in Strabane, could you, with the amount of physical rearrangement --
A: Oh, yes, we were sufficiently flexible to move at any time. I mean, we moved to Belfast in, I do not know what time, February 1971, no difficulty.
Q: That was the reason why the second soldier I was going to put to you on the ammunition point also deals with this, and I wanted, if I could, to deal with two points at the same time. I think I mentioned his reference, he is the warrant officer in command company, HQ Company, 216. We have him at B2153. I suspect, sir, you might remember -- again it does not matter at all if you do not -- 216 describes himself as the second class warrant officer of the Royal Anglian, who was the company sergeant major of command company and on the actual -- all that is listed as HQ Company; does that ring any bells?
A: No.
Q: The point I want to draw your attention to occurs on the second page, paragraph 8 right at the bottom. You see: "At that briefing ..." He is referring here of course to the briefing you would have given: "... the units were told where they were to be deployed. I cannot say that we were sorry that we were not deployed on any of the flash points that day. In many respects the way we were deployed made sense." This is the company sergeant major speaking: "We knew the area, whereas the Paras did not. It was possibly better for us to be held in a reserve position because we knew the streets. Our job was to contain the situation, keeping it to the one area to prevent spreading out. That is why the battalion was blocking the side streets." I pause there. Of course, you had two companies that were in blocking roles, did you not, and one back in Strabane?
A: Yes.
Q: Going on with 216's statement: "If you are going to push crowds around you need to know where you are pushing them. The Paras would not have had that sort of information. It made sense for them to be placed in the more sensitive areas that did not require a detailed knowledge of the area. When we went to Belfast on occasions to assist the resident battalions, the battalion was generally put at the flash points as we were not familiar with the area. That happened on two occasions." Is the company sergeant major right to your recollection, that when you went to Belfast, I think you have referred to it yourself in your evidence, that your own regiment was used in the same way as the Paras were used when they came to Londonderry?
A: Not at all, we did not do scoop-up, we took over an area in the Clonnard.
Q: You think he is mistaken about that?
A: Yeah.
Q: I will come back to it in a second, sir.
.....
Q: The reason why, sir, I wanted you to have the opportunity of dealing with the troops-to-task exercise, as it has been referred to, is that the commanding officers of all the other battalions have already expressed a view on this, apart from, of course, the Parachute Regiment. If I can put them to you in summary, which would be the quickest way of doing it, and then ask you to consider again whether you would reconsider your evidence in the light of this. First of all the brigade major, who I think you accept was very experienced in Londonderry?
A: Yes, he had been there longer than we had. Q: His view was, he told the Tribunal in his evidence on Day 268, page 150, we need not turn it up, that the two resident battalions were already fully deployed on their roles on RUC divisions, and he has explained them. He considered that was the sensible way of using them. The commanding officer of the Coldstream Guards, you remember him?
A: Yes.
Q: We have a reference to him, so that you can keep a check on what I am putting, C598.3, one single sentence, he says: "1 Para were the Province reserve battalion based in Belfast. It was entirely sensible that they be involved. As the province reserve their role was to support the resident battalions wherever and whenever needed. I do not think it was surprising at all that they were getting involved. We could have done the job ..." The commanding officer of the Royal Green Jackets told the Tribunal in his evidence that he would have regarded the displacements of the resident battalions as unnecessarily "mucking up" the battalions, was the phrase he used on a number of occasions, simply "mucking up" their positions. Finally, the commanding officer of the 22nd Light Air Defence, do you remember him?
A: Yes.
Q: Jimmy Ferguson?
A: (Witness nodding)
Q: Told the Tribunal in his evidence that he saw no reason or justification to see that 1 Para should not be used in an arrest role. I thought it was fair to tell you what the other commanding officers had said, but does it remain your view that you think it would have been better for your regiment to have been reorganised so that the Paras could have been put, if necessary, as far away as Strabane and your regiment done the arrest operation?
A: Yes, I mean what you have told me now surprises me somewhat.
Q: That is why I thought you ought to have the opportunity of changing this? A: But I will not change my mind. We did know the area, we did know the local population, I think, et cetera.25
The problem with this evidence is that Colonel Jackson, who may in any event be talking merely about a personal preference (see the second passage underlined, his third answer), clearly does not retain (and to be fair to him, may never have had) a sufficient understanding of the planning that had been necessary in preparation for this march. While it is true that in the event 1 PARA were on the streets of Londonderry 'for a few hours', they had been warned that they might be required in Londonderry for a number of days. Colonel Jackson had begun his evidence (see his sweeping and superficial statement that 1 PARA could, so far as he was concerned, have done the County role) in the belief that as at 30th January 1972 his battalion were still operating under the old roulement system, alternating between three weeks in the City role and three weeks in the County role. When shown what the other senior officers in the Brigade had told the Tribunal Colonel Jackson would not 'change his mind', but was clearly returning to his argument that his battalion should have been given the arrest role: they knew the area and the local population. Colonel Jackson's evidence is far from impressive on this issue and he is moreover alone in taking the view he does.
Despite his earlier evidence that, had he been given the arrest role, he would have wanted to have done it with his own troops26, Colonel Jackson also agreed with a suggestion27 that the arrest force could have been formed from more than one unit. There was inevitably some disruption of the unit formations. A Company 2 RGJ, which is likely to have been in the reserve or resting phase of its own battalion roulement, (leaving two 2 RGJ companies at Magilligan and one in the Sperrins), was placed under
25 Day 286/067/25 26 Day 286/088/03 27 From Mr Elias, at Day 286/095/12 command 22nd Regt; and D Coy 1 PARA was given to 22nd Regt as an immediate, local reserve. However such an arrangement (as Colonel Jackson himself acknowledged in the earlier evidence already referred to) was far from ideal for the one unit that, if utilised at all, was going to have to be the most flexible and the most mobile.
General Welsh was also asked about mixing up units, and agreed with the earlier of the views expressed by Colonel Jackson:
Q: The other is the deployment. If I can use your word you used a little earlier. Using companies of the Royal Green Jackets, would have, I think you said, mucked up the job that the battalion was at the time doing. There was, of course, was there not, in the deployment that in fact was ordered, a certain amount — if I can use your word — of mucking up because of course you had one of your companies taken off its regular task and taken into the city?
A: Yes, but you would try to limit your mucking up, as we put it, to the smallest amount possible, I would think.
Q: I understand that might have been a consideration. Would there have been any reason, negotiation, why a company of Royal Green Jackets should not have operated with a company or two companies of Royal Anglians to form the arresting party?
A: No, there is no reason why that could not be so. Then you do not want to get — you do not want to see how much you can mix-up the command and — to try to test it to see if it will work.
Q: Of course not.
A: It is better if you can have Green Jackets — to have them under the command of the Green Jackets and Royal Anglian under the command of the Royal Anglian.
28 It should not be assumed that this task involved any ongoing or continual activity. It may well have been, as already suggested, in the rest and reserve phase of the rotation between battalion tasks carried out within 2 RGJ. Q: Although there was on the day, as we know, Green Jackets put under 22 Light Air and so on. There was an element of mixing.
A: Not and so on, I think they are about the only ones who were on command moved. Otherwise the rest stayed in doing the jobs they were doing before.
Q: I am not going to go into the detail of that with you, General, but there was not, was there, if it had been the will of the CLF or brigade, there was not any reason why Royal Green Jackets or Royal Green Jackets and Royal Anglians together could not have constituted the arrest force?
A: No, except that you would have been muddling up what was already on the ground.29
The deployment of the Brigade for the march follows on from the principles set out above: the troops of the Creggan and City battalions remained where they were, albeit moving manpower forward from their usual company bases to man barriers; and although the responsibilities of the City battalion had to be divided in two in order to man and effectively control both the permanent company bases and the additional large number of barricades to be erected within its boundaries (barriers 12 to 26 inclusive), this was done by importing a battalion Tactical Headquarters and two rifle companies (1 R ANGLIAN) from just over the river in Ebrington Barracks into the southern half of the City and a single company of 2 RGJ into the northern. The units to which these elements belonged had both in the past carried out the City task themselves.
It is worth noting that, in addition to the requirement for each of them to contain the march in the areas in which they were to operate, the units within the City were required to undertake or continue tasks for which 1 PARA, with their lack of knowledge of the area and the procedures for controlling it, would have been unsuitable. 22nd Regt was to ‘maintain an intensive programme of anti-device patrols in the commercial area of the
29 Day 282/056/18 City' and to 'continue the City task ... in accordance with current policy'; 1 Coldm Gds were to 'mount VCPs to check and control all traffic moving through the enclave', locations to include the humped approved roads but otherwise at the discretion of the Commanding Officer; 1 R ANGLIAN (who had previously carried out the City task on a three week on three week off basis) were to 'carry out the City task ... in accordance with current policy', in particular to 'conduct anti-device patrols in the commercial and Protestant areas of the City'.
The other reserve force, 3 RRF, which was to form the Brigade Mobile Reserve, was if called upon going to be operating in areas in which it had not previously operated: in the City, the Waterside, Strabane, Magilligan or elsewhere in the Brigade area, all areas it did not know. This was precisely the position in which 1 PARA found itself.
ARREST OPERATION
Despite the importance of these other provisions, the 1 PARA tasking has been considered before this Tribunal to the almost total exclusion of the remainder of paragraph 9 of the Operation Order. Furthermore, during the course of the evidence before this Inquiry the terms of paragraph 9f(1) were misrepresented to witness after witness, often inconsistently, and witnesses who gave evidence as to their meaning saw their evidence ignored, both in any further questions (in some cases in the very next question) and in questions to witnesses who followed.
Paragraph 9f(1) of the Operation Order for Operation Forecast deals with the tasking of 1 PARA, as follows:
(1) Maintain a Brigade Arrest Force, to conduct a 'scoop up' operation of as many hooligans and rioters as possible.
______________________________________________________________________
30 See generally Operation Order, Operation Forecast, G 95.568 paragraph 9. 31 Operation Order Operation Forecast, G 95.569 paragraph 9(d) (a) This operation will only be launched, either in whole or in part, on the orders of the Bde Comd.
(b) The Force will be deployed initially to Foyle College Car Park GR 434176, where it will be held at immediate notice throughout the event.
(c) The Scoop-Up operation is likely to be launched on two axis, one directed towards hooligan activity in the area of William Street/Little Diamond, and one towards the area of William Street/Little James Street.
(d) It is expected that the arrest operation will be conducted on foot.
(2) A secondary role of this force will be to act as the second Brigade mobile reserve. 32
In common with the orders given to the other units covered by paragraph 9, this paragraph gives 1 PARA two tasks by way of numbered orders: (1) to maintain the Brigade Arrest Force, with the mission: to conduct a scoop-up operation of as many hooligans and rioters as possible; and (2) to fulfil a secondary role, to act as the second Brigade mobile reserve. Those are the only orders given to 1 PARA in this paragraph. The lettered sub-paragraphs of paragraph (1) are different: they are descriptive, providing information about the arrest operation not just to CO 1 PARA but to all readers of the Operation Order. While some information could be given clearly (the fact that it was always to remain a Brigade task and the location of its initial holding area), in some instances the information provided is no doubt the best information available at the time the order was drafted: the likely axis of the arrest operation if launched (which, combined with the location of the holding area, would give all readers of the Order the best understanding then possible of where the arrest force might be encountered) and an expectation that it would be carried out on foot (ie what type of arrest force the troops on the containment line might encounter).
32 G95.570 No military witness has ever accepted the proposition (an understandable one, perhaps, for lawyers accustomed to finding predictions of events and allowance for legally significant contingencies in documents) that paragraph 9f of the Operation Order dictated either the location in which the Arrest Force was to operate or the tactics it was to adopt. Such detail could not have been set out on the night of 26th January or on the morning of the 27th. A written Operation Order could never have catered for the fluid situation that would inevitably arise on 30th January (still three days away) and the planning that could be done would require the input of the Commanding Officer of the battalion which was to fulfil this role. He, of course, was to be just one of the recipients of the Order, and he would not even be able to carry out his Appreciation until 28th January.
The failure to understand what could and could not be done by way of planning (and therefore orders) as at 27th January may explain what appears to have been a remarkable lack of communication between questioners and witnesses on this issue. There is in fact no inconsistency in witnesses telling the Tribunal that: (i) while they might, when planning the operation, have envisaged the arrest operation taking place in and around (or with its focus at) Aggro Corner, and (ii) that was not, and it was not desirable that it should have been, laid down by paragraph 9f(1)(c) of the Operation Order and (iii) that the Operation Order does not set out any sort of boundary or limit of exploitation.
As a result of an insistence on the part of questioners to read boundaries for the arrest operation into paragraphs 9f(1)(c) of the Operation Order, General Steele, the author (subject of course to the Brigade Commander’s approval) of the Order, clearly had difficulty making his evidence understood, despite the fact there has never been any military evidence indicating that he might now be misinterpreting his own order. The General’s difficulties, and their causes, are illustrated by the following passage from his evidence:
*LORD SAVILLE: In his evidence to Widgery, Brigadier MacLellan did say that the Support Company had gone* much further down Rossville Street than he expected them to do; is your view the same?
A: Well, I would actually have to look at a map to see where they ended up. As I have said many times, it was always in my mind, from the point of view of the scoop-up operation, that it would be conducted in the wasteground in the area Eden Place/Rossville Street. So if the Pigs went down -- okay?
LORD SAVILLE: Sorry, yes.
A: If the Pigs went further down from that area -- and I do not know whether they did or not, to be honest -- then maybe they went further than I had expected. I do know from other evidence I have seen that some of the soldiers went much further south than I had thought, but that, of course, was as a result of the firefight and I am quite clear that once the firefight started, then the whole parameters of the arrest operation were changed.
LORD SAVILLE: One follows that entirely. Why did you envisage that the arrest operation would take place on what one could describe as the Eden Place wasteground, as opposed to Aggro Corner and Little James Street?
A: It was never in my mind that it was going to be done on Little James Street. I saw that the scoop-up operation would be done south of William Street and that was why I pointed that area out at the Widgery Tribunal and why, for Eversheds, I drew the circle on the plan.
LORD SAVILLE: You would not get that impression from the operational order; would you? (A)
A: The operational order did not specify exactly where the arrest area, the scoop-up area was to be.
33 In his written evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, B1235 paragraph 29, Brig MacLellan wrote: 'The Company therefore that moved rapidly in their vehicles to the area North of the Rossville Flats acted in accordance with my instructions, in that such action would effectively place the troops between the rioters and the marchers.' During his oral evidence to Lord Widgery, when asked whether he knew that the plan involved or might involve troops going as far as the north end of the Rossville Flats, the Brigadier replied (at B1279): 'I knew they would have to get behind to cut off; I did not know they would go that far.' He also observed (see letter C at B1259) that in his view nothing had gone awry with the operation.
34 Gen Steele was right: he had by now said this many times, to no avail. LORD SAVILLE: I agree. My question was: you would not get the impression that there was to be an arrest operation on the wasteground comprising Eden Place and Pilot Row from the operational order?
A: No, that is fair.
LORD SAVILLE: The impression you would get, would you not, leaving aside the Little Diamond axis, that the arrest area is going to be Aggro Corner and the wasteground adjoining Little James Street and Little James Street [sic.]? (A)
A: Yes. I think the operation order actually talks in terms of the axes of the arrest operation into those particular areas, because that is where the hooliganism occurred, but to be able to do a scoop-up, you have to be able to get behind them.
LORD SAVILLE: I follow that, but you have to arrest rioters while they are rioting, have you not, otherwise you find enormous difficulties in taking them to Court?
A: Quite so, and that was always the terrific problem that we had with arresting rioters in Derry, that they ran away and it was very difficult subsequently to identify them if they were caught, if they were arrested, to identify them as a hooligan. So it was an enormous problem, and that is exactly why we devised the scoop-up arrest operation, to see if indeed we could arrest them in a swoop, so to speak.
LORD SAVILLE: I follow that, General Steele, and I can see — although I am not a soldier myself — I can see an advantage, for example, in sending some troops along the side, the northern side of the Eden Place wasteground, sending them west so that they could debouch on to that far end of Rossville Street and prevent rioters in the William Street/Little James Street area escaping down Rossville Street (D). I understand that entirely. What I cannot understand at the moment — perhaps you would like to think about it, because we will take a break for ten minutes now — I can understand that idea in the light of the operational order, that that is the area, the William Street/Little James Street area (A), putting the troops down the wasteground going west so that they can turn right and prevent the rioters from escaping from that area; what I cannot understand from the operational order is why it should be in your mind that they would actually conduct the arrest operation itself in that wasteground (A). Could you think about that over the next few minutes? A: Yes, certainly.
.....
LORD SAVILLE: Before we took a break, we were discussing my slight puzzlement, General Steele, about your statement that you expected the arrest operation to take place in what one has described as the Eden Place wasteground, as opposed to Little James Street/William Street and what one might describe as the Little James Street wasteground.
A: Yes, I have given some thought to it during the break and I think the concept that was going through my mind was always based on the fact that the hooligans run away and do not stand. So I had always thought that the only way to conduct a scoop-up was to get behind rioters who were indeed running away, and that is why I did not think that it could be done in that very small wasteground area at the junction of Little James Street and William Street, but in the much larger wasteground area where Eden Place and Pilot Row once used to be.
LORD SAVILLE: We do not want to go over old ground, but in those circumstances it is a little odd, is it not, that that did not appear in the operational order? (A)
A: Well, I go back to saying that the actual arrest operation itself was the province -- sorry, the details of the arrest operation was very much the province of the commanding officer and so much depended on where the hooligans were going to be, and I recall that in the order I used the expression, "likely axes of approach" of advance (A). It could well have been that the hooliganism could have been somewhere else, completely different. That was why I think we gave the commanding officer of 1 Para quite a difficult task, asking him to make a detailed plan for an arrest operation when he did not actually know exactly where it was to be mounted, because we did not know where the hooliganism was to be.
LORD SAVILLE: I take your point entirely about likely and if I may say so, speaking for myself, clearly you could not say more than "likely" at the time you were drawing up the operational order (A), for the very reasons you have given. Equally, you have told us that it was envisaged that it was likely that the arrest operation would take place on the Eden Place wasteground, in which case my comment remains precisely the same, which is that it is a little odd that it does not appear in the operational order (A). A: Yes, we did not go into that detail in the operational order. Whether this was a mistake or not, whether it was right or not to leave those sort of details to the commanding officer, I am not prepared to comment upon. I think we did the best that we could in the operation order to define what his task was as the commander of the arrest force and where it was likely to be.
LORD SAVILLE: When you finally did learn how far down the troops had gone into Rossville Street, as far down as the entrance to the car park, I asked you a few minutes ago whether you were surprised. You said you would like to look at a map. Perhaps Mr Rawat could put a map up on the screen and indicate in broad terms where the troops got to as they came in with the Pigs.
MR RAWAT: Certainly, sir. In fact, perhaps we could be best assisted by putting up the map on which you have indicated where you anticipated the scoop-up operation would occur. Could we have B1315.133, please. We will use it as it is at the moment. General Steele, in your statement, when you discuss this map, you cross-refer to your evidence to Widgery. I would like to show you that in a moment. But to deal with the Chairman's point, and as you will know, Support Company travelled down Little James Street in a series of vehicles which then travelled into Rossville Street, and it was a line of ten vehicles. The first was a Pig which ended up just about here, Eden Place, facing towards the alleyway that led into Chamberlain Street. (Marked with yellow arrow - B1315.0155) The second vehicle in the line of vehicles continued on and turned to eventually end up facing into the car park of the Rossville Flats and you had then, following those two vehicles, a sequence of vehicles which began with the command car, containing the commander of Support Company, a Ferret scout car, two more Pigs, two soft-top lorries and two Pigs after that and they stopped in a line along the north end of Rossville Street. (Marked with red and mauve arrows - B1315.0155) That is, broadly speaking, where the Support Company vehicles that came into the Bogside ended up. I would take it that the Chairman's point relates particularly to the vehicle indicated by the red arrow, which ended up deep into the Bogside and at the car park of the Rossville Flats?
A: It is, of course, the first time I have seen that and I have to say I find it very interesting, particularly the yellow Pig, which you say had turned in towards the alleyway, which of course would be exactly what you would expect it to do if it was taking part in a scoop-up. The red Pig, I have to say, looks to me as though it has gone too far.
LORD SAVILLE: The other thing about this drawing and your circle is that, looking at it from the point of view of the operational order, bearing in mind the word "likely," that appears for what seem to me perfectly sensible reasons in the operational order (B), bearing in mind also, as you say, you have to get behind the rioters, why is not this circle about three squares to the north of where you have put it, because it does not in fact cover Little James Street at all? (B)
A: I would agree with you entirely, sir. This circle was done for Eversheds, sort of on a map on my knee. I know there is no excuse for it, but it is not an accurate circle by any manner of means and I just got a pencil and made a circle, and I agree with you entirely, that it would be much better and more accurate of both the operation order and what I had in mind if the circle was certainly a couple of good squares north.
LORD SAVILLE: That would accommodate your point — whether we accept or not we have to wait to the end of the day — that one of the ways of getting round behind rioters in William Street and Little James Street would be to send troops up the northern edge of the Rossville Street wasteground (C), because that would still be encompassed if you moved your circle two or three squares up, but it would move the general area where you expect there to be arrests more or less precisely to the position which was described as "likely" for one of the two axes of the arrest operation as described in the operational order. (B)
A: Quite so.
LORD SAVILLE: You would accept that?
A: I would. 35
5E-32 At the passages marked (A) Lord Saville has assumed that paragraph 9(1)(c) of the Operation Order is providing for an arrest operation in (and only in) a particular area (‘Aggro Corner and the wasteground adjoining
35 Day 267/130/24 Little James Street and Little James Street'), whereas in fact this sub- paragraph of the Operation Order is providing nothing more than an indication that the arrest operation is likely to be directed towards hooligan activity in that area (or a different area altogether). Because the first of these questions was put in terms of an absence of an impression that the arrest operation was to take place on the Eden Place wasteground, General Steele is able to answer 'that is fair'. Only when the next question suggested that the Order gave the impression that arrests were to take place in a specific area was General Steele able to see the need to explain, and he did so by emphasising both that the area identified was where the rioting was likely to take place, and that 'to be able to do a scoop-up, you have to be able to get behind him.'
In the underlined passages marked (B), which relate to the circle drawn by General Steele over the Eden Place/Pilot Row wasteground on the plan attached to his BSI statement, Lord Saville reveals the strength of his own views by indicating to the witness that, what he describes as the witnesses' 'point', may not be accepted: 'whether we accept or not we have to wait to the end of the day'. The point in question, phrased as 'one of the ways of getting round behind rioters in William Street and Little James Street would be to send troops up the northern edge of the Rossville Street wasteground' (marked (C)), was in fact a suggestion made by Lord Saville, marked as (D). The lack of communication has continued: both the Chairman's and the witness's interpretation of the Operation Order can be accommodated within the circle as redrawn.
The difficulties of the insistence that the Operation Order dictates an area for arrests (which it does not) rather than indicating an area where hooligan activity was likely take place (which it does) have been compounded by an inconsistent approach to the meaning of this provision of the Operation Order. Disagreeing with a suggestion from Mr Rawat that it meant that there was a line between the two specified points (William Street/Little Diamond and William Street/ Little James Street) 'along which arrests would take place', Lord Saville gave an interpretation that allowed for action in either or both of two areas:
A: No, no, that was not the conception at all. The conception was of two separate areas...
Q: That is indeed how I have read it to date, that you were expecting the possibility of hooligan activity in the Little Diamond/William Street area and in the Little James Street/William Street area, so that you might have to mount an operation in each of those areas or the one or the other, depending whether or not there was hooligan activity in the one area or both areas?
The following day, however, the Chairman challenged the accuracy of General Steele's evidence to Lord Widgery. The Chairman did so by insisting that the Operation Order only envisaged an operation in both the Little Diamond/William Street and the Little James Street/William Street areas:
LORD SAVILLE: Can we take it in stages? Can we go back to E for a moment on this page. You were asked a question: "Question: The order was to launch the arrest operation which was envisaged by the brigade order? "Answer: Yes." Is that right?
A. I think that was rather a poor answer, to be honest because --
LORD SAVILLE: I think you see the point.
A. Absolutely, because the brigade order says "in part or in whole".
36 Day 266/069/11. Despite Gen Steele's response to this question, and Mr Rawat's rephrasing of it ('... that proposal of two axes of arrest creates a line beyond which you would not have envisaged the arrest force needing to progress), it is almost precisely what Christopher Clarke QC put to Col Wilford at Day 312/020/05. "... did you appreciate that the order appeared to be contemplating an arrest operation in the area of William Street/Little James Street and around here, in the Little Diamond area, on broadly speaking, as it were, a horizontal axis or axes along William Street?"
37 Day 266/069/13 LORD SAVILLE: It also says two axes, one Little Diamond and one the William Street/Rossville Street junction, if I remember correctly. So the order was not to launch the arrest operation envisaged by the brigade order, that is to say one axis up by Little Diamond, another one down by Aggro Corner; that is right, is it not?
A. No, I do not think that is quite right. I did not say in the order that I gave anything particularly about Little Diamond. The orders that were given were to launch the arrest operation and specifically to put one of the sub-units through barrier 14. So I did not actually mention Little Diamond at all.
LORD SAVILLE: No, you did not, but if you go back to C: "The orders that I gave to 1 Para ... were to launch the arrest operation straightaway; that they were to arrest any hooligans in the area of the wasteground at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street." That is only part of the arrest operation envisaged by the brigade order; is it not?
A. Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: So when you were asked the question: "The order was to launch the arrest operation which was envisaged by the brigade order?" Your answer, "yes," was not wholly accurate?
A. No, I agree with that.
LORD SAVILLE: In addition, of course, the arrest operation as envisaged by the brigade order was an arrest operation on two axes and it was those two axes together that would have occupied three companies.
A. Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: But here we only have part of the arrest operation envisaged by the brigade order. Where do the three companies come in in that context?
A. What was --
MR RAWAT: I am sorry to interrupt, would it assist to have that part of the brigade order side by side with this passage?
LORD SAVILLE: If the General would like to, of course.
A. No, I am perfectly happy not to see it there, because I can remember the brigade order. But the order I gave to 1 Para is quite clear in my mind, that it was to mount the arrest operation and, as we know, the orders that had been given to the commanding officer of 1 Para was that he could use — that he could make his own plan and use his companies as he thought fit. So I do not think there is anything wrong in not mentioning Little Diamond so long as the commanding officer of 1 Para was quite clear that he was able to use his three sub-units.
LORD SAVILLE: I am not suggesting that there is anything wrong. All I was suggesting, General Steele, I think you rather agreed, was that your answer to the question: "The order was to launch the arrest operation which was envisaged by the brigade order," the answer "yes" is not wholly accurate.
A. Yes, I would agree with that.
LORD SAVILLE: Going back to C again, the order as you there described it: "... that they were to arrest any hooligans in the area of the wasteground at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street; that they were to use all three sub-units for that task ..." Did you expressly state that or, again, is that something — I think you do give the answer to that, you did not expressly state that the three sub-units would be used; is that right? If we look at the next question and answer, Mr Gibbens: "Why was it necessary to mention all three? Were they not all one force? "Answer: To be honest, my recollection is that I said that they were to launch the arrest operation, which I knew of course consisted of three sub-units." Then you are given a slight ticking off in the next question. I understand from that and the answer you gave to Mr Rawat a few moments ago, that you did not expressly inform 1 Para when the order was passed on by you that they were to use all three sub-units?
A. No, I did not say "three sub-units" in the order, that is quite right. The expression that I used was, "to mount the arrest operation", it was "to launch the arrest operation," to be honest.
LORD SAVILLE: Can we go back to C, that part of what you say the order was: "... that they were to arrest any hooligans in the area of the wasteground at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street." Was that something that you expressly mentioned when you passed this order on?
A. Yes, I think I did — I said that because I had used the expression that they were to put one sub-unit of their arrest force through barrier 14. LORD SAVILLE: It is difficult to disentangle what happened from what you were thinking immediately before it happened, but there was no contemplation that afternoon, as the march proceeded and the hooligan activity took place, that there would be an arrest operation in the area of Little Diamond at brigade headquarters.
A. No.
MR RAWAT: General Steele, I know that you cannot now, with the distance of 30 years, remember the words that you gave, but you have told us that what you were doing was passing on, in terms, Brigadier MacLellan's order; that is right, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. What it comes down to is that you did not make mention of three sub-units, what you said was, "launch the arrest operation"?
A. That is correct.
Q. The only reference you made to a sub-unit was to the sub-unit that was going to go through barrier 14. All you said was, or all you can say is that that part of the order was the request from 1 Para was now being agreed?
A. No, no, no, I did not say that.
Q. What I am saying is that what you said was, "launch the arrest operation, one sub-unit to go through barrier 14"?
A. With one of the sub-units to go through barrier 14.
Q. Do you have a recollection of saying, "one of the sub-units"?
A. I do.
Q. You have a clear recollection that you, at least implicitly, alluded to the use of other sub-units?
A. Of one sub-unit through barrier 14, yes.
Q. Maybe I am confusing you: do you think you said, "one sub-unit to go through barrier 14," or, "one of these sub-units to go through barrier 14"?
A. One of the sub-units.
Q. How can you be sure of that? A. Because I know that I gave the order for the arrest operation.
LORD SAVILLE: I am a bit puzzled as to why you should identify barrier 14 as the place for one of the sub-units to go through.
A. Well, I particularly wanted one sub-unit to go through barrier 14 because, of course, that is where we knew the hooligans were, and I was well aware that 1 Para had a company there, ready to be launched into barrier 14, because they had wanted to do it at 3.55.
LORD SAVILLE: Another way of looking at it, General Steele, would be it would be particularly important to send another sub-unit through another barrier so you could get round behind the hooligans at barrier 14, which you could not do if you sent them straight through barrier 14.
A. Well, I think that was up to the commanding officer with his plan. I did not know what his detailed plan was. One thing I did know was that the hooligans were at 14; that one of his companies was there ready to be launched at 14 and so that is why I included it in the order. But I just want to make it quite clear here that I am absolutely clear in my mind that I gave the order for the full arrest operation to take place, which meant three sub-units.
LORD SAVILLE: Forgive me for saying this, you keep saying you gave the order for the full arrest operation to take place, but you agreed with me five minutes ago that the full arrest operation envisaged by the brigade order was not going to take place, but only one part of it.
If the paragraph 9f(1)(c) of the Operation Order did not lay down a specific location for the arrest operation it follows that it did not lay down any boundaries either:
Q: ... What I am suggesting, General Steele, is that that proposal of two axes of arrest creates a line beyond which you would not have envisaged the arrest force needing to progress?
38 Day 267/088/03 A. No, I do not think that follows at all. I saw, in the Little Diamond, that the arrest would have to take place in the area of the Little Diamond and, in the William Street/Rossville Flats area, I saw the actual arrest taking place south of William Street.39
5E-37 The suggestion that the Operation Order did lay down an area for the arrests to take place and/or limited the area in which it could operate fails to take any account of the fact that the Security Forces, did not know, either (most importantly for these purposes) at the time the Operation Order was being drawn up or before the march began, what the respective intentions of the marchers and those intent on violence were and what routes were going to be taken. While some options were more likely than others, the commanders in 8 Brigade had to be ready for it to take any route (or routes) and concentrate at any number of points on the various approaches to the City (hence the extensive containment line). On the day 8 Brigade could not work on the basis that the march was always going to do what in the event it did do, and the Tribunal cannot do so now.
5E-38 Had the march as a whole, or even just those seeking violent confrontation decided to direct their efforts up Waterloo Street the guidance in paragraph 9f1)(c) of the Operation Order would of necessity have been discarded, 1 PARA would have had to alter its deployment and different barriers (on this scenario Barriers 15, 16 and 17) would have been used as access points. It is unlikely, to say the least, that anyone in 8 Brigade would have protested at such an adjustment on the basis that it would have meant a failure to comply with the terms of paragraph 9f1)(c).
5E-39 Two further factors, which appear to have been omitted from the considerations of those putting questions on this issue, need to be taken into account. In support of his proposition to General Steele that the Operation Order required the arrest operation to take place on William
39 Day 266/069/24 Street or to the north of it, Lord Saville relied upon the need to be able to identify people rioting in order to arrest them:
*I follow that, but you have to arrest rioters while they are rioting, have you not, otherwise you find enormous difficulties in taking them to Court?*
This was precisely why coloured dye was used in the water canon: if the arrests were to take place out of sight of the barriers, to the south for example of Aggro Corner, dye would be of great assistance in making the necessary identification. And the contrary applies: dye would not have been required if it had it been envisaged (let alone ordered) that arrests would only be carried out in sight of the barriers or by troops trapping the rioters up against the barriers.
Q: Can you remember, General Steele, what the thinking was behind the deployment of those vehicles; what was your purpose in their use?
A: Well, again, it is the same as baton rounds. What we were hoping to do was to disperse rioters using those internal security weapons, and of course if there had been a dispersal of hooligans using those weapons, then it would not have been necessary to have had the arrest operation, which in turn would have followed the overriding principle of the whole of the event, which was that we would do it in as low a key as possible.
Q: The water cannons contained coloured dye?
A: Yes.
Q: And what was the purpose of that?
A: To be able to identify rioters subsequently, if there was to be an arrest operation.
Q: Can you remember, General Steele, what the thinking was behind that; why would you need coloured dye to identify rioters? A: This goes back to the point that was covered earlier this afternoon, that it was of great assistance to soldiers to be able to arrest those who had been rioting and one method of identification was the dye.41
5E-41 In the event, of course, some of those who had been rioting at Barriers 12 and 14 continued to attack the soldiers on the Eden Place/Pilot Row wasteground and the soldiers were able to (and at least in some cases did, prior to the shooting) see who was continuing to riot and concentrate their efforts on arresting those who merited arrest.
5E-42 The second factor that needs to be taken into account is a different provision of the Operation Order, paragraph 7j42:
The Containment Line and the area within it are to be dominated by physical military presence, by OP observation and by sniper posts.
5E-43 Comment has already been made about the omission of the underlined words when this passage has been referred to witnesses. The protection afforded by the counter-sniper positions was clearly intended to extend beyond the containment line, which ran along (to the north of) William Street and down the eastern boundary of the Bogside. On any view the area within the containment line includes the wasteground to the north of the Rossville Flats, and the possibility of troops being on that wasteground had been taken into account:
Lord Gifford: In relation to the snipers, we recall that in the co-ordinating conference agenda43, the snipers were to be deployed where the troops would be in the open, to cover where the troops would be in the open?
General Steele: Yes.
41 Day 268/165/04. See also Day 268/038/06: 'That is why at Widgcry the points were brought out about dye and white cloths.' 42 G 95.568 43 Serial 5 Remark 3, the serial of the agenda that relates to paragraph 7j of the Operation Order at G88.538. Q: That would include the area of the wasteground?
A: Yes.44
5E-44 The serial of the notes for the Co-ordinating Conference to which Lord Gifford was referring reads:
_Aim is to cover troops in open with counter-sniper fire._
5E-45 It is difficult to see how troops carrying out an arrest operation at Aggro Corner or on the small piece of waste ground to the north east of it, still less moving along the northern edge of the Eden Place/Pilot Row wasteground, could be referred to as in the open.
5E-46 In contrast to the difficulty the lawyers appear to have had in aligning paragraph 9f(1)(c) of the Operation Order with General Steele’s evidence that he did envisage circumstances in which the arrest operation might take place south of the junction William Street/Rossville Street, and that the Operation Order he drafted allowed for such an eventuality, the practical realities were obvious to the senior military witnesses:
Q: Does it follow that when you went up in the helicopter, you had — although you might have had ideas of your own, you had no instruction or indeed no knowledge in detail of, geographically, where it was proposed that the arrest operation, the pincer operation should take place?
A: I think that is correct, but it had to be somewhere in the open ground to the south and to the right, to the east of Aggro Corner, I would think between that and the Rossville Flats.
Q: Between Aggro Corner and the Rossville Flats, somewhere in the wasteground. That would have been your general impression, would it?
A: Yes, or it could have been going down Chamberlain Street, depending which — if they are after the yobbos, the
44 Day 268/111/04 yobbos running away, whoever ran faster and where they ran.
Q: I understand.45
5E-47 The position is the same in respect of the notion that the Operation Order imposed any sort of boundary on the movements of the arrest force. The series of questions of which this is a part started with reference to the arrest force provisions of the Operation Order, ie paragraph 9(f), and the map46.
Q: Going back to the plans for the day, was it your understanding that any scoop-up operation was likely to be confined to the roads identified?
A: No, I do not think so.
Q: Did you have any idea of any confinement to a geographical area that was planned?
A: No.47
5E-48 By definition, the Operation Order for Operation Forecast being the Brigade Commander’s orders to his subordinates, a number of issues did not fall within the terms of the Operation Order, either because they concerned the Brigadier himself or because they were matters which in accordance with military practice were left to one of those subordinates, here the Commanding Officer of 1 PARA as the officer commanding the arrest force.
5E-49 The major issue for the Brigade Commander that was certainly not left, by his orders, for his subordinates, was the timing of the launch of the arrest operation48, not least because of the risk of arrest or injury to innocent
45 Gerard Elias QC to Gen Welsh, at Day 282/054/22. 46 See Day 282/018/08 47 Ms McGahcy to Gen Welsh, at Day 282/020/24. 48 Arthur Harvey’s attempt at Day 268/024/20 to equate this issue (in the form of Separation) as a condition for the launch of the arrest operation with the provisions of paragraph 7(b)(1) of the Operation Order can only arise from a misreading of those provisions, which are civilans that that operation had the potential to pose. The principal mechanism decided upon was that the arrest operation would not be launched until there was sufficient separation between the peaceful protesters and the rioters, determined with the aid of an observer flying over the City in a helicopter.
5E-50 A number of the senior officers were asked questions about the adequacy of separation as a method of protecting the interests of those not involved in the rioting. The witnesses accepted that separation was unlikely to be perfect, in that there always remained the possibility that some people, although not themselves involved in the criminal conduct of the hooligans, might remain in the vicinity and become caught up in the arrest operation and/or in any firing that might result from an armed response to an arrest operation.
5E-51 The adequacy of separation cannot however be looked in isolation from (i) the seriousness of the threat faced by the Security Forces; (ii) the degree to which it could or should be anticipated that those without criminal intentions would remain in the area; and (iii) the extent of the risk of gunfire of a nature that might involve the peaceful protesters.
5E-52 The military assessment of the nature and extent of the risks to peaceful marchers has been dealt with at paragraphs 5C-79 to 85 above. The assessment of the seriousness of the threat posed by the rioters, shared by both the military and the police in Londonderry (with the resultant need for an arrest force to be made available) has also been discussed, at paragraphs 5B-4 to 18. And 8 Brigade, of course, had particular experience of the manner in which people behaved when rioting was taking place in Londonderry:
headed 'Dispersal of the Marches' and apply to the Security Forces in general, including those involved in the containment operation. The arrest operation is dealt with at paragraph 7(c), under the heading 'hooliganism' (see G95.567-8). Question: Some of the people in that area, for example, were journalists. Would you expect such a person to be arrested?
Answer: When you conduct a scoop-up operation of that kind you will arrest all those people who are in the area, including journalists.
Question: And I suppose it would follow from that, including local residents who just happened to have wandered out into the area?
Answer: They would not be there, sir. Our experience is that the normal residents about their lawful business do not hang about when hooligans are there.
The balancing act required is clear from these two passages from Brigadier MacLellan’s evidence to Lord Widgery (in relation to the decision he took to launch the arrest operation on the day):
Q: It has been suggested, Brigadier, that one criticism that might be made of this whole operation was that it involved going into the area of Rossville Street to apprehend rioters under the risk of enemy sniping, IRA sniping, to which you would have to reply, when a lot of people were about who might be hit by the rifle fire. Was it, say, in your contemplation that that might be so?
A: Certainly not. My intention throughout was to do everything to reduce the risk to the absolute minimum to the non-violent marchers and, to this end, I certainly was not prepared to launch the arrest operation unless there was serious disorder and rioting and, indeed, we had gone up the scale and, furthermore, I would only do it if the rioters and the non-violent demonstrators were widely separated.
A: I had not that advice [Lagan’s advice that the march should not be stopped] in mind but the advice about hooliganism. The situation as I saw it about the hooligans was this, that if we had not done anything about it there
49 Lt Col Steele to Lord Widgery, at B1312 50 B1252 would have been arson, hijacking of cars, and so on, in William Street. This would then have led at the end of the meeting, which would have presumably been fairly emotional, to a number of people at the meeting joining with the hooligans with a grave risk of them breaking through the barricades or a barrier into the City centre, rioting going on in the commercial areas, my reserve having to be launched and general control being lost of the situation. This was a factor I considered.
Q: I think that leads on to the next question, in other words, you considered that it was essential in the interests of security to order the arrest operation?
A: I did.
There has also been considerable debate during the course of the evidence as to whether or not separation was in the Brigade Commander’s mind during the planning stages of this operation or at all. Generals Ford, Steele and MacLellan have all said (both to this Tribunal and in 1972 to Lord Widgery) that it was. General Steele’s evidence that separation was discussed at the Co-ordinating Conference is supported by some of those who attended. Colonel Jackson is one of them:
Q: One particular matter that the Tribunal has been hearing evidence about, sir, is the question of whether or not anything was said about separation between rioters and marchers. The evidence you gave yesterday was that that was standard operating procedure. I wanted to ask you
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51 B1277
52 Much of the debate has involved using conflicting evidence as to the timing of the creation of the separation mechanism to attempt to show that it was not in fact in anyone’s mind until after 30 January 1972. While it is certainly Gen Steele’s recollection that this mechanism had been decided upon at the time the Operation Order was drafted, provided the Tribunal is satisfied that the need for separation was in the Brigadier’s mind before he launched the operation the precise time at which he decided that separation was necessary is immaterial. See, for example, Day 266/084/19, Day 268/023/23 and Day 268/024/12
53 Mr Harvey attacked Gen Steele on this issue on the ground that separation did not appear on the notes for the Co-ordinating Conference: see Day 268/024/01. What went in the notes may have depended of course on when and by whom it was prepared: see Gen Steele at Day 266/083/25. The point was not put to Col Jackson or Col Ferguson. whether you have any recollection of it being actually discussed or raised at all at the briefing session?
A: I think it was, yes, but the scoop operation would not be launched until there was separation.
Q: You have some recollection of that actually being raised, do you?
A: I think so, yes.
Q: I was not criticising, I was trying very carefully not to lead you in any direction, sir, but I noticed, indeed it is right to say there is some evidence to that effect, sir, I am certainly not criticising you. I did not want to read too much into your own statement at CJ2.37, because of some brackets, and I hope I am not just being legally pedantic. Could we look at it together. CJ2.37. You are there discussing, in your supplemental statement at CJ2.37 — it will come on the screen, sir — this is your supplemental statement?
A: Yes.
Q: You said at the bottom in paragraph 6, where you are discussing whether the operation should have been launched, and your sentence reads: "Although I did not question the, then, need to arrest the hooligans, the actual arrest operation needed careful planning in that (all agreed) there had to be separation." What I wanted to ask you about, despite the brackets, is it your recollection that all did agree?
A: Oh, yes, I mean this was an SOP for anything to try and arrest the hooligan element, there had to be separation from the main marchers.55
And Colonel Ferguson still has the notes he took at the time:
Q [of Colonel Ferguson's post Co-ordinating Conference notes, number 6, 'isolate - hooligans'] : To complete the picture, when you say you have read other people's evidence, the Tribunal has heard evidence from the brigade commander Brigadier MacLellan and the brigade major, Colonel Steele, are those the people you are thinking about; is it their evidence you have recently seen?
A: I have seen their evidence. Yes, I have seen their evidence on the Internet.
Q: They have told the Tribunal, you will have seen, that separating the separation of hooligans or rioters from the civil rights marchers was discussed at the co-ordinating conference; is that the evidence to which you refer?
A: That was the point when you talked about isolating, which is the separation. I answered it that I cannot recall why I made that note and why I made the qualification and I do not remember what that note referred to at that time and it is only from reading their evidence that I would remember this point about separation, but from their evidence it does not – it did not stick out in my mind and I have written down "isolate" rather than "separate".
Q: You yourself do not remember any such discussion; that is right?
A: Correct.
Q: But your speculation would be that such discussion would be to what that note relates?
A: (Witness nodding). 56
That there was discussion of the notion of separation at the Conference is reflected in the fact that call signs other than 61 Yankee did in the event report on the movement of the crowd in relation to the activities of the hooligans: see, for example, 90 Alpha (Colonel Ferguson’s, 22nd Regt) at approximately 1603-04 hrs:
Hello Zero, this is 90 Alpha. There is now a crowd of about 500 on Foxes Corner being addressed from a loudspeaker van. These appear to be normal civil rights people. There’s still a crowd of about 150 hooligans at junction Rossville Street/William Street. Over. 57
56 Day 281/096/12 57 W128 Whatever General Welsh's present memory as to the time at which he received his own task for the operation on 30th January 1972, the requirement for separation had clearly been decided upon by that Sunday morning at the latest:
I think it was at this [ie the Co-ordinating] conference that I was asked to act as an observer in a helicopter. Having looked at the statement that I gave at the time and my evidence to the Widgery Tribunal I can see that I volunteered, but my memory when I look back is that I was asked by the Brigade Commander. I cannot be sure which is correct.58
I made a statement for the Widgery Tribunal dated 1 March 1972. I have the following comments: ... As I have already stated I thought I was asked to go up in the helicopter and I can see here that I volunteered. I cannot now be sure but my recollection is that I was asked to act as an observer at the O Group Conference, rather than volunteering myself on the Sunday of the march, as the statement suggests.59
The risks to the peaceful marchers were also to be minimised by a swift operation:
Q. But you envisaged -- and you say that Brigadier MacLellan would probably have been closely involved in drafting this part of the operation order -- that this arrest operation would be a quick in and out operation?
A. Yes, most definitely. I saw it being quickly mounted; a scoop arrest and then out. And I think a good reflection on that is that I start to fuss about whether they have done a scoop-up operation or not only four or five minutes after they have been launched. I did not envisage this arrest force hanging around in the Bogside; I saw them going in, conducting a swift arrest through a scoop-up operation and then out.60
58 BSI Statement, B1340.004 paragraph 13 59 BSI Statement, B1340.004 paragraph 27 60 Gen Steele at Day 266/067/17 The military witnesses to this Tribunal are agreed that it was not for the Brigade Commander to dictate the tactics to be adopted by the commander of the arrest force. The concept of the operation was provided in the Operation Order:
_Hooliganism_ ..... An arrest force is to be held centrally behind the check points, and launched in a scoop-up operation to arrest as many rioters as possible.\_
Thereafter, while the Brigade Commander needed to know in broad outline what the approach was to be (and until a final decision had been taken, of course, there was little to know; in the operation required on 30th January 1972 that decision would of necessity be made at a late stage), military practice was to leave the detail to the commander on the ground.
There has, however, been some misunderstanding as to the type of operation the scoop-up was going to be:
_MR ELIAS:_ I do not want to go into the detail, but you had been responsible for drawing up an operational order in July of the previous year, Operation Hailstone?
_A:_ Yes.
_Q:_ Where you had put in stop lines, as they were called in the order, as you may recall, showing where troops should go in order to form lines to pick up hooligans who were driven into them?
_A:_ Yes, that was a very different sort of operation.
_Q:_ I understand that --
_A:_ No, I must finish. It was a different sort of operation, in that it was not a scoop-up, it was very much more of a drive. We were driving into a containment line and that is a very different type of arrest operation to what we were conducting here.
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61 Operation Order for Operation Forecast, G 95.568 paragraph 7(e) Q: There would have been nothing to prevent either a provisional plan, at the very least, that the Paras would mount a line which effectively stopped up the junction of William Street and Rossville Street, Aggro Corner, the alleyway that runs down adjacent to Chamberlain Street and Chamberlain Street itself in order to endeavour to pen the hooligans into that area of William Street and the north; nothing to prevent such a provisional plan, would there?
A: And then driven from, where?
Q: And driven from that line north into the barriers where they could be arrested; that is what the scoop-up envisaged, was it not?
A: Yes, but it was not envisaged that it would be on such a line as that. I saw the scoop-up being much further south than that.(^{62})
This misunderstanding may be another example of the problematic interface between those with a legal and those with a military training. The former may not always be able to appreciate the practical implications of what is being, or even what has been, suggested:
Q: You have been asked some questions about the possibility of carrying out an operation which involved inserting stop lines into a particular area; do you remember those questions?
A: I do.
Q: General Steele, as I understand your evidence, you draw a distinction between an operation of that nature and the scoop-up operation you were being given instructions about on 26th January 1972?
A: Yes, there is a distinction, the distinction being that in previous operations where we have used a containment line, you have, so to speak, driven the hooligans into an arrest area, whereas with the scoop-up it was necessary to get behind the hooligans without the benefit of a stop line, and I think that one of the reasons for this was because it
(^{62}) Gen Steele at Day 267/166/23 would be impractical to put a stop line across the Bogside in the context of the march.\\textsuperscript{63}
5E-63 General Steele's evidence on this issue is supported by Major Lewis, then the Company Sergeant Major of Sp Coy 1 PARA:
\\textbf{Q.} On that day, whatever may have happened on other days, you did not expect there to be a line of soldiers somewhere behind the rioters, stopping them?
\\textbf{A.} No, sir, no.
\\textbf{Q.} It would have been totally impractical to do that?
\\textbf{A.} Yes.
\\textbf{Q.} And you could not conceivably, in a situation where you anticipated the probability, or at a minimum the possibility of fire being directed from the Rossville Flats, it would have been madness to put a line of soldiers across the wasteground?
\\textbf{A.} Yes, sir.
\\textbf{Q.} Waiting for you to come in; would it not?
\\textbf{A.} Yes, sir, yes.\\textsuperscript{64}
5E-64 There have also been some surprising observations about the use of helicopters during the event:
\\textbf{MR HARVEY:} What significance was placed upon the presence of a helicopter?
\\textbf{A.} I do not know, that was part of the Brigade Commander's plan. It was not my idea, it was his, I think.
\\textbf{Q.} You see, Mr Mooney has really indicated that it was part of the information and policy research group's suggestion that a helicopter should be there?
\\textbf{A.} I know nothing of Mr Mooney, I am afraid. He was a junior officer somewhere who worked in the headquarters.
\\textsuperscript{63} Day 268/156/17 \\textsuperscript{64} Day 373/110/06 Q. I entirely appreciate that. Are you saying that you were not aware of the essential role that the helicopter was to play as of your meeting on 26th January?65
MR MANSFIELD: I want to ask you a detail which you have not been asked yet about being down there for a moment: the helicopter that was there, you ordered it to return, did you not?
A. I ordered my helicopters to return. I had two; I had flown up in the morning; it was getting dark; I am well aware of the dangers of flying over the Sperrins in the dark, indeed the helicopters at that time could not do it. And so I despatched, either I or my ADC, I cannot remember who but the message is well recorded, told brigade to tell them to send them back, they were my helicopters.
Q. Nothing to do with observing?
A. No, nothing to do with that, they were other helicopters.66
Far from bringing to an end any observation by helicopters of events on the ground, General Ford had simply sent back the helicopters in which he and those who had accompanied him had travelled from Lisburn.67 8 Brigade made its own provision for helicopters, in its tasking for the event from its own resources (its supporting Air Squadron68), on 27th January 1972:
A Avn
(1) One sioux is to be be aval for City recce under Bde HQ con at Grey 01. Two further sioux to be in reserve at base loc at 15 mins notice from 301300Z Jan.
65 These questions arose during Gen Ford’s evidence, at Day 256/089/04 66 These questions arose during Gen Ford’s evidence, at Day 260/061/04 67 The order that they do so can be seen on the transcript of Mr Porter’s tape, W136 Serials 498 - 501 68 Kangaw Flight 3 Cdo Bde Air Sqn (2) Aerial photographic record is to be made of the event, either by cine colour camera, or by still camera. G3 Int at this HQ will be responsible for coord this photography, and for delivering the developed and printed film to HQNI by 301800 hrs.69
It can safely be assumed that the helicopter from which the Commanding Officer of 2RGJ observed the event was provided for in the first of these sub-paragraphs, in all probability the primary rather than the reserve tasking.
CONSULTATION
Some criticism has been made of the planners at 8 Brigade on the basis that they failed to consult the commanding officers of the Londonderry units. For example:
Ms McGahey: Could we go back to your statement, please, CJ2.8, paragraph 36. Going back now to what you were told at the co-ordinating conference, you say: "I had assumed, as I was the longest serving commanding officer in Londonderry at the time, that if anything unusual was planned for Londonderry, I would, at least, have been consulted beforehand." Was it Brigadier MacLellan's practice to consult you beforehand when making plans for the deployment of your battalion?
A: The change of command, of course, happened in October, and we were away in November; we returned to the city in December. So I did not have a great deal of opportunity to get to know the brigadier, nor did he me. Prior to that, with Brigadier Cowan, any operation that I was involved in would have been discussed with him beforehand. And I had assumed that, as I said here, that if anything unusual were to happen, I may have an input.
Q: Was this march regarded as unusual?
A: No. Well, it was a march. No, I had no idea. I had no idea what had been discussed between the Brigadier and Headquarters Northern Ireland, and Headquarters
69 Operation Order Operation Forecast, G 95.570 paragraph 9(i) Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Government, and Northern Ireland Government upwards. We were just poor old chaps on the ground.
Q: Assuming for a moment that all that was planned at HQNI or brigade was the policing, if you like, of this march, would you still have expected to be consulted?
A: I would have thought it was nice to have been consulted before an official operational order had been issued. I mean, I was only 100 yards away from brigade headquarters, and it would have been nice for me to have been asked to walk over and have said, "This is what we intend to do, Roy." 70
There is a large degree of hindsight at work here. Colonel Jackson had not been involved in the planning of Operation Huntsman, an earlier Brigade operation in which his battalion was to play a role, either. 71 Given that fact, and the terms in which the criticism was ultimately put, (ie it would have been ‘nice’ if the Brigade Commander had called him over and told him what was intended), it is difficult to see where this criticism really goes. It is also difficult to see what the Brigade Commander could at this stage have consulted him about, as the description Colonel Jackson gave of the consultation he would have expected (being told what was intended) probably acknowledges. The containment operation was such that there was little room for discussion; 1 PARA were by order of the Commander Land Forces to do the arrest operation; and the detailed tactical planning for that operation would not begin until the Commanding Officer of 1 PARA arrived in Londonderry the following day (28th January).
There is no reason in any event to suppose that, despite his being located in the same barracks as Headquarters 8 Brigade, Colonel Jackson would have been the only commanding officer consulted. Colonel Ferguson’s views, had he been consulted, would probably have been that 1 PARA
70 Col Jackson at Day 285/030/03 71 Day 286/047/03 should take up the forward positions it in the event did, with its central company at the Presbyterian Church, at about the mid point along William Street between the two flanking companies, able to move east or west to meet either of the other companies as the situation dictated:
... if I may just explain the general form of violence, is that in my time there, it did not take place at what is, I see often in evidence, called Aggro Corner. As far as we were concerned, the time that we were there, the violence tended to take place further up William Street, in the vicinity of the crossroads near the cathedral. That is where the young hooligans would foregather and sometimes we would try and ignore them to see if they would go away, but they would start throwing stones or perhaps find a car and try and hijack it, or set fire to it, and quite close to that junction, near the cathedral, there is a place called Stevenson's bakery which backed on to William Street, and for reasons I do not know, that was a target for the hooligans; they obviously had some grudge against Stevenson's bakery and so we had – it had steel shutters on the back, facing on to William Street and they would try and climb over these and set fire to things, and that is where the majority of the violence, hooligan violence would take place.72
Consultation with the Commanding Officer of 2 RGJ would have produced the same views:
MS McGAHEY: Looking at both the map and that order, where did you understand that any arrest operation was likely to take place?
A. I am looking at it now and I do not think at the time I looked to consider that, but Little Diamond was always a difficult place and Little James Street – well Little James Street was just about Aggro Corner, I am sure it would be more down towards Aggro Corner than Little James Street.
LORD SAVILLE: When you say the Little Diamond was always a difficult place, do you mean there was frequently
72 Day 281/027/03 hooligan activity or rioting in that area or did you have something else in mind?
A. No, I had that in mind, but funny(sic) all along William Street and especially, I suppose it is the east end, as opposed to the west end, was most of the hooliganism took place during the week.
LORD SAVILLE: Yes, thank you.73
5E-71 In any event there may well have been a degree of discussion, now long forgotten in the wake of the controversy:
On 28 January I received written and oral orders from Commander 8 Infantry Brigade for operations on 30 January 1972. These confirmed various discussions and planning conferences which had taken place previously ...
SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
5E-72 Communications for the operation are dealt with at the ‘Command and Signals’ paragraph of the Operation Order75. The Signal Instructions was issued separately76 and has not survived.
5E-73 A significant amount of the Tribunal’s time has been spent on an apparent attempt to prove that 8 Brigade and 1 PARA did not have a secure link on 30th January 1972, presumably in an effort to show that (despite the entries on the 8 Brigade and 1 PARA radio logs) 8 Brigade never gave an order for the launch of the arrest operation. The overwhelming weight of the evidence (including now that of INQ 1927, then Officer Commanding 8 Brigade Headquarters and Signal Squadron: see the Tribunal’s letter to the Interested Parties dated 27th February 2004) is that such a link was in operation. And the Brigade Commander’s evidence, fundamental to this
73 Day 282/019/11 74 Col Ferguson’s SA statement, B1112 paragraph 10 75 G 95.575 paragraph 11 76 See G95.575 paragraph 11(a) issue, in 1972\\textsuperscript{77} and now\\textsuperscript{78}, that his order was given to 1 PARA over the secure radio was not challenged by any of the Interested Parties.
5E-74 Criticisms of the effectiveness of this link may have been a part of the attempt to show that there was no order to launch the arrest operation. Those involved in setting up the link however have never been anything other than realistic about what could be achieved:
\\begin{quote} ... we were achieving as much surprise as we possibly could under the circumstances. We wanted to give 1 Para as great a benefit of surprise as we could and the one way we knew we could do it was by using a secure link for the actual deployment order. Now it may well be that you could argue that: well, that was not much of a surprise element, but it was the best that we could achieve, and so we did it.\\textsuperscript{79} \\end{quote}
5E-75 The equipment being what it was (large, heavy, noisy, in short supply and highly classified) it was not possible for the troops on the ground, including the Commanding Officer of 1 PARA when forward, to be equipped with it. The limited aims of the exercise presumably explain why the Brigade Major was not critical in 1972 of the radio indiscipline alleged against 1 PARA during questions of some of the witnesses before this Tribunal. (These allegations were not in the event put to the two witnesses who had been the watchkeepers in the Gin Palace and whose actions had been the subject of the allegations).
APPROVAL OF THE OPERATION ORDER
5E-76 The Order, having been drawn up overnight, was discussed at Commander 8 Brigade’s morning meeting\\textsuperscript{80} and signed off by him. And, despite the suggestions made before this Tribunal of a divergence of approach
\\textsuperscript{77} Statement for the Widgery Tribunal, B1235 paragraph 28 \\textsuperscript{78} BSI Statement, B1279.036 paragraph 57 \\textsuperscript{79} Gen Steele at Day 267/040/05. See also Day 267/016/05: ‘What we were trying to achieve here was to make sure that we had an element of surprise for as long as possible.’ \\textsuperscript{80} Day 268/161/15 between the Commander Land Forces and Commander 8 Brigade (and the absence of any orders that the arrest force go round the back and/or arrest three to four hundred rioters), it received immediate unqualified approval at HQNI. CHAPTER 5F
THE BRIGADE COMMANDER'S ORDERS
5F-1 The Operation Order for Operation Forecast was sent to the units and personnel on the Distribution List(^1) on 27(^{th}) January 1972. The List included Chief Superintendent Lagan, as Comd N Div RUC. On receipt of the Order each of the units involved had their orders.
BRIGADE PLANNING FOR THE ARREST OPERATION
5F-2 The Commanding Officer of 1 PARA, whose battalion was effectively to become a part of 8 Brigade for the purpose of the march, had no difficulty in understanding what his orders were:
*The Operation Order was quite clear in its definition of my task: 1 PARA were to 'Maintain a Brigade Arrest Force, to conduct a 'scoop up' of as many hooligans and rioters as possible', but would only be launched at the orders of the Bde Comd.*(^2)
5F-3 While forming an arrest force was his primary role, he would also have seen that his secondary role was to act as a second Brigade Mobile Reserve. His warning order from his own Brigade Headquarters had told him that he should be prepared to be in the 8 Brigade for up to 4 days(^3).
5F-4 He was also required to attend the Brigade Co-ordinating Conference at 1430 hours on 28(^{th}) January.(^4) During the morning of that Friday he carried out his reconnaissance of the City. This was done on the ground, when he was conducted on a tour of the parts of the City that were thought by 8 Brigade to be necessary and were accessible to the Security Forces (his guide was the 8 Brigade GSO3 Intelligence & Security); and from the air,
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(^1) At G 95.576 (^2) Col Wilford's 1972 Statement, B944 paragraph 3 (^3) Gen Ford's BSI Statement, B1208.035 paragraph 7.9 (^4) Operation Order Operation Forecast, G 95.575 paragraph 11(c) when he could obtain an understanding of the layout of the relevant parts of the City and no doubt look at areas he had not been able to visit on foot or by car. The helicopter would have been provided by 8 Brigade from within its own air resources.
During the course of his reconnaissance and afterwards Colonel Wilford would have started to carry out his Appreciation. He would have required assistance from 8 Brigade and there is no reason to suppose that he did not get it. He would certainly have been discussing the forthcoming march with Captain INQ 1803; and, although the details are now long forgotten, it is not plausible to suggest that he did not have discussions with the Brigade Commander:
Q. Aside from meeting Colonel Wilford at the conference, did you yourself have any further discussions with Colonel Wilford?
A. I really cannot remember. I have been thinking about this point a lot because he went off to do a reconnaissance by helicopter on the Friday morning and he also did a reconnaissance in the car with the G3 Int and I am trying to recall whether, having come back from his reconnaissance, he then came and saw either myself or the Brigade Commander to give his views on what he had so far seen during his reconnaissance. For the life of me I cannot remember whether he did or not. I would have expected him to, but I cannot remember whether he did.3
There is in any event good evidence that there were discussions6 between the Brigade Commander and the commander of his arrest force:
5 Gen Steele at Day 267/008/17 6 At Day 268/022/18 Arthur Harvey QC attempted to equate CO 1 PARA’s position vis a vis 8 Bdc on 28th January (and possibly thereafter) with Comd 8 Bdc’s vis a vis CLF on 25th January, asking Gen Steele why Brig MacLellan did not do as the CLF had done to him and require a written plan from CO 1 PARA. This is an easy point to make, but only on a careful consideration does the comparison does stand up, and then in Brig MacLellan’s and Col Wilford’s favour. Gen Ford (as the record of the orders he gave shows) was legislating for the whole operation, the containment being the most important and complex aspect and involving the largest number of troops. He also left the detail of the arrest operation out, it being the mobile element, the least predictable and requiring the most flexibility. Both CLF and Comd 8 Bdc therefore took exactly the same approach to this aspect of the operation. Perfectly Q: Had Colonel Wilford discussed his plan with you or not?
A: Not in detail, because we did not know (a) where there would be any hooligans on the day for sure, or rioters; or (b) where they would be. We could merely make an outline plan.
Q: Did you yourself know that the plan involved or might involve the Parachutists going sufficiently far down into the Bogside as to be at the north end of the Rossville Flats?
A: I knew they would have to get behind to cut them off; I did not know they would go that far.7
As would be expected, there had been discussions, although the planning could not be detailed at this stage. And that planning, albeit outline, had been of a joint nature.
THE PURPOSE OF THE COORDINATING CONFERENCE
Paragraph 11c of the Operation Order reads:
Coordinating Conference. Will be held at Bde HQ at 281430 hrs Jan for all COs.
Although the passage of time has resulted in some of the attendees remembering the Conference as an Orders Group8, this was a conference provided for in the written orders for the purpose of clarification. While he could not remember the detail, this was General INQ 0598’s understanding of the procedure:
I think if they could do it, they would get the written order to you first and then it would be a confirmatory session, the order group, so to speak, where anybody could ask questions or raise doubts on what was in the order. I
sensibly, Brig MacLellan did not require written plans from any of his other unit commanders either.
7 Brig MacLellan, questioned by Mr Stocker, to Lord Widgery, at B1279 8 See, for example, Col Ferguson at Day 281/058/04, correcting Mr Roxburgh’s use of the term ‘brigade orders group conference’, by saying ‘an orders group is not a conference’. While Mr Roxburgh had mixed the two and was happy to accept the correction, paragraph 11 of the Operation Order makes it clear that this was indeed a conference. The orders on this occasion had already been delivered, in writing. cannot remember which came first, I am afraid, but I do remember going to the confirmatory orders.(^9)
5F-10 In addition to the Commanding Officers who had received orders, this conference was also attended by both Assistant Chief Constable Corbett and Chief Superintendent Lagan, thereby achieving liaison between the military and the police at the highest level:
This conference was attended by: all Commanding Officers and Officers Commanding or their representatives, all my principal staff officers, Assistant Chief Constable D A Corbett, Chief Superintendent Lagan.(^10)
THE CONTENT OF THE CONFERENCE
5F-11 Whether at the beginning or at the end of the Conference, the Brigade Commander clearly used it to make certain announcements. One was his decision as to the location from which he would command the operation (a decision clearly linked to the need for ongoing liaison with his police counterpart):
I stated my intention to exercise command from my main Headquarters in Ebrington Barracks where I should be co-located with Chief Superintendent F Lagan.(^11)
5F-12 The Brigade Commander also explained that the Commander Land Forces would be present, with others from Belfast, and the purpose of his visit:
I also announced that the Commander Land Forces intended to observe the event and that his Rover Group would include the Assistant Chief Constable (Operations) D A Corbett and the Colonel GS (Information Policy) Colonel M A J Tugwell.(^12)
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(^9) Gcn INQ 0598 at Day 272/004/20 (^10) Brig MacLellan's 1972 Statement, B1232 paragraph 14 (^11) Brig MacLellan's 1972 Statement, B1232 paragraph 16 (^12) Brig MacLellan's 1972 Statement, B1232 paragraph 16 The substantive business of the Conference was to ensure that everyone had the information they needed to carry out their allotted task:
At the Co-Ordinating Conference ... I went through the operation order passage by passage to see if there were any queries.13
This was also Colonel Wilford’s recollection of the exercise upon which the Brigade Commander embarked:
The conference went over the deployment of the troops taking part and the Brigade Commander gave his Appreciation. He thought that once the marches were confronted violence would erupt and this would be in the William Street area where the confrontation was bound to take place if the marchers insisted on going through to Ship Quay Place.14
Some of the detail of what was dealt with can be seen from the notes that were prepared in advance15. Clearly these do not amount to an agenda: while they have been referred to as ‘an agenda’ by some questioners during the evidence to this Inquiry – particularly with General Steele16 - they are not headed as such, they were not distributed in advance of the meeting and General MacLellan, who gave evidence to the Tribunal before General Steele, described them as an aide-memoire17. And neither are they comprehensive: there is no mention of the Brigade Commander’s announcements that he would command the operation from Ebrington Barracks, accompanied by his police counterpart, or of the attendance of the Commander Land Forces.
Combining Brigadier MacLellan’s 1972 description of what he did and the existence of the notes, the process is most likely to have been a
13 Brig MacLellan’s 1972 Supplementary Statement, B1225 paragraph 15 14 Col Wilford’s 1972 Statement, B944 paragraph 4 15 G 88.537. It is not possible to say now when they were made or by whom. 16 See, for example, Arthur Harvey QC at Day 268/024/08: ‘Three page agenda’. journey through the provisions of the Operation Order as necessary with updating where possible, emphasis\\textsuperscript{18} and supplementary comment\\textsuperscript{19} prompted by the notes.
The Intelligence update appears at Serial 1 of the notes, where its location corresponds to where the assessment as at 27\\textsuperscript{th} January appeared in the Operation Order. By 28\\textsuperscript{th} January 1972 Brigadier MacLellan had of course received the Signal from the Director Intelligence at Lisburn\\textsuperscript{20}, and while this was only one source of information, (there is no reason to suppose that 8 Brigade were not receiving information from the RUC as it became available), the contents of the Signal are (as would be expected) where appropriate reflected in the information that is being provided to the Conference. In particular:
(1) Serial 1f reads ‘Hooligan violence inevitable’, no doubt taking account of both past experience and the information as to the hooligans contained in paragraph 4 of the Signal (armed with sticks and stones etc.);
(2) The notes record (at serial 2) no change to the threat. The Signal included a warning that the IRA would use the crowd as cover (ie those elements of the crowd who will have armed themselves with sticks and stones: see paragraph 4 of the Signal\\textsuperscript{21}). That eventuality
\\textsuperscript{17} Day 261/075/19 \\textsuperscript{18} There is nothing new, for example, in serial 3 of the notes, ‘Concept of Ops’; this all appears to be emphasis of the low key approach that is to be taken to the event. At Serial 5 there is emphasis that the aim of the snipers is ‘to cover troops in open with counter-sniper fire.’ \\textsuperscript{19} To the section of the Operation Order ‘Background’, for example, is added, under heading ‘Background to Event’: ‘Significance of event in eyes of remainder of Belfast’. And while a number of military witnesses have accepted that there was a risk of arresting non offenders in a scoop up, it was clearly hoped that the dye in the water canon would achieve its aim: Serial 9 of the notes, which deals with arrests, reads ‘Importance of Legality’. Gen Welsh remembers being told that ‘if the march reached the shopping centre it would cause havoc’: see his BSI Statement, B1340.001 paragraph 7 \\textsuperscript{20} G81A.511.1 \\textsuperscript{21} G81A.511.5 had already been catered for in paragraph 2b of the Operation Order;
(3) paragraph 3 of the Signal and Serial 6 of the notes are clearly dealing with the same issue:
3. The organisers are considering a possible diversion in the Brandywell area using young hooligans whom they would prefer out of the way of the March.
4. Vulnerability of Bligh's Lane and Brandywell. 1. Int received of threat to Brandywell. 2. Pre-stocking with ammo. 3. Threat to these locs to be taken very seriously.
It is also clear that Brigadier MacLellan still had the warnings he had received from Chief Superintendent Lagan (who was in attendance) on 24th January very much in mind. Paragraph 3 of Serial 2, the Threat, reads:
Hooligan reaction – continuing after event.
There were further subjects of discussion over and above what can be seen in the notes, in relation to which there has been an inconsistent approach by some of those who questioned the military witnesses. In particular, some questioners tried to establish that neither the separation of marchers and rioters nor the action to be taken in the event of firing at the troops were discussed at the conference. Neither (like the chosen location of the commander and the attendance of the Commander Land Forces) are referred to in the notes.
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22 G95.565 23 G81A.511.5 24 G88.538 25 Recorded in Brig MacLellan's Signal to the Commander Land Forces of that date, at G70A.441.001 26 G88.537 General Steele has a very clear recollection that separation was discussed at the Conference. General MacLellan, in only marginally less confident terms, agreed:
*I am pretty certain, I am almost sure that I talked about separation and that on no account were people to get mixed up with the marchers and so on.*
As has already been discussed, this evidence from those holding the Conference is supported by some evidence from at least some of those who attended: Colonel Jackson remembered the discussion and Colonel Ferguson thought, having seen the debate before this Tribunal on the internet, that the notes he made immediately after the Conference referred to it. Further support for the proposition that separation was discussed comes from serial 365 of the Porter transcript, in that 22nd Regt (of which Colonel Ferguson was of course the Commanding Officer) were clearly reporting in terms of separation at 1603 or 1604 hours:
*Hello Zero, this is 90 Alpha. There is now a crowd of about 500 on Foxes Corner being addressed from a loudspeaker van. These appear to be normal civil rights people. There’s still a crowd of about 1500 hooligans at junction Rossville Street/William Street. Over.*
It is clear that many of the lawyers at this Inquiry hold expectations of the Co-ordinating Conference which differ from those held by those who attended it, both now and then. General INQ 0598 was asked whether any detail of the arrest operation was provided at the Conference:
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27 Day 266/084/19 28 Day 261/075/21 29 Mr Harvey attacked Gen Steele on this issue on the ground that Separation did not appear on the notes for the Co-ordinating Conference: see Day 268/024/01. What went in the notes will have depended on when and by whom it was prepared: see Gen Steele at Day 266/083/25. The point was not put to Col Jackson or Col Ferguson. 30 Gen Welsh, at Day 282/022/07 did not remember any discussion about the circumstances in which the arrest operation would be launched. While he hoped it was not the case, indicating a possible lack of attention, he volunteered the possibility that that might be because the arrest operation was not a part of the operation in which he was involved. 31 W128 Q: Was there any discussion at the co-ordinating conference as to how barriers would be lifted or how the instructions would be given for barriers to be lifted if an arrest operation was launched, in whole or in part?
A: I do not remember that at all.
Q: Was there any mention at the co-ordinating conference that it might be necessary in the course of the arrest operation to move units at specific times; that one unit may have to move ahead of another in order to co-ordinate; what was the ultimate objectives?
A: What do you mean by "units"? "Unit" is a battalion in the Army. Are we talking about a battalion to be moved?
Q: No, units from different battalions. For example, 1 Company of the Parachute Regiment to move through barrier 12; one to move through barrier 14; one to move through barrier 11 and whether it was necessary, for example, if the paratroopers going through barrier 11 were to assist in an arrest, that if they left at exactly the same time as those from barriers 12 and 14, they would have considerably much more ground to make up if the arrest operation was to be at the junction of William Street/Rossville Street. Was there any discussion of anything like that?
A: No.
Q: Any discussion?
A: Not that I recall.
Q: Any discussion, for example, just about synchronising times, so that people are not operating at different timescales?
A: No, there was not, and I can quite understand that, because it is so difficult to foretell what the situation on the ground is. It is a contingency plan and you would — it would become a mile long if you dealt with every possible contingency.
Q: I entirely appreciate that.
32 These are sub units.
33 Questioned by Mr Harvey at Day 272/043/20 General INQ 0598's battalion was manning barriers through which elements of 1 PARA might have to pass. General Welsh explained that Conferences of this nature are not used to go through practices and procedures which fall into the category of standard operational procedures:
Q: And his [Col Ferguson's] second concern was in fact that given that there were different regiments operating in different ways —
A: In different, what is the last?
Q: In different roles, and an arrest operation for which there was no detailed plan, that one particular grouping of soldiers who went in as part of a flanking movement or part of co-ordinated movements with a number of groups, that a shot discharged by one group might be mistaken as hostile fire by another; is that the type of thing you would expect to be dealt with at a co-ordinating conference?
A: (Pause). I do not think so.
Q: You do not think so?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: If you are talking, if somebody fires and you need to have somebody to report back to the other regiments, that would be a perfectly normal thing to do on the brigade net, on the (inaudible) net and the brigade net and I do not think — I mean it is an awful long co-ordinating conference if you looked on every eventuality.
The Co-ordinating Conference was not a forum for discussion of the tactics to be adopted for the arrest operation:
Q: What I am really asking you, General, is whether you can remember any detail, if it was discussed in your presence, for example, of just how that arrest operation would be mounted?
34 Questioned by Mr Harvey at Day 282/070/06 A: No, because I do not think it was discussed in detail, the operation at the conference. I think that would presumably -- I mean, I Parachute Regiment were told to get on with it and it was the commanding officer's plan would be the detail of it.
Q: That would have been unlikely to have been discussed in your presence anyway and at the co-ordinating conference?
A: Very, yes.35
5F-25 In considering whether the Conference ought to have dealt in detail with the arrest operation it is necessary to consider what has actually been proposed by way of the subjects of such a discussion:
Q: There does not seem, as a result of this co-ordinating conference, to be any way formally for the instructions in relation to the operation to go forward, namely the launch of the arrest operation, and to how the barriers were to be lifted; that seems to have been left to 1 Para to use the brigade net to give orders to other battalions?
A: Yes, and that is quite right and proper, I mean that is exactly the way the brigade net is run and, as we did not know where the hooliganism was going to be, it had to be a very flexible plan and I think it was quite right and proper that 1 Para were using the brigade net in order to prepare for wherever it is they might have to go. That is exactly what the brigade net was for.36
5F-26 It is very difficult to see what this questioning means in practice. There was a means for the instructions to be given for the arrest operation to go forward: communication by radio, as all those attending the Conference would expect since the Brigade Commander was not going to be physically situated with the arrest force; and any requirement for the barriers to be lifted would also inevitably be accomplished by radio communication. As General Steele says, that is exactly what the brigade net was for. These senior officers did not require -- or request --
35 General INQ 0598 at Day 272/025/09 36 Arthur Harvey QC to Gen Steele at Day 268/039/03 documentation or further elucidation of these standard operational procedures.
The superficiality of the argument is demonstrated by the practical common sense of the military witnesses. First, Colonel Ferguson at Barrier 14:
Q: Were there any arrangements made as to who would be in charge of giving instructions between various regiments and battalions at the co-ordinating conference or subsequently?
A: No, and I made reference in my evidence that I had asked this question, were there to be any special arrangements for liaison and again I did not get any response, but I made it clear that I could just as easily have made those arrangements myself without having waited for instructions from brigade.
Q: Normally if you have a brigade operation, brigade will be responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the various battalions; is that not correct?
A: Correct.
Q: In other words, if the Paras are instructed to go in and mount the arrest operation, that instruction should come from brigade headquarters?
A: Correct.
Q: If the Paras — rather, if the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment or the Royal Green Jackets are required to take action as a result of the mounting of the arrest operation, the instructions for that action should also come from brigade?
A: That is perfectly true, but I think to put this into context, I would remind you that I was in charge of the William Street area and had been for the previous 30 days and would indeed be responsible for the next 30 days. Therefore, I had always anticipated that at some stage, in the normal course of events of my responsibilities, I might have to deal with rioting and with trying to arrest hooligans.
Q: I entirely accept that, Colonel, but on that day you did not receive any specific instructions from brigade to lift barrier 14. The instruction came over the brigade net via the Parachute Regiment themselves?
A: That is correct.
Q: That is irregular; is it not?37
A: I would not say it was irregular. We all knew that there was to be an arrest operation. I assumed — I did not know where they would mount it from; they could have come from through the Coldstream Guards area; they could have come down William Street from that direction; some of them indeed came from the next barrier, barrier 14. I mean, I did not know. But when we got the request, it was not an order, the request to lift the barriers, because they were going to go through and do the arrest operation, it just seemed to me to be a perfectly logical and reasonable thing to do and I think I would have been very much out of order if I had gone to brigade headquarters to say, "Is it okay to remove the barriers to let the company go through?"
Q: That is precisely why the orders should come from brigade, is to ensure that there is proper liaison and co-ordination of all of the different groups?
A: That is perfectly true. In a perfect world that is the way it would have happened38, but being, you know, a fairly experienced soldier, I understood what was happening and, I hope, made the right decision.
Q: That may as well be, Colonel, but ultimately when you are preparing a plan, one of the matters which did concern you at the co-ordinating conference — you have already dealt with this in a paragraph in your statement — was the difficulties and complexities of different battalions with different detachments, that that is a perfect state for causing confusion, unless there are proper plans to deal with it by way of liaison and co-ordination and instructions coming from brigade; is that not so?
A: I think that is a fair statement, yes.39
37 Mr Harvey did not explain to the witness or the Tribunal the basis for this suggestion. 38 Col Ferguson was not told or reminded of, and may not be taking account of, the arrangement 8 Bde had with 1 PARA for the use of the BID 150. The Bde Ops Room did not deal with the arrest operation on the insecure net until after the order for the commencement of the arrest operation had been given. 39 Day 281/104/09 Colonel Ferguson may in any event have known more than he presently remembers:
Q: [of the notes the Colonel made after the Conference] Eleven is "wire cutters"?
A: Yes, we had to have wire cutters so we could cut the barbed wire quickly when we wanted to let people through.
And then General Welsh:
Q: Could we go back, please, to your statement to the Inquiry at 1,340.002, paragraph 10. You say in paragraph 10: "I am not sure whether I was aware of the detail of the arrest operation. I think I was probably aware in general terms that it would involve some form of pincer movement and the fact that it would go ahead if the opportunity arose." You seem to be speaking there of your state of knowledge at and after the co-ordinating conference; is that right?
A: I suppose so. I cannot remember.
Q: In 1972 your evidence was that you did not know, on the day, the details of the orders given to 1 Para; is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: You just said in evidence a moment ago that separation was obviously very important for an arrest operation to be mounted. You were going to be the person, were you not, who was going to give advice to those on the ground as to when separation had taken place?
A: Yes. I took it as my job to explain from up there exactly what I saw happening on the ground and, yes, there was separation, but separation is a — I am not sure quite the right term, because in my mind there was never going to be complete separation because while the crowd moved south, some people hang back; other people run and join them, so it was always going to be a moving item, but it was
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40 This must mean an arrest force: see his use of this word in respect of his own idea of an arrest force at Day 281/138/16 41 Day 281/060/23 obviously important to get — and for the brigade commander to give the order for the arrest operation when there was a gap as definite as possible.
Q: A gap between the peaceful marchers and those still left rioting?
A: Yes.
Q: Surely, in order to advise usefully on whether that separation had taken place, you needed to know where the arrest operation was likely to be launched?
A: I think that is — I do not think so. I could describe what was happening down below on barricade 14 when the march turned right down Rossville Street; when the rioters -- if and when they left barricade 14 and then I do not think it was for me and I do not think I knew exactly where they would strike or make their arrests.
Q: In that case, how were you ever going to be able to say that the area in which an arrest operation might be launched was clear of peaceful marchers?
A: I do not think I said that the area where it might be launched; I was saying where -- where there were gaps and where there was separation and from that I would think that the arrest operation was flexible enough to do — make their arrests there.42
While the arrest operation may therefore have been mentioned (Colonel Jackson's complaint, a little premature given the uncertainty that existed as at 28th January 1972, was that 'it was not really explained whether this was a scoop operation or, as it happened to be in the end, was merely a frontal assault'), there was no need for any detailed discussion, or discussion as to tactics, at the Co-ordinating Conference. Indeed, any such discussion would have been unproductive as much depended on how things would develop the following Sunday.
Certainly none of those present felt at the time they required more information, not even Colonel Jackson:
42 Day 282/026/15 43 Day 285/045/05 Q: Do you remember any officer at that conference asking for more details of the arrest operation?
A, No, I do not, no.44
5F-31 There is a degree of controversy as to the time at which the Commanding Officer of 2 RGJ received his instructions. The Brigade Commander's evidence in 1972 was as follows:
This co-ordinating conference concluded the preparatory orders and arrangements to cover the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association event on 30th January. The only additional instruction I gave, on the morning of 30th January, was that Lieutenant Colonel P M Welsh MC, the Commanding Officer of 2 RGJ, should observe and report on the event from a Sioux helicopter.45
5F-32 In 1972 Colonel Welsh had written: 'Before I took off I had an informal briefing from the Brigade Commander.'46 While this issue has been used in the attempt to undermine the evidence of the witnesses that separation was discussed at the Conference (as to which see above), it is clear that Colonel Welsh was given his instructions at some point before the march began, and that separation was on any view very much in the mind of the Brigade Commander on the morning of 30th January 1972.
44 Day 285/046/03 45 Brig MacLellan's 1972 Statement, B1232 paragraph 17 46 1972 Statement, B1334 paragraph 4 CHAPTER 5G
PLANNING AND ORDERS IN 1 PARA
5G-1 1 PARA received its Warning Order in respect of the operation in Londonderry from (as the chain of command dictated) its own Brigade Headquarters, 39 Brigade, on Monday 24th January 1972 (the day Commander 8 Brigade signalled to the Commander Land Forces Chief Superintendent Lagan’s assessment of the levels and duration of violence 8 Brigade could expect on 30th January).
5G-2 In addition to the battalion’s operational tasks within the Brigade area at the time, the Warning Order set Battalion Headquarters’ standard preparatory procedures in motion:
From receipt of a warning order a CO would start to think forward. His staff would be expected to get on with their jobs without the need for detailed or specific instructions. The Signals Officer would have to liaise with other Signals Officers and deal with such things as frequencies, call signs, particular radio black spots etc. The Quartermasters would be expected to make arrangements for accommodation, fuel, feeding the troops, and as the Intelligence Officer I would have been expected to get relevant maps, photographs and any other information I could about the area of operation.¹
5G-3 There is evidence from two entirely separate sources, one from 1 PARA and one from 1 R ANGLIAN (and therefore unlikely to have influenced each other in a mistake), that some of the officers went to Londonderry for reconnaissance during that week. Major INQ 0010 was the Officer Commanding A Company 1 PARA:
I cannot remember exactly what happened prior to the march but I think I must have received a warning order
¹ INQ 0007 (IO 1 PARA), BSI Statement, B1238 paragraph 10 because I went on a Battalion recce to Londonderry prior to the event. This was my first visit to Londonderry: lack of familiarity with the area was one of the reasons why a recce was required. I cannot say exactly when it took place, whether a few days or a week before the march.... I only remember the recce vaguely: I do not remember where I went. I am certain that I did not go onto the City Walls as I would have remembered that. I do not remember seeing the cathedral.
Major INQ 0010 told the Tribunal that he is certain that this visit took place, as he can remember that they were wearing civilian clothing. Captain INQ 1495 was the Officer Commanding A Company 1 R ANGLIAN:
I do however remember, shortly before Bloody Sunday (I could not say exactly when) being involved in escorting some officers from 1st Battalion the Parachute Regiment around the area north of Waterloo Place. I cannot remember exactly how many officers there were, but I would say there were a handful of them. I could not say what their ranks were, nor could I in any way identify them now. They were in Londonderry to carry out a reconnaissance in preparation for Bloody Sunday because 1 PARA were likely to have to come into the city as reinforcements. I must have known that the march was due to take place and it was quite usual for different battalions to be moved around to support others. For example, our battalion had travelled to Belfast in 1971 to reinforce the resident troops there.
At some stage on 27th January 1972 Battalion Headquarters received its copies of the Brigade Operation Order for Operation Forecast. 1 PARA’s tasks (the principal of which would become, of course, the Mission of the Commanding Officer’s own orders) are at paragraph 9f:
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2 B1343.001 paragraph 3 3 Day 289/067/17 4 This may indicate that the CO was not present. Capt INQ 1495 could not remember whether he was or was not: see Day 304/047/22. 5 BSI Statement, C1495.2 paragraph 14 (1) Maintain a Brigade Arrest Force, to conduct a 'scoop up' operation of as many hooligans and rioters as possible.
(2) A secondary role of this Force will be to act as the second Brigade mobile reserve.6
5G-6 By paragraph 6 of Annex B to the Order only three of its companies were to remain under command: from 1200 hours on 30th January one company was to be detached to under command 22nd Regt.7
5G-7 In the operation Order Colonel Wilford, as were all of the Commanding Officers involved, was provided in addition to numerous administrative provisions, with background information relevant to the event in question8, 8 Brigade’s assessment of the threat9, its concept of operations10 (including the low key approach to be adopted by the Security Forces, the fact that the march would be permitted for as long as it remained within the containment area and the location of each of the barriers which formed the containment line11), 8 Brigade’s requirements so far as the media were concerned12 and a timetable for the event (1 PARA under command 8 Brigade from 0800 hours on the Sunday)13. 8 Brigade also provided a Signals Instruction, ensuring effective communications between all of the major and minor units working together during the event14.
5G-8 Colonel Wilford was also provided with further information in relation to his own task:
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6 G95.570 7 G95.578 8 G95.564 paragraph 1 9 G95.565 paragraph 2 10 G95.566 paragraph 6 11 Annex D, which does not appear with the copy of the Operation Order in Bundle G but is clscwhcrc, cg at B1279.101 12 G95.573 paragraph 9(p)(6)(b) 13 G95.572 paragraph 9(p)(2) 14 G95.575 paragraph 11(a) (a) This operation will only be launched, either in whole or in part, on the orders of the Bde Comd.
(b) The Force will be deployed initially to Foyle College Car Park GR 434176, where it will be held at immediate notice throughout the event.
(c) The Scoop-Up operation is likely to be launched on two axes, one directed towards hooligan activity in the area of William Street/Little Diamond, and one towards the area of William Street/Little James Street.
(d) It is expected that the arrest operation will be carried out on foot.(^{15})
5G-9 As has already been observed, it is upon sub-paragraph (c) that attention has been focused. Some of the problems encountered by the military witnesses in relation to the approach of the Tribunal, its Counsel and Counsel for some of the Interested Parties have been discussed. That these problems continued at the level of command now under consideration is demonstrated by this question from Christopher Clarke QC, to Colonel Wilford:
> When you looked at that order, and a map which presumably would have shown you something similar to the map that is on the right hand side, did you appreciate that the order appeared to be contemplating an arrest operation in the area of William Street/Little James Street and around here, in the Little Diamond area, on, broadly speaking, as it were, a horizontal axis or axes along William Street?(^{16})
5G-10 By phrasing his question in this way Mr Clarke not only told Colonel Wilford what this provision means, but did so in terms that are inconsistent with the both the terms of the provision and the evidence of the Brigade Major who drafted the order. The directional, mobile element of the provision (‘towards’) is not referred to at all and the two areas identified are given as areas in which the arrest operation is to take place,
(^{15})G95.570 paragraph 2(f)(1)
(^{16})Day 312/020/03 whereas the terms of the provision are clear that it is hooligan activity in those two areas towards which the arrest operation is likely to be launched. Furthermore, the word axis, omitted by Mr Clarke in his description of the likely movement of the arrest force, is now being given the meaning of a static horizontal line, beyond which (it is implied) the arrest force is not to go. Even if this interpretation of the provision is possible (and the senior officers’ case is that it is not), General Steele had clearly given an alternative interpretation of the provision which Colonel Wilford was not told about.
5G-11 So far as the military witnesses are concerned, no geographical limits for the arrest operation were laid down by this, or any other provision of the Operation Order. Had there been such limits, the orders given on the day for the launch of the arrest operation (given by the very same officers who had drafted the Operation Order), would not have contemplated the need for any prohibition against ‘running battles’ or any other activity ‘down Rossville Street’.
5G-12 On Friday 28th January 1972 Colonel Wilford travelled to Londonderry and, under the auspices of Headquarters 8 Brigade (with on hand assistance from the GSO3 Intelligence and Security, Captain INQ 1803) carried out his reconnaissance of the relevant part of the City from the air and, in so far as was possible, on the ground.
5G-13 In the afternoon Colonel Wilford attended the Brigade Co-ordinating Conference. While his thinking at this still very early stage (given the nature of his task), was quite properly not a subject for discussion at the Conference, it is inconceivable that he did not have some form of discussion with the Brigade Commander. That he did so in relation to his plan (albeit in general terms) at some stage before the march, and that (as is to be expected) there was a joint approach by Headquarters 8 Brigade and the Commanding Officer of 1 PARA, can be seen from this passage from Brigadier MacLellan's evidence to Lord Widgery:
Q: Had Colonel Wilford discussed his plan with you or not?
A: Not in detail, because we did not know (a) whether there would be any hooligans on the day for sure, or rioters; or (b) where they would be. We could merely make an outline plan.18
5G-14 At the conclusion of his visit to Londonderry Colonel Wilford then returned to Belfast and called his own Orders Group for 1030 hours the next day.
5G-15 In 1972 Colonel Wilford described the orders he gave in the following terms.19
a. I went through the Brigade Operation Order in detail to ensure we all understood the Situation the Mission and Execution. Annex A.
b. My own mission 'To arrest as many rioters as possible'.
c. The Execution of our mission. I explained that until the rioting started it was not really possible for me to be specific in my plans and I therefore gave a general idea on how I thought it could go. The marchers has (sic) two routes from Bishops Field: Route One would bring them in from the South along Rossville Street into William Street with possible filters through to Waterloo Place and Magazine Street. If rioting broke out from this approach I considered that two companies would come in from North and one from the East to pinch them out from a retreat West and South. Route Two would bring them into William
17 Boundaries (shown on the map at Annex A) are provided for at G95.571 paragraph 9(p)(1) 18 Brig MacLellan questioned by Mr Stocker, to Lord Widgery, at B1279 19 1972 Statement, B945 paragraph 5 Street at the Junction with Lonemoor Road and although confrontation would not take place until the William Street barrier it would likely spread backwards and it would be necessary to put in two companies together to get the maximum impact and achieve mutual support. I thought that the best approach would be from behind the Presbyterian Church. I was going to be forward where I could see the crowd and get an early view of its behaviour. On this I confidently expected to move the companies forward to jump off points.
d. I spoke about the Derry rioters and our lack of experience against them, the fact that they were quite used to rubber bullets and gas, but not to the quick use of snatch squads which would tell against them. However, I warned that we must look to our flanks and front particularly in the open area of Rossville and William Street where there had been so much sniping during previous rioting.
e. I then described the breakout which I intended from the Presbyterian Church and how Support Company would be reinforced with a Composite Platoon to prepare the route. This route would be recce'd and protected prior to any action by us.
Neither this paragraph nor the Notes of the Orders given (which are considered below), indicate that Colonel Wilford had been given (or that he believed he had been given) a limit of exploitation, still less William Street as any such limit. If anything the words he used in this statement raise the possibility that some troops would be operating to the south of William Street: at sub-paragraph c he anticipated a company might move in 'from the East' in order to 'pinch [the rioters] out from a retreat West and South'; and the Group was warned to look to their flanks and front, 'particularly in the open area of Rossville and William Street. The Notes are even more explicit, as they include the following:
g. Concept of the battle
(1) The parade will come into contact with SF Barricades at William Street. There are two approaches. First. From Rossville. This will cause the crowd to attempt a bypass through to Waterloo Street. In this event I would want to put a coy down the Strand into Waterloo Street and two coys in William Street from Lower Road and the Presbyterian Church.
Waterloo Street runs from Waterloo Place south east to Butcher Gate, past High Street and Harvey Street, which themselves run south west to Chamberlain Street.
This is entirely consistent with the thinking of Headquarters 8 Brigade as at 28th January 1972:
Q: I would like you to go back to the circle that you have drawn and corrected. Can we have B1315.133. Assuming that you were discussing this with Colonel Wilford on the 28th and having explained that the rioting may well take place at barrier 14 or barrier 12, or both, do I understand that this circle would still represent the general area within which you would expect the arrest operation to take place?
A: Yes.
Q: You made a correction, which we will come to, but that was more as you would have modified it in the light of events on the day?
A: No, I think I modified it because it was such a roughly drawn circle and was inaccurate.
Q: There are two different issues, General Steele, which I would like you to separate in your mind. The issue I am directing your mind at the moment to is what you would have thought on the 28th, looking forward to the operation and assuming rioting at barriers 12 and 14. There I understand you would have expected the operation to centre upon the area of that circle?
A: The amended circle?
Q: Well, you talk of amended circle, I would like to give you a chance to do it. Could we have Q8, please. It is up to
20 B966 paragraph 3(g) you, General Steele. I am going to ask that you be given control and if you put your fingers on the screen, you can in fact draw a circle. Since you amended it slightly by reference to squares, I would rather if, with the Chairman's leave, that you draw the circle you feel happy with?
LORD SAVILLE: We can try that, but let us understand precisely what the witness is being asked to do. He is being asked to draw a circle of the area in which, before the event, he thought the arrest operation would take place. We have to qualify that slightly, have we not, because in the operational order there are two quite separate places and so you are asking the question in relation to what was described, I think, as the William Street/Little James Street axis. In relation to that part of the operational order, what you are being asked to do, by touching the screen, is to draw a circle encompassing the area, if you are able to do it, which, at that time, that is to say before the event, you envisaged — if indeed you did envisage it — that the arrest operation would take place.
A: Yes, I am happy to do that. (Marked with blue circle - B1315.156)
LORD SAVILLE: That would not be in Little James Street at all, would it, then?
A: I have to say, Chairman, I find it very difficult to draw these circles here to encompass what I had in mind. I always had in mind that the arrest operation would be a scoop-up and that the scoop-up would be conducted in the wasteground south of William Street and where I think my difficulty in this particular question is, is that of course at the time that I drafted the order, not only did I not know where the hooligans were going to be, but nor did I know where the marchers were going to be and where the marching meeting was going to be and nor had the brigade commander given the order of "no running battle down Rossville Street". So I am finding it difficult to, in isolation, so to speak, to draw these circles.
LORD SAVILLE: I follow that, but the difficulty I find, is that, if you remind yourself of the operational order: "The scoop-up operation is likely to be launched on two axes, one directed towards hooligan activity in the area of William Street/Little Diamond and one towards the area of William Street/Little James Street." I just find it odd — you may be able to explain it to me — as to why the expected arrest operation, described in the operational order as "one towards the area of William Street/Little James Street," you draw a circle on the map which, to all intents and purposes, completely excludes Little James Street?
A: Well, of course, the actual point of hooliganism, in our experience, was at the junction; I mean, that is why it was called "Aggro Corner." So although there might have been hooligans between Aggro Corner and the barrier at 12, generally speaking the hooliganism was in that area of the junction. So, I think it is right to say that a scoop-up operation would have had to have come south of that.
LORD GIFFORD: Part of the answer to the Chairman's question lies in the fact that that junction, according to your own order, is where you expect the hooligan activity but not necessarily where you expect the arrests.
A. Yes, I think that is right, and of course it was compounded, as we all now know, by the fact that the hooligan element actually ended up at barrier 14.
Q: Still staying with what you would have discussed with Colonel Wilford on the 28th. In relation to the Little Diamond axis, the likely area of arrests, can you help us at all as to that?
A: No, I am having trouble with your assumption here because of course I cannot recall whether or not I did have such a meeting with Colonel Wilford.
Q: It is because of that I put the question in the form I did: if you discussed it, it would be in your mind, in the same way that is a rough circle for one of the axes, what would be the circle, if you can give it, in relation to the other?
A: This is what would be in my mind.
Q: What, in relation to the Little Diamond; could you draw it?
A: I do -- I beg your pardon, I missed that point entirely. (Indicating)
Q: Can that red be taken off and he be given control to draw a similar circle?
A: (Marked with red circle - B1315.156)
LORD SAVILLE: Are you happy with that, General Steele, or do you want another go?
A: No, no, that is... LORD SAVILLE: I think we can proceed on that basis.
LORD GIFFORD: May we save that image at the appropriate number.
MR RAWAT: B1315.156.
LORD GIFFORD: Looking at that, while that was the area that you might have expected, you would accept that Colonel Wilford had a discretion to go further towards the south within the terms of the operation order, if that was necessary to effect the arrests.
A: Yes.
Q: So it is clear that Colonel Wilford would have appreciated that he was authorised to go into the Bogside as far as was necessary, to comply with the order which has been given?
A: Yes, and that is quite right on the 28th, but on the 30th –
Q: Still on the 28th?
A: Yes, quite so.
Q: Indeed, the rubble barricade itself would not necessarily be out of his range on the 28th?
A: Well, now, I cannot say that, because of course that was not what was in my mind as to where the arrest area would be.
Q: Indeed, chasing into side streets would again not be out of the question?
A: Exactly.21
5G-19 So far as the tactical thinking is concerned, both Colonel Wilford's statement to Lord Widgery and the Notes for his orders stress the outline nature of what could be said. This was no more than what his audience, the Officer Commanding A Company amongst them, expected:
21 Day 268/104/19 Q. Given what we have just seen from the content of Colonel Wilford's written orders, would you accept that your orders would only have been finalised on the day itself?
A. Most certainly.22
5G-20 Major INQ 0010 explained:
You cannot lay down -- well, you can and always attempt to lay down a plan as to what will happen. But all you can do in reality is to make sure that everybody is aware what the task is, the main task, and then you deploy according to the situation.23
5G-21 Underlying the approach is the understanding of those with a military training that commanders cannot predict and control everything, but they can rely upon the training of the soldiers to use their initiative within their understanding of the task they had been given:
MR HARVEY: Just dealing with the last point you were making, is the situation that, if soldiers are to move beyond the tactically optimum which is recommended by the operation order, that that decision is one that really should be made by the commanders, rather than the individual soldiers themselves?
A. May I begin by querying a point? If you are asking: is this -- everything that I have referred to refers to my company.
Q. I entirely understand that.
A. Okay, and in my regiment an initiative is a requirement and the task has to be carried out and therefore individual soldiers in group form, in this case, would be expected to take the initiative. But they would, nevertheless, understand that they were under command, for example to section commander, and he in turn under his platoon commander and/or platoon sergeant. Have I answered your question?
22 Maj INQ 0010 at Day 289/016/13 23 Day 289/018/15 Q. I think you have, if I have interpreted it right. It simply means that within your regiment soldiers are expected to exercise initiative but that initiative still itself is subject to a chain of command. Would that be right?
A. Wherever that is possible.
Q. Wherever that is possible. In fact, that is one of the important considerations of forward planning: one plans ahead on the understanding that it may well have to be offered, but you are dealing with the most probable outcome, and therefore trying to predict behaviour beforehand for soldiers for their safety and their protection.
A. I do not like the word "prediction" when we are talking about operations. There can be no prediction.
Q. Then what is the point of forward planning?
A. I have been on a large number of operations in various parts of the world and in my experience a plan goes out of the window the moment the operation starts.
Q. Does that mean there is no point in forward planning?
A. No, it does not.
Q. What is the point of forward planning?
A. The point I am making is that if you are suggesting that there is some way through the plan -- through a planned form of controlling something, the answer is there is not. If however, which is what I am referring to, you prepare soldiers and they understand what the aim is and they understand how they should operate within that aim, fine.
Q. Yes. I do not think I was asking any more than that.
In the absence of any express limitation upon the task, movement would be in tactical bounds, as follows:
Q: Could we look again please at B1343.008. We have looked at the mission and execution at the top of the page. Paragraph 1, under "Execution," you were asked a few minutes ago about crowd control and movement: "In tactical bounds of no more than 20 metres." I just want to ask you this: should we understand that to be a geographical limitation on the snatch squad carrying out the arrests, that is to say it should not go further than 20 metres from the point at which the arrest operation is presumably commenced; or should we understand that to mean that any arrest squad should move in tactical bands (sic) of about 20 metres at a time and together as a snatch squad?
A: My soldiers were pretty experienced and we had done this many times. That is a guidance, a reminder to them not to go too far. So the aim is to move in — picking up your second point — bounds of a distance, limited distance, dependent on the situation.
Q. So movement would be in bounds of no more than 20 metres as a snatch squad group?
A. Not necessarily. As a guide, in terms of guidance, yes.
Q: I understand.
A. But if, for example, the particular individual they were after was another 10 metres on, they would go for him.
Q. Perhaps it is me, but it does not quite answer the question I am putting to you. I understand that therefore movement of the squad should not be in bounds of more than about 20 metres. But was this in any sense to be interpreted as a geographical limitation, that is to say the snatch squad may not go 60 yards, albeit in bounds of three at a time. Do you follow?
A. I apologise, I misunderstood you. Situation dependent.
Q. So in other words, if there were someone to be arrested who happened to be 50/60/70 yards away —
A. It is possible, but unlikely.
Q. But if it were executed in that way, you would still expect the snatch squad —
A. As long as cover could be maintained.
Q. I follow.
A. In other words, protection.
Q. And that would be — A. Unusual.
Q. — a decision to be taken by the soldiers on the ground?
A. Yes. Not the individual soldiers. It would be those commanding — controlling them.
Q. Of course. So that we are clear about it, therefore 1(b)\\textsuperscript{25}, you would not have interpreted as being a geographical limitation that soldiers should not move more than 20 metres from the point at which they commenced the arrest operation?
A. Forgive me. I should have picked up on "geographical", you are correct. But it is always dependent on a number of variables.
LORD SAVILLE: Let me make sure I understand you. Again, a general limitation of about 20 metres: the reason behind that being so that the cover could be maintained for the snatch squads, they could continue to work in a unit, rather than being scattered many dozens or hundreds of yards around the area, is that right?
A. The aim is always soldiers' safety.
LORD SAVILLE: Yes. So I am reading this as being, and you must tell me if I am wrong, that general limitation — so if you take a specific instance -- they might move about 25 metres, and then, having regrouped, they might move another 20 or so metres, is that right?
A. As long as they were being covered and it was a general movement, yes.
LORD SAVILLE: That is what I meant by "regroup," to provide the cover in the general group, yes.
A. I think in answer to your question, sir, the important point is that soldiers understood that they did not get themselves out on a limb. It would be extremely costly, potentially.
\\textsuperscript{25} B1343.008 paragraph 1(b): "Movement — in tactical bounds of no more than 20m." And the mechanism of a number of snatch squads moving in tactical bounds within a larger – Company or Battalion – operation is not to be confused with the notion of smaller snatch squads operating in isolation.
Colonel Wilford’s aim in his Orders was therefore to inform his Company Commanders of the essentials: the Battalion’s (and therefore their) mission, the nature of the operation, their grouping and individual Forming Up Positions and a general outline, subject to further orders, as to how they might expect to be deployed (A Company on the right flank, Support Company in the centre and C Company on the left). What would have been clear to all of them is that all three companies remaining under command 1 PARA were going to be working together: in both of the scenarios identified in the notes the battalion arrest operation comprises three companies converging on the rioters from one or more directions.
The members of the Orders Group would not have been dismayed by the fact that they were going to operate in an area neither they nor their soldiers knew:
MR HARVEY: Coming in from the rear, do you mean by moving along the Little Diamond then going down using Abbey Street or are you simply not familiar enough with the ground to know what that implies?
A. I certainly cannot recall and I certainly did not know the ground. That would not have prevented me from going, but that is academic, because it did not happen.
26 INQ 0010 at Day 289/034/10 27 A confusion displayed, for example, by Arthur Harvey QC at Day 257/012/13 when questioning Gen Ford: ‘We know now two of those companies were involved in a regular snatch operation.’ 28 Notes, B966 paragraph 2 29 Notes, B966 paragraph 3(a) 30 Notes, B966 paragraph 3(b)-(e) Q. No, but again you did not know the ground and your troops did not know the ground?
A. That is frequently the case and was the case in Belfast.31
5G-26 What is clear from the Notes is that Colonel Wilford was thinking of using the Presbyterian Church as one of his points of access to the rioters. Given the recognition amongst commanders in 8 Brigade of the difficulties of getting close enough to the rioters, this may have been suggested in Londonderry. Captain INQ 1495, referred to above, has told this Inquiry:
15. My Company Sergeant Major, a couple of signallers and I walked around the area with an armed escort and the para officers. I remember showing the para officers two walls, one on either side of the Presbyterian Church each marked A on the attached map (grid reference L05 and K05). At that time we were having difficulties with the regular Saturday afternoon riots which would take place at the north end of William Street. The army's job in this situation was to stop damage being caused to local properties and shops. We would deploy people at William Street and at Waterloo Place. Snatch squads would run forward but the rioters would run away too quickly and no arrests would be made. I was therefore always trying to think of ways to carry out more efficient arrests. One way I had thought of, but not actually tried, was to send troops in around behind the rioters in a pincer movement. I mentioned the possibility of this manoeuvre to the para officers and suggested that the route in through the Presbyterian Church would be suitable for this purpose.32
5G-27 INQ 1495's recollection was that the wall was eight to ten feet high and he was not suggesting that the approach was an easy one. It would have required preparation. Colonel Wilford was planning for Support Company
31 INQ 0010 at Day 289/047/08 32 C1495.2 to be 'reinforced with a Composite Platoon to prepare the route'\\textsuperscript{33}, and in the event Support Company took ladders with them to the Church.
5G-28 General Ford, General MacLellan and Colonel Wilford were all questioned from a critical standpoint about the lack of consultation with the local units. To put it at its lowest, INQ1495's evidence is evidence that had there been some sort of formal consultation exercise, beyond what Headquarters 8 Brigade were able to tell Colonel Wilford on 28\\textsuperscript{th} January, and that crossing over the walls to the sides of the Presbyterian Church was not an approach that would have been ruled out.
5G-29 The reason for not ruling it out, despite its inherent difficulties, was the tactical benefits it had the potential to offer. Any rioting would, initially at least, have been against one or more of the barriers, and the access through the Church, if it could be achieved, would enable the troops to get into the rear of such a riot: they would not have to go through any of the barriers. Furthermore, the Church occupied a central position along William Street between what Colonel Wilford had been told were the most likely areas of hooligan activity: the area of Little James Street/William Street and the area of the Little Diamond/William Street. This would have enabled him to move troops from the centre point towards either of those areas, depending on which of them became the centre of any rioting.
5G-30 The Church offered the commander of the arrest force the perfect pivotal position if 8 Brigade was right in its assessment of the two areas in which trouble was most likely to occur: Support Company would be able to move west to link up with A Company or east to link up with C Company. This positional advantage is obscured if the Operation Order is read so as to anticipate two separate operations rather than a single operation that
\\textsuperscript{33} 1972 Statement, B945 paragraph 5(e) might have to be used in either of the anticipated likely directions, or indeed in any other direction:
LORD SAVILLE: I am sorry, Ms McDermott, I am confused again. On the operational order you have one axis in the Lower Road/Little Diamond area; and the other, if I remember the order correctly, in the Little James Street, William Street area. I have always assumed, but I am perfectly prepared to be told I am wrong, that the idea of going over the wall at the Presbyterian Church was part and parcel of that second axis for the scoop-up operation, namely the scoop-up operation axis in the Little James Street/William Street area — if I am wrong, please tell me straightaway — and that the Lower Road Company A were on the other axis all together.34
Furthermore, a number of questioners have attacked the Presbyterian Church plan on the basis that the troops using it would have to have crossed open ground in the form of the empty space immediately to the south of the Church35. But that is just not the case: by turning left immediately after descending from the wall the troops could have followed walls north east and then south east, around the edge of the piece of ground. There was no need to cross open ground at all. And the maps and aerial photographs36 raised the possibility of a more covered route than that: around the perimeter of the GP Sorting Office complex, between that perimeter and the rear of the buildings on William Street north of the open ground to the front of the Church. If that route was open there was a covered approach for the troops all the way to Aggro Corner.
It would appear that the only or deciding fact which ruled out the church wall as providing one access route was the fact that ground level on one side of the wall was significantly lower than on the other. The Tribunal might fairly consider that this was just the sort of fact which is all too
34 Day 259/090/08 35 Sec, for example, Arthur Harvey QC to Gen Ford at Day 257/054/25 36 Sec, for example, P199. obvious with the benefit of hindsight but which might well not have been anticipated, even with the benefit of careful preparation and/or local knowledge. Only those who had actually climbed the wall and looked at the ground on both sides were likely to have appreciated the problem.
In any event, the need to alter the plan on 30th January 1972 away from the idea of inserting troops onto William Street over the wall, was not the dramatic change which a number of questioners painted it as. Attractive though that route appeared to be from the maps and the reconnaissance carried out thus far, it would require further attention once 1 PARA were on the ground and could get closer to it:
I then described the breakout which I intended from the Presbyterian Church and how Support Company would be reinforced with a Composite Platoon to prepare the route. This route would be recce and protected prior to any action by us.
Captain 200, who attended the Battalion Orders Group in his capacity as Officer Commanding Administrative Company, remembers the Presbyterian Church being described in terms of a potential access point rather than one that had been finally decided upon:
From the overhead photographs and maps of the area it had been decided by Colonel Wilford and the Company Commander that this was a potential area from which Support Company could gain entry into the Bog side and make arrests. Obviously therefore we needed to check out this area in advance to make sure that this was in fact feasible.
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37 Gerard Elias QC, for example, to Gcn Ford at Day 256/050/04 38 Aerial reconnaissance, on 29th January 39 1972 Statement of Col Wilford, B946 paragraph 5(e) 40 BSI Statement, B2022.003 paragraph 18 The companies had in any event been told that, although they had a general outline and had been allotted Forming Up Positions, they would have to be flexible:
... I had been warned by my Commanding Officer that my Company might have to climb over [the wall at the east side of the Presbyterian Church], in order to gain access to William Street. This was the pre-arranged route for my Company, although I was also warned that I might have to enter the area via any of the Army Barriers.
Captain 200's understanding was very similar:
Colonel Wilford's briefing could only contain so much detail about deployment. In order to maintain the maximum possible flexibility the orders were not too rigid in this respect and in effect much would not be decided until we had actually arrived in Londonderry. However, Colonel Wilford's orders were very good and very thorough, as was usually the case. We would have been fully briefed about communications, administration and timings ...
Colonel Wilford appears also to have told his company commanders of the need to take account of the safety of peaceful marchers. Major Loden said in 1972:
It was clearly understood that the peaceful element of the march was to be left undisturbed.
Major 221A was the Officer Commanding C Company, whose orders were passed onto the soldiers at the Platoon Orders Groups:
Q (reading paragraph 11 of the BSI Statement of Cpl INQ 1799, a section commander in C Company): "We travelled from Long Kesh into Londonderry in the armoured vehicles. I remember that as I was section commander, I thought about how I would deal with a situation if gunmen
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41 1972 Statement of Maj Loden, at B2218 42 BSI Statement, B2022.002 paragraph 9 43 1972 Statement, at B2216 were to open fire. I was trying to construct a mental picture of the area. My line of thinking at that time would be that I would have two roles. Firstly, to make sure that my men and innocent civilians were okay and, secondly, to resolve the situation decisively and to our advantage if possible. Taking decisive action would be to either put the gunmen out of action or alternatively to close on them and make their position untenable." Do you recall whether you had in mind a serious possibility that gunmen would be encountered on that afternoon?
A. No, as I have said. I cannot recall the details of either receiving orders or of giving orders.
Q. It may be in the light of your recollection you are unable to answer this, but can you say whether you would have sought to brief either your company as a whole or your platoon commanders about a risk that gunmen would be encountered and the way in which they should deal with that situation, if it arose?
A: We could well have talked it through, yes."
The Company Commanders also relied on the considerable experience they had acquired during the long period they had been carrying out such operations in Belfast. Major INQ 0010 was commanding the remaining company, A Company:
LORD SAVILLE: ... . If there are people around when you come under fire from a gunman, there may well be a risk, if you attempt to fire back at gunmen, of hitting some innocent people. Was that appreciated as a possibility and, if so, what was the practice with regard to that possible situation?
A. Chairman, I understand the point that we are trying to get at here, and I am sure you will understand my position: it is extremely difficult to put these things in black and white. But to answer your question, experience has shown us that gunmen tend to fire from positions where they are not immediately identifiable, and where they can see soldiers which takes them out of the direct line of, in this case, marchers. You are quite correct: it is definitely appreciated, and was definitely appreciated, that on occasions, because the crowd was — a crowd was being used as cover, that there could be a risk. And one had to take care. That is why it was always the case, certainly in my company and I suspect in all others, that the Yellow Card was elaborated to the point that it was only fired at identified gunmen. I am sorry I cannot be more definite than that, but it — each and every situation is different. But the point is made.
LORD SAVILLE: Thank you.
5G-40 That experience had resulted in an understanding of the behaviour of the peaceful element in crowds which was very similar to that acquired by 8 Brigade in Londonderry:
MR RAWAT: You have told the Tribunal that you contemplated that mixed in with the rioters and the gunmen there might be peaceful marchers?
A: No. That was — you used that term. I did not — I do not mean that at all. I expect that the moment that any activity — serious activity started, whether it was rioting or shooting, then the peaceful elements of the crowd, or the march, tend to disperse pretty rapidly.
5G-41 Having made such preparations as were possible 1 PARA set off for Londonderry on 30th January, with much of the tactical thinking that would be necessary still ahead of them.
45 Day 289/011/12 46 Day 289/010/05 CHAPTER 5H
OPERATION FORECAST
'One can always look in hindsight at, shall we say, a nice little battle area ...' 1
5H-1 1 PARA were under command 8 Brigade from 0800 hours on 30th January 19722 and were due in the BSR Factory at Drumahoe by 1100 hours3, a requirement with which they complied4. The move into the FUP at the Foyle College Car Park was to start at 1200 hours5 and was to be complete by 1300 hours6.
PREPARATIONS IN LONDONDERRY
5H-2 Some preparations would no doubt have had to wait until they reached Londonderry: certainly the Intelligence Officer and the Regimental Signals Officer (not least to collect the cards necessary to run the secure net) both visited Headquarters 8 Brigade in Ebrington Barracks.
5H-3 Although no one has remembered it now, it may well be that the Commanding Officer did too7. Tactically, however, his position as commander of the Brigade Arrest Force was one all the senior military witnesses who have appeared before this Tribunal understood:
1 Col Roy Jackson, at Day 286/088/02 2 Operation Order Operation Forecast, G95.572 paragraph 9(p)(2) 3 Operation Order Operation Forecast, G95.573 paragraph 10a(3) 4 8 Brigade recorded the completion of 1 PARA's move from Belfast in its Log at 1104 hours: see W39 serial 28 5 Operation Order Operation Forecast, G95.572 paragraph 9p(2) 6 Operation Order Operation Forecast, G95.572 paragraph 9p(2) 7 The CO and the IO were certainly together by the time the officers of 1 PARA began their reconnaissance of the barriers: Col Wilford's 1972 Statement, B947 paragraph 7. While the Main Body made the move to the FUP, Colonel Wilford and his company commanders set out on the reconnaissance which would enable them to advance their tactical planning for the day. All of the company commanders were instructed to reconnoitre barriers 7, 9, 11 and 12 to 17 (those at which there was most likely to be trouble, no doubt, and those most likely to be used for access to deal with any such trouble) and Colonel Wilford carried out his own reconnaissance with the Intelligence Officer. The Officer Commanding Support Company began his reconnaissance at 1220 hours.
No doubt one issue of great interest to the Commanding Officer and the Officer Commanding his centre company was the viability of the access route at the Presbyterian Church. Given the fact that the need to establish whether troops could or could not be moved over the wall had been identified at the Battalion Orders Group in Palace Barracks, it is no surprise that the two met at the Church. It had now been possible to look at the wall closely and the outcome of the discussion was that in all the circumstances the wall could not be used.
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8 Gen Steele, at Day 267/090/05 9 The last of the companies, Support Company, got there at 1250 hours: see the 1 PARA Log, W89 serial 5; Battalion HQ was sufficiently established there by 1312 hours to have established a telephone link with Brigade: see the Brigade Log, at W40 serial 46 10 1972 Statement Maj Loden, at B2217 11 1972 Statement Col Wilford, at B946 paragraph 5(e) 12 In that they could now get up to the top of it and look down the other side, which provides the answer to Christopher Clarke QC’s question to Col Wilford, at Day 312/049/02: ‘Maj Loden appears to have told you that there were difficulties in getting soldiers over the church wall. Can you help us as to why this was a defect or a difficulty that had not been apparent before?’ 13 Which may have been updated at HQ 8 Brigade: the larger the riot the larger the number of troops that would have to go over the wall. See Col Wilford at Day 312/049/04 The difficulty was not access of itself, but the number of troops that might need to use it:
Major Loden commanding Support Company met me at the Presbyterian Church and informed me that he thought it too difficult to pass a large number of troops through the wire. I agreed with him ... 14
A number of questioners have sought to portray the outcome of this discussion as a reflection of a lack of professionalism on the part of the officers in 1 PARA15. These questions display a lack of understanding of the process in which these officers were involved and (presumably) a failure to appreciate that reconnaissance of the wall, and therefore a further tactical appreciation (including any new information) on the day, had been anticipated from the outset. And that is precisely what happened. Colonel Wilford continued:
I agreed with him but asked him to recce a route forward over the wall to the West of the Church. This he did and found it was possible with difficulty to get forward to the derelict house at 43241701. I told him to be prepared to filter up to one platoon this way and made up my mind then that I would have to use the Little James Street approach if I was to get any number through in time to catch the rioters.16
Colonel Wilford was therefore still hoping to get at least some troops onto William Street from the area of the Church and was clearly continuing to think of troops moving from more than one direction towards the rioters.
Subject to the obvious need to retain flexibility, the Officer Commanding Support Company was, not surprisingly, thinking in the same way in
14 1972 Statement Col Wilford, at B947 paragraph 8 15 Sec, for example, Arthur Harvey QC (in fact asking questions of Gen Ford), at Day 257/056/11. Sec also Gerard Elias QC (also to Gen Ford) at Day 256/049/05 16 1972 Statement Col Wilford, B947 paragraph 8 terms of the numbers of troops that could use the wall and the need for more than one access point:
During this reconnaissance I paid particular attention to a wall on the east side of the Presbyterian Church because I had been warned by my commanding officer that my Company might have to climb over it, in order to gain access to William Street. This was the pre-arranged route for my company, although I was also warned that I might have to enter the area via any of the Army barriers. During this reconnaissance I was met by my Commanding Officer and it was decided that a platoon should deploy forward, if required, to the disused building at 42341703. At 1245 hours my Platoon Commanders joined me at the junction of Queen Street and Great James Street and I warned the Platoon Commander of the Machine Gun Platoon that he might be required to deploy into this disused building. I had by then decided that the disused building would provide a second route into William Street, in addition to the one over the wall on the East side of the Church. From my position of observation East of the Church, I saw that there were windows in the East wall of the disused building which were partially boarded up with corrugated iron. My plan was that the MG Platoon should get inside the disused building from which it could then gain access to William Street from these windows. In this way I hoped to be able to surprise any rioters and also provide myself with an additional route which would enable me to deploy two platoons simultaneously. The route over the wall by the East side of the Church was narrow and exposed and was not suitable for deploying men quickly."
5H-10 Given the outline nature of the planning as at the time of the 1 PARA Battalion Orders Group, understood by all those who attended it, it is inconceivable that Colonel Wilford did not have contact with his company commanders once the Battalion deployed onto the streets of Londonderry. This contact may not have comprised a formal Orders Group, as some questioners appear to have wished it to (relying no doubt on the words that appear in the Notes to the orders given at Palace Barracks: 'I will give the coy deployment in our FUP and then give my concept of how I think
17 1972 Statement Maj Loden, at B2217 the battle can go\\textsuperscript{18}, but all the company commanders were carrying out their reconnaissance at the same time in what was a relatively small area.
5H-11
There was in any event little needed in either A or C Companies for an update although both, it is safe to assume, would have been expecting the order to move to the forward locations which was given at 1516 hours.\\textsuperscript{19} Although there is now no record of any orders to this effect, the commanders of both A and C Companies must at some stage have been told that in the event of an arrest operation they would be moving through the barriers they did in fact move through. C Company, for example, were in Waterloo Place during the rioting at barrier 14 (they must presumably have been there when their Commanding Officer made his request at 1555 hours or thereabouts to move them through that barrier\\textsuperscript{20}), ready to move up to Barrier 14 when the order for the arrest operation was given.
5H-12
In addition to face to face contact with the Commanding Officer, the battalion net was also available if, at the time the orders were needed, it was an appropriate (even if insecure) method of giving orders. While after thirty odd years he cannot remember them, the Officer Commanding C Company, Major 221A, clearly received orders:
\\begin{quote} Q. You carry on in your statement to deal with the movement to Waterloo Place. Can we go on to paragraph 12, please. You say at the beginning of paragraph 12: "Not long after I arrived at Waterloo Place, an order came over the battalion net that C Company was to prepare to go in to the Bogside to mount an arrest operation through barrier 14. I therefore got ready to send my vehicles through barrier 14." Should we understand from that that at that stage, after you had arrived at Waterloo Place, you were planning to send your company through in vehicles?
A (221A). That would appear to be the intention. \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{18} B966 \\textsuperscript{19} 1 PARA Log, W90 serial 23 \\textsuperscript{20} Porter Transcript, W126 serial 336 Q. You say "that would appear to be the intention," I mean that is undoubtedly what is written in your statement. Can you remember whether that was your intention, or not?
A. No, I cannot.
Q. You say a little further on in paragraph 12, after referring to the order being for C Company to move simultaneously with Support Company: "My recollection is that the intention was that both companies would then carry out arrest and scoop-up operations against rioters in the area around the junction of William Street and Rossville Street and the wasteground to the east of Rossville Street." Do you have an actual recollection as you sit here today, that the intention was as you have described it in this paragraph?
A. No, I do not have an actual recollection, no.
Q. Did you have an actual recollection at the time when you made this statement?
A. This is supposition, possibly, by the sequence of events that followed, that is where I get the recollection from.
Q. Leaving aside what is written in the statement and just thinking back, are you able to help us as to who told you or who decided and when you were told what the intention was as to what your company should do when it went through the barrier?
A. Right, we would have received orders from battalion headquarters on the battalion net.
Q. Can you say at what stage in the proceedings you received those orders, or not?
A. I would think whilst we were in the Waterloo Place, but I cannot be sure.
Q. Would details really have been given over an open radio net of the area into which your troops would be deployed?
A. If it was an immediate move, yes. Q. That would seem to indicate that they would only have been given at the moment when the troops were being sent in?
A. Yes, when I say "immediate" I am talking within half an hour or so, immediate in that respect.21
THE BUILD UP
5H-13 Once his reconnaissance had been completed the Commanding Officer of 1 PARA established his Tactical Headquarters in an Observation Post from which he could monitor the development of any violence and, as he would have been expected to do, attempt to maintain the initiative he required if he was to succeed in his task. This he did by moving his companies closer to the containment line at 1530 hours22, warning (through his Main Headquarters) the barrier holding units that they needed to be prepared to lift their barriers in the event of a need for 1 PARA to move through them23, reassessing his options and keeping the units controlling the barriers and 8 Brigade (who were able to hear all transmissions, even if not directed at them) informed of his thinking.24
5H-14 As the commander of the arrest force was watching how things developed the commander of the whole operation and his staff were monitoring events by listening to the transmissions made over the Brigade net. Mr
21 Day 294/139/19 22 1 PARA Log, W90 serial 23 23 Porter transcript, serial 286. The element of forward planning in this message is what is important, not the precise phrasology used by the watchkeepers in the Gin Palace, young officers speaking off the cuff as events developed, rather than preparing carefully the wording of each transmission. There is no basis for suggesting either (as Mr Harvey has repeatedly done) that this message was an order from 1 PARA to 22nd Regt or that it represents improper or irregular conduct by 1 PARA. See for example Col Ferguson’s answer to Mr Harvey at Day 281/105/21: ‘I would not say it was irregular. ... when we got the request, it was not an order, the request to lift the barriers ... it just seemed to me to be a perfectly logical and reasonable thing to do and I think I would have been very much out of order if I had gone to brigade headquarters to say “Is it okay to remove the barriers to let the company go through?”’. 24 See, for example, Porter transcript, at W124 serial 294, discussed in more detail below. Porter's tape permits the Tribunal to hear what was heard by all those with access to the Ulsternet.
**SERIAL 294**
5H-15 This serial reads:
65, from our Sunray. Be prepared for movement through serials 12, 14 and 16. Over.
5H-16 While Mr Rawat appeared to want to pass over it with the comment 'perhaps another breach of the concept of the element of surprise by 1 PARA', General Steele recognised the importance of this transmission:
Could I interrupt here for a second. ... It is quite an important serial, that, because it shows that the commanding officer's thinking at that time was in fact he would use 12, 14 and 16 rather than 11, 12 and 14 that he subsequently did. So that is an important serial, that, because it indicates that the commanding officer had a very flexible plan to try and use his forces as best he could in relation to where the hooliganism was taking place.
5H-17 Barrier 16 was located at Castle Gate, to the south of William Street and east of High Street. Far from any concern on the part of himself or anyone else at 8 Brigade at the notion of 1 PARA moving that far south, the Brigade Major reads it now as Colonel Wilford giving a good indication of what his up to date intentions were:
Q: Moving now to the events of the day, could we have on the screen W124, please, serial 294 you have looked at briefly already. It is a message to 90 Alpha, 22nd Regiment, from 65: "... from our Sunray. Be prepared for more through serials 12, 14 and 16." Do you remember that?
A: I do.
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25 **W124**
26 There is no basis for adding the word 'now' to the word 'movement' in this serial, as Mr Harvyc sought to do at Day 268/018/06
27 Day 267/042/04 Q: Could we have on the screen Q9, please. General Steele, you can see on the screen where barrier 12 is, where barrier 14 is; barrier 16 was at Castle Gate, there, do you see that?
A: I do.
Q: CO 1 Para having given a warning for troops to go through barriers, including barrier 14, must, must he not, have been anticipating inserting troops south of William Street?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you recall any particular reaction on your part when you heard that on the brigade net?
A: No, but maybe I should have done, because it is a very good indication that the commanding officer of 1 Para was thinking very much of how he was going to get his troops behind rioters.29
There was, in any event, a practical need for transmissions such as this:
LORD SAVILLE: Coming back to this: some slight criticism for destroying the element of surprise perhaps, General Steele, I gather from your answers over the last few minutes, but how else was Colonel Wilford expected to warn those manning the barriers that he may be ordered to come through them?
A: There was no other way.
LORD SAVILLE: So on the face of it, it would have seemed quite sensible for the commanding officer of 1 Para to warn the people at the barriers that there may be orders that require him to come through?
A: Indeed.
LORD SAVILLE: Otherwise, of course, you get the position where he is given an order and he cannot comply with it?
28 Transcript says '14'. Must be '16' 29 Day 268/166/09 A: Quite so.
SERIAL 315
5H-19 In his Statement to this Tribunal General Welsh wrote:
I have been asked by Eversheds to comment on which of these transmissions I now think indicated that the necessary degree of separation had occurred. I would say that serial 348, taken together with the earlier messages, indicates that the peaceful marchers had separated from the rioters.
5H-20 The importance of this passage is its recognition of the need to consider the developing picture. The approach of a number of questioners, in particular those who have sought to persuade the Tribunal that the peaceful and the violent elements of the crowd never became separated, has been to look at each Porter tape transmission in isolation. That approach is flawed in that it omits from the consideration of each individual transmission the material that has been provided in earlier serials, and therefore the dynamics of what was happening on the ground.
5H-21 Serial 315 is the first of the messages identified by General Welsh. It was sent at about 1547 hours:
Zero, this is 61 Yankee. Reference the state of the crowd, apart from the hooligan fringe, the vast majority of the people now in the area of the waste ground by the Flats and on the ... on Aggro Corner look as though they're not quite sure what they're going to do next. Over.
5H-22 For 8 Brigade, whose experience was that generally those not involved in violence did not remain in its vicinity, this was the beginning of the move of the peaceful protesters away from those intent on violence:
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30 Day 267/042/14 31 W125 32 B1340.004 paragraph 21 At 1547 hours Commanding Officer 2 RGJ, airborne in a Sioux helicopter, indicated that the separation of the hooligan element from the bulk of the marchers was beginning to take place.33
The process was in its early stages, but the vast majority of people had cleared the junction of William Street and Rossville Street:
Q: You are speaking there of the vast majority of people being now in the area of the wasteground by the flats. Do you now recall what that wasteground was?
A: Being what its substance was?
Q: Or where it was geographically?
A: Geographically it was --
Q: Would you like to see a map, could we have this on the left-hand side of the screen and Q8 on the right. Could you highlight the middle section, please, from William Street downwards?
A: I would think it was down Rossville Street, it is marked "wasteground" on the map, around Eden Place and Pilot Row.
Q: Certainly at this stage, 1547, it appears that there are people on the Eden Place wasteground and the area of Aggro Corner.34
Q: The first serial we have is 315, as we know, that was at 1547. I think at that serial you were reporting on the state of the crowd and specifically drawing attention to the fact that the majority of the people were in the area of the wasteground by the flats?
A: I think that is correct.35
33 Brig MacLcllan 1972 Statement, B1234 paragraph 24 34 Gcn Welsh at Day 282/044/02 35 Gcn Welsh at Day 283/046/16 At about the same time (the Brigade Log records it at a minute later, 1548 hours\\textsuperscript{37}) 22\\textsuperscript{nd} Regt, controlling barriers 12 and 14, provided not only information about the rioting but also about the movement of the crowd:
\\textit{Hello Zero, this is 90 Alpha. Our call signs confirm that general movement of the crowd, although there is a hooligan fringe at serials 14 and 15. Some CS gas has been used, but this was used by them. I repeat: used by them. Over.}
This message is significant in terms of the doubts that have been raised as to whether or not separation was discussed at the Co-ordinating Conference: 22\\textsuperscript{nd} Regt provide their information in terms of confirmation of information provided from the helicopter, an unlikely thing for them to have done in the absence of an understanding of the importance of the issue of separation to the Brigade Commander.
For 8 Brigade the information from 22\\textsuperscript{nd} Regt contributed to what was a developing picture:
\\textit{Q: Serial 320, a message from 22nd Regiment, and this message, you have seen already, confirms: "... general movement of crowd ... hooligan fringe at serials 14 and 15." The crowd as previously described is now eventually moving; do you see that?}
\\textit{A: I do.}
\\textit{Q: What would you have understood that to mean, General Steele?}
\\textit{A: That it was following the -- following on from the situation report from the helicopter; that the majority of the people were, so to speak, on the move, that is to say from the area of the wasteground and the flats, is the way I would have assessed that message.}
\\textsuperscript{36} W125 \\textsuperscript{37} W45 serial 134 Q: When you say "general movement," would you have got any impression from that message of the direction in which they were or might have been moving?
A: Yes, I am quite clear that in fact the direction of the movement was, of course, towards Free Derry Corner and maybe towards the Lecky Road, although it does not say that at item 315.
Q: It does not say that, but I asked you whether you would have gained an impression from it?
A: I certainly would. 38
SERIAL 324 39
5H-27 This transmission by 1 R ANGLIAN, entered in the Brigade Log at 1549 hours 40, marks the first use of firearms on 30th January 1972, and the fire came not from the Army but from the IRA 41:
Hello Zero, this is 54 Alpha. We've just had two shots fired at call sign Hotel 3 from the area of Kildrum Gardens. Strikes seen on the ground in front of their location. No casualties and no fire returned. Over.
5H-28 The target of these shots was 15 Missile Battery, under command 1 R ANGLIAN and located in the Brandywell. While during the course of this Inquiry many have found it easy to ignore these shots altogether, or to dismiss them because they were fired before the arrest operation began and out of its immediate area, it is unlikely that they were treated with such a lack of concern at 8 Brigade when they were reported. Had any promises been made by the IRA to the organisers of the march that they would stay away or that they had removed their weapons from the Bogside, and had any attempt been made to pass on any such promises to
38 Day 268/173/01 39 Porter transcript at W125. See also 8 Bdc Log, W45 serial 136 and 1 R ANGLIAN log, at W102 serial 68. 40 W45 serial 136 41 Used here, as above, without attempting to differentiate between the different groups supporting violence. the Security Forces, this message would have stood as a timely reminder as to the unreliability of any such information. There were gunmen in the area prepared to shoot at the troops and prepared to risk military retaliation.
**SERIAL 329**
5H-29 This is the second transmission identified by General Welsh as an indicator of the developing separation on the ground. It was entered in the Brigade Log at 1552 hours:
Zero, 61 Yankee. The general movement of the main body of the crowd seems to be down Rossville Street towards the area of the Flats. There is a flat-top lorry down behind the Flats. Whether or not this is going to be used as a speakers' platform I wouldn't like to say just yet. Over.
5H-30 The two groups, the violent and the peaceful, are (to Hawkeye's relief) becoming distinct:
Q: Five minutes later we have serial 329. You then report general movement of the body of the crowd down Rossville Street towards the area of the flats. Is it right to say that the crowd then are still in the area marked on the plan as the wasteground, substantial numbers to the north of the Rossville Flats?
A: I would think so. This -- what was being reported was being reported by me with considerable relief because this was the described route of the march and in theory people who went up to barricade 14, therefore, were those who were going to be a nuisance.
5H-31 And the dynamics of the situation on the ground were clear to those listening in the Brigade Operations Room. There were people on Rossville Street, moving down it, towards the Rossville Flats:
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42 W126 43 W46 serial 141 44 Gen Welsh at Day 283/047/04 Q: Over the page, please, 329, another message from the helicopter: "The general movement of the main body of the crowd seems to be down Rossville Street towards the area of the flats." There is a description of a flat-top lorry; you see that?
A. I do.
Q: You have been told earlier about crowds from Aggro Corner across the wasteground to Rossville Street and you are now being told they are moving down towards the flats; is that right?
A. Yes.45
SERIAL 33646
5H-32 At about 1555 hours, by which time the rioting at barriers 12 and 14 had been going on for between ten and fifteen minutes47, 1 PARA updated 8 Brigade on the move forward of its companies, in readiness for 8 Brigade requiring them:
Hello Zero, this is 65. My Sunray has deployed his units slightly forward from their original positions in preparation for any orders which you may have for him. Over.
5H-33 The Brigade Major understood the purpose of this message:
[CO 1 PARA's] forming up point was down in the Strand in the Foyle car park, I seem to remember, and what he has done there is to move them forward to a forward forming up point. So he has not actually moved up into his
45 Gen Steele at Day 268/173/25 46 W126 47 If he was to stand any chance of carrying out his task this was the important issue for CO 1 PARA, not the fact, as Mr Harvey suggested, that the crowd was still in Rossville Street. What Col Wilford was doing was letting the Brigade Commander know that he was there; the Brigade Commander would keep his eye on the separation between the rioters and the peaceful protesters. deployment area; he has moved them forward so that they could be deployed, a very right and proper thing to do.48
SERIAL 33849
5H-34 This is the third transmission from which General Welsh formed the view that separation was taking place. It was entered in the Brigade Log at about 1554 hours50:
Zero, this is 61 Yankee. General state of the crowd. It now stretches between Aggro Corner, which has just had some more gas put on it, down to about 100 yards beyond the Flats. People are generally spreading out and the drift of people is definitely down to beyond the Flats and back the way they came. Over.
5H-35 And it was understood at Brigade Headquarters:
Q: 338, please, at the bottom: "General state of the crowd [another message from the helicopter]. It now stretches between Aggro Corner ... down to about 100 yards beyond the flats. People are generally spreading out and the drift of people is definitely down to beyond the flats and back the way they came." The description is very clearly between Aggro Corner and somewhere about 100 yards beyond the flats; so what picture does that give you in terms of your wait for separation, General Steele?
A: The picture it paints for me, or painted for me then, was that the crowd was moving down Rossville Street towards Aggro Corner and beyond, and that, at that point, at 1554, they were ready 100 yards beyond the flats.
MR TOOHEY: I am not sure you meant what you said.
A: Did I say something wrong?
MR TOOHEY: It is not a matter of whether it is right or wrong, it is a matter of perhaps whether you intended it. Your answer was: "The picture it paints for me was that the crowd was moving down Rossville Street towards Aggro Corner."
A: I do beg your pardon, I meant, of course, Free Derry Corner. Thank you.31
SERIAL 34352
5H-36 This serial was entered in the Brigade Log at 1555 hours53:
65, from my Sunray. He would like to deploy one of his sub units through barrier 14 around the back into the area William Street/Little James Street. He reckons if he does this he will be able to pick up quite a number of yobbos. Over.
5H-37 It is not surprising that Colonel Wilford cannot now assist with the precise meaning to be attached to this transmission.44 What is clear is that there are dangers in attempting to take this transmission at face value: in some respects the message, as it was written down, does not actually make sense, as it is difficult to see how a move through Barrier 14 would result in a move ‘around the back’ into the area William Street/Little James Street55; the suggestion that a single company could be used for the job did not make sense to the military witnesses56; the message has in any event gone through the agency of the Battalion Main Headquarters, where the watchkeepers are trying to repeat what they hear from their Commanding Officer verbatim but there is now no means of gauging their success; and its terms may tempt the reader into relating it back to paragraph 9f(1)(c) of the Brigade Operation Order, particularly if that provision is being
51 Gen Steele at Day 268/174/13 52 W127 53 W46 serial 147 54 Day 313/023/20 55 See Lord Saville at Day 267/097/05 in relation to going round the back: ‘whatever that means’. 56 See Gen Steele at Day 267/052/05: ‘It is very difficult to say what he had in mind to do with just that one company.’ misread so as to require the arrest operation to take place in (as one of two locations) the area of William Street/Little James Street.
Furthermore, the message as it stands does not appear to take account of what was actually going on on the ground:
MR RAWAT: We have barrier 14 here (indicating). At this stage we know that, from the serials we have looked at, that the hooligan activity was occurring at barrier 14. Could the request to send one sub-unit through that barrier be a request for — and the sub-unit we are speaking of, C Company, who we know were behind and did go through barrier 14 — to move west up William Street in a frontal assault towards Aggro Corner and in order to catch any yobbos who were in, as this serial identifies, the area of Little James Street/William Street and this wasteground here; that would be a proper interpretation of this serial, would it not?
A: I really do not know what was in his mind, to be honest. It is very difficult to say what he had in mind to do with just that one company. I mean, this is all hypothetical because, of course, permission was not granted for him to do it. So I cannot really say what was in his mind, to be honest.
LORD SAVILLE: Except that he seemed to be thinking he could pick up some yobbos, as he called them in the William Street/Little James Street area, because that is what the message says?
A: Yes. And yet, if I could follow that up, previous serials have shown that in fact the yobbos were at barrier 14. So driving through barrier 14 and then going up William Street, I do not think would have achieved anything. As I say, this is all hypothetical.
LORD SAVILLE: I think, to be absolutely accurate, the serials gave that as the position and that may well indeed have been the position, but the position was, I think on any view, pretty fluid?
57 The use of the phrase ‘frontal assault’ highlights the difficulty of this interpretation: the message uses the words ‘around the back’, which have to be ignored for the phrase ‘frontal assault’ to make any sense. A. Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: At all events, from that message, it would seem, on the face of it, as though the commander of 1 Para thought there was an opportunity to pick up yobbos in the William Street/Little James Street area?
A. Yes.58
5H-39 What can be said is that the terms of this transmission do not exclude a concurrent move elsewhere. One thing that Colonel Wilford was able to be clear about was the fact that, as General Steele had anticipated, he would not have moved beyond the containment line with a single company.59 It is perfectly possible that this message contained not only a notice that the order for the arrest operation be given but also for Barrier 14 to be opened. No such advance request to open a barrier was required for a move from the Presbyterian Church, which was still the location of the Mortar Platoon, or the derelict building on William Street, which now contained the Machine Gun Platoon. A move from either or both of these locations (certainly Major Loden saw using them both simultaneously as a method of increasing the rate at which soldiers could get onto William Street: see paragraph 5H-9 above) would satisfy both the military view that more than one company was required if the operation was to be of any effect and the apparent intention of going ‘around the back’.
5H-40 This message has also been relied on in the attempt to argue that separation was an afterthought, in particular on the basis that it shows that Colonel Wilford, who was at the Co-ordinating Conference, appears to have known nothing about it.60 Separation was of course an issue for the Brigade Commander rather than Colonel Wilford, whose focus had to be on the success of his own task. The implication that he had to attempt to
58 Day 267/051/18 59 Day 313/018/16 60 Sec, for example, Arthur Harvey QC to Gen Ford at Day 256/084/02 and to Gen Steele at Day 268/030/16 second guess the Headquarters 8 Brigade by making his own decision on whether or not separation had occurred before seeking permission to commence his operation is absurd. In addition, the argument in any event ignores the information about separation that 8 Brigade had already received from Colonel Welsh and 22nd Regt.
5H-41 Those who claim that separation was an afterthought would appear to have forgotten that Colonel Wilford’s request was refused:
... the Brigade Commander decided that he did not have the necessary separation and so I, using the BID 150, told 1 PARA that they could not mount it then. My problem is that I cannot actually remember doing all this today, but I am sure I did and certainly at Widgery, six weeks after the event, I said that I did.61
SERIAL 34862
5H-42 This is the fourth and final message upon which General Welsh relied. It was recorded in the Brigade Log at 1559 hours63 and reads:
Zero, this is Kilo 61 Yankee. General crowd movement now is down into the Lecky Road from the area of the Flats. It seems as though a lot of people feel that they’ve made their protest and are now returning back to their homes.
5H-43 The problems caused by looking at these transmissions in isolation are clearly demonstrated by these questions from Arthur Harvey QC to General Ford:
Q: It does not say anything about where the crowd is, it just says about general crowd movement; is that right?
A. I am reading what you are telling me.
61 Day 267/018/19. The Widgery evidence is at B1303, from C 62 W127 63 W46 serial 150 Q. That is the only information 8 Brigade had from the helicopter up and until 1559, which is one minute before 4 o'clock. You could not conclude from that, those two radio messages, that there was separation between the rioters and the crowd; could you?
A. It does not appear so, but perhaps he had other information, I do not know. 64
Contrary to the description of it given in the first of these questions, the transmission does say where the crowd is, it says in terms that it is moving 'down into the Lecky Road from the area of the Flats.' Even more fundamentally, this message, or this message any other single message, did not constitute 'the only information 8 Brigade had from the helicopter up and until 1559.' From the transmission at serial 315 Brigade Headquarters had been told that the vast majority of the people were on the waste ground by the Flats and at Aggro Corner, where they looked as if they were not sure what they were going to do next; the transmission at serial 329 informed Brigade Headquarters that there were people on Rossville Street, moving down towards the area of the Flats; and from serial 338 they knew that the crowd stretched from Aggro Corner to about a hundred yards beyond the Flats and the drift of people was down to beyond the Flats and back the way they came.
Now, by serial 348, Brigade Headquarters learns that the movement of the crowd is down into the Lecky Road from the area of the Flats. 61 Yankee has described a dynamic, developing picture, not a series of static pictures. The movement of the crowd has been followed from Aggro Corner, down Rossville Street to the Flats and now from the Rossville Flats into the Lecky Road.
That the then Colonel Welsh had this developing picture is clear from his evidence to Lord Widgery:
64 Day 257/040/19 After the water canon was used I saw the bulk of the crowd move down Rossville Street. Activity continued in William Street and I saw CS gas fired. The bulk of the crowd moved down Rossville Street. I reported when the tail of the crowd had passed the northern end of the Rossville Flats.65
Underhill: Did there come a point when the back of the crowd, the whole of the crowd had passed Rossville Flats?
A: Yes, it passed Rossville Flats and I was conscious of a gap between Rossville Flats and what we call Aggro Corner, which is the Rossville Street-William Street corner.
Q: Did you make a report about that on the wireless?
A: Yes I did.66
Lord Widgery: When you passed that message, the tail of the crowd had passed over the north end of the Rossville Flats, the tail of the crowd was beyond the open space and going down to Free Derry Corner?
A: Yes.
Q: When you passed the appropriate message to indicate that the tail of the crowd had passed that point, at that moment were there people in the car park area of the Rossville Flats but virtually no people in the open area at Eden Place and Pilot?
A: I wasn't conscious of people being in the bottom of Rossville Flats, but I wouldn't like to say there was nobody there, but I am almost prepared to say that there was nobody, because I was up at a great height, in the open space around Eden Place.67
McSparren: ... "Zero, this is 61 Yankee. The general crowd movement now is down into the Leckey Road from the area of the flats. It seems as though a lot of people feel they had made their protest and are now returning back to their homes, over." Do you remember saying something to that effect?
65 SA Statement B1334 paragraph 5 66 B1338, at D 67 B1339, at D A: I don't remember saying that, but I do remember the crowd which moved to Derry Corner being very small, and wondering where everybody else had gone to.
Q: Your impression was that they had gone home, had moved out?
A: Yes, it was.68
5H-47 The cumulative effect of these serials was recognised by the Brigade Major:
Q: ... How do you conclude that, looking for example at serial 348, that that illustrates the kind of separation that General MacLellan was looking for?
A: What he was seeking was separation between the hooligans on the one hand and the marchers at Free Derry Corner on the other. The distance between them is about 400 yards and the hooligans of course were also round the corner at barrier 14. So there was, in my estimation, from the report at 348 and also the reports that we have looked at on the other page, that in fact we had a situation where the Brigadier's separation between marchers and hooligans had been achieved.69
5H-48 Although Counsel to the Tribunal demonstrated to General Welsh that he did not in terms report either that the tail end of the crowd had passed the north end of the Rossville Flats or that the gap existed, the messages he did send demonstrate that these were developments he saw and provide the explanation for the messages that, thirty years after the event, he was unable to provide:
I cannot think back, nearly 30 years, why I said what I did, but I believe what I said.70
68 B1340, at E 69 Day 267/064/14 70 Day 282/049/09 General Welsh was therefore able to say (in a passage not shown to General MacLellan or General Steele) to this Tribunal that separation had, within the accepted limits, been achieved:
I can see from looking at the evidence I gave to the Widgery Tribunal, from my statement made at the time and the Porter tape that it appears that I was briefed to look for separation between the peaceful marchers and the rioters. This was something I had in fact forgotten until recently.
I think my role would have been simply to report what I could see and it would have been a matter for those on the ground to interpret my reports. It is probably for that reason that I never expressly said that separation had occurred. Having listened to part of the Porter tape and having read an excerpt of the transcript, it is clear from the messages that I transmitted that the vast majority of the peaceful protesters had separated from the hooligans before the arrest operation was launched at 1607 hours. It would have been a matter for those on the ground to decide the exact moment to launch the arrest operation.71
What Colonel Welsh had seen was in the event understood by 8 Brigade:
Q: ... Movement from the area of the flats down into the Lecky Road. There is no description in that paragraph, General Steele, as we see, of crowds either at Aggro Corner or on the wasteground; do you see that?
A: I do.
Q: Does that have any significance so far as your wait for separation is concerned?
A: Yes, indeed, and it is an important message as far as I was concerned at a minute to 4.00, because it definitely painted a picture in my mind that the march was over; that the general crowd movement, as it says, was now down into the Lecky Road, in other words beyond Free Derry Corner, and that people, having made their protest and having done their marching, were returning back to their homes and I felt that that message indicated -- painted a picture for me
71 BSI Statement B1340.003 paragraphs 18-19 that the march was over and that people had moved away from beyond the flats.\\textsuperscript{72}
At 1559 hours, Commanding Officer 2 RGJ reported that there was a general move of the crowd from the Rossville Flats into Lecky Road and two minutes later\\textsuperscript{73} I received the first report that a crowd was being addressed at Foxes Corner. The estimated number was 200 and four minutes later\\textsuperscript{74} this estimate was raised to 500.\\textsuperscript{75}
SERIALS 353 TO 359\\textsuperscript{76}
5H-51 This series of messages was summarised in the Brigade Log as serial 153\\textsuperscript{77} at 1602 hours:
\\begin{quote} Hello 90 Alpha, this is 65. Is there still a hooligan element in the area above barrier 14? Over.
.....
90 Alpha. Send. Over.
65. Is there still a hooligan element in the area William Street/Little James Street and around barrier 14? Over.
90 Alpha. Yes. Over.
65, roger. Would you mind informing Zero of this, as they don't appear to believe us on this point? Over.
90 Alpha. Wait. Out. \\end{quote}
5H-52 The Commanding Officer of 1 PARA, who has no doubt heard the rioting at barriers 12 and 14 and seen those not involved in violence leave down Rossville Street, is understandably keen to proceed with his task; and
\\textsuperscript{72} Gen Steele at Day 268/175/19 \\textsuperscript{73} Porter W127 serial 351. See below. \\textsuperscript{74} Porter W128 serial 365. See below. This transmission also provided the estimate of 150 for the hooligans at Aggro Corner. \\textsuperscript{75} Brig MacLcllan's 1972 Statement, B1234 paragraph 26 \\textsuperscript{76} W127 \\textsuperscript{77} W47 General Steele, recognising the sentiments behind the phraseology, understood this use of the Brigade net:
A: The serial 356 is perfectly right and proper, they are using the brigade net to get on to 22nd Regiment, who were at barrier 14, to say: is there still a hooligan element around barrier 14, it is a very right and proper thing to ask, and they are told "yes".
LORD SAVILLE: Of course you have to use the brigade net for that purpose?
A: Quite so, sir. Serial 358 is a bit cheeky, to be honest, on behalf of 65. They are using the opportunity of saying: "well, please let Zero know," that is to say brigade headquarters, "as they do not appear to believe us on that point" and that indicates to me that they were, indeed, raring to go.
SERIAL 365
5H-53 Very shortly after this series of messages, further confirmation of the division of the crowd into two groups was provided (again illustrating Alpha's awareness of the need for separation). This transmission was recorded in the Brigade Log at as two messages, at 1603 and 1604 hours:
Hello Zero, this is 90 Alpha. There is now a crowd of about 500 on Fox's Corner being addressed from a loudspeaker van. These appear to be normal civil rights people. There's still a crowd of about 150 hooligans at junction Rossville Street/William Street. Over.
5H-54 Anxious to proceed with his task as the commander of the arrest force may have been, only the Brigade Commander could order the launch of the operation. This check within the system enabled Brigadier MacLellan to allow more time for the consolidation of the division of the crowd on
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78 As did Gen Ford: Day 257/044/09 79 Day 267/060/12 80 W128 81 W47 serial 155-156 the ground. The dash in the second sentence of this passage explains the terms in which the information that separation was complete had been provided to him:
At 1604 the number of hooligans at the junction William Street/Rossville Street was reported as 150. I was now told that the separation of the hooligans was complete – 150 were in William Street, while the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association meeting was 300 metres away at Foxes Corner.82
Mr Rawat and General Steele agreed with the picture the transmissions presented as at 1604 hours – two groups, the violent at Aggro Corner and the non violent at Free Derry Corner, with some movement home, down the Lecky Road from the Rossville Flats:
Q: ... What you have General Steele, please disagree, is a picture taken from these logs that there are hooligans at Aggro Corner; that the crowd at Free Derry Corner has grown to 500 and that some people are beginning to make their way home; would you agree with that?
A. Yes, indeed. You have missed out the fact that some of them are going down the Lecky Road, which is beyond Fox's Corner.
Q. Of course, it is from the area of the flats which I read as the Rossville Flats?
A. Yes, I agree. So, yes, I agree with your summary of the situation at 1604.83
Having heard the message from 22nd Regt at 1604 hours84, the Brigade Major took the view that separation had, within the accepted limits, been achieved and went in to the Brigade Commander's office:
82 1972 Statement, B1234 paragraph 27 83 Day 267/063/16 84 Day 267/082/06 Q: ... You went in and had one conversation with the Brigade Commander; is that right?
A: I did.
Q: What was the discussion about separation?
A: As I have described in my statement, I went in at four minutes past and gave him the situation report. He asked me then to give confirmation of separation, but it is quite right, as Lord Saville asked him, that his information was the same as my information because it was based entirely upon the brigade net. As to the question of getting on the radio to the helicopter, if I had done so, of course he would have heard that too because the helicopter was also on the brigade net. So what we come down to is that the confirmation that I gave to him, my assessment of separation was based on those serials in the Ulsternet that we have already been through.
Q. Were you satisfied that there was adequate separation?
A. In my mind, yes.
Q. There was no question, therefore, of going back to Lieutenant Colonel Welsh and asking for an update on the position?
A. No, I did not.85
Q: Returning, please, to this discussion that you had at 1604 on the day: you have told us that, in your view, adequate separation had been achieved. Did you convey that view to General MacLellan?
A: I did.86
The Brigade Commander was of the same view:
At 1607 hours when it was confirmed by the troops on the ground88 that the hooligans in William Street had become
85 Day 267/068/08 86 Day 267/071/07 isolated from the NICRA marchers, who were moving and slowly dispersing 300 metres away down Rossville Street, I gave orders that the pre-planned hooligan arrest operation should be launched.\\textsuperscript{89}
The sequence of events emerges from the evidence of General Steele:
\\textbf{Q:} ... The last relevant serial that contained information which you were able to give Brigadier MacLellan as part of the sitrep in his office was logged at 1604. You would have gone just after 1604, I assume, into the office and had the discussion. Looking at the last line of the paragraph, you then left the office without having received a decision from Brigadier MacLellan?
\\textbf{A:} That is correct.
\\textbf{Q:} And without Brigadier MacLellan actually having expressed a view on separation?
\\textbf{A:} That is correct.
\\textbf{Q:} Or, indeed, expressed a view as to your opinion that adequate separation had been achieved?
\\textbf{A:} Correct.
\\textbf{Q:} You say that three minutes later he walked into your office and said he was going to mount the operation and you assumed that he had then formed the view that his conditions had been met: "... and he said he did not want 1 Para to engage in a running battle down Rossville Street. Brigadier MacLellan stood beside me as I repeated this order to 1 Para over the secure net. I do not remember my exact words, but I do recall today the two important elements of the orders — that 1 Para should mount the arrest operation straightaway and that they were not to conduct a running battle down Rossville Street." You have a clear recollection that the order was acknowledged?
\\textsuperscript{87} This is of course the time at which Brigade MacLellan gave the order, which he refers to at the end of this sentence.
\\textsuperscript{88} It would be a mistake to read this literally, as troops with their feet on the ground. The distinction in military terms is between the Headquarters in the rear and the troops forward, involved in the incident in question.
\\textsuperscript{89} Brig MacLellan's statement of 31.1.72 at B1222 paragraph 6. A: Yes.
Q: Given that the order was transmitted at 1607, it must have been transmitted within seconds of Brigadier MacLellan arriving in your office?
A: I think I have got those minutes wrong. I start off paragraph 47 by saying: "About three minutes later ..." It may well have been a minute or so because, chronologically, the first -- the last message which I put into my sitrep was at 1604; I walked into his office at 1605; I gave my sitrep, 1606; and the order was passed at 1607. I mean, I do recall that it all seemed to happen very quickly.
Q: What we can be sure of is that we are really talking about a three-minute sequence?
A: Yes.
Q: It was transmitted with General MacLellan standing beside you?
A: Yes, in my office, using the BID 150.
Q: You would have spoken down the telephone to 1 Para?
A: Yes.
Q: The Brigadier would have been able to hear you give the order to 1 Para?
A: Yes.90
During the course of his evidence to this Tribunal Brigadier MacLellan was asked why he did not give the order at 1555 hours, when the commander of the arrest force had asked for permission to move against the rioters, instead giving it at 1607 hours:
The difficulty we are finding is to find anything that could reasonably have caused you to change your mind between five to 4 and nine minutes past.91
90 Day 267/082/06 91 Lord Saville at Day 262/056/25 The direct answer is the developments on the ground: Brigade Headquarters had by 1607 hours received both Colonel Welsh’s message at 1559 hours(^2) and 22(^{nd}) Regt’s message at 1604 hours(^3). To these must be added the Brigadier’s intention to ensure as complete a separation as possible: while the riot was ongoing at Barrier 14 and the speeches had started at Free Derry Corner, he may have been giving any stragglers time to move clear:
[A:\\text{First I confirmed with Colonel Welsh the separation was complete, as I have just mentioned. Then I decided an arrest operation was necessary.}]
[Q:\\text{But did you put it into effect immediately?}]
[A:\\text{Some minutes later, at 1607.}]
[Q:\\text{Why did you wait the three or four minutes?}]
[A:\\text{I wanted to make quite sure that the non-violent people were right clear of it.}]
But in reality he could not, and did not, delay long: as General Steele explained, the last message to be taken into account was received at about 1604 hours. The Brigade Major then had to walk through to the Brigadier’s officer, the two had a discussion and after Colonel Steele left there was a short pause before the Brigadier arrived in the Brigade Major’s office, where the order was given at 1607 hours:
[Q:\\text{At 1607 you passed the order for the 1(^{st}) Paras arrest force to move in?}]
[A:\\text{My Brigade Major passed it; I was standing beside him.}]
[Q:\\text{On your order?}]
[A:\\text{On my order.}]
(^2) Porter transcript at W127 serial 348 (^3) Porter transcript at W128 serial 365 (^4) Brig MacLcllan’s evidence to Lord Widgery, at B1258 That Headquarters 8 Brigade was correct in its assessment that separation had indeed been achieved is demonstrated by:
(1) the heli-telly film;
(2) the photographs at EP28, now that they have definitively been put into their correct sequence;
(3) serial 375 of the Porter transcript, a message sent by Colonel Welsh at a time when he would not have known that the arrest operation had been ordered:
Zero, this is 61 Yankee. The crowd as I see it is about 70 in Chamberlain Street. The people on Aggro Corner have been driven away by the last fusillade of gas cartridges, are moving down towards the meeting, which has now in strength to think about 200 people on the corner behind the Flats. Over.
(4) serial 379 of the Porter transcript, a message sent by 22nd Regt after the order for the commencement of the arrest operation had been given:
Zero. Roger. There are 70 hooligans in Chamberlain Street. Ah, most of those who have dispersed from Aggro Corner are moving down ... moving down Rossville Street. Over.
It has been possible to see from the helicopter that it is the people from Aggro Corner who are moving down towards the meeting at Free Derry Corner, down Rossville Street. These are rioters on the move.
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55 Brig MacLellan's evidence to Lord Widgery, at B1258 56 See the report dated 25th March 2002 of Dr Steven A Bell of H. M. Nautical Almanac Office, at E26.1 and the analysis of the photographs given by Edwin Glasgow QC at Day 265/009/07 – 016/21 57 W129 58 W129 In the face of this evidence questioners adopted various methods in attempts to persuade witnesses that separation was not in fact achieved. See, for example:
(1) Mr Harvey’s misdescription of serial 348 of the Porter transcript to General Ford, who was not listening to the transmissions from the helicopter or anyone else in 1972 and was not part of the discussions about separation at 8 Brigade:
*It does not say anything about where the crowd is, it just says about general crowd movement; is that right?*
(2) Mr Harvey’s attempt to use the arrests made in Glenfada Park to show that there had been no separation, despite the fact that those arrests took place after the most of the shooting, when on any view the situation had changed:
*Mr Harvey: And in fact if many of those who were arrested, far from being rioters, but the vast majority of them were just simply marchers, that would tend to indicate that if separation was a feature of this particular arrest operation, it singularly failed to achieve its objective?*
A. I do not know whether there were rioters or not.
Q. We have seen further pictures, and I do not intend to go into them, but there were two Catholic priests arrested at the wall, a middle-aged woman who screamed her head off, another middle-aged man who was shot in the shoulder at the wall, young boys?
A. I cannot comment on that, I did not see it myself.
Q. It was just a scoop-up operation, to lift anyone who was there and separation was not part of the plan, General Ford, was it?
A. I do not agree.(^{100})
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(^{99}) See paragraph 5H-43 above
(^{100}) Day 256/088/12 Mr Harvey’s attempt to disabuse General Ford of any idea that a helicopter was used on 30th January in connection with separation:
Mr Harvey: What significance was placed upon the presence of a helicopter?
A. I do not know, that was part of the Brigade Commander’s plan. It was not my idea, it was his, I think.
Q. You see, Mr Mooney has really indicated that it was part of the information and policy research group’s suggestion that a helicopter should be there?
A. I know nothing of Mr Mooney, I am afraid. He was a junior officer somewhere who worked in the headquarters.
Q. I entirely appreciate that. Are you saying that you were not aware of the essential role that the helicopter was to play as of your meeting on 26th January?
General Ford was also asked about the fact of separation by Christopher Clarke QC:
Q: What I am suggesting is that, even assuming that there was a separation between marchers and rioters at the time when the Paras went in, the effect of going at 20 or 30 miles an hour down Rossville Street in vehicles down along the line of where the blue arrow is and, in one case, to the spot where the red arrow is, and another to the spot where the green arrow is, would have the effect of destroying the separation between the marchers and the rioters, which was the whole basis upon which the operation was to be launched in the first place.
A: Well, it depends where the marchers were at this moment. I am afraid I do not know.
Q: The problem is that they were in various different places. Some of them had got down as far as Free Derry Corner; some of them were in Rossville Street; a substantial number of people were in and around the car park; some of them were in the wasteground; some of them down Chamberlain Street; they were all over the place? A: I am sorry. Then what exactly is your question?
Q: The point I am putting to you, is this: you have said that the basis upon which the operation was to be launched was that there had to be a separation between the rioters and the marchers.
A: Yes.
Q: So that, I assume, when the arrest takes place the soldiers can be engaged in arresting only rioters and not marchers.
A: Yes.
Q: If you have an operation where soldiers go in on foot and arrest people along this William Street axis(^{102}), it may, depending on the circumstances, well be the situation that the soldiers are dealing only with the rioters who are left.
A: Maybe.
Q: Maybe, yes, I agree. (sic).
A: Maybe.
Q: But do you agree, if in fact what you do is to go down Rossville Street in force in vehicles, which obviously travel much faster than humans can, the likelihood is that you will get yourself in the middle, not of people who have been rioting at the barriers, here and here, but a whole lot of innocent people, marchers, who are here, here, here and here (indicating).
A: First of all, I really have to ask you a question. What you are giving me now are facts which are not being disputed by anyone?
Q: Yes, I think so.(^{103})
5H-66 The basis upon which Mr Clarke suggested that there were non violent demonstrators in Rossville Street, Chamberlain Street, the wasteground, 'all over the place', has not been explained. The suggestion is certainly
(^{102}) This, it has already been submitted, is a misreading of the Brigade Operation Order.
(^{103}) Day 255/005/04 contrary to the content of the messages from Colonel Welsh and from 22nd Regt that appear at serials 375 and 379 of the Porter transcript.
**SERIAL 367**
5H-67 This message was recorded in the Brigade Log five minutes later, at 1609 hours. It has been ignored by those attempting to persuade this Tribunal that the riot had either finished or was no longer serious at the time the order for the commencement of the arrest operation was given (even, on occasion, showing the video of C Company moving through barrier 14 without identifying which element of C Company is shown on the film):
Hello Zero, this is 90 Alpha. People at the moment are advancing on House Martin – wrong, on serial 14, using a corrugated iron shield. Have you any idea yet what time it was 65 was going in? Over.
5H-68 Quite apart from the fact that 22nd Regt clearly had sufficient information about the arrest operation to know that it could provide relief to its barriers, it is clear that one of those barriers, number 14 was, under pressure.
5H-69 A large number of soldiers have given evidence that there was still rioting at the time the arrest operation was ordered. One example is the Officer Commanding C Company 1 PARA, whose company only arrived at Barrier 14 because he had been ordered to move through it. The violence was serious, and impacted upon the deployment:
Q. At paragraph 17 of your statement, B2168.3, you describe the reason for the delay at barrier 14 and the conversation that you had with the officer in command of the Royal Green Jackets. You say that: "He was reluctant to expose his men to the ferocity of the rioters as they could not move the barricades aside whilst protecting themselves by their riot shields." As a result you told him firmly that if
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104 W128 105 W47 serial 157 he would not move the barriers aside, then you would go through on foot. Do you have a clear recollection of this conversation?
A. No, not a clear recollection, no.
Q. Are you sure that this is an accurate description of it?
A. As far as I can be, yes.
Q. You decided to send two platoons through the barrier on foot; is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Was the barrier opened for them or did they have to climb over it?
A. Climbed over it, through it or partially round it, but it was not opened up for vehicles to drive through and certainly we did not wish to go into the area in single file. After all, we were facing rioters.106
THE ORDER TO LAUNCH THE ARREST OPERATION
5H-70 The question as to what orders were given to 1 PARA cannot be considered fairly other than in the context of the situation on the ground as 8 Brigade (accurately) considered it to be. The Brigade Commander knew that, within the accepted limitations (and he had allowed time to pass in order to given any straggler on the waste ground the opportunity to continue out of the area), there was serious violence taking place at barriers 12 and 14 and the body of marchers had moved south of the Rossville Flats.
5H-71 Furthermore, those with a legal rather than a military training must also be wary of a natural inclination to find refuge in, and thereby attach too great a significance to, words either recorded or recalled weeks (let alone years) after events which themselves took place in an extremely short period of time and no doubt carried their own stresses for the individuals involved.
106 Day 294/149/09 In these circumstances the broad thrust of the record or recollection must be of more value than any attempt at recording or recalling precise detail.
There are also very real dangers in an analysis that breaks events down into such detail that their overall scheme – and therefore meaning - is lost. 1 PARA’s role in Operation Forecast, for example, was to maintain a Brigade Arrest Force, to be available to carry out an arrest operation to scoop up as many rioters as possible. It might have had to do that in any number of locations (although, of course, some were more likely than others), and it might have had to use any different combination of its constituent elements in order to achieve its aim (two whole companies, three whole companies, elements of one company – the Machine Gun Platoon and the Mortar Platoon of Support Company, for example, in concert with C Company).
Overanalysis results in questions such as this, the basis of which appears to be that 8 Brigade were in a position to be able to choose between a number of different arrest operations:
Which arrest operation did you have in mind; was it the one that had been requested by Colonel Wilford at 3.55?(^{107})
The fundamentals of Brigadier MacLellan’s 1972 evidence as to the order he gave are clear:
I therefore gave orders at 1607 that the 1 PARA arrest operation should be launched. My Brigade Major conveyed those orders in my presence to 1 PARA on the secure radio – the orders were that: a. The operation was to be launched forthwith to arrest as many rioters as possible in the area of the junction William Street/Rossville Street. B. 1 PARA were not to conduct a running battle down Rossville Street and not to get involved with the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association marchers.(^{108})
(^{107}) Lord Saville, at Day 267/095/02
(^{108}) Brig MacLellan’s 1972 Statement, B1235 paragraph 28 Q: In your order to 1st Para to go in did you add any caution or prohibition about going down Rossville Street?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: What did you say?
A: That they were not to conduct a running battle down Rossville Street and not to get involved with the NICRA crowd.
Q: What did you mean "not to indulge in a running battle down Rossville Street"?
A: I meant that they should not get tied up with the crowd. The situation as I saw it was this: at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street there was a mob of 150 or so rioting. 300 metres or more away past the Rossville Flats there was a large crowd of non-violent people. The scoop up, the arrest, was being launched at the hooligans.109
Q: Your order recorded in item 159 of the log was for one sub-unit of 1 PARA to go through barrier 14?
A: Yes. That was not in fact the order. What I said was 'you are to arrest rioters on the William Street/Rossville Street junction. You are not to conduct a running battle down Rossville Street and not to get involved with the NICRA marchers.' One sub-unit wanted to go through Barrier 14, but it was an arrest operation mounted by Colonel Wilford's battalion.
Q: Did you know that in fact two sub-units were going to be used?
A: I knew three were going to be used.
Q: And you knew they would be going not only through Barrier 14 but also through the Great James Street Barrier as well.
A: Yes110.
109 Brig MacLellan's evidence to Lord Widgery, at B1259 110 Brig MacLellan's evidence to Lord Widgery, at B1279 Two issues have arisen: with what resources was this operation to be carried out; and where was it to take place?
**THE SIZE OF THE ARREST FORCE**
As to the first of these, those seeking to establish that 1 PARA acted in breach of the Brigade Commander's order by using more than a single company for the operation rely upon the Brigade Commander's express reservation to himself of the right to order the arrest operation 'in whole or in part', the terms of the 1 PARA message to 8 Brigade at 1555 hours and the record made in the Operations Room of the order (which had been given in the Brigade Major's office), as reflected in large part by the record made in the 1 PARA Log.
While this analysis may be attractive as offering a degree of tidiness, it does not stand up on close examination. The Operation Order did not define what it meant by part of the arrest operation. Given the view amongst the military witnesses that a single company was unlikely to have been able to carry out the mission, it is more than likely that the 'in part' refers to the axes of approach rather than the number of companies to be involved. (The companies were not in any event, as the deployment of Support Company in the area of the Presbyterian Church demonstrates, absolute entities: they could be divided and sent in different directions just as the battalion could).
As it stands the record of the request made by 1 PARA at 1555 hours does not, either in its own terms or in terms of what was at the time happening on the ground, make sense (see paragraph 5H-37 above); and a fair reading of what is available does not exclude a move not requiring the
______________________________________________________________________
111 Operation Order Operation Forecast at G95.570 paragraph 9(f)(1)(a) 112 Porter transcript at W127 serial 343 113 W47 serial 159 114 W90 serial 31 lifting of any of the barriers (see paragraph 5H-39 above). This interpretation consistent with (provided it is transcribed accurately) the message sent by 1 PARA at 1609 hours, after the order had been given:
Hello 90, this is 65. Can you lift barrier 14, where one of our call signs will be coming through?115
Although it may not much matter (the terms in which the order was recorded do not exclude other entry points, including entry points that did not necessitate the lifting of any of the barriers), there is (apart from the fact that Barrier 14 appears as the identified entry point in both) little reason to take the view that 8 Brigade were at 1607 hours answering a request made at 1555 hours, even had they been able to understand what the request meant. This was an assumption which had clearly been made by Counsel to the Tribunal:
Mr Rawat: The only reference you made to a sub-unit was to the sub-unit that was going to go through barrier 14. All you said was, or all you can say is that that part of the order was the request from 1 Para was now being agreed?
A: No, no, no, I did not say that.116
General Steele was correct: he had said no such thing. There was in any event a long pause between Brigade’s refusal to act on the request and it ordering the arrest operation (twelve minutes, a long time in the scale of the events now under consideration), during which time the Brigade Commander was making his own assessment of what was going on on the ground in the knowledge that the commander of his arrest force was doing the same thing. The Commanding Officer of 1 PARA had been altering his thinking as the afternoon had gone on, reacting to his assessment of
115 Porter transcript W128 serial 370, the transcription of which presently reads: “Can you lift barrier 14, where our call sign will be coming through?” 116 Day 267/092/22 the behaviour and movements of the rioters, and there was no reason to suppose (it was his professional obligation to continue to do so) that he had stopped doing so now.
5H-81 There is furthermore no evidence to suggest that the Brigade Commander had ever indicated to Colonel Wilford that any operation might be limited in the way suggested. In the unlikely event that this is what the Operation Order was providing for, Colonel Wilford would have needed sufficient warning that the provision was, or was likely, to be activated. At all times Colonel Wilford had been fully entitled to work on the basis that he would be able to use his companies just as he wished: in concert, either two working together or three, depending on the circumstances and his assessment of how best to deal with them. The Brigade Commander could never have thought (and, given the prevailing view that one company would not suffice and would be exposed and vulnerable, would never have thought\\textsuperscript{117}) that he could, at the very moment he was ordering this operation, limit the number of companies permitted to participate. To have done so would have placed the commanding officer of the arrest force in an impossible position, and (had he complied with such an order) the troops in a potentially dangerous one.
5H-82 The fact is that none of the military witnesses able to give evidence on this issue thought that the Brigade Commander either would have wished to act to limit the number of companies involved or did in fact do so. Their evidence is supported by the lack of reaction at Headquarters 8 Brigade to reports from 1 PARA of the movements of its Call Sign 5, Support Company.
5H-83 The first such report was made before 1613 hours\\textsuperscript{118}:
\\textsuperscript{117} Col Wilford's BSI Statement, B1110.032 paragraphs 85 and 87 \\textsuperscript{118} Before 1613 hours, as the message logged on the Brigade Log at that time, as serial 164, is clearly the message at serial 388 Hello Zero, this is 65. Our call sign Bravo 3 has moved through barrier 14 to the junction Rossville/William Street. Our call sign Bravo 5 has moved down south to the area of the William Street. Over.
Before any real opportunity is provided for 8 Brigade to react, the message was repeated, with a little more detail (and without the interference):
65. Our Call Sign Bravo 3 has moved south down Strand Road into William Street past barrier 14 and is at the junction Rossville Street/William Street. Our Call Sign Bravo 59 has moved down south through the Church to the area of William Street, directly south of the Church. Over.
The Brigade Major was concerned for the safety of the troops and wanted to get them back, perhaps in too much haste, as he told this Tribunal, spoke only in terms of the company which he knew was to move through Barrier 14 (he actually described it as a move ‘to’ rather than a move ‘through’ Barrier 14):
If you have not conducted any scoop-up then you should withdraw your Call Sign Bravo 3 back to its original position ... for any further operation.
This was not a prepared speech: this was an officer speaking ad hoc, attempting to supervise a swift movement of troops in dangerous circumstances.
In the event, of course, this instruction did not need to be met, as 1 PARA had been carrying out the scoop-up; and it could not be met, because the scoop-up had been interrupted by IRA gunfire.
______________________________________________________________________
119 There is clearly interference at precisely this point in the message, which the transcriber has omitted. When the message is repeated, at serial 387, there is a ‘9’ in here. 120 Porter transcript at W129 serial 383 121 Day 267/117/21 122 Day 267/116/07 123 Porter transcript, W129 serial 388 124 Porter transcript, W129 serial 390 LOCATION OF THE ARREST OPERATION
5H-88 So far as the location for the arrest operation is concerned, the point has already been made that, when its provisions are properly read, neither the Brigade Commander nor the commander of the arrest force were hampered by the Operation Order. What is equally clear is that in none of the his three statements on this issue (set out at above) did Brigadier MacLellan identify the waste ground to the north east of the Little James Street/William Street junction as the location to which he understood he was launching the arresting troops. In each of those statements his description of Aggro Corner was the William Street/Rossville Street junction, and while his formulation during his oral evidence to Lord Widgery was that the arrest force was being launched at the hooligans at that junction, in his written evidence the target had been described as ‘in the area of the junction William Street/Rossville Street.’
5H-89 This all goes to show that this issue needs to be considered practically, just as the officers involved had to consider it at the time. The focus of the operation was the rioters at and around Aggro Corner, and given the number of rioters, the attempts that they would make to avoid arrest and the number of troops required to deal with them, it was inevitable that this operation would move south of the junction(^{125}), onto the Eden Place/Pilot Row wasteground, which is exactly where General Steele repeatedly told the Tribunal he had anticipated that the arrest area would be.
5H-90 As with the number of companies which were to be involved in the operation, there has been a determination on the part of some questioners to show that that 1 PARA’s actions in moving, in some instances, into and, in others, down Rossville Street was also in breach of 8 Brigade’s
(^{125}) Mr Harvey’s suggestion to Gen Steele, at Day 268/048/02 that ‘You initially were telling Lord Widgery that the area you expected the scoop-up operation was no more than the width of the road at the junction of Rossville Street/William Street’ lacks any understanding of the practicalities of putting this number of troops on the ground. order. The prohibition against conducting running battles down Rossville Street is not a geographical limitation: although some questioners paraphrased it as such, it cannot on its own terms mean that 1 PARA were not to move into Rossville Street. It was a limitation on what 1 PARA could do in Rossville Street - they were not permitted to conduct running battles down it – and the limitation would have been pointless had there been an overriding prohibition against being in Rossville Street at all.
Both (i) the common understanding of those at Brigade Headquarters and the commander of the arrest force; and (ii) the confusion caused by the questioning on this issue before this Tribunal are demonstrated by the passages that follow, taken from Gerard Elias QC’s questions to General Steele:
Q: You see, when you agreed, as I understood you to do -- forgive me if I have got it wrong, perhaps you can confirm it -- with the question put to you by the Chairman, that when the Paras went in, there was a limitation on the area of arrest operation, that was a limitation confined to William Street and Little James Street, and when you said a little later that it would have been a breach of the order if they had gone further than Aggro Corner, as I understood it you were combining two pieces of material together; you were putting together your own concept of the plan, that there would be an arrest in that area, and you were adding to it the order given, you say for the first time, there were to be no running battles down Rossville Street as the Paras were about to embark upon the operation; is that right?
A: We come back to the discussion that we had with the Chairman ten minutes ago and now you have confused me, because I thought that we had agreed, the Chairman and I, that the area of arrest operation would now be a re-adjusted circle, which was indeed south of William Street and not just confined to that area.
Q: Insofar as you may have given any answer earlier that suggested it would have or might have been a breach of the order to go beyond Aggro Corner, you would not wish to abide by that answer?
A: I do not believe it was a breach. Q: Of course you, as the author of the operation order, would know as well as anyone how you intended it should be interpreted?
A: Yes.
Q: And your interpretation six weeks after the event might be better than your interpretation 30 years after the event, might it?
A: Certainly.
Q: Look at page B1312 with me, please. Can we have letter B, to the foot of the page. You have been asked questions by Mr Stocker. Before letter B: "Question: Did anybody, Colonel Wilford or anybody else, tell you what his tactical plan was at any time before it was actually put into operation? "Answer: I knew the outline of the plan but not the detail. "Question: He did not know what it could be until the rioting took place, if it took place? "Answer: In the brigade operation order we had in fact given him two axes as to where we thought the rioters would be. "Question: Just one other matter ... if you would look now back again to the executive order that you gave, serial 159, what did you mean by the phrase 'not to conduct a running battle down Rossville Street'? "Answer: What I meant was that I in fact repeated exactly what the commander had said to him, that he did not want the arrest operation to go on down Rossville Street in such a way that they would start a running battle with the main group of the demonstrators which were back at Fox's Corner? "Question: In that context what do you mean by 'running battle'? Do you mean chasing after them and perhaps having to knock them down in some way, or do you mean exchanging shots? "Answer: I mean both exchanging shots and moving down [note the words, please] into the area where the non-violent protesters were. "Question: As far as we know they [that is the non-violent protesters] were at or moving to Free Derry Corner. Would you regard that as an instruction, that they were not to go as far as the northern end of the Rossville Flats? "Answer: No, sir. I believe that to do the scoop-up it might be necessary for them to go as far as Rossville Flats." That is what you were saying six weeks after the event, General Steele; was that correct?
A: Yes, indeed.
Q: That was your interpretation, then, of the order that you had effectively drafted: that it was wide enough for Colonel Wilford to conduct a scoop-up arrest operation over the whole, what I will call the whole of the wasteground to the north of the Rossville Flats?
A: Yes.
Q: When you have amended that today by re-drawing the circle, is that in the light of what you now think it might have been wiser to have ordered, or what in fact the order meant at the time?
A. I think I have been rather confused by that wretched circle which I had to draw for Eversheds, which was done in a very, very haphazard way and I believe now that the circle that I have re-drawn, together with the Chairman, a couple of grid squares up north of where I did it for Eversheds, is probably the most accurate in my mind today. But at Widgery I definitely did say, "it might be necessary for them to go as far as Rossville Flats".
Q: If that was your own interpretation -- because you were not suggesting that would have been a breach of the order?
A: No.
Q: If that was your own interpretation of the order at the time, or within a few weeks, unless Colonel Wilford was told something different, there is no reason why he should not have operated upon the same assumption; is there?
A: I agree.
Q: If we look at your statement made to this Tribunal at page 1315.010, made in October 2000, at paragraph 52, please, you refer to Brigadier MacLellan's additional caution: "Although it was not one of the preconditions set out in the planning of the operation, he insisted that there should be no running battles down Rossville Street. This meant that the arrest force should not engage in a hot pursuit of the rioters, chasing them south along Rossville Street ..." If we pause there, any suggestion they should not go beyond Aggro Corner might have held water, but of course you add the words: "... south along Rossville Street beyond the flats." Which is effectively what you were saying at the time of Widgery?
A: Yes.
Q: "The arrest operation was envisaged as a scoop-up, that is to say an encircling operation ..." Had there been an intention to prevent, for reasons of separation -- and there may have been very good reasons to do it -- to prevent 1 Para from going further south than a line ten yards to the south of William Street or a line taken from Eden Place, its corner with Chamberlain Street up to William Street/Rossville Street, Aggro Corner, such a line could have been demarcated and put into the operational order; could it not?
A: Yes, but it was not.
Q: That could simply have been done, could it not?
A: Yes.126
LORD SAVILLE: If you will forgive me interrupting again, Mr Elias, the map on which Mr Rawat drew the picture of the lined up vehicles on Rossville Street, of the Pig down by the Rossville Street car park entrance and the Pig by Eden Place as something that had happened a very few minutes after you gave the order, would I be right in supposing that you had no idea that that at the time would be the result of your order; I say "your order," the order that you conveyed.
A: Of course I had no idea at the time that I passed the brigade commander's order that there would be vehicles involved at all.
LORD SAVILLE: Correct me if I am wrong, we do not want to keep going over old ground: I have understood your evidence this afternoon to be that when you passed on the order, you almost certainly said something about an arrest operation in the William Street/Little James area. You then have the injunction not to go down Rossville Street. I think you have accepted this afternoon, a very few minutes ago, that that meant not go down Rossville Street to any significant extent. If you had known some three or four minutes after you had passed on the order that there were a large number of vehicles in the first 100 yards of Rossville Street, that there was a vehicle right down by Eden Place and another vehicle even further down, right at the entrance to the car park flats, that would, or would it not, have come as an enormous surprise to you, as being the result of the order that you have conveyed?
126 Day 267/161/13 A. Yes.
MR ELIAS: Of course, if no running battles meant what you have told the Tribunal it did mean to you, and if the Paras had in their mind that they were going to flood most of the wasteground, if you like, with Pigs, and use the whole of it as part of the arrest operation, it would not have been surprising, would it, if the interpretation they had put upon it was, "We will carry out our arrest operation, but beyond that, there is to be no running battle down Rossville Street pursuing hooligans and the like"?
A: Yes, and, as we have already just agreed, it would have been very much better if in fact, coupled with the, "no running battle," there had been "beyond a certain point".
Q: Can we look at what Colonel Wilford says about the matter, briefly for your point. B988, please, his evidence to Lord Widgery, letter D down to the bottom, please, I am reading from just above letter E: "Question: You were told by the brigadier that there were no running battles down Rossville Street? "Answer: Yes. "Question: In fact your troops went down Rossville Street and on to the wasteland. What do you say about that? "Answer: I received a message to say that there were to be no running battles. I understood this perfectly and I understood it and had discussed it with my troops. It was hardly a matter for discussion because our methods of operation do not allow running battles. If you have a running battle and the end the resistance becomes very strong, you could run into a great deal of trouble. So we know that we chew off not more than 200 or 250 yards at any one go. This was perfectly understood and this is what happened." If I understand that answer to mean, "we were going to go in to the extent of 200 yards," do you follow, which would take him certainly down to the north of Rossville Flats?
A: Yes.
Q: Either he was contravening orders or he had not been given any order which suggested he should not do that; do you agree?
A: I think the latter.(^{127})
(^{127}) Day 267/172/22 Q: At page 1110.032, Colonel Wilford's statement to this Inquiry, paragraph 88, comes to the question of — I want to go to the middle of the paragraph, if I may: "I would have interpreted those words as a prohibition against chasing rioters wherever they went eg down to Free Derry Corner and way beyond that. I had no intention of doing any such thing. I expected my companies to arrest using standard procedures which would involve getting behind the crowd and arresting them. There was nothing in the orders to say that we could not go into Rossville Street at all." Is he right about that?
A: Yes.
Q: "I had no intention of conducting a running battle chasing the rioters wherever they went, and this did not happen."
A: Could I just interrupt a second, there in that sentence of course he explains entirely what he reckoned a running battle was.
Q: He does. "I had no intention of conducting a running battle chasing the rioters wherever they went, and this did not happen. Whilst I cannot therefore remember the detailed terms of the order, I can say that there was nothing surprising in it, and nothing limiting the way I was intending to act which might have justified the need to go back to brigade." Do you agree with that?
A. I do.128
Colonel Wilford's understanding, both in 1972 and now, was read to General Steele by Mr Elias. As Colonel Wilford said, his troops understood the concept in the context of the type of operation in which they were engaged. This is confirmed by the Officer Commanding A Company, Major INQ 0010:
Q: Can we please go to W90. This is a page from the log for 1 Para. You have a copy attached to your statement. It
128 Day 267/177/25 is of course, as we know, a copy of the log that would have been typed up after the operation, because during the course of the operation entries would have been recorded by hand. It is also a composite log in that it records communications at battalion level but also at brigade level. But if I draw your attention, please, to serial 31, at 1610 what you see is an entry from plus, which is I think a reference to the tac HQ, the Gin Palace, to call sign 9, Colonel Wilford, which reads: "Move 3 now through K14." And that is a reference to bravo 3 C Company moving through barrier 14: "Also call sign 1 ..." Reference to your company: "... no running battles." Does the phrase "no running battles" trigger any recollection with you?
A. No, except to say that it does not surprise me in the least. It would just be a reminder not to get drawn in.
Q. Does this go back to your description of the way a snatch squad worked, that you would move no more than a distance of about 20 metres?
A. That is — that is the guide. The aim is to retain control.19
The Brigade Commander, the officer who gave the order, was in 1972 of precisely the same view as his subordinates:
The purpose of my order was to ensure that the arresting force only 'scooped up' those actively engaged in riotous behaviour in the William Street/Rossville Street area, and NOT those other persons engaged in a non-violent meeting which had already started at Foxes Corner. To achieve this 'scoop up' it was necessary for the troops to get beyond the rioters and place themselves between the rioters and those already at the meeting place at Foxes Corner. The company therefore that moved rapidly in their vehicles to the area North of the Rossville Flats, acted in accordance with my instructions, in that such action would effectively place the troops between the rioters and the marchers. ... Immediately the troops were attacked by gunfire and bombs, it was necessary for their tactics to change and for the Commander on the spot to take such action as he thought appropriate. In the circumstances therefore he was
129 Day 289/024/01 obliged to engage those attacking him and to open fire. In my view it became inevitable that the troops whom I had expected to be facing North, having cut off the rioters, should now have to turn to meet the attack, from the gunmen and bombers. The actions of the Support Company did not therefore contravene my orders which related only to the arresting of those creating a disturbance.\\textsuperscript{130}
5H-94 That is why, just as when it received the SITREP from 1 PARA referring to both Call Sign 3 and Call Sign 59, 8 Brigade did not react when they learnt, very soon after ordering the arrest operation (this message was recorded on the 8 Brigade Log at 1612 hours\\textsuperscript{131}), that there were vehicles in Rossville Street:
\\textit{Ah Zero, the appearance of the pigs and four tonners in Rossville Street has now effectively moved all the crowd out of Chamberlain Street and they are now forming behind the Flats.}\\textsuperscript{132}
THE ARREST OPERATION
5H-95 When the Commanding Officer of 1 PARA received the order to mount the arrest operation from 8 Brigade there were (as has been discussed above, in relation to both the written Operation Order and the order 1 PARA were given on the secure net on the day) no basis for him to take the view that he was being limited in either the number of troops he could use or where he could go in order to carry out his task.
5H-96 By the time the order was given the reading of the situation within 1 PARA was that the troops moving through Barrier 12 would require the speed of movement afforded to them by their vehicles to get them past the rioters and therefore in a position to cut them off.
\\textsuperscript{130} Brig MacLellan's 1972 Statement, B1235 paragraphs 29 and 31 \\textsuperscript{131} W47 serial 162 \\textsuperscript{132} Porter transcript, W129 serial 381 There has been an attempt to argue that Colonel Wilford's order to PARA was not directed at Support Company at all, and that (for some reason, not explained to the witnesses) Support Company moved anyway:
MR HARVEY: When Support Company did go through, if they went through as a result of a radio communication from their tac headquarters or from their Brigade Commander, then their tac headquarters ought to have been aware of that?
A: I am sorry, I do not quite follow your – Support Company would not have received an order from the Brigade Commander.
Q: Sorry, their own Company Commander?
A: Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: I have lost you a bit, Mr Harvey, it is no doubt my fault. Do you mind starting again.
MR HARVEY: Yes. For Support Company to move forward as part of an arrest operation, that would have to be communicated to them?
A: Yes.
Q: If it was communicated to them by radio, that would have been on their battalion net?
A: Yes.
Q: If it was on their battalion net, then their tac headquarters the Gin Palace ought to have been aware of it?
A: Well, they would have sent it.
Q: Do you not find it, then, absolutely extraordinary, when the tac headquarters of the 1st Parachute Regiment contact you to tell you that they have gone through the Presbyterian Church to the south of William Street when, if their tac headquarters ordered them forward, they must have known it was through barrier 12?\\textsuperscript{133}
A: Well, that is not the message that we received in brigade headquarters.
Q: No, but we are trying to deal with what ought to be the position. If it was an official authorisation by radio to Support Company to go through barrier 12, that had to be on their battalion net?
A: Yes.
Q: And, therefore, their Gin Palace or tac headquarters ought to have been aware of that?
A: Yes.
Q: Because their tac headquarters would have been the people who sent them through barrier 12?
A: Yes.
Q: So it is extraordinary, is it not, that the people who would have sent them through, who would have known they had gone through barrier 12, are telling you that in fact they have gone through the Presbyterian Church to the south side of William Street?
A: Yes, I cannot comment on that because in the brigade Ops room, all we received was that one message which we discussed yesterday. Now, clearly that message was inaccurate. Whether that means that tac headquarters themselves did not know or whether it was a mistake in sending the report, I cannot comment.
Q: It is an extraordinary mistake?
A: That is why I cannot comment on it because I just do not know.
\\textsuperscript{133} Given the manner in which 1 PARA were organised by the time the order was given, there is nothing extraordinary about this at all. Gin Palace pass Bdc order to CO and then hear CO’s order to the coys, which is just ‘Go, go, go’ or similar. So the Gin Palace, which has not been privy to the afternoon’s senior level discussions, have no idea what is going on. Not great, but not extraordinary. LORD SAVILLE: I think what Mr Harvey is giving you the opportunity to agree with or disagree with is that, on the face of it, it is extraordinary that the headquarters -- which on the face of it should have known that Support Company were going through barrier 12 -- should communicate to brigade that they had done something completely different; that is the point Mr Harvey is putting to you.
MR HARVEY: It is.
LORD SAVILLE: On the face of it, it is an extraordinary situation.
A: What can I say, but --
MR HARVEY: You either agree with it or disagree.
A: I agree, but I cannot comment in any other respect.
LORD SAVILLE: I do not think you are being asked to, General Steele, as you pointed out, there may -- we will have to wait and see -- be other explanations. That is why I put the question as I did and why Mr Harvey put the question as he did. On the face of it, this would seem extraordinary, I think you agree; on the face of it, it does?
A: On the basis of that, I agree.134
5H-98 There are a number of problems with this passage from the evidence. Although no doubt confused by the framework he was originally given, General Steele (who was not of course at 1 PARA Main or Tactical Headquarters at any stage of the day) is probably wrong in his suggestion that the 1 PARA order for the arrest operation was sent from the Gin Palace. The likelihood is that it was sent to the companies by the Commanding Officer, although the watchkeepers would of course have heard it in the course of listening to the net.
5H-99 More fundamentally, it is almost certainly not right to suggest either that it was the watchkeepers in the Gin Palace who ordered the arrest operation, or that they must have known that Support Company had moved through
134 Day 268/042/18 Barrier 12. While it is not suggested that the arrangements were ideal, the situation only appears extraordinary in the absence of any consideration of the way in which 1 PARA were organised for the operation and the manner in which they are likely to have been preparing for their task during the early part of the afternoon.
5H-100 Having had the Brigade order to move relayed to him by his Main Headquarters, the Commanding Officer in his OP was able to pass that order on to his companies on the battalion net. He has told the Tribunal that he did so by way of a short exhortation(^{135}), which would have been possible thanks to the discussions he no doubt had with all of his company commanders when they were all on the streets earlier in the afternoon. Where further detail or adjustment was required the watchkeepers, who were not party to the conversations between the senior commanders, would not necessarily have understood the significance of what was being said, particularly if Colonel Wilford had gone out of his way to abbreviate what he was saying so as not to waste time.
5H-101 So far as tactics were concerned, the commander of the arrest force had a free hand. Save that he was not to permit his battalion to get embroiled in a running battle down Rossville Street, he had (rightly, the military witnesses all agree) been given no orders which went to the manner in which he was to conduct the operation. While commonsense dictated that he was going to have to get behind the rioters, he had quite properly received no orders which might tie his hands or commit him to one particular course or another. The battalion had its own standard operational procedures, which he could be confident it would follow: it would not over stretch itself, for example, by attempting to operate over a distance greater than about two hundred metres. And his aim was always
(^{135}) Col Wilford's BSI Statement, B1110.033 paragraph 89 to effect a pincer manoeuvre if he could, closing in on the rioters from more than one direction.
5H-102 Although it has clearly been difficult for many to accept during the course of the military evidence to this Inquiry, in ordering Support Company to switch its point of access from the Presbyterian Church to Barrier 12 Colonel Wilford was not doing anything controversial. He was in fact doing no more than satisfying his duty to do all he properly could to secure the success of his mission. Although there is some evidence of an idea to demolish the wall to the east of the Presbyterian Church with one of the Pigs (and consideration of such a possibility might be expected of professional soldiers turning their minds to ways of solving problems as they presented themselves), as a point of access the Presbyterian Church meant that the troops would be entering the Bogside without their vehicles. The alternative of Barrier 12 imposed no such limitation.
5H-103 Perhaps at the cost of a degree of surprise (a relative concept, worth nurturing, but without an enormous prospect of success once the first steps in the operation had been taken), the vehicles also meant speed. Colonel Wilford had no doubt been grappling with the problem posed by the desire to get behind the rioters. The vehicles would enable him to move past the rioters and place troops across their line of retreat. With C Company in Chamberlain Street, the forward elements of Support Company across the Eden Place/Pilot Row waste ground and the rear elements of both companies on William Street he would be in a position to round some of the rioters up (some, those who got away early and those able to run through the gaps while the soldiers were committed to arresting particular individuals, would get away).
5H-104 Such a plan might not have been described by the purists as a pincer manoeuvre, but no dogma would ever have suited the needs of the task 1 PARA had been set. This thinking involved both Colonel Wilford’s centre and his left hand companies, and was certainly a method of getting behind the rioters, an encirclement or a cutting off. And provided the troops maintained their discipline, stayed within the two hundred metres area the battalion set itself, and tried to catch the rioters on the waste ground as they attempted to come past, Brigade's prohibition against running battles down Rossville Street would be satisfied.
Attempts to test this thinking against the strategic thinking (not orders, as General Ford did not and was in no position to give any such orders) which had taken place at HQNI five or six days earlier fail to appreciate the fundamental difference in the roles and responsibilities of the officers at the different levels of command, Division, Brigade and Battalion. Tactical thinking along these lines by the commander on the ground was in no way 'inconsistent upon the basis upon which [the operation] was to take place in the first place' or 'radically different' from any orders that had been approved by General Ford.
Due to the culture of some parties in this Inquiry of looking for fault at every turn rather than explanation for the purpose of understanding, it was put to a number of the officers that the soldiers carrying out the operation would have needed very detailed instructions before they deployed. A number of the soldiers were asked whether they knew in detail where they would be going and what they would be doing when they got there. These questions simply do not reflect reality.
This was a very simple operation. The officers in Support Company needed to get the troops into positions where they could attempt to arrest those who were running away from the riot, some soldiers ahead of the rioters and some behind. Once the troops were on the ground the means of identifying those who had been rioting, although not perfect, was as good as it could be: if 8 Brigade's experience was right the vast majority of those now running would have been either involved in the riot or close observers willing to take the chance of getting arrested; the rioters would
136 Christopher Clarke QC to Gcn Ford, at Day 255/07/14 137 Arthur Harvey QC to Gcn Ford, at Day 257/057/25 be wearing their makeshift gas masks and some would have been coloured with dye; and a number would (and in the event did) continue to act violently and render themselves properly susceptible to arrest by attacking the troops.
5H-108 This is precisely the exercise upon which 1 PARA embarked. Support Company’s lead Platoon moved down Rossville Street and the two Pigs moved off the road to stop at positions on the wasteground, one (Lieutenant N’s Pig) forward and the other (Sergeant O’s) in a deeper position, further away from the oncoming rioters. It may be that the second of these vehicles, by finishing up on the car park of the Rossville Flats, went further than 8 Brigade had anticipated. However, precision in these vehicles in these circumstances, with people running on the wasteground, would have been difficult and the vehicle remained broadly within the battalion’s two hundred metre limit. (No southern limit had in any event been laid down by brigade and the Brigade Major on no occasion accepted that this amounted to a breach of the order he had given).
5H-109 When the troops left their vehicles they concentrated their efforts on those amongst the crowd running past them who offered them violence. This arrest operation was interrupted by gunfire. Until the troops were fired at they did not move south or west of the open area bounded by the Columbclle Court complex to the west, the Rossville Flats and the rubble barricade to the south and the rear of the Chamberlain Street houses to the east. In particular, they made no effort to close on the crowd who had chosen to listen to the speeches at Free Derry Corner.
5H-110 Having made the necessary tactical decisions and given their orders, Colonel Wilford and Major Loden, each from their own vantage points, had to allow the platoon commanders, the NCOs and the soldiers to carry out their roles and discharge their own responsibilities, never more so than when they were being fired at. In the opening stages of the arrest operation, and then of the firefight, the Commanding Officer and the Company Commander were effectively witnesses to such of the many incidents taking place near them that they were able to watch.
5H-111 As the situation stabilised, however, they were both able to reassert the degree of control appropriate to their level of command. Having experienced incoming fire himself as he crossed the wasteground(^{138}) and having visited the wall at Kells Walk, Colonel Wilford supervised the consolidation of his battalion and its eventual withdrawal from the wasteground. Major Loden did exactly as he should have done and asserted personal control over the firing, even to the extent of momentarily over riding the provisions of the Yellow Card by forbidding any return fire regardless of the threat that might exist to the lives of the soldiers. He too set about the re-organisation.
5H-112 Both of these officers would now be involved in the post operation reporting of events on the ground, including, for Colonel Wilford, an interview with the media.
(^{138}) Col Wilford's BSI statement at B1110.034 paragraph 97. See also Gen Sir Mike Jackson's BSI statement, CJ1.5 paragraph 39. CHAPTER 51
REPORTING OPERATION FORECAST
51-1 The first report 1 PARA made after the arrest operation was started was in the following terms:
Hello Zero, this is 65. Our call sign Bravo 3 has moved through barrier 14 to the junction Rossville/William Street. Our call sign Bravo 5 has moved down south to the area of the William Street. Over.
51-2 The timing '1613' with a question mark against it appears on the Tribunal's transcript of the Porter tape, as does the suggestion (also with a question mark) that this is the message that resulted in Serial 164 of the 8 Brigade Log. Serial 164 reads:
B3 at aggro corner ordered to return to initial location.
51-3 It is clear is that the 1 PARA message has not been separately recorded. It must have been sent prior to the Brigade Major's inquiry as to whether or not any arrests had been made, which (accepting of course, that the timings are approximate) was recorded at 1613 hours. The Officer Commanding Support Company, Major Loden, gave that as the approximate time at which his convoy began to move (he had not received his final order to do so until 1610).
MR RAWAT: ... Can you help us at last as to why or how brigade came to be given such an inaccurate message as to where two units of 1 Para were?
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1 There is clearly interference at precisely this point in the message, which the transcriber has omitted. When the message is repeated, at serial 387, there is a '9' in here. 2 Porter transcript, W129 serial 383 3 W47 4 Porter transcript at W129 serial 388 5 1972 Statement, at B2220 6 1972 Statement, at B2220 A: No, I cannot, and of course you must remember that that was the information that we had at the brigade headquarters. I mean, we are not blessed with the hindsight that we have here today and so all I knew in the operations room, manning the brigade net as I was by then, that is the situation, as serial 387.
LORD SAVILLE: The very significant one, of course, is our call sign Bravo 5, area of William Street, whereas in fact they were way down Rossville Street. The other one might be slightly inaccurate, Bravo 3 has moved down Strand Road into William Street past barrier 14, he is at the junction of Rossville Street/William Street, because some at least of Bravo were probably in Chamberlain Street.
A: Yes, well, you see, again I cannot really comment on it, because that is the information that we had in the Ops room with which we had to work, but I agree with you entirely, I would have thought that C Company would have gone down Chamberlain Street.
LORD SAVILLE: I think one of the reasons we are asking you is whether you have any recollection afterwards that somebody inquired as to how what, on the face of it, was pretty inaccurate information, came to be sent to brigade.
A: No.7
As the Support Company vehicles had yet to be delayed at Barrier 12, the criticism implicit in the questions about the message is misplaced. There was no inquiry as to the accuracy of this message, not only because it was sent very early on in the operation when nothing would have been clear, but also because no inquiry was necessary. At the time the message was sent it was entirely accurate: elements of Support Company had indeed moved south into the area of William Street (the Machine Gun Platoon were in the derelict building on William Street) and C Company had moved through Barrier 14, elements to the junction of William Street and Rossville Street.
7 Gen Steele at Day 267/114/02 The only problem with the message is that it was not comprehensive: it did not inform Brigade Headquarters that the remainder of Support Company was about to move, approaching Barrier 12; and it did not tell them that although a platoon of C Company had indeed moved to Aggro Corner, a second platoon was moving down Chamberlain Street. The reason for this is that those sending this message probably did not know of those facts for the reasons already explained: as two junior captains carrying out a watch keeping role they had not been part of the decision making process during the afternoon and they were not by design, forward with the Commanding Officer at the moment he made his final decisions as to how the battalion was to deploy.
It has already been conceded that this was not ideal, but its importance can be overstated. The Brigade Commander and his Brigade Major knew the number of companies that made up the arrest force and they knew the commander's outline plan, for the execution of which there were not on any view limitless possibilities. It went without saying that more than one access point would be required, to allow both for the numbers of troops involved to be deployed quickly and the need to approach the rioters from more than one direction. They knew the approximate area in which the arrest force would have to operate – a concentration of rioters at Aggro Corner feeding violence at Barriers 12 and/or 14 would mean elements at least of the arrest force moving onto the Eden Place/Pilot Row waste ground. And they had made it clear that the arresting soldiers were not to get caught up with the crowd at Free Derry Corner.
The one disadvantage of 8 Brigade receiving no confirmation that PARA was going to use Barrier 12 was that time was lost at the barrier because the troops there were not ready to open it. Just as 8 Brigade did not react, either with surprise or at all, when they were told that there were
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8 There had been a preparatory message at about 1540 hours to the effect that it might: see the Porter transcript, at W124 serial 294 vehicles in Rossville Street, there is no reason to suppose that they would have done so had the 1 PARA watch keepers had this additional information to give them.
Given the time it had taken for Support Company to get into the Bogside, General Steele’s suggestion that his inquiry about the progress of the arrest operation had been made too early in fact holds true - the General would not of course have been aware of the time it took for Support Company to be in a position to move. The inquiry had of course to be passed on from the Gin Palace to the companies and there would then have been a need for the operator at company level to have attempted to find the answer. That an answer was provided can be seen from the Remarks column on the 1 PARA Log, which reads, against Serial 32: ‘Yes we have’, although whether that answer was relayed to Brigade or simply became a part of the reporting of the fire fight is unclear. The very next serial in the 1 PARA Log reads:
*Gunman. Pistol. Returned fire.*
And in the Remarks column:
*Passed Brigade.*
No military witness expected wholly accurate reporting of what was going on on the ground in the initial phase, when the troops were being engaged by the gunmen. Some information was made available: Corporal 033 in charge of the Support Company Signals Detachment, for example, made his contact report in relation to the Thompson sub-machine gun fire, which was heard by the Signals Sergeant, Sergeant INQ 0720 in the Gin
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9 *Day 267/117/17* 10 Which can be seen happening at the 1 PARA Log, at W90 serial 32 11 W90 serial 33 12 B1621.005 paragraph 39 Palace. But there was, and once the troops were engaged was always going to be, some period of time before reporting was possible. Once equipped with the knowledge that the troops had been engaged. Brigade Headquarters would have expected no more immediately; and even if they had received more they would in any event been powerless to influence events.
While the unit committed was not able to report, the Brigade deployment was such that its headquarters did have other sources of information in relation to the arrest operation:
Zero, this is 76. Two high velocity shots heard in the area of Free ... the Rossville Flats. People are lying on the ground there now.
Brigade Headquarters also knew, as they were told by one of the units involved in the static containment operation, that minutes after the arrest operation was ordered in, the gunmen had attacked the troops again:
Hello Zero and 90 Alpha and 76, this is 54 Alpha. We have just had four shots fired at our Call Sign Quebec 21 on the Walls. Two high velocity shots were returned.
This message was recorded in the Brigade Log at 1617 hours. The message would of course have originated at the point at which the rounds arrived at the Walls, would have been passed to Company Headquarters, and then on to Battalion Headquarters before its final transmission to 8 Brigade. The 1 R ANGLIAN Log, in which it was also recorded at 1617 hours, provides more detail:
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13 C720.3 paragraph 14 14 Porter transcript at W130 serial 394 15 Porter transcript at W130 serial 396 16 W47 serial 168 17 W102 serial 74 4 shots fired at 21 from Bogside Inn. 2 HV returned. No cas. [illegible] shot returned at gunman at rear of Bogside Inn. Man seen to fall.
This gunman was at the Bogside Inn, an area in which there were civilians (not least those who had been reported moving out of the area south down the Lecky Road) and an area which was only a short distance to the west of the meeting which was taking place at Free Derry Corner. 8 Brigade were given these additional details at approximately 1621 hours:
Hello Zero, this is 54 Alpha. Reference two shots returned at gunman near Bogside Inn. Man seen to fall. At 1620 hours one further shot was fired from the area of the Bogside Inn towards our Oscar patrol on the wall. Over.18
By then Brigade Headquarters had received information that the Observation Post on the Embassy Ballroom had also been attacked by gunmen, at 1611 hours.19 This related to a round which must have passed at least roughly over the heads of the soldiers of C Company 1 PARA, and certainly not one that can be left out of account on the ground that it was out of the area under consideration:
Zero, this is 90 Alpha. At 1611 hours, one shot at Echo. No strike. Over.20
At about 1618 hours 8 Brigade HQ had learnt of more shooting at the troops on the containment line:
Hello Zero, this is 90 Alpha. SITREP at 1615 hours on William Street. Seven Pigs of Call Sign Hotel – wrong Call Sign 65 are in the area of Rossville Street in the Rossville Flats. William Street and Rossville Street are clear and
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18 Porter transcript at W131 serial 421 19 Porter transcript at W130 serial 399. See also 22nd Regt Log at W97 serial 58, where the time of this attack is given as 1612 hours. 20 Porter transcript at W131 serial 399 relatively quiet. We just had two shots at one of our patrols on the City Walls at 1614 hours. Over.\\textsuperscript{21}
Gunmen had opened fire on the troops, certainly from one position where peaceful demonstrators were located and very close to Free Derry Corner where there were many more, three times since the commencement of the arrest operation. There was (and is) no reason to suppose that the gunmen would have had any qualms about shooting at the arresting force out in the open, about whom the Brigade Major now no doubt became concerned. While it has been all too easy during the course of this Inquiry to treat these shooting attacks on the troops as entirely separate from the arrest operation, it is most unlikely that the officers running the operation from Brigade Headquarters either saw them as separate or felt they were in a position of such luxury.
Brigade had already been told that there was a company’s worth of vehicles ‘in the area of Rossville Street in the Rossville Flats’. The Brigade Major now asks about Call Sign Bravo 3:
\\textit{Hello 65, this is Zero. What is the current deployment of your Bravo 3? Over.}\\textsuperscript{22}
This question was asked at about 1619 hours,\\textsuperscript{23} only six minutes after Support Company 1 PARA had started to move. Battalion Headquarters had not itself at that stage been given an update:
\\textit{Hello Zero, this is 65. Our Call Sign Bravo 3 ... wait. William Street/Rossville Street. Await confirmation. Over.}\\textsuperscript{24}
It was to be expected that the period after the fire fight would see a gradual increase in the amount of information being sent back and
\\textsuperscript{21} Porter transcript at W130 serial 407 \\textsuperscript{22} Porter transcript at W130 serial 411 \\textsuperscript{23} It was not logged at 8 Brigade, but this is where it lies between transmissions that were. \\textsuperscript{24} Porter transcript at W130 serial 413 therefore an improvement in the accuracy of the information that could be passed back up the line to Brigade.
51-20 Once the engagement in which Support Company became embroiled was over the troops, who were still in relatively vulnerable positions and where there could be no safe assumption that they would not be fired at again, set about the next phase of their standard operational procedures: reporting those matters which were of operational importance. Although a number of questioners appear to have expected something different, at this stage the information the commanders on the ground needed was whether there had been military casualties and what the ammunition states were, as these were the issues that impacted upon the continuing operational effectiveness of the platoons.
51-21 Thereafter what had happened, still in operational terms, began to emerge — insofar as it could then be ascertained from troops still spread out over the Eden Place/Pilot Row waste ground, down Rossville Street and Kells Walk and in the car park of the Rossville Flats. At about 1626 hours the watch keepers at 1 PARA Main Headquarters, having attempted to pass the message over the secure net, reported on the Brigade net that:
Hello Zero, this is 65. SITREP boils down to the fact that the two sub units moved in, got involved in a fire fight, the shots appearing to come from the area of the Rossville Flats. The two sub units have now gone secure in that area. The two civilians are lying wounded or dead, we are not sure yet, in the area of Chamberlain Street. Who shot them we don't know. Over.
51-22 Given the circumstances on the ground and the time at which this information was being provided there is nothing remarkable about the inaccuracies in this message at this stage of the operation. 8 Brigade now
25 The Brigade Log at W48 serial 175 26 Sec Porter transcript at W132 serial 442 27 Porter transcript at W132 serial 442 knew the essentials: a fire fight (which it had in any event received a number of reports about and it knew that there had been high velocity firing in the area of the Rossville Flats\\textsuperscript{28}) as a result of which there were casualties;\\textsuperscript{29} and 1 PARA now firm in the area. It already knews that ‘Seven Pigs of Call Sign ... Sign 65 are in the area of Rossville Street in the Rossville Flats.'\\textsuperscript{30} Brigade knew what it needed to know and the fact that the source of the information was not solely 1 PARA is neither surprising nor material.
Gradually the watch keepers were able to provide Brigade Headquarters with more information. At 1627 hours\\textsuperscript{31} the first thirty arrests were reported; at 1633 hours\\textsuperscript{32} the bodies reported earlier are now confirmed to be dead; by 1703 hours\\textsuperscript{33} the companies of 1 PARA were re-organising along William Street and its headquarters had been able to send a SITREP, detailing the known casualties amongst the troops and amongst the civilians: ‘5 dead (3 gunmen 1 nail 1 petrol)\\textsuperscript{34}, and at 1706 hours\\textsuperscript{35} there was more detail about the casualties sustained within its Support Company. These were all matters of operational importance.
\\textsuperscript{28} Porter transcript at W130 serial 394, set out above. \\textsuperscript{29} There had already been other information about casualties in the messages in the Porter transcript at W132 serial 435 and 437, which refer to ambulances arriving in the area. \\textsuperscript{30} Porter transcript at W130 serial 407, set out above. This serial was ignored at Day 267/130/07 when the Chairman was asking Gen Steele about a later serial, 444:-
\\textit{LORD SAVILLE:} When did you realise that in fact the Support Company had gone right down to, in one case, the entrance to the car park of the Rossville Flats. \\textit{A:} (Pause). I am trying to recall whether I received a report on the brigade net. If not, it will have been later in the evening. \\textit{LORD SAVILLE:} Mr Rawat can no doubt help us; is there anything on the brigade net that would indicate or provide that information? \\textit{MR RAWAT:} No.
\\textsuperscript{31} Porter transcript at W133 serial 458 \\textsuperscript{32} Porter transcript at W134 serial 473 \\textsuperscript{33} Porter transcript at W139 serial 550 \\textsuperscript{34} 1 PARA Log, W90 serial 41 \\textsuperscript{35} Porter transcript at W140 serial 567 While the companies were sending this information back to the Gin Palace, from where it was being sent back up the chain of command to Brigade headquarters, two of the senior officers, General Ford and Colonel Wilford, agreed to be interviewed by the Press.
General Ford, whose only contact with 1 PARA during the day had been (i) as the arrest operation began, when he took the opportunity to give some words of encouragement to the soldiers of C Company(^{36}), and (ii) a brief conversation with Colonel Wilford when the latter returned to the William Street area from the car park of the Rossville Flats. He had himself heard firing shortly after the paratroopers moved south. The fact that he heard this firing was recorded in his Diary of Events:
\[\\text{MS McDermott: When you were writing out your account of the events of that day -- you wrote it out on 31st January, if B1126 could be put up for a moment, please. Five lines down from the top, you say: "At about 1610 barrier 14 was lifted ... It was about this stage that I heard shots fired from the direction of Rossville Flats." I want to ask you one thing in relation to this. At the bottom of the page, the last paragraph: "I spoke to CO1 Para who confirmed my view that his troops had been fired upon first and had returned fire." You only having heard shots fired from the direction of Rossville Flats, I suggest to you that you could not possibly have had a proper view that the troops had been fired on first?}
\[A: I had no view, but I meant my mental view. My mental view was that the 1 Para would have been fired on first before they opened fire, because that is the normal way in which they would operate.}
[Q: You did not know who would open fire. You had only heard shots coming from the direction of the Rossville Flats; you did not know whether they had come from a civilian or a soldier.]
(^{36}) 'As the arrest force went through or over the barrier, Gen Ford shouted some words of encouragement, like: 'Go on boys, go on the Paras!'. In my view, this was a perfectly normal thing for him to do and did not have any of the sinister connotations that have been applied to it since': Col Ferguson in his BSI Statement, B1122.14 paragraph 86. A: No, but I knew that the soldiers do not open fire without good reason. Therefore as that, I assume, was the first shooting, I therefore assumed the shooting had come from the other side, shall we say.
Q: That was an assumption on your part?
A: Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: It would be the case, would it not, General Ford, from these diary entries as a whole, that you would not know who had fired first; or, indeed, whether 1 Para had fired at all; is that not right?
A: That is true, sir.
LORD SAVILLE: I am a bit puzzled by this part of the diary: "I spoke to CO1 Para who confirmed my view that his troops had been fired upon first and had returned fire." ... because you did not know whether the troops had been fired on, or whether they had fired, or whether, indeed, probably it was 1 Para?
A: That is true, sir. I do not know why I wrote it that way. I had only a mental view. I saw nothing, as I have stated.
LORD SAVILLE: It could be suggested, could it not, that you wrote that, General Ford, because it would assist the Army's case?
A: I hope I did not, sir, and I do not believe I did.
LORD SAVILLE: Can you give any other explanation for writing that?
A: No, sir. Well, just this: that of course this was written in great haste, and I know that is no excuse for accuracy, but perhaps the words I chose were not very sensible.
MS McDERMOTT: I understood you to say this morning, General Ford, not that this had been written in great haste, but that a great deal of care had gone into the preparation of it.
A: Of this particular diary?
Q: Yes.
A: Yes, my ADC and my personal assistant were very careful to keep records as they moved with me, and that was where the care was taken. Q: The care was taken in the preparation of it; that is what you said earlier?
A: Yes.
Q: It was an important document, was it not?
A: It was an important document, yes, and therefore I think this spelt my movements out, and what I did and said is written rather fuller than anywhere else I have seen on one of these operations.
Q: Is there anything you want to change now about that sentence: soke to CO1 Para who confirmed my view that his troops had been fired on first.”?
A: In the light of Lord Saville’s drawing my attention to that first sentence, I should have said that — different words definitely, missing out the part "... who confirmed my view". I mean, I was talking of a mental view and not of an actual view.
Q: I appreciate that, but this was part of the story that the Army had decided to put out to cover up what happened, was it not?
A: No, it was not.37
While General Ford when challenged in this way was unable to think why the Diary entry had been made in the terms it was, one answer may be that, for reasons now lost in time (possibly the sound of the weapons from where he was standing, the direction from which the sound was coming) it was indeed the General’s impression, right or wrong, that what he had heard was not military fire. That this had in fact been his impression was picked up David Phillips of ITN whose reaction to the General’s comment ‘That was awfully heavy firing’ was:
His demeanour to me, he looked concerned, and he certainly did not think it was his own men firing.38 And Mr Phillips formed that view at a stage in the event when it cannot be, and was not, suggested that General Ford could even have been thinking of doing anything to meet a case that might be made against the Army.
There is no doubt that when General Ford gave his interview his information was incomplete (no doubt under the pressure of the media repeating the untrue allegation that the troops had fired indiscriminately into a fleeing crowd). He was not on the top of the Embassy Ballroom when the fire fight was taking place, as became plain from the evidence of Colonel Ferguson:
... when we arrived at the corner of William Street and Strand Road ... we heard a burst of [low] automatic fire. Hearing the burst it took me back to my days in Palestine where the Thompson submachine gun was in common use. I recall that General Ford said it was very heavy firing, but I do not recall that I said anything. We continued walking, a matter of 50 yards or so, to the door of the Embassy Ballroom building where I confidently expected to gain immediate access. It was a further embarrassment to me that there was nobody there to let us in. A radio message was sent by one of my party to get the door opened. I cannot recall exactly how long it was that we were waiting outside the door, but it was in the order of five minutes. [See addition at FS7.912.1]
General Ford's own evidence on this had been:
38 M66.12. Units in the containment line did of course report fire at them at (22nd Regt) 1611 hours and (1 R ANGLIAN), from the Bogside Inn, shortly before 1617 hours. 39 See for example Mr Fry at B1208.002 40 Michael Mansfield QC put it to Gen Ford that he was 'plainly there at some point between 4.20 and 4.35 and if you were there watching those areas that are specified, [he] would have seen what is alleged on Major Loden's list took place between those times.' Arthur Harvey QC took the opposite line: 'It looks as though -- and that is before you go into the Embassy building. General Ford, at one time, in some of the documents you refer to estimates that the whole of the shooting lasted approximately 7 minutes? A. I do, sir. I do. I do not remember that. Q. Whatever it was, it was a very short period of time during which the bulk of the firing occurred? 41 Col Ferguson deleted this word at the commencement of his oral evidence: Day 281/002/02 42 BSI Statement, B1122.15 paragraphs 88-89 Colonel Ferguson, having thought about this issue since giving his evidence, has now (at paragraph 6 of his statement of 19th June 2004 B1122.123) provided further confirmation that General Ford was not on the roof of the Embassy Ballroom when the shooting took place:
"I would also confirm that the main shooting occurred before General Ford and I reached the roof of the Embassy Ballroom."
[Continue at 51-29] Q: Can we then go back to 1,208.057. You describe there, at 1620, arriving at the Embassy Ballroom. You had earlier described in this diary how the barrier was lifted about 1610, and then you followed to the junction between Chamberlain Street and William Street. It looks, therefore, as if you took five minutes, possibly more, to arrive at the Embassy Ballroom; is that right?
A. It looks like that, yes.
Q. Do you remember any delay in getting to the top of the Embassy Ballroom?
A. Well, I remember, in a document which I have read for this Inquiry, in one of the documents apparently I say there was some delay with the lift, I think.
Q. I think you do, yes. What you recorded in your diary was that, when you got to the top of the ballroom, you were able to observe the following, in Chamberlain Street: "Approximately one platoon in fire positions at the end of Chamberlain Street looking on to the Rossville Flats. The remainder of the company were rounding up people and leading them back to the waste ground on the junction of Chamberlain Street/William Street ..." When you used the expression "at the end of Chamberlain Street looking on to the Rossville Flats," should we understand that to mean at the end of Chamberlain Street which is nearest to the Rossville Flats, the far end from the Embassy Ballroom?
A. I should think it must be, I think.
Q. This may seem a silly question: "in fire positions" means what, exactly?
A. They had their rifles to their shoulders, presumably, and they probably had one knee down on the ground or resting on something, yes.
Q: The second thing that you describe seeing: "Rossville Street: company moving tactically into positions overlooking Glenfada Flats and Rossville Flats." What exactly does "moving tactically into positions" signify?
A. Well, it moves -- there would be some people moving, covered by others. In other words, there was "fire and movement", as we call it in the Army.
Q. "At the same time other troops were rounding suspects up in Rossville Street and moving them to the waste ground at the junction of Little James Street/William Street where they were searched and held. I then spoke on the radio to HQ 8th Brigade and asked if D Company 1 Para had been transferred to under command 1 Para. It was confirmed."
Again, if we look at W136, if we have a look at serials 495 to 500, this is 74 reporting to brigade: "I hope that the spare call sign of 65 which was under command 90 is now under command 65 [meaning thereby: was under command of 22nd Light Air Defence, is now under command of 1 Para]. From where I am I can see that 65 requires its full three sub-units. Over." The reply is: "Yes, that is correct. That instruction has been given and call sign Bravo 4 is now under call - under command of Bravo call sign. Over." Is that you speaking yourself? A: I think it must be. I mean, it could be my ADC speaking for me, who was a signals officer. I mean, without the recording I cannot really add to what is written there, I am sorry.
Q. But that is the message. A. Yes.
Q. I do not think it matters who spoke. You did not, of course, get to the Embassy Ballroom until approximately 4.20, by which time it looks as if a very large proportion of what did occur had already occurred. When you got there, there must have been, as we can see from this, a Radio Ulster net at the observation post? A. I think there must have been, yes. I mean, I cannot remember it, of course.
Q. Do you know whether there was a radio on the battalion net or any of the battalion nets? A. I am afraid I do not know, but -- I just do not know.
Q: Presumably there was signal traffic going on whilst you were at the observation post, was there? A. Presumably so, yes. But again, I have not specified, I would not hear it.
Q. When you were at the observation post, did you get any idea, apart from what you had seen literally by looking out onto the Bogside, what had been going on? A. I do not think so, no. The signaller presumably had his headphones on. I am afraid I am just guessing, I do not know.43
And there is some evidence that he did not get as full a briefing as he might have done once he did get to the top, as is clear again from Colonel Ferguson’s evidence:
I then [after Ford had left and after making the transmission re return of D Coy to 1 PARA] went to the front of the roof and got more information about what had happened. I recall BC 53 Battery starting to tell me what had happened when he was interrupted and corrected by one of his soldiers. I do not remember who this was or the particular point but there had not been time from the cessation of shooting until our arrival to collate what each of the observers had seen. I do not recall any details, but it became clear that more people had been hit by gunfire than General Ford had been told. At this stage the only indication I had was that there had been a gunfight with the IRA. But as I listened to the various accounts of the observers it became clear that more than three people had been shot. I also gained the impression that there was some concern about the circumstances in which some of the people had been shot. I do not know exactly why I had this feeling but I felt I had to go after General Ford and tell him that there had been more casualties than had been reported to him. I therefore left the Embassy Building and sent to Waterloo Place. There I found General Ford pinned against the wall by a journalist and speaking on camera about what had happened. It was too late for me to update him.44
As it was, the General gave his interview on the basis of what he then knew, from his own experiences and what he had by then been told by both the Commanding Officer of 1 PARA and his ADC (neither of whom would have had a complete picture of events either45), without waiting to
43 Day 255/045/04 44 BSI Statement at B1122.17 paragraph 100 45 The ADC in fact obtained the figure for the number of dead from a member of the Media: BSI Statement Capt INQ 0002, C2.13 paragraph 65 see what information would ultimately be provided to Headquarters 8 Brigade. It is not at all surprising that the information was 'wildly out':
MR CLARKE: Do you know why the information that you had was so wildly out?
A. I do not know why, but I can only say this: from my own experience of fire fights -- and this, as I understand it, was in a very short period -- you very rarely get the picture right on the spot. And I have taken part in a number of fire fights, may I say. There is always confusion and, even immediately afterwards, there are differences of opinion as to what actually happened. And I could quote one or two famous examples if you so wished.
Q. I think we have the point. 46
Although Colonel Wilford had been forward with his soldiers in the Bogside, he had not been with them from the beginning of the incident and was only in a position to report - cautiously - details that he had heard at the time of the interview:
Well I'm told from my quick SITREP and you must understand that it's only a very quick SITREP that three gunmen were hit. We have not got the weapons but this is the usual thing. We saw people come forward. I'm not going to say that I saw weapons taken away because I don't know yet. I have not spoken to the men on the ground. 47
He had, however, experienced the fire from the gunmen himself:
If you're being fired at you return fire and they know that perfectly well. 48
At about the time of these interviews with the media the Officer Commanding Support Company 49 was interviewing those soldiers whom he understood to have been all of the soldiers who had opened fire. He
46 Day 255/050/18 47 B1110.001 48 B1110.001 49 Who had not been exposed to the media and did not know what was being said. conducted this exercise in order to inform his commanding officer of the engagements that had taken place during the fire fight, not to institute an investigation to run at the same time as that which, soldiers having discharged their weapons, would inevitably be carried out by the Royal Military Police. It was an exercise he carried out on his own initiative. At the time at which he was interviewing the soldiers Brigade had not yet required statements from the senior officers in 1 PARA, and he had no reason to even anticipate at 1700 hours or thereabouts on 30th January 1972 that he was going to be quoted in Parliament the following day. This exercise would enable him to provide a prompt report on the number and nature of the engagements in which the soldiers of his company had been involved.
Major Loden recorded what the soldiers told him of the details the Commanding Officer would need, and which in turn the Brigade Commander would no doubt require from the Commanding Officer: the grid references (firer and target) and the nature of the engagement. For the purposes of this exercise the names of the firers were irrelevant: many of them would have meant nothing to the Commanding Officer and none of them would have meant anything to the Brigade Commander.
While the names of the firer would have been recorded somewhere for the purpose of the RMP investigation, at this stage these senior officers needed to know what had happened, not the names of those who had been involved:
*I was not of course the originator of the List and cannot therefore explain why the names of the soldiers were not included. I would observe, however, that this was what might be called an operational reporting process, a Company Commander providing his Commanding Officer with details of the number and type of engagement in which his company had been involved. That is information a*
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50 Presumably by the Company Sergeant Major Company Commanding Officer would have needed at an early stage (I note that the number of rounds fired by each soldier is not recorded either). It must be remembered that this was a reporting process, a totally different process to the investigatory process that would in any event be carried out – and probably was already by the time I was doing these statements – by the RMP. Once Brigade asked for statements later in the evening I imagine that I or Major Loden or both of us decided that the most practical way to include the information on the list would be to attach a copy of it by way of an Annex to Major Loden’s statement. For the purposes of operational reporting names were not in any event relevant and they would have meant nothing to anyone outside the battalion.51
...in an operational report required very quickly, it is of no importance for operational reasons whether it was Private Jones or Private Smith who did this or that; that is meaningless to a brigade commander. It has every meaning, of course, when it comes to the investigative side and the two things are quite different and separate.52
There are of course inaccuracies in the list that was produced. It may be that these resulted from the circumstances in which the discussions took place (in the cramped back of the Pig, with only a small light with a 12 volt bulb,53 Major Loden using a map which the majority of the soldiers would not have used during the afternoon and would probably not have seen before) and/or the speed with which the exercise had to be carried out:
It was my best attempt at the time to find out what had been going on. It was very important for me to ascertain what had happened as quickly as possible and to report this to my Commanding Officer.54
51 Gcn Sir Mike Jackson, BSI Statement, CJ1.63 paragraph 14 52 Gcn Sir Mike Jackson, at Day 384/041/08-15 53 Day 344/013/24-014/05 54 B2283.009 paragraph 53 During the course of the evidence to this Inquiry, the exercise Major Loden undertook and the list which resulted from the notes taken by him have been subjected to a process so creative as to make it unrecognisable.
With General Ford:
You must have been — pausing for a moment — somewhat amazed that in a very short time the paratroopers had moved into a highly fortified area of the Bogside and managed to, as it were, kill snipers at the top of flats who might not be, as it were, making their positions clear with white flags and had therefore come out with really an amazing tally of at least 13 people; did it not strike you as a rather successful raid?
In fact, contrary to what Mr Mansfield told General Ford, the list, when typed up, was headed ‘Gun Battle’ and identified in terms those of the engagements where the targets were thought to have been killed. There are four of them. In ten instances the target is described as ‘hit’, and one of these was ‘hit in thigh’; one other was ‘possibly hit’. One gunman is described as ‘unhurt’ and one incident listed is ‘1 gunman with pistol fired 2 rounds at a soldier armed only with a baton gun at GR 43231688 (Alleyway). Soldier fired one baton round and withdrew swiftly’.
General Steele, whose evidence that he was the operational staff officer at Headquarters 8 Brigade appears to have been ignored, was told quite wrongly that there was a supplemental list, containing the names of the soldiers:
MR MANSFIELD: Yes. I appreciate that. Was your function to do more than merely collect?
A: It was to collect and then send on to Headquarters Northern Ireland.
Q: Going back to this list on ED49.12, you read it on the evening of the 30th?
55 B2283.020 56 Michael Mansfield QC to Gen Ford, at Day 260/038/17 A: So I recall.
Q: And it must have occurred to you, when you read it on the evening of the 30th, that this was an extremely important document because it indicated something which had not come over the radio in detail, the details of the alleged fire fight, or at least the trouble encountered by 1st Paras in detail; did it not?
A: Yes, but had I not also received earlier a report, a sitrep, which I think is in the log which indicates the figure 15 dead and so one would link in with the other in my mind.
Q: I am not going to the log for the moment. Yes, the log does relate, not to 15, but to 14?57
A: Very good.
Q: Concentrating on this document. One of the most significant things would be, as you will see as you run down that list, a lot of grid references are given and places and description; you see that, it is obvious?
A: I do.
Q: But the real question is: who are the soldiers at the grid references?
A: I mean, I have no idea. It came — my only knowledge would have been, presumably, that as it was given to me by Major Loden, that they were soldiers of his Support Company.
Q: The real question is: which soldiers?
A: I have no idea then or now.
Q: Did you ask him?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: I really cannot answer that question, I have no idea.
57 In fact the List of Engagements lists only fourteen engagements in the true sense, as the entry at serial 7 is of a gunman firing a pistol at a baton gunner who fired a baton round and withdrew: see B2283.020 Q: I would like you to think very carefully, please: this was an operation over which it would appear, it has already been put to you, that you had in fact very little control, and at the end of the day you discover a large number of people have been shot and you are collating a report to hand on, in other words a series of reports. Kindly explain why you asked no questions about which soldiers it was that had in fact shot dead a number of people?
A: Maybe it was because it was not my particular responsibility as the Brigade Major to look into the investigation of a round being fired; that was done by the Royal Military Police and I suspect that I thought to myself that each of these incidents would be properly examined by the RMP in the normal way.
Q: You see, the thing that is missing from Major Loden's report is the list which goes with this, indicating which soldier was at which grid reference; that is missing, is it not?
A: Yes, I cannot help you there, I have never seen it.(^{58})
And it was General Steele who was wrongly told that Colonel Loden's evidence had been and would be that he marked what the soldiers told him on a map:
MR MANSFIELD: Again, the reason for asking you these questions is that Major Loden will say -- and has said -- that he marked up a plan himself that very evening when he interviewed the soldiers who claimed to have done the shooting. Did you ever see that map?
A. No(^{59})
At no stage had Colonel Loden said or indicated that he would say any such thing, rather the opposite:
I had a map with me in the command vehicle and the soldiers did the best they could to identify where they were and what they shot at. I wrote down what they told me in
(^{58}) Day 268/073/25
(^{59}) Day 268/082/02 my note book with grid references taken from my map and my notes were subsequently typed up and appended to my statement dated 31 January 1972. I do not recall checking the typed document against my hand written note or against the map.60
Between 1706 hours and 1743 hours, when the Brigade Major entered the details onto the Brigade Log, 1 PARA were able to discuss the afternoon's events in some detail, producing the information that appears at Serial 233 of the Brigade Log.61 1 R ANGLIAN sent the details of the shooting incidents in which they had been involved, in which two gunmen were seen to fall, shortly thereafter, at 1820 hours.62
By 1810 hours, it is safe to assume after Major Loden had completed his notes, 1 PARA were able to draw up a list of casualties, ammunition expenditure and engagements for each of the companies.63 Mr Mansfield told Colonel Loden that this list does not match the engagements he recorded:
The point I am going to make is: if you have done the interviewing between 5.30 and 6.10, or thereabouts, to provide battalion with a sitrep report – and I suggest you are the only one who would be providing this information in compendious form, if you did – then the sitrep report does not tally with your list, and that is why I am going to suggest once again the list had not been drawn up. Now do I make myself clear?64
In fact the two documents do tally. The entry in the 1 PARA Log lists fifteen engagements (all of course involving Support Company): six nail bombers, one petrol bomber, seven gunmen and an acid bomber. The list of engagements has fifteen numbered entries. And if the multiple engagements (in the sense that there was more than one target) in the list
60 BSI Statement at B2283.009 paragraph 52 61 W52 62 8 Brigade Log, W53 serial 241 63 1 PARA Log, W91 serial 45 64 Day 348/008/18 of engagements (the three nail bombers at at the same grid reference, for example, at serial 9) are read as single engagements, the two lists each contain the same numbers of each type of target (seven gunmen, one petrol bomber, one acid bomber – the bomber at the top floor of the flats – and six nail bombers).
After a further period of time (it is not possible to tell how much: the time 1945 hours in the Brigade Log could be when the recording of the message was complete, and it is possible that the information was taken to Ebrington Barracks from the City), 1 PARA were able to provide a narrative of their operation to accompany the number and type of engagements. 1 PARA were claiming five hits. By that time 8 Brigade knew more than 1 PARA did: at 1746 hours it had been told that there were seventeen individuals with gunshot wounds at Altnagelvin Hospital, five of whom were dead; at 1840 hours it had been told that there were eleven dead at Altnagelvin and was provided with some of their names and addresses; and at 1855 hours it had been told that there were eleven dead and fourteen with gunshot wounds.
By the evening of 30th January (and it is perhaps irrelevant whether or not General Ford had the information before he left for Lisburn), the senior officers knew that a very serious incident had taken place. It is however dangerous to apply too much hindsight and to assume that they must then have concluded that something had gone wrong.
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65 W56 66 W57 serial 11 67 8 Brigade Log, W52 serial 234 68 8 Brigade Log, W54 serial 249 69 8 Brigade Log, W54 serial 253. Gen Ford’s Diary of Events noted that when he returned to Headquarters 8 Brigade at 1720 hours he discovered that the total dead had risen to eleven (B1127). This does not appear to be correct: 8 Brigade did not know that there were eleven dead until after half past six, by which time the General had left for HQNI. As at the evening of 30th January 1972 Colonel Wilford and Major Loden had no reason not to accept what their soldiers were telling them: both of them had personally experienced the IRA fire that afternoon and both of them had seen their soldiers behaving as if reacting to incoming fire. 1 PARA had been in Northern Ireland for a long time; the soldiers had been fired at and had dealt with serious rioting before, and had not fired their weapons without justification. On 30th January there were allegations that the troops had fired into the backs of a fleeing crowd, but Major Loden knew first hand that that was not true, and it would not have been the first time that Nationalist Ireland, both media and people, had made serious - and untrue - allegations against the Army. And both officers knew that, whatever their own opinions, the RMP would be carrying out an investigation. For the immediate future 1 PARA were still the 39 Brigade Mobile Reserve, and none of the officers could afford themselves the luxury of undermining its operational efficiency with some sort of inquiry of their own.
General Ford, Brigadier MacLellan and Colonel Steele were in a similar position, albeit at varying degrees of remove, to the officers in 1 PARA. The troops who had been involved in the action were saying that they had engaged gunmen and bombers. The officers could not just assume (as is being assumed by certain parties now) that that was not the case. General Ford was asked why he did not make inquiries as to what had gone wrong. No suggestions were made as to how he might have gone about it. Mr Mansfield suggested that he could have gone and spoken to the Commanding Officer of 1 PARA if he felt that the Brigade Commander was not getting to the bottom of things rapidly enough, but it cannot be assumed that the General would have been in any better position than the Brigadier: Colonel Wilford could only have told him what he knew the troops on the ground were saying.
And if the General had taken the extraordinary step of interviewing the soldiers himself, they would presumably have told him what they had already told their company commander. No questioner has considered whether such a process would have affected, or would subsequently have been alleged to have affected, the RMP investigation, or whether a statement would or should have been taken and if so by whom. And how much time is it envisaged the General would have spent on this task, when his responsibilities were Province wide operations and there were others whose responsibilities included discipline? Was he expected to read any documents before speaking to the troops and put discrepancies between their evidence and that of others to them?
Like many of the questions these witnesses have been asked during long periods in the witness box during this Inquiry, these are easy questions for lawyers to ask in 2002 or 2003. They take no account however of the military structures and procedures to which all of the witness were subject in 1972, the realities of holding a senior command or staff appointment in the Army on operations.
These problems are compounded by an approach to the military evidence which has focused on finding fault to the minutes detail rather than seeking facts which would promote an understanding of how the Army in Northern Ireland in 1972 operated and sought to deal with the problems it faced:
LORD SAVILLE: I am bound to say my own view, it may be completely wrong, General Ford, is that when you got back that night, the very first thing you would ask -- which anyone would ask, but particularly the person who was in overall command -- is: "what happened?" If you had asked the question "what happened", it would surely have soon transpired that vehicles had in fact come in, in what one could describe as a frontal assault down from barrier 12, radically different from the plan to try and encircle rioters, for example, by coming in from the Presbyterian Church
As a matter of principle, I did not interview any of the soldiers who gave statements to Widgery. My view was that if I had done so, it could later be said that I was potentially interfering with witnesses and I did not want this suggested: Col Ferguson, BSI Statement, B1122.18 paragraph 108 one way and up from barrier 14 the other; surely you would have been most anxious to discover what had happened that evening?
A: Sir, I was most anxious, I am sure, to find out what had happened and after having what information was available there, I then decided that the best way of handling it was for the Chief of Staff to try and get together all information that was available, I think up to midnight. But I retired so that I would be fresh next morning to handle the inevitable consequences.
MR HARVEY: Even apart from that night, General Ford, thereafter the question of the use of the APCs was a major factor that would have to be dealt with during the course of the Widgery Tribunal; you were aware of that. You were aware of that because there were discrepancies between what was supposed to have happened and what actually happened?
A: (Witness nodding). 71
The difficulty is, that there was no prohibition against the use of vehicles and there were no orders to 1 PARA to try and encircle the rioters. General Ford was in any event in no position to judge whether the operation had been executed as planned, as he had not been involved in any of the tactical planning for the arrest operation. So far as that operation was concerned, there were no discrepancies between what happened and what was supposed to have happened, because there were no orders as to tactics from either General Ford or Brigadier MacLellan. The situation demanded that the commander of the arrest force have the freedom to decide how to tackle the riot consistent with his mission to arrest as many rioters as possible.
The assumptions highlighted by this passage, and others like them, have no basis in the evidence (rather, in some cases, they have met with a unanimous denial from the military witnesses, who have repeated their
71 Day 257/061/16 denials on numerous occasions), but have run through the whole of the senior officers' aspect of this Inquiry. They disclose a fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence, which can only ever be considered fairly if they are abandoned. CHAPTER 5J
THE CONSPIRACY ALLEGATION
5J-1 THE CASE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A PLAN WITHIN A PLAN
5J-1 We have, in the preceding sections, set out the essential evidence and attempted fully to analyse the contemporary documents relating to: (i) the background to the military planning for the day; (ii) the planning itself and; (iii) the role of the senior officers in the execution of that planning, to the extent that those matters are not addressed in other chapters. We have also sought to address and respond to the principal criticisms directed at those matters.
5J-2 There have, however, been far more serious, but largely unformulated, and in part mutually inconsistent, criticisms made of the planning, which in their various forms appear to represent allegations that all the disclosed planning was, in reality, an elaborate concealment of what were the true intentions of politicians, civil servants and senior army officers.
5J-3 It is not clear to what extent those allegations subsist, or may be permitted by the Tribunal to be pursued, against the politicians, the civil servants or the soldiers. All that we can attempt to do in these submissions is to record those allegations which have variously been raised and explain why, in our submission, the Tribunal should not permit them to be pursued. If attempts are made to revive or pursue any of these submissions, we wish to reserve our right to require the Tribunal to serve clear and unambiguous notice of those allegations which they are satisfied our can properly be required to answer, and to permit us to respond to any such notice.
5J-4 In his opening Christopher Clarke QC addressed the issue of whether there was some ulterior purpose concealed behind the Army's plan for dealing with the civil rights march on 30th January 1972. Prominent among the many, varying and sometimes inconsistent allegations and theories which have been advanced from many quarters – but it must be emphasised not from the Tribunal – are the allegation that the Army intended to use the march as an opportunity to "draw out" the IRA and the allegation that the march was to be used as an excuse to teach the residents of the Bogside and the Creggan a lesson, whatever that may mean. Mr. Clarke rightly emphasised the particular need for precision in defining allegations of this sort.
*It is important not to get tied up in the semantics of the expression "teaching them a lesson", since that begs the question as to what the lesson was to be about and who was to be taught.*
It is clear from the evidence and documents analysed in the preceding part of this chapter that if, as was feared, rioters were to attack the security forces, it was the intention of the Army to respond with an arrest operation. In one sense this would have involved teaching the rioters a lesson. Thus General Ford observed to Desmond Hamill that: the emphasis on the arrest part of the operation
*The emphasis on [the arrest] part of the operation was not written into the orders, but stressed verbally. The object of teaching the hooligans a lesson would be lost unless a good number were caught.*
and he added:
*The main object of the operation was to stop the NICRA march. The Army hoped to take advantage of the anticipated action by the hooligans to seize them as well.*
In his opening Mr. Clarke was dismissive of the suggestion that there had existed a plan within a plan. He addressed in considerable detail the linked questions of whether there existed a plan to draw out the IRA in order to engage with them or
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1 Day 003/097 ct seq. 2 Day 003/105/03 3 B1208.004.007 paragraph 3 4 B1208.004.007 paragraph 4 to teach the citizens of the Bogside a lesson.(^5) (Day 3/97 et seq.) He undertook a comprehensive analysis, in particular of the secret and confidential documents provided to the Tribunal by the Government, and observed:
*The content of this material is important, both for what it says and for what it does not say. There is no reference in it to any plan or anything that looks like a plan to draw out the IRA in order to engage with them or to teach the citizens of the Bogside a lesson.*
*On the contrary, important parts of this material are inconsistent with such a plan.*(^6)
Later he observed:
*Similarly, as we shall see later, and in one respect now, in the high level documentation that followed Bloody Sunday no indication is to be found, or has yet been found, of the existence, fulfilment or non-fulfilment of an such plan.*(^7)
and later still concluded:
*It seems clear that the plan was to arrest as many hooligans as possible if, as seemed highly likely, they caused trouble and to do so in a big scoop-up operation using the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment.*
*The wisdom of the concept and of the operation as planned is one of the questions which the Tribunal will have to address.*
*A quite separate question is whether in truth there was some other and different plan, different from and inconsistent with the documents.*(^8)
Nevertheless, the representatives of the families and those injured on Bloody Sunday in their opening statements made allegations that there was a concealed plan. These allegations were ill-defined and unparticularised. This unsatisfactory state of affairs was recognised by the Inquiry in its letter to the Interested Parties
(^5) Day 003/097 et seq.\
(^6) Day 003/097/18\
(^7) Day 003/100/16\
(^8) Day 003/105/006 dated 19th December 2000 in which it referred to allegations in opening statements "that persons at the highest level in the military and political establishments in London and Northern Ireland (in particular at a level above that of General Ford) authorised or condoned either a policy to draw out the IRA or engage with them, or a policy to shoot-to-kill ringleaders or rioters, or to teach the people of Derry some form of lesson." The Tribunal required those seeking to make such allegations to give notice in writing to the Tribunal, giving full particulars of its basis and the evidence which is said to justify it. It added:
...the Tribunal, itself, will need to be satisfied as to whether there is a sound basis for any such allegation to be investigated.
Following this ruling, various Interested Parties lodged documents in which they made allegations including allegations of conspiracy to murder. These documents, which are analysed below, are open to the same objections as the statements in opening. However, the Tribunal has never given a ruling on whether these allegations were properly maintainable.
Furthermore, the Tribunal has declined to serve Salmon letters indicating to individuals criticisms which it may be minded to make of them in its final report. As a result, despite these observations by counsel to the Tribunal in his opening on 29th March 2000 and the lack, so far as we are aware, of any new evidence since that date which might support a case of conspiracy to murder, none of those we represent has been made aware of whether these very grave allegations remain live issues in the proceedings or, if so, what case there may be to answer.
In these circumstances we have attempted to extract from the opening statements and notices of allegations made on behalf of the families, against politicians and senior officers, those allegations which may be made in respect of this issue and to respond to them on behalf of those we represent. ALLEGATIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILIES
The clients of Madden and Finucane
SJ-11 In the course of his opening on behalf of the clients of Madden and Finucane, Arthur Harvey QC contends that General Ford was pursuing an ulterior motive. While other senior Army Officers such as General Carver, General Tuzo and Brigadier MacLellan are presented as moderate, fair and anxious to keep within the law, General Ford is portrayed as having a "natural repugnance to the idea of the military standing idly by and tolerating what was going on in Derry." According to the submissions of Mr. Harvey, General Ford had fallen under the influence of extremist Unionist politicians on the Joint Security Committee and the extreme Unionist Strand Traders Association on his visit to Londonderry on the 7th January 1972. Later in his opening, however, Mr. Harvey seems to be saying that General Ford, inspired by his meeting with the Strand Traders Association on the 7th January 1972, imposed his will on the plan for the march by insisting on the use of 1 PARA and a scoop-up operation and that this was approved at a high level by the Westminster Government.
SJ-12 General Ford is criticised for taking "the very simplistic soldierly view, that if there is disorder then order should be restored, if there are breaches of the law, then the law should be enforced." It is said that General Ford disapproved of the headquarters' attitude to the position in Londonderry and actively supported the programme for the re-imposition of the rule of law in Derry in a firm and resolute way. General Tuzo resisted the pressure from persons within the Stormont Government for the Army to take harsh and repressive measures. Undeterred by the fact that in his Assessment of 14th December 1971 General Ford recommended the adoption of Course 1 (the least proactive, as fully set out in Section 5B above)
9 Day 044/092/18 10 Day 044/004/03-06 11 Day 044/013/03-09 12 Day 044/014/23 – 044/015/21 Mr. Harvey alleged that he planned "a military operation of less long-term significance than the occupation of Derry in terms of the Bogside and Creggan, but a lesson to the people of Derry and a foretaste of what was to come when the forces were available to them." Similarly, General Ford's Memorandum of the 7th January 1972 is claimed to demonstrate that he "had come to the conclusion that the stage had then been reached where the only solution was to shoot and shoot to kill those persons who were involved in rioting." We have set out what we respectfully submit is a more accurate and careful analysis of that document in Section 5B above.
According to Mr. Harvey, Brigadier MacLellan and Chief Superintendent Lagan had a sensible view of the best method of dealing with the situation in Derry by the use of local troops "a policy which personally and professionally offended [General Ford]." However, "their recommendations were simply overborne by the military approach of General Ford and the implementation of his policies by use of the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment."
What disturbed General Ford about his visit was the attitude of his Brigade Commander and, of course, Chief Superintendent Lagan and the commander of one of the resident battalions. What did not seem to disturb him was the concept emanating from the Strand Traders' Association of the ethnic cleansing of 5,000 people from the area in which they lived, and lived in that area because they were compelled by the political necessities of Unionist rule to live in one ward and one ward only and that the military curfew should be imposed and that they should be shot on sight.
What one could say is that any civilised person responding to such attitudes would, one would have thought, made common cause with General Tuzo in that one had just met with such a reactionary group and one would be deeply concerned in relation to any
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13 Day 044/093/08 14 Day 044/023/14 15 Day 044/098/22 16 Day 044/097/22 suggestions that they might make in relation to requirements for the imposition of law and order. 17
Referring to the meeting of GEN 47 on 11th January 1972 Mr. Harvey states:
At this particular meeting again it seems to be the position that no one is really averting to that matter which General Ford has allowed himself to be particularly exercised by, that there is such a problem in Derry at this moment, that shooting to kill unarmed people is the only answer for law and order compelled by a sense of duty to commit murder for the greater good. But within the meeting there is a recognition that the further alienation of the Catholic population at this stage is something that ought not to be contemplated. 18
Certainly at this meeting one can say that there is no sense of what was happening in the mind of General Ford, but also the embargo on a large military operation. 19
It is submitted that this concession by Mr. Harvey is totally inconsistent with the various conspiracy theories propounded by Interested Parties.
However, Mr. Harvey then refers to the minutes of the meeting of the JSC on 27th January 1972 which include the statement: “The operation might well develop into rioting and even a shooting war”20 and to the memorandum of Colonel Dalzell-Payne dated 27th January 1972 21 which, Mr. Harvey suggests, shows "the MoD preparing for the fallout in public relations if the march goes disastrously wrong".22 On this slender basis he concludes:
What it does, I respectfully submit, is further raise the question: on 27th January and just prior to it, the Government and politicians had been anxious to ensure that there was co-ordination and consistency of line being taken. Why then does it simply evaporate
17 Day 044/107/24 18 Day 044/133/09 19 Day 044/134/07 20 Day 045/030/06 – 045/031/08 21 G82.512 22 Day 045/038/8-21; see generally: Day 045/030 – 045/043 from the papers and these bald statements suddenly arise without comment? 23
He contends that there were
... discussions involving Mr Faulkner, General Tuzo and the British Government, and that these had turned on the expectation of very serious violence in connection with the Derry march. In the absence of other Cabinet papers and other documents which deal with the fringe meetings that may have resolved issues before they find their way into these documents, it is simply not possible to say. 24
When members of the Tribunal put to Mr. Harvey that the operation order stated that the concept of the operation was to be "lowest possible key" 25 he responded with the following unparticularised allegation:
The answer, I respectfully submit, is: yes, the lowest possible key is right in relation to the march, but it is not the concept of General Ford and it is not the concept of the politicians and the officers in the MoD in relation to arrests. 26
According to Mr. Harvey the operation order merely indicated "a divergence of understanding of what is happening by Brigadier MacLellan and those who were above Brigadier MacLellan..." 27 and he questioned whether the arrest operation was genuine. 28
The true nature of the allegation made on behalf of the clients of Madden and Finucane is confused further by Mr. Harvey's subsequent statement:
The point that I am making is that in the employment of 1 Para, General Ford was perfectly aware that their reputation was the reputation of a regiment which would behave in an exceptionally harsh way to anyone to whom they had been ordered to attack. He
23 Day 045/041/16 24 Day 045/046/23 25 This comes from G88.537 26 Day 045/055/06 27 Day 045/056/09 28 Day 045/056/17 – 045/057/01 also knew that, so far as he was concerned, he was saying that the position in Derry had reached a critical time and unless fundamentally the people of Derry or the rioters in Derry were taught a very severe lesson, which he did not have confidence in the resident battalions to do, then this position would develop, and develop along the lines that he had seen where you would have to simply, on a regular basis, shoot persons for stone-throwing. 29
When asked directly by Lord Saville whether he was in fact suggesting that that shooting was anticipated by General Ford, Mr. Harvey replied:
I respectfully submit, that that was anticipated by General Ford but not by the resident battalions under the command of Brigadier MacLellan. 30
On 10th December 1999 there was lodged with the Inquiry on behalf of the clients of Madden and Finucane a document signed by Kevin Finnegan QC and Patricia Smyth, in which they make the following allegation “against the MoD”:
(m) Soldiers acted without authority when they entered the Bogside on Bloody Sunday.
This allegation is, of course, totally inconsistent with any suggestion that the soldiers who entered the Bogside on Bloody Sunday did so pursuant to some nefarious plan of any of the varieties advanced on behalf of the families. In particular, it is impossible to reconcile this allegation with the case advanced by Arthur Harvey QC in opening.
In a document dated 12th February 2001 signed by Seamus Treacy QC and others "those represented by Madden and Finucane" make a number of allegations against senior military and political figures. The allegation of a plan within a plan is not expressly repeated. However, the following allegations are made against General Tuzo, Lord Carver, Colonel Dalzell Payne, Mr. Heath, the members of the JSC who attended the meetings of 13th and 27th January 1972, the members of
29 Day 045/108/07 30 Day 045/111/16 GEN 47 who attended the meetings of 11th and 27th January 1972 and all members of the United Kingdom Cabinet and the Northern Ireland Cabinet.
(1) It is alleged that "those responsible for the planning and control of the operation in fact contemplated the use of unlawful lethal force."
(2) "It is our contention that the prevailing culture, politically and militarily in which the planning and control of Operation Forecast took place was one in which no adequate weight or consideration was attached to the Article 2 rights of the citizens of Derry. It is further contended that this prevailing culture was one which endorsed the perception that the citizens of Derry were hostile to the State and consequently were not to be regarded in the same light as the State would normally regard its own citizens, rather they were to be treated as enemies of the State."
(3) "It is initially contended that the operation was not an arrest operation and we rely on the opening of Arthur Harvey QC in this regard."
(4) "It is further contended that their conduct [i.e. the conduct of 1 Para on Bloody Sunday] evidences a plan which envisaged the use of lethal force. Thirteen acts of murder and a similar number of attempted murders constitutes strong circumstantial evidence of a plan which contemplated the use of unlawful force. Circumstantial evidence which is corroborated by the failure of the state authorities to take any action, disciplinary or criminal, against the soldiers responsible and further corroborated by the cover-up which was the Widgery Inquiry."
(5) "It is contended that this conduct by the soldiers, in the absence of justification, raises a reasonable inference that the shooting of the deceased and wounded was either pre-planned or had the tacit acceptance of those involved."
It is submitted that in a matter of this seriousness such imprecision is objectionable. Finally, in questioning General Ford, Mr. Harvey appeared to withdraw an allegation of intention to kill.
Q. ... This operation to a large extent was coming at a time when you yourself felt there was a definitive moment which provided an opportunity, if it arose, to deal a fatal blow to the Derry hooligans?
A. I think "fatal" is a little over the top, Mr Harvey --
Q. Perhaps it has connotations beyond --
A. -- if I might say so.
Q. -- and I might say that I did not intend, but to deal a significant blow to them? 31
The clients of McCartney and Casey
Lord Gifford QC, in his opening statement on behalf of the family of James Wray, dissented from Mr. Clarke's suggestion in his opening that, as Lord Gifford put it, "because no ulterior plan is referred to in the secret documents which have been disclosed there was therefore no ulterior plan." 32
We say that on the contrary there is a body of evidence already available which does point to the formulation and implementation of a plan, a plan to kill young people in Derry and to teach Derry Catholics a lesson, not a plan to draw out the IRA. That, we will be submitting, was not the plan. I shall refer later to the issue of the intelligence reports which we will be submitting would have indicated to those who were responsible for planning that the IRA would not be using the march, but on the contrary would be staying away from it. 33
This is a clear allegation of conspiracy to murder. However, Lord Gifford did not see fit to particularise his allegation.
We are not expressing a concluded view either as to the details of the ulterior plan or as to all the persons who made it and were
31 Day 258/023/06 32 Day 049/050/09-13 33 Day 049/050/19 Having made an extremely grave allegation, but having reserved his position in this way, Lord Gifford then proposed that:
when we come to the end of all the evidence we will then be able to see with greater clarity what was being planned, both from the documents that we will have from before the event and from an analysis of the events of the day itself.
That point has now been reached but neither Lord Gifford, nor any of those representing Interested Parties making such allegations, has been able to provide sufficient particulars of their various allegations to enable us to respond on behalf of our clients.
In his opening Lord Gifford drew attention “for the moment” to six matters which he suggested point very strongly “to the inference which we at present are minded to draw that there was a plan”. He later suggested that “it is legitimate to infer that there was indeed a plan to do precisely what General Ford had wished to do in his memo [of] 7th January”.
(1) The statements of General Ford and the development of his thinking between December 1971 and January 1972. In particular he refers to the Appreciation of 14th December 1971 and the Memorandum of 7th January 1972. This leads to the following submission by Lord Gifford:
So that, sir, while course 3 in its wider entirety had been rejected, the inference can be drawn that an element of course 3, the shooting of unarmed Derry youths, had been incorporated into the Bloody Sunday operation in order to achieve the objective which was postulated by General Ford in the 7th January memorandum.
34 Day 049/051/05 35 Day 049/051/15 36 Day 049/051/22 37 Day 049/116/16 38 G41.270 How does it look to those who look at the memorandum and then at the events? It looks like this: the desire to kill ringleaders among the rioters had been expressed on 7th January; the opportunity to kill presented itself with the Bloody Sunday March; a tough killing force, the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, was brought into Derry for the occasion. Killing in fact took place on a considerable scale; General Ford was personally on the spot to oversee the operation. Is it not reasonable to infer that the killing may have been deliberately planned in order to fulfil the stated and desired objective? 39
(2) The evidence of Soldier 027 that he was encouraged to "get some kills". In opening Lord Gifford made the following claim:
What we will have to probe is the way that the briefing came down the line. What we know is of course that the briefing came from the High Command through to the Battalion, down to the Company and then finally the ordinary soldiers were briefed, as 027 was, and he was briefed by Lieutenant 119 and we will await his evidence with interest. 40
Despite Lord Gifford's assertion, we are not aware of any evidence implicating anyone above the level of Lieutenant 119 in such a briefing and the only evidence against Lieutenant 119 comes from 027. Whether any reliance is still placed by anyone on his evidence is unclear.
(3) The statement of Guardsman INQ1141 that a couple of nights before Bloody Sunday he had been ordered to investigate the rubble barricade in Rossville Street to find out whether it was rigged with explosives.
(4) The evidence which suggests that the IRA had agreed to stay away from the march and that this intelligence was known to the Army.
(5) Lord Gifford's claim that that the Loyalist community in Derry had received information from the Government which satisfied them that the march would be stopped by force and that riot and bloodshed would result.
39 Day 049/056/07 40 Day 049/059/14 The events of the day show that this, while purporting to be an arrest operation, was not an arrest operation.
Another reason for believing that the killing of unarmed civilians may have been authorised in advance is that as the events in fact unfolded, soldiers fired in various circumstances in which, we will be submitting, they had no reason to feel threatened and they were therefore in flagrant breach of the Yellow Card and indeed of the law. 41
and later:
It was not an arrest operation, it was a killing operation. 42
... The events, we submit, may become more easily explained by the hypothesis that, far from being indisciplined, the soldiers were disciplined; they were following their orders; they were following a plan which authorised them, or at least some of them, to shoot as they did. 43
This leads to the suggestion that:
We must therefore have our minds open, we suggest, to the real possibility that there were in fact two plans: the official plan, an arrest operation, conceived by Brigadier MacLellan and possibly not even ordered by him, and the real plan from the point of view of those in the high command, a killing operation which had been adumbrated by General Ford in his memo 7th January, which was too sensitive to divulge to any but those who really needed to know it on the need to know principle and was on the day ruthlessly implemented by Colonel Wilford and the soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment. 44
41 Day 049/068/22 42 Day 049/069/10 43 Day 049/069/18 44 Day 049/070/21 Lord Gifford then turns to the question of how far his alleged plan was “discussed and approved by those in the military and political hierarchies to whom General Ford was subordinate.”
we submit there are further indications within the evidence that the plan to shoot selected ringleaders of the DYH, to use General Ford’s phrase, that plan was not confined to the cerebrations of General Ford’s mind, but was implemented and approved by the highest members of the political and military hierarchies. This of course is probably the most sensitive issue with which the Tribunal will have to grapple and for the purposes of this opening we propose simply to set down a number of facts and suggest that it may be inferred from those facts that the most senior political leadership up to and including the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and of Northern Ireland, as well as their most senior military advisors, knew that it was intended as part of the military response to the march that firing would be directed at young people who were not gunmen and who, at worst, were rioters. We will need to probe those facts in cross-examination; we may need to supplement them by further evidence.
Lord Gifford, in his opening, relies on the following matters:
(1) He refers to General Ford’s Appreciation of 7th January 1971, points to the fact that it was addressed to General Tuzo and suggests that it is inconceivable that it did not go to General Carver and other senior personnel in the Ministry of Defence. He refers to the lack of evidence that General Ford was ever rebuked or criticised for "his proposal that ringleaders should be killed".
(2) He refers to the meeting of the JSC on 13th January 1971, the minutes of which record that the GOC reported that certain measures were in mind with a view to putting down the troublesome hooligan element. The document states, “It was a very difficult problem to solve within the law.”
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45 Day 049/071/17 46 Day 049/073/13 47 G52.316 (3) Lord Gifford refers to the fact that the minutes of the Director of Operations meeting on 26th January do not refer to the arrest operation and concludes that the decision to carry out an arrest operation was taken "outwith" that Committee. Similarly he suggests that there is no indication that anything that could be described as a "shooting war" was anticipated.
What has happened by the 27th? Is it that General Tuzo has finally agreed to implement the certain measures which he referred to on the 13th and which directly reflect the plan advocated by General Ford? We need to know, and we need to resolve the contradiction between Sir Graham Shillington's view that nothing really had to be decided at the Joint Security Committee meeting at all, all that he and General Tuzo were doing was reporting what the Directorate of Operations had decided, and not to ask approval for anything. There is a clear contradiction in that and the crucial importance that was given to the meeting in the other documents, to resolve that dilemma and that contradiction, the Tribunal must, we submit, seek evidence from whatever sources are now surviving and available as to the proceedings at that meeting.
(4) Referring to the meeting between Mr. Heath and Mr. Faulkner in London on 27th January Lord Gifford asks:
Is it a coincidence that Prime Ministers Heath and Faulkner met, so far as these documents are concerned, met for the first time since 7th October 1971 on a date some three days before the march?
and observes with regard to the note of the meeting at G81.511:
Again we have to ask ourselves what was really said, given the serious worries that had been voiced in the morning, for whatever reason, about what might happen at the Derry march.
He then makes the following submission to which we draw particular attention:
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48 Day 049/094/02-05 49 Day 049/094/23 50 Day 049/096/17 51 Day 049/099/22 But the point is that the note for the record is a note for the record; it does not purport and is not a verbatim report. So that when it is noted that the meeting with the Prime Ministers does not record any evidence of a plan made or approved whether to arrest or to kill ringleaders of the DYH, that does not mean that no such decision was discussed or approved, it just means that in order to draw correct inferences from all these meetings and the events which followed them, we have to look at the whole picture through different documents and we cannot simply say, as we submit Mr Clarke tried a little facilely to do, to say because there is no evidence we cannot conclude there was any sinister plan.
In our submission it is Lord Gifford’s approach which is facile.
(5) Lord Gifford refers to the statement made by James Callaghan M.P., as he then was, in the House of Commons on 27th April 1972:
These tragic events belong in the past. They took place when there was divided responsibility for security and when it is fair to say that very heavy pressure was being brought to bear upon the army commanders to step up their attitude. I do not suppose any of us will ever know whether they were acting on their own judgment or whether they yielded to the judgment of others.
(6) Lord Gifford relies on the memorandum by Colonel Dalzell-Payne at G82.512 and draws the following conclusion:
One sees Colonel Dalzell-Payne referring to a "shoot to kill" policy as a measure of last resort, implying perhaps that it may not have been decided for this march, but at the same time clearly having in mind that some additional measures, some measures having serious consequences had been and might lead to a serious public relations situation on 31st January.
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52 Day 049/101/01 53 It was referred to by Lord Gifford at: Day 049/102/03 (In fact, Mr. Callaghan was unable to recall the source of this information: KC2.1) 54 Day 049/105/17 Lord Gifford relies on a television interview in which Lord Carver refers to rioting in Londonderry:
General Carver: And of course there were immense protests from the Protestant population about what was going on. I mean, it was agreed in the British Government. I mean, it was agreed that something had got to be done.... It was decided by Faulkner .... if this march attempted to come out of the Bogside into the William Street area and towards the Protestant part of town, that not only must it be stopped — and after all an order had been issued when these anti-internment riots started, that all marches were banned, all the illegal marches were banned, that an attempt should be made, if they came, to arrest at least some of those taking an active part. I thought, I thought it was a perfectly reasonable plan.
He made the following submission in relation to this interview:
We accept that in the last part of the interview Lord Carver describes the decision as an arrest operation, but we ask: is that the whole truth? If it was just an operation to arrest hooligans, would that require a decision of the British Government? We would submit clearly no. In any case, as Lord Carver himself says in the early part of the interview, the arrest operation, arresting the young people did not work because once you arrested them, you could not get the charges to stand up in court.
So we submit that in this important interview, which is more explicit than anything said by Lord Carver in his statement, Lord Carver did begin to lift the carpet and uncover the dirty truth.
Lord Gifford made the following submission:
The next factor ... that we pray in aid to show that we can infer that there was not only a plan, but a plan approved in London, is that if, as we have submitted, General Ford, with the approval of his Commander, General Tuzo, had decided to implement on 30th January the plan which he had outlined on 7th January and which General Tuzo himself had been mulling over on 13th January, he could not have done so without the approval first of superior officers, who in turn would need the approval of the political leadership of the country. The best reason for inferring that the plan was approved by the political leadership is that it could not in all reason have been implemented without such approval. 58
He states that there is no evidence of any level in the chain of military command having acted in a maverick way by implementing such a plan without authority and that to have done so would have been an act of gross indiscipline against the normal functioning of political and military structures. 59 He appears therefore to contend that this supports the existence of a secret plan which was approved at a high level in Westminster. This argument is totally circular and self-fulfilling. It seeks to construct a conspiracy to murder from nothing.
(9) Lord Gifford contended that the desire to see law and order imposed by the shooting of rioters was not something which was novel or unthinkable to the members of the British Cabinet at the time. In support of this submission he relies on a statement allegedly made by Lord Hailsham at a meeting of GEN 47 in April 1971. In developing his case Lord Gifford states that “if the reasons for shooting enemies of the Crown appeared justifiable to Lord Hailsham in April 1971, they might have seemed far more compelling to him and his colleagues by January 1972...” 60
(10) While accepting that it is “indicative rather than probative” Lord Gifford further relied, in support of his conspiracy theory, upon the “cold and merciless” response of Mr. Heath to the concerns of the Taoiseach in a telephone conversation on the evening of Bloody Sunday. Mr. Heath’s attitude, Lord Gifford claims, is that of “a leader who had no pity for those who had been slain.” 61
McCartney and Casey state in a letter to the Inquiry dated 15th January 2001:
58 Day 049/110/03 59 Day 049/110/24 – 049/111/05 60 Day 049/113/12 In most cases where one interested party accuses another party of wrongdoing, that accusation is based on evidence within the direct knowledge of the accusing party. However, in the present case, the Interested Parties whom we represent must depend almost exclusively on the Inquiry's staff to unearth all relevant material on the basis of which adverse inferences may be drawn against senior military and political figures. For this express reason, in our opening statement rather than making direct allegations against senior military and political figures, we confined ourselves to indicating areas of questioning and further investigation that we believe likely to lead to evidence supporting such allegations.
We would make two observations in relation to this passage. First, any fair reading of Lord Gifford's opening shows that he was maintaining a positive case of conspiracy to murder. Secondly, such an allegation should not be made without evidence to support it.
Whatever inhibitions Lord Gifford may have felt in opening his client's case, McCartney and Casey make the following allegations in their letter of 15th January 2001 to the Inquiry:
(1) All the members of the JSC present at the meeting on 27th January 1972 knowingly approved a course of action adumbrated by General Ford in his Appreciation of 7th January, namely to shoot selective ring leaders amongst the DYH, after clear warnings have been given. In support of this they rely on:
(a) The Ford Appreciation of 7th January 1971.
(b) The timing and agendas of the JSC meetings.
(c) The fact that certain members of the JSC harboured strong views. (d) The fact that the operation actually carried out was one in which persons seen to be rioters were deliberately shot.
(e) The absence of any disciplinary action after the event.
(f) The false story deliberately concocted to excuse the action taken.
They also rely on the fact that no document shows that any high level decision had resulted in abandoning that proposal.
(2) The plan adopted by the JSC had the approval of "the most senior echelons of the military command", of whom they have to date, so far as we are aware, identified only Lord Carver and Colonel Dalziell-Payne. In support of this allegation they rely on:
(a) The Ford Appreciation of 7th January 1971.
(b) The JSC decision itself "which evinces proof of military input from London".
(c) Lord Carver's documentary interview.62
(d) Colonel Dalziell-Payne's memorandum of 27th January 1971 prepared in anticipation of "some of the problems we may face on Monday 31st January 1971 if events on Sunday prove our worst fears."63
(e) The absence of any disciplinary action after the event.
(f) The failure of Lord Carver to reprimand Ford for the Appreciation of 7th January 1971.
62 X1.28.27-28 Such failure amounts to implicit authorisation of such a shoot-to-kill policy.
(3) Mr. Heath and all the other members of GEN 47 who attended the meeting on 27th January were aware that the JSC meeting “had authorised implementation of the Ford Memo plans ... and participated in the approval of or acquiescence in these plans by GEN 47.” Furthermore, Mr. Heath and all the members of the United Kingdom cabinet who attended the Heath-Faulkner meeting on 27th January were “aware of the JSC decision ... and expressed [their] approval of these plans to Mr. Faulkner.” In support of these allegations they rely on the following matters:
(a) The meeting of the two Prime Ministers was brought about in whole or in part by the imminence of the Civil Rights march.
(b) “The proper inference to be drawn from the fact that the JSC meeting took place in the morning of the same day is that Mr. Faulkner, as prime Minister, would have been fully briefed on all matters of urgent importance, including the fact that the meeting was considering the risk of a “shooting war”, and that he would have indicated his view to Mr. Taylor as to what the meeting should decide.”
(c) “Mr. Faulkner would certainly have apprised [Mr.] Heath of action which had been authorised as above”
(d) The degree of force to be used in stopping the march was recognised to have serious political implications “which would have been notified at the very least to the UK Prime Minister and in all probability to the other members of GEN 47” (e) The fact that the UK government had instructed Mr. Smith to represent its position to the JSC makes it reasonable to infer that the decisions taken would have been promptly reported back to Mr. Heath.
(f) "The absence on the record of any dissent from the plans authorised by the JSC justifies the inference that GEN 47 approved those plans. If the idea had been proposed and rejected, the minutes would be far more likely to have recorded as such."
(g) The note for the record does not contain the full account of the Heath Faulkner meeting.
(h) "We also consider it reasonable to infer that, where a meeting covered a possible future event which might have serious political consequences, the official record of such a meeting was likely to be highly sanitized."
(i) "In line with the foregoing, we allege that if a shoot-to-kill plan had been notified to Sir Edward Heath by Mr. Faulkner and rejected by Sir Edward, the note for the record would have been more likely to reflect the British government's rejection."
(j) "Sir Edward Heath's treatment of Irish Taoiseach Mr. Jack Lynch in their telephone conversation on 30th January demonstrates Heath's implacable hostility to the marchers and the organisers of the march and at no point indicates that its outcome was either surprising or regrettable."
(k) "In the context of the meeting on 31st January between Sir Edward Heath and Lord Chief Justice Widgery, Sir Edward's "propaganda war" reference shows a desire to justify the actions of the army at all costs. Sir Edward appears to have been intimating to the Lord Chief Justice that it was the British Government's position that the findings of his inquiry should not be such as would provide "aid and comfort to the enemy" but rather that the Inquiry had its own role to play in winning the propaganda war."
5J-28 In our submission these are impossible inferences which, in any event, do not begin to support the allegations of conspiracy to murder.
The clients of Brendan Kearney, Kelly & Co.
5J-29 On behalf of Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley, Declan Morgan QC drew attention to the following matters which he said should be investigated by the Tribunal. 64
(1) The appointment of General Ford to his position as Commander of Land Forces. He suggests that there is something sinister in the decision to send General Ford to Ireland as opposed to Germany. He claims that it is necessary to establish:
whether or not General Ford was appointed to achieve a purpose and whether that purpose was connected with any change in Army policy towards civil disturbance and in particular whether it represented any kind of indication of a more aggressive response in relation to that policy. 65
In a submission typical of the various conspiracy theories he states:
Someone in the Ministry of Defence was responsible for making these decisions and they must have had a reason for doing so. 66
(2) The role of General Ford as an observer on 30th January 1972. Mr. Morgan asks: If he was just an observer why did he tell Desmond Hamill that he intervened to give orders to MacLellan? According to Mr. Morgan, a passage in the Hamill interview gives rise to the question:
64 Day 050/018/14-19 65 Day 050/020/19 66 Day 050/020/25 of whether or not there was a scheme, as it were, that was devised here which was going to be put into operation by way of contact with some civilian groups and which was being planned from a reasonably early stage. 67
We simply do not understand the meaning of this allegation. Referring to General Ford’s statement that what was going to occur in Londonderry that day was crucial to the future of Northern Ireland, Mr. Morgan states that:
it causes one to question whether in fact there was within the main plan another plan, a plan to carry out an operation, the detail of which has not been disclosed. In other words, a plan within a plan... 68
(3) The role of Brigadier Kitson. Mr. Morgan suggests that it is “highly likely” that General Ford discussed with Brigadier Kitson the outcome of his visit to Londonderry on 7th January. 69 Mr. Morgan states that General Ford would have been aware of Brigadier Kitson’s “particular skills in relation to questions of peace-keeping, crowd control, dealing with terrorism.” 70 However, he claims that there is “a conspiracy of silence” as to what happened to the Memorandum of 7th January.
(4) Mr. Morgan claims that there were undercover SAS soldiers on the ground on Bloody Sunday. 71 He states that if there were sightings of gunmen in the crowd on Bloody Sunday the Tribunal should satisfy itself that they were not in fact undercover soldiers. 72
(5) There may have been shooting in Sector 2 other than by Mortar Platoon. 73
67 Day 050/025/06 68 Day 050/025/22 69 Day 050/038/03-07 70 Day 050/040/22 71 Day 050/042/16 – 050/045/19 72 Day 050/045/20 – 050/046/02 73 Day 050/046/10 – 050/048/24 (6) Mr. Morgan later returns to the lack of any document recording a response to “Ford's proposal on 7th January to shoot a few hooligans”. Like Lord Gifford he attempts to link the Appreciation of 7th January to the minutes of the meeting of the JSC on 13th January and the Memorandum of Colonel Dalzell-Payne.
That raises the question of whether one is expected to accept that it was a mere coincidence that General Ford, on 7th January, and Colonel Dalzell-Payne, on 27th January, are discussing the same issue, but that there was no indication from one to the other, or process from one to the other whereby one knew what the other was thinking.
In a document sent to the Inquiry on 2nd February 2001 points (1) and (4) above are repeated.
The clients of Desmond J. Doherty & Co. and MacDermott and McGurk
A very different case was advanced by Michael Mansfield QC in his opening. He alleged that there was an intention to “teach those in the Catholic Bogside/Creggan areas a lesson” without indicating what that means beyond saying that it entailed a risk that those who were innocent would be killed:
Ford and Wilford, believed firmly that the Bogside and the Creggan deserved what it got because they had painted in their minds this simplistic picture that anybody congregating on the street in that area must have an unlawful purpose: if it moves, shoot it.
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74 Day 050/055/23 ct sq. 75 Day 050/060/11 76 Day 050/093/07-18 77 Day 050/115/23 In his opening Mr. Mansfield alleges that the authorities “wanted excuses; excuses for carrying out an objective which was quite different.” Later that objective is described in the following terms:
...free Derry presented an anathema that was entirely unacceptable to the political and military authorities of the day. There had to be reoccupation at the earliest possible opportunity and if this meant innocent civilians might be killed or injured, this was an unfortunate but necessary price to be paid for an attempt to flush out the IRA said to be sheltering in the vicinity. In other words the death of innocent people was purely collateral; that is the term now being used in other theatres of war. Make no mistake -- reoccupation of free Derry or the no-go areas was the end game.
Mr Heath wanted it in the sense that he wanted law and order restored as he saw it, otherwise direct rule would be imposed. Mr Faulkner was resisting direct rule at all costs as a calamity and recognised that essentially for there to be economic and political power, there had to be a secure base which meant he had to, one way or another, overcome the problem and the symbol that free Derry presented, and of course the military itself did not wish to be itself down-faced by an area into which, apparently, they could not go.
Mr. Mansfield invited the Tribunal to conclude that the real objective was “to occupy and dominate the Creggan and Bogside, when sufficient forces were available.” Operation Hailstone had been aborted in July 1971 and Operation Motorman was to follow in July 1972:
We say effectively what was on everybody's mind, that at the end of the day the Bogside and the Creggan would be retaken by force, even if it meant saturation, even if it meant there might be innocent people killed. Effectively what happened in January 1972, before Motorman, was an operation which was designed to put a marker down on the population: we, the Paras are here. We did not get in in July 1971. However, the overall objective one day, if not today, is when we come back, do you not dare put your hands up behind a rubble barricade because you will be shot. 81
In a document sent to the Inquiry on 25th January 2001 Desmond J. Doherty & Co. make the following allegations.
(1) “Free Derry presented an anathema that was entirely unacceptable to the military and political authorities of the day. There had to be re-occupation at the earliest possible opportunity, and if this meant innocent civilians might be killed, or injured, this was an unfortunate but necessary price to be paid. In short the mark of Stormont and Westminster authority had to be reasserted and stamped upon the recalcitrant citizens of the Creggan and the Bogside.”
(2) A forcible military occupation was increasingly recognised as the only real way of achieving authority and control.
(3) Whilst the manpower and resources were not available on January 30th to carry out such an operation, our submission is that this was seen as an opportunity to take a step towards the total reassertion of authority through a forcible engagement with the community by front line paratroopers habitually described as “shock troops”.
(4) “On the basis of materials so far disclosed it is possible to infer knowledge and, at least, implicit assent by the officers immediately above Ford, namely Tuzo and Carver, and by one or more politicians at Ministerial level.”
(5) “Once it was clear that the proclaimed plan involved the possible deployment of Paras within the No Go areas resultant deaths of innocent people must have been a foreseeable risk.”
81 Day 050/156/16 (6) The concept of an arrest operation is a sham. It could never have been regarded as a serious manoeuvre and was therefore being used to mask the real and well understood purpose of a forceful incursion against the Catholic community, with its attendant risk of serious injury or deaths. Therefore the use of 1 PARA in this role must have been appreciated and approved at a level above General Ford.
(7) "Although there is no document expressly authorising a forcible incursion by the Paras into the Bogside let alone the use of lethal weaponry in these circumstances, it must have been a clear and inevitable consequence of deploying armed paratroopers on an apparent arrest mission which could have no legitimate chance of success. This must have been appreciated by Tuzo and Carver and whichever ministers were involved in the decision making. Certainly there is no documentation which registers any reservation let alone any prohibition on a fundamentally military operation which might end in a shooting war."
By letter to the Inquiry dated 8th November 2002 Desmond J. Doherty & Co. state further:
(1) Because the UK Rep. was present at the meeting of the JSC on 27th January 1972 the "GEN 47 Group" would have known about the reference to rioting developing into a shooting war.
(2) The GEN 47 document at G78.485.001, which refers to arrests, confirms that Mr. Heath, Lord Carrington and General Carver must have known about the arrest operation.
(3) "Mr. Ramsbotham accepted that the Prime Minister must have been aware of the nature of the arrest operation in order to allow him to be able to speak about it in Cabinet. Therefore we respectfully submit and allege that the arrest operation was therefore authorised when there was a risk of a "shooting war" in a large Civil Rights march." (4) "We respectfully submit that the "military" knew that the arrest operation was a "sham" but we do not say and cannot suggest at this time that Mr. Heath knew or the Cabinet would have known the same (i.e. at Cabinet level)."
5J-35 In questioning General Ford, Mr. Mansfield expressed his case as follows:
The first proposition I want to put to you at this stage as a basis is this: that what you had in mind for the operation on 30th January 1972 necessarily entailed a serious risk that far more unarmed civilians than gunmen would be killed...
The corollary to that, it is proposition number two, ...: that if what you had in mind did not entail that serious risk to unarmed civilians, it is astonishing throughout the time then and the 30 years since, that you have never managed to discover how such highly trained, disciplined and focused troops managed to hit so many targets that were unarmed.
Of course, we say on behalf of the families that the reason you have not discovered it is, in a sense, the answer to that is contained in the first question: that you have known all along that what you had in mind would entail unarmed civilians being killed; ...
5J-36 In our submission this version of the plan within a plan differs fundamentally from those proposed by a number of other Interested Parties. In particular, it does not allege that there was an intention to kill innocent civilians, rather that there was a reckless disregard of the possibility that civilian deaths might occur.
The clients of Barr & Co.
5J-37 Eilis McDermott QC, instructed by Barr & Co. on behalf of Patrick Doherty relies on a memorandum of July 1969 by Sir Oliver Wright, then UK Rep in Northern Ireland, released by the Public Record Office in 2000. It includes the following statement:
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82 Day 260/021/22 In the last resort it must suit the Catholics to get clobbered by us, if that is the only way we can get justice for them.
Miss McDermott submitted:
It is our further contention that Bloody Sunday cannot be considered in isolation. As other counsel have said, and as what I have just read out from the Sunday Telegraph makes clear, the no-go areas and perhaps Free Derry in particular were an anathema to the British Government. There was clearly a military policy formulated for dealing with them which can be seen to stretch from July 1970, the time of the Lower Falls curfew, to Operation Motorman in July 1972. The policy's chief architect was Brigadier General Kitson who, as the Tribunal will know, wrote extensively about low intensity operations and who had considerable experience of the same in many British colonies and former colonies. It was he who released the first Parachute Regiment from Belfast to Derry for Bloody Sunday and in our submission it is vital that this policy be investigated and not just the events of the day.
and she identified the following issues as central to the Tribunal's search for the truth:
7. Whether there existed a culture of cover-up by deliberate obfuscation and who was responsible for this;
8. The relationships between the United Kingdom Cabinet, the Northern Ireland Cabinet, Lord Grey, the Governor of Northern Ireland, and the senior army commanders and, in particular, the way the army commanders assumed control over all security matters after June 1970;
9. The factors coalescing to influence General Ford, such as the influence of Northern Ireland Government ministers, loyalist groups, Protestant businessmen in Derry, army strategic interests and so on; ...
This is the sum of her opening submissions on the point.
In a letter to the Inquiry dated 31st January 2001 Barr & Co. state:
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83 Day 049/010/08 84 Day 049/013/11 85 Day 049/015/01 In adopting the specifics of the replies you have received on behalf of the families of James Wray, Barney McGuigan, William and Alex Nash and Danny Gillespie, we make it clear that we do so based upon our understanding and our interpretation of the material disclosed to us.
What that understanding may be is not apparent. Similarly, Barr & Co. appear to be oblivious of the fundamental differences between the cases advanced by Lord Gifford QC and Mr. Mansfield QC on this issue, both of which are indiscriminately adopted.
5J-II THE ALLEGATION IS NOT MADE OUT
5J-39 These competing and sometimes inconsistent submissions on behalf of various Interested Parties have been set out in some detail to enable the Tribunal to assess the quality of the case for the existence of a conspiracy to murder. It is submitted that the most cursory examination reveals that these submissions do not begin to support such a grave allegation. It may be seen that they are based on conjecture, speculation and inference. The worst possible motives are freely attributed, without any basis, at virtually every step of the argument. Time and again the Tribunal is invited to draw inferences on the ground that they are reasonable and, on this basis, to conclude that there was a plan within a plan amounting to a conspiracy to murder.
5J-40 For reasons set out in Chapter 3 of these submissions, it is submitted that such allegations could be upheld only if the Tribunal were satisfied to the criminal standard on the most cogent evidence that these allegations were proved.
5J-41 Furthermore, before the Tribunal could uphold such an allegation on the basis of inferences from the primary evidence it would have to be satisfied that there was no alternative innocent interpretation of the material which might be correct. Such a case cannot be made out on the basis of reasonable inference. For reasons set out in Chapter 3 of these submissions, before a fact finding body could properly arrive at such a conclusion on the basis of the evidence it would have to be able reasonably to dismiss the possibility of any alternative version of events which did not involve such a conclusion. Further, the Tribunal would have to be sure that any such alternative explanation was untrue. The circumstances must exclude any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.
5J-42 In any event, on any fair reading this edifice of impossible inferences does not begin to support a conspiracy to murder.
5J-43 The Families allege that there was very extensive participation at the highest levels of the Government, the Army and the civil service in this criminal plot. Thus Madden and Finucane identify as participants General Tuzo, General Carver, Colonel Dalzell Payne, Mr. Heath, the members of the JSC who attended the meetings of 13th and 27th January 1972, the members of GEN 47 who attended the meetings of 11th and 27th January 1972 and all members of the United Kingdom Cabinet and the Northern Ireland Cabinet. (Submissions dated 12th February 2001.) It is inherently improbable that all of these senior figures should, without exception, have been prepared to plan and participate in such a scheme.
5J-44 The Tribunal has received full disclosure of contemporaneous records covering the relevant period. These were, for the most part, secret documents which would not have been expected to become open to public inspection. There is nothing in these documents to support the existence of a plan within a plan. While there is some force in the submission that one would not expect participants in a criminal conspiracy to record their plan in writing, even in documents which were believed to be secret, a plot of the scale alleged here could not have failed to leave traces in the contemporaneous documentation.
5J-45 Even if any indication of the true intent could have been kept out of the voluminous documentation produced by so many individuals in Northern Ireland and in Westminster and Whitehall, the implementation of such a scheme would necessarily have involved the willing participation of many others. It is inconceivable that the scheme could have been planned and implemented without information of criminal wrongdoing on such a scale having leaked out. As Mr. Clarke observed in his opening:
*It is, of course, possible for plans to be hatched in secret and kept out of documents that are themselves secret. There is no evidence of that in the papers as I suppose, in an ironic sense, by definition* there would not be. Fulfilment of a plan to keep something out of the documents, even secret documents, would ensure that there was nothing in the documents that related to the plan. But a plan to use the march to provoke a confrontation with the IRA or to draw it out in some fashion would, the Tribunal may think, require both Cabinet approval and military planning or at least one of those.
Such a plan would require a number of very senior personnel from the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff downwards to be involved in, or if not involved, to be deceived or at best to be left in ignorance and could not be carried out at all without giving the necessary instructions to the troops. 85
Equally significant is the fact that in the high level documentation that followed Bloody Sunday no indication has been found of the existence, fulfilment or non-fulfilment of any such plan. 87
On the contrary, the documents before the Tribunal are wholly inconsistent with any such plan. The documents before the Inquiry reveal that during the period from the Autumn of 1971 up to Bloody Sunday the Westminster Government was anxious to take a political initiative which would break the deadlock in Northern Ireland and win the support of the Catholic population. 88 As the following examples make clear, Army planning was taking place in the context of such an initiative in a window of opportunity which, it was thought, might present itself in February 1972.
In a briefing note prepared by the Chief of the General Staff for the Prime Minister for a meeting of Mr. Heath and Mr. Faulkner on 7th October 1971, General Carver argued that a purely military solution was most unlikely to succeed.
The policy at present governing the operations of the security forces is one of maximum vigour in the elimination and apprehension of identifiable terrorists, tempered by a scrupulous care to avoid actions which are, or may be represented as being,
85 Day 003/099/23 87 See the observations of Mr. Clarke in opening: Day 003/099/23 – 003/100/20 88 See the observations of Mr. Clarke in opening: Day 003/099/16 – 003/099/22 indiscriminate as between the terrorists and the general body of the minority community, or deliberately discriminate between Protestants and Roman Catholics as such. It is so tempered in order not to hamper the development of political initiatives, within the existing constitutional structure of Northern Ireland, designed to bring representatives of the minority community into fuller participation in political life, to persuade the minority community that they are not "second class citizens", and thus to erode the support (or at least benevolent neutrality) which substantial sections of the minority community at present afford to the IRA. The success of such initiatives would be a major contribution towards ending the terrorist campaign and permitting the resumption of normal political, social and economic life within the Province.
5J-48 General Carver also observed in this briefing note:
Indiscriminate operations, which do not distinguish between the terrorists and the population among whom they live are self defeating.
5J-49 The record of the meeting between the two Prime Ministers on 7th October 1971 records Mr. Heath as stating that:
...there was now an acute problem of deteriorating morale in Northern Ireland. But he thought that the confidence both in the Province and in Great Britain might be restored if there were clear signs that both governments were working towards a realistic political settlement which should reasonably satisfy the desire of the minority to have their interests represented. ... It was thus essential that any immediate increase in the military effort should be accompanied by parallel political moves.
5J-50 It appears that by the end of December 1971 and thereafter a political initiative in about February 1972 was contemplated. At a meeting of the Ministry of Defence, Northern Ireland Policy Group on 22nd December 1971, attended by among others, the Secretary of State, Lord Carver is recorded as stating:
CGS said that he thought we should aim at some positive political initiative about February, when he judged the security situation
89 G14B.86.9 paragraph 1\
90 G14B.86.10 paragraph 6\
91 G17.121 paragraph 1 would be just right for it. There would only be a short time available for such a move before any hardening of attitudes or backlash set in. It seemed to him that this initiative should have three parts: first, the transfer of responsibility for law and order to Westminster, whether we liked the idea or not; secondly transferring all those areas of governmental activity which were subject to inter-sectarian strife (e.g. education and housing) to public boards; thirdly to enquire into and reorganise representation at Stormont. 92
5J-51 In a draft brief for the use of the Secretary of State for Defence “when GEN 47 next discusses future policy for Northern Ireland”, produced on 29th December 1971,93 Arthur Hockaday stated:
The main theme of this brief is that a lull in violence will not in itself be enough to persuade a significant element of the Catholic community to cooperate in the government of the Province, that we must be ready with a political initiative to take advantage of any fleeting opportunity which a protracted lull in IRA operations may present to us but that a very careful assessment of the Protestant backlash will be an essential ingredient in any judgment on such an initiative. 94
5J-52 In the same way, at the GEN 47 meeting on 11th January 1972 Mr. Heath ruled out a military operation to re-impose law and order in Londonderry while the prospect of a political initiative remained alive:
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the relative quietness of the security situation in Belfast underlined the importance of the search for a political initiative which the meeting would discuss as the next item on its agenda. A military operation to re-impose law and order in Londonderry might in time become inevitable, but should not be undertaken while there still remained some prospect of a successful political initiative. 95
92 G44B.282.4-5 93 G45A.285.1 94 G45A.285.15 paragraph 18 95 G50.309 It is inconceivable that in these circumstances the civil rights march in Londonderry would be taken as an opportunity to draw out the IRA or to teach the Bogsiders a lesson.
In late 1971 and early 1972, the reaction of the United Kingdom Government and the security forces to the virtual state of insurrection in the Bogside and the Creggan was relatively restrained.
Following his visit to Northern Ireland on 15-17 December 1971, General Carver wrote a report for the Secretary of State for Defence on 20th December. In the document, which is marked “Top Secret. Perimeter”, he states:
The situation [in Londonderry] is totally different to that in Belfast. The Bogside and Creggan are no-go areas. To change this would need a major military operation which would demand large numbers of troops, incur a high level of casualties and inflame the situation not only in Londonderry itself, but in the whole of Northern Ireland and particularly in the Republic. To attempt such an operation either in the near future or soon after making a proposal on the lines of that in para. 5 above [i.e. a political initiative] would wreck any chance of such a proposal succeeding. It is clear that the only policy we can sensibly pursue in Londonderry is to maintain a level of military activity which maintains the morale of the Protestants and of our own soldiers, without provoking the Catholic population to an extent which causes us severe casualties, further antagonises them and brings no dividends. Our recent increased activity has tended in this direction and I recommend, as does the GOC and the Brigade Commander, that we adopt a policy of rather less provocative activity than of recent weeks, although higher than the "low profile" attitude adopted in September and October.
This recommendation therefore had the combined support of General Carver, the CGS, General Tuzo, the GOC, General Ford, the CLF and Brigadier MacLellan. This advice was then tendered to the Secretary of State for Defence. This recommendation was accepted by the Secretary of State for Defence. The minutes of the meeting of the Official Committee on Northern Ireland on 5th January 1972 record:
_The Defence Secretary had agreed that the Bogside and Creggan areas should only be entered by troops on specific information and for a minimum of routine patrolling._
It was also accepted by the Home Secretary. The note of the Home Secretary's discussion with the GOC and various senior officers at Lisburn on 14th December states:
_The GOC said that the Army's priorities were first Belfast, second the border and third Londonderry. The position in Londonderry had reached a point where a choice had to be made between accepting that Creggan and Bogside were areas where the Army were not able to go, except on specific information or to mount a major operation which would take ten days and require seven battalions and which would involve at some stage shooting at unarmed civilians. It became clear that the Army preferred the first course, but wanted to make it clear it entailed accepting criticism of allowing "No Go" areas. The Home Secretary said that he had no doubt that the military judgment was right and that it would be wrong to provoke a major confrontation at this stage._
Contrary to the submission of Arthur Harvey QC, General Ford was far from being “an officer who was a willing vehicle for the implementation of the firm, resolute and determined security measures which [the Stormont Government] saw as necessary to deal with the situation in Derry”. While it was his duty to consider and advise on all possible courses of action, the course which he recommended should be followed in Londonderry was one of restraint. It also conformed with the approach adopted by General Carver. Furthermore, the arrest operation on 30th January 1972 as planned was entirely in accordance with General Ford's recommended Course 1 and a half.
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99 G46.287 100 G40.260 paragraph 4 101 Day 043/104/11 All of the proponents of the various allegations of conspiracy rely on paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Memorandum produced by General Ford after his visit to Londonderry on 7th January 1971 at page G48.301. On behalf of the senior officers, our submissions in relation to this document are set out above. In so far as it is appropriate to comment further, we would add:
(1) In his BSI statement Sir Edward Heath states:
I have also been asked by this Inquiry whether I was aware of a proposal, supposedly emanating from General Ford, that some of the young hooligans in Londonderry should be shot, after due warning, as a possible means of restoring law and order in Londonderry. If such a proposal had been approved by General Ford's superiors in the army, it would have reached the Secretary of State for Defence, who would have reported it to me. This did not happen, and I was not aware of any such suggestion. 102
(2) Lord Carrington, the Secretary of State for Defence, rejects the suggestion that General Ford was actually seeking fatalities and adds:
I am sure that no such plan was in existence and, even if it had been, the MoD, the Government and Michael Carver would have had no part in it.
... I can state quite categorically that it was never policy to shoot unless a target had been identified as a threat. 103
He also stated:
All I can say is that we were "Yellow Carding" for all we were worth. I was involved in drafting the amendments to the Yellow Card and we would never have agreed to any course of action which involved the deliberate loss of civilian life. 104
102 KH4.9 paragraph 37 103 KC6.11 paragraphs 20-21 104 KC6.11 paragraph 20 Lord Gifford seeks to place a sinister interpretation on the two memoranda by Mr. Stephens both dated 26th January 1972 at G73.456 and G74.457. While Mr. Stephens may have considered that the choice of tactics for actually dealing with the march was essentially a matter for the JSC, this was not the view of Sir Graham Shillington or the GOC. Sir Graham states in his evidence to this Tribunal:
_The GOC and I agreed that the question of policing marches was an operations matter and as such was to be decided by the Security Forces. It was not a political decision and should not be open to political direction. We did not need approval for our decision; we informed the Joint Security Committee of our decision._
Understandably, Mr. Stephens in these memoranda concentrates on the political consequences of permitting the march to take place and matters of presentation.
In the same way, the following statement in the minutes of the meeting of GEN 47 on 27th January 1972 is concerned with the political implications of the march:
_The meeting agreed that in Londonderry the marchers must be prevented from coming out of the Bogside and Creggan areas; and criticism of the security forces for not entering those areas must be countered by pointing out that it was a matter for military judgement to choose the best place for achieving the aim of preventing the march from reaching its destination._
The meeting’s concern at the prospect of adverse publicity because the Security Forces had not entered the Bogside is hardly consistent with the covert plan which is now alleged.
The statement in the minutes of the meeting of the JSC on 27th January 1972 that:
_The operation might well develop into rioting and even a shooting war_
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105 JS8.11 paragraph 25 106 G79.487 is not open to any sinister interpretation. In the light of the experience of the Security Forces of IRA tactics this was a sensible prediction which, sadly, proved well founded. The suggestion that this is evidence of the adoption by the JSC of a plan to murder Catholic youths is obviously unsustainable.
In his evidence to the Tribunal General Dalzell-Payne candidly accepted that his memo of 27th January 1972 at G82.512 was not clear enough in certain respects and therefore was open to various interpretations. However, any fair reading of paragraphs 12 -15 accords with the account he gave in evidence of his intentions. He had in mind the use of a more aggressive arrest policy and it was to this that "stronger military measures" in paragraph 13 and "additional measures for the physical control of crowds which threaten to march" in paragraph 14(b) referred. This more aggressive arrest policy involved arresting more people and trying them more quickly. It was not in his mind that soldiers were going to use more physical force than they had used in the past to effect arrests. Similarly this was the meaning of the reference to the effect of "firmer measures" on 30th January in paragraph 15. The fact that he was thinking in very general terms is understandable and is not open to the sinister interpretation proposed by Mr. Harvey and denied by the General. He envisaged that the policy of arresting more people and trying them more quickly would be used on 30th January, although it was not his idea. He did not know at the time of writing the paper that CLF had decided that 1 PARA would be used in Londonderry as an arrest force, although he did know on 30th January. He did not remember anyone in the month leading up to Bloody Sunday suggesting that the use of firearms to control a crowd needed to be considered. It was never to his knowledge raised as a possibility for 30th January. When he wrote that paper on 27th January 1972 he had not seen the CLF's memorandum of 7th January 1972, which he first saw when shown it by Eversheds. That came as a complete surprise to him and, so far as he knew, was never seen by the MoD. Far from recommending the use of unlawful force on Bloody Sunday, the document states:
_We must await the outcome of the events planned for the weekend 29/30 Jan 72, see what effect our firmer measures have, and then if necessary advise the Home Office to urge Mr. Faulkner to use his power under the Public Order Act to ban all public meetings, and speed up legal proceedings._
The reference in paragraph 15 to "the only additional measure left for physical control" was a reference to a measure over and above that foreshadowed in paragraph 14(b). He made clear in his evidence that his paper did not envisage shooting people dead for defying a ban on marching, and that that was "the last thing in the world we were going to do."
The differences between the various conspiracy theories are revealing and mutually defeating. The clients of Madden and Finucane advance a case which covers a wide range of possibilities embodied in the nebulous claim that there was "a plan which envisaged the use of lethal force." (Document dated 12th February 2001.) By contrast Mr. Mansfield appears to advance a much more restrained case involving a reckless disregard of the possibility that civilian deaths might occur but based on both an intention to "teach those in the Catholic Bogside/Creggan a lesson” and “an attempt to flush out the IRA said to be sheltering in the vicinity.” On the other hand Lord Gifford, in his opening, expressly denied that there was any plan to draw out the IRA; rather he contended that there was “a plan to kill young people in Derry and to teach Derry Catholics a lesson, not a plan to draw out the IRA.” However, this did not prevent him from questioning General Ford on the basis that there was a plan to draw out the IRA which culminated in the following exchange:
Q. Was it part of the plan for Bloody Sunday to try to attract or provoke an engagement from the IRA who would otherwise probably not get involved?
A. It was not, and there was no covert plan on Bloody Sunday.
In our respectful submission these allegations of conspiracy to murder are so obviously unsustainable as to constitute an abuse of process. The Tribunal should have said so long ago out of fairness to those against whom the allegation is made and in order to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of costs in answering them.
123 Day 050/093/10-11 124 Day 050/154/15-16 125 Day 049/050/19-23 126 Day 258/113/02-06 CLOSING SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENTS OF MR ANTHONY LAWTON
VOLUME 4
CHAPTER 6
SECTOR 1 CHAPTER 6
SECTOR 1
CHAPTER 6A - OUTLINE SUBMISSIONS
6A-I Overview of Sector 1 Submissions ................................................................. 3
CHAPTER 6B - THE PROGRESS OF THE MARCH
6B-I The Progress of the March ............................................................................. 4
CHAPTER 6C - THE BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES TO THE SHOOTING OF JOHN JOHNSTON AND DAMIEN DONAGHY
6C-I The Rioting in Sector 1 - Introduction ............................................................ 8 The Relevance of the Rioting at Barriers 12 and 14 .............................................. 8 6C-II Events at Barrier 14 ..................................................................................... 9 6C-III Rioting at Barrier 12 .................................................................................. 26 Introduction and Summary .................................................................................. 26 Location .................................................................................................................. 27 Military Personnel Present at Barrier 12 ............................................................. 28 Events at Barrier 12 on Bloody Sunday: .............................................................. 29 Evidence of CS Canisters thrown at the Troops by the Crowd ......................... 39 A Second wave of Gas / Rubber Bullets Temporarily Clears the Area Immediately in Front of Barrier 12 ................................................................. 40 Rioting Resumed from Behind Corrugated Iron Shields .................................... 43 The NICRA Banner is Paraded in Front of Barrier 12 ........................................ 46 Rioting Continued after the NICRA Banner was Withdrawn .............................. 53 The Nature and Severity of the Rioting at Barrier 12 ......................................... 56 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 64 6C-IV Events on the Waste Ground Prior to the Shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston ................................................................. 64 Timing of the Rioting in the Vicinity of the Derelict Building ............................ 64 Rioters Assemble in and around the Laundry Waste Ground and Target Soldiers in the Derelict Building ................................................................. 69 The Precise Location and Targets of the Rioters ................................................. 76 The Severity of the Riot ....................................................................................... 81 Nail Bombs ........................................................................................................... 95 Civilian Evidence of The Scale of Rioting in and around the Laundry Waste Ground ................................................................. 104 Rioting was in Progress at the Moment that Live Shots were Fired .................. 109 Evidence Relating to Noise in Vicinity of Derelict Building ............................... 112 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 114 CHAPTER 6G - CIVILIAN GUNMEN IN SECTOR 1
6G-I OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................. 243 Civilian Evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry .............................................................. 244 OIRA Evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry ................................................................. 245 6G-II Defence and Retaliation Order .................................................................................. 245 6G-III OIRA 1's shot from a balcony in Columbceille Court ............................................. 248 OIRA 1's Various Accounts Of Shooting From Columbceille Court .............................. 248 OIRA 1's Shot .................................................................................................................. 290 The Altercation on the Stairs .......................................................................................... 325 6G-IV Civilian Evidence of Other Gunmen In Sector 1 ...................................................... 329 Evidence of other Gunmen Armed with Rifles ............................................................... 329 Evidence of Handguns .................................................................................................... 332 6G-V Military Accounts Of Sector 1 firing ........................................................................ 343 The Presbyterian Church Shot ....................................................................................... 343 Incoming Rounds experienced by Soldiers at Barrier 12 .............................................. 350 Incoming Rounds Experienced by Soldiers behind Barrier 13 ..................................... 353 CHAPTER 6A
SECTOR 1 – OUTLINE SUBMISSIONS
6A-1 Two men sustained gunshot wounds in this Sector, Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. Soldiers A and B both acknowledged in 1972, and consistently since, that they fired 2 and 3 shots respectively at someone in the act of throwing a nail bomb in the area, and at the time, when these two men were injured. There is no forensic evidence linking either of the two soldiers to the injuries sustained.
6A-2 Sector 1 is also important because the rioting and IRA firing in this sector provides an important background to the deployment of troops to conduct an arrest operation.
6A-3 As the march reached the junction of William Street and Rossville Street, the majority of the crowd turned and proceeded south towards Free Derry Corner.
6A-4 A substantial number of those on the march continued on towards Barrier 14 intent upon a violent confrontation with the army. On being denied access to Waterloo Place they began a vicious and sustained assault on the troops behind Barrier 14. At the same time, or shortly afterwards, an attack on Barrier 12 was launched by those further back.
6A-5 The army eventually responded by deploying a water cannon in an attempt to disperse the rioters. CS gas was thrown from the rioting crowd at the soldiers behind Barrier 14. The water cannon and/or that CS gas forced a number of the rioters back from Barrier 14. Some of those who had been repulsed from Barrier 14 continued their assault, but this time against Barrier 12. The army responded with rubbers bullets and CS gas. This was only temporarily and partially effective: it caused the rioters briefly to retreat, but also may have pushed a number of them back, west up William Street towards the laundry waste ground. Here they joined the tail end "marchers" who were by this time themselves attacking the soldiers who were in the derelict building.
6A-6 Word started to spread among the crowd of rioters that there were soldiers vulnerable to attack in the derelict building and a group of rioters, including Damien Donaghy, gathered on the waste ground to the north of William Street and began an attack on those soldiers, and those at the Presbyterian Church.
6A-7 The rioters began hurling objects towards the windows of the building in which Soldiers A and B were positioned. Bricks and chunks of paving were thrown towards and past the windows and nail bombs were heard exploding in the vicinity.
6A-8 Soldier B heard the crump of two nail bombs exploding outside on the waste ground. Soldier A shouted a warning to the platoon that the rioters were using nail bombs.
6A-9 Shortly thereafter, both Soldier A and Soldier B saw a man at the north west corner of the waste ground opposite their position. The man was attempting to light what appeared to be a nail bomb and both soldiers opened fire. Each believes he hit his target.
6A-10 Two people, Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were injured in Sector 1. Neither Soldier A nor Soldier B believes that either of the injured was their target. Each honestly believes that they shot a nail bomber. There is no evidence that either Damien Donaghy or John Johnston were attempting to light a nail bomb when they were hit. There is evidence that Damien Donaghy had been throwing stones and that he was moving in and out from the cover of the building on the east side of the laundry waste ground in a manner similar to that of Soldier A's and B's target.
6A-11 It is, of course, possible that Soldiers A and B are mistaken. If they are, then their mistake was an honest and reasonable one. The following topics are addressed in the submissions on Sector 1:
1. The progress of the march into and through Sector 1.
2. The rioting that took place in Sector 1 at Barriers 12 and 14.
3. The rioting that took place on the waste ground in front of the derelict building with nine windows.
4. The shooting of Damien Donaghy: when was he shot, where he was shot and what was he doing at the time he was shot?
5. The shooting of John Johnston: when was he shot, where he was shot and what was he doing at the time?
6. The shots fired by Soldiers A and B and the justification for them.
7. Civilian Gunmen in Sector 1 CHAPTER 6B
THE PROGRESS OF THE MARCH
6B-1 THE COURSE OF THE MARCH
6B-1 The course and progress of the march on Bloody Sunday is dealt with in detail in the Submissions on Behalf of the Clients of Mr. Robert Aitken, which we have seen in draft. Those submissions are adopted by us and not repeated here other than in summary.
6B-2 In summary:
(1) The march set off at about 14.35.¹
(2) Soldiers manning barriers along the route were subject to verbal hostility. Eamonn McCann’s BSI statement recalls that soldiers manning barricades along the end of the no-go area, particularly in Francis Street, were jeered at by the crowd who “shouted insults and made the usual expressions of hostility.”² The 8 Bde log entry timed at 15.29 records “Large number approaching barrier 9” [Francis Street].³
(3) There is evidence that groups broke away from the march at various points, presumably in order to get ahead of the march and ensure that they could get to army barriers at the end of William Street and were not prevented from doing so by the crush of marchers ahead of them. The 8 Bde log / Porter transcript contain the following entries referring to these breakaway groups:
¹ W113, Serial 111 ² AM77.8 paragraph 14 ³ W44, Serial 113 1522: Crowd moving by Westland St. Elements splitting up to go into Rossville Street.4
1525? ...What is the number that are still now with this group after some have hived off?5
1525? ...The majority are still with them. I would say that they've got a break-off of about, oh, a hundred and fifty, who are at the moment, the majority of them, in the area of the Little Diamond.
...and so the march itself has about 200 strong, 2,000 strong...6
The intentions of this group are clear from Serial 253 timed at 15.31:
There are indications of the normal aggro on the junction of Rossville Street / William Street. Serials 12 and 13 are now being closed. Over.7
Trouble had therefore erupted at the barriers before the front of the march entered William Street at about 15.33.8
4 W43, Serial 106 5 W121, Serial 239 6 W121, Serial 240-241 7 W121, Serial 253 8 W122, Serial 257 Photograph P345 shows as the march proceeded down William Street a substantial group had formed in front of the lorry.
The stewarding was inadequate and incapable of controlling this breakaway group. According to Eamonn McCann:
12. The organisers of the march had clearly been taken aback by the volume of people. The stewards were trying to organise for people to walk in lines of three...However, they were incapable of organising so many people and as soon as it started, the march was chaotic and confused. Their requests for people to walk in line and to keep behind the lorry were ignored. This was a time when a new generation had grown up in Derry and the young in particular did not like taking orders from anyone and certainly not from people from Belfast. I saw that Kevin McCorry had the microphone and he had a Belfast accent.
13. The march was originally led by the lorry ...However, by the time the march had wound down the hill and reached the bottom of Southway, hundreds of people had decided to take a short-cut down a grassy bank so that by the time the lorry reached the bottom of Southway, hundreds of people had overtaken the lorry and were leading the march. This proved to be significant later... ...The people who were walking ahead of the lorry continued across the junction of Rossville Street towards the barricade at the end of William Street.9
(6) The group ahead of the lorry included a hooligan element who were preparing for a confrontation with the army. Nigel Wade's 1972 statement records that:
A lot of people were joining the march as it went on its way, and I noticed in particular youths joining the front of the procession where I was. They looked the same sort of people who regularly riot in the Bogside area. I recognised some of them, and saw them picking up missiles on the way.10
Gerard McDaid was one of these young men. He joined up with 50 or 60 other rioters in Brandywell and making their way to the front of the march. He describes how they were excited and looking forward to a good confrontation.11
(7) Photograph P350 shows a further group of civilians waited at Aggro Corner for the march to arrive.
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9 AM77.8 paragraph 12-15 10 M79.1 paragraph 2 11 Dav 108/016 CHAPTER 6C
THE BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES TO THE SHOOTING OF JOHN JOHNSTON AND DAMIEN DONAGHY
6C-1 THE RIOTING IN SECTOR 1 - INTRODUCTION
THE RELEVANCE OF THE RIOTING AT BARRIERS 12 AND 14
6C-1 The rioting which took place on Bloody Sunday at Barriers 12 and 14 (and to a lesser extent at Barrier 13) is important for a number of reasons.
6C-2 First, and most importantly, although the riots took place at the barriers they were not attacks on the barriers. Rather they were vicious and sustained attacks on the soldiers. They illustrate that large numbers of those on the march were prepared to hurl potentially lethal objects – bricks, paving slabs, scaffolding poles etc – at the soldiers behind the barriers.
6C-3 This is important for the following reasons:
(1) When the arrest operation was launched, it was these rioters whom the soldiers intended to arrest and these rioters who attacked the soldiers conducting the arrest operation.
(2) The evidence of many of those who were prepared, albeit 30 years ago, to launch such a vicious attack on the soldiers must be viewed with some circumspection.
(3) The rioting at Barriers 12 and 14 (and that which followed on the waste ground in front of the house with nine windows) forms the background against which the genuineness of soldier A’s and soldier B’s beliefs should be assessed.
6C-4 Soldiers A and B were in the following situation immediately before the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston:
[ \\text{\\textcopyright 7. 982} ] (1) They were stationed in the house with nine windows and in a position of considerable vulnerability.
(2) There was a violent and sustained riot going on at Barriers 12 and 14 and on the waste ground immediately in front of them. Those involved in the assaults were intent on seriously injuring, or in some cases even killing, the soldiers if they were able to.
(3) Nail bombs were available to and habitually used by rioters in Londonderry at the time.
(4) Nail bombs had been heard exploding close to where soldiers A and B were positioned.
6C-5 It is against this background that soldiers A and B's conduct falls to be judged.
6C-II EVENTS AT BARRIER 14
6C-6 The events at Barrier 14 are dealt with in detail in the Submissions on Behalf of the Clients of Mr. Robert Aitken, which we have seen in draft. Those submissions are adopted by us and not repeated here other than summarily.
6C-7 As the lorry turned south and headed towards Free Derry Corner a significant number of civilians continued down William Street and made a charge on Barrier 14. The 1972 statement of Nigel Wade records that:
4. When the procession reached the Rossville Street corner the youths at the front broke away, and ran down William Street towards the Army barricade. Someone shouted "Charge" as they ran. When they got to the barricade, they started stoning.¹
¹ M79.1 paragraph 4 Some of the group had already picked up missiles to throw at the army. Eamonn McCann told Eversheds:
People were throwing stones and scaffolding poles which they had purloined from a nearby construction site...
The march had been pretty chaotic since the beginning. Some older people and the organisers were making half-hearted attempts to usher the younger people away from the barricade, but mostly without success.²
² AM77.8 paragraph 17, AM77.9 paragraph 20 The group leading the charge were not, certainly at this time, civil rights marchers but were, or included, committed and experienced rioters who had set out with the intention of taking on the army, and seeking revenge for what had occurred at Magilligan. Patrick McCourt had not even been present but recalls that nevertheless “the events of Magilligan had made me and others more hyped up to go on the streets and riot.” He made sure that he was at the front of the march “in case anything started.” McCourt describes himself, and those he was with, as “experienced rioters,” “as a 16 year old rioter at the time, well educated in rioting, I had no fear.”
Paddy McCauley told Eversheds:
I and a number of other like minded youths, (mainly 15, 16, 17 year olds) would gather every Saturday at the junction of William Street, Rossville Street and Little James Street where we would throw stones at the soldiers...
7. On 30 January 1972 the hype was up. I and other hard core rioters were looking for a showdown with the British army. On the previous Sunday, we had been charged by the army on the beach in Magilligan and had the shit beaten out of us. We had no stones with which to defend ourselves and nowhere to run – except the sea. We were therefore going to get our revenge on 30 January by attending the march and forcing our way through to the Guildhall square. My attitude to the march was “fuck civil rights, fuck the British army we are going to the Guildhall”.
...As the march made its way to William Street, I clambered on and off the lorry which was at its head.
10. When the head of the march reached the point marked A [a point to the west of the junction of William Street and Abbey Street]...I and about 50 or 60 other youths ran on ahead to confront the soldiers at the barrier at the eastern end of William Street...Our intention was to prepare the ground for the larger confrontation which we hoped would follow when, as we believed, the march caught up with us at the barrier.8
6C-11 Brian Power put the matter more shortly:
I was looking forward to the march because I was a well known rioter and there was going to be a riot...9
...I remember that some of the older men were trying to stop the rioting and some of the stewards too... Our attitude was that we were not going to be told what to do. They wanted a peaceful demo, but we were keen on a riot.10
6C-12 Mr. Power gave evidence that he and his friends who were fellow rioters had often talked about joining the IRA in the time leading up to Bloody Sunday.11
6C-13 The group at this stage was ahead of the stewards. One of the stewards, Charles Morrison, told Eversheds:
As the lorry turned, I could see that not all of the crowd were following it south onto Rossville Street. A small group of youths had decided to continue east along William Street towards the army barrier. As a steward, I decided to make my way down to the barrier to try and persuade them to turn around and go to Free Derry Corner instead...
I believe there were between 100 and 150 people down at the army barrier on William Street... By the time Kevin McCorry and I reached the barrier a small riot had broken out.12
6C-14 Missiles were thrown by those in the breakaway group towards soldiers behind Barrier 14.
8 AM97.1 paragraphs 7 and 10 9 AP18.1 paragraph 1 10 AP18.2 paragraph 5 11 Day 425/005/23-006/03 12 AM427.8 paragraph 10 At this stage a few stewards were able to make their way in front of the group. Several of the rioters, holding what appear to be long sticks, can be seen on the right hand side of the photographs.
The stewards were unable to hold back the crowd which had swelled behind the rioters. As the crowd approached the barrier the occasional stone was thrown. The soldiers were also the targets of aggressive verbal abuse and spat at.
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13 Video 1, 01:18-40 14 Video 1, 01:41-2:00 Two warnings to disperse were given over a loud speaker by Inspector Junkin, who is captured in Video 1 at the moment that a stone thrown from the crowd knocks off his cap. It is apparent from the video that neither warning had any effect.
The water cannon was used on two occasions on Bloody Sunday. The first time was at approximately 15.44. It was initially successful in clearing the area immediately in front of the barrier. At this stage the vast majority of those who had been simply observing the rioting left the area and either turned down Rossville Street to hear the speeches, or went home. One such individual was Charles Morrison, a steward, who left the area to avoid getting soaked:
A. I think when the water cannon was actually put into use, and that included me personally, I had no desire to get soaked, it sorta just neutralised the situation, people just filtered away after that.
Q. Just before the water cannon came on to the scene, how many people were there at the barrier, how many civilians were there at the barrier?
A. I would say round about 100 to 150 again.
Q. After the water cannon had been used, how many were left?
A. Well, I think most people, including myself, had just decided to go back to Free Derry Corner, you know, it just dispersed the crowd, basically, you know.
As well as clearing the area in front of the barrier, the adding of dye to the water sprayed by the cannon was intended to assist in the identification of rioters. Liam Doherty, a rioter who was himself covered in dye, confirms that by the time the
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15 Video 1, 02:00-02:12 16 W171, Serial 120 17 P390-395 18 Day 126/091/20-092/07 water cannon was deployed those who had no interest in rioting had headed off down Rossville Street to see the speakers.19
6C-20 Some of those who had been rioting at Barrier 14 turned and focused their attentions on Barrier 12, others retreated up William Street and began targeting soldiers deployed to the north of William Street in the area opposite the laundry waste ground.
6C-21 A hard core group of rioters remained in the area of Barrier 14. Two CS gas canisters were thrown by civilians. One lodged under the water cannon and caused it to withdraw.20 It was redeployed once the crew had recovered from the effects of the gas.
6C-22 P1060: CS gas is visible billowing from beneath the water cannon.
6C-23 The BSI statement of PIRA18, William Joseph Anderson, appeared to contain an admission to having thrown a gas canister at soldiers behind Barrier 14, although in circumstances somewhat different to that suggested by the photographs:
Danny [McLaughlin] and I reached the corner of William Street and Chamberlain Street where there was a riot going on. There
19 AD80.2 paragraphs 8-9 20 W45, Serial 134 timed at 1548 "... 14 & 15 bombarded with stones, HOOLIGANS USED CS"; W125, Serial 320 "... there is a hooligan fringe at serials 14 and 15. Some CS has been used, but this was used by them. I repeat used by them. Over." was a lot of stone throwing, and bottles flying over the barrier towards the army... Whilst we were standing at the corner two people approached us. They said that they had a gas canister which they wanted to throw at the army and asked Danny and I to help them. ... It may have been two friends who approached us, or it may have been people who recognised me as being in the Movement...
Danny and I, in any event, agreed to help the two lads. We went south down Chamberlain Street, turned into and up Harvey or High Street, and then turned north into Waterloo Street. When we reached the point marked C [junction of William Street and Waterloo Street] ... we threw the gas canister west down William Street towards the soldiers at Barrier 14.21
Mr. Anderson refused to accept that he must be wrong about the location from which the canister had been thrown.22 According to his BSI statement, having thrown the gas canister Mr. Anderson went back to Barrier 14 and joined in the rioting.23
Sustained rioting resumed and intensified after the water cannon had withdrawn. Numerous photographs capture a group of dedicated rioters attacking soldiers from behind corrugated iron shields.
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21 APIRA18.3 paragraph 10-11 22 Day 408/038/14- 041/05 23 APIRA18.3 paragraph 12 This period of rioting was also captured by a film crew.\\textsuperscript{24}
After the first occasion on which the water cannon had been used only those intent on rioting remained in the area.
\\textbf{P504:} The second deployment of the water cannon was timed at 16.05 by I.T.N. producer, David Phillips.\\textsuperscript{25} The large quantity of water on the ground in the
\\textsuperscript{24} Video 1, 02:12-02:20 \\textsuperscript{25} M66.2 photograph below suggests that this photograph was taken after the second deployment of the water cannon.
The rioting was vicious and justified launching the arrest operation. Stones, bottles, bricks(^{26}) and iron bars(^{27}) were thrown. Bernard Smith agreed that the purpose of the rioting was to injure soldiers as badly as possible.(^{28}) Gerard 'Mad Dog' Doherty, took part in the assault on soldiers behind Barrier 14. He confirmed that rioting did not constitute 'active service' and that therefore, as a member of the Provisional IRA, he was free to take part. He agreed that he, and the crowd he was with, would have killed soldiers if the opportunity had presented itself:
MR. GLASGOW: ... you have already agreed that you would have killed people during the course of that riot if you could. We do not want to dilute it at all, do we, you have already admitted on oath -- I am sorry, on affirmation, that you would have killed soldiers if you could have got your hands on them.
A. Yes.
Q. On this day?
(^{26}) P1043-5, P1048, P1051, P1054, P1059, EP3/2 (^{27}) Video 1, 02:59 (^{28}) Day 067/025/18-026/04 A. Yes, that is right.
Q. So the answer you have just given at the invitation of the Chairman to the Tribunal to tone it down, to suggest it was just bottle and stone throwing –
LORD SAVILLE: Again, Mr. Glasgow, I do not think there is anything between you. What this witness is telling us is that this is not an active service activity. He would be with a crowd of other people of about his age -- you must tell me if I am wrong about this -- all of whom were perfectly prepared to throw stones and bottles at the soldiers in an attempt to maim or even kill them.
A. Yes, that is right.
LORD SAVILLE: But that was not an active service activity ordered by the Provisional IRA; is that what you are telling us?
A. Yes, that is correct.29
6C-29 The Tribunal heard similar evidence from another rioter, Billie Gillespie. He confirmed that soldiers and the police were regarded as legitimate targets for hatred, injury and, where possible, death. Mr. Gillespie favoured the use of a catapult, loaded with marbles or round cobble stones “these would cause the most damage.”30 He agreed it was a powerful weapon capable of causing really serious injury, but denied having a catapult on Bloody Sunday.31
6C-30 Rioting continued until very shortly before 1 PARA deployed. The deployment of the corrugated steel shield and the lifting of Barrier 14 are both referred to in the Porter tape timed at 16.09.32 Billie Gillespie describes running from the barrier at the moment that the snatch squad deployed:
Rubber bullets were being fired at us from behind ... Barrier 14... All of a sudden, a snatch squad of about 30 soldiers came from Doherty’s lane (which was the old butchers) at the back of the Embassy Ballroom. They came towards us with batons. We ran away from the barrier and I turned left (south) down Chamberlain
29 Day 400/130/10-131/09 30 AG33.1 paragraph 4 31 Day 084/173/04-176/09 32 W128, Serials 367 and 370. Street, away from William Street ... the crowd were running away from the barrier falling over each other.33
6C-31 Mr. Gillespie confirmed that he, and a dozen or so others who remained at the barrier until the last minute, took up stone throwing in the car park of the Rossville Flats as the soldiers arrived in the area. He confirmed that Michael Bridge was amongst this group and that he saw him throw a brick towards a soldier.34
6C-32 Patrick Long’s evidence was that a hundred or so people were near the barricade at the time 1PARA deployed, half of whom were throwing stones, the other half looking for stones. As the soldiers climbed over the barrier this group ran, most headed up Chamberlain Street.35 Willie Healey put the number of stone throwers at the time of 1PARA’s deployment at about thirty:
Q. Can you tell us what the scene was immediately before the barrier was parted at barrier 14; what was going on? A. Well, the army was firing rubber bullets.
Q. Stone throwing still going on? A. Yes.
Q. Approximately how many people were there at the barrier at that stage, engaged in throwing stones at the army? A. About, um, about 30.
Q. Were there others watching them or had the spectators departed? A. Well, there was some watching, some spectating, you know.36
6C-33 A number of the known dead and injured were photographed in amongst the rioters at Barrier 14:
33 AG33.1 paragraph 5 34 Day 084/182/06-184/04 35 Day 068/120/21-123/21 36 Day 078/090/18-091/06 (1) Michael Bridge was captured at the forefront of the group which led a charge on Barrier 14 facing those leading the charge.\\textsuperscript{37}
Mr. Bridge was later photographed in the midst of the hard core group of rioters who remained after the water cannon had been deployed for the first time.\\textsuperscript{38}
Mr. Bridge was captured in another photograph probably on the second occasion that the water cannon was deployed.\\textsuperscript{39}
\\textsuperscript{37} P372 / P372.001 \\textsuperscript{38} P382 / P382.001 \\textsuperscript{39} P394 / P394.001 He also appears in a photograph sheltering behind corrugated iron sheeting.\\textsuperscript{40}
(2) John Young was photographed in amongst rioters at the end of Chamberlain Street.\\textsuperscript{41} Mr. Young has also been identified in other photographs showing the latter stages of the riot at Barrier 14.\\textsuperscript{42}
(3) Alana Burke confirmed that she had been shouting at soldiers in the photograph below,\\textsuperscript{43} and that she was later covered in dye from the water cannon.\\textsuperscript{44}
Paddy Walsh who was subsequently photographed near the body of Patrick Doherty appears in the foreground of the photograph below, with a handkerchief tied round his mouth and nose. In the background of the photograph a large
\\textsuperscript{42} P380 / P380.001; P383 / P383.002 \\textsuperscript{43} EP5.2 \\textsuperscript{44} Day 076/094/01-095/09 number of rioters are visible sheltering behind the wall at the end of Chamberlain Street.\\textsuperscript{45}
Known paramilitaries also appear in the photographs taken at the barriers, or have admitted to taking part in the rioting:
(1) Barney McFadden was photographed with his face to the crowd as they pressed up against the barrier.\\textsuperscript{46}
(2) OIRA 7 disobeyed stewards who were shouting for people to follow the march down Rossville Street and went to Barrier 14.
\\textsuperscript{45} P386A / P386A.001 I thought there would be a bit of craic by going down to the barricade in William Street to see if we could get through, as the Guildhall was a goal that would have satisfied me... The crowd threw stones. I threw stones myself and the photograph annexed to the statement shows a person I believe to be me near the front of the crowd. I don't know why I got so near the front but it was probably just a short burst of over enthusiasm.47
Paragraph 132 of his BSI statement states:
I have already been referred to the evidence of Tony Martin... In paragraph 18 of his statement he refers to a man called [redacted] telling some youths to behave. It was not unusual for me to tell 14 or 15 year olds not to throw stones so this might be me, though I have no recollection of doing so.48
OIRA 7 was referred to this section of his statement by Edmund Lawson Q.C.:
Q. Do you think that was you, that he is describing you; this is a classic case of: "do as I say, not do as I do"?
A. Yes, that is possible, yes. I mean, 14, 15-year olds were just getting in the way.
Q. Proper stone throwing had to be left to the big boys?
A. Yeah, well, young people getting hit on the head with plastic bullets was a definite and possible risk.49
(3) Sean Keenan (Jnr) agrees that he went to Barrier 14. He claims to have left before rioting broke out. He has been identified by Brian Power as the man holding a cigarette with an afro style hair cut in EP5.1 (marked with an arrow and saved as AP18.7), a photograph in which Alana Burke has also been identified as the lady in the dark coat, third from the right with her back to the photographer.50
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46 P373 / P373.001 47 AOIRA7.5 paragraphs 23-24. The photograph referred to in this paragraph was not distributed. 48 AOIRA7.23 paragraph 132 49 Day 398/144/06-13 50 Day 425/010/21-011/06 51 EP1.001 Gerard 'Mad Dog' Doherty confirms that he was at the forefront of the rioting at Barrier 14:
*I made my way to the army barricade marked as Barrier 14. A crowd of about fifty or so were throwing stones and trying to pull the wire away so we could get through... The stewards were trying to talk the people out of a confrontation but I think everyone thought “Fuck it”. We were leaning over the barricade, shouting and pulling at it and throwing stones.*
PIRA18, William Anderson, admits taking part in the rioting and being party to the throwing a gas canister at Barrier 14.
OIRA 8 headed towards Barrier 14 but says he did not participate in the rioting he observed.
6C-III RIOTING AT BARRIER 12
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
As the march reached the junction of William Street and Rossvile Street one group of rioters broke away from the body of the march and, as discussed above, headed down William Street towards Barrier 14 where a vicious riot ensured.
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52 AD65.2 paragraphs 7-10 53 APIRA18.3 paragraphs 10-12 54 AW14.1 paragraphs 4-5; Day 410/043/12-22 A secondary group broke away and began attacking the troops behind Barrier 12.
A water cannon was used to soak the rioters at Barrier 14 and a substantial number of those rioters were forced back from the barrier and joined the attack on the soldiers at Barrier 12.
The soldiers behind Barrier 12 eventually responded by seeking to disperse the crowd using rubber bullets and CS gas. These measures initially had little effect, but a second wave of rubber bullets and gas temporarily cleared the area immediately in front of the barrier.
The rioters regrouped, this time using sheets of corrugated iron as shields. The onslaught continued.
LOCATION
The location of Barrier 12 is clear from the photographs taken on Bloody Sunday. It ran from the northern end of Sterritt & Henry Garden Supplies to the building on the corner of Sackville Street and Little James Street.55
55 P244 Barrier 12 was positioned just to the south of the imposing Hogg and Mitchell factory.\\textsuperscript{56}
Like Barrier 14, Barrier 12 was composed of a series of knife rests and barbed wire.\\textsuperscript{57}
**MILITARY PERSONNEL PRESENT AT BARRIER 12**
Barrier 12 was manned by the soldiers of 22 Light Air Defence Regiment.
INQ1326 was in command of Barriers 12 and 13.\\textsuperscript{58} His evidence was that:
\\textit{Our instructions were to prevent the march leaving the Bogside by manning barriers, which had been pre-positioned in the streets...}\\textsuperscript{59}
INQ1326's recollection is confirmed by the "Confirmatory Notes to Orders" of Lt Col Ferguson, CO 22 LAD RA, which record:
\\textsuperscript{56} P356\
\\textsuperscript{57} P242\
\\textsuperscript{58} C1326.2 paragraph 8\
\\textsuperscript{59} C1326.1 paragraph 7 2. MISSION
To contain any march on 30 Jan, together with any accompanying rioting, within the Bogside and Creggan areas of the City within the regt bdrys.
6C-47 INQ1326, realising that Barrier 12 was "more likely to attract trouble" than Barrier 13, personally positioned himself behind Barrier 12. Rioting in Little James Street and Sackville Street was common at the time, hence the sobriquet 'Aggro Corner'.
EVENTS AT BARRIER 12 ON BLOODY SUNDAY:
The March Reaches William Street: A Break Away Group Heads for Barrier 14.
6C-48 As the head of the procession came down William Street there was no serious trouble close to Barrier 12. P242 shows Barrier 12 at approximately the time the front of the march was coming down William Street. The ground is apparently free of debris, and the soldiers have not yet picked up their riot shields. INQ1326 is still wearing his beret.
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60 B1122.055 61 C1326.2 paragraph 12 62 The timing of this photograph is clear from contact prints P233.041:19A-20A. P242 is an enlargement of contact print 20A. The photograph immediately before it on the roll, 19A, shows the main body of the march making its way down William Street. Soldier 109 stated that:
There was initially no confrontation between the marchers and us and the march proceeded quite peacefully down William Street, without any shouting and yelling except, I believe, shouting slogans until the marchers realised that the march was not to be allowed to move through into the city centre.
As the front of the march reached Aggro Corner a large 'break away' group proceeded up William Street towards Barrier 14. The rioting which then ensued at Barrier 14 is dealt with in the Submissions on Behalf of the Clients of Mr Robert Aitken, which we have seen in draft.
Rioting at Barrier 12 before the Deployment of the Water Cannon at Barrier 14.
Although the majority of the rioting at Barrier 12 took place after the water cannon had been deployed at Barrier 14, there is no doubt that, as a charge was being made on that barrier, a number of rioters broke away and headed for Barrier 12.
P354 illustrates this: as the bulk of the crowd makes for Barrier 14, a number of people on the right hand side of the photograph appear to be heading towards Barrier 12. Soldiers at the barrier confirm that they were targeted at this stage:
INQ1326:
...as the march approached, the main crowd continued east along William Street and only the aggressive elements, mostly youths, approached the barriers.
I remember seeing the marchers first appear. I did not know exactly where the march was going, but it went east along William Street and a considerable number of people, mainly youths, detached from the march, came over and started throwing stones at us.
Soldier 123 observed events at Barrier 12 from his position on the roof of the Embassy Ballroom. His RMP statement records that:
[the procession] then turned into Little Diamond and then proceeded down William St towards Waterloo Place.
It was then that I saw a crowd of youths standing at the junction of Little James St/Waterloo St.
As the crowd arrived at the junction, the youths and other people in the crowd started stoning one of the barriers situated at the junction of Sackville St / Little James St. The remainder of the march moving towards another barrier in William St near Waterloo Place manned by members of the 2 RGJ...
INQ0785:
The Battery Commander and I were behind Barrier 12 when we finally saw the crowd. It filled Little James Street and the waste ground to the east of it. People at the front of the crowd appeared to realise that they were going to be pushed one way or another because of the barriers. Things started to get more heated and the barriers became something for the crowd to vent their anger on. They started off by throwing the odd missile but soon mayhem broke out. There were some peaceful marchers who obviously
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63 B1723.003 paragraph 12 64 C1326.3 paragraphs 14-15 65 B1772 wanted to get away from the trouble and they were heading south down Rossville Street, leaving the hard core behind. 66
6C-57 Several civilians observed or have admitted to taking part in rioting at Barrier 12 at this early stage:
(1) Charles McLaughlin in an undated statement attached to his BSI statement describes going directly to Barrier 12: 67
I was at the front of the march. I was with Tony Morrison. At William Street when the march reached the British Army Barricades a riot started. We joined in the rioting. I was rioting at the barrier at Little James Street. 68
(2) Gerard McDaid gave evidence that he was one of a group of 50-60 rioters who had gathered in Brandywell and who had made their way to the front of the march and headed straight for Barriers 12 and 13, by which point they numbered 70-80. 69
(3) James Joseph Kelly told Eversheds:
As the crowd moved down William Street ... the head of the march seemed to go towards the barrier which had been erected across William Street (Barrier 14). There was some stone throwing to my left in Little James Street where the GPO sorting office was and I could hear people yelling and shouting the usual type of expletives at the army. 70
6C-58 As the area in front of Barrier 14 became congested, rioters further back in the march turned their attentions on Barrier 12.
66 C785.1 paragraph 9 67 Day 177/071. His evidence to this Inquiry was that he joined a crowd of about a dozen others already rioting at Barriers 12 and 13 at approximately 3 o'clock, i.e. before the front of the march had entered William Street. Given the apparent absence of stones on the ground in photographs such as P242 it is likely that any rioting prior to the march reaching Aggro Corner was light by comparison with what later occurred. 68 AM321.8 69 Day 108/016-019 70 AK12.2 paragraph 6 John Joseph Doherty:
The march was stopped at the City Picture House by an army barricade shown as Barrier 14 ... people were packed into the street and I could not get any further forward ... I noticed that there was an army barrier across Little James Street ... and I decided to riot there. I moved north up Little James Street ... This was waste ground and there were plenty of stones to throw at the soldiers behind the barrier ... There were also soldiers in Sackville Street ... There was a crowd of us in Little James Street who started to throw stones and rubble at the soldiers behind the barricade in Little James Street.71
Patrick McCallion watched the rioting break out at Barrier 14. Fearful that a snatch squad would be deployed he turned back up William Street before the soldiers behind Barrier 14 had taken any action.72 As he looked north Mr. McCallion saw a smaller group of people catcalling and stone throwing at the army behind the barrier in Little James Street.73
Patrick Eugene McCallion also describes witnessing and taking part in rioting at Barriers 12 and 13 prior to the deployment of the water cannon at Barrier 14.74
The Number of Rioters at Barrier 12 was Swelled by Rioters Running from the Water Cannon used at Barrier 14.
The main rioting at Barrier 12 broke out immediately after the water cannon had been deployed at Barrier 14. The cannon was used on two occasions on Bloody Sunday. The first instance was at approximately 15.44.75 It was initially successful in clearing the area in front of Barrier 14. Rioters and marchers were forced down
71 AD75.2 paragraphs 6-8 72 Day 071/141/02-071/143/01 73 AM74.2 paragraphs 8 74 AM75.2 paragraphs 7-9 75 W171 serial 120 “The water wagon now in action, firing red dye into crowd. Crowd has moved back safely with it”; serial 121: “time now 15.44” William Street towards Aggro Corner. At this stage a much larger number of rioters transferred their attention to the soldiers behind Barrier 12 and Barrier 13.
Serial 322 timed at 15.49 (i.e. five minutes after the use of the water cannon at Barrier 14) records “Serials 12 and 13 also under heavy bombardment from normal hooligans.”
The initial deployment of the water cannon is captured on Video 3. The footage shows that a reduced number of rioters renewed their assault on Barrier 14 and a large group of rioters hurled stones and other debris in the direction of Barrier 12 as they poured onto the Aggro Corner waste ground.
Lieutenant 009 was deployed to the observation post on the Embassy Ballroom. His 1972 statement records the movement of the crowd from Barrier 14 to Barrier 12:
Some sort of action was taken by the Royal Green Jackets but as this was out of my vision I could not see what it was ... the crowd appeared to be forced back from the road block and spread into Rossville Street... At the same time a crowd of about 50 youths, several of whom I recognised as previous troublemakers assembled at the Rosville / William junction and moved onto the waste ground, where they stoned the soldiers manning the road block located in Little James Street and Sackville Street.
Soldier 140’s RMP statement suggests rioters may also have been retreating from CS gas in the area of Barrier 14.
After a few minutes I saw smoke coming from the barrier [14] and knew that CS Gas had been fired by the troops down at the barrier.
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76 P390-395 77 W171, Serial 120 78 W125, Serial 322 79 Video 3: 01.52-02.27 80 Video 3: 02.27-02.40; P382-384 81 Video 3: 02:40-02:54 82 B1389 Then I saw a lot of the crowd return to the junction and the waste ground holding handkerchiefs and scarfs over their faces.
Not being able to get to WATERLOO PLACE they began to advance towards our barrier, shouting as they came, then just before they reached us a hail of stones and bricks plus assorted missiles were thrown at our positions.
There is a body of evidence which suggests CS gas was present in the area of Barrier 14 shortly after the water cannon had been used, and that it was deployed by civilians not the army (see further the Submissions on Behalf of the Clients of Mr Robert Aitken, which we have seen in draft). However, it is unlikely that Soldier 140 would have been in a position to know who had fired the gas canisters from his position behind Barrier 12.
A number of rioters have confirmed that they relocated from Barrier 14 to Barriers 12 and 13 when the water cannon was used:
(1) Charles McGill told Eversheds:
I retreated back along William Street towards Little James Street. The army were positioned at Little James Street and Sackville Street... There were stones lying all around the area and a riot started. People, including me, started throwing stones at the soldiers behind Barrier 12.
(2) John Duddy gave up rioting at Barrier 14 after being soaked by the water cannon. He moved towards Barrier 12 and joined in the riot which was taking place there.
(3) James Joseph Quinn had been throwing stones at Barrier 14. He moved away from Barrier 14 to escape gas in the area.
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83 B1865.005 84 W125, serial 320 timed 15.48 refers to the use of CS gas by civilians at Barrier 14. 85 AM230.2 paragraph 9 86 AD148.6 paragraphs 6-7 87 Day 179/037 I then saw a crowd of between 50 and 60 people throwing stones and bricks at the barrier on Little James Street... I thought I would join them and throw some more stones as well.88
(4) Billy McGilloway, also moved to Little James Street to riot after the water cannon had been brought forward.89
(5) Liam Doherty confirmed that he and others who had been rioting at Barrier 14 transferred their attentions to the soldiers behind Barrier 12. He spent only five to ten minutes rioting at Barrier 12 because of the amount of gas in the area.90
(6) Don Mullan moved away from Barrier 14 where he felt claustrophobic and threw “one or two” stones at soldiers behind Barrier 12.91
Francis Dunne describes in his NICRA statement arriving at Aggro Corner after the water cannon had been used (apparently for the first time) and witnessing the movement of rioters to Barriers 12 and 13:
By the time the section of the march I was with had reached the junction of William St. and Rossville St. the army already had used gas and purple dye. Confusion was caused by the mass of people retreating up from the water cannon into the oncoming marchers... Many teenagers in the march then broke towards Sackville St. and had a go at the military barrier there with stones and waste from the waste ground there.92
Further rioters continued to join as the march proceeded down William Street. James McNulty was at the back of the procession. He approached Barrier 12 and
88 AQ10.2 paragraph 10 89 AM235.1 (NICRA). 90 Day 060/086-087 91 AM448.3 paragraphs 17-20; this section was adopted in evidence Day 148/102. 92 AD173.1 joined in the rioting after word had reached him, whilst in William Street, that someone had been shot.93
6C-71 A significant number of civilians stood on the Aggro Corner waste ground and observed the rioting at Barrier 12.
6C-72 Francis Dunne reached the junction of William Street and Rossville Street after the water cannon had been used at Barrier 14.
I saw photographers and others who had been to the front of the march covered in scarlet dye. The retreat of the front rankers into the press of the rear of the march caused much confusion and many people started to drift across Rossville Street. Some younger members of the marchers moved left towards the army barricade across Little James Street and attacked this with stones and bottles. This developed into a brisk engagement with the army replying with rubber bullets and gas.94
6C-73 According to Michael Noel Quinn, who was drenched by the water cannon, most of the rioting at this stage was directed at the army in Little James Street.95
6C-74 Michael Quinn’s account to Jacobson and Pringle was as follows:
... the water cannon came in and the crowd rushed back up William Street, my back got soaked by purple dye, then CS was fired and there were people fainting. The crowd went back up William Street and some broke away to stone the barrier at Little James Street.96
6C-75 Michael Geoffrey Taylor:
I saw the parade going past in William Street. I then heard cheers coming from the eastern end of William Street. A short time later some of the crowd moved back down William Street and some of
93 AM377.1 paragraphs 2-4 94 AD173.4 95 AQ11.19 paragraph 7-9 96 AQ11.10 them, mostly youths, came into Little James Street until quite a crowd had gathered.97
6C-76 There is some evidence that groups of rioters moved to and fro between the barricades.
6C-77 Michael Canavan noted that:
The rioters were running backwards and forwards from William Street to Sackville Street from barricade to barricade. I didn’t actually see them attack anything; I wasn’t concentrating on that. But there were about 100-200 of them, running in strange waves to and fro. But as the gas came I couldn’t see anyone in William Street apart from the rioters.98
6C-78 Joseph McKinney, who admits having taken part in the rioting at Barrier 14, estimates the group around the barriers numbered approximately 100, some of whom “moved between Sackville Street and William Street.”99
Soldiers Behind Barrier 13 were also Targeted by the Rioters.
6C-79 Barrier 13 was also the focus for rioters. Soldier 034 was behind Barrier 13100 he confirmed that a riot broke out at Barrier 13. INQ1326 stated,
I could not actually see Barrier 13 from my position behind Barrier 12, but I could see that the rioters in front (to the south) of Barrier 12 were also throwing stones at Barrier 13. From the point of view of the rioters, the barriers were virtually one and the same and they were rioting at both of them. I stayed behind Barrier 12 throughout the riot.101
97 M75.1 98 KC4.4 99 Day 076/112/17-25 100 B1624.002 paragraph 11 101 C1326.3 paragraphs 15 Francis Dunne refers to a crowd throwing stones at soldiers and police behind Barriers 12 and 13.\\textsuperscript{102}
Patrick Eugene McCallion says he was one of a group of rioters who threw stones at the soldiers behind Barrier 13.\\textsuperscript{103} Gerard McDaid said he was part of a assembly of 50-70 others rioting on the waste ground in between Barriers 12 and 13.\\textsuperscript{104}
**EVIDENCE OF CS CANISTERS THROWN AT THE TROOPS BY THE CROWD.**
There is evidence that during the course of the riot a number of gas canisters were picked up by the rioters and thrown back at the troops behind Barrier 12. Military accounts of this happening include:
\\textit{Our troops fired CS gas canisters at them and rubber bullets, whenever the yobs got close enough to threaten the position of the barriers... the yobbos used corrugated iron sheets to protect themselves. They would run forward and pick up the CS gas canisters we had fired and throw them back at us.}\\textsuperscript{105}
INQ0863 also refers to CS gas canister being thrown by the rioters.\\textsuperscript{106}
A number of civilians have also referred to gas canisters being thrown back at the troops behind Barrier 12.
Daniel McGuinness, brother-in-law Dr. McClean, witnessed this:
\\textit{At least one smoking canister was picked up by a youth and thrown back along Little James Street.}\\textsuperscript{107}
\\textsuperscript{102 AD173.24 paragraph 6} \\textsuperscript{103 AM75.2 paragraph 7} \\textsuperscript{104 Day 108/018-019} \\textsuperscript{105 C785.2 paragraph 10} \\textsuperscript{106 C0863.2 paragraph 12}
\\textsuperscript{107} Colm O'Domhnaill (referred to in the note as O'Donnell):
the army fired canisters of CS gas and rubber bullets. Some CS canisters were picked up and thrown back at the troops, and the cloud of gas momentarily drifted back on them, then drifted towards the crowd which broke up into Rossville Street and along William Street, with many suffering severe discomfort. 108
Michael Geoffrey Taylor, a reporter for the Londonderry Sentinel, witnessed events from the north side of Barrier 12:
...I saw some clouds of purple smoke coming from canisters which the soldiers threw at the crowd but which in some cases people in the crowd were able to pick up and throw back. 109
Video 3 captures the moment when CS gas was fired by the soldiers behind Barrier 12 at rioters who were pelting them with rubble from the waste ground. 110 The rioters, many wearing handkerchiefs around their mouths and noses, momentarily retreat south away from the clouds of gas. Others shelter behind a make-shift barrier to the left of the frame. One man can be seen running back into the cloud of gas. 111 The man appears to stoop and pick something up, quite possibly a gas canister in order to throw it back at the soldiers. 112
A SECOND WAVE OF GAS / RUBBER BULLETS TEMPORARILY CLEARS THE AREA IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF BARRIER 12.
It would appear from photographic and eyewitness evidence that a second wave of CS gas succeeded in clearing the area immediately in front of Barrier 12 for a short period. At this point many marchers, who had been observing the rioting from the back of the waste ground, were affected by the gas and moved down Rossville Street leaving only hard core rioters.
107 AM277.8 108 AO19.9 109 M75.1 110 Video 3: 02:40-02:54 111 Video 3: 02:50-02:53 P370: Stones thrown by the rioters are visible on the ground; at this stage the rioters appear to have retreated from the area immediately in front of the barrier.
P397: Gas can be seen much further to the south of the waste ground, closer to the junction of Rossville Street and William Street.
Video 3: 02.52 This second wave of gas affected a large number of civilians who had been observing the rioting at Barrier 12.
Bernard Doherty stood at Aggro corner watching the rioting in Little James Street. He describes gas saturating the area.\\textsuperscript{113}
Francis Dunne:
\\textit{I stood at Con Bradley's corner watching this skirmish for 5/6 minutes... the army directed 5 or so CS canisters into the mouth of Rossville street I moved about 20 yards along Rossville Street. At this stage I got a fairly severe whiff of gas... With about 5/600 others I stood and watched the hardier souls who were still in Little James Street throwing away...}\\textsuperscript{114}
EP22/10: Civilians at Aggro Corner moving South to avoid the Gas.
\\textsuperscript{113} AD54.2 paragraph 9 \\textsuperscript{114} AD173.4 RIOTING RESUMED FROM BEHIND CORRUGATED IRON SHIELDS
6C-97 Serial 326 timed at 15.50 records:
... our sub units at call ... serials 12 and 13 have had to disperse the hooligans with rubber bullets and gas. They have been dispersed now into the general area of waste ground Rossville Street / William Street. Little James Street is completely clear. They report that some of the hooligans were wearing respirators, though not of similar pattern to ours.115
6C-98 However it appears from photographs and from military and civilian evidence that as soon as CS gas had cleared a hardcore group of rioters re-grouped behind several sheets of corrugated iron. This is borne out by subsequent entries in the radio logs and military accounts.
6C-99 Serial 328 records the use of further CS gas in the Aggro Corner area.116
115 W126, Serial 326 116 W126, Serial 338 Serial 375, timed at 16.10 (according to the log one minute after Barrier 14 had been lifted), suggests those who had been on the Aggro Corner waste ground had only just departed the scene.
...The people on Aggro corner have been driven away by the last fusillade of gas cartridges, are moving down towards the meeting...
This interpretation is supported by Serial 379:
...most of those who have dispersed from Aggro Corner are moving down, ah, are moving down Rossville Street.
And by military evidence:
Lieutenant 009:
The men manning the Little James Street road block fired CS gas onto the junction of William junction and at the stone throwers in Little James Street which caused the stone throwers to move from the gassed area but they collected more stones from some waste ground having torn walls of derelict houses apart. When the gas cleared they resumed their stoning throwing using corrugated sheeting obtained from the waste ground as shields...
Soldier 123 observed the same scene from the top of the Embassy Ballroom:
Then I saw CS gas vapours coming from the barrier at Little James St after I had heard the sound of several guns, the youths having now acquired several sheets of corrugated iron sheeting which they were using as shields
Many of the photographs capture the congregation of rioters behind corrugated iron shields.
