latin
stringlengths 1
7.55k
| english
stringlengths 1
8.44k
⌀ |
|---|---|
Deinde quia operationes, de quibus supra dictum est, non semper ex huiusmodi corporibus procedunt: quod est evidens signum tales, operationes non provenire ex aliqua virtute indita et permanente, sed ex solo motu alicuius superioris agentis; sicut serra non semper secat lignum sibi coniunctum, sed solum quando ad hunc effectum ab artifice movetur. Quaedam autem actiones occultae sunt corporum inferiorum, quae quandocumque adhibeantur suis passivis, similes effectus producunt; sicut rheubarbarum semper purgat determinatum humorem. Unde relinquitur, huiusmodi actionem provenire ab aliqua virtute indita et permanente in corpore tali.
|
Secondly, activities, which have been mentioned above, do not always proceed from habits of this sort. The evident proof for this is that they do not proceed from a power residing and permanent in them, but only from the motion of a superior agent—just as the saw does not always cut wood brought into contact with it, but only when it is moved for this purpose by an artisan. Certain hidden workings, however, arise from inferior bodies, which whenever they are used, themselves being passive, produce the same effects, as rhubarb always purges a definite humor. And from this it is concluded that the action arises from some power residing and permanent in the body.
|
Restat autem considerandum, quid sit illud principium intrinsecum permanens a quo huiusmodi operationes procedunt. Manifestum est autem hoc principium potentiam quamdam esse: hoc enim dicimus potentiam principium intrinsecum quo agens agit, vel patiens patitur; haec quidem potentia secundum quod refertur ad ultimum in quod aliquid potest, accipit nomen et rationem virtutis. Huiusmodi autem virtus quae est talium actionum vel passionum principium, manifeste ostenditur ex forma rei specifica derivari: omne enim accidens quod est proprium alicuius speciei derivatur ex principiis essentialibus illius speciei, et inde est quod ad demonstrandum proprias passiones de suis subiectis, accipimus pro causa definitionem designantem essentialia principia rei. Est autem essentiae et quidditatis principium forma in determinata materia existens. Oportet igitur huiusmodi virtutes procedere a formis talium rerum secundum quod in propriis materiis existunt.
|
It remains now to consider what is that permanent intrinsic principle from which such activities proceed. Clearly this principle is some potency: for the internal principle by which an agent acts or suffers action we call a potency. And indeed this potency according as it is referred to the limit of anything's possible activity receives the name and description of power. Now the power which is the principle of such actions and passions is shown to be derived especially from the specific form of a thing; for every accident which is proper to some species, is derived from the essential principles of that species. Hence it is that to explain the characteristic passions of their subjects we take for the cause a definition designating the essential principles of the thing. But the principle of essence and quiddity is a form existing in determinate matter. Therefore such powers ought to proceed from forms of things according as they exist in their own matters.
|
Deinde, cum natura rei dicatur forma vel materia illius; si qua virtus alicuius rei ab his non derivetur, non erit tali rei naturalis, et per consequens nec actio vel passio a tali virtute procedens erit naturalis. Huiusmodi autem actiones quae sunt praeter naturam, non sunt diuturnae, sicut quod aqua calefacta calefacit; actiones autem occultae, de quibus nunc loquimur, eodem modo se habent semper, vel sicut frequenter. Relinquitur ergo virtutes quae sunt harum actionum principia, esse naturales et a forma rei procedere secundum quod in tali materia existit.
|
Secondly, since the nature of a thing is termed its form and matter, if a power of a thing should not be derived from them, it will not be a power natural to the thing, and consequently no activity or passion proceeding from such a power will be natural. Now such activities which go beyond nature are not abiding—for example, that water when heated heats; but secret activities of which we are now speaking are always the same, or as often as possible. Hence the conclusion that powers which are the principles of these actions are essential and proceed from a form according as it exists in such matter.
|
Formarum autem substantialium principium Platonici quidem attribuebant substantiis separatis, quas species vel ideas vocabant, quarum imagines dicebant esse formas naturales materiae impressas. Sed hoc principium non potest sufficere. Primo quidem, quia oportet faciens simile esse facto. Id autem quod fit in rebus naturalibus, non est forma, sed compositum ex materia et forma. Ad hoc enim aliquid fit, ut sit. Proprie autem esse dicitur compositum subsistens; forma autem dicitur esse ut quo aliquid est. Non igitur forma proprie est id quod fit, sed compositum. Id igitur quod facit res naturales non est forma tantum, sed compositum.
|
The Platonists indeed were wont to attribute the principle of substantial forms to separated substances which they called species or ideas, the individual representations of which they said were natural forms implanted in matter. But this principle cannot be sufficient. First, the thing making ought to be like the thing made. Now that which comes about in natural things is not form, but a mixture of matter and form; for to this purpose something is made, that it be. Properly it is said to be the subsistent composite whereas the form is said to be that whereby something is. Therefore, that which comes to be is not rightly form but a composite, and that which makes natural things to be is not only form but the composite.
|
Deinde formas absque materia existentes necesse est immobiles esse, quia motus est actus existentis in potentia, quod primo materiae convenit: unde necesse est quod semper eodem modo se habeant. A causa autem eodem modo se habente procedunt formae uniformiter se habentes: quod quidem in formis inferiorum corporum non apparet propter generationem et corruptionem huiusmodi corporum. Relinquitur igitur quod principia formarum huiusmodi corruptibilium corporum sunt caelestia corpora, quae diversimode se habentes secundum accessum et recessum, ad generationem et corruptionem in his inferioribus causant.
|
Secondly, forms existing apart from matter ought to be unmoved, because movement is an act of something in potency, which is the case with prime matter. And so these forms ought to be unchangeable. Now from a cause that is always the same proceed forms that are always the same. But this is not evident in the forms of inferior bodies, because of the coming-to-be and passing-away of these bodies. Therefore, of these corruptible bodies the principles of their forms are heavenly bodies, which, being different according to their rise and fall, cause coming-to-be and passing-away in inferior bodies.
|
Procedunt tamen huiusmodi formae a substantiis separatis sicut a primis principiis, quae mediante virtute et motu caelestium corporum imprimunt formas apud se intellectas in materiam corporalem. Et quia actiones et virtutes naturalium corporum ex formis specificis causari ostendimus; consequens est quod ulterius reducantur, sicut in altiora principia, et adhuc ulterius in substantias intellectuales separatas. Utrorumque autem principiorum vestigium quoddam apparet in ipsis naturalium rerum operibus. Nam quod huiusmodi naturae opera fiunt cum quadam transmutatione, et secundum certum temporis spatium, provenit ex corpore caelesti, per cuius motum temporis mensura definitur. Sed a substantiis separatis intellectualibus invenitur in naturae operibus quod determinatis viis ad determinatos fines ordine et modo congruissimo procedunt, sicut et ea quae fiunt ab arte: ita quod totum opus naturae videtur esse opus cuiusdam sapientis, propter quod natura dicitur sagaciter operari.
|
Nevertheless, such forms are derived from separated substances as first principles, which, through the power and movement of heavenly bodies, impress upon corporeal matter forms which they can understand in themselves. And, since we have shown that activities and powers of natural things are caused by their specific forms, it follows that they may be traced back further, namely to higher principles, to heavenly bodies or to the powers of heavenly bodies, and still further to separated intellectual substances. A trace of both of these principles is evident in the very workings of natural things; for the fact, that the activities of Nature take place with a certain change and according to a definite interval of time, is due to a heavenly body upon whose movement the reckoning of time is based. But due to separated intellectual substances one finds in the operations of Nature that they proceed along fixed paths to determined ends, with order and in a most fitting way, like those things which are made by human skill; so that the whole work of Nature seems to be the achievement of a wise agent. Thus Nature is said to act with wisdom.