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117 W128 Serial 372 "...serial 14 now being lifted..." 118 W128, Serial 375 119 W129, Serial 379 120 B1389 121 Day 301/087 In evidence Soldier 123 confirmed he was referring to rubber bullet guns. 122 B1773 A youth on the far right hand side carries a long bar. As the NICRA banner was carried forward there was a very brief pause in the rioting. Those carrying the banner hurled abuse at the soldiers and the rioting resumed. The actuality footage and available contact prints suggest that the parading of the banner occurred after the water cannon had been used for the first time at Barrier 14 and after the majority of observers had moved down Rossville Street to avoid CS gas in the Aggro Corner area.
The first three photographs in this series record the scene immediately before the NICRA banner was carried to Barrier 12. In photograph 19 CS gas is visible in the area in front of Barrier 12. In photographs 20 and 21 appear to show civilians suffering the effects of breathing in the gas. The last photograph shows the NICRA banner as it is carried towards Barrier 12.
123 RM 2, AK42.3 paragraph 13 Michael Noel Quinn held the Banner for a short time:
I was standing chatting to a friend ... when this guy came up carrying a civil rights banner, grabbed me and told me to take one end of the banner with him out onto the waste ground north of William Street. I did not want to go because I did not want to get too close to the soldiers. I did not know the guy but I subsequently discovered that it was Jim Wray. I reluctantly agree to hold one end of the banner...
He was insistent that one of us would have to do it and the others were laughing at me...I probably only held it for about two minutes. I recall standing in the waste ground to the north of William Street and facing the soldiers at Barrier 12 and around the area area of Little James Street / Prince Arthur Street.124
RM 2 also held the banner with Jim Wray. His evidence suggests this occurred not only after the water cannon had been used at Barrier 14 but also following the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston.
...shortly before I left the area the army used the water cannon on the crowd ...Someone around me had said that two guys had been shot by a sniper further west up William Street and I wanted to check this out.
124 AQ11.20 paragraphs 10-11 ...I stood around on the waste ground in the area between Little James Street and Sackville Street ... There were about 500 people standing around in that area.
Near me, I saw a guy holding the civil rights banner by himself. He was wearing a small black woollen hat. I went over to him and helped carry one of the poles of the banner.
At the time, I did not know who the other guy holding the banner was. I think that the people who had been holding the banner with him had let go of it because of the effects of CS gas.
We walked around the area of the waste ground carrying the banner. We stood very near the soldiers at point B [between Barrier 12 & Barrier 13]. I seem to recall that we were practically on our own as we were doing this, although there were a crowd of people behind us in William Street watching and throwing the odd stone towards the soldiers. As we were carrying the banner around, we shouted abuse at the soldiers but they did not say anything back.
The soldiers fired CS gas over to the crowd to the south of us, in the area of the junction of William Street and Rossville Street. Because I had been on previous marches I thought I was fairly immune to the effects of CS gas, so Jim Wray and I continued to carry the banner around the area of waste ground.
Most of the CS gas seemed to be fired over our heads. I then felt the effects of gas, big time...Whilst I was suffering from the effects of the gas, Jim Wray asked someone to take my side of the banner away from me...125
6C-110 RM 2 identifies himself as the man on the left of the photograph below, and James Wray as the other man in the photograph holding the banner.126 In fact it is clear from other evidence that RM 2 is mistaken and he is the man on the right hand side of the photograph and James Wray, wearing the hat, on the left.127
125 AK42.9 paragraphs 9-15 126 AK42.9 paragraph 12 127 This was confirmed Counsel for the Wray family, Lord Gifford, Day 049/029/06-11. Many photographs and actuality footage capture the NICRA banner being carried towards Barrier 12.\\textsuperscript{128}
It appears there was a brief pause in the rioting whilst the banner was carried forward. By this stage the bulk of the crowd can be seen in the Rossville Street waste ground.
\\textsuperscript{128} See, for example, Video 3 03:24 A photograph taken nearer to the Barrier suggests those closer to the banner were in fact rioters. Those on the right of the photograph prepare to resume rioting. P363: It is clear from this photograph that rioting re-started even as banner was being held up. Christopher Clarke Q.C., in opening, estimated the group in the photograph consisted of between 30 and 40 people.\\textsuperscript{129}
Enlargements from P363 reveal two men holding stones, another bends down to pick up something up from the ground.
P368: A man on the left hand side of the photograph stoops down to pick up a stone (see enlargement)
\\textsuperscript{129} Day 009/036/13 Soldier 109 is now unable to recall the details of what took place in front of Barrier 12 but did refer to the banner being brought forward in his contemporary statement to the RMP.
After about 20 mins the crowd started to fall back into Rossville St. At this time four men came up to our barrier with a banner and they started to abuse us. A group of about 30 youths followed these men and they started to stone us. The original four men tried to stop them, but they failed and when the stoning got heavier they went away. In response to the continuing rioting further CS gas was fired leading those who were carrying the banner to withdraw. The CS gas fired at rioters close to the NICRA banner is recorded on the video footage.
**RIOTING CONTINUED AFTER THE NICRA BANNER WAS WITHDRAWN**
A close study of the contact prints reveals that, notwithstanding the volley of CS gas, rioting continued in front of Barrier 12 after the NICRA banner had been carried away.
**P233.25:22** shows the NICRA banner approaching Barrier 12.
The photograph above is followed immediately by a series of photographs showing a group of rioters advancing from behind the same sheets of corrugated metal. CS gas is fired in response to the renewed rioting (photograph 26).
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132 Video 3 03:25-30 133 Photographs 26A-28 can be found at P233.53, however they do not add anything to those reproduced above. 6C-122 Full scale photographs taken at approximately the same time give a better impression of the scale of the rioting.
P365: A close up of a section of P366 shows bricks and other missiles on the waste ground. THE NATURE AND SEVERITY OF THE RIOTING AT BARRIER 12.
Although the rioting at Barrier 12 was less severe than that at Barrier 14\\textsuperscript{134} nevertheless it is plain from the photographs, and from civilian and military accounts, that the soldiers behind Barrier 12 were subjected to serious and sustained rioting. The large number of stones left on the ground by Barrier 12 gives an indication of the ferocity of the riot.
\\textsuperscript{134} For example George Leonard Downey AD134.2 paragraph 11 “The rioting was, however, not as serious as that at Barrier 14”. Hugh Duffy, AD157.1 paragraph 4 “…a riot was taking place …this was smaller and less serious than the one at William Street.”; see also Patrick McCallion, AM74.2 paragraph 8; and Dr. McClean, AM105.4 paragraph 17. These photographs need to be contrasted with P242 which shows that the ground in front of Barrier 12 was clear prior to any rioting taking place. Military Accounts
6C-126 Military evidence about the level of rioting is divided. Some soldiers have described it as "a fairly normal riot;"35 "nothing too serious;"36 "the sort of rioting that we were used to seeing at the junction of Rossville Street and William Street every week."137 Even if it was the norm for the time, the truth is that rioting was undeniably vicious. Other soldiers, including a number of soldiers who made statements in 1972, have described the rioting as serious and frightening.
(1) Soldier 109's evidence is that "...The rioting was so severe that day. There was no way we could stop it."138
(2) Soldier 140 told Eversheds that he was "extremely frightened"139 by the level of rioting.
... I'd never seen anything like it before. The were shouting and screaming and throwing anything they could get their hands on; stones, bottles, palings, pieces of metal...140
(3) Soldier 023 was observing from the Peter England shirt factory. His RMP statement refers to a large crowd of 2-300 on the waste ground at the William Street /Little James Street junction throwing missiles at troops manning barricades in Little James Street and Sackville Street.141 He told Eversheds:
I could hear all the shouting and hear things being thrown; I remember that people were chucking whatever they could get their
135 INQ1951; C1951.3 paragraph 19 136 INQ1233; C1233.3 paragraph 14 137 Lt009; B1392.002 paragraph 11; confirmed on oath Day 316/083. 138 B1723.007 paragraph 25 139 B1865.002 paragraph 10 140 B1865.002 paragraph 9 141 B1517 hands on such as bricks and bottles. This activity was below the position of my window in the area of Barrier 12.\\textsuperscript{142}
(4) Soldier 109 formed the opinion that the riot was:
...orchestrated and organised. I could see people telling other people where to go and what to do. They were moving around in organised groups ... There was a core element of rioters determined to go for us... The riot gradually moved up the scale and the stoning became heavier despite my Battery Commander warning the crowd that a breach of the peace was being committed... I estimate that there were two or three hundred people backed up front the barrier into the open waste ground who were throwing anything they could find at us...\\textsuperscript{143}
(5) INQ0178:
There was an area of open ground by Little James Street, to the south of our barricade. There were about 150-200 people there, throwing bricks and running around. They were mostly youths, between the ages of 10 and 20... I remember a man carrying a corrugated steel sheet, who was trying to get closer to us. He was getting really close and we were concerned that he could have had something behind it (such as a gun), we did not know. We were shooting rubber bullets at him, trying to knock the corrugated iron sheet out of his hand.\\textsuperscript{144}
(6) INQ1101:
The ground in front of the barrier opened onto a square in which a crowd had gathered, who were throwing bricks, stones, paving slabs, iron bars, in fact anything they could get their hands on at the soldiers.\\textsuperscript{145}
(7) INQ0785:
\\textsuperscript{142} B1524 paragraph 9 \\textsuperscript{143} B1723.004 paragraph 13 \\textsuperscript{144} C178.3 paragraph 21 \\textsuperscript{145} C1101.1 paragraph 7 There were quite a lot of yobbos there, tearing up paving stones and launching missiles with slings. They were quite well prepared for a bit of aggro.\\textsuperscript{146}
\\textbf{(8) INQ1326:}
... a heavy barrage of stones, half bricks and possibly empty bottles. ... I remember noticing that there was an element of the crowd, the slightly older ones, who were trying to control or direct the rioters, by which I mean directing them to throwing things in a particular direction and assisting them to take cover behind corrugated iron shields. I do not remember any stewards trying to stop the rioting. A high proportion of the rioters were wearing scarfs or handkerchiefs around their faces to hide their identities.\\textsuperscript{147}
\\textbf{(9) WO1 Wood}
\\textit{When the parade arrived at the barrier, there was a fair crowd of people gathered and they started throwing stones. I would say that there were about 50 rioters in total, but there was also a further crowd of people watching.}\\textsuperscript{148}
\\textbf{Civilian Accounts}
\\textbf{6C-127} Whilst there are some witnesses who do not recall the rioting as particularly severe, the preponderance of the evidence supports the majority military view that the rioting was serious.
\\textbf{6C-128} Significant numbers of rioters were involved:
\\textbf{(1) Hugh McMonagle described the scene as he came down William Street:}
\\textit{There were young boys, probably about 100 in total, who all seemed to be throwing stones across the waste ground ... towards the soldiers behind those two barriers.}\\textsuperscript{149}
\\textsuperscript{146} C785.2 paragraph 9 \\textsuperscript{147} C1326.3 paragraph 17 \\textsuperscript{148} CW1.4 paragraph 20 \\textsuperscript{149} AM369.2 paragraph 8
\\textsuperscript{\\S} 7. 1034 Nigel Wade stood with Simon Winchester and observed the rioting which took place at Barrier 12 at approximately 16.00 after the use of the water cannon at Barrier 14.\\textsuperscript{150}
\\textit{About 100 youths stoning the barricade at Little James Street, under heavy rubber bullet and gas fire.}\\textsuperscript{151}
Charles James McGill confirmed that he was one of about 200 people who targeted soldiers in front of Barrier 12.\\textsuperscript{152}
Most of those involved in the rioting were experienced and well prepared:
1. it is plain from the photographs that many of the rioters wore handkerchiefs to protect them from the CS gas. Charles McLaughlin says he and his friend, Tony Morrison, had an army shield with them which they used to shelter from rubber bullets.\\textsuperscript{153}
2. According to Patrick Eugene McCallion some of those at Barrier 12 were experienced rioters and could throw stones a very long way.\\textsuperscript{154}
The rioting itself was vicious and involved far more than just stones being thrown:
1. Gerard McDaid described joining up with 50 or 60 other rioters in Brandywell and making their way to the front of the march. All were excited and looking forward to a good confrontation.\\textsuperscript{155} The group, now slightly larger in size, reached Aggro Corner and headed towards Barrier 12.\\textsuperscript{156} Stones and bottles were thrown at the soldiers.\\textsuperscript{157} Mr. McDaid’s
\\textsuperscript{150} \\textbf{Day 109/124}: Mr. Wade’s present recollection appears to be that these events occurred in the reverse order; however he stated that his recollection of the order in which these events occurred should not be relied on.
\\textsuperscript{151} \\textbf{M79.2 paragraph 7}
\\textsuperscript{152} \\textbf{Day 069/134}
\\textsuperscript{153} \\textbf{AM321.1 paragraph 1}
\\textsuperscript{154} \\textbf{AM75.2 paragraph 7-8}
\\textsuperscript{155} \\textbf{Day 108/016}
\\textsuperscript{156} \\textbf{Day 108/018}
\\textsuperscript{157} \\textbf{§ 7.1035} evidence about the attitude of the rioters leaves no doubt that the rioters intended to cause serious injury to the soldiers:
A. We threwed [sic] stones. We do not care what the army was protected with. We would throw stones at them anyway.
Q. It would not matter how they were dressed?
A. As far as we were concerned, we were defending our area, and they should not be there.
...
Q. ... the sort of weapons that rioters would use would be stones?
A. Yeah, stones.
Q. Any kind of missile they could get their hands on?
A. Yeah.
Q. And the heavier and the more dangerous, the better?
A. Well just whatever you got your hand on at that stage.
Q. Iron bars, for example or railings?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Scaffolding poles?
A. You would have threw them too, yeah.
Q. Catapults?
A. A few boys would have had.158
According to Mr. McDaid on Bloody Sunday the intensity of the riot was increased by the presence of rioters from Belfast. He agreed that the Londonderry
157 AM164.2 paragraph 10 158 Day 108/042, 046-047 rioters were keen to show that they knew how to riot without any help from the Belfast gang.\\textsuperscript{159}
(2) Charles McLaughlin located himself between Barrier 12 and Barrier 13:
\\textit{We were throwing any object we could lay our hands on at the British soldiers who were visible at the two barriers – stones, half bricks, metal bars and any other rubble that was lying around on the waste ground.}\\textsuperscript{160}
(3) Professor O'Keefe estimated that between 20-25 people were participating in the rioting at Barrier 12.\\textsuperscript{161} He told Eversheds:
\\textit{I would hesitate to say that the rioting was not serious, because some soldiers may have been hit by stones or bricks... I remember being apprehensive and frightened, but not desperately so.}\\textsuperscript{162}
(4) Francis Dunne arrived at Aggro Corner after the water cannon had been used. He watched the rioting at Barriers 12 and 13 for between five and ten minutes. He describes how the rioters kept having to come south down Little James Street for further bricks and stones to thrown at the soldiers.\\textsuperscript{163}
(5) Liam Mailey, commenting on the propensity for youths to engage in “planking”, remarked that the area to the left of the junction of Rossville Street and William Street was popular because “that was a building site and there were the materials for making such a noise readily available.”\\textsuperscript{164} Undoubtedly such materials were also made ideal missiles to throw during the course of rioting.
\\textsuperscript{159} Day 108/048-049 \\textsuperscript{160} AM321.1 paragraph 1 \\textsuperscript{161} H21.12 paragraph B \\textsuperscript{162} H21.44 paragraph 5 \\textsuperscript{163} AD173.25 paragraph 7 \\textsuperscript{164} Day 163/096/20-24 CONCLUSION
6C-131 Before any soldiers deployed into the Bogside, or fired any shots, the march had degenerated into a violent and sustained attack on the army manning the barriers barring the march’s progress to the Guildhall. A large and angry crowd was pelting the soldiers with anything which came to hand with the intention of inflicting as much harm as possible on the soldiers and, if possible, killing them.
6C-132 This violent and angry crowd was not, however, contained within the areas immediately in front of Barriers 12 and 14: it had spread onto the waste ground immediately in front of where soldiers A and B were stationed and there a further sustained attack took place.
6C-IV EVENTS ON THE WASTE GROUND PRIOR TO THE SHOOTING OF DAMIEN DONAGHY AND JOHN JOHNSTON
6C-133 In addition to the riots taking place at Barriers 12 and 14, it is clear that sustained rioting was also taking place in and around the laundry waste ground.
6C-134 As the tail end of the march came down William Street soldiers of Machine Gun Platoon in the derelict building with nine windows were seen by the crowd and became targets for a group of rioters. The attack which was then mounted on them was vicious and sustained.
TIMING OF THE RIOTING IN THE VICINITY OF THE DERELICT BUILDING
6C-135 There is conflicting evidence, from those civilians who were prepared to admit that there was rioting, about precisely when it broke out in and around the waste ground where both Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot. Some witnesses have suggested that rioting started whilst the main body of the march was coming down William Street; others have said that there were only stragglers in William Street when stones were first thrown.
6C-136 Many witnesses have denied that any rioting took place at all in this location. Damien Donaghy’s own admission to having taken part in a riot in the location where he was shot puts the fact of the riot beyond doubt. Notwithstanding the lack of consensus in relation to this issue, the probability is that it was not until the tail end of the march was passing down William Street that serious rioting broke out. This conclusion is supported by, amongst others, the evidence of the two wounded themselves and by the two soldiers who fired.
There is evidence which suggests episodes of more minor stone throwing and 'cat-calling' took place as the main march proceeded down William Street (see Chapter 6B, above).
Civilian Evidence Relating to the Timing of the Rioting in the Vicinity of the Derelict Building.
Damien Donaghy was asked during the course of his evidence:
*What was the position so far as the march was concerned at this stage; was the march still proceeding along William Street?*
A. No, the vast majority of the march, the marchers went on down to the barrier and other marchers turned right and went up Rossville Street.
Q. At the time the stone throwing was going on, were there still some of the marchers walking down William Street to the junction?
A. Not really a wile lot. They were taking shortcuts along the waste grounds and that to go through Kells Walk and that.
Q. There were some people in William Street, were there?
A. Not a wile lot.
Q. Not many?
A. Not a wile lot.(^{165})
John Johnston told the Sunday Times that he was worried about gas and so made sure he was towards the end of the march.(^{166})
(^{165}) Day 070/006/24-007/15
(^{166}) AJ5.1 Many civilians have given very similar evidence, including the following:
(1) Gerry Duddy gave evidence that it was “more or less at the tail end of [the march]” at the time he saw boys stone throwing on the waste ground.(^{167})
(2) Billy McCartney described those present in the area as “mostly stragglers at the end of the march. The march would have been over at that stage.”(^{164})
(3) Alfie McAleer confirmed the same to Christopher Clarke Q.C.:
[Q. \\ldots \\text{You describe how a group of about 10 or 15 youths, including you and your mates, Peter and Terry, gathered to throw stones at the soldiers, that there were a few people standing watching, but other than that there were no other people around, the march had moved on. Do you know where the march had got to by this stage; was it still in some part of William Street?}]
[A. \\text{No, no, no, I would say the march had reached its destination.}]
[Q. \\text{When you say that apart from the people who were throwing stones, there were a few people standing around, do you mean something like a dozen, or 40 or 50, or what sort of—}]
[A. \\text{There would have been 30, 40 people there.}] (^{169})
(4) Christopher Doherty was asked to confirm by Lord Saville whether the march was still going at the time when he saw stone throwing. Mr. Doherty replied “No, I do not remember the marchers. It was towards the end of the march, you know.” (^{170})
(^{167}) Day 059/160. Mr. Duddy’s evidence that he believes Damien Donaghy was shot before any rioting at Barrier 14 is clearly wrong.
(^{168}) Day 054/166
(^{169}) Day 092/054/15
(^{170}) Day 182/132 (5) Paul Coyle confirmed that marchers were no longer coming down William Street at the time that he witnessed rioting directed towards the soldiers in the derelict building.\\textsuperscript{171}
(6) Patrick Harkin gave evidence that
\\textit{the tail end of the march passing when those two people were shot ... not a lot [of people] there then.}\\textsuperscript{172}
\\textit{Military Evidence re Timing}
6C-142 The military evidence was to similar effect:
(1) Giving evidence to this Tribunal\\textsuperscript{173} Soldier A adopted the account he had given in his BSI statement:
17. I remember hearing the march approaching. I was hyped up because of the previous incoming fire and because there were lots of people, not just hundreds but thousands who spread across and filled the width of the road carrying their banners. As they marched down the road they did not cause us any aggro; but then again they did not now that we were there. They went down the route we were expecting them to follow, down William Street to the east, and everything was going to plan. I tried to keep out of sight, as there was no need for us to risk being seen unnecessarily...
18. Eventually, I cannot remember after how long, the bulk of the march passed by and we were then left with stragglers; the yob element. They were kicking cans around the road and throwing stones. One of them spotted one or some of the soldiers in my building and pointed us out to the others.
19. Once they all realised there were soldiers in the building they started throwing rocks bricks and stones and yelling "There are Brits in there. There are Brits in there. Get the bastards out!" and that sort of thing. Bricks seemed to be thrown in the general direction of our building rather than directly at any individuals
\\textsuperscript{171} Day 152/058 \\textsuperscript{172} Day 089/006/17 \\textsuperscript{173} Day 297/025-026
\\textsuperscript{7} 7.1041 amongst us. Some of the rioters were over to my right in the waste ground forward and to the side of where I was (south east). 174
(2) INQ1917 confirmed the accuracy of the following part of his BSI statement during the course of giving evidence to this Inquiry. 175
12. ... My view from the position of cover was restricted, but I can remember seeing some marchers. They were probably stragglers from the main body of the march and they were in an area of open ground quite near to where we were in the building. They were mostly males in their twenties and thirties. They seemed to be running in various directions and throwing things as well, some of which were being thrown in our direction. I cannot remember specifically what it was that they were throwing. There was a lot of shouting going on. 176
(3) The position was clarified by further questions put to INQ1917 by Mr. Toohey:
MR TOOHEY: ... In paragraph 12 to which Mr Roxburgh has just taken you, you refer to seeing some marchers who were probably stragglers; do you see that, paragraph 12, the first two lines?
A. Yes, sir.
MR TOOHEY: Drawing a distinction for a moment between people who were actually marching down the street and people who might have been marching, but were in the open ground doing various things when you saw them; did you actually see people marching in the street?
A. No, sir.
MR TOOHEY: When you speak of marchers, you are referring to those who were in the open ground adjacent to the building, are you?
A. Yes, sir. 177
174 B20.003 paragraphs 17-19 175 Day 288/064-065 176 C1917.2 paragraph 12 177 Day 288/066-067 (4) Soldier B told Eversheds that he believed that the main crowd of marchers had already passed his position when Machine Gun Platoon became the target for rioters.\\textsuperscript{178} His contemporary statements suggest that a few stones may have been thrown at an earlier stage; but it was after the march had passed that serious rioting broke out.
6C-143 Soldier B's statement to the RMP on 31.01.72 at 01.10 a.m. refers to the main body of the march passing without any real incident. It suggests that it was not until the crowd had passed that it was necessary to use baton rounds to try and disperse the rioting youths.\\textsuperscript{179} His SA statement prepared for the Widgery tribunal suggests that members of Machine Gun Platoon had been seen and targeted by stone throwing youths as they took up their positions in the derelict building.\\textsuperscript{180}
**RIOTERS ASSEMBLE IN AND AROUND THE LAUNDRY WASTE GROUND AND TARGET SOLDIERS IN THE DERELICT BUILDING**
*Stragglers and Rioters in the Area of the Derelict Building are Joined by Rioters who had been Rioting at the Army Barriers.*
6C-144 As stragglers at the end of the march made their way down William Street, the number of rioters in the area of the derelict building was swelled by rioters who were retreating west up William Street in order to escape the CS gas around the army barriers and Aggro Corner and following the deployment of the water cannon at Barrier 14.
6C-145 Whilst not all of those affected by the gas and by the water cannon were rioters, it is clear from a large number of the photographs that at the time that the water cannon and CS gas were used by the army a large number of those closest to the barriers were rioters. Despite, in some cases, having a degree of tolerance to CS
\\textsuperscript{178} B43.003 paragraph 11 \\textsuperscript{179} B43.009 \\textsuperscript{180} B43.012 gas and having handkerchiefs with which to cover their mouths and noses, many rioters were affected by CS gas and moved away from the area to riot elsewhere.
Ciaran Donnelly worked at the time as a photographer for the Irish Times. He was questioned by Edwin Glasgow Q.C.:
Q. Would it be fair to say that from what you saw, by the time the baton rounds and the water cannon were used, apart from photographers who were trying to record the scene, those who were confronting the soldiers at the barrier were the hard core rioters and anybody who was moved to go on the civil rights march and listen to the stewards had already gone?
A. Most of them had, most of them had.
Q. You remained there for most of that period, Mr Donnelly, before you yourself felt the gas and moved away?
A. Well, looking at the pictures that were shown of the camera crew coming -- covered in water, I had obviously left -- they were at the front of the crowd, I was further back, as I say, standing on a windowsill somewhere. I was not right at the very front.
Q. You yourself did not get soaked?
A. I know I got gassed, I cannot say if I got soaked or not. I did not get heavily drenched.(^{181})
This was also confirmed by a self confessed rioter, Liam Doherty. In his statement to the present Inquiry he says that:
...anyone who wanted to riot was there; the others headed off down Rossville Street to see the speakers.(^{182})
Further, a reduced number of 'hard core' rioters regrouped(^{183}) close to the Barriers and remained rioting there until moments before the soldiers were deployed through the barriers. They can be seen in a number of photographs sheltering
(^{181}) Day 071/066-067
(^{182}) AD80.2 paragraph 8
(^{183}) By this stage the rioters at Barrier14 had employed a section of metal sheeting to act as a shield against rubber bullets clearly visible in photographs, for example, P385 behind corrugated metal sheeting in front of Barrier 12 and Barrier 14. Some apparently moved between the barriers.\\textsuperscript{184}
6C-149 A significant number of rioters, however, left the area and went in search of a riot elsewhere.
6C-150 Liam Doherty was one such rioter. He told Eversheds:
\\begin{quote} The water cannon came up and gas and rubber bullets were fired. I was there for about 10 or 15 minutes when I got drenched with the dye from the water cannon and got a heavy dose of gas. I started to moving east up William Street... I was badly affected by the gas and I was sick...
There was rioting going on at Little James Street at the that time; it was sporadic... Some of the crowd joined in with the riot at Little James Street. There was a lot of gas though and it couldn’t really get in to much of a riot.
I went further east up William Street and stood in the road just north of a piece of waste ground...\\textsuperscript{185} \\end{quote}
6C-151 Mr. Doherty confirmed on oath that he had bent down to pick up a stone to throw at the soldiers in the derelict building and shouted to others to do the same.\\textsuperscript{186} He said that no sooner had he gone to throw a stone than he heard two shots. Damien Donaghy, who had just thrown a stone and who was standing beside him, was hit.\\textsuperscript{187} Mr. Doherty’s claim that no stones had been thrown until he gave the ‘call for action’ is unsustainable and is an example of an attempt to play down the level of rioting. It is contradicted by the evidence of other civilian evidence, including rioters, who confirm that rioting was taking place for some minutes before Damien Donaghy was shot.
\\textsuperscript{184} See, for example, the evidence of Michael Canavan, \\textbf{KC4.4}
\\textsuperscript{185} \\textbf{AD80.2 paragraph 9-11}. This section of his BSI statement was adopted during course of oral evidence \\textbf{Day 060/087}.
\\textsuperscript{186} \\textbf{Day 060/091}. It is clear that Mr. Doherty has confused the Abbey and Laundry waste grounds. He accepted the possibility that he had confused the two when he gave evidence \\textbf{Day 060/097}.
\\textsuperscript{187} \\textbf{Day 060/095-096} Patrick McCallion moved back up William Street and away from Barrier 14 because he feared he would be caught in a stampede should the army come in. Mr. McCallion confirmed that he had moved away from Barrier 14 before rubber bullets, CS gas or the water cannon had been deployed. When he reached the laundry waste ground a riot of some proportions was already in progress. He observed twenty to thirty people already on the waste ground throwing “anything they could, including stones and empty milk bottles, at the soldiers on the GPO.”
Paul Coyle was overcome by gas after reaching the junction of William Street and Rossville Street and retreated up William Street to a point near the site of Stephenson’s Bakery. There were already a number of people throwing stones at soldiers in the derelict building. The march had passed by this stage. Mr. Coyle moved southwards through the laundry waste ground. As he did so he heard two live shots and saw Damien Donaghy fall to the ground.
Word spread that there were Soldiers in the Derelict Building and in Buildings to the North of William Street.
The congregation of a large group of rioters close to the derelict building was no coincidence. A number of those who had been rioting at the army barriers learned from those around them that there were soldiers in and around the derelict building in William Street and went with the intention of targeting these soldiers.
Billy McCartney initially went to Barrier 14 with his friend Danny Deehan, AD21. He ignored the request by stewards to go to Free Derry Corner. In oral evidence Mr. McCartney adopted the following section of his Inquiry statement:
______________________________________________________________________
188 Day 071/142 189 Day 071/141-142 190 Day 071/143; AM74.2 paragraph 10 191 Day 152/057-059
§ 7.1046
VI 72 Some people around me near to barrier 14 then said that there were soldiers further back along William Street where we had just marched. Danny and I decided to go back there.
Mr. McCartney agreed he had gone back to see whether people were going to throw stones at the soldiers.
Those who had noticed soldiers in the derelict building drew attention to them with the intention of encouraging rioters to target them.
Soldier A told Eversheds:
One of them spotted one or some of the soldier in the building and pointed us out to the others.
Soldier A’s evidence on this point has been confirmed by a number of civilian witnesses.
(1) Danny Deehan told Eversheds that he recalls people pointing out soldiers on roofs to the north of William Street.
(2) William Curran told Eversheds that he might have pointed soldiers out to potential rioters who then threw stones at them. This is particularly significant as it demonstrates the level of support, and even active encouragement, rioters received from so called ‘peaceful’ marchers.
I looked east down William Street and saw a group of about four or five lads coming west up William Street and saw a group of about four or five lads coming west up William Street towards me at point E. The boys were on the northern side of William Street coming towards the waste ground in front of the Presbyterian Church. I may have called out to the boys to say that the soldiers were there, but I do not now remember. When they saw the soldiers, they picked up some stones from the edge of the waste ground (grid reference K07) and threw them at the soldiers. 196
(3) Derek McFeely, told Eversheds:
... others in the crowd noticed the soldier in the derelict building and had started pointing towards them and jeering and hurling insults at them. I could see the soldiers through two gaping hold in the buildings... 197
(4) Noel Kelly told Eversheds that he saw soldiers on the Presbyterian Church flat roof and in the derelict building with nine windows:
I remember that a call went up that there were soldiers in the building. A small group of young lads, may be four, moved towards a gap in the front (William Street) wall of the shirt factory where the rubble was ... They bent down to pick up stones to throw at the soldiers. 198
(5) Kevin McCallion described how, when he was approximately half way down William Street the atmosphere started to change:
... people in the crowd pointed out that there were soldiers in the vicinity of the old Ritchie's Factory... By now the crowd was getting a bit tense. There was some cat-calling at the soldiers by the crowd, things like "wankers" and "fuckers". The odd stone may have been thrown towards the GPO Sorting Office. I began to think there would be trouble and that a riot was about to start... I still have a vague memory of two shots coming from the GPO ... and then hearing that two people had been shot... 199
196 AC132.2 paragraph 8. Mr. Curran apparently adopted without amendment this section of his statement (to which he was referred by Christopher Clarke Q.C. on Day 055/053). 197 AM217.1 paragraph 4. 198 AK17.9 paragraph 6. Mr. Kelly's evidence to the Inquiry, Day 062/004, was that he was not at the very end of the march; the "call" he describes occurred whilst there were still thousands of people around. Whilst there is no reason to disbelieve Mr. Kelly's evidence about the "call" his claim not to have seen any stones actually thrown is not credible (and undermined the evidence of Damien Donaghy himself). 199 AM69.1-2 paragraph 7-8. Mr. McCallion's Eversheds statement falls to be contrasted with what he said in his NICRA statement, at AM69.6. In the earlier, NICRA, statement Mr. McCallion referred to soldiers on GPO roof and in derelict building firing rubber bullets; but concluded that the live shots "seemed to come from the direction of the aforementioned derelict buildings in William St..." Clifford Lancaster:
I could see three or four paratroopers moving about inside [the derelict building] ... I did not look at any guns they might have been carrying. The crowd had spotted the soldiers and began jeering and shouting ... A group of lads broke away from the march and threw stones at the soldiers. 200
Alfie McAleer, was one of a group of hard core rioters who targeted soldiers in William Street rather than going to the army barriers. Mr. McAleer's evidence, if true, about the careful planning of the rioting makes a nonsense of the suggestion that the rioting was the spontaneous reaction of a few young boys who happened to have noticed some soldiers in the derelict building.
3. I went to the march on 30th January 1972 because I wanted to get the bastards (the army) for the week before at Magilligan where they thumped us into the ground. I had no intention of poncing about on a march – it was too bloody cold. I considered myself and my mates to be experience rioters at the time. We would never turn up for a riot without having scouted the land first to see where the action would happen and where our escape routes lay. We never got caught.... We had agreed that we would not go as far as the army barriers – we knew that the real risk of being arrested was down there.
...As the march moved east along William Street, myself and my mates hung back and decided what to do. We heard that there were soldiers in the old Bakery building (marked A on the map attached to this statement – grid reference J17) and went over for a look...
4. A group of about 10 or 15 youths, including me and my mates, Peter and Terry, gathered to throw stones at the soldiers... 201
200 AL4.1-2 paragraph 5 201 AM37.1 paragraph 2-4. These paragraphs of Mr. McAleer's BSI statement were referred and adopted by Mr. McAleer when he gave evidence, Day 092/052-053. Mr. McAleer's recollection of soldiers standing on the corner of the derelict building at 'A' before Damien Donaghy was shot, although maintained in oral evidence to the Inquiry (Day 092/053-054), must be wrong. No other witnesses, civilian or military, support it. THE PRECISE LOCATION AND TARGETS OF THE RIOTERS.
6C-161 Rioting in the William Street area was directed towards three targets:
- Soldiers on the GPO roof.
- Soldiers on the Presbyterian Church roof.
- Machine Gun Platoon deployed in the Derelict Building.
6C-162 In order to target these soldiers a sizable group of rioters congregated in William Street and in the parts of the Laundry and Presbyterian Church waste grounds closest to the soldiers.
6C-163 Patrick McCallion gave evidence about the movement of the rioters:
A. ...I retreated back up William Street when the crowd started swelling down at the barricade, ...
...Now there was a portacabin there at the time which was a bookies, bookies shop, squared dab in the middle (marked with a blue arrow). That is the waste ground and there was more or less a wee alleyway through each side and the stone-throwers were sort of running across -- I am in the waste ground here -- in this direction here and they were running as far as there and back again gathering whatever they could, probably milk bottles, I would say, were coming from the houses in this area, thrown and back again.
Q. Could I have control and see if I can turn what you have said into a series of arrows? You were about there, is that right?
A. That is correct. Q. That is where the yellow arrow -- that is where there was a portacabin which was used as a bookies? (Marked with a yellow arrow)
A. Aye, but it was smack in the middle of that waste ground, the portacabin was.
Q. The boys in question who were throwing stones, they were coming across from the wasteland that I am pointing at in red and they went as far, did they, as the pavement on the other side of William Street? (Marked with a red arrow)
A. On the waste ground more or less, yes, that is correct.
Q. Where the arrow on the right-hand side in red is, (marked with a red arrow) as far as that?
A. Yes.
Q. And throwing stones at the GPO sorting office?
A. Yes. 202
6C-164 Rioting youths also entered the Presbyterian Church waste ground to the north of William Street (and immediately abutting the derelict building).
(1) Charlie Lamberton
202 Day 071/144-145 Q. ... You describe drawing level with the wasteground in front of the Presbyterian Church that we can see and seeing a group of about 30 or 40 youths running into the wasteground and throwing stones at the soldiers. The wasteground is presumably this one, is it, to the north of William Street and to the front of the Presbyterian Church?
A. Yes. ...
Q. ... Do you recall how far into the wasteground the people who were throwing stones went?
A. I think they were halfway in. 203
(2) Charles McDaid, 204 marked the position of rioters with a blue arrow on the photograph at AM161.25:
(3) Gerry Duddy, 205 said he had seen approximately six boys (in the position marked with blue arrow on the photograph below) 206 throwing stones and bottles at soldiers on the Presbyterian Church flat roof (marked with a red arrow):
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203 Day 183/092 & 183/094 204 Day 060/139 205 Day 059/131-132 & 156 206 AD146.07 (4) Billy McCartney,\\textsuperscript{207} described seeing a crowd of fourteen or fifteen young boys on William Street throwing stones.
(5) Gerald Morrisson told Eversheds:
\\textit{As we passed by the waste ground where Ritchies' Factory used to stand ... up to ten 15 or 16 year old boys were standing in the waste ground throwing stones north up towards the soldiers on the roof of the GPO sorting office and near the Presbyterian Church.}\\textsuperscript{208}
(6) Brian Callan, told Eversheds:
\\textit{There were also soldiers on the roof of the GPO Sorting Office ... some young lads ran towards the soldiers and threw stones at them.}\\textsuperscript{209}
(7) Sean Barr confirmed to Edwin Glasgow Q.C.\\textsuperscript{210} that the boys he saw throwing stones were in the waste ground in front of the building with the nine windows.\\textsuperscript{211}
(8) Joe Carlin, told the Sunday Times:
\\textsuperscript{207} \\textit{Day 054/167 and AM87.2 paragraph 9}
\\textsuperscript{208} \\textit{AM431.8 paragraph 10.} Mr. Morrisson has not given evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. His NICRA statement, \\textit{AM431.5}, refers to stones being thrown at soldiers crouched behind netting wire on the roof of a low building; According to his BSI statement, \\textit{AM431.10 paragraph 30}, he cannot now recall seeing these soldiers.
\\textsuperscript{209} \\textit{AC4.2 paragraph 15}
\\textsuperscript{210} \\textit{Day 063/089}
\\textsuperscript{211} He is one of many witnesses who deny that the rioting was serious. There was the usual Aggro corner collection of lads. And they did throw stones at the flat roof of the Post Office sorting office, where there were some soldiers. The soldiers retreated into the top back corner of the roof, and there were a few jeers and so on. A few lads had actually walked right up to the sorting office (or even in there?).
(9) William Curran, marked the position of the stone throwers with a green arrow on the photograph below.
(10) Seamus Morrison told NICRA that a few stones had been thrown at the soldiers in the derelict houses [presumably the house with nine windows] prior to Damien Donaghy being shot.
The evidence suggests that the rioters formed a separate identifiable group closer to the soldiers than those civilians who were merely observing the rioting.
Patrick McCallion was one of the rioters. From his perspective it appeared that:
the only people who were hanging around would be the people that were looking for to have a wee bit of a confrontation with the army.
Father McIvor was an observer of the riot. He told this Inquiry
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212 AC150.1. Joseph Carlin, AC35, who gave evidence denied that he had given this, or any account to the Sunday Times. 213 Day 055/071; (marked photograph AC132.18) 214 AM438.1. 215 Day 071/150-151 It was easy to identify approximately the 50 young people; they had broken off when the soldier was spotted.
**The Severity of the Riot**
6C-168 The rioting in this part of William Street amounted to a sustained and ferocious attack on the soldiers. During the course of the rioting objects were thrown which were, or which appeared to be nail bombs.
**Military Evidence**
6C-169 Soldier A gave the following account to the RMP on 31.01.72:
...The main body of the marching crowd passed our position and then the youths saw us. They commenced to stone us and to throw bottles. The troops with me fired baton rounds to disperse these youths. They drew back but continued to stone us. Two nail bombs were then thrown and they exploded very close to us. We did not sustain any casualties as the majority of the troops were behind low walls.
6C-170 Soldier A told Eversheds:
19. Once they all realised there were soldiers in the building they started throwing rocks bricks and stones and yelling "There are Brits in there. There are Brits in there. Get the bastards out!" and that sort of thing. Bricks seemed to be thrown in the general direction of our building rather than directly at any individuals amongst us. Some of the rioters were over to my right in the waste ground forward and to the side of where I was (south east).
20. A couple of minutes after the stone throwing began I saw two objects go past, from right to left, slightly lower than the level of the window space through which I was watching. I cannot say now whether they passed one after the other or at the same time ... I cannot be sure about the timing, it was easy to lose track of time in that situation. I am sure that there were definitely two.
21. The objects were black and about the size of a bean can. They looked different to the halves of house bricks and bottles that had
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216 Day 055/009 217 B20.014 been thrown earlier. These objects looked uniform and manufactured; man made. They did not have the jagged shape that rocks and stones had. I cannot now remember them smoking or fizzing.
22. I did not see the objects land, but I heard explosions off to my left. There was something about how the objects looked which, coupled with the sounds I heard immediately afterwards, made me think they were bombs. They sounded like nail or blast bombs which I had heard before; they make a different sound. I was convinced and remain convinced that they were bombs that had been thrown. 218
6C-171 Soldier A was asked by Christopher Clarke Q.C. further details about the 'yob element':
Q... Do you have any recollection now as to the size of the yob element who were doing this?
A. Not accurately, sir, no.
Q. Roughly; are we talking about five, ten, 15, 20?
A. No. Probably between 20, 30, but that is a rough estimate.
Q. Do you recollect what sort of age these people were?
A. No, not really, sir.
Q. Do you recollect how close to the building they had come?
A. Probably about 20 -- 20 metres, something like that, I think, sir. But, again, I cannot be accurate at this stage. 219
6C-172 Soldier A confirmed that he had shouted "Bombers" or "Nail bombers" as a warning to the platoon. 220
6C-173 Soldier B gave the following account to the RMP on 31.01.72 at 01:10:
218 B20.003 paragraph 19-22. Soldier A was referred to, and adopted, this passage from his statement by during the course of his oral evidence Day 297/025-028.
219 Day 297/026
220 Day 297/029-030 ...the main body of the march passed by us without any real incident. There was an element of younger males with the crowd however and these youths stoned us and threw bottles and other objects. When the crowd had passed by the youths continued to attack us. We fired baton rounds to disperse them. There were then two nail-bombs thrown and these landed very close to our position and then exploded.
Some of the stones thrown by the rioters hit the wall of the derelict building; others came through the windows. Soldier B agreed with the proposition, put to him by Ms McGahey, that it would follow that a nail bomb could have been thrown into the building with potentially horrendous consequences for those inside.
In his SA statement and evidence to the Widgery Inquiry Soldier B described the crowd as about 50 strong and consisting of mainly youths and a few adults. To this Inquiry he confirmed on oath his belief that this would have been his best estimate at the time.
Soldier B’s contemporary accounts make it clear that he only heard the explosions which he believed to be nail bombs. He did not see what caused the explosions due to the fact that at the time he was putting on his gas mask. What he believed to be two nail bombs landed in the waste ground to Soldier B’s left. Soldier B’s contemporary accounts record that shortly after the nail bombs had been thrown he noticed a group of rioters in the laundry waste ground. Individuals in the group would run across William Street and throw stones and bottles at the derelict house.
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221 B43.009 222 SA statement at B43.012 223 Day 311/054-055 224 SA statement at B43.012; Widgery Evidence B43.017 paragraph A 225 Day 311/030 226 SA statement at B43.012; Widgery Evidence B43.017 paragraph C 227 SA statement at B43.012; Widgery Evidence B43.017 paragraph C 228 SA statement at B43.013; Widgery evidence B43.017 paragraph E-B43.018 paragraph A Soldier B now has no specific recollection of nail bombs going off.\\textsuperscript{229}
\\textit{A: ...all I remember, there was some people out there... I cannot put a figure on it, um, and I remember seeing dust and -- to my left. That is all I can remember, and there was a lot of shouting.}
\\textit{...}
\\textit{Q: You could see dust on the waste ground immediately in front of the window?}
\\textit{A: Yes}
\\textit{Q: What had made that dust, did you know.}
\\textit{A: I cannot remember now.}\\textsuperscript{230}
\\textbf{6C-178} INQ0588 was hit by a stone thrown through the window of the derelict building. His evidence corroborates Soldier B’s accounts of missiles being thrown into the building:
\\begin{quote} I remember that we had nothing to take cover behind when facing William Street and stones were raining down upon us from above. I also recall that there was an open space opposite the building on the other side of William Street...
...As we entered the building the march was coming down William Street and I recall a mass of people in front of the building... Just after INQ455 fell we came under stoning from youths on William Street to which we were exposed. Those youths were approximately 40-50 metres opposite the front of our location and were throwing stones and bits of paving stones. The room we were in was very small (approximately 10" x 10") and with nothing to take cover behind the only thing to do was face the crowd, watch for stones and try and protect Private INQ455 from the missiles being thrown by the rioters. During this period I was hit by a rock on my left ear which left ear which left me temporarily stunned. I did not see who threw the rock and resumed my duties after 2-3 seconds when I regained my senses.\\textsuperscript{231} \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{229} B43.003 paragraph 11 \\textsuperscript{230} Day 311/029-030 \\textsuperscript{231} C588.2 paragraph 10-13 INQ1919 told Eversheds that the people who spotted them "immediately started pointing and jeering." His BSI statement continues:
As soon as we had been spotted people started to come forward from the same group of people, throwing missiles towards us which did not reach us. It must still only have been a matter of seconds after we had been seen that other people, who were not from this group of people, and who were mainly younger elements in the crowd, began to move forward towards us and across the area of waste ground in front of the derelict building, throwing stones and missiles which were reaching us. I was down on the ground in the derelict building by this stage and my view was more restricted. We obviously took up positions out of the line of sight of the people and away from the objects being thrown which were coming over the top of the walls of the derelict building...
INQ1919 confirmed when called to give oral evidence that his memory was of missiles coming from the top rather than through the windows. He also confirmed that he heard explosions "pretty close" whilst he was in the derelict building; he believed them to be the sound of nail bombs. INQ1919 was referred to, and adopted, what he had said in his BSI statement:
Q. In paragraph 22, the first sentence, you say: "As I was in the derelict building I was only able to see what was happening outside when I moved to the end of a wall and peered out." When you peered out, were you peering out of a window or were you peering out of somewhere else?
A. I thought I was peering out the side of a doorway.
Q. And you say: "As I looked out from behind the wall for, I think, the second time, the group of people throwing missiles and objects at us had thinned out but those people who remained had moved further forward across the waste ground towards us in the derelict building and had more or less reached us." Again, can you give any sort of idea of the number of people who had come forward across the waste ground and were close to the derelict building?
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232 C1919.3 paragraph 19 233 C1919.3 paragraph 19 – adopted by INQ1919 when he gave evidence Day 296/011. 234 Day 296/012 235 Day 296/009-010 A. The view I had of the waste ground was not the entire -- I had a limited view from the angle I was looking through and the limited view I had, no more than 15 people.
6C-181 INQ1919's recollection of a shouting between INQ0441 and Soldiers A and B making mention of a nail bomb corroborates Soldier A's account of a warning shouted by him to the rest of the platoon.
6C-182 INQ1917 confirmed that from his position in the derelict building he had observed a group ("stragglers" per his BSI statement) consisting of males in their twenties and thirties running in various directions and throwing things, some of which were thrown in his direction. He then heard two explosions. They seemed reasonably close to the building where he was. At the time he had no idea what had caused the explosions; but from later experience he believes they might have been nail bombs.
6C-183 INQ0275 describes a crowd of 40-100 youths "throwing rocks and anything else they could find and hurling abuse in our general direction." He told Eversheds that although he does not now recall seeing or hearing nail bombs or explosions it is possible he did and that he has simply forgotten. He describes "a lot of activity across the road, and the situation was tense...it was mayhem." It was "extremely unpleasant" to be faced with "a large crowd of aggressive people ...screaming for your blood." He could not remember whether or not stones or other objects came into the building.
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236 Day 296/016-017\
237 Day 296/017\
238 C1917.2 paragraph 12\
239 Day 288/064\
240 Day 288/065 & Day 288/097\
241 C0275.3 paragraphs 16-19\
242 Day 340/179
§ 7.1060
VI 86 The 'Failure' by Other Members of Machine Gun Platoon to Give Evidence of Nail Bombs
6C-184 A number of the members of Machine Gun Platoon cannot now specifically recall seeing or hearing nail bombs on Bloody Sunday. These soldiers gave no contemporaneous statements in 1972 and their recollections are incomplete. This incompleteness is demonstrated most vividly by the fact that a similar number of soldiers have no recollection, or simply did not hear, even the shots fired by members of their platoon on Bloody Sunday.243
6C-185 Further, most of the soldiers in the house with nine windows were some way back from the open windows and the sound was masked by the deafening background noise of the riots going on the waste ground and at Barriers 12 and 14.
6C-186 INQ0588 sets out in his BSI statement why a combination of noise and his own position may have prevented him from witnessing nail bombs thrown in the area of the derelict building:
...it is possible that nail bombs were thrown past me and exploded but, because of the general confusion, background shooting noise, the noise from the Baton guns and the noise from the crowd, I did not hear them.
18. I have also been asked whether I saw the nail bomber described by Corporal Soldier A and Private Soldier B in their statements. I did not. This may be because I was further west along William Street than where Corporal Soldier A and Private Soldier B say they were and my field of view did not extend as far east along William Street as the location of the nail bomber described by them.244
243 e.g. INQ0441 (C441.4 paragraph 20); INQ1354 (C1354.2 paragraph 9); INQ1544 (C1544.5 paragraph 34); INQ0455 has no memory of what happened between the time that he fell and being in hospital (C455.1 paragraph 8); INQ0153 (C153.2 paragraph 11); INQ0588 (C588.4 paragraph 19)
244 C588.4 paragraphs 17-18 INQ0588 also believes that his hearing may have been impaired as a result of being hit on the left side of his head by a rock thrown by one of the rioting crowd.\\textsuperscript{245} He confirms that he did not hear live rounds fired from his position:
\\begin{quote} I did not see or hear anyone fire a gun from my location (other than a Baton gun) that day nor did I see any rioter being shot. However, because of the reasons stated above about the level of noise in our location at that time it is possible that orders were shouted and a soldier from my unit fired in our defence without me hearing it.\\textsuperscript{246} \\end{quote}
INQ0588 was a baton gunner himself and confirms that during the course of the rioting he fired 20-30 baton rounds at rioters who were stoning him and his colleagues in the derelict building.\\textsuperscript{247}
INQ0275 gave a similar account of the noise level during the course of his evidence to this Inquiry:
\\begin{quote} Q. In the circumstances that applied on 30\\textsuperscript{th} January 1972, when you were in that derelict building, do you think it possible that a nail bomb or nail bombs could have exploded in close proximity to the building without you hearing it?
A: With the amount of noise that was going on, it could have, not too near.
Lord Saville: What sort of noise do you recall going on at that time?
A: It is a big mixture that you get at all riots. It is, it is a terrible noise; people screaming, shouting and whatever else goes on, rubber bullet – bullet guns going off. The thing is, you cannot sort of stand there and listen to an individual noise.\\textsuperscript{248} \\end{quote}
INQ0275 was asked in terms by Mr. Roxburgh whether it would be possible not to hear a normal sized nail bomb if it had exploded on the waste ground
\\textsuperscript{245} C588.5 paragraph 21 \\textsuperscript{246} C588.4 paragraph 19 \\textsuperscript{247} C588.4 paragraph 16 \\textsuperscript{248} Day 340/180/22-181/010 immediately in front of the derelict building. INQ0275 said he did think it was a possibility.\\textsuperscript{249}
\\textit{Civilian Evidence of Rioting}
6C-191 Such was the noise and activity in the area that dozens of soldiers failed to hear the live rounds fired by Soldiers A and B. There has, however, been a demonstrable reluctance on the part of civilian witnesses to give an accurate or honest account of the fact or the degree of rioting.
6C-192 It seems inconceivable that anyone who saw Damien Donaghy and / or John Johnston shot could have been oblivious to the rioting that was taking place in the area. Despite this, a series of witnesses who claimed to have seen either or both of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston shot were prepared to give evidence to the Tribunal that there was no riot of any kind in this location at about this time.
\\textbf{Witnesses who positively assert that no rioting was taking place}
6C-193 Brendan McCrossan said he was behind John Johnston when he was shot. He told Eversheds:
\\begin{quote} 4. I did not hear any other shots or explosions at this time. The mood of the marchers was still good humoured. I did not see anything being thrown at the soldiers.\\textsuperscript{250} \\end{quote}
6C-194 Mr McCrossan gave sworn testimony to the same effect:
\\begin{quote} Q. Did you see any stone throwing going on? A. No.\\textsuperscript{251} \\end{quote}
6C-195 Tony McCourt told Eversheds that he heard a shot and looked towards the soldiers near the GPO.
\\textsuperscript{249} Day 340/181-182 \\textsuperscript{250} AM483.1 paragraph 3-4 \\textsuperscript{251} Day 062/152/18-19 No one was throwing stones at the soldiers.\\textsuperscript{252}
6C-196 He reaffirmed when he gave evidence to the BSI, that he had not seen at any stage stones or the like thrown towards the north side of William Street and had not heard any bangs or explosions.\\textsuperscript{253}
6C-197 John McGee told Eversheds that Damien Donaghy was shot a few yards in front of him:
\\begin{quote} No one around me was doing anything which in my view justified live shots. I did not see anyone throwing stones or anything else at the soldiers on the roof and I am certain that neither Damien Donaghy nor those around me engaged in anything sinister.\\textsuperscript{254} \\end{quote}
6C-198 Mr McGee confirmed on oath\\textsuperscript{255} that he had seen anybody doing anything that was aggressive or could have been interpreted as such.\\textsuperscript{256}
6C-199 Brendan Deehan observed soldiers on the GPO roof:
\\begin{quote} ...I think the crowd may have been shouting up at the soldiers. I did not see any of the crowd throwing stones at the soldiers and I am sure that no-one on the waste ground was throwing stones. There was still a very large crowd passing along William Street towards Aggro Corner and throwing stones from the waste ground to the soldiers would have meant aiming them over the heads of the crowd...
11. I then heard three sharp cracks and someone shouted “Jesus, that’s live rounds.”\\textsuperscript{257} \\end{quote}
6C-200 Monica McDaid gave evidence\\textsuperscript{258} in accordance with her BSI statement. She said she and the others in the laundry waste ground “were all adults except for the one
\\textsuperscript{252} AM148.2 paragraph 8 \\textsuperscript{253} Day 054/131; McCourt gives his location as ‘B’ on the map at AM148.11 \\textsuperscript{254} AM223.4 paragraph 3 \\textsuperscript{255} Day 065/055 \\textsuperscript{256} Mr. McGee was reluctantly forced to agree that he could not assist the Inquiry as to what precisely Damien Donaghy might or might not have been doing immediately before he was shot (Day 065/056) \\textsuperscript{257} AD20.2 paragraph 9-11 \\textsuperscript{258} Day 065/123 boy [Damien Donaghy] and there was no rioting.” Ms. McDaid was adamant that she “did not see any stone throwing at all.”
Thomas McDaid, told Eversheds that he and his wife spent between 10 and 15 minutes in the Laundry Waste ground before hearing a live shot. In evidence, he said:
...there was no activity in where we were. He was the only young lad that was there, the rest of us was adults and there was no guns, nail bombs, stone throwing or anything in that area where we were... there was nobody in front of us on William Street with any activity... Nobody at all, I was looking straight into an empty space direct looking over to ... Great James Street Church.
Ann Harkin, noticed soldiers on the GPO roof and in the derelict building with nine windows immediately before hearing live shots. She told Eversheds:
18. No stones were being thrown at the soldiers I was looking at, even though they were easily visible. There was no rioting at this point.
During her oral evidence to this Inquiry Ms Harkin was referred to her NICRA statement, which mentions “a few boys” throwing stones at soldiers in Richie’s factory. She conceded that she cannot now recall whether or not there was rioting taking place.
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259 Day 065/133 260 AM177 paragraph 6 261 In his BSI statement Mr. McDaid refers to “four young men” lifting Damien Donaghy, AM177.1 paragraph 6. 262 Day 065/33-34 263 AH10.3 paragraphs 16-17 264 AH10.3 paragraph 18. Ms. Harkin also suggests that the crowd at Barrier 14 was “orderly and fairly quiet”, AH10.2 paragraph 10. Although she accepted when shown the video footage, Day 059/068, that rioting must have taken place, she insisted, Day 059/104, that she still did not recall seeing missiles thrown. 265 AH10.8 266 Day 059/071; 059/74 Anthony Feeney gave evidence\\textsuperscript{267} that apart from at Barrier 14 "nobody else was throwing stones anywhere else." \\textsuperscript{268}
Kathleen Turner gave a particularly unconvincing account in her BSI statement. She claimed that soldiers around Richard's factory, possibly in the building with nine windows, were firing rubber bullets and CS gas canisters that were "bouncing off the walls on the southern side of William Street."\\textsuperscript{269} She says it was not apparent to her why the troops were doing so because she saw nobody throw anything at all in the area.\\textsuperscript{270}
Columba Donaghy, told Eversheds that he spent 20-25 minutes at the back of the waste ground\\textsuperscript{271} before hearing live shots. His evidence to this Inquiry was that he did not see any stone throwing from the waste ground where he was standing.\\textsuperscript{272}
According to his BSI statement James McDaid was only 10-12 feet from Damien Donaghy when he was shot.\\textsuperscript{273} When asked by Christopher Clarke Q.C.\\textsuperscript{274} whether he had seen boys throwing stones he replied "I did not pay any particular attention. There is no place there to throw stones at." He said he had not noticed any soldiers at this stage.
\\textsuperscript{267} \\textit{Day 067/094} \\textsuperscript{268} There are further difficulties with his account; including assertion that at the time Damien Donaghy & John Johnston were short there was no one else on the Laundry Waste ground except for him and a girl and that there was no-one in William street or in the waste ground to the North of William Street \\textit{Day 067/092}. \\textsuperscript{269} \\textit{AT19.2 paragraph 8} \\textsuperscript{270} \\textit{Day 054/007}. Her evidence, \\textit{Day 054/009}, that thousands of people were in William Street when Damien Donaghy was shot further undermines her account. \\textsuperscript{271} \\textit{AD116.6 paragraph 7}, which he identifies as being the Abbey Waste ground; but which, logically, must have been the Laundry Waste ground, \\textit{Day 068/071-072}. \\textsuperscript{272} \\textit{Day 068/077} He explained that he had only a limited view of William Street from his position at the back of the waste ground \\textsuperscript{273} \\textit{AM166.2 paragraph 17} \\textsuperscript{274} \\textit{Day 061/005} Patricia McGowan gave evidence that the soldiers in Richie's factory had no reason to fire rubber bullets; she had not seen youths throwing stones at them.(^{275})
Jim Doherty told Eversheds(^{276}) that he was behind Damien Donaghy and John Johnston when they were shot and that there was "no stone throwing going on at that time." Mr. Doherty was a particularly unimpressive witness. He initially agreed that there had been stone throwing going on at time of the shootings;(^{277}) having apparently inadvertently let the truth slip out, he made several unconvincing attempts to recover his original position by suggesting that it was only at certain intervals that he had seen stones thrown; and not at the time of the live shots.(^{278})
William Quigley heard a shot as walked down William Street. He observed a soldier to the west of the Presbyterian Church:
[I \\text{ did not see anybody throwing any stones, gesturing or catcalling towards the soldier I had seen by the church.}] (^{279})
Seamus Bradley told Eversheds,(^{280}) that he was:
[\\text{not aware of any stone throwing in the area at the time the shots were fired, although I was concentrating on getting my wife away from the gas and bullets.}]
His evidence was watered down under cross-examination; he agreed that there may or may not have been stone throwing; he was concerned with his wife's welfare.(^{281})
(^{275}) Day 061/145 (^{276}) AD73.3 paragraph 11 (^{277}) Day 065/105 (^{278}) Day 065/107 (^{279}) AO8.1 paragraphs 4-5. (^{280}) AB69.3 paragraph 7 (^{281}) Day 064/017 In his NICRA statement, Charles Vincent Meehan stated: “I must make it absolutely clear that no one, where I was standing, was involved in riotous or disorderly behaviour.”
Witnesses who assert that the rioting was of a trivial nature
A number of witnesses have conceded that some rioting was taking place, but give an entirely misleading impression as to its extent. These accounts should be treated with the same degree of caution as those who claim no rioting was taking place.
Betty Curran told the Praxis team:
There was nobody behaving aggressively. Nobody that we see, nobody, was behaving aggressively.
She went on to say that the only thing she had seen was a few stones thrown at the back of the march. In her BSI statement she admits:
I saw two or three wee lads opposite where I was standing (i.e. on the north side of William Street). They were throwing a few stones at the soldiers on the flat roof.
Eugene Lafferty,
...I saw two or three young lads in the waste ground south of the PC, in the area marked B ... throw stones towards the soldiers at point A. However, the stones probably did not hit the soldiers as the distance was too far. The lads were a year or two younger than me (I was nineteen at the time) and were simply letting off steam.
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282 AM390.1 283 O6.10 284 O6.15 285 AC130.2 paragraph 10 286 AL1.8 paragraph 6 Sean Barr gave evidence, that he had seen youths shouting and throwing stones at soldiers “it was not a riot; it was a small number of youths.” He confirmed that in his opinion there was no reason for the soldiers to shoot; as he had told Eversheds, “the soldiers were under no threat at the time.” However he seems to implicitly accept that the soldiers were in some danger; in his BSI statement he remarked that he was surprised that soldiers “so near and in full view of the crowd” were not wearing full riot gear.
Charles McDaid told Eversheds, he saw “two or three youths throwing stones...in the waste ground just south of the GPO...”
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are few civilian witnesses who are prepared to depart from the ‘official’ version of events. That said, there is clear evidence of the following:
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287 Day 063/069 288 Day 063/086 289 AB19.4 paragraph 15 290 AB19.3 paragraph 11 291 AM161.3 paragraph 15 (1) There were nail bombs present and to be seen in the Bogside on Bloody Sunday. (See for example the evidence of their being present in Glenfada Park North, Chapter 9).
(2) There were individuals present on Bloody Sunday who intended to use those nail bombs against the soldiers.
(3) There some civilian evidence of nail bombs, or explosions, in Sector 1 on Bloody Sunday.
6C-221 Those civilian witnesses who are prepared to depart from the 'official' line are, admittedly, relatively few in number. That said, and despite their relatively small number, the evidence of those who have been independent enough to give such evidence case must be given almost conclusive weight: these individuals have nothing to gain in giving such evidence. Their motive can only be a desire to tell the truth.
_Civilians Who Admit to having Heard Nail Bombs Exploding_
6C-222 Frank Lawton is among the few prepared to publicly acknowledge hearing a nail bomb on Bloody Sunday: Mr. Lawton admits to having heard what he identified as a nail bomb in the area of the waste ground. In what appears to be his original NICRA statement, witnessed by Bronagh Hinds, he said:
_The man on the lorry was calling for the people to meet at “Free Derry Corner”. This subsequently happened. But at this time I did hear one nail bomb explode. I stress the one and this appeared to be at the Grandstand Bar in William Street. There were no further explosions._
292 AL6.19 There is in fact a further version of this NICRA statement; almost identical (in this passage); save that it has been retyped with a slightly different layout and only the single word “one” has been underlined. Both purport to have been witnessed by Bronagh Hinds (AL6.27). The Grandstand Bar is visible in the photograph below located at the north west corner of the Abbey Street waste ground.293
The timing and location of the explosion described by Mr. Lawton correspond very closely to the accounts given by Soldier A and Soldier B. Mr. Lawton gave the following additional information about the timing of this explosion when he gave evidence on Day 389:
In paragraph 4, you deal with your evidence as to a possible nail bomb and you say that between five and ten minutes before the Army moved in you heard a noise which at the time you thought may have been a nail bomb exploding.
At the time that you heard this noise, had the meeting that we know took place at Free Derry Corner, begun?
A. No, the actual meeting had not begun. The people were moving up the street towards Free Derry Corner at the time, I think.
Q. Was the lorry which we know led the march making its way towards Free Derry Corner?
A. Yes, I think it was, yes.
293 P201 The location was identified by Christopher Clarke Q.C., Day 011/070, as being “the first building left standing to the east of Abbey Street on the south side of William Street” Q. Could you still hear rioting at that time from the area of William Street?
A. There was a lot of noise about, but I would not say it was rioting, you know, it was, it is slightly away from where I was at the time, you know.
Q. At the time that you heard the noise which you thought might have been the nail bomb, could you hear rubber bullets being fired?
A. There was the sound of what I considered to be baton rounds being fired and tear gas canisters and to my mind, in a built-up area -- you get a bigger sort of a bang out of a thing like that in a built-up area. It could have been anything, but with the frequency what I heard at the time, they were probably baton rounds.
Q. If we can take it in stages, please. I just want to try and ascertain what background noise or what other noises you could hear at the time that you heard the noise that you took to be a nail bomb. Putting that noise to one side, could you at that time also hear rubber bullets being fired?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you hear CS gas canisters?
A. I did not, I did not -- well, I did not actually see them being fired, but the gas was there.
Q. In January 1972, were you familiar with the sound of nail bombs?
A. I had heard nail bombs go off before.
Q. Your recollection is still that this noise that you thought may have been a nail bomb came from the direction of the Grandstand Bar on William Street?
A. Yes, the sounds were coming from that direction, yes.
Q. Was that the only explosion you heard that day that sounded like a nail bomb?
A. Yes.294
294 Day 389/093/24-095/21 Mr Lawton's time in the Royal Navy, combined with the time he had spent in the Bogside, means that his ability to recognise particular sounds is likely to have been better than most. Mr. Lawton was questioned further by Nicholas Griffin:
Q. You had been in the Bogside long enough to distinguish the sounds and you go on to say that your hearing was particularly good because of the job you had done in the Navy, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. We know also, as a result of what you have told us today, that you had heard nail bombs go off before 30th January 1972?
A. Yes.
Q. So you had a knowledge of the sound of nail bombs as well?
A. Yes.
Q. May we look, then, at the paragraph above, which is on the screen, the paragraph beginning:
"The man on the lorry was calling for the people to meet at Free Derry Corner. This subsequently happened. But at this time I did hear one nail bomb explode. I stress the one, and this appeared to be at the Grandstand Bar in William Street. There were no further explosions."
We can have, can we not, Mr Lawton, some confidence that what you have said there clearly and without any expression of doubt is likely to be correct?
A. As far as I can remember to this day, yes, that is what I said.
Despite Mr. Lawton's subsequent attempts to downplay the importance of the explosion he heard, it is clear that his immediate reaction on hearing the explosion (and as someone who lived in the Bogside and was familiar with such things) was to conclude that it was a nail bomb exploding. His evidence demonstrates that, at the time that soldiers A and B reported hearing nail bombs, others in the crowd thought that they too had heard a nail bomb explode. Professor William McCormack heard explosions in William Street at a stage which would appear to
295 Day 389/137/02-138/01 be shortly after the first use of the water cannon, when large sections of the crowd were moving from Barrier 14 to Rossville Street.
The Army were firing CS gas but the wind blew it back on top of their own positions. Some water dye blew through the air like silk; there were sounds of explosions in William Street but distant and insignificant. As the wind began to change sides, the crowd felt the effects of the CS. Most people moved back into Rossville Street, the main entrance to the Bog.296
Although Professor McCormack had positively denied hearing nail or petrol bombs in his 1972 statement,297 his evidence to this Tribunal was that the sounds could have been bombs exploding. He was asked by Edmund Lawson Q.C.:
Are you able to help us any further about the explosions?
A. No, they were -- these would be booming sounds rather than piercing, high-pitched sounds of gunfire. They were distant. I saw none of them. I have no idea how they were generated or by whom, if they were the result of some kind of petrol bomb, for example, I saw none, but all I can do is report what I heard.
Q. Indeed. You have told us helpfully you had become, in your short time in Derry, reasonably familiar with the sound of baton guns?
A. Yes.
Q. What you were describing here was explosions as opposed to baton guns firing?
A. That is certainly true.
Q. Which would suggest it sounded to you -- I know you would not claim to be an expert in such matters -- like some sort of bomb going off?
A. That would be one explanation, but all I can do is report the sound, as it were, explosive sounds.298
296 AM136.8 (second column) 297 AM136.17 298 Day 113/118/12-119/07 Although Professor McCormack describes the explosions as occurring after a shot fired by a soldier in William Street for the reasons set out in Chapter 6F, Professor McCormack cannot be describing the shots fired by Soldiers A and B. It is likely, if he heard a shot at all, that he heard a shot fired by a member of the IRA.
Brian Callan also heard an explosion which may have been a nail bomb exploding. After hearing rubber bullets fired by soldiers in “Brewsters Bakery” and noticing youths stoning soldiers on the roof of the GPO Sorting office:
There was an explosion from that direction. People around me said that the soldiers’ CS gas canister must have exploded. There was a larger than usual cloud of CS gas. I was not affected by the CS gas. I cannot say for sure that it was CS gas.
The sequence of events described by Mr. Callan coincides with Soldier B’s description of hearing explosions after baton rounds had been fired at the rioting crowd.
Objects Thrown Past the Windows of the Derelict Building
In addition to there having been explosions heard around the William’s Street waste ground at around the time Soldiers A and B claim to have heard nail bombs exploding. There is civilian evidence which further supports their evidence of having seen two objects thrown past the windows at which they were stationed.
Dermot Carlin
Q. It may be an unfair thing to do, but help the Tribunal if you can: if you had put yourself in the position of the soldiers in the building where you now know they were and where it is common ground that they were, they would have seen some missiles being thrown at them?
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299 Professor McCormack agreed that it was possible that the soldier had not in fact fired a shot, but merely been pointing his rifle at the boys Day 113/102/05-11. 300 BSI map GR J07 – i.e. the location of the derelict building with nine windows. 301 AC4.2 paragraph 15 302 B43.009 A. Probably.
Q. And some going past them from left to right?
A. Obviously, yes.
Q. Mr Carlin, we are talking about quite a lot, I used the word "missile", I did not mean anything emotive by that, but did you see what was being thrown?
A. Bits of stone, concrete, small pieces now, because –
Q. Stone and concrete?
A. Small pieces of building material, yes.
Q. Forgive me for being lawyer-pedantic, but when you say "small" what are we talking about, a fist size?
A. Smaller than that again. The stones I saw being thrown were towards the sorting office and it would be an impossible feat to land a fist-sized stone in that distance. When I looked at it the next day I realised it was a longer distance than I thought it was then even.
Q. I think we have been told -- we can see on the map, in fact, from the waste ground it would be a little over 50 yards?
A. Yes, it would be a good -- some throw.
Q. The distance, of course, from the waste ground to the derelict building we have been talking about is almost half that distance?
A. At certain parts of it, it would be, yes.
Q. Well within range of a young man even with quite a heavy stone?
A. Yes.303
William Curran
Q. There were a number of youths in that general area, is that right?
A. That is correct.
303 Day 060/072/08 Q. They were throwing stones, as we look at the photograph, from left to right?
A. Left to right, yes. 304
Sean O’Neill:
6C-232 Despite the denials of countless witnesses and their evidence that no one in the area of the derelict building was doing anything which might have caused the soldiers to believe that they were being targeted by a nail bomber, the admitted actions of Sean O’Neill demonstrate these denials to be false.
6C-233 Sean O’Neill described his own actions at the time that Damien Donaghy was shot.
7. When I was near a lamppost to the east of Stephenson’s Bakery approximately at the point marked 3 on the map (grid reference K07), I looked behind me and saw two soldiers through a ground floor window of the eastern wall of Stephenson’s Bakery. I attach a photograph on which I have marked the window through which I saw the soldiers. I was holding an empty bottle of lemonade that my friends and I had bought and finished by the time I reached the Bakery. Holding the empty bottle, I left the march, got down on my hands and knees and crawled along the eastern wall of Stephenson’s Bakery towards the window through which I had seen the soldiers, the bottom of which was about one to two feet from the ground. I crawled underneath the window and saw a para inside the building aged about twenty-two to twenty-five wearing a red beret. He wasn’t in a standing or kneeling position, but was kind of crouched down. His flack jacket was open and he was carrying a SLR. I was ready to throw the bottle at him when a gun came out of the window and fired. It was damn loud. I thought he might have seen my head and fired when he saw me. Within a second of hearing the shot I threw the bottle at the soldier and it hit him in the chest. I then raced back to William Street. The soldier did not chase me. 305
304 Day 055/072/06 305 AO65.16 paragraph 7 Mr. O'Neill has not given evidence and his account has therefore not been tested. There are, however, good reasons for believing that his account is only part of the true position. In particular, his account of what was occurring around him at the time that he attempted to throw the bottle through the window of the derelict building is demonstrably false: he told Eversheds that he had not seen anybody else rioting at the stage when Damien Donaghy was shot. The admissions of Damien Donaghy, and of other rioters, demonstrate the falsity of this claim.
It is quite possible that Mr. O'Neill may have been involved in something more sinister than he has been prepared to admit. Because he has not given oral evidence to the Inquiry, the Tribunal is unlikely to find out what.
CIVILIAN EVIDENCE OF THE SCALE OF RIOTING IN AND AROUND THE LAUNDRY WASTE GROUND.
A number of civilian witnesses have admitted that stones and / or bottles were being thrown at soldiers to the north of William Street. Unsurprisingly, perhaps inevitably, the majority has suggested that it amounted to only trivial rioting. In the light of similar denials regarding Damien Donaghy's participation in the rioting their evidence in this respect is wholly discredited.
A small number of civilians give a more credible account of serious rioting in William Street. Even amongst these witnesses there has been a temptation to
306 AO65.16 paragraph 8 underplay the scale of the rioting.\\textsuperscript{307} Doubtless none has exaggerated the level of rioting; their descriptions can therefore only be regarded as an indication of the minimum level of rioting.
6C-238 Father Mclvor gave evidence that he had initially seen one youth throwing stones at soldiers on the GPO roof. This youth was joined by about fifty others. Father Mclvor described the youths as being in the waste ground in front of the sorting office. \\textsuperscript{308} He confirmed that these youths joined in the stone throwing and that “they were throwing bottles as well.”\\textsuperscript{309} He agreed that the concentration of the youths were in the middle of the waste ground.\\textsuperscript{310}
6C-239 Father Mclvor is in error in maintaining that there was a gap of 5-6 minutes between the rioting and the live shots being fired.\\textsuperscript{311} A number of rioters admit to being in process of picking up or throwing objects at the time Damien Donaghy was shot.\\textsuperscript{312}
6C-240 Father Mclvor’s account to this Inquiry (fifty youths rioting) must be contrasted with the account he gave in 1972 in which he suggested that only one youth took part in the stone throwing.\\textsuperscript{313} It demonstrates the reluctance of civilian witnesses, even those in holding respected positions within the community, to admit to the level of violence which was directed towards the army on Bloody Sunday. Father Mclvor’s present candour is exceptional.
6C-241 Another priest, Father Carolan, told Eversheds:
\\textit{Some young boys in the crowd, perhaps about 12, started throwing stones at the soldiers on the flat roof... It was the natural thing at}
\\textsuperscript{307} For example Father Carolan told this Inquiry that 12 youths were rioting; in 1972 he referred to only 2 or 3. \\textsuperscript{308} \\textit{Day 055/003-004; H11.12 –13 paragraphs 6-7} \\textsuperscript{309} \\textit{Day 055/006/11} \\textsuperscript{310} \\textit{Day 055/027} \\textsuperscript{311} \\textit{Day 055/011/24-055/012/06} \\textsuperscript{312} for example, Sean O’Neill \\textsuperscript{313} 1972 statement \\textit{H11.9} the time for the young boys to throw stones at any soldiers who came into sight... I remember people in the crowd trying to stop the young boys from throwing the stones but they could not do so and the stone throwing became too severe – the soldiers were being bombarded.314
Father Carolan’s evidence also needs to be contrasted with his contemporary account, in which he said there were just two or three boys were involved in “throwing stones up at the soldiers on sorting office and in the old burned out factories of Riches and sons.”315
There is further civilian evidence that the rioters near the derelict building formed a noisy and aggressive mob.
Hugh Heggarty saw rioters throwing stones at soldiers on the GPO roof. “At this time I could hear a lot of roaring and shouting to the effect of “get the B……s” and “get the c……s.” 316
Mr. Heggarty’s description bears a strong resemblance to Soldier A’s description of what he heard shouted by the crowd:
Once they all realised there were soldiers in the building they started throwing rocks, bricks and stones and yelling “Here are Brits in there. There are Brits in there. Get the bastards out!” and that sort of thing... 317
Mr. Heggarty accepted that it was potentially a murderous crowd:
Q. And it was -- what the crowd was roaring that they wanted to do was to get at these soldiers whom they were referring to by these obscene words?
A. Yes.
314 H3.2 paragraph 7 315 H3.12 316 AH67.2 paragraph 7 317 B20.003 paragraph 19 Q. And not to mince words, "get at" meant just that, it meant get our hands on them if we can?
A. I suppose so.
Q. Again, to be blunt, Mr Heggarty, if the crowd had got their hands on a soldier, they would have killed him?
A. Most likely.
Q. Most likely. 318
Charles McDaid told Eversheds 319 that there were "a good supply [of stones] in the waste ground." A photograph of the marchers passing the derelict building earlier in the afternoon shows that there was also a good supply of stones in William Street itself. 320 Billy McCartney describes coming up William Street from Barrier 14 and seeing soldiers in the derelict building \[marked 'B'\]:
...I saw a crowd of 14 or 15 young boys who were rioting on William Street. They were throwing stones at the soldiers in the derelict building. The boys were opposite the derelict building, on the south side of William Street, and were getting their stones from the waste ground to their right and left. They were going backwards and forwards across the waste ground. I have marked their approximate positions with crosses on the attached map... There was roaring and bad language from both the rioters and the soldiers. I joined in the stone throwing. It was not heavy stone throwing.... The stone throwing lasted for about five minutes.
Dermot Carlin's evidence to this Inquiry was that he had not personally seen soldiers in the derelict building; but it was obvious to him that those who had been throwing stones had. He confirmed that it made sense that some of the missiles were directed at these soldiers; some of the missiles thrown would have passed them from left to right. Although he claims only to have seen the rioters throwing bits of stone, concrete and small pieces of building material, he accepted that the soldiers in the derelict building were "Well within range of a young man even with quite a heavy stone."
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321 AM87.2 paragraph 9 322 Day 060/044 323 Day 060/072 324 This is entirely consistent with Soldiers A & B's accounts of objects being thrown in front of the windows of the derelict building where they were positioned. 325 Day 060/072/17-73/18 RIOTING WAS IN PROGRESS AT THE MOMENT THAT LIVE SHOTS WERE FIRED.
6C-250 Rioting was taking place, and had been for some time, at the moment that Damien Donaghy was shot. Soldiers of Machine Gun Platoon were amongst those being targeted at the moment that shots were fired by Soldier A and Soldier B. This fact alone does not, of course, justify any firing by soldiers of live rounds. It is, however, relevant to the Tribunal's consideration of the truth and accuracy of the accounts given by civilians about what was going on at the time; its assessment of the situation which confronted the soldiers, including A and B; the accuracy and/or reasonableness and/or honesty of Soldier A's and Soldier B's accounts of what they saw and heard; and the conclusion which it may reach as to why so many civilians, including Mr Donaghy, did not give truthful accounts of what was going.
6C-251 Giving evidence to this Inquiry Patrick McCallion, a self confessed rioter, was referred to and adopted the following section of the account he gave to Eversheds:
10. There were about 20 to 30 people on the waste ground where I stood, who were throwing anything they could find, including stones and empty milk bottles, at the soldiers on the GPO. I did not see anything hit the soldiers...
11. I then heard about three live shots...
12. At the time he was shot, I could not say whether he had been throwing stones... I was not particularly interested as to whether he was throwing stones or not. I was throwing stones as the soldiers at the time and I thought that everybody else in the waste ground was throwing stones as well; Everyone seemed to running around picking up stones.
6C-252 Mr. McCallion describes the rioters making strenuous efforts to arm themselves. He refers to rioters running across the waste ground "gathering whatever they
326 Day 071/143-150 327 AM74.2 paragraph 10-12 could, probably milk bottles...were coming from the houses in this area, thrown and back again."328
6C-253 Alfie McAleer’s evidence is that he was part of a group of about ten to fifteen youths directing their rioting at soldiers in “the old Bakery building” (i.e the house with nine windows).329 He was fetching stones from the laundry waste ground when Damien Donaghy was shot. Damien Donaghy himself was running out into the middle of William Street in order to throw stones.330
6C-254 Mr McAleer was asked in terms about the moment that Damien Donaghy was shot
Q: ... you were not looking at Mr Donaghy when he was shot? A: No.
Q: And have I understood the position correctly, you saw him run past you when you were on the wasteground to the south of William Street.
A: We were coming back from throwing stones, he was going out.331
6C-255 Liam Doherty told Eversheds that he was in the process of picking up a stone when shots were fired.
...I bent down there to pick up a stone and I was about a foot from the wall on the west side of the waste ground (grid reference 18). As I bent down I heard two shots...A bullet hit the wall above me...
21. In my previous statement it says that I had already thrown a stone and was picking up a second when the shots rang out...It may have been the second stone.332
328 Day 071/143-146 Mr. McCallion places the rioters in the laundry waste ground and in William Street. His evidence is that he did not notice soldiers in the derelict building with nine windows. 329 Day 092/054; incredibly he was not asked for the names of the people he was with when giving his statement to Eversheds (Day 092/093). 330 AM37.2 paragraph 7; Day 092/057-059 331 Day 092/094/11 332 AD80.3 paragraph 13; AD80.4 paragraph 21 Patrick Harkin saw approximately seven young teenagers throwing stones at the soldiers in the derelict building with nine windows. The boys were on the waste ground to the north of William Street in front of the derelict building. Whilst the stone throwing was going on he heard two or three shots that resulted in the youths dispersing.333
William Doherty told Eversheds that soldiers on the Presbyterian Church flat roof were firing rubber bullets into a peaceful crowd334 however in evidence to the Inquiry he agreed that he had seen people throwing stones at this stage: “they were attempting to reach the top of the church and there was throwing at Richard’s factory.”335 Mr. Doherty places these rioters in William Street itself, rather than in the Waste ground to the north.336 He personally picked up a stone to throw at the soldiers. As he did so a live bullet was fired over his head (which he believes was meant for him; but which hit Damien Donaghy).337 The manuscript copy of his NICRA statement338 notes that “stones were being throwing into Richard’s factory” (emphasis added). This supports the evidence of a number of members of Machine Gun Platoon who refer to missiles coming inside the building.
Derek McFeely gave evidence that at the time Damien Donaghy was shot:
There was a number of youths very close to the gable end with the nine windows and there had been considerable jeering, basically abusive language, jeering at the soldiers at the time...they would have been in the middle of the road and the footpath next to the derelict building.339
333 Day 089/002-005. Mr. Harkin is undoubtedly mistaken in asserting that Damien Donaghy and John Johnson also fell on the waste ground to the north of William Street. 334 AD180.3 paragraph 8-9 335 Day 055/132-3 336 Day 055/133 337 Day 055/137-139 338 Which he was referred to by Christopher Clarke Q.C. on Day 055/169-171 and which has the PIN 11959/1 and 11036/1. 339 Day 061/072 Mr. McFeely told Eversheds that he was not aware of any stone throwing at the time; but accepted that it is possible that stone throwing was taking place that he did not see.\\textsuperscript{340}
Paul Coyle, described a group of youths throwing stones at the soldiers in the derelict building. Through the windows of the ground floor he says he could see soldiers crouched down taking cover from the stones. As he moved away from the area he heard live shots fired.\\textsuperscript{341}
Charlie Ward told NICRA:
\\begin{quote} I saw a youth about 15 ready to throw a stone at troops who were across William Street in an old derelict house. The troops fired two shots. One youth was shot on the hip and the other shot struck an old man who appeared to be shot in the foot.\\textsuperscript{342} \\end{quote}
\\textbf{Evidence Relating to Noise in Vicinity of Derelict Building}
The noise in and around the area of the derelict building was considerable. The level of noise gives an indication as to the level of rioting taking place.
Derek McFeely gave evidence that at the time that Damien Donaghy was shot, there was:
\\begin{quote} an excessive amount of noise... there had been a lot of loud noises which would appear to me to have been rubber bullets.\\textsuperscript{343} \\end{quote}
The level of noise is spoken to by the number of witnesses placing themselves extremely close to Damien Donaghy (and / or John Johnston) when he was shot yet failed to hear, or failed to distinguish, the sound of live rounds.
\\textsuperscript{340} Day 061/073 \\textsuperscript{341} Day 152/058, AC105.1 paragraph 4 \\textsuperscript{342} AW7.1 \\textsuperscript{343} Day 061/076 James McDaid, placed himself only 10-12 feet from Damien Donaghy; he was only aware of the sound of rubber bullets “which were still going on.” He did not hear live rounds “The only shots I heard was the rubber bullet and gas...there was a lot of crowd noise as well.”
Larry Doherty was in the Rossville Street waste ground opposite Kells Walk when he heard that two people had been shot in William Street.
I didn’t really believe them at the time. There was pandemonium...I am almost certain that I had heard the cracks of two shots above the other noises I could hear, although they had not registered with me until the people started to shout that people had been shot.
Bridie Gallagher heard a rumour that people had been shot when she was held up in William Street opposite the GPO “I had not actually heard the noise of gunfire above the noise of thousands of people.”
Dermot Carlin gave evidence that he was close to Damien Donaghy but heard no shooting. He agreed that there had been quite a lot of noise and commotion in the area; he described it, in an unguarded moment, as a “small riot”; before adding “maybe just a fracas”.
PIRA 17 was also in the area, but failed to hear live rounds fired. He was asked by Edwin Glasgow Q.C.:
The point that I was inviting you to comment on was simply this, PIRA 17: if you were, as you say, between those two yellow arrows throughout the time when such rioting as there was was taking place on the waste ground in front of the GPO and the house with nine windows, you are also there when at least five live rounds were fired in the general direction -- The point I wanted you to have the opportunity of commenting on was that if your evidence be right, you were there when a substantial number of shots were fired and did not hear them?
A. That is correct.
Q. That does not surprise you?
A. That does not surprise me in the least in that I am sure you have seen the footage and you know the noise that comes from CS gas and rubber bullets guns, a piece of corrugated iron that was used to defend people against these, that there was a lot of noise and din and it does not surprise me in the least that I did not hear those shots.
Q. The noise of a riot like the one that you witnessed –
A. Yes.
Q. -- at barrier 14 is sufficiently loud even to be able to drown out live SLR fire?
A. As far as Jam concerned it did, yes.
Q. And nail bomb explosions?
A. I heard none.349
CONCLUSION
6C-270 At the time that Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot a significant crowd of rioters had turned their attention towards the soldiers in the derelict building and had begun an assault upon them. Objects were hurled at the soldiers through the windows of the building. Nail bombs were heard exploding nearby. A wholly false picture of that activity was painted by many of the civilians who gave evidence about it.
349 Day 404/152/17-153/24 CHAPTER 6D
THE SHOOTING OF DAMIEN DONAGHY
6D-I INTRODUCTION
6D-1 Damien Donaghy was shot at a time when the rioting in front of the derelict building with nine windows was at its height. Damien Donaghy was one of the rioters.
6D-2 He was shot at approximately 15.55.
6D-3 Damien Donaghy was almost certainly shot by either Soldier A or Soldier B but it is impossible to say which.
6D-4 Damien Donaghy was either not Soldier A’s or Soldier B’s intended target or, if he was, his actions were such as to lead Soldier A and Soldier B both genuinely to believe that he was about to throw a nail bomb.
6D-II WHEN WAS DAMIEN DONAGHY SHOT?
Introduction
6D-5 It is impossible to put a precise time on the shooting of Damien Donaghy. It is, however, possible to place the shooting within the context of other events.
6D-6 There is no doubt that Damien Donaghy was shot before the 1 PARA were deployed through the army Barriers. Serial 160 of the 8 Bde log records Barrier 14 being lifted at about 16.09.¹
¹ W47, Serial 160 Major Loden’s diary of operations suggests that Damien Donaghy was shot at approximately 15.55, i.e. nearly fifteen minutes before the soldiers deployed.
At the time that Damien Donaghy was shot the main part of the march had passed and serious rioting was taking place in vicinity of the laundry waste ground and close to the derelict building in which Machine Gun Platoon were deployed.
Some of those who took part in the rioting in this area (and some who were simply observing) had retreated back up William Street in response to the use of the water canon at Barrier 14 and in order to escape CS gas which engulfed the waste ground at Aggro Corner.
Several witnesses refer to moving up to Barrier 14 and taking part in rioting after Damien Donaghy was shot. A number refer to the water canon being used again at this stage.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that Damien Donaghy was almost certainly shot after the initial deployment of the water canon and after the use of CS gas by the army at Barrier 12, but before the water canon was deployed for a second time.
Combined with timed entries in the army logs, their evidence tends to support the timing recorded by Major Loden for the shooting of Damien Donaghy as broadly speaking accurate.
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2 B2212 Entry timed 15:55: One high velocity round was fired from the direction of Rossville Flats at the wire cutting party. The shot struck a drainpipe on the east wall of the Presbyterian Church approximately four feet above the heads of the wire-cutting party. The drainpipe is holed. A few moments after this a member of the Machine Gun Platoon observed a man preparing to ignite a nail bomb at the corner of the building grid reference 4325/1699 on the south side of William Street. The platoon commander then gave orders to a corporal and a soldier to open fire as the bomber prepared to throw. These two soldiers did so and the man was seen to fall and was dragged away... Damien Donaghy Was Shot After the use of the Water Canon at Barrier 14 and Initial use of CS gas at Barrier 12:
6D-13 The water canon was used on two occasions on Bloody Sunday. The first time was at shortly before 15.44. The 8 Bde log entry timed at 15.44 records
Use of water canon dispersed crowd in area 14. General movement now down Rossville St., after stoning at 14 and 15.
6D-14 Serial 137 of the log timed at 15.50 records the use of gas at Barriers 12 and 13.
At serials 12 & 13 sub units dispersed hooligans with rubber bullets using gas & rubber bullets. Some hooligans wearing gas masks though not current pattern. Little James Street clear.
6D-15 Liam Doherty's evidence suggests that Damien Donaghy was shot shortly after this. He gave the following account in his BSI statement:
The water canon came up and gas and rubber bullets were fired. I was there for about 10 or 15 minutes when I got drenched with the dye from the water canon and got a heavy dose of gas. I started moving back east up William Street. I stopped at the point marked B for about 5 minutes and leant against the wall trying to get my breath back. I was badly effected [sic] by the gas and I was sick. I remember a cameraman taking my photo while I was there.
10. There was rioting going on at Little James Street at that time; it was sporadic. There was a sense of defeat as the crowd came back east down William Street, away from the barrier, as they realised they were not going to get through. Some of the crowd joined in with the riot at Little James
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3 W45, Serial 132. See also W171 Serial 120 “The waterwagon now in action, firing red dye into crowd. Crowd has moved back safely with it”; Serial 121 “time now 15.44”.
4 W46, Serial 137 Street. There was a lot of gas though and it couldn’t really get in to much of a riot.5
Mr. Doherty’s response was to move up William Street and target soldiers in the derelict Abbey taxis building.6 He was in the process of picking up a stone when shots rang out and Damien Donaghy called out that he had been shot.7
6D-16 This sequence of events is confirmed by Patricia Cunningham:
CS gas and rubber bullets were fired into the crowd but we were so tightly packed that we could not retreat. A lot of people myself included, were overcome by the gas.
The water canon was then brought into action and people panicked and fled back up William Street...I stopped near a derelict building, opposite the site of the former Richard’s Factory. At this stage rubber bullets were being fired from that direction. Suddenly, there was the whine of a high velocity rifle shot, coming from the direction of army snipers who were stationed in a burnt out building adjoining the factory site already mentioned. I looked round and saw a youth fall to the ground.8
6D-17 Jim Doherty’s evidence to the present Inquiry was to the same effect.9
A Riot On the Laundry Waste Ground was already in Progress and had been for some Minutes at the Time that Donaghy was Shot:
6D-18 Those retreating from the gas and the water canon came across a riot which was already in progress.
5 AD80.2 paragraph 9-10 6 Day 060/087-091 7 Day 060/095-096 8 AC135.1 9 Day 065/070-071: Mr. Doherty corrected the part of his statement which suggested that the soldiers actually deployed through the barriers immediately after the water canon was deployed. Patrick McCallion moved away from Barrier 14 because he feared he may be caught up in a stampede. His evidence to the Inquiry was that he had seen 20 to 30 people on the laundry waste ground throwing anything they could including stones and empty milk bottles, at the soldiers on the GPO.
The rioting had been in progress for some minutes prior to Damien Donaghy being shot. There was no response to the initial rioting:
1. John Brown saw no reaction by the soldiers to the boys who were jeering at them.
2. William Curran stated that soldiers on the GPO roof moved back when they saw boys pick up stones and move towards them.
3. Padraig O'Mianain confirms there was initially no reaction by soldiers on the GPO roof to youths who threw stones at them.
Rubber Bullets Had been Fired and Two Objects had been Thrown which were, or Appeared to be, Nail Bombs.
As rioting intensified a number of rubber bullets were fired by soldiers in the derelict building and on roof of the GPO.
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10 Day 071/142-144 11 AB93.1 paragraph 5 12 AC132.2 paragraph 9 13 AO56.14 paragraph 8
Major Loden's Diary of Operations B2212 entry timed 15.50. Padraig O'Mianain, Day 059/042, saw rubber bullets fired at a group of young men who were throwing stones. Father Ivor, Day 055/023, gave evidence that a lot of rubber bullets were fired in the area; including one which hit him.
Patrick McCallion Day 071/146/18-147/02 said soldiers on GPO roof initially did not respond to the stone throwing; but then fired "a couple of rubber bullets."
Patrick McCourt, AM146.2 paragraph 7: "I think that the soldiers hiding in Stephenson's Bakery fired one or two rubber bullets as did the soldiers positioned on Great James Street." Before Damien Donaghy was shot two objects were thrown which Soldier A and Soldier B believed to be nail bombs. At the time the two objects were thrown the group of stone throwers had moved back to escape rubber bullets being fired at them. Soldier A’s present recollection is that these objects were thrown a couple of minutes after the stone throwing began.
Billy McCartney gave evidence that the stone throwing had been going on for about five minutes before a ‘salvo’ of approximately six rubber bullets were fired. Mr. McCartney suggests that the rubber bullets were followed a few seconds later by live rounds.
According to Father Carolan, the rubber bullets appeared to have no affect on the rioting crowd and the soldiers continued to be “bombarded.”
Soldier A and Soldier B identified a man on the North West corner of the laundry waste ground who appeared to be in the process of preparing to throw a nail bomb. Both soldiers aimed and fired at the man virtually simultaneously. (See further the discussion below: Chapter 6F: The Shots Fired by Soldier A and Soldier B)
Very shortly after being shot, probably within seconds, members of the crowd reached Damien Donaghy and he was carried to Mrs Shiels’ house in Columbcall Court.
15 Soldier A: B20.014; Soldier B: B43.009 16 Soldier A’s Widgery evidence B20.031F. Neither soldier can now recall rubber bullets being fired (Soldier A: Day 297/028; Soldier B: Day 311/034). Day 297/028: Soldier A confirmed his belief in the accuracy of his statement to the RMP dated 31.01.72, B20.014, which refers to rubber bullets being fired by the troops he was with towards the rioters. Soldier B also referred to baton rounds being fired towards rioters in his statement to the RMP dated 31.01.72: B43.009. 17 B20.003 paragraph 20 18 Day 054/168-170 19 H3.2 paragraph 7 Patrick McCourt’s BSI statement suggests that the rioting on the waste ground to the north of William Street continued even after Damien Donaghy had been shot.
8. There were still people on William Street as the rioting was taking place on the waste ground north of William Street. I decided to turn around and head back to William Street. As I was moving across the waste ground south towards William Street I saw Damien Donaghy, who I and everyone else knew as “Bubbles”, being carried into a house.
**Damien Donaghy was Shot Approximately 15 Minutes before the Soldiers Deployed.**
Major Loden’s diary of operations suggests that the interval between Damien Donaghy being shot and the army coming in was in the region of 15 minutes.
This timing is broadly supported by civilian evidence, much of which suggests that there was a gap of approximately 15 minutes between the shooting of Damien Donaghy and the deployment of the soldiers.
(1) Billy McCartney said that Damien Donaghy had been collected from the Shiels’ house and taken to hospital by the time 1 PARA deployed. Shortly afterwards he saw soldiers enter the Bogside.
14. After watching Damien Donaghy being driven away, me and Danny left the area and went back towards the junction of William Street, Rossville Street and Little James Street, past Kells Walk. Perhaps 15 minutes had passed since the first shots which hit Donaghy and Johnston had rang out. At a point around Kells Walk, I remember stopping to talk to Brother Regan, an old school teacher of mine. We crossed Rosville Street and ran across the waste ground at
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20 AM146.2 paragraph 8 21 B2212 Entry timed 15:55. Eden Place and Pilot Row towards the Rossville Flats' car park. As we did so, the Saracens and Ferret cars came down Rossville Street from William Street and Little James street and I made a run for it with the vehicles proceeding behind me.22
(2) James (Jim) Joseph McDaid dressed Mr. Donaghy's wounds in the Shiels' house. He estimated about 15 minutes separated the first shooting which he had heard from further shooting outside the house.23
(3) Columba Donaghy spent 15-20 minutes chatting between the moment when Damien Donaghy was shot and hearing someone shout that the army were coming in.24
(4) Alfie McAleer apparently remained in the area close to where Damien Donaghy had been shot. He describes being concerned about his own position after witnessing the shooting of Damien Donaghy. He and his friends stood smoking and discussing how they should get away from the trouble when they heard shouting and the sound of the army coming in. Although unable to say how long separated the two events, it is clear from his evidence that they did not follow on immediately from one another.25
Other witnesses have given evidence about the time between the shooting of Damien Donaghy and further shooting shortly after the soldiers deployed.
(1) In evidence William Curran referred to the gap between the shooting of Damien Donaghy and further heavy firing:
22 AM87.4 paragraph 14 23 Day 061/007 24 AD116.2 paragraph 11-12 25 Day 092/065-066 ...after Bubbles Donaghy was shot, there was a lull in the firing, no more shots for at least 15 minutes. At least 15 minutes after that, then there was heavy, heavy firing coming from the direction of bottom of William Street and Rossville Street.26
(2) Betty Curran’s BSI statement puts the gap between the two episodes of shooting as between 10 and 15 minutes.27
(3) Monica McDaid heard further shooting approximately 20 minutes after the first shootings in William Street.28
_Civilians Evidence of the Events at Barrier 14 after the Shooting of Donaghy: Evidence Relating to the Timing of the Second Use of the Water Cannon._
6D-31 A number of witnesses have described witnessing rioting at Barrier 14 after Damien Donaghy had been shot.
(1) Sean Barr has given evidence that he assisted John Johnston.29 He moved to Aggro Corner where he observed rioting directed at the soldiers behind Barrier 14. He estimated that it was about 20 minutes after the shooting that he decided to walk down Rossville Street.30 As he reached the south side of the rubble barricade he saw army vehicles moving in.31
(2) Sean O’Neill claims to have helped to carry Damien Donaghy to the Shiels' house. He gave the following account of his movements
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26 Day 055/061 27 AC130.2 paragraph 11 28 AM170.3 paragraph 15 29 Day 063/075-076 30 Day 063/078 31 Day 063/078-079 between leaving the Shiels’ house and the moment when the soldiers deployed.
11. I then went to the area of Little James Street and Sackville Street....There were a couple of dozen people rioting in the area throwing stones at the soldiers...
12. ... I only stayed in the area of Little James Street and Sackville Street for a few minutes...
13. I went back to William Street and ran east towards Barrier 14...I got up close to Barrier 14...I was within spitting distance of the soldiers to the east of Barrier 14 but the soldiers did not seem worried.32
Mr. O’Neill confirmed that he would have been one of the boys sheltering behind the metal sheeting.33
16. A water cannon then advanced towards us from the east of Barrier 14. I believe it was used twice that day, but the first time I had been rioting in Sackville Street. The second time it was used I was within twenty yards of it but the cannon was not very powerful...After the cannon retreated I started to return towards Barrier 14. I had been in that area in total for about ten to fifteen minutes when I heard a commotion from Little James Street. I stalled for a few seconds but then Barrier 14 was opened up by the soldiers so I turned and ran south along Chamberlain Street and then turned right in a westerly direction along Eden Place.34
(3) Tony McCourt walked to Barrier 14 with his friend, Peter McGriskin.35 Mr. McCourt sheltered behind tin sheet close to the
32 AO65.2 paragraphs 11-13 33 AO65.3 paragraph 14 34 AO65.4 paragraph 16 35 Mr. McCourt’s evidence is hard to reconcile with that of his friend, Peter McGriskin. Mr. McGriskin [AM267] agrees he was probably with Mr. McCourt as he walked down William Street, but has no recollection of hearing shots or seeing people lying on the ground (Day 106/97). Mr. McGriskin confirms that he was at Barrier 14 with Mr. McCourt and admits to taking part in the rioting there (Day 106/97); he estimates that he and Mr. McCourt spent 10-15 minutes in that location before being forced to retreat from the area having been affected barrier. Giving evidence, he claimed that he was not in the mood to join in with the rioting knowing that two people had just been shot. He decided to move when the water cannon was brought up.
(4) Eugene Lafferty admitted that he had taken part in the rioting at Barrier 14 after seeing Damien Donaghy and John Johnston shot. Mr. Lafferty also referred to water canon being used at this stage.
(5) Having witnessed the shooting of Damien Donaghy, Gerry Duddy continued up William Street towards Barrier 14. He told Eversheds, “I wasn’t scared by Bubbles having been shot...”. At Barrier 14 Mr. Duddy observed “a really good riot” in progress. He remained there until he observed the water cannon come up; at which stage he retraced his steps and then turned down Rossville Street.
These references to the use of the water cannon, which must refer to the second occasion on which it was used, provide a further clue as to the timing of the shooting of Damien Donaghy. David Phillips’ statement to the Widgery Tribunal suggests that the second time water cannon was used was at approximately 16.05. Mr. Phillips, at the time the producer of “News at Ten” was positioned approximately fifteen yards behind Barrier 14. Mr. Phillips made a timed note of events as they unfolded; he suggests by gas. He had reached as far as Eden Place when he heard Mickey Bradley shout “they are coming in” (AM267.2 paragraph 5; Day 106/98).
36 Day 054/134 37 Day 054/135 38 Day 054/136-137 39 Day 064/085-090 40 Day 064/088-089 41 AD146.2 paragraph 7 42 Day 059/140 43 Day 059/141 that the timings noted are accurate to within two minutes. His statement, compiled from the notes, reads as follows:
At 4.05 the water cannon, which had been withdrawn after its first firing, re-appeared and fired again. The reason for its further use was because the crowd had obtained a corrugated iron shield behind which they were advancing. Rubber bullets were also fired at the shield. Those with the shield retreated round the bend but at 4.09 pm returned with the same or a similar shield. At 4.12pm the barrier was pulled aside in the centre and the paratroops went in amongst the crowd ...
6D-33 Serial 372 on the Porter tape records Barrier 14 being lifted at about 16.09. Mr. Phillips times it 3 minutes later. This may mean that the water cannon was in fact deployed for the second time closer to 16.02 than 16.05. This would not affect the probable timing of for the shooting of Damien Donaghy.
Conclusion
6D-34 There is strong evidence which supports the conclusion that Damien Donaghy was shot at approximately 15.55 as recorded in Major Loden’s diary of operations.
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44 M66.1, paragraph 1 45 M66.2, paragraph 2 46 W128 WHERE WAS DAMIEN DONAGHY SHOT?
There is conflicting evidence about where Damien Donaghy was shot. Two principal possibilities emerge:
1. The North East part of the laundry waste ground. This is where Damien Donaghy himself says he was shot.
2. The North West corner of the laundry waste ground. The majority of civilians refer to Damien Donaghy being shot in this location. It corresponds with the location of the target identified by Soldier A and Soldier B.
The North East Part of the Laundry Waste Ground: Damien Donaghy's Evidence about where he was Shot
At the time he was shot Damien Donaghy claimed to have been in the process of retrieving a rubber bullet which had hit the gable wall of a house on the east side of the laundry waste ground.
The yellow arrow in the photograph indicates where Damien Donaghy says he was at when he saw a bullet ricochet off the gable wall of a house on the east side of the laundry.
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47 The corner where the Nook bar was located. 48 Day 070/011-012 49 Day 070/012; (marked up photograph AD120.27) Damien Donaghy confirmed that he believed the following section of the account he gave to Eversheds to be correct: 50
9. I took about three steps towards the rubber bullet. I hadn’t got within 20 feet of the rubber bullet when I felt a jab in my right leg. Initially, there was no strong sensation of pain, but I fell immediately onto my back. My approximate position when this happened is marked F on the Plan... 51
When questioned by Mr. Edwin Glasgow Q.C. Mr. Donaghy confirmed that the letter ‘F’ needs to be moved to the left, towards the word
50 Day 070/013 ; Day 070/32 51 AD120.6 paragraph 9 'Laundry', to take account of the fact that the map does not give a true impression of the 1972 position. He was asked:
Q. If we drew a line between the "C" and the "D" on the corner, the line would finish up about the position where you were going towards the rubber bullet?
A. That is correct, but when I gave my evidence to Eversheds, that is the exact -- they, the laundry as it is there now, as you say it was not there. I put meself there, if the laundry was not there I would have meself right in the middle of the laundry, but that is the one they showed me.
6D-40 Damien Donaghy stated that those witnesses who placed him at the North West corner of the waste ground were mistaken. "I was shot at the other side -- the other gable across."
6D-41 Questioned further by Mr. Glasgow, Damien Donaghy confirmed he had a clear recollection of where he was shot. He said he was positive that it was not the corner where the Nook Bar was located [i.e. the North West corner].
6D-42 There is a relatively slim body of civilian evidence which support's Damien Donaghy's account of where he was shot.
6D-43 Seamus Bradley seems to have assumed that Damien Donaghy had run into the North East corner of the laundry waste ground. Marking the position where he saw Damien Donaghy with a green arrow on the photograph below Mr. Bradley commented "This gable wall here, because it was just to get to the safety in round the corner as quick as we
52 Day 070/032/16-034/03. The laundry building was no longer standing by 31.01.72 and the waste ground was therefore approximately twice as wide as it appears on the map. 53 Day 070/034/04-13 54 Day 070/024/20-21 55 Day 070/031 56 AB69.7 could. The arrow marks a position apparently slightly further to the north and east than that marked by Damien Donaghy himself.
Patrick McCallion, indicated to Eversheds that he had seen Damien Donaghy fall at point F on the map below.
Mr. McCallion gave evidence the day after Damien Donaghy had given evidence to the Inquiry. Mr. McCallion claimed that the position marked on the map was inaccurate. Damien Donaghy had in fact been shot not at ‘F’ but at ‘D’ (i.e. further to the east and in a position more closely corresponding with Damien Donaghy’s own evidence). The location
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57 Day 064/009-010: this location appears to be further to the east than the point marked by Mr. Bradley on the BSI map (marked as point “E”) at the time he made his statement. (AB69.3 paragraph 7; AB69.6). 58 AM74.3 paragraph 11: map at AM74.5 indicated by Mr. McCallion was also marked with a green arrow on the map below.\\textsuperscript{59}
A similar shift occurred in the case of Colm O'Domhnaill. In 1999 Mr. O'Domhnaill marked Damien Donaghy's position on the Evershed's map as the North West corner of the laundry waste ground.\\textsuperscript{60} By the time he came to give evidence (eighteen days after Damien Donaghy had himself given evidence) Mr. O'Domhnaill claimed that Damien Donaghy's position was in fact further to the east (in almost precisely the location where Damien Donaghy claimed he was shot).\\textsuperscript{61} Mr. O'Domhnaill marked where Damien Donaghy fell on the photograph below.\\textsuperscript{62}
\\textsuperscript{59} Day 071/148; and photograph at AM74.06 \\textsuperscript{60} AO19.2 paragraph 9; and point 'B' on map at AO19.23. \\textsuperscript{61} Day 088/141 \\textsuperscript{62} AO19.24 THE NORTH WEST CORNER OF THE LAUNDRY WASTE GROUND
6D-48 The majority of civilian witnesses refer to Damien Donaghy being shot in this location.
6D-49 Anthony Feeney marked where he had seen Damien Donaghy with a red arrow.63
6D-50 Charles James McGill confirmed to Christopher Clarke Q.C. that he had seen Damien Donaghy at the north west corner of the laundry waste ground. Damien Donaghy was “just off the pavement on the waste ground...at the corner of a building.”64
6D-51 Other witnesses who have said Damien Donaghy was shot in the north west corner include:
63 Day 067/089; photograph AF7.6. Feeney had told Eversheds that Damien Donaghy had been shot at the north east corner (marked the map attached to his statement accordingly). It is interesting that, in contrast to witnesses who gave evidence after Damien Donaghy who tend to revise their location in order for it to agree with Damien Donaghy’s evidence, Mr. Feeney’s amendment brings his evidence about the location where Damien Donaghy was shot into line with that of the majority of civilian witnesses. Mr. Feeney gave evidence three days before Damien Donaghy.
64 Day 069/087 in confirmation of the account given to Eversheds re Damien Donaghy’s position at AM230.2-3 paragraph 14; point ‘7’ on map at AM230.7. (1) Padraig O'Mianain.\
(2) Eugene Lafferty.\
(3) Gerry Duddy.\
(4) Thomas McDaid.\
(5) Michael McGuinness.\
(6) Tony McCourt.\
(7) Monica McDaid.\
(8) Billy McCartney.
65 Day 059/045 apparently adopts description given to Eversheds at AO56.15 paragraph 14; and as indicated at point '6' on map at AO56.19.
66 Day 064/082 confirmed to Christopher Clarke Q.C. that his recollection was that Damien Donaghy had fallen precisely at the north west corner of the laundry waste ground.
67 Day 059/133 "He was at the corner of the waste ground by William St...the gable end". Christopher Clarke Q.C. confirmed that Mr. Duddy was referring to the gable end of the Nook Bar. Day 059/157 Mr. Duddy attempted to mark the position with a green arrow on photo at AD146.7.
68 Day 066/037-038. Mr. McDaid agreed that Damien Donaghy had been standing leaning against the wall of the Nook Bar in the position marked with a cross at GR KO8 of his BSI map. Day 066/048 "...about a foot back in from the corner."
69 Day 064/146
70 Day 054/127. Mr. McCourt indicated with a green arrow on photograph AM148.13 the position in which he had seen people gathered around a body. This position is slightly east of the north west corner of the waste ground.
71 Day 055/140/02 Ms. McDaid’s evidence was that she first saw Damien Donaghy at the north west corner of the waste ground (marked with a green arrow on photograph AM170.7); Damien Donaghy then ran along the gable wall after a rubber bullet. He was shot and fell further back into the waste ground (at the point marked with a red arrow on the same photograph).
72 AM87.3 paragraph 10 Mr. McCartney account to Eversheds puts Damien Donaghy slightly further out from the corner of the building but not materially (point 'E' on map at AM87.9). Day 054/173 When he gave evidence on Day 54 Mr. McCartney marked the exact position where he maintains Donaghy fell with a red arrow on AM87.10. This is slightly further still from the north west corner; but not as far East (or as far South into the waste ground) as Damien Donaghy claims to have been. The north west corner of the waste ground is also the location identified by Soldiers A and B for their target.
Soldier A confirmed to Christopher Clarke Q.C. that his target was at the point marked 'B' on his BSI map.
Soldier A was asked by Christopher Clarke Q.C.:
"Q. Do you recall how close to the corner he was?
A. He was at -- well, when he first appeared, sir, he was right against the corner of the building, and he came out of it into my view and then went back.
Q. And then, when you saw him striking a match against the wall, he presumably must have been within very close proximity to the wall?
A. He came away from the wall, sir, but the wall was within -- within reach." Mr. Clarke referred Soldier A to the map attached to his RMP statement dated 30.01.72. Soldier A confirmed that the map inaccurately represents his own position and that of the bomber. The latter was "on that gable end." In reply to questions put by Mr. Harvey about the map, Soldier A explained "I did not have him standing at that wall because I did not make that mark." Soldier A said could not recall ever having seen the map; he said that if he had "I would have pointed out that my position and the position of the bomber was slightly out."
Soldier A was shown the photograph on which Damien Donaghy marked the position where he says he was at the time he was shot. Soldier A told the Inquiry that it was not possible that the person whom he had shot was in the position marked by Damien Donaghy.
Soldier B now has no memory of firing on Bloody Sunday. Soldier B's RMP statement refers to his target as "standing in an alleyway off William Street."
WHAT WAS DAMIEN DONAGHY DOING WHEN HE WAS SHOT?
SUMMARY
Despite his repeated, and very public and doubtless influential, denials, it is now beyond doubt that Damien Donaghy had been rioting on Bloody Sunday.
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77 RMP Statement at B20.014; Map at B3 78 Day 297/048 79 Day 297/073 80 Day 297/157/19-20 81 AD120.27 82 Day 297/036 83 B43.003 paragraphs 14-15 84 B43.009
§ 7.1109
VI 135 His lack of candour for 30 years requires his present account be approached with a considerable caution.
**DAMIAN DONAGHY’S ACTIONS WHEN HE WAS SHOT – HIS VARIOUS ACCOUNTS**
As late as his statement to the Inquiry, Damien Donaghy was still maintaining that he was not engaging in any riotous activity. His BSI Statement records:
7. *...I did not get involved with the lads throwing stones and I did not throw any stones myself.*
Previously, Damien Donaghy has given other, varied accounts. He gave the following explanation of what had occurred on 08.02.72 when questioned by DS Cudmore:
(3) *How did you receive your injuries?*
(A) *I heard a bang and I fell. There was no trouble at the time.*
(4) *What were you doing in the area at the time?*
(A) *I was taking a short cut to go to my cousins in Garvan Place, Rossville Flats.*
He gave the following account in his statement to the Widgery Inquiry on 28.02.72:
*I went round the corner of the “Nook Bar” and into the waste ground beside it. I was walking towards Columbcille Court then. I heard the sound of a rubber bullet being fired and I saw it bounce off the wall on my right and I then ran to pick it up. As I was bending down to pick it up I heard a shot ring out and I felt a twinge in my right leg.*
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85 AD120.6 paragraph 7 86 AD120.17 87 AD120.18 Jacobson and Pringle of the Sunday Times apparently interviewed Damien Donaghy in hospital on 01.03.72 and were given the following account:
He was in William St behind the main body of the march when he saw the gas at the end of the street. He decided to cut across through Columbille Court to the Rossville Flats. There were a few youths throwing stones at about three soldiers on the low roof next to the Presbyterian Church. He heard a rubber bullet being fired, turned round to see where the bullet was coming and as he turned he was hit in the right thigh...
He says that although he is a regular William Street stone thrower he was NOT throwing stones on that day.88
In an undated interview Damien Donaghy gave to Jimmy McGovern, which took place after he had given his BSI statement, he described the moment he was shot:
...I got down to where the Nook Bar was, where I was shot...the march was coming down William Street at the bakery corner round from Abbey Taxis there was soldiers in there, in the derelict building at the side you know. And there were a few stones threw at them but that was it and the plastic bullet was fired and it came off the wall and I went to go for it and next thing I was lying shot.
J. McG...Did you handle the plastic bullet?
D.D. I never even got my hand on it to tell you the truth and then that...it happened that quick do you know what I mean and I was lying on me back...89
In an interview which took place on 23.08.98 Damien Donaghy was asked by Don Mullan:
Don: What do you remember about the incident then – you were on the march?
88 AD120.2 89 AD120.28-29 Damien: On the march, coming down William Street. We were coming down past the bakery, I noticed there were soldiers up on top of what would have been the Protestant Church on Great James Street... There was a wee bit of rioting down at the bottom of William Street and that was it, and there were soldiers in the bakery – it was the old Ormeau bakery on William Street. There were left, but he was hiding in between an old broken window, you know, that was it—you never think, then I just turned round and the next thing I was lying on my back and there were a couple of people came to lift me. One of the men that came to lift me was John Johnston.90
6D-66 On Day 070/001 Damien Donaghy read out the following prepared statement to the Inquiry at the beginning of his evidence.
After discussions with my legal representatives and because the main reason we are here is for the truth to be told, I may wish to admit that I threw stones. I also would like to add that when I was shot, I did not have a nail bomb or anything else in my hands.
6D-67 Damien Donaghy’s persistent lies about his own activities on Bloody Sunday need to be seen in the context of the repeated assertions made on behalf of the families of the fundamental importance of the unadulterated truth being told.
6D-68 In opening Arthur Harvey Q.C. said:
The search for the truth is what the relatives of the deceased and the injured now living have sought; it is all they have sought....91
... The relatives of the deceased and injured themselves seek not just the form, but the substance of public justice. It is only through this Inquiry and this Inquiry alone that the facts can be established and judgments made, actions by any outside body which would seek to compromise the integrity of that work by unlawful action against any person
90 AD120.58-59 91 Day 043/071/22-24 giving evidence, would be an anathema from those persons whom I appear and an affront to their work over 28 years. Public justice demands that this Inquiry is allowed to conduct its work in the reflective attitude that the discovery of truth requires.92
Arthur Harvey Q.C. issued the following plea on behalf of the families on Day 77:
MR HARVEY: Sir, on Day 1 of this Tribunal on 27th March 2000 in opening this case, Mr Clarke, on behalf of the Tribunal, stated: "The Tribunal's task is to try to discover, so far as is humanly possible, in the circumstances with the means now available, the truth. Not the truth as people see it. Not the truth as people would like it to be, but the truth pure and simple, however complex, painful or unacceptable to whomsoever that truth may be. Those who have campaigned for so long to establish this Inquiry seek no more, Parliament which, by the affirmative resolution of both houses establishes this Inquiry, seeks no less, without it many concerns that led to the unique circumstance of a second Inquiry under the 1921 Act into the same facts cannot be led to rest.
"If the truth of what occurred on 30th January 1972 is ever to be established, told and acknowledged, now is the time to do it. By "our clients", I refer to all of the 27 families represented by this Inquiry and urge anyone whoever has anything to contribute, to come forward and do so now and, indeed, are deeply saddened that some individuals have not done so.
This morning the Tribunal offered an opportunity to interested parties to make suggestions which would assist the Tribunal in establishing that truth. All of the representatives of the families have had an opportunity over lunchtime to meet. We believe that there are genuine positive steps that we can take in conjunction with this Inquiry which will assist. In those circumstances, because we do represent 27 families, I would ask that the Tribunal defer dealing with this matter until Monday, and I genuinely believe that there is a deep-seated commitment of these families which has to be brought home and brought to
92 Day 043/073/18-074/04 bear on those who are reluctant, for whatever reason, to come forward which they must realise, they must acknowledge, as this Tribunal stated, the only vindication of what occurred in relation to these families must be the whole truth, even its unpalatable aspects.93
6D-70 Similar sentiments were expressed during the opening of Michael Mansfield Q.C.:
May I say before lunch today, may I begin the remarks that I would wish to place before you in relation to all these families: in another context, the context of contemporary politics and conflict in the north of Ireland and, it has been said, in relation to South Africa and it has been said in relation to Chile, but it is an important phrase, an important observation, that you will never have peace unless you have justice, and you will never have justice without truth...94
There were two major reasons why this Inquiry exists, why this Inquiry was set up, why we are all here. One Mr Harvey mentioned this week and we have cited it in argument before, was the way in which the families and the dignity of the families and their desire not to seek revenge or recrimination, but for the truth. That was one, a dignified search for the truth.95
6D-71 In the light of Damien Donaghy's admission, he agreed that there were several important inaccuracies contained within his statement to the Inquiry.
Q. In your statement as it then read, you said this: "I watched as about five or six lads shouted abuse at the soldiers. The young lads then began to throw stones and bottles towards the derelict building where the soldiers were." Should we read that now as meaning: "The young lads, including me, began to throw stones and bottles towards the derelict building."
93 Day 077/087/12-089/03 94 Day 050/084/07-16 95 Day 050/085/17-24
¶ 7.1114
VI 140 A. That is correct.96
Day 070/007/16
Q. I would like to understand where everybody was. If we could have a look at your map, AD120.24, the building, Abbey Taxis, you have identified with a "C". Can you tell us where the group of you who were throwing stones at the soldiers in that building were?
A. (Marked with yellow arrow). About here. There was a wee wall there.
Q. Yes.
A. I was throwing -- I threw stones from behind the wee wall.
Q. Behind the wee wall?
A. Mmm.
Q. Could we have a look at P199. You would appear to be absolutely right about there being "a wee wall" because we can just see underneath --
A. Just at the "S" and "T" --
Q. There is what looks like the remains of a wall. You were just to the south of that, were you?
A. I would have been about where the "S" is.
Q. Were the others in the same vicinity?
A. Aye around there, roundabout there.
Q. Were some on the other side of the wall, that is to say the north side?
A. I think there were a couple, aye, on the waste ground, aye.
Q. How close did you get to the soldiers? A. I would say 20 to 30 feet maybe.97 In evidence, Damien Donaghy maintained the account in his BSI statement concerning his movements at the time he was shot,
Q. ...You say there, if we could look at the last three lines of paragraph 8: "The rubber bullet fell onto the waste ground on my side of William Street. I saw it and decided to go and pick it up, as everybody collected them at the time and it was possible to sell them as a souvenir." Is that what you did?
A. That is correct.
Q. You say this: "I took about three steps towards the rubber bullet. I had not got within 20 feet of the rubber bullet when I felt a jab in my right leg. Initially there was no strong sensation of pain, but I fell immediately on to my back in the approximate position marked 'F'. Is that correct?
A. That is correct. 98
6D-73 Damien Donaghy agreed that he had heard rubber bullets fired earlier when he and the others had been stoning the soldiers in the derelict building. 99
ADDITIONAL CIVILIAN EVIDENCE OF DONAGHY’S ACTIONS
6D-74 A small but significant number of civilian witnesses admit to seeing Damien Donaghy rioting and describe him acting in a way which suggests that he had just thrown or was in the process of throwing an object at the time he was shot; although, unsurprisingly, none have admitted to this in terms.
6D-75 Liam Doherty confirmed the accuracy of the account he gave to NICRA on the evening of Bloody Sunday:
... I shouted to the lads that they were moving into the back of it. Well, I turned around and I picked up a stone and I went to throw it and this other young lad was standing beside me and he threw a stone to[o] and I turned around again to see if I could get any more stones, I then heard two shots and one hit the wall above my head and the other one hit the young fellow. 100
Mr. Doherty confirmed when he gave evidence that the “young fellow” referred to in his NICRA statement was Damien Donaghy:
Q: He was throwing stones, was he, at the soldiers A: Yes Q: Immediately before he was shot?
98 Day 070/012/20-013/11 99 Day 070/06 100 Day 060/095. NICRA statement at AD80.5 Mr. Doherty places Damien Donaghy in the middle of William Street. Mr. Doherty accepted, but could give no explanation for, the fact that he failed to mention to Eversheds Damien Donaghy's part in the rioting.
Alfie McAleer, said that he had seen Damien Donaghy run out into the middle of William Street in order to throw stones immediately before he was shot. He had not seen Damien Donaghy at the moment he was shot.
Noel Kelly said Damien Donaghy was part of a group who were arming themselves with stones to throw at the soldiers in the derelict building when he was shot.
Charles James McGill, had been rioting at Barrier 12 and retreated up William Street to avoid the gas. Although he denies that there was any stone throwing at the time Damien Donaghy was shot his description of Damien Donaghy's actions immediately before he was shot are consistent with someone who was about to throw a missile. Damien Donaghy was at the north west corner and looked left and right along William Street.
Q. Was stone throwing going on?
A. No, not when I was there. Q. Not whilst you were there. You say that all of a sudden you heard three high velocity shots, and the lad shouted "I am hit"?
A. Yes.
Q. Had you seen him immediately before you heard those shots or not?
A. As I said before, I seen him looking up and down the street. I think he was looking to see was the army coming up or down the street, to be honest with you.
Q. You have described how you saw him looking up and down the street?
A. Yes.
Q. But were you still looking at him at the time that the shots rang out or had your attention been diverted elsewhere?
A. Because I was still checking and me eyes were watering, I was still recovering from the gas. I was pretty well recovered.
Q. What you recollect is, effectively, hearing the shots and then the boy shout?
A. Yes, there was two shots and then seconds later there was sort of a third. The two came together sort of thing, but they were split seconds apart.\\textsuperscript{10}
6D-79 Eddie Doherty gave evidence\\textsuperscript{11} that Damien Donaghy may have been "drifting back and forth" close to the corner of the Nook Bar.
6D-80 Edwin Glasgow Q.C asked him:
Q. Looking back towards you and where Mr Donaghy was, if Mr Donaghy was in your words drifting back and forth, as seen from that building with the nine windows, he would
\\textsuperscript{10} Day 069/088/16-089/16 \\textsuperscript{11} Day 065/007 have been coming into view and going out of view round the corner of the building we can see, is that right?
A. That would have been if he was drifting back and forth, do you know. I am only surmising that he drifted back and forth, do you know, going back 29 years. I know he was in that waste ground and I have pinpointed, you know, C, that area, drifting back and forth that, do you know.
Q. I fully accept that, Mr Doherty, that is why I put your own words to you, they were, I stress, "he could have been drifting back and forth". If he was in your words drifting back and forth –
A. That would have been left him out in view of those nine windows.
Q. He could have been coming in and out of view round the corner. You are unable to help as to whether he had anything in his hand?
A. I do not know if he had anything in his hand. 112
6D-81 Michael McGuinness confirmed in his evidence113 to this Inquiry that it was his belief that Damien Donaghy had been throwing stones in response to the rubber bullets being fired.114
6D-82 John Quigg’s account in his BSI statement is that he saw a stone thrown by the man who was subsequently shot:
I saw his arm move as if he were throwing a stone...he turned round, came into the building I was in and said something...He then went back out onto the street again...115
112 Day 065/026/17 113 Day 064/154 114 A belief first recorded in Pringle’s note of a conversation with Mr. McGuinness at AM283.11. Day 064/172-173; Mr. McGuinness places himself as the closest person to Damien Donaghy at the time he was shot. 115 AO1.1 paragraph 7. In his NICRA statement he says the man who was shot “had been throwing stones towards the ruins of Richard’s factory...” (emphasis added). There can be no doubt that he is describing Damien Donaghy as he describes the injury suffered by this stone thrower as “just above the knee in the right leg.”
In oral examination Mr. Quigg’s evidence as to what the boy he saw shot was doing was as follows:
Q. You then go on to say in paragraph 7 of your statement that a man in his late twenties or early thirties –
A. Yes.
Q. -- immediately to your left was seen by you and you saw his arm move as if he were throwing a stone. Before we get to what he was doing, was the man alone or was he with others or do you not recall?
A. Well, he was with others.
Q. Can you recall roughly how many he appeared to be with?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall what the others were doing?
A. No, no, only just took him on as, you know.
Q. Just what?
A. I only took him on as that he had been throwing a stone.
Q. You say that you saw his arm move as if he was throwing a stone?
A. Yes.
Q. Although you do not know which direction he threw it in?
A. Yes. Q. I understand from that, never mind the direction, at any rate he threw it? A. Yes.
Q. Is that right? A. Yes.
Q. You then say that, having done that he turned round, came into the building and said something and then went out again. Did anybody else come into the building with him so far as you recall? A. No.
Q. Just him. Then he went out. Did you see him go out? A. Out where?
Q. Did you see him go out of the building in which you were? A. After coming in again? Q. Yes. A. Yes.
Q. Did you see what he did after he went out of the building? A. No, no, no.
Q. But what you did hear was hear shots? A. Yes, yes.
Q. You describe a lot of shots? A. Yes.
Q. About twelve and you think there may have been a break between two sets of shots and you saw him with blood coming from his upper leg? A. Yes.
Q. Did you actually see him fall? A. No, no, I did not, no.
Q. You saw him after he had fallen? A. Yes, yes, yes, well, I saw him being carried into the room we were all congregated in.
Q. Wait a moment: after you heard the large number of shots –
A. No, I only heard the single shot. There was a single shot and then a short time after that a group of shots.
Q. So a single shot?
A. Yes.
Q. And then a number of shots?
A. Yes.
Q. But when did you first see the man who had been shot in the leg after he had left the building in which you were?
A. Sorry, I do not understand you, sorry.
Q. You see him throw a stone, he comes into your building, he goes out again, you hear a single shot and then a number of shots?
A. Yes.
Q. My question is: when did you first see the man again?
A. Before the number of -- group of shots. He had been shot in the leg and then he was carried into the building, this derelict building.
Q. Did you see him after the single shot and before the group of shots?
A. After the single shot.
Q. Was he upright at the time; was he falling or had he fallen?
A. No, I only saw him being carried into the building, after the single shot.
Q. Right, there is the single shot. You see him being carried into the building?
A. Yes.
Q. The shots after the single shot, did they take place whilst he was being carried into the building? A. No, no, no, that was much later.
Q. I am trying to get the sequence: you have the single shot? A. Yes.
Q. You see him carried into the building? A. Yes.
Q. How much later did you hear the other shots? A. About 10 or 15 minutes later.
Q. I see, much later? A. Yes, yes, yes.117
6D-84 Questioned by Edmund Lawson Q.C. he said:
Q. Can I test what your current recollection is? In your statement at AQ1.1, paragraph 7, there in your statement you refer, do you not, to the man described as being in his late 20s, early 30s, yes? A. Yes.
Q. You have marked his position on the plan. We have seen that already: "I saw his arm move as if he was throwing a stone, although I do not know which direction he threw it in." Right? A. Yes.
Q. Pausing there for a moment, he had been throwing stones, had he not? A. Yes, it is possible -- it was possible, yes.
Q. I think that was your recollection in 1972? A. Yes, yes.
117 Day 053/081/17-085/019 Q. No doubt that was an accurate recollection at the time. We need not look back to your original statement. Then you refer to him coming into the building where you were, yes?
A. Yes.118
6D-85 His NICRA statement was put to Mr. Quigg in the following exchange.
"On Sunday, 30th January 1972, at 4.10 pm ..."?
A. Yes.
Q. "... I was standing in a derelict house just off William Street, halfway between Rossville Street corner and Abbey Street corner taking shelter from tear gas which was being fired from the Rossville Street area. I was along with 20 to 30 other fellows." That is in line with what you have told us: "A shot came from the ruins of Richard's factory in William Street. A chap alongside me fell to the ground as if he had been shot just above the knee in the right leg." Pausing there, in the statement you made at the time you described the man who was shot as being "alongside" you?
A. Yes.
Q. Which rather looks as if you were either next to him or very close to him?
A. Yes, yes, that is correct.
Q. Would that be right?
A. Yes, that is quite true, yes.
Q. "He had been shot just above the knee in the right leg. He was taken into a nearby house in Columbcille Court by other people." So that looks as if it was where he was taken?
A. Yes.
Q. "He had been throwing stones towards the ruins of Richard's factory, but he definitely had –
A. No weapon, yes.
118 Day 053/132/23-133/19 Q. -- no weapon." It looks from that, does it not, as if you had been in the street near or close to him when he had been throwing stones, but having no weapon and when he was shot above the knee in the right leg and carried off to Columbceille Court?
A. Yes.119
6D-86 Monica McDaid told Eversheds that she saw Damien Donaghy at point 'D' on the map below:
He was leaning against the gable of the derelict building next to him. He kept looking out on to William Street by putting his head around the corner of the derelict building. I cannot recall seeing anything in his hand or seeing him throw anything.120
6D-87 When questioned before this Tribunal, Ms. McDaid said that she had not in fact seen Damien Donaghy put his head round the corner.121 However, given her extraordinary assertion that no rioting was taking place at all at this time, the retraction must surely be seen as an example of a witness determined not to give any evidence which might support the accounts of some of the soldiers.
119 Day 053/089/09–090/21 120 AM170.2 paragraph 7 121 Day 065/116-117; Day 065/140-141: Explaining the appearance of this account in her statement as being a mistake by Eversheds. Patrick McCallion was himself throwing stones when Damien Donaghy was shot and “thought that everybody else in the waste ground was throwing stones as well.” Mr. McCallion was quick to ‘correct’ Edwin Glasgow Q.C. who referred to Damien Donaghy as his “friend.” “You say ‘your friend’; to me he was a rioter.”
Dermot Carlin describes seeing Damien Donaghy being assisted by another youth:
12. ...Both youths were very dusty and they looked like young rogues. It was clear that they had been throwing stones from the dust on them. They were not on the march for civil rights.
Mr. Carlin’s evidence suggests that Damien Donaghy had been throwing stones in the period immediately before he was shot:
It is hard to describe now, but at the time I was quite sure they were stone throwers and I said they were not on the march, they may have been before that, but they were not taking part in this at that stage, I saw them and they were not for a short time before I saw them, because they were stone throwing. That is why I say they were not on the march for civil rights.
Sean McKeever stated in his NICRA statement that a group of boys were throwing stones at the soldiers, four shots were fired and “one of the boys fell,” the clear implication being that Damien Donaghy was one of those throwing stones. Mr. McKeever goes on to say that “This boy had no gun, no nail bomb or petrol bomb.” It appears that Damien Donaghy and this group were throwing their stones at the men in Stephenson’s bakery Damien Donaghy’s Injuries.
______________________________________________________________________
122 Day 071/149-150; 163 123 AC32.2 paragraph 12 124 Day 060/052/14 125 AM293.1 The scientific evidence strongly suggests that Damien Donaghy was facing north (i.e. towards the soldiers) when shot. His medical notes record that
*There was a small entrance wound on the front of the thigh and a large exit wound on the posterior aspect.*
There is an inconsistency in the medical notes as to whether the wound was to his right or left leg. Damien Donaghy's own evidence is that he was shot in the right leg. Photographs of Damien Donaghy being treated in the Shiel's house confirm this. The fact that it was his right leg which was hit fits in with that leg having been exposed around the corner and acting in the manner described by Soldiers A and B.
**WHAT MIGHT IT HAVE BEEN THOUGHT THAT DONAGHY WAS DOING WHEN HE WAS SHOT?**
In considering what Damien Donaghy was doing when he was shot and specifically whether he (or someone very close to him) was doing anything at all which might have been mistaken for lighting a nail bomb the Tribunal should also have regard to the fact that it was by no means unheard of for 'Derry Young Hooligans' to pretend to be engaged in 'terrorist activity' even when 'unarmed' – however extraordinary that may appear to be.
Sean O'Neill admits to crawling up to the derelict building with nine windows and preparing to throw a bottle at the moment that shots were fired. His account is that the bottle was empty, but there can be no doubt that his actions could easily have been mistaken for those of someone with
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126 D0742 127 D0742-D0767 128 Day 070/013/17-18 129 P750-P751 a potentially lethal weapon and, if his own account is truthful, it is very difficult to believe that he cannot have been intending to give that impression.
7. When I was near a lamppost to the east of Stephenson's Bakery approximately at the point marked 3 on the map (grid reference KO7) I looked behind me and saw two soldiers through a ground floor window of the eastern wall of Stephenson's Bakery. I attach a photograph on which I have marked the window through which I saw the soldiers. I was holding an empty bottle of lemonade that my friends and I had bought and finished by the time I reached the Bakery. Holding the empty bottle, I left the march, got down on my hands and knees and crawled along the eastern wall of Stephenson's Bakery towards the window through which I had seen the soldiers, the bottom of which was about one to two feet from the ground. I crawled underneath the window and saw a para inside the building aged about twenty two to twenty five wearing a red beret. He wasn't in a standing or kneeling position, but was kind of crouched down. His flack jacket open and he was carrying a SLR. I was ready to thrown the bottle at him when a gun came out of the window and fired. It was damn loud. I thought he might have seen my head and fired when he saw me. Within a second of hearing the shot I threw the bottle at the soldier and it hit him in the chest. I then raced back to William Street. The soldier did not chase me.(^{130})
6D-95 P323, captures a person on Bloody Sunday, apparently wearing a baraccla, either throwing, or pretending to throw, an object round the corner of a wall in much the same manner described by Soldiers A and B.
(^{130}) AO65.2 paragraph 7 Whatever that person may in fact have been doing it seems reasonable to assume that any informed observer would think that he was throwing a nail bomb.
The following photograph taken from the "The Battle of the Bogside" is an example of an attempt to mimic the actions of, in this case, a gunman. Mr Limpkin's comment by way of caption that "Today, it could cost him his life" may not be unreasonable, and a soldier who fired at someone who looked like might well be justified in doing so.
Alfie McAleer confirmed that this kind of pretence was undertaken not only by individuals but by a crowd.
A. Oh, yeah, I have seen it where the crowd made way so a gunman could shoot, but I have also seen the crowd do it deliberately to frighten the soldiers. ...
A. I have also seen the crowd do it, it used to be a regular thing where someone would shout "snipers!" and soldiers would dive for cover and everybody would move out of the road, but it was done as a joke.
A lot of occasions it was done as a yoke, but a lot of occasions it was not.
Q. I was going to follow-up with the photographs of people I suggested to you looked as if they were doing things. You can help the Tribunal at least to this extent: people pretended that there were gunmen when there were not?
A. On occasion, yes.
Q. Did they not also pretend themselves to be armed when they were not, or pretend that they had nail bombs?
A. (Laughing). That is a very silly occupation. I have never seen anybody do it.
Q. I will not press it.132
Brian Power confirmed that gunmen would fire during the course of a riot,133 but on other occasions rioters would pretend that a gunman was present merely in order to lead soldiers to believe that they were.
131 "The Battle of Bogside", Clive Limpkin. Penguin Books Ltd. 1972 referred to in Lawton Team opening OS7.13. 132 Day 092/098/16-99/14 133 Day 425/006/10-17 A. We would usually just clear the streets, even if there were no gunmen about to let them think that there were, just to put them on edge, just a game of cat and mouse, part of the game it was.
Q. Would you then all return and continue throwing missiles?
A. Continue the riot aye.134
6D-100 Rioters would also learn when nail bombs were going to be thrown during the course of a riot:
Q. In the situations where you were given word and you got off-side, did that include situations where the IRA were in some way controlling the rioters?
A. Well, they controlled them to the extent that they issued that they were going to do something.
Q. By "they were going to do something," do you mean --
A. Have a shot or snipe or whatever at the Army.
Q. Aside from have a shot or a snipe, what else would they do?
A. Nail bombs.
Q. That word would only come to you as the riot was taking place at the time of the riot?
A. Ongoing, aye.135
6D-101 Martin McGuinness is also apparently aware of instances when people pretended to have nail bombs. He was referred by Mr. Jennings to a photograph of nail bombs taken from "Derry thru the lens" by Willie Carson.136 Mr. McGuinness refused to agree that the photograph necessarily showed nail bombs; he replied
134 Day 425/007/09-15 135 Day 425/007/20-008/07 136 M111.162-3 A. They could be young people in the Bogside; they could be people pretending they had nail bombs.\\textsuperscript{137}
6D-102 Liam Mailey refers in his BSI statement to the custom of ‘planking’, an activity specifically designed to scare soldiers:
...kids used to go “planking” on a Saturday night. What they would do is take floorboards from derelict buildings. By standing on one end of the floorboard or plank it was possible to make a sound like a gunshot by pulling back the other end and then releasing it quickly. If a number of kids did this in quick succession it sounded like machine gun fire. I have no doubt that the lads who used to do this had no idea how serious it was – I think it was just something that they did with a view to scaring soldiers.\\textsuperscript{138}
6D-103 Mr. Mailey’s evidence is that this activity commonly took place in and around the area of Aggro Corner.\\textsuperscript{139}
6D-104 Charles Gallagher also referred to youths engaging in this kind of activity:
Q. At the end of paragraph 5, if we go back to AG6.1, you say in the last sentence that at that time kids would sometimes slam planks together to give the effect of gunfire?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. On what sort of occasion did this happen?
A. It used to happen quite a lot. At night-time they would do it if they thought there was an army patrol around, just to scare them, you know. It was one of the daft things they did. I suppose it might sound like a shot to someone, but it was just being nuisances, really.\\textsuperscript{140}
6D-105 Although neither Mr. Mailey nor Mr. Gallagher refers to this activity taking place on Bloody Sunday itself, their evidence demonstrates the
\\textsuperscript{137} Day 391/015/18-19 \\textsuperscript{138} M50.2 paragraph 7 \\textsuperscript{139} Day 163/096/20-24 \\textsuperscript{140} Day 105/033/18-034/09 predilection of youths habitually to act in a way which was intended to make soldiers believe they were under lethal attack. If such behaviour had been engaged in on Bloody Sunday it seems unlikely, after civilians were known to have been killed, that those who did it would admit to it, or that they would have been encouraged to do so. The Tribunal will be aware of the reasons why Sean O’Neill did not give oral evidence.
Further, in order to consider the genuineness / reasonableness of Soldier A and B’s belief, it is necessary to consider the more general situation in Londonderry in 1972 and that, in particular, nail bombs were a frequent if not universal weapon used against the security forces.
Bishop Daly’s evidence to Lord Widgery was that, with the exception of Bloody Sunday, nail bombs were always used in riots:
Q. The Tribunal will pay great attention to the denials that there were nail bombs, but this would be a unique afternoon if none were thrown?
A. This is true, but this is the fact of the situation, and I have no doubt about that, none whatsoever.(^{141})
Francis Dunne gave similar evidence to the Widgery Tribunal. He was asked by Mr. Gibbens:
Q. Another thing that you would expect if things took their normal course was that nail bombs and petrol bobs would be used by the men, is it not, by the rioters?
A. Occasionally petrol bombs and nail bombs were used.
Q. How many times a week?
A. I suppose once or twice in every riot.
(^{141}) H5.41 paragraph A-B Q. If the shenanigans which you expected to take place did take place, among the weapons used you would expect a couple of nail bombs at least, would you not?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it not likely that, with the other sounds on this occasion, you paid no attention as to whether there were nail bombs or not?
A. It is impossible to ignore a nail bomb. If you hear a nail bomb it is a very, very loud crack.\\textsuperscript{142}
6D-109 Despite the apparent lack of ambiguity in his evidence to the Widgery Tribunal, Mr Dunne now claims that his evidence to the Widgery Tribunal gave an exaggerated impression of the number of nail bombs thrown. He put this down to the nature of the cross examination.\\textsuperscript{143}
6D-110 John James Canney (a.k.a. Sean Canney) was a freelance photo journalist at the time of Bloody Sunday and frequently attended marches and riots in order to take photographs.\\textsuperscript{144} Although he had not witnessed any nail bombs thrown on Bloody Sunday he states:
\\textit{On many occasions I had seen and heard guns, rubber bullets, petrol bombs and nail bombs being used. I was very familiar with those weapons.}\\textsuperscript{145}
6D-111 James Joseph Quinn was a regular rioter. He denied ever having thrown nail or petrol bombs himself but agreed that he had seen others doing so. He was asked by Ms McGahey:
\\textit{Q. Do you remember when?}
\\textit{A. It is a long time ago, I just could not tell you dates, but I seen it all happening.}
\\textsuperscript{142} AD173.20 paragraph B-E \\textsuperscript{143} Day 090/053/24-055/23 \\textsuperscript{144} AC24.1 paragraph 3 \\textsuperscript{145} AC24.1 paragraph 3; confirmed on oath Day 093/129/06-13 Q. Can you give us any idea, however roughly, of the number of times you had seen nail bombs or petrol bombs thrown at soldiers?
A. Dozens.
Q. Dozens, before Bloody Sunday?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you remember where within Derry this happened?
A. Well, you would not be standing about if somebody threw a nail bomb. You would be well away from the nail bomb.
Q. Are we talking about the William Street area, the area of the Rossville Flats, the walls?
A. Possibly, possibly.
Q. Anywhere in particular?
A. Not really. 146
At least one nail bomb, and very possibly more, had been thrown the day before Bloody Sunday in William Street in circumstances similar to that described by Soldiers A and B. Peter Robson was one of the two men shot during the course of a riot in which a nail bomb had been thrown:
...[I] was on my way home to the Creggan at about 3.00 pm or 4.00 pm. I was walking west along William Street, and had passed the junction with Rossville Street. I could see a bit of rioting going on somewhere in the area.
Just at that point, I decided to take a short cut through a piece of waste ground where a building had been at the point marked A on the attached map...As I turned into this area I saw a man who was about to throw a nail bomb. He shouted at me to get out of the way, and I think he may even have thrown the nail bomb past me. I had no idea who or what he was throwing it at.
146 Day 179/042/23-043/16 3. I walked through the derelict house and onto the street to the north of Kells Walk and Columbille Court. As I came through the derelict house, I saw the smoke from the nail bomb.\\textsuperscript{147}
Mr. Robson's BSI statement records how, as he ran towards Abbey Street, he heard a shot behind him and saw his friend, Peter McLaughlin, fall. As he went to help his friend he was also shot on his right side, just above the hip. His belief is that his friend was shot by a bullet aimed at himself; and that he was mistakenly thought by the soldier to be the nail bomber.\\textsuperscript{148}
According to Patrick McCourt, who had been present and involved in the riot on 29\\textsuperscript{th} January, Peter Robson had one of those participating in the rioting.\\textsuperscript{149}
The riot had involved at least one member of the Provisional IRA. PIRA18 (William Joseph Anderson) was present when Peter Robson and Peter McLaughlin were shot.\\textsuperscript{150} Incredibly, he claims to have been unaware of a nail bomb being thrown shortly before his friend, Mr Robson, was injured.\\textsuperscript{151}
Paul Mahon's evidence is that Gerard 'Mad Dog' Doherty admitted to him that he had thrown nail bombs on 29\\textsuperscript{th} January. Commenting on the Grimaldi / North tape in his BSI statement Mr. Mahon states:
\\begin{quote} I have been referred to the oral evidence of Susan North and I note that she cannot recall when this front section was taped... The shots Mr. Mills said were on this tape are not all shots. There are nail bombs exploding. I also spoke with the person, Gerry "Mad Dog" Doherty, who threw the bombs in the incident and who confirmed this was \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{147} AR37.1 paragraphs 1-3 \\textsuperscript{148} AR37.1 paragraph 3-6 \\textsuperscript{149} AM146.1 paragraph 3 \\textsuperscript{150} APIRA18.2 paragraph 5 \\textsuperscript{151} Dav 408/030/12-031/08 Saturday. I conclude that it was taped on the afternoon of 29th January 1972...
...My research discloses that the sounds are of two bombs with the response of two high velocity shots. In support of my findings I interviewed the PIRA member who threw the bombs. This was Gerry "Mad Dog" Doherty. I believe that this was part of a PIRA operation around the William Street area; roughly in the same location as where Johnson and Donaghy were shot on Bloody Sunday.152
The importance of the admission by Mr. Doherty is unaffected by whether or not Mahon's interpretation of what can be heard on the tape is correct. As the Tribunal is aware Mr. Mahon confirmed that both the video tape and back up sound tape of his interview with Mr. Doherty are missing.153
Paul Mahon, questioned by Edmund Lawson Q.C., was able to provide some further details about the interview with Mr. Doherty:
If I go ahead, please, to page 9, the same series, under the heading "Analysis the Grimaldi/North Tape (iii)." This is part of your theory, I do not mean to denigrate by that, I am adopting a neutral stance, about the first part of the tape relating to the day before, yes?
A. I have got absolutely no doubt in my own mind that that recording took place on 29th January 1972 at approximately 4.30 pm.
Q. In the light of that conviction, is that something which you drew to the attention then of "Mad Dog" when you spoke to him --
A. I asked "Mad Dog" right at the end of the interview whether he could help me with this portion of the tape. I then played the tape to him and he said "Certainly, I can help you with this." He then explained what was happening. I said to him "How could you be so specific" and he said because he threw the bombs.
Q. The nail bombs, were they or --
152 AM19.9 paragraph 25 b) iii, viii 153 AM19.24 paragraph 63 A. No, I do not know whether they were nail bombs or whether they were blast bombs.
Q. Did he tell you anything more about the incident in which the bombs had been deployed on the Saturday?
A. Only that there was an Army vehicle involved. He was positioned behind a wall. There were look-outs involved and the whistling that you hear on the tape is whistling coming from these look-outs in order for him to finally throw the bombs.
Q. Then did he tell you about some others getting shot?
A. No, I know what you are referring to there. You are referring to the shooting in the same location on the same day of two individuals and I believe that that location, that shooting happened before this bombing happened.
Q. Before the bombing actually occurred?
A. Indeed.
Q. But close to it and at the same place?
A. At the same location, but my understanding is that the shooting happened earlier on in the day. If you listen very, very carefully to the Grimaldi tape, there is an actual reference, very much in the background, someone asks the time and they give the time as 4.30.
Q. That is referred to on your annotated version, is it not?
A. It will be, yes.
Q. "Mad Dog" in any event was unequivocal in telling you that he was the bomber on Saturday afternoon?
A. Indeed.
Q. Do you think that was on tape?
A. That was definitely not on tape.
Q. That was not on tape, what, a bit sensitive?
A. I would say highly sensitive. Q. You have no doubt in your mind that is what he said?
A. Oh, no doubt at all, 100 per cent sure.\\textsuperscript{154}
6D-117 Mr Mahon’s account is supported by intelligence material relating to Mr. Doherty which records, “Gerry Doherty (Mad Dog) 17-18 yrs ... Mad Dog does most of the nail bombing about William Street. I seen ... Throwing nail bombs once.”\\textsuperscript{155} Mr. Doherty claimed to have no recollection of having told or intimated to Mr Mahon that he had thrown nail bombs the day before Bloody Sunday\\textsuperscript{156} and denied that the intelligence material was accurate.\\textsuperscript{157}
6D-118 Charlie Downey believes that he may have heard a nail bomb at about lunch time on Bloody Sunday whilst at his mother in law’s house,\\textsuperscript{158} (to the South of Westland Street).
\\textit{I believe I may have heard some form of explosion, possibly a nail bomb, whilst I was at my mother-in-law’s. However, I did not think it was significant at the time and my memory of it is very vague.}\\textsuperscript{158}
6D-119 His oral evidence to the Tribunal is that this probably occurred at around 1.30 to 2.00 p.m.\\textsuperscript{159} Mr. Downey was asked by Lord Saville:
\\textit{LORD SAVILLE:...when you say your memory of this is very vague, is it possible that this explosion was on another occasion together?}
A. No.
\\textit{LORD SAVILLE: You have a recollection it was on Bloody Sunday?}
\\textsuperscript{154} Day 412/185/07-187/09 \\textsuperscript{155} Int1.331 \\textsuperscript{156} Day 400/182/05-18 \\textsuperscript{157} Day 400/035/07-036/08 \\textsuperscript{158} AD133.1 paragraph 8 \\textsuperscript{159} Day 091/091/08-10 A. Yeah, I think it was.
MR. CLARKE: Had you heard nail bombs before?
A. Quite a lot.\\textsuperscript{160}
6D-120 James Donal Deeney was a regular riot, who, according to his BSI statement, used to boast to his friends that he had never missed a single riot.\\textsuperscript{161} His evidence is that those who wanted to use nail bombs could find them if they wanted:
\\textit{At the time it was easy to get hold of a nail bomb or petrol bomb. It was a matter of asking the right person. They would be kept on hand, in various stashes. You didn’t have to be involved in the IRA, you just had to be game enough to use one.}\\textsuperscript{162}
6D-121 Mr. Deeney confirmed the ready availability of nail bombs in his oral evidence to the Tribunal.\\textsuperscript{163}
6D-122 Billie Gillespie, who on his own account had lost five years of his life to rioting,\\textsuperscript{164} gave the following evidence about the circumstances in which nail bombs were used during the course of a riot:
\\ldots they were more or less, if the army or the police penetrated too far into the Bogside, that is when they would have been used, they would have been more or less a scare tactic.
Q. Were they used with a view to inflicting injuries on the police or the army?
A. Well, they would have.
Q. Must have been, must they not? A. Yes, they would have been.\\textsuperscript{165}
6D-123 It is a reasonable inference that the forward position of the Machine Gun Platoon soldiers in the derelict building may have been regarded by some as 'too far into the Bogside,' thereby making them suitable targets for nail bombs.
6D-124 There were individuals present on Bloody Sunday who were prepared to use nail bombs. Paddy McCauley admits that he would have thrown nail bombs if he had had them. He was asked by Christopher Clarke Q.C.:
\\textit{Q. You told us a moment ago that on Bloody Sunday you were actively looking for stuff on Waterloo Street and were told you were not going to have any of it?}
\\textit{A. Yeah.}
\\textit{Q. What were you looking for?}
\\textit{A. Nail bombs.}
\\textit{Q. Where were you trying to find it from?}
\\textit{A. Um, I had been looking for people who would have been a bit older than meself and just saying, "Is there any nail bombs here". I would have asked anyone.}
\\textit{Q. You would have known people to ask who would have known whether nail bombs were available; is that the position?}
\\textit{A. Yeah.}
\\textit{Q. Thank you.}\\textsuperscript{166}
\\textsuperscript{165} Day 084/140/04-12 \\textsuperscript{166} Day 162/113/12-114/02 CHAPTER 6E
THE SHOOTING OF JOHN JOHNSTON
6E-1 INTRODUCTION
John Johnston was 59 years old on 30th January 1972. He was the manager of a drapery store in Londonderry. He was shot either at the same time as, or very shortly after Damien Donaghy. There is no evidence or suggestion that he was, or had been, engaged in disorderly behaviour.
John Johnston was almost certainly shot by Soldier A and / or Soldier B. The evidence suggests that John Johnston was towards the middle of the laundry waste ground, in a direct line behind Soldier A and Soldier B’s target. Neither soldier who fired was aware that he had hit John Johnston, or anyone other than his target. He was not Soldier A or Soldier B’s intended target and was hit by accident.
John Johnston sustained injuries to his left shoulder, to his right leg and, according to some notes, to one of his hands. The injury to his hand was described by him as a ‘graze’, and was almost certainly caused by a ricochet. This was probably also true of the injury to his shoulder and possibly also the injury to his leg.
John Johnston died on 16th June 1972 from a brain tumour. Notwithstanding the frequent references to him as having been one of those who died as a result of injuries sustained on Bloody Sunday there is no medical evidence which justifies those claims.
1 AJ5.4 paragraph C; his date of birth is given in his medical records as 30.05.12, D0782 2 AJ5.6 paragraph A 3 AJ5.8 paragraph B 4 AJ5.1 6E-II WHEN WAS JOHN JOHNSTON SHOT?
SUMMARY
6E-5 The evidence suggests overwhelmingly that John Johnston was shot simultaneously or immediately after Damien Donaghy had been shot. Whilst there is some evidence that minutes, rather than seconds, separated the two shootings, the preponderance of the evidence, including that of John Johnston and Damien Donaghy themselves, indicates that the period was much shorter.
6E-6 Most witnesses describe hearing a single burst of gunfire - the shots being fired, at most, within a few seconds of each other.
6E-7 Soldier A and Soldier B, both describe firing a second shot (and in Soldier B’s case a third) immediately after the first.
6E-8 In the circumstances those witnesses who refer to the gap as being some minutes are likely to be mistaken.5
John Johnston’s Evidence
6E-9 John Johnston’s own evidence to Lord Widgery put the gap between the two shootings at two seconds:
First I heard a shot, and there was a little boy in the other corner from me, and I saw him lying on the ground. Two seconds after that I got shot in the leg and the shoulder...6
He went on later to explain that he did not see Damien Donaghy actually fall, but saw him shortly after he had fallen.7
______________________________________________________________________
5 e.g. Day 065/020 Eddie Doherty and Day 065/127 and AM170.2 paragraph 13 Monica McDaid (who, when she gave evidence agreed that Mr Johnston was shot “very near the time that the young fella was shot, so it was”).
6 A15.5 paragraph C Other Civilian Evidence
6E-10 Damien Donaghy suggested the period between the shots may have been slightly longer, but expressed a lack of confidence in his recollection on this point:
Q... What sort of interval was there, if any, between the time that you were shot, the bullet that hit you in the thigh, and the two gunshots that you remember hearing thereafter?
A: I could not be precise, but I would say it would be a matter of seconds, maybe 10, 20 seconds, maybe less, I am not too sure.8
6E-11 The majority of witnesses suggest that there was a single burst of fire.
6E-12 Patrick Joseph Harkin’s statement to the present Inquiry suggests that Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot with a very short time frame.
I then heard two or three shots. On hearing the shots the young boys throwing stones dispersed. I then saw two people lying on the ground. I did not see them fall. One of them was getting on in years and had been shot in the leg. I believe he many have been called Johnston ...9
6E-13 Similarly Father McIvor told the Widgery Inquiry that he heard at least two shots and saw Damien Donaghy and John Johnston fall. The clear suggestion is that they were both felled by a single burst of fire.10 This appears even more clearly in his written statement to the Widgery Inquiry:
...two shots at least rang out which I was sure came from the are of the sorting office and the Presbyterian Church. I
7 AJ5.7 paragraph A 8 Day 070/017/07 9 AH29.2 paragraph 7. Mr. Harkin was not asked about the timing between the shots when he gave evidence, Day 089/006. However, he insisted, despite being told of evidence to the contrary, that the two men he saw were on the waste ground to the north of William Street. 10 H11.3 paragraph C-E did not actually see who fired the shots. Two people, one either side of me and about 15 yards from me, fell to the ground wounded. I was told that they were John Johnson, aged about 57, and Damien Donaghy, aged 17.11
6E-14 Father Carolan was close to Father McIvor on the waste ground. He told Eversheds
Two distinct shots rang out within a couple of seconds of each other ... Two people in the crowd fell...12
6E-15 Thomas McDaid was specifically asked about the gap between the shootings when he gave evidence to this Inquiry. He estimated that it was a matter of seconds (apparently five seconds or less) which separated the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston.13
6E-16 Jim Doherty was asked expressly to comment on the time between the shootings:
Q. I know it is difficult, can you give us any idea of the interval of time that you recall between the moment when Damien Donaghy was shot and the moment when John Johnston was shot?
A. I would say seconds maybe, that would be it, do you know.
Q. As little as that?
A. Yes.14
6E-17 Brendan Deehan’s statement to the present Inquiry reads as follows:
11 H11.9. McIvor told the present inquiry that he no longer has an exact recollection of where the men fell. He qualified his 1972 statement in the following way: “I think I saw one of them fall...”. This does not, however, detract from the evidence he gave in 1972, and to the present Inquiry, that there was only one burst of fire.
12 H3.2 paragraph 8
13 Day 066/041 confirming his account to Eversheds at AM177.2 paragraph 6 that John Johnston was shot “within seconds of the boy having been shot.”
14 Day 065/075/15 ...I am positive I heard three shots, one after the other in quick succession...
At about the same time as Donaghy spun round and fell to the ground I noticed Johnston staggering round in circles as if he didn't know what was happening.15
Billy McCartney described the period between the shot which hit Damien Donaghy and that which hit John Johnston as a few seconds.16
Charles McGill was asked:
Q. What you recollect is, effectively, hearing the shots and then the boy shout?
A. Yes, there was two shots and then seconds later there was sort of a third. The two came together sort of thing, but they were split seconds apart.17
Michael McGuinness describes hearing a single burst of fire and thereafter seeing both Damien Donaghy and John Johnston injured. Although he saw neither actually hit, the clear implication is that both were hit in a single burst of fire. In his statement to this Inquiry he said:
As I picked up the rubber bullet I heard sharper cracks. There were at least two shots but I cannot remember any more details. The noise was sharper than the bullet noise I had heard earlier, which had been a more muffled sound. I am certain that there had been no shots prior to these. It was startling that the shots were so distinctive.
11. As I heard the shots I looked across the gap and saw a boy I now know to be Damien Donaghy...my instant reaction was that there was no question that he had been shot...
12. When I saw that Damien Donaghy was being looked after I didn't pay much attention to him. I turned and saw
15 AD20.9 paragraphs 11 and 14. This statement is in contrast to Mr. Deehan's previous statement, at AD20.14, in which he refers apparently to two bursts of fire. 16 Day 054/174; AM87.3 paragraph 11 17 Day 069/89 John Johnston coming around the north-western corner of the building at the place marked (3 on the map (J8). He was holding his shoulder and laws very unsteady... I was sure that he had been shot...18
6E-21 It became clear during the course of Mr. McGuinness' evidence that he had not in fact seen John Johnston coming round corner of the waste ground, but merely presumed that he had been. When referred to a photograph it transpired that he had also intended to refer to the north eastern rather than the north western corner of the waste ground.19
6E-22 Mr. McGuinness was questioned by Edmund Lawson Q.C.; he confirmed that as many as four shots would not be inconsistent with his recollection:
Q. Does that fit in, then, with your recollection? You heard at least two sharp cracks, did you not? A. Yes, I did.
Q. So two, three or four would be your own recollection? A. Yes.
Q. Is that right? A. At least two.
Q. At least two; you would not argue with his saying three or four? A. No.20
6E-23 In her brief NICRA statement Mary Carmel McKenna refers to a burst of shots before she saw John Johnston and Damien Donaghy fall.21
18 AM283.2-3 paragraphs 9-12 19 Day 064/147-148 20 Day 064/171/03-14 21 AM296.1 Eugene Lafferty likewise describes hearing two shots and seeing Damien Donaghy and John Johnston fall simultaneously. He made a statement to this Inquiry in the following terms:
When I was in William Street ... I hear two shots over our heads. They were the first shots I heard that day. The shots came from the direction of the Presbyterian Church in a southerly direction. When the shots went off, two people to my right, that is on the southern side of William Street, were hit and fell to the ground. The two people who had been shot were Damien Donaghy, who was known as "Bubbles", and John Johnston.
Charlie Ward's exceptionally brief NICRA statement reads as follows:
I saw a youth about 15 ready to throw a stone at troops who were across William Street in an old derelict house. The troops fired two shots, one youth was shot in the hip and the other shot struck an old man who appeared to be shot in the foot.
James McCarron gave the following evidence in his statement to this Inquiry:
...I heard what I believed to be three high velocity shots coming from what I believed to be the direction of the Presbyterian Church and GPO Sorting office. The shots sounded very loud and were fairly close together...
Betty Curran was insistent that John Johnston was hit within a few seconds of Damien Donaghy; notwithstanding the fact that this part of her evidence undermined still further her entirely fictional account of John Johnston being in the process of assisting the injured Damien Donaghy.
______________________________________________________________________
22 AL1.8 paragraph 7; Day 064/081-002. Mr. Lafferty agreed that both Damien Donaghy and John Johnson may have been shot on the laundry waste ground and not, as he marked on the map attached to his BSI statement, in the area to the south of the waste ground.
23 AW7.1.
24 AM83.2 paragraph 4
25 Day 055/120 Military Evidence
6E-28 The evidence of Soldier A and Soldier B confirms that each fired his shots in quick succession. The fact that both apparently fired at the same target and neither heard the other's shots also suggests that they fired simultaneously.
6E-29 Soldier A:
*I took aim at the man and fired 1 round at him. This round missed and I fired a second round straight away.*
6E-30 Soldier B:
*I took aim at the man's chest and fired a round at them man. I saw no effect from this round and then fired two further rounds.*
6E-31 Insofar as other members of Machine Gun Platoon are able to recall shots being fired, their evidence supports the conclusion that there was one burst of fire.
6E-32 INQ1917 gave the clear impression that he had heard a single burst of firing from within the derelict building, but said could not be precise about how many shots he heard, although it was "not in excess of five".
6E-33 INQ1919 described in his statement to the present Inquiry hearing a shot from within the building followed by two further shots. He observed Soldier B in a firing position. He commented that it appeared to him that
______________________________________________________________________
26 Confirmed by Soldier A, Day 297/033, who went on to explain, Day 297/159, that the firing of one's own weapon leads to ringing in the ears. Soldier B told the Widgery Tribunal that he had not discovered that another soldier had fired until he was back inside the armoured vehicle, B43.023 paragraph G.
27 B20.015
28 B43.009-10
29 Day 288/069
30 C1919.4 paragraph 22 Soldier B and Soldier A (whose identity he seems to have discovered only later) were aiming towards the same target area. Giving evidence, INQ1919 said he thought that he had probably heard more than three shots. Notwithstanding his concession when cross examined that he did not see what soldiers A and B were firing at and was not in a position to watch A and B to find out whether or not they were firing at the same target simultaneously, undoubtedly his evidence in relation to the timing was to the effect that the shots were fired in very quick succession.
6E-III WHAT WAS JOHN JOHNSTON DOING WHEN HE WAS SHOT?
SUMMARY
6E-34 There is no evidence that John Johnston was involved in any disorderly behaviour at the time he was shot, or that he had been previously.
6E-35 John Johnston's own evidence was that he was in the process of crossing the laundry waste ground in order to visit an elderly gentleman in Glenfada Park.
6E-36 Although John Johnston had been heading across the waste ground in a southerly direction in order to reach Glenfada Park, the evidence suggests that, at the precise moment when he was shot, or very shortly before that, Mr. Johnston had turned and was facing in the general direction of the soldiers in the derelict building on the North side of William Street.
JOHN JOHNSTON'S EVIDENCE
6E-37 At the time he was shot John Johnston was cutting through the waste ground in order to avoid the CS gas further east down William Street. He told Lord Widgery that, as he crossed the street, he noticed four or five
31 Day 296/018 soldiers downstairs in a derelict house close to the burnt out Richardson's factory. It appeared to him that they were trying to hide. Some had their guns pointed out of the windows.32
John Johnston gave the following account of what happened as he crossed the waste ground to the Widgery Tribunal:
A. First I heard a shot, and there was a little boy in the other corner from me, and I saw him lying on the ground. Two seconds after that I got shot in the leg and the shoulder, and then after that I was taken into a house.
Q. What did you think it was that had hit you?
A. I got the impression that it was the soldiers from this waste ground. I was nearly positive it was that.
Q. Did you first of all think it was something other than a proper bullet?
A. No, I thought at the beginning that it was a rubber bullet that I was hit with. I did not even know I was shot.
...
Q. There was still another shot which grazed your hand?
A. Yes I think it is said that that was a ricochet.
Q. You think that was a ricochet?
A. So they say.
Q. Do you think that the other bullet or bullets that caused your injuries may also have been ricochets?
A. No, I do not think so.33
32 AJ5.4 paragraph D - 5 paragraph C. It seems clear that John Johnston was referring to the laundry waste ground and the derelict building with nine windows.
33 AJ5.5 paragraph C-E There has never been any suggestion that John Johnston was holding a weapon of any kind. This was confirmed by John Johnston in evidence to the Widgery Inquiry.\\textsuperscript{34}
\\textbf{CIVILIAN EVIDENCE REGARDING MR. JOHNSTON'S ACTIVITIES}
The likelihood is that before he was shot Mr. Johnston was doing nothing which would have drawn people's attention to him. Despite this, and notwithstanding Mr. Johnston's own evidence about what he was doing when he was shot, there are witnesses who have claimed that Mr. Johnston was engaged in various acts of heroism. Their evidence is of no assistance in discovering the truth about the shooting of John Johnston but serves as a further illustration of the manner in which myths have come to cloud the events of Bloody Sunday.
One suggestion is that Mr. Johnston was remonstrating with the soldiers who had fired.
Eddie Doherty embellishes his account with details which appear nowhere in the account of Mr. Johnston himself:
\\begin{quote} \\textit{A...he was looking towards the GPO, you know, and you know, my recollection is that he was remonstrating with them, you know that they shot this young lad you know.} \\end{quote}
\\begin{quote} \\textit{Q. When you say that he was remonstrating, what did he appear to be doing?} \\end{quote}
\\begin{quote} \\textit{A. You know, he was sort of pointing. I recall he possibly was pointing, you know. He seemed a bit angry that this young lad was shot, you know.}\\textsuperscript{35} \\end{quote}
An alternative myth is that John Johnston was going to help Damien Donaghy when he was shot. This myth has persisted, despite the fact that
\\textsuperscript{34} AJ5.5 paragraph F \\textsuperscript{35} Day 065/008/25 it was expressly denied by John Johnston when he gave evidence to the Widgery Tribunal. This may be partly due to the fact that Damien Donaghy has recounted it in his various accounts:
(1) In an undated first hand account which Damien Donaghy gave whilst he was still in hospital he stated, "...Shouted to a man I'd been shot. He came over, that man, and he was shot, when he was helping me."
(2) Damien Donaghy told Praxis, "Johnson went to lift me, he was shot too".
(3) The story was repeated in Damien Donaghy's BSI statement:
I was told some time afterwards by Michael Deakin, who died about two and a half months ago, that John Johnston was bending down to lift me up when he too was shot. I did not know Mr. Johnston at that time.
Others have given similar accounts of John Johnston's activities at the time he was shot:
(1) Noel Kelly gave the following account in his BSI statement:
An older man (I have since recognised him from pictures I have seen as being John Johnston) went over to help the boy but, as he was standing over him, there was another shot and he fell to the ground, almost on top of the boy.
(2) William Kearns, in what appears to be a NICRA statement, said the following:
______________________________________________________________________
36 AJ5.8 paragraph A.\
37 AD120.26\
38 AD120.25\
39 AD120.6 paragraph 11\
40 AK17.9 paragraph 6 This boy was standing at the corner. A shot rang out. The bullet pierced his leg. I didn't know at this time whether it was a rubber bullet or not. I was running back again to the waste ground. I looked back to see if the boy was alright (sic). He made to get up and fell again. I was going to help him to get up when this old man started to help him. When he got to the boy, he got shot.
(3) William Curran told Praxis:
Johnston, I didn't know Mr Johnston at all, but he had made to lift Donaghy at the same time as I had, but I heard Johnson say oh, my leg, and he got a ricochet, I think. I think it was a ricochet he got in the leg.
Mr. Curran was asked about his BSI statement, which was to the same effect as remarks in his Praxis interview, when he gave evidence on Day 055/058/10:
Q. Then you describe in paragraph 15 how immediately after seeing Bubbles Donaghy: "I approached him and stood at his feet. I glanced round and saw an older man, who I now know as John Johnston, coming to help Donaghy as well. When Johnston was about five or six feet away from me, I saw him clutch his shoulder. I cannot remember precisely where he was in the waste ground when he was shot." Can you tell us in what direction Mr Johnston was moving, where he had come from and where he was going to?
A. Well, I had my back to him and I came from my right side, indicating that he must have come up William Street or came behind me through the waste ground.
Q. You had your back to him and you were facing in what direction?
A. I was facing Bubbles Donaghy's, yes. I saw Mr Johnston out of the tail of me eye and I assumed he was coming to help Donaghy.
41 AK44.1 42 O6.8 Q. That was an assumption on your part? A. Yes.
(4) Betty Curran’s BSI statement is in similar terms to that of her husband’s:
I subsequently heard that Mr Johnson had been hit too. He had been running over to Bubbles when he fell.43
(5) Charles McDaid’s statement to the Widgery Tribunal gives the same impression:
I then saw a youth fall on the west side of William Street ... I called on him to lie still and then I saw a man run out to this boy from the direction of Columbcille Court and I shouted to him to stay down as the soldiers were firing live rounds and not rubber bullets. By this time people were pushing up William Street to see what was happening and I turned towards them to keep them back. Upon doing so there was more gunfire and someone shouted that the man had been shot.44
There are major inconsistencies between Mr. McDaid’s oral evidence to the Widgery Tribunal,45 which was to the effect that he did not see the man who was shot, and the evidence that he gave to the present Inquiry which was that he had seen John Johnston hit.
Q. If we go back to paragraph 19 at AM161.3, we should correct paragraph 19 so as to read: "As I saw him in the area marked "F", Johnson was moving forward in a westerly direction"? A. Yes.
Q. You shouted to him, "get down, they are firing live rounds", and you then heard another shot, again from a
43 AC130.2 paragraph 13 44 AM161.14 45 AM161.16 paragraph E northerly direction, and he went down; you think that he was hit on the leg?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you hear any more shots other than the two followed by the one that you have described?
A. No.
Q. Mr Johnston, you did not know him at the time; is that right?
A. Not by name. I knew him by seeing him in the town, he was a prominent man.46
Surprisingly Mr. McDaid claimed to have no present recollection of seeing a young boy being hit.47
6E-45 John Johnston expressly denied that he had been going to assist the injured Damien Donaghy. He was asked in terms when he gave evidence to Lord Widgery:
Q. Had you gone to assist the boy?
A. No.
Q. Did you not turn round to him at all?
A. No.48
6E-46 Christopher Clarke Q.C. commented on this part of John Johnston’s evidence in opening:
So on that evidence, from that we have just read, he recounts himself as having not turned round at all. That is
46 Day 060/142/17 47 Day 060/143/11-20 48 AJ5.8 paragraph A consistent with what appears in the account given to The Sunday Times.49
6E-47 An alternative interpretation is that John Johnston was simply denying that he had ever turned around towards Damien Donaghy, and he was not saying that he had not turned at all. It is certainly correct that John Johnston appears to have told the Sunday Times journalists that he was shot in the back of the leg.
I went onto the open ground and I think I was about two thirds of the way across, about level with that old wrecked lorry, when there was a big thump on the back of my right leg.50 [Emphasis added.]
IN WHICH DIRECTION WAS JOHN JOHNSTON FACING AT THE TIME HE WAS SHOT?
Summary
6E-48 Notwithstanding the Sunday Times notes of an interview with John Johnston there is compelling evidence that John Johnston must had turned towards the soldiers to the north of William Street at the time, or shortly before, the moment that he was shot.
John Johnston’s Evidence
6E-49 John Johnston’s SC statement to the Widgery Inquiry stated:
I saw soldiers, in firing positions, in a burnt out house almost opposite to this waste ground and north of William Street. As I was crossing this waste ground I turned and looked at the soldiers I heard a crack of a shot. I was hit in the right leg near the hit and then another shot hit me in the left shoulder...I was not carrying any object whatsoever in
49 Day 010/81/12 50 AJ5.1 my hands and at the time I was hit I was on my own.\\textsuperscript{51} [our emphasis]
6E-50 This is the only statement of John Johnston that appears to indicate that he was actually looking in the direction of the soldiers he believed shot him. However the evidence about John Johnston's injuries would seem to support this version of events.
\\textit{Medical Evidence}
6E-51 Mr. Bennett, consultant surgeon, noted that John Johnston "would appear to have been shot on the front."\\textsuperscript{52} Christopher Clarke Q.C. commented in opening that it is not 100% clear what Mr. Bennett meant by that expression "it presumably means that the entrance wound was thought by the consultant surgeon to have been at the front."\\textsuperscript{53}
\\textit{Civilian Evidence}
6E-52 There is also civilian evidence which indicates John Johnston was facing in the direction of William Street when he was shot.
(1) William Doherty:
\\textit{Q. Do you recollect now which way he was facing when he fell?}
\\textit{A. Yes, he seemed to be facing towards William Street. I did not see him actually fall, I seen him stagger too, like, you know.}
\\textit{Q. That must be after he had been hit?}
\\textsuperscript{51} AJ5.3 \\textsuperscript{52} ED32.4 \\textsuperscript{53} Day 010/074 (2) Billy McCartney:
Q. Can I ask you this first: do you recall which way John Johnston was facing when he fell or when he was shot?
A. I do not think Mr Johnston did fall.
Q. Which way was he facing when he was shot?
A. When I seen him he was facing -- his face was towards William Street.
Q. Towards William Street?
A. Yes.
Q. At that stage he was facing to the north?
A. Yes.55
(3) Monica McDaid:
Were you aware of Mr Johnston before he was shot?
A. Yes.
Q. What had he been doing; can you tell us which direction he had been facing in?
A. He was facing on to William Street.
Q. Was he stationary or was he moving?
A. Stationary.
Q. He moved from the position where you first saw him to any different position at the time that he was shot?
A. No.
Q. Was he with anybody?
54 Day 055/142/08 55 Day 054/174/15 A. No, he was on his own.
Q. We have had quite a bit of evidence, including the written evidence from Mr Johnston himself, that in fact that day he had tagged on to the end of the march and was going along this wasteland to the left-hand side of the photograph, to the south, to visit somebody in Glenfada Park. That is to say he would have been going, at least at some stage, facing away from William Street. Do you think you might be mistaken --
A. No, when I seen him he probably came in from William Street, but when I seen him he was standing, standing stationary, looking out on to William Street.56
(4) Michael McGuinness described John Johnston as “facing across to where Donaghy had been shot.”57
(5) Sean Barr suggests John Johnston was facing in a north easterly direction:
Q. So far as the older man is concerned, can you recall which way he was facing when you saw him hit in the leg?
A. Yes, he was facing down William Street.
Q. Facing down William Street?
A. Yes, and he seemed to have stumbled.
Q. If we go back to the map. Can we have AB19.7? When you say "facing down William Street", do you mean facing in the direction of the junction of Little James Street, Rossville Street and William Street?
A. Yes.58
6E-53 John Johnston’s own evidence suggests that he was struck moments after Damien Donaghy. It seems likely, therefore, that the attention of the
56 Day 065/132/01 57 Day 064/148/06 58 Day 063/074-075 majority of those on the waste ground, including John Johnston himself, was focused on activity in the northern part of the waste ground i.e. towards the area where there was rioting and from where both rubber bullets and live rounds were fired.
6E-IV WHERE WAS JOHN JOHNSTON SHOT?
SUMMARY
6E-54 John Johnston was almost certainly shot on the laundry waste ground.
6E-55 John Johnston was not Soldier A’s or Soldier B’s intended target. Neither soldier was aware that he had hit anyone other than his target. The likelihood is that John Johnston was about one third to one half of the way down the eastern side of the laundry waste ground and in a direct line behind Soldier A and Soldier B’s target.
6E-56 The dashed line represents a continuation of the line of soldiers A and B’s fire. The Inquiry plan does not make clear that, in 1972, the western wall of the building marked 'Laundry' did not exist. Christopher Clarke Q.C. dealt with this on Day 12:
It is for consideration whether possibly some of the witnesses have been misled by the plan. What I mean by that is this: if you look at the plan it appears to show a building still in existence in the rectangle in which is contained [sic] the words "laundry". It is possible – we will have to examine it in oral evidence – that some people's recollection is that Mr Johnston was on the east wall of the laundry waste ground and thought when they looked at the map that the wall was on the western edge of the building marked "laundry" on the plan; that is to say that they did not appreciate that the wall of the building did not exist at the time. That wall or wall parallel to the line that I have just put on the screen did not exist but it is just possible that it confused people who marked the plan.59
Where witnesses have not given oral evidence the possibility that they have been misled remains an important consideration.
59 Day 012/004/09 JOHN JOHNSTON'S EVIDENCE
6E-59 John Johnston gave his most detailed account about where he was shot to the Sunday Times:
I went onto the open ground and I think I was about two thirds of the way across, about level with the old wrecked lorry, when there was a big thump on the back of my right leg...some men came to give me a hand and as I was helped away I could see a young lad lying propped up against the wall to my left...there I am walking away with my back to the troops...60
6E-60 The location of what are described as “old wrecked trucks” is marked on a Sunday Times map attached to the statement of Charles Meehan.61 The dashed arrow suggests that a bullet fired from the derelict building in the direction of the north west corner of the waste ground could have hit John Johnston in the approximate position he describes.
6E-61 John Johnston gave the following evidence about his location, and that of Damien Donaghy.
60 AJ5.1 61 AM390.4 Q. How far was Donaghy from you when he fell? A. I would say about 10 feet at the most.
...
Q. At the time were you on his side of the road? A. No, I was crossing over.
Q. Crossing the waste ground? A. Yes, to get over.
Q. You mean crossing the gap between the two houses? A. Crossing that gap to get over to Columbcille Court.
Q. On the same side of the road? A. Yes.
Q. He would be behind you? A. Yes.
Q. He was standing up near the gable end of the wall, was he not? A. Yes.62
6E-62 In opening Christopher Clarke Q.C. commented:
It looks from that evidence as if Mr Johnston was further south on the waste ground so as to have Mr Donaghy behind him to the north when he himself was hit.63
6E-63 In his statement to the RUC taken at Altnagelvin hospital on 2nd February 1972 John Johnston said he had just got on to the waste ground and was going to Columbcille Court.
62 AJ5.7 paragraphs B-E 63 Day 010/073/10 I was walking diagonally towards the entrance to Columbcille Court when I felt a blow to my right leg and left shoulder.
CIVILIAN EVIDENCE
6E-64 A number of witnesses also put Mr. Johnston in a position where he could have been hit by a bullet aimed at someone on the north west corner of the laundry waste ground.
(1) Eugene O’Neill puts John Johnston at the point he marked ‘5’ on his Inquiry map.
(2) Charles Meehan similarly placed John Johnston about one third of the way down the laundry waste ground to the south of William Street.
______________________________________________________________________
64 ED32.5\
65 AO65.2 paragraph 9; AO65.30\
66 AM390.3 (3) Anthony Feeney indicated the position where Damien Donaghy was shot (red arrow) and position where John Johnston was shot (yellow arrow) on the photograph below.67
(4) Billy McCartney marked the position of Damien Donaghy ‘E’ and John Johnston ‘F’ on the map below.68
67 AF7.6: Dav 067/089/08-091/13
7.1168 William Thomas Doherty marked the location of Damien Donaghy 'C' and John Johnston 'D' on the map below. In evidence Mr. Doherty agreed it was possible that Damien Donaghy was at the corner of the laundry where the Nook Bar was located, and that therefore both Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were further North in the waste ground. William Curran said he could not recall precisely where on the waste ground John Johnston was when he was shot; but estimated that John Johnston was five or six feet away from where he was standing; marked on the map below at point 'F'; this may also have been a position where he might have been hit by a bullet intended for soldiers A and B's target at the north west corner of the waste ground.\\footnote{AC132.3 paragraph 15} There is some evidence which places John Johnston further south on the laundry waste ground. One possible explanation for this is that Mr. Johnston undoubtedly travelled through the waste ground in order to reach the Shiels' house in Columbcille Court. There is force in the following opening remarks of Christopher Clarke Q.C.:
As one will see, no entirely clear picture emerges from the statements of these witnesses as to the precise point in or near the laundry waste ground at which Mr Johnston fell. Some witnesses put him as having fallen halfway down the waste ground from William Street. Quite a few put him at the north-west corner and some put him in the north east corner. It is possible that different people saw him at different stages as he walked south, having been hit first in the shoulder and then in the leg.72
Brendan Deehan is an example of a witness who apparently observed John Johnston making his way to Columbcille Court. He marked the position where he saw John Johnston in the southern most part of the waste ground, 'E' on the Inquiry map.73 Giving evidence he clarified that he had not in fact seen John Johnston fall but saw him staggering about.74 A letter dated 7th February 1972 to the R.U.C. from H.M. Bennett, F.R.C.S., Consultant Surgeon, Altnagelvin Hospital, contained the following details about John Johnston's injuries, treatment and prognosis:
This patient was admitted on the 30th January, 1972 with gun shot wounds of the right shoulder and lateral aspect of the right thigh.
Later he was operated upon by Mr Fenton. Both wounds were through and through though a small piece of metal was taken from the wound in the leg.
Here again these are superficial wounds and the patient should make a good recovery with little, if any permanent disability. He would appear to have been shot on the front.
The true position appears to be that John Johnston in fact sustained wounds to his right thigh and to his left shoulder. This is confirmed by Dr. McClean's evidence, by John Johnston's own evidence (which also refers to an injury to his right hand) and by photographs of John Johnston receiving first aid in Mrs. Shiels' house which show wounds to his left shoulder and right thigh. John Johnston has, by some, been regarded as the fourteenth death of Bloody Sunday. In his opening to this Inquiry Arthur Harvey Q.C. outlined the reason for this as follows:
Johnny remained in hospital for ten days. However, he was never the same man again. His immediate family describe him as being very quiet and very introverted, most unlike himself. Indeed, he was no longer as attentive to his nieces, Helen and Brigitte, and his nephews, John and Jimmy, whom he had previously doted on, as he and his wife Margaret had no children of their own.
Johnny returned to work in Hassons, although he appeared distant and disinterested in his work. His health deteriorated rapidly and he died on 16th June 1972. He died from a brain tumour, which Mr Flannon, a consultant neurosurgeon in the Royal Victoria Hospital in Belfast. stated could have been caused as a result of a blow to the head. It is for this reason that Johnny is referred to as the 14th death of Bloody Sunday.79
6E-70 The synopsis of opening on behalf of the family of John Johnston asked the question; “...whether the injuries he sustained on Bloody Sunday contributed to the death of John Johnston”.80
6E-71 There is no evidence that the injuries to John Johnston’s leg, shoulder or hand contributed in any way to his death.
6E-72 It appears from John Johnston’s medical notes that doctors considered whether his symptoms might be caused by a subdural haematoma. It is clear that they considered, properly, whether Mr. Johnston might sustained a minor head injury, in addition to his other injuries, on Bloody Sunday. However, on operating, they discovered that John Johnston had a cerebral tumour. It was the tumour, not a haematoma, which, according to John Johnston’s notes was the cause of death.81 No link is made in the medical notes between a tumour and any possible head injury.
6E-73 A letter sent from Dr. MacFarlane to Dr. Kelly on 21st June states:
This patient died on the 16th June, 1972. As you know he had a cerebral tumour which proved to be inoperable.82
6E-74 Dr. MacFarlane also records a cerebral tumour as the final diagnosis of the principal condition causing admission.83
6E-75 Furthermore, and in any event, there is no evidence to support the contention that John Johnston struck his head as a result of his having
79 Day 048/155/13-156/09 80 OS1.14 81 D0800 82 D0800 83 D0800 been shot on Bloody Sunday. To the contrary, the preponderance of the evidence, including John Johnston's own evidence, is to the effect that, although John Johnston stumbled, he did not fall to the ground on being shot.
(1) John Johnston told the Sunday Times:
...I was about two thirds of the way across, about level with that old wrecked lorry, when there was a big thump on the back of my right leg. I though, my god I've been whacked by a rubber bullet and went to hobble on, though I couldn't move well. Then a man shouted to me "Christ Mr Johnson, you're shot, you'r (sic) trousers are soaking in blood" (sic). I looked down and so they were soaked right through. Some men came to give me a hand and as I was helped away I could see a young lad lying propped up against the wall to my left...84
(2) Billy McCartney's evidence to the present Inquiry supports this conclusion. He was asked:
Q. Can I ask you this first: do you recall which way John Johnston was facing when he fell or when he was shot?
A. I do not think Mr Johnston did fall.
Q. Which way was he facing when he was shot?
A. When I seen him he was facing -- his face was towards William Street.85
(3) Sean Barr's evidence is that he was able to reach John Johnston before he fell:
Q. If we go back to paragraphs 12 and 13 at AB19.3, you describe how he appeared to have been hit in the leg and how you ran towards him and helped him back to where you had been standing. When you did that was he still upright?
84 AJ5.1 85 Day 054/174/15 A. What amazed me about him was, he was still walking and I thought, if you are shot in the leg, you do not walk, but he seemed to be -- have the strength to walk and I also remember there was not an awful lot of blood, I do not remember an awful lot of blood.
Q. So you helped him walk to where you had been before?
A. Just for a few steps, and then other people took over and helped him.86
(4) William Curran claims to have seen John Johnston at the precise moment that he was shot:
I glanced around and saw an older man, who I now know was John Johnston, coming to help Donaghy as well. When John Johnston was about five or six feet away from me, I saw him clutch his shoulder. I cannot remember precisely where he was in the waste ground when he was shot. I believe that he put his left hand to his right shoulder. I did not hear the shot. I think that he was also hit in the leg afterwards and he hopped away down the waste ground.87
(5) Brendan Deehan made the following statement to the present Inquiry:
At about the same time as Donaghy spun round and fell on the ground I noticed Johnston staggering round in circles as if he didn't know what was happening...88
He confirmed the same on oath:
By this stage of your statement you describe hearing three loud-pitched cracks. You were unable to say which direction these cracks came from and then you saw Mr Donaghy and Mr Johnston fall?
A. Yes, I did not actually see Mr Johnston fall; I seen Donaghy fall.
86 Day 063/075/19 87 AC132.3 paragraph 15 88 AD20.9 paragraph 14 Q. Your recollection is that you saw Mr Johnston staggering about?
A. Yes.
(6) Jim Doherty’s evidence was very similar:
Q. What was the first that you saw of Mr Johnston?
A. The first time I saw Mr Johnston was just after Damien Donaghy was shot.
Q. What did you see when you first saw him; was he stumbling, was he falling?
A. He was stumbling, he seemed to be stumbling and people ran towards him.
(7) William Thomas Doherty’s evidence was as follows:
Q. You, as I understand it, saw Mr Johnston fall, but am I also right to understand that before then you had not seen Mr Johnston at all?
A. That is right, yes.
Q. You say in your statement that you think that he was going towards the younger man who had been shot, but you cannot be sure.
A. Right.
Q. Do you recollect now which way he was facing when he fell?
A. Yes, he seemed to be facing towards William Street. I did not see him actually fall, I seen him stagger too, like, you know.
Q. That must be after he had been hit?
A. Yes.
89 Day 155/154/25 90 Day 065/075/07 91 Day 055/141/25-142/14 Thomas McDaid also confirmed John Johnston did not fall:
Q. What happened to Mr Johnston when the shots rang out?
A. Whenever he was hit, then the people that were round knew that he was hit and they got Mr Johnston then, and I did not know where they took him but I presumed they took him back into the flats in behind --
Q. Did he fall?
A. No, he did not fall, no.92
Padraig O'Miahain's evidence also suggests that John Johnston faltered but did not fall. Mr. O'Miahain gave an account of leaving the injured Damien Donaghy to go and help John Johnston. He described John Johnston as looking as if he was "on the point of falling forward after stumbling".93 His oral evidence was that John Johnston was on the edge of the waste ground. He assumed John Johnston had been tripped up by the ground which was broken up.94
Leo Deehan gave the following account in his document entitled "My experience on Bloody Sunday". However, it is right that the timing and location of the shooting he describes are clearly wrong.
I was about half way down William Street now, suddenly a man in my line bent over and groaned, he started staggering out to the right to an open space, I ran over and now there was about ten people round him and one man said "I think he is shot" he pointed in the direction of the spot I saw the heads move. I heard his name Johnston.95
92 Day 066/042/06 93 AO56.15 paragraph 16 94 Day 059/047 95 AD178.16 (11) Michael Joseph Fox described seeing John Johnston, within seconds of seeing the injured Damien Donaghy being carried, in very graphic terms:
... I did not know him at the time but found out later that it was John Johnston. I remember seeing blood oozing from his leg.
John Johnston was still on his feet and I went towards him to help him and touched his arm. He was still standing and there was no-one near him; he looked very pale and shocked. He was not carrying anything at all. I moved with him for about two feet and a number of other people then came forward to assist.96
(12) Anthony Feeney’s account in his statement to this Inquiry is that John Johnston was standing motionless after being shot:
He had his arms folded across his chest and appeared to be hugging his upper arms. He had a very shocked expression on his face and I thought that perhaps he was in shock as a result of seeing the young man who had been shot.
13. I now know that this second man was called John Johnston and that he had been shot in the arm.
14. Just then a girl with blonde hair ran past me on my right. She was running towards William Street along the wall to my right and headed straight for Mr Johnston. She stood in front of him and held him up.97
(13) John Long also gives an account of seeing John Johnston after he had been shot. Curiously Mr. Long’s evidence is that John Johnston was close to the garages at the back of Kells Walk.98 Given that John Johnston was taken to 8A Columbcille Court there would be no reason for him to have been in the area described by Mr. Long.
96 AF26.4 paragraphs 24-5. Fox is almost certainly wrong in believing that it was at this stage that he saw Mr Johnston come round the north east corner of the laundry waste ground, Day 059/017/18 97 AF7.3 paragraphs 12-14 98 Day 068/092 Although Mr. Long did not accept that he might in fact have seen John Johnston in the laundry waste ground, it is more than likely that he has in fact confused the two locations. The fact that John Johnston was apparently standing alone suggests Mr. Long caught sight of him very shortly after he had been shot. He confirms John Johnston was standing.
I saw a man standing on the opposite side of the opening and to my right, at the position marked C on the map (K10). I recognised the man as John Johnston. I knew him to talk to but I didn't know him very well. He was standing up against a parapet with his right leg raised slightly off the ground. I noticed that there were a number of other people around and about but they were all standing very close to the surrounding walls.
4. When I went over to John Johnston I realised that he had been shot. He had a wound on the inside of his right thigh and another wound on his right shoulder. He looked shocked but composed. I saw that there was blood coming from both wounds.
Although there is a small minority of witnesses who do refer to John Johnston falling, neither their evidence, nor that of Mr. Johnston, suggests that he banged his head or sustained any head injury.
John Johnston was discharged from hospital on 10th February 1972. The discharge note from Mr. Bennett describes John Johnston as having made "an excellent recovery" from the "comparatively minor wounds". The only further treatment contemplated is the possibility of further dressing of the wounds by a district nurse. How many bullets struck John Johnston?
6E-78 There is compelling evidence that the injury to John Johnston's hand, and in all probability also the injury to his shoulder, were the result of ricochets. The same may be true for the injury he sustained to his leg.
6E-79 The statement of DS Cudmore records the details of John Johnston's injuries as follows:
"...Johnston was injured in his right leg, on the back of his hand and to his left shoulder, the latter two injuries were believed caused by a ricochet."(^{102})
6E-80 Dr. McClean, who examined John Johnston in the Shiels' house was also convinced that his shoulder wound was the result of a ricochet. His statement to the present Inquiry states that:
John Johnston had a wound in the leg and a peculiar wound in the shoulder. I hadn't seen a wound like it before. It was shallow and appeared to be three holes joined together in a line. I thought it had been caused by a ricochet. If it had not been a ricochet the bullet would have gone through the shoulder and caused a lot of damage. He was not losing much blood.(^{103})
6E-81 Noel Christopher McLoone, one of the Knights of Malta who assisted Mr. Johnston, reached a similar conclusion. His evidence to the present Inquiry is in the following terms:
I also remember another man I treated in this house, again, because of the nature of this wound. He had a big hole the size of a fist in his back. The flesh seemed to have simply been lifted out of the centre of his back near his spine. There was no blood. I remember thinking that it must have been a ricochet wound. I cannot recall any further details about the man, apart from that he seemed elderly to me. I
(^{102}) D0808 (^{103}) AM105.5 paragraph 25 think that somebody told me afterwards that he was called Johnson.\\textsuperscript{104}
6E-82 In addition, when John Johnston described being hit to the Sunday Times team he described being hit only once and not realising he had multiple wounds until Dr. McClean told him so.\\textsuperscript{105}
6E-83 That said, by the time John Johnston gave his statement to the Widgery Tribunal he purported to recall being shot twice:
\\begin{quote} As I was crossing the waste ground I turned and looked at the soldiers I heard a crack of a shot. I was hit in the right leg near the hip and then another shot hit me in the left shoulder. At first I though I was hit by rubber bullets. Another shot, which I believe was a ricochet, grazed my hand but I have no idea when this happened.\\textsuperscript{106} \\end{quote}
6E-84 In his evidence to Lord Widgery John Johnston opined that he did not think that his other injuries could have been caused by a ricochet:
\\begin{quote} Q. There was still another shot which grazed your hand? A. Yes. I think it is said that that was a ricochet. Q. You think that was a ricochet? A. So they say. Q. Do you think that the other bullet or bullets that caused your injuries may also have been ricochets? A. No I do not think so.\\textsuperscript{107} \\end{quote}
6E-85 During cross-examination by Mr. Gibbens the following exchange occurred:
\\textsuperscript{104} AM359.5 paragraph 24 \\textsuperscript{105} AJ5.1 \\textsuperscript{106} AJ5.3 \\textsuperscript{107} AJ5.5 paragraph E Q: Do I understand you right to say you understood you had been hit by a ricochet?
A: On the hand. It was not me that said that, it was the hospital people thought it was a ricochet.
Q: What about your leg?
A: The bullet had to be taken from the leg and the shoulder.
Q: Were you aware how many shots had been fired?
A: At this particular period?
Q: Yes.
A: My recollection was just two shots; two or three shots at the most.
Q: But one caught the boy?
A: Yes.
Q: And you say you had a ricochet, one in your leg and one in the shoulder?
A: Yes.108
Betty (B) and William Curran (A) both referred to John Johnston being hit by a ricochet in the course of the interview they gave to Praxis:
A: ...I did not know Mr. Johnson at all, but he had made to lift Donanghy at the same time as I had, but I heard Johnson say oh, my leg, and he got a ricochet, I think. I think it was a ricochet he got in the leg.
B: I - I -
A: And on the shoulder -
B: I - I think that - that that's what Mr Johnson was shot with, the ricochet that I had seen hitting the ground and bouncing up again.
108 AJ5.7 paragraphs E-G A: You see, we could see the – see the lumps of concrete getting er –
B: Getting lifted with the bullet.
A: Concrete was flying off – off the footpath where Donaghy was lying. They were still shooting, you see...
The following exchange took place when Betty Curran was questioned by Edmund Lawson Q.C.:
Q. You went on both of you, look a few lines down, without my reading it all out, it describes seeing the lumps of concrete being lifted off or flying off?
A. I did not see any concrete, I just seen the bullet lifting the tile.
Q. You did not see any concrete?
A. No, I did not see any.
Q. But you saw the tiles?
A. I seen the thing hit the tile and bounce off it, that was all I seen.
When pressed Betty Curran was very defensive:
Q. He was hit by what you thought was probably a ricochet?
A. You see, I do not see what this has to do with my Bloody Sunday statement to the Tribunal.
Q. Mrs Curran –
A. That there was all done for a television programme.
Q. It is indeed.
A. That was not for this Tribunal. Q. No, but it was another account that you gave. Bear with me, if you will?
A. But that was a long time after Bloody Sunday. The statement I gave was what I remembered on Bloody Sunday. This was taken a -- this was a long time after it.
Q. Do you think what you said in that statement -- I know it was not made for this Inquiry -- in that interview to the television men was to the best of your belief true?
A. Yes.
Q. You certainly would not try to lie to them, would you?
A. I was not lying, no.\\textsuperscript{111}
William Curran was similarly anxious to distance himself from what he had said in the Praxis interview, insisting that it was unsigned and not made as part of his statement to the Inquiry.\\textsuperscript{112} He said he could not say whether or not John Johnston had been hit by a ricochet,\\textsuperscript{113} but confirmed that he had seen lumps of concrete being lifted in the way he had described to Praxis.\\textsuperscript{114}
\\textit{Forensic Evidence}
The Tribunal's experts, Dr. Shepard and Mr. O'Callaghan gave the following account of John Johnston's injuries. Their comments confirm that the multiple injuries suffered by John Johnston may indicate that the bullet or bullets which hit him had fragmented before hitting him (\\textit{i.e.} that they were ricochets).
\\textit{Mr. Johnston had wounds to his right leg and one shoulder and, according to some of the notes, his right hand. Some notes indicate that the shoulder injury was to the left}
\\textsuperscript{111} Day 055/123/21-124/18 \\textsuperscript{112} Day 055/075-076 \\textsuperscript{113} Day 055/081 \\textsuperscript{114} Day 055/082 shoulder while other letters indicate the right shoulder. Photograph EP22/12 shows an injury to the left shoulder being treated. No detailed descriptions of the wounds are present in the notes. A letter to the Royal Ulster Constabulary from Mr Bennett, Consultant Surgeon, dated 7th February 1972 states that the wounds to the leg and the shoulder “were through and through” and that “He would appear to have been shot on (sic) the front”, Mr Bennett adds that “a small piece of metal was taken from the wound in the leg”.
These wounds are described in a discharge letter of the 11th February as being “comparatively minor. X-rays apparently showed “foreign bodies” or “metallic fragments” in the shoulder and the right hand. “A small piece of metal” was removed at operation from the leg wound and two fragments of metal were submitted to DIFS (ref 502/72).
A report by Dr Martin dated 4th April 1972 reports that one was a fragment of lead core and the other of copper jacket. Dr. Martin concludes that the “copper jacket” is consistent with the base of a 7.62 calibre rifle bullet although there are no details of why he came to that conclusion.
Mr Johnston was re-admitted to Altnagelvin Hospital in May 1972 with a brain tumour from which he died in June 1972.
Comment
The multiple injuries may indicate that the bullet (or bullets) were fragmented prior to striking Mr Johnston.115
6E-91 Mr. O'Callaghan confirmed this when he gave evidence to the present Inquiry:
It is possible that a bullet or bullets, according to this, fragmented before striking John Johnston; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Dr Shepherd was asked yesterday what sort of surface the bullet would have had to contact in order to fragment, and he referred that question to you. You have told us today that a hard surface at an angle of about 20 degrees plus would cause a bullet to fragment. Does the surface also need to be a rough surface?
A. It certainly assists it if it is a rough surface.
Q. Is there anything you would like to add to the evidence you have already given today about the nature of surfaces and materials that cause bullets to fragment?
A. No, I think perhaps the only thing I would say is there are no absolutes. You would have to treat each surface individually to determine the angle at which any particular bullet would break up in coming into contact with it.\\textsuperscript{116} CHAPTER 6F
THE SHOTS FIRED BY SOLDIER A AND SOLDIER B
6F-1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
In assessing Soldier A’s and Soldier B’s conduct on Bloody Sunday the Tribunal should, in our submission, have regard to the following principles of law:
(1) An individual who is, or who honestly believes himself to be, under threat of attack is lawfully entitled to use reasonable force to prevent the attack.
(2) The reasonableness of an individual’s response to a perceived threat must be judged according to the facts as that individual genuinely believed them to be, even if it is ultimately shown that his belief was mistaken.¹
Soldier A and Soldier B’s evidence is clear: they both honestly believed themselves (and those around them) to be under lethal attack. They honestly believed that a man was in the process of lighting a nail bomb which he intended to throw towards them and that, if he was not stopped, the likelihood was that the nail bomb would explode inside the derelict building and they (or their colleagues) would be seriously injured or killed. They had only one way of stopping the man and that was to shoot him as they both intended.
The following facts are indisputable:
(1) If a rioter had succeeded in throwing a lighted nail bomb into the derelict building, there would be have been considerable loss of life or serious injury.
¹ See Chapter 3. (2) If a rioter on the north western corner of the laundry waste ground was lighting a nail bomb, the only way in which Soldier A or Soldier B could have stopped him was to shoot him.
6F-4 It follows that if Soldier A and Soldier B honestly believed there to be a nail bomber lighting a nail bomb and intending to throw it towards them, their response to that belief was reasonable. The most important issue for the Tribunal may therefore be whether Soldier A and Soldier B did honestly believe that they were in imminent danger of attack.
6F-5 There is no evidence that either Soldier A or Soldier B was in any sense given to acting rashly or recklessly. Both men had spent long periods in Northern Ireland prior to Bloody Sunday. At the time of Bloody Sunday Soldier A had served ten years in the Parachute Regiment. Despite being involved in many riots neither had fired a live round in Northern Ireland.
6F-6 The Tribunal should, in our submission, to accept Soldier B’s evidence about his target and the manner in which he fired:
I would have fired at a target that I thought was a threat to somebody’s life. I would not have fired willy-nilly, so to speak.
6F-7 The fact that both soldiers had previously been in riot situations strongly supports Soldier B’s evidence that he did not fire in a state of panic.
Q. You said in 1972 that stones had come in through the windows, although you do not remember that now.
Presumably if a stone could come in a nail bomb could come in?
A. That is correct.
Q. And within that area a nail bomb could have caused horrendous injuries to anyone close to it on explosion?
2 Day 297/078/17-18 3 Day 311/009/22-010/06; Day 297/039-040 4 Day 311/050 A. Yes, probably injury and death.
Q. Is there any chance that, with that fear in your mind, you saw the rioters, saw them throwing things, and panicked and fired at them to keep them back?
A. No, because it had happened before in Belfast.
Q. Is there any possibility that -- either your eyes were watering, or because of the respirator, or both -- you could not see clearly what was going on, but felt under threat and so fired?
A. No.5
6F-II THE CONTRADICTORY AND CHANGING NATURE OF THE ALLEGATIONS LEVELLED AGAINST SOLDIERS A AND B.
ALLEGATIONS MADE IN OPENING
6F-8 In the various opening statements submitted on the behalf of the families it has been alleged that shootings were not only unjustified but part of a wider conspiracy to 'teach the Bogsiders a lesson.'
6F-9 The synopsis of opening statement on behalf of James Wray alleges:
The plan. Not just an arrest operation. Citation of pieces of evidence which suggest something more ambitious and sinister was planned. The absence of documents which speak to a more drastic plan does not mean that there was none...At least some senior officers approved an action which was intended to 'teach a lesson' and which involved a high risk of loss of life.6
6F-10 The synopsis of opening on behalf of Barney McGuigan, William and Alexander Nash and Daniel Gillespie makes a similar allegation:
[The families]...are unanimous in the view that the lethal force was unlawful, and where death ensued, amounts to murder. They are also of the view that responsibility for this situation has to be attributed to political and military personnel at the highest level. In
5 Day 311/054/22-055/13 6 OS4.3 paragraph 5 general terms, the events of Bloody Sunday are not an accident of history wherein a few individual soldiers momentarily lost control, but an event which had been orchestrated and condoned and which involved a very simple objective – the forcible reassertion of military authority over the Bogside and the Creggan. Whilst the killing itself may not have been a planned outcome, it was certainly one that was foreseeable, and was considered to be what has more recently termed “collateral damage” during British military operations in a different theatre of war.7
The mind set of the soldiers engaged in the shootings, and those who were their commanders, is also easily evidenced by documents and witnesses. Essentially, the deaths of D.Y.H. would not be regarded as anything amiss, or unacceptable. Ford and Wilford both in memoranda, books and interviews have said as much. There seems to have been a simplistic equation which ran something along the lines that the Irish who lived in the Bogside and the Creggan were nationalists, nationalists were republicans, republicans could be identified with the PIRA and, therefore, in that area, if it moves- shoot it.8
6F-11 The skeleton opening submitted by Barr and Co. Solicitors on behalf of John Johnston and Damien Donaghy alleges:
5. The evidence of Corporal A and Private B is crucial. Their statements exemplify, in our submission a wholesale attempt by soldiers to obfuscate and collude. We will explore the various discrepancies. There is absolutely no reason to conclude that either Corporal A or Soldier B see anyone with a nail bomb or that they had justifications to shoot Damien Donaghy or John Johnston. We believe that the Tribunal should explore why the accounts of A and B are so similar and yet at variance with all other accounts.
6. An issue may arise as to whether or not soldiers were intent on shooting “Derry Young Hooligans” and were given to understand tactically or otherwise that such a course would be countenanced given the affront that these young people were causing to British troops, the rule of law, and the sensibilities of unionist politicians
7 OS2.2 8 OS2.5 paragraph iv and the Unionist community in general and Strand Road Businessmen in particular.9
A similar allegation was made by Arthur Harvey Q.C. in opening, on Day 43:
The truth is that on 30th January 1972 soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment opened fire on an unarmed people, most of whom were in flight; it killed 13 and it wounded 14. The truth is that they did so, not simply as a result of some 27 acts of individual indiscipline, but rather as a result of failures, misjudgments and wholly unacceptable policies made at the highest level both politically and militarily.
The truth is that the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment on the ground was doing no more than what had been envisaged...10
On Day 44:
What happened here genuinely was... that General Ford saw that there was a brigade operation; the brigade operation was in relation to a march; he had one opportunity to go down and teach the Derry rioters a lesson and, not only the Derry rioters, but the population of Derry a lesson and that was through the use of the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment.11
In order for such a plan to have been implemented it would necessarily have had to have been communicated to the troops on the ground. Not only is there no evidence to support the allegation that the shots fired by Soldiers A and B were premeditated, either as part of a plan to 'teach the Bogsiders a lesson,' or otherwise, but such allegations were not put to either soldier when he gave evidence.
The Tribunal is entitled to, and in our submission should, ask why those apparently far fetched and unsupportable allegations were advanced. It may well be the case that it has long been recognised by those who seek to blame the soldiers for what happened on Bloody Sunday that, in the absence of a planned
9 OS6.6 paragraphs 5-6 10 Day 043/072/18-073/05 11 Day 044/123/20-124/03 conspiracy to shoot, it is almost inconceivable that soldiers such as A and B, in the circumstances which they were in, would have fired unless those circumstances had justified, or reasonably appeared to justify, their doing so.
**ALLEGATIONS PUT TO SOLDIERS A & B**
6F-15 In the event the allegations that were put to each soldier not only contradicted the case as opened, but were themselves contradictory.
6F-16 Richard Harvey put to Soldier B, but not to Soldier A, that he had fired in order to 'flush out' the IRA from the no-go areas.
> Q. Is that not exactly why you opened fire: to see if you could flush the IRA out of there?
> A. No. I would only open fire if I thought I was threatened.
> Q. I understand you said you would only do something. I am asking you specifically what you did and why you did it.
> Did you not open fire with that intention to see if you could draw the IRA's fire towards you?
> A. Not at all, no.(^{12})
6F-17 An entirely contradictory, but no less fanciful, allegation was put to Soldier A (but not to Soldier B) by Arthur Harvey Q.C.:
> Q. I suggest to you what happened here is: you were denied the opportunity for either speed or aggression and that you simply shot Damien Donaghy and Mr Johnston, either you or Corporal B in combination, quite literally because you refused to allow yourself to be categorised as an Aunt Sally or a crap-hat?
> A. I shot a man who was preparing to throw a nail bomb.(^{13})
6F-18 By contrast what was put to Soldier B by Arthur Harvey Q.C. appeared to be an allegation of having fired in a state of panic:
______________________________________________________________________
(^{12}) Day 311/093/19-094/02
(^{13}) Day 297/145/22-146/03 Is it that, on the evening of 30th January, both yourself and Soldier A knew and saw that you had shot and injured two people other than a nail bomber because of the precarious position you felt yourselves to be in?
A. On that –that evening we did not know exactly that these two people had been injured.
Q. But at 50 yards you should be able to take a non-lethal shot at a target of a person; is that not right...A non lethal shot. You should be able to hit them in the leg or the shoulder, as opposed to the mid trunk and chest?14
6F-19 It is unclear what, if anything, Mr. Harvey was alleging here. What is apparently clear is that neither of his suggestions amount to an allegation of conspiracy. We have some difficulty at present in reconciling the case which was put to either soldier with the case as opened in which it appeared to have been categorically stated that the firing on Bloody Sunday could not be viewed “simply as a result of some 27 acts of individual indiscipline.”
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO THE RMP MAP
6F-20 Both Soldiers A and B have been the subject of unfair criticism arising out of minor discrepancies in their various statements, and, in particular, their RMP maps.
6F-21 Counsel’s Report No.2 contains three ‘conclusions’ against Soldier A. The first of which is that:
There appears to be a discrepancy here between Cpl A’s RMP statements and trajectory map (which suggest that he was out in the open) and his SA statement, marked-up photo and oral testimony (which suggest that he was inside the derelict building).15
14 Day 311/078/09-20 15 Counsel’s Report No.2, Corporal A, Page 1, Issue 1 This allegation is correct, and Soldier A has always accepted that his first RMP statements and map are inaccurate in this respect. It is perhaps not surprising that at 01.00 a.m., after the previous day’s events, and with no prior knowledge of the area, Soldier A was confused as to precisely where he was after having picked his way through varying degrees of demolition before arriving at the shell of a building. The statement taking process itself appears to have taken no more than ten minutes. Soldier A’s statement is timed 01.00 a.m. Soldier B’s statement, which was also taken by WO Wood is timed 01.10 a.m. Soldier A confirmed that he believed that the statement had taken no more than ten minutes.
The second alleged discrepancy in Counsel’s Report No.2 also relates to the RMP map:
There is a discrepancy here between the trajectory map (which has Cpl A nearer the E wall of the alley way) and the marked up photo (which has him closer to the W wall).
Whilst this conclusion is not expressed as clearly as it might be, what is being alleged is that the target has “moved.”
An examination of the circumstances in which the RMP maps were marked up (dealt with in more detail in Chapter 2) demonstrates that it would be unjust to criticise or hold any individual soldier accountable for discrepancies which exist between the map and any other descriptions or marked up photographs. Cross-examined by Arthur Harvey Q.C. in relation to the map, Soldier A explained:
I did not mark those positions. If I had have marked those positions, I would have put the tip of the arrow into the derelict building, and
______________________________________________________________________
16 Day 297/106/23-25 17 B20.014-015 18 B43.009-010 19 Day 297/066/17-20 20 Counsel’s Report No.2, Corporal A, Page 2, Issue 2 21 This was confirmed by Christopher Clarke Q.C. in his opening Day 010/043/13-14 the position of the bomber I would have put on to the gable end of those buildings.\\textsuperscript{22}
Soldier A’s evidence is that he cannot recall even having been shown the map at the time, if he had been “I would have pointed out that my position and the position of the bomber were slightly out.”\\textsuperscript{23} There is an undeniable logic in what A says about his location, and that of other members of Machine Gun Platoon:
\\begin{quote} I was inside a derelict house on the first floor and the soldiers were down below me. If I have described part of that building which is as a courtyard and it is confusing, then so be it, but the soldiers were not outside where you are suggesting by that low wall because there would not have been no point whatsoever in soldiers who were trying to be concealed being there because they would not have been concealed. There may well be a mix up in grid references and descriptions of the buildings or the derelict walls, floors or whatever.\\textsuperscript{24} \\end{quote}
The evidence of WO Wood, who took the statements of both Soldier A and Soldier B, supports the conclusion that the maps were not marked up at the time, but marked up by persons unknown at some stage after the statements had been taken. (see Chapter 2 above) According to Mr. Wood it was common practice in Belfast for a soldier to refer to and mark up a map during his interview, and then sign the map at the end of the interview.\\textsuperscript{25} So far as Bloody Sunday is concerned it is plain that this did not happen; not one of the soldiers signed his RMP map. The fact that Soldier A’s RMP statement makes no reference to a marked up map is further proof that it was not created in his presence; as is the fact that the map itself appears in a typed up generic format.
A further unfairness lies in the fact that the map itself was at the time out of date. Like the map shown to witnesses by Eversheds, which has expressly been
\\textsuperscript{22} Day 297/064/18-22 \\textsuperscript{23} Day 297/157/09-20 \\textsuperscript{24} Day 297/104/13-22 \\textsuperscript{25} Day 383/159 accepted by Counsel to the Tribunal\\textsuperscript{26} as potentially misleading, the RMP map shows buildings, including an ice house on the laundry waste ground, which were no longer in existence at the time of Bloody Sunday. As Lord Saville rightly remarked, "the trouble is that the [RMP] map does not seem to correlate with what we have in the photographs."\\textsuperscript{27}
Arthur Harvey Q.C., despite having himself expressed concern in opening about the inaccuracies in the map shown to witnesses,\\textsuperscript{28} was content to criticise Soldier A on the basis of his RMP map:
\\begin{quote} Q. ...If you go back to your map, and again if one goes to B3, the wall that you have the man standing at is the completely opposite one to which you now have him standing at on this map.
A. I did not have him standing at that wall because I did not make that mark.\\textsuperscript{29} \\end{quote}
Mr. Harvey's own description of what the trajectory map shows is inaccurate in that the target is shown in an area very roughly in the middle of the waste ground, and not standing against a wall.
Mr. Harvey levelled further criticism which we submit was unfair at Soldier A for having described his position as in a 'courtyard' in his second RMP statement:\\textsuperscript{30}
\\begin{quote} Q. ...Can you see any courtyard there visible from William Street?
A. ...If I have made a mistake in describing, I have done. Perhaps it is easy to see how that happens, the way that you and I are tending to get mixed up with walls, courtyards and everything else, that Colonel Overbury and I could have mixed too.
Q. I am not really mixed up, I think I can tell the difference between a courtyard and a derelict building, but what I am confused about \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{26}eg. Day 059/013/20-23 \\textsuperscript{27}Day 297/095/17-18 \\textsuperscript{28}Day 047/025/16-23 \\textsuperscript{29}Day 297/073/08-13 \\textsuperscript{30}B20.019-020 and would like your assistance is what you would describe as a courtyard; what would you describe as a courtyard?
A. A sort of open space enclosed with walls.31
Lord Saville pointed out that the there is an area visible in photograph P201, could properly be described as a 'courtyard.'32 This led to an apparent about turn by Mr. Harvey who stated "Yes, that is a possibility, and I would not eliminate it at all."33 Lord Saville was then referred by Mr. Elias to P202.1 as a result of which he commented:
LORD SAVILLE: In fact the hard copy of 202.1 does actually – to my eye at least, and I am not saying I am right – show an area which could well be described as a courtyard.34
The fact that Soldier A’s and B’s maps are identical in every respect, including the mistakes, is further proof that they were drawn up not at the time that the statement was made, but together and at some later time – and not in their presence. Like A’s map, Soldier B has not signed his map, nor is it referred to in the body of his statement. In so far as any criticism has been made of Soldier B in respect of his RMP map the same considerations outlined above in relation to Soldier A apply.
Arthur Harvey Q.C. also cross-examined Soldier A at great length in relation to the wording of his RMP statement. By way of example, he sought to criticise Soldier A for having described himself going over rooftops in order to get into position.35 Soldier A’s response was, we would submit, typically straightforward and entirely credible:
Perhaps I was mixed up; perhaps I was tired at the time; perhaps the walls that we went over, perhaps I thought that at some stage they had been roofed and I am giving a generalisation of the
31 Day 297/099/04-22 32 Day 297/132/13-21 33 Day 297/132/22-23 34 Day 297/133/11-15 35 Day 297/061/19-23 derelict buildings, walls, the rubble, et cetera that is between the Presbyterian Church and the derelict house.36
6F-35 Given that it is apparently common ground that Soldiers A and B were both deployed in the derelict building it is difficult to see how the Tribunal would have been assisted by this line of questioning.
ALLEGATION ARISING OUT OF THE MIS-TRANSCRIPTION OF SOLDIER A’S RMP STATEMENT
6F-36 The third alleged discrepancy alleged against Soldier A in Counsel’s Report No.2 is:
There is a discrepancy here between Cpl A’s 1st RMP statement (where he said the target had a match in his right hand) and his SA and oral testimony (in both of which he said that he had the match in his left hand).37
6F-37 This allegation was patently wrong, and inexcusably so, in view of the fact that this misquoted statement, in which the actual allegation was that: “The object in his hand caught fire as if it were a match,” is accurately set out on the very same page of the schedule as that in which it is so misleadingly misquoted.
6F-38 Soldier A had rightly taken up the point in his SA statement that his RMP statement had been mistakenly typed up. The manuscript RMP statement is set out below, the words in bold and underlined indicate the crucial words which were omitted from the typed version.38
I saw him bring his right arm from behind his back. In his hand was some object which was about the size of his fist. I saw the man had something in his left hand and, as I watched, I saw the man brush it against the wall where he was standing. The object in his hand caught fire as if it were a match.39
36 Day 297/061/24-062/04 37 Counsel’s Report No.2, Corporal A, Page 3, Issue 3 38 B20.014 39 B3.003 Christopher Clarke Q.C. fell into the same error when he opened this matter at length on Day 10 and repeated what was in Counsel’s Report No.2.
So insofar as in his SA statement he said that he thought there had been a mistake made on the typed copy, the typed copy is in fact in the same terms as the manuscript copy.40
His mistake was pointed out by Lord Saville. Mr. Clarke conceded that the two statements “are in fact slightly different” but failed to put the whole matter right. The accounts of Soldiers A and B
Since making their first statements in the early hours of Monday 31st January 1972 the key features of Soldier A and Soldier B’s account have remained consistent in all material respects.
Both soldiers give an account of rioting breaking out in and around the laundry waste ground after the main body of the march had passed. Members of Machine Gun Platoon inside the derelict building were amongst those targeted. During the course of the riot two objects were thrown which Soldiers A and B believed to be nail bombs. Shortly after this both soldiers independently identified a man on the North West corner of the laundry waste ground who they believed was in the process of throwing a nail bomb. Soldier A fired twice. Soldier B fired three times. The evidence suggests that they fired virtually simultaneously. At the time neither was aware that the other had fired.
Soldier B now has no recollection of having fired his weapon or of the circumstances which led to him firing on Bloody Sunday. Ms McGahey explored the possibility that his memory may have been adversely affected by brain surgery in 1986.41 Soldier B confirmed that, following the surgery, he had suffered some short term memory loss which had subsequently improved. Whilst expressing the view that he had fully recovered, Soldier B agreed that it was possible that the
40 Day 010/050 41 Day 311/001-002 surgery he underwent, and its after effects, may have affected his recollection of what happened in 1972. He candidly stated, "It could have done; I am not saying it did, but it could have done." It is, of course, a matter for the Tribunal to judge in all the circumstances whether they feel entitled to conclude that Soldier B was attempting to deceive them on this matter (or on any other) but, if he was, it may be difficult to understand why he should have volunteered that statement in those terms.
6F-III SOLDIER A AND SOLDIER B'S SUBJECTIVE BELIEF
THE HONESTY OF THE SOLDIERS' ACCOUNTS
6F-44 Soldier A's and Soldier B's evidence was clear: they believed that they were under attack and they responded appropriately and lawfully by the only means available to them. It is enough that Soldier A and Soldier B's beliefs were honestly held. It is only if the Tribunal entertains doubts about the honesty of their beliefs that it need go further to consider if their beliefs were also reasonable.
6F-45 In order to reject Soldier A's and Soldier B's evidence the Tribunal would, necessarily, have to make the following findings:
(1) Neither soldier believed themselves to be under threat when they opened fire on Bloody Sunday.
(2) Both soldiers opened fire other than in self defence: they both had some other reason to discharge a potentially lethal firearm.
(3) The soldiers conspired together to concoct a false account of their actions and the reason for them.
(4) Both soldiers gave false evidence in 1972 and have continued to do so.
42 Day 311/002 We submit that there is no proper basis on which the Tribunal could reach such conclusions and no basis for suggesting that Soldier A and Soldier B's accounts are other than honest. Having itself now heard the oral evidence of both soldiers, the Tribunal should accept them as witnesses of honesty and integrity.
**THE REASONABLENESS OF SOLDIER A'S AND SOLDIER B'S BELIEF**
In the event that the Tribunal entertains a doubt as to the honesty of these two soldiers' accounts, they may be assisted by a consideration of, not only the honesty of the soldiers' accounts, but also their reasonableness.
The soldiers' accounts are both reasonable on their own terms and when viewed against the known facts of their situation. In particular:
1. There is overwhelming evidence that a serious attack was being made upon the soldiers in the derelict building. At least some of the rioters on the waste ground were targeting these particular soldiers who were in a vulnerable position.
2. Nail bombs were commonly used against troops in riots in Northern Ireland at that time. Both soldiers would have known this.
3. The soldiers had heard what they believed to be nail bombs exploding close to them shortly before they opened fire.
4. Individuals would often behave like snipers etc in order to frighten troops defending against riots.
5. The noise and confusion created by a riot in which a number of objects were being thrown would have been considerable, that noise being aggravated by the echo of rubber bullets being fired from within the derelict building.
Both soldiers had a split second in which to decide how to act. The reasonableness of their belief and their decision must be viewed from their perspective on the day and not with the benefit of hindsight and time for careful reflection. 6F-IV DID EITHER SOLDIER A OR SOLDIER B INTEND TO SHOOT DAMIEN DONAGHY OR JOHN JOHNSTON?
6F-50 Whether Soldiers A or B behaved wrongfully on Bloody Sunday must be determined according to their honest belief on the day. That they honestly believed themselves to be in imminent danger of attack should not in our submission be doubted.
6F-51 The Tribunal is, however, tasked not simply with determining the lawfulness of the soldiers' behaviour. It is required to find out the truth of what happened on Bloody Sunday. It must therefore address not only the question of whether Soldiers A and B were justified in opening fire, but also the question of whether in fact they shot a nail bomber or whether they were mistaken in their belief and were responsible for the shooting of either Damien Donaghy or John Johnston.
DAMIEN DONAGHY
6F-52 Soldier A and Soldier B's evidence is clear: they intended to shoot a man whom they believed to be about to throw a nail bomb. They both also believe that they hit the man they intended to shoot. The Tribunal may even have regard to the possibility or probability that, if dishonest, it might have been very much easier, and more apparently acceptable, for either of these soldiers to have accepted (or pretended) that they did not believe that they had hit the man at whom they aimed.
Soldier A's Evidence about his Target
6F-53 Soldier A gave the following evidence about the appearance of his target to the present Inquiry:
Q. May we then go over the page to B20.004, down to the end of paragraph 26. You say at paragraph 25 that:
"It was at this point when I saw a guy come out from around the corner of the building marked B on the map."
That is the building which we know as the Nook Bar. You describe how you think that you saw him come out and then dart back, and that is what attracted your attention to him. You then describe him as striking a fuse-type match against the wall with his left hand, by which you mean the sort of long match that you might have on a boat.
You describe how that spluttered into light with a bigger flame than a normal match; that in his right hand he was holding a dark object, which you assumed was a nail bomb; and he stepped slightly forward from the wall, brought both hands together, and you assumed that he was about to light the nail bomb and throw it in your direction.
Do you still have a picture in your mind's eye of the events that you describe in paragraph 26?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How soon after you had heard the explosions did you see the man do this?
A. I cannot recall, sir.
Q. Do you recall how close to the corner he was?
A. He was at -- well, when he first appeared, sir, he was right against the corner of the building, and he came out of it into my view and then went back.
Q. And then, when you saw him striking a match against the wall, he presumably must have been within very close proximity to the wall?
A. He came away from the wall, sir, but the wall was within -- within reach.
Q. Did he appear to be with anyone at the time when you saw him?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you recall how many people were in his vicinity at this stage?
A. No, sir. I only saw -- saw the one man.
Q. And you managed to see a match light from this distance, did you?
A. Yes, sir, because -- I described the match; it was not a normal match, it was -- I have tried to explain it as best I can. I mean, it may not be the sort of match that you do get on a boat or anything, but it was not what I term as a domestic match; sometimes the match that used to get fireworks -- to light fireworks with. It splutters. Rather than just a normal flame, there is like a splutter and a large flame from it, which is clearly visible.\\textsuperscript{43}
6F-54 In 1972 Soldier A gave the following description of the man he saw to the RMP at 01.00 on 31\\textsuperscript{st} January 1972:
I then saw a man in an alleyway directly opposite my position on the other side of William Street. The man was wearing a blue cardigan or windcheater and was about 5' 7" tall and had fair hair. He was of average build. I saw him bring his right arm from behind his back. In his hand was some object which was about the size of his fist. I saw the man had something in his left hand and, as I watched, I saw the man brush it against the wall where he was standing. The object in his hand caught fire as if it were a match. The man was then bringing his left hand towards his right hand. He was looking down at what he was doing.\\textsuperscript{44}
6F-55 Soldier A was asked to comment on the following possibilities.
One logical possibility was that there was a nailbomber, as you describe, but in fact you missed him and hit Damien Donaghy instead. As I understand your evidence, you think that is highly unlikely?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The second possibility is that there was indeed a nailbomber, as you describe, and that you hit him with your second shot. Is that what you believe happened?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The third possibility is that the person who you hit was someone who you mistakenly thought was a nailbomber, but who in fact was not. Is that possible?
A. No, sir, because he struck a match and I am sure he was going to light a bomb.
\\textsuperscript{43} Day 297/030-032 \\textsuperscript{44} B3.003 This extract is from the original manuscript version of Soldier A's statement which does not contain the transcription error found in the typed version. Q. The fourth possibility is that there never was anyone who either was or could be mistaken for a nailbomber, and you gave a false account of seeing a nailbomber in order to excuse the shooting that you had done. Is that possible?
A. No, sir.45
...
Q. I wonder whether there is one last possibility that I ought to ask you about, which is this: is it possible that you were panicked into firing at someone who had what might have been a stone and what might have been a nail bomb, but you could not tell?
A. No, sir, because I can see no reason why someone was a striking a match and bringing it towards another object unless it was a nail bomb.46
Accordingly, Soldier A’s evidence is that the man he aimed at was in the process of throwing or preparing to throw a nail bomb and that he hit the man with his second round. That is his evidence as to what he believed and believes.
Soldier B’s Evidence about his Target.
Soldier B no longer has any recollection of his target or of firing on Bloody Sunday.47
Soldier B gave the following account of his target to the RMP at 01.10 on 31st January 1972:
I observed a crowd the far side of William St where I saw one person to whom I paid particular attention. This man was of medium height and was wearing a dark coloured windcheater. He was standing in an alleyway off William St. He was looking towards our position as if trying to locate the nearest soldier. I then saw the man bring his hand, from behind his back. He had a dark object in his hand and this was of a size which appeared to fill his hand. He [sic] other hand he brushed downwards against a wall
45 Day 297/037 46 Day 297/038 47 Day 311/038 and I saw then that he had a lighted flame in his left hand. He was looking down at his hands and started to bring them together.48
6F-59 Soldier B’s SA statement refers to the man as being
...at the front of a group of standing by the wall of a house right on the corner of William Street and the open ground opposite the open round on which the derelict house looked.49
6F-60 Soldier B’s evidence to Lord Widgery was that the man was with a group of about eight others;50 he was dressed in a light coloured windcheater.51
6F-61 Soldier B as asked by Ms McGahey to comment on his 1972 evidence:
Soldier A was asked to deal with various possible interpretations of what happened. I want to ask you to do the same thing. The first possibility is that Damien Donaghy, the man who was shot, was in fact the nail bomber at whom you were aiming.
Do you now have confidence that the man you shot was a man holding a nail bomb?
A. Although I cannot remember it, I have confidence in my own judgment at that time.
Q. Do you have confidence in your judgment in that you think you rightly identified a nail bomber?
A. Yes, I would have.
Q. Are you certain in your mind that you hit the man at whom you were aiming?
A. I wish I could remember it, but I cannot say specifically that I did hit the man I was aiming at.
Q. The first possibility is that you did hit the man at whom you were aiming, and he was a nail bomber. The second possibility is that you aimed at a man who did have a nail bomb, but you missed and hit Damien Donaghy. Yes?
48 B43.009 49 B43.013 50 B43.018 paragraph C 51 B43.018 paragraph B A. That could be a possibility.
Q. The third possibility is that there was no nail bomber at all, but you honestly thought that there was and you fired, hitting Damien Donaghy. Is that possible?
A. All these three situations you have given me are all possibilities, and I am afraid I cannot recall exactly what happened that day, otherwise I could answer correctly what happened. And unfortunately I cannot help you.
Q. I understand that you can only tell the Tribunal in most general terms what you could see when wearing a respirator and if your eyes were watering, because you cannot remember that very situation. But thinking back now, do you remember how certain you were that that man had a nail bomb?
A. Well, I cannot answer that because I cannot remember exactly that day; I wish I could, as I said before.
Q. Do you remember having any doubts afterwards that, because of your eyes watering, wearing the respirator, you might have been wrong and, say, have mistaken a man with a brick for a man with a nail bomb?
A. Remember, we were -- we had been in this situation before, in Belfast for 18 months, with things like this being thrown at us. I had never fired a weapon in anger before, and neither I do not think any of my friends in this particular instant had.
So it does not go to show that we will shoot to kill somebody unless we are certain. Now, I am not saying -- mistakes can happen, as I am quite sure you know. It happens even today with the police. These things do happen.
Because I cannot remember exactly what happened on that particular day, um, it is very difficult for me to answer your questions correctly.
Q. You say you cannot remember what happened on the day itself, but do you remember afterwards having any anxieties that there might not have been a nail bomb at all and that you had got it wrong?
A. No, I do not -- I do not remember that at all.
Q. The fourth possibility is that there was no nail bomber; you knew there was no nail bomber; you fired without justification; and you later gave a false story in order to explain what you had done.
A. Well, I explained that before. We had not done that in the previous situations in Belfast. It was exactly the same. Londonderry or Derry -- whatever you want to call it -- is the same as Belfast. A street is a street; a derelict building is a derelict building; a rioting crowd is the same, no matter where you are in the United Kingdom. If you are called there to uphold the law, and you think your life is at threat, then obviously you will take appropriate action. At first, the minimum force, you use a baton gun -- round. But if that does not work, and then you are still under threat, you would obviously take out the target who is actually threatening you. And you will take him out. Because at the end of the day we are soldiers, not policemen -- or were, I should say.52
6F-62 Although Soldier B is now unable to remember the events of Bloody Sunday, he is clear that he believes that his 1972 account, in which he describes shooting a nail bomber, was accurate.
Might Soldiers A and B be Mistaken in their Belief?
6F-63 It must, of course, be possible that Soldiers A and B were honestly mistaken in the belief that their target was attempting to light and throw a nail bomb. If, but only if, they were, it is possible that the man at whom they fired was Damien Donaghy.
6F-64 Even if Damien Donaghy was Soldiers A’s and B’s intended target, and their belief that he was in the process of preparing to throw a nail bomb is an honest one, they are innocent of any wrongdoing. Furthermore, given all the circumstances with which they were faced their belief was, it is submitted, a reasonable one.
6F-65 The preponderance of the evidence suggests that Damien Donaghy was at the North West corner of the laundry waste ground when he was shot. Further, Damien Donaghy was involved in the riot taking place in front of the derelict house. He was actively throwing stones at the soldiers. Importantly, a number of witnesses (including, for example, John Quigg and Monica McDaid) described Damien Donaghy darting in and out around the building at the corner of the waste ground. (See, generally, the section “What was Damien Donaghy Doing when he
52 Day 311/050/19-053/22 was Shot?, above). Given the frequent use of nail bombs in riots in Londonderry and given that the soldiers had previously heard nail bombs exploding nearby, and had seen an individual darting backwards and forwards round the corner of a building, he might reasonably be thought to be engaged in something more sinister than the remainder of the rioters close to him, whom the soldiers would also have been attempting to keep under observation. The Soldiers' opportunity was limited and they both concluded that they were under lethal threat.
It is almost impossible, 30 years on, to reconstruct precisely what Damien Donaghy was doing on the afternoon of 30 January 1972. A limited picture has emerged before this Inquiry, but the Tribunal can repose no confidence that the account which has even now come out is full and accurate. Furthermore, there is clear evidence before the Tribunal that rioters in Londonderry aped the behaviour of gunmen and nail bombers in order to scare the soldiers controlling the rioters. If Soldiers A and B aimed and shot at Damien Donaghy believing him to be a nail bomber, the probability is that it was his own actions which led them to that belief. His and others' denials to the contrary can be given very little weight indeed. This position was summarised by Edwin Glasgow Q.C. when he began his questioning of Damien Donaghy:
MR GLASGOW: Mr Donaghy, my name is Glasgow and I represent, among others, two of the soldiers who fired from Abbey Taxis.
I do not know how closely you have been following what has been going on, but it is right that I should make plain to you that I have not suggested, and I do not suggest to you that you threw a nail bomb on Bloody Sunday.
What I am putting to you is that you would not have been shot unless you or somebody very close to you did something which led to soldiers almost simultaneously, independently and honestly to believe that you, or whoever it was, was in the process of being about to throw a nail bomb.53
53 Day 070/029/22-030/10 Summary
6F-67 Each of Soldiers A and B honestly believes that he shot at a man who was preparing to light and throw a nail bomb. If they are mistaken in that belief, and they in fact aimed at and shot Damien Donaghy, the probability is that his own actions led the two soldiers honestly and reasonably to believe that they were in imminent danger. In either event, Soldiers A and B’s conduct cannot be criticised.
6F-68 There is no evidence that John Johnston had been or was engaged in any aggressive activity or that he had thrown or was about to throw any object.
6F-69 He was shot on the eastern side of the laundry waste ground in a position directly behind Soldiers A and B’s target. He was not hit directly and his injuries are consistent with his having been hit by fragments of a bullet which had begun to disintegrate, having struck an intermediate object.
6F-70 It is probable that John Johnston was hit by fragments of a bullet or bullets fired by Soldiers A or B. He was not their intended target.
6F-71 That John Johnston was accidentally injured in this way is deeply regrettable. Soldiers A and B cannot, however, be criticised for their actions: faced with the position they honestly believed themselves to be in, they had no option but to shoot the nail bomber with the unfortunate consequence that John Johnston appears also to have been hit. CHAPTER 6G
CIVILIAN GUNMEN IN SECTOR 1
6G-1 OVERVIEW
Before the Army had fired any shots on Bloody Sunday at least one shot was fired by OIRA 1 from a balcony in Columbcille Court towards soldiers on the north side of William Street. OIRA 1 fired before the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston and not, as he claims, in retaliation for the shots fired by Soldiers A and B. The balcony from which OIRA 1 fired had been pre-selected as a good sniping position as it provided an ideal location from which to fire at soldiers in William Street. OIRAs 1 and 2 had gone to Columbcille Court at a time when they knew soldiers were in the area, with the specific intention of firing at the army. They took with them a loaded rifle, or knew that a loaded firearm had been left in the Bogside that would be available for their use. OIRA 1 fired at a soldier whom he identified as being in range and in a vulnerable position. He intended to kill him. The fact that he missed was purely fortuitous.
It is possible, but not certain, that the shot fired by OIRA 1 from Columbcille Court was the shot which was observed by a large number of soldiers to hit a drainpipe on the east side of the Presbyterian Church above the heads of the Mortar Platoon wire cutting party. There is military evidence to suggest that this shot was fired shortly before Soldiers A and B fired five shots in total from the derelict building with nine windows. However, as well as OIRA 1, who may himself have fired more than once, other IRA gunmen were also active in the Bogside prior to the deployment of 1PARA. Non-military witnesses speak of gunmen firing rifles and short arms in the William Street area, and of a line of fire being called for in the area of Kells Walk, shortly before 1PARA deployed. The identity of these gunmen is known only to the gunmen themselves and,
1 Day 393/057/25-058/02 presumably, to a number of their IRA colleagues and civilians who knew that they were intending to be present, or that they had been and/or who saw and recognised or were told who they were. There is evidence it was one, or more, of these gunmen who fired at soldiers near the church. There is also military evidence of shots fired at soldiers manning Barriers 12 and 13 at this early stage.
6G-3 The shot at the Presbyterian Church signalled to the substantial number of soldiers who heard, or became aware of it, the presence of at least one sniper in the very area into which they were about to deploy.
6G-4 The fact that any shot was fired by any IRA gunman prior to the deployment of 1PARA into the Bogside gives the lie to the claim that the IRA had removed their weapons to the Creggan and that there was to be no IRA activity that day. Indeed it is apparent that the standing order of 'defence and retaliation' placed no restrictions at all on the circumstances in which shots could be fired at a soldier, his mere presence being enough to justify him being shot. The presence of a loaded rifle used by OIRA 1 at a pre-arranged sniping position in the Bogside is proof of a preconceived plan to fire at soldiers when the situation presented itself.
CIVILIAN EVIDENCE TO THE BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY
6G-5 Many civilians must have been aware of the presence and activities of IRA gunmen in the Bogside prior to the deployment of 1PARA. Predictably very few have been prepared to give evidence to the Tribunal about what they saw and heard. The very widespread failure of civilian witnesses to admit to the presence and activity of IRA gunmen reflects an almost equally widespread determination, evidently shared by many people, deliberately to attempt to conceal from the Tribunal the truth about IRA activity on Bloody Sunday. The assertion, made by many, that there were no gunmen present at all has, however, been diluted over the years by a small number of civilians which has been prepared to admit to seeing gunmen operating in the Bogside. The evidence of civilians who have made admissions in relation to the presence and activities of gunman on Bloody Sunday is powerful and must be given particular weight (see Chapter 2). To an extent, the significance and persuasiveness of this civilian evidence has been recognised by the paramilitaries who, only after the conclusion of the civilian evidence, have fielded a small group of IRA witnesses to deal with carefully selected parts of the evidence (see Chapter 2).
In relation to Sector 1, having been identified by several civilian witnesses as being present in the vicinity of Columbmcille Court, OIRA 1 has sought to explain his presence by suggesting that he had gone into the Bogside in order to retrieve a defective weapon, a story which was thoroughly undermined during the course of detailed questioning by Counsel. OIRAs 1 and 2, in common with the large majority of IRA witnesses, demonstrated no desire to assist the Tribunal in its search for the truth about Bloody Sunday. Each was prepared to deal only with matters about which the Tribunal had already heard evidence from other sources. Neither was prepared to reveal anything new or give an honest account of his actions on the day.
The evidence of members of the Official IRA is that, on Bloody Sunday, the standing order of defence and retaliation was to apply. The policy of defensive retaliation permitted, and encouraged, the killing of any member of the security forces whenever possible.
OIRA 2 was asked by Ms McGahey:
*Does "retaliation" mean that the Official IRA could use lethal weapons in revenge for the use of live fire by the British Army, even if the British Army were no longer posing a threat?*
*Um, yes.*
______________________________________________________________________
2 Day 395/174-175; Day 392/029. Q. Does that mean that retaliation would have to be taken straightaway --
A. Not, not necessarily.
Q. In that case, if you were entitled to fire in retaliation for live fire by the British Army, does that mean you could fire days after live rounds had been fired by the British Army?
A. Well, if we go into this in a wee bit more detail. In terms of retaliation, let us assume that the Army had killed somebody on a particular day, then the IRA might decide, at the earliest opportunity to, if you like, pay them back one. Normally that is the kind of situation in which that kind of retaliation would come about.3
6G-10 OIRA 2, questioned by Edmund Lawson Q.C., confirmed that for a soldier to be targeted he need not have opened fire:
A. Let us put it like this, Mr Lawson: Derry was occupied by members of the British forces at the time, as you are well aware, therefore, in the broadest sense, attacks on members of the British Armed Forces could be clearly seen as part of a defence and retaliation strategy just because of the very fact that they happened to be present.
...
Q. So a soldier who was on a foot patrol could be quite legitimately, according to the policy, be shot by a sniper?
A. Yes.
Q. Even though he had not opened fire?
A. Possibly.
Q. Not possibly, even though he had not opened fire, but was simply walking along?
A. I have just outlined to you and I am not going to trawl the ground again what my interpretation of defence and retaliation is.
3 Day 392/033/01-19 The very fact that members of the Armed Forces were present on our streets was seen as -- any action against them would have been seen as retaliatory.
Q. Any action against them would have been seen as? A. Retaliatory.
Q. That is retaliation, not defence? A. That would be retaliation in the broadest interpretation of the word, as I would understand it.
Q. Retaliation for the fact of his being a British soldier and a member of the occupying forces? A. You have got it in one.
Q. Nothing to do with him shooting anybody? A. As I said, you have got it in one.
Q. That was the policy, was it? You are telling us this as a member of the command staff of the Official IRA as at January 1972, that was the policy in existence then? A. Yes.4
The evidence of OIRA 1 was also that the order placed virtually no constraints on the circumstances in which a member of the Official IRA could fire at soldiers. He was asked by Ms McGahey:
Q. If a soldier, for example was in William Street, which is not part of Free Derry, did you feel you were entitled to shoot him simply because he was present as a member of the occupying force? A. Yes...
Q. Your policy of retaliation entitled you, you believed, to open fire on a soldier simply walking down the street in Derry? A. If there had been activity prior to that by the British Army which we believed required retaliation, yes.
Q. Could that be action taken days or even weeks earlier?
4 Day 393/010/24-013/15 A. Yes.
6G-12 This section of OIRA 1's evidence was put to Reg Tester, who confirmed it to be accurate and agreed that it would have been the policy taught to young and new volunteers.
6G-13 OIRA1 was also referred by Edmund Lawson Q.C. to the evidence of other members of the Official IRA:
Q. We have heard from OIRA 2 and there, in unequivocal terms from OIRA5, that defence and retaliation as a policy extended to permitting the shooting dead of a British soldier on the streets of Derry, whatever he was doing; was that your understanding of the application of the policy at the time of Bloody Sunday?
A. Yes.
6G-14 OIRA7 was asked by Christopher Clarke Q.C.:
Q. When you say that most of what you did at this time, January 1972, by way of action was defensive, what should we understand the position to have been if, suppose, you had an opportunity to shoot a member of the Security Forces who came into the Bogside or the Creggan; was that something that was regarded as legitimate to do?
A. It would have been legitimate.
6G-III OIRA1'S SHOT FROM A BALCONY IN COLUMBCILLE COURT
OIRA 1's VARIOUS ACCOUNTS OF SHOOTING FROM COLUMBCILLE COURT
6G-15 OIRA 1 has identified himself as the gunman who fired from the balcony of Columbcille Court at a soldier near the Presbyterian Church. At the time of
______________________________________________________________________
5 Day 395/025/04-026/01\
6 Day 414/137/10-139/08\
7 Day 395/176/10-16\
8 Day 398/07/18-25\
9 AOIRA 1.6 paragraph 20 Bloody Sunday he was a member of the Command Staff\\textsuperscript{10} and attached to the Bogside unit.\\textsuperscript{11} In 1972 OIRA 1 spoke to journalists about his involvement in the events of Bloody Sunday. In particular he spoke to John Barry of the Sunday Times\\textsuperscript{12} and Gerard Kemp of the Sunday Telegraph.\\textsuperscript{13}
\\textit{Accounts to Journalists of events in Sector 1}
According to John Barry's notes, known as PIN437, OIRA 1 gave the following account of events in Sector 1:
\\begin{itemize} \\item [(1)] Weapons were stored in the boot of a car in Glenfada Park, possibly a green Avenger. \\item [(2)] OIRA 1 took part in at least part of the march; his constant companion was OIRA 2. \\item [(3)] OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 "scouted round" and had a good look at army positions. They saw two soldiers whom they regarded as snipers by Stevenson's bakery. John Barry assumed they were talking about the soldiers peering over the wall of the Presbyterian Church. \\item [(4)] As the march came down OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 headed to the corner of William Street and Rossville Street. They heard that "two boys" had been shot by the army in William Street. \\item [(5)] OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 had already organised a possible counter-sniping position in Columbciille Court at the back of the flats in the area fronted by white wooden planks, set aside for washing lines etc. They had arranged \\end{itemize}
\\textsuperscript{10} Day 395/007/02-03 \\textsuperscript{11} Day 395/010/15-16 \\textsuperscript{12} OIRA 1.1 with a woman in the flats that she would leave open the gate to this area of her flat.
(6) OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 collected the .303 from the car in Glenfada Park and made their way to Columbcille Court.
(7) OIRA 1 took aim at a soldier on the left side of the Presbyterian Church. In parenthesis Barry has made a note that; "OIRA 1 was actually firing at east side of the church." The soldier put his head up twice and OIRA 1 did not fire; the third time OIRA 1 fired. OIRA 2 told him he had hit the soldier.
(8) OIRA 1 was tackled on the stairwell of Columbcille Court by three members of the Provisional IRA: PIRA1, PIRA2 and PIRA3. PIRA2 took the lead. PIRA1 tried to grab the gun. OIRA 1 stuck it in his stomach and threatened to shoot him. OIRA 1 agreed that he would not fire again and he was allowed to leave in peace.
(9) OIRA 1 returned the rifle to the boot of the car in Glenfada Park.
L210
6G-17 The account given to John Barry by OIRA 1 is to a large extent consistent with the account OIRA 1 gave to Gerard Kemp of the Sunday Telegraph in that it also records that:
(1) OIRA 1 collected the .303 rifle from the boot of a car in Glenfada Park.
(2) OIRA 1 took the rifle to an area behind some white planking, on the top floor of Columbcille Court.
(3) From this position OIRA 1 could see two soldiers by the Presbyterian Church, one kept getting up, he fired a shot at this man. (4) After firing OIRA 1 returned the rifle to the boot of his car in Glenfada Park.
6G-18 The evidence clearly shows that the information contained in PIN437 and L210 came from OIRA 1 (see Chapter 9). OIRA 1, however, now denies that John Barry(^4) or Gerard Kemp(^5) ever interviewed him and rejects entirely the evidence that:
(1) the rifle came from a car in Glenfada Park(^6)
(2) he scouted around and took a good look at army positions(^7)
(3) the washing area in Columbcille Court was a pre-arranged sniping area(^8)
6G-19 The Tribunal will no doubt have in mind the manner in which OIRA 1 has departed from what he undoubtedly told Mr Barry and Mr Kemp, when reaching a conclusion about his evidence as a whole, whilst at the same time bearing in mind the way in which information given to journalists was carefully manipulated in order to paint the Official IRA in the best possible light.
**OIRA 1 and 2's role in the Official IRA's Propaganda Machine.**
6G-20 The account OIRA 1 gave to journalists was, in parts, a more complete picture of what occurred than the absurd, and in our submission incredible, account he gave to this Inquiry of going to retrieve a defective weapon. However, there can be no doubt that his motive for speaking to journalists was purely and simply to justify the shot he fired, a shot, which, although not publicly spoken of, must have been widely known about by civilians in Londonderry. Indeed Paul Mahon gave evidence that someone had once told him "the dogs in the street knew that that
(^{14}) Day 395/106/13-15 (^{15}) Day 395/138/05-07 (^{16}) AOIRA 1.32 paragraph 57; Day 395/110/15-20 (^{17}) AOIRA 1.32 paragraph 53; Day 396/075/01-03
(\\text{VI 251}) shot had been fired". The alleged retaliatory nature of this shot was, and remains, vital to the Official IRA propaganda and should accordingly be received by the Tribunal with particular caution.
6G-21 There is conclusive evidence that lies about IRA firing were considered to be justified and necessary. Both OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 took a full part in the propagation and proliferation of these lies, and continue to do so. In particular both lied in 1972, and have lied to this Inquiry, about the timing of the shot fired from Columbille Court.
6G-22 OIRA 1 indeed admitted when questioned by Edmund Lawson Q.C. that he was willing to lie in order to conceal the truth about Official IRA activity on Bloody Sunday:
A. Well, in 1972 it was decided that, given the propaganda that was coming out from the British establishment and the claims that there were gunmen all over the place and given that people you represent had said that they were fired upon by hundreds of gunmen and hundreds of shots and given the fact that half the world's press were in here trying to find these gunmen, we just decided it would not be right to give them any excuse by admitting to any shot.
Q. In other words, it would be better to lie?
A. Yes.20
6G-23 In relation to OIRA 1's shot Reg Tester remarks in his supplementary BSI statement:
It is also the case that the Official IRA has been economical with the truth in relation to the firing of this shot. The reason that we have been economical with the truth is that the Army Council
18 AOIRA 1.32 paragraph 56; Day 395/112/21-25 19 Day 412/163/17-19 20 Day 395/157/06-16 decided at the time that there were to be no admissions that any shots had been fired. Indeed, that official line was never changed.21
6G-24 A comparison of OIRA 1’s contemporary accounts reveals a propensity to invent details with a view to justifying his own actions. The account he gave Gerard Kemp differs from that he gave to John Barry in that:
(1) OIRA 1 told Mr Kemp, but not Mr Barry, that he personally had seen the crowd dragging away two wounded (Damien Donaghy and John Johnston).
(2) OIRA 1 told Mr Kemp, but not Mr Barry, that he saw the soldier at whom he fired jerk backwards.
6G-25 Reg Tester gave evidence of the concern amongst the Officials not to give the army any excuse or justification for the civilian loss of life.22 There was also a need to justify any IRA firing to the civilian population, some of whom had reservations about the use of violence. Stephen McGonagle made the following observation in his BSI statement:
There were many guns in Derry at the time and there was always a danger that one would be used in a demonstration. However, people had begun to realise the harm that guns could do, not only in physical terms, but on the impact that they could have on the Cause.23
6G-26 Evidence of the ‘Official line’ is to be found in a note of an Official IRA press conference held on the night of Bloody Sunday:
The officer claimed that the IRA Official wing had at no time fired shots in the immediate vicinity of the area where the deaths occurred.
... He could not speak for the Provisionals but to the best of his knowledge there was no shooting at all against the Army in the William Street / Rossville Flats area.24
6G-27 OIRA 2, the press officer at the time, agreed that the contents of the note broadly reflected what had been said at the time.25 He personally gave a highly misleading account of events when he spoke at a rally in Kilburn on 05.02.72. A report compiled by the Metropolitan Police Special Branch records that:
[OIRA 2] claimed that he had been in Londonderry the previous Sunday when British troops fired at a peaceful meeting. He said that the IRA had not fired back until the firing had been going on for 20 minutes and then only in a gallant attempt to draw the troops' fire from the innocent.26
6G-28 Giving evidence to the present Inquiry, OIRA 2 confirmed that he had spoken at the meeting and that the report did not accord with what he had witnessed on Bloody Sunday. 27 Edmund Lawson Q.C.'s questioning of OIRA 2 demonstrated that even now he has no greater desire to tell the truth about the events of Bloody Sunday:
Did you actually see bodies that day?
A. No, because, um, I was trying to get away because of the total confusion that actually happened on the day. When we left the immediate area that we were in, we were trying to move away in the opposite direction.
Q. Because that is something fairly memorable, is it not, seeing bodies lying on the ground?
A. It would be, yes.
Q. You have no recollection of that?
A. I have no recollection of seeing any actual bodies, no. I would'a seen photographs the following day.
24 ED12.4-5 25 Day 393/104 26 Int2.70 paragraph 15 27 Day 392/123-124 Q. Why, in that case, did you say this: "My memories of the rest of the day are of seeing people running and hiding and of bodies lying on the ground"?
A. As I say, it could have been a wee bit of poetic licence, you are addressing a meeting of Irish people in London, so one might have got carried away a wee bit, you know, with the occasion.
Q. I was not referring in fact to the meeting that you addressed in London, I was referring to the statement that you delivered to this Tribunal, we will see it on the screen. AOIRA 2.7, please, paragraph 22, would you expand that. This is the statement that you produced in, we are told about, January 2002, as you have confirmed this morning, with the assistance of your own solicitors and prior to preparing the so-called Eversheds statement. In it, as you can see, in the fourth line of the paragraph on the screen, you solemnly declared this: "My memories of the rest of the day are of seeing people running and hiding and of bodies lying on the ground." So far as the last phrase is concerned, that is simply not true?
A. I have gone on to say there, if you notice: "These are not coherent memories as the time was frantic."
Q. It is not true, whether it is coherent or not?
A. No, I am not saying that it is not true, what I am saying is that in the state of confusion that existed at the time and, even when I was submitting that statement through our solicitors, um, it may well be the case that that was -- that obviously was included.
Q. And it was not true?
A. Those are your words.
Q. Do you remember seeing bodies lying on the ground?
A. I cannot honestly remember whether I saw bodies lying on the ground.
Q. About two minutes ago when I asked you the question you gave a simple: no to that. Which is it, do you want to qualify the note [sic]?
A. No, I do not want to qualify it at all.28 It appears that even amongst members of the Official IRA there was an attempt to turn a blind eye to firing which had taken place. OIRA7 said he had never spoken to OIRA 1 or OIRA 2 about the struggle which they had all been involved in on the staircase of Columbille Court:
A. I have not spoken to them at all about it.
Q. Never?
A. No.
Q. Not since 30th January 1972?
A. Not since 30th -- in fact, the first mention of that actual scuffle was on a video programme that was broadcast on I think the 20th anniversary.
Q. The 20th anniversary?
A. I think it was the 20th anniversary where Denis Bradley talks about the rifle was the first discussion that I had actually heard after the event.
Q. Because it was the sort of topic that dared not speak its name, almost, was it not; no-one talked about it?
A. It was an open/closed secret.29
Once the stage had been reached where the Official IRA could no longer realistically maintain the stance enunciated in their initial press release, a damage limitation exercise was embarked upon. Members of the Official IRA admitted to having fired shots which could no longer sensibly be denied; but sought to suggest they had been fired in circumstances which it was hoped would reflect well on the organisation. OIRA 1’s shot, like that fired by OIRA 4, was sufficiently well known that it needed to be explained rather than simply denied. As a consequence OIRA 1 was forced to accept that he had fired a shot; but he sought to suggest that he had fired only in retaliation for the shooting, moments earlier, of two civilians on the waste ground and in order to defend against further firing.
29 Day 398/156/21-Day 157/009 OIRA 1's evidence to the Inquiry illustrates the importance to members of the Official IRA of justifying the shot on this basis. He was asked by Christopher Clarke Q.C. about the following section of his BSI statement:
Q. Could we have paragraph 40 on the screen, please. You say that when you saw the volunteer with the rifle you realised that it was likely that he was the one who had fired the shot that you heard and you said that that did not concern you because two people had already been shot by the Army and there was, therefore, a good possibility that more people would be shot, and you say that if he had fired at the Army who had fired at Donaghy and Johnston, it was likely that the soldier would not fire any more:
"... so I rationalised it to myself that that shot saved lives rather than caused lives to be lost."
Is this a process that went through your mind at the time?
A. I believe that at the time I, you know, that is what I thought. Um, if that soldier -- if the shot had been fired at the soldier who had fired at Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, then at the very least it would have made him keep his head down, you know, and I mean in the time that, that this fracas or argument or pushing and shoving was taking place, there were not any further shots, so it appeared that this shot had done what it had set out to do.
Q. Should we understand from the fact that this process went through your mind at the time that mentally, at any rate, you thought there was a need to consider whether or not this shot was justified; is that why the thought went through your mind?
A. Um, yes, that is possible.30
OIRA 1's Evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry
Whilst OIRA 1 continues to maintain that he fired in response the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, other aspects of his evidence have radically altered in the intervening years. His account to this Inquiry is not only inherently incredible but is in stark conflict to the contemporary accounts which he undoubtedly gave to journalists.
30 Day 398/041/10-Day 398/042/13 OIRA 1 now claims to have gone to Columbcille Court with OIRA 2 on the afternoon of the march to retrieve a defective .303 rifle that had been left in a dump in breach of the order that no weapons should be left in the Bogside. He claims that they had made an attempt to collect the weapon the night before, but had decided that it was not possible to get to the dump safely. OIRA 1 then claims that, the following day, he and OIRA 2 left the Creggan at about the same time as the march. They went to Columbcille Court and recovered the rifle from the dump at ground level, possibly an outside shed or a coalbunker. Having retrieved the rifle they climbed the stairs to the top floor of Columbcille Court, allegedly with no particular object in mind. It was their intention to break the rifle into two parts to make it easier to transport. After reaching the top floor balcony, and before he had taken the weapon apart, OIRA 1 claims that, by the most extraordinary coincidence, he heard three shots. People in the area below were shouting that two boys had been shot, although he did not see either of the injured men on the ground, or as they were being carried, immediately in front of him, to the Shiels' house. OIRA 2 identified to him a soldier, to the north of William Street, as being the soldier who had fired the shots. OIRA 1 saw that the soldier was aiming and was concerned that he might fire again – whereas in truth, of course, this soldier had not fired at all. OIRA 1 fired one shot at the soldier.
Having fired, both men left the balcony, taking the rifle with them. They were accosted by a group of men on the stairs. Some of the group were horrified that a shot had been fired; others were encouraging them to fire again. After this incident OIRAs 1 and 2 made their way to a car which was parked in Glenfada.
31 AOIRA 1.4 paragraph 10 32 AOIRA 1.4 paragraph 9 33 Day 396/008/06-11 34 Day 395/058-059 35 AOIRA 1.26 paragraphs 15-16 36 AOIRA 1.27 paragraph 18 37 Day 395/196/21-Day 197/016 38 AOIRA 1.27 paragraph 20 39 Day 395/089/08-090/13
Page 7. 1227
VI 258 Park North. OIRA 1 contends that he placed the gun in the boot, locked it, and took the keys with him. He is adamant that there were no other weapons in the boot of the car. At about this point he and OIRA 1 split up. His movements thereafter are dealt with in Chapter 9.
6G-35 The detailed questioning of OIRAs 1 and 2 exposed the many inconsistencies and inherent improbability of their account of why they went to Columbcille Court, and the circumstances in which OIRA 1 fired, and demonstrate that no weight or credit can be given to their claim not to have fired the first shot.
Failure to collect the rifle before the march
6G-36 OIRA 1's evidence is that the order that all weapons were to be removed from the Bogside was received a day or two prior to Bloody Sunday and certainly before the Sunday morning itself. There had been ample opportunity, had they not intended that it should stay where it was, for the rifle to be collected on the evening of 29th January, or on the morning of the march itself, when fewer soldiers would have been in the area and the risk of being caught would have been much less. OIRA 1's suggestion that it was 'logical' to collect the rifle during the march itself is patently ridiculous.
1. The evening of 29th January 1972
6G-37 OIRAs 1 and 2 do in fact claim to have gone to the Bogside to recover the weapon the evening before Bloody Sunday. However both claim to have been forced to abandon this attempt because there had been shooting in the area and they could not get to the dump safely. According to OIRA 1's first statement to the Inquiry
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40 AOIRA 1.28 paragraphs 23-24 41 Day 395/118/11-13 42 AOIRA 1.28 paragraph 26 43 Day 395/035/15-22 44 Day 395/034/23 45 AOIRA 1.4 paragraph 9. they “could not get to the weapon because of the presence of police and army in the area.” OIRA 1 expanded on this in his second BSI statement:
There were quite a lot of people about and I felt uneasy. I knew that a couple of people had been shot by the Army earlier that day and I thought that this shooting might have been carried out by undercover soldiers who might still be in the area. I did not think it was sensible, therefore, to go and collect the weapon from the static dump and decided to leave it. I just did not feel secure. It was instinct; I did not like the look of it. There was nothing more scientific than that. I did not see any soldiers at the time.47
OIRA 2 went even further:
As we approached the fringes of Columbille Court we could hear screaming and bottles being broken and I think a shot or two being fired which we assumed came from the security forces. It was probably nine or ten at night, it was mid winter and awfully dark. There was obviously army all over the place and we thought there might be a snatch squad at work.48
OIRAs 1’s and OIRA 2’s accounts of why the plan to retrieve the weapon was aborted were exposed as disingenuous and dishonest when tested by Edmund Lawson Q.C. He asked OIRA 2:
Q. So you feared there might be soldiers about, you did not know there were?
A. We did not know.
Q. So according to you you went down there the following day when the area was crawling with soldiers?
A. We went down there the following day – let us get it right: where the weapon was was not crawling with soldiers the following day. Most of the soldiery were further on down William Street at the Army barricades...49
46 AOIRA 1.14 paragraph 55 47 AOIRA 1.26 paragraph 11 48 AOIRA 2.14 paragraph 7 49 Dav 393/050/01-09 This evidence is, however, completely at odds with OIRA 2's confirmation, only minutes earlier, that when they had returned the next day there had indeed been soldiers "all over the place," and his suggestion that the large number of soldiers in the area had been a reason why it had been necessary for two volunteers to make the trip to retrieve the rifle.50
Mr Lawson asked OIRA 1 about the contents of his BSI statement:
Q. The shooting to which you refer is a reference to the shooting earlier the same day of two young men called Robson and McLaughlin; is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. -- I can refer to if need be. There is a record of the shooting being in fact at two minutes to 4.00, one of those shot talks about it being between 3.00 and 4.00, the other says a bit earlier, about lunchtime when he came down. It appears to have been in the afternoon of that day and so you would have known about that?
A. Yes, I think I would have heard about it, yes.
Q. That did not deter you from going down to collect the rifle, did it, if that is what you did?
A. No.
Q. When you got down there, you could not see any soldiers, could you?
A. No.
Q. It was dark, of course?
A. Yes.
Q. But there were no soldiers obviously about?
A. Not that I saw.
Q. Was there tell of soldiers being in the immediate area? A. Was there, sorry, what?
Q. Was anyone talking of soldiers being in the area?
A. Talking about the shooting and the fact that these kids had been shot and wondering where they were shot from, but not specifics about any particular soldiers being about, no.
Q. You go on to Glenfada Park North where you had parked the car; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. You walked through the back of Glenfada Park into Columbcille Court in the Bogside; no soldiers there, obviously?
A. No.
Q. Yes?
A. Well, not that I saw, no.
Q. If there had been soldiers in the Bogside, you would have heard of that; would you not?
A. You know, 90 per cent of the time you would have, but I mean, it was well-known that soldiers sometimes infiltrated the Bogside and hid in areas and so on and stayed even sometimes for days. It could possibly have been undercover soldiers in the area, I do not know.
Q. You called it off, because you feared there might be soldiers about; did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. So on the Saturday night, you had abandoned the plan, if plan it was, to collect the rifle because there might be soldiers about and chose instead to go and collect it on Sunday, when you knew there would be soldiers about?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you think that was a safe thing to do?
A. Yes.
Q. You did? A. Yes.
Q. Because of the disruption caused by the march? A. Yes.
Q. The order had been to get all weapons out of the Bogside before the march; had it not? A. Yes.
Q. Which you saw fit to disobey? A. Yes.
Q. Why did you disobey it? A. Because I thought it was unsafe.
Q. What was unsafe about picking up the weapon on Sunday morning? A. Sorry?
Q. What was unsafe about picking up the weapon on Sunday morning? A. Nothing.
Q. Why did you not obey the order? A. Because I took it out on Sunday at the time that I thought was most appropriate.51
6G-42 OIRA 1 eventually conceded that it was not the presence of the security forces which led to him abandoning the mission:
Q. You then refer to there being shooting in the area, you said you could not get to the dump safely. There were no Army personnel about, were there? A. Not that I saw.
Q. No police in the area that you saw?
51 Day 395/184/10-187/24 A. No.
Q. No? It is not right to say that you could not get to the weapon that night because of the presence of police and Army in the area, is it?
A. It would be right to say that I did not get to the weapon because I felt the area was unsafe.
Q. Would it be right to say you could not get there because of the presence of police and Army?
A. No, it would not be right to say that, because I have no idea whether there were police or Army there or not.
Q. Why, in that case, AOIRA 1.14 on the screen, please, paragraph 55, why in that case did you say, as we can see on the screen in paragraph 55, with reference to that night:
"We could not get to the weapon because of the presence of police and Army in the area."
...Why did you say, if it was not true, you could not get to the weapon on the Saturday night because of the presence of police and Army in the area when, as you have told us, there was no police or Army in the area to your knowledge?
A. I did not say there was no police or Army in the area, I said I had not seen any, but I said that we did consider the possibility there was undercover police in the area. We did not actually see them, but we considered their presence could be there.32
2. The morning of the march
The morning of Bloody Sunday presented a further ideal opportunity for collecting the rifle. In response to questions asked by Mr Lawson, OIRA 1 asks the Tribunal to believe that this possibility was not even considered:
Q. Did you consider removing the weapon on the Sunday morning?
A. Not really, no.
Q. Why not?
32 Day 396/002/06-004/08 A. Because I just decided that we would move it at the time we moved it.\\textsuperscript{53}
When he had been asked to consider the possibility by Mr Lawson on the first day of his evidence OIRA 1 gave a different, but no more convincing explanation for not collecting the weapon on the morning of the march:
\\textit{If you are telling us the truth, you could readily have complied with the order to collect that weapon on Sunday morning; could you not?}
A. I could have, yes.
Q. And you chose not to?
A. Yes.
Q. For no good reason?
A. Yes.
Q. You could not be bothered?
A. Well, no not for no good reason, because I considered the time to move it was the most appropriate time.
Q. With as much safety as there could be in such an operation, you could have done it on the Sunday morning, could you not?
A. No, I think it was better at the time we chose.\\textsuperscript{54}
OIRA 2 accepted the suggestion put to him by Ms McGahey that it would have been more sensible to have collected the rifle that morning:
\\ldots we had a meeting in Creggan on that morning to make sure that everybody was fully aware of what their responsibilities should be on the day. So I would imagine that because of the fact that a meeting was taking place that morning, the opportunity did not present itself for us to, um, to go and try and retrieve the weapon, but as you say it probably would have been a more sensible time, but it just did not happen like that.\\footnote{Day 392/087/18-088/001}
Despite this concession, OIRA 2 nevertheless sought to defend the decision not to collect the rifle in the early afternoon. His garbled and inconsistent response, on the one hand seeking to suggest that they sought the cover of the marchers, while on the other hand claiming that the timing was a mere coincidence, demonstrates the degree to which OIRA 2 needed to avoid giving straight answers to this line of questioning:
Q. You said the meeting took place either in the morning or at about lunchtime. If this exercise had to be carried out at all in the afternoon, it would surely have been more sensible to carry it out early in the afternoon?
A. Again, because of the events of the previous night, I think we still had a feeling that there may well have been, you know, undercover Army activity in the area and because of the fact that the march would have been coming down William Street, um, we thought probably that, um, maybe that in some of the vacant buildings there could have been Army photographers and so on or possibly RUC Special Branch photographers photographing people on what they regarded as an illegal march. So we probably felt that at the time it might be safer to wait until there was a larger number -- larger numbers of people about to actually try and retrieve the weapon in question.
Q. You actually managed to choose a time, which is about 4 o'clock, at which the march was pouring down William Street; did you not?
A. I would say the time of retrieving the weapon and the fact that the march was coming down William Street was more coincidental than deliberate.
Q. If you were right in thinking there might be Army undercover people or photographers, surely they were likely to stay there if they were there in the early afternoon until late afternoon?
A. Aye, but the chances are they would have been distracted with the business they were doing, they would have been concentrating on the march, not on anything that was happening, say, along the sidelines of the march or even a good distance away from the sidelines of the march. Because of the fact there would have been so many people about, they would have been distracted themselves by what was happening and we felt that would have given us the opportunity to do what we felt we had to do, which was to go and get the weapon and get it away and get it out of the road.
Q. As the march approached more closely down William Street, closer to Rossville Street, to the Bogside area, closer to where all the Army barriers were, the likelihood of the Army coming into the Bogside was getting greater and greater, was it not?
A. No, not really because -- I can see what you are getting at there, but they had erected barriers down at the junction -- just beyond the junction of Chamberlain Street and William Street, just a wee bit further down, around the corner there as you go towards Waterloo Place and because they had erected barriers down there, I think most people would have assumed that that was where they were going to be and that was as far as the march was going to get because the intention of the march was to go to the Guildhall Square, which is just out there, as you know. I think a lot of people felt -- certainly we felt that the Army would not have come in, say, through the, the first arrivals from the march because that would certainly have provoked a major riot. So the Army were quite simply behind barriers, down where they had set up the barriers further on down William Street. So it was more or less felt: the chances are they will not come in so we will have enough of time and enough opportunity to get this weapon away and out of the road.
Q. You have explained why you thought that about 4 o'clock was a time at which you could use the presence of lots of people as cover to get away. It may well be suggested to you that turning up at 4 o'clock was exactly the right time to snipe at soldiers?
A. But we, we had no knowledge or we had no foreknowledge that you know soldier would be occupying -- that a soldier or a number of soldiers would be occupying positions on buildings overlooking William Street.
Q. Could you not anticipate that, bearing in mind that the march was going to come down William Street?
A. No, not really because -- well, I do not honestly know.
Q. Were you not taking a huge risk in seeking to move this weapon, that you would be caught by soldiers who, at the time that you left Columbcille Court, were really only yards away from you?
A. Yes, but we would have been moving in the opposite direction from where they were and there would have been a large number of people between us and them.
Q. You did not remove the rifle on the night before Bloody Sunday —
A. That is right.
Q. -- because you thought that there might be soldiers in the area? A. Yes, because —
Q. Even though you were operating under the cover of darkness? A. Yes, but at the same time the undercover soldiers would have been operating under the cover of darkness as well.
Q. Why, then, did you try to remove this rifle when you knew there were soldiers in the area? A. No, but we did not know that there would be soldiers in the immediate area. I mean, we assumed that the soldiers would be down at the Army, um, the Army barricade, shall we say, further on down William Street. We were not to know that there was going to be soldiers positioned around, say, buildings overlooking William Street; we had no idea.56
And yet despite saying that he and OIRA 1 did not know about where soldiers would be located, OIRA 2 claims that the local people would have known about Army positions:
Q. Do you remember anything about knowing about the British Army's sniping positions? A. No, I am sure that, you know, local people would have seen some activity in the run-up to Bloody Sunday itself. The people in Derry are very observant, you know and people would probably have seen maybe the Army doing things on the fringe of the Bogside in the lead-up to Bloody Sunday that they maybe would not normally do, so they just assumed that they probably would probably engage in some kind of special counter measures to cope with the Bloody Sunday march, maybe camera positions or whatever, you know, photograph people.57
56 Day 392/088/02-092/03 57 Day 392/045/19-046/05 The evidence of both OIRAs 1 and 2 is undermined by the evidence of Reg Tester that the weapons would only exceptionally be carried in day time and would not be moved unless strictly necessary:
Q. Weapons were not carried in the daytime, were they? A. Not normally, no.
Q. Unless there was some special operation — I do not think we need to go into the details, so no-one needs to jump up — but they would not normally be carried? A. No.
Q. In the normal course of events, there would be no need to tell people not to carry weapons around with them in the daytime? A. No, there would not.
Q. Because they would not anyway; is that right? A. (Witness nodding)
Q. So far as moving weapons around was concerned, that was inevitably a dangerous business; was it not? A. If it was moving between, shall we say the Bogside and the Creggan, yes, because the Army had a line of communications right across the middle of the area.
Q. Quite right, and if you got caught with a weapon — A. Yes.
Q. — by the Army, I suppose you would say if you were lucky you might get arrested, if you were unlucky you might be shot dead? A. That is correct.
Q. So you would not likely encourage, you would not personally move a weapon, unless you had to presumably; is that right? A. That is correct.
Q. You certainly would not encourage your volunteers to do so? A. No, weapons were too valuable to lose.
Q. Yes, quite. The weapon would be too valuable to lose, I am not saying it cynically, but so too would the volunteer? A. Naturally.
Q. You would not want him shot? A. No.
Q. Or arrested, would you? A. No.
Q. You cannot envisage circumstances in which would encourage that unless it was absolutely necessary? A. Unless it was absolutely necessary.58
6G-49 Mr Tester confirmed that it would have been unusual for weapons to have been carried in the streets during the day time:
...you have said that weapons were not usually carried in the daytime? A. That is correct.
Q. Were patrols in cars carried out in the daytime? A. There would always be somebody driving around in a car.
Q. Would there be a weapon in the boot of the car? A. There would possibly have been a weapon in the boot of the car, but we did not walk around or around the streets carrying guns or anything like that.59
3. Failure to collect the weapon before the march was in breach of Orders.
6G-50 The failure to collect the weapon before the march not only exposed OIRAs 1 and 2 to greater, obvious and wholly avoidable danger but, according to their own evidence, was in flagrant breach of the express orders alleged to have been issued at the Command meeting on 29th January and repeated at a further meeting on the morning of 30th January. OIRA 1 agreed with the suggestion put to him by Ms
58 Day 414/111/23-113/13 59 Day 414/164/04-13 McGahey that the whole point of the order was to ensure that all weapons were in the Creggan before the time of the march. He confirmed the same in answers to questions asked by Edmund Lawson Q.C.:
Q. The order was to get it out of there before the march; was it not? A. Yes.
Q. And orders, once given, were expected to be complied with, were they not? A. Yes.
Q. Is it right that you had an OC who imposed rigid discipline? A. Yes.
Q. And would have taken any breach of his orders very seriously? A. Yes.
Q. Is it right that there is no chance that anyone would disobey his orders? A. Yes.
Q. Apart from you? A. Apart from me.
Had the arrangement been as OIRA 1 describes, and had the plans been discussed at or immediately after the Command meeting, it is inconceivable that Reg Tester, the Command quartermaster, would have been unaware of the location of the rifle, or of the plan in place for its transportation to the Creggan. Mr Tester's own evidence is that the rifle was missing at the time:
A long time afterwards I found out that a volunteer member of the Official IRA (I am not prepared to name him) had the Sporting Rifle 303 that was missing at the time.
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60 Day 395/053/21-23 61 Day 395/187/09 - Day 395/188/16 62 AT6.3 paragraph 16 The presence of weapons in safe dumps in the Bogside
Reg Tester's evidence to this Inquiry is that the rifle used by OIRA 1 had been issued to the Bogside unit, who were issued with their own collection of weapons separate from those of the Creggan unit:
"On Bloody Sunday, I knew that there were three weapons out. I did not, however, know where the rifle was, though I know to whom I had issued it."
To whom had you issued it? A. It had gone to the Bogside unit.
Q. Right. When had it gone to the Bogside unit? A. That I could not say.
Q. Can you say approximately how long before Bloody Sunday it had gone to that unit? A. No, I cannot, I am afraid.
Q. For what purpose had it gone to them? A. As part of their own collection of weapons down there.
Q. Do you know where it was kept? A. No, I do not.
Q. Do you know when it was due to be returned? A. It would have stayed with the unit until such times as they either no longer needed it or the situation changed altogether.
Q. According to the evidence that has been given to this Tribunal by OIRA 1 and OIRA 2, this weapon had been left in a dump in the Columbville Court area, though there is a difference in their evidence as to what floor it had been left on, and OIRA 1 has told the Tribunal that he went down with OIRA 2 on the Saturday evening to retrieve the rifle. Were you aware of that happening? A. Not at the time, no.
Q. When did you become aware of that? A. I never did become aware of it.
Q. The evidence from him was that he went down on the Saturday evening but in the event did not collect it on that evening, so he went down again on the Sunday with a view to collecting that weapon. Presumably you were not aware of that either?
A. No, I was not.
6G-53 This evidence is consistent with what Mr Tester told the Sunday Times when he was interviewed in March 1972:
There were to be no weapons in the Bogside except for those held by the Bogside Official Unit, and these were to be kept in several safe dumps. All other Official weapons were to be kept in two cars which would be on hand in the Creggan.
6G-54 Mr Tester stated that he did not have direct control over the weaponry issued to the Bogside unit.
Not being in the Bogside I really had no accurate picture of what went on there. I knew nothing of any of our volunteers with weapons, other than I assumed that the OC had his pistol with him.
Inconsistencies as to why, and whether, it was necessary to remove weapons from the Bogside.
6G-55 OIRA 1's and OIRA 2's evidence about the reasons why it was necessary to remove the defective weapon from the Bogside is inconsistent and disingenuous. OIRA 2 said in evidence that there was a concern that the rifle was not in a secure position:
I would not have regarded it as being in a secure position and that was one of the reasons why OIRA 1 and meself went to retrieve it.
6G-56 This contradicts OIRA 2's comment in his BSI statement regarding the failure to collect the rifle on the evening of 29th January that, "We weren't too bothered we hadn't got the weapon as it was secure." Mr Lawson asked OIRA 2 whether a further reason for removing the weapon would have been to prevent it being used. OIRA 2 agreed that that was "probably true." The inconsistencies in his evidence led Lord Saville to ask OIRA 2 to clarify the reason for removing weapons to the Creggan:
LORD SAVILLE: Mr Lawson, excuse me a moment; OIRA 2 it is the Chairman. Can you help because I do not quite understand, it may be my fault: what was the reason for getting all the weapons back up to the Creggan?
A. Just to make sure that they were secure.
LORD SAVILLE: It seems to follow from that that you must have thought there was at least a possibility that the Army would come into the Bogside; is that right?
A. Well, I suppose the possibility was that they may well -- that they may have come in and decided to search -- engage in a very, very thorough search. So, as a precaution, the idea was just to remove -- to remove the weaponry to a safer location, presumably in Creggan.
MR LAWSON: Was there a fear that they might do a very, very thorough search?
A. I would imagine there probably was, aye.
Q. In that case why leave the rifle in the car in Glenfada Park North if, as you claim you did, that is what happened?
A. Oh, you mean in relation to after the incident?
Q. Yes.
A. The whole idea of leaving the rifle in the car was to get away from the scene as quickly as possible.
Q. I appreciate that, running the risk, what, that the rifle would be found and seized by the Army?
A. Aye, but the other possibility was, because of -- because of the direction that we moved in or were moving in, we could have been spotted from Derry Walls by a soldier and if anybody had have been spotted carrying a weapon, I think you know the outcome.
Q. You would not have been carrying it openly because it would have been taken in half?
A. Well, it may or may not have been taken in half. It might not have been possible to actually dismantle the weapon.
Q. Was there any concern that guns had to be removed from the Bogside in case people would use them if they were there?
A. No, that was not, that was not the reason that the guns were removed from the Bogside and brought to the Creggan.
Q. If this be true, why not simply leave them there, they were secure, were they not?
A. Mr Lawson, I do not know, it probably seemed like a good idea at the time.70
6G-58 OIRA 2’s account is not supported by that of his immediate colleague, OIRA 1, who states that there was no concern that the Army might come into the Bogside and find it:
...it would have been one of the less likely times that the Brits would have come into the Bogside.71
6G-59 OIRA 1’s BSI statement gives the following explanation for the removal of weapons to the Creggan:
At the time we looked at the situation and knew that everyone would be on the march and that the Creggan would therefore be empty. It seemed to make sense to leave our volunteers and their weapons up there, and we would do our best if the army tried to infiltrate the area.72
6G-60 During the course of giving evidence, OIRA 1 agreed that there was in fact no real concern about the possibility of the Army invading the Creggan:
70 Day 393/038/14-040/09 71 Day 395/032/03-04 72 AOIRA1.34 paragraph 67 LORD SAVILLE: Was there a view, then, that there might have been an incursion by the Army into the Creggan because it was empty?
A. Well, it was a possibility. I do not think there was any intelligence or any serious discussion about where they would come in, how they would come in, when they would come in [sic]. It was just somebody suggested: "Look, there is crowds down the Bog, the Creggan is going to be empty, move a couple of cars, there are weapons in them, they should all be up in the Creggan, because that is where we may be vulnerable."
Having agreed that the Officials in the Creggan could not have repelled an incursion by the British army OIRA 1 struggled, and failed, to give a convincing explanation of why it was therefore necessary for weapons to be taken from the Bogside:
LORD SAVILLE: I follow that in one sense, but you have a small number of men, if there was an incursion by any sizeable number of troops -- not the size of Motorman, of course, but a sizeable number -- then the Officials, with pretty obvious common sense reasoning, could not and indeed would not go head-to-head with them because they would surely lose and, in that event, would lose all the arms that had been taken up to the Creggan, this is what is slightly puzzling me?
A. I think maybe you have to get it into the context, I mean, firstly, no-one was absolutely sure -- we had no information there was going to be any large-scale assault on the Creggan. What was simply an issue was that the vast majority of people would be in the Bogside and, with that numbers of people in the Bogside, it was relatively secure.
In the Creggan, which -- there were obviously less numbers of people, it was relatively empty at the time because of the numbers that had come into the Bogside, it was felt that at least by placing a number of armed men there, should an army invasion or an attempt to come in occur, they would be in a position to (at the very least) to fire shots and try to keep their heads down and maybe delay their entrance, and maybe even put them off at the end of the day coming in, maybe even give time for people to organise and come
______________________________________________________________________
73 Day 395/033/02-12 74 Day 395/178/17-179/04 out of their homes and so on. That is all it was; it was a delaying tactic; it was simply a tactic.
Had we had hundreds of armed men with hundreds of weapons, then we would have deployed them with a different -- with different expectations.
LORD SAVILLE: I think I understand that. Of course, it could be said -- this is looking at things after the event -- in view of what you told us a few moments ago, about the people themselves being the best defence, the safest place for your weapons would be the Bogside?
A. Yes, but the whole point of having weapons was not simply to keep them safe; the point of having weapons was to deploy them as and where we thought they might be of the best use.
MR LAWSON: That was not the concern in relation to the defective rifle, was it?
A. What?
Q. To use it?
A. To use it, no.
Q. The defective rifle, as you claim it to have been, was as you described it, in a secure dump?
A. Yes.75
The illogical position adopted by OIRA 1 was also exposed by questions put by Ms McGahey:
Ms McGAHEY: Your evidence is that the rifle in Columbciille Court was broken –
A. Yes.
Q. – and needed repair?
A. Yes.
Q. So if that be right, it was not going to be much use in the defence of the Creggan, was it?
75 Day 395/179/05-181/02 A. No.
Q. What was the point in going to get it?
A. Because it was the orders, that all weapons were to be removed to the Creggan, and at some point the red[sic] weapon would have had to have been taken to the Creggan anyway if it was ever going to be attempted to be repaired that was just the logical time to do it.76
There was nothing logical at all about the time chosen to remove the weapon; being in day light, and coinciding with the period when many more soldiers were in the area. Moreover, Reg Tester's evidence is that weapons in secure dumps in the Bogside would not have been moved:
Q. So in order to comply with this order, somebody would have to go to whatever dumps either on the Creggan or in the Bogside weapons were in; is that right?
A. Anything that was in a safe dump in the Creggan would have been left where it was.
Q. What about anything that was in a safe dump in the Bogside?
A. They probably would have been left there too. It was basically to make sure that nobody, no volunteer, or officer for that matter, was -- had a weapon in his own possession at the time of Bloody Sunday, so that I would know where they all were.
... as you have just said, those weapons that were in safe dumps in the Creggan and the Bogside were left there?
A. That is correct.77
This is consistent with what he told the Sunday Times in 1972:
There were to be no weapons in the Bogside except for those held by the Bogside Official Unit and those were to be kept in several safe dumps.78
76 DaV 395/034/10-23 77 DaV 414/029/24-Day 414/031/12 A weapon would not have been stored in an insecure dump
The evidence is that weapons and ammunition were in short supply and thus extremely valuable to the Officials whether broken or not. Against this background OIRA 2 asks the Tribunal to believe that the position of the dump was such that the rifle could have been found by accident and that there was a considerable risk of an accident to a child or an innocent person who may have come across it.
OIRA 2 was asked by Edmund Lawson Q.C.:
Q. Did you regard it as being in a secure position?
A. I would not have regarded it as being in a secure position and that was one of the reasons why OIRA 1 and meself went to retrieve it.
Q. Let us just think about that: you did not regard it as it being in a secure position and you and OIRA 1 were agreed about that, were you?
A. We would have been, aye.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes
...
Q. ... as far as you were concerned and OIRA 1 apparently agreed with you, plainly it was not in a secure position; was it?
A. That is right.
Despite OIRA 2’s confidence, his colleague does not support his view. OIRA 1’s first statement to the Inquiry describes the weapon as in a secure dump. He confirmed this on oath, although suggested that it was only “relatively secure” when the differences between his own account and OIRA 2's were drawn to his attention by Ms McGahey.83
6G-68 OIRA 2 was himself aware of the shortage of weapons and suggested it was a reason for going to collect the rifle. It is hard to reconcile this evidence with the suggestion that the rifle was left in a location where anyone might have stumbled across it:
...at the time OIRA were so poorly armed we couldn't afford to lose any weapons broken or not. If it fired we needed to keep it. If we ever did lose one we had no guarantee we'd ever get it replaced because we had no proper supply lines at the times, so we couldn't afford to leave it where the Brits or the Provos might find it. As far as I remember this is why it was decided we should try to retrieve the weapon.84
6G-69 In fact, as Reg Tester's evidence confirms, the shortage of weapons meant that no rifle would have been left for days in an unlocked shed:
Q. As you have indicated, moving away slightly from the point I started with, as you have indicated, the weapons were themselves extremely valuable; you were fighting a war as you perceived it and to fight a war you needed guns?
A. Yes.
Q. Obviously you had to take great lengths to ensure, as you sought to, not only they were properly accounted for, but that they were looked after; they were not lost, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. They were not mislaid?
A. No.
Q. If they were left inadvertently somewhere, they were to be recovered --
82 Day 392/135/04-20 83 AOIRA1.4 paragraph 9; Day 395/048/16 84 AOIRA 2.14 paragraph 6 A. Yes.
Q. -- as soon as possible and placed into a secure position?
A. That is correct.85
6G-70 Mr Tester's evidence is also that members of the Provisional IRA were liable to steal weapons from the Officials if they had the opportunity:
...If they found out that the Official IRA had any weapons or ammunition stored away, they would have been the first to steal it.86
6G-71 Sheds would not have been regarded as safe locations for the storage of weapons, "because sheds were too open to theft."87 It is inconceivable that, in the circumstances, the weapon would have been left in the manner OIRA 2 describes for four or five days88 prior to Bloody Sunday.
The weapon was removed from the boot of a car in Glenfada Park North
6G-72 OIRA 1's own account in 1972 was that the weapon was not left in Columbciille Court but collected by himself and OIRA 2 from the boot of a car in Glenfada Park. John Barry's note of an interview with OIRA 1 records that:
He had the available arms stored in the boot of a car in Glenfada. (I think he said it was a green Avenger, but my notes don't record that)...He and OIRA 2 went into the area, having got a .303 from the boot of the car...89
6G-73 Gerard Kemp's article quotes OIRA 1 as having told him:
I went back to my car and got my rifle out of the boot. It is a .303. I walked back to the court and went up the stairs on the way to the upper storey of the maisonettes. I was behind some vertical white planking.90
85 Dav 414/113/14-114/07 86 AT6.1 paragraph 6 87 Dav 414/029/17-18 88 Dav 392/057/13-15 89 AOIRA 1.1 90 L210
§ 7.1250
VI 281 There is independent evidence which supports the conclusion that the rifle came from a car in Glenfada Park. Anthony Martin told Peter Pringle of the Sunday Times that, after assisting with the wounded:
*I met an ira man and he told there (sic) were two rifles in a car – a green avenger – parked in Glenfada Park and he wanted me to help him get to it. I learnt later that the rifles had been removed before the shooting started.*
Vincent Browne’s article in the Sunday Press dated 6th February 1972 refers to the fact that careful preparations had been made to ensure that weapons would be available to Officials in the Bogside:
*The Officials had an Active Service Unit of four men on duty. They were all either to be armed during the parade or to have immediate access to arms should they become necessary. In addition, a number of other volunteers in the parade were armed for their personal protection.*
A broken weapon would not have been left with ammunition.
Ammunition was also a precious resource to the Officials and would not have been left with a weapon unless it was intended for use. OIRA 1’s access to a functioning and loaded firearm was thus no accident but can only be regarded as evidence of a pre-planned operation. Whether or not it was taken by OIRA 1 to Columbciille Court that day, or left deliberately in a position close to a pre-arranged sniping position, it was intended that the weapon should be employed against the security forces on Bloody Sunday.
______________________________________________________________________
91 AM24.5 92 L171 93 Dav 395/062/19-23 The evidence of Reg Tester, Command quartermaster, was that ammunition was very tightly controlled. It was in very short supply and every round mattered.94
Each volunteer had to account for each round of ammunition issued to him and God help him if he could not account for it.95
OIRA 2 agreed:
I think ammunition would have been fairly tightly controlled, because ammunition at the time was in pretty short supply.96
According to OIRA7 the Officials were so short of ammunition at the time that apparently armed patrols were patrolling with broken weapons and without ammunition.97
OIRA 2 agreed with the suggestion put to him by Ms McGahey that the likelihood was that a weapon left with ammunition in order that it could be fired quickly:
Q. Was it the practice of the Official IRA to keep its weapons in dumps loaded?
A. It could well have happened on occasions, aye, it could well have happened.
Q. Did it happen when the intention of the person who left the weapon was that the weapon should be used quickly from the place in which it was stored?
A. That may well have been the case, yes.98
No evidence that the weapon was defective.
There is no independent corroboration for OIRA 1's claim that the rifle was defective. Indeed, on OIRA 1's own account, he was able to fire the rifle without
94 Day 414/115/19-23 95 AT6.1 paragraph 4 96 Day 392/048/05-07 97 Day 398/128/13-130/04 98 Day 392/071/02-09 any difficulty. The shot fired was even accurate enough to make OIRA 2 believe it had found its target.99
6G-82 If the assertion that the rifle was in need of repair were true, there would be no logical reason for it being left in a dump in Columbville Court, or for it to be loaded. It is similarly incredible, given the value of weapons to the IRA, that despite being a member of the Command Staff, OIRA 1 claims not to know whether the weapon was in fact repaired, or whether there was anyone in Londonderry who was capable of carrying out such a repair.100 According to OIRA 1 a defective weapon would have been returned to the quartermaster, Reg Tester.101 This was also the evidence of OIRA7.102 Mr Tester did indeed confirm that the rifle was returned to within a few days of Bloody Sunday. 103 He was not aware that the rifle was defective, and it showed no signs of being defective:
Q. Was it a working weapon as far as you knew? A. Yes, it was.
Q. Did you know as opposed to anything you heard by way of rumour at any time, did you know whether or not it was damaged? A. I had, I never saw the weapon in actual fact.
Q. If the sight to that weapon had been damaged or missing -- A. Yes.
Q. -- then you would have made another one? A. We would have tried to get another one made, yes.
Q. You simply would have done it; would you not? A. Well, I could not do it, I did not have the tools or the skill, but it would have been dealt with.
99 AOIRA 1.27 paragraph 20 100 Day 395/158/21-160/22 101 Day 395/046/16-23 102 Day 398/131/07-22 103 Day 414/158/19-21 Q. Let us have on the screen AT6.14, paragraph 57. This is your recent statement in which you said:
"I am asked by Eversheds whether I know anything of the condition of the weapon that was involved in the shot being fired from the area of Columbille Court. I am aware that the official line is that the weapon was damaged."
That is the official line in the double sense of that word that Mr Clarke was using earlier on: "Official line that the weapon was damaged. It is the case, however, that the weapon would work."
Did you know that?
A. I knew there was a working weapon, but all I was told was that there had been some damage to it.
Q. But you, as you said in your statement made the end of last year, you do not remember if the sight was missing; was that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. "If the sight had been missing, we would have made one", is what you said in this statement?
A. That is correct.
Q. Do you wish to amend that?
A. That is correct.
Q. You say:
"I do not remember whether the sight was actually missing on Bloody Sunday, I do not recall the detail to this extent."
A. No.
Q. As you have already told us, this is not contentious, the weapons were in short supply, were highly valuable –
A. Yes.
Q. -- to you at the time. If there was a fault with a weapon that was capable of being fixed, then fixed it would be as soon as possible?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. That is correct. Q. And you have absolutely no recollection -- this is fair, is it not -- absolutely no recollection of the sporting rifle coming back to you for fixing by reason of a defective sight?
A. No, I have not.
Q. The sporting rifle was one which you saw again after Bloody Sunday; was it not?
A. I did see it again later, yes.
Q. When it was returned to you, again you have no recollection of it being defective?
A. No.
Q. Or requiring repair?
A. No. 104
Nor do other members of the organisation support the evidence of OIRAs 1 and 2. OIRA7, who claims to have assisted OIRAs 1 and 2 with transporting the weapon to the car, was surprised to find that it had been left in the Bogside. No one said at the time, or in the immediate aftermath, anything to him about the weapon being defective. 105
The Choice of OIRA 1 to collect the weapon / OIRA1’s reputation as a good shot
OIRA 1’s evidence is that he and OIRA 2 volunteered to collect the weapon at, or immediately after, a command meeting held the day before Bloody Sunday at which the presence of an outstanding weapon in the Bogside had been discussed. 106 In truth it would have made no sense at all for either OIRA 1 or OIRA 2 to volunteer to collect the weapon if, as they claim, they had not left it in the dump themselves and did not know the precise location of the dump. 107 The real explanation for the choice is undoubtedly OIRA 1’s reputation for being a
104 Day 414/127/19-130/08 105 Day 399/029/19-031/19 106 Day 395/043/08-044/11 good shot, a reputation which OIRA 1 was not prepared to confirm or deny when he gave evidence to the present Inquiry, but which is evidenced from what he himself told Gerard Kemp in April 1972:
Last week, in the Bogside part of the barricaded “no go” area which Roman Catholics call “Free Derry”, I found and interviewed the sniper referred to in the Widgery report. He is in the official I.R.A. and he talked on condition his name and rank were not given.
He admitted firing the “single high-velocity round” but said he did so after he had heard two shots and seen the crowd dragging away two wounded...
The sniper, in his early 20s said he had shot and killed three British soldiers since last August, the Army confirming the deaths.
OIRA 2 was prepared, reluctantly, to agree that OIRA 1 was probably a sniper, but refused to be drawn on whether OIRA 1 had been involved in the shooting of Gunner Ham, shot by an IRA sniper whilst on foot patrol a month before Bloody Sunday.
Q. Was OIRA 1 a sniper? A. Um, I am not prepared to answer that question...
Q. What I am asking you is: was he a sniper, it is a very simple question. If you are here to help the Inquiry? A. I am here to help the Inquiry.
Q. A simple yes or no would be helpful. A. The answer is probably: yes.
Q. Was he in fact the sniper who killed gunner Ham? A. I do not know who killed the soldier that you are referring to.\\textsuperscript{111}
The fact that two volunteers went into Columbcllle Court
The acknowledged dangers of moving a weapon were such that it would have been ludicrous for two members of the OIRA Command Staff to have risked arrest, and even their lives, collecting a defective weapon, particularly given that the OC Official IRA had been arrested only a couple of days before.\\textsuperscript{112} OIRA 2 claimed that they gave this no thought:
\\begin{quote} Q. You took great care on the Saturday night not to take any risks either with the loss of the weapon or risk of capture of yourselves; did you not?
A. That is correct, aye.
Q. This was a damaged weapon, obviously one that you did want to keep if you could; you were risking, if you left it there, the loss of that weapon, were you not?
A. That is right.
Q. If the soldiers came into the Bogside?
A. Yes.
Q. If you had got your guess wrong about what the soldiers' plans were, were you not risking vastly more than the loss of that weapon; you were risking the loss of your lives?
A. It did not occur at the time, you know, I just -- we just did not think about it at the time. As I keep saying, the whole idea was to get the weapon out of the area and away from the area as fast as possible and get it back to where we had agreed and had been instructed that it should be taken to, which was back to Creggan.
Q. That was more important than taking the risk that two members of the Official command staff falling into the hands of the British Army?
A. Well, we just did not think about it that way at the time. \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{111} Day 393/014/25-015/16 \\textsuperscript{112} Day 395/008/20-24 Q. But you did think about that the night before?
A. What we thought about the night before was the fact that, um, because there were not that many people about at the time that we went to try and retrieve the weapon, and because it was very dark and because of the shootings earlier on that night in which two civilians had been wounded by the Army, we thought that it was far too dangerous at that time, on the Saturday night, to try and remove the weapon. 113
6G-87 OIRA 2 gave an entirely different explanation for why he accompanied OIRA 1 when asked questioned by Mr Lawson:
Q. I think you said in answer to Ms McGahey, if you had been found in possession of that gun you probably would not have been here today?
A. The chances are.
Q. What, they would have shot you?
A. In all probability, yes.
Q. It would not have done you much good to say -- excuse me, the gun is not working properly?
A. You are probably right, yes.
Q. It was a dangerous operation, was it, to remove the gun?
A. The whole idea behind the operation was to get the gun out of the area that it was in and get it back to Creggan.
Q. I appreciate what you are saying, but that is not my question: it was a dangerous operation?
A. It was a dangerous operation, yes, yes.
Q. And if you had been caught you were quite likely to have been killed?
A. Yes.
Q. If you had been lucky enough to avoid being killed, you would have been arrested and spent a long time locked up?
113 Day 392/092/16-093/24 A. That is correct.
Q. Both of you?
A. Yes.
Q. Why two of you?
A. It is just the way it worked out.
Q. Come on, you are well-disciplined, you tell us, well-organised, quasi-military organisation, why two of you?
A. Well, it would make sense to have two men because, for obvious reasons, two pairs of eyes are better than one in the sense of being able to look around and see was anybody there, any soldiers or anybody else.
Q. You knew there were soldiers there, they were all over the place?
A. Yes, they were all over the place, that is right, therefore, two men would have had a better chance of getting the weapon away out of the road, back into the car and then hopefully back up to the Creggan; that is the answer to the question.
Q. So what was, and obviously recognised at the time, to be a dangerous operation?
A. That is correct.\\textsuperscript{114}
OIRA 1's SHOT
\\textit{Decision to take the rifle from the dump to the Columbcille Court balcony.}
6G-88 OIRA 1's evidence was that the rifle was in a shed or coalbunker outside Columbcille Court at ground level.\\textsuperscript{115} Had it been his intention merely to collect the weapon, the obvious thing to have done would have been to leave the area as quickly as possible. Instead, he took the rifle to a balcony overlooking William
\\textsuperscript{114} Day 393/040/13-042/06 \\textsuperscript{115} Day 395/058/14-395/059/07 Street on the top floor of Columbcille Court. It is plain that this was a well known and established sniping position.
6G-89 OIRA 1 was asked by Edmund Lawson Q.C.:
Q. Do you agree that there was absolutely no need to go to the second floor?
A. No, I do not agree anything. I have no idea exactly why I went to the top floor, I do not know if there were items in the stairwell, I do not know how dark it was, I do not know if there was people milling about outside; all I know is that when I went in, I went up to the top floor. I do not recall exactly why.
Q. Do you remember people milling about outside?
A. No, I do not.116
6G-90 OIRA 2 told the Tribunal that the reason for going to Columbcille Court was "presumably in response to the two individuals having been shot some time prior to that."117 This is in stark conflict with OIRA 1's evidence which is that he had been in the washing area behind the slats for a minute to a minute and a half before he heard shots fired.118
6G-91 The obvious reason for going to the second floor, as OIRA 2's evidence implicitly and unintentionally acknowledges, was that it afforded OIRA 1 an ideal vantage point from which to fire at soldiers to the north of William Street. Both OIRA 1 and 2 tried, in vain, to suggest that this was not the case. OIRA 2 was asked by Ms McGahey:
Q. Was this weapon stored in this particular dump for quick use in the sniping position on that landing?
A. I would say probably not because, um, the only protection for any intended sniper, the only protection would have been the wooden slats which would have been about maybe a half an inch to
116 Day 396/016/20 117 Day 393/048/19-20 118 Day 395/074/17-21 an inch thick and if anybody had opened fire, say, from that particular position, at a target, the muzzle flash would have been clearly seen and the return fire, particularly if it had been an SLR, would have sent straight through the wood and straight into the person who was doing the firing. So I would imagine that where the weapon was retrieved from was not likely to be a spot from where somebody would fire at a target.
6G-92 However, when seeking to defend the decision to go to the top of the flats during the march OIRA 2 stated “...it would probably have been fairly difficult for them to see us through the slats”
6G-93 Having been shown various photographs of the area by Mr Lawson, OIRA 1 reluctantly agreed that he would have had an unimpeded view from the second floor of Columbille Court of parts of William Street and the laundry waste ground.
6G-94 Contrary to the denials of OIRAs 1 and 2, Gerry O’hEara’s evidence establishes the fact that the washing area in Columbille Court was a well known position from which to fire at Army snipers near the Presbyterian Church:
We all knew Bubbles – he was our age. We were told he had been shot from a well known place from where British soldiers sniped, the flat roof of a building at point marked A (grid reference K05) on the map ... From that point soldiers could stand on the flat roof and peep their heads over the wall to look across the waste ground to the south.
5. There was an area of waste ground between Columbille Court and the buildings to the north of William Street. The IRA and the army would take potshots at one another across that waste ground, the IRA shooting from the washing rooms near a well known republican house in Columbille Court, marked B (grid reference J10) on the attached map, the army shooting from the derelict building.
119 Dav 392/071/10-23 120 Dav 393/051/03-04 121 Dav 396/020/08-021/01 122 AO79.2 paragraphs 4-5 In 1972 OIRA 1 gave John Barry detailed information about the arrangements which had been made to ensure access to the washing area:
He and OIRA 2 had already organised a possible counter-sniping position against the two by the Church. It was in C Court, in one of the areas outside the back door of each flat set aside for washing lines etc. The area is fronted by white wooden planks giving a slatted effect. The two men had arranged with a woman, the occupants of one of the flats, that she would leave open the gate to her washing area. 123
It is unsurprising that OIRA 1 now seeks to repudiate this account of how he came to be in Columbcille Court, given that it patently contradicts the oft-repeated assertion that there were no plans to fire during the march. However, for the reasons set out in Chapter 9, it must be beyond doubt that OIRA 1 provided these details to John Barry, a fact which is illustrated by OIRA 2’s confirmation to Mr Lawson that only himself and OIRA 1 knew that they had fired from the washing area:
Q. Have you broadcast — have you personally being telling a lot of people where you had conducted this firing exercise from?
A. I did not tell anybody.
Q. You would expect, we will have to ask him, OIRA 1 to be equally discreet, would you not?
A. I would have thought so, yes.
Q. The author of this note, then, has managed to get from somewhere or other an accurate description of where you were and of the slatted effect of the wooden planks?
A. Yes. I have no idea where the author of the note got his information, he did not get it from me.
Q. Wherever he has got it from he has got that bit right?
A. Aye, he has that bit right, surely. 124
123 AOIRA 1.1 124 Day 393/084/25-085/13 Reg Tester’s account to the Sunday Times also makes plain that OIRA 1 had a pre-planned position from which to fire:
_The officials realised from the sniping positions taken up on Sunday that the army was eager for a confrontation._
_We know of the following Official shooting:_
1. a man with a .303 sporting rifle fired a single shot at a para on the roof of the Presbyterian Church off William Street. He was firing between the wooden slits on the first floor balcony of Columbille Court. This man had been in the immediate area when Donaghy and Johnston were shot. Being a member of the Bogside unit, he had access to a weapon and rushed to his position. [our emphasis]
OIRA3, The acting OC of the Official IRA in Derry, referred to the use of pre-arranged positions. He told a journalist from the Observer that the Officials had two marksmen on duty, one at the corner of William Street and Rossville Street, the other in the Little Diamond:
_Our policy is to have marksmen stationed so they can, if it looks promising, use the situation when a riot is over._
OIRA 2 agreed that this was a fairly accurate representation of practice at the time.
**Failure to dismantle the weapon immediately, or at all.**
OIRAs 1 and 2 claim that it was their intention to break the rifle down in order to make it easier to transport. If this were true it is self evident that, given the grave risks associated with being seen with the rifle, they would have wanted to do this as quickly as possible. Their failure to do so is yet further evidence of their intention to fire the weapon from the balcony. Q. Having obtained the weapon in the ground floor, why did you climb three flights of stairs with it?
A. Simply to just get away from the street.
Q. Did you want to go off the street in order to take the rifle to pieces?
A. Well, my intention would have been, yes, to take the stock off the rifle and put it into two parts and made it easier to transport.
Q. Why do you not do that as soon as you reach the first floor landing?
A. Well, I am not – I do not know, there was no particular reason, I may have just simply walked up the stairs and stopped when I got to the top of them.
Q. You were aware, were you not, that in order to obtain this rifle you were going to take a risk of being caught by the British Army, when ever you did it?
A. Yes.
Q. You had been very careful not to run unnecessary risks the night before?
A. Yes.
Q. Surely the sensible thing to do was to grab that rifle and get out of that area as soon as you could?
A. No.
Q. Why not? A. Because I did not feel any particular risk in the location at the time that I was there.\\textsuperscript{131}
6G-101 It was wholly self-contradictory for OIRA 1 to suggest that he did not consider retrieving the weapon to be a dangerous exercise, whilst at the same time agreeing that his perception was that, had he been found in possession of the rifle he would, or might have been shot dead.\\textsuperscript{132}
6G-102 OIRA 2 confirmed that they had intended to break down the rifle:
\\textit{Q. You say in the statement that you were going to break down the weapon to make it easier to transport discreetly. How were you going to break it down?}
\\textit{A. Well, you can take the butt off it. You can break it into two pieces. You can remove the wooden butt and that leaves you then with the rest.}
\\textit{Q. Did you remove the magazine?}
\\textit{A. I cannot remember.}
\\textit{Q. Were you going to remove the bolt?}
\\textit{A. I would not say we were going to remove the bolt, no, I would not think so, just remove the butt and then you would have the two bits intact. I cannot remember the exact detail, but I think our intention was to take the butt off the weapon and that would leave it then in two parts, easier to, to move away out of the road.}\\textsuperscript{133}
And yet
\\textit{Q. You say later in your statement that the time between collecting the gun and it being fired by OIRA 1 was a minute or two. Is that what you remember now?}
\\textit{A. Um, yes, that is right.}
\\textsuperscript{131} Day 395/059/08-Day 395/060/18 \\textsuperscript{132} Day 396/004/19-005/22 \\textsuperscript{133} Day 392/069/13-070/02 Q. And you also say that it was only seconds between your hearing the shout "Two boys have been shot" and OIRA 1 firing; is that correct?
A. Aye, I think it would have been -- it would have been a matter of seconds.
Q. So it seems there must have been at least a minute or two minutes between the time that you collected the gun and the time that you heard the shouts, yes?
A. Um, I would say probably, yes.
Q. And your evidence is that it was only when you heard those shouts that you thought there might be justification for firing; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. So you had been there for a couple of minutes. That is enough time, is there not, for you or OIRA 1 to unload the rifle?
A. Aye, you are probably right.
Q. It is enough time for you or OIRA 1 to dismantle it?
A. Possibly, but because of the whole commotion that was going on down below us, it probably never occurred to either of us to do that.
Q. You were in a very vulnerable position indeed, were you not? A. I would say we were, yes.
Q. You needed to be on, on your account, off that landing as fast as you possibly could?
A. That is right.
Q. And back to the car?
A. Yes.
Q. So the only sensible thing to do, surely, was to unload and dismantle that rifle from the second you took it out of that cupboard?
A. Well, that obviously did not happen, otherwise you would not be asking me about it.
Q. My question is: why did that not happen?
A. I would say probably because of what was happening around us; the noise, the roaring and the shouting and so on, you become easily distracted and maybe what was in your head ten seconds before that just left your head because of what was going on around you; that is the only way I can explain that.
Q. If you had been caught by the British Army in possession of this weapon, the consequences to you would have been very serious indeed; would they not?
A. I probably would not be sitting here talking to you now.
Q. It would take an awful lot of distracting you from your task, picking up that weapon, dismantling it and getting out of the way?
A. Probably on the other hand, you see, we would have thought because of the whole commotion around us and there was a fairly good crowd — what seemed like a fairly good crowd below us, the likelihood of the Army arriving on the scene at that point in time was probably fairly remote so we probably felt that there was probably just enough of time to get away, but not in the fashion that you are suggesting.
Q. It may be suggested that the reason you did not dismantle the weapon in the couple of minutes you had available was that you or OIRA 1 intended all along to fire it?
A. No, I dispute that. Not only do I dispute it, I refute it.
Q. It may be suggested that that was your intention, and by "you" I am referring to both of you collectively —
A. Yes.
Q. -- from the moment that you went on to the landing in Columbcille Court?
A. No.
Q. Or that you had actually gone to Columbcille Court with the intention of using a weapon that you knew had been left there for that purpose?
A. No, that was not our intention at all.\\textsuperscript{134}
\\textsuperscript{134} Day 392/073/17-076/17
This evidence is completely at odds with OIRA 2's later account to in answer to Ms McGahey of what had occurred immediately before OIRA 1 had fired: Q. ...Immediately before this happened do you remember what he (OIRA 1) was doing with that rifle?
A. Um, I think he was basically looking to conceal it somewhere in his clothing so that we could get away out of the road before, um, all this distraction about two boys being shot happened.
Q. So he was not beginning to dismantle it?
A. No, I think he was just trying to get away along with meself as fast as possible out of the area.
Q. He was just planning to conceal it under his coat and go?
A. Yes, I would imagine so, yes.
Q. Without seeking first to unload it?
A. No, I think the idea would have been, um, you know, "Let's get away from here as quick as possible."135
It is also inconsistent with OIRA 2's suggestion that the purpose of going up to the top floor of Columbille Court was in response to the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston.136
The evidence of Sean Keenan makes it plain that OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 were in fact in Columbille Court for some time. The relevant section of his evidence was put to OIRA 2 by Mr Lawson:
Q. Mr Keenan gives a description, and we are going to hear from him I gather, that he is walking down Rossville Street and the lady has obviously run over, or come over from Columbille Court, or that area, reports to him that there are people with a rifle up there in Columbille Court. He then goes over there with her and then meets you in the stairwell, which suggests it was more than just a fleeting moment that you were up there on the third floor, does it not?
A. But the length of time on the third floor, as you suggest, would not necessarily -- I mean, I am just, I am wondering exactly, you know, what, what was the point you are trying to get at in terms of
135 Day 392/080/18-081/07 136 Day 393/048/19-20 time. I mean, it would only have taken a matter of seconds to come from where we were down to the stairwell.
Q. A point, OIRA 2, is this, since you ask, I deal with the suggestion now, it is as plain as a pikestaff, I suggest to you, that you and your colleague OIRA 1 were not just passing, you were there in order to shot [sic] at the Army; were you not?
A. We were not there to shoot at the Army.137
Nor was any attempt made, either immediately or at all, to dismantle the gun after the shot had been fired. OIRA7 agrees that there was some time between the firing of the shot that he claims to have heard and the commotion on the stairs involving OIRAs 1 and 2.138 He confirmed to Lord Saville that dismantling the weapon would simply involve undoing a locking nut which fastened the stock to the barrel and the trigger mechanism. No attempt was made to dismantle the gun whilst he was present and it was put into the car complete.139
OIRA 1’s Target
The evidence of OIRAs 1 and 2 is at odds as to the location of the soldier at whom OIRA 1 fired. OIRA 1 marked the location of the soldier as falling within the oval on the map at AOIRA 1.48140
OIRA 1 doubts whether his shot hit the Presbyterian Church:
I have heard talk of a shot hitting the drainpipe to the Presbyterian Church, which I understand may be to the east of the church. This is not the direction in which I fired. I am not aware of my round hitting a drainpipe. If it did hit a drainpipe to the east of the church I cannot explain why I missed the soldier I was aiming at so badly, unless this was down to a ricochet, or the defective sight. I have no
137 Day 393/076/03-23 138 Day 398/152/14-20 139 Day 399/039/20-040/15 140 AOIRA 1.48 recollection of there being a drain on the east side of that building and believe that the story is a fabrication.\\textsuperscript{41}
By contrast OIRA 2 has given evidence that he believes OIRA 1’s shot was probably the shot which hit that drainpipe of the Presbyterian Church.\\textsuperscript{42} He pointed out to OIRA 1 the presence of a soldier on near the Presbyterian Church. OIRA 2 agreed that he did not know whether the soldier was the soldier whom, on his own account, had fired three shots.\\textsuperscript{43}
Q. Let alone, as you have confirmed on Thursday, you had no idea at all whether the soldier who was aimed at at the Presbyterian Church, or by it, was the person who had fired those shots?
A. That is correct.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. You thought it was?
A. Yes.
Q. "That is the bastard", you said?
A. Or words to that effect, aye.
Q. You said to your friend?
A. Yes, that is right, yes.
Q. To be fair to you, you have never disassociated yourself from this shot, he pulled the trigger but the two of you were in it together?
A. Both of us were present when the incident happened, aye.
Q. So you identified -- putting it rather unduly formally -- the target, saying something like "That is the bastard who has just been shooting"?
\\textsuperscript{41} AOIRA 1.27 paragraph 20 \\textsuperscript{42} Day 392/082-083 \\textsuperscript{43} Day 395/080/02-05 A. That is right.
Q. You had no idea whether that was true or not?
A. It looked very likely because of the position that he was in.
Q. You had no idea whether the soldier that you could see had fired those shots?
A. That is right.
Q. Did you?
A. That is right.
Q. Is that right?
A. Well, since I could not see any other soldiers in sniping positions, I just automatically assumed that it must have been him.
Q. You had seen soldiers previously in sniping positions, you told us that --
A. No, I had seen soldiers.
Q. In sniping positions?
A. Well, possibly, they were in the backs of buildings.
Q. You told us that five minutes ago.
A. This particular soldier, you know, appeared to be taking aim; he appeared to be in that position.
Q. Or using his sight?
A. Possibly.
Q. Which they did, did they not?
A. Which they did, yes.
Q. In case he was the one who had shot, you encouraged your mate to try to kill him?
A. Um, if you put it like that, the answer is: yes.\\textsuperscript{144}
\\textsuperscript{144} Day 393/056-058 OIRA 1’s evidence was also that he did not know whether the soldier he fired at was the soldier whom, on his own account, had fired three shots.\\textsuperscript{145}
\\textit{Timing Of OIRA 1’s Shot}
The evidence demonstrates that the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston occurred after the main body of the march had passed at a time when rioting had broken out in and around the laundry waste ground. Whilst this riot was in progress Soldiers A and B fired five shots in total at a man they believed to be in the process of lighting a nailbomb at the north west corner of the laundry waste ground. Neither of the soldiers who fired was aware of any incoming fire whilst he was in the derelict building, nor has either ever suggested that he fired other than in the circumstances and for the reason outlined above. For that reason, in relation to the issue of Soldiers A and B’s shots, the timing of the OIRA 1’s shot, and whether or not it is the Presbyterian Church shot, is to a very large extent irrelevant.
From the civilian perspective it is plain however, that the question of ‘who fired the first shot’ is fundamental and of symbolic significance. It would be, as Paul Mahon discovered, an unforgivable heresy to suggest that the first shot on the day had been fired by a member of the IRA. However in support of this conclusion the Tribunal has heard not only from military witnesses but also from civilians who refer to hearing a single shot prior to the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. Moreover a close examination of the evidence of OIRAs 1 and 2 about the state of affairs at the time they fired the shot shows them also to have lied about the timing of the shot in relation to the shooting of these two civilians.
\\textbf{OIRA 1’s Evidence}
OIRA 1 claims to have set off for the Bogside to collect the rifle at about the time that the march was setting off from the Creggan.\\textsuperscript{146} He agrees that he would have
\\textsuperscript{145} Day 395/080/02-05
\\textsuperscript{146} reached the Bogside much quicker than the march. According to OIRA 2, whether walking or driving, it would have taken only a matter of minutes to travel from the Creggan to the Bogside.
OIRA 1 could not account for how he spent what, on his own account, must have been a considerable period of time between arriving in the Bogside and retrieving the rifle:
Q. ...do you have any recollection of what you did once you got down to the Bogside, apart from getting the weapon and going to the second floor of Columbcille Court?
A. No.
Q. Nothing at all?
A. No.
Q. Complete blank?
A. Yes.
His first statement to the Inquiry gives the impression of his having seen early sections of the march at the point that he reached Columbcille Court.
The majority of the march were behind the lorry, but a number of people had got in front of it. The people both in front and behind the lorry were in a happy mood and there was no sense of anything unusual happening on the day. I do recall that those people I saw on the day were in a generally happy mood...I believe that we approached Colmcille Court from the Bogside Inn direction. Therefore we were not part of the march itself at any time. In fact we really only got glimpses of the march.
Questioned by Mr Lawson, OIRA 1 agreed that if his account of arriving at Columbcille Court from the south, via Glenfada Park North, was correct, that he
______________________________________________________________________
146 Day 396/008/06 147 Day 396/034/08 148 Day 392/066 149 Day 396/035/03 150 AOIRA 1.5 paragraphs 12-13 could not in fact have seen the march until he reached the second floor landing from where he fired.\\textsuperscript{151} He said that he did not have a view of the march from the landing, but did gain the general impression of the march turning from William Street into Rossville Street.\\textsuperscript{152} This evidence places him in the balcony area behind the slats at a stage when the front of the march was in William Street and not, as he claims, at the time when Damien Donaghy and John Johnston were shot.
It is in fact quite apparent from the photographs\\textsuperscript{153} that OIRA 1 would have had a commanding view of the laundry waste ground and a section of William Street from the landing. OIRA 1 was forced to concede this:
\\begin{quote} Q. So you had, it would appear, an unimpeded view from the second floor of Columbcille Court of William Street; do you agree?
A. No, I would -- if that is the situation as it was at the time, I would say, I had an unimpeded view of about 20 feet of William Street.
Q. And of the laundry wasteground right in front of you?
A. Well, yes, it would appear so, yes.
Q. Not it would appear so, it is plainly so; is it not?
A. If that is the situation as it was on the day, yes, it would be...I am assuming that is the way it was on Bloody Sunday, then yes, I accept what you are saying.\\textsuperscript{154} \\end{quote} OIRA 1 contends that whilst on the landing he heard three shots fired by the army from the north side of William Street; almost immediately after this someone shouted that some boys had been shot.\\textsuperscript{155} If he had in fact been on the landing at the time that Damien Donaghy and John Johnston had been shot OIRA 1 could not have failed to have seen the rioting in the laundry waste ground, the two wounded being tended by two different groups of people about 30 yard directly in front of and below his position, or the procession as they were carried a very few yards directly below him to Mrs Shiels' house. His own evidence to this Inquiry is that he saw neither John Johnston or Damien Donaghy at any stage\\textsuperscript{156} - although this did not prevent him from giving an account to Gerard Kemp that he had,\\textsuperscript{157} a section of the account that OIRA 2 agreed was "unlikely."\\textsuperscript{158}
An obvious explanation for OIRA 1's failure to see Damien Donaghy or John Johnston as they lay on the ground or as they were carried to Columbcille Court is that he had, by that stage, already fired and had left his position on the landing.
OIRA 2's evidence regarding the timing of the shot
OIRA 1's account of hearing shots at the stage that he reached the Columbcille Court balcony is not corroborated by his colleague, OIRA 2, who did not hear any shots fired before OIRA 1 fired. OIRA 2 was asked by Ms McGahey:
\\begin{quote} Your evidence is that you heard noise and a confrontation. You had no idea, did you, whether the soldier who you could see had fired any shots? \\end{quote}
\\begin{quote} A. That is correct. \\end{quote}
\\begin{quote} Q. And you actually had no idea whether anyone had fired any shots at all? \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{155} Day 396/023/08-22 \\textsuperscript{156} Day 396/025/05-17 \\textsuperscript{157} L210 \\textsuperscript{158} Day 392/108/06-08 A. That is correct too.\\textsuperscript{159}
6G-120 OIRA 2 lied in his first statement to the Inquiry. He was asked by Edmund Lawson Q.C.:
\\textit{Q. Did you in fact hear any shots fired prior to being party to your colleague, OIRA 1, firing the rifle?}
\\textit{A. Well, I have already told the previous counsel that I have no recollection of actually hearing any shots. I am not sure. I may have done, I am just not sure.}
\\textit{Q. Are you in a position to assert that you can confirm that the shots were high velocity shots?}
\\textit{A. Which shots are we talking about here?}
\\textit{Q. The shots that allegedly preceded the rifle being fired?}
\\textit{A. I would imagine they would have been, yes.}
\\textit{Q. Can you definitely confirm that to be the position?}
\\textit{A. I cannot definitely confirm it.}
\\textit{Q. Why did you do so when you made this same statement for the benefit of the Inquiry?}
\\textit{A. Because --}
\\textit{Q. Just a minute, you ought to look at it, page 3, please, paragraph 9, where you said, did you not, in this statement of about January 2002, that you heard a number of high velocity shots with a gap between them. You cannot remember exactly at this time, but you believe there could have been two or three shots, right. You go on to say that you could not specify the time between them. Lest there be any doubt about the matter, concluded the paragraph by saying:}
"From my experience living in Derry at that time I can definitely confirm that these were high velocity shots."
\\textit{That is what you said, is it not?}
\\textit{A. That is what I said, yes.}
\\textsuperscript{159} Day 392/077/13-19 Q. And you were in no position whatsoever to do that, were you, OIRA 2?
A. Well, according to the way that you are putting it, the answer to the question would be that I probably was not, but again I think, in the general state of confusion possibly what I said there, you know, was, um, just a reflection of how things happened on the day.
Q. It was at best, was it not, a serious exaggeration?
A. No, I would not accept that.
Q. You would accept it was an exaggeration, presumably?
A. No, I would not even accept it was an exaggeration.
Q. What, when you said "I could definitely confirm these were high velocity shots", when you at least were unsure whether you had heard any shots; is that not an exaggeration?
A. It could well be, yes.(^{160})
OIRA 2's evidence is that his colleague fired before the main march arrived. This is further evidence of the fact that the shooting occurred prior to the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. A. We went down, um, I cannot remember the exact timing of when we went down, but I know it was in the afternoon.
Q. You know it was in the afternoon?
A. Aye, it was in the afternoon.
Q. Are you sure?
A. I am 100 per cent certain, yes.
Q. 100 per cent?
A. It was before the march would have arrived.
Q. Before the march had arrived?
A. Before the march. It would have been before the main body of the march would have arrived.
(^{160}) Day 392/127/04-128/023 Q. Thank you. So whatever time it was, it was quite clear — it is quite clear in your recollection that you went to Columbille Court before the march, the main body of the march had got to William Street?
A. Um, in my recollection, yes, that is the way it was, yes.
Q. And you were only there for a few minutes, were you not, on your account?
A. As far as I remember, yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. So at the time that you were party to the firing of the shot — you did not actually pull the trigger — at the time you were party to the pulling of the shot, the march had not yet reached —
A. The main body of the march had not arrived, as far as I recall.
Q. The coal lorry that was leading the march; you remember that?
A. I do not remember seeing the coal lorry, no.
Q. And the street, William Street, was not thronged with people?
A. No, but there were people milling about, do you see, there would have been a lot of people who were just standing by and not taking part in the march.
Q. You would have been, presumably, the more reluctant to shoot if there had been a vast number of people, civilians in William Street?
A. I would imagine that no shots would have been fired at all had there been a large number of people about.
Q. This is at a relatively early stage of the march?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. ... in your statement to Eversheds that you have confirmed to this Tribunal to be accurate, you did not seek to amend when you began your evidence on Thursday, you said it was in the morning that the two of you had gone down there; was that right?
A. I think that should be amended to read "the afternoon". 7.1278 Q. That is just a mistake, is it? A. I think it probably is, yes.
Q. What is not a mistake, I gather from what you have just told us, is the next sentence:
"We came down into the Bogside some time before the march." A. That is correct.
Q. That is absolutely right? A. On my recollection, yes.
Q. Is that as you have put it, 100 per cent right? A. As far as I can remember, yes, that is correct.
Q. You personally had heard no shooting, did you, before the .303 was fired? A. Well, again, as we said on Thursday, because of background noise and so on, I have no direct memory of actually hearing shots being fired.
Q. You do not remember now hearing any shots, right? A. That is what I told you on Thursday when you asked me, yes.
Q. You have some recollection of someone saying something about two people being shot? A. Yes.
Q. This occurred before the main body of the march had passed by? A. As far as I am aware, yes.
Q. Is that right? A. Yes.
Q. You personally had no idea whether there had been any shots? A. From the sound of the way that it was said, um, there seemed to be a lot of commotion and I do distinctly recall hearing "two boys had been shot" or words to that effect.
Q. You had no personal knowledge whether that was right or wrong?
A. I could not see whether it was right or wrong.
...
Q. Was that consistent with the policy of defence and retaliation?
A. It was insofar as two other individuals had been shot before this retaliatory shot.
Q. Had they, OIRA 2; had they? It did occur, if this occurred, as you have told us, when it did, as the march had yet still to pass by, the main body of the march, there had not been any shooting by the Army?
A. Our understanding or our belief at the time was — and this is all that I can tell you — our belief was that two individuals had been shot and that the shot that was fired was a shot that was fired in response to the shooting of these two individuals.(^{161})
6G-121 Edmund Lawson Q.C. asked about the quality of OIRA 2’s recollection:
Q. ...the only matter which you appear to have a clear recollection is the shot from Columbcille Court?
A. Oh, I have a very clear recollection on that, yes.
Q. Yes, which happened, as you said, before the march passed by?
A. Before the main body of the march arrived, yes.(^{162})
6G-122 It emerged that, even on his own evidence, OIRA 2 made no more than an “assumption” that OIRA 1’s shot followed the shooting of the two civilians. This contrasts with his very clear recollection of the stage the march had reached at the time OIRA 1 fired:
Q. But the shot that you say was fired was fired before, as you claim, the main body of the march had come by?
A. That is correct.
(^{161}) Day 393/051/10-058/15
(^{162}) Day 393/120/17-23 Q. If that is correct, OIRA 2, you have not got your story straight because, by then, Mr Donaghy and Mr Johnston had not been shot.
A. Well, it was my assumption that Mr Donaghy and Mr Johnston had been shot before, before the man who was with me fired the shot.
Q. What was clear to you from your vantage position was that the main body of the march had not come by when you fired the rifle?
A. That is as I recollect it: that the main body of the march had not arrived. But your suggestion to me that, um, Mr Johnston and Mr Donaghy were shot, when?
Q. Later on?
A. It has always been my assumption that they were actually shot — I do not know the exact timing — it has always been my assumption that they were shot before the main body of the march arrived.
Q. And on the basis of that assumption, you fitted the rest of the story around that?
A. On the basis of what I believe. What I have told this Tribunal is what I believe.163
Civilian Evidence relating to the timing of OIRA 1's shot
Civilian Evidence of an Early Single Isolated Shot
6G-123 There is civilian evidence of a single shot being fired before Damien Donaghy and John Johnston had been wounded. Several of these witnesses believe that a soldier on the north side of William Street fired the shot they heard. Such an assumption, although undoubtedly wrong, is understandable given the visible presence of soldiers, some of whom were looking down their sights, and the fact that the sound of a bullet striking a position to the north may have been mistaken as the sound of a bullet being fired.
6G-124 Joe Carlin gave the following account to the Sunday Times:
163 Day 393/077/02-25 But I had heard a single shot – a high velocity shot – just as I went in off William Street ... it came from the direction of Gt James St. It didn’t come from the Bog, in front of me. So we proceeded through to the back and hid behind the wall ... but nothing seemed to be happening...on the corner the Aggro was still going on. While we were standing there, a small boy by our side was hit.\\textsuperscript{164}
6G-125 It would seem that Mr Carlin heard a high velocity shot which was wholly unconnected with, and some significant time before, Damien Donaghy was shot close to him.
6G-126 Charles Gallagher says he was only 100-200 metres behind the lorry leading the march:
\\begin{quote} When I reached the corner of Abbey Street...I heard a shot which I believe came from Stevenson’s bakery...I thought the shot was a high velocity shot...At the time I thought that I was the only person who had heard the shot and felt a bit of an idiot when giving my statement to NICRA but with hindsight think that others must have heard it.\\textsuperscript{165} \\end{quote}
His evidence confirmed that the shot was fired during the early stages of the march:
\\begin{quote} Q. Did you see anybody in the William Street area throwing stones, shouting at soldiers?
A. No, no, none at all, no.
Q. You go on to say in paragraph 7 that as far as you were aware there was no reaction amongst the crowd to this shot?
A. Yeah, that surprised me a bit because I -- maybe it was because I lived in the area and knew it so well, you sort of get to know an area amazingly well, but I was convinced it was a shot and I know I said it the next day and I do not think many other people said it, but I said what I thought happened, you know.\\textsuperscript{166} \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{164} AC150.2 \\textsuperscript{165} AG6.1 paragraphs 3-5 \\textsuperscript{166} Day 105/034/10-21 He confirmed to the Tribunal, in answer to questions asked by Edwin Glasgow, QC that there had been no reaction to the shot at all:
Q. It was a fairly crowded street? A. Yes, it was a fairly crowded street, yes.
Q. The one thing you have told the Tribunal about and it is in your statement, and of course I am not challenging, is the thing that struck you was, when you heard that shot, there appeared to be no reaction at all? A. Yes.
Q. You are quite clear about that? A. I was surprised, yes.
Q. A single shot, you are sure about that are you, what you heard was one shot on its own? A. One, yes.
Q. You said yourself you felt a bit of an idiot, but you did not understand why, whatever that shot was and wherever it had come from, there appeared to be no reaction at all? A. No, I do not remember any particular reaction, yes.
Q. Looking down the crowd in William Street in front of you there was nobody running around, or reaction from the crowd at all that you can recollect? A. No, there was not.167
6G-127 Martin Hegarty similarly suggests that there was no reaction from the crowd to this first shot which was fired:
I was marching east along William Street, having reached ...[Abbey Street]... I heard a shot...The shot I heard, which was the first shot I heard that day, was definitely a single high velocity shots which I recognised, as much as one can, as coming from an army weapon. I think it was some time after 3.30 pm when I heard it...
167 Day 105/054/03-25 Whilst people may have been a little anxious when the shot rang out, there was no real panic. People certainly did not run on hearing the shot, albeit that they probably could not have done so because there were so many people packing the street...I did not hear any reports that anyone had been hit by the shot that I heard. Later, when I heard the news and was able to piece things together, I concluded that perhaps the shot that I heard had been the shot that hit the first man.\\textsuperscript{168}
Sheila Ingram:
When I reached...midway down William Street...a single shot rang out...I recognised this shot instantly as a high velocity shot...I formed the impression that the shot was fired from a height, from somewhere on the north side of William Street...I would say that there was a feeling of anxiety amongst the crowd for, perhaps, a few seconds, although I would not say that anyone panicked. There was chitter chatter through the crowd. However, as the shot was not followed by any other shots people soon carried on walking and the march proceeded along William Street...I do not think that I addressed my mind at the time to whether the shot was an army shot or a civilian shot. I had not seen anyone throwing stones, or anything else for that matter, on William Street.\\textsuperscript{169}
The "impression" of the shot coming from the north of William Street is perhaps understandable, this being the area where the shot hit. Ms Ingram's evidence indicates that this shot was not related to the wounding of Damien Donaghy or John Johnston – following which people did not simply revert to carrying on walking.
Professor William McCormack also heard a single shot in William Street. Professor McCormack attributed the shot to a soldier on the GPO who he had observed aiming his rifle at a group of youths who had been stoning him.\\textsuperscript{170} However he agreed that it was possible that the soldier had not in fact fired a shot, but merely been pointing his rifle at the boys.\\textsuperscript{171} Professor McCormack believes
\\textsuperscript{168} AH62.2 paragraphs 8-10 \\textsuperscript{169} AJ1.2 paragraph 7 \\textsuperscript{170} AM136.3 paragraph 18 \\textsuperscript{171} Day 113/102/05-11 that he was in approximately the middle of the march\\textsuperscript{172} and that the shot was fired considerably before the main firing took place.\\textsuperscript{173} His evidence about the lack of reaction to the shot by the crowd in reply to questions by Mr Rawat demonstrates that this was a shot was unconnected with the shots fired later by Soldiers A and B which unquestionably induced a degree of understandable amongst a large number of those present in the vicinity.
\\textit{Q.} If we try and pick up the point you have made about what the march was like at that time, effectively it was static, was it not?
\\textit{A.} Yes.
\\textit{Q.} And your recollection is that after this soldier aimed at the young boy, no-one from the crowd called out?
\\textit{A.} That is correct and I was struck by that at the time. There was of course a lot of noise and I was looking in that direction. I did not, as it were, gaze round and find this incident. I simply was looking in that direction when it happened.
\\textit{Q.} Nor can you say that as a result people scattered?
\\textit{A.} No, apart from the boys who were already retreating and certainly the last one retreated very rapidly, nobody else seemed to move in response to this incident.
\\textit{Q.} You do say in your statement to this Inquiry that it did not seem to change the mood of the crowd, which you described as still buoyant at that point?
\\textit{A.} That is correct.\\textsuperscript{174}
6G-130 John Brown heard a single rifle shot from approximately the area of Kells Walk. It was not until some minutes later that a girl near Kells Walk shouted that a civilian had been shot.\\textsuperscript{175} Mr Brown confirmed, when he gave evidence, that he had heard only one shot and that it was the only shot he heard that day.\\textsuperscript{176} His
\\textsuperscript{172} Day 113/122/18-20 \\textsuperscript{173} Day 113/124/12-14 \\textsuperscript{174} Day 113/101/04-25 \\textsuperscript{175} AB93.2 paragraph 9-10 \\textsuperscript{176} Day 054/59/03-06 response to a question by Edwin Glasgow Q.C. about the direction from which the shot had been fired went on to volunteer evidence about the stage the march had reached which demonstrates that the shot Mr Brown heard was fired before the shots fired by Soldiers A and B:
It was in the William Street direction, but I did not see where there would be anything like that there because the marchers were still coming down. I was sort of halfway down there in the procession, me and this girl. She shouted somebody was shot in William Street and I did not believe that either and I was not going to — it looked to be a long time before there were going to be any political speeches so I decided to move on or go home, because I presumed it had descended into the usual riot.
Q. To the usual riot?
A. Yes.177
Kathleen Turner heard a single rifle shot as she came down William Street.178 At the time she associated the sound of the shot with a boy falling to the ground. Mrs Turner’s evidence is inconsistent with this being Damien Donaghy. The shot was fired at a time when the street was so full of people that it was not possible to turn round and retreat in the opposite direction.179 It is known that Damien Donaghy was shot at a time when only stragglers from the march and rioters were in William Street. The boy Mrs Turner saw fall in William Street was also a considerable distance north of the laundry waste ground where it is known that Mr Donaghy fell.180 Indeed Mrs Turner accepted that the connection between the shot and the boy falling was no more than an assumption on her part:
LORD SAVILLE: If you will forgive me, Mr Harvey. This young lad you saw, you say in paragraph 13:
"I did not stay around after the boy was shot ..." How are you able to say that he was shot? Could he possibly have been injured by a rubber bullet or do you have anything in your mind that helps us to show that he was actually shot?
A. No, I think I just made a connection in my mind between the rifle shot and the lad throwing up his arms, but in all honesty he could have been hit by a rubber bullet or a gas canister.181
William Martin Hegarty also associated the sound of a single high velocity shot with a civilian casualty, who he names as John Johnston. The evidence he gave about the stage the march had reached shows him to be confused and may well indicate that what he in fact heard was an early incoming round, possibly that fired by OIRA 1 from Columbille Court. In his BSI statement Mr Hegarty said he was only 40-50 yards from the front of the march. At the time of the shot he states the crowd in William Street was fourteen people abreast, and the mood still joyous and happy.182 His belief is that the shot occurred at around 15.25 to 15.30183 which can be said with certainty to have been before the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. Although it is right that Mr Hegarty refused to accept the suggestion put to him by Edmund Lawson Q.C., that the shot had been fired from the south of William Street,184 the other evidence he gave is consistent only with it having been an early shot fired by a member of the IRA. In particular, Mr Hegarty confirmed that he was quite sure that he heard the shot at the point when the beginning of the march had only just turned round into William Street.185 He agreed that he did not know John Johnston and only reached the conclusion that it was Mr Johnston who he had seen when it was suggested to him by others after the event.186 The man whom he assumed had been injured was carried from William Street itself to the end of the waste ground, he did not see him taken into a house.187 Mr Hegarty agreed that he had neither seen nor heard anything at the
181 Day 054/022/19-23/6 182 AH65.2 paragraphs 7-9 183 AH65.3 paragraph 13 184 Day 407/037/19-038/22 185 Day 407/038/23-039/01 186 Day 407/039/03-18 187 Day 406/039/24-041/06 time which suggested that another man, Damien Donaghy, had been shot or injured in the area. He heard only one shot.\\textsuperscript{188}
The absence of evidence supporting OIRA 1’s claim that he fired immediately after Donaghy and Johnson were shot.
OIRA 2’s evidence is that “it would have been a matter of seconds” between learning that two civilians had been shot and OIRA 1 firing back.\\textsuperscript{189} At the time there were a substantial number of people in and around the laundry waste ground, many of whom had retreated up William Street in order to escape the worst of the C.S. gas in and around Aggro Corner. According to Anthony Martin people had also been drawn to the Columbille Court area as news of two injured civilians spread. “There had just been wounded people. Everybody sorta goes to see what is going on.”\\textsuperscript{190} Martin estimated that he had seen six or seven people involved in the melee immediately around the gunman as he left Columbille Court and a further 24-25 people in the general area, although “there could have been a lot more people and there could have been fewer.”\\textsuperscript{191} Mr Martin had failed to mention the shot in the NICRA statement he made on 02.02.72.\\textsuperscript{192}
If, as OIRA 2 and OIRA 1 claim, OIRA 1 had fired a very short time indeed after the shots that injured Damien Donaghy and John Johnston had been fired it is unlikely that the many civilians in Columbille Court and in the laundry waste ground would not have heard this shot, which must, quite literally, have passed directly over their heads. The vast majority make no mention at all of any IRA activity. Others who admit to seeing a gunman in the area do not mention that there was no fire was returned, or positively assert that there was none.
\\textsuperscript{188} Day 407/041/15-042/07 \\textsuperscript{189} Day 392/073/21-25 \\textsuperscript{190} Day 176/117/22-24 \\textsuperscript{191} Day 176/118/01-21 \\textsuperscript{192} AM24.1-2 Colm O’Dombnaill heard shots fired by the army and saw a group gathered round an injured civilian on the ground. Mr O’Dombnaill was plainly very close to events in Columbciille Court and yet positively asserts that there was no return fire directed at the army:
There was a scuffle with a photographer but those who attempted to prevent him photographing the injured were fought back by other civilians and eventually he was permitted to go unmolested. There was a momentary panic when someone said that an IRA gunman was going to return fire. However this did not materialise and the crowd soon wandered freely again.193
Mr O’Dombnaill was asked about this incident by Christopher Clarke Q.C.:
Q. If we go to paragraph 11, you describe being near to the injured boy and hearing talk of somebody getting a rifle to fire back. Can you be any more specific about what you heard?
A. Well, this was a kind of conversation that went on among people. I am not even sure whether someone suggested getting a rifle, but, um, it struck me as an extremely insane thing to think about because we were in plain view of troops on the back of a building on Great James Street.
Q. Did anything come of it?
A. Nothing.194
Stephen McGonagle helped carry Damien Donaghy into the Sheils’ house in Columbciille Court, where he remained for a short time until he was satisfied that they were both being looked after.195 He comments that:
There was certainly no retaliation by the crowd. I am certain that if someone on that march had had a gun then there would have been a swift retaliation against those two soldiers...
...People were very annoyed about what had happened and I was quite worried that if anyone did have a gun on the march that this
193 AO19.10 194 Dav 088/144/13-24 195 AM253.4 paragraphs 16 and 19 was the time that it would be produced. My fears were fortunately unfounded.\\textsuperscript{196}
In fact Mr McGonagle did see a young man with a pistol near the William Street / Rossville Street junction a short time later, and it must be plain that if he had heard the alleged retaliatory shot about which he was apprehensive, he would have said so.\\textsuperscript{197}
Despite OIRA 7's attempts to corroborate the accounts which had been given, in the presence of a loyal OIRA team in the public gallery a few days earlier, by OIRAs 1 and 2,\\textsuperscript{198} his evidence contradicts their evidence that the shot was fired immediately after the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. Edmund Lawson Q.C. explored this aspect of his evidence with him:
...paragraph 33, you said you thought it was after about three to five minutes standing around that you heard a single high velocity shot, although you then add:
"It could have been ten to 15 seconds as the whole time just gets blurred in my mind."
A. That is right, you know, time in a situation, that is what I am saying, you know, it could have been ten to 15 seconds, it could have been more, it could have been less, I do not know.
Q. One thing that is clear is that you were not in the immediate vicinity when two or three shots were fired by, or apparently by soldiers?
A. I was not, no.
Q. No. The shots that are alleged to have been fired at Messrs Donaghy and Johnston; you did not hear those so you were not in the area then?
A. I did not hear them.
Q. You obviously arrived some time after that?
\\textsuperscript{196} AM253.5 paragraphs 22-23 \\textsuperscript{197} AM253.5 paragraph 25 \\textsuperscript{198} Day 399/041/08 A. There was a lot of noise going on, but what I am saying is: the shots that are supposed to have hit Johnston and Donaghy, I did not hear the shots.
Q. Bear with me. You arrived some time after those shots have been fired, it would appear?
A. I arrived after they were fired, yes.
Q. Then you spent some time talking to people in the area?
A. I spoke with people in the area, yes.
Q. The people milling around, and then you heard another shot?
A. And then I heard another shot, yes.
Q. Whatever else may be the position, it would be quite wrong, in your recollection of matters, would it not, to suggest shooting: bang, bang, bang: Johnston, Donaghy, shots take place, the shooting, bang, bang, bang, a brouhaha amongst those who are present, "the bastards are shooting", and a retaliatory or defensive shot coming straight from Columbille Court just like that; that did not happen, did it?
A. Because I did not hear the bang, bang, bang I do not know how quickly it happened.199
Peter Mullan witnessed the shooting of Damien Donaghy200 and helped to carry John Johnston some of the distance to Columbille Court.201 He told the Sunday Times that, a short time after helping the injured Mr Johnston, he had witnessed an altercation involving BBC pressmen near the door into which the injured had been taken.202 In his BSI statement Mr Mullan describes standing outside the house for a few minutes.203 He intervened briefly in the altercation involving the pressmen in an attempt to keep the peace.204 At this point he saw OIRA 1, who he
199 Day 398/148/20-150/08 200 AM450.6 paragraph 8. 201 Day 152/194/01-04 202 AM450.2 203 AM450.7 paragraph 12 204 AM450.2; Day 152/236/19-237/01 knew and is able to name, walking northwards towards the area where the two men had been shot.
I have been asked if I am aware of the rifle being fired by the man holding it. As far as I was aware, no shots had been fired from the gun at that point. If the rifle had been fired in my area, I would have heard it. I would think that any shot by the man would have been fired after the young man and Johnston had been shot. I say this because I had carried Johnston part of the way to the house in Columbille Court, after which I had spoken with someone I knew for a couple of minutes. It was therefore several minutes after the shootings of the young man and Johnston that the gunman was heading angrily towards William Street. My clear impression was that the man knew that people had been shot and he was going after the action.
Mr Mullan’s evidence is that he moved south along Abbey Street shortly after this altercation had taken place. The next gunfire he heard came from the south end of Rossville Street. On any view Mr Mullan’s evidence demonstrates that OIRA 1 did not fire immediately after Mr Donaghy and Mr Johnston were shot. If he in fact saw OIRA 1 leaving Columbille Court, and not, as he believes, entering the building in order to fire, his evidence supports the conclusion that OIRA 1 must have fired before the shooting of the two civilians as he heard no shooting between the time Damien Donaghy was shot and seeing the man on the stairs. It is perhaps this possibility that leads OIRA 1 to deny that he is the man Mr Mullan describes.
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205 AM450.8 paragraph 22; 152/204 206 AM450.7 paragraph 14 207 AM450.8 paragraph 20: Mr Mullan confirmed on oath that his impression was that OIRA 1 had not fired at this stage and that those who surrounded him were trying to prevent him from firing (Day 152/203/06-17; Day 152/216/11-23). When a section of OIRA 1’s account to the Sunday Times (PIN 437) was read to him Mr Mullan stated that it was possible that he had not heard the shot as he had been involved in the attack on the pressmen (Day 152/215/08-216/06), however it would have been odd if Mr Mullan had failed to hear a shot fired so close to him (as Mr. Mullan himself said when asked by Edwin Glasgow QC about other evidence of shots in the area; Day 152/240/02-08). 208 AM450.8 paragraph 25 209 Day 396/048/06 In his NICRA statement Frank Hone referred to hearing shots whilst near Columbcille Court; it is plain from his account that some minutes separated the shots which he attributed to the army and the heavier sound of a shot fired by a civilian gunman close to his position:
We withdrew via the side entries of Columbcille Court leading to Rossville St. It was then I heard shots; by their tone I knew they were Army rifles that were being used and being shot as far as I could guess from either the Abbey taxi-stand or the church roof. Then I heard two civilians being hit. About three minutes later I heard a heavier shot from very close to me in Keils Walk.210
Mr Hone now has no recollection of these events.211
Anthony Martin’s evidence supports the conclusion that OIRA 1 had removed the rifle he used to fire from a car in Glenfada Park prior to the march reaching William Street and any shooting by the army.
Q. ...In the account you gave to the Sunday Times you said that you met an IRA man and he told you that there were two rifles in a green Avenger parked in Glenfada Park and he wanted you to help him get to it.
You are recorded there saying:
"I learnt later that the rifles had been removed before the shooting started."
Is that something that you learnt?
A. Yes, I -- we were talking about the car and I was talking to somebody about it, but I got near that car, got the gun out, I most certainly would have used it against the army, (inaudible) and the guy said "well, you would not have got any guns in it because they were moved out".
Q. Did you learn when they had been moved out?
A. I, I was told shortly before -- shortly before the actual march.212 Mr Martin acknowledged that he did not in fact know when the weapons had been removed from the car. He was told only that they had been removed before the point at which he re-entered Glenfada Park having dealt with the deceased and wounded in the area, but whilst soldiers were still present. However he confirmed his opinion that the weapons had been removed at an early stage:
*I would assume it would have been before the shooting, not at the shooting or after.*
**THE ALTERCATION ON THE STAIRS**
As OIRAs 1 and 2 left Columbille Court a group that included members of the Provisional IRA accosted them. The incident is relevant not just in terms of chronology, but because it yet further undermines the credibility of OIRAs 1 and 2 and illustrates the extent to which they, and others from the Official IRA, have sought to orchestrate their evidence to this Inquiry. The presence of a third member of the Official IRA, OIRA 7, in Columbille Court at this time may well be further confirmation of the fact that this was a well known and pre-arranged sniping position used by the Official IRA.
**Credibility of OIRA 1 and 2’s accounts**
OIRA 1 gave the following account of the incident when he spoke to John Barry in 1972:
*OIRA 1 says he was then tackled, on the stairwell or at the entrance of the washing place to it, by three Provos: PIRA1, PIRA2, and PIRA3. PIRA 2 – the oldest of the group – took the lead, said “You cunt” etc. PIRA1 tried to grab the gun. OIRA 1 stuck it in his stomach and said he “I’ll fucking shoot you etc.” PIRA2 backtracked, said there is no need for all of this etc. Agreed that OIRA 1 wouldn’t fire again, and he was allowed to depart in peace.*
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212 Day 176/102/25-103/17 213 Day 176/104/25-105/02 OIRA 1 then has a very hazy chronology. He went back to Glenfada, put the rifle back in the boot of the car, and waited rather at a loose end.214
6G-145 OIRA 1 now repudiates this account:
I have never had an interview with Barry and therefore it is not me who says that I was tackled on the stairwell. I don’t remember any Provisionals being there and certainly not the three who were mentioned. I do not remember who the people on the stairwell were. I did not suggest I would shoot anybody in the way in which it is set out in these notes. It says that I agreed that I would not fire again. I had no intention of firing again.215
6G-146 There is, however, corroboration of the facts set out in PIN437 relating to this incident.
6G-147 PIRA 1 said that he had no recollection of PIRA 2 being present during the argument, but otherwise agreed with the contents of John Barry’s note that were put to him. He was asked in detail about the contents of the note and specifically agreed that, when he had tried to grab the rifle, OIRA 1 had stuck it in his stomach and threatened to shoot him. He also specifically agreed that OIRA 1 had agreed not to fire again and had been allowed to depart in peace.216
The evidence of OIRA 7
6G-148 OIRA 7 claims to have joined OIRA’s 1 and 2 as they left Columbille Court. He purports to corroborate their account of what occurred, in particular, in relation to Sector 1, that OIRA 1 fired after he had learnt that Damien Donaghy had been shot.217 His colleagues undermine his account. OIRA 1 told the Tribunal that he had no recollection of OIRA 7 joining or being present at the confrontation which
214 AOIRA 1.1 215 AOIRA 1.33 paragraph 60 216 Day 409/073/01-074/17 217 Day 398/031/12-16 took place on the stairs. In his BSI statement, OIRA 2 was clear that he and OIRA 1 were the only members of the organisation who were present:
_We were the only two members involved in the incident. If there were any other volunteers around they would have been on the march as ordinary citizens of Derry and no-one was waiting around for orders. As it was most, if not all, other volunteers were in the Creggan._
If, as OIRA 2 claims, the majority of the members of the Official IRA were in the Creggan on Bloody Sunday, the presence of OIRA 7 in Columbciille Court immediately after OIRA 1 had fired is surely very unlikely to have been a mere coincidence.
There is also evidence of a struggle involving a gunman close to Columbciille Court who was disarmed. OIRA 1 is resolute that the gun was not taken from him and that he personally returned it to the boot of a car in Glenfada Park. On OIRA 1’s own account, if his evidence is correct, the incident to which these witnesses refer must have involved another gunman.