|
Opus autem sapientis oportet esse ordinatum: nam hoc proprie ad sapientem pertinere dicimus, ut omnia convenienti ordine disponat. Quia igitur formae inferiorum corporum proveniunt ex sapientia substantiae separatae mediante virtute et motu caelestium corporum, necesse est in ipsis formis inferiorum corporum quemdam ordinem inveniri: ita scilicet, quod quaedam sint imperfectiores et materiae viciniores, quaedam autem perfectiores et propinquiores superioribus agentibus. Imperfectissimae quidem formae et maxime materiae propinquae, sunt formae elementorum, ex quibus alia inferiora corpora materialiter componuntur; quae quidem tanto sunt nobiliora, quanto a contrarietate elementorum recedentia, ad quamdam aequalitatem mixtionis accedunt; per quam quodammodo assimilantur caelestibus corporibus, quae sunt ab omni contrarietate aliena. Medium enim quod ex contrariis componitur, neutrum contrariorum est actu, sed potentia tantum. Et ideo, quanto huiusmodi corpora ad maiorem aequalitatem mixtionis accedunt, tanto nobiliorem formam participant, adeo quod corpus humanum, quod est temperatissimae commixtionis, ut probat bonitas tactus in homine, nobilissimam formam habeat, scilicet animam rationalem.
|
Now the work of a wise man ought be well-ordered; for we say rightly that this is characteristic of the sage, that he disposes of all things harmoniously. Therefore, because the forms of inferior things arise from the wisdom of separated substances through the intermediary of the power and movement of heavenly bodies, some order ought to be found among these forms of inferior bodies, and in such a way, namely, that some are less perfect and closer to natter, while others, however are more perfect and closer to superior agents. The most imperfect forms, though, and especially close to matter, are the forms of elements, of which the inferior bodies are composed as regards their matter. And these (inferior bodies) are indeed the more noble (the more) that, being removed from a contrariety of elements, they approach uniformity of composition, and thus become in some way or other like to heavenly bodies, which are free of all contrariety. Now that which is composed of contraries is neither of the contraries in act but only in potency. And therefore the greater the uniformity of mixture which such bodies approach, so much the more noble a form do they receive from God. Such is the human body, which, enjoying a most uniform composition, as the excellence of touch in men indicates, has a most noble form, namely a rational soul.
|
Virtutes autem et actiones necesse est formis proportionari utpote procedentes ex eis. Et inde est quod formas elementorum quae sunt maxime materiales, consequuntur qualitates activae et passivae, puta calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum et aliae huiusmodi qualitates quae pertinent ad dispositionem materiae. Formae vero mixtorum corporum sed inanimatorum, puta lapidum, metallorum, propter virtutes et actiones quas ab elementis participant ex quibus componuntur, quasdam alias nobiliores virtutes et actiones habent consequentes formas eorum specificas, puta quod aurum habet virtutem laetificandi cor, sapphyrus habet virtutem sanguinem constringendi. Et sic semper ascendendo, quanto formae specificae sunt nobiliores, tanto virtutes et operationes ex formis specificis procedentes excellentiores existunt: intantum quod nobilissima forma, quae est anima rationalis, habet virtutem et operationem intellectivam, quae non solum transcendit virtutem et actionem elementorum, sed etiam omnem actionem corporalem et virtutem.
|
Powers and activities ought to be in proportion to the forms from which they proceed. And thus it is that the forms of elements which are for the most part material give rise to active and passive qualities, for example, heat and cold, moisture and dryness and other similar things which regard the distribution of matter. But the forms of mixtures, namely of inanimate bodies like stones, metals, minerals, in addition to the powers and activities which they share with the elements of which they are composed, have certain other more noble virtues and activities arising from specific forms—for instance, gold gladdens the heart and the sapphire stops bleeding. Thus, always in an ascending order, the more noble the specific forms, so much the more excellent are the powers and operations which come from them, till that most noble form, the rational soul, is reached, which has intellectual power and activities which not only surpass the power and activity of the elements but also every corporeal power and activity.
|
Ex extremis igitur formis oportet de mediis iudicium sumere. Sicut enim virtus calefaciendi et infrigidandi est in igne et in aqua consequens proprias formas eorum, et virtus et actio intellectualis in homine consequens animam rationalem ipsius, ita omnes virtutes et actiones elementorum, consequuntur proprias formas eorum et reducuntur sicut in altiora principia in virtutes caelestium corporum, et adhuc altius in substantias separatas. Ex huiusmodi enim principiis formae inferiorum corporum derivantur, excepta sola rationali anima, quae ita ab immateriali causa procedit, scilicet Deo, quod nullo modo causatur ex virtute caelestium corporum; alioquin non posset habere virtutem et operationem intellectualem a corpore penitus absolutam.
|
Now from the forms at either end of the scale we ought to pass judgment on the forms in between. For as the power of heating and cooling is in fire and water as a result of their special forms, and as man's intellectual power and activity arise from his rational soul, so all powers and activities of things in between which exceed the virtues of the elements, arise from their proper forms, and are traced back to higher principles, to the powers of heavenly bodies, and still further to separated substances. For from these principles the forms of inferior bodies are derived, the rational sod alone excepted, which so proceeds from an immaterial cause, that is, from God, that it is in no way the product of the power of heavenly bodies. Otherwise it could not have intellectual power and activity wholly free of the body.
|
Quia igitur huiusmodi virtutes et actiones a forma specifica derivantur, quae est communis omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei, non est possibile quod aliquod individuum alicuius speciei aliquam talem virtutem vel actionem obtineat praeter alia individua similis speciei, ex eo scilicet quod est sub determinato situ caelestium corporum generatum. Possibile est tamen quod in uno individuo eiusdem speciei virtus et operatio consequens speciem vel intensius vel remissius inveniatur secundum diversam dispositionem materiae et diversum situm caelestium corporum in generatione huius vel illius individui.
|
Therefore, because such powers and workings are derived from a specific form which is common to all the individuals of the same species, it is impossible for an individual of a species to have some kind of power or activity beyond the other individuals of the same species, just because it came into being under a definite configuration of heavenly bodies. Yet it is possible that in an individual of the same species the power and activity arising from the species should be found more or less intense according to a diverse distribution of matter and the different configuration of the heavenly bodies at the coming into being of this or that individual.
|
Ex hoc autem apparet ulterius quod, quia formae artificiales sunt accidentia quae non consequuntur speciem: non est possibile quod aliquod artificiatum aliquam huiusmodi virtutem et operationem a caelesti corpore in sua compositione sortiatur ad producendum ex virtute indita aliquos effectus naturales transcendentes elementorum virtutes. Huiusmodi enim virtutes si quae essent artificiatis, ex caelestibus corporibus nullam formam consequerentur, cum forma artificialium nihil aliud sit quam ordo, compositio et figura, ex quibus prodire non possunt tales virtutes et actiones. Unde manifestum est quod si quas huiusmodi actiones aliqua artificiata perficiant, puta quod ad aliquam sculpturam moriantur serpentes aut immobilitentur animalia vel laedantur, non procedit hoc ex aliqua virtute indita et permanenti, sed solum ex virtute agentis extrinseci quod utitur talibus sicut instrumentis ad suum effectum.
|
From this it is further evident that artificial forms are certain accidents which do not arise from the species. For it is impossible that an artificial product can have or share in a heavenly body's operation and virtue, in order that, through some endowed power, it might effect natural results transcending the virtue of the elements. If there were any such powers in artificial things they would not arise from a form (impressed) by heavenly bodies, since the form produced) by the artisan is nothing other than order, composition and shape, from which such powers and activities cannot come Clearly, then, if artificial things evidence some such powers—for example, should serpents die at the sight of some sculpture or animals be paralyzed in their tracks or suffer injury—it does not come from same impressed and permanent virtue but from the power of an external agent, which uses these things as instruments for its own results.
|
Nec potest dici quod huiusmodi actiones proveniant ex virtute caelestium corporum, quia caelestia corpora naturaliter agunt in ista inferiora; et ex hoc quod aliquod corpus sic vel aliter figuratur, nullam idoneitatem vel maiorem vel minorem habet ad recipiendum impressionem naturalis agentis; unde non est possibile quod imagines vel sculpturae quae fiunt ad aliquos effectus singulares producendos, efficaciam habeant ex caelestibus corporibus, quamvis sub certis constellationibus fieri videantur, sed solum ab aliquibus spiritibus qui per imagines et sculpturas tales operantur.
|
Nor can it be said that such activities result from the power of heavenly bodies, because they act only in a natural way on those inferior things. And that a body has such and such a shape does not make it either more or less suitable for receiving the impression of a natural agent. Thus it is impossible, that images or sculptures which are made for producing extraordinary effects should have their efficacy from heavenly bodies, although they seem to be made under certain constellation. They have it only from superior agents which work through images and sculptures.
|
Sicut autem imagines ex materia naturali fiunt, sed formam sortiuntur ex arte; ita etiam verba humana materiam quidem habent naturalem, scilicet sonos ab hominis ore prolatos, sed significationem quasi formam habent ab intellectu suas conceptiones per huiusmodi sonos exprimente. Unde pari ratione nec verba humana habent efficaciam ad aliquam immutationem corporis naturalis ex virtute alicuius causae naturalis, sed solum ex aliqua spirituali substantia. Hae igitur actiones quae per huiusmodi verba fiunt, vel per quascumque imagines vel sculpturas, vel quaecumque alia huiusmodi, non sunt naturales, utpote non procedentes a virtute intrinseca, sed sunt empericae; et ad superstitionem pertinentes. Actiones vero quas supra diximus consequi corporum formas, sunt naturales, utpote ex principiis intrinsecis procedentes.
|
Just as images are made from natural matter, but get their form through human skill, so also human words have indeed their matter, that is, the sounds produced by the mouth of man, but they have their meaning and as it were their form from the intellect expressing its concepts through such sounds. And so, for a like reason, human words do not have any efficacy for changing a natural body through the power of some natural cause, but only through some spiritual substance. For these works which are effected through such words, or through any kind of image or sculpture, or any such things, are not natural, because they do not spring from an intrinsic but only from an extrinsic virtue. Rather they are to be classed as superstition. The activities, however, which we have said above arise from the forms of things are natural, because they proceed from internal principles.
|
Et haec de operationibus et actionibus occultis ad praesens dicta sufficiant.
|
And so let what has been said about hidden workings and activities suffice for the present.
|
De Motu Cordis
|
On the Motion of the Heart
|
ad magistrum Philippum de Castro Caeli
|
to Master Philip of Castro Caeli
|
Quia omne quod movetur, necesse est habere motorem, dubitabile videtur quid moveat cor, et qualis motus eius sit. Non enim videtur eius motus esse ab anima. Ab anima enim nutritiva non movetur, animae enim nutritivae opera sunt generare, alimento uti, et augmentum et diminutio: quorum nullum motus cordis esse videtur. Et anima quidem nutritiva etiam plantis inest; motus autem cordis animalium proprius est. Neque sensitivae animae motus esse videtur, sed nec intellectivae, intellectus enim et sensus non movent nisi mediante appetitu: motus autem cordis involuntarius est.
|
Since everything that is moved must have a mover, the problem arises: what moves the heart and exactly what kind of movement does it have? For first of all, it does not seem that any soul moves it. The nutritive soul does not move it, since its activities are generation, nutrition, growth and diminution. But the motion of the heart is none of these. Moreover, the nutritive soul is also in plants, but the motion of the heart belongs to animals only. Neither do the sensitive and intellectual souls move it, since sense and intellect move only by means of appetite. But the motion of the heart is involuntary.
|
Sed neque naturalis esse videtur. Est enim ad contrarias partes: componitur enim ex pulsu et tractu; motus autem naturalis ad unam partem est, ut ignis sursum, et terrae deorsum. Dicere autem motum cordis esse violentum, est omnino extra rationem. Manifeste enim hoc motu subtracto, moritur animal, nullum autem violentum conservat naturam. Videtur quidem igitur hic motus maxime naturalis esse, vita enim animalis et hic motus se inseparabiliter consequuntur.
|
In fact the heart's motion does not even seem to be natural, since it is made up of opposite types of movements: push and pull. But natural motion is toward one opposite, not both, such as the motion of fire, which is only up, and that of earth, which is down. On the other hand, to say that the motion of the heart is violent is irrational. For obviously if we do away with this motion, we end up doing away with (i.e., killing) the animal, but nothing violent preserves a nature. Indeed, the heart's motion must be most natural, since animal life is inseparably united to it.
|
Dicunt autem quidam hunc motum naturalem esse non ab aliqua particulari natura intrinseca animali, sed ab aliqua natura universali, vel etiam ab intelligentia. Sed hoc ridiculum apparet. In omnibus enim rebus naturalibus propriae passiones alicuius generis vel speciei aliquod principium intrinsecum consequuntur. Naturalia enim sunt quorum principium motus in ipsis est. Nihil autem est magis proprium animalibus quam motus cordis; quo cessante, perit eorum vita. Oportet igitur inesse ipsis animalibus aliquod principium huius motus.
|
Now some who say that it is a natural motion claim that its source is not the particular nature of the animal, but some outside universal nature, or an intelligence. But this is absurd. For in all natural things, both common and specific properties in them result from an intrinsic principle. Natural things, by definition, have their principle of motion in them. But nothing is more proper to animals than the motion of the heart, for once it stops, the animal dies. Therefore, it follows that the principle of such a motion must be in the animal.
|
Adhuc, si aliqui motus corporibus inferioribus ex natura universali causentur, non semper eis adsunt: sicut in fluxu et refluxu maris apparet quod consequitur motum lunae, et secundum ipsum variatur. Motus autem cordis semper adest animali. Non igitur est ab aliqua causa separata tantum, sed a principio intrinseco.
|
In addition, when the motions in lower bodies are caused by a universal nature, such motions are not always present in them. Take, for example, the ebb and flow of ocean tides, which result from the motion of the moon and change in accord with it. But the motion of the heart is always present in the animal. Therefore, the heart's motion does not result from a separate cause but from an intrinsic principle.
|
Dicunt igitur alii principium huius motus in animali esse ipsum calorem, qui per spiritus generatos movet cor. Sed hoc irrationabile est. Illud enim quod est principalius in aliqua re, oportet esse causam. Principalius autem videtur esse in animali motus cordis et magis contemporaneum vitae, quam quaecumque alteratio secundum calorem. Non igitur alteratio secundum calorem est causa motus cordis, sed magis e converso motus cordis est causa alterationis secundum calorem. Unde et Aristoteles dicit in libro ｟<i>｠De motu animalium oportet quod futurum est movere, non alteratione tale esse｟</i>｠.