Eamon Gallagher was unshakeable in his belief that he saw a gunman armed with a rifle in the area of Kells Walk prior to any shots being fired. Mr Finnegan’s suggestion that the gunman appeared only after army shots had been fired was emphatically denied. According to Mr. Gallagher as the man produced the rifle a group of men gathered around him and either broke or dismantled it.
...they gave me the impression that they did know him because they had no bother – he handed over the rifle to them and they dismantled it and one of the men said “there will be no shooting here today”
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218 Day 395/194/10-105/09 219 AOIRA2.22 paragraph 46 220 AOIRA 1.40 paragraph 119 221 Day 066/120/13-19 222 Day 066/072/09-13 OIRA 1 and 2 were expressed themselves as being absolutely certain that this was not incident that they were involved in. OIRA 2 expressly acknowledged the possibility of there being other riflemen in the area:
Q. If it happened, is another gunman in the area? A. It could well be.
Q. Do you have any recollection of what in fact you were wearing that day? A. I cannot really remember. Probably jeans and a jacket of some sort.
Q. So it is not you, anyway? A. Definitely not.
6G-152 Vinny Coyle gave the following account to the Sunday Times of disarming a gunman who he describes as a freelancer:
He heard a shot. It came from the second storey of Kells Court. Coyle is less than fully frank about what happened. But I take it he met up with Provo "Sean" coming over the waste ground. Anyway, Coyle was the bloke who had a furious row with the bloke who fired. And says he seized the gun and broke the butt against the man's chest. Says the chap was not an Official but a freelance.
6G-153 OIRA 1 says he knew Vinny Coyle and is adamant that he was not present. OIRA 1 was asked by Edmund Lawson Q.C.:
Q. You are aware, because you have been taken to it, of various other descriptions given, for example, by Father Bradley as he was, Vinny Coyle, et cetera, about another gunman in Columbille Court. If their accounts are right, whoever that gunman was, it was not you?
A. Well, as I understand it, Father Bradley's account was that he had seen all of this and then subsequently admitted that he had only heard it second-hand, so I would not take any notice of Father
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223 Day 396/047/12-048/08 224 Day 393/113/02-09 225 AC109.2 Bradley's account. As for Vinny Coyle's account, he says he broke the gun over someone's chest and I think I have pointed out that in my view it would have been more likely that the person's chest would have broke, so I do not think I take account of that view, either.
Q. It was not you? A. No, it was not.226
6G-IV CIVILIAN EVIDENCE OF OTHER GUNMEN IN SECTOR 1.
6G-154 There is civilian evidence that OIRA 1 was not the only gunman operating in the Bogside. Other gunmen were present with rifles and gunmen with handguns.
EVIDENCE OF OTHER GUNMEN ARMED WITH RIFLES
A rifle fired from behind the taxi office in William Street
6G-155 Anna O'Donnell gave the following account to NICRA of seeing a man emerge from the taxi office and fire a rifle from street level in response to a shot that, so she thought, had been fired by a soldier from the Presbyterian Church injuring a youth in the legs.
A man appeared with an old rifle behind the taxi office in William Street and fired one shot-hitting nothing. Other bystanders advised him to put the gun away as it would only draw fire, which he did immediately. I saw no sign of this man after this incident.227
Mrs O'Donnell may have been referring to the City Cabs office the location of which is marked with an arrow on the photograph below.
226 Day 396/048/09-24 227 AO20.1 The location from which the gunman appeared, and the fact that she says the man put the gun away immediately, would suggest that she is not describing OIRA 1.
The Observer Gallery proofs record information from the acting CO of the Official IRA in Londonderry on Bloody Sunday. According to the CO the Officials had two marksmen on duty. One covering Rossville Street from the corner of William Street and Rossville Street; the other in the Little Diamond covering William Street. Both were armed with rifles. 228
Evidence of high velocity fire heard at the City Cabs office timed at approximately 1605 apparently emanating from the west.
The evidence of David Tereshchuk is that a single isolated rifle shot was fired at about 1600. 229 He confirmed that he is quite sure that he did not hear multiple gunfire either before or immediately after this single shot. 230 Mr Tereshchuk's evidence to the Widgery Inquiry was that his impression of where the shot had emanated from coincided with that of witnesses who had described the shot as
228 ED24.9: OIRA3 claims not to remember having spoken to anyone from the Observer, AOIRA3.30 paragraph 56.5; he adds "...we had no-one positioned in Little Diamond as suggested here.", AOIRA3.33 paragraph 56.40 229 M77.12 paragraph 7 coming from the direction of the Little Diamond,\\textsuperscript{231} where, according to OIRA 3 a marksman was stationed in order to cover William Street. It is plain that a shot fired from this direction could not have hit the east side of the Presbyterian church. From an elevated position it is quite possible for the shot to have reached Barrier 13 and there is military evidence (see further below) of a shot fired at Barrier 13 shortly before 1 PARA deployed.
The same shot appears to have been heard by Simon Winchester and Nigel Wade who were also near the City Cabs office at the time. Although "IRA people" persuaded Mr Winchester after the event that it was the shot at the Presbyterian Church, Mr Winchester's initial impression was that this was a shot at an army barrier:
\\begin{quote} When I was in William Street standing by the City Radio Cabs office, I heard a single shot which I thought came from the direction of the Little Diamond. I thought it was a high velocity rifle shot and I said to my colleagues 'Provos', thinking that it was from an IRA sniper. I remember a woman standing to the door of the cabs office, saying to me 'You be sure you get it right who fired that shot'. I took her to mean the army fired it, but that was not my impression. I thought it was fired from the Little Diamond towards the army barricades. I did not hear the whine of the shot. This shot was fired between 4 pm and 4.05. I noted it in my notebook, which I produce to the Tribunal.\\textsuperscript{232} \\end{quote}
So far as the location of the gunman is concerned, Mr Winchester told this Tribunal that he still believes the shot came from behind him as he faced east looking towards Little James Street or William Street. Whilst he could not say specifically where the shot was from the arc of possibility included the Little Diamond, Rossville [Street] and Glenfada [Park].\\textsuperscript{233} Mr Winchester confirmed that the shot did not sound to him like a shot fired by the army.\\textsuperscript{234}
\\textsuperscript{230} Day 071/130/13-131/3 \\textsuperscript{231} M77.7 paragraphs E-F \\textsuperscript{232} M83.16 paragraph 12 \\textsuperscript{233} Day 116/031/07-15 \\textsuperscript{234} Day 116/103/05-14 Mr Winchester was referred to a passage from his book “Holy Terror” in which he made the following comment on the shot he heard:
*It turned out to have been from an IRA gun, fired at an army wire-cutting party. It injured no-one, but it gave an indication that there were IRA guns in the Bogside that day, despite the assurances given to me earlier.*
Mr Winchester explained why he had reached this conclusion about the shot:
*I did because IRA people that I spoke to much, much later once the dust had truly settled suggested that there was an early shot fired at a wire-cutting party. Now who told me that, I cannot tell you at this remove and it was a conversation I had in Belfast, not in Derry.*
Mr Winchester’s own evidence tends to suggest that this was not the shot fired at the Presbyterian Church.
Nigel Wade was with Simon Winchester and also heard a single rifle shot although he is now unable to say whether this occurred as he was walking down William Street or after he had observed rioting at Barrier 14 or say where the shot was fired from.
**Evidence of Handguns**
*The carrying of weapons by members of the Command Staff for Personal Protection*
The evidence of OIRA 4, who has said that members of the Command Staff had access to short arms for personal protection, further undermines the suggestion that all weapons had been removed to the Creggan. OIRA 4 was himself was
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235 Day 116/147 236 Day 116/147/24-148/4 237 Day 109/199 238 Day 109/124 239 Day 109/198/18-199 carrying a .32 pistol on Bloody Sunday for that purpose. It would be surprising if other members of the Command Staff, including OIRAs 1 and 2, were not doing the same, particularly given that, on their own accounts, they were to undertake the task of recovering a defective weapon from an area close to where large numbers of soldiers were deployed. OIRA 2 agreed that they were both authorised to carry a handgun for personal protection but said, despite the dangerous mission on which he was engaged neither he nor OIRA 1 carried a weapon for their personal protection. No weight can be given to the fact that both deny carrying arms other than the .303 recovered from the dump in Columbille Court, having regard to the wholly incredible evidence they have both given to the Tribunal.
A Handgun fired from Kells Walk Balcony
6G-164 Teresa Bradley describes seeing a gunman on a Kells Walk balcony in the location marked with an arrow on the photograph below.
6G-165 Mrs Bradley confirmed on oath the accuracy of the following passage from her BSI statement:
12. ...my attention was grabbed by a gunman at the front end of Kells Walk ... The man was standing completely alone and was
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240 AOIRA4.15 paragraphs 3-4 241 Day 393/096/11-22 242 AB70.14 243 Day 064/035-038 pointing a handgun straight in front of him with arm outstretched, and was firing it in the direction he was facing (the north). He was quite close to me. It was not a heavy gun and the firing sounded like "pops". I heard him shoot several times. His arm and the gun were moving up and down as he fired.
13. The crowd around me who had seen him fire got very irate and were shouting at the man form him to stop shooting.
14. ... average height and slim ... maybe my age at the time ... He had a light coloured jacket on, not any overcoat. 244
6G-166 There can be no doubt, given Mrs Bradley's description of the weapon and the location of the gunman, that the man she saw was not OIRA 1. Further confirmation of this is Mrs Bradley's evidence that the gunman she saw, unlike OIRA 1, had not been physically approached. 245
A pistol fired from street level from near Kells Walk / Columbille Court
6G-167 David Capper saw a separate gunman. Mr Capper witnessed a man three or four feet 246 from him firing a pistol from a position slightly to the east of the Shiels' house in Columbille Court. 247 The shot was fired five to eight minutes after the shooting of Damien Donaghy. 248
I did not see him fire. I heard the bang, looked round and I could see him put a handgun into the coat and then blend into the crowd. 249
6G-168 The man was facing north towards the Presbyterian Church and Mr Capper says he assumed the man had fired at soldiers in the derelict buildings close to the church. 250 Mr Capper confirmed on oath that he had seen the gunman. He described him as being in his thirties or forties, wearing a brown overcoat and
244 AB70.2 paragraph 12-14 245 Day 064/063-064 246 Day 073/014 247 Day 073/069 248 Day 073/070 249 Day 073/011/03-05
VI 334 carrying a pistol. He explained that, for “diplomatic” reasons he had given the impression to the Widgery Inquiry that he had not seen the gunman as he had not wanted to get involved in identity parades. Mr Capper was questioned at length, and he declared himself to be positive that the gunman had fired from ground level. There can therefore be little doubt that this was not the same shooting incident that was witnessed by Mrs Bradley who saw a pistol being fired several times from a balcony at the back of Kells Walk, or OIRA 1. It is evident from the answers that Mr Capper gave in response to questions asked by Edwin Glasgow Q.C. that the Tribunal ought to have heard from many more witnesses about this incident. Mr Glasgow inquired the number of civilians present when the gunman had fired:
Q. What is the sort of size of the crowd?
A. 20, 30. This was after all the milling around and we had been chased and told to get lost and I was standing on the pavement or in the road, um, thinking what am I going to do now, where should I go, should I try and get back in, should I wait and then the bang and he fires this one shot.
Q. Again your recollection is that after the incident they scattered?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Again, I want to be clear: no question of a confrontation between the crowd and the gunman or anything like that?
A. No, they, they, like me, felt that if a shot had been fired that close to them, it was a possibility that the army might have fired back or done something and they were anxious to get out of the road, and so indeed was I.
Mr Capper’s evidence is therefore that this gunman, unlike OIRA 1, was not challenged by a crowd after he had fired. OIRA 1 is resolute that Mr Capper is not describing him:
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250 Day 073/011 251 Day 073/065/07-14 252 Day 073/123/09-23 253 Day 073/123/24-124/16 I know nothing about the evidence he has given about a short man of 30 to 40 years firing one round from a pistol towards soldiers in a derelict building near the Presbyterian Church. It is not me. I did not have a pistol that day.254
A pistol fired from the crowd in William Street prior to the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston.
6G-170 Ciaran Donnelly, gave evidence to Lord Widgery of a single shot from a revolver fired from the crowd in William Street approximately 20 minutes before 1 PARA deployed.255 His evidence to this Inquiry suggests that this shot occurred prior to any other gunfire, military or civilian.256
6G-171 Mr Donnelly gave a detailed description the gunman in his BSI statement:
4. ...a man aged forty to fifty years old, about 5'6" tall with dark hair, wearing a blue suit jacket, dark trousers and a white open-necked shirt, fire a short aimed at derelict house. The firearm he was holding was a small handgun or possibly a starting pistol. I remember thinking that this man appeared to be drunk. After he had fired the shot the crowd around him of fifteen to twenty people said something like "don't be so bloody stupid, clear off" to him. I cannot remember where he was standing when he fired this shot but I do remember that he was aiming toward a bricked up derelict house. 257
6G-172 According to Mr Donnelly's evidence to Lord Widgery the house was in William Street.258 He now believes it more likely that the building was an industrial building rather than a house.259 Giving evidence to this Inquiry Mr Donnelly initially maintained, as he had done to Lord Widgery, that he had not actually seen the man fire.260 When pressed he made the following concession:
254 AOIRA1.40 paragraph 118 255 M22.5 paragraph D 256 Day 071/83-84 257 M22.20 paragraph 4 258 M22.5 paragraph A-D 259 Day 071/068/17 260 Day 071/017 Yeah, maybe, maybe I did see it. It is hard to say. It was a long time ago.261
The fact that Mr Donnelly has consistently described the gun shot as being from a pistol or revolver makes it most unlikely that this was the shot at the Presbyterian Church, which military witnesses overwhelmingly believed to have been high velocity. Mr Donnelly describes an isolated shot, entirely unconnected with the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston.262
**Gunman with a pistol firing from a building on the South of William Street**
Derek Humphry spoke to a member of the Official IRA who admitted firing a pistol shot from a building on the south side of William Street towards soldiers near the GPO building in response to the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston.263 He was asked by Mr Clarke:
*You spoke to this man yourself, did you?*
- A. Yes.
*Q. Not through an intermediary, you actually saw him?*
- A. No.
*Q. Did he describe where he was at the time when he fired this shot?*
- A. I cannot recall, sir.
*Q. What was described as a pistol shot, was it?*
- A. Definitely, yes.
*Q. One only or more than one?*
- A. One, one shot from one pistol.264\* Other corroboration for the presence of handguns in and around William Street prior to the deployment of IPARA.
6G-175 Chris Myant was a journalist who assisted with the taking of NICRA statements. He was told by a young woman that she was sure that somebody had fired a handgun in William Street, although she was unsure about the timing. Mr Myant’s view was that she was hysterical and had probably got it wrong; an opinion which is devalued given the other evidence which confirms that at least one gunman armed with a pistol, and probably more, were active in and around William Street at this time.
6G-176 In his 1972 statement Thomas Mullarkey refers to hearing “a single shot, loud, a revolver I thought, but I could not place where it came from.” The shot was timed shortly after four or five high velocity shots. Mr Mullarkey now has no recollection of this incident but confirmed the reliability of his 1972 evidence.
6G-177 John Long did not hear any shots but as he passed through an alleyway from Kells Walk towards Columbille Court with a doctor for Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, he saw people pushing to get out in the opposite direction. Mr Long recalls that someone mentioned a handgun had been seen and they all wanted to get away. Mr Long said he had not been told where this man had been seen.
Accounts of multiple shots fired from near Kells Walk.
6G-178 William Burke describes in his NICRA statement witnessing the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. He was close to the group who gathered round them:
I stayed around the fringe of this group of people for say five minutes and continued in the direction of Kells Walk. About this
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265 Day 122/176-178 266 AM452.2 The words which are underlined have been added to the typed statement in manuscript. 267 Day 069/034 268 Day 068/096 time I heard three or four shots and ran round beside some garages for cover. Some people were persuading three men to move on and break off firing at the soldiers because of the risk to innocent people around.269
Although the statement does not make it explicit, it appears from the context that Mr Burke saw these gunmen before 1 PARA had deployed. The possibility that this is simply yet another version of the struggle involving OIRA 1 is contradicted by the details in Mr Burke's account of the number of shots. Nor is this likely to have been Teresa Bradley's gunman who was on his own, and who disappeared after firing without being involved in any kind of struggle.
Noreen Donnelly is another witness who refers to the presence of more than one gunman. Her undated 1972 statement describes what must be the injured John Johnston. Five minutes later she was told by a man to "Look at the man on the flats with a gun." She could not see him as she did not have her glasses on. Noreen Donnelly then moved to Rossville Street. Her statement records that:
As I was about to enter the arch at Kells Walk a boy told me to go back. "Don't come in here as the boys have guns up in the flats. There are about thirty." 270
This incident occurred ten minutes before the main episode of shooting broke out in Rossville Street.271 It is not clear from the statement where the gunmen referred to were. It may be that it was either Columbcille Court or Kells Walk. It is unlikely that she means the Rossville Flats as it would have made no sense for her to be told not to go behind Kells Walk if this were the case.
Eye Witness accounts of civilians calling for a line of fire prior to the deployment of 1 PARA
Evidence that civilians were warned that a gunman was about to fire corroborates not only the presence of gunmen in the area but also that a substantial number of
269 AB105.1 270 AD127.1 271 AD127.1 civilians in the area must have been aware of their presence and their intentions. Much of this activity appears to have occurred shortly before, and in anticipation of, the deployment of troops down Rossville Street.
6G-183 The *Sunday Times* note of an interview with Joe Carlin suggests that a line of fire was called for prior to the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston. Mr Carlin refers to retreating as CS gas drifted up William Street:
> So we went up ahead of it [the gas], to the entrance where you go through, through rouble and you go in to Glenfada. As we were going through, a line of fire was shouted for. People lay flat or stepped aside. I was just off the road, moving inside (2) when word came back to get flat, get flat. There must have been 35-40 people at that stage moving through it...While I was clambering over this the word came back “Get down, they’re shooting”. I didn’t know who “they” were, but people were looking back in the direction of the old Bog and hiding to protect themselves from that direction. But there was no shooting. So everyone got up from behind their stones and walked on. But I had heard a single shot – a high velocity shot – just as I went in off William Street.272
6G-184 The precise location where this occurred is unclear. It appears that Mr Carlin was either referring to the laundry waste ground or to a passageway between the north gable end of the Kells Walk block of flats and William Street. The incident is clearly separate from the single rifle shot he heard.
6G-185 *Sunday Times* notes of an interview with [James] Brendan O’Connor and Kieran O’Connor record that one, or both of the brothers, was with Mr Carlin, and appears to have witnessed the same incident. The notes record that:
> One young man, in a white coat, clearing a line of fire around the front of Kells Walk in Rossville Street.273
6G-186 Mr James Bredan O’Connor now denies ever giving an interview to the *Sunday Times* or that he saw the incident recorded in the notes.274
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272 AC150.2 273 AO10.11 Simon Winchester may also have witnessed the same incident; but also saw an earlier instance of civilians being warned that a gunman was about to fire:
*I saw boys clearing paths for snipers on two occasions on Bloody Sunday. The first was before I heard the first shot. At this time I saw boys clearing a path in William Street at the place marked “F” grid reference KO8.*
Mr Winchester concedes that his recollection of the first line of fire is extremely hazy. His evidence in relation to the second line of fire is that it was called for after the first shot in the area south of Kells Walk. Mr Winchester remained in the area for about five minutes during which time no shots were fired. His oral evidence to the present Inquiry was somewhat at odds with the contents of his statement in suggesting that both incidents occurred in the area of Kells Walk Street.
Nigel Wade said he could not recall the first line of fire referred to by Mr Winchester. He is, however, able to recall two men, who he assumed were members of the IRA, clearing a line of fire from Kells Walk Street through to
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274 Day 108/146-151; Day 108/153; Day 108/161-164 275 M83.9 paragraphs 52-54 276 Day 116/34 277 M83.9 paragraphs 54-55 278 Day 116/033-036 279 Day 109/205 Rossville Street. This incident occurred two or three minutes before 1 PARA came down Rossville Street.
The evidence of this activity suggests that there were several gunmen in the area preparing to fire at 1 PARA as they deployed into the Bogside. This conclusion is supported by the evidence of Stephen McGonagle who gives a detailed description in his BSI statement of a man with a pistol or revolver standing slightly south of the junction of Rossville Street and William Street apparently lying in wait for soldiers, but disarmed before they arrived:
I could see a young man of about seventeen or eighteen walking around this area. This young man was wearing a gabardine raincoat which I remember thinking was strange as it was a fair day and not raining. I saw the young man put his hand into the left pocket of his coat and pull out either a pistol or a revolver. He held this in his left hand pointing towards the ground. The young man was walking around as if he was looking for a vantage point from which to open fire.
26. This young man was followed by two people who I knew to be IRA activists. These two men quickly disarmed the young man and I would estimate that this young man was only walking in the open with his gun for about three minutes.
The precise timing of this sighting is unclear. Mr McGonagle says that Rossville Street was very quiet at the time as most people had gone to Free Derry Corner for the meeting; he is therefore presumably talking about a period very shortly before the deployment of 1 PARA.
Marion McMenamin’s account of seeing a gunman near Kells Walk as 1 PARA deployed down Rossville Street is further evidence of a plan to fire at soldiers as they entered the Bogside, and specific corroboration for INQ1383’s account of a gunman with a pistol in this location.285
6G-193 There is Sunday Times material recording discussions with Ivan Cooper which refers to the presence of CIV2 Martin McGuinness and PIRA 17 “in a house in William Street, almost down by C street” armed with Thompsons and a pistol prior to the deployment of troops through the barriers. The notes record a plan to fire through the doorway at soldiers who were occupying houses on the other side of William Street, but state that the trio became trapped and none of the weapons was fired.286 Mr Cooper has described the notes as “poisonous,” and rejects them in their entirety.287 It is not know what truth lies behind this account but it is submitted that there is likely to be some.
6G-V MILITARY ACCOUNTS OF SECTOR 1 FIRING
THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH SHOT
6G-194 There is a considerable body of military evidence of an incoming high velocity shot striking a drainpipe on the east side of the Presbyterian Church above the heads of the Mortar Platoon wire cutting party.288 A large number of soldiers
285 Day 304/129-130 286 KC12.68 287 KC12.12 paragraph 97 288 for example, Soldier N B397, B438.004 paragraph 21-22; Soldier M B359; Soldier K B297, B311.005 paragraph 8; Soldier O B466 paragraphs 1-2, B575.110 paragraphs 19-23; Soldier P B595 paragraph D - B596 paragraph A; Soldier T B734; Soldier U B766, B787.003 paragraph 13, Day 369/012/15-015/17; Soldier V B801, B821.003 paragraph 2.1; Soldier O B635; B657.2 paragraph 13; Soldier 002 B1363.002 paragraph 9; Soldier 006 B1375, B1377.003 paragraph 9; Soldier 013 B1406, B1408.002 paragraph 10; Soldier 014 B1409, B1412.003 paragraphs 14-15; Soldier 017 B1484.002, paragraph 9; Soldier 018 B1485, B1491 paragraph 12; Soldier 019 B1494.001 paragraph 5, Day 343/097/07-14; Soldier 024 B1526; Soldier 032 B1613, B1616.004 paragraph 14, Day 362/006/12-22; Soldier 035 B1625, B1628.003 paragraphs 11-14; Soldier 039 B1651.2 paragraphs 9-11, Day 362/056/11-17; Soldier 106 B1711, Day 299/054/12-056/25; Soldier 112 B1730, B1732.002 paragraph 9, Day 320/093/16-094/25; Soldier 119 B1752.013 paragraph 20; Soldier 200 B1979, B2011 paragraph A-B; INQ007 B1287 paragraph 44; INQ0024 C24.1 paragraphs 4-6; INQ0025 C25.2 paragraphs 13-14; INQ0127 C127.3 paragraphs 10-12; INQ0147 C147.1 paragraphs 5-7; INQ0366 C366.2 paragraphs 12-16; INQ0468 C468.2 paragraph 13; INQ0739 C739.3 paragraph 16, Day 306/017/04-19/02; INQ0748 C748.1 paragraph 5; INQ0768 ...continued witnessed the shot including members of Guinness Force, who were gathered together in the grounds of the church, and members of Mortar Platoon. As a consequence, shortly before they entered the Bogside they became aware of the presence of at least one sniper intent on killing them. This intention was attested to by OIRA 2 who confirmed to Edmund Lawson Q.C.:
Q. ... if you are going to shoot a soldier, you decide to shoot to kill him? A. I would imagine so, aye. Q. Not to give him an ear ache, to kill him? A. That's right.289
That a soldier was not killed was pure good fortune. Unsurprisingly the knowledge that a shot had been fired had an effect on some of those who were awaiting their deployment into the Bogside.
INQ0768, a member of Mortar Platoon, was very close to the drainpipe. His BSI statement records that:
The downpipe split and shattered. Debris from the downpipe fell onto us... We were very open on the flat roof and I remember this was a frightening experience as I expected the gunman to adjust his sights and fire again at us. We got off the roof quickly...290
Soldier 019, another member of Mortar Platoon also recalls pieces of the drainpipe landing near him. He recalls that: “I was not shocked by being shot at but it certainly woke me up.”291 Soldier O was aware of a general change in the mood of the troops in the churchyard:
After we had heard this shot, the mood in the churchyard became more serious: we realised that the prospect of the Rossville Flats being used by snipers had become a fact... 292
However whilst the shot may have raised the level of adrenalin, Soldier O’s evidence makes it clear that it had no effect on the purpose, or implementation of the arrest operation:
...the mood had not changed to “we’re going in to shoot this lot” and indeed this attitude was never there at any time. The idea was still the same for us to get into the crowd and make arrests. 293
Guinness Force soldiers describe the incident, and its effect on them, in similar terms. Soldier K’s evidence is that:
...I was standing east of the Presbyterian Church ...All of a sudden, there was a shot which hit the drainpipe, six feet in front of me. The shot hit the drainpipe quite high up it and ricocheted off. My instant reaction was to hit the deck...Hearing the shot made the adrenalin start running. There was also a certain amount of fear as someone was firing at us and I could not see who or from where. 294
Timing
It is not possible to ascertain the precise timing of this shot. It is known that Guinness Force arrived in the area of the church at about 1500. 295 The shot is recorded in Colonel Loden’s diary of operations under the entry timed 15:55. 296 The evidence of the majority of soldiers who witnessed the shot suggest that this timing is broadly correct. Soldier 106 told the RMP that he had moved from the church yard approximately 15 minutes after the shot. Soldier Q also times the shot as having occurred approximately 15 minutes before receiving the order to move off in vehicles to Barrier 12. Others, for example INQ0127, and Soldier 035, simply describe the shot as having been fired shortly before mounting up in vehicles.
The vast majority of those soldiers who were aware of the shot which hit the church did not hear the shots fired by members of the Machine Gun Platoon from the derelict building with nine windows. This is not surprising given the noise of rioting both in the area of Aggro Corner and in the area further to the west of William Street from where the shots were fired. Those who did hear both episodes of firing confirm that the shot that hit the church was fired first.
Colonel Loden’s diary of operations suggests that the shot at the Presbyterian Church was fired shortly before the shots fired by Soldiers A and B. The entry timed 1555 records:
One high velocity round was fired from the direction of Rossville flats at the wire cutting party. The shot struck a drainpipe on the east wall of the Presbyterian church approximately four feet above the heads of the wire cutting party. The drainpipe is holed. A few moments after this a member of the Machine Gun Platoon observed a man preparing to ignite a nailbomb at the corner of the building [then he gives a grid reference] on the south side of William Street.
The Platoon Commander then gave orders to a Corporal and a soldier to open fire as the bomber prepared to throw. These two soldiers did so and the man was seen to fall and was dragged away by his comrades. Colonel Loden's statement of 17.02.72 records that:
At approximately 1555 hours, I heard one HV round fired from the direction of the Rossville Flats. I heard the crack and believed this round had been fired at the Mortar Platoon wire cutting party...A few minutes later I heard several shots from the MG Platoon in the disused building...
Colonel Loden remained confident that the order of events was as set out in his diary, although his evidence is that the seemingly precise timings in the document were not noted down at the time. He was asked by Christopher Clarke Q.C.:
When things were happening, at for instance 1550 and 1555, was anybody making a note or anything of the kind?
A. No, sir.
Q. So these are timings recollected when, for instance, the Diary of Operations was compiled?
A. Correct, sir.
Q. How confident or otherwise are you in the sequence of events, that is to say as to whether or not the shots from the Machine-Gun Platoon in the disused building followed or preceded the shot at the drainpipe?
A. I am absolutely positive, the shot at the drainpipe was first.
Q. You still have that in your mind now, have you?
A. Absolutely, yes. Soldier 200 also heard two episodes of firing before deploying. His evidence to Lord Widgery was that the first of these had been incoming fire at the Presbyterian Church; the second episode was SLR fire from a derelict building. He was asked by Mr McSparran:
Q. When you were at the Presbyterian church did you hear any firing? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you hear SLR firing? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did that come from a building which was close by? A. I should think it was in the area of the building that has been burnt down.
Q. That is what is referred to at the moment as the derelict building? A. Yes.
Q. How many shots did you hear? A. I only remember hearing one.
Q. But you now know that they fired five shots from there? A. I believe it is correct.
Q. Would it be right that that was the first firing you heard that afternoon? A. No sir.
Q. What firing had you heard before that? A. I was the wire-cutting party.
Q. And there was one high velocity shot fired? A. Yes.
The order appears in the document Soldier 200 produced in preparation for the Widgery Inquiry entitled "Sequence of events." In it the following list appears under the sub-heading "Church":
a. Access
b. HV shot (Warned by K)
c. MG Pl
d. Return to veh.
Soldier 200 has no present recollection of the order in which shots were fired but is able to confirm that his 1972 evidence would have been of his own personal recollection; not simply the sequence of events which he had learned from others. It may not have been helpful for Mr O'Donovan to suggest that, because Soldier 200 could not at the time identify the source of the SLR firing he heard, that he could not say whether it was before or after the incoming shot. Soldier 200 was resolute about the correctness of his 1972 evidence:
A. I am going back to what I told you: that -- as far as sequence of events is concerned. I have no doubt in my mind about the sequence of events and, therefore, I am not sure how you could expect me to answer further than that.
As far as I am concerned the sequence of events are clearly in my mind as far as the two incidents you are referring to, and the only actual information I received after my initial statement was that the, the bangs, the high velocity shot in the area to the right of the Presbyterian Church or the west, I then found out later it was
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304 B2011 paragraph A-C 305 B2022.060 306 Day 367/069/09-071/04 307 Day 368/096/05
7.131g Machine-Gun Platoon. I am sorry, I cannot go any further than that.
6G-208 Soldier A was aware of incoming fire before he and other members of Machine Gun Platoon moved forward to the derelict building.
Before we moved forward, to take position in a derelict building, I was aware of a shot or possibly two shots being fired. I cannot remember if I actually heard the shot or shots or whether someone told me that we had been fired at and to keep my head down.
INCOMING ROUNDS EXPERIENCED BY SOLDIERS AT BARRIER 12
6G-209 Several soldiers at Barrier 12 were aware of incoming fire directed at, or very close to, their position prior to the barrier being lifted. The location of Barrier 12, approximately 100 yards from the Presbyterian Church, makes it unlikely that this was the shot which hit the Presbyterian Church. The fact that more than one shot was fired before the deployment of 1 PARA is corroborated by the significant body of civilian evidence which demonstrates the presence of several active IRA gunmen in Sector 1.
6G-210 W.O. INQ0836 recalls a shot fired at an early stage of the march, before serious rioting had broken out:
10. As the crowd passed us a shot was fired from the south and hit a wall near to where I was standing. I immediately looked up and saw a mark where the bullet had hit about three or four feet above my head, so nine to ten feet from the ground. It was a low velocity bullet so I did not worry about it. I just heard an impact and looked up to the wall it had hit. Because of where it had hit the wall I would calculate that it had come from the direction of the Rossville Flats.
11. The bullet did not cause any particular panic. It was an isolated incident amongst the commotion and the noise going on at any time.\\textsuperscript{310}
6G-211 INQ0836 marked with an arrow on the photograph below the location where he believes the bullet struck:\\textsuperscript{311}
6G-212 INQ0785 recalls a number of shots fired at Barrier 12 shortly before 1 PARA deployed:
12. At one point, while the riot was going on, the Battery commander went around to confer with the paras Regimental Sergeant Major in Great James Street...
13. The Battery commander and I returned to Barrier 12. Suddenly, there was a low velocity shot. I was standing in the street and I heard as well as sensed the shot ... Further similar shots, (fewer than five in total) were fired at us. It was definitely not automatic fire...Although I could not say exactly where the shots were fired from nor where they were fired to, I think I instinctively kept my
\\textsuperscript{310} C836.2 paragraphs 10-11 \\textsuperscript{311} Day 301/031 back to the Rossville Flats, because we were aware that there was a possibility of being shot from there.312
6G-213 INQ0345's exact location is unclear; he was possibly at Barrier 12. He refers in his BSI statement to a high velocity shot hitting a wall somewhere above head height which appeared to have been fired from somewhere behind the march. No more than a minute later a second high velocity shot was fired, aimed lower; he believes it was probably fired from the same gun and same location as the first.313
6G-214 INQ0145 was at barrier 12 when he heard two shots "coming towards my general area".314 The shots were very close together, probably from two different weapons and probably from .303 rifles.315 INQ0145 did not hear bullet strikes. The shots were fired 10-15 minutes before 1 PARA deployed.316 INQ0145 gave evidence that at the time the shots were fired there were still a large number of people in the street, enabling him to conclude that the shots must have been fired before 1 PARA's deployment.317
6G-215 INQ0178 recalls a short burst of automatic gunfire from in front of Barrier 12. He took cover;318 when he returned to his position the barrier had been opened and 1 PARA was deploying.319 INQ0113, who was in a location on the City Walls, also heard automatic gunfire at about this time.
After I had watched the riot, I heard one burst of Thompson machine gun fire which lasted approximately five to ten seconds...It would have been at around 4.00 pm. I said to Major INQ1484, "There's a fucking Thompson going off down there!".320
312 C785.2 paragraphs 12-13 313 C345.3 paragraph 16 314 C145.2 paragraphs 10-11 315 Day 278/019/19-020/13 316 C145.2 paragraphs 10-11 317 Day 278/019/18 318 Day 339/107/18-21 319 C178.3 paragraph 23 320 C113.5 paragraph 39 INQ0007's statement to the RMP described how he heard a crack and thump above his head two minutes before Support Company moved out of Queen Street. The shot came from the direction of the Rossville Flats.\\textsuperscript{321} His present recollection is that the shot was fired after 1 PARA had deployed.\\textsuperscript{322} However he was firm that the shot was distinct from at the Presbyterian Church:
\\textit{...I am quite clear in my own mind now that (a) there was a shot at the Presbyterian Church when I was standing in the courtyard there and that later, when I went down to the barrier [12] to go through, there was another shot then.}\\textsuperscript{323}
**INCOMING ROUNDS EXPERIENCED BY SOLDIERS BEHIND BARRIER 13**
Soldiers behind Barrier 13 were also aware of incoming fire prior to the deployment of 1 PARA.\\textsuperscript{324} Soldier Z recalls an incoming high velocity shot before 1 PARA deployed\\textsuperscript{325} which cracked on the building above his head.\\textsuperscript{326} The shot came from in front of him. He did not think it a threat but Sergeant 041 sent him and two or three others to collect their rifles after it had occurred.\\textsuperscript{327} This shot was separate from the shot which occurred much later, at approximately 16:50, which Z returned.\\textsuperscript{328} It is unlikely given that the bullet struck the position above Z's head, that this was the same round as that experienced by soldiers behind Barrier 12.
INQ1997 heard a low velocity round which he believed to have been fired from the back of the crowd in front of the barrier.\\textsuperscript{329} INQ1997 confirmed on oath that he
\\textsuperscript{321} B1280 \\textsuperscript{322} B1288 paragraph 46-49 \\textsuperscript{323} Day 292/119/15-19 \\textsuperscript{324} Day 0372/088 \\textsuperscript{325} Day 372/093/19-20 \\textsuperscript{326} The building struck by the bullet was marked with a red arrow on the image saved as B879.021. \\textsuperscript{327} B879.004 paragraphs 23-24 \\textsuperscript{328} B879.006 paragraph 38 \\textsuperscript{329} C1997.2 paragraph 12 was sure this shot had been fired before 1 PARA had deployed through the barrier.\\textsuperscript{330} CLOSING SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENTS OF
MR ANTHONY LAWTON
VOLUME 5
CHAPTER 7
SECTOR 2 CHAPTER 7 SECTOR 2
CHAPTER 7A - DEPLOYMENT
7A-I Initial Deployment ................................................................. 1 Firing As the Pigs Moved Down Rossville Street .................................. 1 The Rioters Attacked the Pigs as they Drove Down Rossville Street ....... 11 7A-II Firing as Pig 1 Arrived on the Waste Ground ............................. 16 7A-III The Soldiers' actions having Debussed from Pig 1 ....................... 24
CHAPTER 7B - LIEUTENANT N'S FIRST ENGAGEMENT
7B-I Lieutenant N at the chamberlain street alleyway; .......................... 30 Introduction .................................................................................. 30 The Arrest of Mr Clarke and the Confrontation with the Crowd: Introduction .................................................. 30 7B-II Lieutenant N Fires Three Warning Shots over the Crowd .......... 36 7B-III the timing of lieutenant N's shots ........................................... 46 7B-IV soldiers S and V and the Alleged Assault on Charles Mcmonagle .. 47 7B-V conclusion ............................................................................ 50
CHAPTER 7C - EVENTS IN THE CAR PARK OF THE ROSSVILLE FLATS
7C-I Introduction ............................................................................ 51 7C-II Rossville street was clear of marchers as the pigs deployed .......... 51 7C-III Pig 2 arrives in the rossville flats' car park ............................... 52 7C-IV Alana Burke ......................................................................... 57 7C-V The Rioting in the rossville flats car park ................................. 60 7C-VI Conclusion ........................................................................... 80
CHAPTER 7D - GUNMEN IN THE CAR PARK OF THE ROSSVILLE FLATS
7D-I Introduction ............................................................................ 81 7D-II The Gunman / Gunmen in the Rossville Flats ............................. 82 7D-III Father Daly's Gunman ............................................................ 104 7D-IV Other probable Sightings of Gunmen ....................................... 112 7D-V Automatic Firing Continued After the Soldiers Returned Fire .... 113 7D-VI The Soldiers' Reactions .......................................................... 131 7D-VII Other Activity in the Car Park ................................................. 136 The Peres sequence of Photographs - Block 3 Retaining wall ............. 136 Paddy Brown Near the Group Helping Jack Duddy ......................... 141 7D-VIII conclusion ........................................................................ 146 CHAPTER 7A
SECTOR 2 DEPLOYMENT
7A-1 INITIAL DEPLOYMENT
As the two Mortar Platoon Pigs drove south down Rossville Street and turned east across the Rossville Street waste ground they were attacked by gunmen and rioters. The Pigs were not fast moving vehicles. They were cumbersome and awkward to manoeuvre: Their nick name came from their being ‘pigs to drive’.
FIRING AS THE PIGS MOVED DOWN ROSSVILLE STREET
A number of witnesses have described hearing firing towards the soldiers before the Pigs came to a stop and before the soldiers debussed.
George Nellis was at his mother’s house at 33 Chamberlain Street. He went out into the street when he heard the sound of a running crowd. He stepped out of the house to see a “panic situation”. He described what he saw and heard as he went outside to investigate:
It was as I stepped outside the house that I also became aware of gunfire. I did not hear the sound of guns being fired but I distinctly remember hearing the sound of bullets striking. It seemed to me that I could hear bullets hitting the house somewhere high up, perhaps in the eaves. Bullets seemed to be hitting the house in short bursts, as if there had been regular bursts of fire from an automatic weapon. I remember thinking that the sounds had an echo to them,
1 INQ1579, driver of Pig 2, confirmed this. He said that their top speed was 30 mph but they took time to reach this speed because they were very heavy. There was not enough time to reach the top speed in Rossville Street: Day 336/153/10-154/03. William Harley agreed that the army Pigs were cumbersome and “not the most manoeuvrable.”: Day 077/046/15-21
2 AN 9.2, paragraph 8
3 AN 9.2 paragraph 12 but my overall impression was of the sound of bullets hitting the house somewhere high up.(^4)
7A-4 In his oral evidence to the Tribunal he stated that there were maybe two bursts of possibly three or four bullets each.(^5) Again he placed the bullet strikes (he repeated that he did not hear the weapon discharging) he heard at the level of the eaves of his mother’s house and of the two houses next door. The bullets seemed to move along in a line above his head and were not focussed on one spot.(^6)
7A-5 The rounds that Mr Nellis heard can only have been fired by someone firing northwards from the direction of the Rossville Flats and they must, therefore, have been non-military fire. It would not have been possible for a soldier firing from either the waste ground or from the Rossville Flats car park to have struck the eaves of the houses on the east side of Chamberlain Street. The geography of the area of the Rossville Flats and Chamberlain Street is such that the southern end of Chamberlain Street reaches further south than the gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.(^7)
7A-6 The furthest positions south that soldiers reached were the gable end of Block 1 and the south west corner of the back wall (ie the west) of the Chamberlain Street
(^4) AN 9.2, paragraph 13\
(^5) Day103/146/02-16\
(^6) Day103/149/24 – 150/02\
(^7) B790 houses. There was, therefore, no soldier in a position that would have enabled him to have fired in effect north, back to towards Chamberlain Street.
7A-7 The firing that Mr Nellis witnessed was very early. Although Mr Nellis was subsequently in the Rossville Flats courtyard for about three minutes, he did not hear any gunfire or see any soldiers or Army vehicles (although not consciously looking). Mr Nellis witnessed firing coming from the direction of the Rossville Flats before Pig 2 arrived in the forecourt of the Flats.
7A-8 Gerard Grieve ran away from Barrier 14 where he had been involved in the rioting. He heard shooting, he thought from the William Street area, before he reached the Rossville Flats' car park. In oral evidence he confirmed what he had said in a Praxis interview, that there was firing before the Pigs stopped.
Q: Could we have AG55.2 on the screen, please. This, Mr Grieve, is the notes of an interview conducted by a company called Praxis which was a television company who made a programme called "Secret History: Bloody Sunday". That was to coincide with the 20th anniversary of Bloody Sunday. Do you remember being interviewed by someone from Praxis?
A. Yes, I think I do, yes.
Q. The only part I want to ask you about – what you had said in the preceding paragraph was that everyone ran from the barrier up Chamberlain Street. You go on to say: "The army was coming across waste ground along Rossville Street on foot and Saracens behind. As I got to the courtyard the army were firing. "Firing before the Saracen stopped. Definitely." Looking at that, when you are talking about firing, are you talking about live fire or rubber bullets?
A. There was live shooting at that time, but there might have been rubber bullets fired, but I cannot say for definite, but I know there was live rounds being fired.
8 Day 103/089 9 AN 9.3 paragraph 19 10 Day 147/001/18 11 Day 147/009/01-010/03 Q. Is it still your recollection that you heard live rounds before the Saracen stopped?
A. Yes.
Eunan O'Donnell, a School Teacher at the time, had been on the civil rights March. He heard firing at or about the moment when the Pigs arrived in Rossville Street and on the waste ground. He attributed it, we submit erroneously, to military firing from the City Walls. In his BSI Statement he explained that he was standing in Rossville Street at about the junction with Pilot Row [GR L12]. He heard a (further) volley of six or seven live shots “which appeared to be coming from the City Walls to the south east of the Rossville Flats (of which he is “almost certain”) and definitely from a high trajectory.” He thought the firing consisted of single shots, fired in quick succession. He also recalled seeing at least two APCs and at least ten soldiers at the north end of Rossville Street and on the waste ground around Eden Place and Pilot Row. The APCs were “definitely moving and heading in the direction of the Rossville Flats car park.”
He confirmed this in oral evidence:
Q. You describe in paragraph 11 having heard a volley of shots. I do not keep you to the strict number, but you thought it was about 6 or 7, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. It was after that that you became aware of the army vehicles moving in down Rossville Street?
A. Well, we had heard the army vehicles revving up.
Q. But you had heard that volley of shots before you became aware of the army vehicles moving, so there had been a substantial number of shots in the area before the army vehicles moved down Rossville Street; is that correct?
12 AO 28.1 paragraph 1 13 Having heard two shots earlier on from the approximate location, he said, of the Embassy Ballroom. 14 AO 28.2 paragraph 12 15 AO 28.2 paragraph 11 A. I think they may have happened — I am no longer entirely clear of the order in which they happened. I think they may have happened almost entirely simultaneously; that is what my statement says.\\textsuperscript{16}
7A-11 The firing that Mr O'Donnell heard was at a time when the Pigs were moving on to the waste ground and Rossville Flats' car park. It can only therefore have been para-military firing, and Mr O'Donnell's evidence is thus consistent with the military evidence from soldiers around Pig 1 that they were fired upon shortly or almost immediately on debussing.
7A-12 Edward Dillon also heard firing as he saw the soldiers appearing. It is clear that Mr Dillon saw the first of the Army vehicles arriving in Rossville Street. He had been walking south down Rossville Street prior to the Army's deployment through Barrier 12; he explained in his BSI Statement that he\\textsuperscript{17}
\\ldots heard the sound of vehicles coming into Rossville Street from William Street. I was probably 500-600 yards away from them. I saw approximately five or six vehicles — Saracens and army jeeps (Land Rovers) but I do not know how many of each. \\ldots More or less at the same time as I saw the vehicles I heard shooting. I thought this was from the direction of Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats and possibly from the roof.
7A-13 He thought (illustrating the mindset of many of the civilian witnesses) that the shooting was Army fire, coming from the direction of Blocks 1 and 2 or possibly from the roof. Edwin Glasgow Q.C. asked him about both the timing and the location of this shooting:
\\textit{Could I just ask you one more matter about what you heard when you first saw the army vehicles coming in. Your recollection is of being able to see quite a number of vehicles, is it, do you remember, as you looked back up Rossville Street?}
\\textit{A. I cannot recall how many.}
\\textit{Q. You cannot recall?}
\\textsuperscript{16} Day 054/114/18-115/10 \\textsuperscript{17} AD45.1 paragraphs 4 and 5 A. Yes.
Q. Are you sure that you heard the noise of shooting at about the same time that you first saw any army vehicles, is that your recollection?
A. Yes, round about the same time, yes.
Q. And at that time, you told my learned friend Mr Harvey on the far side, you think you had just crossed the rubble barricade and you were approaching the corner of Blocks 1 and 2.
A. Yes.
Q. Just one word, if I may. I am sorry if it sounds pedantic, if we look at the second page of your statement of AD45.2, I want to see how particular you were being, the top paragraph, paragraph 5. You have just described seeing the vehicles coming in and it has accurately been put to you on a number of occasions that you thought the shooting had come from the direction of Blocks 1 and 2 or possibly from the roof.
In the middle of that paragraph we have on the page, five lines down, you said:
"I have no doubt that the shots I heard were fired by soldiers."
You were twice asked whether you thought they were fired by "the soldiers": did you in fact mean simply that from the noise of the shooting you knew it was soldiers shooting or did you mean the soldiers who you had seen in the road?
A. Soldiers.
Q. Just soldiers, wherever they were, the noise was of soldiers shooting?
A. (Witness nodding).
Q. And your belief -- again, I do not criticise this at all or its honesty -- your belief at that time was that there must have been soldiers in the region of Blocks 1 and 2 or possibly even on the roof?
A. No, I did not think of that at the time, you know. Just to go back to your question, I believe at the time when the shots, when I heard the shots being fired that the only soldiers that I remember seeing clearly at the time was the soldiers that were coming-- well, actually not the soldiers, the army vehicles that were coming behind. So I cannot recall seeing army soldiers or vehicles at Kells Walk. Q. It might help to look at your plan, sir. If we go to AD45.7 and enlarge the centre of it, the position is that, you have accurately said more than once, you got approximately to where your 1 is?
A. (Witness nodding).
Q. You looked behind you or over your shoulder and you see a number of army vehicles coming down here?
A. Right.
Q. I have drawn an arrow for the north of Rossville Street and you cannot remember quite how many? (Indicating).
A. That is right.
Q. And those are the only soldiers that you can see, but the words that have been put to you in your statement, and you accept, is that you thought that the shooting that you heard was coming from Blocks 1 and 2, the ones we have labelled, I put two yellow arrows, one and two, or possibly from the roofs. (Indicating). The only reason why you say you have no doubt that the shots you heard were fired by soldiers is because the noise of the firing sounded like rifles; is that the position?
A. The noise of the gunfire that I heard, I have no doubt that it was the noise that I have heard on numerous occasions previous in time, was the noise from, from army fire.
Q. And allowing, as I am sure we all do, for the echoes and the other noise that was going on, you cannot help the Tribunal any more about the direction from which that shooting was coming, only that it sounded like rifle fire?
A. It sounded like rifle fire, yes.
Q. Did you hear any other noise at all, particularly, for example, rubber bullet guns or explosive noises of shooting of any other kind?
A. I cannot recall, no.
Q. You cannot recall. Was there quite a lot of noise?
A. Quite a bit of noise I thought at the time, yes.(^{18})
(^{18}) Day 174/084-089 Although Mr Dillon was reluctant to accept that the shooting was anything other than military, it is plain from the timing and the location, that he was describing early shooting as the Army vehicles appeared. Given that it is established that there was some time between the soldiers debussing and their opening fire, Mr Dillon must in fact have heard para-military gunfire.
Thomas Daly ran from the junction of William Street and Rossville Street when he heard the noise of the Pigs coming into the Bogside. He ran “as fast as [he] could” from there towards the Rossville Flats car park. By the time he reached Pilot Row he heard what he said he took to be Army fire coming from behind him. He looked over his shoulder and saw Army vehicles coming down Rossville Street. However, what he heard could not have been Army fire as the soldiers did not open fire until some time after they had debussed. Given that Mr Daly had only run a distance of approximately 125 yards as fast as he could, the firing happened far too soon for it to be military fire.
Noel Moore was unequivocal in his oral evidence to the Tribunal that he heard firing before the Pigs came to a halt on the waste ground:
Q. Had you heard the noise of the Saracens approaching before you were lying down on the ground or did you hear them while you were lying on the ground?
A. I heard them while I was lying on the ground.
Q. You were already lying?
A. Yes.
Q. [Refers to AM 416.5, paragraph 26] ...you remember hearing the noise, the noisy engines of the Saracens. That was after you had already heard quite a lot of shooting?
A. That is right, yes.
Q. You are quite sure about that?
19 AD 4.2 paragraphs 15-18 A. Oh, yes.
Q. You heard quite a lot of sustained shooting before those Saracens made their noises, they approached you lying in the car park?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And the Tribunal can be quite certain about that from you: as you were lying in that car park at that time, hearing what was going on, hearing quite a lot of sustained shooting, followed by the approach of the Saracens and the noise they made?
A. Yes.
Q. No doubt about that whatsoever?
A. No.20
Ann McGuinness' (nee Harkin's) evidence was to the same effect:
Q. ...you do have a recollection of hearing shooting at the same time as you are hearing the roaring of Saracens' engines. I want to be clear about it. I have got that right have I?
A. I have that recollection.21
Harry McBride was at Free Derry Corner. He had often heard shooting in the past in the Bogside. What he heard that day was not like what he had heard in the past. It was single shots but quicker than he normally heard. His oral evidence to the Tribunal was that the first shooting he heard was like automatic fire but he thought it was single shots. It was coming from Rossville Street and was directed at Free Derry Corner. In reply to questions from Edwin Glasgow QC he told the Tribunal that he was quite sure that was at the stage when he thought the Saracens would be coming but they had not yet arrived.22
Q: In paragraph 6 you describe the first shooting that you heard; I am right about that, am I not?
20 Day 063/127/04-128/05 21 Day 059/115/23-116/03 22 Day 105/105/20-106/21 A. Yes.
Q. That is the first shooting? A. Yes, on Bloody Sunday.
Q. You say in the fourth line: "It was like automatic fire, but it was single shots and not proper automatic firing." A. Yes.
Q. That is still your recollection, that it sounded like automatic fire, but you think it was single shots? A. Yes.
Q. And a number of them? A. That is right.
Q. If we look down at paragraph 8 on the same page we have there, on the fifth line if you follow it, it is the line which starts with the word "coming" under "Wells": "I did not see any Saracens coming but I was apprehensive that they would come." A. Yes.
Q. Are you quite sure that was at the stage when you thought that the Saracens would be coming, but they had not yet arrived? A. Yes.
Bernard Gilmore was moving away down Rossville Street towards the Rossville Flats with his wife and mother-in-law when he heard the first live round. He described it as SLR fire, of three or four rifles in single shots in quick succession - 30 or 40 shots in 2 seconds. Five seconds later he heard the revving of Pigs. Consequently, the firing that he heard preceded the troops deploying from their Pigs and cannot have been military fire. It was only after he reached his mother's flat in Block 2 of the Rossville Flats that Mr Gilmore saw soldiers running through the waste ground and saw the Pigs parked on the waste ground at grid references M13 and L13 (around Pilot Row). Other witnesses heard hostile fire directed towards the soldiers’ vehicles. Accordingly, there is a significant and consistent body of evidence of there having been hostile fire directed towards the deploying soldiers as their vehicles moved south down Rossville Street.
**THE RIOTERS ATTACKED THE PIGS AS THEY DROVE DOWN ROSSVILLE STREET**
The ABC film sequence of the Pigs entering Rossville Street shows youths throwing objects at one of the vehicles as it passes. It is important to bear in mind that this vehicle is not the first of the vehicles to have passed the Kells Walk wall: we do not see what happened to the first Mortar Platoon Pig before it turned off Rossville Street onto the waste ground.
The ABC film footage shows Pig 2 and the Command Vehicle being attacked by civilians throwing stones from the Kells Walk pavement. The two stills extracted below demonstrate that, moments before they debussed, the soldiers in Pig 2 were being targeted by rioters. Men on the right hand side of the stills can be seen moving towards the vehicle, throwing objects at it and then retreating. Two such men have been indicated with arrows.
______________________________________________________________________
24 For example Donncha McFeely at Day 409/096/01; Ciaran MacLoughlin at Day 415/126/20; Robert McLaughlin at Day 107/14/15; Day 107/035/17 One of those throwing stones has had the candour to tell the Tribunal about his part in what can be seen in the video. Neil McLaughlin\\textsuperscript{2} described how Pig 2 was stoned as it came down Rossville Street\\textsuperscript{2}:
\\textsuperscript{2} AM347 \\textsuperscript{2} Day 091/053/03-11 Q: If we look at paragraph 12 together, your recollection today is that when you ran at, it says "the Pigs", but it was the one Pig, was it not?
A. Yeah.
Q. Throwing stones at them, you think you hit one and suddenly the soldiers jumped out of the back of the Pigs; that would have just been the one Pig?
A. Uh-huh.
7A-24 Of the drivers, Soldier S said in 1972 that missiles were thrown at Pig 1 all the way from William Street; and INQ 1579 recalls people picking up bricks and throwing them at Pig 2. In the back of Pig 2 Soldier P said in 1972 that he could hear stones bouncing off the vehicle; Soldier R still recalls stones and bottles being thrown at the Pig; and Soldier U told the RMP that, as the vehicles advanced, rioters threw stones and bottles at them (in amongst the noise U also heard the automatic fire). Soldier 006’s description of what was happening is consistent with what can be seen on the video and is probably accurate: “...the rioters threw bottles and bricks at the Pigs and they were bounding (sic) off the sides ...the crowd was scattering but some people were still throwing things at the Pigs.”
7A-25 Pig 2 stopped momentarily just south of Pilot Row. It can be seen doing so on Video 48. It seems that five, members of the Mortar Platoon debussed from Pig 2 at this point. The five were probably Soldier P, Soldier 017, Soldier R, Soldier
______________________________________________________________________
27 B707 paragraph 3 28 B591 29 Day 337/014/24 30 B748 and B771 at F 31 B1377.007 paragraph 17 32 B670 33 B592
FS 7 1341
VII 13 U and Soldier 006. Mr White's photograph (below) shows three soldiers following Fig 2.
The three soldiers are close behind Fig 2. Fig 1 is not in the photograph and is yet to cross the waste ground.
The man in the white raincoat (circled) who appears in this and a number of other photographs is a useful aid for determining the correct sequence of the various pictures.
On debussing, Soldier P went over to the Kells Walk side of Rossville Street. Soldier 017 independently went in the same direction. Soldier 017 and Soldier
______________________________________________________________________
7A-26
7A-27
7A-28
______________________________________________________________________
B787.004 paragraph 20 B1375-6 P5/593 B787.004 paragraphs 21-22 006\\textsuperscript{38} began to disperse the crowd and to attempt to make arrests. They “simply debussed and started making arrests as we had been trained to do”.\\textsuperscript{39}
7A-29 Soldier R, who was Pig 2’s vehicle guard, chased after the pig as it moved forward again.\\textsuperscript{40} Mr White’s photograph, P594, possibly shows R chasing the pig.\\textsuperscript{41}
7A-30 The man in the white raincoat (circled) has by now moved a few yards further south towards the Rossville Flats.
7A-31 Soldiers P and 017 both described things being thrown at them.\\textsuperscript{42} Soldier R, the vehicle guard, was hit three times by stones or bottles as he ran after the Pig when it moved off.\\textsuperscript{43} Soldier U went left on debussing; some of the crowd running past him threw objects as they went and U was himself struck more than once.\\textsuperscript{44}
\\textsuperscript{38} B1377.005 paragraphs 19 - 20 \\textsuperscript{39} B1377.5 paragraph 19 \\textsuperscript{40} B691.015 \\textsuperscript{41} P5/594; Day 337/019/09-24 \\textsuperscript{42} B577 and B1482, paragraph 2 \\textsuperscript{43} B677 and 337/24/11 \\textsuperscript{44} B787.004 paragraph 22 Soldier 006 went out across the wasteground. He recalled rioters running past him, some of whom were throwing objects at him and the other soldiers.45
7A-II FIRING AS PIG 1 ARRIVED ON THE WASTE GROUND
7A-32 In addition to the evidence of those who heard general firing at the soldiers as the Pigs drove down Rossville Street, there is clear evidence that shots were directed towards the soldiers as Pig 1 arrived on the waste ground and its occupants debussed. This firing occurred whilst Pig 2 was still in transit.
7A-33 Julian Daly was at position G on the map below, being the north end of Rossville Street by Kells Walk at the junction with Eden Place.46
7A-34 He described what must have been the arrival of Pigs 1 and 247 and he may in fact have witnessed the first soldiers leaving Pig 2, before it turned into the car park: he explained that the “lead APC” stopped at his point J and five soldiers got out. The second APC stopped “south of Eden Place”.48 These two positions correspond
45 B1377.005 paragraph 20 46 AD2.3 Paragraph 13 47 AD2.3 paragraph 14 48 AD2.3 paragraphs 14-16 approximately with the initial stopping points of Pigs 1 and 2, although Mr Daly has described Pig 1 as the second APC and Pig 2 as the first.
Mr Daly said that “almost immediately” after seeing soldiers jump out, and - crucially - whilst Mr Daly was still at point G, he saw bullets hit the pavement about perhaps two feet away from him. He recalled them “pinging up” from the ground. Another man grabbed Mr Daly and said,
.... 'in a very definite way' that these bullets were not rubber bullets but live. I thought this because of the way the bullets struck the ground around me.
Miss McGahey asked Mr Daly about the rounds that he saw:
Q. Had you had the impression that it was live rounds being fired -- in your direction?.
A. It is very difficult to explain, I, I knew they were live rounds, but I did not believe they were live rounds, if you can understand what I mean.
Q. Could it have been rubber bullets that were fired?
A. Oh, no, no.
Q. Why not?
A. Well, when I say "pinging from the ground", I mean, you know, spurts of dust, mortar dust or something like that coming from the ground. Rubber bullets did not do that; rubber bullets simply bounced off the ground.
Q. Your recollection is rubber bullets would not create a cloud of dust --
A. Not in that way.
Q. Had you seen live rounds hit the ground before that day?
A. Oh, yes.
49 AD2.4 paragraph 19 50 AD2.4 Paragraph 20 Q. When had you seen that?
A. Oh, on various occasions, um, I had been in situations where Army had shot and hit walls or hit the ground, so I knew what a bullet looked like when it struck, you know, concrete or a roadway.51
7A-37 As with other civilians, Mr Daly's first instinct on seeing soldiers had been that they should be 'taken on' and he implored others to stay with him; now they ran off south down Rossville Street.52
7A-38 Danny Deehan ran away from the rioting at Barrier 14 down Chamberlain Street as the soldiers deployed through the Barrier. In his BSI statement he had said that he saw the Pigs coming in as he looked through Eden Place towards Rossville Street and that he believed that he "heard live rounds being fired when I was running down Chamberlain Street" and that he "definitely did hear them (live firing) when I burst into the Rossville Flats' car park."53 Mr Deehan has a memory of people shouting, "They're firing live rounds".54 He heard these shots being fired before the Pig that came into the car park stopped.55 As he made for the low wall front of Block 2 he saw someone "going down" approximately five yards away to his right (west) and he thinks he saw someone else going down too.56 There were 40-50 people within a ten yard radius of him.
7A-39 Edwin Glasgow QC asked Mr Deehan about the moment when he heard live firing:
Q. It is as you are running down Chamberlain Street or as you are running into the car park that you first recall hearing live rounds being fired?
A. Yes.
51 Day 183/007/09-008/06 52 AD 2.4 paragraph 20-21 53 AD 21.3 paragraph 12 54 AD 21.3 paragraph 12 55 AD 21.3 paragraphs 12-13 56 AD 21.4 paragraph 15 Q. And were those the first noises of firing of any kind that you had heard since you had left the riot behind you at barrier 14?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. Whether it was while you were still in Chamberlain Street or while you were running across the car park with the Saracen approaching on your right, the one thing you are clear about is that you heard live rounds at that stage
A. Yeah.57
7A-40 In his BSI statement Mr Deehan had given the impression that the stoning of the soldiers continued after the troops around the Pig 2 had begun firing. He said that there were people behind and in front of him and some were turning around and throwing stones.58
7A-41 In oral evidence Mr Deehan said that there was live firing before there was stoning of the soldiers but that as soon as the soldiers around the Pig started to fire and two civilians had been shot, the stoning finished. This means that the firing that Mr Deehan heard prior to the soldiers around the Pig opening fire was civilian rather than military.
Q. So as not to lead you, what is your own answer to this: is your own recollection that the first live firing that you heard was while you were still running?
A. Yes.
Q. How long after that firing that you heard while you were running, either at the bottom of Chamberlain Street or in the car park, how long after that was it before anybody was hit?
A. Um, it would have been within, within 30 seconds, I would say, from entering the car park until I got over the wall. It would have been a short—
Q. Could we look together at page AD21.4, which if you would prefer, as some do, it is the third page of your manuscript statement; at the top we have it as paragraph 15. You there help the
57 Dev 102/027/25-028/14 58 AD 21.4 paragraph 15 Tribunal with your recollection of some people throwing some stones in the car park; do you remember? If you want to check it, it is about 6 or 7 lines down in paragraph 15:
"Some people were turning around and throwing stones but the two I saw go down were not."
A. I do not remember clearly now.
Q. You do not remember it clearly?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember it at all, clearly enough to recall whether that stone-throwing was before the sustained shooting of the large number of shots started, or were people still throwing stones even after live fire started in that car park?
A. I do not remember clearly, I think most people were running at that stage, running away.
Q. I do not mean to push unfairly, can I put perhaps the commonsense point to you again: is it your recollection that young men were actually stoning soldiers while they were firing live rounds?
A. No.
Q. Do you think that that incident of the stoning took place before you saw anybody hit, or is that where you get into difficulty on timing?
A. Yeah, that is where I get into difficulty on the timing.
Q. Very well, but your recollection is that there had been some live firing before that, such stoning as there was, before that started?
A. Yes.
7A-42 Soldier 033 from the Command Vehicle also saw rounds hitting the ground. He heard a Thompson firing and saw a strike of bullets on the ground to the front and left of him.59
59 B1621.5 paragraph 35 The journalist, Simon Winchester was on the waste ground walking towards Free Derry Corner when, at about Pilot Row, "several Humber APCs swept in from the direction of Rossville Street and we all started running." He told the Widgery Inquiry that he saw some soldiers running with the vehicles. He ran towards the Rossville Flats' car park in a crowd of "several hundred". He was asked whether he heard anything.
Q: As you were running did you hear anything? A: Yes. I heard a number of shots. I thought they were from behind me.
Q: Did you see where it appeared they struck? A: No, I didn't.
Mr Winchester said it was difficult to say accurately how many shots he heard but he thought it was "less than ten", of the same type as the single round he had heard in William Street. The firing was, he was "convinced", not the sound of baton guns.
The soldiers in Pig 1 also heard hostile fire as they debussed: Soldiers S, V, 162, 019, and INQ 0768 all heard this fire.
Soldier S, the driver of Pig 1, told Lord Widgery that he heard rapid single repetition fire as soon as he got out of the vehicle. He said in 1972 "As soon as the vehicle stopped and we debussed we came under fire." He did not see any shots land but took cover immediately. S’s evidence to Lord Widgery was that all the men came under fire, “in fact the Pig came under fire”.
7A-47 Lance Corporal V said that he ran to the Chamberlain Street wall and as he did so he heard “single rifle fire” and saw “spurts in the earth” where several shots landed to his right.
7A-48 Corporal 162 heard hostile firing from an automatic weapon firing just as he got out of Pig 1: “just after we had disembussed from the vehicle; as I was getting out, if you like.” The sound came from his right as he rounded the front of Pig 1, i.e., the sound came from the Rossville Flats. Although this evidence does not appear in his RMP statement, Corporal 162 is clear that he would have mentioned it at the time. The vagaries of the RMP statement taking process no doubt account for its omission.
7A-49 Soldier 019 had taken up position at the corner of the Chamberlain Street alleyway (which he describes in his R.MP Statement as the corner of Eden Place / Harvey Street) when
...suddenly I heard three to five shots being fired. These were high velocity and were fired from the direction of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. I could not see the gunman. I was trying to hold back the rioters which were 150 in number and were of mixed sex.
7A-50 Soldier 019 said in his BSI Statement that his current recollection was of rifle fire but he cannot now say whether it was hostile or not; however he remains firm
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70 B712 letter E 71 B719 letter E 72 B807 letter D-E 73 Day 323/177/03-18 74 Day 323/216/13 – Day 323/217/18 75 Day 323/212/14-25 76 As to which see Chapter 2. 77 B1492 78 B1492 79 B1494.003 paragraphs 11 and 12 that he heard this firing before Lieutenant N fired. He accepted that he did not know in 1972 whether the firing was hostile or not.
7A-51 INQ 0768 heard a small burst of automatic fire soon after he debussed. He then heard what he took to be answering Army fire between 3 and 10 rounds (which may have been Lieutenant N's warning shots). INQ 0768 was at the rear of Pig 1 and he almost certainly heard the burst of fire that fell nearby.
7A-52 INQ 1918 was probably one of the last soldiers to debuss from Pig 1. He was the signaller and would therefore have been sitting in the rear of the Pig, furthest from the door, behind the driver. He has only scant, snap shot memories now, but does recall hearing the first incoming fire (which he is sure was not Lieutenant N's shots) while he was close to the Pig. He said in his BSI statement that he was aware of the sound (but not the direction) of incoming non-SLR high velocity fire as he was positioned at the north corner of the Chamberlain Street / Harvey Street alleyway. He thought that he only heard "a couple of shots". The sound was coming from his left rear quarter (i.e. behind him to the west), although he might be mistaken as to the direction. INQ 1918 also heard Thompson Machine gunfire probably after the initial incoming high velocity fire. Fire was returned, but INQ 1918 did not see who fired, nor can he recall how many rounds were fired. INQ 1918 made the point that "if something is not immediately happening to you, you
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80 Day 343/115/06-14; Day 343/139/08; Day 343/165/25-Day 343/166/06 81 Day 343/165/13-24 82 INQ 0768 believes that he was driving Pig 2. In fact he was probably acting as the vehicle guard for Pig 1. Both Sergeant O and INQ 1579 say that INQ 1579 was driving O's Pig, Pig 2. Furthermore INQ 0768 does not remember seeing any other Pig in front of him when waiting at Barrier 12, a factor that again suggests that he was indeed in the lead Pig. The reason for the error was that INQ 0768 drove Pig 2 from Belfast to Londonderry. 83 As to which see further below. 84 Day 342/081/10 - Day 342/082/01 85 Day 342/102/03-Day 342/103/05 86 C1918.2 paragraph 8 87 Day 342/099/03-18 88 C1918.3 paragraph 14; Day 342/099/19; Day 342/101/11 89 C1918.2 paragraph 9 do not focus on it. You are trained to focus on the task in hand and my task was to watch the crowd and to stay near Lieutenant N."90
7A-53 In addition to the occupants of Pig 1, Soldier U from Pig 2, who was on the ground before Pig 2 finally stopped on the car park, said in his statement to the Widgery Inquiry that, having run towards the Rossville Flats in order to cut off the retreating crowd, and before he arrested Mr Canning, he heard the sound of four or five low velocity automatic shots. He did not see where these came from, nor where they landed. He did not remember this shooting when he gave oral evidence to the Widgery Tribunal;91 however, it is his evidence to the present Tribunal that he was clear that, although he cannot now remember this burst of firing, it certainly happened: "If I say it happened, it must have done".92 (U also explained that the incoming fire was not recorded in his RMP statement because he was told by the RMP to "Explain what [he] did, not what [he] saw, someone else will deal with that."93). This firing was probably the same as the firing heard by Soldiers V, S, 162 and INQ 0768 and, probably, 019.
7A-III THE SOLDIERS' ACTIONS HAVING DEBUSSED FROM PIG 1
7A-54 By the time P59494 was taken Pig 1 had come to a halt. The soldiers debussed.
7A-55 Lieutenant N exited via the front passenger door with the intention of making arrests but was quickly involved in a fight with a man who was throwing lumps of concrete at him.95 He grappled with the man, during the course of which his helmet strap broke and the man got away.96 INQ 1918, the radio operator, made
90 C1918.2 paragraph 10 91 B773 letter D 92 B787.010 paragraph 56 93 Day 369/32/10. This explanation makes perfect sense in the light of what we now know about the RMP statement taking process. See Chapter 2 as to the evidential value of the RMP statements. 94 Reproduced at paragraph 7A-29 above. 95 B373; B398 96 B438.008 paragraph 37; Photograph P272 shows Lieutenant N holding his helmet his way to join Lieutenant N. INQ 0768, as vehicle guard, stayed with the pig. Corporal 162 headed north towards the Chamberlain Street alleyway and encountered a man with a metal stake, at whom 019 fired his baton gun. Soldier 112, a baton gunner, headed across the waste ground, firing his baton gun to split up and disperse the crowd, and ended up at the corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. Soldier Q, detailed to act as cover for an arrest group, specifically a baton gunner (possibly Soldier 112, as the other baton gunner, Soldier 019, ended up at the Chamberlain Street wall with Lieutenant N and INQ 1918, although 112 does not now remember being paired with anyone), likewise ran towards the Rossville Flats in his covering role. He was aware of members of the crowd stopping to throw stones as they ran away. S, the driver made his way into cover at the rear wall of the Chamberlain Street houses. Soldier V, also in a covering role for a snatch squad, ran towards the Chamberlain Street wall in order to satisfy himself that the person he saw there (who turned out to be a Knight of Malta, identified in the course of this Inquiry as Charles McMonagle) was not a threat.
Soldier 112 was aware of members of the crowd running towards them. Some of this was captured in P595 (below) which shows one soldier (circled, left) engaged at close quarters with a civilian and a further soldier (circled, right) probably about to be confronted by another, immediately after the occupants of Pig 1 debussed.
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97 C768.3 paragraph 16 98 B1960 99 B1730; B1732.4 paragraphs 17-20 100 Day 320/87/09 101 B635-6; B642 letter A-C 102 B657.3 paragraph 16 103 B707 104 B807 letter B; B821.3 paragraph 2.3 105 B1732.004 paragraph 17
FS 7. 1353
VII 25 There is photographic evidence of what happened in the following moments, although, as has been observed by the Tribunal on many occasions, the photographs only show literally a snapshot in time and the absence of a photograph supporting a soldier's account does not mean that the incident or action described did not occur.
Fulvio Grimaldi's photograph P515 (below), taken from the Chamberlain Street alleyway looking over the waste ground towards Kells Walk, shows that the man in the white raincoat has moved slightly further to the south and, by this time, both the driver's and front passenger's doors of Pig 1 are open. INQ 1918 (Lieutenant N's signaller) has left the vehicle and is in the foreground. At the time this picture was taken Pig 2 was out of sight, having moved off Rossville Street. It is either behind Pig 1 or off the picture to the left, making its way to the Rossville Flats' car park.
By the time of Mr White's photograph P595 (below), Soldier R had passed off to the right of the picture (the soldier who can be seen in the middle of the photograph is wearing a helmet and is therefore not Soldier R, who was not). The man in the white raincoat is still visible and he has moved further to the south. By the time of Mr Grimaldi's second photograph from Chamberlain Street, P484 (below), clouds of CS gas are visible and a Mortar Platoon baton gunner is in the foreground. This may be Soldier 019. The man wearing the white raincoat has moved even further south, out of the picture.
The Heli-teli film shows soldiers debussing from Pig 1 as follows: first, a figure emerges from the rear door passenger side and heads nearly due north back towards William Street; more figures then emerge, namely, one soldier from the driver's side rear door who runs south of the Pig towards the Chamberlain Street wall and a group of three figures (including baton gunners on each flank (and a non-baton gunner in the middle) who emerge from the rear doors and head west/north west. The two baton gunners fire one shot each. They are Soldiers 112 and 019. The middle soldier is probably Soldier Q, as he was with 112. The northerly baton gunner is probably Soldier 019, as he must be the tall baton gunner in the Grimaldi photo P484 who is photographed on the north side of the Pig. 019 fired a baton round at the man with a stake attacking Corporal 162. It is therefore likely that the figure that first runs from the Pig heading back towards William Street is Corporal 162.
The Heli-teli film shows a further figure emerging from the passenger side rear doors. This is probably INQ 1918 as he was the signaller and therefore sitting behind the driver and one of the last and slowest to get out – he too is photographed by Mr Grimaldi (P515, above/repeated below) on the north side of the Pig. There is also another figure who emerges on the driver's side at the rear doors – he may be INQ 0768 who was the vehicle guard and therefore would not have strayed too far from the Pig.
Mr Grimaldi photographed INQ 1918, the Signaller, in P515. At this stage, Soldier S is still inside or by the Pig; Soldiers 112 and Q are heading away from the Pig south over the waste ground. Soldier 019 is still on the waste ground but will shortly be moving east so as to appear in Mr Grimaldi's next photograph. Corporal 162 is probably still north of the Pig. Soldier V may be at the Chamberlain Street wall.
At this stage Lt N was attacked by a civilian. CHAPTER 7B
LIEUTENANT N’S FIRST ENGAGEMENT
7B-1 LIEUTENANT N AT THE CHAMBERLAIN STREET ALLEYWAY;
INTRODUCTION
7B-1 Lieutenant N faced serious violence from the moment he debussed. He acted reasonably in taking the action that was likely to be effective in the time that he had to confront the real danger that threatened him and those under his command.
7B-2 Lieutenant N’s shots, if only on the evidence analysed in Section 7A above, were not the first shots of the day, even in Sector 2.
THE ARREST OF MR CLARKE AND THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE CROWD:
INTRODUCTION
7B-3 Lieutenant N had debussed from Pig 1. Almost immediately, one of the rioters hurled a chunk of concrete at him. N started to get hold of the man but had to fend off another blow with his rifle. During this his helmet strap broke and his helmet fell forward over his eyes. It should not be overlooked that even this would have required some considerable force. The man ran away.
7B-4 Following the attack, N went towards the alleyway that leads from Eden Place to Chamberlain Street. Jeffrey Morris’ photograph P272 shows N arriving at the alleyway holding onto his helmet. INQ 1918 is already at the alleyway and Soldier 019 can be seen in the background on his way to the alleyway.
1 B418G – B419A Almost immediately after the soldiers arrived at the alleyway Mr Clark was arrested. Mr Morris captured part of the arrest in photograph EP 2.4 below. INQ 1918 is recorded as the arresting soldier on the Arrest Forms; his memory of the event only extends to recalling that another soldier handed Mr Clark to another soldier who told INQ 1918 to hold him. Mr Clark was arrested for “throwing stones”.
Photographs P272 and P273 make it clear that the allegation that Mr Clark and other civilians were randomly selected for arrest when doing nothing that justified arrest is untrue. P272 and P273 speak for themselves. To the south of the pictures a man in a hat can be seen first walking past a soldier in a southerly direction, and then retracing his steps, again next to a soldier. He is clearly not interfered with in any way, or either occasion.
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2 C1918.2 paragraph 12 3 ARR. 9.2 Lieutenant N has no present recollection of this arrest, although he did have at the time he gave oral evidence to the Widgery Tribunal, but only to the extent of his awareness (after he had fired his three rounds over the heads of the crowd) that his Signaller (INQ 1918) had detained a man.
Shortly after the arrest of Mr Clark, Lieutenant N was confronted by a hostile crowd. Some were anxious to rescue Mr Clark, others were simply continuing the riot they had been engaged in at Barrier 14. Lieutenant N and the two soldiers near his position (019 and INQ 1918) were massively out-numbered by an aggressive crowd who were moving forward towards them, brandishing and throwing missiles. They were undeterred by baton rounds fired by 019. N thought to deter the crowd by first appearing threatening, then shouting at the crowd and finally had no realistic other option than to fire three warning shots over their heads.
The attempted rescue of Mr Clark
Eamon Baker was a Barrier 14 rioter (and one of those who had been throwing stones from behind the corrugated iron shield). As the soldiers deployed, he fled down Chamberlain Street, passed Eden Place and saw a man run towards a soldier intending to throw a stone at him. Mr Baker described what happened next in his BSI statement:
The soldier lifted his rubber bullet gun to fire at the man. The man threw his stone at the same time that as the soldier fired, but they missed each other.6
Christopher Clarke Q.C. asked Mr Baker about the behaviour of the crowd at the alleyway:
You say that he stepped out and fired and you say in your statement, if you go back to AB2.3, paragraph 17 that there was a man running in front of you who ran towards the soldier in order to throw a stone at him?
A. Yeah.
Q. And the soldier lifted his rubber bullet gun, the man threw a stone at the same time at the soldier but neither of them hit the other; is that right?
A. Yeah.
Q. We have a photograph that is at P274. This is the alleyway, which we are talking about and there appears to be a discharge of smoke from the corner that you were pointing out a moment ago. Is that the place from which the soldier fired?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. You do not recognise either of those two people, do you?
A. It is the first time I have ever seen that photograph, um, and I do not recognise either of them. I do not believe either of them are me, though -- no, I do not think I recognise either of them.
Q. But the boy in question, or the man in question had been throwing a stone at a soldier at that corner?
A. Yeah.
Q. Was it a man or a boy, what sort of age was he?
6 AB2.3 paragraph 17 A. Well, I was just approaching 21 then, it was someone around my own age I would think, yeah."
7B-11 Malachy Duddy said in his oral evidence that some of the crowd in the Chamberlain Street alleyway sought to rescue Mr Clark. To do so they had to close with the three, heavily out-numbered soldiers. Of those three soldiers, one was engaged with Mr Clark (INQ 1918), one had only a baton gun (019) and one had an SLR (N).
7B-12 Malachy Duddy had been rioting at Barrier 14, throwing stones and sheltering behind the corrugated iron hoarding. He described hurrying down Chamberlain Street and saw, at the Eden Place / Chamberlain Street junction, a confrontation between a soldier with a rifle manhandling / arresting a man, who must have been Mr Clark. Mr Duddy said that there were 15 – 20 others at the junction of Chamberlain Street / Eden Place as well, but thought that he was the first on the scene.
7B-13 Mr Duddy tried to pull the man away but then he saw other soldiers advancing upon him so he started to run. A baton round hit him on the back from a range, he said, of three metres causing him to fall. He accepted in oral evidence that what a soldier would have seen was 15 – 20 people advancing on him. Edwin Glasgow Q.C asked him about this:
Q. When that arrest was being made — again, I do not blame you — you decided you would go and rescue the person who was being arrested?
A. That is right, uh-huh. Q. You did not know whether that particular arrest was justified or not, but having been stoning yourself, you felt some sympathy for the man who was about to be arrested?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. Did you physically get into contact with the man and the man who was arresting him, or did you just get close to them?
A. Just fairly close, almost beside him, yes.
Q. And while you were doing that, another 15 or 20 people were some yards behind you, but coming in the same direction?
A. Yes, that is correct, yeah.
Q. Mr Duddy, would it be fair to say, if another soldier had been watching that scene he would have seen you as an individual going to interfere with an arrest, he would have seen 15 or 20 people advancing on the soldier who was trying to make an arrest at the same time?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. At about that time somebody fired at least one rubber bullet in the direction of you and the advancing 15 or 20?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. And when that did not succeed, a live round was fired over the heads of the same crowd?
A. That is my recollection.
Q. That would be fair?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Thank you very much.13
Tony Morrison gave evidence that he actually tussled with a soldier trying to arrest Mr Clark in the Chamberlain Street alleyway.14 He explained how he ran
13 Dev 081/152/03-153/11 14 AM 439.3 paragraph 5 from Barrier 14 when he saw that the Army were getting ready to go through the Barrier, down Chamberlain Street and west along Eden Place:
There was a wee shop on the corner of Eden Place and the waste ground and just next to it I saw a wee man standing rubbing his eyes because of the gas in the air. He was wearing a black jacket and a white shirt and he was a heavy fat man. My friend and me had just stopped right next to the man at point B on the map (grid reference O13) when a hand came round the corner from the waste ground and grabbed the wee man ... I realised it was a soldier's hand. So I decided to pull him back. I grabbed the wee man and the soldier and me started pulling him back and forwards between us. The soldier was armed with a rifle or possibly a rubber bullet gun, but he had it in his left hand and was letting it hang down pointing to the ground while he was pulling with his right hand. He never aimed it at me.
7B-15 Mr Morrison said that, after a couple of minutes, a soldier then appeared and fired over the heads of the crowd, Mr Morrison "supposed, to scare us away." Mr Morrison was more shocked than scared; he considered that the soldier obviously did not want to kill him. But, nonetheless, it was "a fright" to have someone fire so close to him, so he let go of the man and ran away. N was, therefore, right next to some of the civilians in the alleyway.
7B-11 LIEUTENANT N FIRES THREE WARNING SHOTS OVER THE CROWD
7B-16 Lieutenant N described the position in which he found himself in his SA statement:
The situation here was not comfortable because some of the rioters who had run from the open spaces away via Eden Place into Chamberlain Street had returned and were throwing rock.
7B-17 INQ 1918, N's Signaller, agreed. He recalled, in his BSI statement, looking up a road,
15 AM 439.3 paragraph 6 16 B373.398 paragraph 8 ... A bit like looking up a tunnel and there was a crowd of civilians filling the road not more than forty yards away. They were within throwing distance of me. They were throwing stones and bottles and bricks towards us.\\textsuperscript{17}
7B-18 INQ 1918 recalled, in oral evidence, that the crowd was “sufficiently big to fill that road up from side to side”,\\textsuperscript{18} and that he had to “keep going back around the corner to get away from them.”\\textsuperscript{19} He said that they were moving “from side to side” and moving “backwards and forwards” towards him and Lieutenant N.\\textsuperscript{20}
7B-19 Lieutenant N’s reading of the intentions of this crowd was entirely in accordance with the evidence of the members of it who have given evidence (set out above):
\\begin{quote} Q. Have you in your minds eye now any recollection of what exactly what it is that the crowd were doing immediately before you fired?
A. I can just remember seeing a wall of people. They were sort of -- it is like those undersea shots of seaweed moving. They were starting to come towards me. Um, things were being thrown, bricks and stones, I think.\\textsuperscript{21} \\end{quote}
7B-20 Lieutenant N feared that the crowd would attack the arresting soldiers on the waste ground.\\textsuperscript{22} He explained in his BSI statement that by this time most of his men had moved to his right, south. He explained his concern:
\\begin{quote} My immediate concern was that, if the crowd that I could see decided to come back onto the waste ground, as they appeared intent on doing, they would get behind us and there would be a dangerous confrontation. I had to deal with this immediate threat. I made my way to the gap in the wall. My radio operator came with me but I do not recall any other men in my unit being there \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{17} C1918.2 paragraph 6 \\textsuperscript{18} Day 342/088/16 \\textsuperscript{19} Day 342/088/22 \\textsuperscript{20} Day 342/089/08-19 \\textsuperscript{21} Day 322/06104/11 \\textsuperscript{22} Day 322/053/12 although I note from my 1972 evidence that one of my soldiers with a riot gun was also with me. ... 23
N estimated in, oral evidence, that the crowd by that stage numbered between 75-100 people. 24 Christopher Clarke QC sought clarification of the size of this crowd:
I want to ask you one last question about the size of the crowd. You have told us that you had, in the phrase you used, an impression of as it were moving seaweed [...] I think at one stage you said there might have been ten across the alleyway and ten deep.
A. I remember saying that yesterday, yes, to try to help the numbers.
Q. That obviously would make a crowd of 100. Is it possible that there were markedly less than that number but, because it was quite a small alleyway and they were gesticulating and throwing things, that they looked sizeable to you; and they may in fact have been, say, 20, 30 or 40?
A. Four or five deep and, I would say 40 or 50, certainly. Certainly more than 20. 25
N further explained that the estimate which he had given to Lord Widgery was a "pure guess"; he explained what he meant:
By the time I got to the corner my estimate was that there were enough people at the far end of the alleyway to block the mouth of that street. Saying 75 to 100 is a -- is a -- well, it is a pure guess. They were thick, they were blocking, ten people deep, ten across the mouth of that alley, and suddenly you have got 100 people.
Q. Is this fair: after the incident with the man with the breeze block, you chased some people towards Chamberlain Street; you went for the alley and chased them towards Chamberlain Street; when you got to the mouth of the alley you could see people at the Chamberlain Street end, enough to block the mouth of the street, who then began to throw things at you?
A. Yes, that is correct.
23 B438.008 paragraph 38 24 B438.037 letter E 25 Day 323/116/13-117/06 The civilian evidence corroborates N’s account of the size and activities of this crowd. Kevin Leonard was rioting at Barrier 14. Mr Leonard gave telling evidence that, far from being dismayed at the realisation that soldiers were deploying into the Bogside, he and his fellow rioters considered that this in fact presented itself as another opportunity to attack them. Even in his NICRA statement he referred to hearing Pigs going into the Bogside and Rossville Street and “so everybody turned and some shouted to get stones – this was their chance of stoning the Saracen”. He was asked, by Mr Rawat, about the plan to throw stones:
After describing the Saracens going into the Bogside in Rossville Street, what you went on to say was: "So everybody turned and some shouted to get stones -- this was their chance of stoning the Saracen." Do you remember today people shouting to get stones?
A. Well, that was the normal words at that time.
Q. Does that mean, as people were running down Chamberlain Street, there was a plan to throw stones at the Saracens?
A. Well, we knew once we went in that was how it was going to finish up, you know.
John Friel was in the alleyway armed with a stone, with the intention of throwing it at the soldier whom he could see a mere three or four metres away. He gave candid and compelling evidence as to the soldiers’ perspective of his actions. He stated that he stood at the junction of Chamberlain Street and Eden Place and saw
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26 AL 7.5 paragraph 8 27 This is not the only event in relation to which civilian witnesses have expressed this sentiment: see Section Chapter 7C (Rioting in the Car Park) and the evidence of Liam Mailey, M50, in relation to the reaction of the youths at the rubble barricade to the arrival of troops without body armour on Rossville Street. Furthermore, a significant number of civilians at the rubble barricade decided that they would try and rescue a man being arrested by a soldier, as various witnesses have described, including Paul McGready (AM219; Day 137/128), George Downey: “some fellow got arrested on the wasteground and a rioter jumped over the rubble barricade and started throwing stones and stuff like that....people went north of the barricade to try and release him and threw stones at the soldiers as they went” (Day 123/015-016); see also Thomas Melaugh (AM397.23), Gavan Duffy (AD155), and Noel McCartney (M55.8) 28 AL 7.1 29 Day 201/005/15-25 a crowd run across the waste ground and the Saracens going in. He then saw a soldier “only about four or five metres away,” at the corner of Eden Place, with a rubber bullet gun who then disappeared. Mr Friel then:
...picked up a large stone or half brick. I intended to throw it at the soldier if he appeared around the corner again.30
7B-25 Mr Friel was asked by Christopher Clarke Q.C. about the perspective that this scene would have presented to a soldier:
Q. If anybody looked your way, they would have seen you standing up with a stone or brick in your hand, is that right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did you have your hand raised?
A. Yes, I had it raised, yeah.31
7B-26 Mr Friel was also illuminating in his answers to Edwin Glasgow Q.C.:
Q. Try, if you would, to put yourself in the position of the soldier with the gun: whichever corner he came round, as he came round that corner or as he looked round that corner, the sight he would have seen was you with half a brick in your hand ready to throw and a crowd behind you?
A. Yeah.
Q. And a lot of noise?
A. A lot of noise, yes.
Q. You do not know that?
A. A lot of noise.
Q. There was a lot of noise?
A. A lot of noise, yeah, just roaring and shouting.32 Patrick Walsh, who had been stoning the troops at Barrier 14(^{33}) (and who could not be described as a youth), was at the alleyway and saw the soldiers arrive. He threw a brick at one of the soldiers before the soldier opened fire.(^{34}) He gave evidence of a standoff, of about forty people in a line across Chamberlain Street, confronting the soldiers who had come through Barrier 12.(^{35}) It was suggested to Mr Walsh by Christopher Clarke Q.C. that, given that no other witness gives evidence of such an occurrence, perhaps this actually occurred across the alleyway towards the soldiers at the mouth of the Chamberlain Street alleyway leading onto the waste ground. Although Mr Walsh rejected that as a possibility,(^{36}) it is the only explanation of his evidence.
N described the crowd as “extremely hostile” and:
...threatening. They were sort of surging, beginning to come forward from the front, and the people in the crowd seemed to be coming forward as well.(^{37})
It must be impossible for anyone who has not been in a similar position to imagine what it must be like or to anticipate how they might themselves react. (Although the incident took place much later, in 1988, one only has to think of the two Royal Signals’ Regiment corporals, who were abducted, beaten and murdered by a Republican crowd in West Belfast, to see the dangers. Those two soldiers were armed, but chose not to use their weapons (beyond firing a shot into the air to defend themselves.(^{38})) The Tribunal also has the graphic series of photographs that tell the story of the incident at Demesnes Gardens where a hostile Derry crowd succeeded in isolating a single soldier from a number of his colleagues.(^{39})
(^{33}) Day 171/002/15-18 (^{34}) Day 171/016/02-15 (^{35}) Day 171/016/20-017/04 (^{36}) Day 171/017/24 (^{37}) Day 323/105/03-08 (^{38}) Lost Lives 2922; 2923 (^{39}) “The Battle of the Bogside” begins at OS8.52 Lieutenant N was subjected to sustained criticism by Barry MacDonald QC as to his actions in the Chamberlain Street alleyway. This criticism ignores the fact that N fired only as a last resort. He tried first to look threatening in order to stop the crowd. As he told Mr MacDonald, he then “shouted words to that effect (that he threatened to shoot them) to try to scare them away”. That effort failed. He therefore chose as a last resort, to fire over the heads of the crowd. N explained in his SA statement the situation in which he found himself:
The situation appeared dangerous and there were only two of us there (apart from my radio operator who was just round the corner). I fired two SLR rounds over the heads of the crowd. They go back for a moment and then started to come forward again. I fired one more round and they went away. At one stage during the incident I had a stoppage and cocked my rifle. Since at the end of the operation I was one unaccounted for round short I think that I must have ejected it at this moment.
Lieutenant N explained his decision to Mr Clarke:
You say that the only way to stop the surge of the crowd was to fire a warning shot. Was this the only way? Did you ever stand your ground with a weapon aimed in their direction?
A. I -- I think my recollection of firing from the shoulder was when I was trying to scare them. I probably aimed or took up the firing position, um, to try to make them think I was going to shoot at them, um, and that did not work and I could not think of anything else to do.
Q. You have a recollection of doing that, do you: standing in the aim position in order to scare them?
A. I think that -- that came with the, um, trying to look sort of menacing and shouting at them. It is the only way to look menacing when you have a rifle.
Q. Was the soldier with the rubber bullet gun there at this stage?
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40 Day 322/157/01 41 B398 - B399 paragraphs 8-9 42 A very easy point to make in the comfort and safety of the Methodist Central Hall A. I -- I think he was, but I have -- he is not in my mental picture at the moment.
Q. But he did not fire a rubber bullet, nor did you order him to do so?
A. I -- I might have done; he might have done without being ordered. I have got no recollection of that.44
7B-32 Soldier 019, the baton gunner, also described the crowd advancing on them and described N’s shots and their effect. In his RMP statement he said that,
The crowd started to advance on my position throwing bottles and bricks at both myself and N. At this point we were the only two persons at the junction and so N fired 2 x 7.62 rounds into a brick wall above the rioters heads in an attempt to stop them advancing. This had a complete effect and the crowds dispersed up Chamberlain Street in a northerly and southerly direction.44
7B-33 As to whether 019 fired baton rounds to try to disperse the crowd it is clear, on any reasonable and objective analysis of what occurred in those moments, that baton rounds were fired, and that they did not stop the crowd. Soldier 019 was frank in his BSI statement that he could not remember firing any baton rounds at the stage at which he saw a crowd of civilians, but he believed, he “probably would have done”.45 Mr Rawat asked him about this:
Q. You cannot, as you say in your present statement, recall whether you fired baton rounds, but looking at that where you say that you were trying to hold back the rioters and the crowd started to advance on your position, it seems clear, does it not, that you would have used your baton gun if you had to hold back a crowd; is that right?
A. Yes.46
43 Day 322/060/07-061/03 44 B1494.008 45 B1494.003 paragraph 12 46 Day 343/115/15-22 Lieutenant N has always accepted that his firing was outside the terms of the Yellow Card, and was not “accepted conduct”. It is a matter for the Tribunal to consider whether it was “acceptable” or, at the very least, understandable, in the circumstances which confronted him. It is our submission that what N did was justified, in accordance with his training, to bring about the safest result for all concerned:
Q. This is at paragraph 10 of your statement at 438.002. You describe there how you fired a warning shot; do you see that? A. Yes.
Q. That was fired contrary to the Yellow Card; was it not? A. Not contrary to it, it was outside of the scope of the Yellow Card.
Q. Outside of the scope of the Yellow Card? A. Yes.
Q. I will come back to that in due course. In any event, you knew that it was not accepted conduct; did you not? A. Yes.
Q. Why was it not accepted conduct? A. The concept in basic training about riot control was that warning shots were not to be used, shots over the heads of the crowd, because the general picture would be that those shots could go anywhere and could cause damage and --
Q. -- injury to others. A. And injury to others. What I did was to take careful aim at a wall into which the round would go, without causing damage to anybody else.
Q. You were acting in a manner that was contrary to the training that you had received? A. No, the training I received was to react to the situation and to use my professional judgment to bring about the safest result for all
47 Dav 322/127/12-128/17 concerned. This, I would suggest, had not been envisaged, this situation had not been envisaged when the Yellow Card was written. I took very careful aim to achieve an effect without causing or risking anybody.
Barry MacDonald QC cross-examined Lieutenant N to the effect that his firing over the heads of the crowd was unacceptable conduct that was nevertheless acceptable within the Parachute Regiment. Mr MacDonald appeared to imply that 1 PARA in effect operated as undisciplined, yet condoned, mavericks:
Q. When the Yellow Card was drafted it was not envisaged that soldiers may come across hostile crowds?
A. In such a situation where the only solution was to fire an aimed shot into a wall above their heads.
Q. Although it was not really accepted conduct, according to your own testimony, it was acceptable within the Parachute Regiment; was it not?
A. How do you mean?
Q. Because it was accepted by your company commander that you could behave like that?
A. I certainly have no recall of being censured for this, but it certainly would not have been -- for example, I would not have ordered one of my soldiers to do this, I would have taken the responsibility myself.
Q. It was known you had behaved in this way because you had reported it in the usual way to your company commander, I think you said that yourself?
A. Correct.
Q. And you were not reprimanded or censured?
A. Correct.
Q. Or warned about your future behaviour in any way?
A. Correct.
Q. Because it was acceptable to him for you to behave like that?
A. You would have to ask him. I guess in the circumstances it had been acceptable. Q. Yes?
A. That does not mean it would have been acceptable in the future, or under different circumstances.
Q. But you proceeded on the basis, from that experience alone, if no other basis, that you could behave in a way that was unacceptable in general terms and contrary to your training and get away with it?
A. That is not the view I took.
Q. What other inference would you have drawn from the fact that you were not reprimanded or censured for behaving in this way?
A. That under the circumstances at the time it was an acceptable conduct.
7B-36 No action was taken against Lieutenant N for firing his weapon in breach of the Yellow Card, presumably for the very reasons that he gave to justify his shots. No one was hurt by these shots. The repeated suggestion that they were the first shots to be heard in this sector is not consistent with the evidence as a whole. In all probability a physical confrontation in which rioters and soldiers were likely to have been injured was avoided.
7B-III THE TIMING OF LIEUTENANT N'S SHOTS
7B-37 A number of the soldiers in Pig 2 debussed on Rossville Street (see Chapter 7A above). N's shots occurred before the remainder of the occupants of Pig 2 had debussed once the Pig had arrived at its final position in the Rossville Flats' car park. There is evidence of the Pigs being fired at as they drove down Rossville Street and of Pig 1 being shot at as it arrived on the waste ground. Lieutenant N's shots were not, therefore, the first of the day and nor were they confused by other soldiers in Mortar Platoon for hostile fire.
7B-38 According to the evidence of Jeffrey Morris, the Daily Mail photographer who was positioned at the Chamberlain Street wall, N's shots were fired down the Chamberlain Street alleyway just after he took photograph EP 2.4. From that it can be seen that Pig 2 is in the background, not yet at its final position and that it still has its side doors closed. (Coleman Doyle’s later photographs show Pig 2 with the front passenger seat doors open.)
The occupants of Pig 2 are unlikely therefore to have heard N’s shots, partly because they were still inside the vehicle and partly because of the noise that there would have been immediately around them, from the Pig’s engine and the noise of the hostile crowd in the Rossville Flats’ car park.
7B-IV SOLDIERS S AND V AND THE ALLEGED ASSAULT ON CHARLES MCMONAGLE
Coleman Doyle’s photograph EP 24/7 shows two soldiers (in all probability Soldier S and Lance Corporal V) making their way south, away from a Knight of Malta (Charles McMonagle) who is on the ground.
48 Also referenced as P273 Soldiers S and V are making their way south towards the Rossville Flats' car park. In his book, 'Eye Witness Bloody Sunday: the Truth', Don Mullan made the following assertion by way of a caption to this photograph: "In direct violation of the Geneva Convention, a young Knights of Malta paramedic is in a crumpled heap having been attacked by two members of 1 Para". The photograph, of course, depicts nothing of the sort. The Knight of Malta is Charles McMonagle. Mr McMonagle's 1972 statement was not chosen for inclusion in the book, but it makes clear that Mr McMonagle was not on the ground as the result of an assault by soldiers:
When I reached the small wall at the big building in front of the high flats we found a man who had been hit by a rubber bullet and there I met L/Cpl Glenn. As we were treating this man someone screamed that they were coming up Rossville Street in armoured cars and when I looked up I saw 3 or 4 coming in the general direction of the flats. We picked up our patient and ran towards the car park at the back of the flats but there was a wire fence across so there was a very narrow gap for the crowd to get through. In the panic I tried to hold the crowd back to see to our patient but I was knocked down and trampled underfoot. As I lay against the wall as the paratroopers poured out of armoured cars... I lay on the ground with my hands outstretched. At this stage I was wearing a
49 Wolfhound, 1997 50 Don Mullen "Eye Witness Bloody Sunday The Truth"; published Wolfhound; 1998 edition 51 AM 367 gas mask. One paratrooper came dashing over and grabbed me by my uniform and pulled me up and stuck his rifle in my chest. I think he was going to fire and I just indicated wildly at my red cross badge which he looked at and released me and left me on the ground ... 52
Unfortunately, when he came to give his BSI statement to Eversheds Mr McMonagle failed to keep to the truth, although his distortion was not quite as extreme as Mr Mullan's:
The para must then have seen me because he turned to his left and looked straight at me. I immediately put my hands up. I had my back to the wall. I was terrified and did not know what to do. I was in genuine fear for my life. He was shouting and screaming at me ... Because I could tell that he could not hear what I was saying I started to frantically point towards my Red Cross badge. I was shouting 'Red Cross. Red Cross.' The paratrooper then moved up to me and pointed his rifle at my chest and continued to shout at me. Another soldier then came from my right and they both roughed me up. At one stage they took my kit bag and rifled through it. They thrust the bag back at me. After a few seconds they threw me to the ground .... There is annexed to this statement a photograph which shows me on the floor and the two soldiers running through the gap. 53
It is for the Tribunal to decide why Mr McMonagle chose, to put it at its most neutral, to give Eversheds the impression that the photograph shows him on the floor because soldiers threw him there: if anything it was the soldier who returned Mr McMonagle to his feet. When he gave oral evidence, having seen his 1972 statement, Mr McMonagle had to accept that the 1972 version of events was accurate. 54
Q. ...the fact is, I think until you saw this weekend your manuscript notes, you had not remembered that it was the panicking crowd that had trampled you to the ground; that is right, is it not?
A. No, no, no, it was always my recollection that I was knocked over by the crowd, I have never believed otherwise.
52 AM367.8 53 AM367.4 paragraphs 21 and 22 54 Day 102/143/08-18 Q. You had always remembered that it was they who had trampled you to the ground?
A. Yes, the crowd panicked, ran along the wall, that is how I know I was left behind at the wall.
7B-44 He was unable to explain why he had said what he did to Eversheds, although it was not that he had forgotten the detail of being trampled by the crowd.
7B-V CONCLUSION
7B-45 Lieutenant N acted entirely justifiably in a very dangerous situation. Regardless of whether his firing was covered by the Yellow Card, his actions cannot reasonably be criticised.
55 Day 102/146/16 56 Day 102/143/15 CHAPTER 7C
EVENTS IN THE CAR PARK OF THE ROSSVILLE FLATS
7C-1 INTRODUCTION
7C-1 It is clear from the Heli-Teli camera footage that, when the Pigs appeared in Rossville Street, it was largely deserted other than for the odd rioter or stone thrower. It was clear of Civil Rights marchers. As the Pigs entered the waste ground, in the area they were intending to trap, or “hook”, or “get behind” the rioters, the soldiers encounter a crowd composed principally of those who had fled from the rioting, a number of whom returned to rioting once the Pigs had stopped. No one gave evidence of having been a marcher when the Pigs appeared, and having then got caught up in the arrest operation on the waste ground. The Civil Rights meeting had begun at Free Derry Corner; that is where the vast majority of the Civil Rights marchers were, and where anyone who wanted to remain part of the Civil Rights demonstration and/or to be disassociated with rioting had ample time to get to.
7C-2 Furthermore, the claim that the soldiers were confronted with terrified Civil Rights marchers fleeing before them, whilst nothing was being thrown from the Rossville Flats balconies, and no stones were thrown from the car park, is untrue.
7C-II ROSSVILLE STREET WAS CLEAR OF MARCHERS AS THE PIGS DEPLOYED
7C-3 It is clear from the heli-Teli film that Rossville Street was clear when then Pigs deployed. The Civil Rights marchers had passed on and were at Free Derry Corner.¹ Two stills from the heli-teli film illustrate the point.²
¹ See also Video 48 ² See also the Saville Inquiry’s Expert’s Report: “Report on the Timing and Order of Eight Photographs for the Bloody Sunday Inquiry” by Dr Steven Bell, H.M. Nautical Almanac Office 25th...continued 7C-III PIG 2 ARRIVES IN THE ROSSVILLE FLATS' CAR PARK
7C-4 The few soldiers (the minority of Mortar Platoon) left in Pig 2, not having debussed in Rossville Street, finally left the Pig when it had come to a halt at the entrance to the Rossville Flats' car park. Sergeant O initially stayed inside the Pig, observing events. The remainder, probably Lance Corporal INQ 1579, Soldier T, and Soldier 013, debussed.
7C-5 Derrick Tucker's photographs record part of the movements of the crowd in the Rossville Flats' car park. The crowd that ran through the car park from the waste ground was comprised largely of those running from Barrier 14 down Chamberlain Street. These people, including the hard-core rioters from Barrier 14, only left Barrier 14 when they saw the Pigs crossing Aggro Corner on their way
March 2002 at E 26.1-16 on the Tucker photographs that firmly establishes that the arrival of the Pigs is at the conclusion of the sequence and therefore not when the crowd was thronging Rossville Street into the Bogside. Mr Tucker’s photographs only record the beginning of events in the car park. Coleman Doyle’s photographs record the next stage, when the crowd from Barrier 14 started to arrive.
Any suggestion that the photographs prove that there was no crowd in the Rossville Flats’ car park that engaged the soldiers is contradicted by an objective consideration of the photographs. This, together with Lord Saville’s warning against over-reliance on photographs to prove, by the absence of a photograph, that something did not happen, leads to the conclusion that Mr Tucker’s photographs do nothing to disprove the soldiers’ accounts of rioting in the car park.
Mr Tucker’s photograph EP28.4A (below), taken from Block 2 of the Rossville Flats, shows some of the crowd running towards the Rossville Flats. In the middle background, and circled, is Pig 1 in transit as it moves across the waste ground. Pig 2 is not visible – which suggests it is now behind Block 1 having moved off from its stopping position. The only military vehicle on Rossville Street is the Support Company Command Vehicle.
EP 28.5 shows the arrival of Pig 2 in the car park: its bonnet appears at the northeast corner of the northern gable of Block 1. In the background, on Rossville Street, are the Command Vehicle, the Ferret scout car, another Pig and one of the four-ton lorries. The Mini that was in the car park has also been reversed south. back towards Block 2 of the Flats.
The Pig can be seen moving across the car park in EP2.4.
In this photograph the doors of Pig 2 are still closed and it is therefore either still moving or is just coming to, or has just reached, its final halt. The crowd in the car park appear to be thinning out and the immediate foreground is clearing of people. Coleman Doyle’s photographs follow this picture and the crowd is larger, the rioters from Barrier 14 having entered the car park from the southern end of Chamberlain Street. These pictures capture a distinct sequence of events in the car park. In **EP33.1** Pig 2 has its rear doors and front passenger door part way open. It has not, however, reached its final position: **EP 24.2.001**, the next photograph in the sequence, shows - using the fence posts as markers - that Pig 2 has moved slightly further to the east. By the time of **EP33.1** the man in the white raincoat (who is a useful marker) has reached the hard stand of the Rossville Flats' car park; people can be seen around Pig 2 in the space hitherto clear. Not all of them are running away from the soldiers.
The next Coleman Doyle photograph is best seen as **EP 24.2.001** which shows the full, wider perspective. From this print it is possible to see that the man in the white raincoat is running away from the waste ground down the west side of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.
Another print of the same photograph is at **EP 33.3** (below). At this stage Sergeant O can still be seen sitting in the front passenger seat of Pig 2 (and, as already mentioned, it has moved slightly further on from its position in EP 33.1, above).
Whereas there had been a thinning out of the crowd on the car park as the Pig arrived (see EP33.4 and EP 28.5 above), by the time of EP33.4 there are more civilians in the foreground. Those who appear in EP33.4 are the rioters who ran from Barrier 14 down Chamberlain Street when C Company deployed. Many of these rioters, on encountering Pig 2 and its soldiers, resumed their attack at close quarters.
7C-15 Sergeant O is, on close scrutiny of the photograph, again visible sitting in the front passenger seat of the Pig. His rifle can just be seen, sticking out of the doorway. Meanwhile, the soldiers around him are engaged in dispersing the crowd and attempting to make arrests.
7C-16 Some of the crowd are running away, some are standing still and some are assisting a fallen figure. Some are running towards Pig 2.
By this stage, Sergeant O is in the process of getting out of the Pig. There are also at least three civilians in the crowd who appear (at this moment) to be throwing objects towards the soldiers. Civilians are visible behind the low wall in front of Block 2. By Block 1 there is a crowd who continue to stand rather than disperse, despite the soldiers being only yards away.
7C-IV ALANA BURKE
7C-18 Pig 2 hit Alana Burke by accident. She had been badly affected by gas (such that she was very sick(^1) and was treated by a Knight of Malta(^4)) whilst watching the riot
(^1) Day 076/075/04 (^4) Day 076/073/16; Day 076/073/24 at Barrier 14, and the heavy coat that she was wearing had been soaked by the purple dye. She was, in her own words, “in quite a sorry state.”
When, to her surprise and fear, the Pigs entered the Bogside she began to run south towards the Rossville Flats in her waterlogged coat, wearing a skirt and high-heeled shoes, disorientated and ill from gas. She explained to Christopher Clarke QC that she “could not move because I was laden down. My clothes were covered in dye, it was a long coat and I was so heavy I could not move, I seemed to be rooted to the spot.” She said to Jimmy McGovern that she had big high-heeled shoes on, and remarked, “Is it any wonder I could not move”.
Miss Burke explained, in her BSI Statement, what happened:
At this time I was looking for the female friend that I had lost and I was terrified. Everyone was running towards the alleyway between Block 1 and Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. Lorney McMonagle tried to pull me out of the way but he let go and I was hit by a Saracen which entered the Rossville Flats car park from Rossville Street. I was hit just behind the wire fence on the courtyard side.
She elaborated in oral evidence to the Tribunal:
Q. When you say he tried to pull you out of the way but let go, tried to pull you out of the way of what?
A. Um, well at that stage, you know, the Saracens had started to come in to the waste ground and to the car park and when he let go that was it, I was on me own more or less.
Q. You say he let go?
A. Yeah. Q. Was he just pulling you along, or was he pulling you out of the way of either a soldier or a vehicle?
A. Well, I said that he was pulling me out of the way, it is quite possibly was he was pulling me out of the way because there was an army vehicle coming, but I distinctly remember holding him by the tie.
Q. Is your basic recollection that he pulled you along, but let go and then you were hit by a Saracen?
A. Yeah.
7C-22 Alana Burke was hit from behind. This clearly was a glancing blow from the Pig when Mr McMonagle let go of her. Frank Campbell described it as such in his oral evidence. Had it not been a glancing blow, Alana Burke might well have been more seriously injured.
7C-23 Her being hit was, therefore, an accident, as Alana Burke said herself in interviews she gave shortly after Bloody Sunday (although she cannot now remember speaking to journalists) whilst she was still in Altnagelvin Hospital. She said to The Irish News, “I couldn’t say it was deliberate”. and the Evening News quoted her as saying “I could not say if the Saracen deliberately ran me down”. Sergeant O readily accepted, in oral evidence, that Pig 2 could have knocked someone over, and that he just did not see it. INQ 1579, the driver of Pig 2, remained convinced that the Pig did not knock over Alana Burke, but he has always acknowledged that the vehicle did, in the process of braking and coming to a stop, nudge a man who appeared spread-eagled directly in front of the vehicle, who then got up and ran away. It would be oddly inconsistent for INQ... 1579 to acknowledge one incident with a civilian but to positively lie in denying another.
7C-24 Despite the true position, it remains part of the mythology of Bloody Sunday that Alana Burke was deliberately targeted by the driver of the Pig, knocked down and then pinned against a wall by the vehicle. Even now some witnesses have persisted in peddling this lie, seeking to convince the Tribunal that they were eyewitnesses to an event that Alana Burke explained did not actually happen. It is simply one further example of the distortion of what really happened on Bloody Sunday, which began on the day and has continued for the past 30 years.
7C-V THE RIOTING IN THE ROSSVILLE FLATS CAR PARK
7C-25 It is clear from civilian evidence that the arrival of Pig 2 in the car park presented an opportunity to the stone throwers that was not to be missed. Hugh Barbour, a 16 year old who was at the top of Block 1 at the north end of the Rossville Flats when the Army deployed into the Bogside, ran down to the second floor balcony singing to himself, “Let’s see some action”. He saw the soldiers debus. Directly in front of Block 2 were some of the younger men in the crowd who were jeering and taunting the soldiers and some were throwing stones and bottles. He could hear the sound of stones bouncing off the Pig.
7C-26 In oral evidence, he described what the crowd were doing:
Q. You say that you could see and hear the sound of stones bouncing off the Pig. Were some of the crowd running away at this stage, or were the people who were there at the time that you witnessed this the people who had stayed to throw stones at the soldiers?
20 Dav 096/104/22-105/01 21 AB10 22 AB 10.2 paragraph 8 23 AB 10.2 paragraph 12 24 Dav 088/ 057/22-058/08 A. Well, the Pig had just arrived into the car park. Some people were running away, other people were confronting the soldiers.
Q. Can you give us any idea of the size of the crowd that was in the car park at that stage?
A. At that particular time, about, say, 250 to 300 people.
7C-27 Questioned further by Peter Clarke QC, he estimated that 15 – 20 people were throwing stones at the Pig and hitting it.25
7C-28 As the crowd continued to move south and the soldiers followed them, the attack on the soldiers became focused on the Rossville Flats' car park. As the soldiers continued to attempt arrests around the area of the car park, the rioters continued the onslaught. Tucker E.P. 28.5 (below) shows the rioters facing or moving in a northerly direction – i.e. towards the arriving soldiers.
7C-29 Here the rioters were also able to make use of the height offered by the balconies of the Rossville Flats, which put the soldiers at a considerable disadvantage. David Capper,26 a BBC journalist, described debris (tins and bottles) being thrown at the soldiers from the Flats. He told Lord Widgery that there was “a hail of
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25 Dav 088/09610-16 26 M9 missiles". He recorded on his tape that people in the high blocks of flats above him had been firing down missiles of various sorts and that the troops had been firing back mostly with rubber bullets and with CS gas. In oral evidence to this Tribunal he confirmed, in response to questions from Gerard Elias QC, that he saw missiles being thrown down from the Rossville Flats, a general rain of debris that he thought was coming from the walkways, in particular from the middle and upper floor walkways and the roof. Significantly, Mr Capper also referred to civilians fighting the soldiers as they went to effect arrests, describing them as "struggling" and "fighting using fists".
The rioters were not made up purely of young children or teenage boys. The term "Derry Young Hooligans" did not prohibit many grown men, including Patrick Walsh and Michael Bridge, from joining in. The motives of the "DYH" were hardly political, as Patrick McCallion confirmed:
MR GLASGOW: Mr McCallion, can we start at the first page of your statement, AM74.1, please? Look at paragraph 6 at the bottom of the page. You, if I may say so, have been very frank about this: you went to have a good riot?
A. Yes.
Q. There was no political motive behind it, you were not going on a civil rights march, it was like any other opportunity, a good chance for a young man to have a riot?
A. Yes.
Q. You would have been rather older, I think 29?
A. That is correct.
Q. Rather older than most of what were called "the young hooligans", would you not? A. There were people older than me and they would have been in for a good riot as well.
Q. People of all ages were joining in, were they?
A. Yes, yes.
7C-31 The title itself did not originate from the military or the police; so satisfied with their activities and status were the rioters that they coined the phrase themselves and sought to bring to their gang official status. Eamon McCann described in his book how, “stupidly”, the “Young Hooligans Association” “progressed far enough to elect a Committee, have badges printed, and organise a trip to Belfast” to meet its counterparts in Ballymurphy.32 He confirmed this in oral evidence.33
7C-32 James McKinney saw, from behind the low wall in front of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats, stones and bottles being thrown at the soldiers from the balconies of Block 1 of the Flats.34 A dozen or so people were running backwards and forwards throwing missiles.35 There was “a good continuation of stones being thrown at that stage”. They landed close to the soldiers.36
7C-33 Floyd Gilmore,37 the brother of the deceased Hugh Gilmore, whose failure to give oral evidence to this Tribunal has not been explained, also saw and heard bottles and stones being thrown down from the Rossville Flats into the car park below: “This was completely normal and would have occurred in any riot situation had the police and soldiers ever come in that far”.38 See also James McKinney, AM303, below.
32 AM77.31-32 33 Day 87/158/06-159/13 34 AM 303.5 paragraph 33 -34 35 Day 081/118/05-119/08 36 Day 081/115 -116 37 AG 39. 38 AG 39.2 paragraph 11 Maureen Gerke (nee Barr) lived on the ground floor of Block 3 of the Rossville Flats – known as Floor 5. She saw the arrival of the Pigs. Her account provides clear evidence from a civilian that acid was thrown, and therefore may put the issue beyond doubt: she saw people throwing acid from the roof of the Flats. Despite her claims more recently in her BSI Statement and in her oral evidence that she could not remember that, she readily agreed with Edmund Lawson QC that she would not have made up her 1972 account of seeing acid being thrown from the Flats:
In your statement in 1972, you did say, did you not, that acid was thrown from the flats?
A. I did say that in my statement, yes.
Q. Are we to take it that your statement at the time was an attempt to be truthful?
A. Yes.
Q. So if you said that at the time, you must have meant it at the time?
A. I assume so.
Q. So acid was, it would seem, thrown from the flats at the soldiers; is that right?
A. Well, as I say, I cannot remember what I said at the time in the statement, but obviously when I read the statement, that is what I said in the statement at the time, so that is obviously what I believed at the time.
Q. And you would not have made it up, would you?
A. No, I certainly would not. The soldiers below felt the force of this attack, and it seems clear that it included acid and that the acid hit Soldiers T and R. In Soldier R's case the acid was sufficient to burn his denims and for him to feel a burning sensation on his legs. He told the RMP initially that, "the rioters threw acid bombs one of which splattered across my legs." In his second RMP statement he referred to having two acid bombs thrown at him, both of which struck his legs. He referred to two acid bombs in his evidence to Lord Widgery and in his SA statement:
Just after I fired this shot [his first shot] acid bombs were dropped from the middle floor of Block 1 above me. The first one, which was a bottle, hit the ground about a yard in from me and the acid splashed on my trousers. Sergeant O shouted something like "that's acid, look out" and I stepped back. Then a second bomb came down and splashed me some more.
Despite the evidence of Maureen Gerke (above), some at least of the Families, through their Counsel Barry MacDonald QC, challenged Soldier R's evidence of any acid attack. WO1 Wood, who gave evidence after Soldier R, was not challenged when he told the Tribunal that he remembers having a look at R's legs during the statement taking process and that they were red. He said, in his BSI statement, "I could see that [Soldier R's] leg was reddened by something corrosive".
The soldiers were also attacked by civilians on the ground. Sean Collins, a ten year old watching from his family's Flat in Block 3 of the Rossville Flats, gave
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43 See, for example, Sgt O at B575.113, paragraph 34; and LCpl V at B806 and B808 at A. 44 T: B741 at E, and B742 at G; R: B671 paragraph 5 45 B691.003 paragraph 16 46 B659 47 B666 48 B671 paragraph 5 49 CW1.10 paragraph 59 50 AC74 evidence of the Pigs' arrival and the soldiers' actions. He saw milk bottles\\textsuperscript{51} smashing onto the roof of the Pig.
7C-38 Neil McLaughlin\\textsuperscript{52} admitted to throwing stones at the Pig in the Rossville Flats' car park. He was questioned on this part of his statement by Christopher Clarke QC:\\textsuperscript{53}
\\textit{Q. Can we come back to AM347.2, paragraph 12? You describe there how, together with or other people not known to you at the time, you ran at the Pigs throwing stones at them. Can you tell me where you were when you were throwing stones? You had come out of Chamberlain Street and where did you go next, if anywhere?}
\\textit{A. Well, when I came out Chamberlain Street I would have turned right. In actual fact there was a gable wall there, the end house of Chamberlain Street to the right-hand side. I would have turned right and it was there where I seen the vehicles.}
\\textit{Q. Is it from there that you and others threw the stones?}
\\textit{A. It was there I threw the stones, yeah. I would not have been any closer.}
7C-39 Francis Dunne, a schoolteacher, observed the rioting at the Army barriers but did not take part because of his profession. He was heading down Rossville Street when the Pigs deployed and ran into the Rossville Flats' car park. He saw people he described as children stoning the troops around the area of Pig 2's stopping place from near the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 (the children's play area).
7C-40 Billy Gillespie was asked by Edwin Glasgow QC about the stone throwing in the car park.\\textsuperscript{54} He admitted that the rioters were throwing bricks and anything else
\\textsuperscript{51} \\textit{Day 195/89/23-090/09}. His attempt in oral evidence to maintain that there was only one milk bottle and that it was empty is not credible.
\\textsuperscript{52} \\textit{AM 347}
\\textsuperscript{53} \\textit{Day 091/05/19-06/10}
\\textsuperscript{54} \\textit{AG33} they could lay their hands upon. He also told the Tribunal that the stone throwers on the car park included Michael Bridge.\\textsuperscript{55}
\\textbf{Q.} Again I think it right that you should know that nobody I think the Tribunal has heard from has admitted there was any stoning in that area at all; even in the light of that, is it still your admission to this Tribunal on oath that you and others -- leave aside Mr Bridge for the moment -- were stoning in that car park?
\\textbf{A.} Yes.
\\textbf{Q.} It must have been perfectly obvious, for anybody who wants to give an honest account of what happened on that day, that you and others were stoning soldiers in that car park?
\\textbf{A.} Yes, stoning.
\\textbf{Q.} Can you say roughly how many of you there were doing the stoning at that stage?
\\textbf{A.} I would say about eight to fifteen.
\\textbf{Q.} Eight to fifteen?
\\textbf{A.} Yeah.
\\textbf{Q.} If we said about a dozen?
\\textbf{A.} Round about a dozen, yeah.
\\textbf{Q.} That would be a fair summary?
\\textbf{A.} Yeah.
\\textbf{Q.} I do not press it beyond this: is your belief, and you cannot go further than that, that Mickey Bridge was amongst them, or are you saying that you are certain?
\\textbf{A.} Well, Mickey Bridge was angry when he run out.
\\textbf{Q.} Angry, yes?
\\textbf{A.} Yes, angry and shouting and he threw a brick.
\\textbf{Q.} Threw a brick?
\\textsuperscript{55} Day 084/182-184/24 A. Threw a brick at that soldier, that soldier at the corner.
Q. If we look again at P188, Mr Gillespie lighten it, if we may, for a particular reason: in the foreground of that photograph, P188, at the very bottom, we see what appears to be a square object?
A. Yeah.
Q. I do not want to put words in your mouth, what do you think that is?
A. That is a brick, that is what we would call a brick.
Q. That is what you would call a brick?
A. That would be a big one.
Q. Is that the sort of size of missile that you and the dozen of so of whom you were a part were throwing at soldiers?
A. Some would have been that size, as you can see there would have been smaller ones scattered over round there, there are other bricks scattered round there as well.
Q. Bluntly, anything you could get your --
A. Hand on, yeah.
7C-41 It is clear that those rioting on the car park were joined by those who had been at Barrier 14 and who had run down Chamberlain Street as C Company deployed through Barrier 14. These rioters re-grouped in the car park of the Flats and joined those already in the car park attacking the soldiers.
7C-42 Neil McLaughlin was involved in the rioting at Barrier 14 and described the way in which they ran down Chamberlain Street and attacked the soldiers in the courtyard. Michael Bridge was one of those attacking the soldiers. Mr McLaughlin described in his BSI Statement how with about twenty others he ran at the Pigs throwing stones, and that he was pretty sure that he hit one of them.56 He was interviewed by the Sunday Times Insight Team and is recorded as saying that he and the group realised that “there were very few soldiers and a lot of them,
56 AM 347.2 paragraph 17 and that the soldiers weren't in riot gear. They surged forward towards the soldiers. Neil admits that in was in his mind to have a go..."57
Mr McLaughlin confirmed the situation in answer to questions from Edwin Glasgow QC:58
Q. So the position again, without any comment or exaggeration, as the soldiers got out of the back of that Pig armed with whatever they had with them, they were confronted, on your evidence, with a crowd of about 20 people charging at them with missiles in their hands; that is your recollection?
A. Right, yeah.
Q. At that stage there were still a great many people around in the car park?
A. There were.
Q. Who had been the press of people that you had described as being with you in Chamberlain Street?
A. That's right, yeah.
Q. Hundreds of people?
A. Maybe a couple of hundred, yeah.
Q. You agree with that?
A. Yeah.
Q. So hundreds of people who would have seen this charge by 20 people armed with missiles on the soldiers as they emerged from the Pigs?
A. That is right, yeah.
Mr McLaughlin also provides proof of the fact that the rioters from Barrier 14 arrived in the car park and resumed their rioting, putting the Tucker photographs into perspective:59
57 AM 347.12 58 Day 091/054/04-24 Q. So far as the crowd with whom you were, let us stick to the 20, Mr McLaughlin, those 20 whether known to you personally or not, would have been amongst those who would have been throwing stones at the barricade?
A. That is right, yeah.
Q. And all of you had succeeded in running the full length of Chamberlain Street before the army arrived on the waste ground?
A. That is right, yeah.
Q. And again I do not expect you to sympathise or agree with it, but the fact is that if those soldiers were to have any chance of arresting any out of your little bunch of stone-throwers, they had to come down that distance on that occasion?
A. Yeah.
Q. If they had not come that far, they would have stood no chance of arresting you. Again, I do not expect you to agree with it or to sympathise, Mr McLaughlin, the fact is if you had been arrested for rioting at the barricade, you could not really have complained?
A. That is right, yeah.
Christopher Clarke Q.C. confirmed this point in his follow-up questioning of Mr McLaughlin centring around Mr Tucker’s photograph EP 28.5:
We can see that most of the people here [in photograph EP 28.5] are running south. You must have begun throwing stones at the Pig at a time later than this photograph, when a proportion of the people that we see in this photograph must have got further down towards the exit, and it is possible that more people had come in to the entrance in the intervening period. Can you give us any idea, at the time when you were there throwing stones at the Pig, as to whether or not the people in the car park were spread all around it, as this photograph shows, or whether they were in any different disposition?
A. The car park was cleared by the time --
Q. The car park was clear? A. Yeah, there was no people at all. The only people in the car park, to my memory, was the people entering it from Chamberlain Street, including myself. Sorry, go on.
Q. Go on.
A. I was just going to say by that time the Saracen would have been in the car park, (inaudible) and all.
Q. At that stage, the people that you had come with down Chamberlain Street, the 20 or so who began to throw stones at the soldiers, and the rest of the car park, are you saying it had nobody in it or very few?
A. No, no, no, the number 20, I think, was the number put to the people who were attacking the vehicles, but there was hundreds come up Chamberlain Street into the car park on that day.
Q. What happened to those people that had come up Chamberlain Street, apart from those who were throwing stones?
A. I think they were trying to — again they were trying to make their way to safety, you know, and where they went to I do not know, to be honest with you, which, which route they took to get out.
Q. Should we understand this picture: that as you put it, hundreds come down Chamberlain Street; a group of them are throwing stones at the Pig at the entrance to the car park, and the rest are somehow trying to get out of the car park?
A. That is right, yeah.
Q. When you came into Chamberlain Street — when you came out of Chamberlain Street and turned right along the gable end, did you see people already in the car park?
A. No, I do not think so, no, no.
Q. You have a recollection of coming in to an empty car park, do you?
A. Well, I would not say I was the first in, but I knew that the people in the car park had come from Chamberlain Street. I think that is the only people I thought who were in the car park at that time.
Q. So these people that we see on this photograph, who look as if they were already in the car park before you arrived because the Pig has not yet come in to it, you think that these had got out of the car park, do you?
A. Sorry? Q. Do you think these people that we see in the photograph, who were people in the car park before the Pig arrives in the car park, had got out of the car park by the time that you had arrived?
A. I do aye, yeah.
Paul McDaid, then 15 years old, was a rioter at Barrier 14 whose admitted intention was to injure soldiers (McDaid was convicted of possessing explosives in August 1972). He left Barrier 14 having seen the Army vehicles going down Rossville Street. The Pigs had reached the junction of William Street / Rossville Street and were going further down Rossville Street before anybody came through Barrier 14. He then heard a shout that “the Brits are getting behind us” — i.e. further down Rossville Street. He feared being cut off. He saw soldiers coming through Barrier 14 towards the rioters (“us”). There were 50 to 100 people at the junction at this point including “hangers on”. He was the last to get away from the area around Barrier 14 and was in a crowd of about 30 or 40 people running down Chamberlain Street. He reached the west gable end wall of Chamberlain Street and saw two Pigs at the northeast corner of the Rossville Flats and two or three soldiers standing at the front of the Pigs.
Billy Gillespie (above) was frank about the rioting in the Rossville Flats car park. He was a self-confessed hard-core rioter. He ran down Chamberlain Street away from the 1 PARA who had come through Barrier 14. He heard only rubber bullets as he ran (Although he told the Tribunal that he came across Peggy Deery injured in Chamberlain Street, his apparent failure to hear the rifle fire was not highlighted by either Counsel to the Tribunal or for any of the Families.) He entered the Rossville Flats’ courtyard “and picked up some stones ready to throw”. He confirmed in oral evidence that there were others throwing stones, and numbered them at around “ten or fifteen”, “eight to fifteen ... a dozen”.
Frank McCallion, who has not given evidence to the Tribunal, was another rioter at Barrier 14. He fled down Chamberlain Street and heard shooting as he did so. He came out into the Rossville Flats’ car park:
There was a crowd with me. I would estimate that there were about 50 or 60 of us at this stage. We stopped there and looked around to find out which way to go. It seemed to me that some of the crowd in the car park had stopped and intended to fight back with bottles and stones. It seemed that, despite the two shots I had heard in Chamberlain Street, the crowd still regarded this as a riot situation.
At the end of the Chamberlain Street gable wall Mr McCallion saw soldiers just around the corner and saw a Saracen:
That was where people were rioting, throwing bottles and stuff. However, then somebody else shouted that they should not riot and people did seem to lose their enthusiasm for this then.
The situation at the southern end of the waste ground and on the car park of the Rossville Flats can be seen in a series of photographs by Coleman Doyle.
EP 33.1 (below) shows the scene as it developed.
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7C-48
7C-49
7C-50
7C-51
AG 33.2 paragraph 7 Day 084/149/01/09 Day 084/168/12-14 Day 084/183/10-18 AM 481. He has not given oral evidence. AM 82.3 paragraph 13 The sequence continues with **EP 33.3** below:
Again, in **EP 33.4** below the crowd can still be seen: The last in the sequence (Coleman Doyle EP33.2 below) still has people facing the soldiers at the northeast corner. It is plain, therefore, that not all of the crowd are dispersing:
It is unfortunate that here, as elsewhere, the Tribunal has not received the assistance it should have done from its civilian witnesses. A number of witnesses gave evidence of soldiers firing immediately they left their vehicles, without ever attempting to make arrests. This was clearly untrue.
The true position may be well illustrated by Neil McLaughlin's oral evidence. First, Mr McLaughlin was unequivocally clear that Pig 2, and the soldiers in attendance, came under attack; and secondly he was clear that "hundreds of people" must have seen it:
Q: If we look at paragraph 12 together, your recollection today is that when you ran at, it says "the Pigs", but it was the one Pig, was it not? A. Yeah.
Q. Throwing stones at them, you think you hit one and suddenly the soldiers jumped out of the back of the Pigs; that would have just been the one Pig? A. Uh-huh.
Q. The photograph helps you? A. Yeah.
Q. Could we go back to the photograph, Mr McLaughlin, at P188? I, of course, remind myself and you that this photograph, we all agree, was taken much later because effectively everybody has gone with the exception of those that we see standing around? A. Uh-huh.
Q. Did you see it help you to remember the position; do you now recall a scene like that when most people had gone? A. Probably I was gone at that stage as well.
76 For example, Kathleen Crossan: "The Saracen stopped and the soldiers jumped out. Some of them went down on one knee and started shooting rifles at the people." Day 121/104/20; Teresa Cassidy: "About five or six soldiers jumped out and started shooting into the back of the crowd." Day 144/042/06; Michael Lynch: "You say that soldiers jumped out of the Armoured Personnel Carriers and fired their rifles without taking up firing positions? A. Yes." Day 148/180/23 and AL38.2 paragraph 8
77 Day 091/053/03-54/24 Q. But you do now have a mental picture, a picture in your mind, of the Pig being roughly in the position that it is in the photograph, that was the one that you charged at?
A. Yeah.
Q. So the position again, without any comment or exaggeration, as the soldiers got out of the back of that Pig armed with whatever they had with them, they were confronted, on your evidence, with a crowd of about 20 people charging at them with missiles in their hands; that is your recollection?
A. Right, yeah.
Q. At that stage there were still a great many people around in the car park?
A. There were.
Q. Who had been the press of people that you had described as being with you in Chamberlain Street?
A. That is right, yeah.
Q. Hundreds of people?
A. Maybe a couple of hundred, yeah.
Q. You agree with that?
A. Yeah.
Q. So hundreds of people who would have seen this charge by 20 people armed with missiles on the soldiers as they emerged from the Pigs?
A. That is right, yeah.
Whilst some allowance must be made for the point made by Charlie Downey(^78), that by the very nature of the fact that the people were running away and therefore had their backs to the action and may have missed the violence directed towards the soldiers, the consistency between the evidence of the civilians set out above and that of the soldiers means that there are many witnesses who have simply not told the truth about the soldiers being attacked. The reasons for this will have to be addressed by the Tribunal.
7C-58 The evidence of those civilians who have been prepared to give honest accounts of what happened on the Rossville Flats’ car park is entirely consistent with the accounts given by the soldiers.
7C-59 Sergeant O initially remained by his vehicle. He recalled:
There was lots of noise in the car park area with shouting and women screaming. All sorts of objects were being thrown off the balconies... there were bottles, bits of rubble and cans of beans and anything the people could find in their flats to hurl at us.79
7C-60 Lance Corporal V, who moved south on leaving Pig 1, recalled that by the time he ran up to the entrance of the Rossville Flats forecourt there was a large crowd to the left and in front of him around the end of Chamberlain Street throwing bottles, stones and bricks, and that there were bottles thrown from the Rossville Flats which might have contained liquid.80
7C-61 Soldier Q had also been in Pig 1. He described the situation when he reached the car park as follows: “stones and bottles being thrown towards our position from where Chamberlain Street runs into the forecourt of the Rossville Flats”.81 The barrage was sufficiently heavy for him to have to take cover at the north gable end of Block 1. From there he saw bottles being dropped by people on the balconies. As none of the civilian evidence set out above in relation to this stone throwing had been challenged by those representing a number of the families, Barry MacDonald QC’s questions to Soldier Q on this subject82 were surprising. The issue was not pursued with Soldier S, who also made his way south from Pig 1, to
79 BS75.113 paragraph 34 80 B801; B808 letter A-B 81 B624 82 Day 339/066/22 – 070/02 see the crowd throwing stones and bottles being thrown from the top of the Rossville Flats.
None of the civilians identified above has at any stage claimed that the soldiers fired their weapons during this attack. It is however clear that the attack on the soldiers continued after live rounds were fired. Danny Deehan was another rioter who ran away from Barrier 14 and entered the Rossville Flats car park. He arrived before Pig 2 came to its final halt. He saw people behind and in front of him, some of who were turning around and throwing stones at the soldiers. He saw two people fall.
Q. I do not mean to push unfairly, can I put perhaps the commonsense point to you again: is it your recollection that young men were actually stoning soldiers while they were firing live rounds?
A. No.
Q. Do you think that that incident of the stoning took place before you saw anybody hit, or is that where you get into difficulty on timing?
A. Yeah, that is where I get into difficulty on the timing.
Q. Very well, but your recollection is that there had been some live firing before that, such stoning as there was, before that started?
A. Yes.
James Lynch said he could hear shooting and could see two soldiers at the north gable end wall of Block 1. James McKinney went to throw a stone from the gable end Chamberlain Street wall and was pulled back. He accepted that he moved out from the wall in order to do so, or else he could not have seen the
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83 AD21 84 AD 21.3 paragraph 12; Day 102/007-010 85 Day 102/030-031 86 AL24.3 paragraph 15 87 AL 24.3 paragraph 15 and see Day 101/093-094 soldiers at the north gable end of Block 1. This demonstrates the propensity of civilians to emerge from cover, in this case from behind the Chamberlain Street wall, to throw objects at the soldiers even though live firing has begun. Such actions would have given soldiers at whom such objects were about to be thrown a very brief time indeed in which to make a judgement about the threat they faced, in the context where shooting was already taking place.
7C-VI CONCLUSION
7C-64 The soldiers were shot at and attacked as the Pigs drove down Rossville Street. They were attacked as they began to seek to make arrests. The attack was vicious and intended to cause serious injury and, if possible, death: bricks, chunks of concrete, bottles, acid and anything else that came to hand were thrown at the soldiers with the sole intention of causing as great an injury as possible. A number of soldiers were hit by missiles and Soldiers R and T were burned by acid.
7C-65 The rioters on the waste ground were soon joined by those who had been driven south down Chamberlain Street by C Company and a combined assault was launched against the troops.
7C-66 Despite these attacks, the soldiers continued to attempt arrests as planned. Only when gunmen fired at them were they forced themselves to return fire.
7C-67 A large number of civilian witnesses have attempted to disguise the reality of events on the waste ground and in the car park. It is surprising that to an extent, in the examination of some of the military witnesses, those representing a number of the families have joined them in doing so. Their reasons for doing so may lie in what happened next: civilian shooting at the soldiers carrying out the arrest operation.
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88 Day 101/106 CHAPTER 7D
GUNMEN IN THE CAR PARK OF THE ROSSVILLE FLATS
7D-1 INTRODUCTION
7D-1 The evidence that there were gunmen firing at the soldiers in the car park of the Rossville Flats is overwhelming.
7D-2 The following gunmen were active in the car park of the Rossville Flats on Bloody Sunday and were engaged by particular Soldiers:
(1) A man with a pistol firing from behind a red Cortina in front of Block 3, and engaged by Soldier O.
(2) A man with an M1 Carbine firing from the balcony between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats and engaged by Soldier O.
(3) A man, probably using the same M1 Carbine, firing from ground level in the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats.
(4) A man with a pistol firing from ground level in the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Flats and engaged by Soldier R.
(5) A man with a Carbine firing from ground level in the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats engaged by Soldier S.
7D-3 The specific evidence relating to them is dealt with in the Submissions relating to individual Soldiers' engagements.
7D-4 In addition to these gunmen, the evidence establishes the following:
(1) There was at least one further gunman firing at the soldiers from the Rossville Flats. A large body of evidence speaks of a gunman using a Thompson machine gun from the vantage point of the Flats. Other witnesses heard rifle and pistol fire directed at the soldiers. (2) A gunman, colloquially known as Father Daly's Gunman, was seen, and photographed, firing a pistol towards the soldiers from the southern gable of the Chamberlain Street houses.
(3) OIRA 4 fired from the car park.
7D-5 Furthermore, a number of witnesses, who did not identify specific gunmen, nevertheless heard incoming fire being directed at the soldiers and saw them reacting to that fire.
7D-6 Even after the soldiers had returned fire, automatic fire continued to be heard.
7D-II THE GUNMAN / GUNMEN IN THE ROSSVILLE FLATS
7D-7 A large number of witnesses have given evidence to the Tribunal to the effect that they heard automatic fire being directed at the soldiers from the Rossville Flats. Others have spoken of hearing rifle or pistol fire or of being told that snipers were operating in the Flats. The overall picture is of one or more gunmen exploiting the vantage point of the Flats to attack the soldiers carrying out the arrest operation.
7D-8 Peter Stewart, the BBC journalist who was subsequently threatened by both wings of the IRA, wrote a report that was broadcast on the BBC Six O'Clock News on the evening of Bloody Sunday. It included the following statement:
Then in an obviously calculated demonstration the paratroops raced forward in armoured vehicles to be met with a fusillade of terrorist fire. They replied and by dusk two civilians had been shot dead, in addition to another body brought out earlier.
7D-9 In his BSI statement Mr Stewart says with regard to this:
In retrospect I believe it would be fair to say that the term "fusillade" was an emotive rather than a factual one. I still believe, however, that the tragic events that occurred on Bloody Sunday
1 The significance of this threat cannot be overestimated.
2 M88.11 were the result of a response by the Army to a deliberate attempt to overthrow the authority of the civil power.(^3)
7D-10 In his oral evidence to the Inquiry he said he was prepared to stand by his contemporaneous reference to "a fusillade of terrorist fire" although he thought "a fusillade of fire" would be more accurate.(^4)
7D-11 The cameraman with whom Mr Stewart was working that day was Mr Peter Beggin (now deceased).(^5) When Mr. Beggin's written evidence to the Widgery Tribunal(^6) was put to Mr Stewart,(^7) he agreed with it:
Q. Going on: "They contained paras in the same mixture of riot and combat gear, some of whom got out. Some of the paras who dismounted advanced across the open ground towards the Rossville Flats. I cannot remember whether they were carrying riot or combat weapons. Once again there was a flurry of shots, perhaps three or four. Paras in front of the Rossville Flats were at this time running along and none of them were to my knowledge in firing positions." I pause. That does accord with your recollection as to the way the paras were behaving?
A. Absolutely. The first shots - I looked round because I thought that the army were firing at that stage, and I looked round very carefully, and none of the soldiers with whom I was had his weapon in a firing position.
Q. Having thought that they were firing, what struck you was that there was none in a firing position?
A. I made it my business to look.
Q. Again, if you cannot comment please do not, but what Mr Beggin purports to say on behalf of a number of people is: "My impression, which I shared with everyone there at the time, I believe, was that the shots were coming at us from the direction of the flats." If that was Mr Beggin's impression, is it one that he shared with you, or is it one that you yourself independently had?
(^3) M88.6 paragraph 17 (^4) Day 113/083/04 (^5) It is understood that Mr Beggin died before this Inquiry was established. (^6) M4.3 paragraph 8 (^7) Day 113/081/22 A. They were certainly -- the two that I heard were certainly coming from the front left of me as I ran down Rossville Street.
Q. Did you have the impression that any of the shots that you heard, in Mr Beggin's words, came from the direction of the flats?
A. They could have done.
7D-12 David Phillips, the producer of ITN's News at Ten, said in his statement made on 8th February 1972 that at 4.12 p.m. he saw the soldiers go through Barrier 14.
At that time I was standing at the corner of Waterloo Street and William Street when I heard a deep and long burst of automatic firing which I identified as coming from a Thompson machine gun. Immediately afterwards I heard a volley of single rifle shots from the same point. My impression was that the firing was coming from a point about 300 -400 yards away at an angle of about 45 degrees to the line of advance of the troops. I heard General Ford who was looking in the same direction as I was say, "That's is awful heavy firing." He then said, "We know that they have got seventy gunmen in there." I took him to mean the Bogside and Creggan area.
7D-13 Mr Philips said in oral evidence that after the automatic fire there came a fusillade of shooting. He explained that he knew it was from a Thompson because he had heard firing in Londonderry the previous Friday and an Army marksman had identified it as Thompson fire. He also described two single incoming shots at a later point. In the case of the first, a paratrooper told him to get down. His oral evidence to Lord Widgery was to the same effect: he explained that the automatic fire and single shots appeared to come from a point 45 degrees to the left as you faced down William Street. In cross-examination it was made clear that that line ran to Block 3 and the City Walls, and that the automatic fire was the first shooting that he heard. He also indicated that a later incoming single shot had
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1 M66.2 2 Day 139/061/10-13 3 M66.3 4 M66.15 5 M66.7 6 M66.12 7 M66.13 come from high up and demonstrated that it seemed to have come from the western side of the northern tip of Block 1.\\textsuperscript{15}
7D-14 Mr Philips logged the incoming automatic fire at 4.15 p.m.\\textsuperscript{16} Making necessary allowances for slight discrepancies in accuracy of time recording, this is nonetheless significant evidence. It demonstrates that there was a gap between the soldiers deploying and a gun battle occurring; it also demonstrates that the first firing was not military.
7D-15 The civilian evidence in Chapter 7A indicates that firing occurred as Pig 1 arrived on the waste ground, that firing was heard by civilians running away from Barrier 14 down Chamberlain Street, and that there was firing before Pig 2 came to a halt in the car park. Mr Philips' evidence is therefore consistent with him - although not hearing or appreciating this early firing, or indeed N's shots down the Chamberlain Street alleyway - hearing the hostile fire that precipitated the gun battle proper. The effect of Mr Philips' evidence is to support the fact that there was an arrest operation and that the soldiers only fired some time after deployment and in response to non-military fire.
7D-16 Peter Wilkinson, a cameraman, gave very similar evidence to Mr Philips of hearing automatic fire followed by military fire. He described in his written evidence to the Widgery Tribunal (unbeknown to him, echoing the aural experience of then Captain now General Sir Michael Rose\\textsuperscript{17}) how he heard a Thompson firing after the soldiers had deployed and then military fire thereafter. Mr Wilkinson described seeing "a snatch squad" go on foot through the Barrier in William Street, to be followed several minutes later by four Pigs. He followed the soldiers down William Street and took film of the snatch squad from the corner of William Street and Little James Street.
\\textsuperscript{15} M66.8-9 \\textsuperscript{16} M66.12. \\textsuperscript{17} See further below At about this time I heard a Thompson sub-machine gun open fire and from that moment on there was intense gun fire (ball fire) for three or four minutes from the direction of the open ground by Rossville Street.\\textsuperscript{18}
During questioning by Michael Mansfield Q.C., Mr Philips reiterated the timing of the shooting:
\\textit{LORD SAVILLE: I must have been misunderstanding you earlier, Mr Phillips, I thought you had told me you recall hearing what you have described as machine-gun fire as the last of the Paratroopers went through the barrier?}
\\textit{A. Can I refer myself back to the note, sir, which I have logged, okay? (Pause) I beg your pardon, yes, the sequence is definitely down: "4.12" Paras in; that is the first single file going in, capture flag. At 4.15 "real fire". I am sorry, that is the correct sequence}
\\textit{MR MANSFIELD: That is what I was putting to you, Mr Phillips. That is what you said this morning, I appreciate it is 30 years ago. Do you have difficulty remembering this?}
\\textit{A. No, I do not at all.}\\textsuperscript{19}
Mr Mansfield asked why it was that the sound of the automatic firing did not appear on the ITN news footage. Mr Philips explained:
\\textit{Q. Can you explain if they are filming why the sound of a sub-machine gun is not recorded?}
\\textit{A. Yes, I can.}
\\textit{Q. Which is?}
\\textit{A. Because you are shooting in those days on film and you have only got a limited amount of film in the camera. You cannot squirt off the film – you cannot be running all the time, okay, you can only have the X number of feet in the can and we are carrying spares and that is, in any situation, the crew cannot be shooting all the}
\\textsuperscript{18} Although by the time he came to give his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry Mr Wilkinson appeared unable to remember the order in which he heard automatic fire and single shots (see M82.2), he was able to identify the automatic fire he did hear as Thompson Machine Gun fire: M82.4, at D.; his confusion over timing does not detract from his written evidence.
\\textsuperscript{19} Day 139/145/18-146/08 time, so I imagine that Peter Wilkinson was switched off at that moment, okay, and then would catch up with the action.20
7D-19 When cross-examined by Lord Gifford, Mr Philips was resolute that he had heard automatic fire:
A. The sound of the Thompson on the Sunday afternoon, the low, deep rumble was precisely the same and seemed to go on longer than the sound I heard on top of the OP on the Friday.21
7D-20 It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the terms Mr Philips used to describe what he heard are pretty much the terms used, without any possibility of conferring, by the military, the police, other media witnesses and the few civilian witnesses who have been prepared to admit, then or now, that they heard a Thompson submachine gun firing.
7D-21 Many witnesses who heard the automatic fire tried to describe the sound that they heard. By way of example, Soldier 136, a Lieutenant in the Royal Green Jackets described the sound as a “boom noise”, “heavy and slow”;22 INQ 2238 described a “long low burst of Thompson Machine gun fire,” that sounded like someone “beating a war drum”, or a “baboon beating its chest”;24 Soldier 011, Royal Anglian, described “a low thud” sound;25 Corporal 033 of 1 PARA described a “slow thud thud sound”;26 and INQ 736 (Lance Corporal C Company 1 PARA) described a “thump thump thump” sound.27
7D-22 At the time he heard this firing Mr Philips was close to General Ford and it appeared to Mr Philips that General Ford’s reaction, in terms of the source of firing, was the same as his:
20 Day 139/147/14-148/01 21 Day 139/163/09-12 22 B1838.003 paragraph 17 23 C2238.3 paragraph 13 24 C2238.2 paragraph 11 25 Day 382/086/12 26 B1621.005 paragraph 36 27 C736.2 paragraph 8 His demeanour to me, he looked concerned, and he certainly did not think that it was his own men firing.28
Mr Philips also rejected Lord Gifford's suggestion that the other members of Mr Philips ITN crew also reported hearing a Thompson firing only because Mr Philips had done so.29
7D-23 The reporter Nigel Wade, sheltering behind the low wall in front of Block 2, assumed that there was a gun battle between snipers "perhaps in the Flats" and that everyone was "caught in a very heavy cross-fire".30 He had no idea from where the shots were coming, or who if anyone had been hit. He said that it was very hard to tell from where the shots were coming; the echo in the built up area meant that the noise was coming from all around,31 and that his impression was that there was firing from the Army and firing from the flats.32 He had the impression that there were snipers in the Rossville Flats33
7D-24 Simon Winchester wrote in The Guardian Newspaper for Monday 31.1.72:
There was certainly some firing from the IRA. I heard one sub-machine gun open up from inside the Flats and heard a number of small calibre weapons being fired intermittently ...34
7D-25 In oral evidence he confirmed that he had sufficient confidence in his recollection to have written this report "a matter of minutes after it had happened".35
7D-26 Mr Winchester gave lengthy but at times conflicting accounts in both his BSI evidence and to Lord Widgery. It is important to remember that he considers his 1972 evidence the more reliable.36
28 M66.12 29 Day 139/167/18-25; and confirmed this during questioning by Edwin Glasgow Q.C. at Day 139/190/02-191/03 30 Day 109/134/07-15 31 Day 109/132/03-133/12 32 Day 109/221/11-222/09 33 Day 109/210/01-019 34 M83.45 35 Day 116/158/17-159/04 Mr Winchester then left the Rossville Flats car park via the stairwell, sheltered there for a few seconds and then ran through the stairwell out of the Flats to the back. At “about this time”, just as he leaves or just after he exits the Rossville Flats heading south, he heard army fire and answering fire which he thought was low calibre .22 fire and, he thinks, some automatic fire coming from the general direction of the Flats. Mr Winchester said that he could reasonably suppose that the automatic fire was coming from somewhere high up in the Flats. He told Lord Widgery that it was when he was above the Fahan steps and after he saw two casualties fall at the rear of Joseph Place - that he heard the automatic fire.
In cross-examination at the Widgery Inquiry, he said that he could not “consciously” differentiate between 7.62mm and .303 fire; but he could differentiate between an M1 carbine and a 7.62 mm weapon.
Brian Cashinella a journalist in Chamberlain Street observed in his newspaper report for the next day “I thought there was at least one sniper attacking from the roof of the Rossville Flats.” In a statement made in 1972 he said that he followed the soldiers down Chamberlain Street and had heard them firing. By the time he reached to the car park they had stopped. They were not firing while he was with them. They told him to keep his head down and that there was a sniper on the roof of the Rossville Flats.
Where Chamberlain Street comes to an end the wall on the left continues towards Rossville Flats and several paras were strung out along that wall standing in the doorways which are in it. There was a burst of firing which could have come from several directions. It is very difficult to tell where firing is coming from. It appeared to me to come from the area between Glenfada Flats and
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36 Day 116/028/07 37 M83.27 38 M83.33 Widgery evidence letters F-G 39 M83.34 C-D 40 M83.38 letters D-E 41 M11.18 42 M11.5-6 paragraph 28 Rossville Flats. The firing might have come from either block of flats. It might have come from an area between the two blocks and not from the flats themselves at all. I just could not tell. Some of the paras who were there told me to get my head down as they had got their heads down.
I did as I was told. Although I heard the burst of firing I was not conscious of any firing coming near me or near the paras where I was at the end of Chamberlain Street.
...I should have said that when I first came into Chamberlain Street following the troops and looked down it towards Rossville Flats ... the paras at the bottom of Chamberlain Street were firing towards Rossville Flats. When I actually got down the street with them they had stopped firing and were not firing at the time I was down there with them and they told me to get my head down. They told me when I got down to them and I was told to get my head down that there was an IRA sniper on the roof of the flats. I did not see him.43
7D-30 He stated that he then went back up to the top of Chamberlain Street and heard a further “burst” of firing.
7D-31 In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry he stated;
The troops had positioned themselves behind an armoured vehicle and against the walls on both sides of Chamberlain Street. There was no firing taking place at that time, but several of the paratroopers had their rifles pointed towards the top of Rossville Flats: and again they said they thought there was a sniper up there and told me to keep out of sight.44
7D-32 In cross examination he stated that before he joined the soldiers he heard a cacophony of noise, an awful lot of gunfire coming from that area, some 200-300 shots which he would think was rifle fire.
7D-33 In his BSI statement he stated;
I then continued walking up to the end of Chamberlain Street and came to a halt at the southernmost end of the street... where a troop carrier was parked horizontally across the mouth of the
43 M 11.4-5 paragraphs 23-28; Day 110/ 023-4 44 M11.10 letters F-G street. At this point I remember seeing Paratroopers in the doorways of the houses on the eastern side of the street with their rifles pointing towards the Rossville Flats. Beside the last building on the left hand side of Chamberlain Street as I looked towards the Rossville Flats I remember seeing one Paratrooper lying on the ground and another standing up both with their rifles trained on the Flats. It was at this point one of he paratroopers said to me "Keep your bloody head down there's a sniper up there." Referring to the Rossville Flats. I could see the Rossville Flats clearly from where I was located but could not see any sniper... For the whole period that I was standing at the end of Chamberlain Street looking towards the Rossville Flats I did not see any paratrooper fire his weapon or come under any fire.45
His oral evidence was as follows:
Q. Can we then come back to M11.22, paragraph 10? You describe in that paragraph seeing paratroopers in the doorways of the houses on the eastern side of the street with their rifles pointing towards the flats and beside the last building on the left-hand side of Chamberlain Street, seeing one paratrooper lying on the ground and another standing up, both with their rifles trained on the flats; is that right?
A. That is right.
Q. How far down Chamberlain Street did you go? Did you go right to the end?
A. I do not think I did, no. No, I do not think I did. I went past the first Pig, I remember doing that. But I think, I think I was then warned by the paras to come back, because you know, they claimed there were snipers in Rossville Flats, get back again, you know, get out of the way.
Q. You describe how one of the paras said "Keep your bloody head down, there is a sniper up there"?
A. That is right.
Q. Was he a paratrooper who was somewhere down Chamberlain Street but not at the very far end?
A. He was to the right of the Pig we have just seen on the photograph and he was lying on the ground along with a colleague,
45 M11.22 paragraph 10 there was two of them there, this particular chap was lying on the ground with his rifle pointed at the Rossville Flats.46
7D-35 He explained further:
Edwin Glasgow: Then at the foot of the page when you describe what you heard or saw at that moment:
"Answer: The troops had positioned themselves behind an armoured vehicle against the wall on both sides of Chamberlain Street. No firing taking place at that time, but several of the paratroopers had their rifles pointed towards the top of the Rossville Flats and again they said they thought there was a sniper up there and told me to keep out of sight."
A. Yes.
Q. There was not any doubt, was there, from what the soldiers were doing and saying, that rightly or wrongly, they believed there was a sniper?
A. They obviously did, yes.
Q. That was obvious to you
A. Yes, it was very obvious to me, yes.47
7D-36 Patrick Clancy reported in the Daily Telegraph on 31st January 1972 that troops engaged snipers who were firing from the Rossville Flats.48
7D-37 Monica Barr49 observed the events in the car park of the Flats from the rear window of a house in Chamberlain Street. She saw someone fire a pistol from the eighth floor of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats towards the soldiers. Alphonsus Cunningham also heard a pistol fire from the direction of the Rossville Flats.50
46 Day 110/020/07-21/08 47 Day 110/115/13 – 116/04 48 L32 49 AB 16 50 AC125.3 paragraph 12 Mrs Barr was resolute in the face of questioning from Barry Macdonald Q.C. that she did indeed see a man on the top floor of the Flats with a gun and furthermore that she heard the shot when he fired:
Q. What I have to ask you is whether it is possible that you heard a pistol shot when you were looking out of your window; you saw a man in the upper flats, on the top floor of Rossville Flats, perhaps with a camera, perhaps with a bottle. You saw a soldier fire in that direction and you formed the mistaken impression that the man or the hand at the window was firing a gun when in fact it was a man just under your own window; is that possible?
A. No, it is not possible. I saw the man on the top floor with a gun and I heard the pop when he fired.
Q. How can you be so sure it was even a man when you said in your statement to Eversheds that you did not see the shape of this person or even the face of this person?
A. Well, I presumed it was a man because all I saw was the arm coming out the window; I presumed it was a man.
Q. In any event, all this happened some time after you heard the first shots that day?
A. Yes.51
Sally Moran made a manuscript statement on 4th February 1972 in which she stated that she was with her boyfriend Eamonn Deane at Free Derry Corner. Just as the meeting was starting the crowd came under fire from the William Street end of Rossville Street. There was continuous gunfire, both single and automatic.52
Patrick McGlinchey, a convicted PIRA terrorist, spoke of seeing six or seven rapid shots hitting the ground as he ran across the Rossville Flats waste ground. He assumed that this was automatic fire.
Q. May we move to your paragraph 10, please. You have been asked a few questions about the gunfire you mention in this
51 Dav 148/032-33 52 AM 423.2 Ms Moran was only 23 years old in 1972 but has not provided any evidence to this Inquiry. paragraph. You, at least at the time you were speaking to Eversheds, and I think still today, were of the belief that the gunfire that you saw was from a machine-gun?
A. Yes, that was my belief. I never heard the actual shots, it is just because of the way the ricochets hit the ground, I took it that it must have been an automatic weapon.
Q. And you give a few reasons why you think it was automatic?
A. Yes.
Q. The number of rounds fired and the short period of time within which they were fired?
A. Yes.
Q. You have said today about six or seven rounds; that is your present recollection?
A. Yes.
Q. The fact that they were fired very rapidly?
A. Yes.
Q. And they were, as we can see in your paragraph 10, very evenly spaced?
A. Yes.
Q. The soldiers you had seen before you saw that gunfire, the actions of the soldiers that you had seen were consistent with an arrest operation?
A. Well, as I say, I only seen one soldier actually apprehend someone. As I say, he was beating him with the rifle butt.
Q. Could we look at the preceding paragraph, paragraph 9. We can see about halfway down that paragraph your belief at the time was that the Army was operating a snatch squad?
A. Yes.
Q. At the bottom of that paragraph that soldiers were trying to catch individuals in the crowd?
A. That was my general impression.
Q. That was your impression at the time. That is certainly inconsistent with soldiers firing a machine-gun at a group of civilians in order to herd them into an area further away from them?
A. What I said about the soldiers there or that individual soldier, that was just as I moved out of the bottom of Harvey Street, Chamberlain Street. You were talking travelling another 40, 30-40 yards before you actually reached the car park and that is when the different soldiers came in on the Saracen.
Q. Your assumption was that this was military gunfire?
A. Yes.
Q. But, as you have said, you did not see any soldier firing?
A. No. Q. You did not hear anyone firing?
A. No.
Q. My suggestion to you is that the gunfire was not from the Army, that it may have been from a civilian in the Rossville Flats. What you saw, I suggest, is equally consistent with that?
A. Well, if it was somebody in the Rossville Flats firing shots, they were either very poor shots or they were aiming at the crowd.
LORD SAVILLE: Mr McGlinchey, this is the Chairman again. I know it is very difficult and I know you were a lad and were running and pretty scared, but do you have in your mind's eye as you saw these strikes whether that Pig was moving or had come to a stop?
A. No.
LORD SAVILLE: You have got a memory -- sorry to interrupt you, I understand in your mind's eye you seem to remember seeing the rear of the vehicle and you were shown a photograph by Mr Roxburgh which, it is pretty certain that is where it ended up. Of course that show the front of the vehicle.
A. That is correct.
LORD SAVILLE: Do you have any recollection -- and do say if you do not -- as to whether or not when you noticed the Pig it was moving?
A. As I say, all of this happened in the space of maybe 30, 40 seconds from when the Saracen actually came in. My recollection was that it came in, it swung round and soldiers jumped out. As I say, I was still running while you are seeing all of that. As I say, I did not hear any shots. As I was still running I seen strike marks hitting the ground and they were going in the direction that the crowd was going and that was the reason I assumed that the only people to the right of me then was the Army.
LORD SAVILLE: I follow that entirely: just to make sure I have got the time sequence right as best you can remember it: you got down to the car park area; you were running just about as hard as you could, as I understand it?
A. Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: You saw this Pig; you saw soldiers; did you actually see them jumping out of the Pig or just running in near to the Pig.
A. There was actually individual soldiers who were in part of, you know, the vehicle and then the, the Saracen swung round -- from what I recollect and the soldiers jumped out of it.
LORD SAVILLE: And it was after that then that you saw these strikes; was it?
A. Yes.53
Leo Redmond Gallagher also heard automatic fire. He said in his BSI statement that he was proceeding south through Columbille Court and Glenfada Park intending to go to Free Derry Corner when he heard shooting:
I did not know at the time that it was live fire but I knew that it was a sharp sound different from rubber bullets and CS gas guns. I heard three or four shots in quick succession like automatic fire. I had an impression that the shots were coming from the City Walls. My first thought was that the IRA had opened fire which I thought was a silly thing to do with so many people about.54 I thought it was the IRA because at that time, when rioting took place at Lower Road or the junction of Little James Street and Sackville Street, the IRA would sometimes take a shot at the Army.55
Although Mr Gallagher told Miss McGahey that he could not tell the difference between high velocity fire and other types of live firing,56 his reaction at the time
53 Day 388/087/09-92/12 54 It is worth noting that, contrary to one element of Bogside propaganda, Mr Gallagher did not immediately think that the firing could not be the IRA because the IRA did not use their weapons when doing so might result in injury to civilians. 55 AG 25.3 paragraph 16 56 Day 166/142/04-07 had been to conclude that the gunfire he heard was IRA firing and that it sounded like automatic fire.
7D-43 Eamonn Hutton, who was 23 on Bloody Sunday, made a very brief statement in 1972 in which he described running along Chamberlain Street to get behind the High Flats. He said,
As we made for a wall about 3' high a burst of automatic fire from a 9mm gun rang out.57
7D-44 Mr Hutton went on to say that one of the boys, who he did not know personally, fell about twenty yards off from the small wall. Mr Hutton stated that thirty to forty people tried to get to him and got within ten yards. It is possible that this was Jack Duddy.
7D-45 Brendan Harley said in his BSI statement;
During the course of the afternoon I am certain that I heard shots of a repetitive nature and which I would describe as automatic gunfire. They were definitely not single shots. The sound was more like shots being fired very quickly at short regular intervals but not so fast that it was impossible to distinguish each individual shot. I recall a break in the shooting – it was not a continuous flood of fire.58
7D-46 Mr Harley thought that he was in Glenfada Park when he heard the automatic / semi-automatic gunfire. He described it as being “clearly audible” and “in the near vicinity.”59
7D-47 In addition to the weight of non-military evidence of there having been automatic fire directed at the soldiers after they deployed in sector 2, there is also considerable military evidence (and not just from soldiers from 1 PARA) to the same effect.
57 AH 94.1 58 AH 35.4 paragraphs 21-23 59 Day 121/129/18 The evidence of then Captain now General Sir Michael Rose is particularly clear. While in the area of St Eugene's cathedral he heard a burst of firing from a Thompson machine gun coming from the Rossville Flats area as he was tracking the "tail end charlies" of the march as it went down Great James Street. The main tail of the march was "well past."
Q. Is there any doubt at all in your mind about the type of fire you heard?
A. Absolutely none at all. I was familiar by then with the sound of the Thompson machine-gun fire in Londonderry, extremely familiar with it.
Q. You have qualified your evidence in paragraph 19, after saying there it was a Thompson machine-gun, you said, "It was certainly not a high velocity weapon," was that to indicate it might have been some other form of low velocity weapon other than a Thompson?
A. No, it was merely to distinguish the fact that a Thompson was a low velocity weapon and I was reinforcing my view that it was a Thompson machine-gun fire that I had heard.
LORD SAVILLE: Would it be right, General -- tell me if it would not because it is only a guess on my part -- that you could describe a Thompson machine-gun as opposed to a high velocity weapon with the Thompson machine-gun being rather more a thumping type of noise than a crack, would that be inaccurate?
A. It was a lower rate of fire than you could have probably achieved with some other form of machine-gun, a high velocity machine-gun; it did have a sort of hollow thump sound to it, but it could not be mistaken for, for example, a Bren gun or some other form of machine-gun fire, it was very distinctive.
General Rose then ran down the hill to Barrier 12. By the time he got there PARA had already deployed into the Bogside. He crossed over the junction and came under fire himself from what he identified as a Garand or similar weapon. He was in no doubt in oral evidence that this was not British Army SLR fire:
MS McGAHEY: In paragraph 20 you go on to say that having heard that sound you immediately accelerated your pace down the hill to try to find out what was going on. You say you think your route involved you walking down Great James Street and then down Little James Street to barrier 12.
A. I follow the route, ma'am, I follow the route.
Q. Can you give the Tribunal any indication of the length of time it took you, from hearing the fire to reaching barrier 12?
A. Three minutes maximum, I would think.
Q. You say in paragraph 21, that as you went through barrier 12 there were a number of soldiers moving through it and command group standing by the crossing point. As far as you could tell, had the main body of paratroopers already gone into the Bogside by the time you arrived?
A. I would think they had.
Q. You say there were soldiers moving through the barrier, were they moving through as part of an operation to go into the Bogside?
A. I would say they were following up the initial element that had gone through.
Q. From soldiers on foot in the vehicles you could see, could you gain any impression of how long they had gone in; were they still moving into the Bogside?
A. No, I had no impression as to how long they had been there. They were not part of the original force that had gone through, certainly, so they, I suppose, must have been there for a while, the initial element, the vanguard.
Q. You then say that you emerged at the junction of Rossville Street and William Street and, "Some incoming fire was going over our heads. You have identified for us your position at point A, just below the William Street/Rossville Street junction. Where was that incoming fire coming from, could you tell?"
A. It was certainly coming from a southerly direction, like from somewhere over the top of the Rossville Flats, I guess.
Q. You say from somewhere over the top of the Rossville Flats, did you have an impression of shots coming from a height down towards you?
A. Yes, I mean, it would have been compatible with people in the Rossville Flats firing in our direction.
Q. Did you think that, because it was an obvious place from which fire might come, rather than because you could actually identify the direction from which it had?
A. It was the general direction of the Rossville Flats that the fire was coming and because you could not see beyond that, I seem to recall that was where I guess -- I thought it was coming from.
LORD SAVILLE: General, in my case a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, I do understand if you have high velocity fire coming over your head, you will hear the supersonic crack as it goes over. What were you hearing on this occasion?
A. Certainly hearing crack of rounds coming in our direction over our heads, there is no question of that.
MS McGAHEY: You say that the fire was single shots from rifles of some sort and that you do not believe it was from Army fire. Could you tell the difference between fire from an SLR and fire from another form of rifle?
A. Not absolutely, but the SLR fire, it tends -- it is a slightly heavier noise than the sort of fire we were getting on that occasion. So my suspicion, it would have been either a Garrund or something like that. It did not strike me as being SLR, British Army fire at the time.
Q. Were you confident at that time in your ability to distinguish between SLR fire and other types of rifle fire?
A. I certainly would not put myself with a sort of 100 per cent guarantee, but I developed a sort of instinct for whether it was our own type of fire or whether it was, as I say, terrorist weapon fire and my thinking is it was definitely terrorist weapon fire.
Q. Do you have any idea now of the number of incoming shots that you heard?
A. (Witness shaking head). Not that many, I would think half a dozen, something like that.\\textsuperscript{64} General Rose dismissed any suggestion that the firing he heard was later on in the day:
Q. Could it be, General, that in fact you did hear fire from a Thompson sub-machine-gun, but it was not at the time that you now attributed to it?65
A. Absolutely not. That would be quite impossible. The trigger for my moving down from Eugene's cathedral was undoubtedly and unequivocally and unambiguously and without any doubt at all, a burst of Thompson machine-gun fire.
Q. When you moved down from St Eugene's Cathedral, were you able to make any assessment as to whether the engagement was over or coming to an end or just beginning?
A. I was not able to make an assessment, or certainly did not make such an assessment.
Q. What I want to suggest to you, General, is that before any suggestion of a Thompson sub-machine-gun being fired was -- there was considerable other firing?
A. No, I was above the Bogside by St Eugene's Cathedral. The first sound of firing which prompted me to move forward was a burst of Thompson machine-gun fire, without any doubt at all.66
General Rose was far from alone in hearing a burst of automatic fire. A number of soldiers from C Company were on the wasteground. A group of three soldiers consisting of INQ 0444, Widgery 003 and INQ 0131 crossed the waste ground. Soldier 003, a Lance Corporal, armed only with a baton stick, was running across the waste ground when he heard firing break out. The firing, which moved from his right to his left, came from a Thompson sub-machine-gun.67 He was with INQ 0131 who also heard firing. They were right out in the open and INQ 0131 recalls "seeing dirt jumping up in the ground in our general area" and joking to 003 that
65 Mr Harvey made no attempt to tell the witness or the Tribunal what his alternative time was. 66 Day 284/024-25 The General is not the only witness to have said that the first fire was Thompson fire: see Peter Wilkinson, including footnotes, above. 67 B1366.004 paragraph 19; Day 309/084/02/14 003 should go and hit the gunman with his baton. INQ 0444, a Corporal recalls moving past the end of Chamberlain Street. He heard two bursts of Thompson Machine Gun fire, each burst being six or seven rounds.
INQ 1799, a Lance Corporal in C Company, heard an automatic pistol and two distinct bursts from a Thompson as he was moving south down Chamberlain Street. INQ 2045, a Private, heard the sound of automatic gunfire and single shots coming from south west of his direction as he ran down what would appear to have been Chamberlain Street. INQ 0622, a Sergeant, heard a short burst of automatic fire (between 2 and 4 rounds) that he thought came from a sub-machine gun as he was at the junction of William Street and Little James Street. INQ 0736, a Lance Corporal, was at the end of William Street when he heard high and low velocity shots and (as so many witnesses have described it) the thump-thump sound of Thompson machine gun, coming from the south in the direction of the Rossville Flats. INQ 0587, a Private, heard shots from a Garand rifle (the weapon the then Captain Rose also thought he heard) and a Thompson Machine gun when he was on the south side of William Street close to Aggro corner.
Colonel Tugwell was in Chamberlain Street when, after the Paratroopers had deployed, he heard firing that could have been automatic gunfire, machine or sub-machine gun fire of low velocity. He said “the gunfire appeared to come from the area at the bottom (southern end) of Chamberlain Street and around the Rossville Flats”. Although at some stage he had lost touch with General Ford, Colonel Tugwell may well have been near the General at this stage as Captain INQ 0002, ADC to General Ford, heard automatic fire when he was at the junction of
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68 C131.4 paragraphs 19-20 69 C444.3 paragraph 21 70 C1799.4-5 paragraphs 31-36; Day 294/163 71 C2045.2 paragraph 18; Day 309/189/03-190/07 72 C622.4 paragraph 28; Day 310/094/23-096/03 73 C736.2 paragraph 8 74 C587.3 paragraphs 12-18; Day 324/167/02/20 75 B1333.003 paragraphs 14-18; Day 240 Chamberlain Street and William Street coming from the south west after the soldiers had deployed.76
7D-54 Colonel Ferguson of 22 LAD was at the corner of the Strand Road and William Street when he heard low automatic fire that sounded like a Thompson; 1 PARA had already deployed.77
7D-55 INQ 0727, a Gunner in 22 LAD on William Street, heard a two to three second burst of automatic fire “a short time after the marchers had passed by” his position. He explained “I could not say how long had elapsed”. The gunfire was coming from the south east.78
7D-56 Lieutenant INQ 1324 of 30 Field Squadron Royal Engineers was in Sackville Street and the Strand Road area when he heard a Thompson fire. This was after 1 PARA had deployed.79
7D-57 INQ 0119 was in Little James Street. He heard single shots and then heard two or three bursts of automatic fire coming from the direction of the Rossville Flats. He heard this both before and after 1 PARA had deployed.80
7D-58 INQ 0022, a Lieutenant in the Coldstream Guards, was at Bligh’s Lane when he heard one high velocity shot followed by shots from a Thompson coming from the Rossville Flats area as 1 PARA were carrying out their arrest operation.81 Another Coldstream Guards’ officer, INQ 0133, was at Barrier 14 and heard, after 1 PARA had deployed, one or two bursts of Thompson fire.82
76 C2.95 paragraphs 55-56; Day 290/031/03-06 77 B1122.15 paragraph 88; Day 281/067 He thought it was a Thompson because of the distinctive sound of the weapon used by friendly and enemy forces when he was in the Middle East. 78 C727.2 paragraphs 9-10; 79 C1324.3 paragraphs 22-27; Day 301/140/08-141/04 80 C119.1 paragraph 8; Day 278/034/23-038/17 81 C22.4 paragraphs 15-17 82 C133.4 paragraphs 21-24; Day 295/075/05-076/06 Soldier 227, a Lieutenant in 22 LAD, heard “two distinct bursts of Thompson Machine gun fire, the first time was about four rounds and the second time about 5 to 6 rounds”. This occurred during the arrest operation on the wasteground. He categorically dismissed the suggestion that it was possible to confuse “a number of SLRs fired close together” with a Thompson Machine Gun.
INQ 1115, a Lance Corporal, was by the “Gin Palace”. After the soldiers had deployed he heard automatic fire that could have come from a Thompson submachine gun. INQ 0432, a Private in A Company heard a “burst of automatic fire” after the soldiers had deployed. He was unsure of the direction but said that it seemed to be coming from the general direction of the High Flats. Soldier 033 described how the Thompson fire “came out of the blue. We were carrying out an arrest operation for rioting, then all of a sudden, there was Thompson fire.” Soldier 033 described the “long low burst of about 15 –20 rounds as if the magazine were let off in one go. It seemed very quick 2 to 3 seconds. I saw strike of bullets on the ground.”
In addition to gunmen in the flats, there was at least one gunman (in addition to those engaged by the soldiers) firing in the car park itself.
OIRA 4 has identified himself as being Father Daly’s Gunman. As noted in chapter 4 of these submission, it is not clear or accepted that he was, but this section of the submissions is advanced without prejudice to that caveat, and on the basis that the Tribunal is, of course, able to decide that issue. OIRA 4 was, in any
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83 B2184; 84 B2204.003 paragraph 15-16; Day 371/132/6-133/12; Day 371/134/21-135/003 85 Day 371/134/6-8 86 C1115.3 paragraph 16; Day 305/011/02-13/10 87 C423.3 paragraph 19; Day 353/148/15-25 88 B1621.5 paragraph 35 89 B1621.5 paragraph 35 event, a member of the OIRA Command Staff at the time. As such he had access to short arms for personal protection, that is "defensive, not offensive purposes", and was carrying a .32 pistol on Bloody Sunday for his own personal protection. OIRA 4 told Christopher Clarke that he was protecting himself from the RUC and the Army because it was a No Go area.
Q. You say that you were carrying this as a personal protection weapon. From whom were you protecting yourself?
A. Well, it was the no-go area; I was protecting myself against possibly British soldiers or the RUC.
Q. Did you believe yourself to be known to the Security Forces as an OIRA member?
A. I do not know the answer to that.
Q. Protecting yourself against anybody else, anybody other than the RUC or the Army?
A. No, I was not, no.
OIRA Standing Orders were that they could "defend any attack by the Brits and the RUC on the Bogside. We would therefore have had defensive positions set up in the area anyway such as barricades ... but they were not offensive positions; they were just to protect the no-go area."
OIRA 4 observed the riot at Barrier 14 for a while and then went down Chamberlain Street. At some point he began running with everyone else to get away from the snatch squads. As he ran he heard shooting for the first time that day. He ran a few yards into the car park and saw the body of Jack Duddy being attended to by Father Daly. He lost his temper and took his weapon out "and fired
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90 AOIRA 4.15 paragraphs 3-4 91 Day 394/011/16-12/01 92 AOIRA 4.15 paragraph 5 93 AOIRA 4.16 paragraphs 9-10 two, possibly three, shots towards the Saracen. I did it out of pure anger at what was happening around me."
Most famously, Father Daly saw a gunman at the end of Chamberlain Street. He described what he saw happen in his BSI Statement:
Just as we were about to get up and move [with Jack Duddy], I saw a man move along the gable wall of the last house in Chamberlain Street. ... (In one of my contemporary statements I stated that this man appeared to be in his thirties and was wearing a brown car coat, although I cannot remember those details now). He suddenly appeared at the corner of this house and moved along the gable. I thought that his movements were rather strange and suddenly he produced a gun from his jacket. It was a small gun, a handgun, and he fired two or three shots around the corner at the soldiers. The soldiers in the area facing the flats were stepping out in the open from time to time. I cannot recall the soldiers reacting or firing in his direction. I do not believe that they were aware of the gunman. We screamed at the gunman to go away because we were frightened that the soldiers might think that the fire was coming from where we were located. He looked at us and then he just drifted away across the or into the mouth of Chamberlain Street. I did not see him after that nor, to the best of my knowledge, did I see him before then. I did not recognise him as someone I knew ....
At this point we decided to make a dash for it. We got up first of all on our knees and I waved the handkerchief which, by now, was covered with blood. There was another burst of gunfire at this stage. We lay down again. Eventually we got up. I went in front and the men behind me carried Jack Duddy. We made our way to Chamberlain Street, along the street and turned into Harvey Street ...
Robert Brady saw a gunman firing. He gave a statement to the RUC in 1972. He was in the car park of the Rossville Flats looking up Chamberlain Street and saw the crowd from Barrier 14 running towards him chased by the army. It was then that he saw the gunman:
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94 AOIRA 4, 17 paragraphs 13, 16 95 H5.6 paragraphs 24 and 25 I was looking down Chamberlain Street towards William Street and I saw the crowd running towards me chased by the Army. This crowd ran up Chamberlain Street and most of them ran towards an exit at the left hand corner of the flats near the Home Bakery. When the crowd came into the car park area of the flats I saw a man fire two shots from a small revolver, the revolver was smaller than the one used by the RUC and could have been hidden in his hand. This man was standing at the gable wall of the last house in Chamberlain Street on the left hand side looking down in the direction of William Street. He fired towards the waste ground in the direction of the alley which runs off William Street at the back of Eden Place. The man was short, about 5 ft 7 and he had black hair which just hung over his ears. He was wearing a black checked overcoat with a fur collar and black trousers. I saw a young bloke shot in the car park and a priest and others go over to his assistance. This wounded person was being assisted by the Priest and others when the man opened fire. A photograph from the Daily Mail of 31st January 1972 shows the Priest I saw I think he saw the gunman because when he was helping him out of the area I saw him duck his head when he heard the shots. He was walking towards the gunman and probably saw him.
7D-67 Geread Greeve was one of those running from Barrier 14 down Chamberlain Street. He heard shooting before he reached the Rossville Flats' car park. He saw Father Daly attending to a body on ground. He ran for the Gap between Blocks 1 and 2 and as he ran he saw a gunman at the Chamberlain Street gable wall moving towards Rossville Street. He did not see the man fire.
7D-68 It seems clear, therefore, that a gunman fired at the soldiers shortly after Jack Duddy had been shot. Father Daly saw that gunman when he was attending to Jack Duddy. There is, however, evidence of a gunman having fired at the soldiers earlier. William Harley was on the top floor of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats in "the exact centre." He saw a gunman at the south west corner of the Chamberlain Street wall fire five or six shots without looking. The shots "simply hit the ground". The revolver had a 3" barrel and came from the man's right hand pocket.
96 AB 71.1 97 AG 55 98 Day 077/038/20 As far as I can recall this all happened before I saw any soldiers on foot and before I saw or heard any gunfire from the soldiers. I do not believe that the soldiers were aware of this man or his actions. I then watched the man turn and walk towards the southern end of Chamberlain Street in a south east direction.99
This firing accords with a number of soldiers' and other witnesses' accounts of incoming fire prior to the soldiers returning fire. Mr Harley's attempt to alter the timing of the shots he saw fired to accord with those seen by other witnesses is incredible. His explanation for having stated that he had seen no soldiers and heard no firing before the gunman fire beggars belief.
MR CLARKE: Q. You say that you saw this all happen before you saw any soldiers on foot and before you saw or heard any gunfire from the soldiers. Had you seen Jack Duddy's body on the ground before this?
A. May I correct that statement, please?
Q. Yes, certainly.
A. That was a, an error on my part. The incident is exactly as I have described it, but the timing is completely wrong. The reason, at the time there were no soldiers anywhere near that gunman and that is what confused my thinking as to the time. I know now that he fired round that corner while Jack Duddy's body was lying on the ground.100
Given the controversy which for the past thirty years has surrounded the question of whether the soldiers opened fire first on Bloody Sunday, it is simply not credible that Mr Harley was mistaken into thinking that he had not heard any soldiers fire before seeing the gunman fire by the fact that there were no soldiers around the gunman. His explanation is nonsensical and is a patent attempt to alter his originally honest evidence to fit in with the accepted story about the gunman Father Daly saw. That there was a gunman firing at the soldiers from the gable end of Chamberlain Street has always been undeniable because, and perhaps only because, of the photograph of him, but his importance has been constantly played
99 AH 36.5, 36.6 paragraph 30 100 Dav 077/029/11-23 down, it being suggested that he only fired late in the day, ineffectually, in anger and in response to the soldiers' shooting of Jack Duddy. Mr Harley was, however, more honest in his BSI Statement but, realising he was out of step with the line being pedalled, he sought, we submit rather transparently, to alter his evidence to fit in with the accepted explanation.
7D-71 OIRA 4 also claims not to have fired any further shots. This is contradicted by, for example, Maureen Gerke's evidence, if it is OIRA 4 that she saw fire. She lived on the Ground Floor (which was also referred to as the 5th Floor) of Block 3 of the Rossville Flats. She saw a man with a pistol in the Rossville Flats car park who "quite late on", when Jack Duddy was no longer in the car park, was pointing a pistol into Chamberlain Street, not round the corner into the waste ground.
7D-72 It is possible that this is the firing which can be heard on the BBC film taken by Cyril Cave. Mr Cave, who was on the Rossville Street waste ground, accepted that there is a portion of film where he believes the sound of an incoming round in recorded. He was asked by Christopher Clarke Q.C. about this:
Q. Is there anything in the previous clips of film that you may be able to spot from them but that we cannot simply by looking at the film?
A. In this sequence?
Q. No, in the whole sequences that I have been showing you?
A. There is one sequence where the troops are running across ground where there is a zip of a bullet which could have been incoming fire. There is only the one zip, you can hear it very close and I would assume that in Father Daly's statement, he saw a man fire a revolver and that would coincide with that particular sequence in my film. That could have been -- I did not notice it until the Inquiry sent me out a clip of the film and I was running through it -- because I never had a clip of the film and I was running it through and I noticed this, so I ran it very slowly and there is one, just zip and -- as soldiers run across. We would
101 Day 133/090/23-093/16 102 AG 27.4 paragraph 16 assume the soldiers would not have been firing at their own men, somebody was firing at them. That is the only occasion I heard any or seen any incoming fire -- I did not see it, I did not know it existed until I saw that clip.
Q. I wonder if we can identify whereabouts -- what is the piece of film you are talking about. Have you seen that as we were looking through it?
A. Yes.
Q. I wonder if you could stop it when we get there.
A. The troops are running towards the camera.
Q. Let us run it forward, please
(Video played)
A. There, that was the zip. You will have to run it back, it comes earlier in the sequence.
Q. It is just after the sequence with Father Daly. I for my part heard what could be called a zip on the film: that is not a defect in the soundtrack, is it? (Witness shaking head).
This was further confirmed in answers to questions from Edwin Glasgow Q.C.
Q. It was only when you reviewed the film that the Tribunal sent you in advance of giving your evidence that you put two and two together and worked out in your mind that on the film there appeared to be evidence of a different kind of shot, which you thought was consistent with what you had heard about what we have called Father Daly's gunman; does that summarise it fairly?
A. I think that would summarise it fairly.
Q. So we have the picture complete, Mr Cave: your understanding and your confirmation of the order of your film is that the whining shot we hear with the whine of the shot on the film, that of course takes place on the film and took place in your recollection of where the film was, after Father Daly is already escorting the body of the young man carried down Chamberlain Street?
A. That is correct. By the time that this shot is heard, Father Daly had left the car park. Maureen Gerke saw a gunman fire up Chamberlain Street after Father Daly and the party carrying Jack Duddy had moved from the car park. Clearly then either OIRA 4 was still firing from the gable of Chamberlain Street, both up Chamberlain Street or on to the waste ground, or there was one (or theoretically two) further gunmen doing so. It is impossible on the present evidence to say which, but it cannot be doubted that there was continued fire being directed at the soldiers at this time.
Consequently it is hard to establish whether it was OIRA 4 who continued to engage the soldiers, or another gunman. What is clear is that, having first headed towards the Nellis house, OIRA 4 at some stage returned to the car park.
I hadn't been there long when a man and a woman broke off from the group and walked away... when I saw them leaving I decided to follow them. They were the first to break away. I was right behind them and I think some others followed us.
OIRA 4 says that he now knows the woman and the man to be Susan North and Fulvio Grimaldi. Ms North alleges that OIRA 4 told her that he was carrying a weapon. He himself does not recall telling her that he had a gun in his pocket but he considers that,
...it would tie I with my own recollections of being very conscious of the gun and I couldn't say it didn't happen. The man is therefore very likely to be me. I was certainly worried enough about having the gun in my pocket to have said something like that.
It is plain on Susan North's account that this man was still at large, in possession of the pistol, after Father Daly had left the car park carrying Jack Duddy. She saw this man after she and Grimaldi had been into 33 Chamberlain Street and photographed the wounded Mrs Deery and Michael Bridge. She then left the house and went to the gable wall of Chamberlain Street intending to move south.
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104 Day 141/134/03-20 105 AOIRA 4.19 paragraph 22 106 AOIRA 4.19 paragraph 23 107 M35.6 paragraph 31-34 along the east of the Rossville Flats' car park to go through the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3. It was whilst she was there that he spoke to her and told her he had a pistol in his pocket.\\textsuperscript{108}
7D-78 She told Christopher Clarke Q.C. that the man said he had not used the pistol (which was clearly not consistent with what OIRA 4 now claims). Once he crossed with her towards the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3 he left Susan North and went through the Gap.\\textsuperscript{109} Susan North said in her BSI statement that she and Fulvio Grimaldi “waited there a little while” before going through the Gap themselves.\\textsuperscript{110} She said that she never saw the man with the pistol again.\\textsuperscript{111} Therefore, still armed with his pistol, OIRA 4 apparently preceded Ms North and Fulvio Grimaldi in moving into Sector 5; this is precisely where Soldier F encountered a man with a pistol.
7D-IV OTHER PROBABLE SIGHTINGS OF GUNMEN
7D-79. There are a number of other witnesses who saw gunmen at various times and places around the car park. Their evidence is vague and it is difficult to assert with certainty that they prove the presence of additional, specific, gunmen in the car park. What is clear, however, is that a number of people saw individuals carrying or firing weapons in the car park: they may be the gunmen seen by others at different times; they may be further gunmen. What is also beyond doubt is that there were a number of armed terrorists spread around the car park firing at the soldiers, just as the soldiers have always maintained.
7D-80 The following are sightings of the gunmen, in addition to those referred to above:
(1) Dennis Mullan, a trainee solicitor at the time, who had not been rioting, and was in Block 1 at level 2 witnessed - ninety seconds before the troops arrived
\\textsuperscript{108} M35.6 paragraph 31-34 \\textsuperscript{109} AOIRA 4.19 paragraph 24 \\textsuperscript{110} M35.7 paragraph 36 \\textsuperscript{111} M35.6 paragraph 35 in Pigs - a man in a duffle coat being challenged by two or three people as being "bloody useless". The impression that Mr Mullan had was that the man had a weapon on him, concealed in his pocket. This may have been the man who other witnesses saw fire from Block 1 of the Flats, or he may have been another. In either event, he appears to have been a gunman at the flats shortly before the soldiers arrived.
(2) Bernard Gilmore saw a gunman fire along Chamberlain Street. Although in oral evidence he said that he may be mistaken about that, it is improbable that he was. He described the gunman as "a big tall fellow wearing a mask." This description does not obviously fit with any of the known gunmen, but Mr Gilmore's evidence is clear. In oral evidence he wrote down the man's name. Christopher Clarke Q.C. said that the name was the same one that Mr Harley named. It may therefore be that what Mr Gilmore saw was in fact OIRA 4 firing up Chamberlain Street at some stage. OIRA 4, however, disputes Bernard Gilmore's description. He says that he was not a big tall fellow (and he patently was not) and he says he never wore a mask and that he did not fire up Chamberlain Street. There are only two logical possibilities: either Mr Gilmour saw OIRA 4 fire up Chamberlain Street or he saw another gunman. It is impossible to say which.
7D-V AUTOMATIC FIRING CONTINUED AFTER THE SOLDIERS RETURNED FIRE
In addition to those who gave evidence of hearing automatic fire directed at the soldiers shortly after they deployed, there are numerous other witnesses who speak of having heard automatic fire in the Rossville Flats area after the Army had returned fire. In fact, the evidence shows that bursts of automatic fire were heard
112 Day 092/046/16-048/22 113 AM 449.2 paragraph 13 114 Day 092/047/09-48/25 115 AG 38.4 paragraph 24 116 OIRA 4.26 paragraph 56.16 by civilians after the Army had returned fire and even after civilian's had been hit. In short, at least one gunman in the Rossville Flats, armed with an automatic weapon, was engaged in a fire fight with the soldiers.
7D-82 Simon Winchester ran from the waste ground into the Rossville Flats' car park and sheltered behind the low wall in front of Block 2. He then left the car park via the stairwell where he sheltered for a few seconds before running out of the Flats to the back. His evidence was that “about this time”, as he was just leaving or just after he had exited the flats heading south he heard army fire and answering low calibre fire. He thought that some automatic fire was coming from somewhere high up in the Flats, and reported that in the Guardian Newspaper the following day:
There was certainly some firing from the IRA. I heard one sub-machine gun open up from inside the Flats and heard a number of small calibre weapons being fired intermittently....
7D-83 Ciaran Donnelly made a statement in 1972 in which he said that he heard a burst of automatic fire after he had run behind the Rossville Flats when the shooting started and after he saw that two men had been shot dead: “I then heard a burst of automatic fire followed by single shots from the direction of the parachutists.”
7D-84 In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry he stated that he heard a burst of automatic gunfire coming from “somewhere around the position the Army was moving into”. It was quite a long burst – around 10 rounds, coming not from the Rossville Flats themselves but from “beyond the courtyard of the Flats.” It seemed to come from beyond the courtyard in Rossville Street. It was not in the
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117 M83.26: M83.27 118 M83.33 letter F-G 119 M83.45 120 M 22.2 121 M22.8 letter B-C 122 M 22.8 123 M22.18 letter E-F direction of Free Derry Corner. It was a loud burst of machine-gun fire. "I took it to be pretty heavy calibre." He had not heard anything like that before. He also said that what he heard could not be accounted for by a number of individuals firing simultaneously.
7D-85 In his BSI statement he repeats his account of hearing a burst of automatic fire. He states that throughout the period of shooting, which lasted about 15 minutes, he heard only one burst of automatic fire but he was adamant that he heard it:
*I have been asked if this could have been the sound of the blades of a helicopter. The answer is it was not a helicopter. What I heard was automatic fire.*
7D-86 He reiterated his certainty when questioned by Arthur Harvey QC.
*Could it be that continuous fire that you heard was simultaneous fire by a number of soldiers going across the barricade as you were trying to head out of Glenfada Park?*
A. I do not think so, it was a continuous burst with a specific rhythm.
Q. That fire, would it also be correct to say that at that time you took it in fact was coming from the army?
A. I took it at that time -- as I said I thought it was the big gun on top of the Ferret.
Q. Coming from the army, being fired in the direction of the crowd that had been cowering behind the barricade and in Glenfada Park North?
A. Well, I could not say -- I could not see the vehicle, all I assumed it was shooting at something out on Rossville Street."
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124 M22.18 letter F 125 M 22.18 letter F 126 M 22.21 paragraph 9 127 Mr Harvey did not attempt to explain how this effect might humanly have been achieved. 128 Day 071/053/01-18 In his oral evidence to the Tribunal he stated that he was probably taking photographs as a body was being carried across Rossville Street when this burst of gunfire (which in retrospect, having regard to the distinctive sound, he too thinks was a Thompson submachine gun) went out. It was then that he ran for cover.
Q. Going back to paragraph 9, you describe there hearing a burst of automatic fire. Can you place the timing of that; was that before you started taking photographs of the body being carried away or whilst you were doing so, or after you had finished?
A. I had -- I was probably still in the process of taking the photographs as that body was being carried across the street when this burst of gunfire went out and at the time that was when I decided there was more going on than I wanted to stay around to take pictures of and I legged it.
Q. Where did the automatic fire appear to be coming from or going to?
A. I could not actually see a gun firing. I could hear it, it was very loud. Within the confines of the flats, Glenfada Flats, it appeared very loud. Two things entered my mind at the time: the sound of the actual fire was something that I was not familiar with. I thought it may have been the big gun on top of the Ferret scout car, I had never heard one of those fired before, I thought it may have been that. In retrospect it may have been a Thompson sub-machine gun because I know they have a very distinctive sound, although before that day I had never heard one fired.
Q. Can we go to M22.8? This again, the first half please, is your evidence to Lord Widgery. At B you describe how a crowd of youths came round the flats shouting that the army was coming again "I ran round the corner to escape -- to the access to the flats." Then you were asked this: "Question: Did you hear anything at this stage which was different from what you heard before? Answer: Yes. When I was over here taking this picture I heard what I thought was a burst of automatic fire", which is what you have just described. "Question: From which direction? Answer: It appeared to me to be coming from somewhere round here, the position the army were moving into." Could you just explain to me what you meant by that answer?
A. Yeah. I was in the middle of the forecourt -- the middle of the courtyard at Glenfada and, um, taking the pictures of the body being carried towards me when the burst of fire rang out. It seemed to come from either round the other side of the flats on Rossville Street or from somewhere within the courtyard complex and was bouncing off the wall -- the noise was bouncing off the wall inside the courtyard complex. The first thing that sprang into my mind was that the Ferret car had moved forward into Rossville Street and had opened fired with the gun on top, that was the first thing occurred to me at the time, and I thought, "That is it, I am going now".
Q. When you say it appeared to be coming from the position the army were moving into?
A. Yeah.
Q. The army had been moving in a southerly direction down Rossville Street?
A. That is right, yes.
Q. So could you tell in which direction the firing was going?
A. No. It was just the noise, and the noise was very unusual. Um, I did not see any gun, I did not see any vehicle because it would have been in Rossville Street if it was the vehicle. All I heard was the noise and it resonated within the quadrangle of the flats. It was very loud. 129
He said that he heard the automatic gunfire about three or four minutes after the two men had been killed on the rubble barricade. He made it plain that no-one could have missed the sound of the automatic fire:
I initially decided to disappear as soon as I saw the guys down on the barricade, but then I decided to walk back. As I walked back they were carried the body out, through the flats.
Q. From the barricade?
A. From the barricade. I imagine that must have taken them a minute or two, 40 seconds to a minute.
Q. It is after that you hear the automatic fire?
A. They were actually carrying the body when I heard the automatic fire. It was at that instant that I heard the automatic fire and I decided to leave.
Q. And you describe that on two occasions in your own words as being "very loud"? A. Yes.
Q. Noticeably louder than the other firing? A. Yes, yes.
Q. Nobody in the area could conceivably have missed it? A. No.
Q. Everybody who was in that area must have been able to hear that automatic fire? A. Anyone who was in the quadrangle of the flats must have heard it.\\textsuperscript{130}
The ITN team of Gerald Seymour (reporter), Robert Hammond, (sound recordist) and Peter Wilkinson (cameraman) all heard automatic fire. Robert Hammond made a statement on 19\\textsuperscript{th} February 1972 in which he explained how, after the soldiers had gone through Barrier 14 on foot, he had moved to a position on the south side of William Street about 5 yards from the junction with Rossville Street. Mr Hammond is another witness who noted the distinctive sound of the Thompson submachine gun:
\\textit{The firing that I heard was as follows. First of all I heard a lot of single shot firing which sounded as though it was coming from 150 to 200 yards away or maybe further from the area bounded by Free Derry Corner and the junction of Fahan Street and Frederick Street. The sound of this firing was of a deeper thud than of an SLR. Shortly after this firing I heard several bursts of machine gun fire from the same direction. The noise a the machine gun seemed to me to be similar to the noise of a Thompson machine gun which I had previously heard fired in the Falls Road, Belfast but I would emphasis that I am no expert on the sounds of gunfire. Then I became aware of SLRs being fired just around the corner towards the Free Derry Corner.}\\textsuperscript{131}
In his oral evidence to Widgery he stated that the gunfire:
\\textsuperscript{130} \\textbf{Day 071/091/17-092/14} This evidence will be discussed further relation to the civilians who were in Glenfada Park.
\\textsuperscript{131} \\textbf{M37.1-2} .. started off with quite a few single shots and then there was definitely a machine gun, several bursts from a machine gun and also single shots.\\textsuperscript{132}
7D-91 He described the shooting as coming from the general direction of the Rossville Flats.\\textsuperscript{133} He had a (mistaken) idea at the time that it was the Browning on one of the Ferret scout cars that had fired.\\textsuperscript{134} Mr Hammond himself now considers that he was mistaken in relation to the Browning amidst the noise and confusion.\\textsuperscript{135}
7D-92 He does not have any recollection now of hearing either the single shot or the automatic fire but stated that he felt “sure that if I said this in 1972 when events were fresh in my mind, it is likely to be correct.”\\textsuperscript{136} He said in oral evidence, in answer to Christopher Clarke Q.C., that he “certainly” heard automatic fire that day.\\textsuperscript{137} When Arthur Harvey Q.C. suggested to him that he could not tell the difference between different weapons his answer was firm:
.. it would appear you are not able to distinguish between SLR, single shots or machine-gun fire; is that right?
A. Sorry to correct you, I think it is not difficult to tell the difference between machine-gun fire and SLR shots. I hope I have not given that impression. I can tell the difference between a machine-gun and a single self-loading rifle, I think, yes.\\textsuperscript{138}
7D-93 Mr Harvey’s second attempt to make the same point was equally robustly rejected:
Q. What we know as a fact is that there were other soldiers in Rossville Street and much further up in a number of army vehicles who had discharged rubber bullets. If they were discharging
\\textsuperscript{132} M37.4 \\textsuperscript{133} M37.4 \\textsuperscript{134} M37.2 \\textsuperscript{135} M37.17 paragraph 11(d) \\textsuperscript{136} M37.17 paragraph 11(b) \\textsuperscript{137} Day 154/012/03-17 \\textsuperscript{138} Day 154/035/25-036/08 volleys of rubber bullets, could that have confused your ability to differentiate between machine-gun fire and other types of fire?\\textsuperscript{139}
A. I do not think there is any doubting the difference between machine-gun fire and the sort of other single shot fire.\\textsuperscript{140}
7D-94 Mr Hammond (as had David Philips) explained that as the camera only recorded sound when it was running the sound of a machine gun would not have been recorded if it was not running at the time.\\textsuperscript{141}
7D-95 Gerald Seymour, the ITN reporter in the same team as Peter Wilkinson and Robert Hammond, said in 1972:
\\begin{quote} We paused at the corner of William Street and Rossville Street down which the troops had passed some half minute before. At that moment I realised there was firing going on, of ball ammunition and not of baton round and at the Eden Place junction we saw a paratroop (sic) aiming and firing his SLR. He was aiming in the Chamberlain Street direction. The armoured cars were stopped in a line along Rossville Street and we kept behind them during the shooting. There was a period of very intense shooting though no rounds passed near us. I consider that at that time no shots were fired in our direction down Rossville Street. We did however hear automatic fire which we identified as a Thompson sub-machine gun.\\textsuperscript{142} \\end{quote}
7D-96 In his oral evidence to Lord Widgery he said that he became aware of firing when he was at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street;
\\begin{quote} Initially mostly single shots and then I identified amongst the single shots what I took to be one burst of automatic fire.\\textsuperscript{143} \\end{quote}
7D-97 His immediate impression, as he stated both in oral evidence to Lord Widgery and in his 1972 Statement, was that it was a Thompson machine gun. He explained to the Widgery Tribunal that he had “heard Thompsons before in Northern Ireland
\\textsuperscript{139} Once again, Mr Harvey did not attempt to explain who this might have been the case. \\textsuperscript{140} Day 154/041-13/22 \\textsuperscript{141} Day 154/043/16 \\textsuperscript{142} M72.2 paragraph 7 \\textsuperscript{143} M72.5 letter A and at that time my immediate impression was that I thought it was a Thompson."144
Father Carolan referred in his BSI statement to hearing automatic fire (fire that regrettably even he did not mention in 1972):
I should say that shortly after the two separate shots rang out [i.e. in William Street], the general shooting in the Bogside began. The shooting was coming from the army. It seemed that all hell broke loose. It was like a war zone. There was lots of shooting but I cannot say which direction the shots were coming from. I believe there was automatic fire. I was aware that there was a difference between the two types of machine guns which were used at that time, the Thompson and the Sterling, and that the Thompson had a very sluggish type of sound. It sounded to me like it was the Sterling45 that was fired on that day.146
Father Mulvey spoke of hearing automatic fire after he had seen the soldiers deployed into Rossville Street and Columbille Court. He first heard rubber bullets. The situation was relatively calm (such that he was able to stop and chat for a moment or two to a group of people) before he heard the first shot. After that first shot he heard about a dozen shots and then what, he told Lord Widgery, he assumed to be
...a burst of fire which I would describe as automatic fire. It was repeated sustained firing for two or three seconds.147
Father Mulvey recorded in his written statement for Widgery that there was "at least one burst of automatic fire for the space of two or three seconds. All the firing that I heard seemed to be in the area of Rossville Street near William Street."148
144 M 72.2 paragraph 7; M72.6 letter A. 145 This analysis needs to be read in the light that Father Carolan was not prepared to admit to hearing any automatic fire in 1972. 146 H3.3 paragraph 10 147 H15.2 letters A-F 148 H15.12 paragraph 4 This was probably what Father Daly was describing when writing in his BSI statement of the moment when he was running away from the Saracens in the direction of the Rossville Flats:
Then there was a burst of gunfire which caused terror. I could not swear whether they were shots from several weapons simultaneously or from one weapon. At that time I knew that they were live bullets.(^{149})
Hugh Foy gave evidence of hearing automatic fire from a machine gun intermingled with military rifle fire shortly after the seeing soldiers arriving in vehicles and then running towards the Rossville Flats' car park. Whilst Mr Foy may have blurred time and events to a certain extent - he said that he heard a single high velocity shot fired south down Rossville Street and then saw, from his position south of the Rubble Barricade, three "Saracens" travelling down Rossville Street - it is plain that Mr Foy heard machine gun fire – in effect, he heard a gun-battle.
Mr Foy said in his BSI statement that he saw the Saracens come to a halt and soldiers pile out. He described soldiers running into the courtyard of the Rossville Flats in a manner that seemed to be one of taking cover.
There had been a gap of no more than a second or two between the Saracens coming to a stop and shots being fired. There were shots echoing all over the place. I clearly heard the same cracking noises as shots were fired and, at the same time, I could recognise the sound of shots being fired in one burst from a machine gun. The machine gun fire which I heard seemed to be coming from the same direction as the rifle fire, but from slightly further away from me, perhaps from the area of wasteground to the east of Rossville Street near to Pilot Row. There seemed to me to be shots being fired in the area near to me and shots being fired further away from me. I was not aware of any shots being fired from Block 1 of the Rossville Flats or shots being fired towards Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.
...The whole scene lasted no more than 30 seconds during which time there were perhaps a hundred shots which appeared to be
(^{149}) H5.4 paragraph 17 fired, but I may have been hearing the echoes of shots. There was just the one burst of machine gun fire.\\textsuperscript{150}
Mr Foy (who also recognised the distinctive sound of the Thompson sub machine gun) confirmed hearing the automatic fire in his oral evidence in answer to Mr Roxborough:\\textsuperscript{151}
\\textbf{Q.} You also say that you heard -- this is paragraph 19, page AF29.4 -- the sound of a burst of machine-gun fire; is that right?
\\textbf{A.} That is correct, yes.
\\textbf{Q.} Which you thought was coming from the same direction as the rifle fire but from slightly further away from you.
\\textbf{A.} Yes.
\\textbf{Q.} Perhaps from the area of wasteground to the east of Rossville Street near Pilot Row.
\\textbf{Q.} Had you ever heard machine-gun fire before this occasion, Mr Foy?
\\textbf{A.} I cannot remember a specific incident, but I am sure I have.
\\textbf{Q.} Can you describe what it was that enabled you to distinguish this as being machine-gun fire as opposed to being a large number of single shots?
\\textbf{A.} It was rapid, repeated and sounded heavier than the sharp SLR.
\\textbf{Q.} Can you estimate how long this burst of machine-gun fire lasted?
\\textbf{A.} No, I cannot do that.\\textsuperscript{152}
Mr Foy went on to say that he heard rifle fire before the automatic fire, and that the automatic fire opened up during the rifle fire. His account was not challenged.
\\textsuperscript{150} AF 29.4 paragraphs 19, 21 \\textsuperscript{151} Day 146/103/24-104/20 \\textsuperscript{152} Day 146/103/20-104/24 John Friel gave the following account of what he heard as he ran down Chamberlain Street:
As I ran I heard a prolonged burst of rapid, heavy fire in the form of continuous shots. It lasted the whole time I was running from Eden Place to the south end of Chamberlain Street. I said to myself that there must be hundreds of rounds being fired. Immediately after the heavy burst of fire I heard the odd single shot which sounded like "crack, crack." I was in the Army cadets between 13 and 16 years old and I know the difference between automatic, semi-automatic and single fire.(^{153})
In his oral evidence to the Inquiry he stated that the burst of fire sounded like a machine gun and that the odd single shot sounded like an SLR. He could not tell in which direction the fire was going.(^{154}) He was questioned by Edwin Glasgow QC about the prolonged burst of rapid, heavy fire:
Q. Those were the regular shots that you believed and believe were machine-gun fire?
A. Yeah, automatic fire, yeah.
Q. You have said that a number of times. I have to ask you because it may be a matter of very considerable importance to this Tribunal; are you sure about that?
A. Yes.
Q. You are?
A. Yeah, because I had thought the whole place just erupted, you know. After the soldier fired a shot I started to run, and it takes about 10 seconds to get down to the other end of Chamberlain Street and the firing just continued on, just steady firing.
Q. Could we look at the next sentence, please? You say:
"It lasted the whole time I was running from Eden Place to the south end of Chamberlain Street".
(^{153}) AF 33.2 paragraph 10
(^{154}) Day 076/009/06 You remember Mr Clarke asked you roughly how long you thought that took?
A. Yeah, about 10 seconds, yes.
Q. It is the next sentence
"I said to myself that there must be hundreds of rounds being fired."
Again, I would like to know: is that just a turn of phrase; is that just you talking to yourself or do you really mean over 100?
A. No, a turn of phrase. I would say about 50 -- not --
Q. In one burst or more than one burst?
A. A continuous burst. Just the one burst, but it was continued.
Q. Although you were only 19 at the time, you had been in the Army Cadets?
A. Four years.
Q. For four years?
A. Yeah, 13 (inaudible).
Q. You are confident, are you, you can say on oath to this Tribunal that what you heard was automatic fire?
A. Automatic fire, yes.
Q. What you would describe as machine-gun fire?
A. Yeah.
Q. And it happened between the time when the soldier fired the shot that went over your head in Eden Place?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you getting to the bottom of Chamberlain Street
A. Yeah, shortly after I started to run until I got to Chamberlain Street.155
155 Day 076/060/02-062/02 Patrick McCallion, in an undated manuscript statement, attributed various bursts of automatic fire to soldiers. None of this appears in his BSI statement. He admits throwing stones at soldiers from the rubble barricade in Rossville Street.
Despite his silence on this issue when speaking not only to NICRA in 1972 but also, more disappointingly, to Eversheds for the purposes of his BSI Statement, Daniel McGowan made a statement to the Sunday Times in which he said that as he walked down the alley behind Joseph Place;
...I heard what I thought were either high velocity shots or rubber bullets, I don't really know the difference. Then I heard four or five single shots, sort of high pitched cracking noises, and a short burst of what sounded like automatic fire.
Thomas Mullarkey made a statement on 15th February 1972. He described the Pigs coming down Rossville Street. He ran for cover in Glenfada Park:
We waited until things appeared to quieten down and came out again on Rossville Street between the two blocks of Glenfada Park. A few minutes quiet, and another shot. Then I heard what sounded like a burst from a machine gun and said, "There's a Thomson. It's time we were out of here."
Mr Mullarkey said in his BSI statement that he could no longer remember hearing a burst of fire from a machine gun. However, in his oral evidence he stated that when he re-read his 1972 statement, which he had forgotten, he could bring himself back to being able to say that he did hear a Thompson machine gun. He had grown up in an area near the Border in the 1950s and frequently heard the noise of a Thompson, so he was very familiar with the sound. He told the Tribunal that it was pretty clear in his mind when he made his statement in
______________________________________________________________________
156 AM75.6-8 157 AM 75.1-3 He has not given oral evidence 158 AM 255.11 159 AM 452.2 160 AM 452.7 paragraph 31.9 161 Day069/058/09-059/24 1972. He confirmed the same in answers to questions from Edmund Lawson Q.C, explaining that he was very familiar with the sound of Thompson machine guns.
Bernard Smith said in his BSI statement that he ran across the Rossville Flats' car park from the bottom of Chamberlain Street and lay for twenty minutes behind the low wall that runs parallel to the north side of Block 2.
I remained at point C for about 20 minutes. I could hear constant shooting which sounded rapid as if it was coming from automatic weapons. The shots were very clear and were coming from close range. I kept my head down and did not see anybody actually shooting or being shot. I cannot tell whether the shots were being fired from low or high velocity weapons but I could determine that the gunfire was not coming from rubber bullet guns.
His oral evidence to the Inquiry was as follows:
Q. So you describe hearing constant shooting which sounded rapid as if it was coming from automatic weapons. Were you familiar with the sound of automatic weapons at the time?
A. I did not take no -- much heed to it, more or less I was afeared, that is why I kept trying to keep my head down. There were a couple of other people lying down behind the wall, you know, you know they were the same as me.
Q. What I asked you was whether at the time you were familiar with the sound of automatic weapons?
A. No, no.
Q. You were not?
A. No.
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162 Day 069/03/123-38/01 163 Day 69/058/09-059/24; At the time of this firing Mr Mullarkey was between the two blocks of Glenfada Park; he then took shelter behind a wall in Lisfannon Park (AM 452.14 paragraph 31.10) and saw a wounded man being carried into a house; he then heard someone say "Now will you for Christ's sake get the stuff" just before three young men rushed through the door of the house next door (AM 452.17). 164 AS 26.2 paragraph 10 Q. When you say that you could hear constant shooting which sounded rapid as if it was coming from automatic weapons, what was it that made you think it was an automatic weapon that was being used?
A. You know, it kept repeating, you know, steady.
Q. You say that the shots were very clear and were coming from close range; were you able to tell how far away the shots were being fired from?
A. No.
Q. Were you able to tell the direction in which the shots were being fired?
A. No.
Q. Were you able to tell whether they were being fired in more than one direction?
A. No, I could not tell.
Q. Did you see anybody actually firing whilst you were there?
A. No.
Q. Approximately how many people were there sheltering behind the wall I think you say between 10 and 12?
A. Yes.(^{165})
...(^{165})
Q. Finally this, Mr Smith. You spoke in answer to Mr Clarke of hearing gunfire later on, rapid gunfire which kept repeating, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. As if it was coming from an automatic weapon, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Like a machine-gun?
A. Yes.(^{166})
(^{165}) Day 067/013-14
(^{166}) Day 067/026 To similar effect is the evidence of James Joseph Stewart who was sitting in the front of a milk van at Free Derry Corner. In his BSI statement he said:
"At that point I heard a burst of automatic machine-gun fire. It seemed to come from somewhere to my right (east), from the direction of the Derry Walls. It was definitely not coming from the direction of William Street or the Rossville Flats. At the time I was convinced that it was coming from the Walls. I am also certain that this was machine-gun fire that I heard. Having lived in Derry all my life, I was more than familiar with the different sounds of gunshots. I could clearly distinguish between automatic machine-gun fire and single reports from a rifle. I also could not have mistaken the sound of a helicopter's rotary blades for machine-gun fire. The machine-gun fire must have lasted for about two to three seconds in total."(^{167})
The accounts of the journalists, the priest and the civilians set out above establish that there was a burst of automatic fire in the area of the Rossville Flats shortly after the soldiers deployed and that, even after they had begun returning fire, automatic firing continued.
That automatic fire from the flats was also heard by dozens of soldiers stationed around the Bogside. The following are examples only.
INQ 0739, a Corporal in Guinness Force, heard bursts of fire from what he thought was an AK47 at around the time that the Guinness Force lorries stopped in Rossville Street. It was coming from the Rossville Flats towards the soldiers.(^{168}) At the Platform OP, Sergeant 001 heard low velocity shots coming from, he thought, the Rossville Flats. Sergeant 025 of 22 LAD heard a "short burst from a Tommy gun" coming from the area around the Rossville Flats.(^{169}) Major 159 was moving between Charlie OP and Butcher's Gate and heard two short bursts of automatic fire from a Thompson that he considered probably came from the
(^{167}) AS 35.4 paragraph 20. Perhaps, given the terms of his BSI statement, rather surprisingly when he came to give oral evidence Mr Stewart said that what he heard could have been single shots and that he had only assumed it was machine gun fire. See Day 108/092
(^{168}) C739.3 paragraph 22; Day 306/021
(^{169}) B1540 paragraph 7, Day 361/018 Rossville Flats. At the Roaring Meg OP Soldier 124 heard a “burst of machine gun fire” like a Thompson firing from the Rossville Flats. Soldier 156 heard automatic fire from the Rossville Flats that sounded like a Thompson.
On the City Walls, between Butchers Gate and the Rossville Flats, INQ 0113 heard a Thompson firing from the Flats and INQ 0093, a Royal Green Jacket, heard what he took to be an AK47 fire from the same place. INQ 0555 was on the Walls to the right of the Rossville Flats and heard, coming from somewhere around the Flats, fast and furious gunfire and some machine gun fire. He described it as an “intense exchange”.
Sergeant 040 heard automatic fire from the Rossville Flats. INQ 1259 of the Royal Anglians heard, coming from the Flats area towards Aggro Corner, several bursts of Thompson fire, followed by SLR fire.
On barrier 17, soldier 122 heard low velocity automatic fire coming from Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. Soldier 149 heard low velocity automatic Thompson fire from Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. INQ 0212 heard low velocity firing north of the Rossville Flats.
At Barrier 16, Sergeant 137 heard automatic fire that possibly came from the Rossville Flats and Soldier 153 heard two bursts of automatic fire from the Rossville Flats. Sergeant Major INQ 0176 of the Royal Green Jackets heard SLR, Thompson and other “smaller” fire coming from the Rossville Flats area after the soldiers had deployed.
______________________________________________________________________
170 B1953.002 paragraph 19; Day 349/120/15-121/11 171 B1777.002 paragraphs 9, 16; 172 B1939.002 paragraph 10; Day 348/128/05-131/22 173 C555.2 paragraph 8; Day 346/090 174 C176.2 paragraph 13 175 C176.2 paragraphs 10-13; Day 305/036 In addition to the evidence set out above, of gunmen firing at the soldiers, there is further corroborative evidence of the soldiers' accounts from independent witnesses who describe soldiers' reactions on hearing the firing. They clearly believed themselves to be under fire, as indeed they were.
Patrick Clancy of the Daily Telegraph went down Chamberlain Street. He observed that the soldiers considered themselves to be "genuinely fearful" that they were under sniper attack. He heard at least one soldier shout out "Watch for the snipers".176
BBC Cameraman Peter Begin (now deceased) gave evidence to the Widgery Inquiry about the reaction of the soldiers in Chamberlain Street to the shooting.
Answer: Yes, I heard a couple of shots.
Question: Were you able to tell what sort of shots they were?
Answer: I was of the opinion that they were of rifle shots of some sort or another rather than baton rounds or small calibre rounds.
Question: Had you heard any gunshots apart from baton rounds up to that point?
Answer: No.
Question: After you heard those two shots did you notice a difference in the way the soldier were moving?
Answer: Yes.
Question: What was that?
Answer: They became very much more alert, wary. They had changed from a fairly easy going attitude to one of caution and one of wariness and one of careful observation and taking up cover.177
176 M15.3 paragraph 6 177 M4.6 letter A-B Mr Preston: As you watched the soldiers move over that open ground, Mr Beggin, did you hear any shots fired?
Answer: Yes, they had got quite a long way into the open ground before any shots were fired.
Question: How many did you hear?
Answer: Three or four.
Question: So far as you could see were they fired by the soldiers whom you were watching?
Answer: No, they did not appear to be. The soldiers scattered very slightly, but they did not appear to fire at that time.
Question: Did you have any impression as to where those shots had come from?
Answer: I assumed, without seeing the individual who fired them, that they had come from the direction of the flats.
In his 1972 statement he says;
After they had gone through the barricade the Paratroopers divided up. One party in riot gear went up William Street to its junction with Rossville Street. Another party in combat gear, that is carrying rifles, took up positions on the corner of Chamberlain Street and William Street. The riot party obviously made some arrests for they returned with a handful of prisoners very soon, who were put in search positions against a wall at the corner of William Street and Chamberlain Street. This can be seen on film. Just before the prisoners appeared on the scene, I heard two shots fired. At this moment the attitude of the troops changed completely. Earlier they had been moving easily along the centre of the road and carrying their weapons at the trail. After hearing the shots their attitude was completely different. They quickly took up firing positions at the corners and were moving far more sharply and alertly.
178 M4.7 letter A-C Immediately after this some Armoured Personnel Carriers came through the barricade. Some went up William Street and stopped there. One turned into Chamberlain Street and stopped. They contained Paras in the same mixture of riot and combat gear, some of whom got out. Some of the Paras who had dismounted advanced across the open ground towards the Rossville flats. I cannot remember whether they were carrying riot or combat weapons. Once again there was a flurry of shots, perhaps three or four. The Paras in front of the Rossville flats were at this time running along and none of them to my knowledge were in the firing positions. I do not think any of the Paras near me were firing. My impression, which I shared with everyone there at the time, I believe was that the shots were coming at us from the direction of the flats. Everyone took cover. The Paras on the open ground in front of the buildings scattered for cover too. There was then a slight pause with no more firing for a bit.
David Capper reported that there had been some live rounds fired both by the troops and apparently by some of the civilians. He gave evidence that he was under the impression that soldiers were taking cover from live rounds.
Q. If we go back to E3.88, you are obviously describing there missiles of various sorts coming down from the flats and rubber bullets and CS gas. But you then say: "But there have been some live rounds fired both by the troops and apparently by some of the civilians here"; can you recall what caused you to say that?
A. Thinking back on it, it must have been the sight of the -- some of the troops down behind the garden walls taking cover. The soldiers that were near me were not taking cover and I think I just put that in as something to, you know, check that and shots being fired back.
Q. You thought the fact that they were taking cover indicated that they were being fired on?
A. Possibly.
Having been referred to his statement at M9.3 Mr Capper stated; The troops immediately in front of me were standing out in the open firing from the shoulder. There were troops further away behind garden walls.\\textsuperscript{181}
7D-129 He was then referred to his statement:
There were a number of paratroopers along this wall and there were more in there who were firing upwards into the flats.\\textsuperscript{182}
and he stated;
That is my recollection, that they were behind the wall, firing down towards the flats and firing, firing from that position, which gave me the impression that they were under fire themselves, but I did not know.\\textsuperscript{183}
7D-130 John Chartres, a Times journalist, made a statement in 1972 in which he described how when he was at 1 PARA “Battalion HQ”, about ten minutes after Colonel Wilford had left the building, he heard an incoming message on the Battalion net that “We are under fire from the Rossville Flats and are returning fire.”\\textsuperscript{184} He told Lord Widgery that the message was then repeated,\\textsuperscript{185} and that he sought clarification by asking the soldier that he was with whether this meant that “real lead” had been fired to which he received an affirmative answer.\\textsuperscript{186} He explained that he was able to hear because occasionally the signaller took his headset off, and the headphones would then act in effect as a speaker.\\textsuperscript{187}
7D-131 Neil Dakin, a reporter with the Daily Express, made a statement in 1972 in which he described soldiers taking cover behind Pigs on the Rossville Street waste ground. He said that when the bodies were being taken away in ambulances he heard
\\textsuperscript{181} Dav 073/116 \\textsuperscript{182} M9.8 \\textsuperscript{183} Dav 073/117 \\textsuperscript{184} M14.2 paragraph 16 \\textsuperscript{185} M14.5 letter B \\textsuperscript{186} M14.7 letter B \\textsuperscript{187} M 14.7 letter C a burst of both automatic and single shot ball fire. There were two bursts with an interval of about a minute. The people who were gathered round screamed and either ran to the wall of the flats or fell down. I had no idea of the direction of the gunfire.
7D-132 It is unfortunate that there has been propagated the notion that soldiers stood about in the open, without any evident fear, as they fired round upon round towards fleeing civilians. It has been said that, because the soldiers stood exposed as they fired, this gives the lie to their claims to having believed that they were fired at. This myth was fostered significantly, and misleadingly, by Lena Ferguson of Channel 4. The actor in her programme spoke, not the soldier's answer, but Ms Ferguson's question. She was asked about this in her oral evidence:
Q. You yourself already confirmed, you asked him, in fact you put to him: "They were not doing that, they were in the open." He says he finds that a bit strange. But when you came to broadcast that, Ms Ferguson, you broadcast that question as being his words, through an actor; did you think that was fair? Bearing that in mind, on the left-hand page, we have it on the left-hand page, the second thing, you say: "The first thing you have got to do is get close to the building, into the shadows. Get yourself low, start looking, see if you can try and trace where the rounds are coming from "The Paras were not doing that", says the actor, briefed by you, "they went on arresting people." So you have the actor, speaking as if he is speaking the soldier's words, but actually speaking your question, did you think that was fair or careful or impartial and are you still proud of it?
A. There is not a question that I gave words to an actor that that soldier did not actually say, there is not a question about it.
7D-133 The effect of this is that there is a television news programme that has either planted or reinforced the notion that soldiers had stood about in the open and therefore were not under threat.
7D-134 It has also been suggested, in a similar vein, that, because some soldiers appear in photographs without helmets on, they cannot have been fired at. Sergeant O
188 Day 210/163/11-164/07; the actor's script is at X1.6.37 explained that it did not surprise him that soldiers were on the ground under fire but not wearing helmets; he explained the fallacy in oral evidence:
Q. Can you explain to the Tribunal why the wearing of helmets is not regarded by everybody in your regiment as a precaution sensible to take against incoming fire?
A. The airborne helmet is heavy, cumbersome, it is not designed to stop high velocity rounds, it is designed to stop things like a -- shrapnel and so on. It is primarily concerned to save your head when you parachute and really they can be an imbrugrance without a doubt, if you are moving about on the ground. They do get in the way, believe it or not, and in the situation certainly we were in on Londonderry on that day, we would have -- we did have helmets on when we headed for the barricade. I took my helmet off to put my gas mask on and I would imagine quite a lot of lads did the same thing.
7D-VII OTHER ACTIVITY IN THE CAR PARK
7D-135 In addition to the direct evidence of there being specific gunmen in the car park, of incoming fire being heard and of the soldiers taking cover, there is also some photographic evidence which, on the face of its, indicates something very different from a crowd of civilians fleeing from the soldiers. Two sequences of photographs in particular bear close inspection.
THE PERES SEQUENCE OF PHOTOGRAPHS – BLOCK 3 RETAINING WALL
7D-136 This sequence of photographs can only be explained by there having been some danger emanating from the lee of the retaining wall in front of Block 3. One figure in the sequence appears to be either concealing or removing something from his inside jacket pocket. Joseph Nicholas has identified himself as this man. A second figure appears to acquire a jacket from somewhere, and, rather than wear it on cold January afternoon in Derry, instead pushes it along the ground. This he
189 Day 336/123/04 190 Day 336/123/05-123/18 191 AN17.6 paragraph 28; AN 17.8 (photograph); Mr Nicholas was not asked about whether he was doing anything suspicious in this sequence of photographs does by pushing it at his side, rather than dragging it behind him. The impression is of there having been an object concealed under the jacket. This man is labelled as Pat Friel in the print at EP25.9.001.192
7D-137 The actions of the men in these photographs are bizarre.
7D-138 Photo P796 below.
7D-139 The man in the jacket, kneeling the highest to the left of the photograph, appears to be either placing something in or taking something out of his jacket pocket. He then disappears from the photograph sequence. Meanwhile the man without a jacket (possibly called Pat Friel) can be seen.
7D-140 Looking at P796 in detail gives an even clearer picture that the Jacketed Man is doing something with the inside of his coat.
192 John Patrick Friel AF32/Day 118 is not the man; John Friel AF 33/Day 76 is not the man although he did cross from Chamberlain Street to the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 by this route; Pat Friel AF38 (1972 only) is not the man (he was 59 years old at the time) In P797 below it can be seen that man without a jacket has no coat with him.
Photo P798 below shows Patrick Doherty and two others, one of whom is the man without a jacket/ Pat Friel. He however has now acquired a coat of some sort. Instead of putting it on, however, he pushes it with him along the concrete and through the debris on the ground, this despite Sunday 30th January 1972 being, by all accounts, a very cold day – there was ice on the ground. Patrick Walsh described it as a “very, very cold day” to Jimmy McGovern, and that he could not “remember a colder day than that.”
153 AWS.42 154 AW 5.47 Kevin McDaid is the middle figure. He said in oral evidence that he was unable to help with what was going on, and described the scene as "pandemonium" and "panic". He was asked whether there was a gunman in the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3 and refuted the suggestion.
Photo P800 below shows Mr Doherty and the man without a jacket/ Pat Friel apparently taking cover. The man without a jacket is now lying over his coat. He is now seen to be heading back in the direction from which all the men had come. Quite what was going on between these men, during this sequence, remains mystery. They are not, quite obviously, behaving in a normal manner and, in the circumstances, it might well be that what Mr Peres inadvertently captured was the transferring and concealing of a weapon.
Moreover, Photo P801 is striking because it clearly shows the two men in it looking anxiously towards the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3. Further, careful comparison of P800 and P801 reveals that, in the second of these, the jacketless man has crawled away from whatever it was that was causing concern in the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. A consideration of the orientation of articles of rubbish in the foreground against markings on the concrete wall in the background establishes that the photographs were taken from the same direction. The jacketless man has, however, moved approximately 18 inches or two feet away from the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3. The angle of the fixed objects remains the same, whereas the jacketless man has moved.
Note, by reference to the white piece of paper with the latter end, in the gutter, and the two distinct grey rectangles on the concrete wall, the angle of the fixed objects remains the same whereas jacketless man has moved. Given that it is known that OIRA 4, armed with a pistol was around the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3 at some stage around this time, and that a gunman was seeing firing from that position, it may well be that this, or something similar, was what Giles Peres recorded the two men staring at.
**PADDY BROWN NEAR THE GROUP HELPING JACK DUDDY**
A further sequence of photographs of the group around the fallen Jack Duddy likewise captures inexplicable behaviour that may well involve the removal and concealment of a firearm.
Photo **EP 25.6** below shows a man, apparently called Paddy Brown, who is holding what may well be a firearm. The man is plainly acting furtively. It was asserted by Arthur Harvey QC(^{199}) that it can be seen on **EP25.6** that Mr Brown has nothing in his hand. The Tribunal will be able to see from the best original print of that photograph that he plainly does. Additionally, his body position also shows that he is neither standing up nor crouching down; he is bending down, with legs almost straight and back bent to pick something up – an object can be seen in his hand. The fact that he is engaged in some worrying activity is also abundantly apparent from his own facial expression; from the fact that, despite all that is
(^{199}) Day 078/074/12 going on at this precise moment, it is his activity that is preoccupying both Liam Bradley (in the cap) and William Barber (standing); and from the fact that he alone scuttles off across what now appears to be a deserted car park in which all those who remain, to be seen in the photographs below, attend to Jack Duddy.
It may be noteworthy that Fulvio Grimaldi attempted to offer an innocent explanation for what Mr Paddy Brown was doing, being the predictably ludicrous explanation that "he was trying to avoid bullets". Patrick Brown made a BSI Statement, stating that he was in the car park, and that he thought that the man stooping "may" be him. He did not address what he was doing at this point. He did not give oral evidence.
Father Daly gave evidence that the man was not assisting the group around Jack Duddy. Edwin Glasgow Q.C. asked Father Daly about these moments in the car park:
Q. I would ask your help about the photograph you were shown by my learned friend, Mr Clarke, which was EP25.6. I wonder whether we could have that on the screen again. I stress this is obviously of course after you have bravely come out from the protection of the wall and while you were obviously concentrating on Jackie Duddy?
A. The gentleman in the -- that is bent down there, is that?
Q. All you can help about that is that he certainly was never any part of the party that helped you with Jackie Duddy?
A. No.
Photo EP 26.12 above shows the man's legs as he moves away from the group. EP 26.13 above then shows what is in all likelihood the same man as the one who was seen concealing a weapon now running away from the car park. He is wearing similar clothes to the man seen in photograph P627 above – dark shoes, dark trousers and dark coat. Some civilian witnesses have also identified the crouching man as Paddy Brown. OIRA 4 also said that the crouching man is Paddy Brown, and that he died last year. Eversheds asked OIRA 4 if Paddy Brown is carrying a gun in this photograph. OIRA 4 said, "I am quite sure that he would never have had a gun. He might have supported the struggle but he wasn't a volunteer." Whether Mr Brown had a weapon on the day or whether he was simply removing a weapon of some kind from the car park will never be known. What is apparent is that, at a time when people were either fleeing from the gun battle that had broken out, or staying to tend those who had fallen, Mr Brown was doing neither. He was clearly removing something, and the probability is that it was a weapon, the only thing that would need removing.
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202 Billy Gillespie (AG33) Day 084/197; James Deeney (AD 26) Day 086/080 203 AOIRA 4.21 paragraph 33 Even without considering the military evidence, it is clear that fire was directed at the two Pigs as they drove down Rossville Street. Firing, particularly directed at Pig 1, continued as the soldiers deployed.
There was a gunman, armed with an automatic weapon, in all probability a Thompson submachine gun, in the Rossville Flats who opened fire as the soldiers were conducting their arrest operation and who continued to fire at them even after they had returned fire and individuals had been shot.
This is the background against which the actions of the individual soldiers of Mortar Platoon fall to be judged: they had deployed to carry out an arrest operation. Having done so, and having started to make arrests, they were faced with an armed attack launched from the vantage point of the Rossville Flats, on three sides of their position. Each of them was under immediate threat. A failure to engage the gunmen would have resulted in their being killed. CHAPTER 7E
SOLDIER O
7E-I INTRODUCTION
Soldier O engaged three separate gunmen in the car park of the Rossville Flats.
7E-II SOLDIER O'S FIRST TARGET – A MAN WITH A PISTOL AT A CAR IN FRONT OF BLOCK 3
After Soldier O had arrested Mr Doherty and handed him into the custody of, in all probability, Lance Corporal 162, he “started to move back towards the vehicle. It was then that we came under fire.”
This was the first firing of which Soldier O was aware and it was “like everything opening up at once”:
There was a minimum of 4 weapons firing there initially. I know this was not SLR or rubber bullets, it was mixed weapons and I think some if it was low velocity. I saw only one fall of shot and that was on the back corner of 36 Chamberlain Street, just on the corner 4 or 5 yards in front of one of my men. At this stage I did not notice any weapons being used except firearms, no petrol bombs or nail bombs; but we were under heavy stoning and bottling.
Having embarked on the arrest operation immediately after getting out of his Pig, something happened which caused O and the soldiers under his command to stop making arrests and to take up positions of cover and to fire.
On hearing this first firing, Sergeant O moved to the back of the Pig to “get the blokes sorted out” (as he said in cross-examination to the Widgery Inquiry) and he
1 B487 letter C 2 B467 paragraph 6 3 B467 paragraph 6 then moved to a firing position at the forward left wing of his position. The Tribunal will note (bearing in mind the points raised in Chapter 7D refuting the myth that the soldiers just stood about in the open without fear firing at civilians) that O's firing position used the Pig as cover. He was not just standing about in the open.
7E-6 At this stage Soldier O thought that he and three of his men were at the back of the Pig; two more men were in cover at the gable end of Rossville Street; two more had gone onto the Rossville Street side and one was close to the back of 34 Chamberlain Street. Having heard the firing his men spread out into firing positions and sought to identify the gunmen.
7E-7 Sergeant O identified one of the gunmen behind a reddish or maroon Cortina parked in front of the wall in front of Block 3 of the Rossville Flats. The gunman was behind the wall and using the Cortina as cover. He was about fifty yards or metres away. Sergeant O noticed this man in particular because he was stationary while everyone else whom he saw in the car park was moving as quickly as they could to get through the gaps between the Blocks. He could only see the top half of the gunman. He was dark haired, wearing a dark jacket and dark shirt. He was pointing a pistol towards O's location with his right hand. O saw the kick of the pistol. He believed that the weapon was a semi-automatic as it fired too many rounds for a six shot revolver.
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4 B487 letter E 5 B575.113 paragraph 35 6 B467 paragraph 7 7 B467 paragraph 7 8 B475 letter G – B475 letter A 9 B440 10 B477 letter A 11 B467 paragraph 8; B 477 letter D 12 B575.114 paragraph 40 13 B467 paragraph 8 14 B467 paragraph 8 As O said in answer to questions from Christopher Clarke QC, the gunman "... was firing in [his] direction, sir. It could have been me; it could have been one of the other men; it was just in my direction." Soldier O returned fire, firing one "deliberate aimed shot, fired through sights from the shoulder" at the gunman. The shot missed and struck the car's rear windows. Soldier O had broken the stock on his rifle whilst he had been making his arrest and this may account for his first shot having missed. The gunman continued to pose a threat to Soldier O and his men. He "corrected aim and fired two rapid shots". He described in his SA statement what happened to the gunman:
The gunner was thrown backwards and fell out of sight behind the wall. A first aid man ran along the low wall from Chamberlain Street to the gunman, followed by two or three others. They were moving behind the wall. I saw them carrying him away out through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3.
Sergeant O believes that he hit the gunman in the chest, but did not know if he had killed him. He said to the Widgery Inquiry, "I don't know whether he was dead, or just wounded, or what.", he told the present Inquiry that he thought he had hit the man.
He opened fire because someone was firing at him and he was trying to save his life. Once the gunman started firing Sergeant O had to return fire, and "tunnelled down at him".
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15 Day 335/058 16 B575.114 paragraph 42 17 B468 paragraph 11 18 Not Charles Glenn – see BSI Statement B575.114 paragraph 45 19 B468 paragraph 11 20 B575.114 paragraph 43 21 B478 letter C-D 22 Day 335/058 23 Day 366/028 After the man had been shot, a Knight of Malta appeared and went quickly from the area around the south end of Chamberlain Street, behind the low wall, to the gunman. He was followed by a woman and, Sergeant O thought, three men, walking in a "crouched way, much more hesitantly and carefully".
There are no grounds for rejecting Soldier O's account of his own actions and, to the contrary, there is independent evidence to corroborate important elements of it. In particular, the evidence before the Tribunal establishes that (1) there was a car, in all probability a red Cortina, in the position Soldier O described; (2) there was a man with a pistol sighted by civilian witnesses in the area around that car; (3) there is known to have been a man injured in that area who is not one of the known dead and wounded; (4) there was a man who was attended to by a Knight of Malta in the area and (5) a man and a woman set to the aid of a man in the area around Soldier O's target. Soldier O's evidence on each of these issues is therefore corroborated by others. It would be perverse to accept the truth of these elements of his account, while rejecting the balance of it, namely that he honestly believed that a gunman behind the car was about to fire upon him or others.
THE RED CORTINA
Tony Morrison saw the car in front of Block 3 of the Rossville Flats. It is significant to note that his marked up map puts the car at approximately position H. He described the car as a Viva in oral evidence, but did not disagree that that it could have been a Cortina.
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24 Day 366/030 25 Day 366/029 26 Day 335/061 27 B575.114 paragraph 45 28 B575.115 paragraph 47 29 AM439.18 30 Day 184/151/01-11, saying "I was not too good on my cars on the day, you know." Mr Morrison also marked up a photograph showing where the car was. Although a little further to the south than on his marked up map, the difference, in the context, is immaterial:
Mr Morrison put the car, for all practical purposes, in the same place as that described by Soldier O (and marked on his plan as ‘B’).
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31 AM349.12 paragraph 12; AM349.24; Day 184/114 32 B575.128; B575.114 paragraph 40. Soldier O has been consistent as to the location of the car. Mr McDonald’s attempt to prove an inconsistency between Soldier O’s marked up plan and the grid references given in his RMP statement proceeded on a mis-reading of the grid references – failing to appreciate that the first tenth of the square is 0, rather than 1. When the grid references are correctly marked on map OS 2.61 the car appears where it does on O’s RMP map. Mr Morrison said in his BSI Statement that he saw two soldiers (one of whom was white and the other “definitely” black, rather than camouflage creamed) fire from position G on his map a number of shots at the car at position H. Position G is just to the west of the south end of the Chamberlain Street wall – not far in approximate terms from Sergeant O’s position.
One of the oddities about the car at which Sergeant O fired, whatever its precise location, make and colour may have been, is that so very few civilians admit to having seen it, despite the fact that it was obviously there to be seen at various stages by literally hundreds of people. Patrick McDaid, for example, went so far as to say firmly that “there was no cars” in that part of the car park. Mr Morrison’s evidence is a good example of the untenable nature of such evidence; he referred to a group of civilians being terrified as a result of soldiers firing at the car. These people at least were obviously aware of both the car and the firing. This was clear from his answers in oral evidence:
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33 AM439.18 34 AM 439.13 paragraph 12; Mr Morrison confirmed that point H on his map was the correct position of the car (Day 184/112/10-113/5). Although he had the car side on, pointing south towards Block 2 (Day 184/113/12-17), this is nonetheless good corroborative evidence given the passage of time. 35 Day 092/129/14 36 Day 184/152/20-153/04 Q. And a large number of people around who could not conceivably have missed those shots hitting that car, or the shot if there was only one? Quite a graphic incident.
A. Could you repeat that, please?
Q. It was a very obvious incident; you could not have missed seeing it?
A. It was terrifying.
Q. Terrifying, and you have described a number of other people being terrified as well.
Maureen Gerke also saw a car in the position described by Soldier O, in front of Block 3. Her evidence was clear – she saw the car and it was not one which appears in any of the extant photographs of the car park:
Q. Going on to paragraph 15, you refer to a car. I know you tell us you cannot remember any details about the car, but if you could have a look at a photograph, please, one you have seen before, AG27.14, does this look like the car that you saw?
A. No, I do not think that is the one I was referring to. The one I was referring to was further up the courtyard.
Q. Could we have on the screen, please, EP28.4A? You can see in the middle of that photograph what looks like a beige coloured mini?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that in the position in which you saw the car?
A. No, as I recollect it, obviously, as I say it is a long time ago, the one I can remember was even further up the courtyard than this photograph actually shows.
Q. You mean further towards the waste ground?
A. No, I mean further towards block 3.
Q. Your recollection is that the car is somewhere towards the east where it is shown at the moment; is that right?
A. Yes, but further, further east.
Q. Even further?
A. Yes. Q. Would it still be on this photograph? A. No.
Q. Is it parked immediately underneath block 3? A. My recollection is that it was parked in that vicinity, yes.
Q. Can you give us any idea at all of its description? A. Absolutely none.37
7E-19 Brian McGhee also saw the same car and witnessed shots being fired and ricocheting off the ground, although none hitting it.38
7E-20 Even if Sergeant O and those civilians were coincidentally mistaken as to the precise location of the car, and there has plainly been no collusion with Sergeant O, there was a car in the south eastern corner of the car park of which few civilians speak. Even if the car clearly shown in EP28.3A did not move from the position in which it plainly was when Mr Tucker took this photograph, there clearly was a car there.
A MAN WITH A PISTOL WAS SEEN CLOSE TO WHERE SOLDIER O SAW THE GUNMAN
7E-21 As Chapter 7D demonstrates, there were a number of gunmen operating in the car park of the Rossville Flats on Bloody Sunday. Two important factors must be borne in mind when considering the evidence of particular gunmen sighted by particular soldiers: first, there has been a demonstrable reluctance on the part of many civilian witnesses to give evidence about gunmen they saw on the day and, secondly, the gunmen operating on Bloody Sunday were not static. The importance of this latter factor is illustrated by Soldier O’s first target.
7E-22 Soldier 030, a gunner in 22 LAD, was positioned on the City Walls just below Charlie OP.39 He heard a number of low velocity shots and saw:
37 Day 133/087 38 Day 089/174 ...a youth who was holding what I could clearly see was a pistol from which I could see puffs of smoke coming in the gaps between Blocks 2 and 3 of Roseville (sic) Flats. I could not shoot him as there was a crowd of about 10 to 15 people gathered round him. I could see quite clearly that he was wearing a brown jacket, faded blue jeans and he had long dark well kept hair.40
7E-23 Soldier 030 said in oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry that the man was inside the courtyard, kneeling behind the wall.41 He then saw the body of a civilian lying on the ground who was not the gunman.42 He then heard Thompson automatic fire.43 He said, as he confirmed in oral evidence to the Inquiry, he heard SLR fire after the first set of pistol shots.44
7E-24 Soldier 030 marked on a photograph the position as best he could recall it of the gunman.
Q. Perhaps we could save that as B1612.031, the red arrow identifies or indicates the walls, the yellow arrow is Soldier 030's best approximation of the position of the first gunman he saw on 30th January 1972. Would that be an acceptable description, Soldier 030?
A. As much as I can remember.45
7E-25 Gerard Elias Q.C. established, using Video 7, that it was possible for Soldier 030 to see some way through the gap as far as the brick wall.46
7E-26 Whilst the pistol man that Soldier 030 was not in the same position as that described by Sergeant O at the time that Sergeant O saw the gunman fire, Soldier 030 nevertheless provides important corroboration of the fact that there was a man firing a pistol in that vicinity. He was a matter of yards away from where Soldier
39 Day 366; Day 085/086 40 B1612.1599 paragraph 3 41 B1604 letter B 42 B1604 letter C-E 43 B1604 letter E-F 44 B1611 letter A-B; Day 336/120 45 Day 366/118 O saw his target and it may well be that he was the pistol man at whom Soldier I later fired. It was not, and cannot be, suggested that there was collusion between Soldier 030, of 22 LAD, and Sergeant O.
**AN UNKNOWN MAN WAS SHOT NEAR THE RED CORTINA**
7E-27 Of the known dead and injured in Sector 2, the only casualties that were in the location of the low wall in front of Block 2, and the area around the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3, were Michael Bradley and Patrick McDaid. Neither, however, was shot by Soldier O and Patrick McDaid was not shot by a 7.62 m lead bullet. There was a third, as yet unidentified casualty: the gunman behind the car.
7E-28 This man was seen by Eamon Baker after he had been shot. Mr Baker was one of the rioters at Barrier 14. He ran down Chamberlain Street, seeing a confrontation between soldiers and youths at the Eden Place alleyway on his way, and went into the car park. He ran up to a group around Jack Duddy, who was already lying on the ground. After leaving that group, he ran along the low wall in front of Block 2 for the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3. Just ahead of him was a man who said, “I’m hit” and fell to the ground. Mr Baker’s identification of this man as Michael Bradley is wrong: the man Mr Baker saw was in a materially different location from that in which Mr Bradley had been shot; (2) was wearing different clothes from Mr Bradley; and (3) had been shot in the back.
7E-29 Eamon Baker said that the man he saw seemed to slump to the ground in slow motion at GR L18: position B on the map.
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46 Day 366/124-129: Video 7 at time counter 21.25.12 47 See Chapter 70 - Patrick McDaid. 48 AB2.2 paragraph 16, AB2.3 paragraph 18 49 AB2.3 paragraphs 18-19 50 AB2.3 paragraphs 22-23 51 AB2.4 paragraph 24 52 AB2.6 This is not where Michael Bradley said he was when he was shot. Furthermore, when Michael Bradley was shot he was standing not behind the low wall in front of Block 2 but "six feet in front of [it]." Michael Bradley marked his position when he was shot as being at approximately point F on the map:
Clearly the man Mr Baker saw was not Michael Bradley.
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53 AB66.5 paragraph 16 54 AB66.29; AB66.5 paragraph 16 Moreover, the man Mr Baker saw shot was wearing a big dark coloured coat that was either black or blue.\\textsuperscript{55} Certainly by the time that Michael Bradley was being put in the ambulance he was not wearing a big dark coat, as is apparent from the photograph of him on the ambulance trolley:\\textsuperscript{56}
Finally, the injury sustained by the man that Eamon Baker saw shot is not consistent with Michael Bradley's injury. Mr Baker thought that the man had been shot in the back.\\textsuperscript{57} Michael Bradley was shot in the arms. Christopher Clarke Q.C. asked Mr Baker how he now knew the man to be Michael Bradley. The witness answered that he thinks it was "roughly from that moment", because he grew up with him as a person around the Creggan, although he did not know him personally.\\textsuperscript{58} The lingering uncertainty as to the man's real identity that attaches itself to this, rather equivocal, answer becomes even more persistent when Mr Baker explained that the man was wounded in the shoulder.\\textsuperscript{59}
\\textit{Q. Where did you think Michael Bradley had been hit?}
\\textit{A. I thought he had been hit in the, in the -- I thought he had been hit in the back at the top left-hand shoulder.}
\\textsuperscript{55} AB2.4 paragraphs 25-26 \\textsuperscript{56} AB66.16 \\textsuperscript{57} Day 096/140 \\textsuperscript{58} Day 096/136-137 \\textsuperscript{59} Day 096/140 Q. You thought he had actually been hit in the shoulder?
A. Yeah. I believed he was shot in the back. I have been informed since that is inaccurate, but that would be my belief.
Mr. Clarke pressed Eamon Baker on the likelihood that he saw Michael Bradley, rather than another, shot:
Q. You have a recollection, do you, of seeing him fall to the ground?
A. I do, yeah, I do.
Q. And of his being somebody who previously had been running to the same gap as you were; you have a recollection of that, do you?
A. I have a recollection of being stood around Jack Duddy and an utter sense of people shouting and roaring and of confusion and of people wanting to help and a sense of panic and then a sense of more shots being fired and running -- running, as you put it, "like hell", to get away.
Q. Did you have a sense that he, Michael Bradley, was running like hell?
A. In my recollection that is my sense and --
Q. Go on?
A. I know that what I am saying and maybe what actually forensically happened do not quite coincide.
Q. They may not, for this reason: Michael Bradley has given evidence to this Tribunal?
A. Yeah.
Q. Were you here when he gave evidence?
A. No, but I read --
Q. You have read about it. Broadly speaking, his recollection was that he went out of the gap between blocks 2 and 3 and came back in again when he learnt that somebody had been killed and that he was actually shot when he was in front of the wall that runs parallel to block 2 and that he was shot after shouting obscenities at the soldiers in front of an army vehicle at the entrance to the car park and making a gesture at them like this (indicating), which is rather a different account from yours, which is of somebody running in front of you and then gasping out and saying that he was hit. Do you think that you may be mistaken about the details of how Michael Bradley came to fall and was hit?
A. I think I may be mistaken, but what is very clear to me was that right in front of me is a man who is saying, "I am hit, I am hit," and what is also very clear to me is it is a man who is unarmed and, um, it is clear to me that I am then involved with a number of people in trying to help him and get him round, away, as we would have seen it, from the line of fire.
7E-35 Eamon Baker helped, with others, to get the man around the corner.
7E-36 The man who Mr Baker saw was not Michael Bradley; nor was he Michael Bridge either. Michael Bridge was shot in the leg and then carried to Chamberlain Street. Similarly, the man cannot have been Patrick McDaid as he was not hit by a lead bullet.
A KNIGHT OF MALTA IN THE AREA OF THE GUNMAN
7E-37 Sergeant O gave evidence of his gunman being attended to by a Knight of Malta and there is independent evidence of a Knight of Malta (Eddie McLaughlin) in the vicinity of Block 3 and the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3. As Eamon Baker and Pius McCarron's brother were leaving the car park to return to Joseph Place, Eamon Baker saw Eddie McLaughlin heading through the gap between the two blocks. The witness heard people shouting, "There are people dying out here."
7E-38 James Lynch was sheltering at the Chamberlain Street wall when he saw a young girl, wearing a white red cross coat, making her way along a wall along the north west side of Block 3. She was crouching and crawling her way out over to a body
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61 Day 096/133 62 AB2.4 paragraph 27 63 See Chapter 7O - Patrick McDaid of a young man lying face down at GR 16. Mr Lynch thought that she came from the alleyway between Blocks 2 and 3 Rossville Flats. In oral evidence Mr Lynch said that the girl crawled from Block 3 across the car park to the body, and not along the wall. He remained sure that she was coming from the direction of Block 3.
A MAN AND A WOMAN TENDED TO A MAN IN THE AREA AROUND SOLDIER O’S TARGET
7E-39 Sergeant O described a man and a woman going to the aid of the injured gunman behind the car parked in front of Block 3. These individuals were seen by others.
7E-40 Thomas Barr recalled seeing a couple coming out of the Rossville Flats and making for a car which had been shot at. He described in his BSI Statement how he saw a car parked “by the playground about 10 yards out from the retaining wall and was on its own.” Mr Barr then stated that a “youngish man in his mid-to late 20s or early 30’s and a girl with black hair” approached the car from the Rossville Flats. Mr Barr thought they were trying to drive the car away and thought them “mad” as he had “realised that everybody’s life was at risk from the soldiers.”
7E-41 Maureen Gerke, observing from the same flat in Block 3 also recounted a man and a woman approaching the car in front of Block 3:
Q. You say that a couple approached the car. Do you remember them or anybody moving it?
A. I think they were trying to move it, I think that is obviously what they wanted to do, they wanted -- whether at the wanted to get home or what they wanted to do, but my recollection is that they
64 Day 096/144-145 65 AL24.3 paragraph 17. It seems that, likewise, she may also now be mistaken as to where the girl came from, but the fact remains that a young woman was seen attending to the injured man. 66 Day 101/097-98 67 AB117.5 paragraph 29 68 AB117.5 paragraph 28. Soldier O described the two individuals as coming from Chamberlain Street and it may be that, over 30 years after the event, Mr Barr is mistaken as to from where the individuals came. 69 AB117.5 paragraph 28 were trying to get to their car to sort of take their car away and sort of get out of the area.
Q. Did you see the car moved at all?
A. No.\\textsuperscript{70}
In the circumstances the couple must have had a compelling reason to head towards the car and the inherent likelihood is that they were the couple whom Soldier O described as going out to assist the injured man.
\\textbf{7E-III SOLDIER O'S SECOND TARGET – M1 CARBINE BLOCK 2}
After Sergeant O had fired at and, he believes, hit the gunman behind the car he saw another fall of shot that landed between the Pig and the Chamberlain Street wall. He saw the flash of a weapon on the lower of the two enclosed passageways joining Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats. He saw a gunman at the Block 3 end with a weapon like an M1 carbine or small rifle.\\textsuperscript{71} He told the Widgery Inquiry that the gunman was “triggering it off fairly fast.”\\textsuperscript{72}
Sergeant O explained in his BSI Statement that he classified an M1 carbine as a “small arm,”\\textsuperscript{73} hence his description in his RMP Statement of coming under “constant small arms fire.”\\textsuperscript{74}
Having located the gunman Sergeant O fired one aimed shot at him. His first shot missed because, he thought, of the broken stock on his rifle. He fired two more shots and thought that he had hit the gunman in the head (or shoulder)\\textsuperscript{75} from a range of about 75 metres.\\textsuperscript{76} The man was flung backwards against the concrete
\\textsuperscript{70} Day 133/087-088 \\textsuperscript{71} B468 paragraph 12; B479 letters F-G; B575.115 paragraph 49 \\textsuperscript{72} B478 letters F-G \\textsuperscript{73} B575.123 paragraph 94 \\textsuperscript{74} B441-442 \\textsuperscript{75} B575.115 paragraph 51 \\textsuperscript{76} B468 paragraph 12; B575.115 paragraphs 50-51 wall of the balcony behind him. Sergeant O is confident that he hit the man as his actions were consistent with his having done so.
Sergeant O then saw some people moving along the veranda of Block 3, crouching. His impression was that they were going to the area where the body had fallen; he told Christopher Clarke Q.C. that his “natural conclusion” was that they were moving the body away.
THE GUNMAN WITH THE CARBINE
There is considerable evidence of an automatic weapon being fired from the Flats at the soldiers: see Chapter 7D, above. Furthermore, there is independent corroboration for O’s claim that he fired at a gunman with an M1 carbine on the balcony of the Rossville Flats: the gunman himself was seen firing at the soldiers before he was shot and his wounded body was seen after he had been shot.
Billy Gillespie was interviewed by the Sunday Times Insight team who recorded that:
...one civilian, whose name we agreed to withhold, told us that he did see someone with a carbine firing at the soldiers from the fifth floor of the flats. The man fired seven shots and three were returned at him. This gunman corresponds exactly with the man at whom Soldier O said he fired three shots and hit.
Peter Pringle was the Insight journalist who interviewed Billy Gillespie. Christopher Clarke Q.C. asked him about the accuracy of the contents of the note:
Q. Could we go to M68.150. These are, I think, the manuscript notes, are they not, of your interviewing Billy Gillespie?
A. Yes, in my notebook.
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77 B335/065 78 Dav 335/066 79 Dav 335/066-67 80 AG 33; S260; L213 81 L213 Q. In your notebook, yes. If we look on the right-hand side we can see you have written, please correct me if I have it wrong: "5th floor flats. Man with carbine. Fired," was it "two" originally and "seven" has been substituted?
A. That is what it looks like.
Q. "Fired seven shots and then three shots fired at him." Does the circle round the full stop signify anything?
A. No.
Q. "By green sheeting," does that mean anything to you?
A. I am afraid I cannot help you there.
Q. Can I ask you this question generally: can we take it that the notes you took in your notebook recorded, to the best of your ability, what you understood the people were saying to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Can we take it that the typescript notes, insofar as they were not actual transcriptions of tapes, again represented what you understood the people to have said to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you leave anything out of those notes for any reason?
A. Not that I recall."
Billy Gillespie presently maintains that he (a) saw no gunman, (b) would not have known what an M1 carbine looked like and (c) did not speak to the Sunday Times. His denials are not, in our submission, credible, and the Tribunal may wish to consider why he has attempted to make them. Christopher Clarke Q.C. went through the detail of the Sunday Times' archive note with Mr Gillespie when he gave oral evidence; the striking similarities between Mr Gillespie's
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82 Day 190/041 83 AG 33.4 paragraph 23 account and that recorded in the Sunday Times note give the lie to his current denials. 84
Q. Let us have a look at it together. What it records, is this: "Billy Gillespie, 22, brother of the above," were you 22 in April 1972? A. 21.
Q. When is your birthday? A. 6th May -- 6/5/50
Q. Just about to be 22. Your brother was Danny Gillespie? A. Yes.
Q. Was he 31, or thereabouts? A. I would not even know.
Q. "Helped to carry Mrs Deery into 33 Chamberlain Street ..." A. Yeah
Q. You did, or help to carry her? A. I did carry her, yeah.
Q. "... with Michael Bridge." Well, he did not carry her into Chamberlain Street, but he ended up there himself, did he not? A. Yes.
Q. "Went with Bridge into the car park between the flats and saw Duddy shot." You went into the car park between the flats? A. Yes.
Q. Did you go with Michael Bridge? A. I cannot recall going with Michael Bridge and I cannot recall young Duddy getting shot. All that I know, there was people all running, people crouching down, people taking cover and, as I say, there were still some young 'uns there gathering stones to go ahead and fight on.
84 AG 34.17 Q. "He threw some stones at the soldier on the corner of the flats"; that is true, is it not?
A. Yes. 85
7E-51 It is inherently improbable that a senior journalist would create a note which contained otherwise accurate information but which also contains, on Mr Gillespie's account, total invention. Edwin Glasgow QC put this point to Mr Gillespie:
Q. I have to ask you, simply because it is only proper and right that I should, because I am going to comment on it — in other words, I am going to say something about it probably in two and a half year's time — and you should have the opportunity of dealing with what I am going to say so we can make a note of it and I will remind people of what you said, if you want me to, in answer to my comment. I shall be saying: it is a very odd thing that this senior journalist has a note with Mr Gillespie's name and age and a lot of accurate information, and appears to have invented a story about a gunman; can you help?
A. Oh, I have no recollection at all of it, no, no recollection. 86
7E-52 It is simply not credible that this account: (i) was coincidentally corroborative of O's account; (ii) was given by mistake or with the intention of persuading the Sunday Times that there was a civilian gunman in a position where there was none; and / or (iii) was inaccurately recorded by Mr Pringle.
THE GUNMAN AFTER HE WAS SHOT
7E-53 Soldier O believes that he hit his target and Eileen Collins saw the injured gunman outside her flat in Block 2 of the Flats.
7E-54 Eileen Collins was returning from her mother's (Mrs Shiels') house after helping to treat Donaghy and Johnson and having seen William McKinney. She lived in a Flat on the first Floor of Block 2.
85 Day 082/162-164 86 Day 084/192 In her 1991 “Talking in Derry” interview tape with Tony Parker she stated that she saw a body covered in blood on the Rossville Flats balcony outside her door:
Where we lived, my flat was on the first floor of the block, so I went round and up the back staircase to it. Inside the children were all safe ... all of them wanted me to let them out on the balcony and watch what was happening. I thought “Well I’ll look out of the windows first to see if its safe. And still to this day I can’t tell what I saw without the horror of it coming back to me. Right there outside my window lying on the balcony was a dead man, crumpled up with blood all over him. I straight away pulled the curtains together and told the children they weren’t to open them: then I ran out of the door and along the corridor, to go down and see if I could fetch someone to help. At the bottom of the of the staircase at the front was another body lying. I had to step over it to get out, and it was someone I recognised: it was young Tony Doherty’s father, who I knew.
It’s still not easy for me to talk about it ...... I’m sorry, I can’t help crying, do you mind if we stop and I have a cigarette?
Death’s a terrible thing and you can’t mock it. If you’re Irish you have to love Ireland don’t you, love her more than you hate her? But sometimes it’s hard to do, its very hard.8
Eileen Collins, like Billy Gillespie, now maintains that she saw no body and that she has no recollection of talking to Tony Parker.88 Mrs Collins’ attempt now to resile from her previous account is simply not credible. There was, in 1991, no reason why she or Mr Parker would simply have invented the account – which is what her evidence amounts to.
Taken together with Billy Gillespie’s evidence, Eileen Collins’ evidence strongly corroborates Soldier O’s account of his second engagement. Perhaps that is why both are keen to seek to retract their previous accounts.
The strength of the corroborative evidence relating to Soldier O’s second engagement is important for this reason: despite widespread community amnesia
87AC72.11-12 88 Day161/120-122; Day 161/151-154; Day 161/167-169 and (in some case) the active suppression of evidence, Soldier O’s account of his second engagement has been substantiated, by independent evidence which might generally be regarded as ‘against interest’. In short, Soldier O’s account of his second engagement has been shown to be true – he did engage and hit a man firing at the soldiers with a carbine from the Rossville Flats. If his account was, on this occasion true, the Tribunal should look even more carefully at the attempts similarly made to discredit the rest of his account?
7E-IV THE ACID BOMBER IN THE BLOCK 1
7E-59 After firing at his second target Sergeant O described there being a lull in the shooting. He went to the rear of the Pig and received reports from some of his men of acid bombs being dropped from the balconies of the Rossville Flats. Maureen Gerke saw such activity and the Tribunal will recall her evidence of seeing people throwing acid from the roof of the Flats. Despite her claims more recently in her BSI Statement and in her oral evidence that she could not remember that, she said in oral evidence that she would not have made that up.
7E-60 Soldier T gave evidence to Lord Widgery of seeing, from behind Pig 2, bottles being thrown from the Flats. He knew from his in experience in Belfast that because of their “distinctive smell” some of them contained acid.
Q: How were you going to determine whether a bottle was an acid bomb or just a bottle?
A. You can see most bottles coming down: they are all empty. This one contained the same liquid as what the others did ... it was greenish coloured liquid in the bottle. Soldier T said in his SA Statement that he had not seen any of the people who were throwing acid bottles but “had I done so I would have taken aimed shots at them”.95
After this my platoon sergeant O, who was behind me, told me to open fire if I saw anybody throwing acid from the flats. At this time a bottle broke very close to me and splashed my trousers up to the waist. I was definitely sure from where the bottle had come. It came from one of the verandahs of one of the flats very nearby to the position where I was. After this bottle had been thrown at me I saw the man who had thrown it go back into the flat and I was waiting for him to come out again from that general area to see if he had another bottle with him .... I could see that this man was wearing a white shirt with a dark suit and a tie the same colour.96 He came out on to the verandah again and directly he came out I saw him throw a bottle. This bottle landed very close to me at the rear of the vehicle and also splashed me with acid .... The man could have come from anywhere within the Flats. What I saw the man do was to come quickly up to the wall of the verandah which reaches as high as the waist and throw the bottle in my direction with a sideways movement of the arm rather than overarm. I fired one aimed shot at this man in fact before the bottle I have described hit the ground. The man stood by the pillar apparently waiting to see where the bottle would land when I fired the second aimed shot at him which hit the wall a few feet above his head. As a result of this he disappeared.
Soldier T’s marked up photograph shows the respective positions of T and the acid bomber.97
95 B735 96 Sergeant O gave the same description: B468 paragraph 14; B575.117 paragraph 63 97 B747 Sergeant O, in his BSI Statement marked up a photograph with his best recollection of the approximate location of where the acid bomber was.
Sergeant O's attention too was drawn to the stone and bottle throwing and he too smelt acid. He described what happened to Lord Widgery. When I had finished engaging the second gunman I moved to the back of the vehicle. I could smell the acid then. Apparently one had already been thrown. I looked up and there was an acid bomb coming over the verandas there. They are very distinct when they do come, the colour of them. They are a creamy colour, all the ones that I have seen, at least. They have got screw on tops whereas your normal bottle throwing, a milk bottle, like that, hasn't got a screw on top. Wherever it came off, I shouted it was an acid bomb. It struck the ground in front of me, but in between the acid bomb and myself there was one of my soldiers. Soldier T was standing between me and the acid bomb.
Q. Was he affected by that acid? A. It splashed him up his legs.
Q. Did you give him an order? A. I said, if any more acid bombs are thrown from that area, I told them to return fire on it.”
Sergeant O turned to go back to his original position. He heard Soldier T fire two rounds and
....at the same time I heard the busting of a bottle. We turned round and again it was an acid bomb that came off the block.
Soldier T did not hit his target:
Q. As far as you could tell, did it [the first round] strike him? A. No.
Q. So what did you do? A. When I saw that the first round didn't hit him, I fired another one. The first one must have alarmed him, because he stepped back, and I saw the round hit the roof of the building.
Q. Afterwards did you see he come out again? A. No.
102 Sergeant O was told so by Soldier T; see BSJ Statement B575.117 paragraph 61 103 B480 letter G T described how he then felt a tingling in his leg. He poured water on his trousers to weaken the acid solution and changed his trousers. He eventually gave them to Warrant Officer Wood of the SIB and signed what would appear to be an exhibits label.\\textsuperscript{105}
Soldier R was also hit by acid. When he gave oral evidence to the present Inquiry, R no longer had a recollection of an acid bomb splashing a few yards away from him; nor was he any longer able to recall Sergeant O giving orders to Private T to fire at the acid bomber.\\textsuperscript{106} However Soldier R's 1972 account records that he was struck by acid. He recalled there being holes burnt in his denim trousers and he felt a burning sensation on his legs.\\textsuperscript{107} He described in his SA statement how he was caught by acid bombs dropped from above the soldiers.\\textsuperscript{108}
\\textit{Just after I fired this shot acid bombs were dropped from the middle floor of block 1 above me. The first one, which was a bottle, hit the ground about a yard from me and the acid splashed on my trousers. Sgt O shouted something like "that's acid, look out" and I stepped back. Then a second bomb came down and splashed me some more. As the second bomb was thrown I saw one of our platoon (I think T) take aim and fire at the bomber. At the time the acid bombs went off there were no civilians in the area between the Pig and the wall of block 1.}
He was asked about the acid bombs at the Widgery Inquiry:\\textsuperscript{109}
\\textit{Q. An acid bomb came from above?}
\\textit{A. Yes.}
\\textit{Q. What happened?}
\\textit{A. It struck me against the leg, sir. I stepped back for cover, and then my Platoon Sergeant said something like "It's acid, look out".}
\\textsuperscript{104} B742 letter F \\textsuperscript{105} B736 \\textsuperscript{106} Day 337/040 \\textsuperscript{107} B691.003 paragraph 16 \\textsuperscript{108} B691.016 paragraphs 5-6; B688 letters A-G \\textsuperscript{109} B679 letter B T turned round and took aim. Another acid bomb was on its way down. It was T at that time I presume because I was taking off and once more I was hit by the acid as it struck the floor.
7E-70 Sergeant O recalls seeing Soldier R and that Soldier R’s trousers were removed. He also remembers water being thrown on R’s legs.110
7E-71 Furthermore, a number of other Mortar Platoon soldiers saw that at least one of their colleagues had been struck by acid. Lieutenant N saw two of his men whose clothes had been affected by acid burns. He recorded that, “one had some physical discomfort but neither were in serious pain”.111 He still retained a memory of seeing the two casualties when he gave his oral evidence to the present Inquiry.112
7E-72 Soldier 019 recalls seeing Soldier T close to a Pig and someone cutting T’s denims off.113 INQ 1579 recalls the smell of acid bombs and he was aware that one man had burns on his clothing but cannot recall who that was.114 Soldier 006 remembers the fact that Soldier T was hit by acid but cannot remember the circumstances or being a witness to it actually happening.115 INQ 1918 recalled either witnessing or being told that Soldier R was hit by acid116 and Soldier 112 recalls R’s uniform being “in tatters and it seemed as if he had been struck by an acid bomb.”117 Major Loden confirmed in oral evidence to the Inquiry that he recorded in his Diary of Operations the fact that two men had been struck by acid.118
110 B575.119 paragraph 71 111 B399 112 Day 323/110 113 B1494.004 paragraph 19 114 C1579.4 paragraph 30; Day 336/168 115 B1377.008 paragraph 36; Day 334/084 116 C1918.003 paragraph 15; Day 342/104 117 B1732.005 paragraph 20 118 Day 346/019 SERGEANT O'S THIRD ENGAGEMENT
When Sergeant O returned to the front of the Pig, he saw a group of people coming down to ground level from Bock 3 carrying a body which he assumed to be the body of the gunman he had hit up on the balcony. The body was taken through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. He then, "almost instantaneously," came under fire from a gunman that he saw step out from the gap, bring a weapon up to his shoulder and fire. O assumed that the weapon was an M1 carbine, indeed the same weapon that had been fired from the balcony.
Sergeant O fired two aimed shots at the gunman and "he either jumped or fell back." Sergeant O stated that he "cannot say if I hit him". After this incident, Sergeant O recalls, "things appeared to quieten down."
It would appear that this exchange of gunfire, later on as it was in the sequence, would have taken place at about the time when the last civilians were exiting through the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3, and when Mr Doherty and the "jacketless man" Friel were both simultaneously looking, with obvious concern, at the place from which this gunman fired.
CONCLUSION RELATING TO SOLDIER O'S ENGAGEMENTS
Soldier O's accounts, which have been given to different people, in different circumstances, in and since 1972 have been consistent over 30 years. There is independent corroboration for important elements in his evidence. In particular, there is clear evidence that there was a gunman on the balcony of the Rossville Flats firing at the soldiers with an M1 carbine. There is also clear evidence of an injured man being seen in the location that Soldier O indicated he saw his second target fall.
7E-77 In the circumstances, it is clear that Soldier O’s account of his second engagement is independently corroborated in a number of important respects. In order to reject his account, the Tribunal would have to determine that, not only was Soldier O lying for the past 30 years (a conclusion for which there is no evidence at all), but also that Billy Gillespie and Eileen Collins were also, for no discernable reason, lying when they spoke to Peter Pringle and Tony Parker, respectively.
7E-78 Moreover, if Soldier O’s account of his second engagement is true, the Tribunal should consider with even greater care what possible basis is therefore rejecting the balance of his evidence? True, there is less corroborative evidence, but were it not for the existence of incontrovertible journalists’ notes of statements, the makers of which are now prepared to deny under oath, there would be little direct corroborative evidence of his second engagement. In short, given the evidence available to the Tribunal, it is much more likely that potentially corroborative evidence of gunmen being seen operating in the south east corner of the car park has been suppressed than that Soldier O’s account is inaccurate.
7E-79 Soldier O has been consistent over a very long period of time in recounting his actions that day in his own words, from the Sergeants’ Mess interview,126 to the Widgery Tribunal, to Peter Taylor, in his BSI interview and in oral evidence to the Tribunal.
7E-80 Soldier O did not shoot any of the known dead and injured. He opened fire in circumstances where he honestly believed himself and his men to be under lethal threat. He should not, in our submission, be criticised for having done so.
126 Nb see the correct version of the transcript as annexed to O’s BSI Statement at B575.125 paragraph 102 and Appendix 23 at B575.165 as opposed to an incorrect version attaché to the SA Statement. CHAPTER 7F
SOLDIER V
7F-1 INTRODUCTION
Soldier V made his way from Pig 1 south down the Chamberlain Street wall together with Soldier S. EP2.4 shows, in all likelihood, S and V making their way forward.
As V and S made their way to the end of the Chamberlain Street wall they came under fire, so far as Soldier V could judge, from the Gap between Blocks 1 and 2. There was a group of civilians to V’s left near the end of Chamberlain Street who were throwing stones and bottles. Soldier V estimated the crowd to number “approximately 100.” Some were stationary and some were moving, some coming forward to throw and some “generally milling about in the area.” It was from within this crowd that Soldier V’s target emerged.
1 B821.019 letter D-F 2 B821.019 letter F- B821.020 letter B 3 B821.020 letter B-C The man was wearing a dark suit, white shirt, was of medium build and had long dark hair. He had his right arm "in a throwing position", holding a bottle with a lit fuse attached.
V recalled in his BSI Statement seeing a white shirt in his sight. He took aim and fired one round at the man. He believes he hit the man. The bomb did not explode. Soldier V, 30 years on, no longer recalls the act of firing.
His explanation to the Widgery Tribunal was that "for a fraction of a second someone ran in front and obscured my aim, but as soon as I was clear I fired .... My shot struck the man and threw him backwards." He went on to say that, "It was afterwards that I realised he had already thrown the bottle during the fraction of a second that he was obscured from me."
Christopher Clarke Q.C. questioned V on the precise detail of his firing at the bomber. V explained to the Tribunal in response to Mr Clarke's direct question, that he now has no "clear recollection" of what was occurring in front of him as he moved towards the place from which he fired the shot. He also pointed out that his contemporaneous statements fail to convey the reality of the position in which he found himself, referring to his SA statement he said,
"I think what it does not convey is that, um, first of all, there was a lot going down; we were taking fire from different directions and that there were a few things happening in a very, very short space of time and the incident of me actually engaging the petrol bomber happened in a fraction of a second. I do not think that conveys that accurately, in as much as the target was identified and an accurate shot was fired at a petrol bomber, endangering the life of somebody it was my duty to protect. I do not think it does that well enough.
7F-7 Soldier V explained that, as Soldier S was engaging his target, S’s life was endangered by a bomber V had identified, and he therefore engaged him. However, this all happened, as V made clear, in “a flash”, “very quickly.”
7F-II SOLDIER V’S EVIDENCE
7F-8 Soldier V fired a single round on Bloody Sunday. He believes that he hit his target. Soldier V’s reason for opening fire is disputed. Put shortly, Soldier V maintains, and has maintained for 30 years, that he believed that he and S were under threat at the time that he opened fire. That is disputed by the representatives of a number of the families who maintain that he had no such belief. Importantly, Soldier V is not merely being accused of firing when he was not under threat but of doing so at a time when he cannot be reasonably believed that he was: he fired for some other, unspecified, reason, intending to kill or seriously injure the person at whom he aimed.
7F-9 The issue of what was in Soldier V’s mind at the time when, on Sunday 30 January 1972, he fired his one aimed shot, is one about which only Soldier V can give evidence: only Soldier V knows (or more importantly knew) what he honestly believed at the time. Accounts of Soldier V’s actions have been recorded (or purportedly recorded) on the following occasions:
(1) In his RMP statements.
(2) In a memorandum of an interview with Mr Heritage on behalf of the Widgery Inquiry.
(3) In his SA statement to the Widgery Inquiry.
13 Day 333/066/04-21 (4) In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry.
(5) In his BSI statement and oral evidence to the present Inquiry.
7F-10 The Tribunal will have to consider each of the various recorded accounts of what Soldier V has said was in his mind at the time he fired, and give each of them such weight as they may reasonably bear before determining whether it can be sure that he did not believe he was under threat and therefore shot a man in the car park of the Rossville Flats for some other reason.
7F-11 Soldier V himself has emphasised to this Inquiry that his oral evidence to Lord Widgery is the most reliable account of what he believed: it is the only contemporaneous account which Soldier V himself gave – it is Soldier V’s account under oath and not someone else’s interpretation of what he had said. Soldier V is not someone who was, particularly as a young soldier, especially adept at expressing himself well verbally in the somewhat artificial and formal context of statement or note-taking. He preferred to give his account in his own way rather than have it, in effect, filtered or adapted into someone else’s words. The Tribunal should therefore be very cautious before preferring what was written for him, to what was spoken by him.
SOLDIER V’S RMP STATEMENT
7F-12 The circumstances of the taking of the RMP statements are set out in Chapter 2 above. The following facts are of particular relevance:
(1) The RMP statements were intended to be brief contact reports and not comprehensive statements. They were designed to record who fired, how many rounds they had fire, what they had fired at and what the line of fire was. They were expressly not designed to investigate criminal responsibility, let alone to provide those who might be accused of serious wrong doing with an opportunity of fully and carefully explaining what they had done in the knowledge that the record which was being made of their explanation might be held against them in the future. They were taken late on 30 January or early on 1 February 1972 from soldiers who had been on duty all day and in a fire fight.
The vast majority were taken by inexperienced corporals.
Soldier V gave his RMP statement
(a) Under compulsion.
(b) Without caution.
(c) Without legal representation.
The statements were taken in circumstances that were expressly designed to circumvent the protection afforded by the Judges' Rules.
Corporal (INQ 1855) took V's RMP Statement. He has not made a statement to the Inquiry. Corporals should not have been taking statements from those who had fired live rounds. Sergeant Major INQ 1831 said of Corporals that, "they were trainees and would not have recorded statements from those Para involved in the shootings but only back up corroborative statements." The SIB were under great pressure at the time of Bloody Sunday and therefore, as INQ 1831 said in oral evidence to the Tribunal, the good practice of experienced SIB personnel taking statements from soldiers who had fired live rounds, simply could not be followed in the circumstances that existed after Bloody Sunday.
As a record of what Soldier V honestly believed at the time that he fired his round on Bloody Sunday, the statement taken from him and recorded by the RMP should be relied upon only with caution: its purpose was not to investigate Soldier V's state of mind and it did not do so. It provides no satisfactory basis for
______________________________________________________________________
14 C1831.2 paragraph 11 15 Day 258/143/15 disbelieving Soldier V's own contemporaneous evidence of what his honestly believed when he fired.
**MR HERITAGE'S MEMORANDUM**
7F-15 Mr Heritage and Major Bailey held what Mr Heritage described as a preliminary, informal conversation / meeting with Soldier V before his statement to the Widgey Inquiry was prepared. During the course of that meeting Mr Heritage broke off the interview and made a note purporting to record what Soldier V had said in the course of part of the meeting.
7F-16 Soldier V has no recollection of the meeting in question or of meeting Colonel Overbury during it.
7F-17 Mr Heritage's note records the following:
> In the course of my preliminary interview with V, before recording his statement, I invited him to tell me his account of what happened. He told me that he saw a man throw a bottle with a lighted fuse at its end. The bottle landed near S, but the fuse came out in the air and the bottle did not explode. He said he kept an eye on the man who had thrown it, as he moved back in the crowd. As soon as the movement of the crowd gave him a clear sight of the man he shot at him and believed that he had hit him. In answer to Major Bailey he said he thought the man might have been stooping just before he shot. I asked him if he could see anything in the man's hand. He replied 'No, sir, I cannot honestly say that I did'. Major Bailey then intervened and said he wished to discuss the position of this witness with Colonel Overbury before we proceeded. I agreed.
> Major Bailey confirms that this is a fair and accurate record of what V said in our presence.
7F-18 This note is the basis for the allegation that Soldier V did not, at the time that he opened fire, honestly believe that he or others were under threat. This is the
______________________________________________________________________
16 Day 251/88/17-89/1 17 333/069/14-333/070/01; 333/071/10-12; 333/071/20; 18 B821.002 evidence on which the Tribunal are invited to conclude that they are sure that Soldier V shot an individual intending to kill or seriously injure him, not believing himself to be under threat, and for no apparent reason.
7F-19 There are powerful reasons why the Tribunal cannot rely upon Mr Heritage’s note as reliable evidence of what was in Soldier V’s mind at the time he opened fire. In particular, before placing any reliance upon the note, the Tribunal must bear in mind its provenance. It was produced over 30 years ago. It carefully records the agreement of those present to its accuracy; all those present except, of course, Soldier V. It was not produced to the Widgery Inquiry and V was never asked whether it was an accurate record of the Widgery Inquiry and V was never asked whether it recorded what he actually said, was never asked what he meant when he said what he is alleged to have said. Instead, Soldier V gave his account to the Widgery Inquiry, on oath, and was cross examined on it. Thirty years later, the memo surfaced. Soldier V has no recollection of the meeting, let alone of what was or was not said, or what he did or did not mean.
7F-20 All of the usual safeguards that surround the taking of statements in cases involving potential criminal liability were absent during the meeting with Mr Heritage. Soldier V was there because he was ordered to be there. He was not cautioned or given any advice on his right not to answer questions that might incriminate him. He was not legally represented. These safeguards are not mere technicalities: they are designed to ensure that statements recorded in interviews may properly be relied upon as
(1) an accurate record of what a witness actually said;
(2) an accurate record of what the witness intended to say; and
(3) an accurate record of what the witness meant by what they said.
7F-21 At the meeting with Mr Heritage it seems that Soldier V was asked to recount his actions on Bloody Sunday. Part way through his having done so, Mr Heritage formed the view that Soldier V replied to a question that “appeared to me would incriminate him”, and considered the “possibility” of giving V a warning that his evidence "might" incriminate him. He asked a question intended to clarify Soldier V's account: "I asked him if he could see anything in the man's hand. He replied 'No, sir, I cannot honestly say that I did.'" Following this ambiguous answer (Soldier V is not saying that the man did not have anything in his hand, merely that he could not say that he saw that he had), the interview was terminated and Mr Heritage and Major Bailey left the interview. It was never recommenced and Soldier V was asked no further questions. Such a situation could never have occurred if the usual safeguards had been followed – in particular if Soldier V had had a legal representative present who could have ensured that what was recorded by Mr Heritage was what Soldier V actually said, and that what he said was what he actually meant. As it was, Mr Heritage explained to the Tribunal that "I did not ask [V] how long that interval was."
7F-22 It was never explained to Soldier V why the interview had been terminated and he was given no opportunity to comment on what he had said or been thought to have said. Instead, the record of this brief meeting was only shown to Soldier V thirty years after the event, when he has no recollection of the meeting, or of his shooting on the day, and is, therefore, in no position to contradict the content of the note or comment on what he meant.
7F-23 What Soldier V can and does say is that the only evidence before the Tribunal which records his own account of what he believed at the time he fired on Bloody Sunday is the transcript of his oral evidence, on oath, to the Widgery Inquiry. That evidence makes clear that, at the moment that Soldier V fired his single aimed shot in the car park of the Rossville Flats, he honestly believed himself and others
19 KH6.10 paragraph 22; in oral evidence Mr Heritage said he had to "consider the possibility" of whether to give a warning: Day 251/63/08-11 20 It is known from Soldier V's oral evidence to the Tribunal that once he had spotted his target and gone into the aim position his view was that of his "sight target" – i.e. the white shirt: that was the view that V had at the time that he fired. It would appear that he was neither looking at, nor could see, the man's hands. It is hardly surprising therefore that he could not at that point see if there was anything in the man's hands when he fired. 21 Day 251/64/09-13 22 Day 333/071/24-333/072/02 to be at risk of serious injury\\textsuperscript{23} and he honestly believed that it was necessary to shoot the man attempting to throw the petrol bomb in order to avoid that injury.
7F-24 In the circumstances, the best evidence that the Tribunal has of Soldier V’s belief at the time of firing is his evidence to Lord Widgery. The evidence which appears to contradict Soldier V’s own account is too unreliable for the Tribunal to be sure that Soldier V did not hold an honest belief that he was under threat at the time he fired.
7F-III DID SOLDIER V SHOOT JACK DUDDY?
SOLDIER V’S TARGET WAS IN A DIFFERENT LOCATION THAN JACK DUDDY
7F-25 The allegation that Soldier V shot Jack Duddy is based, in large part, on the suggestion that Soldier V described his target as being in a position close to that where Duddy is known to have fallen. This is not correct.
7F-26 Barry MacDonald QC, on behalf of the Duddy family, suggested that Jack Duddy’s fallen body was “extremely close” to V’s target as V had described its location.\\textsuperscript{24} V agreed with Mr MacDonald that his target was “a reasonable distance, a close distance” from the position where Jack Duddy’s body was;\\textsuperscript{25} he agreed that the 30 yards that Mr MacDonald estimated it to be, and the 18 to 22 yards that Lord Saville calculated it to be, was “fairly close”.\\textsuperscript{26} However, in the context of the limited area of the Rossville Flats’ car park, 54 to 90 feet is not particularly close.
7F-27 Jack Duddy fell at a point between the two sets of car parking grids in the Rossville Flats’ car park. The westerly grid consisted of one row of spaces
\\textsuperscript{23} Soldier V being faced with a man about to throw a petrol bomb was lawfully entitled to shoot the man. That the Yellow Card did not list a petrol bomber as a permissible target it irrelevant to the lawfulness of Soldier V’s actions which must be judged as a matter or law.
\\textsuperscript{24} Day 333/158/24
\\textsuperscript{25} Day 333/159/01
\\textsuperscript{26} Day 333/159/14-25 running approximately north-north-east on a bearing of approximately 35 degrees; its south west corner starting on a point from an imaginary line extended out from the north west gable of Block 2. The second grid is a double set of car parking spaces that are contained well within the parameters of the extent of the western gable wall of the end of Chamberlain Street. It is clear from photograph P627 that Jack Duddy's body, whilst lying between the two sets of grids, is appreciably over to the northwest (or left hand if facing north) grid. (See further chapter 7L.)
V's target, described to Major Loden as being at GR43281679, is incorrectly marked on OS 1.807. It is out by one square. It should be the square to the top right or northeast from the position plotted. The point wrongly marked on OS 1.807 as V's target is in the top right hand corner of square 43271678, which is the square to the south west or bottom left of the correct square. The grid reference correctly plotted would place V's target further to the east and slightly further to the north from the position in which Jack Duddy's body fell.
Furthermore, the marked up map attached to Soldier V's the RMP Statement shows V's target more to the south and west, in fact slightly closer to the position
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27 See Virtual Reality and the photographs utilised in Hotspot 71 28 B790 of Jack Duddy, immediately in front of the low wall at the point at which it ends. In spite of being slightly closer, this position is still materially different from the position of Jack Duddy, as Soldier V’s target is within the easterly grid of car parking spaces and not in between the car parking spaces as Jack Duddy was. No reliance should be placed on the RMP Plans in any event as they were just that: plans marked up by the RMP.
7F-30 Soldier V’s target as marked on his trajectory photograph again does not correspond with the position where Jack Duddy fell.
7F-31 If the line of sight is extended beyond the figure 1, it travels on a bearing that crosses the second set of grids, i.e. the easterly double set of spaces, at its south western corner. The angle of shot is bearing away from Jack Duddy’s position as opposed to towards it.
7F-32 Mr MacDonald suggested to V that, at the stage when he marked up the trajectory photograph, he had changed his target’s position from his earlier account to Major
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29 This, incidentally, contradicts Mr MacDonald’s suggestion that V attempted to move his target away from the true position of Jack Duddy.
30 V does not remember putting marking either on the maps or photographs. However he said that, given the option, he would probably have chosen to mark the photograph because it would have been easier to look at a photograph and pick out where he was, rather than picking a grid reference which he understandably could not relate to because he did not have a map at the time of the incident. Loden and to the RMP in order to distance himself from responsibility for Jack Duddy's death. Mr MacDonald did not, however, explain how Soldier V could have been aware so precisely of the position in which Duddy fell. Of course he was not so aware and the suggestion is baseless.
**JACK DUDDY WAS SHOT BEFORE SOLDIER V FIRED HIS ROUND**
7F-33 Soldier V did not shoot Jack Duddy: Soldier V fired his shot after Duddy had already been shot.
7F-34 Sergeant O's evidence was that either he or Soldier S opened fire first. It may have been Soldier S whom Sergeant O saw at the rear wall of Chamberlain Street when the shooting broke out.
7F-35 Soldier S stated in 1972 that, when he was at the rear of 34 Chamberlain Street, he saw a body lying on the ground to Soldier S's front. He was asked at the Widgery Inquiry whether he saw the body before he started firing:
> Mr Hill: Did you see that body before you first started firing at the man you say you saw, or afterwards?
> A: I think it was after when I went into my position, sir
> Q. At the time when you saw that body had you discharged all of your shots or not?
> A. No sir.
> Q. Had you fired at all at that stage when you saw that body?
> A. I may have, sir, but I don't think so.
7F-36 Consequently, Soldier S saw what in all probability was the body of Jack Duddy before he opened fire.
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31 B788.821 32 B476 letter B 33 B721 letter E 34 B722 letter A-B
FS7.1515
VII 187 The third important fact is derived from what V saw and did after he had fired at his target. Having fired, V moved into the Chamberlain Street wall behind Soldier S. V saw that Soldier S was returning fire into the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. V then watched Block 1 of the Rossville Flats before ordering Soldier S, who had finished firing at his target, back to the Pig. It is significant that V was asked at the Widgery Inquiry how many shots he saw Soldier S fire. He initially replied that he could not say, but when pressed answered, “Approximately four”.
As Soldier S fired twelve rounds, in four groups of three, V’s evidence of seeing S fire approximately four rounds, and then ordering him back to the Pig, means that V fired no earlier than late into Soldier S’s firing sequence, and, probably, just before S’s fourth, and last, batch of three rounds.
Taking these events in sequence, starting from Soldier S recalling that there was a body on the ground before he started firing himself, and that V only fired well into S’s sequence and therefore cannot have shot the body that S saw on the ground, the logical conclusion is, that if the body that S saw was that of Jack Duddy, then V cannot have shot Jack Duddy. If the body on the ground was not Jack Duddy then it is a missing casualty.
V told the Widgery Inquiry that he thought that one of the group that attended the body that he hit was a Priest. V said to the Tribunal that that was his perception, but he thinks he may have been mistaken. However, the body that was attended to by Father Daly cannot be said to be V’s target. V explained in his oral evidence
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35 B821.021 letter C 36 B821.021 letter E-F 37 B821.022 letter B; Soldier S confirmed this: see B 718 letter D 38 B821.030 letter C-D 39 B821.030 letter G 40 Day 333/147/05-09 that the description of the person that he hit does not match Jack Duddy as he is seen in the photographs of Father Daly attending him.\\textsuperscript{41}
The reason, as V explained to the Tribunal, why it is perfectly feasible for him to have made an error in attributing the person attended to by a Priest with his target, is the likelihood that V, in the time of the movement back to the Chamberlain Street wall, confused the body he saw on the ground being attended to by a priest with the body that he himself had hit. V explained what he would have done having hit his target:\\textsuperscript{42}
\\textit{.. As soon as he [the target] has gone over and I have seen he is no longer a threat my attention is then looking around for other threats in the area, checking out the area where S is engaged in and looking for more targets. So, because he has posed no more threat, I am not worried about him, so I cannot help you on that one.}
\\textbf{Q.} You did not see him, so far as you recall, being carried away somewhere.
\\textbf{A.} I really cannot remember.
\\textbf{V'S TARGET DOES NOT FIT JACK DUDDY'S APPEARANCE}
Jack Duddy's appearance on Bloody Sunday does not fit Soldier V's description of his target in two important respects. First Soldier V's target was wearing a white shirt, as opposed to Jack Duddy's red shirt and, secondly, V hit his target in the stomach whereas Duddy was shot in the right shoulder. Neither of these is a minor or insubstantial difference.
\\textbf{CONCLUSION}
Taking the evidence as a whole it is submitted that Soldier V cannot have shot Jack Duddy:
\\textsuperscript{41} Day 333/147/16-18; 333/148/03-5 \\textsuperscript{42} Day 333/091/18 – 333/092/01 (1) The man Soldier V shot was in the process of throwing a petrol bomb. There is no evidence that Jack Duddy was doing so when he was shot.
(2) Soldier V’s target was in a different position to Jack Duddy when he was shot.
(3) Soldier V’s target was wearing a white shirt and was hit in the stomach; Jack Duddy was wearing a red shirt and was hit in the shoulder.
7F-IV DID SOLDIER V SHOOT PEGGY DEERY?
7F-44 Christopher Clarke Q.C. asked V whether he shot Peggy Deery. V firmly denied that he did. He explained that the target he fired at was knocked down with the force of the round, and was wearing a dark suit, white shirt and had long hair. V has also referred to his target as male.
7F-45 Mrs Deery was female, hit in the leg and not wearing a white shirt.
7F-46 Furthermore, for the same reason that V cannot have shot Jack Duddy, because of the sequence of firing, V cannot have shot Peggy Deery as she was shot before Jack Duddy.
7F-V CONCLUSION
7F-47 Lance Corporal V fired one round on Bloody Sunday. He hit his target. It has been alleged that he was responsible for shooting Jack Duddy. There are good reasons for doubting that V in fact shot Jack Duddy. In particular, the man at whom Soldier V fired was, or appeared to be, in the act of throwing a lighted petrol bomb and there is no evidence that Jack Duddy was throwing a petrol bomb when he was shot. Further, Soldier V’s target was in a position between
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43 Day 333/90/02-333/092/20 44 B788
FS 7.1518
VII 190 approximately 50-100 feet from where Jack Duddy was shot and was wearing a white, as opposed to a red, shirt.
When Soldier V opened fire, he honestly believed that the man he fired at was about to throw a bomb, thereby endangering him and those around him. The best evidence of Soldier V's belief at the moment at which he fired is the only evidence that reliably records his own account, in his own words: his sworn testimony to Lord Widgery. None of the other accounts of Soldier V's belief at the moment of firing provide a safe basis for the Tribunal to reject Soldier V's own account and to conclude that they are sure that Soldier V did not at that moment believe he and his colleagues were under threat. CHAPTER 7G
SOLDIER R
7G-I SOLDIER R'S ACTIONS ON DEBUSSING
Soldier R was one of the group of soldiers who debussed from Pig 2 when it came to a halt in Rossville Street. As the vehicle guard he then ran after the Pig as it set off again towards the Rossville Flats. It is likely that photographs P593 and P594 show Soldier R first in a group of three soldiers behind the Pig and then more alone, running towards the Rossville Flats. Soldier R agreed with Christopher Clarke Q.C. that it is "possible" that this is him.
1 B670; Day 337/018 As Soldier R ran towards the Pig he was attacked. In oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry he said that as he ran the people around him threw stones and bottles at him. He was hit once on the thigh, once on the calf and was bruised just above the hip. Looking at the position of Soldier R in photograph P594 and knowing the direction in which he had to run, it is clear that his path would have crossed with that of civilians, some of whom admit to having thrown missiles at soldiers, as Soldier R headed south towards the Rossville Flats’ car park. It is therefore hardly surprising that Soldier R would have become merged with the crowd.
There is ample evidence of civilians attacking soldiers in the area of the waste ground, with missiles in the manner similar to that described by Soldier R. This is dealt with in Chapter 7C.
It appears from Soldier R’s RMP Statement that he heard two bursts of fire, one as he ran to the Pig and the other when he reached the Pig, saying “as I reached the Humber I again heard the sound of shots”. The first firing occurred shortly after R debussed from the Pig. He was, he has described, halfway across to the Pig from where he had started to run on Rossville Street, having gone approximately 10-15 yards, when he first heard incoming fire. It was this that prompted him to cock his weapon. Then, having made his way through the crowd to the Pig, and having reached the Pig, he heard shots, both high and low velocity.
Soldier R saw a crowd along the west side of the Rossville Flats’ car park, from amongst which a man emerged and prepared to throw, with his left hand, what Soldier R identified as a bomb.
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2 B677 letter D-E 3 B658-659 4 B677 letter A 5 Day 337/021-022; B684 letter A 6 B658; B677 letter C-D 7 B659 Soldier R marked on his BSI Statement map the group of civilians and their position against the wall of Block 1 of the Flats in position E.⁸
There was indeed a group of civilians clustered around the west side of the Rossville Flats' car park. Coleman Doyle's photographs show such a group.⁹
⁸ B691.008 ⁹ EP33.1 – EP 33.4; and note that one of the soldiers has a baton rather than an SLR Detail in one of Derrick Tucker's photographs,\\textsuperscript{10} taken earlier than Coleman Doyle's, shows people standing along the wall of Block 1, despite the arrival of the Army so far into the Bogside.
In his RMP Statement, Soldier R said that the man he targeted was running with the crowd, stopped, stood at an angle and attempted to throw a bomb.\\textsuperscript{11} In his SA Statement Soldier R said that he noticed a man about thirty yards away "who was not moving in the same direction as the others", who "seemed to come out turning
\\textsuperscript{10} EP 28.5 \\textsuperscript{11} B659 as he did so.” In his BSI Statement Soldier R said that he noticed one man in particular against the wall, to whom the rest of the group did not want to get too close, take a few steps forward from the wall out into the car park of the Flats, turn in his direction, with a smoking object in his left hand that Soldier R took to be a bomb of some description. The man drew his arm back, “in a position similar to a bowling action, as though he was about to throw the object”.
In summary, Soldier R saw a figure who caught his attention, moving in a way contrary to that of the body of the crowd. The man moved and turned and was about to throw what Soldier R took to be a bomb.
He took aim (at the body) and fired a single shot. He believes that the bullet hit the man “high up on the right shoulder, causing him to spin around”. Soldier R cannot say exactly where the bullet struck, but he told Christopher Clarke Q.C. that that is where he presumes he hit him. He saw the man spinning and presumes that he fell. Almost immediately after firing, Soldier R was hit by acid and took cover behind the vehicle. Soldier R does not know what happened to the man after that, other than that a crowd gathered around him and that he was carried towards and through the Gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Flats. Soldier R was shown the photograph of Father Daly’s group carrying out
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12 B670 paragraph 5 13 B691.003 paragraph 14 14 Day 337/31 15 B691.003 paragraph 14 16 Day 337/031 17 Day 337/031 18 See Chapter 2C re acid bombs being thrown from the Flats. The hair was permanently burned from Soldier R’s legs and he has since developed sweat gland fatigue. He was downgraded from A1 Soldier to grade 7: B691.004 paragraph 20 19 B679 letter B-D 20 B691.003 paragraph 14 21 Day 337/038 the body of Jack Duddy. The group that R saw removing the nail bomber was a different group.
7G-12 Soldier R does not know whether the man was killed. When asked, at the Widgery Inquiry, whether he thought he had killed the man, he answered, “No, sir. At that time I did not think I had because of the way he fell”. Christopher Clarke Q.C. asked Soldier R why it was that he thinks he did not kill the man. Soldier R answered,
A. Because I believe I hit him high up on the shoulder and I do not think it was, like I say, a shot that actually would have killed him.
Q. Is that because you think it would have gone through the front of his shoulder to the back?
A. Yes, something of that description, yes, maybe.
7G-13 The bomb the man was in the process of throwing did not explode. That is not particularly surprising: as Soldier R said in his SA statement, “… a fair number of these home made bombs fail to go off, and if anyone had got to it in time they might have pulled the fuse out.” The Tribunal will recall the evidence of PIRA 24 and Mr Gurney to the effect that, at the time, nail bombs quite often failed to go off.
7G-III SOLDIER R DID NOT SHOOT JACK DUDDY
7G-14 Soldier R shot a man he believed was in the process of throwing a nail bomb. His target was next to the east side of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. The man was carried from the car park through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Flats.
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22 Day 337/039 23 B690 letters A-B 24 Day 337/142/21 – 337/143/02 25 B672 paragraph 8 26 See further Chapter 70. The basis on which it is suggested that Soldier R might be held to have been responsible for the shooting of Jack Duddy was encapsulated in Christopher Clarke QC’s questioning of Soldier R:27
Q. ... I should also tell you this: the Tribunal has heard evidence from a considerable number of civilian witnesses, including a considerable number who were in the car park of the Rossville Flats, running towards one of the two alleyways between the two blocks; do you follow?
A. Yes.
Q. None of those witnesses speaks of a man falling, having been shot, at the point identified by you on your photograph or of that man having been shot, being carried away through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2; do you follow?
A. Yes.
Q. That raises the possibility that there was in fact no man with a nail bomb as you describe and that your first shot was in fact directed towards the crowd or somebody who was in the crowd running away and was fired without any justification at all; is that the position?
A. No.
Q. If that were so, that which I have been suggesting to you was so, it would follow that your account of a man with a nail bomb in a left-arm bowling position was invented; did you make that up?
A. No, I did not.
In order to conclude that Soldier R was responsible for shooting Jack Duddy, the Tribunal would have to reject Soldier R’s evidence in toto and conclude that he did not see or believe he saw a nail bomber, did not fire where he said he fired and that he fabricated the account of the man being carried from the car park through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2. Furthermore the Tribunal would have to conclude that Soldier R shot at Jack Duddy for no discernible reason and then
27 Day 337/144/11-145/09 fabricated an account of firing at a nail bomber. There is no evidence before the Tribunal on which it could reach such conclusions.
7G-17 The paucity of evidence from civilian witnesses who describe seeing the nail bomber at whom Soldier R fired, or seeing him carried away, does not lead to the conclusion that Soldier R’s account is untrue. Scores, if not hundreds, of witnesses have been prepared to tell the Tribunal that they saw no armed men Bloody Sunday, that they saw no gunmen fire, in circumstances where it is now incontrovertibly established that there were gunmen, that they did fire and that that firing could not have been missed by truthful witnesses. Over the past 30 years more and more evidence of gunmen operating around the Bogside on Bloody Sunday and firing at the soldiers has emerged. The picture has slowly developed, but it is very far from complete. In such circumstances, and with no other grounds for rejecting Soldier R’s account, it would be unreasonable to rely upon the absence of clear corroboration as evidence of untruthfulness. It would be even more unreasonable to rely upon it as evidence leading to the conclusion that Soldier R must be responsible for the shooting of Jack Duddy, even more so would it be unreasonable to rely upon it as evidence of the fact that Soldier R did not honestly believe himself to be under threat.
7G-18 There is, in any event, available to the Inquiry evidence that indirectly corroborates a number of elements of Soldier R’s account. For example:
(1) There is photographic and video evidence of Soldier R’s movements on the day;
(2) There is civilian evidence of civilians attacking soldiers with missiles in a similar manner to that which R described in the area of the wasteground;
(3) There is evidence that there were civilian gunmen firing in the area of the car park corroborating Soldier R’s evidence of hearing incoming fire; and
(4) There is evidence that acid was thrown and that Soldiers R and T were hit by acid bombs. The absence of detailed corroboration of other elements of Soldier R’s account does not logically result in its being untrue. On the contrary, that much of Soldier R’s account is corroborated, suggests that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the balance of it is also more likely to be true.
7G-IV SOLDIER R: SECOND TARGET
After being hit by the acid bombs, and clearly before the acid burnt through his demins and started to burn his skin, Soldier R engaged a second target, a man firing a pistol from the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3. He saw an arm emerge and fire between 2 and 3 shots. Soldier R saw the first round being fired, and then as it fired again he fired two rounds. He does not think that he hit the target. The arm withdrew and he did not see the pistol again. Soldier R marked on photograph P292 where he recalled the hand had emerged with the pistol.
Soldier R agreed that it is possible that the shots that he fired at the man with a pistol may have missed and struck the retaining wall of Block 3 as witnesses have said.
THE GUNMAN
There is evidence to support Soldier R’s account of a seeing a man firing a pistol from the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats as set out in Chapter 7E, in relation to Soldier O’s first target. That evidence is only consistent with a man in that location firing a pistol towards the soldiers.
There is also evidence, set out in Chapter 7D, of highly suspicious activity around the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Flats and of those crawling in the lee of the building looking anxiously towards the Gap.
28 B671 paragraph 7 29 Day 337/145/10 – 337/147/06 30 Day 337/048 Furthermore, it is now known that OIRA 4, armed with a pistol left the car park of the Flats by that exit. Strikingly, the manner of firing which Soldier R describes – the gunman hiding behind the corner of a wall and firing blindly – is identical to the way in which OIRA 4 described his own firing around the gable of the Chamberlain Street Houses. Soldier R does not believe that he hit his target.
Given these factors, it seems likely that OIRA 4 may well have been the pistol man at whom Soldier fired.
CONCLUSION
Soldier R was 18 years old on Bloody Sunday. He fired for the first time on the day. He was burned by an acid bomb.
Soldier R fired at two targets: he believes that he did not hit the second and that he probably injured, rather than killed, the first.
There is no evidence to support the allegation that he shot Jack Duddy. The paucity of civilian evidence corroborating his account of his first engagement cannot rationally for the basis of a conclusion that he shot Jack Duddy. For the past 30 years there has been widespread suppression of evidence proving that gunmen engaged the soldiers in the Bogside on Bloody Sunday and only latterly has it been shown, beyond doubt, that there were a series of gunmen in action on that day. The picture is so very far from complete that the absence of positive corroboration of a gunman or nail bomber in action cannot reasonably be used as the basis for a conclusion. CHAPTER 7H
SOLDIER Q
7H-I INTRODUCTION
7H-1 On Bloody Sunday Soldier Q was 19 years old. He had never fired a live round in hostile circumstances before that afternoon. He had, however, experience of riot situations in Belfast. He now has only a vague recollection of the events of the day.
7H-2 Soldier Q fired at a man throwing what he took to be nail bombs from the shelter of the corner of the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3. His shot was one of the latest to be fired in Sector 2. This would have occurred at about the time when the last few civilians were making their way out of the Rossville Flats' car park. In all likelihood the group that included Patrick McDaid may well have been crossing to the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3 at this late stage.
7H-II SOLDIER Q'S ENGAGEMENT
7H-3 Soldier Q debussed from Pig 1 and made his way, as the baton gunner Soldier 112's cover, to the Rossville Flats. There he positioned himself at the gable end of Block 1.
7H-4 His attention was drawn to a man who appeared at the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3. He was throwing round, dark coloured objects in the direction of troops at the end of Chamberlain Street that Q thought were nail bombs. One of them exploded: Soldier Q told Lord Widgery that the man first threw "two or three and
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1 Day 339/034/10-12 2 B657.1 paragraph 6 3 B657.1 paragraph 1: 339/029/18-25 4 B642 letter A-E 5 B644 letter B-E
FS 7: 1530
VII 202 they just rolled". (He clarified, in answer to Christopher Clarke QC, that he now recalls seeing at this stage two nail bombs thrown.)
7H-5 As Soldier Q told Lord Widgery, the next bomb to be thrown exploded:
Q. Did you see any of these objects land? A. Yes sir
Q. What did they do? A. Well he threw two or three and they just rolled and then he threw another one and it exploded.
7H-6 Soldier Q described the noise: although very audible, it was "a dull crump". Although it may have been audible to civilians in the car park, and to the soldiers around the Pig, the fact that it was a "dull crump" may explain why other Mortar Platoon soldiers did not hear it exploding, particularly as there was a great deal of other noise in the car park. Only Soldier Q saw these bombs being thrown. He saw one explode and heard the noise as it did so – the "dull crump". The Tribunal must not overlook the combination of sight and sound: other soldiers may, to varying degrees, have heard the noise but did not see the nail bomb explode, so did not register the noise as being a nail bomb. The fact that Soldier Q did not see nails fly out from the exploded bomb led him, in evidence, to consider that the bomb might in fact have been a blast bomb.
7H-7 Soldier Q fired one round at the man when he appeared again with another bomb. The man was preparing to throw it, and was shot when he was in the act
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6 B644 letter F-G 7 B644 letter F-G: Q referred to only one explosion in his BSI Statement: B657.4 paragraph 20 8 Day 339/032/01-13 9 Day 339/031/24-25 10 Day 339/032/08-13 11 Day 339/032/20-24 12 B645 letter A-D of throwing it. Soldier Q fired at a man he honestly believed to be a threat and therefore fired in self defence and in order to defend others.
7H-8 Soldier Q’s marked up trajectory photograph shows the approximate position of the bomber:13
7H-9 He thought he hit the man and that he was dragged away.14 Soldier Q believes that the man was killed.15
7H-10 Soldier Q no longer remembers the sequence of events.16 It seems clear however, that his shot was among the last to be fired in the car park of the Flats. He explained to Lord Widgery that after he had fired his shot he remained in position for about four or five minutes and then moved to the centre of the north gable end of Block 1 “behind the stairway”;17 he was there “about another five minutes.”18
Q. Then what happened?
A. Well, the armoured vehicles came back and I climbed on to them.
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13 B657 14 B645 letter B-C 15 Day 339/60/04-06 16 B657.7 paragraph 45 (e) 17 B645 letter D-E 18 B645 letter F Q. After the time when you shot the man until the vehicles came back and you got into your vehicle, did you hear any more shooting?
A. No sir. 19
7H-11 His 1972 evidence makes clear that he fired after Soldier T 20 had been hit by acid. 21 This puts his firing after Soldier O’s first and second engagements. Secondly Soldier Q did not record hearing any SLR fire after he had fired, which again suggests his shot was amongst the last. Not long after he fired he returned to the Pig.
SOLDIER Q DID NOT SHOOT ANY OF THE KNOWN DEAD OR WOUNDED
7H-12 Christopher Clarke QC asked Soldier Q whether he was responsible for shooting either of Michael Bradley 22 or Jack Duddy. 23
7H-13 Soldier Q fired late in the engagement and after he had moved from the car park gable end of Block 1 to the Rossville Street side and back again. 24 He clearly fired after Jack Duddy had been shot, as Jack Duddy was shot at a very early stage. It was whilst Jack Duddy was being attended to in the car park that Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley were shot. Soldier Q did not recall seeing Jack Duddy in the car park. This may be because Soldier Q was observing at the Rossville Street side of Block 1 whilst these events unfolded.
7H-14 In any event, regardless of the timing issues, Soldier Q could not have shot either of Mr Bridge or Mr Bradley as neither of them were shot close to the location of the target identified and shot at by Soldier Q. Timing and circumstances also rule
19 B645 letter F; he then heard, but not see, a baton round being fired: B645 letter G – B646 letter A 20 B675.5 paragraph 30 21 B624-5; (RMP); B636 (SA); B643 letter F – B 643 letter G; 22 Day 339/055/18 –060/09; but nb Michael Bradley’s counsel accused R of shooting Mr Bradley. 23 Day 339/050/21- 051/22; but nb counsel for the Duddy family accused V of murdering Jack Duddy. 24 B657.3 paragraph 19 out Soldier Q having shot Peggy Deery. The only remaining known casualty is Patrick McDaid and he was not hit by a lead bullet.
7H-15 There is a striking similarity between the Tribunal’s experts’ description of Mr McDaid’s wound having been caused by a “slicing disc” and injury likely to be caused by a nail bomb in a tin can malfunctioning and blowing the bottom off the can, failing to scatter the nails, but sending a disc slicing through the air. Early nail bombs had a propensity to malfunction. Soldier Q’s shot (later in the sequence of military firing) and Mr McDaid’s journey across the car park and his realisation, once he was at the foot of the steps in front of the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3, that he was injured, were around the same time.
7H-III THE NAIL BOMBER BETWEEN BLOCKS 2 AND 3 ROSSVILLE FLAT
7H-16 There is evidence that there was a man throwing nail bombs from around the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Flats.25
7H-17 It is not, and has never been, suggested that Patrick McDaid was armed with or throwing a nail bomb. Nor is it suggested that he was Soldier Q’s target. Mr McDaid was, however, one of the last to be wounded in Sector 2 and he sustained a wound which might well have been caused by a slicing tin can lid such as were used at the time in the construction of nail bombs. (His wound was inconsistent with his having been shot).
7H-18 Furthermore, Giles Peres’ sequence of photographs, showing a number of men crawling along in the lee of Block 3 of the Flats, strongly suggest that there was suspicious activity in the Gap between the Blocks which might well have been a man throwing, or about to throw, a bomb. This may be all the more likely when it is borne in mind that a man was photographed throwing a nail bomb from the
25 See Section Chapter 7 O alley way behind Joseph Place, a matter of yards from the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3.
7H-IV CONCLUSION
7H-19 Soldier Q fired one round at a man he believed was in the process of throwing a nail bomb. That man had already thrown one device that had exploded, albeit perhaps not properly. Soldier Q is unclear whether the bomb thrown was a nail or blast bomb.
7H-20 Soldier Q’s round did not hit any of the known dead or wounded.
7H-21 There is circumstantial evidence that is suggestive of nail bombs having been thrown around the area of the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Flats.
26 P323 CHAPTER 71
SOLDIER S
71-1 S' ENGAGEMENT
CURRENT RECOLLECTION
71-1 Soldier S's recollections of the events of Bloody Sunday have significantly diminished over the years. S explained in his BSI statement that during his military career he has been involved in many serious incidents, and that therefore, although he does not trivialise Bloody Sunday, the events of that day have "faded quite significantly". Soldier S said that the transcript of his oral evidence to the Widgery Tribunal is the most reliable account of his actions on the day.
71-2 His lack of memory is illustrated by the fact that he cannot even remember objects being thrown from the Flats into the car park or a shot being fired at the Presbyterian Church. Both clearly happened and Soldier S recalled them in 1972. It would seem to be unlikely that there can be any reason why Soldier S should wish to pretend that he has no recollection of these events. He no longer has a detailed memory of the events of the day.
71-3 Of his firing, S can only now remember being near to a wall, Sergeant O being to his right at the front left hand side of his Pig, and that he had an exchange of fire with a gunman or gunmen in the alleyway between the Flats. His only recollection of that is that "the exchange was over quite quickly."
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1 B724.001 paragraph 7- B724.002 paragraph 10 2 B724.002 paragraph 11 3 B724.005 paragraph 25.14 4 331/80/15-23 5 B724.003 paragraph 19 6 ie the Gap between Blocks 1 and 2 7 B724.003 paragraph 18 SOLDIER S’S 1972 EVIDENCE
71-4 Soldier S left Pig 1 under fire and made his way south down to the end of the Chamberlain Street wall. From that position he saw a hail of bottles, including acid, being thrown from the Flats, and he saw a gunman in the gap between Blocks 1 and 2.
71-5 The man was kneeling, facing towards a soldier. He fired four shots from, most likely an M1 or possibly M16. The gunman then got up and, in so doing, exposed his rifle to S. As soon as S identified him as the gunman, he fired three aimed shots at him. He did not think he hit him.
71-6 The gunman went out of S’s view but then was seen again, after maybe thirty to forty seconds, in the same position, kneeling. The gunman fired at S again. S saw the muzzle flashes and fired three more rounds at the gunman. This time he thought that he hit the man.
71-7 Soldier S then saw either the same gunman or a different man (he “could not say” which) but still in the same position. Three or four rounds were fired at Soldier S who returned fire that, he thought, missed. S then fired three more rounds and “thought” that he hit the target on this occasion, as his body “jerked backwards”.
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8 B724.023 letter D-G 9 B724.024 letter A-B 10 B724.024 letter A 11 B724.024 letter D-G 12 B724.025 letter A-B 13 B724.005 letter B 14 B724.025 letter C-E 15 B724.025 letter F 16 B724.025 letter F 17 B724.026 letter A 18 B724.027 letter A-B 19 B724.027 letter D 20 B724.028 letter A-B
FS7.1537
VII 209 Lord Widgery asked Soldier S whether the gunman was the same man throughout. He replied that he “could not say whether it was the same man or not”. It seems most probable that Soldier S hit only one person, if indeed he hit anyone. It is certainly not clear whether the man was killed or injured, or the degree to which he was injured. S did not see the man after he jerked backwards as more people crossed his line of sight and obstructed his vision.
Soldier S was then ordered back to his Pig. (Lance Corporal V recalled ordering S back to the Pig, having fired his one round before S fired his last batch of three.)
All the time that Soldier S was in his firing position, and before he fired his first shot, he thought there was a person lying on the ground to his front, and that he was already there when Soldier S first went into his position. He was asked whether he had fired at all at the stage at which he saw the body and replied, “I may have sir, but I don’t think so.” If the body that S was being asked about was that of Jack Duddy he was already on the ground before Soldier S fired and, if that is right, Soldier S cannot have been responsible for shooting him. As Soldier V fired late into S’s sequence of shots, (between S’s third and fourth batches), Soldier V cannot have shot Jack Duddy either.
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21 B724.028 letter C 22 B724.028 letter D 23 B724.029 letter C-D 24 See Section 7F - Soldier V 25 B724.032 letter E- B724.033 letter B 26 B724.033 letter B-C 27 There was a question specifically about whether a Priest was near the body: B724.032 letter G 28 V saw S fire “approximately four shots” B821.030 letter C-D. When S had finished firing Lance Corporal V ordered Private S back to the Pig B821.022 letter C-E, B821.013. 29 See also Chapter 7F - Lance Corporal V CORROBORATION
71-11 Sergeant O saw Soldier S's gunman when the gunman was firing from a kneeling position. O saw the muzzle flashes and Soldier S engaging the gunman. Sergeant O, as the Platoon Sergeant, said in his BSI Statement that, "knowing Private S as I did, I knew that he would not shoot until he was able to fire a clear aimed shot at the gunman. He would not have shot wildly in the direction of the gunman and I did not continue to watch what happened in the exchange of fire between Private S and this gunman."31
71-12 Soldier V saw that S was taking aim and returning fire in the direction of the gap between Block 1 and 2.32 He saw flashes coming from that direction, but he did not hear the shots. V saw S fire approximately four shots.33
71-13 INQ 444 also saw a gunman in the gap between Blocks 1 and 2.34 He saw the man move quickly from left to right, carrying a rifle in both hands. He was not aiming the rifle. "I do not recall seeing the man fire any shots. It happened so quickly that by the time I registered seeing him, he was out of sight. It is almost like a photograph in my mind."35 INQ 444 said that he was "pretty certain"36 that this was a rifle. Soldier 110 (a Second Lieutenant in C Company, 1 PARA) also saw a gunman cross the gap with what looked to be a rifle.37
30 B575.116 paragraphs 55-58 31 B575.116 paragraph 59 32 B821.021 letter D-F 33 B821.030 letter C-D 34 C444.5 paragraph 31 35 C444.5 paragraph 31 36 Dav 344/103/09-11 37 B1726.5 paragraph 22 SOLDIER S’S PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS
71-14 Soldier S readily accepted that there were inaccuracies in his earlier statements that he did not condone; indeed he regretted signing “them”. He explained that, being an 18 year old soldier at the time, making a statement to the RMP was “a frightening affair in itself”. It had been quite late at night and there were “bits that had been added by the RMPs”.
71-15 Soldier S also stated that it was wrong for his RMP Statement of 4th February to say that he had seen a gunman firing from a ground floor window. He accepted that this was untrue. He said
I am not saying that it was put into my mouth, but I am saying that things may have been altered to suit things at the time and the RMP come along and they tell you: this is what, you know, actually happened to you or – but if you wanted to make some sort of supplementary statement, you know, they would more or less tell you to shut up and be quiet, just deal with the question you are being asked to deal with..
71-16 Soldier S was asked by Barry MacDonald QC whether he regretted anything that he did on Bloody Sunday. Soldier S answered:
A. I regret the whole incident, yes. I mean, can I, can I just -- I do not intend, I do not intend to be flippant in any way on this. Can I just -- will you bear with me a moment, please, sir: even the man that I identified as a gunman, who was obviously posing a threat to us in the alleyway, if I did hit him and kill him, it is still a tragedy, is it not; it is still -- somebody grieved him. Although I had a duty to do that, it is still a tragedy to his family; is it not? I am being rhetorical, but I am trying to say that I am not without compassion on this issue; I am a Christian person, sir, I have Christian beliefs, I live by a Christian standard myself. This is a tragedy, it is a tragedy for everybody, I realise that and I am sorry that innocent people got killed on that day, I am very, very sorry for that, but for my action on the day, my particular action, I believe was justified in what I did. I am not saying that these errors in my statement — I am not saying that I am condoning those errors at all, but the action I took was the correct action on the day.
Q. The answer to my question is: you do not regret anything that you personally did on Bloody Sunday, in the sense that you now feel that your conduct, your personal conduct was wrong?
A. No, I do not think my personal conduct was wrong, sir, in the action that I took.
71-17 S went onto say that he felt “a weight of responsibility” about the RMP statements, and that the families present when he gave his evidence “deserve the respect and an explanation from me” about the inaccuracies in the RMP Statements.45
71-II WHOM DID SOLDIER S SHOOT?
71-18 There is a body of evidence before the Tribunal which suggests that a wounded man (in addition to Kevin McElhinney) was taken into Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. It is not clear where that casualty came from.
AN ADDITIONAL CASUALTY INSIDE BLOCK 1
71-19 There was plainly at least one additional, unknown casualty inside Block 1. The evidence relating to this casualty is set out in detail in the Submissions on Behalf of the Clients of Mr Robert Aitken and are not repeated here. In addition to the evidence there relied upon, two further witnesses saw a unidentified casualty.
71-20 Dennis Mullan, who was in Block 1 level 2 when the Pigs arrived, saw, three flights of stairs up in the south stairwell of Block 1, an injured man with longish dark hair, thin faced, about 19 years old with a droopy collar shirt and shiny V
45 Day 332/016/5-9 neck jumper with a stomach injury being treated by a Knight of Malta and Dennis Bradley. The people were saying that they could not find a pulse. This clearly was not Kevin McElhinney as the colour morgue photographs show him to have been wearing a brown roll neck jumper.
Donal Deeney also went up the stairs of Block 1 and saw someone who had been shot being looked after by lots of young girls. Mr Deeney did not know who he was. He thought he was Kevin McElhinney, but said in oral evidence that he was not sure. The injured man had fair hair and Kevin McElhinney had dark hair.
It is not possible to ascertain from where the unidentified casualty came. He may well have come from the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 and therefore be the man that S believed he had hit. It is also possible that Soldier S did not kill his target. His target may have been wounded, and even then not necessarily seriously.
THE KNOWN DEAD AND WOUNDED
It does not seem at all likely that Soldier S shot any of the known dead or wounded. Soldier S did not shoot Peggy Deery for the reasons set out in Chapter 7K. Soldier S pointed out in his oral evidence that had Mrs Deery been shot in a position close to the Chamberlain Street wall, that would have occurred "reasonably close" to him and he was "certainly not" conscious of her, or of a woman being shot in the leg, near him.
Soldier S did not shoot Jack Duddy because Jack Duddy had already fallen before Soldier S started to fire. Furthermore, he explained that he did not shoot towards a crowd of people and hit Jack Duddy.
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46 AM 449.4 paragraph 26 47 AD 26.12 paragraph 17 48 Day 086/50/5-6 49 Day 331/89/23 – 91/12; Christopher Clarke QC remarked, "The evidence is very confusing about Mrs Deery, but one possibility is that she came out from there: Day 331/092/5-7 50 Day 331/089/15-22 Michael Bradley was shot in front of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats and therefore was in the wrong position for Soldier S’s target. Michael Bridge cannot have been shot by Soldier S if, as Soldier S said in evidence, he would not have shot someone who simply strayed across his line of fire, and Soldier S did not shoot anyone in the leg.
Soldier S was adamant in his evidence to the Tribunal that he would not have shot an unarmed civilian: “I would not have shot an unarmed civilian, it is as plain and as truthful as that, I would not shoot an unarmed civilian.” This emphatic rejection of any suggestion of unlawful or reckless shooting was firmly endorsed by Sergeant O.
CONCLUSION
Soldier S now has little recall now of the events of the day. He fired at a gunman, possibly hit him, but by no means necessarily killed him. Soldier S seems very unlikely to have shot any of the known casualties. In the unlikely event that he did, he did so unintentionally, honestly believing that he was firing at a gunman.
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51 B724.005 paragraph 25.12 52 Day 331/94/20-24 53 Day 331/089/4-14 54 BS75.116 paragraph 59 CHAPTER 7J
SOLDIER N'S SECOND ENGAGEMENT
7J-1 INTRODUCTION
Having repelled the crowd and assisted INQ 1918 in escorting Mr Clark to Pig 1. He described what happened next in his SA Statement:
I then moved straight to the back of the Chamberlain Street houses again to get cover. As I was moving up towards my men a civilian stepped out beyond the end house. He came out in a throwing attitude with his right arm back in the attitude of someone about to bowl. He was about 30 or 40 yards away and appeared to me about to throw the object in his hand at my platoon sergeant's Pig. The object in his hand seemed to me to be a nail bomb. His throwing attitude was the attitude of a bomber and not a stone-thrower. I thought too that I saw smoke coming from the object. I fired one shot at him from the shoulder and aimed. I think that I hit him in the right thigh. He put his hands down towards his right thigh and staggered off as if his leg was not working properly. I saw no explosion.'
7J-2 Christopher Clarke Q.C. asked N what recollection he had now of the incident, over thirty years' later. N replied:
A. I can remember my attention being caught by somebody down at the far corner who seemed to duck back and then came forward again just as it is described there.
Q. When you say "duck back," duck back where?
A. Out of my line of sight.
Q. Out of your line of sight and then come back again?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you see what he was doing the first time he appeared? A. No. That caught my attention out of the corner of my eye, I think.
Q. When he first came round the corner, do you recall whether he showed any sign of seeing you?
A. No, I have no idea.
Q. Can you help us as to what other soldiers were around in the area at this stage?
A. Not clearly. Over towards my right, in against the lower edge of the flats, were some of my soldiers, and I was moving -- I was beginning to move across towards them.
Q. That is in towards what we know as Block 1, is it? The block nearest to the Rossville Street ...
A. Yes, the first block, the block nearest to our Pigs.
Q. What about around Sergeant O's Pig, were there soldiers there?
A. I cannot recall seeing his Pig from that position.
Q. Do you recall how long you had him in your sight before you fired?
A. It was a fleeting incident."
N explained that of the Trajectory Map and the Trajectory photograph, he thought that the photograph more accurately represented the event. This indicates that N was some way out from the Chamberlain Street wall when he fired:
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2 Day 322/090-91 3 Day 322/092; B438 In his BSI Statement N said that his current recollection is that his target was wearing an old-fashioned tweed jacket. His present recollection is very limited and, in his oral evidence to the Inquiry, he indicated that his 1972 account of the man wearing a blue anorak was probably more accurate.
After N had shot him, the bomber disappeared out of N’s line of sight, staggering off as if his right leg was not working properly. N assumes that the man took the object with him because he did not see it after that. His general recollection is that order was restored very quickly and that it only took a matter of seconds after he fired to determine that there were no other visible threats. This remains his present recollection.
Lieutenant N was justified in opening fire. He acted in defence of those soldiers around Sergeant O’s Pig who were the likely target of the nail bomber. He honestly believed that the man he saw, who had emerged from behind the Chamberlain Street wall in a bowling action with a smoking object, was about to... throw a bomb. A nail bomb was a lethal weapon and was expressly covered by the Yellow Card. N said in his BSI Statement that he "... only saw him for a split second, but [his] immediate reaction was that he had a bomb and was about to lob it ..." In the circumstances Lieutenant N's reaction was, it is submitted, both honest and reasonable.
Although at the time that N shot at the nail bomber he honestly believed that his men were under threat, thirty years' later he is frank that his recollection of events is less clear and he cannot now be as certain as he originally was. He told Christopher Clarke Q.C:
*At the time I fired that shot, I was absolutely confident, there was no doubt in my mind at all.*
Despite this confidence, N has continued to question whether he might have been mistaken when, in a split second, thirty years' ago, he thought he saw a nail bomber. The doubt cast on the forensic evidence before Lord Widgery, the continued publicity claiming that only innocent people were shot and killed that day made N increasingly question his own actions.
Q. Is the position that you have, as I think you have explained in your statement, had doubts since as to whether the target that you shot did in fact have a nail bomb?
A. Yes, I expressed those doubts to Eversheds.
Q. And I think you say that this is an incident that has bothered you for years and you had increasingly questioned whether he was in fact a nail bomber; is that right?
A. I, I had no doubt in my mind that when I fired that shot, I was convinced I was shooting at a nail bomber, but since then, with nothing to go on but all the press reports saying that there was no shooting that day, there were no nail bombs, there was nothing, then, as each year passed, I began to wonder if the, if my man had
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9 B438.011 paragraph 43 10 Day 322/092 11 B438 paragraphs 43-46 had a nail bomb or not, but at the time I fired that shot, I was convinced I was entirely justified in doing so.\\textsuperscript{12}
7J-9 N suffered from clinical depression in the mid 1990s. He told the Tribunal that his sense of doubt about his shooting of the nail bomber was only one factor in that depression: “there were several negative elements” in his life and he was certainly not “wracked by guilt” then or now by his actions on Bloody Sunday.\\textsuperscript{13}
7J-10 That Lieutenant N should, three decades on, be less certain in his own mind of precisely what occurred in those few seconds in the car park of the Rossville Flats than he was at the time, is hardly surprising. Whatever his present doubts, at the time at which he opened fire Lieutenant N honestly believed that he was firing at a man about to throw a nail bomb and it is, of course, the honesty of his belief at the time that must be judged.
7J-11 WHO WAS LIEUTENANT N’S TARGET?
7J-11 Lieutenant N believed in 1972, and believes now, that he hit the man he was aiming at. Although it was suggested to him that he was responsible for shooting either Michael Bridge or Peggy Deery, it is clear that his target was neither and remains unidentified.
MICHAEL BRIDGE?
7J-12 Michael Bridge was at the alleyway in Chamberlain Street when Lieutenant N fired his warning shots. He then ran down Chamberlain Street and into the Rossville Flats’ Car Park. Lieutenant N did not, however, shoot Mr Bridge: first, Mr Bridge was in a wholly different location from Lieutenant N’s target when he was shot and, secondly, Lieutenant N’s target was holding a smoking object which he was in the process of throwing in a bowling action.
\\textsuperscript{12} Day 322/092-93 \\textsuperscript{13} Day 323/022 Mr Morgan cross examined Lieutenant N about the location of his target relative to the parking space markings on the car park:
Q. If a person is walking from the double spaces to the single spaces, they would come into your view at some point just before reaching the single spaces; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you accept it is a possibility that the reason you did not see the group around Duddy was because that group was so far over into the unmarked space that they may have been out of your view?
A. Could have been.
Q. Do you accept, therefore, as a possibility, that if Mr Bridge made his way from that group towards O's Pig and in the course of doing that was manoeuvring himself closer to the single set of car parking spaces, that he may have so manoeuvred himself that he actually came into your view at some stage?
A. If he was moving he would have come into my view, yes.
Q. Do you accept, at least a possibility, if that is what happened, he may have been the person that you shot, believing him to be a nail bomber?
A. If he had something in his hand, um, was acting in such a way as to make me think he was about to throw a nail bomb, then that is a possibility, if he was close to that, that corner of the wall.
Q. You say, "if he had something in his hand," but without trespassing on the territory that has already been covered, you now have your doubts about whether in fact the person that you shot did have a nail bomb in his hand?
A. I do now, but at the time I did not.
Q. I understand that, and I am not taking issue with you on that, but you are now recognising the possibility that the person you shot did not in fact have a nail bomb in his hand and that you made what I can describe as an error of judgment, in what you have described as very difficult circumstances?
A. I am recognising that as a possibility now, yes.
Q. Therefore, do you recognise the possibility that you in fact shot Mr Bridge?
A. I do not know Mr Bridge. Mr Clarke questioned N further on the possibility that he was responsible for shooting Michael Bridge. N explained that Mr Bridge appeared to have been shot in a different position to the man he shot:
Mr Bridge is the man who appears in photograph P741 that I have just put on the screen. Leaving aside his name, do you recognise the possibility that you in fact shot the man who appears in photograph P741?
A. That is not possible.
Q. Despite the matters that Mr Morgan was putting to you?
A. Yes.
Q. That is not possible because ...
A. It does not fit in with the -- the positioning.
Q. Why does it not fit in with the position?
A. The person I shot was much nearer the corner and was in the -- looked very much in the process of throwing a nail bomb. 14
When N was shown the photographs that purportedly show Michael Bridge being shot15 N pointed out that the man that he hit was coming out from behind the gable wall at the back end of Chamberlain Street.16
May we go back to B741. Is it possible that the person whom you shot is the person whom we see depicted in these photographs?
A. No.
Q. Why do you say "no"?
A. If you follow the line of -- the lines, one sees standing between.
Q. Yes.
A. Can I have this?
14 Day 323/118 15 Day 322/097-098 16 Day 322/098 Q. Yes, certainly. Can we give control to Lieutenant N, please.
A. Thank you. Then it does not look to me as if he is out of my line of sight.
Q. Sorry, what –
A. I presume from this my firing position was round the corner to the right, somewhere behind that wall.
Q. That is round -- what do you mean by the right, it is in one sense round the corner to the left, it is on the west side of the back end of Chamberlain Street?
A. Yes.
Q. Where your yellow arrow is?
A. The man I shot was coming out from behind that, from behind that corner and fell back behind that corner out of my line of sight. This chap in the photograph looks very much as if he is in my line of sight quite a bit, so it would not have been him that I shot.17
Although he might now have doubts as to whether the man he shot was in fact in the process of throwing a nail bomb, he remains “very confident” of the sequence of events that led up to the shot that he fired and of the location of his target.
PEGGY DEERY?
Lieutenant N cannot have shot Mrs Derry: Mrs Deery was shot before Pig 2 had crossed the waste ground and parked in the Car Park. She must have been inside 33 Chamberlain Street by this time. (See the submissions in relation to the shooting of Mrs Deery in Chapter 7K.) Lieutenant N assisted in the arrest of Mr Clarke. Mr Clarke’s evidence was that, at the time that he was put into the Pig, there was already another man in the Pig, who can only be Mr William Doherty. Sergeant O assisted in the arrest of Mr Doherty. Therefore Sergeant O’s Pig must have already parked, and Mrs Deery already have been shot, by the time that Lieutenant N assisted in taking Mr Doherty to the Pig. His second engagement
17 Day 322/098 cannot, therefore have resulted in injury to Mrs Deery as she had already been shot.
Additionally, in view of the candour with which N has openly conceded his current doubts about precisely what he did and why, the Tribunal should consider very carefully whether it would be fair to conclude that N would continue to maintain that his target was a man if there was any room for real doubt in his mind as to that.
The principal ground upon which the accuracy and honesty of N’s belief that he saw and fired at a man who was throwing something which “seemed to be a nail bomb” is challenged is that there is said to have been no one throwing anything in the area into which N fired. While it is accepted that there is a body of civilian evidence which, taken at face value, would support that contention, the far more limited but far more reliable evidence of those who have been prepared to admit that they saw or participated in the rioting in this area contradicts the premise on which the case against N rests. Given that the fundamental basis of the attack on N can be shown to have been groundless, the Tribunal should be exceedingly cautious before concluding that he was mistaken, let alone that he had not an honest belief in the threat that he claimed to have been under. The absence of a witness prepared to admit to seeing anything thrown that was, or could have seemed to have been, a nail bomb does not render N’s evidence unreliable.
CONCLUSION
Lieutenant N fired on two occasions during the course of Bloody Sunday. In both instances it is submitted that his shots were justified. Moreover, and more importantly, on both occasions he honestly believed that he had no alternative but to open fire. The Tribunal has no basis for doubting the honesty of that belief. CHAPTER 7 K
PEGGY DEERY
7K-I INTRODUCTION
7K-1 The accounts of how Mrs Deery came to be shot vary greatly and are markedly and irreconcilably inconsistent. All that is certain is that she was hit relatively early on, and no later than during the soldiers' deployment down Rossville Street and across the waste ground. She was hit by a single bullet of an unknown type and velocity. It entered the front of her left thigh, passed through her leg, and exited at the rear. The person who shot her was positioned to her front. She was carried to 33 Chamberlain Street – before Michael Bridge and was treated there by Otto Schindlwein.
7K-2 The evidence of the circumstances in which Mrs Deery was shot is so inconsistent that it is not even possible safely to conclude that she was shot by a soldier.
7K-II MEDICAL EVIDENCE
7K-3 Records from Altnagelvin Hospital recorded on 7 February 1972 that Mrs Deery's gunshot wound consisted of "a small entrance wound on front of thigh and very large exit wound on back of thigh. There was extensive damage to thigh muscles and comminuted fracture of the femur."
7K-4 Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan reported to the Inquiry that:
Peggy Deery is recorded to have had an "extensive wound on the back of her left thigh" and a complex and compound fracture of the left femur. At operation a wound to the front of the lower left thigh was recorded as simply being present but the wound on the back of the lower left thigh was described as "extensive". The track of the
1 D1077 2 E 10.005 wound is therefore more likely to be from front to back than the reverse. No comment can be made about the nature of the projectile.
7K-III THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH MRS DEERY WAS SHOT
7K-5 It seems clear that at some stage in the afternoon Mrs Deery was at Barrier 14 watching the riot. Anthony McCallion recalled seeing her when he was near the junction of Chamberlain Street and Harvey Street; “I remember saying to her “don’t head up there, they’re rioting”. She just smiled and walked on north up Chamberlain Street”.3
7K-6 Mrs Deery recorded in her first statement dated 29 February 1972, that she approached Barrier 14, but left after the Army fired dye;4
At this point there was no stone throwing or trouble that I could see, but then again I was in the middle of the main crowd. The Army then fired coloured dye and I ran like hell towards Rossville Street at the back of the high flats. By this time my sister and I had got separated in the crowd.
7K-7 Beyond these facts, the evidence surrounding the circumstances in which Mrs Deery came to be shot are hopelessly confused, in part because of significant inconsistencies in her own accounts over the years.
7K-8 Mrs Deery was very seriously injured in circumstances in which no criticism is made of anything that she was doing. She clearly gave markedly inconsistent accounts of what happened to her which do not provide any satisfactory basis for making allegations against any of the soldiers.
7K-9 There are significant differences in the available evidence as to:
(1) The circumstances of the shooting of Mrs Deery – what she was doing immediately before and after she was shot;
3 AM 65.2 paragraph 8 4 ED 62.2 (2) Next to whom Mrs Deery was standing at the moment she was shot;
(3) The location in which Mrs Deery was shot; and
(4) The description of the soldier who was alleged to have shot Mrs Deery.
THE SHOOTING
Mrs Deery's Accounts
7K-10 In her first statement made to the RUC dated 27 February 1972 Mrs Deery said:5
The Army then fired coloured dye and I ran like hell towards Rossville Street at the back of the high flats. By this time my sister and I had got separated in the crowd. I ran round to the back – I was round the back of these high flats running towards the wee gate at the back of the flats when ever I tripped and fell. There were hundreds of people in this area running to get away from the Army who had driven into the back of the flats in Saracens. A man had fallen on top of me and he got up and ran around the corner. Whilst I was on the ground I was able to see the Army men in front of me and I saw and heard them shooting. I attempted to get up but I slipped and cut my head and nose. I then saw a soldier in front of me and he appeared to be taking aim at me and I then felt a blow to my left thigh. I called to a man to help me which he did and he took me to a house in Chamberlain Street."
7K-11 In this account Mrs Deery says she was shot whilst she was on the floor after having slipped and fallen to the ground and after a man had fallen on top of her.
7K-12 The Sunday Times' Insight Team recorded a very different account. Mrs Deery told them how she was:6
... just standing out on the waste ground by Eden street, actually it was where Pilot Row used to be and I heard a man nearby shout "the army's coming in. I looked over towards Rossville Street and there were the big pigs coming in and one headed over towards where we were. Then I saw a soldier with the red para hat come up
5 ED 62.2 6 AD 33.1 from the pig that was near us and he took aim I thought at me or the man standing next to me (she doesn't know who he was). I shouted to this chap "for gods sake watch out that ones going to shoot" and as I moved towards the man for protection like, I felt this big thump in my leg, in my thigh really. Its funny, I never heard the bang."
This account is impossible to reconcile with the one taken by the RUC on 29 February 1972. In that statement she describes falling over, a man falling on top of her, her attempting to get up, but of slipping and cutting her head. She then sees a soldier taking aim and then she was shot. In this statement however she describes herself standing on the waste ground, seeing a soldier “in a red para hat” – as opposed to a helmet - taking aim, shouting to a man standing next to her and then moving towards him for protection. In the RUC statement she does not mention the ‘chap’ standing next to her. In addition, Mrs Deery described, “moving towards the man for protection” – and was, therefore, standing, not lying on the ground when shot as described in the RUC statement.
Mrs Deery explained further to the Sunday Times' Insight Team that:
I tried to get up, I didn't realise I was shot then and I staggered forward and fell again and cut my eye open (deep cut over left eye). When I was down the second time I saw a chap suddenly fall and crawl away round the corner into Chamberlain Street. I thought he was shot, but then he came back round and him and Michael Kelly carried me round into Chamberlain Street.
Mrs Deery's undated statement at AD33.5 records:
On January 30 the soldiers were firing CS gas. I ran towards Chamberlain Street. Someone shouted that the soldiers were coming. I looked at the courtyard of Rossville Flats and saw 8 or 9 Saracens coming in. Soldiers jumped out of the Saracens. There was a man standing there. He seemed to be mesmerised, I ran towards this man, I told him that I thought that the soldiers looked as if they were going to shoot. I looked, I saw a soldier take aim and fire. I got up and fell down again. I hadn't realised I had been
7 AD 33.1 8 AD 33.5 hit by a lead bullet. I didn't see anyone else fall down. A man came to help me. The man pulled me round the corner. A young fellow I knew, Michael Kelly, helped the man to carry me into a house.”
7K-16 Clearly Mrs Deery gave different accounts of her shooting on different occasions.
7K-17 In a file note dated 25th January 1983, Mrs Deery is recorded as saying that she will “never forget his face. I can’t forget his face”, that she still remembers eleven years on the soldier who deliberately shot her from a range of less than 10 feet. She is here recorded as saying,
after the initial burst of firing, Peggy and her friends had run in panic through the Rossville Fats car park and into Chamberlain Street. There she had seen a soldier lift his rifle and point it at her. She threw herself against a Mr Leo Deehan shouting “get down, he's trying to kill us”, when she felt a terrific blow on her leg. As she lay on the ground unaware that she had been shot she was trampled on by the fear stricken crowd. She could hear someone yelling “that woman's been shot” and she remembers Michael Kelly and another man crawling towards her and dragging her into a house in Chamberlain Street.
7K-18 In this account Mrs Deery apparently claimed to have been in Chamberlain Street and to have been trampled by the crowd. There is no mention here of a soldier in the “red para-hat” to whom she spoke after her shooting, nor is there any mention of his hair or its colour.
7K-19 In her statement to the Inquiry, Helen Deery provided further details of her mother’s account of her shooting:
My mother talked about Bloody Sunday a lot afterwards. She said she would never forget the face of the soldier. After he had shot her he had cocked his gun and she had said that she was a widow with four wee ones. He had then put his head down and walked away. She said that he had red hair. She said that he had shot her at close range.
9 AD 33.6 10 AD 32.3 paragraph 20 She was also told by her mother that, as she lay on the ground, Michael Kelly approached her and said “Jesus, Peggy, its you”, and then carried her to Chamberlain Street. Helen Deery told the Tribunal that she was sure that it was the Michael Kelly who was shot on Bloody Sunday who assisted her mother; both she and her mother knew Michael Kelly well. Helen Deery was able to identify him in photograph P635, fallen at the rubble barricade.
Mrs Deery’s son, Owen, said his mother pushed a man out of the way at the moment she was shot:
She told me that she had been standing a few yards from a soldier who was pointing his gun at a man standing very close to her. My mother pushed the man out of the way but the soldier still fired a shot which hit her. My mother always said that she would be able to immediately recognise the soldier who fired the shot by his red hair.
Mrs Deery pushing the man out of the way, is in direct contradiction to other accounts which speak of her seeking his protection.
Nell McCafferty wrote a book about Mrs Deery’s life. She recorded an account of Mrs Deery’s shooting. Christopher Clarke QC asked her about it:
I wanted to ask you about one paragraph in your book, which is the paragraph that deals directly with the wounding of Mrs Deery. It begins at the bottom of page 12 and refers to the soldiers running down Rossville Street, Peggy seeing them coming, running through a courtyard of a nearby block of flats, heading for the presumed safety of Chamberlain Street: “A bullet struck her in the back of her left leg. She called out to a fleeing priest. “Father, I think I am shot” and he called out, “Keep on running” and she did, and then she collapsed on the step of a back door of a Chamberlain Street
11 AD 32.3 paragraph 20 12 Day 077/085/07 – 086/12 13 AD 34.2 paragraph 17; Owen Deery has not given oral evidence 14 “Peggy Deery: A Derry Family At War”. Attic Press 1988, Virago Press 1989 15 Day 168/150/11; Nell McCafferty also referred in her book twice to the fact that there were 28 injured casualties: “Upstairs, doctors operated on the twenty-eight wounded” p13; Chronolgy pp 142-143 house. As she lay on the ground a soldier with red hair came alongside. She looked at him and said she was the mother of fourteen children. He ran on. People ran over her as she lay there. She felt their shoes strike and hurt her head. Her wounded leg felt cold. A man pulled her down an alleyway and in the front door of a house in Chamberlain Street.
7K-24 Mr Clarke asked Nell McCafferty where this account had come from:16
Q. Do you know where the fairly specific contents of that paragraph came from; can they have come from her nieces if they were not there when she was shot?
A. No, but it would have come from the story, I presume. It would have come from her family. The story would have been told and retold over the years how Peggy was shot. She would have told them herself and they recited it.
7K-25 The account that Nell McCafferty has recorded combines elements of other accounts together and provides further twists: she is now shot in the back of the leg; she was heading for the shelter of Chamberlain Street; a Priest is now involved; she kept on running instead of collapsing and being trampled by the crowd and the conversation with the red-headed soldier appears again; but there is no suggestion that it was he who shot her or that she saw, or could have seen, the soldier at the time when he shot her.
NEXT TO WHOM WAS MRS DEERY STANDING?
7K-26 The Sunday Times' Insight Team recorded that Mrs Deery told them:17
Bernard Gallagher was standing very close Mrs Derry when she was hit. He places it as just out from the end gable of Chamberlain Street where a group of some 20 people were standing. This was the gable nearest the wasteground and Mrs Deery was standing on his right, nearer the wasteground. Gallagher recalls that she was instantly picked up by several men and whisked into 33 Chamberlain Street.
16 Day 168/151/05-13 17 AD 33.3 They also recorded that a man called Billy Kelly said that he was thumping a soldier who was
in turn duffing the grey haired man up”, when Kelly, if it is he, believes that Mrs Deery - “a little woman” rushed over and pushed him out of the way as a soldier was about to shoot him. Mrs Deery puts it somewhat differently.
In a file note dated 25th January 1983, Mrs Deery is recorded as saying that she “threw herself against a Mr Leo Deehan shouting “get down, he’s trying to kill us”, when she felt a terrific blow on her leg.
Of the three names mentioned variously (Bernard Gallagher, Billy Kelly, Leo Deehan) as being the man either close to Peggy Deery or being the one whom she was trying to protect, there are no statements to the Inquiry to that effect. Leo Deehan did write an account entitled “My Experience on Bloody Sunday” (AD 178), and there are the Sunday Times’ notes referring to Billy Kelly and Bernard Gallagher. (A Bernard Gallagher (AG3) has made a statement but he does not refer to Peggy Deery.) Had Mr Kelly or Mr Gallagher seen a woman shot by a soldier from a range of less than ten feet in cold blood, or at all, it would be expected that they would at least have recorded that in a statement at the time, and it is highly surprising that they did not do so, and have not done so. Similarly, although a number of witnesses refer to seeing an elderly man being struck by a soldier(s) in the Rossville Flats’ car park, none of them refers to a soldier opening fire at a woman “at less than ten yards” as Mrs Deery has claimed.
The fact that Mrs Deery managed to name three different people as being the man next to her when she was shot, is even more strange, as it will be recalled that she told the Sunday Times’ Insight Team that she “doesn’t know who he was”.
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18 AD 33.4 19 AD 33.6 21 AD 33.1 Christopher Clarke QC showed Helen Deery her mother’s various accounts, and asked if the names Bernard Gallagher or Billy Kelly meant anything to her, or whether her mother ever referred to a Billy Kelly. She answered no to both questions.22
WHERE WAS MRS DEERY WHEN SHE WAS SHOT
Mrs Deery’s Accounts
In her first statement made to the RUC dated 27 February 1972 Mrs Deery said:23
The Army then fired coloured dye and I ran like hell towards Rossvilie Street at the back of the high flats. By this time my sister and I had got separated in the crowd. I ran round to the back – I was round the back of these high flats running towards the wee gate at the back of the flats when ever I tripped and fell.
This account has –significantly, given that she was shot in the front of the leg, - Mrs Deery running towards the Car Park of the Rossville Flats, ie south, the ‘back’ being used locally to refer to the courtyard and the ‘front’ to the shops on the Free Derry Corner side of Block 2.
The Sunday Times’ Insight Team however recorded that she was24
... just standing out on the waste ground by Eden street, actually it was where Pilot Row used to be and I heard a man nearby shout “the army’s coming in”.
Mrs Deery cannot, however, have been shot in this location by a soldier who had deployed from the Pigs. Had Mrs Deery been shot along the Chamberlain Street wall in the region of Pilot Row journalists like David Capper, who was standing against the west wall of the Chamberlain Street houses observing the soldiers deploying on the waste ground, or the photographers like Jeffrey Morris and
22 Day 077/096/23 –098/08 23 ED 62.2 24 AD 33.1 Coleman Doyle would have seen it and they did not. They can hardly have failed to have noticed any of the kind of scenes which Mrs Deery herself had variously described. Neither did Knight of Malta Charles McMonagle, who encountered Soldiers S and V making their way south along the wall.
7K-36 Other evidence of Mrs Deery's account puts her in Chamberlain Street when she was shot. A file note dated 25 January 1983 states that:
...after the initial burst of firing, Peggy and her friends had run in panic through the Rossville Flats car park and into Chamberlain Street. There she had seen a soldier lift his rifle and point it at her.
Others' Accounts of where Mrs Deery was Shot
7K-37 Charles McCarron has also stated that Mrs Deery was shot in Chamberlain Street. He said in his NICRA statement:
I was walking home along Chamberlain Street there was a woman in front of me and she fell with a bullet wound in the leg, the shot was far from behind her from William Street. Myself and two other men lifted her into [ ] house in Chamberlain Street.
7K-38 John Tyer saw Mrs Deery being picked up in Chamberlain Street at a point some way from its southern end, which (unless she was put down and picked up again – which no one has suggested) would be inconsistent with her having been shot anywhere other than in Chamberlain Street itself.
When I was near to the south western end of Chamberlain Street facing towards the Rossville Flats car park, I heard shooting for the first time. I cannot remember exactly where I was when I heard the shots but I was definitely passed Harvey Street, probably around the point marked F on the attached map (grid reference N15). I heard a steady crack and an echo. I knew it was shooting as I had heard SLRs firing before in the Bog and the Creggan. The shots were not ahead of me but coming from somewhere behind me.
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25 AD 33.6 26 AM 80.2 27 AT 20.2 paragraph 10 although I could not say where. I could not look back. The crowd was running towards the car park. There was some panic, girls were shouting and squeeling.
As I ran I saw a couple of men lifting a girl off the ground at about the point marked G on the attached map (grid reference M15). I could see that the back of the right leg, just above the knee was hanging off.
Other witnesses say Mrs Deery was shot on the Rossville Street waste ground. Gerry McBride said that he heard someone shout for help and saw a woman lying on the west side of the back of the houses in Chamberlain Street, “about three up from the bottom” (further south therefore than Pilot Row), and that she had a wound in the top of her right thigh. He did not see her being shot. Mr McBride did not hear any shots at that moment. Mr McBride helped carry her to the house in Chamberlain Street.
Peter Gallagher gave a strange and inconsistent account of Peggy Deery being shot. He claims that she was pushed out from the end of the Chamberlain Street gable wall.
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28 another rioter who refers to the army deploying through Barrier 12 before the rioters left Barrier 14 29 AM 46.1 paragraph 4 30 Day 079/076/01-03 31 AM 46.3 paragraph 11; note: this is the wrong leg 32 Day 079/076/10-13 33 AM 46.3 paragraph 11 34 AG 23.3 paragraph 15 I had my back to the Gable end wall [of Chamberlain Street] and was facing the Rossville Flats car park. Immediately to my right hand side there was an attractive dark haired woman who was about 25 years old. There was a lot of pushing and shoving going on. The force of the crowd pushed the women into the open area just beyond the end of the Gable end wall, i.e. to a position at about G on the map (grid reference L15) The girl suddenly fell to the ground and I realised that she had been shot. The shooting continued. Although I could not see any soldiers I assumed that they were shooting from the waste ground at Eden Place and Pilot Row. This is because I had seen the Saracens in that area earlier.
I bent down on the ground and stretched out an arm to drag the girl back towards me, to the cover of the Gable end wall. She was not carrying a weapon of any description.