|
Some others say that the principle of this motion in the animal is heat, which being generated by spirit moves the heart. But this is unreasonable. For the deeper principle is more likely to be the primary cause. But the motion of the heart is a deeper principle in the animal and more contemporaneous with life than even warmth. Therefore warmth is not the cause of the heart's motion, but on the contrary the heart's motion is the cause of warmth. Thus the Philosopher says in ｟<i>｠On the Motion of Animals｟</i>｠ 10: ｟<i>｠what is about to create motion, not by means of alteration, is of this kind｟</i>｠ (703a24-25).
|
Item animal perfectum, quod est movens seipsum, maxime accedit ad similitudinem totius universi: unde et homo qui est perfectissimum animalium, dicitur a quibusdam minor mundus. In universo autem primus motus est motus localis, qui est causa alterationis et aliorum motuum. Unde et in animali magis videtur motus localis esse alterationis principium, quam e converso. Unde et Aristoteles in VIII ｟<i>｠Physicorum｟</i>｠, hanc similitudinem sequens, dicit quod motus est ｟<i>｠ut vita quaedam natura existentibus omnibus｟</i>｠.
|
There is another way of responding to their opinion: A fully developed animal, one that is capable of moving itself, is more like the whole universe than anything else. This is why man, who is the most fully developed of animals, is called by some a microcosm. Now in the universe the first motion is local motion, which causes alteration and the other motions. So we more clearly see in animals that local motion is the principle of alteration, and not the contrary. As the Philosopher says in book 8 of the ｟<i>｠Physics｟</i>｠: ｟<i>｠for all natural things, to move is to live｟</i>｠.
|
Adhuc, quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per accidens. Primus autem motus animalis est motus cordis; calor autem non movet localiter nisi per accidens: per se enim caloris est alterare, per accidens autem movere secundum locum. Ridiculum igitur est dicere, quod calor sit principium motus cordis, sed oportet ei assignare causam quae per se possit esse principium motus localis.
|
Yet another way: the essential is prior to the accidental. But the first motion of the animal is the motion of the heart. Heat, on the other hand, does not move something else into another place except incidentally. For an essential feature of heat is to warm, and incidentally to move something from one place to another. Therefore, it is ridiculous to say that heat is the principle of the heart's motion. Rather, we need to find a cause that is in its essential makeup a principle of local motion.
|
Principium igitur huius considerationis hinc oportet accipere quod, sicut Aristoteles dicit in octavo ｟<i>｠Physicorum｟</i>｠, ｟<i>｠quorumcumque principium motus in seipsis est, haec natura dicimus moveri. Unde animal quidem totum natura ipsum seipsum movet; corpus tamen eius contingit et natura et extra naturam moveri. Differt enim secundum qualem motum quod movetur eveniat, et ex quali elemento constet｟</i>｠. Cum enim animal movetur deorsum, quidem est motus eius naturalis et toti animali et corpori, eo quod in corpore animalis elementum grave praedominatur. Cum autem animal movetur sursum, est quidem naturalis motus animali, quia est a principio intrinseco ipsius quod est anima; non tamen est naturale corpori gravi; unde et magis fatigatur animal in hoc motu. Motus autem secundum locum in animalibus causatur ex appetitu et apprehensione sensitiva vel intellectiva, ut Aristoteles docet in tertio ｟<i>｠De anima｟</i>｠.
|
Therefore, from this point on we should take as a principle of our investigation what the Philosopher says in ｟<i>｠Physics｟</i>｠ 8 (254b16-20): ｟<i>｠of those things whose principle of motion is in themselves, we say they are moved by nature. So, even when an animal as a whole moves itself by nature, its body can sometimes be moved both by its own nature and by something outside its nature. For there is a difference between the kind of motion that it happens to undergo and its elemental composition｟</i>｠. For when an animal descends it undergoes a motion natural both to it as a whole and to its body, since in the body of an animal the dominant element is heavy, whose nature is to move downward. But when an animal rises it undergoes a motion natural to it as a whole, because its source is an intrinsic principle, namely the soul; nevertheless, this motion is not natural to the heavy body. This is why an animal tires out more in this kind of motion. Another point to consider is that animals move from place to place because of their desires or intellect, as the Philosopher teaches in the third book of ｟<i>｠On the Soul｟</i>｠ (433a9-b30).
|
In aliis quidem animalibus totus processus motus naturalis est: non enim agunt a proposito, sed a natura: naturaliter enim et hirundo facit nidum et aranea telam. Solius autem hominis est a proposito operari, et non a natura. Sed tamen cuiuslibet suae operationis principium naturale est. Quamvis enim conclusiones scientiarum speculativarum et practicarum non naturaliter sciat, sed ratiocinando inveniat, prima tamen principia indemonstrabilia sunt ei naturaliter nota, ex quibus ad alia scienda procedit. Similiter ex parte appetitus, appetere ultimum finem, qui est felicitas, est homini naturale, et fugere miseriam; sed appetere alia non est naturale, sed ex appetitu ultimi finis procedit in appetitum aliorum: sic enim est finis in appetibilibus, ut principium indemonstrabile in intellectualibus, ut dicitur in II ｟<i>｠Physicorum｟</i>｠. Sic igitur et cum motus omnium aliorum membrorum causentur ex motu cordis, ut probat Aristoteles in libro ｟<i>｠De motu animalium｟</i>｠, motus quidem alii possunt esse voluntarii, sed primus motus qui est cordis, est naturalis.
|
Therefore, in animals that act only by nature and not by intent, the whole process of motion is natural. For the sparrow naturally makes a nest and the spider a web. But only man acts from intent and not by nature. Nevertheless, the principle of every human action is natural. For although the conclusions of the theoretical and practical sciences are not naturally known, but rather are discovered through reasoning, nevertheless the first indemonstrable principles are naturally known, and from them we come to know other things. In the same way, the desire for the ultimate goal, happiness, is natural to humans, as is the aversion toward unhappiness. Thus, the desire for things other than what constitute happiness is not natural. The desire for these other things proceeds from the desire of the ultimate goal. For the goal in acts of desire is just like the indemonstrable principles in acts of the intellect, as is said in the second book of ｟<i>｠Physics｟</i>｠ (200a15-25). And so even though the movements of all the other parts of the body are caused by the heart, as the Philosopher proves in ｟<i>｠On the Motion of Animals｟</i>｠ (703a14), these movements can still be voluntary, while the first movement, that of the heart, is natural.
|
Oportet autem considerare quod motus sursum est naturalis igni eo quod consequitur formam eius: unde et generans, quod dat formam, est per se movens secundum locum. Sicut autem formam elementi consequitur aliquis motus naturalis, nihil prohibet et alias formas alios motus naturales sequi. Videmus enim quod ferrum naturaliter movetur ad magnetem, qui tamen motus non est ei naturalis secundum rationem gravis et levis, sed secundum quod habet talem formam. Sic igitur et animal inquantum habet talem formam quae est anima, nihil prohibet habere aliquem motum naturalem; et movens hunc motum est quod dat formam.
|
Moreover, let us recall that an upward motion is natural to fire as a result of its form, and hence that what generates fire, giving it its form, is essentially a place-to-place mover. In addition, just as a natural motion can result from the form of an element in a natural object, so also nothing prohibits other natural motions resulting from different forms in the same natural object. For example, we see that iron naturally moves toward a magnet, which motion is not natural to it as something heavy, but as something having a particular kind of form. In the same way, therefore, insofar as the animal has a particular kind of form, namely the soul, nothing prohibits it from having a natural motion as a result of that form. And the cause responsible for this motion would be what gives the form.
|
Dico autem motum naturalem animalis eum qui est cordis: quia, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro ｟<i>｠De motu animalium｟</i>｠, ｟<i>｠existimandum est constare animal quemadmodum civitatem bene legibus rectam. In civitate enim quando semel stabilitus fuerit ordo, nihil opus est separato monarcho quem oporteat adesse per singula eorum quae fiunt, sed ipse quilibet facit quae ipsius ut ordinatum est, et fit hoc post hoc propter consuetudinem. In animalibus autem idem hoc propter naturam fit: et quia natum est unumquodque sic constantium facere proprium opus, ut nihil opus sit in unoquoque esse animam, scilicet inquantum est principium motus, sed in quodam principio corporis existente alia quidem vivere, eo quod adnata sunt, facere autem proprium opus propter naturam｟</i>｠. Sic igitur motus cordis est naturalis quasi consequens animam, inquantum est forma talis corporis, et principaliter cordis.
|
I myself say that the motion of the heart is a natural motion of the animal. As the Philosopher says in ｟<i>｠On the Motion of Animals｟</i>｠, ｟<i>｠we should consider the animal as if it was a city under good and legitimate governance. For in a city with this kind of stability of order, there is no need for a separate ruler for each and every event, but instead everyone does everything as planned, and things proceed according to custom. The same thing happens in animals naturally. For every part of the animal is naturally equipped to perform its own special function, so that there is no need for a soul in each and every part as a cause of motion. Rather, with the soul present in the principle of the body, the other parts live and perform their own special work as nature made them｟</i>｠. Thus, the motion of the heart is a natural result of the soul, the form of the living body and principally of the heart.
|
Et forte secundum hunc intellectum aliqui dixerunt motum cordis esse ab intelligentia, inquantum posuerunt animam ab intelligentia esse, sicut Aristoteles dicit motum gravium et levium esse a generante, inquantum dat formam quae est principium motus. Omnis autem proprietas et motus consequitur aliquam formam secundum conditionem ipsius, sicut formam nobilissimi elementi, puta ignis, consequitur motus ad locum nobilissimum, qui est sursum. Forma autem nobilissima in inferioribus est anima, quae maxime accedit ad similitudinem principii motus caeli. Unde et motus ipsam consequens simillimus est motui caeli: sic enim est motus cordis in animali, sicut motus caeli in mundo.
|
Perhaps this is why some who have understood this go on to say that the heart's movement is caused by an intelligence, for they think that the soul comes from an intelligence, which is similar to what the Philosopher says in ｟<i>｠Physics｟</i>｠ 8 (255b31-256a3) about the movement of heavy and light things coming from a generator that gives the form which is the principle of their motion. But it is important to note that every property and movement is a result of a form in a particular condition. So as a result of the form of a subtle element like fire, there is motion to a subtle place, namely upwards motion. Now the most subtle form on earth is the soul, which is most like the principle of the motion of the heavens. Thus, the motion that results from the soul is most like the motion of the heavens. In other words, the heart moves in the animal as the heavenly bodies move in the cosmos.
|
Sed tamen necesse est motum cordis a motu caeli deficere sicut et principiatum deficit a principio. Est autem motus caeli circularis et continuus, et hoc competit ei inquantum est principium omnium motuum mundi: accessu enim et recessu corpus caeleste imponit rebus principium et finem essendi, et sua continuitate conservat ordinem in motibus, qui non sunt semper. Motus autem cordis principium quidem est omnium motuum qui sunt in animali; unde Aristoteles dicit in III ｟<i>｠De partibus animalium｟</i>｠ quod ｟<i>｠motus delectabilium et tristium et totaliter omnis sensus hinc incipientes videntur, scilicet in corde, et ad hoc terminari｟</i>｠. Unde ad hoc quod cor esset principium et finis omnium motuum, habet quemdam motum non quidem circularem sed similem circulari, compositum scilicet ex tractu et pulsu; unde Aristoteles dicit in III ｟<i>｠De anima｟</i>｠, quod ｟<i>｠movens organice est ubi est principium et finis idem. Omnia autem pulsu et tractu moventur; propter quod oportet sicut in circulo manere aliquid et hinc incipere motum｟</i>｠. Est etiam motus iste continuus durante vita animalis, nisi inquantum necesse est intercidere morulam mediam inter pulsum et tractum, eo quod deficiat a motu circulari.
|
Nevertheless the heart's motion is not exactly like the heavens', in the same way that what follows from a principle is never exactly like the principle itself. Now as the principle of all the motions in the universe, the motion of the heavens is circular and continuous. For the approach and departure of a heavenly body coordinates with the beginning and end of existence, and by its own continuous movement it preserves the order among moving things that do not exist forever. The motion of the heart, however, is the principle of all movements in the animal. This is why the Philosopher says in the third book of ｟<i>｠On the Parts of Animals｟</i>｠: ｟<i>｠the movements of pleasure and pain and of all the senses seems to arise there｟</i>｠, namely in the heart, and they also end there. Thus, in order for the heart to be the beginning and end of all motions in the animal, it had to have a movement that is like a circle, but not exactly circular, composed namely from a push and pull. And so the Philosopher says in the third book of ｟<i>｠On the Soul｟</i>｠: ｟<i>｠a natural and organic cause of motion is both the source and termination of the motion｟</i>｠. Now since all things are moved by pushes and pulls, it is necessary that something exists in a nearly circular state and that motion arises from it. We can also say it is a continuous movement as long as the animal lives, unless it is necessary to have a rest in between the push and pull (for it is not a perfectly circular motion).
|
Per hoc igitur de facili solvuntur quae in contrarium obiici possunt. Neque enim dicimus motum cordis esse naturalem cordi inquantum est grave vel leve, sed inquantum est animatum tali anima; et duo motus qui videntur contrarii sunt quasi partes unius motus compositi ex utroque, inquantum deficit a simplicitate motus circularis, quem tamen imitatur inquantum est ab eodem in idem. Et sic non est inconveniens si quodammodo sit ad diversas partes, quia et motus circularis aliqualiter sic est.
|
We are now in a good position to consider objections to the contrary. For we see that the heart's motion is not natural to it as something having weight, but insofar as it is animated by a particular kind of soul. Moreover, the two motions that make up the complex movement of the heart seem contrary because the heart does not perfectly have the simplicity of circular motion, but it does imitate that motion since where it moves from it also moves toward. Thus, it is not problematic that its motion is in some way to different parts, for even circular motion is like this.
|
Neque etiam oportet quod causetur ex apprehensione et appetitu, quamvis causetur ab anima sensitiva; non enim causatur ab anima sensitiva per operationem suam, sed inquantum est forma et natura talis corporis. Motus autem progressivus animalis causatur per operationem sensus et appetitus; et propter hoc medici distinguunt operationes vitales ab operationibus animalibus, et quod animalibus cessantibus remanent vitales, vitalia appellantes quae motum cordis concomitantur. Et hoc rationabiliter: ｟<i>｠vivere enim viventibus est esse｟</i>｠, ut dicitur in II ｟<i>｠De anima｟</i>｠; esse autem unicuique est a propria forma.
|
Next, there is no need to say that the heart's motion arises from either sensing or desiring, although it does arise from the sensitive soul. For the heart is not caused to move by the sensitive soul's activities, but insofar as that soul is the form and nature of a particular kind of body. On the other hand, the progressive motion of an animal is caused by the activities of sensing and desiring. This is why doctors distinguish vital functions from animal functions and say that even when the animal functions cease, the vitals may remain. They call the vitals those functions that are immediately related to the heart's motion, such that when they cease life ceases. This position is reasonable. ｟<i>｠For to live for living beings is to exist｟</i>｠, as is said in the second book of ｟<i>｠On the Soul｟</i>｠; but the existence of anything is from its own form.