7K-41 Mr Gallagher confirmed in oral evidence that this was his recollection, and that it was he who pushed her out. He went on to say that the woman was shot in the back of her thigh and was taken into a house in Chamberlain Street.
WHO SHOT MRS DEERY?
7K-42 It is impossible from the descriptions of the soldier who was allegedly seen to shoot Mrs Deery to identify an individual who was in fact responsible.
7K-43 In her RUC Statement dated 19th February 1972 Mrs Deery does not describe the soldier that shot her at all. She simply states:
I then saw a soldier in front of me and he appeared to be taking aim at me and then I felt a blow to my left thigh...
7K-44 If Mrs Deery had been able, a relatively short time before making her Police Statement, reliably to give anything like that kind of detailed description which was so clear and firm that she was able to tell her family that she will “never forget his face”, it is very difficult to understand why she did not even attempt to
34 Dav 083/41/05-: 043/015-:070/14- 35 AG 23.3 paragraph 16 36 ED 62.2 give any description at all to the RUC of the soldier whom she was alleging had taken aim at her.
7K-45 The very graphic description given to the Sunday Times Insight Team was that:37
...the soldier was not more than 25 yards, I could recognise him clearly if I saw him again. He was about your height (5'10''), fatter than you with a round fat face and a little dark of complexion, although he also had that black stuff streaked over his face.
7K-46 Mrs Deery's son, Owen, also reported his mother saying that the man who shot her had red hair:38
My mother always said that she would be able to immediately recognise the soldier who fired the shot by his red hair.
7K-IV WAS MRS DEERY SHOT BEFORE THE SOLDIERS FIRED?
7K-47 A number of witnesses' evidence to the Tribunal suggests that Mrs Deery was injured as or before the soldiers deployed down Rossville Street and before any of them fired.
7K-48 Mr Nellis was a photographer who left the march at Barrier 14 and went to his mother's house at 33 Chamberlain Street.39 All was quiet until he heard the sound of a crowd running down Chamberlain Street. He stepped out of the house and saw a "panic situation".40 He heard the sound of bullets striking, "hitting the house somewhere high up, perhaps at the eaves ... in a short burst, as if there had been regular bursts of fire from an automatic weapon".41 He described the bursts in oral
37 AD 33.1 38 AD 34.2 paragraph 17; Owen Deery has not given oral evidence 39 AN 9.2 paragraph 8 40 AN 9.2 paragraph 12 41 AN 9.2 paragraph 13 evidence to the Tribunal as “maybe three or four, may be two bursts”, striking the eaves of three houses in a line.42
7K-49 It would not be possible for a soldier firing from either the waste ground or from the Rossville Flats’s Car Park to have struck the eaves of the houses on the east side of Chamberlain Street.
7K-50 Mr Nellis began to run towards the Rossville Flats with the crowd. He saw, after a short way, a body lying on the ground. He noticed a crowd “trying to avoid something on the ground, either by jumping over it or moving to the left or right of it.”44 It was the body of a young boy approximately 14 to 15 years old at GR M16 marked with the letter A on his BSI Statement map.45 A man said he was dead.46
7K-51 The body was on its back, the head pointing south. He had dark hair and was wearing a light shirt. Mr Nellis could not remember any blood on him.47 He told the Tribunal that he “still has no idea who he was”.48
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42 Day 103/146/10-16 43 Day 103/149/23 –150/3 44 AN9.2 paragraph 14 45 AN 9.2 paragraph 14 46 AN9.2 paragraph 15 47 AN 9.2 - 9.3 paragraph 15 48 Day 103/087/16-088/2 Mr Nellis continued to move towards the Rossville Flats. Then, after moving only 15 to 20 feet he vividly recalls coming across Mrs Deery. She had blood pumping from a thigh wound. Mr Nellis saw that two men had already got to her and begun to lift her.
Mr Nellis did not hear any gunfire or see any soldiers or army vehicles (although was not looking consciously or over to Rossville Street). He told the Tribunal that he was in the Rossville Flats' courtyard for three minutes. He returned to his mother's house where, shortly afterwards, Peggy Deery was carried in. Then, he recalled, some other men carried in another man shot in the leg.
The only explanation for George Nellis's hearing rounds hitting the east side of the Chamberlain Street eaves, and for his hearing them so early on, is that there was someone in or close to the Rossville Flats firing out northwards, in the direction of Chamberlain Street and the waste ground. This accords with the evidence of some of the soldiers and the non-military witnesses about hearing non-military fire on the waste ground before any soldiers fired.
Martin McGuiness also saw Peggy Deery being carried away, injured, before he heard any shooting. In his draft statement Mr McGuiness explained that he was walking south down Chamberlain Street when people started running behind him. He assumed that an Army snatch squad has been sent in. He looked back up Chamberlain Street but did not see any soldiers, so he continued walking. Before he reached the opening between the Blocks of Flats he saw, some distance away, a group of men carrying a woman who he later assumed was Peggy Deery.
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49 AN 9.3 paragraph 16-17 50 AN 9.3 paragraph 18 51 AN 9.3 paragraph 19 52 Day 103/089/08-18 53 AN 9.3 paragraph 20 54 AN 9.3 paragraph 20; presumably Michael Bridge. 55 KM 3.4 Mr McGuiness did not know, on this account, what had happened to the woman. He had not heard any shots at this stage. Shortly after passing through the opening to the flats he then heard rifle fire. This sequence was confirmed in his BSI statement. Mr McGuiness recollected seeing a woman being carried to his left before he walked through alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2. He has a recollection of “having some visual sense of blood coming out of her leg” but is uncertain as to the reliability of that. He reiterated the important point that, “At the time I saw this woman being carried I had heard no shots being fired.”
Mr McGuiness was asked about seeing Mrs Deery in his Praxis interview:
Q: Did you see Dearie shot? A: I didn’t see her being shot but I seen her shortly after she was shot. As she was being carried into the house. She was bleeding profusely from a thigh wound.
Q. And there were some people carrying her. A. She was carried, there were all sorts of people around her.
He was questioned by Christopher Clarke QC about the injured woman that he saw:
Q. Could we have on the screen, please, KM3.9. Can we have a look at paragraph 7, this comes from your Eversheds statement. You say that you have a recollection of seeing a woman being carried and you say your best recollection is that it was before you reached the alleyway between blocks 1 and 2 and to the left of you as you made your way. You record that at this time you had not heard any shots and you did not see her get shot and your impression is that she was being carried towards Chamberlain Street, though you accept that wherever she was, she may just have fallen off a wall and injured herself. Am I right in thinking, is this a fair way of summarising it, that you are not at all certain that the person whom you describe was in fact Peggy Deery, who we know was shot in the leg on the day?
A. Well, at the time I did not know whoever she was, but since that I have learned that it was Peggy Deery.
Q. I wonder. You recollect a woman being carried and you say that you have some visual sense of blood coming out of her leg, but it is right, is it not, that at this stage you had heard no shot fired; is that right?
A. That has always mystified me, yes.
Q. And you had not seen either a soldier or an Army vehicle in the Bogside?
A. No, not at that stage.
Q. You were not in a position to recognise Peggy Deery?
A. No.
Q. Did you recognise who was carrying her?
A. No.
Q. In those circumstances, when you had not seen a soldier or a vehicle and had not heard a shot, would you accept that it may not in fact have been Peggy Deery that you saw being carried?
A. Well, I suppose that is a possibility. This is an area where I am not speaking with 100 per cent certainty.
Q. You may be right but it is difficult on the timing to fit in what you describe in circumstances where you had not heard a shot and had not seen any soldiers. Can you help me on this, can we have on the screen P205. This is an aerial photograph of the Bogside -- of the carpark of the Rossville Flats. You came out of Chamberlain Street here. You made your way over to the gap between what we call Blocks 1 and 2. Are you able to, by reference to this photograph, if we give you control of the screen, to recall where it was you saw the person in question being carried?
A. Well, as I say, I am not certain about this at all, but my recollection is that she had come from this general area. (Marked with yellow arrows - KM3.124)
Q. Right?
A. Maybe even further back. I mean, I am not sure. Q. Further towards the southeast, the top left-hand corner of the photograph?
A. Towards this direction.
Q. Towards that direction?
A. But, I mean, I could be wrong.
Q. I wonder if we could preserve that image as KM3.124.
While the object of this line of questioning on behalf of the Tribunal is wholly understandable, it is based on the assumption that, notwithstanding the evidence (both civilian and military) of firing before and while the soldiers were moving in, Mrs Deery must have been shot by a soldier. The questioning may also, with respect, overlook not only the fact that Mr McGuiness had said that he had learned that the woman he saw being carried was Mrs Deery but, in his interview with Praxis recorded at KM3.68 he had (admittedly with some exaggeration) said that “Peggy Deery was shot beside me” and later in the same interview, where he was being invited to say precisely what he had seen, he said he did not see her being shot but saw people carrying her. That account, if truthful, of a woman “bleeding profusely from a thigh wound” can only have referred to Mrs Deery.
Billy Gillespie’s evidence also suggests that Mrs Deery was shot very early on, and not by military fire. He was running down Chamberlain Street, away from the soldiers deploying through Barrier 14, when he came across Peggy Deery injured in Chamberlain Street. He helped lift her into a house in Chamberlain Street. Mr Gillespie only heard rubber bullets being fired as he ran down Chamberlain Street. Once again he had not heard any military firing either on the wasteground or down Chamberlain Street before seeing Mrs Deery.
Patrick Moore gave evidence that he saw what must have been Mrs Deery being carried in Chamberlain Street before the Army vehicles arrived in the Rossville
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62 KM 3.75 63 Day 084/147/04 –148/09 Flats' Car Park and before the soldiers appeared there on foot. Mr Moore was at the corner of Chamberlain Street and Harvey Street heading north when he saw soldiers (in all likelihood Lieutenant N and his two men) in a consolidating position at the Eden Place / Chamberlain Street junction roaring like some sort of battle cry.65
He then ran south down Chamberlain Street and slowed at the car park entrance where he saw an “elderly looking woman being carried towards me hastily by two people” with a third assisting. She had a badly wounded leg – “which had a large wound to it. Her thigh had been ripped open and I remember being able to see her thigh bone”.66 He also recalled:67
In the same split second I thought I saw somebody else being carried north from the car park (passing behind me) and up Chamberlain Street. I am not sure as I could only have seen it out of the corner of my eye.”
This may well have been the further casualty seen by Mr Nellis.
Mr Moore then started going south with his brothers across the car park to the middle of the car park at GR M17 when “all of a sudden” he saw two or three Pigs arrive in the car park and the soldiers taking up firing positions.68
When Lord Saville sought to clarify the time sequence Mr Moore repeated that his recollection was “probably clear”, but accepted, effectively, that if he was wrong, he was wrong. Notwithstanding that reasonable and courteous concession it would seem that Mr Moore retained the recollection which he had explained and that on
64 Day 084/146/13-15 65 AM 417.3 paragraph 17. This, of course, is consistent with Soldier N’s evidence that he shouted at the advancing crowd before he fired his warning shots. 66 AM 417.4 paragraph 20 67 AM 417.4 paragraph 21 68 AM 417.4 paragraph 22 any view of his evidence, he believed that he had seen Mrs Deery before he heard any shooting.69
LORD SAVILLE: Mr Moore, in paragraph 20 of your statement you give your recollection of seeing this lady with her wounded thigh and then in paragraph 22 you say you started proceeding south across the car park when the Saracens arrived. How sure are you of that time sequence; are you sure you saw the wounded lady before those Saracens arrived, or is your recollection not clear in which order those events took place?
A. It is probably clear, your Lordship, but I would not be quite sure if it was correct. I felt I saw the lady first and then I approached the opening to try and get away, that is when I seen the Saracen. The timeframe of that was very quick, very sudden, so really I would stand corrected if it is not the exact sequence, you know.
Patrick McDaid also gave evidence suggestive of Mrs Deery having been shot before the soldiers arrived in the Car Park. He ran down Chamberlain Street with the crowd that was running from Barrier 14.70 As he reached the end of Chamberlain Street he came across a group of men who were lifting a badly injured woman. He helped them carry the injured woman to a house in Chamberlain Street. He did not know then, but was told later, that this was Peggy Deery. Mr McDaid first saw Mrs Deery being carried by a group at point E on his BSI map below:71
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69 Day 098/037/02-17 70 Day 092/105/23 – 106/04 71 AM 172.26 He confirmed in oral evidence that he saw Mrs Deery early on – before he had heard any shooting. Mr McDaid agreed that he would have run the distance down Chamberlain Street, having already made his way a little down Chamberlain Street heading for Free Derry Corner, in a very short time. To Edmund Lawson QC he said that he had not heard any shooting in the short time that had elapsed between starting to run and his seeing Mrs Deery:
Q. I want your help about this, because at the beginning of the next paragraph, I am interested maybe in timing, again to remind you, by the time you had run that very short distance down Chamberlain Street, it appears Mrs Deery – you now know her name, although you did not at the time -- Mrs Deery had already been shot?
A. Yes.
Q. That is right, is it?
A. It is, yes.
Q. You did not hear any shooting at that stage?
A. No.
Q. And you were not aware of any shooting at you or near to you when you were running down Chamberlain Street; that is right, is it?
A. It is, yes.
Q. By the time, a very short time had elapsed, then, before you emerged from the end of Chamberlain Street, Mrs Deery had been shot and was already being carried round into the bottom house at Chamberlain Street?
A. She was, yes.
Q. Did you have any idea, did you hear anything at the time as to how or where she had been shot?
No.
Q. Nothing at all about it?
72 Day 092/123/06 – 124/14 Mr McDaid then stood at point F on his BSI map and saw a person run from the western gable wall of Chamberlain Street towards the Gap between Blocks 1 and 2, and be shot, falling at point G on the BSI map. Mr McDaid was told later that this was Jack Duddy. He saw a group around the body, and someone waving a handkerchief, although he did not discern that one of those was a Priest.
If the person Mr McDaid saw shot was Jack Duddy, then it follows that Mrs Deery was shot very early on, and before Jack Duddy fell.
There is therefore a persuasive body of evidence that Mrs Deery was shot as or before the soldiers deployed down Rossville Street and across the waste ground.
It goes without saying that the shot which injured Mrs Deery so grievously must have come from somewhere; but if it had been fired by a soldier who had entered the area in one of the Pigs, (which seems rather to have been taken for granted) it is very odd that such a number of witnesses did not hear or see that or have that impression.
A particularly curious feature of the shooting of Mrs Deery is the fact that there are no witnesses to the actual moment that she was shot. If Mrs Deery had been shot by a soldier from ten feet, in full view of the running crowd, the rioters and bystanders in the Car park, and the observers in the Rossville Flats, then there would have been witnesses in 1972 and before the present Inquiry who would have given evidence of it. Yet there are none. The witnesses that do exist all describe seeing Mrs Deery after she was shot.
7K-68
7K-69
7K-70
7K-71
THE ABSENCE OF WITNESSES
7K-72
73 Day 092/109/7 – 110/7: AM 172.3 paragraph 12 74 Day 092/110/8-11 Furthermore, those variously named men said to have been standing next to Mrs Deery when she was shot have not materialised as witnesses, either by NICRA statement or by BSI Statement. The hearsay accounts of how Mrs Deery described her shooting are variously inconsistent.
A significant number of witnesses saw her injured before they saw soldiers or heard shooting.
In the circumstances it is impossible for the Tribunal to determine who shot Mrs Deery. So poor and contradictory is the evidence that it is not even possible reasonably to conclude that she was shot by a soldier. The only evidence going to support such a conclusion – the reports of Mrs Deery’s own accounts – are so inconsistent and contradictory as to make it unsafe to rely upon them at all. CHAPTER 7L
JACK DUDDY
7L-1 INTRODUCTION
7L-1 It is not, and never has been, alleged that Jack Duddy was doing anything which justified his being shot. It is accepted that he must have been shot by a soldier and submitted that, whoever that soldier was, he did not intend to shoot him.
7L-2 The death of Jack Duddy, understandably, has iconic status in the events of Bloody Sunday. It is said that he was running, in a crowd, across the Rossville Flats' waste ground to the safety of the Flats and was shot dead when there was no justification for any shooting at all. It is submitted that, on any view of the evidence as a whole, the circumstances in which he was shot were far more confusing and confrontational than that.
7L-3 Within 30 minutes of Jack Duddy having been shot, Father Daly gave an interview to the BBC television reporter John Bierman. What Father Daly said in that interview must, understandably, have had a major influence on people's perception of the circumstances in which Jack Duddy died. Father Daly was still on the street where the events had occurred, in a highly charged and emotional atmosphere. His words were broadcast locally, nationally and around the world that night and no doubt repeatedly over the next few days and weeks.
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1 As Barry MacDonald QC, Counsel for the Duddy family, said when questioning Edward Rigney: Day 410/117/03-05 2 John Bierman interviewed Father Daly first, then General Ford. He put the timing of his interview with General Ford as "very roughly half past four. It may have been between half past 4 and twenty to five." M6.19 letter E-G
FS 7.1576
VII 248 John Bierman's interview of Father Daly has been transcribed for the Inquiry:
J.B. "Can you tell me what happened when the Paratroopers came in, Father?"
F.D. "They came in, they just came in firing, the people.... There was no provocation whatsoever.... Er they...."
J.B. "Firing what, rubber bullets?"
F.D. "No, it was lead bullets they fired, they seem to fire in all directions, there were some rubber bullets too, they didn't even seem to fire gas it was just, it was completely outrageous, disgraceful, I don't know its, they call themselves an army, its utterly disgraceful, I think.....
J.B. "Are you quite sure that nothing was fired at them first?"
F.D. "There was nothing fired at them first I am absolutely certain of that, I can speak of this without any difficulty whatsoever because I was there I was just standing there at the flats when the Saracens moved in first of all and there was nothing fired at them whatsoever. There weren't even stones fired people ran in all directions and they opened fire most people had their backs to them when they opened fire at them...."
J.B. "A short while ago we filmed you leading the way with a white, a white handkerchief...........
F.D. "Yes"
J.B. "for a party who were carrying a boy who was dead or dying, now how was he shot?"
F.D. "That little boy was shot when he was running away he, he was just a little bit behind me when he fell I heard the shot, I looked around I saw him die...."
J.B. "You saw him?"
F.D. "Yes, and he was shot....."
J.B. "He was a young man was he?" F.D. "He was a young boy I would say about 15, thereabouts."
J.B. "He didn't have a weapon?"
F.D. "No, he had nothing, he was just, he was just a young boy about 15, he was running, I was running too."
According to the evidence given, and already examined in this chapter of the submissions (but for these purposes ignoring all soldiers' evidence) it is in our submission clear that there had been civilian gunfire before Jack Duddy was shot; that there had been some rioting in the car park, close to where he was shot; and that missiles had been thrown at soldiers. Taking even that evidence as a whole, it seems plain that the situation in the car park had been far more confusing and violently confrontational; and far less one sided, than this account would indicate.
Jack Duddy is likely, in our submission, to have been shot whilst he was within or close to the crowd that was rioting in the car park of the Rossville Flats. The evidence given (and challenged) which would appear to indicate that Jack Duddy had earlier been part of the crowd that had rioted at Barrier 14 is relevant only because it tends to support the evidence that he was also within or close to the crowd that continued, or renewed, that attack on the soldiers once in the Rossville Flats' car park. That account of what happened was given by Neil McLaughlin to the Sunday Times:
Two men were at either side of her [Mrs Deery]. Neither knows the other; both confirmed her story. One of them, a young boxer called Neil McLaughlin, even provides a plausible cause for the Para firing. McLaughlin and several friends, among them Jack Duddy, had surged up Chamberlain Street and rounding the gable into the car park, gave tongue when they saw the Pig drawn up. They surged towards it on their way, most if not all of them, to the back of the car park.
4 AM 347.5 Mr McLaughlin confirmed in his BSI Statement that he had been throwing stones at Barrier 14, and, that once he fled Barrier 14 and reached the car park he, and about twenty others, attacked the Pig with missiles in their hands:
Together with about twenty other people (who were not known to me at the time), I ran at the Pigs throwing stones at them. I am pretty sure that I hit one of them.
It is therefore probable that Jack Duddy was accidentally hit at a time when he was among or close to a hostile crowd that was throwing objects at the soldiers, and when a soldier aimed at another person.
There is a large body of evidence which places Jack Duddy’s body between two of the sets of car parking grids marked on the car park. He was therefore shot close to or at a point between those grids. It is not possible to determine precisely where he was when he was shot: some witnesses have given evidence of his body rolling on the ground after it was hit, or of the body being dragged a little way south. Nonetheless, the approximately location in which he fell is clear.
The westerly grid consisted of one row of spaces running approximately north-north-east, its south west corner starting on a point from an imaginary line extended out from the north west gable of Block 2. The second grid is a double set of car parking spaces that were contained within the parameters of the western gable wall of the end of Chamberlain Street.
The photographs of Father Daly attending to Jack Duddy demonstrate that he was lying more to the west within the space between the grids. P627 shows his body,
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5 AM 347.1-2 paragraph 7-8 6 AM347.2 paragraph 12; confirmed as Pig in the singular: Day 091/053/03-13 7 Day 091/054/21-24 8 See Virtual Reality and the photographs utilised in Hotspot 71
FS 7. 1579
VII 251 whilst still lying between the two sets of grids, appreciably over to the northwest (or left hand if facing north) grid.
7L-12 Jack Duddy's body was also to the south of the car park. Closer detail can be seen in photograph EP26.13:
7L-13 Consequently, Jack Duddy is likely to have been shot around the position marked on the aerial photograph EP21.5 below: Leaving aside Peggy Deery and the peculiar circumstances of her shooting, it is likely that Jack Duddy was the first of the known casualties to have been shot by the soldiers in the car park. He was shot before Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley, both of whom have explained that they were shot as they reacted to the sight of Jack Duddy lying on the ground and both Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley were shot before Patrick McDaid was injured, according to the time sequence from Giles Peres who photographed the injured Patrick McDaid after Father Daly had left the car park with Jack Duddy.
**FORENSIC EVIDENCE**
The bullet that struck Jack Duddy entered his body on the outer side of the right shoulder. Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan reported to the Inquiry that they had concluded that Jack Duddy was
[ \\text{struck by a single bullet in the right shoulder which entered the back of the right side of the chest, damaged the right lung, spine, major blood vessels and the left lung and then through the left upper chest.} ]
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9 See Chapter 7K - Peggy Deery 10 M65.1.1 paragraph 6 – M65.1.2 11 E 2.31 paragraph 7.5.1 12 E 2.32 paragraph 7.5.3 Assuming the Normal Anatomical Position the initial track clearly passed from right to left and there is probably a slight angle backwards. After deflected by the scapula the track passed forwards into the chest where it was again deflected this time by the spine. The greatest care must be exercised in interpreting the track angles in this injury since the mobility of the shoulder may allow for many different positions of the chest and body with the arm in the same position.
The other injuries are minor and due to blunt trauma. The injuries to the face and knee are consistent with a collapse, the injuries to the hand may have been caused in the same way but other forms of minor blunt trauma cannot be excluded.
7L-16 Photograph P2.36 shows the entrance wound:
![P 2.36 entrance wound]
7L-17 Dr Shepherd's Report identifies on a drawing the site of the entrance wound:
![Dr Shepherd's Report]
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13 P 2.36 14 E 2.74 As Jack Duddy was shot in the outer side of his right shoulder, all that can be concluded is that he would have had to be presenting, at the moment of impact, the right side of his body towards the individual who shot him. As he was running diagonally across the car park from Chamberlain Street towards the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Flats, it is unlikely, but not impossible, that he was shot by a soldier to the east of the car park: his torso would have had to have been turned almost 180° around whilst running, which seems improbable.
Given the mobility of the shoulder, it is impossible to draw any further conclusions from the forensic evidence as to the direction in which Jack Duddy was facing, or the location from which he was shot.
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHO SHOT JACK DUDDY
No soldier describes firing at a target that matches the description or location of Jack Duddy.
The civilian evidence as to where the soldier who shot Duddy was located is very confusing. Witnesses have described variously the location of the soldier who fired, with varying degrees of certainty, assumption and qualification. The firer and his location have variously been put as: a soldier from or by Pig 2; a soldier at the gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats; a soldier at the gable end or west wall of Chamberlain Street; and a soldier by a Pig in Rossville Street.
Given this confusing evidence, and the evidence as a whole, the Tribunal is not in a position to determine who shot Jack Duddy.
15 Sean Collins AC 74.2 paragraph 11 -13; James Deeney AD 72.2 paragraphs 9-10; Day 075/126/5-15; Day 075/148/14-150/20 16 For example Brian Doherty AD 57.4 paragraphs 23-26; Isobel Duffy AD 158.2 paragraph 12-15 17 For example Christopher McKnight AM 312.3-4 paragraphs 12-13 (no oral evidence); Elisabeth Dunleavy AD169.2 paragraphs 8-9 18 James McKinney AM 303.4 paragraph 22; Day 81/112/24 –113/12 CHAPTER 7M
MICHAEL BRIDGE
7M-I INTRODUCTION
7M-1 It is not, and was not, alleged that Michael Bridge was doing anything that, if correctly understood by the soldiers, justified his being shot. He was not shot because he was a rioter.
7M-2 In view of the confusion and contradictions in his own, and in the witnesses, evidence, as to what Mr Bridge was doing at the time when he was shot, and as to what was then happening in his immediate vicinity, the Tribunal cannot be satisfied either as to what was happening or as to how it might, or did, appear to the soldiers who faced it.
7M-3 There is, in any event, such conflicting evidence as to the circumstances in which Mr Bridge was shot, and as to where he was shot from, that the Tribunal should not, in our submission, make a finding as to who shot him.
7M-II MICHAEL BRIDGE'S ACTIONS ON BLOODY SUNDAY
7M-4 The Tribunal has evidence that Mr Bridge was a man with a criminal record for violence; that he had been rioting at barrier 14; and that he advanced towards soldiers shortly before he was shot and injured in a menacing way. None of that evidence is relied on as justifying the fact that he was shot. It is, however, relevant to the issue as to the scene that would have confronted the soldier who shot him and as to the honest and reasonable perception of that soldier as to the threat which he faced, either from Mr Bridge, if he was that soldier's target, or from a person close to him, if he was not.
7M-5 The question of which soldier may have shot Mr Bridge has already been addressed in this chapter and is considered further below. It is referred to again only because it is also important here also to acknowledge the fact that the soldier who shot him may well, in all the circumstances, not have intended to and not have realised that he had done so.
7M-6 At the time of Bloody Sunday Michael Bridge was 25 years old. He had a criminal record including disorderly behaviour and unlawful wounding (a stabbing) for which he had been sentenced to three years imprisonment in 1965. Perhaps remarkably, he was a steward on the March. In due course, he, with other stewards, lined up at Barrier 14 and attempted to encourage the marchers to move to Free Derry Corner. However, this did not last very long and soon Mr Bridge was, as he himself admitted, involved in stone throwing at Barrier 14. Photograph P708 captured him at the Barrier.
7M-7 Subsequently, he was overcome by the effects of the gas and went back up William Street into an alleyway and was sick somewhere in the area of Eden Place. He claims he was also hit in the foot by a rubber bullet. There were then
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1 Day 093/059/16 – 060/3 2 Day 093/030/14 – 031/15 3 AB 84.3 paragraph 16 4 AB 84.4 paragraph 19 shouts from the crowd that the Saracens were moving in and so he ran down Chamberlain Street.(^5)
7M-8 He ran into Eden Place and saw Pig 1 and a number of soldiers.(^6) He alleges that the soldiers debussed from Pig 1 and fired their rifles immediately.(^7) There is overwhelming evidence that this is untrue.
7M-9 Having heard Lieutenant N fire his warning shots, Mr Bridge went back into Chamberlain Street and heard a young man shouting something like ‘a boy has been shot up there’ (meaning somewhere in the area of the Rossville Flats’ car park). Mr Bridge came out from the bottom of Chamberlain St into the car park and saw Jack Duddy’s body. He went straight up to him(^8). There were two or three people crouched over Jack Duddy at the time, one of them was a priest and the other was a first aid man.
7M-10 Michael Bridge then turned and, on his own evidence, walked towards the soldiers in the car park entrance, where Pig 2 had arrived and the soldiers had debussed. He was shot in the upper left thigh by a soldier in one of five positions – either the northern corner of Block 1 of the flats; to the east of Pig 2; near to or west of the same Pig; at the back of the Chamberlain Street houses; or from the direction of the waste ground.
7M-11 Mr Bridge was carried to 33 Chamberlain Street and into the back garden.(^9)
7M-12 Michael Bridge had previously admitted that he had something in his hand that he intended to throw at the soldiers. He has, however, denied that in his evidence to the Tribunal. Those witnesses, whose evidence is considered below, who claimed
(^5) AB 84.4 paragraph 21 (^6) AB 84.4 paragraph 22 (^7) AB 84.4 paragraph 22; Day 093/075/6 – 079/9 (^8) There are differing accounts from the witnesses regarding the direction from which Michael Bridge approached the body. Some say that he came from the gable end of Chamberlain Street; others say that he came from in front of Block 3 or from behind the low wall in front of Block 2. (^9) AB 84.6 paragraph 46 to have seen Mr Bridge with anything in his hands were, very properly, challenged on his behalf by his Counsel.
7M-13 It is not alleged that he had anything more than a stone or piece of brick and this evidence is also relevant only to the issue of what soldiers might reasonably have thought he was doing, and to the fact that he has given inconsistent accounts of what he claims to have done.
7M-14 What appear to be notes of an interview with Michael Bridge by the Sunday Times' team records that 'he did chuck half a brick just before getting shot'. Michael Bridge claimed to have no memory of making this statement or speaking to journalists and has suggested that somebody else wrote the note.
7M-15 Paul Mahon's material contains a recording of Michael Bridge admitting that he had picked up some stones when he was shot:
I turned away, and I gathered up some stones and the soldiers at this time were... the Saracens, were [just at the high flats on the waste ground]. There was one soldier in particular. He was [along a well]. I started throwing stones at him.
[Indecipherable references to hands in the air and verbal abuse] "You can shoot anybody, so shoot me?" It sounds stupid, but you'd never believe that they would do it, you know. But he shot. He shot five or six shots [at me into the leg] [but I didn't feel it]. I thought I was hit by a rubber bullet.\] I could sense the bullets flying around me. [A boy run out from Chamberlain Street. He grabbed me.] \[I was spinning, he grabbed me. He pulled me down to the first wee house in Chamberlain Street.
7M-16 In addition, a number of witnesses have given evidence that Michael Bridge did have something in his hands. Billy Gillespie said that Michael Bridge had half a red brick and that he threw it at the soldier at the corner of Block 1. He described
10 AB84.24 11 Day 093/052/17-055/18 12 X4.3.5 Michael Bridge as being part of the small body of rioters in the car park throwing stones at the soldiers. He could clearly see the half brick:
Q. You describe how when you got to the car park you picked up some stones ready to throw; were there other people throwing stones at that stage?
A. Yes, there were a few and as I say Mickey Bridge was there and -- Mickey, I will never forget, had half a red brick and there was a soldier had came to the corner of the first flats and Mickey lifted the brick and I threw me stones, Mickey threw his and Mickey was shouting something, then he shouted, "shoot me, you bastards, something like that, you know, and the next thing the soldier just standing there and he just shot like that there. (Indicating). He was standing up at the time when he fired the gun and it was just like a fountain of blood out of Mickey's leg. I could not tell you now which leg it was, it was like a fountain of blood just out of his leg, just spurted out. (Indicating).
....
Q. You have described yourself as throwing stones and Mickey as throwing a brick?
A. Yes.
7M-17 Mr Gillespie was firm, under questioning from Mr Bridge's counsel, Mr Kennedy, that Michael Bridge threw a brick; he was not, he said, mistaken.
7M-18 Bernard Doherty gave evidence that a man who had been a steward in William Street, no longer wearing his armband, ran at the soldiers in the crowd in the Rossville Flats' car park shouting "Come on, lets get the bastards!" He was carrying a piece of brick in his hand. Mr Doherty heard a shot ring out, and then
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13 Day 084/149/1-17; Day 084/ -- Day 084/150/1-3 14 Day 084/172/16-19 15 AD 54.3 paragraph 13 16 AD 54.3 paragraph 14 17 AD 54.3 paragraph 14 “all hell broke loose”. He did not see what happened to the man but later learned that this was Michael Bridge.
William McClintock, watching from the Rossville Flats recorded in 1972 in his NICRA Statement how people threw milk bottles from the Flats, and that the soldiers were “lined along the wall opposite the back of the flats”. He saw a man stepped forward with half a brick and throw it. A soldier opened fire and hit him in the leg.
Hugh Barbour stated in his BSI statement, and also remained resolute in oral evidence, that Michael Bridge had a piece of wood in his hand when he was shot. In oral evidence he described it as being 10 inches long. Mr Barbour said that Mr Bridge had a reputation as a hard man. (This echoes Neil McLaughlin’s view, noted by the Sunday Times’ Insight Team, that apart from “Bridges” and two others, the casualties that day were “harmless”). Michael Bridge was “extremely angry” at the shooting of Michael Bradley. Full of adrenalin, he “made a go” for the soldier on the opposite side of the Pig to the soldier who had shot Michael Bradley on the east side of the Pig shouting “Fucking bastards”. He was shot by the soldier he was aiming for.
Mr Barbour confirmed that he knew Mr Bridge at the time as one of his oldest peers in the area in which he lived. He explained that he had not mentioned Mr
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18 AD 54.3 paragraph 13 19 AD 54.3 paragraph 14 20 AM 113.1 - NICRA only; no oral evidence. 21 He also stated that eight shots were fired from an M5 carbine at the Saracen in Glenfada Park. 22 AB 10.3 paragraph 18 23 AB 10.3 paragraph 18 24 AB 10.3 paragraph 18; 25 AM 347.15 26 AB 10.3 paragraph 17 27 AB 10.3 paragraphs 17-18 28 AB 10.3 paragraph 19 Bridge in his NICRA statement because of the shock of the time, but he did witness Michael Bridge being shot.29
7M-22 Whichever soldier shot Michael Bridge, if he was that soldier’s intended target (and there were others around him, in addition to OIRA 8, whom we consider below)30 may well have honestly and reasonably believed him to be a potentially lethal threat at that precise time.
7M-23 The fact that, notwithstanding the evidence summarised above, Mr Bridge persisted, in his evidence to the Tribunal, in his denials that he had anything in his hand as he advanced on the soldiers, should cause the Tribunal to consider why he should maintain that deception unless it is that he is aware of the fact that he, and those around him, were presenting a very much more lethal threat to the soldiers than has been admitted.
7M-24 OIRA 8 claims to have witnessed the moment when Mr Bridge was shot. He has told the Tribunal that he was standing “close to” Michael Bridge when he was shot. He has told the Tribunal that he was standing “close to”31 Michael Bridge, “possibly slightly behind him”32 in the Rossville Flats car park when suddenly a shot rang out. OIRA 8 felt that the shot was aimed “at both of us”; he thought it was fired by a soldier at the north end of Block 1.33 OIRA 8 knew OIRA 4, but did not manage, somehow, to see him firing his pistol at the soldiers (as OIRA 4 has claimed he did).34
7M-25 It is submitted that the Tribunal can and should attach no weight to what OIRA 8 claims or admits to having been doing, or not doing, at any time on Bloody Sunday. It may, however, be very significant that OIRA 8, who of course knew
29 Day 088/089/5-089/23 30 The evidence of Billy Gillespie is that there was a crowd throwing stones at the same time or thereabouts, and that certainly Mr Gillespie was: see Day 089/149/1-12; Day 089/150/16-21 31 Day 410/067/18-25 32 AW14.2 paragraph 10 33 AW14.2 paragraph 11; Day 410/049/24-050/14 OIRA 4, failed to see or hear OIRA 4 fire his shots (if he did) nearby at this time. It may be equally significant that neither OIRA 4, nor Mr Bridge, nor any other civilian witness, admits to having seen OIRA 8, or any IRA volunteer “close to” and “possibly behind” Mr Bridge at the time when he was shot.
7M-III WHERE WAS MR BRIDGE SHOT FROM?
MICHAEL BRIDGE’S OWN ACCOUNT
7M-26 Mr Bridge’s own evidence was that he did not see where the soldier who shot him was located. He said:35
I do not believe anybody, witness or people was hit at the time, they can give an impression. The circumstances that happened -- the circumstances that the people were in, and I have heard people relating about who shot who and give the impression about who done it. I do not believe you can do that given the circumstances at the time. I believe you can see a person shooting a gun, but I do not believe that you can identify where that man is aiming at. I think the only person who can do that is the man who puts you in his sights, lines up the weapon and shoots you because that is a very deliberate act and the soldiers describe it very well and they describe their actions very well. I truly believe in the circumstances at the time, the only precise people that knew was the soldiers that pulled the trigger.
Q. You did not actually see, or you have no recollection of seeing the soldier who shot you?
A. No.
Q. Is that right?
A. No.
7M-27 He said in his BSI Statement that the soldier that he thought shot him was positioned a couple of feet off the back wall of the last house in Chamberlain
34 Day 410/047/19-048/5: Day 410/065/20/-067/25 35 Day 093/056/24-057/19 He said in oral evidence that he now however thinks it was Lieutenant N. Given that Mr Bridge admits that he did not see the soldier who shot him, it is difficult to see on what basis he arrived at this conclusion. Furthermore, the evidence of others who saw him shot contradicts Mr Bridge’s assumption.
CIVILIAN ACCOUNTS
7M-28 There are a large number of civilian witnesses who give evidence as to where Michael Bridge was when he was shot and what he was doing. However, these witnesses give a number of different accounts of the direction from which the bullet came and hence the location of the soldier who shot Michael Bridge.
7M-29 The soldier who shot Mr Bridge is variously said to have been at the corner of Block 1 of the flats; to the east of or in front of Pig 2; at the western gable end of the back of Chamberlain Street; on the waste ground; or on the driver’s side or close to Pig 2.
A Soldier at the end of Block 1?
7M-30 There are a number of witnesses who state that a soldier at the end of Block 1 of the flats shot Michael Bridge, although not all say specifically that they saw the soldier shoot.
7M-31 Bishop Daly said in his BSI statement that while he was by Jack Duddy’s body, a young man with long fair hair dashed past. Just in front, a little to the right, he began dancing up and down and screaming at the soldiers. He thinks it might have been ‘shoot me, shoot me’, something of that nature. “I then saw a soldier stepping out from the gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, going down on one knee, taking aim at him, firing, and the young man staggered and then he started running crazily around for a few minutes... I knew he had been struck by a shot from that soldier who took deliberate aim. Father Daly also agreed, after questioning by Brian Kennedy QC that it was possible another soldier could have shot Michael Bridge but he stated that it was very unlikely.
Billy Gillespie helped carry Mrs Deery into 33 Chamberlain St. He said that he then ran into the car park and saw Michael Bridge. He could clearly see that he had half a brick in his hand. He explained in oral evidence how Michael Bridge and others were throwing missiles at the soldiers, and how he prepared to do the same:
Q. You describe how when you got to the car park you picked up some stones ready to throw; were there other people throwing stones at that stage?
A. Yes, there were a few and as I say Mickey Michael Bridge was there and -- Mickey, I will never forget, had half a red brick and there was a soldier had came to the corner of the first flats and Mickey lifted the brick and I threw me stones, Mickey threw his and Mickey was shouting something, then he shouted, "shoot me, you bastards, something like that, you know, and the next thing the soldier just standing there and he just shot like that there. (Indicating). He was standing up at the time when he fired the gun and it was just like a fountain of blood out of Mickey's leg. I could not tell you now which leg it was, it was like a fountain of blood just out of his leg, just spurted out. (Indicating).
Q. It was a soldier who was against the wall at the top of block 1?
A. Yes.
Q. You describe him as not being very tall or very big?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you see what colour soldier he was?
A. I think he was white. Q. You have described yourself as throwing stones and Mickey as throwing a brick?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there others around at that time who were doing something similar?
A. Well, there were people sort of running here and then, as I say, there was more shooting, this was actually more shooting, you could hear more shooting and people were running for cover, that is then, as I say, Mickey put his hand on my shoulder. I cannot even mind if Mickey went down on the ground or what, but the next thing there was people coming to Mickey's aid and I moved away, then I moved over along the wall, that would be over at the back block of flats, I think that is block 3.
Q. Before we get to that, when you had been throwing stones and he had been throwing a brick, you were presumably throwing at somebody?
A. Throwing at the soldier at the corner.
Q. At the soldier at the corner?
A. Yes.
Q. Was he the only soldier that you noticed or were there others?
A. The other soldiers then were starting to run up and the Saracens were coming up the waste ground.
Q. Was there any Saracen at this stage at the entrance to the car park?
A. No, there were no -- I have no recollection of a Saracen at that point. As I say they were moving up the Bog then, in the Saracens, towards us, towards the flats.
Q. Could we have on the screen photograph P188? This is a photograph that was taken on the day?
A. Yes.
Q. Can we lighten it up, please. It has been suggested that that shows, on the left-hand side, Mickey Bridge?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recognise that as him?
A. Yes. Q. There is a Saracen in the photograph between block 1 of the flats and the back of the Chamberlain Street houses. Seeing that photograph, do you recollect the presence of that Saracen?
A. No, sir.
Q. You do not?
A. No.
Q. Was the soldier who shot Mickey Michael Bridge in the position approximately as shown, of the soldier in this photograph?
A. That soldier, yes.
Q. And Mickey Michael Bridge, when he threw a brick, where was he?
A. He had actually been facing that soldier there.
Q. Was he in the position that he appears in the photograph, but facing the soldier, or was he in some different position?
A. I think we were more round towards that soldier.
Q. Closer to the soldier?
A. Closer.
7M-33 OIRA 8 described Michael Bridge standing in the car park of the flats facing in the direction of a soldier in camouflage gear who was kneeling at the northern end of Block 1. OIRA 8 went out and stood next to Michael Bridge, possibly slightly behind him. He stated that both Michael Bridge and himself were shouting ‘stop shooting’. Michael Bridge was extremely angry and shouted at the soldier ‘Shoot us you bastards’. At this point, the soldier stopped and aimed his rifle at them. A shot rang out. OIRA 8 was sure that the soldier who shot Michael Bridge was at the gable end of the Rossville Flats: he stated, “I am sure that Mickey was shot in the leg and I am sure that particular soldier shot him”.
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41 Note however that Michael Bridge’s evidence is that he was facing Chamberlain Street.
42 AW14.2 paragraphs 9-11 Gerard Doherty has described Michael Bridge as being approximately 10 feet to his right as he faced southwards. He stated that Michael Bridge was facing northwards and threw his fists up in the air. He could not remember if he had a stone in his hand or not. He said that Michael Bridge was 'just standing there roaring at the Brits and calling them all sorts of bastards'. Then he flinched and kind of hopped back holding his right thigh. He said that the nearest soldier was about 400 yards was leaning against the side of the wall at the northern end of Block 1 of the flats near the door into Block 1. He had his rifle aimed. Mr Doherty thinks that he is the only one who could have shot Michael Bridge.
In his BSI Statement Bernard Gilmore described the soldier that he said shot Michael Bridge in the following way:
...he was skinny with a blackened face. He was scared looking as if he was hyper. His height was about 5'6" and he was young with dark hair, wearing a beret. He was standing at the north east corner of Block 1 of the flats...He shot Michael Bridge from the waist. I saw the recoil of the rifle so I know it was him who fired.
In his 1972 statement however, he said that the soldier was kneeling. This was a mistake, he told the Tribunal.
Patrick Brown described in his BSI statement that he ran over to Jack Duddy and turned him over. At about the same time and slightly behind him to his left was Michael Bridge. He was screaming 'Go home you English bastards'. He noticed that there was a big tall soldier standing at the north eastern corner of Block 1 of
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43 AD 65.4 paragraph 20 44 AD 65.4 paragraph 20 45 AD65.4 paragraph 21 46 AG 38.4 paragraph 22 47 Day 088 049-50 48 Patrick Brown is in photograph EP 25.6 behaving suspiciously, with a look of concern on his face, possibly having picked up an object from the ground that is concealed in his coat. Mr Brown did not give evidence; it is understood that he has died. 49 AB 98.1 Paragraph 10 the flats, who, without moving his upper arm, brought the rifle up with his lower right arm to hip level and shot from the hip, hitting Mr Bridge in the right hip. (Michael Bridge was in fact shot in the left thigh.)
James Deeney described in his BSI Statement how he was at Jack Duddy’s body when Michael Bridge appeared. He stated that Michael Bridge made a run for a soldier at the northern gable end of Block 1 of the flats. He thought that Michael Bridge might have been carrying a broken bottle in his hands; he could not tell, but his hands were certainly forward of his body. Mr Deeney said that Michael Bridge was shouting at the soldier and calling things out. Mr Bridge moved to within 3 yards of the soldier, and Mr Deeney had moved to within 1 yard to the left of Michael Bridge. Mr Bridge was then shot by the soldier at the north gable end, he thought in the leg. Mr Deeney went on to say that the soldier fired a second shot that he thought hit Michael Bridge in the stomach as he remembered seeing blood there. During his oral evidence, Mr Deeney also stated that he remembered at least a dozen people rioting at the edge of the waste ground and that between 15 and 20 soldiers were involved.
Other witnesses that suggest a soldier at the north end of Block 1 include Brian Ward and Joseph Nicholas.
Contrast description with those of Mr Gillespie and Mr Gilmore who both described the soldier as not very big.
In his oral evidence, Mr Deeney was not so clear, stating that he had been pushed in questions from Eversheds and that Michael Bridge may not have been carrying a bottle: Day 086/031/19 – 32/2.
He qualified this in oral evidence, he admitted that this may just be his memory – it could have been an echo or maybe he moved his hand and saw blood and imagined there was another shot fired.
Mr Deeney specifically endorsed Mr Gillespie’s evidence regarding the rioting in the carpark. A Soldier to the East of/In Front of Pig 2?
7M-40 There are a number of witnesses that give evidence to the effect that Michael Bridge was shot by a soldier either to the east of, or in front of, Pig 2.
7M-41 Hugh Barbour, who was a very nervous and distressed witness, described how two or three soldiers got out of the back of the Pig. One moved to the west side and the front, the other two stayed to the rear and the east of the Pig. The younger men in the crowd were throwing stones and bottles at the soldiers. He could see and hear the sound of stones bouncing off the pig. He said that the soldier on the west side of the Pig then started firing into the crowd from the hip and as he fired, Mr Barbour noticed, Michael Bradley stagger and fall backwards towards Block 2. Mr Barbour said that Michael Bridge got angry following Michael Bradley’s shooting. He said that Michael Bridge had a piece of wood in his hands, and that he made a go for the soldier on the opposite side of the Pig (ie the eastern side) from the soldier that had shot Mr Bradley. He was asked about this in oral evidence:
Q. In paragraph 20, you describe how, when he was hit, he was around the area that you have marked C on the photograph and that you knew he was shot because, as he ran forward towards the Pig, he seemed to stagger and fall forward. I quite follow that you saw that happen to him, did you actually see the soldier towards whom he was running do anything?
A. Well, he shot him
Q. Did you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you see the soldier do, in what position was he?
59 AN 17.4 paragraph 15; Day 078/012/3-12. Mr. Nicholas also stated that he practically bumped into a male civilian with a gun who was on his own. He states that the man was holding a small handgun and had his arm by his side. He did not see this man shoot: AN 17.4 paragraph 16
60 AB 10.2 paragraph 9
61 AB10.2 paragraph 12
62 Day 088/062/21 – 063/11 A. Well, a firing position.
Q. Was he standing?
A. Aye, yes, he was standing.
William Harley also said that he saw Michael Bridge shot by a soldier at the eastern side of the Pig: "I saw the soldier fire and I saw the man fall." Martin Tucker attributed the shot to a soldier by the passenger side of the Pig (which he also described as the offside of the vehicle). Hugh McMonagle, Sean O’Neill and Francis Dunne describe, with differing degrees of detail and contradiction - a soldier by a Pig shooting Michael Bridge.
A Soldier at the back of the Chamberlain Street Houses?
There is also, often inconsistent, evidence that Michael Bridge was shot by a soldier standing at the back of the Chamberlain Street houses. In 1972, Michael Bridge himself strongly believed that it was a soldier at the back of Chamberlain Street who shot him. Now, however, he believes, based on N’s statement to the Tribunal he was shot by N from the waste ground. Having not seen the soldier who shot him, and have altered his view to fit Lieutenant N’s evidence after the event, his present opinion is just that, an opinion or submission. It therefore takes the matter no further.
At various stages and to varying degrees Francis Duddy, Charlie Downey, Joseph Moore and Brian Baker each say they saw, or attribute, the
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63 AH 36.3 paragraph 18; Day 077/015/15-23 64 Day 077/015/22-23 65 AT 17: Day 98 66 Day 098/097/05 67 Day 098/098/05 – 099/03 68 AM 369.4 paragraph 20-21; 69 AO 65.5 paragraph 26; no oral evidence 70 AD 173.27 paragraph 18 71 AD 144.4 paragraph 16; Day 089/071/10-073/14 72 AD 133.4 paragraph 23; Day 091/101/1-11 shooting of Michael Bridge to a soldier at the rear of the Chamberlain Street houses.
**A Soldier on the Waste Ground?**
7M-45 Joseph Moore(^7) (in his NICRA statement), Peter Gallagher,(^6) and Brian Baker have each suggested that a soldier in the waste ground shot Michael Bridge.
**A Soldier Near to or on the Driver's Side of Pig 2?**
7M-46 Denis Mullan was, at the time of the march, a trainee solicitor. He now practises in Derry. He stated that he saw two soldiers debuss from the back of Pig 2 and take up firing positions immediately. One was facing south towards Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. In oral evidence he said that the first soldier was to the right of and slightly in front of the open rear doors of the army vehicle, on the side between block 1 and the vehicle.(^7) He then saw a person who he later found out was Michael Bridge. He described him as having mousy, ginger hair, a moustache and a triangular shaped face. He was wearing beige or tan coloured trousers and a jumper with the sleeves hiked up,(^7) and was saying something like 'here I am, shoot me' with his fists clenched and his hands splayed outwards by his sides. One of the soldiers on the driver's side of the Pig shot him.(^7)
**Other Evidence**
7M-47 Further witnesses state that the soldier that shot Michael Bridge was positioned in none of the positions described above or have given evidence that is not entirely clear. Michael Bridge, a cousin of the injured Michael Bridge, is one example. He
(^7) AM 413.4 paragraph 17; Day 089/130/25-132/19 (^6) AB 1.2 paragraph 10; Day 088/108/8-110/5 (^7) AM 41310 (^7) AG 23.3 paragraph 19; (^7) AM 449.3 paragraph 16-18; Day 092/09/08 - 15 (^7) Michael Bridge was wearing grey trousers and a green anorak. stated that Michael Bridge was facing Chamberlain Street with his arms in the air. He described a soldier of average build who was either black or with a blacked out face, standing between Rossville Street and the back of the houses on Chamberlain Street. Michael Bridge’s oral evidence in relation to the shooting was as follows:
Q. "The soldier was holding his rifle at shoulder level"; is that right? A. Yes.
Q. "Pointing it at Michael Bridge." You stopped to watch for a couple of seconds and saw the soldier shoot Michael Bridge, although you cannot recall seeing the flash from the gun or any recoil, but you heard a bang; is that right? A. That is correct.
Q. And you saw Michael Bridge’s posture change immediately. Did you notice what happened to the soldier at that stage? A. I did not, no.
Q. Were you conscious of there being an army vehicle at the approach to the car park, or anywhere else in the car park? A. No, I do not think I was, no.
7M-IV CONCLUSION
Despite his public protestations, it may well be the case that Michael Bridge has sought to conceal evidence rather than establish the truth about what really happened on Bloody Sunday. The contradictions in the evidence about the circumstances in which he was shot deprive the Tribunal from being able to conclude what the true circumstances were, or form where (and therefore by whom) he was shot.
79 AM449.3 paragraph 18; Day 092/09/05-17 80 Day 088/122/5; AB 83.1 paragraph 6 81 Day 88/122/14-123/5 CHAPTER 7N
MICHAEL BRADLEY
7N-1 INTRODUCTION
7N-1 It is not, and was not, alleged that Michael Bradley was doing anything which, if correctly understood by the soldiers, justified his being shot.
7N-2 He was shot in front of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats in the period following Jack Duddy’s shooting and most probably shortly after Mr Bridge had been shot.
7N-3 There is such conflicting evidence about the circumstances in which Mr Bradley was shot that it is simply not possible even to make realistic submissions about them, save that it is submitted that the Tribunal will not be able to determine with confidence what those circumstances were, or from where or by whom he was shot.
7N-4 We examine below the inconsistencies in the accounts which Mr Bradley himself has given about what he was doing immediately before, and at the time when, he was shot but do so only for the purpose of illustrating the extent to which those to have compounded the lack of reliable evidence as to what he was in fact doing and as to the scene which actually confronted the soldiers at the time when he was shot.
7N-5 Based on his own accounts over the years, and despite his assertion to this Inquiry, Mr Bradley was throwing something at the soldiers when he was shot. It is not clear what else was happening in his immediate vicinity.
7N-6 It appears to be likely that Mr Bradley was shot by a soldier by accident: either because whatever Mr Bradley was actually doing when he was shot caused that soldier mistakenly but honestly and reasonably to believe that he was in the course of throwing a lethal weapon or because someone in his immediate vicinity was, or was believed to be, doing so. The Tribunal will recall that there is both civilian and military evidence of the soldiers coming under attack from stones, bottles and acid in the Rossville Flats Car Park. That evidence has been examined in section 7C of this chapter of the submissions. The situation was still threatening and confusing at the time when Mr Bradley was shot and there is very little evidence about what was going on in his immediate vicinity.
**MEDICAL EVIDENCE**
Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan reported on Michael Bradley's injuries:
*Mr Bradley had a through and through wound right forearm, a through and through wound to the left forearm and two apparently minor injuries to the front of the right lower chest. The injuries to the right arm were the most severe of these injuries.*
*In a discharge summary dated 22 March 1972 Mr Fenton suggests that the injuries to Michael Bradley's left arm are less severe because it was struck first and a bullet "went straight through". Further they record that Mr Fenton suggests that the right arm was the most severely injured because the bullet was "probably spinning" when it struck. It is clear that there was damage to both the bones and the nerves of this arm.*
*A report on a x-ray of Bradley's right forearm taken on 30 January 1972 indicates that "Several small metallic foreign bodies are projected in the soft tissues...". The presence of those fragments was confirmed on the X-ray films made available to us.*
*However no foreign bodies were recovered at operation and neither were there any records or reports from DIFS.*
*It is not possible to determine if the injuries to the arms were caused by one or more than one projectile or if they originated from left or right. No comment can be made concerning the nature of the projectile or projectiles.*
*The injuries to the chest are only described as "a superficial wound" in the operation note of 30 January 1972 and as "two small wounds" in the operation note of 11 February 1972. The injuries to the chest may have been caused by fragments of bone, by* fragments of one bullet or of several bullets or by some other object or objects.
7N-9 It is, accordingly, by no means certain that Mr Bradley was shot by a soldier but it is accepted that the evidence taken as a whole makes that more likely. The medical evidence, however, can provide no assistance as to the direction from which the soldier fired.
7N-II THE SHOOTING OF MICHAEL BRADLEY
7N-10 Mr Bradley has, over the years, given many accounts of how he came to be shot on Bloody Sunday. Despite his protestations in his BSI Statement and in his oral evidence, he was probably throwing something and is, in any event, likely to have been close to others who were throwing objects at or towards the soldiers.
7N-11 The various sources of his accounts include: a NICRA statement dated 28.2.1972; a Statement dated 7.2.1972; a note by the Sunday Times’ Insight Team (undated); extracts from Fulvio Grimaldi’s book (undated); an interview by Praxis for “Secret History”; and an interview with Paul Mahon – all of which are referenced and considered below.
7N-12 In his BSI Statement Mr Bradley said that, having left the Rossville Flats’ Car Park (because he saw that soldiers were deploying) he returned to it because he heard that a young boy had been shot.2
7N-13 He ran along the low wall in front of Block 2. He said in his BSI Statement that he saw a sight that he said was “crystal clear”, of a Pig arriving in the Car Park and the soldiers immediately starting to shoot as soon as they de-bussed from the Pig.3 He said that they “burst out of the Pig, landed and then fired”.4 Mr Bradley withdrew this phrase, in oral evidence, with an apology, as having been a
2 AB 66.4 paragraph 12 3 AB 66.4 paragraph 15 4 AB 66.5 paragraph 15 ‘colloquialism’. This account, however described, and however much corroborated by others who sought to give the same impression, cannot be reconciled with the photographs taken by Coleman Doyle, and indeed the considerable body of evidence that the soldiers did not debuss and immediately start firing, but embarked on dispersing the crowd, making arrests and defending themselves from attack.
Mr Bradley was, he said, behind the low wall in front of Block 2 when he realised that the boy who had been shot was Jack Duddy, who was known to him. He did not know that it was Jack Duddy until someone said his name because there was a crowd of about six or seven people around the body, so he could not see who it was.
Mr Bradley lost his temper and jumped over the wall into the car park so that he was out in the open facing the soldiers. He explained that he was full of “venom”, and started to swear and shout at the soldiers. He described how “all the time I was shouting, I was standing about six feet in front of the low wall away from block 2 at almost the point marked ‘F’, at a slight angle moving my hands in a rapid beckoning motion, inviting them to have a go. I was pointing to myself. I did not have my fists clenched. I was turned slightly so my left side was slightly nearer to them.”
He also claimed to have shouted out “Shoot me”.
I stood up straight to take stock and jumped over the low wall I started swearing at the soldiers “You bastards, you fucking pigs, cunts. You killed a young boy; you murdered him. Shoot me, shoot me you fucking bastards.... All the time I was shouting I was standing at the point marked F at a slight angle moving my hands in a rapid beckoning motion, inviting them to have a go. I was
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5 Day 94/38/4-7 6 AB 66.6 paragraph 20 7 AB 66.4 paragraph 14 8 AB 66.5 paragraph 16 9 AB 66.5 paragraph 16 pointing to myself. I did not have my fists clenched. I was turned slightly so my left side was slightly nearer to them. I was so angry I didn’t even see my friend Mickey Bridge coming across the car park. I have no recollection of throwing any stones or bending down to pick up any stones. I just know that I was really angry”.
7N-17 He went on to state that he definitely did not have anything in his hands when he was shot.¹⁰
As I was standing shouting at the soldiers, this was the same noise with the same crack. I did not hear any different sounds. I do not recall any acid bombs. As far as I am aware nothing was coming down from the Rossville flats but I was not looking up. I was just concentrating on Jack Duddy and the soldiers. However if bottles had been thrown I would have heard the sound of smashing glass which I did not. There were no nailbombs thrown - I would not like to have been in that square if a nailbomb had gone off.
The next thing I remember is feeling a heavy thud on my right upper arm ... my first reaction was that I had been hit by a rubber bullet and I remember saying I am hit I am hit. A young man close to me said I was not hit but that I had been shot. I then saw the blood. It was streaming down my arm. I turned and staggered over to the low wall behind me in front of Block 2. I always thought that I dragged or pulled myself over the low wall and along the wall to the gap between blocks 2 and 3 of the flats crouching as I went along. I remember crouching down because I thought if I had been hit once I could be hit again. I have been told since that I was helped along to block 2. I headed back towards the gap between blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville flats.
I definitely did not have anything in my hands when I was shot. The soldiers took me at my word when I shouted at them to shoot me. I was so close to the soldier leaning over the mud-guard of the Pig that he had to see that I was unarmed. I do not know who shot me, I just always remember seeing this particular soldier. I was sideways on to him.
7N-18 In his interview with Fulvio Grimaldi he is recorded as saying:
So, first thing that came to my mind was.... I was just mad with anger. Though I was carrying nothing at the time, I had neither
¹⁰ AB 66.6 paragraphs 20-22 brick, stone, nor nothin' in my hand, I turned round and started using a lot of swear words, bad language, at the soldiers.
Mr Bradley went as far as to say in his BSI Statement that he did not throw any stones at the soldiers on 30 January 1972. This would seem to wrong. The note of his interview on 1 March 1972 with Mr Jacobson and Mr Pringle of the Sunday Times' Insight Team records:
He then heard the crowd shouting that someone was dead and the name of Jackie Duddy (they were neighbours at the Creggan) and he looked across the car park and saw a body lying there with Father Daly and a group of others round it. He ran out into the car park and was shouting abuse at the soldiers. 'There was a dull thud and my whole body shook and I realised I had been hit. There was a lovely clean hole through my left arm, two in my upper abdomen and the muscle of my right forearm was ripped open.'
At the side of the document is the note:
He agrees he was almost certainly stoning them, cannot really recall.
The account given by Michael Bradley to Derek Humphrey of the Sunday Times, together with the accounts of others for an article that was eventually not published, record:
Michael Bradley, 22, house painter. 'I was throwing stones at the soldiers - my blood was up, you know. I had just finished throwing a stone when I saw a soldier aiming at me from about 20 yards away and I was hit in the arm and chest. I just caught a glimpse of him - he was to one side of me and I did not throw the stone at him, at a Saracen.'
An article published in the Irish Times on 30 January at 1985 gives what purports to be Mr Bradley's account:
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11 AB 66.25 12 M71.30 13 L232 I came back into the forecourt of the flats. I saw the body and my nerves got to me. I lifted stones and started throwing. The Army were sitting there. A Saracen was on the forecourt at the Chamberlain Street corner. I saw soldiers shooting. I could see soldiers taking aim and shoot.
7N-23 Mr Bradley was interviewed by Praxis, who recorded him saying:14
I automatically, with the anger being in me and the bitterness being in me, I looked around, looking around the ground for something to throw. Picking up these two stones, which I had held, one in my right and one in my left hand. I threw the stones. I just threw them. I did not even know where I was throwing them. I just threw them straight in front of me, straight in front of me just. And as I thought when I let the stone go, I went to throw, I felt this heaviness in my right arm, right upper arm and I grabbed my arm such as this. I thought someone had given me a thump, like a thump in the arm and I grabbed the arm like this. I looked over, and there I was in astonishment. The blood was just flowing out of me. Blood was flowing down out of my arm.
7N-24 Mr Bradley accepts he said this to Praxis. He sought to explain the error by saying that he became very distressed in the interview.15 He did not elaborate and his explanation is inherently implausible.
7N-25 The Derry Journal’s twentieth anniversary publication in relation to Bloody Sunday records Michael Bradley saying:16
I lost the head and looked around to see what I could pick up to throw at the soldiers who were pouring into the area. I grabbed two pieces of brick and was just about to throw them when I was shot. I know I had been hit, but I was still on my feet. At first I thought I had been struck by a rubber bullet, but then I felt a heavy thud on the top muscle of my right arm and saw blood pouring from my hand.
7N-26 Paul Mahon interviewed Michael Bridge. In that interview he said that having seen Jack Duddy, “I lost control .. I found two stones .. picked them up and I was
14 O1.17 15 AB 66.13 paragraph 80 16 1.257 about to throw them at the soldiers that was directly in front of me.” Mr Bradley was shot “as I went to throw these two stones.”
There are, therefore, a number of accounts given by Mr Bradley over the years which confirm that he was shot, either after he had just finished throwing a stone or after he had just started throwing stones or after he was about to throw two pieces of brick.
That account is in stark contrast to Michael Bradley’s present recall as recorded in his BSI statement. In oral evidence Mr Bradley said that, “I know I have said on several occasions (about picking up a stone) ... It is because, when speaking to so many people, you get the reaction that maybe you did pick up a stone and maybe you did not, and do not forget I was angry, so I had every option to pick up the stone. I possibly could have picked it up, but my recollection today is I do not remember.”
WHO SHOT MICHAEL BRADLEY?
Mr Bradley only recalled seeing two soldiers within the Car Park. One was leaning over the front mudguard on the right hand side of the Pig as Mr Bradley looked at it, and the other was standing on the Chamberlain Street side, ie the left hand (passenger) side of the Pig. Mr Bradley has expressly stated that he does not know who shot him. In oral evidence he said that all that he really recalled was that they both looked in his direction.
Q. You describe how you could hear shooting; could you actually see any soldier shooting? A. It would be fair to say at this stage, not in particular, no. 22
7N-30 It is not possible for the civilian evidence to establish from where the shot that hit Mr Bradley came.
7N-III CONCLUSION
7N-31 Mr Bradley does not know who shot him and there is no evidence from which it is possible to establish who was responsible for his shooting.
7N-32 There is evidence that Mr Bradley was throwing something at the time that he was shot. It is not clear: what he was throwing; at which soldiers he threw anything; in what manner he did so; from what position he threw; who was close to him or what they were doing.
7N-33 In considering the difficulties which have to be faced in reaching any firm conclusion, either about precisely what Mr Bradley was doing or about what others may have been doing close to him, the Tribunal may have regard to the submissions made in chapter 2 above to the effect that Mr Bradley would, regrettably, appear to have been quite closely involved in activity which has prevented the Tribunal for obtaining the information and assistance that it was entitled to expect would be provided to it.
7N-34 Mr Bradley has given so many inconsistent accounts of what he was doing shortly before he was shot that the Tribunal will need to consider why that may be. While it may be understandable that the circumstances in which he was injured, the fact of the injury, and the passage of time, may all have contributed to confusion and unreliability, the fact remains that the Tribunal cannot properly and confidently make findings about the precise circumstances in which Mr Bradley was shot. In the same way the Tribunal cannot properly and confidently determine what he and others in his immediate vicinity may actually have been doing, or appeared to the soldiers to have been doing.
22 Day 94/25/5-8 CHAPTER 70
PATRICK McDAID
70-1 INTRODUCTION
Patrick McDaid was probably wounded as he flung himself over the wall in front of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats as he made his way towards the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. The Tribunal’s expert evidence is that he was not hit by a lead bullet.
70-2 Mr McDaid may have been hit by a malfunctioning nail bomb.
70-II PATRICK MCDAID’S MOVEMENTS
70-3 Patrick McDaid ran down Chamberlain Street with the crowd that was fleeing from Barrier 14. As he reached the end of Chamberlain Street he came across a group of men who were lifting a badly injured woman. He helped them carry the injured woman to a house in Chamberlain Street. He did not know then, but was told later, that this was Peggy Deery.
70-4 Patrick McDaid confirmed in oral evidence that this happened early on – before he had heard any shooting as set out in Chapter 7K.
70-5 Having apparently seen Jack Duddy fall, Patrick McDaid then ran for the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3, and dived down some small steps leading from the playground area to the pathway in front of Block 2. He landed on that pavement, and someone else landed beside him and told him that he had been shot. Mr McDaid explained in his BSI Statement that “He said to me, “I think you’re shot in the back.” I said “No, they’ve missed.” I did not feel as though I had been
1 Day 092/105/23 – 106/04 2 Day 092/112/10 – 115/24; AM 172.3 paragraphs 13-14 – AM 172.4 paragraph 15
FS 7. 1611
VII 283 The man placed his hand on Mr McDaid's clothing and showed him the blood on his hand. Mr McDaid understandably began to panic.
Mr McDaid was, on his own account, wholly unaware of where he was and what he was doing when he was shot. It may have been that he sustained his injury at some time before he was told he was injured.
Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan state in their Report that:
Mr McDaid had a ragged 3" x 2" lacerated injury over the upper part of the left scapula. No true entrance or exit wounds are described. The wound was surgically debrided by Mr Malhotra who recorded that the wound had "black edges (carbon) lot of carbon particles"
A letter to the Royal Ulster Constabulary from Mr Bennet, Consultant Surgeon, dated 7th February suggested that the injury was a "glancing wound" fired as the patient was "ducking down" which "did not indicate a direct hit from behind". He drew attention to the carbon particles which he suggested "would indicate a fairly close range discharge". In a discharge summary dated 11th February it is again suggested that this possibly a glancing wound with tearing of the skin and superficial tissues.
Photograph P6/761 shows a wound with sharply demarcated margins. The carbon soiling of the edges cannot be confirmed in this photograph.
Comment
The nature of the projectile(s) cannot be determined and in the absence of any further evidence no meaningful conclusions can be made about the "black edges" of the wound. There is no evidence that would allow any conclusions to be drawn about the position of Patrick McDaid at the time he received this injury.
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3 AM172.4 paragraph 14 4 Day 092/115/18 – 116/05 ; AM 172.4 paragraph 15 5 E 10.007-8 In their Further Report dated August 2001 Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan reviewed photograph P761 of Mr McDaid's wound. The wound was
...an essentially, semi-circular wound with little apparent bleeding. The wound seems shallow, as if the tissues have been sliced. The top edge of the wound appears to be composed of a flap of skin pushed or folded upward exposing the underlying tissue. There is a relatively straight margin at the right side and a rather more curved margin at the left.
They concluded that a fresh interpretation of the wound remained difficult, however the appearance of the injury suggested that it may have been caused by a thin disc or sliver of material moving rapidly, which sliced through the skin of the back from a generally right to left direction leaving a flap of tissue at the upper margin. It does not have, they concluded, the appearance of a typical bullet wound. There are no obvious features visible in the photographs to help explain or identify the "black particles" described by Mr Malhotra."
Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan reported further in August 2002. They commented that they were "of the opinion that Patrick McDaid was not struck by a bullet." In answer to Mr Roxborough, Dr Shepherd confirmed this:
Q. Taking into account all the information that you have seen and recognising also its limitations, can you help the Tribunal as to the degree of confidence with which you say that the wound to Mr McDaid was not caused by a lead bullet?
A. I think it would be fair to say that we are confident that it was not caused by a lead bullet.
Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan, in their further Report of 2001 considered that objects that could cause such a slicing wound included "a penny of old coinage, other metal discs, the top or bottom plates of a "U2" type battery etc and we understand that these items were attached to or fired in place of baton rounds in
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6 E18.6.1 7 E20.1 8 Day 229/062/03-09 Northern Ireland in the period of time around Bloody Sunday.” They concluded that there were “no specific features that would allow us to make to a positive interpretation and we cannot distinguish between the possibilities noted above and we accept that other possibilities may exist”.
Dr Shepherd said of carbon particles in oral evidence that:
...carbon particles around the wound are commonly associated with a close discharge of a weapon. That would be of significance, but one would need to see them, in this case also on the overlying clothing and on other points adjacent to the wound for that conclusion to be drawn.
To the suggestion made by Barry MacDonald QC that the “most likely cause of this injury was a doctored rubber bullet”, Dr Shepherd explained, again, that “any disc or sliver of material that could be propelled could potentially have caused this.” A ‘doctored bullet’ was a possibility, but so was a penny or a tin can lid:
...other possibilities exist and we do not want to be in any way exclusive in suggesting the penny or the battery. They were two that were suggested. I have thought of another one today, which is the tin can bit, but I am sure others exist.
Overall, Dr Shepherd was very clear that Mr McDaid’s injury is “an extremely difficult one to interpret”, and that he was not able to say what particularly caused the wound, other than “in the broadest terms”, it being “a sliver or disc”.
In summary, the Tribunal’s experts concluded that, beyond saying that it was unlikely that the wound was caused by a bullet and that it was likely to have been
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9 E 18.6.1 10 E20.2 11 Day 229/060/06-11 12 Day 229/062/23-25 13 Day 229/076/22 - 77/01 14 Day 229/077/15-19
FS7.1614
VII 286 caused by a disk like object, they were unable to determine what struck Mr McDaid or where it came from.
70-IV NAIL BOMBS IN TIN CANS
70-16 Mr Gurney, another of the Tribunal’s experts, described two methods of constructing a nail bomb in his Report to the Tribunal. The first involves a can. The method involved using corrugated paper with nails in it, around explosive inserted into a can. This was described as "pattern one":
To construct a nail bomb, the corrugated paper would first be cut into strips of a width to suit the length of the nails being used. The nails would then be inserted into the channels in the corrugated paper in 'nose to tail' fashion. Sufficient nail-loaded paper would next be wrapped around the explosive charge to make the charge -- including paper and nails -- a snug fit inside the food or drink can that was being used to contain the bomb. The nail/paper/charge assembly would then be inserted into the can. Prior to use, the detonator end of the initiator assembly would be pushed down into the explosive, leaving the exposed end of the safety fuse -- with the match heads attached -- sticking out of the top of the bomb.
70-17 Michael Clarke, PIRA Explosives Officer in Derry in 1972, acknowledged that, initially at least, nail bombs were first made in tins or cans, although he personally did not make them that way:
When they [nail bombs] first started to be used it is possible that they were packed in this way [in a tin or a can], but the usual practice was to make them as light as possible using cardboard and tape .. I did not use cans or tins when I made them up.
70-18 He confirmed this in oral evidence:
Q. Do you remember seeing nail bombs made by others which did use tin cans?
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15 E 18.8.4 16 AC 157.8 paragraph 27 17 Day 402/26/06-14 A. Probably away in 1971, back in 1971, but it is hard to say after 32-odd years, like, you know.
Q. Quite?
A. As I say, they would have been too heavy. We would have discovered they would have been too heavy to throw, too awkward to throw, so we dispensed with using that type of bomb.
When questioned by Anthony Jennings QC, Mr Clarke conceded that nail bombs were used in tin cans at the start, and that although he had not made any, he had seen them used.18
PIRA 24, the head of PIRA in Derry on Bloody Sunday, gave evidence about the characteristics of nail bombs in tin cans, their unreliability, and the fact that the bottom of the can would blow off but the nails would not go anywhere. He confirmed that PIRA made nail bombs in cans at an early stage, but said that “as time went on” the realisation that getting the top off the tin meant making the nail bombs up in advance, which was thought not to be advisable. He went on to say,19
Also, the explosives in the tins tended to sink to the bottom so that when the nail bombs went off, the bottom blew off, but the nails did not go anywhere. It was therefore not a great success so we stopped using the tins as time went on.
The claim that the use of tins had been abandoned by Bloody Sunday20 is contradicted by Patrick Ward’s evidence to the Tribunal:21
Q. How confident are you that all your nail bombs were always in cans?
A. Because we made them, it is all we ever used.
Q. Did other sections use nail bombs that were not in cans?
A. No, I have never seen it happen.
18 Day 402/58/06-60/05 19 APIRA 24.6 paragraph 25 20 APIRA 24.6 paragraph 25 21 Day 385/126/05-127/02 Q. Sorry?
A. I never seen it happen. These were standard.
Q. Can we have on the screen AD65.24. This is a portion of Gerard Doherty's statement to the Tribunal, where what he says is this at paragraph 52. "Paddy Ward says that nail bombs were always in cans. In my experience, the Provisional IRA did not ever use cans for the purpose of making nail bombs. Certainly, I never saw a nail bomb in a can." It seems to be the exact opposite of what you are saying?
A. Yes.
Q. You say that is simply wrong; do you?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Is it possible that you are both right and both wrong, in the sense that sometimes cans were used and sometimes they were not?
A. In my experience it was always used -- a can.
70-22 Mr Ward was clear therefore that nail bombs in fact were always used in cans. Mr Ward had no reason to lie to assist the Army's account. Furthermore, it is plain on Mr Gurney's evidence that nail bombs in cans must still have been in use only one month into 1972. Mr Gurney reported to the Inquiry that:
I can give no dates for the introduction of the two main patterns of nail bomb, but both were in use at the same time in 1972, although the majority encountered in 1972 were of the pattern two variety. I do not know whether the first pattern bombs found in 1972 were due to the PIRA using old stock or whether some bomb-makers simply continued to use old construction methods.
70-23 Kathryn Johnston referred in her third BSI Statement to an extract from a book by a freelance photographer called Willie Carson that contained a photograph of nail bombs apparently exhibited to the photographer at a house in Derry sometime between August 1971 and July 1972. The nail bombs are made with beer cans.
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22 E 18.8.5 23 M111.93 paragraph 5 24 Kathryn Johnston's exhibit KJ7 at M111.164 She also exhibited an extract from the Derry Journal of Friday 3rd September 1971 that reported, “Two beer cans containing a quantity of explosives were found in the garden of a house in Clarendon St, Derry on Tuesday. They were wrapped in a cloth.” This suggests that nail bombs could be made up in tin cans in advance of their being used.
The Peres sequence of photographs shows Patrick Walsh holding a man who appears to be Mr McDaid, although he did not initially think it was him. In oral evidence to the Tribunal he said that in fact he thought it was in fact him: “I would say it might be, I believe it is me, you know.”
Similarly, Patrick Walsh, who plainly is in the photograph, did not recall when he made his BSI Statement, examining a wounded man; he only recalled someone panicking (as indeed Mr McDaid said he was). However, in 1972 the Sunday Times recorded him giving an account of running for the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3, seeing someone being shot, and seeing the injury that he described being as if someone had “taken a butterknife and scooped a big piece of flesh away.” His wife also recalled him talking about a “butter knife” wound.
EVIDENCE OF NAILBOMB ACTIVITY
It is abundantly clear from a number of civilian witnesses both at large in the Bogside that afternoon or observing events that people were sighted with nailbombs in their possession. There is no reason why geography should exclude such activity also being present, even to a limited extent, in Sector 2.
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25 M111.94; Kathryn Johnston’s exhibit KJ9 at M111.169 26 EP 25.7 - 12 27 Day 092/117/10-11 28 AW 5.2 paragraph 16 29 AW 5.15 30 AW 5.24 paragraph 19 Photograph P323 can only show a man who is in the act of throwing what was very probably a nail bomb at a time that is not precisely known but in an area not far from the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3.
Soldier 227, a Lieutenant in 22 LAD on observation duties at Charlie OP heard pistol shots coming from the Rossville Flats area, and he also heard after Support Company had deployed and as the arrest operation was under way “an explosion on the William Street side of the (Rossville) Flats that he sounded like a nail bomb”31, he assumed, although it could have been “any kind of explosive device”.32 He then heard three SLR shots. He also heard “the very distinctive”, unforgettable “horrible thump-thump-thump”33 sound of two “distinct bursts of automatic fire” from, in his opinion, a Thompson. These came from what he thought was the area of Glenfada Park.34
TIMING
Giles Peres took his sequence of photographs after he had photographed Father Daly on the ground with Jack Duddy, and after Father Daly had moved away with Jack Duddy’s body.35 This would mean that, according to the evidence about the
31 B2188 32 B2204.004 paragraph 21 33 B2204.003 paragraph 16 34 B2188 35 M65.1.1-2; Day 213/08/12-14/09 shooting of Michael Bridge,\\textsuperscript{36} he had also been shot before Mr Peres took these photographs (as Michael Bridge ran from the group around Jack Duddy towards the soldiers and was then shot in the leg). The logical conclusion from this sequence, therefore, is that Patrick McDaid was wounded late in the sequence of injuries and shooting in the Rossville Flats' car park.
This is significant when considering the evidence of Soldier Q. Soldier Q was not amongst the first to fire in the Rossville Flats. His SA Statement and his oral evidence to the Widgery Tribunal give the impression that he fired after he had seen a soldier struck by acid thrown from the Rossville Flats, and after Soldier T had fired up into the Rossville Flats. He fired at a man throwing a nail bomb.\\textsuperscript{37} Soldier Q told the Widgery Tribunal that he thought that he had hit the nail bomber, and described him falling and being dragged behind some buildings.\\textsuperscript{38} He described the man as being of medium height, wearing a black windcheater, and having brown hair.\\textsuperscript{39}
**SUPPORTING EVIDENCE - MISSING CASUALTIES**
*Pius McCarron?*
Of the known dead and injured in Sector 2, the only casualties that were in the location of the low wall in front of Block 2, and the area around the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3 are Michael Bradley and Patrick McDaid. There is, however, civilian evidence as to the existence of another casualty in, or in close proximity to, the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3 who is not accounted for amongst the known dead and injured and this is Pius McCarron, who was knocked unconscious, by something.
\\textsuperscript{36} See Chapter 7M: Michael Bridge \\textsuperscript{37} See Chapter 7H: Soldier Q. \\textsuperscript{38} B645 letter C-D \\textsuperscript{39} B645 letter B Patrick Clarke came across Pius McCarron lying unconscious in the Gap, he initially said, between Blocks 1 and 2 although he agreed in oral evidence, as is consistent with other evidence, that this might easily as well be the Gap between Blocks 2 and 3. A knight of Malta was attending to him. Patrick Clarke initially thought that Pius McCarron was dead, so he clearly appeared seriously injured. Mr Clarke helped Mr McCarron to Joseph Place where Mr McCarron said he had been hit on the head by a piece of masonry from a ricochet.
Patrick Clarke's account of this incident is inherently implausible. Further Pius McCarron has never made a complaint about his injuries that he would have been expected to have done if they were indeed caused by a ricochet, nor has he ever made a statement about these events.
In the light of the evidence of Soldier Q, and the injury sustained by Patrick McDaid it is possible that Pius McCarron was knocked unconscious by a blast from a bomb of some description and if it were a nail bomb that may also account for the gash to the head or that injury could have been sustained when he collapsed as he clearly did. This is a far more likely explanation than Mr McCarron being knocked unconscious by masonry dislodged by a bullet. That explanation is solely based upon Mr McCarron allegedly telling Mr Clarke at the time that that was what happened. (It is, of course, unusual for people who are knocked unconscious to be able to recall the cause.)
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40 Day 074/100 41 AC 64.1 42 Day 074/101 43 AC 64.1
"Patrick Clarke said in his BSI Statement that he saw a piece of masonry next to Mr. McCarron. This is a fact that he did not mention in 1972; indeed, in his NICRA Statement Patrick Clarke said that it was Mr McCarron who told him that he had been hit by masonry, and that when he had been in the alleyway with the unconscious McCarron, Patrick Clarke and the attending Knight of Malta "were unable to determine there and then what was wrong with him." AC 64.1 Pius McCarron did not go to Altnagelvin Hospital. He has never made a statement in any form as to his experience of Bloody Sunday and how he came to be injured.
**70-V CONCLUSION**
Patrick McDaid was not injured by a 7.62 mm round fired by a soldier. There is circumstantial evidence from a number of different sources that suggest that the most likely cause of his injury was by being hit by part of a malfunctioning nail bomb.
While it was denied by almost all civilians that any nail bombs were to be seen on Bloody Sunday, a significant number of observations have been made at various times. CLOSING SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENTS OF
MR ANTHONY LAWTON
VOLUME 6
CHAPTER 8
SECTOR 3 CHAPTER 8 SECTOR 3
CHAPTER 8A - MORTAR PLATOON IN SECTOR 3
8A-I Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 Debussing in Rossville Street ....................................................................................... 1 Soldier U comes under attack ...................................................................................... 6 8A-II Soldiers P and 017 at the Kells Walk Ramp ....................................................... 8 Exposed Position ......................................................................................................... 8 8A-III Incoming Rounds ............................................................................................... 9 8A-IV Soldiers P and 017 targeted by Rioters ............................................................ 10 The Rioters Waited to Confront the Soldiers from the Rubble Barricade ................. 10 "Get them" .................................................................................................................. 12 P and 017 attacked ....................................................................................................... 14 Surge forward from Rubble Barricade ........................................................................ 16 Rioters target soldier P and 017 from Columbille Court Alleyway ......................... 19 8A-V The Nail Bomber ............................................................................................... 20 The Evidence of soldiers P and 017 ............................................................................ 21 The Prevalence of Nail Bombs in Londonderry ......................................................... 22 Military Corroboration ............................................................................................... 23 Photographic Evidence .............................................................................................. 24 Nail Bombs in the Glenfada Park Area ....................................................................... 25 The "Yellow Card" ....................................................................................................... 27 Removal of Nail Bomber ............................................................................................. 28 8A-VI Soldier P's Movements following his Engagement with the Nail Bomber ....... 28 8A-VII Gunmen ........................................................................................................... 30 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 30 Diagram: Evidence of Civilians with Handguns in or Around Sector 3 on 30th January 197232 Evidence ...................................................................................................................... 33 Gunmen Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 48 8A-VIII Unidentified Casualties .................................................................................. 49 8A-IX Missing Photographs ......................................................................................... 51 8A-X Soldiers P and 017 Movement East .................................................................... 51 8A-XI Soldier P: Vehicle Escort to Altnagelvin .......................................................... 52 8A-XII Soldier P's State of Recollection ..................................................................... 52 8A-XIII Soldier U's Engagement ............................................................................... 54 Location of Gunman .................................................................................................... 55 Soldier U's shot ............................................................................................................. 56 8A-XIV Hugh Gilmore ................................................................................................. 58 Medical and Expert Evidence ...................................................................................... 58 Civilian Evidence ......................................................................................................... 60 Chronology ................................................................................................................... 71 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 71
# CHAPTER 8C - MICHAEL KELLY, WILLIAM NASH, JOHN YOUNG AND MICHAEL MCDAID
| Section | Title | Page | |---------|-------|------| | 8C-I | Introduction | 186 | | 8C-II | Michael Kelly | 187 | | | Soldier F's Evidence | 187 | | | Michael Kelly - civilian evidence | 188 | | | Why did Soldier F not mention this incident before 19 February? | 215 | | | Conclusion | 220 | | 8C-III | WILLIAM NASH, John Young and Michael McDaid | 221 | | | Counsel's First Report | 221 | | | Questions and Allegations put during Oral evidence | 223 | | | The City Walls Theory | 228 | | 8C-IV | Civilian Evidence | 233 | | | Where in relation to Rubble barricade did John Young, William Nash and Michael McDaid fall? | 234 | | | Which Way were William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid Facing when They were Shot? | 239 | | | The Conduct of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid in area of Rubble Barricade | 245 | | | Arrest Theory | 246 | | 8C-V | Chronology | 249 | | 8C-VI | Missing Casualties and Missing Photographs | 253 | | 8C-VII | Conclusion | 253 | CHAPTER 8A
MORTAR PLATOON IN SECTOR 3
8A-1 INTRODUCTION
DEBUSSING IN ROSSVILLE STREET
8A-1 The ABC footage shows at least four members of Mortar Platoon debussing from the Pig. They are indicated on the following stills from that footage as “1” to “4”.
8A-2 In the still frame below, the first soldier (marked as “1”) starts to exit the vehicle and move right, in a Westerly direction. This is Corporal P or Private 017. 017’s evidence to the Tribunal was that he recalled being in Pig 2 and that:
I have seen a video and it shows, I think it is me, getting out of the back of the Pig before the, um, before they turned off on to the --
MR TOOHEY: You mean in Rossville Street itself?
A. Yes, yes.3
1 V48/12.26 to 12.37; segment 59 2 Day 358/039/19 3 Day 358/044/15 Smoke from a baton round is visible at the rear of the Pig as the first soldier emerges further from the vehicle, below. The Tribunal may find, therefore, that 017 was in fact the first to deploy from the Pig and that he fired a baton round as he did so.
The second soldier (marked "2") is visible in the next still, moving left towards the waste ground. The third soldier (marked "3") exits the Pig in the still below. He moves right, in the same direction as the first soldier. This is the second of either P or 017. Soldier P had told Lord Widgery:
*The vehicle stopped momentarily at the north end of block 1 and myself and the soldier I was to act as guard to debussed along with one or two others: the rest of the section stayed in the vehicle, which pulled onto the car park.*
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*B623.015* By the time of the next still, a fourth soldier (marked "4") has debussed and moved left, towards the waste ground behind the second soldier.
It is unfortunately at this point that this part of the footage comes to an end.
The soldiers' subsequent movements can be followed in the photographs of Robert White, who was positioned in the gap between Glenfada Park North and Columbcille Court. P593, below, shows Pig 2, rear doors open, shortly after the men had debussed. The vehicle is recognisable by the bars on its front. Three soldiers can be seen in this photograph behind Pig 2, moving in a south easterly direction towards the waste ground. The Guildhall clock, in the top right hand corner, shows the time as 4.10 p.m. At this stage, the soldiers can only have come from Pig 2. The photograph therefore suggests that a fifth soldier (marked "5") debussed in Rossville Street and followed the second and fourth soldiers east. The fifth soldier was Private U, who wore a helmet and carried an SLR. A clear copy of the photograph suggests that the soldier to his right is not wearing a helmet and that the soldier furthest to the right may carry a baton gun.
In 1972, Private U confirmed to the RMP that he had debussed in Rossville Street. He was asked in evidence to Lord Widgery:
Q. Did you jump out of the vehicle? A. Yes
Q. Just before it stopped? A. Yes, that is correct.
5 B787.012 Q. And were you giving protection to a soldier who had a baton gun?
A. That is correct, sir.
Q. Were you wearing your gas mask?
A. No, sir.
Q. When you got out and went off with the man who you were protecting, which direction did you go off in?
A. Towards the flats, sir.
Q. What was this to do?
A. To arrest the rioters.
Q. What were the rioters doing? Were there rioters, or people you thought were rioters, there?
A. Yes, sir.6
SOLDIER U COMES UNDER ATTACK
8A-11 The hostile reception generally of Mortar Platoon soldiers in the area of the Rossville Flats waste ground is considered in detail in chapter 7, above. This present section deals specifically with the attack made upon Soldier U.
8A-12 Mr. White’s photograph, P595 below, follows the movement of Soldier U (the only soldier of the three in P593 with helmet and SLR) onto the waste ground.
6 B787.022 paragraph G Immediately upon his arrival there he was confronted by a man, seen in the expanded portion of the photograph below, moving towards him.
Private U's account to Eversheds continued:
I was being hit by stones and bottles from all around. I focused on a man in front of me to my left (south east) as I faced south. He had thrown something at me (I cannot remember what it was or whether it had hit me). I went for him and he ran. He had a small start on me and I did not expect to catch him up immediately but he slipped and fell on some ice, so I was able to grab him and arrest him."
8A-15 **P595** may therefore capture the moment when U was first confronted by the man he proceeded to arrest, Charles Canning.⁴
8A-II **SOLDIERS P AND 017 AT THE KELLS WALK RAMP**
8A-16 Soldiers P and 017, who had both deployed to the west of Pig 2, took up positions to the side of the Kells Walk pram ramp. Within a very short time of their arrival there, they became aware of incoming gunfire and were targeted by stone throwers. Shortly thereafter, Soldier P engaged a nail bomber and then a gunman.
**EXPOSED POSITION**
8A-17 The portion of **P202** reproduced below illustrates the position to which P and 017 initially deployed.
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⁴ When called to give evidence on Day 417 (28.01.04), Mr. Canning refused to co-operate with the Inquiry. He further claimed that his BSI statement of 20.08.99 contained errors, but did not identify what they were, **Day 417/159/14 to Day 417/165/06**. The area was open and exposed. The soldiers would have been acutely aware of areas of potential danger on three sides:
(1) Block 1, Rossville Flats to the east;
(2) the buildings and alleyways to the west of Rossville Street; and
(3) the rubble barricade across the street itself.
**INCOMING ROUNDS**
Shortly after taking up position, both P and 017 heard two shots, coming from south of their location and therefore hostile. Soldier P described the shots in this way to Lord Widgery:
> When we reached the wall there were no people there. Shortly after that we came under fire. I would not say it was myself they were aiming at but from the direction of the rubble barricade.
Q. It was not you they were aiming at, you think?
A. No
Q. But what did you hear or see?
A. I heard a couple of shots which seemed to pass overhead. I heard the crack of them going over.
Q. From which direction?
A. From the direction of the barricade.
Soldier 017 was less sure of the origin of the shots in his SA statement, but believed they may have come from the area of the Rossville Flats.
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9 B623.016 paragraph E 10 B1484.013 paragraph 3 8A-IV SOLDIERS P AND 017 TARGETED BY RIOTERS
8A-21 Very soon after hearing the hostile gunfire, Corporal P and Private 017 came under attack from a number of rioters. This cannot be in doubt: it is confirmed by the photographs, by civilians observing the rioting and by those actually participating in it.
THE RIOTERS WAITED TO CONFRONT THE SOLDIERS FROM THE RUBBLE BARRICADE
8A-22 Robert Bamford described the mindset of the “habitual rioter”, who waited at the barricade for the soldiers to arrive.
Q. Was it the sight of the Saracens that made you pick up stones? A. Yeah.
Q. Could you see other people picking up stones at the same time? A. Yes, there seemed to be everybody done it in unison.
Q. A short while ago you used the words "defend the area"; was there anyone shouting to the people at the rubble barricade that you had to defend the area? A. No, it was an instinct. At that time it would have been the instinctive thing to do.11
8A-23 He was asked:
Q. How many of you were around when you decided, and others with you, to stand your ground? A. There were about 50, 60, perhaps.
Q. 50 or 60? A. Yeah.
Q. So there did come a stage when about 50 or 60 people were standing behind the barricade facing towards the soldiers determined to stop them coming in, if possible?
11 Day 177/112/11
[ 7.1637 ] The decision to "stand your ground" must have been articulated by those at the barricade. Frederick Cunningham's evidence was that as he arrived at the barricade:
"somebody said "stand your ground." I therefore turned around and looked back along Rossville Street up towards William Street."
James Quinn may have heard the same person shouting. He recorded that, as the soldiers began to move down Rossville Street on foot, "Someone said that we had to stop them from coming further into the Bogside". A group of people, therefore, made their way to the rubble barricade, from where they threw stones at the soldiers.
Others had retreated south of the barricade but regrouped and returned to it to confront the soldiers. Father O'Gara saw a group of "young lads" on the rubble barricade "screaming for the mass of the people at Free Derry Corner to come back."
Their entreaties were successful. Ciaran Donnelly explained that he saw:
"... a number of youths come down toward the barricade from the Free Derry Corner area. It was my impression that they were coming back down to the barricade to stop the Army from coming up Rossville Street any further. I would estimate that there were around 50 to 60 people at or near to the barricade at this point."
Mr Donnelly took EP27/6 below, from the Glenfada Park South pram ramp as soon as he realised the Army had moved into Rossville Street and before any shots had been fired in Sector 3. The photograph shows the 50 to 60 people, standing both north and south of the barricade facing the soldiers, many with missiles in their hands.
This, therefore, was the situation that greeted P and 017 as they arrived at the Kells Walk ramp.
"GET THEM"
Thomas Heaney described moving south of the rubble barricade as the soldiers entered Rossville Street.
When the army broke through Barrier 12 a crowd had run towards Free Derry Corner from William Street. At the time I emerged from Glenfada Park North the crowd had slowed down and was beginning to regroup.
Mr Heaney then ran up to the barricade.
I did this because I heard people around me saying "Let's get them" (being the British Army). I ran to the barricade and there was a small crowd of a few dozen people there.
18 AH56.003 paragraph 13 19 AH56.003 paragraph 15 In oral evidence Mr Heaney explained that those were not necessarily the exact words used and that it was “more of a roar than a direct quote.” However, Vincent McCauley heard people using exactly that phrase. He saw youths south of the barricade, close to the junction of Fahan Street West and Rossville Street:
They looked as if they were trying to push the army out of the Bogside. A few of them had bricks in their hands and were facing the soldiers. They were saying things like, “come on boys, let’s get them!” and they were trying to encourage others to join them.
These accounts correspond closely with 017’s evidence that:
A group mainly of youths aged 20-25 broke away and from the crowd behind the rubble barricade and made four or five half hearted approaches towards me. They were trying to urge the rest of the crowd to join them. They were shouting “Get him.” They would have ripped me to pieces if they had got me...I felt very vulnerable on my own.
The rioters at the barricade were emboldened by the fact that the soldiers approaching them did not wear riot gear. Liam Mailey’s evidence was that:
They were obviously going to throw stones at the soldiers who were coming in. I think they were largely encouraged at this stage by the fact that the soldiers did not have riot gear. I heard one of the youths mention this fact.
Similarly, Charlie Lambert observed:
a group of possibly up to 40 people standing south of the Rubble Barricade. Some of these were my mates and others were people I knew who were part of the rioting crowd in Derry at the time. The people standing at the barricade had stones in their hands and were waiting for the soldiers to take them on.
He also stated that:
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20 Day 140/024/18 21 AM99.008 paragraph 13 22 B1484.004 paragraph 23; see also Day 358/055/21 23 M50.026 paragraph C 24 A1.3.005 paragraph 29 The mood was quite confrontational, we thought that as the soldiers were out of their Saracens and out from behind their riot shields, we would really be able to give them a good hammering.\\textsuperscript{25}
**P AND 017 ATTACKED**
8A-37 017 stated succinctly in 1972 that:
*There was a rioting crowd at the barricade and they were stoning troops who deployed around the flats. I fired a number of baton rounds at the crowd. They stoned me.*\\textsuperscript{26}
8A-38 The attack took place almost immediately. Ciaran Donnelly’s account in 1972 was that:
*I went down to a block of flats opposite to the Rossville Flats shortly after this the parachute troops came into Rossville Street in vehicles. A crowd then gathered behind an old barrier used in previous riots and threw stones at the soldiers.*\\textsuperscript{27}
8A-39 It was Ronald Wood’s evidence that:
*As the soldiers took up their positions I saw some youths in and around the area of the Rubble Barricade between the Rossville Flats and Glenfada Park North... The Rubble Barricade was made up of various bits of rubble and brick. The youths picked up pieces of rubble and brick and hurled them towards the soldiers on the north side of the Rubble Barricade. They were also shouting obscenities.*\\textsuperscript{28}
8A-40 Mr Wood might, therefore, be surprised to read the evidence of Hugh O’Boyle, who suggested that the rioting at the rubble barricade was “very low key”\\textsuperscript{29} and was also of the view that “the stones we threw at soldiers when we were rioting did not really hurt them.”\\textsuperscript{30} This last view is rendered all the more extraordinary
\\textsuperscript{25} AL3.005 paragraph 32 \\textsuperscript{26} B1484.011 \\textsuperscript{27} “SR” Statement M22.1 \\textsuperscript{28} AW24.002 paragraph 9 \\textsuperscript{29} AO1.003 paragraph 19 \\textsuperscript{30} AO1.009 paragraph 53 by Mr O'Boyle's oral evidence that on a different occasion he had himself been hit by a stone:
I was struck on the head on one occasion and had approximately four stitches in my head.31
The attack was photographed by Liam Mailey. He was south of the barricade at ground level when he took EP23/4,32 below:
8A-41
Mr Mailey was asked about the photograph at the Widgery Tribunal:
Q. How long had the Saracens been there when you took [EP23/4]?
A. The Saracens had just stopped at that stage.
Q. The people shown in [EP23/4], or some of them appear to be moving towards the armoured vehicles and soldiers?
A. Yes.
31 Day 132/073/15 32 also at P1115; enhanced at E15.006 Q. Did you see them do that? A. Yes
Q. Can you say what they were purporting to do and why? A. They were obviously going to throw stones at the soldiers who were coming in.
SURGE FORWARD FROM RUBBLE BARRICADE
8A-43 There is a compelling body of evidence of one particular surge forward from the rubble barricade. Some suggest it was in response to an early arrest that was taking place on the waste ground, which may or may not have been that of William John Dillon. Examples of the evidence are summarised below because such a movement would have been of particular concern to P and 017 in their exposed position on the West side of Rossville Street.
(1) Gavan Duffy saw a youth running on the waste ground, who was struck by a soldier with his rifle butt. A lot of people at the rubble barricade surged forward trying to help the youth, some throwing stones.
(2) George Downey saw the arrest taking place on the waste ground, followed by the movement north of a group of stone throwing youths from the rubble barricade, intent on securing his release.
(3) Noel McCartney saw a youth run out from behind the Rossville Flats and throw stones at an APC, he was then arrested by a soldier. About 20 people came from the barricade and made for the youth to help him.
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33 M50.26 paragraph C 34 AD155 paragraphs 10 to 11 35 Day 123/015-016 36 M55.008 (4) Paul McGready saw a lad running across the waste ground. A soldier came round the corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and knocked him down with his rifle. A group crossed the barricade in the direction of the soldier.37
(5) Finally, Hugh O'Donnell told this Tribunal of a surge forward involving 30 to 50 rioters. He was taken to his written evidence:
... \[In paragraph 32, at the end, you say:
"We were so angry, we picked up stones and ran at the soldiers throwing them."
Should we understand from that that you were part of a group of people who ran forward to throw stones at the soldiers?
A. Yes.
Q. What sort of number of people was there in this group?
A. An approximation, 30 to 50, but I cannot be certain.
Q. Thirty to 50 actually throwing stones?
A. Thirty to 50 running forward.
Q. And of those, can you give any idea of how many were actually throwing stones?
A. No.
Q. Did you run forward towards a particular group of soldiers?
A. The soldiers at the corner of Rossville Street.
Q. How close did you get to them?
A. I am not too sure.
Q. You said a moment ago the soldiers at the corner of Rossville Street. Did you mean the corner of the Rossville Flats?
A. The corner of the Rossville Flats, yes.
37 Day 137/127 to 128 Q. Did you just run forward once to throw stones or was there a process where you ran forward, threw your stone and then came back to get another one?
A. My memory is one surge forward.15
8A-44 Colman Doyle took photographs on the Rossville Flats waste ground of the arrest of William John Dillon. The photographs are of relevance to P and 017 for what they show taking place in the background, on the west side of Rossville Street. They provide further confirmation of the accounts of the two soldiers.
8A-45 P486, below, shows the early stages of the arrest.19
An enhanced version of the photograph, P486.002, also shows what was taking place at the western end of the rubble barricade at this time.40 It captures the movement of two people, indicated below with arrows, running north in the direction of P and 017.
38 Day 405/013/20 39 The index to Bundle P5, Volume 2 attributes the photograph to Jeffrey Morris in. This is probably an error; P486 corresponds more closely with Colman Doyle’s contact print P233.10/6-6A. 40 The reproduction of P486.002 will inevitably be poor; it is suggested that the Tribunal should inspect the original enhancement or a good copy of it. The next photograph, EP33/7, shows P and 017 at the southern end of the ramp (circled). Private 017 stands to the left and the presence of smoke to his left indicates that he has just discharged a baton round.
Both P and 017 gave evidence of a group of people who came out from the Columbille Court alleyway south of their position and joined those at the rubble. barricade. 017 “fired a steady trickle of rubber bullets to contain them.” Corporal P put it in this way to Lord Widgery:
_Around this time I noticed a group of people coming out from the Columbille Court alleyway and they started stoning us and bottling us. The other person I was with fired some baton rounds to disperse them, which he did._
8A-49 This account is corroborated by Brendan Carlin, whose attention was attracted by two soldiers on the west side of Rossville Street.
_The crowd had come out of the alleyway eastwards from the north of Glenfada Park North and had turned to confront the soldiers. They were taking on the two soldiers and were giving them a right stoning. One of the soldiers had a rubber bullet gun and the other had a rifle. The one with the rubber bullet gun was loading his gun as fast as he possibly could and was firing out at the youths who were coming back and forth from the alley but he was going to lose out and he knew it._
8A-V THE NAIL BOMBER
8A-50 P and 017 were next targeted by a man with a nail bomb, who appeared from behind the crowd. The sighting of a nail bomber amidst the rioting in this area should come as no surprise; it was common at that time for nail bombs to be thrown at soldiers. The presence of a nail bomber is further consistent with evidence both that:
(1) at least one nail bomber was spotted by others and possibly photographed in the area of the rubble barricade on Bloody Sunday; and
(2) nail bombs were being carried on that day to the west of Rossville Street, in and around Glenfada Park.
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41 _B1484.004 paragraph 25_, see also _Day 358/060 to 061_ 42 _B623.017 paragraph C_ 43 _AC30.003 paragraph 12_ Corporal P stated in 1972 that the crowd split up on being hit with baton rounds:
I noticed a man (he appeared to be aged about 25 and was wearing a light coloured jacket) who was taking cover behind the crowd light an object which I would describe as an explosive missile and which seemed to me to be a nail bomb which began to fizz. I told the other soldier I was with to watch out and I took aim at the man and fired two shots. The man fell dropping the object which did not explode.44
Similarly, Private 017 recorded in 1972 that:
P then told me to look out as he had seen a man come from behind the crowd. This man was about 25 wearing a light blue jacket and carrying in his hand an object which I could see had a smoking fuse which I took to be a nail bomb. He was about 30 metres from me and was raising his arm to throw the object. P fired at him and he fell. As this happened the crowd surrounded the man and I am not sure where he was hit. The object did not explode. I did not see the man again or what had happened to him.45
017's current recollection is generally consistent, it is of hearing P shout “Look out, bomber!” and of seeing a man holding “an object with smoke around it.”46
The location of the nail bomber, north of the rubble barricade, is shown on the trajectory photograph on which were indicated the shots fired by P.47
44 B623.012 45 B1484.015 paragraph 3 46 B1484.004 paragraph 27, B1484.008 paragraph 50.2 47 B623 THE PREVALENCE OF NAIL BOMBS IN LONDONDERRY
8A-55 It cannot be doubted that nail bombs were often thrown at soldiers in Londonderry at that time. Father Daly's evidence to Lord Widgery was that it was "a very frequent occurrence." Frank McCarron, who knew a great deal about rioting in Londonderry, confirmed to the Tribunal that Father Daly was correct. He was asked:
Q. This Inquiry has heard evidence from Father Daly and others that in the weeks and months preceding Bloody Sunday, it was a very frequent occurrence in Derry for nail bombs to be thrown, that was your experience as well?
A. Yes, you would have heard them.
48 115.041 paragraph A, confirmed at Day 075/061/05 Q. How often would you hear nail bombs going off in Derry at about the time of Bloody Sunday?
A. I would not be too sure. Probably you could say regularly.
Q. Regularly?
A. Yes.
8A-56 On the very last day of the oral hearings, PIRA 24 was questioned about a nail bombing incident on the 29th January and was asked if he knew about a nail bomb being thrown. He said:
A. I would not have had to know about it. Nail bombs were thrown at, at the Army on a regular basis, so I did not have to account for each one on that occasion.
8A-57 Many of the civilians who remained in and around the rubble barricade when Pand 017 had deployed to the Kells Walk ramp did so with the express intention of confronting the Army. Indeed, what had started as a civil rights march had largely degenerated into rioting in that area. The appearance of nail bombs in such circumstances might therefore be expected.
MILITARY CORROBORATION
8A-58 Sergeant 025, 53 Battery, 22 Light Air Defence Regiment, was positioned at the Charlie Observation Post on the City Walls. He may actually have seen the person subsequently targeted by P, albeit in a slightly different position. His RMP statement records:
From this OP I could observe the corner of Rossville St and part of Rossville Flats...
About 1615 hours I was still observing the area when I saw a male civilian being handed what seemed to me to be a nail bomb, or
49 Day 389/182/11 50 Day 427/15/9 another type of bomb. This bomb had been handed to him by a member of a group of about eight to nine men standing by the barrier in Rossville Street.
I observed this person through my binoculars, his distance from my position being about two hundred and fifty metres, and saw him do something to the object in his hands.37
8A-59 025's platoon commander, Staff Sergeant 139, was present at the Charlie OP with 025 and heard him shout that he had spotted the nail bomber.52
PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
8A-60 There may be photographic evidence of the presence of a nail bomb in the vicinity of the rubble barricade. Generally, the photographs of those rioting at that location are not of sufficient clarity to enable positive identification of the type of missiles they were using. There is one photograph, however, in which a rioter holds an object which has the appearance of a nail bomb. The relevant portion of Mr Mailey's EP23/4 has been enlarged, enhanced and reissued as E15.007, below. The rioter in the centre of EP23/4 holds an object which appears to be cylindrical and lighter in colour than the stones or rubble available in the area.
51 B1535: 025, whose current recollection as to the location of the barricade in question and of the events generally is somewhat different, confirmed to the Tribunal that he would have tried to tell the RMP all that he could recall of the incident. Day 361/24/07 52 B1860, confirmed at B1862.006 paragraph 26.5 This may not be the person at whom P was to fire. However, the presence of a person in the vicinity of the barricade, behind a group of rioters and in the process of throwing an object which has the appearance of a nail bomb, and throwing it in the manner illustrated by the photograph, at the very least provides an insight into the situation which P and 017 had to face. In an exposed position and targeted by young men throwing objects, they had a short period of time to identify any nail bomber and then decide how to deal with the threat.
A number of important photographs taken of the events in Sector 3 are now missing. We address this issue below. It may be of relevance to the absence of further photographs showing nail bombs in use in this part of the Bogside.
NAIL BOMBS IN THE GLENFADA PARK AREA
There is, moreover, strong evidence of the presence of nail bombs on Bloody Sunday near the rubble barricade, in the Glenfada Park/Abbey Park area. It would have been a matter of seconds to transport them to or from Rossville Street. (1) Ben Keaveney saw two people, aged between 19 and 20 years old, carrying a large box containing between two and four nail bombs in the Abbey Parade area running between Glenlada Park South and Abbey Park. In oral evidence to this Tribunal, Keaveney added that he knew one of the two by sight, who "would have been associated with people who, at previous riots, had both nail bombs and rifles."
(2) John Goddard of PRAXIS Films spoke to Michael Kivelehan. According to Mr. Goddard's note, Mr Kivelehan went to his grandmother's flat in Glenfada Park North. Two boys, who were dragged into the flat, dumped nail bombs in the street outside before they entered.
(3) Charles McGill gave information about nail bombs to Eversheds solicitors on condition that it was not to be used in his BSI statement. He saw three young men "who were panicking wanting to get rid of nail bombs." He thought they were Official IRA. They had a tray in which there were about ten nail bombs. He later told the Tribunal that the sighting was made in the Abbey Park area.
(4) Danny Craig saw a child with a tray of nail bombs in Glenfada Park North or Abbey Park.
(5) Michael Quinn apparently told the Sunday Times "under guarantee of total anonymity" that he saw two youths carrying nail bombs in Glenfada Park. One wore a blue, denim jacket and had long fair hair. The other wore a fawn jacket and had black hair. The Sunday Times note records: "he says that he heard from a close source that a senior Official IRA man arrived on the scene and told the nail bombers to take them away as there was too much danger to other
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53 AK2.12 paragraph 54 54 Day 160/047/03 55 AK45.001 56 AM230.11 57 Day 069/115 to 117 58 AC111.003 paragraph 15, Day 135/071 to 072 The evidence of the Sunday Times' Peter Pringle was that the note represented unprompted information received from Mr Quinn. Mr Quinn, himself, now suggests he recalls seeing two youths in the north east corner of Glenfada Park North, looking into Rossville Street, and that one of them had with him an object which might have been a nail bomb.
(6) The issue of nail bombs in and around Glenfada Park North is also considered in chapter 9.
THE "YELLOW CARD"
8A-64 Corporal P's firing of two aimed rounds at the nail bomber was the appropriate and responsible response to a difficult situation.
8A-65 The applicable rules of engagement for the military in Northern Ireland, the "Yellow Card," allowed a soldier to fire without warning where any delay could lead to death or serious injury to himself or to people he was under a duty to protect. The soldier was permitted to fire at a person using a firearm against members of the Security Forces, or against a person carrying a firearm where the soldier reasonably believed it was about to be used for offensive purposes. "Firearm" was expressly defined to include a nail bomb.
8A-66 P and 017 both observed a man with a nail bomb in his hand, which he was about to throw. The soldiers were in an open position, close to the bomber and would consequently have been exposed to the full effects of the blast. P's engagement in these circumstances came within the terms of the Yellow Card.
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59 AQ11.012 60 Day 190/064/09 61 e.g. AQ11.022 paragraph 19, see also Day 169/123 to 124 62 ED71.002 paragraph 13, the November 1971 version of Instructions by the Director of Operations for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland. REMOVAL OF NAIL BOMBER
8A-67 Corporal P stated in 1972 that after shooting the nail bomber, he turned away from the rubble barricade:
At that time my attention was directed down Rossville Street but when I redirected my attention to where I had shot the man, the body had been removed and I could not see any object on the ground.63
8A-68 Private 017's BSI statement explains that the nail bomber's body was quickly removed:
Within seconds he was engulfed by the crowd and that was the last I saw of him. When the crowd went back he had gone.64
8A-69 P and 017 saw the nail bomber fall after P had fired at him. The absence of a body means that it is not possible to determine conclusively whether P's shots hit the nail bomber and, if either or both of them did, whether he was killed or simply wounded. What can be said is that the location of the bomber, North of the barricade, does not correspond with that in which any of the known Sector 3 deceased or wounded was shot. He is, therefore, an unidentified, missing casualty.
8A-VI SOLDIER P'S MOVEMENTS FOLLOWING HIS ENGAGEMENT WITH THE NAIL BOMBER
8A-70 After Corporal P engaged the nail bomber:
A person came out from the alleyway at Kells Walk and I turned around to see what he was going to do.65
8A-71 This is confirmed by the photographs. EP33/7 shows P with 017 at the Southern end of the Kells Walk ramp before P turned around. It also shows that a civilian was present at this time in the Kells Walk alleyway, as P described. E15.004.
63 B623.012 64 B1484.004 paragraph 27 65 B623.018 paragraph E below, represents the expanded and enhanced portion of EP33/7 in which the civilian appears clearly. It is not known what the intentions of the civilian were. His presence in this position at this stage in the proceedings is certainly suspicious, if only in that he appears not have come forward to make a statement at any stage but, if he was doing nothing himself, he was in a prime position from which to observe what others were doing, notable the gunman with a pistol who was observed nearby by witnesses such as Father O’Gara. That evidence is addressed below. EP23/7, below, captures the moment after P had turned to see what the civilian was going to do.\\textsuperscript{66}
8A-VII GUNMEN
INTRODUCTION
Private 017 next came face to face with a civilian with a handgun, who appeared in the alleyway between Columbeille Court and Glenfada Park North. He fired a baton round at him and then sought to get out of his line of fire. Corporal P also engaged a gunman but in a location a little further to the south, at the rubble barricade. This man fired in the direction of P, who returned four rounds.
The accounts of P and 017 must be considered in the context of the considerable body of evidence relating to the presence in that area of civilians armed with handguns. The military and civilian accounts read together provide a compelling narrative of this crucial stage in the events of Bloody Sunday. That evidence is set
\\textsuperscript{66} B623.027 out below in relation to gunmen sighted from Kells Walk to the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.
8A-75 The Tribunal knows of six people who were killed in Sector 3 and of at least one who was wounded. There is also, crucially, evidence which demonstrates that other, as yet unidentified, individuals were wounded here. The existence of unidentified, missing casualties is relevant when attempting to determine whom P shot and is also considered below.
8A-76 Inquiry bundles P and EP contain various photographs taken in Sector 3. Some of the most striking photographic evidence relates to activities in the area of the rubble barricade. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that all of the relevant incidents in Sector 3 have been captured on film. It is now, moreover, clear that important photographs are missing. The issue of those missing photographs is also addressed in this section of our submissions.
67 Michael Kelly, William Nash, John Young, Michael McDaid, Hugh Gilmore and Kevin McElhinney were killed and Alexander Nash was wounded. DIAGRAM: EVIDENCE OF CIVILIANS WITH HANDGUNS IN OR AROUND SECTOR 3 ON 30TH JANUARY 1972
[1] Theresa Bradley position of gunman
[2] Brendan & Kieran O'Connor area in which line of fire being cleared
[3] John Long location of person, pushing to get out to Rossville Street, who had seen a man with a handgun
[4] Father Thomas O'Gara probable location of wall at end of Kells Walk over which gunman fired
[5] Marian McMenamin position of gunman
[6] Private 017 position from which gunman appeared
[7] Michael Lynch position of gunman
[8] Margo Harkin position of gunman Shortly after the shooting of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston, Theresa Bradley saw a gunman with a pistol on the first floor balcony of the Keils Walk flats. He fired several times in a northerly direction. His position was marked on a Virtual Reality still at AB70.014. It, and the other relevant positions in which gunmen were reported are marked on the diagram above.
John Long provided evidence that was potentially corroborative of Theresa Bradley’s evidence. He was in the alleyway immediately to the south of the Keils Walk building on his way to Columbciille Court, when he encountered quite a few people pushing to get out in the opposite direction. He did not see a gunman himself but heard someone in the alleyway mention that “a man with a handgun had been seen and they all wanted to get away.”
Likewise, a note taken by a Sunday Times journalist in 1972 of a conversation purportedly with Brendan and Kieran O’Connor may further explain what was taking place in the area of Keils Walk at this time. The note reports that the interviewees met Joe Carlin at the “alley from R St up into C Court,” where they were heading on receipt of information that a young fellow had been shot. The note continues:
*Said it was one young man, in a white coat, clearing the line of fire around the front of Kells Walk in Rossville Street.*
8A-80 The picture, then, is of armed activity at an early stage in the area of the Kells Walk building: of a gunman shooting from the balcony; of civilians fleeing; and of a line of fire being cleared into Rossville Street. That sets the scene for what was to happen at various locations down Rossville Street and in the area of the rubble barricade.
**Low Wall South of Kells Walk Ramp**
8A-81 The next area in which there is strong evidence of the activity of gunmen is at the wall south of the Kells Walk pram ramp, this is indicated with an arrow in photograph P259 below
8A-82 Father Thomas O’Gara and Marian McMenamin both observed a man with a handgun in this area. Father O’Gara stated in 1972:
*I took up position about 15 yards beyond the barricade on Rossville Street at the corner of the flats. My attention was drawn for some time by some soldiers in battle dress who were positioned beside a wall at the Free Derry Corner end of Kells Walk. One fired rubber bullets and the other got down on one knee several times pretending to fire.*
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68 A1.20.002 paragraph 7; confirmed Day 068/096 to Day 068/097 69 AO75.001 Father O'Gara then described stones being thrown from the barricade. The priest would not have seen the nail bomber at whom Corporal P fired first, positioned on the other side of the barricade and on the opposite side of the street from his location.
He continued:
The third incident which I can clearly recall happened about thirty seconds after the soldier discharged his shot. A young man appeared from the cathedral side of Kells Walk unknown and unseen by soldiers, drew a pistol from his pocket, leaned over a wall at the end of Kells Walk and fired three shots quickly. The soldiers didn't even recognise his presence and he disappeared. This was the only weapon I saw throughout that day. The man wore a longish coat...
The Cathedral referred to must be St Eugene's to the northwest of Kells Walk. The gunman would therefore have been approaching the wall from the west. The wall over which the gunman leant is likely to have been the low one running south from the Kells Walk ramp (indicated in the photograph above).
Marian McMenamin ran down Rossvilie Street as the military vehicles entered the road:
As we were running away, I saw a civilian with a gun. I have never told anybody about this before, not even my husband and we have been married for over 25 years. I feel disloyal to the innocent men who died on Bloody Sunday, but I did see him and I feel that the truth must now be told. The gunman was in an alleyway, near the pram ramp at the south gable end wall of Kells Walk. ... The man was at ground level in the area around the pram ramps, but not actually on the pram ramp. To the best of my recollection, he had his back to the gable end wall of Kells Walk. He was young, probably in his mid to late 20s, about 5'8'' tall, average build, dark hair and wearing dark clothing (3/4 black coat). He did not have his face covered with a mask or balaclava. He was on his own – there was no-one around him; he was just a single gunman. He had a quite big, squarish, hand gun in his right hand. He was holding the hand gun out in front of him, but not aiming it. I did not see him... fire it. He appeared from behind the wall, walked east towards Rossville Street, looked south towards the Rossville flats' shops and then withdrew again. I do not know where he went after that.71
8A-87 In oral evidence, Mrs McMenamin marked the gunman's position on a still from the Virtual Reality model a little further to the south.72 This represents the approximate position of the gunman when she first saw him: at the low wall running south from the Kells Walk ramp. (Mrs McMenamin agreed with Lord Saville that the gunman may in fact have been further south still, in the area of the alleyway between Glenfada Park North and Columbciille Court.73) He held the gun in his right hand and out in front of him in full view; others would have seen him as well.74
8A-88 A third witness may also have seen a gunman in the area of the low wall. Brigadier INQ 1383 was Assistant Provost Marshall at the time of Bloody Sunday and responsible for the provision of Royal Military Police support for the Army. He was in Londonderry on Bloody Sunday and followed the Pigs into Rossville Street on foot. From his position at the northern end of Rossville Street, he saw a gunman in a position similar to that of Mrs McMenamin and at a similar time:
... a man with what I thought was a pistol emerge from behind a wall then immediately withdraw. I cannot remember hearing a shot fired at that time so cannot say whether he fired the pistol. I have no other recollection of this incident and cannot recall accurately geographically where it occurred. I have been shown a map... which has persuaded me that the wall in question was somewhere further up and to the right in Rossville Street.75
8A-89 These three sightings were, therefore, of gunmen operating just around the corner from the positions taken up by P and 017 and a matter of a few metres from the next location considered, the alleyway in which 017 encountered his gunman.
71 AM363.002 paragraph 7 72 AM363.010 73 Day 194/211/20 74 Day 194/206/24 to Day 194/215/22 75 C1383.005 paragraph 14; confirmed at Day 304/130/19 Alley between Glenfada Park North and Columbcille Court
8A-90 Private 017 recorded in 1972 that after the incident with the nail bomber:
... the crowd ... went behind the barricade and continued to throw stones and bottles in our direction. Also bricks and stones and bottles were also being thrown at us by people who were running in and out of the alleyway leading to Columbcille Court. I noticed one man in particular who was throwing bricks from this position and I realized that I could arrest him. I therefore decided to run towards the alleyway. As I did so I saw a man walk around the corner towards me. From where I was he was about 15-20 metres away from me. He was aged about 20 and was wearing a blue shirt and a dark jacket. In his hand he had either a pistol or a revolver. I raised my baton gun and fired a round at him. I do not know if I hit him because my main concern was to get out of his line of fire so I turned and ran off back to where I had come from. As I did so I heard two small calibre weapon shots behind me as if the man had fired twice at me or other troops in my area.76
8A-91 017's current recollection is that:
... the youths doubled back and ran away and I saw a man with a pistol come around the corner, from the north east corner of Glenfada Park North, into the alleyway towards me. The gunman was about 20 – 30 yards from me.77
8A-92 He confirmed in his oral evidence to the Tribunal that he saw the gunman in the alleyway between Columbcille Court and Glenfada Park North.78 B1484.0035 is a still saved from the Virtual Reality model on which is marked with a red arrow the position from which he saw the gunman appear.79 It is transposed on to the diagram above.
8A-93 Michael Lynch lived in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and was making observations from that location on Bloody Sunday. At a stage before he became aware of any dead lying in the area of the rubble barricade, he saw a gunman in
76 B1484.015 paragraph 4 77 B1484.5 paragraph 29 78 Day 358/075 79 Day 358/075 to Day 358/079
7.1664 the alleyway between Glenfada Park North and Columbcille Court fire two shots at soldiers in Rossville Street:
I remember seeing a man with a handgun come out quickly from the north east side of Glenfada Park North at approximately the point marked B on the attached map... and fire 2 shots towards the soldiers in RS. I think the pistol was in his right hand. I do not think he had time to aim at anyone. He was wearing a Parka jacket and he had the hood up covering his head. From the way he moved I formed the impression that he was a young man. I cannot recall any further details about the man. As soon as he fired the shots, he ran away in the same direction from which he had come. I do not know what happened to the gunman after this.80
Margo Harkin, who was looking out of the west side of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, saw a gunman in the same alleyway. She was able to see two “very young men” running from the direction of the Little Diamond to a position which corresponds precisely with that given by 017 for the gunman he saw. Mrs Harkin’s BSI statement describes how:
40. They halted near the corner of the eastern wall of Glenfada Park – facing into Rossville Street with one behind the other – approx at point K on the map. They were very agitated and the one sheltering behind the other wanted to turn away almost immediately – I saw him pulling the other’s jacket.
41. The young man in the foreground was very angry and resisted. He then took a gun from the other man, which was delivered from inside this young man’s jacket. The man armed with the handgun went to the edge of the gable, ducked his head around the gable end to his right – and fired. I believe that he fired one shot randomly – I do not recall that he fired more than one but I can’t be sure – it all happened so fast.
42. Immediately after this the gun was thrust back at the other young man and they both ran away very fast the way they had come. They split off in two different directions and disappeared.81
80 AL38.002 paragraph 10; confirmed at Day 148/185/09 to Day 146/190/24 81 AH23.016 In oral evidence, she described a soldier on the west side of Rossville Street moving towards the rubble barricade, keeping close to a wall as he did so. The gunman fired in his direction, then turned and fled:
... I have to say we thought that he was firing at the soldier that we saw going along the wall, but I mean it was a, it was a really wild shot, you know. It seemed like that to me anyway, it was all very quick, it was just like you know shot -- there may have been more, I do not know, but it was just very quick and they were away. What I remember of this, is helpful, what I remember of this is that the soldier who I saw inching along the wall reacted and he was already turning back and these guys were gone, they were gone, like and I thought -- it was slow motion in my mind at the time.82
It is Mrs Harkin's current recollection that the soldier in question was south of the alley between Glenfada Park North and Columbcille Court and that the gunman fired in that direction (and so towards the rubble barricade). The Tribunal will need to decide whether she was correct in this element of her evidence or whether the soldier may have been in a position further north. Whatever conclusion it reaches, Mrs Harkin's account of a gunman firing a pistol in a cavalier fashion around a corner is in keeping with evidence of the way gunmen were operating in different parts of the Bogside on Bloody Sunday, from Father Daly's gunman's shots at the gable end of Chamberlain Street, to Kieran Gill's gunman in the doorway to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. These gunmen fired, from practically concealed positions, without taking the time or the trouble actually to aim at their intended targets. This should be borne in mind when the Tribunal considers how significant it is that members of 1 PARA were not themselves hit by such fire on Bloody Sunday whereas innocent civilians such as Mr Alex Nash, and possibly even Mrs Deery, may have been.
Liam Mailey may have heard the shots fired by one of the gunmen spotted in the alleyway between Glenfada Park North and Columbcille Court. He heard non-military, low calibre rounds being fired. He reported in 1972 that from his position just south of the rubble barricade he saw the Pigs come in and stop: After this there were rifle shots from the soldiers who had got out of their vehicle and I saw at least two people injured in the advancing crowd. The others got down. I moved across Rossville Street towards the flats and just behind the barricade. While I was crossing I heard three single shots which appeared to be of lower calibre than the rifle shots. They appeared to be fired from the area of Glenfada Park or Kells Walk. I cannot give the direction.83
In his BSI statement he repeated that he had heard low calibre shots (three or four of them):
which sounded to me like an air rifle being fired. I am certain that they were not high velocity rounds and I did not see any soldiers in the vicinity when I heard them...I think it was after the march had started because I remember thinking to myself that it was a particularly stupid time to be firing shots and that we don't need this in the middle of a Parade...I think the shots came from the area of either Glenfada Park North or, perhaps, the southern end of Columbille Court. I am not sure, but I think the latter is more likely.84
The location would correspond very closely to that in which Private 017, Michael Lynch and Margo Harkin all saw gunmen with handguns.
Ciaran Donnelly may also have heard rounds fired by one of these gunmen. He heard two shots at an early stage, from his position on the Glenfada Park South pram ramp overlooking the rubble barricade. This was before any soldier had fired at the rubble barricade. Mr Donnelly was asked at the Widgery Tribunal:
Q. Do you remember hearing any shots fired whilst you were there taking photographs?
A. Yes, there were a couple of bangs, a couple of shots; no-one fell at this time.
Q. Did you see who fired them?
8A-98
8A-99
8A-100
82 Day 416/027/05FF 83 M50.057 84 M50.002 paragraph 6; see now also Day 163/095-096 A. No, but they were fired from nearby, that is, for anyone in the crowd immediately below the pram ramp, at the barricade.85
8A-101 Mr Donnelly did not believe the gunfire came from an SLR or from a baton gun.86 He further suggested that the shots came from a position north of the rubble barricade. However, it was Mr Donnelly’s impression that they came from a soldier situated in the area of the “two APCs and one Ferret” which had drawn up in Rossville Street. That clearly was not the case; no soldier fired from that position and Mr Donnelly did not claim actually to have seen anyone fire from that location. Furthermore, shots which came neither from an SLR nor from a baton gun were not fired by a soldier.
8A-102 Therefore, two civilians, Mr Lynch and Ms Harkin, with close connections to the Bogside,87 speak of gunmen in precisely the position described by Soldier 017. Two further civilian witnesses may have heard shots fired by the gunmen. Whether or not Mr Lynch and Ms Harkin witnessed the same gunman as 017, it is now clear beyond any real doubt that this was an alley in use by armed civilians on Bloody Sunday.
8A-103 It was, incidentally, through this alleyway that OIRA7 passed, on his way from Glenfada Park North as the military vehicles arrived in Rossville Street. OIRA7’s movements are considered in chapter 9.
Glenfada Park North
8A-104 The potential significance of Glenfada Park North in relation to events concerning P and 017 should not be underestimated. This location provided an area of cover, shielded both from Rossville Street and the City Walls, in which gunmen could operate with more freedom than in most other Bogside locations. The alleyway in which Private 017 encountered his gunman fed into the north east corner of
85 M22.006 paragraph A 86 M22.009 paragraph E: Day 071/089/17 87 Mr Lynch lived in the Bogside; Mrs Harkin’s grandmother lived in the Rossville Flats. Glenfada Park North. The rubble barricade, where Corporal P engaged his gunman, was just a few metres away from the “gable end” (southern end) of its eastern block. In other words, it was a matter of a few seconds to move from Glenfada Park North to either of the positions in which P and 017 sighted gunmen.
Michael Kivelehan was in his grandmother’s flat in the “top right corner of top quadrangle” of Glenfada Park, i.e. the north east corner of Glenfada Park North (indicated as “9” on the Inquiry map, above). This was the part of Glenfada Park nearest to the alleyway in which 017, Michael Lynch and Margo Harkin all spotted men with handguns. It is, therefore, of some consequence that Mr Kivelehan was present when a man brought a handgun into the flat. He told John Goddard of PRAXIS, off the record, that a man with a shortarm in the flat had been disarmed and the weapon disposed of. Mr Goddard made a note of that conversation, which the Tribunal has at AK45.1.
Mr Kivelehan claims no longer to be able to recall this incident. However, he does not deny speaking to Mr Goddard in the terms recorded in the PRAXIS note of their conversation. He suggests, rather, that he may have been drunk when they spoke. It is, therefore, significant that, when Mr Kivelehan spoke to his brother-in-law, John McCourt, on a different occasion, he also mentioned that he had seen a gunman on Bloody Sunday. John Goddard has no difficulty recalling his conversation with Mr Kivelehan. It was tape recorded and some of the information he received at that time came also from Mr Kivelehan’s mother and sisters. The note he produced at AK45.1 was certainly an accurate representation of what he had been told.
______________________________________________________________________
8A-105
8A-106
88 Day 406/084/19 89 Day 406/084/25 90 Day 406/081/18 91 Day 423/103/24 92 Day 233/198/10 John Barry confirmed that he was the journalist who conducted a lengthy, tape recorded interview with Ivan Cooper. Mr. Barry was asked:
Q. .... Again, so far as this document is concerned, if we can go back to it, KC12.65, are you able to tell whether this would have been notes made from a tape-recording?
A. Yes, certainly a tape.
Q. Is that because of the length of it?
A. It is the length and the detail, and also there are various parts in it which are clearly verbatim and I would only have used verbatim material if it came from a tape.
During the interview, Mr Cooper purportedly referred to a gunman who was active in Glenfada Park on Bloody Sunday. The gunman had been “running around mad all afternoon” with a revolver. That description would certainly fit the way in which the gunmen witnessed by P, 017 and others had been acting. The notes record that:
IC had seen the Officials in the march. But nowhere else. And IC only heard later that OIRA6 had fired a revolver in Glenfada Park. CIV2 told IC that OIRA6 had been running around mad with a pistol all afternoon. CIV2 says he fired very early.
The notes themselves have caused a strong reaction in those concerned. Mr Cooper has described them as “poisonous and disturbing” and rejected them in their entirety. CIV2 has described Mr Cooper as “a fantastic liar.” Much will, therefore, turn on the Tribunal’s assessment of the witnesses.
For his part, John Barry has stated “I am sure we made mistakes. But we did not invent things.” Barry’s note, however, was not where mistakes were made; it did not contain fabricated information. The fact that he was working from a tape recording of the interview makes it unlikely that he failed accurately to record in his note what Mr. Cooper had told him.
8A-111 There is further important evidence relating to the activity of gunmen in Glenfada Park North, which is considered in detail chapter 9. It relates to the presence of a car containing weapons in Glenfada Park North and the deployment of members of the Official IRA in that location. Crucially, at least one of these men may have been armed with a handgun.
**Rubble Barricade**
8A-112 There is also strong evidence of the presence at the rubble barricade of at least one person with a handgun. Corporal P, two Gunners situated on the City Walls and an Anti Tank Platoon Lieutenant all give evidence of this. What is more, two Sunday Times journalists found in 1972 that persuasive evidence existed of the presence of a gun at this location.
8A-113 It was Corporal P's evidence in 1972 that "several moments" after the incident with the nail bomber:
> several shots came close to us from the direction of the barricade... I observed a man crouching behind the barricade. I cannot recall what he looked like or what he was wearing. He was holding something, which I took to be a pistol. He then stood up and pointed the region down Rossville Street and fired a number of shots although I could not say how many. I then knelt down and took aim and fired four shots at him, one of which hit the barricade. The man behind the barricade fell to the ground. At that time there were no other people in my line of fire."
8A-114 Corporal P was, therefore, faced with a situation in which he had to react to a gunman who was putting his colleagues in Rossville Street in danger. Soldier P was himself in danger, in his exposed position alongside the Kells Walk ramp
______________________________________________________________________
99 B623.012
§ 7.1671
VIII 44 wall. In the circumstances, there was no choice but to take rapid and decisive action. Such action was anticipated and permitted by the "Yellow Card" rules of engagement, which have been considered in relation to the shots fired by P at the nail bomber, above.
8A-115 Corporal P described to Lord Widgery what happened after his engagement with the gunman:
When he fell I stopped firing and then a group of people came out from the Glenfada Park area and ran across the road towards Rossville Flats, and one or two of them came in the direction of the barricade. They picked up something, which I think was a pistol, but I could not be certain, and carried it over to the area of the Rossville Flats.100
8A-116 Gunner 101 (22 Lt AD Regiment, Royal Artillery) was on duty at the base of the Walker Memorial on the City Walls. This soldier, with no connection to the Parachute Regiment, saw a gunman at the barricade who may have been the one engaged by P:
... I heard a pistol being fired and I observed a man at the barricade in Rossville Street shooting at a APC (pig) parked near Rossville Street. He fired about five shots and I then heard a 7.62 rifle being fired and the man at the barricade was hit.101
8A-117 Lieutenant 119 also recalled seeing a gunman fire at soldiers from the area of the barricade. In 1972 he reported to the RMP how, from a position at the south end of Kells Walk:
I then heard a number of shots, from what sounded like a pistol, and also from an M1 rifle... From my observation of the origin of the shots I can state the following: The weapon which sounded like a pistol was located at ground level at the corner of Glenfada Park Flats, about 30 metres ahead and to my right at MR 43221684. I saw distinct muzzle flashes, but not the actual weapon or the person holding it. He was obviously aiming quickly around the corner of this building without exposing himself at all ... I noticed that it was
100 B623.021 paragraph A 101 1670 possible to get into Glenfada Park from an entrance directly to my right. I sent E and F together with a party of men around the right of Glenfada Park...
8A-118 He confirmed his account to Lord Widgery:
A. In fact, our initial reason for taking up cover there [Kells Walk wall] was that we were fired on there. If I can show you on the model, it was from this corner of the building on Glenfada Park.
Q. The south-east corner
LORD WIDGERY: very near the barricade?
A. Yes sir, that is right ... this weapon here, I think, being a pistol of some kind, certainly a hand held weapon which was fired round the corner. The firer, of course, I was unable to see ...
...
A. It was a pistol, I think, sir. I could see the muzzle flashes. It was certainly a weapon that was easy to put round the corner without the firer being observed by me ...
Q. You could see the muzzle flashes from there?
A. Yes sir.
Q. How many shots were fired?
A. Three or four rounds of fire that I observed.
Q. In your direction?
A. Yes sir, the rounds passed overhead.
Q. The rounds passed overhead?
A. Yes sir.
8A-119 Gunner 012 (22 LAD RA) was positioned at the left hand side of the Charlie OP. His task was to observe with binoculars what was taking place below him. He stated in 1972 that:
______________________________________________________________________
102 B1443 103 B1456 paragraph B; see now also Day 363/130/19 About 4.15 I saw a large crowd of youths running from Free Derry Corner towards the barricade in Rossville Street. When they reached the barricade I could [see] that one of the youths was holding a pistol. There is no doubt in my mind. Then I heard a burst of low velocity automatic fire which sounded to me like a Thompson coming from the direction of Columbille Court or Glenfada Park. Immediately after this the youths who were at the barricade turned and ran back down Rossville Street towards Free Derry Corner but ran off up side streets in all directions. I did not see the youth with the pistol again.\\textsuperscript{104}
8A-120 The finding of the Sunday Times Insight article of 23\\textsuperscript{rd} April, 1972, was that:
There is persuasive, though not conclusive, evidence that a pistol then appeared at the barricade and was used.\\textsuperscript{105}
8A-121 Insight journalist Peter Pringle stood by that finding in oral evidence to this Tribunal and accepted that it would have been based on corroborated information, otherwise it would not have been included in the final article.\\textsuperscript{106}
8A-122 The BSI statement of the Insight editor, John Barry, records that:
I also seem to recall there were indications that a pistol had been passed from hand to hand and most likely fired from the rubble barricade on Rossville Street or close behind it.\\textsuperscript{107}
8A-123 In oral evidence he expressed the belief that the note would not have been based only on the evidence of soldiers. Frustratingly, he could not remember of what the non-military evidence consisted.\\textsuperscript{108}
8A-124 It was, incidentally, OIRA1's evidence that he left Glenfada Park North and moved to the rubble barricade. His activities and movements are discussed in detail in chapter 9.
\\textsuperscript{104} B1403; see now B1405.010 paragraph 37 \\textsuperscript{105} L213 \\textsuperscript{106} Day 191/031/02; Day 191/030/10 \\textsuperscript{107} M3.006 paragraph 21 \\textsuperscript{108} Day 193/108/16 The Tribunal also has strong evidence that a member of the Official IRA had been firing from block 1 with a pistol. A member of the Official IRA, with whom the journalist Kieran Gill spoke, confirmed that he had fired three or four shots with a revolver from the doorway of block 1 towards soldiers in Rossville Street. This incident is considered in greater detail in our closing submissions relating to Private U, below. The presence of a civilian within a few metres of the rubble barricade, firing a handgun, is further evidence that this was an area of great danger for the soldiers in and to either side of Rossville Street.
**Gunmen Conclusion**
Sightings of gunmen armed with handguns were made in many locations, from Kells Walk to the area south of the rubble barricade. It is highly significant that much of the relevant evidence comes from civilians, who had no reason to invent or imagine such things and even less to give false accounts of them. The pressures on civilian witnesses to omit references to gunmen in their accounts of Bloody Sunday is an issue that is addressed in Chapter 2.
Marian McMenamin articulated her crisis of conscience in deciding whether to come forward with such information:
> As we were running away I saw a civilian with a gun. I hate myself for saying this; I have never told anybody about this before, not even my husband and we have been married for over 25 years. I feel disloyal to the innocent men who died on Bloody Sunday, but I did see him and I feel the truth must now be told.
Her experience was probably not unique. That being the case, it is particularly significant that so many civilian witnesses have spoken of gunmen in areas close... to where P and 017 deployed and themselves observed gunmen. Other important evidence comes from soldiers in units with no connections to the 1 PARA.
8A-129 In several instances, witnesses observed gunmen fire in the direction of the military. This was the situation into which P and 017 were placed and the background against which their accounts must be considered.
8A-VIII UNIDENTIFIED CASUALTIES
8A-130 Civilian evidence suggests that more people were wounded or killed in the area of the rubble barricade than those identified to date. The existence of unidentified, "missing" casualties may provide an explanation for what happened to the gunman and, possibly, the nail bomber, shot by P. Evidence that bodies of casualties, other than the known Sector 3 deceased and wounded, were removed from the relevant area was considered as early as May 2000 by Christopher Clarke QC in his Summary of Civilian Evidence in relation to the Barricade Deaths. That evidence is considered in detail, below.
8A-131 For the purposes of these submissions it is enough to refer, by way of example, to Robert Wallace's description of what he observed shortly after Michael Kelly's body was carried from the rubble barricade into Glenfada Park North. His BSI statement contains this account:
A few seconds later, a second young man was carried around the gable end from the barricade. I have no idea who he was. He was about 17 or 18 and was a bit smaller than Michael Kelly, but I cannot recall any other details about him. Although he was not moving at all, I saw no wound or blood on him. I was still so shocked by the sight of Michael Kelly that I did not pay much attention to this second man.
8A-132 The only casualty to be carried from the barricade into Glenfada Park North, whose identity is known, was Michael Kelly. The identity of the second person
111 TempD16.007 paragraph 2(6) 112 AW3.002 paragraph 8 Mr. Wallace observed is, therefore, unknown. Nor can we say what he was doing before he was carried away from the barricade. Mr. Wallace was asked for further details about this person during the course of his oral evidence:
Q. What makes you think he was a teenager or 17 or 18? A. He seemed to have longish hair, it was black hair.
Q. Black hair? A. Yeah.
Q. You say you did not see his face; was he being carried face up or face down? A. His face was down, facing down, yeah.
Q. How many people were carrying him? A. There was 2.
Q. Did you know either of those people? A. No, I did not.
Q. Can you describe either of them at all to us? A. Not really.
Q. Are they young or old? A. I would say they were in their twenties.
Q. Both men? A. Yeah.
Q. Can you say whether they were dark or fair? A. I think they were sorta darkish.
Q. Had you ever seen either of their faces anywhere around Derry before? A. No, I did not.
Q. Have you ever seen either of them since? 8A-IX MISSING PHOTOGRAPHS
8A-133 Significant photographs taken in Sector 3, and particularly of the rubble barricade, are missing.
8A-134 The issues of missing photographs is fully address in Chapter 2C-352 – 384. For the reasons there set out we submit, in conclusion that many Sector 3 photographs are now missing, particularly those taken in the area of the rubble barricade. There is now strong evidence that photographers were approached shortly after Bloody Sunday by members of the Provisional IRA and that photographs may have been suppressed at this stage. Other photographs have, apparently, suffered a variety of fates. Some were lent to a journalist but never returned, others were destroyed in a flood. There is also now compelling evidence that two further photographers were active in Sector 3. They have yet to be identified and only one of their photographs has reached the Tribunal. The fate of the rest of their work is unknown. It is clear that Tribunal cannot assume that the photographs which remain tell the whole story of what took place in this part of the Bogside. The Tribunal has been deprived of evidence and the fact that there has been suppression must lead to the conclusion that some at least of that evidence would have been very material to an understanding of events within Sector 3.
8A-X SOLDIERS P AND 017 MOVEMENT EAST
8A-135 Corporal P ordered Private 017 to move back across Rossville Street to the cover of their Pig. In 1972 he described his own movements:
I followed on behind him. When I was halfway across a group of people came out from Glenfada Park area and started coming down the road towards the barricade. Most of then were again throwing missiles at myself, the soldier who had been with me and
113 Day 154/138/21
§ 7.1678
VIII 51 at the vehicle. I thought the crowd was coming too close for comfort so I knelt down in the street and fired three shots over the heads of the crowd in an attempt to disperse them. There would have been no-one in my line of fire. I then reached the cover of the vehicle.\\textsuperscript{114}
8A-136 Private 017 confirmed in his BSI statement that:
\\textit{Having seen the gunman, I decided to go back to the pig ... to get my rifle. As I was going back, I saw soldiers along the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, looking down the west and east sides of that block. There were still people at the rubble barricade but not as many. By then I had heard shots but I do not know where they came from or at whom they were fired. I did not hear any explosions.}\\textsuperscript{115}
8A-137 P's shots into the air were fired while he was withdrawing from an exposed position. He was faced with a resurgence of activity in the area of the rubble barricade and had no more than seconds in which to decide how to respond. The only weapon available to him was his SLR. He chose to take action that would cause those advancing to stop, whilst firing in a way that would not actually put them in danger. His actions were justified in the circumstances.
8A-XI SOLDIER P: VEHICLE ESCORT TO ALTNAGELVIN
8A-138 Corporal P was later ordered to act as escort to Lieutenant N's Pig as it took the bodies of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid to Altnagelvin Hospital.\\textsuperscript{116}
8A-XII SOLDIER P'S STATE OF RECOLLECTION
8A-139 This Inquiry is being held long after the event, in circumstances where the majority of the soldiers in question has long since left the Army and pursued different lives as civilians. P explains:
\\textsuperscript{114} B623.013 \\textsuperscript{115} B1484.005 paragraph 33 \\textsuperscript{116} B623.013; B623.002 paragraph 14 After I left the army, I put my years of service to the back of my mind and forgot about them. I don’t see anyone from the army and I don’t go to reunions; I have just got on with my life and work.\\textsuperscript{117}
Some of the soldiers, particularly those serving in 1 PARA, served for a long time in the Army and lived through a number of different experiences. These included, in the case of Corporal P, three tours of duty to Northern Ireland during a service of fourteen years.\\textsuperscript{118} He would have been involved in numerous incidents, both in Northern Ireland and elsewhere.
P signed his BSI statement on 25\\textsuperscript{th} July 2000, twenty-eight and a half years after Bloody Sunday. There was then a further delay of approximately three years before he was called to give oral evidence, on 30\\textsuperscript{th} June 2003.
None of this is Soldier P’s fault. It has, however, made it very difficult for him to recall what took place on Bloody Sunday. The Tribunal has the benefit of the accounts given by him in 1972. He invites the Tribunal to consider his evidence to Lord Widgery in particular:
\\textit{The matters contained in the transcript are the matters that I wish to rely on as my evidence to the Tribunal. The reason for this is that although I cannot recall giving the evidence or saying these words, I understand that someone took down what I said word for word. If this is the case, then I am happiest with the contents of this as I can be certain that it accurately records what I said.}\\textsuperscript{119}
More generally, the difficulties experienced by witnesses who have been required to recall, approximately three decades after the event, what took place on Bloody Sunday are considered in chapter 2, above.
\\textsuperscript{117} 623.001 paragraph 1 \\textsuperscript{118} 623.001 paragraph 2 \\textsuperscript{119} B623.004 paragraph 28 8A-XIII SOLDIER U'S ENGAGEMENT
8A-144 We return now to events concerning Soldier U who, having handed over his arrestee, took up a position at the north-west corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.\\textsuperscript{120}
8A-145 U described in the statement he gave for the purposes of the Widgery Tribunal that he had been at the corner for about two minutes:
\\ldots when I saw five or six men walking across from Glenfada Park towards Rossville Flats behind the barricade. I saw one of these men had a pistol. He had a light blue jacket on. The other men moved away from him as though they were surprised he had a pistol. He fired two shots in quick succession in the direction of the opposite side of Rossville Street from where I was standing where there were soldiers.\\textsuperscript{121}
8A-146 U described the same incident in similar terms in his BSI statement:
A group of men came out from the Glenfada Park area and headed east across Rossville Street towards Block 1 of the Rossville Flats... They were on the South side of the Rubble Barricade. They were walking, but quickly. Quite suddenly, a guy in the middle of the group stopped, turned quickly to face the Rubble Barricade, pulled out a pistol, raised the pistol in both hands as if trying to get a sight and fired two quick shots. He was not shooting at me. I can only assume that he thought he was shielded because of the lie of the ground. He certainly didn't see me. He appeared to be shooting towards Kells Walk where there were some other paras. As he did so, others in the group he was with seemed to scatter very quickly, as if they did not want anything to do with him. I would say the gunman was in his early thirties or possibly his late twenties... \\textsuperscript{122}
\\textsuperscript{120} B787.5 paragraph 27 \\textsuperscript{121} B787.20 \\textsuperscript{122} B787.5 paragraph 30 LOCATION OF GUNMAN
8A-147 The location of the gunman, south of Block 1, was indicated on Private U’s trajectory photograph.123
That location was confirmed by him during his evidence to Lord Widgery.124 The marking on the trajectory photograph also corresponds with that on his “RMP map.”125
In oral evidence to this Tribunal, U agreed that the 1972 accounts as to the location of the gunman were likely to be correct.126 He indicated the approximate position of the gunman and the direction in which the gunman was facing on a photograph.127 We have reproduced his marking on P203, below:
123 B787 124 B787.31 paragraphs B to C 125 B787.15 126 Day 369/082/17 127 B787.39, blue arrow. The gunman was facing down the road and firing at soldiers situated on the other side of Rossville Street from U.\\textsuperscript{128}
**SOLDIER U’S SHOT**
8A-151 Soldier U’s statement to the Widgery Inquiry describes how he responded:
> Then I was in a standing aiming position. I took off my safety catch and aimed for the centre of his body. I fired one round. He fell backwards and the man behind him clutched his [own] head.\\textsuperscript{129}
8A-152 He described his response in a similar way in his BSI statement:
> I cannot remember if my weapon was already cocked, but I think it already was. I took the safety catch off and I fired one single aimed shot at the gunman. I aimed at the centre of his body and I hit him centrally somewhere. He went down immediately. I still have a horrible mental picture of him falling.\\textsuperscript{130}
8A-153 He had a brief period of time in which to decide how to respond to the threat posed to his colleagues on the west side of Rossville Street and he reacted appropriately in all of the circumstances by firing a single round from the only weapon he had available, his SLR. He explained concisely to the Tribunal that:
\\textsuperscript{128} Day 369/085/01 \\textsuperscript{129} B787.20, the word in square brackets has been added to the statement in manuscript \\textsuperscript{130} B787.6 paragraph 31 I had a clear, well-aimed shot and I took the decision there and then.\\textsuperscript{131}
8A-154 Soldier U accepted from the first that his single round may have hit two people. However, there is no known corresponding second casualty, nor did he observe a wound on the man who had clutched his head.\\textsuperscript{132}
8A-155 The gunman at whom Private U fired wore a light blue jacket, was in his late twenties or early thirties and was shot to the south of the Rossville Flats. He relates to none of the identified Sector 3 deceased or wounded.
8A-156 Two other soldiers gave information in 1972 that support the account given by Soldier U. Captain 028 was the 22 LAD RA Press Officer. The description he gave in 1972 of a gunman to the south of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats has particular similarities with that given by U. The “SA” statement 028 gave for the purposes of the Widgery Inquiry described how:
\\textit{... I saw a man come out from behind the far end of Block 1 of Rossville Flats with a pistol in his hand but he must have been shot as I saw him fall. Two civilians who had been standing nearby walked over to this man and appeared to be shielding him. One of them fell at virtually the same moment as the gunman and the second picked up his pistol and ran off behind Rossville Flats.}\\textsuperscript{133}
8A-157 Private 032 of Guinness Force saw a gunman with a pistol in the same area as the gunman U engaged, though clearly not at the same time. In 1972 he stated that from his position at the wall at the south end of the Kells Walk building:
\\textit{... I ... saw a man with a pistol run in front of a crowd which had assembled on Rossville Street about ten metres south of the South West corner of Block 1. The man ran in a westerly direction and vanished into the flats in Glenfada Park.}\\textsuperscript{134}
\\textsuperscript{131} Day 369/088/09 \\textsuperscript{132} Day 369/087/14; Day 369/088/13 \\textsuperscript{133} B1582.12 \\textsuperscript{134} B1614 We have already referred to the many sightings made along Rossville Street of gunmen carrying pistols and to the existence in this part of the Bogside of unidentified, “missing” casualties. The submissions we have made above are relevant also to the issue of the gunman engaged by Soldier U.
Arthur Harvey QC questioned Soldier U on the basis that, on a fair interpretation of his evidence, he must have shot Hugh Gilmore. That is not the case. There are significant differences between the circumstances in which Hugh Gilmore was shot and those in which U fired at a gunman south of Block 1. Indeed, the differences are such as to preclude the possibility that Soldier U was responsible for Hugh Gilmore’s death. The uncertainty in the evidence generally, however, makes it impossible to determine which soldier (or soldiers) did shoot Hugh Gilmore.
There is disagreement even as to the number of rounds that hit Mr Gilmore, the expert evidence being divided as to whether he was shot once or twice.
The injuries sustained by Hugh Gilmore are set out in the autopsy report prepared by Dr Derek Carson and described in the report prepared for the Tribunal by Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan. The easiest way to understand the location of the injuries is to refer to the photographs.
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135 Day 369/162/07 136 D180 137 Report on the Pathology and Ballistic Evidence following the Bloody Sunday Shootings, E2.58 paragraph 7.13 There is no dispute that the injury on the ulna (little finger) side of the left forearm is an entry wound and that the other injury marks the exit of the bullet from the arm.\\textsuperscript{142}
Dr Carson suggests that the bullet which exited the arm then entered the trunk. He therefore, contends that the injury to the left side of the trunk is an entrance wound and that to the right side marks the exit of the bullet from the trunk. On
\\textsuperscript{138} P100 \\textsuperscript{139} P101 \\textsuperscript{140} P99 \\textsuperscript{141} P100 \\textsuperscript{142} D180: E2.58 paragraph 7.13.1 this hypothesis, Mr Gilmore was struck by a single round passing from left to right. The autopsy report explained:
All four wounds could be brought into line when the left forearm was semi-flexed at the elbow with the upper arm almost alongside the body and the palm facing the lower abdomen. The track through the body then passed horizontally from left to right with a slight inclination backwards.
Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan disagree. They suggest that the injury on the right side of the trunk is an entry wound and that on the left side an exit wound. On this hypothesis Hugh Gilmore was struck by two bullets, one of which hit the left forearm, the other entering the right side of the chest. They add:
The forearm is an extremely mobile part of the body and it is not possible to give any indication of its position when struck. The mobility is so great that the shot that struck the forearm could have come from almost any position around the body. Clearly the shot to the chest, if we are correct in the orientation of this shot, has come from a point to the right of the chest at the moment of discharge.
The Tribunal is, therefore, faced with conflicting theories. Neither will assist it in determining the location of the soldier (or soldiers) who shot Hugh Gilmore without compelling evidence as to his location and orientation at the time he was shot. It is thus necessary to turn to the civilian evidence in this regard.
CIVILIAN EVIDENCE
Christopher Clarke QC's Summary of Evidence in Relation to the Death of Hugh Gilmore and Kevin McElhinney is "an attempt at some from of synthesis of the civilian evidence" seen by the Inquiry as at the date of its drafting. It observes that:
______________________________________________________________________
143 D180 to D181; Dr Carson's evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was consistent with that he gave in 1972: D535 paragraph 13, D537.1, Day 229/012/04 144 E2.61 145 E2.61; this conclusion remained unaltered by Dr Shepherd's oral evidence to the Tribunal: Day 299/013-015 146 Temporary Document 18, dated 01.06.00. there is considerable disagreement between the various accounts of the shooting of Hugh Gilmore...\\textsuperscript{147}
8A-167 The document was prepared at an early stage in the proceedings, but accurately summarises the current position in relation to the civilian evidence. That body of evidence has remained contradictory and confused.
8A-168 For the purposes of these submissions, we consider the civilian evidence relating to Mr Gilmore’s location and orientation at the time he was shot.
\\textit{Location}
\\textbf{At Rubble Barricade facing North}
8A-169 Sean MacDermott’s evidence in 1972 suggested that Hugh Gilmore was on the barricade looking north at the time he received the shot to his chest. His statement includes this description:
\\ldots Hugh Gilmore emerged from the main door of the High Flats on Rossville St. He moved past towards the mound of rubble which formed a barricade across Rossville St. He got on top of the barricade and someone shouted “They’re shooting live ammunition.” When I heard this I crouched and looked round and Hugh Gilmore jumped up clutching the bottom of his stomach shouting “I’m hit, I’m hit.” I thought he had been hit by a rubber bullet so a friend of mine Francis Mellon and myself got hold of him and assisted him around the corner of the Flats on the side nearest Free Derry Corner. As we got round the corner he collapsed.\\textsuperscript{148}
8A-170 Note that Mr MacDermott’s current recollection is a little different. It is of first seeing Hugh Gilmore at approximately the time he cried out that he was hit, when he was just south of the barricade and making his way south.\\textsuperscript{149}
\\textsuperscript{147} TmpD18.1 \\textsuperscript{148} AM4.11 \\textsuperscript{149} AM4.3 paragraph 17; Day 144/060/01 Conversely, James Donal Deeney initially suggested that he had seen Hugh Gilmore only after he had been shot. That changed with his BSI statement, in which he claimed that Mr Gilmore was at the barricade, facing north when he was shot:
12. I saw Gillie around the entrance of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats... He started gesticulating and shouting at me, and to others, shouting such things as "Stand your ground" and urging people to follow him towards the Rubble Barricade... As we came out of Block 1, people were fleeing away from the army and were clambering southwards over the Rubble Barricade. There was a disorganized multitude of people. I followed Gillie towards the Barricade. He was waving his arms and gesticulating as he went. There were still quite a number of people at the Barricade ready to face the army down. There were always about 10-20 rioters ready to coax the army into action...
13. ...I remember Gillie getting right up to the Barricade and he may have clambered on it, a step or two. He then turned around to me and said he had been shot. Just before he had been shot he was still remonstrating and waving his arms around, but I do not have a recollection of him throwing any stones...
This version of events, therefore, describes Hugh Gilmore turning to Mr Deeney after he had been shot.
James Greene is another witness suggesting that Hugh Gilmore was at the barricade facing north when he was shot. His BSI statement includes this description of events:
11. I thought perhaps it might be safer to move away from the Rubble Barricade. Before doing so, I remember bending down to pick up another stone. As I stood up, the young boy beside me (who I didn't know at the time but who I now know to be Hugh Gilmore) said "Jesus, I've been hit"... He and I then turned, with our backs to the soldiers, and ran south down Rossville Street towards the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats... I started running level
______________________________________________________________________
150 AD26.5 paragraph 21 151 AD26.11 paragraphs 12 to 13: Deeney confirmed this was an accurate summary at Day 086/146/15. with the boy but I must have overtaken him because I got to the entrance before he did. As I turned around, I could see him running towards me. He was slowing down as he ran...
12. As Hugh Gilmore reached the entrance to Block 1, I and three or four other people helped him by lifting his legs clear of the ground and carrying him down the Rossville Street side of Block 1 and round to the gable end of that block... 152
The account given by Eamon Melaugh in 1972 makes it clear that Hugh Gilmore was at the barricade, facing north when he was shot:
I found myself standing at the barricade outside the Rossville Street Flats... I was facing the Army and watching the members of the Security Forces fire their self-loading rifles. Most of the shots that I seen fired were being fired from waist level and weren't deliberately aimed. Two shots rang out, the lad standing beside me... who I now know to be Hugh Gilmore lurched forward from the waist. He said "I've been hit Eamon, I'm hit"; meaning that he was shot. I looked at him, there was an expression of amazement, total amazement on his face. He turned round and ran up the street away from the barricade and from the soldiers. I ran after him... 153
Mr Melaugh's current recollection is, however, that Hugh Gilmore was walking south when he was shot, a version of events we refer to below, 154 although he also accepts that the 1972 account might be the more accurate one. 155
According to PIRA 14's BSI statement, he, his brother and Colm Keenan were all at the rubble barricade at the same time as Hugh Gilmore. 156 PIRA 14, his brother and Mr Keenan were all members of the Provisional IRA. 157
PIRA 14's attention was drawn to a soldier on the west side of Rossville Street in front of a ramp near Kells Walk, who opened fire in the direction of Free Derry Corner. 158
152 AG54.3 paragraphs 11 to 12; see also Day 149/014/20 to Day 149/016/02. 153 AM397.70; he gave a similar account to the Sunday Times, AM397.24. 154 AM397.4 paragraphs 38 to 41 155 Day 143/039/07 156 APIRA14.3 paragraph 18 The same soldier then turned his rifle in an arc, so it was pointing in my general direction. I then saw the gun recoil so I am sure that he fired the weapon. I think he fired two shots. As he did so, a young man standing in front of me, just to my right, clutched his stomach in a spasm. I later learned that this was Hugh Gilmore. I have been asked whether I can recall what he was doing just before he was shot. I think he was shouting at the soldiers who had made their way to the end of Block I of the Flats. He may also have been throwing a stone at them, but I cannot be absolutely sure about this. As soon as he had been hit, he turned and ran alongside the Flats in the direction of Free Derry Corner...
PIRA 14 added that “Hugh Gilmore was either on the barricade itself, or just on the William Street side of the barricade standing on some rubble when he was shot.” His evidence is, therefore, clear that Mr Gilmore was facing north at the time he was shot. It further suggests that the shot that hit him at this stage penetrated his chest.
PIRA 14 was asked by Edwin Glasgow QC:
Q. So that is three members of the IRA standing in the immediate proximity of Mr Gilmore when he is shot?
A. Yes.
Q. That is right. Is your evidence still that none of them was armed?
A. Yes. Moving and Facing South
1. North of Rubble Barricade
8A-180 There is then a body of evidence suggesting that Hugh Gilmore was not facing north when he was shot. On the contrary, it suggests he was facing south and moving in the direction of Free Derry Corner. These witnesses are divided as to whether Hugh Gilmore was north or south of the rubble barricade when shot.
8A-181 Geraldine McBride (née Richmond) gave an account in 1972 of the shooting of Hugh Gilmore north of the rubble barricade, as he moved south. The account suggests that the bullet which hit him entered his chest:
We were standing around there in the waste ground for a short time when a man came down Rossville Street with a loud hailer announcing that there was a meeting at Free Derry Corner... The crowd started to move from the waste ground towards Free Derry Corner. I then heard shouting “they’re in – they’re in”, and the crowd started to run... The people were in a panic; some kept running, some stopped and were looking back, nobody could believe that the soldiers were shooting real bullets. I started to run again towards Free Derry Corner and there was a group of people around me. There was a boy on my left and he shouted “I’m hit – I’m hit”. I later learned this boy was Hugh Gilmour (sic). He was holding his stomach and still running. I grabbed hold of him by the right arm and shouted to “keep running”. At this time we were running past the front of the High Flats. Hugh Gilmour was now stumbling along. I remember seeing a photographer – a man standing in... the main entrance to the Rossville Flats with a camera hanging around his neck. As we were passing the main entrance Hugh Gilmour again shouted out “I’m hit”... When Hugh Gilmore shouted to the photographer I called to him “it’s alright I am getting him round the corner to safety”... I got Hugh Gilmore round the corner of the High Flats, I wasn’t able to hold him up and he collapsed. I opened the front of his shirt to see if maybe I could stop the... blood coming out of the wound. I saw the wound on each side of his stomach... 163
163 AM45.30 There have been variations in the evidence given by Mrs McBride. Another account she gave in 1972 suggested that, in fact, she became separated from Hugh Gilmore after they had got through the barricade. Her current recollection is still that Mr Gilmore was shot as he moved and faced south, but that he was south of the barricade at the time he was hit. We refer to this evidence below.
Eamon Melaugh’s present recollection is that Mr Gilmore was shot north of the barricade as he walked with a small group of people in the direction of Free Derry Corner. His BSI statement contains the following description of events:
39. One of the group was a young man (whom I later found out was Hugh Gilmore) who quite suddenly bent over slightly at the waist and clutched his right elbow to his side...
... 40. Mr Gilmore looked into my eyes and said “I’m hit. I’m hit”... when I read the expression on his face I realised he’d actually been shot so I ran after him as he continued towards Free Derry Corner.
Mr Melaugh gave a similar account in oral evidence to the Tribunal. However, he had suggested something very different in 1972, namely, that Hugh Gilmore was at the barricade facing north when he was shot. We have already referred to that version of events above.
2. South of the Rubble Barricade
Frankie Mellon saw Hugh Gilmore run over the barricade towards William Street, throw a stone and turn and ran back in the direction of Free Derry Corner. Mr. Mellon was also running south:
______________________________________________________________________
164 WT Day 6, page 49 paragraph E to page 50 paragraph A 165 AM397.4 166 Day 143/036/06 to Day 143/037/07 167 AM397.70 168 AM399.3 paragraphs 13 to 14 16. Just as I reached the Rubble Barricade I heard two high velocity shots... I think they were probably from the same weapon. I would say they were close, from behind me and slightly to my right...
17. When I heard the two shots Hugh Gilmore was running fast, directly in front of me looking straight ahead. He was about three feet or so in front of me and had just got over the Rubble Barricade. The second shot hit him and as it did so he jumped up with the force, grasped his right side and said “I’ve been hit”. He kept on running: it was the momentum that kept him going... After he had been shot he took a few steps and then started to stumble forward. I caught up with him at the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. I was on his right hand side so that he was between me and Block 1... I took his coat and pulled him round the corner of Block 1... 169
8A-186 Mr Mellon’s account is, therefore, is of Hugh Gilmore running south and, at a position just south of the barricade, being hit by a round which seems to have struck his right side. 170
8A-187 Mrs McBride’s 1972 accounts have been referred to above. Her recollection is now that Hugh Gilmore was shot south of the rubble barricade, rather than north, but she maintains that he was moving south when he was shot:
14. ...As we were running past Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, Hugh was running close to the wall and I was running to his right, slightly behind him. As we were running, he was cursing and said “The bastards are killing us”.
15. ...Hugh and I stumbled over the barricade as best we could... Hugh was still to my left and in front as he was faster than me and got over first. As we were crossing the shooting was fierce...
16. When we got over the Rubble Barricade we continued running towards Free Derry Corner. Hugh was running on the pavement close to the wall of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. I was still to his right and slightly behind him, about six feet away from the wall of
169 AM399.4
170 Hugh Gilmore’s position when struck was described by Mellon in oral evidence to the Tribunal as being just south of the rubble barricade or “slightly over it”, Day 151/142/07. Block 1... I do not know whether Hugh was still holding one of the stones he had picked up...
17. When I was at approximately the point marked E on the attached plan [south of the barricade and close to the western side of Block 1] I heard two shots which came from my right. I felt the bullets rush past in front of me. I heard Hugh gasp. He said he had been hit... I ran on. He continued a few paces after he had been shot. He was crouched over slightly... 171
8A-188 In an important paragraph of her statement she makes it clear that Hugh Gilmore was facing south when he was shot; he did not turn:
18. As we were running down Rossville Street towards Free Derry Corner everyone was turning and looking around. In that situation you concentrate on what is happening in front of you. You are not really aware of what is going on around you. I was looking around in case I needed to duck or lie down. Although I was turning as I ran, my eyes were on Hugh when he was hit. He was running straight towards Free Derry Corner and was not turning. I didn't see the soldier who shot him but I believe the shot came from my right, from the Glenfada Park area to the west of Rossville Street... 172
8A-189 According to his BSI statement, Michael McCusker was running south from the rubble barricade when he saw a group of people ahead of him making for the Block 1 doorway:
One of them was a small youth aged about 17... who I did not know. He was about three people ahead of me. I saw him put his right hand to his back, stagger and fall forward... This must have been when he was shot and I thought that the shot must have come from further north in Rossville Street, but I did not see who fired it because I was running in the opposite direction. The youth got to the doorway where he was grabbed by four or five men and dragged round the corner by the southern end of Block 1... 173
8A-190 It is important to consider this evidence in the light of the account given by Mr McCusker in 1972, in which there is no description of the shooting of Hugh
171 AM45.3 172 AM45.4 173 AM160.5 paragraph 11 Gilmore at all. Rather, Mr McCusker described seeing Hugh Gilmore for the first time at the southern end of Block 1, after he had been shot. Mr McCusker did not account for the differences between the two accounts when he gave oral evidence to the Tribunal.
Margaret Patterson was running south from the rubble barricade when she became aware of a person she later confirms was Hugh Gilmore:
I noticed that a young man was running near me. I think he was also coming south, from the direction of the Rubble Barricade but it is possible that he might have been running west to east across Rossville Street. He was level with the south west corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, just slightly past the door. He was to my right and was a bit further out into Rossville Street than I was. I got the impression that he had caught us up and was just about to overtake us. I then saw him spin round and start to fall to the ground but I did not see him actually hit the ground. I think he fell forwards. As he spun round I saw green matter coming out of him which I thought was his insides. I knew that he had been shot by the way he fell, but I did not see anything actually hit him.
The account, therefore, suggests that Hugh Gilmore was shot near to the southern end of Block 1 as he ran south and, further, that the impact of the round which hit him caused him to spin round. Matters became less clear when, during her oral evidence to the Tribunal, Mrs Patterson accepted it was possible that Hugh Gilmore had been shot at some stage before she first saw him.
It is convenient at this stage to consider the evidence of one soldier. Bombardier 015 was in 11 Battery, 22 LAD RA and positioned in the Peter England Shirt Factory. In the “SA” statement produced for the purposes of the Widgery Tribunal, 015 described how:
______________________________________________________________________
174 AM160.14 175 Day 148/063/21 176 AP2.4 paragraph 20 177 AP2.3 paragraph 19 178 Day 185/079/07 I noticed a soldier observing two men behind a rubble barricade... The soldier was at the near corner of block no. 1. The men were continually throwing missiles in his direction... The two men suddenly jumped up and started running towards an open door... towards the far end of block 1... The rear man stopped suddenly and turned to look at the soldier, [his right arm came up] as the soldier brought his SLR into the aim position. I could see that the man was not holding any weapon as large as a rifle. He was too distant for me to see even through binoculars whether he was holding anything as small as a pistol. The man turned and started running faster towards the open door. I saw the soldier fire one round in the direction of the fleeing man. The man dropped to the ground in the doorway. I saw hands come out and drag the body in.\\textsuperscript{179}
The statement suggests that the soldier shot the “fleeing man” in the back as he ran south. 015’s first statement to the RMP had been in similar terms; it too suggested that the soldier fired at a “fleeing man”. It did not, however, mention the fact that the man had turned to face the soldier before he continued to run south.\\textsuperscript{180} 015’s BSI statement suggested something different again. It suggested that the man was not shot as he ran south but when he had partially turned, presenting his left side to the soldier. The man:
... ran, then stopped and turned anti-clockwise, back towards the soldier at the corner, so that his left side was facing the soldier. As he turned he lifted his right arm up, so that it was bent and at shoulder height across his chest, with his hand pointing in the direction of the soldier.\\textsuperscript{181}
Soldier 015 has not been able to account for the differences between the various statements he has given.\\textsuperscript{182} It should also be noted that his evidence is at odds with that given by Gunner 023, who was present with him at the Peter England Shirt Factory and whose attention 023 apparently drew to the incident he was
\\textsuperscript{179} B1425: the words in square brackets have been added to the statement in manuscript. \\textsuperscript{180} B1414 \\textsuperscript{181} B1434.4 paragraph 26 \\textsuperscript{182} Day 360/189/08 witnessing.\\textsuperscript{183} 023's evidence has been considered in relation to the shot fired by Soldier U, above.
\\textit{Location of Soldier who shot Hugh Gilmore}
8A-196 Finally, in relation to the civilian evidence, we refer to some of the inconsistent accounts of the location of the soldier (or one of the soldiers) who shot Hugh Gilmore. For example:
(1) Geraldine McBride and Kathleen Brown have suggested he was shot by a soldier located in the area of Glenfada Park;\\textsuperscript{184}
(2) Robert White did not see the soldier who shot Hugh Gilmore but assumed it was the same soldier he saw at the northern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats;\\textsuperscript{185} and
(3) PIRA 14 suggested that he was shot by a soldier located in the area of the Kells Walk pram ramp.\\textsuperscript{186}
\\textbf{Chronology}
8A-197 It is further unclear exactly when Hugh Gilmore was shot. For example, it is unclear whether he was shot before or after William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid. We refer in this regard to our submissions below relating to those three individuals.
\\textbf{Conclusion}
8A-198 The evidence regarding the shooting of Hugh Gilmore can be summarised in this way:
\\textsuperscript{183} B1422 \\textsuperscript{184} AM45.4; AB94.7 paragraphs 10 to 12 \\textsuperscript{185} AW11.4 paragraph 22 to 24 \\textsuperscript{186} PIRA14.3 paragraph 19 (1) One expert (Dr Carson) believes Hugh Gilmore was struck by a single bullet, which passed from left to right;
(2) Another expert (Dr Shepherd) believes he was struck by two bullets, one hitting his left arm, the other entering the right side of his chest and passing through his body from right to left;
(3) One group of civilian witnesses suggest that he was shot at the rubble barricade as he faced north;
(4) Another group of civilians suggest that he was shot as he moved and faced south. This group gives different accounts of Mr Gilmore’s location at the time he was shot;
(5) Those civilians who claim to know the location of the soldier (or one of the soldiers) who shot Mr Gilmore give highly inconsistent accounts; and
(6) It is unclear when in the sequence of events Hugh Gilmore was shot.
One matter that is clear is that Soldier U did not shoot Hugh Gilmore. The gunman shot by U:
(1) Wore a light blue jacket – Hugh Gilmore did not;
(2) Was in his late twenties or early thirties – Hugh Gilmore was substantially younger;
(3) Carried a pistol – Hugh Gilmore did not;
(4) Was positioned south of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats when he was shot – most of the civilian evidence suggests that Hugh Gilmore was shot further to the north;
(5) Was shot by a single bullet to the front – if Mr Gilmore was shot by only one round, it passed through him from left to right (but the Tribunal’s own experts suggest he was shot by two rounds); (6) Fell where he was shot – most of the civilian evidence suggests that Hugh Gilmore travelled some distance between being shot and falling to the ground.
8A-200 It is simply impossible to reach any other important conclusions about the circumstances in which Hugh Gilmore was shot or as to the identity or location of the soldier who shot him.
8A-XVALEXANDER NASH
SOLDIER U’S ACCOUNT
8A-201 Soldier U made a second RMP statement dealing exclusively with the shooting of a man we now know to be Alexander Nash by a civilian gunman situated in the doorway of the Rossville Flats:
I saw 2 bodies lying down behind the barricade, a man about 45 years came across to give assistance to one of the bodies, he had come out of the flats. I saw this man sit one of the bodies up behind the barricade and wave for assistance. I could now see that the body he had propped up was a youth of about 16-17 yrs, this youth had a wound to his stomach. I was approximately 50 meters from the barricade. The main doors at the bottom of the flats facing Rossville St were open and I saw an arm holding a pistol extended from behind the door. I saw the pistol jerk, observed the strike of the bullet. It hit about 5 metres short on the other side of the barricade, ricocheted and hit the man who had gone over to the youth, in the right arm. Immediately after this shot, another was fired by the gunman at the doors. I saw the youths head jerk and he slumped into the man’s arms. Previous to this the youth had been looking round. The man had been shouting, “Come and help me, he’s dying”. He also said, “He’s been shot.” After the youth was hit in the head, the man said “He’s dead” and got up onto his feet and wandered away from the barricade, apparently in a daze.187
8A-202 In his BSI statement, U added:
I took it at the time that this gunman was shooting blind, possibly towards the soldiers at the wall. However, one of his shots... hit the
187 B761-762 ground south of the rubble barricade and ricocheted up to hit the old man in the arm. It simply hit the ground and bounced back up to continue travelling in the same direction... As the other shot rang out... the young lad's head jerked backwards. The impression I had at the time was that the shot had hit him. At that moment, the old man turned the young boy round, laid him down, and shouted something like "he's dead". He then wandered away, looking like he was in a daze.188
THE GUNMAN'S MODUS OPERANDI
8A-203 This was not the only gunman to fire "blind" on Bloody Sunday. Bernard Gilmore is one of many civilians to give an account of a man with a pistol firing from the Chamberlain Street wall:
I also noticed a civilian gunman in the market. He was near Chamberlain Street. I saw him after Jack Duddy had been shot. I know who he was... He was standing with his back to the wall near Chamberlain Street... He was holding a hand gun in his hand and was standing against the wall of the houses on Chamberlain Street. He put his hand around the wall and fired some shots along Chamberlain Street. He could not see who he was aiming at because he was facing Block 2 of the Rossville Flats, but with his hand pointing up Chamberlain Street.189
8A-204 Michael Lynch, whose evidence we have referred to above, saw a gunman with a pistol in the alleyway between Glenfada Park North and Columbcille Court. That gunman fired two shots at soldiers in Rossville Street and, Mr Lynch said, "I do not think he had time to aim at anyone."
8A-205 Margo Harkin's gunman was in a similar location to that seen by Mr Lynch. He fired one shot "randomly".
8A-206 This cavalier method of firing shots is designed to afford the shooter maximum protection but puts any civilians in the area in very great danger. It is no surprise, when a gunman is shooting “blind,” that a civilian situated between the gunman and his intended target in fact gets hit.
**INJURIES SUSTAINED BY ALEXANDER NASH**
8A-207 Alexander Nash’s surgeon, H. M. Bennett, described the injuries received by Alexander Nash in a letter to the RUC:
*This patient had a gun shot wound to the left arm and a graze (?? from a rubber bullet) on the left side of his chest.*
*The wound on his arm was through and through passing from right to left. As there is relatively little muscle destruction this was probably a low rather than a high velocity missile...*
*This patient too has relatively minor wounds and should make a good recovery.*
8A-208 It is apparent that it was Alexander Nash’s left arm that was hit by the gunman’s bullet, not his right as U had believed. Significantly, the surgeon who treated Alexander Nash concluded that the round which passed through the arm was probably low velocity, precluding the possibility that it was fired by a soldier. The surgeon, therefore, provides the strongest of support for Soldier U’s account.
8A-209 Alexander Nash’s second injury, to the left side of his chest, was indeed caused by a baton round. He accepted shortly after the event that he had been hit by a rubber bullet. While still in hospital, he told the Evening News:
*I got a bullet in my left arm. A rubber bullet hit me in the chest.*
8A-210 Captain 021, observing from Echo OP, may have observed the rubber bullet hit Alexander Nash. He saw an old man behind the rubble barricade struck by a rubber bullet, which caused him to fall behind the barricade.
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190 **ED33.5;** letter dated 07.02.72. 191 **L94, 01.02.72.** 192 **B1504** ALEXANDER NASH’S ACCOUNTS
8A-211 Alexander Nash has given different accounts of how he came to be injured. In a statement given a week after the events of Bloody Sunday, he suggested that he was shot in the arm and hit in the ribs as he stood behind the barricade with his left arm in the air:
I ran across to help him... I put my left hand in the air to signal that the shooting should stop. I was shot in that arm and was hit in the ribs also. When I was hit I was fired at four or five times more. I dropped down beside Willie and the other 2 men... The Saracen tank came up, two big soldiers came out... one of them said “3 more dead bodies.”
8A-212 However, the statement he gave for the purposes of the Widgery Inquiry suggested that he only became aware of his injury some time after he had dropped to the ground. Mr Nash did not record how he had been shot or from where:
I went on over... more shots were striking around me – I could hear the bullets hitting the stones and I deliberately dropped down flat on my face – this way I had the barricade of stones between me and the shooting soldiers. As I lay there a Saracen came up RS and stopped at the barricade. I then sat with my back to the barricade. I saw two soldiers get out of the Saracen. I heard one of them shouting “three more dead bodies... it was when I was sitting on the ground that I realised that I had been hit by a bullet or bullets.”
8A-213 Mr Nash gave another account to his daughter, Linda Roddy. He apparently told her that he had been shot by an officer with a pistol, standing to the north of the rubble barricade. John Nash, Alexander Nash’s son, recounts what his father told him:
... he says that the soldier who shot him approached him, fired, and came forward again and had the gun raised and he, he says I, I looked in his eyes and I swore blind he going to fucking finish me
193 AN1.14, dated 07.02.72. 194 AN1.10 195 AR21 off. But for some reason he didn't and he put the gun down. Now that is what he has been telling me for twenty-six years.\\textsuperscript{196}
8A-214 The apparent acceptance to his daughter that he was shot by a pistol may be of significance but that account should be compared with Mr Nash's PRAXIS interview. He did speak there of being approached by an officer with a pistol, but only after he had been shot and when the bodies of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid were being collected from the rubble barricade.\\textsuperscript{197}
8A-215 There is, thus, significant inconsistency between the various versions of events given by Alexander Nash. We suggest that they do not assist the Tribunal in discovering the circumstances in which he actually came to be shot. Other accounts, however, provide support for the account given by Soldier U.
\\textbf{CIVILIAN CORROBORATION FOR SOLDIER U'S ACCOUNT}
8A-216 Kieran Gill worked for the Derry Journal at the time of Bloody Sunday and also became involved in assisting the Sunday Times Insight Team in their investigations. Gill's first statement to the Inquiry included the startling information that he had spoken to a gunman who admitted acting in a very similar manner to that described by Soldier U.
\\begin{quote} I received information from PIRA that a member of the Official IRA on Bloody Sunday had a revolver and had fired it. I was told his name and we found his address. Peter Pringle and I went to his home and knocked on his door and he answered it. He recognised both of us. We told him that the Provos had said that he had fired a revolver on Bloody Sunday. I said something like "So you shot Mr Nash!". The man looked horrified. He admitted that he had fired a revolver around a door of the Rossville Street flats. He said that he had fired the revolver after the army had fired between 100-150 rounds and there was a lull in the shooting. There were people lying outside in front of the flats dead and there was a feeling in the flats that the soldiers were coming towards there and that people were frightened that they were going to come into the flats and \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{196} AN6.21, interview with James McGovern. \\textsuperscript{197} O11.3 continue to shoot... The man said that he had put his hand around the door and fired the revolver up Rossville Street to make them stay away. He said that he fired 3-4 shots. We said to him that he might have shot Mr Nash in the arm.198
8A-217 Mr. Gill confirmed this account both in oral evidence to the Tribunal and in a further statement, which he gave after contacting the OIRA gunman. The gunman refused to come forward and now denied any involvement in the shooting:
I showed my source... paragraph 59 of my statement. My source's reaction was to say that he had no recollection of the conversation. He also denied having shot a revolver at the door of the Rossville Street flats. Despite these comments I still believe that the account which I gave in my statement is correct199
8A-218 The Sunday Times archive contains a note potentially corroborating Mr Gill's account:
... there is persuasive, though not conclusive evidence that a pistol then appeared at the barricade and was used... The pistol was then probably taken into the doorway of the flats and may have been used once more – accidentally wounding an old man at the barricade.200
8A-219 The Insight article produced as a result of the Sunday Times investigation concluded that Private U's account of the shooting of Alexander Nash was essentially correct.201
8A-220 It is clear that the Insight journalists were personally convinced by the information they had received. (John) Barry Liddy spoke to one such journalist, whose name he could not recall, in 1972. Mr Liddy informed Paul Mahon:
Barry Liddy: ... I had said... that I'd seen a body at the entrance into the Flats with a camera, you know, I'd seen the lens of the camera poking out of the door.
198 M105.13 paragraph 59 199 M105.29 paragraph 14 200 S303 201 L213-214 [The Insight journalist] said: “Barry that wasn’t a boy with a camera, that was a boy with a gun.
Paul Mahon: He said that?
Barry Liddy: Yeah. Eh Mickey, there’s a lot of things about Bloody Sunday that people know nothing at all about.
Paul Mahon: Was he convinced about that?
Barry Liddy: Oh he was certain sure, he was certain sure, certain sure.
He says: “Did you actually see the camera?” and I says “No, but I seen this thing poking out the door.” ... And I says, “I thought that boy was taking photographs”. “No, Barry that was a boy with a handgun”.
Alexander Nash’s own son, John Nash, told Jimmy McGovern about a man who was apparently resident in Dublin and who had admitted shooting his father:
...my father has been telling me for the last twenty seven years that he was shot by a soldier... but then you have...some other fucking eejit and I actually went down to the Republic of Ireland. I went into a Sinn Fein office and apparently this is only a few years back way this guy says that he is the person responsible for shooting me Da...
...The argument is that he, he is just ...well the argument is that he just stuck he’s hand out the door and he fired you know what I mean well ... this is...a soldiers statement...you know what I mean and I do not believe that statement...you know what I mean because I you know there is nobody dis...because if the points his hand out the door and there is quite a number of people at that door as you can see...you know what I mean like...and I know some of the people that are.....the likes of Jimmy Green ... people like that there... who are there standing at the door... and he said now they never seen no gunman at that point.
This information was not given in John Nash’s initial BSI statement. A further statement was, therefore, taken from him and he was recalled to give oral evidence. He was asked about the McGovern transcript by Bilal Rawat for the Tribunal:
Q. Reading it alone by itself, what you appeared to have told Mr McGovern was that you went to confront someone who claimed to have shot your father, a civilian who claimed to have shot your father and so whose name was known to you; do you follow?
A. Yes.
Q. But your evidence is that that is not the position at all?
A. That is absolutely not the case. You know, had I have ever known of any -- the name of any individual who would have made such a statement as that, the first people to know that name would be the Inquiry. I have done absolutely nothing over the last six years but do my best and my utmost best to assist this Inquiry. If I have given the impression that I actually knew the name of this gunman, then I have given, in this particular interview, I have given a wrong impression and I apologise for that.
Q. Because it seems to be the impression that Mr McGovern had because he then asks you, he says:
"It is strange for a Sinn Fein man to say 'It was I who shot him' because he must have been an idiot" and you do not appear to have corrected him at that point.
Were you surprised when you saw this transcript again and saw what Mr McGovern's impression had been?
A. I have a -- I have never actually seen this particular part of the transcript.
Q. This particular page?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. It is attached to your supplementary statement?
A. Yes, I did not read it.
Q. Was there any reason why you chose not to read it? A. No, not really.204
8A-223 It may be seen that John Nash therefore sought to downplay the significance of the information he had imparted to Jimmy McGovern. However, the information contained in the McGovern transcript must surely be directly relevant to and corroborative of the account given by Soldier U of how Alexander Nash was shot.
8A-224 We refer above to the many sightings by civilians of gunmen with pistols in the Rossville Street area. There is, furthermore, strong evidence of the presence inside Block 1 of at least one gunman with a pistol. We have referred to this body of evidence in our submissions relating to Guinness Force, below. It is, therefore, clear that gunmen were operating in this part of the Bogside and it should come as no surprise that one used the vantage point of the Block 1 doorway from which to fire.
8A-225 Finally, in relation to the non-military evidence, we note that three members of the Provisional IRA were close to the side entrance of Block 1 at about this time. PIRA 14, whose evidence we have referred to in relation to Hugh Gilmore, claims, however, that not one of them carried a weapon.205
MILITARY CORROBORATION FOR SOLDIER U’S ACCOUNT
8A-226 Soldier 033 was a member of 1 PARA’s Signals Platoon. He gave evidence about the circumstances in which Alexander Nash was shot. His BSI statement includes the following account of what he could see take place at and south of the rubble barricade:
44. I could see a male lying on the barricade...Another man was near to him. He was waving one hand...I assumed from what I saw, that the man lying near him had been shot. I thought he was indicating that he wanted help.
204 Day 424/088/04 205 APIRA14.3 paragraph 18; Day 421/082/18 46. I then saw part of an arm and a handgun emerge from Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, at ground level... My memory of the incident is that the gun emerged out of a window but, looking at the photographs of the Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, I believe it would have been from the doorway... I just focused on the arm and the handgun. Seeing the gun was a surprise. It was very unusual to actually be able to see a gunman shooting a weapon, because they were usually concealed. I did not shoot because the arm and weapon did not provide enough of a target to shoot at from that range.
...
48. The shots seemed to be aimed at the troops in what I know now... to be the area of Rossville Street, by Glenfada Park North. I do not know how many shots the terrorist fired. He then appeared to be engaged by troops on my right...
49. I then looked back south towards the barricade and then I saw one or two strikes of bullets that I assume came from the handgun on the barricade, close to the man who was waving, like small explosions of dust upwards. These strikes came from bullets fired behind the man on the barricade. The way the bullets struck the barricade, they could not have come from the soldiers. I found this very confusing. It looked to me as if the gunman was shooting at one of his own people. It did not make any sense, but that is what I saw and I have absolutely no doubt about that.
8A-227 A consistent account was given in oral evidence, during which a photograph was marked with the gunman’s position. It placed him at the Block 1 doorway. Seamus Mallon questioned 033 on behalf of the Nash family. 033’s responses underlined his independence as a witness:
Q. And you would accept that, in the body of that statement, you tend to provide some... level of corroboration for what was alleged by... Soldier U.
Were you aware that he indicated in his second RMP statement that he had observed an outstretched arm emerge from the doorway of Block 1 of Rossville Flats?
206 B1621.006 207 Day 324/070-071; B1621.19 A: I have no idea who Soldier U is, sir, I do not know what you are talking about, I am sorry.
Q: Could Soldier U's name be provided to the witness?
A: I do not remember this person from the Army at all, sir, I am sorry.208
CONCLUSION
8A-228 Soldier U suggested in 1972 that the man we now know to be Alexander Nash was shot by a civilian gunman situated in the western doorway to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. The gunman intended to fire at soldiers north of the rubble barricade. However, he fired without aiming and one of the bullets hit Mr Nash. The surgeon who treated Mr Nash found that the bullet which struck him was probably low velocity. No low velocity weapon was fired by the Army on Bloody Sunday. The surgeon's finding, therefore, corroborated U's account. Journalists working for the Sunday Times Insight Team in 1972 had also concluded that U's account was probably correct.
8A-229 The journalist, Kieran Gill, actually spoke to the gunman in question, who confirmed that he had fired in the way described by Soldier U. If further corroboration were needed that U's account is indeed correct, Mr Nash's own son, John Nash, also received information which must have suggested that his father had been shot by a civilian and not by the Army. There is also important evidence from other soldiers present in the Bogside which confirms what Soldier U has said.
8A-230 In the circumstances, the Tribunal can be confident that Private U's account of the shooting of Alexander Nash is the correct one.
208 Day 324/111-112 Soldier U described how the bodies of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid were retrieved from the rubble barricade. He answered the following questions at the Widgery Tribunal:
Q. Did you see a vehicle go into that direction? A. Yes
Q. Were you still in your position when the vehicle went down there by the barricade? A. Yes.
Q. Did you go with it? A. No.
Q. Were you still in your position when the vehicle went down thee by the barricade? A. Yes
Q. Did you see what was done about the bodies? A. There were three bodies, there was one I could not see at the time which was further behind the barricade. There were three of them and they lifted them on to the vehicle.
Q. Could you see that from your position? A. Yes.209
He confirmed in oral evidence to this Inquiry that he made his observations from the northern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.210
Soldier U described in his BSI statement:
209 B787.28 paragraphs C to E 210 Day 369/101/18 I remember looking towards Free Derry Corner, hearing some gun shots and seeing everyone in that area running off. Two cars then came in from opposite directions and stopped at the points marked G and H on the map [north of Free Derry Corner211]. They stopped facing each other. Some guys got out and started to run to what looked to me like pre-planned positions. There were about five or six of them from one car and about four or five from the other and they were carrying what I thought were small arms such as pistols and rifles... I did not actually hear them shoot and I do not remember what happened to the cars. I could not fire at them because there were people in between me and them.212
8A-234 This ties in with a large body of civilian evidence of the arrival of IRA cars a little further to the south, in the area of the Bogside Inn and Westland Street. This issue is addressed in our submissions relating to Guinness Force, below.
8A-235 Thereafter, Soldier U withdrew from the area of the Bogside with other members of his unit.
8A-XVIII SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
8A-236 Corporal P and Privates 017 and U had experience of riots, and of the dangers that riots posed, prior to their deployment to Londonderry. As 017 has stated: “Sometimes riots would end up in shootings.”213
8A-237 The men of Mortar Platoon deployed to Londonderry as part of an arrest operation. Their briefings nevertheless made them alert to the likelihood that gunmen would be operating in the Bogside.
8A-238 P, 017 and U were shot at before they even moved into Rossville Street, when they were in the area of the Presbyterian Church in Great James Street. Corporal P and Private U were both in elevated positions and the incoming round must have passed particularly close to them.
211 See B787.38. 212 B787.8 paragraph 42; confirmed at Day 369/103. 213 B1484.001 paragraph 2 All three soldiers subsequently moved into Rossville Street in Sergeant O’s Pig. Many civilians reacted with hostility to the arrival of the Army. The Pig was targeted by rioters, who threw missiles at it.
P, 017 and U were amongst soldiers to debus from the Pig in Rossville Street. Soldiers P and 017 moved west, taking up position alongside the Kells Walk pram ramp. This was an open and exposed area. There were areas of potential danger on three sides, from Block 1 of the Rossville Flats to the east; the buildings and alleyways to the west of Rossville Street; and the rubble barricade across the street itself.
Private U moved in the opposite direction, towards the Rossville Flats waste ground. Immediately upon his arrival there, he was confronted by a rioter, as P595 demonstrates. The photograph may therefore capture the moment when U came into contact with the man he proceeded to arrest, Charles Canning.
Meanwhile, Soldiers P and 017 came under attack from rioters based at the rubble barricade and then from a group of people who came out of the Columbille Court alleyway south of their position. 017 discharged baton rounds in an attempt to contain them.
The two soldiers were targeted by a nail bomber, positioned North of the rubble barricade, at whom Corporal P fired two SLR rounds. The man fell, dropping the bomb, which fortunately did not explode. P’s firing of these aimed rounds was the appropriate and responsible response to a difficult situation; it was in accordance with the applicable rules of engagement for the military in Northern Ireland, the “Yellow Card.” The bomber’s position does not correspond with that in which any of the known Sector 3 deceased or wounded was shot. He is, therefore, an unidentified, missing casualty.
The sighting of a nail bomber amidst the rioting in this area should come as no surprise; it was common at that time for nail bombs to be thrown at soldiers. The presence of a nail bomber is further consistent with evidence that at least one nail bomber was spotted by others and possibly photographed in the area of the rubble. barricade on Bloody Sunday; and that nail bombs were being carried on that day to the west of Rossville Street, in and around Glenfada Park.
8A-245 Private 017 next came face to face with a civilian with a handgun, who appeared in the alleyway between Columbceille Court and Glenfada Park North. The Private fired a baton round at him and then sought to get out of his line of fire. Corporal P also engaged a gunman but in a location a little further to the south, at the rubble barricade. This man fired in the direction of P, who returned four rounds.
8A-246 The accounts of P and 017 must be considered in the context of the considerable body of evidence relating to the presence in the area of civilians armed with handguns. The military and civilian accounts read together provide a compelling narrative of this crucial stage in the events of Bloody Sunday. That evidence is summarised in the diagram following 8A-76, above. The diagram demonstrates that many sightings were made, from Theresa Bradley’s gunman on the balcony of the Kells Walk building to Kieran Gill’s gunman in the entrance of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. In several instances, the gunmen were seen to be firing their weapons in the direction of the military. This was the situation into which P and 017 were placed. This is the background against which their accounts must be considered.
8A-247 Corporal P was faced with a situation in which he had to react to a gunman who was putting his colleagues in Rossville Street in danger. P was himself in danger, in his exposed position alongside the Kells Walk ramp wall. In the circumstances, there was no choice but to take rapid and decisive action. Such action was anticipated and condoned by the “Yellow Card.”
8A-248 Civilian evidence suggests that more people were wounded or killed in the area of the rubble barricade than have been identified to date. The existence of unidentified, “missing” casualties may provide an explanation for what happened to the gunman and, possibly, the nail bomber, shot by Corporal P.
8A-249 Many Sector 3 photographs are missing, particularly those taken of events in the area of the rubble barricade. There is strong evidence that photographers were approached shortly after Bloody Sunday by members of the Provisional IRA and that photographs may have been suppressed at this stage. Other photographs have, apparently, suffered a variety of fates. Some were lent to a journalist but never returned, others were destroyed in a flood. There is also now compelling evidence that two further photographers were active in Sector 3. They have yet to be identified and only one of their photographs has reached the Tribunal. The fate of the rest of their work is unknown. It is clear that the Tribunal cannot assume that the photographs which remain tell the whole story of what took place in this part of the Bogside.
8A-250 Corporal P and Private 017 moved across Rossville Street to the cover of their Pig. When P was halfway across the street, there was a resurgence of activity in the area of the rubble barricade. P, fearful for his safety, fired three rounds over the heads of the rioting crowd in an attempt to disperse them. P had seconds in which to decide how to respond. The only weapon available to him was his SLR. He chose to take action that would cause those advancing to stop, whilst firing in a way that would not actually put any of them in danger. His actions were appropriate and proportionate in the circumstances.
8A-251 Corporal P was later ordered to act as escort to Lieutenant N's Pig as it took the bodies of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid to Altnagelvin Hospital.
8A-252 Having handed over his arrestee, Private U took up a position at the northwest corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. From there he observed a gunman located on the eastern edge of Rossville Street and a little to the south of Block 1. The gunman fired two rounds at soldiers on the western side of Rossville Street. U returned a single round, which struck the gunman. He had a brief period of time in which to decide how to respond to the threat posed to his colleagues on the west side of Rossville Street. He reacted appropriately in all of the circumstances by firing one round from his SLR. Arthur Harvey QC questioned Soldier U on the basis that, on a fair interpretation of his evidence, he must have shot Hugh Gilmore. That is not the case. There are significant differences between the circumstances in which Hugh Gilmore was shot and those in which U fired at a gunman south of Block 1. Indeed, the differences are such as to preclude the possibility that Soldier U was responsible for Hugh Gilmore’s death.
The evidence regarding the shooting of Hugh Gilmore can be summarised in this way:
1. One expert (Dr Carson) believes Hugh Gilmore was struck by a single bullet, which passed from left to right;
2. Another expert (Dr Shepherd) believes he was struck by two bullets, one hitting his left arm, the other entering the right side of his chest and passing through his body from right to left;
3. One group of civilian witnesses suggest that he was shot at the rubble barricade as he faced north;
4. Another group of civilians suggest that he was shot as he moved and faced south. This group gives different accounts of Hugh Gilmore’s location at the time he was shot;
5. Those civilians who claim to know the location of the soldier (or one of the soldiers) who shot Hugh Gilmore give highly inconsistent accounts; and
6. It is unclear when in the sequence of events Hugh Gilmore was shot.
The uncertainly in the evidence generally makes it impossible to reach any important conclusions about the circumstances in which Hugh Gilmore was shot or to determine which soldier (or soldiers) shot Hugh Gilmore.
214 Day 369/162/07 Soldier U suggested in 1972 that the man we now know to be Alexander Nash was shot by a civilian gunman situated in the western doorway to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. The gunman intended to fire at soldiers north of the rubble barricade. However, he fired without aiming and one of the bullets hit Mr Nash. The surgeon who treated Mr Nash found that the bullet which struck him was probably low velocity. No low velocity weapon was fired by the Army on Bloody Sunday. The surgeon's finding, therefore, corroborated U's account. Journalists working for the Sunday Times Insight Team in 1972 had also concluded that U's account was probably correct.
The journalist, Kieran Gill, actually spoke to the gunman in question, who confirmed that he had fired in the way described by U. If further corroboration were needed that U's account is indeed correct, Mr Nash's own son, John Nash, also received information suggesting that his father had been shot by a civilian and not by the Army. There is also important evidence from other soldiers present in the Bogside which confirms what U has said. In the circumstances, the Tribunal can be confident that U's account of the shooting of Alexander Nash is the correct one. CHAPTER 8B
GUINNESS FORCE IN SECTOR 3
INTRODUCTION
8B-1 CALL SIGNS 71 AND 71 ALPHA
Guinness Force was comprised of a body of men drawn from a variety of “administrative” jobs within 1 PARA, who were formed into a temporary rifle platoon. The platoon constituted an additional unit that could be deployed in support of the standing battalion platoons when circumstances required it.
8B-2 Captain 200 described it in this way:
When the whole battalion is employed in an operation the Administrative Company provides an operational force in the form of a composite platoon usually known as Guinness Force. This operates under the command of the officer commanding Administrative Company and for the operations of 30 January was commanded by me. In those operations Guinness Force was used to strengthen Support Company.¹
8B-3 The soldiers who turned out for Guinness Force on 30th January 1972 were an experienced group of men with a relatively high average age.² Indeed, the platoon was “over ranked”, in that it contained a much higher than normal proportion of Non-Commissioned Officers. So, for example, Guinness Force sections were generally led by sergeants rather than corporals.³
8B-4 This was a large platoon, of thirty-five men and one officer.⁴ It travelled to Londonderry in two 4-tonne lorries. The occupants of the first vehicle were under
¹ B2022.024 ² B2022.001 paragraph 4 ³ B1628.001 paragraph 4 ⁴ B2022.063 the command of Captain 200 and Colour Sergeant INQ 0147 and used the radio call sign “71”. Those in the second vehicle were under the command of Colour Sergeant 002 (A.K.A. “L1”) and used the call sign “71 Alpha”.
Captain 200’s document entitled *Guinness Force att to Sp Coy 30 Jan 72* was compiled no earlier than 29th January 1972 and provides a list of Guinness Force personnel. Below are listed the men of Guinness Force in order of rank and according to their call sign.
| 71 | 71 ALPHA | |------|----------| | Capt 200 | CSgt 002 | | CSMI INQ 1710 | Sgt 014 | | CSgt INQ 0147 | Sgt 035 | | Sgt 106 | Sgt K | | Sgt INQ 1318 | Cpl 039 | | Cpl INQ 0468 | Cpl INQ 0025 | | Cpl INQ 0739 | Cpl 0812 | | Cpl INQ 0993 | LCpl D | | LCpl 229 | LCpl 010 | | LCpl INQ 0391 | LCpl INQ 0816 | | LCpl INQ 0704 | Pte L | | LCpl INQ 1077 | Pte M | | LCpl INQ 1175 | Pte 032 | | LCpl INQ 1854 | Pte INQ 0127 | | LCpl INQ 2047 | Pte INQ 0405 | | Pte C | Pte INQ 0449 | | Pte 024 | Pte INQ 0748 | | Pte 203 | | | Pte INQ 0024 | |
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5 B2022.063 6 Day 367/049/20
FS 7.1719
VIII 92 There were nineteen men in call sign 71. INQ 0391 was the driver of the half platoon’s vehicle. INQ 1710 was a Warrant Officer APTC (Army Physical Training Corps) and acted as 200’s body guard.
The call sign was split into sections. Sergeant 106, for example, headed a section of four or five men.
There is some evidence to suggest that Private INQ 0024 was part of call sign 71 Alpha. His name is included under that call sign in other documents, very probably in error. The fact that 0024 recalls both being attached to an officer on the day, when 200 was the only Guinness Force officer, and deploying to the Rossville Flats waste ground, the direction in which 71 - not 71 Alpha - went, strongly suggests that he was part of call sign 71.
Call sign 71A was under the command of Colour Sergeant 002. 002’s radio operator was Pte INQ 0127, against whose name “sig”, for signaller, appears in one of Captain 200’s lists. 002’s vehicle was driven by Private INQ 0405.
This half platoon was also split into sections. Sergeant 035 commanded a section totalling five members, which included Private M. It follows that it also
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7 C391.001 paragraph 7 8 B2001 paragraph A; Day 367/028/14 9 B1713.001 paragraph 4 10 B2022.064, “G” Force att Sp Coy; B1353 11 C24.001 paragraph 1 12 C24.002 paragraph 8 13 B2022.064 (unredacted version); Day 360/130/12 14 C405.001 paragraph 4 15 B1625 16 Day 361/059/12 included M's "buddy" on the day, Corporal 039, who was armed with a baton gun.17
8B-11 Sergeant 014 commanded a section of eight men,18 which included Pte 03219 and Private L.20
8B-12 Because the Platoon was seriously over-ranked, Sergeant K, the third of the sergeants in the half platoon, had no position of command on the day.21
8B-IV ORDERS
8B-13 Guinness Force travelled to Londonderry and moved into the Bogside in pursuance of an arrest operation. The members of the Platoon were aware in advance of their deployment of the risks they would face during the mission.
8B-14 Captain 200 attended two briefings (Orders Groups) on 29th January 1972; one from his Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Wilford, and the other from the Officer Commanding Support Company, Major Loden. Extracts from the note he prepared at the C.O' briefing records the following:22
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17 B364 paragraph D 18 B1409 19 B1613 20 Day 372/067/12 21 Day 364/131/21 22 B2022.056; Day 367/036 to Day 367/038 Their full meaning becomes clear by reference to the statement drafted by Soldier 200 in February 1972:
I was fully aware of the situation and tasks involving the Battalion. The NICRA march would consist of a maximum of 8,000 and it was expected that a large hooligan element would be included in the crowd. We were also to expect IRA presence in the form of sniping and bombing. This sniping was most likely to come from the Frederick Street and Rossville Flats areas.
The task given to all Companies was quite simple – To arrest as many rioters as possible.23
He gave his orders to Guinness Force accordingly at 2200 hrs on 29th January 1972.24 The men well understood what they had been told and what their individual roles would be within the context of the arrest operation. For example, Sergeant K records:
_We were told that if Sp Coy had to carry out arrests then we would assist them, in particular to take prisoners to designated areas so they could be processed._
Private M stated:
_We were told that there was a possibility of a riot situation developing as a result of the Civil Rights march in Londonderry that afternoon and my duty would be to give protection to soldier 039 who was to carry the anti-riot gun._
Corporal 039's evidence was:
_Our general orders were that if we were called forward we were to mount a snatch operation and pick up any hooligans or rioters. My own orders were that I was to act as escort to the snatch parties and for this purpose I was issued with a riot gun and baton rounds._
The evidence, therefore, demonstrates that Guinness Force soldiers were professionally and appropriately briefed prior to their deployment to Londonderry. The evidence is wholly inconsistent with any suggestion to the contrary.
**THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH SHOT**
A shot was fired at the Presbyterian Church in Great James Street by a civilian gunman at a time when the soldiers of Guinness Force were gathered in the grounds of, or close to, the building. Therefore, shortly before they deployed into
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23 B1978 24 B1978, B2022.003 paragraph 14 25 311.004 paragraph 3 26 B359 27 B1649
FS 7.1723
VIII 96 the Bogside the members of Guinness Force, among others, became aware that a sniper, very probably positioned in the Bogside, was targeting soldiers.
8B-22 The Platoon arrived in the area of the church at about 1500 hrs. Captain 200 recorded that:
I helped members of the Mortar Platoon cut the wire on the east side of the church. I was warned by my lookout that there was a lot of movement in the top storey stairway at the north end of Rossville Flats. Not long after this warning, a HV round passed over our heads and struck the church wall, passing through a vertical drainpipe...
8B-23 The shot must have narrowly missed those who were engaged in removing barbed wire from the top of the small wall to the east of the Church and parts of the drainpipe struck by the bullet fell close to the soldiers below. Private INQ 0024 records that:
Whoever fired must have seen the two guys up on the wall cutting the wire and aimed at them, but he was a bad shot and hit the drainpipe. I heard the drainpipe crack and shatter and bits of the drainpipe landed at my feet.
8B-24 Sergeant 106 had a similar experience:
The pipe was hit roughly 15 feet above me... The pipe completely shattered when it was hit and parts of it fell into my mug of tea.
8B-25 As did Corporal 039:
The first event of note that took place was a shot being fired at our position. There was a metal drainpipe at the side of what I presume was the church. I heard a crack and thump noise. It was totally unexpected... almost immediately after I heard the crack and
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28 B2022.024 29 B1979 30 C24.001 paragraph 5 31 B1713.003 paragraph 11
FS 7.1724
VIII 97 thump, part of the drainpipe fell away from the wall and crashed to the ground.32
8B-26 That shot was fired with the intention of killing a soldier. It is purely fortuitous that no soldier was killed or wounded by it. The issue of the Presbyterian Church shot is considered in detail at in chapter 6, above.
8B-27 Not surprisingly, the shot had an effect on some of the soldiers in the vicinity of the church, even the experienced sergeants. Sergeant K’s evidence was that:
...I was standing east of the Presbyterian Church ... All of a sudden, there was a shot which hit the drainpipe, six feet in front of me. The shot hit the drainpipe quite high up it and ricocheted off. My instant reaction was to hit the deck... Hearing the shot made the adrenalin start running. There was also a certain amount of fear as someone was firing at us and I could not see who or from where.33
8B-28 Similarly, Sergeant 035 has stated:
12. ... I was within 20 yards of the wall when the bullet hit the drainpipe which was right in front of me. It hit a point at least two times higher than me above my head. The drainpipe shattered where it was hit. The first thing you do in that kind of situation is to look down and make sure you are alright.
13. Another clear recollection which I have of this scene is that a big vein started throbbing in my left knee as the bullet hit the drainpipe. I had never experienced this before and I realised that my adrenalin was pumping.34
8B-29 The shot may have caused their adrenalin to flow, but the professional outlook of the members of Guinness Force remained unchanged. The situation was summed up by Colour Sergeant 002:
I made a sharp turn to the rear and jumped off the ramp. The fact that this shot had taken place did not change the mood that we were in. We had had this in Belfast. The IRA were clever and they would suck us in and try to draw fire. We would not return fire
32 B1651.002 paragraph 9 33 B311.005 paragraph 8 34 B1628.003 paragraph 12; Day 361/060 to Day 361/061 unless we had a clear target. As far as we were concerned this was still an arrest operation.35
8B-VI DEPLOYMENT INTO THE BOGSIDE
BY VEHICLE TO THE NORTH EAST CORNER OF ROSSVILLE STREET
8B-30 Guinness Force mounted its vehicles and deployed through barrier 12, pulling up alongside numbers 1-3 Rossville Street, at the north east corner of the road. The platoon did not go further south in its soft skinned lorries because the vehicles did not provide sufficient protection from gunmen, a threat the members of the Platoon took seriously following their briefings and the shot directed at them at the Presbyterian Church.36
8B-31 The order of deployment was described by Captain 200 in the following terms:
We passed through the barrier in the order two vehicles of the Mortar platoon (pigs), the company commander’s command vehicle and ferret, two empty pigs belonging to the machine-gun platoon which had stayed back at the church, and my two four-tonners. The anti-tank platoon in two pigs followed behind me.37
8B-32 Captain 200 explained to Eversheds:
The pigs [from Support Company] were fully armoured vehicles, unlike our soft skinned four ton lorries. Obviously our transport afforded much less protection from gunfire. As soon as we crossed the junction of Rossville Street and William Street I could see that there was a large open area immediately in front of us. on the left hand side of Rossville Street there was a waste ground and at the bottom of Rossville Street were the Rossville Flats. This whole area was quite exposed, particularly to any gunmen that there might be in the Rossville Flats, and I immediately decided that it would not be safe for our soft skinned lorries to be parked in that exposed area. I therefore decided that our two lorries should park up at the
35 B1363.002 paragraph 11; and see Sgt K Day 364/137/23 36 B1349 37 B1985; Day 367/073/13 north end of Rossville Street, just in the lee of some buildings on the east side of Rossville Street.\\textsuperscript{38}
8B-33 The lorry containing call sign 71 can be seen just as it arrived in a photograph taken from the Rossville Flats by Derrick Tucker. P516.
8B-34 Footage taken by an ABC film crew, on Inquiry Video 48, shows the two Guinness Force vehicles very shortly after they arrived in Rossville Street.\\textsuperscript{39} In the first still, below, the men of call sign 71 can be seen debussing from the front 4-tonner.
\\textsuperscript{38} B2022.005 paragraph 34 \\textsuperscript{39} V48/12.43 (Segments 62 & 63) In the second still, below, the men of call sign 71 Alpha debus from the rear 4-tonner.
The video demonstrates that the men mainly remained in the cover of the rear of the vehicles immediately after debussing and that those who deployed across Rossville Street did so in a manner consistent with the belief that they were in immediate danger.
The drivers of the two vehicles (Lance Corporal INQ 0391 and Private INQ 0405) remained in the general area of the vehicles and did not deploy with the rest of the force. Similarly, Corporal INQ 0812 stayed behind and guarded the tailgate of the rear lorry.
ON FOOT INTO THE BOGSIDE
8B-38 Captain 200 described events developing as follows:
I decided to split my force with 71 moving to the left to give support to the Mor Pl and 71A to move right flanking along the eastern side of Columbille Court. At this stage I heard the burst of automatic fire and one or two single shots in our general direction .... my first concern was for my troops to get deployed from our debussing point as soon as possible. My orders to L1 [Colour Sergeant 002] in command of 71A were to move up the right flank of Rossville Street and to act on his own initiative if we got separated. I went left with 71. On moving off I noticed the Anti Tank Platoon overtaking 71A in their APCs and moving quickly through Columbille Court and the long block east of the Court. I stopped and shouted quick orders to L1 to move up in support of the Anti Tank Pl.
8B-39 Having debussed from their vehicles, Guinness Force soldiers were immediately aware of the hostile reception that they faced in the Bogside.
Rioting
8B-40 The soldiers, looking to the south, could see rioting civilians positioned to the east of Rossville Street and in the area of the Rossville Street rubble barricade attacking soldiers of the Mortar and Anti Tank Platoons. For example, Sergeant K was asked before this Tribunal:
Q. What is your recollection of the scene at or around that barricade at the time when you got out of your lorry?
______________________________________________________________________
40 C391.002 paragraph 9; C405.003 paragraph 15 41 C812.002 paragraph 10 42 B1980 A. That there was a lot of people milling around, a lot of noise and some people throwing stones.\\textsuperscript{11}
His evidence is borne out by the photographs. Liam Mailey and Ciaran Donnelly were both to the south of the rubble barricade at this stage in the proceedings. Their photographs show the military vehicles stationary at the northern end of Rossville Street. Mr Mailey's EP23/4 is a good example. The canopies of the Guinness Force lorries are indicated by the arrow.
Mr Mailey was asked about the photograph during his oral evidence at the Widgery Tribunal:
\\textit{Q. How long had the Saracens been there when you took [EP23/4]?}
\\textit{A. The Saracens had just stopped at that stage.}
\\textit{Q. The people shown in [EP23/4], or some of them appear to be moving towards the armoured vehicles and soldiers?}
\\textsuperscript{11} Day 364/141/17 A. Yes.
Q. Did you see them do that?
A. Yes
Q. Can you say what they were purporting to do and why?
A. They were obviously going to throw stones at the soldiers who were coming in. I think they were largely encouraged at this stage by the fact that the soldiers did not have riot gear. I heard one of the youths mention this fact.
...
Q. The man in the foreground with his back to the camera, is he actually throwing something, or does his arm just happen to be in that position?
A. I would imagine he is about to throw something, a stone probably.44
8B-43 Mr Donnelly's 1972 description of events confirms that youths at the barricade attacked the soldiers:
...I went down to a block of flats opposite to the Rossville Flats shortly after this the parachute troops came into Rossville Street in vehicles. A crowd then gathered behind an old barrier used in previous riots and threw stones at the soldiers.45
8B-44 His photographs EP27/8 and EP27/9 provide further corroboration. Again, the Guinness Force vehicles are indicated with an arrow.
44 M50.026C 45 M22.001 Sergeant 014 stated in 1972:
I could see that rioting had broken out and members of the leading vehicles, who had debussed, were being stoned and bottled by a large mixed crowd on the East side of Rossville Street. The troops were firing baton rounds to disperse the crowd.46
8B-46 The issue of the rioting in the area of the rubble barricade is addressed in detail in Chapter 7.
8B-47 The reception of the Mortar Platoon soldiers in the area of the Rossville Flats car park and waste ground is discussed in detail in the context of Sector 2 (chapter 7, above). It seems clear that there were two phases of rioting in this area. An initial phase took place as the Mortar Platoon vehicles arrived and the soldiers of that platoon debussed and were attacked by civilians. Shortly afterwards, a second phase of rioters arrived from the area of barrier 14 and also attacked the soldiers.
INCOMING FIRE
8B-48 The advance of Guinness Force, after leaving their vehicles, was conducted in the knowledge that there was gunfire ahead. Members of the platoon were able to discern the nature of the rounds being fired and the direction from which they were being fired.
8B-49 Captain 200 recorded in 1972 that he heard a burst of automatic fire and one or two single shots fired in the general direction of his platoon, very shortly after the men had debussed at the north east corner of Rossville Street. The shots prompted him to get his men moved on as soon as possible.47
8B-50 Colour Sergeant 002 was also aware of incoming fire at this time. He told the RMP:
When we debussed there was CS gas in that area and I heard shots from the area of the Rossville Flats, well to the front of Support Company. I saw members of Support Company take cover behind a
46 B1409; B1412.004 paragraph 19 47 B1980 wall adjacent to a block of two storey flats between Kells Walk and Rossville Street. I do not remember how many shots were fired. 48
8B-51 Corporal 039 deployed south with Private M more quickly than most other soldiers in Guinness Force. His evidence was that:
Almost as soon as we started to move forward we came under fire, I identified low velocity weapons and I believe a couple of high velocity rounds. It came from the direction of the Rossville Flats. 49
8B-52 M explained in 1972 that, as he deployed with 039, he saw:
... three or four or possibly more shots of what I thought to be automatic fire came from one of the upper storeys of the centre block of Rossville Flats and hit the road (Rossville Street) about 10 or 12 yds in front of the Command vehicle where soldiers were running forward but no-one was hit. One of the soldiers in this position engaged the gunman in fire and ran off to Rossville Flats... 50
8B-53 M's evidence of incoming fire is entirely consistent with civilian evidence of an automatic weapon being fired down from the Rossville Flats at the soldiers below. The Sunday Times Insight article of April 1972 reported that:
... one civilian, whose name we agreed to withhold, told us that he did see someone with a carbine firing at the soldiers from the 5th floor of the flats. The man fired 7 shots and 3 were returned at him. This gunman corresponds exactly with the man at whom Soldier O said he fired 3 shots and hit. The timing of this incident is clearly important: O had already been firing at another target before that. This gunman cannot have been the first to open fire in the car park. 51
8B-54 The issue of shots fired from the Rossville Flats is considered in detail in Chapter 2, above.
48 B1349 49 B1651.019 50 B360 51 L212 The two Anti Tank Platoon armoured personnel carriers (APCs) pulled up behind the Guinness Force lorries at the northern end of Rossville Street. Members of Anti Tank Platoon debussed and crossed over to the west side of the road, overtaking Guinness Force as they did so. Captain 200 had split his platoon, with call sign 71 moving left with him to the Rossville Flats waste ground and call sign 71A moving right, under Colour Sergeant 002, in support of Anti Tank Platoon.\\textsuperscript{52}
Liam Mailey's photograph EP23/5 captures this stage in the proceedings. It shows the Guinness Force 4-tonners at the northern end of Rossville Street with the two Anti Tank Platoon APCs behind them. On the other side of the road, the men of Anti Tank Platoon can be seen as, probably, can men of Guinness Force, behind them. The men are in cover, at the Northern end of Rossville Street. It is significant that all soldiers in this photograph are in cover, either close to walls or between stationary vehicles. Other soldiers, around the vehicles in the road, have also taken cover at this time.
The distinctively shaped building on the left of the photograph (with the large door under two windows) can be located on P202.1, below.
Sergeant K described how he moved along to the front of the Kells Walk building with members of his half platoon.\\textsuperscript{31}
Private M and Corporal 039 took a different route south than most of call sign 71A. Rather than crossing Rossville Street at its Northern end, they moved south to the area of the Command vehicle (visible with its clear turret in EP23/5, above) and crossed from there.\\textsuperscript{32}
\\textsuperscript{31} B311.039 paragraph A \\textsuperscript{32} B360 Mr Mailey’s photograph EP23/9 shows the situation shortly afterwards and captures Anti Tank Platoon soldiers close to the wall at the southern end of the Kells Walk building, followed by those from call sign 71A.
**ELEMENTS OF CALL SIGN 71 ALPHA DO NOT DEPLOY TO THE KELLS WALK WALL**
Not all members of call sign 71A deployed to the Kells Walk wall. EP23/9 also demonstrates that some men remained at the northern end of Rossville Street. For example, Corporal INQ 0025’s evidence is that:
*I got out of the four ton lorry and went to my right near to the small blocks of flats. There was something there which was rather like a shelter area... We were out of the way... There were about six of us there, plus a couple of other soldiers with SLRs for our protection. We stood there waiting for the prisoners to be fed back to us from the arresting troops.*
In oral evidence to this Inquiry, 0025 was asked:
**Q.** But do you recall at any time moving further south down Rossville Street?
**A.** I do not, no, sir.
______________________________________________________________________
35 C25.002 paragraph 20 Q. Was the job of you and your colleagues simply to collect arrestees from the arresting troops who had advanced to further forward positions?
A. That is correct, sir.56
8B-64 Others did move south, but not to the Kells Walk wall. Private INQ 0748, for instance, secured the area between Columbciille Court and Kells Walk and was still there when members of Anti Tank Platoon brought through the people they had arrested in Glenfada Park North.57
REPLACING ANTI TANK PLATOON AT THE KELLS WALK WALL
8B-65 Members of Guinness Force observed the activities of the Anti Tank Platoon at the Kells Walk wall. Captain 200 had deployed onto the Rossville Flats waste ground but kept an eye on call sign 71A. He said in 1972:
It was at this stage that I saw at least three men from the anti tank platoon kneeling behind the wall on the right hand side of Rossville Street by the building firing their SLRs...My feeling was that the crowd had dispersed rapidly and that gunmen would be likely to appear. I told my men in the vicinity of the long building to spread out – they were too bunched, an obvious target.58
8B-66 Captain 200 then saw the Anti Tank men move off from the wall. He shouted at Colour Sergeant 002 to move up and take over their positions.59
8B-67 002 records that this is exactly what he did,60 as does Sergeant K, who also saw the men of the Anti Tank Platoon depart from the Kells Walk wall and “move off down Rossville Street and then to the right” and confirms that members of call sign 71A took up their positions.61
56 Day 300/083/22 57 C748.003 paragraph 14 58 B2022.026 59 B2005 paragraph C 60 B1354 61 B311.019; B311.007 paragraph 14 The men of call sign 71 Alpha, therefore, deployed in accordance with their Captain's orders. At the time they were taking up position at the Kells Walk wall, members of Anti Tank Platoon were entering Glenfada Park North. At the time that Guinness Force soldiers were engaging targets south of the Rossville Street rubble barricade, some members of Anti Tank Platoon was engaging targets in Glenfada Park North.
**GUINNESS FORCE AT THE KELLS WALK WALL**
**SEQUENCE OF EVENTS**
Members of call sign 71 Alpha, at different positions along the Kells Walk wall independently concluded that two men were using a military style crawl to move away from the Rossville Street rubble barricade. The soldiers could see that at least one of the crawling men carried a weapon. They were both heading for the cover of the entrance to Block 1, of the Rossville Flats from where they would pose a significant threat to the soldiers. Soldiers K, L and M opened fire in these circumstances.
It is possible to work out the general order in which events took place at the Kells Walk wall when the crawling men were spotted:
1. Sergeant K fired first and did so at the rear crawling man;
2. Colour Sergeant 002 and Corporal 039 then ordered Privates M and L to fire;
3. M fired at both crawling men, first at the front crawling man and then at the rear man;
4. L, too, fired at both crawling men. His first shot was fired at the same time as M discharged his rounds. The last of the call sign 71A shots was fired by L; Lieutenant Colonel Wilford arrived in the area of the Kells Walk wall in time to see this final shot being discharged. Sergeant K was amongst the first of the Guinness Force soldiers to arrive at the wall and he was the first to fire from that position. He told Lord Widgery:
> From behind the rubble barricade two men were crawling towards the doors in the base of the Rossville St flats. The rear man was carrying a rifle. On seeing this weapon in his hand I cocked my weapon and fired one aimed shot.(^{62})
The men were doing "the leopard crawl, keeping very low to the ground."(^{63}) Part of the rear man's rifle was hidden by his body. Sufficient remained in sight to enable K to be certain that it was a rifle.(^{64}) It is important in this respect to note that it is likely to be accepted that Sergeant K was a soldier with considerable experience of firearms.(^{65})
Colour Sergeant 002 arrived at the wall as K fired.
> I was just moving up behind soldier K as he fired one round at the barricade and when I joined him he told me there were two men crawling from the barricade towards the far corner of Rossville Flats. When I looked in the direction of his fire I could see a man dressed in what I think was a dark jacket doing what I would call a leopard crawl towards a doorway near the far corner of the flats. I could see he had a rifle in his arms... I ordered soldiers M and L to fire at this man. They both fired two rounds and as he slumped I could see he had been hit.(^{66})
Corporal 039 was also able to see the two crawling men. He recalled in 1972 that both had weapons:
> As I looked towards the flats I saw two men appear from behind the barricade. They were on the far side of the barricade and if they had stayed behind it I would not have seen them. They crawled over to the wall of Block 1 and then began to crawl down the side of the building towards the door at its far end. One of the men who had dark hair and was wearing a dark suit (or dark jacket and trousers)
(^{62}) B311.039 paragraph G\
(^{63}) B311.041 paragraph A\
(^{64}) Day 364/161/16; B311.041 paragraph B\
(^{65}) Day 364/175/02 for example.\
(^{66}) B1361 was doing a leopard crawl and had a weapon cradled in his arms which I identified to myself as a Thompson SMG. The man crawling behind him had long fair hair and was wearing a light coloured coat and trousers. As he crawled he seemed to trail a weapon... I thought it was a short low calibre rifle, but I could not identify the type.
"L" was on my left and "M" on my right. I pointed out the gunmen and ordered these two men to fire at them. They each fired two rounds.67
8B-75 M gave a generally consistent but not identical account. He recorded in 1972 how:
It was then that soldier 039 pointed out to me two men who were behind the barricade crawling along the base of the wall of the block of Rossville Flats nearest to us. I observed that both men were crawling along in what I assumed to be a leopard crawl position. To me both men appeared to be cradling something in their arms and from their shape and length and from their black colour my opinion was that they were rifles. There is no real doubt in my mind that these objects were anything but rifles. I then had a shouted conversation with soldier 039 amidst all the noise which was going on. He had pointed out the men to me previously and now shouted to me "They're carrying something". He added "They look like rifles" and I shouted "They are rifles".68
8B-76 It would have been very noisy indeed. The Anti Tank Platoon soldiers who had left the Kells Walk wall had deployed into Glenfada Park North, where live rounds were being fired at this time. This, and the fact that firing was probably also continuing in and around the Rossville Flats waste ground to the east, probably explains why 039 and M needed to shout to make themselves heard, even though they were next to one another.
8B-77 M noted the order in which shots were fired from the Kells Walk wall:
I had by then cocked my weapon and I then took an aimed shot at the first man who was by then almost at the door of the flats... By this time another soldier nearby had already taken an aimed shot at the second man crawling behind who was still crawling. I then took
67 B1650 68 B360
Fl 7.1741
VIII 114 an aimed shot at this man... Another soldier took another aimed shot at the man but he still kept crawling.\\textsuperscript{69}
8B-78 This reflects a sequence of shots as follows:
(1) K at the second/rear crawling man;
(2) M at the first and then at the second crawling man;
(3) L at the second crawling man.
8B-79 Sergeant 035, M's section commander, observed M fire his two shots at the crawling men.\\textsuperscript{70}
8B-80 Other soldiers heard part of the shouted conversation between Corporal 039 and Private M. Private INQ 0127, who was primarily concerned with the operation of his radio, recalls how "someone next to me said "Thompson Machine Gun" and I think the soldier next to me fired a shot".\\textsuperscript{71}
8B-81 Colour Sergeant 002's statement to Eversheds includes his recollection that:
\\begin{quote} While I was there one of my men who was nearby (I cannot remember who) shouted out something like "There's a gun there" or "There's a guy with a rifle". I looked and saw a man crawling south down the pavement towards the entrance to the Rossville Flats.\\textsuperscript{72} \\end{quote}
8B-82 002 cannot now recall who was shouting but it is clear it was either M or L, because the shout came from one of the two soldiers whom he ordered to fire.\\textsuperscript{73}
8B-83 Private L's shots from the wall were witnessed by Sergeant 014, who recalled in 1972 that:
\\begin{quote} \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{69} B360 \\textsuperscript{70} B1626 \\textsuperscript{71} C0127.005 paragraph 5 \\textsuperscript{72} B1363.004 paragraph 26 \\textsuperscript{73} B1363.004 paragraph 29 I saw two men, one dressed in a dark brown suit the other dressed in dark clothing, crawling from a barricade and moving South along the West wall of Block I Rossville Flats. The rear man in the brown suit was trailing what looked like a rifle behind him.74
"L"... fired two shots at the men...
8B-84 Private 032 gave a similar account in 1972.75
8B-85 Private 010 had been ordered to check call sign 71A's western flank as soon as he arrived at the wall. He, therefore, missed the earliest part of the action there. He recorded in 1972:
As I got back I saw L fire two aimed rounds towards a barricade in Rossville Street. I did not actually see his target but when I looked towards the barricade I saw a male person apparently dragging the body of a second male towards the flats.76
8B-86 It was at this stage that Sergeant 014 became aware of the presence of Lieutenant Colonel Wilford at their position.77 The Commanding Officer arrived in the area of the Kells Walk wall to see L fire his last round. His oral evidence to Lord Widgery's Inquiry was that:
There were several of my paratroopers there who I know to be members of a certain platoon. Just as I arrived behind them I went aground some ten yards behind them and then made my way forward. At that moment one of the soldiers fired. I asked him why he had fired and he told me there was a gunman behind the rubble at the side of Rossville Flats. I then had a quiet word with them. I told them to spread themselves out a little bit as because they were a little bunched...I told them to look out for themselves and then I asked them where the Company Commander was. They pointed across and they said, "He is across there, across the open ground near the Rossville Flats".78 Corporal O9 still recalls the presence of his Commanding Officer at the wall. He told Eversheds:
At some point during the afternoon, Colonel Wilford and his radio operator were also behind this wall. I am sure of this because I can remember him saying something to the effect of "Watch out for yourselves lads".
The Colonel stayed at the wall for "a little while" yet heard no further gunfire from his soldiers there.
The photographer Jeffrey Morris of the Daily Mail took photograph P261 of the Kells Walk wall at the time that Colonel Wilford was there.
The Colonel was asked about P261 at the Widgery Tribunal:
Mr Gibbens. We have seen a photograph earlier in these proceedings of paratroopers with an officer crouched near the end wall, taking cover near the end wall of Kells Walk flats. Was that about where they were?
______________________________________________________________________
79 B1651.004 paragraph 19\
80 B1019 paragraph G\
81 Alternative reference EP2/008 A. If the officer had a beret on that was me, since I was the only one wearing a beret that day.
Lord Widgery. I think it was Mr. Morris' photograph.
A. That is me. (Looking at the photograph)
...
Mr. Gibbens. And the officer with the beret on?
A. Is me. It is also identifiable from the white patch on the back of my smock. I am the only one who wears that white patch.
Q. There is a paratrooper behind with a load of wireless equipment?
A. Yes. He is my radio operator.
...
Q. You see the soldier standing there on the left?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. Apparently without a hat?
A. Yes.
Q. And with the rifle in the aim position?
A. Yes.
Q. Was he the soldier who fired?
A. Yes he was.
Q. And he was firing towards the barricade?
A. Yes, that is right.82
8B-91 Private L confirmed in 1972 that he was the soldier standing to the left of the photograph.83 He had taken off his helmet at an earlier stage.84 P261 was taken after Colonel Wilford had told his men to spread out and after Sergeant K and others had moved off from the wall, explaining the relatively low number of soldiers pictured there.
8B-IX THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEOPARD CRAWLING
A factor in attracting the attention of the soldiers to the two men behind the rubble barricade was the manner in which they were moving. It is clear that, in 1972, the men of call sign 71A believed this to be a military style "leopard crawl", that is to say, not the type of movement one would expect from an untrained civilian.
Sergeant K told Lord Widgery that the men he saw were doing:
the leopard crawl, keeping very low to the ground... it is... lying on your stomach, using your elbows and knees and toes to move along.(^{85})
In leopard crawling, the forward part of the body will be higher than the rear, which is the opposite of what one would expect from an untrained civilian. Sergeant K was also asked about this at the Widgery Tribunal:
Mr Hill. What part of the man was obstructed by the barricade between you and him?
A. From the backside downwards.
Q. Was he higher at the front than he was on the back side?
A. When doing the leopard crawl you tend to have the forward part of your body uppermost.(^{86})
Colour Sergeant 002 has described what he could see in this way:
I can remember that he was... leopard crawling along with a rifle in the crook of his arm. I can remember thinking that it was a good
(^{85}) B311.041 paragraph A (^{86}) B311.045 paragraph C leopard crawl and that I would have given him a B grading if I had been assessing him as a soldier.87
8B-X GUNMEN BEHIND THE RUBBLE BARRICADE
THE SIGHTING OF WEAPONS
8B-97 A number of Guinness Force soldiers spotted weapons behind the rubble barricade. They did so independently of one another and from different positions along the Kells Walk wall. Soldiers then verified with each other what they could see. Further, some soldiers still were able to observe the shots fired by their colleagues and to confirm that they were targeted at gunmen.
8B-98 To recapitulate:
(1) Sergeant K arrived at the wall to see a man with a rifle;
(2) Colour Sergeant 002 moved up behind K and saw a man with a rifle;
(3) Corporal 039 saw the crawling men and could discern they had with them a Thompson SMG and a rifle;
(4) Private M was also able to see that both men were carrying weapons;
(5) 039 and M verified with each other what they could see before M and L fired;
(6) Sergeant 035 observed M's shots and confirms that they were fired at two men with weapons; and
(7) Sergeant 014 and Private 032 observed L's shots. They too had seen a man crawling with a weapon.
87 B1363.004 paragraph 27 In the circumstances, the Tribunal can and should be confident that members of Guinness Force fired at legitimate, armed targets.
**THE REAR CRAWLING MAN**
There is very strong evidence from 1972 that the rear crawling man, who was nearer to the soldiers, had a rifle and wore a brownish jacket.
With this omission of Soldier L, no fewer than six soldiers present at the Kells Walk saw that he had a rifle:
1. K - rifle (possibly a .303),
2. M - rifle,
3. 014 - rifle,
4. 032 - rifle,
5. 035 - rifle,
6. 039 - rifle (possibly a short, low calibre rifle).
The same soldiers gave generally consistent descriptions of the man’s clothing:
1. K - dark suit, (2) M – brownish jacket;\\textsuperscript{95}
(3) 014 – brown suit;\\textsuperscript{96}
(4) 032 – dark brown suit;\\textsuperscript{97}
(5) 035 – brown suit / dark clothing;\\textsuperscript{98}
(6) 039 – light, possibly fawn coloured coat.\\textsuperscript{99}
**THE FRONT CRAWLING MAN**
8B-103 There are inconsistencies in the soldiers' accounts as to whether the front crawling man also had a weapon. Those inconsistencies demonstrate the absence of any basis for the suggestion that the soldiers put their heads together shortly after the event to concoct a self-serving and consistent account of what had occurred.
8B-104 The evidence suggests that both of the men sighted behind the Rossville Street barricade had weapons. Private M, Colour Sergeant 002, Sergeant 035 and Corporal 039 could all see that the front crawling man had with him a weapon. In 1972, the first three described it as a rifle and 039 as a Thompson SMG.\\textsuperscript{100} The failure of other soldiers to see that the front crawler also carried a weapon is explicable by their individual positions at the Kells Walk wall.
8B-105 The “Kells Walk wall” in fact encompasses the two walls confining the ramp from Rossville Street to the car park between Kells Walk and Columbcille Court. The relevant area is indicated on the map below:
\\textsuperscript{95} B361 \\textsuperscript{96} B1410 \\textsuperscript{97} B1614 \\textsuperscript{98} B1626 \\textsuperscript{99} B1642 \\textsuperscript{100} B360 [M]; B1362 [002]; B1626 [035]; B1650 [039]. The ramp rises considerably in the direction of Columbeille Court. This is shown in a still of the ramp from Inquiry Video 1. The soldiers' individual positions at the two walls determined to a material degree what they could see behind the rubble barricade.
(1) Those on the ramp between the two walls had the advantage of an elevated position. The further west they were, the higher their position;
(2) Those furthest west had the best angle of vision for activities taking place on the east side of Rossville Street and in the area of the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats;
(3) The rear crawler would have obscured the front crawler to a certain extent. This would have had a more pronounced effect on those viewing from the east side of the wall;
(4) Some soldiers were further forward than others. Soldiers in front would have obscured to a certain extent the vision of those behind;
(5) The uneven nature of the rubble barricade added a further, unpredictable dimension to the situation.
The soldiers who could not see that the front crawling man had a weapon were generally to the east of and lower down than their colleagues.
Sergeant K located himself just to the left, or east, of the gap between the two walls. He was therefore at ground level. The other members of his call sign were to his right. K volunteered the point that those to his right would have had a different angle of vision and may have been able to see a weapon where he could not. Sergeant 014 recalls that he, too, was at ground level and that some of his men were to his right and higher up:
...The soldiers to my right had a better view of the Rubble Barricade and the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats because of their elevated position...
Private L is another soldier who may not have seen a weapon on the front crawling man, although his 1972 evidence is not consistent on this point. There is evidence from different sources that allow his position at the wall to be determined, should the Tribunal find the issue of relevance. L was certainly at the eastern corner of the wall when he fired. He was seen there by Private 032 and by Lieutenant Colonel Wilford and captured there in P261. His position was not static, however. Another photograph demonstrates that he was positioned elsewhere at a slightly different time. RUC Sergeant Brown's P262 shows L, the only call sign 71A soldier without a helmet, further west. This was at a time when Colonel Wilford was at the Kells Walk wall.
______________________________________________________________________
104 B1412.005 paragraph 23 105 B1412.005 paragraph 25; Day 372/027/16 106 B1614; B984 paragraph G 107 B336 paragraph E 8B-XI RESPONSE TO AN IMMEDIATE THREAT
8B-112 The men of call sign 71A were justified in the action that they took.
THE SOLDIERS' ASSESSMENT
8B-113 Sergeant 014 expressed his view of what he faced in the following terms:
... the man was carrying the weapon. If he had got into the flats, he could have turned round and used that weapon. If he was not going to use weapon, he should have left it at the barricade, should he not?
8B-114 002 had expressed similar views:
_We did not fire indiscriminately. I directed my men to fire.... We were in a dangerous situation and I was going to ensure that they were not put at further risk..._
_As far as I was concerned there was a very clear risk. The man had a rifle and we thought he was going to use it and in fact he probably had used it. We were going to take his power away... We were frightened and we were the guys being attacked. Having identified the man with a weapon we fired at them with controlled shots. I took an instinctive decision... The man I saw posed a threat with his weapon and may already have used it._
8B-115 M put it this way:
_As it was clear that we had already been under fire, I knew that if the two men could reach the sanctuary of this doorway, they would have then found a good sniping position from which they would fire at me or my colleagues. I made the instant decision that I was entitled, under the yellow card rules to fire an aimed shot at each of these 2 men._
8B-116 Similarly, 039 told Eversheds:
_There was no doubt in my mind that he was a hostile gunman and that he would fire his weapon at me or another soldier if he was given the opportunity to do so. He was definitely a threat to us. There was and is no doubt in my mind that the yellow card rules governing fire orders authorised us to shoot this man._
8B-117 Sergeant K made very much the same point during his oral evidence to this Tribunal, as did Sergeant 035.
______________________________________________________________________
108 Day 372/036/09\
109 B1363.004 paragraph 31\
110 B372.005 paragraph 24\
111 B1651.004 paragraph 23; see also Day 362/078/10\
112 Day 364/156/15; Day 361/071 to Day 361/072 The passages extracted above provide a consistent and compelling explanation by experienced soldiers of the situation they faced.
**OTHER RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS**
8B-119 The soldiers' perception of the threat they faced was reasonably and legitimately affected by:
1. The briefing they had received the night before to expect gunmen in the Bogside;
2. The round that had actually been fired at the Presbyterian Church while they were there; and
3. The gunfire they heard as they deployed south on foot.
8B-120 The soldiers made their decision to fire in the following circumstances:
1. The men were in position at the Kells Walk wall because the orders given to them required them to be there. They did not have the option of leaving the area.
2. The soldiers' SLRs were the only realistic means of putting an end to the threat posed by the crawling men. A shot from such a weapon is certain to cause serious injury, if not death.
3. The soldiers had only a matter of seconds in which to decide whether or not to shoot.
8B-121 Their actions were both lawful and wholly reasonable given the circumstances in which they found themselves.
**8B-XII RESTRAINT**
8B-122 Guinness Force soldiers reacted with restraint to the threat they honestly and reasonably perceived to exist behind the rubble barricade. Sergeant K and Private M were, in our submission, conspicuously disciplined soldiers, who would only fire their weapons when the circumstances absolutely required it. Bloody Sunday was the only time that K fired a live round at a human target during his three tours of Northern Ireland. Private M's two rounds on the day were the only shots he fired "in anger" during the twenty-five years of his military service.
The majority of the soldiers at the wall did not fire at all. Section commanders held back so that they could properly carry out their supervisory roles. There was no need for them to fire in circumstances where three other soldiers were engaging the targets. Sergeant 035 was asked by Brian McCartney when giving evidence to this Tribunal:
Q. If these shots were justified, why did you not fire your SLR?
A. I have thought about that. My job on that day was section commander, but when you fire a rifle, for me anyway, it is a difficult job. You have to control your breathing, you have to get the aim right, you have to concentrate and all you can see is what you can see down the end of the rifle; a very, very limited, small part -- view of the world. If you are in that position and firing, you cannot carry out your job as section commander.
Q. Are you really saying that you would not discharge your weapon in any circumstances?
A. I did not say that. I said in this particular instance I did not feel it was appropriate or necessary. Other people were firing; they were hitting the target. I was more interested in carrying out my job as a commander, which is to command.
Likewise, other soldiers held back because there was no need for them to fire. Private 032 was also questioned by Mr McCartney. He explained that:
______________________________________________________________________
13 Day 365/035/01 14 Day 365/138/20 15 Day 361/102/16 ... any reasons I would have had for not firing a shot would be because there were other people who had sighted the target and were controlling the target.
Q. So I want to be clear about this: even though at the time one of them was trailing what appeared to be a weapon rather than what you assert to have been a weapon, you still saw that as justification for the others to open fire; is that what you are saying?
A. Um, yes.116
8B-126 A little later, Mr. McCartney asked 032:
Q. Why then did you not fire?
A. Probably for the same reason that most of the other people there that day did not fire: discipline.117
The answer is very telling.
MOVEMENT FROM THE KELLS WALK WALL
8B-XIII TO THE COLUMBCILLE COURT CAR PARK
8B-127 Lieutenant Colonel Wilford was concerned that his men at the Kells Walks wall were too bunched and, after L’s final shot, he told them to spread out.118 Colour Sergeant 002 carried out Colonel Wilford’s orders by redeploying some of his soldiers from the wall.119 By the time 002 got to the car park himself, his men were already guarding prisoners there.120
8B-128 The men moved up the ramp and into the car park between the Kells Walk building and Columbcille Court. Sergeant K’s evidence was that:
116 Day 362/044/17 117 Day 362/045/18 118 B984 paragraph E 119 B1355 120 B1362 After this time the firing from our position had stopped completely and I went underneath the flats into an alleyway and came out into a car park facing Columbille Court. On the opposite side of the car park in front of the flats between 20-25 people, including a woman and a priest, had been arrested and from this position they were taken away to the battalion arrest area on the corner of William St and the E side of Rossville St.
8B-129 Private M stated that:
I then went through the alleyway with a sergeant and then climbed up onto a ramp in front of these flats. I watched the rooftops and windows of the flats for about 2 minutes. I then went down again and rejoined soldier 039 and we crossed over to the front of Columbille Court where 10 to 15 people were being held, these I believe having been arrested in the area of Glenfada Park.
8B-130 Sergeant 035 helped to guard the arrestees.
8B-131 Guinness Force soldiers can be seen with the arrestees in a photograph taken by William Rukeyser.
8B-132 Their location is marked on the aerial photograph below.
______________________________________________________________________
121 B311.019 122 B361 We have already suggested that P261, the photograph of Colonel Wilford and soldiers at the Kells Walk wall, was taken following this partial deployment from the wall.
THOSE REMAINING IN THE AREA OF ROSSVILLE STREET
Some members of call sign 71A did not move into the car park at this time.
In 1972, Sergeant 014 recorded that he moved to a position south of the Kells Walk wall:
I moved to the South West wall of Number 2 Columbelle Court and observed towards the flats. Whilst at this position I saw an old man kneeling behind a barricade which crossed Rossville Street... The man was waving and trying to attract our attention. I beckoned him forward but he would not move.127
Sergeant 014 no longer recalls deploying south of the wall himself, although he still remembers that two of his men went forward.125
Private L was evidently one of those men. His recollection in 1972 was that after Sergeant K left the Kells Walk wall, he moved south as far as the entrance to
______________________________________________________________________
123 B1626 124 B1410 125 B1412.006 paragraph 30, Day 372/053/06 Glenfada Park North. From there he too saw a man at the rubble barricade. L discovered that the man was kneeling over a body.\\textsuperscript{126}
8B-138 In 1972, L suggested that he next saw a gunman fire rounds from the doorway to Block 1.\\textsuperscript{127} Lance Corporal 039 saw muzzle flashes coming from the same doorway. He cannot now recall whether this was before or after the incident with the crawling men.\\textsuperscript{128}
8B-139 The Guinness Force men then rejoined their colleagues in the area of the Columbcille Court car park.
8B-XVTAKING THE ARRESTEES NORTH
8B-140 Colour Sergeant 002 ordered some of his men to walk the arrestees up from the car park to Little James Street.\\textsuperscript{129}
8B-141 Lance Corporal 039 and Private M were among them.\\textsuperscript{130} M stated in 1972 that:
\\begin{quote} We waited there for about 5 minutes and then [an] officer shouted to us to take the people who had been arrested to Little James Street for questioning. This we did and we left these people with other soldiers by a wire mesh fence in front of a car park on the west side of Little James Street.\\textsuperscript{131} \\end{quote}
8B-142 Their movement north was captured in many photographs and in footage taken by the ITN camera crew.\\textsuperscript{132}
8B-143 Below are three of the relevant photographs. \\textbf{P493} shows the group shortly after they moved off:
\\begin{itemize} \\item \\textsuperscript{126} B321 \\item \\textsuperscript{127} B330 paragraph B \\item \\textsuperscript{128} B1651.004 paragraph 21; Day 362/073/18 \\item \\textsuperscript{129} B1362 \\item \\textsuperscript{130} B1642; B1651.005 paragraph 30 \\item \\textsuperscript{131} B361 \\item \\textsuperscript{132} V3/08.39 \\end{itemize} 8B-144 **P495** captures them as they headed towards Little James Street:
8B-145 Finally, **P497** shows the group against the wire fence at the GPO car park in Little James Street. The Guinness Force soldiers acted as responsible escorts. Not one of the numerous photographs of the group of arrestees during their movement from Columbelle Court to Little James Street captures any assault or incident of inappropriate force being used against an arrestee. Similarly, video footage of the same movement discloses no inappropriate treatment. If there has been serious assaults, or sustained of repeated acts of ill-treatment, it is reasonable to assume that those who were present with the object and intention of observing and photographing what was going on would have observed and/or photographed them.
8B-XVI AMMUNITION CHECK
8B-147 Captain 200 later consolidated his men at the northern end of Rossville Street and in the derelict houses bordering William Street. The two Guinness Force call signs rejoined at this stage. Sergeant K and Private M confirm that they remained in this area for approximately half an hour.
______________________________________________________________________
133 B2017 paragraph E 134 B311.019, B361 An ammunition check was conducted during their time there. It may not have been the first to take place. M recorded in 1972 that there were two, the first had taken place shortly after I had shot the two men I described and also another check had taken place in the derelict building.
M was asked at this Tribunal what an ammunition check would normally have entailed:
A. Check the rounds that you had and check what you had left...
Q. Does that mean that the person conducting the check would actually have examined your magazine to see how many rounds were left?
A. Yes, sir.
CAPTAIN 200 SPEAKS TO THE SOLDIERS WHO FIRED
Guinness Force rejoined their vehicles in William Street and pulled back to the area of the Presbyterian Church and then to Clarence Avenue. Captain 200 explained in 1972:
At Clarence Avenue I asked my two Colour Sergeants in charge of the half platoons what rounds had been fired. Having been given a list of the soldiers who'd fired I then spoke to each soldier individually so that I was clear in my mind as to what they had fired and what targets they had engaged.
In oral evidence to this Tribunal, 200 also explained:
... I wanted to know who had fired, from where they fired, at what and anything about hits at that time, but it was a very brief summary at that time because it was dark and we were soon to be on the move again.\\textsuperscript{140}
8B-152 He noted down in a broadly accurate form the information he received from each of the soldiers that had fired live rounds. He reproduced that information in his statement of February 1972.\\textsuperscript{141}
**KEVIN McELHINNEY**
8B-153 It is not possible to determine who shot Kevin McElhinney. There is certainly no clear evidence to link either Sergeant K or Private M, whom we represent to his death.
8B-XVIII **FORENSIC AND PATHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE**
8B-154 There is no forensic evidence to demonstrate from which individual soldier's weapon the single bullet which killed Mr McElhinney came.
8B-155 Nor will the Tribunal be assisted by the evidence of the pathologists in determining which soldier shot Mr McElhinney. The information they provide is of assistance in determining Mr McElhinney's position when shot (bending over or on all fours\\textsuperscript{142}) and the approximate direction from which the round was fired (behind\\textsuperscript{143} or behind and to the right\\textsuperscript{144}) but it goes no further.
8B-XIX **CIVILIAN EVIDENCE**
8B-156 Much of the civilian evidence relating to the circumstances in which Kevin McElhinney was shot is surprisingly confused, contradictory and unhelpful. It
\\textsuperscript{140} Day 367/146/02 \\textsuperscript{141} B1983 \\textsuperscript{142} D0218 (Professor Marshall); E2.0055 (Dr Shepherd and Kevin O'Callaghan) \\textsuperscript{143} D0218 (Marshall) \\textsuperscript{144} E2.0054 (Shepherd and O'Callaghan) does not assist in determining who fired on him or the circumstances in which he was shot.
8B-157 Many civilians describe the shooting of an individual (other than Hugh Gilmore) as he approached the entrance to Block 1, of the Rossville Flats. Some name him as Kevin McElhinney, others do not.
RUNNING NOT CRAWLING
8B-158 The members of call sign 71A sighted two men who were crawling on their fronts towards the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. The soldiers’ evidence is entirely consistent on this point – and it was not seriously suggested that this part of their evidence was incorrect.
8B-159 Conversely, several of the civilians who describe the shooting of Mr McElhinney suggest that he was running at the time he was shot. We set out below examples of this body of evidence, confined to witnesses who specifically identify the person they were observing as Kevin McElhinney.
(1) In 1972, Alex Morrison described how he and Mr McElhinney ran for the doorway together, “We were crouched and running at the same time...Kevin was beside me for the few moments before he was shot.” Kevin McElhinney was his friend and it is difficult to see how Mr Morrison could have been mistaken about that account.
(2) Sean O’Neill saw Mr McElhinney, whom he knew, albeit not as well as he knew Hugh Gilmore, “crouching down and running” south of the rubble barricade, at the western side of block 1. Mr McElhinney was lying on the
145 AM429.001; see also AM429.002 and now Day 143/150/24 146 AM429.004 paragraph 2 147 AO65.009 paragraphs 44 to 45 148 AO65.009 paragraph 44 floor by the time Mr O'Neill arrived in the flats. There can, accordingly, be no doubt here either as to the identity of the person whom he had seen running.
(3) Liam Mailey's impression was that Mr McElhinney had been running to get away from the firing. He told Lord Widgery that he "didn't crawl into the doorway, he fell into the doorway from a crouching position." He was possibly the fifth or sixth person to come through at this time.
(4) James Norris vividly recalls how Kevin McElhinney entered block 1:
"Suddenly the doors were flung open and a fella crashed though as though he was in full flight...He was like a drunk who had lost all co-ordination. I moved forward to catch him and I can see it today as if it happened a minute ago. I lowered him to the ground..."
If these civilian witnesses are correct, the persons on whom the call sign 71A soldiers fired did not include McElhinney.
CRAWLING ON BACK
Some further witnesses give descriptions of a person they saw shot whilst crawling towards the entrance to block 1 on his back. For instance:
(1) Christopher Doherty observed a person he believed had already been shot, who "was trying to crawl on his back towards Block 1... He was pushing himself with his feet and was making a lot of effort to move himself while all the time being shot at." (2) Professor O'Keefe described a man he saw dragging himself along the pavement towards the doorway. "There was no-one around him. He was in a curious position, half on his back, half on his side, pushing himself with one arm." Professor O'Keefe had the impression that the man had already been shot and believes he was shot for a second time at the doorway.\\textsuperscript{155}
(3) Eugene Bradley saw a man crawling south along the western side of Block 1 \\textit{backwards}. "He was moving almost in a sitting down position and was looking north along Rossville Street to see what was happening there." He was then shot.\\textsuperscript{156}
8B-162 It is impossible to reconcile these accounts either with those of other civilian witnesses or with those of the Guinness Force soldiers. They serve to demonstrate the significant confusion in the civilian evidence of what was taking place in the area to the north of the doorway to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.
8B-163 Generally speaking, the civilian witnesses are unsure whether the person they saw shot:
(1) was upright or crawling;
(2) if he was crawling, whether he was:
(a) on his front or on his back
(b) moving forwards or backwards; or
(3) was alone or with others.
8B-164 They also disagree about how many times he was shot.
\\textsuperscript{155} H21.047 paragraph 17 \\textsuperscript{156} AB113.002 paragraph 12; and see Day 169/165/05 The presence of even one unidentified, "missing" casualty in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats would provide some explanation for the otherwise surprising and wholly inexplicable inconsistencies in the civilian and military evidence of the circumstances in which the Guinness Force soldiers fired and Kevin McElhinney came to be shot.
As Alan Harkens descended the stairs in Block 1, he saw the body of Kevin McElhinney. He then saw another body nearby:
14. I reached the stairwell at the southern end of Block 1 ... Once I had got into the cover of the stairwell I stood up and walked down the stairs. As I did so I saw two bodies, the first of which was on the first half-landing as I went down the stairs, and the second was on the full-landing on the ground floor.
15. I went down to the full-landing, on the ground floor. I looked at the second body which seemed to be propped up against the inside wall of the stairwell. I cannot recall whether there was a coat or a sheet over this body. All I can recall is that the body was again of a young man and he had a pair of boots, which had been taken off and placed beside his feet. I cannot recall whether I looked specifically at his face but I could tell from his shoes and clothes that he was a young fella... 157
The identity of the second person is unknown. Mr Harkens is adamant that he has not confused the second body with that of Hugh Gilmore, whose body was outside the southern end of Block 1. The proposition was put to him by Kevin Finnegan QC:
Q. What I want to suggest to you is that the body you seem to recall seeing inside the stairwell on the ground floor, are you with me?
A. Yes.
157 AH8.004 Q. May well have been the body of Gilmore? A. Yes.
Q. Which would have been outside and you would have seen, before your attention was then directed to Barney McGuigan; could that have been the position. A. That may have been the position.
LORD SAVILLE: I am not entirely sure I followed that question, Mr Finnegan, forgive me. The suggestion is, Mr Harkens, that the body you say you saw in the foyer might in fact not have been in the foyer when you saw it, but outside? A. No.
LORD SAVILLE: That was what you were suggesting. MR FINNEGAN: Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: I was not sure Mr Harkens entirely followed your question. MR FINNEGAN: I am obliged to you, sir.
LORD SAVILLE: You can put it again if you like but, as I understand it, you have a clear memory of seeing the body that you have described in the foyer, not outside? A. Not outside, no.
MR FINNEGAN: How clear are you on that? A. I did not come out at the front of the Rossville Flats at all.158
8B-168 Liam Mailey believes that he was brought downstairs to the entrance to Block 1 by news that someone had been shot. His presence in the area of the doorway at the time that Kevin McElhinney was shot has caused him to question whether the information he first received related to a different, unidentified casualty.
8B-169 He told Eversheds that:
158 Day 096/024/21 I know that I went downstairs to the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats because I had heard that someone had been shot or injured (I cannot recall exactly what was said) and I wanted to see if I could help. However, I believe that I did not see someone who had already been shot or injured but someone who was in the course of being shot. I have wondered therefore whether the person who I had been told was injured and who I went to help, had actually moved or been moved by the time I turned the corner on the small landing on my way down the stairs. In other words it is possible that another person was injured at about the same time as Kevin McElhinney, but I never saw that person.\\textsuperscript{159}
It has again been suggested that the information he received first may have related to Hugh Gilmore.\\textsuperscript{160} There is a real difficulty with that proposition. Photograph P598 demonstrates that Mr Mailey was already downstairs when Mr Gilmore ran by the doorway. In fact, Mr Gilmore would have been amongst people he saw pass the doorway:
\\begin{quote} Q. ... Do you think that you actually saw Hugh Gilmore on the day?
A. I certainly saw people running by the door, I remember that, whether or not it was --
Q. You saw somebody running past the door?
A. Exactly, yes, and as that photograph positions me there, then the people who were running by -- Hugh must have been one of them.\\textsuperscript{161} \\end{quote}
Liam Mailey's account therefore provides some further evidence of a missing casualty in the relevant area.
ROUNDS WHICH MISSED
Kevin McElhinney was hit by a single round. Three call sign 71A soldiers fired a total of five rounds at two different targets. It would be impossible to determine
\\textsuperscript{159} M50.005 paragraph 32 \\textsuperscript{160} Day 163/125/02 \\textsuperscript{161} Day 163/118/07 which if any of these five bullets struck Mr McElhinney, even if it were assumed (which it should not be) that he was one of the targets.
8B-173 Civilian evidence confirms that a number of bullets were fired which could not have hit a person; they either struck the road or the door to Block 1. For example:
(1) Christopher Doherty and Eamon McAteer both saw bullets bounce off the ground around a young man as he crawled south.(^{162})
(2) Charlie Downey saw bullets strike the door at the entrance to Block 1, of the Rossville Flats.(^{163})
8B-174 It was suggested by Mr. McCartney that Kevin McElhinney was the rear crawling man described by the soldiers of call sign 71 A. The rear crawling man sighted by the soldiers had a weapon. If (which is not submitted) Kevin McElhinney was the rear crawling man, it would follow that he was armed.
8B-XXII PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
8B-175 The issue of Sector 3 “missing photographs” is addressed in detail in the submissions relating to the Mortar Platoon in Sector 3 (chapter 8A, above). For present purposes, we draw attention, by way of example, to the evidence of Ciaran Donnelly. Several of his photographs of the rubble barricade are missing(^{164}) and the negatives of the only two of (part of) the eastern portion of the barricade that survive have been deliberately damaged. The area on EP27/8 that is partially obscured by scratches includes, according to Arthur Harvey QC, Kevin McElhinney standing on the rubble barricade.(^{165})
(^{162}) AD58.012 paragraph 22; AM41.004 paragraph 26 (^{163}) AD133.005 paragraph 25 (^{164}) see, for example, Day 071/003/14 (^{165}) Day 047/060/24 PRIVATE L
8B-176 The evidence given by Private L to Eversheds and orally to this Tribunal should be disregarded in its entirety. It is submitted that he is a totally unreliable witness, a man who has evidently had an exceptionally tough life since he left the Army and one which may well have taken its toll on his mental health.
8B-177 The difficulties have arisen since Bloody Sunday and it is not, therefore, suggested that L's 1972 accounts should also be disregarded. That body of evidence will need to be judged on its own merits and in the light of material from other sources, including Captain 200's note of the information he received from L shortly after the event.166
8B-XXIII SOLDIER L'S STATE OF MIND
8B-178 L told Eversheds:
I have nightmares and wake up sweating about the horrors I have witnessed during my lifetime for which no counselling or post traumatic stress therapy was ever provided by the army. It may be therefore that certain incidents have been confused...167
8B-179 In oral evidence he was asked by Arthur Harvey QC:
Q. Could it be that the nightmares have become more real to you than what happened on the day?
A. Oh, yes, definitely, yes, I agree with you there.168
and further:
Q. And the nightmares that you have, are those recurrent nightmares?
A. Yes, yes.
166 B1983 167 B346.009 paragraph 80 168 Day 381/140/7 Q. Do they distort reality for you?
A. I do not think they distort it, they bring it out more visibly, details I missed before, you know, sometimes seem more vivid.
Q. In other words do you have a lot of recovered memories, things that did not seem to be so at the time, but when you have your nightmares, they fall into place for you?
A. Yes. 169
8B-180 The concept that Private L's nightmares have become his current reality is profoundly concerning. It does, however, explain why he described in 2003 incidents he claimed to have witnessed on Bloody Sunday but which he had not referred to in 1972. His accounts of a soldier shooting repeatedly into a body on the ground, of that body later breaking in two as it was lifted up; of recovering pounds of plastic explosive from the rubble barricade; and of watching his colleague INQ 1671 kill a gunman who had just called him a "British Pig", are no doubt the products of a seriously confused and troubled mind.
8B-XXIV THE ACTIVITIES OF SOLDIER H
8B-181 Soldier L suggested to Eversheds that he saw Soldier H firing into a body at the junction of Eden Place and Rossville Street. The incident described did not happen; the account is of interest only because it demonstrates the extent to which he is confused.
8B-182 L explained that he now felt able to discuss it for the surprising reasons that:
"...now I am older and got more control of myself as such, I am in touch with my feminine side of my feelings..." 170
8B-183 He, therefore, described how H approached the body,
"walking up to him and it was like a methodical trance-like marching towards his enemy ..." 171
169 Day 381/148/05 170 Day 381/057/03 before “blasting off rounds from his SLR.” L claimed later to have been involved in placing the man’s body into a Red Cross Pig:
I can also remember the fact that we actually put him into a body bag. He fell into two parts as we lifted him and that is not the sort of thing that you forget.
There is, of course, absolutely no evidence to support any of L’s contentions relating to this body.
EXPLOSIVES AT RUBBLE BARRICADE
L’s claim that he retrieved about three pounds of explosives from the Rossville Street rubble barricade provides a further example of his confused mind at work. He gave a detailed account of the supposed incident to Eversheds:
46. It was as I was still running, that I heard Colour Sergeant Soldier 002 behind me shout out, “Hold up Soldier L, the barricade”. The sergeant was referring to the risk of explosives within the barricade. I was running at the time in a straight line towards Free Derry Corner; it could have been Colonel Wilford who shouted this order. Whichever one it was, it was a direct order and I therefore had to give up the idea I had of trying to go after Martin McGuinness or finding the house in the area of Free Derry Corner. I dived down where I was, close to the barricade and Colour Sergeant Soldier 002 and Corporal INQ 1671 and another soldier, whose identity I can’t recall, came up towards me... and together we began to crawl towards the barricade.
47. In the barricade, I found about three pounds of plastic explosives and a detonator cord leading away. I have been made aware, by Eversheds, that others do not recall or recount this, but nevertheless, I remember this incident very clearly, and it did happen on Bloody Sunday... There was a good 60 feet of cord there.\\textsuperscript{174}
8B-186 The evidence is at odds with everything else the Tribunal has heard, yet L persists in his suggestion that it actually happened.\\textsuperscript{175}
8B-XXVI INQ 1671'S GUNMAN
8B-187 A final example of evidence demonstrating a troubled and confused mind comes with Soldier L's account of INQ 1671 shooting a terrorist in the Rossville Street area. He told Eversheds how he and INQ 1671 spotted the gunman and warned him to stop or they would fire:
\\textit{He responded to the shout with an obscenity such as, "You British Pig! You bastard!" and he was still attempting to release his pistol from his belt.}
8B-188 Consequently, INQ 1671 shot him:
\\textit{As he released it, Corporal INQ 1671 then fired a shot at him with his rifle from a distance of about 100 to 150 feet. It was the clearest and most precise taking out of the enemy that I ever saw. He fell to the ground, shot in the solar plexus and I believe that he was killed instantly. INQ 1671 had him banged to rights.}\\textsuperscript{176}
8B-189 In oral evidence, L maintained that he witnessed this incident and that it occurred on Bloody Sunday.\\textsuperscript{177} However, the Tribunal will be aware that INQ 1671 was not present in Londonderry as part of 1 PARA on 30\\textsuperscript{th} January 1972. There is no statement from him, no other soldier refers to him and he does not appear in the schedule of Support Company (including Guinness Force), according to the
\\textsuperscript{174} B346.004 \\textsuperscript{175} Day 381/109/01 \\textsuperscript{176} B346 paragraph 30 \\textsuperscript{177} Day 381/047/16 Nominal Roll. There is no shred of evidence, other than from Soldier L, to suggest he was there, and contemporaneous documentary evidence that he wasn’t.
The impression given during his oral evidence was that L, no doubt for complex psychological reasons, had actually come to believe the fantastic stories he told Eversheds.
PARTICULAR ALLEGATIONS
8B-XXVII BRIAN MCCARTNEY
Many allegations were ventilated for the first time, and without notice, during the course of the oral evidence. If any of these allegations is maintained by way of final submission, they will, if appropriate, be addressed by way of reply. There are, however, a number of fundamental allegations which can appropriately be addressed at this stage.
It was maintained by Mr McCartney on behalf of those he represents both that the inconsistencies in the various military accounts are evidence of untruthfulness and that soldiers conspired after the event to produce consistent accounts of their actions. Those very serious allegations are themselves inconsistent.
So, for example, when Mr McCartney questioned Private 032, he focused first on the inconsistencies in the military accounts:
Q. ... Can you give any explanation as to why a group of trained observers, occupying the same location as you, witnessing the same events over the same distance as you, over the same period of time, give such conflicting accounts; can you assist this Inquiry with any explanation as to why that would be?
178 GEN 8.001 179 As Mr McCartney put it to Sergeant 014: “There had to be a general and hurried justification given for the event. Let us just say they were armed.” Day 372/068/08 A. No, I can only say what I saw or what I believe I saw.\\textsuperscript{180}
Yet, he next turned to the allegation that 032 had been “unduly pressured” to provide an account that corroborated those of his colleagues:
Q. I am going to suggest to you, 032, that really your evidence then, as it is today, has been influenced by an attempt to justify what was a bad decision by a number of soldiers to open fire on those men; do you understand?
A. I understand, yes.
Q. And I am going to suggest to you that your loyalty, the buddy-buddy system, your loyalty to the Parachute Regiment, your concern for your colleagues, has been a major factor in your interpretation of events that day; do you understand?
A. I understand.
Q. And that you have been unduly influenced to provide an account which misrepresents the reality of what occurred; do you follow me?\\textsuperscript{181}
This caused 032, not unreasonably, to comment on the conflicting allegations being put to him:
A. ... you say I have been led on by other soldiers and then you say I am the only one with one account, everybody else has a different account.
Mr McCartney: I have no further questions.\\textsuperscript{182}
The main difficulty with Mr McCartney’s thesis is that the very presence of inconsistencies in the military evidence undermines his suggestion that soldiers’ accounts have been tailored to corroborate one another. It is inconceivable that soldiers conspiring together to produce a consistent version of events would produce one with the number of inconsistencies, even as to the fundamental issues, that Mr McCartney suggests are contained in the military accounts.
\\textsuperscript{180} Day 362/046/08 \\textsuperscript{181} Day 362/047/11 \\textsuperscript{182} Day 362/048/11 It would have been difficult for the members of Guinness Force to discuss their evidence after the event. Guinness Force was also known as the Composite Platoon because it was made up of a collection of men from many different jobs within the battalion. It ceased to function as a discrete platoon upon the men's return to barracks. Its constituent elements went back to their normal, diverse jobs.
The regimental magazine *Pegasus* described how the platoon consisted of:
*Quartermaster's staff, Orderly Room Clerks, Pay Clerks, Bandsmen, off duty Dog Handlers, spare Drummers and not infrequently volunteer drivers and signallers from Command Company...*
Members of Guinness Force have explained to this Inquiry:
*The fact is that we were a composite force and, when I got back to barracks, I went with my own section and doing my own job. Some of these people I might not see in barracks again.*
and:
*I went back to my normal job that week and I was separated from the rest of the battalion.*
The differences in the military accounts of what was taking place behind the Rossville Street rubble barricade are explained by the different positions of the soldiers at the Kells Walk walls. Soldiers with a better vantage point could obviously describe more of what was taking place, as has been explained above.
Those who maintain that discrepancies in the Guinness Force evidence are significant should also consider the analogous civilian accounts of the shooting of a person some name as Kevin McElhinney as he approached the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. As demonstrated above, the witnesses concerned
______________________________________________________________________
183 R024: Vol 27, No. 1, Jan 1972 184 Day 299/098/21 (Sergeant 106, Pioneer Platoon) 185 Day 362/042/11 (Private 032, Motor Transport Platoon) contradicted one another as to whether he was upright or crawling (and, if he was crawling, whether this was on his front or on his back), or whether he was alone or with others at the time. There were also conflicting accounts as to how many times he was shot.
8B-XXVIII RMP STATEMENTS
8B-202 A further ground of criticism which Mr McCartney made of a number of Guinness Force soldiers, was that, having made tentative identification of weapons in accounts which they gave to RMPs, they consciously and dishonestly "firmed up" those accounts in subsequent statements
"APPEARED TO BE" / "LOOKED LIKE"
8B-203 Sergeant 014's RMP statement recorded that:
I saw two men, one dressed in a dark brown suit the other in dark clothing, crawling from a barricade and moving South along the West wall of Block I Rossville Flats. The rear man in the brown suit was trailing what looked like a rifle behind him.186
8B-204 Mr McCartney asked 014 about the terminology employed in his and other RMP statements:
Q. You see, I want to suggest to you that not one of you at the material time had the guts to go so far as to say "he was definitely carrying a weapon"; all of you used expressions such as "appeared as", "looked like".187
8B-205 The suggestion that it would have taken "guts" to have made a more specific allegation is not understood. The allegation can, in any event, now be seen to have been based on a misconception as to the way in which most RMPs wrote down what they were told.
186 B1410 187 Day 372/068/13
VIII 152 Mr McCartney took a different approach with Private 032:
Q. "What looked like a rifle", in other words, it could have been, for example, a walking stick?
A. No.
Q. It could have been a crutch, it could have been a bit of timber, a bit of metal, but it looked to you like a rifle?
A. Uh-huh.188
"LONG BLACK STICK SHAPED OBJECTS"
In a similar vein, it was suggested by various questioners that the phrase "long black stick shaped objects" used in Private M's RMP statement demonstrated that he had appreciated at the time that he was unable positively to identify the objects being carried behind the rubble barricade as weapons.189
In this instance, the questions were posed even though the same statement went on to refer to the fact that:
the door location [the crawling men] were heading for was a good sniper location where they could have shot a number of troops advancing towards the barricade.190
They were certainly not going to do so with a couple of sticks. Private M told Eversheds he would not have used such language:
I would have been quite firm in that interview that the two men were carrying what I was sure to be weapons.191
He said in oral evidence:
I can only assume that that is the way that the RMP, who took the statement, described it.192
188 Day 362/040/23; this allegation has been considered above in relation to Kevin McElhinney. 189 B348 190 B348 191 B372.007 paragraph 42 EVIDENCE OF RMP/SIB INVESTIGATORS
8B-211 M was right. Corporal Brobson, who took M's RMP statement, agreed that the phrase might indeed have come from him.193
8B-212 The issue was put beyond doubt by the evidence of WO1 Wood, the senior Special Investigation Branch NCO. He explained that it was RMP policy when taking statements to remove soldiers' specific references to weapons. He gave the reason for this:
The soldier would say it was a rifle. He was quite clear it was a rifle from the outset. We had had situations put to us that the man may well have been carrying a walking stick in an unorthodox manner, or whatever. If we had said in the statement that the man was carrying a rifle when he was first seen at some 100 yards or whatever, someone would say what sort of rifle was it, bolt or piston-operated, did it have a long or short magazine, straight or curved magazine -- if the soldier said it was this or that or the other, then the accusation would be that he had the eyes of an eagle and that was totally impossible. If he said he could not remember it had a long or straight magazine, the question would come back that he was obviously mistaken and therefore it must have been a walking stick.
... So we adopted the position that what was seen was a long straight object, if it was talking about a rifle. If it was a hand gun, then obviously we had a different terminology for that. If it was a blast bomb, we had different terminology for that...194
8B-213 The Guinness Force soldiers therefore should not be criticised for the use of language in their RMP statements that fell short of the positive identification of a weapon.
192 Day 365/096/10 193 Day 275/124/12 194 Day 383/150/44 See further in this regard the general submissions relating to the RMP statement taking process in chapter 2B above.
PRIVATE C AND LANCE CORPORAL D
INTRODUCTION
The rounds fired by C and D cannot have hit any of the known Bloody Sunday deceased or wounded.
Private C from call sign 71 A and Lance Corporal D from call sign 71 both deployed to the balcony of the Kells Walk building at a late stage in the proceedings; it was certainly after all of the known deceased and wounded had been shot.
Once there, C targeted a gunman to the southern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. The presence of this gunman in this area at this time corresponds with civilian evidence of armed men arriving in the area of the Bogside Inn and moving north in the direction of the soldiers.
C and D both then engaged a gunman with a pistol in Block 1 of the flats. There is strong civilian evidence that at least one pistolman had already been active in that block.
MOVEMENTS OF SOLDIERS C AND D PRIOR TO TAKING UP POSITIONS AT KELLS WALK
SUMMARY
The Guinness Force lorries entered the Bogside towards the end of the line of 1 PARA vehicles and halted at the northern end of Rossville Street.
As part of call sign 71A, Soldier C deployed initially to the east side of the Rossville Flats waste ground and covered a considerable distance on foot. He moved South down the back of the Chamberlain Street houses, crossed the mouth of the Rossville Flats car park to the north end of Block 1 and then went to the north east corner of Columbille Court.
8B-221 C was then ordered to escort to Little James Street those arrested by the Anti Tank Platoon in Glenfada Park North.
8B-222 As part of call sign 71, Soldier D started to deploy west but was quickly handed an arrestee to take North to the holding area in Little James Street. As he did so, he joined up with C and others taking the prisoners arrested by the Anti Tank Platoon to the same destination.
8B-223 Only at this stage did C and D rejoin their platoon and deploy to the balcony at Kells Walk.
PRIVATE C
8B-224 As part of call sign 71 Soldier C was deployed to the east side of Rossville Street. The lengthy route he then followed is set out in a statement he made in 1972:
The officer in charge of our force ordered us to work our way round the walls on the edge of the open ground and to assemble at the near end of block 1 of the Rossville buildings...
... By the time we reached the end of the Chamberlain Street wall the civilians had run past the barricade on the other side of block 1, and most of them had left the car park off the Rossville Building though I could still see some moving on its far side ... When I got to the car park end of the wall I remember seeing one of our men (I do not remember who) standing by the pig in the car park fire a shot at the far corner between blocks 2 and 3. As he did this I was running across to the end of block 1.
There one of the sergeants sent the whole force to the William Street end of the front of Columbille court. From there half a dozen of us took a party of about 20 prisoners back to a collection point.195
195 B68.016 It is possible to trace Private C's movements in footage taken by various camera crews on the day and it would appear that the detailed account which he gave was wholly accurate.
An ITN crew captured C and his colleagues as they crossed from the North end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats to the west side of Rossville Street. The video still extracted below shows a group of soldiers, some of whom are wearing helmets with visors, crossing the road at a time when the Ferret and Support Company Command vehicle had moved to the north end of Block 1. The only members of 1 PARA to deploy to this part of the Bogside with visors on 30th January 1972 were members of Guinness Force.
A camera crew from the BBC very probably captured the same soldiers moments later, as they moved north up Rossville Street, past the Kells Walk walls. The still reproduced below demonstrates that at this stage:
(1) no soldiers remained in the area of the Kells Walk walls, and (2) the arrestees from Glenfada Park North had already been brought through to the Columbeille Court car park. They can be seen through the archway.\\textsuperscript{198}
8B-228 The same soldiers were filmed by an ABC crew as they moved up Rossville Street, as the still below demonstrates.\\textsuperscript{199} Private C went to the northern end of Columbille Court where he was ordered to help escort a party of about twenty prisoners, those arrested by Anti Tank Platoon, to the collection point in Little James Street.
The group of arrestees is captured in P493 as it was taken north from Columbille Court. C remained with the prisoners until their arrival at the collection point.\\textsuperscript{201}
By the time these prisoners had been arrested, all the known dead and injured had already been shot. As Arthur Harvey QC put it when questioning C:
\\begin{quote} ... by the time those persons had actually been arrested, everyone who had been shot and killed on Bloody Sunday had already been shot and killed. The bodies of people who had been shot at the barricade had already been collected. Those prisoners were eventually arrested by the persons or the group of persons who fired the last shots, including F.\\textsuperscript{202} \\end{quote}
**LANCE CORPORAL D**
On debussing, Soldier D went to the right hand side of Rossville Street.\\textsuperscript{203} Shortly thereafter, he was handed an arrestee, whom he took to the holding point. In 1972, he gave a detailed account of the time he was engaged with the detainee:
\\begin{quote} It was not my task to act as prisoner escort but as I had one I escorted him over to the buildings on the opposite side of Rossville Street. I was then told to take him round the corner just into William Street and we waited there for a short time. There were another 3 prisoners there with 2 troops as escorts. After about 5 minutes there a larger party of about 15 prisoners brought up and taken past our building over the crossroads and up Little James Street. We were told to take our prisoners with them and I escorted mine up Little James Street where I handed him over to our Regimental Police escort.\\textsuperscript{204} \\end{quote}
D told the RMP that it was approximately ten minutes after receiving his prisoner that he handed him over to the battalion Provo staff, \\textsuperscript{205} Arthur Harvey QC commented:
\\begin{quote} Q. That part of your statement is undoubtedly true although you cannot be seen in the photograph; is it not? \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{201} B68.016 paragraph 8 \\textsuperscript{202} Day 354/111/10 \\textsuperscript{203} B85.002 paragraph 12 \\textsuperscript{204} B85.023 paragraph 5 \\textsuperscript{205} B85.020 A. Yes.
Q. That it was after a period when all of the persons who had been arrested at the gable end of Glenfada Park North had been brought to the junction of William Street / Rossville Street, taken from there to Little James Street. You then went over, handed over your prisoner and made your way back; is that not correct?
A. That is correct.206
8B-235 D, like C, did not, therefore, return to Rossville Street and take up a position at Kells Walk until after all the known deceased and injured had been shot.
8B-XXXI DEPLOYMENT TO KELLS WALK
TAKING UP POSITION ON KELLS WALK BALCONY
8B-236 Having handed over their prisoners at the collection point, Private C and Lance Corporal D rejoined their sections in the area of Kells Walk.207 They were ordered to take up positions of cover on the Kells Walk balcony.208 They reached the balcony by means of the stairs at the north end of the block.209
8B-237 Photograph P269 shows the balcony, taken from the pram ramp to its south.
206 Day 355/045/24 207 B68.022 paragraph A; B85.023 paragraph 5 208 B68.022 paragraph B; B85.023 paragraphs 5 to 6 and Day 355/014/22 209 B68.28 paragraph B; B85.004 paragraph 18 The arrow in photograph EP23/7, below, shows the position at the southern end of the balcony ultimately taken up by C and D. The photograph was taken before their arrival there.
C and D arrived at the balcony at approximately the same time. D initially remained halfway along, checking doorways and keeping an eye on the buildings. in the surrounding area.\\textsuperscript{210} C got to its southern end first, having passed D on his way down.\\textsuperscript{211} C’s evidence is that he engaged his first target and had already begun to engage his second target by the time that D joined him at the end of the balcony.\\textsuperscript{212} This corresponds with D’s account, which was that he heard low velocity gunfire and heard C return fire before joining him.\\textsuperscript{213}
\\textit{Private C}
8B-240 Much has been made of C’s evidence to Lord Widgery that he was lying down when he fired from the balcony (by Mr Hill at the Widgery Tribunal and by Arthur Harvey Q.C. at the present Tribunal).\\textsuperscript{214} It has been suggested that photographs taken by the Derry Journal’s Larry Doherty demonstrate that C could not have fired at his targets (including one to the south of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats) from a \\textit{lying} position because the wall surrounding the balcony would have obscured his vision and line of fire.\\textsuperscript{215}
8B-241 It is not clear how far such points actually take those who make them. It is neither disputed that C deployed to the south end of the balcony, nor that he fired from that location. Indeed, Mr Harvey specifically suggested to C that he fired from there at a target south of Block 1.
8B-242 There is, of course, a danger in relying on photographs such as those taken by Mr Doherty to judge exactly what C would have been able to see whilst lying down. Discussing Mr Doherty’s \\textbf{P71} in opening, Christopher Clarke Q.C. correctly suggested that much would depend on whether the photographer’s position when taking the photograph correlated precisely with that of C at the relevant time. Mr Clarke stated:
\\begin{itemize} \\item \\textsuperscript{210} B85.004 paragraph 18; B85.024 paragraph 6. \\item \\textsuperscript{211} B85.024 paragraph 6 \\item \\textsuperscript{212} B68.013; Day 354/125/07 \\item \\textsuperscript{213} B85.024 paragraph 6 \\item \\textsuperscript{214} B68.028 paragraph E \\item \\textsuperscript{215} B68.025 paragraph E, Day 354/132/13 \\end{itemize} ... it is not clear, at least to the untutored eye, to what extent a minor alteration in his position further south or west or further above the ground would make a crucial difference.216
8B-243 C made similar observations about the photograph when asked about his line of vision for his first target, at the southern end of Block 1:
I do not think we are getting the full, true picture out of that photo.217
8B-244 He did, however, agree that it was unlikely he could have seen his second target, who was actually in Block 1, from a lying position.218 His account to Eversheds was that:
I cannot recall now whether I was kneeling or lying down at the time. I probably crouched down to take cover when I was in danger and then stood up to fire towards the window.219
8B-245 Dealing with his evidence to Lord Widgery, C said:
At that time I probably did not explain myself very well. I probably lay down during the sound of incoming fire and then rose to a standing position when I was ready to shoot back. To get from a lying to a standing position I had to kneel.220
8B-246 Private 024 was sent up to the balcony by Sergeant 014 and was present when Soldier C fired at his second target. 024 confirms that:
... C moved round and took aim at a man who was hanging out of the window of a 3rd floor flat in Rossville Flats.221
8B-247 Soldier D confirms that Soldier C was not lying down when he fired at this target.222
216 Day 023/045/10 217 Day 354/048/12 218 Day 354/051/01 219 B68,004 paragraph 16 220 B68,006 paragraph 43 221 B1527; B1529 It cannot sensibly be suggested that the precise position in which Soldier C was at the time he fired is relevant to any material issue which the Tribunal has to decide. He has always admitted being present in that location and firing live rounds from there. Even if he was wrong in the account which he gave of his precise stance or position, it is not an issue that might reasonably be said to go even to credibility.
The first gunman Private C engaged was located at the southern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. His account in the statement he gave to Widgery Tribunal lawyers was as follows:
As I watched the Rossville building I saw a man. What caught my attention was the sound of a shot. The man was at the far end of block 1 and I think he had come out of an opening at the end of the building or round the corner. He was in the aim position and I could see what looked like a weapon in his hands. I could distinguish the shape of the magazine and think it was a klenicov (sic) or a weapon of that kind. My weapon was already cocked and I came into the aim. Before I could get a shot at him he went back. Then he came out a second time. I took aim at him but did not immediately fire. Then he fired 2 shots, and I fired two rounds at him. The man jerked backwards and his weapon went into the air as he did so. I saw him closely at that moment. The position of this gunman is marked 2 on my photograph, but the marking is not perfectly exact because I am not sure whether he came into sight round the corner or out of the doorway.
Soldier C has subsequently told Eversheds that:
It is very difficult to say whether you have hit someone after you have fired at them; it's difficult to tell when looking through a sight from the distance and angle I was firing at. I would still have been guarding myself from other possible gunfire.
He was able to give this Tribunal an additional detail during his oral evidence:
______________________________________________________________________
222 B85.004 paragraph 19 221 B68.012; B68.016 paragraph 9; P004; B68.022; B68.003 paragraph 11 224 B68.016 ... I can still remember the image of the man coming round with the coat, like the Crombie coat on, and the weapon coming out of the coat as if it was being hid under the coat.226
CIVILIAN CORROBORATION
8B-252 C’s evidence about his first target is supported by the many civilians who have spoken of IRA gunmen arriving in cars in the Bogside Inn / Westland Street area shortly after the main episode of military firing. They were seen making their way north on foot towards the troops in Rossville Street. These gunmen did not simply disappear into a vacuum. The timing of their arrival corresponds with the timing of C’s engagement.
The Arrival of Gunmen in the Area of the Bogside Inn
8B-253 Michael Harkin referred to IRA men armed with a variety of weapons arriving in cars a short time after the main shooting, who then moved off in the direction of the soldiers:
... The man with the revolver went in the direction of the British tps. Within a few minutes the car arrived back with another car. There were about 6 or 7 men in the cars and they were all armed – Thompsons – Revs. and a Rifle. One of the men said “We will give covering fire to the people in order to let them out”. They went off in the direction of the Brit tps.227
8B-254 Bernard Heaney saw six to eight men get out of cars which stopped close to the Bogside Inn:
The men ran in a north easterly direction, through the houses up towards Free Derry Corner and Rossville Street.228
8B-255 Tony Quigley told Eversheds he had seen a man carrying a rifle near the Bogside Inn. The gunman said that he was going to take on the British Army.229
225 B68.005 paragraph 35 226 Day 354/034/24 Whilst in Westland Street, Noriyuki Kunioka saw a man with a rifle coming from behind a block of flats and heading towards Rossville Street.\\textsuperscript{230}
Michael Havord gave evidence of seeing a car arriving in Westland Street thirty minutes after the first shots had been fired:
\\textit{Four boys jumped out. They were wearing balaclavas and carrying guns which I think were Enfield .303s. I got the impression they had just rushed down from the Creggan... The crowd of people cheered them and called out to go and get them.}\\textsuperscript{231}
The gunmen headed towards Free Derry Corner. Havord did not personally witness any of them fire but said he would be very surprised if they had not.\\textsuperscript{232}
\\textit{Hiding Weapon under Coat}
Private C's recollection that the gunman produced the weapon from under his coat finds further support in the civilian evidence.
James Donal Deeney saw a group of two or three 'stickies' coming out of a house in the area of Meenan Square.
\\textit{One guy looked particularly tense and said that he was going to take up a position in the Bogside. I only recall seeing one rifle, which the man had been hiding under his coat.}\\textsuperscript{231}
Similarly, Kevin Clifford recalls that he was with his uncle Leo when they both saw a gunman:
\\textit{...I remember seeing a guy with a gun, but I think I saw him near the Bogside Inn, south of Free Derry Corner and around the} junction of Westland St and Lecky Rd. He was coming up (northwards) from between Free Derry Corner and the Bogside Inn. The man was hiding the gun on his right hand side under his coat or jacket as if he was trying to disguise it. I don't know what sort of gun it was, but it was not big enough to be a rifle... The man was walking on his own amongst all these people and only stood out because you could see the gun he was trying to hide and people were saying he was a stickie. I couldn't describe the man, he was young enough, but I had never seen him before that day and I've never seen him since.234
Firing at Troops in Rossville Street
8B-262 The gunmen who arrived in the Bogside Inn area with their weapons would appear, therefore, to have been intent on engaging the British Army. They did just that, as the evidence the Tribunal has received in relation to Reg Tester, an OIRA Command Staff member, indicated.
8B-263 Mr Tester admitted to the Sunday Times in 1972 that he had fired a round from an M1 carbine at a soldier in Rossville Street. The journalist's note records that the soldier was standing next to the Pig which had been sent to collect the three bodies from the Rossville Street barricade.235 We do not suggest that Mr Tester is the man engaged by C, but this evidence demonstrates that members of the IRA were targeting soldiers in the area of Rossville Street after the close of the main episode of firing.
8B-264 Leslie Bedell gives further evidence of rounds being fired up Rossville Street by gunmen who had arrived by car.236
8B-265 The Sunday Times Insight material also includes the note of an interview with "Brendan O'Connor". Mr. O'Connor disputes that he gave such an interview but
234 AC67.002 paragraph 12 235 S035-036; S041; Day 190/098 236 AB28.12 paragraph E adds that his twin brother Ciaran matches other descriptions of the interviewee contained in the note.237
BOC saw three-four runs past with carbines...Says they all vanished across Westland Street (Fahan St?) except the last, who stood with his rifle aimed at the corner of Meenan Sq behind the Inn, pointing northwards, for a bit – then ran up to the corner on the street, fired 2-3 shots, then made it across the road towards the flats at the bottom of W[estland] St where his fellow had gone. BOC heard perhaps 5-6 shots after that ...238
8B-266 A map attached to the note demonstrates the gunmen’s movement north in the direction of the Rossville Flats.239 MILITARY CORROBORATION
8B-267 Private 023, of 22 LAD RA, may have witnessed C’s first engagement.
8B-268 He was stationed in the Peter England Shirt Factory in Little James Street. In his statement to the Widgery Tribunal he described seeing a man appear from the southern end of Rossville Flats Block 1 of the Rossville Flats with a rifle, which he aimed towards soldiers in Rossville Street:
I heard the sound of a shot as he fired. The man went back behind the wall and reappeared a couple of minutes later... I heard the sound of a shot from his rifle. Before I could shoot I heard the sound of a high velocity shot and the man jumped back in the air and fell. A crowd gathered round this man and carried him away.240
8B-XXXIII GUNMAN IN BLOCK 1 OF THE ROSSVILLE FLATS
8B-269 Soldiers C and D both sighted, and fired rounds at, a gunman with a pistol in block 1.
PRIVATE C
8B-270 Within a minute of engaging his first target, C saw a second gunman in the Rossville Flats.241
8B-271 C gave a very detailed account of what he saw to the lawyers of the Widgery Tribunal.
(1) The gunman appeared at a window on the third storey on the west side of Block 1:
As I continued observation I saw the flash of a window being opened in block 1 in the position shown approximately on the photograph marked 3. The window was pivoted upwards as it opened. I saw a man holding the window open with his right hand.
240 B1522; see also B1525.001 paragraph 26; B1525.002 paragraph 31 241 B68.023 paragraph C and see Day 354/059/23 He placed his left forearm across his right arm and appeared to me to be aiming a pistol held in his left hand. I heard a shot being fired and corresponding with that shot I saw his hand kick as if he had just fired.
(2) C was sure that the man held a pistol and not a camera:
I could not at that range distinguish the weapon very clearly, and I did not see a muzzle flash. I am however quite certain that he was not holding a camera, not even the kind of camera that has a pistol grip.
(3) C fired a single shot but it missed the window altogether:
I fired one round at the man with the pistol. This shot hit the wall just above the top right hand corner of the window, I remember seeing a puff of dust from the masonry. After I had fired the gunman vanished from sight and I think the window closed some way but not completely.
(4) It was at this stage that he was joined by Lance Corporal D:
... I told him what I had been firing at. He watched the window with me. I saw the window move again. I'm sure it was the same window. The window opened and I saw the gunman again.
(5) C fired two further shots:
I immediately aimed and fired at him and as I did so he fired 2 quick shots himself. My first round went through the window missing the gunman I fired again and this time I think I hit him in the chest or arm. The gunman was standing partly behind the half open pivot window, and his left side was behind the glass. I saw a hole in the glass in the area behind which his left arm or chest would have been and I think my bullet went through the glass and hit him in this area. C accepts it is impossible to say whether in fact he hit his target:
...I could not tell whether I had hit him or not...I did not see nobody fall to the floor but they might have jerked back in the way, to get out of the way of the bullet or have been hit.
LANCE CORPORAL D
D heard the beginning of this exchange. As he stood half way along the Kells Walk balcony observing Columbille Court, he heard low velocity gunfire, followed by C’s round. He joined C at the end of the balcony.
D also gave a detailed account of what then took place, to the Widgery Tribunal lawyers.
(1) He spotted and engaged the gunman, his first round missing the window:
C pointed out a window in block I indicated on my photograph at X. I was positioned at the other end of the line marked 2. As I watched I saw the window open a little from the bottom and a hand with a pistol came out. I saw the kick of the pistol firing and heard the sound but could not distinguish a muzzle flash. It was not aimed at us, but was aimed at the ground below. I cocked my weapon and fired one round which struck the framework or wall near the pistol to one side of the window.
(2) It was D’s recollection that the arm withdrew, to return shortly afterwards to the same window before firing again. C and D both fired at him again.
(3) D, like C, was confident that he engaged a gunman and not a photographer:
______________________________________________________________________
247 B68.017 paragraph 13 248 Day 354/054/08 249 B85.024 paragraph 6 250 B85.024 paragraph 7 251 B85.024 paragraph 8 The gunman had fairly long hair and a dark jumper. I am quite sure this man was holding a pistol and not a camera.\\textsuperscript{252}
**DETERMINING THE GUNMAN'S LOCATION**
8B-275 Private C told the RMP that his second target was located on the third storey of Block 1 at the fourth window from the right.
8B-276 The Tribunal is able to refer to a plan of Block 1, below.\\textsuperscript{253}
8B-277 C's RMP description would put the gunman in the area of 12 Garvan Place. It is important to note that the north end of Block 1 is on the right hand side of the plan (see the partially obscured "William Street end"). The fourth window from the right as it appeared to C therefore equates to the fourth window from the left on the plan.
8B-278 The locations of the gunman targeted by C and D were marked on the photographs submitted to the Widgery Tribunal.\\textsuperscript{254}
\\textsuperscript{252} B85.024 paragraph 9 \\textsuperscript{253} GEN 3.012 \\textsuperscript{254} P004; P005 Referring once again to the plan, it is possible to determine that the photographs put the gunman in the area of 8 Garvan Place. The description of a location and the marking of a photograph are not exact sciences, especially when one is dealing with a tall block of flats, after the events concerned. In consequence, it is not possible to say with certainty at which window C and D fired. The best that can reasonably be concluded from their 1972 evidence is that they engaged a gunman somewhere in the region of 8 to 12 Garvan Place.
12 Garvan Place
The evidence of C and D is that they fired at a gunman, not at a photographer. Their evidence should be viewed in the light of compelling evidence from civilian witnesses that at least one gunman with a pistol was indeed active in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.
Fulvio Grimaldi claims that shots were fired at a window in a maisonette on the western side of Block 1, from which he had been taking photographs. The Tribunal has evidence showing that the maisonette in question was 12 Garvan In those circumstances, it must be possible that C and D targeted Mr Grimaldi, honestly mistaking his camera for a pistol.
Indeed, Grimaldi was asked at the Widgery Tribunal:
Q. Has it ever occurred to you that by pointing that camera out of the window at the side of the window you were in fact pointing something that looked like the muzzle or could be the muzzle of a weapon?
A. Yes.
We make the following submissions in relation to the shooting at 12 Garvan Place:
(1) It is possible to reach an accurate conclusion as to its timing. The shots were fired shortly before 16:44 hours and therefore certainly long after all of the known deceased and wounded had been shot.
(a) Fulvio Grimaldi and Susan North entered 12 Garvan Place after having already seen the bodies of Paddy Doherty, Barney McGuigan, Hugh Gilmore and Kevin McElhinney. Mr Grimaldi proceeded to take photographs from the window looking out over Rossville Street. Susan North had with her an audio tape recorder, which she activated as soon as gunfire was directed at the maisonette. The tape, and a transcript made from it, are in the possession of the Tribunal.
(b) The television was turned on in the maisonette and can be heard on the North tape in the background. Miss North, therefore, recorded an Army recruiting advertisement shortly after the last
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255 AM152.001 paragraph 1 256 M34.049 paragraph F 257 M34.062 paragraphs 62 to 75 258 A9: E3.030 of the shots at the maisonette had been fired. The Sunday Times discovered that the commercial was aired at 16:44 hours.(^{29})
(2) Larry Doherty's photograph EP35/1, below, shows six bullet holes in the window of 12 Garvan Place. The photograph suggests that two further rounds may have missed the window pane, one hitting the ledge below the glass and the other hitting masonry above (circled). The six to eight bullet holes exceed the number of rounds fired at their target by Soldiers C and D (five).
(3) If the Tribunal nevertheless finds that C and D fired at 12 Garvan Place, the number of bullet holes is explicable by the fact that a soldier or soldiers in another position also targeted the window (F and G were amongst the soldiers who also fired into the west side of Block 1). If this is the explanation of the additional bullet marks, it is significant that soldiers in different positions independently, if mistakenly, believed that there was a gunman at the window.
(^{29}) PIN 0307 Rounds Directed at Other Block 1 Windows
8B-284 It is not possible to say at which window C and D fired.
8B-285 It would be wrong to conclude, simply because there is no photographic evidence of other windows containing bullet holes on the west side of Block 1, that they must have targeted 12 Garvan Place.
(1) Bullet holes in other windows would not necessarily have been obvious or indeed visible to people in the street below. The Rossville Flats comprised large buildings, as the part of P198 extracted below demonstrates in respect of Block 1 and 2.
(2) Furthermore, the occupier of a flat or maisonette from which a gunman had actually been firing is unlikely to have volunteered any information about that, or about any rounds that had been returned by the Army.
8B-286 There is in fact evidence that bullets were fired through other windows on the west side of Block 1 on Bloody Sunday. (1) Kathleen Hutton (aka Carlin\\textsuperscript{260}), a visitor to 8 Garvan Place, says that as she opened a window onto Rossville Street and shouted to a priest, soldiers below fired three or four shots up into the flats. She assumed the shots had been fired at her, but accepted they may have been fired at a target above her head.\\textsuperscript{261} She had the impression that the shots hit a window of a flat above, rather than to the side, of her location.\\textsuperscript{262} It is plain from the plan of Block 1 that this could not have been 12 Garvan Place.\\textsuperscript{263}
(2) A bullet also came through the window of Kathleen Cunningham’s maisonette. It has been suggested this was in 3 Garvan Place,\\textsuperscript{264} which is in Block 1.\\textsuperscript{265} Other information received by the Tribunal calls that address into question and places the maisonette in Block 2. Nonetheless, the Fianna’s Gerry O’hEara’s evidence strongly suggests he was looking out of the western side of block 1 of the Flats – he was looking into Rossville Street – when a shot came through the window and injured Patsy Brolly who was next to him at the time.\\textsuperscript{266} O’hEara’s suggestion that this was a rubber bullet is in contrast with that of both Mr Brolly and his wife, Celine.\\textsuperscript{267}
**CIVILIAN CORROBORATION**
8B-287 There is compelling civilian evidence that a gunman or gunmen were active in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.
8B-288 Monica Barr saw a gunman fire from Block 1 with a pistol. She was witnessing events from Chamberlain Street. She gave an account to Eversheds that has much in common with accounts given by Soldiers C and D of their pistolman:
\\textsuperscript{260} X4.005.001 \\textsuperscript{261} Day 189/063 \\textsuperscript{262} Day 89/065/04 \\textsuperscript{263} GEN 3.012, infra \\textsuperscript{264} AC156.001 paragraph 4 \\textsuperscript{265} GEN3.012, infra \\textsuperscript{266} AO79.005 paragraph 24; confirmed Day 406/161/9 I recall looking over to the Rossville Flats. I have a recollection of seeing a hand stick out of an open window on the 8th floor of Block I Rossville Flats. I think the flat was approximately in the middle of Block I... The window... was tilted inwards at the top and outwards at the bottom. The hand which was holding a pistol appeared from over the top of the window pane and pointed downwards. I remember one shot being fired from the pistol. The shot had a "pop" sound and was certainly different from the other shots I had heard earlier. Almost immediately I heard a "crack" and saw the wood at the top of the window frame splinter where I presume a bullet fired by a soldier below the flats had hit. At around the same time the hand disappeared.
Mrs Barr has given consistent accounts of this incident since 1972. For example, her statement of 1st February 1972 contains the following description of events:
Then there were more shots and I saw a soldier on the far side of the personnel carrier towards the back of it and he looked up towards the flats and fired 3 shots. There was no one up at the windows. Then I heard a couple of more shots and we heard people screaming. Up on the eighth floor of the flats I saw a man at the window with a handgun and he fired one shot towards the troops. He had his hand on the window and when he went to lift his head one of the troops fired a shot which landed above his head at the top of the window.
She remains adamant about what she witnessed. She was questioned by Barry MacDonald Q.C. on the basis that she was mistaken. Her response was forthright:
No, it is not possible. I saw a man on the top floor with a gun and I heard the pop when he fired.
This gunman was operating from a different location within Block I and at a different time from the man engaged by Soldiers C and D. It is impossible to determine whether or not he simply moved from the eighth floor to the maisonette where Guinness Force soldiers saw him, or whether C and D engaged a different person altogether. At the very least, Mrs Barr's evidence demonstrates that a pistolman was firing from Block 1, acting in a very similar way to that described by C and D.
The Tribunal also has strong evidence that a member of the Official IRA had been firing from Block 1 with a pistol. Again, we cannot say whether this was the man whom C and D were to engage. The evidence certainly demonstrates that the Officials used Block 1 as a firing point on Bloody Sunday. A member of the Official IRA, with whom the journalist Kieran Gill spoke, confirmed that he had fired three or four shots with a revolver from the doorway of block 1 towards soldiers in Rossville Street. This incident is considered in greater detail in our closing submissions relating to Private U (chapter 8A, above).
MILITARY CORROBORATION
Private 024 was present on the Kells Walk balcony, witnessed Private C firing and observed his target. He told the RMP:
014 then told me to go up on to the veranda of the flats which I did, where I found 'C' and another member of my Unit stationed at the South end of the veranda. They were observing the Rossville Flats area... C moved round and took aim at a man who was hanging out of the window of a third floor flat in Rossville Flats. He was firing a pistol north along Rossville Street where part of Guinness Force were located. C fired two rounds 7.62 from his SLR and I saw the window shatter and the man with the pistol was thrown back into the house.
Captain 200 provides some further corroboration. He heard two or three shots and then saw two soldiers at the top of the Kells Walk ramp, one of whom he assumed had just fired the rounds. He further assumed that the firing had been directed towards the Rossville Flats, where he had seen an arm extending out of a window, holding an object.
271 M105.013 paragraph 59 272 B1527 273 B2007 paragraph D; B2018 paragraph B; B2022.007 paragraph 41 One soldier whose evidence cannot be relied on is Private INQ 0449. He had told Eversheds that he was also on the Kells Walk balcony, from where he observed a gunman in Columbcille Court. He further suggested that he and the soldier next to him, UNKO541, returned fire.\\textsuperscript{274} INQ 0449 has now told the Tribunal in oral evidence that his recollection is “very, very foggy and faint...” and that he spent twenty-five years in the Armed Forces during which he was involved in other conflicts. He agreed his account may, therefore, have become confused with events that occurred on other occasions.\\textsuperscript{275}
**CONCLUSION**
Guinness Force was comprised of a body of men drawn from a variety of “administrative” jobs within 1 PARA, who were formed into a temporary, composite rifle platoon. The platoon constituted an additional unit that could be deployed in support of the existing battalion rifle platoons when circumstances required it. The soldiers who turned out for Guinness Force on 30\\textsuperscript{th} January 1972 were an experienced group of men with a relatively high average age.
The Platoon travelled to Londonderry and moved into the Bogside in support of an arrest operation. The members of the force were aware in advance of their deployment of the risks they would face during the mission.
A shot was fired by a civilian gunman at the Presbyterian Church in Great James Street at a time when the soldiers of Guinness Force were gathered in the grounds of the building. Therefore, shortly before they deployed into the Bogside the members of the platoon became aware that at least one sniper, very probably positioned in the Bogside, was targeting soldiers.
Guinness Force mounted its vehicles and deployed through barrier 12, pulling up alongside numbers 1-3 Rossville Street, at the north east corner of the road.
\\textsuperscript{274} C449.005 paragraph 22 \\textsuperscript{275} Day 357/063; 357/066 platoon did not go further south in its soft skinned lorries because the vehicles did not provide sufficient protection from gunmen, a threat the members of the force took seriously following their briefings and the shot directed at them at the Presbyterian Church.
8B-300 Captain 200 decided to split his force with call sign 71 moving to the left to give support to the Mortar Platoon and 71A to the right in support of the Anti Tank Platoon.
8B-301 Having debussed from their vehicles, Guinness Force soldiers were immediately aware that they faced a hostile reception in the Bogside. Looking to the South, they could see rioting civilians positioned to the east of Rossville Street and in the area of the Rossville Street rubble barricade attacking soldiers of the Mortar and Anti Tank Platoons. The advance of Guinness Force was conducted in the knowledge that there was gunfire ahead. Members of the platoon were able to discern the nature of the rounds being fired and the direction from which they were being fired.
8B-302 Not all members of call sign 71A deployed to the Kells Walk wall. Some men remained at the Northern end of Rossville Street. Others secured the area between Columbciille Court and Kells Walk.
8B-303 Members of call sign 71A were ordered to replace the Anti Tank Platoon at the Kells Walk wall. At the time they were taking up position at the wall, some members of Anti Tank Platoon were entering Glenfada Park North. At the time that Guinness Force soldiers were engaging targets south of the Rossville Street rubble barricade it is probable that members of Anti Tank Platoon were engaging targets in Glenfada Park North.
8B-304 Call sign 71A soldiers at different positions along the Kells Walk wall independently concluded that two men were crawling away from the Rossville Street rubble barricade. The soldiers could see that at least one of the crawling men carried a weapon. They were both heading for the cover of the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats from where they would pose a significant threat to soldiers. Soldiers K, L and M opened fire in these circumstances. A factor in attracting the attention of the soldiers to the two men behind the rubble barricade was the manner in which they were moving. Certainly in 1972, the men of call sign 71A believed this to be a military style “leopard crawl”, that is to say not the type of movement one would expect from an untrained civilian.
A number of call sign 71A soldiers spotted weapons behind the rubble barricade. They did so independently of one another and from different positions along the Kells Walk wall. Soldiers then verified with each other what they could see. Further soldiers still were able to observe the shots fired by their colleagues and to confirm that they were targeted at gunmen.
There is very strong military evidence from 1972 that the rear crawling man, who was nearer to the soldiers, had a rifle and wore a brownish jacket.
There are inconsistencies in the soldiers’ accounts as to whether the front crawling man also had a weapon. Those very inconsistencies serve to demonstrate the weakness of suggestions that the soldiers conspired together shortly after the event to concoct a self-serving and consistent account of what had occurred.
The failure of some of these soldiers to see that the front crawling man had a weapon is explicable by their individual positions at the Kells Walk wall, which determined to a significant extent what they could see behind the rubble barricade. The soldiers who could not see that the front crawling man had a weapon were generally to the east of and lower down than their colleagues.
The men of call sign 71A were justified in the action that they took. They fired in response to what they perceived to be an imminent threat.
The soldiers reacted with restraint to the threat they perceived behind the rubble barricade. The majority of the soldiers at the wall did not fire at all. Section commanders held back so that they could properly carry out their supervisory roles.
Lieutenant Colonel Wilford was concerned that his men at the wall were too bunched and, after Soldier L’s final shot, he told them to spread out. Colour Sergeant 002 put Colonel Wilford’s orders into action by redeploying some of his soldiers from the wall to area of the Columbcille Court car park. By the time 002 got to the car park himself, his men were already guarding prisoners there.
8B-313 Some members of call sign 71A did not move into the car park at this time. Sergeant 014 and others made observations from Rossville Street before rejoining their colleagues.
8B-314 Colour Sergeant 002 ordered some of his men to walk the arrestees up from the car park to Little James Street.
8B-315 Captain 200 later consolidated his men at the northern end of Rossville Street and in the derelict houses bordering William Street. The two Guinness Force call signs rejoined at this stage. An ammunition check was conducted during their time there.
8B-316 The men of Guinness Force rejoined their vehicles in William Street and pulled back to the area of the Presbyterian Church and then to Clarence Avenue. Captain 200 asked his two Colour Sergeants what rounds had been fired. Having been given a list of the soldiers who had fired, he spoke to each soldier individually so that he was clear in his mind as to what they had fired and what targets they had engaged.
8B-317 It is not possible to determine who shot Kevin McElhinney. There is certainly no clear evidence to link either Sergeant K or Private M to his death.
8B-318 The evidence given by Private L to Eversheds and orally to this Tribunal should be disregarded in its entirety. He is a totally unreliable witness, a man who has evidently had a tough life since he left the Army and one which has taken its mental toll.
8B-319 It was maintained by Brian McCartney on behalf of those he represents both that the inconsistencies in the various military accounts are evidence of untruthfulness and that soldiers acted after the event to produce a false, coordinated account of their actions. Mr McCartney's case was itself inconsistent in that the very presence of inconsistencies of the kind which Mr McCartney himself relied upon in the military evidence undermines his suggestion that soldiers' accounts have been tailored to corroborate one another. For example, if there had been tailored corroboration it is inconceivable that there would not have been agreement at least on the number of guns being carried.
8B-320 The cases of Private C and Lance Corporal D are considered separately from those of the rest of their platoon. The rounds they fired cannot have hit any of the known Bloody Sunday deceased or wounded.
8B-321 Private C from call sign 71 A and Lance Corporal D from call sign 71 both deployed to the balcony of the Kells Walk building at a late stage in the proceedings; it was certainly after all of the known deceased and wounded had been shot.
8B-322 Once there, C targeted a gunman to the southern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. The presence of this gunman in this area at this time corresponds closely with civilian evidence of armed men arriving in the area of the Bogside Inn and moving North in the direction of the soldiers.
8B-323 C and D both then engaged a gunman with a pistol in Block 1 of the flats, a location in which there is strong civilian evidence that at least one pistolman had already been active. CHAPTER 8C
MICHAEL KELLY, WILLIAM NASH, JOHN YOUNG AND MICHAEL MCDAID
8C-1 INTRODUCTION
It is of course clear that four civilians, Michael Kelly, William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid were shot and killed at the rubble barricade in Rossville Street. Forensic evidence has shown that the round which killed Michael Kelly was fired from the rifle carried by Soldier F. It is not, however, possible to determine which soldier or soldiers shot William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid. The circumstances surrounding their deaths are so unclear as to preclude any determination of this issue. That much is evidenced by the fact that it has been suggested by Counsel to the Inquiry and those acting for other interested parties that soldiers from no fewer than three different platoons in 1 PARA might be responsible. Others still have suggested that those responsible were not from the Parachute Regiment at all, but were situated on the City Walls.
8C-2 The Tribunals own experts, Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan, have suggested that the issue must be determined by reference to the witness testimony. It is not possible from the soldiers' evidence to determine which of them was responsible for the shooting of Mr Nash, Mr Young or Mr McDaid. The Tribunal is therefore left to consider the civilian evidence. A preliminary analysis of the civilian evidence conducted by Christopher Clarke QC, and referred to during the course of his Opening, highlighted the "substantial disagreement between the various witnesses." That situation has not been resolved as a result of the witnesses in question having been called and given oral evidence to the Tribunal.
8C-3 Even the most basic preliminary conclusions are now questionable. For example, Counsel for the Nash family drew attention to a photograph apparently showing William Nash alive and standing at the gable wall at the entrance to Glenfada Park North at the time that Michael Kelly's was being carried through Glenfada Park. The photograph has important ramifications for assumptions previously made about the timing of William Nash's death and the chronology of events generally. It is accepted that Michael Kelly was shot by Soldier F. It is not, however, accepted or at all clear on the evidence that Soldier F was aiming at Mr Kelly or that it was Mr Kelly whom he intended to shoot. Forensic evidence shows that the shot which Soldier F fired and which hit Mr Kelly struck or passed through something else, or someone else, before it reached him.
**SOLDIER F'S EVIDENCE**
Soldier F has given the following evidence of his shot at the rubble barricade:
Statement to Lt Col Overbury on 19 February 1972.
\*I have now read my previous statements and looked at maps and photographs of the area, and realise that I have mistaken the sequence of events. After we first left our vehicles in the RF Flats area, I did not, as I said earlier, fire at a window in the RF. I fired these shots later."
*I did however fire; I aimed round at a man I saw behind the barricade about 40 yards from me who was about to throw a bomb. It was a large object and I saw sparks coming from it.*
SA statement
*I then observed a number of people behind the barricade. One of them was attempting to throw what looked like a bomb which was in his hand. It was fizzing. I have seen nail bombs before and am in no doubt that this was one. I fired one aimed shot and he fell. The bomb did not explode. I did not see what happened to it.*
Widgery Tribunal
*I was observing the barricade when I saw a person attempting to throw what looked like a nail bomb. It was fizzing in his hand. I took an aimed shot and then the man with the bomb fell to the* ground... I have seen nail bombs before and am quite familiar with them” B141 at B
Q. Which hand had he got it in? A. right hand.
Q. How was he throwing it when you fired? A. At an angle, a side throw.....(his hand was) about level with his shoulder?4
Q. He was behind the barricade from you, was he, the other side? A. Yes.
Soldier F confirmed in his evidence to the Widgery Tribunal that he fired one shot from the aim position which hit the man with a nail bomb.5 He said that the nail bomb fell to the ground and did not explode.6 He had seen smoke coming from the bomb.7 Soldier F said he could not describe the man at whom he fired.8
8C-6 Soldier F has confirmed in his BSI statement and in his oral evidence to this Tribunal that he no longer recalls this incident.
MICHAEL KELLY – CIVILIAN EVIDENCE
8C-7 It is of course known, as a result of tests carried out by Dr Martin, that the round which killed Michael Kelly was fired by Soldier F. There is no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that Michael Kelly was attempting to throw a nail bomb when he was shot, although, despite some civilian claims to the contrary, he was, it appears, throwing stones. It is not, of course, suggested that throwing stones, if Mr Kelly did throw any, merited his being shot. The evidence examined below is relevant to the Tribunal’s consideration of the whole question of what was in fact
4 B141 at C-D 5 B141 at D-E 6 B141 at F 7 B156 at F 8 B141 at D happening at the rubble barricade immediately before the soldiers fired and of the conclusions the Tribunal is able to form as to the scene which actually confronted the soldiers at the material time.
8C-8 While many witnesses talk of boys throwing stones from the rubble barricade, a number say that Michael Kelly was not part of this group. Hugh O'Boyle, for example, claimed that he neither heard nor saw Michael Kelly doing anything before he was shot. Ciaran Donnelly also told the Widgery Tribunal that, immediately prior to falling, Michael Kelly was doing nothing at all, merely standing although others around him were throwing stones.
8C-9 Danny Craig, who was actually with Michael Kelly, however, stated in a handwritten statement that they were both throwing stones and that Michael Kelly had just raised himself up in position to throw when he was struck in the stomach. Mr Craig confirmed in his BSI statement that Michael Kelly was throwing stones when he was shot.
8C-10 Patrick Norris, AN24, also described Michael Kelly being shot as he was about to throw a stone. Mr Norris said in his BSI statement that he heard Michael Kelly say “Here they come.” Almost immediately after Michael Kelly said those words, he reached down to pick up a stone from the ground at his side. As he stood up, he pulled his arm back and bent his body as if to throw the stone northwards up Rossville Street. It was then that he was shot. Mr Norris said that:
*Michael Kelly did not throw the stone he picked up. He was shot before he had begun to throw it.*
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9 Day 132/052 10 M22.7 at A 11 AC111.11 12 AC111.10 13 AN24.3 paragraphs10-11 It is of course possible that Soldier F mistook Michael Kelly’s actions as a stone-thrower for that of a nail bomber, although his belief that the object he saw was “smoking” or “fizzing” would tend to suggest that this was not the case.
George Roberts was frank in admitting that:
A. I would say nearly everybody at the barricade was throwing stones."
What is apparent from both photographic and civilian evidence however is that there was an additional casualty at the rubble barricade about which neither the Widgery Tribunal nor this Tribunal have been told. That casualty was immediately in front of Michael Kelly. The lack of evidence as to the identity of this person and failure, even at this stage, to acknowledge him as a casualty of the day would tend to suggest that he was indeed armed when shot at the rubble barricade. The likelihood is that this man was the nail bomber at whom Soldier F aimed and fired and Michael Kelly, who was standing directly behind him, was the unfortunate victim of a “shoot through” round.
14 Day 151/113/01-02 Photographic Evidence These photographs clearly show part of an additional body lying at the rubble barricade at the same time as Michael Kelly.
Anthony Coll has given evidence in his BSI statement of going to assist someone whom, we submit, can only have been the additional casualty shown in this photograph.
I remember Michael Kelly falling to the ground....I knew Michael very well, we were good friends. I took his left arm and got hold of his neck and shoulder. Someone else took his right arm. I thought that we would lift him. Michael was dragged to the corner of Glenfada Park North, but I did not help carry him because I went to help someone else after someone had shouted, "This man is shot." He was about 5 yards away from where Michael fell at the point marked B on the map (grid reference J15). He was a wee small fella with black hair with a wave in it. I remember him in front of us when I was standing behind the Rubble Barricade and two minutes later he was dead.\\textsuperscript{15}
AC84.11
8C-16 Mr Coll confirms that the man shown lying in P596 is the man he assisted. Referring to that photograph he says that:
\\textsuperscript{15} AC84.5 paragraph12 Photograph 1 (P596): This shows two bodies on the Rubble Barricade. The one on the left was the one I went to help but who was dead.\\textsuperscript{16}
8C-17 George Roberts, a declared Republican and supporter of both wings of the IRA,\\textsuperscript{17} has actually identified himself in Photograph P596, leaning over the body of this unidentified casualty.\\textsuperscript{18}
8C-18 He describes in his BSI statement how:
\\begin{quote} Shooting then started from the soldiers who were to the north of us....All of a sudden, a young fella who was standing next to me, just in front of me to my left, went down. He fell and was lying on his back with his head pointing up in the direction of William Street and his feet pointing in the direction of Free Derry Corner....I remember that he was wearing a white Arran sweater and there was blood gushing like a fountain out of a hole just under his eye...\\textsuperscript{19} \\end{quote}
8C-19 Mr Roberts explained that photograph P596 shows him leaning over the boy who had been shot just to his left\\textsuperscript{20} and marked his position on the photograph.
\\textsuperscript{16} AC84.9 paragraph39 \\textsuperscript{17} Day 151/079/19 \\textsuperscript{18} AR13.2 paragraph8 \\textsuperscript{19} AR13.1 paragraph7 \\textsuperscript{20} AR13.2 paragraph8 Mr Roberts was asked in oral evidence if it was possible that he could simply have been kneeling on the left to take shelter and then turned back. His reply was unequivocal:
"A. No, no, there was a young fella shot dead before I went down behind the barricade. He was shot underneath the left... the right eye and there was a fountain of blood coming out. Out of his right eye. That is why I went down behind the barricade." While it was also put to Mr Roberts by Arthur Harvey QC that in fact the man he saw shot was John Young, the position of the body over which he is seen crouching would not match what is known of Mr Young, nor would the timing of the man's fall or indeed his dress of which Mr Roberts was quite certain when questioned by Edwin Glasgow QC:
Q. Is that the scene that you are quite certain of is you bending over the man in the Aran sweater?
A. That is what I recall, yes, the Aran sweater. There was a coat on, but it is the Aran sweater sort of sticks out in my mind and the blood coming out from underneath his eye.
Mr Roberts could not have any conceivable reason to invent the account he gives of this casualty. His evidence is corroborated by the photographs, although no one suggests that his recollection of the events with which he was so closely involved at the time was prompted by being shown them. There is other civilian evidence, examined below, which also corroborates his account of a second casualty having been shot before Mr Nash, Mr Young and Mr McDaid were shot. Photograph P597.001 also shows the late Jim Begley looking on with concern at the person who has fallen in the left of the picture, rather than looking either in the direction in which he is walking or at Mr Kelly who is on the ground almost immediately in front of him.
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22 Day 151/097/07-024 23 Day 151/107/10-15 Civilian Evidence that two Men were shot in early shooting at the Rubble Barricade
8C-23 Very little is known about the timing and circumstances in which William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid were shot but it has been accepted that they fell close together in time. They all also fell to the eastern side of the barricade as can be seen from Alex Nash’s position in Video 48. It is also known that there was an appreciable gap between the shooting of Michael Kelly and the other three casualties on the barricade as we see Michael McDaid still walking in P596/597/598 at a time when Michael Kelly is seen as having already fallen.
8C-24 There is, indeed, some suggestion that these three men were not shot until after Michael Kelly was brought into the gable end of Glenfada Park North as Michael Mansfield QC has identified William Nash standing at the gable close to Michael Kelly’s prone body in photograph EP27/11.24
There are, however, a number of civilian witnesses who refer to seeing two young men shot when soldiers first opened fire towards the rubble barricade. It is accepted that one of these must have been Michael Kelly but the other, falling some time before any of Young, McDaid or Nash were shot, must have been an unknown casualty.
John J McLaughlin, AM334, reported in his NICRA statement that:
The paras opened fire. As people ran towards Glenfada Park, two young men fell behind the barricade.25
Hugh Duffy, AD157, said in his Keville / NICRA statement that:
I was standing at the low barricade in Rossville Street when the shooting rang out and I dived to the ground beside the barricade. A young lad who had also dived lay beside me and he turned over on his back. I reached over with my hand but he didn’t move and his eyes were closed. Another lad next to him was lying with the blood pumping out of his stomach. Three young fellows came out to lift him and they were shot at....26
In his BSI statement Mr Duffy gives a somewhat different account but still suggests that there was a second body lying on the rubble barricade along with Michael Kelly. He said:
I then remember looking across to my right towards the Rossville Flats (east across the rubble barricade) and seeing a young chap lying still. He was about 8 feet away from me on the south side of the rubble barricade, lying on his back with his head on the rubble barricade, pointing towards William Street and his lower body and legs on the road, pointing towards Free Derry Corner .......I have marked the point where he was lying on the map with the number 1....
24 Day 050/134 25 AM334.1 26 AD157.9 I then noticed that about 10 yards further across the rubble barricade to the east, closer to the Rossville Flats and further away from me, a second young man was lying in a similar position on the south side of the rubble barricade. He was lying on his back with his legs and lower body on the road, pointing towards Free Derry Corner and his head and upper body on the Rubble Barricade pointing towards William Street. The second young man had long black hair..... He appeared to have been shot in the stomach ... I have marked the point where he was lying on the map with a number 2.
The next moment three or four young lads ran out from the alleyway on my left which led into Glenfada Park North on the west side of the rubble barricade....they went up to the second young man I had seen, the one with the long black hair who had been shot in the stomach and I watched them try to lift him.27
27 AD157.5 paragraph10-AD157.6 paragraph13 Mr Duffy confirmed in oral evidence that he saw these lads move the second youth from the rubble barricade although he does not know if they got the body right into Glenfada Park North. He told the Tribunal that he crawled over to first young man who did not move. While Mr Duffy's description of his position may not be entirely accurate, it seems highly likely, bearing in mind his description of his wounds and the direction in which he was carried, that the second man whom Mr Duffy describes was Michael Kelly. Again it appears that
______________________________________________________________________
28 Day 149/079 29 Day 149/080-081 there must have been a second casualty on the ground at the same time as Mr Kelly.
8C-30 Kieran Gill, M105 also spoke in oral evidence of being generally aware that a second person fell in the very first volley of shots.
Q. Yes, you say you are generally aware that a second person fell; did you understand that to be in the very first volley of shots?
A. Yes.
Q. You did?
A. Yes. I have a very indistinct impression of that, but I cannot offer anything on that.30
8C-31 Pearse McCaul, AM93, spoke in his BSI statement of removing an unidentified body from the rubble barricade before Michael Kelly was moved.
I went to fetch one of the bodies lying near the rubble barricade with the help of one or two other people. I am not sure which body it was. We could not drag the man by his feet so we turned him over and dragged him away by holding him under his arms... I cannot remember where we left him....I have never discovered the man's identity......There was then a lull in the shooting. I went back to the Rubble Barricade and picked up another body with the help of another man. I found out recently that the body was that of Michael Kelly.....We each took hold of one of his legs and possibly a shoulder and carried him from the Rubble Barricade west towards and through the Glenfada Park North car park.31
8C-32 Charles McDaid, AM161, gave evidence in 1972 of carrying a casualty from the rubble barricade who was shot in the right side just above his leg. He said in his SC statement that this man was laid on the ground in the shelter of Glenfada Park.32 Mr McDaid confirmed when he gave evidence to the Widgery Tribunal
30 Day 206/179/07-13 31 AM93.3 paragraphs13-14 32 AM161.14-15 that the youth he helped carry was shot on "the right hand top of the leg," not in the stomach.\\textsuperscript{33}
8C-33 Mr McDaid thus gave clear evidence of carrying a casualty from the rubble barricade into Glenfada Park North who could not have been Michael Kelly.
8C-34 Robert Anthony Wallace, AW3, also described in his BSI statement seeing a man other than Michael Kelly, whom he knew, carried to the gable end of Glenfada Park North from the barricade a few seconds after Michael Kelly.
\\begin{quote} A wounded man was carried around the corner from the Rubble Barricade. He was about 18 or 19, of slim build with long black hair. He was wearing a shirt and jeans. I recognised the young man as Michael Kelly...... A few seconds later, a second young man was carried around the gable end from the barricade. I have no idea who he was. He was aged about 17 or 18 and was a bit smaller than Michael Kelly, but I cannot recall any other details about him.\\textsuperscript{34} \\end{quote}
8C-35 Mr Wallace confirmed this account in his oral evidence and said that the second man was laid down practically beside Michael Kelly.\\textsuperscript{35} Questioned as to why he did not mention the second boy in a 1972 tape-recorded interview, Mr Wallace could not explain the omission but remained adamant that he saw this second boy carried to the gable end.\\textsuperscript{36}
8C-36 Seamus Fleming, AF22, also described in a NICRA statement seeing two men fall in the first burst of shooting at the rubble barricade. He said:
\\begin{quote} There were still about six left at the barricade and they fell for cover. I saw soldiers everywhere and three Saracens. During a lull in the shooting, the six lads at the barricade got up to run towards our entry. The minute their heads appeared, there was a burst of fire and I saw a lad with a blue half jerkin clutch his \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{33} AM161.17 at D \\textsuperscript{34} AW3.2 paragraphs 7-8 \\textsuperscript{35} Day 154/142 \\textsuperscript{36} Day 154/147/21 stomach with his hands and slump on top of the barricade. I saw also a lad with a brown coat slumping over, holding his left side.37
8C-37 Mr Fleming repeated this account in his BSI statement saying of the group at the barricade:
They were heading in my direction, but the minute they got up two of them were hit by shots. They had got up from a crouching position very gingerly to have a look and then they were hit. They were both in their late teens.38
8C-38 Christopher Clarke QC acknowledged in his opening that Mr Fleming had identified an unknown casualty, shot at the same time as a man who appeared to be Michael Kelly.
One of the two men he saw shot at the barricade may have been Michael Kelly, who was shot in the abdomen, so might well have clutched his stomach. But it is not easy to see who the other man might have been. Nobody was shot in the left shoulder and I am not aware of anybody being shot at the same time as Michael Kelly.39
8C-39 While Mr Fleming’s description of the circumstances of Michael Kelly’s shooting, if indeed it is he whom he describes, are not accepted and are indeed contradicted by witnesses such as Danny Craig and Patrick Norris who were with Mr Kelly. Mr Fleming nevertheless clearly speaks of two casualties at this early stage.
8C-40 Matthew Connolly, AC76, also saw an additional casualty at the rubble barricade who was carried away through Glenfada Park North. Mr Connolly, in his BSI statement said he saw three men shot and fall on the barricade including John
37 AF22.11 38 AF22.9 paragraph 25 39 Day 024/049/20 Young. In his NICRA statement however the third man he sees shot at the barricade does not fall there but
stumbled back towards the wall and taken on to a house (sic).
8C-41 He gave a similar account to the Sunday Times team where Connolly says that the third boy
stepped out from the gable end and was shot in the left shoulder. He fell back and a group of about four people took him away through the alley into abbey park.
8C-42 Mr Connolly said when questioned by Mr Clarke that this may have been Michael McDaid and that Mr Connolly had confused him with Michael Kelly in believing he was carried away. His earlier statements are quite clear however that this boy stumbled back behind the gable end which is clearly not what happened to Michael Kelly or Michael McDaid.
8C-43 Arthur Harvey QC also put to Mr Connolly that this might have been Patrick O'Donnell and that Mr Connolly was confused about his being carried away to a house. As Mr Harvey, however, acknowledged in correcting himself, Patrick O'Donnell was shot in the right shoulder and was far from “stepping out” at the time, so Mr Connolly would have to have been very confused indeed for this to be the case.
8C-44 The Tribunal will recall that Michael Havord, in an interview with Paul Mahon, spoke of just such a casualty being taken to Letterkenny Hospital.
Q. Michael Havord continues: "Paddy Devlin then told me that he had come to [indecipherable] area. There was somebody wounded and Paddy Devlin gave the guy his car to get him to Letterkenny. I remember that because it was quite a brand new car. In them days, you know, we did not all have cars in those days. "Mahon: Right, and who was the wounded person, do you know? "Havord: I do not know his name. "Mahon: No, and how was he wounded, can you remember? "Havord: I think he was shot in the arm, I think. "Mahon: Right. "Havord: He went to Letterkenny anyway. "Mahon: He definitely went to Letterkenny? "Havord: Yes. "Mahon: Right. "Havord: Paddy Devlin lent him his car to get him across the border. "Mahon: And someone drove him? "Havord: Someone drove him, yes. "Mahon: To Letterkenny. Right." Did you ever find out -- please do not say the name at the moment -- who Michael Havord was referring to? Did you ever find out who that wounded person was?
A. No.
Q. Can we have AM19.328 on the screen, please. If we could have the bottom half, please. Mr Mahon, can you see the very bottom entry? This is part of one of the pages from one of the four notebooks you supplied, do you see the bottom entry which begins "Michael Havord"?
A. Yes.
Q. What it reads "Michael Havord talked of person [redacted name] wounded in shoulder and treated in Letterkenny Hospital." I am just going to send you that name?
A. Right.
Q. It is just a surname so it is [question-mark] surname, wounded in shoulder and treated at Letterkenny hospital; do you have that?
A. Yes. I have got no recollection of that at all.
Q. That does not help you to remember –
A. It does not, no.45
45 Day 411/059/06-060/24 Civilian Evidence of an additional casualty being carried through Glenfada Park North
8C-45 A number of the witnesses who helped carry Michael Kelly's body across Glenfada Park North have said in evidence that soldiers entered Glenfada Park North and opened fire before the group had reached the exit to Abbey Park. There are, however, a number of witnesses who saw a body being carried in similar fashion to Michael Kelly's but who saw it carried out of Glenfada Park North before soldiers entered the area. While the evidence is far from clear, it would seem that there must have been more than one person carried away across Glenfada, although many witnesses have assumed the person they saw was in all cases Michael Kelly.
8C-46 Fergus McAteer, AM42, describes in his BSI statement seeing a group of people carrying a body "away to the western side of the courtyard." He then describes edging around the gable wall and watching a man crawling along the opposite pavement in Rossville Street. Then:
over a period of a few minutes, I thought constantly of taking flight from the gable wall. This was all before soldiers entered GPN and suggests the person Mr McAteer saw carried must have reached the alleyway by the time they did.
8C-47 Mr McAteer confirmed the timing of these events in oral evidence
Q. Can you help at all with how long the time interval was between your seeing the body being carried across Glenfada Park North and your seeing this man crawling towards the door of Block 1?(all of which Mr McAteer says took place before the soldiers enter Glenfada Park North)
A. Very difficult, there was an awful lot happening around me at the time. Possibly 10 minutes, because at that stage a number of
46 AM42.8 paragraph20 47 AM42.9 paragraph29 other things had happened; I had moved up the gable wall, back down again; I had sensed the intensification of activity and firing and so on around me and then fixed on this person struggling or moving on his stomach along the pavement."
Michael Quinn, AQ11, also described in his SC a body being carried across Glenfada Park North and into a house in Glenfada Park.49
Someone shouted that there were people dying on the barricade at Rossville Street. The shooting then resumed and the people who were standing at the gable wall at Glenfada Park/Rossville Street rushed into the car park at Glenfada Park where I was standing.
Just then a small crowd of people carrying the body of a man, who was wearing a blue anorak, crossed the car park and went into the back of one of the houses at Glenfada Park...50
Mr Quinn repeated this account word for word in a further, sworn statement dated 17 Feb 1972 and witnessed by a Londonderry solicitor.51
Once again, in an interview with the Sunday Times conducted on 1st March 1972 by Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobsen, Michael Quinn repeats that:
The shooting stopped for a bit and I moved between two of the wooden fences behind houses on the east side of Glenfada; from there I saw several men carrying a man's body on their shoulders into one of the houses52 (map)53
Mr Quinn's evidence to Lord Widgery was that he saw the man carried not to the alleyway but to a house in Glenfada Park although he did not recall them quite reaching the house;
48 Day 168/56:2 49 AQ11.7 penultimate line 50 AQ11.7 51 AQ11.18 52 AQ11.11 53 The house into which this body was carried is marked on a map created by the Sunday Times at AQ11.15. Then I saw a crowd of people, a gang of people carrying a man above their heads, across the car park towards a house on the other side. I saw the man was injured. He had bullet wounds in his chest....
Q. In which direction did they go? A. They moved from the gable of Glenfada Park, which is partly out in Rossville Street, towards the other side of the car park.
Q. In that alleyway where this young man had been shot before? A. Not the alleyway, but there are houses running down form that alleyway.
Q. What did you do? A. They were very near the house they were taking him to and I decided to get out of Glenfada Park then....
Mr Quinn now, in his BSI statement, states that
"The group carrying the body reached the centre of Glenfada Park North and I noticed that the man who had been carrying the civil rights banner earlier was amongst them .....At this point the crowd ran into Glenfada Park and someone shouted that "the Army was coming in.""
Indeed when referred in oral evidence to notes accompanying the Sunday Times map Mr Quinn indicated that this was not his recollection.
Q. 2. Sees body. Kelly? Carried into house. A. (Witness shaking head). Q. No? A. Not my recollection.
It is, however, quite clearly the account he gave in both his SC and his sworn statement in February 1972.
54 AO11.2 at D-G 55 AO11.23:22 56 Day 169/127/01-05 Daniel Gillespie, AG34, in his BSI statement gives an account of Michael Kelly's body being carried into Glenfada Park North and towards the Abbey Park exit. He is clear however that this body was carried right through the alleyway as Mr Gillespie followed:
*I followed the crowd through this alleyway to see where they were taking Michael Kelly.*
It is clear that Mr Gillespie places this incident well before soldiers entered the square as he indeed confirmed in oral evidence to the Tribunal:
*A. When I went into Glenfada Park my intention was to go home, but then I turned and as I turned to come out again there was about 5 or 6 people carrying in young Kelly and they took him through into Abbey Park. I followed in to the steps at Abbey Park and come back out –*
Mr Gillespie also gives an entirely different account of a man being carried from the barricade, who was carried straight across Glenfada Park without being laid on the ground as was undeniably the case with Michael Kelly:
*A. I seen them carrying him in from Rossville Street from the rubble barricade, about three-quarter ways in, but they had him up high, you know, shoulder-length -- shoulder-high. ...*
*Q. Did you see him being placed on the ground?*
*A. No.*
*Q. ... Is your recollection that he was brought in from the barricade and carried straightaway across towards the gap between Glenfada Park North and South?*
*A. Towards Abbey Park.*
*Q. Yes, towards Abbey Park?*
*A. Yes. .......*
*...A. Did I see him getting -- I seen him getting carried towards Abbey Park, but at no time did I see him, did I see anybody putting him down.* LORD SAVILLE: Mr Gillespie, it is the Chairman speaking to you, over here to your right. You said a few moments ago you saw a man being carried in shoulder-high?
A. Yes.
LORD SAVILLE: Where was he when you saw that?
A. Coming in from the rubble.
LORD SAVILLE: From the barricade in Rossville Street, yes. What happened then to that man in your recollection?
A. They took him into Abbey Park. ....
Indeed Mr Gillespie's evidence would suggest that he witnessed an entirely different incident to the carrying of Michael Kelly as, not only does he say that the man he saw was not placed on the ground and was carried through to Abbey Park without incident, but he also says that the photograph EP27/10 of the group carrying Kelly was not the group he saw.
Q. Could we have EP27.10: this is our best version of your appendix; what I said before was a mistake. This is another photograph in the same sequence. Here is somebody being carried, if not shoulder-high, at least what may have been an attempt at carrying him that high; you do not recollect that scene at all?
A. No, I do not even think that was the same people as was carrying Kelly.
And while it appeared that Mr Gillespie in fact recognised Michael Kelly,
LORD SAVILLE: They must have come past you?
A. Yes. I actually seen Kelly, I looked to see who it was.
it became clear later in his evidence that in fact this was not the case:
57 Day 158/033-034 58 Day 158/037-038 59 Day 158/036 MR HOYT: Mr Gillespie, did you know Mr Kelly beforehand, or were you told that it was Mr Kelly?
A. No, I was told it was Mr Kelly.60
Eamon McAteer AM41 is a further witness who recalled in his NICRA statement that
the man was carried away into the adjoining park through a passageway.61
He does not recall the incident now.62
Ciaran McLochlainn, AM12, was also watching a group carrying a body and says in his BSI statement that they had passed through the Abbey Park alleyway before soldiers entered Glenfada Park.
"The last I saw of that group carrying the man was when they made it through the alleyway into AP and I lost sight of them.
At this stage he says he could not see any soldiers in the courtyard. It is only when, having lost sight of the group and decided to run across Glenfada Park, he reaches the halfway point between east and west that
I suddenly felt the Brits were behind me.63
Don Campbell, AC8, speaks of someone being carried at a time when he and William McKinney were standing in the middle of Glenfada Park North
A. As far as I remember there was somebody getting carried past on the far side, just basically grouped in the middle of the car park. I do not know what, who he was or what happened.64 He explained that this was before he and William McKinney had reached the south east gable end where William McKinney is pictured, in P639, standing over the still immobile body of Michael Kelly.65
This would appear to be a casualty arriving from the north:
Q. You and Mr McKinney were somewhere in the middle of the car park where the blue arrow now is and you saw somebody being carried past. If you have control of the screen again, can you tell us, first of all, where that person was when you saw him or her?
A. Roughly this way here, he was getting carried towards this entrance.
Q. Being carried towards the entrance to Abbey Park?
A. Abbey Park, yes.
Q. Where was that person coming from?
A. From in behind these garages here, somewhere round there. I do not know exactly because I cannot remember. I just remember somebody being carried across.
Q. You say that person had come from the garages?
A. From behind the garages.
Q. From behind the garages. I think that means the person must have come in through either the northeast entrance -- either through the entrance at the bottom of the picture I am marking with the yellow arrow?
A. No, the other entrance; this one, yes.
Q. The northwest entrance, so you think that person coming in through the northwestern entrance was being carried through to Abbey Park?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you get a look at that person?
A. No, I still do not know who it was.
65 Day 157/034/20 Q. Sorry?
A. I still do not know who it was.66
Indeed Mr Campbell makes quite clear when questioned by Lord Gifford that the body he saw carried was not Michael Kelly:
Q. I quite accept that you recall a different direction. In fairness to you, I think I should say that these pictures are almost certainly people carrying the body of Michael Kelly, which would have been at a later stage than the stage you are talking about?
A. No, it definitely was not Michael Kelly's body I seen, no.
Q. Thank you very much.67
There is, therefore, a considerable body of evidence to show that more than one casualty was carried through Glenfada Park North before soldiers entered the area.
Michael Kelly Forensic Evidence
The report prepared by Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan reported that the bullet which struck Michael Kelly was unstable.68 Dr Shepherd explained to the Tribunal that the most likely explanation for its instability was that it had struck some object or person before Michael Kelly.
Q. Can you offer any opinion as to the likely cause of the bullet's instability?
A. It is most likely that it had struck an object or a person prior to striking Michael Kelly.
Q. Can you say any more than that, or is that really –
A. That, I think, is as much as we can take. Clearly this bullet was not travelling nose-on, having struck him effectively side on, and the most likely reason for that is some prior contact.
66 Day 157/034/09-035/17 67 Day 157/085/09 68 E.02.7.7.3 Q. Can you say, for example, whether it could have been a ricochet in which the bullet bounced off some hard surface or whether it must have travelled through some object?
A. I think it is not possible to say... 69
8C-63 Questioned further by Peter Clarke QC, Dr Shepherd said that:
A. Can I deal with that first: I would not have expected this bullet to have passed through a hard object.
Q. It could not have, actually, could it?
A. I really do not believe that as a possibility. But it could have passed through a soft object, part of someone else's anatomy or something of that sort, without a problem. Whether it had struck a hard object I think is something once again for Mr O'Callaghan with his tests and his angles. 70
Q. Given that, with your gelatine tests which we still have on the screen, the bullet that hit Michael Kelly's abdomen could easily have been a shoot-through a mere 2 yards in front of him, could it not?
A. I would not even attempt to put a distance on. Yes, it could possibly be closer. It could be destabilised as a result of passing through another individual. 71
8C-64 Mr O'Callaghan was also asked about the matter:
Q. "Michael Kelly was hit by only one bullet which struck his abdomen approximately 'side on', most probably with the nose of the bullet pointing upwards and to the right and the base downwards, indicating that the bullet was unstable." In your view, is this consistent with a bullet hitting someone or something before it struck Michael Kelly?
A. Yes, indeed. 72 WHY DID SOLDIER F NOT MENTION THIS INCIDENT BEFORE 19 FEBRUARY?
8C-65 It is accepted that Soldier F’s RMP statements contain no reference to his firing at the rubble barricade prior to his that given to Lt Col Overbury on 19 February 1972.
8C-66 Soldier F’s explanation for the changes between his first RMP and the statement he gave to Lt Col Overbury is given in the later statement as:
I have now read my previous statements and looked at maps and photographs of the area, and realise that I have mistaken the sequence of events. After we first left our vehicles in the Rossville Flats area, I did not, as I said earlier, fire at a window in the Rossville Flats. I fired these shots later. I did however fire; I aimed round at a man I saw behind the barricade about 40 yards from me who was about to throw a bomb. It was a large object and I saw sparks coming from it.73
8C-67 Mr Gibbens returned to the subject in re-examination at the Widgery Tribunal when Soldier F repeated the explanation he had given to Lt Col Overbury that, while he was referring specifically to Sector 5, it was the sight of aerial photographs that clarified his recollections of his shooting on Bloody Sunday:
Question: You have been asked a number of times why you did not refer to the shooting of the man with the pistol behind Rossville Flats until 19th February [that is when you took the statement]. What brought it to your mind then? What was the change that led you to make the statement on the 19th?
Answer: At that time I was shown aerial photographs of the immediate area and I then realised I had shot a man there.
Question: Was that the first time you had been shown aerial photographs of the area?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Otherwise you had merely had a map?
Answer: Yes.
73 B135 Question: And the photograph reminded you of the position, did it?
Answer: Yes.74
Indeed, Lt Col Overbury pointed, in a contemporaneous note, to the fact that additional evidence was gathered by showing soldiers aerial photographs of the area.
Between 11th and 19th February 1972, the team prepared volume IV of the statements of evidence, consisting of the final statements of senior officers and further statements from witnesses clarifying or expanding on previous statements. An analysis of the evidence was prepared and the shot plot was amended after witnesses had been shown aerial photographs of the area.75
Lt Col Overbury has confirmed in oral evidence to BSI that
Q. Insofar as Soldier F says that when he made the statement on the 19th he was shown aerial photographs of the area, that is accurate as I understand it?
A. Yes, sir.76
It cannot, of course, be assumed that simply because arrangements were made to speak to Lt Col Overbury on 19 February, this was the first date on which Soldier F had first mentioned his firing. What is clear is that Soldier F did not tell Lt Col Overbury about his shot towards the rubble barricade because he had been told that ballistic evidence had shown him to have fired the shot which killed Michael Kelly. In fact, tests identifying the round which killed Michael Kelly as coming from Soldier F’s rifle were not carried out until after his interview with Lt Col Overbury.
74 B164 at A 75 CO1.6 76 Day 243/058/24
### Kelly ballistics evidence – chronology
| Date | Document Type | Description | Reference | |------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Undated | RUC report | (author's name illegible). PM performed by Dr Marshall. Bullet removed by Dr Marshall and handed to Constable McCormac. Copper lined bullet bearing rifling marks and believed to be a 7.62 NATO bullet. | DO40 | | 2.2.72 | DIFS Form | Item 11. Bullet extracted from Kelly submitted to DIFS. | DO 36/37 | | | Statement of Const. McCormac | Delivered clothing, bullet and other items from Kelly body to DIFS on Wednesday 3rd Feb 1972. | DO711 | | | Const McCormac's evidence to Widgery Tribunal | McCormac passed all items to DIFS where signed for by Inspector Hill. | DO738 | | 7.2.72 | DIFS Form | JLS/6 one 7.62 mm SLR, No 32515 submitted to DIFS from SIB Lisburn (officer's name illegible) | DO39 | | Note made on 14th February | A note of attendance at the Forensic Investigation Department, Newtonbreda | Para 11. “Mr Martin then went on to discuss the bullets recovered from the deceased and the wounded. He said that two bullets on which forensic work could usefully be done had been recovered from the deceased, one from Kelly and one from Donaghy. They were both army rifle bullets and they will be compared with with test bullets from 31 Army rifles which the Forensic Science Department had been told by the Army were the rifles in question from which bullets had been fired. 22 of these rifles have been already handed into the Forensic Department by the Army and there were nine more to come. No attempts at matching had yet been made, even on the 22 which had been fired. | D550 | | 17.2.72 | Simpson report of visit to DIFS | “The two bullets recovered are of the same calibre – and can be related to a given weapon by laboratory test. No other weapon appears to have been involved” | D628 | | 21.2.72 | DIFS report | “The bullet (item 11) is a 7.62 | D45 |
77 According to Christopher Clarke QC Day 004/139/02. Lt Col Overbury’s evidence regarding this memorandum was that:
A. Mr Hall was asking to identify the soldier to whom the rifle, which had been identified by the forensic experts instructed by Mr Hall, to whom that rifle had been issued, and he was told.
Although he has no direct recollection of taking the statement on 19 February, Lt Col Overbury has also concluded from the documentation that he was not aware of the ballistic evidence linking Michael Kelly to Soldier F at the time he interviewed Soldier F on 19 February. Questioned by Christopher Clarke QC he said that:
Q. We know the forensic evidence was that a bullet from the rifle of this soldier was lodged in the body of Michael Kelly, who was shot at the barricade. Would it be right or fair to infer that by this stage you had learnt that this soldier must have shot a man at the barricade?
______________________________________________________________________
78 Day 243/163/20 79 Day 243/054/11 A. No, sir. I have actually been shown a statement by Counsel to suggest that that knowledge did not come into our hands until much later. So I do not think I could have known it then.
Q. When you say "a statement by Counsel", do you mean a statement at the Widgery Tribunal?
A. I was shown a statement, which was apparently signed by Professor Simpson on 28th February, indicating that he had then carried out an examination and had identified the rounds that killed Mr Kelly from a numbered rifle. Subsequently that numbered rifle, I suppose, was identified as being F's rifle. So I do not think I could have known then, sir.80
Q. I am not quite sure what is the document to which you are referring, and it was not Professor Simpson who discovered it?
MR ELIAS: Sir, would it help if I referred my learned friend to D56.
MR CLARKE: Thank you. This is a document dated 28th February which confirms that the bullet from the deceased, Michael Kelly, is a bullet attributable to a particular rifle, which was the number of the rifle of Soldier F.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Your point?
MR ELIAS: Sir, I think, with respect, the word "confirms" might be misleading because we believe the document says "I have compared", and it does seem that it is giving the result, in other words, apparently on that day.
MR CLARKE: Anyway, that is the document that you are referring to?
A. Yes, sir.
8C-72 Lt Col Overbury did not think, when questioned by Mr McDonald, that he could have received the information from any other source:
Q. Could it be the case that you received advice directly from Dr Martin or from some other source on or after 17th February and
80 Day 243/054/15-055/08 well before 28th February when this information was communicated to the RUC?
A. No, I do not think that is possible, because the only information that we would have got on that basis was when we would have been notified by the Treasury Solicitor and to my knowledge, we were not notified by the Treasury Solicitor, we did not know about this until later. 81
8C-73 The point put by Mr Elias must also, in our submission, be correct; that Dr Martin’s manuscript note of 28 February clearly indicates that the tests had been performed on that day.
CONCLUSION
8C-74 There is then considerable civilian evidence that more than one man fell at the time Michael Kelly was shot. While the evidence of these witnesses is not all consistent as to the position of this missing casualty, such inconsistencies as there are, are entirely in keeping with the general confusion surrounding the rubble barricade and indeed the position of Michael Kelly himself. What is clear is that there was an additional casualty who fell at the same time as Michael Kelly and who, for that reason, cannot have been William Nash, John Young or Michael McDaid. It is likely that this was the man, in addition to Michael Kelly, who was carried away through Glenfada Park North.
8C-75 Moreover, there is conclusive photographic proof of a person lying directly in front of Michael Kelly’s fallen figure, and remaining in that position on the ground in two photographs while Mr Roberts approaches and bends closely over it; and Mr Begley looks on with concern. Such evidence dispels any doubt that Michael Kelly was standing behind this man when he was shot and it is highly likely that, consistent with the forensic evidence as to the round recovered from his body, Michael Kelly was the victim of a “shoot through”.
81 Day 243/160/10
[ \\text{\\textcopyright 7.1847} ] The man who fell in front of Michael Kelly, and whose very existence appears to have been denied by many civilians ever since, seems highly likely to have been the target who Soldier F describes. The very denial of his existence is proof that he was engaged in violent, armed activity at the time he was shot, just as Soldier F describes.
WILLIAM NASH, JOHN YOUNG AND MICHAEL MCDAID.
It is impossible to determine who was responsible for the deaths of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid. This is demonstrated by the fact that Inquiry Counsel and those representing the families have suggested that a host of different soldiers might be responsible for their deaths. It is not presently known which of the allegations is persisted in.
COUNSEL’S FIRST REPORT
Soldiers P, J, U, C, K, L and M were members of three different platoons and were active in different locations. The soldiers in question were variously situated:
1. alongside the Kells Walk pram ramp (P);
2. at the “Kells Walk wall” (J, K, L, M);
3. at the North West corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats (U); and
4. at the southern end of the balcony running along the east side of the Kells Walk building (C).
The group of soldiers includes Soldier P, who was the first soldier to fire a live round in Sector 3, and Soldier C, who was one of the last.
Christopher Clarke QC, in his Report No.1 from Counsel to the Inquiry, suggested that any of these soldiers might have been responsible for the shots which killed... William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid. The report was drafted at an early stage and set out the preliminary results of an analysis of some of the material before the Tribunal at that time. Mr Clarke made it clear that the conclusions the report contained:
are preliminary, subject to change, and will have to be revisited as further analysis is made of the material before Lord Widgery and before this Tribunal, and as the statements of the civilian and military witnesses come in.
Nevertheless, the report indicated that from the early stages of this Inquiry it was not at all clear who shot the three young men.
Mr Clarke prepared another early document entitled Summary of Civilian Evidence in relation to the Barricade Deaths. It was intended to do no more than provide a convenient overview of the evidence as it then stood in relation to the deaths at the Rossville Street barricade. Mr Clarke concluded in that document that there was a consensus in the civilian evidence that:
Young, William Nash and McDaid fell a little after Kelly did, more or less at the same time as each other.
That chronology of events is, in fact, far from clear. However, a conclusion that the three were shot at about the same time makes it all the more extraordinary that soldiers who were active at different times should be singled out as potentially responsible for their deaths.
______________________________________________________________________
83 page 17 paragraph 15.4 84 Day 004/012/98 85 page 2 paragraph 1.1 86 page 3 paragraph 3.3 87 31.05.00; the document was referred to in Mr Clarke’s Opening at Day 026/043/15 to Day 026/53/05 88 TmpD16. 2 paragraph 1(7) QUESTIONS AND ALLEGATIONS PUT DURING ORAL EVIDENCE
8C-83 The documents referred to above were drafted at an early stage and were of a preliminary nature only. It is, therefore, relevant to consider what questions and allegations were actually put to the soldiers when they gave oral evidence to the Tribunal.