|
Hoc autem differt inter animam et principium motus caeli, quod illud principium non movetur neque per se neque per accidens, anima autem sensitiva etsi non moveatur per se, movetur tamen per accidens: unde proveniunt in ipsa diversae apprehensiones et affectiones. Unde motus caeli semper est uniformis, motus autem cordis variatur secundum diversas apprehensiones et affectiones animae. Non enim affectiones animae causantur ab alterationibus cordis, sed potius causant eas; unde in passionibus animae, utputa in ira, formale est, quod est ex parte affectionis, scilicet quod sit appetitus vindictae; materiale autem quod pertinet ad alterationem cordis, utpote quod sit accensio sanguinis circa cor. Non autem in rebus naturalibus forma est propter materiam, sed e converso, ut probatur in II ｟<i>｠Physicorum｟</i>｠, sed in materia est dispositio ad formam. Non igitur propter hoc aliquis appetit vindictam quia sanguis accenditur circa cor, sed ex hoc aliquis est dispositus ad iram; irascitur autem ex appetitu vindictae.
|
We should note that there is a difference between the principle of the heavenly motion and the soul. The former is not moved in any way at all, neither essentially nor incidentally, but the sensitive soul, although unmoved essentially, is moved incidentally. Thus, different types of sensations and emotions arise in it. So, whereas the heavenly movement is always uniform, the heart's movement varies according to the different emotions and sensations of the soul. For the sensations of the soul are not caused by changes in the heart, but just the opposite is the case. This is why in the passions of the soul, such as anger, there is a formal part that pertains to a feeling, which in this example would be the desire for vengeance. And there is a material part that pertains to the heart's motion, which in the example would be the blood enkindled around the heart. But in the things of nature, the form is not the result of the matter, but on the contrary, as is evident in the second book of ｟<i>｠Physics｟</i>｠, matter has a disposition for form. Therefore, although someone does not desire revenge because his blood is burning around the heart, he is more prone to become angry because of it. But actually being angry is from the desire for vengeance.
|
Quamvis autem aliqua variatio accidat in motu cordis ex apprehensione diversa et affectione, non tamen ista variatio motus est voluntaria, sed involuntaria, quia non fit per imperium voluntatis. Dicit enim Aristoteles in libro ｟<i>｠De causa motus animalium｟</i>｠, quod ｟<i>｠multoties apparente aliquo, non tamen iubente intellectu, movetur｟</i>｠ cor et pudendum, et huius causam assignat ｟<i>｠quoniam necesse est alterari naturali alteratione animalia; alteratis autem partibus, haec quidem augeri, haec autem detrimentum pati, ut iam moveantur et permutentur natis haberi permutationibus invicem. Causae autem motuum caliditas et frigiditas, quae de foris et intus existentes naturales. Et praeter rationem utique facti motus dictarum partium, idest cordis et pudendi, alteratione incidente fiunt. Intellectus enim et phantasia factiva passionum afferunt｟</i>｠, ut concupiscentiae, irae et huiusmodi, ex quibus cor calescit et infrigidatur.
|
Now although some change occurs in the heart's motion because of different sensations and feelings, nevertheless such change is involuntary, for it does not come about through the command of the will. For as the Philosopher says in ｟<i>｠On the Cause of the Motion of Animals｟</i>｠, ｟<i>｠often something will be seen which, without any command of the mind, moves｟</i>｠ the heart and private parts, the cause of which he says is ｟<i>｠the natural susceptibility animals have to physical changes. For when its parts undergo change, one part increasing and another decreasing, then naturally the whole animal moves and goes through a sequence of changes. Now warmth and cold, whether from the outside or occurring naturally within, cause such motions of the heart and private parts in animals, even against reason, by yet another incidental change. For the mind and imagination can cause｟</i>｠ a feeling of lust or anger or other passions, on account of which the heart is heated or cooled.
|
Et haec de motu cordis ad praesens dicta sufficient.
|
And let this be enough said on the motion of the heart.
|
Abjiciamus opera
|
Let Us Cast Off the Works of Darkness
|
Sermo eadem Dominica
|
Sermon on the First Sunday of Advent
|
Item sermo fratris Thome de Aquino editus eadem Dominica in domo praedicatorum bononiae coram universitate.
|
This sermon of Friar Thomas Aquinas was preached the same Sunday in the house of the Dominicans of Bologna in the presence of the university.
|
Ad Romanos. XIII.
|
Romans 13:12
|
Abiciamus opera tenebrarum et induamur arma lucis.
|
Let us throw off the works of the darkness and put on the arms of the light.
|
Apostolus christianorum doctor et dux in fide et veritate, in tempore hoc Domini nostri gratiosi adventus, per verba ista, sive in hiis verbis, informat ad duo, scilicet ad liberalem horrorem omnium mundialium macularum et vitiorum, et ad honorabilem amorem sive assecutionem celestium virtutum.
|
The Apostle, teacher of the Christians and leader in faith and truth, formulates this in this time of the gracious coming of our Lord with these words, or in these words, for two reasons: in order to stir up a liberating abhorrence of all worldly stains and vices as well as an honorable love or pursuit of heavenly virtues.
|
Primum facit cum dicit: ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠abiciamus opera tenebrarum｟</i>｠｟</b>｠,
|
The first thing he does when he says: ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠let us throw off the works of the darkness｟</i>｠｟</b>｠;
|
secundum cum subdit: ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠et induamur arma lucis｟</i>｠｟</b>｠.
|
the second, when he adds: ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠and let us put on the arms of the light｟</i>｠｟</b>｠.
|
Circa primum nota quod opera et vicia mundi tenebrosa dicuntur et ideo abicienda:
|
Concerning the first thing, note that the works and the vices of the world are called “dark,” and that therefore they must be thrown off.
|
quia in eis est manifestus defectus sapientiae ad cognoscendum veritatem; Iohannis I: ｟<i>｠lux in tenebris lucet et tenebre eum non｟</i>｠ cognoverunt.
|
For there is in them an obvious lack of the wisdom that is needed in order to arrive at the truth which we are to know. John 1:5 reads: ｟<i>｠the light shines in the darkness and the darkness did not recognize｟</i>｠ ｟<i>｠it｟</i>｠.
|
quia in eis est manifestus defectus providenciae ad precavendum malum, Sapientiae XVII: ｟<i>｠tenebroso oblivionis velamento dispersi sunt｟</i>｠.
|
Furthermore, in darkness there is an obvious lack of foresight, which is needed for preventing evil. Wisdom 17:3 reads: ｟<i>｠they are scattered by a dark veil of forgetfulness｟</i>｠.
|
Circa secundum nota quod opera Evangelii et carismata Spiritus sancti sunt nobis arma contra mundum, carnem et diabolum, et constituunt in luce:
|
Concerning the second point, note that the works of the Gospel and the spiritual gifts of the Holy Spirit are for us the arms against the world, the flesh, and the devil, and that they make us stand firm in the light.
|
quia per effectum gratiae illuminantis instar lucis faciunt nos agnoscere divinum secretum; II <ad> Corinthios III: ｟<i>｠Deus autem qui dixit de tenebris lucem splendescere｟</i>｠ etc.
|
Because through the effect of enlightening grace, which is like a light, they cause us to recognize the divine secret. In 2 Corinthians 4:6 it says: ｟<i>｠yet God, who has said that light will shine from the darkness, has shone his light in our hearts in order to bring to light the knowledge of the glory of God which is on the face of Jesus Christ｟</i>｠.