Mortar Platoon
8C-84 Christopher Clarke QC asked Soldier P of the Mortar Platoon whether he had killed Messrs Nash, Young, McDaid and Hugh Gilmore:
Q. Did you kill four people at or near the barricade? A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Do you know who did? A. No, sir.88
8C-85 Arthur Harvey QC also asked Soldier P whether he was responsible for the deaths of the three at the barricade:
Q. If it is Guinness Force that is behind you, what we do know -- it has already been put to you -- three people were killed in and about the vicinity of the centre of that barricade. You fired four shots, one of which you claimed missed.
There is no person behind that barricade that has three bullets in them. The three people that were killed behind that barricade, who were killed by persons whom we are not in a position to identify are: William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid and each of them was killed by a single shot. Did you in fact kill three people behind that barricade and claim you had really only killed one but hit him three times?
A. No, not at all.89
88 Day 353/061/16 89 Day 353/111/10 Mr Clarke later suggested that, in fact, a soldier of the Anti Tank Platoon must have been responsible and raised the possibility that other members of the platoon had entered into a conspiracy to keep silent about the incident. He said to Soldier H:
Q. ... there are three people who died at the barricade. They were almost certainly killed by soldiers. The explanation that has been given by what seems to be the relevant platoon, which is the Anti-Tank Platoon, does not account for their deaths, or begin to do so.
In those circumstances the Tribunal may conclude that the reason why no explanation is given is because the shootings at the barricade could not be justified and, therefore, everybody concerned has clammed up about them; do you follow what I am saying?
A. I follow what you are saying now, yes, sir.
Q. Is that the position?
A. I would not like to say what the position is on that, sir. I know I never fired at those people and that is all I know.90
Mr Clarke asked the same question of Soldier F:
Q. Can you offer any explanation as to how it comes about that on the accounts given by the Anti-Tank Platoon to Lord Widgery and, indeed, to this Tribunal there is no explanation for how these three died?
A. No, I cannot.
Q. Has there been some conspiracy of silence not to explain how this occurred?
A. Not at all.91
90 Day 377/035/14 91 Day 375/085/11 A similar suggestion appears to have been made to the Anti Tank Platoon Commander, Lieutenant 119, by Arthur Harvey QC:
Q. ... six people were killed at the barricade, five of whom were killed probably around the same time, with Michael Kelly being the first. Michael Kelly was shot by Soldier F; Soldier F was one of your platoon; is that not right?
A. He was, sir.
Q. If you were there at the wall at Kells Walk as the first soldier, as you claim in your current evidence contained in your statement to Eversheds to this Inquiry, and you remained there until such time as all of your platoon had either taken up other positions or gone into Glenfada Park, you must have been a witness to at least five of those deaths; is that not right?
A. I have already stated, sir, that I do not remember what happened at that wall.92
Mr Harvey put a question in similar terms to Soldier J.93
Mr Clarke developed the suggestion that the Anti Tank Platoon was responsible for the barricade deaths, by asking Soldier J whether he had shot and killed one or more of those who fell there:
Q. And the third conclusion that the Tribunal might be driven to conclude is that you yourself shot and killed one or more of the four civilians who died and fell at the rubble barricade. Is that the position?
A. I do not think so, sir.
Q. You do not think so. Are you saying that that may be so?
A. I am saying that I saw -- as you know full well, I saw the shot hit the barricade, but I do not think I hit him.
Q. The conclusion that the Tribunal might reach is that if you shot someone at the barricade, it was not someone who was, or who
92 Day 364/014/11 93 Day 370/098/17 appeared to be, throwing a nail bomb or anything of the kind; what do you say to that?
A. If I opened fire, he was certainly either throwing something or firing something, in this case throwing something with lethal intent.
Soldier H was also asked whether he might have been responsible for the death of one or more of those at the barricade, and whether he had subsequently made up a story to account for the rounds he fired there:
Q. I was suggesting to you before lunch that the account that you gave about firing 19 bullets at the same reappearing silhouette was untrue and never happened and I want to suggest to you what may be a reason why you should invent such an account, that is because you fired a large number of shots that you realised at the time you would not be able to justify and you, therefore, had to make up some account which would explain up to 19 of them and you came up with this one; is that the position?
A. No, I think if I was making up a story, sir, I think I would have made up a better one than that. I have only tried to be honest all the way through and say, even though it sounds silly, it is what actually happened.
Q. Let me tell you why am suggesting that that is the reason for an invented account: it is apparent from the evidence that was given to Lord Widgery and from the evidence that has so far been given to this Tribunal, that a number of things that call out for explanation have not been explained then or now. The first of those things is what I was asking you about before lunch, namely, the death of three people at the barricade in addition to Michael Kelly, for which no explanation, consistent with the soldiers' evidence, has been forthcoming...
Mr Clarke continued:
Q. So if the Tribunal was satisfied that the people I am talking about, the known dead and wounded, were shot by soldiers, it might be driven to conclude that those who were shot and who cannot be linked to the evidence of other soldiers who fired, were shot by you; do you follow?
______________________________________________________________________
94 Day 370/149/16 95 Day 377/085/17 A. I follow, sir, yes.
Q. Do you still say that you fired 19 shots, in the manner that you describe?
A. I do, sir.
Q. And that none of your shots killed or wounded somebody else?
A. That is correct, sir.96
Guinness Force
8C-93 It was also suggested that a member of Guinness Force was responsible for the deaths of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid.
8C-94 Michael Mansfield QC, representing the Nash family, asked Soldier L whether he shot William Nash:
Q. ... Then I come to the crucial bit: how many shots did you fire at the barricade?
A. Two to the best of my knowledge.
Q. Or was it three?
A. (Pause). Two, I do not know, two.
Q. Well, I would like to know because I represent a family who have two people who were injured at the barricade, one mortally, and I want to know whether you in fact fired in such a way as originally described to 200 just at the barricade and you killed Willie Nash; do you follow?
A. I did not fire at just that, and I was given a direct order from my commanding officer to fire at the people with the weapons. Who they were, I do not know.97
8C-95 Mr Harvey QC, who had previously asked Soldier P whether he shot the three men at the barricade, went further. He suggested that Soldier L had in fact shot “a
96 Day 377/101/09 97 Day 381/174/13 group” of people, referring, it is assumed, to William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid:
Q. The person you killed or shot was not Kevin McElhinney, the boy who was crawling away, the person you shot or killed was one of a group who were behind the barricade and behind the barricade on the south western side of Rossville Street and that you chose to lie about that later. Why?
A. You are saying that, not me. 98
8C-96 The problem of identifying the soldier or soldiers responsible for shooting the three men at the rubble barricade, therefore, remains unresolved. Christopher Clarke QC and Arthur Harvey QC asked Mortar Platoon’s Soldier P whether he shot the three men. Mr Clarke then proceeded to question members of Anti Tank Platoon on the basis that one or more members of that platoon had fired the relevant shots. The situation became less clear with the suggestion by Mr Harvey and Mr Mansfield that Soldier L of Guinness Force was in fact responsible.
THE CITY WALLS THEORY
8C-97 Others have suggested that William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid were not shot by members of 1 PARA at all, but by a sniper or snipers situated on the City Walls.
8C-98 Don Mullan compiled and edited Bloody Sunday The Breglio Report in 1997. A summary on the book’s back cover states:
Serious doubts are now raised concerning the shooting dead of Michael McDaid, William Nash and John Young. Who shot them and from where? The Breglio Report is the considered opinion of one of New York City’s most experienced ballistics experts. Supported by the expert medical opinion of Dr. Raymond McClean, both men lend weight to the growing belief that soldiers positioned
98 Day 381/147/10 on the old Derry Walls were also shooting to kill or wound on Bloody Sunday.\\textsuperscript{99}
As Channel 4 News put it:
\\textit{Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash ... all of them teenagers and unarmed ... all shot dead within a few feet of each other... tonight we have post mortem evidence which proves none of these men could possibly have been shot by the Parachute Regiment on the streets.}\\textsuperscript{100}
Robert J. Breglio
\\textit{After examining the autopsy and medical reports of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid and noting the similarities and consistencies of the angle of the trajectories of the fatal wounds sustained by these three young men.}
felt able to conclude that the rounds which struck them:
\\textit{originated from an area up in the vicinity of Derry's Walls and were fired by a high powered weapon using telescopic sights.}\\textsuperscript{101}
Robert Breglio noted that his conclusion was supported by Dr. Hugh Thomas, a surgeon at Prince Charles' Hospital in Merthyr Tydfil, who in January 1997 told Alex Thomson of Channel 4 News that the three could not have been shot by soldiers at ground level. Dr Thomas said:
\\textit{This shot could only have come from a higher level. It would be almost impossible for those three men in the few seconds available to them to bend to exactly the same angle and face exactly the same way and be shot in exactly the same fashion. It would be extraordinary and almost unheard of. So, I would say definitely not.}
\\textit{It's likely to be a marksman, an exceptionally good marksman, firing ... quite fast at the three suspects who were dumped in the}
\\textsuperscript{99} T256 \\textsuperscript{100} X1.6.7; Alex Thomson, Channel 4 News, 17 January 1997 \\textsuperscript{101} T264 same area. You would only need literally a fraction of a second to align the next individual and complete the job.\\textsuperscript{102}
Dr McClean's medical report also espoused the theory that William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid were shot from the Walls and not by soldiers at ground level:
\\textit{The trajectory line of each bullet was strikingly similar in all three cases. The trajectory line in each case being from the front to the back and from above to below, with an angle of approximately 45 degrees.}\\textsuperscript{103}
He then spoke of "a clear eyewitness account" that William Nash was crossing the rubble barricade in the direction of Free Derry Corner when he was shot.
\\textit{From the post-mortem evidence which exists it is clear that this man could not have been shot by soldiers in Rossville Street, who were behind him. Equally, if he were upright or almost upright he could not have been shot from ground level. The conclusion to be drawn from the forensic evidence, allied to the eyewitness account, suggests the likelihood that William Nash was killed by a bullet fired from the vicinity of the Derry Walls. There is also the possibility that Michael McDaid and John Young may have been shot from a similar firing position. There are multiple eyewitness accounts of soldiers shooting from the Walls, even to the extent of claiming hits.}\\textsuperscript{104}
Dealing with paragraph 78 of the Widgery Report, Dr. McClean wrote:
\\textit{Lord Widgery states that Nash was shot in the chest from the front. In this amazing section of the report, he moves directly from the evidence regarding the entry wound to discuss the presence of lead particles, present on the left hand. He disregards the evidence of the eyewitness account, which states that William Nash was positioned with his back towards Soldier P when he was shot... If William Nash was standing upright or nearly upright, then he must...}
\\textsuperscript{102} T264; and see his BSI statement of 05.09.00 at M90.4 \\textsuperscript{103} T267 \\textsuperscript{104} infra have been shot from above. He could not have been shot from ground level.\\textsuperscript{105}
8C-105 He concluded:
An examination of attached diagrams (Appendix E) would suggest that all of these men were shot from above and not from ground level. The similarity of the trajectory lines through the three bodies would suggest that this was not haphazard shooting from different soldiers, at different angles, at ground level. The evidence as established, would indicate that these men were shot from a location above them, and possibly by a marksman or marksmen, firing from the same position.\\textsuperscript{106}
8C-106 Therefore, Mr Breglio and Drs Thomas and McClean all agree that William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid were shot from above, Mr Breglio and Dr McClean both stating that the shots came from “the vicinity of the City Walls”. Breglio and Thomas suggest that a single marksman was responsible, the former also felt able to assert that a telescopic sight was used. Dr McClean leaves open the possibility that more than one marksman was involved.
\\textsuperscript{105} T267 The fact that such a theory could be promulgated in the first place, after apparently careful research, is evidence of the lack of any clear evidence, either forensic or from eye witnesses, linking a soldier or soldiers situated in the Bogside with these three deaths.
The report of Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan includes a consideration of the City Walls theory:
*We have been specifically asked to examine whether or not there is any evidence that shots fired from the City Walls were responsible for the deaths of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid. The apparently similar and steep angles at which the bullets struck the deceased has been interpreted by some as indicating that the shots may have come from an elevated position, possibly a point on the City Walls.*
They concluded:
*Whether the shots were fired downwards from the walls or horizontally at ground level from the Kells Walk direction the deceased would have been bending forward for the shots to have caused the tracks that were found.*
*If facing towards the walls, the deceased would have to have bent forwards at an angle of approximately 40° to align the track through the body with a horizontal trajectory.*
*The difference in angle of shot is therefore only 5°, well within the possible error of measurement.*
*Consequently, our opinion is that the shots which killed William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid, could have been fired from either the street or from the City Walls.*
*However, it is clear from the injuries that all three men were facing in the general direction from where the shots came. It follows that if the shots originated from the City Walls, the deceased would have to have had their backs towards Kells Walk at the time they were shot. Conversely, if the shots originated from the Kells Walk side of the barricade, they would have to have been facing in that direction.*
______________________________________________________________________
106 T268 107 E2.065 paragraph 11.1 The civilian evidence does not, however, help the Tribunal determine this important issue. It is so contradictory as to preclude any clear conclusion. The problems caused by the passage of time and lapse of memories are accentuated by the fact that there was clearly a substantial volume of noise and shooting and considerable confusion. Thus, from the moment of the events themselves, people's impressions and interpretations differed and their accounts of events were, in many cases, inherently unreliable.
This fact was recognised at an early stage by Christopher Clarke QC, whose Summary of Civilian Evidence in relation to the Barricade Deaths of 31st May 2000 referred to the "substantial disagreement between the various witnesses" and set out some of the areas of discrepancy in the civilian evidence, including
1. where on the barricade John Young, William Nash and Michael McDaid fell;
2. which way they were facing when they were shot;
3. what they were doing when they were shot.(^{109})
(^{108}) infra; the debate continues, see Dr McClean's further statement at AM105.108.
(^{109}) TmpD 16.001 paragraph 2 (paragraph erroneously numbered 187.2) WHERE IN RELATION TO RUBBLE BARRICADE DID JOHN YOUNG, WILLIAM NASH AND MICHAEL MCDAID FALL?
The confusion as to where precisely the three men fell is symptomatic of a wider confusion relating to the circumstances in which they were shot. The Tribunal has before it evidence suggesting that one or more of the three was shot:
(1) north of the rubble barricade;
(2) south of the rubble barricade;
(3) on the eastern portion of the barricade; and
(4) on the western portion of the barricade.
North of Rubble Barricade
Various witnesses describe the shooting of William Nash and/or others at a position north of the barricade.
Letty Donnelly saw a person she later learnt was William Nash, “who had been running in the direction of the barricade before he was shot”, who “fell on his front before he reached the Rubble Barricade.” She indicates on her plan a position just to the north of the eastern portion of the barricade. She saw two further people lying north of the barricade, but in front of its western portion. They too were later removed from the barricade in an Army Pig.
______________________________________________________________________
110 AD125.2 paragraphs 9 to 10 111 AD125.7 position E 112 Day 124/122/2, AD125.7 position G Similarly, Ronnie Ballard saw a person he later discovered was William Nash running south towards the rubble barricade:
He ran towards the Rubble Barricade and reached the north side of it... and was right up to the Rubble Barricade about to hurdle it when he stopped. I heard a couple of shots and he collapsed face down onto the Rubble Barricade.(^{113})
Olive Mottram saw a body “lying face down with the head towards Free Derry Corner and feet towards William Street”, north of the rubble barricade, “quite close to Glenfada Park North”. Another young man, who was also north of the barricade, fell a little further to the east.(^{114})
Monica Whoriskey(^{115}) gave an account suggesting the three men were shot as they lay in positions north of the barricade:
8. ...I saw three young men lying to the north of the Rubble Barricade... They were lying on their stomachs with their heads on the Rubble Barricade and their feet pointing north... The young man lying closest to Block I turned his head and seemed to talk to the other men lying there.
9. After a short time I looked out of the window again at the three men lying at the Rubble Barricade but this time I noticed they were not moving at all...(^{116})
South of Rubble Barricade
Many others suggest that the three were in fact shot while they were on the other side of the barricade. There is conflicting evidence as to where, south of the barricade, they were actually shot. Some suggest that they fell parallel to the eastern portion of the barricade, others apparently recall seeing the men fall parallel to the western portion. This evidence is considered below.
(^{113}) AB6.3 paragraph 18 (^{114}) AM441.5 paragraphs 29 to 32 (^{115}) A.K.A. Monica Hegarty AH63 (^{116}) AH63.5 Eastern Part of Rubble Barricade
8C-121 Frank Lawton saw three young men all lying still on the south side of the barricade, all east of its centre.(^{117})
8C-122 Michael Lynch saw three people lying behind (south of) the eastern part of barricade, one of whom may in fact have been Alexander Nash, because he was waving what appeared to be a handkerchief over the top of the barricade.(^{118})
8C-123 Jack Nash helped to carry Michael Kelly away from barricade. When he next looked at the barricade he could see three people lying together, one of whom was Alexander Nash. The two others were lying close by. All were to the south of the eastern portion of barricade.(^{119})
8C-124 Kathleen Brown saw a young man lying face down on the eastern part of the rubble barricade. An elderly man lay over him.(^{120}) It is, therefore, possible that the older man was Alexander Nash and the younger man William Nash.
8C-125 Letty Donnelly believed that William Nash was shot north of the barricade, but to its eastern side.(^{121})
Western Part of Rubble Barricade
8C-126 Denis McLaughlin saw a man he identified as William Nash(^{122}) fall just behind the western part of the barricade. He saw the man:
16. ... crossing the barricade in a southerly direction towards Free Derry Corner. He was approaching the barricade from Block 1 of the flats. He was not holding anything in his hands and did not look
(^{117}) AL6.3 paragraph 13 (^{118}) Day 148/194 to Day 148/197; AL38.011 (^{119}) AN27.3 paragraph 13; Day 137/019/10; AN27.018 (^{120}) AB94, paragraphs 16 to 18; AB84.019; Day 144/116 to 117 (^{121}) AD125.16; Day 124/132/19 (^{122}) AM326.6 paragraph 20 as if he was about to pick anything up... He was running towards Free Derry Corner.
17. As I caught sight of his he fell back and rolled over on his mouth and nose, on the Free Derry side... of the Rubble Barricade. He lay no more than 3 to 4 yards from me and closer to the Glenfada Park pavement side. 123
8C-127 Hugh Duffy saw William Nash and another lying at the rubble barricade, shot. They were “lying very close to each other to the west of the gap in the Rubble Barricade...” 124
8C-128 Bernard Feeney saw three men shot on the barricade; they were nearer to the Glenfada Park end and were staggering around as if drunk before collapsing on the south side. 125
8C-129 Albert Faulkner observed a group of people run across Rossville Street; he believed they were heading for cover in Glenfada Park. 126
Four of the people who were running across Rossville Street towards Glenfada Park, the ones who were at the tail end of the group, dropped to the floor. Three of them fell flat, either on their faces or on their sides, I cannot quite recall. These three fell quite close to one another, but not on top of one another, and lay still. They were on the pavement on the west side of Rossville Street (the Glenfada Park North side) when they fell, and were probably two feet south of the Rubble Barricade, on the Free Derry Corner side. 127
8C-130 Marie Kopiak gives a similar account to that of Mr Faulkner. 128
123 AM326.4 paragraphs 16 to 17 124 AD156.3 paragraphs 14 to 15 125 AF8.4 paragraphs 21 to 22; Day 141/058 to Day 141/059 126 AF4.2 paragraph 7 127 AF4.2 paragraph 8 128 AK39.3 Both sides of Rubble Barricade
8C-131 There are several witnesses who suggest that William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid did not all fall on the same side of the rubble barricade. For example, Letty Donnelly believed that William Nash was shot north of the barricade, but to its eastern side(^{29}) and that two others fell on the western portion of the barricade:
[ \\text{In addition to Mr Nash and the boy that had been shot, I saw two other men lying still on top of each other and more or less on the top of the barricade itself. The approximate point at which they were lying is marked G on the map}^{30} \\ldots \\text{I have never found out who they were.}^{31} ]
8C-132 The “substantial disagreement between the various witnesses” relating to “where on the barricade Young, Nash and McDaid fell”, first identified by Mr Clarke, therefore persists to this day.
(^{29}) AD125.16: Day 124/132/19 (^{30}) AD125.7 (^{31}) AD125.2 paragraph 16 WHICH WAY WERE WILLIAM NASH, JOHN YOUNG AND MICHAEL MCDAID FACING WHEN THEY WERE SHOT?
8C-133 Another area of disagreement identified by Mr Clarke related to the direction in which these men were facing when they were shot.
Facing North
8C-134 A number of witnesses suggest that one or more of the three was facing north when shot. Paul Coyle is an example of such a witness. He saw a youth, who may have been William Nash, “facing north with his arms outstretched, gesticulating with his two fingers up, presumably at the soldiers standing north of his position.” The youth then fell during a hail of SLR bullets.132
8C-135 Dennis Irwin gave the following account in his BSI statement:
23. I remember that the boy closest to me... had dark hair and was wearing a blue denim jacket. He was standing on the barricade facing north towards William Street... The sound of gunshots continued and I saw the boy double over clutching his stomach. He dropped down on to his knees and then kneeled over onto his face.
24. I then saw the other young boy, who was also standing on top of the Rubble Barricade and facing north towards William Street... get shot... At the time I thought that he might have been shot from behind... 133
8C-136 Brian Rainey’s evidence was that the three to four young lads he saw fall at the barricade had been facing the soldiers to the north at the time they were shot.134
Facing/Moving South
8C-137 There is, however, a body of evidence suggesting that at least one of the three was in fact facing or moving south when shot.
132 AC105.2 paragraph 10; and see PRAXIS account at 05.5. 133 A13.3; and see Day 170/083/23. Several witnesses refer specifically to William Nash. They include Ronnie Ballard, who saw a person he later discovered to be William Nash, running south towards the rubble barricade:
He ran towards the Rubble Barricade and reached the north side of it... and was right up to the Rubble Barricade about to hurdle it when he stopped. I heard a couple of shots and he collapsed face down onto the Rubble Barricade.(^{135})
Letty Donnelly saw a person she later learnt was William Nash, “who had been running in the direction of the barricade before he was shot”. She added that “He fell on his front before he reached the Rubble Barricade”(^{136}) and indicated on her plan a position to the north the barricade.(^{137})
Denis McLaughlin referred to a man he later identified as William Nash,(^{138}) who was:
16. ... crossing the barricade in a southerly direction towards Free Derry Corner. He was approaching the barricade from Block 1 of the flats. He was not holding anything in his hands and did not look as if he was about to pick anything up... He was running towards Free Derry Corner.
17. As I caught sight of him he fell back and rolled over on his mouth and nose, on the Free Derry side... of the Rubble Barricade. He lay no more than 3 to 4 yards from me and closer to the Glenfada Park pavement side.(^{139})
One witness refers specifically to Michael McDaid moving south. James Doherty described how he noticed a well dressed fellow he later learnt was Michael McDaid:
(^{134}) AR3.2 paragraph 14\
(^{135}) AB6.3 paragraph 18\
(^{136}) AD125.2 paragraphs 9 to 10\
(^{137}) AD125.7\
(^{138}) AM326.6 paragraph 20\
(^{139}) AM326.4 paragraphs 16 to 17 ... running towards the barricade. I am certain that he had nothing in his hand. He got over the top in a crouched position. He then fell back and lay still with his hands outstretched.
8C-142 Other witnesses suggest that more than one person was shot whilst facing or moving south. James Chapman's evidence was that he saw three people fall as they made their way over the rubble barricade.
8C-143 Kevin McCloskey ran south through the gap in the rubble barricade as shots were fired. Three men, all of them to his right, went down. They fell on their fronts, with their heads in the direction of Free Derry Corner. Mr McCloskey stated: "My impression was that they were hit whilst they got over the Barricade."
8C-144 Susan Coyle gave the following account in 1972:
... three youths and a man were running over the barricade at the entrance to the High Flats. I heard gunfire from the army and two of the youths and the man fell. The third youth took cover by one of the other bodies. As he lay there I actually saw the bullet hit the boy in the head and from his position I assumed him to be dead. The other two youths, when shot, had fallen, one on top of the other and never moved, so I thought they had died immediately. The man raised himself and beckoned to the army and called to them that the boys lying beside him needed an ambulance...
8C-145 Further witnesses claim that those shot whilst facing or moving south were shot in the back. Sheena Martin gave a statement in 1972, which seems to refer to the death of William Nash and the shooting of Alexander Nash and another:
I saw a soldier jump out of a Saracen tank and start shooting indiscriminately. He didn't care what he shot at. There was a fellow trying to get over the barricade and he shot him in the back. When this fellow was shot, a man whom I later learnt was his father, came out and tried to pull him in. When they got his father out they shot him as well. There was a fellow who came out of
140 AD70.1\
141 AC59.2; AC59.8 paragraphs C to F\
142 AM116.4 paragraphs 24 to 29\
143 AC86.1 Abbey St. the end of Glenfada Park and put his hands up in the air. He had nothing in his hands and he called to the soldier, "Go on shoot me." The soldiers took him at his word and they shot him down.\\textsuperscript{144}
Chris Barrett described how:
The first thing I saw was a young fellow running and jumping over the barricade. The next moment he was lying on the ground with his back all covered in blood. They had shot him in the back as he went over the barricade. There were two other lads lying besides him. They also had been shot.\\textsuperscript{145}
It is clear from the evidence of the pathologists that none of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid was shot in the back. It is also clear from photograph P597 that Michael McDaid at least was not shot as he fled towards or scrambled over the barricade; the photograph shows him walking south through its centre. Yet such is the confusion surrounding the deaths of these young men that suggestions of this type continue to be made.
\\textit{Moving West to East}
The situation becomes even more confused and unclear with a consideration of evidence from witnesses who believe that at least one the three men was in fact shot moving in an easterly direction.
Marie Kopiak recorded that:
14. I saw three boys coming out from the gap between Glenfada Park South and Glenfada Park North... I assumed they were trying to cross over Rossville Street for cover. They came out in a straight line one behind the other, with their hands behind their heads... The young men were walking slowly and looked terrified, with their heads bent forward, almost crouching. The shooting was still going on at that stage...
\\textsuperscript{144} AM27.8; In her BSI statement, she could understandably remember less. She did specifically suggest that the 1972 account would be correct, however, AM27.5 paragraph 18.
\\textsuperscript{145} AB21.1 15. I must have looked away for a few moments (I could not watch) because, the next time I looked out, the three men were all lying down on the ground. The other people in the flats were in a terrible state crying. "They've shot three young lads!" The three young men had not got very far when they were shot...
8C-150 Joseph Doherty saw a youth, who he later discovered was William Nash, walk out from the gable end wall of Glenfada Park North, across Rossville Street in the direction of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He was shot as he leant down as if to pick something up from the barricade.
8C-151 William Etherson saw three young men, who were south of the rubble barricade, run out (west to east), one behind the other:
They were running for no more than 10 or 20 paces. Suddenly they all went down to the ground but I could not tell whether they had been shot. When they were running they were all close together. I was not sure if they were running to try to get to the Rossville Flats. I thought they were trying to get to the Rubble Barricade to take cover. They got fairly near to the south side of the Rubble Barricade.
8C-152 Teresa Maxwell saw two young lads run out from the south east entrance to Glenfada Park North, more or less straight across the road towards the Rossville Flats. The next moment she saw one of the lads fall. Somebody said he was called Nash.
Moving East to West
8C-153 That evidence is contradicted by witnesses who saw the young men go down as they moved in a westerly direction.
______________________________________________________________________
146 AK39.3 147 AD76.012 148 AD76.3 paragraphs 22 to 24; Day 138/147/15 149 AE4.004 paragraph 22; Day 143/007 to Day 143/009 150 AM30.002 paragraphs 6 to 7; Day 396/163 to Day 396/166
FS 7.1870
VIII 243 Albert Faulkner observed a group of people run across Rossville Street; he believed they were heading for cover in Glenfada Park:
Four of the people who were running across Rossville Street towards Glenfada Park, the ones who were at the tail end of the group, dropped to the floor. Three of them fell flat, either on their faces or on their sides, I cannot quite recall. These three fell quite close to one another, but not on top of one another, and lay still.
Edward Rigney gave a similar account:
24. ...I saw a lad run from the east side of Rossville Street towards the west side...he was not running nimbly but was running in a direct line across Rossville Street...I think that he reached approximately half way across the Rubble Barricade when he fell forwards. He fell face down. My impression was that he had tripped. I did not see him get up and assumed that he was being sensible and taking cover behind the Rubble Barricade...
25. After he fell, I noticed two other lads run out on to the Rubble Barricade, one after the other, from the east side of Rossville Street...They were only one or two seconds behind the first boy I had seen fall. I received the impression that they might have been going out to him...they, too, fell, one behind the other. The one in the lead seemed to fall forwards, west towards Glenfada Park North, and the boy behind him seemed to collapse straight down upon the ground and did not fall forwards.
Finally, in this regard, Seamus Fleming noted that:
When the five or six people left on the Rubble Barricade were trying to come towards us, they were trying to make for the opening where I was standing between Glenfada Park North and Glenfada Park South. They were definitely facing towards Glenfada Park. They were heading in my direction, but the minute they got up two of them were hit by shots. The "substantial disagreement between the various witnesses" relating to which way John Young, William Nash and Michael McDaid were facing when they were shot, therefore persists to this day.
THE CONDUCT OF WILLIAM NASH, JOHN YOUNG AND MICHAEL MCDAID IN AREA OF RUBBLE BARRICADE
A further area of discrepancy identified by Mr Clarke in his Summary of Civilian Evidence in relation to the Barricade Deaths, relates to what the three men were doing when they were shot. Some suggest that they were throwing stones, others are clear that they were not.
Nothing in their Hands
Kevin McCloskey saw three men go down at the rubble barricade. "All three had nothing in their hands that I could see, Their hands were flat out in front of them and they all fell with their hands in front of them..."135
Paul Coyle referred to the actions of a person he believed to be William Nash, who was part of a group hurling abuse at the soldiers but who had nothing in his hands at the time he was shot.136
Dennis Irwin gives evidence of the shooting of a young boy who was on the rubble barricade: "He was standing doing nothing at the time he was shot. He was not holding anything in his hands."137
The man Denis McLaughlin identified as William Nash138 was crossing the barricade in a southerly direction towards Free Derry Corner. He was approaching the barricade from Block 1 of the
135 AM116.4 paragraph 29 136 AC105.2 paragraph 10; 05.5 137 A13.4 paragraph 24 138 AM326.6 paragraph 20 flats. He was not holding anything in his hands and did not look as if he was about to pick anything up...\\textsuperscript{159}
8C-163 James Doherty's evidence was that Michael McDaid had nothing in his hand when he was shot, although William Nash had leant down as if to pick something up from the barricade: "He may have intended to pick up a stone from the barricade and throw it at the soldiers."\\textsuperscript{160}
\\textit{Stones in Their Hands}
8C-164 Brian Rainey's evidence was that the three to four young lads he saw fall at the barricade had all been throwing stones, grabbing what was nearest.\\textsuperscript{161}
8C-165 Eugene Bradley's evidence was that William Nash had been throwing stones before he was shot.\\textsuperscript{162}
8C-166 Similarly, Alphonsus Cunningham suggests that William Nash had been lifting some rubble off the barricade to throw when he was shot.\\textsuperscript{163}
8C-167 The evidence about even this issue therefore remains in conflict, a conflict which symbolises the state of the civilian evidence relating to the barricade deaths generally.
\\textbf{ARREST THEORY}
8C-168 Various civilian witnesses maintain that Michael McDaid was arrested by the Army and put in the back of a Pig in Rossville Street. The accounts conflict but some witnesses elaborate this allegation by suggesting that CS gas was fired into the vehicle whilst Michael McDaid was in it. It is even claimed that he was shot shortly after he left the vehicle to escape the gas.
\\textsuperscript{159} AM326.004 paragraphs 16 \\textsuperscript{160} AD70.001 \\textsuperscript{161} AR3.002 paragraph 14
\\textsuperscript{FS} 7.1873 Joe Begley gave a statement to Detective Sergeant Ruddell in 1972, which included this account of his arrest:
I saw Michael McDaid of Tyroconnell Street. He is well known to me. I have known him for at least 10 years. He stepped over the barricade going towards William Street. He didn’t seem to be concerned about the shooting. I was not aware live rounds were being used nor was Michael McDaid. It was at this time that I saw a youth lying behind the barricade... I didn’t pay too much attention to him. I heard an elderly man saying he had been shot... I looked up and saw Michael McDaid and one other civilian being marched towards an Army Personnel Carrier which was parked at the William Street end of Rossville Flats on waste ground... Michael had both his hands behind his head... The rear doors of the Army Personnel Carrier were open and I assumed they were going to put Michael into it. I didn’t see Michael again...
Mr Begley now claims that he was inebriated when he made this statement to the RUC. However, he is not the only witness to talk of Michael McDaid’s arrest. Others who describe it, do so in more colourful terms.
Ciaran Donnelly described, in a statement he gave in 1972, how a youth was arrested, assaulted and placed into a military vehicle:
... I saw a youth run out from the back of the Rossville flats and make his way towards the soldiers. A parachutist ran after him from an army vehicle and the youth ran back to the Rossville flats but was caught by another paratrooper who came from behind the Rossville flats. They hit him with batons and took him back into a vehicle. They had to drag him as he was unable to walk. At some time, but I am not sure, I thought that someone said his name was McDaid. I thought little of this until I heard that McDaid was the name of one of those who were killed. If anyone mentioned his name to me it would probably have been a resident in Bogside. Donnelly has subsequently agreed that what he saw was similar to the incident depicted in Jeffrey Morris’s photographs of the arrest of John Dillon. It may, therefore, be that the story of the McDaid arrest started with the misidentification of somebody who was arrested within sight of the rubble barricade.
Frankie Boyle was in the area of Kells Walk. His version of events includes the allegation that CS gas was fired into the military vehicle from which Michael McDaid was to escape:
14. Amongst the people throwing stones at the soldiers was Michael McDaid ... He threw some stones from Rossville Street then went towards the soldiers on the waste ground in the area ... between Block 1 of the Flats and Pilot Row ... He came more or less face to face with one soldier. He was arrested with two or three others and thrown into the back of a Saracen that was close by. Those arrested were kicking about in the back of the Saracen and a soldier fired CS gas inside. About two or three of the lads, including Michael McDaid, escaped from the back of the Saracen. They were choking on CS gas.
15. Michael McDaid ran away from the Saracen towards Rossville Street. When he was about 20 yards away from the Saracen, I heard a bang and saw him fall to the ground. I am not sure exactly where he was when he fell, but I think he was on Rossville Street close to the Rubble Barricade. He seemed to be facing me though I have the impression he was shot in the back. He was not carrying any weapons at all and all he was doing when he was shot was rubbing his eyes from the effects of CS gas.
Mr Boyle confirmed the account of the arrest and of the shooting in oral evidence, albeit with some confusion as to the location of the Saracen in question.
A week after Bloody Sunday, the Sunday Independent’s Joe McAnthony referred to “what numerous eye-witnesses regarded as the most appalling massacre in the
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167 Day 071/025/19; the photographs are at EP2/6-7. 168 AB48.2 169 Day 122/057/18 to Day 122/063/23 whole affair." He reported the arrest and murder of Michael McDaid in similar though not identical terms to those used by Mr Boyle.
Photograph P597 shows Michael McDaid walking south through the gap in the centre of the barricade at a time after Michael Kelly had been shot. At this stage he does not appear to be in any way disconcerted. It might be thought that this photograph alone disproves the allegations concerning his arrest. He certainly does not look or behave in the photograph like a man who has just successfully escaped from the back of a Pig. The evidence about his arrest, therefore, serves to illustrate how distorted have become the accounts of his death and the circumstances surrounding it.
8C-V CHRONOLOGY
8C-177 Christopher Clarke QC's Summary of Civilian Evidence in relation to the Barricade Deaths suggests that there is a consensus in the civilian evidence that:
Young, William Nash and McDaid fell a little after Kelly did, more or less at the same time as each other.
8C-178 Nothing is clear in relation to the barricade deaths; one of the photographs challenges even this preliminary conclusion.
8C-179 Michael Mansfield QC referred to EP27/11, below, when he made an opening statement on behalf of the Nash family. He suggested that William Nash appears in it (marked with an arrow) at the end of the gable wall of Glenfada Park North.
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170 L165; 06.02.72. 171 TmpD16.002 172 Day 050/134/10 Mr Mansfield initially contended that the photograph was taken before Michael Kelly had been shot. It was brought to his attention that the photograph may well depict the beginning of the passage of Mr Kelly's body into Glenlada Park North (circled) and that the photograph must therefore have been taken after the shooting of Mr Kelly. Mr Mansfield agreed that might be the case:
I accept it could be that that group has already retrieved Mr Kelly and therefore William Nash has not yet gone round the corner to the rubble barricade with the others. It is difficult to be precise about that.
Mr Mansfield, therefore, acknowledged the difficulty in determining when William Nash was shot. However, rather than being difficult, it is, in fact, impossible.
Arthur Harvey QC also opened on the basis that EP27/11 may show William Nash at the gable wall. He, however, added that it might also show Michael McDaid and, at its extreme right hand side, Kevin McElhinney:
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173 Day 050/135/08 174 Day 050/136/19 175 Day 047/067/14, there referred to as P420 There is also a possibility, if one looks at this photograph, that that is Michael McDaid. Michael McDaid was wearing a white shirt and checked coat, but one cannot be sure. In the corner is, as one can see, a very small portion of an individual. It appears to be an individual either lying or crawling on the ground; that is possibly Kevin McElhinney.
The identification of William Nash (and possibly Michael McDaid and Kevin McElhinney) at this time would have important ramifications for the timing of various incidents.
(1) It would suggest that the shooting of William Nash, and possibly Michael McDaid, did not happen as soon after that of Michael Kelly as had previously been assumed. On this hypothesis, Mr Nash (and Mr McDaid) were not shot until after:
(a) Michael Kelly was shot and photographed on the ground in the area of the barricade (P597, which proves that Michael McDaid had not been shot at this stage);
(b) Michael Kelly had been carried away from the barricade to the mouth of Glenfada Park North (EP23/10 and EP23/11);
(c) Father Bradley had administered the last rites;
(d) Michael Kelly’s body had been picked up and had started on its way through Glenfada Park North (EP27/11).
(2) The provisional conclusion that William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid were shot at the same time is also called into question by a photograph which may show two of them in Glenfada Park when Michael Kelly’s body was brought in from the barricade.
176 Day 047/067/24 (3) The relationship between the shooting of William Nash and Hugh Gilmore is also brought into question by the photograph. Liam Mailey gave detailed evidence to Lord Widgery, during the course of which he explained the EP23 series of photographs that he took. Mr Mailey himself probably appears in the well known photograph of Hugh Gilmore running past the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats (EP23/9A), apparently taken after Mr Gilmore had been shot. Mr Mailey confirmed in his evidence that this photograph would have been taken before he himself took (EP23/10). EP23/10 is the photo showing a crowd gathered around the prone Michael Kelly at the gable end, the first of the series of three photographs taken at the gable end, all of which were clearly taken before EP27/11. Thus, this series suggests that Hugh Gilmore was shot before William Nash (and possibly Michael McDaid).
(4) Mr Harvey potentially identifies Kevin McElhinney alive in EP27/11 and crawling alongside Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. It is suggested by those representing Mr McElhinney that he was shot in about this position. If correct, the photograph would also suggest that he was shot before William Nash (and possibly Michael McDaid).
Therefore, it can no longer be assumed that William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid were shot shortly after Michael Kelly, nor that they were necessarily all shot within a short time of each other. Mr Nash, and possibly Mr McDaid, may even have been shot after Mr Gilmore and Mr McElhinney. It is now clear that even the most basic preliminary conclusions regarding the circumstances in which they were shot are questionable.
177 M50.28 to M50.29 178 Submissions in relation to Kevin McElhinney are in chapter 8B. 8C-VI MISSING CASUALTIES AND MISSING PHOTOGRAPHS
8C-185 Civilian evidence suggests that more people were wounded or killed in the area of the rubble barricade than those who have been identified. Whilst the existence of unidentified, “missing” casualties further confuses the situation, it may provide an explanation for what happened to the bodies of some of those shot by the military in this part of the Bogside.
8C-186 Significant photographs taken in Sector 3, and particularly of those events in the area of the rubble barricade, have gone missing. They are said to have suffered a variety of fates: unreturned by a journalist, destroyed in a flood or deliberately suppressed. This is considered in detail in chapter 7, in relation to the activities of the Mortar Platoon in Sector 3. It is now clear at the very least that the remaining photographs do not resolve the many problems associated with determining the circumstances in which William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid were shot.
8C-VII CONCLUSION
8C-187 The problem of identifying the soldier or soldiers responsible for shooting the three men at the rubble barricade remains unresolved. That much was demonstrated by the fact that the same questions and allegations were put to soldiers of three different platoons. Christopher Clarke QC and Arthur Harvey QC asked Mortar Platoon’s Soldier P whether he shot the three men. Mr Clarke then proceeded to question members of Anti Tank Platoon on the basis that one or more members of that platoon had fired the relevant shots. The situation became still more confused with the suggestion by Mr Harvey and Mr Mansfield that Soldier L of Guinness Force, was in fact, responsible.
8C-188 The “City Walls” theory posits that the three men were in fact shot by a soldier or soldiers situated on the Walls. The fact that such a theory was promulgated in the first place is itself evidence of the lack of any clear evidence linking a soldier or soldiers situated in the Bogside with these deaths.
8C-189 Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan have accordingly concluded that the key to discovering which soldier or soldiers was or were responsible for the deaths of... William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid is the “witness testimony”. It is not possible from the soldiers’ evidence to determine which of them was responsible for shooting Messrs Nash, Young and McDaid. The Tribunal is, therefore, left to consider the civilian evidence.
8C-190 The civilian evidence does not, however, help the Tribunal determine this important issue. It is so contradictory as to preclude any clear conclusion. The problems caused by the passage of time and lapse of memories are accentuated by the fact that there was clearly a substantial volume of noise and shooting and considerable confusion. Thus, from the moment of the events themselves, people’s impressions and interpretations differed and their accounts of events were, in many cases, inherently unreliable.
8C-191 Evidence suggesting that Michael McDaid was arrested before he was shot further illustrates how distorted have become the accounts of his death and the circumstances surrounding it.
8C-192 It can no longer be assumed that William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid were shot shortly after Michael Kelly, nor that they were necessarily all shot within a short time of each other. William Nash, and possibly Michael McDaid, may even have been shot after Hugh Gilmore and Kevin McElhinney. It is now clear that even the most basic preliminary conclusions regarding the circumstances in which they were shot are questionable.
8C-193 The Tribunal cannot, in these circumstances, reach any conclusion as to the soldier or soldiers responsible for the shooting of William Nash, John Young and Michael McDaid. CLOSING SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENTS OF MR ANTHONY LAWTON
VOLUME 7
CHAPTER 9 SECTOR 4 CHAPTER 9 SECTOR 4
CHAPTER 9A - SECTOR 4
9A-I Allegations ................................................................. 1 Glenfada Park North .................................................. 1 Abbey Park .............................................................. 2 Evidence on Which Allegations are Based ....................... 2
9A-II Submissions - Summary ........................................... 3 Glenfada Park North .................................................. 3 Abbey Park .............................................................. 5
9A-III The Dead and Injured in Sector 4 ............................. 5 The Dead ................................................................. 5 The Wounded ........................................................... 5
9A-IV Soldiers Present in Glenfada Park North/Abbey Park .... 12
9A-V The Tribunal Cannot Rely upon the Civilian Evidence in Glenfada Park North .... 12 There were Gunmen and Nail Bombers which Civilians Simply do not Mention .... 17 Soldiers did not open fire on an isolated group of three men ....................... 19 James Wray was not “executed” .................................... 41
9A-VI The Tribunal cannot rely upon the Evidence of Soldier 027 ....................... 119
THE SOLDIERS’ ACCOUNTS OF ACTIONS IN SECTOR 4 .................. 125
9A-VII Soldiers Entered Glenfada Park North for Legitimate and Proper Reasons .... 125 Glenfada Park Was A Habitual Haven For Paramilitary Activity .................... 125 Military Evidence re Entry into Glenfada Park North ............................... 131
9A-VIII There was Armed Activity in Glenfada Park North ......................... 133 Introduction ............................................................ 134 The North East Corner of Glenfada Park North .................................... 135 Handguns ............................................................... 139 Nail Bombs ............................................................. 173 Rifles ................................................................. 212
9A-IX There were Additional Casualties to the Known Dead and Wounded ............ 290
9A-X Summary .............................................................. 299 CHAPTER 9
SECTOR 4
9A-1 ALLEGATIONS
GLENFADA PARK NORTH
9A-1 In relation to the shootings in the areas of Glenfada Park North and Abbey Park, it is alleged that soldiers moved into Glenfada Park North without good reason and proceeded to fire upon civilians without justification resulting in the deaths of William McKinney, James Wray, Gerard McKinney and Gerard Donaghy and injury to Patrick O'Donnell, Michael Quinn, Joseph Friel and Danny Gillespie.
9A-2 Specifically, it is alleged that:-
(1) The soldiers from the Anti-tank platoon who moved into Glenfada Park North had no legitimate reason for doing so.
(2) On entering Glenfada Park North, Soldiers E, F, G and H fired in an undisciplined way and at random. One or more of them fired from the hip.
(3) There was no justification for such firing and these soldiers intended unlawfully to kill or seriously injure James Wray, William McKinney and Joseph Mahon.
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1 per Christopher Clarke QC: Day 375/109/08 2 per Lord Gifford Day 376/153/03 (4) Such firing was part of a “joint attack”.
(5) James Wray was shot at point blank range while lying prone on the ground by either Soldier G or Soldier H.
(6) Soldier H did not fire 19 rounds into a toilet window as he has claimed and has given this account merely to cover up unjustified shooting.
**ABBEEY PARK**
9A-3 It is alleged that Gerard McKinney and Gerard Donaghy were shot without justification.
**EVIDENCE ON WHICH ALLEGATIONS ARE BASED**
9A-4 In making such allegations it is understood that Counsel for the Tribunal and the interested parties rely upon:-
(1) Civilian evidence of the behaviour of soldiers in Glenfada Park North and Abbey Park.
(2) Civilian assertions that there were no gunmen or nail bombers present in Glenfada Park North on Bloody Sunday and no aggressive behaviour towards soldiers in the area.
(3) The evidence of Soldier 027.
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3 *per Lord Gifford Day 376/153/03* 4 *per Lord Gifford Day 376/142/18* 5 *per Christopher Clarke QC to Soldier H Day 377/093/09, per Lord Gifford Day 378/110/16* 6 *per Christopher Clarke QC Day 377/085/20* (4) The inconsistencies between the forensic evidence relating to the dead and injured and the accounts given by the soldiers of their firing in the area in that
(a) The number of targets identified by Soldiers who fired in Glenfada Park North (6) is insufficient to account for the number of dead and wounded (7 in Glenfada Park North).
(b) The accounts given by soldiers of their targets in Glenfada Park North do not tally with the known circumstances of the dead and wounded in that area and in Abbey Park.
(5) Inconsistencies and omissions in the various statements of soldiers who entered Glenfada Park.
9A-II SUBMISSIONS - SUMMARY
GLENFADA PARK NORTH
9A-5 The inconsistencies and omissions in the civilian evidence as to the circumstances of the shooting in Glenfada Park North are such that the Tribunal cannot reasonably rely upon it as a basis for establishing what took place in Sector 4 on 30 January 1972. Evidence has emerged over the years of the Inquiry to clearly demonstrate that, contrary to many civilian accounts:
(1) There were gunmen and nail bombs in Glenfada Park and the surrounding areas.
(2) There were individuals in Glenfada Park North at least preparing to attack soldiers as they entered the area.
(3) The soldiers did not open fire on an isolated group of three men but in fact encountered a scene of considerable chaos and confusion. (4) James Wray was not “executed” as he lay on the ground.
9A-6 Indeed Civilian evidence of military conduct generally is inconsistent and biased, either deliberately or unconsciously, towards a condemnatory account.
9A-7 The evidence of Soldier 027 has been wholly discredited and can be shown to be entirely inaccurate in respect of Glenfada Park North.
9A-8 The proximity in time and space of those who were killed and injured in Glenfada Park North was such that, taking into account the possibility of so-called ‘shoot-throughs’ and ricochets, the number of “hits” claimed by soldiers who fired there is sufficient to explain the number of dead and wounded.
9A-9 Glenfada Park North was a haven of paramilitary activity in January 1972.
9A-10 Soldiers entered Glenfada Park for legitimate and proper reasons having observed armed activity in the area.
9A-11 There were individuals in Glenfada Park North armed with nail bombs and rifles who were reasonably perceived to present a threat to soldiers entering the area.
9A-12 Those who were killed and injured in Glenfada Park North were probably close to individuals who were so armed.
9A-13 Soldiers entering Glenfada Park North were presented with a scene of chaos and confusion.
9A-14 It is hardly surprising, and far from an indication of dishonesty, that soldiers who were suddenly confronted with such a scene gave accounts which were, at least in part, incomplete or inaccurate. There were additional casualties to the known dead and wounded.
There is no evidence from which the Tribunal can conclude that there was an agreement between any of those who entered Glenfada Park North to mount a "joint attack" on the civilians there.
**ABBEDY PARK**
No allegation is or can be made that any client represented by Mr Anthony Lawton fired any shot in Abbey Park.
**9A-III THE DEAD AND INJURED IN SECTOR 4**
**THE DEAD**
The weight of the evidence suggests that James Wray and William McKinney were shot in Glenfada Park North and fell in the positions shown in P439.
The weight of the evidence, while not without contradictions, suggests that Gerard McKinney and Gerard Donaghy were shot and fell in Abbey Park.
**THE WOUNDED**
The weight of the evidence suggests that Joseph Mahon was shot and injured in Glenfada Park North and fell in the position shown in P439.
The weight of the evidence suggests that Joseph Friel, Patrick O'Donnell and Michael Quinn were shot and injured in Glenfada Park North.
The evidence of and relating to Daniel Gillespie is inconsistent as to the location and circumstances of his shooting, and, indeed, as to whether he in fact sustained a gunshot wound at all. It is likely that, with the exception of Daniel Gillespie, the injuries sustained by the dead and injured in Glenfada Park North and Abbey Park were the result of military firing.
Counsel to the Tribunal's Report No.1 suggested that the evidence of the soldiers who fired in Glenfada Park North refers to insufficient rounds to account for the dead and injured in Sector 4.7
| SOLDIER | HITS | SHOTS | |---------|------|-------| | E | 1 | 2 | | F | 1(2 shots hit 2 the same man) | 3 | | G | 1 or 2 | 3 | | H | 2 (in open air) 1 (behind window) | 19 | | Total: | 7 | 29 |
Thus, taken in its own terms, the evidence of the soldiers accounts for 7 hits at most, of which only 6 were in the open air. Yet there would appear to be 9 dead and wounded in the open air in either Abbey Park or Glenfada Park.
Because of the nature of SLR fire, it is of course entirely possible that one shot can cause injury to more than one person. Because injury or death may result from a ricochet or "shoot through", the number of shots fired and persons injured may not equate. The proximity in time and space of those who were killed and injured in Glenfada Park North was such that the number of rounds fired may in fact account for all of the injuries suffered.
7 Counsels' report no:1 Para 18.2 This possibility is illustrated by the shooting of Joseph Mahon and William McKinney. The position in which they fell is most clearly shown by Mr McBride's photographs at P438/439. Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan concluded in their report in respect of Joseph Mahon that:
*The damage to the bullet is unlikely to have been caused during its passage through the clothing or the body. It is most likely that this bullet has struck an intermediate object prior to hitting Joseph Mahon.*
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that Joseph Friel, Michael Quinn, and James Wray were all shot very close to each other and in the same burst of shooting. The position in which James Wray fell is again shown in P438/439. Joseph Friel has said that he was hit about 8-10 feet from the southwest exit and Michael Quinn also fell at a position close to the
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*E10.9*
*AF34.2:13* southwest corner as he could see the raised footpath. As neither heard any firing prior to the burst in which he was hit they would appear to have been shot at the same time.
9A-29 Joseph Friel himself told the Tribunal that “It is my presumption, it is only presumption, that when I was shot the likes of Jim Wray, Joe Mahon and Willie McKinney were shot.” He presumes they were immediately behind him.
9A-30 Michael Quinn also believes he was shot at the same time as James Wray. As he stumbled immediately after being shot, he saw
...slightly in front of me, a man’s head hitting the ground just in front of me. I did not see his hands come out as if to stop him falling – the man’s head hit the ground directly.
9A-31 Mr Quinn ran on. He believes the man was Wray although he did not recognise him as he fell. He was clear in oral evidence that Wray had been running ahead of him to his right.
9A-32 Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan’s report drew no conclusions as to the round which hit Joseph Friel saying only that
...no comment can be made concerning the nature of the projectile.
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10 Day 169/088/07 11 Day 155/058/14 12 Day 155/085/06 13 AO11.24:25 14 AO11.24:25 15 Day 169/138/16 According to Mr Bennett, a Consultant Surgeon who treated Mr Friel at the time, however, he had suffered a flesh wound or an “almost near miss bullet”.16
There would also appear to have been some suggestion that the bullet which struck Michael Quinn had first struck another object. Foreign material described as “fragments” were reported to be present in x-rays and were submitted to the DIFs. They were found to be “several small spherical pieces of a brittle, black non-metallic substance”.17 Unfortunately, Dr Shepherd and Mr O’Callaghan can offer no comment on the potential significance of this substance18 but it would seem to be common sense that foreign objects must have been carried into the wound in some way, quite probably by the bullet having struck some intermediate surface.
Patrick O’Donnell, who was some distance from the other casualties, suffered what is describes in hospital notes as a “through and through” wound to the right shoulder.19 A number of metal fragments were found on his x-ray, one of which was submitted to DIFs and identified as a piece of lead which “could be part of a bullet”.20 The fractured condition of the bullet again makes it likely that O’Donnell was hit by a ricochet, which, indeed, he is happy to accept.21
The location and timing of the injury to Danny Gillespie is the most unclear as his own account has varied so considerably over time. Mr Gillespie having
16 D780 17 D945 18 E10.9 19 D0899 20 D0906 21 Day 156/118/19 never sought hospital treatment, there are no medical records available with regard to the nature of his wound. However, he himself said, in the account given to the Praxis team, that the suggestion that “the bullet hit a wall and then hit him in the head”\\textsuperscript{22} is a distinct possibility.
9A-37 Even more curiously, a man with an injury very similar to Mr Gillespie’s gave the following account when treated by Dr McDermott (\\textbf{AM5}) at a house in Lisfannon Park\\textsuperscript{23}
\\begin{quote} ... he had been peeping around a wall and that he had seen a brick in the wall splinter when hit by a bullet and he assumed that a splinter of brick had hit him on the forehead. \\end{quote}
9A-38 The doctor says in his BSI statement that
\\begin{quote} I saw immediately that his forehead had been grazed by a bullet. He did not know that he had been shot.\\textsuperscript{24} \\end{quote}
9A-39 McDermott then changed his account when giving evidence to this Tribunal, saying that in fact the man had been hit by a piece of “mosaic” and had not been grazed by a bullet at all.\\textsuperscript{25}
9A-40 It is, then, very likely that a number of those shot in Glenfada Park North were in fact the victims of “shoot through” or ricocheting bullets such that it would be in no way surprising if one round caused injury to two or more of them.
\\begin{footnotes} \\item[21] Day 157/005/15 \\item[22] AG34.18 \\item[23] (Vinny Coyle, in whose house Mr Gillespie says he was treated, lived at AG34.19) \\item[24] AM5.5 paragraph 24 \\item[25] Day 176/185/20 and Day 176/208/02 \\end{footnotes} 9A-IV SOLDIERS PRESENT IN GLENFADA PARK NORTH/ABBEY PARK
9A-41 Soldiers E, F, G, H and J entered Glenfada Park North and were present when some or all of the shooting in that area took place. Lieutenant 119 also entered Glenfada Park North but did so at a late stage when the shooting there was all but over.
9A-42 While it is likely that other members of Anti-Tank Platoon entered Glenfada Park North in order to assist with those detained or arrested there, there is no basis on which the Tribunal can conclude that they were present while shooting was taking place.
9A-43 The weight of the evidence suggests that only one soldier entered or fired into the Abbey Park area and that that soldier was Soldier G.
9A-V THE TRIBUNAL CANNOT RELY UPON THE CIVILIAN EVIDENCE IN GLENFADA PARK NORTH
9A-44 There is very little photographic evidence of events in Glenfada Park North and none showing the moments in which the dead and injured fell. The Tribunal is therefore largely dependent on the oral evidence of civilians and soldiers which is clearly at odds. The Tribunal cannot, however, in comparing these accounts, rely upon civilian evidence as definitive of events in Glenfada Park. This evidence is confused and inconsistent as might be expected given the chaotic conditions on the day and the fact that much of the evidence has been given to the Tribunal at 30 years’ remove.
9A-45 The potential for confusion is amply demonstrated by those witnesses who place William McKinney in Abbey Park when he was shot whereas it is now established almost beyond doubt that he fell in Glenfada Park North. The Tribunal will recall, for example, the evidence of Maureen Doherty, AD85, who knew William McKinney and had seen him at a Christmas dance only weeks before, and claimed to have seen him in the Abbey Park area. She was insistent that he was, at the time a soldier stepped through into Abbey Park, "crawling along the west block of Glenfada Park North flats towards the entrance between Abbey Park and Glenfada Park North flats".
The Tribunal will also recall the BSI statement of James Eugene McLaughlin, AM463, in which he said that he carried William McKinney from steps in Abbey Park into the O'Reilly household. Mr McLaughlin indeed gave accounts of carrying William McKinney's body from such a position in both a NICRA statement and in a 1972 interview with Peter Pringle.
Noel Kelly, AK 17, a man who, as a neighbour, knew William McKinney and indeed his entire family, was also quite positive that he saw him lying on the steps in front of Abbey Park and helped to carry him from there into No 7 Abbey Park. He gave that account both in a 1972 interview with Peter Pringle and in his BSI statement in which he was able accurately to describe his clothing and injuries.
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26 Day 161/095/22 27 AD85.3 paragraph 11 28 AD85.3 paragraph 11 29 AM463.4:18 30 AM337.1 (Mr McLaughlin is apparently also listed as Jim McLaughlin AM337) 31 AM337.2 32 Day 062/030/18 33 AK17.1 34 AK17.11:12 35 AK17.13 paragraph 15; AK17.11 paragraph 13 (Mr Kelly describes a graze above the eye which is not mentioned in the autopsy report but can be seen in autopsy photograph P131.) It is only when shown a photograph at AK17.29 of himself carrying Mr McKinney’s body out of Glenfada Park North(^{36}) that Mr Kelly acknowledged that was “totally confused” as that photograph was entirely at odds with his clear recollection of Mr McKinney lying on the Abbey Park steps.(^{37})
Michael Feeney, AF9, also recognised William McKinney, who again he knew as he lived just around the corner from him in the Westway,(^{38}) as the man he carried from the steps of Abbey Park into the O’Reilly household.(^{39})
While it is not suggested that William McKinney was shot, or at any time lying, in Abbey Park, the testimony of these witnesses provides ample evidence of the potential for apparently consistent and persuasive evidence to prove to be entirely mistaken. Indeed, were it not for the existence of Photograph P689 from which William McKinney can be identified, from a distinctive blazer button (which also appears in mortuary photographs)(^{40}) as one of those being carried from Glenfada Park North, such evidence might well have been accepted.
The unreliability of civilian evidence, whether honest or otherwise, is such that the Tribunal certainly cannot rely upon it to determine the nature of events in Glenfada Park North. Civilian evidence as to the soldiers’ actions in that area, as well as being clearly open to bias, is so inconsistent as to be of little use.
(^{36}) Day 062/054/09 (^{37}) Day 062/054/24 (^{38}) AF9.2:10 (^{39}) AF9.2:9 (^{40}) P129/P131 Civilian estimates, for example, of the number of soldiers entering Glenfada Park North vary from one to “a dozen or so” with every variation in between having some adherents. Indeed the estimates of key witnesses themselves has changed over time. Daniel Gillespie revised the estimate given in 1972 to Peter Pringle of seeing three soldiers to one soldier only when he gave his BSI statement. Joseph Mahon moved in the other direction having told the Sunday Times team in 1972 that he had only seen one soldier, he changed to having seen four or five by the time he gave his BSI statement.
While many witnesses see soldiers enter from the north east corner, consistency is also lacking in this regard as others, such as Joseph Martin Gallagher, Pat Moyne, John O’Kane and Gregory Wild are sure that some or all of the soldiers entered from the north west corner. Michael Wilson, one of the witnesses to the alleged “execution” of Jim Wray, is sure that the soldiers he saw were not on the ground in Glenfada Park North at all but on the “verandas” or balconies of the blocks Glenfada Park North.
Nor is there any consistency in the civilian evidence as to how many of the soldiers who entered Glenfada Park North opened fire. A number of
41 George Downey AD134.4 paragraph 22; Joseph Martin Gallagher AG18.3 paragraphs 14-17; George Hillen AH74.4 paragraph 20-21. 42 Wilson, Michael AW18.1 paragraph 7 43 AG34.17 44 AG34.4 paragraphs 22-23 45 AM18.14 46 AM18.3 paragraphs 12-13 47 AG18.3 paragraphs 14-17 48 AM444.5 paragraph 33 49 AO48.3 paragraph 13 50 AW15.6 paragraphs 10-12 51 AW18.1, 7, Day 029/049/07 witnesses suggest that the two soldiers who entered first opened fire. Others, however, saw only the first soldier to enter Glenfada Park North fire and Joseph Friel was able to say that he was quite sure that the other soldiers did not fire.
*I noticed what the other soldiers were doing with their guns. They were not shooting.*
9A-56 Estimates as to the number of shots fired by soldiers entering Glenfada Park North also varied from “two or three” to “continuous shooting lasting half a minute” and ten or twenty rapid fire shots.
9A-57 The Tribunal has also heard evidence from civilians of shooting which is highly unlikely to be correct such as: Malachy Coyle’s graphic description of the shooting of a young boy at close range in the south east corner of Glenfada Park North or Mrs Frances Lyttle’s account of Jim Wray being shot twice at point blank range by two different soldiers as he was passing through his grandmother’s garden gate.
9A-58 There are, moreover, certain, contentious areas of the evidence relating to Glenfada Park where there is overwhelming reason to doubt the veracity and reliability of many of the civilian accounts to this Inquiry.
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52 Paul Coyle AC105.3 paragraph 14; Dennis Irwin Day 170/085/03; Donncha MacFicheallaigh AM7.3 paragraphs 15-16 53 Pat Moyne AM444.5 paragraph 33; Malachy Coyle AC97.5 paragraphs 32-35; Dennis McLaughlin AM326.7 paragraph 24 54 AF34.5:29 55 Joseph Friel AF34.5 paragraph 29 56 Pearse McCaul Day 164/100/18 57 Paul Coyle Day 152/075/15 58 AC97.5 paragraph 32-35 and Day 152 59 A136.3 paragraph 13 (1) There is clear evidence of gunmen and nail bombers having been present in Glenfada Park North who the civilian witnesses to the Tribunal simply fail to mention.
(2) A number of witnesses have given graphic evidence to the Inquiry of soldiers opening fire on an isolated group of three men as they crossed the southern end of Glenfada Park North. This demonstrably did not happen.
(3) Similarly, a number of witnesses have presented the Tribunal with an equally graphic account of James Wray being 'executed' as he lay upon the ground. This evidence is equally fictitious.
**There were Gunmen and Nail Bombers which Civilians Simply do not Mention**
9A-59 It has become clear as evidence has emerged, largely in the later stages of the oral hearings, that there were paramilitaries operating with handguns, rifles and nail bombs in plain sight in Glenfada Park North and the surrounding areas on Bloody Sunday. That evidence is examined in detail below. It is an unavoidable conclusion that others must have seen such activity but have failed to provide such information to this Tribunal.
9A-60 Indeed the Tribunal will no doubt recall the evidence of the highly respected Mr Barry of the Sunday Times Insight Team as to his experience of this phenomenon:
*It is true to say that my experience of Northern Ireland up to that time was that nationalist sympathisers had a near-genius* for not mentioning the presence of the IRA when giving their versions of some event, and we initially met that in Derry.\\textsuperscript{60}
9A-61 Tony Geraghty, then Chief Reporter for the Sunday Times, was of a similar view:
\\textit{Experience in Northern Ireland had taught me not to rely on eyewitness testimony as it was often coloured by subjectivity and at variance with what had actually happened.}\\textsuperscript{61}
9A-62 Ciaran MacLochlainn was at least prepared to admit, when questioned by Mr Glasgow, that he would not have contemplated admitting to seeing “Republican” activity in Glenfada Park North.
\\textit{Q. ... is it not the plain truth that if you had seen Republican armed activity in Glenfada Park on Bloody Sunday, you would not ever have told this Tribunal about it?}
\\textit{A. That is correct.}\\textsuperscript{62}
9A-63 In addition to this blindness to IRA activity, civilian witnesses to this Tribunal have also provided evidence of military conduct in Glenfada Park North which can be shown to be exaggerated and in many cases entirely false. The allegations, for example, that three men were shot in cold blood as they ran isolated and alone across Glenfada Park North and that James Wray was executed at point blank range are, in fact, contradicted by a close examination of the evidence. The extremely widespread currency and appearance of consistency that these versions of events have gained and the widespread willingness of civilian witnesses to support them severely undermines the value of all of the civilian evidence as to events in Sector 4.
\\textsuperscript{60} M03.5 paragraph 19 \\textsuperscript{61} M28.1 paragraph 2 \\textsuperscript{62} Day 415/133/22 SOLDIERS DID NOT OPEN FIRE ON AN ISOLATED GROUP OF THREE MEN
9A-64 Lord Gifford has himself posited two, mutually contradictory, versions of the scene upon which soldiers fired in Glenfada Park North. To Soldier F he put the accounts of Terence O'Keefe, Eamon McAteer and John McLaughlin of soldiers firing at an isolated group of three men as they fled across Glenfada Park North. To Soldier H Lord Gifford put the alternative account that he and Soldier G fired into a crowd.
9A-65 In fact, accounts of Joseph Mahon, William McKinney and James Wray running together in an isolated group, while providing an attractively coherent narrative, are untrue. Rather there is considerable evidence to suggest that soldiers entering Glenfada Park North encountered a scene of general chaos and confusion, rather than an isolated square across which three broke for cover.
9A-66 Whether there was any riotous activity in Glenfada Park North at this time is unlikely ever to be conclusively established. Many civilian witnesses have, in contrast to the evidence given by the soldiers who entered the area, denied that there was rioting of any kind in Glenfada Park North or any kind of confrontation with the Army there. There are, nonetheless, exceptions to that account which suggest that some of the crowd, at least, were preparing for a violent encounter.
9A-67 PIRA 25, AG17 has said in his BSI statement that
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63 Day 376/149/23; Day 376/152/02; Day 376/152/16 64 Day 378/105-108; Day 378/100-101 When I arrived in Glenfada Park there were lots of people there. They were gathering stones and bottles, ready to throw them at the soldiers.65
9A-68 He told the Tribunal in oral evidence that
There was a whole crowd gathering stones in Glenfada Park66
one of whom he was sure was Jim Wray67.
9A-69 PIRA 25 said that these people were
Getting ready in case they (the soldiers) would come in, you know.68
9A-70 Danny Gillespie also said in his BSI statement that he saw “5 or 6 boys entering GPN with broken flagstones”. He assumed that they intended to use the flagstones as missiles to throw at soldiers but did not see them thrown at any stage.69
The “Three Isolated Men” witnesses.
9A-71 A number of witnesses gave evidence of three men being shot while running from the south east to the south west corner of a deserted Glenfada Park North in an isolated group. Lord Gifford relies particularly on the statements of Eamon McAteer, John McLaughlin and Terence O’Keefe:
9A-72 Eamon McAteer, AM41, was at the south east gable end wall in Glenfada Park North and saw, according to his BSI statement:
65 AG17.2 paragraph 8 66 Day 424/118/08 67 Day 424/114/09 68 Day 424/130/01 Three men from our group run from the gable wall where I was in the direction of the south west exit of Glenfada Park North going into Abbey Park. People were saying "don't run" but they did... I heard three shots, "bang, bang, bang" and two just dropped, one after the other. I do not know what happened to the third one. In the movies people seem to go down dramatically, but these men just dropped to the ground. It was very frightening. It was like a grouse or turkey shoot.70
9A-73 Mr McAteer had given a similar account in a 1972 statement that:
The three of our group dashed from the corner of the gable wall inside Glenfada.71
9A-74 In oral evidence to this Tribunal Mr McAteer felt that he had seen three men fall
I only recall seeing two bodies, but when the people actually ran from our group and then the shots occurred, I felt as if it was three people went down, three positive single shots.72
9A-75 John McLaughlin, AM334.6, was also at the gable end and gave a dramatic account to Peter Pringle in February 1972 of seeing three men run in an isolated group for the south west exit of Glenfada Park North:
Three of the group made a dash for the entrance of the small flats opposite us. I know now that Gerry McKinney was one of them. Just as they reached the pavement on the other side, they all fell down shot; it was as if they had been hit by a single bullet, they all just went down and never moved. I just could not believe I had seen three unarmed men shot down before my eyes. No-one of them was carrying anything in his hands.73
69 AG34.3 paragraph 20-21 70 AM41.4 paragraph 27-41.5 paragraph 28 71 AM41.33 72 Day 168/020/24 73 AM334/007 As well as being clearly wrong about the presence of Gerry McKinney, Mr McLaughlin gave an entirely different account in his NICRA statement, where he did not suggest that the men who fell were part of an isolated group:
Some people attempted to run across the entrance to the Park. A few made it across but three were cut down...
Father Terence O'Keefe gives a highly coherent account of events at the gable end of Glenfada Park North. He says that there were four "lads" who made to run from the south east gable wall one was restrained. He continues:
Everyone at the gable wall was very frightened. There were however four young men who were very agitated... I remember them shouting "we're going to run for it". They were gesturing across the southern block of Glenfada Park North towards the south western exit out of the courtyard which leads to Abbey Park. I remember others including myself in the crowd saying "no, stay and give yourselves up - you'll get killed if you run away". Some of the members of the crowd were able to physically restrain one of the four young lads, who I distinctly remember had red hair. However, the other three made a run for it. They had only taken a few steps into the Glenfada Park North courtyard when a further and recognisably separate burst of gunfire rang out. I assumed that this gunfire came from some soldiers who had veered off to the right when the Saracens first entered the area and had entered the Glenfada Park North courtyard from the north. The three boys fell to the ground in a row. I think that the first and third boys fell on the pavement and that the middle boy fell slumped at an angle across the pavement, partly on the pavement and partly on the courtyard. It was shocking to see them fall in that way.
Father O'Keefe gave a very similar account in his statement to Lord Widgery and to the Insight team. He has told the present Tribunal that the boys he saw fall fell in a position very similar to that in P438/P439. In a taped interview
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74 AM334.1 75 Day 127/121/16 with the Praxis team, Father O'Keefe was very clear that “they broke from our … group you know”.
Other witnesses who support such an account include James Kelly, AK12:
All of a sudden, Jim Wray, who was wearing a woolly hat and a black jacket, made a dash for it across the square with two other men. They all seemed to fall at the same time and were lying quite close together. They appeared to be dead.
Mr Kelly believes he saw James Wray run from the gable end. Referring to photograph P435 he told Lord Gifford:
Q. From what point, as far as you can recall, did James Wray run out; where had he been?
A. Towards the end of the gable wall, fairly close maybe to where Denis Bradley is at the moment, you know, in that vicinity.
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76 O12A.14 77 AK12.4 paragraph 17 78 Day 145/048/06-10 Fergus McAteer, AM42, in his 1972 statement says he was sheltering at the gable end wall of Glenfada Park North when:
...suddenly three men dashed away from my right along the footpath in Glenfada Park. They had only got a few yards away from me when there was a burst of firing which came from the other end of Glenfada Park. The three men fell. I could see them clearly lying on the footpath. Within seconds of this incident, troops appeared around the right hand corner of the gable wall.79 Mr McAteer repeated this account in his BSI statement, clarifying his position as being at the centre of the south east gable end wall of Glenfada Park North with his back pressed against the wall:
Suddenly I was aware of three figures running in front of me and west across Glenfada Park North towards the south west exit into Abbey Park (grid reference H14). The three men appeared in front of me as a group as if they had decided to make a run for it together. They got a little way along the pavement to the west when there was a burst of very loud fire. All three men fell at the same time.
Mr McAteer explained in oral evidence his impression that:
...they came from my left as I had my back to the gable wall, from the east running to the west in front of me. When I first noticed them they were running, yes. So their original origin, whether it was from our immediate group or somewhat in front of the group on the roadway in front of the gable wall, I cannot be sure.
These witnesses clearly describe a group of three young men breaking away from the group at the south east gable wall of Glenfada Park, running alone across the square and being shot down before reaching the south west exit. Either there were additional casualties in Glenfada Park North about which this Tribunal has heard nothing or these three men were Joseph Mahon, William McKinney and James Wray.
Photographic and other civilian evidence including that of Joseph Mahon himself show, however, that this cannot be the case.
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80 AM42.8 paragraph 25 81 AM42.9 paragraph 30 82 AM42.9 paragraph 30 83 AM42.9 paragraph 32 84 Day 168/062/24 There was no “Isolated Group” The evidence of Patrick McGinley, AM241, who was at the gable end, suggests that he was the young man held back at the gable end, giving the appearance of corroboration for the account of Father O’Keefe. Mr McGinley said:
...people started saying to us that the soldiers were coming in....As soon as people started saying this a group of four of us who were all very young decided to make a run south across the entrance to the Glenfada Park North car park into the alleyway at the north east corner of Glenfada Park South. The others made a dash for it and I went to run but suddenly was grabbed from behind and before I knew it I had someone’s arm around my neck and I was struggling to get free.85
Suddenly, I saw one of the three boys who had run out in front of me crumple to the floor. He was less than 20 feet away from me and near a gate and a wooden fence. I am not sure if the other two boys were shot.86
In fact Mr McGinley speaks of boys running towards the opening at the north east of Glenfada Park South. Moreover, he, as a sixteen year old, described them as “all very young”, a description which hardly fits either 27 year old William McKinney or 23 year old James Wray.
Patrick McGinley AM241 has not given oral evidence.
The evidence relating to the three individuals who are known to have fallen in Glenfada Park North, William McKinney, Joseph Mahon and Jim Wray, shows that any account of three isolated men running from the south east corner of Glenfada Park North cannot relate to them.
85 AM241.4 paragraph 22 86 AM241.4 paragraph 23 There is virtually no eyewitness evidence which refers specifically to seeing William McKinney either immediately before or when he was shot. The only person who claimed to have witnessed his fall was Don Campbell, AC8, whose account, by the end of his oral evidence on Day 157 was in such disarray as to be of little assistance to the Tribunal.
It would appear both inherently unlikely and out of character that William McKinney should have chosen to “run for it” when soldiers entered Glenfada Park, however. Unlike many others who were sheltering there, there is no suggestion that he had been engaged in rioting or stone throwing or had any other reason to fear arrest. Indeed it appears that Mr McKinney, a keen amateur photographer, had something of a reputation for standing his ground in such situations. According to Ivan Cooper,
> It was always the joke that even if violence flared up on a march and CS gas was in the air, William McKinney would still be in the thick of the action.(^{87})
Mr McKinney’s own brother, George, AM301, concurs.
> He did take big risks with photos. I have seen footage in the house where he stood for the last minute for pictures.(^{88})
Peter Barnes Harrigan, AH37, indeed, describes William McKinney on Bloody Sunday itself climbing on windowsills and a concrete block to get a better view while photographing rioting at the barrier in William Street.(^{89})
Nor does the account of three men running, in an isolated group from the gable end, accord with the evidence of Joseph Mahon who said in his BSI
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(^{87}) KC12.2.2 paragraph24\
(^{88}) AM301.5 paragraph29\
(^{89}) AH37.1 paragraph7 statement that, at the time soldiers entered Glenfada Park North he was standing, not close to the gable wall, but on the pathway just at the entrance to Glenfada Park South.
When I saw them (the soldiers), I was standing on the pathway just by the north eastern block of Glenfada Park North. The position where I was standing is marked with a D on the attached map (grid reference 115).
9A-95 He confirmed in oral evidence to the Tribunal when questioned by Mr Glasgow that this was his position
So there is no trickery of any kind, or trap for you, I make it plain some people recall you as being in the group that was really close to the gable wall, running out with just three of you, with one person being pulled back and the general group saying "Don't go, don't go" or words to that effect. That is not your recollection, you believe you were well clear of the wall to the south?
A. Yes.
9A-96 Mr Mahon reports nothing of running with three other boys or of the conversation between them “we’re going to run for it” and “no, stay and give yourselves up – you’ll get killed if you run away” that Father O’Keefe so graphically recounts.
9A-97 Mr Mahon’s account also contradicts that of the “isolated group” witnesses in that he did not run straight across Glenfada Park North but says he was
Banging on the wooden fences on the south side of this pathway as I went to see if any of them were open.
90 AM18.3 paragraph 12 91 Day 167/060/03 92 AM18.3 paragraph 12 Joseph Mahon also perceived himself to be one of a much larger group than three or four saying he was running with a group of "15, 20 people or more".93
One of the few pieces of photographic evidence available in Glenfada Park, P436, shows James Wray's position at the time that Michael Kelly was being carried across Glenfada Park North. If, as many witnesses suggest, firing commenced at this time (see below) James Wray clearly did not run from the gable end at all. He was in fact already a good way across the courtyard at the point when soldiers entered Glenfada Park North. Nor, self-evidently, was Glenfada Park deserted of all but three men at this time. At least seven were involved in carrying Mr Kelly's body.
Michael Quinn, AQ11, who is shown in P436 sheltering by a fence, is able to confirm that a man he presumed to be James Wray came from a position ahead of him and to his right:
Q. The reason I ask that is that your recollection is crystal clear of Jim Wray going down in front of you?
A. Of a man going down in front of me.
Q. It was not someone converging on you from your left; he had been running ahead of you, had he not?
A. To the right.
Q. To the right, certainly not coming from the left?
A. No.
Q. If you could activate the screen. If your path was approximately like that across the car park, no question in
93 Day 167/021/03 your recollection of James Wray coming across your path from the left like that?
A. No, the person was ahead of me.
Q. Was ahead of you and to your right?
A. Yes. 94
There is also considerable evidence from those around James Wray that he was amongst a sizeable group when he fell with others in front, to the side of, and behind him and not in an isolated group of three.
94 Day 169/138/08-25 Pat Moyne, AM444, told the Tribunal that in fact he started running with James Wray. This was not part of a small group but a scene in which “everyone started running”
Do you know what it was that made people suddenly start to run?
A. Well, I think it was only natural if there is gunfire that people run.
Q. Did everybody in Glenfada Park run, or just a small group?
A. I presumably think that everybody ran, but some could have stopped.
Q. You tell us that you and Jim Wray started to run towards Abbey Park.
A. Yeah.95
Nor did Mr Moyne believe he began running from the gable end
MR TOOHEY: It is perhaps a bit unfair to give you those directions, but as you come into the entrance there is a wall, a gable wall on your right.
A. Yeah.
MR TOOHEY: Where some people gathered for a time. Did you join those people or were you somewhere else?
A. I think when I came in, in the entrance from, as you would say, the Rossville Street Flats, right, I came in and Glenfada Park is a square in there, I think I was in round the square, I did not, you know, I stopped in Glenfada Park.
MR TOOHEY: Within the square itself?
A. Yeah.96
95 Day 162/018/06-16
96 In fact, far from a scene in which soldiers fired at an isolated group of three men, the Tribunal has heard evidence from some 20 individuals, in addition to Joseph Mahon, William McKinney and James Wray, who were running for the South West exit when the first shots were fired in Glenfada Park North. See the evidence of: George Hillen, AH74; Martin Gallagher, AG18; Donncha MacFicheallaigh, AM7; Pearce McCaul, AM93 (with Seamus Friel); Pat Moyne, AM444; John O’Kane, AO48 (with Gerry McKinney); Don Boyle, AB47; Gregory Wild, AW15; Michael Quinn, AO11; Patrick Bradley, AB68; Paul Coyle, AC105; Joe Donnelly, AD124; George Downey, AD134; Joseph Friel, AF34; Charles McLaughlin, AM321; James McNulty, AM377; OIRA1; and OIRA7.
There are also many witnesses who, while not prepared to concede that there was any element of armed or violent activity in the square, describe a scene of chaos and confusion which is wholly inconsistent with three isolated individuals being shot as they ran across an otherwise deserted square.
Joe Donnelly AD124 has said in his BSI statement that at the time soldiers entered Glenfada Park North he was assisting in carrying Michael Kelly and was conscious that there were:
...a large number of people in Glenfada Park North.97
Indeed, it was Mr Donnelly’s view that
I am sure that had there not been so many people in GPN the soldiers would have had a clear shot at me and I am in no doubt that I would have been fired at.98
96 Dav 162/020/24-021/12 97 AD124.4 paragraph 15 98 AD124.4 paragraph 19 George Downey, AD134, who was with Mr Donnelly, told the Tribunal that when soldiers entered the square
...there were people running all over the place you know."
George Hillen, AH74 saw many people trying to get out of Glenfada Park North at the time when James Wray fell:
A lot of the people in the car park were also trying to get through that gap and it was completely blocked; I would estimate that probably between 40 and 60 people were ahead of me in the alleyway.100
Charles McLaughlin AM321 heard the first live rounds fired in Rossville Street just as he entered Glenfada Park North via the north eastern corner. He said in his BSI statement that:
When I entered through the alleyway, I was literally climbing over people
Some time later, after soldiers had entered GPN he says that:
As I was running, I was aware of a couple of dozen other people also running through the courtyard trying to avoid the bullets.101
According to Martin Gallagher AG18, at the time he saw Jim Wray fall in front of him
...there was people going everywhere.102
99 Day 123/089/03 100 AH74.4 paragraph 19 101 AM321.4 paragraph 13 102 Day 165/016/04 Ciaran MacLochlainn AM12 has said in his BSI statement that, just before Michael Kelly was carried across Glenfada Park North:
There were hundreds of people panicking and running through Glenfada Park North....There was blind fear and panic. I could see people pouring through the north east and north west corners into Glenfada Park North.103
In oral evidence he described the scene as one of “basic pandemonium”104 and said that the south western alleyway into Abbey Park was crowded with people looking for shelter.105
Indeed when questioned by Mr Glasgow about the bullet hole which he claimed to have found in his jacket, Mr MacLochlainn described the scene of chaos in Glenfada Park in graphic terms.
Q. And that shot was fired very, very close to you, while you were in Glenfada Park North?
A. It was -- I believe it was fired -- I believe it was fired in that vicinity. I just do not believe it was fired at me. I believe it was fired at, at everyone that was trying to scramble to safety.
Q. That is what I wanted you to help the Tribunal with if you can and if you will: do you know what was going on immediately around you at the time when that bullet hit your clothing? Do you know what was going on?
A. Um, what I can sense is being, um, among hundreds of people, um, and British soldiers being very close and firing upon -- on us, um, obviously deliberately now and that is why everybody, especially the girls, were squealing and, and, you
103 AM12.4 paragraph24-25 104 Day 415/109/13 105 Day 415/109/21-23 know, we were just trying to stay alive, you know, everybody, we were looking for cover.\\textsuperscript{106}
9A-116 John James McCourt AM\\textsuperscript{144} ran into Glenfada Park North and straight to his wife’s granny’s yard in the square. He says
...the shooting had actually started before I had actually got into the yard.\\textsuperscript{107}
and describes
...pandemonium in the square. There was a lot of noise from people squealing and screaming.\\textsuperscript{108}
9A-117 Joseph Friel AF\\textsuperscript{34} explained in his BSI statement that:
People were running with me, running to get out of Glenfada Park. Everyone was panicking. People were in front and behind me and at the side. The bulk of people were at the west side trying to get out.\\textsuperscript{109}
9A-118 Jim Doherty AD\\textsuperscript{73} told the Tribunal that shortly before he heard that soldiers were coming into Glenfada Park North.\\textsuperscript{110}
I would say there could be up to 50, maybe 100 people there at that time.\\textsuperscript{111}
9A-119 Furthermore, any suggestion that the soldiers opened fire in a square deserted by all but three men is contradicted by the evidence of those who say they were carrying Michael Kelly’s body across Glenfada Park North when shooting began. Certainly those who represent the family of James Wray
\\textsuperscript{106} Day 415/132/21 \\textsuperscript{107} Day 152/157/17 \\textsuperscript{108} AM\\textsuperscript{144}, 2 paragraph 8 \\textsuperscript{109} AF\\textsuperscript{34}, 2 paragraph 13 \\textsuperscript{110} Day 065/086/10-11
\\textsuperscript{FS7.1918} IX-35 appear to accept these accounts as it has been put to Soldier F by Lord Gifford that he fired from a kneeling position on the group carrying Michael Kelly. 12
9A-120 That soldiers opened fire at a time when the group carrying Kelly were still in Glenfada Park North is supported by a number of accounts, several from those who were part of that group.
11 Day 65/084/24 12 Day 376/148/20 Pearse McCaul AM93.3 says that
As soon as I saw the soldier I must have either dropped Michael Kelly on the ground or put him down somewhere in the carpark. Seamus Friel and I started to run towards the northwest [corrected in oral evidence to south west(^{113})] corner of Glenfada Park North. The gunfire started almost immediately.(^{114})
John O'Kane AO48.3 was also helping to carry Kelly and says that.
...as we dropped the boy, I looked to my right and saw that three Paras had entered Glenfada Park North, two via the northeastern entrance and one via the northwestern entrance.
(^{113}) Day 164/095/02
(^{114}) AM93.4 paragraph 16-18 The Paras were firing, and I could hear the bullets whizzing past my head and hitting the wall to my left.\\textsuperscript{115}
Joe Donnelly AD\\textsuperscript{124} was assisting Mr Liddy, who had been hit in the chest with a rubber bullet, when Michael Kelly was shot.\\textsuperscript{116} He says in his NICRA statement that:
\\begin{quote} Six blokes helped to pick him up and moved him into the courtyard. At the far corner of the courtyard came paratroopers and started shooting.\\textsuperscript{117} \\end{quote}
\\begin{quote} About six men picked up Kelly and ran with him from the rubble barricade west into Glenfada Park North. They were going to carry him into the safety of Glenfada Park North. I do not recall seeing them put Michael Kelly down on the way. \\end{quote}
In his BSI statement Mr Donnelly describes how, as soldiers entered at the north east corner:
\\begin{quote} The crowd carrying Michael Kelly almost dropped him in panic at the sight of the soldiers, and he slipped down in between their arms. I took him in my arms and carried him on my own... \\end{quote}
\\begin{quote} ... As I got hold of him, I noticed that one of the soldiers was taking up a firing position. He was kneeling on the ground with his rifle as his shoulder and was aiming towards us. The two other soldiers had their rifles at waist height. All three soldiers fired shots at the crowd... I ran across Glenfada Park North towards the entrance to Abbey Park carrying Michael... \\textsuperscript{118} \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{115} AO48.3 paragraph 13 \\textsuperscript{116} AD124.3 paragraph 13 \\textsuperscript{117} AD124.1 \\textsuperscript{118} AD124.4 paragraph 17-18 George Downey, AD134, Michael Kelly's brother in law, gives a similar account, although he believes Mr Donnelly carried Michael Kelly only once he had tripped in the Abbey Park alleyway.(^{119})
Michael Quinn, AO11, saw the group carrying a body from, he thought, the south east to the north west corner. He recognised the man he now knows to be James Wray amongst them.(^{120}) The group had reached the centre of Glenfada Park North when "the crowd ran into Glenfada Park and someone shouted that 'the Army was coming in". Mr Quinn told the Tribunal that this happened almost simultaneously with the scene shown in P643.(^{121})
A taped interview given to press under the name "Joe McCourt" recounts
[I\\ was\\ in\\ Glenfada\\ Park\\ on\\ Sunday\\ when\\ I\\ seen\\ five\\ British\\ soldiers\\ run\\ into\\ the\\ park.\\ They\\ fired\\ on\\ four\\ fellas\\ carrying\\ a\\ wounded\\ civilian.\\ They\\ fired\\ at\\ the\\ wounded\\ civilian\\ and\\ hit\\ him\\ on\\ the\\ head.\\ These\\ four\\ blokes\\ run\\ with\\ the\\ civilian\\ and\\ had\\ to\\ drop\\ him\\ at\\ the\\ far\\ side\\ of\\ Glenfada\\ Park.]^{122}
John James McCourt, AM144 has no recollection of seeing this or of giving the interview(^{123}) despite the fact that the address and personal details given match his own.
There are a number of witnesses who do not recall seeing the Kelly group in Glenfada Park when soldiers opened fire.
George Hillen AH74 saw James Wray fall but did not see the group carrying Michael Kelly's body. He agrees he could not have missed it had it been
(^{119}) AD134.5 paragraph 23 (^{120}) AO11.23 paragraph 21-22 (^{121}) Day 169/086/07 (^{122}) AM144.6 carried across while he was there. Julian Daly, AD2, also saw James Wray as he was running through GPN and immediately before shots were fired in GPN but did not see a group carrying Kelly. Paul Coyle, AC105 was running for the south west exit when he says shooting started. He says however that he saw nothing of Kelly’s body or the group carrying it. Joseph Martin Gallagher, AG18, says he was running behind James Wray when he fell but recalls nothing of people carrying Michael Kelly’s body.
The apparent ease with which a witness might have failed to see or forgotten seeing this scene is, however, demonstrated by Gerry McLaughlin, AM332. He has no recollection of seeing Michael Kelly carried yet agrees he is pictured in P142.001 standing close to and apparently watching that very scene. Pat Moyne AM444, is actually shown in P642 helping to carry Michael Kelly but has no recollection of doing so.
Despite these witnesses’ evidence the Tribunal may well conclude that the group carrying Michael Kelly were still crossing Glenfada Park North at the time when soldiers entered the square and opened fire, in all probability adding to the scene of chaos and confusion. It must be highly unlikely that any soldier intended to fire at that group however as none of those surrounding Michael Kelly sustained any injury. As Lord Gifford pointed out to Soldier F in a slightly different context:
123 Day 152/148/12 124 Day 164/037/05 125 Day 183/036/10 126 Day 152/074/19 127 Day 152/098/22 128 Day 165/013/08 129 AM332.2 paragraph12 130 Day 162/032/18 As an experienced soldier, as you were already in 1972, if you were shooting at about 50 yards range at a young man running, you could hardly miss; could you?\\textsuperscript{131}
While, then, a number of apparently highly persuasive witnesses have drawn a picture of an isolated group of three men, picked off by soldiers as they were running for the south west exit of Glenfada Park North, a wider examination of the civilian evidence simply does not support this allegation. There is considerable evidence to suggest that, in fact, soldiers entering Glenfada Park North were confronted with a scene of considerable chaos and confusion.
**JAMES WRAY WAS NOT “EXECUTED”**
A further area of civilian evidence which has proven to be false and misleading is that surrounding the death of James Wray. The Tribunal has heard evidence that James Wray was shot while lying prone and defenceless on the ground in Glenfada Park North in the position shown in P438/439. It has been suggested that all the soldiers who were present in Glenfada Park North must have either been involved in or witnessed this atrocity and are engaged in a conspiracy to conceal it. In fact, while James Wray died tragically on Bloody Sunday, the suggestion that he was “executed” while lying on the ground is an example of the myths that have grown up around Bloody Sunday.
Counsel for the Wray family has claimed that
\\textit{Sometimes too the evidence of civilians is directly supported by expert evidence. For example, there are several witnesses looking from different angles who saw Jim Wray shot while he was on the ground and his coat moved. Now the Tribunal's}
\\textsuperscript{131} Day 376/152/05-07
\\textsuperscript{FS 7. 1924}
IX-41 experts have said that their most likely explanation of the forensic evidence which they have examined is that James Wray lay on his left side on the ground when he suffered the wound, which exited on his left shoulder.\\textsuperscript{132}
9A-136 In fact, the civilian evidence is both inconsistent in itself and directly contradicted by the forensic facts. The very evidence to which Lord Gifford refers, when carefully examined, shows that this incident simply did not occur.
\\textit{Accepted Facts}
9A-137 It is accepted that James Wray's body is, very probably, that lying furthest to the right in P438/P439 and that this is the position in which he fell. It is further accepted that he was struck by two bullets which both entered from the right hand side of his back. The higher of the two exited from the top of his left shoulder and the lower bullet exited from the lower left side of his back. The injuries inflicted by these two bullets are described in the autopsy findings of Dr Carson as follows:-
\\textit{The upper of the two entrance wounds was associated with the exit wound on the back of the left shoulder and in its path this bullet had passed through the muscles on the back of the right chest, damaged part of the 5\\textsuperscript{th} thoracic vertebra, fractured the posterior parts of five left ribs and lacerated the left lung, before leaving the body.}
\\textit{The lower entrance wound was associated with the exit wound on the back of the left chest below the shoulder blade. In its path this bullet had passed through the muscles on the back of the right chest, damaged the spinous process of the 10\\textsuperscript{th} and 11\\textsuperscript{th} thoracic vertebrae and fractured the posterior parts of the 10\\textsuperscript{th} and 11\\textsuperscript{th} left ribs opening the left chest cavity and bruising the lower posterior part of the left lung.}
\\textsuperscript{132} Day 029/029/11 Bleeding and escape of air into the left chest cavity from the damaged lung caused death, which may have been fairly rapid but should not have been instantaneous.\\textsuperscript{133}
9A-138 The track of the bullets can best be seen from photograph P125. Dr Carson described the track of the upper of the two wounds in his evidence to Widgery as being
...from right to left and upwards at about 45° to the horizontal plane with an inclination forwards at about 30° to the coronal plane.
9A-139 The track of the lower of the two wounds was described as
...from right to left with an inclination upwards at about 15° to the horizontal plane and forwards about 10° to the coronal plane.\\textsuperscript{134}
\\textit{Forensic Evidence}
9A-140 The Tribunal has had the benefit of expert evidence from a number of forensic scientists, namely Dr Carson, Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan and, more recently, Dr Di Maio. All have given opinions as to the likely positions of James Wray and the firer or firers of the weapon(s) which discharged the rounds resulting in his death.
9A-141 The indicators on which each relies principally are: angle of bullet entry, appearance of wounds (\\textit{i.e.} shoring) and damage to clothing.
\\textsuperscript{133} D252 \\textsuperscript{134} D252 Damage to Clothing
Mr O’Callaghan has made clear to the Tribunal that little can be deduced as to the range of the shots which struck James Wray from the condition of his clothing. They can conclude only that the shots were fired from a distance greater than one metre.
A. Yes, if there was a thorough examination of the jacket for any discharge, evidence of the muzzle discharge, then, yes, the shot was fired from greater than about a metre.(^{135})
Q. Could we have on the screen, please, F23.6. These are Dr Martin’s notes of the examination of the jacket of Jim Wray. The majority of them appear to have been created by his assistant, Mr Donnelly. On the right-hand side you will see a note "no sign of close range", and underneath the first diagram we see "range more than 30 feet". From the material available to you, can you say that the bullets were fired from more than 30 feet?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Is there anything to indicate to you that the bullets were in fact fired at close range?
A. At close range?
Q. Yes, at close range?
A. No.
Q. Indeed is there anything to indicate to you that they were not?
A. No, basically we cannot say anything about the range at all, other than to say if we take at face value the comment that there was no sign of close range, which in turn we take to mean that the detailed examination of the jacket was made to look for evidence and none was found, then it stands that the
(^{135}) Day 230/035/04 shot was most likely to have been fired from greater than about a metre.\\textsuperscript{136}
9A-143 Nor is the pattern of damage to James Wray's clothing conclusive as to the position he was in according to Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan, although the Tribunal will recall the efforts made to photograph James Wray's jacket on Day 230 of the hearings in order to demonstrate that damage was consistent with his lying on the floor.
9A-144 In pursuit of that theory, Mr Harvey put the following to Mr O'Callaghan:
\\begin{quote} Q. If we can have F4.28.4 on the screen, please. If we could leave it like that. That is a photograph which was taken this morning in your presence and indeed with your assistance?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. Was this arrangement of both the position of the individual and the crumpling of the jacket done by you?
A. That is correct, yes, and it illustrates one particular position in which the damage can be reconciled with the position of the deceased.
Q. This, of course, is with a person lying full length on the ground and slightly pushing himself up with his arms?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. Perhaps just for completeness, could we see 4.28.3, a similar shot. There we see the bunching on the left side of the jacket. It is that position essentially that you think accounts for all of the ragged marks that we see in the exit position on F4.1?
A. That is correct, yes.\\textsuperscript{137} \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{136} Day 230/035/08 \\textsuperscript{137} Day 230/063/10 Putting aside the fact that the majority of the civilian eyewitness evidence does not support the position in which James Wray’s jacket was posed in this demonstration, Mr O’Callaghan’s evidence was quite clearly that this is “one particular position in which the damage can be reconciled with the position of the deceased”. His opinion is unchanged from that given in his original report that:
...the most likely explanation for the damage is that the bottom of both the left and right sides of the jacket were folded or crumpled up when the lower of two shots struck\\textsuperscript{138} and that The pattern of damage to the clothing associated with wound 2 (lower) is consistent with the jacket being displaced upwards and folded. This folding could have occurred while James WRAY was lying on the ground, however we cannot exclude the possibility that it could also have occurred in other situations.\\textsuperscript{139}
Indeed a striking image is also presented by Mr O’Callaghan’s own photograph of a technician wearing the jacket at F04.10.
\\textsuperscript{138} E2.0037 paragraph 7.6.2 \\textsuperscript{139} E2.0039 paragraph 7.6.4 This shows that the damage to the jacket is, for example, wholly consistent with James Wray having been bending forwards. Both Dr Carson's and Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan's reports agree that this position is consistent with the angle of entry of both bullet wounds (see further below). The damage to James Wray's clothing is therefore inconclusive as to his position when shot.
The Appearance of the Exit Wounds
Both Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan and Dr Carson\\textsuperscript{140} agree that the upper of James Wray's two exit wounds was "shored" i.e displayed an area of abrasion around it (the lower wound showed no such signs).
Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan's original report stated that:
\\begin{quote} The shoring of this exit wound could be as a result of pressure by tight clothing or it may be the result of pressure by or against a firm surface.\\textsuperscript{141}
In some circumstances, particularly when the velocity of the bullet has been reduced by its passage through the body or for any other reason, even heavy clothing can present a sufficiently firm surface to produce a shored exit.\\textsuperscript{142} \\end{quote}
James Wray was wearing 5 layers of clothing on his torso\\textsuperscript{143} which might well be expected to have been pulled tight over the shoulder area by the action of running, falling or bending. Nevertheless, Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan concluded in their "overall conclusions" that:
\\begin{quote} The exit wound from wound 1, lying on the left shoulder, is in our opinion a shored exit, which indicates that the left shoulder was in contact with a firm surface and/or his clothing was pulled tight at the time that the bullet exited from this site. We believe that the most likely explanation for this is that James \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{140} Day 206/045/10 \\textsuperscript{141} E2.0034 paragraph 7.6.1.2 \\textsuperscript{142} E2.0009 paragraph 2.2.7 \\textsuperscript{143} D228 Wray lay on his left side on the ground when he suffered this wound.
9A-151 It was not clear at that stage why the suggestion that James Wray was lying on his left side should be a more likely explanation for the shoring than his clothing being pulled tight in other circumstances and indeed the Treasury Solicitor sought clarification at E8.16.
9A-152 Dr Carson, in oral evidence commented on the suggestion that the shoring to this wound might have been caused by contact with a firm surface as a result of James Wray lying on his left side on the ground when he suffered this wound.
9A-153 He made the point, apparently overlooked by Messrs Shepherd and O'Callaghan that it would in fact be extremely difficult for Mr Wray to have been lying with the point of exit in contact with the ground. His point is well illustrated by Photograph P125.
164 E2.0039 paragraph 7.6.4 Dr Carson said:
A. Well, no, I do not really see any evidence of that. I have seen many gunshot wounds and on the trunk. Where the trunk is covered by clothing I have often seen areas of abrasion around them, which I attribute to the impact of the tissues on the clothing as the bullet exits. It seems to me in this case that the - - it is a rather curious position. Dr Shepherd seems to have described the wound as being on the tip of the shoulder. Now to my mind the tip of the shoulder would be half an inch or an inch to the left of the tip of the blue arrow and it is -- I find it difficult to conceive how that part of the body, where the exit wound actually is, would be in contact with the ground. If the person is lying on the back then a more prominent part of the back is the shoulder blade, which is well below that wound. If he is lying on his left side then the outer side of the shoulder would be in contact with the ground. So I have some difficulty in deciding how that part of the body could be in contact with Dr Carson agreed that the appearance of the wound could be consistent with James Wray's shoulder "being hard up against a very hard surface such as concrete or granite" such as a kerb stone. He said, however, that in that case the likelihood of the bullet having disintegrated would be increased so that:
There often is fragmentation damage bordering the wound, bordering the exit wound.... Let us say I have seen it quite frequently and if not on the body surface, then I would have expected fragments of debris, concrete, brick or whatever to be lodged or to have hit -- struck the clothing and to be lodged perhaps in the clothing.
Dr Carson agreed that he did not examine James Wray's clothes for debris. He could say only that the wound's appearance would not be inconsistent with pressure against a hard surface. None of the signs that might appear on the surface of the body if this had occurred were present, however.
Following Dr Carson's evidence on Days 206/207, Dr Shepherd modified his evidence and accepted the difficulty of the shoulder being in contact with a solid surface.
A. I am aware this has been put forward as a suggestion and I think I would agree with Dr Carson, it is quite hard to see how this part of the body could come into contact with a flat piece of ground. I find it easier to associate it potentially with a kerb stone or something of that type.\\textsuperscript{151}
9A-158 However, Dr Vincent di Maio, on whose expert publications\\textsuperscript{152} on gunshot wounds Messrs. Shepherd and O'Callaghan explained they had relied, concluded, having examined the same material as was available to the Tribunal's experts, that it was extremely unlikely that the shoring of this wound was due to contact with a firm surface such as a kerb. He considered this extremely unlikely due to the minimal degree of shoring and the absence of secondary fragment wounds.
9A-159 The Tribunal will, moreover, recall that eyewitness evidence does not suggest that James Wray's shoulder was pressed against a kerb.
9A-160 In fact, in oral evidence Dr Shepherd no longer contended that the shoring had been caused by contact with a firm surface but favoured the theory that the shoring was the result of James Wray's clothing being anchored against a hard surface rendering it sufficiently taut to produce the observed shored effect. He explained that this was the scenario he had intended to suggest in the "conclusions" to his first report at E2.39.
A. Indeed. I think in our minds at that time was the possibility, we were aware, having considered this injury, that the clothing was clearly very tightly pulled against this surface or there was considerable pressure against it. We felt that simple movement of the body probably would not achieve sufficient shoring of the wound, whereas lying on the ground with the possibility of tighter pulling of the clothing or contact with a surface could account for this.\\textsuperscript{153}
\\textsuperscript{151} Day 229/031/07 \\textsuperscript{152} Author of "Gunshot Wounds". \\textsuperscript{153} Day 229/026/19 Questioned by Christopher Clarke QC, Dr Shepherd explained that this premise, that James Wray's clothing must have been pulled tight in order to create the shored effect of the upper exit wound, formed the basis of his conclusion that Mr Wray was lying on his left side on the ground when he received this wound:
Q. If we go to page E8.16, we will find a question that was asked by the Treasury Solicitor and your answer. The question was this: "In respect of James Wray it is concluded that." And then the paragraph from your report is set out: "Please state the ground on which these conclusions were reached." Your reply was:
"The grounds for forming the opinion that this is the 'most likely' conclusion concerning the position of James Wray are:
"1. The exit wound in the left shoulder is a 'shored' exit.
"2. The 'standing' or 'bending' scenarios are extremely unlikely to result in sufficient tightening of the clothing and cannot result in outside pressure against the shoulder.
"3. The 'lying' scenario can result in either or both of these effects.
"4. In order to 'shore' an exit of the left shoulder it is therefore 'most likely' that James Wray was lying on his left side.
"While the possible orientations of James Wray are infinite the orientation that allows for the tracks of the injuries and the shoring of the wound are limited and, based on the information available to us, we believe that lying on his left side is the most likely orientation."
Does that still represent your view about this injury?
A. Yes, it does.\\textsuperscript{134}
\\textsuperscript{134} Day 229/027/15 The Tribunal will no doubt already be alive to the very obvious difficulty in Dr Shepherd's conclusion – the fact that eyewitness evidence does not describe James Wray as lying on his left side at all. That evidence is examined more fully below. Indeed that simple contradiction suggests that Dr Shepherd must be mistaken in the conclusion he draws as to the shoring of the upper exit wound and suggests that there must be some other explanation for this shoring.
Indeed both Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan were frank in acknowledging their lack of experience in the field of shored exit wounds and the fact that they had bases their conclusions about James Wray largely on the basis of comparison with one other control sample – the wounds of William Nash.
Q. Are you content with the statement that the standing or bending scenarios are extremely unlikely to result in sufficient tightening of the clothing to create a shored exit, or does that in any way overstate the position?
A. I think the -- we felt that the shoring of the exit in James Wray was considerably greater than that seen in Nash and so we felt that the pressure or tightening had to be consequently greater, which then means that we have to consider the mechanisms that would cause that in this particular case, hence the need for increased pressure caused by lying on the side or by contact with the surface.155
We have seen, in the case of Mr Nash we have seen shoring of the wound to his back, which we believe is caused simply by clothing. We believe in the case of Mr Wray there is a quantitative -- or a qualitative difference in the type of shoring, requiring greater pressure and it was our interpretation that clothing had to be pulled tighter than would possibly be achieved by simple movement and that lying on the ground and
155 Day 229/028/08 pulling the clothing in that manner, or by contact with the ground, would achieve that degree of shoring.\\textsuperscript{156}
9A-164 Mr O'Callaghan agreed that this had, indeed, been the course of their reasoning
\\textit{A. It was our opinion that the shoring in the case of Mr Wray was more significant than that seen in the case of Mr Nash, and on that basis we formed the conclusion that the shoring itself must have been -- the shoring that caused that change must have been greater, hence the conclusions that we drew, that it was most likely that Mr Wray was -- the clothing was being pulled tight by something other than an action of the body. In other words, he was on the ground and the clothing was somehow being pulled against in order to cause the level of shoring that we see here.}\\textsuperscript{157}
9A-165 Both Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan accepted their limited expertise in shored, high velocity exit wounds and reliance on texts such as that of Dr Vincent Di Maio.\\textsuperscript{158} Dr Shepherd conceded:
\\textit{Q. do you have a lot of experience of shoring of wounds with high velocity rounds?}
\\textit{A. No, I do not believe that anyone in the United Kingdom does. To an extent we have to rely on texts, we have to rely on advice that we receive.}\\textsuperscript{159}
9A-166 He conceded later when questioned by Peter Clarke QC that:
\\textit{Q...you have never seen a shored high velocity shoulder wound before or since?}
\\textsuperscript{156} Day 229/029/23 \\textsuperscript{157} Day 230/100/15 \\textsuperscript{158} Day 229/081/18 \\textsuperscript{159} Day 229/081/18 A. Not in my personal examinations, but I have seen them as demonstrated by other pathologists. It is not a unique photograph that I am looking at but, no, in my personal experience, I have not seen another shored one.\\textsuperscript{160}
Mr O'Callaghan also explained:
Q. Would it be fair to say that you have no personal experience of clothing, shoring of high velocity rounds?
A. No, correctly, no.
Q. Have you found any literature that has indicated to you the different scales of shoring that can occur?
A. I think this is a question obviously better put to Dr Shepherd, but I think there is reference material such as Vincent Di Maio book on –
Q. Whose book, sorry?
A. Vincent Di Maio which deals in detail with shoring.\\textsuperscript{161}
Indeed Mr O'Callaghan was happy to concede that he could not discount a "lurch" forward as having caused the shoring:
Q. I think, whatever the mechanism, it has to be sufficient to draw the clothing tight against the shoulder to produce the shored injury.
Q. The mechanism could be a lurch forward, could it not?
A. I do not know, is the short answer. I think, if there was sufficient force within the movement to pull the clothing sufficiently tight for the injury to be shored in the way it has, then, yes.\\textsuperscript{162}
\\textsuperscript{160} Day 230/105/20-25 \\textsuperscript{161} Day 230/072/12 \\textsuperscript{162} Day 230/073/05-12 Following Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan's evidence, and given their own declared reliance on the work of Vincent Di Maio in forming their conclusions as to the shoring of this wound, Mr Anthony Lawton instructed Dr Di Maio to review the issue of the shoring of the upper exit wound on James Wray's back. Dr Vincent Di Maio is, as the Tribunal is aware, a highly respected expert on gunshot wounds and the author of a book with that title. He has set out in his report provided to the Tribunal both his own extensive experience and a number of texts relating to shored exit wounds of which Dr Shepherd was apparently unaware. Dr di Maio said, commenting on Dr Shepherd's testimony:
The suggestion is made in the testimony that the clothing was "pulled tight" due to Mr Wray lying on the ground. In actuality, this positioning of Mr Wray is not necessary to explain the occurrence of the shoring. Mr Wray was dressed in multiple (five) layers of clothing, specifically a corduroy jacket, a polo neck sweater, a round necked sweater, a polo neck sweater and a white shirt. I have seen a number of cases of shoring associated only with multiple layers of clothing. In such cases, the clothing is often tight or pulled tight by the act of bending. The clothing in such cases reinforces the skin sufficiently so as to produce a shored exit. Therefore, there is no necessity for Mr Wray to have been lying on the ground when he incurred the shored exit. The act of bending over and running away or of pitching forward would be sufficient to tighten the clothing such as to produce a shored exit. In other words, there is no way one can say with certainty whether at the time he received the wound, Mr Wray was bent over, pitching forward or already on the ground.
163 Day 230/072/12-16: Day 230/101/15 164 "Characteristics of Shored Exit Wounds" D.S. Dixon, Journal of Forensic Sciences, Volume 26, No4, 1981, pp691-698; "Shored gunshot wounds of Exit" J.C. Anguilar. American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Volume 4, No.3, 1983, pp 199-204. 165 Circulated to the parties without reference Dr Shepherd indeed appears to accept Dr Di Maio’s opinion in his response dated 31st October 2003 as he concludes that
*Dr Di Maio concludes that James Wray “could have been bent over, pitching forward or already on the ground”. He does not express a preference.*
*In both our written and oral evidence we considered all these scenarios and expressed a view on which we considered most likely. We accepted that this view was subjective.*
*In my opinion it is not possible to take this matter further in terms of the pathology of the injury.*
*With the pathology of shored injuries in mind any final conclusions concerning the position of James Wray when he received this injury will now depend on an assessment of any eye witness accounts that are available to the Inquiry.*
Dr Shepherd thus appears to concede that the shoring of James Wray’s upper exit wound is not determinative of his position when he suffered this wound. Both the damage to Mr Wray’s clothing and the shored exit of the wound remain consistent with his bending or lurching forward at the time of impact of this round.
Mr Shepherd’s apparent suggestion that, without the “clue” offered by the shoring of the wound the
*possible orientations of James Wray are infinite* so that
*any final conclusions concerning the position of James Wray when he received this injury will now depend on an assessment of any eye witness accounts that are available to the Inquiry.*
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166 Circulated to the parties without reference 167 Day 229/027/15 would appear, however, to be something of an over-simplification as, according to Dr Shepherd's own evidence, something can still be learned of Jim Wray's position when shot from the angle of bullet entry observed.
**Bullet Track/Angle of Entry**
**One or Two Firers?**
9A-173 It appears that the forensic evidence cannot offer any positive conclusions as to whether the two rounds which struck James Wray were fired by the same firer or as to the time lapse between them.
9A-174 Dr Carson, who had the advantage of having performed the original autopsy on James Wray on 31 January 1972, concluded at that time that the close proximity and appearance of the two entrance wounds suggested that they had been fired by the same weapon while the divergence of the exit wounds suggested some movement of the body between the two shots. He posited a scenario in which the lower wound was caused first with a second round being fired in rapid succession as the body was falling.(^{169}) He felt that the second round would have to be fired after an interval of less than 3 seconds.(^{170}) Such a scenario would be consistent with firing known as a "double tap" in which two shots are fired at a target in rapid succession.
9A-175 Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan agree that
...two bullets fired from his right struck JAMES WRAY.
9A-176 In their opinion, however,
(^{168}) Circualated to the parties without reference
(^{169}) DO529 at C
(^{170}) DO530 at B Despite the close proximity of the two entry wounds and the apparent similarity of the bullet tracks they need not have been caused in very quick succession or by the same weapon.
Notably, however, Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan reject only the necessity and not the possibility, or even the probability, that the rounds were fired by the same weapon in quick succession. Indeed, they put forward three propositions
...that would satisfy the angles of entry of these two bullets
on the basis that
we believe, the same individual fired both shots.
Why Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan should form the belief that the rounds were fired from the same weapon unless they felt that the circumstances in which they were fired were very close in time and space is not clear.
The Relative Positions of Firer and James Wray
The evidence of bullet track/angle of entry also offers information as to the relative positions of James Wray and the firer at the time of firing of the rounds which struck him.
There would, however, appear to be some difference of opinion as to the conclusions that can be drawn from the trajectory of the bullet.
The pathologist who performed the autopsy on James Wray, Dr Carson, concluded that, if the person firing the gun was standing....
And Dr Carson agreed that they need not have been fired from the same weapon. It would be very difficult to conceive of any position in which he (Wray) was not standing.\\textsuperscript{172}
Dr Carson's report was reviewed in 1972 by the Home Office Pathologist Dr Keith Simpson who also gave evidence to Lord Widgery. Dr Simpson's opinion was that:
\\textit{I am not able to say whether the victim of the discharge I am describing was erect or lying down.}\\textsuperscript{173}
More recently, to this Tribunal, Mr O'Callaghan has warned firmly against the dangers of assuming that the track from exit to entry wound can be extrapolated to indicate the direction of fire:
\\textit{A. One thing I would say about the trajectories you have drawn, it falls into the trap of joining a line between the entry and exit which does not indicate the initial angle at which the bullet enters the body.}
\\textit{MR CLARKE: It is not determinative of it?}
\\textit{A. Absolutely not, and it is in fact very dangerous to link those two and suggest it is.}\\textsuperscript{174}
Dr Shepherd explained what, in his view, could be deduced from the angle of entry of a bullet:
\\textit{We have said in our original report, Mr O'Callaghan has reiterated this afternoon, we have to be very careful not to simply draw a line between entry and exit and say that that must reflect the angle at which the bullet hit the body or necessarily travelled through the body. I think all we can do is use these marks to link -- put a line between entry and exit,}
\\textsuperscript{172} DO529 at E \\textsuperscript{173} D634 at B \\textsuperscript{174} Day 230/066/13 remembering that caveat as we do so. It is an aide memoir, but it does not represent necessarily tracks or angles.\\textsuperscript{175}
A...clearly the point of entry on Mr Wray's body must have formed a straight line between the end of the barrel and the entry wound on his body, forgetting what it did once it entered his body, but there must have been a line between those two.\\textsuperscript{176}
It would seem, however, that the information that can be derived from examination of "wound tracks" or angle of entry must go somewhat further than the assertion that one must be able to draw a line between the entry wound and the barrel of the gun. Such an assertion would indeed preclude Dr Shepherd's initial conclusions that there were "Three broad propositions that would satisfy the angles of entry of these two bullets" as there would clearly be many other relative positions between which such a line could be drawn. While minimising the information that can be deduced from wound tracks, Dr Shepherd appears to continue to suggest in oral evidence that these remain the only three possibilities.
Q. Can you actually deduce anything at all about the position of the firer from the wound tracks?
A. From the wound tracks themselves, no, there is nothing I can deduce, other than as I say at the bottom of E2.38, and I think we define three possibilities then, and the third of these is that if he was lying on the ground, the shots must have been fired from above and to his right as if by someone standing, it is the very bottom bullet point on that page.
Q. Are you able to say which, if any, of the possibilities, either outlined in your report or put to you more specifically to you today, are more likely than any other?
A. From the pathology alone, no, we cannot. .......I cannot say from the pathology that that angle is the only solution; all
\\textsuperscript{175} Day 230/095/11-20 \\textsuperscript{176} Day 230/097/04-08 three remain, and it must be on other witness evidence that the conclusions are reached.\\textsuperscript{177}
9A-186 The “three possibilities” to which Mr O’Callaghan referred were set out in his report at \\textsuperscript{E2.38} as being “Three broad propositions that would satisfy the angles of entry of these two bullets if, as we believe, the same individual fired both shots”. They were:
\\begin{itemize} \\item If JAMES WRAY was vertical the shots must have been fired from upwards, as if by someone lying on the ground. \\item If the firer was standing and the shots were fired horizontally JAMES WRAY must have been bending forwards and the shots must have been fired from his right. \\item If JAMES WRAY were laying on the ground the shots must have been fired from above and to his right as if by someone standing. \\end{itemize}
These are three possible variations of the relative positions of the firer and James WRAY, however, others will exist.\\textsuperscript{178}
9A-187 The first scenario would seem to exclude the possibility of a shot fired by a standing soldier at a standing Mr Wray, yet the “line between barrel and entry wound” test that Dr Shepherd appears to deem appropriate would certainly not preclude such a scenario.
9A-188 Indeed, the Tribunal will recall Dr Carson’s original opinion that, if the person firing the gun was standing,
\\begin{quote} It would be very difficult to conceive of any position in which he (Wray) was not standing.\\textsuperscript{179} \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{177} Day 230/096/15 \\textsuperscript{178} E2.0038 paragraph 7.6.4 \\textsuperscript{179} DO529 at E The Tribunal will recall that Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan of course went on in their conclusions to reject scenarios 1 and 2 in favour Scenario 3, based on their conclusions as to the shoring of the upper exit wound. Those conclusions led them to believe that James Wray was lying on his left side when he suffered the upper, shored, wound, an assumption on which they appear to have proceeded when suggesting that
*If JAMES WRAY were laying on the ground the shots must have been fired from above and to his right as if by someone standing.*
Indeed, when Dr Shepherd was questioned in relation to photographs AM18.12, and F4.28.4 approximating the position of a firer above and to the right of a prone body, as described by Joseph Mahon, Dr Shepherd confirmed that the shot could only have come from a firer in this position IF James Wray were lying on his left side.
*Q. But are you able to say whether it is possible that one or more, one or both of the wounds on Mr Wray could have been caused by somebody standing in the position that we see on the left?*
*A. I think the answer to that is: yes, they could, but not if Mr Wray was lying in the position in which we see him lying on the right.*
*Q. What position would he have had to be in, first of all dealing with wound 1?*
*A. In a sense in both wounds, because they are both coming to the right-hand side of his body, in order for a bullet to be fired as shown in the photograph on the left, which is coming down at an angle of about 45 degrees, let me take that as a rough angle, then clearly the point of entry on Mr Wray's body must have formed a straight line between the end of the barrel and the entry wound on his body, forgetting what it did once it* entered his body, but there must have been a line between those two. So Mr Wray I think, if the photograph on the left is correct, would have to have been tipped so that his body was, once again in a very rough angle, at an angle of about 45 degrees to the horizontal or vertical, left side down, right side up.\\textsuperscript{180}
9A-191 Dr Carson also agreed, when asked by Peter Clarke QC, that Jim Wray’s upper injury was “inconsistent with a soldier standing over the body and firing downwards into the ground” he replied “Yes, it may not be totally inconsistent, but in my view it seems unlikely, for the reasons that I gave last week”.\\textsuperscript{181} He agreed that it would be consistent with a soldier standing in that position only if Wray was “on his side, facing certainly sideways, if not almost upwards”.\\textsuperscript{182}
9A-192 The importance of Dr Shepherd’s and Dr Carson’s conclusions that the wounds to James Wray could not have been caused by someone standing to his right become clear once close examination is made of the eyewitness evidence which is virtually unanimous in placing Mr Wray either flat on his front or even raised on his right side. If such eyewitness evidence is taken into account it becomes clear that James Wray cannot have been shot by a soldier standing over him as Joseph Mahon and other witnesses suggest.
9A-193 Dr Shepherd was not questioned as to whether, if Mr Wray was lying flat on his front as the evidence overwhelmingly suggests, it would be possible for his wounds to have been inflicted by a soldier firing from a more distant position.
\\textsuperscript{180} Day 230/096/15-097/13 \\textsuperscript{181} Day 207/029/11 (apparently a reference to “shored” features about which he was examined in his first day of testimony). \\textsuperscript{182} Day 207/029/20 Dr Carson was of the view, when questioned by Peter Clarke QC, that if, as all eyewitness evidence suggests, James Wray was lying in this position his wound could only have been caused by a soldier firing from ground level.
Q. If James Wray was actually lying flat, even if he was trying to push himself up but lying flat rather than on one side, if he is lying flat, right?
A. Yes.
Q. The situation would be that the firer of the weapon would be having to lower his weapon to ground level and fire sideways, would he not?
A. Yes, or he could be lying on the ground, of course.183
No such conduct was ever observed of a soldier in Glenfada Park North.
Summary of Forensic Evidence
The condition of James Wray’s clothing and the shored appearance of the upper exit wound do not enable conclusions to be drawn as to his position when he was shot. This evidence neither indicates that he was on the ground when he was shot, nor that he was not. At most, the shored wound would suggest that his clothing had been pulled tight, quite possibly by the action of bending or falling forward.
Nor is the expert evidence relating to angles of bullet entry conclusive as to the position that James Wray was in when he was shot. There are a number of relative positions of firer and entry wound which could account for the injuries James Wray sustained.
183 Day 207/035/07-14 One scenario which Dr Shepherd is able to exclude, however, is one in which James Wray, lying flat on his front, was shot by a soldier standing over him and therefore holding his rifle at a steep angle. In view of the eyewitness evidence as to James Wray's position, the scene described by Joseph Mahon can therefore no longer be entertained as being accurate.
As to whether Mr Wray, if lying down, may have been shot by a soldier firing from a distance, Dr Carson expresses the view that this would be possible only if the soldier fired from a very low angle, potentially a lying position. There is no suggestion that any soldier in Glenfada Park did so. This was not an area that was explored with Dr Shepherd.
The scenarios in which Mr Wray was either falling or bending forwards remain consistent with all of the forensic evidence before the Tribunal.
**Eyewitness Evidence**
Lord Gifford has described the eyewitness evidence of the shooting of James Wray as "a framework on which the Tribunal can rely" where, while there are "discrepancies of detail" the "corpus of evidence coming from many observers at the same scene can provide irrefutable truth about what happened at that scene". In fact, the eyewitness evidence is contradictory in far more than detail and has in the majority of cases come forward at a very late stage. The flaws in the eyewitness evidence itself as well as its clear contradiction of the forensic evidence shows that, far from being a framework on which the Tribunal can rely, the evidence as to the shooting of James Wray is typical of the myths that have grown up around the events of 30th January 1972.
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184 Day 049/132/06 James Wray's Initial Fall
9A-202 The Tribunal will need to consider whether James Wray's initial fall was due to his tripping or sustaining a gunshot wound. Counsel for the Wray family has accepted in opening that in fact he is likely to have fallen initially as a result of a gunshot wound saying:
We believe it to be overwhelmingly likely that Jim Wray was first hit in the lower back as he ran across Glenfada Park North and that he fell because he was hit and not merely because he stumbled. If he had merely stumbled the likelihood is we think that he would have scrambled the last few feet to the shelter of the alley. George Hillen says that Jim said "I am hit" as he fell and Malachy Coyle, among other witnesses, said that when Jim was on the ground, "I cannot move my legs"; that you may think -- we will explore it with the experts -- would be consistent with a man who had been struck and possibly paralysed by a shot at the lower back. 185
9A-203 Those who represent the family of James Wray have now resiled somewhat from that position:
MR HARVEY: Sir, just one matter. Mr Lawson very fairly put to the witness that Lord Gifford had in fact opened the case on the basis that it was an overwhelming likelihood that Jim Wray had been felled by one bullet as he was crossing Glenfada Park and then shot with another. It may no longer be our position at the end of this case, this, of course, was before the testimony of Mr O'Callaghan and Dr Shepherd which did certainly give rise to the inference that both bullets were fired at Jim Wray as he was lying on the ground. I did not want to interrupt Mr Lawson before, but I also did not want him to be under any misapprehension as to what our final position may be on the subject. 186
185 Day 050/004/11 186 Day 398/188/13-25 Nonetheless the weight of eyewitness evidence is to the effect that James Wray’s fall was caused by a gunshot wound.
John O’Kane described in his BSI statement seeing James Wray behind him and to his right when he fell. His evidence suggests that he actually saw a wound at this stage as, looking back through the south western exit, he is able to say that he
... saw that he had been shot in the right side. George Hillen, AH74, heard James Wray say “I’m hit” and saw him fall forward.
Pearse McCaul, AM93, also described James Wray as “shot” having seen him fall about two feet away from him. Mr McCaul thought that he had been shot rather than merely stumbling “because of the way he fell, he just went flat down, he just (indicating) toppled over.
James Patrick McNulty, AM377, believed he had seen three men fall and was sure they were shot rather than stumbling or diving for cover. Asked if he thought they had been shot he said,
I definitely did, I think, all right.
Q. Why did you think that rather than think they had just dived to the ground, say, for cover?
A. Because they had never moved.
Pat Moyne, AM444, described James Wray as being “hit”.
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187 AM48.4 paragraph 14 188 AH74.4 paragraph 21 189 AM93.4 paragraph 17 corrected from north west to south west at Day 164/095/05 190 Day 164/099/9 191 Day 152/008/05 My impression was that Jim Wray was hit whilst he was standing, but I do not know if it was whilst he was still frozen or whilst he was running.\\textsuperscript{192}
Mr Moyne is, however, "pretty sure" that Wray had been hit by a bullet and had not just fallen.\\textsuperscript{193}
Others have clear memory of James Wray's head hitting the pavement in a fall which clearly lacked the usual reflexes of a man who had merely tripped. Michael Quinn, AQ11, said in an interview with the Sunday Times Insight team
\\textit{james wray (who he now recognised from the pix) fell beside him and hit his head of (sic) the kerb of the footpath.}\\textsuperscript{194}
When making his BSI statement Mr Quinn recalled that, immediately after he was shot he saw out of the corner of his eye
\\textit{...a man's head hitting the ground in front of me. Giving it thought, I now think this was Jim Wray being shot at the same time as me.}\\textsuperscript{195}
He confirmed in oral evidence that he thought James Wray had been shot rather than just stumbling
\\textit{I recall thinking that someone else has been shot with me because -- I guess from the way he fell. He did not put his hand out. I recall his head hitting the kerb stone.}\\textsuperscript{196} "I could tell (he had been shot) I could tell from the fact that his head was
\\textsuperscript{192} AM444.5 paragraph31 \\textsuperscript{193} Day 162/019/23 \\textsuperscript{194} AQ11.13 \\textsuperscript{195} AQ11.24 paragraph 25 \\textsuperscript{196} Day 169/089/13 hitting the kerb stone, his hands were nowhere in view. He did not put his hand out to stop his fall.\\textsuperscript{197}
William O'Reilly \\textbf{AO69} said in his statement to Lord Widgery
\\textit{The last one to run out (of GPN) suddenly fell down. He fell heavily and his head hit the ground first. He lay with his head on the flagstones and his body on the tarmac.}\\textsuperscript{198}
Mr O'Reilly repeated that description in his deposition to the Coroner investigating James Wray's death and in his evidence in chief to Lord Widgery when he describe how he fell “flat, with his head on the path and his body on the tarmac”.\\textsuperscript{199} It was only when cross-examined by Hill that Mr O'Reilly agreed that James Wray could have tripped and fallen.\\textsuperscript{200}
Only a few witnesses suggest that James Wray may have tripped. Don Boyle saw a man “stumble and fall to the ground”.\\textsuperscript{201} He assumed that this man, who may have been wearing a hood or hat, had just tripped. On later seeing photographs he realised it was James Wray.\\textsuperscript{202}
Michael Wilson, \\textbf{AW18}, also assumed at the time that the boy he saw “fell or threw himself on to the ground to my right…… I was sure that he had either fallen or thrown himself to the ground because of the shooting”.\\textsuperscript{203} He also concedes though that although “I do not think he was shot at that stage …he could well have been for all I know”.
\\textsuperscript{197} Day 169/136/03 \\textsuperscript{198} AO69.24 paragraph 2 \\textsuperscript{199} AO69.8 at F \\textsuperscript{200} AO69.10 at D \\textsuperscript{201} AB.2 paragraph 10 \\textsuperscript{202} AB47.2 paragraph 10-11 \\textsuperscript{203} AW18.2 paragraph 8 John Porter, AP11, says in his SC that the man he saw “stumbled and fell at the corner of Glenfada Park”. He had, however, described in his NICRA statement signed on 1 Feb 72 seeing Wray fall saying, “I saw a young man falling and as he fell he hit his head on the sidewalk”. Such an image would certainly suggest that the man had been shot.
The overwhelming probability is then that James Wray was shot while running to the south west corner of Glenfada Park North. It is quite possible he sustained both wounds at this stage in the “double tap” scenario described by Dr Carson while either bending or falling forwards.
It is not and has never been suggested by those representing the soldiers that James Wray was armed on Bloody Sunday although PIRA 25 gave evidence on Day 424 that he did see Jim Wray collecting stones in Glenfada Park, ready for the entry of soldiers. There is persuasive evidence, set out below, however, that at the time he was running for the south west exit of Glenfada Park he was close to members of the Official IRA who were carrying rifles.
The “Execution” of James Wray
There is certainly evidence from a number of witnesses that James Wray was shot again whilst lying in Glenfada Park North, an account which has gained considerable currency and indeed been included in film portrayals of Bloody Sunday which, like many of the equally misleading television programmes which preceded them, will have been seen and accepted as accurate by a number of the witnesses who have since given evidence about the events portrayed and/or discussed. Some of that evidence, such as that of Joseph
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204 AP11.2 Mahon was described by Mr Clarke in opening as being “of the most graphic character”.
The Tribunal may well consider, however, that more useful indicators of the weight that should be applied to this evidence are: (1) whether it can be reconciled with the forensic evidence and (2) when it was first put forward. The latter is particularly significant bearing in mind the opportunity afforded to all civilians to make statements to NICRA. It seems inconceivable that every effort would not have been made to testify to the fact that a defenceless man had been shot in the back as he lay on the ground. A number of highly graphic witnesses – including Mr Mahon – fail both of these tests.
There are in fact only six witnesses who gave an account in 1972 of James Wray being shot while prone. Of these six, Malachy Coyle and Michael Wilson were observing from yards (or perhaps the same yard) in Glenfada Park North. Mr and Mrs O’Reilly, Gerry Campbell and, he claims, John Porter were observing from 7 Abbey Park.
1. Malachy Coyle
Malachy Coyle AC97 has said that he was sheltering in the backyard of the southernmost house at the south gable end of the west block in Glenfada Park North. He was dragged into there by a bald man in his 40’s who was wearing a leather jacket. He believes he can now name him as Mr McCourt. They crouched looking out of the slats in the wooden fence into Glenfada Park North. Mr Coyle says that he was frightened but not hysterical.
In his NICRA statement, Mr Coyle described hiding in the backyard and seeing three unarmed men lying in Glenfada Park North. He says that one of these men had his left eyebrow shot away. The man exchanged a few words with Mr Coyle’s companion. Mr Coyle then says he
...heard another shot coming from the direction of the soldiers and I then knew that the man had been shot again in the back of the left hand shoulder.
It is only then that Coyle mentions seeing
...about eight soldiers running across from my left to right.
Mr Coyle cannot now say how he was able to locate the shot into James Wray’s left shoulder in this way in his NICRA statement. He can only say now that he was shot in the back in some way and he draws this conclusion from the way in which sparks came up from under his body. Mr Coyle indicated to the Tribunal in photograph AC97.27 the area in which he saw the sparks, explaining that James Wray was not lying flat but at an angle with a “gap between the left side of his body and the pavement”.
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208 AC97.4 paragraph 25 209 Day 156/061/13 210 AC97.20 211 Day 156/033/03 212 Day 156/035/09 In his BSI statement, Mr Coyle explained that the man he understood to be James Wray was lying half on and half off of the pavement with one knee on the pavement and the other in the car park. His head was nearest to Mr Coyle and his feet pointing back towards Rossville Street.
The man then raised his head from the pavement, looked directly at Mr Coyle and his companion and said "I can't move my legs". Mr Coyle said "Don't move, pretend you're dead". Moments later, Mr Coyle heard a shot coming from the Kells Walk/Columbville Court area to the north and saw "the pavement near the wounded man explode in sparks". Mr Coyle saw the wounded man groan and saw his head “go slowly down towards the pavement”. Mr Coyle gave the same account in oral evidence.
It is only after this that Mr Coyle saw four or five soldiers “come up -- advance up the far side”. Mr Coyle then claims that one of these men then shot a young boy from point blank range the gable end at which point he “lost it” and ran through the alley at what he described as the south east corner of Glenfada Park North.
Malachy Coyle is quite sure that he remained focused on James Wray after this saying that
*My full attention was on the body. I think, if I can remember, my full attention was on the body. I was not looking round me.*
He is quite sure that no soldier ever approached within yards of James Wray “not while I was in the car park, no”. He is quite sure that “the sparks was, it seemed to have come from the far corner, it seemed to have to me, it seemed to come from way down at the far corner.”
Malachy Coyle’s account is then of James Wray being shot once while prone from a distance. There is, however, considerable reason to doubt his account. not least that he believed that James Wray was shot in the back of the left shoulder.
Moreover, Mr Coyle’s evidence is quite incredible in other respects as he goes on to give an account immediately after this incident of the close-range shooting of a boy in blue denims in circumstances which cannot be correct,(^{222}) despite the fact that he says that “to me it is as real as anything else that happened”.(^{223}) It may well be that Mr Coyle was indeed “in hysterics” as John McCourt has described the teenage boy who he pulled into a yard.
Indeed if Mr Coyle was with John McCourt (AM144) as he believes, their evidence is strangely at odds. McCourt says that he was hidden in the yard of his wife’s grandmother’s house at This was in fact although he does say he pulled boy of 14 or 15 “in hysterics” in with him, a description which would fit Malachy Coyle.
Mr McCourt says that he called out to people in the square and told them to “lie there and to keep still and not move”.(^{224}) However, he did not see James Wray at all at this stage and can only assume he was there as he later saw him lying dead.(^{225}) He could see into Glenfada Park North but saw nothing of the shooting Mr Coyle describes and makes no reference to the boy he was with mentioning this to him either. Matters contained in the transcript of an interview conducted with Mr Coyle by Paul Mahon also raise significant questions as to the accuracy and honesty of Mr Coyle’s evidence to this Tribunal. Firstly, Mr Coyle appears to have been somewhat reticent as to
(^{222}) AC97.6 paragraph 38 (^{223}) Day 156/051/10 (^{224}) AM144.2 paragraph 11 what he has been prepared to tell the Tribunal about the man he was sheltering with in Glenfada Park North. The Tribunal will recall the interchange between Mr Coyle and Mr Clarke as to this man's name and Mr Coyle's eagerness to correct what he claimed was a slip when it was first given. The Tribunal will be well aware of the significance of the first name which Mr Coyle gave.
Q. Since you made your statement you have been able to --
A. I have met him.
Q. You have met him. What is his first name?
A. Tommy, I think.
Q. Tony?
A. Tommy, I think. Is it Thomas -- I just know him as Mr McCourt. I am not 100 per cent sure of his first name. But after the incident I always assumed the man had been killed, I always assumed he was one of the casualties.
Q. What happened: you met him, did you, after you made your --
A. Sorry, John McCourt his name is.
Q. John McCourt. You are sure about his name, are you?
A. I am sure -- well, I have it written down here, that is why I am sure.... I think it was with the, when I was making my statement, as we came down, I was introduced to him and I am not very good at faces, especially after long times, so I did not -- I cannot say I recognised him.
LORD SAVILLE: Mr Coyle, did he recognise you? A. He seemed to, yes.
Mr Coyle appears also, in his evidence to the Tribunal, to have minimized the role of this man in events in Glenfada Park North. He was asked by Mr Roxburgh why he ran from his position at the garages in the north of Glenfada Park North:
Q. Do you remember what it was that made you start running; was there some specific thing that set you off?
A. I think, I think now again that some of the people that were with me started to run and I, I did not want to be left on my own so I just had to run. I think that is what happened. Some people ran first, panicked, whatever, whatever you want to call it and I panicked along with them, when I saw them going, I was not going to be standing there alone.
Q. Do you know whether in fact the whole of that group of people ran at more or less the same time or did some of them stay behind?
A. You are asking me a question which I at the time had no concern about, I just wanted to get out of there.
In his interview with Mr Mahon, however, Mr Coyle describes to Mahon how the mature, bald man in a leather jacket who later pulled him into a yard in fact took control at this earlier point:-
A. this man says, "we'd better move"....And he says "We'll make a run for it!...."
...And the man that was sort of ...he took charge more or less....
Q. So he took charge really of all the people there? A. He says, "Look we're going to have to move here, we're going to have to move or we're in serious trouble"...
....Umm, he points, he says, "We're going to run for that corner there, that opening there"
Q. He actually points to that?
A. Aye, he says that [indecipherable] by there... there were four or five of us....And I was putting my trust in this man because I didn't know what to do.
It is not clear why, when his recollection of this man was so clear when interviewed by Mr Mahon in March 1998, Mr Coyle should now seek to conceal from the Tribunal his role in directing operations in Glenfada Park North.
Another issue of which the Tribunal was apparently unaware when Mr Coyle gave evidence was the extent of his contact with Jim Wray senior at a very early stage in 1972. Indeed Mr Coyle seems deliberately to have kept this information from the Tribunal when he spoke of how and when he came to know Jim Wray's identity.
MR TOOHEY: You were, what, told later that in fact it was Mr Wray?
A. Yes, that is correct.
MR TOOHEY: Do you mean on the day or at some later stage?
A. No, not on the day, no. I think, I think the first time I was told was when I went down to make my statement in the Nazareth house, that original statement that was shown earlier. I think I was told then by the person that was taking the statement that it was Jim Wray. I did not -- even then it was a name to me, I had not -- you know, until I started talking to other people, "Oh, his father was a milkman." 231
It is apparent from Mr Coyle's interview with Paul Mahon, however, that this is simply not true. In fact, Jim Wray Snr had actually come to Mr Coyle's home and asked him to go and make the statement he refers to above.
The next thing I remember was umm Jim Wray coming up. This man I didn't know he was at the time, Jim Wray, the father... He came up to the house and he talked to me and he says, "I want you to... It wasn't very far it was one or two days away (After BS)... Somebody, somebody told him that I must have been talking about it... I think it was maybe more than two or three days, maybe four or five days. He must have hear... he came with another man, umm to talk to me about..." 232
Mr Coyle then describes to Mr Mahon how he went down to Glenfada Park North with Mr Wray and described the scene there to him. He makes it clear that he had not until this time known the identity of the man he had seen shot "I didn't know the person who had been lying there was" 233 and that it was Jim Wray Snr who told him "Yeah he went through the whole, concerning his son". 234 He explains how Mr Wray Snr later went with him to Coleraine to make a statement to the Widgery Tribunal which was refused. 235
The fact that Mr Coyle had such contact with Mr Wray Snr at this early stage, at the alleged scene of his son's shooting and apparently before Coyle had given a statement to anyone must be relevant to the reliability of his later evidence. It is not, however, something about which Mr Coyle has chosen to tell the Tribunal.
9A-243 Mr Coyle also, like every other of Mr Mahon’s interviewees, failed to mention this interview.
9A-244 Most importantly, and in common with virtually every other eyewitness, Mr Coyle places Mr Wray in a position which is at odds with the forensic evidence as to the angle of entry of either bullet. He describes the left side of Wray’s body as being raised on the pavement with the right side lowered into in the car park. He clearly was not attempting to raise himself up as he describes him as having his hands stretched out in front of him.236 In this position, lying on his right side, he could not have sustained the wounds he did.
2. Michael Wilson
9A-245 It may be that Mr Coyle is, in fact, mistaken in his identification of Mr McCourt and was in fact with Michael Wilson (AW18).
9A-246 Mr Wilson describes in his BSI statement observing events from the southernmost backyard in the western block of Glenfada Park North. He recalls that there were other people in the yard “perhaps two or three”237 although in his NICRA statement he referred only to “another fellow and myself” going into the yard.238
236 AM93.9 paragraph17 237 AW18.2 paragraph15 238 AW18.6 In his NICRA statement of 30 January 1972 he described seeing “a fellow about twenty five years old who threw himself down at the kerb.” In his BSI statement he noticed
... a boy who fell or threw himself on to the ground to my right. I do not think he was shot at that stage but he could well have been for all I know. I was sure that he had either fallen or thrown himself to the ground because of the shooting.
Mr Wilson describes James Wray’s position as
... his body was tight up against the kerb and his head was pointing towards the alleyway at grid reference H14 and his feet were out into Glenfada Park North pointing in the direction of Rossville St. He was on his stomach.
In his NICRA statement, Mr Wilson said that:
I called to him to come in with us and he had just shouted back that he couldn’t because they had him pinned down when he was shot in the back.
In his BSI statement Mr Wilson is less certain. He says he called to James Wray to come into the yard. “He said “I can’t move”. I think he may also have said something like “I’m pinned down here” however I cannot be sure of that. Mr Wilson does note, however that “He made no attempt to get up or move his hands.” Mr Wilson says that shortly afterwards James Wray was shot. In his NICRA statement he simply says “he was shot in the back.” In his BSI statement he explains that he did not know where the shot came from but says
I saw the round hit him in the back and I saw his coat lift a little. The round hit him in the middle of his back and the coat lifted about one inch or so and left a small tear in his coat.
According to his BSI statement, the only soldiers that Mr Wilson had seen in Glenfada Park North prior to this were “on the balconies of the buildings opposite...and to my left...on the catwalk or verandah.” He did not see any soldiers on the ground in Glenfada Park. Mr Wilson has not given oral evidence due to ill health.
Mr Wilson, then, gives an account of James Wray being shot once in the back while prone and sees no soldiers close to him. He cannot say who shot him.
3. Bridget O’Reilly
Bridget O’Reilly (AO66) was one of the three witnesses (four if Mr Porter is accepted as being there also) watching from 7 Abbey Park and appeared from her NICRA statement to be the only witness to give evidence in 1972 of having seen James Wray shot at close range. In that statement she said
I saw the man in Glenfada Park raise himself from the ground...then...I saw a soldier run up to him (sic) and shoot him again. He fell in the road again. This same soldier then fired at the man who had stepped over the wall...(in AP). In her BSI statement she says that she saw Wray "lying half on the pavement and half off" and saw him "move his head and look up".
The next thing I saw was Jim Wray's body jerk. I saw his coat jump up. Then I saw a soldier coming into view and I think that he shot Jim Wray again..... The soldier stepped over the top of him. The soldier wasn't tall, he was small and stocky.
Mrs O'Reilly appears then to suggest that she saw Wray shot at close range. In oral evidence, however, it became clear that in fact she saw the soldier only after she had seen Wray's body jerk. This soldier then "stepped over the top of him and came on up". She did not see him aim his gun at Wray. Nor was he pointing it into the ground.
Mrs O'Reilly adds in her oral evidence that Wray was "kind of" lying on his stomach rather than his back. He moved his head "straight up" but did not move his head and shoulders "all I seen was a head going up". The soldier who she says shot James Wray then came on through to Abbey Park and fired there.
Mrs O'Reilly's oral evidence amounts then to having seen Wray's coat "jump" and his body "jerk". The account she gave in her NICRA statement of a close-quarters shooting is no longer borne out by her current memory.
______________________________________________________________________
249 AO66.1 paragraph 9 250 AO66.1 paragraph 9 251 AO66.2 paragraph 12 252 Day 172/006/23 253 Day 172/008/02 254 Day 172/008/20 255 Day 172/010/02 256 Day 172/005/09 257 Day 172/005/13 258 Day 172/023/01
FS 7 1968
IX-85 Once again, this supposed eyewitness account is at odds with the forensic evidence, however, as she is clear that Wray was lying on his stomach and did not move his torso at all which could not, it seems, account for the angle of entry and track of either bullet. If Wray was lying on his stomach, he could not have been shot by a soldier standing above him or near to him.
4. William O'Reilly
In his NICRA statement William O'Reilly describes James Wray being shot apparently for a second time after he fell saying,
*He moved slightly and just as I was going out to him more shots rang out, the youths body jerked and lay still.*
A soldier then appeared who jumped over Wray and went on to fire in Abbey Park
*A soldier jumped over his body and then stood at the Housing Trust Office, a youth in blue denims running with his hands above his head towards the steps, the soldier took aim and shot.*
In his evidence in chief to Lord Widgery Mr O'Reilly also described how James Wray “lifted his head and tried to look round” and how “I was going to run down like, to get him up, and the body gave a jerk” and how “his head just went down again”. He agrees he was unable to see what caused the jerk or twitch. It was only when it was put to him that Mr O'Reilly agreed that his assumption was that the body jerked “because the boy was deliberately shot when he was lying flat and motionless”.
______________________________________________________________________
259 AO69.7 260 AO69.7 261 AO69.10 at E
FS 7.1969 IX-86 In his statement given on 24 February 1972, however, Mr O'Reilly made no reference to any shooting of James Wray while he was prone saying only that “after Mr Wray had fallen, a soldier with a rifle came through the opening.....”. He then described how this soldier went on to shoot Gerard Donaghy and Gerald McKinney.263
Examination on this point before Lord Widgery produced no satisfactory answer as to why Mr O'Reilly had not mentioned this shooting in his statement. Asked “Why didn’t you mention the shot that killed him?” Mr O'Reilly answered “I didn’t see a shot kill him”.264 A further attempt to renew that line of questioning foundered in an unsatisfactory and unclear exchange.265
Mr O'Reilly also failed to mention this alleged shooting in his deposition to the Coroner given on 21 August 1973. In that statement Mr O'Reilly said only that “after Mr Wray fell a soldier came through the opening and the people who were hiding behind the wall appeared to be frightened ....”266 Even at the official inquiry into James Wray’s death then, he makes no mention of a second shooting while he was lying prone.
By the time Mr O'Reilly came to make his BSI statement on 5 May 1999, he no longer recalled seeing Wray fall at all, beginning his account with
*I can remember seeing a young fella who was lying down at the corner of this alleyway....and he seemed to be looking* ...we saw the clothes of the young lad who was lying down, and who was wearing a grey coat, jumping up in the air. When I saw his clothes rise, I automatically and instantly thought that he had been shot. I assumed he was lying down in the first place because he had been shot.268
Mr O'Reilly says that he then
...saw a soldier come into vision and step over the lad moving to his left. I cannot remember much about him except that he had a uniform on and that he seemed doped up. He was like a zombie. He ran past the body of the lad and stopped in the alleyway....269
Mr O'Reilly does not give any indication of how much time elapsed between the shooting of Wray and the soldier coming into his vision.
Unfortunately, Mr O'Reilly has not given oral evidence to the BSI due to ill-health so that, following the unsuccessful attempts at Widgery, there has been no opportunity to examine him regarding the inconsistencies in his various accounts. It would seem extremely odd, however, that a man who had witnessed what Mr O'Reilly claims in his BSI statement to have seen would have failed to mention these details at the inquest into Wray's death. Mr O'Reilly has also now changed his account to include in his BSI statement the fact that James Wray "seemed to be looking around". This contradicts his earlier evidence to Lord Widgery that James Wray was lying "flat and motionless" when he was shot.
267 AO69.2 paragraph9 268 AO69.2 paragraph9 269 AO69.2 paragraph10 Indeed the weight that should be attached to Mr O'Reilly's evidence must be re-considered in light of his interview with Paul Mahon in which his propensity to present hearsay as his own first hand account is fully revealed.
The Tribunal may recall the evidence which Mr O'Reilly gave in his BSI statement in May 1999 that
_The one lad who was wearing a denim jacket and tight denim jeans jumped over the small wall that bordered the grass area... He had his hands in the air... An older fella then jumped after him ....... The soldier who was then in the position that I have shown shot both of them_ 270
_As I recall it, the elder fella even had his hands in the air._ 271
Mr O'Reilly's account to Paul Mahon appears initially to repeat this evidence.
_I just heard the shots. Saw two boys lying there, the wee boy was there. He ran this way, up the steps you see [reference to the boy's hands being up]. He must have seen the soldier too._ 272
It becomes clear, however, following Mr Mahon's far from oppressive questioning that Mr O'Reilly did not actually witness these events at all.
With reference to the "boy with the blue denims", the transcript records Mr Mahon asking
_Did you actually see him jump that wall? No. Right. That's what you think happened._
And later
270 AO69.2 paragraphs11-12 271 AO69.3 paragraph:17 Q. Did you see this boy when he was actually on his feet or did you see him when he was down?
to which Mr O'Reilly replies
*When he was on the ground.*
9A-275 As for his evidence about Gerard McKinney, Mr Mahon asks Mr O'Reilly,
Q. *the older man, the middle aged man, behind him, did you see him put his hands up in the air?*
A. No... I was told.
Q. *You were told that, so you only see (sic) him when he was down on the ground, but you did see the soldier, am I right?*
A. Oh, the soldier, aye.
9A-276 Mr O'Reilly also said in his BSI statement that he did not go on the march and only left his house to look for the daughter of a friend. He clearly told Mr Mahon something different, however, as he introduces the interview by saying that:
*we're gonna follow your route that you took that day. Not the first time when you came home back from the march, OK, but the second time when you went in the house.*
9A-277 Even on his own account, Mr O'Reilly again claims no more than one shot hit James Wray while prone and does not suggest that the soldier was standing over Wray when he fired. Again his account of James Wray lying "flat and motionless" must be borne in mind when considering the forensic evidence. 5. **Gerry Campbell**
9A-278 Also in the O'Reilly house was Gerry Campbell AC13 who first said in a taped interview with Kathleen Keville that he saw a man “Lying between an opening already shot”. He lifted his head up for somebody to help him and another shot hit him in the side. “The position he was lying, the only place it could have come from would have been Derry Walls”. 275
9A-279 While his NICRA statement is very poorly legible, it includes the details given in the Keville interview and is dated 30 January 1972.
9A-280 In his BSI statement Mr Campbell has said that he saw a man “At the gap between Glenfada Park North and Glenfada Park South lying face down with his head and shoulders on a pavement”. The top of his head was pointing towards Mr Campbell276. The man “kept raising his head …three times”.277 Mr Campbell then saw
[\\text{a cloud of dust inches away from the right side of him as I was looking at him, which would have been his left. His body raised on his left side and then he fell down. He did not move again.} ]
9A-281 Mr Campbell clearly did not see a soldier close to James Wray as he “assumed that he had been shot from the northern area of Glenfada Park North”.279 He then goes on to give some rather confused evidence about events in Abbey Park.
______________________________________________________________________
275 AC13.9 276 AC13.4 paragraph 21 277 AC13.4 paragraph 21 278 AC13.4 paragraph 21 279 AC13.4 paragraph 21
FS 7. 1974 Mr Campbell’s evidence amounts then to an account of one shot being fired from a distance into James Wray’s side while he was lying face down. He gives no clue as to the identity of the soldier responsible and indeed thought the shot must have come from the walls.
6. John Porter
The most comprehensive description given in 1972 was that of John Porter (AP11) a former Quartermaster Sergeant in the Irish Army.
John Porter’s statements, while comprehensive, are extremely curious as they report a chronology of events which is wholly at odds with that given by other witnesses. He also describes James Wray being shot twice in the back whilst prone which is clearly inconsistent with his having been shot only twice, the first shot causing him to fall. Mr Porter also describes shooting by paratroopers in Glenfada Park which was not seen by any other witness present.
Mr Porter appears to have made two NICRA statements. In the first dated 31 Jan 1972 the first event he reports witnessing events from an address he describes as “8 Glenfada Park”. The first event he describes seeing from the house was
...a man running towards the front of Glenfada Park. The next thing I saw was the man falling. I think that this man was shot from the walls behind the flats, to the right of Butcher’s Gate.
He then saw two paratroopers appear. One “fired two shots directed towards the corner of Rossville Flats. The next paratrooper fired one shot”. These paratroopers then arrested a group of people “standing behind the flats” including a woman in a green coat who protested and was kicked. Mr Porter then says:
FS 7. 1975 I saw a man lying on the ground wounded, he was shot in the arm and as he fell he cut his right eye. I ran out and was halfway between the man and the flats when there was a volley of shots rang out......I learned later that two men had been shot around the corner, one of them dead.
Mr Porter then returns to the house next door to that he had been in earlier. He then speaks of one soldier firing four shots and the next two shots “not even aiming”. It is not clear where these shots were fired. Mr Porter then reports seeing man lying on his back and hearing shouts that he had had a heart attack. A young lad running with a white handkerchief was then knocked off his feet and Mr Porter says that “I know that he was shot dead with a high powered rifle”. A first aid girl then ran to his assistance who stumbled and fell. It is then far from clear who Mr Porter is speaking of when he says
One of the paratroopers passed where the man was unconscious and he didn’t come back. I saw the man that was lying on the ground move. The clothes on him (sic) back then jumped up and I knew that he had been shot again because smoke started to rise from his clothes. He had been shot at close range by a rifle. Then the paratrooper came out about four yards behind the man. Then I went to help carry this man away. Another bullet was in his right side but the shot that was fired at close range entered his body in his left side and came out at his right shoulder. We then carried him into the house. ....... I couldn’t believe that a paratrooper had shot a wounded man on the ground.
In his NICRA statement signed the next day Mr Porter again describes taking refuge in “8 Glenfada Park” and looking “through the slip-way between the houses in front of us”. From there he saw “a young man falling and as he fell he hit his head on the sidewalk”. He looked away for a period
280 AP11.19-20 281 AP11.1-3 and then saw “his head was raised up looking towards me and I saw a cut above his left eye. He tried to raise himself up but failed and then I saw blood on his wrist”. Mr Porter then describes attempting to run out and assist the man but retreating under fire to “No 7”. Mr Porter then reports seeing a man lying on the ground who is reported to have had a heart attack. He then sees a young man approach this man waving a white handkerchief. He was “knocked off his feet onto the ground”. A girl in white coat with a red heart then runs from a similar place, stumbles and falls. While Mr Porter’s statement is unclear as to locations, he sees two soldiers fire one and two aimed and elevated shots respectively. These soldiers then arrest a group of people “shepherdng together” including a woman in a green coat who objects and is kicked. Two more soldiers then arrive followed by a third who turned and followed the group of arrestees away. The first of these two further soldiers then fires four shots from his hip, fanning his rifle. The second fired two shots from chest height. He then sees the man he saw fall lift his head off of the ground.
I then saw the back of the man’s coat jump up twice about 4 or 5 inches in the air. I saw some smoke rise from where he’d been shot. A few seconds afterwards I saw a second para move out to clear view. That’s the last I saw of that para. He was of light complexion and appeared to have blonde type hair.
We waited a few minutes and the area became completely silent. Myself and a few men rushed out of the house towards this man. We lifted him and carried him back towards the house. When we carried the first man into the house before we lay him face down ... We lifted his shirt up and he had a bullet wound on his right lower back and also one on his left lower back. As we pulled his shirt further up I noticed the long triangular shaped laceration on his left shoulder..... I then said
FS 7. 1977
IX-94 that the man would have a wound in his lower right/left arm and I stood up and left the house. 282
9A-289 Considerable difficulties arise already in reconciling Mr Porter’s evidence with what is known of the shooting of James Wray, even if it is accepted that he has simply confused Glenfada Park for Abbey Park. Most strikingly, he places the alleged shooting of the prone James Wray after events which appear to refer to the shooting of Gerard McKinney and Gerard Donaghy and the appearance on the scene of Evelyn Lafferty. That sequence contradicts the evidence of almost every other witness in both Abbey and Glenfada Park.
9A-290 Mr Porter also says, in his first statement, that when he saw the man fall initially, he believed he had been shot from Butcher’s Gate. That is not an assumption that would have made sense to a man observing James Wray from a house in Abbey Park. It suggests that the man was closer to the Rossville Street area, exposed to the walls. Mr Porter then describes running out to apparently the same man saying “he was shot in the arm and as he fell he cut his right eye”. James Wray was not shot in the arm, and the laceration he suffered to his face was to his left eyebrow. 283 William McKinney was of course shot in his left arm 284 and, as can be seen in the autopsy photograph at P131 suffered a laceration to his right eye.
9A-291 Moreover, Mr Porter describes carrying the man into “the house” apparently a reference to the house he had been sheltering in. In these first statements he states that, while he was initially in No 8, he, having attempted to attend to the man he saw shot, returned to “No 7” or “the house next door” because the door to number 8 was closed. This sequence is confirmed in his taped
282 AP11.1-3 283 D0249 284 D281-282 interview with Kathleen Keville where he says that, having left 8 Abbey Park to run to a wounded man
*the wo - house - er - house what I left was - the door was closed and - and - and then that woman next door told me to come into her house number seven. I went into number seven....*
9A-292 William O'Reilly has confirmed in his interview with Paul Mahon that Mr Porter was indeed observing events at this stage from 7 Abbey Park.
9A-293 James Wray was of course taken into the Carr's house at 8 Abbey Park. William McKinney was the only casualty taken into the O'Reilly household in 7 Abbey Park. He also describes wounds to the man's right and left back which of course does not match James Wray's wounds.
9A-294 In his second statement Mr Porter also describes bullet wounds to both the man's right lower back and left lower back. He also describes "a long triangular shaped laceration on his left shoulder", Mr Porter also said "that the man would have a wound in his lower right/left arm" no doubt a reference to having seen the man shot in the arm as mentioned in his first statement. In this statement Mr Porter says that "we lifted him and carried him back towards the house". When he then refers to taking the man into the house he must be referring to the house from which he has come, 7 Abbey Park. Mr Porter also makes reference to the fact that "a man began to wrap a large wide bandage round his body". Autopsy photographs P129 and P131 show just such a bandage wrapped around the body of William McKinney.
285 AP11.26\
286 X4.33.4\
287 AP11.3 It is only in his SC statement that Mr Porter says that he carried the man he had tried to rescue into 8 Abbey Park. He no longer makes any reference to the man having been shot in the arm and corrects his evidence to say he had an injury to his left eyebrow. This is also the first time that Mr Porter has made any reference to the man wearing a green/brown corduroy jacket.
The chronology of events which Mr Porter describes remains the same as before and similarly in contradiction with almost every other witness. He clarifies his evidence as to the soldiers he saw fire in Glenfada Park North saying that two soldiers came to the south west corner of Glenfada Park North. One fired two rounds in the direction of Joseph Place, the other fired one round. He again reports seeing the arrest of a woman in a green coat and then describes firing by a further three soldiers in Glenfada Park who fired a total of seven rounds towards Joseph Place and the north east corner of Glenfada Park North. None of the witnesses in Glenfada Park at the time saw such firing. Porter says he then
looked at the man I had tried to rescue. He raised his head. I then noticed his green/brown corduroy jacket rise at the back twice and I realised he had been shot again. I didn’t see who fired but I saw two puffs of smoke and I think he was shot at from the southern side of GPN. He then lay still. I then saw a paratrooper move across Glenfada Park behind him.
It is similarly at this stage that Mr Porter ascribes the “smoke” he sees to rifle discharge. Mr Porter described a similar sequence of events in his evidence to Lord Widgery although he failed to mention that, after his first attempt to assist James Wray, he ran into No7 Abbey Park, the house next door to that which he had just come from. He then described seeing James Wray “at a later stage” when:
He started to lift his head up off the park and as he lifted his head up off the park I saw his jacket jump up in the air twice four or five inches. At the same instance I realised the young man had been struck by two bullets in the small of the back. I also saw what I took to be two puffs of gas or smoke as from a rifle.”
“...They (the puffs) came from the direction just behind the man where the shot struck his back.”
Again Mr Porter has added the detail of seeing smoke from a rifle. Lord Gifford has relied on this fact as an indicator of a close-range shooting as
if Mr Porter saw puffs of smoke, one can see that the soldier firing at the prone body of Jim Wray would be close but somewhere out of sight, having advanced towards the southern square.
This fact of course did not feature in Mr Porter’s first two statements in only one of which he mentions smoke and this coming from the injured man’s clothes.
Mr Porter also says now that the man he speaks of was carried into 8 Abbey Park. By this stage Mr Porter has also corrected his description of the wounds which he observed to “an entry wound down here, just there on the right side
______________________________________________________________________
294 AP11.7 at E 295 AP11.7 at F 296 Day 049/147/01
FS 7.1981
IX-98 of the small of his back” and “another entry wound along here a slight bit higher”\\textsuperscript{297}.
9A-302 Under cross-examination by Counsel for the deceased, Mr Porter confirmed that James Wray “had his head raised up looking around him” at one stage but “he was lying flat” when the bullets struck his body.\\textsuperscript{298}
9A-303 Finally, Mr Porter, recorded an interview with Kathleen Keville which appears at \\textbf{AP11.24-28}. It is quite apparent from that narrative that the man Mr Porter first saw shot in the arm, apparently from Butcher’s Gate, the man that Mr Porter attempted to rescue, the man whose clothes Mr Porter saw “jump” and who was later carried into 7 Abbey Park with a wound in his arm were all one and the same person. That person is, on the facts described by Mr Porter, clearly William McKinney. He has later altered his evidence to fit the location, dress and wounds of James Wray, no doubt having been impressed by the rumour that James Wray was the man who had been shot while prone.
9A-304 Mr Porter’s account, quite apart from all the difficulties set out above, still placed James Wray as lying flat on the ground and is thus again inconsistent with the forensic evidence relating to angle of entry.
9A-305 In Mr Porter’s case there is also the additional issue that he claims that the man he saw shot in the back was shot twice at close range. This cannot be an accurate account in relation to James Wray as he sustained only two gunshot wounds, one of which caused his initial fall. Lord Gifford has sought to explain this inconsistency with the theory that
\\textsuperscript{297} \\textbf{AP11.8 at A to B} \\textsuperscript{298} \\textbf{AP11.11 at B} When he was shot again by the soldier who came up at close quarters, it may well be that two shots were fired, one of them striking the upper back and the other narrowly missing his body. Malachy Coyle described how the pavement beside Jim exploded with sparks, which may be consistent with a direct hit of a bullet against the pavement.299
This theory simply does not reflect Mr Porter’s evidence however: his evidence to Lord Widgery was not just that two shots were fired but that two shots hit James Wray’s body. Indeed he explained that he had had fifteen years experience in the army and could clearly recall where he saw the bullets strike Jim Wray’s body.300
The evidence given by those who were in 7 Abbey Park must be viewed in the light of the potential for contamination between the witnesses who were there particularly in light of the fact that the most graphic of them all, Mr Porter, has in fact re-written his evidence for the benefit of the Widgery Tribunal in order to match the known facts relating to James Wray. This fact together with the suggestibility of Mr O’Reilly (as demonstrated by the contrast between his evidence to this Tribunal and the account he gave to Paul Mahon) must raise serious doubts about the evidence emanating from that address.
These doubts are compounded by the apparent failure of Mr Porter, Mr Campbell and the O’Reillys to repeat their shocking account to those around them. Certainly there was no shortage of other people in 7 Abbey Park. Gerry Campbell also reports being in the house with several other people including a Gerald Louge.301 This is possibly a reference to James Logue, (AL18) who
299 Day 050/004/11 300 AP11.12 at B to D 301 AC13.3 paragraph13 says that when he arrived “the house was full”. Maureen Doherty (AD85) reported that it was “packed with people”.
Mr Logue himself gave an account in his NICRA statement of seeing Gerard McKinney shot, then seeing a person crawling towards him and later another body close to his. He makes no reference to James Wray. In his BSI statement he gives a similar account of a man crawling towards Gerard McKinney who is then shot in Abbey Park but now names this man as Wray. Clearly this could not be Wray and Mr Logue’s evidence would seem to reflect, however unconsciously, the influence of the James Wray “myth”. Certainly it does not corroborate the Porter/Campbell/O’Reilly version of events despite the fact that Mr Logue says he had a clear view “through the alleyway in the south west corner of Glenfada Park North”.
Maureen Doherty was also looking from 7 Abbey Park. She explains in her NICRA statement that she was looking from the scullery window in 7 Abbey Park from where she witnessed the shooting of Gerard Donaghy and Gerald McKinney by a soldier who was visible to her but whose position is unclear in her account.
In her SC statement Ms Doherty explains the very good view she had of what would have been James Wray’s position saying “I could see right through the arch of Glenfada to the barricade of Rossville Street”. She explains in her BSI statement that she was able to see people coming out of the gap between Glenfada Park North and Glenfada Park South and remembers “standing at
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302 AL18.2 paragraph 10 303 AL18.7 304 AL18.2 paragraph 13 305 AD85.9 306 AD85.11 the window for some time". From that position she saw a soldier step into view in Abbey Park and shoot two men there. She makes no reference to James Wray however.
There were other witnesses who had a view of the alleyway and/or James Wray and who gave an account in 1972 which did not corroborate the accounts of the five witnesses who claim to have seem him shot.
John Carr (AC42) was thirteen years old at the time and observed Wray from a window in 8 Abbey Park. In his NICRA statement he refers to seeing a youth lying on the edge of the kerb, a soldier ran towards the corner where the youth was lying, he put his boot on top of the youth and pushed him off the footpath. Then he ran forwards......
He does not suggest that James Wray had been shot while prone.
John Carr gave a similar account to the Coroner. In his SC statement he confirmed that James Wray was alive when he first saw him as he says that “He raised his head and moved” before the soldier came and pushed him with his foot. Similarly, in his account to Lord Widgery, he says that “he moved his head and his hand” before the soldier came but did not move after this. Here he expands that the soldier “sort of stopped, kicked and ran on” after which the soldier “paid no more attention to him”. Mr Carr was observing
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307 AD85.2 paragraph 10 308 AD85.3 309 AC42.11 310 AC42.27 311 AC42.14 312 AC42.21 at F 313 AC42.21 at C 314 AC42.21 at G James Wray closely from a point in time when he was still able to lift his head until a soldier ran through the south west alleyway to Abbey Park, yet at no point does see his clothes jump or his body jerk as others suggest.
9A-316 It is only in his BSI statement that Mr Carr gives any indication that he may have witnessed the effects of a second shot as he now says that
_He lifted his head and he lifted his left arm. It was almost as if he did it in slow motion. His head and arm then went down._
9A-317 Mr Carr is far from describing a shot and the position he describes is as usual inconsistent with the forensic evidence. In oral evidence to this Tribunal he had clarified that James Wray lifted only his hand, from the elbow, a movement at odds with any suggestion that he turned onto his side. Moreover Mr Carr saw him raising his left arm which would bring him even further from the position lying on his left side which Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan propose as the most likely explanation for his wounds.
9A-318 Any suggestion that James Wray was shot at close range is contradicted by almost all the 1972 evidence that he was lying on his front. If he was lying on his front the forensic evidence from the Tribunal’s experts establishes that he cannot have been shot a close range: a close range shot is only compatible with his having been laying on left side at the time, presenting his right, rear flank to the firer.
9A-319 Any account of Wray being shot twice on the ground is undermined by evidence that his initial fall was almost certainly caused by a gunshot wound.
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315 AC42.3:16 316 Dav 158/169/05 Thus, at its absolute highest, there is some limited contemporaneous eyewitness evidence which suggests that James Wray was shot once from a distance. Were that to be the case, the question of whether the shot was aimed at James Wray or hit him by accident would remain insoluble.
There are however, serious doubts as to the independence and accuracy of those witnesses who were in 7 Abbey Park and the Tribunal will no doubt have registered concern at the manner in which Malachy Coyle was encouraged to make a statement in 1972 having viewed the scene with James Wray's father. The potential for contamination of his evidence by such a process together with his failure to mention these events to this Tribunal must seriously undermine the persuasiveness of his evidence. Moreover, in considering the conclusion that James Wray was shot while prone, the Tribunal will have to overcome the very considerable difficulty that, if it is alleged that the soldier who shot him was standing over him, the angle of entry of either of the bullets which struck him require him, if lying on the ground, to have been lying on his left side. Not one of these eyewitnesses supports that proposition. If it is alleged that Jim Wray was shot from a distance, it can only have been by a soldier lying or bending into a very low position. No eyewitness describes any soldier behaving in such a way.
Recent Evidence
The Tribunal will no doubt be highly reluctant to accept evidence of the alleged dramatic shooting of James Wray which has not been put forward until almost 30 years after the event. The Tribunal is well aware of the propensity of witnesses, honest or otherwise, to "adopt" recollections they have heard of over the years, particularly where such stories have become part of local lore. It would seem inconceivable that anyone witnessing the brutal shooting of a man lying defenceless on the ground would have failed to report the same to NICRA. The fact that much of such recent evidence is contradicted by both the forensic and 1972 eyewitness evidence shows that it is in fact a clear example of adopting and adding to a myth.
Joseph Mahon has given perhaps the most graphic and oft quoted evidence of all of the shooting of James Wray. He was not called to give evidence by Lord Widgery nor did he make a NICRA statement, possibly because he was in hospital at the time. The most contemporaneous record of his account is therefore the notes of the Sunday Times journalists dated 2 March 1972(^{317}) in which no reference is made to Wray's shooting at all. Instead, Mr Mahon described how James Wray was lying in front of him with his head pointing through to Abbey Park and his feet towards Mr Mahon.
*The next thing I recall clearly is seeing a single soldier on the opposite side of the court from the others looking towards the passageway and firing two or three shots from under his arm, at the same time shouting to the other soldiers "I've got another one, them Dave (sic)". The soldier then pulled back towards the van.*
Mr Mahon has referred to the Sunday Times notes in his BSI statement. He recalled someone from the Sunday Times coming to interview him at home but says that:
*The statement appears to me to have been put together by someone from the Sunday Times after that visit, and it is not an accurate account of what happened to me on Bloody Sunday. What happened to me is what I have set out in this statement.*(^{318})
While he disputes the accuracy of their note, Mr Mahon does not deny that he that he met with the Sunday Times journalists nor does he claim to have told them about the execution of James Wray. His only explanation to this
(^{317}) AM18.15
(^{318}) AM18.7 paragraph46 Tribunal for his failure to do so was that he “was feared for my life”. He told the Tribunal that this was because
Q. Why were you fearful of your life if you were to tell the Sunday Times about that?
A. Well, who was I going to tell. If I had made a statement to the police about it, they are the Security Forces and who killed Jim Wray, who did I see killing Jim Wray while he lay on the ground. It was the Security Forces.
The logic of Mr Mahon’s explanation is far from clear as he had had no qualms about telling the Sunday Times team about the shooting in Abbey Park that he witnessed. Mr Mahon also failed to mention the James Wray incident in what is assumed to be an interview conducted while he was in hospital by Fulvio Grimaldi.
Indeed the first time Mr Mahon mentioned the shooting of James Wray was in an interview with Channel 4 News given in the late 1990’s where he gives an account which is at odds with his BSI statement and all other evidence. The transcript states:
And the paratrooper he made his way across this corner and er Jim Wray who was lying on the corner went to move again and as a paratrooper was passing them He just put shot in the (face).
Mr Mahon’s fully developed account of James Wray’s execution emerged only in his BSI statement, signed on 17 September 1999. After I had seen Jim Wray, as I lay on my side, my face was looking towards the north and I saw a Para walking towards the body of Jim Wray. This was the same Para as I had seen shooting from the hip as described in paragraph 12. This para appeared to be wearing a different coloured jacket to the other paratroopers that I had seen that day. Although the jacket was green, its colour and markings seemed to stand out more than the jackets that the other Paratroopers were wearing. He was holding his rifle down by his hip with the muzzle pointing down towards the ground, as if patrolling. He made no move to search William McKinney or I and effectively he walked in a direct line towards Jim Wray. He did not try and search Jim Wray or to look for a weapon of any kind. He saw Jim Wray's soldiers move and realised that he was still alive. The soldier then pointed the rifle at Jim Wray's back and fired two shots into his back at point blank range. .... I could see Jim Wray's coat move twice. I was absolutely terrified and realised that if the soldier saw me move, he would shoot me as well.
Mr Mahon describes the soldier going to Abbey Park and hears further shooting. He then describes him coming back into Glenfada Park North.
I saw him take his helmet off and wipe his forehead with the back of his hand. His face was blacked up and I could see that he had blonde hair. He then shouted out "I've got another one!"
From the way the soldier was standing Mr Mahon took him to be shouting towards the south eastern corner. The soldier then received an order to pull out and walked towards the north east entrance.
For some reason, I then turned my head to look towards this north eastern entrance and I saw the same soldier standing there. He must have seen me move, because he got down on one knee and aimed his rifle at me. I turned my head to look the other way and prepared to die.
Mr Mahon then heard a woman’s voice shouting “Don’t shoot – first aiders.” He heard a shot but has no memory of hearing the bullet strike anything.
The drama and significance of Mr Mahon’s account is increased as he claims to be able positively to identify the blond soldier who he saw shoot both James Wray and in Abbey Park as appearing in video 3, reference 0903. Mr Mahon has also now identified Soldier G from a family photograph as being this man. He is “not 100 per cent certain, but that was who he thought it was”.
It would seem inexplicable that Mr Mahon failed to mention this dramatic incident in earlier interviews. Moreover there is little corroboration for his account of the close range shooting he describes in any of the 1972 eyewitness evidence. His account is also contradicted by the forensic evidence not least as Mr Mahon describes two shots being fired into James Wray “at point blank range”. As set out above in relation to Mr Porter, there cannot have been two shots fired into James Wray’s body while he was lying prone. Nor were either of the wounds he suffered inflicted at point blank range. Dr Shepherd was also closely examined by Counsel for the Tribunal as to the consistency of the angle of bullet entry of both of these wounds given the position of the soldier which Mr Mahon described. He confirmed
327 AM18.5 paragraphs 24-27 328 AM18.5 paragraph 28 329 Day 167/045/07 330 Day 230/035/08
FS 7.1991 IX-108 that this could only be consistent if James Wray were lying on his left side.\\textsuperscript{331}
We know from numerous eyewitnesses that he was not.
9A-332 Paddy McCauley \\textbf{AM97} is another witness who gives a full, if rather unique, account in his BSI statement of James Wray being shot at point blank range. He made no reference at all to the shooting of James Wray in his 1972 NICRA statement\\textsuperscript{332}. His only explanation for his failure to do so is that “I was 16 at the time and I wanted to make that as brief as possible”.\\textsuperscript{333}
9A-333 In his BSI statement he describes seeing a British soldier with a foot on the body of a man lying in the alleyway leading to Abbey Park, at the western gable end of the northern block of Glenfada Park South.\\textsuperscript{334} He concedes in oral evidence however that he may be wrong about this positioning.\\textsuperscript{335}
\\textit{The man on the ground had his face turned in my direction and his head pointing in a southerly direction. The soldier, a tall and well-built man, possibly with a painted face, had the muzzle of his rifle pointing towards the rib cage of the fallen man. I know now that man was Jim Wray.}\\textsuperscript{336}
Mr McCauley then describes seeing Gerard McKinney running either towards a man lying further down Abbey Park or towards the soldier and James Wray. He describes Gerard McKinney running with his arms in the air shouting “Don’t shoot” or “Don’t shoot him”.
\\textit{In what seemed to me to be one movement, when the soldier shot Jim Wray he then spun to his right and, with his rifle at} hip level, shot in the direction of myself and Gerard McKinney. I saw the soldier's gun recoil as he shot Jim Wray. I think the bullet entered his rib cage around the middle of his left hand side. As the soldier turned and shot in my direction, I dropped to the ground and, at the same time, I heard Gerard McKinney go "Ugh" as I believe he was hit."
9A-334 In oral evidence to this Tribunal, Mr McCauley conceded that he might be wrong about just about all of the detail of his account
A. I cannot sit here today and say "that is 100 per cent", all I can recall is Jim Wray lying on the ground and a soldier with his foot on him as if to hold him there.
Q. Whatever the angles left and right, you have no doubt that you saw a soldier fire a shot into Jim Wray's lying body?
A. Yeah."
9A-335 The vagaries of Mr McCauley's account together, its contradiction of numerous other accounts and incompatibility with the forensic evidence and his failure to mention this shocking scene to NICRA must make him an extremely unimpressive witness to the shooting of Jim Wray. Indeed he is clearly a prime example of the susceptibility of witnesses to report as fact incidents about which they have heard only rumour and story-telling.
9A-336 Pearse McCaul AM93 again made no reference to the shooting of James Wray in 1972 according to notes taken by the Sunday Times team. Nor did he present himself to make a NICRA statement. In his BSI statement however he describes seeing James Wray
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337 AM97.5 paragraph25-27 338 Day 162/099/19 339 AM93.14
FS 7.1993 IX-110 lying face down with the whole of his body on the pavement and his arms were stretched out. I saw him try to push himself up from the ground with his hands but he lurched forwards very suddenly as if he had been shot. He then lay still.
9A-337 In his oral evidence Mr McCaul clarifies that “I think he was shot a second time, but I could not be sure.” He is not a supporter of the close quarters shooting version however, confirming that “there is certainly no recollection of any soldier near Jim Wray’s body.”
9A-338 John O’Kane AO48 is yet another witness who makes no reference in his NICRA statement to seeing James Wray shot while prone. In this handwritten statement dated 23 February 1972 he refers to Wray falling and describes how “we dived for cover around the corner of the block and stood wondering how we were going to reach the boy”. No reference is made to James Wray being shot for a second time.
9A-339 In his BSI statement however he is able to recall looking around the corner of the south western exit and seeing James Wray
lying in the corner of the courtyard with his head facing the alleyway and his feet facing the middle of the courtyard. The upper part of his body was on the footpath and his legs were on the tarmac. He was still alive, and was raising his right hand, saying “help me, help me. The next thing I remember is that one or two shots rang out, the man’s body jumped on the floor and he fell back down, limp. I believe that he was shot again, at that time in his back.”
340 AM93.9 341 Day 164/100/01 342 Day 164/133/15 343 AO48.24 344 AO48.39 345 AO48.4 paragraph 15 Mr O’Kane alleges in his BSI statement that Wray was shot at close range.
Although I did not see the para who shot him, I was pretty sure that he was shot by the para who came in through the north west entrance and had been firing almost at right angles to us. I was also sure that the para was standing over the man when he shot him.
This assumption is based on the fact that this was the nearest soldier he saw to James Wray. In fact, it is clear from Mr O’Kane’s oral evidence that the most he claims to have seen was James Wray lying on the ground, saying “help me”; then, when he heard a couple of shots, his body jump up and then fall back down. He concedes that he could not, from his position, see round into Glenfada Park North at all. All his other observations are assumptions based on these facts.
Despite Mr O’Kane’s insistence that “I am 100 per cent certain that I seen this” his failure in 1972 to mention seeing James Wray shot for a second time together with his apparent willingness to present assumption as fact must raise doubts about his account.
Mr O’Kane’s evidence also contradicts that of Messrs. Mahon, McCauley, Carr and others who suggest that a soldier moved into Abbey Park and shot Gerard McKinney immediately after James Wray was shot while Mr O’Kane describes moving and talking with Gerard McKinney for some time after this.
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346 AO48.4 paragraph15 347 Day 163/023/01 348 Day 163/062/010 349 Day 163/023/22 350 Day 163/066/15 351 AO48.4 paragraph16-17 Vincent Harkin (AH34) appears to be another victim of recovered memory syndrome as, having made no reference to the Wray shooting in either his NICRA statement of 1 Feb 1972 or his taped interview with Kathleen Keville, he now remembers that he saw
a man crawling on the ground in Glenfada Park North north towards the entrance into Abbey Park. I believed that he was crawling because he had been shot. The next thing that happened was the person who was crawling was shot again and was lying still on the ground and I remember people were shouting "They've shot a boy on the ground. They've shot him, they've shot him!"
Indeed Mr Harkin appears to have been merely repeating what others had told him as, in oral evidence he conceded that:
Q. You say that the person was shot again, but did you actually see him or her hit; did you see that person hit?
A. No.
Frances Lyttle AL36 also gives a startlingly graphic account in her BSI statement which was not mentioned in her 1972 NICRA account and which described Jim Wray being shot at point blank range by two soldiers as he approached his grandmother's garden gate. It is so fantastic in its detail as to have no direct evidential value with regard to Wray's shooting. The Tribunal will no doubt bear this account in mind however when considering the propensity of civilian witnesses to give highly detailed accounts of events which they believe to be part of the lore of Bloody Sunday.
352 AH34.3 paragraph 11 353 AH34.3 paragraph 11 354 Day 417/149/13-16 355 AL36.3:13 Contradicting all these accounts is the BSI evidence of John McGee who suggests that he reached James Wray when he was still moving and alive and remained until he saw his body removed. He says
*I believe Jim Wray may have been alive when I saw him; he may have moved his head. I was in a complete daze and I sat down on the ground beside him. While I was there I picked up either from Jim Wray's hands or from the ground very close beside him a small brown handled steak knife and a couple of pebbles. I also picked up Jim Wray's watch which had come off* then "Jim Wray's body was taken away I think by St John's Ambulance."
The Tribunal will, as well as considering the evidence of those who claim to have seen James Wray shot while prone, also bear in mind that none of those gathered at the gable end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North witnessed any shooting within the square after the initial burst of firing as soldiers entered. They certainly did not see what would have been the shocking sight of a soldier shooting a defenceless man a matter of feet away from them.
Eamon McAteer AM41, for example, is clear that "I did not see any soldiers go over to the bodies in GPN and I do not know what happened to them."358
Fergus McAteer AM42 said "I do not recall any of these soldiers shooting while they were visible to me in Glenfada Park North" Soldier 027’s account of Jim Wray’s “execution”
9A-351 Soldier 027 of course gives an account of Soldier H firing at a man on the ground. He said that
H fired from the hip at a ? of ? yards. The bullet passed through one man and into another and they both fell, one dead and one wounded. He then moved forward and fired again, killing the wounded man. They lay sprawled together half on the pavement and half in the gutter. **359**
9A-352 This account hardly corroborates the civilian eyewitnesses who make no suggestion that James Wray was laying even close to much less “sprawled together” with another man. Soldier 027’s observations also of course contradict Mr Mahon’s identification of Soldier G as the soldier responsible for the alleged close range shot.
9A-353 Indeed, in his BSI statement, Soldier 027 retracts this part of his evidence saying that
I cannot say now whether I saw the incident or whether I was told of it later by Soldier H or one of the others in Glenfada Park North**360**.
9A-354 He now says of Soldier H “I have a feeling that he had been shooting down by Joseph Place.”**361**
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**359** B1565.007 **360** B1565.056 paragraph177.9 **361** B1565.048 paragraph135 There is a great deal of civilian evidence referring to the shooting of James Wray whilst lying prone in Glenfada Park North. The Tribunal will, however, have noted both the fundamental contradictions in their accounts and the very late stage at which most of them first came forward. Such evidence is very far from providing a “framework on which the Tribunal can rely” or “corpus of evidence coming from many observers at the same scene” which “can provide irrefutable truth about what happened at that scene” as Lord Gifford suggests. Rather, the eyewitness evidence of James Wray’s “execution” demonstrates an understandable but alarming propensity amongst civilian witnesses to perpetuate popular myth, albeit, perhaps, in some cases sincerely and apparently convincingly at first glance.
An excellent example of this tendency, as explained by an honest and self-aware witness is the recollection described by Nell McCafferty (M54) of seeing James Wray come towards the house she was sheltering in and later falling. She candidly admits that “Memory plays many tricks” and that on many details she has “a vague memory, which may be totally untrue.” She acknowledges the power of emotion in distorting memory, admitting that she may have imagined seeing James Wray because “I am just feeling rotten about it.” She also acknowledges how convincing such “false” memories can be, explaining that, while she would trust the article she wrote
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362 Day 049/132/06 363 Day 168/135/04 364 Day 168/128/21 365 Day 168/134/07 366 Day 168/134.14
FS 7.1999 IX-116 immediately after Bloody Sunday more than her later memory, “the later memory is so vivid.”
9A-357 Ben Keaveney AK2 (with experience of counselling trauma victims) gives an excellent and honest description of the mythologizing process, saying about James Wray,
I still have a vision of him lying on the floor, but that could be just something that has been imposed by reading about it, although emotionally, which is maybe not the best way to give evidence, emotionally I feel that I saw him, I feel that he was there....
9A-358 John O’Kane AO48, while sticking to his account of James Wray’s shooting recognises that other parts of his evidence have been unintentionally fabricated. He admits that, while he claimed in his BSI statement to have seen Damien Donaghy and John Johnston shot,
they were actually shot before I got up there. It was only that, on hearing it from people in the crowd what happened, I actually thought I seen it, but...
9A-359 He is prepared to concede that it is perfectly possible to have
“an honest mental picture of something that you believe you saw, although you subsequently come to realise that you could not have done.”
9A-360 Mr O’Kane himself gives the excellent example:
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367 Day 168/137/03 368 Day 60/037/22 369 Day 163/002/22 370 Day 163/047/10
FS 7.2000
IX-117 "if you go to another country, you say to yourself "I think I was here before", but actually seen it on TV, maybe years ago; that is what you are actually saying."\\textsuperscript{372}
Certainly the Eversheds interview process is likely to have contributed to solidifying certain myths, presumably as a result of the interviewers' unconscious pursuit of consistency in eyewitness accounts. Consider for example the comments of Gerry Doran on Day 157 who, when speaking of his Eversheds interview said,
\\begin{quote} It was pointed out to me that in fact I had identified the wrong people in the wrong place. I was made aware Jim Wray was shot at the entrance to the alleyway.\\textsuperscript{372} \\end{quote}
It is extremely unfortunate that evidence should have been influenced in this way.
Ultimately, while James Wray died tragically on Bloody Sunday, the evidence, closely examined, demonstrates that he was not shot either at close or long range while on the lying on the ground, as, with the possible exception of a shooting by a soldier lying prone on the ground which no civilian witnessed, the angle of bullet entry cannot admit such a possibility if he was lying flat on his front as almost every eyewitness acknowledges. Whether he was shot by a soldier firing from a lowered position, leaning over a car for example, or while he was leaning or bending forward will never be known. What is clear is that the suggestion that he was "executed" is a product of the contamination of evidence over many years. Such a process is aptly summed up by Malachy Coyle himself in a Secret History broadcast\\textsuperscript{373}
\\textsuperscript{371} Day 163/049/03 \\textsuperscript{372} Day 157/182/09 \\textsuperscript{373} Video 7 It [Bloody Sunday] is really in the Derry folklore.
9A-VI THE TRIBUNAL CANNOT RELY UPON THE EVIDENCE OF SOLDIER 027
9A-363 Soldier 027 has shown himself to be a witness on whom the Tribunal cannot rely in any aspect of his evidence. His supposed revelations as to events in Glenfada Park are no less incredible than the rest of his evidence to this Tribunal.
9A-364 Soldier 027 claimed in the document he wrote in 1975 that “E, H, G, F and myself then leapt the wall” and ran into Glenfada Park North. The scene he encountered was of “A group of 40 civilians were there running in an effort to get away.”
9A-365 His allegation that
[ H \\text{ fired from the hip at a range of 10 (? illegible) yards. The bullet passed through one man and into another and they both fell, one dead and one wounded. He then moved forward and fired again, killing the wounded man. They lay sprawled together half on the pavement and half in the gutter.} ]
has already been dealt with above. Soldier 027 has, indeed, admitted in his BSI statement that he cannot in fact say if H’s shooting was something he saw or whether he was told about it later by H or someone else.
9A-366 027’s next allegation in this document is that “E shot another man at the entrance of the Park who also fell on the pavement.” This corroborates
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374 B1565.006 375 B1565.006/007 376 B1565.055 377 B1565.007
FS 7. 2002 IX-119 Soldier E's own evidence presuming that the "entrance" refers to the opening to Rossville Street.
He then says "A fourth man was killed by either G or F". Again, their evidence does not dispute this. Soldier 027 concedes "I can no longer remember the order of fire or who fell first."
By reference to a "fourth man" however, Soldier 027 bears witness to the presence of an additional, unknown, casualty in Glenfada Park North unless of course this latter reference is taken to refer to shootings in Abbey Park which he could not have seen on his account.
Soldier 027 goes on
_The crowd stopped immediately in their tracks turned to face us and raised their hands. This is the way they were standing when they were shot._
This does not accord with any civilian evidence as to the demeanour of Joseph Mahon, Michael Quinn, James Wray or William McKinney who are all described or describe themselves as running when they were shot. Patrick O'Donnell was pressed on top of Mrs. O'Brien. Danny Gillespie was either running or facing the soldiers depending on his account. Only Joseph Friel has said that he had stopped and turned at the time when he was shot and it is not suggested that any of these men raised their hands. Soldier 027's recent admission that this further detail about dead and injured in GPN, "may have been influenced subsequently by having read Don Mullan’s book and read and seen other material"(^{380}) is perhaps not surprising.
9A-371 Soldier 027 then provides an account of the treatment of arrestees and goes on to describe how he was left alone in Glenfada Park North watching the retrieval of the bodies by first aid workers. If nothing else, this would of course suggest that 027 was the soldier who, according to her evidence, insulted and shot at Evelyn Lafferty.(^{381})
9A-372 Indeed all of Soldier 027’s account of events in Glenfada Park North included in his 1975 material is undermined by the statement in his BSI statement that
[ \\text{It is inappropriate for me to claim with any degree of certainty the accuracy of the events in Glenfada Park as described in that document. I do not know now how much of that account was first hand experience and how much of it was hearsay or anecdotal.}^{382}]
9A-373 All he now recalls in his BSI statement is that “F and G then ran to the right closely followed by Soldier E and Soldier H” while he followed on behind.(^{383})
[ \\text{As we ran towards GPN there was a metre or two between each man......Before I entered GPN, shooting had already recommenced}^{384}. ]
[ \\text{As I came on the scene there was at least one body down. I saw a crowd of about 40 shocked and terrified people along the south side of the car park, trying to get away. They were in the process of exiting the south west corner of the car park when,} ]
(^{380}) B1565.057 paragraph 177.10 (^{381}) AM17.4 (^{382}) B1564.044 paragraph 114 (^{383}) B1565.042 paragraph 101 (^{384}) B1565.042 paragraph 102
FS 7 2004
IX-121 in the presence of the shattering noise of the SLRs they became submissive and acquiescent. Some froze in a static huddle.\\textsuperscript{385}
9A-374 027's memory is then unclear. He is not sure where he went but
one of my first images is of seeing a man in a pale grey suit who had been shot, lying in the pavement or gutter that ran along the left side of where I was standing.\\textsuperscript{386}
I then remember being on my own in the car park.
9A-375 He says he saw the bodies removed and
I remember the man in the pale grey suit was the last to be removed.\\textsuperscript{387}
9A-376 This description of a man in a pale grey suit fits none of the dead or wounded. Moreover the order in which bodies were removed appears in the video taken by Michael Rodgers\\textsuperscript{388} to be Joseph Mahon first, then William McKinney and James Wray at the same time. Again, Soldier 027 appears to have identified an unknown casualty.
9A-377 Soldier 027 does not, then, in his current evidence claim to have witnessed shooting by any soldier. He concedes that his account of Soldier H may be hearsay and while he is confident that four soldiers fired in Glenfada Park North it is not at all obvious how he has reached this conclusion as he has no recollection of Soldier E (one of the only four soldiers he recalls seeing in Glenfada Park North) firing at all.\\textsuperscript{389}
\\textsuperscript{385} B1565.042 paragraph 104 \\textsuperscript{386} B1565.042 paragraph 105 \\textsuperscript{387} B1565.042 paragraph 107 \\textsuperscript{388} Video 19 \\textsuperscript{389} B1565.042 paragraph 109 He says that
*I cannot now, with any certainty, associate any soldier with a particular incident.*
Soldier 027’s current allegations therefore amount to:-
*As I initially entered Glenfada Park North, within a very short space of time there were some 10 or 15 rounds fired in a series of rapid, staccato shots, which came in a burst. They were followed by more intermittent firing.*
In fact this hardly conflicts with the evidence of Soldiers G, F, H and E who say they fired 10 rounds in total in the initial burst followed by Soldier F’s shots from the south east corner and Soldier H’s 19 rounds into a window.
Soldier 027 says he saw no weapons, bombs or threatening behaviour, but concedes he arrived after the others and when at least one casualty was down. He cannot describe any of the dead or injured.
Soldier 027 insists that Soldiers F and G were prime movers even though he cannot really say why. He makes no more than a vague and subjective allegation that Soldiers F and G “in particular appeared to assert themselves and influence events”. His suggestion that “I believe LCpl F and Soldier G had a preconceived idea of what they were going to do that day” is completely unsubstantiated.
______________________________________________________________________
390 B1565.042 paragraph 109 391 B1565.042 paragraph 103 392 B1565.042 & paragraph 104 393 B1565.042 paragraph 114-115 394 B1565.042 paragraph 115 Indeed the most likely scenario is that Soldier 027 did not enter Glenfada Park North until after the shooting had finished, if at all. Lt 119 specifically told Lord Widgery that, as would be expected, his radio operator came in shortly after him. He has confirmed in evidence to this Tribunal that this is where he would expect his radio operator to be. Lt. 119’s evidence is of course that he entered Glenfada Park North after the forward party of men including Soldiers F and G and saw, at most, the last shots fired by Soldier F.
In support of Lt 119’s evidence, the majority of civilian witnesses saw four or less soldiers in Glenfada Park North when shooting was ongoing which would not, on his own account, allow for 027’s presence or that of Lt 119.
395 B1466 at E 396 Day 364/003/14 THE SOLDIERS' ACCOUNTS OF ACTIONS IN SECTOR 4
9A-VII SOLDIERS ENTERED GLENFADA PARK NORTH FOR LEGITIMATE AND PROPER REASONS.
9A-385 It is accepted that a number of soldiers give differing accounts of their reasons for entering Glenfada Park North. That their accounts should differ in this way is not, perhaps, surprising in view of the conditions in which these soldiers were operating. There is, moreover, evidence to show that the armed and other activity which they reported at that stage was indeed taking place in the area at the time they describe. Not only was Glenfada Park regularly used by paramilitaries but a small minority of civilian witnesses have been prepared to state that they saw such activity on Bloody Sunday.
GLENFADA PARK WAS A HABITUAL HAVEN FOR PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY
9A-386 There is considerable evidence that Glenfada Park North was a habitual haven of paramilitary activity and a regular sanctuary for rioters and armed individuals. Such evidence has emerged entirely separately from the soldiers' accounts of observing just such activity in the area.
9A-387 William Barrett (AB110) described, when questioned by Counsel to the Tribunal, regular firing by one individual from Glenfada Park towards the Embassy Ballroom:
A. He would run into what you would call Glenfada Park North, is it? I remember he was in there one night anyhow. The lower part of Glenfada, it used to be to me the next square along. Even from in there he could not hit the top of the Embassy anyhow.397
397 Day 198/064/21-065/02 Mr Barrett continued:
Q. In the square itself, from inside the square?
A. Yes, and there would be a crowd following him, like the Pied Piper.
Q. People would follow him around?
A. Certainly I remember that.
Q. How often did that happen?
A. I remember it happening a number -- enough times for people to know, here comes so and so, and suddenly there would be a bang, bang, bang, and everybody would look and run, regularly enough occurrence.
Q. Did this happen before Bloody Sunday?
A. I cannot remember now. I mean, I lived there from, I lived there for 8 or 9 years, the things may not be in the right order that I remember them, but I cannot remember exactly when.398
Mr Barrett continued
... ...there was a terrible lot of things happened around the one area, to actually put a time on it I could not be too sure at all, you know, an exact time. It must have been fairly early on because whenever the shooting really started you did not get many people following a boy around, you know, it was, it was hit the dirt time when you heard shooting.
Q. Did you know where this man obtained the machine-gun?
A. Not at all, no.
Q. Did you know to which, if any, paramilitary organisation he belonged?
A. No. Q. Or was it known generally that he was or might be a member of the Provisional IRA, the Official IRA?
A. No, I think it was maybe somewhere in the back of me mind that he was a member of the Official IRA, but I do not know if he was or not, it was just general talk.
Raymond Rogan (AR24) agreed in his evidence to the Widgery Tribunal that it was “common knowledge” that firing came from the area of Glenfada Park against the troops.
Q. Can you tell my Lord this: Is it not right that frequently rifle fire or IRA fire comes from Glenfada Park Flats?
A. That I couldn’t say with a great degree of certainty who actually does the firing.
Q. But firing does come from that area against the troops, doesn’t it?
A. It is common knowledge.
Mr Rogan, when questioned by Christopher Clarke QC, maintained that such firing did indeed take place:
Q. I understand you there to have been saying that prior to Bloody Sunday it was common knowledge that fire directed against the troops came on occasion from the Glenfada Park flats; is that what you were accepting?
A. That is correct, yes.
Other witnesses gave evidence that Glenfada Park North, and in particular the North East corner, was well known as a place to which hard line rioters and others might retreat for safety at times of disturbance in the Bogside.
399 Day 196/066/14-067/05 400 AR24.31 at C-F 401 Day 184/007/25-008/04 Paddy McCauley (AM97) said in his BSI statement that
From my experience of rioting and experiencing gun battles, I knew that the safest place to be in the Bogside when there was trouble was the north eastern corner of Glenfada Park North. I knew that if I was there I could not be seen from the soldiers on the City Walls and on top of the Embassy Ballroom. I also knew that I could not be lifted by the soldiers on the ground as they would not cross the lines at the northern boundaries of the Bogside.
Mr McCauley described fleeing to the north east corner of GPN as going “back to base”. He reiterated the point in evidence to the Tribunal when questioned by Edwin Glasgow QC:
If there was trouble of any kind, you and the hardline rioters with you would normally try and flee to Glenfada Park North?
A. Yeah.
Q. It was generally known to be a fairly safe place to go, even if you had been involved in rioting?
A. Yeah.
Q. And even if you had got petrol bombs or nail bombs or other weapons like that with you; you were reasonably safe in Glenfada Park North?
A. To me, the way I would have looked at things in those days would have been: you cannot be seen from the Embassy buildings, you cannot be seen from the Derry Walls and the army will not come in that far.
Q. And even if, Mr McCauley, you were carrying weapons of any kind?
A. Yeah. Q. Even if one was carrying weapons, even if a person was carrying weapons of any kind, again Glenfada Park North was the obvious place to run to as being somewhere that was reasonably safe where you could not be seen?
A. Yeah, it was a blank spot, yeah.
Paddy McCauley’s evidence is of course supported by the evidence of and relating to OIRAs 1 and 7, examined below. Such evidence confirms that Glenfada Park North was used by the Bogside section of the Official IRA as an area in which to store arms under the control of the OIRA for potential use against the Army.
Notes taken by Paul Mahon suggest that Glenfada Park was also used as an area for storing weapons by the Provisional IRA. Mr Mahon was referred to pages in his notebooks by Edmund Lawson QC:
Q. Over the page, 232, the notes continue with reference to: "The IRA often would use a car positioned in Glenfada Park as an arms dump." What is not apparent, can you assist, is whether this is a continuation of the same conversation or a different one?
A. That definitely came from "Mad Dog", that information.
Q. That is "Mad Dog" too?
A. Yes.
Even on the account of events now put forward by OIRAs 1, 2 and 7, it is clear that, at a time when, according to OIRA 1, security considerations were paramount, the eastern side of Glenfada Park North was a place considered safe to park their vehicle. It was moreover, according to this account, a safe
______________________________________________________________________
404 Day 162/106/4-107/21 405 AOIRA1.1 406 AOIRA1.25 paragraph11 area in which to “dump” a weapon which was, according to OIRA 1 “in short supply”, even in circumstances where, as OIRA 1 told the Tribunal, “there was a fear the British Army would seize any of our weapons at all times”.
Others support the suggestion that Glenfada Park North was a place which was considered secure from incursions by the Army. Joseph Mahon (AM18) told the Tribunal when questioned by Mr Glasgow that Glenfada Park North was a “safe area”. Mr Glasgow continued:
A safe area. Mr Mahon, somebody else told the Tribunal this week that it was an area where people went at times of trouble for refuge because it was known to be safe?
A. Yeah.
Q. It was not overlooked?
A. Yes.
Q. And it is a place you knew you could not be seen and you were reasonably safe, could not be seen by the soldiers?
A. No, that is, it is not that you could not be seen. They never came that far before.
Seamus Doherty, (AD102), also confirmed in his BSI statement that
I was anxious about the shooting and so I ran..... to point F which was at the west entrance between Glenfada Park North and Glenfada Park South because I thought that was the safest place to be. There is then clear evidence that Glenfada Park North was indeed likely to be the destination of both rioters and armed men surprised by the Army incursion into the Bogside that day.
**MILITARY EVIDENCE RE ENTRY INTO GLENFADA PARK NORTH**
9A-401 Soldier E gave consistent evidence in his RMP statement at B87; SA at B95 and to the Widgery Tribunal at B102 of having taken a decision to pursue rioters/part of the crowd which was moving from the barricade into Glenfada Park.
9A-402 Soldier F described in his RMP statement of 31.1.72 at B167.026 moving into Glenfada Park North having seen rioters move there from the barricade. He added in a further, undated RMP statement at B167.031 that there were amongst that crowd three men, one of whom appeared to be carrying a rifle. Soldier F confirmed such evidence in his SA at B167.035 and in his evidence to the Widgery Tribunal at B167.039E. Consistently with Soldier E, he told the Widgery Tribunal that the decision to enter Glenfada Park was taken by Soldier E.412
9A-403 Soldier G followed Soldier F’s initiative in moving into Glenfada Park North having seen a gunman moving in the alleyway between Glenfada Park North and Columbcille Court.413
9A-404 Soldier H described pursuing a group of young men in possession of nail bombs through the north eastern entrance of Glenfada Park North.414
______________________________________________________________________
412 B167.050G – 051A 413 B168-9; B186 414 B264.020-021; B230; B264.07; B264.029 at A-D Lieutenant 119 took a decision to send men into Glenfada Park having seen a man firing around the corner of Glenfada Park North, apparently with a pistol.\\textsuperscript{415}
There is civilian evidence, albeit given it appears with some reluctance, to confirm that soldiers entered Glenfada Park North with just the apprehensiveness and trepidation that might be expected in these circumstances.
Malachy Coyle included in his draft statement the note that:
\\begin{quote} As they ran into the car park, they were all (with the exception of the soldier without a helmet) in a slightly crouched position and seemed to be taking care to look around and obtain cover. I had the impression that they were afraid of being shot at themselves and were looking for snipers.\\textsuperscript{416} \\end{quote}
Mr Coyle now says, wholly implausibly, that all of this description was a mistake which he does not ever recall giving.\\textsuperscript{417} Asked about this statement by Mr Glasgow. Mr Coyle denied ever saying this to Eversheds:
\\begin{quote} Q. Did you at least say that, even if you have changed your mind about it afterwards, or are you saying you never even said that?
A. I do not think it was part of my initial statement, no. I do not know, those two things were in and when I read them, I did not, I cannot -- I am almost positive I did not say that, you know. The other one too, which I countersigned, I did not say that either, you know.
Q. I have to ask you, Mr Coyle, because it might have quite serious implications. \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{415} B1443; B1450; B1456 \\textsuperscript{416} AC97 \\textsuperscript{417} Day 156/094/20 A. I understand that, it is not a case of changing it to make it look good. I cannot remember having said that.
Q. You cannot remember having said it?
A. Having said it. I got the transcript, I think the next day, and when I read I went down to Paddy and I says, "Look, that there is not right. I do not know what it is doing in there". I do not know who put it in there, but it was not me.418
Strangely, however Mr Coyle had also said in his taped interview with Paul Mahon that the soldiers who entered Glenfada Park North were:
"military alert to danger and they were kneeling down or standing up"419
a description very similar to that which Mr Coyle required to be deleted from his BSI statement.
Furthermore, there is compelling civilian evidence to corroborate the presence of the gunmen with both rifles and pistols, boys with nail bombs and rioters that these soldiers reported seeing. While the soldiers' accounts may give different reasons for their entry into Glenfada Park North, it is inconceivable that the correlation between the men they reported seeing and those men seen by civilians coming forward over 25 years later can be a matter of coincidence.
9A-VIII THERE WAS ARMED ACTIVITY IN GLENFADA PARK NORTH
418 Day 156/094/09-095/03 419 X4.45.52 INTRODUCTION
9A-410 There is now before the Tribunal considerable evidence to prove that, not only was Glenfada Park North regularly used as a haven of paramilitary activity, but that, on Bloody Sunday itself, there were in Glenfada Park North:
(1) gunmen who carried and fired handguns at soldiers in Rossville Street;
(2) young men armed with nail bombs; and
(3) a car or cars belonging to the Official IRA from which rifles and other weapons were removed at or around the time that soldiers entered the Bogside.
9A-411 There is also evidence to prove that some of those weapons were present in Glenfada Park North when soldiers entered the area and were likely to be precisely those guns and nailbombs seen by soldiers in the hands of individuals in Glenfada Park North.
9A-412 In considering such evidence the Tribunal will no doubt wish to place particular reliance upon any evidence of gunmen or paramilitary activity given by civilians who have no possible motivation for inventing such accounts and who indeed might be expected to be extremely reluctant to come forward, as they have been in the past. The point was well made by Mr Barry when he gave evidence to the Tribunal:
A. As a general proposition, and I ask you to believe I am not being facetious here, but as a general proposition I do remember repeatedly telling my colleagues or reminding my colleagues of a saying which I have found very useful, which is a rubric by the great mathematician CS Hardy, who once advised his pupils that when the Archbishop of Canterbury says he believes in God, that is just in the way of business; it is when he says he does not that you can take it he means it, and that weighed with us on the question of what the IRA had done that day and what the civilian witnesses said.\\textsuperscript{420}
**THE NORTH EAST CORNER OF GLENFADA PARK NORTH**
9A-413 Evidence of gunmen and young men with nail bombs operating in Glenfada Park at the time soldiers entered the area is set out below. Photographic evidence also indicates that there was activity in the north east corner of the square shortly before soldiers entered which caused concern to the civilians gathered in the area.
9A-414 It is clear from photograph P432 that efforts were first made by the group carrying Michael Kelly to take him towards the north east of Glenfada Park North. Photographs P436 and P437 then show that the group diverted from that route to carry him across to the south west exit.
\\textsuperscript{420} Day 194/041/18 Pearse McCaul, who was part of the group carrying Michael Kelly, has confirmed, when questioned by Mr Glasgow, that this diversion was not the result of soldiers being seen at that entrance:
Q. Are you able to help the Tribunal: why was it that whoever it was who was leading the party, or all of you were carrying Mr Kelly in a northerly direction at one stage, but then must have turned round and came in the opposite direction?
A. I could not honestly (inaudible).
Q. The only thing you are certain about, you very kindly answered my question on this, but you should reconsider it in the light of this photograph: you are quite sure that it was not until you got down to this corner of the southern side over there, that the soldiers came in, that you say you are sure of?
A. That is correct.
Q. You are sure?
A. As far as I can remember.
Q. Whatever it was that made you change your minds -- if there were more than one mind operating -- whatever it was that made you change your direction from north to southwest, could not have been the entry of the soldiers?
A. I do not know why, there was a lot of confusion.
P433 (aka P1122) also shows a man signalling or remonstrating towards the north east corner of Glenfada Park North. Clearly, as Michael Kelly is shown still lying on the ground at this stage, the entrance of soldiers cannot be the object of his attention. It would appear from the photographic evidence that something was taking place in the north east of Glenfada Park North in the period shortly before soldiers entered.
421 Day 164/128/18 There is compelling evidence that a man was operating with a handgun in the Glenfada Park area at the time soldiers entered the Bogside and took up positions on Rossville Street. Michael Lynch (AL38) was watching from the eighth floor of the Rossville Flats when he saw
A man with a handgun come out quickly from the north east side of Glenfada Park North at approximately the point marked B on the attached map (grid reference J13) and fire two shots towards the soldiers in Rossville Street. I think the pistol was in his right hand. I do not think he had time to aim at anyone. He was wearing a Parka jacket and he had the hood of the jacket up covering his head....
...As soon as he had fired the shots, he ran away in the same direction from which he had come from (sic).422
In oral evidence, Mr Lynch gave a more detailed description of the man's movements and position:
MS McGAHEY: Could you mark for us, please, where he was when you first saw him?
A. Probably just there and he just come to that corner there (indicating).
Q. Did he put his entire body round the corner in order to fire?
A. No, he just put his right-hand, right arm -- sorry, like that.
Q. Would he have been able to see what he was firing at?
A. I do not know. I do not know would be the answer, only he could say that, I suppose. It seemed -- it happened very quickly
422 AL38.2 paragraph10 and it seemed as if he just put his hand round the corner and fired two shots and then ran straightaway again. It happened really within seconds.
Q. Did he run back into the alleyway that you can see on this picture?
A. Yes.
Q. Could we save that image, please, as AL38.10. Mr Lynch could not see any soldiers at the time he saw the gunman due to his position.
A. I could not really see because from where I was looking I would have seen -- I did not come fully up to the window because of what had happened before, so a lot of that area immediately below would have been cut off and I would only have seen from, if you see roughly that footpath there, you know, that corner, about there, I would have only seen from about there back, so I cannot say with certainty if they had moved away, but I certainly did not see them.424
He is clear however that he saw the gunman after soldiers had entered the Bogside.425 Mr Lynch was also able to say that he saw the man prior to seeing three bodies lying on the barricade.426 It would not seem possible that the gunman could have acted as and where he did at a time when soldiers were in Glenfada Park North and this incident must have preceded their leaving that area as Mr Lynch saw, after the gunman had departed, a crowd at the gable end of Glenfada Park North attempting to assist the casualties at the barricade.427 This crowd was of course escorted away from Glenfada Park by the soldiers in the area. Mr Lynch must therefore have spotted the gunman at some time between soldiers entering Rossville Street and their movement into Glenfada Park North.
Margo Harkin
Margo Harkin saw two young men, one of whom carried a pistol, in a very similar position to Mr Lynch, marked as K on her plan at AH23.22.
423 Day 148/188/20-189/14 424 Day 148/190/09-17 425 Day 148/189/23-24 426 Day 148/192/12-18 427 A1.38.3 paragraph15 She saw this young man fire one or more shots from the pistol into Rossville Street.
*I did not really think he took aim at all, he just did this wild, whatever it was. I thought it was one shot, it may have been more, I do not know.*
While Mrs Harkin believed she had seen this man at a considerably later stage than Mr Lynch, she readily agreed that she might be mistaken as to the sequence of events about which she gave evidence.
Despite attempts by Mr Treacy to persuade her otherwise, she was quite sure as to the position in which she saw these boys. In reply to the suggestion that she was mistaken about their position she said that:
*A. I really do not think so. I mean, if I am wrong I am only wrong by a matter of, you know, it is either one side or other side of that ramp, you know.*
Father O'Gara
Father Thomas O'Gara (H19) also described in his SC statement seeing a man fire at soldiers from a similar position. He told the Widgery Tribunal in oral evidence that this had occurred 30 seconds to a minute after army shooting.
*A young man appeared from the Cathedral side of Kells Walk unknown and unseen by soldiers, drew a pistol from his pocket, leaned over a wall at the end of Kells Walk and fired three* shots quickly. The soldiers didn't even recognise his presence and he disappeared. ...The man wore a longish coat...432.
9A-426 Others have also corroborated the existence of handguns in the area of Glenfada Park/Kells Walk. John Long (AL20) reported in his BSI statement that, having seen the injured John Johnston and Damien Donaghy, he went to seek medical help and returned to the area with a doctor:
...as we went through the alleyway from Kells Walk towards Columbville Court there were quite a few people pushing to get out in the opposite direction. Someone mentioned that a man with a handgun had been seen and they all wanted to get away.433
Mr Long confirmed his evidence to the Tribunal on day 068.434
Marian McMenamin
9A-427 Marian McMenamin (AM363) mentioned nothing of any civilian gunman in her NICRA statement435 and indeed indicates in her BSI statement the pressure operating on civilians not to reveal such evidence saying:
I hate myself for saying this; I have never told anybody about this before, not even my husband and we have been married for over 25 years.436
9A-428 Nonetheless, Mrs McMenamin bravely went on to give her account of running south down Rossville Street as the pigs entered and seeing a man with a handgun in a position close to that indicated by Michael Lynch and Father O’Gara.
432 H19.5-6 433 AL20.2 paragraph7 434 Day 068/096/12-19 The gunman was in an alleyway, near the pram ramp at the south gable end wall of Kells Walk. I have marked his approximate position on the attached map point D (grid reference K12). The man was at ground level in the area around the pram ramps, but not actually on the pram ramp. To the best of my recollection, he had his back to the gable end wall of Kells Walk. He was young, probably in his mid to late 20s, about 5'8" tall, average build, dark hair and wearing dark clothing (3/4 black coat). He did not have his face covered with a mask or balaclava. He was on his own – there was no-one around him; he was just a single gunman. He had a quite big, squarish, hand gun in his right hand. He was holding the hand gun out in front of him, but not aiming it. I did not see him fire it. He appeared from behind the wall, walked east towards RS, looked south towards the Rossville flats' shops and then withdrew again. I do not know where he went after that.437 Mrs McMenamin explained that she saw the gunman after the Pigs had entered Rossville Street\\textsuperscript{438} and while shooting was going on.\\textsuperscript{439}
In oral evidence Mrs McMenamin gave a great deal of thought to where she had seen the gunman in the course of which it appeared she may well in fact have seen him closer to the north eastern entrance into Glenfada Park North. Mrs McMenamin responded as follows when viewing virtual reality hotspot 9 A. Yeah, I would say, you know, there is a possibility that it was there because I know that I saw him ahead of me, whereas the other place that you pinpointed, I would have had to look round to see him, but I was looking straight at him.
\\textit{LORD SAVILLE: I think what you are saying is, if you take the first one we looked at, the difficulty is that the wall of Kells Walk in the way.}
\\textit{A. Exactly.}
\\textit{LORD SAVILLE: So you would not have seen him as you remember seeing him, whereas further down here on this other pram ramp area, in this other pram-way, you would have seen him as you remembered seeing him.}
\\textit{A. Yes.}
\\textit{LORD SAVILLE: Do I understand you correctly?}
\\textit{A. That is correct.}
\\textit{LORD SAVILLE: Could it have been in the area of this alleyway? A. Yes, quite possibly.}
\\textit{MR TOOHEY: Mr Rawat, are we now speaking about the alleyway to the north of Glenfada Park North, at least the ramp to the north of Glenfada Park North?}
\\textsuperscript{438} AM363.2 paragraph 6 \\textsuperscript{439} AM363.3 paragraph 8 MR RAWAT: Yes, it would be.
MR TOOHEY: Because that is face on basically to Mrs McMenamin as she comes down?
MR RAWAT: Yes, it would be, yes. Well, it is the alleyway you would go down to get to Columbville Court.
MR TOOHEY: But in terms of the pram ramp she is speaking of, does the ramp not go from west to east?
MR RAWAT: Yes, it does.
MR TOOHEY: It is giving a north-facing appearance on one side?
MR RAWAT: I wonder if we can try and save this view. Now you have seen this, Ms McMenamin, we are going to give you control again. Can you mark the general area where you think you saw this man?
A. I would say there is a good possibility he was in this area.
Q. But positioned on Rossville Street. Let us save that, please, as AM363.10, the blue arrow marking the approximate position where Ms McMenamin saw a man with a gun on Bloody Sunday. Just to make clear for the transcript, the man was standing on Rossville Street. He was not on a pram ramp or behind a wall, was he?
A. He was along a wall, he was moving slowly along a wall.
Q. When you say "moving slowly along the wall", in which -- what exactly do you mean by that?
A. He was moving slowly along the wall, he had his back to the wall, as it were, and he was moving to stay out of sight, he was moving very carefully.\\footnote{Day 194/211/04-213/08} Mrs McMenamin made the reservation in marking the exact position in which she saw the gunman that
A. I think it is 30 years and I think I would be, in the capacity of my work I would have been quite familiar with the Bogside, but it is still hard after 30 years to actually pinpoint it by photograph.\\textsuperscript{44}
She describes his movements in similar terms to those used by Michael Lynch
\\textsuperscript{44} Day 194/214/17-20 He came out from -- he walked along a gable wall with his back to the gable. He came out towards Rossville Street and then he withdrew: he did not actually put his foot on Rossville Street.\\textsuperscript{442}
And confirms that she saw him at a time when soldiers and Pigs were present in Rossville Street
\\textit{Q. At the time you saw him, I know you have told us about your recollection of seeing Saracens coming into the Bogside, but at the time you saw him, were you aware of soldiers being in Rossville Street?}
\\textit{A. Yes}
\\textit{Q. Were you aware of Army vehicles being in Rossville Street?}
\\textit{A. I remember hearing the noise of them.}\\textsuperscript{443}
The Tribunal has been invited to consider on a number of occasions the lack of civilian evidence about the presence of gunmen which, as witnesses such as Mrs McMenamin have been brave enough to confirm, were operating in plain sight on Bloody Sunday. Indeed Mrs McMenamin herself was able to say that:
\\textit{Q. At the time you saw this man with a gun, was there a lot of people running south along Rossville Street?}
\\textit{A. Yes.}
\\textit{Q. So there would have been others who would have seen him as well?}
\\textit{A. Yes.}\\textsuperscript{444}
\\textsuperscript{442} Day 194/214/24-215/02 \\textsuperscript{443} Day 194/215/09-16 \\textsuperscript{444} Day 194/215/03 Liam Mailey
9A-434 Liam Mailey (M50) in his 1972 statement described hearing low velocity shots fired at around this time and location. From his position just south of the rubble barricade he saw the soldiers' Pigs come in and stop.
After this there were rifle shots from the soldiers who had got out of their vehicle and I saw at least two people injured in the advancing crowd. The others got down. I moved across Rossville Street towards the flats and just behind the barricade. While I was crossing I heard three single shots which appeared to be of lower calibre than the rifle shots. They appeared to be fired from the area of Glenfada Park or Kells Walk. I cannot give the direction.445
He described in his evidence to the Widgery Tribunal hearing:
3 shots of a much lower calibre than what the Army were firing... I would imagine it came from somewhere around Kells Walk... 446
9A-435 By the time he came to give his BSI statement Mr Mailey had little recollection of when he had heard the shots but was able to confirm that he did hear:
Three or four shots which were all low calibre and which sounded to me like an air rifle being fired. I am certain that they were not high velocity rounds and I did not see any soldiers in the vicinity when I heard them...
... I think it was after the march had started because I remember thinking to myself that it was a particularly stupid time to be firing shots and that we don't need this in the middle of a Parade.......
445 M50.57 446 M50.27 ...I think the shots came from the area of either Glenfada Park North or, perhaps, the southern end of Columbille Court. I am not sure, but I think the latter is more likely.\\textsuperscript{447}
Mr Mailey was unable to be any more precise in assisting the Tribunal when he came to give oral evidence as to where he was when he heard the low calibre gunfire?\\textsuperscript{448}
\\textit{Michael Kivelehan}
9A-436 The Tribunal will also recall the evidence of John Goddard as to the information which he was given, in 1991, by Michael Kivelehan (AK45) at a Kivelehan family gathering:
\\textit{Me into Glenfada Park, and to my Grannie's flat, top right corner of top quadrangle. Soldiers coming into G Park from Kells Walk......}
\\textit{Off the record:}
-\\textit{Man with short arm in their flat, disarmed and got rid of.}
-\\textit{Two nail bombs dumped in street outside his flat. Know because dragged the two boys in who had them. Ends}\\textsuperscript{449}
9A-437 Mr Goddard also noted that
\\textit{Michael is believable up to a point, but all the contentious stuff which is off tape, his two sisters and mother backed up immediately with more detail.}
9A-438 Mr Goddard confirmed in oral evidence that the "contentious stuff" referred to the information about the gun and nail bombs and emphasised that this evidence was backed up by other members of Mr Kivelehan's family.
\\textsuperscript{447} M50.2 paragraph6 \\textsuperscript{448} Day 163/095-096 \\textsuperscript{449} AK45.1 But the second point was -- I would make is that they were very, very detailed in what happened and that the people with these contentious objects were quickly disarmed, clipped round the ear and told to sit in a corner, which again correlated with other things we had been told in other areas.450
Mr Kivelehan himself eventually, having been summoned by the Tribunal, gave, presumably reluctant, evidence on Day 406 when he had only a vague memory of being interviewed by Mr Goddard451. He was able to confirm, however, when questioned by Mr Clarke, the accuracy of much of the information contained in Mr Goddard's notes 452. Indeed Mr Kivelehan appeared to accept the accuracy of Mr Goddard's notes, despite having no recollection of the interview.
Q. You do not seriously doubt, do you, that these are notes compiled by a journalist on the basis of things that you told him?
A. I do not doubt it at all, but I just cannot remember them.453
Mr Kivelehan refuted any suggestion, however, that he had seen either a short arm or nail bombs on Bloody Sunday.
Q. Your evidence about that is that you do not remember anything about two boys with nail bombs and you do not remember any shortarm in the flat; is that right?
A. Definitely not.
Q. Just to be quite clear about it: did you see any nail bombs that afternoon either in the flat or outside it?
A. Definitely not.
450 Day 233/200/03 451 Day 406/067/21 452 Day 406/069/03 453 Day 406/078/03 Q. Did anyone tell you that some nail bombs had been dumped anywhere near the flat? A. No.
Q. Did anyone tell you that there had been two boys with nail bombs anywhere near the flat? A. No.
Q. Did you see anyone with a shortarm anywhere in the area? A. A shortarm?
Q. Did you see anyone with a shortarm? A. A gun?
Q. Yes? A. No.
Q. Did anyone tell you anything about a man with a pistol or a shortarm anywhere in the area? A. No. 454
The Tribunal will recall that, questioned further by Mr Clarke, the only explanation which Mr Kivelehan could offer for Mr Goddard's notes was that he, Mr Kivelehan, was drunk at the time he spoke to Mr Goddard.
Q. Are you aware of any reason why the journalist would have wanted to make up information about a man with a gun and boys with nail bombs and put it in these notes? A. No.
Q. You suggested that one explanation may be that you were drunk. But if you were drunk, even in drink why would you have wanted to say this sort of thing to a journalist? A. I really do not know.
Q. Can you think of any other explanation of why this information appears in these notes?
A. No.
Q. Is another possibility that you did see these things happen on Bloody Sunday and that you are not telling the truth to this Inquiry?
A. I do not like that accusation.
Q. Well, what is the answer to my question?
A. What is your question again?
Q. Is another possibility that you did see these things happen on Bloody Sunday and that you are not telling the truth to this Inquiry?
A. No, that is not true.455
9A-442 It would appear overwhelmingly likely that the last suggestion put to Mr Kivelehan, that he did see these events and is not prepared to tell the truth to this Tribunal, is correct.
Ivan Cooper
9A-443 John Barry was able to verify the authenticity of notes of a lengthy interview he had conducted with Ivan Cooper in which reference was made to a gunman in Glenfada Park.
Could we have KC12.65? This is what appears to be notes of an interview with Ivan Cooper; do you have any doubt now that you took this interview?
455 Day 406/082/01 A. No, I have no independent recollection of it, but I am sure that these are my notes of an interview.
Q. The handwriting that is on the left-hand side on this page –
A. Is mine.\\textsuperscript{456} ....
... Again, so far as this document is concerned, if we can go back to it, KC12.65, are you able to tell whether this would have been notes made from a tape-recording?
A. Yes, certainly a tape.
Q. Is that because of the length of it?
A. It is the length and the detail, and also there are various parts in it which are clearly verbatim and I would only have used verbatim material if it came from a tape.\\textsuperscript{457}
9A-444 In such notes, Mr Barry records that:
\\textit{IC had seen the Officials in the march. But nowhere else. And IC only heard later that OIRA6 had fired a revolver in Glenfada Park. CIV2 \[according to these notes CIV2 CIV2 told IC that OIRA6 had been running around mad with a pistol all afternoon. CIV2 says he fired very early.}\\textsuperscript{458}
9A-445 Mr Cooper has of course described these notes as “poisonous and disturbing” in his written evidence to the Tribunal and rejected them in their entirety.\\textsuperscript{459} CIV2 has in turn described Mr Cooper as “a fantastic liar”.\\textsuperscript{460}
9A-446 The Tribunal may never be in a position to reach a firm conclusion as to the reason Mr Cooper named CIV2 and OIRA6 as he did but will no doubt have been persuaded by Mr Barry that
\\textsuperscript{456} Day 193/120/24-121/07 \\textsuperscript{457} Day 193/122/02-10 \\textsuperscript{458} KC12.71
FS 7.2037
IX-154 I am sure we made mistakes. But we did not invent things.\\textsuperscript{461}
9A-447 The Tribunal may also wish to consider whether there is any other source from which Mr Barry is likely to have received the name of OIRA 6 who was, himself, unable to explain where Mr Barry could have got his name from if not given to him by Ivan Cooper.
\\textit{Q. This may be a question you cannot answer, but do you have any idea at all why a journalist should write down your name if it were not given to him?}
\\textit{A. I do not know. This is the first time I have heard of this here, of this here, that is why I was brought here, about this. All the years it has gone on, I have never heard of this.}\\textsuperscript{462}
9A-448 Indeed it is not clear from where Mr Cooper would have received OIRA 6's name if not via an intermediary such as \\textsuperscript{CIV2} as OIRA 6 claims that he did not know Mr Cooper.\\textsuperscript{463}
9A-449 Whether OIRA 6's claim to know nothing of \\textsuperscript{CIV2}, the alleged original source of the information, is credible bearing in mind \\textsuperscript{CIV2} is own estimation of himself as a prominent citizen of Derry is a matter for the Tribunal. OIRA6, while agreeing when questioned by Mr Lawson, that Derry was a very small and intimate environment, denied knowing \\textsuperscript{CIV2} at all:
\\textit{Q. It was a place in which people tended to know others, would know what others were doing; was it not?}
\\textit{A. I do not understand your question.}
\\textsuperscript{459} KC12.30 paragraph 97 \\textsuperscript{460} AM208.5 paragraph 17 \\textsuperscript{461} M3.7 paragraph 30 \\textsuperscript{462} Day 413/164/05-11 \\textsuperscript{463} Day 413/163 Q. Did everyone know everybody else's business? It was not put very well.
A. Well –
Q. Pretty well, did they not?
A. One half of town knew the half and the other half knew the other half.
Q. You wanted to gather a meeting of the volunteers out of your section, word could be passed and within half an hour they would all be together?
A. Near enough, yes.
Q. Right?
A. Near enough, yes.
Q. Help in this regard: CIV2 however you pronounce it, is not a name, I gather, known to you?
A. No, it is not.
Q. Let me ask you this: at the time of Bloody Sunday, were you somebody who had been born and bred in Derry?
A. On Bloody Sunday?
Q. Yes?
A. I was born here, aye.
Q. That is a rather stupid question, what I was not seeking to do was to ascertain where you lived now, but you were a Derry man born and bred, is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Did you know of CIV2? A. I have never heard of the man.
Q. Someone who, according to him, ran a substantial business in Derry?
A. No. (Witness shaking head) No.
Q. Ran a business called Derry Office Supplies until 1971, when he sold or transferred it. Does that ring any bells?
A. No, I never heard of that at all, to be quite honest with you.
Q. And then was involved in the selling of ice-cream machines and cash registers from Donegal, but still coming to Derry?
A. No.
Q. You had never heard of him?
A. Never heard of him.
Q. In this very, very small place?
A. That is true.465
Certainly OIRA 6 has denied carrying a weapon on the day.466 His account of his activity on the day is, however, extremely odd as was highlighted by Mr Lawson's questioning of him on Day 413 of evidence:
Q. You have virtually no recollection of what happened during the main part of the violence on Bloody Sunday, have you? A. No, I have not.
Q. Is it right that while you were sitting on the wall having your cigarette and you became aware of people running away down Rossville Street, that as far as you were concerned there was nothing unusual going on at that time?
A. No, that is correct.
465 Day 413/167/10-21 466 Day 413/162/21-163/07 Q. You did not hear any vehicles? A. No.
Q. You did not see any Army vehicles? A. No, I did not, I was out of view.
Q. You did not hear a single shot fired? A. I heard banging all right, but I took it for granted it was rubber bullets or gas.
Q. Do you have any recollection of hearing any shooting of live rounds on the day? A. No, only what I heard people shouting.
Q. None at all? A. No.
Q. And you being somebody who was not only in the Official IRA, but someone with particular knowledge about weaponry, you, of course, would recognise the sound of live rounds being fired; would you not? A. Probably, probably so, yes. I was not paying any particular attention to anything going on.
Q. You were not paying particular attention? A. No, I was just sitting there having a cigarette.
Q. And you clearly remember sitting there having a cigarette, do you? A. Yes.
Q. But you have no recollection whatever of hearing a single live round fired? A. What is the problem there? I was not paying any attention. Q. Is that true? I was not paying any attention.
Q. Is that the truth? A. Probably so\\textsuperscript{467}.
**PIN 437 and L210**
9A-451 The document known as **PIN 437**, which is examined in detail below and which purports to represent notes of an interview with OIRA\\textsuperscript{1} and deals largely with OIRA activity in and around Columbciille Court and Glenfada Park North also makes reference to a man in an area referred to as “the car park” who fired a couple of shots with a .38 automatic\\textsuperscript{468}. It may be that such reference is to the actions of a gunman in the car park of the Rossville Flats, although OIRA\\textsuperscript{4}’s evidence is of course that he was armed with a .32 pistol\\textsuperscript{469}.
9A-452 The Tribunal will also have noted the reference to pistol fire in Mr Kemp’s article L210, also examined below and the product, it is claimed, of a further interview with OIRA\\textsuperscript{1}. In that article, Mr Kemp reports OIRA\\textsuperscript{1} as saying that:
\\begin{quote} After I fired that one shot I went back to my car and put the rifle in the boot. Ten to 15 minutes later the Paras moved up and I told our boys to get their weapons out of their cars......One guy got on to a balcony and fired at the Paras. Someone else fired with the pistol.\\textsuperscript{470} \\end{quote}
9A-453 This reference to firing with the pistol certainly appears to refer back to the preceding quote from OIRA\\textsuperscript{1} “I told some of the boys to get their weapons out of their cars”. The Tribunal may well conclude OIRA\\textsuperscript{1} is in fact referring to a pistol being fired in the area having been retrieved from one of the cars in
\\textsuperscript{467} Day 413/189/20-191/10 \\textsuperscript{468} AOIRA\\textsuperscript{1.1} \\textsuperscript{469} AOIRA\\textsuperscript{4.15 paragraph4} \\textsuperscript{470} L210 Glenfada Park rather than the scenario involving Father Daly’s gunman or OIRA 4.
**OIRA Movements in Glenfada Park Area**
9A-454 The evidence set out above demonstrates the nature of Glenfada Park as a location of IRA activity and undermines the accuracy of those many civilian witnesses in the area who have not mentioned seeing gunmen who were clearly operating in the area in plain view.
9A-455 It appears unlikely that the Tribunal will be in a position to identify the individuals who fired handguns from the vicinity of Glenfada Park North but will no doubt wish to consider the activities and evidence of those admitted paramilitaries who were in the area at the relevant times.
9A-456 OIRA’s 1 and 2 entered Glenfada Park after OIRA1 had fired a shot at soldiers from Columbille Court. They dumped the rifle that had just been fired in a car parked in Glenfada Park North. Both admit they were members of the Bogside Unit and Command Staff of OIRA. OIRA1 has said that he then took up a position at the south eastern gable wall of Glenfada Park North looking out onto Rossville Street. He was still in Glenfada Park North when soldiers entered via the north east entrance at which point OIRA1 ran from the south east to the south west exit to Abbey Park as soldiers opened fire.
9A-457 OIRA2 has told the Tribunal that he too was in Glenfada Park North and was with OIRA1 when he dumped the rifle. In his first statement to this Inquiry
______________________________________________________________________
471 AOIRA1.4 paragraph 6; AOIRA2.4 paragraph 4 472 AOIRA1.29 paragraph 27 473 AOIRA1.29 paragraphs 31-32 474 AOIRA2.6 paragraph 17 he said that he then started to make his way out of the "area" when soldiers arrived at which point he ran towards either Columbcille Court or Abbey Park, he "honestly cannot now remember". By the time he came to make his second statement to this Inquiry OIRA2 had recovered his recollection of exiting Glenfada Park via the gap between Glenfada Park North and Glenfada Park South. He said that as he was running he heard a crescendo of shots which he assumed came from "the paras". The Tribunal will bear in mind OIRA2's failure to account for the time which elapsed between his depositing the rifle in the car and soldiers entering Glenfada Park North, time which OIRA1 claims to have spent at the gable end watching events on the rubble barricade.
OIRA7 has also admitted being in Glenfada Park at the relevant time. He has explained how he assisted OIRA1 and 2 to place the rifle in the car then says that:
I therefore went out of Glenfada Park North through the access way at the north east corner of Glenfada Park North, turned right past a pram walk and came out onto Rossville Street near the pram walk at Kells Walk and was standing about. I have marked my position on the map at point F. [not marked]..... While in Rossville Street I remember hearing the revving of the engines of the army vehicles. The army had not come into the Bogside at this stage. ...Armoured cars then came into view. I was still at the Glenfada Park North pram ramp (grid reference J13)....
______________________________________________________________________
475 AOIRA2.6 paragraph 20 476 AOIRA2.6 paragraph 20 477 AOIRA2.16 paragraph 15 478 AOIRA2.16 paragraph 16 479 AOIRA7.10: paragraph 52- 7.11 paragraph 54 OIRA7 explained that he was still in this position when he heard the first live shot fired by the army. He retreated into Glenfada Park North when he saw soldiers at the Kells Walk pram ramp. He was still by the north eastern entrance when Michael Kelly was brought into Glenfada Park North:
There was a crack of bullets and I remember someone saying "somebody else has been shot". At that time I was still somewhere near the north end of Glenfada by the north eastern entrance into Glenfada Park (through which I had come), and I recall seeing the body of the boy I now know to be Michael Kelly being carried through Glenfada Park North from the south eastern exit towards the south western exit.
Very shortly after I saw the group of people carrying Michael Kelly, the square just erupted with gunfire from behind coming towards us, from the entrance where we had entered (north east). Everyone started running to the south west exit. No one wanted to be the last guy through the gap into Abbey Park. There was a big scramble to get through that south western exit.
Questioned by Counsel to the Tribunal, OIRA7 described in further detail his movements after assisting with the rifle:
Q. AOIRA 7.10. You describe how at some stage -- this is after the rifle has been put into the car in Glenfada Park -- you went out of Glenfada Park North through the access way at the northeast corner, turned right past a pram walk and came out into Rossville Street and were standing about near the position marked as F?
A. Which is not on the map.
Q. Which is not on the map. We will come to that in a moment. You then describe how, whilst you were in Rossville Street, you heard the revving of engines. At the top of the next page, paragraph 54, you describe how armoured cars came into view and your statement goes on to say: "I was still at the Glenfada Park North pram ramp," which is somewhere different from the pram ramp at Kells Walk. Could we have on the screen P200. If you came out of the northeast corner of Glenfada Park North, you would come out in that direction (indicating) and you would end up immediately near the pram ramp at Glenfada, which is what I am pointing out in yellow, but you would not be far away from the pram ramp at Kells Walk, which I am pointing out in red. Do you recall now whereabouts you went to and where you were when armoured cars came into view?
A. I must have said the general area actually between the two pram ramps and that was actually getting a physical description, because there was a bit of confusion earlier, when I talked about the barricade, the assumption was that I was talking about the rubble barricade. I was not talking about the rubble barricade, it was a barricade that had originally been at the end of Rossville Street.
Q. Can we take it in this way: that when you came out of Glenfada Park, you were roughly in the area between the two pram ramps? A. That is correct.
Q. The Glenfada ramp and the Kells Walk ramp?
A. That is correct.
Q. May we go back, please, to paragraphs 55 and 56 on AOIRA 7.11. You describe how you were about 150 to 200 yards from the Army and could see them, see the Army at the junction of Little James Street, Rossville Street and William Street and could also see others running. There was a lot of noise, a lot of shouting and people running. You then say that you saw an armoured car stop where you had been standing earlier near Kells Walk and the doors of the vehicles opened. You describe how soldiers were getting out of the vehicles and taking up positions.483
483 Day 398/057/22-059/23 Q. May we come back, please, to AOIRA 7.11, paragraphs 55 and 56. You describe at the end of paragraph 55 how the crowd, when the vehicles came in, split into three groups, one going into the car park, one going into Rossville Street and the third running into the area of Kells Walk and Glenfada Park. You say in paragraph 56 that it was about this time that you heard the first live shot fired by the Army which seemed to come in your direction along Rossville Street towards Free Derry Corner and from the direction of the soldiers who had made their way from their vehicle to the Kells Walk pram ramp.......
You yourself ran into Glenfada Park when the firing began; is that right?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. Could we come, please, to paragraphs 57 and 58 on AOIRA 7.11. You ran into the northeast entrance; is that right?
A. That is correct....you describe a memory, at some point when you were in the square, of catching your breath and there being a crack of bullets and someone saying that somebody else had been shot at a stage when you were somewhere near the northeastern entrance into the park and then you say that you recall seeing the body of the boy you now know as Michael Kelly being carried through Glenfada Park.485
9A-461 All of those members of OIRA who were present in Glenfada Park have of course denied carrying handguns despite the references in PIN437 and L210 set out above.
9A-462 Furthermore, the evidence of OIRA3,486 OIRA5487 and OIRA4488 was to the effect that it was entirely normal and authorised for Command Staff members
484 Day 398/062/22-063/08 485 Day 398/067/15-068/10 486 AOIRA3.24 paragraph34 487 AOIRA5.21 paragraph 39.5 488 AOIRA5.5 paragraph22 to carry short arms for personal protection. OIRA3 confirmed that there would have been no need for special authorisation to do so on Bloody Sunday(^{489}) and, indeed, OIRA4 has confirmed that he carried such a weapon on the day, as he did almost every day.(^{490})
9A-463 Vincent Browne in the Sunday Press on 6 February 1972, in an article which was clearly critical of the Army on Bloody Sunday, gave the following information:
> The Officials had an Active Service Unit of four men on duty. They were all either to be armed during the parade or to have immediate access to arms should they become necessary. In addition, a number of other volunteers in the parade were armed for their personal protection.(^{491})
Mr Browne no longer recalls the circumstances in which he obtained the information contained in this article but assumes he spoke to members of the Official IRA.(^{492})
9A-464 OIRA2 was certainly under the impression that at least two members of the Command Staff were carrying personal protection weapons on Bloody Sunday and told Mr Lawson that:
> Q. Were you aware of no other gunmen, apart from what you later heard, about the man who came to be known as Father Daly's gunman. Let us put him to one side, he was mentioned at your evening debriefing; was he not?
> A. Yes, that is correct.
> Q. Were you aware of no other gunmen that day?
(^{489}) AOIRA3.24 paragraph34\
(^{490}) AOIRA4.15 paragraph4\
(^{491}) M8.2\
(^{492}) Day 203/087/20-25 A. I was aware that another member was carrying a sidearm for personal protection.
Q. Where was he? A. I am not quite sure.
Q. Was he a member of the command staff? A. He was a member of the command staff, yes.
Q. That is apart from OIRA 4 who apparently volunteers himself to be Father Daly's gunman? A. That is correct.
Q. So in addition to him, in addition to OIRA 4 there was another member of the command staff carrying a sidearm? A. It may well have been the quartermaster.
Q. Mr Tester? A. That is right.
Q. Anybody else? A. Not as far as I am aware, no. 493
It is hardly credible that only one member of OIRA Command Staff carried a personal protection weapon on Bloody Sunday when all were authorised to do so and all were operating in circumstances of equal if not greater danger. Mr Lawson's questioning of OIRA2, about his and OIRA 1's alleged foray to recover a damaged weapon, highlighted the absurdity of such a suggestion:
Q. So what was, and obviously recognised at the time, to be a dangerous operation? A. That is correct.
493 Day 393/023/01-023/22 Q. A member of the IRA at the time when carrying out a dangerous operation of a quasi military nature, what would you take with you?
A. Could you repeat the question, please.
Q. I will be blunt about it if it is not clear: what guns did you take with you?
A. We did not take any guns with us.
Q. Why not, you were embarking on a dangerous military operation to recover guns and if you had been stopped by the military, you could have been shot dead, you are saying you took no weapons at all, neither of you?
A. That is correct.
Q. What was going to happen if you had been stopped, were you simply going to surrender meekly?
A. I do not know.
Q. Had you thought about it?
A. No.
... For the avoidance of doubt you were authorised to carry a handgun for your sole protection?
A. I was authorised but I did not carry a handgun.
Q. So was OIRA 1?
A. He did not carry a handgun either to the best of my knowledge
Q. He was authorised?
A. He would have been authorised, yes. Q. As you have told us, despite the dangerous mission on which you were engaged neither of you chose to arm yourselves?
A. The only weapon in our control was the .303.
9A-466 OIRA7's evidence as to his movements must be considered in light of the compelling evidence set out above that there was a gunman armed with a short arm close to the north east entrance to Glenfada Park North at a time when soldiers had entered the Bogside and shooting had commenced but prior to their entry into Glenfada itself. OIRA7 has said he left Glenfada Park via the north east entrance and remained close to that entrance as soldiers entered the Bogside in APC's. He remained there up to the point where soldiers opened fire before running back into Glenfada Park North via the same entrance and making for the south west corner. Soldiers entered the square as he reached that corner.
9A-467 As was put to him by Mr Lawson, OIRA 7 was at or retreating from the north east entrance throughout the period when witnesses saw an armed man in that area.
Q. Where did you go, then?
A. Um, the way that I had come in to Glenfada Park.
Q. Out of the northeast corner?
A. Yes, the northeast corner.
Q. The Rossville Street side?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Is that right? Is that the point at which you saw the Saracens come into Rossville Street?
493 Day 393/096/11-22 A. That was after a bit of time and listened, watching the gas and listening to plastic bullets, yes, that is where I was when I saw the Army car move.
Q. So you spent a bit of time, did you, standing there or thereabouts?
A. Yes, it definitely did not happen immediately after that weapon was put into the boot of the car.496
...Q. And you stood there or thereabouts, did you, after you had left the other two IRA men until after the soldiers had come into the Rossville Street wasteground area.
A. Yes.
Q. Indeed, you were still there when the shooting began?
A. Yes. After some shots had been fired you retreated?
A. Of course.
Q. But it was after a number of shots had been fired?
A. Yes, after a few shots had been fired, yes.497
Yes....
Q. Michael Lynch has said -- let me give the reference and if you want to see the statement, of course I will put it up at AL38.2, paragraph 10, evidence which he confirmed when he gave evidence to this Inquiry on Day 148, page 186, referred to being on the eighth floor of Block 1, seeing a man with a handgun emerge from the northeast corner of Glenfada Park North at or about the time the Army were coming in, or had come in, and firing two shots at the soldiers in Rossville Street. His position, if we can go back to it, please, AL38.8, the middle again, the position as marked by Mr Lynch on this map of that gunman was at letter B, which is the approximate position
496 Day 398/160/21-161/10 497 Day 398/161/14-162/08 apparently occupied by you, from what you tell us, at that time. Did you see such a gunman?
A. No.
Q. Did you have a gun? A. No.
... Father O'Gara made the statement back in 1972, it is at H19.5 going on to page 6 in which he referred -- it has been put on the screen, you might as well have it, the very bottom of that page, the last two lines.
A. Yes.
Q. The third incident, he said: "I can clearly recall happened about 30 seconds after the soldier discharged his shot." I pause there. the soldier he is referring to, it is apparent from earlier on, that is the first shot in Rossville Street area, right?
A. Okay.
Q. "A young man appeared from the cathedral side of Kells Walk, unknown and unseen by soldiers, drew a pistol from his pocket, leaned over a wall at the end of Kells Walk and fired three shots quickly. The soldiers did not even recognise his presence and he disappeared." He talks of the man wearing a longish coat, right?
A. Yes.
Q. You see what else he says about it there. That, on Father O'Gara's account, would have happened -- if it did -- just in front of you, would it not?
A. On that account, yes.
Q. Yes. Did you see anything of that?
A. No, I did not see it. Referring OIRA7 then to the evidence of Mrs McMenamin, Mr Lawson asked:
Q. "As we were running away, I saw a civilian with a gun. I hate myself for saying this; I have never told anybody about this before, not even my husband and we have been married for over 25 years. I feel disloyal to the innocent men who died on Bloody Sunday, but I did see him and I feel that the truth must now be told. The gunman was in an alleyway near the pram ramp at the south gable end wall of Kells Walk. I have marked his approximate position on the attached map, point D." Can we flick on to the same reference, page 5. You see the letter D sufficiently clearly at the bottom of Kells Walk?
A. Yes.
Q. If I may be allowed to interpolate, effectively the same position as was suggested by Father O'Gara, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Go back to the statement, please, at 363.3 to finish it off, the top paragraph, please. She describes in the third line his position, the area around the pram ramp, it is not actually on it, back to the gable end wall. He was young, mid 20s, five-foot eight, dark clothing, et cetera, on his own, squarish handgun, holding it out in front of him, not aiming it. She says she did not actually see him firing it, right?
A. Yes.
Q. It says he withdrew?
A. Yes.
Q. Let us put that together with what I reminded you of, in relation to the late Father O'Gara. Did you see anything of that?
A. No, I did not see it.\\footnote{Day 398/166/11-167/17} Military Evidence about Handguns
9A-468 There is a coincidence between the accounts set out above and the evidence of gunmen given by Lieutenant 119 and Soldier 017, more fully set out in Chapter 8 of these submissions.
9A-469 The evidence given by Soldier 017 was summarised by Mr Lawson in the course of his questioning of OIRA7
This is his Eversheds statement, as we call it in shorthand and, in his case, it is an echo of the description which he gave in his 31st January 1972 statement at page 1472, the same series. He is describing, as you can see, I need not read it all out, youths throwing bottles or bricks at him. About five lines in: "I saw a man with a pistol come round the corner from the northeast corner of Glenfada Park North into the alleyway towards me. The gunman was about 20 to 30 yards from me. I do not remember which hand his gun was in, but I could see that it was a pistol. He was pointing it in my direction. I fired a rubber bullet ... he shied away. I then ran round the corner ... called P. I cannot be certain as I did so whether or not the man with the pistol fired at me, but I think that he did.
9A-470 In Lieutenant 119's RMP statement of 4 February 1972 he described being in the cover of the Kells Walk wall when:
I then heard a number of shots, from what sounded like a pistol, and also from an MI rifle......From my observation of the origin of the shots I can state the following: The weapon which sounded like a pistol was located at ground level at the corner of Glenfada Park Flats, about 30 metres ahead and to my right at MR 43221684. I saw distinct muzzle flashes, but not the actual weapon or the person holding it. He was obviously aiming quickly around the corner of this building without exposing himself at all......I noticed that it was possible to get into Glenfada Park from an entrance directly to
501 B1484.5, paragraph 29 my right. I sent E and F together with a party of men around the right of Glenfada Park....
9A-471 Lieutenant 119 repeated to the Widgery Tribunal that evidence of seeing pistol fire from the south eastern gable of Glenfada Park North:
A Our initial reason for taking up cover there (Kells Walk wall) was that we were fired on there. If I can show you on the model, it was from this corner of the building on Glenfada Park.
Q. The south east corner
LORD WIDGERY: very near the barricade?
A. Yes sir that is right and also from the flats .....this weapon here, I think, being a pistol of some kind, certainly a hand held weapon which was fired round the corner. The firer of course I was unable to see .....
....A. It was a pistol, I think, sir. I could see the muzzle flashes. It was certainly a weapon that was easy to put round the corner without the firer being observed by me...
...Q. How many shots were fired?
Three or four rounds of fire that I observed.
NAIL BOMBS
9A-472 The Tribunal has also heard evidence from civilian witnesses who saw nail bombs in Glenfada Park North. Michael Quinn
9A-473 Michael Quinn (AO11) told Lord Widgery nothing of seeing any nail bombs when he gave evidence to that tribunal but told Peter Pringle and Philop Jacobsen of the Sunday Times Insight Team "under guarantee of total anonymity" in an interview on 1st March 1972 that he had seen two youths with nail bombs in Glenfada Park North. Their notes of the interview read:
2. While standing between the fences on the south side of Glenfada he saw two youths carrying nail bombs in their hands. One had long fair hair and was wearing a blue denim jacket. The other had very black hair, shortish and was wearing a fawn jacket. The bombs were cylindrical shape with a black fuse projecting from the top; they were about six inches long, he estimates. At no time did he see the bombs lit, but he is adamant that he saw them. One description fits Gerard Donaghy perfectly.
3. He says that he heard from close source that a senior official IRA man arrived on the scene and told the nail bombers to take them away as there was too much danger to other civilians.
9A-474 Mr Quinn agrees that he gave this information to the Sunday Times team but now has a slightly different recollection of the boys he saw. He describes taking shelter in Glenfada Park North having seen soldiers take up positions in the area of the Kells Walk wall. He then moved to a position about halfway along the eastern block of Glenfada Park North. He continues:
I do not know how long I was in Glenfada Park North, but I remember after some time seeing two young fellows in the northeast corner at the point marked I in grid reference J13 (and on photograph MQ1) who were looking round the corner
504 AO11.12 505 AO11.12 506 AO11.22 paragraph17 of the flats into Rossville Street. They were only young, about my age or a little bit older, and I did not know them. I was concerned in case they did anything. They were clearly nervous too, looking out and back again. I recall one of them having a denim jacket and dark hair and one with fair hair and a quilted anorak. The boy with the fair hair and quilted anorak had something which might have been a nail bomb in his left side pocket. I had not seen one before and didn't know what it looked like but I remember something like a Coke tin with grey tape and a piece of material coming out of the top. Coupled with the fact that they were peering out towards the army and seemed very nervous and were keeping a look out I was very frightened by what I saw.507
9A-475 Mr Quinn has thus slightly revised the descriptions he gave to the Insight team and also now states that in fact he actually witnessed the boys leave the area rather than merely hearing about it.
I saw a man coming from the northwest corner of Glenfada Park North... ...I remember hearing him say words to the effect of "put those away, you will only get people killed". My only recollection is of seeing what I took to be a nail bomb in a pocket, but my memory of these words suggests to me that the boys may have had something in their hands which I saw, but cannot now remember seeing... the boys did as they were told and and left by the northwest corner of Glenfada Park with this man back the way he had come. I did not recognise the man, or know whether he was an IRA man but concluded later that the man probably was a member of the IRA by virtue of the way the boys unquestioningly did what he told them. The man was older than we were and was wearing a long coat. I would say he was in his mid twenties but I had never seen him before or since.508
9A-476 Mr Quinn goes on to say, when commenting on his Sunday Times interview that:
507 AO11.22:19 508 AO11.22:19 It is alleged that I had heard from someone else of a man arriving to tell the two boys to get out of Glenfada Park. This is incorrect, for as I have stated above, I witnessed this episode and the fact that they left some time before the entry of the army.\\textsuperscript{509}
Messrs. Pringle and Jacobsen were both content to concede that they may have misinterpreted what Mr Quinn told them about the IRA man and the boys' departure from Glenfada Park North and that he had in fact told them that he witnesses that event.\\textsuperscript{510} Even if, however, Mr Quinn did indeed see the boys leave it would seem most unlikely that this was very long before the entry of the army as he himself says that "The shooting in Rossville Street was going on at this time and was reasonably intense."\\textsuperscript{511}
Danny Craig
Danny Craig (AC\\textsuperscript{111}), in a statement written in 1972, stated that
\\textit{At no time did I see anyone of the civilians with either a gun, a nailbomb or a petrol bomb.}\\textsuperscript{512}
He has now given evidence to this inquiry, however, that he also saw a young boy with nail bombs on Bloody Sunday, again at a time after soldiers must have taken up positions at the Kells Walk wall. It is not clear from Mr Craig's evidence whether or not soldiers had in fact entered Glenfada Park at the time of the incident he describes.
\\textsuperscript{509} AO11.26:46 \\textsuperscript{510} Day 190/065/07-066/05; Day 191/150/02-03 \\textsuperscript{511} AO11.22paragraph 19 \\textsuperscript{512} AC111.9 Mr Craig explained in his BSI statement that he was with Michael Kelly when he was shot and he has identified himself in EP35/9 running away from the rubble barricade. He then describes how:
I got into an area I thought was Glenfada Park North.....There was a fence with about 10-12 people hiding by it and I ran to it. I can't recall where this fence was.....When I was by the fence in Glenfada Park North with the other people I saw this young kid of about 10. He was carrying a tray made of a biscuit tin lid which looked to be full of petrol or nail bombs, although it may not have been as I have never seen a nail bomb and so do not actually know what one looks like. They looked like fireworks.513
The boy was crying and asking what to do with them. Mr Craig said that “the big guys” (his name for the soldiers) were coming across Glenfada Park North at the time and so he “kicked the tray out of the boy’s hands and told him to get out of there.”514
Before the Tribunal, Mr Craig became, as he honestly admitted, confused as to the location in which he had seen these boys:
MR CLARKE: Just a few matters, can you help me on this, Mr Craig, I am a little lost about where your present recollection is that you saw the boy with the tray of nail bombs. In your statement to this Tribunal, if we go to ACII1.3, in paragraph 15, you say: "When I was by the fence in Glenfada Park North I saw this young kid of about 10. He was carrying a tray made of a biscuit tin lid". I understood you to say a little earlier to Mr Richard Harvey, who sits close behind me, that you saw the boy with the tray in Abbey Park in the place where you went over a fence. Which is it?
A. Before I went over the fence I saw the child with the bombs.
513 AC111.3 paragraphs 14-15 and 10-12 514 AC111.3 paragraph 15 Q. Where was the tray, the boy with the tray when you saw him? A. That is my confusion. It was somewhere in Glenfada Park or further, closer to where we had got out from the house. I cannot rightly answer that, that is where my confusion lies.
Q. Is it fair to sum up your position that you are satisfied that you saw a boy with a tray somewhere, but whether you saw him in Glenfada Park North or in Abbey Park, you cannot really be certain about?
A. Abbey Park may have been closer to the truth, but –
Q. You think Abbey Park is more likely, do you?
A. More likely.
Q. Why is it that you think Abbey Park is more likely?
A. I felt I had moved a fair bit from where the incident happened, where all of the shooting took place which was in Rossville Street. I had moved away from that, that is why I say there. As I say, I am confused, I cannot remember.515
What is, however, clear from Mr Craig's BSI statement is that, when at the fence where he saw the boy, he was in a position both to see Michael Kelly pulled in from the rubble barricade and to feel a sense of, unfulfilled, obligation to assist him:
Two braver men than me ran out and pulled Michael Kelly on to the footpath.516
This would suggest that Mr Craig was in fact close to the south east corner of Glenfada Park North albeit he cannot now pinpoint his location on a map or photograph.
515 Day 135/151/01-152/11 516 AC111.3:14 Mr Craig also explained that in fact he had simply been told that soldiers were coming through Glenfada Park. He did not himself see them at this time.\\textsuperscript{517} His evidence clearly shows, however, that nail bombs were present in Glenfada Park North at the time when Michael Kelly was being attended to there, shortly before soldiers entered the area.
\\textit{Thomas McGill}
Thomas McGill (\\textbf{AM230}) also saw young men in the area with nail bombs, carried on a tray reminiscent of that seen by Danny Craig. He made no mention of seeing either this or a man with a rifle which he also describes when he made a statement to NICRA in 1972.\\textsuperscript{518} Nor, when he was interviewed by Eversheds, was he willing to reveal what he had seen in his statement as “he says that he has to live round here”.\\textsuperscript{519} He did, however, tell Eversheds in confidence that
\\ldots long after the shooting was over. He saw three people, young men with long hair, who were panicking wanting to get rid of nail bombs. They had a tray with about 10 nail bombs in, which looked like grenades, shiny and well made. He saw them at about the same time and in the same area as the man with the rifle. He thinks that these men were Official IRA (Stickies).\\textsuperscript{520}
Mr McGill confirmed in a supplementary BSI statement that, as he first told Eversheds, he saw a man with a rifle in the same area and at the same time that he saw the boys with nail bombs, although he did not think they were
\\textsuperscript{517} \\textit{Day 135/114/19-25} \\textsuperscript{518} \\textbf{AM230.8} \\textsuperscript{519} \\textbf{AM230.11} \\textsuperscript{520} \\textbf{AM230.11} He told Eversheds in his first interview that he saw the man with the rifle in Glenfada Park although he stated in his supplementary statement that in fact he had seen him in Abbey Park. Mr McGill was questioned at some length about the location in which he saw the gunman during which he demonstrated a peculiar insistence that he had not even entered Glenfada Park despite its lying directly in the path he described taking.
Mr McGill was also challenged as to his assertion that he had seen both the gunman and the boys with nail bombs long after the shooting had finished. Referring to the gunman, Mr McGill was questioned at some length by Mr Lawson to the effect that in fact shooting was ongoing at the time he saw him.
With reference to the boys with nail bombs, Mr McGill was unable to explain, when questioned by Mr Lawson, why the boys should be panicking if this was long after the shooting had stopped and soldiers withdrawn.
Q. Is this note accurate in that respect, if you look at the first line of the second paragraph: "I mentioned nail bombs, he said he saw these long after the shooting was over." Is that right?
A. Yeah.
Q. You are recorded there as saying that "the youngsters were panicking, wanting to get rid of them"?
A. That is the opinion I got.
Q. That is what it appeared to be?
A. Yeah.
Q. The soldiers had all gone by then, had they not?
A. I never seen any soldiers there.
521 AM230.10 paragraph10 Q. There were not any soldiers about at that stage? A. No, I never seen any soldiers.
Q. Was it apparent to you what they were panicking about? A. It is okay talking now, you asked me a question now that people did not know when the army was going to come in, nobody was to say that the army was going to come in to lift people and arrest people.
Q. That is what you assume that they were panicking about? A. Yeah.
Q. The possibility that the army which had disappeared was coming back? A. It is you is using the word "disappeared". I never seen the army in that area of Glen -- Abbey Park, that general area.522
9A-488 Mr McGill was able to confirm that the tray he saw was “similar” to the “biscuit tin” described by Danny Craig.523 He cannot say if their clothing was as described by Quinn but they were “young people” as Quinn suggested.524
9A-489 The Tribunal will also recall the information given “off the record” to John Goddard by Michael Kivelehan (AK45) in 1991 and recorded in Mr Goddard’s notes:
...man with short arm in their flat, disarmed and got rid of. Two nail bombs dumped in street outside his flat. Know because dragged the two boys in who had them” AK45.1. Flat (grannie’s)was Glenfada Park “top right corner of top quadrangle”.525
522 Day 069/157/14-158/19 523 Day 069/159/25 524 Day 069/161/16 525 AK45.1 The evidence surrounding the authenticity and accuracy of these notes has already been examined above.
**Ben Keaveney**
Ben Keaveney (AK2) also saw nail bombs in the area. He prepared a statement for submission to this Inquiry in May 1998 in which he describes helping an old man who had become distressed, leaving him with a woman somewhere near Rossville Street and then walking back to Abbey Parade. He went on to say:
> Two young men appeared running, which was strange because everyone else was still and quiet and shocked. They were out of breath and one was upset but also angry. They had a number of nail bombs in their hands and some in a box. An older man stopped them going forward and told them not to throw the bombs and that the army had withdrawn. He then told them that 'They' the army will just use it as an excuse to say that is why they fired. They stood still holding the bombs and I told them that the army has moved back and that there is no point. The two men agreed and walked away further into the Bogside. I am very, very clear that the shooting was over and no more shots were ever fired. When I saw the men with the nail bombs, I had already helped carry people into houses and helped the old man.(^{526})
In his BSI statement Mr Keaveney describes returning to “Abbey Parade”(^{527}) having assisted in carrying bodies in the Abbey Park area and escorted an old man to Rossville Street. Here he says he saw
> ...two people carrying a large box containing between two and four nail bombs. I remember that the box was too big for the amount of nail bombs contained in it. They were wearing bulky
(^{526}) AK2.21-22
(^{527}) which he earlier describes as “the pedestrianised area running between Glenfada Park South and Abbey Park” AK2.8 paragraph35 jackets and may also have had some other bombs in their pockets. They appeared to have just arrived in the area and did not know anything about what had happened. They were between 19 and 20 years old and they asked me where the Brits were. At that point, an old man approached us and he and I both looked at the bombs. He said "Don't do it. The soldiers have moved back." And he added that they (by which he meant the army) would only use it as an excuse for their actions that day. After the old man had spoken to them, they appeared to be resigned and moved back towards the Bog Road.
I remember seeing these same men somewhere in Lisfannon Park a long time after the soldiers had retreated. They were standing around another man who was a Provisional IRA member and was wearing a long coat inside which I could make out the obvious shape of a rifle. He told these men to "Get back up"; i.e. to go back up to the Creggan which was an IRA stronghold. People in the area seemed to know him...
Mr Keaveney explained in oral evidence that in fact he saw the boys with nail bombs for a second time with the man with a rifle only a few minutes after his first sighting of them.
Mr Keaveney told the Tribunal that he recognised one of the boys from previous riots in circumstances which would suggest he was a member of one or other wing of the IRA:
Q. What you are sure of is you knew one of them by sight and you had seen him at previous riots?
A. Yes.
Q. Had you seen him with a nail bomb at previous riots?
A. No, I did not see him ever having a nail bomb on the other occasions that I am referring to. He would have been
______________________________________________________________________
528 AK2.12 paragraph 54-55 529 Day 160/051/05-08 associated with people on previous occasions who had nail bombs, but I never saw that man with a nail bomb before.
Q. Did you see him with any other kind of weapon at a previous riot?
A. No, I never saw that man with any other weapon, any weapon at any other previous riot, but again, it is the same answer: he would have been associated with people who, at previous riots, had both nail bombs and rifles.\\textsuperscript{310}
Indeed, Mr Keaveney explained to the Tribunal his belief that both the men with nail bombs and the man with the rifle were PIRA members. The man, he said:
...would have been referred to many times as a Provo in my hearing and he was a man who I was aware appeared on previous occasions, as on this occasion, to be in charge, able to have discipline over the IRA or at that stage in previous riots I would assume the people I am referring to were the Provisional IRA.\\textsuperscript{311}
Mr Keaveney denied, however, that he knew the rifle man's name.
Mr Keaveney also confirmed that his understanding that these men had rushed down from the Creggan was simply an assumption, he did not in fact know where they had come from.
So my assumption was they had rushed down; they were out of breath; they were out of sequence to everything else that was happening at that moment, but, no, I never found out where they had actually come from.\\textsuperscript{312}
\\textsuperscript{310} Day 160/046/16-047/07 \\textsuperscript{311} Day 160/053/17 \\textsuperscript{312} Day 160/048/07-11 Military Evidence of Nail Bombs
9A-496 A number of soldiers gave evidence about the presence of nail bombs in the Glenfada Park area.
9A-497 Soldier H referred to seeing youths with nail bombs in his first RMP statement, which description he expanded in his second RMP statement taken on 31 January 1972 at 0230 hours:
We continued our advance and after moving about ten yards a group of about five youths appeared in an alleyway leading to a block of garages in Glenfada Park. One of the youths had in his right hand a round shaped object, brown in colour which looked like a nailbomb. The object struck the floor in front of me but did not explode. Following two other members of my section I ran up the alleyway which leads into a large square...
9A-498 Soldier H repeated this evidence in his SA statement:
Led by F and G I moved along a low wall leading forward from the Columbille Court building. In front of us was an alley-way leading into Columbille Court. A group of lads appeared just at the end of this wall. One of them had an object in his hand which I thought was a nail bomb. This is because of its shape and colour. It was smooth and cylindrical, about the same size as a Coca Cola tin. It was dark brown in colour. I am positive it was not a rock or other missile of that kind. The lad threw the bomb in our direction and although I did not (?) it land, I heard it hit the ground near us. It did not then explode. After it had landed I did not look at it again, but we chased these youths. They ran down the alley-way and turned left under an archway into Glenfada Park. We chased after them.
533 B230 534 B264.016 paragraph2 And to Lord Widgery:
We began to advance to about here when some youths came and threw a round object... They came from here. That is all I could see, up to the end of that building...
Q. About how many youths were there? A. About five, sir.
Q. When you saw that group of about five were you alone or with anybody else? A. No sir. I was behind F and G... ...
Q... did he throw it in fact? A. He did, sir... He threw it at us, sir... I heard it land.
Q. Did it go off? A. No, sir.
Q. Did you pay any more attention to that object? A. No, sir. We pursued the youths.
Q. Where did the youths go when you pursued them? A. Into Glenfada Park, and we chased after them... 535
9A-499 Soldier H told the Tribunal that he has no present recollection of this incident. 536
9A-500 Having pursued these youths into Glenfada Park North Soldier H also saw youths with nail bombs in the square. His first RMP statement dated 31.1.72 at 0210 hours:
535 B264.029 at A-D 536 Day 377/047/10-11 I saw three youths at a distance of about 70 metres, hiding behind the wall. They were dressed in light clothing.....I saw the three youths in possession of nail bombs. I cocked my rifle, took aim at the youth in the middle of the group and fired 2x7.62 rounds at the centre of the stomach.
.....A youth then appeared from the north west block of flats. He ran from a crowd of people. He was dressed in a jeans suit; that was all I noticed. He picked up an object from one of the youths that had been shot and ran in the direction of the north block of flats across the waste land. I aimed my SLR and fired I aimed SLR round at him which struck him on the shoulder. He then disappeared into a crowd of people converging on the 3 youths who were lying at the side of the broken car.537
In a further RMP statement also dated 31 January at 0230 hours Soldier H gave a similar account
I saw a youth aged between eighteen and twenty two years standing about five feet North East of the North East wall of number 59 Glenfada Park. He had his right arm drawn back in a throwing position and was about fifty yards South West of my position. I saw that he had in his hand a round object about the size of a coca-cola tin which looked like a nailbomb. I fired two aimed shots 7.62mm at the youth and he fell to the ground. The youth was dressed in dark coloured trousers and a bright coloured sweater or shirt. The nailbomb did not explode.
I saw another youth of about the same age, dressed in blue denim jacket and trousers run from the gap in the South West corner of the square. He picked up the nailbomb which was lying on the floor near the fallen youth. The youth turned and faced towards the gap he had run from. I fired one aimed shot 7.62mm at the youth. I saw him stagger and then run North East and into the gap where I noticed other people had assembled.538
537 B220 538 B230-231 Soldier H also gave a similar account in the undated RMP statement which appears at B224-226 and in his SA statement which appears at B233-235. He also repeated this account to Lord Widgery at B240A to B241B.
Soldier H repeated his recollection of this incident in his BSI statement, explaining that he could not recall whether the second youth had run from the southeast or southwest of the courtyard. He also now recalled seeing the nail bomb “smoking” but accepted in oral evidence to this Tribunal that his evidence to Lord Widgery that it was not fizzing or smoking was probably more accurate.
Soldier F also saw a man armed with a nail bomb in Glenfada Park North. In his first RMP statement given on 31.1.72 at 0204 hrs he said:
I saw about 30-40 rioters leave the barricade and go to the right behind a block of flats out of our sight. On seeing this we moved position to our right to Glenfada Park where I saw one of the man light something. I saw it fizzle and spark, and I realised it was some form of bomb. He raised his arm as if to throw the bomb. I fired two aimed shots at the man. The first I saw strike him in the shoulder and the second strike him in the stomach. The bomb did not explode. By this time other members of my unit had joined us and we advanced towards the rioters. The rioters dispersed.
In an undated RMP statement marked “Soldier G” but apparently that of Soldier F he said:
I saw the three men... (who had decamped from the barricade).... on the other side of the square about thirty metres away near to 24 Glenfada Park, south west of our position. I shot and hit one man as he attempted to throw an object which looked like a nailbomb. I saw G fire and hit another of the men who was carrying what appeared to be a rifle.\\textsuperscript{542}
9A-506 Soldier F repeated his evidence in his SA statement:
Then I saw three men leave the barricade. One was carrying a rifle and they moved to the right in the direction of Glenfada Park..... As we entered Glenfada Park the three men were directly in front of us on the far side. One of them turned and was about to throw what appeared to be a bomb (because it was fizzing) in our direction. Myself and G dropped down on one knee. I took an aimed shot. The first shot seemed to hit the man with the bomb in the shoulder, the second in the chest. The man fell to the ground. I saw G hit one of the others. I do not know about the third.\\textsuperscript{543}
9A-507 He then gave consistent evidence to Lord Widgery:
\\textit{A. On approaching the alleyway into Glenfada Park three men directly in front of us saw us and one of the men, who was on the extreme left, looked at us and was attempting to throw what appeared to be a nail bomb... The bomb was in his hand and it was fizzing.}\\textsuperscript{544}
The men were in the south west corner.\\textsuperscript{545} Soldier F said:
\\textit{A. I got down on one knee, took an aimed shot, the first shot hit him in the arm, I then took another aimed shot and hit him in the chest and he fell backwards... G was also firing at the other persons who were carrying a firearm... a rifle...}
\\textit{Q. Then did you see whether G hit that person?}
\\textit{A. Yes.}
\\textsuperscript{542} B167.031 \\textsuperscript{543} B138 \\textsuperscript{544} B167.039 at F \\textsuperscript{545} B167.040 at B Q. What about the third person?
A. I do not remember.546
9A-508 Soldier F has made it clear both in his BSI statement547 and in oral evidence that he no longer has any recollection of this incident.548
9A-509 Soldier J also gave evidence in 1972 of having seen nail bombs in Glenfada Park North. In his RMP statement dated 4 February 1972 he reported that:
At approximately 1605 hrs I proceeded along Rossville Street and took up a further position on the left hand corner of Glenfada Park observing in the direction of this compound which was directly in front of me. As I took up this position I saw two male persons aged about 26 years positioned at the far left corner of the block of flats just beyond the compound. These persons were wearing suits one with an all dark suit the other a Brownish coloured suit. The two persons were in possession of nail bombs which failed to go off. The nail bombs were in their right hands. Two members of my platoon namely F and G fired at these two nail bombers and I saw them fall to the ground.549
9A-510 In a further RMP statement he said he saw two men on the opposite side of GPN who had what looked like nail bombs. He could not be sure that is what they were. In his SA statement Soldier J gave a similar account:
When I reached the entrance to Glenfada Park I saw soldiers F and G firing at two men on the opposite side of Glenfada Park and they fell. They had objects in their hands which looked to me like nail bombs but I could not be sure. These objects did not explode550
546 B167.040 at D- F 547 B167.004 paragraph 31 548 Day 375/090/25- 091/08 549 B270.002 (see manuscript statement for correct transcription) 550 B273 In giving evidence to Lord Widgery Soldier J again clarified that he could not be positive that the objects he saw were nail bombs:
*I don't know if they were explosives. I saw two objects in their hands which had a metallic glint to them.*
Soldier J has also made clear in his evidence to this Inquiry that he no longer recalls this incident.
Soldier E, now deceased, also reported seeing a man with a nail bomb in Glenfada Park North. In his SA statement he described seeing that
*There were about forty or fifty people there, some of whom started to throw missiles in my direction. On the extreme left of the crowd from my direction, I saw a man throwing a petrol bomb in my direction which landed about ten yards from me. I then saw that he also had a nail bomb in his hand which he lit. As he was lighting it I shouted to him to drop it but by this time he had already lit it and so I fired two aimed shots at him... The second one hit him and he fell down. The nail bomb exploded but I could not see anyone hurt.*
In oral evidence to Lord Widgery Soldier E repeated his evidence of seeing and shooting the man with a nail bomb and confirmed that the man he had shot was in the south east corner of Glenfada Park North. Soldier E also confirmed to Lord Widgery that he had seen only one nail bomb thrown in Glenfada Park North. Soldier E is of course the only soldier to have seen a nail bomb explode in Glenfada Park North and he was cross-examined at length in front of Lord Widgery as to how this could have been the case when no damage appeared to have been caused to people or property in the area and others close to the scene did not report seeing or hearing the blast. As Soldier E is now deceased such questions can be taken no further.
While we do not seek to rely on any of his evidence at any stage, the Tribunal may recall that Soldier 027, in his RMP statement taken on 5 February 1972 said:
As I reached the corner of the building I saw a crowd of about 40 civilians at the far end of the park. They appeared to be leaving through an exit in the NW corner of the area. Then I saw a male civilian in his early twenties wearing blue clothing and with long hair lighting something in his hand. I then heard someone say drop it but I do not know who said that or whether it was directed at the youth holding the petrol bomb. As he attempted to throw the bomb 'E' who (sic) knelt and fired at the youth at an estimated range of 20 metres. I saw the youth fall to the ground as the petrol bomb exploded nearby.
Nail bombs – Conclusions
A number of soldiers claim to have encountered nail bombs in Glenfada Park and there is compelling civilian evidence that there were indeed nail bombs in the Glenfada Park area. There is, of course, no civilian evidence of nail bombs being thrown as seen by the soldiers but, as is clear from the material in Chapter 9A, the Tribunal cannot rely on civilian accounts as being definitive of events in Glenfada Park North. Certainly the Tribunal has not been told the full and accurate truth about the presence of nail bombs in the area. It is clear that those who have been prepared to admit seeing them give evidence of having done so in areas and at times when they must also have been seen by many others. Michael Quinn has explained that he saw boys with nail bombs while he was at a position between two wooden fences behind houses on the east side of Glenfada Park North, indeed he is shown in this position in photographs at AO11.39 and AO11.41. From that position he saw Michael Kelly carried across the square as is indeed shown in those photographs. Many others were present in Glenfada Park North at that time again as shown by both the photographs and evidenced by the many accounts of witnesses seeing Michael Kelly's body carried. None, other than Michael Quinn, have come forward to say that there were boys with nail bombs at the north east entrance of Glenfada Park North.
The Tribunal will have noted the evidence of OIRA7 as to his movements in Glenfada Park. It is clear that Michael Quinn saw the boys with nail bombs at the north eastern corner at some stage between the first shots being fired in Rossville Street and the body of Michael Kelly being carried across Glenfada Park North. OIRA7's evidence as set out above is that he was at or close to the north eastern entrance throughout this period and yet failed to see either the boys or the senior member of the IRA who approached them.
Danny Craig also confirmed that there were 10-12 others at the fence with him when he saw, at close range, a boy with a tray of nail bombs. Again none have come forward. Charles McGill has said that, at the time he saw the rifle man and boys with nail bombs "there were, as I say, many people milling about". Ben Keaveney explained that people were talking to and appeared to know the man who he saw standing with the boys with nail bombs. bombs. None of these witnesses has, however, given to the Tribunal the crucial information that there were nail bombs in Glenfada Park North. As well as undermining the credibility and completeness of the civilian evidence as to events in the Glenfada Park area, the sighting of these nail bombs is in direct contradiction to the evidence of both wings of the IRA that they did not have, and indeed had not even prepared, nail bombs for use on Bloody Sunday.
9A-520 The Tribunal is not, therefore, in a position to rely on civilian or paramilitary evidence to negate the evidence of the soldiers that nail bombs were employed in Glenfada Park North.
The Gerard Donaghy Group
9A-521 There is then clear military and civilian evidence that there were nail bombs in the area of Glenfada and Abby Park. As to who may have been in possession of such weapons, the Tribunal should, even if it wholly rejects the evidence of Paddy Ward, still have regard to the location, activities and paramilitary connections of those young men who began the day with Gerard Donaghy, an admitted Fianna member on Bloody Sunday.
9A-522 It has been accepted that Gerard Donaghy was a member of Fianna on Bloody Sunday, although it is less clear whether that membership implied at the time of Bloody Sunday an allegiance to the Provisional or Official IRA. The evidence as to the existence of such an organisation affiliated to either or both wings of the IRA has been set out in Chapter 4.
562 AM230.10 paragraph 9 563 AK2.12 paragraph 55 Information collected by British Intelligence mentions Gerry Donaghy as being associated both with the Provisional and Official IRA, information which may well reflect the drift from the latter to the former which was taking place at the time of Bloody Sunday, now emphatically confirmed by PIRA 24.
There is also no doubt that Gerard Donaghy started the day on Bloody Sunday with a group of eight young men of whom all but one have been engaged in terrorist violence and/or membership of terrorist organisations in the years intervening between Bloody Sunday and this Inquiry.
The group with whom Gerard Donaghy started the day on Bloody Sunday is set out in Peter Taylor’s notes at M76.44 as being Denis McFeeley, his brother, Conal, Frankie McCarron, Hugh O’Donnell, Jim Begley, Pudger O’Hagan, Kieran McLaughlin and Gerry O’Hara.
______________________________________________________________________
564 INT1.85-86 565 INT1.314-327; INT1.328-353 CONAL NAME (18) Group 16-19: exciting times: bombs and stones: threw stones - never thought anything serious
CONAL (best man at Frankie's wedding) DENIS (17) - v. friendly with Gerry Donaghy FRANKIE McCARRON - Computers HUGH O'DONNELL - Creg Com Initiative JIM BEGLEY PATRICK O'HAGAN GERRY DONAGHY [Boy] KIERAN McLOUCHLIN
Mr Taylor stated in oral evidence that the information probably came from "Conal" an assumption confirmed by the transcript of his interview with Conal McFeeley which appears at 1202 in which he says that four boys came to his house including his brother, Denis, Gerard Donaghy and Frankie McCarron. They had arranged to meet others at Donaree (sic) Gardens including Jim Begley, Patrick O'Hagan and Hugh O'Donnell.
The group can also be identified from their own evidence. Denis McFeeley confirmed this grouping in oral evidence and Hugh O'Donnell also acknowledged that he would have seen each of them at some stage on the march.\\textsuperscript{569}
9A-528 Ciaran Maclochlainn [Kieran Macloughlin] (\\textbf{AM12.1}) could not recall exactly who he went on the march with but definitely remembers he was with Gerard Donaghy, Dennis McFeely & Pudger O'Hagan\\textsuperscript{570}.
9A-529 Gerry O'Heara (\\textbf{AO79}) has said that he called for Dennis McFeely on the way to the march but he had already left. Mr O'Hara arrived at Central Drive and fell in with a crowd including Gerry Donaghy, Hugh O'Donnell, Ciaran McLaughlin, Frank McCarron & Denis McFeeley.\\textsuperscript{571}
9A-530 Frankie McCarron \\textbf{AM82} claimed in his BSI statement to have gone on the march on his own and initially maintained that position in oral evidence
\\begin{quote} \\textit{Q. Again, do you remember meeting up with Mr O'Hagan or with Mr O'Donnell?}
\\textit{A. No.}
\\textit{Q. Were they friends of yours?}
\\textit{A. They would have been the same as Jim Begley; they would have been sort of, not really friends, you know, I would have knew of them.}
\\textit{Q. Can you not remember any of the people you were with on the march that day?}
\\textit{A. Not really. I have a recollection of going to the march myself, you know.}
\\textit{Q. Did you know Kieran McLaughlin?} \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{569} Day 405/034/04 \\textsuperscript{570} AM12.1:1-6 \\textsuperscript{571} AO79.1:1-2 A. Just in the same way as the rest of them.
Q. Do you remember whether he was with you that day?
A. No, I cannot -- as I say, I cannot remember anybody that I was with at the march. 572
9A-531 He eventually conceded, when questioned by Nicholas Griffin, that he must have been with the group from time to time on Bloody Sunday. 573
9A-532 There has of course been no evidence to this Tribunal from either Jim Begley (AB29) or Paddy "Pudger" O'Hagan both of whom are deceased.
9A-533 There is no doubt that all of this group, with the sole exception of Conal McFeely, have been involved in paramilitary activity and membership of terrorist or paramilitary organisations.
9A-534 Gerard O'hEara has now, in his second BSI statement, admitted to being the OC of the Official Fianna from August 1971, 574 until shortly after Bloody Sunday. 575
9A-535 Denis McFeely confirmed in oral evidence that on 1st May 1974 he was convicted at Belfast City Commission on one count of attempted murder and two counts of causing an explosion likely to endanger life or property. These charges related to the attempted murder of seven British soldiers using a land mine on 12th April 1973 and the bombing of a shop in the city centre on an earlier occasion. 576
572 Day 389/171/03 573 Day 389/185/19 574 Day 406/090/02 575 Day 406/117/25 576 Day 409/134/21 Frankie McCarron confirmed his conviction on 6th March 1974 at Belfast City Commission of two counts of causing an explosion likely to endanger life or property relating to bombs that exploded on 4th August 1973 at Park Avenue and Academy Road in Derry, and one count of possessing explosives with intent to endanger life or property.\\textsuperscript{577}
Hugh O'Donnell confirmed to the Tribunal that he was convicted on 27th March 1974 at Belfast City Commission of one offence of causing an explosion likely to endanger life or property, and one offence of possessing explosives with intent to endanger life or property, charges relating to a bombing that took place on 22nd April 1973.\\textsuperscript{578}
Kieran McLaughlin, described in Mr Taylor's notes as a senior INLA member in Derry\\textsuperscript{579} confirmed his convictions 24th January 1989 on one count of possessing a firearm and ammunition with intent to endanger life or property and one count of possessing a firearm and ammunition in suspicious circumstances. Those counts related to the possession of a shotgun, a number of shotgun cartridges, a revolver and a quantity of ammunition on 24th February 1988.
Mr McLaughlin was further convicted on 30th November 2001, also at Belfast Crown Court, on one count of possessing firearms and ammunition with intent to endanger life or property, one count of possessing items for terrorist purposes and one count of possessing prohibited weapons in relation to offences committed on 24th November 2000. Those charges related to possession of a 12 bore, sawn off, double barrel Rigby shotgun, a 9mm pistol,
\\textsuperscript{577} Day 389/169/07 \\textsuperscript{578} Day 405/034/17 \\textsuperscript{579} M76.48 9mm self-loading pistol, .5-inch single shot rifle with telescopic sight, a 7.62 x 39mm AKM assault rifle, a sawn off 12 bore Savage shotgun, a 7.62 x 39mm semi-automatic assault rifle and a substantial quantity of shotgun cartridges and rounds of ammunition as well as a pepper spray and a Schock Tronic stun gun, a face mask, Balaclavas, wigs, car defenders, boilersuits, flak jackets, a quantity of uniform-type clothing, a reel of flex and some plastic gloves.580
In respect of “Pudger” O’Hagan and Jim Begley, Conal McFeely confirmed in his interview with Peter Taylor that they both joined the IRA.581 Mr Taylor’s notes record that “Pudger” O’Hagan was a “psychopath” and that he was arrested in 1973/1974 and charged with IRA membership. He escaped in about 1976, was not recaptured and later died of cancer582. Mr Taylor further notes that Jim Begley was charged with IRA membership and was later killed in car accident.583
The accepted “lore” is, of course that the reason for Mr Donaghy’s friends’ activities is that they were so distressed by his death and by what they saw on Bloody Sunday that they were motivated to join the Republican cause. Indeed this was precisely the “angle” that interested Mr Taylor.
“A. If you are making a television programme on Bloody Sunday, you set out with an idea of the kind of programme you want to make. In this particular case we wanted to reflect the experiences of both sides, those, people of the Bogside and Creggan in Derry and the Army and, in the course of our researches in Derry, talking to people, we learnt about this group of eight friends and it is not easy maintaining or getting, maintaining interest in programmes about Northern Ireland outside of Northern Ireland and we thought that if we could do a film, part of which was the story of eight young men who joined the march and subsequently most of them went to jail because they joined the IRA, we thought that was an effective way. One of the points of the programme, which is why Bloody Sunday, as you know, is so important, was that it was as a direct result of what happened that day that literally hundreds of young men and women saw fit to join the IRA and take life: that was why.
Q. These were all people whom you understood had joined subsequent to –
A. Yes, that was the point, they had joined because of what they had seen on the march that day.
Q. Yes, I follow. Thank you.
In fact, however, there is reason to believe that some of this group at least were members of the Fianna and engaged in paramilitary activity prior to Bloody Sunday.
Clearly Gerard O'hEara was a prominent member of the Fianna as at Bloody Sunday, a fact which he failed to mention in his first BSI statement.
Gerard Donaghy was already a member of the Fianna on 30 January 1972 and information derived from British intelligence sources suggest that he was active in that role.
INTI.317 records an interview conducted by the RUC with an individual whose name has been redacted; the date of the interview has also been removed. This person is recorded as having told the RUC about the way in which one could join the Official Fianna. He continued:
584 Day 218/56/14 A few months later I was told by Gerard Donaghy (shot on Bloody Sunday) that there was a camp coming up. I lost contact with the scouts for a while then and I was contacted by Gerard Donaghy who asked me to go back again. Donaghy told me that they had been trained in the use of arms when they were away at the camps which were in the Limerick area.....
Donaghy and I went up to an old house near Creggan shops. There was a big man there and he said he was TO [training officer] was or is interned. There were about five to six others there. We were instructed on the use of a Thompson sub-machine-gun and a Sterling sub-machine-gun. We also done some drill.
9A-546 INT1.333 is another record of an interview which records that
It was the Official Fianna who stole the Army uniforms from the cleaners. They were taken by Gerry O'Hara, 19 to 20 years, Creggan, and Gerry Donaghy who was shot on Bloody Sunday. Gerry O'Hara left the Officials and is now in the Provos.
9A-547 The Tribunal will have noted that Mr Taylor’s notes in respect of Denis McFeely refer to his having a conviction for the theft of British Army uniforms from a local launderette. 585 Certainly INT 1.28, a record of interview of an individual who apparently joined the Fianna in 1970, suggests that Mr McFeely was a member at that time.
9A-548 Indeed, despite Mr McFeely’s account of how Gerard Donaghy’s death drove him to violence,
Well there was a moment of reflection, standing at Gerry Donaghy’s grave – was there anything more I could do than just throw bottles and stones? 586
585 M76.45-46 586 AM7.26-28 British intelligence materials suggest that Mr McFeely was involved in far more serious incidents prior to January 1972.
9A-549 **INT1.44.** records an interview which gives a date some time in 1971 as the date of a planned robbery. It then says that:
> Denis McFeely tried to shoot a soldier in William Street but he missed and could not try a second shot because he might give away his position. He was using a .303 and Gerry O'Hara was waiting in a car to take away the weapon. This took place about August 1971.
9A-550 Intelligence materials also indicate that “Pudger” O’Hagan was involved in the Fianna prior to Bloody Sunday in that they suggest that he was involved in its foundation which, as the Tribunal knows, pre-dated January 1972. **INT1.317** records an, again anonymous, interview in which it is said that:
> I got fed up with the Officials policy. When we were out at night, Martin McGuinness would come around in a car and talk to us. He asked us to join the Provo organisation. “Pudger” Paddy O’Hagan was with the Officials at that time and he also left and many others also. Paddy O’Hagan then started the Fianna Eireann.
9A-551 Mr O’hEara might, as the OC of the Fianna, be in a position to assist the Tribunal with the then membership of this group but has refused to do so. In respect of Denis McFeely he said when questioned:
> Q. Was he a member of the Fianna at the same time as you were?
> A. Well, I am not prepared to name other people here in any capacity, so you should ask him about that.(^{587})
(^{587}) Day 406/104/06 He similarly refused to answer when asked about Paddy O'Hagan's membership of Fianna
Q. Is it right Mr O'Hagan is now dead? A. Yes.
Q. Is it right that he was with the Officials, left and started -- I am not prepared to comment on that.588
And Mr O'Donnell.
Q. Hugh O'Donnell, he was asked about his role on the day. He has given us answers about that. Can you help as to whether he was a member of the Fianna on Bloody Sunday? A. No.
Q. You cannot help? A. No.
Q. Does that mean he was not as far as you were aware? A. I mean I cannot help.
Q. Cannot or will not? A. Hugh O'Donnell, I understand his being here, and I have not seen his evidence or heard what he said, but, you know, I think he is quite able to speak for himself.
Q. Of course he is, and you are also quite able to speak in relation to him. You see the Tribunal has to at the end of the day assess the credibility of what people say and look at the issue of consistency. The Tribunal is deprived of doing that if people will not, even in respect of people have come forward, indicate whether they were or were not members on the day. Will you help in relation to Mr O'Donnell?
588 Day 406/110/23 Eventually Mr O'hEara said
Q. Will you please answer whether or not Mr O'Donnell was a member of Fianna on Bloody Sunday?
A. No, to my knowledge he was not.
Mr O'hEara finally made clear his unwillingness to assist when questioned by Mr Lawson.
Q. I want to ask you this and to think carefully about it, please. I want to ask you -- whether you answer it or not is a matter for you and the Tribunal to direct -- about Fianna in respect of this group. You certainly were a member of Fianna at the time; you were OC, for want of a better title, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Gerard Donaghy undoubtedly was, because you have told us that and in any event he must --
A. A matter of public record.
Q. Identified on the roll of honour as such; was he not, after his death?
A. Yes.
Q. How many other members of Fianna were there in that group?
A. I am not prepared to name other members of the Fianna.
Q. Was Pudger a member?
A. I am not prepared to name other members of the Fianna. Q. Denis McFeeley?
A. I am not going to name anyone. I am not going to confirm or deny anything.
Q. Or Jim Begley, the same?
A. Yes, the same answer.591
... Q. But you are not telling us that they were not members of Fianna, are you, because that would not be true, would it?
A. Well, if I start getting into saying who is or who is not, then I am going down the road I do not want to go down. What I am saying is that I am not going to name who was in the Fianna and I would not like to think that every name I mention is then accused of being a member of the Fianna.592
9A-555 The Tribunal might well consider that Mr O'hEara's reluctance to assist the Tribunal in this way is indicative of at least one or more of the individuals concerned indeed being a member of a paramilitary organisation at the relevant time.
9A-556 It is not suggested that there is before the Tribunal conclusive proof that any of the eight young men who began the day with Gerard Donaghy engaged in armed activity on Bloody Sunday although the Tribunal will recall the notes made by Kathryn Johnston, according to her from information received from several people,593 that:
High Street full of people... Gerard Donaghy had several nail bombs. S McCallion wanted them.” “Throw nail bombs over
591 Day 406/197/21 592 Day 406/199/10 593 Day 387/043/16 roof." "Knows nothing about bomb." "Was fuse lit in bookies and not go off." 594
And
"G Donaghy and McGuinness standing beside each other and Eddie Daly standing against a wall when argument with McCallion was going on." 595
9A-557 Certainly at least some of the group who began the day with Gerard Donaghy were involved in an incident at a bookies at some stage as Jim Begley says in his 1972 statement that:
I went down Chamberlain St as fare as the bookies. Ths soldiers came around the corner and we charged back, they caught a man and we ran back after them.... 596
9A-558 The Tribunal may also wish to consider the significance of the location of the various members of this group. Certainly they are remarkable in that many appear to have been very close to casualties in areas where military witnesses saw men with either guns or bombs.
9A-559 Gerard Donaghy, Denis McFeely and Kieran McLaughlin were all in Glenfada Park North either shortly before or when soldiers entered, an area where of course young men were seen by more than one civilian witness to be in possession of nail bombs.
9A-560 It may be a matter of pure coincidence that so many young men with propensities to sectarian violence were associated with Glenfada Park North
594 M112.50 595 M112.51 596 AB29.1
FS7.2090
IX-207 where much more paramilitary activity than has been admitted now appears to have occurred at the time when soldiers entered the area.
Denis McFeely entered Glenfada Park North by the north east entrance and was shortly afterwards close to Jim Wray and Michael Quinn when they were shot.
A. I decided to follow the group of people who were carrying the body whom I believe was Michael Kelly. I crossed, um, Glenfada Park square and was heading towards the entrance out of, um, Glenfada Park, into Abbey Park basically.
Q. Let us look at what you say about that at AM7.9, paragraphs 15 and 16, where you say: "As I was walking towards the southwestern exit at Glenfada Park North, I heard somebody shout a warning 'there are the Brits' or something like that."
A. I am aware of being in the corner and bullets having hit Michael Quinn in the face. I did not see the soldiers shoot him in the face. I know it was those soldiers who were in that vicinity that shot him in the face and I believe that the soldiers in that vicinity shot Jim Wray as I knew there was a person who fell, in close proximity to myself.
Kieran McLaughlin and Gerard Donaghy entered Glenfada Park North together and were at also at one point sheltering close to the north east entrance. Mr McLaughlin was also in the area of the south west exit when soldiers opened fire into that area and indeed claims to have discovered a bullet hole in his own jacket, although he did not reveal this in his BSI statement.\\textsuperscript{601}
9A-563 The Tribunal will recall the evidence of Michael Quinn who saw young boys with nail bombs at the north east corner of Glenfada Park North and references apparently made by Michael Kivelehan to young boys with nail bombs in the Glenfada Park North area. The Tribunal are also of course aware of the evidence of Soldiers F and H of seeing and firing at nail bombers in the south west corner of Glenfada Park North.
9A-564 The Tribunal will also have noted that Eugene McGillan in his NICRA statement, placed himself in front of Joseph Friel when he was shot\\textsuperscript{602}. Mr McGillan, while not part of the Gerard Donaghy group, was yet another paramilitary who was immediately next to a casualty shot on Bloody Sunday. The Tribunal will recall that Mr McGillan was in fact killed in an incident in Stanley’s Walk together with Colm Keenan shortly after Bloody Sunday. When taken into consideration with the evidence of OIRA gunmen close to Jim Wray when he was shot, the presence of such individuals immediately next to so many of the casualties in Glenfada Park North would appear to be a remarkable coincidence.
9A-565 Indeed that coincidence extends outside of Glenfada Park North. Jim Begley (\\textbf{AB29}), in a statement given in 1972, said that he was lying immediately next to William Nash, John Young and one other when they were shot\\textsuperscript{603}. He gave a similar account to the Sunday Times\\textsuperscript{604}.
\\textsuperscript{601} AM12.5 paragraph29; Day 415/108/18; Day 415/109/06 \\textsuperscript{602} AM233.1 \\textsuperscript{603} AB29.1-3 \\textsuperscript{604} S296/311 Hugh O'Donnell's father (Hugh O'Donnell Snr A031) saw both his son and Jim Begley mount an attack from the barricade on soldiers with stones. Mr O'Donnell confirmed the accuracy of this account in oral evidence.
Q. "We were so angry, we picked up stones and ran at the soldiers throwing them." Should we understand from that that you were part of a group of people who ran forward to throw stones at the soldiers?
A. Yes.
Q. What sort of number of people was there in this group?
A. An approximation, 30 to 50, but I cannot be certain.
Q. Thirty to 50 actually throwing stones?
A. Thirty to 50 running forward.
Q. And of those, can you give any idea of how many were actually throwing stones?
A. No.
Q. Did you run forward towards a particular group of soldiers?
A. The soldiers at the corner of Rossville Street.
Q. How close did you get to them?
A. I am not too sure.
Mr O'Donnell also stated that he was running next to Hugh Gilmore when he was shot.
______________________________________________________________________
605 A031.4 paragraph 22-23 606 Day 405/013/22 607 Day 405/020/18 In a radio interview Mr Mailey repeated that
After I took that print some more people ran up to the door of the flats and I stepped back from the door to let them in. I went and stood on the third step there just inside the doorway. Some five or six people arrived, some of them went up in the lift and others went out the back. I am not too sure where they went to, they went out in that direction anyway. Maybe a minute or so, it is very difficult to judge the time, but possibly a minute after that or half a minute after that Pat O'Hagan, which appears in that print of Gilmore that Barry White took. This is him here, the tall chap with the glasses. He is behind me. He said that there was someone crawling along the front wall of the High Flats. He must have been shot just as he arrived at the door because the bullet passed through his body and ricocheted back and hit Pat O'Hagan on the ankle.
This was put to Mr Mailey when he gave evidence to this Tribunal
It looks from that, does it not, as if your recollection, when this interview took place, is of Mr O'Hagan, who we can see in the White photograph was close to the door, indeed at the door, was giving a commentary --
A. Absolutely, yes.
Although, strangely, Mr Mailey says when questioned further about his evidence about Mr O'Hagan to the Widgery Tribunal
______________________________________________________________________
608 AM19.37 at C-E 609 M50.52 610 Day 163/127/11 Q. Can we assume that was something that you did yourself witness?
A. No, no, I do not actually remember that and while I do not remember that, as I have said before, I do not remember a lot of details. This is clearly something that I learnt later, as I do not know who Paddy O'Hagan actually is, so ...
9A-572 Quite what this group of young men were doing on Bloody Sunday is unlikely ever to be known. There is evidence to show, however, that some of them at least were already connected with paramilitary organisations in January 1972. Their proximity to so many of those who were shot on Bloody Sunday would appear to be at least a remarkable coincidence if indeed they were no more than peaceful participants in the civil rights march.
RIFLES
9A-573 It is now admitted by OIRAs 1, 2 and 7 that a car under OIRA control was parked in Glenfada Park North when soldiers entered the square. They further concede that a .303 rifle was brought into Glenfada Park North shortly before soldiers entered, although all three maintain that this was left, locked in the car and was the only weapon available to them in the area. Each of OIRA1, OIRA2 and OIRA7 have denied that there was any armed activity in Glenfada Park North beyond their depositing one, broken, .303 rifle there.
Accounts to journalists
9A-574 Information recorded by journalists in 1972 gives an account of far more extensive OIRA activity in Sector 4 however. Evidence clearly shows that the information contained in these articles came from OIRA 1 who now seeks to repudiate these accounts given shortly after Bloody Sunday. According to the notes known as PIN437 produced by John Barry of the Sunday Times, and the article “IRA sniper tells of Bloody Sunday” by Gerard Kemp of the Sunday Telegraph (L210), the following events occurred in the Glenfada Park area on Bloody Sunday.
PIN 437
(1) Weapons were stored in the boot of a car in Glenfada Park and a .303 was retrieved from there by OIRA 1 which was then fired at troops from Columbcille Court.
(2) There were five or six members of the Official IRA in Glenfada Park North at the time troops entered the Bogside.
(3) There were two .303’s, a carbine, a Sten and a .22 automatic being moved around in Glenfada Park at a time after troops moved into the Bogside.
(4) An OIRA gunman with a .22 automatic ran out of Glenfada Park North via the north west exit shortly before soldiers entered the square.
(5) OIRA 1 exited Glenfada Park North immediately in front of James Wray.
(6) There was a man in an area referred to as “the car park” who fired a couple of shots with a .38 automatic. (7) One gunman with a “sporting .303” remained in the area and considered returning to Glenfada Park to shoot at the soldiers there.
Corroborated by Kemp Article:
(1) Weapons were stored in the boot of a car in Glenfada Park and a .303 was retrieved from there by OIRA 1.
(2) When the “Paras” moved up, 10 to 15 minutes after OIRA 1’s shot was fired, he gave an order for his men to move weapons out of their cars.
(3) One OIRA man got onto a balcony and fired at the soldiers.
(4) A second OIRA gunman fired with the pistol.
(5) At the time soldiers fired from the Kells Walk wall, OIRA 1 was at the Rubble Barricade.
(6) OIRA 1 was exiting Glenfada Park North via the South West exit immediately in front of James Wray when he was shot.
Such accounts were of course given to the Press at a time when the Official IRA was seeking to minimise its involvement in armed activity on Bloody Sunday and potential responsibility for the tragic events that unfolded that day. It is therefore unlikely that OIRA1 has given a full account of all such activity, even in these interviews. They provide what is likely to be a minimal account of OIRA activity in Glenfada Park North. The Tribunal has heard OIRA1's denials that he was ever interviewed by John Barry, the author of PIN 437\\textsuperscript{618} or Gerard Kemp.\\textsuperscript{619} In considering such denials the Tribunal will bear in mind:
(1) The credibility and working practices of both journalists as described to the Tribunal.
(2) The accuracy of much of the information contained in both accounts as confirmed by OIRA1 himself and independent sources.
(3) The fact that a great deal of such information would have been known to a very limited number of individuals and, in some cases, either OIRAs 1 and 2 alone or OIRA 1 alone.
(4) The proven flaws, inconsistencies and inherent improbability of the whole account given by OIRAs 1 and 2 of their activities on Bloody Sunday.
\\textit{PIN 437 - John Barry}
John Barry was the editor of the Sunday Times Insight team and an award-winning journalist of international repute. He was able to identify his initials on the document known as PIN437 and confirm that it was his document.\\textsuperscript{620} The document in its unredacted form of course carries the name of OIRA 1. Mr Barry acknowledged that he did not recollect the circumstances in which he wrote PIN437 but was able to say that:
\\textsuperscript{618} Day 395/106/13-15 \\textsuperscript{619} Day 395/138/05-07 \\textsuperscript{620} Day 193/100/21-24 A..... The name, the name rings a bell and I certainly am sure that I talked with him during the course of our stay in the Bogside, but I have no independent recollection of this particular interview.
and later that:
I recall the name and I recall having met him and I am sure that at least one of those occasions must have been in the Bogside Inn because I recall going to the Bogside Inn as a way of meeting a lot of people at that time, we all used to go there, but I have no recollection -- I come back: I have no recollection of the circumstances of the gathering of this note.62
While unable to recall the interview, Mr Barry was able to assist by describing his working practices in 1972 which demonstrate that the information presented in PIN437 was the product of an interview, however informal, with OIRA1. Mr Barry when questioned by Counsel for the Tribunal explained that:
Q. What would your normal practice have been if you interviewed someone like OIRA 1 -- did you take notes when you interviewed people?
A. Yes, I took notes and, on almost all occasions, I taped as well. I would not have taped if the interviewee particularly requested not or if it seemed likely that the tape recorder would so inhibit the interviewee that I would get less than I might otherwise. I see from a note at the bottom of the line 8 or whatever, "I think he said it was a green Avenger, but my notes do not record that". I deduce from that that I cannot have used a tape.
Q. It looks like that.
A. Sure.
621 Day 194/93.11-18 Q. Can you give us any idea what interval might elapse between the time when you would have an interview and make the notes and the time when you produce a typed account of that interview?
A. Less than a day if possible.
Q. It may seem a silly question: do you type up from the notes?
A. Yes, the next morning, if possible.
Q. Did you ever consciously type up something that you had not actually been told?
A. No.622
Mr Barry was then, when questioned by Christopher Clarke QC, able to assist the Tribunal further with the nature of the document:
Can I ask you something about your method of working which would have produced a document of this kind? It begins with a name which has been blanked out. There are then various references which say, "said" such and such, "OIRA 1 says", "OIRA 1 then", "then he toyed with the idea", and then there were various quotation marks, and then we get "OIRA 1 says", et cetera. If you had written in a note "OIRA 1 said" or "OIRA 1 says", is there any realistic possibility that that could in fact be summarising what somebody else said which involved or implicated him?
A. No.623
OIRA Corroboration of PIN 437
As to the content of PIN 437, the Tribunal will recall that OIRA 1 rejected in oral evidence the accuracy of several of the facts and statements it contained. Some minor inaccuracies may well reflect Mr Barry's own conclusion that:
622 Day 193/101/08-102/07 623 Day 194/151/03-14 ...whatever was going on in this session or sessions, it was not a normal interview because I would have taken much better notes.624
and
...the notes were more fragmentary than I would have liked.625
The Tribunal was able itself to witness OIRA1's manner of speaking which, as suggested to him by Mr Lawson,626 might explain inaccuracies in the recording of any verbal account taken from him.
It is clear, however, that the accuracy of a great deal of the information contained in PIN 437, which both Christopher Clarke QC and Edmund Lawson QC627 were able to confirm in lengthy questioning of OIRA 1, itself authenticates the document. The Tribunal will recall that OIRA 1 confirmed that:
"The main emphasis by the Officials that day was up in the Creggan"
"They were waiting for a possible Army assault."628
"His constant companion on the early part of the action was OIRA 2."629
The description of slatted planks given in the area from which he fired is correct630. He did aim at a person or persons on the left side of the church.
OIRA 1 fired and OIRA 2, told him he had hit his target.
OIRAs 1 and 2 were tackled on the stairs of Columbcille Court.
There was an OIRA car in Glenfada, possibly a green Avenger.
After shooting from Columbcille Court, OIRA 1 did go back to Glenfada, put the rifle back in the boot of the car, and wait rather at a loose end.
OIRA 1 did look round the corner and see the Saracens approaching.
He did run for it across Glenfada out of the Abbey Park entrance and was running out of Glenfada Park when there was a burst of firing.
He saw a soldier in the northeast corner of Glenfada Park North
OIRA 1 did then hear about Red Mickey and go to Vinny Coyle's house.
He then met with the acting CO.
9A-583 OIRA 2 was then able to confirm, when questioned by Mr Lawson about the details of PIN 437:
That:
"He and OIRA 2 had scouted around. Had a good look at the Army positions"
Was "probably" accurate.631
631 Day 393/082/12-13 That:
I then heard two boys had been shot by the Army in William Street
Was "right".632
That:
In Columbcille Court in one of the areas outside the back door of each flat set aside for washing lines et cetera. The area is fronted by white wooden planks giving a slatted effect.
Was "an accurate description of where we were".633
That:
OIRA 1 went down, took aim, he says at the blokes on the left-hand side of the church. One of them was putting his head up very cautiously from time to time. I knew he was the one who had shot the two lads.
Was "broadly speaking, an accurate description".634
That:
Twice the man put his head up and OIRA 1 did not fire. The third time he put his head up, OIRA 1 fired. OIRA 2 told him he had hit.
Was "a pretty accurate description of your [OIRA2's] version of what occurred".635
632 Day 393/084/08-09 633 Day 393/084/16-19 634 Day 393/085/21-24 635 Day 393/086/13-14 That:
PIRA 2, the oldest of the group took the lead, said 'you cunt', et cetera. PIRA 1 tried to grab the gun, OIRA 1 stuck it in his stomach and said 'I will fucking shoot you' et cetera. PIRA 2 backtracked and said there was no need for all of this. Agreed that OIRA 1 would not fire again and he was allowed to depart in peace.
Is “accurate insofar as there having been an altercation”.636
That:
"...went back to Glenfada, put the rifle back in the boot of the car."
Is “correct”.637
9A-584 OIRA2 is unable to comment on OIRA1s movements after that point as he claims they split up638 but he also agrees in his BSI statement that the car in Glenfada Park “could have been an Avenger or a Cortina, both were popular at the time, and I think it was grey or green”.639
9A-585 Mr Lawson also pointed out to OIRA 1 that Mr Barry’s source stated in PIN437 that, at the time he fired, OIRA 1 was under the impression that two “boys” had been shot.640
They then heard that 'two boys' had been shot by the Army in William Street.641
636 Day 393/089/09 637 Day 393/089/17-18 638 Day 393/090/04-05 639 AOIRA2.14 paragraph 8 640 Day 396/075/04-078/01 641 AOIRA1.1 Mr Lawson put to OIRA 1 the fact that he has repeated in his BSI statement having just such an impression:
*Within seconds there was an even louder buzz and more shouting and I heard from down below me, below the slats, that a couple of boys had been shot.*
OIRA 2 had, indeed, used a very similar expression in his BSI statement:
*Just then I heard someone in the crowd shouting "two boys have been shot"*
OIRA 1 was unable to provide any explanation as to where Mr Barry may have obtained the accurate information about OIRA 1 and 2's mistaken impression. That Mr Barry's source should, if not OIRA 1 himself, have known of his harbouring just such a mistaken impression is simply incredible.
There is considerable independent corroboration of the facts set out in PIN 437 which is considered below. Significant to OIRA 1's current evidence, however, is the fact that much of such information could have come only from a very limited number of people, principally OIRA 1 or OIRA 2. Indeed, the admittedly accurate information which Mr Barry is able to give as to OIRA 1's perceptions of events in Glenfada Park North and his movements after leaving the area can only have come from OIRA 1 himself.
As far as, for example, the description of OIRA 1's firing position is concerned, OIRA 2 was able to confirm when questioned by Mr Lawson that it would have been known only to the two of them and that he did not tell anyone of it.
______________________________________________________________________
642 AOIRA1.27 paragraph 18 643 AOIRA2.15 paragraph 11 644 Day 396/077/22-078/01 Q. Have you broadcast -- have you personally being telling a lot of people where you had conducted this firing exercise from? A. I did not tell anybody.
Q. You would expect, we will have to ask him, OIRA 1 to be equally discreet, would you not?
A. I would have thought so, yes.
Q. The author of this note, then, has managed to get from somewhere or other an accurate description of where you were and of the slatted effect of the wooden planks?
A. Yes. I have no idea where the author of the note got his information, he did not get it from me.
Q. Wherever he has got it from he has got that bit right?
A. Aye, he has that bit right, surely.645
9A-591 OIRA7 was also able to confirm some of the details included in PIN437 although, in similar fashion to OIRAs 1 and 2, he disputed that weapons were moved in Glenfada Park other than the one rifle he claimed was stored in the car.
9A-592 Certainly he was able to confirm that OIRA weapons were, as a rule, stored in cars.
If I was out on night duty the night before any weapons I had would have been in the car. They would have been left there for whoever took over the patrol from us.646
9A-593 OIRA 7 was also able to confirm that the details given in PIN437 as to the number of men left in the Creggan were approximately correct.
645 Day 393/084/25-085/13 646 AOIRA7.3 paragraph 15 "Two sections of 16 men -- both the sections being Creggan ones -- were gathered in cars at the back of the Creggan." Yes, that is what it says?
It was mentioned yesterday, yes.
Q. And tell us, please, are the numbers there given for the Creggan section about right?
A. Yes.
Q. In relation to Bloody Sunday?
A. To the best of my recollection, yes.
Q. They are?
A. Again, I was not -- you know what I mean, I, I went to the Bogside, I did not go round counting the men left in the Creggan. The numbers, the numbers would be about correct, yes.
Q. That is about right for the Creggan guard, is it, so to speak?
A. Yes.647
9A-594 OIRA7 was also able to confirm that weapons would be stored in cars as described in PIN 437.
I am not sure where -- I mean, again, because, as I said, weapons were continually on the move and, you know, from one car to another, you know, being taken where it was felt they were needed to be taken, you know, it would have been kept in the boot of a car, it would have been kept with whoever was in control of it, whether that be the Creggan, you know, or the Bogside.648
9A-595 His evidence appeared also to be that he recalled the car parked in Glenfada Park North being an Avenger
647 Day 399/037/22-038/14 Yes, it would have been -- you know, I am saying it was an Avenger and, um, you know, again, the, the two most popular cars at that point were the Cortina and the Avenger.\\textsuperscript{649}
And that:
\\textit{We could not drive the car out of Glenfada because of the people in Rossville Street.}\\textsuperscript{650}
OIRA\\textsuperscript{7} was also able to confirm that the rifle fired in Columbille Court and then brought into Glenfada Park was a “sporting” .303 as described in PIN\\textsuperscript{437} as being in the possession of an OIRA gunman to whom OIRA\\textsuperscript{1} spoke in the area of Lisfannon Park. OIRA\\textsuperscript{7} confirmed when questioned by Mr Clarke\\textsuperscript{651} that he recognised it as such. He was later questioned on the point by Mr Lawson.
Q. I will take you to a passage in your statement and ask you if it is correct, AOIRA 7.8, please, paragraph 42 the second sentence of which you said you recalled the weapon?
A. Yes.
Q. "... stock stocked about halfway from the trigger guard which made it more of a hunting rifle." I pause there. it has been referred to as a sporting rifle; that is the one, is it?
A. Yes.\\textsuperscript{652}
OIRA\\textsuperscript{2} also confirmed that the rifle OIRA\\textsuperscript{1} had used was indeed a “sporting .303”:
\\textsuperscript{648} Day 398/044/08-14 \\textsuperscript{649} Day 398/048/03-049/01 \\textsuperscript{650} AOIRA\\textsuperscript{7.9} \\textsuperscript{651} Day 398/036/07-15 \\textsuperscript{652} Day 399/029/01-10 In light of the evidence of Mr Barry and what is plainly obvious from the style and content of PIN 437, the Tribunal will consider carefully OIRA 1’s evidence that, while he may at some time have met or been in the company of John Barry, the information contained in PIN 437 did not come from him.
OIRA 1 felt able to tell the Tribunal this with such certainty because:
A. Because why -- I would have no reason to say it; it was not my position to say it. If it was a formal interview, that is a different situation. Conversations were conversations, they were not about this type of stuff.
Such an explanation would appear to be at odds, however, with the position put forward by OIRA 1’s own Counsel Mr O’Donovan when questioning Mr Barry when he said that:
Q. If I may deal with the position of OIRA 1 now. It is his recollection that he may have spoken to you in the context of drinking in the Bogside.
And that
______________________________________________________________________
653 Day 393/110/22-24 654 Day 395/107/06-14 655 Day 395/107/15-25 656 Day 395/108/06-10f 657 Day 194/093/06-08
FS 7.2109
IX-226 Q. Perhaps in order to understand where I have been coming from and the Tribunal does as well, it is the case of OIRA I that he may have spoken to you, but that his comments to you were limited to his activities in Columbciille Court and the fact that thereafter he put one weapon into a motorcar in Glenfada, but that there were no other weapons. I suppose you cannot, without the documents going behind this document, you cannot help on that.658
The position described by Mr O'Donovan would appear to contradict OIRA I's assertion to Mr Clarke that he would not talk at all about "this type of stuff".
As to the use of direct quotations and terms such as "OIRA I said" or "OIRA I says", OIRA I was unable to offer any explanation of such terms when questioned by Counsel for the Tribunal:
Q.... "OIRA I says he was then tackled." In this particular paragraph he seems to be saying in terms that you were the person who provided him with the information?
Yes, well that may be journalistic, just shorthand, you know, I do not know.659
L210 - Gerard Kemp
It is, moreover, clear that Mr Barry was not the only journalist to whom OIRA I gave an account of Bloody Sunday including the facts that OIRA I retrieved his rifle from a car in Glenfada Park North and subsequently ordered other OIRA men to get weapons out of their cars, two of whom fired at soldiers. Such information was also given to Gerard Kemp of the Sunday
658 Day 194/093/24-094/07 659 Day 395/116/02-06 Telegraph. OIRA I also told Mr Kemp that Jim Wray was shot just behind him.
Mr Kemp reported that information in an article titled "IRA sniper tells of Bloody Sunday", published in April 1972. While Mr Kemp can no longer recall the name of his source, the reference in his article to "the sniper referred to in the Widgery report" who "admitted firing the single high velocity round but said he did so after he had heard two shots and seen the crowd dragging away the two wounded (Johnston and Donaghy)" quite clearly refers to OIRA, as he himself conceded.
Moreover, the evidence clearly demonstrates that OIRA was the source as well as the subject of the article as Mr Kemp confirms in his BSI statement.
The article itself detailed a conversation that I had with a man I knew to be an Official IRA man.
I have no reason to doubt that this was told to me at the time and that the quotation in the article was an accurate record of what he said.
It is known to the Tribunal that the Official IRA did not publicly admit any firing at the time of the Widgery Tribunal. Notes of an Official IRA press conference which appear at ED12.4 record that
The officer [whoever it was] claimed that the IRA Official wing had at no time fired shots in the immediate vicinity of the area where the deaths occurred.
660 L210 661 M47.2 paragraph 4 662 Day 395/137/21-24 663 M47.1 paragraph 2 664 M47.2 paragraph 4 It would seem therefore that the accurate information reported by Mr Kemp must have come directly from within the ranks of the Official IRA.
9A-605 OIRA1 was questioned by Mr Lawson as to how Mr Kemp could have obtained the information that he did but provided no explanation.
Q. Although at the time that we are concerned with, that shortly after Bloody Sunday, that was not the official story, the Official story, the party line was, as we have agreed, no shots fired by anybody, by the Officials, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. This is private information that somehow or other gets to the ears of Mr Kemp, and the private information that reaches him you would say is accurate?
A. Yes.665
9A-606 Mr Lawson was then again able to draw OIRA 1's attention to passages in the article giving detail of which only OIRA 1 is likely to have known.
Q. "He [that is attributed to you] told me, 'I did not go on the march.'" That is true, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. "I left my car in Glenfada Park ..." That is true, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. "... and walked over to Columbille Court." That is true?
A. Yes.
Q. "... waiting for the marchers to come down." Is that true?
A. Again, I do not know where the march was at that point, but generally speaking, yes.666
665 Day 396/099/16-25
FS 7.2112
IX-229 Q. "A bit of stoning was going on" That is true, is it not? A. As far as I am aware, yes.
Q. "Then I heard two shots." On your current version, that is true? A. No, it is not, three shots.
Q. Two or three? A. Three. 667
Q. It is right, is it not, that most of the IRA were up on the Creggan? A. The people who were on duty were in Creggan.
Q. For the reason there given: "Because we expected [perhaps feared] the Army to take advantage of the march and move in." Is that right? A. Yes.
Q. That is accurate, is it not? A. Uh-huh. 668
"I went into a house in Abbey Park ... a young fellow there had been shot." Yes?
Yes.
Q. That is true, is it not?
666 Day 396/101/07-101/20 667 Day 396/102/06-13 668 Day 396/104/20-105/04 A. Yes.
Q. "About 20 people in the house, men and women. It is difficult to give numbers ..." You would not argue with that, would you?
A. No.
Q. Gave you a cup of tea, do you remember that?
A. Vaguely, yes.
Q. Yes?
A. Well, vaguely, yes.
Q. A little detail picked up by the journalist, that you were given a cup of tea -- because you did speak to him, did you not?
A. No.669
9A-607 When questioned further by Mr Lawson, OIRA 1 could proffer no explanation as to how Mr Kemp could have obtained such information if not from OIRA1 himself. The Tribunal will recall that he replied only that:
Well, I am not in a position to offer any explanations, it is for the journalist to offer those explanations.670
9A-608 It is clear that the information provided in PIN437 and L210 did indeed originate from OIRA1. His attempts, while acknowledging the accuracy of the documents on numerous other points, to repudiate those central facts which implicate Official IRA gunmen in armed activity in Sector 4 are dishonest and incredible.
669 Day 396/105/21-106/13 670 Day 396/107/17-18 Indeed, in considering the evidence of OIRA1 and OIRA2 in relation to the presence of weapons in a car in Sector 4 and the subsequent movement and use of those weapons, the Tribunal should bear in mind the credibility of other, related areas of their evidence. The Tribunal will recall the evidence of both regarding their presence in Columbcille Court and their insistence that the rifle fired from there was a broken rifle that was being transported to the Creggan, fired only in response to the shooting of Damian Donaghy and John Johnston. Chapter 6 of these submissions addresses the credibility of much of that evidence in which many flaws were highlighted in the questioning of OIRA1 and OIRA2.
The Tribunal will also bear in mind the totality of evidence as to the Official IRA’s orders for the day on Bloody Sunday, the false accounts which were given shortly after the event and the manner in which members of OIRA have presented evidence to this Inquiry, all examined in more detail in Chapter 4 of these submissions. OIRA1 indeed admitted when questioned by Edmund Lawson QC that he was willing to lie in order to conceal the truth of Official IRA activity on Bloody Sunday.
Well, in 1972 it was decided that, given the propaganda that was coming out from the British establishment and the claims that there were gunmen all over the place and given that people you represent had said that they were fired upon by hundreds of gunmen and hundreds of shots and given the fact that half the world’s press were in here trying to find these gunmen, we just decided it would not be right to give them any excuse by admitting to any shot.
Q. In other words, it would be better to lie?
A. Yes.671
671 Day 395/157/06-16 OIRA2 has also demonstrated, when questioned by Mr Lawson, his capacity to mislead:
Q. Did you actually see bodies that day?
A. No, because, um, I was trying to get away because of the total confusion that actually happened on the day. When we left the immediate area that we were in, we were trying to move away in the opposite direction.
Q. Because that is something fairly memorable, is it not, seeing bodies lying on the ground?
A. It would be, yes.
Q. You have no recollection of that?
A. I have no recollection of seeing any actual bodies, no. I would've seen photographs the following day.
Q. Why, in that case, did you say this: "My memories of the rest of the day are of seeing people running and hiding and of bodies lying on the ground"?
A. As I say, it could have been a wee bit of poetic licence, you are addressing a meeting of Irish people in London, so one might have got carried away a wee bit, you know, with the occasion.
Q. I was not referring in fact to the meeting that you addressed in London, I was referring to the statement that you delivered to this Tribunal, we will see it on the screen. AOIRA 2.7, please, paragraph 22, would you expand that. This is the statement that you produced in, we are told about, January 2002, as you have confirmed this morning, with the assistance of your own solicitors and prior to preparing the so-called Eversheds statement. In it, as you can see, in the fourth line of the paragraph on the screen, you solemnly declared this: "My memories of the rest of the day are of seeing people running and hiding and of bodies lying on the ground." So far as the last phrase is concerned, that is simply not true?
A. I have gone on to say there, if you notice: "These are not coherent memories as the time was frantic."
Q. It is not true, whether it is coherent or not? A. No, I am not saying that it is not true, what I am saying is that in the state of confusion that existed at the time and, even when I was submitting that statement through our solicitors. um, it may well be the case that that was -- that obviously was included.
Q. And it was not true? A. Those are your words.
Q. Do you remember seeing bodies lying on the ground? A. I cannot honestly remember whether I saw bodies lying on the ground.
Q. About two minutes ago when I asked you the question you gave a simple: no to that. Which is it, do you want to qualify the note? A. No, I do not want to qualify it at all.672
OIRA2's willingness to embellish his evidence regardless of the truth was again demonstrated when he was questioned by Mr Lawson about the shots he had heard while in Columbcille Court:
A. Well, I have already told the previous counsel that I have no recollection of actually hearing any shots. I am not sure. I may have done, I am just not sure.
Q. Are you in a position to assert that you can confirm that the shots were high velocity shots? A. Which shots are we talking about here? Q. The shots that allegedly preceded the rifle being fired? A. I would imagine they would have been, yes. Q. Can you definitely confirm that to be the position? A. I cannot definitely confirm it.
672 Day 392/125/01-127/03 Q. Why did you do so when you made this same statement for the benefit of the Inquiry?
A. Because --
Q. Just a minute, you ought to look at it, page 3, please, paragraph 9, where you said, did you not, in this statement of about January 2002, that you heard a number of high velocity shots with a gap between them. You cannot remember exactly at this time, but you believe there could have been two or three shots, right. You go on to say that you could not specify the time between them. Lest there be any doubt about the matter, concluded the paragraph by saying: "From my experience living in Derry at that time I can definitely confirm that these were high velocity shots." That is what you said, is it not?
A. That is what I said, yes.
Q. And you were in no position whatsoever to do that, were you, OIRA 2? A. Well, according to the way that you are putting it, the answer to the question would be that I probably was not, but again I think, in the general state of confusion possibly what I said there, you know, was, um, just a reflection of how things happened on the day.
Q. It was at best, was it not, a serious exaggeration?
A. No, I would not accept that.
Q. You would accept it was an exaggeration, presumably?
A. No, I would not even accept it was an exaggeration.
Q. What, when you said "I could definitely confirm these were high velocity shots", when you at least were unsure whether you had heard any shots, is that not an exaggeration?
A. It could well be, yes.673
673 Dav 392/128/23 Independent Corroboration of Facts Related in PIN 437/L210
9A-613 The accounts given in PIN 437 and L210 clearly originated from OIRA 1 rather than being any kind of journalistic fabrication. There is, moreover, independent evidence which proves that the account of significant armed OIRA activity in Glenfada Park North is correct.
David Mills – 24 Hours
9A-614 David Mills (M208) has told the Tribunal that in 1972 he was working as a producer for the BBC on a current affairs programme called 24 Hours. The day after that programme was broadcast he wrote a letter to Col Tugwell which included the following information:
You may also be interested to know that it is almost certain that there were a car load of Officials in Glenfada Park as the paratroopers came in. In their haste to escape they drove their car into a wall and fled on foot taking their weapons. Minutes after three of them started shooting from some way back near “Free Derry” Corner. The fourth circled back and was shot at by Soldier G or F”.674
9A-615 Mr Mills has openly explained that he was probably first told about this incident by Peter Pringle but goes on to say:
I would probably also have done some of my own research to check the details relating to this incident. I have a vague memory of seeing a damaged wall in a small courtyard. I have been shown a map of the Bogside and I think the wall in question was somewhere near the West side of Glenfada Park North. My impression, after speaking to some of the local people about this, was that they felt the Officials had run away and had not engaged the army. I sensed that their actions were seen by the locals to be cowardly, although no one was prepared to say as much......I remember being told that they
674 B1333.057 were armed and that later, after the army shooting had finished, they came back on foot and fired one or two shots, but I have no specific recollection of being told about a stash of weapons in the car.675
In oral evidence, Mr Mills conceded, quite openly when questioned by Mr Rawat, that as he did not intend to use this incident in his programme he did not investigate it very carefully.676 He also explained that the information regarding a man doubling back and firing may have come, uncorroborated, from Peter Pringle.677 Indeed Mr Mills made it clear when questioned that he no longer believed this to be accurate.678 He nonetheless confirmed that he had checked the authenticity of the generality of the account with people in the Bogside:
Q. Looking at what the Insight team wrote in the article, it is clear that they speak of a car load of Officials in Glenfada Park but they say nothing about that car being driven into a wall. Is it possible that the information you received from Peter Pringle you then subsequently relayed on to Colonel Tugwell, but relayed on inaccurate information?
A. No, what would have happened is that Peter probably described the essence of what he has written here. I then checked that with various people in the Bogside.679
Anthony Martin (AM24)
Much of the information in the above articles including John Barry’s reference in PIN 437 to a Green Avenger is corroborated by Anthony Martin (AM24). While he did not mention it in his NICRA statement, Mr Martin told Peter Pringle of the Sunday Times that, after assisting with the wounded:
675 M108.3:14-4 paragraph 15 676 Day 235/014/17-18 677 Day 235/025/04-06 I met an IRA man and he told there (sic) were two rifles in a car — a green avenger — parked in Glenfada Park and he wanted me to help him get to it. I learnt later that the rifles had been removed before the shooting started.
Mr Martin confirms in his BSI statement that, after helping with casualties from Glenfada Park North:
I headed out of Glenfada Park North and met the man I knew who was involved in the IRA. He explained that there was a Green Avenger car parked in Glenfada Park North that had rifles in the boot. He asked me if I would help him go and collect them. I was so angry by that point that I said I would take one of the rifles myself and do something. We went back into Glenfada Park South and made our way to the entrance at the east of Glenfada Park South, looking into Glenfada Park North to see if it was safe to go in. The car was in the position I have marked on the attached map at grid reference 114. The soldiers were still there and we decided it was too risky to approach the car.
Mr Martin also confirmed that the car:
Would have been there to store guns in the way I have described earlier.
These accounts which Mr Martin gave to Mr Pringle and to Eversheds in his statement signed 9th December 2000 corroborate the detail given in PIN437 as to the make and colour of the car and its presence in Glenfada Park North. As to the cars use as a weapons dump and that more than one weapon was stored there, the information given to Mr Martin by the IRA man contradicts what OIRA1 has told the Tribunal. Mr Martin appeared to wish to suggest in his oral evidence to the Tribunal that in fact the weapons had been removed much earlier in the day. Having, however, told the Tribunal when questioned by Christopher Clarke QC that the rifles were moved:
*shortly before the actual march*(^{63})
Mr Martin then acknowledged that he did not in fact know when the weapons were removed from the car. He was told only that they had been removed prior to the point when he re-entered Glenfada Park having dealt with the dead and wounded in the area but while soldiers were still present. Any further suggestion as to timing was conjecture.
*They said that car had nothing in it because the stuff had been removed, and I would assume it would have been before the shooting, not at the shooting or after.*(^{64})
Mr Martin maintained however that he was told that the guns had already been moved at a time when soldiers were still present in Glenfada Park North. Clearly the information he was given contradicts the evidence of OIRA1. Mr Martin was able and willing to some extent to assist the Tribunal with the identity of the man who gave him this information.
Martin says that this man was called John and was part of the Creggan branch of OIRA. He cannot or will not give his second name.(^{685})
OIRA(^7) has accepted that, in speaking of the IRA man, Mr Martin may be referring to him, although he does not recall seeing Mr Martin.(^{686}) OIRA(^7) claimed to have joined OIRAs 1 and 2 as they left Columbciille Court and to have remained with them while they deposited the rifle in the car in Glenfada Park. He was a member of the Creggan section and told the Tribunal that he did consider retrieving the rifle from the car in Glenfada Park North and discussed that possibility with others around him.
Q. You say in paragraph 85 that there was a heated discussion about the sense of your going into Glenfada Park North and you did not make it as far as the car. When you say "there was a heated discussion" was this with one person or were there a number of people?
A. I think there was a lot of anger; there was -- I mean, people were in shock, um, I think I was myself, you know, I, I would not be prepared to say if I was involved in a heated discussion with two, three, ten people, but I know there was, there was, um, a fairly loud exchange.(^{687})
OIRA(^7) rejected, however, all those elements of Mr Martin's evidence that suggested that more than one rifle had at any time been stored in the car. Questioned by Christopher Clarke QC he said:
Q. Firstly, that account refers to the idea of taking more than one rifle
(^{685}) AM24.12 paragraph 27: Day 176/102/06 (^{686}) Day 398/097/02-05 (^{687}) Day 398/096/01-12 (Witness nodding)
Q. -- out of the car in order to have a go. Is he just wrong on that?
A. Yes, he is wrong. 685
9A-626 Further questioned by Mr Lawson, OIRA7 categorically stated that only the weapon fired in Columbcille Court had been stored in the car.
Q. ...your recollection is that all three of you went to a car in Glenfada Park North and put the rifle in the boot of the car and that was it. You say that you do not recall there being anything else in the back or boot of the car. Presumably the car was one of the IRA cars; is that right?
A. Um, my recollection again is -- and Eversheds posed the question to me -- my recollection is, as put in the statement, when you said to me were there any other arms in the car at the time when the rifle was put in, um, there were no other arms in the car when the rifle was put in. 689
9A-627 OIRA7 again told the Tribunal that
I would emphatically deny that they were in the car. 690
9A-628 The Tribunal was, however, able to assess his evidence when questioned closely by Mr Lawson as to the circumstances in which he could have checked contents of the boot of the car as carefully as he now claims
Q... That is not what I asked you. who put it in there?
I cannot remember, probably the person who had possession of the weapon when the car was open.
Q. You cannot remember who that was?
685 Day 398/098/16-22 689 Day 398/46.25-51.-8 690 Day 398/054/11 A. No, I do not remember, no.
Q. Presumably it would make sense if one was putting it in the car, the other two would have been keeping an eye open to see if there was anybody about, watching?
A. Yes, that makes sense.
Q. That would make sense; would it not, yes? Did you go to the boot of the car?
A. I did go to the boot of the car.
Q. Do you remember doing so?
A. I do, yes.
Q. Why did you go to the boot of the car?
A. To see that the weapon was put in there. If three of us were around the weapon, it was a lot harder for anybody else to see.
Q. You all stood huddled around the boot of the car?
A. I think that is the normal way that stuff like that was done.
Q. Is that what you assume happened or something you remember happening?
A. That is what I am saying happened.
Q. Did you look into the boot of the car?
A. Yes, when the boot of the car was open.
Q. That is not my question.
A. As the rifle was being put in I saw inside the boot of the car.
Q. Why did you look into the boot of the car specifically?
A. Because that is where the rifle was going.
Q. There was no particular reason to look in there, was there?
A. If there had have been a jack or a spare wheel or a can of petrol in there, you did not just want to throw a weapon into the boot of a car and slam the boot. Q. Did you in fact take any notice, if you were there, take any notice of what was in the boot of the car?
A. I was there and I do not remember anything being in the boot of the car that would have impeded that weapon going into the boot of the car.691
Q. You cannot say, can you, with the best will in the world, OIRA 7, that there were no other weapons in that car?
A. I can say there were no other weapons in the car because I did not see any in the boot of the car.692
9A-629 OIRA7's account of him and his two colleagues huddling closely around the car in Glenfada Park North is indeed roundly contradicted by OIRA1 himself who claims not to have seen OIRA7 or any other member of the Official IRA in Glenfada Park North
From the time that you arrived in Glenfada Park with that rifle to the time that you left it having put the rifle in the boot, did you see another member of the Official IRA?
A. No.
Q. Are you sure about that?
A. I am sure I did not see any, yes.693
Indeed OIRA2 seemed to doubt whether OIRA7 had been present at Columbille Court as he claimed saying in his BSI statement that:
We were the only two members involved in the incident.694
691 Day 398/158/11-160/01 692 Day 398/160/07-11 693 Day 395/117/07-13 694 AOIRA2, 22 paragraph46 OIRA7 was also unable to explain (as was OIRA2) why, if there were no intention to use it further, the weapon should have been abandoned in the car as opposed to moved from the area of likely army incursion.
Q. Is there any reason why the rifle was not taken further into the Bogside as opposed to being left in the boot of the car?
A. The car was closest.
Q. It could safely have been taken off into the Bogside; could it not? A. The car was closest and that is where it was taken to.695
OIRA7 also rejected, when questioned by Mr Clarke, Mr Martin's evidence that weapons had already been removed from the car at the time in the immediate aftermath of the shooting when they were both considering retrieving them.
Q. When he came to give evidence, Mr Martin said that when they were considering matters either at the end of the day or after Bloody Sunday, he learnt somehow that there had been rifles that had been in the car, but they had been removed before the Army shooting started. Again, if that is what he told the Sunday Times, that is wrong, is it?
A. That is Tony Martin's evidence, um, it does not, it certainly bears no resemblance to the truth as I know it.696
There are then irreconcilable differences between the evidence of Mr Martin and OIRA7. Indeed, OIRA7 disputed in evidence to the Tribunal that he would have been in the position in which Mr Martin recollects the conversation with the IRA man took place.
695 Day 399/036/03-09 696 Day 398/099/25-100/09 Q. Do you have any recollection of attempting to get into Glenfada Park North via Glenfada Park South and deciding against it because soldiers were still in Glenfada Park North?
A. Um, if I am correct the entrance into Glenfada Park South is the same entrance -- it is off the entrance that leads into Abbey Park and, as I am saying, you know, I was in, um -- at the southwest exit when this discussion took place; it did not take place in Glenfada Park South.
Q. Did you go into Glenfada Park South in order to see whether it was safe to go into Glenfada Park North? A. No, because I could have seen from the alleyway whether it was safe or not.697
Mr Martin had, of course, clearly stated that the conversation to which he referred took place at the eastern entrance between Glenfada Park North and South.
We went back into Glenfada Park South and made our way to the entrance at the east of Glenfada Park South, looking into Glenfada Park North to see if it was safe to go in.698
9A-633 Other Evidence re IRA Cars PIN 437 describes an attempt to move an IRA car parked in Glenfada Park North. L210 refers to there being more than one such car. The OIRA witnesses have denied either case. OIRA 7, for example, said:
A. I do not remember there was an attempt to try and take the car out of Glenfada Park.699
9A-634 The Tribunal has had the opportunity to view Video 2 which appears to show the movement of people around a car parked on the eastern side of Glenfada Park North.
697 Day 398/098/16-099/11 698 AM24.13 paragraph27 It is understood that the Aitken Team have made detailed submissions as to the photographic and video evidence of the movement of cars in Glenfada Park which are not repeated here.
Michael Quinn (AQ11) referred, in a statement he gave under guarantee of anonymity to Peter Pringle of the Sunday Times Insight team, to there being two IRA cars in Glenfada Park. Mr Pringle recorded Mr Quinn as saying that
There were two 'IRA cars' parked in Glenfada Park. He knows they were IRA men, known in the district. Two were in one, unknown in the other. He saw no guns.
Mr Quinn denies giving this information although he acknowledges that other details recorded in the same document are correct. He claims in his BSI statement that in fact this suggestion that there were IRA cars in Glenfada Park North came from the Sunday Times team.
At the end I recall they wanted to put certain things to me. I don't recall now but having seen their notes, attached as MQ11 (which I did not see at the time) they put it to me that there were IRA cars in Glenfada Park North. There weren't any and I am very upset and concerned that the notes I have seen have wrongly recorded me as saying there were IRA cars in Glenfada Park.
He similarly told the Tribunal when questioned by Mr Clarke that a series of propositions were put to him by Mr Pringle so that the information about IRA cars must have originated from them.
Q. Do you recall asking to tell them asking under a guarantee of total anonymity? A. No, I do not. What I recall from that meeting I had with them was that I gave them -- I described what had happened to me. At the end of that they said to me there were certain things they wanted to put to me. They put a series of things to me, one about -- which I do not recall now, but I guess it could have been about IRA cars, but I have no recollection of cars in Glenfada Park at all. They then said that there were nail bombs in Glenfada Park and at that point I said, "Well, there were, but they were taken out of the area pretty quickly", and that is why I mentioned the two boys to them.
Q. Your recollection of the sequence of events is that after they had taken down your story, as it were, they started putting to you a series of things that they had heard, propositions they wanted you to agree or disagree with?
A. Yes.
Q. Can we look at the first one? What they have recorded is this: "Quinn told us the following: "I. There were two 'IRA cars' parked in Glenfada Park. He knows they were IRA men, known in the district. Two were in one, unknown in the other. He saw no guns." As written that seems very specific, an acceptance of two cars with known IRA men in them: two in one and an unknown quantity in the other. Do you recall any conversation on those lines or something along those lines being put to you?
A. No, I have no recollection of any cars in Glenfada Park and I understand that there were cars there, but I have no memory of cars at all."
The Tribunal also heard, however, the evidence of both Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobsen who interviewed Michael Quinn together and were both able to confirm that it would not be their usual practice to put such facts to interviewees. Peter Pringle: Not in, not in the way that we would normally interview people. We would want them to come up with this answer, this information and then we would match it to others.
Q. Do you recall now whether he simply volunteered the information about there being two IRA cars in Glenfada Park or whether you asked him a question about whether there were or were not?
A. I think I just said that I believe that we would not have prompted him in this -- to make that answer. The unfortunate part about it is that my notebooks do not really help us here, they just say there were two cars sitting there.704
Philip Jacobsen
...it was not our practice to lead people that we were interviewing, that essentially we were recording their statements. We asked questions where we felt it would be necessary, but what we were most interested in was getting in the most natural form an individual's recollection of events.705
P428
9A-640 It will clearly be for the Tribunal to evaluate the photograph P428 and the suggestion put us to various witnesses that the man shown moving away from the car parked in the south east corner of Glenfada Park may be carrying a rifle, concealed under a coat or similar covering. It may assist, however, to recall OIRA7's description to Mr Clarke as to how such weapons were usually transported by OIRA gunmen and his suggestion that one rifle on the day may well have been concealed by removing a coat and carrying the weapon under it:
Q. You say that you find it difficult to believe that you would have put the gun down the leg of your trousers to help get it
704 Day 190/064/18-065/04 705 Day 191/149/12-17 away and conceal it, but you say you suspect that it was covered with a coat; you had a coat and may have used it to hide the weapon, although you cannot recall if you did or not: "All we were concerned with at the time was getting it out of sight." Is it inherently likely that you or one of the two volunteers tried to hide the gun under a coat and, if so, would be likely to have the coat -- the rifle, the gun down the side of the trousers, underneath the coat?
A. Again, from memory, um, I do not think any of us wore -- I certainly did not wear a long coat, um, you know, it would have been, it would have been awkward to try and hide a hunting rifle inside a sports jacket, I mean, part of it was going to be protruding. So what I have said there, it is possible that I or one of us took off our coat, jacket, and put it over the weapon, you know. Again, I am not sure if it was me -- if any of us did, but certainly, I mean, the idea of keeping the weapon out of sight.
Q. If that was done, if a coat was taken off and put around the weapon, would the best way of carrying it in order to conceal it be to have it down at your side?
A. Yes, it would have been, yes.
9A-641 OIRA7's evidence in his BSI statement was that:
I suspect it was covered with a coat. I had a coat and may have used it to hide the weapon.
9A-642 Both OIRA1 and OIRA7 gave evidence to Eversheds which may well connect them with this photograph, evidence from which both are now keen to distance themselves.
9A-643 OIRA 7 had identified himself in his BSI statement as the figure in P428.
When questioned by Mr Clarke, however, the following exchange occurred:
______________________________________________________________________
706 Day 398/045/02-046/02 707 AOIRA7.9 paragraph44 Q. Could we have on the screen P428. Am I right in thinking that you believe that you are the young man with a light-coloured jacket which my red arrow is pointing to?
A. Um, the identity in this photograph is based on the conversation that I had with Eversheds and this identification is based on the identification made at the barrier in William Street who, this morning I said was not me, so, you know I am saying that as certain as I am that that was not me this morning in William Street, this, then, would not have been me.
Mr Lawson put it to OIRA7 that in fact he was correct in his initial identification of himself and that P428 does indeed show him in possession of a rifle in just the fashion he had described.
Q. I am not going to take up time, Mr Toohey made the point yesterday, what is in the photograph is there to be seen. I will however give you this opportunity. Will you care to tell the Tribunal two things, that is I suggest you, and you know it, one, what were you carrying?
A. Sorry, I was waiting for the question two. Um, when I was in Glenfada Park I was not carrying anything after the rifle was put in the boot of the car.
Q. That could not be you carrying the rifle, could it?
A. It could not because it is too late, um, the rifle at that point is already in the boot of the car.
Q. Of course you have carried a rifle under a coat before; have you not?
A. Yes.
Q. And certainly that photograph of that individual -- I accept that he is in the distance to some extent -- but that photograph
______________________________________________________________________
708 AOIRA7.13 paragraph66 709 Day 398/076/19-077/04 of that individual, it does look, does it not, as though he may be -- he could be carrying a rifle under a coat, could he not?
A. If that was me and I was carrying a rifle under a coat, it would not be as obvious as that, it would be right down beside me, you would not be able to see it.
Q. Not at all?
A. Not to distinguish it to that level, no.
Q. The second question for you, is this: the person behind that which I suggest is you, who is that?
A. I do not know. I do not know.
Q. That individual in the photograph in the white coat, I suggest is you. I also suggest it is more likely -- although I will be the first to accept, it may be open to some different interpretation -- I suggest that person may well have walked from the car that we see in the corner, do you see, parked not appropriately, if you like, in that corner?
A. Yes.
Q. And is making his way, I suggest, towards the northwest corner of Glenfada Park, that is to say not towards the gap where we see the people still crowding through?
A. I do not know, you know, I am saying that to the best of my knowledge that person is not me so I cannot say where they are going, um, I am also -- this is the first time I have actually seen a photograph with these two cars in it as well, I have not seen this photograph before.710
9A-645 Mr Lawson questioned OIRA1 on Day 396 and put to him the likeness between the man shown in P428 and an individual whom OIRA1 had circled in AOIRA1.51 and identified to Eversheds in as being "a person who looked
710 Day 399/062-063 as if he might be me". OIRA1 seemed keen to distance himself from such identification when questioned by Mr Lawson.
Civilian Evidence of Riflemen in Sector 4
The Tribunal has heard from civilian witnesses prepared to admit seeing rifles in the area of Glenfada Park. In respect of those witnesses, and indeed all of those who have found the courage to give similar evidence, the Tribunal will no doubt consider again one of the questions raised by Edwin Glasgow QC in his opening address:
...the second question is: which of those witnesses is likely to be the more reliable, the one who saw the gunman, or the ten who were close to him but say they did not? The handful of people who admit to being aware of terrorist activity beyond the 5th floor of the Rossville Flats, or the hundreds who say nothing about it at all?
John Leo Clifford
In his NICRA statement John Leo Clifford (AC66) said, along with many others, that
During this action at no time did I see anyone carrying guns other than the army.
When, however, he came to give a statement to this Inquiry, he was prepared to admit the following
As I left Mrs Dunlop's house (in Glenfada Park South) and turned northwards whilst still in the Glenfada Park South courtyard, I saw about 40 people being lined up and frisked against the southern gable wall of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North by soldiers who were carrying rifles and batons. I cannot remember what was being said at the time. As I was standing there at approximately the point marked N on the attached map (grid reference 115) a civilian gunman ran from the south west corner of Glenfada Park South in a north easterly direction to the north east corner of Glenfada Park South. He was carrying a .303 rifle and wearing a brown suit. He was aged about 26 to 28. He looked around the north east corner of Glenfada Park South but turned round and then ran back in a south easterly direction. I was with my nephew Kevin at the time and he thought that the gunman was a "stickie" that is a member of the official IRA.715
Mr Clifford has, as the Tribunal is aware, not been able to give evidence due to ill health. His nephew, Kevin has made a statement confirming that he saw what he took to be a "stickie" gunman but placing him in the area of the Bogside Inn rather than the position which his uncle describes.716 Kevin Clifford has not given oral evidence either.
The gunman seen by Mr Clifford was of course in a similar area, at a similar time as the IRA man from the OIRA Creggan section described by Mr Martin. OIRA 7 denied when questioned either seeing the man Mr Clifford describes or being involved in the incident himself.717
Thomas McGill
Thomas McGill (AM230) also saw a gunman in the area although he failed to mention this in his NICRA statement718 and was prepared to tell Eversheds what he had seen only on condition the information not be used. Indeed his
715 AC66.4 paragraph26 716 AC67.2 paragraph12 717 Day 399/034-035 718 AM230.8 first BSI statement signed on 16 June 1999 makes no mention of such gunman. A note made by Eversheds records Mr McGill as saying, however, that:
...after the shooting had finished he saw a man with a rifle in Glenfada Park. He was wearing a long khaki/brown coat and had a rifle underneath his coat, which you could see. It was a swallow tail coat. Mr McGill spoke to him that day. The man asked him where he could get a firing point and Mr McGill told him to fuck off. After that the man disappeared. Mr McGill thinks that perhaps he came from one of the flats in Glenfada Park and that he was a member of the Official IRA.719
The Eversheds' note records the reason for Mr McGill's reluctance to release this information as being that
He has to live around here.
Indeed while admitting the truth of the information he gave in a supplementary BSI statement signed on 22 January 2001, McGill made some attempt to distance himself from detail which might be thought particularly to point to armed OIRA activity in Glenfada Park North. He says in this statement that in fact he did not know the gunman to be a member of the Official IRA but simply assumed that he was as he understood the Provisional IRA had issued orders not to be near the march.720 He also amends the location he had given for the gunman
The note says that I saw the gunman in Glenfada Park. I now do not think that is correct. I now believe that I was in the Abbey Park area. At the time I was not familiar with the area even though I came from Derry.721
719 AM230.11 720 AM230.9 paragraph 6 721 AM230.9 paragraph 7 Mr McGill has since confirmed that Eversheds did in fact record his words correctly.\\textsuperscript{722}
It is not clear why Mr McGill's familiarity with the area should have improved in the 18 months which elapsed between his two BSI statements some 29 years after the events in question. Indeed in oral evidence Mr McGill appeared, somewhat strangely, to deny that he had been in Glenfada Park at any time. While he confirmed that he had, as he described in his BSI statement,\\textsuperscript{723} moved past Gerard McKinney's body in Abbey Park to a position near the rubble barricade, he entirely refuted any suggestion that he had passed through Glenfada Park.
\\textit{Sorry, no, I must have came the outside of Glenfada Park, behind it again. I did not come through Glenfada Park.}
\\textit{Q. You did not come through Glenfada Park?}
\\textit{A. No. You have to understand that.}\\textsuperscript{724}
Mr McGill's insistence on this point appears particularly odd as he confirms he was not familiar with the area\\textsuperscript{725} and he did not in fact recall when questioned, first by Mr Clarke and later by Mr Lawson, what route he did take from Abbey Park to the rubble barricade:
\\textit{Q. Do you think you went down Abbey Park to Fahan Street West, or can you not recall?}
\\textit{A. I cannot recall.}\\textsuperscript{726}
\\textsuperscript{722} Day 069/172/16-20 \\textsuperscript{723} AM230.4 paragraph24 \\textsuperscript{724} Day 069/102/07-11 \\textsuperscript{725} Day 069/101/17-19 \\textsuperscript{726} Day 069/102/12-14 Q. From Abbey Park you went to where, sir?
A. I do not honestly know.
Q. But you ended up somewhere near the rubble barricade; is that right?
A. Yeah. 727
Indeed Mr McGill was later prepared to admit when questioned by Mr Lawson that he is in fact is rather confused about where he was that day
Well, I will be totally honest with you, I was running round in circles like other people that day. 728
9A-655 Nor, while again stating his certainty that he saw the gunman in Abbey Park, can Mr McGill give any indication at all as to where he saw him:
Q. Do you know whereabouts in the Abbey Park area you saw him?
A. I have not a clue.
Q. Sorry?
A. I have not a clue, no. 729
9A-656 It would appear that the fact that the gunman was not in Glenfada Park appeared to be the one certainty which Mr McGill was able and certainly keen to establish as he told Mr Lawson:
I was not in Glenfada Park, that is for sure.
Q. You were not?
A. I was not in Glenfada Park, no.
727 Day 069/127/24-128/04 728 Day 069/154/14-16 729 Day 069/112/18-22 Q. At no stage?
A. No. 730
9A-657 It was eventually put to Mr McGill by Sir Alan Green QC that he was in fact making a deliberate attempt to distance the gunman he had seen from Glenfada Park:
Mr McGill, are you trying to remove all these incidents from Glenfada Park, for some reason?
A. No, no reason whatsoever. 731
The Tribunal will no doubt consider whether Mr McGill had some reason to wish to relocate his evidence in this manner.
9A-658 Mr McGill also initially told Eversheds that he saw this gunman “after the shooting had finished” 732 and repeated in his supplemental statement that “The shooting had ended and there were a lot of people milling around”. 733 He repeated in oral evidence that: “Well, I can say the shooting was all over at that time”. 734 Mr Lawson was able to demonstrate, however, that, if indeed Mr McGill saw the gunman in Abbey Park as he claims, this must have been at a stage when shooting was still occurring as Mr McGill’s evidence was that there was still shooting from the Army when he reached the rubble barricade.
Q. So that we have the general picture: you go from Abbey Park where you saw Mr McKinney to the vicinity of the Rossville Flats?
A. Yes.
730 Day 069/156/12-16 731 Day 069/173/11 732 AM230.11 733 AM230.9 paragraph 9 734 Day 069/112/23-113/01 Q. Yes? A. Near enough, yes.
Q. Where there is still some shooting going on, as you have told us? A. Yeah.
Q. Then you go from there to Free Derry Corner and make your way home via Westland Street? A. Meenan Park and Westland Street, yeah.
Q. And you do not, of course, go back to Abbey Park, because that is not on the way, is it? A. No.
Q. The problem, Mr McGill, is this: you say when you saw this man – A. Yeah.
Q. -- the shooting had finished? A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Of course at the time you left Abbey Park, the shooting was going on, was it not, and it continued to go on when you were near to the rubble barricade; that is what you have told us? A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Was what you were telling us the truth? A. Yeah, it is the truth as far as I can recall. Q. If it is true that you saw a gunman in or near Abbey Park, that would be at a time when the shooting was still going on, would it not?
A. To be totally honest with you, there was no shooting at that time, that is what I recall.
Q. Then the shooting must have resumed, because you have told us it had resumed when you were away from Abbey Park, to which you did not return?
A. I told at the start I could not get any sequence other than what, what I seen that day, but there was no shooting from the gunman.736
The sequence of events described by Mr McGill would indicate that there was a gunman with a rifle in either Abbey Park or Glenfada Park North when soldiers were still engaged in the area. It is not clear whether Mr McGill’s assumption that the gunman was a member of the Official IRA was correct or not. The Tribunal may well consider whether Mr McGill is in some way motivated to distance the gunman he saw from the Glenfada Park area and/or place the sighting later in the day than was in fact the case. Certainly he was reluctant to allow such facts to be released at all, a matter on which he was questioned by Gerard Elias QC
Q. You have said that, as we have seen before in the statement that you have signed on Monday, but you were saying, notwithstanding that, that the reason that you did not tell NICRA this information was that you "had to live around here". I simply want to ask you: by saying that you have to live around here, do you mean that you feared the consequences of telling the whole story?
A. No, I did not, no.
Q. I am sorry? A. No.
Q. What did you mean, some social embarrassment?
A. As I said before, I did not want to detract from the norm to what I had seen that day.
Q. I understand that.
A. That is all I can tell you about it, to be honest with you.
Q. What does that part of the note mean, you had to live around here, what did you mean by that?
A. I do not honestly know what I meant by that.737
9A-660 Mr McGill admitted in his supplementary BSI that he wished to withhold evidence in order not to undermine what he believes to be the correct outcome.
The reason why I did not this information to be put in my Eversheds statement is explained in the Eversheds note. However, I also did not want people to use as an excuse to detract from the enormity of what I had seen that day.738
9A-661 He further admitted in evidence to the Tribunal that, at the time he met with Eversheds, he was reluctant to place any faith in the Inquiry to determine the truth of the events of Bloody Sunday and remains so reluctant:
Can I be honest with you, when I made that statement, I just thought it was a whitewash, to some extent –
Q. You thought it was what?
A. A whitewash, and I -- the way it was put down, the people misinterpreted what I said when they put it down in the statement. Although I signed the statement, I did not read the
737 Day 069/165/20-166/14 738 AM230.10 paragraph12 statement fully through, it is only when I knew I was coming here that I read the statement detail by detail. People told me that they seen four or five bodies in Glenfada Park.
Q. Are you telling us, Mr McGill, at the time you made the statement you were not taking it seriously?
A. I was taking it serious because I feel sorry for the people who were shot and the innocent people who were killed.
Q. But you thought it was a whitewash so you were not too bothered about whether it was right or wrong?
A. Well, I still think it was, to a certain extent.
Q. You still think it is?
A. Yeah.
Q. You think this is a whitewash?
A. To a certain extent, yeah. Time will tell when it comes to fruition, results.
The Tribunal will no doubt consider whether such Mr McGill's declared attitude continues to detract from the reliability of his evidence.
Noel McCartney
Noel McCartney (M55), a staff reporter for the Derry Journal, gave a statement to the Widgery Tribunal in which he reported being at the gable end of Glenfada Park North close to the rubble barricade when he saw a young man fall, shot in the stomach, who was brought into the area where Mr McCartney was. Mr McCartney then says:
I thought only one man was hit at the barricade, the young man I had seen fall. I went through Glenfada Park to Fahan Street looking for a first aid man. I then saw a civilian with a rifle who appeared at the opening to Rossville Street, who crossed inside Glenfada Park in the direction of Abbey Street.\\textsuperscript{740}
It is not clear whether Mr McCartney saw this gunman crossing Glenfada Park North or South although the only "opening" onto Rossville Street, as opposed to alleyways, is that at the south east corner of Glenfada Park North close to the rubble barricade. Moreover previous references to "openings" in Mr McCartney's statement are clearly to that area.
Mr McCartney is, unsurprisingly, unable to assist further as to the exact location of the gunman in giving his BSI statement. He again describes moving from the rubble barricade to Blucher Street and then says that:
\\begin{quote} I think that after reaching Blucher Street I then went to the Lisfannon Park area. It was at some point around this time that I saw a civilian wearing a three quarter length coat holding a rifle in an upright position.\\textsuperscript{741} \\end{quote}
In oral evidence, Mr McCartney was able to confirm to Mr Clarke that he saw the gunman when he was on his way to find medical assistance as indeed he stated in his statement to the Widgery Tribunal, beyond that fact he was able to recall little about the gunman's precise location, although he did not feel it was as close to the rubble barricade as the opening between Glenfada Park North and South.\\textsuperscript{742}
\\begin{quote} Q. I am asking you what you would have meant by the expression that was used in 1972: "I saw a civilian with a rifle who appeared at the opening to Rossville Street who crossed inside Glenfada Park to the direction of Abbey Street". \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{740} M55.9 paragraph 7 \\textsuperscript{741} M55.2 paragraph 7 \\textsuperscript{742} Day 157/114/13-21 A. I am not sure, but I do not think it was that location, that is very close to the barricade. I think it was some distance from the barricade, from vague memory, that I saw this person.743
9A-667 It was suggested to Mr McCartney that the phrasing of his statement suggested he had reached Fahan Street before seeing the gunman:
LORD SAVILLE: Mr Clarke, if you look at 55.9, on the account given then, paragraph 7, the third sentence says: "I then saw a civilian" and the previous sentence says: "I went through Glenfada Park to Fahan Street looking for a first aid man." I read that and whether or not Mr McCartney now can help us with his recollection is that it was only when you had in effect got to or virtually to Fahan Street that you saw this civilian; that would be further south than the arrow on the map Mr Clarke has just shown you?
A. Yes, that would be my memory.744
9A-668 In fact, it would seem that the use of the word “then” in Mr McCartney’s SC statement may be somewhat misleading as it is difficult to see how Mr McCartney could see the man cross Glenfada Park having already reached Fahan Street. Much conjecture followed as to the meaning of Mr McCartney’s SR statement but he was unable to assist a great deal further.
MR CLARKE: If we go back to the map at M55.11, one possibility, if your recollection of your route is correct, is that you went through Glenfada Park South to Fahan Street and that the civilian who appeared at the opening to Rossville Street and crossed inside Glenfada Park in the direction of Abbey Street appeared here and went across in that direction; is that possible?
A. That is possible, but I cannot remember.745
743 Day 157/116/15-23 744 Day 157/116/24-117/12 745 Day 157/117/13-21 MR TOOHEY: Mr McCartney, still to your right: I suppose if you had come into Glenfada Park South and gone down to the southeastern exit, you really would have been going into, what could be described as then going into Rossville -- or an opening to Rossville Street?
A. Yes.
MR TOOHEY: But make of that what you will. That would seem to be the only position in which you could really, having described the route that you took, be speaking about an opening into Rossville Street as opposed to an opening into Fahan Street?
A. Yes, I understand what you are saying.
LORD SAVILLE: Again, back to the Chairman: we must not put words in your mouth or anything like that, but another possibility is that you left the gable end of Glenfada Park North, went through the northeastern entrance into Glenfada Park South -- am I making myself clear to you at the moment -- went across Glenfada Park South and as you did so, saw the rifleman at the southeastern entrance to Glenfada Park South, which would of course lead into Rossville Street. I do not want to put any ideas in your mind, it is your recollection that counts and not our theories, but is that a possibility?
A. Sorry, could you retrace that for me, please?
LORD SAVILLE: Mr Clarke, if you can do it, you can probably do it better than I can.
MR CLARKE: The possibility that is being envisaged, is this: you start off at B, you go into Glenfada Park South, you cross in that direction, which will take you eventually into Fahan Street. (Marked with red arrows - M55.12). But as you pass you see to your left and coming in effect off Rossville Street the man with the rifle coming in there, such that you describe in your contemporaneous statement, him as appearing at the opening to Rossville Street, the only opening into Rossville Street in Glenfada Park South other than the one which you had entered into from the gable end being where that blue arrow is? (Marked with blue arrow - M55.12).
A. Yes, I understand what you are saying. All I can say is that my memory is more of seeing the man between Glenfada Park and Abbey Park, as opposed to that location. My memory would be to come across the first part of the arrow because there was a wall here, therefore, I think I went to that for safety to cross inside the park to make my way up towards Blucher Street. But my memory at the moment would have been seeing that man between Glenfada Park and Abbey Park.
Q. And Abbey Park. Could we just preserve this image at M55.12 so that we can see what was being suggested. the red being your route and the suggestion having been that you may have seen the rifleman at the blue point, but your recollection now is that he was closer to the area between Glenfada Park South and Abbey Park; is that right?
A. Yes.746
It is clear that Mr McCartney saw this gunman in the Abbey Park/Glenfada Park area at a time when soldiers were engaged in that area of the Bogside. Mr McCartney is confident that he saw the man on his way to Blucher Street to obtain medical assistance, shortly after seeing Michael Kelly fall.747 Certainly having reached Blucher Street and then travelled on to Lisfannon Park Mr McCartney says that “I heard more shooting”,748 again confirming the early stage at which he saw the man with a rifle. Mr McCartney was able to confirm in his BSI statement that “shooting was still going on”749 when he reached Blucher Street.
Rifles – Conclusions
While it is impossible to be sure of exact timings and positioning, there is persuasive and cogent evidence, from both well-corroborated press articles and civilian eyewitnesses that there were rifles in and around Glenfada Park North at the time when soldiers were engaged in the area. There are a number
746 Day 157/118/22 –121/06 747 M55.9 paragraph6 748 M55.9 paragraph7 749 M55.2 paragraph7 of points of correlation between what is known of the movement of those weapons and the accounts given by soldiers of armed men in the area.
**Soldier G’s Shots into Columbille Court/Glenfada Park Alleyway**
9A-671 The information contained in PIN437 and L210 shows that weapons were moved out of one or more IRA cars in Glenfada Park at a time after troops moved into the Bogside. Those weapons included two .303’s, a carbine, a Sten and a .22 automatic. There is further information before the Tribunal to indicate when and where those weapons were taken.
9A-672 OIRA1 told John Barry that he:
> Shouted to everyone to retreat. All did except for one – who ran up to what OIRA1 swears was the northwest corner of Glenfad, that is the corner towards Wm St and furthest from the flats. OIRA1 says he got up on a balcony ---on the front of C. Court, he said the bloke told him later,---and got in a couple of shots with the .22 automatic.
9A-673 He repeated the account to Gerard Kemp, although without apparently suggesting that this man was acting against orders:
> One guy got on to a balcony and fired at the Paras.
9A-674 Soldier G in his first RMP statement at 0215 hrs on 31 January 1972 stated that:
> We moved further up the street and I saw a gunman positioned behind a wall at the end of an alleyway about fifteen yards
______________________________________________________________________
750 AOIRA1.1 751 L210
FS 7 2149 IX-266 away. I fired two quick rounds... I ran up the alleyway with F into Glenfada Park area. We were followed by two others.\\textsuperscript{752}
The position of that gunman as marked on map B171 shows him at the north west exit to Glenfada Park.
9A-675 Soldier G repeated his evidence in his SA statement:
\\begin{quote} I saw F start to move forward, so, as it was a short distance to the next cover, I moved with him. I think F might have stopped on the way to cover me and I went to the end of the wall which runs to the alleyway. I refer to the photograph marked “Soldier G”. When I got to the end of that wall, just before I got to the opening, someone shouted, “Look out, there’s a gunman up there” or words like that...... When I looked round I saw a man dodging in and out of an alleyway... I caught a glimpse of what might have been a weapon. After being warned to look out for a gunman I am satisfied that that is what I saw. From the way he moved and the manner in which he carried the object in his hands I was sure he was a gunman. One of the others had to get across the alleyway and to keep this man’s head down I fired two shots at him on the line shown, marked 2. I was aiming at him, though I thought it was unlikely I would hit him, but anyway it served the purpose of keeping his head down.\\textsuperscript{753} \\end{quote}
9A-676 Soldier G gave the same evidence of a man “dodging about” in this alleyway with “a weapon of some description” to Lord Widgery at B193 A to E. He confirmed, when cross-examined by Mr Read, that it appeared to be a rifle due to “The way he was holding it and the way I caught a quick glimpse of what appeared to be a weapon”.\\textsuperscript{754} Soldier G was confident he did not hit the man and both his shots had struck the wall.\\textsuperscript{755}
\\textsuperscript{752} B168-9 \\textsuperscript{753} B186 \\textsuperscript{754} B205 at G \\textsuperscript{755} B206 at E There is then a considerable coincidence in the evidence reported in PIN437 and L210 of a rifleman exiting Glenfada Park North via the north west exit to and the evidence of Soldier G that he saw a man with a rifle in just that position.
Rifles Carried in Glenfada Park North
The Tribunal also has before it evidence as to what is likely to have happened to the other weapons taken from cars in Glenfada Park.
The Tribunal will note the movements of those OIRA members who have admitted being concerned in depositing a rifle in a car parked in Glenfada Park and who, based on the information contained in PIN437, must be assumed to have been involved, with others, in the later movement of weapons out of the area. The time at which these weapons were being moved is also of considerable relevance of course. It is, first, apparent from the course of events related in PIN437 that the attempt to remove weapons from the car parked in Glenfada Park North was made some time after OIRA1 had returned and to secure his rifle in the car as OIRA1 “went back to the Glenfada, put the rifle back in the boot of the car and waited rather at a loose end.” It is also clear that weapons were removed from the car at a time either after Michael Kelly was shot or, at the earliest, after the Pigs had entered Rossville Street as:
Then he either a) saw Kelly’s body, or b) saw the Saracens coming in. From other sources, the latter is the only conceivable one. OIRA1 was appalled. Someone shouted to him, and he went round the gable to see. Behold, the Saracens approaching. He sped back into Glenfada and shouted to them to get the car out....
Whatever the exact timing of the attempts to remove the weapons there is then some further elapse of time as
There were five or six Stickies around the car, and they couldn’t get the thing out in time. OIRA1 said to abandon it, and get the arms out of the boot. They did: the arms consisted of a Sten, a carbine, two 303’s and a .22 automatic”. He toyed with the idea of trying to make a fight of it, but rejected the idea. “The men weren’t in position.” Shouted to everyone to retreat. All did, except for one.....
The Tribunal may well conclude that the activity described occurred in the short but crucial period when members of Anti Tank Platoon were observing movements at the Rubble Barricade and subsequently moving into Glenfada Park North, hence Soldier G’s encounter with the rifleman exiting via the north west exit. That scenario is also important when examining the accounts of soldiers who saw rifles at the rubble barricade as set out in Chapter 8 of these submissions.
OIRA1, in his accounts to Mr Barry and Mr Kemp, said that, having given the order to move the weapons from the car, he went to a position on the rubble barricade. While, as PIN437 itself notes, OIRA1 had “very hazy chronology”, the sequence of events that he relates is:
PIN 437
He sped back into Glenfada and shouted to them to get the car out....
.....There were five or six Stickies around the car, and they couldn’t get the thing out in time. OIRA1 said to abandon it, and get the arms out of the boot. They did...
OIRA1 seems to have blown his mind at this point because he relates in great detail how he saw Micky Kelly...a young cousin of his...fall behind the gable. Pressed, he says that what he saw was a crowd around him, a figure in a white shirt, he thinks. But he insists that he then saw, obliquely, three figures standing at the barricade and a burst of automatic... “machine gun”...fire, at which three fell....adding austerely: “Whether they were hit or not I could not say”
L210
The Paras moved up and I told our boys to get their weapons out of their cars....One guy got on to a balcony and fired at the Paras. Someone else fired with the pistol. I was by the barricade in Rossville Street next and saw three civilians go down....
9A-684 While OIRA 7 he has not mentioned it in evidence, it would appear from notes taken by Paul Mahon that OIRA7 was also in the area of the gable end of Glenfada at some stage. Unfortunately, Mr Mahon can no longer assist in further interpretation of those notes:
Q. Can we look at AM19.251, please. If we could expand the top part, please. As I indicated, this is a page from your notebook 3. As I indicated at the beginning of the day, the reference to OIRA 1 should be a reference to OIRA 7. I think I sent to you the name of OIRA 7 a while ago; you still have that name in your mind?
A. Yes. Q. Help me, please, with some of the handwriting: "Took Joe Mahon's coat off him." What is the next word?
A. "Is pictured at gable end of Glenfada."
Q. Then there is page 194 and 195, "possible sighting in combat jacket." The page 194 and 195, would that be a reference to a volume in part of the Widgery material?
A. I cannot help you there, I cannot be specific on that at all.
Q. Looking at that, what this entry appears to relate to is OIRA 7 being in the area of Glenfada Park and that he could be identified on photographs, is that a possibility?
A. I am sorry, I really do not know who Official IRA 7 is, I have no idea who he is.
Q. The name actually does not ring any bells with you?
A. It does not, no.
Q. So you cannot assist with this entry at all?
A. Not at all, no.756
9A-685 It is clear from his response to Mr Rawat's further questioning, however, that he was given this information about OIRA 7:
Q. "OIRA 7 took Joe Mahon's coat off him as pictured at gable end of Glenfada. Page 194 and 195. Possible sighting in combat jacket." That appears to relate to OIRA 7 being in Glenfada Park and one could see OIRA 7, he could be identified on photographs. I am going to send you the name of OIRA 7 once again. Please do not say the name out loud. Do you know that man?
A. No.
Q. You never met him?
756 Day 411/127/23-128/23 A. No.
Q. At one time it would be right, would it not, someone gave you that name, because you made a note in your notebook?
A. Did I really; is that what the redaction is –
Q. Yes, that is the name.
A. Right, well, someone must have given me the name, um, certainly, because you seem to have here two members of the Official IRA, who have the same surname.
Q. Can I stop you there for a moment, Mr Mahon. I want to give you a copy page with the redaction removed.
A. Fine. (Handed)
Q. Please do not read it out and please do not comment on the name, but you have there a full name as in a first name and a surname. That is the name of OIRA 7. You have said that the name does not mean anything to you, but the fact –
A. Only the comment that I have just made regarding to two members of the Official IRA who seemed to have the same surname.
Q. The point is, what my question goes to is that that is the name that appears on this page; that is right, is it not?
A. That is correct.
Q. So someone must have given you that name?
A. They must have done.
Q. Someone must have told you about OIRA 7?
A. That is right.
Q. You must have shown someone photographs and that person must have identified OIRA 7 on those photographs?
A. Why do you assume that?
Q. Because of this entry here and this entry here, "is pictured at gable end of Glenfada," could that be a reference to OIRA 7? (Indicating) A. You are telling me it is, yes.
Q. I am asking you: could that be?
A. It could be, yes...........
....A. Unfortunately, Mr Rawat, I cannot help you at all, I cannot even help you with regard to the individual concerned.
Q. You have told us you cannot remember the individual concerned?
A. That is right.
Q. What I am suggesting to you is that someone must have told you the information you have recorded?
A. I agree with you, absolutely.
Q. Do not give the name, but can you remember who that person was?
A. No idea at all.757
In examining the evidence of the movements of Official IRA men close to the rubble barricade the Tribunal will no doubt bear in mind the evidence of Soldiers F and INQ0635 as to the rifles which they saw at the rubble barricade while they were positioned at the Kells Walk Wall. Soldier F said in an undated RMP that
I saw three men move from the barricade north west into the area of Glenfada Park flats. One of the men was carrying what looked like a rifle. Myself and G of my Company ran down an alleyway and came into a square.....758
Soldier F repeated that evidence in his SA statement:
757 Day 412/003/23-006/21 758 B129 I then saw three men leave the barricade. One was carrying a rifle, and they moved to the right in the direction of Glenfada Park. Myself and G moved round the side of the wall and into GP in order to cut their retreat off.\\textsuperscript{759}
And to Lord Widgery:
\\textit{After the man I had shot had fell to the ground three persons, one who was carrying what appeared to be a rifle, left from the barricade moving to the right into GP.}\\textsuperscript{760}
9A-687 INQ0635 also recalled seeing rifles at the barricade saying in his BSI statement that:
\\textit{...the next thing I remember was seeing three possibly four men move out from the south gable end wall of the eastern block of GPN ...towards the RB... I believe that two possibly three of these men were carrying weapons. I remember clearly seeing the wooden stocks of two weapons.}\\textsuperscript{761}
9A-688 Soldier F saw the men who had decamped from the rubble barricade once he entered Glenfada Park North. His undated RMP statement continued:
\\textit{I saw the three men on the other side of the square about thirty metres away near to 24 Glenfada Park, south west of our position. I shot and hit one man as he attempted to throw an object which looked like a nailbomb. I saw G fire and hit another of the men who was carrying what appeared to be a rifle.}\\textsuperscript{762}
9A-689 Soldier F explained in further detail to Lord Widgery that:
\\textit{Q. When you went in there you saw these men inside?}
\\textsuperscript{759} B137.4-5 \\textsuperscript{760} B141 at E \\textsuperscript{761} C635.3 paragraph21 \\textsuperscript{762} B167.031 A. Yes.
Q. Did you see any man with a rifle at that stage?
A. The person I saw at that stage was the person attempting to throw a nail bomb......
Q. Did you see any rifle at that stage?
A. At that stage I saw a person with a rifle.
Q. You did see a person with a rifle inside Glenfada Park?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was this person with the rifle that you saw inside Glenfada Park?
A. With the three men in my frontal direction, he was the middle man.
Q. You fired at the man with the nail bomb?
A. Yes.
Q. What about the man with the rifle?
A. G fired at the man with the rifle. Sir.763
9A-690 Soldier G had not seen the man with the rifle while at the rubble barricade but did see him once he and other soldiers had moved into Glenfada Park North.
9A-691 In his first RMP statement taken on 31 January 1972 at 0215 hours he said that:
On entering the square I saw two men standing about twenty five metres away, both of them were holding what appeared to be small rifles in their hands. There was a small group of
763 B167.055 at D - B167.056 at C people standing near to them. I fired three aimed shots at one of the men and I saw him fall to the ground.764
The position of the men Soldier G had seen was marked on a map at B171. Soldier G described the scene further in his SA statement:
As I got round to the end of the car two men attracted my attention in the opposite corner of Glenfada Park at the end of the line marked 3 on my photograph. These men were armed. I cannot identify their weapons exactly but I think they were short rifles like an M1 carbine. They both had some weapon of this sort. I immediately dropped to one knee and fired three aimed shots at one of the men.\\textsuperscript{765}
Soldier G repeated his evidence to Lord Widgery in very similar terms.\\textsuperscript{766}
The movement of armed men within Glenfada Park itself at the time that soldiers entered is corroborated by one of the few pieces of available photographic evidence in the area. \\textbf{P428} depicts the scene in Glenfada Park before any casualties have fallen there but shows civilians rushing to exit the area, many via the south west exit. That is the scene described by many civilians shortly before the entrance of soldiers into Glenfada Park North.
\\textsuperscript{765} B186.5-6 \\textsuperscript{766} B194 at C – B195 at C In view of their admission that they had been handling weapons that day and the information contained in PIN437 and L210, the Tribunal will no doubt wish to consider the movements of OIRA1 and OIRA7 in Glenfada Park North. OIRA7 reported in his BSI statement being part of the group which rushed for the south west corner as soldiers entered:
Very shortly after I saw the group of people carrying Michael Kelly, the square just erupted with gunfire from behind coming toward us...Everyone started running to the south west exit... There was a big scramble to get through that south western exit.\\textsuperscript{767}
I therefore made my way dodging the shooting to the entrance at the south western corner of Glenfada Park. There was a wall behind which I could shelter and I ran in right to this wall... \\textsuperscript{768}
While making for the corner, OIRA\\textsuperscript{7} has also reported in his BSI statement being close to Joseph Mahon when he was shot:
Seeing photograph P428 has shocked me. I believe that I can see myself in this photograph. I believe that I am at the point of running towards the southwest exit that is crowded ahead of me. I have a memory of there being shouting and shooting, and I recall glancing over my right shoulder as if to see if I could dodge the bullets, which were coming... I also note that there is someone close to the fence at the south of the square – to my left. I believe that this is Joe Mahon, who I knew, and who I later became aware was shot there.\\textsuperscript{769}
OIRA\\textsuperscript{7} then doubted when questioned by Mr Lawson that this was in fact him but still believed he had been close to Joseph Mahon when he was shot, either in the same relative position as shown in P428 or slightly to the North. He explained the position when questioned by Mr Lawson about that photograph:
OIRA\\textsuperscript{7} it looks as if this group of three, including the man you previously thought was you, have been running from the southeast corner of Glenfada Park, in this area, to the southwest, whereas, of course, you had come in from the northeast and come down the centre; is that right?
A. That is correct.
\\textsuperscript{767} AOIRA\\textsuperscript{7}.12 paragraph61 \\textsuperscript{768} AOIRA\\textsuperscript{7}.13, paragraphs 67-68 \\textsuperscript{769} AOIRA\\textsuperscript{7}.13 paragraph66 Q. Would you agree that that may be another indication that it cannot be you in the spot marked by the blue arrow that I have put on the screen?
A. The possibility exists that it is me. I am saying that the identification was based on the identification made at barrier 14.
Q. But if -- sorry, go on.
A. You know, if, if I had been on the -- actually in the courtyard itself, um, I might not have appeared in the photograph, but I, I do remember actually seeing a young boy, um, stooped over, you know, assuming that he had been shot.
Q. Sorry, you say you remember seeing a young boy stooped over and you assumed that he had been shot?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did you see a young boy stooped over?
A. Against the fence. My memory of the day is that I saw someone against that fence who was stooped over after, after or in the midst of the shooting and that person I believe to have been Joe Mahon.
Q. What your evidence amounts to is: the person whom you think was Joe Mahon is shown in this photograph in the position from which Joe Mahon was eventually taken?
A. That is correct.
Q. And you recall somebody in that position in a stooped position; is that what you are saying?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did he appear to be stooped, could you tell?
A. I, I assumed he had been shot because, um, the Army had opened fire from inside the square.
Q. Where were you when you saw him in that position?
A. If the person in the photograph that I had previously identified who has got the blue arrow, if that is not me, then I would have been further north than that. Q. More towards the middle of the –
A. More towards where I left the arrow off on the last photograph.\\textsuperscript{770}
9A-697 OIRA\\textsuperscript{7} confirmed his understanding that the boy shown in this photograph was Joseph Mahon.
Q. Am I right in thinking that the person whom you had thought was Joe Mahon is the person I am identifying with the yellow arrow?
A. That is correct.\\textsuperscript{771}
9A-698 He then says that, having run to the south west exit in order to take shelter there:
\\textit{I then remember looking round when I got there and seeing Jim Wray lying on the ground.}\\textsuperscript{772}
9A-699 OIRA\\textsuperscript{7} was then clearly close to those who were shot in Glenfada Park North and in the area where gunmen were seen by Soldiers F and G. Indeed he was under the impression that a shot had been aimed at him as he ran for the south west exit:
\\textit{I remember seeing soldiers aiming their weapons. One aimed a deliberate and aimed shot in my direction.}\\textsuperscript{773}
9A-700 He says he was not aware that OIRA\\textsuperscript{1} was also running for the south west exit:
\\textsuperscript{770} Day 398/078/07-079/25 \\textsuperscript{771} 398/076/19-078/02 \\textsuperscript{772} AOIRA7.13 paragraph67-68 \\textsuperscript{773} AOIRA7.12 paragraph62 When I went into the southwest corner of Glenfada Park, there were quite a few people scrambling to get through it, um. I do not -- you know, he may or he may not have been there. If he was there, I did not see him (OIRA 1). This is where a number of the casualties were too.
OIRA 1 has confirmed on a number of occasions however that he was also part of the group rushing through the south west exit. He gave Mr Barry the following account:
He says that there was then the buzz that troops were coming up to Glenfada. He ran for it across Glenfada, out to the Abbey Park entrance. He says that there were two or three people in front of him, and he is convinced he was the last person to make it. He says there were five or six behind him. Says the person first behind him was Wray whom he claims to have known...
The Tribunal will note that, this account makes no mention of OIRA1 having left Glenfada Park North between evacuating the car and running for the southwest exit. The Tribunal will therefore wish to consider whether he was still carrying a weapon as he exited via the southwest corner.
The fact that OIRA1 did exit Glenfada Park immediately in front of James Wray was confirmed by him to Mr Kemp:
We started running. James Wray was shot dead just behind me.
OIRA1 has confirmed in his evidence to this inquiry that he did indeed exit in this manner although he no longer recalls being next to James Wray.
______________________________________________________________________
774 Day 398/056/20-24 775 AOIRA1.2 776 L210 777 AOIRA1.29 paragraph30-33 The Tribunal has now finally learned, at a very late stage indeed, of evidence to confirm that there were armed Official IRA members close to James Wray when he was shot (and, by inference therefore, also close to Joseph Friel and Michael Quinn).
Paul Mahon has finally revealed to the Tribunal that:
In relation to matters concerning Glenfada Park, I was told by Liam Wray that many years after Bloody Sunday he was approached by a former member of the Official IRA, who told him that he was sorry about what had happened to his brother, Jim, on Bloody Sunday. He explained that he, and another member of the Official IRA, were exiting Glenfada Park North through the alleyway into Abbey Park, carrying unconcealed weapons. He explained that the crowd rushing towards the exit at the time had held back at the sight of the two armed Official IRA men. The Official IRA man told Liam Wray that they both got through the alleyway into Abbey Park and within seconds of their exit heard the gunfire directed towards that position. I asked Liam Wray if he would provide the identity of this man or if it would be possible for him to speak to me and he said that there would be no possibility of this man speaking to me.
Mr Mahon confirmed to the Tribunal that he was given this information by Mr Wray in 1999 but was never told the name of Mr Wray’s source:
A. I think it would have been 1999, but I cannot be absolutely definite about that. I remember the location I was in when he told me.
Q. Presumably this conversation with Mr Wray was not in the context of a formal interview?
A. No. Q. Did you ever conduct a formal recorded interview with Mr Wray? A. No.
Q. Did you make a note of the details of this conversation? A. No.
Q. Was there any reason why you did not make a note of that? A. There was no -- I might not have had my notebook on me at the time, but it was something I was not going to forget, anyway.
Q. Did you ever identify the Official IRA man who was said to approach Mr Wray? A. I could guess who it was.
Q. Perhaps a guess is not good enough; but did you ever identify it? A. In terms of getting --
Q. Did you ever find out who it was? A. A specific name, you mean?
Q. Yes? A. No. 780
9A-707 Mr Wray has of course repudiated this account and denigrated Mr Mahon saying in a statement dated 18th January 2004 that:
I have been asked to make a statement to the Inquiry to comment on certain passages contained in the statement of Paul Mahon at AM19. For the reasons I will return to later, I make this statement with the utmost reluctance.
780 Day 411/124/24-127/22 Regarding the apology made by OIRA he says:
What Paul Mahon says in this paragraph is a complete and utter fabrication. I have never been approached by any person, neither civilian or purported current or former member of any paramilitary organisation, apologising to me for being in any way responsible for the murder of my brother and I have never given Paul Mahon any such account.
Mr Wray intimates that Mr Mahon has drawn on the Insight Article published by the Sunday Times team in providing this account to the Tribunal
The only knowledge I have ever had, other than that contained in material generated through this Inquiry about IRA activity in and around Glenfada Park, derives from the Sunday Times article published on 23rd April 1972 (now in the Inquiry material at L211-214). My late father had retained a copy of this article since its publication and had passed on to me in later years. The article makes reference to an Official IRA leader speaking about guns taken from a car in Glenfada Park by men who retreated through the alley into Abbey Park. I have never heard of this story, other than in the Sunday Times account, and I have certainly never spoken to anyone who claimed to be involved in such an episode. I am certain that Mahon and I would have discussed the contents of this article during our many discussions... I reject in its entirety Paul Mahon's claim that I ever said anything to him of the nature set out in this paragraph. He is either genuinely mistaken or telling a deliberate lie about his recollections of a conversation we had arising out of the Sunday Times article.
Mr Mahon rejected in the firmest terms possible any suggestion that he was either mistaken or lying in his account of this conversation with Liam Wray:
Q. Mr Mahon, first of all, are you "genuinely mistaken"?
A. Definitely not. Q. Are you "telling a deliberate lie"?
A. I certainly am not.781
Mr Mahon also dealt with the suggestion that he had drawn the factual basis for Mr Wray's allegedly fictitious comments from the Sunday Times Insight article:
Q. You must be aware of the Sunday Times article; must you not?
A. I am.
Q. Can we go over to the next page again. As Mr Wray points out, reference to guns being taken from a car in Glenfada Park by men retreating through the alleyway into Abbey Park appears in that article; you are aware of that?
A. I am aware of it now that you have told me. What I was recently made aware of through the Inquiry was notes taken by John Barry at the time, right, who was the Sunday Times Insight team editor, and I note that John Barry actually says that two Official IRA men exited from Glenfada Park North into Abbey Park, but he does not say in those notes that they were armed, but it was quite interesting as well, from my point of view, because what he was saying was, as soon as they had exited from Glenfada Park North into Abbey Park, there was immediate gunfire.
Q. But you did not have John Barry's notes at the time you spoke –
A. I did not, I did not no.
Q. It is quite clear that you and Mr Wray are at complete odds over this conversation, as you will appreciate?
A. Oh, there is no doubt at all about -- I have got to say that Mr Wray is lying here; sheer, unadulterated lie, because that
781 Day 411/130/21-134/06 conversation did take place with me and I can remember the exact location where that conversation took place.
Q. Even though you did not have, for example, John Barry's notes, you would have appreciated at the time that it was quite a controversial piece of evidence; would you not?
A. Oh, indeed. The fact, the existence of guns in Glenfada Park North, my understanding of that, that it was the Sunday Times, um, in their article in April 1972, their long article, that first established a car. I think, in Glenfada Park North with weapons in it.
Q. If we go back to AM19.14, please, and again look at paragraph 34. My questions, Mr Mahon, are directed to your knowledge at the time that this conversation occurred, because one reads this on its own there are two pieces of information that come from it. One is that that Official IRA man and another member of the Official IRA were carrying unconcealed weapons in Glenfada Park North on Bloody Sunday and that that Official IRA man felt sufficiently guilty that he had to approach Liam Wray. Now, both those pieces of information are quite controversial; would you not agree?
A. Indeed.782
9A-710 The matter was raised again by Lord Gifford:
Q. Or is it what you are remembering is not something that Liam Wray told you about in his source of his, but something that you were discussing with him about the supposed source of the Sunday Times?
A. No, let me be extremely specific: what I have written in my statement with regard to what Liam Wray told me is absolute, total gospel truth.783
782 Day 411/134/07-137/05 783 Day 412/120/19-25 The Tribunal has been given no reason to doubt Mr Mahon's credibility and honesty on this and many other issues and he indeed provided his own defence of his integrity and honesty which the Tribunal will consider:
It would not have been right if I was only interested in the activities of the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment. What sort of researcher would I really be then? Where would my credibility lie as a researcher if I was only interested in one side of the story? I always made it very, very plain to the families that what I wanted, what I wanted was the whole truth, hook, line and sinker, warts and all. That, to many, many people in the north of Ireland is not acceptable.
And later to Lord Gifford
A. Lord Gifford, you can stand there and say what you want and you can call me a liar. Do you think after six years of research I would come here and lie to this Tribunal? I certainly would not lie to this Tribunal at all. I have got too much respect for what this Tribunal is trying to achieve and the justice it is trying to give the people of this city, to come here and lie to it. There is nothing in my statement that is a fabrication and there is nothing in my statement that is a lie and I want you and I want this Tribunal to understand that.
Perhaps more tellingly, the Tribunal will recall both Mr Mahon's antipathy towards the Parachute Regiment as a whole and the fact that his motivation for coming forward to this Tribunal was to provide it with his research as to former alleged wrongdoing by the regiment. The Tribunal will also recall what might be described as his eulogy to James Wray on Day 412 ending with the words
He was a top man, a top man, and do you think for one minute that I would come here and try and discredit him or his family
______________________________________________________________________
784 Day 412/070/07-16 785 Day 412/128/19-129/05 or anyone else connected to him? I have come here and I have told the truth and that is the situation.\\textsuperscript{786}
9A-713 The Tribunal may consider that it is inconceivable that Paul Mahon would have gratuitously invented the account of his conversation with Liam Wray as the latter claims.
9A-714 The Tribunal may also recall the evidence of OIRA\\textsuperscript{7} as to his, somewhat inexplicable, account of his feelings of guilt in relation to Joseph Mahon, the boy he believes he was standing close to when he was shot and badly injured:
\\begin{quote} Q. Was it, do you think, about the time of your being filmed for the purpose of the video or the television programme that was referred to, the 25th anniversary one?
A. It may have been around that time, I am not sure.
Q. Because that, so far as we know, is about the time when Mr Mahon first made mention, having made statements previously, first made mention of seeing Jim Wray shot in about 1997; was that about the time you spoke to him?
A. I cannot recall when I spoke to him. I know at a point a conversation took place in which I mentioned the coat.
Q. And when the coat was mentioned, did you have a conversation about the shooting of Jim Wray?
A. I just think at that point, you know, I, I was still embarrassed to talk to Joe Mahon or any of the other victims of Bloody Sunday about what happened that day.
Q. Embarrassed?
A. Yes.
Q. Why? \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{786} Day 412/132/18-22 A. Because I walked away and they did not.
Q. Right. What, because you had not been shot?
A. Yes. 787
9A-715 Soldiers who opened fire in Glenfada Park have given evidence of firing at men armed with rifles and nail bombs. It is of course the case that shots were fired into the areas where Joseph Mahon and William McKinney fell close to each other and where James Wray fell and Michael Quinn, Joseph Friel and, possibly Danny Gillespie, were all injured, possibly by ricocheting or shoot through rounds. There were Official IRA gunmen, who the evidence shows are likely to have been armed with rifles, in just those positions into which shots were fired and casualties fell. This was not a matter of mere chance. Furthermore, it is not mere chance or foresight which led the soldiers to give evidence in January and February 1972 of seeing rifles in just those positions where, evidence emerging considerably later has shown, rifles were indeed likely to have been present.
9A-IX THERE WERE ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES TO THE KNOWN DEAD AND WOUNDED
9A-716 There is compelling evidence that there were armed men in Glenfada Park North about whom the civilians present have chosen not to tell this Tribunal. There is also evidence that there were additional casualties in the area. Whether or not they included the armed men at which soldiers fired is not likely ever to be known.
9A-717 Michael Quinn saw such an additional casualty. He says he saw a boy standing near to the northwest entrance to Glenfada Park North.
787 Day 399/015/15-016/11
FS 7.2173
IX-290 While I was there the shooting began again, and I saw a young man who was standing opposite me in an alleyway leading into Abbey Park, shot in the leg. Suddenly I heard him scream and saw him collapse to the ground. I did not hear the shot that hit him. He just went down. He was tall, thin, aged about 18 or 19. I saw the hole in his leg with blood coming out of it and it was clear to me that he had been shot.
Quinn describes the boy's clothing then goes on to say, "I looked round at the north east corner of GPN where I had seen the two boys earlier because I assumed that that was where the shot had come from. I could see no soldiers there. When I looked back towards the boy, he had gone."
As he exited Glenfada Park North Mr Quinn again caught sight of the man he had seen shot in the leg who was alone. Mr Quinn does not know who he was but is sure that it was not Joseph Friel.
The significance of an unaccounted for casualty with a leg injury is of course compounded by the comments made by OIRA1 to John Barry that then went to his mother's house in [redacted] to reassure his mother. My note says that he told her not to be anxious -- 'Only wounded in the leg'. But who? My recollection is that he kept going on about Mickey Kelly, a young cousin, who was wounded in the leg. But that is nonsense because Kelly was dead. Could it have been Mickey Doherty? Or was it OIRA himself, the man Quinn says was shot in the leg in Glenfada. OIRA1 did not mention that to me, I am sure.
Others offer some corroboration of the existence of the injured man that Mr Quinn saw. Hugh Duffy (AD156) also "saw or somehow became aware of a man who had been shot in the leg"793 somewhere in the vicinity of Gd McKinney’s body.
9A-722 This casualty may also have been seen by Matthew Connolly (AC76) who reported in a Sunday Times interview seeing, while sheltering at the southwest corner of Glenfada Park South looking out to Abbey Park,
[ \\text{a boy of about 18 lying on the ground outside the houses in AP. I could see that he had jeans on. He was holding his left leg as if it had been shot.}^{794} ]
9A-723 Mr Connolly says in his BSI statement that he saw two men lying between the southwestern corner of Glenfada Park South and Abbey Park. One he believes was Gerard Donaghy The other, who had long curly dark hair, did not appear as badly injured as he was talking to the people around him.795
9A-724 Patrick Kelly AK21 describes standing in Abbey Park close to the alleyway into Glenfada Park North when he saw
[ \\text{a young fella coming towards me in a southerly direction. He was being supported by a couple of people who seemed to be holding him up under his arms and shoulders. He was dragging one leg and favouring the other and I think the people around him were saying “let’s get him into an ambulance”}.^{796} ] Mr Kelly added in oral evidence that he did not see blood so that it was possible the boy had been hit with a rubber bullet only. It would seem unlikely that an injury of that nature would require an ambulance, however.
Other civilian witnesses give reports of seeing bodies actually lying in Glenfada Park North which cannot be accounted for by any of the known dead or injured.
Patrick Kelly AK21, having seen the boy with the leg injury helped out of Glenfada Park North, returned while soldiers were still there and saw a body lying approximately halfway up the western side of the square. When he returns to Glenfada Park North some moments later he sees an additional three bodies, presumably Jim Wray, Joseph Mahon and William McKinney.
He describes the first man he saw, however, as
lying close to the pavement outside the western block of Glenfada Park North...I believe he was lying on his side as we could see his face and his feet extending out into the car park.”
This body was
half on and half off the pavement. The upper body was on the pavement and the lower body was in the car park. He was lying on his side as I could see his face. He was probably in his mid-20’s and he had dark hair and dark clothes. He seemed to be dead as he was absolutely still. There was nothing lying around him. We tried to help, although other people in the group with us actually lifted him. I do not remember much about this body although we followed the group of people
______________________________________________________________________
797 Day 158/099/11 798 AK21.7 paragraph20 moving him out of the car park and into the alleyway. I did not see what happened to him after this. 799
9A-730 Mr Kelly is emphatic about the position of this body saying,
Oh, no, no mistake about the position, but who the person was, I am not 100% certain, but the position was right. 800
and
Oh, no, no, that body was always in the car park as far as I am concerned, because that is the body we went out to take in when the soldiers stopped us. If there had not been no body there and we could not see the others from where we were, then there would have been no reason for us to go there in the first place, do you understand what I mean? It is because we saw that body that we made our way out. 801
9A-731 To the suggestion that P438 shows no body in the area he describes, Mr Kelly explained that it would in fact be blocked by the wall on the right hand side of what is, in his opinion, a foreshortened view of Glenfada Park North. 802
9A-732 Mr Kelly went on to describe helping to move another body from Glenfada Park North which was the nearest of the remaining three to the alleyway (the position of Jim Wray). He described him as very young and wearing jeans, a denim jacket and a white t-shirt. 803 He believed this person was dead 804.
9A-733 The suggestion that there was a fourth body lying in Glenfada Park North is supported by that of Anthony Martin AM24 who said he
799 AK21.8 paragraph24 800 Day 158/126/41 801 Day 158/145/39 802 Day 158/146/33 803 Day 158/107/13 804 Day 158/123
FS 7.2177
IX-294 had the impression of a fourth body in the square of GPN, but not on the pavement in the South end
9A-734 He said in oral evidence that he believed he saw this fourth body lying to his left as he entered Glenfada Park North via the southwest alley. He said that he carried William McKinney (and filmed doing so) then went back out for another body at which time he and Danny Gillespie came under fire. As Mr Mahon was carried out before William McKinney and Jim Wray at the same time, this additional body must on his evidence have been a fourth casualty.
9A-735 Joseph Martin Gallagher AG18 said in both his BSI statement and in oral evidence that on entering Glenfada Park North he saw a man lying close to the corner of the fences of the northern block of Glenfada Park South, near to the Rossville St entrance. He marked the position of the man at point F on the map at AG18.7.
______________________________________________________________________
805 Day 176/085/01 806 Day 176/086/13 807 see McBride at Day 168/026/24 808 See P682 809 Day 176/129/25 810 AG18.2 paragraphs 12-13 811 Day 165/010/01
FS7. 2178
IX-295 This would appear from its position to be an unidentified casualty although Mr Gallagher changed his evidence somewhat to suggest that it could have been one of the men shown in P438.812
Greg Doherty (AD 66) also reports in his BSI statement coming across one of four bodies lying along the southern edge of Glenfada Park North.813 The position of the bodies is marked on AD66.11.
812 Day 165/012/23 813 AD66.4 paragraph16 Mr Doherty said that the two bodies nearest to the southwest exit appeared dead while the third was alive and he helped to carry him into a house. He identifies himself in video 19 carrying this man (William McKinney). He did not approach the fourth body. It was closer to the opening onto Rossville Street some 10-12 feet away from the body of Mr McKinney. He has no idea what happened to the body. A body lying in the position described by Mr Gallagher and Mr Doherty would of course correlate with the evidence of Soldier E.
Pat Moyne (AM444) also suggests there was a casualty in this area as he says, that, after seeing Jim Wray shot,
*I think a person was being attended to at the south east entrance to GPN and I think there was a crowd around him.*
Patricia Canning (nee Harkin) AC26 reported in her NICRA statement seeing from her window in the RF
*five bodies lying in Glenfada Park – three on the path and the other two were further in. Some people from an alleyway off GP were trying to pick up one of the bodies but the soldiers were shooting from the corner and they had to retreat.*
Questioned by Lord Gifford, Mrs Canning confirmed that she saw three bodies on the footpath inside Glenfada Park North as well as a further two. She was quite sure that they were all in Glenfada Park North.
The notes of Michael Quinn’s interview with the Sunday Times Insight team also include reference to the fact that
*He heard that a Provisional IRA man had been shot in the chest in the Glenfada area and that the man had been carrying a gun.*
Four crosses have been put through those words in the notes, however, and Mr Quinn is emphatic that he has no such recollection now. Photograph EP 23/11 appears to show a body lying in Glenfada Park North at the time the crowd was tending Kelly which does not correspond with any known dead or injured person.
The Tribunal is not in a position to form firm conclusions as to the exact events which took place in Glenfada Park North on Bloody Sunday. Understandably in the circumstances of panic and confusion which pertained, the evidence of both civilians and soldiers is inconsistent.
It is clear, however, that as well as being extremely confused, key elements of the civilian evidence portray a picture of the soldiers' conduct in Glenfada Park which is demonstrably untrue. It also fails to mention the presence of armed men in the area where they must have been plain for all to see.
It is not submitted that those who were killed and injured in Glenfada Park North were armed. However, in considering the conduct of the soldiers who entered the area, the Tribunal should bear in mind that:
Those soldiers, who had already witnessed scenes of shooting and seen armed men, came, in Glenfada Park North, upon a scene of chaos and confusion.
There is cogent evidence that, at the time they entered, those soldiers encountered men armed with both rifles and nail bombs. The Tribunal will also bear in mind the fact that evidence that such men were indeed present in Glenfada Park North has emerged some 30 years after the event. Soldiers such as Soldier F and Soldier G gave evidence of seeing just such armed men in RMP statements written immediately after Bloody Sunday. No doubt the Tribunal will wish to consider why so many individuals with paramilitary connections were present in Glenfada Park North.\\textsuperscript{822}
The Tribunal will also bear in mind the fact that those who were killed and injured in Glenfada Park North were close to those individuals who were armed with either rifles or nail bombs and at whom it is known soldiers fired. The potential for such innocent bystanders to have been hit by soldiers legitimately targeting the armed men close to them is obvious.
\\textsuperscript{822} They include: OIRA1, OIRA2, OIRA7, PIRA1, PIRA 25, Eugene McGillan, Donncha MacFicheallaigh and Gerard Donaghy CLOSING SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENTS OF MR ANTHONY LAWTON
VOLUME 8
CHAPTER 10
SECTOR 5
FS 7. 2184 CHAPTER 10
SECTOR 5
CHAPTER 10A - INTRODUCTION
Sector 5 - Introduction ................................................................. 1
CHAPTER 10B - SOLDIER F'S TARGET IN SECTOR 5
10B-I Soldier F's account in 1972 .................................................. 2 10B-II Soldier F's evidence to the Present Tribunal .......................... 8 Soldier F's Current Recollection ............................................. 9 10B-III Corroboration of Soldier F's Account ................................. 22 The evidence of Lieutenant 227 ............................................. 22 The Man Firing a Pistol Near the Fahan Street Steps ................. 34 10B-IV Conclusion ........................................................................ 44
CHAPTER 10C - SHOOTING FROM GLENFADA PARK
10C-I Introduction ........................................................................... 47 10C-II Other soldiers in Glenfada Park firing into Sector 5 ............... 47 Two or more soldiers in kneeling positions in the entrance to glenfada park north pointing their rifles across Rossville Street .................................................. 48 A volley of shots fired into Sector 5 which has not been accounted for .................................................. 53 10C-III Conclusion ........................................................................ 66
CHAPTER 10D - BERNARD MCGUIGAN
10D-I Did Soldier F Shoot Bernard McGuigan? ................................. 66 Soldier F's 'Admission' in the Witness Box ............................... 66 The forensic evidence ............................................................... 78 The Eyewitness Testimony ....................................................... 79 Conclusion .............................................................................. 138
CHAPTER 10E - PATRICK DOHERTY
10E-I Introduction ........................................................................... 140 10E-II The Orientation of Patrick Doherty's Body as he crawled towards the alleyway behind joseph place .................................................. 140 Introduction ............................................................................ 140 The Photographic Evidence .................................................... 141 The Eyewitness Testimony ..................................................... 149 The Pathology of the Bullet Wound ........................................ 158 Conclusion ............................................................................ 163 10E-III The Gap in Time Between the Shootings of Patrick Doherty and Bernard McGuigan .......................... 163 Introduction ............................................................................ 163 Bernard McGuigan went to the aid of Patrick Doherty .................................................. 164 Other evidence also suggests Patrick Doherty was shot significantly more than a few seconds before Bernard McGuigan ................................................................. 170 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 174
CHAPTER 10F - THE WOUNDED IN SECTOR 5
10F-I Introduction .................................................................................. 175 10F-II Patrick Campbell ........................................................................... 175 The location of Mr. Campbell when he was shot ........................................ 175 When was Patrick Campbell shot? ............................................................ 179 10F-III Daniel McGowan ......................................................................... 180 The assistance Mr. McGowan provided to Mr. Campbell ......................... 180 The location of Mr. McGowan when he was shot ...................................... 181 10F-IV Conclusion .................................................................................. 183 CHAPTER 10A
SECTOR 5 - INTRODUCTION
10A-1 Soldier F is the only soldier who has admitted firing shots into Sector 5, the area between Block 2 of the Rossville Flats and Joseph Place. He fired two shots at a man firing a pistol in the area around the bottom of the Fahan Street steps.
10A-2 There is evidence before the Tribunal which corroborates Soldier F's account. In particular there is evidence of a man with a pistol being heard to fire shortly before F returned fire (Section 10B).
10A-3 Two people were killed and at least two people were wounded in Sector 5. Despite the fact that Soldier F believes he hit his target, the gunman, it is possible that one or both of the rounds he fired struck (either directly or indirectly) one or two of the known dead and wounded.
10A-4 Soldier F was not, however, responsible for all four shootings. There is evidence that Soldier F was not the only soldier to fire shots into Sector 5 (Section 10C). In the circumstances, it is difficult to link Soldier F with any particular death or wounding in Sector 5.
10A-5 The individual circumstances surrounding the shooting of each of the four casualties in Sector 5 are considered in separate sections 10D-F. CHAPTER 10B
SOLDIER F'S TARGET IN SECTOR 5
10B-1 SOLDIER F'S ACCOUNT IN 1972
The following documents record Soldier F's contemporary recollection of the circumstances in which he fired shots in Sector 5:
10B-2 Soldier F's statement taken by Lieutenant Colonel Overbury on 19th February 1972:
Immediately after this firing at a nail bomber in Gleifada Park I ran along the Eastern wall of Gleifada Park to the corner. As I did so I heard pistol shots coming from the area of the wall at the far end of the Rossville Flats. I shouted "there's a gunman" and I dropped to one knee and took an aim position. I saw a man near the wall facing in my direction who turned as if to run. I saw he had an object in his hand. He was the only person in the area from which the gunfire had come. The object in his hand was large and black like an automatic pistol. I fired 2 rounds at this man and he fell to the ground. I then saw 20 people, 19 men and one woman standing near me huddled together at the end of the flats in Gleifada Park. I arrested these people with others including G who came up. ¹
10B-3 Soldier F's SA statement:
I then asked G to cover me as I heard pistol shots in the direction of Rossville Flats. I approached the south-east corner of Gleifada Park. I got down on one knee. I observed a man with a pistol at the far end of the Rossville Flats. I think he was wearing darkish clothes. He had a black object which looked like a pistol in his hand. I then shouted to G "There's a gunman down here" and then took two aimed shots and he fell to the ground. He was in a half-crouching position moving to the right as I shot him.
I then observed in the position where I was about twenty people (19 men and 1 woman) huddled against the side of a wall at the south
¹ B135 paragraph 3 end of the western block of Glevada Park. I shouted to G to assist me in arresting these people. We then ushered them back through the rear of Glevada Park into Columbille Court and I saw soldiers taking them cf. 2
10B-4 Soldier F's oral evidence to the Widgery Tribunal:
(1) In answer to questions from Mr. Gibbens:
Q. What happened next?
A. Next thing happened I heard pistol shots from the direction of Rossville Flats. I told G to cover me while I went up to investigate.
Q. Where did you go?
A. I went up to this corner.
Q. You went to the south-east corner?
A. Yes
LORD WIDGERY: Before we leave there, your Corporal (whom we call E) has told me that he was also in the Glevada Park compound or courtyard. You did not see him at all?
A. No.
Mr. GIBBENS: You went to the south-east corner and what happened there?
A. On reaching the south-east corner I got down on one knee and I observed in the direction where the pistol shots were coming from. I saw a man with a pistol firing on the wall here.
Q. The far end at the back of the Rossville Flats southern block by the wall there?
A. Yes.
Q. How was he dressed?
A. He was wearing darkish clothing.
Q. What was he doing?
2 B138 paragraphs 6 and 7 A. He had a pistol in his hand and as he saw me he attempted to turn. I then fired two aimed shots and the man fell to the ground.
LORD WIDGERY: You are going too fast: I have him with a pistol in his hand and you observe him. What does he do?
A. He about turns as though to move to the right. As he did so I shouted to G "There's a gunman down here." I then took two aimed shots and the man fell to the ground.
MR. GIBBENS: When you say he turned as if to move to the right, which way was he facing in the first place?
A. In the first place he was facing the front and looking at me.
Q: So he would have turned as if to move to the right, which way was he facing in the first place?
A. He was turning as if to come in this direction.
Q. To his left but to your right?
A. To my right.
Q. Down past Joseph Place. When you aimed at him what was his position?
A. A half turn to the right, a crouching position.
Q. A half turn to your right?
A. Yes, in a crouching position.
Q. When you fired, did you hit him?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he do?
A. He fell to the ground.
Q. Then did you notice anything?
A. After I had fired at the man, in the position where I was there was a group of about 20 people, 19 men and one woman, huddled together at the side of the wall.
Q. You had fired past them had you?
A. Yes.
Q. And what happened about them? A. I then shouted to G "There are some rioters here" and asked him to assist me in arresting these people.
Q. Did these people come out at all before you arrested them and move away from the gable end?
A. No.
Q. Did you then arrest them?
A. We then arrested them and ushered them to the rear of Gletfada Park courtyard into the alleyway here.³
(2) In answer to questions from Mr. McSparran:
Q. Did you leave the rifle there [in GPN] for somebody else to come along and pick it up? Was it not important to get that rifle into your custody?
A. At the time I heard pistol shots from the direction of Rossville Flats. I then said to G to cover me while I investigated.
Q. You turned your attention from in here, and did you go right out again the way you came?
A. No, sir. I went along the side of the wall to that corner, there, and that is when I observed the gunman.
Q. You observed a gunman away down here?
A. Yes.
Q. And fired at him?
A. Yes.
Q. At that stage the rifle should just have been lying across the courtyard from you?
A. Yes.
Q. And you did not bother to go in to pick it up?
A. I was too interested in the pistol shots.
³ B143 at A Q. You were not interested in somebody coming along and picking up that rifle and shooting you when you were diverting your attention to the man with the pistol?
A. That was the idea of having G to cover me.
Q. Did G go over to get the rifle?
A. I do not know, sir....
Q. So far as the pistol shots are concerned, when you looked across there and before you fired down there in this direction, did you know there was a telephone box in there?
A. No, sir.
Q. You did not?
A. No, sir.
Q. To get out, of course, to a position where you would have a line of fire of fire down here, you would have to come beyond the line of this building here?
A. No, sir.
Q. Where did you come to?
A. I was on the corner, exactly on the corner.
Q. Did you come around this corner? Just tell me what corner you mean.
A. That corner, there.
Q. You came round this corner?
A. Yes, I observed ----
Q. You did not see a telephone box there?
A. No.
Q. Could you see people sheltering there?
A. No, I was purely interested in this man with the pistol.
Q. You did not see people in there. Did you see people about the entrance of the Rossville Flats?
A. No, sir.
Q. You did not see people standing about the door? A. No, sir.
Q. You did not see the door of the Rossville Flats, then? You were in this position and there was nothing you noticed around this corner or just around the corner in the recess?
A. No, sir.
Q. Would you have a look at photographs 12 and 13? (Documents handed to the witness). At the time you fired had an Army vehicle come down to the barricade or not?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. You did not see any vehicle?
A. No, sir.
Q. If you look at photograph no. 12, you see the two bodies there?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see the flats in the distance there?
A. Yes.
Q. Those are the flats that you had come up alongside, on the basis of your evidence. When you fired across that line, as you did, you did not see any people there?
A. No.
Q. There were no bodies lying there?
A. I cannot remember, sir.
Q. You cannot remember. That is the kind of thing one would remember if it happened?
A. My attention was solely on observing this gunman.
Q. Observing the gunman, that was your line of sight across this area here I am talking about.
A. Yes.
Q. Will you turn to the next photograph: that shows a more general view of the area of the corner with the telephone box and there are obviously a number of people sheltering there?
A. Yes.
Q. You did not see any of them? A. No. 4
10B-5 A photograph was marked with the trajectory line of Soldier F’s shots for the purposes of the Widgery Tribunal:
10B-II SOLDIER F’S EVIDENCE TO THE PRESENT TRIBUNAL
10B-6 Soldier F no longer has any recollection of the circumstances in which he fired shots into Sector 5:
I do not now recall seeing “a man with a pistol at the far end of the Rossville Flats”. I do not now recall firing two aimed shots at this man or in this direction.6
10B-7 His oral evidence to this Tribunal was to the effect that he would only have fired if he was justified in doing so. He maintained that his evidence to the Widgery Tribunal, that he targeted a man with a pistol, was true.7
4 B159 at D 5 B165 (also at P8) 6 B167.008 paragraph 46(g) 7 Soldier F gave this evidence at various, for example Day 376/111/19; Day 376/117/16; Day 376/141/15; Day 376/176/10 SOLDIER F'S CURRENT RECOLLECTION
10B-8 Due to the passage of time, Soldier F no longer has any recollection of the circumstances in which he fired shots on Bloody Sunday.
10B-9 He gave his statement to this Tribunal 28 years after Bloody Sunday.8
The allegation that Soldier F lied about his memory loss
10B-10 It is important to bear in mind that the question of whether Soldier F lied in 1972 is an entirely separate from the question of whether he lied to the Tribunal about the state of his memory.
10B-11 The allegation that he was lying about his memory loss was made repeatedly to Soldier F in the witness box. It was made purely on the basis that he allegedly has a motive to lie; that he benefits in some way by pretending that he cannot now remember anything about the circumstances of his shots.
10B-12 However, in view of all the documents that set out Soldier F's contemporary recollection of the events, the fact that he no longer recalls the circumstances of his shooting has little practical consequence. If his current recollection were consistent with his recollection in 1972 it would add little; if it were different, it is likely that his 1972 evidence would be regarded as the more reliable. It is, therefore, difficult to see any advantage to Soldier F in feigning a loss of memory.
10B-13 Further, the allegation levelled at Soldier F was simply an assertion: there is no evidence that Soldier F was lying about his loss of memory and, in fact, there is nothing extraordinary about his not now having a memory of the events of the day. On the contrary, numerous BSI witnesses, many of whom were not called, have candidly said that their memories of Bloody Sunday are now almost completely blank. There is nothing to suggest that their memories have been
8 B167.008 eroded away by anything but the passage of time. Countless others may not have come forward to give a statement for the same reason.
10B-14 The examples below plainly illustrate that there is no universal standard: some people retain memories better than others; some retain no memory at all, or wholly false memories, in the same circumstances as others retain relatively good and accurate ones.
10B-15 Ken Murphy was 17 years old on Bloody Sunday. He witnessed a number of events in Glenfada Park, including a person being shot. He was able to recount the events in detail when he gave a statement to NICRA the day after Bloody Sunday.
10B-16 When he gave a statement to the Tribunal in the year 2000, he said that he could not recall any of these events:
1. ...I knew Michael Kelly very well. He was the same age as me and I had known him since he was a child.
2. I can remember being on the march and it was a bright cold day. In particular I remember being on Southway and speaking to Michael Kelly. I cannot remember exactly what we were talking about but it was something to do with an advert that was around for Coca-Cola at the time. The advert said that Coca-Cola would bring you alive or something like that and I was joking with him about it.
3. Other than this I have no recollection of the rest of the day. I know that I was in number 13 Glenfada Park. The house is marked with an A (...) on the attached map. I do not remember getting in there or who was in there with me. I ended up living in the flat a couple of years later. I can remember that the main window looked into the car park area.
______________________________________________________________________
9 AM457.3 paragraph 1 10 AM457.4 11 AM457.2 4. I went to the flat a couple of weeks ago and stood outside for 20 minutes or so trying to recall what I had seen on Bloody Sunday. I am afraid it was a total blank.
5. I gave a statement in 1972 about what I saw on Bloody Sunday, and this is attached. Now I can remember absolutely nothing about what is described in this statement, nor giving the statement itself. However, if I said it at the time then it was true. 12
10B-17 There is no reason to suppose that Mr. Murphy lost his memory other than through a natural process of atrophy. Yet he recalls nothing of the events he described in his NICRA statement; his memory of the day is virtually blank apart from an inconsequential discussion he had with Michael Kelly.
10B-18 Similarly, John Begley has suffered a complete memory loss. He was about 35 years old on Bloody Sunday. He made a statement on 23rd February 1972 recording what he had seen from the rubble barricade. 13 Thirty years later, he was unable to recall anything at all. 14
10B-19 Noreen Donnelly was 25 years old at the time of Bloody Sunday. 15 She gave a statement to NICRA, recording a number of events that she witnessed. 16 In her statement to the Tribunal she said:
I'm afraid I have very little memory of events on Bloody Sunday and given that I made a statement at the time, which I attach as Appendix 1, I see little point in going over this old ground. The detail in my original statement will obviously be so much better than anything I could remember today, even though I can't recall any of the events recorded in it. The problem is that these events took place 30 years ago. That combined with the fact that everyone in Derry has seen television footage from Bloody Sunday for years and years means it is, in my view, useless to try and remember anything independently now. I'm very suspicious of long term
12 AM457.3 13 AB30.6 14 AB30.5 15 AD127.2 paragraph 1 16 AD127.1 memory anyway because I know it can play tricks. I do feel guilty that I can’t remember more but I have tried and I simply can’t.\\textsuperscript{17}
Ms. Donnelly’s further comments suggest that there is nothing extraordinary about Soldier F’s memory loss:
\\textit{I am totally amazed at people who say they can remember it all. I know a terrible thing like this effects people’s memory in different ways and sometimes you block things out but, quite honestly, after thirty years I am surprised anyone can remember anything.}\\textsuperscript{18}
Perpetua Gray, née O’Neill, was 15 years old at the time of Bloody Sunday. She was able to recount the events she witnessed in Barrack Street in some detail in a NICRA statement.\\textsuperscript{19} Brenda Doherty was there too, and she describes Mrs Gray talking to the soldier manning barrier.\\textsuperscript{20} However, Mrs Gray’s memory of all of this in now completely blank:
09. As I have said, I know I ended up in a house in Barrack Street but I don’t remember anything about coming out of the house or being with Brenda Doherty or seeing any soldiers. Brenda says in her statement at Appendix 2 that I talked to a soldier. I have no recollection of this but it sounds like the sort of thing I would do. I was certainly bold in those days. I don’t remember the incident referred to in the statement at Appendix 1 involving an injured man or the man being searched or the flash of the gun in the soldier’s hand. All I have is a very clear memory that I had defied my father in the first place [by going on the march] and I had to get home before he did and even if I did get home in one piece I would never be able to tell anyone where I’d been.
10. My husband has said to me that in the 24 years we’ve been married, not once can he remember that day ever being mentioned between us…. When he heard about the statements that mentioned my name he said to me “How could you have forgotten this?” I agree with him – if all that happened how is it I don’t remember it?
\\textsuperscript{17} AD127.2 paragraph 2 \\textsuperscript{18} AD127.3 paragraph 9 \\textsuperscript{19} AO63.1 \\textsuperscript{20} AO63.6 paragraph 1 It feels as though these are somebody else's recollections, not mine.21
10B-22 There appears to be little to explain this loss of memory, although she does say that her mother died a couple of years before Bloody Sunday and that there are many things she doesn't remember while she was grieving for her mother.22
10B-23 Margaret Gallagher has suffered an almost complete loss of memory which she was unable to explain. She gave a NICRA statement the day after Bloody Sunday – when she was 20 years old - which records that she witnessed two people being shot, probably Jack Duddy and Bernard McGuigan. In her statement to this Tribunal, she said:
5. It never occurred to me that anyone would want to talk to me about Bloody Sunday until some fella came to find me. I was actually at my brother's house when he called and he said that I had made a statement already and therefore I should come and give evidence to the new inquiry. At first I was so convinced I hadn't made a statement I said to him that they must have the wrong person....
6. I really would like to help the new inquiry and I can understand why, having seen the attached statement, people might think that I have some interesting recollections of the day. However, this statement just doesn't register with me at all.23
10B-24 At the time of Bloody Sunday, Frank Campbell was 37 years old.24 When he gave his statement in 2001, he remembered so little about what happened that day that he was reluctant to accept the detailed account he had given in a NICRA statement in 1972:
16. I have been shown a copy of a statement made by a Frank Campbell on 31 January 1972, attached as Appendix 2. I don't remember giving a statement after Bloody Sunday. However, although I am not sure of the house number, the address on the
21 AO63.3 22 AO63.2 paragraph 2 23 AD83.2 24 AC137.6 paragraph 1
£ 7. 2199
X 13 statement is my correct address for that time. As I have said I don't remember who I was with that day. The part about the soldier hitting someone with the butt of a rifle is familiar to me but I can't remember it now. Where it refers to a square in the statement, I would have been referring to the Rossville Flats car park. I don't remember being hit by a Saracen myself. Maybe there is a misprint in the statement and it should say that the Saracen hit a girl as opposed to me.
17. At the time of Bloody Sunday there was only my sister and I living in our house. I don't remember taking Alana Burke into any house. I don't remember seeing anybody being shot that day. In particular, I don't remember seeing anyone being shot next to the Rubble Barricade with his hands in the air. Neither do I remember seeing a young boy being shot in the leg. I can't explain why all this appears in the statement with my name on it but I think it is unlikely that I would have remembered seeing somebody being shot. I don't remember seeing the old man referred to in the statement. I was aware that Knights of Malta were on the march. I therefore wouldn't have gone to look for a doctor as is stated. I heard rubber bullets being fired at the army barricade in Rossville Street but not in the Rossville Flats car park. 25
10B-25 The NICRA statement was clearly provided by Mr. Campbell. There is a transcript of a tape recording made by Kathleen Keville which closely matches the contents of the statement that Mr. Campbell no longer recalls making. 26 It appears that the statement was typed up from that recording, albeit that the NICRA statement suggests that Mr. Campbell had been hit by a Saracen when this is not clear from the tape recording. The tape recording begins with a voice of a man describing himself as a full-time youth worker. That is what Mr. Campbell says he did at the time. 27
10B-26 Mr. Campbell couldn't make sense of the fact that the statement appeared to be his when he could recall so little of its contents. Edmund Lawson QC suggested to him that the contents of the NICRA statement were either untrue, or he had lost his recollection of the events the statement suggested he had witnessed:
25 AC137.8 26 Compare the tape transcript at X2.33.37 to the NICRA statement at AC137.1 27 AC137.6 Q. ...I think it is fair to say either you have no recollection of or it simply did not happen?
A. Yeah.
Q. Is that a fair summary?
A. To the best of my knowledge, yes, or unless I have had a complete blackout since then – I just do not know. 28
Donald Cudmore is another example of a witness whose memory is blank. He made a detailed statement shortly after Bloody Sunday. It records that he was on duty in the area of Great James Street where he witnessed the rioting there. He witnessed a number of events: the use of baton rounds and gas, hearing low velocity shots and seeing Paratroopers deploy through the barriers. 29
Mr. Cudmore has no memory of this at all:
I can see by reading a statement which I made at the time, that I was on duty in Great James Street on the day of the march. I can recall coming back to Londonderry from Belfast on the morning of the march. There was mammoth traffic jams because the Army had set up road blocks and I was concerned that I would be late starting work. However, apart from this, I have no recollection of what happened on the afternoon of the march. Although my statement shows that I was on duty in the City Centre that afternoon, I have no memory of being there to police the march.... I have no memory of seeing the Civil Rights march, and I honestly have no recollection of what I heard and saw that afternoon. 30
Despite interviewing six of the Bloody Sunday injured in the weeks that followed, his memory is now completely blank about this too. 31
He says nothing in his statement to suggest that his memory loss has been accelerated by anything other than the passage of time.
28 Day 121/026/18 29 JC26.11 30 JC26.5 31 JC26.7 paragraph 13 There are countless examples of witnesses who, during the course of their evidence, were presented with evidence confirming that they had done something which, thirty years later, they could not remember doing.
Nell McCafferty wrote an article published in the Irish Times on 1st February 1972 which recorded the fact that she had examined some bullet holes in a wall. When the article was read out to her in the witness box, she described herself as being stunned about not being able to recall the events it described:
"... Several times since 4.15 pm on Sunday afternoon my memory has gone blank. Others confirm the experience. Did I really see a Paratrooper shoot at a girl with a Red Cross uniform? Like everyone else I went back to look. On the wall of the courtyard where I sought shelter in a house, there are two deep holes (reminders of the bullets that missed). Like doubting Thomas, I put my fingers into them and checked the diagonal line between the holes, the girl's position in the middle of the square and the Paratrooper's position at the far corner." Do you have any recollection now of doing that?
A. No, I read that in the files last week and was amazed, yeah, and went back again this morning to look at the holes.
Q. Did you see the holes that you may have been talking about?
A. I saw lots of holes. Yeah, the holes, yeah, I did. A lot of them were above the windows and some below — this morning, yes. But that stuns me that paragraph, did I really do that? Well, I must have done it, or I would not have written it.
The evidence of Patrick Moyne demonstrates how the passage of thirty years can sometimes have a dramatic effect on a person's memory. Mr. Moyne now has no recollection of helping to carry the body of Michael Kelly. Photograph P642 shows that he did:
______________________________________________________________________
32 L117 33 Day 169/044/77 The photograph was shown to Mr. Moyne in the witness box and he identified himself in the picture:
Q. The next photograph, please, P642. Do you recognise yourself or anyone else in that picture?
A. Yeah, I am in there at the front; Jim Wray is there in the hat and
Q. Are you the person in the jacket and tie on the left-hand side?
A. Yeah.
Q. Jim Wray is the man we see on the right?
A. Yeah. 34
However, Mr. Moyne could not remember helping to carry the body:
34 Day 162/32/09 Q. Looking at that photograph, do you have any recollection of helping to carry --
A. No.
Q. A body?
A. No.
Q. Does that photograph help you to remember what it was that you did when you first went into Glelafada Park?
A. As I said, my recollection is quite hazy there, but it is in the photograph, it must've happened. 35
In 1972, Mr. Moyne had been able to tell the Sunday Times Insight team where the body was taken. 36 Curiously, Mr. Moyne could remember the name of the journalist he spoke to:
Q. Do you remember speaking in 1972 to a journalist from the Sunday Times?
A. Peter Pringle.
Q. Have you seen the notes taken by the Sunday Times journalist, it may have been Peter Pringle, at the time?
A. No.
Q. Could we have those on the screen, please, as AM444.8. What he has written is:
"Pat Moyne, pictured in the Irish Times picture carrying the Kelly body [that is the picture you have just seen taken by a photographer called Ciaran Donnelly] across Glelafada Park. Says that he believes that the body was put down at the entrance to the alley leading into Abbey Park when firing started in Glelafada. It was not until there was a lull in the firing that the body was taken into number 8 Abbey Park."
Does that bring back any memories at all?
A. No, I took no body into Abbey Park. 37
35 Day 162/32/18 36 AM44.8 There are other instances of people not recalling that they helped to carry a body when there is photographic evidence of it. For example, John Friel could not remember helping to carry the body of Hugh Gilmore:
Q. The last matter I want to ask you about is this: can we have AF33.11 on the screen? This is a picture, that is attached to your statement, of your carrying somebody's body. Is that Hugh Gilmore's body or is it somebody else's?
A. I was told it was Hugh Gilmore's body, but I cannot recollect at all. I cannot remember that at all. 38
John McIntyre witnessed the rioting at barrier 14. Now his memory of this is completely blank:
Q. ...We have heard a lot of evidence and seen quite a lot of news footage of a great deal of activity at the barrier, stone-throwing after negotiations with the soldiers had failed; the use of water cannon; the firing of rubber bullets; and the appearance of people behind a corrugated shield being fired at by rubber bullets hitting the shield. Do you have no recollection of any of that?
A. Yes, I really reported this earlier on.
Q. Sorry?
A. I really reported this to one of the clerks earlier on, that I said, after paragraph 9 -- sorry, just give me a minute to read this. Yes, between paragraphs 10 and 11, there was a riot, which I already told the clerk this morning, I wished to change. I was told you would ask me this at the start of the hearing.
Q. I have not been told that you wanted to make that change. Was there anything else in your statement that you wanted to change?
A. The only reason I wanted to change that is because I seen footage on the television of a riot, but when I made this statement I could not remember the riot.
Q. It had just completely passed from your memory, had it?
A. Yes. 39 These are just a few of the examples of witnesses who have experienced total or partial memory loss over the last thirty years. They show that there is nothing extraordinary about Soldier F’s failure to recollect the circumstances in which he fired his shots.
The nature of Soldier F’s recollection
It may be said against Soldier F that the loss of memory in his case is surprising because it relates to ostensibly memorable events in which he was closely involved. There is, however, no evidence, expert or otherwise, to support that contention. The experience of those civilians whose evidence is considered above, (and against whom no-one has alleged dishonesty), and experience of life, shows that this assumption may be unsafe and unfair.
There is no reason to suppose that Soldier F’s memory must have remained intact over three decades. In fact, the nature of his memory loss suggests that it occurred through an entirely natural process of atrophy. Not only is Soldier F unable to recall any of the facts which help his case, an examination of what he appears to be able to recall about the day suggests that his memory has almost completely deteriorated.
Having heard so many witnesses give evidence, the Tribunal - and counsel who have appeared before it - have become used to judging whether a witness has an accurate memory or not. Often witnesses - who have generally been oblivious to the factual matrix into which their evidence might fit - remained unaware that those listening to them knew their recollections to be false.
Looking at Soldier F’s statement, it is evident that his ability to recall events over a long period of time is generally poor. For example, his memory of his deployment:
39 Day 092/146/20 40 See for example: B167.006 paragraph 42(e)-(n) I recall that we were deployed at first light. I recall being in a road, near to or in our vehicles, but do not recall anything more about how I got there or the location itself. The next thing I recall is hearing gun fire.... I heard Major Lodden inform Colonel Wi,ford by radio that we were “taking fire”, or “under fire”; I cannot recall the exact words used. The response from Colonel Wi,ford came a few seconds later. I could hear it over the radio set. He said “Go, go go!”.... The next thing I recall is going on foot through a barbed wire army barrier that had been pulled to one side to allow us to pass through. I recall this being in semi-darkness at the break of day. 41
10B-44 He is mistaken in his belief that the arrest operation began at day-break, that he went through a military barbed wire barrier on foot and that he was in a position to hear messages sent over the Battalion Net. These are ‘false memories’. It is, however, difficult to envisage any reason why Soldier F should wish to pretend that he has a false memory of any of these matters.
10B-45 Although the process by which true memories become supplanted by false memories over time is not transparent, it is sometimes possible to infer where the source of the confusion lies.
10B-46 For example, Soldier F deployed with the rest of the battalion from Palace Barracks at day-break. This might be the source of his confusion; it is possible that his memory of this event is no longer distinct from his memory of the launch of the arrest operation.
10B-47 The true provenance of his ‘memory’ that he deployed on foot through a barrier might be the video footage of soldiers from C Company of 1 PARA deploying through barrier 14, or it might be a memory of his own deployment on foot through a barrier on a day other than Bloody Sunday.
10B-48 Although it has the appearance of still being intact, Soldier F’s memory of the launch of the arrest operation has in fact deteriorated almost completely; it has
41 B167.003 paragraphs 20-23 been supplanted in his mind by a false image, albeit one that he honestly believes to be true.
Nearly every aspect of his memory of Bloody Sunday has deteriorated over the last thirty years. Soldier F's BSI statement illustrates how the effect of the passage of time on his memory has been indiscriminate and pervasive.42
Conclusion
It appears that there has been a presumption against Soldier F: that he faked his memory loss because it was in his own interests to do so.
There is no evidence to support this presumption. It has been made purely on the basis of an imputed motive. In fact, his memory loss is not of any advantage to him.
There is nothing exceptional or extraordinary about Soldier F's memory loss. Many other witnesses have suffered similar memory loss.
Soldier F's memory loss is entirely genuine. The evidence suggests it has deteriorated through a natural process of atrophy over nearly thirty years.
CORROBORATION OF SOLDIER F'S ACCOUNT
There is reliable evidence to corroborate Soldier F's account of firing at pistolman in Sector 5.
THE EVIDENCE OF LIEUTENANT 227
Lieutenant 227 was a Troop Commander in the 22nd LAD RA.43 He was in charge of Charlie OP on the day. He took up a position just to the north of the permanent
42 See in particular B167.002 paragraphs 18 to 38 43 B2204.001 paragraph 2 Sanger and was kneeling down, observing the Bogside through a parapet. He marked his location at point ‘A’ on the map attached to his statement:
From his position, Lieutenant 227 saw a soldier in Glenfada Park North fire two shots along the south side of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats.
The identification of the soldier that Lieutenant 227 saw fire
Lieutenant 227 has not been able to provide a description of the soldier who fired. The best he could say is that the soldier who fired was a member of 1 PARA, and that he was “blacked up”. It is, however, likely that the soldier he witnessed firing was Soldier F. The consistency between their respective accounts is striking in nearly all key respects:
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44 B2204.002 paragraph 7; the map can be found at B2204.032 45 B2204.005 paragraph 24
1. The location from which the soldier fired
10B-58 Lieutenant 227 marked the location from which the soldier fired as ‘C’ on the map attached to his statement.
10B-59 This is the same spot from which Soldier F fired according to the line of trajectory marked on a photograph in 1972.
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46 B2204.005 paragraph 23: B2204.032 47 B165 He confirmed to the Widgery Tribunal that the line marked on the photograph represented the line of the shots he fired:
[Mr. Gibbens:] Would you have a look at these photographs....
Q. Is this the line of shooting when you fired from the south-east gable of Glefada Park?
A. Yes.48
It is reasonable to infer that the photograph above was the one to which Mr. Gibbens referred when he asked Soldier F the question; what it depicts is consistent with what Soldier F said about these shots in his evidence to the Widgery Tribunal.49
2. The direction in which the soldier aimed his shots
Lieutenant 227 gave this description of the direction in which the soldier aimed his shots:
48 B167.046 at BD 49 B143 at AB I could not say exactly where he was aiming, but his rifle seemed to be aimed parallel with Block 2 of the Rossville Flats towards the walls.
He could not, however, see along the entire length of the soldier’s line of sight:
From my position, I could not see the end of Block 2 nearest me. From the right side of my OP I could see halfway down the shops at the base of Block 2.... Part of this Para’s line of sight was therefore dead ground to me.
This corresponds with Soldier F’s description of aiming at a pistolman in the “area of the wall at the far end of the Rossville Flats.” Similarly, it corresponds with the line of fire marked on the trajectory photograph at paragraph 10B-59.
3. The number of shots the soldier fired
Lieutenant 227 said that the soldier he saw fired two shots.
This corresponds with the number of shots Soldier F fired in the direction of the Fahan Street steps.
4. The posture of the soldier as he fired
Lieutenant 227 described the action of the soldier in the following way in his statement to the present Tribunal:
The para I had noticed first took cover by a lamp post and knelt down. He was facing south east and seemed to be looking towards Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. I have a very clear memory of him kneeling next to a lamp post. The lamp post was on his left-hand
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50 B2204.005 paragraph 24 51 B2204.005 paragraph 25 52 B135 53 See first RMP at B2186; second RMP at B2185; SA statement at B2189 paragraph 8; evidence to Widgery Tribunal at B2196 at E; BSI statement at B2204.005 paragraph 24; evidence to this Tribunal Day 371/150/04 - 371/151/09 54 B135; B138 paragraph 6 side, positioned between him and the eastern block of Glerfada Park North.\\textsuperscript{55}
10B-68 He told the Tribunal he still had a distinct memory of this:
\\textit{Q. ... The Para that you describe who emerged from behind the eastern block of Glerfada Park and then took up a position, do you still remember him taking up a kneeling position?}
\\textit{A. Distinctly, yes, sir.} \\textsuperscript{56}
10B-69 This is the same posture Soldier F described adopting in a statement taken by Lieutenant Colonel Overbury on 19\\textsuperscript{th} February 1972:
\\textit{I shouted, "there's a gunman" and I dropped to one knee and took an aim position.}\\textsuperscript{57}
10B-70 Soldier F gave the same account of getting down on one knee in his SA statement,\\textsuperscript{58} and on oath before the Widgery Tribunal.\\textsuperscript{59}
5. The location of the pistolman
10B-71 It is important to note that Lieutenant 227 only heard the pistol shots; he did not see them being fired.\\textsuperscript{60}
10B-72 In 1972, he judged the approximate location from which he heard the pistol shots being fired as "in the area of the Rossville Flats." \\textsuperscript{61}
10B-73 From what he could see of the direction in which the soldier fired his shots, Lieutenant 227 believed that the pistolman was in the area of ground that was out
\\textsuperscript{55} B2204.005 paragraph 23 \\textsuperscript{56} Day 371/146/17 \\textsuperscript{57} B135 paragraph 3 \\textsuperscript{58} B138 paragraph 6 \\textsuperscript{59} B143 at B \\textsuperscript{60} Day 371/171/15-17 \\textsuperscript{61} B2195 at AB of his view. He gave this answer to the Widgery Tribunal when Mr. McSparran asked him where the soldier's shots were directed:
Q. Where was that [shooting] directed?
A. From what I could see, at the man with the rifle to my low and to my right. 62
10B-74 Lieutenant 227 said in his BSI statement that he believed that the word “rifle” must be a typographical error on the Widgery transcript.63 It is most likely that he had said “pistol”, otherwise counsel who appeared before the Widgery Tribunal would have picked up on it, which they did not.64
10B-75 During his evidence to this Tribunal, he was asked what he meant by “to my low and to my right”. He marked the area to which he believes he was referring on a map that was shown to him, using a yellow arrow.65 (This was saved with the reference B2204.036 – it cannot be inserted here because it has never been served on the Interested Parties in Laserfiche form.)
10B-76 Soldier F described the location where he saw the man with the pistol as follows:
As I did so I heard pistol shots coming from the area of the wall at the far end of the Rossville Flats. 66
10B-77 The proximity of the locations each of them marked independently of one another is noteworthy, especially bearing in mind that Lieutenant 227 had pinpointed the spot by hearing the sound of the pistol shots.
62 B2200 at BC 63 B2204.010 paragraph 58; Day 371/173 64 B2200 at C 65 Day 371/175 and B2204.036 66 B135 6. The soldier fired in response to a number of pistol shots
10B-78 Lieutenant 227 told the Widgery Tribunal that the soldier fired in response to a number of pistol shots:
Q. When you heard the pistol shots from Rossville Flats, did you see any counteraction taken?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What was that?
A. A soldier kneeling on the corner at Glerfada Park fired two definite shots.67
10B-79 He commented on this aspect of his testimony to the Widgery Tribunal in his BSI statement as follows:
Page 43, paragraph E – I have described hearing the pistol shots and have been asked whether any counter action had been taken. I then describe seeing the para kneel at the south gable end of Glerfada Park North and fire two definite shots. As I have explained with reference to my RMP statement, I am no longer certain that these two incidents were actually linked and it may be that I put the two together in my mind at the time.68
10B-80 This, however, is unlikely: in each of Lieutenant 227's three contemporaneous statements, it is clear that he witnessed the soldier fire in response to the pistol shots. In his first RMP he said:
At this point I heard two or three pistol shots being fired from the area of Rossville Flats. The soldier in Glerfada Park then fired two rounds towards Rossville flats...69
10B-81 In his second RMP statement he said:
67 B2195 at E 68 B2204.010 paragraph 54 69 B2186.2 At this time, I heard two or three pistol shots being fired from the area of Rossville Flats. The shots were fired in rapid succession. The soldier kneeling at the corner of Block 1 Glensada Park then fired two aimed shots towards Rossville Flats.(^7)
10B-82 His SA statement suggests the same sequence:
I then heard two or three rapid pistol shots from the area of Rossville Flats. The kneeling soldier fired two deliberate shots....(^7)
10B-83 Lieutenant 227 confirmed to this Tribunal his belief that his contemporary accounts would be more accurate than his current recollection because of the period of time that has passed since Bloody Sunday. Mr. Mansfield summarized the position and the witness agreed:
Q. You indicated earlier on, and you have maintained the position, that because of the difficulties of the, as it were the time that has passed, you wish to stand by your 1972 written accounts; you have said that on more than one occasion?
A. That is correct, sir.(^7)
10B-84 Lieutenant 227's account is consistent with Soldier F's account of firing the two shots at the pistolman after he had heard him fire.(^7)
The significance of the evidence of Lieutenant 227
10B-85 Lieutenant 227 is the only witness whose evidence identifies Soldier F as the soldier who killed Bernard McGuigan. No other witness has given evidence to the Tribunal which:
(1) clearly identifies Soldier F, and
(^7) B2185 (^7) B2189 paragraph 8 (^7) Day 371/200/16 (^7) B135; B138 paragraph 6 suggests that Bernard McGuigan fell at the same moment that the soldier fired.
The fact that Lieutenant 227 saw Mr. McGuigan fall as the soldier fired is apparent from his contemporary accounts:
(1) In the statement he gave on 1st February 1972, Lieutenant 227 said:
_The soldier in Gle, fada Park then fired two rounds towards Rossville Flats and I saw a man fall at the corner of Block 1 of the flats._
(2) The next day, he made a second statement in which he said:
_The soldier kneeling at the corner of Block 1 Gle, fada Park then fired two aimed shots towards Rossville Flats. I saw him do this and I also saw a man on the corner of block 1 Rossville Flats fall to the ground._
(3) Later in that statement he alluded to the identification of the man who fell to the ground as Bernard McGuigan:
_A small group of people round the body produced a white Civil Rights Banner and dropped it across the body of the man I had seen shot._
(4) In his SA statement, he identified the man who fell as Bernard McGuigan from the photographs of his body lying where it fell:
_I have seen photographs EP25/17 and EP25/18 and identify the foreground figure as the man I saw fall._
(5) At the time Lieutenant 227 gave his BSI statement, his recollection was that he did not in fact see the man fall. But when he came to give evidence to
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74 B2186.2 and B2186.3 75 B2185 76 B2186 77 B2189 paragraph 8 78 B2204.005 paragraph 24 and B2204.008 paragraph 42 the Tribunal, he made it clear that he wished to correct what he had said in his BSI statement:
Q. ... I think there is one matter you wish to deal with in relation to seeing the man fall; is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct, sir.
Q. Could you tell us what that is?
A. Yes, I have looked at my original Royal Military Police and at the statement I have made for the Inquiry and both in paragraphs 24 and in paragraph 42, I say that, in 24 "I do not know if I actually saw the person fall" and in paragraph 42 I go on to describe seeing a man fall "I definitely did not see either of the men fall", I wish to stand by my Royal Military Police statement that I made in 1972 which says that I did, sir. 79
Lieutenant 227's evidence of a man firing a pistol
10B-87 The evidence of Lieutenant 227 is equally significant because he corroborates Soldier F's contemporary accounts of firing at a man who had fired a pistol only moments before.
10B-88 It would be irrational and perverse to rely upon Lieutenant 227's evidence to conclude that Soldier F shot Bernard McGuigan but to ignore his evidence about the pistol shots.
The reliability of Lieutenant 227
10B-89 The Tribunal will have noted that Lieutenant 227 appeared transparently honest in the witness box.
10B-90 He appeared to have no objective other than to tell truth. This is evidenced by the fact that he gave evidence that was contrary to the interests of other soldiers. Not only did he implicitly suggest that the soldier he observed firing from Glenfada Park North killed a civilian, but he also observed that he did not see any firearms
79 Day 371/112
¶ 7.2218
X 32 near the man. In fact he said this of both the civilians he saw lying on the ground in a statement he gave to the RMP:
*I did not see any firearms with or near either man.*
If his aim had been to protect other soldiers, it might be thought extremely unlikely that he would have mentioned this at all.
He demonstrated his scrupulous fairness to the Tribunal on several occasions, most notably when Ms. Quinlivan suggested to him that his purpose was to protect 1 PARA:
*Q. Can I suggest to you, Soldier 227, that when you went to make your statement that really your purpose in making the Royal Military Police statement was to provide support to the Parachute Regiment?*
*A. None whatsoever.*
*Q. That is why you state in your statement that "I can definitely state the first shots fired were not from an SLR" it was to emphasise that the Parachute Regiment had come under fire and not civilians?*
*A. I was making an honest statement on what I believed I heard and saw.*
*Q. The absence of the 108 shots that were fired by members of the Parachute Regiment, either you are confused about the sound or that was a deliberate omission on your part to minimise the role that the Parachute Regiment played on that day?*
*A. I think what I said was based on the questions I was asked.*
*Q. When you gave your second RMP statement, that is the typed version, if I could take you to 2184 the bottom of that page you state: "I heard the sound of a nail bomb exploding followed by what sounded like three aimed shots from an SLR."*
*A. Yes.*
*Q. I think you have acknowledged yourself that the use of the term "aimed shots" is quite an unusual one?* A. Correct.
Q. Can I suggest to you the reason you used the term like that was to suggest that the conduct of the Parachute Regiment was controlled and was appropriate to the situation they met and that this was part of the whole process of trying to effectively protect the Parachute Regiment?
A. At no time when I was giving my statements was it suggested to me that I should actually say specific things in order to protect anybody.
Q. I am not suggesting it was suggested to you. I am suggesting that when you went along to make a statement, that in your mind you were partly there to protect your colleagues?
A. None whatsoever.
Q. How on earth could you have described shots that you did not see from an SLR as aimed shots?
A. As I have already said, "deliberate" would have been a better word.
Q. There is no way you could have described them as aimed shots, is there?
A. I know, I agree."
THE MAN FIRING A PISTOL NEAR THE FAHAN STREET STEPS
The location in context
10B-93 Soldier F identified a man firing a pistol just to the south of the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. Any evidence of civilians carrying a pistol in this area is relevant to the question of whether it is likely that a pistol was fired in the area of the Fahan Street steps as Soldier F alleged. It demonstrates that 'gunmen were in the area.'
10B-94 It is important to bear in mind that the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 was a thoroughfare for people leaving the Rossville Flats car park through the south- eastern exit. Once Mortar Platoon had advanced, it is likely to have been the preferred exit route for any civilian gunman present in the Rossville Flats car park: this route presented the quickest access to the cover of the alleyway behind Joseph Place, which in turn provided a relatively sheltered passage into St. Columb's Wells.
10B-95 The alternative of exiting the car park through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 would have been less appealing to anyone armed as it did not provide a safe escape route out of the Bogside. Choosing the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 would have meant being exposed to soldiers on the City Walls on the south side of the gap, whereas emerging through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 would have the advantage of remaining out of sight of the troops deployed on the City Walls.
10B-96 The Tribunal already knows this was the route that OIRA 4, who has admitted being armed with a pistol, used to exit the car park of the Rossville Flats. However, he may not have been the only person who was armed with a pistol to pass through that exit: any man armed with a pistol in the Rossville Flats car park is more likely than not to have used the same route.
10B-97 The possibility that OIRA 4 may not have been the only man armed with a pistol caught in the funnel-effect of the Rossville Flats car park when Mortar Platoon advanced is dealt with generally in Chapter 7D. Furthermore, there is evidence of something suspicious, possibly a pistol, being moved surreptitiously towards the gap between Blocks 2 and 3, and apparent activity in or close to the gap causing alarm to those who were among the last to use it as an exit from the car park. (See 7D-VII above.)
81 Day 371/186 82 AOIRA 4.19 paragraph 24 The identity of the man with the pistol
10B-98 OIRA 4 says he was carrying a .32 calibre pistol. The account he gave in his BSI statement was that he wanted to escape through the car park at the back of Joseph Place:
*I just wanted to get away as quickly as possible and I kept on going (southwards) down through the car park at the back of Joseph Place and away.*
10B-99 Is it merely a coincidence that a Sunday Times document places a man with a pistol of the same calibre in “the lane behind Joseph Place”?
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**officials/4**
A different car then returned to collect this official and drove him back to the Craggs.
The following incidents are hard to place timewise but are authenticated by staff officers.
1. An official fired and was wounded in the leg somewhere near Hatton Bishop St early in the march. This is almost certainly Mary Holland’s man. We are getting more details.
2. An official fired two .32 pistol shots from the lane behind Joseph Place up at the Walker C.P. It was hopelessly out of range but the man was infuriated and frustrated; it was also risky, since he was in full view of the walls, and the lane was crowded with panicky people.
10B-100 The overwhelming probability is that this information is reliable. There is no dispute that it originally came from Reg Tester, the Command Staff Quartermaster
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83 AOIRA 4.5 paragraph 22 84 AOIRA 4.19 paragraph 25 of the Official IRA, who gave it to the Sunday Times on 15th March 1972. Both Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson told the Tribunal that he was the source. (Mr. Pringle said that Mr. Tester had agreed to release them from a duty not to disclose his identity.) Mr. Tester did not dispute the veracity of the information, or that he had provided it to the Sunday Times.
It may be that the man who fired the .32 calibre pistol from behind Joseph Place may not have been OIRA 4. There is no evidence before the Tribunal to indicate whether .32 calibre pistols were less common than .38 or .45 pistols. The value of the information contained in the Sunday Times note is that it suggests one of two alternative scenarios:
1. If it was OIRA 4 who fired the shots from behind Joseph Place, then he plainly did fire his pistol again after leaving the Rossville Flats car park, contrary to what he claimed in his BSI statement.
2. If it was not OIRA 4, then there was another member of the IRA using that or another pistol in Sector 5.
Of the members of the Official IRA who gave evidence, not one of them chose to assist the Tribunal in its search for the truth about the identity of the man who fired a pistol from behind Joseph Place. It is unlikely that they were unaware of the significance of this evidence revealing which of the scenarios above is the correct one. Either OIRA 4 has lied to the Tribunal about not firing his pistol on a second occasion or there was another gunman in the area.
Whoever the gunman was who fired a pistol from behind Joseph Place, it is important to consider the context of his location. The gunman who fired the shots from the alleyway behind Joseph Place is much more likely to have been
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85 S37 86 For Peter Pringle's assertion: Day 190/093/08; for Philip Jacobson's assertion: Day 191/112/15-19 87 Day 190/017/03-13 88 Day 414/063/12-24 travelling down it from north to south. If he had begun his journey from the south, it is unlikely that he would have gone as far as the alleyway as this would have meant crossing Fahan Street East and exposing himself to soldiers on the City Walls who were obviously there to look out for gunmen. It would have been safer and more expedient, if he wanted to shoot at soldiers on the City Walls, to do so from the derelict houses within St. Columb’s Wells.
10B-104 There is no reason to doubt OIRA 4’s evidence that he crossed the very area in which Soldier F identified a man with a pistol. OIRA 4 was, on his own admission, armed with a .32 calibre pistol at the time. When it comes to the question of the presence of gunmen in the relevant area, the only issue that cannot be resolved on the information that OIRA 4 revealed to the Tribunal is whether another man also crossed the same area while armed with a .32 calibre pistol before firing it from the back of Joseph Place.
Is it safe to conclude that no pistol shots were fired?
10B-105 Soldier F’s case that he shot at a man firing a pistol is not dependent on the Tribunal finding that an unknown person was shot and wounded in this vicinity. Soldier F may have missed the gunman he fired at. His contemporary evidence is that he saw the pistol man fall, but this does not necessarily mean that he had been hit by a bullet; it is common for people to ‘hit the deck’ when they are being shot at.
10B-106 If the gunman was hit, it is most likely that he was taken down to St. Columb’s Wells through the alleyway behind Joseph Place. There is very strong evidence to support the fact that a number of unidentified casualties were put in cars in this area. (See the submissions we made jointly with Mr. Robert Aitken.) Several witnesses in this area clearly spoke with less compunction about the number of casualties they saw as they were completely unaware of the circumstances in which they had been shot.
10B-107 The majority of civilian witnesses who were aware of the unidentified individual who fired a pistol from behind Joseph Place never disclosed it to the Tribunal. This is hardly surprising. In fact, there are other suspicious facts in Sector 5 which have been met by similar silence.
10B-108 For example, no-one has owned up to laying the lead-soiled scarf over the body of Bernard McGuigan. The quantity of lead on the scarf is consistent with it having been used to wrap up a recently fired pistol.89
10B-109 Similarly, no-one has ever disclosed what it was that the small group, using the ambulance as cover from soldiers further north on Rossville Street, were passing surreptitiously between each other when they were caught on film soon after most of the shooting had taken place.90
10B-110 Also, nobody admits to knowing anything about the figure in the background in photograph P323:
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89 Dr. Lloyd agreed with Dr. Martin's opinion that this was a possible source of the lead that was found on the scarf: Day 227/047/22 – 048/04 90 Video 1 at about 330 In any event, two civilian witnesses appear to have been aware of the fact that there was a pistolman in the area between Block 2 and Joseph Place. One of them sought to withdraw his evidence on the unconvincing basis that he had only mentioned it to impress his friends. Kevin Martin said in a statement dated 31st January 1972:
I then ran down beside the shop side of the flats. It was then that I heard the shots, I think I know gunfire well enough to recognise SLRs. I seen one IRA man with a pistol, he opened fire. I must stress that this was after the army opened fire.
In his BSI statement he gave another flimsy explanation for giving a false statement at the time:
I wanted to make the point that even if there had been a guy with a "short" about, it would have been ridiculous for him to take on the Paras and even if he did try to, he only shot after they shot first. I wanted to emphasise how stupid it would have been for any civilian to take the Paras on, but, in fact, I was well off side and I saw nothing of this.
Edwin Glasgow QC had this exchange with Mr. Martin:
Q. You say "it was total fabrication," but I wonder whether you do yourself justice. As a result of the conversation that you had had with your young friends, you certainly believed that a gunman had been seen in the area?
A. Yes.
Q. So you were not telling a lie; in your words, you were embellishing it, on your recollection, by saying that you had seen something which you had not yourself seen?
A. Absolutely.
Q. I want to be clear about this: did you believe at the time when you wrote that statement out that the things that you were putting in it, the important things like the gunman and the man falling beside you, were true even though you had not yourself seen them?
91 AM25.1 92 AM25.6 paragraph 21 A. Oh yes.
Q. Oh yes.
A. Yes.
Q. And you are quite sure in your own mind -- I am not asking for their names -- but at least some of the bunch of young people who you were with were telling you that there had been a gunman in the area where you were prepared to go along with it and say you had seen one?
A. Um, I am not exactly sure what you mean by "the area". By "the area" I would understand the Bogside, not particularly in the area of lower Glenfada Park.
Q. The crucial area is not Glenfada Park, is it, because you will recall Mr Rawat again helped you with this. You were talking about, whichever entrance you had gone through, having been in the area by the shops, behind the central block?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had no reason to lie -- I do not mean lie, you had no reason to embellish that; had you?
A. No.
Q. So the Tribunal could fairly confidently work on the assumption that that was a truthful and accurate account as to at least where you had been?
A. Yes. 93
10B-114 PIRA 25 also gave evidence which supports the fact that a man armed with a gun was in the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. In his BSI statement he said he saw the muzzle of a gun appear round the south eastern corner of Block 2 from his position in front of the shops.94
10B-115 When he gave oral evidence to the Tribunal, PIRA 25 said he could not identify what type of weapon it was:
93 Day 420/199/15 94 AG17.3 paragraph 18 MR GLASGOW: The last matter, may we go back, please, to AG17.3, this is the last paragraph on the page, paragraph 18. May I ask you one more question about that: when you saw the people coming out towards you round the corner of Block 2 from the car park, you recall seeing the muzzle of a rifle?
A. Yes.
Q. How much of it did you see?
A. Not a lot, just a bit from the tcp and the muzzle on the rifle.
Q. Could you see enough to identify the type of rifle?
A. No, I am sorry.
Q. Really all you could say is that it was the end of a gun –
A. Yes.
Q. – of some kind?
A. (Witness nodding)
Q. And you did not see who was holding that gun?
A. No, just heard a voice saying "move out", "move on", just.
Q. Are you absolutely certain on oath that you saw, on Bloody Sunday, a gun sticking out round the corner of Block 2 where you saw the people coming?
A. Yes, I could say I did.
Q. You are certain?
A. Yes, I am certain, yes. 95
10B-116 In view of the fact that any civilians who had been ordered through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 by a soldier with a rifle would undoubtedly have told the Tribunal about this, the fact that no-one has mentioned it makes it more likely that the person holding the gun was a civilian, not a soldier.
95 Day 424/141/03 This ties in with evidence from Patrick Moore of a “known Republican who seemed to be quite used to being under fire and did not have the same look of fear as everybody else” directing people through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. Mr. Moore specifically said in his BSI statement: “The person who I recognised as a Republican told us to keep moving…” Like other witnesses, however, he later tried to retract his suggestion that there was a “known Republican” in the area. He gave an inconsistent and rather unlikely explanation for his retraction in answer to questions from Christopher Clarke QC:
Q. You say that taking cover with you behind the wall was a known republican who seemed to be quite used to being under fire and did not quite have the same look of fear as anyone else; is that right?
A. That is the correction I made, there was a person there who took command of things and just seemed to be able to control and help people.
Q. Was he a known republican or not?
A. Well, when I asked who the person was who helped us, nobody seemed to know just somebody said "I think he is a republican", that is basically where that description come from.
Q. Do you know who he is; do you know his name?
A. No, I do not believe I ever knew it.
Q. He told you to keep your heads down; is that right?
A. He kept us calm and helped us get out of there.
Despite the reticence of civilian witnesses to say anything that would lend support to the fact that a gunman passed through the area between Block 2 and Joseph Place, there is no doubt that at least one pistolman did pass through this area. In the context of all the evidence the Tribunal has heard from and about the Official IRA, it is difficult to believe that any member of the organisation armed with a pistol on Bloody Sunday would not have exploited an opportunity to fire at soldiers if one arose.
10B-119 The location in which Soldier F identified a man with a pistol was hidden from soldiers deployed on the City Walls. It was also an ideal location from which to escape into the cover of the alleyway behind Joseph Place, and from there, if necessary, into the safety of St. Columb’s Wells.
10B-120 The fact that the Official IRA have been so determined to obstruct the Tribunal’s search for the truth about the identity of the man whom Reg Tester admitted had fired a pistol behind Joseph Place suggests something in itself. Some among their number must know who it was and, more importantly, whether he made use of his pistol in the area between Block 2 of the Rossville Flats and Joseph Place. The fact that he fired a couple of shots at the City Walls is plainly not what is controversial about his identity.
10B-121 In the circumstances, the Tribunal should draw the following inference: the reason the identity of this gunman has been kept secret is because it supports the truthfulness of Soldier F’s account that the reason he fired into the area between Block 2 of the Rossville Flats and Joseph place was because there was man firing a pistol in that location.
10B-IV CONCLUSION
10B-122 Soldier F faces allegations that he fired the shots that killed Bernard McGuigan and Patrick Doherty. These specific allegations are dealt with in later sections. However, the basic reason for Soldier F’s shots into Sector 5 is very relevant to the question of his responsibility for what happened. In fact, the question of whether Soldier F was firing at a man with a pistol is central to the Tribunal’s search for the truth about events in Sector 5.
10B-123 The evidence of Lieutenant 227, who appears to have seen Soldier F fire the relevant shots, establishes that Soldier F’s explanation that he was firing at a man firing a pistol between Block 2 and Joseph Place is reliable and true. Moreover, there is independent evidence that one – or possibly two – members of the Official IRA passed through the area between Block 2 and Joseph Place while armed with a pistol. It is unlikely that this is nothing more than a coincidence.
The Official IRA has refused to provide the Tribunal, even confidentially, with any information about the identity of the gunman who subsequently fired a number of shots from behind Joseph Place, yet it is well known that these shots missed their intended target. The Official IRA’s desire to keep his identity secret is likely to be important for other reasons. The identity of that gunman is, most notably, relevant to the question of whether it is likely that a pistol was fired in the area between Block 2 and Joseph Place as Soldier F alleged. CHAPTER 10C
SHOOTING FROM GLENFADA PARK NORTH
10C-I INTRODUCTION
10C-1 On day 38 of his Opening Speech, Christopher Clarke QC drew the Tribunal’s attention to a conundrum relating to Sector 5:
The Tribunal will have noticed, quite apart from the fact that the number of dead and wounded in this sector appears to be four, that there are more shootings to be accounted for than can be accounted for by two bullets. Also, there is a sizable body of evidence to the effect that there was more than two shots fired from westerly direction towards the area where Patrick Doherty was. ¹
10C-2 In 1972 Soldier F admitted firing two shots into Sector 5. Since then it has been assumed that he was responsible for killing Bernard McGuigan and Patrick Doherty. It is unlikely, however, that Soldier F was the only soldier to fire into Sector 5. As set out below, there is evidence that at least one other soldier fired into Sector 5.
10C-II OTHER SOLDIERS IN GLENFADA PARK FIRING INTO SECTOR 5
10C-3 Michael Mansfield QC recognised in his Opening Speech that Soldier F’s admission that he fired two shots in Sector 5 did not mean that other soldiers in Glenfada Park North did not also fire shots into the same area:
Whoever fired that shot — and we say it has to be one of those soldiers, we say almost certainly F or someone with F in Glenfada Park North because, as you know, the only soldier that accepts, that does not mean to say there are not others from that area, who admits any trajectory anywhere near this position is F. ²
¹ Day 038/067/01 ² Day 050/123/18 The identity of the other soldier(s) who fired into Sector 5 is unclear because, unlike Soldier F, none has accounted for these shots. Lord Gifford, however, hypothesised that Soldier G fired shots alongside Soldier F:
Private G also fired shots before he entered Glenfada Park North. He fired in Glenfada Park and he then went through to Abbey Park and shot Gerald Donaghy, again the bullet matches the rifle, and Gerard McKinney. He then rejoined Lance Corporal F at the gable end of Glenfada Park, from where we know that at least two soldiers were firing.
It is not clear, on the face of the available evidence, whether two soldiers in Glenfada Park North ever fired shots across Rossville Street simultaneously with one another. In fact, the evidence shows that remarkably few witnesses saw any soldiers in Glenfada Park North firing into the area to the south of Block 2.
A significant handful of witnesses, however, did at one time see two or more soldiers kneeling in the main entrance to Glenfada Park North and pointing their rifles across Rossville Street in the general direction of where the deceased and injured in Sector 5 were shot, although they did not actually see them fire.
PIRA 25 said in his BSI statement that he saw three soldiers in the entrance to Glenfada Park North. He believed they had been firing shots into the area between Block 2 of the Rossville Flats and Joseph Place:
I heard two or three sharp cracks of gun fire and I saw shots hitting a wall ahead of me at the point I marked E on the attached map (grid reference L15). I threw myself back, close up against the façade of Block 2 and looked north-west towards Glenfada Park North. I saw three soldiers kneeling, out in the open in the approximate position I have marked F on the attached map (grid reference L15). I have also marked their positions on the attached photograph, marked A. I saw their uniforms and their helmets, but I
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3 Day 049/137/19 did not actually see them fire their weapons, although I was sure at the time that the man who was hit had been shot by the three soldiers. As soon as I saw the soldiers they lowered their rifles from the aim position, (butts of the rifles at their soldiers) and got up and moved away.
The map which PIRA 25 marked and attached to his statement appears at AG17.16:
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4 AG17.7 paragraph 14 PIRA 25 confirmed this evidence on oath to the Tribunal. He was not challenged on it.
Hugh Barbour appears to have seen the same three soldiers in a kneeling position. He saw them at point L as he looked towards Glenfada Park North from his position at point J.
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5 Day 424/121-122 6 For Mr. Barbour's location: AB10.5 paragraph 26, for the soldiers: AB10.5 paragraph 29 Mr. Barbour gave an account in his BSI statement of seeing the soldiers having just witnessed Bernard McGuigan fall to the ground:
I have a recollection of seeing three or four soldiers coming out of the gap between Glenfada Park North and Glenfada Park South, on to Rossville Street, at the point marked L on the attached map (grid reference L15). They took up kneeling positions and put their rifles to their shoulders. I was convinced that they were going to shoot at me and the other people who were with me. I tried to take cover at the veranda poles..... When I saw those soldiers I decided to make a run for it towards Joseph's Place. I could now hear intense shooting from the Glenfada Park Area.
He told the Tribunal that he believed the soldiers had come from inside Glenfada Park North. He confirmed on oath that his impression was that the soldiers were
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7 AB10.5 paragraphs 29 and 31 8 Day 088/076/01-04 aiming their rifles in his direction, i.e., between Block 2 of the Rossville Flats and Joseph Place.9
10C-14 Joseph Nicholas gave an account in his BSI statement of seeing two of the soldiers in squatting positions:
I could still hear shooting so I started to crawl through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. I made my way as far as the south east corner of Block 2 where I stood up again. As I looked round the corner towards Glerfada Park South, I saw two soldiers standing at the north eastern corner of Glerfada Park South at about point I (grid reference 115). I remember that one of them was black. They were both in a firing position facing towards me. They appeared to be squatting down. I did not see them fire any shots [emphasis added].10
10C-15 Counsel to the Tribunal asked him to clarify what he meant by “squatting down”:
Q. ... You say that they appeared to be squatting down. What exactly do you mean by that? Squatting in what sense?
A. I mean kneeling.11
10C-16 Mr. Nicholas mentioned these soldiers in a statement he made on 2nd February 1972, suggesting that they fired shots towards Patrick Walsh as he went out to Patrick Doherty:
Because of firing aimed in his direction from the two soldiers at the entrance to Glerfada Park he was unable to get Mr. Doherty to the safety of the alleyway at Joseph Place.12
10C-17 Similarly, he gave this account to Philip Jacobson of the Sunday Times in the weeks after Bloody Sunday:
... in the centre of glerfada [sic] Nicholas saw two paras. One was kneeling, the other sort of squatting, both with rifles at their
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9 Day 088/087/04-06 10 AN17.4 paragraph 18 11 Day 078/022/04 12 AN17.17 paragraph 2 soldiers, both were aiming directly up the gap, making Doherty right in their line of possible fire.
10C-18 He told the Tribunal that he recalled seeing a number of rounds hit the retaining wall that runs parallel to, and below, Fahan Street East, both before and after the point at which he believed Patrick Doherty was hit.
A VOLLEY OF SHOTS FIRED INTO SECTOR 5 WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR
10C-19 There is also evidence to suggest that there were two volleys of shots fired into Sector 5 separated by a gap in time. Brian Doherty witnessed at least two volleys of such gunfire. He was with a group of people, including the injured Michael Bradley, in a shop beneath Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. He said he thought it was "Barr's shop." The location of Molly Barr's shop is easy to identify as it can be seen in photograph P320: it is the second shop from the west on the ground floor of Block 2:
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13 AN17.20 from line 13. Mr. Nicholas said he recalled giving the account: Day 078/047/15\
14 Day 078/034/16-24\
15 AD57.5 paragraphs 34 and 35\
16 Day 149/057/20 He said that he had heard bursts of shooting fired in volleys while he and others carried Michael Bradley into the shop. He spent four or five minutes in the shop. Then he decided to try to make a run for it:
I decided to leave the shop and run to Free Derry Corner. I seem to remember that a group of other people had the same idea, and when there was a lull in the firing we all ran together towards Free Derry Corner. I instinctively felt there would be safety in numbers and I ran with these people. We had not got very far when another volley of shots rang out. By the sound of them, these shots seemed to be coming from our west, perhaps from the area around Glenfada Park. I cannot be more precise than that. We all realised that we were exposed where we were and we dropped to the ground. The position where we were when we did this is marked with an F on the attached map. We began crawling back towards Block 2, but had only got a few yards when another volley of shots rang out. The position where we were when this volley of shots occurred is marked with a G on the attached map.
The relevant part of the map attached to his statement is shown below:
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17 AD57.5 paragraph 35 and 36 18 AD57.5 paragraphs 37 to 39 19 AD57.11 Mr. Doherty said he believed that both volleys of shots came from the direction of Glenfada Park. He said that he could see the impact of two or three of the bullets on the pavement, and he indicated where they landed when he gave oral evidence to the Tribunal:
It is possible that this occurred before Bernard McGuigan and Patrick Doherty were shot because this witness did not see any bodies lying in the positions in which they died, although of course it is possible that he simply failed to notice them.
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20 AD57.6 paragraph 40 21 Day 149/056/23 – he marked the spot with a blue arrow: saved at AD57.13 22 Day 149/055/12 - 149/056/05 Mr. Doherty confirmed this evidence on oath without being challenged about it.\\textsuperscript{23} None of the Interested Parties asked him any questions at all.\\textsuperscript{24}
There is a certain amount of eyewitness testimony that supports the fact that a volley of shots, quite distinct from the shots fired by Soldier F, was fired into Sector 5.
The soldier whom Denis Bradley saw firing one such volley into Sector 5 was almost certainly not Soldier F:
\\begin{quote} A few minutes later a British soldier arrived at the corner of the gable nearest the car park in Glefada Park. He was followed by four or five other British soldiers. One of the soldiers ordered myself and the other people who were against the gable to move in the direction of William Street, along Glefada Park with our hands on our heads. Before I could do as this soldier told me another soldier grabbed me and pushed me off the pavement along the perimeter of Glefada Park. When I recovered my balance I found myself beside another soldier who fired between 4 and 7 shots from his rifle, which he was holding at hip level. The gun was aimed slightly above the horizontal in the direction of Free Derry Corner. I grabbed his arm and asked him to stop firing, but he shrugged me off.\\textsuperscript{25} \\end{quote}
His BSI statement records more detail, however, and makes a distinction between the first soldier to come around the corner into view and the one who fired the shots across Rossville Street:
\\begin{quote} 30. The next memory I have is of Paratroopers coming round to the gable end wall at the corner of GPN from a northerly direction... The first soldier round was surprised to see us, or that was my impression. He raised his gun, pointed it at me and shouted to us to move on into the car park of Glefada Park North. I didn't think I was going to be shot... I went towards the soldier to speak to him. He said to me 'hands up'. My next memory is of people being moved up into Glefada Park North and I was still trying to speak to the soldier... \\end{quote}
\\textsuperscript{23} Day 149/054/11 - 149/058/03 \\textsuperscript{24} Day 149/149/05 \\textsuperscript{25} H1.42 31. I remember that around this point another soldier started firing from the hip or waist in a southerly direction from the entrance to the Glelafada Park car park at the east...26
10C-28 This distinction between the first soldier to come around the corner and the one who fired the shots across Rossville Street also appears in one of Mr. Bradley’s contemporary accounts. In the very similar account he gave to a Sunday Times journalist not long after Bloody Sunday, he described the soldier who fired as “another soldier who had just moved up” after the other soldiers had started moving the arrestees northwards.27
10C-29 During his oral evidence, Mr. Bradley marked the location of the soldier on the Virtual Reality model. Christopher Clarke QC, summarised what the arrows meant:
Q. The arrows show -- the mauve arrow is where the people have been, the turquoise arrow is the route the soldiers came down, the green arrow is where the people were being taken by the soldiers back up into Glelafada Park North, the light blue arrow is approximately where the soldier was and the dark blue arrow is the direction into which he moved; is that right?
A. That is roughly correct. There is an assumption, by the way, because I could not have seen and did not see where the soldiers came from, but they came from that direction. I am not saying they came up that particular street. 28
26 H1.12 paragraphs 30 and 31 27 H1.32 and H1.33 28 Day 140/137/19 This evidence is confusing. First, if the turquoise arrow is meant to describe the route the soldiers came down, then there is no “light blue” arrow to indicate where the soldier was. It is possible that when Christopher Clarke said “light blue arrow” he meant to say “little blue arrow” or it may be that he simply forgot that the turquoise arrow – which could also be described as light blue – had already been used to denote the direction in which the soldiers came. Secondly, the reference to the dark blue arrow describing the direction in which the soldier moved is ambiguous because there are two “dark blue arrows”. If it is the bigger of the two which is meant to denote the direction in which the soldier moved, it appears to be pointing in the very direction from which he had come. It may be that this arrow was mistakenly put on the screen back to front. Nor is it clear where the soldier was when he actually fired.
It is unlikely that Mr. Bradley’s evidence about the location from which the soldier fired is clear enough to be of any assistance to the Tribunal except insofar as it appears to indicate that he fired from a location approximately where Soldier F fired from.
10C-32 The soldier Mr. Bradley saw was not, however, Soldier F:
I remember at around this point another soldier started firing from the hip or waist in a southerly direction from the entrance to the GPN car park at the east. I remember being horrified. He was certainly not kneeling or with his gun up to his eye line and seemed to be firing from the side, probably two handed, but I am not sure about that. I remember grabbing onto him, he pushed me and I slipped off the pavement and fell and stumbled to the ground. I was to his right as he shot. I told him to stop shooting. I remember a pram ramp south of where I was standing at the gable wall and that there were people there over towards that ramp. I didn't think he was firing at them specifically but I remember thinking I wouldn't have wanted to be there.
My impression is that Lord Widgery interpreted what I said about this soldier to mean that he firing towards Free Derry Corner. He was certainly firing in a southerly direction and that is what I meant. I don't think he was firing at Free Derry Corner but generally in a southerly direction. My memory is not of him shooting across the road to the front of the Rossville flats (in the direction of the television [sic] kiosk), but to the south. He might have shot across the road to the front of the flats but I don't think he did. Again, the Widgery Inquiry seemed to be leading me to say that this soldier's shots, which were between 6 and 8 in number, might have been those that killed, for example, Barney McGuigan. Whilst not impossible, my impression of the manner of the firing is that this highly unlikely. The soldier was moving around and swaggering, but the general body position was not in that direction. My fear was for the people I could see either on the ramp or through the ramp. The soldier was just shooting, not particularly at anyone. The angle of fire seemed to me to be slightly over people's heads. I didn't think the soldier had lost his head. I didn't think he was going to shoot me. He didn't say anything to me. One of the other soldiers told me to get along. [Emphasis added.]
10C-33 The highlighted passages illustrate the important differences between Mr. Bradley's account and Soldier F's actions as corroborated by Soldier 227. Soldier 227 was not challenged by any of the Interested Parties in relation to his account. of the soldier he saw firing. In fact, his evidence was relied upon by Michael Mansfield QC to put to Soldier F that he was seen to shoot Bernard McGuigan.30
Mr. Bradley’s evidence is totally inconsistent with that account of Soldier F’s actions:
(1) Lieutenant 227 said the soldier “took cover by a lamp post and knelt down.”31 Every account that Lieutenant 227 has given consistently stated this fact.32 Counsel to the Tribunal asked 227 whether he could still remember the soldier kneeling down to fire, and he was never challenged on his answer:
_The Para that you describe who emerged from behind the eastern block of Glefada Park and then took up a position, do you still remember him taking up a kneeling position?_
_A. Distinctly, yes, sir._ 33
(2) Mr. Bradley said that the soldier fired from the hip.34 Lieutenant 227 has consistently described the soldier he saw fire as holding the gun to his shoulder.35 He was never challenged on this.
(3) Lieutenant 227 has consistently described the soldier he saw fire in the direction of the Rossville Flats and not in the direction of Free Derry Corner as Mr. Bradley suggested.36 It was never suggested to 227 that he was wrong about this.
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29 H1.1.3 paragraphs 31 and 32 30 Day 376/124-127 31 B2204.005 paragraph 23 32 B2186.2; B2185; B2189 paragraph 7; B2195 at E 33 Day 371/146/17 34 Day 140/137/15 35 B2196 at A; B2204.005 paragraph 24; 36 B2186.2, B2185; B2189 paragraph 8; B2195 at F; B2204.005 paragraph 24
FS 7.2245
X 59 (4) Mr. Bradley described the soldier as “spraying” the bullets he fired without aiming properly. Lieutenant 227 suggested that the soldier he saw fire took aim with each shot he fired. This is how he described it in his statement to the Tribunal, without any challenge:
I could see that he took aim quite carefully and I then saw him fire two shots. He paused after the first shot to re-aim before shooting a second time.
(5) Mr. Bradley has given various descriptions of the number of shots that he saw the soldier fire, but the number has always been between four and eight. Whereas the soldier whom Lieutenant 227 saw fired two shots. It was never suggested to Lieutenant 227 that the soldier he saw fired more than two shots.
(6) Although Mr. Bradley suggested that the soldier he saw fire was not the first to come around the corner of the gable wall, the soldier Lieutenant 227 saw fire was the first one to come around the corner:
The next thing I remember is looking into Glelafada Park North. I was not looking through my telescopic sight at this point. My attention was caught by a soldier who I believe was a member of the Parachute Regiment. He appeared from behind the eastern block of Glelafada Park and took up a position at the south west corner of the eastern block. There were some civilians behind him. Two other paras came into my line of vision directly behind him.... The para I had noticed first took cover by a lamp post and knelt down.
10C-35 Mr. Bradley said he physically tried to stop the soldier firing. He described it in this way in his statement of 22nd February 1972:
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37 Day 140/141/01 38 B2185; B2189 paragraph 8; B2195 at EF; 39 B2204.005 paragraph 24 40 B2186.2; B2185; B2189 paragraph 8; B2195 at F; B2204.005 paragraph 24 41 B2204.005 paragraph 23 I grabbed his arm and asked him to stop firing, but he shrugged me off.
10C-36 He confirmed that he could still remember this when he was asked about it by Edwin Glasgow QC:
Q. Your recollection is that you physically handled him, to use a neutral word? A. Yes, yes.
Q. You actually got hold of him? A. Yes.
Q. Do you think it is possible time has played tricks with your memory over that, or is that a clear recollection? A. It is one of the clearest recollections I have, but memory is memory.
10C-37 The only characteristic of this soldier that Mr. Bradley was able to describe was that his face was blackened.
10C-38 The only common feature of their respective accounts is that both Mr. Bradley and Lieutenant 227 describe a soldier firing out of Glenfada Park North from a similar location around the time the arrestees were being taken away. If Mr. Bradley's account is capable of proving anything above and beyond that basic fact, it should be borne in mind that there is no evidence to suggest that the soldier he described is more likely to have been Soldier F than any other member of Anti Tank Platoon who entered Glenfada Park North.
10C-39 Other evidence also indicates that the soldier Mr. Bradley saw was not Soldier F. George Irwin was behind the same gable wall and he believed that he and Fr. Bradley, as he then was, were the last in the line of arrestees. He has not provided
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42 H1.42 43 Day 140/238/23 44 Day 140/143/01 a statement to the Tribunal and the only record of an account given by him is a NICRA statement, which is undated. In it he said:
_The Army then came around our wall, at our backs, from the Glenfada Car Park. Three soldiers told us to move into the car park where we saw another five or so soldiers. I and Fr. Bradley were probably the last of the line and as I moved into the car park, past the first soldier who came from the car park, a tall soldier, he fired at least three shots from the hip. From the direction that the gun was pointing, I think he had three possible targets – the fallen man behind the small barricade, the fallen youth by the flats or the door of the flats._ 43
10C-40 The reference to a tall soldier must necessarily exclude Soldier F: he could never be described as tall. A photograph of Soldier F proves his height, presumably with his boots on, to have been about 5'6". 46
10C-41 Relative to other members of Anti Tank Platoon who entered Glenfada Park, Soldier F was among the shortest. He confirmed this in answer to questions from Lord Gifford:
_Q. ... You were a short man; were you not?_
_A. I still am._
_Q. Shorter than G?_
_A. Yes._
_Q. Shorter than E?_
_A. Probably the same height._
_Q. And considerably shorter than H?_
_A. Yes._ 47
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43 A14.2 46 ARR5.1 47 Day 376/159/15 An anonymous witness who wished to be known by the cipher RM2 also described seeing a “tall” soldier standing near the entrance to Glenfada Park North and firing from the hip into Sector 5.
28. We edged [from the area of the telephone box] slowly along the shops of Block 2, moving in a south easterly direction. We had got about a quarter of the way along the block, at point L on the attached map (grid reference K17), when I turned around and saw a paratrooper on the opposite side of Rossville Street, at the entrance to the Glenfada Park North car park at point M on the attached map (grid reference I16). I think he had come south down Rossville Street because at the time I had a clear view of the entrance way to Glenfada Park North, and my impression was that he had not come from there. The soldier continued to walk slowly southwards down Rossville Street; he was quite brazen about the way he was walking and was not up against a wall. The soldier, who seemed to be right handed, was holding his gun by his midriff and turning his head from side to side, looking around. He was tall and looked confident. He had a red beret on, so I could tell he was a para. He had a white face with no camouflage on. I do not think the sleeves of his jacket were rolled up. As I saw him, at point M, there were no people standing behind him at the gable end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North.
29. The soldier saw and looked at us. He lowered his gun to his hip and casually fired two shots in our general direction. The shots appeared to go high and I do not think they would have hit anyone. It was as if the soldier was saying “here I am”, merely making his presence known. After he had fired the two shots, the soldier walked backwards, north up Rossville Street, out of my line of sight. I was very frightened when I saw him as he had the opportunity to shoot us. Until then I didn’t think that the army knew there were people to the south of Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats, and now they knew people were there they might come after us. We therefore started moving quicker in a south easterly direction along Block 2. As we walked along by the shops we tried to get into them for cover. I remember banging on the door of Barr’s but it was locked. As we walked along there we tried to stay as close to the shops as possible. I looked across to the flats at Joseph Place and people there were shouting at us, words like “don’t move, don’t run across here, they’re still shooting” [emphasis added].
48 AK42.12 paragraph 28-29 The relevant part of the map attached to RM2's statement is reproduced below:
RM2 fairly accepted from counsel to the Tribunal that he could not be sure where the soldier had come from. However, it would appear from his oral evidence that the spot he marked with the letter 'M' was that from which the soldier fired, rather than the location in which he first noticed the soldier. Counsel to the Tribunal asked him to mark the location from which he saw the soldier fire on a photograph, which was then saved. The location was a little bit further north of where he had marked it on his map, although still on the pavement on the corner south of the entrance to Glenfada Park North. (It cannot be reproduced here as it has not so far been served to the Interested Parties in Laserfiche form.)
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49 AK42.17 50 Day 424/048/1-11 51 Day 424/045/09 – 424/047/16 52 Day 424/051/07-13 RM2 had the impression that the direction in which the soldier fired was towards the northern block of Joseph Place. The shots were close enough for him to be concerned. He was adamant that the soldier fired, and he was adamant that the soldier fired from the hip.
Although RM2 had described the soldier as tall, he was not asked how tall. It seems unlikely, however, that he would have described a man who was about 5'6" as tall.
CONCLUSION
Soldier F admitted firing two shots into Sector 5 from a kneeling position near a lamp post on the southwest corner of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North.
If the Tribunal finds that the aggregate number of shots fired by Anti Tank Platoon into Sector 5 exceeded two, the question will arise as to who fired them.
The Tribunal will, given its general approach, be unwilling to conclude that no other soldier fired into Sector 5 simply on the basis that no other soldier admitted to doing so. Also, there is no evidential basis for a conclusion that Soldier F must be responsible for each and every shot fired into Sector 5 - however many - simply because he admitted firing two shots into that Sector.
Distinguishing one member of Anti Tank Platoon from another has proved a virtually impossible task for both civilian and military eyewitnesses. The testimony of some witnesses nevertheless suggests that at least one volley of shots was fired from the main entrance to Glenfada Park North across Rossville Street by a soldier who has never owned up to it. The evidence does not suggest, however, that it was Soldier F.
53 Day 424/051/16-24 54 Day 424/073/05-19 55 Day 424/049/1-15 CHAPTER 10D
BERNARD MCGUIGAN
10D-1 DID SOLDIER F SHOOT BERNARD MCGUIGAN?
The assertion that Soldier F shot Bernard McGuigan is supported by the fact that he admitted in 1972 that he fired two shots in a line of trajectory which passed very close to the location in which Bernard McGuigan was shot.
Moreover, Lieutenant 227 gave evidence that he saw a man near the southern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats fall at the same moment a soldier kneeling by the lamp post in the south eastern corner of Glenfada Park North fired into Sector 5. Lieutenant 227's description of the manner in which that soldier fired is consistent with Soldier F's own description of how he fired. (That evidence is set out in section 10B-III, above.)
Other evidence, however, is not as persuasive as some may suggest.
SOLDIER F'S 'ADMISSION' IN THE WITNESS BOX
Soldier F was questioned by Michael Mansfield QC on behalf of the family of Bernard McGuigan on day 376. He made an equivocal admission that he must have been the soldier who fired the shot that killed Bernard McGuigan. When assessing Soldier F's apparent concession, it is important to bear in mind that he is a man who has no current recollection of the events of the day: he is not, therefore, honestly able to say whether any particular version of the events of the day is true or not – he cannot honestly deny the truth of a particular account any more than he can advance a positive case based upon his present recollection. An agreement by such a witness that a particular version of events could be true is, therefore, evidentially valueless.
Mr. Mansfield based his allegation upon the evidence of Lieutenant 227 and, ostensibly, the evidence of Geraldine McBride, née Richmond. Lieutenant 227 is the only witness – military or civilian – whose evidence is capable of identifying Soldier F as the soldier who fired at the moment Bernard McGuigan fell to the ground.
It is necessary to look carefully at what Soldier F was told about the case against him. This is how Mr. Mansfield described the evidence against him, and because of its importance, it is set out in full:
Q. Right. So that is where you were, in a kneeling position. A. Yes.
Q. According to you. A. Yes.
Q. In that position you were seen by a number of soldiers; did you realise that? A. No.
Q. Up on the walls, that is beyond the Rossville Flats, there were observation points; did you know that? A. No.
Q. And those observation points were manned, not by paratroopers, but in the main by members of the Light Air Defence Regiment. You did not know that, obviously? A. I did not.
Q. I am not going to go through them all, there are a number of them, but one in particular gives a graphic description of what I suggest is you firing because you are the only one on that corner in a kneeling position, so it has to be you; do you follow? A. I do.
Q. This is an officer; he is known as 227, in the Light Air Defence Regiment. Before I tell you what he says, you better as it were be shown the view that he says he has of the corner and so on. Could we have 2204.033. This is roughly the view, nothing can replicate it precisely, that he had from the walls, where you can see the end of Block 1. You can see Block 2 and you can see the corner of Glenfada Park that we have just been talking about, with the lamp post. Can you see it? A. Yes. Q. That is roughly the view: 2204.034 is a photograph closer; this time there is an armoured personnel carrier which is there, which I appreciate was not there when you were there. In the distance is that same lamppost with two people standing by it; all right?
A. Yes.
Q. In the foreground is the same body that you have been shown before, cf Barney McGuigan. Again, he has identified these photographs. Finally, 2204.035. This is a photograph and I would like -- I am sorry to put figures to you -- you to bear in mind this figure is also known as EP25.17, and I have to come back to that, but this photograph he, 227, also identified. That is the general scenario. I take it, therefore, that you had never been shown what he said about these incidents at the time.
A. That is correct.
Q. He said it many times and he repeated it here last week. He is an officer. He was in charge of the observation post. Could we have 2189, please, paragraph 8. I am going to read it to you because it may be you have not seen it before: "I then heard two or three rapid pistol shots from the area of the Rossville Flats. The kneeling soldier [that is, I suggest, you because he has already described that] fired two deliberate shots towards my right and downwards [he is up on the walls] aimed I believe in the direction of the near end of Block 1. As he did this I saw a man falling. He was a few paces out from the end of Block 1 where a small group of people were gathered. I have seen EP25/17 [that is the photograph I have just shown you, all right] and EP25/18 [that is another one in the same series] and identify the foreground figure as the man I saw fall. I should add that the Pig appearing in the photographs was not there when the Paratrooper fired. I saw nothing in the hands of the man who fell." That is a very clear description; is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. By someone, cf officer rank, whose job it was to observe that day and nothing else much; do you follow?
A. I do.
Q. And he is not alone. This is not just civilians, but other soldiers who saw the kneeling paratrooper fire in this way. So bear that in mind. He gave evidence at Widgery, just so there is no doubt at all, can we have one passage, 2196, please. This is what he told Lord Widgery at letter A onwards, please:
"Question: When he fired [he is talking about you again] how many shots did he fire?
"Answer: Two shots, sir." "Question: When he fired those two shots, did you see any man who may have been his target?
"Answer: Yes, sir, I did.
"Question: Where was that man?
"Answer: By the bottom end of Block 1.
"Question: Was that near the telephone kiosk?
"Answer: Yes.
"Question: What did you see?
"Answer: I saw a man fall, sir.
"Question: Did a small group of people gather?
"Answer: They stood away there as soon as he was hit.
"Question: Would you look at EP25."
Then I will not trouble you to the rest because he goes on to the same photographs again and he identifies the man in the photograph, in the foreground, Barney McGuigan, as being shot by the kneeling soldier, whose name he obviously did not know, but it was you. I am not for the moment going to trouble you with other soldiers who saw a very similar scene. I want to switch, if I may, to the civilians, for this purpose a series of photographs, please. [Emphasis added].
The suggestion that there were other military witnesses who saw a soldier in F's location shoot Bernard McGuigan is incorrect. Mr. Mansfield could only have been referring to Gunner 030, Sergeant 040 and Gunner 134: they were the only soldiers who have ever said that they saw a soldier in Glenfada Park North fire shots into the area south of the Rossville Flats. They were all members of the 22 LAD RA and were deployed on the City Walls, as Mr. Mansfield described.
However, each of their accounts is quite different from what Lieutenant 227 described seeing from his location on the City Walls. There are a number of
1 Day 376/123/22 important distinctions, and these make the evidence of Lieutenant 227 unique. Pre-eminent among them is the fact that not one of the other soldiers has ever suggested that Bernard McGuigan – or a man in his location – fell at the same moment that a soldier in Glenfada Park North fired.
Gunner 030 saw a soldier fire one shot from a different location in Glenfada Park. By the time he gave evidence to the Tribunal, he could not remember seeing the soldier aiming his SLR into Sector 5. However, when the events must have been fresher in his mind, Gunner 030 gave this evidence to the Widgery Tribunal when he was questioned by Mr. McSparran on behalf of the families of the dead and injured:
Q. Until you saw the paratrooper in Glenfada Park --- Just point out where you saw him, please.
A. He came running in and he stopped about there because there was a car park in Glenfada Park and it was about the first or second tree up.
Q. That paratrooper was the one who fired down towards the bottom, the back of the flats?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Where you say you heard pistol shots from?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Just let me have the pointer, please. Your evidence is that this paratrooper fired from where? Just you alter the position of the pointer if you feel it necessary to do so?
A. It was about there, the middle. The car park ran down there.
Q. And he got right down on one knee and fired past the telephone kiosk down to this direction?
A. Yes sir.
Q. A paratrooper [i.e. Soldier F] has given evidence to my Lord about firing down in that direction and he has told my Lord about
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2 Day 366/122/04-11
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7.2256
X 70 peering round this corner here, you see, and then going round from there and firing from about this position. Do you understand?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did you see anyone firing from this position?
A. No sir.
Q. It could not be the same person?
A. No sir.
Q. You have no doubt about all that?
A. Yes. 3
10D-10 According to Gunner 030’s contemporary statements, a body fitting the description of Bernard McGuigan’s had already been shot dead by the time the soldier in Glenfada Park North had come into view. 4 It is therefore unlikely that Mr. Mansfield had Gunner 030 in mind when he told Soldier F that other witnesses had seen a soldier fire in the way that Lieutenant 227 described.
10D-11 Sergeant 040 was not called to give oral evidence to this Tribunal. He said in his BSI statement that he could not remember seeing or hearing a soldier in Glenfada Park North firing his weapon. 5 His RMP and SA statements suggest that he witnessed a soldier in Glenfada Park North fire a single shot which hit a man who was some distance from Bernard McGuigan’s location. 6 It is unclear whether Mr. Mansfield had Sergeant 040 in mind: if so, the soldier he described firing a shot from Glenfada Park North was not responsible for shooting Bernard McGuigan.
10D-12 Gunner 134’s evidence similarly lends no support to any suggestion that the soldier he described firing into Sector 5 was responsible for the shooting of
3 B1612.027 at G 4 RMP statement: B1612.011 paragraphs 2 and 4; SA statement: B1612.018 paragraph 4 5 B1661.005 paragraph 30 6 See in particular B1661.022 paragraph 3 and B1661.024 paragraph 2 Bernard McGuigan. The account he gave in his BSI statement was of a soldier shooting a man who could not easily be confused with Bernard McGuigan:
I saw a man running along and parallel to the south side of Block 2 of the Rossville flats towards my location from a northwest to southeast direction. The first time I saw him he was at the far west end of the Rossville flats. The man was not sprinting, he was just jogging. Attached to this statement as Appendix 4 is a map on which I have marked with an 'A' the position in which I first saw the man. He was wearing a knee length dark coat. I cannot describe him further. I do not know how old the man was. He did not appear to be carrying a weapon in his hands and I did not see a weapon anywhere else on him.
The next thing I saw was a soldier from the Parachute Regiment. I have marked the approximate place where I saw him with a circle on the attached map at Appendix 4. He was easily identifiable by his Denison smock and his dome shaped hat. He knelt down by a lamp post. The paratrooper I was watching definitely fired because I heard a shot and could see the smoke coming from the barrel of his gun. When I first saw him he was in an aiming position and then he lowered the gun in the way a soldier would after he had fired his weapon. I looked back towards the man in the long coat. He had fallen onto the floor face down and was still facing towards me. He had travelled two thirds of the length of the Rossville flats before I looked back and saw him lying on the ground. I have marked the approximate place where he fell with a 'B' on the map.
The map which Gunner 134 marked with position of the soldier (a circle) and the location where he saw the man shot (B) is reproduced below:
______________________________________________________________________
7 B1831.003 paragraphs 18-19 The accounts Gunner 134 gave in his RMP and SA statements were much the same.(^8)
As none of these witnesses saw a soldier in the location that Lieutenant 227 described fire two shots at a man anywhere near Bernard McGuigan's location, it was not accurate to suggest that Lieutenant 227's account is supported by what they said. The evidence of Lieutenant 227 is unique in implicating Soldier F in the shooting of Bernard McGuigan: only he suggested that Bernard McGuigan – or a man in his location – fell at the same moment that a soldier in Glenfada Park North fired.
Soldier F, as a result of the matters put to him must have believed, quite wrongly, that there were a number of other witnesses whose evidence was that a soldier in his location shot Bernard McGuigan. As a consequence, Soldier F was put under considerable pressure to concede that it would be unreasonable for him to deny
(^8) First RMP: B1823 lines 10-13; Second RMP: B1826 lines 7-17; SA statement: B1829 paragraphs 5-7 that he had shot Bernard McGuigan, notwithstanding that he has no recollection of the event.
Soldier F’s position was not helped by the selective nature of Mr. Mansfield’s appraisal of the evidence against him. In fact, the very witness whom Mr. Mansfield chose to exemplify what he claimed other witnesses had said, had actually provided some corroboration for Soldier F’s account that he fired two shots at a man located between Block 2 of the Rossville Flats and Joseph Place who had just fired a pistol. In fact, immediately above the part of Lieutenant 227’s evidence to the Widgery Tribunal which Mr. Mansfield put to Soldier F appears the following testimony:
Q. When you heard the pistol shots from the Rossville Flats did you see any counter-action taken? A. Yes, I did.
Q. What was that? A. A soldier kneeling on the corner at Gleifada Park fired two definite shots....
Q. In which direction did he fire? A. Down to my low and right.
Q. Parallel with the coloured block of Rossville Flats? A. Yes.
Q. Did you see what he was firing at? A. No, sir, I did not. 9
It was only a week before Mr. Mansfield asked questions of Soldier F that Lieutenant 227 had said in the witness box that “down to my low right” was a
9 B2195 at EF reference to the area between Block 2 and Joseph Place which was obscured from his view.\\textsuperscript{10}
10D-19 Having begun his cross-examination of Soldier F by overstating the strength of the military evidence against him, Mr. Mansfield pursued a line of questioning which had no discernible forensic value. He “switched to the civilian evidence” apparently so as to suggest that their evidence would also corroborate that of Lieutenant 227:
\\begin{quote} I am not for the moment going to trouble you with other soldiers who saw a very similar scene, I want to switch, if I may, to the civilians, for this purpose a series of photographs, please.\\textsuperscript{11} \\end{quote}
10D-20 Mr. Mansfield did not, however, show Soldier F any civilian evidence that linked him to the shooting of Bernard McGuigan. Instead, he took Soldier F to the evidence of a single civilian witness, Geraldine McBride, née Richmond.
10D-21 He asked Soldier F to read quietly to himself the following paragraph from the her BSI statement:\\textsuperscript{12}
\\begin{quote} I remember hearing two distinct shots. After the first one Mr. McGuigan turned back towards us and, although I cannot be certain, I think he turned his whole body and not just his face. I did not see the bullet hit anything, I just heard it. The second shot hit him and blew his head up like a tomato exploding. I saw his eye come out. I did not see the back of his head.\\textsuperscript{13} \\end{quote}
10D-22 However, he did not show Soldier F the passage two paragraphs further on, which would have revealed that Mrs. McBride was aware that shots had been fired “... from the south east towards Rossville Street....”, evidence that is consistent with Soldier F’s own account that pistol shots were fired from that direction.\\textsuperscript{14}
\\textsuperscript{10} Day 371/174/15 – 371/175/15; marked up image appears at B2204.036 \\textsuperscript{11} Day 376/127/22 \\textsuperscript{12} Day 376/130/24 \\textsuperscript{13} AM45.18 paragraph 26 \\textsuperscript{14} AM45.19 paragraph 28 Mr. Mansfield’s choice of Mrs. McBride’s account as the only example of civilian corroboration of Lieutenant 227’s evidence is surprising as Mrs. McBride did not actually see who it was who shot Bernard McGuigan. Yet Soldier F had earlier been told that both civilians and soldiers saw him shoot Bernard McGuigan:
And he [Lieutenant 227] is not alone. This is not just civilians, but other soldiers who saw the kneeling paratrooper fire in this way. So bear that in mind.
When, however, Soldier F had finished reading the passage that was shown to him, Mr. Mansfield asked only one question, the purpose of which plainly had more to do with its intended effect on the witness than with assisting the Tribunal:
Q. You will accept, I think, that the injury suffered by this man who had no more than a handkerchief in his hand, was truly horrific; was it not?
A. Yes.
Mr. Mansfield’s next showed Soldier F a photograph of Bernard McGuigan’s horrific injuries, after which he put his allegation in the following way:
Q. ... I am going to ask you because, as you fully recognise and have been informed many times, it is virtually the last occasion this family can expect from you, at least a recognition of what you have done; are you prepared to make that recognition?
A. As I have said in my previous statements, the person I shot from that corner had a pistol in his hand; that was it.
Q. If you have noticed, I have not relied on a memory that does not exist; you do not have a memory, do you; do you?
A. If you say so.
Q. No, you have said so.
A. At that particular time I have no recollection of it, that is correct. Q. If you have no recollection, there is no way that you can stand here today and suggest you did not shoot this man, Mr McGuigan, is there?
A. No.
Q. Would you, for the benefit of his wife, who is here, and his six children, finally accept and recognise — we will come to whether you meant to do it in a moment, but that is what you did; are you happy to or are you prepared to at least accept that?
A. Yes. 17
10D-26 Soldier F accepted that, without any recollection of the events of the day, he was not in a position to deny that he fired the shot that killed Mr. McGuigan. Soldier F’s answer to the subsequent question was predicated on that basis and is therefore of limited, if any, probative value.
10D-27 Soldier F continued to assert that he had only targeted a man with a pistol:
Q. I say on behalf of the family they are grateful that you have done that, but you do recognise that if you shoot an unarmed man in the back, that is murder; is it not?
A. As far as I was concerned, as I say in my statement, the man had a pistol.
Q. But not this man, you see, no-one suggested this man had a pistol. If you shoot a man who is unarmed only with a handkerchief in the back of the head, it is murder; is it not?
A. I said I fired on a person who had a pistol. 18
10D-28 Soldier F repeated this assertion when the allegation was put him again by counsel to the Tribunal:
Q. Secondly, you have accepted, in answering questions from Mr Manfield behind me, that you shot Barry McGuigan [sic], whose photograph, in a pool of blood, you have seen; do you remember that?
17 Day 376/131/17 18 Day 376/141/06 A. Yes.
... Q. What is alleged in relation to each of those four people is that you shot them without justification, that is to say, that you murdered them; do you follow?
A. I follow, it is not correct, but I follow, yes.
Q. And you say that it is not correct, because?
A. Because, as I refer to my statements, the people I shot were either petrol bombers or a person who had a weapon.¹⁹
10D-29 Soldier F has not averred that Bernard McGuigan was armed with a pistol; he has merely averred that the man he targeted was armed with a pistol.
10D-30 His contemporaneous accounts suggest that the man he targeted was near the bottom of the Fahan Street steps.
THE FORENSIC EVIDENCE
10D-31 There is no forensic evidence which supports the assertion that it was Soldier F who shot Bernard McGuigan. The forensic evidence in relation to the bullet wound does no more than establish that Bernard McGuigan could not have been facing the rifle that fired the shot at the moment he was hit. The entry wound was on the left side of the head 8 cm behind the ear. The exit was in the right lower eyelid.²⁰
10D-32 Dr. Shepherd and Mr. O’Callaghan gave the Tribunal their opinion about the appropriate inferences that could be drawn from the track of the bullet:
Assuming the Normal Anatomical Position the track is from behind and forward. However, the greater mobility of the head means that these angles must be treated with greater care than normal as this mobility means that the head may not have been facing the same direction as the other parts of the body when he was shot. However,
¹⁹ Day 376/175/17 ²⁰ E2.0046 paragraph 7.9.1 it is clear that Bernard McGuigan could not have been facing the rifle that fired the shot. 21
10D-33 In view of the conflicting eyewitness testimony about the direction Bernard McGuigan was facing at the moment he was shot, the fact that he could not have been facing the rifle that fired the shot is of limited value in determining who shot him.
THE EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
10D-34 There were 40 civilian witnesses who either saw or were in a position to see the shooting of Bernard McGuigan. The majority of them were located very near to where Bernard McGuigan was shot at the southern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. Others were in other areas such as in or around Joseph Place or on Rossville Street or in Glenfada Park North.
Witnesses at the southern end of Block 1
10D-35 Counsel to the Inquiry identified the witnesses in the vicinity of the telephone box at the southern end of Block 1 during his opening.22
(1) Canney, Sean AC24 (2) Carlin, Frank AC33 (3) Davies, John AD8 (4) Gallagher, Bernard AG3 (5) Harrigan, Thomas AH39 (6) Kelly, Hugh AK9
21 E2.0048 22 Day 038/074/07 A number of further witnesses have since said they were in the vicinity of the telephone box at the relevant time, making a total of 28:
(1) Barbour, Hugh (2) Harkin, Anthony (3) McCallion, Sean (4) McCusker, Michael Witnesses who observed the shooting of Bernard McGuigan from other locations
10D-37 A further 12 relevant witnesses placed themselves in the vicinity of the Threepenny Bits, Joseph Place or Glenfada Park:
(1) Bradley, Eugene AB113 (2) Brown, Kathleen AB94 (3) Cooper, Ivan KC12 (4) Deane, Gerard AD17 (5) Doherty, Joseph AD76 (6) Doherty, Susan AD105 (7) Duddy, Malachy AD151 (8) Duffy, John AD160 (9) Flood, James AF23 (10) Hutton, John AH105 (11) McDaid, Thomas AM176 (12) McGlinchey, Patrick AM247
10D-38 The evidence of all 40 witnesses falls into one of six categories: (1) Witnesses who believe or had the impression that Bernard McGuigan was shot by a soldier situated in Glenfada Park North.
(2) Witnesses who believe or had the impression that Bernard McGuigan was shot by a soldier situated on the City Walls.
(3) Witnesses who believe or had the impression that Bernard McGuigan was shot by a soldier situated further north up Rossville Street.
(4) Witnesses who believe or had the impression that Bernard McGuigan was shot through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2.
(5) Witnesses whose evidence is not clear or is silent on the issue of the source of the shot that killed Bernard McGuigan.
(6) Witnesses who give other evidence.
10D-39 The evidence of these witnesses is analysed in turn:
Witnesses who believe or had the impression that Bernard McGuigan was shot by a soldier situated in Glenfada Park North.
10D-40 Sean Canney (also known as John James Canney) had the impression that Bernard McGuigan was hit by a single shot fired from Glenfada Park:
*It seemed to me that the man was hit by a single shot fired from across Rossville Street from the direction of Glenfada Park, although there had been some intermittent shooting, prior to him being shot.*
10D-41 Mr. Canney confirmed, in answer to questions from counsel to the Tribunal, that it was no more than an impression that the shot was fired from Glenfada Park North:
*Q. When you say in relation to the man we know to be Bernard McGuigan that it seems to you that he was shot by a single shot*
______________________________________________________________________
23 AC24.8 paragraph 44 fired from the direction of Glenfada Park, what was it that caused you to think that that was the case?
A. At the time that was my impression, that he had been shot from across the street, um, from no other area.
Q. It was simply an impression, was it?
A. Yeah. 24
In fact, Mr. Canney did not see any soldiers in Glenfada Park at that stage:
Q. When you stood, as you did, at or near to that telephone box, you were not actually aware of any soldiers?
A. At that point, no.
Q. You could not see any?
A. Correct.
Q. And more particularly you were not aware of and did not see any soldiers across the road from you, that is across Rossville Street, near to the entrance into Glenfada Park?
A. Not at that point.
Q. It was just across the road, was it not?
A. It was.
Q. So although you told us of your impression that Mr McGuigan had been shot from across the road, across Rossville Street, you did not see any soldier there?
A. I did not see, I did not see him, I did not see the soldier shoot him. I could not imagine at that time where else he could have been shot from.
Q. But there was, as far as you were aware, no soldier across there?
A. I did not see any soldiers at that time.
Q. That would have been a few feet away from you, would it not?
24 Day 093/116/12 Later on, after an ambulance had arrived, Mr. Canney saw six or seven soldiers in the area he described as the alleyway between Glenfada Park North and Glenfada Park South. He described these soldiers as "just standing there... really doing nothing else."
Noel Millar was not aware of the source of the shot that killed Bernard McGuigan, but he formed the impression that it came from the direction of Glenfada Park North because he saw Mr. McGuigan's eyelid on the gable end of Block 2:
Most of the people at the phone box were older people. I was the youngest there. I was very scared and I did not know what was going to happen, I could see people in the distance towards Free Derry Corner. They were standing and looking north in amazement. I felt lost. I thought I was going to be mowed down. I saw a man who was in a tizzy. He was going this way and that and then he fell. He fell at about the point marked A on the attached map (grid reference J16). I remember he was wearing a white shirt, black trousers and a black coat and that he had a bald head. Although I did not really see it happen I later found out he was shot in the head. He had been standing more or less with his back to Rossville Street about ten or eleven feet out from the phone box. I formed the opinion later that he must have been shot from Glenfada Park because his eyelid and eye lash became stuck on the gable end wall of Block 2. That would make sense if he was shot from Glenfada Park. I was sure that the army was in Glenfada Park because I could hear shots coming from there. From where I was taking cover I could also see soldiers running across the gap between Glenfada Park North and Glenfada Park South and taking cover at the points I have marked B and C on the attached map (grid reference J15). Others were just standing in the gap. There were about 10 soldiers all together and they were facing towards me. Some were moving, running and shouting and they had rifles in their arms at chest level. I did not see any of them shooting. They wore uniforms and helmets. I could also see civilians in the area. marked D on the attached map. I realised later that people were shot there as well.
10D-45 The relevant part of Mr. Millar's map is produced below: 28
![Map Diagram]
10D-46 Joseph Moore believed he saw Bernard McGuigan as he was shot:
As we were all huddling against the wall, one man ran out towards Joseph Place. I later discovered this man was Barney McGuigan. He was standing very close to me and he moved from behind or beside me. I think he was to my left hand side. I felt the movement as he ran out from the wall towards Joseph Place. I called out to him something to the effect of "where do you think you're going?" He was running out and was probably about eight feet away from me when he was hit. He was facing towards Joseph Place and I could see the side of his face come off although I cannot remember which side. Part of his face exploded in a whole mess of blood. He fell down onto his back. He must have died immediately, before he hit the ground. 29
28 AM477.5 29 AM413.4 paragraph 20 Mr. Moore confirmed this account when he gave oral evidence to the Tribunal, but added no more detail.
He said in his statement to the Tribunal that he had the impression that Mr. McGuigan had been shot from Glenfada Park:
*I do not know where he was shot from but at the time I got the impression that he was shot from the Glenfada Park area because he had been hit in the back of his head. I do not recall hearing one particular shot before he was hit and fell to the ground.*
Mr. Moore confirmed during his oral evidence that he could not tell which particular shot hit Mr. McGuigan:
*Q. But you do not recall a particular shot before he was hit?*
*A. No, there was quite a lot of shooting at that time, you know.*
According to Mr. Moore, he could hear the sound of shots coming from further north up Rossville Street and in Glenfada Park:
*Q. Can you help us, you said there was quite a lot of shooting at this time. When you were standing at the end of block 1 and when Bernard McGuigan was there, you could hear shooting at that stage, could you?*
*A. Yes.*
*Q. Where did it seem to be coming from?*
*A. I would say somewhere behind me or at the side of me. It would be hard to say, you know, there was quite a lot of shooting, just after I got through into -- when I got through the entrance between the two flats, you know.* Gerard Deane was standing in Rossville Street at point C when he observed Bernard McGuigan being shot while at point G:
Mr. Deane's BSI statement shows that he plainly believed that Mr. McGuigan was shot in a location where he was exposed to soldiers whom Mr. Deane could see at Kells Walk:
I do not know where he came from but, while everyone else was lying down taking cover, he was walking towards the Rubble Barricade (in a northerly direction). He walked slowly with his head down and his right arm in the air, waving a white handkerchief at the soldiers that were still visible at the south gable end of Kells Walk. Suddenly I heard a single crack of gunfire. I saw the man's head jerk (I think from left to right) and something appeared to hit the south gable end wall of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He had been shot. I had quite a clear view of this since I was only 10 feet or so away.
However, Mr. Deane said in the next paragraph of his statement that he believed that Mr. McGuigan had been shot from "the Glenfada Park area":
______________________________________________________________________
34 AD17.2 paragraph 10 35 AD17.3 paragraph 16; the map appears at AD17.8 36 AD17.3 paragraph 17 The man fell to the ground, landing partly on his side and partly on his back but ending up lying on his back. He appeared to have been shot in the head but I did not see the wound from where I was lying. I believe that he was shot from the Glenfada Park area. 37
10D-54 The person who took his BSI statement does not appear to have asked Mr. Deane why he believed that Mr. McGuigan was shot from the area of Glenfada Park. Moreover, his statement doesn't state clearly whether he saw any soldiers in Glenfada Park. The fact that the statement is silent on this point would suggest that Mr. Deane did not. Bearing in mind his location, it would be surprising if Mr. Deane remained unaware of an SLR being fired so near to him. Mr. Deane was not, however, called to give oral evidence.
10D-55 John Hutton believed he saw Hugh Gilmore and Bernard McGuigan shot by the same soldier situated in Glenfada Park North. Mr. Hutton was in a house in the northern block of Joseph Place, although it is unclear whether it was the most northerly house or the third or fourth one down. 38 His evidence to the Tribunal was that he was with his friend, Samuel Kelly, throughout the events of Bloody Sunday. 39
10D-56 On the face of it, Mr. Hutton is an important witness because he claims to have seen the soldier who shot Bernard McGuigan. However, a closer scrutiny of his various accounts shows that he is not a wholly reliable witness.
10D-57 Mr. Hutton gave a statement to John Doherty, a solicitor acting for the families of the dead before the Widgery Tribunal, on 25th February 1972. The impression given by the statement is that Mr. Hutton was trying to piece together an account from different sources. It may be that during the three and half weeks before he gave the statement his memory became contaminated; he describes seeing some things that plainly did not happen:
37 AD17.3 paragraph 18 38 Day 185/028/4-13 39 Day 185/033/5-9
PS 7.2274
X 88 The shooting stopped a few seconds later and I went to the window of the living room and looked out. I noticed about thirty people huddling against the gable wall at the entrance to the car park at Glenfada Park. Then three soldiers came round the corner of the gable wall from the direction of the car park. They motioned to the crowd of people to put their hands on their heads and it appeared as if they were placing them under arrest. As the crowd was being marched down Rossville Street two soldiers came and took up position at the car park end of the gable wall. I then noticed a young man with fair hair and wearing blue denim jeans and jacket put his hands in the air. He had handkerchief [sic] in his right hand and was waving it. He walked out from near the telephone kiosk at the gable wall of the western block of flats and went towards Glenfada Park. He had only walked about four or five paces when I noticed one of the two soldiers I have mentioned get down on one knee, bring the rifle to the aiming position at his shoulder and fire towards the young man. The young man turned and fell on his back with his head facing down Rossville Street towards William Street. I then noticed a middle aged man, whom I recognised as Bernard McGuigan, come out from behind the telephone kiosk. He was wearing a blue anorak. He was in a crouched position with his hands waving in the air. There appeared to be a handkerchief or rag in his right hand and he was waving this. He started walking towards the body of the young man who had been shot. He was about five or six yards from the body when the soldier I had seen shoot earlier at the young man fired again and McGuigan twisted and fell with his head facing up towards Free Derry Corner. The two soldiers stayed in their positions at Glenfada Park for about five minutes.
10D-58 Hugh Gilmore was wearing blue denim jeans. Mr. Hutton is likely to have seen his body dressed in that way when he made his way over to the vicinity of the telephone box when the shooting had stopped. Other than that, it is unclear how Mr. Hutton pieced together in his mind an artificial account of seeing a young man in denim shot by a soldier situated in Glenfada Park North.
10D-59 Mr. Hutton's account of the shooting of Bernard McGuigan is that he was shot by the same soldier who had moments before shot the young man in denim. In his 1972 statement, Mr. Hutton said there were two soldiers, one of whom fired both shots:
As the crowd was being marched down Rossville Street two soldiers came and took up position at the car park end of the gable wall....
...when the soldier I had seen shoot earlier at the young man fired again and McGuigan twisted and fell with his head facing up towards Free Derry Corner. 43
However, when Mr. Hutton gave his BSI statement on 12th February 2000, he made no mention of the young man in denim. Nor did he mention the second soldier:
08. My attention was then caught by a wee soldier sticking his head out around the corner at the south western corner of the east block of Glerfada Park North, marked point J (grid reference J11). He peeped his head around the corner, then withdrew.
09. Suddenly this small soldier moved out from the corner, about three feet, got down onto his right knee, raised his rifle and fired a shot towards the gap between Block 2 of the Rossville Flats and the northern end of Joseph Place. He then withdrew. I remember crying out to the people in the living room that he was shooting.
10. I continued looking through the window. A minute or two later I saw Barney McGuigan move out from cover by the telephone box at the southern gable end of Block 1. He was hunching over, keeping his head down, and waving a white hankie with his right hand. He stepped out in a south west direction towards point K on the attached map (grid reference J16/17). He only took two or three steps and I saw the same wee soldier look out again, step out about three feet from the corner of the eastern block of Glerfada Park North, go down on his right knee and shoot his rifle. Barney McGuigan seemed to be hit in the right side of the head and the force of the bullet spun him so that he was facing towards me (south east) and he then fell down onto his back. He span anti-clockwise through about 90 degrees and fell with his head pointing towards where I was.
11. I don't know where Barney McGuigan was going or what he intended to do. He was just showing himself and gesturing with a white hankie. The soldier then disappeared and I did not see him again. He was only about 50 or 60 yards away from me, but I could not say from that distance what he looked like, only that he was very small. I think he was wearing a tin helmet. 44
10D-61 Such description as he was able to provide of the soldier will not assist the Tribunal in identifying which soldier fired.
10D-62 Mr. Hutton's account about the number of soldiers present when a shot was fired changed several times when he gave evidence on 29th January 2002. First, he told the Tribunal in answer to questions from Mr. Roxburgh that there was only ever one soldier:
Q. When he looked out that first time when you first saw him, do you remember whether there were any civilians in the area of the gable end where the soldier was?
A. There were civilians before he, before he was — before he put his head round, there was civilians arrested on that gable end.
Q. Were the civilians who had been arrested still there when he looked round the corner or had they been taken away?
A. Taken away.
Q. When you looked out round that corner for the first time, do you remember whether there were any other soldiers anywhere near him?
A. No.
Q. Do you mean no, you do not remember or no, there were not any other soldiers?
A. No, when he went out to shoot he was on his own.
Q. Completely on his own, was he?
A. Yes. 45
44 AH105.2-3 45 Day 185/035/25 When Mr. Roxburgh returned to the question, Mr. Hutton said that there were in fact two soldiers, and that they both disappeared before only one reappeared. Mr. Hutton said he never saw the second one again:
Q. Let us get this straight. First of all you see two soldiers? A. Yeah.
Q. Do both of them come out from behind the wall? A. Yeah, and go back in again.
Q. Both go back behind the wall? A. Yes.
Q. And then one of them comes out? A. Yes.
Q. And the one who comes out is the small soldier? A. Yes, yes.
Q. And he fires a shot? A. Yes.
Q. When he comes out to fire the shot, did you see the other soldier at all? A. No.
Q. Or was he out of your view? A. I never seen him again.
Mr. Roxburgh asked a third time and Mr. Hutton's account changed again:
Q. On this account it would appear that the soldier who shot Mr McGuigan was with another soldier because you say at the end of the passage I have just read out: "The two soldiers stayed in their positions at Glenfada Park for about five minutes. Do you think that may be the position, that there were in fact two soldiers at or near the gable end of Gleifada Park at the time when Mr McGuigan was shot?
A. No, the second soldier came out after Mr McGuigan was shot, came out and the two of them stood there.
Q. What did he do when he came out?
A. They just stood and looked over just, the two of them. 47
When Mr. Hutton was asked questions by Mr. Mansfield, the veracity of his evidence was further undermined by the fact that he maintained that Bernard McGuigan had looked directly at the soldier who shot him:
Q. But exactly which way he was looking at the point at which he was shot?
A. At the soldier.
Q. I just –
A. At Gleifada.
Q. What I want to ask you is whether in fact you may be mistaken, that he was actually looking at the soldier as opposed to looking back to where he had come, do you follow?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you think you may be mistaken about that and that is why you thought he was shot on the right instead of the left?
A. It could be, but I am not quite sure, but I know he stood and looked at the soldier, you know. 48
Although the Inquiry attempted to trace Samuel Kelly - Mr. Hutton’s friend who remained with him throughout - it appears to have failed as no statement from Mr. Kelly has been forthcoming.
47 Day 185/052/21 48 Day 185/056/01 Interestingly, Kathleen Brown also believed that she witnessed a soldier in Glenfada Park North shoot both Hugh Gilmore and Bernard McGuigan. It is useful, while reading her evidence, to look at the map she marked up:
Mrs. Brown observed events from her house at [location] which appears at [location]. This is the account she gave in her BSI statement:
11. I then saw a soldier positioned by the south gable end wall of Glenfada Park North at point 4 on the map (grid reference J15) shoot Hugh Gilmore. I remember seeing smoke come from the gun. The soldier was standing positioned half behind the gable wall and half outside from it. His position is marked by 'X' on photograph D attached to this statement. He lifted his gun with one arm and fired it from his waist. He never took aim, simply stepped out from behind the wall, lifted the gun and fired, shooting Hugh Gilmore. Hugh was not facing the soldier when he was shot. I don't even
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49 AB94.16 50 AB94.6 paragraphs 1 and 3 think he saw the soldier. I put my hands up to my face and cried "Jesus, he's dead!" I remember the soldier was quite small and had a beret on his head, I cannot recall the colour.
12. Hugh Gilmore fell at the gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He went down on to his front between points 2 and 3 on the map with his head facing northwards towards Rossville Street at an angle, and his feet were facing towards Joseph Place. After Hugh Gilmore was shot, I heard more firing.
13. Within a matter of seconds I saw another man at point 5 marked on the map (grid reference J18) come out from behind one of the Threepenny Bits and walk towards where Hugh Gilmore lay. The man was wearing a raincoat, in a fawn colour, which was open. I don't remember him having anything on his neck. I would say he was in his thirties. He had hair, but not a lot at the front. He got up and held a white hankie up in the air, waving it, looking across at the soldier at point 4 at Glevifada Park, as if to say "hold your fire!" He walked towards the gable end of Block 1 of the flats.
14. I saw the same soldier who had shot Hugh Gilmore shoot this man. Again, the soldier came out from behind the south gable end wall of Glevifada Park North, raised his rifle with a single arm and shot the man. It was a single shot. I saw smoke come from the gun. I saw the man fall front ways. The place I saw him fall is marked at point 6 on the map (grid reference J17). I did not know who the man was at the time but have learned since Bloody Sunday that it was Barney McGuigan. 51
Mrs. Brown did not remember giving the contemporary statement that had her name and address on it. However, she accepted that her signature appeared on the hand-written version of the statement:
Q. Could we go back to the statement that you appear to have made in 1972 and could we have AB94.10 on the screen, please? I think it is right, is it not, Mrs Brown, you do not recall making this statement?
A. I do not recall making this statement at all.
Q. I know you have been shown a handwritten version of the statement?
A. That is right.
51 AB94.7-8: the photograph Mrs. Brown marked with an 'X' went missing: Day 144/098/9-17 Q. And it appears to have been signed by you; is that right?
A. Well, it looks like my signature, but I do not remember ever signing that. 52
10D-70 The relevant part the contemporary statement reads as follows:
Looking out of the window I saw a man coming out from the alley between the flats towards the market. He staggered and fell. He rolled over twice. A man ran towards the fallen man to help him. I didn't know what direction he came from. A soldier took aim from Glenfada Park and fired two shots at the man running. He then fired another shot at the man on the ground to finish him. 20-30 people were in Glenfada taking shelter from bullets and the soldiers came to arrest them. 53
10D-71 It is not difficult to conceive of the processes by which Mrs. Brown's recollection has changed and developed over the years. However, it is impossible to conceive of how, without any contamination, her recollection could have actually improved over nearly three decades. It is obvious that Mrs. Brown, like Mr. Hutton, has reported to the Tribunal her own ex post facto analysis of what she thinks happened.
10D-72 It is always possible that she did see a soldier fire from Glenfada Park North, and that she has been unable to stop herself putting her own gloss on what she suspects that soldier did. However, her evidence that the soldier in Glenfada Park fired from the hip while standing erect suggests either that she did not actually witness the event of Soldier F firing or she witnessed another soldier firing into shots into Sector 5.
52 Day 144/111/10 53 AB94.15 Witnesses who believe or had the impression that Bernard McGuigan was shot by a soldier situated on the City Walls.
10D-73 Barney McFadden was amongst the group by the telephone box when Bernard McGuigan was shot. He was, however, not looking at Mr. McGuigan when he was shot. His ex post facto analysis was that Bernard McGuigan had been shot from the City Walls:
Although I did not know it at the time, I later discovered that the Army had been positioned further North in Rossville Street. I do not believe that the soldiers in Rossville Street could have seen him to shoot him from where he was standing. I believe therefore that he was shot from the City Walls.
10D-74 Mr. McFadden was not called to give evidence to this Tribunal.
10D-75 Sean McGee was not called to give evidence. Nor, for some reason, did he sign his BSI statement. In any event, it is clear from his statement that his impression was that Bernard McGuigan was shot from the City Walls:
I can visualise him leaving the area where I was though I cannot remember whether he was walking slowly or moving more quickly. I cannot remember whether he had his hands up or indeed whether he was holding a hanky. He did not make it more than three steps however. He was looking in the direction of the two men and I was looking at him ahead of me, but a little to my left. I saw him shot. I saw part of his head leaving his skull and he fell where he was hit. He fell in the direction away from where I was sitting and I could see the right side of his head had been blown away. I now know this was Barney McGuigan.
My instant impression was that he had been shot from the City Walls. I think I got that impression because everybody looked up there but I did not see anything specific. I did not hear the specific shot that killed Barney.
54 AM210.2 paragraph 11 55 AM210.3 paragraph 14 56 AM210.3 paragraph 16 57 AM226.4 58 AM226.6 paragraphs 16-17 Some witnesses who believed at the time that Bernard McGuigan was shot from the City Walls ended up changing their minds before they gave evidence to this Tribunal. Geraldine McBride, née Richmond, said this about the source of the shots in her BSI statement:
At the time I thought Mr McGuigan had been shot from the direction of the City Walls towards Rossville Street. I knew there was shooting from the right, from the Glerfada Park area across Rossville Street, because I heard and saw the bullets. However, the bullets were bouncing and ricocheting all over and some were coming from the opposite direction, i.e. from the south east towards Rossville Street. I thought he had been shot from the direction of the walls because of the direction his head was facing when he was shot. However, I now think he was shot from the direction of the Saracen parked on Rossville Street shown on the photograph at attachment 4. 59
Mrs. McBride confirmed to the Tribunal that she never actually saw a soldier or a vehicle on Rossville Street:
Q. The only question I have to ask you is: you heard vehicles, did you ever see a vehicle yourself in that position? A. No.
Q. Or a soldier in that position? A. No.
Q. This photograph, the bottom half of it obviously shows Barney McGuigan after he has been shot, and you have already described how that occurred. Plainly from what you are saying, would this be fair, he could have been shot by a soldier in the position of the photograph, but you cannot be sure; is that right? A. Yes. 60
Counsel to the Tribunal asked Mrs. McBride why she had changed her mind about the source of the shot that killed Bernard McGuigan:
59 AM45.19 paragraph 28 60 Day 146/039/15 MR CLARKE: Could we have back on the screen P814 photograph number. You told us you thought at the time Mr McGuigan had been shot from the direction of walls, but you now think he was shot from the direction of the Saracen that we can see in this photograph. My question to you is: is there anything in particular that has caused you to change your mind?
A. I thought he had been shot from the walls because of the directions of the bullets, you know. But when he, when he fell, you know, when the bullet hit him, you know, his whole body moved round, you know, so now that I am older I think that he was shot from there, but I cannot be certain either. 61
10D-79 Her evidence is unlikely to assist the Tribunal in determining the source of the gunshot that killed Bernard McGuigan.
10D-80 Paul McLaughlin is the man who appears in many of the photographs of the group by the telephone box wearing a Knight of Malta cap. 62 He seems to have acquired an inaccurate recollection of seeing Mr. McGuigan falling to the ground:
I did not actually see him shot. I just remember seeing him fall. My memory is of him falling flat on his face, although I have seen photos of him lying on his back. I do not know whether this was because he was turned over or whether he rolled as he fell. 63
10D-81 Unlike other witnesses, 64 Mr. McLaughlin did not see Bernard McGuigan turn around to look at the group by the telephone box moments before he was shot:
I definitely did not see him turn round and am sure that when he was shot and fell, he was facing south east towards the injured man lying by Joseph Place. 65
10D-82 On the basis that he believed Bernard McGuigan was facing south east when he was shot, Mr. McLaughlin changed his original opinion that Mr. McGuigan had
61 Day 146/027/03 62 Day 176/015/11; see for example the photographs at P815 – P820 63 AM350.16 paragraph 34 64 For example, Geraldine McBride 65 AM350.16 paragraph 34 been shot from the City Walls when he discovered that the bullet had entered the back of the head:
I had always assumed that Bernard McGuigan was shot in the front of the head. Because of the direction in which he was facing and walking, I had calculated that he must have been shot from the area of the City Walls, above the steps which lead onto the different levels at the back of Joseph Place. I have now been informed that he was shot in the back of the head and that the bullet exited through his eye. If this is the case, then I would guess that Bernard McGuigan was shot from the west side of Rossville Street, although it would be impossible to say exactly where from. 66
10D-83 Mr. McLaughlin told the Tribunal that his impression was that the shooting came from all directions. 67 He was fair in his view of the inability of any lay person to discern the precise source of the gunfire:
In my view, it would have been impossible for any lay person to indicate which way the shots were being fired, unless they had specifically seen the soldiers who fired them. 68
10D-84 Mr. McLaughlin in any event ventured the opinion that the shooting came from one of three possible directions: Glenfada Park, Rossville Street, or the City Walls. 69
10D-85 Malachy Duddy observed Bernard McGuigan from a garden in front of the most northerly house in Joseph Place. 70 He saw Mr. McGuigan heading out towards an injured person who was lying near a junction box a few yards southwest of Mr. McGuigan’s location. Mr. Duddy also saw Bernard McGuigan’s body after he had been shot, but he did not witness the actual shooting:
I then looked back towards the direction from which I had just come and I saw a man walking out from the gable end of Block 1. This man was carrying a handkerchief and he seemed to be making
66 AM350.16 paragraph 38 67 Day 176/012/19 68 AM350.14 paragraph 21 69 Day 176/022/13 – 176/023/08 70 AD151.3 paragraph 12 his way towards another man who was lying on the ground on tcp of something which looked to me like a junction box. The man who was lying on the ground was not dead because he was moving. I thought that the man with the handkerchief must be going to give assistance to the man who was lying on the ground. I saw the man with the handkerchief walk about five or six metres from the gable end of Block 1. Then I must have looked away and when I looked back I saw the man with the handkerchief lying on the ground. I did not actually see the man with the handkerchief shot nor did I see him fall because I was keeping my head down. I just remember that one minute I saw him walking and then when I looked again I saw him on the ground. The man with the handkerchief was about 40 to 50 years of age and was wearing a raincoat or long coat of some sort. I believe around four or five shots were fired at the time the man fell. I did not try to go over to him and I did not see his injuries. I later found out that this man was Barney McGuigan. 71
10D-86 He wasn’t really able to assist the Tribunal in determining the source of the shot that hit Mr. McGuigan. He was asked these question by Christopher Clarke QC:
Q. ... Were you able to tell where those shots appeared to have come from?
A. I believe myself they came from the Derry Walls. They could have come from elsewhere.
Q. Is there any particular reason why you believe that?
A. Well, from the position he was shot it either came from the Derry Walls or across Rossville Street. 72
10D-87 John Coyle, who appeared on behalf of the McGuigan family, asked Mr. Duddy if he saw any soldiers in Glenfada Park North at the time Mr. McGuigan was shot, he did not:
Q. Did you notice anything in Glenfada Park North?
A. No.
Q. Did you see any military present there at that time?
71 AD151.3 paragraph 13 72 Day 081/137/16 A. No, I was just concerned with the immediate area there where I was at Joseph Place and the gable of the flats, you know. 73
Witnesses who believe or had the impression that Bernard McGuigan was shot by a soldier situated further north up Rossville Street.
Eugene Bradley was arrested at the southern end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North. His account is important because he believes he was standing in that location when Bernard McGuigan was shot:
17. The next thing I recall was the paras appearing behind me at point F as I looked out towards Rossville Street and the Rubble Barricade. I was grabbed by the scruff of the neck by a short and stocky para and told to put my hands on top of my head. The soldier had a Scottish accent. He was carrying a baton. He did not have a rifle. I think there were two or three paras who collected the seven or eight men sheltering at point F. They turned us round and began to march us north through the car park of Glenfada Park North back towards the north east entrance....
18. Just as I was being arrested, I noticed Barney McGuigan walking out from the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. He was waving a hanky in his hand.
19. I was turned round by the Scottish para and told not to look round again but to walk north along Glenfada Park North to the north east entrance. However, I heard another shot and turned round to where Barney McGuigan had been standing to see him lying on the ground, clearly having been killed. It was my impression that the shot had come from the area of Kells Walk further north along Rossville Street. 74
Counsel to the Inquiry asked him why he had that impression:
Q. Your impression was that the shot had come from Kells Walk; why was that?
A. The sound of the bullet or whatever -- the rifle or whatever, it just sounded from that direction.
Q. The sound [came] from that direction?
73 Day 081/149/06 74 AB113.3 paragraphs 17-19 Mr. Bradley confirmed that he did not hear any shots fired from very close to him:
Q. While you were in that area did you hear any shots being fired closer to you than that?
A. Yes, shortly before we went down towards the, what-do-you-call-it, the pram ramp again, there is a few Paras came up past us and shortly after that, there was two or three shots fired after that.
Q. Before this happened, just as you were being arrested and you saw Mr. McGuigan shot, did you hear any shots, at that stage, being fired close to you?
A. Just the one or two, and that was it until we got round that corner.
Q. Where did the one or two come from?
A. That I am not sure. I assume it was the direction at the start of where we went up in the back of Kells Walk, in the general direction of William Street.
If an SLR rifle was fired a few feet away from Mr. Bradley, he would have been aware of it.
Frank Carlin also believed that Mr. McGuigan was shot from the northern end of Rossville Street:
Although I do not know where the shot came from, it seemed to me it was obvious that it came from Rossville Street. This is because Barney McGuigan was facing in that direction when he was shot.
He suggested in a tape recorded account he gave to Kathleen Keville on the evening of Bloody Sunday that Mr. McGuigan was thrown back about four feet by the force of the shot:
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75 Day 169/176/02 76 Day 169/176/08 77 AC33.3 paragraph 13 The next thing I seen was - shot - shots rang out the next thing - head was practically blew c.jf and he was knocked about four feet back, dead as a door. That's what I seen. The shots definitely came from the corner at William Street end because he was facing that when it happened. 78
10D-94 This witness was not called to give oral evidence to the Tribunal.
10D-95 James Rowe told the Tribunal that Bernard McGuigan was heading towards the rubble barricade when he was shot:
I saw Barney take two or three steps towards Rossville Street from his position beside the telephone kiosk. As he moved, he held out above his head a white handkerchief which he waved. He turned to face in the direction of the Rubble Barricade and I assumed that he was going out to the bodies which I had heard were lying on it but could not actually see. At that moment I heard the crack of a high velocity shot and saw Barney's head hit by a bullet. He fell onto his back with his head facing Free Derry Corner, and his feet facing William Street. I did not see who fired the shot but I formed the impression, from the sound of the shot, that it was fired along Rossville Street by one of the soldiers who I assumed were positioned on Rossville Street to the north of the Rubble Barricade. 79
10D-96 He remained firm in his recollection that Bernard McGuigan was heading towards the rubble barricade when he was shot:
Q. You describe him then as turning to face in the direction of the rubble barricade at which moment you heard the crack of a high velocity shot and saw his head hit by a bullet?
A. That is true.
Q. We have had some evidence from a number of people whose recollection is that Barney McGuigan moved out from this position, but instead of turning to face in the direction of the barricade, he was either facing towards Joseph Place or, according to one witness, facing back in to the car park of the Rossville Flats. How clear a memory do you have of his turning to face in the direction of the rubble barricade?
78 AC33.8 79 AR29.3 paragraph 10 A. Well, to my recollection, that is the way I remember it, you know.
Q. You describe him as turning to face in that direction; when he moved out, in which direction do you recall him to have been walking?
A. I think he was walking out towards the barricade.
Q. You say that you saw his head hit by a bullet and he fell on his back with his head facing towards Free Derry Corner and his feet facing William Street. You say that you formed the impression that it was fired along Rossville Street by one of the soldiers. Are you aware where the entry wound was to Barry McGuigan?
A. No, I could not say for definite.
Q. We know now from the medical evidence that he was struck by a bullet that entered the left side of his head and exited through his right eye, in which case at the moment that he was shot his back must have been, or the back of his head must have been towards the bullet. If we look at your map at AR29.5, your recollection as I understand it is that he was going in the direction of and facing towards the rubble barricade; is that right?
A. That is right, yes.
Q. If he was going in that direction, and was shot in the back of the head, I think it would follow that if he was shot from soldiers in Rossville Street, he would have to have turned at some stage, would he not?
A. Well, if you say he was hit in the back of the head, he would have had to turn. 80
Mr. Rowe never in fact saw any soldiers while he was in the vicinity of the telephone box. 81 He agreed with Mr. Mansfield's summary of his evidence:
Q. My final question is: really all you can say about the shot that killed him was that your impression was that it had come from Rossville Road?
A. From Rossville Street, yes.
80 Day 091/153/08 81 Day 091/155/19 Q. So sorry, Rossville Street? A. Rossville Street.
Q. But you are not able to say whereabouts on the street it came? A. No. 82
Witnesses who believe or had the impression that Bernard McGuigan was shot through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats.
Hugh Barbour said in his BSI statement that he saw Bernard McGuigan being shot. His impression was that he was shot by a soldier in the Rossville Flats car park through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2. His account begins at the point where he decided to leave the area of the telephone box:
There were shops along the south side of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats so I decided to try and hide in one of those. I remember dashing from the gable end of Block 1 across the gap to Block 2 because I was still afraid that I might be shot by a soldier in the Rossville Flats car park. There was a general grocers shop close to the western end of Block 2 called Molly Barrs; it was known locally as Molly McGuire's. I tried the door of this shop but it was locked and I could not get in... I stayed where I was, just under the veranda on the south side of Block 2 at the point marked J... It was then that I saw Barney McGuigan shot. I have a very clear recollection of Mr McGuigan standing in the gap between Block 1 and Block 2, at the point marked K.... He was very animated, standing up waving arms. I think he was holding and waving a white handkerchief but I may have this memory confused with pictures that I have seen of Father Daly doing the same. Mr McGuigan was shouting to somebody through the gap who I couldn't see. He was shouting "Please, please help - don't shoot me". I cannot remember his exact words but I remember the pleading tone in his voice. He was showing himself in clear view and was not trying to hide. He had nothing in his hand except for the handkerchief and was wearing a coat that came just below his waist. I do not remember him wearing a scarf. He was perhaps three yards away from me to the north-west. I have a very animated
82 Day 091/169/16 vision of him standing there. It seemed to me that Mr McGuigan was shot in the face....
Mr. Barbour, when he was asked about it by counsel to the Tribunal, confirmed on oath that he believed Bernard McGuigan was shot as he looked through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2:
Q. You describe having a clear recollection of his standing in the gap between block 1 and block 2, very animated and waving his arms; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And he may have had a white handkerchief and you describe him as shouting to somebody through the gap, "please, please help - don't shoot me". When you say that he was shouting to somebody through the gap, do you mean by that that he appeared to be facing towards somebody who was in the car park?
A. Can you repeat that?
Q. Yes. What you say there is that: "Mr McGuigan was shouting to somebody through the gap who I could not see, shouting 'Please, please help - don't shoot me.'" Which gap is that?
A. The gap between the two blocks of flats at the, the telephone box area.
Q. So there appeared to be somebody the other side of the gap, did there?
A. Well, um, I am only assuming there were soldiers there, but, he appeared to be shouting to someone.
Q. Did you see which way he was facing when he was shouting?
A. He was facing into the car park, into the car park direction.
Patrick McGlinchey observed the shooting of Bernard McGuigan from behind (to the south of) the Threepenny Bits. Although Mr. McGlinchey quite clearly told the Tribunal that he did not see the soldier who shot Bernard McGuigan, the
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83 AB10.4 paragraphs 26-28 84 Day 088/072/14 account he gave in his BSI statement suggests that he was shot by a soldier in the Rossville Flats car park through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2:
My attention then turned to a group of about four or five men who were standing around the gable end wall at the south of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. All of them, except one, who I now know to be Bernard McGuigan, were keeping down. Mr McGuigan was standing up. He had his back to me and seemed to be facing through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. He was waving a white handkerchief, which I think he was holding in his right hand. There is no way this could have been mistaken for a gun or a bomb. I remember the hanky hung straight down because there was no wind at all. I could not see his face. He was wearing a half-length dark coat. I do not remember whether he was wearing a scarf. He said two or three times "Don't Shoot". I could see it very clearly. I heard a bang. Mr McGuigan crumpled and fell sideways. I knew he had been shot. 86
Counsel to the Tribunal asked Mr. McGlinchey some supplementary questions about this aspect of his evidence. Perhaps, strictly speaking, Mr. McGlinchey's evidence should come under the category of witnesses who believed that Bernard McGuigan had been shot from the City Walls because it emerged during his oral evidence that, at the time, he believed Bernard McGuigan could only have been shot from the City Walls:
Q. ... Do you remember seeing Mr McGuigan moving at all in the moments before he was shot or was he standing still?
A. He, he was standing, to me it was that he felt the biggest danger was through the gap, that is the impression I got and that is where he was sort of waving, waving — well, he had his hand out with the handkerchief, but he, he was basically stationary, he just was maybe taking a step or two, to my recollection.
Q. Are you sure that he was facing away from you?
A. Well, he was sideways and his back more or less to me. I was behind him.
85 AM247.7 paragraph 12 86 AM247.7 paragraph 14 Q. Was his back pointing towards you or his side, do you remember?
A. To me what I seen was his side more so, you know what I mean. It is difficult to say if he was not directly, you know, his full back towards me, it was, it was sort of half and half.
Q. Can you remember which side of him it was, his right side or his left side that was turned towards you?
A. His right side.
Q. Did you see who had shot him?
A. No.
Q. Did you see any soldiers in that area?
A. No.
Q. Or on the other side of Rossville Street from where Mr McGuigan fell?
A. No, I was keeping pretty much down, you know what I mean, you were looking over from time to time. I initially believed that the only place he could have been shot from was the Derry Walls. 87
10D-102 It is to be noted that, from his position to the south of the Threepenny Bits, Mr. McGlinchey would have been in a prime position to have seen any soldiers firing shots from the vicinity of the southern gable of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North.
Witnesses whose evidence is not clear or is silent on the issue of the source of the shot that killed Bernard McGuigan.
10D-103 John Davies was not able to identify the source of the shot that killed Bernard McGuigan:
There was shooting going on at this stage but I cannot recall the specific shot that hit him. 88
87 Day 388/080/09 88 AD8.3 paragraph 15 Mr. Davis said that he could not tell where the shooting that he could hear was coming from. Counsel to the Tribunal asked Mr. Davies if he saw any soldiers while he was near the telephone kiosk. Mr. Davies replied that he did not.
Mr. Mansfield raised the possibility that Bernard McGuigan had been shot by a soldier from Mortar Platoon who accompanied the Pig to collect the bodies from the rubble barricade. But Mr. Davies was unable to assist: the soldier would have been out of his view:
Q. Can we go back to P813, please, which you have seen today? P813 is the first of the sequence you have been shown this morning. We know where you are on this photograph, but if you home in on the Pig, which is in the distance on the other side of Rossville Street, if we have that. There is, although it may not be able to discern, there is a soldier there outside the Pig towards the front corner of that Pig. I will just put an arrow to where that is. I certainly do not ask you to speculate, but from where you were crouched down by the telephone kiosk -- and only you can say really -- would you have been able to see somebody on the other side on that corner from where you were on the gable wall?
A. No.
Q. If there were soldiers on that corner, one or more of them who shot the fatal shot, you would not have known that it came from there, would you?
A. No.
Frankie Mellon attended to Hugh Gilmore as he lay dying. He was not aware that Bernard McGuigan had been shot until he saw his body lying on the ground:
Q. ... Do you now remember seeing Mr McGuigan being shot?
A. No, I did not see Mr McGuigan being shot. The only time I knew that he had been shot was when I left the body of Hugh Gilmore
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89 AD8.2 paragraph 12 90 Day 172/027/08 91 Day 172/042/21 92 AM399.11 paragraph 18 and went to beside the phone box and I looked out, that is when I saw he was dead. I did not actually see him being shot. 93
10D-107 He was not able to help the Tribunal as to where the shot had come from:
By the time I got to the telephone box at the south gable end of Block I the shooting had built up to a crescendo and seemed to be coming from all directions. I could not tell from which direction it came because it was echoing around the flats although I remember thinking that it was from Rossville Street towards Free Derry Corner. I think this is because I had seen vehicles and soldiers on Rossville Street. I do not know whether there was any shooting from the City Walls. I could not see the Walls from where I was standing. 94
10D-108 Mr. Mellon’s oral evidence to the Tribunal was consistent with this impression, although he added that it was possible that the sound of shots being fired was also emanating from the Rossville Flats car park:
Q. Can you tell us the direction from which that shooting was coming?
A. I actually felt it was coming from north, towards the rubble barricade. I thought the shooting was coming at us from across somewhere down there; that was my feeling at the time and that, the reason for that was because Barney McGuigan was facing that way as well and he was waving the white hanky at the people on that side, that is why I thought it was coming from there plus it sounded as if it was coming from there as well.
Q. Were you conscious of the sound of any shots that might have come from a different direction?
A. No, I was not, no.
Q. Any possibility of any shots being fired within the Rossville Flats car park on the other side of you?
A. Yeah, that is a possibility because there was a lot of shooting at one point, so it could be coming from anywhere given the fact it could be echoing. I do not know, I was preoccupied at that time. It took me a few minutes or a few seconds or whatever to realise the
93 Day 151/157/18 94 AM399.12 paragraph 24 extent of the shooting because I was a bit occupied with Hugh Gilmore. 95
10D-109 He said that while he was near the telephone box he saw a soldier in Glenfada Park North:
When I had been at the telephone box for only a few minutes, I remember looking to my right towards Glenfada Park. I saw a man running in Glenfada Park North and a soldier down on one knee, screaming at the man to stop. The soldier had his rifle on his shoulder. The man had dirty fair hair and was young, thin and athletic looking. I cannot recall any details of his clothes. I did not see the soldier shoot the man but I saw a shot hit him in the back. He clutched his stomach. A chunk came out of the wall in front of him. I do not know the positions of the soldier or the man because I only saw this out of the corner of my eye. I do, however, know that it was south of the Rubble Barricade and the soldier was aiming somewhere into Glenfada Park North. I have some recollection of seeing an alley way: I think it may have been the south west corner of Glenfada Park North but I cannot be certain. 96
10D-110 However, his recollection was that he saw this soldier after Bernard McGuigan had been shot:
Q. ... First of all, Mr Mellon, do you remember whether that was before or after you saw Mr McGuigan dead?
A. It would have to be in my recollection after Mr McGuigan, I saw that. 97
10D-111 Sean MacDermott helped Hugh Gilmore around the south west corner of Block 1. 98 At some point while he attended to Mr. Gilmore, he noticed Bernard McGuigan in the crowd by the telephone box. 99 Mr. MacDermott was focusing all of his attention on Mr. Gilmore; he was not taking in very much of what people were doing around him. 100 He did not see Mr. McGuigan move out from the
95 Day 151/156/14 96 AM399.12 paragraph 27 97 Day 151/165/13 98 AM4.4 paragraph 19 99 AM4.4 paragraph 21 100 AM4.4 paragraph 21 He only realised Mr. McGuigan had been shot after seeing his dead body.
Until I saw him, I had not been aware that anyone else had been shot. Whilst I had been attending to Hugh Gilmore, I was oblivious to everything else that was happening around me. I had not even heard any gunfire.
Mr. Clarke asked him about this:
Q. Do you have any recollection of where the shots were coming from?
A. No.
Mr. MacDermott’s evidence does not help to resolve the question of who shot Bernard McGuigan.
Bernard Gallagher did not see any soldiers while he crouched down against the wall, although he suggested in his statement to the Tribunal that someone else in the group was aware of soldiers firing shots from Glenfada Park North:
I ran to the middle of the south gable wall where I crouched down against the wall (at point that is marked with an “E” on the attached map at grid reference J16) near the telephone box. I heard someone calling out that the shooting was coming from the direction of Glenfada Park North. However, at no time did I look around the corner of the south gable wall toward Glenfada Park North to see what was happening. A short while later (it could have been seconds or minutes), I remember someone else saying that the army was coming through Glenfada Park North. I remember thinking that if I got in tight with my back against the south gable wall then I would be protected from shooting from that direction. So, that is what I did. Although Mr. Gallagher went on to describe seeing Bernard McGuigan shot, his statement is completely silent on the issue of the location of the individual who shot him.\\textsuperscript{106} He was not called to give oral evidence to the Tribunal.
If someone in the group was aware of soldiers in Glenfada Park at the point when Bernard McGuigan was shot, it is not clear who that was. However, in a contemporary NICRA statement, which Mr. Gallagher accepted he had given,\\textsuperscript{107} he suggested that it was a first aid man who told the group that the Army was approaching:
\\begin{quote} There was about seven of us jammed in that corner. The first aid man told us to get back in tight against the wall because he saw the army coming up the other side of Rossville Street. We were still all jammed in that corner when Barney McGuigan took three or four steps out in front of us and fell. I heard a distinctive single shot and he fell dead.\\textsuperscript{108} \\end{quote}
The statement records that he was told that the Army was coming up the other side of Rossville Street. Mr. Gallagher’s recollection that he was told that the Army was firing shots from Glenfada Park may, therefore, be inaccurate.
The “first aid man” is very probably a reference to the Knight of Malta, Paul McLaughlin.\\textsuperscript{109} His evidence accords with Mr. Gallagher’s contemporary account:
\\begin{quote} I do not recall seeing any soldiers at Glenfada Park North or the Rubble Barricade. I think I was aware that they were at the north end of Rossville Street, but at that point I had not idea how far into the Bogside they had come.\\textsuperscript{110} \\end{quote}
Michael Rooney was 13 years old on Bloody Sunday.\\textsuperscript{111} He says that he and a few others crammed themselves into the gap between the telephone box and a "transformer house" just to the east of the telephone box. He believes that he saw Bernard McGuigan in his vicinity for a few seconds:
Q. Do you remember him being there at the time that they were pointing towards somebody who had been shot?
A. I mind seeing Barney in the vicinity, that was all, for a few seconds, that was all.
Q. Do you remember what he was doing?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember seeing him at the time that people were pointing out a body round the corner of the flats?
A. He was there, that is all I know. He was in the vicinity. I would not ... it is a very small area, you know.
Q. Was he there when you first arrived at the telephone box to take cover?
A. No, I did not see him then....
Q. Was he standing still or was he moving when you saw him?
A. All I mind, I seen his face, that is all. 113
10D-120 Mr. Rooney did not see Mr. McGuigan shot:
The next thing I remember is hearing another series of shots ring out. I covered instinctively. I looked up when the shooting was over. Bernard McGuigan was lying where he had stood at point N. He had been shot in the head. There was a pool of blood already forming around his head. 114
10D-121 He only discovered it was Mr. McGuigan some hours later:
Q. Then you saw him lying on the ground?
A. I seen a body lying on the ground; I did not know it was Barney then.
112 AR28.4 paragraph 13 113 Day 174/107/15 114 AR28.4 paragraph 16 Q. When did you know that it was?
A. That night, the night-time or the next day even, something like that. 115
Counsel to the Tribunal asked Mr. Rooney about the source of the gunfire that he heard when Mr. McGuigan was shot:
Q. Do you have any idea of the direction from which those shots were coming?
A. From the same area, the same direction, Rossville Street; everything to me seemed to come from there.
Q. Do you have a recollection of there being two distinct bursts of shooting?
A. Yeah, there was, aye, there was a lull for a while and then it started again.
Q. Is this the second burst of shooting that you are describing here?
A. I would not know, no. No, I think that was the first, it was before the lull. There was a lull after that.
Q. At the moments immediately surrounding Bernard McGuigan being shot, do you have any idea of the number of shots that were fired?
A. 10, 20, just that. 116
Edmund Melaugh arrived in the vicinity of the telephone box having come through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 from the Rossville Flats car park. 117 At the time he gave his statement to this Tribunal, his recollection was that he saw the body of Bernard McGuigan already lying on the ground when he arrived near the telephone box. 118 During his oral evidence, Mr. Melaugh told the Tribunal that
115 Day 174/109/19 116 Day 174/109/01 117 AM398.10 paragraphs 15 and 16 118 AM398.10 paragraph 16 he believed this account could be wrong. He said he could not be sure when he first saw Bernard McGuigan's body:
Q. And in paragraph 16 you say that as you came out of the alleyway you stepped near the telephone box, and you think it was then that you first saw a man whom you now know to be Barney McGuigan?
A. I think -- at the time I thought it was then that I seen him because I had seen him actually twice. I had seen him once when he was not covered up with a banner or something and then the next time I seen him, he had a banner on his -- covering his head.
Q. When did you see him for the first time uncovered?
A. I am not sure. I think now it had to be after Paddy Doherty was shot, but I am not terribly sure on it.
Q. If you can think now of coming through that alleyway, do you remember seeing anybody lying on the ground?
A. No. 119
After taking him through the remainder of his evidence, counsel to the Tribunal came back to the issue and attempted to clarify when Mr. Melaugh had first seen the body of Bernard McGuigan:
Q. You have now taken us through the sequence of events when you saw Mr Doherty shot and eventually went out to help him. Can you remember now when the first time was that you saw Mr McGuigan?
A. Not with any clear certainty, no. I think that after coming out I had been wandering around here. I remember seeing Father Mulvey waving a handkerchief down near an ambulance and I cannot remember when exactly I seen Barney McGuigan. I know I seen him twice, I seen him without his face being covered and then I seen him with his face being covered, but I cannot remember when they were.
Q. Do you think that the first time you saw him was in fact after the shooting was over and you had come out to help Mr Doherty? A. Quite possibly, yes.
10D-125 The significance of the timing of it was that when Mr. Melaugh was in the vicinity of the telephone box is that while he was there he believes he saw a soldier in Glenfada Park North drop to a kneeling position and fire shots into Sector 5:
Then, from where I was standing at the south end gable of Block 1, I could see soldiers advancing into the Glenfada Park North courtyard. There were not many, maybe four or five. They all had rifles and were shooting across the Glenfada Park North courtyard in the direction of Glenfada Park South. I then saw one soldier drop and kneel near to the centre of the Glenfada Park North courtyard (at point J marked at grid 114) and start shooting towards the hexagonal flowerbed and the south gable end of Block 1 where we were standing.
10D-126 During his oral evidence, Mr. Melaugh marked a photograph with a purple arrow to show the location of the soldier he saw in a kneeling position:
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120 Day 170/129/05 121 AM398.11 paragraph 20 - 21 122 Day 170/116/04-07 On the same photograph, he marked a green arrow to show the position of a number of other soldiers on the southern perimeter of the Glenfada Park North courtyard. It is, however, unlikely that Bernard McGuigan was shot at this point: it is virtually inconceivable that Mr. Melaugh would not have noticed his body on the ground before heading off towards the alleyway behind Joseph Place.
It is noteworthy that neither of Mr. Melaugh’s contemporary statements records that he ever went near the area of the telephone box or that he saw the body of Bernard McGuigan. Both statements deal solely with what he witnessed from the alleyway behind Joseph Place. Furthermore, Mr. Melaugh had no recollection of a young woman “having hysterics” near the telephone box - although he said he
123 Day 170/117/10-13 124 AM398.19: AM398.22 did know Geraldine McBride at the time. Nor did he have any memory of seeing the body of Hugh Gilmore.
Hugh Kelly joined the group by the telephone box having come through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2. He probably arrived after Bernard McGuigan had been shot:
*Did you ever see — presumably you did not see a group of people which included Bernard McGuigan still alive, did you?*
A. No, not that I remember.
In any event, he only became aware of Mr. McGuigan after he had been shot.
Several other witnesses similarly arrived too late to assist the Tribunal in its task of identifying who shot Bernard McGuigan.
Patrick Kelly arrived in the area after Bernard McGuigan had been shot.
RM2 appears to have left the area before Bernard McGuigan was shot. The only casualty he saw was Hugh Gilmore.
Brian McCool was also amongst the group by the telephone box. Mr. McCool was not called to give oral evidence to the Tribunal. He stated in both his NICRA and BSI statements that he became aware of Bernard McGuigan’s body after he had been shot; he did not witness him move out from the rest of the group. He made no reference to the source of the shot that killed him.
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125 Day 170/140/03 – 09 126 Day 170/111/02 – 10 127 AK9.2 paragraphs 12-14 128 Day 072/194/23 129 AK9.3 paragraph 18 130 AK21.5 paragraph 11 131 AK42.13 paragraph 32 132 AM133.3 paragraph 21 133 AM133.4 paragraph 24; AM133.10
FS 7.2306
X 120 Shelia Sheerin, née Duffy, gave a short statement to the Tribunal saying that she saw Mr. McGuigan go out from the wall at the southern end of Block 1 and that she could recall seeing his body lying on the ground. She provided no evidence that might assist the Tribunal in determining the source of the shot that killed Mr. McGuigan. She was not called to give oral evidence.
Anthony Harkin was also at the southern end of Block 1. He witnessed Bernard McGuigan wander out towards Rossville Street, but did not actually see him shot. He was unable to discern the source of the shot that hit him:
The next thing I noticed was a man who had been standing in the area close to the telephone box near me. He appeared to be middle aged and I think he was wearing a tweed overcoat which was buttoned up. The man was stooped over slightly and he walked out west from the telephone box waving a hanky. Other people in the group around me began to shout for him to come back, but he kept going. I believe he got as far as the point marked M on the attached map (grid reference J16). As he walked out I heard a couple of shots ring out. I have no idea where they came from the north, on Rossville Street, or the west from Glevada Park North. I believe I must have taken my eyes off the man just before the shots rang out, because I did not see him actually shot. However, the people in the crowd around me suddenly shouted “Jesus, he’s shot”. When I looked back, I saw that he had slumped to the ground. He appeared to have his head right down on the floor and was on his knees. However, his body was not still, but seemed to be in a crumpled heap. I do not recall seeing any blood, but at that point, I knew I needed to get away from the area.
Mr. Harkin was not able to assist the Tribunal further about the source of the shot that hit Bernard McGuigan when he gave evidence.
So too, Sean McCallion:
Our plan had been to get away by running down towards Joseph Place, but it was not safe to go out. I can remember, however, that
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134 AS45.2 paragraph 6 135 AH11.4 paragraph 24 136 AH11.5 paragraph 26 137 See for example, when he was questioned by counsel to the Tribunal at Day 077/031-036 there was one man who was more in the open than us. He was balding and in his 40's and of medium build. He was wearing trousers and a coat. I did not see him do anything or have anything in his hands. I think he went out to help someone, but I do not know that as a fact. He got shot. I did not think at the time about where he had been shot from. People were saying that they were shooting from the Walls, and it could have come from there or from a westerly direction. I certainly did hear shots coming from the city Walls at some stage. 138
10D-139 Counsel to the Tribunal asked him several questions in the hope of eliciting more evidence about the source of the shot, but he was unable to help any further. 139
10D-140 Michael McCusker was another witness who was near the telephone box at the southern end of Block 1 who had no idea from where Bernard McGuigan was shot:
A man standing beside me, to my left, I think, took about two steps away from the wall. He had his hands in the air. I cannot recall if they were empty. I do not recall seeing him with a handkerchief in his hand. He then fell forward with his head towards Free Derry Corner, at the point marked 3 on the map. He was lying half over on his right side. I initially thought he had tripped over but when I saw the amount of blood coming out of his head, I realised he had been shot. I did not see who fired the shot nor do I know where it came from. There was nothing anyone could do to help him. Then man was in his late 40s and I now know that he was Bernard McGuigan. 140
10D-141 When Mr. McCusker was called to give evidence he was not asked any questions about the source of the shot that killed Bernard McGuigan.
10D-142 John Nash was another who was unable to help the Tribunal about the source of the shot that killed Mr. McGuigan. This is the account he gave in his BSI statement:
138 AM492.2 paragraph 12 139 Day 147/160-162 140 AM160.3 paragraph 13 As I was pushed through the other side of the Rossville Flats by the force of the crowd, I saw a man fall. I later found out it was Bernard or Barney McGuigan. I can't say which way he was facing or from where he was shot, I saw it all very quickly. Someone then shouted "Hit the deck they're firing from the walls". At this stage, I kept low and tried to get in close to Joseph's Place so that if the firing was coming from there I would be safe. I didn't look back again.
10D-143 He later retracted this account in the witness box:
Q. In paragraph 13 you are recorded as saying as directed: "As I was pushed through the other side of the flats by the force of the crowd, I saw a man fall. I later found out that it was Bernard or Barney McGuigan." I think your present recollection is that this is not in fact Barney McGuigan that you are referring to in this paragraph?
A. That is correct. The only memory that I have is actually of hearing a warning and someone shout, basically, "hit the deck" and I seen a person fall.
10D-144 James Flood was in the northern-most house in Joseph Place. This is the account he gave in his BSI statement:
I then saw a man whom I recognised as Barney McGuigan standing at the corner of the southern gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. I have marked the position on the attached map at E (grid reference J16). He was standing with his back to me, close in to the wall, facing towards the Rubble Barricade. One or two people were trying to prevent Barney McGuigan from going out but there was a lull in the shooting and I think that convinced him that it was safe to step out. I think he was going to the aid of someone who was lying on the Rubble Barricade, although I cannot remember seeing a body on the Rubble Barricade. He stepped out from behind the corner, still facing towards the Rubble Barricade and as soon as he did so he was shot. I saw him fall. After he was shot people who were also sheltering at the southern gable end of Block 1 of the
141 AN6.2 paragraph 13 142 Day 097/079/06 143 AF23.1 paragraph 4; see the map at AF23.9 Rossville Flats tried to pull him back in behind the gable end wall. They pulled him a short distance.
10D-145 When counsel to the Tribunal asked him if he had any idea at all about the direction from which Bernard McGuigan was shot, Mr. Flood was unable to help:
Q. Do you have any idea at all of the direction from which he was shot?
A. I do not know. I do not know who fired the shot, I am being honest with you about that, but I know he was shot.
10D-146 When Soldier F fired two shots into Sector 5, he would have been within view of Mr. Flood, yet Mr. Flood appears not to have seen this happen.
Witnesses who give other evidence
10D-147 Joseph Doherty was looking through the letter box of one of the two most southerly houses in the northern block of Joseph Place. He told the Tribunal that he believed he witnessed Bernard McGuigan being shot by a soldier who was located within the area defined as grid reference G17 on the map attached to his BSI statement. The relevant part of the map is reproduced below with grid reference G17 high-lighted in yellow:
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144 AF23.2 paragraph 6 145 Day 172/120/04 146 AD76.2 paragraphs 18-19 147 AD76.4 paragraph 27 Mr. Doherty's account in 1972 was that the soldier fired from the entrance to Glenfada Park North. However, when he gave evidence to the Tribunal on oath, Mr. Doherty remained firm in his belief that the soldier fired from the corner of Rossville Street and the Old Bog Road. Counsel to the Tribunal asked Mr. Doherty how sure he was:
Q. You are obviously doing your best, Mr Doherty, to recall what you saw through that letterbox in 1972. Are you really sure in your own mind today that the soldiers were down at that corner as opposed to being somewhere in the area of this entrance of Rossville Street into Glenfada Park North?
A. Oh, I am quite sure there was two soldiers at where I am stating they were and one left and one remained. 148
148 Day 138/150/07 He was not to be moved:
Q. So do you think you are wrong about the soldier being in an alleyway at all?
A. As I said, this is my recollection now and what I say now is the soldier to my mind was at the corner to Fahan Street West, to which I believe you can get access to from Gleefada Park.
LORD SAVILLE: Ms McDermott, Mr Roxburgh has had a go, you have had a go, I am not sure you are going to change what Mr Doherty believes he saw on the day. 149
Thomas Harrigan arrived in the area at the southern end of Block 1 having come through the gap between Blocks 1 and 2. 150 While he was there he saw two people shot:
The next thing I heard more shooting and as I heard the shooting, I saw two people to my left (the west) close to the telephone kiosk, fall. 151
This evidence is consistent with a statement he gave on 4th February 1972:
Two civilians in the back of the flats were unarmed and yet they were shot and I saw them fall. I did not know who these people were, but even in the confusion I saw that they were unarmed. 152
By the time he gave his statement to this Tribunal, Mr. Harrigan had formed the belief that one of the men was Bernard McGuigan, 153 and the other Hugh Gilmore. 154 Mr. Harrigan has probably identified the bodies correctly, although his evidence about the locations in which they fell is inconsistent with the more
149 Day 138/168/13 150 AH39.4 paragraphs 21-22 151 AH39.4 paragraph 23 152 AH39.7 153 AH29.5 paragraph 25 154 AH39.4 paragraph 24 reliable photographic evidence. Nor could he recall the body he identified as Bernard McGuigan being surrounded by a pool of blood.
10D-153 If the man he identified as Bernard McGuigan was in fact someone else, his true identity remains unknown.
10D-154 Mr Harrigan was unable to say what either of the men was doing when they were shot. But he was able to give significant evidence about the source of the gunfire:
The only other thing which happened whilst I was standing close to the telephone box was that Mr. Devlin (his family nickname at the time was "Ding") was hit in the temple by masonry which flew off the south gable end of Block 1. This occurred just before the other two men fell. I believe Mr. Devlin was standing in the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 behind the telephone box looking out at me, at point Z on the attached map (grid reference J/K16). I am not sure which direction the bullet which hit Block 1 came from but I think he was hit in the temple at the same time as I heard the bullets fired and saw the two men fall.
10D-155 During his oral evidence, he marked on a photograph the point where the bullet hit the wall with two small purple arrows a few feet above the telephone box:
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155 AH39.12; Day 170/168/15 – 170/169/09 156 Day 170/171/16 – 170/172/15 157 AH39.4 paragraph 23 158 AH39.5 paragraph 26 159 AH39.12 He confirmed that he actually saw a piece of masonry come off the wall and hit Mr. Devlin on the head:
Q. Could you see whereabouts the masonry had come from?
A. I believe the masonry came from round about here, above the telephone box (marked with a purple arrow). I can only assume that is where it came from because it is roughly where he was standing in line with that particular particle of concrete.
Q. But you saw a bit of masonry actually come off the –
A. Yes –
Q. The cladding and come some way down and hit Mr Devlin on the head?
A. That is right, yes, yes.\\textsuperscript{160}
\\textsuperscript{160} Day 170/170/06 It was an event he mentioned in an account he gave to Kathleen Keville soon after Bloody Sunday. The transcript of that account records that two or three people were hit by the falling masonry.
Q. "About four shots rung above my head at this point. Two or three people were hit with masonry coming off the wall, one of them had his head cut, I thought he was hit with one of the rifle ... bullet. I found out later that he was not." That is presumably a reference to Mr Devlin; is it?
A. I would assume it is, yes.
Q. You appear to have recalled more than one person was hit with masonry coming off the wall; is it possible that was so?
A. It is a possibility, although I do not remember it. Mr Devlin is the only one sits out in my mind about that.
Sean MacDermott saw a bullet hit the same wall at around the time that Bernard McGuigan was shot. Using a photograph, he pointed to the approximate location of where the bullet hit the wall. Lord Saville described it as "a position about eight feet up on the wall above Mr. Hugh Gilmore's body."
Mr. Harrigan marked his own location at the time as point H on the map attached to his BSI statement.
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161 Day 170/177/07 162 AH39.10 163 Day 170/179/18 164 AM4.5 paragraph 26; Day 144/063/18 – 24 165 Day 144/092/24 – 144/093/01 166 AH39.4 paragraph 23; the map can be found at AH39.9 The round that hit the wall was very probably fired from a location to the south of the dashed line marked on the map. It could not, therefore, have been fired from Soldier F's position by the lamp post near the southern end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North. If Soldier F had fired while Mr. Harrigan was standing at point H, Mr. Harrigan would probably have noticed it.
Susan Doherty believes that she saw the soldier who shot Bernard McGuigan. She was situated in the vicinity of the stairs about half way along the northern block of Joseph Place and was looking out towards Rossville Street and Joseph Place.\\textsuperscript{167}
\\textit{I saw the soldier who shot Barney McGuigan. He was walking up Rossville Street away from Free Derry Corner at the northern end of Glenfada Park South in the area of grid reference H16. At about point 10 on the attached map (grid references 115 and 116) the soldier stopped, turned towards the man I now know to be Barney McGuigan (who was at about point 9 - grid reference J16), dropped onto one knee and fired across Rossville Street at him. The soldier had a clear view of Barney McGuigan. He then calmly...}
\\textsuperscript{167} AD105.2 paragraphs 12-13; the map appears at AD105.6; also see Day 170/09 stood up and continued walking as if nothing had happened. I do not recall hearing the shot. There were hysterical people in Joseph Place. I do remember seeing the recoil of the rifle as he fired. This shooting sticks in my head because of the way that the soldier did it. It seemed so cold blooded. I remember it clearly because it bothered me that he had done that. I think that the soldier was wearing a beret. For some reason that is in my mind but I cannot be totally sure. He had no other protection on his head. He was wearing normal gear, green khakis, like the others. He was a stockily built soldier with a round face. I cannot remember whether his face was blackened. I did not see colours that day, only black and white. After the shooting, the soldier just got up and walked away.\\textsuperscript{168}
10D-162 Counsel to the Tribunal asked Mrs. Doherty to use a red arrow to point out where the soldier was positioned when he shot Bernard McGuigan.\\textsuperscript{169} The photograph is reproduced below, (the red arrow is the one on the left):
\\textsuperscript{168} AD105.4 paragraphs 22-23 \\textsuperscript{169} Day 170/023: the marked-up photograph appears at AD105.8 The location she marked is consistent with the spot she marked on the map attached to her BSI statement. 170
Mrs. Doherty said that she witnessed this event after the arrestees had been taken away from the gable wall at the southern end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North:
LORD SAVILLE: When you saw the soldier firing the shot, how close was he to the people who had been rounded up by the other soldiers?
A. They had already gone round.
LORD SAVILLE: They had already gone round?
A. Yes. LORD SAVILLE: Was he on his own, this soldier?
A. Yes. LORD SAVILLE: No civilians around that you remember seeing?
A. No. 171
Thomas McDaid lived at 11 Joseph Place, which is the second most northerly house in Joseph Place. 172 His account was that Bernard McGuigan was shot as he made his way towards Rossville Street:
George and I stood on a bed and looked out of a small high window in the room, north, towards Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. I saw a group of approximately 10 people at the north western corner of Block 2 at point B on the attached map. Some people in the group were lying on the ground. My attention was immediately drawn to Barney McGuigan who was standing among the crowd at B. He was a very tall man and stood out. I think his right hand was raised; he seemed to be holding something white in his hand and trying to get attention. I assumed he was holding a handkerchief. He was the only one from the group moving forward. He took approximately 15 to 20 quick steps in a north west direction from point B towards Rossville Street. He was bent forward and kept his
170 AD105.6; she marked the location with the number 10: AD105.4 paragraph 22 171 Day 170/027/07 172 Day 185/061/16-20 head low. I had no idea what he was doing. I could still hear the crackling noise at this time. He didn't get very far before he suddenly fell forward, face down, at point C on the attached map. He fell forward, face down, at point C on the attached map. He fell forward in the direction he had been moving. People started to scream. I assumed that Barney had been shot because I had realised by that time that the crackling sound was gun fire. I had heard live gun fire in the Bogside before. At this time, I could also see people running into the Glenfada Park North car park. 173
10D-166 The relevant part of the map he marked appears below: 174
10D-167 The arrows on the map mark the routes of three soldiers he saw heading south down Rossville Street, initially in a V-shaped formation, shortly after Bernard McGuigan had been shot. 175 Mr. McDaid saw no other soldiers. 176 It should be noted that Mr. McDaid said he saw people running into the Glenfada Park North car park at the time Mr. McGuigan was shot, yet he was not aware of a soldier in that location firing a weapon into Sector 5; see the last sentence of the extract from his BSI statement above.
173 AM176.1 paragraph 4 174 AM176.3 175 AM176.2 paragraph 5 176 Day 185/066/304 Noel McLoone gave a unique account of Bernard McGuigan being shot by a soldier who was only a few feet away. His evidence was that the soldier had come around the south-western corner of Block 1:
As I reached the gp between Blocks 1 and 2 near the telephone kiosk on the south side of Block 1, I noticed a man in front of me. I did not pay much attention to him. He was walking slowly, quite warily in the same direction as me. He had no weapons in his hands. I cannot recall whether I saw only his back or whether I also saw the side of him. I did not recognise him. He was about three yards in front of me, to my left.... A soldier then appeared at the south western corner of Block 1. I had not seen him before and so do not think he had crossed over Rossville Street towards the Rossville Flats. I did not notice much about his appearance because as soon as he saw us, he lifted his rifle to his shoulder and aimed it, as far as I was concerned, at me. The man who I had seen in front of me put his hands up in the air and, at the same moment, I ducked as I thought the soldier was about to shoot me. I heard a very loud "bang", almost as if it was right in my ear. I immediately fell to the ground with my arms over my head. I did not see which way the other man was facing as the shot was fired, as I was already aiming for the ground. I heard the man fall very close to me. Although I did not see the soldier shoot the man, it was my clear impression that it must have been him. When I looked up, I saw the body of the man who had fallen. 177
Mr. McLoone's evidence was that the soldier was standing upright. 178 Counsel to the Tribunal pressed Mr. McLoone about the location of the soldier he had seen; Mr. McLoone remained firm:
Q. Is it really your evidence that the soldier was there?
A. There was a soldier appeared at that corner, he was only there briefly.
Q. Can you say how far away from the actual corner of the building he was?
A. Um, I would, I would put him right at the corner.
Q. Actually standing right next to the corner of the building?
177 AM359.3 paragraph 16-18 178 Day 175/163/14 A. That is what I would say, yeah, or very, very close to it.
Q. Is there any possibility that your memory is mistaken about that and that in fact the soldier was somewhere over on this side of the street, that is the west side near the entrance to Glerfada Park North?
A. No, there was a soldier at the corner and he must have been only there briefly because when I lifted my head again, he was gone. 179
10D-170 Mr. McLoone's contemporary account is consistent with this evidence. 180
10D-171 Ivan Cooper's evidence suggests that Bernard McGuigan was heading out towards Rossville Street and that he was shot after he had exposed himself to soldiers whom Mr. Cooper had seen in the area of Kells Walk. 181 Mr. Cooper marked a map with the letter E to show his own location, and the letter F to show Mr. McGuigan's location: 182
10D-172 Mr. Cooper described Bernard McGuigan as being shot when he reached letter G:
179 Day 175/147/19 180 Day 175/166-167 181 KC12.6 paragraph 55 182 KC12.6 paragraph 53; the map appears at KC12.64 I believe that there were soldiers around Kells Walk and in the area of the waste ground to the east of Rossville Street but cannot recall whether I could actually see the soldiers at this stage. My eyes were totally fixed on Barney. Barney had only taken a few steps and, as he came out into the open, at about point G (grid reference J16), I think that I then heard the same cracking noise as I had heard earlier of a shot being fired. The scene which I saw seemed to be in slow motion, and the few seconds which this scene lasted were telescoped. Barney just folded up. He crumpled and fell down on his side, I think it was his right side, like a bag rolling off a lorry. He fell towards the wall at the south end of Block 1. 183
10D-173 Mr. Cooper told the Tribunal, however, that he could not connect the soldiers he had seen with the shooting of Mr. McGuigan. 184 Perhaps all that can really be gleaned from Mr. Cooper’s evidence is that Mr. McGuigan did not appear to him to have been shot from Glenfada Park North:
Q. You know where the entrance to Glenfada Park North is; do you not? A. Yes, I do, yes.
Q. That was in your vision; was it not? A. Glenfada Park, yes. Yes, it was, yes.
Q. Was there a soldier standing near to the entrance to Glenfada Park North in a shooting position? A. There could have been, but I did not see him shooting Barney McGuigan. 185
10D-174 Sean McDaid could not say where the shooting was coming from:
I was in the area for about 10 minutes, near to the outbuilding at Block 1, at about the point marked E on the attached map (grid reference K16) before the shooting intensified. There was then chaos and commotion. The sounds of the shooting seemed to be all around me. 186
183 KC12.6 paragraphs 55-56 184 Day 419/053/19-21 185 Day 420/060/21 186 AM174.3 paragraph 15 He gave his opinion about the source of the shot that killed Bernard McGuigan:
I didn't hear the particular shot that killed Barney McGuigan. There were lots of shots at that time. I think the shot may have come from the Glenfada Park area across Rossville Street as I had seen soldiers at Glenfada Park prior to that. I originally thought that the shot came from the walls because I thought that he had been shot in the back of the head. However, I cannot be certain where it came from. At the time he was shot I think he was facing towards Glenfada Park looking across Rossville Street. [Emphasis added].
If Mr. McGuigan "was facing towards Glenfada Park looking across Rossville Street" at the moment he was shot, this would exclude Glenfada Park as the source of a shot which entered the back of his head. As noted above, Dr. Shepherd and Mr. O'Callaghan stated: "... it is clear that Bernard McGuigan could not have been facing the rifle that fired the shot."
The soldiers Mr. McDaid had seen earlier in Glenfada Park were, according to him, on the balconies of the Glenfada Park flats. He could not recall seeing any soldiers at ground level:
Q. Did you see any soldiers at ground level as well as the soldiers on the balconies or was it just the soldiers on the balconies?
A. The soldiers on the balconies definitely caught my eye because they were so obvious. I did not really -- I cannot recall seeing any soldiers at ground level.
John Duffy believed that he saw Bernard McGuigan heading towards an injured person at the rubble barricade when he was shot:
The man lying at the Rubble Barricade before the man walked out to him was all clumped over. I was looking at him from about 200 yards away and he was on my side of the barricade. The man who walked out towards him with his hands up and got shot was, I thought, in his fifties but then I was 14 and everyone looked old to me. The shot I heard as the man crossed with his hands up sounded like the other shots and I knew it was live ammunition. I shouted at the people behind Block 2, something like “they’re after murdering that man” and for some reason I remember I did not say “shot”. I think now that the man I saw shot was Mr McGuigan. I did not know who he was at the time but I found out later. The way he fell his head was turned a different way from his torso. I will always remember looking at the body and seeing his blood was so thick and black and thinking “how can there be so much blood in a man?” I think he was wearing an anorak but I really only remember the colour of his blood.
However, when Mr. Duffy was called to give oral evidence, he told the Tribunal that he wished to qualify his BSI statement because he had not actually seen Bernard McGuigan shot:
Q. In paragraph 17 I think you want to add the qualification to the paragraph to the effect that you saw Mr McGuigan as you were leaving the area, but did not see him shot?
A. Correct.
CONCLUSION
The eyewitness testimony is inconsistent, confused and unreliable. Many witnesses have given evidence that is incompatible with the case that Soldier F shot Bernard McGuigan.
The only witness whose evidence is capable of identifying Soldier F as the soldier who shot Bernard McGuigan is Lieutenant 227. This is because his account of what he saw the soldier do corresponds with Soldier F’s own account of what he did. (That evidence is set out in section 10B-III, above.)
The possibility still remains that Bernard McGuigan was shot by a soldier whom Lieutenant 227 did not see: all Lieutenant 227 said was the man fell to the ground.
191 AD160.3 paragraph 16-17 192 Day 080/126/09 at the same time the soldier fired. The fact that soldiers were firing simultaneously or nearly simultaneously with one another pervades the civilian eyewitness testimony.
10D-183 The possibility that Bernard McGuigan was shot by another soldier cannot be safely excluded. First, a significant number of the eyewitnesses gave evidence that Mr. McGuigan was shot from a location which suggests it is unlikely that it was Soldier F who was responsible. Secondly, it would be unsafe to conclude to that Soldier F was the only soldier to fire into Sector 5.
10D-184 If Lieutenant 227's evidence is relied on to establish that it was Soldier F who shot Bernard McGuigan, equal weight should be given to his evidence that, just before he saw the soldier fire, he heard the sound of pistol shots coming from the same location where Soldier F saw a man firing a pistol. CHAPTER 10 E
PATRICK DOHERTY
10E-I INTRODUCTION
Soldier F did not fire the bullet that killed Patrick Doherty: the pathology of Patrick Doherty’s gunshot wound makes it very unlikely that he was shot from Glenfada Park North as he made his way from the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 to the alleyway behind Joseph Place.
10E-2 Soldier F fired only two shots into Sector 5, one immediately after the other. It is therefore very unlikely that he shot Bernard McGuigan and Patrick Doherty. If one of the two shots which Soldier F fired into Sector 5 killed Bernard McGuigan, then the other shot could not have hit Patrick Doherty because Patrick Doherty was shot some time before Bernard McGuigan was shot.
10E-II THE ORIENTATION OF PATRICK DOHERTY’S BODY AS HE CRAWLED TOWARDS THE ALLEYWAY BEHIND JOSEPH PLACE
INTRODUCTION
The fact that the track of the bullet wound which killed Patrick Doherty is inconsistent with him having been shot from Glenfada Park North has, it seems, always been appreciated by those representing his family. In their first opening statement, drafted by Eilis McDermott QC and Philip Magee, the following paragraph appears:
The difficult factual issue relating to Mr. Doherty is if he was shot from the Glenfada Park direction as Lord Widgery found and as some civilian witnesses e.g. Donna Harkin AH13 believe, how can the position of the entry wound be explained given the position of his body in the photographs? A similar problem arises if he was shot from the walls as Edward Dillon AD45 believes, the angle of entry of the bullet may make a shot from the walls rather unlikely.¹
Similarly, in their second Opening Statement, drafted by Michael Topolski, it says:
\*It has always proved difficult in the case of Patrick Doherty to correspond the Medical Evidence with any potential firing position thus it is difficult to identify with any precision the identity of the firer. We will await to see how the evidence unfolds in this regard.\*²
**THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE**
Although the photographs do not depict precisely where Patrick Doherty was when he stopped crawling, they are the best evidence the Tribunal has to determine where he stopped before he was turned over. They provide good evidence of the fact that he was heading towards the alleyway behind Joseph Place. If the location he was in after he was turned onto his back is marked on a Q8 map, the photographs suggest it was in the spot which is marked with the arrow below:
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¹ OS6.7 paragraph 3 ² OS6.15 paragraph 14 A number of photographs taken by Gilles Peress and Fulvio Grimaldi show where Patrick Doherty's body was after he stopped crawling. The foreshortening effect of the photographs can give a misleading impression of the precise location of his body. However, the photographs which appear at P809 and P811 make it possible to determine the location with some precision.
Mr. Peress pointed his camera almost precisely to the south west when he took the photograph at P809. He took P811 while facing almost precisely to the south east. These photographs enable the location to be pin-pointed on two axes:
Photograph P809 shows that Patrick Doherty's body was positioned directly opposite the entrance to the alleyway behind Joseph Place: Photograph P811 appears below. It shows that Patrick Doherty's head was positioned on the line described by the row of trees which ran parallel to Block 2. The aerial photograph below shows how the paved area between the Rossville Flats and Joseph Place had a pattern of large squares on it. It appears from these photographs, and others taken by Gilles Peress, that Patrick Doherty's body was approximately in the middle of the square marked with an arrow.
The fact that his body was located inside this square is particularly clear from a photograph taken by Fulvio Grimaldi at EP26/17: All of the photographs of Patrick Doherty in Sector 5 were taken after he had been turned over. None show Patrick Doherty lying on his front.
Patrick Walsh told the Sunday Times soon after Bloody Sunday that he had found Patrick Doherty lying on his front and that he had turned him over onto his back:
Then Walsh saw the body of a man lying on his face just about halfway across the space between the passageway [between Blocks 2 and 3] and where he was [at the entrance to alleyway behind Joseph Place]. He thought the man was still alive, there were slight movements and he was groaning from time to time. Walsh shouted "are you all right mate" but got no answer: he crawled out to him and turned the man onto his back.
3 AW5.36 It is very likely that Patrick Doherty was turned onto his back before Gilles Peress came through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 from the Rossville Flats car park. Mr. Peress believed that he started taking the photographs of Patrick Doherty and Patrick Walsh as soon as he came through the gap:
LORD SAVILLE: Again, the Chairman, Mr Peress, it may also be a difficult question: you come through that passageway, you see the scene depicted in the first two photographs on your strip; do you have any idea of the time sequence; did you see that and take the photographs straightaway or did you spend some time doing something else, or –
A. No, no, straightaway.
LORD SAVILLE: You come through, you see the scene, you take the photograph?
A. That is correct.
LORD SAVILLE: We are talking of seconds, are we? A. The act of shooting the picture, yes, it is seconds.
LORD SAVILLE: The act of coming through, seeing the body and Mr Walsh and taking the pictures?
A. Yes, it was immediate, we are talking about seconds.
MR RAWAT: So the images depict the scene that you came upon when you went through that alleyway; is that right?
A. Yes.
Mr. Peress believed that he took the sequence of photographs south of Block 2 about a minute or more after completing the sequence of photographs he took in the south eastern corner of the car park:
Q. ... I am now probably going to ask you a question that may be almost impossible for you to answer, but are you able to assist us at all as to the time gap between these two images [P801 and P802]?
4 Day 213/036/04 A. I am trying to figure out a range. (Pause) I cannot be any more precise than something like between 1 and a few minutes.
Joe Nicholas believes that he went to find Mr. Peress after witnessing Patrick Doherty collapse onto his face and stop moving. He recalls that he asked Mr. Peress to follow him and take a photograph of Patrick Doherty. Counsel to the Tribunal asked Mr. Nicholas whether he thought it was possible that Patrick Doherty was turned over during his temporary absence:
Q. ... By the time these photographs are taken [by Mr. Peress], as we can see from them, Patrick Doherty is lying on his back. Did you see how he came to be lying on his back having previously, as you have described, fallen on his face?
A. No.
Q. If we go back to paragraphs 23 to 25 on AN17.5, you describe how you went back through the gap between blocks 2 and 3 to where you had seen the photographer in the car park and spoke to him and he came and followed you back to the position you had previously been at and began to take photographs of Paddy Doherty and Paddy Walsh, which we have seen?
A. Yeah.
Q. I wonder whether it may have been the case — tell me if it is not — that when you first saw Patrick Walsh going out to Patrick Doherty, Patrick Doherty was still on his face and was turned by Paddy Walsh when you had gone back to get the photographer?
A. Yes, that might have happened.
Q. That may have happened?
A. Yeah.
The evidence of Mr. Nicholas was never put to Mr. Peress for his comment, but it corroborates the fact that there was a delay between the point when Patrick Doherty stopped moving and the arrival of Mr. Peress with his camera.
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5 Day 213/028/20 6 AN17.5 paragraphs 21 and 23 7 Day 078/029/25 Moreover, Mr. Doherty had clearly been turned onto his back by the time Mr. Peress started taking photographs of him. As a result, there is no photographic record of the precise location at which he came to rest before he was turned onto his back.
**THE EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY**
The majority of the many witnesses who saw Patrick Doherty did so after he had been turned onto his back. Their recollections of the position and orientation of Patrick Doherty's body generally accord with what the photographs show. Some recall his body - lying on its back - in positions inconsistent with what the photographs determine beyond doubt. In these cases, their evidence is superseded by the much more reliable photographic evidence.
The witnesses who observed Patrick Doherty at an earlier stage overwhelmingly agree that as he emerged from the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 he was heading towards the alleyway behind Joseph Place. The arrow marked on the map below represents the most likely route that Patrick Doherty would have taken, which is consistent with the location at which he came to rest: he was moving almost precisely from east to west. Mr. Nicholas noted the orientation of Patrick Doherty's body before he was turned onto his back:
*I could see that he was lying with his head pointing west, towards the alleyway behind Joseph Place and his feet pointing towards me.*
Mr. Nicholas was standing at the south eastern corner of Block 2 at the time. He confirmed, when he was asked questions by Edmund Lawson QC, that Patrick Doherty had been crawling west from the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 towards the entrance to the alleyway behind Joseph Place:
*Q. He, Mr Doherty, was, as you have described to us, crawling -- I think now we are familiar with it without having any other photographs -- crawling from that gap between blocks 2 and 3, across where that line is shown?*
*A. (Witness nodding).*
*Q. Towards the west side or towards Joseph Place, yes?*
*A. Yes.*
*Q. So he, Mr Doherty, would have been side on to the soldiers who were at Glerfada Park North or South?*
*A. That is right, yeah.*
*Q. Is that right?*
*A. Yeah.*
*Q. If anything perhaps his head slightly more towards them, yes?*
*A. Yes.*
*Q. Than his feet, his feet towards the gap, right?*
*A. Uh-huh.*
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8 AN17.5 paragraph 21 9 AN17.4 paragraph 18 10 Day 078/055/06 Mr. Nicholas also confirmed that Patrick Doherty never changed the direction in which he faced:
Q. He at no stage presented his or had his rear or his buttocks towards the soldiers who were at Glenfada Park North or South, did he?
A. (Witness nodding).
Q. That is right, is it?
A. Yeah. 11
Mr. Nicholas accepted the way Lord Saville summarised his evidence as follows:
LORD SAVILLE: ... your recollection is that Patrick Doherty crawled in more or less a straight line from the passageway between blocks 2 and 3 towards, directly towards the alleyway behind Joseph Place?
A. Yes, that is right. 12
Edmund Melaugh saw Patrick Doherty as he, Mr Melaugh, helped a wounded man down the alleyway behind Joseph Place. 13 After passing the wounded man onto some other people he returned to the entrance to the alleyway. He described in his BSI statement what he witnessed as he crouched down in the mouth of the alleyway:
Paddy Doherty called out that he had been shot. He was crawling and calling for someone to come and help him. The other man and I were crouched down in the shelter of the low wall at the northwest end of the alleyway. We could not go out as the shooting was continuing and we thought that we would be shot if we left the cover of the wall. I and the other man told Paddy Doherty to lie still and not move. We thought that we would make him a target to be shot again if he kept crawling. I remember that he was crawling facing towards the alleyway where we were with his feet nearest to Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. He was much further away from the Joseph Place alleyway than the other two wounded men.
11 Day 078/056/018 12 Day 078/060/03 13 AM398.5 paragraph 28 had been. At the time I assumed that he had been shot some time while he was making his way through the gap between Block 2 and Block 3 of the Rossville Flats towards the Joseph Place alleyway. I did not see Paddy Doherty come out of the gap between Block 2 and Block 3. I only saw him when he was crawling on the ground. I did not see him actually being shot. When I first saw him I gained the impression he was crawling to avoid the shooting. 14
As Mr. Melaugh was actually inside the mouth of the alleyway, he was well placed to observe that Patrick Doherty was “crawling facing towards the alleyway....” Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. Doherty’s family sought to establish more precisely the direction from which Mr. Doherty was crawling. Mr. Melaugh asserted that his feet were pointing to the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. This was apparently not the answer Ms. McDermott wanted and so she pressed the witness to accept that Mr. Doherty had in fact come from a position further west along Block 2. Mr. Melaugh remained adamant that his feet were pointing towards the gap between Blocks 2 and 3:
MS McDERMOTT: Mr Melaugh, I represent the family of Paddy Doherty. I have just a few questions for you, please. The first is that you remember in your statement that you said that you remember seeing Mr Doherty crawling, facing towards the alleyway where you were with his feet nearest to Block 2 of the Rossville Flats?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you say that his feet were pointed in the direction of the flats as opposed to the direction of the gap between Blocks 2 and 3?
A. I would say it was the gap.
Q. You say now that at the time you assumed he had been shot while making his way through the gap?
A. Yes.
Q. But you have been referred in the last few moments to your 1972 statement. Do you recall that in that you said: “I saw another man crawling along the ground from the flats towards the lane”? Do you think –
14 AM398.5 paragraph 29 A. Where is that; which paragraph is that in?
Q. Do you have it in front of you, Mr Melaugh; it is in the second paragraph, just over halfway down?
LORD SAVILLE: AM398.19.
MS McDERMOTT: if that might be put on the screen, the middle paragraph; do you see the sentence beginning: "We were in front of the man dragging him when I saw another man crawling along the ground from the flats –
A. Yes.
Q. -- towards the lane"? I wonder whether that might not mean that at the time your impression was that he was coming from the direction of the flats?
A. No, I believed he was coming from the, the gap in the flats, you can just move that down a bit.
Q. You had run over from the flats yourself, is that not right, from the shops?
A. Yes, I had run, I had run across the front of the shops and then crossed, and then crossed over.
Q. But you thought he was coming from a different direction?
A. I thought he was coming from – I thought he was coming from that gap that you can see between 4 and 7. 15
10E-27 Having witnessed Patrick Doherty attempting to crawl from the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 towards the alleyway behind Joseph Place, Mr. Melaugh then saw him being turned onto his back. 16 It was then that Mr. Doherty was photographed by Mr. Grimaldi and Mr. Peress.
10E-28 Jean Marie McGeehan marked the location of the flat in which she lived at the time of Bloody Sunday on a photograph attached to her BSI statement: 17
15 Day 170/131/19 – 170/133/16; the reference to the gap between 4 and 7 is a reference to the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 – see the map Mr. Melaugh drew on his NICRA statement at AM398.19 16 AM398.5 paragraph 31 17 AM228.1 paragraph 1; the photograph she marked appears at AM228.6 At some stage Mrs. McGeehan moved to a window overlooking Joseph Place. This window was evidently very close to the eastern edge of Block 2. Mrs. McGeehan marked her position as 'F' on the map attached to her statement. The dashed lines on her map, marked 1 and 2, represent the routes taken by two injured men into the alleyway behind Joseph Place.\\textsuperscript{20}
Mrs. McGeehan also identified a third man she saw as Patrick Doherty.\\textsuperscript{21} The description that she gave in her BSI is quoted in full. It is a remarkably clear account of the last stages of Patrick Doherty's life:
17. I saw the third man just as the second man got to the alleyway at Joseph Place. He was crawling on his belly from the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats towards the alleyway at the back of Joseph Place. He was nearly flat on the ground and was using his arms in front of him to drag himself along. His arms were not straight out in front of him but were bent. He was moving slowly towards the alleyway. When I saw him I assumed he was dragging himself that way because he had seen what happened to the second man. I cannot remember thinking he was hurt or injured.
18. The man got to about the point marked G on the attached map when he suddenly stopped. He was about halfway between Block 2 and the alleyway. I thought that he had stopped because he was afraid of the gunfire. The gunfire I had first heard when I was in the bedroom overlooking the Rossville Flats car park was still going on when I saw this third man. I think by this time there was still a fair amount of shooting but it seemed to be more single shots than rapid continuous fire. I could not say which direction the shooting came from because of the echo. I assumed that it was from Rossville Street from where the Army vehicles were.
19. I carried on watching the man for a short time because he was so still. I was worried that he might get shot. I do not know how long I watched him. As I watched him, the colour seemed to drain from his face. He was lying diagonally with his feet towards the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 and his head towards the alleyway of Joseph Place. He was lying on his front with his legs behind him and his arms bent in front of him in the position he had been in when he was dragging himself along. His face was turned towards Rossville Street.
20. I then saw another man appear from the back of the alleyway behind Joseph Place and start moving very slowly towards the man.
\\textsuperscript{20} AM228.3 paragraphs 15 and 16. \\textsuperscript{21} AM228.5 paragraph 27 lying on the ground at point E. This man was on his hands and knees crawling very slowly. My uncle opened the window and shouted out to him to be careful and watch himself because there was shooting. As he crawled along he was looking all around him but not really looking in any one particular direction. He kept stopping and starting and it took him quite a while to reach the man lying at point B. At the time he reached him I think the gun fire had stopped.
21. He turned the man over. I do not know whether he intended to turn him over or whether he went to take his pulse and turned him over as he was examining him, but he did end up lying face up. I do not have any recollection of what either man looked like apart from the fact that I think the one who had been shot was an oldish man, but I was only 12 years old at the time. I definitely think he was older than the first two men I had seen.
22. The next thing I remember is seeing a man walk out from the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats towards where the two men were. This man had a camera around his neck which he held in his left hand. He held a white hanky in his other hand. He faced towards Rossville Street, waving the hanky and holding the camera up as though the Army would know he was a photographer and not to shoot. I did not hear him say anything. By that time the shooting had stopped.
23. I also remember seeing a man in a grey uniform come out from the alleyway behind Joseph Place and go towards the man who had been shot. I assumed that he was a Red Cross man as he was wearing a light grey uniform [Emphasis added].
10E-32 During her oral evidence, Mrs. McGeehan confirmed, in an answer to a question from counsel to the Tribunal, her recollection was that Patrick Doherty came from a point to the east of her window.
10E-33 Eilis McDermott QC attempted to persuade Mrs. McGeehan that her that Mr. Doherty had in fact come from the direction of the shops further towards Rossville Street. However, Mrs. McGeehan did not accept this.
22 AM228.3-4 paragraphs 17-23 23 Day 171/080/13 – 15 24 Day 171/095/8-24 When Mrs. McGeehan gave her BSI statement, her clear recollection was that when she saw Patrick Doherty crawling towards the alleyway behind Joseph Place, his feet were pointing towards the gap between Blocks 2 and 3.
Derrik Tucker was also observing from a flat in Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. His impression was that Patrick Doherty was crawling from the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 towards the alleyway behind Joseph Place:
As the courtyard cleared of people, the family moved to the other side of the flat to see what was happening. Almost immediately my attention was drawn to a man who was crawling from the direction of the alleyway between Blocks 2 and 3 of the flats towards the north east corner of the maisonettes at Joseph Place.
Counsel to the Tribunal asked him where Mr. Doherty was when he first saw him:
Q. May we have a look at the map attached to your statement, AT15.21. The man, as I understand it, was coming out of this alleyway there; is that right, or appeared to have done?
A. Yeah.
Q. You of course would not be able to see him?
A. That is right.
Q. Until he had come round the block?
A. Yes.
Q. When you saw him, was he approximately at the position that you have marked as D, that is to say equidistant between block 2 and the alleyway behind Joseph Place, or did you see him at some other position first?
A. Slightly previous to having arrived there, it would have been a matter of feet before.
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25 AM228.4 paragraph 19 26 AT15.4 paragraph 26 27 Day 099/017/11 Although he seemed to agree with a suggestion made by counsel who appeared on behalf of Mr. Doherty's family that he could not really say where Mr. Doherty had come from, he confirmed that when he first saw him, Mr. Doherty was in between the entrance to the alleyway behind Joseph Place and the gap between Blocks 2 and 3:
It is beyond question that Patrick Doherty came through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. The photographs taken by Gilles Peress which show Patrick Doherty in the south eastern corner of the Rossville Flats car park heading towards the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 establish that Patrick Doherty arrived in Sector 5 through that gap.
The eyewitness testimony as a whole supports this, with a few exceptions. The few witnesses who believe that Patrick Doherty made his way in a south-easterly direction along the shop fronts of Block 2 before turning right to head across the open ground to the alleyway behind Joseph Place are almost certainly mistaken: no eyewitnesses saw Patrick Doherty head in a north-westerly direction along the front of Block 2 at any stage.
THE PATHOLOGY OF THE BULLET WOUND
Dr. Carson carried out an autopsy on Patrick Doherty's body on 31st January 1972, at 10.00 pm. He found that death was due to a single gunshot wound of the trunk. The bullet went straight through Patrick Doherty's body and was not recovered. As a result, the type of bullet has not been identified. Although it could have been a 7.62 calibre bullet, it could also have been a bullet of another calibre.
In their Report on the Pathology and Ballistic Evidence Following the Bloody Sunday Shootings, Dr. Shepherd and Mr. O'Callaghan stated that, as part of the
28 D0395 29 D0400 paragraph 2 general procedures for the examination of gunshot fatalities, a full internal post mortem examination pays particular attention to the track(s) of the bullet(s). In the case of Patrick Doherty, it is clear that Dr. Carson took particular note of the location of the entry and exit wounds, and the track of the bullet. His report states:
The bullet had entered the right buttock and penetrated the right ilio-sacral joint, entering the abdominal cavity. It had then lacerated the aorta and the inferior vena cava, the two main blood vessels in the abdomen, and torn the colon and the bowel attachments. Then it had lacerated the diaphragm and entered the left chest cavity, lacerating the lower outer part of the left lung before fracturing the 8th and 9th left ribs and leaving the body through the left side of the chest, well below and somewhat in front of the armpit.
The location of the entrance wound was described by Dr. Carson as follows:
Right buttock: A circular entrance wound, 7 mm diameter, centred 20 cm. behind the anterior superior iliac spine and 13 cm from the mid-line of the back.
The location of the exit wound was described as:
Chest: an elliptical exit wound, 5 cm x 3 cm. on the left side, centred 10 cm below the nipple and 5 cm behind it.
Dr. Carson noted that:
The two wounds were connected by a track through the body which passed from back to front, upwards at an angle of 45° to the horizontal plane, and from right to left at an angle of 33° to the coronal plane.
There is no note, record or other evidence to suggest that the bullet altered its course midway through Patrick Doherty's body.
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30 D0400 paragraph 4; Day 230/054/23 – 230/055/24 31 E2.0016 paragraph 5.1 32 D0400 paragraph 2 33 D0396 paragraph 3 34 D0396 paragraph 2 35 D0396 paragraph 4 Dr. Shepherd and Mr. O'Callaghan reviewed all the contemporary material: Dr. Carson's report, his notes and the post mortem photographs. They were also able to examine the clothes Patrick Doherty had been wearing at the time he was shot. They found:
There was an entry hole in the right rear of the waistband of the trousers directly above the back pocket. The bullet clipped the leather belt but left a clearly visible bullet wipe around the lower part of the hole. The bullet then passed through the T-shirt and underpants. 36
The entrance hole in the trousers and the belt can be seen in the photograph at F6.17:
36 E2.0056 paragraph 7.12.2 It was on the basis of their examination of this material that Dr. Shepherd and Mr. O'Callaghan formed their opinion on the direction from which Patrick Doherty had been shot:
In our opinion the pattern of the damage to the clothing and the pattern of the injury to the body are all consistent with Patrick Doherty being shot from behind while bending forward on all fours.
It is clear from the track of the bullet that Patrick Doherty was not necessarily shot directly from behind. The evidence of the bullet track suggests that the firer was approximately 33° to the right of the centre line, or coronal plane.
Given this, it is certainly very unlikely that the firer was any more than 45° to the right of the coronal plane. This is supported by the opinion of Dr. Vincent Di Maio, who assessed the original autopsy notes and photographs on behalf of the Tribunal at the request of Anthony Lawton's Team.
Dr. Di Maio's opinion was that, if Patrick Doherty was on his hands and knees at the time he was shot, then the source of the shot:
1. Had to be behind and to the right of Mr. Doherty in the 90° arc depicted in the diagram below; and,
2. Was most probably at 45° to Mr. Doherty's spine.
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37 E2.0057 paragraph 7.12.3 38 D0396 paragraph 4 39 E29.9 The Tribunal's own forensic pathologist, Dr. Richard Shepherd, has confirmed his agreement with Dr. Di Maio's opinion:
There appears to be no significant difference between this opinion and the opinion we expressed in our report (E2.0057):
"In our opinion the pattern of damage to the clothing and the pattern of the injury to the body are all consistent with Patrick Doherty being shot from behind while bending forward on all fours."
Dr. Di Maio has defined more closely the words 'from behind' and I would happily accept this refinement of our opinion and agree the shooter was most probably behind and within the 90° arc from 3 o'clock to 6 o'clock.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that Dr. Shepherd and Mr. O'Callaghan were unable to determine the nature of the weapon that caused the injury to Mr. Doherty. It is possible that he was not hit by a round fired from an SLR. CONCLUSION
10E-54 The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that when Mr. Doherty emerged from the gap between Blocks 2 and 3, he headed for the alleyway behind Joseph Place. He is most likely to have taken a direct route and would have been travelling due west. In other words, his buttocks would have been pointing east.
10E-55 Apart from a few witnesses who suggested that Mr. Doherty began crawling towards the alleyway behind Joseph Place from a point nearer to Rossville Street, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Doherty's buttocks were pointing towards Glenfada Park North at any stage.
10E-56 It is very unlikely, therefore, that Mr Doherty was shot by Soldier F.
10E-III THE GAP IN TIME BETWEEN THE SHOOTINGS OF PATRICK DOHERTY AND BERNARD MCGUIGAN
INTRODUCTION
10E-57 Soldier F fired only two shots into Sector 5, one immediately after the other. It is therefore very unlikely that he shot Bernard McGuigan and Patrick Doherty. If one of the two shots which Soldier F fired into Sector 5 killed Bernard McGuigan, then the other shot could not have hit Patrick Doherty because Patrick Doherty was shot some time before Bernard McGuigan was shot.
10E-58 Soldier F's contemporary accounts record the fact that he fired two shots into Sector 5. If the Tribunal were to conclude that more than two shots were fired into Sector 5 (which, given the number of casualties, is likely), there is no evidence that Soldier F was responsible for firing more than two shots.
10E-59 Soldier F's shots were fired one after the other, with only a short pause between them. Lieutenant 227 gave the following account in his BSI statement:
42 B135 paragraph 3; B138 paragraph 6; B143 at D The Para kneeling by the lamp post then raised his rifle to his shoulder at which point I could tell that he was a right-handed man. I could not say exactly where he was aiming, but his rifle seemed to be aimed parallel with Block 2 of the Rossville Flats towards the walls. I could see that he took aim quite carefully and I then saw him fire two shots. He paused after the first shot to re-aim before shooting a second time. As he fired each shot I could see the rifle buck slightly and a very small amount of smoke emit from the muzzle. I had not seen what he was aiming at but once I saw him fire I looked around and I saw somebody lying near the telephone box. 43
10E-60 Counsel to the Tribunal asked Lieutenant 227 to quantify how much time elapsed between the two shots:
Q. ... Can I pause there, can you assist at all with how much time elapsed between the first shot and the second shot?
A. Only from my own experience of firing deliberate shots, so it is anywhere between one and two seconds.
Q. Essentially however much time it takes to re-aim before shooting a second time?
A. Correct, sir. 44
10E-61 The eyewitness testimony establishes that the two known deceased in Sector 5 were not shot at the same time. Patrick Doherty was shot before Bernard McGuigan and the time between their respective shootings was considerably longer than one or two seconds.
BERNARD McGUIGAN WENT TO THE AID OF PATRICK DOHERTY
10E-62 The shooting of Bernard McGuigan as he embarked on an attempt to assist the injured Patrick Doherty is an enduring image of Bloody Sunday. In his Opening Submissions, Arthur Harvey QC described what Bloody Sunday evokes in the minds of the local population:
43 B2204.005, paragraph 24 44 Dav 371/151/05 ... [The image of Patrick Doherty lying behind Rossville flats, with his eyes being closed by Leo Day from the Knights of Malta. It is the image, both visual and vocal, of Geraldine Richmond, cowering behind block 1 of the Rossville flats, between the entrance and the telephone box, having witnessed the prone body of Hugh Gilmore, who struggled round the corner to die, and then witnessed Barney McGuigan, compelled by the inner voice of his own humanity to go out to the attendance of Patrick Doherty, who did not want to die alone.]
10E-63 Michael Topolski QC, on behalf of Mr. Doherty's family, suggested to Simon Winchester that the true sequence of events was almost beyond doubt:
Q. I can help you with the sequence of events. What we do know almost beyond doubt is that Barney McGuigan was shot as he walked in the direction of probably the prone body of Patrick Doherty. So that body would have been on the ground first, do you follow?
A. I do. 46
10E-64 The case for the family of Bernard McGuigan has always been put on the basis that Bernard McGuigan was shot just as he started to walk towards Patrick Doherty. In his Opening Submissions, Michael Mansfield QC suggested that Bernard McGuigan's purpose in leaving the cover of the southern gable wall of Block 1 was to render assistance to Patrick Doherty:
There are a number of statements which deal with what happened. We have put some of them into the bundle. Geraldine McBride, who was then known as Geraldine Richmond, and you have seen her on various photographs, there is a description which is worth just referring to. It is supported by others at AM45.5. At the top, paragraph 22, she is dealing with the death and the shooting of Hugh Gilmore. Later she goes to a point near the end of block 1 and the Rossville flats which she has marked on a plan. Paragraph 24: "Whilst we were huddled together I heard a man's voice calling 'I do not want to die alone -- somebody help me.'" It is suggested that is Doherty round the corner in the direction of the walls, effectively on Fahan Street East and the steps: "I could also hear him whining and saying 'God help me'. The whining would stop and
45 Day 043/034/25 46 Day 116/091/15 then start up again. I think the calling was coming from the Fahan Street East and the Fahan steps area. I think from what I heard later that the man was Patrick Doherty. I wanted to go out to help him but I could not move, I was too scared." As you will know she was in a bit of a state because of what she had already seen: "We all huddled together tighter. The man was obviously in pain although we could not see him. All I could see was Hugh Gilmore's body. By the time I heard the man calling he had already been shot. "25. Barney McGuigan, one of the men huddled at the wall with me, was a community man and was generally looked up to. After a short time (although I do not know how long) Mr McGuigan said that he could not stand the sound of the man calling any longer and that if he went out waving a white hanky, they would not shoot at him. We tried to dissuade him from going out. We told him they would shoot him. However, he was brave and he stepped away from us holding the white hanky in his hand. Although I cannot be certain I think he held it in his left hand. He walked out slowly sideways ..." 47
10E-65 In paragraph 26 of her BSI statement, Mrs. McBride said:
I remember hearing two distinct shots. After the first one Mr McGuigan turned back towards us, and although I cannot be certain I think he turned his whole body and not just his face. I did not see the bullet hit anything, I just heard it. The second shot hit him ... 48
10E-66 She confirmed this was her recollection in answer to a question from Christopher Clarke QC:
Q. You describe in paragraph 26 hearing two distinct shots, after the first of which Mr McGuigan turned back towards you. You think he turned his whole body and the second shot hit him and blew his head up. You are quite sure, are you, that it was the second and not the first shot? A. It was the second shot. 49
10E-67 Mrs. McBride said that she believed Mr. McGuigan was responding to cries for help coming from the other end of Block 2:
47 Day 050/120/25 – 050/122/15 48 AM45 18 paragraph 26 49 Day 146/025/25 ... Before I do that, can I ask you about this -- we have dealt with Mr Gilmore -- were you aware of where someone else was who was crying for help; could you see them or could you only hear them?
A. We could only hear them.
Q. You have indicated that you thought it was coming from the Faham steps area?
A. Yes.
Q. I will come back to that in the photograph in a moment. When Barney McGuigan walked out, away from the wall, looking at photograph 310, did he walk in the direction of the photographer or did he walk slightly towards his left, in other words the right of this photograph, or slightly towards his right, that is the left of this photograph, or can you not remember?
A. He would have walked out from where I was, was the right, you know, he would –
Q. Could you mark this photograph. I am sorry to ask you to do this. Could you mark the sort of direction in which he walked, as you remember it?
A. (Marked with blue arrow - AM45.15). 50
10E-68 In fact it was saved as AM45.39:
50 Day 146/033/20 Mrs. McBride gave the same account in her NICRA and SA statements, when the events of Bloody Sunday were still fresh in her mind.(^5)
A number of other eyewitnesses gave similar accounts of Mr. McGuigan going out to assist somebody who was calling for help.(^5) The fact that it was Patrick Doherty who was calling out is supported by Donna Harkin who was able to see him clearly from her flat in Block 2 of the Rossville Flats.(^5) She said in her BSI statement that she "could hear Mr. Doherty calling out saying that he did not want to be alone and that he needed help."(^5)
Other evidence establishes that Patrick Doherty remained alive for some time after he had been shot. For example, Francis Duddy believed Patrick Doherty was still alive after he had been turned onto his back:
[ \\text{We made our way between the exit of Block 2 and Block 3 of the Rossville Flats and as I emerged on to the south side of the Rossville Flats, I noticed a man lying on his back at about position K (grid reference K18). He looked to me like he was taking his last breath and I realised he had been shot. I went over to him and gave him mouth to mouth resuscitation...} \\quad ^5]
Mr. Duddy then described in his BSI statement how he searched Patrick Doherty and found some rubber bullets and a card with his name on it.(^5) He believed Patrick Doherty died soon after this:
[ \\text{I then remember Paddy Doherty taking his last gasp of breath and I cannot remember if I could feel a pulse in his neck or not. I think he then died, but other people arrived to help.} \\quad ^5]
(^5) NICRA: AM45.25; SA statement: AM45.24 paragraph 7 (^5) For example, Michael McCusker: AM160.3 paragraph 13; Paul McLaughlin: AM350.5 paragraphs 31-34 (^5) Day 171/113/01-21; the image showing the arrow pointing to her flat was saved as AH13.25 (^5) AH13.21 paragraph 39 (^5) AD144.13 paragraph 21 (^5) AD144.13 paragraph 21 (^5) AD144.13 paragraph 24. Mr. Duddy’s evidence suggests that he arrived after Patrick Walsh had already turned Mr. Doherty over. Counsel to the Tribunal sought to clarify whether Mr. Duddy was aware of anyone else on the scene at the point he arrived:
Q. You describe going over to him and giving him mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and rolling him over and seeing a bullet hole in his back in the upper lung area. I would like to show you a photograph: may we have P717? We know that at some stage the person we know to be Paddy Doherty was lying on his back in this position and there was a man crawling close to him. When you came through the gap between blocks 2 and 3, did you see any scene like that or were there more people around? A. I think there was one, there was one person there, yeah.
Q. When you first arrived you think there was one person there? Yeah, there was one person there.
Another witness, also called Patrick Doherty, gave similar evidence:
The next thing I remember was hearing the voice of Molly Barr, who I knew, in Chamberlain Street. She came and joined me along with a photographer who I think may have been foreign. Both of them were waving white handkerchiefs. At some stage, we walked between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats and out onto the south side of the Rossville Flats. It was there that I saw the body of the man I now know to be Patrick Doherty. He was lying in the position I have marked on the map (grid reference K15). I think we must have been amongst the first people to see him, as there were only two people with him at the time – a woman was praying in his ear. He was still alive, although he was very white. [Emphasis added]
During his oral evidence, Mr. Doherty said he “presumed it was a woman” who was praying in Patrick Doherty’s ear, but the person’s head was down low and he could not see. The suggestion that Patrick Doherty was still alive at this stage is supported by what Mr. Doherty said in the statement he gave on 1st February 1972. It records that there were two bodies lying south of the Rossville Flats, but only one was dead. In his BSI statement Mr. Doherty identified the two bodies he saw lying south of the Rossville Flats as Patrick Doherty and Bernard McGuigan, the latter, he said, "was obviously dead".
It is clear that Mr. Doherty arrived after the stage when Patrick Walsh crawled out to Patrick Doherty:
Q. You then make your way through the exit between blocks 2 and 3. Do you wait in that alleyway between blocks 2 and 3 for any length of time? A. No, by the time we walked round was -- I just followed Molly Barr and with whoever was along with her.
Q. The reason I ask you is because you said in paragraph 20 of your statement to this Tribunal that you thought you must have been amongst the first people to see Patrick Doherty. What you did not see, is this right, is anybody crawling out to his body?
A. No, that would have been -- we came round, we were walking round and there was people standing here in front of me and then we just looked and seen Patrick Doherty (indicating). So there was two people at him already by the time I seen him.
Certainly, at the time Father O'Gara reached Patrick Doherty, he was still alive.
Other evidence also suggests Patrick Doherty was shot significantly more than a few seconds before Bernard McGuigan.
Other evidence also clearly demonstrates that, after Patrick Doherty was shot, there was a gap in time of significantly more than one or two seconds before Bernard McGuigan was shot.
62 AD96.6 63 AD96.4 paragraph 21 64 Day 085/033/21 65 H19.6 paragraph 2 Fulvio Grimaldi saw Bernard McGuigan fall to the ground after Patrick Doherty had been already been shot. Mr. Grimaldi came through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 from the Rossville Flats car park and immediately saw the body of Patrick Doherty lying on the ground in front of him, with his head pointing towards Joseph Place. Mr. Grimaldi’s recollection was that, by this stage, Patrick Doherty had been turned onto his back.66
Mr. Grimaldi described in his BSI statement what he saw next:
I then saw a man, to my right, moving towards the body [cf Patrick Doherty]. He moved out diagonally from the area of the shops at the bottom of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. I think he took three to four steps diagonally towards Doherty. He was walking carefully and after a couple of steps I saw he was hesitant. His head jerked back, his face whipped round to the left, his body spun around and he collapsed. He was looking towards the body of Patrick Doherty when he was shot. The man fell in a position parallel to Patrick Doherty, also on his back. His right eye had been shot out and there was a hole where his eye should have been. I have since found out that the man’s name was Barney McGuigan. I was not aware of hearing the actual shot that hit him. There was shooting generally going on in this area at the time.67
Whatever might be said about Mr. Grimaldi’s obvious prejudice against the British State generally, and specifically the British Army at the time of Bloody Sunday, and the probability that he lied about a number of issues, such as the source of the bullets he presented to the Widgery Tribunal and his denial that he was aware that he had photographed Father Daly’s Gunman, it appears that he had no reason to lie to the Tribunal about witnessing Bernard McGuigan fall to the ground.
In his SR statement, made for the purposes of the Widgery Tribunal on 26th February 1972, Mr. Grimaldi also said that he witnessed Mr. McGuigan fall to the ground after seeing Mr. Doherty’s body on the ground:
66 M34.62 paragraph 62 67 M34.63 paragraph 63 The other side of the building I saw a body I now know to be Doherty's. Further down, in front of the telephone box, I saw out the corner of my eye a man spin round and fall. I now know this was Barney McGuigan. I then took photographs. Doherty was dying. I saw no blood. I photographed McGuigan. I then saw a body (Hugh Gilmore) at the corner. 68
10E-84 Mr. Grimaldi gave the same account when he gave oral evidence to the Widgery Tribunal. First, when he was being questioned by Mr. Stocker he said:
As I was passing through the passage [between Blocks 2 and 3] two bullets hit the pillar of the passage and I managed to get through. The first thing I saw was Doherty dying and then McGuigan standing and falling. 69
10E-85 Mr. Grimaldi told the Tribunal that he believed that the first photograph he took of Patrick Doherty is the one that appears at EP26/19. 70 This photograph was clearly taken after Mr. Doherty had been turned onto his back:
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68 M34.2 paragraph 7 69 M34.46 at G 70 Day 131/058/18 – 25 The first photograph Mr. Grimaldi took of Bernard McGuigan, apparently just after he had been shot, is probably the one that appears at EP26/18 (and at P318):
Referring to the photograph above, Christopher Clarke QC asked Mr. Grimaldi if he was conscious of having taken a photograph of Bernard McGuigan from his position at the entrance to the gap between Blocks 2 and 3, i.e., before he moved forward to approach the body of Patrick Doherty:
Q. Are you conscious of having taken a photograph of Barney McGuigan from this spot?
A. Yes, because it was more or less at the same — very few seconds after I noticed, coming round, Patrick Doherty on the ground, the man crawling towards him, pumping air into him and then I noticed this movement and the collapse and the fall of this man, Barney McGuigan.
Mr. Grimaldi’s evidence suggests that the shooting of Patrick Doherty preceded the shooting of Bernard McGuigan by at least enough time for him to observe Patrick Walsh tending to the fatally wounded Patrick Doherty. Perhaps more significantly, by the time Mr. Grimaldi had arrived through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3, Patrick Doherty had already been turned onto his back. 71
CONCLUSION
10E-89 If one of the two shots which Soldier F fired from the lamp post at the south eastern corner of Glenfada Park North hit Bernard McGuigan, then it is extremely unlikely that the other shot hit Patrick Doherty.
10E-90 It would follow that the shot which hit Mr. Doherty has not been accounted for by a soldier in Glenfada Park North. However, this is not surprising, bearing in mind that the forensic evidence suggests that, if Mr. Doherty was shot by a soldier, it is very unlikely that the soldier was situated in Glenfada Park North.
71 M34.62 paragraph 62 CHAPTER 10F
THE WOUNDED IN SECTOR 5
10F-I INTRODUCTION
Patrick Campbell and Daniel McGowan were both shot in the area to the south of the Rossville Flats. It is probable that they were shot from Glenfada Park North. In each case there is no evidence which identifies the soldier responsible.
10F-2 It is not envisaged that any of the Interested Parties, having regard to all the evidence, will seek to persuade the Tribunal that either Mr. Campbell or Mr. McGowan was shot from the City Walls.
10F-3 The soldiers deployed on the part of the City Walls which overlooked the area between Joseph Place and Block 2 of the Rossville Flats were all from 53 Battery, 22 LAD RA. Soldier 210 was the Battery Sergeant Major and was ultimately in charge of the supply and re-supply of ammunition for the whole Battery. His evidence, which was mentioned twice in counsel to the Tribunal’s opening speech, was never challenged. It confirms that no rounds were expended by anyone within 53 Battery.
10F-II PATRICK CAMPBELL
10F-4 There are basically two relevant issues: the location of Patrick Campbell when he was shot, and the timing of his shooting.
THE LOCATION OF MR. CAMPBELL WHEN HE WAS SHOT
10F-5 Christopher Clarke QC said in his opening:
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1 B2135.001 paragraphs 14-16 2 Day 026/107/11; Day 041/044/22 3 RMP statement: B2133. BSI statement: B2135.002 paragraph 19
FS 7.2361
X 175 The only direct account of the wounding of Patrick Campbell, in the sense of eyewitness accounts, appears in the statement of Patrick Campbell himself. I have no reason to doubt the broad accuracy of what he says about the circumstances in which he was shot.
Interestingly, there was a witness who believed that he had seen Mr. Campbell being shot. James Joseph Quinn said in his BSI statement that he saw Mr. Campbell shot on Fahan Street East, near the entrance to the car park south of Joseph Place.
However, if it was in fact Mr. Campbell that he saw in that location, it was almost certainly after Mr. Campbell had been shot. Indeed, when Mr. Quinn gave oral evidence, he accepted that he may not have seen Mr. Campbell actually being shot.
Mr. Quinn's evidence about the location in which Mr. Campbell was shot is not corroborated by Mr. Campbell's own description of where he was at the time. The Tribunal is in possession of the two principal accounts given by Mr. Campbell in the weeks after he was shot. It wasn't possible for this Tribunal to take a fresh statement from him as he died in the mid-1980s.
Mr. Campbell gave the first of these accounts in a statement taken by Detective Sergeant Cudmore on 7th February 1972.
I stood for some time beyond the wee barricade, which is outside the Rossville High flats looking down towards William Street, where they were throwing the gas. The Army tanks then came into Rossville Street and the soldiers jumped out and at this I turned and ran towards the gable end of the High Rossville Flats. I stood there for a few minutes and I then ran across the waste ground towards Free Derry Corner. I then felt like a thud in my lower back and fell
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4 Day 037/094/08\
5 AQ10.7 paragraphs 36-37; see the map he marked with the location at AQ10.8\
6 AH11.6 paragraphs 32 and 33\
7 Day 179/094/13\
8 AC14.5 paragraph 28 onto my knees. I put my hand to my hip and I saw there was blood on it. I then put my hand up and called that I was shot. Some men then came and took me into a house near Free Derry Corner, and I was kept waiting there for a car to take me to hospital.
It is not clear what he meant by “the waste ground”. The relevant area is shown in a photograph that appears to have been taken from the Rossville Flats:
Fortunately, Mr. Campbell’s second account is more precise. The Sunday Times still had this note of an account he gave them on 1st March 1972:
I moved along Rossville Street and crossed the barricade outside the flats and stood there. As I looked back down Rossville Street I saw the Saracens coming in. I saw soldiers jumping out and when the shooting began I made a dive for cover behind a small gable near the telephone box. From there I could see soldiers milling about in Glen fadda [sic] park. I then made a dash for Joseph Place and was shot in the back (the wound is in the spine). After that he remembers virtually nothing (he is a deeply inarticulate man) he knows he was carried into a house, he thinks in Columbus Wells or Joseph Place.
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9 ED27.7 10 P330 provided by the Imperial War Museum, undated. 11 AC19.1 This account is consistent with the one he gave to the police three weeks earlier insofar as it records that he spent some time at the gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and that this was the starting point for his journey south. However, he was shot while on his way to Joseph Place, not Free Derry Corner. This is not necessarily a contradiction. From his starting point at the southern end of Block 1, Joseph Place would have been in a broadly similar direction to that of Free Derry Corner.
Although the Sunday Times note does not state whether he had reached Joseph Place before he was hit, its construction suggests that the bullet struck him while en route to Joseph Place. If this is right, it would appear that he was most probably shot somewhere within the triangle marked on the map below:
Mr. Campbell may have given a more precise description of the location to the Sunday Times which wasn’t recorded in their note. They published a map with their article of 23rd April 1972 and the location in which he was shot was marked with the letter H. 12
WHEN WAS PATRICK CAMPBELL SHOT?
10F-15 There is no reason to doubt Mr. Campbell’s account of seeing soldiers in Glenfada Park North while he was at the southern end of Block 1:
As I looked back down Rossville Street I saw the Saracens coming in. I saw soldiers jumping out and when the shooting began I made a dive for cover behind a small gable near the telephone box. From there I could see soldiers milling about in Glenfada [sic] park. I then made a dash for Joseph Place and was shot in the back... [emphasis added]. 13
10F-16 This indicates that he must have been shot after soldiers had deployed into Glenfada Park North.
12 L212 It seems almost certain that he was shot before Daniel McGowan, as the evidence dealt with below illustrates.
Similar issues of location and timing are relevant to the shooting of Daniel McGowan.
Mr. McGowan described in his BSI statement where he first saw Mr. Campbell:
*It was then that I saw Patrick Campbell, whom I knew, walking like a man who had a few bottles in him. When I first saw him, Paddy was in the area to the south of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats by the shops which were on its ground floor. This area is marked C on the map. Paddy was leaning against the wall of the shops, as if to prevent himself from falling, and was staggering in a south easterly direction towards Joseph Place. In my view he had emerged from the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats.*
The relevant part of the map attached to his BSI statement is reproduced below:
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13 AC19.1 14 AM255.2 paragraph 10 15 AM255.9 Having realised that Mr. Campbell was injured, Mr. McGowan helped him to the alleyway behind Joseph Place:
I went over to Paddy and helped him to the alleyway to the east of Joseph Place, the entrance to which is marked D on the map. I only realised he had been hit when he saw me and said "I am shot, I am shot." I could not see where he had been hit as he was wearing a heavy coat.... The alleyway to which I helped Paddy is formed by the gap between the wall on the southern side of the houses in Joseph Place and a retaining wall for the steep banking that leads up to the City Walls. It was packed with men, women and children taking cover from the shooting. It was so packed that it was difficult for me and Paddy to fit in. I realised that I could not take Paddy much further (as he weighed some 15 stone) so I left him in the care of some people in the alleyway at the point D on the map. 16
Mr. McGowan went on, in the next paragraph of his BSI statement, to give an account of how he was then shot. There is no reason to doubt the sequence of events as he described it. If Mr. McGowan was shot after Mr. Campbell, it follows that he too was shot after soldiers in Mortar Platoon had deployed into Glenfada Park North.
THE LOCATION OF MR. MCGOWAN WHEN HE WAS SHOT
Mr. McGowan appears to have given different accounts of where he was situated when he was shot. His SC statement, dated 28th February 1972, which was made for the purposes of the Widgery Tribunal, suggests he was shot at the top of the Joseph Place alleyway:
I ran over and caught [Patrick Campbell] by the arm and helped him along towards the rear of the houses on Joseph's Place. Just as I had pushed him round the corner of the rear of the houses my right leg folded underneath me and I realised that I was shot. I went unconscious for a very short while. When I came to, I dragged
16 AM255.2 paragraphs 11 and 12 myself round the corner of the houses and proceeded along for about 15 yards. 17
10F-24 This accounts suggests that Mr. McGowan was shot at point A:
10F-25 In his BSI statement on the other hand, Mr. McGowan appears to suggest he was closer to point B:
\[Having left Mr. Campbell in the care of people in the Joseph Place alleyway... I then decided to make my way up another set of steps which lead from the entrance of the alleyway to Fahan Street East.... I was on the very first step at the bottom of these steps when I was shot. I have marked the position as “E” on the map. My recollection is that as I headed from the alleyway to the steps, there was a lot of shooting going on. 18
10F-26 It is possible that Mr. McGowan was confused when he gave his BSI statement. He appears to have been under the impression that the entrance to the alleyway behind Joseph Place was right next to the bottom of the steps leading up to Fahan
17 AM255.5 18 AM255.2 paragraphs 12-13 Street East. Two sentences in his BSI statement are clues which suggest this was the case:
The alleyway to which I helped Paddy is formed by the gap between the wall on the southern side of the houses in Joseph Place and a retaining wall for the steep banking which leads up to the City Walls.... I then decided to make my way up another set of steps which lead from the entrance of the alleyway to Fahan Street East, and which are shown on the map at grid references K/L19/20. 19
If Mr. McGowan was labouring under this misapprehension, it would explain the apparent discrepancy between the account he gave to the Widgery Tribunal and the account he gave to this Tribunal. However, his BSI statement also contains sentences which suggest that he was aware that the Fahan Street steps and the entrance to the alleyway behind Joseph Place were not right next to each other.20
This apparent inconsistency in his BSI statement was never clarified in oral examination as Mr. McGowan was too ill to be called (and is now deceased). However, whether he was shot at the entrance to the alleyway behind Joseph Place or at the bottom of the steps leading up to Fahan Street East, he is most likely to have been shot from the direction of Glenfada Park North.
CONCLUSION
The evidence suggests that Patrick Campbell and Daniel McGowan were both shot in the area to the south of the Rossville Flats. In that location they would have been within sight of any soldiers in Glenfada Park North or on Rossville Street south of the rubble barricade.
The shots which hit Mr. Campbell and Mr. McGowan were probably fired by a soldier situated in Glenfada Park North. If Bernard McGuigan was also shot by a soldier in Glenfada Park North, then it follows that not all the shots that were fired from that location have been accounted for.
19 AM255.2 paragraph 12 (contains both sentences) The fact that at least one shot which was fired into Sector 5 has not been accounted for raises a question as to who fired it. Whoever did, there is no evidential basis for a conclusion that Soldier F must be responsible for this and any other shot unaccounted for that was fired into Sector 5 simply because he admitted firing two shots into Sector 5.
20 For example, see: AM255.2 paragraph 13, second sentence
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6eb6c7f3f0cd35d44e001114122f52b98e486f68 | ## INFORMATION ON SERIES OF DOCUMENTS
| Series | BT 156, BT 157 & BT 153 | |--------|-------------------------| | **Title** | BT 156: Board of Trade: Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen: Monthly Lists of Deaths of Seamen 1886-1890\
BT 157: Board of Trade: Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen: Registers of Seamen's Deaths, Classified by Cause 1882-1888\
BT 153: Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen and predecessor: Registers of Wages and Effects of Deceased Seamen 1852-1889 | | **Structure** | BT 156 is arranged by chronologically by year, 1 volume per year except for BT 156/1, which covers 1886-1887.\
BT 157 is arranged chronologically, each volume consists of half a year (Jan to June or July to Dec), except for BT 157/1 which covers all of 1882.\
BT 153 is arranged chronologically by year. | | **Size/Scope** | Approx 6600 images for BT 156&7, Approx 15400 images for BT 153.\
BT 156 consists of 4 bound volumes, and contains lists of the death of seamen kept by the Registrar General of Shipping for 1886 to 1890. These were compiled monthly, usually from crew lists and agreements. The records provide name and age, rating, nationality or birth place, last address, cause and place of death, ship’s name, official number and port of registry\
BT 157 consists of 9 bound volumes containing the registers of seaman’s deaths kept by the Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen for 1882-1888. These manuscript lists classified the entries by cause and were compiled twice a year. The records give name and age, rating, nationality or birth place, last address, cause and place of death, ship’s name, official number and port of registry and also gives the information about the last voyage. The column marked ‘remarks.’ May also contain additional information.\
BT 153 consists of 22 bound volumes contains registers of the Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen containing entries of the receipt of dead sailors’ wages and effects (such as clothes of sea-chests), or their proceeds, handed to Shipping Masters by the masters of British ships |
Whilst The National Archives endeavours to ensure that the information is correct, in no event shall The National Archives be responsible for any loss or damage of any kind arising out of access to or reliance on or use of any information. This document is intended to provide guidance only and it is recommended that personal research of the records be undertaken. | Series | BT 156, BT 157 & BT 153 | |--------|-------------------------| | **Physical Format and Condition** | Large bound registers, stored in cardboard boxes, the majority of which are approx. A2 size although size is highly variable. Condition is good, although some pages are creased with torn edges, some paper is fragile. Some pages are blank in a small number of cases. BT 153 has variable, sometimes poor condition of binding, some is fragile. BT 156 is compiled of foliated printed lists, while BT 157 consists of manuscript registers. Mainly fair to good condition, the condition of bindings is variable. Approx 150-200 pages per volume in BT 156, 250-350 in BT 157, and 400 pages in BT 153, pages are double sided in the main, a mixture of printed forms and handwritten information. | | **Popularity** | In conjunction with the BT 334 registers, these lists could be extremely valuable to family historians for tracing merchant seamen who died at sea. It is expected that popularity would increase with increase in the general knowledge on availability of the records. | | **Copyright clearance** | Crown Copyright | | **Research Guide** | Births, Marriages and Deaths at Sea | | **Possible areas for indexing** | Name, Date of Death, Name of Ship, Official Number of Ship |
Whilst The National Archives endeavours to ensure that the information is correct, in no event shall The National Archives be responsible for any loss or damage of any kind arising out of access to or reliance on or use of any information. This document is intended to provide guidance only and it is recommended that personal research of the records be undertaken.
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85f4a853d788d78ea159c94bcf070560be9b1c11 | BT digital archives
- UK’s telecoms heritage now online -
A £1 million project to digitise BT’s historical collection of photos and documents has today brought 165 years of UK telecoms heritage to the public’s fingertips with the launch of an interactive online archive.
Jisc, who provide digital services for UK education and research, funded Coventry University and partners, BT and The National Archives, to digitise over 500,000 photographs, reports and correspondence preserved by BT since 1846 - and create a searchable online catalogue.
For the first time this remarkable collection - which is recognised by UNESCO and Arts Council England as being of international importance - will be accessible to a global audience. Users from around the world will be able to log on to www.bt.com/btdigitalarchives and explore 50 terabytes worth of images and documents showcasing Britain’s pioneering role in the development of telecommunications and the impact of the technology on society.
The records detail how Britain laid the foundations for global telecommunications, from the first telephone exchange in 1879 to the Queen making the first automatic long distance telephone call in the fifties.
Highlights from the BT digital archives include:
- documents relating to the establishment of BT’s ancestor company, the Electric Telegraph Company, which in 1846 became the first of its kind in the world;
- a letter from 1877 from Alexander Graham Bell’s agent offering Bell’s telephone to the British government - who turned it down photos of Britain’s first telephone kiosks with concept drawings and correspondence detailing their design and public reaction to their introduction;
pictorial records of the advent of the world’s first emergency call service, 999.
an image of Central Telegraph Office staff dealing with telegrams about the birth in 1948 of Prince Charles
Notes from Winston Churchill and an image of him working next to an early ‘golfball’ candlestick telephone in 1915 - the telephone handset had incorrectly been replaced upside down after a call
photographs of bomb damaged streets and buildings around the UK during WWII
documents illustrating the role of British telecommunications workers in the war effort during both world wars
An image of Jane Cain, the telephone operator and actress recording Speaking Clock messages in 1935
The project and its new website – which has been built by Coventry University’s Serious Games International – is a valuable online resource for anyone interested in social history including teachers, students, researchers and the general public, who for the first time will have easy access to an archive of cultural and technological significance to the UK.
David Hay, Head of Heritage at BT Group, said: “BT’s archive documents over a century of the achievements of British telecommunications engineers and scientists in pushing the boundaries of communications technology. I’m constantly fascinated by the photographs and documents in the archive- it’s fantastic that the public can now enjoy it so easily, using our technology and networks”.
Chris Mumby, Head of Commercial Delivery at The National Archives said: ‘Our renowned expertise in creating and preserving digitised records ensures that this important collection is accessible to more people now and in the future.’ Professor Neil Forbes, Director of Research at Coventry University, said: “It is a great pleasure to be able to launch the BT digital archives. Teams of experts from across the partners involved have worked together to produce an extraordinarily rich and important online archive. It’s a magnificent achievement.”
Paola Marchionni, programme manager, Jisc said: “We’re very proud at Jisc to have funded the digitisation of this internationally recognised archive. The strength of this project lies in a partnership that goes beyond the higher education sector and which has made openly available 100,000s of digital resources for just anybody to enjoy. At the same time, the academic team has produced fascinating case studies which show how digitised archival material can be used to explore new avenues both in research and teaching in a wide range of subjects, from design to linguistic and cultural studies.”
For further information, please contact The National Archives Press Office on 0208 392 5277 or [email protected]
Notes to Editors
About The National Archives For the record, for good…The National Archives is a government department and an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). As the official archive of the UK government and England and Wales, we look after and make available to the public a collection of historical records dating back over 1,000 years, including records as diverse as Domesday Book and MI5 files.
Our 21st-century role is to collect and secure the future of the record, both digital and physical, to preserve it for generations to come, and to make it as accessible as possible. We do this by devising technological solutions to ensure the long-term survival of public records and working to widen access to our collection. The National Archives also advises on information management across government, publishes all UK legislation, manages Crown copyright and leads the archive sector. We work to promote and improve access to public sector information and its re-use.
Follow the press office on Twitter @TNApressofficer and for general news @UkNatArchives. About BT BT is one of the world’s leading providers of communications services and solutions, serving customers in more than 170 countries. Its principal activities include the provision of networked IT services globally; local, national and international telecommunications services to its customers for use at home, at work and on the move; broadband and internet products and services and converged fixed/mobile products and services. BT consists principally of four lines of business: BT Global Services, BT Retail, BT Wholesale and Openreach.
In the year ended 31 March 2013, BT Group’s revenue was £18,017m with profit before taxation of £2,501m.
British Telecommunications plc (BT) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of BT Group plc and encompasses virtually all businesses and assets of the BT Group. BT Group plc is listed on stock exchanges in London and New York.
For more information, visit www.btplc.com
About BT Heritage BT’s commitment to its heritage is published in its Heritage Policy (www.bt.com/archives) adopted in 2004. BT is the only major company to have made such a public commitment to safeguard its heritage on behalf of the nation.
BT continues to fulfil this long-standing commitment to preserve and make accessible Britain’s rich telecommunications history, still being made today.
About Coventry University Coventry University is a modern, forward-looking university whose roots can be traced back to 1843 to the Coventry College of Design. With both a proud tradition as a provider of high quality education and a focus on multidisciplinary applied research, the University has established an academic presence regionally, nationally and across the world.
Through its links with leading-edge organisations and its longstanding culture of business support, the institution has earned a strong reputation for enterprise and innovation which sees it work with more SMEs each year than any other university, and helped it to secure the Times Higher Education ‘Entrepreneurial University of the Year’ award in 2011. Find out more at www.coventry.ac.uk.
About Jisc Jisc offers digital services for UK education and research, owned by the Association of Colleges (AoC), GuildHE and Universities UK (UUK). The charity enables people in higher education, further education and skills in the UK to perform at the forefront of international practice by exploiting fully the possibilities of modern, digital empowerment, content and connectivity. Jisc has been at the forefront of the practical application of technology in schools, colleges and universities for over two decades. We’ve earned a reputation as a trusted partner for the education and research sectors and today we combine the latest in digital thinking, network and IT services with access to content and resource procurement to deliver new and better ways of working for all customers to achieve operational advantage.
Find out more at www.jisc.ac.uk
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10d2a400a2d3b0a7f822c2ea133493b32a8a49dc | | No. of Badge | Name | Rank or Rating | Ship | Cause of Incapacity | |-------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 57 | W.H. Phillips | 2nd Mate | s.s. "Sebek" | Pulmonary Tuberculosis, caused by exposure in an open boat after the vessel was sunk. | | 58 | E.G. Hogg | 2nd Engineer | "Coquet" | Nervous prostration caused by being exposed in an open boat and made prisoner by Arabs, after the vessel was torpedoed. | | 59 | H. Brown | Messroom Steward | "Stanley" | Frostbite, resulting in the amputation of 5 toes from the right foot and 2 from the left. | | 60 | M. McDonald | 2nd Officer | "Earl of Forfar" | Left Lower leg fractured, left forearm fractured and amputated 3 inch above elbow joint, and other injuries caused by explosion at Archangel on a Russian munition vessel. | | 61 | J.W. Smith | Master | "Lady Charlotte" | Nervous breakdown caused by war conditions. | | 62 | W.H. Jones, | General Steward | s.s. "Turakina" | Heart disease and neurasthenia caused through shock at time of torpedoing of the "Turakina". | | 63 | W. Oseman | Senior Wireless Operator | H.M.T. "Cameronian" | Nervous breakdown and heart trouble caused through shock, result of being twice torpedoed. | | 64 | W. McKinlay | Second Mate | s.s. "Coningbeg" | Pulmonary tuberculosis | | 65 | G.W. Marchant | Seaman | s.s. "Stobart" | Fractured thigh and injury to knee when ship was mined. |
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98e60c87b60da3077a7f5f79f8cbc889fbd00da1 | Surname: ABBAS Christian names: HASSAN Place of birth: Aden Year of birth: 1881 Mercantile Marine Ribbon issued: 23.4.20 to M.M.O. British Medal Ribbon issued: 23.4.20 to M.M.O. Mercantile Marine Medal issued: 16.1.21 to M.M.O. British Medal issued: 16.1.21 to M.M.O. Clasps issued: 161 Application dated 23 Apr 1920 sent to Grangemouth
Address
Retd. 17. 5. 20
(Is) (62823) Wt. 37687/353 100,000 12-18 W B & L
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9a49e005cc9695ebbd5e4ad0a692ad797a18f13a | The Budget 2014
Overview
On 19 March 2014, Chancellor George Osborne delivered his 5th annual Budget. It built on his previous announcements made in the Autumn Statement 2013 providing an update on the economy and future plans for public spending and taxation. Full details and further information on the Budget can be found on the Treasury’s website.¹
The Budget contained a number of policies, which will directly impact on local government. The key headlines for London local government are outlined below:
Key issues for London Councils …
01. Government Property Unit’s Strategic Land and Property Review has identified scope to generate £5bn of receipts from land and property nationally
02. Help to Buy: equity loan scheme extended to March 2020
03. £150m fund to be set up to kick start the regeneration of large housing estates through repayable loans
04. The Government will work with the Mayor of London and the GLA to develop proposals for extending the Gospel Oak to Barking Line to Barking Riverside
05. It will also work with the GLA and the London Borough of Barnet to look at proposals for the Brent Cross regeneration scheme
06. Government will publish a prospectus by Easter 2014, setting out how local authorities can develop proposals for bringing forward new garden cities
07. Welfare cap to be set at £119bn in 2015-16, rising with inflation to £127bn in 2018-19
08. Phase 2 of the Troubled Families programme to be rolled out in 2014-15
09. £50m for an early years pupil premium, to help improve outcomes for the most disadvantaged three and four year-olds
10. £140m of new funding to repair flood defences that have suffered damage
11. £200m “potholes challenge fund” established across UK
12. Public Works Loan Board borrowing limit to increase from £70bn to £95bn
Economic Outlook
Alongside the Budget, the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) published new forecasts for the economy and the public finances, taking into account Budget policy measures. It has assessed whether the Government is on course to meet its medium-term fiscal objectives:
1. to balance the cyclically-adjusted current budget (CACB) by the end of a rolling, five-year period, which is now 2018-19; and
2. to see public sector net debt (PSND) falling as a share of GDP in 2015-16.
The OBR has concluded that the Government has “a greater than 50 per cent chance” of meeting the fiscal mandate. The current projections suggest that the second rule will not be met with debt only starting to fall as a proportion of GDP in 2016-17².
¹ https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/budget-2014 ² http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/economic-fiscal-outlook-march-2014/ **Growth**
GDP growth projections for 2014 and 2015 have been revised up since the 2013 Autumn Statement. However, forecasts for 2017 and 2018 have fallen since December (see Chart 1 below).
**Chart 1 – Change in GDP growth forecasts since Budget 2013**
![Chart showing GDP growth forecasts]
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility; Economic and Fiscal Outlooks
**Economic & fiscal indicators**
Table 1 below outlines the key economic and fiscal indicators underpinning the Budget. Public sector net borrowing will decrease each year until 2018 when there will be a small surplus.
The OBR expects CPI inflation to be below target at 1.9% in 2014 and then to stay at the 2.0% target for the rest of the forecast period.
Unemployment will continue to fall, reducing from 7.6% to 5.4% by 2018. At the start of 2014 the claimant count was 1.2 million, the lowest level since December 2008, and the OBR now expects it to fall below 1 million in 2017 for the first time since 2008.
**Table 1 – Key economic and fiscal indicators**
| | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | |----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------| | Growth (GDP % on prior year) | 1.8% | 2.7% | 2.3% | 2.6% | 2.6% | 2.5% | | Public sector net borrowing (£bn) | 107.8 | 95.5 | 75.2 | 44.5 | 16.5 | -4.8 | | Public sector net debt (% of GDP) | 74.5% | 77.3% | 78.7% | 78.3% | 76.5% | 74.2% | | Public sector net borrowing (deficit as % of GDP) | 6.6% | 5.5% | 4.2% | 2.4% | 0.8% | -0.2% | | Unemployment rate (%) | 7.6% | 6.8% | 6.5% | 6.1% | 5.7% | 5.4% | | Employment (millions) | 29.9 | 30.4 | 30.6 | 30.9 | 31.2 | 31.4 | | CPI inflation (%) | 2.6% | 1.9% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.0% |
Source: HMT – Budget 2014; OBR - Economic and Fiscal Outlook March 2014 Budget 2014 – Announcements affecting London local government
Public Spending
- Total Managed Expenditure (TME) will continue to fall in 2016-17 and 2017-18 at the same rate as over this Parliament.
- By 2018-19 this is equivalent to a £4.5 billion reduction in TME.
- TME will be reduced by around a further £2 billion each year from 2016-17 taking account of permanent reductions in departmental revenue budgets announced at the Autumn Statement.
- A permanent reduction to Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) of £725 million will be made in 2015-16 to ensure that public sector employers are meeting the cost of public service pension schemes, rising to around £1 billion a year from 2016-17 onwards.
- Spending cuts will continue to affect local government funding from central government (see appendix B for further explanation).
Public sector pay & pensions
- The Government confirmed that in 2014-15 pay awards for most public sector workers covered by the recent Pay Review Body recommendations will be limited to 1%.
- The Government is removing progression pay in the civil service by 2015-16. Proposals have now been agreed with departments covering over 50% of the civil service workforce.
- The Government will pilot pay bill control in a number of central government organisations from 2014-15. This is a new method of pay restraint where the overall pay budget is controlled for the organisation, rather than average pay awards.
- The Government will introduce new employer contribution rates for the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme, the NHS Pension Scheme (E&W), the Police Pension Scheme (E&W) applying from 1 April 2015 and for the Teachers’ Pension Scheme (E&W) applying from 1 September 2015.
Public sector land and property
- Government Property Unit’s Strategic Land and Property Review has identified scope to generate £5 billion of receipts from land and property nationally.
- By Autumn Statement 2014 the Government will look to quantify its housing and growth ambitions for this new surplus land programme.
- Government Property Unit will increase its work with local areas on better use of public sector assets, linking in with Growth Deals and building on the Strategic Land and Property Review.
- As with the One Public Estate pilots already taking place, this work will focus on opportunities for cross public sector working, efficiency and growth.
Housing
- The Government will extend the Help to Buy: equity loan scheme to March 2020 to help a further 120,000 households purchase a home.
- The Help to Buy: mortgage guarantee scheme will continue to support access to high loan to value mortgages until the scheme ends on 31 December 2016.
- The Government will consult on creating a new ‘Right to Build’, giving custom builders a right to a plot from councils, and a £150 million repayable fund to help provide up to 10,000 serviced plots for custom build.
- The Government will also look to make the Help to Buy: equity loan scheme available for custom build.
- The Government will shortly consult on the design of a priority ‘Right to Move’ for social tenants to increase their mobility for work-related reasons. Options will include giving such tenants priority when a new social home becomes available, and setting aside a pool of vacant lets to enable them to move across local authority boundaries. • The Government will establish a £150 million fund to kick start the regeneration of large housing estates through repayable loans. Expressions of interest have already been made through the GLA relating to the Aylesbury Estate, Blackwall Reach and Grahame Park regeneration projects in London. • The Government will work with the Mayor of London and GLA to develop proposals for extending the Gospel Oak to Barking Line to Barking Riverside, and to ensure that any public investment unlocks the construction of up to 11,000 new homes. • It will also work with the GLA and the London Borough of Barnet to look at proposals for the Brent Cross regeneration scheme, subject to value for money and affordability. • The Government will support a new Garden City at Ebbsfleet with capacity for up to 15,000 new homes, based on existing brownfield land. Up to £200 million of infrastructure funding will be available to kick start development. • The Government will publish a prospectus by Easter 2014, setting out how local authorities could develop their own proposals for bringing forward new garden cities.
Welfare cap • The Budget 2014 caps welfare spending in scope for the years 2015-16 to 2018-19 at the level of the OBR’s forecast, as published in the OBR’s March 2014 ‘Economic and fiscal outlook’ (see Table 2, and Chart 2 for a comparison with past trends).
Table 2 – Welfare Spending Cap
| | 2015-16 | 2016-17 | 2017-18 | 2018-19 | |----------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | Welfare cap (£bn) | 119.5 | 122.0 | 124.6 | 126.7 |
Source: OBR, March 2014 EFO (Table 4.28)
• The cap will apply to all welfare spending in AME, with the exception of the state pension and the automatic stabilisers. • A forecast margin of 2% above this level will ensure that policy action is not triggered by small fluctuations in the forecast, but will not allow for discretionary policy action which breaches the level of the cap. • In future, any new lines of spending that fall within the OBR’s social security or personal tax credits forecasts and impact upon Public Sector Current Expenditure will be presumed to be included within the cap. • The welfare cap will be included in the ‘Charter for Budget Responsibility’ alongside the fiscal mandate. (OBR’s first assessment of performance in Autumn Statement 2014).
Chart 2 - Trends in welfare spending
Source: OBR, March 2014, EFO (Chart 4.5) Troubled Families Programme
- The Government will roll-out **Phase 2 of the Troubled Families programme** in 2014-15, providing support for up to 40,000 families with multiple and costly problems.
Tax-Free Childcare
- Budget 2014 confirms that the **Tax-Free Childcare costs cap will be increased to £10,000 per year for each child.**
- This will mean that eligible parents can now benefit from greater support, worth up to **£2,000 per child** from autumn 2015.
- Tax-Free Childcare will be rolled out to all eligible families with children under 12 within the first year of the scheme’s operation.
Education and skills
- Budget 2014 announces **£50 million for an early years pupil premium**, to help improve outcomes for the most disadvantaged three and four year-olds in government-funded early education.
- The Government is investing **£350 million to increase the per-pupil school budgets of the least fairly funded local areas in 2015-16.**
- The Government is building on the **Apprenticeship Grants for Employers scheme**, by providing an extra **£85 million in 2014-15 and 2015-16 for over 100,000 grants to employers.**
- The Government will provide **£20 million over 2 years to support apprenticeships up to postgraduate level.**
Arts & culture
- The Government will introduce **Theatre Tax Relief** from September 2014. This relief will support the production of plays, musicals, opera, ballet and dance at a rate of 25% for touring productions and 20% for other theatre productions. A consultation on the relief will be launched shortly.
Infrastructure
- Budget 2014 provides **£140 million of new funding to repair flood defences** that have suffered damage.
- The Government is developing a **long-term plan** that will direct this investment to protect the country from future flooding and will publish this in the autumn.
- Budget 2014 provides an extra **£200 million, across the UK, to set up a potholes challenge fund** to help authorities to repair up to 3.2 million potholes following the severe weather.
- The Government has commissioned HS2 Ltd to develop proposals for accelerating the HS2 project and opening the line to Crewe by 2027, 6 years earlier than planned, as well as exploring options for undertaking a **substantial redevelopment of Euston station.**
- The Government will provide **£20 million for a grant scheme for repairs to cathedrals in recognition of their heritage significance and role in forthcoming remembrance activities to commemorate the First World War.**
- The Government will take the legal powers needed to increase the **current Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) limit of £70 billion to up to £95 billion in future to enable local authorities to continue to borrow from the PWLB.**
- There will be a new air ambulance for London.
Reform of the planning system
- The Government will review the **General Permitted Development Order**, consulting on specific change of use measures, including greater flexibilities for change to residential use, for example from warehouses and light industry structures, and allowing businesses greater flexibilities to expand facilities such as car parks and loading bays within existing boundaries, where there is little impact on local communities. Local growth
- Business rate discounts and Enhanced Capital Allowances in Enterprise Zones will each be extended by 3 years as an incentive for new and expanding businesses to locate there.
Waste and other environmental taxes
- The aggregates levy rate will remain at £2 per tonne in 2014-15.
- Legislation will be introduced to suspend elements of the aggregates levy that are subject to a formal state aid investigation by the European Commission, from 1 April 2014.
- The standard and lower rates of landfill tax will increase in line with the RPI, rounded to the nearest 5 pence, from 1 April 2015.
- The government will introduce a loss on ignition testing regime on fines (residual waste from waste processing) from waste transfer stations by April 2015. Only fines below a 10% threshold would be considered eligible for the lower rate. Full proposals will be set out in a consultation document later in 2014.
- The value of the landfill communities fund for 2014-15 will be reduced to £71 million. As a result, the cap on contributions by landfill operators will be amended to 5.1%.
- Measures announced at this Budget will result in the proportion of revenue from environmental taxes increasing from 0.5% to 0.8% over this Parliament, in accordance with the coalition commitment. Appendix A – Public spending reductions to 2018-19
Today’s Budget outlines overall public spending figures to 2018-19 (see Table A1 below). While Resource AME continues to rise, overall Government Resource DEL (which is largely where local government funding comes from) will fall by £30bn in cash terms from 2013-14 to 2018-19.
In line with previous policy, the government has set a fiscal assumption that Total Managed Expenditure (TME) in 2016-17 and 2017-18 will continue to fall at the same rate as over this Parliament. As set out in Autumn Statement 2013, TME will be held flat in real terms in 2018-19. Reflecting permanent reductions to spending as a result of the spending reductions announced at Autumn Statement and the reduced AME costs of public service pensions, TME will be reduced by around a further £2 billion each year from 2016-17. Departments remain ahead of their consolidation targets and are forecast to underspend by £7 billion in 2013-14.
Table A1 – Total Managed Expenditure to 2018-19
| | 2013-14 | 2014-15 | 2015-16 | 2016-17 | 2017-18 | 2018-19 | |----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | **CURRENT EXPENDITURE** | | | | | | | | Resource AME | 326.2 | 341.6 | 356.3 | 373.6 | 391.6 | 407.5 | | Resource DEL, excluding depreciation | 315.4 | 317.9 | 312.9 | | | | | Ring-fenced depreciation | 26.4 | 20.4 | 22.3 | | | | | **Implied Resource DEL, including depreciation** | 325.2 | 314.8 | 311.8 | | | | | **Public sector current expenditure** | 667.9 | 679.9 | 691.5 | 698.8 | 706.4 | 719.3 | | **CAPITAL EXPENDITURE** | | | | | | | | Capital AME | 6.5 | 6.3 | 5.1 | 3.4 | 5.5 | 6.0 | | Capital DEL | 41.1 | 45.9 | 47.0 | | | | | **Implied Capital DEL** | | | | | | | | **Public sector gross investment** | 47.6 | 52.1 | 52.1 | 53.8 | 54.8 | 57.2 | | **TOTAL MANAGED EXPENDITURE** | 715.5 | 732.0 | 743.6 | 752.5 | 761.2 | 776.5 | | Total Managed Expenditure (% GDP) | 43.5% | 42.5% | 41.6% | 40.2% | 38.9% | 38.0% |
Memo: average annual real growth in Total Managed Expenditure (2010-11 to 2015-16): -0.7%
Source: Budget 2014 (Table 2.3, p.60)
Resource DEL figures in the Budget are slightly higher in 2013-14 and 2014-15 than previously forecast at the 2013 Autumn Statement (see Chart A1 below). Forecasts for 2016-17 and 2017-18, are lower than forecast in December, while the 2018-19 figures are up slightly because of revisions to ONS and OBR GDP deflators.
Chart A1 - Projected Government RDEL (incl. depreciation)
Source: Budget 2013 (Table 2.3); Autumn Statement 2013 (Table 2.3); Budget 2014 (Table 2.3). Appendix B – Potential impact on local government
The Resource DEL figures outlined in the Budget (see Tables B1 and B2 below) show a real terms reduction to overall government DEL in 2015-16 of 2.5%. We know from Spending Round 2013 and the illustrative 2015-16 local government finance settlement that this translated to a real terms cut of 10% to local government RDEL, and a 15% real terms cut to Settlement Funding Assessment for local authorities (16% for London boroughs).
It is, therefore, concerning that the figures published today show overall government RDEL reducing by 4.5% in real terms in 2016-17 and 5.3% in 2017-18 and 2.9% in 2018-19. If the Government continues to ring-fence certain departments, then further cuts to local government of similar or greater severity are likely over the medium-term.
Table B1 - Government spending projections (Budget 2014)
| | 2013-14 | 2014-15 | 2015-16 | 2016-17 | 2017-18 | 2018-19 | |----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | Resource AME | 326.2 | 341.6 | 356.3 | 373.6 | 391.6 | 407.5 | | Resource DEL (incl. dep) | 341.8 | 338.3 | 335.2 | 326.2 | 314.8 | 311.8 | | Public sector current expenditure | 667.9 | 679.9 | 691.5 | 698.2 | 706.4 | 719.3 | | Total Managed Expenditure | 715.5 | 732.0 | 743.6 | 752.5 | 761.2 | 776.5 |
Source: Budget 2014 (Table 2.3)
Table B2 - Real terms % change on previous year
| | 2013-14 | 2014-15 | 2015-16 | 2016-17 | 2017-18 | 2018-19 | |----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| | Resource AME | - | 2.5% | 2.7% | 2.9% | 2.9% | 2.0% | | Resource DEL (incl. dep) | - | -3.2% | -2.5% | -4.5% | -5.3% | -2.9% | | Public sector current expenditure | - | -0.4% | 0.1% | -0.8% | -0.8% | -0.2% | | Total Managed Expenditure | - | 0.1% | 0.0% | -0.7% | -0.7% | 0.0% |
Source: Budget 2014 (Table 2.3)
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95d060ed12f82ec5d6deb8c8868767479705e909 | The National Archives Education Service
HOLDING HISTORY What can we learn from an Archive? Holding History is a stop motion animated film created by students during a week-long workshop at The National Archives. The film was designed to highlight key historical stories from within our collection and covers a variety of time periods and themes. When making the film, students were asked to consider:
What is The National Archives? How has it changed and developed over the centuries? And what are the challenges, threats and importance of an archive in today’s world?
Each student was then given a specific story to research within our records before they could storyboard, design, create and capture their stop motion sets.
These finished film clips can now be used by teachers and students as brief overviews, introductions or interest points for the various topics explored within the film. These accompanying questions are designed to work alongside the film clip, to guide students in thinking about what they have learned from the clip or from their lessons and previous knowledge. Some questions can be answered from the film itself, others are intended to be answered after class discussion or independent thought.
The clips can also work as a model for student’s creative exploration of history, allowing students to see what can be done to tell stories from history and inspire their own creative work – either through animation, drawing, storytelling or other creative exploits.
NOTE TO STUDENTS
You will need to listen to the narrator of the film clip to answer some of these questions. Other questions require you to study images included within the film clip or require your own ideas and opinions based on your own knowledge. Read through the questions before you view the clip. Why did William of Normandy come to England?
Who was the King of England?
What date was William of Normandy crowned King of England?
How did William try to gain control over the country?
Why did he commission Domesday Book?
What questions were asked by his inspectors as they visited different parts of the country?
What do you think is the value of The Domesday Book for historians writing about 11th century? Why did Henry VIII break with Rome?
Who was his first wife?
Why did Henry VIII want to marry Anne Boleyn?
Who oversaw the dissolution of the monasteries?
What was Valor Ecclesiasticus?
Why would Henry VIII be interested in having the information provided by Valor Ecclesiasticus?
Why did Henry send men to visit the monasteries?
How were ordinary people effected by the closure or dissolution of the monasteries?
How many monasteries were closed 1536-1540?
How much money did Henry VIII receive from this closure by 1547? Who were two main groups in dispute during the English Civil Wars?
Why was King Charles I put on trial?
Pause on the document called ‘The Act’. Write it out, then put it in your words.
What was Charles I’s attitude to the court that put him on trial?
When was Charles I executed?
Why might people at the time have been shocked by the execution of Charles I?
What do you understand by the term ‘Divine Right of Kings?’ Who was Thomas Farrinor?
Where did the Great Fire of London start?
How many houses were burnt down in four days?
How many people were made homeless as result of the fire?
How did Charles II help London to recover from the fire?
Can you think of three original sources that we could use to find out about the impact of the Great Fire of London? Why was James Watt’s invention so important for the Industrial revolution?
What does the term ‘workshop of the world’ mean?
What different things were manufactured in Britain?
Why have some people described Britain at this time, as an ‘age of innovation’? From what area did Britain capture and enslave people?
When and how many people were taken?
What words would you use to describe this activity?
How did enslaved people try to resist?
Who were the Maroons?
What did they do?
When did they achieve freedom? What two changes in Britain increased the growth of crime?
How did the government respond to this increase?
How many prisons were built from 1842-1877?
What did many people think was the purpose of prison?
What was the treadmill and the crank used for?
Why was prison particularly bad for child prisoners?
How can we find out about child prisoners? Use the image clue in the clip to help. When did popular protest and radicalism start to take off in Britain?
How did people find out about public meetings at the time?
How did the government try to control these protest movements?
What was the Chartist movement?
Who was William Cuffey?
How did he resist the authorities?
When was he brought to trial and what was his sentence?
What documents can be used to help us find out about his trial?
Why did he remain in Tasmania once his sentence was over? Who was Cyril Evans?
What was the name of his ship?
Why did he send a radio message to ships in the area?
Who was Jack Philips?
What historical evidence can we use to find out about events concerning the sinking of the Titanic?
How many people lost their lives as result? When was Archduke Franz Ferdinand assassinated?
Why was this one of the triggers for the outbreak of the First World War?
What other factors led to the outbreak of war? When was Noor Khan born?
When did she come to Britain?
What do the letters SOE stand for?
During her training for SOE, why was opinion about her abilities divided?
Using the clues given in the film clip, how can we find out about Noor Khan’s role in the Second World War?
What work did she do in France in 1942 as a British spy?
When was an investigation launched into her disappearance?
Why was she rewarded the St George Cross?
When were files about Noor Khan released to the public? When was the Ministry of Information set up?
What was the purpose of the Ministry?
Pause on the completed poster called: ‘Careless talk Costs lives: Keep Mum, she’s not so dumb.’ Can you work out the message behind this poster?
Pause on the group of posters designed for other campaigns on the Home front. Which in your opinion is the most persuasive poster? Can you explain why?
Do the posters vary in their approach? [Clue: think about differences in use of language, design, colours used]
How important is the use of language in trying to persuade the public to do things?
Why do you think The National Archives has copies of these posters in its collections?
Can you think of other sources that could be used to influence how people should think and behave?
Can you write your own definition of the term propaganda, or ask your teacher to help? Why did Britain face labour shortages after the Second World War in 1948?
Can you name two islands in the British Caribbean which many people left to travel to Britain?
How many passengers travelled on the Empire Windrush to Britain?
What living conditions did some of the new arrivals face in Britain?
Who was Sam King?
What was his important achievement?
Can you explain the term ‘Windrush generation’? What year did fear about contracting AIDS emerge?
What was the result of this sense of panic?
How did the government in the UK respond at the time?
Who was the Health Secretary at the time?
What were the aims of his campaign?
Why was the campaign criticised by Mrs Thatcher?
Was the health campaign effective in reducing number of deaths from AIDS? What is the Dark Archive?
How is a file protected from deletion or corruption?
Can you give examples of any new types of digital documents which could now be saved in the Dark Archive?
How could this affect historical research in the future?
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f20b5948d5fc41d1d863e42ed90206a5e6ccca81 | Hollands Farm Liaison Group Meeting 3 – Powerpoint Slides
Liaison Group Meeting 3 – Draft Development Brief
Chair: Cllr Dominic Barnes, South West Chilterns Community Board Lead Officer: Charlotte Morris, Principal Planning Officer Chris Kennett: Natural Environment & Urban Design Officer Chris Steuart: Major Development Team Leader Emily Hadley: Planning Policy Officer
Agenda
1. Introductions (10mins)
2. Progress since March (15mins)
3. Development Framework (1hr)
- Access and movement
- Green infrastructure and open space
- Heritage and conservation
- Infrastructure - Onsite + off-site requirements
4. Appropriate Assessment + Sustainability Appraisal (20 mins)
5. Next steps (5mins)
6. AOB (15mins)
Progress to date
- First draft of Development Brief
- Internal consultation with specialists
- Further refinement of infrastructure requirements
- Development framework plan
- Completed Draft Appropriate Assessment
- Completed Draft Sustainability Appraisal
- Legal challenge update
- Programme going forward Site analysis – Constraints and Opportunities Access and movement
- Existing public right of way
- Current access Hedsor Road + Princes Road
- Link road requirement including bus route
- Need for wider connectivity
- Former orchard
- Hedsor Road
- Wessex Road Employment Area
- Town Centre
- Connect to existing PRoWs
- Location of primary school Green infrastructure and open space
- Requirement to be landscape led
- use of buffers
- building on existing green
- corridors – former orchard,
- maintain hedgerows + mature trees
- Open space and play provision
- Incorporation of SUDs
- Incorporating existing wildlife corridors Heritage and Conservation
- Conservation Area + listed buildings
- Cores End Roundabout
- Design of Hedsor Road junction
- Relationship with properties at Hedsor Road Development Framework
- Landscape-led approach
- Green space focus for setting
- Connected green infrastructure
- Use of generous green corridors as the basis for a footpath/cycle network
- Respond to the different characters of the adjoining areas
- Use landscaping to screen industrial + business park
- Maintain separation from Hedsor Road properties through tree belt buffer
- Respond to views across the site from public rights of way
- Respond to the sites topography
- Retain and protect existing mature trees Infrastructure Requirements
Onsite
- Link road + bus route
- 1 form primary school
- Strategic open space, including the sports pitches, MUGA, Teen play facility, NEAP and allotments
Off site
- Junction improvements
- Provide and enhance footpath and cycle links to the village centre
- Contributions to facilitate public access to the former orchard
- Contributions towards improving access and upgrading the bridleway on the disused former Bourne End to High Wycombe railway line
- S106 contributions to mitigate recreational impacts at Burnham Beeches SAC Next Steps
- Finalise draft Development Brief
- Commence public consultation End of November
- Early 2021 finalise and adopt Development Brief as a Supplementary Planning Document
Consultation methods
- Online survey
- Leaflet drop
- Social media
- Press release
AOB?
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a2dbd8534f97891e1d4819588a667f8288b33a33 | Home food fact checker
Advice on some common household food safety questions and misconceptions.
Here we answer some of the most common food safety questions we get asked about different types of food.
FSA EXPLAINS
There are a number of myths and misconceptions about how long you can store food, when you know it’s gone off, and how to keep your food safe at home. By fact-checking the most common questions, we hope this will help you to stay safe and avoid throwing away good food unnecessarily.
Rice
How long can you safely eat rice for after cooking?
Rice may be eaten cold if it is cooled down quickly. Put the rice in the fridge and consume within 24 hours.
You can get food poisoning from eating reheated rice. It's not the reheating that causes the problem, but the way the rice has been stored before it's reheated.
Keep rice in the fridge for no more than one day until reheating. When you reheat any rice always check the dish is steaming hot all the way through.
Uncooked rice can contain spores of a bacterium called Bacillus cereus. This bacteria can cause food poisoning. The spores of Bacillus cereus can survive being cooked. The longer cooked rice is left at room temperature, the more likely it is that the bacteria or toxins will make the rice unsafe to eat.
Can you reheat takeaway rice?
You should never reheat rice more than once. Extra care should be taken with takeaway rice. Ideally takeaway rice should be eaten shortly after purchase or shortly after it has been delivered. This is because some food businesses may pre-cook their rice and then re-heat it before it is given to customers. Whether it is safe to reheat the cooked rice will depend on how it was stored, handled and if it was cooked outright in the first place. It’s always worth asking the takeaway business how they handle the rice.
**Can you freeze rice?**
You can freeze rice, but should cool the rice quickly before putting it in the freezer. To do this you could place the container of rice in cold water, then cover and store it in the freezer. By making sure rice goes in the freezer within an hour of cooking, you will stop bacteria multiplying and producing a toxin. Before eating, you should defrost your rice in the fridge and then reheat it until it is piping hot before eating immediately.
**Eggs**
**When eggs float are they bad?**
We do not suggest using the egg float test to tell if eggs are safe or not. Eggs are safe to eat for a couple of days after the best before date. The best before date should be stamped on the egg. You should make sure both the white and yolk of the egg are cooked thoroughly. You can use eggs a couple of days after the best before date in cooking or baking.
**Are eggs safe if they have red spots in the yolk?**
Egg yolks with red spots on are safe to eat. The red spots are small blood spots which are sometimes found on egg yolks.
**Should you store eggs in the fridge?**
Eggs should be stored in a cool, dry place. Ideally eggs should be stored in the fridge. The storage area should be cleaned regularly. Follow the manufacturer’s advice and avoid storing eggs where they would be exposed to extreme temperature changes. Temperature changes can lead to condensation on the surface, which causes increased penetration of Salmonella from the outside of the shell into the egg.
**Can I freeze eggs?**
Eggs can be frozen and used safely at a later date. Simply crack your eggs into a container, seal and freeze. You can separate yolks from whites first if you prefer and then put them into separate containers.
Label the containers so you can easily identify them when you wish to use them. This can be useful for baking. You can also crack the egg into a sealable container and beat it before freezing. This can be easily used to make scrambled eggs or an omelette.
**Fruit**
**Can you eat brown bananas?** Fruit that is a bit overripe, such as brown bananas, wrinkly apples and slightly mushy strawberries, can be eaten normally. This is as long as they don’t contain any mould. Overripe fruit is great for cooking, baking and made into smoothies.
**Should you wash fruit?**
Remember to wash fruit and vegetables with water before you eat them. This is to make sure that they are clean and harmful bacteria can be removed from the outside. You should wash them under a running tap, or in a bowl of fresh water, making sure to rub their skin under the water. You can start with the least soiled items first and give each of them a final rinse.
**Can you still eat food if you remove the mouldy part?**
Food that is obviously rotten or containing mould should not be eaten. This is due to potential risks from the mould. This advice is especially important for people in vulnerable groups. This includes children, the elderly, pregnant women and those who have a weakened immune system.
While it is possible that removing the mould and a significant amount of the surrounding product could remove any unseen toxins that are present, there is no guarantee that doing so would remove them all.
**Vegetables**
**Can you eat potatoes when they go green and start to sprout?**
If potatoes have sprouted, simply remove the sprouts before use. Remember to cut off any green or rotten bits before using.
Green bits on potatoes can contain high levels of natural toxins called glycoalkaloids. Glycoalkaloids are usually found in potatoes at low levels, but they can be higher in:
- green parts
- damaged parts
- sprouted parts
High levels of glycoalkaloids can upset the digestive system and cause symptoms such as abdominal pain, vomiting and diarrhoea. However, glycoalkaloid poisoning is extremely rare, even though potatoes are eaten in very large amounts in many countries.
To avoid high levels of glycoalkaloids being produced in potatoes, store them in a dark, cool and dry place.
**Can potatoes be frozen?**
You can freeze cooked or parboiled potatoes which have been boiled for 5 minutes. Leftover cooked potatoes can also be frozen. You can roast boiled potatoes straight from the freezer, make sure they are steaming hot all the way through. Put them in the oven with a little oil to crisp up.
**Can you store potatoes in the fridge?**
Store raw, unpeeled potatoes in a cool, dark place, like a cupboard. Do not store in the fridge. Potatoes stored in the fridge can form more sugars, which can mean higher levels of acrylamide. when the food is cooked roasted and fried.
**How long can you eat vegetables after their best before date?**
Vegetables past their best before date may become wrinkly or mushy, but are safe to eat as long as there is no visible sign of decay. Make sure to check for rotting or mould before eating.
The best before date is about quality, not safety. Food will be safe to eat after the best before date but may not be at its best. The length of time vegetables are acceptable to eat after a best before date can depend on the product and the storage instructions.
WRAP’s food storage A to Z tool offers advice for different foods after the best before date.
**Are raw kidney beans poisonous?**
Canned beans purchased in the supermarket are safe to consume as they have been pre-soaked and boiled to kill any toxins present.
Raw beans, especially red kidney beans can be risky. This is because they naturally contain a lectin that can produce toxic effects. You should not slow cook raw red kidney beans as it does not destroy the toxin and may increase its toxicity.
**Meat**
**Is it safe to reheat meat in the microwave?**
You can reheat meat in a microwave once. Make sure that it is steaming hot all the way through before eating. It is best to use small pieces of meat, as large pieces may dry out in some places while not being thoroughly heated in others.
It is a good idea to stir food while it is reheating. When food is microwaved it can be very hot at the edges and still be cold in the centre, stirring helps to prevent this.
If you are reheating a food product in a microwave, follow the manufacturer’s instructions on the packaging, including advice on standing and stirring. Standing and stirring are part of the process of cooking and reheating in a microwave. This will help to make sure that food is the same temperature all the way through.
**Can you reheat meat more than once?**
Previously cooked and frozen meat should only be reheated once.
**Canned food**
**Is food safe if the can has a dent in it?**
Food should remain fit to eat if a can is dented, providing the denting of the can is shallow and there are no other obvious signs that the can is damaged. However, if the denting is deep, the can may have a hidden split, hole or break in the seal. This could result in a can that is no longer a reliable container. If this is the case, the food inside should not be eaten. If the denting has caused the can to rust, the food inside should not be consumed either.
You should avoid eating food from a visibly bulging can. If the can spurts when it is opened, this may be a result of gas build up in the food. This could be due to the presence and growth of microorganisms. These microorganisms can spoil the food and can make it unsafe. If consumers have purchased cans which are visibly bulging, they should return them to the retailer.
**How long can canned food be eaten after the best before date?**
The length of time canned food is acceptable to eat after a [best before date](#) depend on the product, storage conditions and the brand.
Follow the manufacturer’s instructions on the ‘open life’. This usually indicates where to store products and for how long. Different brands of the same products can undergo different manufacturing processes. This can affect their composition and how perishable they are.
**Can you eat canned food cold?**
Many canned foods intended to be cooked before eating will not pose a safety risk if eaten cold. However, this will depend on the product. Always follow the manufacturer's instructions before eating.
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22facf0e500ba96e0984f69bf6948409efb5c157 | The National Archives Education Service
The Home Front
How did people prepare for the war at home? The Home Front
How did people prepare for war at home?
Lesson at a Glance
Suitable For: KS3
Time Period: Second World War 1939-1945
Curriculum Link: Challenges for Britain, Europe and the wider world 1901 to the present day
➢ The Second World War and the wartime leadership of Winston Churchill
Learning Objective: To investigate the British reaction to the Second World War at home
Resources needed: Printed sources and questions
The Home Front
Britain started to prepare for the Second World War at least a year before it actually started.
In 1938, the government began to build new warships and increase its armaments. However, this war would not just involve soldiers. The government expected the war to disrupt and threaten the lives of civilians left at home. This happened in a variety of different ways, from cutting down railings to be melted down and used in munitions factories, to rationing and evacuation plans.
Between 1938 and 1939, the government thought of all the possible dangers and difficulties the Home Front would face during war, and started to take precautions. People were needed on the home front to help with all sorts of things. They were encouraged to plant vegetables on any spare land they had to supplement the rationing, but people were also recruited into a variety of essential positions such as Air Raid Wardens and the Home Guard. People were also encouraged to think about their safety, and the government spent a great deal of time educating people on what to do in situations such as an air raid, or a gas attack, as well as providing information on how to make rations stretch further and how to keep yourself healthy.
Contents:
Background: ................................................................. 3 Teacher’s notes: ............................................................ 4 Source One: ................................................................. 6 Source Two: ................................................................. 7 Source Three: ............................................................... 8 Source Four: ................................................................. 11 Source Five: ................................................................. 12 Source Six: ................................................................. 15 Source Seven: .............................................................. 17
This resource was produced using documents from the collections of The National Archives. It can be freely modified and reproduced for use in the classroom only. Evacuation
Evacuation plans had been in preparation well before the outbreak of war. Small-scale evacuation of women and children were carried out in September 1938 but the real evacuation began in September 1939. The government had planned to evacuate about three million people but in the end only one million left home. A few hours after the war was declared on 3 September 1939, almost all of them had been evacuated from the danger areas to the reception areas.
Air raids
The biggest danger came from air raids. Air raids meant both danger and disruption. 60,595 civilians died as a result of enemy action in the UK. Homes, workplaces and public buildings were destroyed. Streets were subject to the ‘blackout’ – lighting restrictions – and the ban on street lighting caused a huge rise in car accidents. Volunteers were needed to be trained in civil defence duties. These included fire-fighting, first aid and ambulance driving.
Civilians were instructed in how to protect themselves against poison gas attacks and issued with gas masks, which they were encouraged to carry on all journeys. Fortunately, poison gas was never used as a weapon in Britain. They were also given materials to build air raid shelters in the backyards. Strong buildings were also prepared for use as air raid shelters.
Workers
The working lives of most of the adult population changed with the outbreak of war. To fight the war, men aged between 18 and 41 were needed in the navy and army. This would take them away from their jobs in factories and farms. To fill the shortage, women were recruited for jobs previously done by men. Women worked in the factories, constructing weapons and many others joined the Land Army to work on farms.
Rationing
Much of the food, clothes and fuel which Britain needed came from abroad. The war disrupted and prevented these supplies from arriving. This meant shortages of the essentials to keep life going. In 1940, rationing was introduced in Britain. The ration book became indispensable for every man, woman and child, ensuring a fair distribution of what meagre essentials were available. The government also tried to encourage people to grow food on every available piece of land.
Invasion
Another danger was from invasion. When in 1940 the Channel Isles fell into German hands and it looked as though the RAF was losing the Battle of Britain, the government called on volunteers to join the Home Guard – Dad’s Army – to help defend Britain from attack. The Home Front
How did people prepare for war at home?
Teacher’s notes
This lesson asks pupils to develop their understanding of the war on the Home Front from their basic understanding. Through primary source analysis it examines how those involved on the Home Front were encouraged to deal with the war and the problems that shortages and uncertainty created.
Pupils investigate the organisation and bureaucracy behind the ARP system, before looking at details of how individuals were advised to take precautions. This lesson helps pupils understand the attitude to the war on the Home Front, as well as developing their ability to use source evidence to question and challenge existing beliefs.
This lesson can form part of studies for Key stage 1 and Key stage 3 studies of the Second World War. In addition, it offers coverage of National Curriculum requirements for History in England, relating to general requirements of knowledge and understanding of events, people and changes in the past, together with breadth of study requirements to study significant events and developments from across the 20th century. Similarly there are clear links to citizenship and PSHE issues that can be explored further with teacher development.
Sources
Illustration : INF 3/96 – Dig on for Victory Poster
Source 1 : INF 3/98 – Dig for Plenty Poster
Source 2 : INF 13/171 – Don’t Do It Mother Poster
Source 3 A, B & C : HO 186/2247 – Gas Raid Quiz and Gas Mask Leaflets
Source 4 : INF 3/400 – Just a Good Afternoons Work poster
Source 5 A : HO 186/2247 – ARP Notice
Source 5 B : ZPER 34 – Air Raid house picture from the Illustrated London News, 1938
Source 6 : WO 199/94 – Conversation between Mr Celave & Capt. Denaro regarding beach mines
Source 7 : INF 3/232 – Be Careful what you say poster
Tasks
Look at Source 1
1. This is one of a series of posters designed to encourage people to grow their own food: a) Why did the government want the Home Front to 'Dig for Plenty'?
1. If the Home Front had not organised growing more of its own food, what would have happened?
2. Would a poster showing what would happen if people did not start to 'dig' have been more or less effective? Explain your answer. Look at Source 2
2. This is a government poster about evacuation: a) Who is the ghostly figure whispering ‘Take them back!’? b) Where is he pointing? c) What does he want the mother to do and why? d) Why might this mother be tempted to ‘Take them back’? e) Why were civilians evacuated during the Second World War?
Look at Source 3 a, b and c 3. These were leaflets produced during the war: a) Who produced these leaflets? b) What dangers are these leaflets about? c) How many different types of gas masks would the government have to provide? d) How useful do you think the advice offered in these leaflets is? e) The government had to be careful not to scare people, but at the same time it wanted people to take notice and be prepared. f) How do these leaflets: • get people to take notice? • educate people? • reassure people?
Look at Source 4 4. This poster shows a woman slapping Hitler in the face. a) What type of war work does this poster advertise? b) What is happening in this poster? c) Can you explain the double meaning behind the caption? d) Why was the work of part-time women workers an essential part of defeating Hitler? e) How might this poster encourage women to contribute to the war effort?
Look at Source 5 a and b 5. These are wartime waning posters. a) What dangers do these sources warn the public about? b) Who was the local air raid warden for Drypool Green? c) What was the air raid signal for ‘all clear’? d) In the months leading up to September 1939 many towns practised their air raid signals and taking shelter. Why do you think this was necessary? e) Read the section in Source 5a called ‘Fire Precautions’. Which parts are the public... • likely to follow? • likely to ignore? f) Look at Source 5b. Read all the labels. How would each precaution help save lives if there was an air raid?
Look at Source 6 6. This is a telephone conversation between Mr. Cleave and Captain Denaro a mine laying specialist in 1940 a) Why were mines placed on the beaches? b) What is Mr. Cleave complaining about? c) According to Mr. Cleave, was placing mines on the beach an effective way of protecting Britain? d) Do you think Mr. Cleave was being unreasonable? e) What does this source tell us about the power the government had over people’s lives during the Second World War?
Look at Source 7 7. This picture shows Hitler balancing on a telephone line. a) What other precautions were taken to protect Britain? How did people prepare for war at home?
Source 1 – Dig for Plenty poster – Artist: Le Bon (INF 3/98) Source 2 - Don’t do it, Mother – Leave your children in the safer areas poster (INF 13/171) Source 3a - Gas Raid Quiz Leaflet (HO 186/2247) How did people prepare for war at home?
Source 3b - War Gas Leaflet (HO 186/2247)
**WAR GAS**
**OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY**
**IF THE GAS RATTLES SOUND**
Put on mask, holding your breath until mask is in position. Turn up collar. Put on gloves or keep hands in pockets. Take cover in nearest building quickly. Put up umbrella if you have one.
**IF YOU GET GASED**
by Vapour Gases
1. Keep your mask on even if you feel discomfort.
2. If discomfort continues, go to First Aid Post.
by Liquid or Blister Gas
1. Dab, but don’t rub the splash with your handkerchief. Then destroy the handkerchief.
2. Rub No. 2 Ointment well into place (buy a 6d. jar now from any chemist). In an emergency, chemists will supply Bleach Cream free.
3. If you can’t get the Ointment or Cream within 5 minutes, wash the affected place with soap and warm water.
4. Take off at once any garment splashed with gas.
**HOW TO PUT ON YOUR MASK**
1. Hold your breath. 2. Hold mask in front of face, thumbs inside straps. 3. Thrust chin well forward into mask. Pull straps as far over head as they will go. 4. Run finger round face-piece taking care head-straps are not twisted.
**MAKE SURE IT FITS**
See that the rubber fits snugly at sides of jaw and under chin. The head straps should be adjusted to hold the mask firmly. To test for fit, hold a piece of paper to end of mask and breathe in. The paper should stick.
**ALWAYS HAVE YOUR GAS MASK WITH YOU – DAY AND NIGHT. LEARN TO PUT IT ON QUICKLY** What to do about GAS
HINTS TO MOTHERS
★ Learn to put on baby’s gas helmet quickly, while wearing your own mask. Your Health Visitor will show you how. If you don’t know her address ask at Town Hall or at the Child Welfare Centre.
★ With more than one baby you need help. Arrange with a neighbour, or find out if your local W.V.S. has a Housewives’ Service.
★ Toddlers soon learn to put on their own masks. Let them make a game of it and they will wear their gas masks happily.
In a gas attack, first put on your own mask, then you will be better able to help baby.
MAKE SURE YOUR FAMILY HAVE THEIR GAS MASKS WITH THEM NIGHT & DAY Source 4 - Just A Good Afternoon’s Work Poster (INF 3/400) The Home Front
How did people prepare for war at home?
Source 5 a- Air Raid Precautions Card (HO 186/2247) AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS
- The A.R.P. Warden’s Post for your Sector is:
______________________________________________________________________
\*The nearest First Aid Post is:
______________________________________________________________________
\*These two posts will always be manned during air raids
Help or advice upon A.R.P. matters will be given by the local wardens.
IN CASE OF INJURY
Wounded and gas contaminated casualties who can walk should go direct to the nearest First Aid Post. If you suspect that your clothing has been contaminated by liquid gas, remove the affected garment immediately and place it outside the house, then wash yourself thoroughly. Stretcher cases will be taken to hospitals.
GAS MASKS
TAKE CARE OF YOUR GAS MASK. Learn how to put it on and take it off and how to store it properly. Keep it ready for immediate use. If you have no gas mask, or if your mask does not fit or seems out of repair, speak to your Warden about it at once.
LIGHTING RESTRICTIONS
All windows, doors, skylights or openings which would show a light must be screened so that no light can be seen from outside. Do not use a light in a room unless the blind or curtain is drawn and remember that a light at the back of the house is just as visible from the air as one at the front.
AIR RAID WARNING SIGNALS
\*WARNING SIGNAL Warbling or intermittent sound on siren. Whistles blown by police and wardens.
GAS WARNING Rattles sounded. \*RAIDERS PASSED Continuous sound on siren. \*ALL CLEAR Handbells ring. When you hear the WARNING Signal TAKE COVER AT ONCE and stay there until you hear the continuous sound on the siren or the ringing of a handbell. Have your Gas Mask with you. If RATTLES have been used warning you of gas, do not come out until you hear HANDBELLS.
FIRE PRECAUTIONS
Be ready to deal with an incendiary bomb. Clear all lumber from your attic NOW, and see that you have easy access to the attic or roof space. Provide two buckets filled with water and, if possible, a stirrup pump with two-purpose nozzle, either producing a spray for dealing with the bomb itself, or producing a jet for tackling the resulting fire.
Have a reserve supply of water in buckets or tubs. Leave used water in bath.
If you have no stirrup hand pump, have two buckets of sand or dry earth near the top of the house, and a shovel with a long handle for putting sand on the bomb. After covering the bomb with sand place it in a bucket which has a few inches of sand in the bottom and remove it from the house. Scrape up every particle of burning metal. The resulting fire will have to be extinguished. Buckets of water or a folded blanket kept wet from a bucket of water might be used.
On no account throw water on the bomb or an explosion may result.
If you cannot put out the fire send for help to
______________________________________________________________________
- HANG THIS CARD IN A PERMANENT AND PROMINENT POSITION How did people prepare for war at home?
Source 5b - Detail from The Householder’s part in ARP: Meeting Bomb and Gas Dangers: Illustrated London News July 16 1938 (ZPER 34/193) Source 6 - Telephone conversation between Mr Cleave and Captain Denaro (WO-199-94)
Digest of conversation that took place over the 'phone when Captain Denaro rang me up on Sunday the 22nd of September 1940 at 9.45 a.m.
Hullo. Is that Mr Cleave. Yes, who is that speaking? I am Captain Denaro of the Royal Engineers. Oh yes. About your letter. He said he would not remove the mines. I replied, surely they could be removed to a safer position? He said, he would have the position surveyed. I told him the matter was most urgent, and had counted 13 strewn over the foreshore immediately opposite my house, laying loose and washed about by the tide, and further said, when his men were laying the mines, I pointed out the position in which they were being set would prove a menace, as the battering they would receive from a high tide, and a strong wind, coupled with the further risk of any flotsam and jetsam striking them, would explode them. He said I did not understand the position, and he intended to guard the whole coast. I replied I quite agreed and understood about taking every precaution against an enemy, but he surely did not seriously anticipate, out of the hundreds of miles surrounding the British Isles, the enemy would pick on my 200 feet of foreshore for his invasion plan, and even if he did, the mines would be no deterrent, as they would have already exploded and have done their damage, not to Jerry, but to me. He laughed, and said, they may land anywhere. I replied, yes, but surely the end you are endeavouring to attain, could be so attained without having my property periodically damaged. He asked if I was nervous. I said no, and had yet to learn that objecting to one's house and home being blown up was a symptom of nervousness, but was apprehensive of having my home blown to blazes. I told him, on two separate occasions mines had exploded, and it was not altogether enjoyable expecting at every high tide for more to go off, and I did most strongly object to being blown up by my own people. He suggested I should let the matter drop, and say no more about it, to which I replied, I most certainly did not intend to let the matter drop. He said my letter had threatened him, and although he did not like turning people out of their homes, if I persisted, he would ask for a compulsory evacuation. I replied we had been asked to stick it, and we were going to stick it, and the leaving of the premises would in no way prevent more damage as the matter was at present. I again urged that the mines be removed from the immediate vicinity and falling this, could they not be properly secured to prevent accidental explosion, but because I lodged a legitimate complaint, to threaten me with expulsion, was only burking the question, and to adopt such an attitude was quite untenable. He again said he would have the position surveyed. Transcript of telephone conversation between Mr Cleave and Captain Denaro (WO-199-94)
Digest of conversation that took place over the 'phone when Captain Denaro rang me up on Sunday the 22nd of September 1940 at 9.45 a.m.
Hullo. Is that Mr Cleave. Yes, who is that speaking? I am Captain Denaro of the Royal Engineers. Oh yes. About your letter. He said he would not remove the mines. I replied, surely they could be removed to a safer position? He said, he would have the position surveyed. I told him the matter was most urgent, and had counted 13 strewn over the foreshore immediately opposite my house, laying loose and washed about by the tide, and further said, when his men were laying the mines, I pointed out the position in which they were being set would prove a menace, as the battering they would receive from a high tide, and a strong wind, coupled with the further risk of any flotsam and jetsam striking them, would explode them. He said I did not understand the position, and he intended to guard the whole coast. I replied I quite agreed and understood about taking every precaution against an enemy, but he surely did not seriously anticipate, out of the hundreds of miles surrounding the British Isles, the enemy would pick on my 200 feet of foreshore for his invasion plan, and even if he did, the mines would be no deterrent, as they would have already exploded and have done their damage, not to Jerry, but to me. He laughed, and said, they may land anywhere. I replied, yes, but surely the end you are endeavouring to attain, could be so attained without having my property periodically damaged. He asked if I was nervous. I said no, and had yet to learn that objecting to one’s house and home being blown up was a symptom of nervousness, but was apprehensive of having my home blown to blazes. I told him on two separate occasions mines had exploded, and it was not altogether enjoyable expecting at every high tide for more to go off, and I did most strongly object to being blown up by my own people. He suggested I should let the matter drop, and say no more about it, to which I replied, I most certainly did not intend to let the matter drop. He said my letter had threatened him, and although he did not like turning people out of their homes, if I persisted, he would ask for a compulsory evacuation. I replied we had been asked to stick it, and we were going to stick it, and the leaving of the premises would in no way prevent more damage as the matter was at present. I again urged that the mines be removed from the immediate vicinity, and failing this, could they not be properly secured to prevent accidental explosion, but because I lodged a legitimate complaint, to threaten me with expulsion, was only burking the question, and to adopt such an attitude was quite untenable. He again said he would have the position surveyed. Source 7 - Be careful what you say poster (INF 3/232)
You never know who's on the wires!
BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU SAY
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a2cfa08ec32070d88c46f1e99a773c08fe7661c8 | Information Management Assessment
Action plan progress report
Home Office
Reviewed February 2017
Published July 2017
Working with government to raise standards in information management Background The Information Management Assessment (IMA) programme is the best-practice model for government bodies wishing to demonstrate commitment to the principles of good information management.
The Home Office IMA took place in 2015. This progress report summarises key developments since the IMA. Areas where attention is still needed are listed below under ‘Next Steps.’
Action plan development A statement by then Permanent Secretary, Mark Sedwill, was published alongside the IMA report in May 2016.¹ This highlighted the department’s intention to improve performance under the four development areas identified by our assessment.
An action plan was produced under the ownership of the Knowledge and Information Management (KIM) team and Departmental Records Officer (DRO). We are pleased to note that work to progress a number of key action points received support from the Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO).
The IMA team was also invited to a meeting of the department’s newly formed Knowledge and Information Executive Group (KIEG) to discuss findings and next steps in January 2016. The IMA team will attend a further meeting in summer 2017.
¹ http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/manage-information/ima/ima-reports-action-plans/ Progress to address recommendations and risk areas
1 The value of information
| Performance rating | IMA 2015 | Review 2017 | |--------------------|----------|-------------| | Communicating and realising value | Satisfactory | Satisfactory | | Managing information as an asset | Development area | Satisfactory |
Situation at the time of the IMA
Home Office had recognised the need to improve standards of paper records keeping following publication of the 2014 review by Peter Wanless and Richard Whittam QC. The department had also identified gaps in relation to current practice and areas for improvement that had been communicated to the Executive Management Board and Permanent Secretary. However, there was no single, endorsed, time bound plan in place to drive necessary work across the organisation or communicate to staff why this mattered.
A programme of work to improve oversight of the department’s information assets had been carried out, but significant gaps were still evident at the time of the IMA.
Home Office has produced a principle-led and format-neutral information strategy that has been promoted internally. It is intended to help drive better culture as well as better IT provision. A promotional news story on the intranet at the time of publication was used to point staff to existing guidance and provide a reminder to participate in responsible for information training. It also provided a push for the department’s new knowledge and information management e-learning package (see p. 6).
The strategy is scheduled to run through to 2019 and focuses on the themes of information assurance, information availability and information exploitation. It provides a summary of current practice and internal and cross-government drivers as well as setting out the benefits of improving standards. This represents a significant step forward for Home Office. However, while the strategy has been surfaced at Permanent Secretary and SIRO level, it currently lacks visible senior endorsement. While some key priorities are being delivered through annual work plans, no formal implementation plan has been developed. These points need to be addressed to maintain the satisfactory rating under this heading. Although there is an intention to ensure alignment with Home Office’s Transformation and Excellence and Data Strategies, information strategy goals do not appear to have been adopted by the organisation as a whole.
Guidance and policy documentation relating to information assets is not yet fully consistent, but Home Office’s Information Asset Register and governance processes for information assets have already been substantially overhauled since the IMA. The Knowledge and Information Management Unit (KIMU) undertook a project to engage with business areas and ascertain what information assets were held according to clearly defined criteria, focussing on volume, criticality and sensitivity. Retention and disposal of information assets is now within scope. Home Office has also standardised the role of Information Asset Owner (IAO), which now has to be held at a minimum of Civil Service Senior Executive Officer level. The National Archives ran its Delivering IA Training course in November 2016 for members of Home Office’s KIM and Security teams. The department is now developing its own IAO training programme.
2 Digital information and supporting technology
| Performance rating | IMA 2015 | Review 2017 | |-------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------| | Supporting information through technology | Development area | Progressing to Satisfactory | | Digital continuity and IT change | Development area | Development area |
Situation at the time of the IMA
Although Home Office’s Corporate File Plan met key records management requirements, staff were not using it consistently and it was not available to the whole department. Unstructured shared drives and SharePoint 2007 were in use in some areas. No size limits were in place on email accounts and large volumes of information was held outside shared spaces in mailboxes and personal drives. Home Office had begun rolling out an interim SharePoint 2010 based solution, iManage, to address the risks raised by its IT environment ahead of wider technology change and planned moves to Office 365. While we were pleased to note that Home Office recognised the need for third-party plug-ins to enable email integration and increased records management functionality in SharePoint 2010, it also needed to consider limiting alternative storage locations.
Home Office had not embedded digital continuity related considerations in KIM planning or defined the risks it faced.
iManage has now been fully rolled out. Limitations imposed by the configuration of Home Office’s IT network have resulted in some potential barriers regarding the uptake of the system. These include the need for an additional login and the fact that users are directed to their personal drives when saving documents. The Corporate File Plan has been closed off and the contents have been made read-only.
Home Office has not yet identified fully how it will ensure the digital continuity of its information. We recognise, however, that information availability is one of the pillars of its new information strategy and that goals under this heading cover both current and legacy information. Home Office has committed to assessing and addressing the risks it faces and intends to develop a formal strategy to deal with the issue of aging data and file formats. It plans to use its e-Discovery software to understand the scale of the issue it faces and then agree an approach.
No decisions have yet been reached on capping or imposing limits on personal repositories within the Office 365 environment, including email and OneDrive, although such consideration are within scope of planned work. At the time of our review meeting it was not clear whether SharePoint Online would still form part of the department’s Office 365 roll-out. It has since been confirmed that the platform remains within scope. Home Office now needs to ensure that its legislative and business requirements for information and records management are met through the adoption of its new IT environment. It is considering use of third-party plug-ins to enable email integration with SharePoint Online, but is not intending to use them to increase functionality in areas such as retention and disposal, export and audit. Home Office needs to define how any potential gaps in these areas will be addressed. To ensure current progress can be maintained, Home Office’s IT plans must be aligned and in-step with the information availability goals set by the information strategy.
3 Information risk, governance and oversight
| Performance rating | IMA 2015 | Review 2017 | |-----------------------------|----------------|-------------| | Recognising information risk| Satisfactory | Satisfactory| | Establishing control | Development area| Satisfactory| | Providing guidance | Satisfactory | Good practice| | Measuring impact | Good practice | Good practice|
Situation at the time of the IMA
Home Office had one of the most mature understandings of information management-related risk that we had encountered. Cultural factors that might lead to non-compliance with policy still needed to be recognised at a local level. The Chief Operating Officer and SIRO had supported and enabled the team’s promotion of information management priorities at board level. We were also pleased to note that information and records management had been subject to scrutiny from internal audit.
A Knowledge and Information Executive Group (KIEG) had been set up, badged as a senior-level forum for considering and deciding knowledge and information issues. This body had significant potential, but had not yet bedded in. The KIMU team was working with a clear purpose, but its remit did not cover the whole department, which lacked a single coherent governance framework for enabling and improving knowledge and information management performance.
A range of guidance was available, but gaps were evident and staff awareness was low in some areas. However, the department had recognised the need to ensure staff understood what information they needed to keep and how it should be managed. It also had an active approach to assessing capability in information management and information assurance using its integrated One3M maturity model.
The risk that Home Office may fail to find key information is currently logged on the Information Rights risk register. At the time of our review meeting, the potential consequences for the department and impact on departmental objectives of a failure to implement the planned EDRM solution was also clearly set out. While we saw no evidence that risks related to compliance with information management policy were being formally defined locally and owned by business area, Home Office has used the KIEG to engage senior managers on the subject. There is a standing agenda item on information management risk.
Home Office now has a unified governance structure for information and records management. The Information Management and Compliance Unit was absorbed into KIMU following the IMA. Quarterly meetings are now held with KIM staff in the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism. The KIEG is acting as a forum for the communication of key priorities and for reviewing and initiating planned work. KIEG agreed the department’s KIM Service Level Agreement for 2016/17 and owns the information strategy. KIEG members, in their capacity as Knowledge and Information Champions, are expected to help realise the vision set out by KIEG in their own business areas. They have, for example, played a key role in ensuring the Information Asset Register was up to date.
Existing information management support roles in the business have been reviewed and standardised. Records Advisers have been replaced by KIM Advisers. A suggested Key Performance Objective has been drafted. The role of KIM Manager has been introduced. Responsibilities include driving compliance with policy and acting as a focal point of contact and escalation point to the KIEG. We were pleased to note that Border Force now has its own KIM community that holds monthly information management forums with senior sponsorship.
KIM policy and guidance has been reviewed and presented to the KIEG in November 2015. Home Office has mapped policy and guidance, identifying owners and logging review dates. It is working to consolidate and standardise guidance, including documentation inherited through machinery of government change. Retention schedules have been reviewed and simplified and Home Office is working to apply consistent standards to all areas of the business. What-to-keep guidance published on GOV.UK immediately prior to the IMA has been updated as this work has progressed.²
A plan has been established for the dissemination of KIM principles and priorities to staff via a range of channels, including delivery of its KIM professionalism plan. Links between the KIM professionalism plan and civil service reform goals for a more skilled workforce have been defined. Additional channels include the department’s new internal e-learning package. All staff – aside from those in front-line roles – were expected to complete the course by March 2017 and repeat it once every three years. The SIRO played a key role in promoting the course at board level and messaging was reinforced through the KIEG.
Home Office’s One3M maturity model has continued to develop and evolve, enabling a new focus on cyber security and on behavioural testing, which the department hopes will allow areas of weakness to be highlighted. It is currently assessing how the model could be mapped to information strategy goals in the future.
² https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/home-office-retention-and-disposal-standards#history 4 Records, review and transfer
| Performance rating | IMA 2015 | Review 2017 | |--------------------|----------|-------------| | Oversight of records and selection | Satisfactory | Progressing to good practice | | Implementing disposal decisions | Satisfactory | Satisfactory |
Situation at the time of the IMA
Home Office was working to improve the quality of data on its paper records tracking system RMSys, imposing standard data entries where the status of records was unclear. A review of paper holdings had been carried out in 2014 and Home Office had published retention schedules online in accordance with recommendations in Sir Alex Allan’s Records Review. It had begun work on developing an appraisal report.
Home Office had not yet mapped out how resource changes would impact on its ability to meet requirements for increased transfer volumes during the transition to the 20-year rule. Disposal of records was on hold due to the requirements of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. However, Home Office had no ability to apply disposal to its shared drives and had no central oversight or control over their contents.
Home Office has a clearer understanding of its legacy in all formats. Its Records Transfer Report is submitted to the Permanent Secretary. This demonstrates the significance attached to meeting its obligations under the Public Records Act. Its appraisal report has been developed with input from The National Archives; Home Office expects this to be opened for public consultation shortly. It is exploring with The National Archives the use of macro appraisal approaches. A majority of errors identified in RMSys have been resolved. Home Office still plans to replace the system.
Home Office is working to index its shared drives using its e-Discovery tool and plans to liaise with The National Archives on search terms. It will then use the tool to identify information with potential historical value and treat the remainder as a wasting asset that will be placed under a blanket 15-year disposal schedule. Home Office is also undertaking an analysis of its digital records created prior to the end of its print-to-paper policy in 2005. It is hoping to use the tool to support sensitivity review of digital information; the process has been trialled for the transfer of records relating to the Litvinenko Inquiry. Next Steps
The National Archives will continue to work closely with Home Office so that it is supported as it continues its work on information and records management through to the time of its next IMA in 2019/20. In the interim, Home Office should work with The National Archives to address remaining actions that need attention. These include the following:
- Identifying a senior owner for the information strategy and providing an endorsement
- Establishing an implementation plan to ensure defined outcomes for the availability, exploitation and security will be achieved, including those to be delivered through IT change. Links between KIMU and digital, data and technology colleagues need to be embedded to support delivery of shared and overlapping goals
- Ensuring guidance and policy documentation relating to information asset governance is fully consistent
- Continuing to assess the benefits of putting controls in place to limit the ability of staff to store information outside shared areas. This is most likely to deliver benefit when accompanied by work to drive the right behaviours and encourage positive changes in information and records management culture
- Ensuring that the department fully defines how its legislative and business requirements for information and records management will be met within the Office 365 environment and how any gaps will be addressed. This should be reflected in risk descriptions. Without an appropriate technology solution, a significant burden may be placed on business areas and the central team
- Defining actions needed to ensure digital continuity is maintained in line with Home Office information strategy goals
- Defining the risk the department faces in terms of ensuring the usability of current and legacy digital information
- Continuing work to consolidate and standardise policy and guidance
- Implementing plans for disposal of legacy information
- Developing search terms for the e-Discovery work to identify information of potential historical value
- Utilise macro-appraisal methodologies to achieve compliance with the transition to the 20 year rule.
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a5bcab516cfbc94bd9f6ea235b64dd7b83413846 | RECOMMENDATION 1 Home Office to build on its KIM action plan and ensure that the new Knowledge and Information Executive Group (KIEG) owned information strategy sets goals for the whole department. The strategy should provide impetus for work to improve technology, governance and culture. There would be benefit in centring the strategy on the principles of information availability, security and exploitation that are already defined as objectives in the department's risk governance approach.
Progress Update - June 2016
| Ref: | Actions | Priority (High/Med/Low) | Target Completion date | Status | |------|---------|-------------------------|------------------------|--------| | 1.1 | Create a 3 yr KIM strategy. Align and link to all other related HO strategies/units. Present to KIEG. Obtain KIM Strategy and action plan sign off with KIEG and SIRO | High | Dec-16 | OPEN | | 1.2 | Investigate and action a more direct formal linkage between all information and data related experts through merger, reporting, process or governance | Med | Sep-16 | OPEN | | 1.3 | Information asset owners to evidence they have considered DigC issues and implemented measures to protect information once HO has established the contractual position | Med | Mar-17 | OPEN | | 1.4 | Investigate future 'New desktop' management/control of information functionality. Create options and plan of action for embedding effective digital continuity. Assign a point of contact within KIM to work with new project leads. | Med | Dec-16 | OPEN | RECOMMENDATION 2 KIMU and information assurance staff to work together to increase oversight and control of Home Office’s information assets, establishing clearer department-specific principles for Information Asset Owners (IAO’s).
Progress Update June 2016
| Ref: | Priority (High/Med/Low) | Target Completion date | Closed | |------|-------------------------|------------------------|--------| | 2.1 | Med | Aug-16 | OPEN | | | Review and update Information Assurance Policy, IAO guidance, governance and interaction/linkage with KIM policy on retention, data asset and data sharing guidance. IAO guidance to include the responsibilities, training and management of data and the setting of retentions. | | | | 2.2 | Med | Feb-17 | OPEN | | | The business via KIEG to review all unit assets are on register, have a suitable IAO, correct registered detail & ensure retentions marked in line with new retention standards. | | | | 2.3 | Med | Dec-17 | OPEN | | | Work with Digital to align asset register with the new Data Cat. Ensure all relevant details are included. | | |
### RECOMMENDATION 3
Develop plans to increase oversight and drive good governance of information held outside the Corporate File Plan (CFP) and iManage, information not migrated to iManage, and held in personal repositories and unstructured shared drives.