|
quia per effectum gratiae conciliantis instar lucis pacificant quod intra nos gestamus bellum, Proverbiorum XVI: ｟<i>｠mandatum lucerna est et lex lux｟</i>｠ etc.
|
Because by the effect of reconciling grace, which is like a light, these [spiritual gifts] make peace when we wage war among ourselves (cf. Gal 5:22–23). Proverbs 6:23 says: ｟<i>｠the commandment is a lamp and the law a light｟</i>｠, et cetera.
|
quia per effectum gratiae honestantis instar lucis decorant nos et in nobis totum universum; Iohannis V: ｟<i>｠ille erat lucerna ardens et lucens｟</i>｠.
|
Because through the effect of the grace of honesty, which is like a light, they make us beautiful, and, in us, the whole universe. John 5:35 reads: ｟<i>｠he was a burning and light-giving lamp｟</i>｠.
|
Caelum et terra
|
Heaven and Earth Shall Pass Away
|
Redactio parisiensis
|
Sermon on the First Sunday of Advent
|
Luce. XXI.
|
Luke 21:33
|
Caelum et terra transibunt.
|
Heaven and earth will pass.
|
Sermo
|
Part I
|
In verbis istis quae Salvator noster clementissimus, tanquam piissimus pastor et providus ovium suarum saluti consulens, ad cautelam futuri iudicii discipulis in persona omnium fidelium commendavit, littera praetermissa quia plana est, secundum spiritualem intelligentiam describitur iusti et iniusti conditionis pulcra sed difformis varietas, dum ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠caeli｟</i>｠｟</b>｠ nomine ponitur caelestis viri mira sublimitas et ｟<i>｠｟<b>｠terra｟</b>｠｟</i>｠ nomine ponitur mundani digna vilitas, et per verbum ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠transeundi｟</i>｠｟</b>｠ caute ponitur conversationis utrorumque qualitas.
|
｟<b>｠｟<i>｠Heaven and earth will pass｟</i>｠｟</b>｠ (Luke 21:33). In these words the situation of the just and the unjust is described according to a spiritual knowledge. Our most providential and meek Savior commended these words—out of care for his sheep’s salvation in faith (cf. John 10:13)—to his disciples and in them to all believers for serious attention to the Last Judgment, without mentioning the term, because it is clear. By the noun ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠heaven｟</i>｠｟</b>｠ the marvelous loftiness of the heavenly man is mentioned, and by the noun ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠earth｟</i>｠｟</b>｠ the deserved lowliness of the worldly person is mentioned, and by the verb ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠will pass｟</i>｠｟</b>｠ he carefully refers to a distinctive quality of each.
|
Describens ergo caelestis viri sublimitatem miram et eminentiam dignam appellat eum 'caelum'. Considerandum autem quod caeli nomine caelestis vir designatur propter multiplicem proprietatem ipsius caeli. Est enim ｟<i>｠｟<b>｠caelum｟</b>｠｟</i>｠:
|
So, as he describes the marvelous loftiness and the worthy eminence of the heavenly man, he calls him “heaven.” Yet we must consider that the heavenly man is signified by the noun “heaven” for four reasons:
|
Primo luminose materie. Sic vir caelestis est luminosus per irradiatam divinitus evangelicam sapientiam, Ecclesiastici XXIIII: ｟<i>｠ego feci in caelis ut oriretur lumen indeficiens｟</i>｠. ｟<i>｠In caelis｟</i>｠, id est in sanctis viris facit aeterna Sapientia Patris spirituale sapientiae ｟<i>｠lumen.｟</i>｠
|
Heaven is of a great brightness, as the Philosopher demonstrates in Book 2 of ｟<i>｠On Heaven and Earth｟</i>｠. Thus it is shown that the just man ought to be full of light by heavenly wisdom, as we read in Sirach 24:4: ｟<i>｠I have made my home in heaven, so that perfect light may rise｟</i>｠.
|
Secundo est circularis seu orbicularis formae. Sic vir caelestis est circularis per capacem compassionem et misericordiae pietatem, Ecclesiastici XXIIII: ｟<i>｠girum caeli｟</i>｠, id est cor capax misericordiae et pietatis, ｟<i>｠circuivi sola｟</i>｠, ego supple Sapientia Patris, secum inhabitando per gratiam.
|
It has a splendid appearance, as the Philosopher demonstrates in Book 2 of ｟<i>｠On Heaven and Earth｟</i>｠. Thus it is shown that the just man ought to be like a circle by a wide mercy, or like an orbit by a broad devotion and perfect love. ｟<i>｠I alone have gone round the canopy of heaven｟</i>｠, says eternal Wisdom in Sirach 24:5.
|
Tertio est causatiuum et ordinatissimum motu. Sic vir iustus semper motus invenitur per diligentiam et ordinatus per honestatem, Iob XXXVIII: ｟<i>｠quis enarrabit caelorum rationem et concentum caeli quis dormire facit.｟</i>｠ Et iterum ibidem: ｟<i>｠numquid nosti ordinem caeli｟</i>｠?
|
It sets in motion, as the Philosopher shows in Book 8 of ｟<i>｠Physics｟</i>｠. Thus it is shown that the just man ought to be moved always by a spiritual carefulness. Job 38:37 reads: ｟<i>｠who will narrate the heavens’ thoughts, and who will put to sleep what they contain?｟</i>｠
|
Quarto est altissimum situ. Sic vir iustus sanctitatis per eminentiam, Iob XXV: ｟<i>｠suspice caelum quod altior te sit.｟</i>｠
|
It is high in location, as the sight and the effect of it prove. By this it is pointed out that the just man ought to excel in holiness by eminence. Because, as we read in Sirach 43:1: ｟<i>｠the firmament of highness｟</i>｠—that is, the highness of the firmament—｟<i>｠is his beauty, the sight of heaven in a vision of glory｟</i>｠.
|
Sic descripta breviter caelestis viri sublimitate mira nomine caeli, subiungitur mundani hominis vilitas nomine ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠terre｟</i>｠｟</b>｠. Sciendum tamen quod vir iniustus comparatur terre:
|
The worldly man is absolutely not comparable to him; he is compared to the earth, [as follows:]
|
Primo ratione compacitatis intelligentiae, Genesis I: ｟<i>｠terra autem erat inanis et vacua et tenebre erant super faciem abyssi｟</i>｠.
|
On the ground of his capacity of understanding, as we read in Genesis 1:2: ｟<i>｠darkness was over the face of the abyss. The earth was void and empty｟</i>｠.
|
Secundo ratione infirmitatis avaritie. Talibus dicitur <ad> Colossenses III: ｟<i>｠quae sursum sunt sapite, non quae super terram.｟</i>｠
|
On the ground of the weakness of avarice, as we read in Colossians 3:2: ｟<i>｠taste the things that are above, not those upon the earth｟</i>｠ and Psalms 44:25 says: ｟<i>｠our stomach is stuck to the ground｟</i>｠.
|
Tertio ratione ariditatis malitiae. Tales enim sunt sicci et aridi｟<i>｠,｟</i>｠ Genesis I: ｟<i>｠vocavit Deus aridam terram.｟</i>｠
|
On the ground of the aridity of wickedness (cf. John 4:10–15), as we read in Genesis 1:10: ｟<i>｠and God called the arid land ‘earth.’｟</i>｠
|
Quarto ratione immutabilitatis propositi. Tales enim non moventur ad penitentiam, Ecclesiastes I: ｟<i>｠terra in aeternum stat｟</i>｠.
|
On the ground of the immutability of the soul, or of the life, or opinion, as we find it in Ecclesiastes 1:4: ｟<i>｠the earth truly stands forever｟</i>｠.