#### Progress Update - June 2016
| Ref: | Priority (High/Med/Low) | Target Completion date | Closed | |------|-------------------------|------------------------|--------| | 3.1 | Med | Jun-17 | OPEN | | 3.2 | Med | Mar-17 | OPEN | | 3.3 | Med | Dec-16 | OPEN |
- **3.1** Work with IT futures to ensure KIM requirements around email is incorporated into planning.
- **3.2** Work to develop the e-discovery solution as a means to identify material of long term business, historical, reuse or compliance value.
- **3.3** Create solutions for future control of corporate and personal storage. RECOMMENDATION 4 Establish a single approach for knowledge and information management governance that cuts across the existing group structure to drive consistent department-wide improvement.
Progress Update - June 2016
| Ref: | Priority (High/Med/Low) | Target Completion date | Closed | |------|-------------------------|------------------------|--------| | 4.1 | High | Sep-16 | OPEN | | | Review current governance, reporting lines and BAU processes and establish a formal/informal linkage. | | | | 4.2 | Med | Jun-16 | OPEN | | | Ensure all KIM documentation in a standard, consistent and mapped to relevant policies. Ensure process in place to review regularly. | | | | 4.3 | Med | Jul-16 | OPEN | | | Share One3M results with KIEG, SIRO and wider KIM Community. Find other routes to publish results to general staff | | | RECOMMENDATION 5 Establish a plan to ensure messages about information and records management requirements and responsibilities are reaching all staff across all groups.
Progress Update - June 2016
| Ref: | Priority (High/Med/Low) | Target Completion date | Closed | |------|-------------------------|------------------------|--------| | 5.1 | Med | Aug-16 | OPEN | | | Create and implement communication plan to inform all staff regularly of their key responsibilities with support of KIEG members. | | | | 5.2 | Med | Sep-16 | OPEN | | | Incorporate behavioural measures into 2016/17 One3M model. | | | | 5.3 | Med | Sep-16 | OPEN | | | Review risk register and mitigations to reflect report comments | | | | 5.4 | Med | Jun-16 | OPEN | | | Develop and deliver KIM eLearning programme for staff | | | | 5.5 | Med | Dec-16 | OPEN | | | Review Knowledge and Information Champion and support roles and amend as necessary | | | **RECOMMENDATION 6** Establish a plan for achievement of 20-year rule commitments for the remainder of the transition period, ensuring clear process and guidance for review staff are defined.
**Progress Update - June 2016**
| Ref: | Priority (High/Med/Low) | Target Completion date | Closed | |------|-------------------------|------------------------|--------| | 6.1 | High | Ongoing | Open | | 6.2 | Med | Dec-16 | Open | | 6.3 | Med | on-going | Open |
- **6.1** Create regular reports - short/long term planning/achievement to DRO/TNA on progress and issues
- **6.2** Review processes on methods of appraisal and implement
- **6.3** To continue to work with TNA on the Digital Transfer Group and the Digital Sensitivity Group to plan digital transfer of records in 2017.
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e8a3b926aae9fc8ffc0d0ac44413f81370033669 | Information Management Assessment
Home Office
Reviewed June/July 2015
Published May 2016
Working with government to raise standards in information management Contents
Statement of commitment 2 IMA background 2 Glossary 3 Key findings of the assessment 4 Highlights table 9 Recommendations to address risk areas 11
1 The value of information 15 2 Information and supporting technology 26 3 Information risk, governance and oversight 33 4 Records, review and transfer 45
© Crown copyright 2016.
You may use and re-use the information featured in this report (not including logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Any enquiries regarding the use and re-use of this information resource should be sent to [email protected] Statement of commitment
In advance of each Information Management Assessment (IMA) we recommend that permanent secretaries publish a statement of commitment to the assessment process that also underlines the importance of good practice in information and records management. The Home Office has not published a statement of commitment. However, the department ensured that all participating units were made aware of their permanent secretary’s commitment to the IMA process and to working with us.
IMA background
The Home Office IMA involved a detailed review of supporting documentation followed by interviews with senior staff, specialists and practitioners in the department’s London office. These were conducted between 24 and 28 June 2015. Additional interviews with key staff were conducted at Heathrow Terminal 5 and by telephone into July 2015.
The following report provides a summary of good practice and risks identified. IMA reports and departmental action plans are published on The National Archives’ website at:
nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/our-services/ima-reports-action-plans.htm Glossary
CFP – Corporate File Plan DRO – Departmental Records Officer EDRM – Electronic Document and Records Management EMB – Executive Management Board FOI – Freedom of Information HMPO – HM Passport Office IAO – Information Asset Owner IICSA - the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse IMA – Information Management Assessment IT – Information Technology KIEG – Knowledge and Information Executive Group KIM – Knowledge and Information Management KIMU – Knowledge and Information Management Unit One3M – Home Office’s information management and information assurance maturity model (previously I3M) OSCT – Office for Security and Counter Terrorism RMsys – Records Management System for tracking corporate paper records SIRO – Senior Information Risk Owner UKBA – UK Borders Agency UKVI – UK Visas and Immigration Key findings of the assessment
1 The value of information
| Performance rating | Communicating and realising value | Satisfactory | |--------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------| | | Managing information as an asset | Development area |
- The Home Office is currently placing an increased priority on information and records management in response to well-publicised shortcomings that have had a negative reputational impact. We gained a good level of assurance that the Home Office is actively working to improve its ability to manage its records in all formats. The permanent secretary has been supportive, for example, giving his backing to the establishment of a new governance body. The department has also committed to developing a new information strategy. To deliver most benefit, we recommend that this should establish a joint approach for information and data. The Home Office has already identified as objectives through its risk management framework the principles of information availability, information security and information exploitation. These principles should be at the heart of the Home Office’s new information strategy.
- The Home Office is working to increase oversight of its information assets and has undertaken Information Asset Owner (IAO) training, delivered by The National Archives’ Information Assurance and Cyber Security Engagement Programme. However, there is not yet a single governance approach for the management of information assets, with HM Passport Office (HMPO) still maintaining its own separate processes. Internally published guidance for IAOs is generic rather than specific to the Home Office and is unlikely to be providing effective direction to staff. The Home Office needs to clarify whether its open and inclusive definition of an information asset should routinely be applied to unstructured information. It should also more clearly establish the extent to which the concepts of records and information assets overlap. Records management and information assurance staff should work together to ensure that retention requirements are identified for existing information assets. 2 Digital information and supporting technology
| Performance rating | Supporting information through technology | Development area | |--------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------| | | Digital continuity and IT change | Development area |
- The Corporate File Plan (CFP) meets key requirements of the Section 46 Code of Practice but is inflexible and under-used. The introduction of the SharePoint 2010-based system, iManage, is expected to help the Home Office manage its digital information more effectively, making information easier to find and reducing the burden on users.
- The introduction of iManage has been formally identified as a mitigating action for the information availability related risks that the Home Office faces. The Home Office needs to ensure alternative mitigating actions are also defined for areas where the CFP is not in use and where iManage will not be adopted. This includes areas such as the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT), which is upgrading from SharePoint 2007 to SharePoint 2013. To effectively manage these risks and help ensure the success of its new system, the Home Office must also address the significant volume of information held outside shared repositories in email accounts and personal drives. These lack size limits or auto-deletion functionality that may have been helpful in encouraging staff to store emails in corporate repositories.
- The Home Office has good foundations in place to support the management of digital continuity risk, but lacks formal plans to enable this. It should embed its approach in its new strategy and include a description of digital continuity risk at a proportionate level in its risk management framework, engaging with its IT supplier as needed. This is particularly important in view of the length of time that some of the Home Office’s information and data will need to be maintained. 3 Information risk, governance and oversight
| Performance rating | Recognising information risk | Satisfactory | |--------------------|------------------------------|--------------| | | Establishing control | Development area | | | Providing guidance | Satisfactory | | | Measuring Impact | Good practice |
- Risks relating to information exploitation, information security and information availability are defined at appropriate levels in the Home Office risk management framework. Risks are well described. The information availability risk is owned by Corporate Services. It establishes the impact of poor performance in information management and the role of KIM improvement work in reducing the risk that the Home Office faces. Current risk descriptions do not make reference among mitigating actions either to steps taken by the business to adhere to policy or to central compliance checking activities. Both points should be addressed at an appropriate level within the Home Office risk management framework. The Home Office should also assess whether it is gaining the insight it needs into work to reduce information availability risk across all areas of the business, with particular reference to areas where KIM governance is not delivered by the Corporate Services based Knowledge and Information Management Unit (KIMU).
- We strongly support the creation of the Knowledge and Information Executive Group (KIEG), which has the potential to provide a new impetus to work to improve information management standards. The Home Office also needs to resolve the way responsibility for information and records management governance is distributed across its groups. In our view, arrangements at the time of the IMA, with responsibility divided between separate knowledge and information management teams, did not yet reflect the Home Office’s status as an integrated single department. The Home Office needs to work to deliver a more consistent governance approach. The KIEG has the potential to play a key part in this.
- The Home Office recognises the need to improve the quality of guidance it provides to staff. Work to review and improve this was underway at the time of the IMA. We support the Home Office’s aim of adopting a three-tier approach with detailed policy that is accompanied by guidance and briefer desk guides. In particular, staff need clearer guidance to help them recognise what to keep. With this in place, it will be easier to encourage greater business ownership of information and records management.
- Capability in information assurance and information management is assessed at group level via the Home Office One3M maturity model. We recognise this as a useful means of benchmarking performance. The model is based on the 2012 HMG Information Principles and has evolved to test performance in new priority areas such as cyber security. The Home Office should now review the basis on which the model is established as adherence to the information principles is no longer mandatory. At the same time, it should consider shifting the focus of the model to deliver a more in-depth, qualitative assessment of whether policy and guidance are being adhered to.
4 Records, review and transfer
| Performance rating | |----------------------------------------| | Oversight of records and selection | Satisfactory | | Implementing disposal decisions | Satisfactory |
- The Home Office Departmental Records Officer (DRO) is also the Head of KIM and is well placed to oversee paper and digital as a whole. The DRO is in a good position to exert strategic influence and ensure that the potential impacts of information and records management related risks are clearly communicated. The Home Office recognises the limitations of its tracking system for corporate paper records, RMSys. It has conducted a data cleansing project to improve the quality of data on the system before a replacement is implemented; an audit of paper files held by the business was also commissioned by the permanent secretary in support of the review carried out by Peter Wanless and Richard Whittam QC. The department has conducted specific digital searches in response to the Rotherham child sex abuse investigations and this has led to a wider piece of work aimed at improving eDiscovery.
- The Home Office continues with appraisal work, with a view to ensuring it can get back on track with the preparation and transfer of files to The National Archives. It has published its disposal schedules in response to recommendations in Sir Alex Allan’s Records Review report.¹ It is also an active participant in The National Archives’ Digital Transfer User Group. At the time of assessment, disposal of records was on hold in accordance with the requirements of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA). With reduced resources following a KIM team restructure, the Home Office needs to produce a revised forward plan for the appraisal, sensitivity review and transfer of its records. It also needs to have clear criteria for the disposal of information not migrated to iManage, and should work to improve its knowledge of the information stored in its unstructured shared drives.
¹ [www.gov.uk/government/publications/records-review-by-sir-alex-allan](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/records-review-by-sir-alex-allan) The following are among the areas of good practice identified at the time of the assessment. They include systems and approaches that other government organisations may find helpful in mitigating information and records management related risks:
| Highlights of the 2015 IMA | |---------------------------| | The need to improve information and records management has been communicated at the most senior level within the Home Office and the backing of the permanent secretary has been obtained for key initiatives. These include the establishment of a Knowledge and Information Executive Group to help deliver better governance and senior engagement. | | The previous information strategy, though now lapsed, delivered tangible outputs and was prominently endorsed by the then Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO). | | The Home Office has invested effort in improving its performance in responding to enquiries under the Freedom of Information (FOI) act. Weekly performance targets are in place, with weekly meetings used to flag any issues. The Home Office has published the highest volume of FOI releases of any department of state on GOV.UK – 1,674 of the 4,798 documents published by the department (as of 1 June 2015). | | A requirement has been established to consider transparency as a factor in business cases over a specific threshold, and the Head of Transparency sits on the project boards of larger projects. | | By defining a strategic-level risk relating to information exploitation, the Home Office has demonstrated that it recognises the true value of its information and the impact if this information cannot be used as needed. | | The Home Office has described an information availability risk that includes a range of cultural and IT-related causes. The risk description clearly establishes the impact of poor performance in information and records management for the department and establishes the role of KIM initiatives in | reducing the level of risk that it faces. Undergoing an Information Management Assessment has been included among mitigating actions in recognition of the benefit that can be obtained from external scrutiny and review.
A Service Level Agreement is in place for knowledge and information management, which sets out responsibilities of the central team and the business.
Results from assessments using the department’s information management and information assurance maturity model (One3M) are shared with internal audit and help inform audit plans for the coming year. Consolidated results are shared with the SIRO.
A Historical Inquiries and Review team has been set up to handle all e-discovery work with the exception of FOI. This team has been engaged with the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) from the start.
# Recommendations to address risk areas
## Recommendation 1
The Home Office should build on its KIM action plan and ensure that the new information strategy owned by the Knowledge and Information Executive Group (KIEG) sets goals for the whole department. The strategy should provide an impetus for work to improve technology, governance and culture.
There would be benefit in centring the strategy on the principles of information availability, security and exploitation that are already defined as objectives in the department’s risk governance approach.
This would be supported by:
- Establishing a joint or linked strategy for corporate information and data to tackle the current siloed approach.
- Factoring in plans to increase oversight and control of operational records.
- Factoring in digital continuity considerations and defining a digital continuity risk at an appropriate level (such as the performance and risk directorate risk register).
- Underlining the benefit the adoption of the information strategy will deliver to the department with endorsement by the Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO) or at Executive Management Board (EMB) level.
- Establishing a requirement to report to EMB or SIRO at appropriate milestones.
## Recommendation 2
KIMU and information assurance staff should work together to increase oversight and control of the Home Office’s information assets, establishing clearer department-specific principles for Information Asset Owners (IAOs).
This would be supported by:
- Defining more clearly the relationship between records and information assets.
- Ensuring that retention requirements for existing information assets are visible to the Departmental Records Officer (DRO).
- Bringing greater consistency to the IAO role and establishing how IAOs should be supported in provision of assurance (for example, by a specific role or by their teams).
- Reviewing the IAO handbook to reflect the processes in place within the department. **Recommendation 3**
Develop plans to increase oversight and drive good governance of the information held outside the Corporate File Plan (CFP) and iManage, information not migrated to iManage, and the information held in personal repositories and unstructured shared drives.
This would be supported by:
- Identifying who has responsibility for governance of unstructured shared drives (see also recommendation 4).
- Defining an approach to address and limit the storage by staff of important information and ephemera in email accounts in the future.(^2)
- Defining an approach to ensure the availability of information with long-term historical or business value currently held in email accounts and shared drives (see also recommendation 5).(^3)
- Ensuring that information not migrated to iManage becomes read-only and that a plan is in place for its disposal. Where information has long-term value its continuity will need to be maintained.
- Defining the mitigating actions for information availability risk in those areas where iManage will not be adopted and where the CFP is not in use.
**Recommendation 4**
Establish a single approach for knowledge and information management governance that cuts across the existing group structure to drive consistent, department-wide improvement.
This would be supported by:
- Establishing more formal links between the DRO and head of KIMU, IMCU and OSCT. KIM teams should support the effective planning and delivery of the new information strategy.
- KIEG endorsement of key documents that set out KIM functions and roles (such as the Terms of Reference for the Home Office Head of Knowledge & Information Management Profession and the KIM service level agreement) to provide a basis to hold the business and KIM staff to account.
______________________________________________________________________
(^2) The National Archives’ guidance recommends imposing size limits on personal repositories and email accounts as a means of encouraging corporate storage of information with value. The Home Office should consider this in the future as part of wider plans.
(^3) The Home Office should also recognise the limitations in terms of time available to staff as well as the potential impact of users transferring large amounts of email at once, learning from the experience of other government departments.
- Ensuring that consistent branding and common principles are applied to KIM policy.
- Ensuring that monitoring of information availability risk, and progress made in addressing it, cuts across group boundaries
**Recommendation 5**
Establish a plan to ensure messages about information and records management requirements and responsibilities are reaching all staff across all groups.
This would be supported by:
- Seeking KIEG sponsorship and the support of senior management for this work.
- Extending the responsibilities of business areas and managers (as set out in documentation such as the KIM service level agreement and *Managing information: manager’s responsibilities*) to include ensuring that staff adhere to information management policy.
- Using One3M (or other means) to make qualitative assessments of the extent to which policy and guidance is being followed. This may form part of wider work to review the basis on which the model is established.
- Publicising One3M results internally to raise standards.
- Considering obtaining assurance from the business at an appropriate level that information is being kept as required against defined standards. This may help embed understanding of corporate responsibilities.
- Ensuring the business owns the risk of not taking the right action to adhere to information management policy. This risk may, for example, be defined and owned at group or team level. Action taken to monitor compliance should also feature in central risk descriptions.
- Reviewing and improving training and guidance provision: in particular, looking at developing bite-size guidance and use of e-learning.
- Reviewing the provision of information support roles to better fit the Home Office’s needs. This might include, for example, splitting the iManager role into two, with one role focusing on oversight and promoting good KIM practice while the other focuses on more administrative tasks.
**Recommendation 6**
Establish a plan for achieving 20-year rule commitments for the remainder of the transition period, ensuring that a clear process and guidance for review staff are defined. This would be supported by:
- Producing a revised forward plan for the appraisal and transfer of records, in all formats, which factors in quality requirements and available resources.
- Considering the reduced team size, reviewing sensitivity review guidance to ensure that as much information will be released as possible and sensitive information will be protected where possible.
- Continuing to investigate macro methods of appraisal.
- Continuing to work alongside The National Archives in developing a process for appraisal, sensitivity review and transfer of digital information, drawing on the experience of other government departments and its own Information Management Consultant. 1 The value of information
1.1 Communicating and realising value
Goal: The organisation establishes information’s value in principle and supports its realisation in practice.
Establishing the importance of information
The Home Office has been subject to criticism and reputational damage because of its inability to demonstrate that it could locate information relating to historic child abuse allegations. The 2014 review by Peter Wanless and Richard Whittam QC was set up to examine whether the Home Office had failed to act in the 1980s on information it received in respect to allegations of organised child abuse involving public figures. Their review highlighted gaps in filing conventions and record keeping methods. Because of these gaps, the authors concluded that it was ‘not possible to say whether files were ever removed or destroyed to cover up or hide allegations of organised or systematic child abuse’.
In response, the Home Office has publicly committed to improving processes for discovery of existing paper files. This is to be achieved through better housekeeping of files and replacement of the department’s paper record system, RMSys, as recommended by one of two recent Home Office internal audit reports that looked at information and records (see p.24 and 46).
Through our assessment, we saw evidence that the Home Office is also giving priority to the management of current digital information and to ensuring that the right records are created in the first place. A new KIM team is in place under a Senior Civil Service-level Departmental Records Officer (DRO) and support has been sought
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4 The Wanless and Whittam QC review: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/372915/Wanless-Whittam_Review_Report.pdf 5 Annual report and accounts 2014-15: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/441282/HO-AR15_web.pdf from the department’s permanent secretary to take action to improve performance in the following four priority areas:
- Improved understanding
- Better technology
- Better control
- More reward and recognition
We recognise these as appropriate areas to target and are pleased to see that the first steps have been taken, with a letter sent to Executive Management Board (EMB) members seeking engagement on the formation of a new KIM governance board, the Knowledge and Information Executive Group (KIEG). The Home Office used this opportunity to emphasise to EMB members the role of information as an enabler for the department’s public task. The letter also stated that leaders within business units need to take responsibility for the way their staff manage knowledge and information.
Policy and guidance already contain some helpful messages on the importance of good information management and staff obligations in this regard. For example, the information management home page on the Home Office intranet, Horizon, provides the following clear statement:
*Every civil servant is responsible for managing the information and documents they create and use in their work. It’s a requirement of the civil service code that we: ‘keep accurate official records and handle information as openly as possible within the legal framework’*
However, from our interviews it is clear that such messages are not being heard or recognised by all staff. Across the department as a whole, staff awareness of records management as something that matters to the Home Office was varied. In 2013, the Home Office took on responsibility for the functions of UK Border Agency (UKBA) and the executive agency status of HM Passport Office (HMPO) was removed in 2014. A substantial number of the staff who are now Home Office employees fulfil frontline roles and are based outside the corporate centre. In our view, staff interviewed from these areas in particular tended to be less clear about corporate messages relating to information and records management.
A push on records management responsibilities is something that a number of the staff we spoke to actively want their department to provide. Several interviewees expressed the view that the Home Office needs to make it clearer that everyone has a responsibility to manage their information. One felt that the Home Office needs ‘to push harder on the fact that everyone has responsibility for IM, with a commitment to support this by providing better systems.’ Another stated, ‘Everyone has responsibility for RM, but it is particularly important for managers and particularly important to convey to new staff. Staff need to get the message that this is business critical.’ A third staff member said, ‘Policy and strategy for IM is not embedded in the culture … Home Office needs to drive policy to individuals and build it into people’s roles and get people to do the right thing. If this had happened all along the department wouldn’t be having the problems it is having now in terms of responding to inquiries. The longer Home Office takes to address it, the bigger the problem will be.’
Key messages about information and records management must reach all staff. Leadership from senior management would be helpful in ensuring these messages are heard and understood across the whole department. We recommend that a specific plan is established to ensure that they are communicated effectively. It is worth noting here that Horizon has not proved a successful tool for this so far – staff we spoke to outside the corporate centre said they found it very difficult to search and that it was often slow. The continued rollout of the department’s new SharePoint system, iManage (see pp. 27-8), may offer at least part of the solution. It has the potential to provide a shared corporate storage area and a tool for communicating messages about good practice in records and information management. It is also expected to help staff communicate better across team boundaries. In addition, the Home Office should make greater use of its networks of Records Advisors and iManagers to promote KIM messages. See recommendation 5 Setting goals for information and its management
In 2012, the Home Office 2010 information management strategy, *Want to know more?*, was refreshed and reissued under the title *Still want to know more…?* Although not time bound and lacking a schedule for further review, the strategy was endorsed by the then Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO). *This is good practice.* We also note that the strategy provided impetus for the development of tangible outputs in the form of the Home Office’s I3M maturity model (see pp. 42-4). This was introduced to provide a framework for an evidence-based assessment of Home Office policies, procedures and practices against the HM Government Information Principles.
*Still want to know more?* has not been revisited or revised recently – for example, since the incorporation of the former UKBA or HMPO into the Home Office – and it is no longer a live document. We are, therefore, pleased to note a commitment from the Home Office to develop a new strategy, following the publication of this report, that will be owned and taken forward by the KIEG.
In the absence of a current information strategy, we highlight the existence of two separate action plans that are providing direction: the Home Office Data Science action plan and the Improving Knowledge and Information Management in the Home Office action plan. The former sets expectations for the deployment of data science, capability development and work to overcome barriers. A key goal is the establishment of a single data platform under the direction of the Home Office Data Analytics Capability to ‘unlock the value of data in Line of Business systems’. A data board has been formed and a programme is in place to migrate data and decommission five existing systems. Benefits highlighted by interviewees include a shift from a case-focused approach to a more holistic person-focused approach for the data the Home Office collects on individuals, with the ability to establish a ‘customer’ narrative. We understand that the establishment of a data directory will form part of this work.
Meanwhile, the Improving Knowledge and Information Management in the Home Office action plan sets out necessary steps to address performance in historical search and review and in the four priority areas for improvement that have been highlighted to the permanent secretary (see pp. 15-16). The Improving KIM action plan provides a clear summary of the issues that need to be addressed. We regard the development of this document as a useful start in developing a targeted approach, but note that it is not time bound, corporately branded or endorsed. It does not set out how actions will be delivered, or who will be responsible for delivering them over what period.
The central Knowledge and Information Management Unit (KIMU) sits within Corporate Services. The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) has its own KIM team, while Immigration Enforcement, UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) and Border Force are managed through the Information Management & Compliance Unit (IMCU). These sit in different business areas from KIMU and are working to different corporate requirements. KIMU has drafted its 2015-16 business plan according to Corporate Services principles. The schedule of work within this document, while not mapping precisely to the Improving KIM action plan, clearly covers a number of its priority areas. IMCU lacks a direct senior civil service chain and has not produced a 2015-16 business plan. Meanwhile, OSCT staff are working to deliver their own, separate KIM strategy from 2010. Because of this, and because of the lack of reference in the Improving KIM action plan to specific challenges within OSCT, Immigration Enforcement, UKVI and Border Force, it is not clear how far the document applies to them in practice. To drive consistent improvement and risk mitigation, the Home Office needs to ensure that planned work applies to the whole department. The information strategy it develops must set goals that enable this. See recommendation 1
A number of senior staff interviewed were open to the idea of a joint strategy covering information and data. Similar goals are already being set for information and data in terms of ensuring that they are available to meet business needs, and are supported by effective technology. Datasets, like unstructured information, have lifecycles that need to be managed and some will need to be maintained for a considerable length of time. We also note that, from a risk management point of view, the Home Office already has a joined-up approach, with strategic risks relating to information exploitation defined in an inclusive manner that covers information and data. As the Home Office has already defined information security, information availability and information exploitation (see p. 33) as objectives through its risk management framework, we recommend that it establishes these as the core principles for its new information strategy. We recommend that the Home Office should either establish a joint overall strategy for its information and data, or ensure that individual strategies and plans are formally linked and structured around these common principles. See recommendation 1
Enabling public access to information and supporting transparency and re-use
According to the latest published statistics for FOI at the time of the IMA (Q4 2014), the Home Office received the fifth highest number of FOI requests (692) among the departments of state. This is itself the lowest volume that the Home Office has received since Q3 2012. 80% of requests in Q4 2014 were met within the 20-day deadline and 90% were answered in time (in other words, meeting deadline or within permitted extensions). Home Office response rates dipped below 85% in Q3 2012 and remained below this level through 2013. We were told that this was due, in part, to structural changes and loss of expertise during the transfer of the former UKBA’s functions to the Home Office. The Information Commissioner’s Office monitored the Home Office’s timeliness in responding to requests for information between July and September 2013. The Home Office’s performance improved in 2014 and remained above the required level in three out of four quarters. It granted 38% of resolvable queries in full in Q4 2014, which was below the average of 49% for departments of state. It also withheld in full 39% of resolvable requests, which was above the average of 32% for departments of state.
Interviewees indicated that there is now very close scrutiny of the FOI process and performance within the Home Office, with regular reporting to senior staff. Current FOI processes appear to be robust and were recognised as such by interviewees. The Information Rights team operates a partially devolved service, handling around a third of FOI requests directly and providing a coordinating role for the remaining requests. These are dealt with by Information Access practitioners in the business.
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6 [www.gov.uk/government/collections/government-foi-statistics](http://www.gov.uk/government/collections/government-foi-statistics) FOI guidance has been recently refreshed and the team has put in place weekly targets and uses weekly meetings to flag anything problematic.
As at 1 June 2015, there were 4,798 publications by the Home Office on GOV.UK, 306 of which were classed as transparency data. The department has published 284 datasets on data.gov.uk. The website gives the department an average score for openness of 1.7 and it has received a total of 483 stars, the third highest number among departments of state. Key successes noted by interviewees included making places of worship data available in open data format and the provision of data that underpins the police.uk website. The Home Office has also recently published the raw data for that website. We were told that a requirement has been established to consider transparency requirements in business cases over a certain threshold. The Head of Transparency sits on the board for larger projects with links in to digital and open standards work. This is good practice
1.2 Managing information as a valued asset
Goal: The organisation protects, manages and exploits its information assets to achieve maximum value.
Defining and cataloguing information assets
The Home Office has a main information asset register for logging significant information assets, with a threshold for inclusion based on factors including sensitivity and business criticality. Information Asset Owners (IAOs) should log information assets that fall below the threshold for inclusion on local information asset registers. We understand that a suggested template is provided that includes 14 fields.
The Home Office IAO Handbook sets expectations for the management of information assets in the department. It defines an information asset as:
A body of information, defined and managed as a single unit so it can be understood, shared, protected and exploited effectively. This is the standard government definition, promoted through supporting documentation for the security policy framework and by The National Archives.(^7)
The Home Office IAO handbook contains many positive elements. These include a clear definition of the risks that information assets may be subject to, such as cyber security and information management related risk. The Home Office worked with Cabinet Office to produce this document, which was drafted in a generic style with the hope that other government departments would be able to make use of it and adapt it to reflect their own business needs.
We recognise the IAO Handbook itself as a best-practice template, but it can only have limited utility as a piece of guidance if it is not tailored. The Home Office has not done this when publishing the handbook internally and has made the guidance available to staff in its generic form. The handbook states throughout what ‘your organisation’ or an IAO within ‘your organisation’, should do. It does not set out how processes actually work in the Home Office or particular groups within the Home Office, or what the specific expectations are for the Home Office’s own IAOs. Governance arrangements are not established and the department’s name does not feature within the branding or contents. In addition, while the handbook contains links to guidance published by the Information Commissioner’s Office and The National Archives, it does not link to any internal Home Office policies covering areas such as information security, information assurance or information management.
The Home Office’s approach for identifying and maintaining oversight of its information assets is still evolving. A project was run in 2014 to bring the main information asset register up-to-date and identify and include information assets held within the former UKBA. The project did not extend to HMPO, which still oversees its own information assets and maintains its own assurance process. This means that the Home Office does not yet have a single structure for the management of its information assets.
We found evidence that the concept of an information asset is not yet fully embedded and that information assets do not yet appear to be consistently identified
(^7) [www.gov.uk/government/publications/information-asset-owner-role-guidance](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/information-asset-owner-role-guidance) and logged. In one case, we carried out a spot check on an information asset that contained sensitive information with long-term business value and that had been subject to digital continuity loss earlier in its life. The information asset in question did not appear on the main information asset register at the time, but was subsequently added, confirming our view that it had been over the threshold for inclusion. In other cases, staff we interviewed were unclear why particular bodies of information they described to us would be classed as information assets and logged on local information asset registers, although they met criteria set out in the IAO Handbook.
In particular, we saw limited evidence that the definition of an information asset was being routinely applied to proportionate groups of unstructured information and records, as set out in the IAO Handbook. Not all directorates had included examples of this type of asset on the information asset register extract supplied to us for review. Exceptions included one directorate that had catalogued information assets described as containing draft and finalised reports and advice given on specific topics. While the IAO Handbook specifically states that all files associated with a project may be classed as an information asset, only the HR directorate had listed information assets containing project documentation. We also noted that Home Office guidance on project management makes no reference to the concept of information assets, IAOs or to the processes that should be followed.
One underlying cause may be the fact that the Home Office has not fully established how the concepts of records management and information asset management overlap and support each other. Of particular interest from the point of view of this report is the lack of clarity around oversight of retention requirements for information assets. The main information asset register has a column to collect retention requirements with a heading indicating that these should be passed on to records management staff, but this is not happening. Within HMPO, retention requirements are not collected at all.
This is concerning because, in practice, everything that government departments generate is a public record and needs to be managed as such. Departments have a responsibility under the Public Records Act to ensure the safekeeping of everything they generate, whether or not it will ultimately be identified as having historic value. and selected for permanent preservation. Risks relating to the future availability of information assets may be increased if retention requirements are not identified or are not applied correctly. The DRO and SIRO need assurance that the right criteria have been identified for the retention of the Home Office’s information assets. We recommend that the Home Office tightens its procedures in this area and ensures that retention requirements for information assets are subject to more effective scrutiny with closer involvement from the DRO and his team. At the same time, it needs to amend the IAO Handbook to establish department-specific principles and provide clear direction for its IAOs. This should include clarifying the relationship between information assets and records. See recommendation 2
Ownership of information assets
We recognise that the Home Office has been working to address understanding and visibility of the IAO role. We are pleased to see that the Home Office has taken advantage of IAO training provided by The National Archives’ Information Assurance and Cyber Security Engagement Programme, with just under 200 IAOs from across the department trained through to March 2015.
The Home Office does not appoint its IAOs at a specific level of seniority, but there is an expectation that staff with more seniority will have responsibility for more significant or sensitive information assets. IAOs with less seniority should escalate usage requests for smaller information assets such as extracts from larger datasets. In contrast to a number of other departments, the Home Office does not nominate any specific support role to help IAOs discharge their duties or define how certain responsibilities may be delegated in practice. The Home Office should consider doing this - for example, to establish responsibility for the day-to-day management of larger information assets. See recommendation 2
A number of the issues we encountered were identified in the 2014 Home Office internal audit report on information assurance. It is clear to us that much remains to be done to bring consistency to the role of IAO and to ensure that it delivers benefit
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8 The Public Records Act: nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/legislation/public-records-act/ to the department. We recommend that a specific plan is put in place to improve oversight of information assets with involvement from KIMU and information assurance staff. This is particularly important given the Home Office’s aspiration to utilise new opportunities offered by iManage to delegate more responsibility for information asset management to local teams. See recommendation 2 Information and supporting technology
2.1 The technology environment
Goal: The technology environment supports the management, protection and exploitation of information.
Corporate storage of information
The core Home Office has had a main repository for unstructured information since the introduction of the Corporate File Plan (CFP) in 2005. The Home Office has invested considerable effort in maintaining the CFP, which is functionally based and has a documents and records area. The latter offers the ability to manage information and protect records from accidental or unauthorised alteration, copying, movement or deletion in line with guidance set out in the Section 46 Code of Practice. A number of interviewees stated that the CFP met their needs at a basic level, with one describing it as ‘a solution to a problem, but old-fashioned’. The CFP has some key limitations and the Home Office recognises that these have had a negative impact on buy-in to and use of the system. KPIs are in place for the creation of folders, which the Home Office reports are always met or exceeded. Despite this, there was still a perception among some staff we spoke to that processes for setting up files can be time consuming, that the structure is inflexible or hard to change, and that in some cases it has not been kept up to date effectively as needed. Others questioned how well the CFP is adopted and used, saying: ‘Even where CFP has been embraced, practice isn’t consistent,’ and ‘A lack of naming conventions means you can’t find anything if there are large numbers of files in a folder’.
The Home Office hopes to address the limitations of the CFP through the introduction of iManage, which is based on SharePoint 2010 and is intended to lessen the burden on staff. Within the current technology environment, however, matters are complicated by the fact that the CFP has not been available to the whole
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9 The Section 46 Code of Practice: [www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/manage-information/planning/records-management-code/](http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/manage-information/planning/records-management-code/) department. This means that the Home Office is not starting from a level playing field, with some areas facing greater or lesser risks in information and records management terms.
For example, OSCT has its own SharePoint 2007 implementation, with a Meridio bolt-on that supports records declaration, but not disposal. This has historically been delivered by a different IT supplier to that used by the rest of the department. Border Force, meanwhile, and other areas that formed part of UKBA, use unstructured shared drives. These are not subject to central oversight or control and do not offer the same benefits as the CFP in terms of the lifecycle management and protection of information from unauthorised alteration, copying, movement or deletion. We saw evidence of the potential impact of this from a business perspective. In one case, we were told that a dataset identified by interviewees as having significant current value to the Home Office from a reporting point of view had been inadvertently deleted and staff had to contact IT to try to retrieve it.
We note that a print-to-paper policy is in place for Border Force’s key operational outputs. This could help reduce some of the risks that the current provision and use of this environment raises to information with long-term historic value, as long as the policy has been and is fully adhered to.
**Electronic Records Management System - iManage**
iManage is being consciously adopted as a ‘stop gap’ solution to improve the Home Office’s information and records management performance ahead of the department’s move to a new technology platform by 2017.
iManage is the Home Office’s name for the EDRM software procured as a service from its IT supplier, Fujitsu Cloud Services. It is being rolled out with an Automated Intelligence Compliance Extender to boost the records management functionality and Automated Intelligence Syncpoint to enable email integration. We were told that the Home Office will no longer be relying on users to create metadata, close files or declare records, as much of this will now be automated. The system has the capability to manage information through its lifecycle and has so far been rolled out to around 3,500 staff, with plans to roll it out to another 9,000 in autumn 2016. The CFP was still in active use at the time of the IMA and requests to set up new folders were still being made. We understand that the CFP is being progressively shut down from January 2016.
There is no plan yet to remove access to alternative storage areas, such as shared and personal drives and the CFP, once iManage is fully up and running, although some business areas have already asked KIMU to do this for them. If staff continue to have access to alternative repositories when iManage has been rolled out to them, there is a risk that information with value will be stored outside the system, undermining the expected benefit to be obtained from its introduction. Access to these alternative filing areas should be removed once iManage has been fully rolled out, staff are aware how to use the system, and any important information has been migrated across to it. See recommendation 3
Finding, accessing and protecting information
The way that digital information has been managed within the Home Office has led to substantial issues around its discovery. As one member of staff commented, these have ‘exposed the risk - the causes of which are a lot of data and versions and poor understanding of what should and should not be stored.’ The introduction of iManage is expected to help address this and make it easier to find information stored in shared spaces. This has been a key driver for the push to adopt iManage.
While this is positive, we note that iManage is listed as the sole IT-related mitigating action for the information availability risk that the Home Office has identified (see p. 33); it is also the sole IT-related solution for shared storage areas listed in the Home Office Improving KIM action plan (see pp. 18-19). At the time of the IMA, it was not clear how far the system would be rolled to the operational areas of the Home Office and what the benefits there would be. As noted elsewhere in the report, these are areas of the Home Office where there have been gaps in provision and awareness of information management policy and where unstructured shared drives are in use rather than the CFP. Both factors are likely to increase the risk that the information the Home Office needs will not be available. The Home Office should ensure that alternative mitigating actions are clearly defined and communicated for areas where iManage will not be adopted. This includes OSCT and any areas where unstructured shared drives will continue to be used. See recommendation 3
The Home Office has also identified the storage of information in personal repositories as a concern. While there is an aspiration to address this through the ‘better technology’ component of the Improving Knowledge and Information Management action plan, as yet there is no concrete plan to do so.
The Home Office provided us with approximate estimates that around 50 TB of information is held in individual and shared mailboxes and 30 TB is held in personal drives. There are no limits on email storage across the whole of the Home Office and no limits on the size of personal drives in the majority of the department. The exception is OSCT, where limits on personal drives are in place and interviewees highlighted an active policy of encouraging staff to file emails and keep inboxes to a reasonable size. A lack of limits makes it possible to hold large volumes of information that may have corporate value outside shared spaces. This may mean that information is either held for longer than it needs to be or disposed of prematurely when it should be retained. A number of interviewees stated that they saved emails into the CFP when they needed to record a decision or agreement. However, it was clear that other interviewees were retaining and managing large volumes of emails within Outlook folders. Some of the staff we spoke to reported inboxes with five, ten or more years’ worth of email, including information from previous roles. To underline the scale of the problem, we also heard accounts of inboxes that had become unstable because of the volume of emails that had been retained in them.
One member of staff stated that they were unclear about the rules relating to retention, but never deleted emails and held large volumes to ensure they had a record of decisions ‘because I’ve been burned in the past’. Another who similarly said they were holding a ‘huge’ amount of email and were unaware of corporate guidance said ‘I don’t delete anything in case I need to go back to it.’ In one case an interviewee said that they kept emails for their own audit purposes, but applied their own retention policy, deleting everything over three years old on a rolling basis.
The Home Office has previously conducted deleted/junk email initiatives and has in the past planned to put hard limits in place for email accounts and personal drives, while at the same time encouraging and enabling storage in shared repositories. The Home Office has a network-accredited date-based retention tool that could, in theory, be applied to both areas to reduce the length of time information is held and the size of these areas. It is also considering the use of e-Discovery tools to help identify information with value held outside shared repositories.
The Home Office needs to identify and address information that is currently held in personal repositories, including email accounts, that should be retained and information without value that should not be. It also needs to address and limit the storage by staff of important information and ephemera in email accounts in the future. The Home Office does not now intend to impose limits on personal repositories within the current IT environment. We recommend, though, that it should consider doing so in the future as part of wider plans to address these issues. These plans should contain a significant cultural component. Any solution for information currently held in email accounts and personal drives needs to recognise business as well as historic value, and be practical and proportionate. Staff are unlikely to be able to spend extended periods of time reviewing old emails or documents to decide what should be kept. See recommendation 3
Plans also need to balance the requirement to engage staff and ensure that information with value is captured with the potential negative impact on iManage’s stability if large volumes are moved in one go. The Home Office intends to mitigate the risks through guidance and training. It is recommended that the Home Office learns from the experiences of other departments using Syncpoint, such as the Department of Health - in particular, the impact on iManage if users start to transfer large amounts of email at once. See recommendation 3 2.2 The continuity of digital information
Goal: The organisation is taking proactive steps to ensure the continuity of its information, over time and through change.
Oversight of information type and format
It is relatively easy for the Home Office to understand the age and type of information that is held on the CFP and iManage, which are both subject to central control and oversight. This includes records from the department’s old EDRM system, Meridio, which were created between 2005 and 2012. These were migrated to the CFP, but lost some metadata in the process. Date last modified has been retained.
As noted above, there is no central oversight of the shared drives inherited from the former UKBA and no central knowledge of the type, format or state of information held in them. Without such knowledge it will be harder for the Home Office to ensure its information remains accessible, readable and useable according to business need. We were told by interviewees that some of this information dates back to the early 1990s. The Home Office hopes that the use of e-Discovery tools will help it to address this.
In addition to this, the Home Office’s historic data in case management environment is complex, with data management carried out on a system-by-system basis. Data has different structures, different retention, different mandatory fields and is of different quality. Although the Home Office is in the process of moving to a common data platform, the current state of data management has proved challenging in terms of responding to requests for information and investigation. This complexity and the challenges involved in maintaining usability underline the importance of establishing a joint strategy and a joint approach for ensuring the continuity of data and digital information. See recommendation 1
Digital continuity planning/IT change
We gained a good level of assurance that business requirements for information management are at the heart of plans to roll out iManage. OSCT are moving to a different version of SharePoint (2013). Interviewees indicated that differing solutions may be used for at least some aspects of these two projects: for example, iManage will utilise a records centre and OSCT will consider managing records in place. This is concerning as, without customisation, the latter approach may put stored information at risk of inadvertent deletion. However, it is positive to hear that OSCT has engaged and consulted with KIMU on key aspects including content types.
Although there is no joint approach for management of retention requirements for existing information assets, the DRO has good visibility of the ICT procurement process. As an assessor, the DRO has the ability to comment on and contribute to business cases. **This is good practice.** We were given verbal assurance that helpful informal links exist between IT and KIM staff, which should help ensure that iManage is factored into the Home Office’s forthcoming IT refresh. The inclusion of IT subject matter experts alongside senior business representatives as standing members of the KIEG offers the opportunity to strengthen and formalise these links.
While the Home Office has solid foundations in place to ensure that digital continuity risks are managed, it does not yet have a plan to enable this. In addition, while it has a sound approach to documenting information risks in general as described below, we also note that it has not yet formally defined any risks in this specific area. The recommended joint approach for managing information and data should include managing their continuity. Information and data needs to remain usable through to disposal or transfer to The National Archives. The fact that the Home Office has large volumes of data that may have to be retained for anywhere from 50 to 100 years makes the lack of policy structure around digital continuity a particular concern. **See recommendation 1 and 3** 3 Information risk, governance and oversight
3.1 Recognising information risks
Goal: The organisation defines and manages information risks to minimise threats and maximise opportunities.
Documenting and defining information risks
The Home Office has defined a strategic-level risk relating to the exploitation of information. The Home Office is one of a small number of departments among those we have assessed to have done this. By defining this risk, the Home Office has demonstrated that it understands the value of the information that it works with and the potentially significant impact if this value it is not realised effectively. This is good practice.
Beneath the level of the main corporate risk register, the Corporate Services risk register contains a well-described risk relating to information loss. From an information security point of view, an appropriate range of potential causes have been identified, ranging from a failure to adhere to guidance, to insider threat and cyber-attack. In summer 2014, the Home Office identified a need to separate out from this risk an additional risk relating to information availability. Again, this is something that relatively few other departments have done.
The information availability risk is owned by the DRO and highlights a range of cultural and systems-related causes that may undermine the effective and appropriate management of information and records. This is good practice. Although the above risk description does not include non-compliance with the Public Records Act and other legal requirements among potential outcomes, it does set out a range of potential negative business outcomes and reputational impacts.
By defining and describing risks to information availability in this way, the Home Office has codified current known issues and communicated the outcome of any further issues through the department’s risk framework. Doing this underlines the impact of bad practice and positions information and records management as a current business issue rather than a purely historical issue relating to archived records.
**Implementing an information risk management approach**
The National Archives’ Information Assurance and Cyber Engagement Programme has delivered Board-level training in addition to the IAO training mentioned above (see p. 24). Briefings on cyber-security and information risk were delivered to the SCS and Executive Management Boards in June and July 2015. According to the Home Office annual report and accounts 2014-15, a cyber strategy is also under development.
The Home Office SIRO is the Head of Corporate Services and Chief Operating Officer. The SIRO is the owner of the information exploitation risk on the corporate risk register. His sponsorship of the request to EMB members for nominations to the KIEG demonstrates that the SIRO's role of driving a supportive culture for the protection, management and exploitation of information is recognised and taken seriously. We are also pleased to note that the Home Office internal audit team has been active in this space. In addition to the 2014 thematic review of information assurance, the internal audit team looked at records management related issues for the first time in December 2014, focusing on historic file search, discovery and destruction.
One particular positive is the fact that KIM team initiatives are included as mitigating actions for the information availability risk described on the Corporate Services risk register. This formally positions planned work to improve performance in records and information management as a risk reducing activity and provides a key framework through which progress can be monitored. However, in view of the current fragmented governance for KIM discussed below (see pp. 37-8), the Home Office should ensure that it gives sufficient coverage to risk causes and mitigating actions in all areas of the business. These include OSCT, which has its own KIM team and will not be adopting iManage, HMPO and groups originating in the former UKBA where KIM governance is currently split between KIMU and UKVI KIM staff. As noted above, plans to roll out iManage in the latter areas were not yet defined at the time of the IMA while the storage of information in unstructured shared drives is likely to increase risks to its availability. See recommendation 5
In addition, although the risk description for information availability risk covers action needed to improve technology and guidance, the action that the Home Office needs the business to take in terms of actually following and adhering to guidance does not feature. This gap needs to be addressed, particularly as we found no evidence of information and records management related risks being documented on local risk registers. We recommend that the Home Office does so by encouraging business areas to recognise the risk of failure to comply with policy, and action to mitigate it, on local risk registers. Mitigations listed on the Corporate Services risk register should also be expanded to include action to obtain commitment from the business to comply with policy and to identify and target any areas that do not. See recommendation 5
3.2 Establishing control
Goal: The organisation has effective governance structures in place that foster communication and strategic planning.
Governance structures
The first meeting of the Knowledge and Information Executive Group (KIEG) took place in April 2015. The group was created with the aim of addressing a lack of crosscutting senior engagement with information management related issues, and to initiate a new system of governance for knowledge and information management. Expected functions include reviewing directorate progress, discussing risks, agreeing knowledge and information initiatives, monitoring progress, and holding the KIMU to account. Draft terms of reference issued in April 2015 position the KIEG as a senior-level ‘forum for considering and deciding knowledge and information issues’. It is clear from this document that the new body is intended to act as a proactive force that will help to involve the business in decision making and drive improvements. The KIEG is currently expected to meet on a quarterly basis and will be chaired by the DRO and Head of KIMU; it will be attended by Senior Civil Service-level representatives from the Home Office Directorates and ALBs. These staff will assume the newly-created role of Knowledge and Information Champions, and may be represented at meetings by a deputy at a level no lower than Grade-7. The board will also be attended by subject matter experts from Home Office Technology, Corporate Security and the Office of the Chief Digital Officer. This is good practice and has the potential to foster effective communication and joined-up planning.
The Board’s senior membership and a defined escalation route up to EMB level have the potential to provide real impetus to the Home Office’s efforts to improve performance. Its creation is likely to increase central oversight and improve understanding of local dynamics. Interviewees aware of the new group were positive, with one noting: ‘It is a potentially helpful means of cutting across the silos – I’ve heard positive things. It needs to focus on the important issues and key risks.’ Another stated: ‘The KIEG could make a difference as long as it gets buy in’. We strongly support the foundation of the KIEG and recommend that it receives ongoing support to ensure its potential as a force for change is reached. We understand that, following the IMA, links have been established between the KIEG and the Data Board. The DRO is now a member of the Data Board and the Head of KIM Direction is a member of the Board sub group. This is good practice
Supporting the business
A service level agreement is in place for Knowledge and Information Management. This is good practice. It covers the services to be delivered and the responsibilities of the service provider. It also establishes a relatively detailed set of expectations for how the business should act. However, while responsibilities include nomination of a member of staff at Senior Civil Service pay band 1 level to support Home Office KIM governance, the service level agreement does not mention the KIEG or the Knowledge and Information Champion role. The service level agreement is not itself mentioned in the KIEG draft terms of reference. We recommend that the service level agreement is endorsed by the KIEG. Doing this would provide a basis to hold both KIMU and the business to account. In line with our recommendations relating to information risk, we recommend that the responsibilities of business areas are extended to ensuring that staff manage, use and protect information effectively, and are not limited to simply communicating the requirement to do so. See recommendation 5
KIMU and KIM governance
KIMU sits in the Performance and Risk Directorate within Corporate Services. The restructured team was created in August 2014, reaching initial operating capability in March 2015. In the intervening period it has reduced from an initial size of over 100 staff towards a target size of 67 staff and has been rationalised into five teams:
- Information rights
- Information management
- KIM direction
- KIM development
- Historical inquiries and reviews
The need to reduce administrative costs as part of wider government commitments was a key driver for the restructure. The initial objective was to establish a smaller, more efficient, professional and customer-focused organisation. There was also a hope that the reorganisation would allow the new team to provide ‘a single set of policies, advice, and services to all parts of a homogenous department’. Based on our review of documentation and interviews with staff, this has not yet happened.
Although individual KIM teams and KIM staff are working well and delivering benefit, the lack of a single unified governance structure can be seen in differing approaches to business planning, as noted above (see p. 19). As a consequence, it may be having a negative effect on the Home Office’s ability to consistently reduce risk and drive improvements. It may be playing a part in the lack of clarity that we noted over whether responsibility for the department’s unstructured shared drives lies with KIMU or IMCU. It could also be leading to risks and issues being missed in some areas of the business. For example, we understand gaps in the provision of retention scheduling for corporate information in the former UKBA were spotted following queries from the business rather than being spotted by KIMU or IMCU staff.
The lack of a single, unified governance structure for information management is likely to be a factor in a lack of clarity over where to turn for support and the limited penetration of key KIM messages in some areas of the business. During our visit to Heathrow, staff gave a number of examples of how they and their teams were working to ensure their information was better structured and managed. In most cases, local rather than central principles appeared to be being followed. KIMU itself had only limited visibility. When one interviewee, who began the interview by emphasising the importance of good records management to their group, was asked whether their team had worked with KIMU they said, ‘No – why would we?’
The creation of the KIEG offers an opportunity to significantly improve the situation, enabling business engagement and extending the reach of KIMU and IMCU. In addition, the Home Office should also establish more formal links between the DRO and head of KIMU and the IMCU and OSCT KIM teams, and a means of delivering a governance approach that cuts across group structures. This is required to support effective delivery of the new information strategy, oversight of information risk and a consistent approach to improving culture throughout the department. See recommendation 4
Support networks
A number of information-focused networks exist within the Home Office; of these, Records Advisers and iManagers and the information champion role within HMPO fulfil an information and records management-focused role. We were told that OSCT has its own network but that it has lapsed and needs to be re-energised. We saw evidence that the department has maintained lists of staff in the Records Adviser and iManager role, giving us a degree of confidence that both roles are currently (or have recently been) subject to central oversight. It is also clear that an active Records Adviser network has been in place, with staff mentioning newsletters and centrally-issued messages that staff were expected to communicate to their teams. The Records Adviser’s role has been to ‘manage their unit's information on the corporate file plan and consult on, monitor and encourage compliance with best practice in information management’. Because it is focused on supporting effective use of the corporate file plan, the Records Adviser role does not cover the whole department. There are a handful of Records Advisers within Border Force, for example, but these appear to be there to support senior staff or cover key aspects such as the Border systems programme. There are no Records Advisers in Border Force to support front line staff and none at all in other areas of the Home Office, such as Immigration Enforcement.
Generally, in areas of the department where the Records Advisers should be in place, we found a mixed understanding of the responsibilities of the role. While some saw it as having responsibility for sorting out permissions, restructuring files and opening part folders, others recognised a more substantial requirement to monitor and challenge behaviours. One Records Adviser, for example, said they checked the folders they set up in the CFP to make sure that staff used them, commenting: ‘The CFP is somewhere to save business files instead of your G Drive - it’s important to use it in case someone is on leave or is absent.’
Recognition of the value that such support roles offer appeared to vary. One member of staff was keen to ensure that full benefit was obtained from the iManager role in their area as a means to drive good practice. They felt that policing should be an important part of the role and that the management chain should be used to support and enable it. By contrast, another senior member of staff gave their view that ‘Records Advisers lapse when staff leave. Their departure is not necessarily noticed and they are not necessarily replaced. Governance is needed to keep networks energised’. This is an important point because of the potential impact on the efficient set up of file structures and systems if support roles are not resourced, supported or utilised effectively.
We recommend that the KIEG is used to help ensure that the importance of networks is recognised and ensure that roles receive the support they need to drive good practice. See Recommendation 5 3.3 Providing direction
Goal: The organisation gives staff the instruction they need to manage, protect and exploit information effectively.
Knowledge and Information management policy and guidance
Better policy and guidance are positioned as key enablers for the improved understanding goal in the department’s Improving Knowledge and Information Management action plan. At the time of assessment, the KIM Direction team were part way through a review of policy and supporting materials due to be completed in September 2015. The KIMU action plan 2015-16 commits the team to reviewing and refreshing all policy by December 2015, and half of all supporting materials by the end of the financial year.
We are pleased to note that approval of knowledge and information policy will be part of the KIEG’s role. When doing this, it should ensure that consistent branding is used and common principles are applied, while recognising individual business requirements and ways of working. See recommendation 4
What to Keep
The Improving Knowledge and Information Management action plan includes a clear statement that ‘people in the business need to know what information to keep and how it should be managed.’ A number of staff recognised the importance of this, with one saying, ‘The lack of enterprise search has been a problem and the introduction of iManage should help, but there still needs to be a clearer line on what to keep.’
The Home Office has developed general guidance for staff on the retention and disposal of information and records. The guidance provides advice on whether to keep information and whether to register it as a record, and also whether it should be disposed of – this includes information that is disseminated and shared through social media and other internal and external communication tools. Awareness among interviewees of the need to keep information with value varied. Where this was happening, staff were not necessarily drawing on corporate guidance to do so. A positive view was given by one Records Adviser, who said: ‘Guidance is fine and fit for purpose. Business information needs to be in corporate spaces – that’s easy to interpret and staff are hitting the right balance as not all emails need to be stored and staff need to sift the key things out.’ An opposing perspective came from a manager within the same group, who said: ‘I have no confidence that my teams are keeping the right things – some will be keeping too much and some too little. The challenge is significant in terms of email – capturing ebbing and flowing and evolving policy discussions. My view is that principles are not formalised and there are no hard and fast rules, with the result being redoing work and repeated discussions on the same issues.’ Across all interviewees, we found indications of varying standards in terms of information capture, titling and file structures. As one senior manager commented: ‘Records management can be patchy and is not consistent – some teams do it well, some teams not so well.’
The Home Office recognises a lack of knowledge of correct processes as a cause in the risk of important information being unavailable (see p. 33). The promotion of retention and disposal principles should form a prominent part of the work to promote information and records management requirements to all staff. This is an ideal area for the KIEG to pay attention to. It would provide a good foundation for the Home Office’s aspiration to ensure that business leaders take responsibility for the way their staff manage information. It would be enabled by the shift in focus that this report recommends, from communicating required behaviours to staff to ensuring that they are adopted. See recommendation 5
Providing training
The Home Office has provided different levels of training in the use of iManage as part of the rollout, with ‘embedding’ activities carried out over summer 2015 between the rollout phases. The Home Office reports that more than 100 courses have been run between the IMA and December 2015. An e-learning package has also been produced and is available to all staff. HMPO and OSCT both provide specific training in information management and specific e-learning is available for the knowledge and information management community. There is no wider programme available to staff across the Home Office as a whole. The Home Office aims to address this and develop an electronic information management training package for use by Home Office staff. We support this idea.
3.4 Measuring impact
Goal: The organisation measures performance in practice and takes informed risk based action as a result.
Measuring compliance with policy
The Home Office incorporated information assurance into its existing information management maturity model – I3M – in 2013, to form a new single information maturity model, One3M. Assessing performance against the model is a mandatory requirement in six Home Office Groups and five of the department’s arm’s length bodies, but may be undertaken by other areas on a voluntary basis. The model was introduced with the explicit aim of helping to drive a culture of excellence in information management, embedding good information management and encouraging improved behaviours across the Group. Interviewees described One3M as ‘a flexible model that changes to accommodate new areas of focus’. We saw positive evidence of a commitment to ensuring it continues to develop and evolve. This can, for example, be seen in the decision to add questions on cyber security to the 2014-15 version of the maturity model.
One3M is aligned with the HMG Information Principles, which were an output from the 2012 Government IT strategy. KIMU assesses each business area twice a year. Leads collate and present evidence and attend reviews. In the end-of-year review, likely results are discussed and a formal report is produced by KIMU. A development plan is agreed by both parties and produced by KIMU. The minimum level to be achieved is mandated each year by the SIRO. By undergoing this process annually, the Home Office expects to gradually improve its performance under each of the information principles that underpin the model. Each assessment results in a RAG rating, all of which are then consolidated into an overall annual RAG rating for the department. The score achieved by each business area is determined by the lowest score it receives under any principle.
High-level results from the Home Office’s One3M information maturity model form part of the departmental security health check submitted to Cabinet Office. They are also submitted to internal audit. We were given verbal assurance that they have helped to inform future audit plans and have helped the team to focus in on specific issues. This is good practice
Staff in the corporate centre recognised a number of benefits derived from One3M; one stated, for example, ‘You might think you know you are doing something right – this tells you whether you are.’ Another commented that its use had allowed the Home Office to ‘re-baseline risk’ after its transformation from a department of 3,500 staff to one of over 30,000.’ We see this as a particularly important benefit of One3M, which has undoubtedly helped communicate the value of information across the department and the importance of managing, protecting and exploiting it effectively.
However, as the 2012 government ICT strategy that established the information principles has now been superseded, adherence to them is no longer mandatory. To ensure One3M’s continued relevance is recognised, we recommend that the Home Office reviews the basis on which its model is established. It may, for example, consider rebranding the principles as Home Office rather than government principles. Doing this would put the Home Office in a good position to gain continued benefit from the use of the tool now that initial benchmarking of the department has been undertaken.
At the same time, we recommend that the Home Office addresses the following points. We found limited awareness among staff about whether their group was better or worse than others. The Home Office should consider publishing results by area to encourage an element of competition that will help raise standards. This motivation has been used successfully by a number of other departments in the IMA programme. See recommendation 5
We heard some criticism from interviewees about the lack of depth and insight that the model provided, with some staff surprised by how well their areas had performed in view of the shortcomings and gaps that they perceived. In our view, the focus of the questions does not reflect the Home Office’s status as a single entity. For example, questions about whether policies are in place would have had more value before HMPO and the former UKBA were absorbed into the department. The existence of policies should be known now that the Home Office is a single department. We also note that the gaps in retention scheduling within the former UKBA referred to above (see p. 37) were not revealed through use of the One3M model. As staff were unaware the gap existed, they were presumably not well placed to identify it through the self-assessment process.
To support the Home Office’s aim of driving business ownership of records management, the Home Office should assess whether policy requirements are being adhered to and take action accordingly. The Home Office should consider using One3M to do this. Support for this may be leveraged through the KIEG and the department’s new network of senior Knowledge and Information Champions. See recommendation 5
Assessing progress against strategic goals
By developing and seeking support to take forward the Improving Knowledge and Information Management action plan, the Home Office has essentially benchmarked current performance and established a commitment to improve. The KIEG draft terms of reference establish the department’s Executive Management Board as enablers, with an escalation route on an exceptions basis if KIEG is unable to resolve issues itself. The Home Office should also consider establishing a formal reporting requirement directly to EMB – for example, at the mid and/or end points of its new information strategy. See recommendation 1 4 Records, review and transfer
4.1 Oversight of records and selection
Goal: The organisation understands the value of its records and can consistently identify those with enduring historical value.
Position of the DRO
The DRO is the Head of KIM. The DRO is well-placed to exert influence on wider KIM issues, escalate risks and highlight issues and has been active in doing so. The DRO reports into the Director of Performance and Risk who, in turn, reports to the Chief Operating Officer and SIRO.
Alongside key performance-related priorities in areas including historical review and FOI performance, the KIMU 2015-16 business plan includes a commitment to achieving budget reductions in a sensible, pragmatic and fair manner. The Home Office has reorganised its FOI service to reduce the amount of work that the KIMU does on behalf the business. The historic review team reduced from a total of 20 staff to five staff, with an additional member to be recruited in January 2016. The impact of reductions in staffing numbers on arrangements for the future review of records, including appraisal and selection and sensitivity review, is unknown. At the time of assessment we were told that future transfer schedules had been mapped out through to September 2015, the point at which team headcounts were due to be finalised.
Oversight, control and use of records
The Home Office set up the Historical Inquiries and Review team within KIMU to be a coordination point for inquiries and inquests. All e-Discovery work (except for FOI) will be channelled through this team. The aim is to establish clear policies and processes. They have been involved with the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) from the start and are hoping that this will help to shape their policy and process going forward. This is good practice. The Home Office is engaging with The National Archives on the issue of outstanding and misplaced records, and the department is working to reduce the number of records on its outstanding list (those requisitioned for over six months). The National Archives has also recently discussed with records review staff those records that have been misplaced while on requisition.
The Home Office’s corporate paper records continue to be tracked through RMSys, which was introduced in 1993 to replace manual tracking records such as ledgers and docket books. Paper customer records for UKVI, IE and BF are tracked by an alternative system (RMS) with HMPO records tracked through a third such system. RMSys was a key focus for the internal audit report commissioned at the end of 2014 in response to problems identified during the review of the department’s response to historic child sex abuse allegations. The report concluded that the search functionality was unreliable and inadequate and that staff had not used the system consistently, stating that:
*Records management has not been given due prominence in the department. As a result, staff have not been thorough in their handling and processing of historic files and an outdated system is being relied on to meet current day requirements, which are more involved than previously. Governance arrangements have been weak which means the integrity of the records management archive (database) is compromised. Current business as usual processes and practices for file recording and searching do not give us confidence that the department is providing comprehensive answers to questions asked.*
An action plan was produced following the audit. The Home Office is working to improve guidance and training for staff and is reviewing processes for bulk destruction. A project is running through 2015 to cleanse data on RMSys, imposing standard data entries where the status of records is unclear. The Home Office plans to replace the system in the future. In its 2014-15 Annual Report and Accounts, the Home Office indicated that it will ‘have to accept the risk to its reputation and its ability to meet legislative obligations until this occurs’. The 2014 permanent secretary sponsored review of paper file holdings found no significant volumes of records dating from before 1987 held in business areas. Previous office moves in 2005 are thought to have helped limit volumes of historic paper files within the business. The audit did, however, highlight the existence of some 250,000 virtual and accidentally linked case files on RMS. Staff referred to issues including failure to register case files, and duplicate files being set up. Such practices raise the risks of confusion and inaccurate decisions being taken without reference to original files. With the scale of the issue now known, the Home Office should include plans to improve the situation in the scope of its new information strategy. See recommendation 1
Appraisal and selection
The KIMU 2015-16 business plan includes a commitment to get historical review and transfer back on track. The Home Office accelerated review project has allowed the department to progress appraisal of paper files through to 1991. The department originally intended to select files through to the end of the 20-year transition period. A resulting delay in preparation and transfer of files to The National Archives has led the Home Office to put further appraisal work on hold while it catches up. This should improve the Records Transfer Report figures and help the Home Office to remain on track with the transition to the 20-year rule. The Home Office needs to ensure that appraisal continues at the required pace. See recommendation 6
The Home Office has largely been carrying out appraisal by a process of file-by-file review, although it does use Series Level Appraisal Questionnaires to gather information about file series and their content. The current aim is to maintain a higher-level approach that will help the Home Office keep pace with its obligations despite having a smaller team. We support this and recommend that the Home Office further explore macro methods of appraisal. We are pleased to note that the Home Office has begun work on developing an appraisal report. This will allow the Home Office to identify, at a high level, groups of information that would be of historical value and use these to inform appraisal of both paper and digital records. See recommendation 6
10 The Records Transfer Report: nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/our-role/transparency/record-transfer-report/ 4.2 Implementing disposal decisions
Goal: The organisation understands the process for records disposal and consistently implements decisions in line with defined plans.
Triggers for disposal
The Home Office has published its retention and disposal schedules in accordance with recommendations in Sir Alex Allan’s 2014 Records Review report. These were last updated in 2010-11 and The National Archives was given the opportunity to contribute. We are pleased to note that the Home Office is in the process of reviewing and revising them.
As a result of the moratorium on file destruction in relation to the IICSA Inquiry, disposal of paper and digital records was on hold at the time of the IMA. To help avoid problems due to growing volumes of paper that the department cannot dispose of, the Historical Inquiries and Review team and Information Management teams have worked to identify file series of lowest risk that are unlikely to contain information of relevance to the IICSA Inquiry. The Historical Inquiries and Review team plan to carry out checks and then prepare a submission to the permanent secretary about restarting destruction of these series.
The Home Office has previously undertaken date-based disposal of records from the shared drives, excluding the CFP, which continues to use the retention schedules referenced above. The department plans to use the expected migration of digital information to iManage as an opportunity to archive material not moved across. We understand that the Home Office intends to adopt a risk-based approach to migration. This could include migrating some or all historic CFP records into the new system and treating any documents not amended for more than a year as records. The Home Office needs to ensure that a plan is in place for the disposal of records that are not moved across. See recommendation 6 In the frontline area we visited, staff recognised a need to separate out legacy information and were doing so by setting up separate ‘archive’ areas. This did not appear to be being done with reference to central principles. At the same time, we noted that one folder in the unstructured shared drive we had the opportunity to view included the words ‘do not delete’ in the file name. In this particular case, staff had no clarity on what the folder contained, whether the work that generated it was being taken forward or how long it needed to be kept.
The use of unstructured shared drives makes it more likely that local rather than corporate processes will be applied, which may impact on the way information is stored, structured and titled. This may increase the likelihood that business and potential historic value become harder to identify and understand, and make it harder to manage information according to its value. In addition to the risk that information with long-term value will not be protected from deliberate or inadvertent deletion, there is the risk that information that ought to be disposed of will be retained. This has potential implications in a number of areas, including the Home Office’s ability to discover information easily and its ability to comply with the Data Protection Act. The Home Office needs to improve its knowledge of the information stored outside the CFP and iManage and ensure that it has a plan in place to manage it. See recommendation 3
In common with a number of other government departments, some of the Home Office’s legacy databases were set up without the functionality to dispose of data. We understand that the Home Office has raised this issue with the Information Commissioner’s Office. The Home Office plans to dispose of data during future data migrations as it moves to the new common data platform. This underlines the importance of establishing a joint approach for the management of information and data in the future. See recommendation 1
Sensitivity review
The Home Office has had some issues with the quality of sensitivity review on files that were reviewed a number of years ago but only recently transferred to The National Archives – a small number of files were transferred open with sensitive information that had not been identified. The Home Office is working to address this by re-reviewing these files.
To date, the Home Office has largely focused on paper sensitivity review, but the department is now engaged with The National Archives’ work around digital sensitivity review. Sensitivity review is carried out by the same team that does appraisal, selection and preparation of records. We were told that desk notes exist to help reviewers identify sensitivities and that, in the view of this team, the majority of sensitive information found in Home Office records is personal data. We were told that, because of this, problems can arise when dealing with complex or non-standard sensitivities.
We were told that a 10% random check is carried out of files reviewed for sensitivity. If errors are found then these are sent back to be re-reviewed. Given the recent reduction in numbers of staff, change of personnel and potential loss of knowledge, the Home Office needs to ensure that it has sufficient resource to continue carrying out sensitivity review and a clear process and guidance in place for staff to follow to ensure that as much information is released as possible and that sensitive information is protected where necessary. See recommendation 6
In terms of digital sensitivity review, KIMU is starting a pilot digital review exercise for a major inquiry that will centre on sensitivity review and software tools that could be used to aid the process. The Home Office needs to ensure that it continues to work alongside The National Archives in developing a process for sensitivity review of its digital information. See recommendation 6
Transfer and planning
Latest published Records Transfer Report figures at the time of the IMA (spring 2015) showed that the Home Office was progressing with review; however, there were still 2,278 legacy files, 2,148 files for 1987-8 and 2,278 files for 1989-90 to review. The Home Office is now (at the time of report publication) covered by a retention instrument for legacy files and files for 1987-8. The Home Office aims to clear its retained records by the end of 2016. At the time of the IMA, the Home Office did not have a clear sense of how reduced resource and potential knowledge loss would impact on its ability to keep up with the transition to the 20-year rule. It was suggested that the Home Office might consider outsourcing this work. The Home Office needs to develop a revised forward plan for appraisal and transfer of paper files given the reduction in size of team. It should also ensure that it has sufficient resource to continue to carry out appraisal, selection and transfer of records in line with the 20-year rule transition timetable. If outsourcing is an option, then they should learn from the experience of other departments who have adopted this approach. See recommendation 6
The Home Office is a member of The National Archives’ Digital Transfer User Group. The department is not due to transfer digital records to The National Archives until 2025. The Home Office should still ensure that it develops a plan for the appraisal, selection and transfer of digital information, learning from the experiences of other government departments and drawing on support from its Information Management Consultant. See recommendation 6
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f71e3372f3fbd2ac9e73264a244ac0fe6ab9083f | Councillor David Simmonds\
Local Government Association
1 October 2015
Dear David
SYRIAN RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME
We all want to bring refugees from the Syrian conflict to the UK as quickly as possible. We share the desire to see things happen rapidly and want to harness the support and goodwill emanating from across the United Kingdom at every level of society. We remain extremely grateful for all expressions of interest and pledges of places from local authorities on this national and voluntary scheme with which we have made genuine progress in a short period of time. Last week we welcomed the first group of refugees since the Prime Minister’s announcement that we would take 20,000 more people during the course of this Parliament. Further new arrivals are due in the UK in the coming weeks.
We have been working closely with UNHCR which has resulted in them referring more cases to us. A team of officials were at the UNHCR headquarters in Geneva last Friday and will return this Friday to discuss expansion plans in detail. The first phase of our programme is to build on the fact that we have been operating resettlement schemes for many years and have established effective networks to accommodate and support resettled people. In the short term, we may contact individual local authorities or Regional Strategic Migration Partnerships directly about possible participation in the current resettlement scheme with a view to many more refugees arriving before the end of the year.
However, we recognise that the increase in numbers will require an expansion of current capacity. The second phase of our programme will therefore involve working together to build systems that can meet the needs of more people, more quickly whilst minimising the impact on local communities. Our programme will utilise strategic and operational expertise encouraging innovative practice from all levels of government, NGOs and the civil society.
The expansion of the scheme needs careful planning. As I mention above, local authorities will play a vital role as we turn the strong offers of support and assistance from across the UK into long-lasting and life-changing guarantees. The first 12 months of a refugee’s resettlement costs are fully funded by central government using the overseas aid budget. To ensure that local authorities can plan ahead and continue to respond to the overwhelmingly generous response of the British people, we will also provide additional funding to assist with costs incurred in future years. These arrangements will be applied to all cases since the 20,000 expansion was announced. We understand that Councils need certainty about the financing of the scheme in order to enter into contracts and commit resources. We will be working closely with local government to develop the process for drawing down the funding in order that this certainty can be given, including to those councils offering help under the existing scheme.
I attach an updated factsheet and we will continue to work with you and local authorities to provide further updates as quickly as possible as the process for phase two develops. I welcome your ongoing support and commitment and look forward to continue working with you.
I am copying this letter to the Association of Directors of Children's Services.
Yours sincerely
Paul Morrison Resettlement Gold Command
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03e59168836d2fa48e3d665a33c4434f21fe0cd2 | HATE CRIME
Public statement on prosecuting homophobic, biphobic and transphobic hate crime
Crown Prosecution Service cps.gov.uk Hate crimes often have a disproportionate impact on the victim because they are being targeted for a personal characteristic. We recognise that hate crime not only impacts the individual victim but also the wider community. Hate incidents as one-offs or a related series of events can send reverberations through communities, just as they can reinforce established patterns of prejudice and discrimination. This is why it is so important for hate crime to be prosecuted effectively.
Our policy is to:
- Identify crimes involving hostility on the basis of sexual orientation or transgender identity as early as possible
- Build strong cases with our partners that satisfy the tests within the Code for Crown Prosecutors
- Remind the court of its power to increase the sentence under s.146 Criminal Justice Act 2003 (s.146 CJA 2003) where there is evidence of hostility based on sexual orientation or transgender identity or presumed sexual orientation or transgender identity, including minor offending
- Recognise that crimes of stirring up hatred based on the grounds of sexual orientation are by their very nature highly sensitive. For this reason, and to ensure a consistent approach, all such cases will be considered by our Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division. No charges can be brought without the consent of the Attorney General
- Support victims and witnesses to give their best evidence
- Work closely with the police, criminal justice agencies, academics, community stakeholders and other bodies to continuously refresh our understanding of homophobic, biphobic and transphobic crime and to improve our response to it
- Improve awareness of homophobic, biphobic and transgender hate crime
- Monitor the implementation of this policy
When deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute homophobic, biphobic and transphobic hate crimes, our prosecutors must have regard to the Code for Crown Prosecutors. The Code states that where the offence was motivated by any form of discrimination, including against the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity or whether the suspect demonstrated hostility towards the victim based on sexual orientation or gender identity, the presence of any such motivation or hostility will mean that it is more likely that a prosecution is required.
**Monitored homophobic, biphobic and transphobic crime**
In order to identify cases involving homophobic, biphobic or transphobic hostility, we have agreed with the police a shared definition. This definition is wider than the legal definition of a hate crime within the CJA 2003 to ensure we capture all relevant cases:
“Any incident/crime which is perceived by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards a person because of their sexual orientation or transgender identity or perceived sexual orientation or transgender identity by the victim or any other person.” It is important that relevant incidents are identified as hate crimes as early as possible. This will assist the police to obtain the best available evidence in order to support the aggravating factor at court and at sentence.
Once a case has been flagged as a hate crime and received by the CPS, it is CPS policy not to remove the flag for any reason other than administrative error. This signals the CPS commitment to treat all such crimes seriously and to accept the victim’s perspective, even where we are unable to identify sufficient evidence to prosecute the case as a hate crime.
The legal framework for homophobic, biphobic and transphobic crime
1. **Sentence uplift under s.146**
S.146 CJA 2003 gives the court the power to increase the sentence of any offence that is aggravated by hostility on the grounds of sexual orientation or transgender identity. An offence will be homophobic, biphobic or transphobic if:
- At the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrated towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the sexual orientation (or the presumed sexual orientation) of the victim or the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender; or
- The offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards persons who are of a particular sexual orientation or who are transgender.
Both the CJA 2003 and the police/CPS definition refer to hostility, not hatred. There is no statutory definition of hostility and the everyday or dictionary definition is applied, encompassing a broad spectrum of behaviour.
For more information about the nature of homophobic, biphobic or transphobic crime, see the [CPS legal guidance](#).
2. **Stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation**
Part 3A Public Order Act 1986 covers stirring up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation, whether towards persons of the same sex, the opposite sex, or both. As with all hate crime, any initial report to the police will be assessed by applying the police/CPS definition of what constitutes a hate incident/crime, before more detailed consideration of the evidence and charging options. We acknowledge that people have a right to freedom of speech. It is essential that in a free, democratic and tolerant society that people are able to exchange views, even when these may cause offence.
However, we will balance the rights of an individual to freedom of speech and expression against the duty of the state to act proportionately in the interests of public safety, to prevent disorder and crime and to protect the rights of others. Stirring up hatred is committed if a person uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening, if he intends thereby to stir up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation. Threatening is the key word, and the offence is not committed by words or behaviour that is abusive or insulting. It covers behaviour such as making a speech, posting material online, displaying a poster, performing a play or broadcasting on the media.
Stirring up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation is limited to threatening words or behaviour and we have to prove intent. Additionally, there is a freedom of expression defence contained in Section 29J, but no corresponding statutory defence for the racial offence. Any prosecution for the offence of stirring up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation requires the consent of the Attorney General. For more information, see the legal guidance on stirring up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation.
There is no offence of stirring up hatred on the grounds of transgender identity.
3. The Gender Recognition Act 2004
We acknowledge that in certain circumstances, breaches of s.22 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 could be motivated by hostility and be considered as hate crimes.
It is an offence under this section of the law, for a person who has acquired ‘protected information’ in an ‘official capacity’ to disclose the information to any other person. Protected information under the law relates to information regarding the gender status of the individual before his or her acquired gender. Where the victim perceives a disclosure to be, at least in part, motivated by hostility on the grounds of transgender identity, the police should seek evidence of such hostility, which may be used by the court to increase any sentence under s.146.
4. Those affected by homophobic, biphobic and transphobic crime
The Public Order Act 1986 confirms that “hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation” means hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to sexual orientation whether towards persons of the same sex, the opposite sex or both. The CPS policy relating to sexual orientation therefore covers hostility towards lesbian, gay, bisexual and heterosexual people.
Trans or transgender are terms for people whose gender identity does not correspond with their birth gender. The terms ‘transgender’ and ‘transgender identity’ are used in the hate crime legislation and include references to being transsexual, or undergoing, proposing to undergo, or having undergone a process or part of a process of gender reassignment.
Gender identity is one of the most commonly used terms to acknowledge the gender spectrum. It includes those who identify as male and female and incorporates intersex, gender nonconforming or gender variance, for example those who might identify as non-gender, non-binary or gender fluid as well as those within the gender reassignment definition in the Equality Act 2010. Where there is no or insufficient evidence to prove the element of hostility based on sexual orientation or transgender identity, prosecutors may still be able to draw the attention of the court to any other relevant statutory aggravating features at sentencing.
Younger people can often face a range of challenges when engaging with issues around personal identity and we will be alert to all the circumstances, including the particular impact for the younger victims of these offences.
**Offending behaviour**
Hate crime can take many forms, ranging from verbal abuse to physical and sexual assault and can include encouraging others to commit acts of violence, threats, criminal damage, harassment, stalking and anti-social behaviour. Incidents can be one-off events or form part of a series of repeated and targeted offending. The hostility may be targeted at individuals, groups, those associated with such groups, or property e.g. homes, places of work or worship, and community venues. Hate crime can occur anywhere.
Hostility and hatred might be based on misconceptions about the individual’s characteristics. However, there is no need to confirm a victim’s personal characteristics in order to prosecute a hate crime. Evidence of hostility based on the perpetrator’s presumption of the victim’s sexual orientation or transgender identity is sufficient.
We recognise that the victims of hate crime can be repeatedly targeted. We will encourage the police to investigate any previous incidents or allegations. We will bring charges that reflect the overall picture of offending or if possible make a bad character application to the court to present evidence of previous conduct towards the victim or others.
We recognise that people can be targeted for a combination of reasons, including disability, race and religion, in addition to their sexual orientation or transgender identity. Prosecutors will consider the most appropriate charges and apply to courts for an appropriate increase in sentence, based upon all relevant aggravating features.
**Reporting hate crime**
It is important that all hate crime incidents are reported to the police whether it’s a one off or part of a pattern of repeat offending.
It is for the police to investigate the incident and to decide whether to refer the case to the CPS for a decision on whether to charge the suspect and, if so, with what offence.
The reluctance of some people to report homophobic, biphobic or transphobic incidents that they experience or witness may stem from intimidation or fear of outing. In cases of attempts at extortion and blackmail targeted at victims due to their actual or perceived sexual orientation or transgender identity, we will make sure victims are properly supported to aid a successful prosecution. Some victims and witnesses may also fear becoming the subject of a police investigation and possible prosecution because of where they were or because of the activity they were engaged in when a crime was committed against them. Although the CPS cannot guarantee that people who commit offences will not be prosecuted, we will consider such offences in the context of what else occurred, such as a more serious crime.
**Internet and social media**
Hate crime can be perpetrated online or offline, or there can be a pattern of behaviour that includes both. The internet and social media in particular have provided new platforms for offending behaviour and our [revised guidance on the prosecution of social media cases](#) provides more detail.
In approaching online hate crime, we will:
- Recognise that modern communications technology provides opportunities for hate crime
- Understand the internet and the changing nature of social media platforms as well as their community standards and policies for taking down material
- Be familiar with the relevant law and referral systems
- Be alert to the need to identify originators as well as amplifiers or disseminators
- Prosecute complaints of hate crime online with the same robust and proactive approach used with offline offending, whilst recognising that children may not appreciate the potential harm and seriousness of their communications
- Consider the potential impact on a targeted individual or community
- Treat online complaints as seriously as offline complaints and encourage all to be reported to the police
As with all hate crime offences the police will be required to seek a charging decision from us.
**Criminal investigation**
We adopt a proactive approach and will seek further evidence where necessary from the police, to assist in the identification of evidence of hostility or an intention to stir up hatred, to support a prosecution for a hate crime offence or an application to increase sentence.
In some cases, we may advise the police to follow up other possible lines of enquiry. This might include looking at previously reported incidents involving the same victim, or the same suspect. It may also involve seeking information or evidence from other agencies such as specialist support groups and relevant community groups.
There is no need to make enquiries as to the sexual orientation or gender identity of a complainant. The focus of an investigation should be on identifying the evidence of intent to stir up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation, to support a hate crime prosecution, or hostility in support of an increase in sentence under s.146 CJA 2003. Charging decisions
When making charging decisions relating to homophobic, biphobic or transphobic crime, as in all cases, prosecutors must apply the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
Bail
If there is a risk of danger or threats or repeat offences, we will seek to protect victims and witnesses by applying to the court to remand the defendant in custody where appropriate, or by asking the court to impose conditions on bail where possible (for example, not to approach any named person or to keep away from a certain area).
Prosecution and sentencing
In prosecutions involving homophobic, biphobic and transphobic hostility, we will build cases that present evidence based on these aggravating factors where possible.
We will remind the court of its powers to increase the sentence under s.146. The Sentencing Council Guidelines provide an offence by offence basis on the way in which the s.146 uplift is determined. We shall draw the court’s attention to a Victim Personal Statement (VPS), which gives victims an opportunity to describe the effects of the crime upon them, express their concerns and indicate whether or not they require any support. Making a VPS is entirely optional. Victims are entitled to choose whether they would like to read their VPS aloud in court, whether they would like someone else to read it aloud or whether it should be played back, if recorded, for them. A Community Impact Statement may also be made to show the impact of offending on the wider community, including the lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender community.
We have a responsibility to assist the court in sentencing. Prosecutors will apply for appropriate additional or ancillary orders, including restraining orders and compensation for loss, injury or damage. We will always have regard to the victim’s needs, including the question of their future protection.
The court has a duty to give reasons for, and explain the effect of, the sentence that it imposes.
Withdrawal
Sometimes, a victim will ask the police not to proceed any further with the case, or will ask to withdraw the complaint. We will consider the impact on the victim of not proceeding, including the risk of further harm to the victim, however this does not necessarily mean that the case will automatically be stopped. Applying the Code for Crown Prosecutors, we will prosecute all cases where there is sufficient evidence; it is in the public interest to do so and there are no factors that prevent us from doing so. Case progress – information for victims
Information on how victims of crime are kept informed of case progress can be found in the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.
Victims’ Right to Review
For qualifying decisions, if a victim requests a review of our decision not to bring proceedings, or to end all proceedings, we will look again at the decision to establish if it was correct. For information on how to ask for a review of a decision see The Victims’ Right to Review Guidance.
Support
It is important to note that the majority of homophobic, biphobic and transphobic hate crime prosecutions result in a guilty plea from defendants, reducing the need for victims and witnesses to give evidence in court. However where victims and witnesses are required to give evidence, we are committed to supporting them to give their best evidence.
Victims of hate crime are entitled to enhanced support services. Victims who are intimidated can be supported by applications to the court for Special Measures. Special Measures are a series of provisions that help ‘vulnerable’ and ‘intimidated’ witnesses give their best evidence in court and help to relieve some of the stress associated with giving evidence. Special measures can include the use of screens in court so the victim or witness does not have to see the defendant, or giving evidence from a separate courtroom via a video link. These measures can help reduce stress and anxiety. Automatic reporting restrictions apply to persons under the age of 18 in cases in the Youth Court and to victims of rape and other serious sexual offences, irrespective of age. Reporting restrictions can also be applied for in other circumstances, if specific criteria are satisfied, to protect the identity of the victim.
More information can be found on the Victims and Witnesses section of the CPS website.
Equality Duty
We are a public authority for the purposes of equality legislation. This policy and our related legal guidance form a key part of our efforts to meet our obligations under the Public Sector Equality Duty to eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation of people due to their sexual orientation or gender identity and to promote equality and good relations.
Working with stakeholders
We work locally and nationally, with the police and other partners who have a role in addressing hate crime, as well as with individuals, community groups and academics with experience and expertise in relation to hate crime. This ensures that we are able to continuously refresh our understanding of the nature of homophobic, biphobic and transphobic offending and can improve our response to it. Monitoring and Implementation
We will monitor our performance through our Hate Crime Assurance Scheme, under the oversight of our hate crime governance structures. We will also receive feedback on our performance through our local and national panels that provide scrutiny of CPS cases, decisions and policies.
Our Hate Crime Annual Report provides transparent accountability in respect to our performance.
It should be noted that the CPS can only monitor the work of the CPS.
Hate Crime Webpage
We have created a hate crime page on the CPS website, to provide more detail on the CPS approach to hate crime. The webpage includes the following information on homophobic, biphobic and transphobic crime:
- The legal context of homophobic, biphobic and transphobic crime
- What happens if a victim withdraws or no longer wishes to give evidence
- Sentencing
- Implementation of the CPS Policy About the Crown Prosecution Service
The CPS is responsible for prosecuting most cases heard in the criminal courts in England and Wales. It is led by the Director of Public Prosecutions and acts independently on criminal cases investigated by the police and other agencies. The CPS is responsible for deciding the appropriate charge in more serious or complex cases and provides information, assistance and support to victims and witnesses.
cps.gov.uk
@cpsuk
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26471462b343a5eefe3b46de941fd76547b7569f | An estimate of youth crime in England and Wales: Police recorded crime committed by young people in 2009/10
Christine Cooper and Stephen Roe
Key implications
This report provides an estimate of the proportion and number of police recorded crimes committed by young people aged 10 to 17 in 2009/10.
The approach used was to apply data on proven offending from the Police National Computer, which contains the key information on the age of proven offenders, to police recorded crime statistics. An adjustment was made to account for potential bias in the data on proven offending related to age differences in offending involving more than one perpetrator.
- The analysis estimates that young people aged 10 to 17 were responsible for 23 per cent of police recorded crime in 2009/10, equivalent to just over a million police recorded crimes.
- Young men aged 10 to 17 were found to be responsible for 20 per cent of all police recorded crime in 2009/10 and young women responsible for only four per cent.
- Acquisitive offences comprised a greater proportion of youth crime compared with crime committed by adults while violent offences accounted for a higher proportion of crime committed by adults compared with youth crime.
Although young people aged 10 to 17 were responsible for a minority of incidents of police recorded crime, the estimate of around one in four incidents of police recorded crime attributable to young people represents a disproportionate amount of crime given that 10- to 17-year-olds account for only about one in ten of the population above the age of criminal responsibility (age 10). This finding highlights the importance of tackling crime by young people in reducing overall levels of crime.
Contents
1. Introduction
2. Method
3. Results
4. Conclusion Appendix A: Additional Tables References
Keywords
Youth crime Young people Crime Young offenders Co-offending Police recorded crime
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors, not necessarily those of the Home Office (nor do they reflect Government policy).
You may re-use this information (not including logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or e-mail: [email protected]
© Crown copyright 2012
ISSN 1756-3666 ISBN 978-1-84987-756-5
May 2012 An estimate of youth crime in England and Wales: Police recorded crime committed by young people in 2009/10
Christine Cooper and Stephen Roe
Context
The aim of this study was to estimate how much crime is attributable to young people aged 10 to 17.
Existing evidence shows that young people are more likely to offend than adults, yet there is no current, generally accepted measure of the level of youth crime in England and Wales. The Home Office has overall responsibility for crime reduction so has an interest in broader measures of youth crime beyond proven offending. Measures based on the proven offending of young people, such as first-time entrants to the Criminal Justice System (CJS) and re-offending rates, provide only partial measures as many offences and offenders are not processed by the CJS. Crime statistics include many incidents that are not brought to justice but do not typically include the age of the offender, which is not usually known until the offender is caught and processed through the CJS. A previous estimate of the extent of youth crime, based on a national self-reported offending survey in 2003, indicated that 35 per cent of offences were committed by young people aged 10 to 17 (Budd et al., 2005). The issue with this estimate is that it included many low-level offences that many people would not usually regard as a crime.
Approach
The method used in this analysis to estimate the level of youth crime was to apply data on proven offending from the Police National Computer (PNC), which contains basic demographic characteristics on all known offenders, to crime statistics that record crimes irrespective of whether or not they are detected. Police recorded crime statistics were used as the basis of this analysis (rather than those based on the British Crime Survey) because these data have a more complete coverage of crime types and the offence categories match to those used in proven offending data.
An estimate of the level of youth crime was initially calculated based on the proportion of all proven offences for which young people had been cautioned, convicted or given a Fixed Penalty Notice. This estimate was refined by applying the proportions of each offence type committed by young people to the relevant police recorded crime offence categories. Co-offending, in which an offence involves multiple offenders, would result in ‘double-counting’ within the data on proven offences. This was adjusted for using data from the PNC on proven co-offending.
Results
Overall, once co-offending has been taken into account, the analysis found that young people aged 10 to 17 were responsible for 1.01 million crimes in 2009/10, 23 per cent of total police recorded crime in that year. This represents a disproportionate amount of crime given that 10- to 17-year-olds account for about one in ten of the population aged 10 (the age of criminal responsibility) and above. Dividing the estimate by gender indicated that about 860,000 crimes were committed by young men in 2009/10 and 160,000 by young women. This equated to around 20 per cent of total police recorded crime in 2009/10 being attributable to young men and four per cent to young women (Table 1).1
The basic data from the PNC on proven offences committed during 2009/10 showed that young people (aged 10 to 17) were responsible for 20 per cent of notifiable offences (equivalent to those offences that constitute crime recorded by the police). However, the proportion of proven offences committed by young people varied considerably by offence type from around
______________________________________________________________________
1 Proportions for men and women do not add up to the total due to rounding. one in two (51%) robbery offences to fewer than one in ten (7%) fraud and forgery offences. The proportion of proven offences committed by young people for each offence type was applied to the total number of police recorded crimes of that type in 2009/10 and summed. This generated a basic estimate of 1.06 million crimes committed by young people in 2009/10, which came to the attention of the police, equivalent to 25 per cent of total police recorded crime in that year.
Adjusting the basic youth crime estimate for co-offending resulted in a refined estimate of 1.01 million crimes committed by young people in 2009/10, 23 per cent of total police recorded crime. This small downward shift to the basic estimate (from 25% to 23%) is to be expected as young people are more likely to co-offend than adults, but for both adults and young people co-offending is less common than sole offending.
The analysis of police recorded crime committed by young people was also used to examine the nature of youth crime. Acquisitive offences, which include robbery, burglary, offences against vehicles, other theft (including shoplifting) and fraud and forgery, accounted for a higher proportion of youth crime compared with crime committed by adults (58% compared with 51%) while violent offences accounted for a higher proportion of crime committed by adults compared with youth crime (22% compared with 15%).
Knowledge gaps
There is a lack of detailed information about how the attrition process, the filtering that takes place from crimes being committed to offenders being found guilty, differs between young people and adults. Therefore the analysis was unable to take account of potential differences in the likelihood of adults and young people being brought to justice for their crimes. Recent youth crime policy has sought to divert young people away from the CJS, suggesting that they are less likely to be given a formal sanction and would therefore be under-represented in the proven offending data used to construct this estimate. Consequently this analysis is likely to be an under-estimate of police recorded crime committed by young people. However, there is no evidence on differences in attrition at other stages, for example we do not know about differences in young people and adults being caught for their crimes.
The lack of information on how attrition differs by age means that the main assumption underlying the estimate is that the attrition rate does not differ between young people and adults. Further research into the attrition process and how this differs by age and gender would be useful in order to test and refine this assumption.
Table 1: Estimates of police recorded crime committed by young people by gender, 2009/10
| | All 10 to 17 | Men aged 10 to 17 | Women aged 10 to 17 | |----------------------|-------------|-------------------|---------------------| | Basic estimate | | | | | Number (000s) | 1,064 | 897 | 165 | | Percentage | 25 | 21 | 4 | | Adjusted for co-offending | | | | | Number (000s) | 1,014 | 857 | 155 | | Percentage | 23 | 20 | 4 |
Note: Numbers for men and women may not add up to ‘all’ due to missing data on gender. An estimate of youth crime in England and Wales: Police recorded crime committed by young people in 2009/10
Christine Cooper and Stephen Roe
1. Introduction
The aim of this study is to estimate how much crime is attributable to young people and to consider patterns of youth offending in order to increase our understanding of the extent and nature of youth crime. Young people are defined here as those aged between 10 and 17 years old, the age group dealt with by the Youth Justice System.
Evidence on both self-reported and proven offending has shown that young people are more likely to offend than adults (Budd et al., 2005; MoJ, 2011a). However, there is no current, generally accepted measure of the level of youth crime in England and Wales. A previous estimate of the extent of crime attributable to young people in England and Wales was based on data from a self-reported offending survey, the 2003 Offending Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS). According to the 2003 OCJS, 35 per cent of the incidents measured by the survey were accounted for by 10- to 17-year-olds (Budd et al., 2005). Yet this estimate will have included many low-level incidents that many people, including the participants themselves, will not perceive to be serious enough to be a ‘crime’, such as minor assaults not involving injury taking place between pupils in school.
The Home Office, with its overall responsibility for preventing and reducing crime, has a particular interest in looking beyond levels of proven offending to a broader measure of youth crime that takes account of all crimes that have been recorded by the police, even if no offender has been brought to justice for the crime. Generally, measures based on the proven offending of young people, such as first-time entrants to the Criminal Justice System (CJS) (MoJ, 2011b) and re-offending rates (MoJ, 2011a) have been used as indicators of the level of youth crime, but these provide only partial measures as many offences and offenders are not processed by the CJS. Official crime statistics do include those many incidents that are not brought to justice but do not typically include the age of the offender, because this is not usually known until the offender is caught and processed through the CJS. This study aims to overcome some of the limitations of statistics on crime and proven offending by combining these data sources in order to produce a youth crime estimate. 2. Method
The method used here to estimate the level of youth crime is based on a technique used previously in a report for the Scottish Executive to measure the extent of youth crime in Scotland (DTZ Pieda Consulting, 2005). The approach is to apply data on proven offending, which contains basic demographic characteristics on all proven offenders, to crime statistics that include all offences reported to the police, regardless of whether an offender has been found guilty.
Official crime statistics cannot be used by themselves to estimate the number of crimes committed by young people, because the statistics are based on reports by the victims of crime, most of whom would not have seen the offender and therefore would not be able to provide information about their age. This means that little is known about offenders until they are caught and proven guilty.
Official crime statistics are available from two main sources: the British Crime Survey (BCS), a victimisation survey of adults resident in households in England and Wales, and police recorded crime. Comparing the two sources of crime statistics, police recorded crime only captures incidents that are reported to and recorded by the police while the BCS attempts to capture all crimes (whether or not reported to the police) committed against households and individuals (see Figure 1). Police recorded crime statistics are used as the basis of this estimate of youth crime because these data have a more complete coverage of crime types. The BCS is a victimisation survey of the resident household population, so it omits particular crime types, such as crimes against businesses (e.g. shoplifting), which may be particularly important for this age group. The police recorded crime types map more closely to the offence types captured within statistics on proven offending, which are used to gather information on the age of offenders for the youth crime measure.
There are two main sources of data on proven offending in England and Wales. There is information on flows through the Criminal Justice System (MoJ, 2011a; YJB, 2012) and data on proven offending are also available from the Police National Computer (PNC). Information from the PNC has been used for this analysis because the data can be extracted on an offence and on an offender basis, rather than by episode in the CJS (such as a court appearance).
- The PNC includes details of proven ‘recordable’ offences. The disposals included in the count of proven offences in the analysis below include convictions, cautions and Fixed Penalty Notices. Including this broad range of disposals ensured that the analysis was not affected by any greater likelihood of young people receiving one of these disposals rather than another.
- The ‘recordable’ offences on the PNC represent a broader range of crime types than the ‘notifiable’ offences that police forces are required to report to the Home Office for inclusion in police recorded crime statistics (see Figure 1). The subset of proven offences on the PNC that represent ‘notifiable’ offences were the focus of this analysis in order to ensure that the estimates derived from the PNC analysis were applicable to the police recorded crime data.
- The PNC also includes basic demographic data (age, gender and ethnic group) on proven offenders, which enable a breakdown of offences committed by young people. In this analysis, young people are considered to be those aged 10 to 17, reflecting the age range covered by the Youth Justice System. The small number of offences (0.1% of all proven offences) for which the age of the offender was unknown were excluded from the analysis.
An initial estimate of the level of youth crime was calculated directly from PNC data based on the proportion of all proven offences for which young people had been cautioned, convicted or given a Fixed Penalty Notice. By using recorded crime data and looking at each crime type separately, a more precise estimate was generated by taking account of the differences in the volume of recorded crimes in each crime type and the proportion of each recorded crime type committed by young people. This approach of looking at individual crime types also provided valuable information on the patterns of youth offending. A breakdown of the estimate by gender has also been provided in order to give a more detailed picture of youth crime as men and women are responsible for different levels of offending and for different types of crime.
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2 Accepting a Fixed Penalty Notice does not necessarily mean that the offender has been found guilty. Nevertheless, Fixed Penalty Notices are included in this measure in order to capture the lower-level disorder that may be an important feature of youth crime. Offences taken into consideration are not included in the measure due to uncertainty over data quality.
3 This approach was used by the National Audit Office (NAO) in their report on youth offending (NAO, 2010). Assumptions and limitations
There are a number of assumptions underlying the methodology that may lead to biases in the estimate. The way the data on proven offences are counted means that if a single crime is committed by two offenders it will be recorded twice on the PNC. This factor may also bias the estimate of youth crime if, as suggested by previous literature, young people are more likely to co-offend compared with adults (van Mastrigt and Farrington, 2009). The PNC includes information on co-offenders for all the disposals included here, enabling adjustments to the estimate to be made to take co-offending into account.4
There are other potential sources of bias that arise from the process of attrition from committing a criminal act through to the police recording it as a crime and the crime being ‘solved’ and a person being ‘found guilty’. For example, in 2009/10 the BCS estimated that there were 9.6 million personal and household crimes, whereas 4.3 million crimes were recorded by the police and only 1.2 million incidents ‘cleared up’ by a detection (Flatley et al., 2010).
A key potential source of bias for this estimate of youth crime is a difference between young people and adults in the attrition rate from police recording the crime to an offender being brought to justice. Recent youth justice policy has attempted to divert some young offenders away from the formal CJS (for example through restorative justice schemes), suggesting that young people may be less likely than adults to receive formal sanctions and would therefore be under-represented in the proven offending data used to construct this youth crime estimate. This suggests that the estimate of both the proportion and extent of youth crime presented here is likely to be an under-estimate, although the degree of the under-estimate is not clear. In addition, there are other aspects of the attrition process, such as the likelihood of being caught, for which even less is known about how this differs between young people and adults. Although detection rates provide an indication of the extent of attrition between police recorded crime and proven offences, detection rates are only available differentiated by offence type and not by age. In the absence of this information, the estimate relies on the assumption that the attrition rate does not vary between young people and adults.
For offences where detection rates are high, there is less scope for variation in attrition between young people and adults. Hence, there can be greater confidence in the estimates of youth crime for the specific offence types with higher levels of detection. Drug offences and shoplifting have relatively high detection rates.
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4 The adjustment of the estimate for co-offending assumes that co-offenders belong to the same age and sex group as the offender. Previous analysis of self-reported offending data has suggested that co-offenders tend to be from the same age group and most men offend with men but women are quite likely to offend with men (Budd et al., 2005). (94% and 61% respectively in 2009/10) which mean that the estimates of the percentage of these crimes committed by young people are more likely to be accurate as they are less likely to be affected by variations in attrition between young people and adults. Conversely, the estimates of youth crime for offences against vehicles, burglary and criminal damage (which all had detection rates of less than 15% in 2009/10) may be less accurate (Flatley et al., 2010).
The number of crimes committed by young people estimated in this analysis will be an under-estimate because the analysis is based on police recorded crime, which represents only a minority of actual crimes committed due to the attrition involved between the occurrence of a crime and the crime being reported to and recorded by the police (40% of BCS incidents are reported to the police). The extent to which the relative proportion of crime attributed to young people would be altered by consideration of unrecorded crime is less clear. As with detection rates, reporting rates for crime cannot be differentiated by age of the offender. Considering the different composition of youth and adult proven offending, some of the offence types that form a greater component of youth offending (compared to adult offending), such as robbery and burglary, have relatively high reporting rates, while other offence types, such as criminal damage/vandalism, have relatively low reporting rates (Flatley et al., 2010).
3. Results
This section presents the results from a series of analyses bringing together data on proven offences from the PNC with police recorded crime statistics. The data used were from the PNC relating to offences committed in 2009/10 (rather than offences brought to justice in 2009/10) and police recorded crimes for the same period. The section starts with a basic estimate of the proportion of recorded crime accounted for by young people, and then presents further analysis to improve and refine the estimate. The end result is a best estimate that young people aged 10 to 17 were responsible for 23 per cent of police recorded crime in 2009/10, equivalent to 1.01 million crimes.
Basic estimate
An initial estimate of the proportion of crime accounted for by young people can be calculated directly from the proportion of proven offences on the PNC committed by young people. Young people were responsible for 16 per cent of total recordable offences on the PNC. A significant proportion (around a third) of the other (non-notifiable) offences included on the PNC are motoring offences that many young people in the 10 to 17 age range are not in a position to commit. The remainder of the analysis is based only on notifiable offences as this enables the link to be made with police recorded crime.
According to data from the PNC on proven offences committed during 2009/10, young people (aged 10 to 17) were responsible for 20 per cent of notifiable offences.
Using the total number of proven offences committed by young people as the basis of the youth crime estimate does not take account of the very different proportions of each of the crime types committed by young people. The proportion of each crime type (based on notifiable offence groupings) for which young people were responsible varied considerably from around one in two (51%) robbery offences to fewer than one in ten (7%) fraud and forgery offence. Robbery, burglary, offences against vehicles, other theft and criminal damage were all more likely than average to be committed by young people (Figure 2, Table A.1).
5 It should be noted that fraud is a particularly challenging offence to measure as incidents are known to be significantly under-reported to the police. To refine the estimate of the proportion of crime that is committed by young people, the proportion of proven offences by young people for each offence type (given in Figure 2) was applied to the total number of police recorded offences in that crime type in 2009/10 and summed. This takes account of the differences in the proportion of different types of crime committed by young people. Using this method generated an estimate of 1.06 million crimes committed by young people in 2009/10, which came to the attention of the police (Table A.2). This is equivalent to 25 per cent of total police recorded crime in 2009/10 and provides a basic estimate that can be refined further.
**Adjustment for co-offending**
As previously discussed, a potential source of bias in the estimate of the amount of crime committed by young people is co-offending, when more than one offender is involved in committing an offence. When co-offending occurs, although only one crime would be recorded within police recorded crime statistics, counts of proven offending would register that crime for each offender involved. The PNC database includes details on co-offending, which enables this issue to be examined and accounted for by an adjustment to the estimate.
The degree of co-offending can be expressed as the average number of offenders per offence. Overall, there were 1.06 offenders per proven notifiable offence committed in 2009/10. For young people there were 1.12 offenders per proven notifiable offence while for adults there were 1.05, confirming previous findings of greater co-offending amongst young people (Tables 2 and A.3). This estimate of co-offending from the PNC is lower than has been found in other studies (for example van Mastrigt and Farrington, 2009). A possible explanation is the different stage in the CJS when the co-offending is identified. The analysis of co-offending used here is based on PNC data, which will only record proven co-offenders who are found guilty of the same incident by being given a conviction, caution or Fixed Penalty Notice. While these figures are likely to under-estimate the true extent of co-offending, this will not affect the reliability of the estimate because the adjustment relates to bias that arises from the way data are presented in the PNC data rather than actual co-offending.
Co-offending was greater for the offence types of robbery and burglary than for other offences (again in accordance with previous research, Reiss and Farrington, 1991). Higher levels of co-offending amongst young people compared to adults was consistent across most offence types apart from those that were least likely to involve co-offending (drug offences and sexual offences), where the difference between the age groups was negligible (Table 2).
The average number of offenders per offence (shown in Table 2) can be used to generate alternative estimates of the proportion of each proven offence type attributable to young people (an alternative to the estimates shown in Figure 2) that take into account co-offending. This is done by dividing the number of proven offences for each offence type and age group used to calculate the basic estimate by the average number of offenders per offence.
Applying the adjusted estimates of the percentage of proven offences by offence type attributable to young people to the police recorded crime figures provided an alternative estimate of 1.01 million crimes committed by young people in 2009/10, 23 per cent of total police recorded crime (Table A.4). This small downward shift to the basic estimate (from 25% to 23%) is to be expected as young people are more likely to co-offend than adults, but for both adults and young people co-offending is less common than sole offending (Table A.3).
### Analysis by gender
The PNC data on proven offending includes gender as well as age for (almost) all known offenders, enabling the estimate of youth crime to be calculated separately for young men and young women. According to PNC data, of the proven offences committed during 2009/10, young men were responsible for 15 per cent of notifiable offences while young women were responsible for five per cent (Figure 3, Table A.5).
As expected, young men were responsible for a greater proportion of youth crime compared with young women and this is reflected within each offence type with the notable exception of shoplifting (Figure 3, Table A.5). Young women were responsible for five per cent or less of proven offences for each offence type except shoplifting, for which they were responsible for 11 per cent of proven offences committed in 2009/10 (compared with young men who were responsible for 9% of shoplifting offences).
The proportion of proven offences by young men and young women for each offence type (shown in Figure 3 and Table A.5) can be applied to the total number of
### Table 2: Average number of offenders per proven notifiable offence by offence type and age group, PNC 2009/10
| Offence type | Average number of offenders per offence | |------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | | 10 - to 17-year-olds | 18 years and over | | Violence Against the Person | 1.08 | 1.04 | | Sexual | 1.03 | 1.02 | | Robbery | 1.32 | 1.23 | | Burglary | 1.24 | 1.13 | | Offences Against Vehicles | 1.18 | 1.08 | | Shoplifting | 1.17 | 1.05 | | Other Theft (not shoplifting)| 1.13 | 1.09 | | Fraud and Forgery | 1.08 | 1.04 | | Criminal Damage | 1.11 | 1.03 | | Drug Offences | 1.04 | 1.04 | | Other Miscellaneous | 1.13 | 1.06 | | **Total Notifiable** | **1.12** | **1.05** |
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6 Only 0.4 per cent of proven offences in 2009/10 were committed by an offender whose gender was unknown and these cases are excluded from the analysis. police recorded offences in that crime type in 2009/10, in the same way as the basic estimate of youth crime was calculated above. This method generated an estimate of about 900,000 crimes committed by young men in 2009/10 and 170,000 by young women. This is equivalent to 21 per cent of total police recorded crime in 2009/10 being attributable to young men and four per cent to young women.
The estimates of youth crime for men and women can be adjusted for co-offending in the same way as the overall estimate was adapted above.
In terms of co-offending, young women appear to be slightly more likely than young men to co-offend but the difference in co-offending by gender is not as great as the difference by age (Tables 3 and A.6). Greater co-offending amongst women would suggest that they are over-represented in the figures on proven offending, in which multiple offenders involved in an offence results in ‘double-counting’.
Co-offending was taken into account by dividing the number of proven offences of each proven offence type committed by young men and young women by the number of proven offenders per offence, as shown in Table 2, and then applied to the police recorded crime figures. This generated an alternative estimate of about 860,000 crimes committed by young men in 2009/10 and 160,000 by young women. This equates to around 20 per cent of total police recorded crime in 2009/10 being attributable to young men and four per cent to young women (Table 4).7
The analysis confirms that young women were responsible for much lower levels of youth crime than were young men. Young men were estimated to be responsible for 85 per cent of youth crime. Looking at the same estimate of
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7 This adjusted estimate for co-offending appears to lower the proportion of youth crime attributable to young men rather than young women despite higher co-offending amongst young women. However, the decrease in the estimate for young women is disguised by rounding of the figures. Both estimates for young men and young women are reduced when co-offending is taken into account as young people co-offend more than adults. The estimate for young women is reduced proportionately by a greater extent but this does not appear in the figures as the estimate for young women is already low, so the absolute decrease in the estimate for young women is lower than for young men. Table 3: Average number of offenders per proven notifiable offence committed by young people by offence type and gender, PNC 2009/10
| Offence type | Average number of offenders per offence | |-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | | Men aged 10 to 17 | Women aged 10 to 17 | | Violence Against the Person | 1.08 | 1.08 | | Sexual | 1.03 | 1.02 | | Robbery | 1.32 | 1.36 | | Burglary | 1.24 | 1.34 | | Offences Against Vehicles | 1.18 | 1.22 | | Shoplifting | 1.12 | 1.22 | | Other Theft (not shoplifting) | 1.13 | 1.13 | | Fraud and Forgery | 1.07 | 1.11 | | Criminal Damage | 1.11 | 1.10 | | Drug Offences | 1.04 | 1.05 | | Other Miscellaneous | 1.13 | 1.14 | | **Total Notifiable** | **1.11** | **1.14** |
Table 4: Estimates of police recorded crime committed by young people by gender, 2009/10
| | All 10 to 17 | Men aged 10 to 17 | Women aged 10 to 17 | |--------------------------------|--------------|-------------------|---------------------| | Basic estimate | | | | | Number (000s) | 1,064 | 897 | 165 | | Percentage | 25 | 21 | 4 | | Adjusted for co-offending | | | | | Number (000s) | 1,014 | 857 | 155 | | Percentage | 23 | 20 | 4 |
Note: Numbers for men and women may not add up to ‘all’ due to missing data on gender.
police recorded crime committed by young people from an alternative perspective, young men were responsible for 23 per cent of crime by all men and young women 25 per cent of all crime by women.
The nature of youth crime
The analysis of police recorded crime committed by young people can also be used to examine the nature of youth crime and to make comparisons between the types of crime committed by young people and adults. Overall, there was a similar pattern in the composition of adult and youth crime. Other theft (including shoplifting) represented the biggest share of each (24% of crime committed by both 10- to 17-year-olds and those aged 18 and over). Criminal damage offences accounted for the next biggest share of crime committed by young people aged 10 to 17 (21%), while violence against the person offences represented the next greatest proportion of police recorded crime committed by adults (22%). Acquisitive offences, which include robbery, burglary, offences against vehicles, other theft (including shoplifting) and fraud and forgery, accounted for a higher proportion of youth crime compared with crime committed by adults (58% compared with 51%; Figure 4).
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8 Figures given in this section are based on estimates of police recorded crime committed by young people that have been adjusted for co-offending. The types of crime committed by young men and young women can also be compared, bearing in mind that the figures for the composition of crime committed by young women are based on a far lower volume of crimes. Violence against the person offences represented a greater proportion of police recorded crime committed by young women compared with young men (26% compared with 13%), while criminal damage offences accounted for equal shares of crime committed by young men and young women (21% of each). Amongst acquisitive offences, shoplifting represented a much higher proportion of crime committed by young women compared with young men (19% compared with 3%) while robbery, burglary and offences against vehicles each accounted for larger shares of crime by young men (4%, 18% and 16% respectively) compared with young women (2%, 6% and 4% respectively)(Figure 5).
**Comparison with previous estimates**
Comparing the new youth crime estimate produced in the analysis above to previous estimates can give some indication of the validity of the new estimate.
A previous estimate of the extent of crime attributable to young people in England and Wales has been produced based on data from a national self-reported offending survey, the 2003 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS). According to the 2003 OCJS, 35 per cent of the incidents measured by the survey were accounted for by 10- to 17-year-olds, although many of these incidents will have been relatively trivial (Budd et al., 2005).
The overall adjusted estimate of 23 per cent of police recorded crime attributable to 10- to 17-year-olds is lower than the 35 per cent of self-reported offences attributable to 10- to 17-year-olds from the OCJS. This would be expected given that more of the self-reported offences committed by young people rather than by adults would be relatively minor (for example, non-injury assaults represent a greater proportion of self-reported offending by young people) and take place in contexts (such as within school) that would mean that they were less likely to come to the attention of the police and would therefore not be included in this new youth crime estimate. Figure 5: Composition by offence type of estimated recorded crimes committed by young people by gender, 2009/10
| Offence type | Percentage of recorded crime | |-------------------------------------|-----------------------------| | Violence Against the Person | 26% | | Sexual | 1% | | Robbery | 4% | | Burglary | 18% | | Offences Against Vehicles | 16% | | Shoplifting | 19% | | Other Theft (not shoplifting) | 19% | | Fraud and Forgery | 2% | | Criminal Damage | 21% | | Drug Offences | 3% | | Other Miscellaneous | 1% |
However, when the figures for the percentage of police recorded crime attributable to young men and young women are compared to the 2003 OCJS estimates, the figure for men is much more similar than the figure for women (20% and 22% for men compared with 4% and 13% for women with the higher estimates for the OCJS). Previous comparisons of self-reported offending data with data on proven offending have also highlighted the greater gender differential for proven offending compared with self-reported offending (Budd et al., 2005). As women offenders appear to be less likely to have contact with the CJS, the low proportion of police recorded crime attributable to young women may be seen as a particular under-estimate. However, this finding does not necessarily imply gender bias in decision-making within the CJS as other influential factors, such as offence severity, are unable to be accounted for. Previous research in North America has suggested that, once other factors are taken into account, there is no evidence of gender bias in police arrests or juvenile justice processing (Farrington et al., 2010).
The 2003 OCJS also gave details of the profile of offences committed by young people and adults in the survey. The 2003 OCJS found that violent crime formed a greater part of offending by young people compared with adults while acquisitive offences comprised a greater share of adult offending (Budd et al., 2005). The figures presented above based on police recorded crime and proven offending suggested the reverse. This discrepancy is likely to be explained (at least in part) by the fact that many of the violent offences reported in the OCJS were very minor (often involving little or no injury), especially those reported by young people. These minor assaults are less likely to be reported to the police and therefore less likely to appear in the estimate of police recorded crime committed by young people. The 2003 OCJS also indicated that violent offences accounted for a greater proportion of offending by women compared with offending by men and this is supported by the figures presented above based on the combination of proven offending and police recorded crime.9
9 Estimates in the 2003 OCJS report refer to all women compared with all men while figures presented in this report relate to crime committed by men and women aged 10 to 17. The other previous figure to which this new youth crime estimate can be compared is the estimate produced for the Scottish Executive, which used a similar methodology. That report estimated 22–23 per cent of all crime (including crime not recorded by the police) in Scotland was accounted for by under-18s (DTZ Pieda Consulting, 2005). That figure is very similar to the best estimate (23%) produced here for England and Wales for police recorded crime.
Overall, comparison of this youth crime estimate with the previous estimate of youth crime from the OCJS highlights considerable differences. These differences are to be expected given the nature of the data sources. The lower proportion of police recorded crime, as opposed to self-reported offences, attributable to young people reflects the often relatively minor nature of many of the offences captured in a self-reported offending survey such as the OCJS. These offences are less likely to come to the attention of the police.
4. Conclusion
It has been well established that young people are more likely to offend than adults and will therefore account for a disproportionate amount of crime. As there is no way of directly counting youth crime, estimates or proxy measures have to be derived. These are often based on levels of proven offending by young people and such estimates will always undercount actual levels of crime. Building on a previous exercise undertaken in Scotland (DTZ Pieda Consulting, 2005), this study has produced an estimate that young people aged 10 to 17 are responsible for nearly one-quarter (23%) of police recorded crime in England and Wales, equivalent to just over a million crimes.
It is evident from the youth crime estimate that young people account for a disproportionate amount of crime because 10- to 17-year-olds represent about one in ten (11%) of the population of England and Wales aged 10 and over (based on mid-2009 population estimates) yet account for around one in four incidents of police recorded crime (according to this analysis). The youth crime estimate produced here reinforces the significance of tackling crime by young people in reducing crime overall.
The analysis presented above has adopted the previously used methodology of applying the percentage of proven offences committed by young people to crime statistics but developed this by taking into account potential bias in the proven offending figures arising from co-offending. Adjusting for co-offending decreases the estimate of youth crime as young people are more likely to co-offend. This holds true for young men and young women. Proven offending data will under-estimate the extent of co-offending because not all of those involved in an offence will be caught, but self-reported offending studies also indicate that the majority of offences are committed by sole offenders (Budd et al., 2005).
Given the assumptions and limitations of the analysis already outlined above, the youth crime estimate produced here should be seen as indicative and treated with caution. Any attempt to delineate trends over time in youth crime using replications of this estimate is fraught with difficulties of interpretation given the potential effect on the estimate of changes in the operation of the CJS. This youth crime estimate for 2009/10 should be seen in the context of a trend in decreasing use of out-of-court disposals and fewer first-time entrants to the CJS. The trend has been seen amongst both adults and juveniles, but has been more accentuated amongst juveniles (MoJ, 2011b). This trend of reduced formal processing for juveniles implies that young people will be less likely than adults to be represented in the proven offending figures used to generate this youth crime estimate, therefore making it likely that it is an under-estimate of the proportion and extent of police recorded crime attributable to young people.
The assumptions and limitations of the estimate generate some possibilities for further research that would enable the estimate to be refined. Further research into the attrition process from the commission of a crime to police recording a crime and an offence being proven and how this differs by age and gender would be useful. This further research could inform attempts to extrapolate from the data on proven offending, which has the key information on characteristics of the offender, to the broader measures of crime.
Despite the limitations noted above, the youth crime estimate produced here provides a useful, alternative perspective on the extent and nature of crimes carried out by young people. By focusing on police recorded crime, the estimate overcomes the narrow remit of proven offences (which only include those offences brought to justice) and the broader range of self-reported offending (which include many relatively minor offences). The process of creating the estimate also provides valuable information, such as an indication of which crime types young people are most likely to be responsible for, which could help in considering the factors behind changes in particular crime types (e.g. robbery) that are most likely to be committed by young people.
## Appendix A: Additional tables
### Table A.1: Number of proven offences by age group and offence type, PNC 2009/10
| Offence group | Numbers (000s) and percentages | England and Wales, proven offences | |--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | | All ages | 10 to 17 | % 10 to 17 | | Violence Against the Person | 352.2 | 64.4 | 18% | | Sexual | 7.0 | 1.4 | 20% | | Robbery | 10.5 | 5.4 | 51% | | Burglary | 33.3 | 10.6 | 32% | | Offences Against Vehicles | 27.5 | 8.6 | 31% | | Shoplifting | 173.3 | 34.6 | 20% | | Other Theft (not shoplifting) | 66.1 | 17.0 | 26% | | Fraud and Forgery | 33.0 | 2.3 | 7% | | Criminal Damage | 107.1 | 30.3 | 28% | | Drug Offences | 139.1 | 18.4 | 13% | | Other Miscellaneous | 57.2 | 7.7 | 13% | | **Total Notifiable** | **1,006.3** | **200.7** | **20%** | | Other | 486.7 | 44.5 | 9% | | **Total Recordable** | **1,493.0** | **245.2** | **16%** |
### Table A.2: Estimated police recorded crime committed by young people aged 10 to 17 by offence type, 2009/10
| Offence group | Numbers (000s) and percentages | England and Wales, police recorded crime | |--------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | | Total police recorded crime | % 10 to 17 | Police recorded crime committed by 10- to 17-year-olds | | Violence Against the Person | 871.7 | 18% | 159.3 | | Sexual | 54.5 | 20% | 10.7 | | Robbery | 75.1 | 51% | 38.4 | | Burglary | 540.7 | 32% | 172.5 | | Offences Against Vehicles | 495.0 | 31% | 154.0 | | Shoplifting | 307.8 | 20% | 61.5 | | Other Theft (not shoplifting) | 729.6 | 26% | 187.9 | | Fraud and Forgery | 152.3 | 7% | 10.7 | | Criminal Damage | 806.7 | 28% | 228.3 | | Drug Offences | 235.0 | 13% | 31.1 | | Other Miscellaneous | 70.1 | 13% | 9.4 | | **Total Notifiable** | **4,338.6** | **1,063.9** | |
### Table A.3 Proven co-offending by age group and offence type, PNC 2009/10
| Offence group | Mean number of offenders per offence | % proven offences with co-offending | |-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | | 10 to 17 | 18+ | 10 to 17 | 18+ | | Violence Against the Person | 1.08 | 1.04 | 8% | 3% | | Sexual | 1.03 | 1.02 | 3% | 2% | | Robbery | 1.32 | 1.23 | 24% | 19% | | Burglary | 1.24 | 1.13 | 19% | 11% | | Offences Against Vehicles | 1.18 | 1.08 | 15% | 8% | | Shoplifting | 1.17 | 1.05 | 15% | 5% | | Other Theft (not shoplifting) | 1.13 | 1.09 | 12% | 8% | | Fraud and Forgery | 1.08 | 1.04 | 8% | 4% | | Criminal Damage | 1.11 | 1.03 | 10% | 3% | | Drug Offences | 1.04 | 1.04 | 4% | 4% | | Other Miscellaneous | 1.13 | 1.06 | 12% | 6% | | **Total Notifiable** | **1.12** | **1.05** | **11%** | **5%** |
### Table A.4 Estimated police recorded crime by age group and offence type, 2009/10
| Offence group | Police recorded crime committed by those aged | |-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| | | 10 to 17 | 18 and over | All | | Violence Against the Person | 153.6 | 718.1 | 871.7 | | Sexual | 10.6 | 43.9 | 54.5 | | Robbery | 37.1 | 38.0 | 75.1 | | Burglary | 161.3 | 379.3 | 540.7 | | Offences Against Vehicles | 145.3 | 349.7 | 495.0 | | Shoplifting | 56.5 | 251.4 | 307.8 | | Other Theft (not shoplifting) | 182.1 | 547.5 | 729.6 | | Fraud and Forgery | 10.3 | 142.0 | 152.3 | | Criminal Damage | 216.7 | 590.0 | 806.7 | | Drug Offences | 31.1 | 203.9 | 235.0 | | Other Miscellaneous | 9.0 | 61.1 | 70.1 | | **Total Notifiable** | **1,013.6** | **3,325.1** | **4,338.6** |
Note: The figures for those aged 10 to 17 presented in this table differ from those presented in Table A.2 as the estimate in this table has been adjusted for co-offending.
### Table A.5 Number of proven offences by gender, age group and offence type, PNC 2009/10
| Offence group | Numbers (000s) and percentages | England and Wales, proven offences | |--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | | Men | Women | % 10 to 17 | | | 10 to 17 | 18 and over | 10 to 17 | 18 and over | Males | Females | | Violence Against the Person | 47.5 | 238.9 | 16.7 | 48.4 | 14% | 5% | | Sexual | 1.3 | 5.5 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 19% | 0% | | Robbery | 4.9 | 4.9 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 47% | 4% | | Burglary | 10.0 | 21.6 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 30% | 2% | | Offences Against Vehicles | 8.1 | 18.2 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 30% | 2% | | Shoplifting | 15.7 | 92.8 | 18.6 | 45.5 | 9% | 11% | | Other Theft (not shoplifting) | 14.3 | 39.5 | 2.7 | 9.5 | 22% | 4% | | Fraud and Forgery | 1.7 | 23.3 | 0.6 | 7.3 | 5% | 2% | | Criminal Damage | 25.7 | 68.0 | 4.4 | 8.6 | 24% | 4% | | Drug Offences | 17.1 | 108.4 | 1.2 | 12.3 | 12% | 1% | | Other Miscellaneous | 6.8 | 44.2 | 0.9 | 5.0 | 12% | 2% | | **Total Notifiable** | **153.1** | **665.2** | **46.7** | **138.6** | **15%** | **5%** |
Note: Number of proven offences for males and females do not add up to totals given in Table A.1 due to missing data on gender.
### Table A.6 Proven co-offending by age group, gender and offence type, PNC 2009/10
| Offence group | Numbers | England and Wales, proven offenders | |--------------------------------------|---------|-------------------------------------| | | Men | Women | | | 10 to 17| 18 and over | 10 to 17 | 18 and over | | Violence Against the Person | 1.08 | 1.08 | 1.03 | 1.04 | | Sexual | 1.03 | 1.02 | 1.02 | 1.07 | | Robbery | 1.32 | 1.36 | 1.23 | 1.23 | | Burglary | 1.24 | 1.34 | 1.12 | 1.17 | | Offences Against Vehicles | 1.18 | 1.22 | 1.08 | 1.09 | | Shoplifting | 1.12 | 1.22 | 1.05 | 1.07 | | Other Theft (not shoplifting) | 1.13 | 1.13 | 1.09 | 1.08 | | Fraud and Forgery | 1.07 | 1.11 | 1.04 | 1.04 | | Criminal Damage | 1.11 | 1.10 | 1.03 | 1.03 | | Drug Offences | 1.04 | 1.05 | 1.04 | 1.06 | | Other Miscellaneous | 1.13 | 1.14 | 1.06 | 1.08 | | **Total Notifiable** | **1.11**| **1.14** | **1.05** | **1.06** | Table A.7 Estimated police recorded crime by age group and offence type, 2009/10
| Offence group | England and Wales, police recorded crime | 10 to 17 | 18 and over | 10 to 17 | 18 and over | |-------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------| | | | Men | Women | Men | Women | | Violence Against the Person | | 113.6 | 597.9 | 39.8 | 120.4 | | Sexual | | 10.4 | 42.9 | 0.2 | 1.0 | | Robbery | | 33.9 | 36.2 | 3.1 | 1.8 | | Burglary | | 152.7 | 362.9 | 8.5 | 16.5 | | Offences Against Vehicles | | 138.3 | 335.4 | 6.8 | 14.4 | | Shoplifting | | 26.9 | 170.3 | 29.3 | 81.3 | | Other Theft (not shoplifting) | | 152.6 | 440.9 | 29.1 | 106.9 | | Fraud and Forgery | | 7.6 | 108.3 | 2.8 | 33.7 | | Criminal Damage | | 184.2 | 524.1 | 31.9 | 66.5 | | Drug Offences | | 29.0 | 183.6 | 2.1 | 20.3 | | Other Miscellaneous | | 7.9 | 55.0 | 1.1 | 6.1 | | **Total Notifiable** | | **857.1**| **2,857.6** | **154.8**| **469.1** |
Note: The number of police recorded crimes by gender do not add up to the totals given in Table A.4 due to missing data on gender. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank all those who have contributed to the analysis while working in the Crime and Policing Analysis Unit at the Home Office, especially Geraldine Brown, Samantha Cherry-Downes, Emma Sutton and Maria Willoughby.
References
Budd, T., Sharp, C. and Mayhew, P. (2005) Offending in England and Wales: First Results from the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey, Home Office Research Study 275. London: Home Office.
DTZ Pieda Consulting (2005) Measurement of the Extent of Youth Crime in Scotland. Edinburgh: Scottish Executive.
Farrington, D. P., Jolliffe, D., Hawkins, J. D., Catalano, R. F., Hill, K. G. and Kosterman, R. (2010) ‘Why Are Boys More Likely to Be Referred to Juvenile Court? Gender Differences in Official and Self-Reported Delinquency’. Victims & Offenders, 5:1, 25-44.
Flatley, J., Kershaw, C., Smith, K., Moon, D. and Chaplin, R. (eds.) (2010), Crime in England and Wales 2009/10, Home Office Statistical Bulletin 12/10. London: Home Office.
Ministry of Justice (2011a) Re-offending of juveniles: results from the 2009 cohort, Ministry of Justice Statistical Bulletin. London: Ministry of Justice.
Ministry of Justice (2011b) Criminal Justice Statistics: Quarterly Update to December 2010, Ministry of Justice Statistical Bulletin. London: Ministry of Justice.
National Audit Office (2010) The youth justice system in England and Wales: Reducing offending by young people. London: The Stationery Office.
Reiss, A. J. and Farrington, D. (1991), ‘Advancing Knowledge about Co-Offending: Results from a Prospective Longitudinal Study of London Men’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 82: 360-95.
van Mastrigt, S. and Farrington, D. P. (2009) ‘Co-Offending, Age, Gender, and Crime Type: Implications for Criminal Justice Policy’, British Journal of Criminology, 49: 552-573.
Youth Justice Board/Ministry of Justice (2012) Youth Justice Statistics 2011/12. London: Ministry of Justice.
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6625988b645b18e6006c9bea6e687af9506108c1 | Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
Research Report 87
Nick Morgan, Oliver Shaw, Andy Feist and Christos Byron
January 2016
# Table of Contents
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 4
Executive summary .................................................................................................................. 5
1: Background, aims and structure .......................................................................................... 12 Aims and Structure .................................................................................................................. 16
2: Vehicle security and vehicle theft in England and Wales .................................................. 19 The first vehicles and the first wave of vehicle security ....................................................... 19 The vehicle crime rise of the 1980s and early 1990s and the security response .................. 21 The Car Theft Index and the arrival of electronic immobilisers ........................................... 25 Evidence relating to the effectiveness of specific security devices ...................................... 27 Thefts from inside the vehicles ............................................................................................. 28 Thefts of vehicles .................................................................................................................. 28 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 29
3: Modelling the spread of electronic immobilisers and the timing of their likely impact on vehicle thefts ........................................................................................................... 31 The model ............................................................................................................................. 32 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 32
4: Analysis of vehicle theft trends and methods in Great Britain .......................................... 42 Aims, data and methods ........................................................................................................ 42 Findings – National level ...................................................................................................... 43 Findings – Police force area level ....................................................................................... 55 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 57
5: Evidence from other nations .............................................................................................. 58 The spread of immobilisers internationally ......................................................................... 59 Analysis of theft trends ........................................................................................................ 63 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 69
6: The current vehicle crime landscape .................................................................................. 70
7: Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 75
Appendix 1: Diffusion, displacement and switching ................................................................. 78
Appendix 2: The effect of LoJack on car thefts in the US ....................................................... 83
Appendix 3: Why does crime spike? ...................................................................................... 87
Appendix 4: Two local-area cases studies: Western Australia and Merseyside .................... 92
Appendix 5: Other reasons for the rise and fall in vehicle crime ........................................... 97
Appendix 6: Time series modelling (written by Christos Byron) ........................................... 104
Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Amanda White, Mike Warren, Andrew Kent, Daniel Heap, Tony O’Donnell, and Chris Lyons for their comments, suggestions and/or fact-checking. We would also like to thank the two independent academics who peer reviewed different draft versions of the report: Pat Mayhew and Ben Vollaard. Executive summary
This report analyses trends in vehicle security devices and tries to determine the extent to which improved security has driven down vehicle-related theft in England and Wales and other nations.
For the first half of the 20th century, few vehicle thefts were recorded and vehicle security devices were rare. Then thefts started rising in the 1960s and steering locks were introduced as a result. These checked rather than halted rising crime, leading to a ‘second wave’ of security devices in the 1980s and 1990s including central locking, car alarms and – most importantly – electronic immobilisers(^1). To begin with, these devices appeared to have little effect as vehicle crime levels rose faster than ever up until 1993. But then crime began to fall sharply as many of the ‘second-wave’ devices spread through the vehicle fleet, see Figure 1. Using a mixed-methods approach, this report attempts to assess the degree to which improved vehicle security might have caused the vehicle crime decline by reducing the number of opportunities for would-be offenders. Findings are supportive of a marked crime-reduction effect. But the results also suggest that security has not been universally effective, nor does it seem to be the only factor that has made vehicle crime rise and fall so sharply over the last 50 years.
Figure 1: Police recorded thefts of and from vehicles in England and Wales (per 1,000 vehicles on the road) and accompanying security developments
(^1) Electronic immobilisers are devices fitted to vehicles that prevent the starting of the engine without the key. They were designed to prevent thieves ‘hot-wiring’ vehicles. The key policy issues arising from the analysis are as follows:
- Different types of security devices have had different levels of success in reducing theft, partly because some crimes are harder to prevent than others. Within vehicle crime, for example, evidence in this report suggests that there were two clear instances of security devices driving down thefts of vehicles: steering locks and electronic immobilisers. But, despite the similar trends shown in Figure 1, the evidence that security was involved in the large reductions in thefts from vehicles is less clear. For all but the most organised offender, stealing a vehicle requires the ability to drive it away, which provides a clear ‘break-point’ for security to target. This is not quite the same for offences like theft from vehicles or burglary where multiple points of entry need to be secured and there is no direct equivalent to not being able to drive the car away.
- The evidence also suggests that security devices that have been proven to be effective have worked because they made the theft more difficult, not because they led to more offenders being caught. Vehicle crime detection rates changed little through the sharp rise and fall in offences. Also, the devices with the strongest evidence of effectiveness required no knowledge or conscious action by the consumer – most people do not know their car has an electronic immobiliser, and are not required to switch it on.
- Another reason for the variable effectiveness of security devices is longevity. Whereas previous devices (e.g. steering locks) seem to have kept thieves at bay for a limited period, electronic immobilisers have remained a strong deterrent for more than two decades.
- The speed with which a new security measure spreads is almost as important as the effectiveness of the device itself. Highly effective security may have little effect on overall crime if it protects only a minority of the target population. This is demonstrated by analysis of the spread of electronic immobilisers. Whilst the devices first appeared between 1989 and 1992 in all seven nations studied, estimates suggest it took between eight and 14 years for half the vehicle fleet to become protected. During that period, theft trends varied. While vehicle crime fell in England and Wales, it continued to rise until 2001 in Australia, where the initial effects of improved security were most likely overwhelmed by other upward crime pressures until the pool of unprotected vehicles became sufficiently small.
- The spread of electronic immobilisers happened more quickly in Europe and Australia than in the US or Canada due partly to the presence and timing of legislation mandating the installation of electronic immobilisers in new vehicles, see Table 1. This creates a ‘natural experiment’ for determining both the effectiveness of the devices and the timing of their impact. As Figure 2 shows, despite the variation in trends to that point, once electronic immobilisers were installed on around half the vehicle fleet all these nations saw a sharp decline in vehicle thefts of around 40 per cent. Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
Table 1: Findings from cross-national analysis on electronic immobilisers
| Dates of electronic immobiliser spread | Eng + Wales | Scotland | Netherlands | Sweden | Australia | US | Canada | |----------------------------------------|------------|----------|-------------|--------|-----------|----|--------| | Estimated first appearance of electronic immobilisers in mass market vehicles | 1991-92 | 1991-92 | 1991-92 | 1991-92 | 1989-1990 | 1988-1992 | 1988-1992 | | Year in which electronic immobilisers mandated on new vehicles | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 2001 | None | 2007 | | Estimated year in which 50% of all vehicles have electronic immobilisers (threshold) | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2006 | 2006 |
Changes in numbers of police-recorded vehicle thefts
| | Eng + Wales | Scotland | Netherlands | Sweden | Australia | US | Canada | |----------------|------------|----------|-------------|--------|-----------|----|--------| | Five years pre-threshold | -33% | -31% | -5% | 9% | 9% | -2% | -6% | | Five years post-threshold | -41% | -35% | -44% | -39% | -46% | -34% | -46% |
Figure 2: Recorded vehicle thefts in five nations, indexed to 2000 (2000=1)
- Several further conclusions follow from these results. Legislation requiring new vehicles to have an electronic immobiliser probably played a part in reducing crime rates by speeding up the spread of devices. But had the legislation applied to all vehicles rather than just new vehicles, more crime might have been prevented because spread would have been faster. Legislation may also have been important in putting the onus onto manufacturers rather than consumers – there was little evidence of consumers retrofitting electronic immobilisers to existing vehicles.²
- A common criticism of security is that it simply displaces crime somewhere else (i.e. if
² The only instance that could be found of retrofitting occurring in significant numbers was in Western Australia. But even then, significant government subsidies were provided and take-up was only partial leading to mandatory retrofitting a few years later. See Appendix 4. would-be offenders cannot steal a new vehicle, they will steal an older vehicle without an immobiliser). Overall, the analysis is consistent with other studies in finding that while displacement does occur it rarely overwhelms the effect of improved security completely. Offenders did switch to stealing older vehicles, but overall thefts still went down. However, two further points need to be made. As the example of Australia demonstrates, displacement can eliminate crime-reduction gains for a number of years if there is still a sufficiently large pool of unprotected targets available. Secondly, improved security seems to have deterred all but the most committed offenders, which has had a large effect on the volume of thefts in many nations. But some of the remaining offenders switched to higher-harm vehicle theft methods, like car-key burglary and robbery, as a result.
- The findings in this report also touch on the validity of the ‘security hypothesis’, which has suggested that improvements in the quality and quantity of security may be the main reason why overall crime has fallen. This report offers mixed support. On the one hand, the cross-national evidence from Table 1 and Figure 2 demonstrates that electronic immobilisers clearly drove a reduction in thefts of vehicles. But for many nations, England and Wales included, the crime decline was already well underway by the 2000s, which is when electronic immobilisers seemed to have their greatest effect.
- Vehicle crime in England and Wales rose and then fell very quickly in the period before electronic immobilisers reached 50 per cent penetration (Figure 1). There have been examples of security improvements driving large changes in trend like this, but these occurred when a large proportion of the target population was protected in a very short space of time, as happened with steering locks in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s or more recently with mobile phone security. This was not the case with the second wave of vehicle security devices, like central locking, alarms and immobilisers. At the 1993 turning-point in recorded vehicle crime, estimates suggest only the newest cars would have had electronic immobilisers, amounting to fewer than five per cent of vehicles on the road, and thieves had shown a preference for stealing older vehicles anyway.
- The percentage of vehicles with other security features - car alarms, mechanical immobilisers and central locking - would have been higher in 1993, but the evidence of effectiveness for these devices is more mixed than for electronic immobilisers. Analyses of theft rates by age of vehicle show that only vehicles manufactured from 1992 onwards had markedly lower theft rates even though car alarms and central locking began appearing in new models in the mid 1980s. In addition, the fact that thefts increased so sharply in the early 1990s, as central locking, mechanical immobilisers and car alarms were spreading through the vehicle fleet also suggests they were not the catalyst for the initial drop in crime. Even taking into account all the improving combinations of security devices, there was still a large pool of unprotected vehicles during the 1990s and both Car Theft Index data and findings from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) show that during the initial period of the vehicle theft decline, rates fell sharply in vehicles without security as well as in protected vehicles. Overall then, the analysis suggests that vehicle security - and electronic immobilisers in particular - made an important contribution to an already falling trend rather than causing the initial crime turn-around.
______________________________________________________________________
3 This is discussed in Appendix 1. 4 Formerly the British Crime Survey. Two exploratory attempts were made to model the proportion of the fall in thefts of vehicles attributable to electronic immobilisers. Retrospectively attempting to establish causality and quantify the size of effects is fraught with difficulty due to the lack of a control group, so these results should be treated as exploratory only. But the two different methods produced reasonably similar results, tentatively suggesting that at least a quarter and possibly as much as half of the drop in thefts of vehicles in England and Wales could be attributed to electronic immobilisers. No estimates were attempted for thefts from vehicles.
That other factors were probably involved is also suggested by the fact that other types of crime tended to peak at the same time as vehicle-related theft and then fall with an initially similar trajectory. Certainly the rise and fall in vehicle crime was highly correlated with burglary in England and Wales and Australia, and with violence in the US, see Figure 3. This implies either that:
- improved vehicle security had a marked effect on other crime too; or
- that there was a simultaneous and equally large improvement in other types of security: household security in England and Wales and Australia, and security relating to violent crime in the US; or
- that there was a large shift upwards and then downwards in some other factor, or combination of factors, that would affect crime trends more generally.
Figure 3: Panel of charts showing police recorded thefts of vehicles and selected other crimes in England and Wales, Australia and the US This analysis found little convincing evidence for the first option. The second option was not covered in this study. Security improvements on houses and other products were not examined in detail and neither were place-based security devices like CCTV. So it is possible that these had a separate effect on vehicle crime, burglary and other types of vehicle crime. In relation to the third option, it is important to ask what might have driven such a change. There is a vast literature on possible reasons for the crime drop and it is beyond the scope of this report to summarise them. Changes to policing, economic conditions, incarceration rates and long-term demographic shifts may all have played some role, as may the timing of drug epidemics. Previous Home Office research has shown that epidemics also follow a sharply rising and then falling pattern and affect multiple crime types. In that light, one further finding from this report – that joy-riding declined relative to more profit-driven theft even through the vehicle crime rise – may be relevant. The final section of this report looks at the nature of vehicle crime today. Overall, vehicle crime levels are about a fifth of what they were in the mid 1990s, despite eight million more vehicles on the roads(^5). However, if this impressive decline is linked to the gradually reducing pool of vehicles on the road without electronic immobilisers, as data suggest, then some of the downward pressure on crime may be petering out. Fewer than three per cent of vehicles on the road in 2013 were made before 1997, meaning virtually all vehicles now have electronic immobilisers. So to further reduce crime, new interventions to tackle the minority of thieves who have been able to get around current security levels may be required.
Indeed, the latest figures for the year to June 2015 showed a three per cent increase in police-recorded thefts of vehicles in England and Wales, the first rise in two decades. This appears to be mainly due to an increase in stolen scooters and motorcycles. Motorbike thefts fell in line with other crime from 1995 to 1999, but from 1999 numbers of thefts have been quite stable, while thefts of cars fell sharply. This was probably due to the fact that motorbikes are less well protected by security for the simple reason that they are easier to transport away from the scene without cracking the immobiliser. It also means that trends in motorbike/scooter theft can now drive trends in overall vehicle theft. Exploring ways to better protect motorcycles may therefore be an important element of future thinking on vehicle crime prevention.
Finally, a crucial policy question that this report has been unable to resolve fully is whether new technology is changing vehicle security dynamics again. The technology to overcome electronic immobilisers certainly exists and is available(^6) but current theft rates suggest it is not being used by a large number of offenders (relative to the 1990s). There are perhaps four reasons.
1. There are simply fewer would-be offenders now – so even though the technology exists, it is not being used.
2. The price, and the need to buy the technology in advance (i.e. to plan the theft), may raise the bar sufficiently to deter many opportunist car thieves. If high crime levels of the past have been predominantly about less-organised offenders exploiting straightforward opportunities that required little preparation or planning, then it is possible that the new methods of theft may have only a small impact on crime levels.
3. Other types of security, like CCTV or number-plate recognition technology, continue to make vehicle theft unattractive to more opportunistic offenders.
4. Word simply has not spread yet. This is the most worrying option – i.e. that once the knowledge of electronic compromise spreads from more seasoned offenders to more casual ones, thefts will start to rise.
Presently it is hard to know which of these explanations applies. Either way, but particularly in the case of the fourth, there is a case for manufacturers and others to be thinking carefully about a ‘third wave’ of vehicle security to ensure they stay ahead of the technological curve.
______________________________________________________________________
(^5) CSEW figures show that the number of vehicle crimes in 2013/14 was 22 per cent of the corresponding figure in 1995. The equivalent for police recorded crime (which peaked in 1993) is 23 per cent.
(^6) See for example: [https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827894-500-criminals-find-the-key-to-car-immobilisers/](https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827894-500-criminals-find-the-key-to-car-immobilisers/) The idea that security might be an important driver of crime has come a long way in the last 40 years thanks to pioneering work by Home Office researchers among others. Indeed, the origins of what is now called ‘the security hypothesis’ can be traced to the growing recognition that ‘opportunity’ is a key driver of crime. Three papers tell the story of this process: ‘Crime as Opportunity’ (Mayhew et al. 1976), ‘Opportunity Makes the Thief’ (Felson and Clarke, 1998) and ‘Opportunity Makes the Thief. Really? And so what?’ (Clarke, 2012). As these papers outline, ‘opportunity theory’ began as an opposition movement. It challenged the perceived wisdom of the time, which placed criminals at the centre of the quest to reduce crime, rather than crime itself. The new adherents wondered whether crime could be reduced not just by making people less criminal but by changing the crime environment to make situations less conducive to crime. As Ronald Clarke put it:
*Is opportunity a cause of crime? The question was unavoidable because if opportunity is a cause, then reducing it could be expected to reduce crime without displacing it; if opportunity merely determined when and where crime occurred, but did not cause it, then the expected result of reducing opportunity would simply be to displace it.*
Source: Clarke, 2012.
This inquiry began a body of work that drew together several different theoretical strands, in particular ‘routine activity theory’ (Felson, 1998), ‘crime pattern theory’ (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991) and ‘rational choice theory’ (Clarke and Felson, 1993). The links between these approaches and opportunity is eloquently outlined in Felson and Clarke (1998) and interested readers are signposted there. But briefly, routine activity theory suggests that crime is influenced by what people do on a daily basis rather than simply being driven by ingrained criminological tendencies. Crime pattern theory looked at how crime was influenced by aspects of place and physical geography and not just individuals; and rational choice theory suggested that an individual’s actions could be influenced by aspects of the environment that changed the costs and benefits of committing a crime.
One of the most important aspects of this research agenda was that it focused on designing and testing on-the-ground interventions that could have immediate crime-reduction impacts. There are now hundreds of studies which suggest that altering the crime environment to lower opportunity can reduce crime. Though these studies vary considerably in the quality of their research design, most attempts to summarise the evidence base conclude that situational crime prevention, as it has become known, is effective. For example, a recent systematic review of interventions that aimed to reduce repeat victimisation found that crimes decreased by one-sixth, on average, relative to controls (Grove et al., 2012). Burglary interventions produced the biggest crime reduction effects and of these, the authors found that “appropriately tailored and implemented situational crime prevention measures, like target hardening and neighbourhood watch, appear to be the most effective” (ibid.). A review of 102 situational interventions also found a high level of effectiveness and while displacement did occur in some cases, it never completely offset the main crime-reduction effect and in some cases a diffusion of benefits occurred (Guerette and Bowers, 2009). The concepts of displacement and diffusion are crucial when evaluating opportunity/security effects, so Appendix 1 explores these issues in more detail.
A wide range of approaches came to be incorporated under the opportunity banner. For example, although improved security and target hardening was clearly part of the approach, Felson and Clarke (1998) also link opportunity theory to problem-oriented policing, defensible space architecture, and crime prevention through environmental design. For evidence of the effectiveness on these approaches see Weisburd, et al. (2008) and Cozens, et al. (2005). This in turn meant that opportunity approaches could be applied to crimes other than just theft. A review of evidence on violence in the night-time economy found that several elements of the physical and social environment predicted violence levels. And more recently the techniques of situational crime prevention have been applied to crimes as diverse as internet child pornography (Wortley and Smallbone, 2006), suicide bombings (Clarke and Newman, 2006), and organised crimes of various kinds (Tremblay et al., 2001; Bullock et al., 2010; Chiu et al., 2011).
Overall, Clarke (2012) summarises the achievements of work on opportunity and security as follows.
1. It has supported the development of situational crime prevention, a highly effective means of crime control.
2. It has helped make credible the claim that the cumulative effect of situational prevention, whether or not implemented under that label, has brought about widespread drops in crime in Western countries.
3. It has helped to clarify that most criminological theories are theories of criminality not theories of crime – in other words, criminological theorizing has been preoccupied with the question of why certain individuals or groups become involved in crime and not the question of why crime occurs. This latter question cannot be answered simply by explaining why some people are more likely to be delinquent or criminal; it must also be explained by how situational factors facilitate or encourage the actual commission of criminal acts.
4. It has supported the development of an alternative set of crime (or opportunity) theories that will enable the growth of crime science.
There is a considerable body of evidence to support the first, third and fourth of these points. The second point – that situational crime prevention may have been the main cause of the crime drop – provides the context for the rest of this paper.
There have been a number of attempts to link opportunity and security to aggregate-level crime trends. As Felson and Clarke (1998) pointed out, “for a long time, the routine activity approach provided the best explanation for the rise in burglary in the United States and western Europe during the 1960s and 1970s.” This was based on the increase in women’s labour participation during that period, which left more houses empty during the day, and consumer/technological growth which meant more tempting (and light-weight) products available to steal. This was extended to violence too:
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7 Although this suggests that situational interventions might reduce night-time economy violence it does not conclusively prove it in the way that an evaluation of a particular intervention would. “the most general explanation of crime rate trends is an indicator of the dispersion of activities away from family and household settings. As people spend more time among strangers and away from their own homes, their risk of personal and property victimization rises.”
Felson and Clarke, 1998
This hypothesis has been challenged from two directions. Firstly by Eisner (2008), who notes that many of the variables used to explain the rise in crime – more disposable income to spend on alcohol, urban growth and increased leisure time – were also rising from 1840 to 1950 when all available evidence suggests that homicide, violence and some types of property crime were declining across the developed world. More recently, the hypothesis has been somewhat wrong-footed by the crime drop, which has featured sometimes very sharp falls in the rates of violence, theft and homicide without an obvious curtailment in either the opportunity to socialise and consume alcohol or the number of stealable goods people own. And while some environmental changes seemed to have had surprisingly large effects – Clarke and Mayhew (1988) showed that making domestic gas less poisonous reduced UK suicides markedly without displacement to other methods – other changes had surprisingly little effect. For example, the Licensing Act 2003, which came into force in November 2005, abolished set licensing hours in England and Wales, effectively allowing bars and pubs to sell alcohol on a 24-hour basis if they obtained a licence. In the run-up to implementation, there was widespread concern that the legislation would lead to ‘24-hour drinking’ and an increase in associated problems (Hough et al., 2008); a concern perfectly in line with opportunity theory. Yet an evaluation suggested that the change had essentially no effect on the overall volume of offences. All that happened was that a small amount of the violence that previously occurred earlier in the evening was displaced to the early hours (ibid.)
Recently then, some opportunity proponents looking for effects on aggregate-level crime trends have moved away from routine activities to an extent, and focused instead on security. This has given rise to the ‘security hypothesis’, which has been set out in a series of recent papers (see in particular Farrell et al. 2014).
Briefly, the argument is that increasing opportunities for offending (more cars on the road, more consumer goods to steal etc.) drove up crime but also generated a security backlash. That is, rising crime led to fear of crime which led to pressure from consumers and governments for security improvements (van Dijk and Vollaard, 2012). These arrived in the form of improved anti-theft devices on cars and houses, but also public-space measures like CCTV, private security guards and so on. In other words, opportunity drove crime up and security has driven it back down again.
Evidence in support of the security hypothesis mainly comes in two forms: studies testing the effectiveness of security devices in a local context; and studies looking at the introduction and
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8 This is not to say that opportunity played no role in the declines of these offences. Some situational interventions aimed at reducing criminal opportunity may have contributed (e.g. CCTV or problem-solving policing). The point being made is that the opportunity and routine activity theories that had been used to explain the rise in crime did not suddenly turn around in such a way as to offer an explanation for the fall. People continued to buy goods, more and more women entered the workplace and socialising in the night-time economy continued.
9 The retrospective nature of the evaluation meant that it was not as robust as a randomised control trial or a quasi-experimental design, so its findings should be treated slightly cautiously. However, the fact that violence – whether measured by police figures, the Crime Survey or hospital data – continued to decline through that period suggests the Licensing Act cannot have caused meaningful upward pressure on violence at the national level. One possible reason is that, as the evaluation showed, the actual number of premises that extended their hours was quite ‘modest’ (Hough et al., 2008). spread of improved security nationally to see whether it correlates with falling crime. The impact of electronic immobilisers has been central to the hypothesis because it has been studied in both contexts. Research has demonstrated that cars with electronic immobilisers are far less likely to be stolen than cars without immobilisers (van Ours and Vollaard, 2014; Farrell, Tseloni, and Tilley, 2011; Brown, 2013). More recently though, it has also been suggested that the introduction and spread of electronic immobilisers played an important part in causing the crime turning point in nations like England and Wales, the US, the Netherlands and Australia (Farrell et al., 2014).
Research has also examined the effectiveness of other security measures. Farrell et al. (2011) suggest that vehicles with certain combinations of security (particularly electronic immobilisers and central locking) were up to 25 times less likely to be stolen than vehicles without security. Other studies have focused on how the benefits of improved housing security may have reduced burglary rates (Vollaard and van Ours, 2011; Tseloni et al., 2014). But to this point the evidence that improvements in housing security coincided with crime’s turning point is more limited. This is important because – as Figure 3 demonstrates – the crime drop occurred in many types of crime more or less simultaneously. In England and Wales and Australia, for example, burglary and vehicle theft rose and fell with very similar trajectories. For the security hypothesis, this implies either that:
- marked security improvements occurred on houses and cars at more or less the same time; and/or that
- the benefits from a particular security device ‘diffused’ almost instantaneously from one crime type to the other.
Farrell et al., (2014) have suggested two mechanisms by which the benefits of vehicle immobilisers may have spread to other types of acquisitive crime and violence. The first of these, the debut crimes hypothesis, is based on the evidence that vehicle theft is frequently one of the first offences that offenders commit, but that it can be followed by a long and diverse criminal career (Cooper et al., 2013). This means that deterring vehicle theft may stop a criminal career at the earliest stage, preventing other types of offences. The other possibility, the keystone crime hypothesis, is based on the evidence that stolen cars are used to commit, or are implicated in, other crimes like burglary or theft from vehicles. Many of the vehicle theft offenders interviewed by Light et al., (1993) said they stole cars to commit other crimes or to sell-on the contents (often the stereo) rather the vehicle itself. Thus, deterring theft of vehicles might prevent various other crime types.
This paper seeks to add to the evidence base by attempting a systematic examination of trends in vehicle crime and the spread of vehicle security devices, particularly electronic immobilisers, in England and Wales and six other nations.
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10 Brown (2015) also finds some support for the security hypothesis in a study that surveys offenders about reasons for the crime drop. In interviews with nearly a thousand offenders in 2012, 15 per cent of the sample or 31 per cent of those who offered an explanation (most gave no response or said they didn’t know) mentioned better security in their explanation of crime’s decline, making it the most common single explanation.
11 Whereas electronic immobilisers began appearing at about the same time as the vehicle crime turning point in England and Wales in 1993, CSEW data suggest that the important changes to housing security – better window and door locks – started earlier and gradually improved through both the sharp rise and fall of burglary shown in Figure 4. Tilley et al. (2014) have recently argued that the sharp turn-around in burglary may still be due to security if security is measured via quality rather than quantity, and they also suggest a possible role for other household improvements, like double glazing. Aims and Structure
Aims
The main aims of this paper are as follows:
i) to outline the main trends in vehicle security and vehicle crime in England and Wales, with briefer descriptions of trends in several other nations;
ii) to model the spread of electronic immobilisers in England and Wales and assess their likely crime impact;
iii) to test the modelling results against actual crime trends, both within England and Wales and internationally, to see whether the data suggest that electronic immobilisers reduced vehicle crime and if so when;
iv) to analyse the effects of electronic immobilisers on other types of crime i.e. to look for signs of displacement and/or diffusion of benefits;
v) to analyse the current vehicle crime landscape in England and Wales to see whether security still provides a deterrent.
Throughout these sections, policy-relevant conclusions are also drawn out wherever possible. One of the most important of these relates to the overall extent to which security has driven down vehicle crime. It is difficult to know where to prioritise resources for the future if past trends have not been fully explained. In relation to the ‘security hypothesis’ and the fall in crime, it is therefore important to point out that this paper only covers the aspects of the hypothesis that relate to vehicle crime. The paper does not look at improvements in housing or other types of security (including some that could have applied directly to vehicle crime, like CCTV and number plate recognition technology), or at other aspects of situational crime prevention. It is perfectly possible that these made important and separate contributions to the crime decline and it is also possible that these interacted with the security devices examined here to enhance their effectiveness. In this report, the intention is simply to assess the role played by security improvements made to the vehicle itself, and in that sense this paper is only a partial examination of the security hypothesis.
Structure
The remainder of the report is divided into five sections and a number of appendices. The first section (Chapter 2) provides background information on long-term trends in vehicle security and vehicle crime in England and Wales. In Chapter 3, data from England and Wales are used to model the spread of immobilisers and the timing of their likely impact in relation to the crime turning point in the mid 1990s.
Chapter 4 continues the examination of the likely timing of an electronic immobiliser impact by examining trends in vehicle thefts and methods of theft nationally and at police force area level within England and Wales. Police Recorded Crime (PRC) and Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) data are used.
Chapter 5 employs a panel dataset with seven nations (England and Wales, Scotland, the US, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden) to test for the magnitude and timing of any electronic immobiliser impact on numbers of vehicle thefts and whether the benefits diffused to other crime like burglary.
Chapter 6 analyses current data on vehicle crime to ascertain whether the security improvements from the 1990s are still effective. This is followed by a brief conclusion, outlining the main findings.
Six appendices provide further information on some aspect of the analysis or in some cases they explore some conclusions which do not directly relate to the relationship between vehicle security and vehicle crime in England and Wales, but which may be of interest. Details of the appendices are shown below:
Appendix 1: Diffusion, displacement and switching
Appendix 2: The effect of LoJack on car thefts in the US
Appendix 3: Why does crime spike?
Appendix 4: Two local-area case studies: Western Australia and Merseyside
Appendix 5: Other factors that might have driven vehicle crime trends
Appendix 6: Time series modelling
Data
For England and Wales, the main datasets used are the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), Police Recorded Crime (PRC) and the Car Theft Index (CTI). For the analysis testing the effects of electronic immobilisers, PRC is mainly used for the central variable of interest: the number of motor vehicle thefts. The main reason is that police statistics are available for a large number of nations over several decades and are also available sub-nationally in some instances. This gives police recorded crime a huge advantage – in terms of sample size – over victimisation surveys, which are the other possible source of figures on vehicle thefts.
Police statistics suffer from well-known limitations. They capture only the crimes that are reported to and recorded by the police and are therefore subject to any variation in reporting rates or in recording practice. Because of these limitations it is often preferable to use victimisation surveys when looking at trends in crime. However, vehicle theft (and to a lesser extent burglary, which is also used throughout this report) may represent an exception to this general rule. This is because vehicle theft tends to be one of the best reported and recorded offences and is therefore subject to far less variation due to changes in recording practice. The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) suggests that reporting rates for vehicle theft are consistently above 90 per cent, most likely because victims are required to report the offence for insurance reasons. As a result, for England and Wales and the US (two nations with comprehensive victimisation survey data), there is a high degree of similarity, both in the level and trend of vehicle theft nationally, between police statistics and victimisation surveys, see Figure 4.
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12 A full list of sources for these statistics is provided in the Technical Appendix. It would seem that, in the case of vehicle theft, police statistics are comparable in their reliability to victimisation surveys. Hence they are used throughout this report and details of how recording practice changes and crime-type changes were incorporated can be found in the Technical Appendix. Where possible, survey data are also employed to triangulate results.
Descriptions of the method and other data used are provided within each section, with supplementary material in a Technical Appendix (Appendix 7). This chapter looks at existing evidence on the history of vehicle security and vehicle theft. It also highlights some evidence gaps, which the subsequent analysis will try and fill.
The first vehicles and the first wave of vehicle security
According to the National Motor Museum, the first motor vehicle appeared in the UK in the 1890s and official statistics show that by 1909 there were nearly 150,000 motor vehicles on the road. There was little in-built security on these early vehicles, with the cabs of the first cars being completely open (Webb, 1994). Registration plates were introduced in 1904, partly with the intention of preventing re-sale of stolen vehicles, but anecdotal evidence suggests this was hardly enforced initially (Webb and Tilley, 2005). Gradually security became more of a concern and door-locking systems and devices for protecting ignition switches were introduced and improved (Karmen, 1981).
Despite the initially rudimentary security, statistics on vehicle theft through the first half of the 20th century suggest that theft levels were very low, see Figure 5. However, there is evidence of concern about vehicle theft registering with the Metropolitan Police Service as early as 1918 (Webb and Tilley, 2005), and the number of thefts were probably not as low as Figure 5 implies as they did not include thefts in which the vehicle was subsequently recovered. These were included from 1968 onwards, and, as the 1968 step-change in the red line in Figure 5 (top chart) demonstrates, this had a very large effect on the number of thefts recorded. Indeed, statistics show that from 1968, the majority of police recorded thefts were cases in which the vehicle was recovered. This can occur because the theft was motivated by joy-riding, by the need to travel, or by desire for the contents of the vehicle rather than the vehicle itself. Stolen vehicles that are not recovered are often sold abroad or stripped for parts (Light et al., 1993; Sallybanks and Brown, 1999). Figure 5 demonstrates the remarkable rise and fall in vehicle thefts that has occurred over the last half-century. Webb (1994) argues that the growth of both vehicles on the road, and the number of thefts, through the 1950s and 1960s led to demands for improved security. This culminated in the introduction of legislation in Europe and in the US in the 1960s and 1970s. which for the first time required manufacturers to fit cars with steering column locks\\textsuperscript{13} (ibid.)
The impact of the legislation has been examined by Webb (1994). He shows that steering locks had a significant effect on vehicle theft rates in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) where legislation made them mandatory on all vehicles in 1961. The number of thefts fell 20 per cent in three years after the legislation (ibid.). Thefts started to increase again after that, but at a rate roughly proportional to the growth in vehicles on the road, hence the rate of vehicle theft stabilised. However, there was some evidence of displacement into motorbike theft and the legislation had no apparent effect on theft from vehicles. Webb (1994) also suggested that there were positive impacts on vehicle thefts in the UK and the US though these were more muted and delayed because steering locks were only mandated on new vehicles rather than all vehicles, so they spread through the vehicle fleet gradually. In England and Wales, there was no immediate fall in the absolute volume of thefts, but by the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s vehicle theft in England and Wales rose in line with, rather than faster than, numbers of vehicles on the road.
This first wave of improved security provides an introduction to three concepts that will be important to the rest of this paper.
1. **Timing**: It shows that the impact of security devices may be different depending on whether they are introduced on all vehicles or only on new vehicles. If they are installed on all vehicles simultaneously an effect can be expected immediately; if they are installed on new vehicles, the main effect on crime is likely to be delayed.
2. **The security arms race**: The German example suggests that devices may be successful initially but that success may wane over time as thieves gradually find ways to bypass security.
3. **Displacement and diffusion**: A key question for this report is whether the net impact of vehicle security on crimes other than vehicle theft is negative, positive or neutral. In the case of steering locks, it appears that in the Federal Republic of Germany there may have been some displacement to other crimes (though almost certainly not enough to offset the gains from better security in cars), while in the other nations the effect was broadly neutral. There was no evidence for diffusion of benefits, even to theft from vehicles.
**The vehicle crime rise of the 1980s and early 1990s and the security response**
During the 1980s, there were some important changes in the nature of vehicle crime in England and Wales. As Figure 5 shows, throughout the 1970s, both thefts of vehicles and thefts from vehicles had risen faster than the number of vehicles on the road. But in the 1980s, theft of vehicle rates stabilised, while the rate of thefts from vehicles accelerated. Webb (1994) lists three possible reasons for this divergence in trends.
- **Security**: Security devices may have suppressed ‘theft of’ offences but had little effect on ‘theft from’ offences. This would apply if the effect of steering column locks were delayed until the 1980s when enough vehicles on the road had the devices.
\\textsuperscript{13} For a description of these steering column locks and details of the original legislation, see Webb (1994). Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
- **Increased reporting:** The Crime Survey showed that reporting rates for thefts from vehicles increased from 30 per cent in 1981 to 55 per cent in 1991 (though rates decreased again after that). By contrast, reporting rates for thefts of vehicles rose only from 90 per cent to 95 per cent. Reporting could therefore account for a large proportion of the 141 per cent rise in police-recorded thefts from vehicles over that period. But it does not explain all of it, because the Crime Survey – which is unaffected by shifts in reporting to the police – shows a 92 per cent rise in thefts from vehicles over the same period.
- **Better items to steal:** Many researchers suggest that the increasing tendency for vehicles to contain desirable stereo systems and/or radios was an important cause in the rise of thefts from vehicles during the 1980s. In a survey of offenders in Manchester, 77 per cent said they would break into a car to steal the radio/cassette player (Smythe, 1990).
While there is good evidence for all these factors playing a role, trends also suggest another shift in the nature of vehicle crime occurring at that time. Up to 1980, thefts of vehicles were dominated by incidents in which the vehicle was subsequently recovered, suggesting that joy-riding was the primary motive. But from 1980, there is some evidence to suggest that vehicle crime became more about financial gain. The rise in thefts from vehicles is one example, but another is that within thefts of vehicles, numbers of thefts in which the vehicle was subsequently recovered stabilised in the 1980s and only ‘unrecovered’ thefts increased (Webb and Laycock, 1992). Given that unrecovered theft normally implies a profit-motive (either the car is broken up for parts or exported) whereas recovered theft can imply joy-riding, these trends suggest that vehicle theft became more profit-motivated during the 1980s.
At this time, one of the explanations offered was that improved security had ended (or at least seriously curtailed) the ‘culture of car theft’ and joy-riding that had persisted in the 1970s. It was felt that security had been part of the reason why vehicle crime seemed to have become more the domain of serious profit-driven offenders (who might be less deterred by security) rather than younger thieves seeking mainly excitement and a relief from boredom (Clarke and Harris, 1992; Webb and Laycock, 1992, see also Appendix 5). Certainly, there was much discussion of improved security during the 1980s, led by the Home Office. Southall and Ekblom (1985) showed the potential for vehicle security to be markedly increased with “minimal interference to the design of cars, at relatively little cost and in a manner which imposes no inconvenience to the motorist”. This was part of a process aimed at cajoling industry to take security more seriously.
The statistics show that vehicle security almost certainly did improve during the 1980s. While Ekblom (1985) found that only a handful of new and very expensive models of car had central locking in 1985, by 1991 the Crime Survey suggests that more than a third of vehicles did. It also suggests that around a quarter (23%) had mechanical immobilisers and about the same
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14 Distinguishing between joy-riding and for-profit theft based on whether the vehicle was recovered has become commonplace in studies of vehicle theft. But the measure is far from perfect. As Gant and Graborsky (2001) point out, a proportion of recovered vehicles are stripped of their parts and then burnt out, suggesting profit was the main motive. Likewise, there is some evidence that cars were stolen simply for their radios (Light et al., 1993) and that the vehicle was then discarded afterwards, which is another example of a ‘recovered’ theft being committed for profit. Offender interviews also blur the boundary between joy-riders and professional thieves; many offenders appear to start as the former and end up as the latter (Light et al., 1993; Dhami, 2008). In that light, it is interesting that van Ours and Vollaard (2014) found that electronic immobilisers were effective in reducing unrecovered thefts as well as recovered ones. Even some so-called ‘professional’ thieves clearly found them to be a deterrent.
15 Webb and Laycock (1992) show that a change in police recording practice means that if anything the divergence between thefts of and from vehicles during the 1980s is probably under-estimated. In 1980, thefts in which the vehicle was subsequently recovered but with property missing were recorded as ‘thefts from vehicle’ but after 1980 they were included in the theft of vehicle category. proportion (23%) had alarms, see Table 2.
Table 2: Trends in vehicle security precautions for the main or sole vehicle in all vehicle-owning households
| | 1991 | 1995 | 1999 | 2001/02 | |----------------------|------|------|------|----------| | Car alarm | 23% | 38% | 49% | 54% | | Central locking | 35% | 50% | 66% | 75% | | Any immobiliser | 23% | 46% | 63% | 70% | | Electronic immobiliser| n/a | n/a | 45% | 55% | | Mechanical immobiliser| n/a | n/a | 40% | 42% | | Any audio security | n/a | n/a | 74% | 80% | | - removable stereo | n/a | n/a | 42% | 44% | | - security pin number| n/a | n/a | 55% | 63% |
Note: The increases in car alarms, central locking and ‘any immobiliser’ are all significant between 1991 and 2001/02 as are the increases in electronic immobilisers and ‘any audio security’ from 1999 to 2001/02.
Source: ONS, Crime Survey for England and Wales.
In addition, people had become far less likely to leave their vehicle unsecured. Field tests in which researchers checked cars in car parks showed that around 22 per cent of vehicles were left unlocked in 1971, but this had fallen to four per cent by 1992 (Webb and Laycock, 1992). As already discussed, the proportion of recovered thefts fell from around 80 per cent to around 60 per cent (according to both police and Crime Survey data), suggesting that casual thieves were being deterred, a fact reinforced by trends in attempted thefts, see Figure 6.
Figure 6: Thefts of and from vehicles and attempts, England and Wales from 1981 to 2014/15
Source: ONS, Crime Survey for England and Wales. Figure 6 suggests that in 1981, only around one in nine theft attempts were unsuccessful. This proportion increased through the 1980s so that during the early 1990s around 40 per cent were unsuccessful, which suggests that thefts of and from vehicles became harder during the decade.
However, despite these apparent improvements in security, vehicle crime of all kinds surged markedly in the early 1990s, whether measured by the Crime Survey or by police figures (see Figures 5 and 6) and the consensus was that the security improvements to that point remained insufficient to deter large-scale theft. In a 1992 paper, which contained interviews with car thieves from Greater Manchester, 20 per cent claimed they could enter a car and drive away in 30 seconds or less with a further 18 per cent saying the process would take between 30 and 60 seconds (Webb and Laycock, 1992). A year earlier, WHICH? magazine published similar estimates showing the inadequacy of car security (WHICH?, 1991). So, although central locking was later suggested to be an effective security measure, particularly in conjunction with an electronic immobiliser (Farrell et al., 2011), it was either not widespread enough or not effective enough to prevent the rapid rise in vehicle crime of the early 1990s (or both). Table 2 shows that around a third of vehicles had central locking in 1991 and about 50 per cent did in 1995, a decade after Ekblom noted the presence of the first centrally locked cars.16
It was not just internal car security that was coming under threat. Theft from vehicles also surged to new levels in the early 1990s, following a slight lull in thefts around 1987/88.17 It is hard to piece together the types of items stolen during this crime surge and during the later decline, because data are imperfect. But CSEW trends are available from 1991, see Figure 7, and some additional conclusions from earlier years can also be drawn (notably that external parts were probably the most stolen items in the late 1980s as well as in the late 1990s – see the Technical Appendix).
**Figure 7: Numbers of ‘theft from vehicles’ incidents by item stolen**
Note: As multiple types of items can be stolen in an incident of theft, the combined total of items in the chart above will exceed the number of incidents of thefts from motor vehicles.
Source: ONS, Crime Survey for England and Wales.
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16 In relation to views on central locking at this time, see: [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/car-thieves-beat-remote-central-locking-systems-new-antitheft-coding-devices-could-cost-up-to-pounds-200-per-vehicle-susan-watts-reports-1564804.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/car-thieves-beat-remote-central-locking-systems-new-antitheft-coding-devices-could-cost-up-to-pounds-200-per-vehicle-susan-watts-reports-1564804.html)
17 The ‘lull’ is visible in the police recorded crime trend in Figure 4, but not in the Crime Survey trend as the survey was only run every four years at that point. Despite the inconsistencies in the data, the analysis of items stolen in thefts from vehicles suggests four tentative conclusions.
- Though other evidence suggests stereo thefts increased through the 1980s (Smythe, 1990), the trends in Figure 7 show that stereo thefts peaked in 1991 at the latest and declined thereafter.
- Thefts of external vehicle parts made up a sizable component of all thefts from vehicles, featuring in between a quarter and two-thirds of thefts depending on the year. Thefts of external parts seem to have surged in 1987 (see Technical Appendix) and to a lesser extent in 1997.
- For the final years of the rise in thefts from vehicles (1991 to 1993), thefts of other items from inside the car – i.e. not stereos or exterior fittings – also drove up theft levels.
- From the crime peak to 2014 thefts of virtually all types of items have fallen. The fall in stereo thefts has been particularly sharp, the decline in thefts of external parts and valuables from inside the car, slightly less so.
A number of reasons have been offered for the high levels of thefts of external car parts. Sallybanks and Thomas (2000) suggest three possibilities:
i) that the cost of replacing these parts fed a stolen goods market;
ii) that stolen number plates were used to alter a vehicle’s identity;
iii) youth ‘crazes’ for wearing car badges.
Other authors have also cited this final point (see Clarke and Webb, 1999), and the apparently high levels of external parts theft at the end of the 1980s would fit with available evidence on the youth fashion ‘craze’ which was sparked in England and Wales by members of US rap-rock group ‘the Beastie Boys’ wearing Volkswagen car badges in their music videos (ibid.). Newspaper articles from 1987, when songs by the Beastie Boys were high in the charts and the band toured the UK, suggest that badges were very easy to remove and that thefts were rife in both the US and the UK at that time. Reports suggest that Volkswagen dealerships gave out hundreds of free replacements each day to replace stolen badges (Bromley, 2012).
The Car Theft Index and the arrival of electronic immobilisers
As a result of these rising vehicle crime levels, and given the growing influence of situational crime prevention in general, there was increased pressure applied by the Home Office for vehicle manufacturers to further boost security levels. This culminated in the publication of the first Car Theft Index in 1992 (Houghton, 1992). It graded types of cars by their theft rates with the aim of informing consumers about the vehicles most targeted and hence encouraging manufacturers to beef up security. Several types of security were promoted, including alarms, window etching and central locking. But perhaps the most promising was the electronic
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18 If the ‘other’ category is broken down it becomes clear that ‘electrical goods’ is an exception. Thefts in which electrical goods were taken increased markedly from 2005/06, though this may simply reflect a widening of the categorisation to include GPS navigation devices. See the Technical Appendix for more on this.
19 See https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2202&dat=19870730&id=SOYIAAAIBAJ&sjid=jfwFAAAAIBAJ&pg=1410,3141621&hl=en immobiliser, which aimed to prevent thieves ‘hot-wiring’ vehicles once entry was gained. Electronic immobilisers were devices fitted to vehicles to prevent the starting of the engine without the correct key.
They seemed to have started appearing on special high-end models of car in the UK, the US and Australia during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Brown (2013) speaks of certain ‘anti-theft devices’ that resembled electronic immobilisers appearing on a few top-of-the-range cars in the US from around 1987. Geason and Wilson (1990) say that “an electronically-operated deadlock system” was fitted on the top-line Commodore (Australia’s top-selling brand of car in the early 1980s) in 1989 and also mention special security concept cars from the UK. Research suggested that these new cars with electronic immobilisers had markedly lower theft rates (Geason and Wilson, 1990; Hazelbaker, 1997).
Even so, spread of the devices seems to have been quite gradual initially. Modelling by Farrell et al. (2014) using the CSEW suggests that electronic immobilisers were a negligible presence before 1993 in England and Wales, relative to total cars on the road. In interviews with UK car thieves carried out in 1992, the devices were not mentioned once and though there was some evidence of older vehicles being easier to steal than newer ones, car security in general was largely regarded as risible – probably because at that point there were still so many relatively unprotected vehicles on the road (Light et al., 1993).
The spread of electronic immobilisers was given fresh impetus in 1995 by European Union Directive 74/61/EEC, which made installation of electronic immobilisers on all new passenger cars sold in the EU mandatory from October 1998 (Farrell et al., 2014). The result was that many more manufacturers began fitting electronic immobilisers on new models in anticipation of the law change. A survey of anti-theft measures by the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (Dixon, 1996) found that electronic immobilisers were standard equipment on 95 per cent of new UK manufactured models and 74 per cent of imported models in 1996. The survey examined 879 models accounting for over 80 per cent of new registrations. Brown and Thomas (2003) suggest this may over-estimate the speed of the spread of electronic immobilisers slightly. They say that although by 1994 immobilisers were widely fitted to most new mid- to top-of-the-range cars, (medium/large/luxury saloons, sports cars, 4x4s and people carriers), minis/superminis and small saloons were not widely fitted with electronic immobilisers until around 1997. These types of car made up just over 60 per cent of the vehicle fleet according to 1996 Car Theft Index data.
Despite these difficulties in determining the exact speed of spread, when the law came into effect in 1998, it can be taken for granted that virtually all new vehicles in England and Wales (and indeed throughout Europe) had electronic immobilisers. But it would take some time for the majority of total vehicles on the road to be protected. Data from the Crime Survey suggest that about 45 per cent of vehicles remained without electronic immobilisers by 2001/02, though overall vehicle security had clearly improved through the 1990s, see Table 2. By the late 1990s, crime had begun to fall. Police recorded thefts from vehicles declined from 1992 and thefts of vehicles started falling from 1993. Total crime, as measured by the CSEW dropped from 1995. This sets up the possibility that the second-wave security devices (those in Table 2) were wholly or partly responsible for the crime turn-around.
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20 Bässman (2011) notes that the exact date at which electronic immobilisers first appeared is further complicated by the fact that descriptions of ‘electrical systems’ are very similar to electrical immobilisers yet were “much easier to overcome” (ibid.). Evidence relating to the effectiveness of specific security devices
As Farrell et al. (2011) have noted, the different types of security in Table 2 aim to prevent different types of vehicle crime. Farrell et al. (2011) rated security devices on their own and in combination with other devices. The metric they developed was the ‘security protection factor’ (SPF), which compared theft rates of vehicles with different combinations of security against theft rates for vehicles with no security, using CSEW data from 2001 to 2007. An SPF of 3, for example, would imply that the vehicle with that level of security had a theft rate three times lower than a vehicle with no security. This was done for both theft of and theft from vehicles. Though their results have some important caveats, the authors generally found that the more devices a vehicle had the better it was protected with the most effective combinations of security having theft rates up to 25 times lower than vehicles with no security. In addition though, they also found that, with the exception of car alarms, most devices offered better protection against theft of the vehicle than against theft from the vehicle. The best combinations of security resulted in ‘theft from vehicle’ rates that were around six and half times better than no security, rather than 25 times lower for ‘theft of vehicles’. In other words, theft from vehicles was found to be harder to prevent than theft of vehicles. As Southall and Ekblom (1985) point out in their paper aimed at designing perfect vehicle security, this is likely to be because vehicle immobilisation has a single aim: preventing the thief from starting the car without the keys. Entry to the vehicle, which is all that is needed for theft from vehicle, can be achieved through the doors, the windows, the boot or the bonnet, requiring multiple types of effective security (ibid.) Thefts of external items do not even require entry to the vehicle, making them even harder to prevent.
For that reason it is important to examine the effectiveness and spread of vehicle devices in relation to the thefts in which they aimed to prevent.
Thefts of external parts: Security measures aimed at reducing these thefts include alarms and target hardening of external parts. Available evidence suggests car alarms first started appearing in the mid 1980s but spread only very gradually, such that around half the vehicle fleet remained without them in 1999 (Table 2). In their CSEW analysis, Farrell et al. (2011) found that, on their own, alarms had only a very marginal effect on reducing theft of vehicle rates (SPF = 1.2) but were slightly more effective against thefts from vehicles (SPF = 1.5).
There is also some evidence that target hardening of external parts occurred – for example the use of locking wheel nuts may have reduced thefts of wheels (Sallybanks and Thomas, 2000) and Volkswagen did redesign their badges to try and reduce thefts – but current news articles suggest that a motivated thief can still steal a very large number of car badges in a short space of time, which perhaps suggests that the downward trend in external parts thefts was more to do with changing fashions and the end of the craze for wearing badges.
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21 The Farrell et al. (2011) results have some limitations, most of which are acknowledged by the authors. There are several factors unaccounted for that might confound the results, notably the age of the vehicle and the location and behaviour of the owner (presumably people who buy more secure cars are also more security conscious in other ways and may live in less crime-prone areas). In addition, the results cannot necessarily be taken to be nationally representative as the CSEW weighting system was not used and the question used to generate the denominator for the calculation (i.e. security on the total population of vehicles) refers only to households’ main vehicle rather than all vehicles – see the Technical Appendix for more on this. Finally as van Ours and Vollaard (2014) note, victim surveys may not measure vehicle security particularly well as many people are not clear about what an electronic immobiliser actually is. In that light, it is important to note the difference between CSEW predictions of electronic immobiliser spread and those generated by modelling from the CTI data (Figure 12). If vehicle owners were systematically under-reporting the presence of electronic immobilisers on the CSEW through the 2000s, as Figure 12 suggests, this would affect the SPF calculations.
22 See for example: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/coventry-car-badge-thief-woman-2917847 and http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/local-news/boys-are-arrested-stealing-car-badges-930021 Thefts from inside the vehicles
For thefts of items from inside the car, alarms, audio security and central locking may all have been relevant. Table 2 suggests that audio security was present on about three-quarters of all vehicles by 1999, but limited data are available before that. As such, it is hard to determine whether improved security was the main factor in the decline of stereo thefts throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Evidence on their effectiveness is somewhat mixed. Braga and Clarke (1994) report statistical data from Germany and Australia suggesting that security-coded radios have reduced theft and Kock et al. (1996) report that thieves avoided these radios. On the other hand, there are some reports that thieves defeated coding with little difficulty (Sutton, 1998).
More data are available on central locking, which was first seen in vehicles in the mid 1980s and was present on about half of all vehicles in 1995. Though no studies could be located that test the effect of central locking using experimental or quasi-experimental methods, the results from Farrell et al. (2011) suggest that on its own central locking halves the rates of thefts from vehicles (SPF = 2.0). This suggests that the spread of central locking might have played an important role in reducing thefts from inside the vehicle. Yet evidence demonstrates that the number of vehicles with central locking must have been increasing through both the sharp (52%) rise in thefts from vehicles from 1989 to 1992 (which Figure 7 shows was mainly an increase in items stolen from inside the vehicle) and during the fall thereafter. Therefore, if central locking was the deciding factor, a sharp ‘tipping point’ must have occurred. Though this is certainly a possibility, a survey of offenders carried out in 1992, on the eve of the crime turning point, suggested that alarms were more of a deterrent than locking at that time (Light et al., 1993).
In fact the report concluded that: “Vehicle security is seen as lamentably weak, offenders having little or no trouble in overcoming door and ignition locks.” This does not suggest that the growing penetration of cars with central locking was about to reverse the trend in vehicle theft. And though alarms may have been a greater deterrent, their spread was even more gradual than central locking, according to Table 2.
Overall then, the current evidence suggests that better security almost certainly put some downward pressure on trends in thefts from vehicles and that this would have been likely to accelerate as more vehicles became protected by devices like central locking and car alarms. However, the fact that certain types of thefts are much harder to prevent with these devices (notably thefts of car badges) and that generally their spread through the vehicle fleet was gradual, it seems likely that other factors were also involved in the very sharp crime turning point.
Thefts of vehicles
Arguably, all the devices in Table 2 might have had a crime-reduction effect on theft of vehicles. Of those devices, however, only mechanical and electronic immobilisers might be expected to only have an effect on theft of vehicles as they prevent the vehicle being driven away and do
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23 It might be argued that there is no need for a ‘tipping point’ argument in relation to ‘theft from vehicles’ because of the introduction of electronic immobilisers in 1992, which conferred very large security benefits when employed in conjunction with central locking. There are two points to bear in mind with this argument. The first is that electronic immobilisers were present on very few cars at the crime turning point in 1993 and though most of the vehicles with electronic immobilisers would also have central locking, there would still have been a large pool of vehicles with central locking only and an even larger pool without either. In the 1991 CSEW, 40 per cent of households’ main vehicles had no central locking, alarm, or mechanical/electronic immobiliser. Secondly, Farrell et al. (2011) found that – as expected – adding an electronic immobiliser to a vehicle with central locking conferred relatively little additional benefit in relation to theft from vehicles.
24 Specifically, 34 per cent of the offenders in the Light et al. (1993) sample said that they would be deterred from vehicle theft by the presence of any alarm; a further 27 per cent said it would depend on the make and/or model. However, many of those who said they would be put off by a car with an alarm added that they would simply move on to another vehicle rather than giving up on the theft entirely. not offer any deterrent against entering the vehicle or external-part theft. Only partial data are available on the introduction and spread of mechanical immobilisers, which were consumer-purchased products fitted usually to the steering wheel and aimed to prevent the vehicle being driven away. Manufacturers of these items first appeared in the mid 1980s and the CSEW suggests that around one in four households owned one by 1991. The survey did not explicitly separate electronic and mechanical immobilisers until 1999, but given that electronic immobilisers would have been rare until 1992 it seems likely that most of the 23 per cent of households in 1991, who said they had an immobiliser (Table 2), had a mechanical immobiliser or ‘crook lock’, as they were better known. During the 1990s penetration of mechanical immobilisers reached around 40 per cent and then stalled. In all likelihood this was because more effective electronic immobilisers were beginning to be installed in a larger and larger number of vehicles. Testing by experts found that many mechanical immobilisers could be overcome quite quickly. But Farrell et al. (2011) found that a mechanical immobiliser on its own had an SPF of 2.8 for theft of vehicles compared with an SPF of 4.0 for electronic immobilisers, suggesting that many thieves operating in the 1990s were not particularly expert. In combination with central locking the SPF for mechanical immobilisers increased to 5.4 (compared with 11.8 for electronic immobilisers, though as with other devices, the SPF figures were far lower for theft from vehicle).
Like car alarms and central locking then, the spread of mechanical immobilisers began during the late 1980s. In the absence of other factors, it is not clear therefore why thefts would have increased so markedly during the early 1990s when numbers of cars on the road with the devices would have been rising from a negligible to a noticeable level. The only device which was first introduced to the mass-market in line with the crime turn-around was the electronic immobiliser. And as the SPF results show, it is also the device with the most evidence of effectiveness. In fact, the effectiveness of electronic immobilisers has also been tested in a number of other ways including via more robust, quasi-experimental methods and in all cases it has been found to reduce ‘theft of vehicle’ rates significantly (see Brown, 2013 for a review). As such, the next two sections focus on the evidence relating to electric immobilisers. The next chapter attempts to model their spread through the vehicle fleet in England and Wales and Chapter 4 looks in more detail at trends in vehicle theft and methods of theft.
Conclusion
The existing evidence on vehicle security and vehicle theft demonstrates that both were minor concerns generally through the first half of the 20th century. Rising crime of the 1960s changed this and governments mandated the installation of steering column locks. This had an immediate impact in the Federal Republic of Germany where the devices were mandated on all vehicles simultaneously, and possibly a more muted and delayed impact in England and Wales, and the US, where they were only mandated on new vehicles, meaning that they took much longer to spread through the vehicle fleet.
Despite having some success, steering column locks failed to halt the overall rise in vehicle crime which continued through the 1980s and accelerated in the early 1990s in England and Wales. During this period there is some evidence that a greater proportion of thefts were profit motivated and fewer were motivated by joy-riding. Thefts from vehicles surged particularly high. This was probably driven by a trend for stealing external parts like vehicle badges and increasing thefts of vehicle stereos up to 1991.
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25 See for example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Club\_(automotive) 26 See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/732669.stm Rising crime of the 1980s prompted a ‘second wave’ of security devices including car alarms, mechanical immobilisers and central locking. There is some evidence of success for these devices although the rapid acceleration in crime in the early 1990s probably occurred after they had started spreading through the vehicle fleet.
There is far stronger evidence for the success of electronic immobilisers which would have begun appearing more or less in line with the point in 1992/93 when vehicle crime of all kinds began to fall sharply. Like other ‘second-wave’ devices, electronic immobilisers were introduced on new vehicles only – a process that was mandated across the European Union in 1998. The legislation speeded up the spread of electronic immobilisers relative to other second-wave security devices (which spread very gradually) but even so, it probably took a number of years before most vehicles were protected.
This review of existing evidence has a number of evidential gaps. More evidence is required on the methods and types of theft that drove the early 1990s’ rise in vehicle crime given that most measures suggest security was improving at that time. Were car alarms and central locking only successful in conjunction with electronic immobilisers or was their initial effectiveness overwhelmed by other upward pressures? The evidence is clear that electronic immobilisers were effective during the crime decline, but it is not clear on exactly when they would have affected national-level crime trends and how big that effect might have been. The rest of this report aims to examine these questions and draw out policy conclusions. This chapter examines the spread of electronic immobilisers in more detail. Though much of the research is not of the highest quality (few studies have control groups for example), the evidence that electronic immobilisers are effective is consistent – see Brown (2013) for a review. Most studies find that the devices have a large crime-reducing effect on theft rates, relative to vehicles without electronic immobilisers. This suggests that transforming the vehicle fleet from one without electronic immobilisers to one in which all vehicles have the devices would be likely to markedly reduce numbers of thefts. But the timing of that impact has been less well explored. Given that electronic immobilisers were not introduced on all vehicles at the same time, it is hard to know exactly when thefts would have begun falling. Would the impact begin when they were first introduced on new vehicles? Or would it only become visible later, when a sufficient portion of the fleet became protected and displacement to older, unprotected vehicles was more difficult? Answering this question is the main aim of this section.
There are at least three reasons why the main impact of electronic immobilisers might be delayed.
- **The vehicle fleet is mostly comprised of older vehicles:** New vehicles make up a minority of vehicles on the road. Office for National Statistics data consistently show that for the period 1994–2013 only about eight per cent of cars on the road in Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland) were less than a year old, and the average vehicle was around seven years old, see Figure 8. So because electronic immobilisers were first introduced on new vehicles only, their spread through the fleet would have been gradual. Laycock (2004) estimated that it would take around a decade for the majority of vehicles on the road to be protected.
**Figure 8: Average age of vehicles on the road, Great Britain**
!\[Figure 8: Average age of vehicles on the road, Great Britain\](source: Office for National Statistics.)
- **Thieves prefer to steal older vehicles:** Studies show that, both before and after the introduction of electronic immobilisers, theft rates were higher for older vehicles, even taking into account their greater numbers on the road. In the 1992 Car Theft Index, the highest rate of theft occurred in vehicles registered in 1985 (Houghton, 1992). Sallybanks and Brown (1999) list five reasons: improved security on recent models; older vehicles having higher demand for used parts; knowledge of how to steal older vehicles being more widely disseminated among car thieves; older vehicles being more common in areas in which car thieves operate; and older vehicles being more susceptible to insurance fraud.
- **Displacement:** If the introduction of electronic immobilisers on new vehicles caused thieves to switch (to an even greater degree) to older vehicles, then the initial benefits of the devices could be all or partially offset. Evidence of such displacement has been identified by Brown and Thomas (2003) and van Ours and Vollaard (2014), and the issue is explored further below. The offsetting effect of displacement might be large at first, given the considerable pool of vehicles without electronic immobilisers, but could be expected to reduce over time as that pool shrank.
For these reasons, most researchers agree that it would probably have taken a number of years from the point at which electronic immobilisers were first fitted on new vehicles until they had a material impact on vehicle theft trends. For example, Houghton (1992) notes that:
".... improvements in car security introduced into new vehicles by manufacturers will take many years to impact upon the overall level of car crime – even if they are effective and all manufacturers adopt them."
Cherbonneau and Copes (2006) say:
"The overall benefits of the recent legislation mandating electronic immobilizers to newer cars manufactured after 1997 may only exist after a sufficiently large proportion of cars are protected by immobilizers; meanwhile target displacement to unprotected vehicles is likely to occur."27
**The model**
To try and model the exact timing of impact, three main data sources were used.
**Car Theft Index (CTI) data:** The CTI was first produced in 1992 and then ran annually from 1997 to 2006, after which it was discontinued. The series was based on car theft data from the Police National Computer and on information provided by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency which was used to calculate numbers of cars on the road. By combining those two sources of information, the Index provided the most stolen types of cars in Great Britain relative to their presence in the vehicle fleet. The 1992 Index employed a different methodology from the subsequent publications, each of which contained data from the previous year. For example, the Index titled ‘2006 Car Theft Index’ used data on thefts and cars on the road from 2005. So in terms of data, there is a consistent series available from 1996 to 2005. It relates to cars only, however; motorbikes and commercial vehicles are excluded.
**Office for National Statistics (ONS) vehicle data:** ONS produce a series for total vehicles on the road in Great Britain and a series for total cars in Great Britain broken down by age of the car.
**Police recorded crime data for vehicle thefts:** Total motor vehicle thefts data were sourced from
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27 Sallybanks and Brown (1999) gave a label – “the reduced pool theory” – to the hypothesis that the impact of electronic immobilisers on vehicle theft would be likely to grow as the pool of unprotected vehicles became smaller. Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
ONS for England and Wales and from the Scottish Government for Scotland.
The first task was to try and estimate the proportion of new vehicles that would have had electronic immobilisers, annually. To help with this, the total number of thefts recorded in each year of the CTI was broken down by age of the stolen vehicle. This is shown for a series of years in Figure 9.
**Figure 9: Thefts rates of cars stolen between 1996 and 2005, by year in which the car was manufactured**
Source: Car Theft Index.
**Methodological notes:** The y-axis shows thefts rate computed by dividing the number of car thefts by the number of cars on the road, according to the Car Theft Index. This is done by year of registration (x-axis). So the highest bar on the first chart represents the number of thefts, in 1996, of cars made in 1985 divided by the total number of cars on the road in 1996 that were made in 1985. The average lines on these graphs are simply the total number of thefts for each year divided by the total number of cars on the road in that year, according to the Car Theft Index data. The mode year in each case is highlighted orange.
The first chart, for thefts in 1996, demonstrates thieves’ preference for older vehicles, regardless of immobilisers. Cars registered in 1985 have the highest theft rates that year, even though cars made later, in 1988 for example, would not have had electronic immobilisers either. In part, this may demonstrate the initial effectiveness of devices like central locking, car alarms and mechanical immobilisers, which would have started appearing on vehicles from around 1985 onwards. Moving forwards a year, the 1997 chart shows a very similar distribution of thefts, but the rates have decreased regardless of the age of the vehicle. Between 1996 and 1997, the Car Theft Index data show that theft rates on cars made in the 1990s (so ones that may have had electronic immobilisers) fell by about 17 per cent, while rates of cars made in the 1980s or before (which would have been very unlikely to have electronic immobilisers) fell an almost identical 16 per cent.²⁸
²⁸ The data from which these figures are computed are shown in section 2 of the Technical Appendix. Kriven and Ziersch (2007) find similar results during the early years of the crime drop in Australia (2000–2004) with shifts in the age distribution of thefts suggesting electronic immobilisers were effective alongside large drops in thefts for vehicles of all ages. Brown (2013) Thereafter though, the distribution of thefts changes considerably. Theft rates stay low on vehicles made in ‘post-immobiliser’ years (manifested by a lengthening left-hand tail of the distribution) but rise on older models made in ‘pre-immobiliser’ years, probably as a result of partial displacement. Cars registered in 1990, for example, were stolen at a rate of about 0.02 in 1997 and at more than 0.03 in 2003 despite an overall decline in theft rates between those dates. Whilst this clearly suggests the effectiveness of security introduced on cars made after 1992, it also suggests that there was still a large pool of cars made in 1990 that were more easily targeted. In other words, the earlier security devices – like car alarms, central locking and mechanical immobilisers – were either not as effective as electronic immobilisers or they were not installed in enough vehicles in the early 1990s to deter thieves.
By 2005, all cars up to ten years old have below-average rates of theft, a clear sign that something has changed thieves’ behaviour, given that ten-year-old cars were among the most popular at the beginning of the series. Taking the charts collectively, the transition to lower theft rates seems to occur in cars made between 1992 and 1996, with all cars made after that year having low theft rates in all charts and cars made before 1992 having low theft rates to begin with but high rates by the end of the series. This transition period is largely consistent with the qualitative evidence relating to the spread of electronic immobilisers, which probably first appeared on the mass market around 1992 and were installed on the vast majority of new vehicles by 1997 (Dixon, 1996; Brown and Thomas, 2003). In other words, whether or not electronic immobilisers would have achieved this reduction of theft rates on their own or were helped by the combination of additional security devices like car alarms and central locking, the evidence suggests that it was only once electronic immobilisers first appeared in mass-produced vehicles that the long-term pattern of vehicle theft really changed. Other security devices would have been present on cars made between 1986 and 1991, but thieves still found ways to steal these in large numbers eventually. For cars made after 1992, however, and certainly for those made after 1996, theft rates remained low showing that thieves were more permanently deterred.
For the purpose of modelling impact, it was therefore assumed that the numbers of vehicles on the road with electronic immobilisers was negligible before 1992, but that it increased linearly from that year until 1996 and that by 1997 all new vehicles were equipped with the devices, a year earlier than the law enforced this. Under these assumptions, it is possible to split the figures for total cars on the road between those with electronic immobilisers and those without, for each year. The method for this is shown graphically in Figure 10 for a sample year (2000) with the full results in Table 3.
concluded from these results that: “The significant reduction in vehicle thefts observed in Australia was owing to factors other than just the introduction of electronic immobilisers.” Figure 10: Vehicles on the road in 2000, broken down by year to show how trends in vehicles with electronic immobilisers were constructed
Source: ONS vehicle statistics.
Note: The percentages shown are the percentage of vehicles registered in those years that are assumed to have electronic immobilisers. So the size of the blue bar indicates the number of vehicles registered in each year (which clearly does not increases in a linear fashion) whereas the percentages indicate the proportion of new vehicles for that year that are assumed to have electronic immobilisers, and these percentages do increase linearly. i.e. the 1991 value is 0 per cent and the 1997 value is 100 per cent. Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
Table 3: Vehicles on the road in Great Britain broken down by the estimated percentage with and without electronic immobilisers
| Year | Total vehicles on the road (ONS) | Estimated number of vehicles with electronic immobilisers | % | Estimated number without electronic immobilisers | % | |------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------------------|---| | 1991 | 24,511,000 | - | 0%| 24,511,000 | 100%| | 1992 | 24,577,000 | 653,999 | 3%| 23,923,001 | 97% | | 1993 | 24,826,000 | 1,321,250 | 5%| 23,504,750 | 95% | | 1994 | 25,231,000 | 2,014,207 | 8%| 23,216,793 | 92% | | 1995 | 25,369,000 | 3,400,416 | 13%| 21,968,584 | 87% | | 1996 | 26,301,921 | 5,219,513 | 20%| 21,082,408 | 80% | | 1997 | 26,973,790 | 7,552,522 | 28%| 19,421,268 | 72% | | 1998 | 27,538,412 | 10,009,459 | 36%| 17,528,953 | 64% | | 1999 | 28,367,560 | 12,588,515 | 44%| 15,779,045 | 56% | | 2000 | 28,897,581 | 15,145,392 | 52%| 13,752,189 | 48% | | 2001 | 29,747,130 | 17,925,963 | 60%| 11,821,167 | 40% | | 2002 | 30,556,673 | 20,739,325 | 68%| 9,817,348 | 32% | | 2003 | 31,207,359 | 23,293,103 | 75%| 7,914,256 | 25% | | 2004 | 32,258,856 | 25,943,061 | 80%| 6,315,795 | 20% | | 2005 | 32,897,383 | 28,025,893 | 85%| 4,871,490 | 15% | | 2006 | 33,070,484 | 29,461,370 | 89%| 3,609,114 | 11% | | 2007 | 33,650,981 | 30,921,740 | 92%| 2,729,241 | 8% | | 2008 | 33,883,382 | 31,849,531 | 94%| 2,033,851 | 6% | | 2009 | 33,958,429 | 32,426,713 | 95%| 1,531,716 | 5% | | 2010 | 34,120,148 | 32,934,665 | 97%| 1,185,483 | 3% | | 2011 | 34,228,594 | 33,290,013 | 97%| 938,581 | 3% | | 2012 | 34,522,322 | 33,750,973 | 98%| 771,349 | 2% | | 2013 | 35,034,487 | 34,383,277 | 98%| 651,210 | 2% |
Source: ONS, Car Theft Index.
This method does not take into account the possibility that older cars may have been retrofitted with electronic immobilisers once their effectiveness became clear. If this was done to any significant degree the results could change. However, no data could be located to estimate retrofits and van Ours and Vollaard (2014) examined retrofitting in the Netherlands and concluded that its rate of application was almost certainly “low”. Furthermore, the modelled estimates are comparable with the series from the CSEW, which asked respondents from the 1999 survey onwards whether their main vehicle had an electronic immobiliser. Following Farrell et al., (2014) this trend has been extrapolated back using a polynomial trend-line and is shown alongside the modelled estimates from the Car Theft Index in Figure 11. Though there are differences, particularly in the more recent period, generally the two methods tell a similar story for the initial spread of electronic immobilisers. Both suggest that up to around 1995 probably fewer than ten per cent of vehicles had electronic immobilisers, and that it took until around 2000 for more than half of vehicles to be protected.
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29 Also, Potter and Thomas (2001), looking at data from Western Australia, showed that retrofitting an immobiliser to a much older car achieved less marked reductions in theft rates than immobilisers on newer cars. They speculated that older vehicles may have other weak spots.
30 The CSEW question asks about security on respondents’ main vehicle so it is possible that these estimates may under- or over-estimate the spread of electronic immobilisers slightly depending on whether second or third cars are more or less likely to be new than the primary household vehicle.
31 The divergence between the two series from 2000 onwards may be related to the fact that, as van Ours and Vollaard (2014) point out, some of the general public may be unaware of the presence of an electronic immobiliser on their own vehicle. This may be why fewer vehicles appear to have electronic immobilisers on the CSEW than via the modelling method. The next aim of the modelling was to understand how this gradual spread of electronic immobilisers would influence the timing of the impact on theft trends. To do this, the number of vehicles on the road was used as a baseline. It was assumed that – in the absence of changes to security levels and other factors – the number of vehicle thefts would track the number of vehicles on the road. As Figure 5 showed, this was more or less true through the 1970s and 1980s. As the number of cars increased, the number of thefts rose by about the same proportion.
So, to model the *counterfactual*, the estimated theft trend in the absence of electronic immobilisers, it was assumed that the *rate* of theft (per vehicle on the road) would have remained constant. In 1991 there were 626,181 vehicle thefts in Great Britain and 245,110,000 vehicles on the road (ONS) giving a theft rate per vehicle of 0.026; or 26 per 1,000 vehicles. Our predicted counterfactual trend assumes this rate stays constant as the number of cars on the road increases. This is shown in Figure 12.
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32 There were 581,901 in England and Wales according to police recorded crime statistics (ONS) and a further 44,280 in Scotland, according to the Scottish Government. Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
Figure 12: Chart showing total vehicles on the road in Great Britain, numbers of vehicle thefts and hypothetical numbers of thefts had the 1991 theft rate been maintained
The effect of electronic immobilisers was modelled by assuming that vehicles without them continued to be stolen at the same rate while vehicles with electronic immobilisers were stolen at a reduced rate. To calculate the rate of theft for vehicles without electronic immobilisers the overall theft rate from 1991 was used but this was adjusted for age of vehicle using the earliest year for which the age breakdown of car thefts was available (1996), see Figure 13.33
Figure 13: Distribution of car thefts in Great Britain in 1996 by age of vehicle
33 It would have been preferable to use the distribution from the 1992 Car Theft Index, to capture the distribution before electronic immobilisers appeared, but unfortunately this used a very different methodology for gathering data on thefts, and hence was not deemed suitable. The total number of thefts in 1991 was distributed according to the distribution shown in Figure 13, and a rate for each age of vehicle was calculated. In other words, in the absence of electronic immobilisers, it was assumed that vehicles almost a decade old would continue to be stolen at a higher rate than newer vehicles. To model the reduction in rate caused by electronic immobilisers, scenario analysis was used. Rates of theft on vehicles with electronic immobilisers were reduced by a fixed proportion (relative to the counterfactual). These proportions were 20 per cent, 40 per cent, 60 per cent and 80 per cent (and are effectively net of displacement – see below), so the aim was to illustrate the resulting trends at different levels of immobiliser effectiveness. The results are shown in Figure 14.(^{34})
**Figure 14: Modelled trends in vehicle thefts at different levels of assumed electronic-immobiliser effectiveness**
There are several points to make about Figure 14. Firstly, it is important to recognise that the measure of effectiveness is a 'net effect' that takes account of any hypothetic displacement. So “40 per cent effectiveness” could mean that rates of theft fell 40 per cent in vehicles with electronic immobilisers and rates of theft in older, unprotected cars were unaffected. Or it could mean that theft rates on new cars fell 60 per cent, but that a third of this effect was offset by displacement to older vehicles. Evidence suggests the latter is more likely. Brown and Thomas (2003) offer empirical evidence of displacement to older vehicles in England and Wales and van Ours and Vollaard (2014) actually quantify the effect using data from the Netherlands for 1995 to 2008. They find that on average through the period, theft rates on cars with immobilisers were reduced by 72 per cent but that “displacement to older, less-protected cars was substantial during the first 10 years after the regulatory change.” They calculated that this displacement offset the theft reduction by more than a third, meaning the net effect was a reduction in the theft rate of 46 per cent for protected cars relative to non-protected cars.
Figure 14 also shows that the bigger the net effect of immobilisers, the larger the reductions in thefts through the period. However, even an 80 per cent net effect does not produce a reduction in thefts as great as the reduction that actually occurred. Furthermore, irrespective of the level of
(^{34}) The actual computations are shown in the Technical Appendix. effectiveness, the modelled theft trends are much flatter through the early years of the series, when numbers of vehicles with electronic immobilisers were relatively small. Levels of modelled thefts do not decrease by more than five per cent (relative to their level at the beginning of the series) until 1999 in the 80 per cent effectiveness scenario, 2000 in the 60 per cent scenario and 2003 in the 40 per cent scenario. Thereafter, however, thefts fall quickly.
These results suggest that electronic immobilisers may have made an important contribution to the fall in vehicle thefts but that most of the impact would have been felt in the 2000s rather than around the crime turning point. One way to estimate the proportion of thefts prevented by electronic immobilisers is to use the 46 per cent net effectiveness figure generated by van Ours and Vollaard (2014) using data from the Netherlands and apply it to the model. The difference between estimated thefts prevented by electronic immobilisers and the actual reductions in thefts recorded can then be calculated. Using this method, it was estimated that around 43 per cent of the drop in vehicle thefts from 1992 to 2013 was due to electronic immobilisers. This amounts to around four million fewer offences over the 20-year period.
Caution is required. Models are not intended to capture all real-world effects; they are intended to deliver simplified, but helpful conclusions. Levels of effectiveness might have been higher or lower in England and Wales than they were in the Netherlands. And the modelling strips out other factors that might have influenced vehicle thefts. It is possible that electronic immobilisers could have caused larger reductions during the early years of the series if benefits from the small proportion of protected vehicles diffused to the rest of the fleet. For example, if thieves were unable to tell which vehicles were protected, even a small percentage of new cars with electronic immobilisers might act as a significant deterrent. Ayres and Levitt (1997) find effects of this kind when examining another vehicle security device, LoJack, see Appendix 2. But van Ours and Vollaard (2014) tested for this kind of ‘diffusion of benefit’ in relation to electronic immobilisers in the Netherlands and found no effect.
The modelling also does not take into account other types of vehicle security improvements (or interaction effects between electronic immobilisers and other security devices) or indeed other factors that might drive theft trends more generally, like changes in police activity, sentencing, drug use and so on. Even so, the model findings still suggest that if van Ours and Vollaard’s estimate of electronic immobiliser effectiveness is translatable from the Netherlands to England and Wales, then electronic immobilisers probably had a marked crime-reduction effect. But it also suggests that – on their own – the devices were probably not the catalyst for the initial turning point in vehicle theft.
**Conclusion**
This section outlined the methodology and results for modelling the spread of immobilisers and their impact on car theft. The main conclusions are:
- Electronic immobilisers may have first appeared on new vehicles in Great Britain during the late 1980s but they were probably a negligible presence in the fleet as a whole before 1992. In 1993, when recorded vehicle crime peaked, both CSEW and CTI data suggest that only around one in 20 vehicles would have been likely to have an electronic immobiliser and thieves generally stole older vehicles anyway. Thereafter they probably increased gradually such that around half of all vehicles were likely to be protected by 2000.
- Analysis of Car Theft Index data shows that up to 1997 theft rates fell sharply on all cars, regardless of their age and security level. But after that point there is clear evidence of a change in theft patterns driven by improved security. Theft rates on new vehicles fell and remained low, while theft rates on much older vehicles increased. The timing of this transition matches the introduction of electronic immobilisers though the displacement to older vehicles makes it unclear when national-level theft trends would have been most affected.
- Exploratory scenario modelling suggests that a major crime-reduction impact would have been unlikely before a majority of cars were protected by electronic immobilisers in the 2000s, but that after that point, drops in vehicle thefts due to electronic immobilisers might have been substantial, explaining around 43 per cent of the drop in total vehicle thefts through to 2013. Aims, data and methods
This chapter presents analysis of vehicle theft data in Great Britain (England and Wales and Scotland) in an attempt to examine some of the evidential gaps noted in Chapter 2. It also seeks to test the modelling from Chapter 3, which tentatively suggested that electronic immobilisers spread quite gradually through the vehicle fleet in Great Britain and may not have had a marked effect on numbers of thefts until around half the fleet was protected in 2000.
Two data sources were used: Police Recorded Crime (PRC) and the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW). The former has data on numbers of thefts nationally and sub-nationally for 42 police force areas in England and Wales. CSEW data are only available at national level but also include information on method and type of theft.
The analysis focused on specific questions relating to the following.
The crime peak: The previous section looked at the crime turning point in relation to trends in electronic-immobiliser spread and suggested that the devices could not have caused the crime turning point without marked and rapid diffusion of benefits. In this section the analysis is extended to police force area level trends.
The shape of the crime decline: Modelling found that the introduction of electronic immobilisers would – in the absence of other factors – have caused a transition from a slowly rising trend in thefts to a slowly falling trend to a steeply falling trend. This is tested using national and sub-national figures.
The method of theft: If electronic immobilisers were effective, methods for stealing vehicles would be likely to change. When this occurred therefore provides a useful test of when the main immobiliser impact occurred.
The correlation and sequencing of falls in different crime types: If the crime-reducing benefits of electronic immobilisers diffused to other crime types via the keystone/debut-crime method, or via some other mechanism, trends in other crimes might be expected to correlate with vehicle theft or to follow it with a slight lag. Reductions in other crime types would not be expected to precede falls in vehicle theft, unless other effects were involved. This is tested using PRC data on burglary and theft from vehicles. These crimes were selected for three reasons: i) they are high volume offences – burglary and vehicle crime comprised more than half of all recorded offences at the peak; ii) they have reasonably high reporting rates (burglary rates are around 60
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35 There are currently 44 police forces in England and Wales but data were not available for British Transport Police through the 1980s and City of London was also excluded due to its vastly smaller geographical size.
36 The sample size for the CSEW has varied and for some years, regional-level analysis is possible though confidence intervals are generally quite large. to 70 per cent and theft from vehicles 30 to 55 per cent according to the CSEW(^{37}) and figures are also available on the CSEW so trends can be checked for reporting/recording biases; and iii) if benefits from electronic immobilisers were to diffuse to other crime types, these would seem likely candidates given the evidence that stolen cars are used to commit burglaries and that vehicles are often stolen for their contents rather than for the vehicle itself (Light et al., 1993).
**Findings – National level**
The national-level vehicle theft trends for England and Wales, and for Scotland, are shown in Figures 15 and 16.
**Figure 15: Vehicle theft trends in England and Wales**
**Figure 16: Vehicle theft trend in Scotland**
Sources: ONS Crime Survey for England and Wales, ONS police recorded crime, Scottish Government statistics.
Figures 15 and 16 show that vehicle thefts in England and Wales peaked in 1993, and in
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(^{37}) Importantly, reporting rates for theft from vehicles peaked in the early 1990s at around 55 per cent. During the 2000s, rates were stable at between 40 per cent and 50 per cent, but for the last five years they have been between 35 per cent and 40 per cent. This implies that some of the decline in recorded theft from vehicles is due to fewer crimes being reported. Scotland they peaked in 1992. The modelling in the previous section estimated that about five per cent and three per cent of all vehicles in Great Britain had electronic immobilisers in 1993 and 1992, respectively.
The peak is also relatively sharp in both cases, rather than the gradual transition predicted by the modelling. Though England and Wales had a rising trend in the 1980s and Scotland a falling trend (with some volatility in each case), both experienced a recorded crime rise of around 50 per cent in just two years at the start of the 1990s and a drop of almost exactly the same amount in the four years after that. There was a slight levelling-off period in the England and Wales CSEW series between 1991 and 1995, but after 1995 it also falls quickly.
The sharp early 1990s rise in crime does not correlate well with the gradually improving security for this period outlined in Chapter 2 (fewer vehicles left unlocked, more central locking), so other factors are likely to have been involved. Analysis of CSEW data shows that the rise in theft of vehicles from 1987 to 1993 was mainly (over 80%) due to thefts in which the vehicle was either not recovered or was recovered with items (like the stereo) missing, see Figure 17.
**Figure 17: Vehicle thefts by recovery status**
**Note:** Inspection of responses in 1999 show that a much higher proportion of victims reported that ‘external fittings’ were stolen, and were subsequently missing, than in other years. Given the abruptness of the break in trends for just those thefts where the vehicle was recovered (blue and red lines), it is possible that this anomalous year may be caused by slightly altered questioning of victims. Caution is therefore required for interpreting the trends for that year, which is why they have been shown with dotted lines.
**Source:** ONS, Crime Survey for England and Wales.
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38 From 1987 onwards the survey has asked victims of vehicle theft whether items, other than the vehicle, were recovered. It is not possible to know exactly what items were returned for a lot of incidents, as the victim is only asked whether none, some, or all other items were returned. If it can be assumed that most recovered vehicle theft in which nothing went missing is joy-riding, then these results suggest that joy-riding was high but stable during the sharp rise in vehicle crime of the early 1990s. It was categories of economically motivated theft that largely drove the increase, which may help determine which other factors were pushing crime up at that time. Increased heroin/crack use, rising unemployment or rising demand for stolen goods from Eastern Europe following the fall in the Berlin Wall may all have been involved (see Appendix 5 for more on these).
One further fact about the peak in crime is worth mentioning. In 1993, theft of vehicles made up 11 per cent of police recorded crime and three per cent of CSEW crime. Total vehicle crime made up 38 per cent and 23 per cent respectively. But they were not the only crimes to fall subsequently. In fact total CSEW crime fell 60 per cent, only a slightly smaller decline than the 78 per cent drop in vehicle crime. For improvements in vehicle crime (especially those like electronic immobilisers which deterred thefts of vehicles more than thefts from vehicles) to have driven the overall fall in crime would therefore put quite a weight on the diffusion of benefits hypothesis.
Though both England and Wales, and Scotland, had a sharp four-year fall in vehicle thefts following the peak, trends differed slightly in the late 1990s. Offences in England and Wales continued to fall, while trends in Scotland stabilised from 1997–1999. From 2000, both series fall sharply with each reaching a level about an eighth as high as at the crime peak by 2013.
One implication of these trends is that vehicle thefts fell at a faster rate during the five years immediately after the crime peak than during the five years after that, when a far greater number of vehicles would have been likely to have had electronic immobilisers. This is shown in Table 4.
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39 One caveat to this conclusion is required. It is possible that joy-riding could still have been the primary motive in cases of 'theft of vehicle' in which an item was also stolen from the vehicle.
40 Total police recorded crime fell too, but the exact figures are complicated by the recording practice changes in 1998 and 2002 that resulted in a considerable number of extra crimes being counted in the figures, mainly minor violence offences. Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
Table 4: Vehicle thefts in England and Wales and Scotland, annual percentage change and cumulative fall from peak
| Year | England and Wales | Scotland | |------|------------------|----------| | | PRC vehicle thefts | % change on previous year | Cumulative fall from peak | PRC vehicle thefts | % change on previous year | Cumulative fall from peak | | 1990 | 494,209 | 25.6% | 36,103 | 24.2% | | 1991 | 581,901 | 17.7% | 44,280 | 22.6% | | 1992 | 587,856 | 1.0% | 47,433 | 7.1% | | 1993 | 597,519 | 1.6% | 42,816 | -9.7% | | 1994 | 541,749 | -9.3% | 41,962 | -2.0% | | 1995 | 508,450 | -6.1% | 37,156 | -11.5%| | 1996 | 493,489 | -2.9% | 32,504 | -12.5%| | 1997 | 407,239 | -17.5% | 27,857 | -14.3%| | 1998 | 389,223 | -4.4% | 29,290 | -5.1% | | 1999 | 374,081 | -3.9% | 28,881 | -1.4% | | 2000 | 338,135 | -9.6% | 25,555 | -11.5%| | 2001 | 326,737 | -3.4% | 23,146 | -9.4% | | 2002 | 318,507 | -2.5% | 20,881 | -9.8% | | 2003 | 291,858 | -8.4% | 17,604 | -15.7%| | 2004 | 242,732 | -16.8% | 15,633 | -11.2%| | 2005 | 214,182 | -11.8% | 14,041 | -10.2%| | 2006 | 193,384 | -9.7% | 15,000 | 6.8% | | 2007 | 170,038 | -12.1% | 12,105 | -19.3%| | 2008 | 147,238 | -13.4% | 11,551 | -4.6% | | 2009 | 117,684 | -20.1% | 9,304 | -19.5%| | 2010 | 106,162 | -9.8% | 8,716 | -6.3% | | 2011 | 92,056 | -13.3% | 7,060 | -19.0%| | 2012 | 79,821 | -13.3% | 5,731 | -18.8%| | 2013 | 75,330 | -5.6% | 5,976 | 4.3% |
Sources: ONS, Scottish Government.
For England and Wales, thefts fell by 208,296 in the five years immediately after the peak (1994–1998) at an average rate of 8.1 per cent per year. In the five years after that (1999–2003), thefts fell a further 97,365 at an average rate of 5.6 per cent per year. In Scotland, thefts fell by 19,576 in the first five years after the 1992 peak and by a further 6,976 thefts in the five years after that. For both series, just over half the entire drop in thefts is achieved by 2000, before the majority of vehicles on the road would have been likely to have had electronic immobilisers.
In the last chapter, data from the Car Theft Index suggested that during the initial fall in crime, rates of theft fell on all types of vehicle, regardless of security. This was further tested using the CSEW. Full details of the methodology are in the Technical Appendix (section 8), but essentially data were extracted for survey years between 1991 and 2001/02 in which a proportion of respondents were asked about the level of security on their main vehicle (if it was a car or light van). These were then cross-referenced with the question asking about whether the respondent
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41 The fall in the first five years post-peak compared to the five years subsequently is also greater in the CSEW data, whether looking at volumes or percentages. Vehicle thefts fell 35 per cent between 1993 and 1998/99 and by 32 per cent between 1998/99 and 2003/04. Given sampling error, it would be hard to say for certain that the trend was definitely steeper in the earlier period but even if the percentage drops are deemed to be the same, that would still imply a much larger volume decline in the earlier period. had had a car/van stolen. This allowed for the calculation of ‘theft of car/van’ rates for households whose main car had car alarms and/or central locking and households whose main vehicle had neither. Figure 18 shows the difference in these theft rates between 1991/1993 (pooled together) and 1999/2001/02 (pooled together).
**Figure 18: Household incidence rates of past motor vehicle theft by the security features of the current, main car/van used**
**Source:** CSEW.
**Notes:** Ninety-five per cent confidence intervals around the incidence estimates are shown. The falls in theft rates for both types of households are statistically significant (p\<.01) with the pooled years shown above. The falls are also statistically significant (p\<.05) when individual years are compared – see Technical Appendix section 8.
There are two possible conclusions from Figure 18, though both require caution. The first conclusion is that rates of car/van theft fell during the 1990s, regardless of the vehicle’s security level. Both households with and without security on their main vehicles experienced statistically significant declines in theft over the period. This is in line with the Car Theft Index evidence presented earlier. More surprising perhaps, is that Figure 18 also appears to show that rates of theft were actually higher for households whose main car/van had security than for households with no security. Importantly, this difference is not statistically significant in either period and in our judgement it is likely to be a spurious conclusion caused by the limitations in this analysis (see below).
The most obvious limitation is that the ‘no security’ category does not include electronic or mechanical immobilisers, so it possible that the lower rates of theft in this group may be driven by cars/vans with no central locking or alarms but with a mechanical or electronic immobiliser. However, this is unlikely to bias the results significantly because it would be unlikely for a vehicle to have had an electronic immobiliser and not to have had also an alarm or central locking. Farrell *et al.* (2011) found that all vehicles with electronic immobilisers had at least one other security device. In relation to mechanical immobilisers, these were not included in the ‘no security’ group because they were not asked about in all the years of the survey shown in Figure 18. However, analysis of the data in years for which mechanical immobilisers could be included still suggested that there was a significant fall in thefts of vehicles without any security (see Technical Appendix, section 8).
A far more important limitation of the analysis is that households’ main vehicle may not have... been the vehicle that was actually stolen. It would have been preferable to compare the security profile of stolen cars with the security features in the total ‘population’ of cars, as Farrell et al. (2011) attempt to do. This is not possible, however, for years before 2001/02 as the survey only asked households about security features on their current main car/van, not on the vehicle that was stolen. It is quite possible therefore, that a household’s second or third car may have been stolen, but it is not known what security features these secondary vehicles had (probably inferior to the primary car). Similarly, in some cases victims of vehicle theft may have obtained a replacement car with better security, or improved the security on the stolen vehicle if it was recovered. Additional analysis suggested these reasons may help to explain the counter-intuitive result that surveyed households with better vehicle security experienced higher (but not statistically significantly higher) rates of theft.
It is important to note, however, that these issues – thefts of secondary cars and changes to a car’s security following a theft – should not affect the finding that theft rates fell during the 1990s for secure and non-secure vehicles alike. This is because it is unlikely that a household would have a second car with better security than its main car, and it seems even more unlikely that a household would get a car with inferior security after experiencing a vehicle theft. As such, we can reasonably assume that for households whose main, current car has no alarm/central locking, past thefts were also of cars with no alarm/central locking.
In general then, the data show a similar pattern to the Car Theft Index data. Both sources suggest that the decline in vehicle thefts had two phases: an initial one in which thefts rates fell on all vehicles, regardless of their level of security; and a second phase, beginning around 2000, in which improved security drove theft rates very low on new vehicles and caused some displacement to older, unprotected vehicles.
Another way to assess the extent of improved security’s role in the pre-2000 declines in vehicle crime is by analysing data relating to the type and methods of vehicle theft. Bässman (2011) has suggested that comparing trends in successful vehicle crime and attempted vehicle crime can be one way of assessing the success of security. Figure 6 showed that the ratio of attempted thefts to successful thefts increased through the 1980s, suggesting improved security. But Bässman (2011) also hypothesised that if security, rather than any change in numbers of motivated offenders, were the catalyst for the vehicle crime fall then there would be a marked short-term rise in attempted thefts following the peak in actual thefts, as thieves who had previously committed vehicle crimes were deterred. He found evidence of such an effect in Germany. Figure 6 shows the relevant CSEW trends for England and Wales. The evidence is rather inconclusive. The graph appears to show a slight rise in attempted thefts and a fall in actual thefts between 1993 and 1995, but neither of these changes is reported as being statistically significant and after 1995 both trends decline in unison until the early 2000s when attempted thefts drop faster. So on that measure there is little strong evidence to suggest a marked security impact in the early stages of the crime decline.
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42 See Table A2.1, note 3, in Mirrlees-Black et al, 1996. 43 Mirrlees-Black et al (1996) do make reference to a 13% rise in attempted police recorded vehicle thefts between 1993 and 1995, when completed thefts had already begun falling. That could imply a security effect of the type Bässman suggests. Unfortunately though, it is not clear how this was calculated as police recorded vehicle theft attempts are generally included in the overall vehicle crime figures rather than being separated out, so it is hard to verify the 13% rise. It appears in Table 2.3 of Mirrlees-Black et al (1996) but the number of attempted vehicle theft incidents in that table (150,000) represents only a 4% rise from the identical table for the 1993 survey, which shows 143,000 attempted incidents – see http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r14.pdf. The only other police series on attempted thefts that could be located was Table 5.01 in Simmons (2002). This does not include data from before 1996. From 1996 the trend shows a year-on-year fall in incidents of attempted theft of vehicles. Data are also available from 1995 for England and Wales on the method of entry for vehicle theft and whether the vehicle was subsequently recovered. These are shown in Table 5 and Figure 19 below. Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
Table 5: Method of entry for theft of vehicles, CSEW
| Theft of vehicle | 1995 | 1997 | 1999 | 2001/02 | 2002/03 | 2003/04 | 2004/05 | 2005/06 | 2006/07 | 2007/08 | 2008/09 | 2009/10 | 2010/11 | 2011/12 | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | Significant difference 2004/05 - 2013/14 | |------------------|------|------|------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|------------------------------------------| | Offender forced lock or tried to | 65 | 66 | 66 | 61 | 62 | 53 | 55 | 50 | 51 | 36 | 40 | 48 | 35 | 22 | 25 | 18 | * | | Offender broke window or tried to | 13 | 16 | 13 | 17 | 20 | 23 | 21 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 14 | 10 | 12 | | | Door was not locked | 3 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 12 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 2 | 13 | 9 | 11 | 16 | | | Offender forced/broke/prised door | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 3 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | | | Offender used a key | 9 | 7 | 8 | 12 | 9 | 12 | 12 | 15 | 15 | 19 | 29 | 24 | 26 | 46 | 41 | 46 | * | | Window was left open | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | Other | 12 | 8 | 11 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 6 | 7 | 16 | 11 | 13 | 15 | |
Unweighted base 239 156 183 215 222 204 203 164 155 179 117 74 62 75 44 43
Source: ONS, Crime Survey for England and Wales.
Figure 19: Percentage of stolen vehicles that were subsequently recovered, CSEW
In Table 5 there are no statistically significant year-on-year changes from 1995 to 1999. From then on there is a general trend for vehicle thefts via forced locks to decline, slowly at first, and then steeply. The method: ‘offender had a key’ follows the opposite pattern. Over the last ten years, the change in these trends is statistically significant.
A number of studies have shown that some offenders reacted to electronic immobilisers by targeting car keys in other types of theft (van Ours and Vollaard, 2014). One example is ‘car-key burglaries’ in which houses are raided with the intention of taking the car keys and hence the vehicle outside. Data show a rise in car-key burglaries in England and Wales once most vehicles had electronic immobilisers. This implies that, regardless of any potential diffusion of benefits pushing crime like burglary down, electronic immobilisers also drove a limited amount... of displacement pushing burglary levels up.\\textsuperscript{44} Levesley \\textit{et al.}, (2004), using data from Northumbria and Greater Manchester police, found that 85 per cent of stolen cars registered after 1997 (those that would definitely have had electronic immobilisers) were taken using keys and that burglary was the most common method. The CSEW shows that this shift to car-key burglary occurred from around 2000 which might therefore suggest – in line with the modelling – that electronic immobilisers were not present in enough vehicles to drive big changes in offender behaviour before that.\\textsuperscript{45} An alternative possibility would be that only more serious and committed offenders would make the switch to car-key burglaries and more casual, opportunistic thieves may have given up offending at even a low level of immobiliser penetration.
One way to further examine these possibilities is to look at recovery rates of stolen vehicles. Given that thefts in which the vehicle is recovered are more likely to indicate opportunistic offending (joy-riding or for-transport thefts) and unrecovered theft in which the vehicle is presumably either broken for parts or exported is more likely to indicate a higher degree of organisation or professionalism, some researchers have suggested that a downward shift in recovered thefts, relative to unrecovered thefts, might be a sign of improved security because devices would be more likely to deter opportunistic thieves than professional ones (Farrell \\textit{et al.}, 2014; Brown, 2013).
Figure 19 shows that, generally, there has been a shift from recovered thefts to unrecovered thefts over the last 25 years, a potential sign of overall improved security. But careful examination suggests that this happened in two distinct periods. From 1987 to 1995, as vehicle crime largely increased, there was a shift downwards in the proportion of recovered thefts. Figure 17 showed that this was due to a rise in unrecovered thefts rather than a fall in recovered thefts (i.e. a rise in profit-driven, more organised offending potentially). During the initial crime decline from 1995 to 2000/01, however, the proportion of recovered stolen vehicles did not change significantly. The declines in vehicle theft occurring during this period affected recovered and unrecovered vehicles alike. There is then a sharp second downward shift in the proportion of recovered vehicles from 2001/2 to 2003/4. It is possible that this represents the impact of electronic immobilisers reaching critical mass within the vehicle fleet, i.e. the downward shift could have been caused by falling numbers of opportunistic offenders relative to more professional offenders as a result of electronic immobilisers. Again though, any conclusion must be extremely tentative given that they rest on several assumptions about the links between types of theft and types of offenders that have not always been borne out in empirical studies. For example, van Ours and Vollaard (2014) found that electronic immobilisers were very effective in reducing unrecovered thefts as well as recovered ones.
Taken together though, the data on types of theft and method of entry are consistent with an electronic immobiliser effect, but one that was most prominent in the 2000s rather than the 1990s. What does this imply for the issue of displacement or diffusion to other crime types? Figure 20 shows the trends in vehicle thefts compared to those for burglary and for theft from vehicle.
\\textsuperscript{44} Note that it is possible for the two to co-exist. Some offenders may have been driven to car-key burglaries by electronic immobilisers, while others may have given up crime entirely.
\\textsuperscript{45} This shift in offender patterns also suggests that house security was seen as less of a barrier generally than vehicle security at this point. Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
Figure 20: Police recorded burglary and vehicle crime by volume of offences (left chart) and indexed (peak year = 1) (right chart)
England and Wales
In England and Wales there is a very high degree of correlation between the three crimes, particularly from 1989 onwards, as Table 6 shows. In Scotland the correlation is less strong in the 1980s but becomes stronger through the crime-drop period of the 1990s and 2000s.
Scotland
46 The trends for England and Wales have a ‘bump’ in around 2002. This may be caused by the introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard that year, which increased recording of crime generally. It affected violence mostly, but may have boosted the recording of burglary and vehicle crime slightly too. See Technical Appendix for more on this. Table 6: Correlations between crime types in England and Wales, and Scotland
| | PRC burglary and theft of vehicle | PRC burglary and theft from vehicle | PRC theft of vehicle and theft from vehicle | |------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| | England and Wales| | | | | 1980-2013/14 | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.92 | | 1990-2013/14 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | | Scotland | | | | | 1980-2013/14 | 0.87 | 0.85 | 0.90 | | 1990-2013/14 | 0.96 | 0.97 | 0.96 |
Note: All the above correlations are significant at the one per cent level
These high correlation coefficients certainly support the hypothesis that whatever was driving vehicle theft trends at this point was driving trends in other types of theft too. However, there are complexities. The indexed chart for England and Wales demonstrates that through the period of the crime ‘spike’ of the 1990s, all three offence types rose and fell at a very similar rate, but that through the 2000s vehicle thefts fell faster. Table 7 shows that in Scotland vehicle thefts fell more slowly than the other crimes in the 1990s but about as fast or faster in the 2000s.
Table 7: Average annual change in burglary and vehicle crime levels, by decade
| | PRC burglary | PRC theft from vehicle | PRC theft of vehicle | |------------------|--------------|------------------------|----------------------| | England and Wales| | | | | 1980-89 | 4% | 9% | 2% | | 1990-92 | 18% | 8% | 9% | | 1993-99 | -5% | -5% | -6% | | 2000-09 | -5% | -7% | -11% | | Scotland | | | | | 1980-89 | 2% | 10% | -2% | | 1990-91 | 11% | 10% | 23% | | 1992-99 | -9% | -9% | -5% | | 2000-2009 | -6% | -11% | -10% |
Methodological note: The 1990s is broken into two in both cases to show the different trends either side of the crime turning point.
Arguably, Table 7 and Figure 20 suggest two possible narratives, one that supports an almost perfect diffusion of benefits and one that moderately contradicts the notion that benefits from immobilisers spread to other crimes. In the first narrative, electronic immobilisers had an immediate impact from the moment they appeared in the vehicle fleet in the 1990s, reversing an upward trend in vehicle thefts and reversing similar trends in related theft types.\\textsuperscript{47} In the second narrative, another factor or factors drove all types of theft up and then down sharply in the 1990s and then electronic immobilisers had an \\textit{additional} effect during the 2000s, causing vehicle thefts to fall at a faster rate than most other crimes.
The sequencing of crime peaks offers some support for both possibilities. The CSEW has all three crime types in England and Wales peaking in 1993, in line with potential diffusion of benefits. But police recorded crime trends generally run counter to the hypothesis. In England and Wales theft \\textit{from} vehicles peaked first in 1992, followed by burglary and theft of vehicles in 1993. In Scotland, PRC burglary and theft from vehicles peaked in 1991 followed by theft of vehicles in 1992. It is difficult to be certain which measure offers the more trustworthy picture of sequencing.\\textsuperscript{48} CSEW trends will be unaffected by any reporting or recording influences but rely on the accurate recall of interviewees making the determination of precise turning points somewhat problematic.
Another way to analyse the likely effect of electronic immobilisers is via time series modelling. Full details of the methodology and results are in Appendix 6. But in brief, an initial model confirmed that trends in burglary and theft from vehicles were strongly significant predictors of the trend in thefts of vehicles in England and Wales from 1980 through to 2013. This suggests the possible presence of a common factor linked to general propensity for theft, which drove all three crime types up initially and then down from 1992–3. However, the model also showed that these relationships were not constant over time. Using maximum likelihood estimation, it was possible to determine the presence of two statistically significant ‘break-points’ in the relationship between burglary and thefts of vehicles, suggesting the presence of another influence on vehicle thefts over and above any ‘common factor’. The first break-point occurred in 1992 in line with the introduction of electronic immobilisers. At this point, thefts of vehicles began decreasing at a slightly faster rate than burglary, but this accelerated considerably at the second break-point in around 2004 when a majority of vehicles would have been protected by the devices. From this point onwards, thefts of vehicles began falling much faster.
Using this method, it is possible to estimate a trend in thefts of vehicles for a hypothetical scenario in which electronic immobilisers had not been introduced. This is shown in Figure 21. By calculating the difference between the fall in thefts in this hypothetical scenario and the actual fall, it is possible to generate an estimate for the contribution of electronic immobilisers. Using this approach suggests that 23 per cent of the fall in vehicle thefts can be attributed to electronic immobilisers.
\\textsuperscript{47} Note that in Scotland, the diffusion of benefits goes beyond 100 per cent, as vehicle thefts actually fell by less than burglaries and thefts from vehicles during the 1990s.
\\textsuperscript{48} It is worth bearing in mind too that – to a certain extent – the national PRC peaks are illusory given that there is a degree of variation in the peaks at force level. Like the modelling from the previous section, caution needs to be applied to these results due to the lack of experimental conditions and the assumptions being made. The assumptions are mostly the same as in Chapter 3, i.e. no attempt is made to model the additional benefits of other types of vehicle security or any interaction between those and electronic immobilisers. But there is also one important additional assumption central to this modelling approach: electronic immobilisers were assumed to have no effect on burglary. These findings implicitly assume that there was no displacement or diffusion of benefits. For that reason, it is perhaps not surprising that this exercise produced a lower estimate than the method employed in Chapter 3. As such, 23 per cent can probably be viewed as a lower bound on the proportion of the fall in thefts of vehicles that can be attributed to electronic immobilisers.
**Findings – Police force area level**
Moving from the national to the local level, 15 of 42 police forces in England and Wales (36%) show sequencing that supports a diffusion of benefits hypothesis (i.e. their trend in vehicle thefts peaks in line with or before their trends in burglary, other theft or theft from vehicles). See Table A7.3 in the Technical Appendix.
Breaking trends down to police force area level allows another examination of electronic immobiliser impact. For the most part their introduction can probably be thought of as a ‘national’ effect. That is, their spread would be likely to have been fairly uniform across areas given that legislation mandating them on all new vehicles applied to all police force areas at the same time. There will have been some variation, as some areas are likely to have had a higher percentage of new vehicles than others, but generally it might be expected that electronic immobilisers would have caused a downward trend in vehicle thefts across all areas at more or less the same time. To test the two possible narratives, Figure 22 takes the six police forces with the largest average annual volume of vehicle thefts and shows their trends, indexed first to the national vehicle crime peak in 1993 and then to the point at which the modelling suggested a that a majority of vehicles would have electronic immobilisers, in around 2000/01.
**Figure 22: Vehicle theft trends in the six highest-volume police force areas, indexed to 1993/94 (top chart) and 2000/01 (bottom chart)**
The top chart shows a great deal of variation in vehicle theft trends both before and after the indexation point (1993). For example, vehicle thefts in Merseyside and West Midlands
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49 Trends in Merseyside arguably offer a particularly interesting case study as they differ from the national trends in several continue to rise for a period after 1993 and in West Yorkshire there is a large increase in thefts in the early 1990s followed immediately by a large decrease, but then thefts stabilise until the early 2000s at which point they fall sharply again. So 1993 does not appear to mark a uniform downward shift in police-force-area vehicle theft trends. By contrast, the bottom chart shows that from around 2000 on (West Yorkshire arguably see a slightly later effect) the six police forces had relatively uniform declines of sizeable magnitude.
Broadening the analysis to all areas using a similar approach, Table 8 shows the number of police forces areas with rises or falls in vehicle thefts for each five-year period from 1981 to 2010. There is some variation up to 2000 after which every police force in England and Wales has a decade of consistent decline.
Table 8: Number of police forces showing rises/falls in vehicle thefts, by five-year periods
| Period | 1981-85 | 1986-1990 | 1991-1995 | 1996-2000 | 2001-2005 | 2006-2010 | |--------------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------| | Number of forces seeing rises | 36 | 40 | 23 | 3 | 0 | 0 | | Number of forces seeing falls | 6 | 2 | 19 | 39 | 42 | 42 |
Conclusion
This chapter examines available data from England and Wales and Scotland on trends and methods of vehicle theft. All three nations had a sharp rise and then fall in vehicle thefts during the 1990s, with numbers of thefts falling fastest in the years immediately after the crime turning point, when data suggest that fewer than five per cent of vehicles on the road would have had electronic immobilisers.
The analysis also adds further evidence that, whilst joy-riding was still a common motive for vehicle theft, the bulk of the early 1990s rise in crime was due to a surge in economically motivated offending.
Analysis of data on household vehicle security through the crime turning point revealed evidence to suggest that devices like central locking and car alarms were limited in their effectiveness up to 1993 and that the initial fall in crime saw theft rates decrease sharply on all vehicles, regardless of their security levels. This, along with the low numbers of vehicles with electronic immobilisers at the crime turning point and the sharp falls in other types of acquisitive crime, suggest perhaps that other factors were likely to be driving crime down at that time.
This was further supported by an examination of data on vehicle theft methods, an analysis of vehicle thefts by police force area and time series modelling. The latter showed that electronic immobilisers were pushing down on vehicle thefts from their introduction in 1992, but that the effect was small until a majority of vehicles were protected in 2000.
Ultimately these analyses suggest that although other factors may have been more important around the crime turning point and immediately afterwards, electronic immobilisers had an additional and substantial impact on vehicle crime during the 2000s. This was consistent across police force areas and has persisted at least to 2013/14. They changed the security ‘arms race’ in a way that other devices like steering locks, central locking and car alarms were unable to do, driving at least a quarter of the total fall in thefts of vehicles to that point and perhaps up to a half.50
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50 This range – between a quarter and a half – combines the quantitative estimates from the last two chapters to produce an important ways. This is examined in more detail in Appendix 4. The aim of the analysis in this section is to test the conclusions reached so far using data from other nations. Given the trends in electronic immobiliser spread, vehicle thefts and other types of crime in Great Britain, two specific hypotheses were developed.
i) The ‘immediate impact’ hypothesis: That electronic immobilisers had a marked impact on vehicle crime and possibly other types of offence from the point at which they first started appearing on new vehicles.
ii) The ‘delayed impact’ hypothesis: That the impact from electronic immobilisers was small until a significant portion of the fleet was protected at which point the devices drove a marked fall in vehicle thefts largely irrespective of trends in other crimes.
These hypotheses were tested, against the possibility that immobilisers did not have an impact, on national-level trends using data from a panel of seven nations: England and Wales, Scotland, the US, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden. These nations were selected for data reasons. They were the only nations for which complete datasets could be located for the relevant police recorded crime types going back to 1980.
Cross-national crime comparison has numerous pitfalls. Crime categories that sound similar often have subtle differences that can affect levels and/or trends markedly. However, the primary crime of interest here was theft of vehicles, which is subject to less variation in interpretation than other offences like violence.
Police recorded crime statistics were used throughout. For the panel of seven nations, these were collected from the country-specific statistical or governmental authority. These sources are fully referenced in the Technical Appendix.
To test the hypotheses, trend analysis similar to that from the previous section was employed. As in that section, the analysis was necessarily retrospective meaning it can really only suggest conclusions, rather than prove them. However, as the speed of electronic immobiliser spread was examined across nations it became clear that a ‘natural experiment’ of sorts could be used to strengthen the analysis. The evidence suggests that electronic immobilisers first appeared in all nations at more or less the same time in the early 1990s but that their spread was faster in Australia and Europe than in the US and Canada. This provided an opportunity to check more robustly the ‘delayed impact’ hypothesis, by examining whether the marked impact visible in approximate range. England and Wales occurred later in the US and Canada, in line with the slower spread of electronic immobilisers in those nations.
**The spread of immobilisers internationally**
This section briefly examines available evidence on the introduction and spread of immobilisers in the seven nations used for the main analysis, though England, Wales and Scotland have already been covered.
**The US**
In the US, most researchers agree that electronic immobilisers began to be fitted on new vehicles at around the same time as in Europe – i.e. from the late 1980s and early 1990s – but that the spread was slower. Brown (2013) and Fujita and Maxfield (2012) both cite a 1998 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration report stating that certain anti-theft devices were fitted on some new models of car in the US from the late 1980s. It is hard to be certain whether these were actually electronic immobilisers or simply ‘electrical systems’ which were easier for thieves to overcome (Bässman, 2011). More certain is that the first mass-market cars to be fitted with electronic immobilisers in the US were BMWs in 1995 (Fujita and Maxfield, 2012).
Unlike Europe, the US did not have legislation making electronic immobilisers mandatory in new vehicles which meant some manufacturers took longer to introduce them. Two sets of researchers have attempted to estimate the spread of immobilisers in the US: Fujita and Maxfield (2012) and van Ours and Vollaard (2014). Both suggest that electronic immobilisers were a negligible presence in the early 1990s and that the spread was gradual such that by 2010 only around 30 per cent of all cars on the road had electronic immobilisers. These estimates may under-estimate the speed of spread slightly. Separate analysis by Fujita (2011) examining samples of parked vehicles in New Jersey between 2005 and 2009 found that almost half had electronic immobilisers at that time(^{51}). The National Institute for Highway Safety suggested that 86 per cent of new vehicles were fitted with electronic immobilisers by 2009 (van Ours and Vollaard, 2014). Using this and data on average age of vehicles on the road in the US(^{52}), an estimate of immobiliser spread was produced, see Figure 23.
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(^{51}) This may be due to the fact that New Jersey is one of the wealthiest states, as measured by median income – see: [http://www.census.gov/statatab/ranks/rank29.html](http://www.census.gov/statatab/ranks/rank29.html)
(^{52}) See [http://www.epa.gov/oms/models/mobile6/r01047.pdf](http://www.epa.gov/oms/models/mobile6/r01047.pdf) According to this estimate, it was not until the late 2000s that around half of all vehicles became protected, though some uncertainty around the precise trend exists.
**Canada**
As with all other nations studied, the first reports of electronic immobilisers in Canada appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But available evidence suggests that spread of the devices was more similar to the gradual progression in the US rather than the swifter adoption seen in Europe.
Unlike the US, Canada did introduce legislation mandating installation of electronic immobilisers on new vehicles, but not until 2007. However, the Canadian Theft Deterrent Standard was published in 1998, which began a programme aimed at encouraging manufacturers to voluntarily introduce electronic immobilisers on new vehicles. Wallace (2003) shows that the late 1990s saw a shift to thefts of older vehicles just as in England and Wales and Australia (see below), and that around 50 per cent of new vehicles had electronic immobilisers in 2000. The Insurance Bureau of Canada reported that this had increased to 60 per cent by 2003 (IBC, 2003).
Assuming roughly linear increases in the introduction of electronic immobilisers on new vehicles from the early 1990s to the early 2000s would imply that adoption of electronic immobilisers in Canada was slower than in England and Wales but followed a similar trajectory to that in the US. In other words, while the 2007 legislation may have speeded up the end of the process, with the proportion of new vehicles with electronic immobilisers going to 100 per cent in 2007, most of the spread was dictated by the date of introduction and the gradual increase of new vehicles with the devices during the 1990s and 2000s.
**Australia**
Evidence suggests immobiliser spread in Australia resembled Europe more than the US or Canada. In fact, improved security may have affected the mass market in Australia even before it did in Europe. Geason and Wilson (1990) say that “an electronically operated deadlock system” was fitted on the top-line Commodore (Australia’s top-selling brand of car in the early 1980s) in 1989. Potter and Thomas (2001) note that Ford and Holden began incorporating electronic immobilisers in their biggest selling models as early as 1992.53
Electronic immobilisers were made mandatory on all new vehicles in Western Australia in 1999, following two years of a voluntary scheme that encouraged the retrofitting of immobilisers to older vehicles. National legislation enforcing immobiliser installation on new vehicles was introduced in 2001. The earlier legislation in Western Australia therefore constitutes something of its own natural experiment, which is examined in Appendix 4. Here the focus remains on the national trends.
Whilst the national legislation in 2001 almost certainly increased the speed of spread, evidence suggests electronic immobilisers were already well established in Australia by this point. Kriven and Ziersch (2007) find that almost half (47%) of cars already had immobilisers in 2000 with the majority of those being of the approved ‘Australian standard’ variety. This statistic would put Australia on an almost identical trajectory to Great Britain and the Netherlands (see below). In each case, about half of the fleet became protected in around 2000.
This is further supported by data on thefts by age of vehicle, which is available from the CARS data analyser (see https://ncars.on.net/statistics.html). Figure 24 shows the age distribution of vehicles stolen in 2004.
**Figure 24: Cars stolen in 2004 in Australia, by age**
This distribution is similar to those produced for Great Britain earlier in the report (Figure 9). If it was primarily electronic immobilisers that caused lower theft rates on newer vehicles, then the chart suggests that the introduction of the devices on new vehicles probably occurred from about 1989 to 1992. If that is true, then the majority of vehicles were probably already protected by the time legislation was introduced in 2001.
53 Kriven and Ziersch (2007) say that these early immobilisers were not as effective as later models and were “easily defeated.” However, the Australian theft figures by age of vehicle (Figure 24) suggest otherwise. Rates are very low for vehicles registered from around 1992 onwards. As such, Potter and Thomas (2001) note that the initial devices did appear to “reduce theft rates significantly” with only minor additional gains coming from the later models. The Netherlands
Spread of electronic immobilisers in the Netherlands has been estimated by van Ours and Vollaard (2014), see Figure 25 below. This trajectory is almost identical to the estimates presented earlier for Great Britain, with a low percentage of vehicles having the devices before 1995 and a majority being protected from 2000 on. Figure 25 also shows an estimated trend for the US, which suggests a slower take-up than that proposed in this report, as explained above. Sweden
Very little evidence relating to electronic immobilisers was identified for Sweden. However, being subject to the same EU legislation as Great Britain and the Netherlands it seems reasonable to assume that the spread of the devices would have been similar to that in England and Wales provided the age profile of the vehicle fleets were similar. Eurostat data suggest that the average age of passenger cars in Sweden increased from about seven to nine years during the 1990s, whereas it was constantly around six years old for the UK and the Netherlands. So Sweden had a slightly older age profile and hence the spread of electronic immobilisers may have been fractionally slower in Sweden than in the UK or the Netherlands. However, modelling work showed this effect to be small.(^{54})
Analysis of theft trends
To analyse the effects of electronic immobilisers, data were gathered on police recorded theft of vehicles and burglary for the period from 1980 to 2013 for seven nations.(^{55}) These were: England and Wales, Scotland, the US, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden. Full information on data sourcing is contained in the Technical Appendix.
Table 9 shows changes in vehicle theft levels for each of the nations by decade, along with dates related to electronic immobiliser spread from each nation.
(^{54}) To try and capture the degree to which immobiliser spread in Sweden may have lagged that in England and Wales and the Netherlands, modelling was carried out on two imaginary vehicle fleets, one with an average age of vehicle of 6.5 years and one with an average age of eight years. In the younger vehicle fleet, spread of immobilisers reached 50 per cent in the tenth year. In the older fleet it took 11 years.
(^{55}) Burglary data were collected as well as vehicle theft data in an attempt to test for offence-level displacement or diffusion of benefit. Table 9: Changes in vehicle theft levels, by decade
| Dates of electronic immobiliser spread | Eng + Wales | Scotland | Netherlands | Sweden | Australia | US | Canada | |----------------------------------------|------------|----------|-------------|--------|-----------|----|--------| | Estimated first appearance of electronic immobilisers in mass market vehicles | 1991-92 | 1991-92 | 1991-92 | 1991-92 | 1989-1990 | 1988-1992 | 1988-1992 | | Year in which electronic immobilisers mandated on new vehicles | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 1998 | 2001 | None | 2007 | | Estimated year in which 50% of all vehicles have electronic immobilisers (threshold) | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2006 | 2006 |
| Changes in numbers of police-recorded vehicle thefts | 1980-90 | 1990-00 | 2000-10 | |------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------| | Eng + Wales | 52% | -32% | -69% | | Scotland | 12% | -29% | -66% | | Netherlands | 89% | 43% | -53% | | Sweden | 120% | -16% | -66% | | Australia | 94% | 1% | -61% | | US | 45% | -29% | -36% | | Canada | 18% | 40% | -42% |
Sources: Police figures for each nation, see Technical Appendix for details.
Table 9 shows that all nations had rising trends in vehicle thefts during the 1980s, though with variation of magnitude. During the 1990s trends are mixed with four nations seeing overall falls and three seeing rises (though the rise in Australia is just one per cent). In the 2000s, all the European nations had a decline of more than 50 per cent, while levels in the US and Canada fell around 40 per cent.56
The data in Table 9 offer support for an immobiliser effect, given the size of the declines in the 2000s. There is stronger support for the ‘delayed impact’ hypothesis than for the ‘immediate effect’ hypothesis. The Netherlands, Canada and Australia all have higher levels of vehicle thefts in 2000 than in 1990 even though a far greater number of vehicles would have had electronic immobilisers by the end of that decade. But the fact that the falls during the 2000s are similar in the European nations and smaller in Canada and the US would be in line with a substantial effect at or around the point when the majority of vehicles became protected.
To further investigate this, trends for each nation were plotted and indexed to 2000, the year in which it was estimated that Australia and the European nations would have a majority of vehicles protected.
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56 Canada’s vehicle theft trend is particularly interesting because it does not follow trends in other types of recorded acquisitive crime. While most types of recorded theft (and violence) began falling around 1991 in Canada, thefts of vehicles peaked in 1996 and did not fall sharply until around 2007. Dauvergne (2008) shows that there was variation at the state level within Canada. For the period 1997–2007, for example, most Canadian states saw drops in vehicle thefts in line with other types of recorded acquisitive crime, but Manitoba and Alberta saw large volume increases, which kept the overall Canadian level of thefts high. This could be due to different trajectories of security adoption, but in Manitoba at least, it seems to be connected instead to a surge in joy-riding amongst 15- to 18-year-old offenders (ibid.). In other words, available evidence suggests Canada may share some similarities with Australia in that during the period in which penetration of electronic immobilisers was partial, other upward pressures on crime caused displacement to older vehicles and theft trends continued to rise until greater penetration was achieved. Figure 26 shows that prior to 2000, trends across the nations were highly variable. But after 2000, the trends become uniform and cluster into two groups. The European nations and Australia have substantial declines from 2000, whereas the US and Canada have declines of a similar magnitude beginning several years later in about 2006/07.
The results of the ‘natural experiment’ are highly supportive of a marked crime-reduction effect for electronic immobilisers. But they also demonstrate the benefits of government legislation because nations that mandated the installation of electronic immobilisers earlier had earlier drops in crime. Even so, it is worth considering how things might have gone even better. Vehicle thefts dropped even more quickly several decades earlier in FRG following the mandatory introduction of steering locks on all vehicles rather than just new ones. Had any country adopted a similar policy for electronic immobilisers in the 1990s, the evidence in this report suggests it would have been highly effective.
A question for future policy-making is the role that consumer choice played in these declines in vehicle thefts. The aim of the original Car Theft Index in 1992 was to encourage manufacturers to install better security by highlighting to consumers each vehicle’s relative vulnerability to theft. If security became part of the consumer choice process when buying a vehicle – the logic went – then manufacturers would be forced to up their game and install the latest security devices. It is hard to gauge how effective this process was. Thefts certainly fell in England and Wales shortly after the Car Theft Index first appeared, but the findings above suggest that the speed at which the majority of the fleet was protected was the crucial factor and this was achieved just as quickly in other nations that did not produce theft indices (to our knowledge). Furthermore, the US, which did have a series of theft indices beginning in the 1980s, had a much slower improvement in security. Taken together this perhaps suggests that consumers paid relatively little attention to security indices, or not enough to affect manufacturers’ decision-making process markedly. In a study using data obtained from Motoring Which’s annual review of new and used vehicles, Shaw and Pease (2010) attempted to test the degree to which security was used in the decision-making process to recommend vehicles. Their results were somewhat equivocal. They tested two separate years and price was the only factor that was consistently significant as part of the decision to recommend vehicles in both years (with more expensive vehicles being more likely to be recommended). Security was significant in one of the two years, along with several other factors.
In addition, the results shown in Figure 26 demonstrate that the spread of electronic immobilisers through the vehicle fleet, and the crime reduction benefits this brought, was ultimately brought about for the most part by the natural churn of vehicle purchasing. Countries had to wait for enough new vehicles with electronic immobilisers to be bought before their national-level crime trends benefitted from their effectiveness. Outside of Western Australia there was little evidence of significant numbers of individuals retrofitting the devices to older vehicles despite their success; and even in Western Australia the limited success of retrofitting required significant subsidies (see Appendix 4).
Yet it would probably be a mistake to write off consumer-driven theft-reduction policies entirely. Shaw and Pease’s result suggests that security levels may play some role in vehicle selection, and even if legislation rather than the Car Theft Index was ultimately the most important factor in driving down crime, the move to create an Index may have spurred the legislative process on and brought manufacturers to the table. Also, the lack of retrofitting may have been a failure of communication rather than consumer willingness. Table 2 showed that a significant number of consumers were willing to spend their own money on security devices like mechanical immobilisers, so perhaps if the benefits of electronic immobilisers had been detected and communicated more widely and more quickly a larger amount of retrofitting may have taken place. It also seems possible that a more tangible device like a mechanical immobiliser might have been more popular with consumers than the invisible – but actually more effective – electronic immobiliser.
A further question about the results shown in Figure 26 concerns whether the security benefits, so evident in relation to vehicle thefts, also diffused to other crimes. As such, burglary trends were analysed to see whether the correlation and sequencing of trends supported a diffusion-of-benefits hypothesis. The main results are shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Statistics on burglary and vehicle theft trends for seven nations
| | Eng + Wales | US | Canada | Australia | Netherlands | Sweden | Scotland | |----------------------|-------------|----|--------|-----------|-------------|--------|----------| | 1980-2013 correlation| 0.96 | 0.37 | 0.19 | 0.86 | 0.55 | 0.76 | 0.87 | | Vehicle theft peak | 1993 | 1991 | 1996 | 1991 | 1994 | 1990 | 1992 | | Burglary peak | 1993 | 1980 | 1991 | 2000 | 1994 | 1992 | 1991 | | Sequencing | Simultaneous| Burglary first | Burglary first | VT first | Simultaneous | VT first | Burglary first | | Five years pre-threshold (VT) | -33% | -2% | -6% | 9% | -5% | 9% | -31% | | Five years pre-threshold (B) | -33% | 4% | -10% | 13% | -23% | -8% | -34% | | Five years post-threshold (VT) | -41% | -34% | -46% | -46% | -44% | -39% | -35% | | Five years post-threshold (B) | -29% | -4% | -24% | -40% | 5% | -16% | -33% |
Sources: Police figures for each nation, see Technical Appendix for details. Note: Correlation coefficients (top line) are significant at the one per cent level for all nations except the US, which is significant at the five per cent level and Canada, which is not statistically significant.
The first row of Table 10 shows the correlation coefficients between burglary and vehicle theft in each nation from 1980 to 2013. There is generally a high correlation in the European nations and in Australia, but much lower correlation coefficients for the US and Canada.
The next three rows look at the timing and sequencing of the peaks. This reveals a mixed picture with three nations having peaks simultaneously or with burglary following vehicle theft with a short lag (Sweden) or long lag (Australia). Broadly speaking, these would support a diffusion-of-benefits hypothesis. But in three other nations the sequencing is reversed and in the US in particular, burglary peaks more than a decade earlier than vehicle theft.
The final four rows are an attempt to look at displacement and/or diffusion to burglary at the point at which most evidence suggests electronic immobilisers had their greatest impact. This is referred to as a notional ‘threshold’ in Table 10 and is set at 2000 for the European nations and Australia and 2006 for Canada and the US in line with the evidence presented above. The table shows the percentage change in levels of the two crime types for the five years before and after the threshold. Pre-threshold, trends in both crime types are variable, with falling trends of differing magnitude in five countries and rising trends in two countries. After the threshold, trends become uniform for vehicle theft with all nations seeing falls of between 34 per cent and 46 per cent. Burglary figures after the threshold remain quite varied, though all countries apart from the Netherlands experience falls of between four per cent and 40 per cent.
Another way to analyse diffusion and/or displacement impacts would be to look for deviations in trend at the point of maximum immobiliser impact. Figure 27 shows a panel of charts with burglary and vehicle theft trends for each nation.
Figure 27: Indexed trends in burglary (red line) and vehicle theft (blue line) For most nations, burglary trends do not seem to deviate markedly at the ‘threshold’ point, when electronic immobilisers were installed in more than half the vehicles on the road. If anything the two trends often separate at this point, suggesting that immobilisers affected one but not the other. In other words, there does not appear to be significant evidence of either displacement or diffusion. Australia is an exception. In Australia, the trend in burglary does deviate sharply at the threshold point, falling more or less in line with vehicle theft. Australia is also the only country in which the estimated threshold point is in line with the turning point for overall recorded crime.
An attempt was made to repeat this analysis for trends in theft from vehicles, to see whether there was evidence of diffusion of benefits. However, data could not be sourced for all nations. and the results – shown in full in the Technical Appendix – were somewhat inconclusive. For the US and Canada, trends in theft from vehicles show little if any deviation when theft of vehicles starts falling in 2006. But for most other nations, theft from vehicles does show signs of deviation from 2000 on, falling at the same rate, or slightly slower than, vehicle thefts. There is partial support, then, for the theory that benefits from electronic immobilisers diffused to theft from vehicles, once a majority of vehicles on the road had the devices.
**Conclusion**
Available evidence suggests that electronic immobilisers first appeared in new vehicles in the late 1980s or early 1990s for all the seven developed nations studied. However, due to differences in legislation, the speed of spread was different in different countries. In particular, it was slower in the US and Canada than elsewhere.
Analysis shows that trends in thefts of vehicles were varied across nations, with different peaks at different times. But at the point where electronic immobilisers were installed in around half of all vehicles, which occurred in around 2000/2001 for most nations but later for the US and Canada, thefts fell sharply and uniformly by around 40 per cent. This suggests that electronic immobilisers were effective but that they were not necessarily the catalyst for the falls in vehicle thefts in all nations.
These results also imply that government legislation was an important factor in bringing down theft, but that had the legislation applied to all vehicles rather than just new ones, crime reductions could have occurred even more rapidly.
Tests were also conducted to check for diffusion of benefits to burglary at the time when electronic immobilisers appeared to have their greatest crime reduction impact. For the most part little evidence of diffusion was found, although there was some tentative evidence in relation to theft from vehicles. This section examines current data on vehicle crime, with the aim of drawing out policy conclusions in relation to whether security remains a deterrent for thieves.
In 2014 in England and Wales, there were 75,000 recorded vehicle thefts and 246,000 recorded thefts from vehicles (the corresponding figures for the CSEW were 58,000 and 668,000). This represents a fall of more than 75 per cent in total vehicle crime since the mid 1990s on both sources. Despite this large fall in offences, rates at which offenders are charged for vehicle offences remain low. In 2014/15, 86 per cent of the outcomes assigned to vehicle thefts were: “Investigation complete – no suspect identified” and only five per cent resulted in an offender being charged. It is hard to determine precise trends over time as recording practice has shifted several times, but examination of historical reports suggests that detection rates for vehicle crime shifted little during the 1990s, through the rise and then fall in crime. So there is little evidence to suggest that the fall has been due to an increased number of offenders being caught.
Evidence presented in the rest of this report suggests instead that other factors are likely to have been responsible for the fall in vehicle crime, including the spread of electronic immobilisers, which deterred offenders rather than causing more to be apprehended.
However, two separate strands of recent evidence have been cited to suggest that security effectiveness may now be waning. These are:
1. **The effect of technological change**: Evidence shows that tools are available (and easy to buy via the internet) which allow thieves to bypass current car security. A number of recent research studies have examined this phenomenon and concluded that “electronic immobilisers are now prone to getting hacked”. (Choudhuri et al., 2014; Mason, 2012).
2. **Current trend data**: Though vehicle crime remains at a historically low level in virtually every nation studied in this report, there are signs that the downward trend may be slowing. The latest Police Recorded Crime statistics for England and Wales showed a three per cent rise in ‘theft of vehicles’ for the year to June 2015 and the trend for vehicle thefts in Western Australia has also turned upwards.
To examine the current situation, data were sourced from the Metropolitan Police Service (which has also seen its first annual rise in vehicle thefts for around 20 years) on vehicle thefts
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57 Note that the actual number of stolen vehicles is likely to be higher than 75,000. Recorded crime figures use the ‘principle offence rule’ which counts a crime involving multiple offences within the category of the most serious of those offences. So a burglary in which a thief steals car keys and takes the vehicle from outside the house is recorded as a burglary rather than vehicle theft.
58 It is likely that ultimately around 90 per cent of the 2014/15 offences will result in no suspect being identified as the latest figures show that four per cent of cases are still pending.
59 Research demonstrates a range of products available on the internet with a wide price range. Some products are expensive and may therefore be unavailable to low-level thieves for that reason, but even low prices imply the need to plan, and commit to, the crime in advance, which may not be compatible with opportunist offenders (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1980). in London for 2012 and 2014, broken down by age and type of vehicle. These data have slightly higher annual totals than are captured in PRC because they include vehicles stolen in burglaries (which are recorded as burglaries, rather than thefts of vehicles in police figures). This small discrepancy aside, comparing the two years of data showed that the slight rise in vehicle thefts in London is due to an increase in the theft of motorbikes. Whereas car thefts in 2014 were down by 15 per cent compared with 2012 (equating to around 2,800 fewer offences), motorbike thefts had increased by 44 per cent (around 2,900 extra offences). Separate but unpublished analysis by the Retail Motor Industry Federation (RMIF) using data from the Police National Computer, which looked at the whole of England and Wales, also suggests a rise in motorcycle thefts during 2014.
It is not clear why motorbike theft appears to be increasing. The rise is not simply a reflection of increased motorbikes on the road, as Department for Transport statistics show that whereas numbers of registered cars are rising again following a lull after the 2008 recession, numbers of motorbikes have been largely flat for the last five years. It is possible that there is some displacement from car theft as a result of security deterrence (though no direct evidence of this could be located). Media reports have also suggested that stolen motorbikes are being used to commit other crimes: data released by the MPS showed that there were 1,240 recorded crimes in London in which suspects rode mopeds or motorbikes during the 12 months to February 2015.
The Crime Survey shows that, due to the drop in car thefts, motorbike thefts have gradually made up a bigger proportion of all vehicle thefts (grouping together the years since 2010, this proportion currently stands at about 40 per cent). That means fluctuations in the trend for motorbike thefts can now affect the trend in all vehicle thefts, see Figure 28.
**Figure 28: Thefts of cars/vans and motorbikes from 1995 to 2013/14**
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60 The 2012 data actually covered the 12-month period from November 2011 to October 2012. 61 Police recorded crime data obtained from 17 forces for 2014/15 also showed an overall rise in motorbike/scooter theft. Additionally, there were some rises in recorded car theft in a few of the police forces with the largest crime volumes, but overall, theft of cars was down up to the end of 2014. The thefts data from the MPS was also broken down by age of vehicle to see whether the pattern for lower theft rates among newer vehicles – visible in Figure 9 – has been maintained through to 2014. Figures 29 and 30 demonstrate that it has.
**Figure 29: Cars stolen in London in 2014, by age of registration**
**Figure 30: Car theft rates in London, per 1,000 vehicles on the road, by age of registration**
Source: MPS data. Figure 29 shows that in volume terms, newer cars make up a far higher proportion of stolen vehicles than older cars, but that once this is adjusted for numbers of cars on the road, those vehicles that were made in the 1980s (before the second wave of vehicle security began) are still more likely to be stolen even though they collectively make up less than two per cent of vehicles on the road. In other words, it appears as though vehicle security may still be keeping theft rates down, with only a few offenders bypassing the security to steal newer vehicles, and some thieves still seeking out older cars with weaker security. Similar trends from the CSEW also support this. Figure 31 suggests the fall in thefts of vehicles through the 2000s has been wholly driven by the gradually reducing pool of older, more vulnerable cars on the road.
**Figure 31: CSEW car/van thefts, broken down by age of vehicle**
These trends are consistent with the conclusion that most vehicle theft offenders operating today are more organised criminals capable of bypassing current security levels. Hence new security devices may be required. The results from Farrell *et al.*, (2011) suggest that tracking devices may be highly effective but that they are only installed on a minority of vehicles currently. Anecdotal evidence from officers working on vehicle crime in the Metropolitan Police Service suggests that some offenders routinely park a vehicle in a safe location for a few days immediately after stealing it to check it is not being tracked. This would suggest that boosting the number of vehicles with tracking devices might reduce the ‘rump’ of more organised vehicle theft that remains. However, trackers may also have limitations. Jamming devices which prevent stolen vehicles being tracked are also available online (Choudhuri *et al.*, 2014; Mason, 2012).
A further point to make in relation to Figure 31 is that it is slightly at odds with the new research suggesting that current electronic vehicle security can be easily compromised and that newer cars are therefore easy to steal again, despite the presence of electronic immobilisers and other security devices. Two possibilities suggest themselves:
i) the degree to which security has been compromised has been somewhat exaggerated; and/or
ii) security is easier to overcome, and hence the opportunity for committing car theft has increased markedly, but thefts remain low for another reason.
It is hard to determine which of these two positions is closest to the truth. But given the potential threat for electronic compromise of security, there is a clear priority for policy-makers to try and better understand the degree to which new technology does or does not make cars easier to steal. The other main conclusion from this section is that security on motorbikes does not seem to be as effective at preventing thefts as security on cars, hence looking at methods for better protecting motorbikes should also be a priority if the long-standing decline in vehicle crime is to continue. The Home Office published a discussion paper on opportunity/security as a driver of crime in line with the Home Office hosted crime and policing conference in January 2015. The paper provoked much debate on this issue. This analytical report has attempted to clarify some points and add further to the discussion.
The idea that opportunity and security might cause crime and hence drive crime trends has come a long way in the last 40 years (Clarke, 2012). Before that, crime causation theories focused mainly on the development of criminality within individuals and assumed that changes to this process drove aggregate trends. The research of Clarke and others challenged this view, giving rise to situational crime prevention, which showed that altering the crime environment by improving security or lowering opportunity could reduce numbers of crimes committed. This is now reasonably well accepted and has become an important plank of policy-making.
Neither the discussion paper, nor this research report, sought to challenge the importance of that journey. Opportunity/security is an important driver of crime; but not the only driver of crime.
The main aims of this report were to examine long-term trends in vehicle security; to draw out policy lessons and to examine a new strand of opportunity-based research: ‘the security hypothesis’. The hypothesis suggests that better security, particularly on cars and houses may be the main reason why crime has declined (Farrell et al., 2014). The most studied example has been the electronic immobiliser and numerous reports have demonstrated its effectiveness in preventing vehicle theft.
The analysis presented here has added to that evidence base. Unlike earlier advances in vehicle security – which may have deterred thieves for a while – but which clearly provided limited deterrence by the end of the 1980s, electronic immobilisers seem to have been one of the main reasons why vehicle thefts have fallen further than just about any type of crime in many of the nations studied in this report, and why they have continued to decline through to 2014.
But were electronic immobilisers the catalyst for the vehicle crime turning point? On balance, the evidence presented in this report suggests not. Rather, the main impact of electronic immobilisers appears to have been delayed until they reached critical mass within the vehicle fleet. In many nations, the crime decline was well under way by then.
In England and Wales for example, all types of theft – vehicle crime, burglary and personal theft (as measured by the CSEW) – fell sharply from the mid 1990s. For immobilisers to have caused that, they would not only have had to reverse a steeply rising trend in stolen vehicles and in other types of theft, but they would need to have done this at a time when fewer than one in ten cars on the road had the devices. This is not impossible, but it places a heavy burden on the power of the debut crime/keystone crime hypotheses to transmit benefits to other crimes. Furthermore, thefts of vehicles made up just three per cent of crime in England and Wales at the crime peak according to the Crime Survey (total vehicle crime made up 22 per cent), so it seems unlikely that ‘diffusion’ from electronic immobilisers can fully explain the fact that overall crime fell 62 per cent between 1995 and 2013/14.
Alternatively, strong evidence may emerge that other types of vehicle security, like central locking, may have had an earlier impact. Or that housing security improved markedly at the same point in time, negating the need for diffusion of benefits from immobilisers to burglary. But even then, further explanations would be required. In the US, and in certain parts of the UK (Merseyside and Edinburgh), burglary peaked far earlier than it did elsewhere, which would suggest two-speed trends in housing security levels. And if central locking was important, why did vehicle thefts rise so sharply in the early 1990s when this technology was first spreading?
Arguably more plausible is that better security is just one of several factors that explain the decline in crime, and some of these are explored in Appendix 5. Whatever the driving force, one fact about crime trends that emerges from the analysis in this report, from the local to the national, and whether they relate to violence or property crime, is the sharpness of many of the crime turning points (see Figures 20, A2.1, A2.2, A3.3). Crime generally did not gradually switch from a rising to a falling trend; it spiked. Whilst it was not the purpose of this paper to try and explain this phenomenon, some thoughts are offered in Appendix 3.
It should be acknowledged that there are limitations to the analysis in this report as well as several bits of missing data that could strengthen or disprove the conclusions. Trying to explain a change that has already happened is a complex exercise that is subject to bias given that no prospectively generated control groups are available. This report has attempted to use systematically gathered trends at different geographical levels and employed some natural experiments to generate findings, but ultimately the exercise involves looking for patterns in historic data and triangulating where possible. As such, it is difficult to be conclusive about any findings. All that can really be said is that the findings represent a plausible explanation of the data available. And further data would help. It would be useful, for example, to have more information about immobiliser spread in the US and Canada. It would also be helpful to see Australian theft rates by age of car from the early 1990s to check that the low rates on vehicles up to ten years old was a phenomenon that emerged through that decade, in keeping with improved security, or was always the case.
Where does this evidence leave the security hypothesis? This paper has provided some challenges, particularly in relation to claims that security may have been the catalyst for the initial turn-around in crime. But it has also provided further evidence that better security did play an important role in the drop in vehicle thefts and probably also contributed to the decline in thefts from vehicles. Further analysis may yet add more evidence in relation to security improvements to houses and shops and possibly even in relation to violent crime. Certainly, the example of electronic immobilisers clearly suggests that changes to security levels can change national levels of crime, and hence that situational crime prevention must remain a crucial pillar of any crime reduction programme, even if other factors also played a role in the crime drop.
Indeed, from an opportunity perspective, the scope and reach of cyberspace has arguably created the greatest ever challenge for crime and policing policy-makers. As well as providing the opportunity for potential victims and offenders to come together in ways that were unimaginable a few decades ago, it also means that methods for overcoming security can be disseminated quickly and universally. Instruction manuals for how to bypass electronic immobilisers and steal cars quickly are now available on the internet. At the timing of writing, however, there is limited evidence that this is having an effect on levels of vehicle theft, which remain at historic lows.
It is hard to know whether to interpret this as evidence of the long-lasting impact of security or as an indication that the number of people who would even think to look online or elsewhere for methods of stealing cars has decreased since the 1980s and 1990s. Certainly there is ample evidence that crime is only one type of risky behaviour that has fallen over the last two decades, which would suggest that there has been a general shift in young people’s attitudes that has accompanied improved security and the fall in crime (Mishra et al., 2009; HM Government Horizon Scanning Programme, 2014). The roots of these attitudinal changes remain to be fully explained, but something appears to have worked and it would be helpful to identify more precisely what that is. So whilst the evidence in this paper suggests that reducing opportunity and improving security remain important crime reduction tools in the new (cyber) crime landscape – and the equivalent of the electronic immobiliser for cyberspace would certainly be welcome – it perhaps also suggests that proven interventions aimed at preventing criminal careers and reducing long-term propensity for crime should remain part of the policy-makers’ toolkit. Appendix 1: Diffusion, displacement and switching
As the above discussion has emphasised, it is impossible to analyse the degree to which opportunity and security have affected aggregate-level crime trends without understanding the concepts of displacement and diffusion (of benefits). Hence this brief section will seek to explain these terms as well as to distinguish them from ‘switching’, which – as it is defined below – is a separate but equally important phenomenon in this context. A brief summary of the evidence in relation to these effects is also attempted.
- **Displacement and diffusion** (of benefits), in this context, are effects that may or may not occur in reaction to some kind of crime-reduction intervention. For example, if CCTV is introduced in a car park with the intention of reducing the number of offences, it may be the case that offences reduce in that car park but increase in a neighbouring one, as thieves simply switch locations. That is displacement. But it is also possible that the neighbouring car park also experiences reduced offences. This phenomenon – which is called diffusion of benefits – could occur if offenders are put off crime entirely by the introduction of CCTV. As Felson and Clarke (1998) point out, there are at least five ways in which displacement/diffusion might occur (their list below relates to displacement but theoretically diffusion might operate through similar channels):
o **geographic displacement** (crime moves from one location to another); o **temporal displacement** (crime moves from one time to another); o **target displacement** (crime moves from one target to another); o **tactical displacement** (one method of committing crime can be substituted for another); o **crime-type displacement** (one type of crime can be substituted for another).
Measuring all these different types of displacement/diffusion is not easy and requires very carefully constructed control groups to be done properly. For example, in an environment in which crime is falling generally, it is very easy to mistake a general trend for diffusion of benefit from an intervention and vice versa.
- **Switching**, in this context, refers to a change in criminal behaviour that is not caused by a crime-reduction intervention but for some other reason. This may relate to conditions related to opportunity and security. For example, mobile phone thefts increased sharply in the late 1990s while theft of other goods (like car stereos) decreased. This suggests the possibility that thieves switched target as a result of the increased opportunity to steal phones. Mobile phones were rare in the early 1990s but ubiquitous by the end of the decade. However, switching might also occur for reasons unrelated to opportunity, like a change in the relative value of the two goods or simply a change in fashion. A great deal of research has examined displacement and diffusion. A review by the Dutch Ministry of Justice (Hesseling, 1994) examined 55 studies that measured displacement/diffusion effects following a situational intervention. In six of the 55 studies, no evidence of displacement was found but there was evidence of diffusion of benefits. In 16 studies there was no evidence of either displacement or diffusion and in the remaining 33 studies, displacement occurred but not to the extent that the original crime reduction benefit was completely offset. In other words, there was always a benefit to the intervention.
This finding has been reinforced by more recent studies. A systematic review of 102 situational crime interventions by Guerette and Bowers (2009) found evidence of displacement in 26 per cent of the studies and diffusion of benefit in 27 per cent. Another systematic review by Grove et al. (2012) also found that a diffusion of benefit was about as likely to be observed as displacement. As Felson and Clarke (1998) have pointed out, this is powerful evidence that changing the crime environment can have important crime reduction effects, and that crime does not simply move elsewhere.
In the current context though, it is important briefly to note some limitations of this evidence. Firstly, quality of research design is slightly variable amongst the studies and very few measured all types of possible displacement. Of particular relevance to this paper is that in both the Hesseling (1994) and Guerette and Bowers (2009) reviews very few studies examined displacement/diffusion effects in relation to other crime types (Johnson et al., 2014) and fewer than ten per cent measured temporal displacement. Most studies looked at local, spatial displacement/diffusion only (ibid.).
Secondly, the results – powerful though they are in demonstrating the effectiveness of individual situational interventions – do not really tell us much about the extent to which situational crime prevention as a whole has driven aggregate level crime trends. To determine that, it would be necessary to estimate a trend in situational crime prevention over time. For example, many of the reviews highlighted above demonstrate that problem-solving policing is an effective tactic that reduces crime without displacement. Yet it is still difficult to say how much this has contributed to the crime drop as we do not know how the amount of problem-solving policing has changed over time.
This is not to say that situational crime approaches have not affected national-level trends. In some cases, like those relating to immobilisers and vehicle crime examined in this paper, the evidence is compelling. Another example is the study by Mayhew et al. (1989) showing that legislation requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets triggered a fall of around 100,000 motorbike thefts within six years. Given the absence of any other potential explanation and the fact that a similar drop occurred when the same legislation was introduced in England and Wales, the authors concluded that the fall was caused by an opportunity effect: offenders wanting to steal a motorbike now had to go equipped with a helmet (Mayhew et al., 1989). Furthermore, although there was some evidence in Germany of displacement to thefts of cars, and possibly also bicycles, it did not offset the drop in motorbike thefts, in volume terms at least (ibid.). Again, this is good evidence that making criminal opportunity harder is a very valid way of reducing crime, even at the national level. But like most of the vehicle-crime examples above, the motorcycle legislation produced a national-level effect on motorbike theft only. It did not, in Germany or in England and Wales, cause a crime turning point in several different crime types at the same time. Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
This is important for the analysis in this paper because it identifies instances in which crime types have risen and fallen simultaneously at the national level but also instances when a single crime type moves in a quite unique way. Generally, the available evidence on displacement seems to suggest that the latter instances are more likely to be driven by opportunity/security changes. Or to put it another way – when the opportunity to commit a particular type of offence is reduced through improved security or some other method, the most common result seems to be a reduction in that type of offence only. Sometimes there may be a little displacement to other crimes, but this generally does not offset the benefits of the intervention entirely, but almost never – to our knowledge – is there an obvious example in which diffusion of benefits has occurred to alternate crime types at the national level. The motorbike example drove a drop in motorbike thefts, but not a drop in car or bike thefts. When an earlier vehicle crime security device was introduced, it had a large crime-reduction effect on car theft, but there was some possible displacement to motorbike theft and no discernible effect at all on theft from vehicles (Webb, 1994).
Two more recent examples have similar results. Metal thefts increased in England and Wales from 2009 to 2011, as they did in many other nations, due in all likelihood to the rise in global metal prices during that period (Sidebottom et al., 2014). Yet the rest of acquisitive crime continued to fall. And when a combination of enforcement and legislation (beginning in early 2012) reduced the opportunity to dispose of stolen metal profitably by restricting and then banning cashless trading at scrap metal yards, metal thefts reduced markedly. But again, there was no obvious deviation in the trajectory of other acquisitive crime trends, see Figure A1.1.
**Figure A1.1: Metal thefts and other acquisitive crime, 2010–2013**
One final example is important here. Another recent security success appears to have been the introduction of activation locks on mobile phones. Initial analysis has suggested these had an instant impact on mobile phone thefts in London (BIT and Home Office, 2014). In the 12 months to September 2013, recorded thefts from the person were up by seven per cent in England and Wales with i-phone thefts particularly prominent. Then Apple introduced its activation lock via the operating system ios7, which was incorporated on almost 80 per cent of i-phones within three months. This quick rate of penetration (far faster than that for vehicle security during the 1990s\\textsuperscript{62}) seemed to have an instant effect. Data for the 12 months after ios7 was launched showed that theft from the person was down by 24 per cent.
In this instance benefits probably \\textit{did} cut across crime types. But this is because phone theft is not a crime category on its own. Phones may be stolen in thefts from the person, but also in robberies or in ‘other thefts’. They’d be less likely to be stolen in burglaries, thefts of vehicles or incidents of shoplifting. This makes detection of displacement and/or diffusion of benefits more difficult. Figure A1.2 shows an apparently big crime-reduction effect for theft from the person, and possibly a smaller effect for robbery and other theft. But the year-on-year trends in other crime types seem largely unaffected.\\textsuperscript{63} In other words, it does not seem to be the case that the benefits from the activation locks on phones diffused to theft generally.
\\textbf{Figure A1.2: Percentage change in theft levels compared to the previous year}
\\begin{figure}[h] \\centering \\includegraphics[width=\\textwidth]{figure.png} \\caption{Percentage change in theft levels compared to the previous year} \\end{figure}
Overall then, there are many persuasive examples of security bringing down levels of the crime against which the security is targeted. But there is no strong evidence from these examples that the benefits diffuse from one type of crime to another.
A separate point needs to be made in relation to switching. Farrell \\textit{et al.}, (2014) has used the fact that mobile phone thefts increased while thefts of other items fell in the late 1990s as a test for crime-drop hypotheses. The argument being:
\\textit{“Phone theft ... is a street crime which increased when others were decreasing (Mayhew and Harrington, 2001), and at the time of writing in 2013 is experiencing a resurgence due to expensive smart phones. More generally, theft of valuable electronic goods such as laptops and...”}
\\textsuperscript{62} For the speed of ios7 adoption see: \\url{http://www.macnn.com/articles/14/07/14/figure.based.on.visits.to.the.app.store.growing.at.one.percent.a.month/}
\\textsuperscript{63} A fascinating question for future research is whether activation locks on phones drove diffusion or displacement within the items targeted. i.e. within theft from the person did the improved security on phones cause an increase in thefts of other types of items even as overall thefts declined? GPS-Satnavs have increased. Any explanation of the decline in other crime types must not contradict these facts. Most hypotheses fail this test because they suggest that all types of crime should have decreased. This is because their focus is the number or the motivation of offenders.”
Farrell et al., 2014.
The logic of this test is not clear to the current authors. The type of goods stolen will change over time as fashions, values and opportunities shift, but it seems perfectly possible for this to co-exist with a rising or falling offender population and for that to be the key factor in driving crime. Put differently, if there were 10,000 active offenders in the 1980s and just 100 in the 2000s, the latter would still commit more mobile phone theft and internet-related offences because mobile phones and the internet did not (effectively) exist in the 1980s. But overall crime would still be down, due to the vast fall in numbers of offenders. Appendix 2: The effect of LoJack on car thefts in the US
The analysis in the main report suggests that the fall in vehicle crime in the US from 1991 would be unlikely to be caused by electronic immobilisers given that such a small proportion of vehicles would have had them installed at that time. However, it is possible that another security device was responsible: LoJack tracking equipment.
Its effectiveness was examined by Ayres and Levitt (1997), who concluded that LoJack reduced vehicle thefts, though more so in some parts of the US than others, and that benefits diffused to other crime types. A subsequent study (Gonzalez-Navarro, 2013), found that LoJack also proved to be effective in Mexico when it was introduced, very publicly, on a specific model of car that was previously much stolen. However, LoJack also appeared to cause some displacement. Gonzalez-Navarro (2013) found that in the state in which LoJack was introduced on a specific car, the theft rate of that car was much reduced and theft rates on other cars were largely unaffected; however, in neighbouring states theft rates for the same model of car (which in those states did not have LoJack fitted) increased. In other words, there was displacement to the same type of car in a different state (where LoJack was not used), rather than to other cars in the same state.
In this brief appendix, the effectiveness of LoJack is analysed in a different way. The concern here is not simply whether LoJack was effective in reducing theft rates; overall the evidence suggests that it was (with qualifications). Instead this analysis looks at whether the penetration of LoJack correlates with the turning point in crime at the state level within the US and hence whether it can be seen as a catalyst for the decline.
LoJack was introduced at different times in different states. Ayres and Levitt (1998) write that: “LoJack was first introduced in Massachusetts in 1986, and Massachusetts remains LoJack’s strongest market today. LoJack was subsequently introduced in South Florida in 1988 and three additional markets in 1990. As of December 1994, LoJack served 12 markets.” Other evidence (IDCH, 2003) agrees that LoJack was first introduced in Massachusetts in 1986. It came to Florida in December 1988 and to Los Angeles, Michigan, Illinois and New Jersey in 1989. Georgia, Rhode Island and Virginia became LoJack markets in the early 1990s and the devices first appeared in New York in 1994 (ibid.). The IDCH (2003) reports states that: “By year-end 1989, LoJack had "installed 35,000 systems in Massachusetts and south Florida ... and recovered over 900 cars for clients." Given that around 50,000 vehicles per year were stolen in Massachusetts at that time and around 80,000 in Florida that suggests LoJack’s influence may have been small at first. Indeed Ayres and Levitt note that because installation occurred almost exclusively on new vehicles, initial penetration into markets tended to be quite slow, as was the case with electronic immobilisers. Using data obtained from LoJack, they estimated that after five years in a market, LoJack’s typical coverage was less than 2% of total registered vehicles. The company estimated that by late May 1997, LoJack was installed in about 15 per cent of all new cars in Massachusetts and about ten per cent of new vehicles in Florida, New York and California. Given these relatively low percentages, and the fact that new cars make up only a fraction of cars on the road, it seems initially unlikely that LoJack was the catalyst for the nationwide fall in vehicle thefts from 1991.
However, Ayres and Levitt find that LoJack was effective even at very low penetration levels. They argue that this could be due to the fact that many vehicle-theft offenders are prolific offenders, stealing perhaps hundreds of cars per year. In that scenario, even if LoJack is present on just 2 in 100 cars, it could raise their risk of apprehension in any given year considerably. In addition, the IDCH report (2003) lists research suggesting that many car thefts at the time were committed by drug addicts who took the vehicles to chop-shops for selling of parts. Ayres and Levitt (1998) note that chop-shops would therefore encounter hundreds of stolen cars each month, hence even a low percentage of LoJack devices could significantly increase their chances of being detected by enforcement services.
To test the possibility that LoJack may have markedly driven down vehicle theft rates from the outset, this appendix attempts some simple analysis looking at trends in the states affected by LoJack to see whether the security device appears to be a credible reason for the turning point in overall vehicle thefts. From the evidence above, a table of states was constructed containing the year in which LoJack was introduced. It was assumed that the other states did not have any LoJack penetration before 1995, as suggested by both Ayres and Levitt (1998) and the IDCH report (2003).
Table A2.1: Year of LoJack introduction and vehicle theft peak, by US state
| State | Year LoJack introduced | Vehicle theft peak | |----------------|------------------------|--------------------| | Massachusetts | 1986 | 1975 | | Florida | 1988 | 1994 | | California | 1989 | 1992 | | Michigan | 1989 | 1984 | | Illinois | 1989 | 1979 | | New Jersey | 1989 | 1990 | | Georgia | 1990–94 | 1996 | | Rhode Island | 1990–94 | 1990 | | Virginia | 1990–94 | 1991 | | New York | 1994 | 1990 | | Other States | n/a | 1991 |
Source: Uniform crime reports, FBI.
At first glance, the table does not demonstrate much support for LoJack being a central factor in the reversal of vehicle theft trends within states. Of the ten LoJack states, four had vehicle theft peaks before LoJack was introduced. And the average peak for the non-LoJack states was in 1991, which must also have been before LoJack was a presence in these markets. These facts clearly suggest that other factors must have been involved.
However, looking in more detail at the trends in each state reveals a slightly more mixed picture. All evidence suggests that Massachusetts achieved the highest initial LoJack penetration and that this was initially focused in the state’s major city, Boston. Trends for both the state of Massachusetts and Boston are shown in Figure A2.1. The FBI’s uniform crime-recording data tool has data at the state level from 1960 and at the city level from 1985. Figure A2.1: Vehicle theft trends in Massachusetts and Boston
Figure A2.1 shows that vehicle thefts at the state level rose from 1980 to 1990 while remaining at a lower level than in the 1970s ‘spike’ in thefts. However, in Boston, thefts fell from 1986, the year LoJack appeared in the city. Furthermore, Figure A2.1 also shows that violence continued to rise in Boston through to 1991 in line with other parts of the US and with the city’s crack epidemic (Braga, 2003). Given that violence and vehicle theft correlate strongly at the national level in the US (Farrell et al., 2014), possibly due to the link between drug markets, stolen cars and violence (Blumstein and Rosenfeld, 2008), it seems possible that in Boston, LoJack broke that link. That is, the earlier penetration of LoJack may have driven down vehicle theft even as other crimes continued to rise.
Similarly, as Ayres and Levitt (1997) show, other cities within LoJack states like Chicago (the major city in Illinois) also start to see falling trends in vehicle thefts more or less in line with the introduction of LoJack. However, Miami in Florida continued to see a rising trend for several years after LoJack’s introduction while New York experienced sharp falls in motor vehicle thefts and violence for three years before LoJack appeared in 1994, see Figure A2.2.
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64 Blumstein and Rosenfeld write that: “The trend in motor vehicle theft, with a turning point in the early 1990s, is more similar to those for robbery and homicide than to the burglary trend, and it is consistent with qualitative accounts of stolen cars traded for drugs during the crack era (Jacobs, 1999) or for use by drug dealers to avoid having their own cars confiscated as forfeited assets. A clear need exists for research on the divergence between burglary and motor vehicle theft trends over the past 25 years.” On the latter, one possible explanation is that burglary and general theft were more associated with the heroin epidemic of the 1970s in the US in which users stole to fund their use, while the crack epidemic gave rise to a new generation of drugs sellers (some of whom were also users) but who tended to be more associated with violence, robbery and car theft (see Morgan, 2014, for more on this). Overall then, this analysis suggests that LoJack may have been a contributor to the turnaround in vehicle crime in some areas, particularly in Boston. However, it was certainly not the only factor involved and it appears to have affected vehicle thefts only, rather than crime more generally. Appendix 3: Why does crime spike?
A central finding from the examination of crime trends presented in this report is that numbers of offences do not, in general, gradually switch from rising to falling trends or vice versa. Instead these reversals often happen very sharply, with periods of steeply rising crime followed by periods of steep falls. This brief section offers some tentative thoughts on this issue.
The first reason for this phenomenon that often comes to mind is that the cause is some sort of blip or shift in the way the data are recorded, i.e. that the trend is not real but an artefact of the data collection process. In some cases, this may be what has occurred. The trend in police recorded burglary offences in England and Wales is shown in Figure A3.1.
**Figure A3.1: Police recorded burglaries in England and Wales**
Source: Police recorded crime, ONS.
Clearly this has one very large ‘spike’ in the middle of the series but also another rise and then fall (admittedly more of a bump than a spike) occurred in about 2002. The latter may well have been driven by recording practice changes. The National Crime Recording Standard came into effect in 2002 and this had the effect of increasing the number of recorded burglaries by around three per cent according to a Home Office report (Simmons *et al.*, 2003). It is possible that this initial rise in recording eroded, either correctly or incorrectly, in subsequent years to give rise to the trend above. Overlaying the trend with the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) equivalent suggests that this small spike may have been artificial. Clearly though, the main spike in the middle of the series does not seem to be an artefact of any data collection process for the simple reason that it is present in both series, despite the fact that their data collection processes are quite different.
This, and the fact that spikes seem to crop up with incredible regularity, particularly in local-area data (see Figure A3.3), suggests that there is more to the phenomenon than simply data recording issues.
**Figure A3.3: Burglary and vehicle theft trends in four police forces in England and Wales**
**Bedfordshire**
**Kent** One explanation is that changes to the crime environment create sudden ‘breaches’ that drive up offending until they are spotted at which point the breach is closed and crime falls again. Killias (2006) has documented a number of instances of this kind including the “mass production and consumption of spirits” which coincided with crime increases in the early 19th century and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 which opened up a new market for stolen goods in Eastern Europe. The latter is a good example of a ‘breach’ that is in line with opportunity theory. A new market for goods does not directly affect the number of potential offenders or their propensity for crime, it just increases the potential reward and hence the temptation to indulge in crime. But Killias (2006) also talks of breaches that more directly affect numbers of potential offenders, like drug epidemics, where numbers of new users have a tendency to rise and fall sharply irrespective of precautionary activity (Morgan, 2014).
Another explanation has been offered by Paul Ormerod (2011) in his book ‘Butterfly Economics’. In the chapter on crime trends, Ormerod notes the large number of sharp fluctuations present in crime data. For him, the explanation is that human behaviour is not simply the result of an individual’s own preferences, but that human behaviour is instead profoundly influenced by the behaviour of others. Ormerod shows that this effect can be modelled and that it gives rise to the kind of sharp spikes seen in the data. For example, when modelling crime he divides the population into three groups: those who are unlikely to commit crime regardless of the behaviour of others (he includes most women and all pensioners in this group), those who are active criminals, and those who are susceptible to criminality. Crucially the number of offences committed by this last group depends on the size of the active offender population. So when the number of active criminals increases, this drags an ever-increasing number of those susceptible into crime, and vice versa.
Though a proper examination of the validity of Ormerod’s approach is beyond the scope of this report, it is worth noting that there is very strong evidence that one type of behaviour frequently linked to crime – heroin/crack-cocaine use – does operate in a way that seems to fit with Ormerod’s model. Numerous studies have shown that heroin use, for example, spreads through networks of friends and relatives rather than via drug dealers and pushers. An ethnographic study of heroin users in the Wirral in Merseyside, found that nine out of every ten users said that they had first received heroin from a friend or relative, rather than from a dealer (Parker et al., 1988). In their seminal book on the spread of heroin epidemics Hunt and Chambers (1976) describe the process as follows:
Heroin use... spreads within groups of closely associated youths by a process of peer emulation and influence. Exactly why one person should copy the behaviour of another, and voluntarily adopt his attitudes and practices, is no clearer for heroin use than for religious conversions, but both are empirical facts. ... Though the idea of peer-influenced spread was well established, at least in the scientific literature, its implications seem to have been mostly overlooked. If heroin use is transmitted among friends, being as often sought by the non-user as offered by the initiator, then it is contagious ... (underline added).
Source: Hunt and Chambers, 1976.
And of course, if there is a relationship between heroin use and crime, as other research has suggested (Morgan, 2014) then it follows that crime too is contagious to some degree.
The London riots offer another example from a completely different context. Many of the explanations offered by the rioters for their actions suggest that they were influenced by the behaviour of others and that criminality bred further criminality. For example:
“All right then, well, everyone’s getting free stuff, I’m joining in, like, coz it’s fucking my areas.”
“After it all kicked off and everyone was doing it, you just joined in and it felt fine.”
Source: Lewis et al., 2011.
If there is any truth at all in this approach, it has some quite important implications both for crime research and crime policy. The obvious research implication is that the standard economic models of crime need to be revised. These are based on the notion that an individual rationally makes up his or her mind whether to commit crime based on the relative costs and benefits of the situation. These models therefore assume that the number of other people committing crime in the vicinity is irrelevant to the individual (except via indirect ways65). If Ormerod is correct, these models will never accurately capture crime trends and the explanatory variables that drive them. Instead, different models that incorporate the way in which human behaviour is influenced by, and influences, the behaviour of others, need to be employed.
For crime policy, the most obvious implication is that ‘tipping points’ are likely to exist and that once reached, sharp changes could occur that may be impossible for policy action to prevent. Crime is currently falling, which, following Ormerod’s logic, means that – other things equal – crime is likely to go on falling as fewer and fewer criminals influence fewer and fewer susceptibles. But if something should cause the number of criminals to increase, even slightly, history suggests this could tip the trend into a sharp reverse.
65 Economic models typically include the likelihood of being caught as an important variable, weighing this and the potential punishment if caught, against the potential gain. Arguably the likelihood of being caught may be affected by the number of other offenders in the vicinity via the diversion of police resources, so it is possible that an element of the ‘contagion’ model enters standard economic models. But this does not really capture the essence of Ormerod’s argument: that individual behaviour is influenced by the behaviour of others irrespective of how it affects their own costs and benefits. There are, indeed, parallels between the current situation and that in 1960. Then, as now, homicide rates, and crime rates generally, were at historic lows. Yet within a decade the number of murders had increased by nearly 75 per cent(^{66}) and the number of recorded robberies rose more than three-fold. It is still not clear exactly why this happened, which means it is hard to be certain that something similar will not occur in the next decade. In other words, though crime has been falling for 20 years in England and Wales, without a fuller understanding of the mechanisms that have driven this decline, we cannot be absolutely sure it will continue.
(^{66}) In 1961 there were 265 police recorded homicides. By 1971 there were 459, and by 1991 there were 725. Appendix 4: Two local-area cases studies: Western Australia and Merseyside
This appendix analyses trends from the state of Western Australia and the police force area of Merseyside in England. These areas show important differences from their respective national-level crime trends and may therefore shed light on the underlying causal mechanisms.
Western Australia
The state of Western Australia has been cited by many as a ‘natural experiment’ for testing the effectiveness of electronic immobilisers because it introduced legislation promoting the devices earlier than the rest of Australia. Electronic immobilisers were made mandatory in new vehicles in Australia in 2001, but in Western Australia a scheme commenced in 1997 in which subsidies were provided to encourage retrofitting of electronic immobilisers. Due to the limited take-up, this was followed in 1999 by legislation mandating the installation of electronic immobilisers on all new vehicles, two years earlier than the same legislation was passed at the national level. Importantly though, the Western Australia legislation had an additional component. It also mandated the installation of an electronic immobiliser on any car that was transferred (i.e. bought and sold) as long as it was less than 25 years old. In other words, anyone wanting to buy a second-hand car in Western Australia after 1999 had to first ensure it was fitted with an electronic immobiliser.
An obvious question then, is whether the earlier action taken by Western Australia in relation to electronic immobilisers caused an earlier fall in vehicle thefts compared with Australia generally. Figure A4.1 shows trends in police recorded vehicle thefts in Western Australia compared with the national trend.
Figure A4.1: Vehicle theft trends in Australia and Western Australia
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. Figure A4.1 shows that vehicle thefts did fall earlier in Western Australia than in Australia generally. The evidence is not totally conclusive, because Western Australia had a different trend from the rest of the country prior to the introduction of the voluntary scheme in 1997 and, arguably, numbers of thefts began falling from around 1995. But certainly the state experienced a sustained fall in thefts that commenced shortly after the scheme came into effect and which occurred before a similar fall was observed in the rest of the country.
In line with the analysis in the main report, the Western Australia example provides little support for the hypothesis that the benefits from electronic immobilisers diffused immediately to other acquisitive crime types. Figure A4.2 shows that, unlike vehicle thefts, recorded burglaries did not start falling earlier in Western Australia. Like burglaries nationally, they continued to rise until the early 2000s and actually peaked a year later (in 2002) than for Australia overall.
**Figure A4.2: Burglary trends in Western Australia and Australia**
The pattern in Figure A4.2 is also reflected in the trend for ‘other theft.’ Numbers of these incidents continued to rise in Western Australia until 2002, after which they fell 22 per cent in four years. This again is very similar to the national picture and perhaps suggests that another factor, affecting Australia more generally, also contributed to the fall in acquisitive crime during the early 2000s. One candidate is the reduction in numbers of heroin users that occurred at this time. Other evidence suggests that trends in heroin use correlated with general acquisitive crime trends in a number of countries through the crime turning point (Morgan, 2014). For Australia, available prevalence estimates suggest that numbers of heroin users rose for at least two decades up the late 1990s but then abruptly halved in the early 2000s (Hall et al., 2000a; Degenhardt et al., 2004).
To further examine the effect of the electronic immobiliser legislation in Western Australia, analysis was conducted to look at the breakdown of car thefts by the age of the vehicle stolen. Figure A4.3 shows this breakdown, in comparison to Australia as a whole, for thefts in 2000 and 2008. In 2000, the distribution of car thefts in Western Australia was very similar to that of Australia as a whole, with thieves displaying a clear preference for cars that were between 10 and 20 years old. This is further evidence that the introduction of the early electronic immobilisers from around 1990 had an important impact on criminal behaviour. From this date, there is clear displacement of thefts to older vehicles, though total thefts continued to rise initially. So although Western Australia had earlier legislation, the initial spread of immobilisers was probably quite similar to that seen nationally. By 2008 though, Western Australia shows a distribution that is quite different from the national picture. Nationally, thefts are still skewed towards older vehicles with the mode group being those aged 15–19 years, which is the youngest group of cars that will contain some vehicles without electronic immobilisers. In Western Australia though, the retrofitting scheme (and the compulsion for buyers of older cars to have an electronic immobiliser fitted) appears to have had a clear effect. In Western Australia, the most stolen group in 2008 is the group of vehicles aged 0–4 years.
Overall then, whether the earlier legislation in Western Australia drove an earlier fall in vehicle thefts in that state is debatable, given the trend was heading downwards anyway and up until 2000, there is little evidence that theft patterns were that different from the national picture. But what this evidence does suggest is that by mandating retrofitting as well as installation on new vehicles, Western Australia may have driven a greater fall in thefts in a shorter space of time because the pool of vehicles to which thieves could turn shrunk far more quickly due to the legislation. In Western Australia the peak-to-trough fall in vehicle thefts was 64 per cent and this was achieved by 2009. Nationally, the fall reached 62 per cent by 2013. In this light, Western Australia may also provide a glimpse of what the ‘post-immobiliser’ landscape may look like, once only a negligible number of cars on the road do not have the devices. If Western Australia is representative, it might be expected from the evidence in Figure A4.3 that new cars will be targeted more than older vehicles and that there may be renewed upward pressure on total thefts, given that car thefts in Western Australia increased about 15 per cent between 2008 and 2013. Merseyside
Merseyside provides an illuminating example of a different sort because it is one of the few areas in England and Wales in which vehicle thefts show a different trend from the other high-volume acquisitive crime types: burglary and theft from vehicles. Table A7.3 shows that 41 of the 44 police force areas had peaks in all these acquisitive crimes more or less simultaneously between 1990/91 and 1996/7. The Metropolitan Police Service, West Midlands and South Yorkshire each have one crime type that peaks at a different time, but Merseyside is the major exception. None of its crime types peaks in the early 1990s. As Figure A4.4 shows, burglary and thefts from vehicles peaked in the mid-1980s, while theft of vehicles was largely flat (with some volatility) through till 2000 when it began to fall sharply.
Figure A4.4: Acquisitive crime trends in Merseyside, England
Previous Home Office research has suggested that a possible explanation for the different trends in Merseyside is that it had a different trajectory of heroin use compared to most of the rest of the British Isles (Morgan, 2014). Merseyside had a steep increase in the number of heroin users in the early 1980s in line with several other parts of the UK, including Manchester and Glasgow (Parker, 1998). But Addicts Index data suggest that by the 1990s, Merseyside was the only area in England and Wales in which the heroin problem was in decline (Morgan, 2014). By contrast, most other areas experienced their sharpest increase in heroin users during the late 1980s/early 1990s (ibid.).
In this context, however, the Merseyside example is interesting because, regardless of its different trends up to that point, Merseyside still has a substantial fall in vehicle thefts from 2000, at the point in which the modelling in this report suggests that the main effect of electronic immobilisers would be likely to occur. Appendix 5: Other reasons for the rise and fall in vehicle crime
This appendix explores other factors that may have been important drivers of vehicle crime trends in England and Wales. It is broken up into six sections: opportunity, economics, drugs, policing, prison and other factors.
Opportunity
Figure 5 showed that between 1975 and 1990 the trend in vehicle thefts tracked the increasing trend in cars on the road to a reasonable degree. This does not, of course, prove that there was any relationship, but it is perhaps suggestive that an increasing number of targets, and hence opportunity for criminality, probably played some role in that long-term increase. Similarly, for thefts from vehicles, the data presented in this report suggest that when victims and manufacturers increased the opportunity for criminality by putting reasonably valuable and easily-stolen stereos into vehicles during the 1970s and 1980s, thefts increased at an even faster rate than numbers of vehicles on the roads.
However, there is less evidence to suggest that opportunity played an important role in the sharp rise and then fall in vehicle crime that occurred in the majority of police force areas during the 1990s. Department for Transport statistics show that, having risen every year from the end of World War 2, the number of licensed vehicles on the road in Great Britain actually fell from 1990 to 1992, during the period when both thefts of and from vehicles saw their sharpest increases. This fact, which was almost certainly due to the recession of the time, does not suggest that opportunity – in its simplest sense – was driving the vehicle crime trend. The rising trend in licensed vehicles resumed in 1993. Between 1993 and 2014, around 8 million more cars have been registered, so the decline in thefts is nothing to do with the number of vehicles on the road. It must have been due to security and/or other factors.
Economics
There is a huge literature on the relationship between economic factors and crime. The results remain inconclusive and much debated.
Much of the debate reflects the fact that economic conditions correlated strongly with the rise in crime in the early 1990s, the sharp turning point and then the long fall in crime through to 2008. The correlation ended at that point, however. This is demonstrated by Figure A5.1, which shows unemployment in England and Wales (proxied by male claimant count) and numbers of recorded burglaries. The two series show a strong correlation for most of the period, and especially during the early 1990s. But there was no rise in crime during the 2008 recession. This suggests either that the earlier correlation was spurious or that by the time of the later recession, the relationship had either ended or changed in some way. For example, there is some evidence that the 2008 recession was different from previous recessions. Unemployment rose in 2008, but not by nearly as much as in the early 1990s; and though cuts to household consumption were actually worse than in previous recessions, the type of reductions were different, with a greater reliance on cutting back on nondurable expenditure and less of an effect on durable items (Crossley et al., 2013). This could suggest that people were not finding it as hard to purchase essential items like food. Also, as US criminologist Richard Rosenfeld has argued, the economy entered the 2008 recession with historically low levels of inflation (Rosenfeld, 2014). This was the opposite of earlier downturns, which had shown stronger links with crime. Perhaps even more importantly, as the Institute of Fiscal Studies has shown, income inequality actually decreased from 2008 to 2012 (in sharp contrast to earlier recessions) as real earnings for those in work fell, while benefits and tax credit incomes remained robust (Cribb et al., 2013). So if income inequality or bottom-decile incomes are important factors (as suggested by Machin and Meghir in a 2004 paper), then it may not be surprising that there was no obvious crime rise during the 2008 downturn.
Regardless of what happened in 2008 though, unemployment is one of the few data series that offers compelling correlation with vehicle crime (and other types of theft) during the sharp rise and fall in numbers of offences during the early 1990s. Given that this report has found little correlation with security or opportunity trends during that period (though both are clearly important at other times), the early 1990s recession and swift recovery must remain potentially important factors in explaining the vehicle crime turning point. Policing
If changes in policing have been important in driving vehicle crime trends, there are probably two ways in which this could have happened. Firstly, there could be a relationship with police resources. This is a fairly obvious formulation: if police resources increase, crime might be expected to fall and if resources decrease they might be expected to rise. Many studies have attempted to test this hypothesis with mixed results (see for example: Klick and Tabarrok, 2005; Evans and Owens, 2007). But whatever the specific relationship between crime and police resources, it seems unlikely that it played an important part in the vehicle crime turning point in England and Wales, for the simple reason that there was no marked change in police officer numbers at this point, see Figure A5.2.
Figure A5.2: Crime and police officer numbers in England and Wales
The other way in which policing might affect crime levels is through improved tactics and techniques. This has been cited as a major reason for the crime decline in the US, particularly in New York City (Zimring, 2001; 2012). In England and Wales too, some have linked falling crime to improvements in policing, either via raised detection rates (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2012), or through the increased adoption of problem-solving policing (Economist, 2013). It is beyond the scope of this paper to test these claims, due in part to the fact that it is very difficult to obtain data at the aggregate level on the degree to which police practices (like the adoption of problem-solving policing) have changed. So it remains a possibility that changes to policing played an important part in the overall crime decline. But policing is perhaps unlikely to have been the main cause of the sharp spikes in crime visible at the local-level in the mid 1990s, because that would imply police tactics got markedly worse and then markedly better in a short space of time. Prison
For the most part, studies that have looked at the relationship between incarceration and crime levels have yielded significant but small effects. Overall, they suggest that increases in the prison population have probably played some role in the crime decline but that they are unlikely to be the main driver of trends. The mid 1990s turn-around in crime in England and Wales did coincide with an increase in the prison population and the prison population has continued to rise as crime has continued to fall, see Figure A5.3.
Figure A5.3: Crime and the prison population in England and Wales
Other nations (notably Canada) saw crime turn downwards during the 1990s without raising their prison populations, which suggests the possibility that the correlation in England and Wales is spurious. However, the number of prisoners increased by around 50 per cent between 1993 and 1998, meaning that around 24,000 more individuals were in prison in 1998 than at the crime peak in 1993 (Ministry of Justice, 2013). Table A5.1 shows a breakdown of the sentenced prison population (it does not include prisoners on remand) from 1990 to 2013. It shows that violent and sexual offenders made the biggest contribution to the prison population increases over the whole period. But during the 1990s – when crime turned around – many more offenders of all types were incarcerated. It therefore seems possible that at least some of the most prolific vehicle crime offenders went to prison at this time and that this contributed to the sharply falling vehicle crime rate. Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
Table A5.1: Sentenced prison population by offence groups, 1990 to 2013, England and Wales
| Offence Group | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2013 | Increase 1990-2000 | Increase 1990-2013 | |--------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------|-------------------| | Violence against the person | 7,477| 8,781| 11,217| 15,178| 20,247| 19,473| 50% | 160% | | Sexual offences | 3,018| 3,668| 5,090 | 6,185| 9,304| 10,540| 69% | 249% | | Robbery | 4,052| 5,372| 6,353 | 8,378| 8,834| 8,873| 57% | 119% | | Burglary | 5,885| 5,953| 8,982 | 8,082| 6,857| 7,073| 53% | 20% | | Theft and handling | 3,042| 3,729| 5,044 | 4,126| 3,850| 4,500| 66% | 48% | | Fraud and forgery | 795 | 1,167| 1,016 | 1,454| 1,544| 1,320| 28% | 66% | | Drug offences | 2,829| 4,256| 8,473 | 10,661| 11,064| 10,175| 200% | 260% | | Motoring offences | na | 1,678| 2,328 | 2,163| 931 | 723 | na | na | | Other offences | 3,280| 2,628| 3,723 | 5,289| 7,353| 7,625| 14% | 132% | | Offence not recorded | 3,148| 1,631| 866 | 664 | 887 | 479 | -72% | -85% | | All offences | 33,526| 38,863| 53,092| 62,180| 70,871| 70,781| 58% | 111% |
Sources: Data for 1990 to 1993: Prison Statistics England and Wales (1999), Table 1.7 (motoring offences were included in ‘other offences’). Data for 1994 to 2004: Offender management caseload statistics England and Wales 2004, Table 8.2. Data for 2005 to 2013: Annual prison population (2013), Table A1.3b.
Drugs
Heroin and crack-cocaine use has been linked to the rise and fall in vehicle crime in both England and Wales (Morgan, 2014) and in the US (Blumstein and Rosenfeld, 2008). Certainly, available surveys of heroin/crack-cocaine users show a high self-reported volume of thefts of and from vehicles. Table A5.2 shows the total self-reported offending by a cohort of 1,699 heroin and/or crack-using arrestees in England and Wales during a 12-month period from the mid 2000s.
Table A5.2: Self-reported annual offending by regular heroin/crack-using arrestees in England and Wales
| Offence Group | Total offences | Offences per individual | |------------------------|----------------|-------------------------| | Domestic Burglary | 2,352 | 1.4 | | Commercial Burglary | 4,396 | 2.6 | | Theft of Vehicle | 2,662 | 1.6 | | Theft from Vehicle | 5,931 | 3.5 | | Theft from Person | 2,528 | 1.5 | | Robbery | 719 | 0.4 | | Shoplifting | 300,952 | 177.1 | | Other Theft | 43,335 | 25.5 | | Violence | 2,212 | 1.3 | | Criminal Damage | 13,443 | 7.9 | | Total | 378,530 | 223 |
Source: Home Office Arrestee Survey, 2006. Similar results have been found in other studies (see Morgan, 2014 for a review) and certainly suggest that any changes in the number of heroin/crack users may have had an important effect on the rise and fall of vehicle crime, given that numbers of heroin/crack users increased from the low thousands to the hundreds of thousands in both the UK and the US. Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008) noted that the high correlation between violence and theft of vehicles in the US may have been due to declining crack markets and the fact that stolen vehicles were often traded for drugs (see Jacobs, 1999). Morgan (2014) has suggested that the heroin epidemic may have contributed to the rise and fall in acquisitive crime (including vehicle crime) in England and Wales, noting that peaks in heroin use tended to coincide with peaks in theft both locally and internationally, which could explain some of the variations in trend, notably the fact that Merseyside peaks earlier than the rest of England and Wales (see Appendix 4) and the earlier peak in theft in the US and the later peak in Australia.
However, data difficulties mean it is hard to track the progress of drug epidemics precisely. Epidemic models suggest numbers of users can both increase and decrease very quickly at the local level, which would fit with the ‘spikes’ in crime shown in Figure A3.3, but it is hard to measure the national peak in heroin/crack use precisely. In that light, the changes to both unemployment and the prison population may be important. Evidence suggests a link between job markets and heroin spread (Parker et al., 1987; Pearson, 1987), so the vastly improved unemployment situation from 1993 may have helped to curtail numbers of new users; and given the highly prolific level of offending by some heroin/crack users (Table A5.2), if even a proportion were incarcerated during the rise in the prison population from 1993, this could have had a marked effect on crime levels.
One objection to the hypothesis that heroin/crack use may have played a role in driving vehicle crime trends is that drug use is not particularly compatible with joy-riding, and so if joy-riding was the major component of vehicle thefts it is unlikely that drug use would play a role.
The evidence shows, however, that thefts of vehicles typically made up about 10–15 per cent of all vehicle crime on the CSEW, hence joy-riding is far from the main component of all vehicle crime. Indeed, the proportion of thefts committed purely for joy-riding (or for reasons other than financial gain) is hard to quantify, but Figure 17 shows that the sharp rise in crime was more due to with economically motivated offending than joy-riding. In interviews with car thieves from the early 1990s, Light et al., (1993) found that although excitement and relief from boredom were the main reasons for first stealing a car, the main reason for continuing in car crime was listed as “money”. Arguably the latter would probably account for the majority of offences, given that crime is generally skewed to a few highly prolific offenders.
In the US, evidence suggests joy-riding had reduced markedly by the time vehicle thefts peaked. At the height of the vehicle crime peak in New York in the early 1990s, a hearing that convened a series of experts to discuss the problem, concluded that joy-riding typified the vehicle crime problem “25 years earlier” and that it accounted for only five per cent of vehicle thefts by 1990. “Profit-making” was seen instead as the main motive (Committee on the Judiciary, 1992).
It is probably fair to say though, that while the evidence is stronger for a security effect on theft of vehicles, due to the research on electronic immobilisers particularly, the evidence regarding heroin/crack use is probably stronger for theft from vehicles. There is considerable evidence to suggest heroin/crack users committed large amounts of stereo thefts from cars (Ball and Wikngaart, 1994; Akhtar and South, 2000). And areas like Merseyside and the US, that had a heroin epidemic peak before 1990, often had peaks in burglary and theft (including thefts from vehicles) at the same time. But their peaks in thefts of vehicles did not correlate with trends in heroin use and instead peaked far later (though in line with the peak in the crack-cocaine epidemic in the case of the US). For those areas that had heroin peaks after 1990, however – like most parts of England and Wales and Australia – the drug trends seem to correlate well with all types of theft, including thefts of vehicles. It is not totally clear why this should be the case, but one possibility is that when heroin use peaked in the 1970s in the US and in the early 1980s in Merseyside, theft of vehicles was still dominated by joy-riding and hence was less affected by the epidemic. But after that point, as rates of joy-riding declined and financial motivations increased, vehicle theft trends became more aligned with heroin/crack trends. Part of this story may also involve the development of a new market for stolen cars from 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down and opened up a new source of illegal demand from Eastern Europe.
Other
This appendix has summarised some of the other factors that have been suggested as possible causes of the fall in vehicle crime (and other types of crime) in developed nations around the world. But there are many more and it is beyond the scope of this report to examine them all in great detail. This final section will simply note therefore that many of the other theories for crime’s decline involve long-term or generational impacts, which are generally not consistent with the sharp crime spikes seen in Figures 5 and A3.3.
One of these is demographic change. There is some evidence that the number of young males in the population shifted downwards shortly before crime fell in England and Wales and certainly the ratio of old to young increased through the crime drop. This may therefore have contributed to the overall shift from rising to falling crime, but arguably it cannot have happened quickly enough to offer a compelling explanation for the sharp reversal in vehicle crime that occurred in the 1990s.
The same can be said of theories relating that operate on a generational basis like the lead hypothesis offered by Nevin in a 2007 paper or the abortion hypothesis put forward by Donuhue and Levitt (2001). These approaches argue that a significant change occurred a generation before the crime drop (a marked drop in atmospheric lead levels in the case of the first hypothesis and the legalisation of abortion in the case of the second), which would have lowered the crime propensity of later generations and caused falling crime.
It should be acknowledged that there is considerable evidence to support the notion of a generational change in relation to the crime drop in England and Wales. Certainly the decline has occurred in line with falls in risky behaviours of all kinds (speeding, traffic accidents, alcohol use, smoking, etc.) which suggests a general attitudinal change amongst young people may have occurred (Mishra et al., 2009; HM Government Horizon Scanning Programme, 2014). But again, whilst this may be a hugely important part of the story of the crime decline overall, it does not offer a compelling explanation for the sharp shifts in trends that occurred around the crime turning point. Generational change, almost by definition, has to be gradual.
1. Initial analysis
Looking at the national police recorded crime dataset for ‘theft of motor vehicle’ (TOMV), ‘theft from motor vehicle’ (TFMV) and burglary, with 41 forces aggregated(^67), an initial model(^68) was formulated as follows:
[ (A) \\quad Y = a + bU + cV + dT ]
where,
- (Y) = TOMV
- (U) = TFMV
- (V) = Burglary
- (T) = time (in calendar years)
| Parameter | B | Std. Error | t | Sig. | 95% Confidence Interval | Partial Eta Squared | |-----------|-------|------------|-------|------|-------------------------|---------------------| | Intercept | 43740.413 | 18231.374 | 2.399 | .023 | 6506.980 - 80973.845 | .161 | | sum_Burglary | .240 | .045 | 5.306 | .000 | .148 - .333 | .484 | | sum_TFMV | .310 | .053 | 5.809 | .000 | .201 - .419 | .529 | | Time | -5169.181 | 410.025 | -12.607 | .000 | -6006.564 - 4331.797 | .841 |
The findings in Table A6.1 show that burglary and TFMV are significant predictors of TOMV. The coefficient on the ‘Time’ variable indicates that over the whole time period there was a decline in (Y) (TOMV) after taking account of (U) (TFMV) and (V) (Burglary). It implies that for every year the number of vehicles stolen above what (U) and (V) predict decreases by 5,169 (CI=4,332 and 6,007), i.e. at (T=1) there were 5,169 fewer vehicles stolen than (U) and (V) alone would predict, at (T=2) there were 2 x 5169 fewer, etc.
However, further inspection of the data revealed a problem with this approach. This is illustrated in Figure A6.1, which shows the ratio of (Y/U) and (Y/V) by time across all forces.
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(^67) The aggregated force-level dataset used in this analysis comprised of PRC crime totals for 41 forces. City of London, British Transport Police and Wiltshire were excluded for reasons of missing data or small geographical size.
(^68) As a general rule (except for multi-level models), the models were run as General Linear Models (GLM) rather than as (traditional) linear regression, to take advantage of the robustness of the GLM procedure when it comes to model definition. The graph shows that the ratios are not constant over time. Overall, both lines fall from the beginning of the series to the end. This in itself is not a problem. It merely suggests that something reduced TOMV more than burglary and TFMV over the period – at an average rate of about 5,000 fewer offences per year. The problem is that the lines are not linear, as was assumed in the initial model. The rate of decrease also varies with time. Therefore, a better model would allow for this variation across time. In particular, we want to test whether the non-linearity in the downward trend matches the evidence on electronic immobilisers. Put more simply – does TOMV start falling faster than the other crimes once electronic immobilisers are introduced and begin to spread through the vehicle fleet.
The chart also shows that the ratio of Y/U falls very sharply at the beginning of the series. Whilst this could be due to changes in vehicle security that affected TOMV but not TFMV it is probably more likely that most of the effect is caused by an increased rate of TFMV reporting, as outlined in the main report. Crime Survey data for that period showed clearly that a greater percentage of TFMV were reported to the police in the early 1990s than in the early 1980s. Using U as a ‘general theft propensity’ variable is therefore problematic. It was therefore excluded from the final research hypothesis and model – as outlined below - and burglary alone was used as the proxy for ‘general theft propensity’.
2. Research hypothesis
The research hypothesis was developed as follows.
- There is a time-varying (latent) variable Z, which is an underlying measure of “propensity for general theft” that cannot be measured directly but which affects both
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69 In addition, analysis revealed that the relationship between Y/V and Y/U varies greatly by force. Therefore, it seemed inappropriate to try and combine them all into a single model that takes into account the variation at force level and at the same time is meaningful and relatively easy to interpret. The analysis presented is therefore based on the aggregate (national) dataset where all forces have been combined per year, thus removing the force-level variation. Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
TOMV (Y) and burglary (V).
- Some unknown function of Z, affects V across the whole period from 1980 to 2013.
- V can be thought of as a function of Z (and also of time T, as there may be some other time-varying effect on V other than the function of Z).
- Y is also a function of Z (and T). However, unlike for V, we hypothesise that at an unknown time point t0, the introduction of electronic immobilisers changes Y (but not V). In other words, this modelling assumes no displacement or diffusion; the introduction of electronic immobilisers is assumed to have no effect on burglary.
- Therefore, up to t0, Y is only a function of Z and T (general theft propensity), but after t0, Y becomes a function of Z, T and also a new time-varying variable which we will call X (the electronic immobiliser variable).
- Given the other evidence showing a possible acceleration of the immobiliser effect when a majority of vehicles became protected, we hypothesise that there would be two discontinuities. It is important to note that does not mean there genuinely are only two. The modelling is set up with the presumption that there are two discontinuities and we test merely whether they are significant and what their effects are.
3 The model
The final model was therefore:
\[ Y = a^*V + b0^* V^\* D0^\* (T-t0) + b1^\* V^\* D1^\* (T-t1) \]
where:
- V=burglary
- Y=TOMV
- t0=1992
- t1=2004
- D0=0 if T\<t0 & D0=1 if T>=t0
- D1=0 if T\<t1 & D0=1 if T>=t1
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) was used to identify the “most likely” years where discontinuity takes place (T0 and T1), i.e. it identifies years in which the trend in TOMV changes in a way that would not be expected by the trend in burglary. This is in order to identify potential effects from the introduction and spread of electronic immobilisers. It is an iterative process equivalent to fitting models hypothesising a discontinuity in each and every year of the time
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70 This model does not have T in it directly and ideally should be a no-intercept model so that Y becomes directly proportional to V (i.e. if V is zero, then Y is zero irrespective of time). Also, the model did not include a time slope before the discontinuity, i.e. time was not included as a main effect. Therefore it was assumed that before the intervention, Y is just a constant multiple of V; any changes in time in V will automatically be expressed as changes in time in Y. After the intervention, the multiplier will start to decrease. A version of the model was also run with both the intercept and the “time-slope” included and neither was significant, which is in line with the assumption of a common factor driving all types of theft. series (34 years in total), and picking the model with the “best fit”. The MLE was set up to find the “best model” when allowing for two point-changes.
4 Results
The MLE resulted in $t_0=1992$ and $t_1=2004$. This means that the model with these specific change points results in the best fit, which in this case translates to the minimum “Root Mean Square Error (RMSE)”.
This means, in effect, that the best-fit discontinuities are in line with other evidence on the introduction and spread of electronic immobilisers, i.e. the devices were introduced in England and Wales in around 1992 and had spread to half the vehicle fleet by the early 2000s. Model results are shown below:
Table A6.2: Main model results
| Parameter Estimates | 95% Confidence Interval | |---------------------|-------------------------| | Parameter | B | Std. Error | t | Sig. | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | Partial Eta Squared | | sum_Burglary | .447 | .005 | 83.356| .000 | .436 | .458 | .996 | | sum_Burglary * d_1992 * t_1992 | -.008 | .001 | -6.907| .000 | -.010 | -.005 | .606 | | sum_Burglary * d_2004 * t_2004 | -.016 | .004 | -4.153| .000 | -.024 | -.008 | .357 |
The interpretation is as follows:
- up to the first change (1992), $Y$ (TOMV) can be predicted as being 44.7 per cent of the value of $V$ (burglary)
- between 1992 and 2004, this reduces by 0.8 percentage points per year
- from 2004, the rate of reduction increases by a further 1.6 percentage points per year, so a 2.4 percentage point reduction per year in total.
In other words, the model suggests that from the introduction of electronic immobilisers in 1992, TOMV starts falling at a slightly faster rate than theft generally (as proxied by burglary). But the effect is quite small until around 2004, when TOMV starts falling at a much faster rate, relative to burglary.
To more directly visualise the effect of the spread of electronic immobilisers relative to other factors, it is helpful to partition the model-predicted $Y$ into its two components: $Y_z$ (i.e. the part of TOMV that burglary can predict) and $Y_x$ (i.e. the part of TOMV that is over and above what burglary can predict):
a) prediction of TOMVs if no intervention: $Y_z = a^\*V$ Figure A6.2 shows Y together with the model-predicted value for Y and also the model-predicted value for Yz.
**Figure A6.2: Police recorded burglary and theft of vehicles, modelled theft of vehicles and estimated trend in theft of vehicles in the absence of electronic immobilisers**
Comparing the blue (Y) and green (predicted Y) lines, we can confirm that the model fits very well for all time points. The red dotted line shows Yz. This is the same as the predicted Y up to 1992 (i.e. the green and red lines are the same); after 1992, the red dotted line shows the estimated number of thefts of vehicles if electronic immobilisers had not been introduced. Note that it still falls considerably from its level during the early 1990s. This implies that ‘general theft propensity’ decreased from that point, but that electronic immobilisers had an additional effect.
b) prediction of prevented TOMVs after intervention: ( Y_x = b_0 V^*(T-t_0) + b_1 V^*(T-T_1) )
Figure A6.3 shows Yx after 1992 (i.e. the change in Y that cannot be predicted by V), together with Yz, Y and predicted Y. Yx can be seen as a direct estimate of the number of TOMV offences prevented by electronic immobilisers. Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime
Figure A6.3: Theft of vehicles, actual and modelled, and the estimated number of thefts prevented by immobilisers
Source: ONS, police recorded crime.
Reading from the chart above, the actual numbers for 2013 are $Y_z=196,100$ and predicted $Y=62,887$. This implies that without electronic immobilisers ‘theft of vehicle’ volumes would be about three times higher than they currently are, demonstrating the marked effect of immobilisers.
But this analysis suggests that the downward shift in ‘general theft propensity’ contributed even more to the drop in TOMV offences. The black line (prevented TOMVs: $Y_x$) goes down from 0 (in 1992) to -133,213 (at 2013), implying that 133,213 vehicle thefts in 2013 were prevented by electronic immobilisers. The modelled number of total vehicle thefts fell by about 539,000 between 1992 and 2013 (shown by the fall in the green line). Taken together, these results suggest that around a quarter of the fall in vehicle thefts (133,213/539,000) from 1992 to 2013 can be attributed to electronic immobilisers. In reality this may be a lower bound for the actual effect because of the assumption that no benefits from electronic immobilisers diffused to burglary.(^{71})
(^{71}) Note that this estimate is calculated in a slightly different way from the one in Chapter 3, as it takes a proportion of the total fall from 1993 to 2013 attributable to electronic immobilisers, rather than calculating a separate proportion for each year and aggregating. However, the current method was re-run calculating the proportion for each year and aggregating and the result was almost identical: 23 per cent of the fall was attributable rather than 25 per cent. We therefore use 23 per cent in the main report. 5 Conclusion
The results from this section suggest that there has been a strong relationship between trends in burglary and vehicle theft from 1980 to 2013. This implies that a factor or factors affecting general propensity for theft played an important role in both the rise and fall in crime.
However, the results also show the presence of an additional factor depressing levels of vehicle theft from 1992, which is in line with the introduction of electronic immobilisers. Results suggest that these devices prevented more thefts year on year from 1992 and that their effectiveness accelerated further from 2004, once a majority of vehicles were protected. Overall, the results imply that at least a quarter of the total decline in vehicle thefts between 1992 and 2013 were directly attributable to the devices even assuming no diffusion of benefits. Appendix 7: Technical Appendix
This technical appendix contains additional methodological details and findings.
1. Police recorded crime trends used in this report
This brief section gives details of the recorded crime trends used in this report including how recording practice and crime-type changes were incorporated.
For ‘theft of vehicles’ counts of crime type 48: ‘Theft or unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle’ were used. In 1992 the offence of ‘aggravated vehicle taking’ was created (code: 37.2) and these were also included in the annual totals as these were offences that would previously have been incorporated into crime type 48. In 1998/99 the offence of ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ was made notifiable. This offence, which was created in the 1981 Criminal Attempts Act, was a summary offence prior to 1998/99 and therefore would not have appeared in total police recorded crime figures. It includes “recorded crime offences where there is evidence of intent to commit either theft of or from a vehicle or taking without consent (TWOC), but there is either (i) no evidence of intent to commit one of these three offences specifically, or (ii) there is evidence of intent to commit TWOC (TWOC is a summary offence but, under the provisions of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, it is not legally valid to have an attempted summary offence)” (Home Office, 2010). In other words, a proportion of attempted theft of vehicles (those that were not intended to be permanent thefts) would be included in ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ rather than in ‘theft of vehicles’, but they should have been excluded from the latter throughout the period 1981 to 2013/14. This means that the trend in crime type 48, with the addition of crime type 37.2 should be unbiased throughout the series – it will not include all attempted thefts but the types of thefts excluded should remain constant. However, in practice this may not have occurred, according to (Povey et al., 1998). They write that making ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ a notifiable offence may have caused some forces to shift offences previously recorded as (attempted) ‘theft of vehicle’ into the new category. To investigate this, the trend in ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ was examined along with trends in total recorded vehicle thefts and a count of the police-recorded attempted thefts that were included in crime type 48 (the main ‘theft of’ category). The latter was obtained from a supplementary data collection that ran from 1996 to 2002/03. These trends are shown in Figure A7.1 below. Figure A7.1: Police recorded trends in vehicle thefts, attempted thefts and vehicle interference and tampering
Figure A7.1 shows that from 2002/03 onwards ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ has a similar trend to total vehicle thefts. Both fell by around 75 per cent between 2002/03 and 2013/14. Between 1998/99 and 2002/03 though, ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ rises sharply. There are two possible reasons for this. The first is that, as suggested in Povey et al. (1999), there was some transference from ‘theft of vehicle’ into ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ during that period. Looking at the proportion of total thefts that were recorded as attempts, this remained constant at around 11.5 per cent of total thefts in 1996 and 1997, but from then on it fell sharply – i.e. the green line in Figure A7.1 declines more sharply than the blue line. This suggests that some attempted thefts may have moved into ‘vehicle interference and tampering’. One way to estimate the degree of transference is to assume that if the new crime category had not been introduced, the proportion of attempted thefts recorded within ‘theft of vehicle’ would have remained constant. Assuming this, it is possible to estimate an adjusted trend in ‘theft of vehicles’. This is shown in Figure A7.2. Figure A7.2 suggests that although the introduction of ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ may have led to subsequent ‘theft of vehicle’ figures being under-estimated, any effect would have been slight with the degree of deflation ranging from 1.8 per cent to around seven per cent depending on the year.
However, there is another reason why ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ may rise sharply from 1998/99 to 2002/03. During that period all recorded crime was affected by two recording practice changes that culminated in the introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) in 2002. Full details of these changes can be found in Povey et al., (1998) and Simmons et al., (2003). In general though, the changes had the effect of increasing the number of offences recorded. Violence was the crime category most affected, but available evidence suggests that there was also a smaller impact on vehicle crime and burglary, with some crimes being recorded that would not previously have been. Available estimates of these effects are shown in Table A7.1.
Table A7.1: Effects of the recording changes on vehicle crime and burglary
| | 1998/99 change | | | | |----------------------|----------------|----------|----------|----------| | | Old rules total | New rules total | % uplift | | Burglary | 951878 | 953187 | 0.1% | | Theft of vehicles | 390691 | 391611 | 0.2% | | Theft from vehicles | 680937 | 685021 | 0.7% | | | | | | 2002 change | | Theft of and from vehicles | 835000 | 975924 | 9.0% | | Burglary | 870000 | 878547 | 1.0% |
Sources: Povey et al., 1998 Simmons et al., 2003. Table A7.1 shows that the impact of the 1998/99 recording change on burglary and vehicle crime was small; the uplift was less than one per cent in all cases. For the introduction of the NCRS the impact was bigger, though separate estimates were not attempted for theft of and from vehicles. However, separate analyses (see Table 3.04 in Thorpe (2005)) suggests that the majority of the uplift would likely have come from ‘theft from vehicles’ and that ‘theft of vehicles’ was very well reported and recorded even prior to 2002. Table 3.04 in Thorpe (2005) also shows that the impact of the recording changes on recorded attempted thefts may have been much larger. So it could be that the rise in the red line in Figure A7.2 simply represents improved recording of the attempted vehicle thefts (both thefts of and from) that would never have been included in the ‘theft of vehicles’ trend.
In addition, Table A7.1 shows that regardless of the impact of ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ the rule changes would have inflated the vehicle crime and burglary figures slightly (burglary and theft of vehicles would have been affected only marginally, with an uplift of up to 1.5 per cent at most, though there was probably a bigger effect on theft from vehicles). This would have counteracted any transference into ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ to some extent. Indeed, comparison with the CSEW suggests the unadjusted vehicle theft trend gives a better representation of the true trend. The decline from 1993 to 2013/14 on the CSEW is 88 per cent. On the unadjusted PRC trend it is 87 per cent and on the adjusted PRC trend which inflates figures post 1998/99 to account for vehicle interference and tampering, the fall is 86 per cent.72
As a result, the decision was taken, not to adjust the ‘theft of vehicles’ trend to take into account ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ for the purposes of the analyses in this report. This does mean however, that although the trend is very similar to the CSEW trend, see Figure 4, it will not include all attempted vehicle thefts. This is not the only difference between the series. The CSEW does not include offences against commercial targets and offences against individuals in institutions.
To summarise:
- In theory, the fact that ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ became notifiable in 1998/99 should not affect the theft of vehicles trend used in this report because the offences included should have been separate both before and after the change.
- But, evidence suggests some crimes previously recorded as ‘theft of vehicle’ may subsequently have been recorded as ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ during the period from 1998/99 to 2002/03. This would have a small deflationary impact on the ‘theft of vehicles’ trend from 1998/99 onwards.
- However, during the period from 1998/99 to 2002/03 there were two recording practice changes. These would have had a small inflationary impact on the ‘theft of vehicles’ trend from 1998/99 onwards.
- As a result of the evidence presented above, and the fact that the two effects will counterbalance to some extent (a fact supported by looking at the CSEW trend), the decision was
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72 The analysis in the main report suggests a third possible reason why ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ may have risen from 1998 to 2002 without apparent transference from the recorded ‘theft of vehicles’ figures: that attempted TWOC thefts genuinely increased. If this represents the period when electronic immobilisers reached critical mass, attempted thefts may genuinely have risen as more opportunistic thieves were thwarted by the improved security. taken not to try and incorporate any or all of the ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ figures into the ‘theft of vehicles’ trend. But aggravated vehicle taking was included.
For the national and force-level burglary trends used in the main report, the PRC category of ‘total burglary’ was used which incorporates recorded attempts. No further adjustments were made as the likely uplift due to the 1998–2002 recording changes would have been around 1.5 per cent at most.
For theft from vehicles, trends in crime type 45 ‘theft from a vehicle’ were used and no attempt was made to adjust for ‘vehicle interference and tampering’ becoming a notifiable offence (because in theory this should not affect the trend, as explained above). However, an adjustment was made for the recording practice changes in line with the evidence presented in Povey et al., (1998) and Simmons et al., (2003) and set out in Table A7.1 above. The effect of this is shown in Figure A7.3 below. The relevant analyses were also run with the unadjusted figures and results remained broadly the same.
**Figure A7.3: Trends in thefts from vehicles recorded by police showing the adjustment for the recording practice changes**
Sources: ONS, police recorded crime; Povey et al., (1998); Simmons et al., (2003)
2. **Theft rates computed from Car Theft Index Data**
In section 3, statistics relating to theft rates for cars registered in the 1990s and the 1980s are quoted. Table A7.2 provides the data from which these figures were computed. Table A7.2: Theft rates computed from Car Theft Index data
| Year | Total cars registered in the 1980s or before | Theft of cars registered in the 1980s or before | Theft rate per car on the road | Change of theft rate compared with previous year | |-----------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| | 1996 Car Theft Index | 11,864,930 | 337,094 | 0.028 | | | 1997 Car Theft Index | 11,084,781 | 265,767 | 0.024 | -15.6% | | 1998 Car Theft Index | 9,618,991 | 230,319 | 0.024 | -0.1% | | 1999 Car Theft Index | 8,133,109 | 200,975 | 0.025 | 3.2% |
Note that the 1996 Car Theft Index (CTI) employed a slightly different methodology from that used in subsequent years. This resulted in it capturing a slightly lower proportion of all thefts than the other years.
To adjust for this, the number of thefts recorded by the CTI was compared to vehicle thefts in the official police recorded crime (PRC) statistics. There are important differences between these series. The Car Theft Index records thefts of cars only but includes data from Scotland, whereas the police recorded crime data excludes Scotland but includes thefts of other types of vehicle. Also, the Car Theft Index data are recorded on a calendar-year basis whereas PRC switches to financial years in 1998/99. (Hence, the data point shown below as 1998/99 for the red line is actually the 1998 data.) Despite these differences, the two series show similar levels and trends for total numbers of thefts, see Figure A7.4.
Figure A7.4: A comparison of total car thefts recorded by the Car Theft Index and total vehicle thefts recorded by police recorded crime
Sources: Car Theft Index, ONS police recorded crime. The correlation for the two series is very close except that the CTI recorded 87,000 fewer thefts in 1996 due to the different methodology. For the modelling then, the total number of thefts in the 1996 Index was converted to the PRC thefts total, but the distribution of thefts (in terms of age of vehicle) was maintained from the original Car Theft Index data. As such, it should not bias the results unless the missing 18 per cent of thefts had a different age distribution. There seems no obvious reason why this should be the case.
Also, Table A7.2 shows that theft rates for both 1990s-registered and 1980s-registered cars fell between 1997 and 1998 too (though only marginally in the case of the older vehicles). It is only in 1999 that theft rates on older vehicles start to rise, indicating possible displacement consistent with the impact of electronic immobilisers.
3. Calculations for immobiliser effectiveness
In section 3 of the main report, modelling of immobiliser impact is calculated using a range from “20 per cent effectiveness” to “80 per cent effectiveness.” This was calculated by assuming that vehicles without electronic immobilisers continued to be stolen at the same rate as they were before the devices began appearing on any vehicles (adjusted for age using the 1996 Car Theft Index distribution as explained in the main report).
For vehicles that did have electronic immobilisers the same method and theft rates were used but they were multiplied by a given fraction depending on the level of effectiveness. So for the “20 per cent effectiveness” model, all theft rates for vehicles with immobilisers were multiplied by 0.8 to give a 20 per cent reduction. In the “40 per cent effectiveness” model, the multiplier was 0.6, and so on.
4. The sequencing of peaks for all police force areas in England and Wales
Table A7.3 gives the full results for the analysis of sequencing at a police force area level. The datasets used for this analysis contained counts of crimes in each financial year and the peak year is shown for burglary, theft of vehicle, theft from vehicle and other theft. Areas in which theft of vehicle peaked at the same time or before the other crime types were coded as being in accordance with a diffusion of benefits hypothesis. Table A7.3: Crime peaks for theft offences by police force area
| Police Force Area | Burglary | Theft of Vehicle | Theft from Vehicle | Other Theft | Fits with Immobiliser sequencing | |-------------------|----------|------------------|--------------------|-------------|---------------------------------| | Avon and Somerset | 1992/93 | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 | NO | | Bedfordshire | 1992/93 | 1993/94 | 1991/92 | 1996/97 | NO | | Cambridgeshire | 1993/94 | 1995/96 | 1996/97 | 1991/92 | NO | | Cheshire | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 | 1999/00 | YES | | Cleveland | 1995/96 | 1993/94 | 1990/91 | 1992/93 | NO | | Cumbria | 1992/93 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | 1991/92 | YES | | Derbyshire | 1993/94 | 1995/96 | 1992/93 | 1992/93 | NO | | Devon and Cornwall| 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | NO | | Dorset | 1995/96 | 1990/91 | 1995/96 | 1992/93 | YES | | Durham | 1995/96 | 1993/94 | 1991/92 | 1993/94 | NO | | Dyfed-Powys | 1992/93 | 1992/93 | 1992/93 | 1991/92 | NO | | Essex | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | 1991/92 | 2000/01 | NO | | Gloucestershire | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 2000/01 | YES | | Greater Manchester| 1992/93 | 1992/93 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | NO | | Gwent | 1997/98 | 1993/94 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | NO | | Hampshire | 1992/93 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | 1992/93 | YES | | Hertfordshire | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | 1995/96 | 1991/92 | NO | | Humberside | 1993/94 | 1994/95 | 1993/94 | 1991/92 | NO | | Kent | 1995/96 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | YES | | Lancashire | 1996/97 | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | NO | | Leicestershire | 1994/95 | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 | NO | | Lincolnshire | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | 1992/93 | NO | | Merseyside | 1986/87 | 1987/88 | 1987/88 | 1995/96 | NO | | Metropolitan | 1992/93 | 1982/83 | 1992/93 | 1991/92 | (YES) | | Norfolk | 1993/94 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | 2000/01 | YES | | North Wales | 1992/93 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 | 1991/92 | NO | | North Yorkshire | 1994/95 | 1995/96 | 1994/95 | 1995/96 | NO | | Northamptonshire | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | NO | | Northumbria | 1991/92 | 1991/92 | 1990/91 | 1985/86 | NO | | Nottinghamshire | 1993/94 | 1991/92 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | YES | | South Wales | 1992/93 | 1994/95 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | NO | | South Yorkshire | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 1984/85 | NO | | Staffordshire | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 | 2000/01 | YES | | Suffolk | 1993/94 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 | YES | | Surrey | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | 1992/93 | 2000/01 | YES | | Sussex | 1992/93 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | 2000/01 | YES | | Thames Valley | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | NO | | Warwickshire | 1992/93 | 1993/94 | 1992/93 | 1991/92 | NO | | West Mercia | 1993/94 | 1993/94 | 1996/97 | 1993/94 | YES | | West Midlands | 1992/93 | 1996/97 | 1987/88 | 2000/01 | NO | | West Yorkshire | 1993/94 | 1991/92 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | YES | | Wiltshire | 1992/93 | 1991/92 | 1993/94 | 1991/92 | YES | Fifteen of 42 forces have sequencing that supports a diffusion of benefits hypothesis and 26 have sequencing that runs counter to the hypothesis. Arguably ‘other theft’ is less reliably recorded compared to the other offences. When this crime type is excluded the number of forces with sequencing supporting a diffusion hypothesis rises to 22.
5. Sources for the international times series
Full sources for the data in the international time series used in this report are listed below.
**England and Wales**
Police recorded crime from ONS was used for all years. See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/historical-crime-data](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/historical-crime-data)
**Scotland**
Police recorded crime sourced from the Scottish government was used for all years. This was obtained by email.
**The United States**
Police recorded crime data from the Uniform Crime Reports data tool was used for all years. See: [http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/](http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/)
**Canada**
Police recorded crime data sourced from Statistics Canada. For the years from 1981–2001, data were sourced from Table 1 in this document: [https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/jrst85-002-x2003001-eng.pdf](https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/jrst85-002-x2003001-eng.pdf). For the years after 2001, table 252-0051 was used from here: [http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/COR-COR/COR-COR/objList?lang=eng&srcObjType=SDDS&srcObjId=3302&tgtObjType=ARRAY](http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/COR-COR/COR-COR/objList?lang=eng&srcObjType=SDDS&srcObjId=3302&tgtObjType=ARRAY)
**Australia**
Police recorded crime data sourced from the Australian Institute of Criminology. For the years from 1980 to 1995, data were sourced from this publication: [http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/8/C/D/%7B8CDE7EA6-7019-40D3-BAFA-DA1040BE608C%7DRPP07.pdf](http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/8/C/D/%7B8CDE7EA6-7019-40D3-BAFA-DA1040BE608C%7DRPP07.pdf) and converted from rates to volumes using population data from here: [http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/3105.0.65.0012014?OpenDocument](http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/3105.0.65.0012014?OpenDocument). For the years from 1996 to 1999, data were sourced from this document: [http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/4510.02000?OpenDocument](http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/4510.02000?OpenDocument). For the years from 2000 to 2009 data were sourced from here: [http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/4510.02009?OpenDocument](http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/4510.02009?OpenDocument) and for the remaining years data were sourced from here: [http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/4510.02013?OpenDocument](http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/4510.02013?OpenDocument)
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73 The Metropolitan Police Service supports the hypothesis in the sense that theft of vehicles peaked first, but given that it peaked around a decade earlier than the other crimes, it does not seem likely that ‘diffusion of benefits’ from security devices is a likely reason. The MPS has therefore been excluded from this bit of the analysis. The Netherlands
Recorded crime data on vehicle thefts from RDW (the Netherlands Dept. of Motor Vehicles). Recorded crime data on burglary for 1980–1992 from this paper: http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/people/academic_research/david_farrington/cnscj.pdf with rates converted to volumes using population data from here: http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLEN&PA=37556eng&D1=0,21&D2=81-115&LA=EN&HDR=T&STB=G1&VW=T. Recorded burglary data from 1993 onwards were sourced from Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat).
Sweden
Police recorded crime data for all years sourced from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention. See: http://www.bra.se/bra/bra-in-english/home/crime-and-statistics/crime-statistics/statistical-tables.html
6. Analysis of theft from vehicles trends, looking at possible displacement/diffusion
Figure A7.5 shows a panel of charts with indexed trends in theft of vehicles and theft from vehicles. The aim was to see whether trends in theft from vehicles deviated at the point at which immobilisers would be likely to have their maximum impact. However, data for theft from vehicles could not be sourced for the US, Australia or the Netherlands. For the US, therefore, Figure A7.5 shows theft of vehicles compared to the category of ‘larceny-theft’ which contains thefts from vehicles but also other types of theft. Similarly for Australia, the larger category of ‘other theft’ (which contains thefts from vehicles) was used in Figure A7.5. No suitable category could be found for the Netherlands.
Figure A7.5: Indexed trends in vehicle theft (blue line) and theft from vehicles or the wider category containing that crime type (red line) Figure A7.5 reveals a mixed picture. For the US and Canada, trends in theft from vehicle (or larceny-theft in the case of the US) show little if any deviation when theft of vehicles starts falling in 2006. But for most of the other nations (except Scotland), theft from vehicles (or for Australia, the wider theft category containing that offence) does show signs of deviation from 2000 on, often falling at the same rate as, or slightly slower than, vehicle thefts. There is certainly some support, then, for the theory that benefits from electronic immobilisers diffused to theft from vehicles as well as preventing theft of vehicles. This is in accordance with the evidence that some vehicles are stolen more for their contents than for the vehicle itself (Light et al., 1993). However, in the European nations and Australia, the degree of correlation through the entire series, even back to 1980 so long before immobilisers appeared, is very high. This perhaps suggests that other factors were also involved in driving both trends at certain points.
7. CSEW trends in types of items stolen in ‘theft from vehicle’ offences
Although the CSEW has contained questions on items stolen since 1981, the types of items listed have changed substantially making it difficult to construct consistent trends. Generally, over time, more categories have been added, both to increase precision and to reflect changing technology. For instance, the 1987 survey had only 17 possible categories, while the 2005/06 survey had 68 (Table A7.4).
Crucially, from 1991 onwards respondents were asked what types of vehicle parts/accessories were stolen (Table A7.4). This allows us to know whether these items were stolen from inside or from off the outside of the vehicle. It also potentially allows us to know whether ‘radio/audio equipment’ relates to car stereos or other types of stereo equipment that just happened to be in the vehicle.
Two approaches were used to create meaningful groups of categories.