|
Descripta autem mundani hominis vilitate dignissima et iusti sublimitate mira, subditur utrorumque conversationis distinguenda qualitas sub verbo ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠transeundi｟</i>｠｟</b>｠. Notandum vero quod diversimode transire dicitur iustus et iniustus.
|
Well, now that the most deserved disdain toward the worldly man and the marvelous loftiness of the just have been described, the quality of the way of life of each of them must be distinguished, in view of the verb “to pass (｟<i>｠transire｟</i>｠).” Indeed, we must note that passing is said of the just in a different way than of the unjust.
|
Transit enim iustus:
|
For the just passes on,
|
Primo de peccato ad iustitiam, Isaias XLV: ｟<i>｠viri sublimes｟</i>｠ et peccatores superbi ｟<i>｠ad te transibunt et tui erunt.｟</i>｠
|
firstly, from sin to justice, as it says in Isaiah 45:14: ｟<i>｠lofty men｟</i>｠ and proud sinners ｟<i>｠will pass over to you, and they will be yours｟</i>｠.
|
Transit secundo de virtute ad virtutem proficiendo, Ecclesiastici XXIX: ｟<i>｠transi hospes, orna mensam｟</i>｠, id est conscientiam sponso caelesti.
|
He passes, secondly, by advancing from virtue to virtue, as it says in Sirach 29:26: ｟<i>｠pass, stranger; prepare the table｟</i>｠, meaning, ｟<i>｠prepare your conscience for the heavenly spouse｟</i>｠ (cf. Prov 9:1–6).
|
Transit tertio de presenti labore ad aeternum refrigerium, Psalmista: ｟<i>｠transivimus per ignem et aquam et eduxisti nos in refrigerium.｟</i>｠
|
He passes, thirdly, from labor in the present to the eternal refreshment, as it says in Psalms 66:12: ｟<i>｠we have come through fire and water, and you have led us out into refreshment｟</i>｠.
|
Iniustus autem transit
|
Yet the unjust passes,
|
primo de innocentia ad culpam, Ecclesiastici XXVII: ｟<i>｠transgreditur de iustitia ad peccatum.｟</i>｠
|
first of all, from innocence to guilt, as Sirach 28 reads: ｟<i>｠he passes from justice to sin｟</i>｠ (Sir 26:19 or 26:28).
|
Transit secundo de culpa in culpam, Proverbiorum XX: ｟<i>｠sapiens timet et declinat a malo, stultus｟</i>｠ transit ｟<i>｠et confidit｟</i>｠.
|
He passes, secondly, from guilt into guilt, as Proverbs 14:16 has it: ｟<i>｠a wise man fears and turns away from evil; a foolish man passes on and is self-confident｟</i>｠.
|
Transit tertio de culpa in penam aeternam, Iob XXXVI: ｟<i>｠si non audiverint transibunt per gladium｟</i>｠, pene aeterne scilicet.
|
He passes, thirdly, from guilt into eternal punishment, as Job 36:12 reads: ｟<i>｠if they will not listen, they will pass through the sword｟</i>｠, namely, through eternal punishment.
|
Visa igitur descriptione brevi mire sublimitatis viri caelestis nomine caeli, visa etiam hominis mundani vilitate dignissima nomine terre, visa nihilominus utriusque conversationis varietate sub transeundi verbo, studeam terrena despicere et amare caelestia, sic ut mundanam vitam spernentes et caelestem amplectentes, de labore transferamur ad requiem, de mundo ad gloriam, quam nobis concedat etc.
|
So in view of the short description of the marvelous loftiness of the heavenly man in the noun “heaven,” also in view of the very well deserved disdain toward the worldly man in the noun “earth,” and in view of the difference of the life of these two in respect of the verb “to pass,” let us apply ourselves to renouncing earthly things and to loving heavenly things (cf. Col 3:1), in such a way that we disdain the worldly life and embrace the heavenly life, that we may pass over from labor to rest (cf. Heb 4:10), from the world to glory, which may he grant us, et cetera.
|
Ecce ego mitto
|
Behold I Send My Angel before Your Face
|
Item sermo fratris Thome de Aquino editus Mediolani coram clero et populo civitatis.
|
Sermon of friar Thomas Aquinas preached at Milan in the presence of the clergy and people of the city.
|
Mathaei. XI
|
Matthew 11:10
|
Ecce ego mitto angelum meum ante faciem tuam.
|
Behold, I send my angel before your face.
|
(Sumptum de Malachiae ultimo)
|
These words are taken from the last chapter of Malachi (3:1).
|
In hiis verbis describuntur tria circa Salvatoris gratiosum adventum, scilicet dignatio mirifica Dei Patris, dignitas gratifica Precursoris et benignitas mirifica Salvatoris.
|
In these words three aspects of the gracious arrival of the Savior are described: the marvelous estimation of God the Father, the obliging ardor of the precursor, and the marvelous kindness of the Savior.
|
Primum ibi: ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠ecce ego mitto｟</i>｠｟</b>｠;
|
The first, where it says: ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠behold, I send｟</i>｠｟</b>｠;
|
secundum ibi: ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠angelum meum｟</i>｠｟</b>｠;
|
the second, where it says: ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠my angel｟</i>｠｟</b>｠;
|
tercium ibi: ｟<i>｠｟<b>｠ante faciem tuam｟</b>｠｟</i>｠.
|
the third, where it says: ｟<b>｠｟<i>｠before your face｟</i>｠｟</b>｠.
|
Nota igitur quantum ad omnia quod tam Salvator quam Precursor fuerunt nobis missi a Patre angeli officio non natura; etenim fuerunt vere nostri angeli divinitus missi;
|
So note, regarding all these things, that, just as the Savior was sent, so also the precursor was sent to us by the Father through the commission of an angel, not through nature. For they have truly been our angels who were sent to us in the name of God,
|
ad caelestium mansionum paranda itinera, Genesis XXVIII: ｟<i>｠vidit｟</i>｠ Iacob ｟<i>｠scalam et angelos Dei ascendentes et descendentes per eam;｟</i>｠
|
in order to prepare the ways that lead to the heavenly dwelling places. Genesis 28:12 reads: ｟<i>｠Jacob saw the ladder and God’s angels ascending and descending on it｟</i>｠. This was [as follows:]
|
ad divinarum voluntatum patefacienda secreta, <ad> Galatas III: ｟<i>｠lex｟</i>｠ fuit ｟<i>｠ordinata per angelos in manu mediatoris;｟</i>｠
|
(a) In order to disclose the secrets of the decrees of the divine will, ｟<i>｠the Law was issued by the angels at the hand of a mediator｟</i>｠, as it says in Galatians 3:19.
|
ad divinarum condescensionum implenda ministeria, Mathaei IIII: ｟<i>｠angeli accesserunt et ministrabant ei;｟</i>｠
|
(b) In order to fulfill their duty concerning the divine things coming down from heaven, ｟<i>｠angels came to him and served him｟</i>｠, as Matthew 4:11 reads.
|
ad spiritualium perfectionum prebenda exempla et documenta, Genesis XXXI: ｟<i>｠fuerunt｟</i>｠ Iacob ｟<i>｠obviam angeli Dei｟</i>｠, et post: ｟<i>｠castra Dei sunt haec｟</i>｠.
|
(c) In order to render examples and proofs of spiritual perfection, ｟<i>｠the angels of God had gone to meet Jacob, and when he had seen them, he said: ‘these are the encampments of God｟</i>｠’; Genesis 32, 33:12.
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.