- **The first** was to use the groupings used in the ONS publication ‘Focus on property crimes’. For surveys back to 2001/02 there is a set of derived variables that automatically give this particular grouping. For surveys back to 1991, the groupings had to be created manually. For surveys before this point, it is not possible to create this grouping as the detail on motor vehicle parts/accessories is required. (Table A7.5)
- **The second** was to condense these groupings into four categories: external fittings and parts (e.g. bumper, wheels, brakes), non-electronic valuables (e.g. purse, cash, jewellery), stereo-hi-fi/car radio, and other items likely to be inside vehicle (e.g. tools, mobile phone, camera). (Table A7.6)
The second grouping revolved around the type of security required to defend against that type of theft. For example, central locking aims to prevent thieves from entering the vehicle. It might therefore be expected that as these devices spread through the vehicle fleet, thefts from inside the car would fall, but thefts of exterior parts might be unaffected. Table A7.4: Stolen item categories for selection of CSEW years
| 1981 | 1987 | 1991 | 1997 | 2001/02 | 2005/06 | |---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------| | Cash | Car/van | Car/van | Car/van | Car/van | Car/van | | Cheque book/credit card | Motorcycle/scooter | Motorcycle/scooter | Motorcycle/scooter | Motorcycle/scooter | Motorcycle/scooter | | Car/van | Vehicle parts | Vehicle parts | Vehicle parts | Vehicle parts | Vehicle parts | | Motorbike/scooter | Handbag | Handbag | Briefcase/handbag | Briefcase/handbag | Briefcase/handbag | | Motor vehicle parts | Wallet | Wallet | Purse/wallet | Purse/wallet | Purse/wallet | | Bicycle | Purse | Purse | Cash | Cash | Cash | | Car radio/car cassette | Cash | Cash (not from meter) | Cheque book | Cheque book | Cheque book | | TV | Money from meter | Money from meter | Credit card | Credit/switch/debit card | Plastic card | | Radios/cassette player | Cheque book/credit card | Cheque book/credit card | Bicycle | Mobile phone | Mobile phone | | Tapes/cassettes | Bicycle | Video equipment | Television | Clothes | Clothes | | Bicycle parts | Video equipment | Video equipment | Television | Documents | Documents | | Personal papers | Television | Television | Stereo/hi-fi | Camera | Video equipment | | Purse/wallet, handbag | Stereo/hi-fi | Camera | Video equipment | Television | Television | | Cameras | Camera | Camera | Computer equipment | Mobile phone | Stereo/hi-fi | | Jewellery | Jewellery | Jewellery | Camera | Camera | Camera | | Garden equipment | Silverware | Silverware | Jewellery | House keys | House keys | | Tools | Other | Tools | Tools | Computer equipment | Computer equipment | | Petrol | Clothes | Clothes | Clothes | CDs/tapes/videos | CDs/tapes/DVDs | | Clothing | Documents | Documents | Documents | House keys | House keys | | Sports equipment | Other | Other | Other | Car keys | Car keys | | Toys | Tools | Tools | Tools | Tools | Tools | | Alcohol | Bicycle | Bicycle | Garden furniture/equipment | Garden furniture | Garden furniture | | Food/tobacco | Bicycle | Garden furniture/equipment | Wheely bin/dustbin | Wheely bin/Dustbin | Wheely bin/Dustbin | | Household equipment | Caravan | Children's toys | Children's toys | Children's toys | Children's toys | | Other items | Other | Other | Other | Other | Other |
**Motor vehicle parts accessories**
| Radio/tape/CD/stereo | Radio/tape/CD/stereo | Radio/tape/CD/stereo | Radio/tape/CD/stereo | |----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------| | In-car telephone | In-car telephone | In-car telephone | In-car telephone | | Two-way radio | Two-way radio | Two-way radio | Two-way radio | | Instruments | Instruments | Instruments | Instruments | | Exterior fittings | Exterior fittings | Exterior fittings | Exterior fittings | | Wheel/tyre | Wheel/tyre | Wheel/tyre | Wheel/tyre | | Tools kept in car | Tools kept in car | Tools kept in car | Tools kept in car | | Mechanical parts | Mechanical parts | Mechanical parts | Mechanical parts | | Fuel | Fuel | Fuel | Fuel | | Other | Other | Other | Other | | Tax disc | Tax disc | Tax disc | Tax disc | | Air bags | Air bags | Air bags | Air bags | | Other | Other | Other | Other |
**Exterior fittings of motor vehicle**
| Bumpers | Bumper | |---------|--------| | Hub caps | Hub caps | | Wheel trims | Wheel trims | | Aerials | Aerials | | Exhaust | Exhaust | | Number plates | Number plates | | Maker's badge | Maker's badge | | Luggage rack | Luggage/bicycle rack | | Wing-mirror | Wing-mirrors | | Wipers | Wipers | | Other | Other | | Lights | Lights | | Other | Other | Table A7.5: Items stolen in ‘theft from vehicle’ offences (by percentage and volume) PERCENTAGES External fittings Stereo/hifi Valuables CDs /Tapes /DVDs Other (non vehicle parts ) Tools Mobile phone (or in-car telephone) Other vehicle parts Wheels /tyres Electrical goods Fuel Hous e keys cam era Tax dis c Hous ehold item s Car keys Vehicle s tolen Garden equipm ent Bicycle food/toiletries /cigarettes
VOLUMES (000s) External fittings Stereo/hifi Valuables CDs /Tapes /DVDs Other (non vehicle parts ) Tools Mobile phone (or in-car telephone) Other vehicle parts Wheels /tyres Electrical goods Fuel Hous e keys cam era Tax dis c Hous ehold item s Car keys Vehicle s tolen Garden equipm ent Bicycle food/toiletries /cigarettes
19 9 1
2 0 10 / 11
2 0 11/ 12
2 0 12 / 13
2 0 13 / 14
19.0
27.9
36.4
31.1
28.4
31.7
30.0
30.4
37.1
34.2
35.4
36.8
38.7
40.5
36.8
36.3
36.6
38.8
30.6
30.9
27.9
23.9
24.6
23.5
23.6
24.8
19.7
18.0
16.7
12.4
11.2
7.5
7.3
4.7
4.4
17.5
19.5
14.8
13.3
16.2
18.1
17.0
20.3
16.8
16.8
15.4
15.2
13.0
16.1
15.2
17.6
19.6
19.2
9.1
11.7
12.7
13.9
10.5
9.6
8.8
7.6
8.4
5.4
6.5
5.5
4.7
18.9
25.7
20.4
15.4
23.1
9.5
7.2
10.0
10.2
7.3
6.8
7.0
8.0
5.0
5.7
5.6
6.0
5.2
7.9
8.4
7.9
6.4
8.3
9.2
9.1
9.0
6.7
5.2
5.4
6.0
5.8
4.4
5.9
5.0
4.5
5.2
1.3
2.9
2.6
2.4
4.1
4.1
5.2
5.5
6.6
4.5
3.5
3.7
3.0
2.7
2.6
2.3
3.1
3.3
5.7
8.4
5.9
4.0
6.7
4.7
3.6
3.8
5.4
7.9
7.7
5.7
7.6
7.7
8.1
9.3
10.4
12.8
3.3
4.1
4.4
7.5
5.9
4.9
2.7
1.5
3.0
3.0
2.5
2.8
3.2
1.7
2.5
2.2
2.3
3.0
0.3
1.0
1.0
0.7
2.0
2.0
1.6
2.8
2.6
2.6
9.4
11.6
14.0
14.8
13.5
16.1
16.0
18.9
2.9
1.0
1.4
2.7
0.8
1.2
1.1
0.8
1.3
0.6
0.9
0.7
0.9
1.1
0.5
1.1 0.8
0.8
1.6
1.0
0.7
1.6
1.2
1.2
1.1
0.7
0.5
0.9
0.4
1.0
1.5
1.1
1.3
1.7
2.3
1.8
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.0
1.3
1.3
1.6
2.0
1.4
1.4
2.3
3.1
1.9
2 0 0 1/ 0 2 2 0 0 2 / 0 3 2 0 0 3 / 0 4 2 0 0 4 / 0 5 2 0 0 5/ 0 6 2 0 0 6 / 0 7
2 0 0 7/ 0 8
2 0 0 8 / 0 9 2 0 0 9 / 10
1.0
19 9 3
0.8
0.4 0.1
0.1
19 9 5
1.3
0.4 0.0
19 9 7
1.0
0.1 0.0
19 9 9
0.8
0.6 0.5
2 0 0 1/ 0 2 2 0 0 2 / 0 3 2 0 0 3 / 0 4 2 0 0 4 / 0 5 2 0 0 5/ 0 6 2 0 0 6 / 0 7
2 0 0 7/ 0 8
20.7
0.9
0.8
1.2
1.3
1.3
1.0
3.7
2.5
1.3
0.3
0.4
0.5
1.7
0.6
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2 0 0 8 / 0 9 2 0 0 9 / 10
19 9 1
19 9 3
19 9 5
19 9 7
19 9 9
2 0 10 / 11
2 0 11/ 12
2 0 12 / 13
2 0 13 / 14
500.6
482.6
695.1
783.1
559.7
416.0
441.0
389.1
356.7
402.3
372.7
338.1
373.2
320.5
342.3
323.9
275.1
263.4
938.9
775.8
770.5
600.7
430.8
360.7
326.8
306.6
291.0
214.1
196.4
160.0
125.7
92.6
63.3
63.9
35.8
31.7
422.1
494.8
368.8
286.3
292.2
265.9
236.2
264.1
197.0
182.5
167.9
144.7
132.1
133.7
129.0
154.8
148.4
138.1
133.9
161.9
165.1
163.5
114.2
105.0
83.9
77.5
69.7
46.1
57.1
41.6
33.6
456.3
651.8
508.5
331.8
416.3
139.6
99.6
130.3
119.9
78.9
74.2
66.6
80.8
41.1
48.2
49.7
45.8
37.2
189.8
213.7
196.6
136.9
149.9
135.3
126.8
117.3
78.0
56.7
58.8
56.9
58.4
36.4
50.1
43.7
34.0
37.6
32.2
74.4
66.0
52.0
73.0
59.9
71.9
71.4
77.0
49.4
38.4
35.6
30.1
22.7
21.8
20.2
23.6
23.6
138.9
212.6
147.8
87.0
119.9
69.5
50.6
48.7
63.8
85.7
84.4
54.0
77.4
64.2
68.3
81.8
78.9
92.4
79.4
102.8
108.7
160.2
105.6
71.5
38.1
20.0
35.5
32.6
27.1
26.4
32.1
14.5
21.5
19.7
17.5
21.5
25.5
15.1
36.7
29.9
21.9
36.8
30.6
28.2
102.6
110.8
141.7
123.1
113.9
142.2
121.2
135.8
21.2
38.0
10.2
14.0
11.6
8.5
12.0
6.4
7.3
5.6
8.4
9.5
8.5
17.7
10.0
6.7
13.1
10.0
10.3
8.4
5.4
5.4
9.7
4.2
9.7
15.2
8.7
11.2
15.0
17.7
12.9
7.1
25.3
69.9
24.2
24.6
19.3
9.8 2.4
1.9
32.3
9.0 0.0
20.6
1.8 0.0
14.0
10.7 9.6
15.5
7.2
14.9
13.7
10.6
15.8
18.4
18.1
13.6
53.8
35.2
16.3
3.7
6.0
6.8
24.6
8.6
6.2
4.0
4.1
0.5
0.4
0.6
0.0
0.4
1.5
0.6
0.0
0.5
0.3
0.4
0.0
1.9
0.0
14.2
14.2
15.7
20.2
11.2
12.1
20.6
23.7
13.9
Source: ONS, Crime Survey for England and Wales.
124
Table A7.6: Trends in items stolen in ‘theft from vehicle’ offences, four categories
| PERCENTAGES | 1991 | 1993 | 1995 | 1997 | 1999 | 2001-02 | 2002-03 | 2003-04 | 2004-05 | 2005-06 | |-------------|------|------|------|------|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------| | External parts | 25% | 24% | 32% | 42% | 34% | 34% | 35% | 33% | 35% | 44% | | Stereo-hifi/car radio | 39% | 31% | 31% | 28% | 24% | 25% | 24% | 24% | 25% | 20% | | Other items inside vehicle | 34% | 44% | 36% | 30% | 45% | 41% | 40% | 43% | 42% | 38% | | Valuables | 17% | 20% | 15% | 13% | 16% | 18% | 17% | 20% | 17% | 17% |
| ESTIMATED VOLUMES (000s) | 1991 | 1993 | 1995 | 1997 | 1999 | 2001-02 | 2002-03 | 2003-04 | 2004-05 | 2005-06 | |--------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------| | External parts | 602 | 596 | 807 | 896 | 605 | 492 | 493 | 425 | 405 | 473 | | Stereo-hifi/car radio | 939 | 778 | 772 | 601 | 432 | 365 | 329 | 308 | 288 | 212 | | Other items inside vehicle | 820 | 1,113| 894 | 642 | 802 | 595 | 562 | 556 | 488 | 413 | | Valuables | 422 | 496 | 369 | 286 | 293 | 269 | 238 | 265 | 195 | 181 |
It is worth pointing out that the ‘external parts’ category in the second grouping (Table A7.6) includes things like tyres and wheels, which are listed as separate items in the published grouping (Table A7.5).
The tentative conclusions in the main report draw from the trends in Table A7.6 and are as follows.
- Trends show that stereo thefts probably peaked in the 1980s (or at the latest 1991) and declined thereafter.
- Thefts of external vehicle parts made up a sizeable component of all thefts from vehicles, featuring in between a quarter and two-thirds of thefts depending on the year.
- For the final years of the rise in thefts from vehicles (1991 to 1993), thefts of other items from inside the car – i.e. not stereos or exterior fittings – drove up theft levels.
- From the crime peak to 2014 thefts of virtually all types of items have fallen. The fall in stereo thefts has been particularly sharp, the decline in thefts of external parts, valuables and electrical goods from inside the car, slightly less so.
In addition, some further conclusions arise from looking at some of the smaller categories in Table A7.5.
- Electrical goods are the one category of good that buck the generally downward trend from the mid 1990s. These rise markedly in the mid-to-late 2000s before falling back slightly in the most recent years. This surge in thefts may be connected to GPS satellite navigation systems becoming commonplace.
- In the most recent period (since 2010), most types of items have seen falling trends, but there are some exceptions. Thefts of valuables have remained fairly stable and thefts of ‘other internal vehicle parts’ have risen. It is not entirely clear what is driving the latter trend.
8. **CSEW trends in theft of vehicle incidents and car security**
One way of calculating rates of vehicle theft according to vehicle security is to, as Farrell *et al.* (2011) do, compare the security features of vehicles stolen, as reported by victims, with the overall security features of households’ main vehicle. For example, if in the population five per cent of vehicles have no security, but this category makes up 50 per cent of stolen vehicles, it is clear that these types of vehicles are stolen at a higher rate than vehicles overall.(^{74})
However, before 2001/02 the CSEW did not ask victims of vehicle theft about the security features of the stolen vehicle. And only from the 1990s onwards did the survey ask about the security features of the household’s most used car or van. Unfortunately, these questions changed for each survey in the 1990s, and the only security components consistently asked about were car alarms and central locking. (Note that no such questions were asked in the survey covering 1997.)
Figure A7.6 shows how throughout the 1990s and 2000s the presence of alarms and/or central locking on households’ main vehicles increased substantially – from 45 to 90 per cent over 15 years.
**Figure A7.6: Proportion of car/van owning households by whether the main car/van had an alarm and/or central locking**
The analysis in the main body of the text assumes that cars/vans without an alarm or central locking were very unlikely to have an electronic immobiliser.
______________________________________________________________________
(^{74}) However, it is important to recognise that even this approach has limitations. Using data on households’ main vehicle as, in effect, data on the entire pool of vehicles will also be slightly biased due to the issues involving theft of non-main vehicles and security improvements made post-theft. Indeed, when we look at households’ main vehicle in the 2001/02 survey, only eight per cent of cars/vans with an electronic immobiliser did not have an alarm or central locking.
**Figure A7.7: Incidence rates of motor vehicle theft, split by whether household’s main car had an alarm and/or central locking**
Source: CSEW.
Note: The black bars are sometimes lower than the other two bars as the ‘all households’ incidence rates include in the denominator households that did not own a motor vehicle in the past 12 months. These households therefore cannot be victims of vehicle theft.
Once vehicle-owning households are split into two groups – those whose main car/van had an alarm and/or central locking, and those whose main car/van did not have either feature – it is straightforward to calculate incidence rates of motor vehicle theft, as shown in Figure A7.7. However, there are a number of potential issues with using these incidence rates to compare the security of vehicles and their risk of theft. Some of the following were mentioned in the main text.
1.) Thefts of motorbikes and scooters are included in the incidence rates, but are not represented in the security questions. Therefore in the main body of the text and for the rest of this appendix rates of theft only relate to cars or vans. However, the method of computing these incidence rates is substantially more time-consuming meaning that only a few key years around the crime peak and fall (1991, 1993, 1999, and 2001/02) were investigated.
2.) Respondents are asked about the household’s **main** car/van, meaning that if a second or third car/van is stolen, the security features of these vehicles are not necessarily represented correctly in the data. This is significant because secondary cars/vans are more likely to have worse security than the household’s primary car/van, and are, therefore, at greater risk of being stolen.
3.) Respondents are asked about the household’s current car. Regardless of whether the stolen vehicle is returned, if a household is a victim of car/van theft it is more likely that the security of the household’s car/van will subsequently increase than if the household had not been victimised. For example, if the vehicle is not recovered, the victim is likely to buy a car/van with improved security, either as a conscious decision to prevent further thefts, or simply as a product of newer vehicles having improved security. Similarly, if a vehicle is recovered, the owner may decide to install security features to prevent further thefts.
4.) A final factor is that other security features not picked up by every wave of the survey, such as mechanical immobilisers, may be more likely on cars/vans without an alarm or central locking than those that did have those features. But the available data suggest this is not the case. In 1991 22 per cent of households whose main car had no alarm/central locking had a mechanical immobiliser, which was very similar to the proportion found for those households whose main car did have an alarm/central locking (24%).
An important question is whether these limitations affect the conclusion – as stated in the main text – that vehicle thefts fell during the 1990s, regardless of security levels. The conclusion seems sensible given that it would be unlikely a household would have a second car with better security than its main car, and it seems even more unlikely that a household would get a car with inferior security after experiencing a vehicle theft. But Figure A7.8 shows the findings from some further analysis on this issue. It shows theft incidence rates for households whose main vehicle had no security for the individual years investigated. The decreases in these rates from the early 1990s to the late 1990s and 2000s are statistically significant (Table A7.7) just as they are when the years are pooled, as shown in the main body of the text. Figure A7.8: Incidence rates of car/van theft for households whose main car/van had no alarm or central locking
Table A7.7: Statistical significance of changes in incidence rates shown in Figure A7.8
| Change between | p value | |------------------------|---------| | 1991 and 1999 | p\<.05 | | 1993 and 1999 | p\<.01 | | 1991 and 2001/02 | p\<.05 | | 1993 and 2001/02 | p\<.01 |
Furthermore, to check that the fall in ‘no-security’ thefts was not being biased by the absence of mechanical immobilisers from the analysis, we re-calculated ‘no-security’ theft rates for two years in which these devices were asked about: 1991 and 1999. So households who had a mechanical immobiliser only were take out of the ‘no-security’ group. This still showed a statistically significant fall in theft rates from the former year to the latter. Aebi, M. (2004). ‘Crime trends in Western Europe from 1990 to 2000’, European journal on criminal policy and research, vol. 10(2-3), pp 163-186.
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d09910746e2a141e17359e41df96f2cf9fa21c29 | Hate Crimes, England and Wales, 2013/14
Byron Creese and Deborah Lader
Kevin Smith (Ed.)
16 October 2014
HOSB: 02/14 POLICE RECORDED CRIME
In accordance with the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007, statistics based on police recorded crime data have been assessed against the Code of Practice for Official Statistics and found not to meet the required standard for designation as National Statistics. The full assessment report can be found on the UK Statistics Authority website. Alongside the Crime in England and Wales, Year Ending March 2014 release, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) published a progress update on actions taken in addressing the requirements set out by the Authority. Further information is provided in the Hate Crimes Data Quality section (Annex A).
For further information about police recorded crime statistics, please email:
[email protected] or write to:
Home Office Statistics, 1st Floor, Peel Building, 2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF.
Home Office Responsible Statistician:
David Blunt, Chief Statistician and Head of Profession for Statistics
Contact via [email protected]
This statistical bulletin is produced to the highest professional standards and is free from political interference. It has been produced by statisticians working in the Home Office Statistics Unit in accordance with the Home Office’s Statement of Compliance with the Code of Practice for Official Statistics, which covers our policy on revisions and other matters. The Home Office Statistics Unit works under the direct line management of the Home Office Chief Statistician, who reports to the National Statistician with respect to all professional statistical matters. Key points
- In 2013/14, there were 44,480 hate crimes recorded by the police, an increase of five per cent compared with 2012/13, of which:
- 37,484 (84%) were race hate crimes;
- 4,622 (10%) were sexual orientation hate crimes;
- 2,273 (5%) were religion hate crimes;
- 1,985 (4%) were disability hate crimes; and
- 555 (1%) were transgender hate crimes.
- It is possible for one hate crime offence to have more than one motivating factor which is why the above numbers sum to more than 44,480 and 100 per cent.
- There were increases in all five of the monitored hate crime strands (race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity) between 2012/13 and 2013/14.
- Much of the increase in race and religious hate crime is likely to be due to a rise in offences in the months immediately following the murder of Lee Rigby in May 2013. Additionally, the police may have improved their recording of crime and the identification of motivating factors in an offence over the last year.
- It is less clear whether the increase in sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity hate crime reflects a real rise in hate crime or improved police identification of these offences. The increase across all three strands may suggest improved identification is a factor. 1 - Introduction
1.1 - OVERVIEW
This publication provides information on the number of hate crimes recorded by the police in England and Wales in 2013/14.
Further information on hate crimes including data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) and figures from the Ministry of Justice can be found in ‘An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales’, released in December 2013.
Hate crimes recorded by the police
Hate crime is defined as ‘any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal characteristic.’ This common definition was agreed in 2007 by the police, Crown Prosecution Service, Prison Service (now the National Offender Management Service) and other agencies that make up the criminal justice system. There are five centrally monitored strands of hate crime:
- race or ethnicity;
- religion or beliefs;
- sexual orientation;
- disability; and
- transgender identity.
Hate crimes are a subset of notifiable crimes that are recorded by the police and make up around one per cent of all crimes (based on police recorded crime figures for 2013/14, see ‘Crime in England and Wales, Year Ending March 2014’).
In the process of recording a crime, police can flag an offence as being motivated by one or more of the five monitored strands above (for example, an offence can be motivated by hostility towards the victim’s race and religion). Figures in this bulletin show both how many hate crime offences the police recorded, and how many motivating factors these offences covered (for more information see Annex A).
Around two per cent of hate crime offences in 2013/14 are estimated to have involved more than one motivating factor.
Hate crimes and racially or religiously aggravated offences
There are some offences in the main police recorded crime collection which can be recorded as racially or religiously aggravated. These are defined by statute and constitute a set of offences which are distinct from their non-racially or religiously aggravated equivalents (the full list of these is shown in Table 1). These racially or religiously aggravated offences are by definition (see above) hate crimes. However, the hate crime collection on which the majority of the bulletin is based has a wider coverage of race and religious hate crime. This is because the hate crime flag described above can be applied to any offence, not just those for which there is a separate racially or religiously aggravated offence for
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1 Estimation from 18 Home Office Data Hub forces who supplied suitable data, see section 2.2 for more information on the Home Office Data Hub. the police to record against. Therefore, the number of race or religious hate crimes in this bulletin will be greater than the total number of police recorded racially or religiously aggravated offences.
Table 1: The five racially or religiously aggravated offences and their non-racially or religiously aggravated equivalents
| Racially or Religiously Aggravated | Non-Racially or Religiously Aggravated Equivalent | |-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| | Offence code | Offence | Offence code | Offence | | 8P | Racially or religiously aggravated assault with injury | 8N | Assault with injury | | 105B | Racially or religiously aggravated assault without injury | 105A | Assault without Injury | | 8M | Racially or religiously aggravated harassment | 8L | Harassment | | 9B | Racially or religiously aggravated public fear, alarm or distress | 9A | Public fear, alarm or distress | | 58J | Racially or religiously aggravated other criminal damage | 58A | Criminal damage to a dwelling | | | | 58B | Criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling | | | | 58C | Criminal damage to a vehicle | | | | 58D | Other criminal damage |
Source: Police recorded crime, Home Office
Racist incidents recorded by the police
This release contains figures on the number of racist incidents reported to police forces in England and Wales (excluding British Transport Police). A ‘racist incident’ is any incident, including any crime, which is perceived by the victim or any other person to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person’s race or perceived race.
Racist incidents include notifiable offences, non-notifiable offences (e.g. some types of anti-social behaviour), incidents that were not subsequently recorded as crimes and ‘no crimes’(^2). Conversely, certain race hate crimes may not have been initially recorded as racist incidents if the racial motivation was not immediately apparent. For these reasons, the racist incidents total does not match the race hate crimes total.
(^2) A no-crime occurs when the police have originally recorded an offence, but have subsequently determined that the crime did not take place, or was recorded in error. Offences may be no-crimed in one of the following situations: 1) The crime was committed outside the jurisdiction of the police force in which it was recorded. In this case it will be no-crimed and referred to the appropriate force; 2) additional verifiable information becomes available that determines that no notifiable crime has been committed; 3) The crime is part of a crime that has already been recorded; 4) An incident has been recorded as a crime by mistake; 5) The crime was one of assault (not more serious than actual bodily harm) and there is clear evidence that the offender acted in self defence. 2 - Hate Crimes
2.1 – PREVALENCE AND TRENDS
There were 44,480 hate crimes recorded by the police in England and Wales in 2013/14, an increase of five per cent compared with 2012/13 (42,236 offences; see Table 2).
Table 2: Hate crimes recorded by police by monitored strand, 2011/12 to 2013/14
| Hate crime strand | 2011/12 | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | % change 2012/13 to 2013/14 | |-------------------------|---------|---------|---------|-----------------------------| | Race | 36,008 | 35,889 | 37,484 | 4 | | Religion | 1,621 | 1,573 | 2,273 | 45 | | Sexual orientation | 4,364 | 4,261 | 4,622 | 8 | | Disability | 1,753 | 1,843 | 1,985 | 8 | | Transgender | 310 | 361 | 555 | 54 | | Total number of motivating factors | 44,056 | 43,927 | 46,919 | 7 | | Total number of hate crimes | N/A | 42,236 | 44,480 | 5 |
Source: Police recorded crime, Home Office
Table notes:
1. A breakdown of 2011/12 data by police force area is available from [https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crimes-england-and-wales-2011-to-2012-2](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crimes-england-and-wales-2011-to-2012-2)
Table 2 also shows the number of hate crimes broken down by monitored strand. It is possible for a crime to have more than one motivating factor (for example an offence may be motivated by hostility towards the victim’s race and religion). Thus, as well as recording the overall number of hate crimes, the police also collect data on the number of motivating factors by strand as shown in Table 2.
In 2013/14, of the 44,480 hate crimes:
- 37,484 (84%) were race hate crimes;
- 4,622 (10%) were sexual orientation hate crimes;
- 2,273 (5%) were religion hate crimes;
- 1,985 (4%) were disability hate crimes; and
- 555 (1%) were transgender hate crimes.
There were increases in all five of the centrally monitored strands between 2012/13 and 2013/14 (Table 2). The Office for National Statistics has attributed recent increases in some categories of police recorded crime to improvements in police recording rather than a real increase in offences. For example, there was a six per cent increase in the overall number of police recorded violence against the person offences between 2012/13 and 2013/14 while other sources of violent crime trends (including the Crime Survey for England and Wales and NHS hospital admissions for assault) fell over the same period. Around a third (30%) of police recorded hate crime is for violence against the person offences (see Section 2.3 for more detail), so any improvements in the recording of these offences may be a factor in the trend in overall hate crime. An additional cause of the rise in hate crime may be an improved identification of motivating factors behind an offence. That is, of all the violent offences recorded in 2013/14, the police may have identified and flagged a higher proportion as hate crimes than in previous years.
However, there is evidence to suggest that the increase in race and religious hate crimes may be partly due to higher levels of hate crime following the murder of Lee Rigby, rather than solely due an improvement in the identification of offences as hate crimes. This is discussed in more detail below.
**Race and religious hate crimes**
The number of race hate crimes increased by four per cent (up 1,595, to 37,484 offences; Table 2) between 2012/13 and 2013/14. Over the same period, religious hate crime increased by 45 per cent (up 700 to 2,273 offences; Table 2).
Together, racially and religiously motivated hate crime accounted for around three-quarters of the increase in overall hate crime seen in the last year. A contributing factor behind the rise in these two strands of hate crime is likely to be an increase in offences following the murder of Lee Rigby in May 2013.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the police have the option to record some offences as racially or religiously aggravated. While not covering all hate crime offences, in practice the majority of race or religious hate crimes that the police record will come under one of these aggravated offence codes. The data the Home Office receives from the police in the main police recorded crime return for these offences are available on a monthly basis, allowing the trend in these offences to be seen around the time of the Lee Rigby murder.
Figures 1 and 2 show the number of racially or religiously aggravated offences for public fear alarm or distress and assault with/without injury (which together accounted for around 90% and 70% of all race and religious hate crime respectively, see Section 2.2). As shown in both charts, there was an increase in the number of racially or religiously aggravated offences in the immediate time period following the Lee Rigby murder in May 2013. The number of offences then returned to similar levels seen in 2012/13 and 2011/12. Without the increase in offences seen between May and July 2013, the number of racially or religiously aggravated offences would have been at a similar level to the previous two years. Due to the fact the majority of race hate crimes are recorded in these aggravated offences available to the police, the overall level of race hate crimes will be affected similarly.
Furthermore, because the majority of hate crimes recorded by the police are motivated by race (84%), hate crimes motivated by this strand tend to drive overall trends in hate crime. Therefore, much of the five per cent increase seen in overall hate crime between 2012/13 and 2013/14 (Table 2) is likely to be due to the increase seen in racial or religiously aggravated offences following the Lee Rigby murder.
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3 See [http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/crime-stats/crime-statistics/period-ending-march-2014/stb-crime-stats.html](http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/crime-stats/crime-statistics/period-ending-march-2014/stb-crime-stats.html)
4 NHS Health and Social Care Information Centre, dated 15th July 2014.
5 Although data from the main police recorded crime collection are sent to the Home Office broken down by month, the data are only quality assured with police forces on a quarterly basis. Figure 1: Number of racially or religiously aggravated public fear, alarm or distress offences by month, 2011/12 to 2013/14
Source: Police recorded crime, Home Office
Figure 2: Number of racially or religiously aggravated assault with and without injury offences by month, 2011/12 to 2013/14
Source: Police recorded crime, Home Office The Home Office Data Hub (see Section 2.2 for more detail about the Data Hub) provides supplementary information on race and religious hate crimes, which covers all notifiable offences (rather than just assault with/without injury and public order offences) for a subset of forces. A similar pattern is observed as that seen for the racially or religiously aggravated offences described above; the number of offences increased sharply in May, June and July 2013. The number of hate crimes then fell, with little difference between 2012/13 and 2013/14 for the months of October to March (data not shown).
In addition, in June 2013 the Metropolitan Police (who are not included in the Data Hub data) reported there had been an increase in Islamophobic hate crime in the wake of the Lee Rigby murder. Appendix Tables 1.01 and 1.02 show that Metropolitan Police recorded a 45 per cent increase in religious hate crimes between 2012/13 and 2013/14, from 631 to 915 offences. As the Metropolitan Police accounted for around 40 per cent of all religious hate crime in England and Wales in 2012/13 and 2013/14, changes in the level of offences in this police force area can drive the national trend.
The pattern of higher levels of race and religious hate crime in May, June and July 2013 compared with the same period in the previous year is not observed for the other strands of hate crime (sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity; data not shown).
Race hate crime was the most commonly recorded strand of hate crime in all 44 police forces. For the majority of forces (89%), religious hate crime was either the third or fourth most commonly recorded strand (Appendix Table 1.02).
The Home Office also collects data on the number of racist incidents (that is notifiable offences as well as incidents which do not amount to a crime in law) recorded by police, more detail on these figures is included in Section 3. These data are only available by financial year, so cannot be used to assess the effect of external events on the number of incidents recorded.
**Sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity**
Transgender identity hate crime saw the biggest percentage increase of the five strands between 2012/13 and 2013/14 (54%) while disability and sexual orientation hate crime increased by similar proportions to race hate crime (both by 8%). Disability and transgender hate crime are the only two strands which have increased each year since 2011/12 (Table 2).
It is less clear whether increases in disability, sexual orientation and transgender hate crime reflect a real rise in these offences or whether they reflect improved identification and recording practices by the police. The increase across all three strands may suggest improved identification of hate crime is a factor, but genuine increases cannot be ruled out.
In the majority of police forces (89%), sexual orientation hate crime was the second most commonly recorded hate crime while in 82 per cent of forces transgender identity hate crime was the least commonly recorded hate crime (Appendix Table 1.02).
**2.2 – MORE DETAILED HATE CRIME DATA FROM THE HOME OFFICE DATA HUB**
The Home Office are currently implementing a new data collection system called the Data Hub which is designed to streamline the process by which forces submit data. The Home Office Data Hub will replace the current system with automated capturing of record level crime data via direct extracts from forces’ own crime recording systems. As a result the police will also be able to provide more detailed information to the Home Office which will allow a greater range of analyses to be carried out. The
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6 Simon Letchford interviewed on the Today Programme, 10 June 2013 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22838581](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22838581) migration to the new system is ongoing and for forces providing data via the Data Hub, it is possible to exploit this richer data and conduct a more in depth analysis of hate crime offences.
Eighteen police forces(^7) (accounting for 23% of the total number of hate crimes recorded in 2013/14) provided suitable hate crime data through the Data Hub for 2013/14; although notably this did not include the Metropolitan Police whose data accounts for around one quarter of police recorded hate crime. It is therefore important to note that the analysis in this section may not be representative of all forces in England and Wales.
**Hate crimes by type of offence**
Using the Data Hub it is possible to examine which specific types of offence have been flagged as hate crimes. The available data show that for the 18 police forces analysed (Appendix Table 1.03):
- fifty-five per cent of hate crimes were public order offences, with the vast majority of these (98%) being public fear, alarm or distress;
- thirty per cent were violence against the person offences, of which 34 per cent were violence with injury and 66 per cent were violence without injury offences; and
- ten per cent were criminal damage/arson offences while the remaining five per cent were other notifiable offences such as theft and sexual offences.
By way of comparison, Figure 3 shows that in 2013/14, public order, violence against the person and criminal damage/arson offences accounted for four per cent, 18 per cent and 14 per cent of all police recorded crime offences respectively (Crime in England and Wales, Year Ending March 2014).
**Figure 3: Breakdown of hate crimes and overall recorded crime by selected offence types, 18 police forces, England and Wales, 2013/14**
(^7) The following forces submitted suitable data via the Data Hub in 2013/14: Avon and Somerset, Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, City of London, Cleveland, Derbyshire, Dorset, Essex, Gloucestershire, Kent, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Northumbria, North Yorkshire, Staffordshire, Surrey, Thames Valley. Figure 4 shows the proportion of offence types for each monitored strand. Public order offences and violence against the person were the two most common offence types associated with hate crime for all strands except religion. For religious hate crime, while public order offences were the most common, the second most common offence type was criminal damage/arson. The monitored strands with the highest proportions of violence against the person were sexual orientation (42%) and disability (40%).
**Figure 4: Breakdown of hate crime by selected offence types, 18 police forces, England and Wales, 2013/14**
As mentioned above, the category of violence against the person can be broken down further into violence with injury and violence without injury. Examples of violence with injury offences are assault with intent to cause serious harm and assault with injury, while violence without injury includes offences such as harassment and assault without injury.
In 2013/14, 34 per cent of violent hate crimes were violence with injury (Appendix Table 1.03). In comparison, around half of all police recorded violence offences were violence with injury from the 18 Data Hub forces (a similar figure to the proportion across all forces). The proportion of violence against the person offences which were violence with injury varied by hate crime strand: 46 per cent of sexual orientation hate crime was violence with injury, higher than all other monitored strands which varied between a quarter (transgender) and a third (race).
**Outcomes**
The Data Hub also provides information on the outcomes of offences flagged as hate crime. The new outcomes framework replaced the detections framework in April 2013. The move from detections to outcomes is a significant change, with an emphasis on greater transparency on how all crimes recorded by the police are dealt with. The previous focus on detections (i.e. crimes resolved via a sanction against the offender, such as a charge, summons or caution) gave a partial picture of the work police do to investigate and resolve crime. Data for the full outcomes framework will not be available until 2014/15 so analysis below is constrained to outcomes that were available to the police under the old detections framework. For more information on outcomes see Crime Outcomes in England and Wales 2013/14.
Analysis of the 18 forces who supplied suitable data via the Data Hub shows that (also see Appendix Table 1.04):
- Public order hate crime offences were less likely to be dealt with by a charge / summons or a caution than public order offences for overall crime. Thirty-seven per cent of public order hate crime offences resulted in a charge or summons and seven per cent resulted in a caution (compared with 40% and 10% respectively for overall crime).
This is partly due to the mix of offences; 98 per cent of hate crime public order offences in 2013/14 were for public fear, alarm or distress. For overall crime, this figure is lower, at 74 per cent, with 26 per cent being for other offences against the state and public order. These offences tend to have a higher charge / summons rate than public fear, alarm or distress, hence the higher charge / summons rate for crime overall. For public fear, alarm or distress, there is little difference in the charge / summons rates between hate crime and overall crime.
- In contrast, violence against the person hate crime offences were more likely to be dealt with by charge / summons than overall violence (33% compared with 26%). Cautions were less likely to be used for violent hate crime offences (5%) than overall violence (11%).
- Fourteen per cent of criminal damage hate crime offences resulted in a charge or summons and four per cent resulted in a caution (compared with 9% and 6% respectively for overall crime). 3 - Racist Incidents
A ‘racist incident’ is defined as any incident, including any crime, which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person. The coverage is wider than the race hate crime collection as non-notifiable offences, as well as notifiable offences, are included.
In 2013/14, there were 47,571 racist incidents recorded by the 43 police forces in England and Wales (racist incident data excludes the British Transport Police). The number of racist incidents recorded by police has remained relatively stable for the past three years. Prior to this the number of racist incidents fell between 2009/10 and 2011/12 (Figure 5; Appendix Table 1.05).
Figure 5: Number of racist incidents recorded by police (excluding British Transport Police), England and Wales, 2009/10 to 2013/14
Source: Police recorded incidents, Home Office Further information
‘Hate Crimes, England and Wales, 2011/12’ is available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crimes-england-and-wales-2011-to-2012--2
‘An Overview of Hate Crimes in England Wales’ (wider coverage using data from the Ministry of Justice and the Crime Survey for England and Wales) is available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/an-overview-of-hate-crime-in-england-and-wales
Other sources of hate crime data from a number of different organisations (including the Association of Chief Police Officers, Stonewall and the Crown Prosecution Service) can be found here: http://www.report-it.org.uk/hate_crime_data1 (figures published by ACPO are based upon calendar year data and also include Northern Ireland).
The True Vision website contains more information about hate crime and how to report it: http://www.report-it.org.uk/home
Information about ‘Challenge it, Report it, Stop it: The Government’s Plan to Tackle Hate Crime’ can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/challenge-it-report-it-stop-it-a-plan-to-tackle-hate-crime, and the latest update can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/307624/HateCrimeActionPlanProgressReport.pdf
Hate crime statistics published by the Scottish and Northern Irish governments can be found here: http://www.psni.police.uk/index/updates/updates_domestic_and_hate_motivation_statistics.htm http://www.copfs.gov.uk/media-site/latest-news-from-copfs/773-hate-crime-in-scotland-2013-14 (figures published by the Scottish Government are based on the number of offenders charged, rather than police recorded crime).
The Crown Prosecution Service website also carried information about hate crime, including policy and guidance and performance information, which can be found here: http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/equality/hate_crime/index.html
A report by the Law Commission which considers whether hate crime offences should be extended to cover all five on the monitored strands can be found here: http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc348_hate_crime.pdf
Copies of other Home Office publications (including crime statistics releases prior to April 2012) are available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office/series/crime-statistics#publications
Copies of crime statistics publications from April 2012 are available from the Office for National Statistics website: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Crime+and+Justice
This includes the User Guide to Crime Statistics, a useful reference guide with explanatory notes regarding the issues and classifications that are key to the production and presentation of the crime statistics.
The dates of forthcoming publications are pre-announced and can be found via the UK National Statistics Publication Hub: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/announcements Annex A – Hate Crimes Data Quality
INTRODUCTION
In January 2014, the UK Statistics Authority published its assessment of ONS crime statistics. It found that statistics based on police recorded crime data, having been assessed against the Code of Practice for Official Statistics, did not meet the required standard for designation as National Statistics. The UK Statistics Authority published a list of requirements for these statistics to regain the National Statistics accreditation.
Some of the requirements of this assessment were to provide more detail on how data sources were used to produce these statistics, along with more information on the quality of the statistics. Additionally, there was also a requirement to provide information on the process used by police forces to submit and revise data, and the validation processes used by the Home Office. In order to ensure that this publication meets the high standards required by the UK Statistics Authority, details are provided below.
DATA SOURCES AND VALIDATION PROCESS
Hate crime data are supplied to the Home Office by the 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales, plus the British Transport Police. Forces either supplied the data monthly via the Home Office Data Hub or on an annual basis in an aggregated return. For forces with data on the Data Hub, the Home Office extracts the number of offences for each force which have been flagged by forces as having been motivated by one or more of the monitored strands. It is then possible to derive the count of offences and the number of monitored strands covered. In the aggregate return, police forces submit both the total number of hate crime offences (that is a count of the number of unique offences motivated by one or more of the five monitored strands) and the number of monitored strands (or motivating factors) associated with these offences. The second figure is supplied broken down by monitored strand so an offence motivated by hostility to race and religion would be counted twice, once under each of the strands.
At the end of each financial year the Home Office carry out a series of quality assurance checks on the data collected from the police forces (either by aggregate return or from the Data Hub). These checks include:
- Looking for any large or unusual changes in hate crimes from the previous year.
- Looking for outliers.
- Checking that the total number of hate crimes is higher than the total number of offences. Where these two figures were the same, the force was asked to confirm they were recording multiple hate crime strands.
Police forces are then asked to investigate these trends and either provide an explanation, or resubmit figures where the reconciliation identifies issues.
The data are then tabulated by monitored strand and year (2011/12, 2012/13 and 2013/14) and sent back to forces for them to verify. At this stage they are asked to confirm in writing that the data they submitted are correct and if they are not, then they have the opportunity to revise their figures.
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2b38ded7afe9595db6f38ebe8a60dbcc7ba1052d | Natural Resources Wales permitting decisions
Variation and consolidation of a bespoke permit
We have decided to issue a Natural Resources Wales initiated variation for Aberthaw Works operated by Tarmac Cement and Lime Limited.
The variation number is EPR/BL3986ID/V013.
We consider in reaching that decision we have taken into account all relevant considerations and legal requirements and that the permit will ensure that the appropriate level of environmental protection is provided.
Purpose of this document
This is a decision document, which accompanies a variation notice and consolidated permit being issued following a review of the permit.
It explains:
- **how** we have carried out our statutory review of the Operator’s Permit;
- **why** we have decided to vary the Permit as a result of that review; and
- **why** we have included the specific conditions in the revised Permit through the variation notice we are issuing.
It is our record of our decision-making process, to show how we have taken into account all relevant factors in reaching our position.
It explains how we have reviewed and considered the techniques used by the Operator in the operation and control of the plant and activities of the installation. This review has been undertaken with reference to the decision made by the European Commission establishing best available techniques (BAT) conclusions (‘BAT Conclusions’) for the Production of Cement, Lime and Magnesium Oxide, which were published as a Commission Implementing Decision (2013/163/EU) in the Official Journal of the EU on 9th April 2013. It also provides a justification for the inclusion of any specific conditions in the permit that are in addition to those included in our generic permit template.
As well as considering the review of the operating techniques used by the Operator for the operation of the plant and activities of the installation, the consolidated permit takes into account and brings together in a single document all previous variations that relate to the original permit. It also modernises the entire permit to reflect the conditions contained in our current permit template, which incorporates the requirements of the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED).
This Variation is considered to be a normal variation because along with the administrative changes i.e. consolidating previous variations and moving to the new template, some detailed technical evaluation is required. This is a more complex variation than the norm, because it is doing three different things at the same time:
- **First**, it gives effect to our decisions following the statutory review of the existing Permit, following the implementation of the IED and the publication of BAT Conclusions covering the Production of Cement, Lime and Magnesium Oxide. That is what this variation is principally about.
- **Second**, it takes the opportunity to bring earlier variations into an up-to-date, consolidated Permit. These changes have already taken place and we are not re-explaining them, but the consolidated Permit should be easier to understand and use.
- **Third**, it modernises the entire Permit to reflect our current template. The template reflects our modern regulatory permitting philosophy and was introduced because of a change in the governing legislation. This took place when the Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2000 were replaced in 2008 by a new statutory regime under the Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010 (as amended in 2013) to effectively introduce the IED.
The introduction of new IED template conditions makes the Permit consistent with our current general approach and philosophy and also with other permits issued to installations in this sector. Although the wording of some conditions has changed, while others have disappeared because of the new regulatory approach, it does not affect the level of environmental protection achieved by the Permit in any way. We therefore explain only the statutory review and our determination of substantive issues relating to the new BAT conclusions in this document.
As the Variation will not have any negative effects on the environment it is not a substantial variation and so does not require external consultation. A fee for a normal variation based on the Operators OPRA score has been invoiced to the Operator. Structure of this document
- Summary of our decision
- The legal framework
- How we took our decision
- Key issues/Regulation 60 response
- Changes we have made
- Conclusion
- Annex 1 – Decision Checklist regarding relevant BAT Conclusions 1 Our decision
We have issued a Variation, which will allow the Operator to operate the Installation, subject to the conditions in the varied Permit.
The Variation does three things:
- it consolidates the original Permit to reflect changes made through earlier variations;
- it brings the Permit into line with our modern regulatory template; and
- it varies the Permit where appropriate to reflect the outcome of our statutory review and incorporate Best Available Techniques (BAT) and associated Emission Limit Values (ELV’s).
We consider that, in reaching this decision, we have taken into account all relevant considerations and legal requirements and that the Permit will continue to ensure that a high level of protection is provided for the environment and human health.
The original Permit, issued on the 21st January 2003, ensured that the Installation, employed Best Available Techniques (BAT) and ensured a high level of protection for human health and the environment. We have updated the Permit as a result of the statutory review, and we are confident that the new requirements will deliver a superior level of protection to that which was previously achieved.
2 The legal framework
The Variation and Consolidation Notice (which includes the consolidated permit as Schedule 2) will be issued under Regulation 20 of the Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010. The Environmental Permitting regime is a legal vehicle which delivers most of the relevant legal requirements for activities falling within its scope. In particular, the regulated facility is:
- an installation as described by the IED;
- subject to aspects of other relevant legislation which also have to be addressed.
We consider that, in issuing the Variation Notice and consolidated Permit, it will ensure that the operation of the Installation complies with all relevant legal requirements and that a high level of protection will be delivered for the environment and human health.
We explain how we have addressed specific statutory requirements more fully in the rest of this document.
3 How we reached our decision
Requesting information to demonstrate compliance with BAT Conclusion techniques
We issued a Notice under Regulation 60(1) of the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010 (a Regulation 60 Notice) on 6th March 2014 requiring the Operator to provide information to demonstrate how the operation of their installation currently meets, or will subsequently meet, the revised standards described in the relevant BAT Conclusions document.
The Regulation 60(1) notice required the operator to:
- Describe the techniques that will be implemented before 9th April 2017, which will then ensure that operations meet the revised standard, or
- justify why standards will not be met by 9th April 2017, and confirmation of the date when the operation of those processes will cease within the installation or an explanation of why the revised BAT standard is not applicable to those processes, or
- justify why an alternative technique will achieve the same level of environmental protection equivalent to the revised standard described in the BAT Conclusions.
- Where their permitted activity involves the use, production or release of hazardous substances, as defined in Article 3(18) of the Industrial Emissions Directive, carry out a risk assessment considering the possibility of soil and groundwater contamination at the permitted installation with such substances. Where risk of such contamination is established prepare a baseline report containing information necessary to determine the state of soil and groundwater contamination so as to make a quantified comparison with the state upon definite cessation of the activity. Tarmac Cement and Lime Ltd were required to provide a copy of the risk assessment and any consequent baseline report.
The Regulation 60 Notice response from the Operator was received on 30th January 2015. However, on 26th June 2015 we subsequently requested additional information from the Operator to support their original Regulation 60(1) response. Additional information was received 30th July 2015. This additional information provided further clarification on the techniques employed in respect of the following BAT conclusions: 5(g), 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 (see Annex 1 Decision Checklist regarding Relevant BAT Conclusions) below. This additional information also included the operator’s assessment of background (kiln) ammonia emissions and a proposal for the ammonia Emission Limit Value for emission point A1.
Upon receipt of the operator’s Regulation 60(1) response and the additional information relating to BAT conclusions: 5(g), 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20 and the assessment of background ammonia emissions, we considered that the response contained sufficient information for us to commence determination of the permit review. The Operator made no claim for commercial confidentiality. We have not received any information in relation to the Regulation 60 Notice response or subsequent additional information that appears to be confidential in relation to any party. 4 Key issues/Regulation 60 response
BAT Conclusions for the Production of Cement, Lime and Magnesium Oxide were published as a Commission Implementing Decision (2013/163/EU) in the Official Journal of the EU on 9th April 2013. There are 29 BAT Conclusions which are relevant to the cement industry. Annex 1 provides a record of decisions made in relation to each relevant BAT Conclusion applicable to the installation. Annex 1 should be read in conjunction with the permit/variation notice issued.
A detailed response was received from Tarmac Cement and Lime Ltd. Where the Operator has concluded that they have achieved BAT, and we are in agreement, no further information / justification has been sought by Natural Resources Wales.
5.0 Changes we have made
5.1 BAT-AELs and Emission Limit Values (Kiln Firing)
Table 1. Summary of Kiln Firing Emission Limit Values
| Emission Point Reference | Description | Parameter | Emission Limit Value (until 08/04/17) | Emission Limit Value (from 09/04/17) | |--------------------------|-------------|-----------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| | A1 | Main stack on pre-heater tower | Particulate matter | 30 | 20 | | | | TOC | 50 | 50 | | | | HCl | 10 | 10 | | | | CO | 1000\* | 1000\* | | | | SO₂ | 800 | 400 | | | | NOₓ | 500 | 500 | | | | NH₃ | No limit | 80 | | | | Cd & Tl (total) | 0.05 | 0.05 | | | | Hg (and compounds) | 0.05 | 0.05 | | | | Sb, As, Pb, Cr, Co, Cu, Mn, Ni & V and their compounds (total) | 0.5 | 0.5 | | | | Dioxins & Furans (i-TEQ) | 0.1ng/Nm³ | 0.1ng/Nm³ |
Note: All values expressed as mg/Nm³ unless otherwise stated.
- An ELV of 1500 mg/Nm³ applies following completion of IC3 and subsequent written approval from Natural Resources Wales.
5.1.1 Particulate Matter: The existing emission limit of 30 mg/Nm³ is reduced to 20 mg/Nm³ and as per BAT Conclusion 17. It may be reduced further pending the completion of Improvement Condition IC2.
5.1.2 Total Organic Carbon: The existing Total Organic Carbon (TOC) emission limit value has been retained at 50mg/Nm³ in accordance with Annex VI of the Industrial Emissions Directive. TOC emissions arise from the pre heating / processing of raw meal containing volatile organic compounds.
5.1.3 **Hydrogen Chloride:** The existing hydrogen chloride (HCl) emission limit value has been retained at 10 mg/Nm³.
5.1.4 **Oxides of nitrogen (NO and NO₂ Expressed as NO₂):** The NOₓ emission limit value has been retained at 500mg/Nm³ in accordance with the requirements of BAT Conclusion 19 for pre-heater kilns with primary NOₓ emissions >1000 mg/Nm³. During the 2015 background ammonia monitoring trial, the kiln was operated for an agreed period without the use NOx abatement (SNCR) and emissions with primary control techniques were shown to be >1000 mg/Nm³.
5.1.5 **Carbon Monoxide:** The carbon monoxide (CO) emission limit value has been retained at 1000 mg/Nm³. However, the operator has requested a future increase in the ELV to 1500 mg/Nm³. This change has been requested to allow the operator to burn more alternative raw materials and fuels in preference to fossil fuels and virgin materials so this increase is necessary for maintaining kiln stability. The increase in the CO ELV to 1500 mg/Nm³ will apply subject to the completion of IC3 and subsequent written approval by Natural Resources Wales. See section 5.7.3 below.
5.1.6 **Sulphur Dioxide:** The SO₂ emission limit has been reduced from 800mg/Nm³ to 400mg/Nm³ from 09/04/17 to achieve compliance with BAT Conclusion 21. The operator reports that sulphur inputs derived from raw materials will be reduced by management of quarrying operations / kiln inputs and the use of hydrated lime injection prior to the pre-heater fan.
5.1.7 **Ammonia (NH₃):** As well as ammonia slip associated with the Selective Non-Catalytic Reduction (SNCR), oxides of nitrogen (NOₓ) abatement process, ammonia releases are also associated with the use of other raw materials in the manufacturing process. The Raw Mill operation offers some abatement of these other ammonia releases when it is operational. However the Raw Mill needs to be switched off on a regular basis for maintenance and on these occasions, the abatement effect for background ammonia emissions from the process is lost.
Tarmac Cement and Lime Ltd have therefore completed a background NH₃ emissions monitoring trial in 2015 (as agreed with Natural Resources Wales) and derived an average daily baseline NH₃ emission (Raw Mill off) of 35.6mg/Nm³. On this basis, the operator proposed a daily emission limit value of between 75 – 85mg/Nm³ taking into consideration the ammonia slip BAT-AEL of 30-50 mg/Nm³.
We have reviewed the results of the background NH₃ assessment from the operator and have conducted our own detailed air dispersion modelling using ADMS to assess the impact (nutrient nitrogen and acidity) of NOₓ and NH₃ emissions from emission point A1 (main stack on pre-heater tower) on sensitive habitats, vegetation and ecosystems.
Based on the results of the operator’s background NH₃ assessment and our own detailed air dispersion modelling, we have applied an ammonia emission limit value of 80mg/Nm³ to emission point A1 (applicable from 09/04/17) to control ammonia slip from the SNCR NOx abatement system in accordance with BAT Conclusion 20. This emission limit is comprised of the daily average background NH$\_3$ release from the process, (when the Raw Mill is not operational) (around 36 mg/Nm$^3$) and 44 mg/Nm$^3$, to allow for the ammonia slip from the SNCR NO$\_x$ abatement process. We consider that the ammonia emission limit of 80 mg/Nm$^3$ is environmentally protective including for human health. This also represents an environmental improvement because there is currently no ammonia ELV associated with releases from emission point A1.
The permit requires that ammonia emissions from the kiln are monitored continuously in accordance with relevant standards.
5.1.8 Metals
**Cadmium & Thallium and their compounds (total)** The existing Cd & Tl and their compounds (total) emission limit value has been retained at 0.05 mg/Nm$^3$.
**Mercury and its compounds** The existing Hg and its compounds emission limit value has been retained at 0.05mg/Nm$^3$.
**Group III Metals and their compounds (total)**. The existing emission limit value for Group III Metals (Sb, As, Pb, Cr, Co, Cu, Mn, Ni and V and their compounds (total)), has been retained at 0.5 mg/Nm$^3$.
5.1.9 Dioxins and Furans (I-TEQ) – The existing emission limit value for Dioxins and Furans (I-TEQ) has been retained at 0.1 ng/Nm$^3$.
No changes have been made to the dioxin & furan monitoring requirements – these continue to be required at 6 monthly intervals in accordance with Annex VI, Part 6, Paragraph 2.1(c) of the Industrial Emissions Directive.
5.1.10 Dioxin-like Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) & Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs)
Prior to this variation, the permit included the requirement to monitor PCBs and PAHs emissions from the kiln on a six monthly basis. No emission limit values were set for these parameters.
Since the last permit review in 2011, Schedule 13A, paragraph 4(2)(b) of The Environmental Permitting (England & Wales) (amendment) Regulations 2013, has amended paragraph 2.1(c) of Part 6, Annex VI of the Industrial Emissions Directive.
In summary paragraph 2.1(c) now requires that dioxin-like polychlorinated biphenyls and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons are monitored but only in the case of particular plants where the regulator can demonstrate that emissions of those additional substances are, or are likely to be, significant.
We have reviewed the 6 monthly PCB and PAH emissions data supplied by the operator between 2007 and 2014. During this time alternative fuels were in regular use. We have used this data to complete detailed dispersion modelling and have concluded that PCB and PAH emissions are unlikely to be environmentally significant. Natural Resources Wales does not therefore consider that PCB & PAH emissions from the kiln are, or are likely to be significant and has now removed the monitoring requirement from the permit with immediate effect.
5.2 BAT-AELS and Emission Limit Values (Cooling & Milling Processes)
BAT Conclusion 18 applies a particulate emission limit value for emission points associated with cooling and milling processes (raw meal, coal and clinker), the relevant emission points and associated emission limit values are detailed in table 2 below. Note, kiln firing has been addressed in the section above.
A particulate emission limit is not applicable for clinker cooling at Aberthaw Works as a planetary cooler is utilised with exhaust gases being returned to the kiln.
Table 2. Milling Processes Emission Limit Values
| Emission Point Reference | Description | Parameter | Emission Limit Value (until 08/04/17) | Emission Limit Value (from 09/04/17) | |--------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------| | A2 | Cement Mills | Particulate matter | 30 | 20\* | | A3 | Cement Mills | Particulate matter | 30 | 20\* | | A4 | Coal Mills 1 - 4 | Particulate matter | N/A | 20\* |
Note All values expressed as mg/Nm$^3$
\*The Emission Limit Value is set at 20mg/Nm$^3$ for milling processes. Improvement Condition IC4 requires the operator to review the operational capability of the existing bag plants. Where a lower emission concentration is achievable the emission limit will be revised down by 09/04/17. Any substantial (future) upgrades to the bag plants shall achieve 10mg/Nm$^3$.
The operator has not applied for a derogation for particulate emissions for any emission point.
5.3 Emission Limit Values - Dusty Operations
5.3.1 Particulate Emission Sources >10,000 Nm$^3$/hr
Three existing emission points arising from the de-dusting of operations (excluding kiln firing, milling or cooling activities) have been identified with a volumetric discharge rate exceeding 10,000 Nm$^3$/hr.
These are as follows;
a) ‘Primary Crusher’ – new emission point reference A5 b) ‘Raw material handling dust plant’ – new emission point reference A6 c) ‘Polychip walking floor transfer point’ – new emission point reference A7
The emission points shall meet an emission limit value of 10mg/Nm$^3$ as required by BAT Conclusion 16 by 09/04/17. 5.3.2 Particulate Emission Sources \<10,000 Nm³/hr
A list of small particulate emission sources (bag filters with a volumetric flow rate less than 10,000 Nm³/hr) has been provided by the operator and incorporated into the permit (table S3.2). These sources typically include filters fitted to storage silos and conveyer change over points.
The operator confirms that these emission points will be capable of meeting an emission limit value of 10mg/Nm³ as required by BAT Conclusion 16 by 09/04/17.
5.4 Emissions Monitoring – Air
- Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems (CEMs) will be retained on all existing emission points, periodic extractive monitoring of kiln emissions will continue to be completed on a six monthly basis.
- Emissions monitoring standards within schedule 3 have been reviewed and updated where necessary.
- Monitoring standard BS EN 141814 currently applies to continuous emissions monitoring of the kiln. To ensure CEMs provide reliable monitoring data the principles of EN 14181 will also apply to CEMs installed on other sources (milling activities) from 09/04/17. A reduced number of parallel measurements may be acceptable as agreed with the site inspector.
- Permit condition 3.3.5(a) has been amended to include a 95% confidence interval for ammonia. This has been set at 40% as per hydrogen chloride - both parameters are monitored using the same technique.
- Permit condition 3.3.5(a) has also been amended so that it references Table S3.2 as well as S3.1. This change ensures consistency in the uncertainty budget for particulate monitoring using CEMs. Therefore both the kiln and the cement mills have been allocated the same uncertainty budget of 30% for particulate matter based on the 95% confidence intervals of a single measured result at the daily emission limit value.
- For clarity, the kiln start up and shut down definitions have been added to Schedule 6 of the permit (previously subject to agreement in writing). The definitions may be subject to amendment (as agreed in writing with NRW) where the operator can provide suitable justification on a site specific basis.
- BAT Conclusion 5 specifies either periodic or continuous monitoring for non-kiln sources and as a default the permit now requires 6 monthly extractive sampling for such sources. From 09/04/17 emission point A4 must be monitored on a 6 monthly basis to demonstrate compliance with the emission limit value. See also section 5.7.2 below.
5.5 Emissions Monitoring – Water
The emissions monitoring requirements for W1 remain unchanged.
5.6 New listed activities
Table S1.1 of the permit has been updated to include the following listed activities:
- Activity Reference A2: S3.1 A(2)(a), 4 lines - grinding cement clinker in cement mills.
- Activity Reference A3: S3.1 B(a), Storing, loading or unloading cement or cement clinker in bulk prior to further transportation in bulk.
- Activity Reference A4: S3.1 B(b), 2 lines - blending cement in bulk or using cement in bulk other than at a construction site, including the bagging of cement and cement mixtures, the batching of ready-mixed concrete and the manufacture of concrete blocks and other cement products.
These activities are existing activities at the installation. However, activity A2 was previously captured within the envelope of the main S3.1A1(a) listed activity and Activities A3 and A4 previously formed a single unlisted directly associated activity covering all cement storage, blending, packing and loading.
The amendment to table S1.1 has been necessary to reflect the fact that grinding cement clinker is recognised as a listed activity in its own right in the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2013. The original directly associated activity of cement storage, blending, packing and loading, has been removed and these activities have been correctly listed as individual S3.1 part B activities in line with the Environmental Permitting Regulations (England and Wales) 2010.
5.7 Improvement Conditions
Based on the information provided in the Regulation 60 response, we consider that we need to set improvement conditions. These conditions are set out below. We are using these conditions to require the operator to provide Natural Resources Wales with details that need to be established or confirmed during operations. We have also set an improvement condition in response to the operator’s request to increase the existing CO ELV on emission point A1.
5.7.1 Improvement Condition IC1 requires that:
- Particulate emission data (Continuous Emissions Monitors) for emission points A2 & A3 shall be corrected to standard reference conditions (as detailed in Schedule 6) from 09/04/17 onwards. Pre-determined correction factors for each emission point may be acceptable as an alternative to upgraded CEMS where the operator can demonstrate that these parameters are stable and consistent, providing historical data as evidence.
In line with BS EN 15259, historic moisture and temperature measurements would need to be shown to not vary above or below 10%, (as a guide value), of the statistical mean from available data derived from periodic measurements. The Operator shall provide a report to Natural Resources Wales confirming (for agreement) how particulate emissions data will be corrected.
In accordance with the BAT Conclusions document, emissions monitoring data shall be corrected to standard conditions. The correction requirements for kiln emissions remain unchanged but as of 09/04/17 particulate emissions monitoring data from cooling and milling processes must be corrected to dry gas at a temperature of 273k, a pressure of 101.3 kPa with no correction for oxygen.
We have set Improvement Condition IC1 to ensure that particulate emission data from the above non-kiln emission points is corrected to the standard reference conditions that apply from 9th April 2017. IC1 requires Tarmac Cement and Lime Ltd to inform Natural Resources Wales how this emissions data will be corrected. This may include the use of predetermined ‘correction factors’, where conditions allow, for each respective emission point.
Schedule 6 of the permit has been amended to include data correction requirements before and after 09/04/16.
The Operator’s response to Improvement condition 1 is required to be submitted by 31st October 2016.
5.7.2 Improvement Condition IC2 requires that:
- The Operator shall provide a written report detailing the proposed monitoring technique to be employed to demonstrate compliance with the particulate matter ELV of 10 mg/Nm³ at emission points A5, A6 and A7.
If the Operator proposes the use of an alternative technique (i.e. not extractive or continuous measurement in accordance with recognised standards), then evidence must be provided to prove the technique will demonstrate compliance with the ELV to an equivalent level of certainty.
From 9th April 2017 emission points A5, A6 and A7 must be monitored to demonstrate compliance with the emission limit value of 10 mg/Nm³. BAT Conclusion 5 specifies either periodic or continuous monitoring for non-kiln sources and as a default the permit now requires 6 monthly extractive sampling.
However, it is recognised that these emission points may require significant modification to reach the required standard for extractive monitoring and pose a relatively low risk to the environment. If the operator cannot provide a suitable alternative technique, they will be required to monitor these emission points in accordance with Schedule 3(b), Table S3.2 of the permit.
The Operator’s response to IC2 is required to be submitted by 31st October 2016.
5.7.3 Improvement Condition IC3 requires that:
- The operator shall assess the potential human health impact associated with the proposed new emission limit of 1500 mg/Nm³ for carbon monoxide releases from emission point A1. The assessment shall use the Environment Agency H1 Software Tool or an equivalent method. The assessment together with a written report summarising the conclusions of the assessment shall be submitted to Natural Resources Wales for approval.
We have imposed this improvement condition in response to the operator’s request to increase the existing carbon monoxide emission limit on emission point A1 from 1000 mg/Nm³ to 1500 mg/m³. The change has a potential environmental benefit associated with operation of the kiln, in that it would allow the operator to use more alternative raw materials and fuels in preference to fossil fuels and virgin materials, whilst at the same time being able to maintain kiln stability. However, there is no BAT-AEL for carbon monoxide releases from cement plants in the BAT conclusions document. Therefore, this request must be assessed by comparing the predicted impact of the proposed new emission limit against the Statutory Air Quality Limit Value for CO, to ensure that no exceedance will occur.
The improvement condition requires the operator to make this assessment using H1 or an equivalent method. We will then review the assessment and decide if the operator’s request can be granted. The operator cannot operate at the proposed new limit of 1500 mg/Nm³, unless written approval has been given by Natural Resources Wales.
The Operator’s response to IC3 is required to be submitted by 31st October 2016.
5.7.4 Improvement Condition IC4 requires that:
- In order for Natural Resources Wales to set the appropriate emission limit values, the Operator shall submit a report detailing the operational capability (expressed as mg/Nm³ of particulate released) of each bag filter plant associated with emission points A1, A2, A3 & A4. The report shall include:
I. A statistical analysis of at least two years of particulate monitoring data for each emission point with supporting graphs demonstrating individual values, averages and standard deviations.
II. Design specification of each bag plant.
III. Details on all maintenance (including filter bag changes) carried out for each bag filter plant during the monitoring period, including dates and times of each maintenance The purpose of IC4 is as described in the section on BAT-AELS and Emission Limit Values (Cooling & Milling Processes) above.
The Operator’s response to IC4 is required to be submitted by 30th November 2016.
5.7.5 Improvement Condition IC5 requires that:
- If storing Priority Hazardous Substances on site, the Operator must carry out the following assessments with reference to the Environment Agency’s guidance “How to carry out a risk assessment if you’re applying for a bespoke permit that includes discharging hazardous pollutants to surface water”:
Phase 1 Part A screening tests for mercury, cadmium, nickel, lead, benzene, polyaromatic hydrocarbons and any other relevant priority hazardous substances. Phase 1 Part B screening tests for mercury, cadmium, polyaromatic hydrocarbons and any other relevant priority hazardous substances.
For any substance which is not screened out by the Phase 1 Part A or Part B screening tests the Operator will also need to carry out Phase 2 modelling, as described in “How to carry out a risk assessment if you’re applying for a bespoke permit that includes discharging hazardous pollutants to surface water”.
The Operator must provide Natural Resources Wales with the results of the emissions monitoring, the results from the screening tests and the results from any Phase 2 modelling. The Operator may use the Environment Agency’s H1 electronic screening tool to present the emissions data and to carry out the Phase 1 screening tests.
Note: With regard to the Phase 1 Part A screening - a full list of priority hazardous substances is provided in the Environment Agency guidance “How to carry out a risk assessment if you’re applying for a bespoke permit that includes discharging hazardous pollutants to surface water” under the section entitled “Screening test: priority hazardous pollutants”. The Operator must review the list and carry out the screening for any substances, in addition to those specified above, that may be present in the installations discharges to surface water. With regard to the Phase 1 Part B screening for priority hazardous pollutants, the section entitled “Screening test: priority hazardous pollutants” provides a full list of relevant priority hazardous substances and their associated annual significant loads.
We have set IC5 to ensure that the installation meets Water Framework Directive requirements going forward for screening dangerous substances.
The Operator’s response to IC5 is required to be submitted by 30th June 2017.
5.7.6 Improvement Condition IC6 requires that:
- The Operator shall submit a report on the baseline conditions of soil and groundwater at the installation. The report shall contain the information necessary to determine the state of soil and groundwater contamination so as to make a quantified comparison with the state upon definitive cessation of activities provided for in Article 22(3) of the IED. The report shall contain information, supplementary to that already provided in the application Site Condition Report, needed to meet the information requirements of Article 22(2) of the IED.
This improvement condition requires information supplementary to that already provided in the application site report, which is needed to meet the information requirements of Article 22(2) of IED. Specifically, any relevant hazardous substances which are used, produced or released by the installation need to be identified and additional baseline monitoring undertaken if relevant hazardous substances are associated with the installation.
The Operator’s response to IC6 is required to be submitted by 30th September 2017.
5.7.7 Improvement Condition IC7 requires that:
- The Operator shall submit the written protocol referenced in condition 3.1.3 for the monitoring of soil and groundwater for approval by Natural Resources Wales. The protocol shall demonstrate how the Operator will meet the requirements of Articles 14(1) (b), 14(1) (e) and 16(2) of the IED. The procedure shall be implemented in accordance with the written approval from Natural Resources Wales.
Improvement Condition 6 has been set with the purpose of defining the procedure by which monitoring of groundwater and soil required by new permit condition 3.1.3 will be conducted. (Permit condition 3.1.3 has been added to deliver the requirements of the Industrial Emissions Directive). The written protocol developed by the Operator will be used to deliver compliance with permit condition 3.1.3 in terms of the monitoring regime to demonstrate continued protection of the soil and groundwater.
The Operator’s response to IC7 is required to be submitted by 31st December 2017.
5.8 Site Specific Updating Changes
The following changes have been made as a result of this variation:
- Waste recovery code R5 “Recycling / Reclamation of other Inorganic Materials” added to Table S1.1, Activity reference 3.1A(i)a, to reflect use of Alternative Raw Materials (ARM).
- Table S2.2: title amended to “Permitted Waste Derived Fuels and Alternative Raw Materials”.
- Schedule 3(b) Table S3.2 updated to capture emission points A4, A5, A6 and A7 serving the coal mills, primary crusher, raw meal handling dust plant and polychip walking floor transfer point respectively. These are existing emission points which were captured as part of a grouping of “A4 to A18 other process vents” in the original permit. The amendment has been necessary to enable us to apply emission limits and monitoring requirements to these particular release points.
- Schedule 3(b) Table S3.2 also updated to removed reference to “A4 to A18 and A20 to A23 other process vents” and “SRF handling filter vent”. This change was necessary because with the exception of emission points A4, A5, A6 and A7, the other release points are captured by the final line in the table which has been added to cover all other small sources of particulate matter (\<10,000 Nm³/hr) from dusty operations other than cooling and the main milling processes.
- Schedule 3(b) Table S3.4: parameters updated to ensure consistency of process monitoring requirements across the sector in Wales.
- Schedules 3(a) & (b) Table S3.5: Terminology changed from “process waste” to “CKD/Bypass dust if produced”
- Schedule 6, Interpretation has been updated as follows:
- “Chapter IV abnormal operating conditions” definition amended to include reference to IED, article 45 1(f);
- Text on determination and reporting of toxic equivalence concentration (I-TEQ & WHO-TEQ for dioxins / furans, WHO-TEQ for dioxin-like PCBs) updated to fully reflect the interpretation text in our permit template. This helps to add clarity on how results for dioxins / furans and dioxin-like PCBs should be reported.
- The two tables of Toxic Equivalence Factors has been updated by new versions in line with our permit template. In the tables, the 1997/8 WHO-TEFs for humans / mammals have been replaced by the later 2005 WHO-TEFs.
- Schedule 7, Site plan updated to show all permitted emission points.
5.9 Changes to Reporting
The tables in schedules 4(a) & (b) of the updated permit have been amended to reflect the changes in monitoring and reporting imposed by the preceding schedules of the permit.
6 Conclusion
We have reviewed the existing permit for the Aberthaw Works installation and we are satisfied that the operator is either currently achieving or will achieve compliance with the relevant BAT conclusions for cement by 9th April 2017. We therefore believe this permit variation provides a sound basis for ongoing regulation of the Installation.
We believe that we have ensured compliance with all relevant legal requirements in carrying out this review and making our determination on the Variation. Annex 1 - Decision Checklist regarding relevant BAT Conclusions.
This checklist provides a record of decisions made in relation to each relevant BAT Conclusion applicable to the installation. This annex should be read in conjunction with the Variation Notice and Consolidated Permit.
All BAT Conclusions arising are listed by number in order below.
| BAT Conclusion No | Summary of BAT Conclusion requirement | Page number in Operators Regulation 60 | Status | |-------------------|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------| | | | | | | 1. | In order to improve the overall environmental performance of the plants/installations producing cement, lime and magnesium oxide, production BAT is to implement and adhere to an environmental management system (EMS) that incorporates all of the listed features | 6 - 7 | Currently Compliant | | 2. | In order to reduce/minimise noise emissions during the manufacturing processes for cement, lime and magnesium oxide, BAT is to use a combination of the listed techniques | 8 - 9 | Currently Compliant |
General BAT conclusions
The BAT mentioned in this section apply to all installations covered by these BAT conclusions (cement, lime and magnesium oxide industry).
| BAT Conclusion No | Summary of BAT Conclusion requirement | Page number in Operators Regulation 60 | Status | |-------------------|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------| | 3. | In order to reduce emissions from the kiln and use energy efficiently, BAT is to achieve a smooth and stable kiln process, operating close to the process parameter set points by using the listed techniques | 11 | Currently Compliant | | 4. | In order to prevent and/or reduce emissions, BAT is to carry out a careful selection and control of all substances entering the kiln | 12 | Currently Compliant | | 5. | BAT is to carry out the monitoring and measurements of process parameters and emissions on a regular basis and to monitor emissions in accordance with the relevant EN | 13 – 16 (plus additional information) | Compliant in Future |
Technique (g) For new emission points A5, A6 & A7, periodic monitoring will be required by | BAT Conclusion No | Summary of BAT Conclusion requirement | Page number in Operators Regulation 60 Response | Status | |------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------| | 6. | standards or, if EN standards are not available, ISO, national or other international standards that ensure the provision of data of an equivalent scientific quality, including those listed. | received 30/07/15) | 09.04.17, subject to improvement condition IC2 | | 7. | In order to reduce energy consumption, BAT is to use a dry process kiln with multistage preheating and pre-calcination. | 17 | Currently Compliant | | 8. | In order to reduce/minimise thermal energy consumption, BAT is to use a combination of the listed techniques. | 18 - 20 | Currently Compliant | | 9. | In order to reduce primary energy consumption, BAT is to consider the reduction of the clinker content of cement and cement products | 20 (plus additional information received 30/07/15) | Currently Compliant | | 10. | In order to reduce/minimise electrical energy consumption, BAT is to use one or a combination of the listed techniques. | 22 - 23 | Currently Compliant | | 11. | In order to guarantee the characteristics of the wastes to be used as fuels and/or raw materials in a cement kiln and reduce emissions, BAT is to apply the listed techniques. | 24 - 25 | Currently Compliant | | 12. | In order to ensure appropriate treatment of the wastes used as fuel and/or raw materials in the kiln, BAT is to use the listed techniques. | 26 | Currently Compliant | | BAT Conclusion No | Summary of BAT Conclusion requirement | Page number in Operators Regulation 60 Response | Status | |------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------| | 13. | BAT is to apply safety management for the storage, handling and feeding of hazardous waste materials, such as using a risk-based approach according to the source and type of waste, for the labelling, checking, sampling and testing of waste to be handled. | 26 - 27 | Currently Compliant | | 14. | In order to minimise/prevent diffuse dust emissions from dusty operations, BAT is to use one or a combination of the listed techniques | 28 - 29 | Compliant in the Future (Subject to the completion of measures identified in the site dust management plan update submitted to NRW 27th April 2015). | | 15. | In order to minimise/prevent diffuse dust emissions from bulk storage areas, BAT is to use one or a combination of the listed techniques. | 30 (plus additional information received 30/07/15) | Compliant in the Future (Subject to the completion of measures identified in the site dust management plan update submitted to NRW 27th April 2015). | | 16. | In order to reduce channelled dust emissions, BAT is to apply a maintenance management system which especially addresses the performance of filters applied to dusty operations, other than those from kiln firing, cooling and main milling processes. Taking this management system into account, BAT is to use dry flue-gas cleaning with a filter. | 31 (plus additional information received 30/07/15) | Compliant in the Future (Fabric filters and maintenance system in place, BAT-AEL will be met by 09/04/17) | | 17. | In order to reduce dust emissions from flue-gases of kiln firing processes, BAT is to use dry flue-gas cleaning with a filter. | 32 | Compliant in the Future | | 18. | In order to reduce dust emissions from the flue-gases of cooling and milling processes, BAT is to use dry flue-gas cleaning with a filter. | 33 | Compliant in the Future |
Fabric filter in use is capable of achieving upper BAT-AEL of 20mg/Nm³ by 09/04/17. Improvement Condition 2 requires operator to assess if lower limit of 10mg/Nm³ can be achieved. | BAT Conclusion No | Summary of BAT Conclusion requirement | Page number in Operators Regulation 60 Response | Status | |------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------| | | In order to reduce the emissions of NOx from the flue gases of kiln firing and/or preheating/precalcining processes, BAT is to use one or a combination of the following techniques. | 34 – 35 (plus additional information received 30/07/15) | Currently Compliant (existing Emission Limit Value of 500 mg/Nm³ retained) | | 19. | When SNCR is used, BAT is to achieve efficient NOx reduction, while keeping the ammonia slip as low as possible, by using the given technique. | 36 (plus additional information received 30/07/15) | Compliant in the Future Ammonia Emission Limit Value of 80mg/Nm³ included in permit (kiln) to account for slip and background ammonia from process. | | 20. | In order to reduce/minimise the emissions of SOx from the flue-gases of kiln firing and/or preheating/precalcining processes, BAT is to use one of the given techniques. | 37-38 (plus additional information received 30/07/15) | Compliant in the Future (existing Emission Limit Value of reduced from 800 to 400mg/Nm³ from 09/04/17) | | 21. | In order to reduce SO2 emissions from the kiln, BAT is to optimise the raw milling processes. | 38 | Currently Compliant | | 22. | In order to minimise the frequency of CO trips and keep their total duration to below 30 minutes annually, when using electrostatic precipitators (ESPs) or hybrid filters, BAT is to use the listed techniques in combination. | - | Not Applicable (fabric filters used) | | 23. | In order to keep the emissions of TOC from the flue-gases of the kiln firing processes low, BAT is to avoid feeding raw materials with a high content of volatile organic compounds (VOC) into the kiln system via the raw material feeding route. | 39 - 40 | Currently Compliant | | 24. | In order prevent/reduce the emissions of HCl from flue-gases of the kiln firing processes, BAT is to use one or a combination of the listed primary techniques. | 40 | Currently Compliant (existing Emission Limit Value retained) | | BAT Conclusion No | Summary of BAT Conclusion requirement | Page number in Operators Regulation 60 Response | Status | |------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------| | 26. | In order to prevent/reduce the emissions of HF from the flue-gases of the kiln firing processes, BAT is to use one or a combination of the listed primary techniques. | 41 | Currently Compliant (existing Emission Limit Value retained) | | 27. | In order to prevent emissions of PCDD/F or to keep the emissions of PCDD/F from the flue-gases of the kiln firing processes low, BAT is to use one or a combination of the listed techniques. | 41 - 42 | Currently Compliant (existing Emission Limit Value retained) | | 28. | In order to minimise the emissions of metals from the flue-gases of the kiln firing processes, BAT is to use one or a combination of the listed techniques. | 42 - 43 | Currently Compliant (existing Emission Limit Values retained) | | 29. | In order to reduce solid waste from the cement manufacturing process along with raw material savings, BAT is to use the techniques listed in the table. | 43 - 44 | Currently Compliant |
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4d983a3f98492b119359aefab1ec777ebd87f973 | Natural Resources Wales permitting decisions
Variation of a bespoke Permit.
We have decided to issue the variation for Aberthaw Power Station operated by RWE Generation UK plc.
The variation number is EPR/RP3133LD/V014.
We consider in reaching that decision we have taken into account all relevant considerations and legal requirements and that the permit will ensure that the appropriate level of environmental protection is provided.
Purpose of this document
This decision document:
- explains how the application has been determined
- provides a record of the decision-making process
- shows how all relevant factors have been taken into account
- justifies the specific conditions in the permit other than those in our generic permit template.
Unless the decision document specifies otherwise we have accepted the applicant’s proposals.
Key issues of the decision
Introduction
Natural Resources Wales has received an application from RWE Generation UK plc to vary the environmental permit for Aberthaw Power Station. The application follows the recent Natural Resources Wales (NRW) led variation EPR/RP3133LD/V013 which reduced oxides of nitrogen (NO and NO\\textsubscript{2} expressed as NO\\textsubscript{2}) (NO\\textsubscript{x}) emission limit values (ELVs) in line with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgement on 21\\textsuperscript{st} September 2016.
The current variation application from the operator is for plant modifications which are necessary to allow the installation to burn Higher Volatile Matter Coals (HVMC) in order to comply with the tightened NO\\textsubscript{x} emission limits in the permit. As such the focus of our assessment is based on the proposed fuel diet change (from Low Volatile Matter Coals to HVMC) and the Best Available Techniques (BAT) case associated with the plant changes and proposed operating techniques. There is no change in risk to human health or ecological receptors as a result of this variation. Our consultation position
We do not routinely consult with external organisations for normal permit variation applications. We consider that there is no change in risk to human health associated with this normal variation application. On this basis, Natural Resources Wales considers that paragraph 6 of Schedule 5 of the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016 does not apply and therefore formal consultation with Public Health Wales and Cardiff and Vale University Health Board is not required. However, based on the high level of interest in this application, we took the decision to write to Public Health Wales (PHW) and Cardiff and Vale University Health Board (CVUHB) to formally explain this position and seek agreement to our approach.
Individual letters were sent to PHW and CVUHB on 10 May 2017. A joint response from the two organisations was received on 16 May 2017. The response agrees with NRW’s position that there is no need to formally consult with PHW & CVUHB on this permit variation given that there is no anticipated change in process emissions and reiterates that the changes made to the permit to reduce emissions from the installation are welcomed.
Applicable Directives
All applicable European directives have been considered in the determination of the application. Furthermore, a new ELV has been added to the permit to demonstrate equivalence of the current daily 95%ile ELV to the requirement to at least maintain the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) minimum standards during the Transitional National Plan (TNP) period. See Emission Limits section below.
Operating Techniques
We have reviewed the techniques used by the operator and compared these with the relevant guidance notes. During the determination of this variation application, the European Commission published the Best Available Techniques Reference Document (BAT BREF) BAT conclusions for large combustion plant (referred to further here as the LCP BREF). This was published on the 17 August 2017. As such, this becomes a formally recognised document for the assessment of BAT for plant within scope of the LCP BREF.
The LCP BREF sets out BAT Associated Emission Levels (BAT-AELs). Under Article 21(3) of the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) regulators must ensure that permit conditions are reconsidered and if necessary updated within 4 years of the publication of the LCP BREF. Article 15(3) of the IED requires regulators to set emission limit values that, under normal operating conditions, do not exceed the BAT-AELs, unless by derogation under Article 15(4).
The European Commission also provide a set of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) in relation to IED, which provides the following guidance in relation to plant subject to specific derogations under IED Chapter III. The FAQ is set out below: IED.III.8: What is the relationship between IED Chapters II and III, in particular between the provisions of Article 15(4) providing for a general derogation from BAT conclusions, and the specific derogations applicable to large combustion plants?
For combustion plants benefitting from the time-limited and specific derogation provisions of Articles 32 to 35, Article 15(3) does not apply for certain air pollutants and these plants are not required, for those air pollutants, to comply in addition with the conditions for the derogation set out in Article 15(4);
Combustion plants which do not benefit from time-limited and specific derogations pursuant to the Articles 32 to 35 are obliged to meet the requirements as set out in compliance with Article 15(3). However the national authorities may in certain cases and if all conditions set out there are met grant a derogation according to Article 15(4);
Article 18 is applicable under all derogation regimes.
Therefore, plants that are subject to Article 32 to 35, which includes the Transitional National Plan (TNP) – Article 32 – are not subject to the requirements of Article 15(3) and thus Article 15(4), whilst subject to such derogation provisions in Articles 32 to 35. Aberthaw Power Station is subject to Article 32, and thus the European Commission FAQ is relevant here, although this does not remove the requirement to apply BAT.
We have therefore required the applicant to submit a BAT assessment for the control of NO\\textsubscript{x} emissions, and for this BAT assessment to consider the recently published LCP BREF. The applicant has provided in their BAT assessment, consideration of the damage costs of the NO\\textsubscript{x} emissions in a similar approach that would be required if an applicant sought to apply for an Article 15(4) derogation. This has been considered for scenarios up to operation through to 2028, although it remains the proposal of UK Government that all UK coal fired power stations cease operation by 2025. It should be noted that no such derogation is required prior to exit of the TNP, however this does provide additional information to inform BAT and its associated emission limits prior to the power station’s exit from the TNP.
RWE have provided a cost benefit analysis for each abatement option. NRW is satisfied that all appropriate abatement options have been included in the submission. The cost benefit analysis includes a range of values for NO\\textsubscript{x} including the most extreme value assigned by the European Environment Agency for this type of emission and a more valid site specific value derived from a tool developed by the UK regulators to properly reflect the impact on the surrounding population. We have assessed the cost benefit analysis against a number of criteria including those set out in Article 15(4) of IED and used the bold text headings below to demonstrate BAT compliance in this regard: Are there geographical, local environmental or technical reasons for allowing a less strict emission value than that stated in the Bref?
There are no local environmental or geographical reasons that make this installation different from others in the UK or Europe, the initial design to use locally sourced coal does have an impact but this is considered as a technical reason. Aberthaw is the only plant of this design in the UK and rare throughout Europe. The plant was originally designed to use locally sourced coal of low volatility. This design means that the boilers operate at higher temperatures and have longer combustion residence times resulting in higher NO\\textsubscript{x} levels in the emissions than plant of a more conventional design. The plant is only expected to operate until 2025 and only for part of the year reducing the viability of any possible abatement. NRW consider the design of the plant to be a technical reason that enables consideration of a NO\\textsubscript{x} ELV that is higher than that set out on the LCP Bref document, in BAT conclusion 20, Table 3 (including footnotes).
If a less strict limit is set, will there be a breach of Environmental Quality Standard?
Air dispersion modelling has shown that NO\\textsubscript{x} emissions result in local ground level concentrations lower than air quality standards. The models have used historic emission levels that are higher than current and proposed levels. The results of the modelling are conservative and therefore there will be no breach of an environmental quality standard because of this emission.
Will the limit set breach any applicable limit in the Annexes to the Directive?
NRW will ensure that the limits set in the permit at the end of the TNP period comply with Annex V of the Industrial Emissions Directive. The proposed limit that will be achieved following optimisation of the boilers, (and completion of improvement condition IC41), during the TNP, matches the 450 mg NO\\textsubscript{x}/Nm\\textsuperscript{3} limit listed in paragraph 4 of Part 1 of Annex V of IED for plants that do not operate more than 1500 hours per year as a rolling average over 5 years. The ELV set in the permit is also considered to represent current site specific BAT for NO\\textsubscript{x} emissions from the station, subject to a review of performance during optimisation in accordance with improvement condition IC41 (see Improvement Conditions section below) to be completed before the end of the TNP.
Will the ELV result in any significant pollution and is there a high level of protection?
The limits in the permit have been set to be protective of the environment based on air quality modelling. There has also been monitoring of ambient air quality in areas likely to be affected by Aberthaw Power Station. Since monitoring began in 2002 the NO\\textsubscript{x} concentrations have been consistently below air quality standards which are set to be protective of human health, the reduced operating time and reduced emissions from Aberthaw will ensure this reduces further. Does the cost benefit analysis use recognised figures for harm where they exist?
The cost benefit submitted with the BAT assessment uses recognised figures of harm per tonne of NO\\textsubscript{x}, RWE have also included site specific costs that are the most appropriate to the specific emissions from Aberthaw.
Does the cost benefit analysis use costs that can be verified?
The costs of the abatement provided by RWE are comparable with costs of similar plant in the electricity supply sector and other industries. In addition, the actual costs of installing low NO\\textsubscript{x} technology on Unit 9 has been used and is indicative of the costs likely to be incurred at Aberthaw.
Are the costs disproportionate to the environmental benefits that could be achieved?
RWE have submitted a robust set of data and a cost benefit analysis that shows that the installation of Windbox technology onto units 7 and 8 is cost effective and will meet the requirements of Annex V of the IED. The cost benefit analysis submitted shows that reductions to meet the BAT AELs post the TNP will be disproportionate to benefits that could be achieved.
Using the criteria set out in Article 15(4) of IED, NRW is satisfied that BAT is represented by a limit of 450 mg/Nm\\textsuperscript{3} or lower if this can be achieved through optimisation and that further abatement to reduce this limit, results in disproportionate cost compared to the benefits that could be achieved.
Following the submission of additional data on cost benefit analysis sensitivity to the current operational baseline, we have concluded the following:
- The costs of all viable techniques outweigh the benefits significantly, with the exception of the proposed HVMC fuel conversion in combination with existing mixed primary NO\\textsubscript{x} controls;
- The cost-benefit assessment (CBA) uses an appropriate methodology and conservative assumptions; and
- Sensitivity analysis of the CBA assumptions to baseline date, closure date, abatement costs, achieved abatement level and damage costs does not alter the disproportionality of the costs compared to the environmental benefits.
In order to assess BAT in terms of the future of Aberthaw we have used the criteria set out in the Industrial Emissions Directive to evaluate the potential abatement options. The criteria listed in Article 15(4) have been used to evaluate the validity of the emission limit set in the permit against the limits laid out in the recently published BREF note. The Bref limits will not apply to the power station until at least the TNP has ended and the power station is no longer subject to derogation under Article 32. A further assessment may be required if the parameters used in the assessment have changed. The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales IED BAT ESI review paper “BAT Review for the period 1 January 2016 until implementation of new BAT conclusions, or end of the TNP/LLD (as appropriate) E&W” (28th October 2014), set out site specific BAT for the installation when firing on Low Volatile Matter Coal. However, this has now been superseded by the BAT assessment submitted as part of this variation application.
A further review against the LCP Bref BAT conclusions will be undertaken during 2018 allowing further operating performance to be considered when setting BAT ELVs for the post-TNP period.
We consider that the emission limits included in the permit reflect the BAT for the installation. We also consider that the operating techniques represent appropriate techniques for the facility.
**Start-up / Shut down load threshold.**
The Operator originally applied to change the minimum start up and shut down load (MSUL/MSDL) thresholds in Table S1.5 from 395 MWe (74%) to 385 MWe (72%) as part of this variation. This change was requested to account for variations in works power taking sent out generation below the Stable Export Limit (SEL) which is equal to 395 MWe. However, since the variation application was submitted, the Operator has confirmed that they wish to withdraw this particular change request from the application, as their preference is for the information in the permit to match the SEL which remains at 395 MWe. However, from an environmental perspective, the operator has confirmed that the data capture for emissions reporting in MERS the (Continuous Emissions Monitoring (CEMs) system), will be triggered at the lower value of 385 MWe, which means that more emissions data will be captured when the station is running at lower loads.
**Raw Materials**
We have specified limits and controls on the use of raw materials and fuels. More specifically we have updated Table S2.1 of the permit to reflect the fact that the installation will now be fired on higher volatile matter coal as well as low volatile content coal. As such, we have identified a volatile matter content range for the coal typically from 9% to >33% as received.
**Improvement Conditions**
Based on the information on the application, we consider that we need to impose improvement conditions. Improvement Condition IC41 requires that:
- Following the commissioning of Units 7, 8 and 9 and a period of 6 months operation on HVMC, the Operator shall submit a written post-commissioning report to Natural Resources Wales for approval. The report shall confirm the commissioning completion date for each unit conversion to bituminous coal firing. The report shall also state the emission reductions achieved and relevant performance parameters under the full range of operating scenarios, including, but not limited to:
- noise levels associated with commissioning activities and routine start up and operation
- fugitive dust emissions associated with coal stocking and handling
- ash quality (and identification of the need for PFA landfill design review)
- carbon in ash levels
- tube failure rates
- start up, shut down thresholds and boiler stability
- slagging
- thermal performance
- CEMs performance
- electrostatic precipitator performance
- FGD performance
- NOx emissions, including NO:NO2 ratio
- CO emissions
The report shall include a justification of the Best Available Techniques Emission Limit Values (BAT ELVs) to be adopted upon full optimisation of all units, including a date by which the BAT ELVs will be achieved.
Recognising that Aberthaw Power Station will no longer be subject to Article 32 from 1 July 2020, we have included this improvement condition to confirm the performance of the plant modifications which will further inform the full LCP BREF review to be conducted for Aberthaw Power Station and the emission limit values for NOx.
The Operator’s response to improvement condition IC41 is required to be submitted by 31st May 2018.
Improvement Condition IC42 requires that:
The operator shall carry out a review of the Accident Management Plan to take account of each unit conversion to bituminous coal.
The reviewed plan shall be submitted to Natural Resources Wales for approval, and any additional measures and controls identified in the approved plan shall be implemented within 12 months of the written approval of the report by Natural Resources Wales.
NRW has already assessed the proposed measures for fire management and control as part of the variation application. However this improvement condition enables the operator to demonstrate that these control measures have been incorporated into the installation’s Accident Management Plan and to ensure that the plan is reflective of operating experience using HVMC.
The Operator’s response to improvement condition IC42 is required to be submitted by 31st May 2018.
**Incorporating the Application**
We have specified that the applicant must operate the permit in accordance with descriptions in the application, including all additional information received as part of the determination process. These descriptions are specified in Table S1.2 “Operating Techniques” in the permit.
**Emission Limits**
For combustion plant in the TNP, Article 32(2) requires that plant shall at least maintain the emission limit values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and dust under the requirements of the Large Combustion Plant Directive (now repealed but still relevant for setting minimum standards during the TNP).
The current 95% of validated daily means within a calendar year was considered to provide an appropriate equivalent for the 95% of validated 48 hourly means set out in the LCPD. However, to ensure that this is the case, this specific provision is also now included in the permit for the duration of the TNP, delivering the requirements of Article 32(2).
A 550 mg/m$^3$ 48-hourly annual 95%ile Emission Limit Value (ELV) for NO$\_x$ has been added to the permit as part of this variation. This new ELV will take effect from 1st November 2017. The purpose of the new ELV is to demonstrate equivalence of the current daily 95%ile ELV to the requirement to at least maintain the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) minimum standards during the Transitional National Plan (TNP) period. As there is currently very limited operational emissions data from the station using bituminous coal, it has not been possible to derive a daily 95%ile ELV for NO$\_x$ with clearly demonstrable equivalence to the LCPD 550 mg/m$^3$ 48-hourly annual 95%ile ELV for NO$\_x$. The current daily 95%ile NO$\_x$ ELV of 605 mg/m$^3$ will be retained until the end of the TNP for transition to Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) Annex V ELV purposes.
As a result of the BAT assessment, we consider the following emission limit values as site specific BAT for NOx emissions whilst Aberthaw power station is subject to the Article 32 TNP derogation provisions in IED Chapter III:
Monthly average 450-500 mg/Nm$^3$. 500mg/Nm$^3$ applies immediately with 450 mg/Nm$^3$ or less to apply following completion of unit optimisation and approval of the date specified in the response to improvement condition IC41.
Annual 95th percentile of daily averages 550-605 mg/Nm$^3$. 605mg/Nm$^3$ applies immediately with 550 mg/Nm$^3$ or less to apply following completion of unit optimisation and approval of the date specified in the response to improvement condition IC41).
Annual 95th percentile of 48 hourly averages 550 mg/Nm$^3$, representing the 110% of the monthly average ELV as set out in Article 14(1)(b)(ii) of the LCPD.
**Monitoring**
We have decided that monitoring should be carried out for the new 550 mg/m$^3$ 48-hourly annual 95%ile ELV for NO$\_x$ using the methods detailed in Table S3.1 of the permit and to the frequencies specified therein. Condition 3.6.7(a) has been updated to reflect the fact that the new emission limit will be measured using Continuous Emissions Monitors (CEMS) and therefore all monitoring is subject to the permit requirements and confidence intervals associated with the use of CEMs.
**Reporting**
Reporting of NO$\_x$ emissions from emission point A1 continues to be required every three months. This reporting requirement also applies to the new 48-hourly annual 95%ile ELV of 550 mg/m$^3$
**Administrative Change**
The text “designed to operate on low volatile content coal” has been removed from Table S3.1 (under source: coal fired boiler plant). This is based on the fact that although this statement remains accurate, the installation’s coal fired boiler plant will now be operating on Hard Coal which includes HVMC.
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a42313cf8401e795cb6abedb73f764eb2ec8c65a | London Borough of Barnet Equalities Policy
Aiming for Equal Life Chances in Barnet – ensuring the right approach to equalities in changing times.
Revised January 2014
Contents Foreword by Councillor Richard Cornelius, Leader of the Council What does Barnet Council want to achieve? Who is included in the policy? How will we do it? Expectations of Partners and Citizens How will we know we are making a difference?
Foreword by Councillor Richard Cornelius, Leader of the Council
In a time of unprecedented financial challenge, it is important to ensure that the decisions the council takes are fair and that, as an organisation, we are efficient, transparent and accountable to local people. Barnet’s revised Equalities Policy will help us to deliver our commitment to equal opportunities for all as the council commissions and delivers services during challenging times.
Barnet is large, growing and diverse and we are proud that Barnet is a place where people get along well together. The focus of the council is to foster growth in the local economy and we want everyone to benefit from that growth. But we know that some residents will continue to need our support, which we will provide, whilst helping others maintain their independence.
The council will be transparent and keep equalities at the heart of decision making as we continue to make tough financial decisions. We will monitor and report our progress, making sure we are aware of any disproportionate impact on particular groups.
We want to keep Barnet as a great place for people to live, work and study. I look forward to working with our local partners and residents from across the borough to ensure that everyone can achieve their potential and benefit from all that Barnet has to offer.
1. What does Barnet Council want to achieve?
At a time of change and continuing financial austerity, the council has made a commitment to treat citizens equally with understanding and respect; provide equal opportunities and quality services in line with Best Value principles. This commitment is at the core of the council’s constitution.
We will take a borough wide approach to equalities and we recognise that one sector alone cannot reduce inequality, grow the economy or encourage community action. We will work with all our partners in the private, public and community sector and the rich diversity of Barnet’s communities to:
- Keep Barnet as a good place to live work and study where every Barnet citizen has the opportunity to live, work and study in a safe environment free from harassment and discrimination.
- Build on local community strengths and assets so that citizens can support each other to take control of their own lives, optimise their independence, and make a difference in their communities and to local services.
- Support communities to get on well together and build understanding about what really matters to Citizens.
- Promote active engagement with the rich diversity of Barnet’s communities, people who use services, residents and employees.
- Seek out the voices of people who are not always heard and those who need extra help to access our services.
- Place a clear emphasis on creating the right environment for fair economic growth across the borough which supports the development of diverse markets. We want to ensure that workforces and suppliers can maximise the benefits of jobs and growth for local people and communities.
- Use evidence to support the delivery of needs led, appropriate and accessible services which reflect the diversity of need at different stages in people’s lives.
- Meet our legal, organisational and personal responsibilities to treat people fairly, promote equalities, address inequality, challenge discrimination, and make reasonable adjustments when we identify any physical or attitudinal barriers which limit equal opportunities.
2. Who is included in the Barnet’s Equalities Policy?
Barnet Council’s Equalities Policy is relevant to all Barnet Citizens - everyone who lives, works, studies and uses services in the borough. The Policy outlines key ways of working for Barnet Council staff and the organisations who deliver services in partnership with, and on behalf of, the council. 3. How will we do it?
Barnet is a ‘Commissioning Council’, providing services through a mixed economy of private, public and community organisations to secure the best value for the taxpayer.
We will:
- Work to reflect and integrate equalities into everything we and our partners do. We will embed equalities into the decisions the council and partners make and into business and financial planning processes.
- Work with local partners including public, private, voluntary and community sectors to gather information and data to understand and act on citizen’s needs and expectations. Use data to identify trends and barriers and take action to make reasonable adjustments.
- Assess the impact on equality as the council and our partners develop and implement specific strategies, policies and programmes.
- Be open and transparent, publish information regarding our progress against our equality objectives and ensure partners can be held to account for mutually agreed outcomes.
- Make consultation and engagement with the rich diversity of Barnet communities a cornerstone of developing new actions and approaches.
- Enable everyone to participate in the life of the community and celebrate its diversity.
- Develop a ‘Communities Together’ network, with the council facilitating different local groups to share information and build an understanding about what really matters to Barnet’s communities, and how we can get on well together.
4. What do we expect from our partners?
The council expects all its partners to:
- Commit to the aims and principles and ways of working set out in Sections 1 and 3 of this policy document and reflect these in the way they do business in Barnet.
- Reflect legal requirements for equality including the General Public Sector Equality Duty where it applies, by promoting equality, tackling discrimination and paying due regard to equalities in decision making.
- Collect analyse and share equalities data to support the achievement of this policy and report progress, for example, as part of Barnet Council’s Strategic Equalities Objective.
- Know about and respond to the diverse nature of Barnet as part of their standard business model. • Support people to access services and reflect Barnet’s diversity in their service provision by communicating with their customers, making their services accessible and personalising their offer to meet individual needs without a service premium.
5. What do we expect from our citizens?
We want to support everyone in Barnet to take control of their own lives, communities and local services. We will foster a culture of personal responsibility where citizens and communities encouraged to promote equalities and community cohesion, maximise their independence, support each other and challenge discrimination.
6. How will we know that we are making a difference?
We will focus on the outcomes of our equality aims as set out in section 1 of this policy.
• We will publish our Strategic Equalities Objective and measure our performance against it. These measures will reflect the things that people tell us they value and we will monitor the impact of the economic downturn on the most vulnerable and disadvantaged.
• In collaboration with our partners we will measure our progress, publish the results and take action to address physical and attitudinal barriers to people having equal life chances. For example, we will monitor the reporting of hate crimes.
• We will publish an annual report of our progress against our Strategic Equalities Objective.
• We will share best practice and achievements with our partners so that we can collaborate, learn from others and improve.
The Leader of the Council, who is the responsible Elected Member for Equalities, the Lead Member for Community Cohesion and the council’s Strategic Director for Communities, will review progress against our aims.
This Policy will be reviewed with the Corporate Plan in 2015 and in the meantime, we will continue to work with our partners, communities and residents to implement the Action Plan that goes with this policy.
Our Strategic Equalities Objective and progress against the performance measures we use to measure it will be kept online and up to date here; http://www.barnet.gov.uk/info/200041/equality_and_diversity/224/equality_and_diversity
More information can be found on the Equalities pages on our website, including: • Our Equalities Policy Action Plan which will be updated annually • Our Strategic Equalities Objective and the measures we use to monitor it • Information on our progress and our key achievements • Our staff equalities policy • Links to our partners’ equalities policies
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d1cae1e50267b4827c531aebe60805eb89624513 | ORR Equality Information
The Office of Rail and Road (ORR) is the independent safety and economic regulator of the railways in Great Britain and the economic monitor of Highways England.
As a public body, ORR has duties under the Equality Act 2010 (EA2010). This table contains an outline of the elements of our work that may affect group of people sharing protected characteristics, and how ORR takes the three arms of the general equality duty into account.
ORR’s primary roles are as health and safety regulator for the whole railway industry, and as economic regulator of Network Rail (the monopoly owner and operator of the national rail network). This includes setting the terms on which train operators use the network and other essential facilities. We also have competition powers for the rail sector and some powers under consumer law. In addition, we have economic regulatory functions in relation to railways in Northern Ireland and for the northern half of the Channel Tunnel.
Passenger train operators are primarily regulated by government through franchise contracts, but ORR is responsible for setting and enforcing licence conditions on operators relating to complaints handling, passenger information and protection for disabled passengers. Decisions on the level of funding for the railways are for government, and ORR works closely with the Department for Transport and Transport Scotland. We also work with other agencies and organisations – the Rail Safety and Standards Board and the Rail Accident Investigation Branch are just two of the stakeholders that support and inform the work of ORR.
The following table focuses on the direct responsibilities of ORR with relevance to the EA2010, but also indicates key interfaces with other organisations where appropriate.
- Protected characteristics are – age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race (including ethnic or national origins, colour and nationality), religion or belief (including lack of belief), sex and sexual orientation.
- The three aims of the general equality duty are (1) eliminate unlawful discrimination (2) advance equality of opportunity (3) foster good relations.
The description of how ORR exercises its duties under the EA2010 is organised by function.
Last updated: August 2020 | Specific function / work area | Relevance | How is the function exercised with regard to ORR’s duties under EA2010 | How do we evidence/record the exercise of this function to show consideration? | Further information. | |-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | ORR’s Decision making | Under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, ORR must give “due regard” to the following three aims of general equality duty within our regulatory decision making:
- Eliminate unlawful discrimination: Removing or minimizing disadvantages suffered by people with protected characteristics;
- Advance equality of opportunity: Taking steps to meet the needs of people from protected groups; and
- Foster good relations: encouraging people from protected groups to participate in public life.\
We must also consider the potential impacts of the policy on people with different protected characteristics and prohibited conduct in relation to people sharing these characteristics. | To consider the potential impact of the decision/policy on people with different protected characteristics.\
To have evidence to demonstrate that we have discharged our PSED obligations in our decision making.\
Given the nature of ORR’s responsibilities in the sectors that we regulate, the primary area of focus for us is on people with reduced mobility, which has relevance to the protected characteristics of disability, age, and pregnancy and maternity.\
The nine protected characteristics and prohibited conduct in relation to people sharing these characteristics being Age, Disability, Gender reassignment or gender identity, Marriage and civil partnership, Pregnant people and those on maternity leave, Race and ethnicity, Religion and belief, Sex, and Sexual orientation. | To ensure we are considering our Equality Duty in our decision making, we have
- a box on the cover page of our Board/committee template signposting consideration of the PSED in our decision making and to ensure decision makers can monitor our compliance where relevant;
- an additional paragraph on PSED in section B – The objective(s) and developing the options in the body of the Board/committee paper template.\
To demonstrate compliance we will
- monitor policy papers going to PolCo and RegCo and keep a record of the Equality Impact Assessments and Equality Statements produced as part of our policy making; and
- keep all our completed Equality Impact Assessments and Equality Statements on ORRacle at – Developing policy and regulatory decisions.\
To support ORR’s policy makers we have guidance available
- on our Equality Impact Assessment or Equality Statement and Developing policy and regulatory decisions ORRacle pages and in ORR decision-making framework. | Webpage on decision-making and accountability | | Specific function / work area | Relevance | How is the function exercised with regard to ORR’s duties under EA2010 | How do we evidence/record the exercise of this function to show consideration? | Further information. | |-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | Accessible Travel Policies (ATPs) | This function is of specific relevance to Disability, and other protected characteristics that may involve reduced mobility. Eliminating unlawful discrimination: Making sure that ATPs comply with the requirements of the ATP guidance, and ensuring the operators are fulfilling the commitments set out in those ATPs. Ensuring station operators comply with the joint ‘Code of Practice’: Design Standards for Accessible Stations Advance equality of opportunity: the objective of ATPs is to advance the interests of people with disabilities that use the railways. | ORR sets and enforces the requirements of operator licences. One such condition is for train and station operators to establish and comply with an Accessible Travel Policy (ATP). This sets out the arrangements and assistance that an operator will provide to protect the interests of older and disabled people using its services. We approve these policies and monitor compliance with them. We also investigate reports of station operators not complying with the Code of Practice and, if necessary, take action. We published revised ATP Guidance in July 2019, alongside an Equality Impact Assessments of the revisions made, and subsequently consulted on amending this guidance to strengthen the provision of accessible rail replacement services. We expect to publish further revisions in summer 2020, alongside and updated impact assessment. In the meantime we are approving ATPs submitted by licence holders and monitoring TOC compliance, with approved ATPs. | We published the 2019 ATP guidance, alongside an Equality Impact Assessment. For ATP approvals, we publish our decision letters, summarising any issues that were raised during the process, noting areas of good practice and shortfall. We monitor compliance with ATPs through our core data work, as well as via bespoke research, and publish the results in our annual consumer report. We continue to publish the results of our ongoing survey of passengers who booked assistance. In 2017 we published the first of these surveys, alongside - a mystery shopper exercise of unbooked assistance. - a survey of passengers with disabilities, to gauge awareness - in-depth interviews with passengers, staff and industry leaders This established an evidence base to prioritise and target interventions. Our revised guidance will be subject to an updated Equalities Impact Assessment. | Information for passengers with disabilities on the types of services they can expect to receive when travelling by train is available on our website in our passengers with disabilities page. Information for train and station operators on our role in approving and monitoring policies is also available. Our consultations on improving assisted travel, and supporting research can be found on our website. | | Specific function / work area | Relevance | How is the function exercised with regard to ORR’s duties under EA2010 | How do we evidence/record the exercise of this function to show consideration? | Further information. | |-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | **Complaints Handling Procedures** | Disability, age, pregnancy and maternity are protected characteristics with particular relevance to mobility, transport and rail. Passengers with other protected characteristics may have a complaint regarding their treatment | ORR has worked closely with stakeholders to establish a consistent reporting procedure for passenger complaints relating to discrimination and harassment. ORR publishes data on passenger complaints handling, including information on complaints relating to accessibility. | National Rail Portal records type of complaints received by operator, including 10 categories related to accessibility. Measuring Up report shows data on accessibility complaints, by operator. | [Complaints handling webpage](#), including information for passengers and operators [Complaints data](#), including guidance for operators. | | Specific function / work area | Relevance | How is the function exercised with regard to ORR’s duties under EA2010 | How do we evidence/record the exercise of this function to show consideration? | Further information. | |-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | Enforcement | Disability, age, pregnancy and maternity are characteristics, related to mobility, with particular relevance to safety risk levels. | The specific circumstances of workers and rail users with protected characteristics are reflected where appropriate eg: use of barrow crossings by wheelchair users, prams etc. | Selection of stakeholder consultees and taking into account responses, on new and existing policies and procedures. | Webpage on ORR’s enforcement of rail vehicle accessibility legislation. | | | Eliminating discrimination: Safety considerations and practices should give due regard to groups with protected characteristics. | Enforcement principles, and Enforcement Management Model, will be revised to reflect the effect of protected characteristics on safety risk, where appropriate. | Recording how we take equality into account when developing policies and applying guidance in individual cases. | Annual health and safety report. (Link) | | | Promoting equality: The railway should be safe for groups with protected characteristics to use. | Investigation decisions give due regard to the effect upon groups sharing protected characteristics. | Improvement notices, prohibition notices and prosecutions will refer, where relevant. | | | | | | Annual health and safety report provides information on accessibility-related work. | | | Specific function / work area | Relevance | How is the function exercised with regard to ORR’s duties under EA2010 | How do we evidence/record the exercise of this function to show consideration? | Further information. | |-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | Accident and investigation | Disability, age, pregnancy and maternity are characteristics with particular relevance to safety risk levels. | Follow up recommendations from Railway Accident Investigation Branch. | Equality analysis included when following up recommendations and as action is taken, if appropriate. | Webpage | | Guidance and research | Disability, age, pregnancy and maternity are characteristics with particular relevance to safety risk levels. | Publication of guidance, consultations and research. ORR convenes a panel of consumer experts, which has access to expertise on disability-related issues from the Disabled Passengers Transport Advisory Committee. ORR seeks input on policy consultations from groups representing people with protected characteristics, and liaises where appropriate with the Disabled Passenger Transport Advisory Committee. | Explicit early references when developing policies and procedures. Equality analysis and impact assessments to identify any areas of concern where appropriate. (Level crossings publication (2011) refers to users with reduced mobility. (Policy guidance on Driver Controlled Operation polic refers). | Health and safety strategy [webpage](#) DPTAC [website](#) | |-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Duties under the Health and Safety at Work Act (HSW 1974) | Eliminating discrimination: ORR guidance and research should give due regard to the needs and views of groups that share protected characteristics. Promoting equality: Groups sharing protected characteristics should have the opportunity for input and feedback on guidance and research. Fostering good relations: Guidance should explicitly justify any recommendations, and disproportionate practices, to counter any 'special treatment' argument. Similarly, representative groups should be assured that their views have been taken into account, particularly if representations have been outweighed by other concerns in final policy decisions. | | | | | Specific function / work area | Relevance | How is the function exercised with regard to ORR’s duties under EA2010 | How do we evidence/record the exercise of this function to show consideration? | Further information. | |-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | Inspections and audits | Disability, age, pregnancy and maternity are characteristics that may have particular relevance to safety risk levels. **Eliminating discrimination:** Inspections and audits give due regard to the needs of groups that share protected characteristics | Inspection procedure and practice pays explicit attention to the safety of groups sharing protected characteristics. Audit of duty-holder safety procedures gives due regard to impact on groups that share protected characteristics. Assurance of risk assessment procedures to ensure that groups with protected characteristics are included. | Concerns are recorded within case-management system where relevant, and acted upon where appropriate. Any systemic concerns are reported in Annual Health and Safety report, and raised with industry via RIHSAC | Railway Industry Health and Safety Advisory Committee [webpage](#) Health and safety strategy [webpage](#) | | Specific function / work area | Relevance | How is the function exercised with regard to ORR’s duties under EA2010 | How do we evidence/record the exercise of this function to show consideration? | Further information. | |-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | Safety certification | Eliminating discrimination, promoting equality: Important to ensure that regulation and certification do not unduly discriminate against groups sharing protected characteristics. | Certificates and authorisations are issued in accordance with ROGS guidance. Explain and justify any lawful discrimination as required (eg: colour-blindness for train drivers) | Specific references included in guidance. (Strategic Risk Chapter 12 refers) Equality analysis guidance included in regulatory impact assessments. | Webpage | | Specific function / work area | Relevance | How is the function exercised with regard to ORR’s duties under EA2010 | How do we evidence/record the exercise of this function to show consideration? | Further information. | |-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | Train driver licensing | Relevant to people with all protected characteristics that want to become train drivers. **Race, age, and sex** may be of particular relevance. **Eliminate discrimination:** Important to ensure that people with characteristics are not subject to unlawful discrimination. **Fostering good relations:** Ensure that lawful discrimination is justified, where appropriate. | ORR is responsible for issuing licences to drivers and keeping the national register of licences. We inspect and monitor train operators’ arrangements for training, competence management and fitness of drivers, and ensure that these do not discriminate unlawfully. | Guidance issued and records of decisions and appeals kept (not published). We have recently clarified our guidance on how we deal with absence from driving due to maternity leave | [Webpage](#) on ORR’s train driver licensing | | Technical specifications on interoperability (TSI) and Rail Vehicle Accessibility Regulations (RVAR) | Disability, age, pregnancy and maternity are characteristics with particular relevance to requirements under the Persons with Reduced Mobility (PRM) TSI. | DfT is the policy lead on accessibility for rail; ORR has enforcement powers in respect of the technical standards for rail vehicle accessibility defined in PRM TSI and RVAR. ORR seat at PRM TSI working party filled by specialist from RSSB. Reactive monitoring and assurance of compliance with TSI and RVAR, making sure vehicles are accessible in compliance with the law by responding to reports submitted by members of the public, stakeholders and ORR staff. We use a supplement to the enforcement management model as an aid to decision-making for our enforcement approach to accessibility non-compliances, as they are not health and safety matters. Accurate and timely advice given on exemption, deviation, dispensation and derogation processes (the processes for these modifications to standards fall to other bodies). Consultee for DfT’s exemption, deviation and derogation processes, although ORR input is in respect of health & safety implications and effect on ORR’s ability to exercise enforcement powers. | Publication of how needs of protected groups have been taken into account in formulation of TSIs. (see ERA website) We retain evidence for decisions on authorisations. DfT keeps information on exemption, dispensation and derogation decisions. RSSB keeps information on deviation decisions. | Webpage on ORR’s enforcement of rail vehicle accessibility legislation. Webpage on TSI authorisation process. Webpage on ORR’s supplement to the HSE enforcement management model. ERA webpage on TSI requirements. DfT webpage on rail vehicle accessibility. | | Specific function / work area | Relevance | How is the function exercised with regard to ORR’s duties under EA2010 | How do we evidence/record the exercise of this function to show consideration? | Further information. | |-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | **Network Rail regulation – Land disposal** | Disability and age may be of particular relevance, from time to time. **Promoting equality of opportunity.** Land disposals may have an effect upon pre-existing facilities, eg: disabled parking. | When Network Rail refers a disposal to us for consent, it must provide a description of the proposals plus evidence of stakeholders’ views and final positions together with any commentary on them. For every submission we expect Network Rail to consult the relevant stakeholders depending on the geographical location of the proposed disposal. It is expected that passenger representative organisations will represent the overall comments or views of individuals using the railways when giving their views to Network Rail. | Our published land disposal guidance refers to EA2010 duties. We scan for Equalities Act issues arising in casework. Where found, we record them in our casework notes, consider the associated views, issues and impacts and have regard to them in reaching a decision. All land disposal casework is filed electronically in “Box” our corporate cloud-based storage and retrieval system. | Webpage on land disposal | | Specific function / work area | Relevance | How is the function exercised with regard to ORR’s duties under EA2010 | How do we evidence/record the exercise of this function to show consideration? | Further information. | |-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | Network Rail regulation: Periodic Review | Disability and age are characteristics with a particular relevance to mobility and access. | The Department for Transport decides the scope and amount of Access for All funding. ORR is responsible for ensuring that the work is delivered, effectively and efficiently. | Evaluation of Network Rail’s performance and expenditure is included within the NR monitor. ORR attend periodic Programme Boards with NR, DfT and TS to monitor governance of the Access For All (AfA) ring-fenced fund. Any issues would be reported in the NR monitor, however there have been no issues to report in CP5 or year 1 of CP6. AfA funding and the list of stations which will receive improvements has been set for CP6. Details can be found on the Government website here. | Access for all website (DfT) Access For all website with map of schemes (NR) | | Specific function / work area | Relevance | How is the function exercised with regard to ORR’s duties under EA2010 | How do we evidence/record the exercise of this function to show consideration? | Further information. | |-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | Consumer law functions | Eliminating discrimination and promoting Arm 1, 2 & 3: Important that consumer law enforcement gives due regard to the Equality Act 2010. | Part 8 of the EA02 can be used only where an infringement harms the collective interests of consumers. The breach must affect, or have the potential to affect, consumers generally or a group of consumers – this can include a group with certain shared characteristics, such as age or disability. | In exercising our consumer enforcement function, we will have regard to those impacted by the offending act or behaviour. Relevant evidence taken into consideration will be recorded within our corporate decision-making documents. | Webpage | | Highways Monitor | Mainly indirect through how our monitoring affects Highways England's delivery. Disability and age are characteristics with a particular relevance to mobility and access. | The Department for Transport sets the requirements in the RIS, including the performance specification and the scope and size of ring-fenced funds. ORR is responsible for monitoring Highways England's delivery of those requirements. | Recording how we take equality into account when developing policies. | Webpage (Adam Spencer-Bickle) | ORR Equality Objectives
The Office of Rail and Road (ORR) is the independent safety and economic regulator of the railways in Great Britain and the economic monitor of Highways England.
As a public body, ORR has duties under the Equality Act 2010 (EA2010). To this end, ORR has published the following Equality Objectives, setting out some of the ways that ORR will be working to advance the aims of EA2010. These objectives reflect just some of the work that ORR does in this area.
**ORR will promote improvements to accessibility for disabled passengers and passengers with reduced mobility.**
To facilitate this ORR will undertake the following activities, and report on progress.
a. ORR will work to improve the reliability of booked assistance by a. Working with a pilot group of operators to continue trial testing of reliability safeguards in booked assistance b. Publishing data showing the rate of change over time for booked assistance delivery.
b. As part of ORR’s monitoring of Accessible Travel Policies, ORR will keep train operators’ plans for staff disability awareness training under review, to ensure ORR’s required outcomes and deadlines are met.
c. ORR will published revised ATP Guidance including new requirements relating to the accessibility of rail replacement services. ORR will work with DVSA to provide clarity about how the accessibility rules for these services will be monitored and enforced.
*Last revised: August 2020*
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91385003c85db41ecd216fe2952aa9363c7ff1a3 | Equality & Diversity Policy Contents
1 Introduction and key principles ................................................................................................................. 3 2 Purpose and scope.......................................................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Purpose .................................................................................................................................................... 3 2.2 Scope ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 2.3 Other relevant policies ....................................................................................................................... 4 3 Accessibility ...................................................................................................................................................... 4 4 Monitoring and Review................................................................................................................................. 4 5 Responsibilities ................................................................................................................................................ 4 5.2 Heads of Department and Managers are responsible for: ................................................................. 4 5.3 Human Resources and Organisational Development are responsible for: ................................. 5 5.4 All employees are responsible for: ....................................................................................................... 5 5.5 The Equality & Diversity Forum is responsible for: ........................................................................ 5 6 Raising a complaint........................................................................................................................................ 6
Policy owner: Human Resources Published: May 2011 Reviewed: August 2017
This policy was agreed with the Trade Union Side on 18 Aug 2017. It will be reviewed at the request of either party. 1 Introduction and key principles
1.1 The National Archives is committed to
- Equality and diversity in all aspects of what we do. We believe it is a key part of maintaining and developing a successful organisation,
- Being an organisation which is inclusive and values difference by attracting, recruiting, developing and retaining talented people from all sections of the community to contribute at every level of the organisation,
- Ensuring that our services are relevant and accessible to all,
- Creating an environment and culture that treats everyone with dignity and respect,
- Complying with the Equality Act 2010 by providing equal opportunities in employment and avoiding unlawful discrimination in employment and customer service,
- Ensuring that all our employees understand their responsibility to promote Equality and Diversity and challenge inappropriate behaviour, and
- Tackling unlawful discrimination in all its forms.
1.2 This policy is intended to assist The National Archives in putting commitment into practice. Compliance with this policy will also ensure that employees do not commit unlawful acts of discrimination.
2 Purpose and scope
2.1 Purpose
2.1.1 The purpose of this policy is to ensure that anyone engaging with the work of The National Archives is not treated less favourably as a result of having “protected characteristics”.
2.1.2 It is unlawful to discriminate directly or indirectly in recruitment or employment because of a protected characteristic. The Equality Act 2010 covers the following protected characteristics:
- sex
- age
- disability
- gender reassignment
- pregnancy or maternity
- race (which includes colour, nationality and ethnic or national origins)
- sexual orientation
- religion or belief,
- marriage or civil partnership.
2.1.3 The National Archives aims to provide a working environment and culture which values and recognises difference, pro-actively tackles barriers to inclusion and ensures no individual or group is discriminated against. 2.1.4 We are committed to ensuring that we consider equality, diversity and inclusion issues in everything we do, including the development and implementation of organisational policies and strategic planning.
2.1.5 For more information about what is covered under the Equality Act 2010, please refer to the chart in Appendix 1. Refer to the chart in Appendix 2 for examples of discrimination.
2.2 Scope
2.2.1 This policy applies to all employees and third parties (e.g. partner organisations, subcontractors and suppliers) and protects all employees, third parties and anyone engaging in the work of The National Archives from unlawful discrimination.
2.3 Other relevant policies
2.3.1 Our Bullying & Harassment Policy, Maternity Leave Policy, Maternity (Paternity) Support Policy, Flexible Working Policy, and Domestic Violence Policy may also be relevant.
3 Accessibility
3.1 If any aspect of this policy or procedure causes you difficulty because of any disability that you may have, or if you need assistance because English is not your first language, you should raise this issue with your HR contact, who will make appropriate arrangements.
4 Monitoring and Review
4.1 The policy will be reviewed regularly and agreed with the Trade Union Side to ensure that it meets the requirements of both the business and our diverse workforce.
5 Responsibilities
5.1 The Chief Executive Officer and the Executive Team are responsible for:
- Ensuring The National Archives meets all of its legal obligations
- Ensuring, with the assistance of Heads of Department and Managers, that strategies, processes and practices relating to this policy are successfully implemented, monitored and reviewed
- Being a high profile lead on issues related to the policy
5.2 Heads of Department and Managers are responsible for:
- Ensuring that strategies, processes and practices relating to this policy are successfully implemented
- Ensuring all employees are aware of their responsibilities and accountabilities under the policy
- Ensuring all employees attend appropriate training to enable successful implementation of the policy
- Ensuring that disciplinary action is taken against anyone who participates in discriminatory behaviour or practices • Ensuring, where appropriate, external partners are aware of the policy • Ensuring that they are not discriminating unfairly if involved in recruitment, selection, promotion and the management of staff • Delivering effective services that meet the needs of The National Archives’ diverse customers and clients
5.3 Human Resources and Organisational Development are responsible for:
• Providing appropriate training as part of induction to ensure that all employees understand their responsibilities in relation to equality, diversity and inclusion • Ensuring that recruitment, learning and development and performance management are dealt with in accordance with the Equality & Diversity policy • Assisting and advising managers to ensure that disciplinary action is taken against anyone who participates in discriminatory behaviour or practices in line with employment law and the appropriate policies and procedures • Ensuring the policy is continually reviewed and all employees attend appropriate training as required to ensure successful implementation of the policy • Monitoring and reporting on statistical and demographic information relating to equality and diversity of The National Archives’ staff
5.4 All employees are responsible for:
• Ensuring their own compliance with this policy • Fostering an environment where everyone (including but not limited to staff, visitors and commercial partners) can participate in the work of the organisation without fear or intimidation • Not victimising any person who has complained, including complaints of unlawful harassment or discrimination, or who has given information in connection with a complaint • Being pro-active in their approach to tackling discrimination in the workplace and to responding to situations appropriately, ensuring that the Equality & Diversity Policy are put into practice.
5.5 The Equality & Diversity Forum is responsible for:
• Promoting equality and diversity, adopting a 'champion' role • As champions, encouraging respect and good relations between staff and modelling positive behaviours • Acting as a conduit for feedback between staff in their areas and the E&D Forum • Providing a 'sounding board' for E&D concerns where an employee feels unable to raise a concern to their line manager or to HR, and providing initial support. • Attending training to stay abreast of E&D issues and support them in their champion role. 6 Raising a complaint
6.1 Employees should raise a complaint to their Line Manager or HR Manager in the first instance. Should they feel unable to raise a concern in this way, employees can contact an Equality & Diversity champion or a Trade Union Representative. A list of E&D champions can be found on Narnia.
6.2 Any complaint will be taken seriously and dealt with in a timely and sensitive manner, in accordance with the relevant grievance and disciplinary procedures. For further information on the process please refer to the Bullying and Harassment Policy.
6.3 For non-employees, such as visitors, clients and customers, stakeholders, partner organisations, sub-contractors and suppliers a complaint should be raised via the Comments, Compliments and Complaints page on The National Archives website.
### Appendix 1
| Equality Act 2010 | Protected Characteristics | |-------------------|---------------------------| | What is covered by the Legislation? | Age | Disability | Gender | Gender Reassignment | Race | Religion or Belief | Sexual Orientation | Marriage & Civil Partnership | Pregnancy & Maternity | | Direct Discrimination | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | Someone is treated less favourably than another person because of a protected characteristic | | | | | | | | | | | Associative Discrimination | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Not covered by the legislation | | Direct discrimination against someone because they associate with another person who possess a protected characteristic | | | | | | | | | Not covered by the legislation | | Discrimination by perception | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Not covered by the legislation | | Direct discrimination against someone because others think they possess a protected characteristic | | | | | | | | | Not covered by the legislation | | Indirect Discrimination | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Not covered by the legislation | | When a rule or policy applies to everyone but disadvantages a particular protected characteristic | | | | | | | | | | | Harassment\* | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Not covered by the legislation | | Someone can complain of behaviour they find offensive, even if it’s not directed at them | | | | | | | | | Not covered by the legislation | | Harassment by a Third Party\* | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Not covered by the legislation | | Someone can complain of behaviour by a third party not employed by The National Archives | | | | | | | | | Not covered by the legislation | | Victimisation\* | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | Someone is treated badly because they have made / supported a complaint or grievance under the Act | | | | | | | | | |
\*These are covered under the Bullying and Harassment Policy
## Appendix 2
### Example types of Discrimination
| Type of Discrimination | Example | |------------------------|---------| | **Direct Discrimination**<br>Someone is treated less favourably than another person because of a protected characteristic | Manager A, a senior manager, turns down Employee B’s application for promotion to a team leader position. Employee B, who is gay, learns that Manager A did this because he believed the team he applied to manage are homophobic. Manager A thought that Employee B’s sexual orientation would prevent him from gaining the team’s respect and managing them effectively. This is direct sexual orientation discrimination against Employee B. | | **Associative Discrimination**<br>Direct discrimination against someone because they associate with another person who possess a protected characteristic | Employee C is the partner of Employee D who works at The National Archives. Employee C decides to undergo gender reassignment and Employee D’s manager discovers this. As a result Employee D is now treated less favourably by her manager compared to other staff. This is discrimination because of association with a trans person. | | **Discrimination by perception**<br>Direct discrimination against someone because others think they possess a protected characteristic | Employee A is 45 and looks much younger. Many people assume she is in her mid-20s. She is not allowed to represent The National Archives at a conference as her Director thinks she looks too young, and would not be taken seriously. Employee A has been discriminated against on the perception of a protected characteristic. | | **Indirect Discrimination**<br>When a rule or policy applies to everyone but disadvantages a particular protected characteristic | The National Archives introduces a dress code for all staff who are customer-facing. The dress code requires women to wear a uniform skirt. Employee F, a Muslim worker refuses for religious reasons and is dismissed. This would be indirect discrimination, because a large number of Muslim women would not be able to comply with the rule. | | **Harassment**<br>Someone can complain of behaviour they find offensive, even if it’s not directed at them | Employee G is disabled and is claiming harassment against his line manager after she frequently teased and humiliated him about his disability. Employee H shares an office with Employee G and he too is claiming harassment, even thought he is not disabled, as the manager’s behaviour has also created an offensive environment for him. | | **Harassment by a Third Party**<br>Someone can complain of behaviour by a third party not employed by The National Archives | Employee J works in the Reading Rooms and is approached by a reader who makes an inappropriate comment toward her. Employee J raises it with her line manager, Manager K who is concerned and monitors the situation. Within a few days the reader approaches Employee J again and makes further offensive remarks. Manager K reacts by speaking to the reader and pointing out that their behaviour is unacceptable. She follows this up with a letter advising that she will ban him if it happens again. Manager K keeps Employee J in the picture with the actions she has taken and believes she has taken reasonable steps to protect Employee J from third party harassment. | | **Victimisation**<br>Someone is treated badly because they have made / supported a complaint or grievance under the Act | Employee K makes a formal complaint against her manager because she feels that she has been discriminated against because of her civil partnership. Although the complaint is resolved through the Grievance procedure, Employee K is then ostracised by her colleagues, including her manager. Employee K could claim victimisation. |
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92fbad6cf7ff9797d655bbb4acbd868b7657cf37 | Equality and Human Rights Policy
Version 1: published July 2015
1. **Introduction and Purpose**
1.1 This Equality and Human Rights Policy explains how Blaby District Council aims to advance equality of opportunity, foster good relations and challenge discrimination, harassment and victimisation in the local area, in delivering services and as an employer.
1.2 As a Local Authority we aim to meet both our legal and moral duty to show fairness, equality and respect to our residents, our service users and our employees. We know that the population of our District is becoming more diverse and that people have very different backgrounds and life experiences. As a result of this we want to make sure that we continue to provide services that meet the varying needs of our residents by communicating, consulting and involving people across the District. As an employer, we constantly aim to have fair and equitable recruitment and selection processes and a welcoming and inclusive working environment, with respect for all.
1.3 The policy aims to promote long-term and continuous improvement, for all employees, job applicants, customers, suppliers and visitors. The responsibility for implementing it lies with all members of Blaby District Council whether they are elected councillors or employees. Our policy recognises the importance of ensuring that the principles of equality and human rights inform key decision-making at every level and builds on the consultation, action plans, our People Strategy and the equality schemes we have produced previously.
1.4 This policy supports our Vison and Values which highlights the Council’s commitment to ensuring that all staff and service users are treated fairly and equally. These Visons and Values can be found in the Blaby Plan which sets out the Council’s ambitions and how we will deliver our priorities.
1.5 We also recognise that we have a moral duty to challenge discrimination and harassment as we believe that our purpose is to play our part in protecting the well being of residents and employees. 1.6. In light of the importance attached to this policy, the Council will ensure that all employees and councillors attend equality, diversity and inclusion workshops at regular intervals and complete the e-learning Equality and Diversity induction module.
1.7. We also ensure that equality, diversity and inclusion are integral and fully reflected in all the Councils practices, policies and procedures relating to service provision, recruitment and employment.
2. What is Equality and Human Rights?
2.1 Equality, Diversity and Inclusion Equality is about creating a fairer society where everyone has the opportunity to fulfil their potential. Diversity is about recognising and valuing difference in its broadest sense. Inclusion is about an individual’s experience within the workplace and in wider society and, the extent to which they feel valued and included.
2.2 Human Rights Human Rights are the basic rights and freedoms that belong to every person in the world. They are based on core principles like dignity, fairness, equality, respect and autonomy. They are relevant to day-to-day life and protect individual’s freedom to control their own life, effectively take part in decisions made by public authorities which impact upon their rights and get fair and equal services from public authorities.
3. What the law says 3.1 The Equality Act 2010 including the Public Sector Equality Duty and the Human Right Act 1998 are the main pieces of legislation which focus on the rights of people not to be discriminated against and safeguard the fundamental freedoms of everyone.
3.2 The Equality Act 2010 is about making sure that people are treated fairly and equally. The law talks about the different ‘protected characteristics’, and guards people in these groups from discrimination because of who or what makes them different from other people.
3.3 It is against the law to discriminate against anyone because of any of these 'protected characteristics'. This applies whether the discrimination is actual or perceived and if it occurs directly, indirectly or by association. The details of these protected characteristics can be found in Appendix 1.
3.4 The Public Sector Equality Duty requires organisations such as district councils, schools and hospitals to think about how they can make things better for people from the different groups. Public authorities must ensure that everyone has equal opportunities and do not suffer discrimination when they carry out their functions and must seek to:
- Eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other conduct prohibited by the Act.
- Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not.
- Foster good relations between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not.
3.5 The Human Rights Act 1998 obliges public authorities to treat everyone with dignity, respect and fairness. It gives people the right to a voice, and protects from excessive action which could result in loss of life, liberty or intrude into peoples lives.
3.6 All councillors and everyone who works for public authorities must act in a way that is compatible with the Act. By providing services in this way it not only meets the act but makes a positive difference to people's lives. 4. Implementation
4.1 This policy applies to the Council members, all employees, as well as potential employees, service users, secondees, agency workers, contractors, volunteers, work experience and student placements.
4.2 The Equality Objectives action plan details how we plan to deliver our improvements in relation this policy and it also covers other equality areas that are not specifically mentioned as individual protected characteristics, but are equally significant in their own right. These include socio-economic status and groups such as carers, asylum seekers and gypsies and travellers. This plan will also help us to meet the requirements of current and future equality and human rights related legislation. Progress of these objectives are reported annually and reviewed every four years.
Click on the link to view the Equalities Objectives: Equality Objectives
4.3 The effectiveness of this policy and objectives will be monitored through the collation of statistics relating to service performance, satisfaction, employment. This data will be available on the Equalities pages of our web site along with other appropriate equalities documents.
Click on the link to view the Equalities Information: Equalities Information
How does this policy relate to the strategic priorities of the Council?
5.1 This policy cannot be delivered in isolation. In order to successfully embed equality, diversity and human rights in all that we do, this policy will link closely with other council policies, strategies and strategic priorities as defined in the following:
- Blaby Plan 2015-2018
- Medium Term Financial Strategy
- People Strategy 5.2 In 2013, the Council achieved the Customer Service Excellence Award. The assessors recognised that we have an in-depth understanding of our customer groups and are committed to raising awareness about diversity.
5.3 This Equality and Human Rights Policy will be reviewed every 3 years.
6 Engaging and consulting with our communities
6.1 We engage and consult with our communities regularly so that we understand our customer’s views and can ensure that the services we design and deliver are appropriate and meet the needs of all. We recognise that different groups of people may need to be engaged in different ways and have put in place guidance to assist in ensuring equal and fair access for all.
6.2 All policies, strategies and processes within the council are subject to Equality and Impact Assessments as appropriate to ensure that they take into consideration the effect they may have on different protected characteristics.
7 Roles and Responsibilities
7.1 We expect staff and councillors to treat everyone they come into contact with dignity and respect and have an expectation that customers, stakeholders, partners and suppliers will afford the same treatment to those who carry out duties in service of the Council.
7.2 All staff and Council members, all share responsibility for promoting equality, diversity, and inclusion and ensuring that this policy is implemented in practice, with any breaches reported. It is the responsibility of all to ensure that all mandatory equality related training is completed.
7.3 The Chief Executive, Directors and all Managers have a responsibility to ensure that staff have read and understood the policy and that they are encouraged to complete equalities related training. In addition managers must ensure that the policy is complied with and deal with any issues or complaints arising, seriously, speedily, sensitively and confidentially.
7.4 **The Performance Manager** is responsible for implementing, reviewing and monitoring progress of the policy and objectives. Additionally they are responsible for providing advice on equality and human rights policy.
7.5 Breaches of this policy will be dealt with under the Councils internal Disciplinary and Grievance procedures or our external Acceptable Behaviour Statement.
8 **Procurement**
8.1 In order to be compliant with the Public Sector Equality Act, the Council is obliged to ensure that the goods and services they procure are fit for purpose and meet the needs of the user. The Duty highlights a number of factors that managers should take ‘due regard’ to when making decisions about procurement. The Council must ensure the procurement processes include consideration of equality issues and clarify areas of responsibilities.
**Document Control Table**
| Date Document approved | 17th July 2015 | |------------------------|----------------| | Date Document modified | | | Review Date | July 2018 | Protected Characteristics
**Age**, relates to a person belonging to a particular age group (e.g. 32 year olds) or a range of ages (e.g. 18 - 30 year olds).
**Disability** is defined as a physical or mental impairment that has a 'substantial' and 'long term' negative impact on a person’s ability to do normal daily activities.
**Gender Reassignment** is the process of transitioning from one gender to another. This 'characteristic' covers a person who is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning their gender by changing physiological or other attributes of gender.
**Marriage and Civil Partnership**, legislation relating to marriage was amended on 13th March 2014 and from 29th March 2014 same sex marriages could take place. Currently same sex couples can also have their relationships legally recognised as 'civil partnerships'. Civil partners must be treated the same as married couples on a wide range of legal matters.
**Pregnancy and Maternity**, pregnancy is the condition of being pregnant or expecting a baby. Maternity refers to the period after the birth, and is linked to maternity leave in the employment context. In the non-work context, protection against maternity discrimination is for 26 weeks after giving birth, and this includes treating a woman unfavourably because she is breastfeeding.
**Race**, refers to a group of people defined by their race, colour, nationality (including citizenship), ethnic or national origins.
**Religion or Belief**, religion refers to any religion or no religion. Belief includes religious and philosophical beliefs including no belief (e.g. Atheism). Generally, a belief should affect your life choices or the way you live for it to be included in the definition.
**Sex (Gender)**, covers the 'characteristic' of being a man or of being a woman.
**Sexual Orientation**, relates to whether a person's sexual attraction is towards their own sex, the opposite sex or to both sexes. APPENDIX 2
About the residents of Blaby District
Blaby District Profile Blaby District Council is in the East Midlands of England. The Council covers an area of 13,000 hectares or 129 km² to the south west of Leicester, part of which boarders Leicester City Council. The district contains the M1/M69 junction which is close to the major shopping centre of Fosse Park.
The area is classified as urban by Natural England although is part rural and includes a number of villages.
Population • A population of 95,851 (estimate 2014 ONS) although this is predict to rise to 110,100 by 2033, a 17% change from 2011. This is lower than the expected rate of increase for Leicestershire and East Midlands but greater than that for the England. • There are 40,345 households • The district has higher population density than nationally, 737 persons per square kilometre as opposed to 315 persons per square kilometre across Leicestershire, and 411 nationally.
Age • Blaby’s under 19 population, at 23.35%, is similar to the East Midlands and England. However, Blaby’s population of over 65’s is slightly higher at 19.7% than the averages across the, East Midlands and England. The over 65 population is projected to rise to 21.6% by 2021 and 25.5% by 2033. 57% of the population is aged between 20 and 64 years.
Gender • Females make 51% of the population of Blaby, this is the same as the East Midlands and England as a whole.
Source: ONS http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/snpp/sub-national-population-projections/Interim-2011-based/index.html Crown copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO
Gender Reassignment • There are no accurate statistics available regarding those who identify as trans or transgender within Blaby District, or the UK as a whole. Figures from Leicester LGBT Centre suggest approximately 1% of the population are transgender. This would equate to 958 residents within the District
Sexual Orientation • There are no accurate statistics available regarding the lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) population within the District, or the UK as a whole. Sexual orientation is not incorporated into the census or other official statistics; however it is acknowledged that approximately 6-10% of any population will be LGB. In Blaby District this would equate to between 5,750 and 9,585 residents.
Marriage and Civil Partnership In the 2011 census, 15,086 households within the District declared that they were married or were in a registered same-sex civil partnership. There is a relatively equal balance of people who are married or in a registered same-sex civil partnership across all districts and boroughs within Leicestershire.
Ethnicity – (2011 Census)
- In 2011, in Blaby, 88.5% of residents were White British and 11.5% were from Minority Ethnic Groups.
- The largest Minority Ethnic Group is Asian or Asian British (6.1%), the same group in the East Midlands makes up a proportion of 6.5%.
- Since 2001 the population has grown by 4% with the largest change contributed by Asian or Asian British people with an increase of 2% or nearly 2,000 people.
(Source: ONS http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/census/2011/index.html reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO)
- 95.9% of the population has English as their first language
- 0.7% of Blaby residents state that they cannot speak English/cannot speak English well
Religion – (2011 Census) 58% of residents state their religion as ‘Christian’ and Those stating that they have no religion is the second largest group at 29% broadly similar to England as a whole. The Hindu (2.7%) and Sikh (2%) religions make up the next largest groups in the district which are higher than the England average.
Source: ONS http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/census/2011/index.html Crown copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO
Health
- The percentage of people in Blaby with a long term limiting illness is higher than in Leicestershire, East Midlands and England at 15.7%.
- Nationally it is estimated that 1 in 4 people will be affected by mental health issues at some time in their life. This would equal nearly 24,000 currently in the district.
- People living in Blaby have a similar life expectancy to those living in the rest of Leicestershire, but higher than the East Midlands and England
| Measure | Blaby | England | |---------|-------|---------| | Male | Years | 80.7 | 79.4 | | Female | Years | 84.6 | 83.1 |
Deprivation - (2010 Indices of Deprivation)
- Blaby district has low levels of deprivation. It is the 2nd least deprived district in Leicestershire. • Blaby is the ranked 297 least deprived district in England (where 354 is the least deprived and 1 is the most deprived). This is a move from rank 326 in 2007, meaning there is more deprivation in the district. • About 9.1% (1,500) children in the district live in poverty.
Source: [http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/indices2010](http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/indices2010)
**Lone Parents** • In Blaby there are 2,324 lone parent households with dependent children. This is 6% of all households in the district, this is lower than the England figure of 7.1%, but higher than the average for Leicestershire of 5.6%.
**Employment** • The district has low levels of unemployment at 1.0% (January 2015) and a high percentage of people employed in the service sector.
**About the staff of Blaby District Council**
The Council employs approximately 300 staff in a variety of roles.
| Employees (as at 31 March 2015) | Total number of employees: 303 | |----------------------------------|--------------------------------| | % | Category | | 55.45% | Females | | 44.22% | Males | | 2.64% | Employees with a disability | | 3.30% | Asian or Asian British - Indian | | 0.33% | Asian - other | | 0.33% | Black British | | 0.66% | Mixed – White and Black | | 4.62% | White – any other White background | | 0.33% | White and Asian | | 85.15% | White - British | | 0.66% | White - Irish | | 4.62% | Prefer not to specify |
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be21b07a2db45ffad70ac562b4fd59060bed6d88 | EQUALITY ACT 2010: PUBLIC SECTOR EQUALITY DUTY WHAT DO I NEED TO KNOW? A QUICK START GUIDE FOR PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/equalities/ Introduction
The Equality Act 2010 (the Act) replaces the previous anti-discrimination laws with a single Act. It simplifies the law, removing inconsistencies and making it easier for people to understand and comply with it. It also strengthens the law in important ways, to help tackle discrimination and inequality. The majority of the Act came into force on 1 October 2010.
This quick start guide is intended to help public sector organisations understand a key measure in the Act – the public sector Equality Duty, which came into force on 5 April 2011. The Equality Duty ensures that all public bodies play their part in making society fairer by tackling discrimination and providing equality of opportunity for all.
Sources of further information about the Equality Duty are listed at the end of the guide. What is the Equality Duty?
The Equality Duty is a duty on public bodies and others carrying out public functions. It ensures that public bodies consider the needs of all individuals in their day to day work – in shaping policy, in delivering services, and in relation to their own employees.
The new Equality Duty supports good decision-making – it encourages public bodies to understand how different people will be affected by their activities so that policies and services are appropriate and accessible to all and meet different people’s needs. By understanding the effect of their activities on different people, and how inclusive public services can support and open up people’s opportunities, public bodies are better placed to deliver policies and services that are efficient and effective. The Equality Duty therefore helps public bodies to deliver the Government’s overall objectives for public services.
The Equality Duty is set out in section 149 of the Act.
What has changed?
The new Equality Duty replaces the three previous public sector equality duties – for race, disability and gender. The new Equality Duty covers the following protected characteristics:
- age
- disability
- gender reassignment
- pregnancy and maternity
- race – this includes ethnic or national origins, colour or nationality
- religion or belief – this includes lack of belief
- sex
- sexual orientation
It also applies to marriage and civil partnership, but only in respect of the requirement to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination.
The new Equality Duty is designed to reduce bureaucracy while ensuring public bodies play their part in making society fairer by tackling discrimination and providing equality of opportunity for all.
Who does the Equality Duty apply to?
The Equality Duty applies across Great Britain to public bodies listed in Schedule 19 to the Act, and to other organisations when they are carrying out public functions.
______________________________________________________________________
1 A public function is a function of a public nature for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Equality Duty
The Equality Duty has three aims. It requires public bodies to have due regard to the need to:
- **eliminate unlawful discrimination**, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct prohibited by the Act;
- **advance equality of opportunity** between people who share a protected characteristic and people who do not share it; and
- **foster good relations** between people who share a protected characteristic and people who do not share it.
Having due regard means consciously thinking about the three aims of the Equality Duty as part of the process of decision-making. This means that consideration of equality issues must influence the decisions reached by public bodies – such as in how they act as employers; how they develop, evaluate and review policy; how they design, deliver and evaluate services, and how they commission and procure from others.
Having due regard to the need to **advance equality of opportunity** involves considering the need to:
- remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by people due to their protected characteristics;
- meet the needs of people with protected characteristics; and
- encourage people with protected characteristics to participate in public life or in other activities where their participation is low.
**Fostering good relations** involves tackling prejudice and promoting understanding between people who share a protected characteristic and others.
Complying with the Equality Duty may involve treating some people better than others, as far as this is allowed by discrimination law. For example, it may involve making use of an exception or the positive action provisions in order to provide a service in a way which is appropriate for people who share a protected characteristic – such as providing computer training to older people to help them access information and services.
**Taking account of disabled people’s disabilities**
The Equality Duty also explicitly recognises that disabled people’s needs may be different from those of non-disabled people. Public bodies should therefore take account of disabled people’s impairments when making decisions about policies or services. This might mean making reasonable adjustments or treating disabled people better than non-disabled people in order to meet their needs.
**Example**
A university might decide to provide car parking spaces for disabled students so that those who cannot use public transport because of their impairment have equality of opportunity in access to courses. Although non-disabled students might also want a parking space, they will not suffer the same degree of disadvantage without one. Implementing the Equality Duty
Public bodies need to consciously think about the three aims of the Equality Duty as part of the process of decision-making. The Equality Duty will be one of a number of factors that need to be considered. The weight given to the Equality Duty, compared to the other factors, will depend on how much that function affects discrimination, equality of opportunity and good relations and the extent of any disadvantage that needs to be addressed.
The following principles, drawn from case law, explain what is essential in order for the Equality Duty to be fulfilled. Public bodies should ensure:
**Knowledge** – those who exercise the public body’s functions need to be aware of the requirements of the Equality Duty. Compliance with the Equality Duty involves a conscious approach and state of mind.
**Timeliness** – the Equality Duty must be complied with before and at the time that a particular policy is under consideration or decision is taken – that is, in the development of policy options, and in making a final decision. A public body cannot satisfy the Equality Duty by justifying a decision after it has been taken.
**Real consideration** – consideration of the three aims of the Equality Duty must form an integral part of the decision-making process. The Equality Duty is not a matter of box-ticking; it must be exercised in substance, with rigour and with an open mind in such a way that it influences the final decision.
**Sufficient information** – the decision maker must consider what information he or she has and what further information may be needed in order to give proper consideration to the Equality Duty.
**No delegation** – public bodies are responsible for ensuring that any third parties which exercise functions on their behalf are capable of complying with the Equality Duty, are required to comply with it, and that they do so in practice. It is a duty that cannot be delegated.
**Review** – public bodies must have regard to the aims of the Equality Duty not only when a policy is developed and decided upon, but also when it is implemented and reviewed. The Equality Duty is a continuing duty.
**Demonstrating compliance with the Equality Duty**
There is no explicit requirement to refer to the Equality Duty in recording the process of consideration but it is good practice to do so. Keeping a record of how decisions were reached will help public bodies demonstrate that they considered the aims of the Equality Duty. Who needs to be involved?
It is important for people throughout public bodies to be aware of the Equality Duty. These include:
- Board members – in how they set strategic direction, review performance and ensure good governance of the organisation.
- Senior managers – in how they oversee the design, delivery, quality and effectiveness of the organisation’s functions.
- Equality and diversity staff – in how they raise awareness and build capacity about the Equality Duty within the organisation and how they support staff to deliver on their responsibilities.
- Human resources staff – in how they build equality considerations in employment policies and procedures.
- Policy makers – in how they build equality considerations in all stages of the policy making process including review and evaluation.
- Communications staff – in how they ensure equality information is available and accessible.
- Analysts – in how they support the organisation to understand the effect of its policies and practices on equality.
- Front line staff – in how they use equality considerations in the delivery of services to the public.
- Procurement and commissioning staff – in how they build equality considerations in the organisation’s relationships with suppliers. The Equality Duty in practice
The Equality Duty ensures that public bodies consider the needs of all individuals in their day to day work. The following examples show how the Equality Duty could help public bodies contribute to making society fairer by tackling discrimination and providing equality of opportunity for all.
Example
A police authority, when reviewing its policy on hate crime, finds that 68% of all hate crime reported is described as being homophobic. The police authority takes account of the extremely high occurrence of hate crime on the local LGB population in drawing up and implementing its new policy addressing hate crime.
Example
When reviewing the services it provides, a public transport service provider finds that Sunday services are often used by people going to religious services. Reducing the Sunday service would therefore affect the ability of people belonging to certain religious groups to attend those services. The transport service provider considers this evidence along with any other relevant factors, such as the cost of providing the service, when arriving at its conclusions following the review. Common misunderstandings about the Equality Duty
Under the previous public sector equality duties (for race, disability and gender), public bodies sometimes took unnecessary, inappropriate, disproportionate or counter-productive action in the name of equality.
The new Equality Duty should be applied in such a way as to reverse the overly-bureaucratic and burdensome approach often used under the previous duties, so that the focus is on performance, not process.
The Equality Duty does not impose a legal requirement to conduct an Equality Impact Assessment. Nor is there any practical need to conduct one. Compliance with the Equality Duty involves consciously thinking about the three aims of the Equality Duty as part of the process of decision-making. That will entail understanding the potential effects of the organisation’s activities on different people, but there is no prescribed process for doing this. Keeping a simple record of how decisions were reached will help public bodies show how they considered the Equality Duty. Producing an Equality Impact Assessment after a decision has been reached will not achieve compliance with the Equality Duty.
The Equality Duty does not mean that public bodies have to examine equality issues where they are not relevant to the matter in hand. Where it is clear from initial consideration that a policy will not have any effect on equality for any of the protected characteristics, no further analysis or action is necessary. For example, if a public body is conducting a review in relation to an issue which has no implications for equality – such as an evaluation of the effect of coastal pollution on marine life – undertaking a formal consultation or analysis addressing equality issues where it is evident that the Equality Duty is not relevant would be pointless and is not required.
The Equality Duty does not require public bodies to take disproportionate action on equality. Public bodies should take a proportionate approach when complying with the Equality Duty – in practice, this means giving greater consideration to the Equality Duty where a function or policy has the potential to have a substantial effect on discrimination or equality of opportunity for the public or the public body’s employees, and less consideration where the potential effect on equality is slight.
For example, a public body might decide to translate a leaflet about a key public service into a few commonly spoken minority languages, in order to ensure people from particular ethnic minority communities have access to the service.
2 The specific duties which apply to relevant Welsh public bodies contain a requirement to make arrangements for assessing the likely impact of their activities on their ability to comply with the Equality Duty. But translating all of its public information into the 300 languages regularly spoken in London would be a disproportionate response to the Equality Duty.
**The Equality Duty does not require public bodies to treat everyone the same.** Rather, it requires public bodies to think about people’s different needs and how these can be met. So the Equality Duty does not prevent public bodies providing women-only services – for example, for female victims of sexual violence or domestic violence. Indeed, such services may be necessary in order to ensure women have access to the services they need.
**The Equality Duty does not require public bodies to treat all religions as being equal or to treat all religious festivals equally.** For example, a public body displaying a Christmas tree every year in its reception area would not be a breach of the Equality Duty.
**The Equality Duty does not require public bodies to make services homogeneous or to try to remove or ignore differences between people.** So, for example, it does not mean that a public body must stop providing age-appropriate services for people of different ages, or that it can no longer commission some services to be provided by different faith organisations. Faith organisations are sometimes well-placed to deliver services which meet the particular needs of their community.
______________________________________________________________________
**Enforcement**
The Equality and Human Rights Commission is responsible for assessing compliance with and enforcing the Equality Duty. It has powers to issue compliance notices to public bodies that have failed to comply and can apply to the courts for an order requiring compliance. The Equality Duty can also be enforced by judicial review. This can be done by the Commission or any individual or group of people with an interest. Specific Duties
Section 153 of the Act gives Ministers powers to impose specific duties on certain public bodies to enable them to perform the Equality Duty more effectively.
Draft regulations were laid before Parliament on 27 June 2011, which would require public bodies to:
• publish information to demonstrate their compliance with the Equality Duty, at least annually; and • set equality objectives, at least every four years
The new draft specific duties will reduce burdens and bureaucracy on public bodies, moving away from a process-driven approach to a focus on transparency. This will free them up to do what is appropriate in their circumstances, to take responsibility for their own performance, and to be held to account by the public, shifting the approach to focus on performance, not process.
The Government Equalities Office and the Equality and Human Rights Commission will each be producing guidance on the specific duties.
The specific duties applying to relevant Welsh public bodies came into force on 6 April 2011. Further information can be found at www.assemblywales.org. The specific duties applying to relevant Scottish public bodies are currently being considered by the Scottish Government.
Further sources of information
The Equality and Human Rights Commission is the statutory body established to help eliminate discrimination and reduce inequality. It will produce a statutory Code of Practice on the Equality Duty later in 2011, explaining the law in more detail. It will also produce practical guidance on how public bodies can comply with the Equality Duty and achieve good practice:
www.equalityhumanrights.com 0845 604 6610
General information about the Government’s equality strategy and legislation is available from the Home Office at:
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/equalities/ 020 7035 4848
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cf1546f6047dcf2d0067499e88e6f0140b122157 | Department for Work and Pensions Equality Information 2011
Report under the Public Sector Equality Duty List of tables.................................................................................................................................3 Introduction......................................................................................................................................5 Section 1: Information about our policies and services.................................................................11 Data sources and availability........................................................................................................11 Employment related impact indicators.........................................................................................14 1. Rates of people moving from out of work benefits into employment..............................14 2. Numbers on key out of work benefits..................................................................................15 3. Proportion of children living in workless households.........................................................20 4. Young people not in employment or full time education....................................................22 5. Gap between the employment rates for disabled people and the overall population........24 6. Average age people stop working.......................................................................................26 Poverty and social mobility related impact indicators.................................................................28 7. Rate of disability poverty......................................................................................................28 8. Rate of pensioner poverty.....................................................................................................31 9. Social mobility in adulthood..................................................................................................33 Pensions related impact indicators.............................................................................................34 10. Number of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer.........................34 Operational working of the Department related impact indicators ..............................................36 11. Monetary value of fraud and error in the benefit system....................................................36 12. Public opinion of DWP service levels..................................................................................37 13. Additional customer data.....................................................................................................42 Section 2: Information about our employees..................................................................................44 14. The DWP workforce................................................................................................................44 15. Disciplinary procedures..........................................................................................................49 16. Exits.........................................................................................................................................51 17. Working patterns.....................................................................................................................54 18. Grievances...............................................................................................................................56 19. Performance markings............................................................................................................58 20. Promotion.................................................................................................................................61 21. Recruitment process................................................................................................................62 22. Pay gap.....................................................................................................................................63 23. Training data............................................................................................................................67 24. Maternity data..........................................................................................................................68 25. Additional employee data........................................................................................................69 List of tables
Employment Table 2.1-2.3: Number of people on key out of work benefits by age, ethnicity and gender. Table 3.1-3.3: Proportion (percent) of children in each economic activity status of household category by age, gender, and ethnic origin of child. Table 4.1-4.3: Proportion of young people not in full time education who are workless by disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 5.1-5.4: Gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population by age, ethnicity, gender and religion. Table 6.1-6.4: Average age of withdrawal from the labour market by disability and gender, ethnicity and gender, gender overall and by gender and religion or belief.
Poverty and social mobility Table 7.1-7.4: Poverty rate for families by presence of disabled members and age, disabled members overall, disabled members and ethnicity, 2007/08-2009/10 and disabled members and gender. Table 8.1-8.4: Poverty rate for pensioners by age, disability, ethnic group of head of household and gender.
Pensions Table 10.1-2: Numbers of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer by age and gender.
Operational working of the Department Table 12.1-12.8: Customers’ reported overall satisfaction with Jobcentre Plus and the Pension, Disability and Carers Service by age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Additional customer data Table 13.1: Percentage of employment gaps for various protected characteristics.
DWP workforce data Table 14.1-14.4: Percentage of DWP workforce by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 15.1-15.4: Percentage of employees disciplined by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 16.1-16.4: Percentage of reason for leaving by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 17.1-17.4: Percentage of employees with a part time working pattern by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 18.1-18.4: Percentage of employees raising a grievance by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 19.1-19.4: Percentage of performance ratings by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 20.1-20.4: Percentage of employees promoted by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 21.1-21.4: Percentage of recruitment process at different stages by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 22.1-22.4: Pay gap by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 23.1-23.4: Percentage of training applications by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 24.1-24.3: Percentage of employees returning from maternity leave by age, disability and ethnicity. Introduction
Under the Public Sector Equality Duty, part of the Equality Act 2010, as a public body the Department for Work and Pensions has a specific duty to publish relevant proportionate information to demonstrate our compliance with the legislation.
This means that we have to publish information to show that we have paid due regard to the three aims of the Equality Duty:
- eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation and any other conduct prohibited by the Act;
- advance equality of opportunity between people who share a protected characteristic and people who do not share it; and
- foster good relations between people who share a protected characteristic and people who do not share it.
The protected characteristics covered by the Equality Duty are:
- age;
- disability;
- gender reassignment;
- pregnancy and maternity;
- race - this includes ethnic or national origins, colour or nationality;
- religion or belief - this includes lack of belief;
- sex;
- sexual orientation; and
- marriage and civil partnership - in respect of eliminating unlawful discrimination only.
We must publish:
- information relating to people who are affected by our policies and practices who share protected characteristics, for example, our service users; and
- information relating to our employees who share protected characteristics.
Our overall approach
The report is divided into two sections:
Section One shows information and data relating to our policies, practices and service users; and
Section Two shows information and data relating to our employees. Transparency is a key operating principle for the Department, we want the information we provide to be easy to understand and use. To help with this, where possible and relevant, for each piece of data we have provided:
- a table of data;
- a brief explanation of what this tells us and how an improvement will be shown; and
- links to other information that you may find useful.
In future, we intend to embed equality information into our annual Departmental report which is usually published in July. Given this, where possible, we have used data that were available in July 2011. This means that some of the data sets do not cover the same period. However, when we next publish in July 2012, we will use the same data sets 12 months on, to allow annual comparisons to be made.
The Government is developing a cross-government Disability Strategy, with the aim that this will be published in Spring 2012. We will use this to inform both the disability equality information that we publish in future, and the description of our disability equality objectives under the Equality Duty. Discussions on the Strategy are on-going and more information can be found online.
**Our approach to providing information about our policies, practices and services**
In section one we have used the existing Departmental Impact Indicators included in our Business Plan. They show key data which are designed to help the public judge whether our policies are having the effect they want. We have broken the impact indicator data down by as many protected characteristics as we currently have available. Where data are not available we have explained how we plan to fill the gap in the future where this is possible and as relevant.
The information is grouped under four main areas which reflect our responsibilities:
- employment;
- poverty and social mobility;
- pensions; and
- the operational working of the Department.
It is important to note that the service user data sets used within section one come from a variety of different sources. Given this, the periods they cover and the frequency by which they are collected and analysed are not all the same. To help understanding we have explained specific details about the data sources and their availability in a table at the beginning of the section. Our approach to providing information relating to our employees
The Department is committed to equality and valuing diversity. We aim to build a workforce which reflects the society we serve and promote a working environment that is free from discrimination, bullying and harassment. We monitor the effectiveness of our policies and processes in relation to these principles primarily by analysing information collected by our internal human resource recording system called Resource Management (RM).
We encourage our employees to voluntarily and confidentially provide their information on RM in relation to sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity. We are also currently putting processes in place to include religion or belief as a category. Following Cabinet Office consultation with the Government Equalities Office and a:gender (a support network for staff in Government Departments) we do not currently plan to include questions on gender identity. However, we do use other methods, such as consulting with staff network groups and we are active participants in the a:gender Trans Equality Index, that allows us to monitor our progress on transgender equality.
Unfortunately, at this time indication rates in relation to sexual orientation are too low for this information to be included. We are planning a communications campaign to encourage employees to make a declaration. At 31 March 2011 the indication rate for ethnicity was 76% and 82.5% for disability.
The ethnicity and disability indication rates are calculated from the number of people who have chosen to indicate their status, as this is the method recommended by the Office of National Statistics (ONS).
In section two we have used data from RM and other administrative systems to display information about:
- the make up of our workforce;
- discipline;
- exits;
- working patterns;
- grievances;
- performance management;
- recruitment and promotion;
- gender pay gap;
- training; and
- maternity leave.
Our approach to benchmarking as an employer
The Department participates in a number of external benchmarking exercises that compare our performance with other public sector organisations. For example, Stonewall’s Top 100 Workplace Equality Index where in 2012, we came 27th, which is a significant increase on our previous year’s result of 80th. We have also received recognition from a number of external bodies that highlight our best practice as an employer. For example, the Civil Service Fast Stream is ranked in the top ten Times Top 100 Graduate Employers. The Fast Stream Summer Diversity Internship Programme also won the ‘Best Diversity in Work Experience’ award as part of the National Placement and Internship Awards 2012.
Our approach to engaging with our employees
The Department understands the importance of engaging our employees and the benefits that having an engaged workforce brings for both the organisation and for the individual. We use a wide range of engagement tools and techniques for example, every month employees are offered the opportunity to talk to our Permanent Secretary Robert Devereux in a conference call known as ‘Robert’s question time’. They are encouraged to ask questions, raise issues and offer up ideas or suggestions.
We also operate a ‘back to the floor’ scheme where senior leaders spend time working in a service delivery office. This gives employees an opportunity to work alongside the people that make and influence business decisions. It also gives our senior leaders valuable insight into the operation of our front line services. Since 2007, over 300 senior figures have gone ‘back to the floor’.
We use a structured approach to staff diversity network groups, recognising the valuable role they play in terms of communicating the views of and engaging with our employees. We have recently conducted a joint review, involving staff network representatives, and moved from having separate diversity strands to create a new corporate Equality Group. The DWP Equality Group exists to champion diversity and equality of opportunity across the Department in relation to both staff and customer issues. The group is supported by an intranet based equality hub involving on-line communities which provides a range of resources about each of the protected characteristics. It also includes a discussion group which is an employee forum for topical debate. Themes emerging from the on-line communities escalated to the Equality Group for further consideration.
The Department runs an employer sponsored volunteering scheme where we offer our employees the opportunity to spend a day working for a local voluntary or community organisation in their area. In 2011 we committed to giving 10,000 volunteering days via our ‘Community 10,000’ scheme.
We also recognise the importance of working alongside and consulting with our Departmental Trade Unions as a method of employee engagement. Approximately two thirds of our employees are currently a member of a union. Representatives from across the Department meet our Trade Unions on a regular basis, at both a national and regional level to discuss and progress relevant issues. For example, we engaged with them about the approach we should take for this report. Our approach to engaging with our service users
We recognise the need to involve customers in diversity issues and to consult them in relation to our proposals for implementing equality legislation and discharging our responsibilities under the Public Sector Equality Duty.
For example, in 2007 the Department established the DWP Customer Equality Reference Group to help us embed a strong customer perspective specifically on diversity issues and to act as a consultative group. It has a membership of 22 external customer representative groups and usually meets twice a year. They provide robust insights by applying their expert knowledge across the breadth of the Department’s policies and services. Representatives offer their views as individuals with personal experience and as representatives of their organisations and communities.
We consulted with the group about our overall approach to the Public Sector Equality Duty. This included getting feedback on the structure and content of this report and also the development of our equality objectives.
On a wider level the Department has a variety of measures in place to engage with our customers and their representative groups. These include traditional formal policy consultation routes but also more informal methods. For example, we publish several newsletters such as the DWP Stakeholder Bulletin which provides a monthly update on what is happening in our Department. Also our ‘e-zine’ Touchbase which provides up-to-date information about benefits, pensions, DWP services and relevant news from other government departments and agencies.
As part of the Department, The Office of Disability Issues (ODI) works closely with the Minister for Disabled People and leads the Government’s vision of achieving equality for disabled people. They consult and engage representative groups such as Equality 2025 which is a group of publicly-appointed disabled people. It offers strategic advice at very early stages of policy development on issues that affect disabled people.
Our approach to paying due regard
The Department pays due regard to the equality duty when we develop, implement and evaluate our policies, services and processes. We are currently working with stakeholders to produce revised guidance and templates about equality analysis to help meet the new duty. We will continue to use our established equality impact assessment process to enable the Department to demonstrate compliance until the new guidance is fully embedded.
Our approach to developing equality objectives
The specific duty requires the Department to set measurable equality objectives by 6 April 2012 and then at intervals of not less than four years from the initial date of publication. Our objectives look at addressing key equality issues for both our customers and employees. They are embedded within our organisational aims and align with our Departmental Business plan and equality information. Our equality objectives will be regularly reviewed and updated.
**Alternative formats**
If you would like a copy of this report in an alternative format, please contact:
Diversity and Equality Directorate, Porterbrook House, 7 Pear Street, Sheffield, South Yorkshire, S11 8JF.
Email: [email protected]
**Feedback**
Thank you for taking the time to read this report, we welcome your feedback. Please write to us using the details above.
## Section 1: Information about our policies and services
### Data sources and availability
| Number | Indicator | Data source | Time period and availability | |--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1 | Rates of people moving from out of work benefits into employment | DWP and HMRC administrative data | • New indicator data are not yet available. | | | | | • Progress will be reported on a quarterly basis and will cover Great Britain. Both measures will be available between 18 and 21 months after either a claimant moves from out of work benefits or where someone moves from these benefits into employment. This is partly due to the time it takes to process the management data and also the time periods used to calculate the statistics. | | 2 | Numbers on key out of work benefits | DWP administrative data | • Splits currently available by age and gender, and partly for ethnicity. | | | | | • Latest data available at July 2011 covered November 2010. | | | | | • Produced four times a year covering the months of February, May, August and November. Data are available with six months delay. | | 3 | Proportion of children living in workless households | Household Labour Force Survey | • Splits currently available by age, ethnicity and gender. | | | | | • Latest data available at July 2011 covered Quarter 2 2010. | | | | | • Produced twice a year. Data are available for Quarter 2 and Quarter 4 each year with a delay of around six weeks after the period referred to. | | 4 | Young people not in employment or full time education | Labour Force Survey | • Impact indicator covers age. Splits currently available by disability, ethnicity and gender. | | | | | • Latest data available at July 2011 covered Quarter 1 2011. | | | | | • Produced monthly approximately six weeks after the period referred to. Three months of data are combined for the indicator. | | Number | Indicator | Data source | Time period and availability | |--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 5 | Gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population | Labour Force Survey | • Impact indicator covers disability. Splits currently available by age, ethnicity, gender and religion or belief.\
• Latest data available at July 2011 covered Quarter 1 2011.\
• Produced quarterly approximately six weeks after the period referred to. Three months of data are combined for the indicator.\
• Splits currently available by age, ethnicity, gender and religion or belief.\
• Latest data available at July 2011 covered Quarter 1 2011 for gender and disability, and 4 quarter averages (to increase data reliability for these groups) from Quarter 2 2010 to Quarter 1 2011 for ethnicity and religion or belief.\
• Produced quarterly approximately six weeks after the period referred to.\
• Methodological differences mean only data presented by disability is fully comparable with the headline data. The average age of withdrawal is based on multiplying each age by the probability of exiting the labour market at that age. | | 6 | Average age people stop working | Labour Force Survey | • Indicator covers disability. Splits currently available by age, ethnicity and gender. Information on religion or belief and sexual orientation has been collected from April 2011. Results are expected to be available in Spring/Summer 2013.\
• Latest data available at July 2011 covered 2009/10.\
• Produced once a year covering a financial year, with a delay of just over a year after the end of the period referred to.\
• Data do not include care home residents due to the sample for the survey used consisting of the private household population. | | 7 | Rate of disability poverty | Family Resources Survey | • Splits currently available by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Information on religion or belief and sexual orientation has been collected from April 2011. Results are expected to be available in Spring/Summer 2013.\
• Latest data available at July 2011 covered 2009/10.\
• Produced once a year covering a financial year, with a delay of just over a year after the end of the period referred to.\
• Data do not include care home residents due to the sample for the survey used consisting of the private household population. | | 8 | Rate of pensioner poverty | Family Resources Survey | • Splits currently available by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Information on religion or belief and sexual orientation has been collected from April 2011. Results are expected to be available in Spring/Summer 2013.\
• Latest data available at July 2011 covered 2009/10.\
• Produced once a year covering a financial year, with a delay of just over a year after the end of the period referred to.\
• Data do not include care home residents due to the sample for the survey used consisting of the private household population. | | Number | Indicator | Data source | Time period and availability | |--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 9 | Social mobility in adulthood | To be determined | a year after the end of the period referred to. | | | Number of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer | Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings | • Data do not include care home residents due to the sample for the survey used consisting of the private household population. | | | | | • To be determined. | | | | | • Splits currently available by age and gender. This will be supplemented by data from the Family Resources Survey for religion or belief and sexual orientation which has been collected from April 2011. Results are expected to be available in Spring/Summer 2013. | | | | | • Latest data available at July 2011 covered 2010. | | | | | • Produced once a year covering a financial year, with a delay of just over a year after the start of the period referred to. | | 10 | Monetary value of fraud and error in the benefit system | DWP administrative data | No equality information currently available. We are considering the feasibility of collecting this and will provide an update in the next report. | | | Public opinion of DWP service levels | DWP administrative data | • Splits currently available by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. | | | | | • The latest data available at July 2011 covered 2009 for Jobcentre Plus and 2009/10 for the Pension Service. Produced once a year. | | 11 | Employment gap | Labour Force Survey | Indicator focuses on disabled people, splits are available by age (for young adults and older workers), ethnicity and disability. | | | | | • Data available approximately six weeks after the end of each quarter. | | | | | • Data are seasonally unadjusted so only year on year comparisons can be made. |
Note: Estimates are based on a variety of data and are therefore subject to uncertainty. Small differences should be treated with caution as these will be affected by sampling error and variability in the data source. Employment related impact indicators
1. Rates of people moving from out of work benefits into employment
What does this tell us?
This is a new indicator that combines two aspects:
- the rate of people moving from out of work benefits; and
- the percentage of those that moved from these benefits going into employment.
No data were available at July 2011. We expect data to be available for the rates of people moving from out of work benefits into employment split by age, ethnicity and gender for the next report.
How will an improvement be shown?
This indicator will show an improvement if the time taken to move claimants off benefit and into work reduces, and so directly affects the employment rate. 2. Numbers on key out of work benefits
What does this tell us?
This indicator looks at numbers of people on key out of work benefits:
- Jobseekers Allowance;
- Incapacity Benefits/Employment Support Allowance;
- Lone parents receiving Income Support; and
- Others receiving income related benefits. These are mainly Pension Credit recipients for men aged under state pension age. The remainder are in receipt of Income Support.
How will an improvement be shown?
This indicator will show an improvement if the number of people in receipt of key out of work benefits decreases, reflecting the Department’s economic and social objective of helping more people into employment.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further information about a variety of benefits and customer groups is available on the DWP tabulation tool where user defined tables can be created.
Table 2.1: Number on key out of work benefits by age, Great Britain, thousands, November 2010
| Age | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (UK seasonally adjusted) | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (GB not seasonally adjusted) | Employment and Support Allowance and Incapacity Benefits | Lone Parents on Income Support | Other (Income Support, others and Pension Credit) | |-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| | Unknown | .. | - | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.30 | | Under 18 | .. | 4.21 | 4.84 | 5.13 | 12.06 | | 18-24 | .. | 385.73 | 154.94 | 171.89 | 29.38 | | 25-34 | .. | 329.18 | 330.42 | 272.08 | 7.65 | | 35-44 | .. | 285.79 | 561.76 | 160.89 | 6.83 | | 45-49 | .. | 137.57 | 378.50 | 27.94 | 4.10 | | 50-54 | .. | 108.66 | 403.87 | 7.99 | 4.51 | | 55-59 | .. | 84.25 | 454.64 | 2.31 | 5.35 | | 60-64 | .. | 16.21 | 297.36 | 0.07 | 121.87 | Table 2.2: Number on key out of work benefits by ethnicity, Great Britain, thousands, November 2010(^1, 2)
| Ethnicity | Jobseeker’s Allowance (claimant count) (UK seasonally adjusted) (^3) | Jobseeker’s Allowance (claimant count) (GB not seasonally adjusted) (^4) | Employment and Support Allowance and Incapacity Benefits (^5, 8) | Lone Parents on Income Support (^5) | Other (Income Support, others and Pension Credit) (^6, 7) | |------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------| | White: British | .. | 1,009.94 | .. | 485.73 | .. | | White: Irish | .. | 8.45 | .. | 3.86 | .. | | White: Other White | .. | 31.96 | .. | 11.08 | .. | | Mixed: White and Black Caribbean | .. | 11.77 | .. | 7.32 | .. | | Mixed: White and Black African | .. | 3.34 | .. | 1.91 | .. | | Mixed: White and Asian | .. | 2.73 | .. | 1.16 | .. | | Mixed: Other Mixed | .. | 6.69 | .. | 3.23 | .. | | Asian or Asian | .. | 21.96 | .. | 4.72 | .. | | British: Indian | .. | 29.10 | .. | 13.76 | .. | | British: Pakistani | .. | 12.76 | .. | 4.81 | .. | | British: Bangladeshi | .. | 10.79 | .. | 3.49 | .. | | British: Other Asian | .. | 39.18 | .. | 17.64 | .. | | Black or Black British: Black Caribbean | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | Ethnicity | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (UK seasonally adjusted) | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (GB not seasonally adjusted) | Employment and Support Allowance and Incapacity Benefits | Lone Parents on Income Support | Other (Income Support, others and Pension Credit) | |----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------| | Black or Black British: | | | | | | | Black African | .. | 38.48 | .. | 27.61 | .. | | Black or Black British: | .. | 9.53 | .. | 4.55 | .. | | Other Black | | | | | | | Chinese or Other | .. | 2.89 | .. | 1.43 | .. | | Ethnic Group: | | | | | | | Chinese | .. | 23.91 | .. | 11.92 | .. | | Ethnic Group: Other | | | | | | | Prefer not to say | .. | 69.04 | .. | 26.28 | .. | | Missing/old values/no personal contact | .. | 19.14 | .. | 17.78 | .. | Table 2.3: Number on key out of work benefits by gender, Great Britain, thousands, November 2010(^1,2)
| Gender | Jobseeker’s Allowance (claimant count) (UK seasonally adjusted) (^3) | Jobseeker’s Allowance (claimant count) (GB not seasonally adjusted) (^4) | Employment and Support Allowance and Incapacity Benefits (^5,8) | Lone Parents on Income Support (^5) | Other (Income Support others and Pension Credit) (^6,7) | |--------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------| | Male | 1,022.00 | 944.13 | 1,477.41 | 20.80 | 145.53 | | Female | 438.00 | 412.31 | 1,109.02 | 627.50 | 46.51 |
All tables sourced from: DWP administrative data.
Definitions and conventions: "-" Nil or negligible ".." Not available. Caseload figures are rounded to the nearest ten. Some additional disclosure control has also been applied. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
State pension age: The age at which women reach state pension age is gradually increasing from 60 to 65 between April 2010 and April 2016 to November 2018. From December 2018, the state pension age for both men and women will start to increase to reach 66 in October 2020. This will introduce a small increase to the number of working age benefit recipients and a small reduction to the number of pension age recipients. Figures from May 2010 onwards reflect this change.
Notes:
1. This table includes the key out-of-work client group categories, with the exception of carers who are not subject to activation policies in the same way as other groups.
2. This table presents just one Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) series. The United Kingdom (UK) seasonally adjusted series is not broken down by age, but is available by gender. The JSA series presented covers Great Britain (GB) and is not seasonally adjusted. This second series is presented as it allows comparisons with the other key out of work benefits published by DWP which also cover GB and are not seasonally adjusted. This JSA series differs slightly from the JSA numbers presented elsewhere for this indicator as it excludes non-computerised clerical cases (approx 1 percent of cases).
3. UK figures (seasonally adjusted) published by the ONS. This series is the most reliable and up-to-date source for claimant unemployment.
4. GB figures (not seasonally adjusted) published by the ONS. This series is the most reliable and up-to-date source for claimant unemployment.
5. GB figures (not seasonally adjusted). Published by DWP as part of the 100 per cent working age client group analysis. A consistent series for the UK as a whole is not readily available.
6. GB figures (not seasonally adjusted). Published by DWP as part of the 100 per cent working age client group analysis. A consistent series for the UK as a whole is not readily available. This group has been reasonably stable over time.
7. Excludes claimants in receipt of Income Support and Carers Allowance.
8. The "Incapacity Benefits group" includes Employment and Support Allowance (ESA). ESA replaced Incapacity Benefit and Income Support paid on the grounds of incapacity for new claims from 27 October 2008.
9. Proportion of children living in workless households
What does this tell us?
This indicator looks at the proportion of children living in workless households in the UK. A workless household is a household that includes at least one person aged 16 to 64 where no-one aged 16 or over is in employment. This indicator reflects the Department's core aims around employment and preventing worklessness.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, an improvement would be demonstrated by a fall in the indicator. Such a change would imply a rise in the proportion of children living in working household. However other factors, for example, changes in household types over time may also need to be accounted for.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further information can be found on the Office of National Statistics website.
Table 3.1: Percentage of children in each economic activity status of household category by age of child
| Age of child | Combined Working households | Households containing both working and workless members | Workless households | |--------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | Under 1 | 55.5 | 28.4 | 16.1 | | 1 | 49.6 | 33.4 | 17.0 | | 2 | 51.3 | 30.8 | 17.9 | | 3 | 51.8 | 30.9 | 17.4 | | 4 | 48.4 | 33.2 | 18.4 | | 5 | 52.6 | 28.7 | 18.7 | | 6 | 53.0 | 30.0 | 17.0 | | 7 | 53.5 | 28.6 | 17.9 | | 8 | 55.4 | 28.2 | 16.4 | | 9 | 53.5 | 31.4 | 15.1 | | 10 | 56.6 | 28.4 | 15.0 | | 11 | 54.0 | 30.6 | 15.4 | | 12 | 51.3 | 33.0 | 15.7 | | 13 | 51.6 | 35.6 | 12.8 | | 14 | 47.1 | 38.5 | 14.4 | | 15 | 50.1 | 36.6 | 13.3 | | All | 52.1 | 31.7 | 16.2 |
### Table 3.2: Percentage of children in each economic activity status of household category by gender of child(^{1,2})
| Gender of child | Combined economic activity status of household | | |-----------------|-----------------------------------------------|---| | | Working households | Households containing both working and workless members | Workless households | | Male | 52.2 | 31.6 | 16.1 | | Female | 52.0 | 31.7 | 16.3 | | All | 52.1 | 31.7 | 16.2 |
### Table 3.3: Percentage of children in each economic activity status of household category by ethnic origin of child(^{1,2})
| Ethnic origin of child | Combined economic activity status of household | | |------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---| | | Working households | Households containing both working and workless members | Workless households | | White | 56.0 | 28.9 | 15.0 | | Mixed | 26.3 | 58.9 | 14.8 | | Asian or Asian British | 39.8 | 29.9 | 30.3 | | Black or Black British | 26.3 | 58.9 | 14.8 | | Chinese or other ethnic group | 48.1 | 25.4 | 26.5 | | All (^3) | 52.1 | 31.7 | 16.2 |
All tables sourced from: Labour Force Survey household datasets, Quarter 4 2010 (October-December 2010).
Notes:
1. Children refers to children under 16.
2. Households including at least one person aged 16 to 64.
3. Total includes children with unknown ethnic origin.
4. Young people not in employment or full-time education
What does this tell us?
This indicator is measured by dividing the number of 18-24 year olds who are not in either work or full-time education by the total number of 18-24 year olds. This means it is precisely the proportion of 18-24 year olds not in employment or full-time education. The indicator will measure the Department's success in improving the proportion of young people engaged in a positive activity, be it employment, education or training. It recognises the importance of raising participation in education and improving labour market outcomes for young people not in full-time education.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, a decrease in the indicator will demonstrate an improvement in the labour market position of young people. However, economic conditions will also need to be taken into account.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further information about the Department's business plan transparency measures is available online.
Table 4.1: Proportion of young people not in full time education who are workless by disability, UK, Quarter 1 2011 (January 2011-March 2011)(^1,2)
| Disability status | Proportion | |-------------------|------------| | Disabled | 56.8 | | Non-disabled | 26.6 | | All | 30.1 |
Table 4.2: Proportion of young people not in full time education who are workless by ethnicity, UK, quarterly average Quarter 1 2010 to Quarter 4 2010 (January 2010-December 2010)(^1,3)
| Ethnic group of individual | Proportion | |----------------------------|------------| | White | 30.8 | | Mixed | 43.5 | | Asian or Asian British | 48.3 | | Black or Black British | 50.1 | | Chinese or other ethnic group | 53.8 | | All | 32.5 | Table 4.3: Proportion of young people not in full time education who are workless by gender, UK, Quarter 1 2011 (January 2011- March 2011)(^4)
| Gender | Proportion | |--------|------------| | Male | 26.8 | | Female | 33.9 | | All | 30.3 |
All tables sourced from: Labour Force Survey.
Notes:
1. As with the headline impact indicator, this measure uses LFS data. However, unlike the overall measure, these data are seasonally unadjusted and only released quarterly. Therefore it is not fully comparable with the overall measure.
2. Disability includes those who are disabled under the Equality Act definition, those who are work-limiting disabled only, and those who are both. It covers the individual rather than the household.
3. This looks at the average of the four quarters from Quarter 2 2010 to Quarter 1 2011 (April 2010-March 2011) inclusive. Individual quarters are not given due to sample sizes.
4. These data are fully comparable with the headline impact indicator using the ONS seasonally adjusted data.
5. Gap between the employment rates for disabled people and the overall population
What does this tell us?
This indicator is measured by comparing the seasonally unadjusted employment rate for disabled people with the unadjusted working age employment rate for Great Britain. This uses the ONS Headline Rate definition of the employment rate which is between the ages of 16 and 64 for both males and females.
These data allow the Department to monitor progress towards employment equality for disabled people. It allows the public to assess how well the Department is performing against its aim of promoting high levels of employment by helping people move into work.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally a decrease in the indicator will demonstrate that an improvement has been achieved. However, economic conditions will also need to be taken into account, particularly as recent research indicates that employment prospects for disabled people are less sensitive to economic conditions than the overall population.(^1) This may mean that as the economy improves and overall rates increase, the gap between the disabled and the overall employment rates will increase, which would represent a decline in this indicator.
Links to other information that you may find useful
A full description of indicators towards disability equality by 2025 is available on the Independent Living and Office for Disability Issues website.
Table 5.1: Revised gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population by age, GB, Quarter 1 2011 (January 2011-March 2011)(^1,2,3,4)
| Age | Gap (percentage points) | |-------|-------------------------| | 16-17 | 10.8 | | 18-24 | 20.6 | | 25-34 | 24.4 | | 35-44 | 26.4 | | 45-54 | 24.6 | | 55+ | 19.8 |
(^1) An example of this research can be found online. Table 5.2: Gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population by ethnicity, GB, Quarter 1 2010 to Quarter 4 2010 (January 2010-December 2010)(^{1,2,3,4})
| Ethnicity | Gap (percentage points) | |--------------------------------|-------------------------| | White | 25.4 | | Mixed | 11.2 | | Asian or Asian British | 24.0 | | Black or Black British | 17.9 | | Chinese and other ethnic group | 24.0 |
Table 5.3: Gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population by gender, GB, Quarter 1 2011 (January 2011-March 2011)(^{1,2,3,4,5,6})
| Gender | Gap (percentage points) | |--------|-------------------------| | Male | 25.8 | | Female | 20.5 |
Table 5.4: Gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population by religion or belief, GB, Quarter 2 2010 to Quarter 1 2011 (April 2010-March 2011)(^{1,2,3,4,7,8})
| Religion | Gap (percentage points) | |-------------------|-------------------------| | Christian | 24.8 | | Buddhist * | * | | Hindu | 22.0 | | Jewish * | * | | Muslim | 20.6 | | Sikh | 26.5 | | Any other religion| 18.9 | | No religion at all| 24.5 |
All tables sourced from: Labour Force Survey.
Notes:
1. Data are rounded to the nearest 0.1 percentage point.
2. Data are subject to sampling variation and is not seasonally adjusted.
3. Data covers GB only, not UK.
4. Accuracy of data are limited by small sample sizes.
5. Ethnicity is self reported.
6. Changes to the collection of data on ethnicity in the LFS. Mean data for 2011 are currently unavailable.
7. Religion or belief is self reported.
8. - denotes sample size is too small to reliably quote.
9. Average age people stop working
What does this tell us?
This indicator is measured using the ‘average age of withdrawal from the labour market’ statistic which has been previously published by the ONS.
This indicator measures the ages at which people withdraw from the labour market and become inactive; data are not seasonally adjusted. Due to the nature of the indicator, year on year changes tend to be small. The focus should not be on the short term changes but the long term trend. Extending working life is an important part of the response to demographic ageing and ensuring pensions sustainability. Monitoring changes in average age of withdrawal will provide an indication of how the Department’s policies are encouraging longer working.
How will an improvement be shown?
An increase in the age of withdrawal from the labour market would constitute a success. There may be a number of contributing factors including: a continuation of long term trends; changing attitudes around working longer; and the effect of state pension age changes.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further information on the labour market and retirement is available in the ONS report on Pension Trends.
Table 6.1: Average age of withdrawal from the labour market by disability and gender, UK, Quarter 1 2011 (January-March 2011)(^{1,2,3})
| Disability status | Men | Women | |-------------------|------|-------| | Disabled | 63.8 | 61.9 | | Non-disabled | 65.5 | 63.4 |
Table 6.2: Average age of withdrawal from the labour market by ethnicity and gender, UK, Quarter 1 2010 to Quarter 4 2010 (January 2010-December 2010)(^{1,2,4,5})
| Ethnic group of individual | Men | Women | |----------------------------|------|-------| | White | 64.7 | 62.6 | | Mixed | 60.2 | 59.2 | | Asian or Asian British | 63.0 | 60.4 | | Black or Black British | 64.0 | 62.6 | | White and Asian | 62.1 | 61.2 | Table 6.3: Average age of withdrawal from the labour market by gender, UK, Quarter 1 2011 (January-March 2011)\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Age of withdrawal from labour market | Men | Women | |-------------------------------------|-----|-------| | Age | 64.5| 62.8 |
Table 6.4: Average age of withdrawal from the labour market by gender and religion or belief, GB, Quarter 2 2010 to Quarter 1 2011 (April 2010-March 2011)\\textsuperscript{1,2,6,7,8}
| Religion or belief | Men | Women | |-------------------|-----|-------| | Christian | 64.6| 62.5 | | Buddhist | 59.2| 59.9 | | Hindu | 62.1| 60.6 | | Jewish | 64.1| 61.3 | | Muslim | 64.0| 58.1 | | Sikh | 59.8| 59.5 | | Any other religion| 62.7| 60.6 | | No religion | 64.5| 63.1 |
All data sourced from: Labour Force Survey.
Notes:
1. Data are rounded to the nearest 0.1 year.
2. Data are subject to sampling variation and are not seasonally adjusted.
3. Data covers individuals who indicate a current disability under the Equality Act definition (data do not cover past disability).
4. Ethnicity is self reported.
5. Changes to the collection of data on ethnicity in the LFS mean data for 2011 are currently unavailable.
6. Data covers GB only.
7. Religion or belief is self reported.
8. Accuracy of data are limited by small sample sizes. Poverty and social mobility related impact indicators
9. Rate of disability poverty
What does this tell us?
This indicator measures the percentage of individuals in families containing someone who is disabled with incomes below 60 percent of equivalised median income(^2), before housing costs. Tackling disability poverty is a priority as families with a disabled member have a higher rate of low-income poverty than average. Using 60 percent of equivalised median income as a poverty threshold is a historical and international benchmark. These data do not include care home residents due to the sample for the survey used consisting of the private household population. No adjustment is made to disposable household income to take into account any additional costs that may be incurred due to the illness or disability in question, and disability benefits have been included in the equivalised household income used. This means that the position in the income distribution of these groups, as shown here, may have some upward bias. Results based on incomes excluding disability benefits are available on request.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally a decrease in the indicator will demonstrate that an improvement has been achieved. However, economic conditions also need to be taken into account.
Links to other information that you may find useful
For further information, a full description of indicators towards disability equality by 2025 is available on the Independent Living and Office for Disability Issues website. Further analysis of Households Below Average Income (HBAI) data are shown in the annual HBAI publication.
______________________________________________________________________
(^2) In order to allow comparisons of living standards between different household types, income is adjusted to take into account variations in the size and composition of the household in a process known as equivalisation. This adjustment reflects the common sense notion that a household of several people requires a higher income than a single person in order for both households to have an equivalent standard of living.
### Table 7.1: Poverty rate for families by presence of disabled members and age, 2009/10, United Kingdom(^{1,2,3,4})
| Group | Age | Poverty rate (proportion) | |------------------------|--------------|---------------------------| | | Families with a disabled member | Families with no disabled member | | Children | | | | | 0-4 | 25 | 19 | | | 5-10 | 22 | 16 | | | 11-15 | 25 | 19 | | | 16-19 dependent children | 33 | 18 | | Working-age adults | 16-19 adults | 28 | 25 | | | 20-24 | 28 | 17 | | | 25-29 | 25 | 13 | | | 30-34 | 21 | 11 | | | 35-39 | 20 | 13 | | | 40-44 | 23 | 13 | | | 45-49 | 22 | 12 | | | 50-54 | 18 | 12 | | | 55-59 | 23 | 14 | | | 60-64 males | 21 | 17 | | Pensioners | 60-64 females| 15 | 15 | | | 65-69 | 15 | 16 | | | 70-74 | 16 | 21 | | | 75-79 | 20 | 23 | | | 80-84 | 19 | 29 | | | 85+ | 20 | 33 |
### Table 7.2: Poverty rate for families by presence of disabled members, 2009/10, United Kingdom(^{1,2,3,4})
| Poverty rate (proportion) | |---------------------------| | Families with a disabled member | Families with no disabled member | | Poverty rate | 21 | 16 | Table 7.3: Poverty rate for families by presence of disabled members and ethnicity, 2007/08-2009/10, United Kingdom\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,5}
| Ethnic group of head of household (3-year average) | Poverty rate (proportion) | | |---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|---| | | Families with a disabled member | Families with no disabled member | | White | 22 | 14 | | Mixed | 32 | 20 | | Asian or Asian British | 43 | 31 | | Indian | 29 | 22 | | Pakistani and Bangladeshi | 56 | 46 | | Black or Black British | 32 | 26 | | Black Caribbean | 27 | 23 | | Black Non-Caribbean | 37 | 28 | | Chinese or other ethnic group | 34 | 25 |
Table 7.4: Poverty rate for families by presence of disabled members and gender, 2009/10, United Kingdom
| Gender | Poverty rate (proportion) | | |--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|---| | | Families with a disabled member | Families with no disabled member | | Male child | 24 | 18 | | Female child | 26 | 19 | | Male working-age adult | 22 | 14 | | Female working-age adult | 21 | 14 | | Male pensioner | 16 | 17 | | Female pensioner | 18 | 22 |
All tables sourced from: Households Below Average Income 2007/8-2009/10.
Notes:
1. This indicator is measured using HBAI statistics sourced from the FRS. The indicator measures the percentage of individuals in families with a disabled member with incomes below 60 percent of contemporary equivalised median income, before housing costs. Data are annual with approximately a 12-month time delay after the end of the survey period.
2. All estimates are based on survey data and are therefore subject to uncertainty. Small differences should be treated with caution as these will be affected by sampling error and variability in non-response.
3. Proportions of individuals in low-income households have been rounded to the nearest percentage point.
4. Results cover the financial year 2009/10.
5. Results cover the financial years 2007/08 to 2009/10.
6. Rate of pensioner poverty
What does this tell us?
The indicator measures the percentage of pensioners in households with incomes below 60 percent of equivalised median income, after housing costs.
Tackling pensioner poverty is a priority for the Department. Strategies used include the ‘triple guarantee’ that pensions are raised by the highest of earnings, prices or 2.5 percent. In addition, protecting key benefits for older people such as keeping the winter fuel payment exactly as budgeted for by the previous Government. Rules and regulations relating to pensions are also being simplified to prevent people from falling into poverty in later life.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, a decrease in this indicator will demonstrate that an improvement has been achieved. However, economic conditions also need to be taken into account.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further analysis of HBAI data are shown in the annual HBAI publication.
Table 8.1: Poverty rate for pensioners by age, UK, 2009/10(^{1,2,3,4})
| Age | Poverty rate (percentage of pensioners in low income households) | |--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------| | 60-64 females| 14 | | 65-69 | 14 | | 70-74 | 16 | | 75-79 | 16 | | 80-84 | 17 | | 85+ | 19 |
Table 8.2: Poverty rate for pensioners by disability, UK, 2009/10(^{1,2,3,4,5})
| Disability status | Poverty rate (percentage of pensioners in low income households) | |--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------| | Those living in families where no-one is disabled | 17 | | Those living in families where someone is disabled | 15 | Table 8.3: Poverty rate for pensioners by ethnic group of head of household, UK, 2007/08-2009/10(^1,2,3,6,7)
| Ethnic group of head (3-year average) | Poverty rate (percentage of pensioners in low income households) | |--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------| | White | 16 | | Mixed | .. | | Asian or Asian British | 33 | | Indian | 29 | | Pakistani and Bangladeshi | 46 | | Black or Black British | 27 | | Black Caribbean | 25 | | Black Non-Caribbean | .. | | Chinese or other ethnic group | 28 |
Table 8.4: Poverty rate for pensioners by gender, UK, 2009/10(^1,2,3,4)
| Gender | Poverty rate (percentage of pensioners in low income households) | |-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------| | Male | 14 | | Female | 16 |
All tables sourced from: Households Below Average Income 2007/8-2009/10.
Notes:
1. This indicator is measured HBAI statistics sourced from the FRS. The indicator measures the percentage of pensioners with incomes below 60 percent of contemporary equivalised median income, after housing costs. Data are annual with approximately a 12-month time delay after the end of the survey period.
2. All estimates are based on survey data and are therefore subject to uncertainty. Small differences should be treated with caution as these will be affected by sampling error and variability in non-response.
3. Proportions of individuals in low-income households have been rounded to the nearest percentage point.
4. Results cover the financial year 2009/10, i.e. April 2009 to March 2010.
5. No adjustment is made to disposable household income to take into account any additional costs that may be incurred due to the illness or disability in question, and disability benefits have been included in the equivalised household income used. This means that the position in the income distribution of these groups, as shown here, may have some upward bias. Results based on incomes excluding disability benefits are available on request.
6. '..' means data are not available due to small sample size.
7. Results cover the financial years 2007/08 to 2009/10.
8. Social mobility in adulthood
What does this tell us?
This indicator is currently in development. The Department is committed to working with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and others to develop new measures of progress in improving social mobility. We are looking at ways of measuring access to the professions, progression in the labour market and the availability of ‘second chances’ to succeed.
No data were available as at July 2011. We expect data to be available for mid to late 2012.
How will an improvement be shown?
As this indicator is still in development, we are unable to explain how an improvement will be shown. Pensions-related impact indicators
10. Number of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer
What does this tell us?
This indicator measures the number of jobs (including those affected by absence) where the individual is aged at least 22, under state pension age and earning above the earnings threshold for automatic enrolment (£7,475 in 2011/12 earnings terms) who are participating in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer. The indicator excludes the self-employed and it should be noted that an individual may have more than one employer.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, an increase in the indicator will demonstrate if an improvement has been achieved.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further information on this indicator is available online.
Table 10.1: Number of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer by age, 2010, United Kingdom
| Age | Employees (millions) | |---------|----------------------| | 22-24 | 0.3 | | 25-29 | 1.1 | | 30-34 | 1.4 | | 35-39 | 1.6 | | 40-44 | 1.9 | | 45-49 | 2.0 | | 50-54 | 1.6 | | 55-59 | 1.2 | | 60-64 males | 0.4 |
Table 10.2: Number of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer by gender, 2010, United Kingdom
| Gender | Employees (millions) | |--------|----------------------| | Male | 6.0 | | Female | 5.4 | All tables sourced from: DWP analysis of the Office of National Statistics Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE).
Notes:
1. This indicator is measured using the ASHE and includes all employee jobs (including those affected by absence) with an employer sponsored pension where the individual is aged at least 22 and less than state pension age (currently 65 for men and 60 for women) and where annual gross earnings is above the earnings threshold of £7,475 in 2011 earnings terms.
2. All estimates are based on survey data and are therefore subject to uncertainty.
3. Numbers of employee jobs have been rounded to the nearest 0.1million. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
4. '..' means data are not available. Operational working of the Department related impact indicators
5. Monetary value of fraud and error in the benefit system
What does this tell us?
This is the primary Departmental indicator for levels of fraud and error in the benefit system. The Fraud and Error National Statistics published for this indicator include global estimates for fraud and error in the benefit system. In addition there are more detailed estimates for Income Support, Jobseeker’s Allowance, Pension Credit and Housing Benefit, and for types of error. This indicator is important for Departmental assurance on the effect of anti-fraud and error activity across the businesses. No equality information is currently available for this indicator. We are considering the feasibility of publishing any information for this impact indicator and will provide an update in the next report.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, a decrease in the indicator will demonstrate if an improvement has been achieved but economic conditions and overall expenditure will also need to be taken into account.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Reports on the monetary value of fraud and error in the benefits system are available online. 12. Public opinion of DWP service levels
What does this tell us?
We have recently redeveloped this into a new indicator. In the future it will show the satisfaction levels of people who have had meaningful contact with the Department as a whole in the previous six months. There will be a score for overall satisfaction, with sub-indicator scores for satisfaction against four key drivers of customer satisfaction - On Time, Right Treatment, Right Result, and Easy Access.
The indicator demonstrates the Department's service to the public, allowing performance to be reviewed and service improvements to be made accordingly. For the next report, we will include data collected relating to the new indicator.
For this report we have included results from the previous separate Jobcentre Plus and Pension, Disability and Carers Service (PDCS) surveys to give some information on public opinions of DWP Service Levels. The 2009 Jobcentre Plus survey found that 75 per cent of Jobcentre Plus claimants were satisfied overall with the service they received with 12 per cent reporting dissatisfaction. The 2009/2010 PDCS survey found that 92 per cent of customers were satisfied overall with 6 percent reporting dissatisfaction. Because different surveys are used, direct comparisons of the Jobcentre Plus and PDCS data are not valid.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, for the new indicator a higher score will indicate greater customer satisfaction. This will be a baseline measure for the Department. Once the baseline is set, good performance can be agreed and reflected in maintaining or improving the level of satisfaction, depending on the amount of change for the Department at the time.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Information on the new impact indicator is available online.
The Jobcentre Plus Customer Survey 2011.
PDCS annual report of quarterly satisfaction 2009-2010.
### Table 12.1: Customers’ reported overall satisfaction with JCP by age
| Group | Age | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied | |------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | 16-24 | 79 | 9 | | | 25-34 | 73 | 12 | | | 35-49 | 75 | 12 | | | 50+ | 75 | 12 |
Sources: DWP Research Report 567. JCP Customer Satisfaction Survey.
### Table 12.2: Customers’ reported overall satisfaction with PDCS by age
| Group | Age | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied | |------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | 16-24 | 88 | 12 | | | 25-34 | 88 | 12 | | | 35-49 | 83 | 17 | | | 50-64 | 88 | 12 | | Pensioners | 60-65 | 95 | 5 | | | 66-69 | 90 | 10 | | | 70-74 | 93 | 7 | | | 75+ | 94 | 6 |
Sources: DWP Research Report 761. PDCS Annual Report Quarterly Satisfaction Monitor.
### Table 12.3: Customers’ reported overall satisfaction with Jobcentre Plus by disability
| Group | Long-standing illness or disability that limited daily activities or work | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied | |------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | Yes | 74 | 12 | | | No | 77 | 12 |
Sources: DWP Research Report 567. Jobcentre Plus Customer Satisfaction Survey.
### Table 12.4: Customers’ reported overall satisfaction with PDCS by disability(^2,3,4)
| Group | Long-standing illness or disability that limited daily activities or work | Customers’ reported satisfaction | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied | |------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | Yes | 76 | 24 | | | | No | 89 | 11 | | | Pensioners | Yes | 85 | 15 | | | | No | 95 | 5 | |
Sources: DWP Research Report 761. PDCS Annual Report Quarterly Satisfaction Monitor.
### Table 12.5: Customers’ reported overall satisfaction with Jobcentre Plus by ethnicity(^1)
| Group | Ethnicity | Customer’s reported satisfaction | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied | |------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | White | 75 | 12 | | | | Asian | 83 | 8 | | | | Black | 69 | 16 | | | | Mixed/Other | 73 | 13 | |
Sources: DWP Research Report 567. Jobcentre Plus Customer Satisfaction Survey.
### Table 12.6: Customers’ reported overall satisfaction with PDCS by ethnicity(^2,3,4)
| Group | Ethnicity | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied | |----------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | White | 86 | 14 | | | Asian | 85 | 15 | | | Black | 94 | 6 | | | Mixed/Other | 86 | 14 | | Pensioners | White | 94 | 6 | | | Asian | 87 | 13 | | | Black | 87 | 13 | | | Mixed/Other | 81 | 19 |
Sources: DWP Research Report 761. PDCS Annual Report Quarterly Satisfaction Monitor.
### Table 12.7: Customers’ reported overall satisfaction with Jobcentre Plus by gender(^1)
| Group | Gender | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied | |----------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | Male | 69 | 16 | | | Female | 80 | 9 |
Sources: DWP Research Report 567. Jobcentre Plus Customer Satisfaction Survey. Table 12.8: Customers’ reported overall satisfaction with PDCS by gender(^2,3,4)
| Group | Gender | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied | Percentage of customers who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied | |----------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | Male (Age 16-64) | 87 | 13 | | | Female (Age 16-59) | 86 | 14 | | Pensioners | Male (Age 65+) | 93 | 7 | | | Female (Age 60+) | 94 | 6 |
Sources: DWP Research Report 761. PDCS Annual Report Quarterly Satisfaction Monitor.
Notes:
1. The 2009 Jobcentre Plus National Customer Satisfaction survey was commissioned to measure overall level of satisfaction and assess differences across different customer groups. 4,125 interviews were completed between July and October 2009 with findings representative of Income Support, Incapacity Benefit and Jobseeker’s Allowance customers. The questionnaire focused on customers who had both claimed/received benefit and had had contact with Jobcentre Plus within the last 12 months.
2. The 2009/2010 PDCS Quarterly Customer Satisfaction Monitor was commissioned to measure overall level of satisfaction and assess differences across different customer groups. 5,941 interviews were completed with findings representative of Attendance Allowance (AA), Carers Allowance (CA), Disability Living Allowance (DLA), Pension Credit and State pension customers. The questionnaire focused on customers who had both claimed/received benefit or had contacted to report a change in circumstances with Pension, Disability and Carers Service in the three months previous to each quarterly survey.
3. PDCS also serves working-age customers, those receiving DLA or CA may also be customers of Jobcentre Plus.
4. DLA and AA customers of the PDCS have a disability in order to meet the qualifying criteria. However, some may choose not to report it on the satisfaction survey.
5. Additional customer data
Employment gap information
What does this tell us?
The employment rate gap compares the overall employment rate for 16 to 64 year olds with the employment rate for 16 to 64 year olds with various protected characteristics, for Great Britain. A positive employment rate gap means that the overall Great Britain employment rate is higher than the employment rate for the group with a particular protected characteristic.
How will an improvement be shown?
A reduction in the employment gap would generally show an improvement. However, economic conditions will also need to be taken into account.
Table 13.1: Percentage point employment gaps for various protected characteristics, Quarter 1 2011(^1,2,3)
| Disadvantaged group | Employment rate gap | |--------------------------------------|---------------------| | Female(^4) | 5.1 | | Disabled people | 25.1 | | Ethnic minorities | 12.8 | | Young people (aged 18 to 24) | 15.8 | | Older workers (aged 50 to 64) | 7.1 |
Source: Labour Force Survey.
Notes:
1. Data are rounded to the nearest 0.1 percentage point.
2. Data are subject to sampling variation and is not seasonally adjusted.
3. Data covers GB only, not UK.
4. Data for the gender employment gap covers the UK and is seasonally adjusted. Links to additional information:
DWP Equality Impact Assessments
National and Official Statistics products - the Department produces a number of National and Official Statistics products.
Employment and Support Allowance - Work Capability Assessment and Sanctions
Income Related Benefits Estimate of Take-Up - includes details on age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Households Below Average Income Series - includes details on age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Low-Income Dynamics - includes details on age and gender.
Pensioner Incomes Series - includes details on age, ethnicity and gender.
Family Resources Survey - includes details on age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Access to Work - includes details about the programme that helps fund reasonable adjustments for disabled workers.
Lone parents on Jobseekers Allowance - includes details on age, gender, disability and ethnicity.
Second tier pension provision - includes details on age and gender.
DWP tabulation tool - includes a range of benefit data with details on age and gender and some splits available by disability and ethnicity.
Life Opportunities Survey - a detailed survey looking at life opportunities for disabled and non-disabled people.
Pre-Work Programme and Get Britain Working Official Statistics - includes details on age, disability and ethnicity:
Independent Living and Office for Disability Issues indicators on disability equality by 2025.
Please email [email protected] if you are interested in any of these data sources or want to enquire about the feasibility of any analysis of DWP data by a protected characteristic that is not included here. Section 2: Information about our employees
14. The DWP workforce
As part of our commitment to achieving a workforce representative of the society we serve and providing equality of opportunity, we monitor representation of protected characteristics by grade across the Department.
The Civil Service grading structure indicates level of seniority within the organisation and covers a range of roles:
Senior Civil Service (SCS): Pay Band 3 Director General Pay Bands 2 and 1 Director and Deputy Director
Senior Management: Grade 6/Band G Grade 7/Band F
Managerial: SEO/Band E HEO/Band D EO/Band C
Administrative: AO/Band B AA /Band A
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show the Department’s employees by grade as percentages against each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Unfortunately, at this time indication rates in relation to sexual orientation are too low for this information to be included. At 31 March 2011 the indication rate for ethnicity was 76% and 82.5% for disability.
How will an improvement be shown?
A higher percentage under each protected characteristic will show we employ a greater proportion of people with that protected characteristic. We have set representation rate targets for staff at senior grades until 2013 for ethnicity, disability and gender. Progress towards these was previously reported in our Equality Schemes update. Some of these targets have already been met.
### Table 14.1: Percentage of DWP workforce by age(^{1,2,3})
| ONS Age Range | % Band A/AA to Band C/EO | % Band D/HEO and Band E/SEO | % Band F/ Grade 7 | % Band G/ Grade 6 | % SCS all | % Not known | Total % by age | Actual total headcount | |---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|-----------------------| | 16-24 | 3.3 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 3,280 | | 25-29 | 7.5 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 14.3 | 7.0 | 7,625 | | 30-34 | 9.0 | 6.1 | 10.3 | 4.0 | 1.6 | 23.8 | 8.7 | 9,472 | | 35-39 | 10.9 | 10.1 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 7.8 | 19.0 | 10.8 | 11,803 | | 40-44 | 15.7 | 17.4 | 16.8 | 14.4 | 14.4 | 23.8 | 15.8 | 17,334 | | 45-49 | 18.6 | 25.0 | 21.2 | 23.8 | 30.7 | 14.3 | 19.3 | 21,133 | | 50-54 | 16.4 | 21.4 | 22.6 | 23.0 | 22.6 | 0.0 | 17.1 | 18,670 | | 55-59 | 11.7 | 11.8 | 13.4 | 20.8 | 20.2 | 4.8 | 11.8 | 12,902 | | 60-64 | 5.8 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 5.6 | 6,112 | | 65+ | 1.1 | * | * | * | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1,113 |
| % Headcount by grade | 87.9 | 9.8 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 100 | | Actual total headcount | 96,159 | 10,718 | 1,608 | 682 | 257 | 21 | 109,445 |
Notes:
1. Headcount is the number of people employed.
2. Percentages shown are the number of employees [ONS headcount] by age and grade over the total number of employees by grade.
3. Data as at 31 March 2011.
- - Level of data too low for publication Table 14.2: Percentage of DWP workforce by grade and indicated disability\\textsuperscript{1,2,3}
| Disability | Grade | % Band A/AA to Band C/EO | % Band D/HEO and Band E/SEO | % Band F/ Grade 7 | % Band G/ Grade 6 | % SCS all | % Not known | Total % by disability | Actual total headcount indicated | |------------------|-------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------| | 2013 Target | | | | | | | | | | | Disabled | 6.0 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | Non-disabled | 6.6 | 5.9 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 5.8 | 0.0 | 6.5 | 5,856 | | | Actual total headcount indicated | 93.4 | 94.1 | 95.5 | 95.5 | 94.2 | 100.0 | 93.5 | 84,419 | | | | 77,979 | 10,027 | 1,431 | 627 | 208 | * | 100 | 90,275 | |
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees [ONS Headcount] who have chosen to indicate their disability and grade over the total number of employees by grade.
2. Data as at 31 March 2011.
3. Headcount indicated is the number of employees who have indicated their disability status.
- - Level of data too low for publication Table 14.3: Percentage of DWP workforce by grade and indicated ethnicity\\textsuperscript{1,2,3}
| Ethnicity | % Band A/AA to Band C/EO | % Band D/HEO and Band E/SEO | % Band F/ Grade 7 | % Band G/ Grade 6 | % SCS all | % Not known | Total % by ethnicity | Actual total headcount indicated | |--------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------|----------------------|----------------------------------| | 2013 Target Ethnic minority | N/A | 7.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.0 | N/A | N/A | N/A | | White | 12.0 | 7.0 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 2.5 | 11.1 | 11.3 | 9,369 | | Actual total headcount indicated | 88.0 | 93.0 | 95.1 | 95.9 | 97.5 | 88.9 | 88.7 | 73,783 | | | 72,266 | 8,895 | 1,239 | 542 | 201 | * | 100 | 83,152 |
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees [ONS Headcount] who have chosen to indicate their ethnicity and grade over the total number of employees by grade.
2. Data as at 31 March 2011
3. Headcount indicated is the number of employees who have indicated their ethnicity status.
- - Level of data too low for publication Table 14.4: Percentage of DWP workforce by gender\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Gender | % Band A/AA to Band C/EO | % Band D/HEO and Band E/SEO | % Band F/ Grade 7 | % Band G/ Grade 6 | % SCS all | % Not known | Total % by gender | Actual total headcount | |--------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|------------------|----------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------| | 2013 | | | | | | | | | | Target | N/A | N/A | 47.0 | 45.0 | 39.5 | N/A | N/A | N/A | | Female | 68.8 | 60.8 | 49.4 | 44.3 | 38.9 | 61.9 | 67.5 | 73,836 | | Male | 31.2 | 39.2 | 50.6 | 55.7 | 61.1 | 38.1 | 32.5 | 35,609 | | Actual total headcount | 96,159 | 10,718 | 1,608 | 682 | 257 | 21 | 100 | 109,445 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees [ONS Headcount] by gender and grade over the total number of employees by grade.
2. Data as at 31 March 2011.
3. Disciplinary procedures
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show the proportion of employees who have been subject to formal disciplinary procedures against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Table 15.1: Percentage of employees disciplined by age(^{1,2})
| Age | Total % | Total overall headcount | |---------|---------|-------------------------| | 16-24 | 5.1 | 3,280 | | 25-29 | 3.5 | 7,625 | | 30-34 | 2.8 | 9,472 | | 35-39 | 2.4 | 11,803 | | 40-44 | 1.8 | 17,334 | | 45-49 | 1.7 | 21,133 | | 50-54 | 1.6 | 18,670 | | 55-59 | 2.1 | 12,902 | | 60-64 | 2.0 | 6,112 | | 65+ | 1.7 | 1,113 | | (blank) | 0.0 | * | | Overall total | 2.2 | 109,445 |
Table 15.2: Percentage of employees disciplined by indicated disability(^{1,2})
| Disability | Total % | Total overall headcount indicated | |------------|---------|-----------------------------------| | Disabled | 2.5 | 5,856 | | Non-disabled | 1.9 | 84,419 | | Total indicated | 1.9 | 90,275 |
Table 15.3: Percentage of employees disciplined by indicated ethnicity(^{1,2})
| Ethnicity | Total % | Total overall headcount indicated | |---------------|---------|-----------------------------------| | Ethnic minority | 2.7 | 9,369 | | White | 1.9 | 73,783 | | Total indicated | 2.0 | 83,152 | Table 15.4: Percentage of employees disciplined by gender\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Gender | Total % | Total overall headcount | |--------|---------|-------------------------| | Female | 1.7 | 73,836 | | Male | 3.1 | 35,609 | | Total | 2.2 | 109,445 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management.
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees disciplined in the period over the total number of employees who have chosen to indicate that protected characteristic.
2. Data as at 31 March 2011.
- - Level of data too low for publication
16. Exits
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show the reasons why employees leave the Department against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Table 16.1: Percentage of reason for leaving by age
| Age | % Death in service | % Dismissal | % Early retirement | % Early severance | % Other | % Resignation | % Transfer | % of total leavers | Actual leavers | |-------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------|---------------|------------|-------------------|----------------| | 16-24 | * | 9.2 | 0.0 | * | 18.5 | 22.4 | 8.4 | 18.0 | 2,149 | | 25-29 | * | 11.6 | 0.0 | 5.4 | 12.1 | 19.2 | 23.1 | 15.0 | 1,791 | | 30-34 | * | 12.9 | * | 7.1 | 7.7 | 11.6 | 17.6 | 10.1 | 1,207 | | 35-39 | * | 12.3 | * | 14.9 | 6.5 | 11.2 | 15.0 | 9.5 | 1,127 | | 40-44 | 9.2 | 13.7 | * | 20.3 | 6.3 | 10.3 | 10.5 | 9.2 | 1,097 | | 45-49 | 11.5 | 13.2 | * | 23.7 | 7.4 | 9.5 | 12.1 | 9.4 | 1,115 | | 50-54 | 22.1 | 10.9 | 33.8 | 6.6 | 8.8 | 7.3 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 1,065 | | 55-59 | 29.8 | 11.2 | 58.2 | 5.0 | 9.6 | 5.5 | 4.5 | 8.8 | 1,054 | | 60-64 | 11.5 | 4.2 | * | 10.8 | 17.2 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 8.4 | 1,005 | | 65+ | * | * | * | * | 5.8 | * | 0.0 | 2.6 | 311 | | (blank)| 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 | | Total % leavers by reason | 1.1 | 10.9 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 37.9 | 43.1 | 3.2 | 100 | | Actual total leavers | 131 | 1,298 | 213 | 241 | 4,514 | 5,143 | 381 | 11,921 | Table 16.2: Percentage of reason for leaving by indicated disability\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,4,5,6,7}
| Disability | % Death in service | % Dismissal | % Early retirement | % Early severance | % Other | % Resignation | % Transfer | % of total leavers | |------------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------|--------------|------------|-------------------| | Disabled | 14.8 | 11.8 | 9.7 | 7.6 | 11.3 | 5.6 | 7.9 | 9.3 | | Non-disabled | 85.2 | 88.2 | 90.3 | 92.4 | 88.7 | 94.4 | 92.1 | 90.7 | | Actual leavers indicated | 108 | 821 | 207 | 224 | 1754 | 1533 | 152 | |
Table 16.3: Percentage of reason for leaving by indicated ethnicity\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,4,5,6,7}
| Ethnicity | % Death in service | % Dismissal | % Early retirement | % Early severance | % Other | % Resignation | % Transfer | % of total leavers | |-----------------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------|--------------|------------|-------------------| | Ethnic minority | 11.9 | 17.3 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 12.1 | 11.4 | 11.9 | 12.0 | | White | 88.1 | 82.7 | 96.5 | 96.4 | 87.9 | 88.6 | 88.1 | 88.0 | | Actual leavers indicated | 101 | 802 | 171 | 196 | 1997 | 1944 | 159 | |
Table 16.4: Percentage of reason for leaving by gender\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,4,5,6,7}
| Gender | % Death in service | % Dismissal | % Early retirement | % Early severance | % Other | % Resignation | % Transfer | % of total leavers | |--------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------|--------------|------------|-------------------| | Female | 59.5 | 58.9 | 54.5 | 64.3 | 57.6 | 63.0 | 50.4 | 59.9 | | Male | 40.5 | 41.1 | 45.5 | 35.7 | 42.4 | 37.0 | 49.6 | 40.1 | | Actual leavers | 131 | 1298 | 213 | 241 | 4514 | 5143 | 381 | |
All data sourced from: Resource Management. Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of leavers who have chosen to indicate that protected characteristic and reason for leaving over the total number of employees by reason for leaving.
2. Data as at 31 March 2011.
3. Dismissal – Dismissal and discharged probation.
4. Transfer – Transfer to other Government department, transfer of function.
5. Early retirement – approved early retirement, voluntary early release – early retirement.
6. Early severance – voluntary early release – early severance.
7. Other – retirement at/above minimum age, ill health retirement, end of temporary contract, blank reason for leaving.
- - Level of data too low for publication
17. Working Patterns
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show the proportion of employees with a part-time working pattern against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender. These data show part-time working rates as at 31 March 2011.
Table 17.1: Percentage of employees working part-time by age
| Age | % Part-time | Total overall headcount | |---------|-------------|-------------------------| | 16-24 | 12.7 | 3,280 | | 25-29 | 19.5 | 7,625 | | 30-34 | 32.8 | 9,472 | | 35-39 | 41.3 | 11,803 | | 40-44 | 42.4 | 17,334 | | 45-49 | 37.5 | 21,133 | | 50-54 | 32.3 | 18,670 | | 55-59 | 29.4 | 12,902 | | 60-64 | 57.2 | 6,112 | | 65+ | 67.1 | 1,113 | | (blank) | 0.0 | * | | Total | 36 | 109,445 |
Table 17.2: Percentage of employees working part-time by indicated disability
| Disability | % Part-time | Total overall headcount indicated | |------------|-------------|----------------------------------| | Disabled | 37.9 | 5,856 | | Non-disabled | 39.8 | 84,419 | | Total indicated | 39.7 | 90,275 |
Table 17.3: Percentage of employees with a part time working pattern by indicated ethnicity
| Ethnicity | % Part-time | Total overall headcount indicated | |-----------------|-------------|----------------------------------| | Ethnic minority | 35.2 | 9,369 | | White | 39.1 | 73,783 | | Total indicated | 38.7 | 83,152 | Table 17.4: Percentage of employees with a part-time working pattern by gender
| Gender | % Part-time | Total overall headcount | |--------|-------------|-------------------------| | Female | 47.3 | 73,836 | | Male | 12.1 | 35,609 | | Total | 36.0 | 109,445 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees working part-time over the total number of employees that have chosen to indicate that protected characteristic.
- - Level of data too low for publication
18. Grievances
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show the proportion of employees who have raised a grievance against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Table 18.1: Percentage of employees raising a grievance by age(^{1,2})
| Age | Total % | Total overall headcount | |---------|---------|-------------------------| | 16-24 | 1.2 | 3,280 | | 25-29 | 1.1 | 7,625 | | 30-34 | 1.0 | 9,472 | | 35-39 | 1.1 | 11,803 | | 40-44 | 1.0 | 17,334 | | 45-49 | 0.9 | 21,133 | | 50-54 | 0.7 | 18,670 | | 55-59 | 0.8 | 12,902 | | 60-64 | 0.7 | 6,112 | | 65+ | 0.4 | * | | (blank) | 0.0 | * | | Total | 0.9 | 109,445 |
Table 18.2: Percentage of employees raising a grievance by indicated disability(^{1,2})
| Disability | Total % | Total overall headcount indicated | |------------|---------|----------------------------------| | Disabled | 1.5 | 5,856 | | Non-disabled | 0.9 | 84,419 | | Total indicated | 0.9 | 90,275 |
Table 18.3: Percentage of employees raising a grievance by indicated ethnicity(^{1,2})
| Ethnicity | Total % | Total overall headcount indicated | |-----------------|---------|----------------------------------| | Ethnic minority | 1.1 | 9,369 | | White | 0.8 | 73,783 | | Total indicated | 0.9 | 83,152 | Table 18.4: Percentage of employees raising a grievance by gender\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Gender | Total % | Total overall headcount | |--------|---------|-------------------------| | Female | 0.9 | 73,836 | | Male | 0.9 | 35,609 | | Total | 0.9 | 109,445 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management.
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees raising a grievance in the period over the total number of employees that have chosen to indicate that protected characteristic.
2. Data as at 31 March 2011.
- - Level of data too low for publication
19. Performance markings
What does this tell us?
The current performance management marking system was introduced in 2008/2009. Employees are marked as 'wholly exceptional', 'consistently good' or 'unsatisfactory'. Where employees were given a marking other than one of these three it is shown as 'other marking'.
The data presented here show the proportion of employees awarded each performance marking against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Where some employees have not been given a performance marking, the total percentage for that group will not be 100 percent. Table 19.1 Percentage of employees with each performance marking by age
| Age | % Wholly exceptional | % Consistently good | % Unsatisfactory | % Other marking | Total % with markings | Total overall headcount (excl. SCS) | |-------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------| | 16-24 | 2.3 | 78.4 | * | 0.7 | 81.5 | 3,280 | | 25-29 | 3.1 | 80.4 | 0.1 | 1.5 | 85.1 | 7,624 | | 30-34 | 3.0 | 85.3 | * | 3.0 | 91.3 | 9,468 | | 35-39 | 3.2 | 88.2 | 0.2 | 2.7 | 94.2 | 11,783 | | 40-44 | 3.3 | 89.7 | 0.1 | 1.4 | 94.5 | 17,297 | | 45-49 | 3.0 | 90.6 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 94.2 | 21,054 | | 50-54 | 2.2 | 91.7 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 94.4 | 18,612 | | 55-59 | 1.8 | 91.6 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 93.9 | 12,850 | | 60-64 | 0.7 | 92.6 | * | 0.2 | 93.6 | 6,106 | | 65+ | * | 92.0 | * | * | 93.2 | 1,113 | | (blank)| 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | * | | Total | 2.6 | 89.1 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 92.9 | 109,188 |
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees (excluding SCS) with a performance marking for the period over the total number of employees (excluding SCS) by age.
2. Performance ratings for 2010/11 reporting year.
3. Table reflects employees with a marking entered on Resource Management.
- - Level of data too low for publication Table 19.2: Percentage of employees with each performance marking by indicated disability\\textsuperscript{1,2,3}
| Disability | % Wholly exceptional | % Consistently good | % Unsatisfactory | % Other marking | Total % | Total overall headcount indicated (excl. SCS) | |--------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------|---------------------------------------------| | Disabled | 1.7 | 93.1 | * | 1.0 | 95.9 | 5,844 | | Non-disabled | 2.9 | 92.6 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 96.9 | 84,223 | | Total indicated | 2.8 | 92.6 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 96.8 | 90,067 |
Table 19.3: Percentage of employees with each performance marking by indicated ethnicity\\textsuperscript{1,2,3}
| Ethnicity | % Wholly exceptional | % Consistently good | % Unsatisfactory | % Other marking | Total % | Total overall headcount indicated (excl. SCS) | |-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------|---------------------------------------------| | Ethnic minority | 2.1 | 91.4 | 0.2 | 2.6 | 96.2 | 9,364 | | White | 2.8 | 91.6 | 0.1 | 1.0 | 95.5 | 73,587 | | Total indicated | 2.7 | 91.6 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 95.6 | 82,951 |
Table 19.4: Percentage of employees with each performance rating by gender\\textsuperscript{1,2,3}
| Gender | % Wholly exceptional | % Consistently good | % Unsatisfactory | % Other marking | Total % | Total overall headcount (excl. SCS) | |--------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------|-----------------------------------| | Female | 2.7 | 89.7 | 0.1 | 1.5 | 94.0 | 73,736 | | Male | 2.4 | 87.9 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 90.7 | 35,452 | | Total | 2.6 | 89.1 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 92.9 | 109,188 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees (excluding SCS) with a performance marking for the period over the total number of employees (excluding SCS) who have chosen to indicate that protected characteristic.
2. Performance Ratings for 2010/11 reporting year.
3. Table reflects employees with a marking entered on Resource Management.
4. Promotion
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show employees promoted against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender. These data are for the twelve month period between 1 April 2010 and 31 March 2011.
Table 20.1: Percentage of employees promoted by age(^{1,2})
| Age | Total % | Total overall headcount | |---------|---------|-------------------------| | 16-24 | 0.7 | 3,280 | | 25-29 | 0.8 | 7,625 | | 30-34 | 0.6 | 9,472 | | 35-39 | 0.5 | 11,803 | | 40-44 | 0.4 | 17,334 | | 45-49 | 0.3 | 21,133 | | 50-54 | 0.3 | 18,670 | | 55-59 | 0.1 | 12,902 | | 60-64 | * | 6,112 | | 65+ | 0.0 | 1,113 | | (blank) | 0.0 | * | | Total | 0.4 | 109,445 |
Table 20.2: Percentage of employees promoted by indicated disability(^{1,2})
| Disability | Total % | Total overall headcount indicated | |------------|---------|----------------------------------| | Disabled | 0.3 | 5,856 | | Non-disabled | 0.4 | 84,419 | | Total indicated | 0.4 | 90,275 |
Table 20.3: Percentage of employees promoted by indicated ethnicity(^{1,2})
| Ethnicity | Total % | Total overall headcount indicated | |---------------|---------|----------------------------------| | Ethnic minority | 0.3 | 9,369 | | White | 0.4 | 73,783 | | Total indicated | 0.4 | 83,152 |
Table 20.4: Percentage of employees promoted by gender(^{1,2})
| Gender | Total % | Total overall headcount indicated | |--------|---------|----------------------------------| | Female | 0.3 | 73,836 | | Male | 0.5 | 35,609 | | Total | 0.4 | 109,445 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management.
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees promoted over the total number of who have chosen to indicate that protected characteristic.
2. - - Level of data too low for publication
3. Recruitment Process
What does this tell us?
These data presented here show applicants and those successful at each stage of the recruitment process against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender. These data are for the twelve month period between 1 April 2010 and 31 March 2011.
Table 21.1: Percentage of successful applicants at different stages of the recruitment process by age
| Age | % Applications | % Success at application | % Success at testing | % Success at final stage | |---------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------| | Under 25| 26 | 27 | 30 | 33 | | 25-54 | 69 | 69 | 65 | 64 | | Over 55 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 3 |
Table 21.2: Percentage of successful applicants at different stages of the recruitment process by indicated disability
| Disability | % Applications | % Success at application | % Success at testing | % Success at final stage | |------------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------| | Disabled | 6 | 6 | 13 | 10 | | Non-disabled| 94 | 94 | 87 | 90 |
Table 21.3: Percentage of successful applicants at different stages of the recruitment process by indicated ethnicity
| Ethnicity | % Applications | % Success at application | % Success at testing | % Success at final stage | |---------------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------| | Ethnic minority| 43 | 44 | 33 | 29 | | White | 57 | 56 | 67 | 71 |
Table 21.4: Percentage of successful applicants at different stages of the recruitment process by gender
| Gender | % Applications | % Success at application | % Success at testing | % Success at final stage | |--------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------| | Female | 51 | 51 | 47 | 50 | | Male | 49 | 49 | 53 | 50 |
All data sourced from: Internal Management Systems. 22. Pay Gap
The Department analyses data to identify any differences in pay on the grounds of gender, race, age and disability.
The pay gap is calculated by adding together the pay of all of the members of the potentially disadvantaged group in the Department who are in grades below the Senior Civil Service (SCS) and then working out an average salary. This is then compared to the average salary of the potentially advantaged group. The gap is the difference between the two averages divided by the average pay of the advantaged group.
[ \\text{Pay gap} = \\frac{\\text{Pay difference}}{\\text{Pay of the advantaged group}} ]
Therefore, in the case of the gender pay gap, the average salary of women in grades below SCS is calculated and then compared to the average salary of men in grades below SCS. The difference is expressed as a percentage and is presented by grade.
What does this tell us?
The table below shows which group is considered to be advantaged or disadvantaged for the purposes of expressing the pay gap for that protected characteristic. In the case of age, the majority age group (25-54) is shown against both the younger group (16-24) and the older age group (55 and above).
| Protected characteristic | Disadvantaged group | Advantaged group | |--------------------------|---------------------|------------------| | Age | 16-24 | 25-54 | | | 55 and above | 25-54 | | Disability | Disabled | Non-disabled | | Ethnicity | Ethnic minority | White | | Gender | Female | Male |
How will an improvement be shown?
Where the potentially disadvantaged group, for example women, have a higher average salary than their male counterparts, it is expressed as a negative percentage (for example -0.5 percent). This analysis informs the Equal Pay Audit, which takes place on a three yearly basis to identify areas for action.
[\\text{Pay difference} = \\text{mean pay of the advantaged group} - \\text{mean pay of the disadvantaged group}] Table 22.1: Pay gap by age\\textsuperscript{1,2,3}
| Age | Band A/AA | Band B/AO | Band C/EO | Band D/HEO | Band E/SEO | Band F/Grade 7 | Band G/Grade 6 | All grades | |----------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|------------| | Age 16-24 (mean salary) | £14,193 | £16,064 | £21,169 | £25,714 | N/A | N/A | N/A | £16,697 | | Age 25-54 (mean salary) | £14,632 | £17,253 | £23,093 | £28,059 | £34,028 | £47,191 | £59,539 | £21,163 | | Pay gap (percent 16-24 to 25-54) | 3.0 | 6.9 | 8.3 | 8.4 | N/A | N/A | N/A | 21.1 |
| Age | Band A/AA | Band B/AO | Band C/EO | Band D/HEO | Band E/SEO | Band F/Grade 7 | Band G/Grade 6 | All grades | |----------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|------------| | Age 55 and above (mean salary) | £14,700 | £17,465 | £23,666 | £29,291 | £35,742 | £50,058 | £61,990 | £21,518 | | Age 25-54 (mean salary) | £14,632 | £17,253 | £23,093 | £28,059 | £34,028 | £47,191 | £59,539 | £21,163 | | Pay gap (percent 55+ to 25-54) | -0.5 | -1.2 | -2.5 | -4.4 | -5.0 | -6.1 | -4.1 | -1.7 |
### Table 22.2: Pay gap by indicated disability(^{1,2,3,4})
| Disability | Band A/AA | Band B/AO | Band C/EO | Band D/HEO | Band E/SEO | Band F/Grade 7 | Band G/Grade 6 | All grades | |-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|------------| | Disabled (mean salary) | £14,753 | £17,678 | £23,634 | £28,686 | £34,626 | £47,769 | £60,196 | £21,844 | | Non-disabled (mean salary) | £14,715 | £17,579 | £23,390 | £28,317 | £34,342 | £47,756 | £60,285 | £21,741 | | Pay gap (percent disabled to non-disabled) | -0.3 | -0.6 | -1.0 | -1.3 | -0.8 | 0.0 | 0.1 | -0.5 |
### Table 22.3: Pay gap by indicated ethnicity(^{1,2,3,4,5})
| Ethnicity | Band A/AA | Band B/AO | Band C/EO | Band D/HEO | Band E/SEO | Band F/Grade 7 | Band G/Grade 6 | All grades | |-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|------------| | Ethnic minority (mean salary) | £14,677 | £17,427 | £23,076 | £28,070 | £34,113 | £47,229 | £60,876 | £20,486 | | White (mean salary) | £14,692 | £17,471 | £23,378 | £28,348 | £34,383 | £47,746 | £60,423 | £21,665 | | Pay gap (percent ethnic minority to white) | 0.1 | 0.3 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.1 | -0.7 | 5.4 |
### Table 22.4: Pay gap by gender
| Gender | Band A/AA | Band B/AO | Band C/EO | Band D/HEO | Band E/SEO | Band F/Grade 7 | Band G/Grade 6 | All grades | |-----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|------------| | Female (mean salary) | £14,645 | £17,339 | £23,242 | £28,250 | £34,193 | £47,291 | £59,564 | £20,895 | | Male (mean salary) | £14,611 | £16,975 | £23,042 | £28,279 | £34,579 | £48,231 | £60,792 | £21,514 | | Pay gap (percent female to male) | -0.2 | -2.1 | -0.9 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.9 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management.
Notes:
1. Salary totals are total full-time salaries in the pay band, excluding allowances and overtime. However, to prevent skews in diversity analyses due to different pay zones, all salaries here are treated as though they are on DWP National pay scales. That is, salaries on pay scales for inner London, outer London and special location pay zones have been placed on their equivalent position on the National pay scale. ERNIC and employer’s superannuation (Civil Service Pension) contributions are excluded from these figures.
2. Mean salary is the total full-time basic salaries for the pay band, divided into the headcount.
3. Records excluded from this analysis include SCS employees and specialists (accountants, lawyers etc) whose salaries are on separate pay scales. Casual and fixed-term appointments are included. The population used in the analysis therefore represents 98.1 percent of the 109,445 DWP employees paid and in post on 31 March 2011.
4. In defining working patterns, all part-year appointments have been categorised as part-time, whether or not part-year attendance is full-time or part-time.
5. Mean salaries only take into account those who have indicated their disability status.
6. Mean salaries only take into account those who have indicated their ethnicity status.
7. Training Data
What does this tell us? These data show applications made and training received by employees against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender. These data are for the twelve month period between 1 April 2010 and 31 March 2011.
Table 23.1: Percentage of training applications made and training received by age
| Age | % Training applications | % Training received | |-------|-------------------------|---------------------| | 16-24 | 3.0 | 3.4 | | 25-29 | 7.1 | 7.4 | | 30-34 | 8.3 | 8.5 | | 35-39 | 10.7 | 10.7 | | 40-44 | 15.5 | 15.4 | | 45-49 | 20.6 | 20.4 | | 50-54 | 17.4 | 17.0 | | 55-59 | 11.6 | 11.1 | | 60-64 | 5.0 | 5.0 | | 65+ | 0.9 | 1.0 |
Table 23.2: Percentage of training applications made and training received by indicated disability
| Disability | % Training applications | % Training received | |------------|-------------------------|---------------------| | Disabled | 6.7 | 6.7 | | Non-disabled | 93.4 | 93.3 |
Table 23.3: Percentage of training applications made and training received by indicated ethnicity
| Ethnicity | % Training applications | % Training received | |---------------|-------------------------|---------------------| | Ethnic minority | 26.5 | 27.2 | | White | 73.6 | 72.8 |
Table 23.4: Percentage of training applications made and training received by gender
| Gender | % Training applications | % Training received | |--------|-------------------------|---------------------| | Female | 69.6 | 69.0 | | Male | 30.4 | 30.9 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management. 24. Maternity Data
What does this tell us? These data shows the number of employees returning from maternity leave against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability and ethnicity. These data are for the twelve month period between 1 April 2010 and 31 March 2011.
Table 24.1: Percentage of employees returning from maternity leave in period by age(^{1,2})
| Age | % Total returning | Actual headcount | |---------|-------------------|------------------| | 16-24 | 3.5 | 58 | | 25-29 | 19.1 | 321 | | 30-34 | 35.9 | 604 | | 35-39 | 26.8 | 451 | | 40-44 | 12.6 | 212 | | 45-49 | 2.1 | 35 | | 50-54 | 0.0 | 0 | | 55-59 | 0.0 | 0 | | 60-64 | 0.0 | 0 | | 65+ | 0.0 | 0 | | (blank) | 0.0 | 0 | | Total | 100 | 1681 |
Table 24.2: Percentage of employees returning from maternity leave in period by indicated disability(^{1,2})
| Disability | % Total returning | Actual headcount indicated | |------------|-------------------|---------------------------| | Disabled | 5.1 | 22 | | Non-disabled | 94.9 | 409 | | Total indicated | 100 | 431 |
Table 24.3: Percentage of employees returning from maternity leave in period by indicated ethnicity(^{1,2})
| Ethnicity | % Total returning | Actual headcount indicated | |-----------------|-------------------|---------------------------| | Ethnic minority | 16.6 | 204 | | White | 83.4 | 1024 | | Total indicated | 100 | 1228 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management
Notes:
1. Data as at 31 March 2011.
2. Percentages shown are the number of employees returning from maternity leave in the period by indicated protected characteristic over the total number of employees returning from maternity leave.
3. Links to additional information
2011 People Survey Results - includes details of the DWP People Survey which is part of the Civil Service People Survey. It contains 57 questions to help determine employee engagement throughout the Civil Service.
2012 Star Performer Network - recognition is due to the work, dedication and commitment of SONG (the DWP national sexual orientation staff network group). This is the first time DWP and SONG have received this recognition.
Top 100 Employer - DWP is one of Britain's Top 100 Employers for lesbian, gay and bisexual staff.
Performance Related Pay - includes details of non-consolidated performance-related pay by DWP, our agencies and executive Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) for the performance year 2010-11.
Workforce Management Returns - includes details of the DWP workforce, our agencies and executive NDPBs.
Business Plan Quarterly Data Summary provide a quarterly snapshot on how each department is spending its budget, the results it has achieved and how it is deploying its workforce.
Equality Impact Assessments help us to make sure the needs of people are taken into account when we develop and implement a new policy or service or when we make a change to a current policy or service. DWP Equality Information 2011 Report under the Public Sector Equality Duty
Under the Public Sector Equality Duty, part of the Equality Act 2010, as a public body the Department for Work and Pensions has a specific duty to publish relevant proportionate information to demonstrate our compliance. Information showing that we have paid due regard to the aims of the Equality Duty is contained in this report.
Diversity and Equality Directorate Porterbrook House, 7 Pear Street, Sheffield, South Yorkshire, S11 8JF.
Contact Information: [email protected]
978-1-84947-998-1 (revised) Published by the Department for Work and Pensions 31 January 2012 www.dwp.gov.uk
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70645481a8305d5274aa6399da2df9a718b1e0b8 | List of tables.................................................................................................................................3 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................5 Section 1: Information about our policies and services.................................................................6 Employment related impact indicators..........................................................................................9 1. Rates of people moving off out of work benefits .................................................................9 2. Numbers on key out-of-work benefits ..................................................................................11 3. Proportion of children living in workless households............................................................17 4. Young people not in employment or full-time education ......................................................20 5. Gap between the employment rates for disabled people and the overall population ........22 6. Average age people stop working.........................................................................................25 Poverty and social mobility related impact indicators .................................................................27 7. Rate of disability poverty.......................................................................................................27 8. Rate of pensioner poverty......................................................................................................31 9. Social mobility in adulthood ..................................................................................................34 Pensions-related impact indicators..............................................................................................36 10. Number of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer .........................36 Operational working of the Department related impact indicators ............................................38 11. Monetary value of fraud and error in the benefit system ......................................................38 12. Public opinion of DWP service levels..................................................................................39 13. Additional customer data .....................................................................................................45 Section 2: Information about our employees..................................................................................47 14. The DWP workforce................................................................................................................47 15. Disciplinary procedures..........................................................................................................52 16. Exits.........................................................................................................................................54 17. Working Patterns.....................................................................................................................57 18. Grievances...............................................................................................................................59 19. Performance markings............................................................................................................61 20. Promotion ...............................................................................................................................62 21. Recruitment process...............................................................................................................64 22. Pay gap....................................................................................................................................64 23. Training data...........................................................................................................................69 24. Maternity data.........................................................................................................................70 25. Links to additional information ..............................................................................................71 List of tables
**Employment** Table 1.1-1.2: Number and rates of people moving from out-of-work benefits. Table 2.1-2.3: Number of people on key out-of-work benefits by age, ethnicity and gender. Table 3.1-3.3: Percentage of children in each economic activity status of household category by age, gender, and ethnic origin of child. Table 4.1-4.3: Percentage of young people not in full-time education who are workless by disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 5.1-5.4: Gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population by age, ethnicity, gender and religion. Table 6.1-6.3: Average age of withdrawal from the labour market by ethnicity and gender, gender overall and by gender and religion or belief.
**Poverty and social mobility** Table 7.1-7.4: Poverty rate for families by presence of disabled members and age, disabled members overall, disabled members and ethnicity and disabled members and gender. Table 8.1-8.4: Poverty rate for pensioners by age, disability, ethnic group of head of household and gender. Table 9.1: Percentage in the bottom income quintile that have progressed in the distribution of earnings.
**Pensions** Table 10.1-10.2: Numbers of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer by age and gender.
**Operational working of the Department** Table 12.1-12.8: Customers’ reported overall satisfaction with Jobcentre Plus and the Pension, Disability and Carers Service by age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
**Additional customer data** Table 13.1: Percentage of employment gaps for various protected characteristics.
**DWP workforce data** Table 14.1-14.4: Percentage of DWP workforce by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 15.1-15.4: Percentage of employees disciplined by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 16.1-16.4: Percentage of reason for leaving by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 17.1-17.4: Percentage of employees with a part-time working pattern by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 18.1-18.4: Percentage of employees raising a grievance by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 20.1-20.4: Percentage of employees promoted by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 22.1-22.4: Pay gap by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Table 24.1-24.4: Percentage of employees returning from maternity leave by age, disability and ethnicity. Introduction
On 31 January 2012 the Department published its first Equality Information report under the Public Sector Equality Duty. Whilst the legal requirement is an annual publication, the initial report committed to aligning information with the Department's reporting cycle by producing an update in July 2012.
This update follows the same format as the original report:
Section One shows information and data relating to the Department's policies, practices and service users; and
Section Two shows information and data relating to the Department's employees.
Future reporting
The Department intends to publish a comprehensive Equality Information report in July 2013. This will include an annual data update and also progress made in the detailed areas of the first report about our approach to:
- providing information about our policies, practices and services;
- providing information relating to our employees;
- benchmarking as an employer;
- engaging with our employees;
- engaging with our service users;
- paying due regard; and
- equality objectives.
Notes to data
Changes to the presentation of tables and amendments required following the first report are clearly explained in the commentary next to the relevant tables.
Alternative formats
If you would like a copy of this update in an alternative format please contact: Diversity and Equality Directorate, Porterbrook House, 7 Pear Street, Sheffield, South Yorkshire, S11 8JF. Email: [email protected]
Thank you for taking the time to read this update, we welcome your feedback. Please write to us using the details above.
## Section 1: Information about our policies and services
| Number | Indicator | Data source | Time period and availability | |--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1 | Rates of people moving from out-of-work benefits | DWP administrative data | • Latest data available for claimants that have flowed off Jobseekers Allowance was from January-March 2011 and March 2012. Whereas, latest data for claimants flowing off Employment and Support Allowance was from October-December 2010 and March 2012. | | 2 | Numbers on key out-of-work benefits | DWP administrative data | • Splits currently available by age and gender, and partly for ethnicity. | | | | | • Latest data available at July 2012 covered November 2011. | | | | | • Produced four times a year covering the months of February, May, August and November. Data are available with six months delay. | | 3 | Proportion of children living in workless households | Labour Force Survey | • Splits currently available by age, ethnicity and gender. | | | | | • Latest data available at July 2012 covered Quarter 4 2011. | | | | | • Produced twice a year. Data are available for Quarter 2 and Quarter 4 each year with a delay of around six weeks after the period referred to. | | 4 | Young people not in employment or full-time education | Labour Force Survey | • Impact indicator covers age. Splits currently available by disability, ethnicity and gender. | | | | | • Latest data available at July 2012 covered Quarter 1 2012. | | | | | • Produced monthly approximately six weeks after the period referred to. Three months of data are combined for the indicator. | | 5 | Gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population| Labour Force Survey | • Impact indicator covers disability. Splits currently available by age, ethnicity, gender and religion or belief. | | | | | • Latest data available at July 2012 covered Quarter 1 2012. | | | | | • Produced quarterly approximately six weeks after the period referred to. Three months of data are combined for the indicator. | | Number | Indicator | Data source | Time period and availability | |--------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 6 | Average age people stop working | Labour Force Survey | • Splits currently available by age, ethnicity, gender and religion or belief.\
• Latest data available at July 2012 covered Quarter 1 2011 for gender, and 4 quarter averages (to increase data reliability for these groups) from Quarter 2 2011 to Quarter 1 2012 for ethnicity and religion or belief.\
• Produced quarterly approximately six weeks after the period referred to. | | 7 | Rate of disability poverty | Family Resources Survey | • Indicator covers disability. Splits currently available by age, ethnicity and gender. Information on religion or belief and sexual orientation has been collected from April 2011. Results are expected to be available in Spring/Summer 2013.\
• Latest data available at July 2012 covered 2010/11.\
• Produced once a year covering a financial year, with a delay of just over a year after the end of the period referred to.\
• Data do not include care home residents due to the sample for the survey used consisting of the private household population. | | 8 | Rate of pensioner poverty | Family Resources Survey | • Splits currently available by age, disability, ethnicity and gender. Information on religion or belief and sexual orientation has been collected from April 2011. Results are expected to be available in Spring/Summer 2013.\
• Latest data available at July 2012 covered 2010/11.\
• Produced once a year covering a financial year, with a delay of just over a year after the end of the period referred to.\
• Data do not include care home residents due to the sample for the survey used consisting of the private household population. | | 9 | Social mobility in adulthood | Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings | • Likelihood of progression of 25-30 year olds by gender. Data for other protected characteristics are not currently available.\
• Latest data available at July 2012 covered 2002-2011. | | Number | Indicator | Data source | Time period and availability | |--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 10 | Number of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer | Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings | • Splits currently available by age and gender. This will be supplemented by data from the Family Resources Survey for religion or belief and sexual orientation which has been collected from April 2011. Results are expected to be available in Spring/Summer 2013.\
• Latest data available at July 2012 covered 2011. | | 11 | Monetary value of fraud and error in the benefit system | DWP administrative data | • No equality information currently available. We are considering the feasibility of collecting this and will provide an update in the next report. | | 12 | Public opinion of DWP service levels | DWP administrative data | • Splits currently available by age, disability, ethnicity and gender.\
• The latest data available at July 2012 covered 2011 for Jobcentre Plus and 2010/11 for the Pension, Disability and Carers Service. Produced once a year. | | 13 | Employment gap | Labour Force Survey | • Indicator focuses on disabled people, splits are available by age (for young adults and older workers), ethnicity and disability.\
• Data available approximately six weeks after the end of each quarter.\
• Data are seasonally unadjusted so only year on year comparisons can be made. |
Note: Estimates are based on a variety of data sources and are therefore subject to uncertainty. Small differences should be treated with caution as these will be affected by sampling error and variability in the data source. Employment related impact indicators
1. Rates of people moving off out-of-work benefits
What does this tell us?
This indicator reports off-flow rates for cohorts of customers who flow onto each benefit in a given period. For example: across all ages 87.2% of those starting to receive Jobseeker’s Allowance between January and March 2011 had stopped receiving the benefit 52 weeks later; 73.6% of 25-49 year olds who claimed Employment and Support Allowance between October and December 2010 had stopped receiving the benefit 65 weeks later.
This measure is included because Jobcentre Plus adds value by reducing the time it takes for a customer to move off benefit. The Jobseekers Allowance portion of the measure directly affects the claimant count, and the measure as a whole will provide useful information as to whether the Department's spending review settlement is being implemented.
How will an improvement be shown?
An increase in the indicator will demonstrate whether an improvement has been achieved. However, the indicator level will be affected by benefit conditionality and operational changes, seasonal variation and the economic cycle. For example, in a recession, even if Jobcentre Plus is performing well, the off-flow rate is likely to fall. Also, as Incapacity Benefit claims are re-assessed for Employment and Support Allowance the off-flow rate is likely to fall.
Links to other information that you may find useful
A one-off Destination Survey was undertaken by the Department in 2011 which provides data on the rate of people moving from key out-of-work benefits into employment.
______________________________________________________________________
1 The title and scope of this indicator has been amended from the ‘rate of people moving from key out of work benefits into employment’ in the 2011/12 Business Plan. HMRC data originally intended to measure the ‘into employment’ element of this indicator was found to substantially underestimate the proportion of benefit leavers moving into work because it does not fully record paid employment. For example, people who earn less than the tax threshold and those in self-employment will not appear. No ongoing data source has been found to substitute this data so the scope of the indicator has been reduced accordingly. Table 1.1: Jobseeker’s Allowance off-flow rate within 52 weeks, for claims received between January-March 2011\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,5,7}
| Age | Total on-flow | Total off-flow | Rate | |-------|---------------|----------------|-------| | 16-17 | 5,900 | 5,460 | 92.5% | | 18-24 | 309,340 | 279,960 | 90.5% | | 25-49 | 420,170 | 356,670 | 84.9% | | 50+ | 101,060 | 87,660 | 86.7% | | Unknown Age\\textsuperscript{6} | 70 | 70 | 100.0% | | Total | 836,530 | 729,810 | 87.2% |
Table 1.2: Employment and Support Allowance off-flow rate within 65 weeks, for claims received between October-December 2010\\textsuperscript{1,2,4,5,7}
| Age | Total on-flow | Total off-flow | Rate | |-------|---------------|----------------|-------| | 16-17 | 1,300 | 650 | 50.0% | | 18-24 | 26,840 | 20,950 | 78.1% | | 25-49 | 99,150 | 72,970 | 73.6% | | 50+ | 48,970 | 34,730 | 70.9% | | Unknown age\\textsuperscript{6} | 10 | 10 | 100.0% | | Total | 176,270 | 129,310 | 73.4% |
All data sourced from: DWP administrative data, Jobseeker’s Allowance Processing System (JSAPS).
Notes:
1. The on-flow cohort period corresponds to the reporting month beginning on the Saturday after the final Friday of the previous month and ending on the final Friday of the current month. This data covers three on-flow cohort periods.
2. The rate is calculated as the total number of off-flows from an on-flow cohort period, divided by the number of on flows within the on-flow cohort period, multiplied by 100 (to one decimal place).
3. On-flow and off-flow figures rounded to the nearest 10.
4. Off-flow for Jobseeker’s Allowance is based on claims ending within 52 weeks of on-flow.
5. Off-flow for Employment and Support Allowance is based on claims ending within 65 weeks of on-flow.
6. There are a small number of cases having an incorrect date of birth recorded on the Administrative Systems (JSAPS).
7. Due to seasonal movements in benefit claiming patterns only year on year comparisons should be made.
8. Numbers on key out-of-work benefits
What does this tell us?
This indicator looks at the number of people on the following key out-of-work benefits:
- Jobseeker's Allowance;
- Incapacity Benefits/Employment and Support Allowance;
- Lone parents receiving Income Support; and
- Others receiving income-related benefits. These are mainly Pension Credit recipients for men aged under state pension age. The remainder are in receipt of Income Support.
How will an improvement be shown?
This indicator will show an improvement if the number of people in receipt of key out-of-work benefits decreases, reflecting the Department's economic and social objective of helping more people into employment.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further information about a variety of benefits and customer groups is available on the DWP tabulation tool. Table 2.1: Number on key out-of-work benefits by age, Great Britain, thousands, November 2011\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Age | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (UK seasonally adjusted) \\textsuperscript{3} | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (GB not seasonally adjusted) \\textsuperscript{4} | Employment and Support Allowance and Incapacity Benefits \\textsuperscript{5,7} | Lone Parents on Income Support \\textsuperscript{5} | Other (Income Support, others and Pension Credit) \\textsuperscript{5,6} | |--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------| | Unknown age | .. | - | 0.1 | - | 0.3 | | Under 18 | .. | 3.9 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 10.6 | | 18-24 | .. | 452.4 | 153.5 | 170.0 | 27.4 | | 25-34 | .. | 361.9 | 333.0 | 249.1 | 6.7 | | 35-44 | .. | 302.4 | 546.8 | 128.2 | 4.6 | | 45-49 | .. | 148.1 | 380.3 | 21.1 | 2.7 | | 50-54 | .. | 116.9 | 404.4 | 6.6 | 3.0 | | 55-59 | .. | 89.4 | 446.6 | 2.0 | 3.8 | | 60-64 | .. | 21.3 | 306.3 | 0.2 | 115.8 | Table 2.2: Number on key out-of-work benefits by ethnicity, Great Britain, thousands, November 2011\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Ethnicity | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (UK seasonally adjusted) | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (GB not seasonally adjusted) | Employment and Support Allowance and Incapacity Benefits \\textsuperscript{5,7} | Lone Parents on Income Support \\textsuperscript{5} | Other (Income Support, others and Pension Credit) \\textsuperscript{5,6} | |------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------| | White: British | .. | 1107.9 | .. | 436.6 | .. | | White: Irish | .. | 8.8 | .. | 3.4 | .. | | White: Other white | .. | 41.5 | .. | 10.0 | .. | | Mixed: White & Black Caribbean | .. | 13.9 | .. | 7.2 | .. | | Mixed: White & Black African | .. | 4.0 | .. | 1.8 | .. | | Mixed: White & Asian | .. | 3.2 | .. | 1.1 | .. | | Mixed: Other Mixed | .. | 8.5 | .. | 3.0 | .. | | Asian or Asian British: Indian | .. | 24.0 | .. | 3.8 | .. | | Asian or Asian British: Pakistani | .. | 34.8 | .. | 11.6 | .. | | Asian or Asian British: Bangladeshi | .. | 15.2 | .. | 4.1 | .. | | Asian or Asian British: Other Asian | .. | 12.3 | .. | 3.1 | .. | | Black or Black British: Black Caribbean | .. | 45.4 | .. | 15.5 | .. | | Black or Black British: Black African | .. | 46.0 | .. | 25.0 | .. | | Black or Black British: | .. | 11.1 | .. | 4.1 | .. | | Ethnicity | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (UK seasonally adjusted) | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (GB not seasonally adjusted) | Employment and Support Allowance and Incapacity Benefits | Lone Parents on Income Support | Other (Income Support, others and Pension Credit) | |-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| | Other Black | | | | | | | Chinese or Other | .. | 3.0 | .. | 1.2 | .. | | Ethnic Group: Chinese | | | | | | | Chinese or Other | .. | 27.4 | .. | 10.1 | .. | | Ethnic Group: Other | | | | | | | Ethnic Group | Prefer not to say | 69.6 | .. | 23.5 | .. | | | Missing/old values/no personal contact | 19.5 | .. | 16.6 | .. | Table 2.3: Number on key out-of-work benefits by gender, United Kingdom, thousands, November 2011
| Gender | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (UK seasonally adjusted) | Jobseeker's Allowance (claimant count) (GB not seasonally adjusted) | Employment and Support Allowance and Incapacity Benefits | Lone Parents on Income Support | Other (Income Support others and Pension Credit) | |--------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| | Male | 1068.2 | 997.8 | 1440.6 | 16.3 | 133.0 | | Female | 527.8 | 501.6 | 1135.0 | 565.3 | 41.9 |
All data sourced from: DWP Administrative Data; Columns 1 and 2 from the Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) Claimant Count.
Definitions and conventions: "-" Nil or negligible ".." Not available. Caseload figures are rounded to the nearest hundred. Some additional disclosure control has also been applied. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
State pension age: The age at which women reach state pension age is gradually increasing from 60 to 65 between April 2010 and April 2016 to November 2018. From December 2018, the state pension age for both men and women will start to increase to reach 66 years old in October 2020. This will introduce a small increase to the number of working-age benefit recipients and a small reduction to the number of pension-age recipients. For more information see [http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/espa.pdf](http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/espa.pdf).
Notes:
1. This table includes the key out-of-work client group categories, with the exception of carers who are not subject to activation policies in the same way as other groups.
2. Tables present just one JSA series. The United Kingdom (UK) seasonally adjusted series is not broken down by age or ethnicity, but is available by gender. The JSA series in the second column covers Great Britain (GB) and is not seasonally adjusted. This series is presented as it allows comparisons with the other key out-of-work benefits published by DWP which also cover GB and are not seasonally adjusted. GB JSA totals for ethnicity and age are lower than they are for gender, as gender is available on the 1 per cent of clerical cases but ethnicity and age are not.
3. UK figures (seasonally adjusted) published by the ONS. This series is the most reliable and up-to-date source for claimant unemployment.
4. GB figures (not seasonally adjusted) published by the Office for National Statistics. This series is the most reliable and up-to-date source for claimant unemployment.
5. GB figures (not seasonally adjusted). Published by DWP as part of the 100 per cent working-age client group analysis. A consistent series for the UK as a whole is not readily available.
6. Excludes claimants in receipt of Income Support and Carers Allowance.
7. The "Incapacity Benefits group" includes Employment and Support Allowance (ESA). ESA replaced Incapacity Benefit and Income Support paid on the grounds of incapacity for new claims from 27 October 2008.
8. Proportion of children living in workless households
What does this tell us?
This indicator looks at the proportion of children living in workless households in the UK. A workless household is a household that includes at least one person aged 16 to 64 where no-one aged 16 or over is in employment. This indicator reflects the Department's core aims around employment and preventing worklessness.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, an improvement would be demonstrated by a fall in the indicator. Such a change would imply a rise in the proportion of children living in a household with at least one working adult. However other factors, for example, changes in household types over time may also influence estimates.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further information is available on the Office of National Statistics website. Table 3.1: Percentage of children in each household economic activity category by age of child, October-December 2011\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Age of child | Working households | Households containing both working and workless members | Workless households | All children | |--------------|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------| | Under 1 | 54.5 | 29.5 | 16.1 | 6.2 | | 1 | 50.0 | 30.7 | 19.3 | 6.9 | | 2 | 51.4 | 31.4 | 17.2 | 6.9 | | 3 | 51.9 | 31.0 | 17.2 | 6.7 | | 4 | 50.9 | 29.6 | 19.6 | 6.7 | | 5 | 51.4 | 30.1 | 18.5 | 6.7 | | 6 | 51.8 | 29.9 | 18.3 | 6.1 | | 7 | 53.8 | 29.3 | 17.0 | 6.2 | | 8 | 52.9 | 30.8 | 16.3 | 5.8 | | 9 | 53.1 | 32.2 | 14.7 | 5.7 | | 10 | 53.2 | 32.9 | 13.9 | 6.0 | | 11 | 52.5 | 32.8 | 14.8 | 5.7 | | 12 | 53.8 | 33.0 | 13.2 | 5.9 | | 13 | 49.5 | 38.0 | 12.5 | 5.9 | | 14 | 48.6 | 39.6 | 11.7 | 6.5 | | 15 | 48.5 | 38.4 | 13.1 | 6.0 | | All | 51.7 | 32.4 | 15.8 | 100.0 |
Table 3.2: Percentage of children in each household economic activity category by gender of child, October-December 2011\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Gender of child | Working households | Households containing both working and workless members | Workless households | All children | |-----------------|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------| | Male | 51.1 | 32.5 | 16.4 | 51.2 | | Female | 52.3 | 32.3 | 15.5 | 48.8 | | All | 51.7 | 32.4 | 15.9 | 100.0 | Table 3.3: Percentage of children in each household economic activity category by ethnic origin of child, October-December 2011\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Ethnic origin of child | Combined economic activity status of household | | |------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---| | | Working households | Households containing both working and workless members | Workless households | All children | | White | 56.3 | 29.0 | 14.7 | 82.3 | | Mixed | 46.4 | 30.8 | 22.7 | 3.8 | | Asian or Asian British | 24.4 | 60.9 | 14.6 | 7.8 | | Black or Black British | 30.1 | 34.7 | 35.3 | 4.0 | | Chinese or other ethnic group | 29.9 | 46.7 | 23.4 | 2.0 | | All \\textsuperscript{3} | 51.7 | 32.4 | 15.9 | 100.0 |
All data sourced from: Labour Force Survey household datasets.
Notes:
1. Children refers to children under 16.
2. Households including at least one person aged 16 to 64.
3. Total includes children with unknown ethnic origin.
4. Young people not in employment or full-time education
What does this tell us?
This indicator shows the percentage of young people that are not in employment or full-time education. It is measured by dividing the number of 18-24 year olds who are not in work or full-time education by the total number of 18-24 year olds. The indicator will measure the Department's success in improving the percentage of young people engaged in a positive activity such as employment, education or training. It recognises the importance of raising participation in education and improving labour market outcomes for young people not in full-time education.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, a decrease in the indicator will demonstrate an improvement in the labour market position of young people. However, economic conditions will also need to be taken into account.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further information about the Department's business plan transparency measures is available here.
Table 4.1: Percentage of young people not in full-time education who are workless by disability, UK, Quarter 1 2012 (January 2012-March 2012)(^1,2)
| Disability status | Percentages | |-------------------|-------------| | Disabled | 57.6 | | Non-disabled | 30.1 | | All | 33.0 |
Table 4.2: Percentage of young people not in full-time education who are workless by ethnicity, UK, quarterly average Quarter 1 2010 to Quarter 4 2010 (January 2010-December 2010)(^1,3,4)
| Ethnic group of individual | Percentages | |----------------------------|-------------| | White | 30.8 | | Mixed | 43.5 | | Asian or Asian British | 48.3 | | Black or Black British | 50.1 | | Chinese or other ethnic group | 53.8 | | All | 32.5 | Table 4.3: Percentage of young people not in full-time education who are workless by gender, UK, Quarter 1 2012 (January 2012-March 2012)
| Gender | Percentages | |--------|-------------| | Male | 31.4 | | Female | 34.7 | | All | 33.0 |
All data sourced from: Labour Force Survey (LFS).
Notes:
1. This data is fully comparable with the overall measure for young people not in employment or full-time education using the ONS seasonally adjusted data.
2. As with the overall measure for young people not in employment or full-time education, this measure uses LFS data. However, unlike the overall measure, this data is not seasonally adjusted and only released quarterly. Therefore it is not fully comparable with the overall measure.
3. Disability includes those who are disabled under the Equality Act definition, those who are work-limiting disabled only, and those who are both. It covers the individual rather than the household.
4. Data for young people not in full-time education and who are workless split by ethnicity is currently not available. Therefore, the most recent reliable figures are the same as those reported in the Equality Information 2011 report.
5. Gap between the employment rates for disabled people and the overall population
What does this tell us?
This indicator is measured by comparing the seasonally unadjusted employment rate for disabled people with the unadjusted working-age employment rate for Great Britain. This uses the ONS Headline Rate definition of employment which is for people aged between 16 and 64.
These data allow the Department to monitor progress towards employment equality for disabled people. It allows the public to assess how well the Department is performing against its aim of promoting high levels of employment by helping people move into work.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally a decrease in the indicator will demonstrate that an improvement has been achieved. However, economic conditions will also need to be taken into account. For example, recent research indicates that employment prospects for disabled people are less sensitive to economic conditions than the overall population. This may mean that as the economy improves and overall rates increase, the gap between the disabled and the overall employment rates will increase, which would represent a negative outcome for this indicator.
Links to other information that you may find useful
A full description of indicators towards disability equality by 2025 is available on the Independent Living and Office for Disability Issues website.
______________________________________________________________________
2 An example of this research can be found online. Table 5.1: Gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population by age, Great Britain, Quarter 1 2012 (January 2012-March 2012)(^1)
| Age | Gap (percentage points) | |-------|-------------------------| | 16-17 | 6.7 | | 18-24 | 16.6 | | 25-34 | 26.3 | | 35-44 | 26.9 | | 45-54 | 26.6 | | 55+ | 20.9 |
Table 5.2: Gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population by ethnicity, Great Britain, Quarter 2 2011 to Quarter 1 2012 (April 2011-March 2012)(^3,6)
| Ethnicity | Gap (percentage points) | |-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------| | White | 25.1 | | Mixed / Multiple ethnic groups | 15.7 | | Indian | 24.5 | | Pakistani | 20.1 | | Bangladeshi | 18.6 | | Chinese | * | | Any other Asian background | 20.2 | | Black / African / Caribbean / Black British | 18.9 | | Other ethnic group | 21.0 |
Table 5.3: Gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population by gender, Great Britain, Quarter 1 2012 (January 2012-March 2012)
| Gender | Gap (percentage points) | |--------|-------------------------| | Male | 26.4 | | Female | 21.3 | Table 5.4: Gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population by religion, Great Britain, Quarter 2 2011 to Quarter 1 2012 (April 2011-March 2012)\\textsuperscript{3,7}
| Religion | Gap (percentage points) | |----------------|-------------------------| | Christian | 24.0 | | Buddhist | 24.7 | | Hindu | 22.5 | | Jewish | 21.4 | | Muslim * | | | Sikh | 20.3 | | Any other religion | 21.7 | | No religion at all | 27.0 |
All data sourced from: Labour Force Survey.
Notes:
1. Care should be taken when comparing Table 5.1 with last years report due to an error in estimates for the gap between employment rates for disabled people and the overall population by age in Jan-Mar 2011. Comparisons should be made with the correct version which is available here.
2. Data are rounded to the nearest 0.1 percentage point.
3. - denotes sample size is too small to reliably quote estimates.
4. Data are subject to sampling variation and is not seasonally adjusted.
5. Accuracy of data is limited by small sample sizes.
6. Ethnicity is self-reported.
7. Religion or belief is self-reported.
8. Average age people stop working
What does this tell us?
This indicator is measured using the ‘average age of withdrawal from the labour market-static indicator’. High level figures which are not broken down for equality groups are published by ONS annually in the Pension Trends series.
This indicator measures the ages at which people withdraw from the labour market and become inactive; data are not seasonally adjusted. Due to the nature of the indicator, year on year changes tend to be small. The focus should not be on the short-term changes but on the long-term trend.
Extending working life is an important part of the response to demographic ageing and ensuring pensions sustainability. Monitoring changes in average age of withdrawal will provide an indication of how the Department’s policies are encouraging longer working.
How will an improvement be shown?
An increase in the age of withdrawal from the labour market would constitute a success. There may be a number of contributing factors including: a continuation of long-term trends; changing attitudes around working longer; and the effect of state pension age changes.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further information on the labour market and retirement is available in the ONS report on Pension Trends.
______________________________________________________________________
3 The Equalities Information 2011 report contained a breakdown for disabled people versus non-disabled people (Table 6.1). For the 2012 report we have dropped this table. Our investigations into the data quality have identified that the methodology used does not support a breakdown by disability status as the prevalence of disability in the population increases with age, and an individual becoming disabled is associated with withdrawal from the labour market, meaning that the calculation is biased. A more detailed note explaining the calculation of the “static” exit age indicator is available in the Average Age of Withdrawal from the Labour Market report. Table 6.1: Average age of withdrawal from the labour market by ethnicity and gender, Great Britain, Quarter 2 2011 to Quarter 1 2012 (April 2011-March 2012)(^3,4)
| Ethnic group of individual | Men | Women | |-------------------------------------|------|-------| | White | 64.5 | 62.6 | | Mixed | 60.7 | 58.0 | | Asian or Asian British | 64.3 | 59.9 | | Black or Black British | 61.2 | 61.9 | | White and Asian | 62.3 | 59.4 |
Table 6.2: Average age of withdrawal from the labour market by gender, Great Britain, Quarter 1 2011 (January-March 2012)
| Age of withdrawal from labour market | Men | Women | |--------------------------------------|------|-------| | Age | 64.6 | 62.4 |
Table 6.3: Average age of withdrawal from the labour market by gender and religion or belief, Great Britain, Quarter 2 2011 to Quarter 1 2012 (April 2011-March 2012)(^5,6,7)
| Religion | Men | Women | |------------------------|------|-------| | Christian | 64.4 | 62.4 | | Buddhist | 62.1 | 59.6 | | Hindu | 64.1 | 59.2 | | Jewish | 63.4 | 62.4 | | Muslim | 63.4 | 56.9 | | Sikh | 61.0 | 58.3 | | Any other religion | 63.0 | 61.3 | | No religion | 64.6 | 63.1 |
All data sourced from: Labour Force Survey (LFS).
Notes:
1. Data are rounded to the nearest 0.1 year.
2. Data are subject to sampling variation and is not seasonally adjusted.
3. Ethnicity is self-reported.
4. Changes to the collection of data on ethnicity in the LFS mean that the latest data may not be comparable with previous years.
5. Data covers Great Britain only.
6. Religion or belief is self-reported.
7. Accuracy of data is limited by small sample. Poverty and social mobility related impact indicators
8. Rate of disability poverty
What does this tell us?
This indicator measures the percentage of individuals in families containing someone who is disabled with incomes below 60 per cent of equivalised median income(^4), Before Housing Costs. Tackling disability poverty is a priority as families with a disabled member have a higher rate of relative low-income poverty than average. Using 60 per cent of equivalised median income as a poverty threshold is a historical and international benchmark. These data do not include care home residents due to the sample for the survey used consisting of the private household population. No adjustment is made to disposable household income to take into account any additional costs that may be incurred due to the illness or disability in question, and disability benefits have been included in the equivalised household income used. This means that the position in the income distribution of these groups, as shown here, may have some upward bias. Results based on incomes excluding disability benefits are available on request.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally a decrease in the indicator will demonstrate that an improvement has been achieved. However, economic conditions also need to be taken into account.
Links to other information that you may find useful
For further information, a full description of indicators towards disability equality by 2025 can be found on the Independent Living and Office for Disability Issues website. Further analysis of Households Below Average Income (HBAI) data are shown in the annual HBAI publication.
(^4) In order to allow comparisons of living standards between different household types, income is adjusted to take into account variations in the size and composition of the household in a process known as equivalisation. This adjustment reflects the common sense notion that a household of several people requires a higher income than a single person in order for both households to have an equivalent standard of living. Table 7.1: Poverty rate for families by presence of disabled member and age, 2010/11, United Kingdom\\textsuperscript{1,2,4,5,6}
| Group | Age | Poverty rate (%) | |------------------------|----------------|------------------| | | Families with a disabled member | Families with no disabled member | | Children | 0-4 | 25 | 17 | | | 5-10 | 19 | 14 | | | 11-15 | 22 | 16 | | | 16-19 dependent children | 23 | 17 | | Working-age adults | 16-19 adults | 33 | 22 | | | 20-24 | 24 | 17 | | | 25-29 | 26 | 13 | | | 30-34 | 23 | 11 | | | 35-39 | 20 | 12 | | | 40-44 | 20 | 12 | | | 45-49 | 21 | 11 | | | 50-54 | 20 | 10 | | | 55-59 | 23 | 13 | | | 60-64 males only | 22 | 15 | | Pensioners | 60-64 females only | 16 | 14 | | | 65-69 | 14 | 14 | | | 70-74 | 14 | 17 | | | 75-79 | 18 | 24 | | | 80-84 | 18 | 31 | | | 85+ | 22 | 31 |
Table 7.2: Poverty rate for families by presence of disabled member, 2010/11, United Kingdom\\textsuperscript{1,2,4,5,6}
| Poverty rate (%) | |------------------| | Families with a disabled member | Families with no disabled member | | Poverty rate | 20 | 15 | Table 7.3: Poverty rate for families by presence of disabled member and ethnicity, 2008/09-2010/11, United Kingdom\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,4,5,6}
| Ethnic group of head (3-year average) | Poverty rate (%) | Families with a disabled member | Families with no disabled member | |--------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------| | White | 20 | 14 | | Mixed | 28 | 19 | | Asian or Asian British | 40 | 29 | | Indian | 31 | 21 | | Pakistani and Bangladeshi | 52 | 44 | | Black or Black British | 32 | 26 | | Black Caribbean | 26 | 22 | | Black Non-Caribbean | 38 | 29 | | Chinese or other ethnic group | 36 | 24 |
Table 7.4: Poverty rate for families by presence of disabled members and gender, 2010/11, United Kingdom\\textsuperscript{1,2,4,5,6}
| Poverty rate (%) | Families with a disabled member | Families with no disabled member | |------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------| | Male child | 20 | 15 | | Female child | 24 | 17 | | Male working-age adult | 22 | 14 | | Female working-age adult | 21 | 13 | | Male pensioner | 15 | 15 | | Female pensioner | 17 | 20 |
All data sourced from: Households Below Average Income (HBAI) 2010/11.
Notes:
1. This indicator is measured using HBAI statistics sourced from the Family Resources Survey. The indicator measures the percentage of individuals in families containing someone who is disabled with household income below 60 per cent of contemporary equivalised median income, Before Housing Costs. Data are annual with approximately a 12 month time lag after the end of the survey period.
2. All estimates are based on survey data and are therefore subject to uncertainty. Small differences should be treated with caution as these will be affected by sampling error and variability in non-response.
3. Estimates showing ethnic breakdowns are presented as three-year averages because of small sample sizes. However, the figures must still be treated with some caution, as the sample sizes are still small for certain ethnic minority groups.
4. Percentages of individuals in low-income households have been rounded to the nearest percentage point.
5. Disability is defined as having any long-standing illness, disability or impairment that leads to a substantial difficulty with one or more areas of the individual's life. Everyone classified as disabled under this definition would also be classified as disabled under the Equality Act 2010. However, some individuals classified as disabled under the Equality Act 2010 would not be captured by this definition.
6. Results cover the financial year 2010/11, i.e. April 2010 to March 2011.
7. Rate of pensioner poverty
What does this tell us?
The indicator measures the percentage of pensioners in households with incomes below 60 per cent of equivalised median income, after housing costs.
The Government wants all pensioners to have a decent and secure income in retirement. Key strategies include the restoration of the earnings link for the basic State Pension and the “triple guarantee” that the basic State Pension will increase by the highest of earnings growth, price increases or 2.5 per cent. In addition, the Government is protecting key benefits for older people, including Winter Fuel Payments, free prescriptions, and free TV licences for those aged 75 and over. Automatic enrolment will be introduced into workplace pensions from 2012 to reinvigorate private pension savings, and it was announced in the Budget 2012 that the Government will reform the State Pensions system to introduce a single tier pension for future pensioners, which will lead to a simpler and fairer system that reduces the need for means testing and supports saving.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, a decrease in this indicator will demonstrate that an improvement has been achieved, but external factors such as wider economic conditions also need to be taken into account.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further analysis of Households Below Average Income (HBAI) data are shown in the annual HBAI publication.
Table 8.1: Poverty rate for pensioners by age, UK, 2010/11(^1,2,3,7)
| Age | Poverty rate (percentage of pensioners in low income households) | |-------|---------------------------------------------------------------| | 60-64 | 14 | | 65-69 | 12 | | 70-74 | 13 | | 75-79 | 14 | | 80-84 | 16 | | 85+ | 18 | Table 8.2: Poverty rate for pensioners by disability, UK, 2010/11\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,4,5,7}
| Disability status | Poverty rate (percentage of pensioners in low income households) | |--------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| | Those living in families where no-one is disabled | 14 | | Those living in families where someone is disabled | 14 |
Table 8.3: Poverty rate for pensioners by ethnic group of head of household, UK, 2008/09-2010/11\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,6,7}
| Ethnic group of head (3-year average) | Poverty rate (percentage of pensioners in low income households) | |--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| | White | 15 | | Mixed | .. | | Asian or Asian British | 32 | | Indian | 31 | | Pakistani and Bangladeshi | 38 | | Black or Black British | 24 | | Black Caribbean | 22 | | Black Non-Caribbean | .. | | Chinese or other ethnic group | 31 |
Table 8.4: Poverty rate for pensioners by gender, UK, 2010/11\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,7}
| Gender | Poverty rate (percentage of pensioners in low income households) | |--------|------------------------------------------------------------------| | Male | 13 | | Female | 15 |
All data sourced from: Households Below Average Income (HBAI) 2010/11.
Notes:
1. This indicator is measured using HBAI statistics sourced from the Family Resources Survey. The indicator measures the percentage of pensioners with incomes below 60 per cent of contemporary equivalised median income, after housing costs. Data are annual with approximately a 12 month time lag after the end of the survey period.
2. All estimates are based on survey data and are therefore subject to uncertainty. Small differences should be treated with caution as these will be affected by sampling error and variability in non-response. Estimates showing ethnic breakdowns are presented as three-year averages because of small sample sizes. However, the figures must still be treated with some caution, as the sample sizes are still small for certain ethnic minority groups.
3. Percentages of individuals in low-income households have been rounded to the nearest percentage point.
4. Disability is defined as having any long-standing illness, disability or impairment that leads to a substantial difficulty with one or more areas of the individual's life. Everyone classified as disabled under this definition would also be classified as disabled under the Equality Act 2010. However, some individuals classified as disabled under the Equality Act 2010 would not be captured by this definition.
5. No adjustment is made to disposable household income to take into account any additional costs that may be incurred due to the illness or disability in question, and disability benefits have been included in the equivalised household income used. This means that the position in the income distribution of these groups, as shown here, may be somewhat upwardly biased. Results based on incomes excluding disability benefits are available on request.
6. ‘.’ means data are not available due to small sample size.
7. Results cover the financial year 2010/11, i.e. April 2010 to March 2011.
8. Social mobility in adulthood
What does this tell us?
This indicator measures the percentage of people aged 25-30 that started out in the bottom quintile of the earnings distribution that have moved up the distribution by twenty or more percentiles in a ten-year period.
The Social Mobility Strategy committed DWP to developing an indicator of wage progression, whilst acknowledging that other indicators of labour market success will also form part of a wider suite of indicators of social mobility in adulthood.
How will an improvement be shown?
An increase in the percentage of the group that progressed in the labour market will demonstrate an improvement in social mobility. However, the percentage with no data available will also need to be taken into account.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further information on this indicator is available in the Proportion of lowest earners experiencing wage progression report.
Additional indicators of social mobility in adulthood are available from the Cabinet Office website.
Table 9.1: Likelihood of progression for people aged 25-30 by gender from the bottom earnings quintile, Great Britain, 2002-2011
| Of which (%) | All (%) | Male | Female | |--------------|---------|------|--------| | Progressed | 12 | 12 | 12 | | Did not progress | 41 | 38 | 43 | | No data available | 47 | 50 | 45 | | Total | 100 | 100 | 100 |
All data sourced from: DWP analysis of the Office for National Statistics Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE).
Notes:
1. This indicator is measured using the ASHE. The earnings variable of interest is gross hourly earnings excluding overtime where earnings are not affected by absence. For individuals with more than one job (about 2 per cent of employees in the sample) only their ‘main job’ is included in the analysis; as defined by the job with the greatest gross weekly pay and then the greatest total hours.
2. ASHE does not contain information on disability; gender reassignment; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sexual orientation or marriage and civil partnership.
3. All estimates are based on survey data and are therefore subject to uncertainty.
4. This indicator uses unweighted data as the weighting variables within the dataset are intended for cross-sectional rather than longitudinal analysis, consistent with other longitudinal ASHE outputs within DWP. This may bias estimates as data are not necessarily representative of the employee population (calibrated to the Labour Force Survey) or adjusted for differences in response rates across firms.
5. Progression is defined by a move up the earnings distribution by 20 or more percentiles between 2002 and 2011.
6. Did not experience progression is defined by not increasing along the earnings distribution by 20 or more percentiles.
7. No data available to judge progression (in the bottom quintile in 2002 but no earnings recorded in 2011). Pensions-related impact indicators
8. Number of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer
What does this tell us?
This indicator measures the number of employee jobs (including those affected by absence) where the individual is aged at least 22 years of age, under state pension age and earning above the earnings threshold for automatic enrolment who are participating in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer. The indicator excludes the self-employed and it should be noted that an individual may have more than one job.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, an improvement in the indicator will be demonstrated if an increase has been achieved.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Further information on this indicator is available online.
Table 10.1: Numbers of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer by age, 2011, Great Britain
| Age | Number (millions) | |-----------|-------------------| | 22-24 | 0.3 | | 25-29 | 1.0 | | 30-34 | 1.3 | | 35-39 | 1.5 | | 40-44 | 1.8 | | 45-49 | 1.9 | | 50-54 | 1.6 | | 55-59 | 1.2 | | 60-64 males only | 0.4 | | Total | 11.0 | Table 10.2: Numbers of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer by gender, 2011, Great Britain\\textsuperscript{1,2,3}
| Gender | Number (millions) | |--------|------------------| | Male | 5.8 | | Female | 5.2 | | Total | 11.0 |
All data sourced from: DWP analysis of the Office of National Statistics Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE).
Notes:
1. This indicator is measured using the ASHE and includes all employee jobs (including those affected by absence) with an employer-sponsored pension where the individual is aged at least 22 and less than state pension age (up to 2011/12 this was 65 for men and 60 for women) and where annual gross earnings is above the earnings threshold of £8,105 in 2012/13 earnings terms.
2. All estimates are based on survey data and are therefore subject to uncertainty.
3. Numbers of employee jobs have been rounded to the nearest 0.1 million. Totals may not sum due to rounding. Operational working of the Department related impact indicators
4. Monetary value of fraud and error in the benefit system
What does this tell us?
This is the primary Departmental indicator for levels of fraud and error in the benefit system. The Fraud and Error National Statistics published for this indicator include global estimates for fraud and error in the benefit system. In addition there are more detailed estimates for Income Support, Jobseeker’s Allowance, Pension Credit and Housing Benefit, and for types of error. This indicator is important for Departmental assurance on the effect of anti-fraud and error activity across the businesses.
No equality information is currently available for this indicator. The Department plans to include equality information for this Impact Indicator in the 2011/12 Fraud and Error National Statistics, due to be published in Autumn 2012.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, a decrease in the indicator will demonstrate if an improvement has been achieved but economic conditions and overall expenditure will also need to be taken into account.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Reports on the monetary value of fraud and error in the benefits system are available online. 12. Public opinion of DWP service levels
What does this tell us?
This measure shows the satisfaction levels of people who have had meaningful contact with the Department as a whole in the previous six months. This includes a score for overall satisfaction, with sub-indicator scores for satisfaction against four key drivers of customer satisfaction - On Time, Right Treatment, Right Result, and Easy Access.
The indicator demonstrates the Department’s service to the public, allowing performance to be reviewed and service improvements to be made accordingly.
For this report we have included results from the previous separate Jobcentre Plus and Pension, Disability and Carers Service (PDCS) surveys to give some information on public opinions of DWP Service Levels. The 2011 Jobcentre Plus survey found that 88 per cent of Jobcentre Plus claimants were satisfied overall with the service they received with 10 per cent reporting dissatisfaction. The 2010/2011 PDCS survey found that 91 per cent of customers were satisfied overall with 8 per cent reporting dissatisfaction.
How will an improvement be shown?
Generally, a higher score will indicate greater customer satisfaction. This will be a baseline measure for the Department. Once the baseline is set, good performance can be agreed and reflected in maintaining or improving the level of satisfaction, depending on the amount of change for the Department at the time.
Links to other information that you may find useful
Information is available online for the impact indicator, the Jobcentre Plus Customer Survey 2011 and the PDCS annual report of quarterly satisfaction 2010-2011. Table 12.1: Customer's reported overall satisfaction with Jobcentre Plus by age(^{1,5})
| Group | Age | Customer's reported satisfaction | Percentage of customers who are either 'fairly' or 'very' satisfied | Percentage of customers who are either 'fairly' or 'very' dissatisfied | |----------------|------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | 16-24 | 92 | 8 | 8 | | | 25-34 | 90 | 9 | 9 | | | 35-49 | 87 | 12 | 12 | | | 50+ | 86 | 12 | 12 |
There is a statistically significant difference in level of satisfaction between 16-24 year olds and 50+. No other two-way comparisons between rows are statistically significant.
Data sourced from: DWP Research Report 775 'Jobcentre Plus Customer Satisfaction Survey'.
Table 12.2: Customer's reported overall satisfaction with Pension, Disability and Carers Service by age(^{2,3,5})
| Group | Age | Customer's reported satisfaction | Percentage of customers who are either 'fairly' or 'very' satisfied | Percentage of customers who are either 'fairly' or 'very' dissatisfied | |----------------|------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | 16-24 | 92 | 8 | 8 | | | 25-44 | 86 | 13 | 13 | | | 45-59 | 84 | 14 | 14 | | | 60-64 | 87 | 12 | 12 | | Pensioners | 60-65 | 94 | 5 | 5 | | | 66-74 | 92 | 6 | 6 | | | 75+ | 93 | 5 | 5 |
There is a statistically significantly different in satisfaction levels between 16-24 and 45-59 year olds. No other two-way comparisons between rows are statistically significant.
Data sourced from: DWP Research Report 789 'Pension, Disability and Carers Service Annual Report Quarterly Satisfaction Monitor'.
Page 40 Table 12.3: Customer's reported overall satisfaction with Jobcentre Plus by disability\\textsuperscript{1,5}
| Group | Long-standing illness or disability that limited daily activities or work | Customer's reported satisfaction | Percentage of customer's who are either 'fairly' or 'very' satisfied | Percentage of customer's who are either 'fairly' or 'very' dissatisfied | |---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | Yes | 84 | 14 | | | No | 91 | 8 |
There is a statistically significant difference in satisfaction levels between those who have a long standing illness, health problem or disability and those who do not.
Data sourced from: DWP Research Report 775 'Jobcentre Plus Customer Satisfaction Survey'.
Table 12.4: Customer's reported overall satisfaction with Pension, Disability and Carers Service by disability\\textsuperscript{2,3,4,5}
| Group | Long-standing illness or disability that limited daily activities or work | Customer's reported satisfaction | Percentage of customer's who are either 'fairly' or 'very' satisfied | Percentage of customer's who are either 'fairly' or 'very' dissatisfied | |---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | Yes | 81 | 18 | | | No | 91 | 7 | | Pensioners | Yes | 90 | 8 | | | No | 96 | 4 |
There is a statistically significant difference between those with disability and those without with regards to levels of satisfaction. This is the case for both working age adults and pensioners.
Data sourced from: DWP Research Report 789 'Pension, Disability and Carers Service Annual Report Quarterly Satisfaction Monitor'. Table 12.5: Customer’s reported overall satisfaction with Jobcentre Plus by ethnicity\\textsuperscript{1,5}
| Group | Ethnicity | Customer’s reported satisfaction | Percentage of customer’s who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied | Percentage of customer’s who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied | |----------------|-----------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | White | 88 | 10 | | | Asian | 94 | 2 | | | Black | 90 | 10 | | | Mixed/Other | 77 | 23 |
There is no statistically significant difference in levels of satisfaction by ethnicity.
Data sourced from: DWP Research Report 775 ‘Jobcentre Plus Customer Satisfaction Survey’.
Table 12.6: Customer’s reported overall satisfaction with Pension, Disability and Carers Service by ethnicity\\textsuperscript{2,3,5}
| Group | Ethnicity | Customer’s reported satisfaction | Percentage of customer’s who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied | Percentage of customer’s who are either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied | |----------------|-----------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | White | 86 | 13 | | | Asian | 87 | 13 | | | Black | 82 | 18 | | | Mixed/Other | 84 | 15 | | Pensioners | White | 93 | 5 | | | Asian | 96 | 4 | | | Black | 91 | 7 | | | Mixed/Other | 95 | 5 |
There is no statistically significant difference in levels of satisfaction by ethnicity.
Data sourced from: DWP Research Report 789 ‘Pension, Disability and Carers Service Annual Report Quarterly Satisfaction Monitor’. Table 12.7: Customer's reported overall satisfaction with Jobcentre Plus by gender(^1,5)
| Group | Gender | Customer's reported satisfaction | Percentage of customer's who are either 'fairly' or 'very' satisfied | Percentage of customer's who are either 'fairly' or 'very' dissatisfied | |----------------|--------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | Male | 84 | 14 | | | Female | 91 | 8 |
There is a statistically significant difference in satisfaction levels between males and females.
Data sourced from: DWP Research Report 775 'Jobcentre Plus Customer Satisfaction Survey'.
Table 12.8: Customer's reported overall satisfaction with Pension, Disability and Carers Service by gender(^2,3,5)
| Group | Gender | Customer's reported satisfaction | Percentage of customer's who are either 'fairly' or 'very' satisfied | Percentage of customer's who are either 'fairly' or 'very' dissatisfied | |----------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | Working-age adults | Male (Age 16-64) | 85 | 14 | | | Female (Age 16-59) | 86 | 13 | | Pensioners | Male (Age 65+) | 93 | 5 | | | Female (Age 60+) | 93 | 6 |
No statistically significant differences in level of satisfaction between males and females.
Data sourced from: DWP Research Report 789 'Pension, Disability and Carers Service Annual Report Quarterly Satisfaction Monitor'.
Notes:
1. The 2011 Jobcentre Plus Customer Satisfaction survey was commissioned to measure overall level of satisfaction and assess differences across different customer groups. 2,803 interviews were completed between January and March 2011 with findings representative of Income Support, Incapacity Benefit, Employment and Support Allowance and Jobseeker’s Allowance customers. The questionnaire focused on customers who had both claimed/received benefit and had had contact with JCP within the last six months.
2. The 2010/2011 Pension, Disability and Carers Service Satisfaction survey was commissioned to measure overall level of satisfaction and assess differences across different customer groups. 5,002 interviews were completed through two waves of fieldwork with findings representative of Attendance Allowance, Carers Allowance, Disability Living Allowance, Pension Credit and State pension customers. The questionnaire focused on customers who had both claimed/received benefit or had contacted to report a change in circumstances with Pension, Disability and Carers Service in the three - six months previous to each wave.
3. The Pension, Disability and Carers Service also serves working-age customers, those receiving Disability Living Allowance or Carers Allowance may also be customers of Jobcentre Plus.
4. Disability Living Allowance and Attendance Allowance customers of the Pension, Disability and Carers Service have a disability in order to meet the qualifying criteria however they do not always consider that they have a disability that limits them and consequently do not report it.
5. Tests for statistical significance used the Chi-squared approach and were significant at the 95 per cent confidence level.
6. Additional customer data
Employment gap information
What does this tell us?
The employment rate gap compares the overall employment rate in Great Britain for 16 to 64 year olds with the employment rate for 16 to 64 year olds with various protected characteristics. A positive employment rate gap means that the overall Great Britain employment rate is higher than the employment rate for the group with a particular protected characteristic.
How will an improvement be shown?
A reduction in the employment gap would generally show an improvement. However, economic conditions will also need to be taken into account.
Table 13.1: Employment gaps for various protected characteristics, Quarter 1 2012 (January - March 2012)
| Disadvantaged group | Employment rate gap (percentage points) | |--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | Female | 4.9 | | Disabled People | 24.0 | | Ethnic Minorities | 11.7 | | Young People (aged 18 to 24) | 15.0 | | Older Workers (aged 50 to 64) | 4.8 |
Data sourced from: Labour Force Survey.
Notes:
1. Data are rounded to the nearest 0.1 percentage point.
2. Data are subject to sampling variation and is not seasonally adjusted.
3. Data covers GB only, not UK. Links to additional information:
DWP Equality Impact Assessments
National and Official Statistics products - the Department produces a number of National and Official Statistics products.
Employment and Support Allowance - Work Capability Assessment and Sanctions
Income Related Benefits Estimate of Take-Up - includes details on age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Household’s Below Average Income series - includes details on age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Low-Income Dynamics - includes details on age and gender.
Pensioners Incomes Series - includes details on age, ethnicity and gender.
Family Resources Survey - includes details on age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Access to Work - includes details about the programme that helps fund reasonable adjustments for disabled workers.
Lone parents on Jobseekers Allowance - includes details on age, gender, disability and ethnicity.
Second tier pension provision - includes details on age and gender.
DWP tabulation tool - includes a range of benefit data with details on age and gender and some splits available by disability and ethnicity.
Life Opportunities Survey - a detailed survey looking at life opportunities for disabled and non-disabled people.
Pre-Work Programme and Get Britain Working Official Statistics - includes details on age, disability and ethnicity.
Independent Living and Office for Disability Issues indicators on disability equality by 2025
Please email [email protected] if you are interested in any of these data sources or want to enquire about the feasibility of any analysis of DWP data by a protected characteristic that is not included here. Section 2: Information about our employees
14. The DWP workforce
As part of our commitment to achieving a workforce representative of the society we serve and providing equality of opportunity, we monitor representation of protected characteristics by grade across the Department.
The Civil Service grading structure indicates level of seniority within the organisation and covers a range of roles:
Senior Civil Service (SCS): Pay Band 3 Director General Pay Bands 2 and 1 Director and Deputy Director
Senior Management: Grade 6/Band G Grade 7/Band F
Managerial: SEO/Band E HEO/Band D EO/Band C
Administrative: AO/Band B AA/Band A
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show the Department's employees by grade as percentages against each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender. As at 31 March 2012 we had 99,958 employees [headcount], their declaration rate for ethnicity was 78.1 per cent and 85.2 per cent for disability. Unfortunately, at this time the levels of declaration for sexual orientation and religion or belief are too low for publication.
How will an improvement be shown?
A higher percentage under each protected characteristic will show we employ a greater proportion of people with that protected characteristic. We have set representation rate targets for staff at senior grades until 2013 for ethnicity, disability and gender. Progress towards these was previously reported in our Equality Schemes update. Some of these targets have already been met. Table 14.1: Percentage of DWP workforce by age and grade\\textsuperscript{1,2,3}
| ONS Age Range | % Band A/AA to Band C/EO | % Band D/HEO and Band E/SEO | % Band F/Grade 7 | % Band G/Grade 6 | % SCS (All) | % Not known | Total % by age | |---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------| | 16-24 | 1.9 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.7 | | 25-29 | 6.3 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 0.0 | * | 31.6 | 5.8 | | 30-34 | 8.7 | 5.4 | 10.1 | 4.1 | 2.7 | * | 8.4 | | 35-39 | 10.4 | 9.2 | 9.8 | 8.4 | 6.8 | * | 10.3 | | 40-44 | 15.0 | 16.1 | 16.4 | 16.4 | 15.5 | * | 15.1 | | 45-49 | 19.3 | 25.4 | 24.2 | 25.2 | 30.6 | * | 20.0 | | 50-54 | 17.9 | 23.3 | 22.3 | 24.8 | 22.4 | 0.0 | 18.5 | | 55-59 | 12.7 | 13.1 | 13.3 | 17.7 | 18.7 | 0.0 | 12.8 | | 60-64 | 6.3 | 4.3 | 2.3 | 3.2 | * | 0.0 | 6.0 | | 65+ | 1.5 | 0.4 | * | * | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.3 | | % Headcount by grade | 88.0 | 9.9 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 100 |
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees by age and grade over the total number of employees by grade.
2. Data as at 31 March 2012.
3. - - Level of data too low for publication. Table 14.2: Percentage of DWP workforce by grade and indicated disability\\textsuperscript{1,2,3}
| Disability | % Band A/AA to Band C/EO | % Band D/HEO and Band E/SEO | % Band F/ Grade 7 | % Band G/ Grade 6 | % SCS (All) | % Not known | Total % by age | |------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------|----------------| | 2013 Target | 6.0 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | N/A | N/A | | Disabled | 6.6 | 5.8 | 4.2 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 0.0 | 6.5 | | Non-disabled | 93.4 | 94.2 | 95.8 | 96.7 | 96.4 | * | 93.5 | | % Indicated by grade | 87.0 | 10.8 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 0.2 | * | 100 |
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees by disability and grade over the total number of employees by grade who have chosen to indicate their disability.
2. Data as at 31 March 2012.
3. - - Level of data too low for publication. Table 14.3: Percentage of DWP workforce by grade and indicated ethnicity\\textsuperscript{1,2},
| Ethnicity | Grade | % Band A/AA to Band C/EO | % Band D/HEO and Band E/SEO | % Band F/ Grade 7 | % Band G/ Grade 6 | % SCS (All) | % Not known | Total % by ethnicity | |--------------------|-------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------| | 2013 Target | N/A | 7.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.0 | N/A | N/A | N/A | | Ethnic minority | 12.0 | 7.1 | 5.8 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 0.0 | 11.4 | | | White | 88.0 | 92.9 | 94.2 | 95.5 | 96.3 | 100.0 | 88.6 | | | % Indicated by grade | 87.4 | 10.5 | 1.3 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 100 | |
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees by ethnicity and grade over the total number of employees by grade who have chosen to indicate their ethnicity.
2. Data as at 31 March 2012. Table 14.4: Percentage of DWP workforce by gender and grade\\textsuperscript{1,2}.
| Gender | % Band A/AA to Band C/EO | % Band D/HEO and Band E/SEO | % Band F/Grade 7 | % Band G/Grade 6 | % SCS (All) | % Not known | Total % by gender | |--------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------| | 2013 Target | N/A | N/A | 47.0 | 45.0 | 39.5 | N/A | N/A | | Female | 69.7 | 61.1 | 50.4 | 44.6 | 40.2 | 52.6 | 68.3 | | Male | 30.3 | 38.9 | 49.6 | 55.4 | 59.8 | 47.4 | 31.7 | | % Headcount by grade | 88.0 | 9.9 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 100 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management.
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees by gender and grade over the total number of employees by grade.
2. Data as at 31 March 2012.
3. Disciplinary procedures
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show the percentage of employees who have been subject to formal disciplinary procedures against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Table 15.1: Percentage of employees by age who were disciplined
| Age | Total percentage | |---------|------------------| | 16-24 | 5.8 | | 25-29 | 3.8 | | 30-34 | 2.8 | | 35-39 | 2.1 | | 40-44 | 2.0 | | 45-49 | 1.8 | | 50-54 | 1.7 | | 55-59 | 1.9 | | 60-64 | 2.5 | | 65+ | 2.6 | | Total | 2.2 |
Table 15.2: Percentage of employees by indicated disability who were disciplined
| Disability | Total percentage | |------------|------------------| | Disabled | 2.8 | | Non-disabled | 2.0 | | Total indicated | 2.0 |
Table 15.3: Percentage of employees by indicated ethnicity who were disciplined
| Ethnicity | Total percentage | |---------------|------------------| | Ethnic minority | 2.5 | | White | 2.0 | | Total indicated | 2.0 | Table 15.4: Percentage of employees by gender who were disciplined\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Gender | Total percentage | |--------|------------------| | Female | 1.8 | | Male | 3.1 | | Total | 2.2 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management.
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees disciplined in the period over the total number of employees who have chosen to indicate that protected characteristic.
2. Period - 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012.
3. Exits
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show the reasons why employees leave the Department against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Table 16.1: Percentage of reason for leaving by age(^{1,2,3,4,5,6})
| Age | % Dismissal | % Early exits | % Resignation | % Retirement | % Other | % of total leavers | |-------|-------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|---------|--------------------| | 16-24 | 6.0 | 0.6 | 15.4 | 0.0 | 10.9 | 8.7 | | 25-29 | 12.0 | 2.7 | 20.1 | 0.0 | 17.4 | 13.2 | | 30-34 | 12.1 | 3.3 | 13.1 | 0.0 | 11.9 | 9.4 | | 35-39 | 12.0 | 3.6 | 10.7 | * | 8.9 | 7.7 | | 40-44 | 14.0 | 6.8 | 10.8 | 0.5 | 11.1 | 9.2 | | 45-49 | 14.4 | 8.6 | 10.3 | 0.8 | 12.9 | 10.1 | | 50-54 | 12.7 | 23.1 | 7.9 | 7.8 | 11.7 | 11.9 | | 55-59 | 10.6 | 30.1 | 5.9 | 15.8 | 10.0 | 12.6 | | 60-64 | 6.0 | 17.8 | 4.7 | 52.6 | 4.6 | 13.1 | | 65+ | * | 3.4 | 1.0 | 22.3 | 0.7 | 4.1 | | Total % leavers by reason | 8.4 | 13.8 | 24.2 | 13.7 | 40.0 | 100 | Table 16.2: Percentage of reason for leaving by indicated disability\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,4,5}
| Disability | % Dismissal | % Early exits | % Resignation | % Retirement | % Other | % of total leavers | |----------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|---------|-------------------| | Disabled | 11.2 | 7.4 | 4.3 | 9.7 | 9.6 | 8.3 | | Non-disabled | 88.8 | 92.6 | 95.7 | 90.3 | 90.4 | 91.7 | | Total % leavers by reason | 10.9 | 25.6 | 18.6 | 25.4 | 19.6 | 100 |
Table 16.3: Percentage of reason for leaving by indicated ethnicity\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,4,5}
| Ethnicity | % Dismissal | % Early exits | % Resignation | % Retirement | % Other | % of total leavers | |-----------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|---------|-------------------| | Ethnic minority | 13.4 | 4.4 | 10.2 | 7.0 | 15.4 | 9.9 | | White | 86.6 | 95.6 | 89.8 | 93.0 | 84.6 | 90.1 | | Total % leavers by reason | 9.9 | 21.7 | 20.8 | 21.9 | 25.7 | 100 |
Table 16.4: Percentage of reason for leaving by gender\\textsuperscript{1,2,3,4,5}
| Gender | % Dismissal | % Early exits | % Resignation | % Retirement | % Other | % of total leavers | |--------|-------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|---------|-------------------| | Female | 53.2 | 58.8 | 62.9 | 67.4 | 54.0 | 58.6 | | Male | 46.8 | 41.2 | 37.1 | 32.6 | 46.0 | 41.4 | | Total % leavers by reason | 8.4 | 13.8 | 24.2 | 13.7 | 40.0 | 100 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management. Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of leavers who have chosen to indicate that protected characteristic and reason for leaving over the total number of employees by reason for leaving.
2. Data as at 31 March 2012.
3. Dismissal - dismissal and discharged probation.
4. Early exits - approved early retirement, voluntary early release, early retirement, early severance.
5. Other - death in service, transfer to other Government department, transfer of function, retirement at/above minimum age, ill health retirement, end of temporary contract, blank reason for leaving.
6. - - Level of data too low for publication.
7. Working Patterns
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show the percentage of employees with a part-time working pattern against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender. These data show part-time working rates as at 31 March 2012.
Table 17.1: Percentage of employees by age with a part-time working pattern
| Age | Percentage working part-time | |---------|-----------------------------| | 16-24 | 14.2 | | 25-29 | 21.5 | | 30-34 | 35.4 | | 35-39 | 42.7 | | 40-44 | 43.9 | | 45-49 | 39.6 | | 50-54 | 35.3 | | 55-59 | 33.4 | | 60-64 | 59.3 | | 65+ | 68.3 | | Total | 38.7 |
Table 17.2: Percentage of employees by indicated disability with a part-time working pattern
| Disability | Percentage working part-time | |------------|-----------------------------| | Disabled | 40.6 | | Non-disabled | 41.7 | | Total indicated | 41.7 |
Table 17.3: Percentage of employees by indicated ethnicity with a part-time working pattern
| Ethnicity | Percentage working part-time | |---------------|-----------------------------| | Ethnic minority | 37.3 | | White | 41.4 | | Total indicated | 40.9 | Table 17.4: Percentage of employees by gender with a part-time working pattern
| Gender | Percentage working part-time | |--------|-----------------------------| | Female | 50.3 | | Male | 13.7 | | Total | 38.7 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management.
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees working part time over the total number of employees that have chosen to indicate that protected characteristic.
2. Grievances
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show the percentage of employees who have raised a grievance against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Table 18.1: Percentage of employees by age who raised a grievance
| Age | Total percentage | |---------|------------------| | 16-24 | 1.5 | | 25-29 | 1.3 | | 30-34 | 1.3 | | 35-39 | 1.4 | | 40-44 | 1.1 | | 45-49 | 1.0 | | 50-54 | 1.0 | | 55-59 | 1.1 | | 60-64 | 1.1 | | 65+ | 1.2 | | Total | 1.1 |
Table 18.2: Percentage of employees by indicated disability who raised a grievance
| Disability | Total percentage | |------------|------------------| | Disabled | 2.0 | | Non-disabled | 1.1 | | Total Declared | 1.1 |
Table 18.3: Percentage of employees by indicated ethnicity who raised a grievance
| Ethnicity | Total percentage | |---------------|------------------| | Ethnic minority | 1.3 | | White | 1.1 | | Total indicated | 1.1 | Table 18.4: Percentage of employees by gender who raised a grievance(^1,2)
| Gender | Total percentage | |--------|------------------| | Female | 1.1 | | Male | 1.2 | | Total | 1.1 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management.
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees raising a grievance in the period over the total number of employees that have chosen to indicate that protected characteristic.
2. Period - 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012.
3. Performance markings
We are currently unable to provide updated data for this set as these data are analysed later in the year. We will include this information as soon as it is available. 20. Promotion
What does this tell us?
The data presented here show employees promoted against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability, ethnicity and gender.
Table 20.1: Percentage of employees promoted by age\\textsuperscript{1,2,3}
| Age | Total % | |-------|---------| | 16-24 | 1.2 | | 25-29 | 1.2 | | 30-34 | 1.3 | | 35-39 | 0.7 | | 40-44 | 0.6 | | 45-49 | 0.5 | | 50-54 | 0.3 | | 55-59 | 0.3 | | 60-64 | 0.3 | | 65+ | * | | Total | 0.6 |
Table 20.2: Percentage of employees promoted by indicated disability\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Disability | Total % | |------------|---------| | Disabled | 0.4 | | Non-disabled | 0.5 | | Total indicated | 0.5 |
Table 20.3: Percentage of employees promoted by indicated ethnicity\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Ethnicity | Total % | |---------------|---------| | Ethnic minority | 0.9 | | White | 0.5 | | Total indicated | 0.5 |
Table 20.4: Percentage of employees promoted by gender\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Gender | Total % | |--------|---------| | Female | 0.6 | | Male | 0.6 | | Total | 0.6 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management. Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees promoted in the period over the total number of who have chosen to indicate that protected characteristic.
2. Period - 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012.
3. - - Level of data too low for publication.
4. Recruitment process
We are currently unable to provide updated data about recruitment as we are changing the way we manage our processes to utilise a Civil Service wide model. We will include this information as soon as it is available. 22. Pay gap
The Department analyses data to identify any differences in pay on the grounds of gender, race, age and disability.
The pay gap is calculated by adding together the pay of all of the members of the potentially disadvantaged group in the Department who are in grades below the Senior Civil Service (SCS) and then working out an average salary. This is then compared to the average salary of the potentially advantaged group. The gap is the difference between the two averages divided by the average pay of the advantaged group.
[ \\text{Pay gap} = \\frac{\\text{Pay difference}}{\\text{Pay of the advantaged group}} ]
Therefore, in the case of the gender pay gap, the average salary of women in grades below SCS is calculated and then compared to the average salary of men in grades below SCS. The difference is expressed as a percentage and is presented by grade.
What does this tell us?
The table below shows which group is considered to be advantaged or disadvantaged for the purposes of expressing the pay gap for that protected characteristic. In the case of age, the majority age group (25-54) is shown against both the younger group (16-24) and the older age group (55 and above).
| Protected characteristic | Disadvantaged group | Advantaged group | |--------------------------|---------------------|------------------| | Age | 16-24 | 25-54 | | | 55 and above | 25-54 | | Disability | Disabled | Non-disabled | | Ethnicity | Ethnic minority | White | | Gender | Female | Male |
How will an improvement be shown?
Where the potentially disadvantaged group, for example women, have a higher average salary than their male counterparts, it is expressed as a negative percentage (for example -0.5 percent). This analysis informs the Equal Pay Audit, which takes place on a three yearly basis to identify areas for action.
______________________________________________________________________
5 Pay difference is the mean pay of the advantaged group minus the mean pay of the disadvantaged group. Table 22.1: Pay gap by age\\textsuperscript{1,2,3}
| Age | Band A/AA | Band B/AO | Band C/EO | Band D/HEO | Band E/SEO | Band F/Grade 7 | Band G/Grade 6 | All grades | |----------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|------------| | Age 16-24 (mean salary) | £14,569 | £16,505 | £21,514 | £26,733 | N/A | N/A | N/A | £16,840 | | Age 25-54 (mean salary) | £15,018 | £17,792 | £23,190 | £28,003 | N/A | N/A | N/A | £21,473 | | Pay gap (percent 16-24 to 25-54) | 3.0 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 4.5 | N/A | N/A | N/A | 21.6 |
| Age | Band A/AA | Band B/AO | Band C/EO | Band D/HEO | Band E/SEO | Band F/Grade 7 | Band G/Grade 6 | All grades | |----------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|------------| | Age 55 and above (mean salary) | £15,075 | £18,011 | £23,728 | £29,214 | £35,605 | £49,457 | £61,233 | £21,767 | | Age 25-54 (mean salary) | £15,018 | £17,792 | £23,190 | £28,003 | £33,921 | £47,018 | £59,239 | £21,473 | | Pay gap (percent 55+ to 25-54) | -0.4 | -1.2 | -2.3 | -4.3 | -5.0 | -5.2 | -3.4 | -1.4 |
### Table 22.2: Pay gap by indicated disability(^{1,2,3,4})
| Disability | Band A/AA | Band B/AO | Band C/EO | Band D/HEO | Band E/SEO | Band F/Grade 7 | Band G/Grade 6 | All grades | |-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|------------| | Disabled (mean salary) | £15,142 | £18,192 | £23,644 | £28,618 | £34,570 | £47,633 | £59,353 | £21,968 | | Non-disabled (mean salary) | £15,108 | £18,081 | £23,419 | £28,288 | £34,238 | £47,416 | £59,836 | £21,948 | | Pay gap (percent disabled to non-disabled) | -0.2 | -0.6 | -1.0 | -1.2 | -1.0 | -0.5 | 0.8 | -0.1 |
### Table 22.3: Pay gap by indicated ethnicity(^{1,2,3,4,5})
| Ethnicity | Band A/AA | Band B/AO | Band C/EO | Band D/HEO | Band E/SEO | Band F/Grade 7 | Band G/Grade 6 | All grades | |-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|------------| | Ethnic minority (mean salary) | £15,059 | £18,020 | £23,192 | £28,039 | £33,800 | £46,813 | £60,917 | £20,896 | | White (mean salary) | £15,082 | £17,975 | £23,415 | £28,321 | £34,300 | £47,451 | £59,889 | £21,881 | | Pay gap (percent ethnic minority to white) | 0.2 | -0.3 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.3 | -1.7 | 4.5 | Table 22.4: Pay gap by gender
| Gender | Band A/AA | Band B/AO | Band C/EO | Band D/HEO | Band E/SEO | Band F/Grade 7 | Band G/Grade 6 | All grades | |--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|------------| | Female (mean salary) | £15,028 | £17,890 | £23,331 | £28,227 | £34,102 | £46,980 | £59,025 | £21,257 | | Male (mean salary) | £15,004 | £17,562 | £23,214 | £28,225 | £34,475 | £47,976 | £60,264 | £21,881 | | Pay gap (percent female to male) | -0.2 | -1.9 | -0.5 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.9 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management.
Notes:
1. Salary totals are total full-time salaries in the pay band, excluding allowances and overtime. However, to prevent skews in diversity analyses due to different pay zones, all salaries here are treated as though they are on DWP National pay scales. That is, salaries on pay scales for inner London, outer London and special location pay zones have been placed on their equivalent position on the National pay scale. ERNIC and employer's superannuation (Civil Service Pension) contributions are excluded from these figures.
2. Mean salary is the total full-time basic salaries for the pay band, divided into the headcount.
3. Records excluded from this analysis include SCS employees and specialists (accountants, lawyers etc) whose salaries are on separate pay scales. Casual and fixed-term appointments are included. The population used in the analysis therefore represents 98.1 percent of DWP employees paid and in post on 31 March 2012.
4. In defining working patterns, all part-year appointments have been categorised as part-time, whether or not part-year attendance is full-time or part-time.
5. Mean salaries only take into account those who have indicated their disability status.
6. Mean salaries only take into account those who have indicated their ethnicity status.
7. Training data
We are currently unable to provide updated data on training undertaken by our employees as we are transferring to a new Civil Service wide system. We will include this information as soon as it is available. 24. Maternity data
What does this tell us? These data shows the number of employees returning from maternity leave against their status in relation to each of the following protected characteristics: age, disability and ethnicity.
Table 24.1: Percentage of employees returning from maternity leave in period by age\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Age | Total percentage | |-------|------------------| | 16-24 | 3.2 | | 25-29 | 22.6 | | 30-34 | 36.9 | | 35-39 | 25.8 | | 40-44 | 10.4 | | 45-49 | 1.1 | | 50-54 | 0.0 | | 55-59 | 0.0 | | 60-64 | 0.0 | | 65+ | 0.0 | | Total | 100.0 |
Table 24.2: Percentage of employees returning from maternity leave in period by indicated disability\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Disability | Total percentage | |------------|------------------| | Disabled | 2.4 | | Non-disabled | 97.6 | | Total indicated | 100.0 |
Table 24.3: Percentage of employees returning from maternity leave in period by indicated ethnicity\\textsuperscript{1,2}
| Ethnicity | Total percentage | |---------------|------------------| | Ethnic minority | 18.7 | | White | 81.3 | | Total indicated | 100.0 |
All data sourced from: Resource Management.
Notes:
1. Percentages shown are the number of employees returning from maternity leave in the period by indicated protected characteristic over the total number of employees returning from maternity leave.
2. Period - 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012.
3. Links to additional information
2011 People Survey Results - includes details of the DWP People Survey which is part of the Civil Service People Survey. It contains 57 questions to help determine employee engagement throughout the Civil Service.
2012 Star Performer Network - recognition is due to the work, dedication and commitment of SONG (the DWP national sexual orientation staff network group). This is the first time DWP and SONG have received this recognition.
Top 100 Employer - DWP is one of Britain’s Top 100 Employers for lesbian, gay and bisexual staff.
Performance Related Pay - includes details of non-consolidated performance-related pay by DWP, our agencies and executive Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) for the performance year 2010-11.
Workforce Management Returns - includes details of the DWP workforce, our agencies and executive NDPBs.
Business Plan Quarterly Data Summary provides a quarterly snapshot on how each department is spending its budget, the results it has achieved and how it is deploying its workforce.
Equality Impact Assessments help us to make sure the needs of people are taken into account when we develop and implement a new policy or service or when we make a change to a current policy or service. DWP Equality Information 2012 Update
Under the Public Sector Equality Duty, part of the Equality Act 2010, as a public body the Department for Work and Pensions has a specific duty to publish relevant proportionate information to demonstrate our compliance. Information showing that we have paid due regard to the aims of the Equality Duty is contained in this report.
Diversity and Equality Directorate Porterbrook House, 7 Pear Street, Sheffield, South Yorkshire, S11 8JF.
Contact information: [email protected]
978-1-78153-058-0 Published by the Department for Work and Pensions 12 July 2012 www.dwp.gov.uk
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acfdeb1bb0f472b9d51c3d4d90fb09aa36330c1b | ORR’s Equality Information
January 2013 ORR’s Equality Information
Introduction and background
01. The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) is committed to furthering the aims of the Equality Act 2010.
02. The public sector duty of the Equality Act 2010 consists of a general equality duty, which is set out in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. In summary, those subject to the equality duty must, in the exercise of their functions, have due regard to the need to:
a. Eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other conduct prohibited by the Act;
b. Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not; and
c. Foster good relations between people who share a protected characteristic.
03. ORR is also subject to specific duties which are imposed by secondary legislation in the form of the Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) Regulations 2011. Those specific duties include the need to publish sufficient information to demonstrate its compliance with the general equality duty across its functions. The information provided must include:
a. Information on the effect that its policies and practices have had on people who share a relevant protected characteristic, to demonstrate the extent to which it furthers the aims of the general equality duty for its employees and for persons affected by its policies and practices;
b. A statement of one or more objectives it thinks it should achieve in order to comply with the public sector equality duty. ORR’s equality information
04. ORR has a total of 284 staff. In order to avoid identifying particular individuals, the data is only shown for groups of more than 10 staff. This has been indicated in the data.
05. Our equality data has been taken from two sources. Much of the data is from ORR’s HR database (as at 31 December 2012); the rest of the data has come from the Autumn 2012 Civil Service People Survey (78.2% of staff responded) and many of the key questions in the survey have helped us to assess how effective our people policies have been in advancing equality.
06. ORR has analysed the distribution of its workforce, as far as it is able to, in terms of the protected characteristics (age, disability, gender reassignment, race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation, marriage and civil partnership). This has been broken down by grade where possible. This data shows that the majority of staff are male (67%), most staff are white (68%) and 5% of staff have a reported disability. This data is largely similar to the data in January 2012. The data can be found in Annex 1.
07. ORR has analysed the numbers of part-time and full-time staff at each level of the organisation. The majority of part-time staff are women at each grade. This data can be found in Annex 2.
08. An analysis of pay for male and female staff has been undertaken to assess whether there is a gender pay gap. This has been broken down by grade. The data shows an improvement compared with the January 2012 data. The data can be found in Annex 3.
09. Information about the effectiveness of our people policies has come from our people survey. This can be found in Annex 4. Since January 2012, ORR has implemented a range of initiatives i.e. a review of our people strategy and policies, training and the introduction of ‘anti-bullying and harassment advisers’ to minimise bullying and harassment. The latest people survey feedback shows that there has been an improvement.
10. ORR does not currently have any reported transsexual staff in employment. As part of our Equality and diversity policy, we aim to recruit as diverse a workforce as possible, and would welcome applications from anybody.
11. There are a number of areas that we are unable to report on because the numbers are too few (10 people or less). These areas are pregnancy and maternity, dismissals and grievances, and recruitment.
12. We are committed to publishing our equality information on an annual basis. Annex 1
% distribution of ORR’s workforce by protected characteristic and grade (as at 31 December 2012)
| Protected characteristics | SCS\* | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | Overall | |---------------------------|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------| | **Gender** | | | | | | | | | | | Male | 4 | 6 | 9 | 27| 7 | 6 | \*\*\*| 4 | 67 | | Female | \*\*\* | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 8 | 4 | \*\*\*| 9 | \*\*\*| 34 | | **Race/ethnicity** | | | | | | | | | | | White | 6 | 7 | 9 | 26| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 68 | | Mixed | 0 | 4 | 0 | \*\*\*| 4 | 4 | 0 | \*\*\*| 13 | | Asian or Asian British | 0 | 0 | 0 | \*\*\*| 4 | \*\*\*| 9 | | | | Black or Black British | 0 | 0 | 0 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 5 | | | Other ethnic group | \*\*\* | 0 | 0 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 0 | \*\*\* | | Unknown | 0 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 7 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 14 | | | **Disability** | | | | | | | | | | | Reported disability | 0 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 0 | \*\*\*| 0 | 5 | | No reported disability | 6 | 8 | 10| 33| 9 | 6 | 12 | 7 | 92 | | **Age** | | | | | | | | | | | 19 and below | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 20-29 | 0 | 0 | 0 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 11 | | | 30-39 | \*\*\* | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 7 | \*\*\*| 6 | \*\*\*| 27 | | | 40-49 | \*\*\* | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 11| 4 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 27 | | | 50-59 | \*\*\* | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 13| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 30 | | | 60+ | \*\*\* | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 0 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 6 | | | **Religion or belief** | | | | | | | | | | | No religion | \*\*\* | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 12 | | | Christian | \*\*\* | \*\*\*| 4 | 10 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 21 | | | Buddhist | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | \*\*\*| | | | Hindu | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | \*\*\*| 0 | \*\*\*| | | | Jewish | \*\*\* | \*\*\*| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | \*\*\*| | | Muslim | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | \*\*\*| 0 | \*\*\*| | | Sikh | 0 | 0 | 0 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 0 | \*\*\*| | | | Other | 0 | 0 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 0 | 0 | \*\*\*| | | Not known | 4 | 5 | 5 | 18 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 5 | 59 | | **Sexual orientation (from people survey)** | | | | | | | | | | | Heterosexual | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 57 | | Gay or lesbian | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | \*\*\* | | Bisexual | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 | | Other | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 | | Not known | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | \*\*\* | | Marriage and civil partnership | | | | | | | | |-------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | Married | \*\*\* | 7 | 6 | 23 | \*\*\* | 4 | \*\*\* | 49 | | Single | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 6 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 29 | | Divorced | \*\*\* | 0 | 0 | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 0 | 4 | | Widowed | 0 | \*\*\* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | \*\*\* | 0 | \*\*\* | | Civil partnership | 0 | 0 | 0 | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 0 | 0 | 0 | \*\*\* | | Partner | \*\*\* | 0 | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 0 | \*\*\* | 0 | 0 | \*\*\* | | Unknown | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 14 |
**Senior Civil Servant - this represents the most senior level of the organisation and grade G is at the least senior level of the organisation.**
***In order to avoid identifying particular individuals, the data can only be shown for more than 10 people.*** Annex 2
% distribution of ORR’s workforce by gender, working pattern and grade (as at 31 December 2012)
| Protected characteristic | SCS | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | Overall | |--------------------------|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---------| | Male | | | | | | | | | | | Full-time | 4 | 5 | 8 | 26 | 6 | 6 | \*\*\*| 4 | 62 | | Part-time | \*\*\* | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 0 | 0 | 4 | | Female | | | | | | | | | | | Full-time | \*\*\* | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 5 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 6 | \*\*\*| 25 | | Part-time | \*\*\* | \*\*\*| 0 | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 0 | 8 | Annex 3
An analysis of employees’ average full-time equivalent pay by gender and grade (as at 31 December 2012)
Median
| Grade | Male | Female | % difference of female compared with male | |----------------|--------|---------|------------------------------------------| | Senior Civil Servant | | | | | A | £72,326| £72,821 | 0.68 | | B | £63,718| £61,684 | -3.19 | | C | £55,960| £54,070 | -3.38 | | D | £43,081| £42,351 | -1.70 | | E | £33,577| £31,076 | -7.45 | | F | £27,076| £29,836 | 10.19 | | G | £22,529| £20,303 | -9.88 |
Mean
| Grade | Male | Female | % difference of female compared with male | |----------------|--------|---------|------------------------------------------| | Senior Civil Servant | | | | | A | £71,828| £71,749 | -0.11 | | B | £63,166| £62,320 | -1.34 | | C | £55,534| £54,712 | -1.48 | | D | £42,943| £42,566 | -0.88 | | E | £33,419| £32,896 | -1.56 | | F | £27,685| £29,325 | 5.93 | | G | £21,964| £21,487 | -2.17 | Annex 4
An analysis of equality data from ORR’s Civil Service People Survey (Autumn 2012)
78.2% of staff responded to the people survey
| People survey questions | % Positive score | % Neutral score | % Negative score | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------| | I am treated fairly at work | 78 | 13 | 9 | | I am treated with respect by the people I work with | 88 | 8 | 4 | | I think that ORR respects individual differences (e.g. cultures, working styles, backgrounds, ideas etc) | 65 | 21 | 14 |
| People survey questions | Yes (%) | No (%) | Prefer not to say (%) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|--------|-----------------------| | During the past 12 months, have you personally experienced discrimination at work | 9 | 81 | 9 | | During the past 12 months, have you personally experienced bullying or harassment at work? | 10 | 80 | 9 |
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c3a0f5b0ff3684ed229bc97bcc47b9fcd6fd5024 | ORR’s Equality Information
January 2012 ORR’s Equality Information
Introduction and background
1. The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) is committed to furthering the aims of the Equality Act 2010.
2. The public sector duty of the Equality Act 2010 consists of a general equality duty, which is set out in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. In summary, those subject to the equality duty must, in the exercise of their functions, have due regard to the need to: a. Eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other conduct prohibited by the Act; b. Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not; and c. Foster good relations between people who share a protected characteristic.
3. ORR is also subject to specific duties which are imposed by secondary legislation in the form of the Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) Regulations 2011. Those specific duties include the need to publish sufficient information to demonstrate its compliance with the general equality duty across its functions. The information provided must include: a. Information on the effect that its policies and practices have had on people who share a relevant protected characteristic, to demonstrate the extent to which it furthers the aims of the general equality duty for its employees and for persons affected by its policies and practices; b. A statement of one or more objectives it thinks it should achieve in order to comply with the public sector equality duty.
4. ORR has an equality project group in place with representatives from across the organisation. The purpose of this is to coordinate ORR’s response to the Equality Act 2010 and the Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) Regulations 2011: a. In respect of its duties as an employer, to ensure that ORR complies with the Act and, where possible, demonstrates best practice; b. In respect of its public role, to ensure that ORR has due regard to advancing equality when exercising its regulatory functions – working together with other bodies where appropriate; and c. To ensure that ORR staff are aware of the implications of the Act for them, both as employees and as public servants. ORR’s policies and practices
5. ORR’s equality scheme outlines the policies and practices that are in place and how they further the aims of the general equality duty. This was revised recently in light of the new legislation and will be developed further to incorporate the requirement to prepare and publish ORR’s equality objectives, in April 2012.
6. ORR has also revised its equality and diversity policy in light of the new Equality Act 2010.
7. We have engaged with our Staff Representatives’ group when developing our work on equality. We have raised awareness with staff about the changes arising from the Equality Act 2010, through internal communications and seminars. We will also engage with external stakeholders to advance equality when carrying out our role as a regulator.
ORR’s equality information
08. At this stage we are focusing on the equality information for our employees. We will consider whether we need to extend our information gathering more widely to include service users and passengers.
09. Our equality data has been taken from two sources. Much of the data is from ORR’s HR database (as at 31 December 2011). The rest of the data has come from the Autumn 2012 people survey (85% of staff responded). Some of the key questions in the survey have helped us to assess how effective our people policies have been in advancing equality.
10. ORR has analysed the distribution of its workforce, as far as it is able to, in terms of the protected characteristics (age, disability, gender reassignment, race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation, marriage and civil partnership). This has been broken down by employees’ grades where possible. This data shows that the majority of staff are male (65%), most staff are white (64%) and 5% of staff have a reported disability. The data can be found in Annex 1.
11. ORR has analysed the numbers of part-time and full-time staff at each level of the organisation. The majority of part-time staff are women at each grade. This data can be found in Annex 2.
12. An analysis of pay for male and female staff has been undertaken to assess whether there is a gender pay gap. This has been broken down by grade. ORR endeavours to ensure that our pay system is fair and equitable. We will continue to analyse these differences in more detail. The data can be found in Annex 3.
13. Information about the effectiveness of our people policies has come from our people survey. This can be found in Annex 4.
14. ORR has a total of 280 staff. In order to avoid identifying particular individuals, the data is only shown for groups of more than 10 staff. This has been indicated in the data.
15. There are a number of areas that we are unable to report on because the numbers are too few (10 people or less). These areas are pregnancy and maternity, dismissals and grievances, and recruitment.
16. ORR does not currently have any reported transsexual staff in employment. As part of our Equality and diversity policy, we aim to recruit as diverse a workforce as possible, and would welcome applications from anybody.
**Next steps**
17. ORR is committed to furthering the aims of the Equality Act 2010 and will work to address any inequalities highlighted in the data.
18. ORR will develop its equality objectives and publish these as part of the Equality Scheme, in April 2012. Further action planning will be undertaken as necessary.
19. We will also be developing our HR database to ensure that we hold more comprehensive data about our workforce. In particular, we will improve our data collection on religion and belief, and sexual orientation. We will be engaging with staff as we develop this.
20. We are committed to publishing our equality information on an annual basis. Annex 1
The distribution of ORR's workforce by protected characteristic and grade (2011)
| Protected Characteristic | SCS \*\* | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | Overall | |--------------------------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------| | Gender | | | | | | | | | | | Male | 60% | 73% | 71% | 80% | 63% | 67% | 26% | 46% | 65% | | Female | 40% | 27% | 29% | 20% | 38% | 23% | 74% | 54% | 35% | | Race/ethnicity | | | | | | | | | | | White | 87% | 91% | 71% | 66% | 63% | 71% | 41% | \*\*\* | 64% | | Mixed | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 0% | 0% | \*\*\* | | Asian or Asian British | 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 5% | | Black or Black British | 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 4% | | Other ethnic group | \*\*\* | 0% | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 5% | | Unknown | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 28% | \*\*\* | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 20% | | Disability | | | | | | | | | | | Reported disability | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 5% | | No reported disability | 100% | 95% | 94% | 96% | 91% | 96% | 94% | 96% | 95% | | Age | | | | | | | | | | | 19 and below | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | | 20-29 | 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 9% | | 30-39 | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 20% | 38% | 58% | 32% | \*\*\* | 26% | | 40-49 | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 40% | 34% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 30% | | 50-59 | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 42% | 31% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 29% | | 60+ | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 6% | | Religion or belief | | | | | | | | | | | No Religion | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 14% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 13% | | Christian | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 25% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 21% | | Buddhist | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | | Hindu | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\* | 0% | 0% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | |-------------|----|----|----|----|-----|----|----|-----|-----| | Jewish | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\* | | Muslim | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\*| 0% | \*\*\* | | Sikh | 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\*| 0% | 0% | \*\*\*| \*\*\* | \*\*\* | | Other | 0% | 0% | \*\*\*| 0% | \*\*\* | 0% | \*\*\*| 0% | \*\*\* | | Not Known | 80%| 50%| 58%| 60%| 72% | 54%| 65%| 54% | 61% |
**Sexual Orientation (from People Survey)**
| Heterosexual | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 64% | |--------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----| | Gay or lesbian | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\* | | Bisexual | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\* | | Other | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\* | | Not Known | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 14% |
**Marriage and civil partnership**
| Married | \*\*\*| 64%| 68%| 64%| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 32%| \*\*\*| 48% | |--------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----| | Single | 0% | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 14%| 41%| 46%| 44%| 54%| 26% | | Divorced | \*\*\*| 0% | 0% | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 0% | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 5% | | Widowed | 0% | \*\*\*| 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\*| 0% | \*\*\* | | Civil Partnership | 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\* | | Partner | 0% | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 0% | \*\*\*| 0% | 0% | 0% | \*\*\* | | Unknown | \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 11%| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| \*\*\*| 17% |
**Senior Civil Servant - this represents the most senior level of the organisation and grade G is at the least senior level of the organisation.**
***In order to avoid identifying particular individuals, the data can only be shown for more than 10 people.*** Annex 2
Analysis of equality data by gender, grade and work pattern
| Protected Characteristic | SCS \*\* | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | Overall | |--------------------------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------| | Male | | | | | | | | | | | Part-time | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 0% | 0% | 9% | | Full-time | \*\*\* | 94% | 86% | 88% | 90% | 94% | \*\*\* | 100%| 91% | | Female | | | | | | | | | | | Part-time | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 30% | | Full-time | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 58% | \*\*\* | \*\*\* | 68% | 93% | 70% | Annex 3
An analysis of employees’ average full-time equivalent pay by gender and grade (2011)
Median
| Grade | Male | Female | % difference | |----------------------|------------|------------|--------------| | Senior Civil Servant | £87,461.50 | £105,611.00| 20.75% | | A | £72,969.00 | £74,115.00 | 1.57% | | B | £64,695.50 | £61,088.00 | -5.58% | | C | £56,727.00 | £54,912.00 | -3.20% | | D | £42,711.00 | £42,711.00 | 0.00% | | E | £33,674.50 | £33,799.00 | 0.37% | | F | £29,427.00 | £28,488.00 | -3.19% | | G | £21,723.00 | £20,741.00 | -4.52% |
Mean
| Grade | Male | Female | % difference | |----------------------|------------|------------|--------------| | Senior Civil Servant | £98,571.40 | £104,836.20| 6.36% | | A | £71,925.44 | £73,487.83 | 2.17% | | B | £64,186.23 | £62,286.89 | -2.96% | | C | £55,562.75 | £53,574.94 | -3.58% | | D | £42,348.05 | £40,331.02 | -4.76% | | E | £33,896.81 | £34,217.13 | 0.94% | | F | £28,705.78 | £29,013.36 | 1.07% | | G | £21,843.25 | £21,307.14 | -2.45% |
ORR endeavours to ensure that our pay system is fair and equitable. We will continue to analyse these differences in more detail. Annex 4
An analysis of equality data from ORR’s people survey (Autumn 2011)
85% of staff responded to the people survey
| People survey questions | % Positive score | % Neutral score | % Negative score | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------| | I am treated fairly at work | 72 | 16 | 12 | | I am treated with respect by the people I work with | 86 | 9 | 5 | | I think that ORR respects individual differences (e.g. cultures, working styles, backgrounds, ideas etc) | 56\* | 25 | 19 |
| People survey questions | Yes (%) | No (%) | Prefer not to say (%) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|--------|-----------------------| | During the past 12 months, have you personally experienced discrimination at work | 13\* | 80 | 7 | | During the past 12 months, have you personally experienced bullying or harassment at work? | 12\* | 82 | 5 |
\*These figures have been identified by the organisation as areas that need to be investigated further, to establish what the underlying reasons are. We will shortly be introducing ‘anti-bullying and harassment advisers’. These volunteers will be fully trained in supporting staff who feel discriminated against, bullied or harassed. We are also reviewing our ‘protection from bullying and harassment policy’. We are working with our staff representatives to further the work necessary in these areas.
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0767820504657d17db3a8e95122615bfcf5d01b4 | Memorandum of understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority: equivalence and exemptions
October 2019 Memorandum of understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority: equivalence and exemptions
Presented to Parliament pursuant to Regulation 6(3) of the Equivalence Determinations For Financial Services and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019
October 2019 General responsibilities
1.1 This Memorandum of Understanding is established in accordance with regulation 6 of the Equivalence Determinations for Financial Services and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (the Equivalence Regulations). It sets out how the Treasury, and the Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) expect to co-ordinate the discharge of their respective functions in relation to equivalence determinations and exemption determinations and the provision of information or advice under the Equivalence Regulations.
1.2 The Treasury is responsible for determining the equivalence of and the application of exemptions to any country or territory outside the United Kingdom (“third country”) where such a function is provided for in legislation. The Treasury may make determinations which are partial, time-limited, or subject to other conditions.
1.3 The Bank of England, PRA and FCA (“the regulators”) are responsible for providing support to the Treasury for matters relating to their regulatory functions. This includes the provision of information or advice to the Treasury in connection with any consideration of a new equivalence or exemption determination.
1.4 The regulators are also responsible for recognising third-country firms which operate in the UK under an equivalence determination where this is provided for in legislation.
Process for initiating new determinations
1.5 The Treasury will decide whether to initiate considerations of new equivalence or exemption determinations for any third country or any relevant regime within a third country. For example, this may be in response to, or in anticipation of, a regulatory need.
1.6 The Treasury will inform the regulators when it initiates consideration of a new equivalence or exemption determination. Each regulator may also recommend to the Treasury to initiate consideration of a new equivalence or exemption determination.
1.7 Once informed of the Treasury’s intention to initiate consideration of a new equivalence or exemption determination, each regulator, in light of the potential implications of such a determination on their statutory objectives, may recommend to the Treasury that their advice should be sought.
1.8 In the normal course of business, the Treasury will request information or advice from the regulators to support its assessment of third country equivalence or to support its exemption determinations. Such requests will be made in writing to the regulators setting out a reasonable timeframe so that the regulators can organise their resources accordingly.
1.9 The regulators may also proactively provide information or advice to the Treasury, in the absence of a formal request from the Treasury. 1.10 The Treasury and the regulators should keep in close coordination throughout any equivalence or exemption process, including through updates during the preparation of advice.
**Regulators’ advice**
1.11 The Treasury and the regulators will agree on the format of advice. The regulators’ equivalence advice should set out the applicable criteria used for assessing equivalence, the assessment methodology, and an account of the evidence gathered to determine whether the criteria are met. The regulators will take a proportionate approach to their assessment of equivalence, in line with their individual statutory objectives, as relevant.
1.12 When providing advice in support of a proposal for an equivalence determination, the regulators must be satisfied that the third-country jurisdiction meets the requirements of the relevant equivalence regime. The regulators will not be expected to provide advice on any aspect of a third country’s regime which goes beyond their functions.
1.13 The regulators’ advice in relation to the merits of an exemption will set out the impact of the exemption on the regulators’ statutory objectives. It will include an account of any evidence gathered to support this advice.
1.14 Subject to any relevant statutory obligations on the Treasury and the regulators, any information or advice which the Treasury receives from the regulators will be kept confidential during the Treasury’s assessment process.
**Procedure for contacting third countries and responding to third-country communications**
1.15 When initiating new assessments of third-country jurisdictions, the Treasury will be responsible for contacting the relevant authorities in that jurisdiction of its intention to initiate an assessment. The Treasury will primarily be responsible for contact with third-country finance ministries where relevant functions are exercised at that level. When appropriate, the Treasury may delegate to the regulators the responsibility for contacting third-country finance ministries. The regulators will include the Treasury in correspondence with third-country finance ministries.
1.16 The regulators will primarily be responsible for contacting and liaising with third-country regulatory and supervisory authorities. The regulators will keep the Treasury informed of relevant developments from their communications with third-country regulatory authorities.
**Timing expectations**
1.17 The Treasury and the regulators may agree a proposed timeframe for providing information or advice, which will be set out in HMT’s written request for advice. Expectations about the timeframe for providing advice should take into account resourcing implications for the regulators and the priority of the assessment, and should be proportionate to the nature of the advice. Publication of advice and determinations
1.18 The Treasury’s determinations will be laid in Parliament and made publicly available.
1.19 Equivalence and exemption determinations will be accompanied by an Explanatory Memorandum (EM) setting out the justification for the determination. The EM will give an account of the advice that the Treasury has received from the regulators and considered before making an equivalence or exemption determination.
1.20 When the Treasury lays an instrument to make an equivalence or exemption determination, the regulators are responsible for determining whether to publish a summary of their advice, as well as any materials they deem necessary in support of it.
1.21 The expectation is that the regulators’ assessments will not be published in advance of the Treasury laying an equivalence or exemption determination before Parliament.
Other organisations
1.22 When necessary, the Treasury may consult other organisations, including other government departments, as a part of making equivalence and exemption determinations.
Process for initiating review of existing equivalence and exemption determinations
1.23 The Treasury may review any existing equivalence or exemption determinations.
1.24 The Treasury will inform the regulators when it initiates consideration of a review of an existing equivalence or exemption determination.
1.25 Each regulator may recommend to the Treasury that a review of an equivalence or exemption determination is undertaken in response to material changes in the applicable framework. Each regulator may also request a review of an equivalence or exemption determination if they have concerns arising from their statutory objectives (including financial stability, safety and soundness, market integrity, consumer protection or competition implications).
1.26 In the normal course of business, the Treasury will request information or advice from the regulators to review existing equivalence or exemption determinations. Such requests will be made in writing to the regulators. The Treasury will inform the regulators of its need for information or advice within a reasonable timeframe so that the regulators can organise their resources accordingly.
1.27 Each regulator may also proactively provide information or advice to the Treasury to assist the review of existing equivalence or exemption determinations, in the absence of a formal request from the Treasury.
1.28 Reviews may be undertaken periodically or at any time, or in response to changes to the applicable framework. This does not prejudice the Treasury’s ability to revoke existing equivalence or exemption determinations at any time.
**Monitoring existing equivalence and exemption determinations**
1.29 The Treasury and the regulators will maintain an appropriate level of engagement with third-country jurisdictions where equivalence or exemption determinations have been made to monitor changes to the regulatory and supervisory framework of that country.
1.30 Where relevant, cooperation arrangements with third-country finance ministries and/or regulatory authorities shall be set out in separate MoUs.
**Interaction between FCA and Bank of England in areas of joint competence**
1.31 The regulators will provide advice in relation to their regulatory functions (e.g. the Bank in relation to CCPs and the FCA in relation to trading venues). When advice is requested on areas of joint competence (e.g. Capital Requirements), the ‘lead regulator’ should provide the advice after consulting the other regulator. In some cases, the regulators may provide advice on different aspects of a determination, according to their functions.
**Maintenance and review of MoU**
1.32 This MoU may be reviewed at the request of the Treasury or the regulators. HM Treasury contacts
This document can be downloaded from www.gov.uk
If you require this information in an alternative format or have general enquiries about HM Treasury and its work, contact:
Correspondence Team HM Treasury 1 Horse Guards Road London SW1A 2HQ Tel: 020 7270 5000 Email: [email protected]
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afb9ee27d36792c945a9932579a34990d1b51492 | UK Biopharmaceutical Sector Bioscience and Health technology Sector Statistics 2018
Headlines
- 2,150 Businesses
- £49.8bn Turnover
- 121,000 Employees
- 2,480 Sites
Sector Characteristics
- 36% life science industry businesses
- 49% life science industry employment
- 68% life science industry turnover
- 58% of employment in sector excluding services and supply chain
- Global TOP 25
Sector Employment
- 85% Large Companies
- 15% SMEs
Sector Turnover
- 95% Large Companies
- 5% SMEs
Largest Segments by Employment
1. Small Molecules
2. Therapeutic Proteins
3. Antibodies
Top 3 segments account for 91% of all employment in the core Biopharmaceutical sector
Largest Segments by Turnover
1. Small Molecules
2. Therapeutic Proteins
3. Vaccines
Top 3 segments account for 94% of all turnover in the core Biopharmaceutical sector
What is the Biopharmaceutical Sector?
Businesses involved in developing and/or producing their own pharmaceutical products, from small R&D-focused biotechs to multinational Big Pharma. Includes supply chain and specialist service sector.
Distribution of Employment Across UK
- London 25%
- South East 20%
- East of England 12%
- Wales 10%
- West Midlands 5%
- East Midlands 4%
- Yorkshire and Humber 4%
- North West 12%
- North East 4%
- Scotland 7%
- Northern Ireland 2%
Year-On-Year Growth - 2009 to 2018
-12% Employment -9% Turnover
Core Biopharma employment decreased between 2010 and 2012 before stabilising, while turnover decreased 2011 to 2015 before returning to growth
Service and Supply Chain
An essential cluster of specialist suppliers supports the biopharmaceutical sector in the UK. Does not include non-life science businesses.
- 1,450 businesses
- 57,700 employees
- £16.4bn turnover
For More Information https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/bioscience-and-health-technology-database-annual-reports
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668f24fb17e348aae6cd51a326119103ee3bd16e | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IN RELATION TO THE MASTER LIST AND THE LISTS OF EU APPROVED FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS AND CERTAIN OTHER SPECIFIED FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS
Presented at the meeting of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health on 1 February 2018. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IN RELATION TO THE MASTER LIST OF LISTS AND THE LISTS OF APPROVED FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS
In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 852/2004, establishments preparing foodstuffs must be registered in each Member State. Furthermore, a number of establishments, mainly handling products of animal origin for which hygiene conditions are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 853/2004, must be approved by the competent authority of each Member State. According to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004, Member States must make up-to-date lists of approved establishments available to other Member States and to the public.
The Commission created a web page with the objective of providing an easy and central access to the different lists of approved food establishments in Member States and certain other countries. It also presented in 2005 to the Standing Committee on Food Safety and Animal Health technical specifications to harmonize and codify the presentation of such lists. The presentation of such lists took full account of data protection legislation.
The objective of this working paper is to set down and update the above mentioned specifications.
Annex I to this document sets down the food establishment sections, requiring approval, in the sequence of the sections in Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004. Secondly, other establishments requiring approval were added. Finally, certain establishments, not subject to approval according to EU requirements, but for which intra-EU trade may benefit from the publication of a list, were added for voluntary listing.
Annex II lists the categories of establishments in each section.
Annex III lists activities performed in the main food sectors.
Annex IV provides a model layout for the listing of establishments.
Annex V sets down codes and legends to be used when completing a list of establishments.
______________________________________________________________________
1 Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs (OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 1)
2 Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific rules for food of animal origin (OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 55)
3 Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1) ANNEX I
FORMAT OF THE MASTER LIST
'EU APPROVED FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS AND CERTAIN OTHER SPECIFIED FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS
Establishments handling, preparing or producing products of animal origin for which requirements are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 853/2004, must be approved by the competent authority in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 854/2004. In addition, approval may be required for certain other establishments in accordance with Article 6(3)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 852/2004. This legal basis was used to impose approval of establishments producing sprouts in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 210/2013.
For ease of reference, the lists of approved food establishments are published in the order of Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004. A Section 0 has been added to cover establishments with general activity and which cannot be placed under one of the other specific Sections mentioned below.
______________________________________________________________________
4 Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption (OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 206)
5 Commission Regulation(EU) No 210/2013 of 11 March 2013 on the approval of establishments producing sprouts pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 68, 12.3.2013, p. 24) PART A: FOOD OF ANIMAL ORIGIN
SECTION 0 General activity establishment SECTION I Meat of domestic ungulates SECTION II Meat from poultry and lagomorphs SECTION III Meat of farmed game SECTION IV Wild game meat SECTION V Minced meat, meat preparations and mechanically separated meat SECTION VI Meat products SECTION VII Live bivalve molluscs SECTION VIII Fishery products SECTION IX Raw milk and dairy products SECTION X Eggs and egg products SECTION XI Frogs' legs and snails SECTION XII Rendered animal fats and greaves SECTION XIII Treated stomachs, bladders and intestines SECTION XIV Gelatine SECTION XV Collagen SECTION XVI Highly refined products
PART B: FOOD OF NON-ANIMAL ORIGIN
SECTION I Sprouts
PART C: NON-MANDATORY LISTING
SECTION I Honey
Note for the webmaster: The numbered section below shall be used as a code in all language versions. However, the title of each section may be expressed in at least one official language of the Community. ANNEX II CATEGORIES OF FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS
Part A
SECTION 0: General activity establishments
- Cold store (Independent, stand-alone)
- Re-wrapping and re-packaging establishment (Independent, stand-alone)
- Wholesale market
- Reefer vessel
SECTION I: Meat of domestic ungulates
- Slaughterhouse
- Cutting plant
SECTION II: Meat from poultry and lagomorphs
- Slaughterhouse
- Cutting plant
SECTION III: Meat of farmed game
- Slaughterhouse
- Cutting plant
SECTION IV: Wild game meat
- Collection centre (voluntarily)
- Game-handling establishment
- Cutting plant
SECTION V: Minced meat, meat preparations and mechanically separated meat
- Minced meat establishment
- Meat preparation establishment
- Mechanically separated meat establishment
SECTION VI: Meat products
- Processing plant
SECTION VII: Live bivalve molluscs
- Dispatch centre
- Purification centre SECTION VIII: Fishery products ✓ Factory vessel ✓ Freezing vessel ✓ Fresh fishery products plant ✓ Processing plant ✓ Wholesale market ✓ Auction hall ✓ Mechanically separated fishery products plant
SECTION IX: Colostrum, raw milk, colostrum-based and dairy products ✓ Collection centre ✓ Processing plant
SECTION X: Egg and egg products ✓ Packing centre ✓ Liquid egg plant ✓ Processing plant
SECTION XI: Frogs' legs and snails ✓ Processing plant
SECTION XII: Rendered animal fats and greaves ✓ Collection centre ✓ Processing plant
SECTION XIII: Treated stomach, bladders and intestines ✓ Processing plants
SECTION XIV: Gelatine ✓ Collection centres and tanneries authorized for supply of raw materials for the production of gelatin for human consumption (voluntarily) ✓ Processing plant
SECTION XV: Collagen ✓ Collection centres and tanneries authorized for supply of raw materials for the production of collagen for human consumption (voluntarily) ✓ Processing plant
SECTION XVI: Highly refined products ✓ Processing plants Part B SECTION I: Sprouts ✓ Producing plants
Part C. Non-mandatory listing SECTION I: Honey ✓ Producing plants\\textsuperscript{6}
\\textsuperscript{6} This should include plants after primary production.
## ANNEX III
### ACTIVITIES IN THE MAIN FOOD SECTORS
| MAIN SECTORS | ACTIVITY CODES | |-----------------------|---------------------------------| | MEAT | CC, CP, CS, GHE, MM, MP, MSM, PP, RW, SH | | MILK | CC, CS, PP, RW | | EGGS | CC, CS, EPC, LEP, PP, RW | | FISHERY PRODUCTS/LBM | AH, CS, DC, FFP, FV, PC, MSFP, PP, RW, WM, ZV, RV | ANNEX IV
LAYOUT FOR INDIVIDUAL LISTS OF APPROVED ESTABLISHMENTS
'SECTION xxx
| Approval number(^7) | Name | Town/Region | Category(^8) | Associated activities(^9) | Species(^9) | Remarks(^{10}) | TSE feed ban registration authorizations(^{11}) | |----------------------|------|-------------|----------------|-----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------------------------------| | | | | | | | | |
(^7) Registration number for relevant cold stores in section 0 and plants in section XVI, authorisation number for collections centres and tanneries in sections XIV and XV
(^8) Use codes defined in Annex V for each category/activity. Categories of food establishments are mentioned in Annex II
(^9) Where appropriate, use codes defined in Annex V for each species
(^{10}) Where appropriate, use codes defined in Annex V
(^{11}) This column should be included only if the Member State has chosen "Option 2" of the Technical specifications for harmonised format for the listing of establishments in accordance with Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 999/2001, using codes laid down in [https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/safety/docs/biosafety_food-borne-disease_tse_list_establishments.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/safety/docs/biosafety_food-borne-disease_tse_list_establishments.pdf)
## ANNEX V
### CODES AND LEGENDS
| CATEGORY/ACTIVITY | SPECIES | REMARKS | |-------------------|---------|---------| | AH = auction hall | A = poultry | bl = blood products | | CC = collection centre | B = bovine | mp = meat products | | CP = cutting plant | C = caprine | pap = meat extracts | | CS = cold store | F = frogs | and any powdered | | DC = dispatch centre | L = lagomorphs | products derived | | EPC = egg packing centre | O = ovine | from meat | | FFPP = Fresh fishery | P = porcine | st = treated | | products plant | S = solipeds | stomachs, bladders | | FV = factory vessel | SN = snails | and intestines | | GHE = game handling | fG = farmed land | co = colostrum and | | establishment | mammals other than | colostrum-based | | HO = honey | domestic ungulates | products | | LEP = Liquid egg plant | R = ratite | | | MM = minced meat | wA = wild birds | | | establishment | wL = wild | | | MP = meat preparation | lagomorphs | | | establishment | wU = wild ungulates | | | MSFP = mechanically | wG = wild land | | | separated fishery | mammals other than | | | products plant | wild ungulates and | | | MSM = mechanically | wild lagomorphs | | | separated meat | | | | establishment | | | | TA = tannery | | | | PC = purification centre | | | | PdP = producing plant | | | | PP = processing plant | | | | RV = reefer vessel | | | | RW = re-wrapping and | | | | repackaging establishment | | | | SH = slaughterhouse | | | | WM = wholesale market | | | | ZV = freezer vessel | | |
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Subsets and Splits